**Beyond Seablindess Redux:**

**Introducing the International Affairs Special Section on Maritime Security**

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In our 2017 *International Affairs* article, ‘Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies’, we argued that it was time for international relations and security studies to pay more attention to the oceans.[[1]](#footnote-1) We suggested not only that more scholarly attention should be paid to the maritime space as a key site of international relations and security in and of itself, but also that in doing so we need to move beyond land-based thinking. Many of the contemporary challenges of maritime security move beyond both realism’s traditional focus on seapower and geostrategy and liberalism’s focus on the norms and institutions of the law of the sea. Both of these remain important. Issues of geopolitical contestation at sea are of continuing and pressing relevance, as are debates sounding the implementation and future of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and related international maritime laws and regulations. Even so, we argued, maritime security today incorporates a broader range of themes and challenges than traditional strategic studies or legal perspectives fully capture. In response, we called for a wider scholarly engagement with maritime security, in ways that take the sea as their starting point, that can capture the relationships and interconnections between issues, their spatial and epistemic characteristics, as well as the nature and evolution of maritime governance arrangements.

**Understanding maritime security**

The five papers in this special section are framed in the context of this new maritime security agenda. The ‘agenda’ in this sense refers to a cluster of security issues centred on the maritime domain. They incorporate the rise of a series of new, or at least reemergent disorders at sea. Of these, the growth and subsequent decline of piracy off the coast of Somalia from the mid-2000s onwards has attracted perhaps the most political, popular and academic attention.[[2]](#footnote-2) However, new political and security attention has also turned to other maritime themes in recent years. These include the continuing problem of piracy, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and the Singapore and Malacca Straits;[[3]](#footnote-3) the threat of maritime terrorism[[4]](#footnote-4); hybrid warfare at sea, human trafficking and illegal migration in the Mediterranean and other places[[5]](#footnote-5); drug and arms trafficking by sea[[6]](#footnote-6); various other forms of trafficking and smuggling by sea[[7]](#footnote-7); fisheries crimes[[8]](#footnote-8); as well as intensified naval, geopolitical and legal competition at sea, in the South China Sea and elsewhere.[[9]](#footnote-9) In addition, new interest in the economic potential of the maritime environment has been stimulated by the increasing importance of so-called ‘blue growth’ strategies, as a component in the Global South in particular. Blue growth refers to use of the seas and marine resources for sustainable economic development, and so has relevance for economic security themes, but also implies the need to protect such spaces from the kinds of maritime disorders and threats we identify above.

Few of these issues are wholly ‘new’, in the sense that they have no antecedent or analogue in (often quite recent) history, as several of the papers in the special section help to illustrate. Even so, the contemporary maritime security agenda does present novelty in several important areas.

First, the maritime security agenda is closely linked to the rise of global connectivities and contemporary capitalist circulation. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) notes, ‘[m]aritime transport is the backbone of international trade and the global economy’, with around 80 per cent of global trade volume and 70 per cent by value taking place at sea.[[10]](#footnote-10) The intensity and importance of globalised maritime trade thus creates new opportunities for predation, through piracy for instance, but also increases the global stakes when it occurs. Global connectivities facilitate many maritime security threats by creating new opportunities for criminal or terrorist financing, as well as global markets for illicit goods, as the example of the global drugs trade helps to illustrate.

Secondly, and as Sarah Percy has argued, many of the challenges the maritime security agenda incorporates are not ‘traditional security issues, in the sense that they are often lower-order, unconventional threats… that straddle the border between crime and international security.’[[11]](#footnote-11) Indeed, and as Barry Ryan suggests in his contribution to this special section, responses to these issues imply ‘a mode of security that is focused on criminals more than enemies….’[[12]](#footnote-12) In this sense the rise of the maritime security agenda shares much with the earlier turn to non-traditional security themes on land, in that it expands the scope and nature of security at sea in both concept and practice, including issues of development, security and law enforcement, and the relationship between these themes.

Finally, and until recently, the new maritime security agenda has received considerably less scholarly and practitioner attention than similar phenomena on land. It has, in short been an area of collective seablindness, both in international relations and security studies, but also amongst policy makers and practitioners too. Yet, arguably, the era of seablindness is over. The sea and maritime security issues are receiving gathering international attention. Recent maritime security debates in core (security) institutions such as the UN Security Council, the G7, NATO, the EU or the AU are telling indicators, as is the proliferation of maritime security strategies amongst different states and international organisations, increased operational activity, and capacity building activities. Also, scholarship across the social science spectrum is paying increasing attention to the sea, to the point where we might even speak of a ‘blue turn’; that is a shift in perspective where thinking starts from the sea and not the land.

Maritime security is an umbrella term that refers to a wider range of different security challenges at sea. In this sense, it functions as a buzzword that not only ‘define[s] what is in vogue’, but also links together a series of interconnected themes and issue areas in ways that recognise their diversity and unique features, but also broad provide a framework for analysis and action.[[13]](#footnote-13) How though can we articulate this framework in a way that both captures this diversity and but also provides an organising coherence to the issue at hand, for both scholars and practitioners?

In our original ‘Beyond Seablindness’ paper and elsewhere, we argued that maritime security can be understood as a matrix comprising four main domains.[[14]](#footnote-14) The first of these is the *national security* domain. National security issues at sea largely correspond to the traditional concerns of sea-power, including disputes between states and naval competition. They may also include a range of other threats such as maritime terrorism or arms proliferation. A second domain addresses the *marine environment*. It incorporates issues associated with environmental security, including the protection of marine resources from activities such as illegal fishing or pollution, as well as marine challenges of climate change and biodiversity. Marine environment issues are closely linked to a third domain of *economic development*. This domain includes issues related to the blue economy and economic security, including the protection of global trade and the sustainable management and exploitation of marine resources. Finally, a *human security* domain encompasses those maritime insecurities experienced by individuals and local communities, whether those be as victims of human trafficking or kidnap piracy, or in consequence of the adverse effects of illegal fishing, marine pollution and so on.

Contemporary maritime security issues share four distinguishing characteristics.[[15]](#footnote-15) The first of these is their *interconnected* and sometimes interdependent nature. Security issues in one domain may exacerbate challenges in another or have effects in multiple domains simultaneously. Thus, for example, and as Elizabeth DeSombre illustrates vividly in her contribution to this special section, illegal fishing can have pathological impacts on fish stocks, biodiversity, and the coastal communities who depend on these. In the case of Somalia, such pressures were one of the factors that stimulated the rise of piracy in the mid to late-2000s.[[16]](#footnote-16) Secondly, maritime security issues are *liminal* in the sense that they do not just take place at sea but implicate the land too. This may be because activities such as piracy or terrorism are organised, sustained and funded on land, but also because land-based ‘root causes’ of development, exclusion and dislocation often underpin insecurities at sea. Third, maritime security is commonly *transnational* in nature, in that many of challenges it incorporates take place across or between national borders, or in regions of shared sovereignty such as the high seas. Finally, and by extension, maritime security is *cross-jurisdictional*, both in the sense of taking place in multiple sovereign territories, but also because it implicates a wide variety of institutions and organisational actors in addressing it, including navies, coastguards, port authorities, courts, prisons and many more.

Maritime security is thus increasingly understood as an interlinked security complex of growing global, regional and national significance. The consequence has been a series of innovations in maritime security governance at sea as states and other maritime actors adapt and respond to what Barry Ryan calls ‘the turbulence of maritime politics.’[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Introducing the special section**

In this special section, we present five papers that explore the bounds of the emergent maritime security agenda. Our first two papers explore the maritime security from traditional perspectives of geopolitics and the law of the sea.

Aviad Rubin and Ehud Eiran from the University of Haifa examine the emergent geopolitical contours of maritime security in the Eastern Mediterranean.[[18]](#footnote-18) One of the most striking features of their analysis is the end of seablindness in this region. The authors argue that states in the Eastern Mediterranean littoral increasingly turned their backs on the sea following the decline of the Ottoman empire and in the face of pressing political and security preoccupations on land. In recent years this has changed markedly however, driven by three main developments. The first of these has been the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, a region characterised by complex and contested maritime boundaries. The second has been an increase in political instability in the region in consequence of the so-called Arab Spring, and the associated migrant crisis that has in large part stemmed from or been facilitated by this. Finally, the past decade has also seen the entry of new or newly resurgent maritime powers into the Eastern Mediterranean arena in the form of Russia and China.

Rubin and Eiran’s analysis highlights that traditional security issues at sea have not gone away. Geopolitical tensions and the race to secure maritime resources has led to significant programmes of naval acquisition amongst states in the region. At the same time, claims to maritime territory and disputes over existing boundaries have taken on a new urgency at regional states scramble to secure access to oil and gas reserves beneath the seabed. Even so, the authors also that there are some important indications that this may be changing, particularly in response to the migrant crisis and the need to manage shared issues such as marine pollution, and that over the longer term, more cooperative maritime security responses in the region may become apparent.

Douglas Guilfoyle from the University of New South Wales Canberra turns to the question of ‘lawfare’ in the South China Sea.[[19]](#footnote-19) He considers the ways in which the Law of the Sea may interact with and condition key elements of the maritime security agenda. Focusing on the South China Sea, his paper also highlights the continuing salience of traditional security challenges in the maritime arena. These dynamics of inter-state competition have taken on novel forms that move beyond naval confrontation. In particular, and in common with Rubin and Eiran, he highlights the key role of maritime resources, and by extension blue economy issues, in driving geopolitical tensions in the region. Significantly, these include not only undersea oil and gas reserves, but also fisheries as a key fulcrum of competition.

Guilfoyle’s analysis has other implications too. In particular, he shows how innovations in states’ maritime security practices can be disruptive as well as collaborative in nature. China’s strategy of island building in the South China Sea represents one such form of disruptive innovation. It has been accompanied by a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese state to deploy legal resources to challenge and unsettle the existing legal order at sea. For Guilfoyle, this Chinese maritime ‘lawfare’ serves two strategic purposes. First, it ‘buys time’ on the question of the legality of China’s maritime territorial claims which allows it to consolidate its material gains on the ground. Second however, it establishes a marker in its efforts to legitimise its own position, and so ‘open up spaces in which it can act as a norm entrepreneur [in the evolution of the law of the sea] and consolidate its “rightful” regional position’ over the longer term.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Elizabeth DeSombre from Wellesley College traces the security implications of fisheries, examining how different dimensions of security interact around this critical node of maritime activity.[[21]](#footnote-21) DeSombre’s paper examines four main security themes associated with fisheries. The first, which parallels some of Guilfoyle’s analysis of developments in the South China Sea, concerns conflicts over the small islands and access to the fisheries resources associated with them. The second draws out the role of fisheries (and their exploitation and depletion) in creating or exacerbating other maritime security challenges; in this case the rise of Somalia piracy. The third theme comprises so-called ‘fish wars’ in the sense of inter-state conflicts and confrontations over fisheries resources, with a focus on the Anglo Icelandic Cod Wars and the Turbot War between Canada and Spain. Finally, she looks at the human security implications of fisheries, concentrating particularly on the use of forced labour and slavery or slavery-like conditions on some fishing boats at sea.

DeSombre’s work highlights a number of important themes for maritime security. First, she shows the importance of thinking from the sea rather than land. Small islands (and small island states) may have a tiny terrestrial surface area, but their maritime territories and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) can be very large indeed. This has led some to use the term ‘large ocean states’ to describe such places.[[22]](#footnote-22) Second, her analysis clearly illustrates the multidimensional, interconnected and liminal nature of many maritime security challenges. Fisheries incorporate themes of national security (including inter-state conflict), marine environment, economic development, and human security issues, as well as the way in which such issues may interact with each other and with circumstances on land. Finally, her paper suggests that while conflicts over fisheries may sometimes be associated with traditional inter-state disputes over contested maritime territories (as with the Cod Wars), the dynamics of more recently conflicts are often more complex and nuanced and concerned the collective governance of shared resources at sea.

Katja Lindskov Jacobsen from the University of Copenhagen and Jessica Larsen from the Danish Institute for International Affairs pick up these themes to examine collective maritime security governance in counter-piracy operations. They focus on how responses to piracy in the Western Indian Ocean have worked to fashion and sustain novel constellations of actors and activities that have persisted even after the threat of piracy in the region has itself receded. The paper argues that, in addition to themes of interconnectedness, liminality, transnationality and cross-jurisdictionally, maritime security is also characterised by *contingency*.[[23]](#footnote-23) As the authors note ‘[t]he seas, while not an unregulated domain, are subject to different conditions: the oceans are communal, rather than divided among sovereign states, and states enjoy flexibility in the exercise of their jurisdiction and are subject to limitations on their sovereign rights.’[[24]](#footnote-24) These circumstances of contingency mean that the seas offer ‘a pronounced potential for reordering new and old actors in the maritime domain’.[[25]](#footnote-25)

In large part because of this contingency, counter-piracy operations in the Western Indian Ocean have functioned as crucibles of innovation for maritime security governance. Jacobsen and Larsen show how such responses have led to novel constellations of actors coordinating and working together around a common counter-piracy goal, as well as creative solutions to problems such as how to effectively prosecute those pirates that are captured at sea. However, they also argue that these responses are not just important because of the (quite successful) ‘problem effects’ they have had in addressing the Somali piracy issue itself. They have also had *constitutive* effects, in the sense that such responses have themselves led to the creation of new security governance mechanisms and forms of order at sea. These in turn have endured beyond the decline or containment of the immediate piracy problem and now function to structure and organise collective maritime security responses more generally in the region as a whole.

In our final paper, Barry Ryan from Keele University also looks at the constitutive effects of maritime security governance activities.[[26]](#footnote-26) He offers a perspective from history and critical geography to show how processes of zoning at sea have worked to fashion specific maritime security responses and shape an evolving redistribution of spatial order at sea. Ryan’s paper traces the history of zonation at sea, posting a long-standing tension between two conceptions of maritime space. The first comprises those practices and discourses that envisage that ‘sea space is a fundamentally different [risky and apolitical] phenomena to from land space… amenable to minimal structures of governance’ – a conception he terms *imperium*. The second entails those approaches loosely associated with *dominium*, or legal and permanent sovereignty, which attempt to ‘territorialize sea space… [and] extend state governance structures from land onto the maritime space.’ For Ryan, these tensions between *imperium* and *dominium* have characterise issues of maritime security governance through recent history and demonstrate not only the fundamental liminality of the maritime space, but also form a fulcrum around which maritime security responses have been conceived over time

Ryan argues that the contemporary maritime security agenda takes place in the context of an intensifying and extensifying process of zonation at sea; the extension of a gathering logic of *dominium* in the maritime spatial order. This foundations of contemporary zonification at sea were laid by the finalisation of the UNCLOS negotiations in 1982, which established the legal principles of sovereign maritime territories and EEZs, and which Ryan calls ‘the Westphalian moment for the world maritime sphere.’[[27]](#footnote-27) However, he also suggests that these territorialising dynamics have intensified in recent years with rise of the EEZ as an intensified site of marine surveillance and policing, characterised by the rise of the maritime security agenda itself. At the same time, zonification has extensified through a series of further maritime security initiatives – such as the establishment of high risk areas for shipping in the face of Somali piracy and the increasing development of large scale marine protected areas. For Ryan, therefore, the rise of the maritime security agenda has implications not just for the management and amelioration of the new maritime insecurities, nor simply the constitution of new security governance mechanisms at sea, but in relation to a wider and deeper evolution of political and spatial order in the maritime environment as a whole.

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Ryan further argues for this reason the discourse and practices of states utilising the sea to exercise power must always cohere with a global maritime security agenda, referencing the environment, terrorism, illegal fishing, smuggling pollution and so on. Ryan observes that since UNCLOS the politics of maritime security has emerged from an intensification and extensification of zonation at sea. The EEZ has become an intensified site of marine surveillance and policing, characterised by the rise of the maritime security agenda itself. At the same time, zonification has extensified through a series of further maritime security initiatives – such as the establishment of high risk areas for shipping in the face of Somali piracy and the increasing development of large scale marine protected areas. For Ryan, therefore, the rise of the maritime security agenda has implications not just for the management and amelioration of the new maritime insecurities, nor simply the constitution of new security governance mechanisms at sea, but in relation to a wider and deeper evolution of political and spatial order in the maritime environment as a whole.

1. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies’, *International Affairs*, 93: 6, 2017, pp. 1293-311. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Christian Bueger, ‘Piracy studies: Academic responses to the return of an ancient menace’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48: 3, 2014, pp. 404-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ali Kamal-Deen, ‘The anatomy of Gulf of Guinea piracy’, *Naval War College Review*, 68: 1, 2015, pp. 93-118; Alexandra Alming et.al. *Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas* (Broomfield CO: One Earth Future, 2019), <https://stableseas.org/file/281/download?token=Td_kwmhf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism goes to sea’, *Foreign Affairs*, 83: 6, 2004, pp. 61-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Eugenio Cusumano, ‘The sea as humanitarian space: Non-governmental Search and Rescue dilemmas on the Central Mediterranean migratory route’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 23: 3, 2018, pp. 387-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Julie Høy-Carrasco. *Navigating Changing Currents: A Forward-Looking Evaluation of Efforts to Tackle Maritime Crime off the Horn of Africa* (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2018), <https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/navigating-changing-currents/download-rapport/CMS_Rapport_2018__4_-_Navigating_changing_currents__final__digital_19092018_.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Examples include wildlife and antiquities trafficking, amongst others. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

   *Stretching the Fishnet: Identifying Opportunities to Address Fisheries Crime* (Vienna: UNODC, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Felix K. Chang, ‘China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment’, *Orbis*, 56: 1, 2012, pp. 19-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. UNTAD, *Review of Maritime Transport 2018*, <https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2245> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Sarah Percy, ‘Counter-Piracy in the Indian Ocean: A New Form of Military Cooperation’, *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 1: 4, 2016, pp. 270-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Barry Ryan, ‘A history of maritime security and zonation’, *International Affairs*, X: X, 2019, p. X. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Andrea Cornwall, ‘Buzwords and fuzzwords: deconstructing development discourse’, *Development in Practice*, 17: 4/5, 2007, pp. 472, 474-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness’, pp. 1299-300; Christian Bueger, ‘What is maritime security?’, *Marine Policy*, 53, pp. 159-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Bueger and Edmunds, ‘Beyond seablindness’, pp. 1300-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg and Basil Mahayni, ‘The dialectics of piracy in Somalia: the rich versus

    the poor’, *Third World Quarterly* 31: 8, 2010, pp. 1381–3; Sarah G. Phillips, ‘When less was more: external

    assistance and the political settlement in Somaliland’, *International Affairs* 92: 3, May 2016, pp. 629–46. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ryan, ‘A history of maritime security and zonation’, p. X. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Aviad Rubin and Ehud Eiran, ‘The Eastern Mediterranean: towards a coordinated maritime security environment’, *International Affairs*, XX: X, pp. XX-XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The rule of law and maritime security: understanding lawfare in the South China Sea’, *International Affairs*, XX: X, pp. XX-XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Guilfoyle, ‘The rule of law’, p. X. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Elizabeth DeSombre, ‘The security implications of fisheries’, *International Affairs*, XX: X, pp. XX-XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Nicholas Chan, ‘“Large Ocean States”: Sovereignty, small islands, and Marine Protected Areas in global oceans governance’, *Global Governance*, 24: 4, 2018, pp. 537-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Jessica Larsen, ‘Piracy studies coming of age: a window on the making of maritime security actors’, *International Affairs*, XX: XX, pp. XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Jacobsen and Larsen, ‘Piracy studies’, p. X [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Jacobsen and Larsen, ‘Piracy studies’, p. X [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ryan, ‘The disciplined sea’, pp. XX-XX. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ryan, ‘The disciplined sea’, p. X. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Ryan, ‘The disciplined sea’, p. X. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)