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**Speculating About Society, Analyzing the Individual: Where Freudian**

**Accounts of Antisemitism Go Wrong**

Occasional references to “cultural codes,” “political culture,” “modernization,” or “functionalism” notwithstanding, current historical research on antisemitism in the English-speaking world remains wedded to empiricist frameworks. The situation is somewhat different elsewhere. German scholars of antisemitism, for example, are often committed to specific theoretical frameworks. Indeed, one such approach has come to define theoretical engagement with the subject in recent years. While it would be premature to speak of a renaissance of Critical Theory in this connection, students of antisemitism increasingly encounter references to Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Löwenthal, or Erich Fromm.[[1]](#footnote-1) As much as this focus on Critical Theory should not be surprising – no other school of thought has reflected on the matter with such depth and perspicacity –, it relies heavily on psychoanalytical assumptions that tend to undermine rather than bolster the enterprise.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The essay sets out to trace the way in which Freudian thinking on antisemitism has been received in the course of the twentieth century. It will examine early and more recent psychoanalytic writings on the subject; demonstrate how critical theorists, then and now, have appropriated specific concepts from the Freudian corpus; and suggest that both the more traditional psychoanalytical understandings of Jew-hatred and the more sociologically inflected psychological interpretations suffer from the same defect, namely an insufficient discussion of how the psychology that is invoked can disclose the social developments that are described. Various authors have highlighted a number of methodological problems in this regard, including the speculative nature of Freudian theories, the conflation of antisemitism/racism with authoritarianism and vice versa, the confirmation bias of *The Authoritarian Personality*, the pathologization of antisemites, or the inability to operationalize key concepts such as psychic energy and projection.[[3]](#footnote-3) My intention is to put forward a more fundamental critique**:** much of the literature that purports to offer social psychological construals of antisemitism does not in fact do so. It is neither social psychology properly applied to concrete historical contexts nor personality psychology systematically applied to society at large nor a combination of personality psychology and social psychology sensitive to the relative weight of personality and situation.

The essay is divided into three sections, movingfrom the more basic to the more specific, from expositions that require very little in the way of psychoanalytic knowledge to expositions that require a great deal of familiarity with the workings of psychoanalytic theory. The first set of explanations – castration anxiety, the revolt against monotheism, among others – requires some knowledge of psychoanalysis, and particularly of its cultural and anthropological assumptions. It is primarily about social behavior, but does not explore how this social behavior happens on the ground. The second set – abreaction, regression, pent-up hate, among others – derives from Freudian drive theory, but echoes ideas about the emotions that can be found outside a Freudian framework. It includes elements from both social and personality psychology, but does not specify how they interact**.**  The third set – displacement and projection as the result of a weak ego or non-existent super-ego – involves a rather intimate acquaintance with Freud’s structural model of the mind. It is founded on personality psychology, but does not clarify how individual psychology becomes social psychology.

**Killing the Father**

Sigmund Freud’s scattered comments on the origins of Judeophobia have been discussed in some detail in the literature. Psychoanalytic publications aside, Freud’s more speculative interventions on the subject have been less influential than his conceptualizations of the mind, especially as they pertain to prejudice and persecution. These have allowed critical theorists and others to come to grips with antisemitism without endorsing some of Freud’s more fanciful conjectures.

Danielle Knafo has helpfully compiled a list of themes that characterize psychoanalytic interpretations of antisemitism, including “displacement, projection, scapegoating, castration anxiety (as linked to circumcision), latent homosexuality, sibling rivalry, intolerance of small differences, rejection of dark pigmentation because of its association with feces, Jewish disavowal of the murder to the father, Jewish masochism, psychopathy, paranoia and envy of the Chosen People.”[[4]](#footnote-4) Several other themes could be added to this catalogue, but for now I would like to attend to those hypotheses that have been taken up in detail by subsequent psychoanalysts and that are occasionally invoked by prominent non-psychoanalysts anxiety: “castration anxiety” and “envy of the Chosen People.”Both notions, albeit resting on assumptions initially derived from individual psychology, deal with collective feelings and their consequences for Gentile-Jewish relations.

A crucial component of the so-called Oedipus complex, Freud first mentioned castration anxiety in relation to Jew-hatred in 1909, when he stated that “the castration complex is the deepest unconscious root of antisemitism.” In this briefest of asides, tucked away in a footnote of an otherwise seminal essay, Freud surmised that from an early age on nursery boys “hear” that something was missing from Jews’ penises. This information, he added, permitted youngsters to “despise” the Jews.[[5]](#footnote-5) Thirty years later, in his final work on *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud once again returned to this explanation of antisemitism, only that it now figured as one of many reasons for Gentile animosity, alongside the “narcissism of small differences” and resentment against (Jewish) monotheism’s injunctions. Freud attributed this fear of circumcision/castration to mankind’s (the Oedipus complex presupposes male primacy) earliest phylogenetic experiences, when the father “*actually* punished his sons with castration.”[[6]](#footnote-6) Circumcision, in other words, conjured up these primal fears, and the Jews became the targets of counter-phobic behavior.

Two prominent psychoanalysts expanded on Freud’s elaboration of the Oedipus complex. Writing a few years after the publication of *Moses and Monotheism*, Otto Fenichel concluded that knowledge of Jewish male circumcision heightened an already widespread feeling that the Jews were different, weird, and uncanny. More importantly, it enabled non-Jews to make sense of their nebulous anxiety: Jewish circumcision appeared to confirm that Jewish “retribution” would take on sexual forms.[[7]](#footnote-7) Rudolph M. Loewenstein, writing in the early 1950s, likewise maintained that the Jewish rite gave Gentiles the shivers, but also spelled out why they felt (unconsciously) threatened by the possibility of emasculation, dismemberment, and castration: Jewish circumcision evoked reminiscences of repressed urges and, by extension, the punishment that would ensue were these urges to be fulfilled.[[8]](#footnote-8)

“Castration anxiety” vis-à-vis the Jews hinged on the psychoanalytical tenet that the psychosexual experience of boys in the so-called phallic stage involved competition between father and son for possession of the mother. Faced with the prospect of paternal wrath, the boy yielded, thereby acknowledging the “reality principle” at the expense of the “pleasure principle,” internalizing societal strictures, developing a super-ego based on these norms, and joining a society that would replicate the Oedipus complex over and over again. Unlike other Freudian attempts to come to terms with antisemitism, “castration anxiety” was not put down to individual pathologies. Instead, this version posited that central components (desire, the threat of recrimination, repressing or sublimating the desire) of a general law (the Oedipus complex) accounted for collective behavior (fear, resentment, and counter-phobic action) toward the Jews. It was a social psychology that did not apply to specific historical contexts because it implied a universal logic that would remain in place as long as Jewish circumcision persisted. It goes without saying that historians as well as empirical social scientists have found this proposition difficult to stomach. Even classical psychoanalysts otherwise beholden to Freud have dismissed the idea as impractical inasmuch as it “represented a level of abstraction unsuited to” clinical research.[[9]](#footnote-9)

An equally abstract approach to the question recalls Kano’s references to “sibling rivalry” and “envy of the Chosen People.” Even though “castration anxiety” is less prominent in writings detailing this approach, the underlying assumption is very much tied to Freud’s fundamental concept of the Oedipus complex. According to psychoanalytic commentators such as Rudolphe Loewenstein, Bela Grunberger, and Mortimer Ostow, Jews personified the bad conscience or super-ego or father imago of Christian society. The starting point for such ruminations were Freud’s final remarks on antisemitism in *Moses and Monotheism*. According to the founder of psychoanalysis, most antisemitic nations became Christian very late in the day. Since the new faith had been imposed on these countries, their Christianity remained superficial, merely disguising a “barbaric polytheism” that survived in the deeper layers of the collective psyche. The members of these societies therefore never overcame their resentment toward monotheism, usually displacing their ill feeling onto the Jews and sometimes attacking both religions, as National Socialism’s persecution of both Christians and Jews confirmed.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Later commentators took up this idea, sometimes sticking to more modest narratives inspired by orthodox readings of the Oedipus complex, sometimes venturing their own chronicles of ancient history. For Loewenstein, Jews often embodied the dreaded and loathsome father. As the “ancestors” or “older generation” in Christian theology, the Jews “unconsciously symbolized” conflicts that continued to fester in Gentile society. Christian children, for example, regarded the Jews as the “representatives” of the despised yet beloved father, Loewenstein maintained, although he never outlined how these children were able to unpack such a complex chronicle of Gentile-Jewish ambivalence.[[11]](#footnote-11) Ostow argued along similar lines, writing that the modern antisemitic “impulse” signified a kind of return to polytheism, as Christians could not live up to the exacting nature of “true” monotheism.[[12]](#footnote-12) Grunberger suggested that monotheism’s intellectualism had estranged humans from the carnal and material world, as well as from the warmth and compassion associated with the mother. Christianity sought to compensate for this loss by inventing the figure of the Virgin Mary, but this resourcefulness only exacerbated negative emotions in the shape of Oedipal guilt. The Jews, standing for a deity that did not brook any diminution of the monotheistic paradigm, resembled the father in the Oedipal conflict. This in turn explained why feelings of guilt for embracing the “mother” (in the shape of Christianity) periodically culminated in the violent “abreaction” of hostile emotions against the Jewish minority.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Freudian inferences on the nature of antisemitism were not confined to acolytes and followers. Citing “Hitler’s jibe” that “conscience is a Jewish invention,” the literary scholar George Steiner held that “the requirements of absolute monotheism proved all but intolerable” for most people. Like Grunberger, he referred to Christianity’s attempt to mitigate the severity of monotheism’s claims on the faithful, licensing as it did “scope for the pluralistic, pictorial needs of the psyche.” What is more, Christianity turned out to be a hybrid affair, combining “monotheistic ideals with polytheistic practices”, as the “proliferation of saintly and angelic persons, or in their vividly material realization of God the Father, of Christ, of Mary” testified. Still, all these measures did not suffice. By killing the Jews, “Western culture” eradicated “those who had ‘invented’ God, who had, however imperfectly, however restively, been the declarers of His unbearable Absence.” Steiner even went so far as to establish a link between the “long-inhibited, of nat­ural sensory consciousness, of instinctual polytheistic and animist needs” and the Holocaust. Killing the Jews was killing the father, was eradicating a tradition that had been foisted on peoples for whom the injunctions of monotheism had always been anathema.[[14]](#footnote-14)

As in the case of castration anxiety, these efforts to identify antisemitism with the revolt against monotheism hypothesized a collective psyche that “acted out” unbearable tensions collectively. The social psychology on offer is far removed from differentiating between individuals, between individuals and groups, between groups in society, or between societies in Europe and elsewhere. In many ways it approximates the Oedipus complex writ large, with less detail on concrete (albeit unconscious) fears (of castration, for example) and few references to psychoanalytic terminology (concerning the super-ego, for example), but a clear understanding that, in holding fast to monotheism, the Jews resembled the father and would continue to do so even if individual Jews no longer practiced their religion. There is no room for change in this scenario, let alone dynamic change, nor are actual Christian-Jewish relations relevant. The thesis relies on a special kind of social inference theory whereby the collective Christian/Gentile unconscious/psyche depended “automatically on general schemas or stereotypes in a top-down deductive fashion.”[[15]](#footnote-15) How that collective unconscious is transmitted, whether its transmission can be halted, why it is manifested at certain times (of crisis) and not at other times: all these questions are left unanswered. Finally, the thesis upholds a gender stereotyping in which “‘regressive narcissism’ is associated with the mother and opposed to the Oedipal/paternal capacity to face reality,”[[16]](#footnote-16) mirroring Freud’s own belief that the civilizing processes coincided with the dissemination of (masculine) rationality.

**Letting Go, Giving In, Breaking Down**

Psychoanalytic drive theory underwrites most Freudian accounts of antisemitism. Freud defined the drive (*Trieb*) as a “dynamic pressure which has a *source*, an *aim* and an *object*.” Drives were comparable to needs that had to be satisfied. Such needs included food and sexual gratification. The *source* of these drives was “the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life” by a drive. It was the purpose of the nervous system to master such excitation by getting rid of the stimuli that reach it or by reducing them as much as possible. While the *aim* was the satisfaction of the drive or the elimination of the internal stimuli, its *object* (the element through which the drive achieves its aim) was variable: “it may be an external object, someone in the person’s immediate circle for example, or part of the subject’s own body.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

The notions of regression and abreaction can be found in psychoanalytically informed studies of antisemitism, most of which rest on drive theory and its above-mentioned components.[[18]](#footnote-18) The ways in which scholars apply drive theory, however, and the functions each of these concepts serve in their respective narratives, vary widely. Some authors provide rather generic accounts, suggesting that Judeophobia was hardly out-of-the-ordinary and establishing straightforward connections between individual and social psychology. Others are indebted to the latest developments in psychoanalytic thinking, relying heavily on personality psychology and thus finding it more difficult to explain social aberrations with individual deviance. The more personality psychology is involved, the likelier it is that the particular theory equates antisemitism with abnormality.

In an important early work on the social psychology of antisemitism, the Zionist activist and later Israeli politician Fritz Bernstein belonged to the first commentators who denied any relationship between who the Jews were and how the antisemites behaved. Equally important, Bernstein took on board psychoanalytic drive theory without embracing Freud’s developmental psychology with its postulates about normal psychosexual development. In Bernstein’s view, antisemites behaved no differently from other bigots. It was therefore incumbent upon scholars to show that the victims of prejudice did not explain the latter. Even so, psychoanalytic ideas about (aggressive) drives informed *Der Antisemitismus als Gruppenerscheinung* (Antisemitism as a Group Phenomenon).

All anger required an outlet, Bernstein remarked, no matter what its source. In fact, the source may have had no or only an incidental effect on subsequent behavior, as “pain” or “listlessness” could accumulate in such a way that the initial pretext for built-up irritation was no longer remembered. Pain, Bernstein continued, was transformed into “feelings of hatred,” which slowly piled up in a reservoir. In times of crisis these dammed-up negative emotions would have to be discharged. Whoever happened to be the target at that moment was chosen for instrumental reasons (namely emptying the reservoir), so that the justifications for persecution (referring to the “character” of the Jews, for instance, or referring to their “noxious” influence) were mere rationalizations.[[19]](#footnote-19) Because Bernstein refused to pathologize prejudice, his personality psychology translated into social psychology more smoothly than in alternative Freud-inspired models. As a “functional unit,” he contended, the group was “indispensable,” permitting individuals “to enjoy all the benefits that human community can offer,” including the possibility to express “feelings of unfriendliness” (*Unfreundlichkeitsgefühle*) that were “constantly issuing forth, ready to be discharged.”[[20]](#footnote-20) Contrary to what common sense or nationalist dogma would have us believe, “similarity” (in the shape of ethnicity, language, religion, creed) did not produce groups. Rather, individuals formed groups so as to be able to satisfy their need to express enmity (*Feindschaftsäußerung*).[[21]](#footnote-21)

Bernstein’s position on the nature of groups accorded well with that of Floyd Allport, the “first person to openly challenge the view that social psychology was a branch of sociology.” In his *Social Psychology*, published in 1924, Allport insisted that there was “no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals.”[[22]](#footnote-22) Taking issue with the likes of Gustav Le Bon who had posited a group consciousness, he rejected the idea of such a collective awareness of the world, not least because consciousness required a nervous system that could only be possessed by individuals. While the details of Allport’s social psychology have largely been forgotten, it has prevailed in much subsequent crowd research, where under the heading of “convergence” scholars continue to hold that the personal characteristics of crowd members determine crowd behavior. More specifically, “violent and antisocial crowds reflect the convergence of violent antisocial or ‘riot-prone’ individuals, the so-called ‘riffraff’ of society.”[[23]](#footnote-23) In the words of Stephen Reicher and John Drury: “If Le Bon’s position can be characterized in terms of the crowd rendering people ‘mad,’ so Allport’s position can be characterized in terms of the crowd as an assembly of the ‘bad.’”[[24]](#footnote-24)

As much as Bernstein avoided the notion, backed by Le Bon and Freud alike, that persons lost their rationality and especially their identity in crowds,[[25]](#footnote-25) his alternative rendition of collective hatred entails problems of its own. The first difficulty is methodological in nature – and common to all theses under review in this essay: convergence theories fail “to first observe, describe, and specify the behaviors” they seek to explain. In other words, the theoretical assumption that individuals with pent-up aggressions join groups in order to release these tensions is nowhere analysed properly. What is more, the theory implies that individuals that comprise groups are “exclusively and continuously engaged in the same behavior at the same time.” Most large groups, however, “are more accurately characterized as consisting of alternating and varied sequences of individual and collective behavior—not continuous and unanimous behavior.”[[26]](#footnote-26) Bernstein does not explain how individuals with their strong (antisemitic) emotions know *when* to be sure that joining a group guarantees the discharge they so desire, nor does he explain why individuals remain members of groups in times that make the much-needed unburdening of the “reservoir” unlikely.

In contrast to most other Freudian-inspired approaches to prejudice, Bernstein refrained from pathologizing antisemites. He also tried to delineate the transition from personality psychology to social psychology. Yet these advantages had a downside: where later psychoanalytical theorists simply asserted the unconscious (and hence unfalsifiable) motives underlying antisemitic behavior, Bernstein, in stipulating the rational grounds for seeking out groups, described *cognitive* transformations that enticed individuals to join (and presumably exit) groups. To support the rational choice theory that guided this line of thinking would have required a very close reading of individual cases – one that is absent from the literature.

Bernstein was not alone in suggesting that antisemites craved sporadic abreaction. Grunberger, for example, likened the periodic pogroms of the past to opportunities for the “Russian masses to give free rein to their instincts.” Once they had “killed, plundered, and raped,” they would return to their normal lives as if nothing unusual had happened.[[27]](#footnote-27) Ernst Simmel, a notable German-American neurologist and psychoanalyst, also believed that irrational behavior served a specific purpose in the psychological make-up of individuals. Irrational impulses, he noted, helped to overcome “pathological disturbances,” restoring a psychological equilibrium that had been seriously undermined.[[28]](#footnote-28) Unlike Bernstein, however, Simmel hoped to uncover the unconscious mechanisms at work in antisemitism. With this in mind, he proposed three possible causes of anti-Jewish regression: either it signified a return to earlier stages of infantile development; or a relapse in the collective civilizing process; or else a disturbance in the relationship between individual and civilization. Simmel opted for the third explanation: antisemites reverted to an ontogenetic and phylogenetic moment in human development when hatred rather than love governed relations with the outside world.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Simmel’s choice was well considered: given that he intended to advance a social psychology of antisemitism, it seemed only reasonable to speak of a “pathological hatred” that befell “mankind” as a whole rather than individuals only. At the same time, he remained, as a psychoanalyst, concerned with individual psyches. Simmel therefore embraced an intermediate position that combined Bernstein’s convergence model with the psychoanalytic search for unconscious structures. He differed from Bernstein and sided with Le Bon in alleging that groups engendered deindividuation.[[30]](#footnote-30) By outsourcing the pathology from the individual to the group, however, he diverged from most fellow psychoanalysts. Only as part of a collective would the psychosis that was antisemitism take shape.

According to Simmel’s convergence model, the international “mass” phenomenon did not spread because many neurotic Jew-baiters came together. Neurotic individuals, after all, were “asocial” and “inhibited” outsiders incapable of establishing groups or movements. They could neither generate nor sustain antisemitism.[[31]](#footnote-31) Judeophobia resembled a “mass psychosis” rather than a “mass neurosis,” Simmel declared. At the same time, the deindividuation that happened in groups went well beyond Le Bon’s inkling that belonging to crowds precluded rational and critical comportment. Simmel offered a much more dramatic version of events. In “pathological” circumstances, the ego of otherwise “well-adjusted” and “normal” persons temporarily “disintegrated.” This disintegration coincided with the suspension of repression. Once this occurred, unconscious material could flood the ego, overwhelming it with irrational drives and destructive hostility from the dark “inner world.” Simmel suspected that, in the course of this atavism, individuals regressed to a stage in life where the super-ego (internalized conscience) had not yet come into existence. [[32]](#footnote-32)

All this took place in a group setting, Simmel reminded his audience. The individual antisemite outside the crowd was not psychotic but normal. In fact, behaving psychotically in the crowd prevented persons from succumbing to psychosis on their own. The submergence of particular egos into groups enabled these egos to surmount their feelings of impotence toward reality.[[33]](#footnote-33) Indeed, whereas the individual psychotic “breaks with reality” on account of her “pathological weakness,” in the crowd “reality first breaks with the ego”: “Flight into a mass psychosis is therefore an escape not only from reality, but also from individual insanity.”[[34]](#footnote-34) Unlike Bernstein, who held that antisemites with pent-up aggressions deliberately entered groups in order to abreact, Simmel did not spell out the extent to which individuals consciously engaged in mass behavior so as to weather difficult or “pathological” circumstances. But his language indicated that, for these people, “reality” was occasionally too much to bear, and that without outlets such a mass gatherings they could not withstand permanent regression.

By bringing Freud’s *Civilization and its Discontents* into play – antisemitism, the above discussion implies, amounts to a disturbance in the relationship between individual and civilization –, Simmel struck a balance between the rather elusive notion of collective disengagement from the civilizing process and the more unambiguous notion that antisemitic individuals returned to earlier stages of their infantile development. This compromise position, however, makes it difficult to understand the difference between antisemitism and other forms of collective regression. What is more, the depiction of the disturbance suggests something far worse than Simmel was willing to concede and that Bernstein’s approach encapsulated: Simmel appeared to admit that millions of persons were regularly on the verge of becoming interminably psychotic, only to be delivered from insanity by the beneficent presence of groups. In psychological terms, these individuals were scarcely the rational choice actors portrayed in Bernstein’s work. Far from it, they had been so worn out by the claims placed on them by civilization (or their super-egos) that the onset of mental illness seemed only a matter of time which the collective flight into psychosis seemed to postpone only momentarily.

**Sparing the Father, Killing the Jew**

Unlike Bernstein and Simmel, most psychoanalysts were intent on identifying personality disorders at the bottom of the prejudice. Before I turn to Critical Theory’s far-reaching commentaries on the psychology behind antisemitism, it is helpful to mention some lesser-known inquiries into “regression” that spoke of individual pathologies rather than collective abreactions.

Alexander Mitscherlich, Germany’s best-known psychoanalyst in the second half of the twentieth century, is a good starting point. His brief outline is not only a helpful reminder of how scholars applied drive theory to antisemitism, it also illustrates the way in which analysts parted company with Bernstein and Simmel. For Mitscherlich, Judeophobia did not stem from a habitual want, common across cultures, to abreact unfavorable emotions. “Abreaction” and “regression,” he noted, were not confined to group settings, where “normal” men and women congregated in an effort to dodge insanity. Referring to the disposition for prejudice (*Vorurteilsbereitschaft*) among antisemites, Mitscherlich reminded his receptive readers that drives needed objects to quell their excitation. Normally, aggressive drives were “refined” (*veredelt)* or sublimated through cultural activities. This was not the case, however, when “educators” failed to teach children and adolescents how to divert their impulses from the goal of immediate release to one of a more acceptable social, moral, or aesthetic nature. In times of strain and crisis, such as hunger or religious disorientation, frustrations were exacerbated as men and women repressed their drives ever more, leading to a “general rise in regressive tendencies.” The “deeper” this regression, Mitscherlich concluded, the more pronounced the disintegration of a given personality.[[35]](#footnote-35)

For the doyen of West German psychoanalysis, it did not suffice to attribute antisemitism to the periodic urge to emit frustration, anger, or aggression. His brief summary alluded to several features that were characteristic of psychoanalytic treatments of the subject, particularly character formation. This factor was usually a good indicator of whether the respective analysis diagnosed pathological psychological developments. Whereas Le Bon, Bernstein, and Simmel spoke of the temporary loss of rationality in crowds, either because large groups transformed individuals into pliable non-entities or because pliable people sought out large groups in the first place, psychoanalytic interpretations of de-individuation were far more complex. Regression did not denote recurring abreaction; rather, it pointed to serious flaws in the ontogenesis of antisemites.

Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, whose book on antisemitism appeared in the post-war *Studies in Prejudice* series, maintained that anti-Jewish attitudes appeared “when the individual, mobilizing mechanisms of self-defense to combat or conceal his weakness, utilized prejudice as a rationalized outlet for inner conflicts and pent-up hostility.”[[36]](#footnote-36) As can be gleaned from this short statement, Ackerman and Jahoda did not concern themselves with large-scale exposure to antisemitism, not least because the patients that formed the backdrop to their study suffered “from a sense of loneliness, emptiness, and privation.” Instead, antisemitism arose as a “profound though irrational and futile defense effort to restore a crippled self.”[[37]](#footnote-37) Like Mitscherlich, Ackerman and Jahoda broke with earlier accounts: against Bernstein, for whom antisemitism manifested “normal” abreactions, and against Simmel, for whom “normal” people became “psychotic” in groups, the psychoanalysts emphasized that something *was* wrong with antisemites, whether they ventilated it on a therapist’s couch or at mass rallies in town squares. That said, it was impossible to link antisemitism with any one disorder, as the diagnoses covered “a wide range of disturbances.” Antisemitism was found “in psychoneurotics of various types; in character disorders, perhaps more particularly of the sado-masochistic type; in psychopathic and psychotic personalities as well as in others with less precisely defined disturbances.”[[38]](#footnote-38)

Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, finally, differed from both Mitscherlich and Jahoda/Ackermann in that their work privileged an ego psychological over a Freudian approach. Bettelheim and Janowitz recalled the “ego-strengthening” implications of chauvinism that Heinz Hartman and Ernst Kris had dubbed “regression in the service of the ego.”[[39]](#footnote-39) First introduced by Kris in 1936, the latter concept initially referred to the way in which art benefited from “regression.” Whereas “primary processes” (or the “pleasure principle”) overwhelmed the ego in the sleeping state, regression served the ego in the shape of “wit and caricature.” The aims of the ego were sometimes enhanced by the ability of people to tap the unconscious to develop alternative ways of thinking, feeling and behaving. Later, Hartman and Kris suggested that this ability to regulate regression also came into play in other areas of life, depending on the ego’s capacity to control the id.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Applying the concept to antisemitism and other forms of prejudice, Bettelheim and Janowitz noted that “in certain critical phases of the inner life of the individual, projection (or simple discharge of tension through ethnic hostility) is such regression in the service of the ego, granting a re-establishment of the threatened ego control over the rest of the instinctual forces.”[[41]](#footnote-41) As befitted the more optimistic language of ego psychology, Bettelheim and Janowitz did not mention “crippled” selves or the “disintegration” of characters. They preferred to speak of the need to strengthen weak egos. Although widespread, such egos were much less prevalent than Bernstein’s naturally impulsive subjects. Even so, the fairly commonplace compulsion to retain or restore one’s sense of identity meant that the authors were loath to discuss the matter in pathological terms. Bettelheim and Janowitz contended that “the search for identity, and with it the search for ego strength and personal control, might well involve as a detour the desire to find one’s identity, or to strengthen it, through prejudice.”[[42]](#footnote-42) Of all psychoanalytic interpretations of prejudice, theirs was the furthest removed from classifying antisemitism as medically or psychologically abnormal, *regardless of whether the Jew-baiting happened in groups or not*. Even if they spoke the language of disturbance and disorder, Bettelheim and Janowitz did not claim that prejudice involved deep character flaws.[[43]](#footnote-43) Such a judgment was reserved for the most influential Freud-inspired interpretation of antisemitism in the twentieth century, Critical Theory.

“Frankfurt School” analyses of Judeophobia differed from other psychoanalytic interpretations in two crucial respects: in contrast to Bernstein and Simmel, they moved beyond simple convergence models (individual bigots constituting collective bigotry) by adding a sociology of prejudice (capitalist modernity generating bigots and bigotry). Where earlier convergence models had alleged that individuals attached themselves to groups in order to rid their systems of excess energy or in order to avert the danger of losing touch with reality, critical theorists sought to comprehend why the bigotry took the form it did. Antisemites were antisemites, Adorno and Horkheimer believed, because they were impelled to put an end to their excitation *and* because putting an end to their excitation could only be achieved by attacking and ultimately annihilating Jews. Like Mitscherlich, Jahoda, and Ackerman, furthermore, critical theorists denied that antisemitism arose from simple everyday frustrations regularly experienced by all people – it ran much deeper than that. Their characterology stipulated that the “crippled” human beings with antisemitic personalities bespoke a profoundly flawed socialization that could not be rectified overnight.

The relationship between Critical Theory’s social theory and characterology is tenuous at best. While socialist readings of antisemitism never disappeared completely, they were gradually substituted by commentaries that owed more to Freud than to Marx. Eventually, most of these commentaries described Jew-hatred as the mental inability to cope with modernity’s impositions. As much as social theory remained part of many studies indebted to the “Frankfurt School,” the personality psychology that stood at the center of Freudian understandings of character development has attracted far greater attention than the sociology that was supposed to throw light upon the ontogenesis to begin with.[[44]](#footnote-44) Recurring references to displacement, projection, and ego weakness in recent work confirms the enduring legacy of Freud even as the other half of the equation (the critiques of capitalist modernity and instrumental rationality) has fallen somewhat into oblivion.

In the 1930s, Adorno and especially Horkheimer were committed to class-based analyses of Judeophobia.[[45]](#footnote-45) Even as late as 1938-9, “Horkheimer could still write an article on antisemitism that analyzed the phenomenon from a bluntly Marxist perspective.” In fact, “Die Juden und Europa,” written at a time of existential crisis for the Jews, hardly mentioned the minority at all, preoccupied as it was with the nature and origins of fascism.[[46]](#footnote-46) In the early stages of devising the *Dialectic of Enlightement,* Adorno explained the wider role of antisemitism in a private letter to his parents: “Fascism in Germany, which is inseparable from anti-Semitism, is no psychological anomaly of the German national character. It is a universal tendency and has an economic basis … namely the dying out of the sphere of circulation, i.e. the increasing superfluity of trade in the widest sense, in the age of monopoly capitalism.”[[47]](#footnote-47) As Jack Jacobs has shown, Horkheimer and Adorno came to incorporate psychoanalytical explanations of antisemtism fairly late in the day. Even though both had resorted to psychological reasoning before this period,[[48]](#footnote-48) only in 1941 did the exiled Institute for Social Research lay down that economic interpretations of antisemitism were to be “supplemented by an analysis … of psychological mechanisms.”[[49]](#footnote-49) In their private correspondence both Horkheimer and Adorno remained ambivalent as to the relative importance of psychology in addressing the subject of antisemitism.[[50]](#footnote-50)

The role and reception of psychology depended heavily on which project took center stage. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Marxist interpretations of antisemitism existed side by side with Freudian interpretations. In either case, the abstract reflections proved somewhat removed from Jew-hatred on the ground. Indeed, it could be argued that it is the very theoretical nature of “Elements of Antisemitism” (the final section of *Dialectic*) that has appealed to scholars, offering sweeping assertions that are difficult to verify or disprove. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the Jews had lost their raison d’être as the primary agents of circulation. Unable to admit publicly that the working-class was their true enemy as well as determined to keep the “negroes” in their place, capitalists focused on the economically unserviceable but psychologically functional Jewish target instead. The mechanism of projection helped to illuminate why capitalists managed to get their message across so successfully: the danger and aggressiveness that antisemites projected onto the Jews was actually located in the psyches of the perpetrators themselves.[[51]](#footnote-51)

The background story of the Jews’ demise within the capitalist system reads like this: it was the purpose of human rights to promise happiness where real power was absent. When the duped masses began to recognize that the promise of universal equality would remain unfulfilled as long as the class system prevailed, they felt deceived. This betrayal notwithstanding, they tried to repress any thought of the happiness that had been dangled in front of them for such a long time. As with all forms of repression, the process could only escalate: the greater the need to experience happiness, the fiercer the effort to repress that desire. The Jews, by contrast, still seemed to be enjoying the good life, even though their access to power had been curtailed. For the Gentiles, this sight was impossible to countenance. The Jewish intellectual did what the “others” could not imagine doing, he allegedly worked without hardship and prospered without exertion. Jewish intellectuals and bankers alike were the exponents of circulation; they were also the “denied ideal” (*verleugnete* *Wunschbild)* of all those who had been maimed by the authorities. The latter, sensing the possibility of continuously securing their status, sanctioned the murderous drives of the disenfranchised. As the victims of capitalism, the antisemites projected onto the Jews the aggressions that should have been reserved for the system.[[52]](#footnote-52)

Horkheimer and Adorno’s text contained contradictory messages, sometimes upholding antisemitism’s centrality to fascism, sometimes denying the existence of a “genuine antisemitism,” sometimes comparing Judeophobia to the animus against vagabonds, Catholics, or Protestants.[[53]](#footnote-53) Nevertheless, two components of “Elements of Antisemitism,” one derived from its social theory, the other from its psychology, would re-emerge in later research on the subject: first, that capitalism impelled antisemites to choose the wrong enemies; and second, that projection *enabled* the downtrodden to accept capitalism’s injunctions. *The Authoritarian Personality* would elaborate on both components, taming the critique of capitalism and extending the discussion on projection. But these changes came at a price: the sociology of capitalist modernity eventually mutated into a characterology of submissive-destructive personalities; and the method of projection assumed a catch-all quality that would come to explain any kind of anti-Jewish act.[[54]](#footnote-54)

Horkheimer and Adorno spurned the idea that antisemitism was one of many means of evincing frustration and resentment, exemplifying as it were a routine “anger management” that did not require much thought beyond the ego’s deference to drive theory’s modus operandi. Modern capitalist society, they explained, fostered authoritarian tendencies in individuals, depriving them of their autonomy, transforming them into reified objects, and binding them ever closer to authoritarian rule.[[55]](#footnote-55) Society in its current arrangement rather than drive theory as a psychological constant had given rise to antisemitism, critical theorists concurred, but the missing link between capitalist society on the one hand and genocidal hatred on the other was the character formation of men and women who put antisemitic theory into practice. Without psychoanalysis, critical theorists would have lacked the vocabulary to formulate their theory of the authoritarian character.

Alongside Wilhelm Reich, the psychoanalyst and one-time “Frankfurt School” member Erich Fromm not only belonged to the leading characterologists of his day, he also influenced the reception of Freudian thought among critical theorists.[[56]](#footnote-56) As was true for psychoanalytic characterology more generally, Fromm took Freud’s comments in “Character and anal eroticism” and *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* to frame his own theory on the subject.[[57]](#footnote-57) In 1908, Freud had detected a cluster of personality traits that he would come to associate with “anal” tendencies. Orderliness boiled down to excessive conscientiousness, coupled with inordinate neatness and cleanliness. Obstinacy encompassed stubborn, willful, and rigid behavior. Parsimony represented stinginess with money and time. Freud classified these traits in response to patients whose reminiscences had revealed an emotionally charged preoccupation with the pleasure of emptying their bowels or “holding back.” The “anal character” on display would be later identified with the developmental stages of libido (oral, anal-sadistic, genital, and phallic), each of which corresponded to the primacy of the given erotogenic zone. In certain circumstances, when a person became unduly attached to a certain zone, the fixation would metamorphose into deep-seated character traits.[[58]](#footnote-58)

For Fromm, traits could originate in the pre-genital fixations outlined by Freud or in the experience of “regression” at a later point in life, responding to sexual deprivation in families or society at large.[[59]](#footnote-59) Like Reich before him, he set out a sociology of conscience that departed from Freud’s preoccupation with law-like psychosexual development in childhood. In repressive and patriarchal societies, he made plain, individuals first encountered brute force in the shape of the father, whose dictates the child internalized in the shape of the super-ego. Fromm proffered an ingenious dialectic that was missing from Freud and other psychoanalysts: once incorporated into the psyche, men and women would project their newly acquired super-egos onto the powers-that-be. Crucially, this act of projection meant that from now on rational criticism of the authorities would become unthinkable. And so the dialectic would be perpetuated: the less critique, the more adulation; the more adulation, the greater the internalization. “Authority and super-ego,” Fromm concluded, “can no longer be separated from each other.”[[60]](#footnote-60)

This near-impregnable dialectic, moreover, spawned certain characters. Repressive societies produced and re-produced persons for whom complying and knuckling down and relinquishing individuality became a way of life. Because these “masochistic” characters comprised the majority of people in society, scholars failed to recognize the abnormality that was all around them, studying masochism as a discrete perversion rather than as an everyday occurrence in their immediate surroundings. Ordinary “masochists”, meanwhile, “rationalized” their “authoritarian character” by pointing out the “legality,” “necessity,” and “rationality” of their behavior.[[61]](#footnote-61) Here and elsewhere Fromm introduced the notion of an authoritarian character that resided in the sadomasochistic character and vice versa. The two character types became synonymous.[[62]](#footnote-62)

Although Fromm’s ties with the Institute for Social Research were severed in 1939 – Martin Jay writes that Fromm’s work “became anathema to his former colleagues in the 1940s”[[63]](#footnote-63) – , the whole idea of an authoritarian type would shape *The Authoritarian Personality* and subsequent research on how personality psychology affected the course of antisemitism. All of these studies have faced the challenge, never satisfactorily resolved, of demonstrating the relationship between the psychological and the social. More seriously, the introduction of personality psychology (as opposed to social learning theory, for example) has made it extraordinarily difficult to address historical change, prompting critical theorists to propose revolutionary regime change as a panacea or, much more modestly, educational measures within capitalist society as an antidote to hard-wired antisemites. Neither solution, however, could adequately explain how change would come about or how the change that did come about transpired.

The background to the *Authoritarian Personality* has been examined in much detail elsewhere.[[64]](#footnote-64) The first page of the preface prefigured the problems of all studies on antisemitism that have relied on personality psychology: “This is a book about social discrimination. But its purpose is not simply to add a few more empirical findings to an already extensive body of information. The central theme of the work is the relatively new concept of an ‘anthropological’ species we call the anthropological type of man.”[[65]](#footnote-65) The type that Adorno, his collaborators, and later scholars invoked to explain antisemitism did not so much suffer from sadomasochism as from ego weakness or the absence of a super-ego or both. The manifestations of any of these character flaws were projection, displacement, paranoia, and psychosis. Freud-inspired critical theorists did not just describe antisemitism; they diagnosed a disorder that befell individuals early in life and that was not subject to cyclical fluctuations. Since modern capitalism caused the disorder, Critical Theory’s analysis of antisemitism did not address the questions that tend to occupy both history and social psychology: how did (capitalist) socialization lead certain individuals to join certain groups? How did it allow certaingroups to come into being? How did it explain behavior in certainsituations? In his darker moments, Adorno conceded that modern capitalism *as such* had produced a universal type *per se*, relativizing earlier efforts to distinguish between “high-scoring” authoritarian subjects and the rest of society.[[66]](#footnote-66) Such a claim, needless to say, made it impracticable, even pointless to account for the dynamics of antisemitism at a given time, in a given place.

Critical theorists were ambivalent about the relative importance of psychology in explaining antisemitism. Still, there can be no doubt as to the function of Freudian psychoanalysis in their conceptualizations of Judeophobia. Although Adorno maintained that psychology was secondary to sociology (“social factors”) in grasping prejudice, much of *The Authoritarian Personality* itself, as well as his remarks on the making of the study, document the extent to which he was indebted to Freud.[[67]](#footnote-67) In the latter notes, he insisted that the *Authoritarian Personality* was in “full agreement” with orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, the group of researchers involved in the project had resisted calls to sideline the role of infantile sexuality and the unconscious in order to “sociologize” Freud. Similarly, while much of the methodology employed in the *Authoritarian Personality* followed social scientific practice, the “projective items” of the questionnaires and interviews were based on psychoanalytic thinking.[[68]](#footnote-68)

The main message of the study, one which scholars of antisemitism would reiterate time and again, was clear: with their psyches seriously imperiled, authoritarians lacked the freedom of choice that came with an ego that could integrate both the super-ego and the id. In the words of Adorno and his collaborators: “The most essential feature of this structure is a lack of integration between the moral agencies by which the subject lives and the rest of his personality. One might say that the conscience or superego is incompletely integrated within the self or ego, the ego here being conceived of as embracing the various self-controlling and self-expressing functions of the individual. It is the ego that governs the relations between self and outer world, and between self and deeper layers of the personality; the ego undertakes to regulate impulses in a way that will permit the gratification without inviting too much punishment by the superego, and it seeks in general to carry out the activities of the individual in accordance with the demands of reality.”[[69]](#footnote-69) But what followed from this malady?

On one level, the absence of a well-integrated conscience led to the straightforward victory of the primary drives over the rest of the psyche, or, as Adorno put it, the super-ego had transmogrified into “the spokesman of the id.”[[70]](#footnote-70) This part of the analysis was not particularly original, as it basically confirmed Freud’s apprehension about the degree to which civilization could keep the drives in check. Unlike Freud, however, the authors of *The Authority Personality* held that what used to be restricted to periodic outbreaks of the “barbaric instincts” now made up certain characters: the id, in these men and women, was always in control.

On another level, the drives could not merely be released at will, irrespective of their potential target. Even if the aggression was originally aroused by and directed against the ingroup authorities (the visible agents of “civilization”), authoritarian characters could not help but displace it onto outgroups. Adorno did not suggest, in the manner of frustration-aggression theory or Bettelheim and Janowitz, that antisemties re-established their positive self-image by blaming individuals or groups for whatever grievance they might have. Rather, “the authoritarian *must*, out of an inner necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups,” as he or she is “psychologically unable to attack ingroup authorities.”[[71]](#footnote-71) In fact, both Bernstein and Fenichel had anticipated this central thesis of *The Authoritarian Character*, the former noting that individuals who joined antisemitic groups were prohibited from attacking these groups themselves and, in attacking others, hoped to escape disapproval or censure;[[72]](#footnote-72) and the latter noting that antisemitism empowered “average human beings” to gratify two conflicting urges, the wish to respect authority and the desire to revolt against the demands of civilization.[[73]](#footnote-73) Such affinities notwithstanding, *The Authoritarian Character* differed fundamentally from earlier work. Adorno and his collaborators did not envisage “normal” individuals intermittently gathering in groups so as to discharge aggressive drives or fend off permanent regression. Antisemites were antisemites as a matter of course: their super-ego had been externalized for good; their aggressive drives could rein free, if leveled against outgroups; and their conduct – a combination of authoritarian submissiveness and destructive rebelliousness – constituted a veritable psychological type.

If these men and women unleashed their destructiveness in a particular fashion rather than arbitrarily, they also practiced antisemitism in distinct ways. Most scholars of a Freudian bent agree that antisemitism invariably involves projection. In an important early essay on paranoia, Freud had first fleshed out the mechanisms of this procedure, describing how patients experiencing delusional thinking projected their own feelings of enmity (that had once been feelings of love or adulation) onto those whom they now feared or despised. This fear or distain, moreover, could be justified on the grounds that it was a perfectly legitimate form of self-defense.[[74]](#footnote-74) In the psychoanalytic literature on the subject, projection normally resembles a defense mechanism whereby “the subject imputes to the other (…) qualities, feelings, wishes that he rejects or renounces in himself.”[[75]](#footnote-75) “Prejudicial” projection has been subdivided even further: either it relates to conflicts between the super-ego and the ego, where the superego demands are projected onto another group, which is duly portrayed as “demanding, aggressive, shrewd, cunning, manipulative.” Or it relates to conflicts between the id and the ego, where the id demands are projected onto another group, which is duly depicted as “lecherous, sensuous, lazy at work, inferior –a fountain of instinctual drive.”[[76]](#footnote-76)

Instead of differentiating between both versions of projection, Freudian accounts of antisemitism usually mention both forms, making it difficult to know whether an antisemite projects sporadically or for deep-seated reasons. As a result, we find, in one and the same publication, antisemites who project “conventional” drives onto the Jews (anger, lust, fear, aggression) in order to keep “id-drives ego-alien” as well as character-specific drives (the need for absolute control, the desire for utter destruction, the inability to attack ingroup authorities) in order to accommodate their problematic personalities.[[77]](#footnote-77) More surprisingly perhaps, contemporary scholars of antisemitism have rarely tried to rectify the omissions of the past; they, too, favour additive or summative narratives that combine various approaches, without questioning their relative credibility, plausibility, status, or historical applicability.[[78]](#footnote-78) Finally, as much as “projection” is implicated in fantasies, fabrications, and falsehoods, we still wish to understand why certain individuals, groups, and nations resorted to projections; how it was possible for entire peoples to be captivated by projections; or why particular projections emerged, disappeared, and recurred when they did.

**Conclusion**

Critical Theory’s analysis of antisemitism is appealing for three reasons in particular: it is sufficiently abstract (and therefore difficult to falsify) to cover all sorts of contexts; its Freudian elements satisfy the search for psychological explanations of extreme behavior; and its core concepts – displacement, projection, regression – sound like valid explanations even for situations that are not exceptional. The problem with Critical Theory does not lie in any of these attractive features. Like other accounts based on psychoanalysis, there is nothing especially wrong with the idea that, in moments of crisis, people blow of steam, project their fears onto much-maligned minorities, displace their anger (with the state of affairs) onto the powerless, or regress to the point of renouncing all critical faculties. In fact, all of these explanations figure prominently in one of the most important works on inter-ethnic ethnic violence, albeit in language that does not rely on Freudian conceptualizations.[[79]](#footnote-79)

It is not always easy to validate these constructs, to be sure, and they sometimes detract from real conflicts, “rational” interests, or manipulative practices. They can also assume a somewhat improbable catch-all quality, where hundreds of thousands of people project continuously, for example. That being the case, all sorts of historical events – from medieval massacres to Russian pogroms to the “bloodlands” of Eastern Europe – can be examined with the help of these categories.[[80]](#footnote-80) Historians interested in contingency, context, and change, then, as well social psychologists interested in person-group and person-situation interactions can live with the idea that “normal” individuals “project” and “regress” from time to time.

But Critical Theory does not content itself with such a utilitarian approach to the problem. Like any characterology, it faces the conundrum of having to explain historical change while relying on personality psychology.[[81]](#footnote-81) Blaming “modern capitalism” or “monopoly capitalism” for an early childhood socialization that deprived the young of autonomy in the name of authority, there is little room for conceiving an end to this kind of education or the impact it has over the human beings it produces. As only certain forms of primary socialization (i.e. rigid child-rearing practices) produce authoritarian, anti-democratic, and antisemitic personalities, these ingrained attitudes could only be changed through in-depth psychotherapy, transformative pedagogy, or an end to capitalism that is nowhere in sight. Yet many cultures have embraced rigid child-rearing practices without becoming exceptionally antisemitic, while other cultures have challenged their antisemitic legacies without altering long-established routines of primary socialization.[[82]](#footnote-82) Critical Theorists may retort by suggesting that the change that has happened is only superficial and that deep down the “crippled” personalities remain crippled. This approach begs the question, however. Some scholars sympathetic to Critical Theory have admitted as much, referring to the danger of reifying character types (only to defend the “model of the authority-bound character”),[[83]](#footnote-83) speaking of “predominant traits” as opposed to personality disorders,[[84]](#footnote-84) or wondering about the efficacy of pedagogic interventions vis-à-vis antisemitic characters.[[85]](#footnote-85) Nevertheless, it is clear that psychoanalytic studies of antisemitic characters presuppose a deeply flawed personality that cannot be removed or reformed at will. As Samuel Salzborn, a vocal champion of Freudian takes on antisemitism, has acknowledged, such approaches predicate “a point of no return.” The “revision of antisemitic resentments,” he writes, is “pedagogically imaginable only if these have not already become, in childhood, the emotional and cognitive foundation of the entire personality structure.”[[86]](#footnote-86)

But if this is so, Critical Theory even falls behind modern personality psychology. Despite relying on the notion of inherent traits (the so-called ‘big five’: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, neuroticism), personality psychologists are much more reluctant than psychoanalysts to address historical change.[[87]](#footnote-87) Instead, they either assert that traits are substantially inheritable, cross-cultural, and distributed uniformly in society, disavowing any claim that such a perspective could explain large-scale social trends;[[88]](#footnote-88) or they tentatively suggest that certain political attitudes (such as liberalism and conservatism) correlate with certain personality traits (such as openness to experience and conscientiousness);[[89]](#footnote-89) or else they carefully interrogate the relative role of personality and situation in different sets of circumstances. Even where psychologists try to gauge the degree to which personality might shape the outcome of events, they are well aware that situations may trump differences between individuals.[[90]](#footnote-90)

The question, then, is this: how can Freudian-based Critical Theory justify its sweeping explanations of antisemitism if its premises rest on characterologies that cannot convincingly account for the growth and decline of anti-Jewish hostility, for its popularity here and notoriety there, for its fall from favor in capitalist states and prevalence in socialist states, for its role in some populist parties and absence in others, for its regional, religious, and political variations, for its genteel and violent manifestations, in short: for the sheer complexity of the interplay between individual, situation, group, culture, and time?

1. Critical Theory has become something of an outlier both in sociology and philosophy. See the special issue of *Mittelweg* entitled “Metamorphosen der Kritischen Theorie,” 30 (2021), pp. 1-111, for discussions of the place of Critical Theory in current intellectual debate. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For the role of psychoanalysis in Critical Theory, see Michael Wolf, *Psychoanalyse als Forschungsmethode der Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2018). For recent reiterations of that role in connection with antisemitism, see various articles in Katrin Henkelmann, Christian Jäckel, Andreas Stahl, Niklas Wünsch, and Benedikt Zopes (eds.), *Konformistische Rebellen. Zur Aktualität des Autoritären Charakters* (Berlin: Verbrecher Verlag, 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Werner Bergmann, in: “Starker Auftritt – schwach im Abgang. Antisemitismusforschung in den Sozialwissenschaften,” in: Werner Bergmann and Mona Körte (eds.), *Antisemitismusforschung in den Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 219-239; Siegfried Schumann, *Persönlichkeit. Eine vergessene Größe der empirischen Sozialforschung* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), p. 244; idem, *Persönlichkeitsbedingte Einstellungen zu Parteien. Der Einfluß von Persönlichkeitseigenschaften auf Einstellungen zu politischen Parteien* (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 2001); Peter E. Gordon, “The Authoritarian Personality Revisited. Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump,” in: Wendy Brown, Peter E. Gordon, and Max Pensky, *Authoritarianism. Three Inquiries in Critical Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), pp. 45-84, here p. 53; Markus Brunner, “Vom Ressentiment zum Massenwahn. Eine Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie des Antisemitismus und die Grenzen psychoanalytischer Erkenntnis,” in: Charlotte Busch, Martin Gehrlein, and Tom David Uhlig (eds.), *Schiefheilungen. Zeitgenössische Betrachtungen zum Antisemitismus* (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2016), pp. 13-35, here p. 13-14; .” Detlef Oesterreich, “Flight into Security: A New Approach and Measure of the Authoritarian Personality”, in: *Political Psychology* 26 (2005), pp. 275-297, here p. 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Danielle Knafo, “Anti-Semitism in the Clinical Setting,” in: *Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association* 47 (1990), pp. 35-63, here p. 36. For brief discussions of these themes, see Avner Falk, Anti-Semitism. A History and Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Hatred (Westport: Praeger, 2008), especially pp. 67-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sigmund Freud, “Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben,” in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume VII (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 271, fn. 1. On this passage, see especially Eliza Slavet, *Racial Fever. Freud and the Jewish Question* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), p. 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Sigmund Freud, “Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion,” in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume VVI (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 196-198. Shavet, *Racial Fever*, p. 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Otto Fenichel, “Elemente einer psychoanalytischen Theorie des Antisemitismus,” in: Ernst Simmel (ed.), *Antisemitismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1993), pp. 35-57, here p. 53. The text was originally published in 1946. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Rudolphe M. Loewenstein, *Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), p. 56. The original French version appeared in 1952. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder. A Psychoanalytic Interpretation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Sigmund Freud, “Der Mann Moses,” p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Loewenstein, *Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus*, p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Stephen Frosh, *Hate and the Jewish Sciences. Antisemitism, Nazis, and Psychoanalysis* (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 55. See also Ostow’s remarks on the sibling rivalry between Cain and Abel, where the Jew figures as the prototypic, archaic, dangerous sibling of early childhood fantasy: Mortimer Ostow, *Myth and Madness. The Psychodynamics of Antisemitism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Bela Grunberger, “Der Antisemit und Ödipuskomplex,” in: *Psyche*, 16 (1962), 255- 272, here p. 42. See also Frosh, *Hate*, pp. 163-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. George Steiner, *In Bluebeard’s Castle. Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 36, 39, 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Michael A. Hogg and Graham M. Vaughan, *Social Psychology* (Harlow: Pearson, 2008), p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Frosch, *Hate*, p. 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Jean-Michel Quinodoz, *Reading Freud. A Chronological Exploration of Freud’s Writings* (London and New York, Routledge, 2011), p. 137. See also Susan Sugarman, *What Freud Really Meant. A Chronological Reconstruction of his Theory of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 46-61; Bernd Nitzschke, “Triebtheorie,” in: Wolfgang Mertens (ed.), *Schlüsselbegriffe der* Psychoanalyse (Stuttgart: Verlag Internationale Psychoanalyse, 1997), pp. 87-95; Peter Kutter and Thomas Müller, *Psychoanalyse. Eine Einführung in die Psychologie unbewusster Prozesse* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), pp.105-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See, for example, Simmel, “Antisemitismus als Massen-Psychologie,” pp. 493, 499, 500, 503; Yigal Blumenberg, “Die Crux mit dem Antisemitismus”. Zur Gegenbesetzung von Erinnerung, Herkommen und Tradition, in: *Psyche* 51 (1997),1115-1160; Vamik D. Volkan, *Blindes Vertrauen. Großgruppen und ihre Führer in Zeiten der Krise und des Terrors* (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2005), pp. 63-104; Samuel Salzborn, “The Politics of Antisemitism,” in: *Journal for the Study of Antisemitism* 2 (2010), pp. 89-114, here pp. 98-100; Andreas Peham, Pathologische Massenbildung gegen Juden und Jüdinnen: Zur Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus, in: *Context XXI* Heft 8/2002-1/2003, <http://www.contextxxi.at/pathologische-massenbildung-gegen.html>, retrieved on 1 June 2021; Werner Bonefeld, “Critical Theory and the Critique of Antisemitism: On Society as Economic Object,” in: Journal of Social Justice 9 (2019), pp. 1-20, here pp. 9, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Fritz Bernstein, *Der Antisemitimus als Gruppenerscheinung. Versuch einer Soziologie des Judenhasses* (Königstein: Jüdischer Verlag, 1980), pp. 62, 72-73, 162, 180, 185. The book was originally published in 1926. On Bernstein, see Thomas Gloy, “Fritz Bernsteins Soziologie des Judenhasses,” in: Hans-Joachim Hahn and Olaf Kistenmacher (eds.), *Beschreibungsversuche der Judenfeindschaft. Zur Geschichte der Antisemitismus-forschung vor 1944* (Berlin and Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016), pp. 286-313. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Bernstein, *Antisemitismus*, p. 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid., p. 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Gary Collier, Henry L. Minton, and Graham Reynolds, *Currents of Though in American Social Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 85. See also Clark McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd* (New York: Aldine de Gryuter, New York, 1991), p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Stephen Reicher and John Drury, “Social Psychology of Collective Behavior,” in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015), pp. 151-156, here p. 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. On Le Bon and Freud’s views regarding deinviduation in groups, see Gustave Le Bon, *Psychologie der Massen* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1911), pp. 10, 13, 17; Sigmund Freud, “Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse,” in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume VIII (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 126, 128, 142; Stefan Jonsson, “After Individuality: Freud’s Mass Psychology and Weimar Politics,” in: *New German Critique* 40 (2013), 53-75; Tom Postmes and Russell Spears, “Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis,” in: *Psychological Bulletin* 123 (1998), pp. 238-259; Stephen Reicher, “ ‘The Crowd’ century: Reconciling practical success with theoretical failure,” in: *British Journal of Social Psychology* 35 (1996), pp. 535-553; John Drury and Clifford Stott, “Contextualising the crowd in contemporary social science,” in: *Contemporary Social Science* 6 (2011), pp. 275-288; Stephen Reicher, “Mass action and mundane reality: an argument for putting crowd analysis at the centre of the social sciences,” in: *Contemporary Social Science* 6 (2011), pp. 433-449. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. McPhail, *Myth*, pp. 43-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Grunberger, “Der Antisemit,” p. 257. See also Samuel Salzborn, “Integration und Ausgrenzung. Zur Politischen Psychologie des Antisemitismus,” in: Markus Brunner et al. (eds.), *Politische Psychologie heute? Themen, Theorien und Perspektiven der psychoanalytischen Sozialforschung* (Gießen: Psychosozialverlag, 2012), pp. 163-181, here p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Ernst Simmel, “Antisemitismus als Massen-Psychologie,” in: idem., *Antisemitismus*, p. 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., pp. 69-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid., p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Ibid., pp. 66-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., p. 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid., p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Alexander Mitscherlich, “Die Vorurteilskrankheit. Einleitung zum Thema,” in: *Psyche* 16 (1962), pp. 241-244, here p. 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Ackerman and Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder*, p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Ibid., p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Ibid., p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. For Hartmann and Kris, the “main task of psychoanalysis was to assist a patient in managing intraspsychic conflict. This meant: working on modulating and above all *neutralizing* libidinal and aggressive drives, and above all expanding autonomous ego functions (such as distinguishing between reality and fantasy, controlling impulses ego functions (such as distinguishing between reality and fantasy, controlling impulses and affects rather the acting-out, and integrating synthetically contradictory feelings).” Dagmar Herzog, *Cold War Freud. Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 35. See also Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black, *Freud and Beyond. A History of Modern Psychoanalytical Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), pp. 34-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Danielle Knafo, “Revisiting Ernst Krisis’s Concept of Regression in the Service of the Ego,” in: *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 19 (2002), pp. 24-29, here pp. 24-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 48, 58-59. See also Martin Wangh, “Psychoanalytische Betrachtungen zur Dynamik und Genese des Vorurteils, des Antisemitismus und des Nazismus,” in: *Psyche*, 16 (1962), pp. 273-284, here p. 275. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid., pp. 56-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Bettelheim and Janowitz anticipated social identity theory, which argues for the fluidity both in prejudice and self-definitions. See Robin Bergh and Nazar Akrami, “Generalized Prejudice: Old Wisdom and New Perspectives”, in: Chris G. Sibley and Kate Barlow (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 438-460, here p. 448. See also Martijn van Zomeren and Russell Spears, “The crowd as a psychological cue to in-group support for collective action against collective disadvantage”, in: *Contemporary Social Science* 6 (2011), pp. 325-341; and John Drury and Steve Reicher, “Collective action and psychological change: The emergence if new social identities”, in: *British Journal of Social Psychology* 39 (2000), pp. 579-604. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. For exceptions, see Bonefeld, “Critical Theory,” and Marcel Stoetzler, “Capitalism, the nation and societal corrosion: Notes on ‘left-wing antisemitism’,” in*:**Journal of Social Justice* 9 (2019), pp. 1-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. The definitive work on Adorno’s relationship with psychoanalysis is Wolfgang Bock, *Dialektische Psychologie. Adornos Rezeption der Psychoanalyse* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Jack Jacobs, *The Frankfurt School, Jewish Lives, and Antisemitism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ibid., pp. 58-59. The letter was written in February 1940. See also Helmut König, *Elemente des Antisemitismus. Kommentare und Interpretationen zu einem Kapitel der Dialektik der Aufklärung von Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno* (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2016), pp. 221, 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Jacobs, *Frankfurt School*, pp. 47, 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Ibid., p. 60. See also König, *Elemente des Antisemitismus*, p. 232. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., pp. 90, 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Max Horkheimer, “Elemente des Antisemitismus. Grenzen der Aufklärung,” in: *Gesammelte Schriften Band 5: Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940-1950*, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2014), pp. 197-198. The work was first published in 1944. Hannah Arendt also maintained that the hostility toward them turned from traditional to totalitarian when the Jews purportedly lost their public function (as representatives of the state), See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest, 1979), p. 5. On *Dialectic,* see also Anson Rabinbach, “The Cunning of Unreason: Mimesis and the Construction of Anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*,” in: idem., *In the Shadow of Catastrophe. German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 166-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Horkheimer, “Elemente,” pp. 199, 201-202, 214, 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Ibid., pp. 200-201, 215-217. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. See also Gordon, “The Authoritarian Personality,” p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Lars Rensmann, *Kritische Theorie über den Antisemitismus. Studien zu Struktur, Erklärungspotential und Aktualität* (Berlin and Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 1998), pp. 11-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. For Reich’s characterology, see Wilhelm Reich, *Charakteranalyse* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1989), first published in 1933; idem., *Massenpsychologie des Faschismus. Zur Sexualökonomie der proletarischen Sexualpolitik* (Copenhagen, Prague, and Zurich: Verlag für Sexualpolitik, 1933); Andreas Peglau, *Unpolitische Wissenschaft? Wilhelm Reich und die Psychoanalyse im Nationalsozialismus* (Gießen: Psycho-Sozial, 2013). Reich’s work has had little impact on antisemitism studies. His interpretation of fascist violence as the outcome of repressed sexual energy would influence radical students in 1960s West Germany in their attempts to come to terms with the Nazi past. See Anthony D. Kauders, *Der Freud-Komplex. Eine Geschichte der Psychoanalyse in Deutschland* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2014), chapter 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Erich Fromm, “Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie,” in: *Analytische Sozialpsychologie. Gesamtausgabe Band I* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), pp. 59-77, here pp. 60-61. The original appeared in 1932; Sigmund Freud, “Charakter und Analerotik,” in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume VII (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 203-209. On the history and use of the concept in German psychoanalysis, see Ulrike May, “Zur Frühgeschichte der Analerotik,” in: *Psyche*, 66 (2012), pp. 213-246. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. On the different phases of sexual development, see Sigmund Freud, *Drei Abhandungen zur Sexualtheorie*, in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume V (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 27-145. Originally published in 1905, the book would go through six editions. In 1915, Freud introduced the idea of the organization of the libido in successive stages. Ten years later, in the sixth and final edition, he incorporated the phallic stage. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Fromm, “Charakterologie,” pp. 69-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Erich Fromm, “Studien über Autorität und Familie,” in: *Analytische Sozialpsychologie. Gesamtausgabe Band I* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), pp. 139-177, here pp. 146-147. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid., pp. 170-171. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See also his “Sozialpsychologischer Teil,” in: Erich Fromm, *Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung* (Paris: Felix Alcán, 1936), pp. 78-134, cited in: Lawrence J. Friedmann, *The Lives of Erich Fromm. Love’s Prophet* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 54. See also Rolf Wiggershaus, *Die Frankfurter Schule. Geschichte. Theoretische Entwicklung. Politische Bedeutung* (Munich: dtv Wissenschaft, 1991), pp. 173-178. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1996), p. 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Aside from the work of Jacobs, Jay, Rensmann, and Wiggershaus cited above, see also Eva Maria Ziege, *Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie. Die Frankfurter Schule im amerikanischen Exil* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levenson, R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Norton Library, 1969), p. ix. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Gordon, “Authoritarian Personality,” p. 61. Gordon appears to sympathize with this pessimistic assessment: “What passes for politics today in the United States has its etiology not in determinate forms of psychological character but rather in modes of mindless spectacle that may awaken doubt as to whether the ‘mind’ remains a useful category of political analysis.” Ibid., p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Theodor W. Adorno*, Bemerkungen zu ‚The Authoritarian Personality’ und weitere Texte*, edited by Eva Maria Ziege (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2019), pp. 25, 30. The “Remarks on the Authoritarian Personality,” written in 1948, have only be in published in German. The original English manuscript can be found in the Nachlaß Horkheimer, Archivzentrum der Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt am Main. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Adorno, *Bemerkungen*, pp. 34, 36. See also p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levenson, R. Nevitt Sanford, “The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends,” in: idem: *Authoritarian Personality*, p. 234. On the absence of a well-integrated super-ego and “ego weakness,” see, for example, Simmel, “Antisemitismus und Massenpsychologie,” p. 66; Ackerman/Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder*, p. 49; Rensmann, *Kritische Theorie*, pp. 40, 42, 67, 212-213; idem., *Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemtismus in der politischer Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. T.W. Adorno, “Prejudice in the Interview Material,” in: Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levenson, Sanford, *Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 605-653, here p. 630. See also Ziege, *Antisemitismus*, p. 270. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levenson, Sanford, “The Measurement,” p. 233. We could apply this hypothesis to Arendt’s analysis: of antisemitism despite representing the state, the Jews never actually incarnated the state, which non-Jewish elites in the bureaucracy, military, and aristocracy continued to embody. And these in-group elites could not be attacked. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Bernstein, *Antisemitismus*, pp. 77-78. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Fenichel, “Elemente,” p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Sigmund Freud, “Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in: *Gesammelte Werke,* Volume VIII (Fischer: Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 239-316, here pp. 275-276, 283, 295, 299, 303, 309-310. See also Loewenstein, *Psychoanalyse des Antisemitismus*, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *Das Vokabular der Psychoanalyse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 403. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Elizabeth Youn-Bruehl, *The Anatomy of Prejudices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. In *The Authoritarian* Personality: Daniel J. Levenson, “The Study of Antisemitic Ideology,” in: Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levenson, Sanford, *Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 57-101, here pp. 95-96; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levenson, Sanford, “The Measurement,” p. 240; Adorno, “Prejudice in the Interview Material,” pp. 613, 618-623. See also Horkheimer and Adorno, “Elemente,” p. 197-199;, here pp. 178-179, 217, 223; Fenichel, “Elemente,” pp. 38, 45-46, 55; Leo Löwenthal, *Falsche Propheten. Studien zum Autoritarismus. Schriften Band 3* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), pp. 175-237. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. For recent aggregate or additive accounts, see Rolf Pohl, who cites Adorno, Horkheimer, Freud, Melanie Klein, Otto Kernberg, and Jan Philipp Reemstma in an overview that does not privilege one approach, but hopes to come to grips with antisemitism by placing many prominent (but often contradictory) psychoanalytical explanations side by side: Rolf Pohl, “Der antisemitische Wahn. Aktuelle Ansätze zur Psychoanalyse einer sozialen Pathologie,” in: Wolfram Stender, Guido Follert, Mihri Ozedogan (eds.), *Konstellationen des Antisemitismus. Sozialpädagogische Praxis* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), pp. 41-68. See also Samuel Salzborn, *Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne. Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2010), especially the final chapter entitled “Zur Theorie des modernen Antisemitismus”; and Rensmann, *Demokratie*, pp. 65, 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 86, 115-116, 146, 147, 343, 349, 536. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. For an example of a remarkably unapologetic characterology of antisemitism, see Grunberger, “Der Antisemit,” pp. 259-260, 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Miriam Gebhardt, *Die Angst vor dem kindlichen Tyrannen. Eine Geschichte der Erziehung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Rensmann, *Kritische Theorie*, p. 193. See also Gordon, “Authoritarian Personality,” pp. 51-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Young-Bruehl, *Anatomy of Prejudices*, p. 32. Salzborn prefers the term “predispositional variables.” Salzborn, *Antisemitismus*, p. 327. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Salzborn, *Antisemitismus*, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Ibid., p. 329, and idem., “Integration und Ausgrenzung,” p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Personality psychology is primarily about “enduring characteristics” that account for “generalized patterns of behavior.” See Krahé, *Personality*, p. 10.Nick Haslam, Luje Smillie, and John Song, *An Introduction to Personality, Individual Differences and Intelligence* (London: Sage, 2017), pp. 6, 18; David Funder, *The Persoanlity Puzzle* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), pp. 121, 129; Jens B. Asendorpf, *Persönlichkeit. Was uns ausmacht und warum* (Berlin: Springer, 2019), pp. 7-8; idem., “Personality: traits and situations,” in: Philip J. Corr and Gerald Matthews (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 45-53, here p. 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Stenner, *Authoritarian Dynamic*, p. 145; Bergh and Akrami, “Generalized Prejudice,” p. 439; Walter G. Stephan and Cookie White Stephan, “Intergroup Threats,” in: Sibley and Barlow, *The Cambridge Handbook*, pp. 131-148, here p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Jeffrey J. Mondak, *Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Schumann, *Persönlichkeit.* [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Seth A. Wagerman and David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations,” in: Corr and Matthews, *Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology*, pp. 27-42, here p. 36. See also John M. Doris, *Lack of Character and Moral Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 24-25. Prominent personality psychologists maintain that people actively select situations according to their personality. See Asendorpf, “Personality,” p. 51, and Funder, *Personality Puzzle*, p. 131; Krahé, *Personality*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)