West German Psychoanalysis in Post-Analytic Times: Navigating Demands for Self-Actualization, Self-Governance, and Social Change, 1968-1990

First introduced by Michel Foucault in the late 1970s, the concept of governmentality (*gouvernmentalité*) refers to the way in which liberal societies control their citizens through various empowering techniques, especially but not exclusively psychotherapy. This process of enhancing and improving selves, Nikolas Rose maintains, has led to a form of incessant self-scrutiny, self-improvement, and self-optimization, replacing ethical and communitarian concerns with the higher-order norm of personal fulfillment.[[1]](#footnote-1) The following essay seeks to qualify the view that governmentality defined the parameters of psychotherapy in the late twentieth century. As much as different therapeutic schools promoted autonomy, authenticity, and self-control, the exact meaning of these goals was not set in stone. Where in some instances the values attached to psychotherapy harked back to familiar (Enlightenment and middle-class) precepts such as the sovereignty of reason or emotional restraint, in other instances the drive to achieve functionality stood at the forefront. Conflicting sensibilities among theorists and practitioners, moreover, suggest that certain forms of self-governance were seen critically.

Psychoanalysis in the Federal Republic is a good case in point, not least because of its distinct features. First, it retained a stubborn loyalty to Freudian traditionalism.[[2]](#footnote-2) True, analysts appropriated, assimilated, and augmented methods shared by practitioners and theoreticians throughout the world. They travelled to Great Britain or North America to learn from and debate with colleagues in these countries, while English-speaking analysts visited West Germany to attend conferences or to discuss case studies at leading institutes. Even though these transnational ties highlighted the cosmopolitan nature of the psychoanalytic project, they also disclosed the peculiarity of its West German offshoot, where the response to National Socialism entailed a deferential relationship toward psychoanalysts abroad.

Second, insofar as psychoanalysis was associated with Jews, socialists, and emigrants, its West German reception from the late 1960s onward highlighted the political implications of Freudian theory. To be sure, Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich proved to be popular figures in countercultures elsewhere, but the critical impetus members of the student movement discovered in psychoanalytic texts led to radical experiments in West German child care centers and continued to influence debates within the psychoanalytic community in the 1970s and 1980s. While sympathizers of the alternative milieu during the so-called “psycho-boom” increasingly emphasized self-actualization,[[3]](#footnote-3) prominent analysts insisted that Freudianism necessitated political interventions in current affairs, many of which touched on the legacy of National Socialism in West German society.

Third, commentators debated the extent to which psychoanalytic identity was compatible with national health insurance provision. The West German state generously financed analytical psychotherapy (*analytische Psychotherapie*) and depth psychological (*tiefenpsychologische*) treatments from 1967, adding behavioral therapy to the service catalogue of statutory health insurances from 1987. Many analysts in the country welcomed this trend, as it legitimized their discipline, promised support for patients unable to afford psychotherapy otherwise, and ensured the livelihood of analysts less successful at attracting private patients.[[4]](#footnote-4) At the same time, psychoanalysts beholden to Freud feared that integrating into a healthcare system would either undermine the autonomy of psychoanalytic practice or jeopardize the “critical” and therefore political components associated with psychoanalytic theory.

All of these debates concerned the status of West German psychoanalysis vis-à-vis the international Freudian community. Developments in Eastern Europe, where psychoanalysis either figured as a means to produce the self-managing worker or clashed with the Marxist-Leninist narrative or else survived in coded language among small groups (underground), did not affect most analysts in the Federal Republic.[[5]](#footnote-5) For them, IPA recognition was central, and while some authorities further east conjured up psychoanalysis in an effort to overcome dogmatic, authoritarian frames of mind,[[6]](#footnote-6) the deep-seated anti-individualism distinctive of Marxist appropriations of psychotherapy was anathema to (liberal) Western proclivities.

These narratives were embedded in larger disputes about the place of psychology in the post-1968 period. Psychoanalysts responded to numerous expectations at the time, whether these emanated from rival therapeutic schools, the medical establishment, or particular sections of the public. In doing so, they not only disclosed conflicting interpretations of what actually comprised their own “thought collective” (*Denkkollektiv*),[[7]](#footnote-7) but also levels of disagreement that relativize the notion of a neo-liberal governmentality sustaining discourse on the psyche in the 1970s and beyond.[[8]](#footnote-8) The essay will examine three controversies connected to the features outlined above: *How Freudian should psychoanalysis be? How much politics could it afford?* And *how much autonomy did it require?* Since all three pertained to the relative importance of science, hermeneutics, therapy, and cultural criticism in the thought collective that was psychoanalysis, they were interrelated. They were also related to the claims informing wider debates on psychotherapy at the time, namely whether it should facilitate self-actualization, self-governance, or social change.

Freud’s Legacy

To be a West German psychoanalyst in the late 1960s and 1970s meant, first and foremost, to follow in Sigmund Freud’s footsteps. The Freudian tradition incorporated many names, institutions, and commitments, but for analysts in the Federal Republic the legacy had as much to do with theory and praxis as it did with coming to terms with the past. Occasionally, confronting National Socialism involved deliberate attempts at *Vergangenheitsbewältiging*. This had been true in 1956, when Alexander Mitscherlich, Max Horkheimer, and others organized events on the occasion of Freud’s one-hundredth birthday;[[9]](#footnote-9) in 1967, when Mitscherlich and his wife Margarete Mitscherlich(-Nielsen) published *Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern*;[[10]](#footnote-10) and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when student activists appropriated Freudo-Marxist positions in an effort to banish an authoritarianism they equated with fascism.[[11]](#footnote-11) More often, however, dealing with the stains and scars of National Socialismmanifested itself more obscurely. Some analysts, for example, assumed that psychoanalysis was a Jewish science unsullied by Hitler’s despotism.[[12]](#footnote-12) Others surmised that membership in the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) amounted to democratization and Westernization. Yet others believed that specific Freudian premises (the inescapable conflict between unconscious drives and the strictures of civilization) or procedures (strengthening the “ego” vis-à-vis the “id” and “super-ego”) could serve as antidotes to irrational forces both in the individual and in society at larges.

For many (fledgling) psychotherapists, reclaiming Freud after 1945 entailed the possibility of (re)acquainting themselves with a tradition that had been interrupted in 1933. While psychotherapy continued to be offered in the Third Reich in the shape of a depth psychology that amalgamated Freudian, Jungian, and Adlerian components, the specifically German therapy (*Seelenheilkunde*) available at the Göring Institute in Berlin and elsewhere severed ties to the international psychoanalytic community.[[13]](#footnote-13)In the early Federal Republic, therapists who wished to retain the Göring Institute’s so-called neo-analytical approach made up a majority of members in the German Psychoanalytical Society (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft, DPG). The German Psychoanalytical Association (Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereiniging, DPV), founded as a break-away group in 1950, catered to analysts who sought to be readmitted to the Freudian camp.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Although later in the century the DPG would initiate a process of “Refreudianization”,[[15]](#footnote-15) it was the DPV that stood for Freud and the Freudian tradition until at least the 1990s. Reclaiming the founder of psychoanalysis occupied DPV members throughout the 1960s, as they (re)read the relevant literature, travelled abroad to learn from seasoned practitioners in the United States and Great Britain, and invited foreign analysts to offer supervisions and deliver lectures at West German institutes.[[16]](#footnote-16) Professional motives aside, opting for Freud was also always a political statement in a society that tended to associate psychoanalysis with a “strange treatment imported from the United States”.[[17]](#footnote-17)

More critical analysts found fault with this processes of reintegration. Günther Amnon, whose training analysts had included Carl Müller-Braunschweig in Berlin and Isaac Ramsey in Topeka, bemoaned the mythical status of the DPV as the standard-bearer of West German Freudianism. The Association, he complained, had morphed into a bureaucratic monster that tried to perpetuate ideas and traditions from the Victorian age. He also lambasted the IPA for arrogating the role of sole bestower of legitimacy on psychoanalytical organizations across the globe. Amnon would leave the DPV and found his own Deutsche Akademie für Psychoanalyse, establishing a form of dynamic psychiatry that was based on group therapy.[[18]](#footnote-18) Manfred Pohlen, an equally sharp detractor of “orthodox” psychoanalysis in the country, reported on how the DPV and IPA put pressure on conference organizers to suppress public lectures that did not conform with the official teachings of both groups.[[19]](#footnote-19) Not all critics were outsiders who had either never joined the DPV (like Pohlen) or abandoned mainstream psychoanalysis (like Amnon). Mitscherlich-Nielsen, for instance, castigated the Vereinigung for its slavish identification with the IPA, the consequences of which had condemned West German psychoanalysis to sterility, rigidity, and uniformity. What is more, the over-identification with Anglo-American institutions had enabled DPV members to side with the victors and disregard German responsibility (including the responsibility of non-Jewish analysts between 1933 and 1945) for National Socialism.[[20]](#footnote-20) Despite these expressions of loyalty, IPA members continued to mistrust developments in West Germany, so much so that attempts to host an IPA congress on German soil were resisted for many years. The first such conference would take place in Hamburg in 1985, forty years after the end of World War II.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Some of the developments outlined above – the desire to reconnect with and reclaim the Freudian heritage as well as the interaction with and deference to the IPA – no doubt contributed to what commentators registered as late as the 1980s, namely the lack of theoretical pluralism in West German psychoanalysis. Interdisciplinarity did exist, but often the choice of whether to embrace ego-psychology or object relations theory or constructivism or possibly Lacan ended in the reaffirmation of a drive theory most closely associated with Freud and elaborated by ego-psychologists such as Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolf Loewenstein.[[22]](#footnote-22) If elsewhere ego-psychology had ceased to dominate discussions on the future of psychoanalysis, fusing with object-relations theory and self-psychology to form the psychoanalytical mainstream in the 1960s and1970s,[[23]](#footnote-23) the situation in the Federal Republic was more complicated. While a broader reception of new approaches commenced in the 1970s,[[24]](#footnote-24) debates on the nature of psychoanalysis – how it differed from other psychotherapies, what it promised its patients, whether it could be applied to politics – revealed the continued relevance of Freudian drive theory.

During the celebrations commemorating Freud’s hundredth birthday in 1956, drive theory had already been prominently invoked to make sense of the past and to offer guidance for the future. Speakers spoke of the “drives” and “instincts” responsible for National Socialism and of “reason” and “rationality” as the means to strengthen individual psyches so as to withstand future onslaughts against “European civilization”.[[25]](#footnote-25) This reading of the Third Reich also influenced reactions to the student movement.[[26]](#footnote-26) Throughout the 1970s, analysts repeatedly described the deficits of the modern psyche in terms of regression, permissiveness, or malfunctions of the ego. Defined as a “controlling structure”, the ego was supposed to regulate and integrate demands originating from within and without the self.[[27]](#footnote-27) Threats to this mediating function, analysts noted, arose from a permissive (consumer) society that no longer “took seriously the drives”. Parents had failed to exercise their responsibility of regularly inculcating social norms that constituted the “super-ego”. Oral and aggressive drives among youths exposed in turn the extent to which regression characterized Western culture.[[28]](#footnote-28)

At the same time, analysts formulated what could be expected of psychoanalytic therapy. The modest goals delineated in many of the publications of this period reflected typical Freudian values, denying hopes for large-scale transformation – be it of individual psyches or society as a whole – which other contemporaries were anticipating as a result of psychological interventions. These objectives were sometimes couched in ordinary language, sometimes in the vocabulary of Freudian theory. The aims, however, were similar, ranging from the “expansion of consciousness” and the development of a “critical and self-critical ego” to the activation of “thought processes” that would prevent “instinctual demands” from being satisfied;[[29]](#footnote-29) from allowing patients to live more agreeable lives once unconscious motives had been uncovered to allowing patients to experience reality as less overwhelming once “neurotic misery” had been cleared away.[[30]](#footnote-30) If psychoanalysis worked, it would either lead to critical reflection about oneself (the cognitive promise) or better integration into life (the praxeological promise).[[31]](#footnote-31)

What it did not offer, at least for many analysts, was the gratification of certain desires, including the longing for expressiveness, authenticity, and self-actualization that often accompanied a hunger for experience (*Erfahrungshunger*).[[32]](#footnote-32) Johannes Cremerius, otherwise highly critical of conservative tendencies in West Germany’s psychoanalytical establishment, claimed that therapy was not about “reaching for the stars”. On the contrary, Freud would have opposed all calls for healing (*Heilungsbegriffen*) that aimed too high. Such a “sober skepticism” regarding psychoanalytical measures, Cremerius recalled, had been poignantly formulated during the IPA congress in 1975. At the London gathering, analysts repeatedly confirmed that the best that could be hoped for was “to get along together”.[[33]](#footnote-33) This was a far cry from the demands for emancipation that underlay popular perceptions of what psychotherapy could and should achieve.[[34]](#footnote-34)

**The Legacy of 1968**

According to Cremerius, institutional psychoanalysis had been overwhelmingly hostile to the student movement. Exceptions such as Mitscherlich or Horst-Eberhard Richter notwithstanding, members of the DVP and IPA repeatedly distanced themselves from aspirations to radically revamp individual psyches and social orders alike.[[35]](#footnote-35) True, the Freudian community sided with student activists in condemning “parental despotism”, “alienation” in the workplace, and “illiberal” university traditions. They also shared widespread calls for greater democratic participation. Still, a majority of analysts showed little sympathy for those students who had enthusiastically borrowed from Reich and Marcuse in order to supplant a bourgeois “reality principle” with social norms considerably more sympathetic to the free flow of libidinal energy. In this respect Mitscherlich was equally averse to endangering “civilization” by privileging the “pleasure principle” at the expense of the “reality principle”.[[36]](#footnote-36)

The impact of the student movement, however, was felt throughout the 1970s and 80s. There were several reasons for the generational imprint on psychoanalytical discussions. First, student concerns, including socialism and feminism, affected wide sections of the public.[[37]](#footnote-37) Second, in a heavily politicized climate, psychology was considered to be a progressive discipline. Third, analysts were compelled to dissociate themselves from new rivals, and in particular behavioral therapy. And fourth, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, whether in connection with one’s own discipline or elsewhere, forced analysts to take a stance in the public sphere. Where professionals had emphasized the tentative nature of the Freudian project, often as a means to minimize expectations that it could bring about dramatic change for patients or communities, the goals detailed in these self-descriptions could still be utilized politically. Summoning the virtues of critical awareness and self-reflection, analysts and sociologists close to psychoanalysis dismissed demands for salvation, revolutionary change, and self-governance, all of which were deemed to be incompatible with the Freudian tradition.

As the welfare state expanded in the 1970s, so did the provision of services in all areas of life, including higher education.[[38]](#footnote-38) The field of psychology benefited from these developments. Student numbers increased from 2.000 in 1960 to 20.012 in 1981.[[39]](#footnote-39) Analysts also profited from this turn of events. Psychoanalytical institutes, for example, attracted an ever-growing number of trainees (*Ausbildungskandidaten*).[[40]](#footnote-40) Throughout the 1970s, universities appointed analysts to chairs in psychosomatic medicine and psychotherapy. Counseling centers set up by student unions and church groups employed doctors qualified in analytic therapy.[[41]](#footnote-41) Occasionally, the popularity of psychoanalysis bordered on the utopian, as when student activists in Frankfurt requested that psychoanalysis replace psychology in the curriculum.[[42]](#footnote-42)

Over the course of the 1970s, however, analysts saw themselves confronted with calls for self-actualization on the one hand and efficiency on the other. The first need was met by the expansion of humanistic psychologyand other therapies offering the prospect of “authenticity”; the second was met by the growth of behavioral therapy promising to transform psychotherapy into a modern, evidence-based discipline.[[43]](#footnote-43) While it would be mistaken to speak of a decline of psychoanalysis in this period, analysts felt threatened by these developments, as Freudianism seemed increasingly out of touch both with the demands of clients inspired by the “psycho-boom” and universities keen to maintain scientific standards. Analysts reacted to these developments in several ways. Although a few lone voices emphatically denied any connection between Freud and politics,[[44]](#footnote-44) many others exploited his thinking to counter the challenges mentioned above. If analysts continued to advocate a kind of sober skepticism toward the idea of therapy as a transformational technique, there was less reluctance to refer to the cognitive promise (i.e. fostering a critical or self-critical ego) as a distinguishing mark of psychoanalysis. Other disciplines and schools, the argument went, lacked this feature, supposedly propagating “conventionalism”, “conformism”, and “efficiency” instead.

The “post-analytic” claims on psychology that scholars have equated with the “psycho-boom” did not go unnoticed among Freudians. Indeed, they could not help but address these new currents. On a more general level, the “boom” was viewed with suspicion. Analysts compared the emergence of different schools to short-lived fashions that captivated individuals in a manner reminiscent of religious sects.[[45]](#footnote-45) Like other fads, these new forms of therapy would never be able to establish themselves as serious competitors of psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, observers of these developments complained that colleagues continued to ignore the prevailing tastes that had nurtured the success of the new healing treatments.[[46]](#footnote-46) Had they engaged critically with these needs, they would realize that the longing for “sensualism” and “inwardness” so characteristic of the “psycho-boom” was merely a reaction to “pressures to adapt” in modern capitalist economies. Ego-autonomy could only prevail, this interpretation suggested, if patients resisted the social conditions that gave rise to conformist behavior in the first place.[[47]](#footnote-47) Prominent psychoanalysts, in other words, called attention to the environment as a major factor in accounting for psychological illness. The neat division between the late 1960s as a period sensitive to what was outside the individual (“you are sick because society is sick”) and the 1970s as a period ushering in the rule of self-governance (“society is sick because you are sick”) is difficult to sustain.[[48]](#footnote-48)

If society was at least partly to blame for the suffering that had made the “psycho-boom” possible, analysts argued, then society’s more recent preference for behavioral therapy would hardly improve matters. In discussions about how psychoanalysis differed from other psychotherapies, it was sometimes difficult to isolate methodological from political arguments. Early on, analysts had complained about the “instrumental thinking” typical of medicine and psychiatry, where “assembly line” attitudes to improving health undermined the quest for psychological well-being.[[49]](#footnote-49) In later years, the hermeneutical approach of psychoanalysis was pitted against the “positivism” found in rival schools of psychotherapy. Analysts repeatedly censured what they believed to be unique to behavioral therapy: its positivistic, efficiency-orientated, and affirmative reasoning.

If disorders of the psyche derived from social arrangements, it was incumbent upon analysts to recognize the historical processes underlying “hermeneutic” interpretations. This was all the more important in light of efforts, occasionally labeled as “unhistorical energetics”, to determine individuals’ “real” nature.[[50]](#footnote-50) As much as it was possible to study “psychotherapeutic processes” with recourse to “objectifying and quantifying” methods, only hermeneutic techniques produced “real insight” into the human condition.[[51]](#footnote-51) While such disavowals of “positivism” lay at the heart of a critical social psychology popular at Frankfurt’s Sigmund-Freud-Institut as well as among members of *Psyche*’s editorial board, it was not confined to analysts self-identifying as “progressive” or “leftist”.[[52]](#footnote-52) Helmut Thomä and Horst Kächele, for instance, perhaps best-known for their commitment to reconcile psychoanalysis with empirical studies, also dismissed attempts at transforming psychoanalysis into an explanatory science devoid of hermeneutical components.[[53]](#footnote-53)

If hermeneutics occasionally figured as the stick with which to beat “positivism” more generally, many analysts reserved their ire for an adversary closer to home, behavioral therapy. The reasons for singling out the latter were obvious, as itgained currency both in higher education and the health care community at large.[[54]](#footnote-54) Even so, the ideological grounds for this sort of boundary marking had defined psychoanalytical commentaries from the very outset.In the West German case, a strong affiliation with the Freudian tradition went hand in hand with the after-effects of 1968. For Mitscherlich-Nielsen, behavioral therapy differed fundamentally from psychoanalysis because it showed no interest in “expanding consciousness”, exploring the inner world, or strengthening the “critical and self-critical ego”.[[55]](#footnote-55) Removing symptoms alone, other analysts averred, played into the hands of patients fearful of “expanding freedom” (*Freiheitsspielräume*), preferring as they did unenlightened immaturity. More seriously, symptom-orientated therapies were unable to ascertain the “etiological connections” between social structures on the one hand and psychological structures on the other. Freud’s critical potential, according to this assessment, lay precisely in the ability to make sense of these connections. In short, where behavioral therapy led to conformism (*Anpassung*) and fatalism, psychoanalysis challenged power relations (*Herrschaftsverhältnisse*).[[56]](#footnote-56)

Such critiques were not confined to the early 1970s. Indeed, it can be argued that the more behavioral therapy expanded, the more strident the objections. Many of these negative assessments involved analyses of behavioral therapy as a method sympathetic to the interests of industry. Like other “dissociative-corrective techniques”, the aim was to rid individuals of “objectionable and/or inadequate segments” so as to “adjust to a desirable level of performance (*Leistungsniveau*)”. The primary goal, on this reading, was to ensure that patients returned to a state that enabled them to function properly.[[57]](#footnote-57) Analysts frequently censured behavioral therapy for adopting instrumental reasoning rather than a holistic perspective. Hans-Geert Metzger, for example, relied on Jürgen Habermas’ juxtaposition of agency as domination (*Beherrschung menschlicher und nichtmenschlicher Natur*) and agency as communicative action (*kommunikatives Handeln*) to stress the uncritical, functionalist, and conformist philosophy supposedly intrinsic to behavioral therapy.[[58]](#footnote-58)

The language directed at the adversary could be harsher still. Several analysts described the legacy of John Watson and B. F. Skinner as a “meaningless (*sinnentleert*) technical perfectionism” bordering on “totalitarian control”.[[59]](#footnote-59) Manfred Pohlen, whose reservations toward “orthodox” psychoanalysis we have encountered earlier, compared ego psychology to behavioral therapy – with the intention of disparaging both. Ego psychology served to exalt psychoanalysis to the position of *Legitimitationswissenschaft.* By denying the importance of unconscious drives, Hartmann and other ego psychologists had made Freud palatable to positivism. Behavioral therapy was similarly conformist, mirroring the “average ethical code of the average American”: “whoever lives by this “canon” lives an ordinary life”. By compartmentalizing human beings, cognitive therapists denied the unavoidable inner battle between the “id” and the “super-ego”.[[60]](#footnote-60) Metzger agreed. If psychoanalysis wished to emulate behavioral therapy, it would have to renounce the Freudian tradition and continue along the lines of ego psychology. The end result, he feared, would be a therapy striving for efficiency in an “uncritical, generalizing and meaningless” way.[[61]](#footnote-61)

These figures were not lone voices whose political understanding of psychoanalysis had somehow survived the demise of the student movement. On the contrary, the notion that psychoanalysis, however much part of the state (health care system), remained a heterodox science, resonated with many analysts. Their enthusiasm for Marx, Reich, and Marcuse may have been muted or non-existent, but many of the more conservative practitioners acknowledged that Freud’s interventions had been instances of critical enlightened thinking. When Peter Kutter, professor of psychoanalysis and acting director at the Sigmund-Freud-Institut, faced criticism in the mid- to late 1980s for his willingness to write a report on the psychological development of young recruits in the West German army,[[62]](#footnote-62) his defense disclosed the impact of earlier debates on the nature of psychoanalysis. Kutter declared that, far from paying court to the powers-that-be, his work for the Bundeswehr was informed by an inherently critical stance. Behavioral therapists working for the army, for instance, had read his account as an attack on the “system Bundeswehr”.[[63]](#footnote-63) His recommendations, moreover, were intended to nurture the soldiers’ “reasoning powers and critical faculties” (*Denk- und Kritikfähigkeit*). Finally, psychoanalysis could never be abused politically, Kutter reminded his detractors, given that its method of uncovering unconscious processes would always be an instrument of enlightenment.[[64]](#footnote-64)

**(Not) Seeing Like a State**

Psychoanalysts not only confronted the “psycho-boom” and the rise of behavioral therapy. They were similarly pre-occupied with their own self-understanding as the successors of Freud in a country that had incorporated psychotherapy into the state-run health insurance system. Analysts realized that the much-touted “unity of praxis, teaching, and research” would always be more of an ideal than a reality. The “splendid” isolation that had existed in the early years of the “movement”, when analysts in Vienna and Berlin set out to professionalize psychoanalysis,[[65]](#footnote-65) was a thing of the past. Now, analysts were forced to negotiate the relationship between university institutes and psychoanalytic institutes; state institutions and psychoanalytic institutions; and medicine and psychotherapy. Many of these disputes revolved around the question of Freudian autonomy and authenticity.[[66]](#footnote-66)

In the early 1970s, the state employed approximately half of all trained psychologists (*Diplompsychologen*); at the end of the decade, the figure rose to two thirds.[[67]](#footnote-67) Although analysts belonged to the group of state employees, particularly at counseling centers and in academia, they remained outsiders on account of their backgrounds. Unlike a majority of behavioral therapists, DPV members tended to join medical faculties rather than psychological institutes.[[68]](#footnote-68) Like many behavioral therapists, however, they encountered the state primarily through the health care system, which began to finance analytical psychotherapy and depth psychology (*Tiefenpsychologie*) from 1967 and behavioral therapy from 1987 onward.[[69]](#footnote-69) This proximity to state institutions forced analysts to reconsider their place in society, a debate that occurred at two levels. On the one hand, international discussions about the “essence” of psychoanalysis addressed the commonalities of a discipline that some compared to a “normal science”;[[70]](#footnote-70) on the other, West German discussions about the discipline’s scientific status were intertwined with the question of whether expectations “alien” to the enterprise should be accommodated.

Beginning in the early 1980s, prominent practitioners expressed growing concerns about the fragmentation of psychoanalysis. At the IPA’s annual conferences in Montreal in 1987 and Rome in 1989, Robert Wallerstein addressed both the reigning theoretical pluralism that documented psychoanalysis’ transformation since Freud and the need to find common ground lest pluralism make dialogue impossible. While Wallerstein recounted the many divergences from Freud’s original drive theory, he also suggested that a prevalent “experience-near clinical theory” (as opposed to “experience-distant” metapsychology) could be discerned in the day-to-day practice of most analysts. In many consulting rooms, he noted, therapists worked with the “phenomena of resistance and defense, of anxiety and conflict and compromise, of self- and object-representation, of transference and countertransference”. Wallerstein’s interventions did not go unanswered. Roy Schafer, for instance, held that different techniques reflected different metapsychologies, so that the radical pluralism unique to psychoanalysis should be “celebrated” rather than “deplored”.[[71]](#footnote-71) Such a stance, however, was bound to frustrate efforts at achieving scientific status. Any science, Wallerstein maintained, was “obligated to strive for a unifying theoretical structure that explains best, and most parsimoniously, the range of phenomena that are demarcated within its conceptual boundaries”.[[72]](#footnote-72) If one (Freudian, Kleinian, Kohutian, Lacanian) theory was correct, the other(s) had to be false.

In the Federal Republic, many analysts were sympathetic to Wallerstein’s cause. They affirmed that, regardless of differences between concepts and methods, “experience-near” clinical observation reinforced psychoanalysis’ claim of being evidence-based.[[73]](#footnote-73) For theorists beholden to the hermeneutical tradition, experience and evidence (*Evidenzerlebnis*) coexisted, allowing analysts to grasp recurring patterns of interaction which earlier repressed encounters had engendered. Some analysts relied on “scenic understanding” (*szenisches Verstehen*) to uncover these patterns, [[74]](#footnote-74) others relied on “inter-personal consensus” to establish the “truth” behind neurotic behavior.[[75]](#footnote-75) Even where practitioners differed in their theoretical outlook, they shared the conviction that “repetition” and “change” could be monitored reliably in the consulting room. Recording what happened in such clinical settings would produce a body of knowledge subject to collective appraisal. Ideally, then, therapy consisted in a combination of hermeneutical understanding and causal explanation.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Where much agreement existed on the soundness of psychoanalytic findings, less unity existed on how analysts should relate these findings – and the methods that generated them – to the rest of society. Which aspects of the psychoanalytic tradition – the frequency of sessions, the role of training analysis, the length of individual therapies, the self-understanding of analysts – were to be altered or even sacrificed for the sake of state recognition? Was Freudian autonomy to be protected at all costs, or was this autonomy responsible for sect-like behavior that made a mockery of the promise to develop self-critical egos? Would society be better served if analysts kept to themselves, resisting the temptation of state recognition, or was state recognition essential to treating as many patients as possible? Similar to disputes over the legacies of Freud and the student movement, the debate on autonomy turned on the relative importance of (positivistic) science, the place of therapy in psychoanalytic identity, and psychoanalysis as an instrument that would hold up a mirror to the rest of society.

Looking back at the state of West German psychoanalysis in the 1970s and 80s, Otto Kernberg recalled how practitioners in the DPV had felt threatened by the prospect of decreasing the number of weekly therapeutic sessions from four to three, a reduction implemented in French and Uruguayan psychoanalytic associations. Many German analysts preferred to abide by a rule, Kernberg suggested, that demonstrated loyalty to an international movement that had only recently readmitted them.[[77]](#footnote-77) In fact, throughout this period analysts differentiated between one technique – “psychoanalysis” – that required at least four weekly hours and another – “psychotherapy” – that involved fewer sessions. Many analysts were loath to admit that they rarely “analyzed” patients. Two surveys in 1987 disabused the psychoanalytic public of the false belief that analysts were principally applying psychoanalytic treatments. The first showed that only 7.1 percent of members of the DGPT (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse, Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie) treated patients four times a week. The second showed that 62 percent of patients cared for by DPV members saw their therapists once or twice a week only.[[78]](#footnote-78) These figures were hardly exceptional. A study conducted by the Menninger Foundation in Kansas over a period of thirty years (1952-1982)had shown that “the therapeutic modalities of psychoanalysis, expressive psychotherapy, and supportive psychotherapy hardly exist in ideal or pure form in the real world of actual practice” and “that real treatments in actual practice are intermingled blends of expressive–interpretive and supportive-stabilizing elements”.[[79]](#footnote-79)Both Dutch and American analysts conceded that fewer and fewer patients – in the United States just over 30 percent in 1978 – met their therapists four times a week or more.[[80]](#footnote-80)

In spite of these statistics, critics of the arrangement with the health insurance system raised several methodological and ideological concerns. Echoing traditional Freudian caveats, they questioned whether patients financially dependent on the state could act independently toward their therapists. Likewise, they questioned whether the autonomy of analysts would suffer if these could bank on a steady income from the state.[[81]](#footnote-81) At a DPV workshop in 1978, skeptics outlined how analytic therapies would be adversely affected on several fronts because of health insurance funding. Aggressive forms of transference would arise less frequently, for example, as money would no longer play a role in the relationship between analyst and analysand. More seriously still, transference as such would be impeded as the state became “the all-powerful, nurturing, phallic mother”, diminishing the function of the analyst as the object of projective identification.[[82]](#footnote-82)

What is more, notable analysts called on their colleagues to resist the temptation of efficiency – whether manifested in “micro- or macroeconomic terms”. The pressure to conform to such standards, they warned, endangered the Freudian ideal of a “strict, non-tendentious psychoanalysis”. They regretted that the health care system did not appreciate psychotherapy as an open-ended process and refused to approve therapies beyond the 300-hour threshold.[[83]](#footnote-83) The language used to justify limits to the number of therapeutic sessions, Carl Nedelmann and Reichmut Reiche complained, revealed an economic thinking that stunted psychoanalysis in the name of “solidarity” (*Solidargemeinschaft*).[[84]](#footnote-84) Gottfried Appy, chairman of the DPV from 1986 to 1988, went one step further, declaring that therapists who reduced the frequency of sessions ceased to be analysts in all but name.[[85]](#footnote-85) Appy also recommended two possible loopholes that would prevent the “corruption” of Freudian integrity: either practitioners should disengage from state-run institutions altogether or they should take advantage of the system by initially applying for high-frequency analyses and then, upon quickly reaching the 240-300-hour maximum, entering private contracts in order to continue along the analytic path.[[86]](#footnote-86) Finally, Klaus Horn, Horst-Eberhard Richter, Hans Martin Lohmann, Hans-Geert Metzger, and Johannes Cremerius all feared that psychoanalysis would lose its political potential, particularly vis-à-vis the state, if it degenerated into mere therapy that would leave analysts bereft of their critical powers and turn them into simple “experts of inwardness” (*Innerlichkeitsexperten*). The “medicalization” and “therapeutization” of psychoanalysis was to be opposed at all costs.[[87]](#footnote-87) While such warnings became less common in later years, they did not subside after German unification.[[88]](#footnote-88)

**Conclusion**

Many of the questions facing West German analysts were not unfamiliar to colleagues elsewhere. They too reflected on the best methods to treat patients, they too considered the (political) legacy of Freud, they too meditated on the (potential) role of psychotherapy in the health care system. As in other European countries, West German analysts deliberated the drawbacks and opportunities of state-funded psychotherapy.[[89]](#footnote-89) Left-wing intellectuals and activists claimed psychoanalysis as a tool to challenge repression, imperialism, and authoritarianism.[[90]](#footnote-90) In all of these places, however, Freud did not assume the symbolic role that had been reserved for him in the Federal Republic. Here he not only figured as the founder of psychoanalysis, but also embodied liberal democracy, re-integration into the West, and *Wiedergutmachung*. Throughout the period in question, it proved difficult to discard his drive theory, even where practitioners acknowledged the importance of rival concepts In fact, Freudian drive theory was regularly conjured up in public disputes. When analysts warned against revolutionary transformation, Freud stood for rationality in the face of irrationality. When they rejected calls for spiritual self-actualization, he stood for sobriety and constraint. When they lambasted “affirmative” behavioral therapy, he stood for self-critical enlightenment. And when they objected to state-legislated psychotherapy, he stood for critical theory against “therapeutization”.

This does not mean that West German psychoanalysis was not implicated in the “technologies of the self” that critics have identified with governmentality. Nikolas Rose in particular has criticized the psy disciplines for contributing to an order that privileged selves “freed from all moral obligations but the obligation to construct a life of its own choosing, a life in which it realizes itself”. According to this reading of events, life in the late twentieth was “measured by the standards of personal fulfillment rather than community welfare or moral fidelity, given purpose through the accumulation of choices and experiences”. The downside of this “norm of autonomy”, Rose contends, was a “constant and intense self-scrutiny, a continual evaluation of our personal experiences, emotions, and feelings in relation to images of satisfaction, the necessity to narrativize our lives in a vocabulary of interiority”.[[91]](#footnote-91) Perusing psychoanalytic discourse in the wake of 1968, it is easy to detect references to autonomy and freedom, to psychic health as the ability to make choices that psychological ill health had precluded. It is equally easy to equate psychoanalysis with the language of interiority.

Compelling as this image may be, there is reason to mistrust the thesis that, in quasi hegemonic fashion, governmentality proceeded from and usurped the psy disciplines in the name of “neoliberalism”. As this essay has tried to show, psychoanalysis in general and West German psychoanalysis in particular complicate the picture. Freudians hardly imagined selves untouched by moral obligations. They never promised that the conflict between the “id” (drives) and the “super-ego” (introjected social norms) could be resolved conclusively. They acknowledged that society was at least partly to blame for neurotic misery, and renounced the idea that “personal fulfillment” trumped “community welfare”. As much as the “continual evaluation” of personal experiences and emotions were the stuff of psychoanalytic treatment, its goal did not boil down to “satisfaction”. The self, at least for most analysts, was not about “options” uncontaminated by “fate”,[[92]](#footnote-92) but rather about fates that therapy would make a little bit less suffocating. The Freudian community was hardly singular in pondering the personal and social implications of constant self-reflexivity or in disagreeing over the extent to which the state should determine the exact course of therapeutic treatment.

Future research might gauge the relative impact of “governmentality” on individual lives. As much as therapy was about “normalization” and self-optimization, it does not follow that those who undertook treatment uncritically acceded to the directives of a given technique. The ambivalence of the process, which could involve “exit”, “voice”, or “loyalty”,[[93]](#footnote-93) should not be discounted. While the pressures associated with constant self-scrutiny have been rightly highlighted, this was only part of the story. For some, self-reflexivity was a liberating experience. Here self-governance related more to critical insight than to an ethos of performance. It could just as well originate in traditions connected to enlightenment values or the *bürgerlicher Wertehimmel.* It allowed parents, for example, to surmount traditions of child-rearing they increasingly found wanting.[[94]](#footnote-94) It allowed homosexuals to overcome the shame they had felt all their lives.[[95]](#footnote-95) “Therapeuticization” often suggests that therapy amounted solely to the “inwardness” of disconnected selves. It did not have to. Sometimes, personal engagement with emotions – fear, shame, guilt, anger – enabled men and women to publicly combat sexism or homophobia.[[96]](#footnote-96) It helped others to “change their personal relations, solves conflicts, and relate differently to their bodies”.[[97]](#footnote-97) The more historians examine the effects of “technologies of the self” on the ground, then, the more we will come to understand the ways in which individuals responded to the demands associated with self-governance – demands that altered lives, but that did not necessarily lead to unthinking, apolitical, and immoral monads navigating the nasty seas of neoliberal society.

1. Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul. The Shaping of the Private Self, London 1999, p. 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. On this traditionalism, see Sarah Marks, Psychotherapy in historical perspective, in: History of the Human Sciences, 30, 2017, pp. 3-16, here p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. On the alternative milieu, see Sven Reichardt, Authentizität und Gemeinschaft. Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren, Berlin 2014. On the psycho-boom as a post-analytic phenomenon, see Maik Tändler, Das therapeutische Jahrzehnt. Der Psychoboom in den siebziger Jahren, Göttingen 2016, chapter 9; Jens Elberfeld, Anleitung zur Selbstregulation. Eine Wissensgeschichte der Therapeutisierung im 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main and New York 2020, pp. 175, 419. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The historical literature refers to “patients” rather than “clients”. In using the former term, I am not suggesting that men and women seeking therapy were “ill”. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sarah Marks, Suggestion, persuasion and work: Psychotherapies in Communist Europe, in: European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 20, 2018, 10–24, here p. 16; Christiane Leuenberger, Cultures of Categories: Psychological Projects before and after the Trandsition from State Socialism in 1989 in East Germany, in: Greg Eghigian, Andreas Killen, and Christine Leuenberger (eds.), The Self as Project. Politics and the Humans Sciences, Chicago 2007, 180-204; Werner König and Michael Geyer, Wiederannäherung an die Psychoanalyse in den 1960er Jahren, in: pp. Michael Geyer (ed.), Psychotherapie in Ostdeutschland. Geschichte und Geschichten 1945-1995, Göttingen 2011, pp. 161-164, here p. 163; Mat Savelli, The Peculiar Prosperity of Psychoanalysis in Socialist Yugoslavia, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 91, 2013, pp. 262-288, here pp. 263-264, 266, 275, 285. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ana Antic, Raing a true socialist individual: Yugoslav psychoanalysis and the creation of democratic Marxist citizens, in: Social History, 44, 2019, pp. 86–115. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ludwig Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, Frankfurt am Main 1980. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. On the “regime” of neo-liberal governmentality, see, for example, Reichardt, Authentizität, pp. 66-71; Sabine Massen, Genealogie der Unmoral. Zur Therapeutisierung sexueller Selbste, Frankfurt am Main 1998; idem., Das beratende Selbst. Zur Genealogie der Therapeutisierung in den “langen” Siebzigern. Eine Persepktivierung, in: idem., Jens Elberfeld, Pascal Eitler, and Maik Tändler (eds.), Das beratene Selbst. Zur Genealogie der Therapeutisierung in den “langen” Siebzigern, Bielefeld 2011, pp. 7-33; Ulrich Bröckling, Das unternehmerische Selbst. Soziologie einer Subjektivisierungsform, Frankfurt am Main 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Dirks (eds.), Freud in der Gegenwart. Ein Vortragszyklus der Universitäten Frankfurt und Heidelberg zum hundertsten Geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main 1957; Münchener Universitätsreden. Neue Folge, Heft 19. Sigmund Freud Gedenkfeier zur 100. Wiederkehr seines Geburtages am 7. Juli 1956 veranstaltet von der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität und der Deutschen Forschungsanstalt für Psychiatrie, Munich 1956; Timo Hoyer, Im Getümmel der Welt. Alexander Mitscherlich – Ein Porträt, Göttingen 2008, pp. 329-340. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Alexander und Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens, Munich 1967; Tobias Freimüller, Alexander Mitscherlich. Gesellschaftsdiagnosen und Psychoanalyse nach Hitler, Göttingen 2007, pp. 303-321; Martin Dehli, Leben als Konflikt. Zur Biographie Alexander Mitscherlichs, Göttingen 2007, pp. 273-283. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See, for example, Claus-Dieter Rath, Begehren und Aufbegehren. Eine Skizze zum Verhältnis von Kritischer Theorie, Psychoanalyse und Studentenbewegung, in: Luzifer-Amor, 14, 2001, pp. 50-99; Uta Gerhardt, Hedonismus und Revolution. Zur Rezeption der Psychoanalyse in der Berliner Studentenbewegung der sechziger Jahre, in: Luzifer-Amor, 27, 2014, pp. 25-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. On several occasions Mitscherlich called psychoanalysis a “Jewish science” and psychoanalysts a persecuted minority similar to the Jews. See Alexander-Mitscherlich-Archiv (AMA), Frankfurt am Main, Allgemeine Korrespondenz, I 2457.19, Mischerlich letter to Horkheimer, 25.7.1966; AMA, VII 35, Frankfurter Kongreß 1964, Redenmanuskript, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. On the Göring Institute, see especially Geoffrey Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich. The Göring Institute, New Brunswick 1997; Regine Lockot, Erinnern und Durcharbeiten. Zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und Psychotherapie im Nationalsozialismus, Gießen 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. On these developments, see, for example, Regine Lockot, Die Reinigung der Psychoanalyse. Die Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft im Spiegel von Dokumenten und Zeitzeugen (1933-1951), Tübingen 1994; Anthony D. Kauders, Der Freud-Komplex. Eine Geschichte der Psychoanalyse in Deutschland, Berlin 2014, chapter 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Michael Schröter, Zurück ins Weite: Die Internationalisierung der deutschen Psychoanalyse nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Heinz Bude and Bernd Greiner (eds.), Westbindungen. Amerika in der Bundesrepublik, Hamburg 1999, pp. 93-118, here p. 115; Franz Wellendorf, Zur Geschichte der DFG nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Psyche, special volume on IPA congress in Berlin, 61, 2007, pp. 404-411. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid., pp. 102, 105; Archiv der Psyche (AdP), Folder 1976, M-Z, Lutz Rosenkötter to Rose Spiegel (New York), 19.2.1976; Ludger M. Hermanns, Die Gründung der DPV im Jahre 1950—im Geiste der ‘Orthodoxie’ und auf der Suche nach internationaler Anerkennung, in: Psyche, 64, 2010, pp. 1156-1173, here p. 1157. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Brocher, Einfluß, p. 322. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. AdP, Folder 1970, A-K, exchange of letters between Günter Amnon and Helmut Thomä, epecially Amnon’s letter of 8.1.1970. See also Dynamische Psychiatrie*,* 3, 1970, pp. 52–57. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. AdP, Folder 1979, A-Z, Pohlen letter to Klaus Horn, 9.11.1979. The psychoanalyst Pohlen served as both director of the university clinic for psychotherapy and professor at the Philipps-Universität Marburg. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Theorie in der Krise, in: Psyche, 41, 1987, pp. 961-967, here pp. 962-964. For a similar view couched in less acerbic terms, see Hermanns, Gründung der DPV, p. 1169. See also Helmut Thomä, Psychohistorische Hintergründe typischer Identitätsprobleme deutscher Psychoanalytiker, in: Forum Psychoanalyse, 2, 1986, pp. 59-69. On the rigidity of adopting post-1945 Anglo-American Freudianism, see also Werner Bohleber, Zur Aktualität von Sigmund Freud – wider das Veralten der Psychoanalyse, in: Psyche, Sonderheft September/October, 2006, pp. 783-798, here p. 791. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. AMA, IIa 35, Protokoll der Sitzungen von Vorstand u. Ausbildungsausschuß, 4 and 5 May, Ulm; Otto Kernberg, Die Psychoanalyse in Deutschland: Ein persönlicher Blick, in: Psyche, special volume on IPA congress in Berlin, 61, 2007, pp. 375-385, here p. 376-379. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. On the non-reception of Lacan, see AdP, 1975, folder L-Z, letter by Caroline Neubauer to Helmut Dahmer, 6.12.1975. On the pluralism of ideas that did not always mean the appropriation of new ideas, see Helmut Thomä, Identität und Selbstverständnis des Psychoanalytikers, in: Psyche, 31, 1977, pp. 1-42, here pp. 9, 37; Werner Bohleber, Die Gegenwart der Psychoanalyse. Zur Entwicklung ihrer Theorie und Behandlungstechnik nach 1945, in: idem. and Sibylle Drews (eds.), Die Gegenwart der Psychoanalyse – die Psychoanalyse der Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2001, pp. 15-34, here pp. 16-17. On Hartmann’s influence in West Germany, see Werner Bohleber, Die Entwicklung der Psychoanalyse in Deutschland nach 1950, in: Psyche, 64, 2010, pp. 1243-1267, here pp. 1249-1250. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Michael Ermann, Psychoanalyse in den Jahren nach Freud. Entwicklungen 1940-1975, Stuttgart 2009, pp. 51-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Dagmar Herzog, Cold War Freud. Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catasrophes, Cambridge 2017, p. 145; Michael Ermann, Psychoanalyse heute. Entwicklungen seit 1975 und aktuelle Bilanz, Stuttgart 2012, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Adorno und Dirks, Freud in der Gegenwart, pp. 8, 32-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See the following section. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Hans Müller-Braunschweig, Zur Genese der Ich-Störungen, in: Psyche, 24, 1970, pp. 657-677, here pp. 657-658. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See, for example, Henry and Yala Lowenfeld, Die permissive Gesellschaft und das Über-Ich. Freuds Gedanken zur Kulturentwicklung, vom Standpunkt der Gegenwart betrachtet, in: Psyche, 24, 1970, pp. 706-720, here pp. 708-713; Wolfang Loch, Gedanken über “Gegenstand”, Ziele und Methoden der Psychoanalyse, in: Psyche, 25, 1971, pp. 881-910, here pp. 891, 900. Loch’s paper was based on a lecture at the British Psychoanalytical Society given in March 1971; Johann Schülein, Psychoanalyse und Psychoboom. Bemerkungen zum sozialen Sinnkontext threapeutischer Modelle, in: Psyche, 32, 1978, pp. 420-436, here pp. 432-433. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Was macht einen guten Analytiker aus? Literaturübersicht und kritische Erwägungen, in: Psyche, 24, 1970, pp. 577-599, here pp. 579, 590; Carl Nedelmann and Klaus Horn, Gesellschaftliche Aufgaben der Psychotherapie, in: Psyche, 30, 1976, pp. 827-853, p. 831; Loch, Gedanken, p. 898. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Wolfgang Loch, Psychoanalyse und Wahrheit, in: Psyche, 30, 1976, pp. 865-895, here pp. 865-866. Loch’s piece was based on lectured delivered in Bremen and Helsenki. Nedelmann and Horn, Aufgaben, p. 838. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. For a distinction between the two, see Helmut Thomä and Horst Kächele, Wissenschaftstheoretische und methodologische Probleme der klinisch-psychoanalytischen Forschung. II Teil, in: Psyche, 27, 1973, pp. 309-355, here pp. 313-316. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Tändler, Jahrzehnt, p. 338; Elberfeld, Anleitung, pp. 184-186, 315; Häberlin, Contemporary Self, p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Cremerius, Präsenz des Dritten, pp. 12-13. See also idem., Die hochfrequente Langzeitanalyse und die psychoanalytische Praxis. Utopie und Realität, in: Psyche, 44, 1990, pp. 1-29, here p. 22; Wolfram Lüders, Psychoanalyse versus Familientherapie, in: Psyche, 37, 1983, pp. 462-469, here pp. 468-469. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. For conservative criticism of this kind of “emancipation ideology”, see Jens Hacke, Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit. Die liberalkonservative Begründung der Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2006, pp. 109-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Johannes Cremerius, „Psychoanalyse als Beruf oder “Zieh’ aus mein Herz und suche Freud”, in: Ludger M. Hermanns (ed.), Psychoanalyse in Selbstdarstellungen II, Tübingen 1992, pp. 73-144, here p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. AMA, X26, Hypothesen über sozialpsychologische Ursachen des Studentenprotestes, Diskussionsgrundlage für Montag, 19.5.1969, Zusammenstellung aus der Diskussion vom 21.4.1969; AMA,VII Beitrag für Titel, Thesen, Temperamente, HR, zweite Fassung, 30.11.1970; AMA, I 4527.13, Lutz Rosenkötter to Mitscherlich, 29.4.1969; AdP, Folder 1969, A-K, Peter Modenhauer to Ernst Klett Verlag, 15.12.1969; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BArch), Bestand 339, 216, Frederick Wyatt “Klinische Beobachtungen zur Krise der Autorität”, 17.4.1969. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. For psychoanalysts who adopted feminist critiques of psychoanalysis, see Yanara Schmacks, “Only Mothers can be True Revolutionaries”: The Politicization of Motherhood in 1980s West German Psychoanalysis, in: Psychoanalysis and History, 23, 2021, pp. 49–73. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 91-98; Anselm Doerring-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven der Zeitgeschichte, Göttingen 2012, pp. 47, 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. The popularity of psychology was not confined to the Federal Republic. For the United States, see Jessica Grogan, Encountering America. Humanistic Psychology, Sixties Culture, and the Shaping of the Modern Self, New York 2013, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Bohleber, Entwicklung, p. 1255; Steffen Dörre, “Im wesentlichen von den Psychiatern gesteuert, welche uns das ganze Problem eingebrockt haben”? Die Psychiatrie-Enquete als entscheidender Impuls für die Etablierung des Politikfeldes “psychotherapeutische Versorgung”, in: Luzifer-Amor, 34, 2021, pp. 7-48, here p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. AMA, IIb 94, Psychotherapeutische Beratung für Studierende im Studentenwerk Frankfurt, Arbeitsbericht für den Zeitraum vom 1. Mai 1969 bis 1. Mai 1970; Studentenwerk Frankfurt am Main, Geschäftsführer Kath an Rektor, 1.6.1970; Wolfram Lüders, Sechs Jahre Beratung. Arbeitsbericht der Evangelischen Beratungsstellen Frankfurt am Main, in: Psyche, 30, 1976, pp. 327-337. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. BArch, Bestand 339, 1744, Peter Kutter to Mitscherlich on appointment processes (*Berufungsverfahren*) at Frankfurt University, 6.7.1974. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Tändler, Jahrzehnt, p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See, for example, AdP, Folder 1978, A-L, Igor Caruso to Psyche editorial office, 30.6.1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Nedelmann and Horn, Aufgaben, p. 843. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Schülein, Psychoanalyse und Psychoboom, p. 421, 430. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Hans-Geert Metzger, Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Anmerkungen zum gegenwärtigen Verhältnis von Psychoanalyse und Verhaltenstherapie, in: Psyche, 38, 1984, pp. 329-343, here p. 335. See also Klaus Horn, Gibt es einen Aggressionstrieb?, in: Psyche, 26, 1972, pp. 799-817, here803-805; Nedelmann and Horn, Aufgaben, p. 848-850; Schülein, Psychoanalyse und Psychoboom, p. 428; Loch, Gedanken, p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Maasen, Das beratene Selbst, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. AMA, Allgemeine Korrespondenz, I 4527, Lutz Rosenkötter to Mitscherlich, 13.8.1970. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Horn, Aggressionstrieb, p. 807. Such early critiques of plans to “biologize” the human psyche were also directed against leftist supporters of Wilhelm Reich. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Lutz Rosenkötter, Die psychoanalytische Situation als Grundlage der psychoanalytischen Therapie, in: Psyche, 27, 1973, pp. 989-1000, here pp. 994, 997. See also Hermann Argelander, Über psychoanalytische Kompetenz, in: Psyche, 28, 1974, pp. 1063-1076. The article was based on a talk held in Hamburg at the official opening ceremony of the Michael-Balint-Institut in February 1974. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. IPA and DPV members complained that too many “sociological” and “political” articles were being published in the *Psyche.* See AdP, Folder 1983, A-J, Hans-Martin Lohmann to Elisabeth Brainin, 2.12.1983; Folder 1983, K-Z, Hans-Martin Lohmann to Helmut Dahmer, 22.11.1983; Folder 1986, A-G, Helmut Dahmer to Hermann Argelander, 24.3.1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Helmut Thomä and Horst Kächele, Wissenschaftstheoretische und methodologische Probleme der klinisch-psychoanalytischen Forschung. I Teil, in: Psyche, 27, 1973, pp. 205-236, here p. 207; idem, Probleme Teil II, p. 320. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. As the authorities refused to incorporate humanistic psychology (*Gesprächspsychotherapie*) into the health care system, it posed less of a threat than behavioral therapy. What is more, Abraham Maslow, one of the founders of humanistic psychology, repeatedly spoke of the “evil” emanating from society and self-actualization going hand in hand with non-conformism. See Grogan, Encountering America, pp. 12-13, 50, 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Mitscherlich-Nielsen, Analytiker, p. 579. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Nedelmann and Horn, Aufgaben, pp. 831, 848; Udo Eberenz, Die Rolle und die Funktion des Psychotherapeuten in der Psychotherapie. Ein Vergleich zwischen Psychoanalyse und Verhaltensmodifikation, in: Sebastian Goeppert (ed.), Die Beziehung zwischen Arzt und Patient. Zur psychoanalytischen Theorie und Praxis, Munich 1975, pp. 76-91, here pp. 80, 88; Peter Fürstenau, Probleme der vergleichenden Psychotherapieforschung, in: Claus Henning Bachmann, Psychoanalyse und Verhaltenstherapie, Frankfurt am Main 1972, pp. 18-57, here p. 39; Hans Strotzka, Fortschritte der Neurosentherapie, in: Bachmann, Psychoanalyse und Verhaltenstherapie, pp. 18-57, here pp. 68-69; in: Mario Muck, Krankheit, Konflikt und das Konzept der Psychoanalyse, in: Mario Muck et al., Information über Psychoanalyse. Therapeutische, theoretische und interdisziplinäre Aspekte, Frankfurt am Main 1974, pp. 10-36, here pp. 37, 39, 44, 47; Rolf Klüver, Die Zielsetzung der Psychoanalyse und einiger anderer psychotherapeutischer Verfahren, in: Muck, Krankheit, pp. 64-77, here p. 75; Udo Eberenz, Psychoanalyse und Verhaltenstherapie, in: Muck, Krankheit, pp. 78-107, here pp. 81, 91-93, 99, 103, 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Schülein, Psychoanalyse und Psychoboom, p. 434. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Hans-Geert Metzger, Selbstkontrolle und Selbstsicherheit. Zu neueren Techniken der Verhaltenstherapie, in: Psyche, 33, 1979, pp. 29-62, here pp. 38-39, 49-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. #  Christian Niemeyer, Sprechzimmer, Buschflugzeug und Sozialarbeit, in: Psyche, 32, 1978, pp. 860-886, here p. 862. Niemeyer was quoted approvingly in Eckhard Schiffer and Rudolf Süsske, Der Therapeut als Opfer und Agent wissenschaftlicher Verhältnisse. Zum Dialog zwischen Tiefenpsychologie und Verhaltenstherapie, in: Psyche, 36, 1982, pp. 726-732, here pp. 729-730. Both texts conjured up Habermas. See also Tomas Plänkers, Zum Verhältnis von Psychanalyse und Systemtheorie, in: Psyche, 40, 1986, pp. 678-708, here pp. 701-702. Udo Eberenz had also spoken of the “totalitarian” nature of behavioral therapy. See Eberenz, Psychoanalyse und Verhaltenstherapie, pp. 92, 103.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Manfred Pohlen and Lothar Wittmann, Die Modernisierung der Verhaltenstherapie. Der Fortschritt der “kognitiven Wende” als Rückschritt zur Ichpsychologie”, in: Psyche, 37, 1983, pp. 961-987, here pp. 961, 964-967, 968, 974. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Metzger, Wunsch und Wirklichkeit, p. 334.Metzger repeatedly attacked behavioral therapy for instrumental reasoning and attempt to master (human) nature. See pp. 335, 337. See also Eva Jaeggi, Kognitive Verhaltenstherapie. Kritik und Neubestimmung eines aktuellen Konzepts, Weinheim 1979. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. BArch, Bestand 339, 1743, and Peter Kutter, Informationen über ein umstrittenes Gutachten, in: DPV-Informationen 4 (1988), pp. 26 f. Kutter’s main critics were Cremerius, Richter, Meinhard Korte, and Alfred Lorenzer. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. BArch, Bestand 339, 1743, Kutter to Cremerius, no date. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Kutter, Informationen, pp. 26 f. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Ernst Falzeder, Die Gründungsgeschichte der IPV und der Berliner Ortsgruppe, in: Psyche, 64, 2010, pp. 1110-1133; Michael Schröter, Zur Frühgeschichte der Laienanalyse. Strukturen eines Kernkonflikts der Freud-Schule, in: Psyche, 50, 1996, pp. 1127-1175; Uffa Jensen, Wie die Couch nach Kalkutta kam. Eine Globalgeschichte der frühen Psychoanalyse, Berlin 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. BArch, Bestand 339, 141, Berufspolitische Kommission des DPV-Vorstandes. Protokoll der Sitzung, Frankfurt am Main Flughafen, 28.1.1984, pp. 7-8; Bestand 339, 141, Sitzung der berufspolitischen Kommission der DPV, Stuttgart 28.4.1984, pp. 1-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Tändler, Jahrzehnt, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Ibid., p. 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Ulrich Rüger, Andreas Dahm, Michael Dieckmann, and Martin Neher, Faber/Haarstrick. Kommentar Psychotherapie-Richtlinien, Munich 2015; Gesa Wunderlich, Die Öffnung der Psychoanalyse. Von der elitären Privatwissenschaft zur anerkannten Behandlungsmethode, Stuttgart 1991, p. 143; Simon Duckheim, Annemarie Dührssen oder die gesundheitspolitische Anpassung der Psychoanalyse, in: Alexandra Geisthövel and Bettina Hitzer (eds.), Auf der Suche nach einer anderen Medizin. Psychosomatik im 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2019, pp. 233-242. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Helmut Thomä, Zur Rolle des Psychoanalytikers in psychotherapeutischen Interaktionen, in: Psyche, 28, 1974, pp. 381-394, here p. 51. Thomä’s piece was based on a paper delivered at a DPV conference at Ulm Univerisity in November 1973. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Robert S. Wallerstein, Psychoanalytic controversies: Will psychoanalytic pluralism be an enduring state of our discipline?, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 86, 2005, pp. 623-638, here pp. 623-624; Roy Schafer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, New Haven 1976. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Wallerstein, Controversies, pp. 624-625. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Thomä and Kächele, Probleme. 1. Teil, p. 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., pp. 214-215. The concept of scenic understanding is fully developed in: Alfred Lorenzer, Sprachzerstörung und Rekonstruktion. Vorarbeiten zu einer Metatheorie der Psychoanalyse, Frankfurt am Main 1970. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Loch, Der Analytiker als Gesetzgeber und Lehrer. Legitime oder illegitime Rollen?, in: Psyche, 28, 1974, pp. 431-460, here pp. 454-455. Loch also referred to the pragmatic nature of truth-seeking: insofar as therapy has brought about positive change, it was true. See Loch, Psychoanalyse und Wahrheit, p. 879. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Thomä and Kächele, Probleme. 1. Teil, pp. 319-320. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Kernberg, Psychoanalyse, p. 380. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Carl Nedelmann and Reimut Reiche, Analyse und Analysieren im Spiegel einer empirischen Studie, in: Psyche, 44, 1990, pp. 202-217, here pp. 203-204, 206-207. The article was based on a lecture at a DPV workshop in Berlin in May 1989. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. #  Robert S. Wallerstein, The Psychotherapy Research Project of the Menninger Foundation: An overview, in: Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 57, 1989, pp. 195-205.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Johannes Cremerius, Die hochfrequente Langzeitanalyse und die psychoanalytische Praxis. Utopie und Realität, in: Psyche, 44, 1990, pp. 1-29, here p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Nedelmann and Horn, Aufgaben, pp. 835-836. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Albrecht Kuchenbuch, Einflüsse der Kassenfinanzierung auf den Verlauf psychoanalytischer Behandlung, in: Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung: Die Einflüsse der Kassenregelung auf die psychoanalytische Behandlung, 1978, pp. 11—21, here pp. 11-12; Veronica Mächtlinger, Die Auswirkung der Kassenregelung auf den analytischen Prozeß an Hand der Aufnahmeverträge seit Herbst 1975, in: Deutsche Psychoanalytische Vereinigung: Die Einflüsse der Kassenregelung auf die psychoanalytische Behandlung, 1978, pp. 22—25, here pp. 23 and 25, both cited in Cremerius, Präsenz des Dritten, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. According to the “psychotherapy guidelines” (*Psychotherapierichtlinien*), analytical therapy was not intended as a means of changing personality structures or contributing to the maturation of personalities. Faber/Haarstrick, pp. 1, 26, 45-46. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Nedelmann and Raiche, Analyse, p. 216. Nedelmann chaired the DGPT from 1983 to 1985 and the DPV from 1992 to 1994. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Appy made these comments at a DPV workshop in Wiesbaden in November 1986. G. Appy, Selbstentfremdung der Psychoanalyse in der Gesundheitspolitik. Vortrag DPV-Arbeitstagung in Wiesbaden am 20.11.1986, cited in: Cremerius, Langzeitanalyse, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Gottfried Appy, Thematische Anmerkungen zur Arbeitstagung DPV vom 7.–9. 5. 1987 in Essen. Thema: Analytischer Prozeß und Institution, unpublished, and idem.,  letter to E. Kaiser, in: Psychoanalyse-Info, No. 31, October 1988, p. 2. , both cited in Cremerius, Langzeitanalyse, pp. 13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Cremerius, Präsenz des Dritten, p. 25; Metzger, Wunsch und Wirklichkeit, p. 341; Klaus Horn, Wer überliefert Psychoanalyse wozu – politische Fragen, in: Sybille Drews et al. (eds.), Alexander Mitscherlich zu Ehren. Provokation und Toleranz – Festschrift für Alexander Mitscherlich, Frankfurt 1978, pp. 341-360; Hans-Martin Lohmann, Psychoanalyse in Deutschland – eine Karriere im Staatsapparat. Ansichten von jenseits des Rheins, in: Psyche, 34, 1980, pp. 945-957, here p. 954; Horst-Eberhard Richter, Die Jugend und wir Psychotherapeuten, in: Psyche, 37, 1983, pp. 1-15, here pp. 4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. See, for example, various contributions in Anne Springer, Karsten Münch, and Dietrich Munz (eds.), Psychoanalyse heute?! Tagungsband der 57. Jahrestagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse, Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Tiefenpsychologie 2006, Gießen 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Health care systems outside West Germany adopted analytic therapy in the period under review. Full, variable and partial funding for analytical therapies existed in Norway, Finland, Belgium, France, and Austria, and the Netherlands. See Gilbert Diatkine and Alain Gibeault, Psychoanalysis and health insurance, Psychoanalysis in Europe, 36, 1991, pp. 39-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Herzog, Cold War Freud, chapters 5 and 6; Antic, Raising a true socialist individual. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Rose, Governing, p. 258. See also Bröckling, Unternehmerisches Selbst, pp. 164-165; Maasen, Das beratene Selbst, pp. 16-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Maasen, Das beratene Selbst, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Albert O. Hischmann, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organization, and States, Cambridge, MA 1970. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Miriam Gebhardt, Die Angst vor dem kindlichen Tyrannen. Eine Geschichte der Erziehung im 20. Jahrhundert, Munich 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Benno Gammerl, Anders fühlen. Schwules und lesbisches Leben in der Bundesrepublik. Eine Emotionengeschichte, Munich 2021, pp. 30-31, 135-136, 223, 237, 307-308. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Ibid., pp. 31, 311. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Joachim M. Häberlen, The Emotional Politics of an Alternative Left. West Germany, 1968-1984, Cambridge 2018, p. 183. See also idem., The Contemporary Self in German History, in: Contemporary European History, 27, 2018, pp. 1-19, here p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)