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**Managerial agency:**  
**Personality, psychopathy, structure and leadership.**

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March 2017

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## Abstract

This study begins with the clinical observation that psychopathic patients distort and disrupt the organisation containing and caring for them on one hand, and that organisational leaders manage to galvanise followers into realising his vision on the other; the two seeming to be phenomenologically similar; the former is organisationally effective antisocially, and the latter, pro-socially; one destructive and one creative.

The study explores the implications of this observation through the sociological, psychological and leadership literatures, having focussed on the question of how managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable. Examining Hitler as a crucial case study, who as a leader combined effectiveness, charisma and a personality cult with a violent and psychopathic regime, the study uses a hermeneutic phenomenology methodology. Having looked at the case through the triangulated lenses of personality, historical context (structure) and managerial case history (agent), the study concludes that charisma rather than psychopathy may be the critical success factor, and it proposes and describes a concept of "managerial agency" as a capability that combines charismatic with transactional and more coercive leadership.

It argues that the sociological dualism of structure and agency ontologically are the same, such that social structures are collectively held (structured) ideas. In an organisational (managerial) context they are divided by a relationship between the owner of the structure and the agent. The managerial agent, charismatically uses inspiration of and care for the individual subordinate, to modify (structure) their psychology and attitudes, establishing energetic adherence to the manager's task, which influence can be strengthened with more hierarchical transactional factors.

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***SUBMISSION OF THESIS FOR A RESEARCH DEGREE*****Part I. DECLARATION by the candidate for a research degree. To be bound in the thesis**

Degree for which thesis being submitted **DBA**

Title of thesis **Managerial agency: personality, psychopathy, structure and leadership.**

**This thesis contains confidential information and is subject to the protocol set down for the submission and examination of such a thesis. NO**

Date of submission **31.10.16**

Original registration date **September 2005**  
(Date of submission must comply with Regulation 2D)

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Research Institute **Humanities/Social Science**

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## **1. Introduction**

This research asks a particular set of questions about how leaders and managers are effective within organisations<sup>1</sup>. Driven by a “clinical hunch” that leaders and psychopathic patients have personality traits in common, the question is to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their effectiveness.

Having explored clinical, sociological and leadership literatures, Hitler, was selected as a “crucial case”, in which effective agency, psychopathy and charisma are all widely-noted properties. His combination of the components of leadership (charisma, determination and a clear vision), with those of management, (transactional elements and the use of systems) lead to the construct “managerial agency”. Core in this concept is the charismatic, emotional manipulation of colleagues to change their internal psychological structures, combined with maximising the potential of positional power.

### **1.1 Psychopathic agency by patients.**

The research question was developed during a career of clinical practice with personality disordered patients, in the context of simultaneously occupying leadership and management roles.

Personality disorder as a concept tries to capture the notion that people can be “crazy” but not formally insane, that their problems and behaviours (usually forms of violence and self harm) are an extreme of normal, and therefore better described as compulsively and destructively eccentric; their “deeply ingrained maladaptive patterns of behaviour”<sup>2</sup> are cited as part of the clinical definition.

The observation as a clinician is that some personality disordered patients can enact a form of ground up leadership; achieving organisational impact and potency by disrupting and undermining the structures attempting to contain or treat them, usually prisons and psychiatric hospitals. The observation as a manager was that these patients have a similar set of interpersonal skills as effective leaders and managers.

Some examples demonstrate not only the patients' pathology and risk, but also their agency or organisational potency in effectively disrupting and/or damaging the organisation containing them.

*A patient in a secure personality disorder treatment unit escapes, and while at large and as part of his negotiation to return, constructs a complaint about the unit that is highly publicised, leads to exchanges in parliament, a full judicial enquiry, the closure of the unit, and nearly the hospital.<sup>3</sup>*

*A patient seduces and impregnates a female member of staff in a well known secure hospital, selling the story to a tabloid newspaper, which publishes it with pictures of her heavily pregnant taken without her knowledge.*

*A psychiatric hospital ward has three riots within a short space of time that stop when a particular patient is removed, although the ward that he is sent to subsequently has a more serious riot.*

*A young and good looking male patient is refused psychological treatment, subsequently lacerating his face in a shopping mall, leading to criticism in the local press, and the provision of the therapy that he was requesting. Out of largesse, the female CEO meets him with the medical director to explain*

*their care plan. Subsequently, he fabricates a complaint about the female CEO alleging sexual harassment, taking this to the local papers leading to the resignation of the CEO.*

*An inpatient requests that staff witness a change of name deed, the patient changing his surname. The story is covered in the national press as a marriage ceremony to a celebrity that he has stalked for years, thus linking the name of the celebrity to the stalker.*

The personality disorder type or trait involving violence is antisocial/dissocial personality,<sup>4</sup> and its more extreme and focussed variant is psychopathy.<sup>5</sup> The “malice aforethought” involved in the seduction and impregnation of a female member of staff *in order to* make some money from a tabloid newspaper (as in the second example) contains within it several of the key factors attributed to popular conceptions of psychopathy, namely violence (psychological in this case), callousness, lack of empathy, and charm to enact the seduction.

In addition to these psychopathic symptoms, however, there seemed to be another factor more closely allied to leadership. These organisationally effective, destructive patients were demonstrating an ability to plan, to act strategically and to engage others in enacting their plan. The plan included the identification of the gaps and weaknesses in the security of the systems that contained them, and the gaps and weaknesses in the staff that were working with them. It was from a consideration of these similarities that the “clinical hunch” emerged regarding the similarity of leaders and such psychopathic patients.

## **1.2 Psychopathic agency by managers?**

A number of popular books have linked psychopathy with management and leadership.<sup>6</sup> At training courses and conferences about psychopathy someone will

usually comment that the psychopathic person or characteristic just described sums up their manager, a well known politician, or one of the seminar leaders or conference presenters. In such settings, the resonance of these comments may derive from most people having had the experience of becoming aware that they are being manipulated, or more overtly bullied, by a manager or leader. The examples below are some of the researcher's experience of such phenomena.

*In a secure hospital setting, complaints were made and concern expressed that a senior manager was bringing items in for a psychopathic patient; it was concluded that the manager had been duped and compromised. A plan was drawn up in which the patient would be moved from the unit at the same time as the manager was moved to a different function. Preparations were made without the managers' knowledge to prevent the manager making the patient aware; to manage the risk the patient might present, and to enable effective and decisive management of the compromised manager.*

*Negotiating the development of government regulation of psychotherapy, the Department of Health proposed this be under the new "Health Professions Council". Seeing this as unsuited to the regulation of "talking heads" psychotherapies, as opposed to physical therapies such as Occupational Therapy, Osteopathy, and Podiatry, the psychotherapists and psychologists together formed a powerful lobby group chaired by Lord Alderdice (a psychiatrist and psychotherapist), proposing an alternative psychotherapy bill in the Lords. Behind the back of this group, the Department of Health approached the British Psychological Society, who had been seeking state regulation for years, offering them a fast track into the Health Professions Council and state registration, thus splitting the larger "talking heads" group and neutering their resistance.*

*In a secure hospital setting, the lead clinician had been a Doctor. A senior psychologist was brought in by the new CEO to carry out a consultation and “review”, under which terms his input was accepted by the clinical therapeutic staff. In the event, the review did not materialise, but instead the psychologist replaced the consultant psychiatrist in terms of managerial role and funding of his post. The concept of a “review” was, in retrospect, a managerial ruse to facilitate entry and acceptance.*

In each of these examples, in retrospect the managerial decisions were appropriate and correct in the circumstances. In spite of having been a dupe in all three instances, the researcher accepts that the ends justified the means of pragmatic managerial enactment. The paradox, therefore, is that apparently at times the only way to get the right thing done is via duplicitous and manipulative managerial methods. Opprobrium for Machiavellianism may be a disavowal of managers’ everyday real strategy in dealing with people. Managers can’t always tell people the truth; have to close down their empathetic resonance with subordinates, and have to “groom” and charm people consciously to manipulate them. Each of these are psychopathic traits that are being used in the broader interests of the managerial strategy, and their legitimacy and moral justifiability are determined by the moral valance of that strategy or intended outcome.

The “clinical hunch” that emerged was as follows: on the one hand the psychopathic patient undermines the organisation containing them, eroding its culture and structure by manipulating peers and staff. On the other, a good manager or leader leads and develops the organisation, altering its culture and structure by manipulating executive board peers and subordinate staff. Patients and managers are using the same set of manipulative levers antisocially, and pro-socially respectively.

### 1.3 Managerial agency

The notion of managerial effectiveness leans into the researcher's preoccupations that are being triangulated in the study. These are;

1. **Within an organisation, how do people get things done?** This element derives from the execution of the researcher's own management and leadership roles, and seems to rest heavily on the extent to which a manager or leader can galvanise the support of their subordinates to enact their vision. In this way, the phenomenon being explored elides the concepts of leadership and management, which are more commonly separated into distinct functions.<sup>7</sup>
2. **How is it that people at the bottom of a hierarchy can change organisations?** This element derives from clinical work with PD patients whose symptoms include distorting and destroying the organisation by which they are contained, and a wish to understand the mechanism by which this agency operates.
3. **What relevance does the personality of the leader have to the movement or organisation that bears their name?** To what extent is Emerson right that "there is properly no history, only biography"?<sup>8</sup>

These preoccupations are the basis for the first limb of the research question, "how managers are effective within organisations", A model of "managerial agency" is proposed as a response that combines leadership and sociological concepts.

The second limb of the research question, namely, "to what extent is the personality and psychopathy of the manager is a critical variable," derives from the researcher's heuristic perspective as a psychoanalytically trained psychiatrist specialising in personality. Although this second half of the research question is less squarely met

with an outcome from the research, it is proposed that the critical personal variable for managerial effectiveness is charisma rather than psychopathy per se.

In looking at “how managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable”, there are several areas specifically bracketed out.

1. **This is not about organisational strategy or “what to do”.**<sup>9</sup> Achieving organisational success is in large part the result of selecting the right strategy in the external environment. To the extent that making the right strategic decisions expedites the leader’s agency internally, it is bracketed out within this project.
2. **This is not about “change management”**,<sup>10</sup> an internal campaign utilising various techniques and strategies contingent on the nature of the change to percolate a new idea or way of doing things through an organisational unit; evaluating resisters, neutrals and supporters. This again can be seen as strategy, although internal rather than external.

In summary, the question driving the research derives from the observation that there are people who are able to effectively manipulate and massage organisations and the individuals who make them up. Revolutionaries and some psychopathic patients are able to do this from the bottom of the organisation or structure, and effective leaders are able to do this from the top. In the first example above, the patient, Daggett, who had escaped from Ashworth high security hospital, triggered a full judicial enquiry and debate in the House of Commons followed by £3bn investment in treating psychopathy differently between 2000 and 2008.<sup>11</sup> Daggett had agency, but was not managerial. Managerial agency as a concept proposes that individuals, by force of their personalities, can enrol followers to accept and enact their vision. This ability is further amplified by combining with their structural position of power to amplify their potency and agency further.

#### **1.4 Outlining the research: Executive summary**

In exploring the stated research question of “how managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable”, a style of research is adopted (chapter 5) which is intended to allow for rich and nuanced understandings and theoretical propositions.

Within this paradigm, the managerial and leadership literature is reviewed (chapter 2), with a particular emphasis on the phenomenon of charismatic leadership. As this chapter is focused on the leaders in the context of the second limb of the research question, “to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable”, there is a brief account of the personality and psychopathy literature.

Next, the sociological literature is explored (chapter 3) particularly examining accounts and models of structure and agency, Archer’s morphogenic theory; and the power literature as relevant to a manager’s enactment of their authority. This exploration provides a platform to propose a theory of structure and agency as an interpersonal relationship by incorporating psychoanalytic “object relations” theory. Finally, within the theoretical exposition, because there is little or no scholarly literature about psychopathic leadership directly,<sup>12</sup> the issue is explored by looking at “bad leadership” (chapter 4) through the literature available, and more generally in terms of ethics.

In the theoretical discussion, proposed contributions arrived at include an “object relations” theory of structure and agency (3.3); an evolutionary theory of “bad charisma” (4.2.2) and redefinition of criminal organisations (4.5).

Having explained and argued for the legitimacy of the hermeneutic phenomenological research paradigm as appropriate to a project exploring social and psychological issues, and looking for complex and textured hypotheses, (chapter 5), a crucial case study research method (chapter 6) is described and justified in terms of Hitler having combined the elements in the research, having lead a psychopathic and violent movement, having been an effective leader, having had a personality cult, and being said to be charismatic.

The research data are then presented in four chapters so developing an account and understanding of Hitler as the crucial case. These look in turn at the man biographically and psychiatrically (chapter 7); at the structural context culturally and historically (chapter 8), and at his career as a leadership/management case history (chapter 9). The structuring of the case history reflects a structure/agency; context/case dialectic that runs through the research, then leadership and cultural themes from the case history are explored (chapter 10).

In the case history, specifically, it is concluded that the evidence does not support a view that Hitler was characteristically/clinically psychopathic but there are stronger indications that he probably had Asperger's syndrome. It is also concluded that the NSDAP and the German state from 1930 were a criminal organisation (10.1/10.2).

In the final chapter (Chapter 11), having outlined various contributory conclusions previously arrived at, a model of "managerial agency" is proposed. This concept combines the proposed leadership model of interpersonal account of agency (3.3) and charisma, with the transactional and hierarchical managerial elements that emerged in the case history. Finally, some limitations of the study are noted, as are proposals for further research.

The overall conclusions of the project are that in response to the first limb of the research question, "how managers enact agency within organisations" the concept

of “managerial agency” is proposed. This holds that a “managerial agent” has an ability to mutate and change the internal “structured” attitudes of followers, accessing and manipulating these through the mechanisms described in the charismatic leadership literature. The manager/leader adapts their goals to align with and appeal individually to followers’ aspirations and values. Having evolved and developed a cultural hegemony, the positional, structural and coercive power achieved amplifies and extends the leader’s agency.

Looking at the second limb of the research question, “to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their effectiveness”, it is broadly concluded that charisma is a crucial factor, but that psychopathy is not. The influential psychopathic patients described in chapter 1 were more likely to have been effective by virtue of their charismatic manipulative skills rather than their psychopathy.

## **2. Personality, leadership and charisma**

The research question of “how managers are effective within organisations, and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable” is motivated and shaped by the researcher’s personal heuristic of understanding organisations and cultural movements in terms of the personalities that lead them.

Through the researcher’s professional practice of psychoanalytically informed psychiatric practice with personality disordered patients, a sensitivity has developed to the fit between people, the situations that they end up in, and to the organisations or groups that that they may lead managerially. The tendency is to understand events, organisations and cultural phenomena in terms of the personalities of the protagonists in the same way as in professional practice.

The difficulty is that this perspective of personalising understandings of current affairs and artistic and intellectual creativity can be decried as a tabloid oversimplification. The 1984 miners’ strike as a crisis was about Scargill, a Jaguar driving Marxist, and Thatcher, determined to pay back the humiliation meted out to the Heath government: a clash of personalities.

Other explanations, perhaps in terms of the evolution of a post-industrial society; the legitimacy of the state investing in peoples’ jobs; the battles over union power and the UK industrial malaise; the emergence and legitimacy of the monetarist “big idea” as an alternative to Keynesianism are potentially obscured by a simplistic anthropomorphisation of the contest.

Notwithstanding this critique, the definition of historical epochs in English history in terms of the monarchs remains; the Elizabethan or Victorian periods are phenomena

understood in part in terms of the personality of that particular monarch. In relation to this research, more relevant are the social and political movements that bear the name of their originator; Scargillism or Thatcherism in the example above, where there is a clear link between the ideas and leadership of the individual and the movement that takes their name.

The subsequent chapter explores the research question from the sociological perspective of structure and agency. This chapter is exploring what the leadership and personality literature has to say about the nature of the agent.

## **2.1 Leaders**

One argument in favour of the idea that the actual person at the helm of an organisation; the actual person leading a structural change is important, is the existence of the executive search industry. The idea that for a particular task, there will be people who will be more and less good at achieving it, so finding and attracting the right person becomes a task absorbing large amounts of energy and thinking. The high level of executive salaries is constantly justified on the basis of there being competition for the particular people that are needed.

The ability of a leader or person with positional authority to get people to do things is dependant on their ability to motivate them and persuade them to carry out the leader's requests; this in turn is dependant on their ability to alter cultural content and attitudes within the environment, and within the individual persons that comprise it. Notwithstanding the developing critical stance,<sup>13</sup> the driving force of the vast and exponentially multiplying leadership literature seems to have been an effort to find a holy grail of more effective leadership. The performance of an organisation or group is elastic. For the same sunk costs of wages and equipment, vastly different outcomes can be obtained depending on how hard people work and how enthusiastic

they are, and this arguably depends on the quality of the leadership being provided. Good leadership therefore may be a very valuable commodity.

### **2.1.1 Leadership**

The leadership literature is vast, ranging from hagiographies to lists of tasks to unlock the mysteries. Scoullier<sup>14</sup> distinguishes between literature describing models of leadership as,

- “Philosophies” of leadership, for example the notion of servant leadership, and
- “Styles” of leadership, value and philosophy neutral descriptions of the behaviour of leaders in practice.

Carlyle’s biography of Fredrick the Great was an example of pre 20<sup>th</sup> century leadership study.<sup>15</sup> Great (almost exclusively) men might be studied as a means of understanding their power. Built upon this, the “trait theories” of leadership in the 1930s and 1940s, looked at the personality traits of the leaders of American industry, predictably finding them to be “tall white men”, and rather discrediting the trait theory of leadership in the process.<sup>16</sup> Other research proposes that a person’s history or personality can determine their likelihood of becoming a leader, for example being first born<sup>17</sup>, to having narcissistic traits<sup>18</sup>

Hofstede’s work, finding different styles of leadership in different divisions of IBM in a number of different countries,<sup>19</sup> argued leadership was contingent, in this instance, on prevailing culture. The styles of management literature proposed that the style was contingent on the nature of the work; that one would vary between focussing on the task (for example in more manual industries) and focussing on the people (for example in a more professional setting).<sup>20</sup> Different organisational cultures were

characterised; high focus on people and low on task was a “country club” style; low focus on people and high focus on task was a “produce or perish” style and so on.

There followed a host of different ways of characterising the variables, for example Hersey and Blanchard distinguishing between the leader having to “tell” or “sell” the task depending on follower willingness;<sup>21</sup> or Feidler’s model distinguishing between leaders adopting a more task or relationship orientated approach based upon organisational “favourableness”.<sup>22</sup> According to Schein, the key to being able to mobilise the individuals that make up an organisational unit is by manipulation or management of the culture.<sup>23</sup>

These models derived some empirical support, and in general it seemed that leader *behaviours* were more correlated with performance or effectiveness than leader traits.<sup>24</sup> However, the atomisation of behavioural descriptive approaches seem too concrete to incorporate the very considerable differences in behaviour that leaders exhibited.<sup>25</sup>

As a result, there seems to have been a bifurcation of the literature, with on one hand a more explicit empirical examination of leadership behaviour,<sup>26</sup> or on the other exploring what Lord Slim termed leadership “of the spirit”.<sup>27</sup>

Another bifurcation has been the development of a distinction between transactional type leadership<sup>28</sup> where the leader articulates their structural power with rewards or censure; and transformational leadership<sup>29</sup> involving the building of a collective vision and the intellectual stimulation of followed by the leader, in the context of concern for followers, the latter being closer to Lord Slim’s account. The emphasis within this current research project is on the psychological and interpersonal dimension of leadership, on transformational rather than transactional accounts. Leadership as combining concepts of “spirit”; cultural and personal transformation and the

interpersonal dimensions of agency point towards charismatic theorisation of leadership, which will be explored next.

### **2.1.2 Charisma**

There are a number of difficulties with the charisma concept, redolent of the irrational, religious and charlatan. The word “charisma” means “God’s grace”.<sup>30</sup> Notwithstanding these, in the current exploration of how managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable the concept of charisma has come to occupy a central position.

In the classical Weberian account, the attraction of the charismat derives firstly from the anxiety of being in a crisis situation and becoming dependant on someone coming forward with a solution, irrespective of whether this is a good or bad one.<sup>31</sup> The charismatic leader therefore exploits people’s emotional vulnerability in a situation of anxiety provoking crisis. This is a key to the concept. Charismatic leadership is about the manipulation of followers’ emotions, about the circumventing of their rationality such that they put aside their own interests to some degree in favour of the interests of the leader, or the organisational task.

The charismatically-led follower works harder and becomes more productive for no material benefit or gain for themselves other than pleasing the leader, and feeling like an effective and legitimate part of a social group. Belief in a charismatic leader (which is ubiquitous) is an example of an irrational loss of personal emotional control. This is why when faith is lost, they have to be vilified, as if they had turned bad.

The charisma literature consists largely of impressionistic definitions, perspectives and anecdotes that are difficult to integrate and synthesise. Because the concept has emerged as a central element in the research, five different approaches to the

concept are now summarised in some although the different perspectives are partly overlapping and contradictory.

**2.1.2.1 Weber.** The classical and most accessible approach to theorising charisma is that of Weber, for whom charisma was one of the four forms of political “domination” (also translated as “authority”), alongside traditional, patriarchal and legal domination.<sup>32</sup> Weber’s charismatic leader is more likely to be legitimised in a context of social upheaval and uncertainty, in which followers latch onto the three facets of the concept; firstly the leader’s clear sense of vision, what to do; secondly the leader’s perceived exceptional qualities; and thirdly what Weber describes as a “felt duty” to action the leader’s vision.

Weber’s “felt duty” with can be linked with House’s characterisation of charismat’s ability to inspire better performance via confidence in their ability coupled with high expectations;<sup>33</sup> Conger and Kanungo describe empowerment via an increase in the self efficacy belief of followers.<sup>34</sup>

The other important aspect of the Weberian account of charisma is that it is inherently unstable. In spite of followers ignoring some faults and mistakes in order to preserve the idealisation of their leader, real failure deconstructs their belief in his exceptional qualities and so their attachment. Secondly, the context of situational crisis that bolsters the charismatic leaders’ power will not be permanent, so that there is a tendency for charismatic organisations to evolve into Weberian bureaucracies through the process of “routinisation”.<sup>35</sup>

**2.1.2.2 Bass and Alvolio’s “4 Is”.** A second access point into the concept of charismatic leadership is via the “4 Is” model of Bass and Alvolio that underpins their leadership questionnaire, the MLQ (Multi factor Leadership Questionnaire).<sup>36</sup> The “I”s referred to identify four characteristic aspects of charismatic leadership;

- **Idealised influence** – corresponding to Weber’s attribution of exceptional abilities, the charismat is believed to be above the commonality.
- **Inspirational motivation** – this combines the Weberian attribution of vision and clarity of direction with an ability to be able both to effectively communicate it and make it believably attainable.
- **Intellectual stimulation** – similar to Weber’s “felt duty”, it involves the follower personally buying into the vision, the strategy to achieve it, and the belief that it represents a path to a better future. The follower with a charismatic leader is personally intellectually stimulated and motivated by the task.
- **Individualised consideration.** This has been linked “EQ”, emotional intelligence, the ability of some leaders to have an empathetic resonance with followers,<sup>37</sup> but it extends beyond this to both tuning into followers feeling states, and also having a personal connection with individual followers. Related to charismatic leadership it has two facets,
  - It enables the leader to describe the vision in terms that will chime with the aspirations for the future of followers, and with their dissatisfactions with the current situation, so that they will buy into the strategy.
  - In individual interactions, it develops a personalised sense of connection between the follower and leader that promotes follower (faithfulness).

**2.1.2.3 Steyrer’s Mechanisms.** A third approach to understanding charismatic leadership is to follow Steyrer’s “conceptual system of concepts”<sup>38</sup>(sic), which theorise the mechanisms by which charismatic leadership operates. He identifies four groups of theories;

- **Leader-centred theories**; to the leader attributions mentioned above he adds a Kohutian psychoanalytic concept of a grandiose sense of self that requires idealisation by followers.<sup>39</sup>
- **Follower centred theories** that include Mendel's "social contagion effect";<sup>40</sup> within a context of crisis, people need a leader to follow, and attribute them with charismatic characteristics, and the other side of Kohutian Narcissism, that the leader takes on an idealised protective parent image that the follower can be part of.
- **Context centred theories**, where the emphasis is on the crisis in the environment.
- **Interdependency theories**, where the two elements of narcissism come together, the leader's need to have followers, and the follower's need to have a leader.

**2.1.2.4 Typologies.** The fourth approach is to look at the series of distinctions that have emerged in the literature that clarify the concept of charismatic leadership and in doing so, have contributed to the evolution of the concept.

- **Transactional and transformational leadership**: the distinction between the two.
  - Transactional leaders "... influence the behaviour of their followers by exchanging one thing for another";<sup>41</sup> equated with the more standard management practice.
  - The transformational leader "... motivates followers to do more than they originally intended to do"<sup>42</sup>, transforming the follower's attitude and performance.
- **Charismatic and transformational leadership**, similarities and distinctions. At times, it seems that the terms "transformational" and "charismatic" leadership are used synonymously to describe a style of leadership that employs a social dimension, or which utilises the emotions

of workers. At other times, the distinction between transformational and charismatic leadership is seen as one of degree, with charismatic leaders being an order of magnitude more intense in their use of emotion. For example Connelly's<sup>43</sup> account, wherein communicating his vision, the transformational leader inspires interest, excitement, optimism and hope in followers; the charismatic leader inspires all of these and awe in addition. In establishing their initial influence, the transformational leader creates a feeling of relief, contentment and happiness in followers; the charismatic leader creates these feelings, and in addition, feelings of responsibility, compassion and caring.

- **Socialised and personalised charisma**, the distinction between the two.

The distinction between socialised and personalised charisma is one answer to the concerns raised above about the possibility of being manipulated and duped.<sup>44</sup>

- The socialised charismatic leader uses his skill at manipulating the emotions of followers for the greater good and "higher order values"<sup>45</sup> and in the interests of the group. His followers feel empowered and more potent to carry out the task, and grow and benefit from the experience.
- The personalised charismatic utilises his manipulative skill for his own aggrandisement, develops followers into a submissive and dependency, and works for personal and hidden goals, "bad charisma".<sup>46</sup>

**2.1.2.5 Experiential.** The final approach is not literature based, but rather, experiential. Everyone has had the experience of working with inspirational leaders demonstrating Conger and Kanungo "empowerment" dynamic<sup>47</sup> and aspects of the 4 "I"s model of Bass and Avolio;<sup>48</sup> and can therefore construct a narrative about what it was about their behaviour and attitudes that inspired, and whether, post hoc, they felt used or duped. To quote Roberts and Bradley (1988);

**We have neither a theory to predict outcomes, nor any critical understanding to ensure “good” and prevent “bad” charisma... Do we really want to deliberately risk unleashing its darker side?<sup>49</sup>**

If the leadership literature strives to describe the basic “stuff” that makes leaders effective, then there is an argument that the charismatic aspect of leadership *is that “stuff”*. The problem is, then, that it rests on an anti-rational, emotional, and quasi-spiritual process that partially dissolves the worker’s individual perspective. This can be good for the delivery of the leader’s or the organisation’s task, but has the risk of dissolving the moral standards and frame, such that it can be a force for good or ill.

## **2.2 Personalities**

The clinical hunch underlying the research question, namely how are managers are effective within organisations and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager a critical variable, is that those with no positional power, personality disordered people, may disrupt and distort organisations *purely by force of personality*, and the question asks whether managers who are effective within organisations has some link with this observation.

The individual personality, social context and constitution of individual leaders plays a part, for example, leaders are more commonly first born children,<sup>50</sup> and there may be people who are “compulsive leaders,” that can only feel comfortable in a context of being followed, and that this compulsion becomes a self fulfilling prophesy.<sup>51</sup> Having looked at the leadership literature, the personality variables of the manager will be explored.

According to Marshall in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology,

**The [personality] concept has its origins in the of the Latin word persona (meaning mask), and refers to the set of more or less stable characteristics, as assessed and judged by others, that distinguish one individual from another... [that] hold stable across time and place and underlie behaviour...<sup>52</sup>**

Theoretical approaches to personality can be distinguished into three broad groups; developmental ideographic approaches that understand personality, to include Freud, the psychoanalysts and associated descriptive accounts such as Erikson;<sup>53</sup> classificatory systems that try to identify different personality types using psychological tests, and biological approaches.

### **2.2.1 Personality and biology.**

The origins of the biological study of personality include the “somatotypes”, linking body shape with personality characteristics<sup>54</sup> and Gall’s phrenology.<sup>55</sup> The biological study of personality now comprises the two disciplines of genetics, with personality traits demonstrating different degrees of heritability,<sup>56</sup> and neuroanatomy and physiology.

Particularly heritable are antisocial aspects of personality with aggressiveness being about 40% genetic,<sup>57</sup> fitting in with the common sense view of heritability of personality characteristics in families. With brain imaging, there is increasing understanding about the role of particular brain structures, particularly the limbic system, in the management and experience of the emotions, aggression and behaviour, although in terms of detailed understanding of the psyche, these remain at a high level of abstraction, like the celebrated account of Phineas Gage, an 18<sup>th</sup> century railway worker who survived an industrial accident where a pin lodged in his

eye piercing his brain's occipito-frontal cortex, turning a conscientious worker into a drinking unreliable sensualist.<sup>58</sup>

### 2.2.2 Personality theory – type and trait

The signs of the Zodiac are an example of a personality typology. More sensible are trait theories, such as Eysenk's proposal of three dimensions of personality along which people varied, introversion/extraversion; psychoticism (proneness to bizarre beliefs and behaviour) and neuroticism (general nervousness).<sup>59</sup> Within such a dimensional model, a good leader would be likely to be extroverted, stable (rather than psychotic) and non-neurotic.

The current lead personality trait theory is the so-called "Big Five,"<sup>60</sup> a model supported by a considerable research base demonstrating some intercultural and developmental reliability.<sup>61</sup>

High score characteristic	Trait scale	Low scores characteristic
Worrying, nervous, insecure	<b>NEUROTICISM</b>	Calm, relaxed, secure
Sociable, active, sociable	<b>EXTRAVERSION</b>	Reserved, sober, aloof
Curious, creative, original	<b>OPENNESS</b>	Conventional, down-to-earth, inartistic
Soft hearted, good natured, trusting	<b>AGREEABLENESS</b>	Cynical, rude, suspicious
Organised, reliable, hardworking	<b>CONSCIENTIOUSNESS</b>	Aimless, unreliable, lazy

**Table 1. Big Five summary (From Costa et al 1992)**

Given the empirical grounding for this theory, it lends considerable support for some form of trait theory of leadership, as it would be difficult to imagine being able to provide leadership or effective management if one's personality was high in

neuroticism, low for extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Having said this, personality trait accounts of leadership are too concrete to provide meaning for phenomena such as Lord Slim's leadership "of the spirit".<sup>62</sup>

### **2.2.3 Personality theory; psychoanalytic.**

Psychoanalytic and more generally psychodynamic theories of personality have the potential to provide deeper and more complex and nuanced accounts of personality characteristics of leadership, for example leaders having narcissistic needs<sup>63</sup> and followers having dependency needs leading to their attachment.<sup>64</sup>

Broadly the Freudian enterprise proposes,

- Adult personality is moulded by events in childhood, by the success by which various psycho-developmental milestones are negotiated, and by other contingent traumata.<sup>65</sup>
- Various structural metaphors of personality, including the concept of the unconscious, the super-ego/ego/id; oral/anal/phallic developmental fixations; the instincts, narcissism and so on.<sup>66</sup>

Common in subsequent elaborations of psychoanalytic accounts of character<sup>67</sup> or personality is the theme of the struggle between the agency or will of the person and the givens of their environment (social expectations and mores) between the instincts and the superego. This "dynamic" account of personality provides a platform for interpretative accounts of the decisions of individuals, for example the Ted Hughes' proposal that George Bush's enthusiasm for war in Iraq was contributed to by the failure of his father's war in the same region.<sup>68</sup>

Freud's rather scientific project was based upon natural science metaphysics and an original belief that the psychic structures he was proposing would knit together with

the evolving science of neurology.<sup>69</sup> It was based upon a rational doctor-patient relationship, with an expert power differential; and crucially, an alliance between patient and doctor. It was assumed that the psychoanalyst would be able to ally with the patient, and together they would explore the patient's psyche.

This classical Freudian tradition spread with the psychoanalytic diaspora in the 1930s, becoming dominant in the US with the Ego Psychology school.<sup>70</sup> The "British Tradition" however, was somewhat different, based on the work of Klein,<sup>71</sup> who saw the psychoanalytic process much more as a dynamic relationship, characterised by the mistrust and paranoia that brought the patient to the therapy in the first place. The patient is not going to be an ally in their psychoanalysis; but rather, the patient will distrust the analyst, and shield material about which they are ashamed.

The Kleinian critique of the Classical Freudian approach was that the patient was unlikely to be an ally in the exploration of self; they were more likely to dupe and to hide out of shame or fear, or the enjoyment of triumph over the analyst. Psychoanalysis could only proceed in spite of the patient, rather than with them as co-researcher.

The British psychoanalytic tradition, therefore, assumes that to a greater or lesser extent the patient is always "playing" the analyst, that the therapeutic process primarily involves the perception of these plays (often very difficult), their elucidation and presentation to the patient, and then a discourse on what they hide.

From this perspective, disobeying Kant's categorical imperative by "playing" people rather than relating and dealing honestly with them is much more widespread than just being practiced by its more extreme psychopathic protagonists. The manifest interpersonal motive on the surface is espoused; but that the latent, motive under the surface is disavowed, and this operation is assumed by the researcher's British psychoanalytic tradition to be a largely unconscious daily practice, not just for the

personality disorder clinician, or manipulative manager, but is part of everyday social engagement.

From this perspective, the managers and patients that interest the researcher have become virtuoso at this every day social duplicity, and use it for their antisocial or organisational objectives.

#### **2.2.4 Personality disorder and psychopathy**

Sociologically, the concept of psychiatry has spawned considerable social criticism,<sup>72</sup> with the likelihood of more for its even less empirically validated psychiatric diagnosis of “personality disorder”. Patients who display bizarre and disturbed behaviour, but who are not formally psychiatrically ill with schizophrenia, manic depression or dementia were characterised as “neurotics; neurasthenics; the character disordered.”

A common definition is,

**Deeply ingrained, maladaptive patterns of behaviour present since adolescence and causing the self and/or others to suffer.<sup>73</sup>**

Interest in this group expanded early in the last century, particularly within the psychoanalytic movement. Psychodynamic psychiatric treatment involves the understanding of the patient's symptoms and difficulties within a context of their history, the structure of their personality, and their characteristic ways of reacting to and dealing with everyday traumata. Gradually over time, and through an iterative process backwards and forwards between the individual's history and an emerging understanding of the nature of their personality, the interconnectedness of the three factors, symptom, history and personality can be identified.

The question is not about “nature vs. nurture”, in terms of a chicken and egg argument. An individual’s personality is not a particular way *because* of a trauma in childhood, but there is a link, rather like a Greek tragedy, where the seeds of the denouement are sown in the first act, such that the plot twists are chance fate and choice at the same time. The therapeutic outcome of the work is the development with the patient of a narrative that to some extent enables them to choose the screenplay: To be able to manage their personality rather than be entirely driven by it.

In the empirical study of personality, there has been some more success in the clarification and measurement of specific individual personality types and traits. One example of this approach is the well known distinction between “Type A and Type B personalities” in terms of the risk of heart disease.<sup>74</sup> This has also been the approach to the development of the concept of psychopathy.

The term “psychopathy” has several meanings as follows;

- **Legal** – within the UK Mental Health Act 1983-2007, psychiatric problems were divided into learning disability; mental illness (schizophrenia/manic depression) and “Psychopathic disorder”. The latter corresponded to those with personality disorder.<sup>75</sup>
- **Popular** - from the tabloids, which can range from any criminal or violent person to someone sharp and selfish.
- **Technical** – scoring above 30 on the PCLR psychopathy checklist, see below.
- **Clinical** – more severe antisocial personality.

The problem of criminality led to a formulation by Cleckley in the 1930s.<sup>76</sup> The operationalisation of Cleckley’s clinical descriptions in to the “Psychopathy Check List”<sup>77</sup> produced a very powerful risk assessment tool, with much empirical support that directly relates the risk of further violent crime to the score achieved.<sup>78</sup> Using

self report and collateral information (police records and intelligence, conviction and other histories etc.) A score of over 25 or 30 out of 40 identifies clinical psychopathy in a UK population.<sup>79</sup>

Within the psychopathy checklist, two separate factors emerge that correspond to the different aspects of criminality described, factor 1 involving broadly social psychopathic variables, socially charming, but manipulative violent, cunning and ruthless; and factor 2 having the more disorganised contents with poor impulse control, uncontrolled substance abuse and so on, the “bar room brawler”.

The significance of the concept is that many have noticed the parallel between the charming, ruthless, manipulative popular notion of a psychopath and that of the successful CEO.<sup>80</sup> Hare’s “Snakes in Suits”<sup>81</sup> describes how self interested and selfish individuals can ruthlessly and effectively manipulate an organisation for their own interests, and the havoc that this can cause to the business.

Increasingly, and supported by empirical data, the key attitudinal dyad of being callous and unemotional is being cited as the core pathology for clinical psychopathy.<sup>82</sup> Violence is simply one variable that some callous and unemotional psychopathic people have,<sup>83</sup> that brings them in conflict with society, and therefore frequently to prison. One’s manager, leader or political representative may well be a clinical psychopath, just probably not a violent one.

### **2.3 Personality, leadership and charisma: Conclusion**

Neither discipline of leadership, personality or psychopathy alone provide a sufficiently rich account to illuminate the “clinical hunch” crystallised in the research question of how managers are effective within organisations, and the relevance or otherwise of the personality or psychopathy of the manager.

There is a schism between the managerial and sociological literatures; the managerial focus on the influence of the person and behaviour of the Chief Executive, whereas the sociological literature is more focussed on the structural, the power of structure and habitual cultural mores. Consequently, the sociological themes of structure, agency and power will be explored next.

## **2. Agency and power**

In exploring the question of how managers are effective within organizations, models of social structures within sociology might be anticipated to illuminate organisational theory. Questions of social agency and power likewise might contribute to understanding leadership.

Having touched upon the issues of personality and psychopathy, this section takes the research question about managerial agency into the domain of social theorizing, looking at the question of structure and agency on the one hand, and power on the other, proposing an interpersonal account of agency.

### **3.1 Structure and agency**

If the history of social theorising began with the Greeks the overwhelming approach was theistic. Agency was evacuated into deities, with mythological accounts of the gods themselves in conflict with the fates and each other. With the enlightenment develops more of a notion of human as opposed to divine agency, fuelled by industrialisation and a mechanical augmentation of human activity, and then by the development of capitalism and the expansion of private property.

"Individualism" developed, combining three emergent social theoretical strands; notions of the "Rights of Man";<sup>84</sup> Adam Smith's theorisation of individual activity in the market place,<sup>85</sup> and utilitarian ethics,<sup>86</sup> which atomise ethical decision making from divine statute to individual people and situations.

This developing tension was explored by Durkheim,<sup>87</sup> who described "anomie" as a

condition where traditional social structures and mores have dissolved, leaving an individual without referents. Contrasting this view was Marx's account of social structure as rigidly determined by capitalism.<sup>88</sup> Modern theorising of the structure/agency relationship begins with Weber's classification of different types of social action at a micro-level.<sup>89</sup>

### **3.1.1 Unalloyed structure or agency**

Archer is critical of extreme versions of rational choice theory as representing the extreme end of an atomised, individualistic, subjective agentic account of society, and an extreme version of linguistic structuralism to represent its opposite.<sup>90</sup> Her main argument seems to be that these accounts leave something of being human out of the equation.<sup>91</sup> An Adam Smith market place society would be a pure meritocracy, where people's earning potential would be related to the value of their skills and abilities; there is no account of underlying structural constraints or facilitators such as old boy or Masonic networks, prejudice, and so on. Elegant though the theory of the pure market is, it lacks face validity because it doesn't describe life as it is.

Characteristically, the one-dimensional accounts at the extremes are both elegant and internally coherent; they can refute challenges and reinterpret counter arguments in their own terms. Their elegance and coherence derive from their eschewal of the central problematic of how the two, structure and agency; will and reality, how these two actually engage. In her challenge to the linguistic structuralists, Archer comments that if the extreme structural linguists were to be believed, one could turn base metal into gold by saying so.

A further characteristic of one-dimensional accounts is that the opposite pole is in someway disavowed or displaced elsewhere, into some other part of the system. Marxism displaces agency onto the owners of the means of production, who reduce wages and increase prices to squeeze profits out of an increasingly unstable

system.<sup>92</sup> Religious people, by projecting their own limited agentic potency into a deity, can feel reassured as said figure takes on omnipotent proportions. Such models of enforced passivity allow people to disavow the fact that they have choices and agency that they choose not to use.

### **3.1.2 Structure and the “category mistake”**

As part of his structuration theory, Giddens describes structure and agency as being two sides of the same coin; that the two are constitutive of the same phenomena, but perceived from different angles, such that the two cannot be seen at the same time together. This idea was elaborated by Hay suggesting that the two being metal constituents of an alloy of which the coin is made, such that they together form an irreducible “compound” that cannot be separated.<sup>93</sup>

Giddens’ structuration theory employs a neat elision of structure and agency where agency requires structure to be able to have the conditions to act potently, and that by utilising the structure, it confirms it and strengthens it. Like a language, to be understood and act, one needs to use English, as by doing so the structure that is the English language is strengthened and confirmed. To suggest that social structures are “things” like blocks of granite is a category mistake. Attempts to understand social structures in the same way that one understands physical objects are futile for this reason. For Giddens<sup>94</sup>, social structures only exist in their praxis and use by people.

However, if the “category mistake” notion underpins Giddens’ coin or Hay’s alloy (as it seems to), then the analogy of structure and agency to the coin’s faces or alloy is wrong. Rather, agency is to structure what a coin is to money, not as a coin is to its constituent chemical compound, or to another facet of its physical structure.

Money only has meaning for so long as it is being used and actively valued by

individual agents. Money is made up of individual coins in the same way that (in Giddens' model) structure comprises individual agents. Money is almost a verb, a doing word, where the "doing" is active valuing and usage of money in transactions, in the same way as structures in fact are structurations by their active usage and praxis.

Absent from this ontological point is how agency and structure might actually engage with each other. To be facetious, what happens to the coin if it doesn't want to be just money, but it wants to be a flower instead. Or, closer to Giddens' analogy, one side of the coin wants to be a dollar, and the other wants to be a pound.

People, individuals, do want to do unpredictable things. How does structuration theory accommodate the process of their struggle? Sometimes these capricious ideas take off: the idea of evolution; the internet; the "final solution". An account of structure and agency needs to be able to account for these deviations and major turns in societal development that can begin from the ideas of individuals without structurally collapsing these ideas into pre-existing nascent cognitions structured by the external environment on the one hand, or dissolving into a cult-personality/agency worship on the other.

### **3.1.3 "Situating" agency**

Giddens' contribution can be argued to be threefold, where he uses his technique of "bracketing" structure and agency respectively to explore the issues contained. These three separate accounts of structure and agency take three separate positions on the spectrum rather than that they integrate into one grand theory.

Giddens' agent focussed account involves individuals utilising structures to carry out actions.<sup>95</sup> His contention is that people live within social structures, use them towards their ends, and that they need them to be able to function. In many ways,

this is a common sense perspective about the nature of society, and uncontroversial. Giddens' account of an agent's praxis involves the habitual carrying out of sequences of actions that confirm and underpin structures<sup>96</sup>. The structure of the banking industry is confirmed, not by the daily decisions about whether to leave one's money in a bank or not, but by the fact that one always has without thinking about it.

Giddens' account raises the question of the importance of internal structures, within the agent's mind, as determinants of behaviour. Pre-existing accepted social mores and practices themselves *influence* the agents' actions. However, pre-existing prejudices and unquestioned assumptions and habits may do more than influence; according to Giddens, they determine both the agents' actions and the solidity and dependability of the social structures that as agents provide the frameworks for action.

The question for Giddens is what is there left for the agent to do, once they have confirmed in their daily structured routine. There seems to be little room for an agent to be able to do anything innovative, different, or agentic at all.

Giddens' account of agency framed within a structuration process paints a similar picture to that proposed by Bevir and Rhodes' concept of "situated agency". Bevir's interpretivist approach<sup>97</sup> describes what is meant by being situated in terms of a "web" of beliefs, culture and practice; a web that is structurally engendered. As in structuration, the agent's situation both facilitates and constrains his actions, but Rhodes draws a clear and helpful distinction between agency and autonomy, where the former is situated within a particular social and ideational context, and the latter is not. Rhodes is clear that agency within a social context is a phenomenon, but that an agent so situated cannot be completely autonomous.

This account makes intuitive sense; Rhodes points out that this is true of many

interpretivist accounts, but that they should not be underestimated as a result.<sup>98</sup>

Unlike Giddens, Rhodes makes no claim to have solved the structure/agency riddle, arguing instead that an interpretivist model can provide a set of hypotheses about the nature of the knowledge web of the agent that contextualised and may explain his action. Rhodes account can be criticised as being relativist and lacking the clarity of grand theory of other writers, and at times the question can arise, as in Giddens, of what there is left for the agent to do once their autonomy has been curtailed by their situatedness.

There is no account in either of these models of the struggle between agent and structure. It is as if everyone is happy with their appointed lot in living within their situation, or in supporting the structuration process of which they are a part. There is an aspect of the liveliness, criticism and rebelliousness of life and being that seems neutered in Rhodes' or Giddens' agent; the logic of their arguments takes them inexorably towards a more structural account. However, Rhodes reassures the reader on occasion that the agent does have a degree of freedom as this is part of the theory, and Giddens tells the reader that they do have agency as illustrated by the fact that individuals can move their bodies unpredictably and as they wish.

### **3.1.4 Morphogenesis and culture**

A critical realist perspective involves the notion of layers of reality, illustrated in Archer's trilogy of books, two exploring structure and agency respectively, and a third exploring culture.<sup>99</sup> The role of culture within Archer's morphogenic theory is a staging post between the actions of an individual, who through a collective, incrementally acts upon the culture, which changes, and structural change may follow.

Archer classifies the foregoing accounts into those that focus on agency,<sup>100</sup> that she describes as an "upward conflation" including variations of rational choice and social

action theory; those that she describes as a “central conflation”, such as structuration theory, and those that she describes as a “downward conflation”, particularly the iterations of structuralism, although the researcher will argue that her own “morphogenic theory”<sup>101</sup> can be included in this group.

The power of the explanatory value of the three terms, agency, culture and structure lies in part in terms of their differential epistemological derivations that are summarised in table 2.

	<b>Ontology</b>	<b>Epistemology</b>	<b>Comment</b>
<b>Agency</b>	Individual idea	Phenomenological; hermeneutic	An understanding of agency derives from an empathetic process derived from personal experience of agency
<b>Culture</b>	Partially shared idea	Hermeneutic, positivist	Culture is disavowed or unrecognised everyday practice that can be inductively established
<b>Structure</b>	Collectively shared idea	Positivist; falsificationist	Structure is explicit practice and organisation

**Table 2. Ontology and epistemology for structure, agency and culture**

Morphogenesis proposes a staged model of agency changing structure, where an individual might start a change in the cultural flux that might lead to a collective of individuals of like mind that in turn leads to a change in the structure.<sup>102</sup> Important for this model is the dimension of time, agents can change structures over a temporal span in a developmental way. The stages of morphogenesis involve an agent interacting socially with a group that takes on and adopts the agent’s perspective, and the group work together, potent to change the structure.

Morphogenic theory, while seeming convincing and “common sense”; seems not to have an explicit theory of agency. How, and in what way, does the agent “convert” the group to their way of thinking? Why does the group take on the agent’s

perspective, and not somebody else's? Following this unexplained conversion of the rest of the group to the agent's view, what holds the group to task; who defines the task i.e. how to achieve the new direction identified? Is it the agent or some form of group dynamic?

Archer's explanation for the mechanisms underlying the process relies heavily on the concept of culture. In parallel with the process described above, culture is changing in a gradual way following the same sequence as structure changing. This is an interesting and important aspect of the theory, chiming, as it does with the management literature that acknowledges the difficulty of describing and identifying culture, but which sees cultural change as crucial to organisational change.<sup>103</sup> However, at the level of abstraction of structure and agency within social theory, it is inordinately difficult to define what is meant by culture in such a way as to distinguish it from structure for two reasons. Firstly, from a neo-Marxist perspective, if culture is defined as local tradition, attitudes and shared values, conscious or unconscious, these are structure, placed there to maintain the alienation of the working classes, and so on. Culture is simply hidden structure. While structuration theory does not make explicit use of the term, culture might be close to the habits and daily praxis of the millions that are structuring the structures in their everyday lives. These habits and social mores are simply describing the personal experience of structure, rather than its shared manifestation. Culture is the personal feeling of snobbery at a person's accent or table manners; class is the social structure that is its collective manifestation.

What is required is a sense of what an agent does to start a morphogenic movement off. Indeed, what is the nature of the agent? Is it an individual, a particular person? Is it an idea, in a sort of neo Hegelian way that an idea springs up and simply by the force and power of the idea, the morphogenic process pushed forwards on a tide of ascent and recognition? Or is the agent the incubator of unseen social currents and eddies, such that individuals emerge to espouse an idea

whose time has come?

Once a morphogenic movement is started, Archer's account is adequate; but rather like the antiquated "first mover" arguments for the existence of God, it seems to beg the question about the nature of agency rather than giving an account of it.

### **3.1.5 Micro-sociological agents**

The forgoing accounts have been "structure heavy", in spite of their avowal of agency, the logic of their arguments crowds agency out. There are other social theory literatures that do accurately and powerfully describe aspects of agentic behaviour. In the spectrum diagram above are included the "Dramaturgical" accounts, principally Goffman<sup>104</sup>, but also the insights from the symbolic interactionist tradition<sup>105</sup>, for example Weber's classification of different types of social action<sup>106</sup>.

Powerful and relevant, though these accounts are, they attempt to describe and explain human behaviour in different specific and micro situations, rather than providing an account of potent agency. Becoming sensitised to the non verbal cueing and engagement of everyday conversation is interesting, and an awareness of deeper layers of communication being developed at a symbolic level within a discourse is fascinating; as is spotting the various different dramaturgical roles people adopt strategically in everyday life. These descriptions of how an individual person interacts with and personally mutates the social structures that surrounds them; descriptions of their everyday social psychology are relevant in understanding day-to-day social activity and communication. They do not (and do not claim to) offer a grand theory how the agent tries to change the structure within which he is placed. In short, they seem silent about both structures, and about the interaction of structure and agency.

### 3.1.6 Hay and the “strategic agent”

Hay<sup>107</sup> proposes that the agent identifies the action that they wish to make, evaluates the environment and positions of other agents, (supportive or resistant) and plots out a strategy to achieve the action. During the process of acting, the agent is aware both that their action may change the environment and that there will be activities of supporters and detractors, so that the strategy needs to constantly change to take account of this. The agent’s strategy takes account of the environment and significant others, and then the re-development of strategy takes into account feedback from the environment.

It is surprising how little management literature is appealed to in these accounts of structure and agency within social theory. If the researcher’s critique of Rhodes, Giddens and Archer is accurate, namely that their accounts are in fact crypto-structuralist, then this may be a reason. While Hay does not quote the management literature, he seems to come to a similar conclusion, namely that the crucial activity of the agent is the establishment of a clear sense of an action that they wish to take, and second, the development of a strategy to bring this about following a close environmental analysis. Thirdly, a continual process of review of the strategy in the light of environmental change steers changes in strategy.

Two things seem to be missing from this account, firstly, that the process of competing strategies seems to be rather too civilised; if the agent’s plan is thwarted, in an unemotional way he will simply re-calculate and start again? Secondly, Hay spends insufficient time defining and describing the nature of either an agent or a structure. One can infer that an agent is perceptive of the structural environment and to the attitudes of others, and that they have sufficient intellectual ability to devise a good strategic plan, but in this account it is not clear whether the agent is the person or the strategy itself. In other words, are organisations and societies changed by people, or is the agent simply a vessel for an idea whose time has

come?

### 3.1.7 A structure/agency spectrum.


The different “solutions” to the structure/agency question can be placed along a spectrum from those with more structuralist leanings at one pole, to those with more agency-based understandings at the other. Occupying the two extremes are linguistic structuralism or neo-marxism at the extreme structuralist pole, with phenomenological accounts and rational choice theory on the other. Scattered between the two poles are other accounts noted above, and in the middle are the balanced structuration model of Giddens, or the alloy/two faces of a coin of Hay. A diagrammatic summary of the various theoretical accounts and their relative positions on a spectrum is produced in table 3 below.

An alternative temporal model of structure and agency situated within the spectrum of past present and future is articulated by Emirbayer and Mische<sup>108</sup>. For them, agency is a compound structure of a past “iterative element”, the historical contextual, habitual contribution; a “projective element” where future trajectories can be anticipated, as articulated by the rational choice theorists; and a “practical-evaluative element”, that might be described as reactive and strategic, contingent on the emerging situation. Together this “chordal triad of agency” consists of

**...engagement by actors ...through the interplay of habit, imagination and judgment transforms those structures in response to ...changing historical situations<sup>109</sup>**

The aim in this section is to survey the different approaches to and accounts of structure and agency in order to apply it to the question of manager’s effectiveness in organizations. Such an application requires a synthesis such as that provided by Archer’s morphogenesis; by the notion of a spectrum of theories; or by Emirbayer’s spectrum of past, present and future. This discussion will be returned to below to

develop an interpersonal model of structure and agency, which it will be argued is more closely relevant to the realities of managerial practice.



Agent influence	Structuralist pole	Structure influence
0%	Linguistic structuralism <sup>110</sup> /extreme functionalism and neo-Marxism	100%
	Parsons' functionalist interpretation of Weber's Social action <sup>111</sup>	
	Giddens' account of structure enabling agency <sup>112</sup>	
25%	Rhodes "situated agent" model <sup>113</sup>	75%
	Giddens' account of agentic habit and use creating structure <sup>114</sup>	
	Archer's layered morphogenesis <sup>115</sup>	
50%	<b>Structure/agency as two faces/alloy of a coin analogy (Giddens/Hay<sup>116</sup>)</b>	50%
75%	Micro-sociology - Weber's social action theory <sup>117</sup> ; dramaturgical accounts. <sup>118</sup>	25%
	Hay "strategic agent" model <sup>119</sup>	
100%	Economic rational choice model <sup>120</sup> Phenomenology <sup>121</sup>	0%
Agent influence	Intentionalist pole	Structure influence

**Table 3 The Structure/agency theoretical spectrum.**

### 3.2 Power

One variable that potentiates agency is the power of the agent, hence the

exploration of the concept. In the management literature Pfeffer gives an account of managers being phobic of the concept of power and its political, organisational expression<sup>122</sup> and argues that this is surprising as power is a clear and evident construct of central importance to an executive getting things done.

Weber distinguished between power and domination, where power is defined as the individual's "ability to carry out their will in a given situation despite resistance", but this concept is not developed further by him, and instead, as with the accounts above, the more structural account of domination is explored at length in terms of the ways that authority is legitimised.<sup>123</sup>

Approaching the sociological literature on power conflationary and reductionistic issues emerge. The conflationary problem seems to be the difficulty in distinguishing the sociological power literature from the rest of sociology. Theories of power are implicit in accounts of social order from the macro global level to the micro level of individual social repertoire. This can reproduce a secular form of pantheism by, for example Marx's materialism, or the "pantheoreticism" of a Foucauldian understanding of "discipline", with obedience culturally programmed; invisible by its ubiquity<sup>124</sup> and inseparable from the very language describing the phenomenon.

On the other hand, the study of power can be reduced back to an ontological dispute between structure and agency. Clegg's cites Hobbes' structuralist legitimisation of political power as "... a myth of order based on sovereignty"<sup>125</sup> on the one hand, with the more agency orientated Machiavellian account of strategies<sup>126</sup> on the other.

### **3.2.1 Power – A on B.**

For Hobbes, power is about the structures of the state that ensure conformity of the people; a relatively omnipotent legitimised authority, to avoid the chaos and suffering ensuing from the 16<sup>th</sup> century English Civil War. The monarch, or later,

parliament; but importantly something/anything agreed to be sovereign. In the context of the industrial revolution, Marx places sovereignty in the hands of the owners of the means of production. Within a context of developed capitalist democracies, perhaps the sovereign may become a “power elite”.<sup>127</sup>

Mann identifies “four sources and organisations of power”,<sup>128</sup> namely,

- **Ideological**, via manipulation/control of meaning, and norms.
- **Economic**, manipulation/control of the satisfaction of needs and circuits of production.
- **Military**, coercive
- **Political**, via the institutionalised regulation of social relations.

The study of the mechanisms of legitimised political power of the state lead to the so called “three dimensions” of political power, beginning with Dahl’s clarification that power is essentially the ability of A to get B to do something. Dahl’s position was to critique the elitist account of politics, following the process of the city authorities in New Haven.<sup>129</sup> He traced power pluralistically distributed within the society, coalesced into interest and pressure groups that influenced policy and decisions. The path of power was therefore a summation of the different vectors pulling and pushing the executive in different directions.

Bachrach and Baratz argued that that power could also be, “exercised by confining the scope of decision making to relatively safe issues”,<sup>130</sup> keeping contentious issues off the agenda, Lukes added a third,<sup>131</sup> namely that B does what A wants unaware that A is exercising power over them. That is to say that A prevents B realising that what A was making them do is in A’s interests. This final concept of the third dimension of power has as its foundation the notion of, “false consciousness”; where one dominant class or group has the power to manipulate the very ideas and perceptions of their subordinates.

### 3.2.2 Power as a collective

Clegg points out that Hobbes' "social contract" to abide by the rules set out by the sovereign contains within it a collectivist account of power, in that the social contract is entered into freely by the population, to extend their lives and opportunities from its "nasty, brutish and short" alternative.<sup>132</sup>

For Hobbes, this free choice of the people to accept a sovereign has a Lamarkian quality,<sup>133</sup> such that the agreement to obey the identified sovereign cannot subsequently be recalled, and subsequent generations are bound by the agreement. But the genesis of the power of the sovereign is based upon the consent of the people, at least originally.

Other writers have been more explicit in this formulation, most notably, Parsons' account of power as being like money, in that it is actually created by people, and that it changes hands between people, ideas, or structures; like money.<sup>134</sup>

Parsons' starting point is to say that power is a "key concept in the great western tradition of thought..." but to criticise it for being "conceptually diffuse", for not giving an account of the distinction between coercive and consensual power, and for being assumed to be "zero-sum", that the power of A diminishes the power of B. He defines the "core complex of meaning" of power as the capacity of persons or collectives "to get things done" effectively, in particular when their goals are obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition", and later as "means of acquiring control of the factors of effectiveness", where "factors of effectiveness" part of his model that parallel aspects of economic theory, and are defined in table 4.<sup>135</sup>

	<b>Economic theory</b>	<b>Parsonian theory of power</b>
<b>Inputs</b>	<b>Factors of production</b>	<b>Factors of effectiveness</b>
	Land	Commitment to collective action
	Labour	Collective need (interest group pressure)
	Capital	Control over some part of economic productivity
	Organisation	Legitimacy of authority of collective decisions
<b>Outputs</b>	Goods, services	Influence
	Consumption “wants”	Collective demand satisfaction
<b>Process</b>	Resource combination increasing value	Resource combination increasing effectiveness
<b>Circulating medium</b>	Money	Power

**Table 4 A Summary of Parsons’ economic theory of power.**

Haugaard traces Parson’s theory back to a review of Mills “Power Elite” book.<sup>136</sup> Parsons had influentially criticised it as an “eccentric”<sup>137</sup> justification and rationalisation of conservative societal structures of the United States. His power theory comprises part of his biological metaphor of “structural-functionalism” of the organism adapting to its environment, and a significant critique is that this explains away conflictual social phenomena in a Panglossian “best of all possible worlds” manner as if the inevitable outcome of a social natural selection.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, central and legitimate in Parson’s account is the truism that power is found in the collective. Without the consent and compliance of the masses, Mill’s power elites or Hobbs’ sovereign have no power.

This theme is extended in Arendt’s work: She defines power as,

**... The human ability to act ... Power... belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. <sup>138</sup>**

Barnes' consensual theory of power echoes this; for him,

**... Social power is the capacity for action in a society... the agent's power to act through the bodies of others. <sup>139</sup>**

There are difficulties in these collective theories of power, particularly for Barnes, how to conceptualise coercive power; Arendt responds to this by qualifying her definition of "power" as a positive creative energy born out of the collective, and distinct from violence, equated with coercive power.

### **3.2.3 Personal power**

Within the management literature, the specific issue of personal power all seems to refer back to French and Raven's 1959 paper<sup>140</sup> that identifies five sources of social power;

- Reward power
- Coercive power,
- Legitimate power
- Referent power
- Expert knowledge power

The broad hypothesis is that an individual with more of each and any of these attributes will have more power. The first three of these attributes are based upon an assumption of a social structure, an organisation within which the individual has

a position or role, by virtue of this position they can confer an advantage or the opposite on subordinates.

Type of personal power source	Supporting concepts/literatures
<b>Reward power</b> – ability to confer financial, promotional or other reward.	Positive reinforcement – learning theory <sup>141</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Material benefits</li> <li>• Status benefits</li> </ul>
<b>Coercive power</b> – the ability to inflict negative stimuli on the subordinate	Negative reinforcement – learning theory <sup>142</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Criticism</li> <li>• Demotion/exclusion/material dis-benefit</li> </ul> Economy of violence <sup>143</sup>
<b>Legitimate power</b> – the belief that the individual has the right to exert influence.	Weberian legitimate domination <sup>144</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rational/legal</li> <li>• Traditional</li> <li>• Charismatic</li> </ul> Position power – authority/seniority within structured organisation <sup>145</sup>
<b>Referent power</b> – the power holder as a role model, so that the subordinate is personally motivated to obey.	Charisma/transformational theory (see above).
<b>Expert knowledge power</b> – having knowledge needed by the subordinate	Consultant ability to guide and supervise subordinates' work Wisdom; expert; intelligence – early trait theory

**Table 5 Sources of personal power**

Organisations comprise an operationalisation of the collectivist power theories described above, that power and the ability to carry out actions is based upon a process of structuring individuals into collectives organised around a particular task, the division of labour with reduction in transaction costs. Within a structured collective, an organisation, individuals will vary in the degree to which they can utilise and control other individuals that comprise it.

### **3.2.4 Power as internal: Ideology, discipline and habitus.**

The nature of accepted and invisible paradigms in society seems to have been the subject of the post structuralists, and the same basic theme crops up in different guises in a number of different accounts.

Weber's concept of *Herrschaft* has no exact English translation, but combines the notions of "domination" and "authority" with the idea that it has organisational power that is usually obeyed; "authority" based upon an understanding of the allied notion of legitimacy<sup>146</sup>. Crucial is the fact that the *Herrschaft* authority is obeyed on the basis of internal beliefs and attitudes, rather than because of threat or coercion. The follower obeys on the basis of what was subsequently identified as internal discipline by Foucault, *habitus* or structuration by Bordieu and Giddens respectively.

A starting point is Foucault's account of the function of the Panopticon prison in *Discipline and Punish*.<sup>147</sup> He notes that there has been a vast reduction in the severity of physical punishment, but that this has been balanced by a "punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations".<sup>148</sup>

In the panoptic on prison, the miscreant is continually observed by representatives of "normal" society that judge harshly his misdemeanours, and the attitudes and "episteme" that underlie them:

**The penitentiary technique bears not on the relation between author and crime, but on the criminal's affinity with his crime.**<sup>149</sup>

The effect of this "treatment" is the deconstruction of the delinquent's set of attitudes and values, and the recreation of those accepted by society. Release back into normal society is contingent on this transformation taking place.

The significance of this process is that it illuminates the pervasiveness of particular ways of thinking and attitudes that determine and control everyday life: internal discipline. This is,

**Real subjection... so it is not necessary to... constrain the convict to good behaviour... the worker to work, the schoolboy to application...**

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This theme of “real [internalised] subjection” underlies other post structuralist accounts. Giddens’ “practical consciousness knowledge” takes us, unthinking, about our daily activities, and in turn “structurates” society<sup>151</sup>. Bourdieu’s “habitus” is,

**... A tacit knowledge of how to ‘go on’...a form of disposition...both an internalisation of reality, and in the moment of practice, an externalisation of self...”<sup>152 153</sup>**

The individuals that comprise the collectives on whom power depends are themselves subjugated by internal ideas, symbols and practices namely discipline, practical consciousness and habitus.

### **3.3 An object relations theory of structure and agency**

Having explored leadership, agency and power, the aim of this section is to integrate these concepts by proposing firstly that the structure and agency is an interpersonal dynamic (using Dahl’s nomenclature) between A and B, and secondly, that A articulates their agency by creating the structure within which B is constrained. This theory is based upon firstly on the claim that structure and agency are ontologically identical, and secondly on psychoanalytic “object relations” theory.

### 3.3.1 The ontology of “structure”.

Giddens<sup>154</sup> and Bhaskar<sup>155</sup> have argued for the need to address the ontological dimension of the structure-agency question, and there is a risk of collapse into a hopeless relativism, as Hay suggests,

**...there are as many different solutions to the structure-agency problem(atique) as there are authors holding different ontological assumptions<sup>156</sup>.**

Human social development involves being encultured into a set of social mores, and it is extraordinarily difficult to break through the barriers that these social structures construct around us. The personal anxiety and phobia generated by disobeying social mores and customs falsely gives the impression of solidity and permanence to these habits; the ability of individuals to transgress social boundaries, for example, criminals thieving (traducing the social structure of property ownership), or people committing incest (overcoming fundamental taboos) demonstrate that social structures can be overcome by a subordinate idea; a sense of entitlement or overwhelming need for a thief; hedonism or idiosyncratic family culture contributing to incest.

Notwithstanding their power, the structures described in sociology are ideas. Physical structures have an existence in the external world; an existence in physical space, they are “extended” in the Cartesian definition. Social structures do not. Social structures have no existence outside people’s minds. Some ideas, such as the ownership of property, or the legitimacy of the legal system, are very powerful, because lots of people accept them. Social structures such as class; the state; human rights; the family; these are all ideas, ideas that lots of people accept, but simply ideas.

The difference between an idea and a social structure is determined by the number of people who accept it. The ideas of the nation state or of class are social structures because the ideas are widely accepted. The idea of stoning blasphemers to death, or the idea of the need for FGM is not widely held in the UK, and therefore these are not social structures in the UK.

By using the word “structure” to denote something like class, there is an implication that the idea has the strength and solidity of a block of granite, which it does not. Its fluidity is illustrated by the different manifestations of societal stratification in different cultures, for example based upon wealth in the US, “caste” in India and a complex mix of historical, educational and financial factors in the UK. The demise of some very established social structures such as public executions or slavery in western societies demonstrates that social structures are essentially ephemeral, unlike a physical structure, the block of granite

### **3.3.2 Object relations theory.**

“Object relations” theory is a psychoanalytic approach to understanding and describing human relations associated with the British Kleinian tradition, and particularly theorists such as Fairbairn, Klein and Winnicott.<sup>157</sup> It seeks to explain the vicissitudes of human relationships in terms of those previously encountered during development. The individual might relate to their partner, colleagues, children and so on, as they formerly did to their parents, siblings etc. Each of these people are termed “objects”; as being the object of a psychological drive (loving, hating etc.); the term illustrating their interchangeability.

An object relations theory of structure and agency proposes that one person’s agency becomes another person’s structure; that structure and agency are at the core a human relationship. Two agents are “related” if they have interests in common. Varieties of relatedness include the very intimate and involved relationship of a marriage partnership, the sort of relationship between the taxpayer and state,

the relationships between employer and employee, or farmers in rich and poor countries. For a relatedness to exist, some form of shared interest in an area relevant to the structure/agency issue in question is required; an issue about which they struggle; an ongoing dialectic. The agent is defined by winning, subordinating the other to their imposed idea, which becomes the structure.

Structure and agency are ontologically identical, with neither to be privileged, although perceived from different perspectives within a relationship. The agency of actor A becomes the structure of actor B; or the agency of actor B becomes the structure for actor A. The relative success of each in structuring their peer's world determines whether A or B is the agent and whether A or B is constrained by structure. Agency is an outcome of overwhelming the subordinate actor. Being constrained by structure is an outcome of being overwhelmed by the superordinate actor.

### **3.3.3 Agents and their structures**

An agent can be singular or plural, can be an individual, a group, an organisation or institution, a nation state. For example, it is common practice in the field of globalisation for individual nation states act as agents,<sup>158</sup> or in the analysis of the actions of institutions in political theory.<sup>159</sup> Similarly, it is extendable to the inclusion of semiotics as in actor network theory<sup>160</sup>, in that an idea can subjugate human actors.

Neither can an agent be reduced to being a single responsible mind or idea. Rorty<sup>161</sup>, following Hume<sup>162</sup>, powerfully deconstructs the notion of a single autonomous psychological sense of self; Subsequent psychoanalytic writers have characterised the individual using very similar terms as social theorists characterise society; as confused, with fragmentary value sets, variable and contradictory aims and preferences, and with the presence of an internal conversation or dialectic about what action to take.

The risk of the theory dissolving into a tautology is prevented firstly by the presence of a subject/object directional dimension to the two actors. This need for an empathetic resonance in examining such structure agency situations is illustrated by the anthromophisation. The law is a policeman; the court is a judge; the nation state is the premier or president. This structure is experienced not just as “the rules”, but as someone else’s rules.

Take the road traffic law as an example: the UK legislature is the agent-subject that lays out a structure to constrain the driver-agent-object. As the speeding driver on a lonely deserted road, the tables are turned, and the agent-subject becomes the driver imposing their structure on parliament-agent-object; until, that is, they drive into a speed trap around the next bend, the polarity is reversed again.

The second polarity preventing collapse into a tautology is the issue of power. In short, structure is the dominant agency, the more powerful agency. Most people obey the traffic laws because of the power of the criminal justice system. In relation to the structure agency question, the issue about power is simply about its relative distribution, rather than (as in political science) the overt or covert ways it is manifest.

### **3.4 Agency and power: Conclusion**

In addressing the question of how managers in organisations are effective, the broad thesis starts to be defined theoretically. If social structures are ideas, then the agency in changing them is the process of inculcation of ideas. The task for A if they want to impose something upon B, is for A to mould B’s internal discipline/habitus/herrschaft/structuration so that the action sought is self-evident and taken-for-granted - every day praxis - for B.

Translated into an organisational context, the leader/manager perceives the internal psychological structures that comprise internal discipline/habitus/herrschaft/structuration of the follower. The leadership task becomes the creation and then the orchestration of these internal structures of followers to conform with the vision of the leader, and internally motivate the follower to enact the this vision.

#### **4. Bad leadership**

In exploring the issue of how managers are effective within organisations, the issues related to the leader as an individual have been explored by looking at the leadership literature and personality as a variable. Next, the sociological literatures have been explored, redefining “effectiveness” as “agency”, and developing a hypothesis of leadership manipulating follower’s internal habitus/structures. .

This section explores questions relating to bad and unethical leadership, to focus on the second part of the research question, namely the extent to which psychopathy in management and leadership is a critical variable. The approach taken has been to look at four areas,

- The question of “bad leadership” directly;
- “Corrupted leadership” through the topics of “bad charisma” and Machiavellianism;
- Models of psychopathic leadership through organised crime and the callousness of organisational theory;
- Exploration of the mainstream approach to such questions, namely “ethical leadership”.

##### **4.1 Bad Leadership**

It is striking that much organisational failure is attributed in practice to bad leadership, and yet the large leadership literature is relatively silent on the issue.

#### 4.1.1 Kellerman's typology

In her book "Bad Leadership", Kellerman<sup>163</sup> has classified the types of bad leadership using case examples as summarised in table 7. She suggests that this scotomisation of bad leadership as a topic within the leadership literature can be understood in a number of ways. Firstly, there are genuine difficulties post hoc. of identifying the contribution of leadership to an adverse episode. Secondly, she suggests that even if it were possible to attribute failure clearly to leadership, one would be averse to doing so. There is a need to preserve the illusion of leadership infallibility in a context of the ubiquity of living different aspects of reliance on leadership. Finally, in terms of corporate governance and commercial considerations, there would be organisational resistance to both clearly acknowledging organisational failure and then attributing leadership fault.

She argues that as a result, we know much less about a rather common and extremely important issue than we should. She argues that the "bad side" needs to be reclaimed, so that meaning can be made of it, and it can be learned from.

Kellerman's method is to classify examples of leadership failure into seven different types, describing each, but particularly using case examples, summarised in table 6.

A number of criticisms can be raised against Kellerman's model. Firstly, these examples can be taken as an illustration of Enoch Powell's apocryphal comment that all political lives end in failure; indeed Kellerman herself comments on this factor. Secondly, in general, there are a number of weaknesses in using case examples to illustrate good, bad, ethical or unethical leadership. The difficulties are that the case examples are:

- **Partial;** either focussing on usually one particular success or failing or even one pattern of success or failure within a vast career output of any given leader, and/or not describing the context of the reported success or failure;

were they in the right place at the right time (for success) or the wrong place at the wrong time (for failure).

<b>Ways of “leading badly”</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Examples</b>
<b>Incompetent leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack will or skill (or both) to sustain effective action</li> <li>• Do not create positive change with an impotent leadership challenge</li> </ul>	Juan Antonio Samaranch – Olympic corruption
<b>Rigid leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stiff and unyielding</li> <li>• Unable/unwilling to adapt to new ideas/information or changing times</li> <li>• Not “deflected by the facts”<sup>164</sup></li> </ul>	Thabo Mbeki – AIDS and South Africa
<b>Intemperate leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lacks self control</li> <li>• Followers unable/unwilling to intervene</li> </ul>	Boris Yeltsin – alcohol
<b>Callous leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uncaring and unkind</li> <li>• Ignores/discounts needs/wants of organisation members</li> </ul>	Martha Stewart – “nastiness”
<b>Corrupt leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lie, cheat or steal</li> <li>• Self interest ahead of public interest (more than norm)</li> <li>• Motivated by power or greed</li> </ul>	A Alfred Taubman – Sotheby’s/Christie’s cartel
<b>Insular leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minimisation/disregard of the health of “the other” – i.e. Those outside realms of direct responsibility</li> </ul>	Bill Clinton – Rwanda
<b>Evil leadership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commit atrocities</li> <li>• Use pain as instrument of power</li> <li>• Harm done is severe, and physical, psychological or both</li> </ul>	Foday Sankoh – Sierra Leone civil war atrocities

**Table 6. Kellerman’s (2004) typology of “Bad Leadership”**

- **Short termist** and culturally determined; leaders celebrated at one time are later criticised (e.g. Robert Maxwell, Asil Nadir); and then sometimes in

subsequent generations more appreciated (e.g. the recent revisionism regarding Richard II<sup>165</sup>)

- **Normative;** depending on the author's frequently un-stated prejudices about "good leadership".

A third criticism of this approach can be made that some pathological aspects of personality are necessary for effective leadership, for example Kellerman's describes rigid, intemperate and callous leadership. There would be an argument, that a temperate leader might be unable to summon the passion to take a group or organisation along with them; that the tenacity required to deliver a vision requires a degree of rigidity, and that difficult decisions require a degree of callousness. It seems inappropriate, therefore, to identify leaders as bad because they display these characteristics, which can be argued to be contributory to their success. Instead, the question one of degree; whether the characteristic in question is unbalanced.

The same can be said of her other variables. Regarding corruption, there is a "real politic" argument that a degree of questionable deal making is inevitable with leadership and power. Similarly, insularity of focus can be lauded as "sticking to the knitting"<sup>166</sup>, and a leader overly concerned with extra-group peripheral issues can be criticised.

Kellerman's account itself can be reframed as capturing some of the characteristics required of leadership, perhaps up to and including the need to commit "atrocities" during downsizing in order to preserve the viability of the organisation. Kellerman may capture some characteristics required of leadership, but then colour them with negative terminology. Table 7 (below) reframes Kellerman's "bad leadership" types into putative managerial strengths to illustrate the issue.

This criticism of Kellerman's account potentially leads to a form of relativism. Bad leadership is not about being incompetent, rigid, intemperate, and so on, but about being inappropriately incompetent, rigid, or intemperate. Furthermore, if the discussion about good and bad leadership moves from a typology of qualities that define bad leadership on to a discourse about balance of leadership traits that in excess can lead to failure, the definition of "good leadership" starts to look Aristotelian. Firstly, in terms of the Greek notion of a healthy character (or leadership) comprising an appropriate balance of the humours, and secondly, a general sense of integrity of life and way of living implying a balance of passion and temperance; rigidity and flexibility; and so on.<sup>167</sup>

<b>Ways of "leading badly"</b>	<b>Positive reframing</b>
Incompetent leadership	Leadership willing to take on and struggle to achieve the impossible
Rigid leadership	Tenacious/principled/consistent leadership
Intemperate leadership	Passionate leadership
Callous leadership	Leadership willing to make difficult decisions
Corrupt leadership	Leadership able to operate flexibly within different cultural environments and value sets
Insular leadership	Leadership "sticking to the knitting"
Evil leadership	Leadership not afraid to be ruthless if necessary

**Table 7. A positive reframing Kellerman's typology of "Bad Leadership".**

#### **4.1.2 Lipman-Bluman's "Toxic Leadership"**

Lipman-Bluman's concept and definition of what constitutes a "toxic leader"<sup>168</sup> is somewhat confused, including case examples illustrating bullying and psychological manipulateness, but also incompetence and failure.

The power of the toxic leader concept instead derives from the analysis of their origins, namely through the needs and actions of followers. In her account, toxic leaders are not born, but made by their followers. Leaders, she argues, are created to meet followers',

- Need for reassuring authority figures (to fill parent's shoes);
- The willingness to surrender freedom to achieve security and certainty;
- Need to feel chosen/special;
- Need for membership;
- Fear of being ostracised/isolated;
- Fear of personal powerlessness to challenge a bad leader.

Reasonable leaders can be turned bad by the pressures that followers bring to bear, for example:

- Flattery that prevents the leader having a true picture of the environment and followers' views.
- Followers' need to identify with an uplifting vision, such that leaders are more often chosen on the basis of their vision, rather than competence, turning the leader "toxic" in terms of incompetence.
- Once in place, "Maslow hierarchy control myths" create an illusion the leader is essential to meet physiological needs, safety needs, belonging needs, making them unimpeachable.

Although the "toxic leadership" model ends with an exhortation to "nurture reluctant leaders," her central thesis is that leaders are there to protect followers from existential, social and infantile fears. She concludes that the whole equation of leadership and followership is irrational and potentially damaging for both sides, and obscures the perception of the real world.

The relevance for the current research is that her theory describes the process of followers surrendering their own potency and agency to the leader because of their needs that she describes; making them vulnerable to leaders whose personalities may have narcissistic or psychopathic elements.

## **4.2 Corrupted leadership**

If the previous section directly explored bad leadership, this section looks at leadership that becomes bad, that becomes corrupted. Three models of leadership are explored, firstly the real concern of the potential to corrupt charismatic leadership, where the traditional typological accounts are challenged with a proposed evolutionary theory; looking at the writings of Machiavelli, and then looking at organised crime where, rather than the leadership being corrupted, leadership practice is utilised within a corrupt or criminal organisation.

### **4.2.1 “Good” and “Bad” charisma.**

The core of charismatic leadership is the leader's ability to neutralise the rationality and even values of followers, reconfiguring them towards the leaders' or organisation's aims. David Koresh and Jim Jones as charismatic leaders demonstrate both the power and negative potential of the model.

There are two theories that try to rehabilitate the concept from what Roberts called its “darker side”<sup>169</sup>; by distinguishing between socialised and personalised charisma, and distinguishing between “authentic” and “pseudo-” transformational leadership.

The “authentic/pseudo” distinction is articulated in a paper by Bass and Steidlmeier,<sup>170</sup> where they cite literature proposing that the ethical dimensions of leadership rest on “three pillars”:

- The moral character of the leader,

- The ethical values embedded in the leader's vision,
- The morality of the "... choice and action..." pursued.<sup>171</sup>

Table 8 (below) summarises the differences between the two types of according to Bass.

	<b>Genuine transformational</b>	<b>Pseudo-transformational</b>
<b>Modal values</b>	Honesty	Instrumental mendacity
	Loyalty	Nepotism
	Fairness	Favouritism, victimisation
<b>Ends values</b>	Justice	Submission
	Equality	Racial superiority
	Human rights	"Social Darwinism"
<b>Inner change dynamics</b>	Intellectual stimulation	Imaginary enemies, fictitious obstacles
	Freely embraced change of heart	Bribes; abuse of authority
<b>Leader's attitude</b>	Need for power channelled in socially constructive manner	Power used for self aggrandisement; privately contemptuous of followers
<b>Idealised influence</b>	Acclamation by followers	Self aggrandisement; "impression management"; consciously projected image of strength and decisiveness
<b>Inspirational motivation</b>	Realisable aspirational shared goal as vision	Unrealistic fantasy; magical vision; "We – they" differences
<b>Intellectual stimulation</b>	Genuine open ended intellectual stimulation	Imaginary enemies; fictitious obstacles; "logic containing false assumptions to slay the dragons of uncertainty"; Emotional argumentation instead of rational discourse
<b>Individualised consideration</b>	Development of followers into leaders	Maintenance of follower's dependency; Maintenance of distance between followers and leader; Fermentation of favouritism and competition

**Table 8. Transformational/pseudotransformational leadership**<sup>172</sup>

A second conceptualisation of the distinction between good and bad charisma is articulated by Howell<sup>173</sup> in terms of the degree of socialisation (summarised in table 9 below) of the leader's aims and motivations, and whether they are focused primarily on the group's or the leader's own progress and development.

Whereas the Steidlemeier model looks at the behaviours and strategies of the leader to establish the distinction, Howell focuses on the leader's underlying attitude and motivation, whether it is collective or selfish and individualistic.

	<b>Socialised</b>	<b>Personalised</b>
<b>Focus of power motive</b> <sup>174</sup>	Inculcation of higher order values	Exert dominance and submission over others
	Serving the common good	Serving the leaders interests
<b>Goals and values</b>	Development of collective goals	Imposition of leaders goals
	Tolerance and understanding	Cultivation of leaders values
	Serving the common good	Serving the leader's interests
<b>Methods</b>	Follower autonomy and empowerment	Follower dependence on the leader fostered
	Leader psychological availability	Leader psychological distance

**Table 9. Socialised and personalised charismatic leadership**

There are three arguments against these distinctions. Firstly, there is the problem of extremes. The two binary models of Howells and Steidlemeier do articulate something true about different types of charismatic leader, but they describe two

ends of a spectrum. Leaders such as Mother Theresa might be described as being down the “good” column of the two tables, and criminal gang leaders or end stage totalitarian dictators down the “bad” column, but even within these groups, the division starts to fall apart as demonstrated by the iteration of lionisation and vilification of leaders within the popular press. The practical problem is identifying “god” and “bad” charismatic or transformational leaders in real time, as distinct from in hindsight.

A second criticism employs the phenomenon of the “halo effect”, namely the tendency, when questioned, to attribute good attributes to people thought to be good, and bad ones to those thought to be bad.<sup>175</sup> There is evidence that people attribute charismatic qualities broadly to leaders that they have respected.<sup>176</sup>

Thirdly, distinctions between “good” and “bad” charisma may be a way of reassuring ourselves and rationalise the fear of being emotionally manipulated and duped. One of the powerful proposals of the post-structural movement is the idea that scholarly articles claiming truth value in fact follow literary and rhetorical conventions, for example the setting up of a binary grouping, one good one bad.<sup>177</sup> “Good” and “bad” charisma, via whatever categorisation, Steidlemeiers’ genuine/pseudo; Howell’s socialised/personalised, or Alvolio’s “transformational vs. pure”,<sup>178</sup> (where “pure” is similar to “personalised”, fostering dependency): These divisions potentially rationalise away the fear of a charismatic element of leadership, and may cover a rather weak argument that one can inherently distinguish between types of charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership is powerful and can be dangerous. It may be an illusion to think that it is easy to distinguish between the two.

#### **4.2.2 An evolutionary model of “bad charisma”**

In contrast to identifying different types of charisma, some beneficent and benign, and some malignant, as in the approach above, the account below proposes a developmental/evolutionary model, wherein the different types form a continuum.

The advantage of this over a typology is that it raises the awareness that “good” charisma can turn into “bad” charisma in certain situations. Secondly, it highlights that there is a natural tendency for the charismatic element of the leadership to expand over time in the sense that “power corrupts”.

Firstly, the model utilises the suggestion that different types of managerial style; transactional, transformational and charismatic have increasing amounts of charismatic type leadership behaviour respectively (see 2.1.2.4 above). Secondly, it proposes that, because it is successful and effective, operant conditioning<sup>179</sup> will shape the managers behaviour to favour and expand the more charismatic elements of their managerial practice.

At the first stage of evolution, the transactional leader develops and expands the transformational elements of behaviour in their leadership practice. This is driven by operant conditioning<sup>180</sup>; the manager may be unaware of it, but their transformational behaviour is positively re-enforced because of the positive feedback and task success engendered. Pre-existing transformational type behaviour such as caring about subordinates, intellectually engaging them about the task or vision; speaking of a better future; all increase in frequency through operant conditioning because the manager is rewarded by followers in the form of improved performance.


The second stage of evolution is between transformational and charismatic leadership. For some, the terms are used synonymously; for others, charismatic leadership is transformational leadership plus some additional factors that intensify the charismatic/transformational effect<sup>181</sup>. In this developmental model, a transformational leader becomes charismatic at the point that they realise the effectiveness of their use of charismatic/transformational behaviours, and begin to use them deliberately.

The leader realises that particular aspects of their behaviour are more effective than others; that 4 “I” behaviour is more effective than conventional transactional management type rewards and punishments, and that moreover, 4 “I” behaviour is entirely within their aegis to provide, and are resource neutral, unlike financial bonuses.

While the leader may not be aware of the theoretical context of their behaviours, they develop some sense that “leadership” is a distinct activity from “management”; that “leadership” is an emotional and personal activity, about teambuilding, care and consideration of followers, about gaining buy into a direction and organisational strategy, about cultivating the interest of followers, and their ownership of the organisation or the leader’s aims. The leader begins to recognise what are in effect a series of highly potent emotional levers, and starts to use them.

The third stage involves the development of “bad” from “good” charismatic leadership. To start with, all transformational and then charismatic leadership needs to be “good enough” to be able to improve organisational performance. In the language of “socialised and personalised” charisma, it has to start off as sufficiently “socialised” for the authority base to develop; for the person to receive promotion; for the individual to develop the Weberian distinction and exceptionality required as a charismatic prerequisite. The development of “bad” charisma from “good” is driven by adverse contingencies, either related to the business environment context, or to the personality of the charismatic leader.

Charismatic political leaders, whose time has passed, but who do not wish to relinquish power provide the clearest examples of bad charisma. There are purges of individuals perceived as unsupportive; truths that underline the facts about the need for change are suppressed; image management becomes an increasingly important and central activity with the use of naked power to quell dissent.



**Fig 1. Developmental model of charismatic leadership**

The second contingent driver of charisma from good to bad involves the personality of the individual leader themselves, for example De Vries' managerial case history of the "imposter"<sup>182</sup>. This man quickly rose through the ranks of industry as an

impressive performer and reliable and modest team player, to become CEO. At this point, his attitude completely changed to becoming autocratic, unreasonable, self serving and vain. He saw no conflict with this change; the issue was simply that there was no one that he had to please any more, so that he could please himself. There is a variation in the moral and ethical attitudes and values of individuals, such that power corrupts some more than others. As the power of charismatic managerial practice is realised by the individual, their own moral and ethical attitudes are amplified, be they pro- or anti-social; be they directed towards the common or selfish individual good.

Where the leader is significantly challenged to the point of threat; the same powerful levers that had previously provided purchase and traction are brought to bear, not with the aim of furthering the task, but rather focussed on ensuring the survival of the manager.

The importance of this developmental model lies in the proposal that there is a natural development between good and bad charismatic leadership. There are not two types of charismatic leader, all good charismatics can develop into bad charismatics with a particular set of circumstances.

#### **4.2.3 Machiavelli's extreme pragmatism.**

Machiavellianism is often used as a byword for psychopathic management. For most leadership, the moral dilemma is whether or not to act ethically dubiously in the pursuit of the greater good, where "good" of the ends can be easily and unequivocally argued.

An ambitious man himself, Machiavelli, after some political success in the unstable political environment of late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> century Florence was imprisoned by the Medicis and withdrew from public life, to write.<sup>183</sup> His aim was to articulate how a "prince" could stay in power. Central in his arguments is the following

- **War/fighting/change** is the natural state:

... Human affairs [are] in a state of perpetual movement, either ascending or declining”; “... men are more ready for evil than for good... first [they] seek to secure themselves against attack, then they attack others...”<sup>184</sup>; “it is impossible for a republic... to remain long in the quiet enjoyment of her freedom... for even she does not molest others, others will molest her...”<sup>185</sup> [so that] “... the foundation of states is good military organisation... Without such military organisation, there can neither be good laws, nor anything else good.”<sup>186</sup>.

- **Morality must appear to be enacted**, rather than needing to be.

... The chief duty of every prince is to keep himself from being hated and despised...<sup>187</sup>

Machiavelli distinguishes between private and public morality; Private morality is private, drawn from whatever idealistic source, but which may not be shared by the population and therefore cannot be used as a foundation of power.

Public morality must always be seen to be high. The leader must duplicitously create a public (avowed) persona of generosity, compassion and integrity while explicitly acting thriftily, ruthlessly and cruelly if necessary and while being cunning and conniving. The moral justification of at times unpalatable actions derives from the greater good of preserving a stable state.<sup>188</sup>

- **Virtue as tough-mindedness.** “Virtue” for Machiavelli, the central requisite of a leader, and has been variously translated as “strength, skill or prowess”<sup>189</sup>, or even male sexual potency in his erotic verse<sup>190</sup>. It might best be understood as “discipline” where the leader requires to be self disciplined not to fall victim to the temptations to “effeminacy” from lack of willingness to do the morally uncomfortable. Brutal punishment makes an example of several lawbreakers to encourage the masses to obey the laws; maintaining an army at readiness, and not shirking from battle if required, and so on.
- **Using an “economy of violence”.** Presaging Weber’s theorisation that the state has a monopoly of violence<sup>191</sup>, Machiavelli argues that violence or cruelty should be used for the greater good as a means of reducing other violence. Wolin argues that the requirement for violence is finite and measurable, hence his characterising it as economic.<sup>192</sup> This may justify Machiavelli’s advice to the Prince to treat several criminals very cruelly, to make an example of them in the interests of the lawfulness of the majority.
- **Being feared rather than liked.** Machiavelli’s question of whether it is better to be feared or loved is answered in terms of the former, as all leaders will have to do things that make them unpopular.
- **Chance** plays a significant part.

**And if anyone might oppose [Fortune’s purpose] she either kills him, or she deprives him of any faculty of doing any good;**

...<sup>193</sup>

**Fortune, when she wishes to effect some great result, she select[s] for her instrument a man of such spirit and ability that he will recognise the opportunity which is afforded him...in the**

**same way, when she wishes to effect ruin and destruction, she places men at the head who contribute and hasten such ruin<sup>194</sup>**

Ledeen uses the example of Yasser Arafat to illustrate the successful manipulation of public perceived morality,

**Arafat had to kill potential challengers to maintain control of the PLO, yet it was also important for him to appear as a “moderate”... he therefore had his intelligence services secretly create the Abu Nidal terrorist organisation... to assassinate his enemies within the Palestinian movement... the existence of such a violent and murderous group enabled... Arafat [to] maintain a lofty pose and speak of peace. The deception succeeded fully. Even the Israelis were unaware until... the head of the Romanian secret service defected... Arafat spoke of peace in English to foreign diplomats and promised to his own people in Arabic that Israel would eventually be destroyed.<sup>195</sup>**

In a Machiavellian analysis, the leader is required to succeed. If the only morally acceptable outcome is the achievement of the objective, the duty is to do whatever it takes to achieve the objective. It is not that one is justified/excused the unacceptable action; rather one is morally required to carry it out to maintain power, to maintain peace. .

#### **4.2.4 Mafia management.**

In his “Mafia Manager” book, “V” (the author) illuminates a number of aspects of leadership in organised crime.

- The place of the Capo

**... Everyone, early in his or her career needs the sponsorship of a capo... before you can command, you must learn to obey... when a subordinate, behave like a subordinate... no task he gives you is so mean or so bloody (metaphorically speaking) [sic.] that you would hesitate to undertake it. [However]... later in your career, if by bad happenstance the mentor of your early years... stands in the way of your own advancement, what do you do? Whack him, no question. He's had his career, right? ...All capos... stand on the shoulders of giants... and on the bones of giants. When you climb the pyramid, you climb a bone-heap. But he who would have the fruit, must climb, eh?<sup>196</sup>**

- The pleasure and activity of leadership.

**... The pleasure of commanding is sweeter than sexual intercourse... you have to keep telling your staff how good they are... stress their worth and the value to you of what they do... blow smoke. Every day, blow smoke”<sup>197</sup>**

- The focus on task and absence of ethics

**... Our Thing is about making money. Making it in any way it's possible to make it... a complete lack of scruples confers substantial advantages.<sup>198</sup>**

- The use of violence-

**... A kind word and a gun are much more effective than a kind word alone<sup>199</sup>**

In Kellerman's typology of bad leadership, organised criminal leadership would be "Evil Leadership"<sup>200</sup> in that it uses actual bodily violence, for Arendt's; it would constitute illegitimate violence based subjection.<sup>201</sup>

### **4.3 Ethics and leadership**

Focusing on the second part of the research question, namely the extent to which psychopathy in management and leadership is a critical variable, bad and "corrupted" leadership have been explored. The leadership ethics literature is a response to concerns that are raised both about the potential power of leaders over vulnerable followers, and to concerns about the power of institutions.

This section looks firstly at ethical considerations in general, then at the leadership ethics literature, exploring the dilemma raised by "V" that unethical practice can be more effective in business terms. A further issue explored is the argument that organisations are structurally (and legally) obliged to be psychopathic, leading to a proposal for the redefinition of criminal organisations to distinguish such normal but potentially psychopathic organisations from genuinely criminal ones.

#### **4.3.1 The Good**

A basic polarity running through efforts to understand leadership and organisations as good or bad has to be traditional ethical conceptions of the distinction between good and bad. Given that many of the definitions of bad or evil come down to "the absence of the good"<sup>202</sup>; this seems a reasonable definition of "bad". A historical summary is to be found in table 10( below).

In their paper trying to untangle the problem of the possibility of malign charismatic leadership, Bass uses distillations from "Socratic and Confucian typologies".<sup>203</sup>

<b>Ethical theory</b>	<b>Content – The Good...</b>	<b>Critique</b>	<b>Obverse – The Bad...</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Individual/leadership</b>
<b>Judeo-Christian</b> <sup>204</sup>	Absolutist – e.g. 10 commandments. Evolution from “lex talionis”, to “love thy neighbour”,	Evacuation of morality from individuals into deity.	Disobeying deity, or deity's rules.	External legislative coercion; being seen to follow religious values.	Accepting and acting within external moral code
<b>Rational/Kantian</b> <sup>205</sup>	Categorical imperative – people are ends not means	Neutral about task	Treating people as means	“...our customers/staff are our biggest asset...”	Person focussed leadership style (Tannenbaum and Schmidt <sup>206</sup> )
<b>Empirical/Utilitarian</b> <sup>207</sup>	Right action bring mathematically maximised happiness	Impossible measurement	Non maximised happiness	Marketplace as the fairest distribution of resource; stakeholder impact analyses	Leadership is a technical process of benefit analysis
<b>Relativist</b> <sup>208</sup>	Moral statements express personal feelings	Wide acceptance of many moral themes across different cultures	Nothing inherently good and nothing bad	Moral rhetoric differs when addressing shareholders and customers	Post modern skills; moral flexibility, rhetoric and “spin”
<b>Applied</b> <sup>209</sup>	Promotion of specific issues – fertility, abortion, environmental issues, animal rights	Atomised and politicised,	Lack of consideration of specific issue	Sensitivity and response to politicised single issues	Leadership as fanatic
<b>Economic/Business</b>	Increasing wealth/success	Partial – for a defined group at the expense of another defined group	Decreasing wealth/business failure	“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” <sup>210</sup>	Organisational success/personal wealth

**Table 10. Conceptions of the good (continued over)<sup>211</sup>**

<b>Ethical theory</b>	<b>Content – The Good...</b>	<b>Critique</b>	<b>Obverse – The Bad...</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Individual/leadership</b>
<b>Socratic/ Greek<sup>212</sup></b>	Defining “a good life” – or a “well lived life”...	Partial/discriminatory morality; “Well lived life” of a man; not a woman or slave or occupant of neighbour city state;	Not living a “good life”	A good responsible company – is good for business – like an individual’s “good life”	Personal Integrity leads to positive moral leadership
<b>Confucian<sup>213</sup></b>	Proper conduct; respect of authority, family fidelity, respect of others	Idealistic	Improper conduct	Proper organisational conduct	Integrity of character – with integrity defined in terms of behaviour

**Table 10. Conceptions of the good (continued)**

While I have argued elsewhere that their project to clearly distinguish good and bad charisma is flawed, their overall technique of exploration of the issue seems legitimate, namely that judgement or comment about the ethical valence of leadership/management requires recourse to extremely broad perspectives about the nature of the good.

With the vastness of the literature, there is a plethora of different broad brush-stroke classifications by different writers. In table 10, three broad distinctions have been drawn, firstly relating to the externality or internality of the moral imperative. For many, the moral imperative comes from without, either in the form of a vengeful god, or the demands of a single issue or market success.

Secondly, Greek and Eastern approaches more focus on the nature of the character of the individual or organisation, with the implication that being good is not only a personal struggle, but also a personal task of definition.

A third important dimension is the distinction between the focus on outcomes and the focus on means: teleological vs. deontological approaches. Rational theories (e.g. Hume and Kant) argue for rational categorical imperatives determining what is good (e.g. the Kantian, people as “ends” not “means”) and more empirically grounded theories such as Utilitarianism evaluate the amount of good the outcome. This is summarised by Ciulla<sup>214</sup>, who notes recent organisational ethical debate being about teleological accountability for low wages in developing countries, environmental impact of activities and so on, factors previously ignored.

#### **4.3.2 Ethical leadership**

In exploring the conventional approach to concerns about bad leadership, namely developing leadership ethics, following a general survey of “the good” and understanding “the bad” as its absence, this section will explore some specific literature on applied leadership ethics that has emerged. .

##### **4.3.2.1 The “smell, sleep and newspaper” tests? Paine complains that**

**Ethical analyses [are] rarely a defined part of business decision making... [beyond the]... smell tests, sleep tests and newspaper tests: Does it smell OK? Will it keep me awake at night? How would it look on the front page of the newspaper?<sup>215</sup>**

While she accepts that such “instinct or gut feeling” assessments have their place, they cannot be thought to be sufficient. What this approach does do, is focus on the individual leader, and therefore clarify the leader’s accountability for the ethicality of the actions of the organisation.

Ciulla<sup>216</sup> critically appraises the treatment of ethical issues in leadership studies heretofore, with a dearth of discussion of the issues in Bass’...

**Encyclopaedic... Handbook of Leadership... the text is 914 pages and contains a 162 page bibliography... if you look ethics up in the index, five pages are listed”<sup>217</sup>**

She cites as an example Rost’s book “Leadership in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century” which is extensively researched and has a chapter on ethics, but dismisses traditional philosophy and discourse as “useless”, suggesting that a “new language of civic virtue” will emerge; Ciulla comments, “he fails to notice that the language of civic virtue is quite old”.<sup>218</sup>

She concludes that in leadership studies, scholars, because they feel intuitively they have an ethical sensibility, fail to distinguish their own practical knowledge from theoretical knowledge such that they

**... End up either reinventing fairly standard philosophic distinctions and ethical theories, or [do] without them and [proceed] higgledy-piggledy with their discussion<sup>219</sup>.**


Calas et al propose that much leadership study is to find the Rosetta Stone of leadership,<sup>220</sup> but Ciulla proposes this process of fragmentation of the leadership task prevents an ethical exploration, which requires a broader perspective.

**4.3.2.2 Ethics vs. effectiveness.** Ciulla argues that defining good leadership is predicated upon one’s perspective about the different tasks of leadership. This dilemma is illustrated by Tannenbaum and Schmitt’s dualism of focus on task vs. focus on persons; is good leadership defined by getting the job done, or by the wellbeing of followers? That good leadership is person rather than task focussed is supported by the “rationalist” Kantian categorical imperative, and Yukl confirms that the followers of person-focussed leaders are consistently found to be happier.<sup>221</sup>

Alternatively, if good leadership is defined by delivery of the task, then a Machiavellian approach is justifiable.

The more loaded question is whether there is an inverse proportionality between ethical management and effectiveness, defining “ethical” in Kantian terms. The conflict between the two can be illustrated generally in a number of different ways; the need to maximise profit forcing wages and worker benefits downwards; taking environmental responsibility as an ethical starting point, profitability will be inversely proportional to the efforts made to protect the environment. There are also more specific examples include the ruthlessness of managers in dismissing poorly performing staff where growth is an explicit objective.<sup>222</sup>

Paine addresses the issue more pragmatically, suggesting that there is a degree of competition between ethical practice and economic success, proposing a “zone of acceptability” between the two and for which leaders must aim. “Centre driven” decision-making needs to both withstand market testing of the adopted strategy, as well as ethical challenge. Leaders “... will need to marry NPV (net present value) with MPV (moral point of view) analyses.”<sup>223</sup>



**Fig 2. Paine’s “zone of acceptability”.**

#### **4.3.2.3 Diverse moral compasses** A collection of papers by Paine et al<sup>224</sup>

comprises different approaches to the question of what constitutes moral/ethical or good leadership. One way of conceptualising these diverse approaches is the notion of a “moral compass for decision making”;<sup>225</sup> that leaders need to have some ethical frame with which to evaluate the legitimacy of their decisions aside from the more obvious one of the financially profitable bottom line. Examples of these are listed.

- **The relational approach** – that “responsible leadership is about building and sustaining trustful relations to all relevant stakeholders... by making them partners on a leadership journey...”<sup>226</sup>
- **The spiritual approach** – using examples of successful organisations with religious leaders at their head, the authors conclude that “the evolution from a rational based... to a spiritual based perspective...” leadership involves an “increasingly inclusive sense of responsibility – a spiritual openness that ultimately embraces humanity and the planet.”<sup>227</sup>
- **The “Caux Round Table principles”** – an international committee of eminent leaders from politics and business whose experience has been distilled into guidance and recommendation for responsible leadership.

Young summarises their conclusions as follows

- “There is a need for principles...
- What gets managed gets accomplished...
- Interests must be addressed...
- Culture counts...
- The fish rots from the head”<sup>228</sup>

- **Cultural and/or environmental approach**, also can define the moral “north”<sup>229</sup>
- **The Aristotelian approach** of good leaders being people leading a “good life” with integrity and balance as described by Greek philosophers. Sison summarises,

**The excellence of action is called prudence... Prudence in leadership not only requires knowledge of the proper end, but also the right choice of means to that particular end... leadership comes close to the metaphysical model for a perfect, immanent act, where the end is external to the activity itself**<sup>230</sup>

In an influential book, Selznick identifies leaders becoming opportunistic in tackling challenges leading to organisational drift as a moral challenge; that rather the leader should

**“choose key values and ... create a social structure that embodies them”.**<sup>231</sup>

While each different set of moral compass points will have its advocates, their very diversity illustrates both the unintegrated nature of the accounts, their lack of shared foundation and their potential to “talk past” each other.

#### **4.4 Organisations: Pro-social, criminal and psychopathic.**

Having explored the question of the extent to which the psychopathy of a leader is a critical variable by looking at types of bad leadership, corrupted leadership and

leadership ethics, this section explores the extent to which organisations themselves might be termed psychopathic. It explores differences between criminal and pro-social business organisations; looks at a theory that organisations are themselves structured to be “psychopathic”, then constructs a proposed distinction and redefinition of criminal organisations.

	<b>Pro-social legitimate business organisation</b>	<b>Criminal organisation e.g. Mafia</b>
<b>Violence</b>	Nonviolence	Centrality of violence
<b>Openness</b>	Transparency	Centrality of secrets and criminal code of silence
<b>State structures</b>	Work with legitimate (state) authority	Work against <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police/drug law enforcement</li> <li>• Tax and customs</li> </ul>
<b>Democratic process</b>	Work within democratic process	Pervert democratic process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political corruption</li> <li>• “We are the government”<sup>232</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Judicial process</b>	Work within judicial process	Pervert judicial process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perverse use of existing legislation</li> <li>• Tampering with court processes</li> </ul>
<b>Group task</b>	Legitimate business providing financial gain	Criminal activity providing financial gain
<b>Personnel</b>	Free entry/exit	No free exit
<b>Equal rights</b>	Espouses equal rights, recognition of wide group of stakeholders	Abnegation of the rights of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General citizens (non family/tribe or opposing family/tribe)</li> <li>• Individual group members (within the same family/tribe if an individual gets in the way of an individual or the groups ends or means)</li> </ul>

**Table 11 Legitimate and criminal organisations; distinctions**

Criminal/mafia organisations can be argued to be different to legitimate business, along various parameters as noted in table 11 (below).

Notwithstanding these distinctions on a number of parameters, the distinction between criminal and non-criminal organisations can be challenged as follows

- Both have making money as the ultimate aim in a capitalist context
- Both develop strong group membership cultures that can foster self protective unethical practice
- Both can dissemble or dupe authorities in terms of tax minimisation and probity
- Both seek to influence the political process and policymaking

#### **4.4.1 Organisations as psychopathic**

Balkan takes the argument that the difference between criminal and pro-social business organisations is difficult to define a stage further, arguing that all business organisations are psychopathic by virtue of their structure.<sup>233</sup>

Starting from organisational theory, organisations are groupings together of activities to reduce transaction costs.<sup>234</sup> Such structures quickly lead to the separation of those charged with running the organisation from the owners and shareholders.

That managers may service their own interests rather than that of the firm is the “principal agent problem”. As a consequence, such pursuit of the managers’ agenda has been thoroughly restricted by legal obligations on organisational managers to maximise profits and minimise losses for and to the owners. According to Balkan, the manager “doing the right thing” morally becomes a contractually and legally forbidden activity if it does not maximise profit.<sup>235</sup>

Fox contends that as a result, people operate a “destructive dualism” between their behaviour and morals outside and inside work, leading to an “occupational schizophrenia”<sup>236</sup> Within work, they are required above all other duties to maximise the profit of the company, irrespective of the damage this may do to persons, the environment and so on.

Sensitivities regarding such moral scruples are versions of the “principal agent problem” putting their own predilections above those of the owners of the company. As Dershowitz commented,

**I would never do many of the things in my personal life that I have to do as a lawyer.<sup>237</sup>**

A counter argument can be made that treating people and employees ethically well is “good for business,” since profit may be enhanced by caring for workers or enhancing the reputation of the company. But there remains a significant problem with the theory of ethics relating to organisations, as distinct from individuals.

#### **4.4.2 Redefining “criminal organisations”**

Although there is research by law enforcement into specific criminal organisations with the aim of obtaining prosecutions, there seems to be very much less or none into these organisations as organisations; models of leadership; organisational culture and so on.

Organised crime has been defined as

**... Criminal activity carried on by groups of persons, however loosely or tightly organised, for the enrichment of those participating, and at the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently**


**accomplished through ruthless disregard of any law, including offences against the person...**<sup>238</sup>,

For the purposes of the current research, the question is of how to distinguish between criminal (antisocial) and normal business (pro-social) organisations. The relevance of this distinction is not only related to the current discussion of the role of psychopathy in managerial effectiveness, and the extent to which the leader or organisation is psychopathic/antisocial, but also in relation to the analysis of the nature of the NSDAP organisation run by Hitler as the crucial case in the chapters below.

The distinction can be further explored by the creation of a four square matrix from the Machiavellian “ethic” of means and ends, as in figure 3 below. This matrix yields four distinct ethical organisational styles; Machiavellian, criminal, Kantian and “ethical”. These distinct ethical organisational types identified might be defined as follows:

- **Machiavellian** characterised by an extreme pragmatism, with the moral valence of the actions taken managerially are judged by the moral legitimacy and significance of the objective. (Similar to Blake and Mouton’s managerial grid concern for the task)<sup>239</sup>
- **Criminal** where both bad or evil ends and means are utilised and striven for.
- **Kantian** with a moral emphasis on the Kantian categorical imperative of treating people as ends rather than means, such that the managerial objective in no way can justify less than ideal treatment of subordinates; (concern for persons in the managerial grid).

- **Ethical**, where there is “goodness of task” in terms of the ends, (for example the UK charitable requirement to be working for the “public good”); and within which there is an expectation of a high level of ethical practice or “means”.




**Figure 3 Machiavellian 4 square matrix; Goodness of ends and means**

This typology can be further explored by referring back to Paine’s distinction between the economic and ethical acceptability of organisational actions/strategy/tactics; that unethical practice may be more efficacious (4.3.2.2).

This notion can also be subtended into a matrix, placing “economic acceptability/efficacy” on the y axis, and “ethical acceptability” on the x axis (figure 4 below).

In the Paine matrix of ethical vs. economic acceptability, the distinction between Machiavellian/Criminal and Kantian/Ethical cultures is lost. For the Kantian, the moral valence of the outcome is defined by the treatment of those defined as “people”, with this being more important than organisational efficacy, or economic acceptability in Paine’s terms.



**Figure 4. Paine 4 square matrix; economic acceptability (organisational efficacy) vs. ethical acceptability.**

Machiavellian and criminal organisations are indistinguishable within the efficacy vs. ethics table, the task seeming all important, possibly explaining part of the general ethical unease and popular opprobrium with a Machiavellian approach.

Criminal and Machiavellian ethical organisational types can be distinguished on the “Machiavellian” means/ends matrix, but not on the Paine efficacy/acceptability matrix. Machiavellianism has good “ends”, unlike criminality.

This distinction goes some way to responding to Balkan's posed challenge that organisations are inherently psychopathic, by emphasising that the choice of organisational ends and aims are a legitimate ethical variable<sup>240</sup>, which return the focus onto the issue of the leader.

#### **4.5 Bad leadership: Conclusions**

To explore the second limb of the research question, about whether the degree of psychopathy in the manager or leader is a critical variable, the question of bad leadership has been explored. A distinction has been drawn between bad in the sense of psychopathic leadership (Mafia and Kellerman's "evil" category) and leadership where the aims and intentions are good, for example Machiavelli's recommendations for maintaining social order. The issue is confused by a built in callousness in organisational theory, but it has been proposed that one can distinguish between the "psychopathy" attributed to organisations by legal requirement noted by Balkan and the callousness attributed to more explicitly criminal organisations through consideration of a means/ends matrix.

A tentative conclusion is that while there is a negative correlation described by Paine between ethical and effective practice, and while organisations themselves can be described as psychopathic, within the literature, psychopathy has not been identified as a success factor for leadership. The conclusion of the previous chapter has been that charisma is the crucial variable in the efficacy of leadership. These tentative conclusions and "bad management" theories are utilised in the exploration of the case study below. Before giving the case account, Chapters 5 and 6 set out the methodological and epistemological basis of the enquiry.

## **5. The hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm**

This chapter develops the research paradigm on which the method rests. The question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their effectiveness, is one located within the psychological phenomenological and the socially constructed world. Consequently the research is set within a qualitative non-positivist epistemology using a hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm.

The chapter is split into two sections, the first epistemological, and the second starting from an ontology. The first section both critiques positivism as having an hegemony of empirical research, and more fundamentally, develops the theme of epistemological scepticism to its more recent post modern manifestation. The second commences with dualist ontology, constructing an alternative episteme based on the coherence of psychological experiences and shared social phenomena, and describes the hermeneutic phenomenology adopted as the research paradigm.

### **5.1 Epistemic scepticism and the postmodern condition.**

This section will firstly set up the positivist paradigm, which has an assumed hegemony on scientific research, and then critique it from various perspectives, including traditional philosophical scepticism then a critique of science as a social phenomenon. A more radical critique from the perspective of language and rhetoric will be followed by deconstructionism. Together, these perspectives will develop the argument for epistemological scepticism that underlies postmodernism.

### 5.1.1 Positivism and certainty

The development of western civilisation can be attributed to the industrial revolution, in turn driven by the application of the positivistic natural sciences into developing technologies. Regarding the foundation of these sciences, Crotty summarises that the

**... positivist perspective encapsulates the spirit of the Enlightenment, the self proclaimed Age of Reason... positivism offers assurance of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world<sup>241</sup>**

The importance of certainty as a grounding in the emerging sciences was a central preoccupation for the philosophy of science, as was the importance of accuracy in recording the perceptions on which science rests. Descartes resolved,

**never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say ... to exclude all ground of doubt.<sup>242</sup>**

And concluded that observations of the natural world are,

**True, in as far as... the object is clear and distinctly apprehended.<sup>243</sup>**

In this context of assumed certainty, the inductive processes for the natural sciences that had been set out by Bacon could proceed by

**Investigating and discovering truth... Construct [ing] its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms...<sup>244</sup>**

Ayer popularised the verificationism and scientific positivism of Comte and Mill,<sup>245</sup>

**M Comte... maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts...**<sup>246</sup>

Ayer and the positivists' position was somewhat softened by Popper's modification to falsificationism, with his critique of non falsifiable pseudo-scientific systems such as psychoanalysis and astrology "with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation--on horoscopes and on biographies..."<sup>247</sup> He summarises,

**A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific... Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is falsifiability...**<sup>248</sup>

Crotty concludes that,

**Like the Enlightenment that gave it birth, positivism offers assurance of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world**<sup>249</sup>

The natural sciences underlie the researcher's medical training and therefore his natural outlook. Because the current project specifically eschews a positivist approach, this account of positivism has been summarised in order to critique it below.

### **5.1.2 Scepticism and Doubt**

Notwithstanding the confidence and success of the natural sciences built on positivism, there are challenges that can be made to its epistemology by challenging knowledge, the external world, and cause and effect. The first of these is from

philosophical scepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge.

Scepticism has a long history; Pyrrho (about 360-270 BC) was said to have argued for accepting that nothing could be certain.<sup>250</sup> Subsequently Sextus Empiricus in AD 200 summarised,

**Scepticism is the ability to find the opposites... Because the opposed things or reasonings have equal force, we are led first to suspension of judgment, and then to serenity<sup>251</sup>**

The sequence is that a thesis proposed is challenged such that the foundations on which it is built are shown to be circular or an infinite regress. Pyrrho argued against the possibility of certain knowledge on the grounds that;

- Different people, and people and animals perceive things differently, and different situations (position/amount of light) change the appearances of things
- Things change (e.g. ground black goat horn powder is white)
- The “veil of perception” argument, that we perceive perceptions, not the “things in themselves” (to use the Kantian term)
- Things happen frequently or rarely
- The wide difference in cultural and ethical beliefs between peoples<sup>252</sup>

Plato is credited with the creation of the standard definition of knowledge, namely that it is “justified true belief”; the “J.T.B” theory of knowledge. In the account of Socrates’ dialogue with Theatetus,

**I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion<sup>253</sup>**

JTB theory has been drawn as a Venn diagram, where there are two overlapping circles, one being belief, and the other being truth, and within the overlap; the small shared area, is knowledge that is both true and believed. While this is clear, counter examples have been described<sup>254</sup> that have lead to an iterative process of increasingly complex and tortuous qualifications of JTB,<sup>255</sup> suggesting that this approach to truth is not immune to challenge.

A second challenge is that the philosophy of science is unable to prove the existence of a material world based on its perception because one cannot be certain of any of what Russell terms “sense data”.<sup>256</sup> In Socrates' dialogue with Theaetetus, Socrates anticipates Descartes,

**SOCRATES: ... How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?**

**THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond... the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.**

**SOCRATES: You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised...**<sup>257</sup>

Descartes' method of “doubt,”<sup>258</sup> rejecting that about which he could not be completely certain, undermined the traditional belief in information from sense data. How can one prove one is not dreaming/hallucinating?

**We know by experience that the senses sometimes err... And to one who has thus**

**resolved upon a general doubt, there appear no marks by which he can with certainty distinguish sleep from the waking state.<sup>259</sup>**

This was taken further by Bishop Berkley with his proposal that there was no physical world, but rather God is orchestrating people's sense data.<sup>260</sup> For Berkley, "esse est percipi", to be is to be perceived.<sup>261</sup> Everything in the external world is in some way perceived or has been processed by the sense organs of a thinking being; for Berkley it added nothing to the description of reality to suggest material substances in addition to these perceptions. For physical objects,

**nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them..<sup>262</sup>**

These perspectives have their modern iterations in the "five minute hypothesis", or the "brain in a vat" argument<sup>263</sup>. In both of these it is difficult to prove that the universe was not created five minutes ago, or that one is not simply a hallucinating brain in a laboratory artificially being kept alive.

The third challenge was more specifically about cause and effect. In the context of the world appearing to be a Newtonian rational place, where simple mathematical formulae once discovered, will explain everything, Hume challenged the scientifically axiomatic conservation of momentum using the classic billiard ball example;

**Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first... May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? ... Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? <sup>264</sup>**

As the porcelain jug falls to the ground, one feels one should be able to predict that it will break, but until it has actually done so, one cannot be certain; it may bounce; it may be caught. One cannot predict what will happen next purely by considering the items in front of one. Hume argues that the inductive notion of cause and effect is not to be found within the objects themselves, but rather by an “association of ideas.”<sup>265</sup>

Where epistemology looks for Descartes' clear and distinct truths, Hume substitutes belief,

**All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from... a customary conjunction between that and some other object. ... If flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold... This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect**<sup>266</sup>

Thus reducing the certainty promised by the natural sciences to mere familiarity and faith.

Finally, the certainty promised by the Logical Positivists was substantially qualified by later Wittgenstein, who argues that language, far from being a metaphysical bedrock, is like a game of “ring a ring of roses”, tennis or chess which have a process in common, but actions at variance. General linguistic definitions are of limited usefulness as the only user of the word is likely to know the current local, shared active usage and meaning.<sup>267</sup>

**We can also think of the whole process of using words in as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language...**

**I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the “language game”<sup>268</sup>**

While the success of the natural sciences cannot be denied, its epistemological grounding remains unstable.

### **5.1.3 Doubting positivism; the sociology of science.**

The preceding section challenged the epistemological basis of positivism. This section moves on to examining practiced science as a social phenomenon. More commonly, a positivist critique is made of the knowledge claims of the social sciences; the “Sociology of Scientific Knowledge” (SSK) reverses this, to challenge the objectivity of the natural sciences themselves.

Merton described aspects of the structure of science, linking its culture with protestant piety<sup>269</sup> (as Weber had linked capitalism with its ethic), and described its norms, including communality and “organised scepticism”.<sup>270</sup> Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” would be classified in the subsequent debate as “weak” SSK, focussing in the main on evidence from what turned out to be historical, scientific blind alleys: the adherence during the dark ages to Aristotle’s physics, stones falling to earth as it is their “natural place” for example, or Ptolemy’s astronomy with the Earth at the centre of the universe being replaced by Copernicus<sup>271</sup> placing the sun there. The 19<sup>th</sup> century belief in Phrenology provides an illustration; the “science” of external skull lumps and bumps articulating psychological and constitutional characteristics. It was popular, particularly among the developing late 19<sup>th</sup> century middle classes, and was proposed to be driven by this class’ anxiety related to changing social hierarchies and the dwindling authority of the aristocracy by providing a pseudo-biological legitimacy.<sup>272</sup>

Kuhn’s criticism was more potent, however, with its defining of scientific “paradigms”

which organise the activity in a manner similar to religious orthodoxies. Within a “paradigm”, “normal science” proceeds, this is a process of clarifying and extending the science on the basis of broadly agreed assumptions and scientific techniques. Kuhn described this work as taking place within a network of “commitments”<sup>273</sup> to the belief system set up within the original paradigm, but reified into a conformity required for individual researchers to obtain grants, publication and acceptance. A “scientific revolution” occurs after a long period of the active ignoring of findings contrary to the paradigm, but as these anomalies become overwhelming, a new theory emerges that explains them, leading to conflict between the schools. Kuhn quotes Plank,

**A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”<sup>274</sup>**

“Strong” SSK was developed by Bloor, in particular arguing that challenge should be made *not only* to scientific “facts” subsequently demonstrated to be false, but to all “facts” equally, including those currently held to be true. This was one of his four characteristics of the “strong programme”; that exploration and critique were impartial as to the acceptance of the construct, and treated successful and failed theories symmetrically. He cites Lord Kelvin’s disproof of the theory of evolution on the grounds that by calculating the sun as a body losing heat, it was not of sufficient age for evolution to have taken place, accepted at the time.<sup>275</sup>

Collins explored the “experimenter’s regress”, found at the leading edge of science rather than where Kuhn’s “normal science” is taking place. The regress is that there is neither agreement on the nature or existence of the phenomenon (gravitational waves in his example) *nor* of how to measure them. To establish whether there are gravity waves hitting the earth,

**We must build a good gravity wave detector... But we won't know if we  
have built a good detector until we have tried it [and found them]<sup>276</sup>**

Most significantly, at the time of this controversy, on the basis of interviews, physicists distinguished between data on the basis of factors irrelevant to the science; factors that included the researchers',

**Reputation... style and presentation... size and prestige of university...  
nationality...<sup>277</sup>**

Latour, in the late 1960s, embedded in one of the teams racing to discover a thyroid hormone that is now a routine medical test, described the "construction of scientific facts" in a hierarchy of five stages, beginning with "speculation", passing through "claims", then "reports" to "new findings", and finally "facts taken for granted".<sup>278</sup>

Radically, Latour denied that the thyroid hormone was "discovered" based upon his constructionist position, that the hormone occupies a particular place within his other theoretical contribution of actor Network theory.<sup>279</sup> For Latour, the thyroid hormone construct is contributed to by other nodes in its network, including the winning of the Nobel Prize; the competition between the two laboratory teams; the medical conditions that it will help to alleviate and so on. To talk in terms of a "discovery" would be too final and complete for his constructionist relativism.

Notwithstanding this degree of counter challenge<sup>280</sup> and rapprochement<sup>281</sup>, the promise of the positivists for Crotty's "assurance of unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world"<sup>282</sup> is significantly undermined by these illustrations of social forces disrupting the objective recording and evaluation of data. To the epistemological challenge to positivism is added a social one.

#### **5.1.4 Doubting communication: Language and Rhetoric.**

Having challenged the assurance of certainty from the positivist sciences from an epistemological and sociological angle, this section articulates scepticism at the level of written and spoken language. Based on Jacobson's work, it proposes that all language has a rhetorical dimension, and is therefore potentially untrustworthy. Because structurally, knowledge is equated with language, this comprises a further significant challenge.

Structuralism broadly proposes that beneath the apparent randomness and choice in life there lie structures. For many, the underlying structure in the world has been some form of deity, for example confirmation of Descartes' clear and distinct perceptions because God was no deceiver,<sup>283</sup> or coordinating Berkley's sensations of the world in different perceivers.<sup>284</sup> Articulating the romanticism of his time, Feuerbach reversed this structural position by echoing the supremacy of man that had been declared by Hegel, by declaring that in fact man had created God,<sup>285</sup> so that man, or the human mind or spirit comprised the underlying structure. With the dethroning of man by Darwin, returning him to the animal kingdom, rationality/reason; knowledge or "science" has become the core structure.

Levi-Strauss proposed that all of this knowledge and reason itself are predicated upon, and located within language narrowly;<sup>286</sup> within semiotic systems of signs more broadly. However, language can beguile and convey a false message, undermining its truth value, for example through rhetoric. The tradition of antipathy to rhetoric dates back to Plato, who railed against the Sophists, whose rhetoric had...

**... An inferior degree of truth... being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and... awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason.**<sup>287</sup>

The subjective experience of realising one has made a decision having been emotionally manipulated through rhetoric is ubiquitous and traumatising. However, a critical reading of Plato might propose that Socrates himself is a rhetorical flourish deployed poetically to amplify Plato's views, and time and time again in his writing, one is struck by the beauty of the language, even in the short citations above.

Gadamer argues that the problem of truth and rhetoric extends into the physical sciences.

**All presentations of physics... owe their effect to the rhetorical element... even Descartes, that great passionate advocate of method and certainty is in all his works a writer who handles the tools of rhetoric with consummate skill.** <sup>288</sup>

He goes on,

**Plato had discovered... that the appropriate arguments [are] brought forward in regard to the specific receptivity of the souls of those to whom they [are] directed.** <sup>289</sup>

Language does not simply convey facts, it influences and manipulates through the action of rhetoric.

A linguistic account of how all discourse has a rhetorical element is to be found in Jacobson. Building on Peirce's and Saussure's semiotics<sup>290</sup>, he argued that sentences, or communications operate in two dimensions; the first being the dimension of combination, which is horizontal, and the second being the vertical dimension, in which the poetic and metaphorical communication is articulated. "The cat sat on the mat" for example, has a simple structure of subject, verb predicate in its horizontal combination. However the construction of the communication crucially

involves the selection of metonyms for the different elements of the communication. The communicator has chosen “cat” rather than “domestic feline”, or “pussy”; has chosen, “sat” rather than “was seated” or “relaxed” or “rested” or “settled”; and has chosen “mat” rather than “rug” or “carpet” or “door mat”. “The cat sat on the mat” means pretty much the same as “Tiddles settled on the rug”, but each sentence has a different “feel”. It is this “feel” that is the rhetorical or poetic function of the sentence.

For Jacobson, the metaphorical meaning content of the communication comprises the vertical axis with the poetic impact determined by the *selection* of words: selection between metonyms. In each semiotic system, the different signs or signifiers have different “values”, meaning that they have different relations within the particular linguistic or semiotic field that is specific to that field. For example “cat” in English has associations to “dog” and other common household pets, but also to the “big cats”, lions, tigers, leopards and so on. “Cat” also rhymes with “fat” and the association of feline laziness may explain the effectiveness of the combination “fat cat”. “Pussy” on the other hand has an alternative value in the (vulgar) sexual realm, such that substituting “the cat sat on the mat” with “pussy lounged on the shagpile” provides an entirely different vertical poetic function.

To the epistemological and social challenge to positivistic certainty is added a linguistic one; that language can contain emotionally manipulative rhetorical content that distorts its message.

### **5.1.5 Doubting discourse: Derrida and deconstruction.**

Having challenged the assurance of certainty from the positivist sciences from an epistemological, sociological and communicative angle, this section articulates scepticism more generally at the intelligibility of discourse through Derridian deconstruction.

Throughout the western philosophical tradition, the emphasis has been on reason, on knowledge. All of this Knowledge is discourse, consisting of “statements” in the sense used by Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*.<sup>291</sup> Within the mystic/Gnostic Christian tradition, all of this knowledge is also man, or the essence of being human, echoing Hegel<sup>292</sup>. In the preface from John's Gospel, the Greek “Logos” also means knowledge.

**“In the beginning was the word [logos], and the word was with God,  
and the word was God”<sup>293</sup>**

The post structuralists refer to “discourse”, what Benveniste termed “enonce”. “Statements”<sup>294</sup> represent the entirety, not only of linguistic communication, but of all communication understood as the totality of semiotic systems. Discourse is written and spoken language, as well as other modes of communication that can be understood as signs and symbols within the Saussurian sense.<sup>295</sup> It is this entirety that is challenged by deconstruction.

In considering Derrida, the researcher would propose that there is a need to distinguish the substance of deconstructionist ideas on the one hand, from the at times theatricality of the movement on the other. In the latter may be found the extremes to which the rejection of knowledge is taken, and the, at times, fetishistic denial of meaning and value in discourse. From the former, the ideas, comes a recognition of the flimsiness and unreliability of discourse as a substantial knowledge medium, and in articulating several other structures of discourse of note.

Derrida points out that the history of thought revolves around binary oppositions such as male/female, straight/gay, Marxist/capitalist. His method involves identifying the superior, or superordinate binary, and requesting its definition. It will be defined in terms of its binary opposite. What is a “man” is “not a woman”. What is “straight”

or “heterosexual”, eventually it is defined as “not gay”, or not homosexual. The superordinate binary relies for its definition on the subordinate binary. So why is one superordinate, and one subordinate. If “man” depends on “woman” for definition then surely “woman” is superordinate.<sup>296</sup> Such a critique can be highly corrosive to the various traditional cultural binaries, presence/absence; good/bad; mind/body and so on.

A second critique revolves around the French neologism “différance” which is a misspelling of “différence”. The point is that when spoken, the two are indistinguishable.<sup>297</sup> One would distinguish them by definition, but this brings up the tautologous nature of Saussurian linguistics. For Saussure, a sign signifies a concept.<sup>298</sup> However, this concept is itself defined in terms of another sign, also defined by reference to another sign, and so on and so on in a never ending chain of signifiers. One cannot define “différence” to distinguish it from “différance” without eventually spiralling into tautological argumentation in an endless line of signifiers.

To the epistemological, social and linguistic challenges to positivistic certainty is added a more general critique that discourse; statements; knowledge is tautologous.

#### **5.1.6 Doubting everything: The postmodern condition.**

This chapter develops the research paradigm on which the method rests. This first section has critiqued positivism from the perspectives of epistemological scepticism, science as a social action, in terms of the reliability of communication and the intelligibility of discourse. The aim is to articulate the “post modern condition” deriving from this critical process, and then build an alternative epistemology, and research paradigm out of it.

Lyotard summarises the postmodern tradition as an “incredulity toward meta-

narratives”.<sup>299</sup> He argues that prior to science, overarching narratives were provided by myth; religious myths; the evolution of the human spirit; pursuit of wealth or a Marxist dialectic and so on; and that science maintains it is not a myth based upon the narratives of its reason and epistemology. However, using the concept of language games, he argues that the proliferation and specialisation in science results in a profusion of these specialist languages that cannot be contained by one narrative, including moralistic ones. The postmodern condition is the mourning of their loss.<sup>300</sup>

Postmodernism takes up the counter enlightenment theme of anti-rationality, characterised by Kierkegaard's deliberation on Abraham's triumph of obedience to God (belief) over reason in the instruction to kill his son;<sup>301</sup> of Nietzsche's exhortation of Dionysianism over a slave morality.<sup>302</sup> But post modernism's critique of rationality extends this; it is the central Hegelian process of thesis and antithesis it rejects. Deleuze promotes “another sensibility”,<sup>303</sup> one of comparison; one of the examination of “difference”, rather than the binary right and wrong.

Contributing to the postmodern condition is “derealisation”. Kant's phenomenology of the “things in itself” being unknowable<sup>304</sup> is extended to the subject, the individual's sense of self, by Deleuze and Guattari.<sup>305</sup> The self as ego is fractured by Freud's mental structures and conflicting drives.<sup>306</sup> Lacan presents the self as illusory, built at the mirror phase of development.<sup>307</sup>

These challenges to the subject represent a challenge to a core theme of the western philosophical tradition, challenging the “I” at the centre of Descartes' Cogito. It is from this point of epistemological scepticism, or even nihilism that the research paradigm builds an alternative episteme and then research paradigm.

## 5.2 Constructing a research paradigm.

In the process of building a research paradigm on which to rest the method for this research, the first section has critiqued positivism through epistemological scepticism; science as a social action, in terms of the reliability of discourse. This section will construct an alternative non-positivist episteme starting with a dualist ontology, and will develop arguments for a research paradigm of hermeneutic phenomenology.

### 5.2.1 Ontology: "...Speaking as the ghost..."

The researcher's ontology is dualist, essentially the mind/brain problem ridiculed by Ryle as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine",<sup>308</sup> dating back beyond Descartes' distinction between two separate substances, the physical (extended) matter, and the mental (thinking) matter.<sup>309</sup>

The argumentation in favour of this dualism derives from there uncontrovertibly being an inner psychic realm of ideas, and equally uncontrovertibly, an outer physical world. Exactly how the two interact, or how the physical world and brain create and sustain the subjective experience remains a mystery. But the cognitive dissonance from this unknown is less than that involved in either an idealistic or materialistic monism. Dualism will be explored by looking at arguments for the existence of a mental realm followed by those for a physical realm.

For Descartes, the Cogito begins the development of some certainty about what exists

**... There is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks... / THINK, THEREFORE / AM, is... most certain...**<sup>310</sup>

Russell subsequently challenged (or rather he qualified) this basic ontological statement as follows

**I think, therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain<sup>311</sup>**

But he concedes that

**... There are thoughts<sup>312</sup>.**

Plato's theory of forms is more than an account of the philosophical problem of universals; Plato is making a claim for "what is" namely that "what is" is ideas. Things in the physical external world are dubious, confusing, changeable and inconsistent, whereas the ideas of things in the internal world can be perfect and unchanging. The primacy of ideas, of his forms, is illustrated by his allegory of the cave, a complex thought experiment where a group of prisoners raised in a cave watch shadows cast on a wall by people with puppets using a light from a fire behind both them and the prisoners. The prisoners get to understand and recognise the shadows in all their indistinctness. He compares this with the prisoners' experience when they emerge from the cave and see objects in the full light of day, equated with the world of forms, or ideas, which can be known clearly and distinctly, the same as when the prisoners emerge from the cave, and see

**... the sight of ... the objects themselves; ... gaze upon  
the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled  
heaven ...<sup>313</sup>**

Bishop Berkley extended this idealism to argue that the existence of a physical world was not necessary, by challenging the validity of sense data. In his fictitious dialogues Philonious' deconstruction of Hylas' belief in a material world proceeds

through his challenging of the reliability of his sense data. For example, that tepid water feels hot to a hand previously in cold water, and cold to one previously in hot<sup>314</sup>, resulting as mentioned above in his conclusion that “to be” was to be perceived, *only*: “Esse EST percipi”<sup>315</sup>.

The existence of an internal world, of the experience of consciousness, is difficult to deny. The researcher, as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst has spent a career assessing and treating troubled minds, and would share Descartes’ “repugnance” in the denial of an internal psychic world.

Having argued that there must, ontologically, be some form of thinking, or internal psychic experience, there is a need to explore the ontological basis of the physical world. The starting point for physicalism is common sense or natural realism, which argues broadly that there is a world of physical objects that can be perceived. In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, as a reaction to the sceptical philosophising of the enlightenment, the Scottish Common Sense Realists advocated for this naive realism as follows

**Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke, have all employed their genius and skill to prove the existence of a material world; and with very bad success. Poor untaught mortals believe undoubtedly that there is a sun, moon, and stars; an earth, which we inhabit; country, friends, and relations, which we enjoy; land, houses, and movables, which we possess... I despise Philosophy, and renounce its guidance—let my soul dwell with Common Sense.**<sup>316</sup>

Common sense or naive realism is summarised by Dewey thus

**The plain man, for a surety, does not regard noises heard, lights seen, etc., as mental existences; but neither does he regard them as things known. That they are just things is good enough for him.**<sup>317</sup>

The philosophical arguments in favour of physicalism by the ancients was summarised by Aristotle, who combined it with the idealism of his Platonic teacher in the *Metaphysics*. According to Aristotle

**...Primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else.**<sup>318</sup>

Aristotle's primary substances were a particular thing, a "real being"; a man or a horse or rock.<sup>319</sup> Descartes' division of "what is" into mental substances and physical substances significantly into a more accurate distinction with the physical as devoid of the meaning content, such as "man, horse, rock". For Descartes, material objects are characterised by

**...The extension of body: ... SOMETHING THAT FILLS SPACE, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion.**<sup>320</sup>

Then carrying out scientific enquiry he proposes that

**SOLIDITY, EXTENSION, MOTION or REST, NUMBER or FIGURE. These, which I call ORIGINAL or PRIMARY qualities of body, are wholly inseparable from it;**<sup>321</sup>

Locke made the same distinction<sup>322</sup>, proposing that secondary are those thought to affect sense organs; colour, taste, smell, sound.

**... The ideas of SECONDARY qualities are... produced by the operation of insensible particles on our senses**<sup>323</sup>

For the researcher, the principal argument in favour of some form of dualism is pragmatic, deriving from the other two potential monistic positions being counterintuitive. Understanding the physics and biology of sound transmission; understanding the physiology of sight; understanding how Philonious' challenge of hands from hot and cold water, giving conflicting sensations works through the process of cortical sensory adaptation. These are all explanations, understandings and developments that have come from the physical sciences, starting with the effort noted above to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. These in turn are based upon assuming the existence of the external world and finding out about it. Thus, vis-à-vis the external world, the researcher adopts a reconstructed common sense realist approach.

Dualistic ontology, however, has been criticised. Ryle describes his book "The Concept of Mind" as a polemic, with his target the "Descartes myth". Where Descartes had mind as a separate substance, Ryle argues that it is a *function*; a verb rather than a noun. To describe mind as an entity is a "category mistake"; (to use his example) like someone, having been shown the colleges and libraries in Oxford, but then asking to see the university.

**"She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair" is a well known joke based on the absurdity of conjoining terms of different types...  
Now the dogma of the ghost in the machine does just this...<sup>324</sup>**

Although Ryle argues that his model of the mind is not reductionist, and does not follow the "hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of matter by Mind"<sup>325</sup>, it has not silenced the debate, for example recently reformulated as the "hard problem of consciousness"<sup>326</sup>.

Descartes' Cogito crystallises the ontological chasm that requires William James' "leap of faith"<sup>327</sup> between the two realms of ideas and the physical world. On the

basis of a dualist ontology, the different domains can be studied independently, and are more complementary rather than conflicting.

These two approaches were manifest in German universities within their overall systematic scientific study (Wissenschaft) divided into the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft), or sciences of the soul. The physical sciences can proceed and explain by bracketing out problems of how an individual perceives truth absolutely. The psychological and social sciences can proceed with understanding (verstehen) social phenomena and constructs, bracketing out the need for positivistic or verificationist proof.

The adoption of a dualist ontology explains the dichotomy of the success of the natural sciences contrasted by their inability to quell scepticism of the possibility of knowledge or certainty about the existence of the physical world. The reason is that there are two complementary epistemologies, one for the Naturwissenschaft comprising Baconian scientific method, positivism and so on; and a different epistemology for the geisteswissenschaft. The researcher submits that the research question in the current study is located in the geisteswissenschaft, so that the remainder of the chapter explores an alternative epistemologies and develops a research paradigm appropriate for this ontological domain.

### **5.2.2 Verstehen and Hermeneutics.**

Comte's vision for sociology<sup>328</sup>, was that it would proceed positivistically, as did the others; this was partly realised by Durkheim's method employed memorably in his treatise on suicide<sup>329</sup>. However, a positivist approach for sociology or the human sciences was criticised by Weber, who advocated that the science should be built on a basic process of understanding (verstehen) human actions and motivations, which would be non positivist.

Weber's focus on verstehen derives from his construction of sociology as a discipline, identifying "ideal types" of social action.

**... Sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalised uniformities... to formulate pure ideal types of the corresponding forms of [social] action...**<sup>330</sup>

Social action is distinguished from action directed at inanimate objects, or actions such as "at the beginning of a shower, a number of people put up their umbrellas at the same time"<sup>331</sup>. Actions are

**... Social action only so far as they are orientated to the behaviour of others**<sup>332</sup>

And the action is formulated on the basis of the attitudes and reactions of others. In this context, verstehen, understanding is an

**... Explanatory understanding... in terms of *motive* the meaning an actor attaches... what makes him do this at precisely this moment and in these circumstances ...**<sup>333</sup>

So that

**Sociology... is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action, and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.**<sup>334</sup>

Such a science is explicitly non positivist, because social actions could not be

**.. thought of as somehow objectively 'correct' or 'true' by some**

**metaphysical criterion.**<sup>335</sup>

Hermeneutics is knowledge founded on interpretation and understanding.

Hermeneutics as a practice has a long history, long predating Weber. Especially within religion; the interpretation of sacred texts has been widespread, from Talmudic scholars, to the Scholastics' biblical exegeses<sup>336</sup> on the one hand, and in philology (interpreting the Greek masters) and history more generally on the other.

A contemporary of Descartes, and writing against his dualism, Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) is cited by Gadamer and other later hermeneutics theorists, for his insistence on the cultural situatedness of knowledge; man makes himself the measure of all things. Vico built an alternative model of "poetic wisdom"<sup>337</sup> to describe this alternative form of knowledge.

Hermeneutics proper, however, began following the reformation, and Luther's Sola Scriptura doctrine, which required everyman to read and make his or her own biblical exegesis, leading to a rush to understand the interpretative, and thereby hermeneutic process. Schleiermacher described the "hermeneutic circle", a process where one goes from the specific item being studied to the larger picture (the rest of the text, the historical context) and back again in an iterative process<sup>338</sup>. Schleiermacher's and other writings at this time have been termed "Romantic" hermeneutics because of the subjectivist trope therein contained<sup>339</sup>. Dilthey had a lifelong "Critique of Historical reason" project<sup>340</sup>, attempting to found the human sciences, particularly philology and history, in hermeneutics, as Kant had founded the physical sciences, in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Humboldt (1767-1835) described the hermeneutic process as he proposed that the historian

**... Must take the scattered pieces he has gathered into himself and work them into a whole...He can do so, like the poet only through the imagination.** <sup>341</sup>

Droysen (1808-1884) argued that

**The essence of historical method is *understanding*... The possibility of this understanding arises by the kinship of our nature with that of the utterances lying before us as historical material** <sup>342</sup>

In understanding and interpreting the actions of individuals, Dilthey hypothesised a psychological model of the “psychic nexus” itself derived from a process of abstraction, concentration and completion<sup>343</sup>.

**On the basis of this empathy... there arises the highest form of understanding – re-creating or re-living... attitudes, powers, feelings, aspirations and ideas contained in our own lives [enable] us to re-produce the mental life of another person.** <sup>344</sup>

**Recreating and reliving what is past and alien... This art is the basis of philology. The science of this art is hermeneutics.** <sup>345</sup>

Husserl's approach to hermeneutics reverses the process, moving verstehen/understanding from one of a set of ways of looking at things, to it being a core and active process in basic perception. For Husserl (following Kant), “verstehen” is the fundamental, primary, active process bestowing sense on perception. The meaning comes first, and then the perception of the object in the external world is built around that meaning. Perception is founded upon the activity of meaning (see below in the discussion of phenomenology)<sup>346</sup>. Heidegger, following

this, took meaning a step further, and placed it at the centre of ontology; for him, meaning was core to the process of being<sup>347</sup>

Gadamer, still the authority on hermeneutics now after 40 years<sup>348</sup>, was heavily influenced by Heidegger, but his project was to extend the hermeneutic dimension of phenomenology as an underpinning for the human sciences. This culminated in his book *Truth and Method* in 1960 which presented a number of important concepts<sup>349</sup>. These included that:

- There is a **historical and cultural “horizon”** which bounds the researcher/reader, and a distinct and different historical and cultural horizon that bounds the historical/text.
- “Prejudice”, “authority” or “tradition” compose the historical and cultural horizon of the researcher; **the post enlightenment obsession with objectivity is unachievable.**
- A correct reading of Plato is that **truth emerges from the dialogue**; emphasising *phronesis* (practical knowledge) which is achieved through the use of (*praxis*) the ideas.
- Contradicting the romantic hermeneutic tradition, a **researcher cannot completely or empathetically resonate with the meaning of a text** given the historical or cultural distance between them.
- The hermeneutic task is to find areas of **overlap between the cultural and the prejudicial horizon of the source text and that of the researcher.** Within this overlap, the researcher can develop understandings.

- Crucial to this process is the **researcher developing a self awareness of their own historical and cultural context/horizon** that contributes to their perception of meanings

Gadamer argued that the “in vitro” logical positivist mathematical and theoretical method had become hegemonic within the post enlightenment period, such that the human and historical sciences were now judged with this inappropriate frame<sup>350</sup>. As noted above, Gadamer argued that all discourse has a rhetorical element and there is no such thing as neutral language conveying a message<sup>351</sup>. Gadamer's model of hermeneutics is that because all discourse is rhetoric, hermeneutics are required to untangle it.

A Weberian view of knowledge about the social advocates the development of understanding. Hermeneutics provides a method, with the use of the hermeneutic circles of iteration between consideration of parts and the whole of the issue as understanding develops, and an iteration (following Gadamer) between the text and self reflection to include the researcher's context and prejudices. This hermeneutic process comprises the first part of the hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm.

### **5.2.3 Phenomenology**

A dualist ontology has been articulated, and verstehen argued as the epistemological grounding for the geisteswissenschaft, in its systematised hermeneutic form. The second component in the hermeneutic phenomenology paradigm is phenomenology, a method from the existentialist movement in the first half of the last century. .

Because of this subjective focus, “Existentialism” comprises a collection of disparate traditions and writers, and is difficult to define, but they share a preoccupation with

the examination of experience in itself, devoid of prejudices and pre-formed conclusions. The term itself was coined by Jaspers, but not until the mid 1930s with his calling his version of authentic being “Existenz”<sup>352</sup>, (Heidegger’s Dasein) characterised particularly by freedom. The term was made much more popular, particularly by French writers Sartre and Camus. Retrospectively, the work of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard grouped within this philosophical movement.

If existentialism is the “weltenshaung” or world view, phenomenology is the method. Phenomenology has been described as the “study of essences”<sup>353</sup> Kafle cites van Manen in summarising that

**... The structure of a lived experience is revealed to us in such a fashion that we are now able to grasp the nature and significance of this experience in a hitherto unseen way.**<sup>354</sup>

Husserl tackled the core, classic ontological problems, attempting to develop something close to a classical philosophical system like those of Kant and Leibniz, and attempting to provide a foundation for science<sup>355</sup>. Husserl, like Descartes, was a mathematician, and he sought apodictic truths in philosophy that could be as clear and incontrovertible as those of geometry, developing Kant’s notion of the phenomenon into the discipline of phenomenology<sup>356</sup>.

For Kant, the “phenomenon” is the personally constructed and active experience of the individual initiated by the perception of the external object “thing in itself”<sup>357</sup>. This active process combines sensations and understanding, memory and familiarity. The same word was used by Hegel to entitle the human “mind” or “spirit” in his account of the unfolding of human history and development, in the Phenomenology of Spirit<sup>358</sup>. Husserl’s use of the term is much more circumscribed, and closer to Kant as he extends the focus on the subjective, making it the foundation of knowledge and experience<sup>359</sup>.

Husserl articulates a phenomenological method. The first step is the “eidetic reduction,” focusing on the experience that one is having at the time. For example, in looking at the researcher's coffee, he sees, not a set of shapes and colours, he sees a cup of espresso coffee. Husserl performs an “epoche” from the researcher's experience of the coffee which brackets questions of the metaphysical or material or “thing in itself”, leaving the researcher to focus on the personal experience of specifically the cup of coffee. The researcher is unable to credibly deny either the experience or the knowledge of what the cup of coffee is. In this way, Husserl achieves his requirement of knowledge being apodictic, namely incontrovertible.<sup>360</sup>

Part of the reason why the researcher's experience of his coffee is apodictic is because of what structural linguistics would term the associative trains from it. The researcher's knowledge of different coffee making techniques, and the turn of the last century Italian invention of the pressured steam/water technique; the awareness that the espresso coffee is both darker roasted and finer grained; the variability in the size, from the tiny first liquor served in Italy, to the French “petit cafe” served to puzzled English tourists expecting a mug full. All of these personal associations together constitute the “meaning” of the phenomenon as the researcher experiences the cup in front of him. Within the Kantian stage of the researcher's investment in the phenomenon, the bare perception of shape, colour and smell combine because I can tell in advance it is a cup of coffee. For Husserl, this extends; the researcher further invests the phenomenon with the thoughts and feelings mentioned above. The researcher's cup of espresso *is* a cup of espresso *because* it has the personal meanings to him noted above; *because* he actively and intentionally invests meaning in it.

Heidegger then developed this phenomenology further and takes on this issue of “the world out there”. Heidegger proposes that the basis for an ontology is to be found in examining the question of being, of how things “be” as it were<sup>361</sup>. Being, is

a more immediate experience to perception. He proposes that the human “Dasein” is defined as a thing that strives to make meaning in the world. Dasein’s activity is to “be something” (a psychiatrist; a professor; a father). Dasein’s striving after meaning distinguishes it from things like hammers and stones which do have being, but do not strive after meaning, and are therefore not Dasein beings.<sup>362</sup> Thus for Heidegger, meaning takes on an ontological significance as a core experiential phenomenon.

In psychiatry, Jaspers revolutionised the conception and classification of psychiatric illness by applying phenomenological techniques of the value free exploration of the mental phenomena of the psychiatrically ill<sup>363</sup>. By simply attending to the patients’ experience (voices, irrational and abnormal beliefs) rather than immediately trying to diagnose, treat and suppress the madness, a new and extended taxonomy of psychiatric experiences was able to be adumbrated

**The challenge of phenomenology is to describe what is given to us in immediate experience without being “obstructed by pre-conceptions and theoretical notions”.<sup>364</sup>**

Weber’s advocacy of verstehen derives from his defining social action as having motivation which required to be understood. Phenomenology pulls back to the level of the individual, and the need to understand and describe the subjective phenomena that they experience, as far as possible, eschewing the usual explanations and assumptions.

#### **5.2.4 Hermeneutic phenomenology**

If the study of essences defines phenomenology, then hermeneutic phenomenology is the deepening of understanding of these phenomenological essences through the hermeneutic processes described. Hermeneutic phenomenology is a recognised

combination of disciplines, where there is already a considerable amount of overlap.

Various writers distinguish between Husserl as a phenomenologist, and the group Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, as hermeneutic phenomenologists.<sup>365</sup>

Hermeneutic phenomenology is a

**... research methodology aimed at producing rich textual descriptions of the experiencing of selected phenomena in the life world of individuals<sup>366</sup>**

which

**occurs through increasingly deeper and layered reflection by the use of rich descriptive language.<sup>367</sup>**

**hermeneutic phenomenology challenges the researcher to reflect deeply on what it is that the texts of the field have to say. The researcher is called to play with the texts – to get lost in deep conversation with them.<sup>368</sup>**

The subject under study are phenomena, personal and social, as far as possible perceived, experienced and described as free of assumptions as possible within the researcher's Gadamerian cultural horizon. The epistemology and research process is hermeneutic, with its iterative circular process from the whole picture to the specific and back, and similarly the hermeneutic circle in the dimension between subject to the researcher's subjective reflection and back.

In the current study exploring the question of how managers enact agency within organisations, there are a number of social action type questions, of motivations and actions. There are also a number of more subjective and phenomenological ones,

for example the personality of the manager, and the follower's acquiescence. In both, addressing the phenomenological essence of the issue, and the historical exploration of the case study, the research process requires deep reflection in a hermeneutic circle.

#### **5.2.5 Psychoanalytic theory: Unconscious "logic"**

This section is building the epistemological case that the "Geisteswissenschaft", has legitimate foundations by looking at the alternative form of "logic" proposed by psychoanalytic theory in its exploration of the unconscious. Examination in some detail is justified for three reasons. Firstly, heuristically, it describes the *weltanschauung* of the researcher. Secondly, it articulates a particular application of the hermeneutic phenomenology paradigm, but most importantly the following. Unconscious "logic" from psychoanalytic theory provides a post modern epistemology, and the psychoanalytic technique of "free floating attention", provides a practical research method.

When asked to give an example of something that they can be certain of, many turn to mathematics, and to simple mathematical equations like seven and five make twelve (using Kant's example). Such truths survive both Cartesian and Pyrronian scepticism. Psychoanalytic theory begins from a different position with regard to such a priori analytic truths, namely that they *assume* linear logic, and rationality. Psychoanalytic theory proposes that such rational logic is a developmentally late acquisition, which supersedes a more primitive and archaic form of thinking that continues to operate in the unconscious.

For Freud, rational logic is *secondary* process thinking. Unconscious logic is *primary* process<sup>369</sup>. The unconscious mind operates within a different model of logic, an example of which is illustrated by the following playground joke

Q. What is the past tense of speak?

A. Spoke.

Q. What is the white of an egg?

A. The yolk.

Q. Are you sure?

Lacan argued that the unconscious was structured like a language<sup>370</sup>, or more accurately like a semiotic system, where the rational/conscious linkage between thoughts and concepts is replaced by metaphorical, homonymic and contiguous association from personal history. “Seven and eight make nine” not because they mathematically, logically and rationally do so, but “because” one is familiar with the sequence “seven, eight nine”. The white of an egg is the yolk “because” it has an association with egg and rhymes with “spoke”.

In his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*<sup>371</sup>, Freud challenges the assumption that such mistakes as that around which this playground joke turns (slips of the tongue) are to be dismissed, explaining them in terms of unconscious processing which groups and classifies ideas in terms of similes, homophony, contiguity and other associative chains, *not* in terms of logical connections, which are used by the conscious mind. Freud argues that the content of parapraxes (slips of the tongue); the crazy content of dreams and of psychotic patients’ delusions, are illustrations of this alternative, unconscious way of thinking.<sup>372</sup> Years later, Derrida argued that “il n’y a pas hors text,”<sup>373</sup>. So that the text of the joke above is extant and has an impact, so that it must have some legitimacy at some level. As a phenomenon, it requires some form of explanation. The psychoanalytic theory of the primary process logic of the unconscious provides an explanatory theory<sup>374</sup>.

In his *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud in particular describes the functions of “condensation and displacement”. The task of the dream is to disguise mental contents (unacceptable wishes), which is done by condensing ideas together. For

example, take the dream fragment that the Eiffel Tower is in London, combined with the dreamer's real world issue that the dreamer's father having arrived in London. The Eiffel Tower might be a phallic symbol (paternal), and is both a strong and sturdy thing (the dreamer's attitude to their father), but also (built to be) temporary 19<sup>th</sup> Century technology bound to fail at some point (the dreamer's anxiety about the father's mortality or state of health). The father is "displaced" in the dream by the Eiffel Tower, and the symbol of the Eiffel Tower "condenses" thoughts about the father, masculine power yet frailty, and something where it should not be.

The Russian Formalists had argued that the artistic technique in poetry was to de-familiarise the text, to "roughen" it such that its meaning was obscured, thus challenging and drawing in the reader in.<sup>375</sup> A psychoanalytic perspective takes an opposing view, suggesting that the Jacobsean "vertical" or rhetorical/poetic dimension<sup>376</sup> described above (5.1.4), far from obscuring the meaning, augments it with the fecundity of rhyming and associative links of "primary process" thinking. Psychoanalytic theory suggests the poetic function expands and enriches the meaning with the Jacobsean vertical metonymic condensations and associated metaphors.

The statement, "seven and eight make nine", or that "the white of an egg is the yolk" in the joke, are "true" not in the rational, linear logical sense, but in a sense that Jacobson might call "poetic". Freud would account for in terms of this different mode of logic that exists in the unconscious mind.<sup>377</sup>

Briefly stated, psychoanalytic therapy attempts to understand unconscious mental contents on the assumption that the neurotic patient's symptoms are caused by the denial and disavowal of unacceptable unconscious thoughts. In his description of the psychoanalytic method, Freud advocates the use of "free floating attention" in the analyst, as they listen to the patient's thoughts. What this means is that the analyst does not try to follow in detail the patient's linear narrative, but rather they

(the analyst) try to use his or her own unconscious to decode and process the unconscious of the patient by attending to their own (the analyst's) thoughts and associations to the patient's narrative. It is assumed that the patient's unconscious contents have been censored, displaced and shaped into a rational (secondary process) narrative, so that they won't be saying what they mean, so

**The attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything that he heard particularly in his memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious.<sup>378</sup>**

Thus precedes the psychoanalytic version of hermeneutic phenomenology, as a clinical exploratory method, in which a rich and deeply reflective hermeneutic process focuses upon the mental phenomena of the patient.

In the current research, this method as far as possible, has been focussed on the research subject, the phenomenon of leadership and followership, and on the case history, cycling between these and the theoretical material in a Dilthean hermeneutic circle from which hypotheses emerge<sup>379</sup>.

### **5.2.6 Postmodern knowledge**

The first half of this chapter ended with the "post modern condition" based upon an all encompassing scepticism, such that all is reduced to irony and entertainment. There are, however, types of knowledge that survive, and are proposed by postmodern writers. Derrida's "différance" is a comparative approach to knowledge rather than a competitive thesis/antithesis one.

Similar to this is the post-modern epistemology of Deluze and Guattari <sup>380</sup>, who liken the traditional rational linear scientific narrative to being a tree, with a central “arboreal” trunk of a hypothesis or paradigm from which sub-hypotheses branch out. They propose an alternative “rhizomic” structure of knowledge. In Botany, plants like ferns and knot grass spread and propagate using underground stems (rhizomes) that spread out from the original plant, and create a sibling plant up to several feet away, which repeats the process, so they can propagate over large areas. Rhizomic knowledge does not have a central trunk, but rather multiple stems; multiple entry and exit points; multiple manifestations and versions.

The epistemology on which the current research rests assumes two things. Firstly, it assumes the legitimacy of post deconstructionist comparison based knowledge, and the wider non linear “logic” of Freud’s “primary process” thinking of the unconscious. Secondly, it assumes the legitimacy of a Delusian “rhizomic” (non “arboreal”, not solely linear/logical) epistemology and psychoanalytically derived “free floating attention” method. On this foundation it builds theory through the development of hermeneutic circles elucidating complex phenomena to develop complex verstehen based formulations of the social and psychological phenomena being studied.

### **5.3 Critique of research paradigm.**

The epistemological basis for the research is summarised as being hermeneutic phenomenology, which it has been argued can constitute a form of knowledge that survives a postmodern critique of knowledge. This foundation can itself be critiqued from several different standpoints.

Postmodernism has of course come under sustained criticism. A Marxist first

principles challenge is that it denies the reality of materialist fundamentals such as class. This is similar to the “Mumbo-Jumbo” critique, where the ethical relativism implied by postmodernism is anathema.<sup>381</sup> A more nuanced Marxist account is that post modernism itself is a function of late capitalism, providing a trivialisation of reality to entertain and confuse the masses. In this way it is a latter day “opiate of the masses”, previously a function of religion.<sup>382</sup>

The “Art bollocks” essay provides a test for post modern writers (art critics specifically), namely that if their sentence can be reversed to mean the opposite and still make logical sense in its context it must be nonsense<sup>383</sup>. This argument echoes the point of the Sokal paper<sup>384</sup> where a physicist published a paper that was self consciously nonsense. The defence in both cases is the same, it is that Derridian “difference” frees thought from the simply linear binary truth/falsity dyad, to a point that knowledge becomes comparative, and that self contradictory statements can both have some relative truth value.

Moving to phenomenology, arguments against this include its being chimerical and subjective, impossible to replicate and objectively demonstrate. A philosophy that places the individual fundamentally alone in the universe is indeed going to find it difficult to construct a generalisable and agreed account of its self. More practically, Dennett argues against what he calls “lone wolf autophenomenology” researchers<sup>385</sup>, on the grounds that they have been unable to agree basic tenets. He argues this to introduce his adaptation, heterophenomenology, where mental contents is compared third person, although such model seems to closely represent the reality of the psychoanalytic scientific discourse.

A critique of a hermeneutic approach also challenges phenomenology, given that from its Kantian origins, basic cognitive processes such as perception are seen as interpretative processes, such that interpretation is a core psychological function. As summarised by Neitzche, “there are no facts ... only interpretations”<sup>386</sup> Sontag’s

“against interpretation” is not directed at this metapsychological interpretative stance, but referring to art she complains that

**Interpretation excavates, and as it excavates it destroys ...Marx and Freud[‘s] ...elaborate systems of hermeneutics, [are] aggressive and impious ...To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world”<sup>387</sup>**

Relating to the current study, one might argue that deciphering some of the mysteries of effective leadership is to reduce their effectiveness; or that relating to Hitler as the case, to explain may be to forgive, and that instead, one should rather stand in uncomprehending awe of the evil.

The principle argument against hermeneutics is relativism; the opportunity for as many interpretations and explanations of the meaning of material as there are hermeneuticians such that hermeneutically derived knowledge collapses into a hopeless relativism. This argument emerged more specifically, in Habermas’ critique of Gadamer’s emphasis on the authority of the standing point of history and tradition in the development of a hermeneutic perspective, arguing that it was politically naive<sup>388</sup>.

This relativist critique needs to be held alongside the critique of positivist knowledge as essentially un-knowable. Notwithstanding this philosophical challenge, the physical sciences progress. Similarly, notwithstanding hermeneutic relativism, useful verstehen (understandings) emerge and scholarly verstehen research activity leads to evolving and legitimate debate and discipline formation.

#### **5.4 A hermeneutic phenomenology paradigm: Conclusion and critique**

This chapter has elaborated the research paradigm on which the method rests.

Critiquing positivism and extending this to a more general epistemological scepticism, it has then described a verstehen based hermeneutic phenomenology as a research paradigm suited to the topic of inquiry, extending this to post modern, psychoanalytic, “rhizomic” knowledge, exemplified by primary process thinking and psychoanalytic free floating attention method.

The question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in determining their effectiveness was triggered by a “clinical hunch”. This chapter has sought to explicate the epistemological foundation that underpins the “clinical hunch” by arguing that alongside the pragmatic legitimacy of the positivistic experimental sciences, there is an equally legitimate corpus founded on subjective understanding.

In the next chapter, the specific methods based on the identified hermeneutic phenomenological paradigm will be articulated, namely a crucial case history approach.

## **6. The crucial case research method.**

Having laid out the ontological and epistemological foundations of the hermeneutic phenomenological research paradigm, this chapter articulates the more specific research strategy and tactics.

The distinction between strategy and tactics in the management literature derive from their military use<sup>389</sup>, where the strategy is the broader plan and objectives based upon the political policy, and the tactics are the battle plan to achieve a particular goal or target. This chapter has been divided into two sections, one looking at research strategies, at a more operational level than the research paradigm being utilised, and the other looking at the specific tactics, or method involved in the research.

There are three broad strategies described; firstly the traditional linear method of hypothesis, literature search, empirical case study and conclusions; second the process of analytic induction, and thirdly, a more chaotic post modern approach to method closer to the postmodern epistemology arrived at in the previous chapter, namely a “bricolage” approach.

At the next level of specificity, the tactics and therefore the specific method employed have included an extended and divergent literature search, followed by a case study, the case study triangulating a psychobiographical/clinical case study; a

historical account exploring particularly the context of the case; and finally a case study account of the organisation that mediated these two.


## **6.1 Methodological strategy**

The exploration of research paradigm proposed that a hermeneutic phenomenology approach was appropriate for the post modern epistemological position of the researcher. The work of Deluze and Guattari, distinguishing between traditional rational, linear “arboreal” knowledge formation with its central trunk and branches of main hypothesis and sub hypotheses on one hand, and on the other, a more “rhizomic” knowledge structure fitting with the post modern and post structuralist thinking and the Freudian metapsychology of the researcher.

At the level of the research strategy, both approaches, the traditional, linear, rational “arboreal”, and the more chaotic, post modern have been utilised as follows.

### **6.1.1 Strategy of enquiry I: Traditional/Linear/Arboreal**

Linearly, the first task has been to complete a literature search in two areas. Firstly, to understand the question of how managers enact agency within organisations, and to what extent is the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable by through looking at the managerial and leadership literatures, then the sociological and personality literatures, and glancing into various others such as the philosophical dimension of freewill and determinism<sup>390</sup>. Secondly, there has been a process of methodological research through the literature, with the development of an ontological and epistemological position that provides a foundation for a psychoanalytically informed case study method. (See Fig 5 below)



**Figure 5. Linear, “Arboreal” sequence of research.**

The second linear stage has been conducting the case history, with much reading around the man and the historical context. Finally, there has been a process of synthesis of this with further reading to develop theory.

Conceived as a linear/arboreal project, the process of the research is summarised in Figure 5, where an initial literature search is followed by the case history and then by gearing the literature and data from the case study in the development of theory.

### **6.1.2 Strategy of enquiry II: Bricolage**

In contrast to the linear “arboreal” research method noted above is the notion of qualitative research as a “bricolage” of methods and approaches. Feyerabend's “Against Method”, begins its polemic in favour of a more divergent chaotic and free epistemology thus

**“Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical  
anarchism ... is more likely to encourage progress than its law- and-  
order alternatives”<sup>391</sup>**

He cites Mill that stultifying scientific method, “maims by compression, like a Chinese ladies foot”<sup>392</sup> going on to conclude that anarchy makes “bad politics but good epistemology”<sup>393</sup>. Feyerabend's account might be seen as “post modern method”, resulting in Deluzian rhizomic distributed nodes of knowledge which may combine and interact from multiple dimensions, rather than in a linear, “arboreal” centrally structured way.

Denzin presents qualitative research as “bricolage”.<sup>394</sup> Levi-Strauss contrasts the modern engineer's praxis with the his postulate of “Savage Mind” fixing something. The modern engineer enacts an exact solution, whereas the “savage” uses whatever is at hand to achieve a piece meal fix.<sup>395</sup>

Derrida, citing Levi-Strauss extends the notion of “bricolage” to language and discourse in general, thus confirming the bricoleur as a postmodern response to the collapse of structuralism.

**The bricoleur, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses "the means at hand,"... every discourse is bricoleur. The engineer ... is a myth. <sup>396</sup>**

For Denzin,

**The multiple methodologies of qualitative research may be viewed as a bricolage, and the researcher as a bricoleur ... deploying whatever strategies, materials or empirical materials as are at hand ... The researcher-as-bricoleur-theorist works between and within competing and overlapping perspectives and paradigms. <sup>397</sup>**

And that

**The product of the bricoleur's labour is a bricolage, a complex, dense, reflexive collage like creation that reflects the researcher's images, understandings and interpretations of the world or phenomenon under analysis. <sup>398</sup>**

The etymology of bricolage, deriving from French, has no exact English translation, but it might be located somewhere close to a "bodge"; making do with what is realistically available and achievable. Within the lexicon of the managerial literature is the concept of "satisficing", where decisions have to be made moment to moment, prior to all the pertinent facts being known, or where the complexity of the issue precludes this.

### **6.1.3 Strategy of enquiry III: Analytic induction.**

A third research strategy is to recognise the inductive nature of the research process, concluded to be a form of inductive method. The direction of this research is inductive; from a specific observation (the experience crystallising the "clinical

hunch”); to identifying a pattern, to developing a tentative hypothesis, rather than deductively, proceeding from a theory to a hypothesis, to an arranged set of observations to confirmation.

Znaniecki’s account of “analytic induction” in 1934 <sup>399</sup> as a sociological method forms part of the challenge to positivism written nearly half a century after the success of empirical sociology typified by Durkheim’s study of suicide. Essentially, he argues for a method of

**... inducing laws from a deep analysis of experimentally isolated instances** <sup>400</sup>

His argument is that the analytic inductive method is not new and contrived, but rather it is *how science has proceeded*. The full quotation cites one of the scientific stars

**... Galileo, who, after investigating thoroughly a few systematically differentiated causes of movements drew conclusions which bear on all movements...**

And that

**And there are all those innumerable laboratory workers... who have made physics, chemistry and general biology, not by agglomerating large masses of superficial observations, but by inducing laws from a deep analysis of experimentally isolated instances.** <sup>401</sup>

Versions of Znaniecki’s method have been used by sociologists investigating in depth social phenomena, some in the process modifying and refining the method

proposed. For example, Cressey, in his book about embezzlers, sets out an extended version of analytic induction:

**First, a rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is formulated. Second a hypothetical explanation of that phenomenon is formulated. Third, one case is studied in light of the hypothesis with the object of determining whether the hypothesis fit the facts in that case...**<sup>402</sup>

Then going on to describe an iterative process which increases certainty in the findings and evolves the formulation

**... a single negative case disproves the hypothesis and requires a reformulation ... examining cases, re-defining the phenomenon and reformulating the hypothesis is continued ...**<sup>403</sup>

Different researchers have modified the method, for example, in Becker's research on medical students, where data-gathering preceded the theoretical exploration of the hypothesis<sup>404</sup> emphasising the inductive element of the method. Further elaborations of the method were summarised by Pope et al in the BMJ, in the context of emphasising the legitimacy and reliability of the method.<sup>405</sup>

The current research, as others, has modified and emphasised particular elements of the method, emphasising the "deep analysis" and theoretical exposition elements. This modification can be understood as the use of the analytic induction methodology within a more phenomenological frame, where the emphasis is on the clarification and definition rather than objective demonstration.

#### **6.1.4 Strategy of enquiry IV: Grounded theory**

Grounded theory as a quasi (or pseudo) empirical method is explicitly not being used in the current study, although in the spirit of bricolage, it is a “found” method. “Found” in the sense of “objects trouvee” used by post modern artists, such as Duchamp’s “fountain”<sup>406</sup>.

In their 1967 book, Glaser and Strauss describe the process of “constant comparative analysis”<sup>407</sup>, which formed one of the foundations of grounded theory. They argue that the method combines the process of

**conver[sion of] qualitative data into crudely quantifiable form ... [to] provisionally test a hypothesis**

On the one hand with that of the mere

**generat[ion of] theoretical ideas.** <sup>408</sup>

In the latter process the researcher

**... merely inspects his data for new properties of his theoretical categories, and writes memos on these properties**<sup>409</sup>.

They go on to argue to describe their constant comparative method as combining

**... the explicit coding procedure of the first approach and the style of theoretical development of the second.** <sup>410</sup>

Znaniecki complains about the positivist rush to classification and judgement using the concept of “pseudo-deduction”<sup>411</sup>. This can be expanded to a broader critique of the coding and scoring elements of the Strauss and Corbin method as being “pseudo-positivism”.

Znaniecki's core argument is that *real* science proceeds by the "deep analysis of the experimentally isolated instance", from which non logical, psychological processes<sup>412</sup> produce a hypothesis inductively, which hypothesis is subsequently subjected to empirical investigation and testing following a traditional positivist scientific methodology. Becker's argument in favour of "quasi-statistics"<sup>413</sup> seems suspect in this regard, although overtly he argues for it simply providing detail.

Eschewing pseudo-empiricism, the researcher is "inspecting his data" and "writing a memo" about his findings, which Hammersley points out is Glaser and Strauss' summary of an analytic induction methodology<sup>414</sup>. There is a hope that some truths and legitimate explanatory models and mechanisms emerge. Rather than grounding emergent theory within a pseudo empirical method, it is grounded within the epistemological foundation and hoped for intuitive coherence of the emergent theory. It may be, following Znaniecki's model, that, as with Weber's initial *verstehen* based theory of charismatic leadership, subsequent empirical exploration of the conclusions sheds further light on the phenomenon, but such exploration is not part of the method within the current study.

#### **6.1.5 Strategy of enquiry V: Postmodern method.**

Foucault's method "archaeology" eschews a central "arboreal" historical narrative, rather opting instead for the examination of a single issue examining the apparent chance and contiguous events taking place at the same time. For example the exclusion of the mentally ill from society and the development of lunatic asylums being contiguous with the closure of leprosaria, and often on the same site<sup>415</sup>.

Psychoanalytic "free floating attention" (5.2.5 above) and Foucault's "archaeology" constitute postmodern methods. The knowledge derived, like postmodern discourse, is characterised by multiple versions and qualifications requiring comparison rather than linear logical arbitration of truth and falsity.


## **6.2 Methodological tactics.**

Having explored the research paradigm and some methodological strategies, the tactics and specific methods used will be described.

### **6.2.1 Methodological tactics I: Literature search**


Part of the method of the research is to acknowledge that the research is interdisciplinary, and that the literatures that impinge upon the subject are multiple, and illuminate different aspects of the issue. The research question is multidimensional, and the different literatures reflect these different dimensions.

Broadly, the process of literature search was in the context of a familiarity with the personality literature delving into the sociological structure and agency debate in some detail, then looking at power and domination. Having established this grounding, the management and leadership literature was explored to examine the phenomenon of leadership and authority, the same issue through the lens of a different discipline, alighting on the charisma literature, and then having to move to that of ethical leadership.



**Figure 6. (above) Dimensionality of literature**

**Figure 7.(overleaf) The rhizomic character of the literature search**



The philosophical literatures were mainly related to the development of a coherent epistemology, the freewill/determinism dimension of the structure/agency seeming to be a word game rather than having a practical application. Reading around the case history has also been extensive and rhizomic, the researcher having not previously studied modern history.

### 6.2.2 Methodological Tactics II: Case study method

Yin's case study research manual <sup>416</sup> sets out a number of stages and definitions required for quality case studies. These will be rehearsed and briefly annotated from the current study.

- **The question.** Yin argues that the case study method is more appropriate for “how” and “why” type research questions, on the grounds that the answers they evoke are more explanatory. Questions in this study include
  - “How” people in a leadership role exercise such influence,
  - “Why” can that influence apparently arbitrarily be used for good or evil,
  - “How” do the clinical and psychological concepts of personality and psychopathy illuminate these processes.
- **The propositions** of the study, “direct attention to something that should be examined within the scope of the study” <sup>417</sup> This would include
  - Whether and how the nature and force of an agent's personality wrought a change in their social structures/organisations
  - The mechanisms whereby this takes place
- **The unit of analysis:** the case study examines a single leader, namely Hitler, and more specifically the detail and the mechanism of his rise to the peak of his power. The study is not about his behaviour 1941-45. The unit of analysis is the man, and the achievement of his rise to a pre-eminent position in Europe.

- **Linking data to propositions.** The research is presented and set out in such a way that, the theories developed will be used as explanatory lenses to structure the exploration of the data.
- **The criteria for interpreting findings** will consist of the explanatory power of the theory developed.
- **The contemporaneous nature of the case study** such that accurately, this study is a case history rather than a case study.

Crotty and others argue that the case history method epistemologically rests heavily on a constructivist paradigm<sup>418</sup>, the method deriving from the tradition of medical, clinical case histories where the individuals life and background are presented as elements that together construct and contextualise the phenomenon being studied; they have to make sense.

Various authors have developed typologies of case studies. Mitchell describes a spectrum of increasing complexity from the more simple 'apt illustration' through the more complex "analysis of a social situation", to the potentially very complex "extended case history". Yin distinguishes between explanatory, exploratory and descriptive studies<sup>419</sup>; Stake between intrinsic and instrumental<sup>420</sup>, where the former is an everyday example to illustrate context, and the latter is chosen to examine some specific phenomenon.

### 6.2.3 Methodological Tactics III: Hitler as a "crucial case"

In an essay on the case study in political science, Eckstein<sup>421</sup> describes the "crucial" case. In the context of arguing for the legitimacy of case study methodology in the development of theory that can be studied later by more comparative studies,

... A well chosen case, one that is somehow... crucial for a theory<sup>422</sup>

Has the same targeted contribution that the “well constructed experiment” has to test a hypothesis “in the physical sciences”<sup>423</sup>. Yin<sup>424</sup> writes of the “critical case” as one where the circumstances are particularly unusual or extreme such that it has illustrative purpose.

**The essential abstract characteristic of a crucial case... [is that it] must closely fit a theory**<sup>425</sup>

Gerring<sup>426</sup> cites Popper’s example of the power of the crucial case method, carried out by Einstein at a solar eclipse, where the theory of relativity predicted that the gravitational field of the sun would alter the apparent position of stars by bending their light. The confirmation of the theoretical prediction in the particular set of circumstances was a powerful confirmation of the theory.

Gerring, however, emphasises the corollary disconfirmatory power of the method. In the current research, this is critical relating particularly the second limb of the question about the extent to which the personality or psychopathy of the leader might be a critical factor in their effectiveness. Given the violence and mendacity associated with Hitler’s NSDAP on the one hand as indicating psychopathy, and the personality cult and personalisation of authority characteristic of the NSDAP on the other, Hitler is a strong case for the argument that these two variables are critical. If the personality and/or psychopathy of the leader are critical factors, they would definitely be found in Hitler as a case. If not found in Hitler as a case, they are unlikely to be so elsewhere and in general.

The researcher submits that Hitler closely fits the theory on the grounds that he both was an extremely successful leader, and because he is possibly the archetypal psychopathic charismat. The choice of Hitler as the case derives from the following considerations


- **The articulation of potent agency.** Hitler’s achievement between 1918, being a broken down “private first class” and 1938, having led one of the greatest nations on Earth, and playing on the world stage to the extent of being able to dupe the British prime minister into

letting him take Czechoslovakia without a fight, evidences astonishing agency. The consistency of his vision and enactment of this supports the singularity of this agency.

- **The relevance of the dialectic with structure.** In the account of the origins of the 39-45 war, a significant structural account can be made, arguing that the post war dynamics in Western Europe coupled with the development of dictatorial communism in Russia and the emergence of Fascism in other European countries and the various extreme market events, made it inevitable that some form of conflagration and conflict would emerge.
- **The psychopathic question.** Within the popular conception of psychopathy, the notion of malice and evil emerges. For many, the NSDAP culture and values culminating in the Holocaust typify this; so that Hitler lead a psychopathic regime, and that he must therefore have been a psychopathic leader.
- **The centrality of charisma.** While Hitler's speeches can be looked back on with hindsight as melodramatic, at the time they were bewitching not only to those who were invested followers. The centrality of the charismatic element in the Hitler phenomenon, both positive in the development of the movement, and negative in terms of its overall outcome, combines a number of the emerging themes of the research.
- **"Playing" people.** Accounts of Hitler's dealing with the various heads of state 1936-38 detail a master of political manipulation, and illustrate that the control of the person equates to the control of the structure that they own. Hitler was a virtuoso player of/manipulator of people.

For the current research Eckstein also describes an alternative possible case study type to the crucial case, namely the plausibility probe case,<sup>427</sup> although this he describes as

**Preliminary to testing ...to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing<sup>428</sup>**



**Figure 8. Hitler as a crucial case combining themes of the research**

More practically, in terms of being a research subject, there is a vast literature of both primary, secondary and tertiary, which would facilitate the applied clinical examination of the case as in the method below.

#### **6.2.4 Methodological Tactics IV: Triangulating case study methods**

This final section describes the triangulation of perspectives applied, roughly grouped into the following three chapters that in turn focus upon the man; the structure; and the agent.

The development of a quasi clinical formulation of the man reviews his biography as a quasi clinical case history. Secondly, exploration of the structure invokes the historical context in which the case emerged and thirdly, his career as an agent adopts more of a management or leadership case history approach and examines his rise to power.

**6.2.4.1 The Structural context: Historical method.** Historical research method can seem invisible as the reader gets caught up in the narrative of the account that has been researched. There are

two disciplines underlying, firstly philosophical, and secondly a historiography. Chiming with the history of leadership theory, Carlyle concluded that

**The history of the world is but the biography of great men** <sup>429</sup>

The earliest history, accounts of the Graeco-Persian wars by Herodotus from the 5<sup>th</sup> Century BC also heavily focus on the personalities involved; <sup>430</sup> Carlyle continues

**In all epochs of the world's history, we shall find the Great Man to have been the indispensable saviour of his epoch;— the lightning, without which the fuel never would have burnt. (Ibid)**

The critique of this “great man” approach to history began with Spencer

**... Ask whence comes the great man, we find that the theory breaks down completely... the great man is natural... a product of his antecedents...** <sup>431</sup>

Broadly, in place of “great men” as the nodal points in historical narrative, were then substituted “great metanarratives”, which provided these “patterns” and “laws”. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Whig interpretation of history as evolutionary towards the Victorian British constitution was common; subsequently, Marx’s dialectical materialism became the fulcrum.

Spalding describes the unveiling and then challenge of these metanarratives, for example the Marxist/materialist interpretation of the French revolution being undermined by empirical evidence that it was in fact “started” by the bourgeoisie. Similar stretch of a metanarrative is seen with the contortions of the Whig British Constitutional narrative explaining away the American War of Independence as

**the triumph of the English settlers’ love of liberty and representative institutions** <sup>432</sup>

Aside from these differing “historicist” accounts is the question of the extent to which history can be a science, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, von Rank set out an ideal for historical evidence, framing history as a narrative, but one evidentially supported by sufficient facts from primary sources to be able to “know” and “recreate” the past <sup>433</sup>.

This approach is to be contrasted with the post-structuralist “archaeology” of Foucault where a single phenomenon is focused upon, with the implications radiating outwards as the facts are rearranged to articulate and illustrate a particular point, for example comparing breaking at the wheel and modern penal practice as a change enacted in only several hundred years<sup>434</sup>. Spalding <sup>435</sup> extends Deluze’s arboreal metaphor, where a Rankean central narrative trunk is replaced by a post modern focus on the leaves, the mass of detail without the underlying structure to define its position. Thus the modern museum approach reproducing 1940s front rooms or 1918 trenches to convey a historical message.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Popper wrote disparagingly of “The poverty of Historicism”,

**I mean by historicism an approach... discovering the “rhythms” or the “patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” of history. <sup>436</sup>**

What is more, it is self evidently absurd to suggest that, as Rank implies, the narrated past is accurately recreated; the past is gone. The leaves are on the ground. Postmodernism is the gathering together of a set of leaves to create a narrative. Any narrative can be argued as the leaves can be arranged in whatever way. Thus, history is made by the victors in wars; thus the meta-history of “totalitarianism” in the post war years, when the evil of Hitler’s state was replaced by the Soviet block in the cold war; thus the meta-history of globalisation; thus the “axis of evil” to justify the Iraq war and so on.

The second dimension of historical method is historiography, the study of the specific method of gathering historical data, and its reliability. Data can be primary, secondary, tertiary sources, and its reliability affected by the degree of impartiality, the trope and assumptions of the writing and so on.

In the current study a wide variety of primary, secondary and tertiary materials have been used in order to develop an understanding and narrative of the different “rhythms and patterns” that were extant at the time of the emergence of Hitler. The aim has been to get a “feel”, and “primary” material used has included engagement with the turn of the century arts, literature and music as well as including some contemporaneous news reports and film footage, and longer study of Hitler’s partially penned autobiography, *Mein Kampf*.

In a sense the historical debate between Spencer’s “antecedents” and Carlyle’s “lightning”, the structure and the agent respectively, are the core question of the study. The aim of the historical element of the triangulated method is to describe the “fuel”, to be able to assess to what extent Hitler was a potent agent or a cork on the tsunami of contemporary political and cultural events.

**6.2.4.2 The man; Clinical formulation/psychobiographical method.** Dreyfuss argues that the notion of an inner sense of me, or “self-hood” is a relatively recent phenomenon<sup>437</sup>, and so the attribution of motivations to Carlyle’s “Great Men” are a quite recent phenomenon. The narrower psychobiographical idiom seems to date its own origins to Freud’s case histories<sup>438</sup>, where in addition to his in depth clinical discussions of the “wolf man” and the “rat man”, he wrote a shorter essay on Leonardo daVinci<sup>439</sup>. Hitler also figures in the discipline’s development, in particular the psychoanalytically orientated biography commissioned by the US military in the early 1940s from Henry Murray<sup>440</sup>, referred to elsewhere. Frequently they have a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic bias, although a broad criticism has been that so called psychobiographies can be very bad, given the ease of fabrication and attribution of irrelevant and spurious motivations and interpretations of those long dead and unable to defend themselves<sup>441</sup>.

The second method being used in developing an account of the man is a modified clinical process and activity. In the researcher’s clinical practice, this involves a long period of observation, and discussion with colleagues and the patient. In classical psychoanalytic practice, a gradual piecing together as the patient’s story emerges. In both cases, the therapeutic activity is the presentation to the patient of manageable/digestible pieces of the clinical formulation that emerges, are tested with

the patient, and that then where correct, contribute to the patient's insight. It involves developing and providing for the patient their own psychobiography like a map so they can avoid repetitive pitfalls.

A significant (and unanticipated) criticism of this process as a research method, therefore, is that there is no "patient" to be able to engage with. The psychobiographic researcher is unable to test out emerging hypotheses on the subject, which is a core element of the psychoanalytic clinical process.

In the development of a clinical understanding of a patient, there is an iterative process whereby the therapist develops a possible understanding, outlines it to the patient, and observes the response. It is not only the question of whether the patient affirms or denies it: it is rather that inferences are drawn about the effect that the proposal has; anger; indignation; indifference; elaboration, acceptance and so on. This backwards and forwards iterative process has not been possible in the study of Hitler.

Instead, as an alternative, the researcher immersed himself in a variety of biographical sources, with the different perspectives to some extent mimicking the back and forth of dialogue with the patient. The researcher has been immersed in other people's prejudices and preconceptions. This has been a partial solution, given the extensive number of sources available, the number of different biographical accounts providing different overall impressions. For example, Bullock's contempt for a man whose values and vision could be reduced to there being more cakes available for Arian Germans<sup>442</sup>; Fest (a contemporary journalist who fled, and whose biography ends prior to the outbreak of war) clearly actively hates him<sup>443</sup>; the master biographer Kershaw seems to focus on the structures around him rather than the man himself, so avoiding a personal reaction<sup>444</sup>; Shirer seems fearful of the efficiency of the political machine<sup>445</sup>; Waite's biography of the "Psychopathic God" tries to capture the utter powerlessness of those caught in his path<sup>446</sup>.

A second important source has been, after general historical accounts framing the issues and establishing the basic historical facts, Hitler's own *Mein Kampf*. This has been closely read on the

grounds that it consists of primary material, notwithstanding the accounts of it having been partly ghost written and edited by his followers, there is an impression that the man speaks through. Other primary sources include transcripts of speeches<sup>447</sup> and archive film material<sup>448</sup>

**6.2.4.3 The Agent; Management /leadership case.** During the development of management as an academic discipline driven by the needs of the burgeoning US capitalist economy, to try to train young executives to be effective in industry, Harvard developed the “case history” method of teaching. The argument was that each business situation was unique, and the way to package the wisdom of experienced industrialists was to mimic their long-lived experience by taking trainees through the sequences of significant industry events and developments in the form of in depth case studies<sup>449</sup>.

Management/leadership MBA type courses do not dwell on the societal, economic and cultural structures, perhaps because their task is to foster the belief that individual leaders *can* make a difference, they are supporting the Carlyle rather than the Spencer version of history being created by great men. This culture of leadership training is based on the assumption of agency being extant. Consequently the culture of management/leadership case histories focuses on critical strategic decisions made by the leaders of organisations and the effect these had on the organisation and their environments.

It has been argued<sup>450</sup> that the use of case histories is a legitimate research tool on the grounds of the uniqueness of the particular industry and business situations. Conceived as a management case history in this research, Hitler is explored in terms of the sequence of events from the point of the crystallisation of his vision of engaging in politics to the point at which his power in Germany was consolidated. The issue of interest was not about the process of his self destruction (Kershaw’s “Nemesis”), but at the culture of the man as a leader and how he was successful.

### **6.3 Critique of method: Randomised controlled trials vs the clinical hunch.**

In summary, the research process has involved a hermeneutic phenomenological process firstly focussing on the background literature, circling hermeneutically around the phenomena and understandings of leadership and management as they are differentially refracted through leadership, personality and sociological literatures. Secondly, it has been the utilisation of a similar process firstly through different accounts, perspectives and direct presentations of Hitler as the case and the phenomena described therein, and then the circling between these and the previously explored theoretical models that emerged in the literature search.

This overall research method adopted can be criticised in a number of ways. For example, Miles<sup>451</sup> describes qualitative data, particularly case study method as an “attractive nuisance”, a legal term for something that puts people at risk. He complains that

**...there are very few for protection against self-delusion, let alone the presentation of “unreliable” or “invalid” conclusions<sup>452</sup>**

More dismissively, Campbell and Stanley reported of the “One shot case study” that

**such studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value ... Any appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about singular isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis**

The method can be defended in two ways; firstly, as did Yin<sup>453</sup> by appealing to method and rigour of technique and analysis so that

**Case study practice can be dramatically improved by applying what is already known<sup>454</sup>**

The second defence is more general rather than specific. The critique of this research method

compared to more statistical methods parallels the dialectic in medicine between the “clinical hunch” and the “randomised controlled trial” (RCT)<sup>455</sup>. In an RCT, the efficacy of a treatment is investigated by randomly allocating patients to a treatment and non treatment group, where neither the patients nor the researchers knows which each patient is in, with a comparison of relative improvement. According to the critique, clinical hunches are untrustworthy subjective whims, and scientifically evidenced based treatment is legitimate, evidence based and certain.

Utilising a the biological sciences distinction between research “in vitro”, in the laboratory, and “in vivo”, with live subjects, (“in the field” in sociological research language), the researcher submits that the subject of the study, namely leadership and the development of influence among a follower group are “in vivo” phenomena, about which the positivistic sciences’ “in vitro” certainty must be relatively silent. While a case history method within a hermeneutic phenomenological paradigm does not provide the “in vitro” certainty of the positivistic sciences, it is all that is available in trying to intellectually grapple with such evanescent social and psychological issues.

#### **6.4 The crucial case research method: Conclusion**

This chapter’s aim has been to justify and build a method upon the epistemological foundation laid in the previous discussion, to describe why Hitler is a legitimate critical or crucial case study, and the way that the case study approach has been triangulated into an historical, psychobiographical and managerial case method to illuminate the different aspects.

In the previous chapters, there has been an exploration of structure and agency, and the next three chapters, can be understood in two ways. Firstly, as complementary accounts providing layers of data from which patterns emerge. Secondly, the chapters about Hitler’s biography and the historical context can be understood as a description of the agent or case, and a description of the structure, or context, respectively. The third chapter of case data of the management/leadership case history describes the actions of the agent/case, from Hitler’s adoption and development of the NSDAP as his organisational grouping, to his use of this to seize power. The fourth chapter pulls together some themes from the data regarding the culture of the NSDAP as Hitler’s organisational grouping.

## **7. Psycho-biography: The man**

The volume of secondary source material means that the basic facts of Hitler's biography are well rehearsed and repeated in outline rather than detail here. This familiarity is increased by Hitler's own repeated emphasis on his humble beginnings in speeches, and further confused by the manufacture of the conscious creation of the Hitler myth in the 1930s on the one hand, and the disinformation of contemporaneous political enemies, for example making the most of the idea that he might have illegitimate Jewish lineage, on the other.

### **7.1 Linear biographic narrative**

Biographical accounts of Hitler are striking by their relative mundanity. There seem to be few, if any nodes or events that have potent explanatory power harbingering the man who would emerge. His father was gruff and authoritarian; mother submissive, doting and depressive dying painfully when he was a late teenager. He lost a brother in a family in which there had been several losses previously; there was some sibling rebellion, but he was fed and schooled, forming part of a family of a rural Austrian civil servant in the developing middle class.

#### **7.1.1 Hitler's parents.**

Hitler's father, Alois was a custom's official, at that time a semi-military profession; a proud and ambitious man until he achieved a certain level of seniority as a middle ranking civil servant. He had initially left his home village refusing to return until he had made something of himself; he seemed unashamed of being illegitimate, and there has been much debate about who his father (Adolf Hitler's paternal grandfather) was. Alois, at the age of about 40 was legitimised by a local man with whom he was close, and who many believe was in fact his father (and therefore Adolf Hitler's paternal grandfather). This late legitimisation led to much speculation about some Jewish ancestry,

Alois' mother having been in service to the Rothschilds and a second local Jewish family, and there has been an account that the Baron or other master had sired the illegitimate child. Kershaw concludes that the evidence "simply does not stand up"<sup>456</sup>. Irrespective of the biological reality, Adolf Hitler's later secrecy about his background and the research carried out by the Gestapo suggest that he himself in fantasy believed that he might have a Jewish paternal grandfather.

In "Mein Kampf" (MK) Hitler refers to his father in an affectionate and very normal way as "the old man" and gives an account of his struggles when declaring that he wanted to be an artist rather than a civil servant, the career planned out by Alois.

**The father would not abandon his 'Never', and I became all the more consolidated in my 'Nevertheless'.<sup>457</sup>**

However, other accounts describe Alois as an autocratic and dictatorial man who was by that time on his third wife. His first wife had been a woman some years his senior, apparently, an instrumental marriage, she had some wealth, and died some years after their marriage, but not before there was an awareness of Alois' infidelity. In Adolf's mother, he married a young woman who came into his house as his stepdaughter, and who remained subservient, continuing to call her husband "uncle" through the marriage<sup>458</sup>. Accounts report Alois continuing to wear his full uniform whenever in public, and lording it over the locals by insisting that they address him by his full title Finanzwach Oberaufseher Heidler. In the context of this proud Austrian serviceman, Adolf's German nationalism must have been provocative, and this, together with other evidence constructs an account of considerable tension between Adolf and his father until father's death in 1903 when Adolf was 14.

Biographers argue that the only person Hitler was ever genuinely close to was his mother Klara, apparently a quiet diffident, religious (Roman Catholic) woman who age 16 had married her uncle age 45. Hitler's attachment to his mother is evidenced both by direct accounts and by his sequence of being "adopted" by maternal figures later in life (e.g. the Wagner's widow; the Bechstein wife<sup>459</sup>,

etc), and the fact of his having had a picture of his mother on his wall in his bedroom for the rest of his life<sup>460</sup>.

### **7.1.2 Early years and school 1889-1906**

Hitler was born in Brannau am Inn, a small Austrian Village near the German border on 20.4.1889. Hitler's early years were disrupted by frequent moves of the family; they moved from Brannau when he was three across the border to Passau, Germany, where his father had been posted. Subsequently, there were four further family relocations. In 1894, they moved back to Austria, (to Lintz) father's last posting prior to his retirement. In 1895 in Hafeld, father had bought and then struggled to maintain a smallholding he had bought as an attempt to recreate his own pastoral youth in his retirement, replete with his children, including the young Adolf having a list of farm chores to complete at the end of the school day. After two years, Alois gave up the farm. By this time, Adolf was age 6; his full sister Paula had been born, and his half brother Alois Jr had left home ostensibly because of father's gruff abuse.

Hitler's mother, Klara buried four of her six children, and the somewhat sickly Adolf was her only surviving son such that all accounts agree that she spoiled the young Hitler.

**Adolf's early years were spent, then, under the smothering protectiveness of an over-anxious mother in a household dominated by the threatening presence of a disciplinarian father, against whose wrath the submissive Klara was helpless to protect her offspring.**<sup>461</sup>

By 1897, Adolf was age 8, and things settled somewhat with a move to nearby Lambach, Father adopted a more normal retirement pattern, living off his pension. Hitler lived across the road from, and attended the local monastery school, identifying with the religious ritual and ceremony and apparently for a period thinking of going into the church. The following year when Adolf was 9, they made their last move to Leonding in 1898 where the family settled. Adolf's brother Edmund died after a long illness in 1900, when Adolf was 12, being buried in the cemetery next to the house, where the grave could be overseen from the young Adolf's room.

While Hitler's school record had always been mixed, in 1904, age 15, he only just passed the year in the Linz Realschule on the grounds that he left the school, instead, having to enrol in a school 50 miles away in Setyr<sup>462</sup> where there was something of an improvement in his performance. In MK, Hitler argues that he did well in the subjects that he was interested in, but from various sources, there is no consistent account of underachievement through poor behaviour or boredom, his performance seems to have been generally patchy, although his interest in history and military history was clear.

### **7.1.3 The indolent young dandy: Linz; Vienna, 1906-09**

Having left school age 16, Hitler spent about a year as something of a drone in the family flat, rising late and attending various cultural events in Linz. Following a visit to Vienna, he resolved to move there, notwithstanding his school failure, but with the backing of his doting mother, ostensibly to study at the Academy of Fine Arts. He failed the entrance exam, and failed to gain admittance the following year again, although seems not to have disclosed this to his family and friends. Over this time, he was supported by his "orphan's pension" and by the family at home. He chose not to obtain any gainful employment to support himself throughout this time, instead being a young man about town with independent means<sup>463</sup>.

During this period – as described in an account by his then best friend Kubizek, Hitler was well and stylishly dressed, cutting the figure of a young middle class dandy in Vienna where he shared a room with Kubizek. Hitler would spend his money on going to Wagner operas, preaching to Kubizek (who was by that time studying music) his views and critique. Also, over this time he developed an unrequited obsession with a young woman, would stand at the street corner awaiting her passing, and soliloquise about her at length to Kubizek, planning their wedding and life together, but whom he never actually approached. Kubizek describes Hitler critiquing Viennese architecture and regaling him with characteristic one sided monologues about how he (Hitler) would redesign the city, these seeming to be empty grandiose fantasies at the time.

Hitler's mother died in December 1907 when he was 18, after a long struggle with breast cancer, accounts suggesting that towards the end she was in considerable pain, and that she had endured significant and painful treatments involving the application of caustic remedies to her wounds following surgical intervention earlier in the year. Hitler returned home from Vienna and was very devoted during her last weeks, and devastated following her death, not returning to Vienna for a further few months after this. Kershaw cites the (Jewish) family Dr Bloch in supporting his MK statement that he had lost his only genuinely warm and affectionate attachment and was very affected by the bereavement<sup>464</sup>.

#### **7.1.4 The drift into vagrancy 1909-13**

Following the death of his mother, in 1908 Hitler was ordered by the courts to forgo his orphan's pension, it passing instead to his sister. In 1909 (aged 20) Hitler was left to his own financial devices. Having failed for a second time to get into the academy, he left the house he had shared with his student friend Kubizeck and was formally homeless, for several months sleeping rough or in overnight hostels and eating in soup kitchens<sup>465</sup>. Having pawned all his belongings, his physical appearance strikingly changed from the former young dandy, to his having long lank hair and dark beard and dressed in a large black overcoat. It was over these months that he may have done the casual labouring work that he described later in MK as where he first came across unionism (see below 9.4). Given his physique, it is unlikely he did much of this work.

As a vagrant, various accounts of Hitler's lost years put him in libraries and reading rooms where he may have sought the combination of warmth and shelter with intellectual stimulation. Eventually, in 1910, age 21, after time in homeless hostels, he found a poor men's house to stay in for the next three years.

As Hitler stabilised at his new level, having to live off his own means rather than handouts and pensions, he obtained a meagre but dependable salary from selling his drawings of local landmarks copied from postcards. This business was initially in partnership with a friend Hanisch<sup>466</sup> who would do the selling, and who apparently was frequently frustrated that Hitler would paint when it pleased him, rather than regularly, until the two fell out. By 1913, Hitler was well

established within the home, an acquaintance Hanisch describing him as having his regular place there where he would read and draw and would “keep his distance and ‘not let anyone come close’”<sup>467</sup>, but by that time again in a suit, albeit worn, and clean shaven.

It is likely that his reading diet was papers, journals and pamphlets rather than the lexicon of German enlightenment and romantic literature claimed retrospectively by NSDAP propaganda. Bullock points out that Hitler was manifestly not widely read <sup>468</sup> and cultured, but he does seem to have built an extensive and encyclopaedic knowledge on several somewhat limited areas, including continental political and military history of the previous century; he seems to have spent these lost years developing this knowledge base through superficial means mentioned as driven by his preoccupations and obsessions, then by reading more in depth..

His growing sophistication in the local Austro-Hungarian political scene (demonstrated later in his account in MK) seems to have led to contempt for this and it is interesting to speculate whether a political awareness developed in that context, or whether a pre-existing political interest sensitised him to the politics going on around him. Either way, these activities will have deepened his rejection of the proposal that he would serve in the Austrian military, which he was required to do from 1909

#### **7.1.5 Move to Munich 1914**

In Vienna, Hitler had apparently been avoiding the draft, which may have contributed to his move to Germany (Munich), but he left shortly after becoming eligible for a legacy from his father when he turned 24. <sup>469</sup> Munich became his home city, and he reported that the 15 months there before the war were among his happiest. He rented a small room in a family house that he shared with his travelling companion from Vienna for several months, and established himself painting tourist watercolours from postcards, spending his time reading the papers in the cafes, and solitary other than when engaging in political debate. However, in January 1914, he was briefly taken into custody for avoiding military service, sending to the Austrian authorities a fawning note in mitigation, so was not prosecuted. He was found physically unfit at examination, and so able to recommence his previous lifestyle<sup>470</sup>.

Continuing to make a modest living drawing and selling his paintings, together with his lack of direction; his political preoccupation and artistic activity fitted him quite well into a role prevalent at the time of the “bohemian” romantic hero, the artist/revolutionary, focussed solely on their work, without a care for their material well-being. Later, Hindenburg would contemptuously dismiss him as the “bohemian corporal”,<sup>471</sup> it not being clear if the president was in error over Hitler’s lineage, or being figurative about this somewhat odd man.

#### **7.1.6 Hitler as a soldier 1914-18**

Hitler was reported to be very pleased with the German declaration of war in August 1914 and can be seen in a photograph of a crowd celebrating this in the Odeonplatz on 2.8.1914<sup>472</sup>. He received a special dispensation from Ludwig III to join the Bavarian army, the 16<sup>th</sup> Bavarian reserve regiment, the List Regiment. Having joined up on 16.8.1914, by 29.10.1914 he was involved in the first battle of Ypres.

The German Schlieffen plan was that the war in the west would be quickly won so that troops could be transported to the Eastern Front while Russia slowly mobilised. Resistance from the French and British armies resulted in a “race to the sea”, as the battle line was drawn that would constitute the Western Front for the next four years. The first battle of Ypres was a desperate push by the German army to end the war, and the equally desperate effort of the French and English to halt their advance, and particularly to protect the Pas-de-Calais ports.

Hitler and the List regiment arrived near Ypres<sup>473</sup> shortly after the German losses, later characterised as the “massacre of the innocents”, when enthusiastic student volunteers repeatedly charged against French and British defensive positions, using 19<sup>th</sup> century battle-craft techniques made anachronistic by the amplified lethality of modern weaponry which cut them down. By December 1914, the 250 men of the List regiment had been reduced to 42. Over the next 4 years, the List regiment was involved in the Battle of the Somme; the Battle of Arras; the Battle of Passchendale and so on.

The traditional view of Hitler's war <sup>474</sup> is that he served bravely at the front with his regiment. Differing accounts have him as using his time between battles reading the German classics (probably not true), and being somewhat alone and aloof among his peers (as he articulates in MK), believing in the war and engaged with the glorious vision of victory, rather than falling prey to the cynical pragmatism of his peers; eschewing leave, and requesting to return to the front from a job in Berlin while convalescing from his first wound. Similarly, various stories are attached to his two Iron Cross awards, including his having come across, and single handed, capturing a group of English soldiers sheltering in a bomb crater. The traditional account has Hitler's war experiences as his "university" in the sense of his bravery and developing direction and determination.

Williams' conclusion was that "There can be no doubt that he was a brave and fanatical soldier..."<sup>475</sup>, in the context of having been in the fighting, and having spent several years as a dispatch rider, a dangerous job. This is challenged, however, by Weber with primary research, citing Hitler as a "rear area pig"<sup>476</sup>, working behind the lines where he could curry favour with the officers with the potential for un-earned medals. Weber's account <sup>477</sup> of the role of dispatch rider acknowledges that at times, this could be dangerous work under fire. But that, because it was attached to the regimental HQ, some way away from the front line, Hitler's war was lived in rooms with beds and sheets rather than in the mud of the trenches. Furthermore, it is suggested that at times, particularly dangerous dispatch missions, for example, would be "bartered" in exchange for dispensations by the officers, and medal recommendations. Weber's criticism demolishes something of a straw man argument that Hitler's wartime experiences "explain" his later activities. Accounts acknowledge that he was thought of as odd and did not fit in well; that, unusually, he was less interested in time away from the battlefield, but of course, he did not have another life to speak of. Kershaw attributes his subsequent sense of providence to his survival in that theatre where vast numbers did not.

Hitler's own account of his war years in MK is written from the perspective of the whole sweep of his Pan-German Social Darwinist vision, with a critique of the political and tactical way it was being run, as if a German world hegemony was inevitable, but in the current war was not being achieved on account of the bungling and the treachery of the Berlin political elite.

In March 1918 Hitler was involved in the briefly successful German Spring Offensive. In the drive towards Paris<sup>478</sup>, Hitler and the List Regiment were involved in the 3<sup>rd</sup> battle of Aisine, retaking Chemin-des Dames, a strategically important ridge, Hitler was triumphant at his involvement in this success.

By October the German Offensive had run out of steam, and the List Regiment was back near Ypres; Hitler was the victim of a gas attack, being blinded and evacuated to hospital in Pasewalk, where he learned of the armistice.

In MK Hitler ascribes his decision to go into politics to this crisis of hearing of the German defeat, which some biographers doubt, arguing that this decision was a more gradual process. Langer<sup>479</sup> reports that the hospital psychiatrists later used Hitler's blindness as a case illustration of hysteria for lectures, suggesting Germany's defeat was an enormous personal wound.

Notwithstanding the subsequent critique of the "university" theory of these years, something did happen between 1914 and 1918 for Hitler. In the five years before, he is a vagrant and failed aesthete. In the 5 years after, he has taken over and developed a political movement characterised by a nuanced and sophisticated use of propaganda and instrumental use of violence, his party having recruited the support of Ludendorff, who had effectively been the executive lead of the army and indeed the country during that war.

### **7.1 7 Post war and politics.**

Hitler's post war activity is outlined below (Ch 9) as the "management case history" as it is at this point that his political career commences, but to summarise, following his recovery, he returned to Munich, like the rest of Germany, in political upheaval, remaining in the army for a further few years, but increasingly becoming involved in politics.

## 7.2 Personal themes

Having outlined Hitler's early personal history, some overarching personal and biographical themes will be annotated; relationships; work patterns and so on. Broadly, the selection of the themes in section 7.2 and 7.3 is a combination in part of those aspects normally included in psychiatric histories and evaluations<sup>480</sup>, and in part heuristic, identified by the researcher as worthy of comment for an adequately rich description of Hitler's personality.

### 7.2.1 Relationships

Different accounts rehearse Hitler's aloofness and aloneness, even living cheek by jowl in the trenches, where he disapproved of his peers' cynicism and keenness to get home from the front. Kubizeck, his friend in Vienna, commented that their relationship worked because he was someone who would listen to his long monologues, passively<sup>481</sup>. A striking characteristic of Hitler's relationships was the nature of his immediate and intimate social circle, who a previous century might have said lacked "culture and breeding"; in the world of the developing new media attracting ridicule and contempt. For example, Goering's cladding of his obese frame in a sequence of garish self styled uniforms; Goebbels' serial infidelities; Hitler's own early use of traditional Bavarian clothing in sophisticated political society; Hess' other-worldish naivety and the more frankly boorish violence of Rohm and Bormann. And yet notwithstanding this, he won the acquiescence and probably the respect of the most cultured, sophisticated and educated nation at the time.

Accounts give the impression that the success was partly achieved by ruthless control of the "message", illustrated by the fastidious control Hitler had over published images and material about himself, practicing his photographic poses and oratorical flourishes<sup>482</sup>. Relationships were not something to be spontaneously engaged with, but something to be carefully constructed and managed. Normal people meeting Hitler would be entranced by the steady gaze of his blue eyes, by his handshake or other contact which seemed to convey his deep understanding and intimacy with them, but any intimacy this was completely one sided on the part of the observer, a consciously constructed habit of Hitler's combined with their subjective susceptibility to the his charisma.

His real intimates seem to have been his closest political colleagues, many of whom were old army contacts; and possibly more importantly his domestic staff, his chauffeur and photographer. Given that there is much evidence that Hitler felt he was superior (in the Nietzschean *Übermensch* sense), it would be reasonable to suppose that Hitler felt comfortable with his more artisanal staff on the grounds of sustaining this feeling of superiority. It also seems clear that Hitler was antagonistic towards the “establishment”, older political, cultural and academic elites.

In terms of his more intimate and romantic relationships, Kershaw notes his fondness for dogs, latterly Blondi, and in the trenches a small terrier called Foxl, whom he “liked... so much” as he “only obeyed me.”<sup>483</sup> Kershaw extends this formulation to all his relationships, which were “based upon subordination to his mastery”<sup>484</sup> His relationships with women can be understood within this model, he met them when he was in his 30s and 40s, and they only aged 16 or 17: Hitler was quoted as saying he liked a woman to be a “naïve little thing – tender, sweet, and stupid”<sup>485</sup>.

Kershaw suggests that Hitler took the prevailing 19<sup>th</sup> century sexual morality at face value while eschewing the hypocritical other side in the form of the burgeoning Viennese sex industry. The chaste infatuation with a young woman in Vienna was previously noted, and there was a date with a Maria Reiter in 1926 (age 16). She wanted marriage, but for him she was an “attractive temporary distraction”<sup>486</sup>.

Hitler’s two big loves were first Geli Raubal, the vivacious 16 year old daughter of his half sister who had come to act as housekeeper in 1928; she (Geli) lived with her mother in his flat. Hitler was proud of her, but jealous and controlling, a strain given her flirtatiousness. She eventually felt trapped, and following his forbidding her to leave and move away to start a singing career, she apparently committed suicide using Hitler’s gun in his apartment in 1931<sup>487</sup>. This was at the height of his political manoeuvring for power in Germany, Hitler became significantly depressed and withdrawn for a period afterwards.

His “partner” Eva Braun was an office worker and a model for his official photographer<sup>488</sup>, who he met when she was 17, but whom he began to see more regularly following the death of Geli two years later. Hitler did not have the same passion for Eva as he had for Geli; she remains in the background, Hitler keen to maintain a public image of his being a single man, although she was frequently present at gatherings in the Berghof, having to make herself scarce for official business. She insisted on staying with him in the Berlin bunker at the end<sup>489</sup>, the two marrying shortly prior to their joint suicide in April 1945.

Hitler was discrete with his relationships; he seems not to have been celibate, but there are several accounts belying the more lurid stories of perversity. Kershaw remarks

**And even if the alleged repulsive perversions really were his private proclivities, how exactly they would help explain the rapid descent of the complex and sophisticated German state into gross inhumanity after 1933 is not readily self-evident.**<sup>490</sup>

#### **7.2.2 Accommodation.**

Hitler’s modest living quarters prior to the 14-18 war has been noted above. On leaving the army, he rented a sparse two-room apartment in Vienna, which he would stay in between 1920 and 1929, by which time he was a significant political figure.

At this point, Hitler’s asceticism changes to becoming more grandiose. In 1929 he bought with party donated funds a luxury apartment<sup>491</sup>, the Nazi party eventually buying out the whole building. This is the apartment where Geli was found dead in 1931. In 1928, he had rented a holiday retreat, a small chalet in the Obersalzberg where he wrote the second volume of MK. In 1933 he bought it apparently from profits from MK, then in 1935 it was extensively renovated, becoming the Berghof, a concrete hill fort. The NSDAP bought out most of the local residents, and high ranking party colleagues built houses nearby.

Similarly, with the offices of the NSDAP, they operated out of smaller premises until the conversion of the Brown House, a large former residential building bought in 1929 and renovated it to be

**a building of tasteless grandiosity that he was singularly proud of. Pictures of Frederick the Great and a heroic scene of the List Regiment's first battle in Flanders in 1914 adorned the walls<sup>492</sup>**

where Hitler had a "huge work room". Neoclassical grandiosity in the NSDAP was the house style, explicitly to intimidate visitors, with long high wide corridors and pillared facades<sup>493</sup>, this intimidation being effective, according to the memoirs of visiting politicians.

Hitler lived between these three settings, and a regular set of cafes and restaurants, until the turn of the war, by which time he had built a series of bunker/fortresses around the occupied territories<sup>494</sup>. The 12 Fuhrer Headquarters (FHQs) included the Berghof, where there was further fortification; the Fuhrerbunker in Berlin beneath the Reich Chancellery where, as the Red Army approached in spring 1945, he died alongside the Goebbels family; and the "Wolfs Lair" in central Poland where Hitler spent several years directing the ill fated operation Barbarossa. Between them, he would use a fortified train field headquarters, the Fuhrersondersug, which he used to follow the speedy advance of the Blitzkrieg invasion strategy through Western Europe.

Hitler's accommodation in the FHQs was not luxurious, but rather functional in line with his lifestyle. The major facet in relation to municipal buildings was the grandiloquence of Hitlerian architecture, more a function of his leadership style and vision than his personality.

### **7.2.3 Personal Finance**

Exact details about Hitler's personal finance are difficult to clarify. For six months pursuing his political career in the small NSDAP he remained in the army, drawing his salary. This set the pattern of a link between his political and personal finance and income. Kershaw concludes that

**His proclaimed modest demands in matters of food and clothes – a constant element of his image as a humble man of the people – fell within a context of chauffeur-driven Mercedes, luxury hotels, grand residences, and a personal livery of bodyguards and attendants.<sup>495</sup>**

Hitler's personal finance was controlled by Martin Bormann, who as his personal secretary and with a lead role in the NSDAP, was in an extremely powerful position, latterly (following the departure of Hess) controlling access to Hitler.

**His sources of income have remained largely in the dark. They were kept highly secret, and totally detached from party finances. Schwarz, the party treasurer, had no insight into Hitler's own funds...<sup>496</sup>**

Broadly, Hitler seems to have received income from

- Sales of Mein Kampf – income inflated by the Government after 1933 buying thousands of copies for soldiers and education
- "Expenses" from the NSDAP for his appearances and delivering speeches
- Charges made for the use of his image – for example on postage stamps
- Payment for articles written for the NSDAP papers and periodicals
- Charges for press and other interviews
- Personal donations from admirers and supporters.

#### **7.2.4 Developmental relationships.**

If personalities are forged in the intense developmental relationships of childhood, Langer points to a passage in Mein Kampf where an apparently fictitious account of a disaffected youth is given which may well be autobiographical and articulating an attitude to his own father specifically and by extension, authority more generally ;

**...the biting impudence of his [the disaffected youth's] behaviour combined with an immorality which makes ones hair stand on end...The three year old child has now become a youth of fifteen who despises all authority...now he loiters about and God only knows when he comes home<sup>497</sup>.**

Langer interprets the death of Hitler's brother<sup>498</sup> as a solution to competition for his mother's time, and the death of his father as Oedipal triumph, thus inculcating omnipotent murderousness as an effective strategy. Equally, however, these traumata can be seen as enhancing the natural degree of anomie that develops in young adults as they move on from the value sets of their parents and have to develop their own.

At the time of these deaths, Hitler failed that year at school, having to leave, and enrolling at another some distance away, which he was also required to leave consequent on disruptive behaviour in his second year there<sup>499</sup>, for example, his getting drunk and tearing up his school report, which he used to wipe his backside, suggesting these deaths were destabilising traumata, possibly enhancing a natural tendency to maintaining his distance and staying aloof.

### **7.2.5 Health**

Kershaw attributes Hitler's sexual naiveté to the same cause as his general asceticism and vegetarianism, namely that it was preached by Schonerer and the Pan German Movement<sup>500</sup> by whom he had been influenced as a teenager and subsequently. Schonerer<sup>501</sup> preached that men should be celibate until age 25, not use prostitutes, and that meat and alcohol should be avoided on the grounds of weakening the man.

In addition, Hitler was a hypochondriac, in part prompted by chronic digestive symptoms<sup>502</sup>, which in the last decade of his life drove his demand for increasingly bizarre and addictive treatments and therapies provided by his personal Physician Morell. In addition, however, Hitler was extremely conscious of his own poor/puny physique

**The walks were always downhill, with a car stationed at the bottom to ferry Hitler and his accompaniment back up again. Hitler's detestation of physical exercise and fear of embarrassment through lack of athleticism remained acute<sup>503</sup>**

such that the emphasis on physical prowess and excellence of the Aryan and Nazi Youth movements might be interpreted as a reaction to his own feelings of inferiority in this regard.

A further apparent reaction formation to this ascetic attitude was Hitler's fondness for cakes and pastries, which he would frequently eat large quantities of<sup>504</sup>, and would happily receive from his surrogate mother figures<sup>505</sup>.

#### **7.2.6 Asceticism.**

Hitler's vegetarianism, teetotalism and maintenance of a public belief in his celibacy was to some extent his natural preference, and also somewhat foregrounded as part of the mythology of the dedicated leader focussing on his country and above corruption. Langer writes

**Although he is a vegetarian, ...his meals are scarcely to be considered as a form of deprivation. He eats large quantities of eggs prepared in 101 different ways by the best chef in Germany and there are always quantities and a large variety of fresh vegetables prepared in unusual ways. In addition, Hitler consumes incredible quantities of pastries and often as much as two pounds of chocolates in the course of a single day. Nor are his personal tastes particularly inexpensive. Although his clothes are simple, he has an incredible number of each article of clothing. All are made of the finest materials that can be procured and made up by the best workmen.<sup>506</sup>**

Hitler had a lifelong addiction to chocolate, cakes and pastries, and accounts describe him nearly being on the border of starvation, but when money was available, binging on cakes and pastries.

### 7.3 Descriptive psychological/characterological phenomena

There are a number of personality traits that are characteristic, and illuminate some of his leadership characteristics.

#### 7.3.1 Hysteria.

Langer cites one of the Pasewalk physicians who looked after Hitler following his second hospitalisation at the end of the war as diagnosing his “blindness” as hysterical<sup>507</sup>. Mustard gas causes severe swelling of exposed mucous membranes, so Hitler’s eyes would have been swollen, but blindness other than through bandages would have been psychogenic, that is psychological and without physical basis. Further, the account is of a significant deterioration in the patient following the news of the armistice, possibly a classic account of the “conversion”<sup>508</sup> of a psychological trauma into a physical symptom.

Secondly, the phenomenon of “group hysteria” describes mysterious non organic sicknesses and fevers spreading through groups such as schools and monasteries<sup>509</sup>. The mass adulation and collective emotional experiences of groups with their favoured celebrity mirror this phenomenon, and “group hysteria” described the effect that Hitler’s oratory had on the NSDAP rallies.

Hitler’s tantrums and aggressive outbursts were feared and were effective at bullying subordinates and within negotiations.

**Rauschning, in describing one of these uncontrolled exhibitions, says: "He was an alarming sight, his hair dishevelled, his eyes fixed, and his face distorted and purple. I feared that he would collapse or have a stroke." ... The more extreme descriptions claim that at the climax he rolls on the floor and chews on the carpets. Shirer reports that in 1938 he did this so often that his associates frequently referred to him as "Teppichfresser" [carpet-eater]<sup>510</sup>**

Hysterical outbursts characteristically are extremely emotional, but are only superficial for the hysteric, while having a full emotional impact on observers. There are accounts of his summoning these on demand, for example, in his intimidation of Schuschnigg the Austrian premier, in the choreography leading to the Anschluss with Austria, raising the possibility of their having a dramatic instrumental quality.

### **7.3.2 Suicidality, fatalism and providence.**

Hitler several times threatened suicide to emphasise his belief in a project or his devotion to it, for example, that he would kill himself should the 1923 putsch fail. Although striking, these threats were relatively unusual during Hitler's lifetime; at this point, and following the death of Geli (below). Nevertheless, it is of note that he did eventually suicide simultaneously with a cyanide capsule and self shooting. His completed suicide, however, seemed relatively "rational" given his situation with the Red Army in Berlin, his notoriety, responsibility for the war, its failure, and the genocidal programmes under its cover.

Following the death of Geli, Langer reports

**Gregor Strasser actually feared that he might commit suicide during this period and stayed with him for several days. There is some evidence that he actually tried to do so and was prevented from carrying it out.<sup>511</sup>**

This may be linked to a more general fatalism and to his preoccupation with "providence". All soldiers who survived service at the front in the Great War will have had "near miss" experiences, with the development of various degrees of superstition and accounts of their luck. Hitler linked his survival with "providence", a quasi religious belief in his destiny<sup>512</sup>.

Following the war, and in the context of developing a political persona, "providence's" role was expanded from protecting his person to guiding his destiny to lead and then save Germany and German peoples. Having established vast tracts of "lebensraum" by 1941 both to the east and west, he disastrously turned on his Soviet neighbour. This was the avowed plan all along, to tackle

the perceived threat of Bolshevism, but would he have stopped at the Urals, the aim of Barbarossa? The occupation of Western Europe seemed as remote a possibility in 1938 as the Germanisation of greater Russia does in retrospect. Hitler didn't stop at the Ruhr; at the Anschluss; at Chekoslovakia, Belgium, Poland, France. There is an implication that he would have carried on until stopped in some way, and that the only way he could have been stopped was defeat. Neither was a defeat negotiated, it was total immolation; "annihilation", in the language of Barbarossa<sup>513</sup>. For Hitler, life seemed to be a choice between annihilation or being annihilated.

### **7.3.3 Depression and indolence.**

The contrast between Hitler's effectiveness, drive and ambition later in his life from age 29, and the period of drift and passive homelessness age 19-22 in Vienna has been difficult, biographically, to assimilate. Langer interprets the distinction as a qualitative difference in personality brought about by the psychiatric illness of a biological depression according to the monoamine theory<sup>514</sup>. Thus, for three or four months between 1909 and 1910 Hitler became a different man, subjectively depressed and hopeless and biologically slower with altered brain chemistry that materially altered his personality and characteristic way of reacting to his environment. Within this hypothesis – his depression may have been triggered by the combination of the death of his mother and his twice being rejected by the Viennese Academy of Art combined with the narcissistic wound of being penniless in a city with a prominent and affluent middle class with whom he identified but was excluded from, following the drying up of his allowances.

A second possibility is that rather than being depressive, that the period of vagrancy was an exacerbation of his indolence, which was also a characteristic of Hitler. Kershaw links his characteristic daily routine as Chancellor with that when living at home, having left school age 16, sleeping late, working desultorily and not at all regularly, the same habit as during his late teenage years.

**... recalled Wiedemann, 'Hitler appeared as a rule only just before lunch, quickly read the press summaries provided by Reich Press Chief Dr Dietrich, then went to eat' ... When Hitler was at his residence on the Obersalzberg, it was even worse.**

**‘There he invariably left his room only approaching 2p.m. Then it was lunch. The afternoon was mainly taken up with a walk, and in the evenings, straight after the evening meal, films were shown.’<sup>515</sup>**

#### **7.3.4 Other personality facets**

- **Hypochondriasis.** Hitler’s mother had died horribly at the relatively young age of 47, and this may have set the stage for an obsessive hypochondriasis that will have been maintained by ongoing abdominal discomfort caused by his chronic excessive wind with his vegetarian egg based diet.

During the war years, Hitler was seldom far from his personal physician Morel (former society dermatologist) who gave Hitler various potions and remedies, graduating to injections of both conventional medications (the opiates and amphetamines) to more outlandish preparations from horse serum and so on. Hitler in the last years, became both increasingly disabled by these “remedies” and addicted to them both psychologically and physically<sup>516</sup>.

- **Paranoia.** Being an effective political strategist requires a significant element of paranoia, reading between the lines and evaluating motivations with a critical and suspicious attitude. Hitler was the consummate political strategist, accurately reading his opponents.

Politically, Hitler seemed to organise his thinking, and developed support through an orientation to the “other”. In the first war, this was the Allies; the resolution of his hysteria seems to have been through the creation of an “othered” political class of Jewish people and democratic liberals. In the early days of the NSDAP it was the communists, then the Communist/Jewish conspiracy”. Melanie Klein describes the power and ingrained character of such thinking in her description of the “paranoid schizoid position”<sup>517</sup>, the

fantasy that safety can only be achieved through the attack and destruction of the bad and dangerous “other”.

- **Narcissism.** Lees’ analysis puts Hitler’s fund of hatred at the centre of his drive. Unlike some other characteristics of Hitler, his narcissism is central from Kubizeck’s accounts of his redesigning Linz and beginning writing an opera to sit next to Wagner’s age 16. The hatred derives from the disjunction of the personal sense of omnipotent certainty and the real world ignominy and inconsequentiality<sup>518</sup>.
- **Obsessionality and magical thinking.** The obsessional “thinks” that by enacting their ritual they will be able to erase their general angst, so called “magical thinking”<sup>519</sup>. Hitler demonstrated significant “magical thinking” as the course of the war was reversing, believing that the German “secret weapons” programme, the v1 and v2 for example, would magically reverse the inexorable progress of the allies. It is less clear the extent to which this was genuinely what he believed and a position to hold to rally the troops.

#### **7.4 Specific psychiatric diagnostic conclusions: Psychosis, Psychopathy or Asperger’s**

Some psychological and characterologically descriptive comments have been made about Hitler’s personality, including the possibility that he experienced a period of depression while in Vienna. In this section, some more broad diagnostic comments are made, concluding that Hitler was not psychopathic or psychotic, but that aspects of his personality may support an Asperger’s diagnosis.

##### **7.4.1 Psychosis.**

Hitler was not mad in the sense of his being formally psychotic. Citing the World Health Organisation International Classification of Diseases, he did not have

**hallucinations, delusions, or a limited number of severe abnormalities of behaviour, such as ... catatonic behaviour**<sup>520</sup>

Hitler's belief in the "November criminals", Jewish politicians, and businessmen who conspired to "stab in the back" the Wehrmacht in Autumn 1918; was a firmly held false belief, therefore looking like a delusion, but was not one because it was collectively held: It was normal within that particular subculture of indignant defeated German people. Similarly, Hitler's few purges (of Rohm and the SA in the "night of the long knives" in 1934; in the post Reichstag Fire violence in 1932 and following the 1944 assassination attempt) seem instrumental and strategic, foresightedly taking out significant potential foci of resistance, unlike the purges of Stalin which have a paranoid feel.

Hitler's weaving together the Jewish race; their success in German and Austrian society; their involvement in finance; the Jewish people involved in the 1917 Russian Revolution and communist movements in other countries to create an "International Jewish conspiracy" could be argued to have been "delusional work" (knitting together the disparate issues to form a delusional coherence) and was held with delusional intensity, but again it is significantly dismantled by it having been widely shared at the time as an anti-Semitic preoccupation.

#### **7.4.2 Psychopathy.**

Controversially, perhaps, the researcher would argue that Hitler personally was not psychopathic. The defining characteristics from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD10) for "dissocial personality"<sup>521</sup> will be looked at in turn.

**(a) Callous unconcern for the feelings of others;** there are numerous stories of his concern and thoughtfulness for individuals on the one hand and sensitivity to the public and audience's mood; he was grossly callous for politically or culturally defined "others" which is not unusual.

**(b) Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, rules and obligations.** In holocaust research, a significant difficulty is tracing the orders back to Hitler, he having made considerable efforts to distance himself from the euthanasia and Jewish “transport”, this evidences *regard* for the norms rather than disregard. In contrast he ostentatiously and with apology and reasoning *owned* responsibility for the 1923 putsch and the Rohm purge.

**(c) Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in establishing them;** Hitler did maintain long term relations with his entourage and Eva Braun and there is little evidence that he was socially or sexually promiscuous.

**(d) Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, including violence;** It is a matter of conjecture to what extent Hitler’s tantrums were strategic, or a genuine loss of control. Much he did patiently, for example, his waiting for the Chancellor post. Importantly, other than as a soldier, there are very few examples of he himself being actually physically violent.

**(e) An incapacity to experience guilt or to profit from experience, particularly punishment;** There is little evidence of subjective experience of guilt, but objectively he learned from adverse experience, for example, after the failed putsch, he “learned” to operate legally following his imprisonment. The apparently genuine grief over mother and Geli’s death may rather have been at his own loss rather than a sense of guilt.

**(f) Marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible rationalizations, for the behaviour that has brought the patient into conflict with society<sup>522</sup>.** Hitler was not personally in conflict with his own society of inter war Germany, arguably he was in tune with it, and shaped it. During the decline from 1940 onwards, with setbacks on the Eastern Front, he would always blame his generals, then even when Berlin was surrounded, blaming the German people, although again, this might be seen as politically instrumental.

Hitler's personality clearly was exceptional and unusual, but it was not formally disordered or pathological; his personal eccentricities and oddities were not disabling in terms of his achievements. For example, his apparently ascetic vegetarian diet was punctuated by chocolate and cream cakes; his temper tantrums were far outweighed by his successful performance in his chosen field of politics, such that the oddities in his personality did not compromise his performance, at least from about 1912 by which time he had become established in his small trade in art prints.

Regarding the extent of his involvement in violence and mendacity to obtain electoral success, violence was ubiquitous in 1920s Bavarian politics, and mendacity may still be in politics in general. His construction of the "big lie" as a political strategy he himself attributed to the allegedly Jewish protocols of the elders of Zion. There are questions about how intimate he was in his social circle, his remaining aloof and detached for the most part, but he did have a collection of friends and sustained relationships including romantic.

#### 7.4.3 Aspergers'

If Hitler falls into any broad psychiatric classification, it might be Asperger's syndrome (not a new idea)<sup>523</sup>. In the ICD, Asperger's is

**Characterized by the same kind of qualitative abnormalities of reciprocal social interaction that typify autism, together with a restricted, stereotyped, repetitive repertoire of interests and activities... Most individuals are of normal general intelligence but it is common for them to be markedly clumsy**

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- **"Abnormalities of reciprocal social interaction"** All biographies and commentaries note Hitler's inability to engage in discussion for the most part, he was lecturing or he was quiet and uninvolved. He would lecture for hours as dinner guests would attest, with the house staff in despair if certain subjects were touched upon as this would lead to extended monologues. Similarly, the calm stare and steely blue eyes that were said to reach deep

into the soul and significantly move people can be reinterpreted as a socially awkward man sticking to a script and role, and unable to relate in a “normal” way. Soldiers from the List Regiment reported that he was not one of them, but that he was aloof and separate, more likely to deliver an admonition for their cynicism about the war, or criticise their enthusiasm to get leave and have respite.

**On the whole, he always maintains a considerable distance from other people. Ludecke... writes: "Even in his intimate and cosy moments, I sensed no attitude of familiarity towards him... there was always a certain distance about him, that subtle quality of aloofness...."<sup>525</sup>**

One might interpret the need for the development of a personality cult, and a Hitler myth in part because Hitler was incapable of being his own spontaneous man, instead requiring a pre-ordinate self-role that he could play. Similarly, his obsession with his own appearance in photographs, poring over his appearance, and tightly controlling those that were published to ensure they conformed to his stereotyped presentation of self.

- **“Restrictive, stereotyped, repetitive repertoire of interests and activities”.** Rees argues that Hitler’s clarity, consistency and utter certainty was a significant contributor to his overall charismatic appeal<sup>526</sup>, and this can easily be reinterpreted as restricted, stereotyped and repetitive content. Rees (as do others) also analyses Hitler’s speeches, noting their beginning with the usual breathless anticipation and his being late, followed by his grand entry; his stumbling beginnings about his humble beginnings, and lowly war experience, the sense of humiliation and indigence at the “stab in the back” on the brink of winning the war; the explanation in terms of “International Jewry”, and the uplifting exhortative message of the racial superiority of the German people, and the need to struggle and fight on. This sequence is interpretable as a repetitive stereotypy.

Hitler’s nearly savant knowledge of specific narrow issues has also been frequently noted, summarised by one of Langer’s interviewees

**"He knows exactly what kind of armament, the kind of armour plates. The weight, the speed, and the number of the crew in every ship in the British navy. He knows the number of rotations of airplane motors in every model and type existent. He knows the number of shots a machine gun fires in a minute, whether it is a light, medium, or heavy one, whether it was made in the United States, Czechoslovakia or France."**<sup>527</sup>

- **"Markedly clumsy"** Hitler was well known as someone daunted by physical activity, and ashamed of his lack of physical grace and prowess, possibly contributing to the NSDAP focus on youth and physical excellence culminating in Germany winning the 1936 Olympic Games.

"Autistic psychopathy" was described in a paper by Asperger in 1944, rediscovered in the 1990s. Broadly, Asperger's model was that these people were autistic, but not learning disabled and without the usual delayed language<sup>528</sup>. Seen through such a diagnostic lens, a number of Hitler's personality characteristics fall into place. For example, another citation from Langer

**Particularly noticeable is his inability to cope with unexpected situations... when he laid the cornerstone of the House of German Art in Munich... he was handed a dainty, rococo hammer for delivering the three traditional strokes to the cornerstone, but not realizing the fragility of the rococo, he brought the hammer down with such force that at the very first stroke it broke into bits. Then, instead of waiting for another hammer, Hitler completely lost his composure, blushed, looked wildly about him in the manner of a small boy caught stealing jam, and almost ran from the scene leaving the cornerstone unlaid** <sup>529</sup>

The "small boy" element of Hitler was in evidence both in his very close relation with his own mother, and his sequence of surrogate mothers, Helene Bechstein and Winifred Wagner's widow for example. Indeed, a significant element in his electoral appeal seems to have been to women,

possibly based in this “small boy” element of his personality, the lock of hair over the forehead and slightly comical moustache. Also falling into place are both his renowned fits of blind rage a common catathymic reaction of people with autistic spectrum disorders when over-aroused, such as by unexpected stimuli or when the normal rituals are being or have been disrupted.

Were Hitler somewhat autistic, it would also propose an alternative motivation for the murderous antipathy to Jewish people and what Wilson characterises as the Wagnerian self immolation fighting to the bitter end<sup>530</sup>, namely that it articulates the catathymic oblitative violence that is reported in autistic spectrum disorders<sup>531</sup>. It is not a cruel violence, because it lacks the perception of suffering of the subject. Hitler’s word in the Barbarossa campaign, that the Russians were to be “annihilated” or obliterated rather than killed, the latter having a human quality which the former does not.

Arguments against this include that retrospective and remote diagnosis cannot be accurate, and that an autism diagnosis is made more commonly with actuarial instruments<sup>532</sup> that combine clinical observation with history and collateral accounts.

## **7.5 Biographic conclusions: Personality summary/clinical formulation**

The conclusion to this chapter is in the form of a brief clinical and biographic formulation.

*Hitler was born at the turn of the century in an ideologically fecund period leading up to the “seminal catastrophe” of the great war; and in the Viennese crucible of modernity and disintegration of the old world order. As a young man, he was unable to settle to a regular job and professional direction, on account of indolence and/or narcissistic contempt for workaday mediocrity.*

*His evolving German nationalism was galvanised by the declaration of war in 1914. When this was lost, his achievement as a soldier of a sense of direction was hardened into*

*fanaticism. An intelligent man, previously desultorily preoccupied with political issues and their historical antecedents, Aspergic traits amplified his sense of focus and singularity of purpose. This synergised with his intuitive charisma, and enabled him to manipulate and ride a cultural zeitgeist in a Germany humiliated in 1918 but feeling undefeated.*

*His sense of providence, confirmed to him by his survival through the 14-18 war, combined with his army network of fellow zealots, enabled his involvement and success in the violent post war political maelstrom in post Great War Germany. Later, this sense of providence, in German and then European politics, supported him psychologically in his series of audacious all or nothing gambles, which until Stalingrad, were largely won. His catastrophic decline seems to demonstrate that setback and compromise were simply not part of his narrowed Aspergic repertoire such that he was unable to adapt*

## **8. Historical context: The Structure**

The perspective taken in this chapter is brief overview of the historical and structural factors that provided a context to, and structural scaffolding for, Hitler's personal professional development, and the growth and then electoral success of his agent grouping, the NSDAP..

### **8.1 Austria**

Hitler was born in Austria. The History of the House of Hapsburg had been glorious, as a leading European dynasty from the 13<sup>th</sup> century on, although through the 19<sup>th</sup> century it was in slow decline<sup>533</sup>. The Hapsburgs lead the confederation of states that comprised the Holy Roman Empire until the formation of the Austrian Empire in 1804 after Napoleon's dismantling of the former.

In the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the "Concert of Europe" had stabilised Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic wars<sup>534</sup>, and involved the major powers maintaining a balance between them. The first half of the century was the "Age of Metternich" after the conservative Austrian chancellor who was central in coordinating both the German Confederation, and the European Powers following the Congress of Vienna (1814).

In the middle of the century (1848) there were a series of revolutions across the European states<sup>535</sup> in the context of food shortages, population increases, and the growing popularity of Marxist ideas. In Austria these were resolved partially by the resignation of Metternich and abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand I. Franz Joseph I, who became emperor aged 18 in 1848, provided a long period of continuity, remaining in power until his death in 1916.

The Austria that Hitler was born in was in significant decline. It had been out-manoeuvred by

Bismarck and Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein<sup>536</sup>, and had lost the seven weeks war in 1866. It had to cede not only significant territory to Prussia and Italy, but also the role of being the pre-eminent Germanic nation and indeed the most powerful European nation, to the new North German Confederation from which Bismarck strategically excluded it.

Through the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Austria's integrity was undermined by the growing nationalistic demands of its nine different non-Germanic ethnicities. The Magyars in Hungary had revolted in 1848 unsuccessfully, but a weakened Austria after the Austro-Prussian war had to negotiate the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the creation of a dual monarchy<sup>537</sup>. The other major agitator group was the ethnic Serbs in the south, a separate Serbian nation having been created in 1815 following a period of revolt against the crumbling Ottoman Empire<sup>538</sup>. These ethnic tensions continued, fuelled by the mixture of the developing concept of the nation state, and demands for liberal reform. Tensions crystallized in the form of the assassination of Franz Joseph's heir Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian agitators during a visit to Belgrade, and Austria's subsequent ultimatum began the sequence of war declarations between the European powers in 1914<sup>539</sup>.

There are accounts of the political process in the post compromise Austro-Hungarian Empire mired in bureaucracy exemplified by the incorporation of two national languages. It was this political process that Hitler observed while living in Vienna and which in MK he is critical of.

## **8.2 The 19<sup>th</sup> century**

Hitler was born in the last decade of a century that had seen a sequence of technological, cultural and political revolutions. Politically, the whole century can be seen overshadowed by the events in the last decade of the 1700s in France; the revolution and installation of the enlightenment rubric "Liberte; Egalite; Fraternite"; but also with the resulting "terror" and political instability of the largest country in Europe as an unstable republic<sup>540</sup>. In turn, it had been preceded by the American War of

Independence, where the yoke of an autocratic ruler had again been removed by a popular uprising.

In Europe, not only was the 19<sup>th</sup> century lived under the shadow of the powerful ideas of the political enlightenment, the French annexation of most of Europe in the first decade of the century had extended the reach of the “Napoleonic Code” with its culture of liberal enfranchisement<sup>541</sup>. However, more concretely, the temporary resolution of chaotic France into the bellicose “Caesarism” of the Napoleons extended the quarter of a century of war. Consequently, the powers at the Congress of Vienna were determined to structure a lasting peace, which largely held until 1914.

The short tactical wars and revolutions that took place during the century did not serve to undermine the optimistic assumption as the century wore on, that in the (Hegelian) evolution of man and his spirit; that total war was a thing of the past, and that mankind had graduated from such behaviour to an age of reason and diplomacy.

As the century progressed, egalitarianism crystallised into Marxism, and other ideas took hold, including Nietzsche’s death of God<sup>542</sup>, Weber’s death of the protestant magic supporting capitalism<sup>543</sup>, and the antecedents to Freud’s further Copernican revolution, placing man’s rationality in orbit around his animalistic unconscious<sup>544</sup>.

Technologically, it was the century of industrialisation. The high-powered steam engine was invented in 1802 and Stephenson’s Rocket in 1829. The development of technology was a concrete articulation of the vision of an unfolding enlightened humanity, again an apparent Hegelian evolution of spirit<sup>545</sup>.

In contrast to this, in the middle of the century as unrest and revolution swept across the world, Marx’s Capital in 1867 delivered its gloomy message of individual alienation; of class struggle, conflict and the collapse of the economic and social system<sup>546</sup> and in January 1889, Nietzsche

collapsed psychiatrically having (arguably) presaged the post-modern philosophical and cultural debates of the subsequent century.

Economically, the two decades preceding Hitler's birth were characterised by the "Long Depression"; Bismarck's abandonment of the silver standard after the Franco-Prussian war of 1871 and falling prices and mining stocks and unsustainable bubble in investment in the developing technologies of railways and steamships lead to the "Panic of 1873"; a Viennese stock market crash and the failure of a large American Bank Jay Cooke and Co<sup>547</sup>.

The final decade of the century was more optimistic in Europe, as living standards increased with some trickle down of the benefits and wealth of industrial development. The economic recovery lead to the "Belle Époque" in France<sup>548</sup>, late Victorian and Edwardian prosperity in the UK and the expansive Willhelmine years in Germany, where the new, young Kaiser articulated the pre-eminence in Europe of the Germany he had inherited from Wilhelm I and Bismarck<sup>549</sup>.

### **8.3 Germany.**

In contrast to Austria-Hungary as an empire in decline, the new German Empire, declared in the palace of Versailles in 1871, victorious over the old Napoleonic adversary, was in its ascendancy. The myriad of small German states had consolidated somewhat following the revolutionary instabilities of 1848 with the development of the Frankfurt parliament (to which Bismarck was Prussia's envoy)<sup>550</sup>. An underlying tension was whether these small states would federate around the Austrian Hapsburgs, or Prussian Hohenzollerns.

As allies, Austria-Hungary and Prussia fought a brief victorious war with Denmark over the Schleswig-Holstein territories, but tensions developed, and Austria lead the majority of the German states against Prussia in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 after Prussia annexed Holstein. After just seven weeks, the Prussian army won the decisive battle of Koniggratz<sup>551</sup>. With this Austrian defeat,

the question was whether a unification of the German peoples should be of a “greater” or “lesser” Germany; that is, including or excluding Austria. Bismarck favoured and enacted the latter<sup>552</sup>.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was also engineered by Bismarck by fabricating an insult allegedly delivered by the French ambassador to Wilhelm over a tension that a Hohenzollern might succeed to the Spanish throne, which Napoleon III was keen to prevent<sup>553</sup>. The war was longer and more messy than that with Austria, with the Sieges of Paris and Metz, but the French were beaten at Worth by the smaller German 2<sup>nd</sup> army, which for the first time was comprised of soldiers from the different German provinces, forging a new national identity.

Hostilities continued following the surrender of Napoleon at Sedan, but Bismarck capitalized upon his eventual victory over the self declared French “Third Republic” to seal Prussia’s leadership of the former North German Confederation, and declare Wilhelm Kaiser of a new German Empire. He had humiliated the French, taking Alsace/Lorraine back, and five billion Francs in war reparations, and declaring this (as mentioned), the new German Empire in the Palace of Versailles in 1871.

Now the preeminent force in continental Europe, Bismarck focused inward, fuelling various internal cultural rivalries (for example against the Catholic Church) to consolidate the power of the state, the “Iron Chancellor” being apparently sensitive to the precariousness of the new empire’s achievements. This attitude chafed with Wilhelm II, who succeeded the year before Hitler’s birth in 1888. The new Kaiser was keen to flex the power of the empire he had inherited, such that Bismarck was dismissed in 1890.

The loss to the new Germany of a master strategist arguably contributed to a gradual deterioration in its international position. By 1914 Germany was encircled by countries with alliances with France, the prevention of which had been Bismarck’s central strategy. However, in the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first of the 20<sup>th</sup>, Germany rode high, was prosperous and successful, and Wilhelm II’s bellicose hubris, illustrated by the bungling of the two Moroccan crises, was more in keeping with the new nationalist mood<sup>554</sup>.

#### **8.4 German Nationalism.**

Hitler is reported to have had a German Nationalist history teacher. Understanding the development of nationalism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is complicated by the recognition that it was advocated by liberals rather than conservatives. The notion of the nation state with its assumption of law, a system of enfranchisement and rule by a parliament was a powerful counterpoint to the alternative of autocratic dynasticism, monarchism and the divine right of kings. Particularly in Germany, but also elsewhere in Europe, the concept of the nation was further complicated by the historical precedent of small city or regional states, each with their own royalty and civic society, albeit federated in the context of Germany under the Holy Roman Empire and its subsequent iterations. Further, there is a difficult distinction to be drawn between German and Prussian nationalism; if the triumph of 1871 was a continuation of the glorious tradition of Fredrick the Great, this was specifically a Prussian rather than a German tradition. German nationalism and the Prussian tradition were different, but opportunistically combined by Bismarck.

The “German People” were broadly the Germanophones distributed across the small city and regional states that comprised the Holy Roman Empire and its post Napoleonic successor German Confederation of more consolidated states. The region of “Germania,” to the East of the Rhine, and including modern day Poland, was defined by the Romans in the context of their eastern frontier. The different German dialects were significantly coordinated following Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, and with it, the sense of continuity of the German speaking peoples. This was the foundation of a German national identity as theorised by Herder<sup>555</sup>.

Within the small Germanian principalities, along with the different royal families and state bureaucracies was duplication in educational institutions and universities, such that German literature, philosophy science and culture both flowered and was disseminated. German identity consolidated around the writing of Goethe and Schiller, the philosophies of Kant and Hegel; Mozart, Beethoven then Wagner and so on.

Politically, pan-German nationalism emerged as a reaction to the Napoleonic wars<sup>556</sup>. French republicanism was about loyalty to “La France” replacing the Monarch. As French armies swept through Germania, dominating through conquest or alliance, the embattled and billeted Germanophones reflected on what distinguished them from their oppressors. The Hapsbergs explicitly declared an Austrian Empire in 1805; the rest of Germany; occupied, reorganized and conforming to an imposed alien culture/code wanted to follow.

The inventor of physical education, Father Jahn had earned the Iron Cross for actions against Napoleon but was imprisoned for involvement in, among other things the book burning at the 1817 Wartburg Festival. This articulated protest against the conservatism of the Treaty of Vienna, and failure to consolidate a German nation in the post Napoleonic peace<sup>557</sup>. Crucially, the core of Jahn’s rhetoric and writing was about German identity, the Wartburg festival, for example being held on an anniversary Martin Luther’s theses. The movement anticipated later anarchist/terrorist political activism in its sensationalism and stirring of debate.

Romantic “sturm und drang” (literally “storm and urge”, perhaps “passion and energy”) in mid 1700s Germany had literary and musical influence<sup>558</sup>. Consisting of the enhancement of the emotional content of art, it developed into the counter-enlightenment preoccupations of romanticism, the emphasis on the subjective; a challenge to the rational and enlightened thinking<sup>559</sup> of the Napoleonic Code.

Although its origins were German, Romanticism was international. The German protagonist, Wagner, was somewhat anachronistic, the artistic world having moved on from the middle of the 1800s. However, in Germany, romanticism became combined with nationalism. The Volkish movement, with notions of idealization of the German peasantry and rural working values provided an underpinning to the conceptualization of a greater Germany for Germanophones<sup>560</sup>. This combined with the quick development of radicalism and socialism consequent on the almost feudal relations between the classes in the country and in the fast developing industries. These divergent forces fuelled the development of the concept of the state as an entity to inspire fealty in all.

## 8.5 Prussia.

The Old Baltic Prussians were pagans, invaded and Germanised by the Teutonic Knights as a crusade during the 1200s<sup>561</sup>. The Hohenzollerns were the Dukes of Nuremberg, to whom in 1398 the Electorate of Brandenburg succeeded, and subsequently, the Duchy of Prussia in 1618<sup>562</sup>.

Thus the two geographically separate areas were joined by a Hohenzollern personal union, albeit a distance apart.

The area was ravaged by the thirty years war, but strengthened by the development of a martial culture by Fredrick William I (1640-88), and the subsequent declaration of the Kingdom of Prussia in 1701 on the grounds of Baltic Prussia being outside the Holy Roman Empire, and therefore able to be a monarchy. The subsequent Hohenzollern strategy was to extend territory to unite the two geographical areas greatly facilitating administration and strengthening the empire. Significant steps were taken by Fredrick II ("the Great" 1740-86) particularly with the Partition of Poland (1772), obtaining Royal Prussia, which linked the Brandenburg and Prussian Duchy lands, integrating the Kingdom. The first Silesian war with Austria extended Brandenburg southeast into the rich Silesian Province<sup>563</sup>.

While Prussia was defeated by the Napoleonic armies in 1806, losing about a third of its territory and becoming a French satellite, it was a crucial actor in the final Battle of Waterloo, and benefited in the Treaty of Vienna (1815), having its territory returned, and gaining the Rhineland and Westphalia, which included the rapidly industrializing Ruhr valley<sup>564</sup>.

Bismarck, not a nationalist, carefully de-emphasised the Prussian hegemony; but his successes were predicated on Prussian culture and attitude. The Prussian tradition was military and bureaucratic, so the struggles that shaped both England and France in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century between the Monarch and the Nobles were finessed. Societal legitimacy was predicated on national service, either in the army or in the civil service, and both of these structures developed meritocratic admission and promotion processes. The Junkers, as the equivalent of landed gentry, while conservative and resisting of democratic reform, were not lazy and decadent, but were

actively engaged in their property locally, and politically or militarily active and engaged nationally<sup>565</sup>.

During the 1700s, the Fredricks had maintained very large armies, which were hired out as mercenaries to other states. By allowing the soldiers to return home at sowing and harvest times for the peasantry, and having a short national service and continuing connection for the professional and Junker classes, militarism was inculcated at all levels of society, and as part of the everyday rural village life<sup>566</sup>.

This culture of widespread identification and active involvement with the military and civil society was complemented by values of selfless hard work, inculcated by the behaviour of the Fredricks themselves, particularly the personal example set by Fredrick II "The Great", seem to have had a very deprived childhood with his abusive and tyrannical father who executed his best friend in front of him; who derided his interest in the arts and music, forcing him to learn the martial arts, and who for the good of the country became a master military strategist and triumphal leader<sup>567</sup>.

It was on this cultural foundation that Bismarck was able to build the effective and militarily potent state that declared an integrated German Empire in 1871<sup>568</sup>, and many of these cultural factors contributed to the efficiency of the NSDAP state in the subsequent century.

## **8.6 Religion**

Regarding the issue of religion as a cultural influence, there was a differentiation of religion between Bismarck's German Empire, and Austro-Hungary, the area having been heavily influenced by the reformation. Catholicism and Protestantism had been fought over during the 30 years war (1618-1648), ending with reaffirmation the 1555 Augsburg "cuius regio, eius religio" confirmed in the Treaty of Westphalia<sup>569</sup>. Broadly, the more northern of the German states had followed Luther; with the southern, in particular the Hapsburg Empire remained loyal to Rome.

These agreements largely enabled religious differences to lie dormant, but they subsequently were used in Bismarck's struggle with Austria-Hungary. The German Empire from 1871 being predominantly Protestant, Bismarck enacted a series of laws later termed the "kulturrekampf", persecuting the German Catholics whose numbers had grown, but who remained relatively unintegrated<sup>570</sup>. The effect of this was for Catholics to politicise, with the formation of the German Centre Party (Zentrum).

Hitler attended the Benedictine monastery school in Lambach for the year 1897-98. In MK he writes

**In my free time I practiced singing in the choir of the monastery church at Lambach, and thus it happened that I was placed in a very favourable position to be emotionally impressed again and again by the magnificent splendour of ecclesiastical ceremonial. What could be more natural for me than to look upon the Abbot as representing the highest human ideal worth striving for<sup>571</sup>**

Hitler's family and he himself were Catholic, his mother devoutly so, and Hitler never formally left the church.

## **8.7 Vienna**

In some analyses, Vienna 1900 was the birthplace of modernism<sup>572</sup>. In the arts, music, politics and philosophy, it was fulcrum between the new and what went before in the same way as its geographical position put it at the axis of east and west. Surrounded by the Alps, the industrial revolution in transport had a particularly dramatic effect on the city in the second half of the century. The third quarter of the century was dominated by the development of the architecturally grandiloquent Ringstrasse, the Emperor having given a belt of military land comprising the city walls and associated glebes to the city.

The grassy areas around the walls had ensured the visibility of invading armies maintained since the siege of Vienna in 1529 by the Ottomans<sup>573</sup>, but which had been ineffective during the uprisings in revolutionary 1848. The new Ringstrasse aped the Parisian wide boulevards, both architecturally impressive, but more importantly, difficult to barricade during periods of civil unrest. A decade of triumphalist building of large municipal and residential buildings in historicist styles followed; a grand Parthenon for the parliament; a gothic Town Hall; a baroque War Ministry, renaissance Palace of Justice and so on. This exuberant development culminated in the World Exposition in 1873 with its large Rotunda, Machine Hall and (Hellenic) Kaiser Palace<sup>574</sup>.

Emerging modernism in Vienna has been seen as a reaction to the ubiquity of traditionalism and historicism concretely surrounding it. In the Arts, the Vienna Secession lead by Klimt split from the Association of Austrian Artists, attempting to free art and architecture from a perceived conformist straightjacket<sup>575</sup>. In Music, the Viennese tradition of Mozart and Haydn then Beethoven, Brahms and Bruckner gave way to Mahler, Schoenberg, Berg, and the “Second Viennese School”, developing 12 tone atonality<sup>576</sup>.

In philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein grew up contemporaneous with Hitler, as a scion of one of the richest families in the Hapsburg empire. Although Wittgenstein followed Frege and then Russell to Cambridge, it was in pursuit of the same logical positivist approach that characterized the work of the later “Vienna Circle” of Bergman and Carnap. At the time reading circles studying the work of Wagner, Nietzsche and so on were popular, bringing together the significant intellectuals in the city including Freud.

Schorske’s analysis is that the core Viennese Fin de siècle zeitgeist was about the failure of liberalism. The revolutions across Europe in 1848 had not brought about radical social and political change, so the move was from the practical to the internal; the psychological<sup>577</sup>. Hence the “turn” to the more surreal, atonal, and with the development of Psychoanalysis, attempts to chart the chaotic, sexual and animalistic beneath the 19<sup>th</sup> century veneer of respectability.

Finally, the beginning of the Great War turned around Vienna's politics, based upon the analysis of that conflict being brought about by the collapse of the formerly vast Hapsburg empire. The secession was precarious, the Emperor having had no children of his own; and the empire itself was also precarious after the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, everything having to be agreed by both parliaments. The internal civil peace was also precarious in the context of growing agitation in the south, particularly by the Serbs, being visited by and resulting in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand<sup>578</sup>.

### **8.8 Anti-Semitism and discriminatory politics.**

Vienna was a politically complex city of contrasts, symbolized by the hubristic World Exposition opening on 1<sup>st</sup> May 1873, but immediately followed by a black Friday 9<sup>th</sup> May with a Viennese stock market crashed, and a cholera outbreak in the Danube World Exposition Hotel.<sup>579</sup>

Along side the opulence of the Hapsburg Empire was a significant underclass. Central European cities including Vienna were still urbanising, augmented by migration from the east, particularly of Jewish people, fleeing the Russian Pogroms within the Pale of Settlement areas, and for Czechs and inhabitants of the Balkan states. This ingress led to the quadrupling of the population in the 60 years between the 1850 and 1910 census<sup>580</sup> to over 2 million.

Vienna was also the focal point of the instabilities and conflict consequent on the evolution of democracy within the Hapsburg Empire. Increasing enfranchisement exacerbated the ethnic and "racial" tensions that characterised Austria-Hungary, with its multiple ethnic groupings including the Magyars, the Balkan groups, the Czechs and Poles. For example, following the compromise with the Magyars in 1848 creating the dual monarchy<sup>581</sup>, the Czechs were granted a similar dispensation regarding the use of that language in the civil service in Bohemia, leading to uproar, and Franz-Joseph's eventual suspension of the Parliament. Hitler's period in Vienna enabled him to observe and participate in this political and cultural ferment, and to watch the mayor, Lueger, maintain his political position and influence through his political craft.

The history of anti-Semitism in Germany<sup>582</sup> is complex. Moses Mendelssohn's translation of the Torah into German and the establishment of Jewish schools teaching in German, expedited the integration of Jewish people into German society that was legislated as part of the Napoleonic Code in the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In the Hapsburg Empire, the Jewish people had been further enfranchised by Franz-Joseph, moving out of their traditional areas of small money lending and agrarian middle man trading to joining the ranks of the industrialists and capitalists, becoming doctors, academics and culturally central.

Writing at the time of the Nazi book burning, Roth could say.

**It would be true to say that from about 1900, German cultural life was largely defined by this "top class" of German Jews<sup>583</sup>**

The success of Jewish integration was illustrated by the numbers of cultural and scientific leaders who were German Jews; Marx; Mahler; Einstein; Husserl; Freud to name but a few; and the increasing rates of intermarriage<sup>584</sup>. In contrast to this Germanised cosmopolitan group were those fleeing from the Shtetls in the east; poor with a more orthodox lifestyle and religious observances who gathered in the developing immigrant ghettos.

Pre-war, Hitler was living within this diverse cultural mix. One influence was Lueger, about whom Hitler later wrote (in MK) that his initial judgment that Leuger was

**reactionary ... [but] that opinion grew into outspoken admiration ...<sup>585</sup>**

Hitler was critical that Lueger's Christian Socialist Party's anti-Semitism was religious rather than racial which

**... did not upset the Jews very much ... a few drops of baptismal water would settle the matter ...**<sup>586</sup>

While Kershaw concludes that Hitler took his anti-Semitism into his first war, deriving from the culture of Vienna at that time<sup>587</sup>, others disagree, for example, Weber, who cites his good relations with his Jewish senior officer in the List Regiment who recommended him for his Iron Cross. Hitler had lived in the rather deprived Jewish Quarter of the city, and ending up wearing a large black coat and beard, looking like the Jewish people that he describes disparagingly in MK.

### **8.9 Wagner.**

Hitler's love of Wagnerian opera is undisputed, supported by his late teenage friend Kubizeck's account of his enthrallment<sup>588</sup>, and his subsequent engagement with the Wagner family.

Richard Wagner himself had been something of a polymath developing a grandiose and all encompassing vision of the function of music in society in the romantic idiom for which, with its belief in music as the supreme art form because of the romantic notion that it had direct access to the emotions. Wagner's output was, musical, mythological (via the narrative content of his operas), "philosophical", and political. There are a number of themes that can and have been used to explain Hitler's adulation.

For example, Wagner had been a revolutionary, having to hide in exile after being pursued by the authorities from the barricades in Dresden during the 1848 riots<sup>589</sup>. He had a grandiosity of vision which resulted in the musical phenomenon of Bayreuth and the Ring cycle, but also in his always being in debt and several times during his life having to flee his creditors.

Wagner also enacted a turn from being a social revolutionary supported by his turgid prose, to developing a vision of the 'total artwork', a construction of music, visual and text art that would

change society from the inside<sup>590</sup>. Whereas his contemporary Karl Marx preached liberation through uprising, Wagner preached the liberation through the spiritual redemption of a total aesthetic experience.

## **8.9 The 1918 defeat.**

Hitler was distraught on hearing of the armistice. In the latter half of the war, the German state was an effective military dictatorship with Hindenburg as the nominal head of the army, but Ludendorff the effective one, and de facto head of state. When the Germans won in the east as the Russian revolution broke, they sued for peace at Brest Litovsk, moved substantial troops to the west, and launched the 1918 spring offensive. The Reichweir were nearly successful, making considerable strides, and getting as far as the Marne, near Paris. However, the other facts of the German situation, the country being encircled; the effectiveness of the allied blockade and the US coming into the war following the continued sinking of neutral US vessels by German submarines, made it clear to the Generals that the war was lost<sup>591</sup>. Ludendorff instructed the chancellor to sue for peace, and personally withdrew<sup>592</sup>.

The “Stab in the back” myth, attributed to a distorted comment of a British officer, broadly articulated the view that the Reichweir had not lost the war, but rather that the (liberal/Jewish) politicians, industrialists and trades-unionists had undermined the war effort such that the rug was taken from beneath the army’s feet<sup>593</sup>. To most, the surrender was a complete surprise, coming after the successes of the Spring Offensive. As late as early 1918, there had been popular discussions about how the newly annexed German territories acquired on victory, would be used. The difficulties in supplying the war effort caused by the allied blockade had meant that for the previous year, Germany’s activities had been unsustainable, although the population and many politicians seem to have been unaware of this, the military government maintaining a tight control on information.

Within the Reichstag, through the war, there had been a group of doves, arguing for negotiation

and settlement with the allies, and it was broadly this group of moderates left in power (including some liberal Jewish politicians) following the abdication of the Emperor. It was these liberals (including Max Weber<sup>594</sup>) marched into the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles<sup>595</sup>, to be humiliated by the victorious allies, and to take the bitter reality of the terms of the Versailles treaty, with its opprobrium of war guilt, loss of territory and crippling reparation payments, back to the German people.

### 8.10 Living in a time of revolutions.

Hitler returned to Munich in 1918 having recovered. In the immediate period after the war in Germany there were a series of revolutions and challenges to civil society whose significance is amplified in the context of the overweening German culture of “peace and social justice” (a phrase oft cited at the time)<sup>596</sup>. Significant is that Hitler lived through a period where the structures of a society previously defined by its order and structure is dissolved or significantly challenged several times and in different ways.

- **The Kiel mutiny** was a naval rebellion on 3.11.18 – sailors refused to sail on a cruise against the British Navy to go out with a final glorious battle several days before the armistice, and after Ludendorff had instructed the civil government to sue for peace. Revolutionary fervour spread across Germany. Aping the recent history in Russia, workers' councils emerged within the different German cities, prompting the abdication and flight of Wilhelm II on 9.11.18. With the creation of the republic, they deferred to the re-established local authorities, not extending the Bolshevism as in Germany's neighbour Russia<sup>597</sup>.
- **In Munich**, wither Hitler returned, having recovered from his blindness in Pacewalk, there were a number of political turns
  - Kurt Eisner had declared the **Bavarian Republic** on 7.11.18, prompting King Ludwig III's abdication on 12.11.18.
  - The following February (1919) **Eisner was assassinated** as he travelled to resign his presidency, his Independent Social democrats having lost the elections.

- Johannes Hoffmann unsuccessfully attempted to hold together a **coalition government**, from 7<sup>th</sup> March 1919 after this election.
- From April 6<sup>th</sup>, Ernst Toller's chaotic "**Bavarian Soviet Republic**" administration took power.
- On 12<sup>th</sup> April, a **communist coup d'état** lead by Eugen Levine. More closely linked to the Russian Soviets, this government rounded up elite hostages, some of whom were shot, precipitating intervention by Weimar Republic President Ebert.
- On 3<sup>rd</sup> May, the Freikorps marched on Munich, crushing the fledgling independent state, and realigning it into the Weimar republic.
- **The "Spartacist Uprising"** in Berlin between January 4<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>, 1919 was a populist uprising supported by the communist groups. Following a general strike and barricades in the streets, it was crushed by Freikorps sent in by Ebert, with the infamous summary execution of Rosa Luxemburg, her body thrown into a canal<sup>598</sup>.
- **The Kapp Putsch** in March 1920 was precipitated by the attempt to disband one of the more active Freikorps groups, and was a right wing attempt to establish a more authoritarian regime planned in disaffected right wing and military circles for some months. General Luttwitz ordered the Freikorps to take over government buildings in Berlin. Defence Minister Noske's instruction to the Reichweir to suppress the rebels was refused on the grounds that the German army could and should not fire upon the German people. The Government fled to Dresden, but was not supported there by Generalmajor Maercker and had to move on to Stuttgart, where it called for a general strike. This received wide support which crippled the newly declared Chancellor Kapp's cabinet, and after clashes across the country, the two putsch leaders fled into exile<sup>599</sup>.
- **In the Ruhr, the general strike** on 13.3.20 was used for a larger political aim, and workers' councils across the area seized power, creating a "Red Ruhr Army". On April 2<sup>nd</sup>, units from the Reichweir and Freikorps suppressed the uprising<sup>600</sup>.
- November 1923 – Hitler's own "**Beer Hall Putsch**" took place in Munich.

In addition to Eissner in Bavaria, there were a number of other high profile assassinations,<sup>601</sup> this briefly being a legitimate part of the political process.

- Hugo Hasse, in 1919, a Social Democrat moderate, but pacifist, who with Ebert set up the provisional government in November 1918.
- The Spartacists, Rosa Luxembourg; Karl Leibkenect, and then Leo Jogiches in 1919.
- Matthias Ertzberger, in 1921: Finance Minister, from the Centre party and an influential Catholic, who campaigned against the war in the latter stages, and eventually signed the Armistice, being seen by the right as a traitor for doing so.
- Walter Rathenow in 1922; Foreign Minister, who infuriated nationalists by arguing that the terms of the Versailles Treaty should be honoured.

Bavaria, where Hitler was stationed saw 6 different governments over a short period, including two revolutions, an assassination and a military invasion. Within a five-year period, the German state was challenged by 5 significant uprisings (taking the Bavarian sequence as one).

### **8.11 Weimar I; Disillusion, democracy; reparation and inflation.**

The Weimar constitution, named after a small town synonymous with the best of German literary and cultural tradition, was written during the difficult winter of 1918/19, being finally ratified in August<sup>602</sup>. With its universal suffrage, proportional representation; enshrining of the rights of citizens, it was a bold and progressive political structure<sup>603</sup>. While it had flaws, for example the ability of the President (serving 7 years) to rule by decree in an emergency (Article 48), and to sack the chancellor even if he had the confidence of parliament (echoing the recent imperial past and the role of the Kaiser), one can argue that these flaws were dwarfed by the challenges that it had to face. These included

- **The disillusionment of the German people** at the loss of the war, the Generals (Luddendorf and Hindenberg), handing back the responsibility and opprobrium for suing for peace to the politicians. Those remaining in power had been active critics of the war or liberals and moderates. These were left to “negotiate” the peace.

- **The terms of the Versailles Treaty**, particularly the War Guilt clause, and the requirement to pay 50-225 billion Marks reparation depending on how this is calculated, and what was actually paid. This has been described as a Carthaginian peace; albeit reparations being mitigated by the subsequent Young and Dawes plans prior to being suspended in 1931, and there is debate about how crippling it actually was to the German economy<sup>604</sup>; but it did form a central dilemma for the Weimar government. They were divided between needing to enact the provisions of the treaty in order to re-establish an equal place within international relations, and the need to be seen to be resisting and protesting to maintain political legitimacy at home. In consequence, it seems there was a cat and mouse passive resistance, with at times reparations payments falling behind, leading in 1923 to the occupation of the Ruhr region, so the French could take the coal and industrial product component of the payments directly.
- **The hyperinflation of 1923** was crystallised by the instruction by the German Government to passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr, such that production ceased, but the government continued to pay the wages of the striking workers. Longer antecedents included the Mark leaving the gold standard during the war, and political denial of the pressures on the currency brought about by the reparations<sup>605</sup>.

If the Government was Janus faced about the reparations, it was also about the disarmament requirement. The Versailles limitation of the Wehrmacht to 100,000 troops (from something like 13 million during the war) was enacted by tolerating the thinly disguised “sports and shooting” groups that were paramilitary organizations, and in particular the groups of the Freikorps, explicitly used by President Ebert in his constitutional task to crush the insurrection; then themselves becoming dangerously powerful, with the Kapp putsch of 1920<sup>606</sup>.

### 8.12 Weimar II; The Golden 20s.

The “Golden 20s” in Germany started inauspiciously. By 1923, things were at crisis point, with the hyperinflation making savings worthless; Hitler’s putsch in Munich; the occupation of the Ruhr area

by France and Belgium; the declaration of an independent Rhineland Palatinate, and the vote of no confidence in the Reichstag against the Chancellor, who resigned.

Although having resigned as Chancellor, Stresemann continued as Foreign Minister until his death in 1929<sup>607</sup>. In that role he was credited for the rationalisation of both foreign relations and sorting out the hyperinflation with the development of the new Rentenmark, backed by property as security rather than gold.

Following the review of the reparations issue by Charles C Dawes, former US ambassador to the UK and Banker, there was a reduction in yearly amounts with a reorganisation of the Reichbank, and withdrawal of troops from the Rhine. US loans to Germany followed, that for the rest of the 1920s fuelled an economic boom. The cycle was that US loans to Germany facilitated payment of war reparations which in turn enabled France, particularly, to pay its war debts back to the US.

Globally, the 1920s saw economic prosperity, with new technologies like electric light and other appliances such as the radio<sup>608</sup>, fuelled by the rise of cinema articulating a Jazz Age consumerist ideal that was emanating from the buoyant US<sup>609</sup>.

### **8.13 The structural, historical context: Conclusions**

This chapter has annotated some of the themes extant in the historical context that formed the cultural substrate from which Hitler, the NSDAP and its ideology emerged. This discussion provides a backdrop for the discussion in the next chapter of the agent, Hitler, as a leadership case history.

## **9. Leadership case history: The agent**

Having outlined the nature of the man, and looked at the historical context and cultural tropes leading up to the point at which Hitler seemed to galvanise himself into political action and potency, this management case history orientation follows his progress as a political agent.

Fest (a contemporary journalist) maps Hitler's strategy against the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"<sup>610</sup>. This was a document purporting to be a manifesto for Jewish world domination written to promote anti-Semitism in Russia towards the close of the 1800s. Its central strategy involved the use of the democratic process to establish a dictatorship through the manipulation of public opinion using propaganda and civil unrest.

Although outwardly, from the time of his imprisonment, Hitler was a legitimate politician, within the NSDAP, obtaining the chancellorship was not about the leadership of the pluralist Weimar democracy, but about the "seizure of power".

### **9.1 Political awakening 1919**

Post war Germany was ravaged by the allied blockade from the Armistice until the Versailles Treaty was signed in July 1919, which combined with the Spanish Flu epidemic and political upheaval made immediate post war German society unstable and chaotic. Notwithstanding his monologues about his opinions delivered to Kubizeck; to his fellow residents in the men's hostel in Vienna, and to his peers in the trenches, Hitler had not been politically active or even engaged. Given the precariousness of the state and the centrality of the army as the broker of power, a programme of nationalist training for soldiers was arranged, with the view that the development of nationalism would be a stabilising cultural influence. In one lecture Hitler remonstrated with the

speaker utilising the vehemence and eloquence which he was to later develop, being noticed by his seniors, and as a result being asked to deliver lectures himself<sup>611</sup>.

His clarity of authoritarian nationalist vision and aloofness from his peers was used by his superiors who employed him to inform on subversives<sup>612</sup>, and to visit the beer-kellars where political meetings were held; to keep an eye on and report back about the different political groups and movements that fermented at the time. By chance, Hitler may have found that he had an aptitude for practical politics in revolutionary times the same way that by chance he found that he had the right attitude of unswerving loyalty to Germany to be a soldier in the trenches.

## **9.2 Finding and taking over the NSDAP 1919-23: The emergence of leadership**

In that fecund political environment, Anton Drexler<sup>613</sup>, a left wing locksmith, combined the socialism that had a resonance at the time with a local brand of nationalism, "Volkish" nationalism<sup>614</sup>. The "Volk" referred to a romantic notion of the German people and ethnicity, with an emphasis on folklore and agrarianism. Drexler had specifically excluded the word "socialist" from the name of the German Workers Party such that it was named the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, abbreviated to DAP<sup>615</sup>.

In September 1919 Hitler visited this group in his informant role, going to a meeting where with powerful rhetoric he heckled and trounced the speaker Gottfried Feder<sup>616</sup> who was advocating Bavarian succession from Prussia. Thus, he came to Drexler's attention who invited him to join; Hitler joined as the 55<sup>th</sup> member. Hitler reports in MK his ambivalence about accepting, but did so, and at his maiden speech at a gathering of about a hundred people, he realised that he could "make a good speech"<sup>617</sup>.

Accounts have Hitler over this time becoming devoted to the development of the DAP, working tirelessly and long hours to develop publicity material and personally printing and distributing it; strategising about, arranging and managing speaking engagements. He worked with the other

leading figures, Drexler and Feder to mould and change the party's ideology, articulated as the "25 points"<sup>618</sup>. To the name he added, "nationalsozialistische" to the previous Deutch Arbeiterpartei, forming the NSDAP. By February 1920, Hitler had organised a successful meeting in the Staatliches Hofbrauhaus which held 2000; by February 1921 he had addressed a crowd of 6000<sup>619</sup>.

In July 1921 in the context of concern within the party that Hitler was becoming too influential, there was a confrontation. Hitler resigned, and only agreed to return on condition that he became party Chairman<sup>620</sup>, replacing Drexler, appealing over his head to the broader membership of the party, who were unwilling to loose the success that he was bringing. On 29.7.21 he was declared chairman and was introduced as its Fuhrer (leader).

### **9.3 Leading the NSDAP to the beer-hall putsch 1921-23**

Hitler's "Beer Hall Putsch" took place on 8.11.23<sup>621</sup> in the context of several significant factors. Firstly, after the French occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923 on the grounds of German default of obligations imposed by the Versailles war reparations, the Berlin government's popular protest in the form of passive resistance was abandoned in September 1923, inflaming nationalists. Secondly, in Italy in October 1922, Mussolini had been asked to form a government by the king. This success by a popular fascist movement in seizing power demonstrated the potential for the NSDAP in Germany, inspiring members and emboldening the leadership including Hitler.

Thirdly, the country was in crisis with hyperinflation, so that on the day of the Putsch itself, the NSDAP newspaper the Volkischer Beobachter would have cost 5,000 million marks to buy<sup>622</sup>. Finally, Rohm's SA (Sturmabteilung, the paramilitaries), and the newly formed "Hitler Youth" were hungry for action. The NSDAP, following a series of propaganda coups, had considerably increased its standing and influence, such that Hitler had been awarded executive leadership of the "Kampfbund", a collection of nationalist political and fighting groups. Together, these factors had situated Hitler as a significant power in Bavarian politics.

To stabilise Bavaria, martial law had been imposed since September 1923 overseen by the “triumvirate”, comprising Gustav Kahr a strong politician as Minister President, and the heads of the Bavarian army and police, significantly blocking Hitler’s opportunities for influence. The triumvirate seemed to be taking the initiative from the Kampfbund, scoping the possibilities of overthrowing the government in Berlin<sup>623</sup>, until it became clear the Reichweir (German army) would not support it.

Hitler and Kampfbund allies made hasty plans for their long anticipated putsch. Apparently to seize back the initiative, Kahr had arranged a large meeting on the evening of 8.11.23. Hitler surrounded the building with SA. Having placed a machine gun at the entrance, he walked in, shot his own pistol into the ceiling to get attention and declared that the revolution had broken out<sup>624</sup>. He then took the members of the triumvirate into a back room, saying that they would keep their roles in a government headed by him and Ludendorff, then returned to the crowd and established their support for his actions. The captive triumvirate agreed and returned to the podium.

Meanwhile, the SA and other factions making up the Kampfbund were having difficulties taking over the barracks and government buildings, so Hitler left the meeting to intervene; the triumvirate was allowed to leave by Ludendorff, as men of their word, but reneged on their agreement as soon as they were free, pulling in army reinforcements from nearby towns.

By dawn it seemed clear that the putsch had failed, and after argument and confusion, a protest march through Munich was agreed, which began at midday with about 2,000 SA and Kampfbund troops, many armed. A first police cordon was swept aside, but a second, further into the city lead to a standoff, followed by a brief but intense gun battle leaving four policemen and 14 NSDAP dead. Hitler himself was bundled into an SA doctor’s car who treated his dislocated shoulder<sup>625</sup>, being picked up by the police several days later.

#### **9.4 Hitler as a national figure**

Hitler was convicted at a trial that took place in February and March of 1924, along with several other Putschists, Hitler receiving a five year sentence with the option of parole after six months served<sup>626</sup>. This was Hitler's second time before the court, and Judge Georg Neithardt. He had been convicted of breach of the peace after a violent break-up of a rival political group meeting in 1922, and served a month of a three month sentence. In interviews with the prosecuting council prior to the Putsch trial, Hitler made much of his potential to implicate the triumvirate government in Bavaria<sup>627</sup>, given that in the Bavarian army had trained Kampfbund paramilitaries, and they themselves had conspired against the Berlin government.

In the event, Hitler's principal strategy was to own responsibility for the putsch<sup>628</sup> and thus to assume leadership of the anti-establishment movements. The courts at the time were lenient on nationalists accepting a defence of patriotism. Add the nationalist sympathies of the presiding Judge, and a situation was created where Hitler could use his oratorical and propagandist skills. At the trial itself, Hitler was allowed free reign to pontificate politically at great length (his opening speech lasting 3 ½ - 4 hours, for example) and cross examine his witnesses from the then governing triumvirate.

**He was allowed to turn the courtroom into a stage for his own propaganda, accepting full responsibility for what had happened, not merely justifying but glorifying his role in attempting to overthrow the Weimar state<sup>629</sup>.**

Attracting world-wide media coverage, Hitler developed an international reputation. His five year sentence was the derisory minimum the court could impose, and it took no account of the police fatalities, the destruction of property, or Hitler's breach of his probation.

## **9.5 Imprisonment, and reflection 1923 – 24**

Hitler was imprisoned for a total of 12 months, having been picked up by the police after the Putsch in December 1923, and being released having served nine months of his 5 year sentence in

December 1924. This was on the grounds of good behaviour and following fawning support of the prison governor<sup>630</sup>. However, there was a strong representation against his release from the Bavarian state prosecutor, whose arguments were overruled by the court.

Hitler's time in Landsberg prison involved three significant issues<sup>631</sup>

- Time for Hitler to articulate his vision in writing, **dictating his first volume of Mein Kampf**. Exactly what this volume is, is difficult to define, but it is not the autobiography of the courtroom star that his publisher expected. It is part autobiography, part political manifesto, primer and polemic, Hitler always argued that the most effective means of communication for was face to face, and that his "performances" translated poorly onto paper. Accounts of heavy editing prior to the final indigestible version are illustrated by the change made from Hitler's original title "Four and a Half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity and Cowardice" to "My struggle"<sup>632</sup>.
- Time for the NSDAP and the **Volkish right movement to fragment** and dissipate, evidencing Hitler's centrality.
- Time for his **attitudes to grow and consolidate**. According to Kershaw<sup>633</sup> three particular aspects of Hitler's personal attitudes and beliefs consolidated.
  - After the triumphant outcome of the trial, Hitler's narcissistic self-belief in his leadership role expanded. Previously, he had spoken of being the "drummer"; a John the Baptist for a German leader to come. 'I am nothing more than a drummer and rallier [Trommler und Sammler]...' <sup>634</sup> But in Landsberg he became convinced that he was that leader, a belief with almost a transcendental quality. Practically, in the context of his critique of democracy and belief in dictatorship as a governmental form, this attitude was articulated in the "führerprinzip", the total command of the leader.
  - The development of the "lebensraum" principle – namely that Germany needed to expand to the East and expand its available living space

- Allied to this, the consolidation of the link in his mind between Jewry and Marxism; on the grounds that Lenin had a Jewish background and a world view that there was a mutually exterminatory struggle between Arians and Jews, echoing that between the NSDAP and communism (or democracy more generally)

## 9.6 Consolidation and development 1925-29

Following his release in December 1924, Hitler's strategy had three main objectives. Firstly, to confirm his own control and mastery within a movement that had become fragmented internally quarrelsome; secondly to extend and organise the movement nationally, and thirdly, to re-orientate the party to being (or appearing to be) law abiding.

To establish control, in the New Year (1925) he announced the reformation of the NSDAP, declaring that all were required to register anew with the new NSDAP, rather than that existing competing organisations could affiliate. He staged a theatrical meeting in February 1926 (The Bamberg Conference<sup>635</sup>) where all of the previously squabbling factional leaders shook hands and agreed to take their places within the newly formed party under Hitler's leadership. At the same conference, the *Fürherprinzip* principal was confirmed; the expectation of complete loyalty to superiors within the party. The ideology of the party was also confirmed in terms of the previously articulated 25 points.

The other main leadership rival nationally, the war hero Ludendorff was dispatched by flattery and persuading him to stand for the presidential elections in 1925. Ludendorff, who effectively ran the country 1914-18 polled only 1% of the popular vote against Hindenburg, thus being humiliated and discredited, gradually retreating to eccentric ignominy<sup>636</sup>.

Second was the task of organisation and extension of the movement. The late 1920s saw the Weimar boom, with economic growth and prosperity, such that the NSDAP political ideology built on hatred and resentment attracted only the support of the minority, polling 2-3% in elections in

which it stood<sup>637</sup>. Hitler used these years of relative quiet to develop the organisation of the party across Germany, particularly appointing the able Gregor Strasser to organise the North of Germany, Hitler's natural support to date having been more in the Bavarian South.

Third was a significant cultural change; Hitler's newly formed party was to try to work within the law. There were two aspects to this; the first was the restraint of the actual violence perpetrated by the SA, the paramilitary wing, as far as was possible. The second was to utilise the structures of the state to grow the party's influence by contesting seats in the Reichstag. Hitler had initially opposed this strategy, given his antidemocratic stance, but the minor successes achieved by NSDAP members standing for election seemed to offer a new option. Following the 1923 Putsch, Hitler had been banned from speaking in most German states. As the 20s progressed, Hitler, the law-abiding politician, had these bans lifted one by one<sup>638</sup>.

Notwithstanding legal proscription in parts of Germany, the SA continued to grow, to march the streets, and be engaged in street violence. From his release from prison, Hitler would use violence by the SA as a potent threat, but deny personal involvement<sup>639</sup>.

By the end of the 1920s, the NSDAP was running a well organised and energetic political campaign, with frequent meetings, a network of drilled speakers, and with a strategy of identifying local issues and applying the NSDAP perspective to these. Although there was disappointment that this did not yield results in the 1928 elections, this strategy continued, and might be argued to have made people aware of an alternative that was available to them, which they would use as a protest at their situation in the coming period of hardship from the 1929 economic crash.

### **9.7 The seizure of power 1930-33.**

Having extended and reorganised the party, Hitler was in a good position to capitalise on the economic depression that radiated across the world from 1929. In Germany, unemployment reached nearly 30% in 1932. The NSDAP, having polled only 2.6% in 1928 federal elections, polled 18.3% in 1930; Hitler was the Chancellor in waiting, though other political leaders sought to avoid this, particularly the aging president, Hindenberg .

The sense of anomie and resentment that people felt in 1929/30 as Germany grappled with its second economic catastrophe in a decade, benefited the NSDAP with its clarity of uplifting message, and vague strategic detail. In addition, the primary statesman of the Weimar republic, Stresemann died in 1929 having briefly been chancellor, but latterly, an effective foreign minister and international advocate for Germany for the previous decade, leaving a vacuum as the aging Hindenberg was increasingly unengaged. Thirdly, there was an increasing tendency for democratic politics to be seen as part of the problem, and to be implicitly and then more explicitly undermined by the chancellor and president repeatedly ruling by decree under Article 48 of the constitution. The frequent elections were in part brought about by the Reichstag parliament objecting to this abnegation of its authority, and the President in turn being able to simply dissolve it.

During 1930, the paramilitary SA, were difficult to manage for Hitler, straining at the leash to enact a violent coup, and provoked by Hitler's efforts to confirm his political legitimacy as a law abiding political leader. In 1930 Hitler appeared in a trial to give evidence in the defence of several Wehrmacht officers who were NSDAP members (this being forbidden), using the opportunity to clearly state and confirm his determination to take power by lawful means, although conceding that a revolution would follow this<sup>640</sup>.

In the face of the economic collapse, a grand coalition lead by Muller fell apart, and he resigned, with Hindenburg appointing Brüning as Chancellor. Brüning's approach to the recession was economic austerity, cuts in social security, public sector wages and public spending in general<sup>641</sup>. These unpopular measures were pushed through by increasing use of presidential decrees.

Bruning, was aware that his legitimacy (and indeed his appointment in the first place) was entirely predicated on Hindenburg's patronage, so he pushed for elections to get public support for his measures. This led to the dissolution of the Reichstag in July 1930, and elections in September; this in the context of a damaging recession. Hitler's NSDAP extensively campaigned with a clever polemical strategy of presenting themselves as an almost religious revival of the German spirit. There was a landslide to the NSDAP at the expense of the governing coalition parties. The NSDAP obtained 107 seats<sup>642</sup>, such an unexpected surprise that they had not identified sufficient deputies to enter the Reichstag.

The Brüning administration continued on, although the recession deepened with more bankruptcies and very high unemployment. Over this period, street violence was extremely common between the political factions. Simultaneously, the NSDAP used their large parliamentary party explicitly to frustrate and delay business. The SA and the SS fermented unrest with marches and violence, further undermining the democratic process, such that Brüning requested a decree to outlaw these two NSDAP paramilitary groups. Schleicher brokered a "Gentleman's agreement" with Hitler where new elections would be called, and the NSDAP would calm. The violence and political instability continued, however, and Hindenburg (continuing to be advised by Schleicher) grew impatient with Brüning, by presidential decree dismissing him in May 1932.

In his place, Franz von Papen was made chancellor, a wealthy and politically experienced Catholic man. Papen saw Hitler's popular appeal as a resource that could be used to stabilise the country, and he repealed Brüning's ban on the SA. Following the July 1932 elections, where the NSDAP increased their Reichstag seats from 107 to 280 (37% of the vote), with Hindenburg, Papen offered Hitler the role of vice-chancellor. There seems to have been a hope that Hitler's appeal would become tarnished by his involvement in government, but Hitler refused, demanding to have six ministers, and to rule by personal decree.

Following Hitler's refusal, Hindenburg met him in August 1932<sup>643</sup>, being angry at Hitler's position, and releasing the content of the meeting to the press. This infuriated Hitler, who amplified the street

violence and unrest which was appeased by fresh elections, Hitler expecting his swelling tide of support to continue. The new Reichstag sat in August 1932 to pass only one motion, in a “coup de theatre” with Goring as its chair, a vote of no confidence in Papen<sup>644</sup>.

The new elections in November checked the advance of the NSDAP and they lost some seats, but the crisis continued; von Papen proposed suspending the Weimar constitution and introducing martial law rather than have his government fall in another apparently inevitable Reichstag vote of no confidence. Schleicher (as his defence minister) was clear that the Reichweir would not support this; von Papen’s situation became untenable<sup>645</sup>, and he resigned in November 1932.

Hindenburg then appointed Schleicher Chancellor, again by decree in December 1932, the long term behind the scenes “fixer” taking the helm<sup>646</sup>. Chancellor for less than two months, Schleicher had been Hindenburg’s main advisor and a significant strategic political player since the mid 1920s. Shleicher’s plan was to split the NSDAP by offering Gregor Strasser a role in Government, as Vice Chancellor and Minister President of Prussia. These were central and significant roles, and this would also bring Strasser’s trade union support in line. Strasser was minded to accept, and resigned from the NSDAP<sup>647</sup>.

Strasser’s resignation of his NSDAP roles was potentially the most significant crisis in the NSDAP’s history since the failed 1923 putsch, as Schleicher intended. Hitler acted decisively, with a whistle-stop speaking tour of the NSDAP groupings, preaching a rhetoric of treachery and betrayal, with the result that there were no significant sectional defections and the party did not split. Strasser was isolated. Following a meeting between Hitler and Strasser about which there is no further detail, Strasser withdrew from his political activities entirely, initially going abroad for a break, but playing no further active role, until he was executed in the “night of the long knives” purge<sup>648</sup>, after Hitler had taken power.

Meanwhile, von Papen had again gained the ear of Hindenburg, with whom he had always been close. Following the failure of Schleicher’s attempt to split the NSDAP, which had the effect of amplifying Hitler’s targeting of his administration, von Papen began to articulate a strategy of

offering Hitler the Chancellorship, on the grounds that he (Hitler) would be a 'chancellor in chains', given his being uneducated, having no experience in government, and having von Papen, Hugenberg and other political figures in the cabinet to manage him. Hindenburg agreed, and Hitler became chancellor on 30 January 1933.

### **9.8 Consolidation of power**

Hitler's consolidation of power 1933-36 following his confirmation as Chancellor, was fast, and focussed. In summary, it was achieved by the simultaneous activity in several different domains.

#### Purges

- Immediate, with the pretext of the Reichchancellery fire a month after taking office
- The "night of the long knives", in June 1934, against the SA and other important individuals.

#### Constitutional extension of dictatorial powers

- The Enabling act<sup>649</sup>
- Assumption of Head of State role following the death of Hindenburg<sup>650</sup>

#### Dissolution of opposition groups

- The trade unions
- Other political parties
- Cultural reorientation along nationalist/NSDAP lines

#### Extending his democratic mandate

- With the immediate declaration of an election
- Through achieving foreign policy triumphs
- Goebbels' propaganda amplified by the infrastructure of the state

Hindenburg and Von Papen's strategy for Hitler's new cabinet was that Hitler would be completely outnumbered by non NSDAP conservative ministers particularly von Papen and Hugenberg. However, Hitler had two allies in strategically central positions as Ministers of the interior of Prussia and the rest of the country. Given the NSDAP's use of violence and intimidation; these posts were pivotal, controlling the police and thereby state sanctioned force and violence. Undermining efforts to create a working coalition, in his cabinet, Hitler called for new elections, arranged for March 1933, before which there was a devastating fire in the Reichstag on 27<sup>th</sup> February.

Hitler's first purge of political opponents was enabled by the panic created by the Reichstag fire; Hitler blamed the communists, and pushed through an emergency decree suspending the Weimar Republic rights and freedoms the following day. With public support he was able to imprison many trade unionists and opposition activists; by April 1933, 2500 communists, trade unionists and political activist opponents had been detained<sup>651</sup>; many beaten and some killed in newly built concentration camps.

Hitler's enabling act had been anticipated and planned in advance as an "antidote" to democracy, having considerable support. In Shirer's words, "the German Parliament would be requested to turn over its constitutional functions to Hitler and take a long vacation". Practically, it enabled Hitler to rule by decree without reference to either the Reichstag or the President.

As a constitutional amendment (part of the strategy of legal legitimacy) passage of the enabling act required a two-thirds majority<sup>652</sup>, and the amendment required to be renewed every four years. Hitler had increased his Reichstag representation in the 5<sup>th</sup> March elections, but did not have an outright majority. However, on the day of the vote, many of the deputies who would have voted against had been imprisoned in the purge and some were simply not allowed in the chamber. The chamber itself was swarming with and surrounded by an intimidating band of SA troops, and in his role as Chair of the House, Goring changed procedure in that the votes of absent members were not to be counted. The large Centre Party was given concessions, and a reassurance that these would arrive in writing (which they never did), on the basis of which the Centre Party voted for the measure. Although the Social Democrats voted against, the motion was passed.

Hitler's seizure of power had let loose much of the violence within the paramilitary organisations that had to be suppressed during the democratic phase of the Nazi rise. The street fighting with the communists and persecution of Jewish people grew such that it offended the middle classes. In addition, a constitutional dimension was growing to the problem, with Rohm (leading the SA, which now numbered something like three million) nurturing his plan to replace the Wehrmacht. During 1934, the political split was such that with Hindenburg's support, von Papen made a speech in Marburg decrying the lawlessness, and let it be known that Hindenburg was considering imposing martial law.

For a long period, Hitler dithered, but on 30.6.1934 executed his second purge, operation Hummingbird, the "night of the long knives." A predetermined large group of 70 or 80 SA commanders were rounded up and executed by the SS and Gestapo, with the opportunity being taken to kill a number of other political figures, such as von Kahr, suppressor of the 1923 Putsch; Strasser, Hitler's more left wing former colleague, and Schleicher, who he accused (falsely) of being involved in a treasonous plot. Von Papen was also on the list, but was not at home.

Hitler publicly owned the decision to enact the purge on the grounds of national security, and the SA was formally disbanded. Simultaneously, Hitler had allied himself with the Wehrmacht (who had wanted the SA disbanded); acted in accordance with the popular mood, which had been disturbed by the violent excess of the SA troops; and resolved a divergent split within the party.

Hitler's last vulnerability was Hindenburg, who as president could formally dismiss him as chancellor. Hindenburg was ailing, and appeared in public little, Hitler had always been outwardly respectful on these occasions, but privately contemptuous. As Hindenburg took to his death-bed, Hitler legislated for the roles of President and Chancellor to be combined, thus making himself head of state. This meant (highly significantly) that members of the Wehrmacht (initially the Generals) were to declare an oath of allegiance to Hitler personally in his role of president.

In understanding the way that Hitler articulated and disseminated his authority, Kershaw uses the phrase “working towards the Führer”<sup>653</sup>, meaning that decisions were taken by followers on the basis of what Hitler would want or approve of. This analysis can be extended further to partly explain the cultural revolution that took place across all areas of German society in the mid 1930s as existing groups and social and political structures were redefined within a National Socialist guise.

A particular example, requiring more active effort was the reorientation of the trade unions. The day after a delirious celebratory national holiday declared for Mayday 1933, the union buildings across Germany were all occupied and the independent unions dissolved. With the trade union leaders imprisoned, a German Labour Front was created in its place, whose role initially was to negotiate with industry leaders, this later giving way to a view that the factory leaders should be the authority within the factories, backed up by the state, and that there was to be no bargaining. In a similar manner, through a combination of intimidation and a demand for loyalty to Germany, the political parties themselves aligned or dissolved themselves before a law in July 1933 outlawed any party other than the NSDAP.

Kershaw writes

**Hardly any spheres of organized activity, political or social, were left untouched by the process of Gleichschaltung – the ‘coordination’ of institutions and organizations now brought under Nazi control. Pressure from below, from Nazi activists, played a major role in forcing the pace of the ‘coordination’. But many organizations showed themselves only too willing to anticipate the process and to ‘coordinate’ themselves in accordance with the expectations of the new era**<sup>654</sup>

Hitler increased his democratic franchise in two ways. Firstly, he conducted elections and plebiscites, and secondly, he increased his support through his foreign policy successes. Childers argues that the November 1932 elections halted the inexorable rise and the sense of inevitability of achieving power<sup>655</sup>; Goebbels had said that they should not campaign again while not actually in

Government. Now Hitler was, there was a further opportunity, and in the aftermath of the Reichstag fire, the internment of thousands of political opponents, and allegations of electoral irregularities, the NSDAP increased their vote in March 1933 to 44%. By the following year, the NSDAP was the only legitimate political party, but the electoral support was continued and extended with a sequence of plebiscites.

The first of these was in October 1933 in the context a foreign policy success. The disarmament talks in 1932 and 1933 were struggling with Britain and France unwilling that Germany should have parity. Hitler withdrew from the conference, and from the League of Nations, blaming the unreasonable terms of the Versailles treaty and the hypocrisy of the allies to whom he had offered a total disarmament as an option. The ubiquity of resentment at the terms of the Versailles treaty in Germany, and sense of unfair treatment at the hands of the Allies made these moves very popular.

Secondly, in 1934, a plebiscite in the Saarland took place that had been agreed at the point of French occupation at the end of the first war. NSDAP propaganda included flooding the country with “Goebbelsschnauzen” (Goebbels’ Snouts) a relatively low priced radio enabling the NSDAP and German message to be delivered. Threats and intimidation also contributed to delivering the majority preferring to return to Germany, and this was enacted in July 1935 to national jubilation.

In the following years, to these successes was added the reoccupation of the Ruhr – risking a French military response in March 1936; the Anschluss with Austria in 1938 and so on to the triumphant defeat of France in 1939.

### **9.9 Hitler as a leadership case history: Conclusion**

Hitler’s leadership managed to combine power centralisation with rigid autocracy; extreme pragmatism with an iron consistency and strategy based on delicate intuition on one hand and instrumental violence on the other. The following chapter pulls together some of these overarching themes of Hitler’s leadership and the NSDAP as the organisation he led.

## **10 Case history comments and conclusions**

For two decades Hitler was a successful leader, growing a small political party to local then national success, he then had considerable success geopolitically as chancellor. Within popular judgement, his organisation and vision was psychopathic, in the sense of being violent and callous, and thirdly, he personally is acknowledged to be significantly personally charismatic. So in the exploration of how managers are effective within organisations, and to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable, Hitler was argued to be a “crucial case” justifying a single case study methodology

Having set out the facts of his biography, the historical setting (structural context) and his leadership case history, this chapter looks at aspects of the culture of Hitler’s leadership and within his movement, the NSDAP, then articulates some conclusions including that the NSDAP is best characterised as a criminal organisation. Hitler’s own relation to violence is more complicated given he was probably Aspergic rather than psychopathic.

### **10.1. NSDAP cultural themes**

This section examines prominent aspects of organisational culture within the NSDAP; the espoused culture of leadership, the use of mendacity and violence and so on. The selection of these themes is partly heuristic, for example the centrality of violence as ideology and strategy, or the ubiquity of mendacity; partly linked to the theme of the research, such as the phenomenon of the Fuhrerprinzip, and partly the themes echo emphases made by other writers, for example the cult of personality<sup>656</sup>.

### 10.1.1 The Fuhrerprinzip

In this discussion, there is some laxity between referring to the leadership themes and cultures of “Hitler” and “the NSDAP”. This is partially justified on the grounds of the culture of personal allegiance to Hitler demanded and the structure of the Fuhrerprinzip, the absolute authority of the leader.

Through its ranks, the NSDAP developed a particular culture of leadership, where the leader was the total autocratic authority. This reflected Hitler’s own attitude to his leadership of the party, the so-called Fuhrer principle. In MK, Hitler articulates his contempt for democratic politics, suggesting that

**There is a better chance of seeing a camel pass through the eye of a needle than of seeing a really great man 'discovered' through an election. Whatever has happened in history above the level of the average of the broad public has mostly been due to the driving force of an individual personality.<sup>657</sup>**

His position (somewhat after Nietzsche) is that there are great people who change history, rather than the structuralist account of tectonic societal tropes driving change. The authority of these Ubermensch within their organisations should be complete. The person bestowed with leadership authority

**... is the sole leader of the movement. All the committees are responsible to him, but he is not responsible to the committees. His decision is final, but he bears the whole responsibility of it. The members of the movement are entitled to call him to account by means of a new election ... He is then replaced by a more capable man who is invested with the same authority and obliged to bear the same responsibility. One of the highest duties of the movement is to make this principle imperative not only within its own ranks but also for the whole State. The man who becomes leader is invested with the highest and unlimited authority, but he also has to bear the last and gravest responsibility.<sup>658</sup>**

This bestowal of absolute authority is the Führerprinzip, this cascading to local leaders of the groups of paramilitaries, which autocracy lead to public criticism and unrest, after their roles were enfranchised by the state after 1933. At the level of the NSDAP party, the organisational culture was of complete obedience to the Führer. At the level of the state this was echoed by the presidency, which Hitler aligned integrated with the Chancellorship.

### **10.1.2 The Cult of Personality.**

Following Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, the effects of the personality cult could be seen; as Kershaw summarises

**'Poems' – usually unctuous doggerel verse, sometimes with a pseudo-religious tone – were composed in his honour. 'Hitler-Oaks' and 'Hitler-Lindens', trees whose ancient pagan symbolism gave them special significance to völkisch nationalists and Nordic cultists, were planted in towns and villages all over Germany. 252 Towns and cities rushed to confer honorary citizenship on the new Chancellor. Streets and squares were named after him... the Führer cult created an entire industry of kitsch – pictures, busts, reliefs, postcards, figurines, penknives, badges, illuminated buttons, zinc plates...<sup>659</sup>**

Its creation had its roots from about 1922; up until that time Hitler had only foretold of a leader that would come after him; criticising the confusion and indecision of the Weimar democracy around him, and arguing that there was a need for a German saviour, a leader to cut through the tangle of pluralism

It is not possible to clearly identify the point at which Hitler embraced the idea of his own saviourhood, perhaps it grew in the context of recognising his rhetorical power in speeches, and utilising this to be organisationally effective, or his success in the 1924 trial after the 1923 putsch. Another contributor cited by Kershaw is Mussolini's success in Italy with the March on Rome in October

1922<sup>660</sup>. Alternatively, his avowal of being the “drummer” for the leader to be was the same dynamic described below, of Hitler playing the ingénue while planning the more omnipotent path.

From the days of his well pressed evening wear as a teenager when in the Vienna Opera as described by Kubizeck, Hitler was fastidious about his appearance, and this extended to his public persona in the form of his images. Throughout, he operated through one photographer Hoffmann with whom he was close friends, and through whom he kept very tight control of images of himself allowed into public, hence the popular images of his stern half profile, a favoured shot. His self-conscious control and manipulation of his appearance is illustrated by a series of photographs Hoffmann was commissioned to take by Hitler articulating passionate poses he might assume during speeches<sup>661</sup> in order to understand the impact of his oratory.

The content of the personality cult can be argued to be fairly generic psychoanalytically understood as a projection of the followers “ego-ideal”<sup>662</sup> (an internal representation of the self as one would like to become) onto the subject of the cult. The image management task is simply to maintain the public persona in such a way as not to jar with that benign public perception. Hitler was being portrayed as being an expert on everything from theatre to architecture<sup>663</sup>; loving children and animals, ascetic and hardworking.

Kershaw argues that the bestowed charisma deriving from the large car and the airborne leader both were explicitly to contribute to this cult. Hitler used a large Mercedes Limousine from the point of his release from prison in 1923, along with the “Hitler over Germany” accounts<sup>664</sup> of his using aircraft in the 1932 elections to speak in up to five different cities in one day to massed rallies of 30-100 thousand.

However, Kershaw also suggests that active propaganda, even with Goebbels’ virtuoso could not have created the adulation that surrounded Hitler, for example “Hitler Day” for his 42<sup>nd</sup> Birthday where almost all towns and cities were festooned in his honour. There seemed to be a dependency need within the population to latch onto a saviour figure Hitler utilised<sup>665</sup>. In explaining the

phenomenon of Hitler's success in capturing popular attention, Laswell's work, "psychopathology and politics" cited by Kets de Vries, would suggest that

**What gives truly effective leaders such conviction and power is their ability to articulate the underlying issues of a society ...trying to solve for all what they originally could not solve for themselves<sup>666</sup>**

In addition, to the personality cult, Hitler the individual held together a movement with very diverse aspirations, more violent; more socialist than its publicly acceptable image; and he sustained this with something of a vacuum in relation to publicly acceptable policy, thus retaining public support.

### **10.1.3 Instrumental use of violence**

Violence by Hitler and the NSDAP was in the main not spontaneous and cathartic, it was specific and targeted. Psychoanalysis formulates violence as the failure of symbolisation<sup>667</sup> supporting Arendt's version of its use politically as crossing a Rubicon; breaking a boundary that subsequently redefines the movement<sup>668</sup>. In terms of power (previously discussed) violence is a powerful legitimiser, and for the NSDAP violence was at its core; tactically, strategically and ideologically.

- **Violence as tactics.** From the start of the movement, violence was used informally to protect meetings of the party and become involved in fights with and intimidation of communists and opposing parties. In the context of the inter-war restriction on the Wehrmacht and tolerance of such groups, the NSDAP paramilitary group, lead by Rohm, became the SA.

Planning for and enacting the putsch in 1923 with the Kampfbund; the violence in the streets leading up to the seizure of power in 1933, and the violence and settling of scores after Hitler became chancellor, were tactics to support Hitler's claim to the Chancellorship in the context of the NSDAP electoral success, and then to assert the authority of the new order from 1933.<sup>669</sup>

In both the 1923 putsch, and for the passing of the 1934 enabling act, peaceful political process was explicitly distorted by the threat from armed men. Kahr's political meeting was surrounded by SA with guns in the chamber, as was the Reichstag in 1934.

- **Violence as strategy.** In Bavaria between the years 1920-23 Hitler obtained concessions with the threat of civil war. At a national level a decade later, the rapid sequence of Reich elections between 1929 and 1933 was due in no small part to SA agitation and coordination of civil unrest, combined, Janus faced with avowed political legitimacy, and development of the political franchise. Schleicher's strategy of including Hitler in Government was in part to pacify this destabilising influence<sup>670</sup>.

Finally, and triumphantly, it was the credible threat of a further conflagration to a war weary Europe in 1938 that may have enabled Hitler to persuade Chamberlain that his territorial ambitions extended no further than Czechoslovakia. In all three of these situations; from the street brawls with the communists in Munich in 1920 – the key was that the threat was not idle; that there was a culture of actuated violence, and that Hitler and many of his ex-army followers enjoyed, relished and glorified violence and the opportunity to articulate it.

From early in the development of the NSDAP, the political growth of the party was paralleled with the development and growth of a paramilitary violent element. Once in government, this utilisation of violence was a natural and a central part of the party's activity. Candlelight processions and large set piece rallies were intimidating because of the numbers involved, the uniforms and the militarism. The power and effectiveness of Hitler and the NSDAP use of violence was that political "negotiation" was frequently concessions obtained under threat of violence. This process had two parts, the credible threat of violence (as evidenced by practice), and the phobia of violence in others in the decades after the Great War. Repeatedly, Hitler took a position of publicly condemning the violence, but quietly condoning and coordinating it to achieve maximum impact.

- **Violence as ideology.** Rees' interpretation of Hitler's "struggle" (Kampf) is that it was violent; that it was a ubiquitous and inevitable consequence of his social Darwinism. The competition for survival is between different races as evolutionary units, and war and violence is that struggle manifest.<sup>671</sup>

Hitler's achievement was to surf on the wave of violence without being consumed by it; the dilemma of how to balance and manage the violence, on the one hand fanning it sufficiently to drive the political process through the credible threat and concession, but on the other, not to actually unleash it, and thus undermine the party's wider political legitimacy.

There was some genuine difficulty in this; the Beer Hall Putsch and the unsuccessful march on the parliament the following day both may have been enacted prematurely because of the groundswell of pressure of pent up violence and the requirement to act. In the years 1931-32, with the Nazi party a significant force in national politics and Hitler refusing places in coalition governments, there was again the difficulty of keeping the violence of his followers at bay, leading to its outpouring in the days and weeks following his eventual accession to the Chancellorship in January 1933.

#### **10.1.4 National Socialism as a secular religion**

The religious nature of fervent political movements has been a traditional theme of analysis, for example Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution<sup>672</sup>; that it "pursued the same course as a religious revival". Hitler writes in MK that in the monastery that has on one icon the swastika later adopted by the NSDAP, he

**practised singing in the choir ... and thus it happened that I was placed in a very favourable position to be emotionally impressed again and again by the magnificent splendour of ecclesiastical ceremonial.**<sup>673</sup>

The religious elements of the NSDAP might be broadly listed

- **The emotional appeal of revivalism.** Rees<sup>674</sup> emphasises the collective sense of defeat and exhaustion in the German people in the aftermath of the war, and during the periods of economic crisis in the hyperinflation of 1923, and the economic crash of 1930; that Hitler was preaching a form of redemption and renewal on the grounds of a pan-German revival.
- **The cultivation of martyrs;** Hitler begins MK with a solemn list of the “fallen” in the 1923 putsch, whose names continued to be revered. For example Burleigh describes the explicit search for an appropriate death to sanctify by Goebbels<sup>675</sup>, alighting upon Horst Wessel, whose self penned song became a second national anthem, sung at each sitting of the Reichstag along with Deutschland Uber Alles.
- **The creation of pseudo religious icons** and ritual. Rallies and assemblies of the NSDAP clearly mimic those of religious worship ritual and observance. A significant icon was the NSDAP colours flag carried on the 1923 Putsch, spattered with the “Blood of the martyrs”, which was solemnly placed on the dais alter, and each new party divisional flag was touched by it.
- **The observance of a calendar of festivals** and holidays, marking anniversaries of the NSDAP movement, for example the 9<sup>th</sup> of November from the 1923 Putsch; the “seizure of power” on 30<sup>th</sup> January; these being honoured by speeches, rallies; centrally organised celebratory activities; and the crowning Autumn Nuremberg rally.

Rees links the three elements of the Fuhrerprinzip; the personality cult and Hitler’s rhetorical skills as components of his charisma in the religious sense. He argues that these specific factors combined with other general and situational ones, such as the public need for a saviour; the sense of anomie, and hunger for certainty in the face of bewildering change. These synergistically combined to heighten the emotional impact of the movement, and the salvationist illusion. In addition, Rees notes, Hitler amplified the religious symbolism in each speech, by emphasising his humble beginnings; his ascetic simplicity and his path of suffering as a junior soldier, evoking the stable, the teachings and the crucifixion testing of the Nazarene. Rees cites Orwell

**The fact is that there is something deeply appealing about him... the face of a man suffering under intolerable wrongs... it reproduces the expression of innumerable pictures of Christ crucified, and there is little doubt that that is how Hitler sees himself.**<sup>676</sup>

The effect of this revivalist religious fervour was to facilitate the denial of reality; the reorientation of the moral compass. For Rees, the NSDAP, like an economic market bubble, had faith as its central scaffold. He cites Mussolini

**Faith moves mountains, because it gives us the illusion that mountains do move**<sup>677</sup>

Hitler was a chorister age 8; the embedded ritual that formed part of the candlelight processions, the icons and festival days of the Nazis clearly have the character of "ecclesiastical ceremony" as practiced in that setting. This aspect of the Nazi regime has been articulated in terms of the extent to which it might be termed a political religion itself. Adding to Toquevilles analysis<sup>678</sup>, it is unsurprising that, Voegelin's "The Political Religions"<sup>679</sup> published in 1938 and pointing out the false dichotomy between Church and state in a historical context, was suppressed by the NSDAP.

Within the Nazi movement, there were later moves towards a reinstatement of the more traditional German pagan traditions, although Hitler himself seemed unimpressed by these. Rather, he seemed to maintain a statesmanlike support of the established Christian religions, although those closer to him, and comments from the "Table Talk" write ups of discussions among his confidants suggest a more cynical politically expedient attitude.

**In the long run, National Socialism and religion will no longer be able to exist together**<sup>680</sup>

He argues that he would anticipate religion would eventually wither or consume itself, but also later arguing that Christianity is preferable to superstition.

#### 10.1.5 The message and the lie.

Managing the message for Hitler had a number of elements. Firstly, in its form; his speeches and the party propaganda. Second the content, with alternation between clarity and vagueness of policy, the “big lie” and sprachregelung.

**Message delivery.** Hitler argued that the most powerful form of engagement was real engagement with real people, delivering speeches and persuading people

**An orator receives continuous guidance from the people before whom he speaks. This helps him to correct the direction of his speech; for he can always gauge, by the faces of his hearers, how far they follow and understand him, and whether his words are producing the desired effect ... He will always follow the lead of the great mass in such a way that from the living emotion of his hearers the apt word which he needs will be suggested to him and in its turn this will go straight to the hearts of his hearers ... In this struggle between the orator and the opponent whom he must convert to his cause this marvellous sensibility towards the psychological influences of propaganda can hardly ever be availed of by an author.**<sup>681</sup>

**Message clarity.** In the 1930s, a German conservative Herman Rauschning who had initially supported the NSDAP, fell out with them, and exiled himself. He became a critic and Nazi detractor, and having settled in the US, published a supposed exposé of the invidiousness of the regime, “Hitler Speaks”<sup>682</sup>. This was based upon personal conversations, the authenticity of which was challenged. The debate was unnecessary; the NSDAP programme had been clearly set out in Mein Kampf, published in 1925. Indeed, the notorious Nuremberg Laws of 1935 depriving the Jewish people of citizenship were the enactment of points 4, 5 and 6 from the 1920 NSDAP manifesto’s “25 points”.

Hitler and the NSDAP were extremely consistent in their aims – and clear about them.

**Propaganda.** Characteristic of the NSDAP throughout its history, and of the national regime it articulated when in power, was a tight control of the message (with the 1934 sedition laws making comments against the Fuhrer a capital offence for example) and the promulgation of propaganda. The centrality of propaganda to Hitler's thinking and political strategy is illustrated by the fact that his first role within the NSDAP was as being in charge of propaganda. In MK several years later, he commended Leuger (Mayor of Vienna) for his intuitive skill in managing the public perception, and he expounded this theoretical underpinning

**... All effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and those must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulas... it must appeal to the feelings of the public rather than to their reasoning powers... finding the appropriate psychological form that will arrest the attention and appeal to the hearts of the national masses... it must present only that aspect of the truth which is favourable to its own side [and with]... constant repetition will finally succeed in imprinting an idea on the memory [and]... be rewarded by the surprising and almost incredible results<sup>683</sup>**

Goebbels, an academic, was Strasser's more socialist wing of the NSDAP<sup>684</sup>. Hitler recognised his talents at the confrontational meeting in Bamberg in 1926 when he wrested back complete leadership, inviting him to Munich so he shifted camps. The centrality and importance of Goebbels' role in shaping and organising the propaganda effort cannot be overemphasised, illustrated by the fact that Goebbels' family was in the Berlin Bunker on April 1945 at the end, shooting their children before committing suicide themselves.

**The "Big Lie"** describes the technique of developing explicit and conscious fabrications and untruths. Hitler describes the "big lie" in MK

**In the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional**

**nature than consciously or voluntarily;... they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation. For the grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down,**<sup>685</sup>

It is entirely consistent with Hitler's leadership style that the "big lie" in MK is attributed to others in the context of a moral disapprobation. Throughout the war he subsequently created, he unwaveringly attributes the aggression to the allies, in particular to an international Jewish conspiracy while his regime is enacting genocide in the east against that same people.

**Sprachregelung** The word "sprachregelung" refers to the use of euphemistic terms. For the NSDAP, the notorious ones included the "Aktion T4" "euthanasia" program where those with physical deformities and psychiatric illness were killed. In the case of children, they were sent to the "children's speciality department". "Wet work" referred to engaging in actual violence and torture rather than the more office surveillance and detective work of the SS. In the same vein, the 1944 preparations for the Red Cross visit to the Terezin (Theresienstat) concentration camp in June 1944, where shops, cultural centres and good accommodation were faked as part of a dupe away from the reality of the "final solution", itself a "spraregelung". The notorious "Einsatzgruppen", or "task force", were formed with the explicit role of killing the Jewish people, socialist and intelligentsia in the Eastern occupied countries, known as "Housecleaning".

While the NSDAP euphemisms were particularly grotesque and a potential illustration of Arendt's "Banality of Evil", the practice of euphemising is ubiquitous. For Hitler and the NSDAP as the regime progressed, the extent, the extremity and the centrality of the violence meant that the normal euphemisms had to cover much more disturbing reality than they normally do. Indeed, the need to use them argues against the evil being banal, but rather that it retained some of its emotional valence that people prefer not to directly mention.

Hitler duplicitously convinced Chamberlain that he was both a man of his word, and wanted peace, in the context of a German rearmament programme and clearly declared war aims. Hitler himself was unprepared for Chamberlain's concessions such that he had to put the planned invasion of on hold<sup>686</sup>.

#### **10.1.6 Centralisation by distribution.**

Kershaw's account of "working towards the Fuehrer"<sup>687</sup>, where preference and career progression was based on anticipating what Hitler would want and making it happen, was in part a reaction to the lack of clear bureaucratic structures<sup>688</sup>. Hitler's "administration" would include poorly set out job roles so that there was a form of managerial and policy Darwinism, where the different people with overlapping responsibility would fight it out among themselves; or work to best each other in anticipating Hitler's wishes in their "working towards" him, with Hitler siding with the winner of the competition.

This distancing himself from the operational activities of the state had the effect of enhancing his perceived power through his inaccessibility, but also, as the violence of the regime unfolded, a gap was perceived between Hitler himself, and the actions of his subordinates. Thus the actions of the SA were perceived as local excesses about which Hitler must be ignorant.

#### **10.2 Organisational culture more clearly attributable to Hitler personally.**

While the case history of Hitler and the NSDAP illustrates well the way that effective leaders mould the culture and then the structure of the organisation to a template articulated by their own personality, there are several further significant aspects of Hitler's character itself that seem more clearly attributable to the man, as illustrated by his more personal and social behaviour and his activity at those points where he had to make decisions himself in the loneliness of power<sup>689</sup>.

### 10.2.1 Passivity and action.

Hitler's executive activity can be seen as an oscillation between action, decisive and at times brutal; and passivity.

**Prevarication and delay,** The management of the SA in the months after the "seizure of power" is an example of his extended prevarication prior to an incisive and brutal action. Their violent anti-Semitism was not tolerated by moderate opinion, neither was Rohm's pushing to subordinate the Reichweir to the SA. Hitler eventually acted on the night of the long knives of the 1934 purge. Similar to this was his apparent passivity, holding out for the chancellorship, and refusing the vice-chancellorship. Kershaw cites Weidemann;

**'He took the view that many things sorted themselves out if they were left alone.'**<sup>690</sup>

**High stakes gambling.** Alternatively, Hitler could be decisive and audacious, time and again taking a significant risk.

- Within 6 months of joining the DAP, and in the context of their previous political gatherings attracting a hundred people or so, Hitler hired the Staatliches Hofbrauhause which could hold two thousand; a massive step up from the usual audiences gathered, and a gamble, albeit successful.
- When confronted in July 1921 about being overbearing, he resigned from the party. His comrades, realising that Hitler was this small parties main asset, allowed him to return on his own terms which included his being undisputed leader.
- The 1923 Putsch and his strategy in the subsequent court case, namely to entirely own responsibility for the action. Given that this was high treason, this was again a significant personal risk.

- Holding out for the chancellorship in the context of declining electoral votes, and refusing the vice-chancellorship was a significantly risky strategy
- Subsequent foreign policy triumphs
  - Occupation of the Ruhr valley
  - Anschluss with Austria
  - Occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland and then the bold conquest of France in 4 days.

Characteristic of Hitler's resolution was a clarity and certainty once he had decided how to proceed.

### **10.2.2 Playing the Ingénue.**

Time and again from Hitler's commencement of professional potency, Hitler was repeatedly underestimated and dismissed by his peers. This is first seen at the point at which he joined and then took over the NSDAP because Drexler thought he could "use" him. The quintessential iteration of this process was his duping of Chamberlain in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, persuading this cultured and experienced statesman that he was a "man of his word"; a man that that he, Chamberlain, and the British people could "do business with".

In the granting of Hitler the Chancellorship in January 1933, von Papen sought to "play" Hitler, proposing to Hindenburg the cabinet with him (von Papen) and Hitler in Chancellor and vice-chancellor roles, reassuring Hindenburg (throughout extremely sceptical and disapproving of a Hitler chancellorship) that with himself, the authoritative Hugenberg and all but two of the cabinet as von Papen's men, that Hitler would be "boxed in" and easily manageable.

Stalin was said not to have believed that Barbarossa had begun, and while the Blitzkrieg had commenced in one area of the Germano-Soviet border, raw materials were still being shipped to Germany by Stalin as part of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

It is not clear the extent to which it was an avowed strategy of Hitler's to maintain a role of being faintly absurd (the Charlie Chaplain moustache); his predilection until quite late for odd looking Volkish Bavarian clothing and lederhosen, possibly so as to be easily dismissed and underestimated.

### 10.3 NSDAP Germany was a criminal organisation

The proposal that the NSDAP was a criminal organisation (and that the whole state of Germany became thus) derives from two arguments, echoing the discussions above in Ch 4. The table below is an extension of table 11 (above); and evidences the significant leaning of the NSDAP towards a more criminal organised culture.

	<b>Pro-social legitimate business organisation</b>	<b>NSDAP</b>
<b>Violence</b>	Nonviolence	Violence as central strategy and tactics; e.g. SA in Karr's meeting prior to 1923 putsch; SA in Reichstag during the vote for Enabling Law
<b>Openness</b>	Transparency	"The big lie" explicitly articulated in Mein Kampf
<b>State structures</b>	Work with legitimate (state) authority	Revolution through the democratic process; assumption of control of state followed by dissolution of democratic process; enactment of "protocol of the Elders of Zion"
<b>Democratic process</b>	Work within democratic process	Explicit perversion of process; e.g. Exclusion and internment of various deputies and SA threat for the vote on the "Enabling Law"; Reichstag votes of no confidence to bring down government coalition;
<b>Judicial process</b>	Work within judicial process	Maintenance of some judicial independence within Germany; extermination of judiciary and other prominent cultural figures in occupied territory, e.g. Poland.
<b>Group task</b>	Legitimate business providing financial gain	Enacting supremacy of the German race through theft and violence to peer nation states and non German races
<b>Personnel</b>	Free entry/exit	Executions of anti-Hitler commentators
<b>Equal rights</b>	Espousal of equal rights; recognition of wide group of stakeholders	Structural (state enabled) abnegation of rights of groups through tight definition of citizenship

**Table 12. Legitimate pro-social and NSDAP organisational culture (c.f. table 11 above)**

This contention is supported further by considering the NSDAP in terms of the moral matrices described above (4.4). In the Machiavellian matrix of ends vs. means, both were bad/antisocial, thus defining it through this analysis as a criminal organisation.

Kershaw, commenting on the characters of the people Hitler had around about him, writes that his inner court had the “whiff of the gangsters den”<sup>691</sup>. The researcher submits that descriptively and in terms of the moral matrix analysis above that the NSDAP and Germany following the enabling law could be characterised as organised crime.

A second argument in favour of defining the NSDAP and so the German state after 1930 a criminal organisation is to be found in the ethical typology of organisational morality described in 4.4 above. “Criminal organisations” are redefined in terms of their being distinguishable from Machiavellian organisations and Balkan’s “psychopathic organisations” by virtue of their different aims.

Critics of this conclusion would cite Kellerman’s work on “Bad Leadership” (4.1 above), in that the descriptions are partial and can be described in positive and negative terms. For example, NSDAP Germany was successful as a government using many economic and political indices in the 1930s.

A criminal organisation might be characterised as one which has the triad of an adverse aim (racial supremacy for the NSDAP); centrally uses violence (politically and internationally for the NSDAP), and mendacity (Chamberlain dupe of “Peace in our time”). Some of the issues set out above in the case history “Leadership Themes” section, can be seen to echo the comments of “V” in his mafia manager book (4.2.4), for example the parallel between the Führerprinzip and V’s Mafia “Patron”, or the NSDAP using the threat of violence and actual violence at a micro- and geopolitical level as an application of V’s comment that “a kind word and a gun are much more effective than a kind word alone”<sup>692</sup>.

An area for further research might be whether the extensively explored and documented history of the NSDAP itself can illuminate some of the organisational, leadership and management characteristics of self declared criminal organisations.

#### **10.4 Case history conclusions.**

Hitler as a case study related to the research question has been relevant relating to several of the parameters. He was clearly an effective manager and leader, and his personality was a critical variable both in terms of the delivery of a consistent overarching strategy and personal world view, and his personal charisma and cult of personality.

A significant factor to have emerged unexpectedly from the case history was the extent to which Hitler and the NSDAP utilised the “transactional” elements of leadership (involving position power, coercion and reward) in the enactment and building of their power, particularly with the “enabling law”. Hitler and the NSDAP may have “seized power” through charisma, rhetoric and persuasion, but having seized it, they utilised the machinery of the state to maximal advantage.

One concluding proposal is that Hitler and the NSDAP were the embodiment of a post modern political movement and then State. The centrality of power is both a critique and a tenet of post modernism. A critique in that Lyotard’s “incredulity toward metanarratives”<sup>693</sup> delegitimises overarching understandings of human and societal development and progress, religious, national, progressive (in the Hegelian sense), leaving a vacuum that is filled only by the pursuit of power. Foucault’s analysis of various phenomena are reducible in essence to the exchanges and dynamics of power<sup>694</sup>, foreshadowed by Nietzsche’s “will to power”<sup>695</sup> Hitler and the NSDAP redefined traditional morality, usurped the authority of religious ritual and manipulated the democratic process explicitly in the interests of the “seizure of power”, then having achieved this nationally, extended it out wards internationally by dupe, brinkmanship, threat and violence until it was thwarted.

A second concluding proposal is that the NSDAP was a criminal organisation. This proposal distinguishes the two elements of the Hitler/NSDAP phenomenon, the psychopathy/violence element and the charismatic/religious one described in 10.1.4, where the NSDAP's function as a secular religion is proposed.

It is submitted that Hitler's charisma was the critical factor of success rather than the violent character of Hitler's vision and culture of the NSDAP, on the grounds of firstly he universally being described as being a charismatic speaker and leader, supported by the development of a personality cult and the explicit religiosity of NSDAP ritual. Secondly, this is proposed on the grounds of the evidence of this charismatic leadership being a crucial element in the development of his base of support, through his speaking engagements, then Hitler explicitly developing elements of charisma, (for example the 4 Is model<sup>696</sup>), of having exceptional ability, being inspiring, intellectually stimulating and giving the impression of caring and interest in followers. Hitler's charisma enabled him in sequence to take over the small DAP, making it his own organisational vehicle, to grow it as a party then as a national movement.

The classification of the NSDAP as a criminal organisation, however, potentially limits the applicability of findings from this case history to normal and non criminal ones. In addition, it has been argued that Hitler personally was not psychopathic (7.4). Yet he was an effective leader. The amount of violence enacted by the regime suggests it was likely that there were a number of psychopathic people in positions of power, but Hitler's own "psychopathic" vision seems to have derived from an Asperger/autistic personal pathology, such that his use of the violent activities of the regime derived from an absence or lack of emotional resonance with the regime's victims rather than a more psychopathic callousness or enjoyment of violence . Hitler can be said not to have been a case study that fully explored the question of psychopathy in leadership.

## **11. Conclusions: Research contributions and the managerial agency concept**

The research question for the project was to enquire how managers are effective within organisations, and specifically to what extent the personality or psychopathy of a manager is a critical variable in explaining that effectiveness. As described below, the outcomes of the research have been limited by a number of constraints and errors, although some tentative conclusions can be drawn that comprise the contributions of the research.

This final chapter will centrally set out the response to the research question of “how managers are effective within organisations” through annotating the managerial agency concept. However, first other conclusions will be briefly rehearsed that are believed to be contributions.

### **11.1 Conclusions/contributions within earlier chapters.**

These conclusions split into three broad groups, first conclusions about the case study, second, conclusions and contributions drawn during the process of the theoretical exposition, and third general conclusions about the second limb of the research question, to what extent the personality or psychopathy of the leader is a critical variable determining their effectiveness.

- Regarding the case study, it has been argued that Hitler’s personal psychological pathology probably best fits an Asperger’s diagnosis (7.5.3). This has been previously tangentially suggested in the literature, but the depth of clinical review in the present study and evidence to support the diagnosis is novel. Further, and more controversially, it raises the question of the personal moral valence of his genocidal policies, in that they possibly have an ablative unemotional “autistic” quality. This finding directly impacts upon the second half of the research question, namely to what extent is the psychopathy of a

manager is a critical variable in explaining their effectiveness. It has been argued that Hitler was a crucial case to test the hypothesis. The finding of his not having been psychopathic suggests that this is not a critical variable.

- It was also proposed that the NSDAP is best described as a “criminal organisation” (10.3), supported by an analysis utilising a Machiavellian ends/means matrix and an ethical acceptability vs. efficacy matrix; itself a novel technique (4.4). Comparison of Machiavellian vs. Mafia organisations on these matrices distinguishes the “goodness of aims” as a critical variable, such that Machiavelli’s Prince, or Hobbes’ ruthless monarch may not be criminal if their objective is peace or an ordered society. This proposal may raise more questions than it answers, but it provides explanatory value in understanding the culture and actions of the regime more clearly, pointing towards criminal and mafia as comparison organisations rather than other legitimate political parties or governments, however ruthless and Machiavellian in the pursuit of their goals.
- It was proposed that the Hitler/NSDAP phenomenon articulates a post modern polity, with power as the only meaningful object and currency. This proposal illumines the ability of the regime to utilise and manipulate cultural metanarratives such as religion, nationalism, race and the Hegelian “Phenomenology of Spirit” belief in progress, instrumentally to obtain power.

The second group of conclusions relates more to the specific question in the research. Firstly the question of how managers are effective within organisations, it is concluded that the leadership model of charisma or transformational leadership contribute in combination with sociological models of power.

- In chapter 4, an alternative evolutionary model of “bad charisma” to the typologies in the literature was proposed (4.2.2). This contributes to the charisma literature by challenging the complacency of traditional typologies that try to explain and bracket the “bad charisma” of malignant charismatic leaders such as David Koresh or James Jones. It argues instead

that all “good charisma” can turn “bad” as it is challenged, by virtue of the power of the charismatic influence on followers. This finding illuminated both the paradox that the NSDAP was approved of in the early 1930s by many, and how it managed to gain broad popular appeal in Germany.

- In chapter 3, an, “object relations” model of structure and agency is proposed (3.3.3), borrowing from psychoanalytic theory, and based on the argument that structure and agency are ontologically identical, determined by which person (or “object”) has power. It argues that structure and agency is a description of power in personal relationships, that the superordinate person’s agency defines the structure for the subordinate. This argument is critical in the development below of the managerial agency concept. It proposes that power relations and structure/agency struggles are essentially interpersonal phenomena, and thus can be influenced by charismatic emotional manipulation.

Turning to conclusions about the second limb of the research question, the following conclusions are proposed.

- Regarding the question of psychopathy as a critical variable for effective leadership, the research proposes that the critical personality and behavioural variable for effective leadership is charisma rather than psychopathy. The “answer” to the clinical riddle proposed in chapter 1 about similarities between psychopathic patients and organisational CEOs is that some psychopathic patients have charismatic personalities and so can enact some organisational agency consequent on this. Their effectiveness is predicated upon their charisma rather than their psychopathy.
- Regarding the question of whether the personality of the leader is a critical variable, the evidence from the case history is that it is. Firstly the leader’s personality is important in that charisma is a “neo trait” theory based upon a personality trait of the leader. Secondly, the case history illustrates the centrality of Hitler’s personality in shaping the organisation then the country, illustrated by the development of a cult of personality.

## 11.2 Organisational effectiveness: Managerial agency

The proposal of a concept of “managerial agency” provides a response to the research question of how managers are effective within organisations. The model combines four theoretical strands that have emerged;

- The object relations theory of structure and agency (3.3.) with its central argument that structure and agency are ontologically identical, namely ideas held collectively and individually, respectively
- Archer’s Critical Realist Morphogenic model linking agency, culture and structure, (3.1.4);
- Accounts of charisma (2.1.2)
- The accounts of discipline and power as an internalised structure of Foucault and others (3.2.4).

The model is predicated on the assumption that organisational effectiveness is based upon the manager galvanising subordinates to enact their vision, and the argument can be summarised as follows.

1. Subordinates’ behaviour is determined by internalised “structured” habitus (Giddens’ praxis of structurations (3.1)<sup>697</sup>; Bordieu’s “habitus” (3.2.4)<sup>698</sup>; Foucault’s internal “discipline” (3.2.4)<sup>699</sup>.
2. The managerial agent, through the mechanism of charisma has the ability to mould and change the internalised structures of their subordinates.
3. The manager enacts agency within their group through the
  - a. Active charismatic emotional manipulation of followers internal structures and attitudes,
  - b. Establishing an investment in their (the manager’s) vision
  - c. The manager’s vision becomes the new culture, and so is structured to become

the new structure.

More descriptively, this model involves the construction of a vision that can be communicated to and is intelligible to followers (*what* we are going to do); and secondly, the charismatic or transformational function, that is *why* followers should do it; why it is in their own interests to do it; why they will be transformed by doing it. This transformational/charismatic element enhances performance by galvanising followers' enthusiasm about the task. This will enhance their performance and provide organisational "stretch". The model can be divided into three stages, characterised below as seduction, enrolment and consolidation, loosely parallel to the different types of management/leadership referred to above (2.1.2), transactional, transformational and charismatic.

#### **11.2.1 Seduction.**

The first stage is the process whereby the manager in the new setting is commencing their engagement. The end point is that the followers are listening, that they are paying active attention to their manager/leader, and that they are receptive to and interested in hearing what he or she has to say.

Aside from having some structural authority that confers an initial legitimacy; the main processes active at this point are the manager, tuning into, or divining, the collective psychology of the group, and then addressing it; engaging with the issues as they are perceived by the group members. The group's "collective psychology" can be an issue relating to history (the departure of the previous manager, for example) or it may be a specific dynamic of one or two powerful members of the group. For Hitler, it was the collective sense of grievance at the wounded narcissism of a proud race that felt undefeated following its 1918 retreat at the armistice from occupied land, and unfairly treated by Versailles.

The second task of the manager is that they have to begin to address the issues, to demonstrate that they have "read" the psychology; they have "heard" the issues; that they have something

sensible and legitimate to say about it. Within this model, the effectiveness of the action is immaterial; what is important is that it evidences that the manager is listening to the group, and that the manager believes and feels that what the group is saying and feeling is important and legitimate. In a parallel process, as the manager demonstrates he or she is listening, so the followers start to “listen” to the manager; they become receptive to the manager’s position and comment.

### **11.2.2 Enrolment.**

The second stage is enrolment. Once the manager has got their team listening and indeed hungry to hear what they have to say, through the development of elements of dependency, the manager delivers his or her vision. The successful end point of the enrolment phase is a workforce with a broad consensus on the nature of the task, and motivated to engage with it.

Within this model, the vision consists of more than just how to achieve the task; it contains within it value elements (striving to be better for example); transformational elements (achieving the goal will make people feel actualised and confirmed), and will be translated into a form that specifically responds to, and appears to be a solution for, the group psychology problems noted above.

The manager will communicate both the task related vision and how to achieve it, and also the set of values, priorities and world view on which it is based. If enrolment is successful, all of these will be accepted by followers, and at the end stage, they will have identified with it. If asked, they would not refer to the “manager’s vision”, they would articulate “the” vision, complete with values, priorities and world view *as if it was their own*. Accepting the vision is not sufficient, it has to be assimilated, to become part of the follower and owned as if it were the followers own.

More concretely, the manager will have a pre-existing vision and task that they will communicate, and during the enrolment phase, they use their persuasive skills along with further seduction, manipulation, charm and so on, to “bring on board” the group. Whereas in stage one, charm and EQ skills are being used to gain the trust and engagement of the group, in the second, they are being used to enrol the group in the way of seeing the problem held by the manager. Secondly,

they are gaining “buy in” to the manager’s solution. The manager is enrolling the group into agreeing with his vision of the task.

By the end of this stage, the manager’s vision is becoming the culture of the organisation. This model of effectiveness brings together the sociological and managerial literatures. In the leadership model of Schon<sup>700</sup>, the “glue” between vision and delivery is proposed to be culture, as an organisational factor that an effective leader can shape and change. Archer’s morphogenetic theory of structure and agency proposes that half way between an agent’s vision and the creation of a social structure is culture. Managerial agents create an organisational culture around them based upon their own vision and psychological prejudices and preferences, which becomes the mindset of the subordinate group.

### **11.2.3 Consolidation**

The third stage of the managerial agency model covers the process from the point at which followers have adopted the leader’s perspective and vision to the point where, through familiarity and praxis, it becomes the structure. It becomes the default way of thinking and operating. While superficially, the two stages of enrolment and development may seem similar, the difference lies in the embedding of an idea vs. the repeated enactment of praxis, doing things shaped by the managerial agent’s ideas over and over so that it becomes second nature, becomes habituated. This would be structure in the sociological sense of deeply engrained attitudes and processes that are seemingly insurmountable; that go unchallenged as they are unnoticed.

In the development of this hegemony, having “won over” followers, the managerial agent can bring the more instrumental and transactional dimensions of their position to bear, by rewarding and coercing stragglers or non believers to conform. In this way, they are able to increase the homogeneity of their culture which has adopted the manager’s values and vision, and adapted to it. The use of more transactional reward and coercion provide a




Figure 9 The three stage model of managerial agency.

second line of defence for the manager in the face of challenge of or threat to the culture/structure. The first line is the conformity of the majority, and the natural social forces promoting this conformity in social settings.

#### 11.2.4 Contextualising the Managerial agency concept

For the purposes of this research, the terms leadership and management have been elided and used synonymously. To develop the concept of managerial agency, there needs to be a return to the more traditional division of management and leadership as being distinct.<sup>701</sup>

Within the “managerial agency” concept, the traditional dichotomy between management and leadership is developmental and complementary rather than typological, arguing that transactional (managerial) styles develop into transformational. In the initial stages, the managerial agent with some legitimate transactional authority and power is in a position of influence, but this advantage is built upon and amplified with the softer more psychological interpersonal skills.

The managerial agent’s “management” role defines two things, firstly their job, meaning the fact and dimensions of the individual’s responsibility vis-à-vis the task. Secondly, the “management” role defines and denotes the more transactional elements and levers of the role, the identification of strategy and tactics in achieving the task; allocation of resources for the task and the management of subordinates in terms of performance and reward.



**Figure 10. Leadership, management and managerial agency.**

In its preoccupation with the more inspirational tasks of leadership, the literature rather underplays the importance and centrality of management as clunky and process driven. In fact the managerial frame is core and central in that it defines the task and the area of responsibility that the leader is required to enact.

#### **11.2.5 Critique**

The critique of this model derives principally from the criticisms that can be levelled at the research methodology, particularly its non positivist approach, although a rationale for the single case study design and hermeneutic phenomenology research paradigm has been made above (Chapters 5 and 6).

Within its own epistemological terms a legitimate criticism of such a model of management might derive more generally from its potential irrefutability, following Popper's criticism of the "pseudo-sciences"<sup>702</sup>, where a counter example is re-interpreted within the frame of the model so as not to contradict it, for example a non charismatic leader's behaviour might be reinterpreted as having elements of the charismatic process, although they not being obvious.

A second critique might be made building on the assumption that managerial effectiveness within an organisation in predicates on their ability to lead, mobilise and direct subordinates. As a result, it might be argued that the model covers a very small element of the overall leadership and management process, focussing exclusively on the manager's activity and leadership with their own subordinate team, and missing the larger organisational function of the leader, their entrepreneurial activity, and engagement with superordinate managers. This is an acknowledged failing, based upon Parson's collectivist notion of power (3.2.2), and there are some speculations and proposals for further research noted below.

#### **11.3 Research constraints, speculation and recommendation for further research**

It is a constraint of the research that Hitler was chosen as a “crucial case” because of the probability of his being a psychopathic leader. It has been argued that Hitler led an organisation that is best characterised as criminal; it is proposed that he himself was on the autistic spectrum rather than being psychopathic. Within the crucial case method, this finding proves the null hypothesis; concluding that psychopathy is not a critical factor in leadership. However, a criticism might be that this undermines the method, in that he was not a psychopathic leader, and should not have been the critical case, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn relating to the second limb of the research question. In future research it would be interesting to explore the leadership styles of genuinely psychopathic leaders of criminal activities and gangs.

A second significant limitation for the principal conclusion is that it provides a model for leaders to influence their followers; that is, how they are effective subordinates. An area for further research might be to explore how personality influences superordinate functioning; that is to say, how they are effective with those organisational structures that contain the leader and their activity. The managerial agent may be effective superordinately by being able to relate to and engage with the structures in an organisation because they recognise that the “structures” are in fact people and that people can be played by seduction, manipulation, intimidation and so on. Managerial agency may be achieved by the charismatic emotional manipulation of supra-ordinate managers as well.

One might speculate that the role of the leader/manager at whatever level of a rational/legal bureaucracy is to both administer, and also be the expert in the rules for the specialist area for which they have responsibility, within a Weberian rational/legal authority based bureaucracy<sup>703</sup>. For the managerial agent, the “owner” of these rules would be the best person to know how to “get around” them, and would be the person who can make the decision to derogate them for a particular instance. In the ward setting, personality disordered patients know this. If the nurse on the ward says that something is against the rules, they will mention it to the hospital manager next time they are down, or complain to them in order to gain direct access. If they can effectively “play” the manager (which comes down to a very personal face to face contest), the rule is reversed, dissolved or derogates. Rules in a rational/legal structure are only as robust as their keeper.

The managerial agent, therefore, may be upwardly effective; that is, they can change and modify the organisational structures that limit their activity. This may be an ability to beneficially “flex” the superordinate rules and their respective keepers; “managing up” to influence them to bend these if required. For the managerial agent, the organisational structures are people, people who can be persuaded, cajoled, manipulated, bullied. With a protégé to appoint during a recruitment freeze, there might be a need for “a conversation with A”, a budget holding superordinate manager; finding a way around rules about equal opportunities are “lunch with B” who leads HR. Because organisational “structures” are in fact simply internalised, structured, habituated ideas, these ideas are owned and administered by individuals who have a personality, proclivities and vulnerabilities. The personality may be able to be influenced; can be changed using the same charismatic process that mutates the internal structures of subordinates. Following the self actualising effect of charisma, A and B in their relative roles may feel good for breaking the organisational structures, it having deepened the intimacy with the charismatic managerial agent.

Future research, utilising a qualitative methodology with semi structured interviews might illuminate the extent to which bureaucratic organisational structure and function can be flexed by personal interaction with the people who hold the authority.

#### **10.4 Conclusion**

In Weber’s analysis of modernity, he argues that the success of capitalism is in part predicated upon the eclipse of magic<sup>704</sup>

**The fate of our times is characterised... above all, by the disenchantment of the world<sup>705</sup>**

Overly structured divisions of labour in the “iron cage” of modernity can lead to fatalism, Marx’s analysis of alienation within modernity; Durkheim’s description of Anomie.

Perhaps the role of the leader in the post religious disenchanted world is to recreate a sense of meaning, with an attendant pseudo-spiritual dimension. To create solidarity and community by facilitating and attending to the relationships; to dis-alienate the workers from their activity by giving the work meaning, and personal relevance; to re-enchant the world of work with spirit, albeit false and manufactured and exploitatively instrumental.

It behoves us as followers, notwithstanding complacent reconstructed postmodern irony, to be aware of the risks of deserting the rational for the enchantments of the charismatic leader.

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