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The representations of Royalists and Royalism in the press,

c. 1637-1646

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Developing from the recent surge of interest in the Royalist cause during the Civil Wars, this thesis explores the question of how Royalists were portrayed in the press between 1637 and 1646. It addresses the question through textual analysis and specifically examines printed material in an effort to investigate the construction of Royalist identity as well as the peculiarities of Royalist discourse. At its most fundamental level, this thesis seeks to address the issue of Royalist identity, and in doing so suggests that it was predicated on an inconsistent and problematic form of English patriotism. According to the argument presented here, Charles I led a cause that was supposed to protect and champion the core institutions and cultural norms upon which the very nature of Englishness rested. Royalism existed to preserve England from what were perceived as the foreign and anti-English agendas of Parliament.

An underlying argument in this thesis is that Royalist print aspired to define and anchor language, with the implication that textual meaning was solidly formed and unquestionable. Royalist text, unlike that of Parliament, was supposed to represent truth, effectively rendering Royalist print a force for stability in an increasingly chaotic world. Alongside its focus on the ways in which the Royalist press tried to fashion an English identity for the King's supporters, this thesis also explores the image of the cavalier stereotype. It aims not to debunk such a stereotype, but to explore the implications behind it and show how they challenged and undermined the Royalists' Englishness.

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Abbreviations

C.R.O.	Chester Record Office
C.S.P.D.	Calendar of State Papers Domestic
G.R.O.	Gloucester Record Office
O.D.N.B.	Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

Introduction

At its fundamental level, the work in this thesis aims to explore the representations of Royalists and Royalism in the press. It investigates two issues. Firstly, the Royalists' struggle to develop and assert an image or identity that could be construed as legitimate and consistent with England's Protestant heritage forms a key component of the overall discussion. What emerges during the course of this thesis is a notion that the Civil Wars were characterised by a conflict over control of what Englishness was, however nebulous, inconsistent and fluid any contemporary definition of that term may have been. Secondly, it is intended that this study will provide some further insights into the nature of Royalist print, specifically the ways in which it attempted to engage with Englishness and command textual space.

Royalism has been, and to an extent continues to be, a somewhat problematic and troublesome area in Civil War studies. In practical terms, the lack of Royalist records may hinder research on Royalism, although we are still left with a not insubstantial portion of printed material that merits further attention. It may well be that Royalism has acquired an unfashionable image, with its focus on the divine right of kings having no place or relevance in the supposedly democratic nature of modern British politics. Ultimately, the outcomes and products of the Civil Wars rest uneasily with both Parliament's victory and the original objectives of the Royalist cause. Some supporters of Charles I must have felt alienated by the Restoration, and those who supported the Regicide were hardly likely to have welcomed the return of the monarchy. In any case, since the 1980s, and in particular the last decade, Royalists

and Royalism have been the subject of increased academic study.¹ This has in large part been in response to a perceived abundance of work on Parliamentarianism and Parliamentary leadership, and the focus on Royalism has been designed to redress this academic imbalance. The literature on Royalism is steadily growing and has generally been advanced by the adoption of more interdisciplinary approaches towards the 1640s, as demonstrated by the work of de Groot, and Smith and McElligott's recent edited volumes on Royalism.²

The key problem with the subject of Royalists and Royalism lies in identifying, defining and understanding who or what they were. Is it appropriate to consider or describe any opponent of Parliament as a Royalist? What of the internal differences within the Royalist cause? Was there such a phenomenon as popular Royalism, and if so did it differ from a more elitist Royalism? Studies into the high politics of Royalism have attempted to answer some of these questions. Smith's theory of Constitutional Royalism offers a way of identifying a core component of the Royalist cause, since it traces an actual political theory.³ Within the theory of Constitutional Royalism, the legal position of the King and his powers in relation to those of Parliament, together with the preservation of the established Church, is of fundamental interest. However,

¹ E.g. Smith, D., *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640-1649*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994; Hutton, R., *The Royalist War Effort*, London, Longman, 1982; Barratt, J., *Cavaliers: The Royalist Army at War 1642-1646*, Stroud, Sutton, 2000; Spencer, C., *Prince Rupert: The Last Cavalier*, London, Phoenix, 2007; Smith, G., *Royalist Agents, Conspirators and Spies*, London, Ashgate, 2011; Newman, P., *The Old Service: Royalist Regimental Colonels and the Civil War, 1642-46*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993; Newman, P., 'The King's Servants: Conscience, Principle and Sacrifice in Armed Royalism', in Morrill, J., Slack, P., and Woolf, D., (eds.), *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England: Essays Presented to G.E. Aylmer*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

² De Groot, J., *Royalist Identities*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; McElligott, J., and Smith, D., *Royalists and Royalism During the English Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; McElligott, J., and Smith, D., *Royalists and Royalism During the Interregnum*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010.

³ Smith, D. *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c. 1640-1649*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

as Scott points out, three issues undermine Smith's assertions.⁴ Firstly, an argument for the existence of Constitutional Royalism implicitly assumes that there was also a group of non-Constitutional Royalists amongst Charles' supporters. It may well be possible to argue that certain individuals in the King's camp, such as Rupert, were non-Constitutional Royalists. But such arguments are challenged by printed Royalist newsbooks and proclamations, which were consistent in their championing of legality. Secondly, as a term or label, Constitutional Royalism may be a little vague. Smith's theory can have the effect of being so broad and encapsulating that virtually any Royalist can be described as being a Constitutional Royalist. Despite carrying the implication that non-Constitutional Royalism also existed, Constitutional Royalism is seemingly undermined by the differences, disagreements and political ambitions of individual Royalists. Hyde and Culpeper, both included amongst the Constitutional Royalists, were locked in competition with each other in 1643. Even the seemingly absolutist Rupert advised Charles of an accommodation with Parliament, and by doing so can also qualify as a Constitutional Royalist. Thirdly, Smith's theory is perhaps problematised by the definitions and application of the terms, 'constitutional' and 'absolutist'. Given the diversity of seventeenth-century concepts of what was constitutional and absolutist, it may be difficult to accurately establish exactly what Constitutional and non-Constitutional Royalism could be. If, as Sommerville points out, absolutism can be regarded as a belief that the monarch's power and authority are divinely ordained, then it is difficult to see how any Constitutional Royalist could not also be absolutist.⁵ Indeed, the questions and problems posed by Smith's theory of Constitutional Royalism also apply to Hutton's

⁴ Scott, D., 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642-49', in Adamson, (ed.), *The English Civil War: Conflict and Contexts, 1640-49*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

⁵ Sommerville, J.P., 'Absolutism and Royalism', in Burns, J.H., (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

theory of moderate and ultra Royalists.⁶ The distinctions between the two main groups of Royalists in Smith's and Hutton's theories may in effect be too artificial and arbitrary to operate with consistency, but they do to an extent allow one to explore the overall image of Royalists and Royalism.

A number of cultural approaches to Caroline England have also been undertaken, many of which have the potential to affect our understanding of Royalism during the Civil Wars. The distinction between the courts of the early Stuarts and those of the Tudors has led historians and literary critics to examine the concept of chivalry and explore the rise of the Cavalier. In the 1950s, Yates noted the importance of chivalry during the reign of Elizabeth I. She described the Accession Day Tilts as being part of 'an imaginative re-feudalisation of culture'.⁷ Significantly, Yates suggested that during Elizabeth's reign the notion of chivalry became compatible with English Protestantism, and ultimately became 'a vehicle for patriotic devotion to the popular national monarchy and zeal for the Protestant cause'.⁸ Indeed, by the 1630s, Elizabeth's reign appears to have become preserved for posterity as one coloured by the exploits of heroic English Protestant figures such as Sir Philip Sidney.⁹ This has influenced James and Adamson in their assertions that the tradition of chivalry and honour played a major role in culture and identity during the 1640s.¹⁰

James explored the issue of chivalry and honour, arguing that honour was directly linked to political identity and violence. By examining a range of books and

⁶ Hutton, R., 'The Structure of the Royalist Party, 1642-1646', in *The History Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1981.

⁷ Yates, F.A., 'Elizabethan Chivalry: The Romance of the Accession Day Tilts', in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, No. 20, 1957, p. 22.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹ Stewart, A., *Philip Sidney: A Double Life*, London, Pimlico, 2001, p. 2.

¹⁰ James, M., 'English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485-1642', in James, M., *Society, Politics and Culture*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986; Adamson, J.S.A., 'Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England', in Sharpe, K., and Lake, P., (eds.), *Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England*, London, Macmillan, 1994.

manuals which were printed between the late fourteenth and early seventeenth centuries, James was able to chart the changes in the concept of honour. He suggested that by the early seventeenth century a split was emerging in the identity of the man of honour as the monarchy became alienated from other areas of government.¹¹ Whilst James implied that Ramon Llull's *The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry* of 1283 showed that a knight's duty was not necessarily tied to his king, but rather to his 'earthly lord and naturel cuntry', he also argued that the printing of works such as John Foxe's 1563 *Book of Martyrs* enabled images of war to become entwined with Protestant images of the Anti-Christ, and thereby promote the concept of a chivalrous Protestant knight.¹² This imagery came to be extended to mariners through books which embraced and glorified the adventures of English privateers, such as Richard Hakluyt's *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* of 1589. Alongside these developments in the concepts of chivalry and honour, James revealed that the rise of Humanism during the sixteenth century promoted a 'composite' form of honour in which it was possible for non-military men to have honourable status.¹³ In effect, James' work implied that there was a split emerging in the concept of chivalry by the early seventeenth century, and this potentially raises some issues in relation to the Royalism of the Civil Wars.

Since they either failed in, or were unable to champion, 'causes... Martiall', both James I, and ultimately Charles I throughout most of the 1630s, tried to distance themselves from the image of the chivalrous warrior-knight.¹⁴ Indeed, James I came to be referred to as 'Jacobus Pacificus' by Sir Henry Neville, and Thomas Carew wrote

¹¹ James, 'English Politics', in James, *Society*, p. 309.

¹² James, 'English Politics', pp. 385-386; Yates comments on Queen Elizabeth's retention of St. George in the Statutes in Yates, 'Elizabethan Chivalry', in *JWCI*, pp.22-23.

¹³ James, 'English politics', in James, *Society*, p. 309.

¹⁴ *Cyule and Vncyule Life*, p. 76.

of how Charles' 'Regall browes' were adorned with 'peacefull Olive bowes'.¹⁵ As such, Smuts has observed that a cultural 'revolution' occurred during the peaceful years before 1642.¹⁶ For example, the tradition of holding tilts on the anniversary of the monarch's ascension to the throne ended once Charles became King.¹⁷ This was part of what Adamson has described as 'the creation of a new chivalric ideology' which was designed to distance the monarchy from the politically awkward concept of the Elizabethan 'Golden Age' of war against Spain.¹⁸

For Adamson, the distancing of the monarchy from the Elizabethan era was achieved through the courtly arts, which tried to illustrate that the belligerent armoured knight was out-dated and obsolete as his 'shields and swords' truly were 'Cobwebbed and rusty'.¹⁹ Indeed, Adamson suggested that under Charles the identity of the knight became that of a 'guardian of the peace'.²⁰ Adamson's argument has been taken a step further by the contributions of art history. Peacock, Corns, Smuts and Wilcher have considered the implications that lie behind the symbolism in contemporary paintings.²¹ By reading into Peter Paul Rubens' *A Landscape with St. George and the Dragon*, Smuts and Wilcher have argued that in adopting the image of St. George, Charles was effectively being presented as an Arthurian king who was saving his people and country from the 'devouring monster' of war which was then

¹⁵ Quoted in Smuts, R., *Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987, p. 25; Wilcher, R., *The Writing of Royalism, 1628-1660*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 10. It is worth noting that in the early 1620s, Charles openly displayed an interest in military matters and actually allowed his portrait to adorn the frontispiece of the English version of *Civil and Military Aphorisms of Guicciardini*, Gregg, P., *King Charles I*, London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1981, p. 34.

¹⁶ Smuts, *Court Culture*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Adamson, 'Chivalry', in Sharpe and Lake, *Culture and Politics*, pp. 164-165.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹⁹ Adamson, 'Chivalry', in Sharpe and Lake, *Culture and Politics*, pp. 169-177; the court masque, *Prince Henry's Barriers* quoted in Smuts, *Court Culture*, pp. 23-30.

²⁰ Adamson, 'Chivalry', in Sharpe and Lake, *Culture and Politics*, p. 170.

²¹ Peacock, J., 'The visual image of Charles I', in Corns, T., (ed.), *The Royal Image: Representations of Charles I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 176; Smuts, *Court Culture*, pp. 247-249; Wilcher, R., *The Writing of Royalism, 1628-1660*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. See also Bence-Jones, M., *The Cavaliers*, London, Constable, 1976, p. 9.

consuming Europe.²² To use Richard Fanshawe's words, Charles appeared to be the 'author of peace / And *Halcyon* dayes': he was shown to be an imperial ruler, an '*Augustus*' of England, and not an obsolete medieval warrior-king.²³ Parry and Wilcher's analysis of both courtly writing before 1642 and post-war Royalist writing reinforces this idea, since the iconography within such material seemingly constructs a mythical Caroline Golden Age.²⁴ According to Smuts references to medieval warrior-kings and Elizabethan naval supremacy 'virtually disappeared from court masques and poems' in the early Stuart era, thus enabling the monarch to escape from the implications of the Thirty Years War in Europe.²⁵ The implication of such arguments is that Charles' court became increasingly isolated during the 1630s, and that court culture developed an artificial flavour which exploded the King's own ideology and thereby created a barrier between Charles and the outside world.²⁶

There are, however, problems which are largely unaddressed or acknowledged by cultural approaches to Charles' rule. Firstly, was Charles' switch from a seemingly pacific monarch to a warring King ever resolved in either courtly or Royalist literature? Secondly, is not the concept of Caroline chivalry and Cavalier identity more complex than it may appear? The impression one gets from cultural histories of the 1630s is that there was a move away from Elizabethan heroism in the court. Smuts' work, for instance, suggests that the culture in the courts of James and Charles was generally different from that of Elizabeth. Indeed, part of Smuts' work argues that the political approaches and cultural images of James and Charles contrasted quite strongly with those that had been developed around Elizabeth, and

²² Smuts, *Court Culture*, pp. 247-249; Wilcher, *Writing*, p. 10.

²³ Quoted in Wilcher, *Writing*, pp.12-13.

²⁴ Parry, G., *The Golden Age Restored: The Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603-42*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1981, p. 1; Wilcher, *Writing*, pp. 7-9.

²⁵ Smuts, *Court Culture*, p. 24.

²⁶ Parry, *Golden Age*, pp. 264-265; Wilcher, *Writing*, pp. 11-13.

as such distanced them from the perceived patriotic traditions of both the English monarchy and its subjects.²⁷ It is for this reason that part of the work in this thesis examines the image of Elizabethan England and its endurance into Charles' reign.

What also emerges from cultural approaches to Stuart England is that the term, 'Cavalier', and its application are important. Sharpe has argued that 'there were no cavaliers in the 1630s – if the term is intended to delineate a coherent political group'.²⁸ Although the origins of the word, 'Cavalier', predate the Civil Wars, it only appears to have gained widespread association with Charles and his followers after the Bishops' Wars. Assuming that we can and should refer to 'Cavaliers' before the outbreak of war, then there is an inconsistency in Cavalier identity. If the Cavalier was a product of a peaceful court and embodied pacific Stuart rule, then the Cavalier of the 1640s was clearly very different. Whether we examine the Parliamentary or Royalist concepts, it is apparent that the Cavalier possessed some form of martial identity that clashed with the image we have of Charles' court in the 1630s.

The works of Hunt and Butler go some way to teasing out the question of chivalry in Caroline England. Hunt has argued that a 'civic chivalry' was emerging from the 1610s onwards as popular fears of a Spanish invasion of England continued to grow.²⁹ By the early seventeenth century such fears had, according to Hunt, sparked a move for the remilitarisation of England and English society. This resulted in the refounding of the Artillery Garden in 1610 along with the establishment of a series of urban militias during the 1620s. Although these organisations apparently received no royal funding, they became enshrined in the public imagination as

²⁷ Smuts, *Court Culture*, chs. 1-2.

²⁸ Sharpe, K., *Criticism and Compliment: The Politics of Literature in the England of Charles I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 27.

²⁹ Hunt, W., 'Civic Chivalry and the English Civil War', in Grafton, A., and Blair, A., (eds.), *The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, p. 213.

genuine protectors of the English nation and holy warriors of true religion. In effect, they were portrayed as the seventeenth-century English counterpart to chivalrous medieval crusaders.³⁰ Hunt pointed out that these images were reflected in books such as Thomas Adams' *The Soldier's Honour* whilst other writers, such as William Gouge, dedicated poems to the chivalrous Artillery Garden.³¹

Closely related to Hunt's notion of civic chivalry and identity, then, is the fact that, as Butler has argued, political issues permeated contemporary plays and printed works, turning them into 'vehicles of criticism' which implicitly challenged monarchical policies, and hence courtly identity.³² What this potentially means is that the extent to which Charles and his court were isolated is questionable, and it also asks us to reassess how and where the Cavalier developed, and what it signified. Such issues are thus linked to James' assertion that the public theatre and its depiction of honour fed the Cavalier and Roundhead stereotypes of the 1640s.³³ Such issues invite us to explore whether the court, and later Royalism, ultimately had to facilitate and incorporate some Elizabethan imagery into their own projections. It is certainly clear that books which glorified England's heroic Protestant past and questioned Stuart foreign policy emerged from the press in the wake of the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618.³⁴ It is also apparent that the actions of the 'high and mighty' Gustavus Adolphus helped to revive the Elizabethan legend.

³⁰ Hunt, 'Civic Chivalry', in Grafton and Blair, *Transmission of Culture*, pp. 224-225.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Butler, M., *Theatre and Crisis 1632-1642*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp.3-4.

³³ James, 'English politics', in James, *Society*, pp.410-411. According to his argument, by the 1630s there was a sense that honour could be gained and served only through public causes. This was implicit in Jonson's *The New Inn*, in which Lovel says 'it springs out of reason / And tends to perfect honesty, the scope / Is always honour and the public good / It is no valour for a private cause...'. Fighting for personal honour in this context is seen to be false; it is 'man's idol' which has been 'set up against God'.

³⁴ E.g. Reynolds, J., *Vox Coeli*, London, 1624, p. 37.

The endurance and influence of England's Elizabethan ethos is an issue that has been touched on by Loxley, who suggests that Charles came under pressure to become a leader or figurehead of a continental Protestant cause.³⁵ Indeed, Butler's work emphasises the exact same point. He points out that events, such as the arrival of the Elector Palatine and Prince Rupert in England in 1635, exerted pressure on Charles to enter the European conflict and champion the Protestant cause.³⁶ Butler's work in many ways challenges the assertions of Smuts and Wilcher, since it reassesses some aspects of court culture and reviews their implications. Butler's examination of *The Triumphs Of The Prince D'Amovr* leads him to the conclusion that masques had the potential to criticise both Charles' foreign policies and the Caroline concept of chivalry. The emphasis that is placed on the image of a religious warrior-knight invokes the memory of Crusade-era knightly orders and displaces the pacific and decadent Stuart Cavalier.³⁷

If cultural approaches to the 1630s reveal that there were differing versions of chivalric ideals, then there is also some work on how those ideals affected the 1640s. Adamson provides some insights into this issue by suggesting that a medieval form of chivalry emerged during the 1640s. For Adamson, Parliamentary polemic was initially shaped by a desire to profess loyalty to the King and true Protestant religion whilst attacking his supposedly papist counsellors.³⁸ Within this context, the nobility had a duty to resist any corrupt advisors of the King so that the interests of the

³⁵ Loxley, J., *Royalism and Poetry in the English Civil Wars: The Drawn Sword*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997, pp. 23-24; *An Elegie Upon The Death Of The Most Illvstrioivs And Victorivvs Prince Gvstavus Adolphvs*, London, 1632. For an example of an elegy on Gustavus Adolphus, see *The Cavses for which the Most High and Mighty Prince and Lo: Lord Gustavus Adolphus*, London, 1631.

³⁶ Butler, *Theatre*, p. 31.

³⁷ Butler, *Theatre*, pp. 31-35; *The Triumphs Of The Prince D'Amovr*, London, 1635, pp. 4-8. The fact that the Knights Templars were a Catholic institution appears to have been overlooked by the masque.

³⁸ Adamson, 'Chivalry', in Sharpe and Lake, *Culture and Politics*, pp. 164-165.

country could be maintained.³⁹ The language of documents such as the *Nineteen Propositions* gave the Parliamentary cause a quasi-legalistic platform based on ancient and medieval precedents, and endued the Earl of Essex with a vice-regal status.⁴⁰ According to Adamson's interpretation, therefore, the Civil Wars had a baronial context. The weighting of Adamson's theory, however, lies on the Parliamentary perspective and leaves one to ask how Royalists perceived and projected both themselves and the Civil Wars.

De Groot goes some way to addressing Royalist identity by asking what Royalism wanted to be. The creation of binary oppositions in Royalist polemic is a strong focus in de Groot's research, as he argues that 'Royalist writing attempted to define a straightforward identity hierarchy in which you were either in or out'.⁴¹ The centre of de Groot's thesis is the claim that

Royalist identity consisted in not being implicated in the accusations, in being loyal and virtuous... Being a Royalist consisted of being what a Rebel was not, in refuting the traitorous challenge of the Parliament... Parliamentarians sought the death of the King, inverting and negating all notions of order and stability... Royalists embraced the King, understanding his paternal relation to them...⁴²

By examining the language and rhetoric of Royalist newsbooks, pamphlets and poetry, de Groot offers an interpretation of Royalist polemic and identity which suggests that Royalism was concerned with creating stability.⁴³ Given that both King and Parliament understandably felt the need to justify their actions, as already

³⁹ Adamson, 'Chivalry', pp. 164-165.

⁴⁰ Adamson, J., 'The Baronial Context of the English Civil War', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, No. 40, 1990, pp. 94-114.

⁴¹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 18 and p. 94.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 44. Indeed, de Groot's statement clearly relates to Marston's argument that a gentleman's identification of the King as the head or father of the nation's people related to contemporary patriarchal conceptions of family honour, and thus proved to be a motivation to join the Royalist cause, Marston, J.G., 'Gentry Honour and Royalism in Early Stuart England', in *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, November 1974, p.21, 27-33.

⁴³ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 7-8.

suggested in Adamson's work, de Groot argues that Royalist identity was defined by the law, and that this was reflected in Royalist writing.⁴⁴ At the heart of the Royalist conception of stability stood the King, the embodiment of law, and the King's person was the one power which could stop the 'wild Career' and 'dire paines' of the Parliament of 'Hell'.⁴⁵ With this in mind, de Groot adopts a similar argument to Loxley, and suggests that 'Royalist language was prescriptive of identity'.⁴⁶ In effect, Royalism was about control of language and meaning.

De Groot's basic concept is very difficult to refute. Pamphlets such as *The Devil Turn'd Round-Head* clearly present the reader with a binary presentation of Royalism and Parliamentarianism, enabling de Groot to show that the Roundhead is in 'perfect opposition to the Cavalier'.⁴⁷ One question that arises from these ideas is whether Royalist attempts to 'culturally encode and identify' their readers were more flexible and inclusive than de Groot's 'in or out' concept of Royalism allows.⁴⁸ Wilcher points out that by 1643 there were examples of Royalist writers trying to reach out to a broader section of the population.⁴⁹ Royalist pamphleteering was, according to Wilcher, beginning to emphasise 'the moral failings of those who remained at Westminster'.⁵⁰ Wilcher's ideas relate to de Groot's interest in Royalist legal space, but tend to stress how Royalism was capable of appealing to more people. One of the implications behind the theories of Adamson and de Groot is whether patriotism played an important role during the 1640s. De Groot raised the issue of Royalism and

⁴⁴ Adamson, 'Chivalry', in Sharpe and Lake, *Culture and Politics*; Adamson, 'Baronial Context', in *TRHS*; de Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 20-50.

⁴⁵ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 23 and p. 42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴⁷ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 79-95; *The Devil Turn'd*, p. 6. See also, Oldridge, D., 'Protestant Conceptions of the Devil in Early Stuart England', in *History*, Vol. 85, No. 278, April 2000.

⁴⁸ *The Devil Turn'd Round-Head*, London, 1642; de Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 60, pp. 79-81.

⁴⁹ Wilcher, *Writing*, pp.162-163.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3; *A Letter From A Grave Gentleman*, London, 1643, p. 1.

Englishness, but the focus of his work tended to be on the textuality of Royalism.⁵¹ Adamson's research shows that service to the person of the King could be divorced from service to the country, and this leads one to question whether patriotism influenced Royalist and Parliamentary discourse and identity.

The issue of patriotism and patriotic identity in relation to Royalism appears in Malcolm's and Stoye's works. In Malcolm's case, a picture emerges of a Royalist cause that was heavily dependent on the use of non-English soldiers. According to Malcolm's analysis, the use of Welsh, Cornish, and especially Irish soldiers in Royalist armies was damaging for the King's image.⁵² Referring to the case of Sir Edward Dering, Malcolm points out that the defections of individuals from the Royalist side serves as evidence that some people shed their Royalist credentials due to alienation from the apparent change in the identity of Royalism.⁵³ Her argument is further supported by her investigation into the designs of Royalist banners, which indicates that senior Royalist commanders occasionally disapproved of the use of battle standards that displayed references to Protestantism. Following this logic, Royalism had the potential to alienate contemporaries and thereby push them towards the Parliamentary cause, which more clearly expressed an identity in keeping with their own religious beliefs.⁵⁴ In effect, Royalist identity suffered from several confusions which made it difficult for the King's cause to be precisely and coherently defined. Unfortunately, there are doubts over Malcolm's statistics, and her apparent use of Parliamentary reportage as evidence of how Royalists reacted to the Irish presence is

⁵¹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 37.

⁵² Malcolm, J.L., *Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King Charles 1642-1646*, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1983, pp. 92-120.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵⁴ Malcolm uses the example of a Captain John Fenwick being unable to use his desired slogan 'For the King and the Protestant Religion' on his battle standard in the Marquis of Newcastle's army. Fenwick subsequently defected to Fairfax's army where he would be able to use such a standard. Dering, having seen 'so many papists and Irish rebels in the king's army and the anti-parliament' decided that 'his conscience would not permit him to stay longer with them' and defected to Parliament. Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, p. 154.

questionable.⁵⁵ But Malcolm's research is nonetheless important, since it introduced the issue of whether xenophobia influenced the shaping of Civil War identities and allegiances.

Stoyle's work advances many of Malcolm's ideas and raises the point about how Royalism could project an image that may have had a broader appeal. Stoyle's work suggests that one of the issues which ought to be considered is how Royalism could forge a patriotic identity. If Royalism could be accused of relying on foreign assistance, then what were the implications of Parliament's alliance with Scotland? As Stoyle puts it, Parliament's alliance created a sense of 'decay' which gave Royalist pamphleteers the opportunity to explode Royalism's patriotic credentials.⁵⁶ However, the focus of Stoyle's work was not specifically on Royalism, but on the influence and impact of foreigners on the wars in England.

One general limitation of Civil War studies is that they are frequently Anglo-centric, although Stoyle's work has gone some way to addressing this. Consideration of the Celtic fringes of the British Isles is potentially important in relation to the issues of Royalist identity since it adds further challenges as to how Gaelic soldiers and their commanding officers perceived the war in which they were fighting. This in turn questions the motivations of those Gaelic soldiers fighting under a Royalist commander, and therefore offers a further challenge to the notion of popular Royalism. For instance, as Stevenson mentions, the campaigns of the Marquis of Newcastle against the Scottish Covenanters from 1644 to 1645 saw an amalgamation

⁵⁵ Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, pp. 108-116. Malcolm has estimated that some 22,240 to 22,740 troops were shipped over to England from Ireland, and of these some 8,000 were native Irish. Barratt and Stoyle, however, suggest that only about 2,000 native Irish served in the Royalist armies, Barratt, *Cavaliers*, p. 140; Stoyle, *Soldiers and Strangers*, p. 61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-90; Stoyle, M., *West Britons: Cornish Identities and the Early Modern British State*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 2002; Stoyle, M., 'Caricaturing Cymru: Images of the Welsh in the London Press, 1642-46', in Dunn, D., (ed.), *War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2000.

of Gaelic clan warfare and religiously motivated fighting with the Royalist cause.⁵⁷ In the eyes of some contemporaries, once Montrose was leading Alasdair MacColla's force of Irish troops and Highlanders, the character of the war in Scotland became less clearly defined as the foreign invasion came to be associated with a Scottish Royalist uprising.⁵⁸ Alongside Montrose's Royalist identity existed Irish 'Catholic crusaders', who saw the campaign in Scotland as a way of removing the Covenanting army from Ireland, and MacColla's Highlanders, who wanted to wage war against the Campbells.⁵⁹ Thus, as Stevenson and Barratt have implied, with these different internal identities and motivations lying underneath Montrose's command, it seems unlikely that Montrose's ultimate ambition of directing his forces against the Parliamentary armies in England and winning a decisive victory for the failing Royalist cause would ever have materialised.⁶⁰ It may well be that, with the exception of high ranking officers, an analysis of the perspectives of those common soldiers who fought in the Gaelic fringes of the British Isles is almost impossible to conduct, but it does invite the question as to whether Royalist print ever engaged with the identities of those fighting beyond England's borders. Certain parts of this thesis suggest that Royalist print actually did make some attempt to address Welsh and Cornish people, though the extent to which such efforts may have been effective is not quantified.

What has generally been noticeable in research on Royalism is the position of Charles himself. Often regarded as an aloof and private person, Charles has emerged as a considerably more complex individual. For instance, Poynting's research is quite revealing in terms of Charles' personal life, and potentially offers new insights into

⁵⁷ Stevenson, D., *Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars*, Edinburgh, John Donald, 1980, pp. 121-122.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*; Barratt, *Cavaliers*, pp. 179-187.

the nature of language in Royalism.⁶¹ As the obvious centre of the Royalist cause, it would naturally be expected that Charles had a vital role in the shaping of Royalism and Royalist identity. In the context of de Groot's work, Charles was central in defining Royalism. He embodied law and social order, and his eventual execution destroyed Royalism's meaning and identity. But literary criticism also suggests that Charles may not have had total control over his own identity. Potter's interpretation of Royalist texts raises the interesting point that the identity of the King himself was reshaped, even recreated by Royalist writers during the late 1640s, as he became a 'much more vivid personality than he had ever been while still at freedom'.⁶² This was achieved through publications such as the *Eikon Basilike*, which, as Raymond and Wheeler say, changed Charles into a figure who was accessible to common readers.⁶³ What this might indicate is that the absence of the King enabled individuals to re-envisage Royalism in their own unique ways. Indeed, Potter's work concludes that the Regicide did not end Royalist identity, but rather changed it. Instead of mourning and accepting that the death of Charles signified the end of Royalism, Royalists became the King's 'avengers'.⁶⁴ Subversion and resistance were thus staples in Royalist identity, and this was an argument shared by Corns and Underdown.⁶⁵

Corns approached the concept of the subversive Royalist by highlighting Lovelace's *Lucasta* as a clear example of defiance, describing it as 'the song-book of

⁶¹ Poynting, S., '“I doe desire to be tightly vnerstood”: Rhetorical Strategies in the Letters of Charles I', in McElligott, J., and Smith, D., *Royalists and Royalism During the English Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; Poynting, S., 'Deciphering the King: Charles I's Letters to Jane Whorwood', *The Seventeenth Century*, Volume 21, Number 1, in *The Seventeenth Century*, Spring 2006.

⁶² Poynting, 'Rhetorical Strategies', p. 175.

⁶³ Raymond, J., 'Popular Representations of Charles I', in Corns, T., (ed.), *The Royal Image: Representations of Charles I*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 62; Wheeler, E., 'Eikon Basilike and the Rhetoric of Self-Representation', in Corns, *The Royal Image*, p. 127.

⁶⁴ Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 192.

⁶⁵ Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue*; Underdown, D., *Royalist Conspiracy in England, 1649-1660*, Yale University Press, 1960.

the undefeated'.⁶⁶ By examining the chivalric elements of *Lucasta*, Corns argued that Lovelace was attacking Parliamentary rebelliousness and expressing Royalist virtue.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Corns interpreted the eroticism in *Lucasta* as a challenge to Puritan morality, and suggested that Lovelace's use of eroticism was indicative of a Royalist's identity. This eroticism, however, was not indicative of the debauching Cavaliers seen in Parliamentary literature. Instead, Corns argued that in *Lucasta*, Lovelace was suggesting that a man who expresses passionate love towards his mistress is capable of offering self-sacrifice and devotion to his King.⁶⁸ Royalist sexuality in this context does not resemble the self-centred excess of the stereotypical Cavalier, but instead signifies selfless loyalty. Royalist subversion is therefore predicated on the impact of political and legal revolution, and not purely on the cultural change imposed by a Puritan regime.

Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the theme of excess in the concept of Royalist subversion, and this forms a key component in Potter's work on Royalist poetry, ballads and literature.⁶⁹ Malcolm may have argued that the authors of Royalist ballads unwittingly gave credence to Parliamentary images of corrupt and immoral Royalists, but Potter has shown that such themes were central to Royalist identity and culture during the Interregnum. In drinking 'whole ones or nothing', Royalists were drinking for the destruction of 'those that would destroy drinking', and Potter has interpreted such actions as 'an unthreatening parody of real rebellion'.⁷⁰ It is apparent, therefore, that the association of Royalists with activities such as drinking served to counter the excessive hunger of the Parliamentarian monster for devouring

⁶⁶ Corns, *Uncloistered Virtue*, pp. 68-69.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-76.

⁶⁹ Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp. 137-145.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Wilcher, *Writing*, p. 333; Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 101.

the history, culture and identity of the late King's England.⁷¹ Additionally, with Royalists and Royalism being identified with the subversive, Potter raised the interesting point that Royalism, banditry and disguise came to be closely related, and actually helped form the identity of Charles II.⁷²

In order to fully understand the Royalist identity, or identities, of the 1640s, it is apparent that we need to examine the years which preceded 1642. Judging by the contributions made by scholars such as James, Adamson, Smuts and Hunt, it is evident that the identities of the Royalists and Parliamentarians during the 1640s were based upon earlier conceptions of chivalry and honour. However, the question as to how Charles' apparently pacific version of chivalry during the 1630s transformed into a belligerent code of honour in the 1640s needs to be further explored. Religion was clearly a significant factor in defining identities, but, as Stoye and Malcolm have suggested, the influx of foreign soldiers into England during the First Civil War of 1642 to 1646 and their subsequent integration with English military forces challenges those identities.⁷³ The association of the Royalist cause with foreigners, notably the Irish, surely shook popular perceptions of the King and his followers. It is certainly worth considering whether the presence of foreigners in the Royalist cause complicates de Groot's thesis of binary oppositions at any level.⁷⁴ If, however, the foreign elements of the Royalist cause do not form any challenge to de Groot's assertion that Royalism defined itself as the opposite of Parliamentarianism, then it remains to be seen how each opposing army was presented in contemporary reports of battles and sieges, and whether these representations were indicative of

⁷¹ Quoted in Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp.35-36.

⁷² Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp. 102-104.

⁷³ Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, pp. 113-123; Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers*, pp. 53-72.

⁷⁴ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 1.

specifically Royalist ideals.⁷⁵ The impact of military defeat on Royalist print is another area that deserves some attention, since there exists the possibility that the projection of Royalism could have been changed by the collapse of the King's war effort.

Given that research on Royalism has raised the question of patriotism, the overall aim of this thesis is to attempt to tease out the ways in which Royalism tried to engage with an English identity. It must be acknowledged at this point that the whole concept of an English or patriotic identity in the seventeenth century is problematic. In no small part this is probably due to the conflicts over Englishness and Britishness, and the extent to which the two terms can become synonymous. The question of what England and English identity are or were remains difficult in our current political climate, and the issues are no less complex when considering their application in the early modern period. Following the work of Pocock and Russell, it is only relatively recently that the British dimension of the wars between King and Parliament has been appreciated.⁷⁶ Approaches to the conflicts tend to be largely, though perhaps understandably, Anglo-centric, with fringe populations and outsiders being seen to intermittently affect events in England.⁷⁷ The concept of the wars of the 1640s being "English Civil Wars" is thus enduring and misleading. It is difficult, even impossible, to accurately and confidently term the wars as being specifically English. People from each corner of the British Isles were actively involved in them, as were individuals from the continental mainland and beyond.

⁷⁵ For instance, in the wake of the 'Military Revolution' and the rise of a more modern form of warfare with an emphasis on missile weaponry, it remains to be seen whether Royalist propaganda and writing frequently depicted Royalist soldiers fighting in a neo-chivalric fashion of hand-to-hand combat instead of dishonourable ranged engagements.

⁷⁶ Russell, C., 'The British Problem and the English Civil War', in Gaunt, P., (ed.), *The English Civil War: The Essential Readings*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000.

⁷⁷ E.g. Purkiss, D., *The English Civil War: A People's History*, London, Harper Press, 2006; Braddick, M., *God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars*, London, Penguin, 2009.

Perhaps the first problem occurs in identifying the distinction between England and Britain, since they are often taken to be synonymous. A cursory glance through various sixteenth- and seventeenth-century publications reveals numerous references to 'Britain', 'Great Britain', and 'England', but their application and meaning is often different and sometimes cryptic. The seventeenth-century historian and cartographer, John Speed, wrote *The History of Great Britain* and produced an atlas entitled *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* to accompany it. In the latter publication, England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland are shown to be united, most probably because of the ascension of James I. Yet in other instances references to 'Great Britain' appear to be synonymous with England.⁷⁸ In some cases the word, 'Britain', is used in relation to the ancient ancestry of certain peoples, notably the Welsh and Cornish.⁷⁹ We are thus led to question whether a reference to 'England' actually means England alone, or whether it means an England in which Cornwall and Wales are integrated into it. Likewise, can 'Britain' be used to describe England and Wales during the 1640s, given that full political union between England and Scotland was still over sixty years into the future? It is evident that a concept of Britain existed in contemporaries' minds, but there was little consistency or clarity in what that concept actually consisted of.

Cornwall had effectively been politically integrated with England since the tenth century, when Saxon rule was finally extended to the south-western peninsula. The inevitable result of this was that by the 1640s, the cultural and political identity of the Cornish had already been assaulted and eroded through several centuries of

⁷⁸ E.g. *An Alarme to England*, London, 1647; *The Flying Post*, London, 1644.

⁷⁹ E.g. Parker, M., *Britaines Honour*, London, 1640.

Anglocentric literature.⁸⁰ In 1337 the duchy of Cornwall was established, and there were twenty-one Cornish boroughs by the early seventeenth century.⁸¹ Along with the political unification of Cornwall with England came the decline of the Cornish language. Less than one quarter of Cornwall's population still spoke Cornish by 1600.⁸² Perhaps more so than any other Celtic area in the British Isles, Cornwall was, and still is, regarded in many ways as a mere extension of England.

Yet for all of Cornwall's political integration with England, the Cornish were still portrayed as an alien people. Throughout the war of 1642 to 1646, the Parliamentary press targeted the Cornish, clearly distinguishing them from the inhabitants of south-eastern England.⁸³ Stoye points out that the Cornish still retained a sense of difference by the 1640s. He suggests that an awareness or perception that Englishness was culturally encroaching Cornwall may have been a strong factor in driving the Cornish to war.⁸⁴ The legend that the Cornish were descended from Corineus was apparently influential in forming the identity of many a Cornishman by the seventeenth century, clearly placing them at odds with the English, who were supposedly descended from Brutus.⁸⁵

As Cornwall had experienced political integration with England, so too did Wales. England and Wales were brought closer together under the Tudors. Henry VIII's Acts of Union from 1536 formed the basis of closer political ties between England and Wales, and the Council in the Marches had ensured that Wales did not

⁸⁰ Stoye, M., *West Britons: Cornish Identities and the Early Modern British State*, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 2002, pp. 9-10.

⁸¹ Duffin, A., *Faction and Faith: Politics and Religion of the Cornish Gentry before the Civil War*, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1996, ch. 1.

⁸² Stoye, *West Britons*, pp. 12-16; Stoye, *Soldiers and Strangers*, p. 34.

⁸³ See Stoye, *West Britons*, pp. 33-35 and Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.

⁸⁴ Stoye, *West Britons*, ch. 1; Stoye, 'Cornish Rebellions', in *History Today*, Volume 47, No. 5, 1997.

⁸⁵ Stoye, *West Britons*, p. 13.

lose its own identity to England.⁸⁶ Whilst Wales became integrated with English law and administration, it retained a sense of self that was relevant to the changing political circumstances. Further unity between England and Wales was brought about by the Elizabethan settlement, which saw the translation of the Bible and Book of Common Prayer into Welsh. Protestantism thus became relevant and accessible to the Welsh, cementing their bond with the English.⁸⁷ The Tudors' own Welsh lineage may also have aided in drawing England and Wales together, and this too applied to their Stuart successors.⁸⁸

If England and Wales had been drawn together under the same legal and administrative systems, then Scotland was more problematic. The death of Elizabeth in 1603 resulted in James VI of Scotland becoming James I of England, thus bringing the two kingdoms under one crown and creating the British monarchy. But James' inheritance of the English crown and his subsequent move south meant that royal power came to be located in London, depriving Scotland of any substantial royal presence. English politicians, such as the Duke of Buckingham, came to influence Scottish business, with the result that Scotland was drawn into the pursuits of English foreign policy. This led to Scotland being viewed as a type of satellite state of England, and it was this perception of Scottish subservience to England which the Jacobites ultimately tried to exploit during the eighteenth century.⁸⁹ As with Wales, Scotland retained a cultural identity that was distinct from England, and this was in part due to

⁸⁶ The Council also included five English counties. Williams, P., *The Council in the Marches under Elizabeth I*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1958; Roberts, P., 'The English Crown, the Principality of Wales and the Council in the Marches, 1534-1641', in Bradshaw, B., and Roberts, P., (eds), *British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-1707*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁸⁷ See Jenkins, P., 'The Anglican Church and the Unity of Britain: The Welsh Experience, 1560-1714', in Ellis and Barber, *Conquest & Union*, pp. 118-120.

⁸⁸ For further discussion of Wales and its relationship with England see Roberts, P., 'Tudor Wales, National Identity and the British Inheritance', in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*.

⁸⁹ Brown, K.M., 'Scottish Identity in the Seventeenth Century', in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*, p. 237.

the Scottish Covenant which certainly coloured events from the 1630s. Even after the union of 1707, Scotland's identity was guaranteed by the preservation of the Church and Scottish legal system.

If, as Smyth points out, Scotland could be described as the lesser partner in a relationship with England, the situation regarding Ireland was far different, since it was regarded as a colony.⁹⁰ After all, the implication of the 1649 act for 'abolishing the kingly office of England and Ireland' was that the crowns of England and Ireland were not divisible, whereas that of Scotland was.⁹¹ Ireland's position as a colony of England was supported by the policy of plantation, which had gained momentum following the Desmond rebellion of the 1570s, and by the assertion of the English crown's authority over the country after the defeat of Hugh O'Neill in 1603.

Plantation effectively expanded the control and ownership of Protestant settlers whilst displacing the Catholic Irish, and was aggressively pursued by the Earl of Strafford during the 1630s. Unlike Wales and Scotland, English approaches to Ireland amounted to cultural and religious eradication, with the Protestant settlers regarding themselves as English rather than Irish. Even then, the English identity of the Protestant settlers was blurred by Parliamentary pamphleteers during the 1640s so that those who arrived in England after 1643 were thought of as Irish. The question as to who or what constituted England, Englishness, Britain or Britishness is therefore further confused.

⁹⁰ Smyth, J., 'Anglo-Irish Unionism before 1707', in Bradshaw and Roberts, *British Consciousness*; Barber, S., 'Scotland and Ireland under the Commonwealth: A Question of Loyalty', in Ellis, S., and Barber, S., (eds.), *Conquest & Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725*, London and New York, Longman, 1995, pp. 200-205; Canny, N., *Making Ireland British, 1580-1650*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, esp. chs. 1-2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

Wormald points out that James I initially tried to present himself not as the King of England and Scotland, but as the King of Great Britain.⁹² Neither the King nor his subjects, however, embraced an actual British identity with any long-term consistency and enthusiasm. Indeed, Hirst's article describes how the individual kingdoms and peoples of the British Isles 'suffered' from a British union.⁹³ But what, exactly, did England or Englishness mean? Morrill states that by 1500 'there was very clearly an English sense of Englishness', and that central to this English identity was a sense amongst the English people of being subjects to a monarch who provided them with legal and military protection.⁹⁴ Morrill's point is derived from Davies' assertions that scholars should examine the British Isles in terms of its peoples and not its nations.⁹⁵ In this respect, Morrill's and Davies' perspectives can be seen as growing out of Seton-Watson's argument that the term, 'nation', has developed over a long period of time, and the concept of nationhood is relatively modern.⁹⁶ For Seton-Watson, England and Englishness only began to fully develop with the advent of print and the rise of a rich print culture, with the vernacular bible proving to be a key component in helping to fashion Englishness.⁹⁷ Alongside Protestantism, anti-Catholicism became significant in reinforcing Englishness. According to Lake's argument, anti-Catholicism was an 'ideological tool' with a variable language that

⁹² Wormald, J., 'James VI, James I and the Identity of Britain', in Bradshaw, B., and Morrill, J., (eds.), *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago*, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996.

⁹³ Hirst, D., 'The English Republic and the Meaning of Britain', in Bradshaw and Morrill, *The British Problem*, p. 192.

⁹⁴ Morrill, J., 'The British Problem, c. 1534-1707', in Bradshaw and Morrill, *The British Problem*, pp. 5-6.

⁹⁵ Davies, R., 'The Peoples of the Britain and Ireland', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th Series, Vol. V, 1995.

⁹⁶ Seton-Watson, H., *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, London, Methuen, 1977, pp. 1-10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-35.

allowed English people to relate their own experiences to broader concerns.⁹⁸ If this was indeed the case, then we have perhaps been brought closer to establishing whether people engaged with politics beyond the borders of their own localities. Lake's argument therefore tallies with Hughes' assertion that people in local communities participated in a broader 'national political culture'.⁹⁹ We might argue that an English identity can be defined in terms of religion, and it is generally the association of Protestantism and anti-Catholicism with Englishness that is used throughout this work.

The work here tries to approach the English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh and Cornish separately, since it is felt that this forms the basis of dealing with Royalism's own attitude to the Kingdoms and peoples of the British Isles. The focus is generally on Royalism's relationship with England and the ways it tried to fashion an English identity for itself, with the Welsh, Scots, Cornish and Irish being used to problematise that identity. An issue that arises from this approach is that this thesis remains largely Anglo-centric. Non-English people in the British Isles tend to be discussed in relation to England and the English. They are often explored in terms of how they impacted on England, and how they were presented in English textual space, rather than in their experiences in their own countries. But it is felt that such an approach is fitting with the central issue of how Royalists were presented. Given that the fundamental argument is that the Royalist press attempted to construct an English identity for the Royalists, the Welsh, Scottish, Cornish and Irish dimensions are used to explore the flaws in such a concept and thereby problematise the Royalists'

⁹⁸ Lake, P., 'Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice', in Cust and Hughes, *Conflict in Early Stuart England*, p. 96. See also Pincus, S., *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁹⁹ Hughes, A., 'Local History and the Origins of the Civil War', in Hughes, A., and Cust, R., (eds.), *Conflict in Early Stuart England*, London, Longman, p. 249.

Englishness. At its heart this thesis is in agreement with Adamson's assertion that whilst there was undoubtedly a British context of the wars of the 1640s, it was the turmoil in England which had the most obvious and significant impact on the whole of the British Isles.¹⁰⁰

In terms of outright chronological scope, this thesis stretches from 1567 to 1649, with the bulk of the research lying within the years 1638 to 1646. The reasons for this particular time span are twofold. Firstly, coverage of the Elizabethan era provides some context into the creation of martial Protestantism which would influence Royalist identity. Secondly, it is felt that an in-depth examination of Royalism between 1638 and 1646 is still wanting. McElligott and Smith's edited collection of essays is the most recent work on Royalism between 1638 and 1649, but a significant portion of it is confined to events after 1646.¹⁰¹ Both Wilcher and Potter have investigated Royalism during the First Civil War, but one is still left with the impression that the regicide and its aftermath form a substantial focus for their work. McElligott has also studied the nature of Royalist print, highlighting its complexities and suggesting that Royalist writers were adept at targeting different audiences and creating texts that were not necessarily bound by rigid conventions.¹⁰² Again, however, McElligott's work focuses on Royalist print after 1646, leaving Royalist literature during the First Civil War comparatively unexplored. Likewise, Peacey's research on Royalist pamphleteering is weighted towards the late 1640s.¹⁰³ Royalist

¹⁰⁰ Adamson, J., 'The English Context of the British Civil Wars', in *History Today*, Vol. 48, No. 11. For alternative views, see Russell, C., 'The British Problem and the English Civil War', in *History*, Vol. 72, No. 276, 1987; Morrill, J., 'The Britishness of the English Revolution', in Asch, R., (ed.), *Three Nations - A Common History? England, Scotland, Ireland and British History c.1600-1920*, Universitaetsverlag Brockmeyer, 1993.

¹⁰¹ McElligott and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism*, pp. 1-20.

¹⁰² McElligott, J., *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2007.

¹⁰³ Peacey, J., ' "The Counterfeit Silly Curr": Money, Politics and the Forging of Royalist Newspapers in the English civil war', in *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2004.

poetry and lyric have frequently been investigated, with a particularly resonant theme being that after the war, and especially after the Regicide, Royalists withdrew to the safety, purity and comfort of rural England.¹⁰⁴ As observed in the early parts of this introduction, court culture has also been the subject of much attention, forming the basis of substantial literary approaches to Stuart rule and Caroline England. It is only relatively recently that newsbooks and pamphlets have received serious attention. Raymond's work on print culture during the 1640s offers major insights into the practicalities and development of newsbooks and newsbook reportage, covering numerous titles and authors of the period.¹⁰⁵ However, a more extensive exploration of the discourse in Royalist newsbooks like *Mercvrius Avlicvs* is still left wanting, despite Thomas' work on Sir John Berkenhead.¹⁰⁶ Apart from appreciating that *Avlicvs* was designed as a Royalist response to the tide of Parliamentary print and had a significant impact on Civil War press reportage with its intellectual snobbery, there are still some questions left regarding the issues it addressed and its approaches towards them. This thesis cannot pretend to offer a definitive examination of *Avlicvs*, or indeed of any other individual newsbook, but it does attempt to provide further insight into Royalist discourse and suggest its importance in developing Royalism's identity.

Much of the inspiration for the research and themes within this thesis stems from the works of de Groot and Stoye. De Groot's question of what Royalism wanted to be is taken to be a fundamentally sound basis for an investigation into Charles I's cause, but its focus has been shifted in this thesis so that it now asks what Royalists

¹⁰⁴ E.g., Wilcher, *Writing Royalism*, ch. 9.

¹⁰⁵ Raymond, J., *The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks 1641-1649*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas, P.W., *Sir John Berkenhead: A Royalist Career in Politics and Polemics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969.

were supposed to be. As a result, this work also relates to Griffin's research on regulations in the Royalist army, since it explores the images and representations of Royalists, and the implied identity that resides within them.¹⁰⁷ Thus, at its core, this thesis draws on some of the aforementioned work and attempts to link the issues of Royalists and Royalism with ethnicity and the concept of an ideal image. Although the issue of Royalism and English identity was raised in de Groot's work, there is room for it be pursued. For instance, the question as to whether Royalist print consistently exploded an English identity has room for further investigation. Stoye's work on the involvement and impact of people from outside of England on the wars of the 1640s has influenced a core aspect of the chapters here, prompting one of the central questions of this thesis: did Royalism want and try to assert an English identity? The overall aim of this thesis is thus not to indulge in a rigorous assessment and analysis of high politics, but to examine how Royalists were portrayed in a patriotic, cultural and ethnic context. Issues such as the Royalists' relationship with the English, Scots, Welsh and Cornish, and the ways in which Royalist print tried to engage with them are raised in the work here. Questions relating to press reportage, gender and textual space are raised, and some attempt to show their relevance in the construction of Royalist Englishness is also made.

Given that the central concern of this thesis is the creation of Royalists' identity, it is felt that attention should be focused on the literature that was publicly available during the Civil Wars. The focus is on the projection of Royalists, and not on what individual Royalists thought and believed. This thesis seeks not to claim that all Royalists or Royalist sympathisers were the same, and it certainly does not intend to assert that Royalism provided no room for individuals to follow their own political

¹⁰⁷ Griffin, M., *Regulating Religion and Morality in the King's Armies, 1639-1646*, Boston, Brill, 2004.

consciences. Much like with any modern-day political party, a diversity of political outlooks resided within the umbrella of Royalism. To be a member or sympathiser of a political movement or party does not mean that one has to subscribe to every single policy or belief within it. Rather, the party or movement provides a set of core ideas which act as an anchoring point for its numerous, and very different, members. Individuals like Clarendon or Falkland simply did not share the exact same political outlook as Royalists such as Lunsford or Goring.¹⁰⁸ But without a set of key central ideas, images or policies to establish its foundations and structure, a political cause or party cannot exist in any coherent form, or in any form at all. As such, this thesis makes no deliberate attempt to directly challenge or undermine the work of McElligott and Donagan.¹⁰⁹ At its most fundamental level, this thesis asks whether the research on Royalists and Royalism that has been completed has tended to overlook the question of what the King's supporters were supposed to be. It suggests that detailed and intricate examinations into the lives and political outlook of individual Royalists may actually bypass the broader issue of Royalist identity itself. The view underlying the work here is that it is almost as if the deconstruction of the Royalist cause and Royalist identity has begun before we can even establish who or what Royalists and Royalism may have tried to be.

In an effort to explore such issues, this thesis has focused on printed sources. Rather than investigate the more closed and private material pertaining to Royalism that can be found in manuscripts, it is felt that an analysis of the more freely available printed material brings us much closer to the images of Royalists that a broader section of England's population may have been exposed to. Admittedly, the argument

¹⁰⁸ *ODNB*.

¹⁰⁹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*; Donagan, 'Rainbow Royalism'.

that manuscript sources were more private is flawed in the sense that some contemporaries copied printed tracts into their correspondence with friends and relatives, but it is nonetheless one that can be generally asserted. There can be little doubt that printed pamphlets and newsbooks were intended to be read by a wide audience, whereas the intended readership and exposure of manuscript sources is much more debateable. *Mercvrius Avlicvs* was not published with the intention of it not being circulated to as many people as possible, but personal correspondence was written and addressed directly to individuals whom the author knew. Furthermore, letters and private discourse may have been instrumental in spreading and sharing opinions of the content within printed tracts, but they do not in themselves present the more centralised projection of Royalists and Royalism that can be found in proclamations and newsbooks. In effect, it is believed that a study of printed material brings us closer to what the Royalists claimed to be, and how the ideas in Royalist textual space were challenged.

As a result, the work which follows this introduction aims to both construct and deconstruct the projection of the Royalists. It tries to identify and interpret key images that were projected by Royalist print in order to ascertain what the Royalists' outward image was, and it also makes an effort to read into the flaws that were inherent in such images. The ideal which Royalist print attempted to explode is thus read and contrasted with the actuality of Royalism's situation. Inconsistencies within Royalist pamphlets and the ideas they projected are also highlighted in an effort to examine the ideological problems which Royalism faced. It is therefore asked during the course of this thesis whether Royalist print ever made any attempt to resolve or explain the inconsistencies in Royalist theory. But the emphasis is not solely on Royalist print. Parliamentary pamphlets are also examined, since they too identify

and exploit Royalism's inconsistencies and are vital in investigating the creation of Royalist stereotypes.

The general approaches in the work here can therefore be classed as semi-chronological and thematic, with the thesis being roughly split into two sections. The first section consists of four chapters, two of which adopt a semi-chronological approach with the intention of establishing the overall context for the more thematic second half of the thesis. Chapter One specifically examines Royal Proclamations, *Mercvrius Avlicvs*, *Mercurius Rusticus* and *The Man in the Moon*. It raises issues concerning the circulation and authorship of print; and the significance of textual space and control of meaning. The chapter questions who the intended readers of Royalist print were and suggests that the Royalist cause attempted to take a controlled approach to print. The physicality of Royalist text reflected a desire to control language and meaning, and even the reader too. This chapter relates to the general themes and interests of the thesis by introducing the idea that Royalist print tried to embody true English language, and that Parliamentary print was a perversion of the English language. Royalist print aimed to guarantee textual meaning and draw it into the centre of its attempt to develop an English identity. Ultimately, this chapter asks the question whether the removal of Charles brought about the collapse of textual control and meaning, enabling Royalism to be interpreted and shaped in multiple ways.

Chapter Two aims to set the context for what Englishness meant in the decades before the Civil Wars. It traces the creation of a martial Protestant ethos under Elizabeth in order to tease out the image of England as an embattled country. Given Morrill's assertion that the conflicts of the 1640s were wars of religion, it is felt necessary to identify what heritage and history Royalism and Parliamentarianism

could relate to.¹¹⁰ The legend of an apocalyptic war between Protestant England and Catholic Spain appears to have been particularly powerful and enduring, and in many ways fostered a fear that militant Catholicism would return to invade England. With the Eighty Years' War raging on the continent, Charles' religious policies, wars against Scotland and eventual war against Parliament all stoked anxieties that Counter-Reformation forces were descending on England. The endurance of the legendary struggle against Catholic Spain meant that both Royalism and Parliamentarianism had to identify themselves as the guardians of Protestant England, and that it was this context which laid the foundations for Royalists' identity. In effect, both Royalism and Parliamentarianism tried to establish themselves within a context of martial English Protestantism, since the English soldier was supposed to fight against Catholicism. Thus, the issues raised in this chapter resonate throughout the rest of the thesis, and in particular relate to the discussion of Royalist stereotypes in Chapter Seven.

Chapter Three builds on the context of Chapter Two by exploring the Bishops' Wars. It effectively argues that the King's supporters and publicists attempted to access the image of martial English Protestantism in order to portray Charles' wars as a patriotic defence of England. Protestant Scotland was presented as an outsider, a foreign other who threatened to invade England and overthrow the King. One key issue in this chapter is the application of the terms Royalism and Royalist. Whereas cultural history has tended to be relatively comfortable in discussing Royalism prior to 1642, more politically oriented work has not. For instance, Wilcher has openly explored Royalism from 1628.¹¹¹ Fletcher has stated that 'everyone was a Royalist in 1641', thereby rendering the term, 'Royalism', before the formation of the Long

¹¹⁰ Morrill, J., 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', in Morrill, J., *The Nature of the English Revolution*, London, Longman, 1993.

¹¹¹ Wilcher, *Writing Royalism*.

Parliament somewhat meaningless.¹¹² One argument in this chapter is that ‘Royalism’ can be applied prior to 1641. It argues this not on the basis of there existing an identifiable Royalist party defined in opposition to a Parliamentarian party, but on the grounds that literature in support of the King defined the Covenanters as anti-monarchical. By producing the image of the anti-monarchical Covenanter, Royalism in effect created itself. Royalism may not have existed during the Bishops’ Wars in the same way as it did after 1641, but the set of ideas generated during the wars against Scotland came to form an integral part of Royalism once the King declared war against Parliament. The anti-Scottish, patriotic English ideal set out by anti-Covenanter material fostered the sense that loyalty to the Crown was directly related to patriotic duty. The fact that there was an absence of a solidly formed and politically active party in support of the King does not necessarily mean that the term, ‘Royalism’, should not be applied before 1641. The existence of the supposedly anti-monarchical Covenanters meant that English resistance was by implication Royalist in anti-Covenanter literature.

Chapter Four is intended to trace the emergence and creation of Royalism after the Bishops’ Wars. It generally points out that whereas the Bishops’ Wars had been marked by the formation of an anti-Scottish cause around the King, the months before August 1642 were characterised by the need for Charles to appear to distance himself from his disastrous wars in the north. The King attempted to emerge as a bringer of peace and guarantor of stability once the Long Parliament had assembled, helping him to form a Royalist party.¹¹³ In many ways, the period between January and August 1641 illustrates the creation and presence of the two general groups

¹¹² Fletcher, A., *The Outbreak of the English Civil War*, London, Arnold, 1981, pp. 280-295.

¹¹³ Fletcher, *Outbreak*, pp. 292-293; Cust, R., *Charles I: A Political Life*, Harlow, Pearson, 2005, pp. 288-297; Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, pp. 744-751; *Englands Ioy and Sorrovv: Expressing Their Sorrow for the Kings Going into Scotland, and Their Ioy for the Queene Mothers Farewell*, London, 1641, p. 4.

which book-ended what Donagan calls the 'rainbow coalition' of Royalist identity.¹¹⁴ These were the apparently militant or tyrannical extremists, which could include the Earl of Strafford, and those who, like Edward Hyde, are abstractly known as 'constitutional' Royalists.¹¹⁵ It would be the conflicting approaches and images of these two broadly defined groups of Royalists in public which dogged the creation and resolution of an all-catching Royalist identity in the press in 1641, as the King's actions and image oscillated between aggression and conciliation. Events in 1641 certainly damaged the image of those surrounding the King, and the rebellion in Ireland and the promulgation of a popish plot that was supposedly being hatched in order to destroy Protestant England coloured much of the press reportage between 1641 and 1642. This resulted in those close to the King being presented as evil advisers bent on destroying England, and the arrest of the Five Members appeared to confirm such assertions.¹¹⁶ Although Charles had been able to appear moderate in his handling of the militia and established Church, his association with military coups discredited his image. This chapter therefore suggests that Royalist plots helped to give birth to the stereotypical Cavalier.

Switching to a more thematic approach, Chapter Five develops the ideas that are present in Chapters Three and Four, and in doing so addresses the concept of a patriotic English Royalist identity. It argues that Royalist print projected an English identity onto the Royalists that was predicated on anti-Scottish sentiments.

Parliament's alliance with Covenanted Scotland was essential in the construction of

¹¹⁴ Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism', p. 66.

¹¹⁵ Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, ch. 3.

¹¹⁶ Russell, C., 'The First Army Plot of 1641', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, No. 38, 1988; Cust, *Charles I*, pp. 283-284; *A Discovery Of many, great, and Bloody Robberies: Committed Of Late by Dissolyte and Evill Affected Troopers*, London, 1641; *The Brothers of the Blade: Answerable to the Sisters of the Scaberd*, London, 1641; Bennett, R., 'War and Disorder: Policing the Soldiery in Civil War Yorkshire', in Fissel, *War and Government*, pp. 248-253; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, ch. 7; Cressy, *England on Edge*, pp. 83-86; Hibbard, 'Episcopal Warriors', pp. 166-167. It is, of course, important to note that the association of soldiers with disorder was not a new theme created in the press.

the Royalists' patriotic credentials, and this chapter points out that Royalist texts took particular care in claiming that Parliament was betraying the English people by indulging in a systematic destruction of England. The fact that Parliament had invited the Scots to invade England enabled Royalist print to argue that the King's opponents were fundamentally anti-English. Reports of the Scots' presence in England, coupled with sensational accounts of English people being displaced by Parliament's northern allies, illustrated that Parliament was engaged in a plot to physically and culturally destroy England.

If Royalist text sought to integrate the Royalists within some form of English patriotism, then it is painfully evident that it was a contradictory, and even impossible, aspiration. Chapter Six points out the flaws that undermined these attempts to fashion an English identity for the Royalists. It is divided into two sections, the first of which provides a brief overview of the composition of the Royalist army, whereas the second section investigates Royalist discourse in relation to the ethnicity of Royalist soldiers. The first section makes the fundamental point that the presence of foreigners in the King's armies immediately contradicted the Royalists' supposed English identity. Building on from the more mechanical first section, the second half of this chapter analyses Royalist print in order to tease out the inconsistencies in its approach towards the Royalists' identity. It essentially asks whether Royalist print ever made any attempt to resolve the differences between the presence of non-English soldiers in the King's armies and the English identity it tried to create. In exploring such questions, a pattern emerges in which Royalist print appears to have tried linking the Royalist cause with Welsh and Cornish sentiments. Overall, this chapter suggests that the Royalist press failed to satisfactorily address the inconsistencies in its projection of the Royalists.

Developing from the findings of all of the previous chapters, in particular those in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven examines the Cavalier stereotype. It aims to identify some of the characteristics associated with the stereotypical Cavalier with the intention of showing how Royalists and Royalism constituted an other in England. This chapter suggests that the stereotypical Cavalier was in essence a monster who sought to eradicate the Protestant English by physically eradicating them. His appearance disrupted local defence initiatives and signified the materialisation of a popish plot. Gruesome and barbaric crimes against civilians underlined the Cavalier's lack of Christian humanity, removing him from the English population and thereby turning him into a vulgar and dangerous figure against which Parliament could legitimately react.

Although the Cavalier was a threat to England, he was also an effeminate coward unable to withstand the might of Parliamentary force. His weapons were only effective against unarmed civilians; rape, murder and plundering empowered him, signifying his contempt for established law. But the Cavalier's effeminacy gave Parliamentary pamphleteers the opportunity to critique Royalist leadership. Perceived uxoriousness amongst the Royalist commanders resulted in Parliamentary pamphlets inverting traditional gender roles, with Royalist women appearing to be more powerful than their husbands. Chapter Seven ultimately suggests that anti-Royalist literature established a theme in which the King's rule was shown to be weak and limp. His marriage to Henrietta Maria was said to have undermined the security of Protestant England, giving rise to the Cavalier invasion of the country, and this allowed Parliament to be aligned with English patriotism.

Scott has suggested that the Civil Wars were based around issues that went even deeper than whether the King should rule or without Parliament. For Scott, the

'nature of English nationhood' was precisely one of the major tensions in the 1640s, and it is generally aimed in this thesis for Royalists and Royalism to be regarded in light of an English identity, or what supposedly constituted Englishness.¹¹⁷ It is not intended for the Royalist cause to be investigated in terms of court factions or individual political interests, but it is intended for it to be explored in terms of an overall identity, and it is argued that that identity was linked to Englishness.

¹¹⁷ Scott, D., 'Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642-9', in Adamson, J., (ed.), *The English Civil Wars: Conflict and Contexts*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 59-60.

Chapter One:

Print Culture, Royalism and Royalist Text

This chapter will briefly outline the context of Civil War print culture before attempting to explore the nature of Royalist print. Issues such as readership, audience, textual space and authorship will be discussed, with the overall aim being to ask how Royalism projected itself within text. To this end, much of the discussion will focus on what were arguably the most well known Royalist publications of the period; namely the King's proclamations, *Mercvrius Avlicvs*, *Mercurius Rusticus* and *The Man in the Moon*. This chapter will suggest that at least until the end of the First Civil War, one of the primary concerns with Royalist text was control over language and meaning, and that these concerns were related to a concept of Englishness.

The conflicts that engulfed the British Isles during the mid 1600s were marked not only by outright physical violence, but also by a proliferation of printed material, or 'paper bullets'. For contemporaries, the avalanche of printed material during the 1640s was unprecedented. Prior to the Civil Wars, it had been illegal for domestic news to be reported, and in 1621 the States General agreed to James I's request for the export of corantos to England to be prohibited. Elizabethan news pamphlets had tended to focus on continental affairs and sensational reports, but even as tensions between England and Spain grew news was published comparatively sporadically. Publications prior to the 1640s were not serialised, so titles like George Gascoigne's *The Spoyle of Antwerp* existed as isolated pamphlets and tended to focus on narrating a single current event. It is noticeable that the Civil Wars brought with them a form of journalism previously unseen in the British Isles. In the Elizabethan era, professional

news writers or scribes could be employed to write a letter of news, although such a service was expensive and was also dependent on the seasonal nature of news dissemination. Men with military experience, such as George Gascoigne or Henry Hexham, were not infrequently the authors of printed news. The 1640s, in contrast, were marked by the emergence of those who could be termed professional editors, such as Sir John Berkenhead, Marchamont Nedham and John Crouch.

Despite the fact that since the 1980s historians have questioned the efficiency and effectiveness of government censorship in the British Isles, the proliferation of print during the Civil War period appears to coincide with the removal of government control over print.¹ The abolition of the Court of Star Chamber and the impeachment of Archbishop William Laud ensured that a total collapse of Stuart press censorship had occurred by 1641.² Research shows that some 2,042 pamphlets were published in 1641, followed by a sharp increase to 4,038 pamphlets in 1642.³ Thereafter, the number of publications dropped to an average of about 2,000 per year between 1643 and 1646 before increasing again in 1647.⁴ Raymond also notes that the rapid growth of printed material actually began in 1638, with Collinson describing 1640 as a 'watershed' in the history of print. Rising from an output of some 600 titles, approximately 900 titles were printed in 1640.⁵ What this clearly indicates is not that the collapse of press censorship spawned an unruly press, but that a vibrant

¹ Research since the 1980s suggests that government censorship was not particularly effective anyway. Patterson, A., *Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1984; Cressy, *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640-1642*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 280-290.

² Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. 305.

³ Raymond, J., *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 163; Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. 292.

⁴ Raymond, *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering*, p. 163.

⁵ Cressy, D., *England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution 1640-1642*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 292; Collinson, P., Hunt, A., and Walsham, A., 'Religious Publishing in England 1557-1640', in Barnard, J., and McKenzie, D.F., (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 35.

pamphleteering trade was emerging even before the official means of control disintegrated. The noticeable rise in printed output from 1638 coincided with the King's tensions with the Scottish Covenanters, thus evidently linking the growth of the press with the politically charged atmosphere. It further suggests that a healthy market and audience existed for printed material to be circulated and digested, and thereby implies that printers willingly circumvented the law in order to get pamphlets published.

Significant though the rise in print production seems, the questions that are nonetheless more significant focus on the issue of readership and the circulation of material. After all, what is the historical significance of the rise of print if we are unable to address the extent to which contemporaries read, approached and reacted to texts? Raymond has pointed out that many historians and critics have taken 'readers for granted', and this is clearly a pertinent issue.⁶ How many people could read during the 1640s? Did many people even actually read the pamphlets? How effective were pamphlets in affecting their audiences? It is perhaps impossible to ascertain the exact answers to these questions, but the context of the pamphlet market itself, coupled with the information that can be gleaned from private correspondence and the reactions of other pamphleteers, provides some intriguing insights.

Smith has argued that a 'democratising of information' marked the Civil Wars, with a much broader audience being exposed to printed material.⁷ Bellany likewise subscribes to the concept of a democratisation of news, arguing that a 'large, geographically broad and socially varied' audience existed for the press during the

⁶ Raymond, 'Introduction', in Raymond, *News, Newspapers and Society*, p.7.

⁷ Smith, N., *Literature and Revolution*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1994, p. 24.

1640s.⁸ Cressy's findings would appear to reinforce such ideas, since it reveals that between 70 and 80 per cent of men and 15 to 20 per cent of women within London were literate, whilst on a national level some 30 per cent of men and 10 per cent of women were literate.⁹ The problem with Cressy's approach is that it is based on the ability of individuals to sign their own names, and is therefore predicated on the assumption that the capacity to write is directly linked to the ability to read. This is a flaw which to an extent also affects Houston's research, despite the importance of his sociological approaches towards literacy.¹⁰ Clark's work on book ownership offers another route into establishing a picture of early modern literacy, but is nonetheless limited by the problem of whether book ownership actually equates to reading ability, since books can function as mere decorative objects.¹¹ A focus on book ownership is also likely to be affected by the question of physical durability. Since pamphlets and newsbooks are far less durable than books, it is possible that some titles have been lost or destroyed over time. Innovative and enlightening though they are, the methodologies of analysing book ownership and examining and counting signatures do not necessarily provide definitive answers to the question of early modern readership, nor do they reveal much concerning the impact of pamphlets on their readers.

It is perhaps unlikely that historians will ever know an accurate literacy rate for seventeenth-century Britain, but knowing an exact figure is arguably unnecessary anyway. Guillory has stated that 'literacy is not a simple matter of knowing how to

⁸ Bellany, *The Politics of Court Scandal in Early Modern England*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 132.

⁹ Cressy, *Literacy and the Social Order* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 62-103, esp. pp. 72-5. Cressy's research on literacy is based on the ability of people to sign their names, describing it as 'the best evidence of literate skills', p. 42.

¹⁰ Houston, R.A., *Literacy in Early Modern Europe*, Longman, London and Edinburgh, 2002,

¹¹ Clark, P., 'The Ownership of Books in England, 1560-1640: The Example of Some Kentish Townsfolk', in Stone, L., (ed.), *Schooling and Society: Studies in the History of Education*, Baltimore, 1976.

read or write, but refers to the entire system by which reading and writing are regulated as social practices in a given society'.¹² A strong focus on quantifying literacy, therefore, may even detract from the question of readership, since it is dependent on rigidly defining reading as an individual act of seeing, understanding and decoding physical text. The quest to effectively measure and quantify literacy alone either sidesteps or overlooks the complex dynamics which constitute reading and readership. In order to be exposed to printed material, it is enough for one to listen to another individual read a text out loud. What this means is that the question of actual literacy should perhaps instead be shifted to focus on print exposure, since it is probable that more people were exposed to the content of print than quantitative literacy rates might suggest.¹³

Watt's work shows that personal competence in reading may not necessarily have been a barrier to an individual's ability to access text.¹⁴ Oral culture was still an important aspect in the dissemination of the written word. Inns and taverns might prove to be ready sources of information, whilst news and commentaries on current issues could be transmitted in the form of ballads, which would then be sung in the streets.¹⁵ *The Subjects Thankfulness*, detailing information about the Covenanting army in 1640, is a notable example of how news could be spread and circulated in ballad form.¹⁶ Possibly because of their use of memorable rhymes, tunes and choruses, ballads were an effective means of conveying and spreading news. It would certainly appear that pro-Covenanter ballads were relatively popular in England

¹² Guillory, J., *Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 79.

¹³ On literacy, see also Spufford, M., 'First Steps in Literacy: The Reading and Writing Experiences of the Humblest Seventeenth-Century Spiritual Autobiographers', in *Social History*, Vol. 4, No. 3, October 1979.

¹⁴ Watt, T., *Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550-1640*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, ch. 1.

¹⁵ Achinstein, S., 'Texts in conflict: the press and the Civil War', in Keeble, N.H., (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Writing of the English Revolution*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 55.

¹⁶ *The Subjects Thankfulness: or, God-a-Mercie Good Scot*, London, 1640.

during the summer and autumn of 1640, enjoying considerable public exposure and recital in many parts of the country.¹⁷

Oral communication was important in the dissemination of print in other ways. It is clear that a group of ministers in Northamptonshire discussed recent publications during the summer of 1640, and there seems little reason to doubt that similar conversations occurred in the alehouses visited by a more diverse clientele.¹⁸ Some of the informants of Sir Samuel Luke, Parliament's Scoutmaster General, also read and verbally relayed back information acquired from various Royalist pamphlets.¹⁹ Clergymen and religious figures played a role in ensuring that print permeated the population, both with and without official consent. On 30th January 1639 Sir Jacob Astley wrote to Secretary Windebank saying that he had received notice from Sir John Clavering that Scottish preachers were crossing the border into northern England and 'preaching strange doctrine' which championed the Covenanting cause.²⁰ There is some evidence to suggest that church pulpits could be used to project official publications. It is not impossible that Lady Harley's claim that ministers had made the pulpit a 'stage, wherein to act their parts against the Parliament' meant that the content of Royalist print was being disseminated during church services.²¹ Walter Balcanquhall's *Large Declaration* explicitly stated on its cover that it was to be read in church, and records show that church sermons held in Durham in Many 1639 were very much influenced by the content of royal

¹⁷ Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. 72.

¹⁸ *CSPD*, 1640, pp. 634-635 and pp. 647-648; Cressy, *England on Edge*, pp. 300-301; Achinstein, 'Texts in Conflict', p. 55.

¹⁹ Philip, I.G., *The Journal of Sir Samuel Luke*, Oxford, The Oxfordshire Records Society, Vol. 2, 1950, p. 12 and p. 23.

²⁰ *CSPD*, 1639, p. 385.

²¹ HMC, *Portland*, 3, pp.87-89.

declarations.²² Balcanquhall was, however, the dean of Durham at the time, so there remains the possibility that he was in a sense advertising his own work and that the *Large Declaration* was never actually read from any other pulpit in the country.²³ But even if Balcanquhall's work did not enjoy widespread oral dissemination, it does not by implication follow that no other publication was orally projected. Absence of evidence does not necessarily equate to evidence of absence, and there remain questions over how or whether soldiers on the march were exposed to print. The correspondence of the Parliamentary soldier, Nehemiah Wharton, indicates that the circulation of news played some role in army life. Reports on current events were discussed amongst soldiers; and civilians shared information with soldiers passing through a locality, which in Wharton's case was then relayed back to his correspondents in London.²⁴ Griffin's research on the regulations of the Royalist Army also has implications for our understanding of Civil War print culture.²⁵ Assuming that literacy levels were in general relatively low amongst the common soldiery, then it seems a fair assumption that the most effective and efficient means of disseminating the army's regulations was through the spoken word. However, the actual extent to which the Royalist Army's regulations were circulated amongst soldiers remains uncertain.

If literacy was not an insurmountable barrier to an individual's capacity to access texts, then Watt points out that financial circumstances may have been. She

²² *By the King. A Proclamation and Declaration to Inform Our Loving Subjects of Our Kingdom of England of the Seditious Practices of Some in Scotland*, London, p. 3; CSPD, 1639, pp. 507-508; Balcanquhall, W., *A Large Declaration Concerning The Late Tumults in Scotland, from Their First Originalls: Together With a Particular Deduction of the Seditious Practices of the Prime Leaders of the Covenanters*, London, 1639; 'The Diary of Robert Woodford' in H.M.C., *9th Report Part 2*, p. 498; *A Sermon Preached Before the Kings Most Excellent Maiestie*, London, 1639.

²³ ODNB.

²⁴ Peachey, S., (ed.), *The Edgehill Campaign & the Letters of Nehemiah Wharton*, Partizan Press, Leigh-on-Sea, 1989.

²⁵ Griffin, M., *Regulating Religion and Morality in the King's Armies, 1639-1646*, Brill, Leiden, 2004.

reveals that despite the rise in a labourer's wages and the stability of book prices up until the mid 1630s, few people in the lower echelons of society would actually have had enough disposable income to spend on more luxurious commodities like pamphlets.²⁶ The prospect of spending one or two pence on just a pamphlet from a wage of anything from four pence to one shilling a day was probably not particularly tempting for a working man who had to think about feeding and clothing not only himself, but also his family.²⁷ Given that the 1640s were marked by economic depression, the purchasing power of an individual's wages would have decreased.²⁸ With the cost of essential commodities growing, it seems unlikely that purchasing pamphlets would have been a priority for the majority of people within the British Isles. On the surface, the actual market for acquiring the latest books and pamphlets thus appears to have generally been accessible only to those from wealthier social groups.

Nevertheless, this over-simplifies the pamphlet market and the ways in which pamphleteers could spread their wares. One did not necessarily have to be in a more comfortable financial position to acquire print. Pamphlets could sometimes be distributed free of charge. For instance, the mayor of Newcastle upon Tyne, Alexander Davison, reported that during the night of 18th February 1639

divers... books were scattered abroad and cast in at the doors and shop windows of several people, who have brought eighteen of them to Mr. Mayor.²⁹

²⁶ Watt, T., *Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550-1640*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 261-262.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-262; Bowden, P., 'Agricultural Prices, Farm Profits, and Rents', in Thirsk, J., (ed.), *The Agrarian History of England and Wales*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 599.

²⁸ Watt, *Cheap Print*, pp 261-262; Bowden, 'Agricultural Prices', pp. 593-600.

²⁹ Watt, *Cheap Print*, pp. 261-262.

In a similar vein, one Suffolk clothier was known to be spreading a 'seditious book' amongst the local populace towards the end of August in 1640.³⁰ The reason why a pro-Covenanter pamphlet commonly known as *the Intentions of the Scots* was able to 'swarm' London and Rowell may also be because it was distributed free of charge.³¹ Given the expense of ink and paper, however, it is unlikely that many pamphleteers just simply gave away their wares.³²

Even if a specific run of pamphlets was not given away, then it is still apparent that contemporaries shared the pamphlets they had acquired with their friends, relatives and neighbours. Pamphlets could be passed on to other readers, or copied and circulated in manuscript form. Such was the case of a Mr. Kelly, who obtained and copied a 'naughty manuscript' during his stay in Westminster before sharing it amongst his neighbours in Bedfordshire in 1639.³³ The postal service was instrumental in enabling individuals to send copies of the latest pamphlets to their associates, although the combined cost of a newsbook and postage was probably affordable only to the more affluent.³⁴ For instance, Sir John Coke the Younger was forwarding copies of 'gazettes' to his father in Melbourne during August 1643.³⁵ Print production was frequently centred on the postal service, and serialised pamphlets and newsbooks like *Mercvrius Avlicus* were printed in time for the Tuesday post.³⁶ For all of the limitations of seventeenth-century transport and technology, pamphlets were still able to circulate widely across Britain, with book pedlars crossing counties and countries. The Bishops' Wars, for example, were in part characterised by the

³⁰ *CSPD*, 1640, pp. 634-635 and pp. 647-648.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 638. The book referred to is likely to be *The Intentions of the Armie of the Kingdome of Scotland Declared to Their Bretheren of England*, Edinburgh and Amsterdam, 1640.

³² Raymond, *Invention*, p. 233-234.

³³ *CSPD*, 1639, pp. 554-555.

³⁴ Raymond, *Invention*, p. 239. Raymond states that 8d would get a letter as far as Scotland.

³⁵ HMC, *Cowper*, Vol. 2, Series 23, Part 2, p. 336.

³⁶ Raymond, *Invention*, p. 239.

infiltration of Covenanting pamphlets in England, with the Scottish bookseller Alexander Johnson spreading his pamphlets to Manchester whilst other publications dealing with the 'Scottish business' reached London.³⁷ An anonymous pamphleteer, who was clearly struck by the quantity of printed material in 1640, stated that 'there hath been such a number of ballad-makers and pamphlet writers this year'.³⁸ Three years later *Avlicvs* was circulating not only in Oxford, but also in Bristol and London.³⁹ Richard Royston, a London publisher and Royalist sympathiser, is likely to have helped circulate *Avlicvs* in the Parliamentary heartland until at least July 1645, whilst the capture of Bristol provided the Royalists with a new base for printing presses from July 1643.⁴⁰ It is also apparent that Shrewsbury was a source of Royalist publications such as Bruno Ryves' *Mercurius Rusticus*, although there is no record of *Avlicvs* having ever been printed there.⁴¹

Relatively high print runs could also boost newsbook and pamphlet circulation. Two hundred and fifty copies seems to be accepted by Cotton and Raymond as an approximate minimum print run for a newsbook, although the maximum size of a run is disputed. Whilst Cotton has suggested that printers could produce approximately eight hundred and fifty copies of an eight-page serialised newsbook in ten hours, Raymond's estimates reveal that it was theoretically possible for as many as three thousand copies to be produced.⁴² Estimates for *Avlicvs*' print runs are equally diverse, ranging from two thousand to five thousand copies per issue, and the question of how many copies a print run for a single-page proclamation

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 551; H.M.C. Cowper, Vol. 2, Series 23, Part 2, pp. 216-217, *CSPD*, 1639, pp. 554-555.

³⁸ Quoted in Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. 289.

³⁹ Thomas, P. W., *Sir John Berkenhead, 1617-1679: A Royalist Career in Politics and Polemics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 50.

⁴⁰ *ODNB*; Thomas, *Berkenhead*, p. 50.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

⁴² Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 234-235.

is open to even more speculation.⁴³ As with reading and readership, though, it is very difficult to quantify and ascertain an entirely accurate estimate of newsbook print runs. Newsbook and pamphlet production was affected by numerous variable factors, including the availability and expense of ink and paper, and the efficiency and experience of the printer or printers involved. The fact that there existed no single, standardised format of a newsbook further complicates matters. Newsbooks of various lengths, highly diverse typefaces and type sizes were in production throughout the wars. It was also not uncommon for a single issue of a newsbook to display a variety of type sizes within its own pages, as was sometimes the case in *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* or *The Parliament Scout* where additional news could be forced into any remaining space by using a smaller type. Naturally, this variety meant that an issue of a newsbook like *Avlicvs* could consist of eight pages with a uniformly small type, whereas an issue of *The Parliament Scout* might display a larger type within the same number of pages. In *Avlicvs*' case the problem is compounded by both the variation of its length, since eight pages was by no means standard for the Royalist newsbook, and by the demise of the Royalist war effort. Did shorter issues of *Avlicvs* enjoy larger print runs than lengthier issues, and did declining military fortunes affect print runs? As will be discussed later on in this chapter, military reversals clearly had an adverse effect on *Avlicvs*' presence in the market.⁴⁴ In terms of the size of print runs in relation to *Avlicvs*' physical size, there is virtually no evidence to answer the question. We can, however, consider the context in which *Avlicvs* was launched as a possible indicator as to how large its print runs may have been. By early 1643 the number of London newsbooks that either reported on events

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-152; Thomas, *Berkenhead*, p. 52. Thomas estimates that *Avlicvs* may have had print runs of five thousand copies during some weeks, although Raymond disputes this. A figure of two thousand copies seems more reasonable.

⁴⁴ See also pp. 65-70 of this chapter.

at Westminster or promoted an anti-Royalist stance was increasing. *England's Memorable Accidents, A Continuation of the True Diurnall, Diurnall Occurrances, and A True Diurnall of the Last Weeks Passages in Parliament* were amongst the many titles emerging from the London presses. Assuming that each title enjoyed an average print run of one thousand copies, then it would have made sense for *Avlicvs* to enjoy print runs that were large enough to offer real competition and thereby provide a noticeable voice in support of the King's cause. Print runs for some publications could potentially have been larger than may have initially been the case, as material from different sources was occasionally reprinted in newsbooks, effectively boosting its circulation. For instance, proclamations were reprinted in *Avlicvs* in order to bypass Parliament's restrictions on material entering London.⁴⁵ It is therefore evident that neither geography nor official directions prevented the circulation of pamphlets. Through either subversion or the simple fact that printing was not confined to just one town, newsbooks and pamphlets had the potential to enjoy a wide circulation, and there is little reason to doubt that Royalist print was widely circulated.

Although it is undeniable that the avalanche of print was unprecedented in the 1640s, it does not follow that their readers wholeheartedly digested and believed the printed page without question. As much as present-day society is familiar with the concept of propaganda, it is surely not implausible that some seventeenth-century readers approached texts objectively and questioningly, and then subsequently formed their own opinions. Whilst the rapid rise and spread of pamphlets was ultimately both a useful weapon and a cause for concern for political and military leaders, it is important that we do not underestimate the intelligence of a seventeenth-century reader. Sir John Suckling may have regarded pamphlet readers

⁴⁵ Thomas, *Berkenhead*, p. 53.

with contempt, describing the 'certain foolish and greedy curiosity in mans nature of news', and it was no doubt in response to the tide of pro-Parliamentary pamphlets that *Mercvrius Avlicvs* was launched, but there is evidence to suggest that readers did not always simply accept what was told in print.⁴⁶

Seaver's attempt to reconstruct the reading practices of Nehemiah Wallington clearly demonstrates that contemporaries could ponder intensely over the meanings contained within pamphlets.⁴⁷ Similarly, it is evident that the diarist John Rous absorbed much of the reportage in pamphlets and was very much aware of their discrepancies and unreliability.⁴⁸ Personal correspondence also provides some insights into the impact of pamphlets and the ways in which readers responded to them. In a letter to the Earl of Bridgewater in September 1640, Richard Harrison commented that the 'Intelligence of all news in the northern parts [is] so various that I know not what to write'.⁴⁹ Sir John Suckling was also very much aware of the conflicting and unreliable nature of newsbooks and pamphlets saying in the summer of 1640 that 'There are that have read the Chronicles, and they finde the *English* oftner march'd into *Edenburgh*, then the *Scotts* into *London*'.⁵⁰

It is unfortunate, though by no means surprising, that there are few traces of the approaches and responses of readers from lower and less educated social circles. But if we consider the fact that the contents of pamphlets were circulated and discussed not only through personal correspondence, but also in conversations, then we begin to see an image of an engaged and engaging audience in seventeenth-

⁴⁶ Clayton, T., (ed.), *The Works of Sir John Suckling: The Non-Dramatic Works*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 141.

⁴⁷ Seaver, P., *Wallington's World: A Puritan Artisan in Seventeenth-Century London*, Stanford University Press, 1985.

⁴⁸ *Diary of John Rous*, p. 121.

⁴⁹ Cressy, *England on Edge*, p. 317.

⁵⁰ Clayton, *Works*, p. 140.

century Britain. What does not appear to emerge is a reader who would digest the news and material from only one source, but from multiple texts. Readers in 1640s Britain were ones who, as Atherton has noted, had a growing thirst for news.⁵¹ They were not necessarily merely passive and submissive recipients of politically charged and biased textual material. As indicated by the practices of individuals such as George Thomason, Nehemiah Wallington, John Rous and Sir Samuel Luke, some pamphlet readers in 1640s Britain actively sought out new material, and in doing so brought their previous reading experiences and knowledge to whatever new texts they encountered.

Nevertheless, the question of how contemporaries read and approached does not in itself address the issue of a publication's target audience. Griffin's work on the regulations of the Royalist Army carries with it the problem of who was addressed by such publications. Were regulations printed specifically for soldiers to read and act on, or were they printed with the aim of fashioning a specific image for the benefit of another audience altogether? According to Griffin's analysis and argument, the regulations of the Royalist Army were designed to express a Protestant identity.⁵² The implication from these findings, therefore, is that army regulations functioned as part of a public relations exercise, along with other Royalist pamphlets; they were arguably intended for a broader audience than just military personnel. Army regulations perhaps existed not so much to instil discipline in the ranks, but to counter the anti-Royalist stereotypes which were so prevalent in Parliamentary print, and in doing so define and control Royalist identity.

⁵¹ Atherton, I., 'The Press and Popular Political Opinion', in Coward, B., (ed.), *A Companion to Stuart Britain*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, p. 93.

⁵² Griffin, *Regulating Religion*, esp. chs. 3-5 and 7.

If it could be argued that army regulations were not intended to be read exclusively by soldiers and their officers, then what of other publications? Print in the early modern world was not universally applauded as a progressive and enlightening development. Indeed, printers, printing presses and the people who bought and read printed material to an extent suffered from the creation of cynical stereotypes which linked interests in print to base depravities.⁵³ Print could be perceived as the literary domain of those from the lower circles of society, and it is apparent that some pamphlets during the 1640s were designed to appeal to 'vulgar' individuals.⁵⁴ *Avlicvs*, however, does not appear to have been intended for a lowly readership, in either social or intellectual terms. That the Royalist newsbook often derided and mocked the 'meanest' individuals surely indicates that it was not written with the intention of appealing to the less distinguished in society.⁵⁵ At 3d per issue *Avclivs* was considerably more expensive than the majority of other newsbooks, thereby limiting it to a more affluent readership.⁵⁶ *Avlicvs* thus had a socio-economic exclusivity which was indicative of a desire to control textual space and maintain command over meaning, and this Royalist idiosyncrasy was not unique to *Avlicvs*. *Rusticus*' reportage suggests an anxiety and fear over losing control and legal ownership of physical space to an unknown and arbitrary form of government.⁵⁷ The horror with which Royalist writers received *The King's Cabinet Opened* also indicates that textual control and security of property were central themes within Royalist print, with *Anti-Britanicus* apparently being established to combat Parliament's invasion of the King's

⁵³ Raymond, *Anthology*, pp. 10-12; Clayton, *Works*, p. 140.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-20.

⁵⁵ E.g., *Avlicvs*, No. 20, 14th-20th May 1643.

⁵⁶ Thomas, *Berkenhead*, p. 52. Thomas also notes that by 1645 *Avlicvs* cost 18d.

⁵⁷ *Rusticus*, Nos. 1-16. Much of *Rusticus* centred on reports of Parliamentary soldiers plundering properties.

correspondence.⁵⁸ Royal writing was not for common people to read, and Royalist writing appears to have attempted to control the reader who was exposed to it.⁵⁹

Hughes has argued that one of the strengths of Parliamentarianism was that it was able to integrate and unify different sections of society into a common cause.⁶⁰ Given that *Avlicvs* appears to have conveyed a more socially exclusive image, it would seem that Royalist textual space was not particularly effective in fostering and harnessing the inclusivity that could help to promote popular Royalism. It was arguably with the King's military defeat and his subsequent loss of control over Royalist print that Royalist textual space began to open up and attempt to establish a broader appeal. Potter pursues this argument further by describing how Charles effectively lost control over his own image and became a construct.⁶¹ Publications such as *His Majesties Complaint Occasioned by his later sufferings* and *A Copy of Verses said to be composed by His Majestie, upon His first Imprisonment in the Isle of Wight* fostered a new image of the King, giving him a personality that existed only on paper.⁶² Even before *Eikon Basilike* emerged from the press, Royalist writers had formulated the endearing and unforgettable concept of Charles the martyr which could only be fully substantiated by the King's execution. The implication behind this thought is that the Royalist cause could attempt to gain support through more populist textuality once the physical and earthly presence of the King had been destroyed.

Launched in April 1649, John Crouch's *The Man in the Moon* provides some insight into the stylistic transition of Royalist writing following Charles I's execution.

⁵⁸ *Anti-Britanicus*, Nos. 2 and 3; de Groot, pp. 71-76.

⁵⁹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, ch. 3.

⁶⁰ Hughes, A., 'The King, the Parliament and the Localities during the English Civil War', in Cust, R., and Hughes, A., (eds.), *The English Civil War*, London, Arnold, 1997.

⁶¹ Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp. 173-175.

⁶² *Ibid.*

Without the physical presence of the King, Royalist textual space was not subject to the constraints and censorship of Royal authority. *The Man in the Moon* differed from *Avlicvs* precisely because it was not the product of either Royal will or Royal consent. It inhabited a textual space that was divorced from England's new legal and political spaces and represented an independent, rather than centralised, Royalist voice. Whilst *The Man in the Moon* shared the same principle as *Avlicvs* and *Anti-Britanicus* that the King was the centre of authority, it differed from the Oxford newsbooks in that it tackled the multiplicity of textual meaning and deployed it against Parliament in order to reassert Royal legitimacy.⁶³ Whereas *Avlicvs* and *Anti-Britanicus* asserted the King's legal rights through a more academic and exclusive polemic, *The Man in the Moon* focused on the Republic's illegality in a populist and sensationalist diatribe. Both *Avlicvs* and *The Man in the Moon* were championing the same principles, but whilst the former used a more definable space to assert a definable law of governance, the later delved into a chaotic space to promote traditional political and social cohesion.

In his analysis of *The Man in the Moon*, Underdown argues that Crouch used sexual libels as a means of expressing an essentially conservative political and social outlook.⁶⁴ Crouch's sensational and grotesque tales regarding the sexual licentiousness of various MPs was designed both to act as a metaphor for the illegality of the Republic and to amuse the reader. At one level the sexual perversity of Crouch's constructs is just an attack on the named individual, but at another it represents an insatiable lust for power and a desire to invade and conquer private property. Unscrupulous sex is taken to be indicative of the ambitious political drive of figures

⁶³ E.g. *Man in the Moon*, No.1, 9th-16th April 1649, pp. 2-3; No. 2, 16th-23rd April 1649, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁴ Underdown, D., 'The Man in the Moon: Loyalty and Libel in Popular Politics, 1640-1660', in Underdown, D., *A Freeborn People: Politics and the Nation in Seventeenth-Century England*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996.

such as Cromwell; the leaders of the Republic simply have to keep penetrating physical bodies to assert and reaffirm their political control.⁶⁵ With no King to control it, England's political and social structure has been demolished, enabling Parliament's highly charged political lasciviousness to break free from established legal bonds.

Given its frequently pornographic and humorous content, *The Man in the Moon* would certainly appear to have been intended for consumption by a different type of reader to that which *Avlicvs* had been aimed at. At only 1d per issue, *The Man in the Moon* was also considerably cheaper than *Avlicvs*, and therefore possibly more affordable to those on much lower incomes.⁶⁶ The general presentation and format of *The Man in the Moon* would also indicate an intended readership from less prestigious backgrounds. McElligott has noted that Royalist newsbooks often used Latinate titles, whereas their Parliamentary counterparts tended to use English mastheads.⁶⁷ *The Man in the Moon* is clearly an exception to this observation. Crouch's decision to use a vernacular English title can be seen as a deliberate effort to steer the newsbook away from the more elitist approaches of titles like *Avlicvs* and make the publication more appealing to those from society's lower strata. Furthermore, as Underdown points out, the character of the Man in the Moon would also have been a familiar one, being derived from folklore and fairytales, and this would therefore indicate that Crouch was aiming at a more popular market.⁶⁸ Additional evidence for *The Man in the Moon's* intended reader may also be found in its regular use of verse. Opening with a series of quatrains which presented the reader with a brief overview of the material and issues covered by the newsbook, *The Man in the Moon* typically

⁶⁵ *Man in the Moon*, No. 26, 17th-24th October 1649, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁶ Underdown, 'The Man in the Moon', pp. 98-99; Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 50-52.

⁶⁷ McElligott, J., *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2007, p. 24.

⁶⁸ Underdown, 'The Man in the Moon', p. 98.

incorporated rhyming couplets into the commentary contained within it. Unlike the detailed analyses and commentaries of *Avlicvs*, Crouch's rhymes would have connected with the orality of news dissemination, enabling the illiterate to access the text.

There are, however, a number of problems with the suggestion that Crouch was trying to promote Royalist sentiments amongst a new readership. As Raymond notes, Crouch's humorous commentary relied on readers possessing and applying some knowledge of current political affairs.⁶⁹ This would indicate that despite its seemingly lowbrow, sensationalist and crude content, *The Man in the Moon* still required a reader with some form of an educated and knowledgeable background. There is also the problem that *The Man in the Moon*, as *Avlicvs* had done, often derided people from lowly social backgrounds. For instance, Crouch sneers at how Parliament employs 'The Brewer, the Baker, and the Linen Draper, the Taylor, the Souldier, and the foole' in important offices of state.⁷⁰ If *The Man in the Moon* was to be read by an individual of lower social standing, then it seems unlikely that such scathing comments would have been particularly endearing to its intended readers.

Nevertheless, McElligott has argued that Royalist newsbooks were capable of appealing to a broader audience, and textual evidence from *The Man in the Moon* appears to confirm his assertions.⁷¹ That *The Man in the Moon* required a reader to possess some political knowledge can be challenged by Crouch's characterisation of leading Parliamentarians. Figures such as Cromwell are memorable not solely because of Crouch's political satire, but because of his description and exaggeration of their physical traits. In *The Man in the Moon*, Cromwell becomes a figure for

⁶⁹ Raymond, *Invention*, p. 182.

⁷⁰ *Man in the Moon*, No. 3, 23rd-30th April 1649, p. 6; *ODNB*. Given that Cromwell's family had a history of being involved in the brewing trade, Crouch's comments were no doubt directed at the future Lord Protector.

⁷¹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, pp. 35-44.

lamponing due to his ridiculous physical appearance; his nose dominates his face, and Crouch frequently refers to him as 'Nose' or 'Nose Almighty'.⁷² One would not have needed to have been particularly politically aware to appreciate and enjoy such characterisation.

The somewhat problematic issue of the social background of the *Man in the Moon's* intended reader can also be tackled by exploring Crouch's approach towards Parliament. Although it has been mentioned earlier in this chapter that Crouch referred to the social composition of Parliament, it is important to observe that *The Man in the Moon* was not necessarily isolating and attacking social groups per se. Instead, what Crouch appears to have attempted was to separate Parliament from the rest of the population. Having had its natural head severed with the execution of Charles, England was growing a new and monstrous cranium in the form of Parliamentary government. MPs, it was claimed by Crouch, had a 'grand Designe... to be Kings, Princes, and Lords themselves; and we made slaves, beggars and vassals to all eternity'.⁷³ In *The Man in the Moon*, social class was used to define Parliament against the people, and not to identify specific legitimate social groups with the Republic. The social chaos depicted in *The Man in the Moon* was not merely a representation of the unnatural and unlawful governance of Parliament, but was rather an apprehension that ought to have been felt by every reader, as Crouch says of MPs that

I cannot say they are Vagrants, but they are worse, that sit to invent Taxes to make the people beggars, and then beat them to worke.⁷⁴

⁷² *Man in the Moon*, No. 3, 23rd-30th April 1649, pp. 4-7; Underdown, 'The Man in the Moon', p. 101.

⁷³ *Man in the Moon*, No. 3, 23rd-30th April 1649, p. 5.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

In *The Man in the Moon*, Parliament exists only for its own material advancement at the expense of all law-abiding people, regardless of their social position. In fact, Crouch pursued this image throughout the life of *The Man in the Moon* by claiming that Parliament had re-established serfdom and reduced everyone to slavery. Similarly to the concerns that coloured *Rusticus'* content, private property and hard-earned wealth, irrespective of one's position in society, became key issues in *The Man in the Moon*, as Crouch wrote of how

Parliament-men, Committee-men, Souldiers, and Sequestrators have all the Wealth of the Kingdom in their hands, and all other are but meer slaves and vassals to work and Labour for these idle *Drones* and wicked *Catterpillers* that have eate God out of his House, the King out of his Court, the Noblemen out of their Mannors and Lordships, the Gentry out of their Habitations, nay the poor Commons out of their Cottages...⁷⁵

Clearly, *The Man in the Moon* was attempting to spread a Royalist message that transcended social strata. It was not just the land owning nobleman whose property was at risk of falling into the 'Committees purses', but also the pittance paid to the 'poor man' who took 'paines to earn his living all his life long'.⁷⁶ Whether, and to what extent, people from society's lower strata actually read *The Man in the Moon* is impossible to establish. It is nonetheless apparent that Royalism had the potential to appeal to a less exclusive audience and thus suggests that Royalist writing potentially enjoyed a broad readership, provided Royalist writers were not restricted by a centralised regulatory authority.

It is curious that whilst it is seemingly accepted that Parliamentary pamphleteers had many voices, it is only relatively recently that it has been proposed that Royalism was not devoid of its own political spectrum.⁷⁷ This surely

⁷⁵ *Man in the Moon* No. 21, 5th-12th Sptember 1649, p. 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Donagan, B., 'Varieties of Royalism', in McElligott, and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism*.

problematises our understanding of what Royalism was, but we must also consider how Royalists and Royalism were projected in their own textual space. It is apparent that Charles had some awareness of the value of print as a means of issuing proclamations, since his printer, Christopher Barker, travelled with him to York and Shrewsbury after the failed attempt to arrest the Five Members.⁷⁸ Recognising the significance of print and actually participating in the composition of publications are, however, different issues. Larkin has expressed his conviction that Charles actually penned many of the proclamations.⁷⁹ Whilst it is a fact that each proclamation was headed with the words, 'By the King', there is no certainty that Charles personally drafted his proclamations. By June 1646 the Royalists remaining in Oxford had destroyed many of their documents, so there are likely to be significant gaps in the historical record which make it difficult to ascertain the authorship of the royal proclamations issued during the war. Although it focuses on Charles' personal correspondence, Poynting's work has implications for the analysis of royal proclamations. Given that she has shown that Charles' literary style changed according to whom he was writing, Poynting opens up the possibility that language and literary structures can be used to determine whether Charles actually was the author of the proclamations.⁸⁰

One indicator is the change in the proclamations' mode of address. It is noticeable that after the summer of 1642, many more proclamations contained first person plurals and possessive determiners, such as 'us', 'we' and 'our'.⁸¹ Admittedly, this does not prove Charles' authorship, but it is important in the sense that it forms a

⁷⁸ Larkin, *Proclamations*, p. vi.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xx.

⁸⁰ Poynting, S., '“I doe desire to be rightly vnderstood”: Rhetorical Strategies in the Letters of Charles I', in McElligott and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism*.

⁸¹ For instance, compare nos. 310-332 with nos. 339-369, in Larkin, *Royal Proclamations*.

slightly more intimate and immediate style than the third person possessives, 'his' and 'His Maiestie'.⁸² The voice and authority of the King was thus brought closer to the reader and listener, creating the impression that the King was speaking directly to them. It may be that Charles' personality and political stance can be used to determine whether he was involved in the composition of the proclamations. Poynting notes that the most noticeable changes in Charles' writing occurred to his allies as the war progressed.⁸³ She argues that as Royalist fortunes on the battlefield waned, Charles increasingly felt the need to adopt more persuasive strategies to engage with the arguments and concerns of his followers.⁸⁴ However, she also notes that Charles' communication with his opponents did not change, and we must remember that proclamations were addressed to both his allies and enemies. If Charles' position was solid, then we must expect this to shape any printed material that was drafted by him. As Poynting reminds us, Charles frequently wanted to be 'rightly vnderstood' by his subjects.⁸⁵ It is precisely this language and approach towards policies and people which pervades several of the proclamations issued during the war. For example, a proclamation issued in July 1642 states that 'We publish to all Our Subjects, and to all the World, that they may truly understand the clearing of Our Intentions herein'.⁸⁶ The emphasis that the reader should 'truly understand' the text, and hence the King's actions, is one which echoes Charles' aim to be 'rightly vnderstood', and as such implies that the King's own words are present in the text.⁸⁷ Further evidence that Charles was personally involved in creating the royal proclamations can also be found in the observations of his closest advisers and

⁸² Larkin, *Royal Proclamations*, nos. 339-369.

⁸³ Poynting, 'Rhetorical Strategies', p. 137.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁸⁶ Larkin, *Proclamations*, p. 789.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*; Poynting, 'Rhetorical Strategies', p. 136.

relations. Two proclamations were issued in days following Edgehill, and it is apparent that Charles set to work on at least one of them during the morning immediately after the battle.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, the possibility that Charles was involved in the drafting and composition of some proclamations overlooks the contributions made by other individuals. Although it was published under the King's name, the *Large Declaration* of 1639 was compiled by the Laudian-sympathising Walter Balcanquhall and was an important document in establishing the King's position on the Scottish Covenant.⁸⁹ Likewise *Avlicvs*, whilst not actually published under the King's name, was nonetheless commissioned by Charles and became a significant voice for the Royalist cause from 1643 onwards.⁹⁰ This distinction between textual authorship and the King was recognised by figures such as Robert Baillie, who said of the *Large Declaration* that Balcanquhall had made the King 'in his Manifesto print as much for Arminians as the heart of Canterburie could wish'.⁹¹ Even if we consider the fact that different authors championed and contributed to Royalist polemic, then we should not overlook the point that Royalist publishing differed from that in Parliament's circle. Whereas the London presses remained virtually unrestricted until September 1649, those in Oxford were heavily censored. It appears that precious little, if anything, could be published without either the consent or knowledge of the King until his surrender to the Scots in 1646.⁹² Oxford's smaller physical size, Berkenhead's role as licenser, and the fact that only two printers were involved in producing material, all

⁸⁸ Warburton, *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 32; Clarendon, *Rebellion*, vol. III appendix.

⁸⁹ *ODNB*.

⁹⁰ Raymond, *Invention*, p. 26.

⁹¹ *ODNB*; Baillie, *Letters*, 1.140.

⁹² Achinstein, 'Texts in Conflict', pp. 60-61; Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 7.

contributed to the creation of a more controlled printing process.⁹³ The problem with Royalist authorship thus lies not in the fact that different personalities projected a variety of voices, but in how Royalist print approached and used the textual space created by its authors.

McElligott has raised the question of political diversity within Royalism, pointing out that the authors of Royalist pamphlets shared no common background.⁹⁴ It is perhaps undeniable that the personal and political attributes of various individuals cannot simply be categorised and defined according to a monolithic and binary political spectrum. Despite this, the writing produced by Royalist authors expressed some common themes, and even though the King was not involved in the composition of every Royalist text, each tract still maintained a relationship with the King. To identify and assign the minutiae of individual Royalists' characteristics and sympathies to specific texts in an attempt to explore and categorise political diversity might actually overlook the projection and nature of Royalism itself. If the King desired to be 'rightly vnderstood', then Royalist texts were vessels in which textual meaning and interpretation could be governed.⁹⁵ By implication, Royalism was at least in theory supposed to be a centrally determined cause. The point that there existed a political spectrum within Royalism is not incompatible with the concept of a centrally defined cause.⁹⁶ Since the King was the only head of Royalism, and since his supporters fought in his name, then it surely follows that their own political stances were built around either Charles himself, or the institution of monarchy. The point here is not that the individual could interpret Royalism, but that Royalism intended to be clearly defined and controlled, and this is evident in Royalist textual space.

⁹³ Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp.7-15; de Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 46-53; Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 20-21.

⁹⁴ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, ch. 4.

⁹⁵ Poynting, 'I doe desire', pp. 136-141.

⁹⁶ I.e., Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism'.

Charles issued fifty two proclamations between 1640 and 1642, and one hundred and sixty nine proclamations during the war of 1642 to 1646.⁹⁷ De Groot has argued that royal proclamations were designed to assert and claim legitimacy for the Royalist cause, effectively empowering Royalism with a legally defined space.⁹⁸ Royalist language and meaning, in other words, were supposed to be controllable and therefore closed to misinterpretation.⁹⁹ Regardless of authorship and audience, the text and language of a proclamation was that of the King. Under Charles, Royal power and authority was not to be constrained by either the writer or the reader of a text, but the subject was supposed to be controlled and governed by language within the text. It is evident that the proclamations issued after the Battle of Edgehill were aimed at capitalising on Essex's failure to destroy the King's army. Royal language was intended to enlighten Charles' 'Ignorant' subjects with the truth, and those who accepted truth would receive the King's pardon.¹⁰⁰ Parliamentary texts and language had worked with 'great Industry and Subtilty' to 'corrupt' people against the King, and it was through proclamations that Royalism sought to define truth, assert its legal space and present itself as the cause for the 'Rules of Law'.¹⁰¹ Royalist text was intended to supplant deceit with truth, and it was the 'word of a King' that acted as a guarantee of textual and political integrity.¹⁰²

De Groot notes that proclamations were related to property.¹⁰³ In the case of the proclamations issued in the aftermath of Edgehill, the concept of property was linked to language. In referring to Parliamentary documents such as the 'pretended

⁹⁷ Larkin, *Proclamations*, p. xi.

⁹⁸ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 25-33.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Larkin, *Proclamations*, nos. 352 and 353.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 25-33.

Ordinance of the Militia', royal proclamations asserted that Parliamentarianism threatened and invaded physical property through textual space.¹⁰⁴ By corrupting English law and then concealing its actions behind pseudo-legal language, Parliamentarianism was the true destructor of social, legal and political norms. Without the King's presence and governance, society would descend into chaos, and the Parliamentary London was shown to reflect that point. Parliament's perversion of law and social order empowered the 'meanest and poorest' to invade the physical space of the 'best and substantial Cittizens and Inhabitants' in the capital.¹⁰⁵ Without the King, legal boundaries could no longer be maintained and guaranteed, and English law could easily be supplanted and subverted by the 'threates and menaces' of the crude, chaotic multitude unleashed by Parliament.¹⁰⁶ Royal proclamations wanted to assert and affirm the meaning of written law, and by implication they aimed to reveal the destructive, subversive and meaningless nature of Parliamentarianism.

If proclamations were textual representations of the King's voice that asserted the King's authority and defined the law in contrast to Parliamentarianism, then *Avlicvs* was designed to control print and language in an environment flooded with pamphlets.¹⁰⁷ Commissioned by Charles and initially edited by Peter Heylin in 1643, *Avlicvs* came to be edited by Sir John Berkenhead and was a hugely important Royalist publication. As Raymond points out, the Royalist newsbook was intended to be easily distinguishable from other publications.¹⁰⁸ With a uniform typeface, marginalia and generally tidy presentation, *Avlicvs* appeared more restrained than the majority of other pamphlets and newsbooks. *Rusticus* also displayed a similarly

¹⁰⁴ Larkin, *Proclamations*, no. 353.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰⁸ Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 26-27.

restrained presentation in which uniform type was also a key feature that characterised the overall tone of the publication. In fact, an even greater emphasis seems to have been placed on textual restraint in *Rusticus* than in *Avlicvs*, since it went so far as to include both a full title page and a six page long preface to the reader in its first issue.¹⁰⁹ This restraint in Royalist text was significant, since it visibly represented the intellectual, legal and political control over language and meaning that Royalism so desired. The fact that *Avlicvs* was an officially commissioned newsbook gave it an authority which, until the Ordinance for the Regulation of Printing was passed in June 1643, Parliamentary pamphlets lacked.¹¹⁰ Often a considerably lengthier newsbook, with many issues extending to twelve or more pages, *Avlicvs* was physically different to the more common eight-page pamphlet. *Rusticus* likewise exhibited moments where the quantity of textual space was noticeably more substantial than the majority of its Parliamentary rivals, as did *Mercurius Academicus*.¹¹¹ Indeed, the actuality of *Avlicvs*, *Rusticus* and *Academicus*' physical space, together with the abundance of text within them, testified to their own authority and thereby exuded a command over current events and the reader.

Raymond notes that *Avlicvs* was written to expose the political factions and tensions within the Parliamentary cause and demoralise Parliament's supporters.¹¹² This is undoubtedly true, especially when one considers *Avlicvs*' rhetoric during the summer of 1643, when it seemed as if the King would win the war.¹¹³ But *Avlicvs* had a further cultural and intellectual purpose, and one which ran deeper than that of *Rusticus*. From its outset, *Rusticus* was advertised as 'The Covntries Complaint of the

¹⁰⁹ *Mercurius Rusticus*, No. 1, 20th May 1643. Subsequent issues dropped both of these features.

¹¹⁰ Cressy, D., *England on Edge*, p. 309.

¹¹¹ *Rusticus*, No. 18, 16th December 1643.

¹¹² Raymond, *Invention*, p. 26.

¹¹³ Jones, P., *The Siege of Gloucester*, MRes diss., Keele University, 2007, ch. 4.

Murthers, Robberies, Plundrings, and *other Outrages committed by the Rebels on His Majesties faithfull Subjects*'. Evidently, the purpose of *Rusticus* was to relate to the reader tales of how Parliamentary forces routinely invaded and stole from people's private property. The objectives of *Avlicvs* and *Academicus* were different. Because readers had 'long beene abused with falsehoods', it was the duty of *Avlicvs* and *Academicus* to challenge the numerous libels being spread by Parliamentary pamphleteers.¹¹⁴ These newsbooks existed to deconstruct the 'untruthes' made by Parliamentary pamphlets and demolish the credibility of Parliamentary polemicists, and in doing so reassert Royal control over the English language.¹¹⁵

It is apparent that *Avlicvs* was the product and the promoter of two Royalist assumptions, both of which were consistent with the proclamations. Most noticeable was that *Avlicvs* appears to have been designed with a passive reader in mind.¹¹⁶ Although it often claimed to lay Royalism and Royalist activities before the judgement of the 'world', *Avlicvs*' words were not intended to be open to interpretation by the reader, but instead existed for the reader to 'truly understand' them.¹¹⁷ This approach towards the reader was mirrored in the newsbook's presentation, since its more formal and controlled textual space was one which commanded authority over the reader, and by implication defined the relationship between the monarch and subject. *Academicus* shared a very similar style of presentation to *Avlicvs*, with its relatively neat appearance likewise identifying it as a more sophisticated newsbook. *Avlicvs* further reflected Charles' style of kingship through the message printed on its front page. By communicating the 'intelligence, and the affaires of the Court, to the rest of the Kingdome', *Avlicvs* was not merely disseminating Royalism and Royalist news to

¹¹⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 1, 1st-7th January 1643, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, ch. 3.

¹¹⁷ *Avlicvs*, No. 1, 1st-7th January 1643, p. 1; No. 25, 18th-24th June 1643, p. 8.

its readers, but was positively locating the King and his court at the heart of England.¹¹⁸ It was Parliament, with its 'unlimited and arbitrary commands' and efforts to 'assume a power unto themselves', that sought to destroy the 'whole frame and government of the Kingdome'.¹¹⁹ The word of the King and the messages in *Avlicvs* supposedly served to defend and uphold the political and legal system of England. The position of *Avlicvs* and the royal proclamations was evident: government centred not on the factious Parliament, but on the monarch alone, and it was the monarch who shaped a stable England.

Whether there are grounds for contesting the size of Royalist print runs or not, it is nevertheless apparent that *Avlicvs*, and to an extent *Rusticus*, made a serious impact on the print trade.¹²⁰ Such was the impact of *Avlicvs* that it prompted the Parliamentary *Mercurius Britanicus* to be launched in August 1643.¹²¹ Nor could other Parliamentary pamphleteers simply ignore the challenge posed by the Royalist press, and *The Kingdome Weekly Intelligencer* and *Mercurius Civicus* attempted to counter *Avlicvs*. The poet and Parliamentary army officer, George Wither, went so far as to copy the title of Ryves' newsbook and released his own version of *Rusticus* in October 1643.¹²² In April 1644, George Bishop's *Mercurius Aulico-Mastix* was launched specifically 'In Opposition To The Poysonous Intelligence of *Avlicvs*' and closely imitated *Avlicvs*' format.¹²³ Even as late as the spring of 1645 Parliamentary pamphleteers still believed that *Avlicvs* was a hugely powerful publication, with the author of *The true Character Of Mercurius Aulicus* asserting that innumerable 'English

¹¹⁸ *Avlicvs*, No. 1, 1st-7th January 1643, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 25, 18th-24th June 1643, p. 3.

¹²⁰ Raymond, *Invention*, p. 149; Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 49-50.

¹²¹ Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 49-52.

¹²² *ODNB*.

¹²³ *Mercurius Aulico-Mastix*, London, 1644.

hearts' had feasted on the 'bad nourishment' of *Avlicvs*.¹²⁴ In a comment which implied that Parliamentary pamphleteering was ineffective, the same author claimed that *Avlicvs* 'doth so intoxicate' readers that 'there is no theriaque [sic] strong enough to expel the Poyson'.¹²⁵ *Avlicvs*' perceived success was such that some Parliamentary pamphleteers believed that it had 'done the Parliament more hurt than 2000 of the Kings Souldiers', and its reportage was said to be so convincing for readers that it

...casteth a mist afore the eyes of them that read his book:
which maketh them to thinke that they see things really as they
are; when they see but the mere shadow, and resemblance of
them indeed...¹²⁶

One of the advantages *Britanicus* had over *Avlicvs* was arguably in its masthead. Whereas *Avlicvs* asserted that it was spreading news from Oxford, *Britanicus* addressed the population of the British Isles since it was 'communicating the affaires of great Britaine For the better Information of the People'.¹²⁷ By implication, *Avlicvs* risked drawing attention to the corruption and intrigue of the King's Court.¹²⁸ The Royalist newsbook may have been trying to define England in relation to the King, but *Britanicus* linked courtly space with Royalist textual space in order to subvert the alleged truth of Royalism's language. Unsurprisingly, what *Britanicus* tried to achieve was to reverse the Royalist concept that the King's language was sacrosanct. Instead of guaranteeing meaning and order, the King had issued *Avlicvs* with the 'Commission to lie for his life', and had thereby undermined his own integrity.¹²⁹ Such a charge was, of course, substantiated after the King's personal correspondence was captured

¹²⁴ *The True Character of Mercurius Aulicus*, London, 1645, p. 4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Character of Mercurius Aulicus*, p. 4.

¹²⁷ *Britanicus*, No. 3, 5th-12th September 1643, p. 1.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

in the aftermath of Naseby and subsequently published as *The King's Cabinet Opened* in July 1645.¹³⁰

The Royalists' defeat at the hands of the New Model Army signalled the collapse of the King's war effort in both military and textual terms. Militarily, defeat at Naseby meant that Charles simply did not have a substantial field army left under his command, and this led to a destabilisation of Royalist-held territories.¹³¹ But with the loss of control over physical space came the disruption of Royalist textual space. Royalist print had been able to survive previous military reversals. For instance, *Avlicvs* had creatively interpreted events between August and September 1643 so that the Royalists' strategic failure at Gloucester appeared to be a deliberate and calculated attempt to lure Essex's army into battle.¹³² Even Rupert's defeat at Marston Moor and the Royalists' subsequent collapse in northern England in July 1644 did not seriously affect *Avlicvs*' production, although *Rusticus* seems to have disappeared from the press by that point. What is noticeable, though, is that Marston Moor was followed by a reduction in the average length of an issue of *Avlicvs*. Between July and September 1644, *Avlicvs* was frequently a mere eight pages long. Only five of the fourteen issues printed between 30th June and 5th October ever stretched beyond eight pages, and two of these issues coincided with Essex's defeat at Lostwithiel. These figures compare unfavourably with *Avlicvs*' length during the summer of 1643, a period often recognised as the peak of Royalist military success.¹³³ All fourteen issues of the newsbook printed between July and September 1643 were over eight pages long, and these figures would suggest that varying military fortunes had a

¹³⁰ Wilcher, *Writing Royalism*, pp. 240-241.

¹³¹ Hutton, *Royalist War Effort*, ch. 17; pp. 201-203.

¹³² Jones, 'Gloucester', ch. 4. *Avlicvs* also made an unconvincing attempt to blame its erroneous reportage of Marston Moor on information from captured Parliamentary soldiers.

¹³³ E.g. Barratt, J., *The First Battle of Newbury*, Stroud, Tempus, 2005.

direct impact on the Royalist newsbook. Marchamont Nedham and Thomas Audley, the editors of *Britanicus*, evidently noticed the change in the newsbook's length, remarking that *Avlicvs*' pen had 'dropt of his hand, and himselfe dropt after it into his *Grave*'.¹³⁴

Yet despite the changes to *Avlicvs* in the wake of Marston Moor, the Royalist newsbook remained in regular production. The case of Naseby was far different, since *Avlicvs*' actual production went into significant decline and its reportage became incredibly fictitious and erroneous. The impact of Naseby on Royalism was clear to Parliamentary writers, with one pamphleteer stating that *Avlicvs* was 'utterly ruined'.¹³⁵ When *Britanicus* asked 'Where is King *Charles*? What's become of him?' it could easily have asked where *Avlicvs* was instead.¹³⁶ Between June and September, there may only have been as many as four issues of *Avlicvs* which emerged from the press.¹³⁷ These final issues of *Avlicvs* displayed the same form of continuous pagination which had been used since the newsbook's inception. Pages from non-existent issues of the newsbook were counted and included in the total pagination, with the result that when subsequent issues were printed, their pagination began where the ghost newsbook had ended. For instance, when the issue dated 25th May to 8th June ended on page one thousand six hundred and twenty, the following issue, dated 13th to 20th July, began on page one thousand six hundred and sixty one. Thus, although there had been no other issues printed between 8th June and 13th July, it

¹³⁴ *Britanicus*, No. 39, 10th-17th June 1644, p. 1.

¹³⁵ *Newes from Smith The Jaylor. With the Arraignments of Mercurius Alicus, Who is Sentenced to Stand in the Pillory Three Market Dayes, for His Notorious Libelling Against State and Kingdome*, London, 1645, p. 4.

¹³⁶ *Britanicus*, No. 92, 28th July-4th August 1645, p. 1.

¹³⁷ Thomason's collection contains only four issues during this period. It is possible that more issues were printed, but given Thomason's near complete collection of *Avlicvs* up until this point, it seems unlikely that he would cease acquiring the Royalist newsbook and yet continue collecting other titles. Gaps in *Avlicvs*' production are confirmed in Seccombe, M., and Nelson, C., *British Newspapers and Periodicals, 1641-1700: A Short-Title Catalogue of Serials Printed in England*, New York, Modern Language Association of America, 1987, pp. 206-207.

nonetheless appeared to the reader that he had missed several weeks of *Avlicvs*. The aim of this seems to have been to convince the reader that *Avlicvs* was still in regular, continuous production, and thereby create the impression that Royalism was still very much a vibrant force. Assuming that this was Berkenhead's intention, it was unfortunate that on one occasion *Avlicvs*' pagination was inconsistent and wholly inaccurate, with two issues containing the same page numbers, thus undermining the pretence of regular production.¹³⁸ *Avlicvs*' façade of numerical and chronological coherence was curiously not applied to the other primary characteristic of its serialisation: issue numbers. In contrast to his previous practices, by the summer of 1645 Berkenhead no longer had *Avlicvs*' issue number printed on its front page, thus contrasting with *Britanicus* which still proudly displayed each issue number. This was all part of the deceptive tactics used in the last Royalist newsbooks. By not displaying an issue number, Berkenhead did not have to account for any missing issues and could pretend that *Avlicvs* had remained in continuous production, although the printing of a fictitious issue number would have complemented the newsbook's imaginative pagination.

If *Avlicvs*' production became increasingly erratic after Naseby, then its physical size was also adversely affected by the Royalists' defeat. Whereas in the week prior to the Battle of Naseby *Avlicvs* had reached twenty pages in length, at no point after the King's defeat did the Royalist newsbook ever exceed twelve pages, and the final issue which emerged on 7th September was only eight pages long.¹³⁹ Indeed the launch of *Academicus* in December 1645 indicates a Royalist attempt to regain some command of textual space in the wake of a terminally declining *Avclivs*.

¹³⁸ *Avlicvs*, 27th April to 4th May 1645; 4th to 11th May 1645.

¹³⁹ *Avlicvs*, 25th May to 8th June 1645.

Nevertheless, even with a reduction in size, *Avlicvs* remained noticeably lengthier than its Parliamentary counterpart, *Britanicus*, which generally remained at only eight pages in length throughout its entire shelf life. This was a fact which Berkenhead's newly-launched *Mercurius Anti-Britanicus* targeted when it commented on how *Britanicus's* 'weekly Volumes... never exceed a *sheet*; And that *sheet* a flat, grosse, impotent, wretched *Libell*'.¹⁴⁰ Throughout its brief life, *Anti-Britanicus* continually referred to the shorter size of *Britanicus*, reminding readers that the flagship of Parliamentary news only ever appeared each week 'in a thinne Quarto'.¹⁴¹ *Anti-Britanicus* went on to claim that if a new Parliamentary publication could be weighed 'it would not amount to a Graine of Mustard-seed', and it was surely no mere coincidence the subsequent issues of *Anti-Britanicus* increased from eight to twelve pages in length.¹⁴² *Academicus* appears to have been venting a very similar assertion to *Anti-Britanicus* when it observed

The first thing we meet this weeke, is a sheet of *Britanicus*, and indeed a sheet will become him as the garment of Repentance: Three parts of this sheet, he wastes in rayling against *Academicus*; only in the last two pages he hath here and there a drop of Newes; a very shrewd signe that his Maisters cause goes back...¹⁴³

It is as if the Royalist press felt the urge to assert its textual authority more than ever before, and the physicality of the text was thought to be important to this end. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, physical size had been an implicit issue in *Avlicvs*, but with *Anti-Britanicus* and *Academicus* it was clearly addressed. For both *Anti-Britanicus* and *Academicus*, the physical size of the text signified an intellectual

¹⁴⁰ *Anti-Britanicus*, No. 1, August 1645, p. 4. John Cleaveland was also involved in the writing of *Anti-Britanicus*, Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 118-120.

¹⁴¹ *Anti-Britanicus*, No. 2, p. 3; No. 3, p. 4.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, Nos. 1-3.

¹⁴³ *Academicus*, No. 5, 12th-17th January 1646, p. 1. The irony of such an assertion was naturally overlooked in the newsbook.

superiority that was able to exert an authoritative command over text and meaning, which in turn raised serious cultural issues in the wake of the Royalists' declining military fortunes.

Berkenhead's approach in *Anti-Britanicus*' was noticeably different to that which he had used in *Avlicvs*. Whereas the defining characteristics of *Avlicvs* had been its analysis of military news and witty criticism of the Parliamentary press, *Anti-Britanicus* was primarily focused on attacking Parliamentary print and language. The very title of *Anti-Britanicus* defined it in direct opposition to Parliament's *Britanicus*, and after its first issue *Anti-Britanicus*' title was extended so that it became the *King's Cabinet vindicated*. Unable, and perhaps even unwilling, to challenge the New Model Army's victory at Naseby, Royalist print concentrated on asserting textual truth and integrity of meaning. *Anti-Britanicus* existed neither to report on nor to create Royalist military victories, but to re-establish truthful meaning in the English language and culture.

According to *Anti-Britanicus*, Parliamentarians spoke and wrote in 'broad English', a corrupt language in which true meaning was lost.¹⁴⁴ It was a lexicon in which meaning was conveyed through a 'liberty of speaking by Contraries'; words and titles were used in opposition to their true definitions, whilst slanders appeared in the 'shape of Truths'.¹⁴⁵ Whereas Royalists had 'learnt to define Truth', Parliamentarians had supposedly devised a form of 'Wit' which constituted a 'Liberty of rayling at Great Men'.¹⁴⁶ Parliament's *Britanicus* was, in the words of *Anti-Britanicus*, 'One who generally offends as much against *Wit*, as against *Persons* of

¹⁴⁴ *Anti-Britanicus*, No. 2, p. 8.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 5.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 2, p. 3.

Quality'.¹⁴⁷ Royalist textual space was thus intended to be an intellectual fortress which both sealed and protected the truth and wit of the English language from the chaos of Parliamentary interpretation. Royalism and English language were therefore synonymous; the Royalists' written language was an art, but that of Parliamentarians was just an unrefined and shapeless monstrosity which spewed forth from the minds of ignorant and depraved individuals. As *Anti-Britanicus* observed of Nedham, 'we cannot say, that this Fellow writes, but vomits'; Parliamentary writing supposedly had no refinement, but possessed a similar style to those common people who threw 'rotten Egges' at a carting.¹⁴⁸ Parliamentary English was freakish, and to *Anti-Britanicus* it was as if a 'strange double-sex'd kind of writing' had been created or 'ingendred' in the London presses.¹⁴⁹ Royalist pamphleteers thus portrayed Parliamentarianism to be as much an attack on the English language as it was an assault on the King's 'Great Men'.¹⁵⁰ In fact, Berkenhead appears to have pursued this image of an assault on the English language by relating it to Parliament's alliance with the Scots. The language of *Britanicus* was not English, but 'Scottish mist', and was thus a sign that England would be irredeemably transformed under a victorious Parliament.¹⁵¹ *Anti-Britanicus* was thus anticipating a line of argument that would later appear in *The Man in the Moon*, which claimed the regicide signified a complete reversal of political, social and cultural identity.¹⁵²

Just one week before Naseby, when Royalist forces had stormed Leicester, *Avlicvs* was triumphantly proclaiming that Parliament's supporters were 'most deeply

¹⁴⁷ *Anti-Britanicus*, No. 1, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 2, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 6.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 2, p. 3.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, No. 3, p. 2.

¹⁵² E.g. *Man in the Moon*, No. 36, 26th December 1650-2nd January 1651, p. 5.

sensible of the eminent ruine which is coming upon them'.¹⁵³ With the Royalists' military successes a mere memory of the recent past, Royalist pamphleteering seems to have instead focused on the cultural implications of the King's defeat by the second half of 1645. Royalist writing was presented as the antithesis of Parliamentary polemic and supposedly guaranteed truthful, meaningful language. Royalist language added 'new whiteness to Alabaster', and unlike Parliamentarianism was 'Chrystall cleare' in its meaning, and that clarity was diametrically opposed to the dishonesty of Parliamentarianism.¹⁵⁴ The professed certainty of textual integrity in Royalism's 'plaine English' was a guarantee of political and social stability for the rest of the country.¹⁵⁵ For Royalism, the reason why Parliamentarians could not provide any definable textual meaning was precisely because the Parliamentary cause was composed of a 'changeable Multitude', and this perceived absence of meaning equated to a lack of political and legal rectitude.¹⁵⁶

For all of the attacks made by Royalist pamphlets on the chaos of Parliamentary text and politics, it cannot accurately be asserted that any sole author constructed Royalist textual space. Earlier sections of this chapter have suggested that Charles was to an extent involved in the writing of proclamations, but whether he played an active role in the construction of other textual spaces is uncertain. The extent to which Charles was the author of *Eikon Basilike*, for instance, remains debateable, with Daems and Nelson suggesting that the text was a collaborative project between the King and John Gauden.¹⁵⁷ There has also been some conjecture over who was involved in the writing of *Avlicvs*, with John Taylor and George

¹⁵³ *Avlicvs*, 25th May to 8th June 1645, p. 20.

¹⁵⁴ *Anti-Britanicus*, No. 3, pp. 7-10.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 2, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ Daems, J., and Nelson, H. F., (eds. And intro.), *Eikon Basilike with Selections from Eikonoklastes*, Ontario, Broadview Press, 2006, pp. 16-21.

Wharton emerging as possible authors. The evidence for this theory, however, is based on the assertions of the Parliamentarian John Booker, who may in any case have been trying to undermine the integrity of the Royalist newsbook and the intellectual capacity of Royalist writers.¹⁵⁸

Nevertheless, one should consider the point that the composition of pamphlets and newsbooks was generally a collective effort involving writers, editors, licensors and printers. Ultimately, the question of who the author of a newsbook was should be shifted to who the authors of a newsbook were. As a licensor, Berkenhead was involved in the production of numerous pamphlets and texts at Oxford between 1642 and 1646, so it is not beyond plausibility that individuals such as Taylor and Wharton contributed to *Avlicvs* in some form.¹⁵⁹ After all, Berkenhead assisted Heylin in editing *Avlicvs* until he assumed overall editorship in September 1643, and then Heylin briefly returned as an editor in June 1644.¹⁶⁰ What has often been noted, though, is the change in *Avlicvs*' voice from September 1643. After Berkenhead assumed editorship, *Avlicvs* seems to have developed a more aggressively incisive and wittier commentary, and this change tallies with the style found in Berkenhead's other satirical pamphlets.¹⁶¹

One question that must surely arise from the issue of authors and authorship is authorial motivation. Were newsbook writers primarily attracted by the economic opportunities offered by the printing press, or were there deeper motivations? The 1640s certainly opened a new market and offered budding printers the chance to earn some money relatively quickly. Considering that newsbooks like *A Continuation Of Certain Speciall and Remarkable passages* and *A Continuation of Certain speciall*

¹⁵⁸ ODNB.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, p. 106.

¹⁶⁰ Thomas, *Berkenhead*, pp. 30-33; ODNB; Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 26-27.

¹⁶¹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, pp. 99-104; Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 26-30; ODNB.

and remarkable Passages had strikingly similar titles, one conclusion is that some editors tried to capitalise on the work of others by plagiarising material from established publications.¹⁶² Newsbook titles further suggest that editors tried to create unique selling points for their wares. Titles such as *A true Divrnall*, *The True Informer*, or *A Perfect Diurnall* seemed to promise prospective consumers quality and authoritative news reportage, whilst titles of such as *Bloody Newes from Dover* offered sensational stories with the possible intention of attracting high volume sales. Woodcuts and more decorative title pages, such as the ones routinely presented on *Mercurius Civicus* and *A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament*, clearly made a newsbook stand out from the numerous other offerings a consumer faced. In terms of Royalism, however, economic motivations do not appear to hold any real substance. The unique selling points of *Avlicvs* and *Rusticus* was their comparatively neat presentation, but this primarily ties in with Royalism's image as an ordered and controlled cause, and not as a financially motivated choice determined by the editors. As an officially commissioned newsbook designed to counter the tide of Parliamentary print, it is highly unlikely that monetary gain was ever a driving force behind *Avlicvs*. Any link between financial incentives and pamphleteering seems likewise tenuous with regard to *Rusticus* too, since its relatively irregular publication would not have been conducive to the establishment of a lucrative trade.

Even after Royalist print ceased to emanate from Oxford during the later 1640s onwards, the prospect of financial gain does not fully explain authorial motivation. As McElligott points out, the amount of money that could be earned per pamphlet from the late 1640s onwards was unlikely to compensate for any legal

¹⁶² The former title had a much neater type and continued to be produced for at least a year, whereas the latter ceased to exist after a few weeks.

repercussions from the new regime.¹⁶³ Whilst it is true that from the late 1640s until his death in 1653 John Taylor supplemented his insubstantial income by writing, support for the King still remained a theme throughout his work.¹⁶⁴ In the first issue of *The Man in the Moon*, Crouch proclaimed that the only money he desired was that which was sufficient to fund the materials needed to continue his pamphleteering.¹⁶⁵ It could be the case that Crouch was merely establishing an attractive and enticing anti-establishment image for himself which would ultimately help to sell his newsbook, but it seems more likely that his pamphleteering was politically motivated. Despite having been arrested in December 1649, Crouch continued to edit *The Man in the Moon*, and it was only after he was arrested for a second time in June 1650 that his newsbook's life came to an end.¹⁶⁶ Even then, it seems possible that it was not imprisonment, but Charles II's defeat at Worcester and the severe and final blow it dealt to the Royalist cause which brought an end to Crouch's Royalist writing.¹⁶⁷

The intriguing aspect about Crouch is that, for such a politically charged and inflammatory writer, he lived in obscurity until the late 1640s. It was not until the publication in 1647 of a fake version of *Mercurius Melancholicus*, followed by *Craftie Cromwell* and *The Man in the Moon* in 1649, that Crouch entered the world of newsbook editing and pamphleteering.¹⁶⁸ Given his silence throughout the war, one could conclude that Crouch was either neutral or a passive supporter of the Royalist cause. It seems unlikely, although not impossible, that Crouch ever supported the

¹⁶³ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, p. 99. Berkenhead apparently earned up to forty shillings for each pamphlet he penned.

¹⁶⁴ *ODNB*; Capp, B., *The World of John Taylor the Water-Poet 1578-1653*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, chs. 7 and 8.

¹⁶⁵ *Man in the Moon*, No. 1, 9th-16th April 1649, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ *ODNB*.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*; McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Parliamentary cause during the war of 1642 to 1646. As Potter points out, the surname Crouch often appears to be related to pro-Royalist activity: Humphrey Crouch produced a number of ballads during the 1640s, a John Crouch worked as an apprentice to the King's printer; and an alehouse keeper called Dorothy Crowch was prosecuted in 1644 for permitting her guests to sing anti-Parliamentary songs.¹⁶⁹ Admittedly, this evidence is not conclusive. Humphrey Crouch does not appear to have been related to John Crouch, although Edward Crouch was involved in printing some of Humphrey's work; and the John Crouch who worked under the King's printer also seems to have been a different individual to the John Crouch who edited *The Man in the Moon*.¹⁷⁰ If John Crouch was related or associated with any of these other individuals, then it still does not explain why he remained silent throughout the war. The tone of *Craftie Cromwell* and *The Man in the Moon* indicates that the Crouch's Royalism stemmed from a strong apprehension towards a seemingly arbitrary form of government that was devoid of any royal involvement. In effect the emergence of Crouch from the late 1640s, followed by his apparent withdrawal from Royalism during the 1650s, may suggest that his allegiance was tied not to the person of the King specifically, but to the position and role of the monarch in relation to England. His ultimate acceptance of the Protectorate need not necessarily mean that Crouch actually became anti-Royalist, but rather that he came to believe that the country's stability rested on a strong and established government, and that continued resistance would only weaken England.

What is apparent from an examination of Royalist print is that there were a series of common themes and elements which linked texts together, despite the

¹⁶⁹ Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 15.

¹⁷⁰ ODNB.

number of individuals involved in the overall printing and editing process. Concerns for security of property, control over law and order; and language and meaning, however differently expressed, were present in the proclamations, *Avlicvs*, *Rusticus* and *The Man in the Moon*. It appears that Royalist print was supposed to be a space in which identity and meaning could be defined and managed. Even the different approaches of *Avlicvs* and *The Man in the Moon* ultimately lead to similar concerns: political, legal, religious and social stability in the country. McElligott has suggested that Royalist editors 'subsumed their identity into a collective', and it is evident that in spite of the presence of numerous voices within Royalism, there was an attempt to forge an identity in print that was predicated on issues relating to the integrity of England.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, p. 104.

Chapter Two:

The Elizabethan Legend and its Endurance

It has been suggested that the English Civil Wars were religious conflicts, with their roots lying in the reforms instigated by Charles I and William Laud.¹ Morrill famously asked whether the Civil Wars were actually the last wars of religion, and his question has been echoed in the works of other historians since. As McBride and Claydon have argued, religion was also linked to national identity in the British Isles, and it is this concept which acts as a key theme throughout this chapter.² From what context did contemporaries regard the conflict between King and Parliament? Exactly how might individuals have perceived Royalism, and exactly how did Royalism aim to project itself as a relevant and meaningful cause? In effect, this chapter aims to explore the historical context within which Royalism was regarded and projected. It intends to ask whether England became associated with militant Protestantism during the sixteenth century, and whether Stuart rule came to be compared and contrasted with that of the Tudors, in particular Elizabeth. To this end, this chapter acts as a means of establishing the contextual background for Royalist identity. It implicitly asks whether Charles I's cause was affected by a perceived English martial Protestant heritage, and ultimately whether Royalism was both viewed, developed and judged in relation to that heritage.

It is also the intention of this chapter to reveal some of the problems that resided within the images of war and soldiering in the early modern era. This exploration is intended to introduce some of the issues raised later on in this thesis, and as such the representations of soldiers in this chapter can be read in tandem with the discussion of Royalist soldiers in Chapter Seven. In effect, the material presented here establishes what

¹ Morrill, J., *The Nature of the English Revolution*, London, Longman, 1993.

² McBride, I., and Claydon, T., (eds.), *Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

the ideal role and identity of an English soldier was supposed to be, whilst Chapter Seven reveals how the identity of the Royalist soldier was problematised. The work here suggests that the English soldier was supposed to be a defender of Protestantism, but Chapter Seven points out how the Royalist soldier was often seen to be acting in ways that ran counter to that ideal. Indeed, the stereotypical Royalist soldier, or Cavalier, was actually a manifestation of Protestant England's archenemy: the Spaniard, or militant Catholic.

This chapter ends with a section that briefly explores the ways in which Charles' image seemingly contrasted with the martial Protestantism of the Elizabethan era. It contrasts English military failure with the apparent successes under Elizabeth, and shows how the memory of Elizabethan martial Protestantism endured into Charles' reign, creating a tension with both Charles' image and his policies. This final section basically suggests that England's perceived role as a champion of Protestantism was undermined both by Charles' policies and by Charles' image. Whereas Elizabeth had come to be presented as the leader of a militarily proficient Protestant country, Charles appeared to distance himself from such a role. Both Charles' foreign policies and his personal image suggested that he attempted to reinterpret the role of an English monarch. Instead of being a warring Protestant leader, Charles appeared to be conveyed as the guardian of a peaceful country, and this particular role seemed to be at odds with both England's past and its efforts as a bastion against Catholicism.

By the sixteenth century, the character of war was changing from its medieval form. New military technologies, tactics and strategies had a profound impact on the nature of warfare, and Roberts' *Military Revolution* thesis has secured technological change as an integral part of historiography.³ Entirely new means of destruction, together with the

³ For discussions regarding gunpowder and military change, see Roberts, 'Military Revolution', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*; Parker, G., 'The "Military Revolution, 1560-1660" – A Myth?', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*; Parker, *Military Innovation*; Black, J., 'A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*; Black, J., *A Military Revolution? Military Change and*

increasing scale of warfare, coincided with the rise of Protestantism and its subsequent struggle against Catholicism. As Hale's work demonstrates, in such a religiously charged environment, the new form of warfare gave rise to apocalyptic visions of both the present and future.⁴ Distinctions between the civilian and military worlds also became increasingly blurred, with civilians becoming direct victims of war, and English writers came to present Spanish and Catholic soldiers as the chief perpetrators of such atrocities. In the minds of such writers, Spain and Rome effectively constituted an axis of evil that was bent on the destruction of Protestant nations, especially England. It was precisely this fear and hatred, coupled with a sense of England's medieval military legacy, which English writers used to fashion an honourable English Protestant martial ethos. England effectively came to be portrayed as the 'Eden' of the world, an enticing, uncorrupted and lush realm which foreign invaders desired to conquer and occupy.⁵ From the 1570s onwards, as England was increasingly drawn into the struggles against Spain, English writers and pamphleteers created the impression that at the heart of true soldiering lay the defence of Protestantism and struggle against the antichristian forces of Catholicism. Lake and Wiener have noted

European Society 1550-1800, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1991; Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*; Parrott, D.A., 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The Military Revolution', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*. Allmand's discussion of the Hundred Years War has shown that civilian communities were seen to be increasingly involved in war efforts from at least as early as the fourteenth century, Allmand, C., 'War and the Non-Combatant in the Middle Ages', in Keen, *Medieval Warfare*, pp.261-262. Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*, esp. pp. 72-77. Henninger has suggested that 'mutation' might be a more appropriate word to describe military changes, Henninger, L., 'Military Revolutions and Military History', in Hughes, M., and Philpot, W.J., (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 16; DeVries, K., 'Gunpowder and Early Gunpowder Weapons', in DeVries, K., (ed.), *Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, Essay 11, pp. 125-142; Hale, J.R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, London, Fontana, 1985; Purkiss, D., 'Dismembering and Remembering: The English Civil War and Male Identity', in Summers, C.J., and Peabworth, T., *The English Civil Wars in the Literary Imagination*, Columbia and London, University of Missouri Press, 1999, pp. 220-241; Taunton, N., *1590s Drama and Militarism: Portrayals of War in Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare's Henry V*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001; de Somogyi, N., *Shakespeare's Theatre of War*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998; Murrin, M., *History and Warfare in Renaissance Epic*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1997.

⁴ Hale, J.R., *Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990.

⁵ Wolf, P., 'The Emergence of National Identity in Early Modern England: Causes and Ideological Representations', in Grabes, H., (ed.), *Writing the Early Modern English Nation: The Transformation of National Identity in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England*, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Costerus New Series 137, 2001, pp. 152-166.

the unifying effect of anti-Catholic sentiments in Elizabethan and Stuart England.⁶ It was this sense of a united English Protestant cause which many Elizabethan pamphlets evoked, providing the foundations for a more public cause, or what Stoye has called the ‘patriotic context of the English Civil War’.⁷

Although the late Elizabethan and early Stuart periods have often been associated with a decline in the number of peers with military experience, Manning’s research reveals an opposite trend. Between 1585 and 1640, the number of England’s peers with military experience increased from forty per cent to sixty nine per cent.⁸ The apparent growth in aristocratic military experience from 1585 onwards obviously coincides with the religious conflicts in Europe, and by implication England’s confrontations with Spain. Taken within the context of the Spanish threat, the increasing participation of the nobility in warfare suggests that the notion of a public cause had displaced that of a private cause, with the interests of the country’s security taking priority over the ambitions of the individual. Defence against militant Catholicism, rather than pursuit of personal glory, emerges as the chief role of English aristocracy, and it was one that was ideally supposed to be shared with the common soldier.⁹

In his study of warfare in early modern Europe, Hale states that European governments attempted to launch propaganda campaigns in an attempt to encourage men

⁶ Lake, P., ‘The Significance of the Elizabethan Identification of the Pope as Antichrist’, in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 31, No. 2, April, 1980, pp. 163-4; p. 177; Wiener, C.Z., ‘The Beleaguered Isle. A Study of Elizabethan and Early Jacobean Anti-Catholicism’, in *Past and Present*, No. 51, 1971, pp. 27-62.

⁷ Stoye, M., *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 8; Coster, W., ‘Fear and Friction in Urban Communities During the English Civil War’, in Naply, W., and Roberts, P., (eds.), *Fear in Early Modern Society*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 100-114.

⁸ Stone, L., *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 265-266; Tallet, F., *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495-1715*, London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 101; Manning, R.B., *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.16-17. See also McCoy, R.C., *The Rites of Knighthood: The Literature and Politics of Elizabethan Chivalry*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 2-9.

⁹ See Colon Semenza, G., ‘Sport, War and Contest in Shakespeare’s Henry VI’, in *Renaissance Quarterly*, 54, No. 4, 2001, esp. pp.1251-1253.

of social standing to go to war.¹⁰ Judging by the content of Elizabethan print, it is apparent that news writers at least attempted to blend private and public war together through their focus on militant Catholicism. The conflicts in the Netherlands coupled with England's naval actions against Spanish shipping provided pamphleteers with the opportunities to stir religious and patriotic sentiments by dramatically portraying Catholic Spain as Protestant England's ultimate enemy. On paper an apocalyptic war emerged in which the security and safety of both England and Protestantism were at stake.¹¹ Judging by the graphic and dramatic content of these publications, readers were clearly intended to not only be shocked by the threat posed by England's enemy, but to also unite behind a common or public cause against that enemy. In effect, pamphlets attempted to promote public war over private war. Rather than becoming a threatened social class that sought some form of chivalric revival in order to survive a changing world, the Elizabethan aristocracy thus maintained a martial status which located them within a relevant religious and patriotic context.¹²

From the 1570s onwards newsbooks created a favourable image of English soldiers serving in the Netherlands by defining them in opposition to Spanish or Catholic troops and associating them with the defence of true religion and the realm. According to soldier-writers such as Geoffrey Gates, Elizabethan soldiers had a vital role in the early modern world as they fought 'for the repressing and restraining of the tyrannies and noyfull malice of the wicked'.¹³ From Gates' perspective, a true Elizabethan soldier stood for the maintenance of the entire basis of England's religious, legal, social and economic

¹⁰ Hale, 'War and Society', pp. 23-24.

¹¹ E.g., *The Trve Reporte of the Skirmish Fought Betweene the States of Flaunders, and Don Ioan*, London, 1578; *A Trve Relation of all Svch Englishe Captaines and Lieutenants, As Haue Beene Slaine in the Countries of Flaunders*, London, 1584.

¹² Naunton, R., *Fragmenta Regalia, or, Observations on the Late Queen Elizabeth*, London, 1641, pp.18-19; Blandie, W., *The Castle, or Picture of Policy Shewing Forth Most Liuely, the Face, Body and Parties o the Commonwealth, the Duety Quality, Profesion of a Pefect and Absolute Souldiar*, London, 1581, Bi-Biiii. Blandie was actually a Catholic, but he supported English intervention in the Low Countries against Spain. See *ODNB*.

¹³ Gates, G., *The Defence of Militarie Profession*, London, 1579, pp.5-6.

systems.¹⁴ Published in 1578, Gates' words would have been of significance as England had been facing the threat of a Spanish invasion since the Duke of Alva's occupation of Brussels in August 1567.¹⁵ With the looming military presence of Spain overshadowing England, news of Spanish actions in the Low Countries reached the press and entered the public sphere, giving rise to what Pratt called the 'genre of alarm'.¹⁶ It was this genre which would help forge the identities of soldiers in England's press, and which also helped to link English identity to Protestantism.

Newsbooks and news sheets which related to the Spanish-Dutch conflict and the 'poore Christians in the low Countries' had been produced by the English printing press since at least 1574, two years after the first English expeditionary force under Sir Thomas Morgan had been dispatched to aid the Dutch.¹⁷ Readers were explicitly made aware of the Spanish 'sheadding of Christian blood' in the Low Countries, and were made to believe that Spanish soldiers thrived on wreaking chaos.¹⁸ In effect, Philip II's forces in the Low Countries constituted part of the 'hellishe Dragon' of Spanish Catholicism which sought nothing more than the 'spoyling... of all dominion and libertie... and of... liues also'.¹⁹ Further weight was given to this image when sensational news of the 'calamities, great hunger & extreame miseris' endured by the citizens of Middelburg under their Spanish garrison reached England in 1574.²⁰ The Spanish soldiers, it was claimed, had forced the

¹⁴ Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p.10.

¹⁵ Wernham, W.B., *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1980, pp. 34-45.

¹⁶ Pratt, S.M., 'Antwerp and the Elizabethan Mind', in *Modern Language Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.1, 1963. See also Webb, H.J., 'Military Newsbooks During the Age of Elizabeth', in *English Studies: A Journal of English Letters and Philology*, Vol. 33, Nos. 1-6, 1952, pp. 241-251.

¹⁷ *Certayne Newes of the Whole Description, Ayde, and Helpe of the Christian Princes and Nobles*, London, 1574; Wernham, R.B., *Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588*, Worcester and London, The Trinity Press, 1966, p. 318; Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 126.

¹⁸ *Certayne Newes*, p. 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰ *Middleborovv. A briefe Rehersall of the Accorde and Agreement... With a Lamentable Discourse of the Calamities*, London, 1574.

population of Middelburg to ‘suffer a moste miserable hungre’ after they had, under the direction of their own colonel

... taken out of the poore Citizens Houses, all kind of victailes wherwith they might haue sustained the liues of their wyues and children, beating them, & bandiying them moste rigorously...²¹

Significantly, it was made clear that similar or worse treatment would befall any godly person under the power of what one newsbook editor called the ‘Deuillishe, Popishe, and Antechristian Kingdome’.²² Whilst this author acknowledged that Protestant forces could also cause ‘miserye’ for civilians, he also stated that any hardships experienced under militant Protestantism were preferable to submitting to Catholic rule because if

... the Tyrant[s] shoulde get the upperhande, they wil not bee content with our Cities, Landes, goodes, and possessions, but they would force our Wiues, raiushe and defile our Daughters, kyll our young men, murther our olde men and women, and with penurye and hunger, famishe our Children and sucking Infantes...²³

Besides, it is worth remembering that England had already experienced the impact of Catholic rule and the forces of the Counter-Reformation under Mary I, with pamphlets and writings detailing the horrors and threats posed by Spain to England having been produced since at least 1553.²⁴

As Parker has stated, the atrocities committed in the wake of the Spanish mutinies of 1576 gave rise to a ‘wave of nausea and Hispanophobia in the Netherlands’, and these sentiments also appeared in the English press.²⁵ The sack of Antwerp and the ensuing ‘Spanish Fury’ in November 1576 provided anti-Spanish propagandists in England with further evidence of the cruelty of Philip II’s rule and helped crystallize the barbarous

²¹ *Middleborovv*, pp. 8-9.

²² *Certayne Newes*, p. 6.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 6, p. 11.

²⁴ Grabes, H., ‘England or the Queen? Public Conflict of Opinion and National Identity Under Mary Tudor’, in Grabes, *Writing the Early Modern English Nation*, pp. 47-87.

²⁵ Parker, G., *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 236.

image of the Spanish warrior, which in turn was shown to be the binary opposite of the English Protestant soldier.²⁶ Pratt has identified at least three publications in 1576 to 1577 which focused on the sack of Antwerp, and from George Gascoigne's words that news of the sack 'filled all Europe', provoking 'manyfolde light tales' in England, it is apparent that the events at Antwerp made a serious impact on contemporary minds.²⁷ By doing so, Spain increasingly emerged as an immediate and dangerous threat to England and Protestantism.

Anxious pamphleteers saw the sack of Antwerp as a warning for the English nation as to what would happen in the event of a Spanish invasion. It is interesting to note that although in his own newsbook Gascoigne professed to be offering his readers a 'true report' which had 'neither malice to one side, nor partiall affection to the other', his writing nevertheless seems to have aided in confirming the horrific identity of Spanish soldiers.²⁸ Gascoigne's account illustrated the Spanish soldier's capacity to massacre and torture 'infinite numbers of people' with 'barbarous cruelty', since he wrote that the Spanish

... neither spared age, nor sexe: time nor place: person nor country:
profession nor religion: yong nor olde: rich nor poore: strong nor
feeble: but without any mercy, did tyrannously triumph when there
was neither man nor meane to resist them: for age and sex, yong
and old, they slew great numbers of yong children...²⁹

Indeed, the Spanish were presented as being akin to barbarians instead of Christian soldiers, as Gascoigne argued that

... when the blood is cold, and the fury ouer, me thinks that a true
Christian hearte should stand content with victory, and refrayne to
prouoke Gods wrath by sheadding of innocente blood...³⁰

²⁶ Wernham, *Before the Armada*, p. 329; Pratt, 'Antwerp'; Gascoigne, G., *The Spoyle of Antwerpe*, London, 1576.

²⁷ Pratt, 'Antwerp', p. 54; Gascoigne, *Spoyle*, p. 5.

²⁸ For example, Norris, R., *A Warning to London by the Fall of Antwerp*, London, 1577; Pratt, 'Antwerp', pp. 54-55.

²⁹ Gascoigne, *Spoyle*, pp. 29-32.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

For all of their ‘boasting of the catholique religion’, the Spanish troops were shown to have succeeded in conducting themselves in a most unchristian-like manner by ‘polluting... euery streete with the gore and carcases of men’.³¹ Most chillingly of all, Gascoigne’s depiction of the sack of Antwerp appears to have attributed superhuman or even supernatural powers to the Spanish troops, as his account reflects his amazement not only at the scale of destruction once the sack began, but also the fact that the Spanish were able to capture the city so easily, since he could not ‘conceiue howe it should be possible’.³² Such characteristics which Gascoigne gave to the Spanish at Antwerp reflected the fear of English contemporaries that if Philip II’s troops could ‘ouercome France, and these lowe Countries, they woulde proceede further’, spreading throughout Protestant Europe and eventually turning towards England.³³ Ultimately, Gascoigne’s message to his readers was for them to ‘learne to detest the horrible cruelties of the Spanyerds in all executions of warlike stratagemes’ which did not possess the ‘honour wherewith Englishe Souldiours haue always bene endowed in theyr victories’.³⁴

The failures of the 1576 to 1577 Pacification of Ghent and Perpetual Edict, which were followed by the split of the States-General into the Union of Arras and the Union of Utrecht in 1579, led to a renewal of war in the Low Countries.³⁵ It was during this phase of revived war that soldiers from the British Isles, of whom there were 7,000 in the Low Countries by July 1578, came to be closely associated with the Protestant cause.³⁶ The author of the 1574 newsbook, *Certayne Newes*, had argued that the Protestants in Europe

³¹ Gascoigne, *Spoyle*, pp. 32-34.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

³³ *Certayne Newes*, p. 2.

³⁴ Gascoigne, *Spoyle*, p. 47.

³⁵ Geyl, P., *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1958, pp. 149-150; Hammer, P.E., *Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604*, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 104-105; Wernham, *Before the Armada*, p. 329.

³⁶ Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, p. 113.

should keep ‘themselues within the bondes of unitie and concorde’ or they would ‘easily... be... broken in pieces’, and by 1585 troops under Elizabeth were seen by propagandists to be central to this Protestant unity against Catholic Spanish power.³⁷ The actions of Philip II’s new governor-general of the States-General, Don John of Austria, in the summer of 1577 appears to have fed the English apocalyptic view of Spanish rule and military power.

Don John’s seizure of Namur in July, recall of Spanish troops by August and subsequent military actions resulted in at least two newsbooks being printed in London during August 1578, both of which contrasted Spanish with English troops.³⁸ The two newsbooks, the *Trve Reporte* and *A discourse of the present state of the Wars*, identified soldiers from Elizabeth’s kingdoms as warriors of great ‘valiancye’.³⁹ Any memories of the stark failures of England’s forces during the 1560s at Le Havre were forgotten and replaced by a revived military image on a level similar to that depicted in Shakespeare’s *Henry V*.⁴⁰ In 1590 Sir Roger Williams recalled that the bulk of the English contingents in the Low Countries consisted of ‘ignorant soldiers’, but these same men were said by newsbook authors to be winning ‘great fame’ for their martial skills.⁴¹ For the authors of these newsbooks, English and Scottish soldiers were the ‘Lampes of light’ in a country which was plagued by Spanish troops who simply wanted to ‘kyl men, women, and children’.⁴² *The Trve Reporte* in particular presented the English and Scottish soldiers as being in the thick of the ‘hote and great’ action at the Battle of Rijmenam on 1st August 1578, fighting ‘valiantlye against the enemy’.⁴³ The fact that in this instance Scottish soldiers were effectively shown to be comrades in arms with the English is interesting and

³⁷ *Certayne Newes*, p. 1.

³⁸ Wernham, *Before the Armada*, p. 330; Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 237; *The Trve Reporte of the Skirmish Fought Betweene the States of Flaunders, and Don Ioan*, London, 1578; *A Discourse of the Present State of the Wars in the Lowe Countries*, London, 1578.

³⁹ *A Discourse*, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 137.

⁴¹ Williams, R., *The Actions of the Lowe Countries*, 1618, in Evans, J., (ed.), *The Works of Sir Roger Williams*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 118; *The Trve Reporte*, p. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1; *A Discourse*, p.3.

⁴³ *The Trve Reporte*, pp. 3-5.

establishes a more British identity in the struggle against Catholicism. It was precisely this kind of association between English and Scotsmen against militant Catholicism that fueled the cooperation and alliance between Parliament and Scotland from the Bishops' Wars onwards.

The Trve Reporte told its readers not only of the exploits of English gentry, such as Sir John Norris who was described as 'a second Hercules, a second Hector', but also of the common soldiers.⁴⁴ According to *The Trve Reporte* there was a moment in the battle when

There was a Spanish Captaine ouertaken in the Chase by an Englisheman... where they fought a long time together, hand to hand: and the Englishman fought so valiantly, that hee made the Spaniard to retyre and put him in great danger: so that he feared himselfe whereupon hee tooke his Rapyer, and... slew him. An other English man a simple fellow... saw the cowardly part of the Spanyarde immediatlye with his sworde thrust him throw the backe...⁴⁵

Thus, the concept that soldiers should fight in a common cause was being realised in newsbooks, as even the socially low soldiers were presented by the author of *The Trve Reporte* as 'valiant wightes of Britaine blood' who were fighting for their fellow Protestants 'beyonde the Seas'.⁴⁶

Queen Elizabeth, as Wernham has argued, may have wanted to avoid engaging England in a religious war, but it is apparent that pamphleteers saw the English troops in the Netherlands as defenders of the Protestant faith.⁴⁷ Even before Elizabeth had officially committed England to aid the Dutch and had taken them into her protection through the Treaty of Nonsuch of August 1585, English pamphleteers were portraying English soldiers as guardians of the Protestants in the Low Countries.⁴⁸ In his catalogue of the actions and

⁴⁴ *Trve Reporte*, pp. 5-7.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-10.

⁴⁷ Wernham, *Before the Armada*, p. 331.

⁴⁸ Wilson, C., *Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands*, London and Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1970, p. 83.

‘Inuincible courage’ of English soldiers, entitled *A Trve Relation of all svche Englishe Captaines and Lieutenants, as haue beene slaine in the lowe Countries*, what Lingham repeatedly asserted was that Englishmen were fighting in ‘forain cuntries for their coscience sake, & the glory of the Gospell’.⁴⁹ As Lingham put it, English soldiers had ‘armed themselues for the succour of the poore distressed countrey of Flanders’ and had sprung to the ‘defence of the oppressed’ like ‘Lyons in the fielde’.⁵⁰ They were effectively shown to be steadfast in their devotion with their supposed willingness to ‘spend their dearest blood’ for Protestantism.⁵¹ Such imagery was shared by George Whetstone, as during the year of England’s formal entry into the Dutch wars he wrote that

The Lyon prayes, vpon the stoutest beast,
yet lickes the sheep, the which the wolfe hath woud:
So worthy mindes, proude lookes, that feareth least,
doth helpe to raise, the wounded from the ground.
Like Lyons then, the Armes of England shield,
Pray on your foes, and pittie those that yeld.⁵²

The propaganda which was circulating in England during the 1580s thus reflects the arguments of Strong, Van Dorsten and Adams, who have suggested those ‘servants, and... friends’ who followed the Earl of Leicester on the 1585 expedition to the Netherlands helped give the enterprise a distinctly militant Protestant and anti Catholic character.⁵³

Moreover, Puritanism appears to have been linked to a heightened sense of English martial ethos at a time when Spain was gaining further political and military strength. Spain’s acquisition of the Portuguese navy in 1580 and Philip II’s installation as the protector of the French Catholic League through the Treaty of Joinville in December 1584

⁴⁹ Wilson, *Revolt of the Netherlands*, p. 2, p. 13.

⁵⁰ Lingham, J., *A Trve Relation of all Svche Englishe Captaines*, pp. 12-14.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵² Whetstone, G., *The Honorable Repvtation of a Souldier*, London, 1585, p. 6.

⁵³ Strong, R.C., and Van Dorsten, J.A., *Leicester’s Triumph*, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 32-37; Adams, S., ‘A Puritan Crusade? The Composition of the Earl of Leicester’s Expedition to the Netherlands, 1585-86’, in Adams, S., *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2002, pp. 176-190; Dop, J.A., *Eliza’s Knights: Soldiers, Poets, and Puritans in the Netherlands, 1572-1586*, Alblasterdam, Remak, 1981, pp. 156-176.

meant that England was increasingly threatened by Spanish military power.⁵⁴ The anonymous author of the pamphlet *A most necessary and godly prayer*, which was published in 1585, described an apocalyptic image in which the Spanish ‘Hidra’ sought to ‘swallow up... people as a graue’.⁵⁵ It was in such an atmosphere that propagandists, aware that ‘this little Isle of England’ was facing the might of the Spanish Empire, created a heroic image of Elizabeth’s soldiers in which Protestantism was amalgamated with a form of English patriotism.⁵⁶

Tales which emphasised the martial prowess of English soldiers were printed, and most notably in 1585 Christopher Ocland’s patriotically entitled *The Valiant Actes And victorious Battailles Of The English nation* was published.⁵⁷ In effect, the English population was reminded of its own martial heritage. Through pamphlets such as *A most necessary and godly prayer* and Lingham’s *A Trve Reporte*, news of the ‘valiante actes and honourable exploytes’ of the soldiers who were serving in the Netherlands demonstrated that the English people had inherited and maintained the military skills of their ancestors.⁵⁸ Emerging from recent setbacks such as the loss of Calais, English soldiers were in a way perceived to be reinvigorating the martial heritage from Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt.

As with the medieval soldiers in Ocland’s work, Elizabeth’s troops were seen to be earning ‘immortall praise’ and ‘endlesse glorie’ through their actions.⁵⁹ The most obvious example was Sir Philip Sidney, but there were other heroic figures.⁶⁰ The Captain Cromwell who was described by Lingham, for instance, truly was like Shakespeare’s Talbot, having supposedly ‘with sword and shield cut in pieces so many thousand

⁵⁴ Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, p. 107; Wernham, *Elizabethan Foreign Policy*, p. 55.

⁵⁵ *A Most Necessary and Godly Prayer, for the Preseruacion of the Right Honourable the Earle of Leicester*, London, 1585, p. 2.

⁵⁶ *The Trve Reporte*, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁷ Ocland, C., *The Valianet Actes and Victorious Battailles of the English Nation*, London, 1585.

⁵⁸ Lingham, *A Trve Reporte*, p. 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶⁰ Barker, F., ‘Sir Philip Sidney and the Forgotten War of 1586’, in *History Today*, November 1986; *Vpon the Life and Death of the Most Worthy, and Thrise Renowmed Knight, Sir Philip Sidney*, London, 1586, pp. 8-9; *A Short Admonition or Warning, Vpon the Detestable Treason*, London, 1587, p. 3.

Spanyards' by himself.⁶¹ Such figures were thought to be 'worthie examples for others to followe', proving that God had indeed 'made Englande a chosen shaft' against the Spanish Antichrist.⁶²

The Spanish soldier, unlike his English counterpart, supposedly had an intrinsic relationship with crime. Whereas the forces under the Earl of Leicester were shown to be operating under godly discipline and orders, Spanish troops were unsurprisingly identified with plunder, murder and rapine.⁶³ The fall of Antwerp to the Duke of Parma's forces after a year-long siege in August 1585 recalled the memories of the sack of 1576, prompting the publication of a 'tragicall Historie' of the city.⁶⁴ With their military successes under Parma, most notably their capture of Zutphen and Sluis in January and August 1587, the Spanish were shown to be lusting for England. This was reflected in George Whetstone's work where a Spanish soldier fantasizes over the prospect of invading and penetrating the Virgin Queen's country:

Ah Sir, the time nowe draweth neare, that we shall haue the spoile
of rich England that we shall embrace their faire wiues, and make
hauocke of their lo[n]g gathered riches...⁶⁵

It would be during the years when England was 'in feare of finall destruction' when English propagandists highlighted the patriotism and courage of English seamen alongside the masculine heroism of the soldiers in the Netherlands.⁶⁶

Following Sir Francis Drake's expedition to the Caribbean from September 1585 to July 1586, English naval forces were increasingly presented as a symbol of Elizabethan military power. One pamphlet which reported on Drake's expedition proudly stated that

⁶¹ Lingham, *A Trvve Reporte*, p. 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 7; *A Godly Prayer*, p. 2.

⁶³ *Lawes and Ordinances, Set Downe by Robert Earle of Leycester*, London, 1586; Whetstone, *Honorable Repvtation*, pp. 2-3.

⁶⁴ *An Historicall Discovrse, or Rather a Tragicall Historie of the Citie of Antwerpe*, London, 1586.

⁶⁵ Whetstone, *Honorable Repvtation*, pp. 2-3.

⁶⁶ Anthony, M., *An Exhortation, To Stirre Vp the Mindes of all Her Majesties Faithfull Subiects*, London, 1588, p. 1. The 'manhoode' and masculinity of English military men often appears in Elizabethan newsbooks, e.g. *A Trve Relation*, p. 5; *A Godly Prayer*, p. 4.

the Spanish could see ‘what woulde come to passe, if our gracious Queene woulde bende her whole force against them’.⁶⁷ The same pamphlet went on to illustrate how the Elizabethan navy simultaneously championed English liberty and Protestantism whilst openly challenging Spanish imperial rule, as shown in the following verse:

So likewise by Gods mighty hande
Syr Frauncis Drake by dreadfull sworde
Did soyle hys foes in foraine lande,
Which did contemne Christes holy word.
And many Captiuies did sette free
Which earst were long in miserie.⁶⁸

The English military man was thus increasingly seen as being the personal scourge and primary enemy of the Spaniard; an image which had apparently begun to take form after Leicester had been made Governor-General of the Netherlands on 25th January 1586.⁶⁹ Drake himself was described as ‘a man of meane calling’ who was able to ‘deale with so mightie a Monarke’ as Philip II, especially after his raid on Cadiz 19th April 1587.⁷⁰ The personal clash between English and Spanish soldiers was also a theme which appeared in Whetstone’s writing whereby an Englishman challenges a caricature of a Spaniard to single combat, only for the Spaniard to cowardly depart ‘without giuing any bon-giorno’.⁷¹

It is important to remember, however, that in English print this personal nature of the fight between English and Spanish soldiers and seamen was related to the broader and public interests of both the country and its religion. Elizabethan newsbooks and news reporting appear to have presented the personal actions of the Queen’s military subjects as being ‘honourable to their cuntrie’, creating the impression that they were fighting for the

⁶⁷ Greepe, T., *The True and Perfecte Newes of the Worthy and Valiaunt Exploytes, Performed and Done by that Valiant Knight Syr Francis Drake*, London, 1587, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶⁹ Hammer, *Elizabeth’s Wars*, pp. 126-127.

⁷⁰ Greepe, *The True and Perfecte Newes*, p. 3; Haslop, H., *Newes Ovt of the Coast of Spaine*, London, 1587; Coote, S., *Drake: The Life and Legend of an Elizabethan Hero*, London and Sydney, Simon & Schuster, 2003, pp. 228-249.

⁷¹ Whetstone, *Honorable Reptytation*, pp. 2-3.

‘famous and noble kingdome of England’.⁷² Individuals such as Leicester and Drake were presented in the press as exemplars for their fellow countrymen. Furthermore, the patriotic and apocalyptic imagery of Saint George battling the Dragon was invoked in the printed appeals to the population of England during 1588, in which England was shown to be pitched against the ‘horrible beast’ of Spain which had ‘receiued power from the Dragon’.⁷³ Any personal ambitions of English soldiers, sailors and commanders were masked by the rousing assertion that all of England’s warriors were ‘one fire’.⁷⁴ Elizabeth’s ‘naturall’ subjects from all walks of life were shown to share ‘one hart, one minde, & one strength’, unlike the minions of Philip II who ‘warred for greediness’.⁷⁵ Spanish troops continued to be portrayed as the alarmingly merciless forces of material greed with an insatiable appetite for destruction, as Anthony Marten, author of *An Exhortation, to Stirre Vp the Mindes of all Her Maiesties Faithfull Subiects*, warned his readers that

... after they haue taken their vile pleasure of your wiues, your sonnes and daughters, they will utterly destroy you, that the name of our Nation shal be no more remembered upon the earth...⁷⁶

Such imagery was shared in the pamphlet, *An Oration Militarie to all naturall Englishmen*, which aimed to show ‘the delight of libertie, and the tyrannie of the enemie’.⁷⁷ However, in Marten’s pamphlet, England, Queen Elizabeth and all of her subjects were shown to be struggling not simply for the preservation of their lives, but for a higher cause. Dop has argued that many contemporaries considered Leicester’s expedition to the Netherlands in

⁷² *A Trve Relation*, p. 13; Marten, A., *An Exhortation, to Stirre Vp the Mindes of all Her Maiesties Faithfull Subiects*, London, 1588, p. 9.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁴ *An Oration Militarie to all Naturall Englishmen*, London, 1588, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Marten, *An Exhortation*, p. 3.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷⁷ *An Oration*, frontispiece.

1585 to be a ‘Protestant crusade’, and it appears that similar sentiments prevailed in 1588.⁷⁸ In his pamphlet, Marten zealously asserted that

... our cause is so rare, so great, and concerns, not onlie our liues and goods, our wiues and children, our honor, our Prince & our Common-weale: But most of all... it toucheth the saluation of our soules, The inheritance of Christs kingdome, and the preseruacion of all his Saints...⁷⁹

England was very much thought of by propagandists as a Holy Land, a ‘most Christian kingdome’, whilst Elizabeth herself was seen to be a ‘Lanterne and light of true Religion’.⁸⁰

This imagery of English godliness and righteousness appears to have gained currency with the defeat of the Armada. Reports and tales of the defeat of the Spanish Armada complemented the news reporting of the 1570s and 1580s, which had helped foster the vision of English soldiers and sailors embarking on a crusade against militant popery.⁸¹ It was believed that God had taken the English nation, ‘His Church and Sheepe’ as one propagandist put it, into his own protection, as he had ‘showed His power against Philip in the rout of his great Armada and in the success of the English fleet, which did not lose a ship or have a man taken prisoner’.⁸² The reality of the fact that the ships and sailors of the English navy were in a dire state by August 1588, and were thus unable to pursue the remnants of the Spanish fleet, did not matter.⁸³ Pamphlets celebrating the failure of the Armada, the godliness of England and the power of Elizabeth’s navy abounded.⁸⁴ These sentiments were reflected in Robert Greene’s *The Spanish Masquerado*, which said that the

⁷⁸ Dop, *Eliza’s Knights*, p. 176.

⁷⁹ Marten, *An Exhortation*, p. 17.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10; *An Oration*, pp. 12-14.

⁸¹ Dop, *Eliza’s Knights*, pp. 156-176; Adams, ‘A Puritan Crusade?’, pp. 176-177.

⁸² *A Skeltonicall Salvation*, London, 1589, p.5; quoted in Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 60; *Lists and Analysis of State Papers Foreign*, Elizabeth I, August 1589 – December 1595, Vol. II, p. 383, no. 670.

⁸³ Wernham, R.B., *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 3-15.

⁸⁴ Esler, A., ‘Robert Greene and the Spanish Armada’, in *ELH*, No. 32, 1965, pp. 314-316; Greene, R., *The Spanish Masquerado*, London, 1589, p. 35.

English navy was ‘filled with Noble men of invincible courage’, such as that ‘terroure of Spaine... Sir Francis Drake’.⁸⁵ The foundations of the legend of Elizabethan naval strength and military valour, which would haunt Stuart England, were thus set by propagandists as they gloated that the ‘frighted’ Spanish sailors would ‘never dare againe’ enter the waters around England.⁸⁶ As Davies has argued, the writers of the 1596 Cadiz expedition, who further elaborated on the differences between Englishmen and Spaniards, gave England’s image as the mortal enemy of Spain.⁸⁷

It would appear that to pamphleteers, the conduct of English military forces during the 1590s was bolstered by a profound sense of the righteousness of England’s cause. Unlike the conduct of Spanish forces from the 1570s onwards, English troops were shown to represent freedom and godliness.⁸⁸ As Simon Harward’s *The Solace for the Souldier and Saylor* argued, English forces were very much seen to ‘vundergoe so many deadly dangers abroad’ for both ‘the peace and quietnesse at home’ and for the maintenance of ‘God’s truth’.⁸⁹ By the later years of the sixteenth century, therefore, English soldiers and sailors were beginning to have their identities shaped by godliness and military prowess. They were seen to have withstood Spanish power, and the fact that English forces were seen to have taken the war to Spanish territories by the 1590s arguably resulted in the fear of Spanish invincibility being deconstructed.⁹⁰ However, it would be precisely the imagery of

⁸⁵ Greene, *Masquerado*, p. 24.

⁸⁶ *An Answer to the Vntruthes, Pvblished and Printed in Spaine, in Glorie of Their Svpposed Victorie Atchieued Against Our English Navie*, London, 1589, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Davies, R., ‘News From The Fleet: Characterizing the Elizabethan Army in the Narratives of the Action at Cadiz, 1596’, in Taithe, B., and Thornton, T., (eds.), *War: Identities in Conflict 1300-2000*, Stroud, Sutton, 1998, pp. 25-32.

⁸⁸ Davies, ‘News From the Fleet’, in Taithe and Thornton, *Identities in Conflict*, pp. 30-31; English forces and English rule were shown to be the opposite to Spanish tyranny, e.g. Whetstone, *Honorable Reprvtation*, p. 48. In this context, ‘freedom’ appears to signify liberty and distance from the tyranny of Spanish rule.

⁸⁹ Harward, S., *The Solace for the Souldier and Saylor*, London, 1592, pp. 4-7.

⁹⁰ Esler, ‘Robert Greene’, pp. 329-332. It is apparent that Spain, her military forces and even her language and culture were ridiculed by English propagandists after the failure of the armada. For instance, the pamphlet *A Skeltonical Salvation* mocked Spanish military strategy and the Spanish language itself, as it satirised the fact that ‘the Spanish nation, / That in a bravado, / Spent many a crvsado, / In setting forth an armado, / England to invado’.

Elizabethan military actions in face of Spanish power during the closing decades of the sixteenth century which would clash with the nature of Caroline rule.

The signing of the Treaty of London on 18th August 1604 brought an end to the Anglo-Spanish conflict. By doing so, England's official support for the Dutch rebels was terminated and Spanish shipping was theoretically freed from the predations of English naval forces. Hunt has argued that after Elizabeth's death, the English population still retained a real fear of Spanish Catholicism that underpinned the national psyche.⁹¹

McDermott has conjectured that during the second half of the sixteenth century, England suffered from a national feeling of inadequacy which stemmed from her position as a lesser power in Europe.⁹² Considering that by Elizabeth's death England was still not a first-rate power, it is possible that McDermott's theory can be also applied to the opening decades of the seventeenth century. For all of the expense English aggression had cost the Spanish government, neither Spain nor the Spanish Empire had been smashed, a fact which clearly weighed on Sir Walter Raleigh's mind for some years after Elizabeth's death.⁹³

With the Dutch revolt still raging as England officially withdrew from outright conflict, it appears that Catholic Spain's endurance created a sense of uncertainty and even insecurity amongst the English population. Whereas Elizabethan military action, as portrayed in print, had offered reassurance that Spanish aggression could be countered and that England could be defended, James' non-aggressive policies arguably left some contemporaries anxious about whether Spanish power would be allowed to grow unchecked. Having gained some status by resisting Spain at the end of Elizabeth's reign, England's perceived role as a guardian of Protestantism was thus challenged by the official withdrawal of anti-Spanish military action.

⁹¹ Hunt, W., 'Civic Chivalry and the English Civil War', in Grafton, A., and Blair, A., (eds.), *The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.

⁹² McDermott, p. 232.

⁹³ Oldys, W., and Birch, T., (eds), *The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh*, 1829, Vol. 8, p. 246.

Memories of Spanish actions on the continent, notably the sacking of Antwerp, were compounded by the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in 1618, and in turn this fuelled moves for a militarisation of society.⁹⁴ As Elizabeth's soldiers and sea-dogs had been associated with the defence and championing of a Protestant cause, so too were the militiamen of the early Stuart era. Writers such as Thomas Adams and Abraham Gibson rekindled the imagery of medieval crusaders, emphasising both the pious portrayal of the English militia and the godliness of their service to England.⁹⁵ Adams's *The Souldiers Honovr* specifically addressed the members of the Artillery Garden and those who were a part of the 'Societie of Armes', saying

WEe [sic.] are all *Souldiers*, as wee are Christians: some more specially, as they are men. You beare both *Spirituell* Armes against the enemies of your Saluation, and *Materiall* Armes against the enemies of your Countrey. In both you fight vnder the Colours of our great Generall *Jesus* Christ.⁹⁶

Similarly, Gibson argued that those who served in the militia were 'Christs Souldiers' who were descended from the 'auncient orders of Knighthood, as Knights Hospitallers and Templers: Knights of S. Iohn of Ierusalem, and S. Iames of Compostella; and Knights of the holy Ghost'.⁹⁷ Significantly, Gibson argued that to fight for the Protestant cause would win oneself eternal fame and 'euerlasting remembrance', and it is worth noting that the tales and memories of Elizabethan heroes persisted into Charles' reign, clashing first with the English military failures of the 1620s and then with the pacific foreign policy of Caroline rule during the 1630s.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Oldys and Birch, *Works of Raleigh*, pp. 213-223.

⁹⁵ Adams, T., *The Souldiers Honovr*, London, 1617; Gibson, A., *Christiana-Polemica, or Apreparative to Warre*, London, 1619.

⁹⁶ Adams, *The Souldiers Honovr*, p. A3; Gibson's pamphlet likewise addressed 'The Worthy and well-deseruing Citizens of London, that practise Armes in the Artillery Garden', Gibson, *Christiana-Polemica*, p. 7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁹⁸ Gibson, *Christiana-Polemica*, p. 29; Cogswell, T., *The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-1624*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 14.

When Charles ascended the throne in 1625 he had, with the aid of the Duke of Buckingham, already been aligning himself with the anti-Spanish sentiments in Parliament.⁹⁹ However, whilst Charles himself seems to have thought of waging war against Spain as a way of regaining his honour from the failed Spanish match of 1623, some Members of Parliament reflected on the 1580s and the perceived Elizabethan Protestant crusade against Spain.¹⁰⁰ It is important to note that the military ventures of the 1620s were seen in light of the legendary exploits of Elizabethan mariners and soldiers.¹⁰¹ In 1625, the year of Edward Cecil's failed expedition to Cadiz, William Camden's *Annales: The True and Royall History of the famous Empresse Elizabeth* was published for the first time in English.¹⁰² Readers were invited to 'reade the dayes, / When Britanns ground, / With blessings all, / was compast round', and its frontispiece proudly reflected on the 'Renowned Glory' of Elizabethan military operations and Spanish defeats:

How that a Spanish Fleet (by DRAKE) thereof
The very sees will witnesse, that with foure
Of royall Ships, he burnt two hundred more.
If you enquire from whence those Royals came;
From Englands shore, Spaines fury for to tame.¹⁰³

Although Camden was certainly not a religious zealot, much less a militant Protestant, his *Annales* nevertheless convey nostalgia for England's victories at Cadiz in 1587 and against the Armada in 1588. According to Camden, individuals who manifested Elizabethan heroism had been the human 'props and stayes' of English liberty, governance and Protestantism.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Sharpe, K., *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, New Haven and London, 1992, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*; Gregg, P., *King Charles I*, London, Melbourne and Toronto, Dent & Sons, Ltd, 1981, pp. 88-89.

¹⁰¹ Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 257-258.

¹⁰² Camden, W., *Annales The True and Royall History of the Famous Empresse Elizabeth*, London, 1625.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, frontispiece. Camden died in 1623, so there is the possibility that his editor was responsible for producing such rhetoric.

¹⁰⁴ Camden, *Annales*, frontispiece.

English military performance in 1625 stood in contrast to the Cadiz raids of 1587 and 1596.¹⁰⁵ Thomas Scott stated that the success of the Elizabethan raids had struck ‘a more deepe impression in the hearts of the Spaniards’.¹⁰⁶ It is evident, however, that writers in Caroline England felt the need to reflect on and cherish the memory of the Elizabethan heroes who had once secured the country from foreign threats. John Reynolds’s *Vox Coeli*, for example, presented the reader with the memory of the Elizabethan struggles with Spain, showing the ghost of Queen Elizabeth bewailing

O my ships, my ships: God knows they were still deare to me,
because still necessary to England. Where is my *Drake*, where my
Cumberland, my *Forbisher*, and the rest: Alas they want me, and
king *Iames* and England wants them; for when they liued, and I
rigned, our valour could stop the progression of Spaine; yea my
ships domineerd in his Seas and ports...¹⁰⁷

Memories of Elizabethan naval power became more important once the remnants of Cecil’s expedition had returned to England in February 1626.¹⁰⁸ The figure of Sir Walter Raleigh re-emerged in a pamphlet which was printed in 1626, rekindling memories as to how Raleigh’s efforts ‘had beene euer fatall to Spanish practises’.¹⁰⁹ As with Camden’s work, this pamphlet nurtured the memory of the ‘generall warlikenesse of the British Nation’, with the ghost of Raleigh being seen to argue that ‘no Nation vnder heauen was so able in power... as this Iland of Great Britaine’.¹¹⁰ Indeed, Elizabeth’s intervention on the continent was said to have been vital in saving both Protestantism and the people of the Netherlands who would have otherwise been ‘swallowed vp in the gulphe of... tyrannie’, thus nurturing the image of Elizabeth and England as the guarantors of freedom.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 255-261.

¹⁰⁶ Scott, T., *Sir Walter Ravnleighs Ghost, or England Forewarner*, London, 1626, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Reynolds, J., *Vox Coeli*, London, 1624, p. 37.

¹⁰⁸ Scott, *Sir Walter Ravnleighs Ghost*, p. 2; Adams, *The Souldiers Honovr*, pp. 1-4.

¹⁰⁹ Scott, *Sir Walter Ravnleighs Ghost*, p. 10. Raleigh has been described by some historians as ‘never more than a second-rank soldier’, Hammer, P.E.J., *Elizabeth’s Wars*, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.3 and p. 19.

¹¹¹ Scott, *Sir Walter Ravnlieghs Ghost*, p. 25.

The memory of the Elizabethan struggle against Spain continued to be kept alive after 1625, with Sir Francis Drake being ‘Reuiued’ in a book which was published in both 1626 and 1628.¹¹² It is interesting to note that whereas the 1626 edition was published following the Cadiz mission, the 1628 publication lay in the aftermath of Buckingham’s disastrous landing on the Île de Rhé in 1627.¹¹³ Both editions attacked the ‘Dull or Effeminate Age’ of English military failure whilst revelling in Drake’s ‘stirrings in eighty seauen, his remaquable actions in eighty-eight’.¹¹⁴ Likewise, in 1629 Matthew Sutcliffe wrote of ‘England’s Happinesse’ during Elizabeth’s reign, naturally paying attention to the country’s confrontations with Spain in the 1580s.¹¹⁵ In spite of the dire execution of military strategy in 1625 and 1627, the press nevertheless continued to fuel the memory of the Elizabethan Protestant cause and the English martial ethos. This is evidenced in Richard Bernard’s *The Bible-Battells*, which asks the reader to

Remember that Great Brittain is inferior to no Nation, and that by the prowess and valour of English and Scots, glorious victories haue beene obtained. You cannot you may not forget the valiant acts of Generall Norice in the Low Countries... of the never dying Names of Drake, Furbisher, & Hawkins, of the right famous Earle of Essex, of the deservedly eternized Veres...¹¹⁶

As Sharpe has shown, Charles’ financial incapacity to wage war coupled with his sense of personal dishonour through the military fiascos of Cadiz and Isle of Rhe caused him to pursue peace with Spain and France during the 1630s.¹¹⁷ In such a situation, popular

¹¹² Nichols, P., *Sir Francis Drake Reuiued: Calling Vpon this Dull or Effiminate Age, to Folowe his Noble Steps for Golde & Siluer*, London, 1626 and 1628.

¹¹³ Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 261-269.

¹¹⁴ Nichols, *Sir Francis Drake*, title page, p. 6.

¹¹⁵ Sutcliffe, M., *A True Relation of Englands Happinesse; Vnder the Raigne of Queene Elizabeth and the Miserable Estate of Papists, Under the Popes Tyrany*, London, 1629, p. 82.

¹¹⁶ Bernard, R., *The Bible-Battells or the Sacred Art Military. For the Rightly Waging of Warre According to Holy Writ*, London, 1629, pp. 8-12.

¹¹⁷ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 44-66; Russell, C., *Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 323-326; Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 269-270; Coward, B., *The Stuart Age: England, 1603-1714*, Harlow, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1994, pp. 166-167.

images of English Protestant warriors acting as a bulwark against Catholicism were seemingly at odds with pacific Caroline foreign policy and culture.¹¹⁸

By April 1629 peace had been made with France, and after the ratification of the Treaty of Madrid in November 1630 England was officially at peace with Spain despite the formation of the piratical Puritan Providence Island Company by the Earls of Holland and Warwick.¹¹⁹ Although it has been argued that England remained a valuable political and naval ally for continental powers during the 1630s, in the press it was Gustavus Adolphus's Swedish forces which emerged as the prominent defenders of European Protestantism.¹²⁰ As with the struggles in the Low Countries prior to the Twelve Years Truce of 1609, during the Thirty Years War the English press produced apocalyptic tales of wanton Spanish destruction and atrocities.¹²¹ News of Spanish atrocities, such as 'The Malicious inhumane Cruelty' at Magdeburg in 1631, was displayed on the front pages of various newsbooks.¹²² Imperial armies were said to be acting 'without any iust cause' and 'against the lawes both of God and of Nations, against naturall right', whilst the armies of Gustavus Adolphus were shown to be protecting fellow Protestants from supposedly evil Spanish machinations.¹²³ From the perspective of newsbook writers in peaceful Caroline England, it was Adolphus who was an ideal monarch and a 'Most Christian King'.¹²⁴ The author of *The Continuation of the most remarkable occurrences of Newes* had the headlines of his newsbook tell of 'The valour and courage of the Protestants in Bohemia,

¹¹⁸ Adamson, J.S.A., 'Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England', in Sharpe, K., and Lake, P., (eds.), *Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England*, London, MacMillan, 1994, pp. 164-165.

¹¹⁹ Smuts, M., 'The Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria in the 1630s', in *English Historical Review*, 93, 1978, pp. 32-33.

¹²⁰ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 68-70.

¹²¹ For example, *The Continuation of the Most Remarkable Occurrences of Newes*, No. 9, p. 4; *The Continuation of Our Weekly Newes*, No. 23, p. 2.

¹²² *Continuation of Occurrences*, No. 31.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, No. 17, p. 1. The godliness of the Swedish army was also emphasised in the press, e.g. Watts, W., *The Swedish Discipline*, London, 1632.

¹²⁴ *The Continuation of Ovr Weekely Avisoes*, No. 35, p. 3.

in resisting the tyranny of the Imperialists', and his publication of Adolphus' proclamation served to appeal to the consciences of English Protestants, as it claimed

... we doe finde ourselues and obliged... to helpe the said Princes [of Germany], that are so neare in blood vnto vs, against so detestable and damnable vniust oppressions and violences...¹²⁵

The central question which was raised by the author seemed to be that if Adolphus and the people of Sweden, who were members of the 'Euangelicall Church' and proponents of the 'true sauing Religion', could not ignore oppressive Spanish actions in Germany, then how could England stay detached from the war?¹²⁶ True, soldiers from the British Isles were shown in the press to be 'most manfully' fighting Spanish forces with Gustavus Adolphus, but Charles still remained aloof from the Protestant struggles in Germany and the Netherlands.¹²⁷ As Sharpe has argued, Charles' reasons for keeping himself distant from the struggles in Europe during the 1630s came to be based on an understanding of the economic and strategic implications of a growing Dutch naval power which threatened English shipping.¹²⁸ In effect, the legendary Protestant cause of the Elizabethan era, which seemed to occupy the imaginations of newsbook writers and figures like Sir Thomas Roe, was out of touch with English strategic interests in the 1630s.¹²⁹ Moreover, for Charles the religious divisions amongst the Dutch Protestants themselves shattered the idea of a united Protestant cause.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, the deaths of Frederick V and Gustavus Adolphus in November 1632 raised concerns in England about the future survival of Protestantism. The succession of Charles' nephew, Charles Louis, as the Elector Palatine was believed by some to increase the responsibility of the English King for the Palatinate. For instance one writer, John

¹²⁵ *Continuation of Occurrences*, No. 31, p. 2.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 17, p. 2.

¹²⁷ *Continuation of Weekely Avisoes*, No. 35, pp. 7-8.

¹²⁸ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 75-78.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

Pory, stated that the death of Frederick meant that Charles and England would be ‘obliged to do more for a nephew than for a brother in law and more likewise for a widow than a wife’.¹³¹ Furthermore, the death of Gustavus Adolphus at the Battle of Lutzen prompted English newswriters into trying to goad Charles and the English nation into giving substantial support to their fellow Protestants on the continent.

In his elegy John Russell described the death of Adolphus as being ‘like a mortall wound’, lamenting that ‘no more victorious sounds’ for the Protestant cause could be heard emanating from Europe.¹³² His writing illustrates an anxiety that the ‘strange sad silence’ which followed Adolphus’s death would be accompanied by an atmosphere of ‘terroures, doubts, and fears’ as Spanish military forces prepared to renew their onslaught against Protestantism.¹³³ Instead of hearing the ‘thundering noise, / Of doubled triumphs, conquests, and applause’, Russell was pressing home the point that English people would once again listen to the ‘groans and cries’ of Protestants if they failed to provide military assistance.¹³⁴ In effect, Russell wanted ‘The hollow-sounding drumme and trumpet shrill’ of militant Protestantism to fill the air, and was arguing that England ought to revitalise her past image and stance as a force against Spain.¹³⁵ England, he seemed to claim, was guilty of enjoying peace at the expense of European Protestants, and in one paragraph he cries out

Oh happie England, who wilt scarce confesse,
Drunk with securitie, thy happiness;
That dost enjoy such Quietnesse, such Ease,
Such calme Tranquillitie, and blessed Peace;
And that not purchas’d by laborious Toil,
By fire, and sword, by ruine, and by spoil...¹³⁶

¹³¹ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p. 72.

¹³² Russell, J., *An Elegy Upon the Death of the Most Illvstriovs Gvstavus Adolphvs King of Swethland*, London, 1632.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*; Russell, J., *The Two Famous Pitcht Battels of Lypsich, and Lutzen, Wherein the Ever-Renowned Prince Gustavus the Great Lived and Died a Conqueror*, Cambridge, 1634, p. 46.

¹³⁵ Russell, *Two Famous Pitcht Battells*, p. 40.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Indeed, Russell's work showed contempt for England's official political and military stance in Europe, scathingly describing the country as having 'of late / grown tender and effeminate'.¹³⁷ More seriously, Russell wrote of how 'delicious ease / And Courtly softnesse never once could please' Adolphus.¹³⁸ This was an apparently stark contrast to the court of Charles I, where courtly arts suggested that the 'shields and swords' of England's past had become obsolete tools of English kingship.¹³⁹ In the eyes of those who subscribed to the idea of an ongoing Protestant clash with Catholic Spain, it was the 'high and mighty' Adolphus who appeared to be the epitome of Protestant kingship.¹⁴⁰ In contrast, Charles seemed to be either unable or unwilling to 'take up the conqueror's mantle' in the name of the Protestant faith, especially after his support of Laudian church reforms distanced him from many English Protestants.¹⁴¹

In addition to his policies, the arts of the 1630s distanced Charles from the war in Europe. Court masques and portraits of the King suggest an isolation from battle, which in turn re-envisages the ideal role of an English monarch. For instance, the masque, *Albion's Triumph*, interprets Charles as a Roman Emperor who is able to conquer and control everything, including war. Control without recourse to war is evident in the portrayals of Charles on canvas. As Smuts points out, Rubens' *A Landscape with Saint George and the Dragon* is an allegory for the peace in the British Isles under Charles' rule: Saint George represents Charles, and his slaying of the dragon signifies a release from war.¹⁴² Van Dyke's paintings of Charles on horseback reveal a similar theme. Although wearing

¹³⁷ Russell, *Two Famous Pitch Battells*, p. 32.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹³⁹ Smuts, M., *Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987, pp. 23-30, p. 83.

¹⁴⁰ Wilcher, R., *The Writing of Royalism, 1628-1660*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 14-15; *The Cavses for Which the Most High and Mighty Prince and Lo: Gustavus Adolphus*, London, 1631.

¹⁴¹ Russell, *An Elegy*; Loxley, J., *Royalism and Poetry in the English Civil Wars: The Drawn Sword*, Basingstoke and London, MacMillan Press, 1997, pp. 23-24; Wilcher, *Writing Royalism*, pp. 14-15; Coward, *The Stuart Age*, pp. 172-178.

¹⁴² Smuts, *Court Culture*, p. 249.

armour, Charles is not brandishing a sword; his weapon is a marshal's baton, and he is conveyed as a highly skilled horseman. As with Reuben's work, Van Dyke also links Charles to Saint George, for he shows him wearing the Order of the Garter. But Charles' concept of the knight is strikingly different to that of the religious warrior or crusader of the medieval period, and indeed the Protestant champion of the Elizabethan era. Under Charles, the knight seems to emerge not as one who actively fights, but rather as one who preserves peace. As suggested by the calm and submissive nature of his horse in Van Dyke's paintings, Charles is able to manage and govern his kingdoms with ease. The point in these paintings seems to be that Charles does not need the military force used by previous monarchs, since his authority is defined, controlled and unquestionable. Naturally, such an image came to clash with the fact that Charles ultimately engaged in a total of four wars against his subjects across the British Isles. It was, however, an image that was to an extent rekindled in the aftermath of Charles' execution, since Royalist literature cast him as a gentle monarch who was wronged by militant and corrupt enemies.

Charles' apparent distance from the perceived Protestant cause during the early 1630s clashed with the apparently popular drive for England to support the struggle against Catholicism. As Smuts has argued, even Henrietta Maria's faction did not constitute a Catholic and pro-Spanish movement within the court, with Holland and the French ambassador, the Marquis de Senneterre, using the Queen as a means of moving Charles towards adopting an aggressive foreign policy.¹⁴³ The Elector Palatine's visit to England in 1635 was said by the Venetian Ambassador to have been 'received with more pleasure by those who fervently desire a parliament', and it was at this time that a new series of images of Protestant soldiers emerged from the press.¹⁴⁴ The masque, *The Triumphs Of The Prince D'Amovr*, appears to be one such example. Butler has suggested that this masque, which

¹⁴³ Smuts, 'Puritan Followers of Henrietta Maria', pp. 32-39.

¹⁴⁴ Butler, M., *Theatre and Crisis 1632-1642*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 286.

was performed in honour of the Elector Palatine, criticised Caroline foreign policy, and it is evident that the masque promoted military images which were designed to ‘teach the heart to beat’.¹⁴⁵ The implication in the masque, therefore, is that under Charles, England should once again assume its legendary role as the champion of Protestantism, and that this message is concealed beneath the pacific tendencies that lie on the masque’s surface. Somewhat ironically, with its criticism of the ‘swaggering Souldiers... of the cheaper quallity’ who never engaged in military actions, *The Triumphs Of The Prince D’Amovr* anticipated the stereotypical cavalier of the 1640s.¹⁴⁶ These characters who could only ‘roare, not fight’ appeared to personify England’s perceived distance from the continental wars of the 1630s.¹⁴⁷ They were contrasted with those soldiers who, like ‘those heroique Knights *Templars*’, were prepared to fight in defence of their religion.¹⁴⁸

Furthermore, the apparent displacement of war with peace in Caroline England was reflected in the transition from the first to the second parts of the masque where the priests of Mars are told by Cupid to ‘resigne to Love’.¹⁴⁹ However, during the later scenes of *The Triumphs Of The Prince D’Amovr* it is significant that the god Apollo appears ‘T’inspire, and breath himself in every Knight’.¹⁵⁰ As had previously been implied in various military newsbooks up until 1635, *The Triumphs Of The Prince D’Amovr* amalgamated war with the love of the Protestant faith, resulting in an invitation at the end of the masque for all soldiers to participate in the ‘Triumphs of the War’.¹⁵¹ Indeed, during the siege of Breda in 1637 news writers such as Henry Hexham continued to produce reports and stories of the actions of soldiers from the British Isles. For Hexham, one of the incentives for doing this

¹⁴⁵ *Theatre and Crisis*, pp. 31-35; *Prince D’Amovr*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁶ *Prince D’Amovr*, p. 4. See Chapter Seven of this thesis for a discussion of the cavalier stereotype.

¹⁴⁷ *Prince D’Amovr*, p. 4.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.8-12.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

was 'to giue satisfaction to some of our owne nation'.¹⁵² He intended to show the population of the British Isles that there were individuals in Charles' kingdoms who were prepared to fight the 'mighty Armie of the King of Spaine', providing his readers with a list of soldiers from the British Isles who had died whilst fighting the Spanish.¹⁵³

According to such material, Spain still remained the true enemy of the British Isles, and soldiers from within Charles' kingdoms were still very much thought of in light of the Elizabethan struggle against the forces of Catholicism.

Two fundamental issues have been identified within this chapter. Firstly, Elizabeth's reign was marked by the creation of an impassioned image of England as a bulwark of Protestantism against the might of militant Catholicism. Secondly, the Elizabethan concept of a militant Protestant England endured far beyond Elizabeth's death and clashed with Charles' foreign policies. Under Charles, the concept of the knight or monarch being the one who oversaw and guaranteed peace in the kingdom obviously clashed with later events. Any notion that Charles could govern without force was obviously undone by the Bishops' Wars, and as Chapter Three will suggest this made it necessary for the King's image to be revised. If an apparent distancing of both the monarch and England from militant Protestantism marked the so-called Halcyon Days of the early 1630s, then it is evident that the years from 1637 onwards were shaped by the necessity for Charles to locate his cause within a supposed English identity that justified military action.

¹⁵² Hexham, H., *A Trve and Briefe Relation of the Famovs Seige of Breda*, London, 1637, preface to the reader.

¹⁵³ *A Short Description of the Marching Forth of the Enemie Out of Breda, and What Thereupon Followed: With Other Remarkable Passages*, London, 1637, p. 1; Hexham, *Famovs Seige*, p. 17.

Chapter Three:

The Bishops' Wars, Royalists and Englishness

The previous chapter has attempted to explore the growth of martial Protestantism and anti-Catholicism and suggest that they were essential features of English identity by the end of the Tudor dynasty. This chapter has two interests: the conflict between Charles' war with Scotland and England's perceived role as an anti-Catholic power; and the emergence of an English Royalist identity that was predicated on a hatred of the Scots. It is apparent that the union of 1603 received a hostile reception amongst the English, since Scotland was considered to be economically and culturally inferior to England. Part of the problem was that it was regarded by contemporaries as being an 'imperfect union' in which Scotland maintained its own forms of law, administration and government.¹ A union between England and Scotland, it was feared, would open England's borders to the comparatively impoverished Scots, who would in turn gorge themselves on English wealth.² As this chapter will show, a very similar theme emerged in Royalist pamphlets printed during the Bishops' Wars.

The Bishops' Wars were problematic for Charles' image, since they clashed with the peacekeeping façade he had acquired and developed throughout most of the 1630s. Charles' pacific image, as discussed in the previous chapter, was demolished at a stroke in his declaration of war against Scotland. Such a dramatic shift from peace to war demanded that the Royal image be revised in order for the King's cause to become located within a seemingly relevant and legitimate identity. As Elizabeth's struggles against Catholic Spain had fostered the growth of an English martial

¹ See Russell, C., 'James VI and I and Rule Over Two kingdoms: An English View', in *Historical Research*, Vol. 76, No. 192, March 2003.

² Smith, D., *A History of the Modern British Isles*, Malden, Blackwell, 1998, pp. 26-28.

Protestantism, Charles' causes between 1638 and 1649 attempted to ingrain themselves within a similar patriotic context. In effect, Royalist identity needed to be seen to be relevant to the culture and identity that had been developing in England since the sixteenth century. The difference, however, was that unlike Elizabeth, Charles was waging war against not only his own subjects, but also against another Protestant nation. An underlying suggestion in the work here is that the Wars of the Three Kingdoms were struggles for cultural and national identity as much as they were religious conflicts.

This chapter has already made numerous references to Royalism, several in relation to events prior to 1642, and it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the term, 'Royalism', in the discourse that follows. Literary critics have often referred to 'Royalism' before the outbreak of war between King and Parliament, describing and tracing the origins of 'Royalist' thought and culture as early as 1628.³ The use of such a term prior to the hostilities in King Charles' kingdoms during the 1640s seems to rest uncomfortably with the internal peace experienced throughout the British Isles up to 1637. Royalism is implicit of a specific binary political or military allegiance, and as such may only be used to denote or describe an individual, party or force which exists in a polarized political or military spectrum. Indeed, Fletcher has commented that 'everyone was a Royalist in 1641', thus implying that any use of the term prior to that date is misleading.⁴ The problem with Fletcher's assertion, however, is that it appears to assume there is only one interpretation or definition of Royalism, namely that which existed in opposition to Parliamentarianism from 1642. In other words, Fletcher does not seem to consider the possibility that differing

³ Smuts, *Court Culture*, ch. 1; Wilcher, *The Writing of Royalism*, pp. 1-6.

⁴ Fletcher, A., *The Outbreak of the English Civil War*, London, Edward Arnold, 1981, p. 283.

versions of Royalism could have existed. By implication, this chapter to an extent accepts Donagan's theory of 'rainbow Royalism'.⁵ However, the work here shifts the question of 'rainbow Royalism' so that it asks not whether there was a political spectrum within Royalism, but suggests that Royalism had a slightly greater chronological scope than is often described. The issue is not whether Royalism can be measured against and defined in relation to the Parliamentarianism which arose from 1642, but whether Royalism should only be applied to the period after war broke out with Parliament. A central theme in this chapter is that since the King's supporters linked the anti-episcopacy of the Scots Covenanters to anti-monarchism, Charles' cause between 1639 and 1640 can be viewed as Royalist. After all, Royalist pamphleteering from 1642 onwards projected the Parliamentary cause as being fundamentally anti-monarchical, so the principle for determining Royalism in the years prior to the outbreak of war essentially remains the same. That historians tend not to use the term before 1642 should not dissuade us from thinking about its application on a slightly earlier period. What this chapter proposes is that Royalism can be used in relation to the Bishops' Wars from a cultural perspective. The Bishops' Wars enabled Charles' supporters to create a cultural and political other against which they could define the King's cause, and it was the very creation of an identifiable other that enabled a form of Royalism to exist. Cultural approaches towards Royalism have already been attempted. Underdown, for instance, related political and military conflict in the southwest to cultural diversity, suggesting that popular allegiances were influenced by contrasts within regional cultural practices.⁶ County-based studies have also raised the question as to whether contemporaries

⁵ Donagan, 'Varieties of Royalism'.

⁶ Underdown, *Revel, Riot and Rebellion*, chs. 1-4.

fought on behalf of either the King or Parliament on the basis of local, rather than national, interests.⁷ But what remains to be asked is whether Royalism actively sought to project itself as the natural shield for culture and identity, and the answer to this predates 1642.

Historians have frequently noted that the King's attempts to subdue his Scottish subjects by force in the Bishops' Wars of 1639 and 1640 were unpopular with the English population.⁸ The proclamation of 1638 may have claimed that the King was the 'defender of the faith' in order to combat the impact of the 'Rebellious Pamphlets' from Scotland, but to many pamphleteers in England it was royal policy which was at odds with Protestantism.⁹ Whilst the King professed to be 'maintaining true religion' with the intention of beating 'out all superstition', his religious reforms, notably the introduction of the Scottish Book of Common Prayer, were actually seen to be introducing popish practices into churches throughout the British Isles.¹⁰ In Scotland these reforms clashed with the country's national identity by threatening to undermine the Presbyterian Kirk, thus giving rise to the formation of a National Covenant. The Covenanters argued that the King's religious reforms were 'delinquent' against their religion and attempted to appeal to the sentiments of the English population.¹¹ Images that the 'subtil malice of Romes emissaries' had seeped into the

⁷ Stoyale, M., *Loyalty and Locality: Popular Allegiance in Devon During the English Civil War*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1996.

⁸ Bennet, M., *The Civil Wars in Britain 1638-1651*, Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 38-50; Kenyon, J., and Ohlmeyer, J., 'The Background to the Civil Wars in the Stuart Kingdoms', in Kenyon, J., and Ohlmeyer, J., (eds.), *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 16-26; Fissel, *English Warfare*, pp. 272-274; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, pp. 162-166.

⁹ *His Majesties Proclamation in Scotland: With An Explanation of the Meaning of the Oath and Covenant*, London, 1639, p. 1; *A Proclamation and Declaration to Inform Our Loving Subjects of Our Kingdom of England of the Seditious Practices of Some in Scotland, Seeking to Overthrow Our Regall Power Under False Pretences of Religion*, London, 1638, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Neuues from Scotland*, London, 1638, pp. 1-3; *The Beast is Wounded, or Information from Scotland, Concerning Their Reformation*, London, 1638, p. 13.

¹¹ *Neuues from Scotland*, pp. 2-3.

royal court and was on the verge of spreading throughout the British Isles filled the pages of various pamphlets.¹² It was said that the King had been influenced to

... follow the advice & counsel of professed papists, and to intrust them with the chieftest charges of the armes and armies now preparing for the threatened invasion of this Kingdome, and still intend to raise jealousies in the one Kingdome against the other, and so commit them together...¹³

Pamphleteers suggested that the future stability and 'brotherly respect' between England and Scotland was being undermined by emphasising the perceived Catholic influences within the court.¹⁴ It was thought that the very idea of the King waging war against his Scottish subjects would be horrifying to 'all good Christians vvithin the kingdome of England'.¹⁵ Significantly, as Fissel has pointed out, the King's plans to employ soldiers from the traditional enemy of Protestantism, Spain, in his service against Scotland alienated many people in the British Isles.¹⁶ In effect, these plans suggested that the King was aligning himself against his subjects with those from a country which had for years sought to invade England.¹⁷ For one pamphleteer this was a confusing predicament. He argued that the true enemy of Protestantism, the King and his realms lay outside of the British Isles, as he pleaded

Thou seest what armed bands
Tny will they can raise, and even by thy wink commands,
They if thou speak the word, can sack proud Rome,
And give the Law for Thee to Christendom:
While yet their armes are clear, their courage hot,
Doe not, O mighty King! Dissolve them not,
But let Eliza lead them to her Rhine,

¹² *An Information to All Good Christians VVithin the Kingdome of England, from the Noblemen, Barrons, Borrows, Ministers, and Commons of the Kingdome of Scotland, for Vindicating Their Intentions and Actions from the Unjust Calumnies of Their Enemies*, London, 1639, p. 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ *An Information*, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, frontispiece.

¹⁶ Fissel, M.C., *The Bishops' Wars: Charles I's Campaigns Against Scotland, 1638-1640*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 162-166; Stoyale, M., *Soldiers and Strangers*, 2005, pp. 3-5.

¹⁷ Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, pp. 162-166.

And repossesse her there. Her cause is thine...¹⁸

It was thought that instead of fighting Scotland, Charles could win 'endlesse glorie' for himself, Protestantism and the British Isles by engaging his military forces in a continental war.¹⁹ Thus, even as the British Isles began its descent into the wars of the 1640s, there were some who still believed that Charles should muster British troops for the type of religious cause which had shaped the image of Elizabethan England and English soldiers. The fact that he seemed incapable of doing this during the early 1640s served to fuel the belief that a religious war was breaking out in Britain, and that the emerging Royalist party was tainted with Catholicism.²⁰ The clash between Charles' policies and the popular perceptions of the role of England's military in maintaining true religion thus contributed towards what Morrill has described as the 'coiled spring effect' of 1642 when there was mounting belief that Protestantism was being betrayed.²¹

The King's attempt to impose religious reforms in Scotland, notably the 1636 Book of Canons and 1637 Prayer Book, precipitated riots in Edinburgh and Glasgow on 23rd July and 10th August 1637, with the result that by 28th February 1638 the Scottish National Covenant had been formed and a Scottish manifesto produced. As Macinnes has defined it, the Covenant constituted a tripartite act between God, the King and the people which justified rebellion against the British monarch if he should err in his duty to maintain and defend the nation's true religion.²² As Scally has

¹⁸ *Tvveeds Teares of Joy, to Charles Great Brittaines King*, London, 1639, p. 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰ Smuts, 'Puritan Followers of Henriatta Maria', pp. 43-45; Morrill, J., 'The Religious Context of the English Civil War', in Morrill, J., *The Nature of the English Revolution*, London and New York, Longman, 1993, pp. 52-68.

²¹ Morrill, J., 'The Nature of the English Revolution', in Morrill, *Nature*, pp. 14-15. See also Scott, J., *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 129-130.

²² Macinnes, A.I., *The British Revolution, 1629-1660*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 111-113.

shown, Charles ignored the advice of the Marquis of Hamilton to accept the Covenant.²³ Charles' effort to create a different Covenant through the bond of faith, which was designed to bind its signatories to uphold true religion under royal authority, encouraged the Covenanters to push further with their aims, culminating in the National Petition of 20th September.²⁴ By this time, however, the King was already preparing for military action. Since July the King had been aware that he could command those nobles who either held offices or lands in the north to prepare for the defence of the border, and by 17th September orders for the removal of arms from the Tower to Hull had been issued.²⁵ This was also a period during which the King's Council of War, a committee from the Privy Council which had assembled in July 1638, began to determine a method 'for better preparing the hearts and affections of His Majesty's subjects to serve him in a business of so great importance'.²⁶

Stater has commented that although the English lieutenancy encountered little overt resistance, there was 'no patriotic rush' to join the King's cause in 1639.²⁷ Ultimately though, as Sharpe and Kishlansky have suggested, this appears to have been exactly what the King's supporters tried to instigate. This was especially true by 1640, when military failure exacerbated Royal animosity towards the Covenanters, resulting in the King trying to appeal to existing enmities and resentment amongst his

²³ Scally, J., 'Counsel in Crisis: James, Third Marquis of Hamilton and the Bishops' Wars, 1638-1640', in Young, J.R., (ed.), *Celtic Dimensions of the British Civil Wars: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Research Centre in Scottish History University of Strathclyde*, Edinburgh, John Donald Publishers, 1997, pp. 25-29.

²⁴ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 793-794.

²⁵ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 795-797; Ohlmeyer, J.H., *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms: The Career of Randal MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 82.

²⁶ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 795-797; Fissel, *Bishops' Wars*, pp. 62-68. A 'Scottish Committee', also formed in July 1638, was responsible for building an army. Russell, *Fall of British Monarchies*, pp. 80-81.

²⁷ Stater, V.L., 'The Lord Lieutenancy on the Eve of the Civil Wars: The Impressment of George Plowright', in *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1986, pp. 280-283.

English subjects towards the Scots.²⁸ Charles had been trying to counter Covenanter calls for 'all his Majesties good Subjects' to join them 'for the good of Religion, his Majesties honour, and the quyetness of the Kingdome' in their struggle to cure the 'diseases' infecting the Kirk throughout 1637 and 1638.²⁹ As Macinnes has argued, the perceived threat of Laudianism, which had become synonymous with popery, enabled the Covenanters to present themselves as being both Charles' loyal subjects and the champions of Scottish interests.³⁰ To the Covenanters, 1638 was a triumphal year in Scotland's history as it was celebrated in pamphlets as 'the yeare that the *Bishops* had their downefall' and that the 'Beast' of religious innovation was 'wounded'.³¹ Such language clearly related to the sixteenth-century struggle against Catholicism.

Russell observed that anti-Scottish sentiment in some elements of the Long Parliament formed the basis of the 1642 Royalist party, and this view is particularly compelling despite Scott's challenging of it.³² It is apparent that such ideas constituted a significant part of Charles' campaigns in 1639 and 1640, and it is evident that the King's cause was designed to relate to English patriotic sentiments, despite clashing with religious traits common to England and Scotland.³³ This was particularly evident in the 1638 proclamation, which was essentially aimed to appeal

²⁸ Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, p. 797; Kishlansky, M.A., 'A Lesson in Loyalty: Charles I and the Short Parliament', in McElligott and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism During the English Civil Wars*, p. 17.

²⁹ *Answers to the particulars Proponed by His Majesties Commissionar*, Edinburgh, 1638, pp. 1-4; Wilcher, *The Writing of Royalism*, p. 26; *Neuues from Scotland Being Two Copies, the One, a Proclamation of the King: the Other a Protestation Against It, by the Noblemen, Barons: & Ministers of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1638, pp. 1-2.

³⁰ Macinnes, *The British Revolution*, p. 112.

³¹ *The Beast is Wounded, or Information from Scotland, Concerning Their Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1638, p. 1.

³² Russell, C., *The Causes of the English Civil War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 15; Russell, C., 'Why Did Charles I Call the Long Parliament?', in Gaunt, P., (ed.), *The English Civil War: The Essential Readings*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 136-137; Scott, D., '“Hannibal at our Gates”: Loyalists and Fifth-Columnists During the Bishops' Wars – the Case of Yorkshire', in *Historical Research*, Vol. 70, No. 173, October 1997.

³³ Dawson, J., 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture and Integration in Sixteenth-Century Britain', in Ellis, S.G., and Barber, S., (eds.), *Conquest & Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725*, London and New York, Longman, 1995.

to the King's 'loving Subjects' in England by alerting them to the 'seditious practices of some in Scotland'.³⁴ A royal proclamation issued in 1639 created the impression of a patient and compromising monarchy, asserting that the King had

endeavoured... for a long time together by all calm and faire
ways to appeale the disorders and tumultuous carriages
caused by some evill affected persons in Our Realm of Scotland,
but hitherto all in vain...³⁵

Cleverly, the proclamation exploited the word 'Covenant' by asserting that the King's rebellious Scottish subjects had rejected the King's 'Covenant' in favour of their own version.³⁶ In contrast to the King who had, according to the proclamation, given them 'lenicie and gentleness', the Covenanters were portrayed as being uncompromising and unreasonable.³⁷

As with Charles' correspondence to Salisbury, the proclamation asserted that the Covenanters were manipulating religion for anti-monarchical objectives.³⁸ Church government and monarchical rule were said to be linked, and an attack on episcopacy was shown in the proclamation to be a direct challenge to the monarchy.³⁹ In short, the proclamation emphasised that Covenanter activities were 'a course not fit to be endured in any well ordered Kingdom', and that they were creating an imbalance in the kingdoms.⁴⁰ In a similar theme to the courtly masques of the 1630s, harmony throughout the kingdom was shown in the proclamation to reside in the monarchy.⁴¹ Suckling had written in 1638 that Covenanting Scotland was similar to a 'Hive of swarming Bees' in which natural order and harmony failed to materialise, with the

³⁴ *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 1.

³⁵ *Neuues from Scotland*, p. 2; *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁷ *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁴¹ Smuts, *Court Culture*, pp. 255-258.

result that the kingdom did not 'yield much Honey', and the royal proclamation presented a similar view.⁴² It was thus implied that the harmony of Charles' kingdoms was jeopardised by the waspish designs of the Covenanters against the monarchy. As one anti-Covenanter pamphlet of 1639 put it, 'peacefull Bees have Kings, the Waspes have none, They onely buzze, and sting'.⁴³ According to a concept of order and hierarchy in which the King resided at the pinnacle, any anti-monarchical machinations by nature were malevolent forces which threatened the entire English population.⁴⁴ Suckling had commented that there was 'no resemblance betwixt this new Covenant and our *Saviours*', and such ideas were projected by the royal proclamation.⁴⁵ Through the use of imagery which was reminiscent of that used during the Armada years, the proclamation stressed that England was facing the threat of an invasion by a jealous foe. In a twist on the proclamation's initial assertion that the Scottish people were being misled by a minority of malcontents, the Royal declaration actually appears to have sought to capitalise on traditional English anti-Scottish sentiments, and thereby link the King's cause to a form of patriotic identity. Attempts were made to tap into popular fear of militant Scottish fury, as it was asserted that should the invading force

...not finde Us ready, both to resist their force and to curbe their insolencies: for many, and some of the chieftest among them, are men, not onely of unquiet spirits, but of broken fortunes, and would be very glad of any occasion... to make them whole upon the Lands and Goods of Our Subjects in England...⁴⁶

⁴² Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, pp. 140-142.

⁴³ *The Complaint of Time Against the Tumultuous and Rebellious Scots*, London, 1639, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Daly, J.W., 'The Origins and Shaping of English Royalist Thought', in *Historical Papers / Communications Historiques*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1974, p. 16.

⁴⁵ Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, p. 140.

⁴⁶ *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 2.

A strong attempt to incite enthusiasm for war against Scotland was also made when the proclamation asked its English readers whether they would be prepared to 'share' their property with 'such desperate hypocrites, who seek to be better, and cannot well be worse'.⁴⁷ In order to garner support for the King, the royal proclamation was thus overlooking the implications of Laudian reforms, and instead turning the issue between the King and the Covenanters into a struggle for the preservation of English liberty and property against a corrupted Scottish foe. Such ideas were mirrored in a satirical letter by Suckling in which he masqueraded as a Scottish Covenanting Lord replying to the accusations of a London Alderman, writing that the Covenanters

made use of Religion (which every one is apt to doubt) rather than Poverty (which no man would have disputed); and to say truth in this, I was something unsatisfied with my self, until I had spoken with one of the Learned of the Covenant, who told me, That he had observed very few to thrive by publishing their poverty, but a great many by pretending Religion.⁴⁸

The proclamation of 27th February 1639, however, did not simply define property in terms of land and wealth, but also in relation to the families of individual subjects. English readers were told that the defence of England meant the protection of the King's subjects 'with their wives, children, and goods' against the 'rage and fury of these men and their Covenant'.⁴⁹ The proclamation defined the Scottish Covenant as the embodiment of arbitrary and tyrannical government. Covenanting leaders, it was claimed, desired to strike at the 'very Root of Kingly government' in order to crown themselves with 'Regall power' before proceeding to 'lay Impositions and Taxes upon Our people'.⁵⁰ By implication, therefore, the King was the guarantor of English liberty

⁴⁷ *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, p. 142.

⁴⁹ *Proclamation and Declaration*, p. 3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

and property, and his cause was presented as the only possible defence against the Scottish aggressors.

With the proclamation's emphasis on the alleged anti-monarchical designs of the Covenanters and threat to English property, Charles appears to have been trying to fashion a form of patriotic English Royalism. Balcanquhall's *Large Declaration* continued in this vein, though it attempted to secure the patriotic anchorage of the King's cause by also alluding to the legendary English struggle against Rome.⁵¹ Whereas the proclamation of 27th February had superficially presented the Covenanters as subversive individuals who held 'private meetings' and plotted throughout the Kingdoms, the *Large Declaration* offered its readers a detailed argument of Covenanting objectives which covered four hundred and thirty pages.⁵² Although Griffin has argued that in 1639 the King did not present the Scottish crisis as a religious crusade, it appears that some anti-papist rhetoric was incorporated into the Royal message, although this admittedly served to reinforce the King's publicized legal concerns.⁵³ Imagery which appeared to refer to the 1605 gunpowder plot was used in the *Large Declaration*. The Covenanters were said to be agents of the 'Conclave of Rome' who wanted to 'undermine and blow up the Religion Reformed' in order to bring England back into 'Roman obedience'.⁵⁴ The *Large Declaration* argued that since English law and liberty were inextricably tied to the reformed religion, the English people could only look to their King, who professed to be the 'principall prop and stay' of the Protestant Church, to defend them from enslavement by a foreign

⁵¹ Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*. For further discussion of this text, see Chapter One.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵³ Griffin, M., *Regulating Religion and Morality in the King's Armies, 1639-1646*, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2004, pp. 40-50.

⁵⁴ Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*, p. 3.

foe.⁵⁵ Indeed, the King's stance as the guardian of liberty was emphasised in the *Large Declaration* by the argument that his religious policies in Scotland had been implemented in order to protect the Scottish people from the arbitrary actions, or 'hard usage and great oppression', of their own lords.⁵⁶

The *Large Declaration* appears to have been designed to appeal to 'unprejudicate readers' who were 'true hearted and loyall'.⁵⁷ Those who supported the Covenant seemed to be regarded as irredeemable. They and their Covenant were presented as a 'monstrous birth' and an 'itching humour' which threatened to spread infection into the other kingdoms and destabilise their natural order.⁵⁸ Covenanters were effectively the diseased flesh of Charles' Kingdoms, or as Suckling put it, a 'Byle broken out in the Breech of the Kingdom'.⁵⁹ The implication, therefore, was that the King's military actions were not the actions of a butcher inasmuch as the work of a surgeon. As it was described in the *Large Declaration*, by fighting the Covenanters the King was acting like a 'faithfull Physician' prepared to shed 'bad bloud' for the 'preservation of the whole body'.⁶⁰ The question, however, was which body the King's cause was supposed to preserve.

It seems that by 1640 Charles' cause was developing a strong anti-Scottish streak in the way it was projected in the press. As the author of the Covenanting pamphlet *An Information to all good Christians vwithin the kingdome of England* observed, those supporting the war against Scotland were trying 'to raise up the old nationall bloud-shed and quarrels'.⁶¹ In contrast to earlier publications, such as the

⁵⁵ Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*, pp. 3-5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.1-4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵⁹ Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, p. 140.

⁶⁰ Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*, p. 5.

⁶¹ *Information to All Good Christians*, p. 9.

proclamation of 27th February, the pamphlet, *The Complaint Of Time*, specifically attacked the ‘tumultuous and Rebellious Scots’.⁶² Just as Covenanting pamphlets emphasised the internal unity of Scotland, the author of *The Complaint Of Time* seemed to view all Scottish people as one rebellious force. Although it displayed no national symbols which distinguished the two armies, the dramatic woodcut which dominated the title page of the pamphlet functioned as a visual representation of Scottish aggression. The besieged castle is indicative of the Covenanters’ affront to Charles authority and monarchical government, and serves as an inversion of Covenanter claims that ‘Romes emissaries’ were trying to ‘beat down the walls of Ierusalem’.⁶³ Indeed, by March 1639 Covenanting forces had captured Dunglas, Tantallon, Dumbarton and Edinburgh Castles.⁶⁴ The cracks and breaches being made in the walls equate to the damage which Charles believed the Covenanters had inflicted upon his rule, and serve to reinforce the argument made on the following page that the Scots were ‘pulling downe the house of God, and building Babels of their owne invention’.⁶⁵ *The Complaint Of Time* therefore illustrated to readers that Charles’ rule was intrinsically connected to the established ‘Hierarchy of the Church’, asking the rhetorical question as to whether the Scots must ‘teare the Miter from the head / Of Bishops’.⁶⁶

It is also important to note that in *The Complaint Of Time*, Time itself was personified and used to historicise the conflict between the King and Covenanters.

According to the argument voiced by Time, rebellion was usually a part of a natural

⁶² Saltonstall, W., *The Complaint of Time*, London, 1639, frontispiece. Saltonstall later reproduced much of this material in *Englands Complaint: Against Her Adjoyning Neighbours the Scots*, London, 1640, esp. pp. 6-15.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Kenyon, J., and Ohlmeyer, J., ‘The Background to the Civil Wars in the Stuart Kingdoms’, in Kenyon, J., and Ohlmeyer, J., (eds.), *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-23.

⁶⁵ Saltonstall, *Complaint of Time*, p. 1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

cycle occurring through the ages which inevitably saw the re-establishment of sovereign authority. The Scottish crisis, however, was an ‘unnaturall Rebellion’ in the sense that it was shown to be the product of men trying to bring the nation back into the dark ages of paganism.⁶⁷ In other words, the Scots were shown to be engaging in an abnormal reversal and regression of time itself through the conscious destruction of institutions and hierarchies which had been progressively constructed by the will of God over centuries, as Time bewails

And Time that measures out the workes of nature...
By the King of Heaven, and my power is dated
And whatsoever is his great Decree
I must therein obey his Majesty.
But since the Giants warres I was not tooke
With greater feare, nor with more horroure stoke
Then when lowd Fame did bring unto my Eares
The Scots attempt...⁶⁸

The sense in *The Complaint Of Time* was that ‘Only the ‘Most perfect Creatures have the truest sense / Of Sovereignty and true obedience’, and that by their affront to Charles’ sovereignty the Scots existed outside of the natural world.⁶⁹ Scotland itself was effectively presented as a land of chaos, a ‘Wildernesse of Rebellion’, which threatened to destabilise England.⁷⁰ Royal proclamations issued on 20th December 1637, 19th February and 28th June 1638 aimed to defend the King from Covenanter claims that a popish plot was being hatched by stressing his revulsion of popery and commitment to Protestantism.⁷¹ The Royal message contained in these declarations was initially that although the King had found his authority ‘much iniured’, he

⁶⁷ Saltonstall, *The Complaint of Time*, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3; John Taylor stated that Kings were ‘the Royall Fathers of Terrestriall Government’ in Taylor, J., *Part of this Summers Travels, or News from Hell, Hull, and Hallifax, from York, Linne, Leicester, Chester, Coventry, Lichfield, Nottingham, and the Divells Ars a Peake*, London, 1639, p. 41.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6.

⁷¹ Larkin, J.F., (ed.), *Stuart Royal Proclamations: Volume II, Royal Proclamations of King Charles I 1625-1646*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 580-582; *Neuues from Scotland*; Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, pp. 790-793.

considered the Covenant to be a product of 'a preposterous zeale' but without 'any disloyalty or disaffection to our Soueraingty'.⁷²

However, it is clear that the Royal attitude towards the Scots progressively hardened from 1639. Although it appears to have received popular approval, the Pacification of Berwick signified a military failure and insult to the King's honour.⁷³ Indeed, it appears that some Covenanting pamphleteers were producing material by September which claimed that the Treaty of Berwick had in reality been designed to disguise Charles' loss of honour.⁷⁴ The author of *Tvveeds Tears of joy* may have thought a 'happy Union' between England and Scotland had been achieved by 'Great Charles' at the Treaty of Berwick, but in reality the events of the summer of 1639 provided the foundations of a hardened Royal image and cause.⁷⁵ As early as 22nd July the Venetian ambassador was reporting that it was believed the peace with Scotland would not last for long.⁷⁶ Apparently disgruntled by the treaty with the Scots, during the summer and autumn of 1639 Suckling anticipated the creation of a much hardened Royalist cause. The play on which he was working, *Brennoralt*, also known as *The Discontented Colonell*, was based around the struggles between the Polish King Sigismund III and the rebellious Lithuanians, and appeared to criticise Charles for being too lenient with the Scots. The hero Brennoralt, who is arguably representative of Suckling himself, is shown early on in the play to criticise King Sigismund's treaty with the Lithuanians by asking

Who puts but on the face of punishing,
And only gently cuts, but prunes rebellion:

⁷² *Neuues from Scotland*, p. 1.

⁷³ Razzell and Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, pp. 244-246; *Scots Scots Discoveries*, pp. 46-48; on 19th June 1639 Robert Woodford recorded receiving 'welcome newes of peace with Scotland', in 'The Diary of Robert Woodford, Steward of Northampton', in H.M.C., *9th Report Part 2*, p. 498.

⁷⁴ Razzell and Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, pp. 249-250.

⁷⁵ *Tvveeds Tears of joy*, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁶ Razzell and Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, pp. 246-247.

He makes that flourish which he would destroy.
Who would not be a Rebell when the hopes
Are vaste, the feares but small?⁷⁷

For Brennoralt, the King's failure to utterly destroy the rebels and the seeds of rebellion is dangerous, since in his view it will only allow future rebellions to sprout from their old roots. Any notion of compromising with rebels is, to Brennoralt, unthinkable, and this is a view which is also shared by other advisers of the King.⁷⁸ As with the pamphlet *The Complaint Of Time*, Suckling historicises rebellion in *Brennoralt*, with a Lord in the play agreeing with Brennoralt, saying

Turne o're your owne, and other Chronicles,
And you shall finde (great Sir)
That nothing makes a Civill warre long liv'd,
But ransome and returning backe the brands
Which unextinct, kindled still fiercer fires.⁷⁹

Appeasement and compromise, therefore, is shown by Suckling to stoke the fires of greater turmoil in future; history teaches monarchs not to endure any affront to their authority. One of the reasons given by Suckling for this attitude is that the future security and prosperity of realms and nations is threatened if a ruler fails to impress on his subjects his power and authority. Furthermore, religious arguments and grievances of rebels are overlooked as mere pretensions, whilst the issue of successfully suppressing rebellions becomes linked to a form of patriotism, as Brennoralt asks

If when Polands honour, safety too,
Hangs in dispute, we should not draw our Swords,
Why were we ever taught to weare 'em Sir?⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Suckling, J., 'Brennoralt', in Beaurline, L.A., (ed.), *The Works of Sir John Suckling: The Plays*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, I.iii.73-77.

⁷⁸ Beaurline, *Works of Suckling*, I.iii.88-91.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I.iii.92-96.

⁸⁰ Suckling, 'Brennoralt', II.III.29-36 and III.ii.66-68.

Armed force is thus presented as a necessary and natural arm of Royal governance, whilst those who fight for the King, as epitomised by swordsmen such as Brennoralt, put aside their own grievances with the King in order to preserve the country.⁸¹

There was, in other words, a patriotic dimension to Suckling's Royalism. This was a dimension which assumed that religion was secure under the King's governance, and that it was the 'Hypocritical Puritane' or Covenanter who sought to subvert England's national security.⁸²

Indeed, one pamphlet printed in 1640 claimed that the King's quarrel with the Covenant was no less than 'Englands Complaint' against Scotland.⁸³ The author of the pamphlet, Wye Saltonstall, was trying to persuade his readers that the political and military upheaval of the kingdoms was not actually the result of any religious innovations attempted by the King, but rather the product of Scottish Anglophobia and envy of the Kingdom of England. It was the Scots, a people 'as barren in goodnesse as their soyle', who were trying to hatch a 'Puritane powder-plot... to blow up the Kingdom of England'.⁸⁴ Cultural and historical distinctions between England and Scotland had been noted by Covenanting pamphleteers in 1639 when they commented on English military impotence, but these distinctions had ultimately been based on criticism of Charles' religious policies. As Covenanting pamphleteers saw it, St. George had broken his spear and sword in unsuccessful wars against the Spanish and French before attempting to wrongly thrust a bishop's mitre on St. Andrew 'instead of a blew Bonnet'.⁸⁵ *Englands Complaint* used similar principles by

⁸¹ Suckling, 'Brennoralt', III.ii.38-41.

⁸² Saltonstall, *Complaint of Time*, p. 2.

⁸³ *Englands Complaint Against Her Adjoyning Neighbours the Scots*, London, 1640, frontispiece.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁸⁵ *Scots Scotvs Discoveries*, pp. 6-7 and p. 21.

positioning St. George and the English nation strongly behind the King and above the Scots, declaring

... the English are to prove them by the fierie arguments of warre, rebellious blew-caps, stout Covenanters against their King, and marke the conclusion... Saint *George* the English patron hath beene ever acknowledged above Saint *Andrew*...⁸⁶

These ideas were manifested in various other ballads and news sheets throughout 1640. The author of *A true Subjects wish*, who was possibly Martin Parker, appeared to define Charles' cause as a *Royalist* or pro-monarchy movement whilst simultaneously align it with England's 'ancient honour'.⁸⁷ Conflict between King and Covenant was polarised into an issue of England against Scotland, with legendary English military skill underpinning Royal and patriotic honour, as the fourth stanza asserted that

It much importeth England's honour
Such faithless Rebels to oppose,
And elevate Saint Georges banner,
Against them as our countries foes,
and they shall see
how stoutly we,
(for Royall *Charles* with courage free)
will fight if there occasion be

A true Subjects wish emphasised distinctions between Charles' English, or 'true', subjects and the 'factious Scot'.⁸⁸ Englishmen were automatically included in the King's cause, and were expected to uphold the honour of King and country by deflating 'proud Jocky's boasting' through military action or financial support.⁸⁹ It

⁸⁶ *Englands Complaint*, p. 3.

⁸⁷ *A True Subjects wish*, London, 1640; Firth, 'Ballads', p. 263.

⁸⁸ *A True Subjects wish*.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 'You who have money doe not grudge it, / But in your king and countries right, / freely disburse'.

was, as the royal proclamations issued during August stated, the Englishman's obligatory service to defend England against the Scots.⁹⁰

Additionally, in *A true Subjects wish* the Scots were effectively ejected and excluded from any common identity with England and concept of Britain. The Scots were presented as an 'other' in the British Isles. They were a people who had rejected the rule of their true King in favour of calling in 'forraine aide' by allying themselves to England's other traditional enemy, France.⁹¹ This was referring to the evidence found by the Earl of Traquair and presented to the Commons by Windebank on 17th April, which showed that the Covenanting leaders had been in correspondence with the French King.⁹² This exclusion of the Scots from Charles' Britain was continued in another of Parker's pamphlets, *Good Newes from the North*, which tried to define the war in terms of a clash between English and Scottish interests.⁹³ For example, Parker referred to English cavalry as 'our horsemen' in the service of 'our King and Country', thereby emphasising the point that the Scots had become an 'other' in the British Isles by rejecting Charles' rule and breaking the 1603 union.⁹⁴ Somewhat amusingly, although the military action reported in this publication was only a minor skirmish at a 'M[r] Pudsey's house', Parker seems to have attempted to convert it into a magnificent English victory which, unlike the Short Parliament, promised to cure what had been referred to as the 'Scottish disease'.⁹⁵ The defeat of the King's army

⁹⁰ *A Proclamation to Summon All Such as Hold of his Majestie by Grand Sergeantry, Escuage, or Knights Service, to do Their Services Against the Scots, According to Their Tenures*, London, 1640; *A Proclamation Commanding all the Trained Bands and Others on this Side Trent, to be in Readinesse with Horse and Arms, to Serve His Majestie for Defence of the Kingdome*, London, 1640.

⁹¹ *A True Subjects Wish*.

⁹² Kishlansky, 'Lesson in loyalty', pp. 20-27; Razzell and Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, Vol. 2, pp. 10-11.

⁹³ Parker, M., *Good Newes from the North*, London, 1640; Firth, 'Ballads', pp. 269-271; *DNB*.

⁹⁴ Parker, *Good Newes*.

⁹⁵ *CSPD*, 1640-1, pp. 79-81; Parker, *Good Newes; Diary of John Rous*, p. 88.

only lent a greater sense of urgency to the anti-Scottish and patriotic rhetoric of such writing.

Parker's ballad, *Newes from New-castle*, was printed in the aftermath of the Scots' capture of Newcastle upon Tyne.⁹⁶ Verbal, visual and textual media combined in this ballad to project the image of Scottish aggression challenging English honour. It was addressed 'To all English men' with the intention of undermining what was seen as the 'fond opinion' of the English towards the Scottish army.⁹⁷ Indeed, the refrain at the end of each verse in *News from New-castle* was aimed at warning readers and listeners about the alleged deceptiveness of the Scots, and appears to have been intended to spark the growth of militant anti-Scottish sentiment, as Parker wrote

Then let not faire words, make fooles faine,
But let us beate the Scots againe.⁹⁸

These words also complimented the tune to which *Newes from New-castle* was meant to be sung, namely *Lets to the Wars againe*, in Parker's aim to win support for war against Scotland.

Scottish aggression and military operations were cited as proof that the King was the wronged party. Unsurprisingly it was the Scots, and not the King's advisers, who were said to be the real 'Machiavillians' and 'truce breakers', with the woodcuts depicting the Scottish occupation of Newcastle serving to underline the defensive nature of the King's cause.⁹⁹ The patriotic dimension of the Royalist image was emphasised and romanticised in *Newes from New-castle*. As with *Britaines Honour*,

⁹⁶ Parker, M., *Newes from New-castle*, London, 1640.

⁹⁷ Parker, *Newes from New-castle*.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* The use of the words 'let us beate the Scots againe' seems strange, given that English forces had been defeated at Newburn and had subsequently left Newcastle open to Scottish occupation. This could either be alluding to historical English victories over the Scots or to the skirmish described in *Good Newes from the North*.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Parker focused on individual soldiers in *Newes from New-castle* as exemplars of English honour, martial skill and patriotism. They were projected as being the epitome of English masculinity, for they had ‘manfully’ fought against the Scots.¹⁰⁰ For instance, Sir John Digby was referred to as a ‘valorous and worthy Knight’ whilst Charles Porter, a cornet of a ‘warlike troupe’, was described as having been a ‘hopefull bud of chevalry’ on the battlefield.¹⁰¹ Parker then proceeded to make Porter’s ‘death shine bright’ by turning it into a glorification of English patriotic sacrifice. The cavalry officer, Parker wrote, had ‘seal’d his honor with his blood’ and had ‘ne’r yielded till death made him stoope’. Porter becomes a key focal point in the ballad, with

His broken sword in’s hand twas found,
(When he lay grovelling on the ground)
His Cornet colors ‘twixt his thighs,
Thus yielded he in sacrifice,
His life and blood in’s Countries right.¹⁰²

Here was an image of the perfect soldier in the King’s service. The broken sword which was supposedly found still clutched by Porter’s corpse functions as a symbol of the unbreakable will and resolve of a true English soldier fighting and dying for ‘King and countries good’.¹⁰³ Parker was essentially trying to show how the Scottish invasion should ‘knit English hearts in one’.¹⁰⁴ Collective language was used by Parker to include English readers in the King’s military affairs, with the King’s soldiers being referred to as ‘our cavaleirs’ and ‘our gallants’.¹⁰⁵ The implication which such language posed was that the Royal army was fighting for the English population, and that the readers of *Newes from New-castle* should therefore support the King’s cause

¹⁰⁰ Parker, *Newes from New-castle*.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

to remove 'Jocky' from English soil.¹⁰⁶ In many ways Parker's writing echoed the Earl of Strafford's opinion that the Scottish invasion potentially offered the King significant propagandistic advantages, as he wrote to Lord Cottington that

the Scots have come into England, and so the invasion actual, which clears the case more to the King's advantage than if we had been the aggressors...¹⁰⁷

Indeed, the imagery of invasion was one which Royalism would again use in 1643, after Parliament had sealed an alliance with Covenanting Scotland.

Royalism may not have existed as a coherent political movement within Westminster, but the Bishops' Wars nonetheless illustrate that a form of Royalism existed before 1642. The Bishops' Wars provide an insight into some of the key themes and images that would be expounded by Royalist writers after war broke out in England. Control over English property and identity were championed as the cornerstones of the King's cause by pro-Royalist writers, and it is evident that royal proclamations were designed to tap into patriotic sentiments.¹⁰⁸ In effect, those who supported Charles during the Bishops' Wars equated the King's cause to a defence of England, and it was this exact same relationship which would colour a not insignificant quantity of Royalist print after 1642.

¹⁰⁶ Parker, *Newes from New-castle*.

¹⁰⁷ *CSPD*, 1640, p. 627.

¹⁰⁸ Further discussion of proclamations is given in Chapter One.

Chapter Four:

Royalists and the Struggle over Representation, 1641 to 1642

The previous chapter has suggested that a form of Royalism existed before 1642, and that it aspired to be a patriotic English cause by attempting to tap into anti-Scottish sentiments amongst the English population. The work in this chapter explores the representations of Royalism and Royalist figures in the months leading up to the outbreak of war. It examines the reportage and portrayal of significant political events and asks what relationship Royalists had with an English identity. The chapter suggests that the relationship between the Royalist cause and England was important in efforts to consolidate the Royalists' identity, but that it was often problematic. Questions surrounding key issues such as the reform of the Church and control of the militia were integrated into the survival of England. Royalism asserted that such reform amounted to an attack on England and English law. De Groot has argued that Civil War identities were legally defined, with people being 'either included or excluded within differing versions of legal space'.¹ Without maintaining established laws, Royalism asserted that English people were vulnerable to arbitrary and tyrannical governance. The Royalist cause which would emerge by August 1642 was to be founded in the relationship between the monarchy, law and episcopacy, with further church reform being presented as a force alien to the English people.² Both King and Parliament can be seen to have been making efforts to locate themselves within a patriotic English context. Whereas the Bishops' Wars had demonstrated that Laudian reform had been perceived to be a threat to the Protestant heritage of the

¹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 40.

² Morrill, J., 'The Attack on the Church of England', in Morrill, *English Revolution*, p. 72, p. 85-9.

British Isles, by 1641 and 1642 it was Parliament's religious aspersions and dubious legal stance which provided the King with sufficient grounds on which to project himself as the guardian of the established Church. Parliamentary moves for the English Church to be reformed 'root and branch', together with the numerous articles in the Grand Remonstrance and Militia Bill, enabled Charles to capitalise on apprehensions towards sectarian dogma and define and project himself as the champion of English law.³

As with the projection of Charles' cause during the Bishops' Wars, the cause with which Charles went to war in 1642 appears to have been based upon an idea of English patriotism. The main distinction was that the Royalist cause of 1642 was set in circumstances which enabled it to relate to England's Elizabethan heritage by defining itself as a cause which protected the established English legal and religious systems from the threat of the seemingly chaotic and alien forces of sectarianism within Parliament.⁴ As Parliamentary pamphleteers were capable of presenting the Royalists, or 'Cavaliers', as a foreign, popish other, so too were the King and his supporters able to argue that the Parliamentary cause was alien to Protestant England.⁵ The construction of Royalism throughout 1641 and 1642 can be seen to be an attempt to project allegiance to the King and the established church as a commitment to the preservation of England and its localities, thereby suggesting that the patriotic element which had been present in 1639 and 1640 was still predominant by 1642. The difference, however, was that whereas the Royalism of the Bishops' Wars had to an extent been based on medieval precedents and perceived anti-Scottish sentiments amongst the English population, the Royalism of 1642 tried

³ Morrill, 'Religious Context', p. 63.

⁴ Smith, *Constitutional Royalism*, ch. 4; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 287; Morrill, 'Attack', pp. 85-90.

⁵ Robuck, G., 'Cavalier', in Summers, C.J., and Pebworth, T.L., (eds.), *The English Civil Wars in the Literary Imagination*, Columbia and London, University of Missouri Press, 1999, p. 14.

to connect with contemporary religious struggles, the rule of law and the ancient constitution. Since the Reformation, England had often been depicted as an island beleaguered by militant Catholicism.⁶ The objective of Royalism between 1641 and 1642 was to locate itself within the English psyche by showing how the English Church and population were under threat from a force which aimed to corrupt and conquer, much like European Catholicism. The problem was that between 1641 and the opening weeks of 1642, the image of the King was seriously impaired not only by the actions of Catholics, especially with the outbreak of the Irish Rebellion, but also by his own political blunders.

Chapter One has argued that control over language, meaning and textual space was a key issue in Royalist print, but the work in this chapter, and indeed Chapters Six and Seven, suggests that the Royalists never had a secure enough grasp of their own identity. Control was more of an aspiration than a reality, since part of Royalist textual space inevitably had to respond to the negative image of Royalists developed in the Parliamentary press. Royalist actions, notably those initiated by or with Charles' consent, had the effect of undermining whatever control Royalism had over its own image. The appointment of Lunsford as the lieutenant of the Tower of London, the arrest of the Five Members, and the attempt to seize Hull all cast shadows over the Royalists' image, and in doing so hindered the development of popular anti-parliamentary sentiments.⁷ In effect, Royalist actions in the months leading up to the war laid the foundations for the development of the Cavalier

⁶ Wiener, C.Z., 'The Beleaguered Isle. A Study of Elizabethan and Early Jacobean Anti-Catholicism', in *Past and Present*, No. 51, 1971, pp. 27-62; Wolf, P., 'The Emergence of National Identity in Early Modern England: Causes and Ideological Representations', in, Grabes, H., (ed.), *Writing the Early Modern English Nation: The Transformations of National Identity in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England*, Amsterdam, Rodopi, Costerus New Series, 2001, 200-201.

⁷ Coates, W.H., (ed.), *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes: From the First Recess of the Long Parliament to the Withdrawal of King Charles from London*, Yale University Press, (1942) repr. 1970, pp. 384-401; Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 283.

stereotype which would come to dog Royalism throughout the war. The work in this chapter therefore begins to show that the relationship between Royalism and Englishness was unstable at best, and that its instability was in part derived from an inability to totally control its own representation.

On 18th October 1641 the King wrote to Edward Nicholas, directing him to assure people that he would remain 'constant for the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England as it was established by Queen Elizabeth and James I'.⁸ As Russell and Smith have suggested, this letter was significant, since it marked a point at which the King was beginning to present himself as a 'rallying point' for those committed to the preservation of episcopacy.⁹ As with the image projected by the royal proclamations issued during the Bishops' Wars, Charles' letter to Nicholas signified that the monarchy was inseparable from the established form of church government.¹⁰ The attack on the 'cursing *Architophells* and rayling *Rabshakahs*' in the printed version of the letter positioned Charles in opposition to the seemingly populist forces which threatened to destroy the 'root and branch' of church government, echoing Digby's argument in February 1641 that the King could not 'put downe Bishoppes totally with safety to Monarchy'.¹¹ In effect, it seems that the King was beginning to present a moderate image of himself as the guardian of the established law and religion of England, and this was a role which had the potential to gain political and moral support.

⁸ CSPD, 1641-1643, p. 140; Gardiner, S.R., *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, London, Green and Co., 1884, Vol. IX, ch. xcvi, esp. pp. 281-284.

⁹ Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, p. 371; Smith, D.L., 'From Petition to Remonstrance', in Smith, D.L., Strier, R., and Bevington, D., (eds.), *The Theatrical City: Culture, Theatre and Politics in London 1576-1649*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 217.

¹⁰ CSPD, 1641-1643, p. 140.

¹¹ *King Charles His Resolution Concerning the Government of the Church of England, Being Contrary to that of Scotland. With a Speech Spoken by the Lord Car, in the Parliament in Scotland, Being a Little Before His Examination Concerning the Plot which was Found Out in Scotland*, London, 1641; Smith, 'Petition to Remonstrance', pp. 210-212; *The Third Speech of the Lord George Digby, to the House of Commons, Concerning Bishops, and the Citie Petition*, London, 1641, p. 18.

On 8th September Parliament passed an order regarding the 'Innovations in Religion' which required the removal of all forms of beautification and idolatry from places of worship.¹² By 4th October the Venetian Ambassador was recording that people in various parishes had refused to implement Parliament's orders, preferring instead to maintain the 'ancient observance without any alteration'.¹³ In St. George's parish in Southwark there appears to have been a struggle within the local community over the removal of the church altar rails during the first fortnight in October, whilst the vicar and churchwardens of St. Giles parish ignored Parliament's orders.¹⁴ Efforts to remove or destroy certain features of churches were viewed by some as the machinations of disorderly and subversive forces which posed a real threat to the law, with Sir Peter Wroth actually contemplating the dangerous outcome of London turning 'proselyte'.¹⁵ In a satirical comment, Edward Reed observed on 20th September that the affairs in England were actually 'distempered' by 'those that would have themselves thought to be most holy, and judge themselves fitter to regulate the church affairs, rather than the law and the judges'.¹⁶ Likewise, the Venetian Ambassador noted the apprehension of large sections of the population towards the Parliamentary attack on the established church, asserting that

Those who profess the Protestant faith let it be freely understood that they will rather embrace the Catholic religion, which is odious to them, than change a jot in the ancient use or to introduce the rigorous observance of the dogmas of Calvin, which the Puritans are trying to introduce as the most efficacious means of preventing the people from tolerating the Monarchy any longer...¹⁷

¹² *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, p. 279; Gardiner, S.R., *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, (1889), 1906, pp. 197-8; *ODNB*; *HMC Portland*, Vol. III, p. 79.

¹³ Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, Vol. II, p. 128.

¹⁴ Coates, W.H., (ed.), *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes: From the First Recess of the Long Parliament to the Withdrawal of King Charles from London*, Yale University Press, (1942), 1970, p. 3.

¹⁵ *CSPD, 1641-1643*, pp. 132-3.

¹⁶ *HMC, Cowper*, Vol. II, p. 291.

¹⁷ Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, London, Caliban Books, Vol. II, pp. 123-4.

Interestingly, this statement associates any form of reformation on the Church established by Elizabeth I as an attack on the monarch. Further reform in the Protestant religion practised in England is being likened to disorder, and despite the attempts to prevent pro-Episcopacy petitions from entering Parliament, it seems that it was a theory shared by the inhabitants of other cities.¹⁸ The petitions from Huntingdonshire and Chester in December 1641, for example, cite the ‘schismatics and separatists’ as the real danger to the Church and State.¹⁹ Even Stanley Gower believed that religious schism posed a threat to England, as in a letter to Sir Robert Harley dated 9th August he observed that

On the one side papists that erect theyr Babel amongst us; on the other side, Brownists that discourage your reformation of our Zion, whilst they contend for theyr independent governmentt, they seyres and auncestors the Anabaptists did hinder the reformation in the dayes of Luther... methinks – that your honourable hous[e] should timely meet with this anarchy and confusion...²⁰

Gower’s views were also shared by William Pleydell, who felt that England was trapped between ‘Scylla and Charybdis, popery on the one side, and I know not what to call it on the other’.²¹ What emerges, then, is an impression that individuals felt that England was being torn apart by destabilising religious forces, both popish and sectarian, and that Charles’ position on Church government could be regarded as the key to political and social stability.

Given the wording of Parliament’s orders of 8th September and the fact that Thomas Smith reported that Parliament was ‘very busy perfecting’ them, it appears

¹⁸ HMC, *Cowper*, Vol. II, p. 295.

¹⁹ HMC, *4th Report*, pp. 107-9; Aston, T., *A Remonstrance, Against Presbitery. Exhibited by Divers of the Nobilitie, Gentry, Ministers and Inhabitants of the County Palatine. Of Chester with the Motives of that Remonstrance*, London, 1641.

²⁰ HMC, *Portland*, Vol. III, pp. 79-80.

²¹ Quoted in Morrill, J., *Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630-1648*, London and New York, Longman, (1976), 1999, p. 53.

that whereas during the summer of 1641 the King had seemed to pose a threat to the rule of law, by the autumn Parliament was beginning to be viewed as a greater danger.²² This fluctuation in perception would continue into and beyond 1642, fuelling the growth of stereotypical images. It is apparent that there was growing disaffection with Parliament by October, with disobedience of Parliamentary orders being accompanied with open criticism of Parliament. A churchwarden of St. Giles's parish, resisting the order of 8th September, openly declared the Commons to be all 'asses', whilst a 'papist' called William Moore had allegedly 'spoaken disgracefullie of the howse of Commons saying they were a companie of prickeared fellowes'.²³ More significantly, anti-Parliamentary pamphlets and other scandalous printed works began to emerge from presses. Thomas Smith informed Sir John Penington on 26th October that 'Libels are thrown up and down in abuse of the best in Parliament'.²⁴ Interestingly, whereas in 1639 and 1640 the anti-Scottish dimension of Royalism had failed to generate a popular cause, by 1641 pamphlets were printed in London and York which accused MPs of being the 'authors of seditious deliberations, traitors to the King, the Kingdom and the nobility and of having conspired with the Scots to the hurt of the people here'.²⁵ Parliament was effectively being accused of 'disloyalty' to the King and the English people, and the anti-Scottish theme in these pamphlets would later re-emerge in *Mercvrius Avlicvs* once Pym had secured a Scottish alliance against Charles in September 1643.²⁶

Throughout September and October, the Venetian Ambassador was convinced that there was a 'universal dissatisfaction with the efforts of Parliament' on account of

²² Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 295; *CSPD 1641-1643*, pp. 146-147.

²³ Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, pp. 17-24.

²⁴ *CSPD 1641-1643*, pp. 146-147.

²⁵ Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, p. 131.

²⁶ *CSPD 1641-1643*, p. 129.

the Commons' religious motions and taxes being levied on the London population.²⁷ Presumably writing after receiving information about the developments in Parliament, he felt that there was a chance that the King could 'cultivate' the division between the Lords and Commons in order to form a party.²⁸ Similarly, in a letter to the King on 5th October, Nicholas stated that he was 'credibly assured that the City of London grows very weary of the insolent carriage of the schismatics, finding their way of government to be wholly arbitrary'.²⁹ All of these perceptions were formed despite the fact that news of the second army plot and the attempt to assassinate Argyle and Hamilton was being revealed in Parliament and being printed by 20th October.³⁰ Nicholas's observation suggests that in the popular imagination, Parliament was becoming associated with schism, disorder and arbitrary rule. The outcome of the London Mayoral election in September was seen as evidence of an increasing level of disaffection towards Parliament, with Sir Peter Wroth writing that Parliament's 'lovers' had started to fall off once its schismatic 'deformity' had begun to be 'unmasked'.³¹ In an environment in which Parliament's image seemed to be breaking down, the King was provided with an opportunity to fashion himself as a moderate sovereign capable of governing within the law.³² Whereas in the spring of 1641 it was held that Parliament was the only 'cure' for the 'malady' and 'gangrend

²⁷ Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, p. 131.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 126-127.

²⁹ Pearl, V., *London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City Government and National Politics, 1625-43*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 124.

³⁰ *CSPD 1641-1643*, pp. 138-139; Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, pp. 8-17.

³¹ *CSPD, 1641-1643*, pp. 132-135.

³² In addition to the community clashes over Parliament's religious orders, it is worth remembering that the law and order in various areas was being further challenged by the lawless actions of some disbanded soldiers. *A Proclamation for the Peacable and Quiet Passage of the Troopes of Horse to be Disbanded in the North Partes*, London, 1641; *A Proclamation for the Securing of the Peace and Safety of His Majesties Subjects, Against Outrages and disorders*, London, 1641; *CSPD 1641-1643*, p. 134; *A Discovery of Many, Great, and Bloody Robberies: Committed of Late by Dissolvte and Evill Affected Troopers*, London, 1641.

body' of the British Isles, by the autumn it was starting to appear that the only 'rotten and putrified members' of Britain were to be found in the House of Commons.³³

De Groot has shown how during the Civil War Royalism was defined in opposition to Parliamentarianism, and was built upon the concept of social stability, as 'Royalist discourse attempted to put the country together again'.³⁴ These ideas also seem applicable to the weeks prior to the arrest of the Five Members on 4th January 1642. According to Edward Reed in a letter to Sir John Coke on 24th October, the King's return to London from Scotland was eagerly anticipated by a large proportion of the London population, and this impression was also reflected in the Venetian Ambassador's correspondence.³⁵ Faced with what appeared to be a 'hydra' in the form of the House of Commons, some people perceived the King to be the guarantor of social, legal and religious stability, and this was the exact image of the King which was projected by both Charles and those increasingly alienated from Pym.³⁶ The printed version of Charles' letter to Nicholas, *King Charles His Resolvtion*, clearly distanced the King from religious reform. Interestingly, it seems that the anti-Scottish dimension of Charles' cause in 1639 and 1640 had not been entirely dropped, since *King Charles His Resolvtion* distinguished England from Scotland in its assertion that the English Church was 'contrary to that of Scotland'.³⁷ Another pamphlet, *A Trve Relation Of A Scotchman*, told readers of an incident in which a Scot entered St. Olaves Church and destroyed a service book. The anonymous author seemed truly horrified and insulted by the actions of this Scottish individual, asserting that as an 'alien' who was not 'one of our own nation', the Scotchman had 'no right' to interfere with the

³³ *A Discourse Shewing in what State the Three Kingdoms are in at this Present*, London, 1641, p. 1.

³⁴ De Groot, J., *Royalist Identities*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. xv and pp. 8-28.

³⁵ HMC, *Cowper*, Vol. II, p. 293; Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, p. 150.

³⁶ Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, p. 150.

³⁷ *King Charles His Resolvtion*, p. 1.

English Church.³⁸ However, whereas *King Charles His Resolvtion* fixed the King as the guardian of the Elizabethan and Jacobean Church and defined him as the one figure capable of defending Protestantism against the ‘cursing *Architophells* and rayling *Rabshakahs*’, the author of *A Trve Relation Of A Scotchman* was objecting only to foreign interference in English matters.³⁹ Clearly, apprehension of people and matters foreign to English custom and culture had significant implications in pamphleteering and political outlook.

In contrast to Charles’ willingness to use Catholic forces during the Bishops’ Wars, the ideology which appeared to be building up around the King by 1641 centred on the opposition to anything which could be defined as being foreign to England. With the Commons’ push for the ‘roots and branches’ of the established Church to be reformed, the King had the opportunity to define himself, his supporters and his cause as that which opposed religious innovation and upheld English law. It was an idea which preyed on existing anti-Puritan sentiments and imagery, and was arguably derived from conceptions of a heroic English Protestant Church.⁴⁰ The established Church appears to have been depicted by its supporters as a distinctly English phenomenon. As play-pamphlets such as the anonymous *A Dialogue Betwixt Three Travellers* argued, the Church of England did not promote superstition or unruliness.⁴¹ Unlike the Papist, ‘Crucy Cringe’, and the Puritan, ‘Factiovs Wrest-Writ’, the Professor of the Church of England, ‘Accepted Weighall’, has the wisdom and

³⁸ *A Trve Relation of a Scotchman*, London, 1641, p. 5.

³⁹ *King Charles His Resolvtion*, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Holden, W.P., *Anti-Puritan Satire 1572-1642*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954, esp. ch. 2; McDowell, N., *The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution, 1630-1660*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 35-38; Barbour, R., *Literature and Religious Culture in Seventeenth-Century England*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, chs. 1-2.

⁴¹ On play-pamphlets, see Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 201-210; *A Dialogue Betwixt Three Travellers, as Accidentally They Did Meet on the High-way: Crucy Cringe, a Papist, Accepted Weighall, a Professour of the Church of England, and Factiovs Wrest-Writ, a Brownist*, London, 1641.

intelligence to find 'Truth' in religious practice.⁴² This was an argument put forward in other pamphlets, especially those written by the future Royalist, John Taylor.⁴³ Catholic and Puritan, or Sectarian, discourses are said to be founded in ignorance, and Taylor's *A Pedlar And A Romish Priest In a very hot Discourse* presented its readers with a scene in which a Papist and a Sectarian amusingly acknowledge that their own religious beliefs and practices are based upon an incoherent and unintelligible lexicon in which textual and linguistic meaning have been lost, as the Pedlar concludes that

Because a learned Priest may pray in Latin,
And mumble o're his Even-song, Masse, and Matin,
Ergo a Pedlar to the Lord may pray,
And know no sillable that he doth say,
So when you put me to your Pater noster,
I aske an Egge when I would have an Oister...⁴⁴

Any interpretation of Christianity, save that followed and practised in the established Church, was thus said to be anathema to true religion. Furthermore, as evidenced in texts such as *The Schismatick Stigmatized*, it was argued that schismatic practices distorted Christ's teaching by creating a religion based on fiction.⁴⁵ Significantly, it was also implied in *A Pedlar And A Romish Priest* that the doctrinal differences between the Papist and the Pedlar could not be resolved, since unlike in *A Dialogue Betwixt Three Travellers* there was no Professor from the Church of England to educate and enlighten them, and guide them between the 'rockes' of Popery and Separatism.⁴⁶

Religious schismatics and challengers to the Church of England were depicted as the instigators of social turmoil. It was suggested that the deconstruction of

⁴² *Dialogue Betwixt Three Travellers*, p. 6.

⁴³ ODNB.

⁴⁴ Taylor, J., *A Pedlar and a Romish Priest in a Very Hot Discourse, Full of Mirth, Truth, Wit, Folly, and Plain-dealing*, London, 1641, pp. 2-6, p. 22.

⁴⁵ Carter, R., *The Schismatick Stigmatized*, London, 1641, p. 4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22; *Dialogue Betwixt Three Travellers*, p. 6.

established biblical interpretation and religious practice would lead to the fragmentation of social, legal and political orders. The very language spoken by mechanic preachers was shown by Taylor to be indicative of disruption. The broken sentences spoken by the character 'My-heele Mendsoale' in *A Tale In a Tub* were not only an indictment against schismatic, in this case Brownist, linguistic and doctrinal incomprehensibility; they were a reflection of the threat posed to English society as a whole.⁴⁷ As would later be similarly argued by Thomas Edwards, Taylor suggested that the 'well infected Brethren' of the Brownists, along with those members of other religious sects, intended to spread their disease to the rest of the English population, as My-heele Mendsoale says to his congregation

This sentence I shall divide into 4 parts, because your understandings my Beloved Brethren, consisteth chiefly in the Knowledge of Divisions...⁴⁸

In effect, the deconstruction of meaning is suggested by Taylor to be part of a sectarian process of weakening and demolishing society, whilst in other pamphlets the Puritan's language serves to destroy peoples' lives through its attack on popular activities and culture.⁴⁹ In Taylor's work, religious sects constitute a definable, foreign other in England. Their opposition to the established church signifies that they are the absolute opposite of what defines England and constitutes English identity.

⁴⁷ Taylor, J., *A Tale in a Tub or, A Tub Lecture as it was Delivered by My-heele Mendsoale, an Inspired Brownist, and a Most Upright Transator*, London, 1641, p. 1.

⁴⁸ See Hughes, A., *Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; Taylor, *Tale in a Tub*, p. 1; Taylor, J., *The Brownists Synagogue or A Late Discovery of Their Conventicles, Assemblies; and Places of Meeting, Where They Preach, and the Manner of Their Praying and Preaching*, London, 1641, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Taylor, J., *Lvcifers Lacky, or, The Devils New Creature. Being the True Character of a Dissembling Brownist, Whose Life is Hypocriticall, Instructions Schismaticall, Thoughts Dangerous, Actions malicious, and Opinions Impious*, London, 1641; *The Lamentable Complaints of Nick Froth the Tapster, and Rvlerost the Cooke. Concerning the Restraint Lately Set Forth, Against Drinking, Potting, and Piping on the Sabbath Day, and Against Selling Meate*, London, 1641; *The Resolution of the Round-Heads: Being a Zealous Declaration of the Grievances Wherewith Their Little Wits are Consumed to Destruction*, London, 1641; *The Resolution of the Rovnd-Heads to Pull Downe Cheap-Side Crosse*, London, 1641. See Underdown, D., *Revel, Riot and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England 1603-1660*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

The established Church became the fortress in which anybody fearing the implications of religious schism could seek refuge, and the King was its governor. Whereas heroic militant Protestantism had been seen to protect England from Spanish invasion during the later sixteenth century by many pamphleteers, by 1641 future Royalists were showing the forces of further Reformation to be foreign powers which sought to invade England. Taylor's pamphlet, *Religions Enemies*, presented its readers with a title page bearing a woodcut which showed a Papist, a Familist, a Brownist and an Anabaptist tossing the 'true' Protestant religion, represented by the Bible, in a blanket.⁵⁰ Public discourses of religion, which were referred to by Taylor as the 'Table-talk in every Taverne and Ale-house', were shown in *Religions Enemies* to be responsible for fracturing English society and subsequently exposing the country and its people to foreign ideological, and possibly military, invasion.⁵¹ The argument, as Taylor put it, was that 'too many places of *England*' were 'too much *Amsterdamnised*', and that further religious reform or innovation ran counter to existing English legislation, as instituted through 'true' Christian teaching and Acts endorsed by the King and Parliament.⁵² As implied in the statement in *The Brownists Synagogue* that 'A Kingdome divided cannot stand', Taylor was arguing in his pamphlets that the future well-being of England depended upon the survival of the national Church and the eradication of sectarian thought.⁵³ England and its Church were once again embattled, but rather than being in danger of destruction from specifically Popish plots, Taylor publicised the idea that the Church was facing multiple enemies from both ends of the religious spectrum. In some instances, news

⁵⁰ Taylor, J., *Religions Enemies. With a Brief and Ingenious Relation, as by Anabaptists, Brownists, Papists, Familists, Atheists, and Foolists, Sawcily Presuming to Tosse Religion in a Balquet*, London, 1641.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Taylor, *The Brownists Synagogue*, p. 1.

of sectarian gatherings was treated in a similar way to reports of Popish plots, being presented as a shocking 'Discovery' to readers.⁵⁴ Representations of the opponents of the established Church, especially those by Taylor, fostered the notion that England was facing an alliance between Papists and sectaries who aimed to 'stir up all forrain power' against Charles' kingdom.⁵⁵ The memory and imagery of heroic Elizabethan Protestantism came to be deployed by Taylor against all forces of religious reformation. English history, government, culture and identity was said to be cemented to the established Church of England, as Taylor had his religious conspirators in *The Hellish Parliament* address Satan thus

You may remember with what Heroicke stomackes we have complotted for the enlargement of your infernall Empire, as in that fatall yeare 1588 when with such large summes we negotiated abroad, and at home endeavoured to conquer, for you, that same little angle of the world, England...⁵⁶

It appears that for Taylor, Parliament's role was to protect the Church from both Papists and schismatics, and in his pamphlets such as *Old Nevves Newly Revived*, the anti-Papist duties of the Houses are said to have been successfully executed.⁵⁷ As stated in various pamphlets, notably Taylor's *Religions Enemies* and the anonymous *Certaine Affirmations In defence of the pulling down of Communion Rails*, the Church of England was a lawful establishment, created by the monarchy and Parliament.⁵⁸ With Parliament's order of 8th September presumably fresh in his mind, however, Taylor seems to have tried warning or reminding his readers that Parliament's full duties

⁵⁴ Taylor, J., *The Discovery of a Swarme of Separatists, or, A Leatherfellers Sermon*, London, 1641.

⁵⁵ Taylor, J., *The Hellish Parliament Being a Counter-Parliament to this in England, Containing the Demonstrative Speeches and Statutes of that Court. Together with the Perfect League Made Between the Two Hellish Factions the Papists and the Brownists*, London, 1641, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Taylor, *Hellish Parliament*, p. 3.

⁵⁷ Taylor, J., *Old Nevves Newly Revived: or, The Discovery of All Occurrences Happened Since the Beginning of the Parliament*, London, 1641, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁸ Taylor, *Religions Enemies*, pp. 3-4; *Certaine Affirmations in Defence of the Pulling Down of Communion Rails, by Divers Rash and Misguided People, Judiciously and Religiously Answered*, London, 1641, esp. pp. 22-23.

also extended to the prosecution of sectarians. The Commons' zeal in fighting popery was said to have exposed the Church to the ever increasing threat posed by schism, since Parliamentary legislation had begun to strike at the roots of the established religion. Taylor's pamphlet, *The Brownists Synagoge*, seemed to call for Parliament to guard the Church from schismatics, as Taylor stated

I hope the Parliament will take into their wise and grave considerations and pious care, the peace of the Church, and not suffer it to be clouded or eclipsed by these mists and errors of darknesse and ignorance...⁵⁹

Subsequent Parliamentary actions, especially the passing of the *Grand Remonstrance* on 22nd November, allowed Charles and Royalism to fill the role of a 'David' who would destroy the 'violent & fantastick Doctrine' championed by the sectarian 'Goliah'.⁶⁰ Indeed, as had emerged in royal proclamations in 1639 and 1640, by 1641 those opposed to the Church of England were in some cases, such as Carter's *The Schismatick Stigmatized*, portrayed as being ungodly and anti-monarchical in nature.⁶¹ As with Royalist representations of Scottish Covenanters during the Bishops' Wars, Carter claimed that schismatics used 'Religion for a cloak' in their design to break 'Old Englands Peace'.⁶²

It is interesting to see how Charles came to be depicted in some pamphlets as a restorer of peace, or a ruler who had brought about a 'happy Vnion' between England and Scotland.⁶³ The anti-Scottish dimension of Charles' cause during the Bishops' Wars was conveniently overlooked, and in *The Hellish Parliament*, the King was conspicuously absent from having any responsibility for the wars between England

⁵⁹ Taylor, *Brownists Synagoge*, p. 2. Although dating this pamphlet is uncertain, it is likely that it was not printed before late September 1641, given that 28th September is mentioned by Taylor in the tract.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Carter, *Schismatick Stigmatized*, p. 4 and pp. 16-17.

⁶² Carter, *Schismatick Stigmatized*, p. 1 and p. 17.

⁶³ Taylor, J., *Englands Comfort, and Londons Ioy*, London, 1641, p. 8.

and Scotland.⁶⁴ Charles' return to London was marked by the publication of celebratory publications, notably Taylor's *Englands Comfort* and the pamphlet written by a certain L.P. entitled, *Great Britaines time of Triumph*.⁶⁵ The fact that there still appeared to be substantial divisions between the King and his Scottish subjects, given that Charles had stated the English Church to be 'contrary' to that of Scotland was overlooked, as was the plot to remove Argyle and Hamilton.⁶⁶ Taylor interpreted the physical body of the King to represent 'Great Britaine' in the sense that the English and Scottish peoples shared him, celebrating 'That as the King is one, so we as one'.⁶⁷ The darkness of war that had descended upon northern England was said by Taylor to have been lifted by the King's presence in Scotland, which 'lighted all the North'.⁶⁸ Moreover, it was also anticipated in *Englands Comfort* that Charles, with his 'Raies illustrious', would enlighten the social and political darkness, or the 'Night of woe', which was developing in London under Parliamentary motions. This was a view which was also shared by the author of *King Charles His Entertainment*.⁶⁹ Ignoring the fact that Charles had lost the war with Scotland and had effectively been forced to accept the Covenant in Scotland, Taylor seemed to argue in his verse that the King had brought a halt to rebellion. Somewhat ironically in hindsight, the personification of rebellion, Sheba, was shown to have her head severed by Charles when Taylor proclaimed

Let Sheba's head be lost, and let us be,
 England, and Scotland, both in Vnity.
 Hee's Ours and Theirs, and he is Theirs and Ours,
 Let's love and serve him, with our Prayers, and Powers...⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Taylor, *The Hellish Parliament*, p. 3. The Bishops' War of 1639 is included with the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 as a plot concocted by Popish and sectarian plotters.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; *Great Britaines Time of Triumph. Or, The Solid Subjects Observation*, London, 1641.

⁶⁶ *King Charles His Resolution*, p. 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 7.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; *King Charles His Entertainment*, p. 5.

⁷⁰ Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 7.

In this interpretation of the outcome of the Bishops' Wars, the Scots are not the anti-monarchical rebels depicted by the royal proclamations of 1639 and 1640; they are instead 'well affected brethren'.⁷¹

With the anti-Scottish Royalist cause of the Bishops' Wars superficially extinguished and the awkward balance between the King and Covenanter Scotland apparently whitewashed, the emerging Royalism of the autumn and winter of 1641 was modelled on the defence of the established Church and fierce opposition to religious innovation in England, both popish and puritan. The author of *King Charles His Entertainment*, for instance, accepted that although Laud had tried to corrupt the Church, the real danger now lay from those pushing for reform in any direction. Free from the innovations of Laud, the author argued that the English Church had been 'cleans'd from all impuritie', and that the real threat came from those pushing for further reform.⁷² Such individuals were said to include the 'Brownists, Arminians, Separatists, and those / Which to the Common Prayer are mortall foes'.⁷³ Their supposedly hypocritical assertions and enthusiasm for further reform, reminiscent of Jonson's Puritan stereotypes in *Bartholomew Fair*, were said to be hardly a form of 'Purecraft'.⁷⁴ Instead, they were illustrated as being the genuine impurities of English society, whose 'Zeal of the Land' threatened the political and religious stability of the country.⁷⁵ Emphasising the sun-like properties of the King, the author anticipated that the 'glorious rayes of Majestie' would blast through the growing 'clouds of

⁷¹ Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 8.

⁷² *King Charles His Entertainment*, pp. 5-6.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Jonson, B., *Bartholomew Fair*, (1614), London, Penguin Classics, 1985. See Act I, Scene VI for a brilliant example of how Jonson characterises Puritans. Interestingly, a second folio of this play was printed in the year of the Second Bishops' War, 1640.

⁷⁵ *The Pvirtanes Impvritie: Or The Anatomie of a Puritane or Seperatist, by Name and Profession*, London, 1641.

darknesse' in England, which he believed were being encouraged by some MPs at Westminster who considered themselves to be 'more pure' than the rest of the population.⁷⁶

The verse at the end of *King Charles His Entertainment* also built up the attack on Parliament and religious reformers by trying to undermine the concept of Parliament as the supreme court and protector of law; and image seemingly championed in pamphlets such as *A Discourse Shewing In what state The Three Kingdoms Are in At this present* and *A Trve Relation Of A Scotchman*.⁷⁷ Through this deconstruction of Parliament's image, the House of Commons was turned into an anti-court in which the law was subverted by the influence of the 'beguiling devill'.⁷⁸ The King was thus able to emerge as the true champion of justice who could keep a check on

Those demy powers of Parliament which strove
In our Kings absence, to expresse their love
And care of us his Subjects, now shall finde
A Royall guerdon, those that were inclin'd
To practise mischief of this Iudge shall have
A Regall judgement, and a legal grave.⁷⁹

Sir Peter Wroth may have believed that Parliament was spinning a web which would prove difficult, if not impossible to 'disentangle', but the author of *King Charles His Entertainment* placed the sword of justice in Charles' hands and, unknowingly anticipating the events of January 1642, expected him to slash through Parliamentary offences.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ *King Charles His Entertainment*, pp. 5-6.

⁷⁷ *A Discourse*, pp. 1-4; *A Trve Relation*, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁸ *King Charles His Entertainment*, pp. 5-6.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *CSPD 1641-1643*, p. 133.

Despite the somewhat ominous implication of the King being able to create a 'legal grave', it is important to note that the projection of Charles' political cause by supporters at this stage was not overtly militant.⁸¹ Although Taylor may have suggested that 'all whom thy returne doth not delight / Let them be hang'd', the idea was not too dissimilar to that presented by Balcanquall in the *Large Declaration* of 1639 in which the King was compared to a surgeon.⁸² Indeed, Charles was ascribed the role of physician in *Englands Comfort* when it is said that his presence in London would have a medicinal effect by curing 'all wrenches, fractures, spraines and rents / Where Church, and Common Wealth is dislocated'.⁸³ It was a theme similar to that contained in Thomas Jordan's *A Medicine For The Times*, which treated religious and political radicalism as a 'malady of the minde' which could only be treated with 'one heartfull of Ecclesiastical obedience, [and] as much of Regall submission'.⁸⁴ For Taylor, the aim of removing any 'ill-affected Traytors' by cutting them out from the body of English society was to consolidate peace and preserve the law. As with Carter's *The Schismatic Stigmatized* in which religious radicals were portrayed as the 'enemies to Old Englands Peace', Taylor's *Englands Comfort* was arguably a reassertion of the representations of Charles during the 1630s as the guardian of peace.⁸⁵ Charles was said to be 'Gods Great Lieutenant' who would despatch the 'mischiefs' being hatched back 'To Hells blacke Vault, from whence they first assended', and thus bring a 'blessed peace' to the 'four great Kingdomes'.⁸⁶ Charles was not shown to be a King who would simply crush Parliament. He was instead

⁸¹ *King Charles His Entertainment*, pp. 5-6.

⁸² Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 8; Balcanquall, *Large Declaration*, p. 5.

⁸³ Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 7.

⁸⁴ Jordan, T., *A Medicine for the Times. Or, An Antidote Against Faction*, London, 1641, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Carter, *Schismatic Stigmatized*, p. 1; Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 8; Wilcher, R., *The Writing of Royalism*, ch. 1; Smuts, *Court Culture*, pp. 82-83.

⁸⁶ Taylor, *Englands Comfort*, p. 8.

being expected to restore religious stability by taking the sword of justice against those schemers and plotters that desired to destroy the House of God, or the established Church. As Loxley has suggested, the problem with such imagery was that it created a 'spatially specific' King with 'limited authority' who could not enforce his will and authority in places where his physical person was absent.⁸⁷ It was an idea which would come to have particular relevance by January 1642, when the King abandoned London.

McElligott has argued that the objective of Royalist newsbooks from 1647 was to gain the support of London citizens by targeting the increasing levels of taxation and trade disruption whilst promulgating the theory that the war had been the product of an anti-monarchical conspiracy led by a minority of disaffected individuals.⁸⁸ In essence, the Royalists' concept was that no division between the King and his people had ever existed, and that Royalism would have been the popular cause during the 1640s. These ideas are precisely what emerge when considering pamphlets such as *Englands Comfort* and *King Charles His Entertainment* as well as the King's speech to the city's Recorder on 25th November, which depict all manner of London citizens eagerly participating in the King's return to the city.⁸⁹ The notion of the people, or the 'main part of the city', both enjoying and being included in the Royal celebration was one which was enthusiastically inclusive.⁹⁰ Charles' statement that he would govern England 'according to the laws of this kingdom, and in maintaining and protecting the true Protestant religion, according as it hath been established in my two famous predecessors' times' was also a concept designed to

⁸⁷ Loxley, *Royalism and Poetry*, p. 70.

⁸⁸ McElligott, J., *Royalism, Print and Censorship in Revolutionary England*, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2007, p. 21 and p. 39.

⁸⁹ Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 201-202.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

place himself at the heart of England's religious, political and social traditions.⁹¹ As in Denham's *Cooper's Hill*, the King was seen to be like a river whose governance and religious course is preferable to the unknown consequences of religious reform, which as Robert Sanderson described, was a

...wild thing, for want of a more proper name commonly called Puritanism, like a sea-breach, runs itself into a thousand channels, and knows not where to stop.⁹²

This was the exact idea which Charles wanted to convey to the population when, on 10th December, a printed Royal response to the Parliamentary order of 8th September finally emerged from the press.⁹³ Furthermore, the Royal reply to the *Grand Remonstrance* on 23rd December elaborated on this moderate image through its claim that

...no Church can be found upon the earth that professteth the true religion with more purity of doctrine than the Church of England doth, nor where the government and discipline are jointly more beautified and free from superstition, than as they are here established by law, which, by the grace of God, we will with constancy maintain (while we live) in their purity and glory, not only against all invasions of Popery, but also from the irreverence of those many schismatics and separatists, wherewith of late this kingdom and this city abounds, to the great dishonour and hazard both of Church and State...⁹⁴

By the winter of 1641, the King had stoutly proclaimed his cause to be the only logical and moderate path towards religious and political settlement. With Parliament having apparently faced public challenges towards its integrity throughout the autumn, and the King positioning himself as the guardian of the established laws and Church in England, Royalism was assuming itself to be a popular cause.

⁹¹ Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 201-202.

⁹² Wilcher, *Writing Royalism*, pp. 82-89. Sanderson is quoted in Aylmer, 'Collective Mentalities', p. 20.

⁹³ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, pp. 752-754.

⁹⁴ Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 234-235.

It is arguably a measure of how great a threat or challenge the imagery produced by Charles and his supporters towards Pym's junto was when we consider the reaction it produced from some pamphleteers. An early sign of this reaction can be seen in the form of the pamphlet, *Peace againe in Sion*, which challenged notions that Charles had been responsible for cementing the peace process between England and Scotland.⁹⁵ Unlike publications such as *Great Britaines time of triumph*, which gave the impression that a true, loyal, or 'Solid' subject would believe the King had restored the peace, *Peace againe in Sion* to an extent displaced Charles' position as peace-bringer. It effectively implied that Parliament, and not the King, had succeeded in reconstructing the relationship between England and Scotland.⁹⁶ With its assertion that Parliament was the 'terror of those which were bad' and 'joy to them which were not blotted nor stained with treachery', *Peace againe in Sion* located the Lords and Commons at the forefront of British interests, or 'great Britaines happinesse'.⁹⁷ Indeed, the use of the words, 'not stained with treachery', implied that only traitors would oppose Parliament, and the last pages of the pamphlet seemed to be a defence of the Houses and their work, reminding readers of how it had always been Parliament which had acted in their interests, with

Godly Priests... restored, Traytors executed... Ship money and Pattents put downe, Universities reformed. Sabbaths better Sanctitised, sporting upon those holy dayes, being quite suppressed, Popish Ceremonies sentenced, persecuted Pastors recalled; no High Commission Court, or Star-chamber admitted...⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *Peace againe in Sion, Or, Heaven Appeased, Man to God Reconciled, England and Scotland United*, London, 1641.

⁹⁶ *Great Britaines Time of Triumph*, p. 1; *Peace Againe in Sion*, p. 1.

⁹⁷ *Peace Againe in Sion*, pp. 3-5.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

With this list of achievements, the author of *Peace againe in Sion* was defining Parliament as the opponent of arbitrary government, although it is important to note that the position of the King remained unclear within the framework of the text. The emphasis in the pamphlet appeared to centre on the notion of a popish plot, with the language of the text appearing to celebrate Parliament's triumph over the 'evil' councillors who had infiltrated the Court. The pamphlet, however, did not appear to have a distinctly anti-Royalist argument, and did not attack the King himself. After all, at the end of *Peace againe in Sion*, the figure of Charles is reinstated as the ruler of a peaceful nation. Rather, the argument of the pamphlet seemed to be that the King functioned as the guarantor of Parliamentary legislation, and that ideally, the King and Parliament should work together, with Parliamentary productivity glorifying majesty.⁹⁹

An image of Parliament, and Pym in particular, as the true protector of England and Protestantism was simultaneously in development with that of the King during the autumn and winter of 1641. Where Charles himself, along with pamphleteers like Taylor, had created the image of a besieged Church of England, Pym's supporters aimed to fashion the idea of an embattled patriotic Parliament fighting Catholicism even before the outbreak of the Irish Rebellion. News of plots to destroy or disrupt the Houses emerged from the press to create the sense that Parliament was at the forefront of a by-then traditional English war against popery. As with *Peace againe in Sion*, the anonymous pamphlet *A Damnable Treason, By a Contagious Plaster of a Plague Sore* defined hostility to Parliament as an attack on the country itself, and this was an idea which held particular resonance in January

⁹⁹ *Peace Againe in Sion*, p. 6.

1642.¹⁰⁰ In this pamphlet, which told of an attempt to infect Pym with plague, Pym is ascribed characteristics reminiscent of Elizabethan heroes. As with individuals like Drake, the author anticipated Pym to become a celebrated man in English history.¹⁰¹ The legendary strength of Elizabethan Protestantism was invoked in the text through the author's description of how Elizabeth's statue at Ludgate towered over any potential popish plotters, and this historical Protestant heroic context appears to have been used by the author to develop Pym's character.¹⁰² In a sense the scurrilous concept of 'King Pym' has been extended and reinterpreted by the author, so that like Charles' protestation to defend the Church with his life, Pym is revealed to have the potential to be a martyr-like and patriotic figure who considers his own 'dearest Blood' to be 'no price, to buy his Countries good'.¹⁰³ There is an assumption in the pamphlet that the conspirator is a papist. The use of a plague sore, and the failed plotter's own sickness, was taken by the pamphlet's author to be indicative of the corrupt nature of Catholicism which sought to infect the 'choyest Plants' in England's Eden, or Parliament.¹⁰⁴

The outbreak of the Irish Rebellion, with its leaders claiming to be acting under the King's direction, provided Pym and his supporters with proof that a Popish Plot existed, and reinforced the projection of Parliament as the chief opponent of Catholicism.¹⁰⁵ As Lindley has shown, news of the Irish Rebellion created a climate of fear in England, with various counties petitioning Parliament to put the country into a

¹⁰⁰ *A Damnable Treason, by a Contagious Plaster of a Plague Sore*, London, 1641.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1. This attempt to kill Pym is mentioned in Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, p. 37.

¹⁰² The Ludgate statue of Elizabeth is now situated at St. Dunstan's Church in Fleet Street, Brayley, E.W., *Londiniana; Or, Reminiscences of the British Metropolis*, London, Hurst, Chance and Co., 1829, Vol. II, pp. 177-178.

¹⁰³ *A Damnable Treason*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Dunlop, R., 'The Forged Commission of 1641', in *English Historical Review: Notes and Documents*, 1887; Lindley, K., 'The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641-5', in *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 70, September 1972.

state of defence.¹⁰⁶ Numerous pamphlets gave the impression that Parliament was on the frontline of the war against popery, and it was intimated in some pamphlets that the survival of England was directly related to the existence of Parliament. The failure of popish plotters to destroy or undermine Parliament was regarded as being 'Englands Deliverance' from annihilation, thereby rivalling the King's image and credibility as England's guardian.¹⁰⁷ With the Irish rebels under Sir Phelim O'Neil declaring themselves to be operating under a Royal Commission, Charles appeared to be acting against the interests of the country.¹⁰⁸

By November 1641, authorities across England had begun to make some form of defensive preparations in anticipation of Catholic uprisings, with town watches being either formed or doubled whilst local militias were put in readiness.¹⁰⁹ The King's calls for Parliament to discharge the Trained Bands clashed with reports which demonstrated the necessity for local militias to remain on standby. The pamphlet, *A Royall Message From the Kings most Excellent Majestie*, informed readers of the King's desire for the Trained Bands to be disbanded before telling of how a skirmish had been fought on 20th November between the militiamen of Chester and a group of popish plotters.¹¹⁰ By implication, the King was shown to be detached from reality. His order for the Trained Bands to be discharged was indirectly suggested to risk

¹⁰⁶ Lindley, 'Impact of the 1641 Rebellion', pp. 150-155.

¹⁰⁷ *A Discovery of a Horrible and Bloody Treason and Conspiracie: Against the Protestants of this Kingdome in Generall, but Especially Against Divers of the Nobility, and Many of the Honourable House of Commons in Parliament, and also Against Some of the Citizens of London*, London, 1641; *A New Plot against the Parliament. Englands Deliverance. Or a True and Great Discoverie of a Horrible and Bloudy Treason and Conspiracie*, London, 1641.

¹⁰⁸ *The Petition and Declaration of Sir Sir Philom Oneal Knight, Generall of Ireland, to the High Court of Parliament Now Assembled in England, and the Lords and Nobility Commanders of the Army of the Catholicks of Ireland*, London, 1641; *The Heads of Severall Proceedings in this Present Parliament*, 22nd-29th November, London, 1641, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁹ E.g., C.R.O. A/B/2 Orders 520-540; G.R.O. GBR B2, f. 24.

¹¹⁰ Starkey, H., *A Royall Message from the Kings Most Excellent Majestie to the Honourable Houses of Parliament. With the Answer of the House of Commons Concerning the Said Message. Likewise the True Relation of a Bloody Conspiracy by the Papists in Cheshire. Intended for the Destruction of the Whole Countrey*, London, 1641; *Heads of Severall Proceedings*, p. 6.

exposing English Protestants to militant Catholicism, whilst Parliament's desire for the Trained Bands to remain on duty seemed to reflect a concern for the survival of 'poore England' and its people.¹¹¹ *A Royall Message*, as with the *Grand Remonstrance*, thus seems to have been designed to express Parliamentary virtue.¹¹² Despite the moderate Royal reply to the *Grand Remonstrance* on 23rd December which aligned Charles with English law and Protestantism, the King's actions during late December and January fuelled beliefs that the British Isles were being subjected to a militant popish conspiracy.¹¹³

Strier has pointed out that the authors of the *Grand Remonstrance* sought to demonstrate that they were working to protect the laws of the realm, with conservative words, such as 'preserve', being incorporated into the document in order to distinguish Parliament from any concept of 'innovation'.¹¹⁴ Contrary to his own assertions, and those of pamphleteers like Taylor, in London it was Charles who began to emerge as the nucleus of disorder over the winter of 1641 to 1642, as soldiers and swordsmen gravitated towards the court.¹¹⁵ The King's removal of Sir William Balfour and the appointment of Colonel Thomas Lunsford as the new Lieutenant of the Tower on 22nd December did little to assuage growing anxieties that the city would be subjected to a popish rising.¹¹⁶ By the time of his appointment, Lunsford already had an unsavoury public reputation, and seems to have replaced

¹¹¹ Starkey, *A Royall Message*, p. 4.

¹¹² Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, pp. 424-429; Raymond, *Invention*, p. 122; Strier, R., 'From Diagnosis to Operation', in Smith, Strier and Bevington, *The Theatrical City*, esp. pp. 234-239.

¹¹³ Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 233-236.

¹¹⁴ Strier, 'Diagnosis to Operation', pp. 238-239.

¹¹⁵ Porter, S., 'Introduction', in Porter, S., (ed.), *London and the Civil War*, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 2-3.

¹¹⁶ *ODNB; Dvyrnal Occvrrnces: Or The Heads of Severall Proceedings in Both Houses of Parliament*, 20th-27th December, London, 1641, pp. 4-5; Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, IV, p. 133.

Suckling as an archetypal swordsman of the court.¹¹⁷ Rumours of an imminent papist attack on London over the Christmas period were circulating by the start of December, and in the wake of an attempt to station a guard of 200 men around Westminster without Parliament's consent, the appointment of a known 'shedder of blood' and allegedly popish figure over the Tower made London citizens increasingly fearful for their safety.¹¹⁸ With no small encouragement from Pym, it was believed that Lunsford would initiate a popish rising or attack on London by bombarding the city with ordnance from the Tower, and on 23rd December a petition was received in the Commons for the removal of the man whom Nehemiah Wallington called the 'wicked bloody Coranel Lounsee'.¹¹⁹ Even though Charles replaced Lunsford with Sir John Byron on 26th December, the infamous colonel remained a prominent figure in the public eye, and continued to be regarded as proof that the court was still being controlled, or at least influenced, by militant papists.¹²⁰ As Fletcher points out, the displays of alliance between King and alderman, and the expectation that order would be restored; a theme which had been so anticipated in *King Charles His Entertainment*, were quickly dying by December 1641.¹²¹

Anti-episcopal riots broke out at Westminster on 27th December, and continued for three days. On the second day of the rioting, a royal proclamation was

¹¹⁷ ODNB; Newman, P., *Royalist Officers in England and Wales: A Biographical Dictionary*, New York, Garland, 1981, p. 72; *A Bloody Masacre Plotted by the Papists Intended First Against the City of London, and Consequently Against the Whole Land*, London, 1641, p. 3. The difference between Suckling and Lunsford was that, whereas the former had to an extent become the subject of lampoons, the latter was regarded by Parliament as a decidedly sinister character.

¹¹⁸ *Bloody Masacre*, pp. 1-5; Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, pp. 263-265.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3; *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 353-355; Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, pp. 346-347; ODNB; Booy, D., (ed.), *The Notebooks of Nehemiah Wallington, 1618-1654*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 133. This was not the first case of Londoners fearing that Charles' officers would use arms and ordnance from the Tower to control the city, as in September 1640 it was feared that Cottington would try to use force to subdue the population, Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, p. 28.

¹²⁰ Fletcher, *Outbreak*, p. 170. On 24th December, the Commons voted Lunsford to be unsuitable for the office of Lieutenant of the Tower.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 171; Ashton, R., 'Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Inaction: Three Phases in the Role of the City in the Great Rebellion', in Porter, *London and the Civil War*, pp. 50-51.

issued which ruled against the riots and demonstrations in the city, stating that action would be taken against those involved.¹²² Charles also wrote to the Lord Mayor, asking him to use men from the Trained Bands to suppress the rioters with lethal force if necessary.¹²³ Throughout this turmoil Lunsford was seen to preside over attempts to suppress the demonstrations of reputedly unarmed London apprentices with 'great violence'.¹²⁴ The fact that such characters, with Royal approval, were seen actively fighting those opposed to episcopacy gave further credence to the belief that the court was still falling under the control or influence of alleged papists. It was a sign of how Parliament's patriotic image had improved at the expense of the King's credibility when Pym reported from the committee for examining Lord Viscount Dillon that 'most of the officers heere are more faithfull to the Parliament of England then to the King'.¹²⁵ It is noticeable that the wording in this instance conjoined Parliament with England to produce an impression that the Houses were married to the interests of the country. The King, with his popish swordsmen, was thus implied to be divorced from his principal kingdom, especially when there was a possibility that he would physically attack Parliament.¹²⁶

The implications of the actions and images which associated the court with seemingly militant individuals were further emphasised by the King's attempt to arrest the Five Members on 4th January 1642. The growth of an armed cadre, now referred to as Cavaliers, at court had clearly been noticed by the start of January.¹²⁷ In the newsbooks such as *Diurnall Occurrences In Parliament*, for example, it was noted

¹²² Larkin, *Proclamations*, pp. 755-756.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 756.

¹²⁴ *Bloody Masacre*, p. 4; Booy, *Notebooks of Wallington*, pp. 133-134.

¹²⁵ Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, p. 351.

¹²⁶ Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, p. 351. On 30th December, Pym moved that a plot was afoot to destroy the House of Commons, and that they should withdraw to Guildhall.

¹²⁷ *Diurnall Occurrences in Parliament*, 2nd-10th January, London, 1642, p. 1; Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, p. 367.

that 'Delinquents are much countenanced at Court'.¹²⁸ Figures such as Lunsford were once again brought to the attention of the public as the King tried to decisively halt the motions being instigated in the Commons. Although Russell has argued that Charles' case against the Five Members was not without some legal weight, the King's physical presence with an armed guard at Parliament discredited his image as a moderate ruler who upheld the law.¹²⁹ Whereas before January 1642 Pym, along with various pamphleteers, had only been claiming that there was a popish design to destroy the Commons, the events of 4th January actually seemed to confirm their theories.¹³⁰ The King was publicly seen to have violated a legal space, with the result that MPs like Pym could be presented as the chief opponents of militant popery, and could then be considered to be paramount to the survival of Protestant England. The attempted arrest was seized on by many pamphleteers as conclusive proof that a popish plot was afoot, and by 18th January letters allegedly written to Lunsford which incriminated him of being a popish conspirator emerged from the press.¹³¹ It was also historicised within the context of the European Protestant struggle against Catholicism. One pamphlet, described as a 'VWarning peece for London', was published, and appears to have compared 4th January with the oppression of Protestants on the continent by reminding readers of the French Huguenots who were massacred by 'Papists and Cavileers' on St. Bartholomew's Day in 1572, along with the Spanish Armada of 1588 and Gunpowder Plot of 1605.¹³² As Wallington

¹²⁸ *Diurnall Occurrences*, 2nd-10th January, p. 1.

¹²⁹ Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, p. 448.

¹³⁰ Coates, *Journal of Simonds D'Ewes*, pp. 367-368; *Discovery of a Horrible and Bloody Treason; A New Plot Against the Parliament*.

¹³¹ *A Remonstrance of the Present State of Things in and about the City, since the King and Queenes Departure to Hampton Court*, London, 1642, pp. 1-2.

¹³² *A VWarning Peece for London Being a True Relation of the Bloody Massacre of the Protestants in Paris*, London, 1642; *A Terrible Plot Against London and VWestminster Discovered*, London, 1642, p. 5; *The Iesvites Plot Discovered Intended Against the Parliament and City of London Very Lately*, London, 1642, p. 1.

recorded, the failure of Charles' coup in January was regarded as a 'grate deliverance' from popery for England and the 'deere sarvants of God'.¹³³ The impression thus given in the press was such that Parliament did not appear to be the source of political and legal radicalism, since it was shown to be the victim of an arbitrary act by a King surrounded with foreign, popish councillors. A Declaration and Protestation was issued by the Commons which cleverly manipulated conservative language in order to suggest Parliament was the centre of moderate government. Definitions of religious reform and established religion were blurred, so that Parliament stood for the 'true reformed protestant Religion in his Majesties Dominions, established'.¹³⁴ The Protestation, too, bound its subscribers to defend 'the true Protestant Religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England', thus making a distinction between Parliament and seemingly popish figures at court.¹³⁵ Moreover, the legacy of Charles' personal rule was rekindled in the Declaration, so that readers were reminded of how

The long intermission, and unhappy breach of Parliaments hath occasioned many illegal Taxations, whereupon the Subject hath bin prosecuted: and grieved, and divers Innovations and superstitions have bin brought into the Church...¹³⁶

By implication, therefore, the Declaration was stating that arbitrary rule would re-emerge in England in the event of a successful plot to destroy Parliament, and the royal proclamation which called for the apprehension of the Five Members was

¹³³ Booy, *Notebooks of Nehemiah Wallington*, p. 136.

¹³⁴ *Declaration or Discovery*, p. 4.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

dismissed by the Commons on the grounds that it ran contrary to the interests of the Commonwealth.¹³⁷

Contrary to the image which had been propounded by the King and pamphleteers like Taylor that the monarch was the guardian of English interests and identity, as manifested through the established Church, the events of January 1642 seemed to align Charles with destructive foreign forces. Roberts has suggested that the memory of the King's efforts to recruit foreign mercenaries, including the Irish, during the Bishops' Wars remained lodged in the minds of the population, and this was important in efforts to show how the King's actions posed a wider threat to the country.¹³⁸ Those involved in the attempt to arrest the Five Members were thus identified as a hostile alien force in Protestant London. They were categorised as belonging to a subversive 'malignant party', also referred to as 'Iesvites', which constantly plotted for the 'ruin of the whole Nation'.¹³⁹ With a Catholic rebellion still raging in Ireland, the attempt to arrest MPs simply gave anti-court pamphleteers the opportunity to argue that London and Parliament were dependant upon one another, and that the survival of Protestant England could only be ensured through the continuing work of the Lords and Commons. The image of the King's political cause was therefore instantly tarnished with what appeared to be Catholic militancy, as Clarendon recalled how 'great a change' had occurred in peoples' attitudes towards the King and Parliament after 4th January, with the result that

They, who had before even lost their spirits, having lost their credit and reputation... now again recovered greater courage then ever, and quickly found that their credit and reputation was as great as ever it had been; the court being reduced to a

¹³⁷ Larkin, *Proclamations*, pp. 757-758; *Declaration or Discovery*, pp. 7-8; Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 237-241.

¹³⁸ Roberts, K., 'Citizen Soldiers: The Military Power of London', in Porter, *London and the Civil War*, pp. 101-102; Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, pp. 462-463.

¹³⁹ *Declaration or Discovery*, p. 8; *The Ievites Plot*.

lower condition, and to more disesteem and neglect, than ever it had undergone. All that they had formerly said of plots and conspiracies against the parliament, which had before been laughed at, was now thought true and real...¹⁴⁰

It was an impression shared also by the Venetian Ambassador, who believed that Pym's junto had 'redeemed their credit generally and won back the affection of an ignorant people', and on the night of 6th January popular fears that the King's armed cadre would assault London brought Parliament and the city closer together.¹⁴¹

Wallington's recollection of that night suggests that a common cause or interest, which centred on a conviction that militant Catholicism had infiltrated the court with the intention of destroying Protestant England, had effectively been established between Parliament and the city, with Trained Bandsmen and civilians being ready to respond to a popish uprising.¹⁴²

The events of 4th January clearly struck a chord with inhabitants from many other counties. The image of Parliament being assaulted by armed papists coincided with a series of county petitions which called for the maintenance of Parliamentary privileges along with the execution of defensive preparations throughout the country.¹⁴³ Judging by the wording of some petitions, it seems that Parliament was perceived to be taking 'great care of Church and Common-wealth', whilst during the weeks following 4th January the image of Charles and his followers was further damaged.¹⁴⁴ Although a royal Proclamation calling for a fast on behalf of the 'lamentable and distressed estate of His good Subjects in His Majesties Kingdom of

¹⁴⁰ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, p. 151.

¹⁴¹ Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, Vol. II, p. 165; Booy, *Notebooks of Nehemiah Wallington*, pp. 138-139.

¹⁴² Booy, *Notebooks of Nehemiah Wallington*, pp. 138-139.

¹⁴³ Coates, W.H., Young, A.S., Snow, V.F., (eds.), *The Private Journals of the Long Parliament*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982, Vol. I, pp. 145-166; *A Perfect Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament*, 24th-31st January, London, 1642, p. 1; *The True Diurnal Occurrances or, The heads of the Proceedings in Parliament*, 31st January-7th February, London 1642, p. 7 and 7th-14th February, pp. 3-5.

¹⁴⁴ *A Continuation of the True Diurnall of Passages in Parliament*, No. 6, 14th-21st February, London, 1642, pp. 2-3.

Ireland' was issued on 8th January, suspicions about Charles' connection with popery continued to emanate from the press.¹⁴⁵ Along with the Bishops' Exclusion Bill, control of the militia had become a priority in Parliamentary proceedings by the start of 1642.¹⁴⁶ Substantial coverage of the Militia Bill was given in numerous London newsbooks, with the proposed legislation being presented as one of the 'remedies' for the 'evils and distempers of the Kingdom'.¹⁴⁷ The image of a beleaguered Protestant British Isles, exemplified by the arrest of the Five Members, was incorporated into the coverage of the Bill's progress in both Houses, and on 26th February reports that the Pope was preparing a crusade against Protestant Ireland appeared in the press.¹⁴⁸

Russell has suggested that after January 1642, Parliament was effectively waiting for the King to provoke a civil war, but that the series of proclamations issued by both Charles and Parliament were 'useless' and 'unsatisfactory' in gaining public support.¹⁴⁹ However, the coverage of political developments in various London newsbooks and pamphlets appears to have left little textual space in which Parliamentary proceedings could be subjected to detailed analysis and interpretation as the King's previous portrayal as the guardian of England was eroded. In the face of a supposed popish plot to destroy Protestant England, Charles' refusal to consent to the Militia Ordinance was said to be a reckless act of 'dangerous consequence' which would

hazard the peace and safety of all his Majesties Kingdoms,
unlesse some speedy remedy bee applied by the
Parliament...¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Larkin, *Proclamations*, pp. 759-760.

¹⁴⁶ *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 404-406, pp. 414-415; *Lords Journal*, Vol. IV, pp. 568-571

¹⁴⁷ E.g. *Continuation of the True Diurnall*, No. 6, 14th-21st February, p. 2; *Perfect Diurnall*, 21st-28th February.

¹⁴⁸ *Perfect Diurnall*, 21st-28th February, p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, pp. 462-479.

¹⁵⁰ *Perfect Diurnall*, 28th February-7th March, p. 2.

Despite the shadow cast over the King through December and January, he was not without some form of support in the London press at this point in time. A royal proclamation or order against 'seditious books' appears to have been issued by 6th January, but as Raymond points out no Parliamentary action was taken against the printing of books until it seemed that sympathies for the King were beginning to emerge from some London presses.¹⁵¹ The Commons appear to have objected specifically to Robert Wood's *A Continuation of the true Diurnall of Proceedings in Parliament* dated 14th to 21st March. Raymond points to the fact that in this issue Wood gave publicity to Charles' response to Parliament's proposals concerning the militia, and consequently cast doubt over the legality of Parliamentary proceedings.¹⁵² It is apparent, though, that Wood's newsbook was focusing on the King's responses slightly earlier, with Charles' speech at Newmarket on 9th March dominating the closing pages of one issue.¹⁵³ As in the previous autumn, Charles was attempting to cast himself as a moderate figure. His speech asked Parliament a series of rhetorical questions which, in the context of Wood's newsbook, encouraged readers to think that Parliament was destabilising the country with its ambitions to seize power for itself.¹⁵⁴ Such an assertion certainly seems to have won some favour among some individuals at this stage, with one Colonel Edmonds being alleged to have stated that he hoped the King would 'display his Banners' against Parliament.¹⁵⁵ Similar sentiments were supposedly shared by others, such as one Dr. Showberry of

¹⁵¹ HMC, *5th Report*, p. 3; *The True Diurnall Occvrrances or, The Heads of the Proceedings in Parliament*, pp. 6-7; Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 12-14, pp. 137-140. It is also worth noting that these proposals seem to have emerged after the printing of Sir Edward Dering's speeches, *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, p. 414.

¹⁵² Raymond, *Invention*, pp. 138-139. There also appear to have been other newsbooks or pamphlets which Parliament took offence at, as *Perfect Diurnall*, 14th-21st March, p. 8, mentions a pamphlet entitled 'A Relation of some passages that happened the ninth of March between the Kings Majesty and the Committee of Both Houses, when the Declaration was delivered'.

¹⁵³ *Continuation of the True Diurnall*, No. 9, 7th-14th March, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Perfect Diurnall*, 7th-14th March, p. 3; *Continuation of the True Diurnall*, No. 10, 14th-21st March, p. 5.

Cambridge who was reported to have said on 15th March that ‘if hee could meet with King Pym, hee would tell him that hee was a Rascall, and he would cut his throat and sinnewes’.¹⁵⁶ There was also a case of a certain Mr. Lee in Gloucestershire who uttered ‘most vile words against the Parliament’, whilst in London a Dr. Howell was said to have outlined in public the threat posed to Charles and the rule of law by the ‘company of giddy heads’ in the Commons.¹⁵⁷ The following month, Nathaniel Fiennes told of an individual in Bromsgrove who had openly stated that he ‘cared not a fart for the Parliament’s orders’, since in his view the Houses were a ‘company of asses’ bent on creating division between the King and his subjects.¹⁵⁸

In spite of these few instances of popular Royalism, the justice of the King’s cause remained dubious in the press as the integrity of Charles himself was questioned. The memory of 4th January was still very much alive by March, with Pym continuing to press on the theory that the King was connected with papists. On 16th March the Commons voted that the King’s absence ‘so far remote from his Parliament, is not only an Obstruction, but may be a Destruction to the affairs of *Ireland*’, and this resolution appeared in *A Perfect Diurnall*.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Charles and his followers were increasingly being shown to be the destructive movement in England and Ireland, as Pym’s inference that the King had issued passes for Catholics wanting to enter Ireland in support of their rebellious colleagues also found its way into newsbooks.¹⁶⁰ Far from being the representative and guardian of the ‘true Protestant profession’, Charles was again being associated with militant popery.¹⁶¹ It was an association

¹⁵⁶ *A True Diurnall of the Passages in Parliament*, No. 10, 14th-21st March, p. 2; *Perfect Diurnall*, 14th-21st March, p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ *True Diurnall*, No. 10, 14th-21st March, p. 8; *Perfect Diurnall*, 14th-21st March, p. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Cited in Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, p. 371.

¹⁵⁹ *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 480-482; *Perfect Diurnall*, No. 10, 14th-21st March, p. 6.

¹⁶⁰ *Perfect Diurnall*, No. 10, 14th-21st March, p. 2; No. 11, 21st-28th March, p. 5.

¹⁶¹ *Continuation of the True Diurnall*, 7th-14th March, pp. 7-8.

which would be manipulated and emphasised with the King's attempt to seize Hull in April.

Within days of his failed January coup both Charles and Parliament had begun making moves for the securing of Hull, a city which held the country's second largest weapons magazine.¹⁶² In Hull itself, the attempt to arrest the Five Members had caused alarm, resulting in a series of security measures being initiated in the city.¹⁶³ Although neither the King's appointed governor, the Earl of Newcastle, nor Parliament's, Sir John Hotham, could initially gain control of Hull, it seems that fear of Parliamentary power ultimately swayed the town in yielding to Hotham by 24th January.¹⁶⁴ As Clarendon observed, the move on Hull undermined whatever support the King was gaining.¹⁶⁵ In much of the printed discourse, Charles continued to be associated with aggressive foreign powers.¹⁶⁶ Reports of an invasion directed against Hull by a coalition army of French and Dutch in support of Charles appeared in *A Perfect Diurnall* on 21st March.¹⁶⁷ Charles' attempt to seize Hull certainly did little to improve Royalism's relationship with English interests and actually provided the King's opponents with ample opportunity to build on the fearful imagery created by the January coup. Parliamentary orders and declarations which asserted that those accompanying the King were a 'malignant party' of papists were printed.¹⁶⁸ Regardless of his own accusation of treason against Hotham, it was the King who was

¹⁶² Ryder, I.E., 'The Seizure of Hull and its Magazine January 1642', in *The Yorkshire Archaeological Journal*, Vol. 61, 1989, p. 139.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁶⁴ *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, p. 371; Morrill, J., *Revolt in the Provinces: The People of England and the Tragedies of War 1630-1648*, Longman, London and New York, (1976), 2nd ed., 1999, pp. 67-68; Ryder, 'Seizure of Hull', p. 143.

¹⁶⁵ Clarendon, *History of the Great Rebellion*, p. 156.

¹⁶⁶ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, pp. 763-764.

¹⁶⁷ *Perfect Diurnall*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶⁸ *The Declaration and Severall Votes of Both Houses of Parliament*, London, 1642, pp. 2-3.

continuing to be shown acting outside of the law, and in *The Declaration And Severall Votes* it was pointedly asserted that Charles' actions at Hull were

A great Infringment of the Liberty of the Subiect, and the Law of the Land, which his Majesty had so often lately professed should be the rule to governe by...¹⁶⁹

By implication, then, Parliament was suggesting that the King could not be trusted to rule legally, and was thus proclaiming itself to be the true guardian of the law. It was a message which was repeated in other pamphlets, such as *Five remarkable passages which have very lately happened betweene His Maiestie, And the High Court of Parliament*.¹⁷⁰

Malcolm has argued that during the spring and early summer of 1642, Parliament was more successful in aligning itself with local defence concerns and initiatives, whereas the Royalists appeared to exist outside such initiatives.¹⁷¹ Charles' solution to the Militia Ordinance, the Commission of Array, was an outdated and seemingly alien piece of legislation written in Latin, and thus particularly vulnerable to false and deliberately misleading translations by Parliament's supporters.¹⁷² Various newsbook and pamphlet writers pursued a similar strategy. Charles may have been continuing to assert that he was the genuine guarantor of the law, but in many London newsbooks he appeared to be the aggressor towards Parliament and local interests.¹⁷³ A newsbook which ran for only one issue, *Remarkable Occurrences From The High Court of Parliament*, informed readers on its

¹⁶⁹ *Declaration and Severall Votes*, p. 7.

¹⁷⁰ *Five Remarkable Passages, Which Have Very Lately Happened Betweene His Maiestie, and the High Court of Parliament*, London, 1642.

¹⁷¹ Malcolm, J.L., *Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King Charles 1642-1646*, London, Royal Historical Society, 1983, pp. 19-24.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*; Hutton, R., *The Royalist War Effort 1642-1646*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003, chs. 1-2; Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, pp. 777-781.

¹⁷³ *The Answer of Both Houses of Parliament, Presented to His Majestie at York, the Ninth of May, 1642. To Two Messages Sent to Them from His Majestie, Concerning Sir John Hothams Refusall to Give His Majestie Entrance into His Town of Hull. With His Majesties Reply Thereunto*, London, 1642.

title page of 'His Majesties raising of Warre' and of 'His Majesties intentions to raise warre against the Parliament'.¹⁷⁴ This image of a warmongering King also appeared in *Some Speciall Passages*, whilst in *Diurnall Occurrences In Parliament* and *Remarkable Passages In Parliament* reports emerged of foreign military commanders arriving in England.¹⁷⁵ If Charles had hoped that the inclusion of the Elector Palatine in his effort to secure Hull would boost his own Protestant credentials, then clearly he failed as his party of supporters were simply cast as foreign invaders.¹⁷⁶

Attention continued to focus on Hull throughout the summer as the King's cause was increasingly portrayed as the force of disorder in contrast to a Parliament which was projected as an institution committed to the 'peace and quiet of the Kingdome'.¹⁷⁷ One pamphleteer even went so far as to directly associate the King's physical presence with the growing turmoil, saying that 'Since his Majesties going downe to *Yorke*, many troubles and discontents have molested that part of the Kingdome'.¹⁷⁸ The idea of the King as the guarantor of social and political stability, which had been celebrated by Taylor in November 1641, was therefore being deconstructed. As the *Grand Remonstrance* had stated that the wars of 1639 and 1640 were the product of a Catholic conspiracy, so London newsbooks in the spring and summer of 1642 claimed the King's attempt to seize Hull was the result of 'seditious and tumultuous spirits', who unlike Parliament were

¹⁷⁴ *Remarkable Occurrences from the High Court of Parliament*, 16th-23rd May, London, 1642, p.1.

¹⁷⁵ *Some Speciall Passages from London, Westminster, Yorke Hull, Ireland and Other Partes*, 24th May -2nd June, London, 1642, pp. 6-8; *Diurnall Occurrences*, 30th May-6th June, p. 8; *Remarkable Passages in Parliament*, 30th May-6th June, London, 1642, p. 8. Ultimately it would be Prince Rupert's arrival in August which would further boost Parliamentary claims that the Royalist cause consisted of foreigners. In February 1642, Prince Rupert arrived at Dover. He was, however, advised to return to the continent at this stage, due to the King's delicate political position, *ODNB*.

¹⁷⁶ Wedgewood, C.V., *The King's War: 1641-1647*, London, Book Club Associates, (1958), 1974, pp. 88-89.

¹⁷⁷ *A New Plot Against Hull*, London, 1642, p. 2; *Horrible Newes from Yorke, Hull, and Newcastle*, London, 1642.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

rather stirred up by fury then judgment and led on rather by discontent and faction, then by affection either to their King and Countrey...¹⁷⁹

This was a statement that placed Parliament at the centre of local and national defence initiatives and, with the King's strategy of returning to besiege Hull once again in July, was one which seemed to gain currency. In *A Declaration Of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, For the preservation and safety of the Kingdom, and the Town of Hvll*, Parliament capitalised on Charles' overt aggression towards Hull, and was again able to style itself as the champion of local and national interests.¹⁸⁰ Hotham's refusal to submit to the King's forces was shown to be bound to Parliament's professed commitment to 'the glory of our Nation', or the 'true Protestant Religion'.¹⁸¹ As with the attempt on the Five Members in January and the operation to seize Hull in April, Charles was effectively charged with deliberately levying war against an institution which sought 'peace and purity'.¹⁸² Furthermore, Royal claims to uphold the law were called into question, as the Parliamentary declaration reminded readers that

His Majestie hath frequently promised and published to the Kingdom; and in particular to the County of *York*, with solemne protestations that He would not, nor had it entered His thoughts to make war against His Parliament... But however those promises and protestations have been no sooner made, but broken, and our hope of peace and safety thereby wholly disappointed...¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ *More Newes From Hvll. Or, A Most Happy and Fortunate Prevention, of a Most Hellish and Divelish Plot, Occasioned by Some Unquiet and Discontented Spirits, Against the Town of Hull*, London, 1642, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸⁰ *A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, for the Preservation and Safety of the Kingdom, and Town of Hvll*, London, 1642.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁸² *Declaration of the Lords and Commons*, p. 4.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

In legal, textual and linguistic terms, therefore, it was implied that the King and his cause lacked meaning and substance. By definition, then, Parliament was professing itself to be the guarantor of the law and national interests, and this was supported by one Peter Bland, who compiled a detailed essay which asserted the legitimacy of the Militia Ordinance.¹⁸⁴ Any ideas that service to Protestant England could be defined in terms of obedience to the King's person only were similarly trounced in *A Declaration Of Sir Iohn Hothams Proceedings At Hvll*.¹⁸⁵

The issue of Charles' legal right to have access to Hull was one which, despite their profession of loyalty and assistance to the King, was sidestepped in the printed response of the Yorkshire gentry.¹⁸⁶ In Herefordshire, though, Parliament's dubious legal position, or the 'new unheard of State Law', was apparently a factor in determining their loyalty to the King, whom they believed could heal political and legal wounds.¹⁸⁷ In effect, Hull came to symbolize Parliamentary illegality over Royal lawfulness, as Dr. Rogers

...compared the taking away of the magazine at Hull to a man robbing by the highway pretending he did it to give to the poor...¹⁸⁸

Similarly in Kent, the struggle over Hull was a key feature in their declaration of support for the King.¹⁸⁹ In Kent's case, the petition debunked Parliamentary assertions that a popish plot was afoot, and that foreign enemies were entering

¹⁸⁴ Bland, P., *Resolved Vpon the Question. Or A Question Resolved Concerning the Right which the King Hath to Hull, or Any Other Fort or Place of Strength for the Defence of the Kingdome*, London, 1642.

¹⁸⁵ *A Declaration of Sir Iohn Hothams Proceedings at Hvll*, London, 1642.

¹⁸⁶ *His Maiesties Demands to the Gentry of York-shire, Concerning the Towne of Hvll, Answered by Two Severall Parties*, London, 1642.

¹⁸⁷ *A Declaration, or Resolution of the Countie of Hereford*, London, 1642.

¹⁸⁸ HMC, *Portland*, III, pp.87-89.

¹⁸⁹ *The Humble Petition of the Commons of Kent, Agreed Upon at Their Generall Assizes, Presented to His Majesie the First of August*, London, 1642, pp. 4-5; Woods, T.P.S., *Prelude to Civil War: Mr. Justice Malet and the Kentish Petitions*, Wilton, Salisbury, 1980, ch. 8, app. V.

England.¹⁹⁰ Undoubtedly, however, the most potent printed Royalist document was the King's response to the Nineteen Propositions. What this document was almost certainly intended to do was revise the image of Charles, and indeed those around him, so that he was essentially remodelled as a genuinely constitutional monarch. Displacement and erosion of the King's traditional authority equated to an invasion of the subject's liberty and property by those 'intoxicated' with powers beyond their legally and socially defined station. After all, if even the education of the King's own children could be interfered with and invaded by Parliament, then what were the implications for the rest of the population? Arbitrary and unlawful power was thus shown to reside with Parliament, whose 'bottomlesse' demands, it was claimed, would lead to the 'total Subversion of the Fundamentall Laws, and that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom'.¹⁹¹ Charles was therefore supposed to represent and uphold the laws of England, and his actions were not those of a tyrannical ruler, but those of a monarch concerned with the preservation of secure and stable government.

Yet for all of the rhetoric contained in *His Maiesties Ansever To The XIX Propositions*, the fact remained that it was Charles who could be seen to be trying to gather armed forces. Charles' supporters became a definable stereotypical force known as the lawless 'Cavileers' who plotted for the destruction of English settlements, and the siege of Hull in July was used as proof of this.¹⁹² Chapter Seven

¹⁹⁰ *Humble Petition of Kent*, pp.4-5.

¹⁹¹ *His Maiesties Ansvver to the XIX Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament*, London, 1642, pp. 9-11.

¹⁹² *The State of the Whole Kingdom: Concerning His Majestie and the Parliament, Betweene, London, Yorke, and Hull*, London, 1642, p. 4; *Declaration of Sir Iohn Hothams*, p. 5; *An Abstract of Severall Letters from Hull, York, and Beverly, of His Majesties Proceedings.*, London, 1642, p. 1; *Horrible Newes from Hvll. Wherein is Declared How the Kings Majesty, Attended by the Prince and 400 Horsemen, and 700 Footmen are Gone to Besiege Hvll*, London, 1642, p. 6; *Strange Newes from Yorke, Hull, Beverley, and Manchester. Or A Continuation of the Proceedings Passages, and Matters of Consequence that Hath Passed this Last Weeke in His Maiesties Army Before Hull, with Some Occurrences from York During the Kings Absence*, London, 1642, esp. pp. 5-6.

will explore this stereotype further, but the point here is that the King's image in the response to the Nineteen Propositions seemingly conflicted with his actions. Despite the efforts made in Royalist print to fashion an identity for the King which asserted his position as a guardian of English law, by the summer of 1642 there was an overwhelming number of pamphlets which presented Royalism and Royalists as a subversive force which threatened Protestant England. The King's actions, especially the attempt to arrest the Five Members and the marches on Hull in April and July, made the Royal image particularly vulnerable, and fuelled Pym's popish plot theory, thus giving rise to popular anti-Royalist stereotyping.

This chapter has attempted to show that the period between the end of the Bishops' Wars and the outbreak of the 1642 to 1646 war was marked by a struggle over English identity. An examination of the printed material published during this period indicates that Royalist actions, along with Charles' ill-judged decisions, helped establish the foundations for the negative Cavalier stereotype that would so plague the Royalists' image in later years. Far from being the upholders of English law, the King's supporters came to be represented as the disturbers of peace. Their noticeable presence in both the textual and physical sense exposed them to accusations of foreignness, with the concept of the popish plotter essentially becoming so malleable that Royalists could easily be linked to the militant Catholics in Ireland and the continent. As such, Royalists came to be defined in much the same way as the Catholic enemies of Elizabethan England had been, whilst Parliament emerged as the champion and defender of England.

One aspect of the months between 1641 and 1642 is that the King's supporters were unable to establish and exert substantial control over textual space. Whereas the winter of 1641 to 1642 saw the development of several serialised

newsbooks and pamphlets which were either implicitly or actually anti-Royalist in nature, there was simply no Royalist counterpart until the arrival of *Avlicvs* in 1643. Instead, the textual defence of the King was left to royal proclamations and individual sympathisers like Taylor, who was capable of reinterpreting Parliament to the extent that it appeared to be the focal point for religious sects who were bent on further church reform. Taylor related English identity to the established church, and in doing so defined the King's political opponents as those who sought to undermine the integrity of England. But for all of the skill of a writer like Taylor, the fact remained that before 1643 Royalism had no official counterpart that could contend with the reportage in the unlicensed London newsbooks. The tensions of 1641 to 1642 were essentially coloured by a contest over which side could be more closely associated with an English identity, and as Chapter Five will argue, Royalist print made a serious effort to promote Royalists and Royalism as the guardians of England.

Chapter Five:
Royalists, Royalism and Englishness

Chapter Three has argued that the Bishops' Wars were marked by the development of a Royalist identity that was built around English patriotism, which in itself was predicated on anti-Scottish sentiments. Developing from this, Chapter Four has suggested that the English identity of the Royalists was tainted by events such as the Army Plots, and that the reportage on those events helped to create the negative Cavalier stereotype. This chapter aims to continue the themes developed in the previous chapters by pursuing the concept of the Royalists' English identity. At its core it attempts to explore two issues, namely the response of Royalist print to Parliament's alliance with the Scots, and the portrayal of Royalists as patriots. This chapter focuses on how Royalist print presented the Scottish alliance as an invasion of England which threatened to consume English property and displace both English people and the established church. In essence, this chapter suggests that Royalist print aimed to show that Parliament, along with its Scottish allies, was trying to destroy the fabric of England by instigating a forceful Scotticised social, political and religious revolution. In light of such an onslaught, Royalist print was able to portray Royalists as defenders of English people, law, property and religion.

In many ways, Royalist rhetorical strategies during the First Civil War were no different from those used during the Bishops' Wars. The main focus of Royalist writing was to draw readers' attention to the issue of Parliament inviting foreigners into England to suppress the King's laws and the King's subjects. The distinction, however, was that whereas the Bishops' Wars witnessed relatively little bloodshed, the war of 1642 to 1646 was physically destructive and saw Scottish forces drive deeper into English territory. The very link between Parliament and Scotland enabled Royalist print to characterise the war

as a defence against a foreign invasion. An underlying suggestion in this chapter will therefore be that Royalist strongholds were conveyed in Royalist print as symbols of English resistance, with the defence of physical space equating to a defence of cultural identity.

As Stoye has pointed out, Parliament's acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant on 25th September 1643, and the ensuing Scottish invasion in January 1644, provided Royalism with an even greater opportunity to assert its own patriotic English credentials.¹ From the Oxford presses, the articles of the pacification between England and Scotland in 1641 were reprinted, whilst *Avlicvs* accused both Parliament and the Scots of breaching the peace.² Royal proclamations issued on 9th October and 22nd December 1643 were clearly designed to emphasise Royalism's patriotic image, and in these publications Parliament stood accused of traitorously working with a 'Forraigne Power' in order to 'bring in forraigne Force to invade this Kingdome'.³ Parliament's acceptance of the Covenant was proof that MPs wanted to destroy England, and to 'invite and joyne with a Forraigne Nation to ruine and extinguish their own'.⁴ The Scottish army was a 'forraigne Force' that was conquering English territory, and its presence enabled Royalist print to raise serious cultural and socio-economic issues in relation to Parliament's war effort.⁵

According to Royalist rhetoric, the Scots existed purely to feast on English wealth. *Avlicvs* portrayed the Scottish incursion as an actual permanent territorial conquest, stating that the Scots 'would gladly try change of Pastures' in order to access and consume England's material riches.⁶ England, it was said in the Royalist newsbook, was under

¹ Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 79-85; *Commons Journal*, Vol. 3, p. 539.

² *An Act for the Confirmation of the Treaty of Pacification Between the Kingdoms of England and Scotland*, Oxford, 1643; *Avlicvs*, No. 37, 16th-22nd September 1643, p. 3.

³ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, pp. 947-951; pp. 987-989. Quotes on p. 988 and p. 956.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 989.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 956-957 and pp. 987-989; Calver, E., *Englands Sad Postvre. Or, A True Description of the Present Estate of Poore Distressed England, and of the Lamentable Condition of These Distracted Times, Since the Beginning of this Civill, and Unnaturall Warr*, London, 1644, p. 2, p. 23.

⁶ *Avlicvs*, No. 26, 1st-7th July 1643, pp. 2-3.

threat from Scots who, with Parliamentary consent, aimed to ‘get more money out of *England*’ and to milk the country of all of its wealth, as it was stated that

...whereas the *Scottish* Forces were to receive from the two *English* Houses 30000 *l.* a moneth, now they should have 1000 *l.* per mensem more, to make them hit just one and thirtie... But whether the two indigent *Houses* will be readie with their two hundred thousand pound to be payd in hand, and 30000 *l.* a moneth besides; and whether these well payd men will depart according to their *Publike Faith*, I leave to the private faith of every honest Reader.⁷

This was a collection of images which recalled those used by Suckling in his writings during the Bishops’ Wars.⁸ In a retort to a London newsbook which claimed that the King had offered the Scots £500,000 and five English counties if they refrained from invading, *Avlicvs* wryly commented, ‘Nay, sure ‘twas all England’.⁹ *Avlicvs* was arguing that it was Parliament, the ‘two indigent *Houses*’, and not the King who had betrayed the country through its dealings with the Scots.

The issue of English money and property being consumed by Scottish soldiers remained a consistent theme in *Avlicvs*. On 13th February 1643 Parliament addressed the issue of the payment of arrears to Scottish troops serving in its armies, and *Avlicvs* lost no opportunity in attempting to open up divisions between Parliament’s English and Scottish supporters through its coverage of political developments.¹⁰ Writing about a clash between an English officer and a Scottish Captain on 16th March, both of whom were in Parliament’s service, *Avlicvs* took special care to relate the Englishman’s complaint that ‘the *Scots* who did no service had received their pay; whereas those who ventured their lives at *Edge-hill* were still kept without it’.¹¹ Heylin was not the only individual to perceive and act on the potential damage which could be inflicted on Parliament’s cause by

⁷ *Avlicvs*, No. 38, 23rd-30th September 1643, pp. 14-15; No. 39, 30th September-6th October 1643, p. 4.

⁸ See Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, pp. 140-142.

⁹ *Avlicvs*, No. 39, 30th September-6th October 1643, p. 16.

¹⁰ *Commons Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 963-964.

¹¹ *Avlicvs*, No. 12, 19th-25th March 1643, p. 144; *Commons Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 3-4.

the tensions between English and Scottish soldiers, and it appears that various ‘ill-affected persons’ were publicly giving ‘seditious speeches’ against the Scots before March 1643.¹² Just one week after the outbursts in Westminster, Parliament issued a declaration which was designed to sooth any quarrels between English and Scottish soldiers, and prevent a ‘Nationall Quarrell’ between the two kingdoms.¹³ Asserting the ‘need of Uniting the hearts and affections of the people of both Kingdomes’ and a desire to ‘make no difference betweene’ English and Scottish officers, the declaration demonstrated an awareness that Scottophobia could jeopardise future military aid from Scotland.¹⁴

Reports in *Avlicvs* were clearly designed to appeal to English Scottophobia, with the implication being that Parliament favoured to appease Scottish greed at the expense of English interests. Indeed, *Avlicvs* openly invited Londoners to question the actual economic and practical value of Scottish intervention. Trade between Royalist-held territories and London had been forbidden by the King since July 1643, resulting in London’s coal supplies from Newcastle Upon Tyne being cut off.¹⁵ Parliamentary pamphleteers appear to have regarded Scottish intervention as a means of re-establishing London’s fuel supplies from the north, and the withdrawal of Royalist forces from the border was seen to be the first step in achieving such an aim.¹⁶ *Avlicvs*, however, challenged this concept by questioning the material results of the Scottish invasion. Pointing out that despite having spent ‘vast Thousands’ on the Scots, *Avlicvs* observed that Londoners could not get ‘one penny worth of coales from the North’.¹⁷ Contrary to the assertions of Parliamentary pamphleteers, the Scots were not interested in upholding

¹² *A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament: Concerning a Late Difference Betweene Some Officers of the English, and Some of the Scottish Nation*, London, 1642; *Commons Journal*, Vol. 3, p. 13.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, p. 932, p. 961; *Commons Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 104-106, p. 231.

¹⁶ Reid, S., *All The King’s Armies: A Military History of the English Civil War 1642-1651*, Staplehurst, Spellmount, 1998, pp. 108-109; *Britanicus*, No. 42.

¹⁷ *Avlicvs*, No. 27, 30th June-6th July 1643, p. 5.

Protestantism. For Royalism, the Scots were backward, poor and waspish in nature, and their true interests lay in sucking all material wealth out of England.

Royalist writing explicitly linked Scottish avariciousness to Parliament's perverted sense of duty to England and its people. John Taylor, for instance, commented on how Parliament would deceive 'the miserable misled People to believe once more in the unsaving *Publique Faith*', and thereby secure a further '1 or 200000*l* to reward your mighty Commanders, and your Brethren the *Scots*'.¹⁸ Making some observations on the allied army, or 'the great medley body of *Scots* and *English* rebels', *Avlicvs* attempted to show how Parliament held nothing but contempt for English soldiery. Its reports claimed that priority was being given to pay the Scottish troops over Englishmen in Parliament's service, and that Sir Henry Vane had found the well-paid Scots to be 'very tender of laying down their lives'.¹⁹ This was an image which was pursued by the Royalist newsbook during the days after Marston Moor, once it had finally conceded the battle to be a Parliamentary victory, with *Avlicvs* relating that

The *Scots* were the Reserves in all their 3 Armies (precious men that ought not to be touched till all the English were cut off) but they smarted deeper for it, because the Van both of Horse & Foot, not standing, brought most Execution upon these Reserved Brethren, who hoped to have seene the *English* play all the game one against another that they at last might take into the stakes.²⁰

What is suggested in this report is that, in contrast to their 'Reserved Brethren' the Scots, English lives were expendable in Parliament's eyes, and that Scottish interests were potentially able to expand whilst Englishmen shed each one another's blood. It is arguably a mark of how potentially damaging to Parliament such assertions in *Avlicvs* actually were

¹⁸ Taylor, J., *No Mercurius Aulicus; but Some Merry Flashes of Intelligence, with the Pretended Parliaments Forces Besiedging Oxford Foure Miles Off, and the Terrible Taking in of a Mill, instead of the King and Citie. Also the Breaking of Booker, the Asse-tronomicall London Figure-flinger, His Perfidious Prediction Failing, and His Great Conjunction of Saturne and Iupiter Dislocated*, Oxford, 1644, p. 7.

¹⁹ *Avlicvs*, No. 27, 9th-15th July 1643, p. 9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 28, 15th-21st July 1643, pp. 8-10.

when we consider the emphasis given by Parliamentary publications, including *Britanicus* and *The Scottish Dove* on the unity and cooperation between English and Scottish soldiers at Marston Moor.²¹

If Royalism claimed that the King's enemies were engaged in a plot which amounted to a calculated murder of English people, then it also suggested that Parliament was physically consuming England. In an issue of *Avlicvs* it was reported that

...the *Members* made an *Ordinance* on Monday last, to give the *Lord Major* power to digge and cut *Turfe* upon any *Heath*, *Meadow*, or *Pasture* of any *delinquents Land* for the supplying *London* with *fewell* against *Winter*... So that having already imprisoned mens persons, sold their goods, rented out their houses, and cut downe their woods, they have nothing left but the bare earth it selfe...²²

In this instance, *Avlicvs* claims that both the fabric of English soil and English law are being swallowed by Parliament. The two Houses have effectively become a tyrannical and unaccountable political and military monstrosity which suppresses the Englishman's rights and liberties. For *Avlicvs*, Parliament exists outside of English law. The Lords and Commons are merely 'two pretended *Houses* at *Westminster*', devoid of any legitimacy whatsoever, and their actions were shown by the Royalist newsbook to have physically and politically 'devoured' England. *Avlicvs* reported that London had become a city full of empty houses and destroyed families due to the huge numbers of able-bodied men being pressed and killed in Parliamentary military service.²³ In this context, the physical space of the Englishman's home has been destroyed, and the family unit is therefore subverted by an unaccountable and illegitimate power. With the physical body of the father having been removed through impressment, the family unit is left at the mercy of Parliament.

²¹ *A Relation of the Good Successes of the Parliaments Forces Under the Command of Generall Lesly, the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax, Against the Forces Commanded by Prince Rupert and the Earl of Newcastle, on Hesham-Moore*, London, 1644; *Britanicus*, No. 42, 1st-8th July 1644, pp. 7-8; *The Scottish Dove*, No. 40, 13th-19th July 1644, p. 3.

²² *Avlicvs*, No. 27, 6th-12th July 1644, p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, No. 29, 14th-20th July 1644, p. 2.

Traditional family structure is thus broken down by Parliament, and without the existence of the family, the country itself cannot survive.

The invasiveness and impact of Parliament's political and military ambitions on the family environment was further emphasised and developed in Royalist print, and integrated deeper into Royalism's relationship with Englishness. Not only had Parliament succeeded in severing the male head from the body of the family, but it was also supposedly replacing the national identity of the English people. *Avlicvs* reported on how English women were to be 'reserved for those *Scots* now in *England*, who must have more than two wives a piece'.²⁴ This image in effect works on two levels. Firstly, it is suggestive that a programme of Scottification is being executed in England. The Scotsman implicitly has an insatiable sexual appetite and must conquer an innumerable number of English women. His sexual antics are a physical manifestation of his desire to penetrate and command England itself. With her English husband absent, the body of the English woman is brought under the direct control of the Scotsman. Any future offspring arising from such copulation will not be English, meaning that Scottish blood will gradually permeate English families. The removal of the English husband and father, coupled with the union of the English woman with the Scotsman, creates the impression of a physical and cultural displacement of the English people. It amounts to a form of colonisation, and it is one that is being performed with Parliament's approval. Secondly, the image of the Scotsman demanding several women serves as an attack on the 'true religion' which Parliament claimed to be fighting for. By permitting bigamy, the religion which both Parliament and Scotland follow is clearly not Christian by any standard. Royalism therefore remains as the guarantor of both English Protestantism and the English family, neither of which are to be subjected to Scottish control.

²⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 41, 6th-12th October 1644, pp. 9-10.

The theme of Scottish colonisation of English people extended beyond England's coastline. Assertions of Parliamentary 'otherness' and Scottish dominance were even given a transatlantic context in *Avlicvs*. The Royalist newsbook claimed that the recently deceased governor of Virginia, Sir Francis Wyatt, had become 'Covenanted' by Parliament prior to his departure for America in 1643, and had subsequently aligned himself with 'Pagans' and engaged in a colonial war against the Christian settlers there.²⁵ By implication, *Avlicvs* was suggesting that Scottishness and Scottish religion were akin to paganism. Wyatt's alleged countenancing of the native American people, or 'Pagan-Covenanters', was for *Avlicvs* simply a reflection across the Atlantic waters of the Parliamentarianism within the British Isles which had allowed Scottish 'creatures' to advance on Newcastle Upon Tyne, and the newsbook evidently aimed to invite readers to draw the same conclusion.²⁶

According to Royalist print, Parliament had openly invited the foreign Scots to wage war on their English neighbours. The physical presence of the Scottish army, in conjunction with the reversal of Charles' military fortunes in the north, strengthened the patriotically charged language in Royalist print. Failure to support the King was supposed to equate to a betrayal of England, and Rupert's inability to stop the Scots at Marston Moor meant that the Royalist presence in the north was confined to a series of garrisons, including York and Newcastle Upon Tyne.²⁷ Parliamentary newsbooks naturally interpreted events in the north as a sign that Royalism was on the verge of total collapse, and by the autumn of 1644 *The Weekly Account* was reporting that

...the Malignants in [the] Town report, that the unseasonableness of the weather will not admit of the continuance of any siege, which is all the hopes... they have that Newcastle, Liverpool,

²⁵ *DNB*; *Avlicvs*, No. 35, 25th-31st August 1644, pp. 2-4

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Furgol, E., 'The Civil Wars in Scotland', in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, *The Civil Wars*, p. 54; Young and Emberton, *Sieges*, p. 80.

Banbury, and some other places which I could name, will hold out...²⁸

For Parliamentary newsbooks such as *Britanicus*, Marston Moor signified that the ‘*Cloud*’ of Royalism had begun to be ‘*dissipated*’, and that the north, or ‘the other side of *Christendome*’, was starting to be enlightened by true Gospel.²⁹ In his somewhat confusing letter to Rupert prior to Marston Moor, Charles had not underestimated the value of northern England to Royalism, stating that ‘If York be lost I shall esteem my crown little less’.³⁰ Parliamentary pamphleteers clearly seem to have considered Marston Moor a decisive blow to the King, anticipating that victory in the north would enable Essex and Waller to defeat Royalism in southern and western England, and thus end the war.³¹ After Marston Moor, many Parliamentary newsbooks were anticipating a succession of quick victories over a string of Royalist garrisons. Greenland House in Oxfordshire fell to Parliamentary forces on 12th July after a siege lasting six months, and *The Scottish Dove* clearly expected Basing House to fall soon after, as did the editors of *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, *Mercurius Civicus* and *The True Informer*.³²

Whilst reports of Marston Moor from the victors showed how Rupert and Royalism were being physically purged from northern England, with Scottish cavalry in pursuit of the defeated Royalist general, military defeat allowed Royalism to portray Parliamentarianism as a tide which threatened to swamp every locality in the kingdom.³³ Defeat on 2nd July 1644 had irrecoverably lost Charles northern England, despite whatever

²⁸ *The Weekly Account*, No. 59, 9th-16th October 1644, p. 4.

²⁹ *Britanicus*, No. 42, 1st-8th July 1644, p. 4; *Ruperts Sumpter*, p. 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; Young and Holmes, *The English Civil War*, pp. 190-191.

³¹ *A True Relation of the Late Fight Between the Parliament Forces and Prince Rupert, Within Four Miles of Yorke: with the Names of Divers Commanders that were Slain and Wounded. Also, the Quantity of Arms, and Number of Ordnance that were Taken*, London, 1644, p. 8; *Britanicus*, No. 42, p. 4; *The Glorivvs and Miracvlvos Battell at York*, Edinburgh, 1644.

³² *The Scottish Dove*, No. 39, 5th-13th July 1644, p. 8; *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, No. 63, 9th-16th July 1644, p. 5; *Mercurius Civicus*, No. 58, 27th June-4th July 1644, p. 7; *The True Informer*, No. 38, 6th-13th July 1644, p. 6.

³³ Stewart, W., *A Full Relation of the late Victory Obtained (Through God’s Providence) by the Forces Under the Command of Generall Lesly, the Lord Fairfax, and the Earl of Manchester*, London, 1644, p. 12.

strategy he may have formulated with regard to Montrose's successes in Scotland.³⁴ It also proved to be an embarrassment for *Avlicvs*, which rather unconvincingly blamed its own erroneous reportage on information obtained from Parliamentary prisoners.³⁵ Nevertheless, Marston Moor provided Royalism with an opportunity to show how Parliamentarianism, with its recent 'great Conquest in the North' as *The Court Mercurie* described it, threatened to besiege and eradicate regional cultures and identities.³⁶

With a tide of Scottish Covenanters flooding northern England whilst their English Parliamentary allies prepared for their forthcoming campaigns across the rest of the kingdoms, *Avlicvs* attempted to show readers how only Royalism could preserve existing identities and livelihoods. For example, Sir Thomas Glemham, the Royalist Governor of York, appears to have briefly emerged in the Royalist press as a patriotic hero. Glemham's purported reply to the Marquis of Argyle made it clear that both he and Royalism stood opposed to 'forraigne Confederacies'. The King's cause stood to preserve the English Church, law, national honour and identity, as Glemham replied

you cannot thinke that we are grown such tame Creatures, to desert our Religion, our Lawes, our Liberties, our Estates, upon command of Forreigners, and to suffer our selves and our Posterity, to be made Beggars and Slaves without opposition...³⁷

In Glemham's letter, Royalism is clearly shown to protect English property and English law. Glemham is seen to take pride in both his English identity and his service to the King, deriding those MPs who accepted the Covenant and invited the Scots to invade as 'Vipers

³⁴ Barratt, *Cavaliers*, ch. 14; Young, *Marston Moor*, ch. 15; Montrose's operations seem to have already been shown by *Mercvrius Avlicvs* to be a beacon of light for Royalism by June, *Avlicvs*, No. 26, p. 3.

³⁵ *Avlicvs*, No. 29, 14th-20th July 1644, p. 4.

³⁶ *The Court Mercurie*, No. 3, 10th to 20th July 1644, p. 3.

³⁷ *The Copy of a Letter from Colonell Francis Anderson to Sir Thomas Glemham, January 20. 1643. Touching the Invasion of Scotland. The Copy of a Letter from the Marqves of Argyle & Sir William Armyne, to Sir Thomas Glemham the 20. January 1643. The Copy of Sir Thomas Glemhams Letter in Answer to the Lord Marquesse of Argyl's, and Sir William Armyne's*, Oxford, 1643, pp. 6-8.

to their native Country'.³⁸ He is a committed patriot who refuses to betray England to a foreign invasion, and his patriotism is linked to loyalty to the King.

As with Glemham's refusal to capitulate to the Scots, the Royalist resistance at Newcastle-Upon-Tyne was shaped as a defence of England's interests. The struggle between the Royalist garrison and their besiegers was coloured by *Avlicvs* in distinct ethnic and racial terms. The Royalist newsbook's reportage of the siege drew an explicit binary distinction between the English garrison and Leslie's 'Blue-Caps'.³⁹ In doing this, *Avlicvs* seems to have been suggesting that Royalist efforts were designed to protect the English people. A relatively small number of Royalist soldiers were thus shown to be sacrificing themselves in order to serve the greater good of preventing the Scots from permanently settling on English soil. The conduct and determination of the Royalist garrison became a focus for *Avlicvs*. By claiming that hundreds of Scotsmen were being slain in the gritty fighting around the city, *Avlicvs* showed how Newcastle's resistance was aimed at destroying the appetite of the 'hungry Scots' flooding over the border.⁴⁰ It was essentially an image which was identical to those deployed during the Bishops' Wars, and which also related to English anxieties regarding the 1603 union.⁴¹ Parliament had unleashed the ravenous Scotch force on England, and only the Royalists could defeat it.

Ironically, the reportage in some Parliamentary newsbooks arguably confirmed *Avlicvs*' assertions. After the Scots captured Tynemouth Castle, *The Parliament Scout* confidently claimed that northern England was 'cleared', and was looking forward to Parliament launching a final grand design to 'clear the Kingdome'.⁴² Both *The Parliament*

³⁸ *The Copy of a Letter*, p. 8. Glemham's reply was also printed as *A Letter from the Marqves of Argile and Sir William Armyne, in the Name of Themselves and Their Confederates, to Sir Thomas Glemham, Dated at Barwicke, January 20. With the Answer of Sir Thomas Glemham and the Commanders and Gentry of Northumberland, Dated at Newcastle, Janaury, 23.*, Oxford, 1643.

³⁹ *Avlicvs*, No. 37, 8th-14th September 1644, p. 5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 35, 25th-31st August 1644, pp. 3-4; No. 37, 8th-14th September 1644, p. 5; No. 40, 29th September-5th October 1644, p. 8.

⁴¹ See Chapter Three; Russell, 'James VI and I'; Smith, *Modern British Isles*, pp. 25-28.

⁴² *The Parliament Scout*, No. 72, 31st October-7th November 1644, p. 6.

Scout and *Britanicus* anticipated the use of the ‘valiant brethren of Scotland’ in more southerly operations, including an eventual push on Oxford.⁴³ Since such newsbooks were openly commenting on how Parliament’s strategy would deepen the Scottish presence in England, Royalism’s image as a guardian of England was arguably given further credence. Parliament’s alliance with the Scots would rip through the material and spiritual fabric of English society. English theology risked being displaced by corrupt teaching, with ‘Scotch-stuffe’ being preached by ministers who wore the ‘Blew-cap’.⁴⁴ Defence of property, of England’s physical space, from Parliament and the Scots would thus preserve the cultural and spiritual identity of the whole country.

The Brecknockshire political writer, James Howell, appears to have fuelled the development of this concept. Howell’s account of the causes of the Civil War in *The Trve Informer* linked Royal and English national honour together, with challenges to the King’s authority along with Scottish, or ‘forreigne’ interference in English political affairs being shown to damage the country.⁴⁵ The connection made by Howell between the monarch and the country was one which was shared by Taylor, whose definition of a ‘Noble Cavalier’ was that of a man who, among factors such as the established Church, would ‘serve for his Sovereigne’ and for ‘his Countrey’.⁴⁶ English failure during the Bishops’ Wars, interpreted by Howell as a result of domestic treachery given that the Scots invasion of 1640 was ‘rather an *Invitation*’, was shown to mark the beginning of England’s demise, as one of the speakers in *The Trve Informer* observes:

I am afraid the English have seene their best dayes... They say
abroad, Tis the Scots time now to be a great Nation⁴⁷

⁴³ *Parliament Scout*, No. 73, p. 6; *Britanicus*, No. 58, 11th-18th November 1644, p. 8.

⁴⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 41, 6th-12th October 1644, p. 10.

⁴⁵ Howell, J., *The Trve Informer, Who in the Following Discourse, or Colloqvie, Discovereth unto the World the Chiefe Causes of the Sad Distempers in Great Brittainy and Ireland*, London, 1643, p. 12, p. 24.

⁴⁶ Taylor, J., *The Noble Cavalier Characterised, and a Rebellious Caviller Cauterised*, Oxford, 1642, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Howell, *Trve Informer*, p. 12.

English military failure against the Scots in 1640, coupled with the challenges to Royal authority from both Scotland and Parliament since the Treaty of Ripon, had jeopardised England's future, with the country being shown to be subservient to Scottish will

Indeed, I heard the *English* much censur'd abroad for enslaving as it were their understanding and judgement in points of Religion to the *Scot*, whom they made Christians, and Reformed Christians first, and now for the *English* to run to them for a Religion, and that the *uniformitie* should proceed from them, they having disdain'd us formerly, what a disparagement is it thinke you to the *Anglican* Church?⁴⁸

In this context, therefore, English and Royalist identity were shown to be founded within the framework of the established Church. Such is the damage and shame inflicted on England by Parliamentary and Scottish challenges that Howell's character refuses to reveal his identity abroad, and resolves to never step foot in England until Charles' authority is rightfully restored.⁴⁹ Parliament's continued aggression towards the King was said by Howell to be weakening England, as the Militia Ordinance and the 'furious, phrenetique Schismatickes' constantly subverted Royal efforts to secure peace and order via the Commissions of Array.⁵⁰

Avlicvs impressed upon readers that the Scottish threat was not simply confined to the northern counties, but affected the entire population of England. Throughout the war, Scotsmen appeared in various counties across England, and *Avlicvs* specifically noted their presence at sieges throughout the country. In its siege reportage, *Avlicvs* appears to have tried making its readers aware that English properties were being subjected to Scottish attack. The most obvious cases of this were York, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne and Newark, but the newsbook provided various other examples. For instance, readers were made aware that it was an 'insolent *Scot*', a Sergeant-Major General Forbes serving under Sir Thomas

⁴⁸ Howell, *Trve Informer*, p. 24.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

Fairfax, who was directing siege operations against the Royalist-held Helmsley Castle in Yorkshire during October.⁵¹ But *Avlicvs* also made its readers aware that the Scottish presence on English soil had crept further south. A specific point was made in the newsbook that three Scottish captains were involved in the plundering of the Viscountess Falkland's property. It was also made clear in *Avlicvs* that Parliament's operations in Somerset were being headed by that 'Scot-Rebell', Middleton, who was also accompanied by a 'Renegado Scot' known as Major Carre.⁵²

Furthermore, *Avlicvs* outlined the long-term implications of Royalist defeat in its commentary regarding Parliamentary administration in the south, claiming that in Dorset

It cost a poore man ten shillings a day towards maintenance of these strange Rebels... and hee was a meane man that had not fifty pound fine laid upon him... and present moneys were to be paid, else the party plundered to his shirt, and after hurried away prisoner.⁵³

This arbitrary and tyrannical form of administration was said to be a result of Parliament drafting in an army of 'six hundred *Swedes, Germans, Danes, French, Wallownes* and *Scots*', who in turn were directed by none other than those 'two perfidious Scots, *Belfoure* and *Midleton*'.⁵⁴ Having tried to usurp Charles from his rightful position, Parliament is shown to be abdicating power and authority to non-English people and subjecting the English to illegitimate rule and extortionate taxation.

In an issue of *Avlicvs* dated 14th September 1644, a letter written by Lord Maitland to the Committee of Hampshire concerning the siege of Basing House was reprinted. Berkenhead took special care to inform readers of Maitland's ethnicity, referring to him as 'the *Scot*', before proceeding to comment on how

⁵¹ *Avlicvs*, No. 41, 6th-12th October 1644, p. 8; Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications*, p. 66.

⁵² *Avlicvs*, No. 34, 18th-24th August 1644, pp. 4-5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, No. 40, 29th September-5th October 1644, p. 6.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*; No. 43, 20th-26th October 1644, p. 10.

...the Scots are not satisfied to invade *England* 3 times in 4 yeares, to lodge at *London* in the English Lords houses without the Lords owne consent, to feast and goes rich at the *Londoners* charges, and to sit voting at *Westminster* in the newest fashion'd Covenant the rebellious *State-Committee* but they concurre also every single act and circumstance of this Rebellion...⁵⁵

As with the commentary printed in *Avlicvs* at the time of Marston Moor, this was an assertion which stressed the extent to which the Scots were consuming English finances and private property whilst simultaneously wrecking the prestige and autonomy of government within England. The image of Scottish noblemen displacing their English counterparts from their own properties was yet another indication in *Avlicvs* that England was effectively becoming a mere Scottish dominion or colony, and Maitland's apparent involvement in operations against Basing served as confirmation of this argument. *Avlicvs* was therefore effectively reasserting its argument that Parliament was prepared to subject the indigenous English population to foreign dominance, and that the Scots headed that dominance. Only the arrival of the King's army in the south-west was capable of liberating the English from the 'strange yoake' of foreigners and tyranny imposed by Parliament.⁵⁶ It was an idea which in some ways was effectively the Royalist counterpart to the 'Popish Plot' that had been promulgated in large part by Pym from 1640 onwards. Moreover, it was an idea which cemented Royalism's relationship with Englishness: defence of physical property against Parliament and its allies protected England's cultural and legal integrity.

One of the defining characteristics of the wars of the 1640s was that the majority of combat occurred at sieges.⁵⁷ Significantly, many of the places that were besieged were not purpose-built fortresses, but rather improvised strongholds. Reinforced country houses and stately homes accounted for the majority of Civil War fortifications, and as such war was

⁵⁵ *Avlicvs*, No. 37, 8th-14th September 1644, p. 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 40, 29th September-5th October 1644, p. 6.

⁵⁷ Young, P., and Emberton, W., *Sieges of the Great Civil War*, Bell and Hyman, London, 1978, pp. 1-9. Although in 1644/45 Charles had approximately 20,000 men in arms, the majority of them served in garrisons and not field armies.

brought directly to individual property.⁵⁸ The image of the siege appears to have been particularly powerful in *Avlicvs*, which illustrated how Parliament's war effort was geared to smash through the walls of private property, assaulting the owner within and bombarding him into political subservience. The resistance of a fortified house came to epitomise Royalist pride, determination and martial skill, and it became a microcosm of a broader patriotic struggle. By assaulting, capturing and demolishing private property, Parliamentarianism was attacking the heart of England. Places such as Basing House, Lathom House and Donnington Castle represented the Englishman's property. Royalist print integrated the King's fortresses into the physicality of the country, and in doing so reaffirmed Royalism's patriotic pretensions.

Royalist accounts of Henry Gage's relief of Basing in particular appears to have been portrayed as a patriotic operation. For Royalist print, Gage's operation was 'so eminent and so deserving [of] memory' that by the time of his death in January 1645 it seems to have already become something of a popular legend.⁵⁹ Wilcher has pointed out that Gage himself emerged as an heroic figure within Royalism, but it could also be argued that Walsingham's celebration of Gage placed him in a patriotic context.⁶⁰ For instance, it is interesting that Saint George was said to have been the word which was used to launch the final stages of Gage's advance on Basing, since it implicitly associated Royalism and the relief of Basing with patriotic interests.⁶¹ Far from the stereotypical self-serving, sexually obscene profligate type of Cavalier frequently presented by Parliamentary pamphleteers, Gage was shown to be motivated by his 'zeale and love to his Majesty'.⁶² Yet in Walsingham's work, Gage's supposed devotion to Charles does not appear to have

⁵⁸ Young and Emberton, *Sieges*, pp. 1-9.

⁵⁹ Walsingham, *Alter Britannie Heros*, p. 11 and p. 17; *DNB*.

⁶⁰ Wilcher, *Writing of Royalism*, p. 240.

⁶¹ 'Henry Gage's Account' in Adair, *They Saw It Happen*, p. 62; Walsingham, *Alter Britannie Heros*, p. 13. Walsingham appears to have gleaned much of his information on the relief of Basing from Gage's own account.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

divorced from English interests, and this was implied in its title, *Alter Britanniae Heros*, which situated Gage as a patriotic hero. But Walsingham's work had a twist, since both he and Gage were Catholics. Considering that defence of Protestantism was frequently linked to a defence of England, and that Parliamentary newsbooks consistently accused the Royalists of being papists, it seems unusual, even unwise, for Gage to be upheld as a patriot. The title, *Alter Britanniae*, suggests that the individuals celebrated inside the text possess an otherness, but one that is not isolated from national identity. Thus, Walsingham's point seems to be that Catholics are not the shadowy and frightening plotters endeavouring to subvert England, but are instead genuinely loyal subjects. Having been mortally wounded in a skirmish near Oxford, Gage is still seen to be committed to serving 'His Majesty, and his Country in this just Quarrel', thus linking Charles to England, and Royalism to patriotism.⁶³

Symbolically, Gage's operation challenged Parliamentary confidence in the field. The simple fact alone that a Royalist force from Oxford could infiltrate Parliamentary territory and break through to Basing was enough to cause concern amongst Parliamentary pamphleteers like Dillingham, who began to worry about the possibility that other beleaguered Royalist fortresses could in turn be relieved.⁶⁴ That a Royalist relief force could break through Parliamentary lines signified that only the King could truly command England's terrain, and not the unlawful power of Parliament. The resistance and relief of Basing thus deflated the imposing image of Parliament's war machine, and it was a theme which reappeared in other Royalist siege reportage. For instance, *Avlicvs* drew attention to the fact that even a woman, the Countess of Derby, had managed to defeat the efforts of her besiegers at Lathom House in Lancashire.⁶⁵ Donnington Castle also proved to be a focus for Royalism's deflation of Parliamentary military strength. The rapid response of

⁶³ Walsingham, *Alter Britanniae Heros*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ *Parliament Scout*, No. 64, 5th-13th September 1644, p. 8.

⁶⁵ *Avlicvs*, No. 28, 7th-13th July 1644, p. 9.

Colonel John Boys, the governor of Donnington Castle, to the Parliamentary summons on 31st July was that both he and his soldiers were ‘fully resolved’ to defend the fortress with their own blood.⁶⁶ *Avlicvs* clearly seems to have taken pride in this response, and used it to fashion a martial ethos around Boys and the defenders of Donnington. The fact that *Avlicvs* proclaimed Parliament could not win the castle ‘by words’ alone served to contrast Royalist resolve with an implied Parliamentary cowardice, and effectively challenged the martial ability of the besiegers.⁶⁷ It was a challenge which was soon after fulfilled, for on 2nd August a major Parliamentary assault on Donnington was repelled by the ‘Gallant Garrison’, prompting *Avlicvs* to present the Royalist defence as a hard-fought, but united operation against overwhelming odds, in which

All the Garrison from the Gallant *Governour* to the meanest common souldier did beyond expression gallantly; for besides that they plyed it extreame close without any intermission, they did it also with that chearefulnesse and delight, as if every man had beene to encourage himselfe and all his fellowes...⁶⁸

In *Avlicvs*’ representation of the siege of Donnington Castle, traditional social boundaries were thus to an extent transcended, with the newsbook making particular note to the reader that all Royalist soldiers, regardless of rank, were enthusiastically fighting against Parliamentary aggression. The portrayal of the Royalist garrison at Banbury was similar, with *Avlicvs* noting on 26th October that although the ‘Rebels playd furiously with great shot and Granadoes’, all of the ‘Commanders and Souldiers did their parts so coragiously, that they never admitted any one parley’.⁶⁹ Moreover, the depiction of Gage’s relief of Basing likewise illustrated how social boundaries were not insurmountable obstacles for

⁶⁶ *Avlicvs*, No. 31, 28th July-3rd August 1644, p. 5.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 43, 21st-26th October 1644, p. 9.

Royalism, with Cavalry troopers being shown to share their steeds with the common infantrymen.⁷⁰

It is noticeable that in *Avlicvs* the survival of Donnington Castle was ascribed not to any Parliamentary operational shortcomings, but to Royalist resolve and martial ability. On 24th August, the Royalist newsbook described how Boys, that ‘brave Governour’, had

So often met with them contrary to their expectation, that now they keep a very mannerly distance, permitting him this morning without daring to resist, to let his waggons carry in Hay and Corne into the Castle.⁷¹

It was this sort of alleged commitment, from both Royalist commander and common soldier alike, which was used by Berkenhead to form a distinct contrast between Royalism and Parliamentarianism in the pages of *Avlicvs*. Indeed, in an issue of *Avlicvs* which reported on the defence of Donnington Castle, Berkenhead commented on Parliamentary self-interest and division, saying how ‘both those at *Westminster*, and these in the field would suddenly fall to peeces and cut one anothers throats for their severall stakes and interests’.⁷² As a result, Royalism was projected as a cause which both attracted and inspired genuine individual commitment, martial bravery and a willingness to sacrifice oneself for a perceived greater good. *Avlicvs*’ portrayal of the ‘hearty Royalists’ in the defence of Donnington, along with those Cornishmen who valued ‘their honour and consciences above their blood’, was presented as an ‘example to the rest of *England*’, and contrasted starkly with Essex’s conduct in the west.⁷³ Royalist projections of Parliament’s cowardly military conduct were further developed in *Avlicvs*, which reported on how

The Rebels speed so ill at down-right fighting that now they practice a new way of Murther; for we are certainly advertised from *Donnington Castle*, that when the Rebels close besieged that

⁷⁰ Walsingham, *Alter Britanniae Heros*, p. 12.

⁷¹ *Avlicvs*, No. 34, 18th-24th August 1644, p. 5.

⁷² *Ibid*, No. 32, 4th-10th August 1644, p. 5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, No. 32, p. 8.

place, they hired a Souldier to poison their Well, on the North side of the Castle...⁷⁴

Unable to match the martial prowess of their Royalist opponents, Parliament's soldiers were being seen to compensate for their own ineptitude in combat by using dishonourable tactics. Indeed, for all of the Parliamentarians' 'strength' and 'zeal', Boys and his men were shown by Berkenhead to have rendered Charles' enemies impotent to the point at which they dared 'not offer the least resistance'.⁷⁵ As *Avlicvs* put it, the only action which Parliament could take against the castle was to 'grinne' at it.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the siege was given an added significance by the fact that Donnington was initially been besieged by a 'greedy *Scot*', namely Middleton, who was 'so hungry' to consume it.⁷⁷ There, in Berkshire, was an example of what Berkenhead believed were the defining characteristics of the Scots, '*Gaine and Cowardice*', with English Royalism starving a Scotsman of his prey.⁷⁸ The very fact that Donnington was still standing firm against Parliament challenged Parliamentary military competence and questioned the value of a resistance to the King which saw English lives and money being wasted.⁷⁹

Avlicvs' coverage of sieges attempted to establish a united Royalist martial ethos that was to an extent coloured by patriotic rhetoric, and which defied both Parliamentary and Scottish military progress. Royalist garrisons were heroised by *Avlicvs*, which repeatedly praised them as 'gallant' soldiers.⁸⁰ Royalist resistance and the endurance of the King's fortresses was supposedly preventing England from being totally consumed by the Scots and their sympathizers in Westminster. Although the north may well have been truly lost to the King as a result of the Scottish invasion and Rupert's subsequent defeat,

⁷⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 47, 17th-23rd November 1644, p. 1.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 35, 25th-31st August 1644, p. 8.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 46, 13th-19th November 1644, p. 2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 40, 29th September-5th October 1644, p. 6.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 41, 6th-12th October 1644, p. 11.

⁷⁹ *Civicus*, No. 62, 25th July-1st August 1644, p. 8.

⁸⁰ *Avlicvs*, No. 31, 28th July-3rd August 1644, p. 3.

Royalism's self-image was arguably enhanced. *Avlicvs* was able to use the alliance between Parliament and Scotland as a means of emphasising the inherent patriotism of Royalism. By inviting the Scots to invade England, Parliament had jeopardised English property and risked converting the country into a mere dominion of Scottish rule. The language used to describe Parliament's alliance was stark, creating a binary distinction between the King and his enemies. *Mercurio-Coelico Mastix*, for example, asserted that events in the north of England were an 'Insurrection and intended Invasion of the Scots'.⁸¹ Royal proclamations used similar language. On 30th September 1644 a proclamation was issued which called for the country to be 'secured from the danger of a Conquest by Forraigne Forces'.⁸² The implication behind such language was evident: the Royalist cause was a defence of England.

It has been the intention of this chapter to suggest that Royalism sought to portray itself as a patriotic English cause, and that those who fought for the King were patriots. It has also been suggested that the concept of English patriotism was largely developed in response to Parliament's alliance with Scotland. This response functioned in four ways. Firstly, it obviously drew attention to the ethnicity of Parliament's allies and aimed to fuel traditional English antipathy towards the Scots. In this respect, Royalist print related to ideas dating back to at least the union of 1603 that the Scots were a poorer, lecherous people who wanted to suck on the nourishment of English wealth. Secondly, by linking the established church to English identity, Royalists texts claimed that the Scottish invasion was intended to displace English culture. Scottish practices and doctrine were supposedly entering England, courtesy of Parliament. Thirdly, Royalist patriotism focused on defining Parliament as a corrupt institution. According to Royalist rhetoric, Parliament had abandoned the very people it claimed to represent, and this meant that only support for the

⁸¹ Wharton, G., *Mercurio-Coelico Mastix*, Oxford, 1644.

⁸² Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamation*, pp. 1047-1048; *Mercvrius Avlicvs*, No. 41, 6th to 12th October, pp. 3-5.

King could guarantee the safety and preservation of the kingdom. Contrary to the assertion in a letter printed in *The Speciall Passages and Certain Informations* that Parliament's forces were fighting for 'our Countrey's good', *Avlicvs* was arguing that destructive Scottish interference was entering England through Parliament, and given Parliament's collusion with the Scottish Covenanters in 1640, such a suggestion was not without its precedents.⁸³ *Avlicvs* endeavoured to shape Royalism as a defence against foreign invasion, and its reports were designed to show how English property and law was threatened by Parliament's alliance against England. Fourthly, in an attempt to consolidate the pro-English credentials of the King's cause, Royalist soldiers were portrayed as patriotic heroes who were fighting to resist the foreign powers and influences emanating from Parliament.

Royalist print during the First Civil War therefore appears to have used an argument that was fundamentally the same as that which had been deployed several years earlier in anti-Covenanter material. Rhetoric that focused on the infliction of economic, physical and cultural woes upon English people by the Scots was a key tool in the armoury of Royalist print. The very fact that the Scots had been invited into England by Parliament was a cornerstone of Royalist discourse, and at its rawest demonstrated that only the King could protect English interests.⁸⁴ In 1645, *The true Character Of Mercurius Aulicus* may have argued that Royalism did not serve English interests, but *Avlicvs* was central in linking Royalism and Royalists to patriotism.⁸⁵ As the following chapter will demonstrate, the supposed English identity of Royalists and Royalism was problematised by not only the fact that foreigners were present in the King's armies, but also by the efforts in Royalist print to address people from other areas of the British Isles.

⁸³ *The Speciall Passages and Certain Informations*, No. 30, 28th February-7th March 1643, p. 5.

⁸⁴ Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, pp. 140-142; *The Complaint of Time*, London, 1639, p. 3.

⁸⁵ *The true Character of Mercurius Aulicus*, London, 1645, p. 7.

Chapter Six:
The Problem of the Royalists' Englishness

Whereas Chapters Three and Five have argued that the Royalist press attempted to portray Royalists as patriots, with Royalism subsequently emerging as a pro-English cause, this chapter examines the problems with the English identity of Royalists and Royalism. As the likes of Stoye have made clear, the conflicts between King and Parliament were not confined to England and the English population alone. Geographical boundaries were transcended and drew in peoples from diverse ethnic backgrounds, thus infusing the wars with a more British dimension. Royalist pamphleteers and polemicists could attack the Parliamentary cause on the grounds that it was inviting Scottish invaders into England, but similar charges could also be levelled at Royalism.

With the King's readiness to use the services of people outside of the indigenous English population, Royalism's efforts to portray itself as an English cause were inconsistent with reality. Thus, the Royalist cause was faced with the problem of resolving the identities of those who served the King with the English image that was so present in its own textual space. The work in this chapter is therefore divided into two sections. Whilst the first section underlines the inconsistencies of an English Royalist identity by providing an overview of the ethnic composition of the King's armies, the second section explores the ways in which the Royalist press approached, or rather failed to approach, the realities and implications of the Royalists' ethnicity.

In terms of ethnicity, the actual composition of the Royalist armies undermined any ambition to assert an English identity. Whilst it is undeniable that Parliamentary forces also employed numerous foreigners, one cannot ignore the

ethnicity of Royalist recruits. Welsh, Cornish, Scottish and Irish soldiers all served Charles, and one cannot overlook the fact that some of the most prominent Royalists were not English. Obviously, neither Charles nor Henrietta Maria were English, and the presence of the German Princes Rupert and Maurice could not have improved Royalism's efforts to establish an English identity for itself. Patrick Ruthven, a Scotsman, was the lord-general of the Royalist army until March 1644.¹ Dutchmen such as the military engineer Bernard de Gomme bolstered the non-English Royalist population, as did cavalry officers like the Florentine John Devilliers.² The Royalists also employed foreigners to command certain garrisons, as was the case with Eccelshall Castle which Lord Hastings placed under the governorship of a Danish officer.³

Lord Byron may have described Wales as that 'land of promises, but never of fulfillment', but it is apparent that the King benefitted from substantial numbers of Welsh recruits during the 1640s.⁴ From the outbreak of war, MPs and Parliamentary commanders were certainly worried about the possibility of a large and successful Royalist recruitment drive in Wales.⁵ Although Wales' real contribution to Royalist manpower was exaggerated by Parliamentary pamphleteers, Welsh soldiers nonetheless fought for the King during the Bishops' Wars, and some estimates suggest that up to half of the fourteen thousand Royalist soldiers who fought at Edgehill were Welshmen.⁶ Lord Herbert raised two armies in 1643. The first was raised in February and consisted of two thousand men, whilst the second was

¹ ODNB; Barratt, J., *Cavalier Generals: King Charles I and His Commanders in the English Civil War 1642-46*, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2004.

² Roy, I., *Royalist Ordnance Papers*, Vol. 1, pp. 1-20; ODNB; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 93.

³ Osborne, *Sieges and Fortifications*, p. 20, p. 58.

⁴ Byron, Lord J., 'Account of the Siege of Chester', in *Cheshire Sheaf*, 4th Series, No. 6, 1971, p. 3.

⁵ *Journal of the House of Commons*, Vol. II, p. 787, pp. 792-796; Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, Vol. II, p. 305.

⁶ Malcom, *Caesar's Due*, pp. 108-109.

recruited in July and had a strength of approximately five thousand men. Welshmen formed the backbone of both armies, and despite the ill fates of Herbert's forces Wales continued to supply the King with not insignificant numbers of men until the end of the war.⁷

One of the reasons why the war simply did not end after Naseby was because eighty-seven Royalist garrisons, consisting of twenty thousand troops, remained in arms. At least sixteen of these garrisons were located in Wales, and the final Royalist fortress to capitulate was Harlech Castle in March 1647.⁸ In 1645 there were at least 300 Welsh soldiers amongst Chester's garrison, and during the summer of that same year Bristol also received a number of Welsh troops into its garrison.⁹ At least two hundred Welsh soldiers under Sir John Owen were present in Charles' army at Naseby and yet more Welsh soldiers served the King in Cornwall and Hampshire.¹⁰ Furthermore, although the exact number of Welshmen who served in it remains unknown, the last Royalist field army was recruited in and around Wales by Sir Jacob Astley at the start of 1646 and consisted of about three thousand men.¹¹

If Wales proved to be a rich recruiting ground for the King, then so too did Cornwall. Unlike most counties, Cornwall was not subjected to Royalist impressments and it would seem that those who fought under the King's banner did so as volunteers.¹² Five Cornish regiments totalling at least one thousand and five hundred men are known to have served the King throughout the war, and it appears that by June 1643 the strength of the Western Royalist army had grown to about four

⁷ Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, pp. 108-109.

⁸ Barratt, *Cavaliers*, p. 200; Gaunt, *Nation Under Siege*, p. 18; Osborne, M., *Sieges and Fortifications of the Civil Wars in Britain*, Leigh-on-Sea, Partizan Press, 2004; Phillips, *Memoirs*, p. 332.

⁹ Warburton, *Memoirs*, p. 167.

¹⁰ Young, P., *Naseby 1645: The Campaign and Battle*, London, Century Publishing, 1985, p. 85.

¹¹ Barratt, *Cavaliers*, ch. 11.

¹² Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, p. 107; Barratt, *Cavaliers*, ch. 11; Hutton, *War Effort*, chs. 2 and 4.

thousand men.¹³ This substantial force was instrumental in the siege of Bristol in July 1643, and it appears that the Cornish suffered heavy casualties when the city was stormed. By the following year the number of Cornishmen serving Charles had increased still further, with estimates suggesting that as many as five thousand Cornishmen had taken up arms for the Royalist cause, excluding those who had already died in service.¹⁴

Alongside the Welsh and Cornish elements of the Royalist forces were the Irish. Unlike the Welsh and Cornish, however, it is less certain how many genuine Irishmen actually fought for Charles. One problem could be that contemporaries confused the identity of the Irish Confederate with that of the Anglo-Irish soldier. Although the Marquis of Ormonde's cessation with the Irish Confederates in 1643 theoretically allowed Charles to recruit from Ireland, in practice it seems that those soldiers who were shipped to the King originated from the English army that had been dispatched to quash the rebellion in 1641.¹⁵ As such, it is difficult to distinguish whether the King's so-called Irishmen were in reality Irish, Anglo-Irish, English, or in some cases even Scottish. Estimates for the total number of troops shipped over from Ireland vary considerably, as do the estimated numbers of native Irishmen who served Charles. Whereas Malcolm calculates that over twenty two thousand soldiers, including eight thousand native Irish, entered England, Barratt and Stoye believe that fewer than ten thousand soldiers from Ireland, of whom no more than one thousand were indigenous Irish, ever fought in England.¹⁶ The contingent of four thousand men who came under Lord Byron's command in December 1643 is likely to represent the

¹³ Barratt, *Cavaliers*, pp. 130-131; Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, p. 107.

¹⁴ Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 44.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁶ Barratt, *Cavaliers*, p. 166; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 60-61; Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, p. 116.

largest influx of troops from Ireland, but the majority of these were English.¹⁷ Although the bulk of these troops were either killed or captured at Nantwich in January 1644, their survivors served at the equally ill-fated battles of Marston Moor, Montgomery and Naseby.¹⁸ Some Irish soldiers also served in various Royalist garrisons, including Chester and Harlech Castle but their numbers were insignificant.

Although Chapters Three and Five have argued that Royalism attempted to promote an anti-Scottish and patriotic English cause during the Bishops' Wars, it is also evident that Charles actually depended upon some military assistance from Scotland. Toynbee and Young's research reveals that there was a noticeable Scottish presence in Royalist Oxford, with Scotsmen partially populating the ranks of Royalist officers.¹⁹ Such was the presence of the Scots in the King's service that on 12th December Arthur Trevor observed how

The English begin to be full of discontents, that they swarm so about the King, now in a time when the Nation is coming upon him to tear his Crown from his head.²⁰

From 1644, the forces commanded by the Marquis of Montrose would also add to the Scottish Royalist dimension of the Civil Wars, and by the autumn of 1645 the Royalists' increasingly fantastical strategy was built around the concept of uniting the remaining Royalist forces in England with those under Montrose. That the Royalist cause should have relied on non-English force to sustain itself was hardly in keeping with the English identity of the Royalists in publications like *Avlicvs*. It effectively asks how the Royalist press approached foreigners, and whether it ever made any attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in the English identity it had tried to create.

¹⁷ Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 209.

¹⁸ Young, *Naseby*, pp. 95-96; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁹ Toynbee, M., and Young, P., *Strangers in Oxford: A Side Light on the First Civil War, 1642-1646*, London and Chichester, Phillimore, 1973, pp. 8-9; pp. 123-125.

²⁰ Carte, *Original Letters*, Vol. I, p. 27.

It cannot be stressed enough that the Royalist press' approach to foreigners was frequently ambivalent. Overwhelmingly presented as an enemy in Royalist print, it is evident that the Scotsman was on several occasions during the mid-seventeenth century an important Royalist ally. For all of the Royalist anti-Scottish rhetoric that had been printed during the Bishops' Wars, it was Charles who tried to invite a Scottish invasion in 1648, and it was his son who marched into England at the head of yet another Scottish force in 1651. Even the way Charles himself at times described the Scots was occasionally at odds with official publications and Royalist print. His correspondence to the Earl of Salisbury during February and March 1639, for instance, creates not the impression of an anti-Scottish sentiment, but of a frustration at a minority within the Scottish population.²¹ Yet the Scotsman generally remained an official and significant Royalist enemy, and was a key issue on which Royalist print attacked Parliament.

For all of the efforts in Royalist print to create a patriotic English identity, the very ideas that underpinned that exact perception were themselves challenged by the interests and culture shared between England and Scotland. If Royalism could claim to be upholding Protestantism, then it could also be seen as the destroyer of that same religion. Since the 1570s, Scotsmen had been appearing in the press alongside Englishmen in the struggle against militant Catholicism.²² With the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, Scotsmen had again been seen to be fighting Protestant England's enemy.²³ Given the history shared between England and Scotland in fighting

²¹ HMC, 9th Series, *Salisbury (Cecil) Manuscripts*, Vol. 22, p. 299.

²² See Chapter Two. See also Dawson, J., 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture and Integration in Sixteenth-Century Britain', in Ellis, S., and Barber, S., (eds.), *Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725*, London, Longman, 1995.

²³ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture'.

Catholicism, the efforts of the Royalist press to demonise the Scots seem ideologically and culturally flawed.

Covenanting pamphleteers were naturally eager to stress the links between England and Scotland, claiming that two countries were 'all under one roof, in one and the same ship, and members of one body'.²⁴ But it is unmistakable that the Scots enjoyed a favourable representation in non-Royalist English publications and were also well-received across a not insignificant section of English society. In 1640 Robert Baillie noted that in England the 'binding word' in many printed ballads was 'grammercie, good Scot', and in September of the same year the Venetian Ambassador observed that

... universal acclamations at the entry of this army become ever louder. Those of the Puritan faith in particular never tire of applauding them, in the hope that this move will suffice to compel the King to summon Parliament again, whereby not only Scotland but England also would recover their accustomed liberty, which has suffered injury solely from the principles of the present Government, which is most hateful to the people...²⁵

The close bonds between the Scots and English continued to be expressed throughout the First Civil War, creating the impression that England and Scotland shared a 'common enemy'.²⁶ John Booker, the Parliamentary astrologer who between 1643 and 1645 was engaged in a personal pamphlet war with his Royalist counterpart, Sir George Wharton, attempted to overcome any ethnic distinctions between English and Scottish forces by asserting a common religious identity between the two peoples.²⁷

²⁴ Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish Protestant Culture', p. 26.

²⁵ Quoted in Firth, 'Ballads', p. 258; Razzell and Razzell, *A Contemporary Account*, p. 26.

²⁶ Coles, *Perfect Relation*, p. 13; Remonstrance of the Nobility, p. 23; *A Proclamation Against Libellous and Seditious Pamphlets, and Discourses sent from Scotland*, London, 1640; Larkin, *Proclamations*, pp. 703-705; *A Proclamation Against the Home-loyterers, Recusants to the Common Cause, within the Colledge of Iustice*, Dunghlass, 1640; *Information from the Scottish Nation* quoted in Raymond, *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering*, p. 192.

²⁷ ODNB. Wharton penned a number of pamphlets under the pseudonym George Naworth.

Recalling Scottish actions in 1639 and 1640, Booker identified the Scots as 'valiant brethren' who were '*Lights of the Common-Wealth*' in a kingdom which was then 'over-crowded with a generall Darkness'.²⁸ Military progress by Parliamentary and Scottish forces throughout the kingdoms in this context was aimed at eradicating the purported ignorance and superstition of the dark or distance corners of the land, as Booker anticipated

...his *Excellencies* approach to *Oxford*, and Sir *William Wallers* journeying to the *West*, and his baiting the *Devon* and *Cornish* Brutes into a better sence of *Religion*, and the *Scots* conquest in the *North*, their taking of *New-castle*, purging the *Marquesse* with a *Pill* against Popery, making the *Gospel* shine all over the Northerne parts, and so dazzle the *Newarkers*, that they will not put them to the trouble of Scaling the *Workes*...²⁹

Parliament and the Scots were thus presented as a union which endeavoured to 'burne down the house of *Baal* to the ground'.³⁰ The alliance between England and Scotland was thus not about the subversion of English identity inasmuch as it was the creation of a British identity of sorts, and Royalism's opposition to Scotland was therefore indicative of its allegedly inherent popery.

If Royalism was able to promote its own English identity, then we need to ascertain whether it attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction in its acceptance of military assistance from within Scotland. Given the general lack of coverage on Montrose and the so-called Scottish Royalists in publications such as *Avlicvs*, it would seem that Royalism conveniently overlooked its own Scottish dimension in an effort to preserve its English identity. There is, however, some insight into how Royalism could have resolved its approach to Scotland in Montrose's

²⁸ Booker, J., *Mercurius Vapulans, or Naworth Stript and VVhipt. In Answer to a Most Base and Scandalous Pamphlet, Called Mercurio-Coelico-Mastix, An Anti-Caveat, & c.*, London, 1644, pp. 4-5.

²⁹ Booker, *Mercurius Vapulans*, p. 4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8; *Ruperts Sumpter and Private Cabinet Rifled. And Discovery of a Pack of his Jewels. By Way of Dialogue Between Mercurius Britannicus and Mercurius Aulicus*, London, 1644, p. 3.

declaration of 1644, which made a distinction between Royalist and Parliamentary Scots. Although Montrose's Declaration made it clear that Charles, like Parliament, was prepared to use Scottish military aid, it also professed the 'hatred and detestation' of Scotch Royalists to 'the present invasion of this of England by those of our nation'.³¹ According to this argument, therefore, Royalists still fought for the preservation of England. Unlike Parliament's courting of the Scots, Charles' use of Scottish military service was not shown to be introducing a foreign power into England. Rather, Scotch Royalism, as depicted in Montrose's Declaration, was designed to preserve England through military action north of the border, and was thus not necessarily entirely at odds with the projected Englishness of the King's cause. However, it is uncertain as to how widely Montrose's declaration was circulated, and its importance in either reshaping or resolving Royalism's approach to the Scots remains questionable. Moreover, the presence of Catholics in Montrose's army from 1644 could hardly have assuaged any doubts about Royalism's cultural and religious identity.³²

If Royalism attempted to promote an English identity by contrasting itself with the seemingly pro-Scottish Parliament, then it is also noticeable that its approach towards Englishness was further complicated by its concept of Britain. In both the Bishops' Wars and the First Civil War, Welsh and Irish were included in the Royalist framework of Britain whilst the Scots were excluded. For Royalism, whilst the Scots were foreigners who possessed little or no common identity and heritage with the English, the Welsh and Irish shared close bonds. To an extent, Royalism's favourable approach to the Welsh was not without some cultural grounds. Since the start of the

³¹ Carte, *Original Letters*, pp. 42-44.

³² Reid, *Scots Armies*, pp. 17-28.

Tudor dynasty the Welsh had been increasingly able to see themselves as an integral part of the British Isles.³³ This view had apparently been encouraged after 1603, with the Welsh peoples' legendary Trojan and ancient British roots being reconciled with a commonly held view that James I, and hence Charles I, was descended from King Arthur.³⁴

That the Welsh were descended from the ancient Britons was a theme which was reflected in Royalist print. On various occasions throughout the war, *Avlicvs* described the Welsh as 'true Britaines' who were 'of another make' to the Scots, and the 1640 pro-Royalist pamphlet, *A true Subiects wish*, integrated the Welsh and Irish in the fight to defend 'England's honour'.³⁵ Parker's ballad, *Britaines Honour*, likewise praised the Welsh and celebrated them as 'Trojan worthies', pointing to the martial prowess of two 'Valiant *Welchmen*', who had supposedly held their ground against 15,000 Scotsmen at Newburn in August 1640. Parker's ballad clearly contrasted the Welsh with the Scots and created a strong link between Wales and England by having the two Welshmen proclaim that 'The vaunting *Scot* shall know what valour / Doth in a *Britains* brest reside'.³⁶ This display of stubborn Welsh resistance in *Britaines Honour* was shown to stem from an intense love of and loyalty to the established Stuart monarchy, and an understanding that the country's honour was directly linked to the King.³⁷ Such was Royalism's strong relationship with the Welsh that Pembrokeshire, a culturally more English part of Wales, was described by *Avlicvs* as

³³ Jenkins, P., 'The Anglican Church and the Unity of Britain: The Welsh Experience, 1560-1714', in Ellis and Barber, *Conquest & Union*; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 12-18.

³⁴ Jenkins, 'The Welsh Experience', pp. 14-18.

³⁵ *Avlicvs*, No. 39, 24th-30th September 1643, pp. 3-8; *A True Subiects wish*.

³⁶ Parker, M., *Britaines Honour*, London, 1640.

³⁷ Charles' Scottish identity was overlooked.

...the most seditious County of all *Wales*, or rather of *England*, for the Inhabitants live like English *Corporations*, very unlike the loyall *Welchmen*...³⁸

Avlicvs' attitude towards Pembrokeshire is particularly revealing on two points regarding Royalism's approach to ethnicity. Firstly, Pembrokeshire's lack of Royalism means that its population is not 'true *Welch*', and are excluded from Welsh geography, culture and ethnicity. Secondly, the persistence of Parliamentarianism within Pembrokeshire can only be explained by its comparatively more English identity. The county is less of a part of Wales and more of an extension of England; for Royalism, Pembrokeshire is that '*Little England beyond Wales*'.³⁹ *Avlicvs* thus directly associates rebellion with the English, and in doing so problematises Royalism's relationship with Englishness, since the qualities Royalism values are not thought to be present amongst the English people.

The moderate Parliamentarian clergyman, John Corbet, explained that Royalism appealed to the Welsh primarily because they were an unenlightened and slavish people, but it is evident that Royalist print targeted Welsh cultural sensitivities.⁴⁰ *Avlicvs* stressed that Parliamentarianism and its innovations struck at the heart of Wales and threatened to corrupt Welsh society.⁴¹ More significantly, *Avlicvs* suggested that this threat would effectively replace Welsh identity with a perverse and Scotticised imitation of it. Denbigh, Brereton and Myddleton's intention to 'onely... plant the Gospell among the Welchmen' stemmed not from a wish to bring enlightenment, but from a desire to culturally eradicate the Welsh and reduce them to the chaotic Scottish dominance similar to that which was supposedly operated in

³⁸ *Avlicvs*, No. 29, 16th-22nd July 1643, p. 5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 30, 23rd-29th July 1643, p. 9.

⁴⁰ *ODNB*; Corbet, J., *Military Government*, p. 10; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, ch. 1.

⁴¹ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 23rd-29th July 1643, p. 8.

Yorkshire.⁴² *Avlicvs* argued that, if left unchallenged by military force, Parliament would effectively colonise Wales by implanting Scottish ministers like Alexander Henderson, who would then force the Covenant into the established church and recreate Wales in the Scottish image.⁴³ According to Royalist discourse, Parliament was a blatant cultural aggressor which wanted to ‘furnish all *England* as well as *Wales*’ with religious zealots who had either ‘ignorance or faction enough to serve the *Covenant*’.⁴⁴

Alleged cultural threats to the Welsh were not divorced from physical harm in Royalist print. Operations led by Richard Swanley and Rowland Laugharne in Wales during 1644 were presented in *Avlicvs* not only as clear evidence of Parliament’s tyranny, but of proof that only Royalism championed Welsh interests.⁴⁵ Swanley was characterised as an English bogeyman; he was a ‘bloody Mariner’ who in the name of Parliament engaged in an ethnic war and regularly committed atrocities against the Welsh.⁴⁶ Against depraved and sadistic Parliamentarians, Royalist military action was presented as the only response, and *Avlicvs* interpreted Charles Gerard’s operations as a liberating force for Wales. Unlike Swanley and Laugharne, Gerard was a protector. Instead of death, Gerard and Royalist military power brought justice for the Welsh and sought out the Parliamentary perpetrators of atrocities.⁴⁷ *Avlicvs* claimed that Welsh ‘Gentry and Commons’ alike were ‘so much startled’ at the ‘horror’ of Parliamentarianism that they had risen as ‘one man’ against the malefactors.⁴⁸

⁴² *Avlicvs*, No. 28, 9th-15th July 1643, p. 4; No. 30, 23rd-29th July 1643, p. 7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*; *ODNB*.

⁴⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 28, 7th-13th July 1644, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Hutton, *Royalist War Effort*, ch. 6; *ODNB*.

⁴⁶ *Avlicvs*, No. 26, 23rd-29th June 1644, p. 1; *ODNB*; Capp, ‘Naval Operations’, pp. 170-171; Phillips, *Memoirs of the Civil War in Wales*, Vol. 2, pp. 161-162. Such accusations were not without some degree of truth, as Swanley was responsible for the deliberate drowning of a shipment of ‘Irish’ at Milford Haven in May.

⁴⁷ *Avlicvs*, No. 26, 23rd-29th June 1644, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

On 23rd June 1644 Oswestry fell to Parliamentary forces under the Earl of Denbigh and Sir Thomas Myddleton. The Shropshire town was considered to be a place of 'great concernment', and was regarded by Myddleton as 'the key which opens the door to Wales'.⁴⁹ *Avlicvs* argued that Parliamentarianism had a sinister interest in Wales, and the Royalist newsbook argued that the 'loyall Welchmen' could only suffer, both physically and culturally, at the hands of Parliament.⁵⁰ How could a population, *Avlicvs* seemed to ask, which was frequently derided as '*barbarous and heathenish*' in the London press, and whose very language was not understood and was simply dismissed by Parliamentary writers as mere 'howlings', expect to receive just governance from Westminster?⁵¹ What emerges in *Avlicvs* is thus an image of Royalism as a popular Welsh cause. Royalism is supposed to be the protector and guardian of the Welsh people, irrespective of their individual social positions, and the protection provided by Royalism applied to the physical and cultural dimensions of Wales.

However, if Royalism was designed and projected as a defender of Wales, then its position as a champion of Englishness subsequently seems flawed, especially when its war effort necessitated the use of Welsh force on English soil. Indeed, one noticeable flaw in Royalism's efforts to promote the Welsh was the very shape and nature of Welsh participation in the King's cause. A pamphlet entitled, *The Welshmans Answer*, claimed that the Welsh were committed to the 'advancement' of both their 'Country and the English people in their Britannicall glory and fame', but their

⁴⁹ Mitton, T., *Two Great Victories: On Obtained by the Earle of Denbigh at Oswestry*, London, 1644, p. 8; Barratt, *Cavaliers*, p. 147.

⁵⁰ *Avlicvs*, No. 28, 7th-13th July 1644, p. 4.

⁵¹ Mitton, *Two Great Victories*, p. 6; *Avlicvs*, No. 28, 7th-13th July 1644, p. 4.

conduct on English soil challenged such a protestation.⁵² Unlike the Scottish presence in England between 1639 and 1640 which had not been tainted with serious bloodshed, Welsh intervention in England in 1642 was marked by a major battle and an apparent attack on the English people. Welsh soldiers fought against Parliament at Edgehill, and a Welsh regiment under Sir Thomas Salisbury was involved in the storming of Brentford.⁵³ Lord Herbert's armies provided yet further proof that Royalism was not acting in English interests. On 28th January 1643 Parliament issued a declaration which told of how 'ruine and destruction' was threatened on English society. Its language was clear in that it gave the Welsh Royalists under Lord Herbert a distinct, binary ethnic identity that divorced them from England. They were a 'hellish & accursed crew', or 'forraigne Enemy' who threatened to invade England, and not the long-term partner of the English people.⁵⁴ Royalist actions in Gloucestershire throughout 1643 were particularly unnerving for the Parliamentary press, which characterised the conflict in the region as a defensive struggle to protect English territory. For *The Kingdomes VWeekly Intelligencer*, a Royalist victory in Gloucestershire would create 'a gappe to let in the Welsh'.⁵⁵ In this context Royalism appears to be a threat to English society, and its association with Wales is said to be physically and culturally destructive.

⁵² *The Welshmans Answer to that False Petition Which was Printed of Her Reputation, and Protestation Made in Her Vindication of Her Defamed Reputation*, London, 1642, pp. 6-8.

⁵³ Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, pp. 54-55.

⁵⁴ *A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament: For the Prevention of a Most Horrid, Wicked and Unnaturall Designe, Pursued by Sir Ralph Hopton and His Adherents, Rebels and Traytors, in a Warlike Manner in Cornwall, and Devon, Whereby Ruine and Destruction is Now Threatened by the Welch, and Others of that Hellish & Accursed Crew to the County of Somerset, and the Adjacent Counties, Who are Therefore Hereby Authorised to Imploy the Moneys Rayseed there upon the Parliaments Propositions, for Defence of Themselves*, London, 1643.

⁵⁵ *Kingdomes VWeekly Intelligencer*, No. 7, 7th-14th February 1643, p. 7.

Interestingly, *Avlicvs* appears to have ignored the issue of the ethnic composition of Herbert's forces.⁵⁶ It was only after Herbert's forces were surrounded and defeated by Sir William Waller at Highnam on 25th March 1643 that the Royalist newsbook actually described them as '*Welch-men*' who were fighting to prevent Parliamentary incursions into Wales.⁵⁷ Tellingly, *Avlicvs*' approach to the matter was protective of Welsh culture; the Welsh force appears to be defensive in nature, even though it is invading English territory. Royalism therefore seems to be more concerned with the protection of Wales than it does with the security of England. The clear association of Wales with the King's cause from June 1642 onwards thus tainted Charles' cause with an 'otherness' that was distinctly un-English and which was further accentuated by Royalism's relationship with Cornwall, that '*Little Wales Beyond England*'.⁵⁸

Stoye has argued that the Cornish believed the Civil War to be a war against English religious and cultural encroachment, resulting in them considering Royalism to be intrinsically linked to a patriotic defence of Cornwall.⁵⁹ Royalism, he argues, encouraged the Cornish to regard themselves as ethnically distinct from their English neighbours in an attempt to harness their manpower against Parliament, and it is clear that *Avlicvs* commented on the political differences between the Cornish and the English.⁶⁰ One paradox which seems to arise from this argument is that, by appealing to a Cornish sense of difference, Royalism had by implication defined Englishness as

⁵⁶ *Avlicvs*, No. 8, 19th-25th February 1643, p. 8. The newsbook did, however, describe Sir Ralph Hopton's army as Cornish.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 13, 26th March-1st April 1643, p. 10. Whether this was done with the intention of appealing to Welsh readers and consolidating their allegiance to the King remains uncertain, given that the English language was spoken by relatively few Welsh people, Gaunt, P., *A Nation Under Siege: The Civil War in Wales 1642-48*, London, HMSO Publications, 1991, p. 17.

⁵⁸ Razzell, *Contemporary Account*, Vol. II, p. 219; Malcolm, *Caesar's Due*, pp. 201-204; *Avlicvs*, No. 30, p. 9.

⁵⁹ Stoye, M., *West Britons: Cornish Identities and the Early Modern British State*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 2002, ch. 4; Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 49.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45; *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 9.

Parliamentarianism, and had therefore undermined its own credibility as an 'English' cause. However, as with its strategy in building relations with the Welsh, Royalism to an extent relied on anti-Scottish sentiments in an effort to overcome this apparent inconsistency.

Charles appeared in person at Kingsmoor near Ilchester on 23rd July 1644 to publicly address the 'true *Britaines*' there, and it seems that he used a similar rhetorical strategy to that which had been used in *Avlicvs*' commentaries on the Welsh.⁶¹ By the time of Charles' speech, Essex was advancing towards Plymouth with the intention of invading and conquering Cornwall. It is, as Stoye points out, important to note that by the summer of 1644 neither Parliament nor its supporters in the London press had demonstrated any affection towards the Cornish, who had become the subject of vicious attacks in various newsbooks.⁶² What Charles appears to have attempted in his speech at Kingsmoor was to capitalise on the well-established anti-Cornish attitudes of Parliamentarianism whilst locating himself at the centre of a defence of Cornwall. As at the time of Marston Moor, when *Avlicvs* had presented Parliament and the Scots as forces which wanted only to consume England, so too in late July did the King claim that Parliament's mission was to physically and culturally destroy the Cornish. Essex's army, Charles asserted, was the beast which would 'devoure' those vital aspects of Cornish life, namely 'Religion, Property, and Liberty'.⁶³ Much like its relationship with the Welsh, Royalism came to be fashioned as the protector of the Cornish. Charles even positioned himself as the personal guardian of the Cornish and their culture, stating that he would 'refuse no danger' to defend them from Parliamentary 'slavery', and that with their manpower he would

⁶¹ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 9.

⁶² Stoye, *West Britons*, pp. 66-75.

⁶³ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 10.

eject the culturally alien Parliamentary army.⁶⁴ For Royalism in Cornwall during July 1644, Parliament's western forces were effectively a reincarnation of the legendary giant, Gogmagog, and at Kingsmoor Charles seemed to be adopting the role of Corineus, who according to legend had finally hurled the fearsome Gogmagog out of ancient Britain.

If in his speech Charles was appealing to a Cornish sense of cultural and ethnic difference to English Parliamentarians, then he also seems to have addressed, albeit briefly, the distinctions between Cornish and English Royalists. Stoyles argument suggests that the Cornish were in reality pursuing their own separatist movement from English domination, especially once Sir Richard Grenville had assumed command in Cornwall.⁶⁵ Yet in his speech at Kingsmoor, Charles also stressed to his Cornish audience that he was not fighting a war in the west simply to protect it from English influence. According to his assertions, it was not the English per se which threatened Cornish lives, livelihoods and culture, but rather it was a corrupted form of English power which posed the real danger. As a result of Parliament's acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant, and the subsequent Scottish invasion of England, the very nature of English religion and governance had, at least from a Royalist perspective, been transformed and made in the Scots' image. It was this Scottish power and influence over the English which, Charles argued, had serious implications for the future of Cornwall. Welsh and Cornish support for Royalism, as Stoyles argues, may have done 'nothing to strengthen Charles I's fragile credibility as an English national leader', but the King was nonetheless in his speech trying to incorporate these peoples into a defence of both themselves and England, of a defence of Britain.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 10.

⁶⁵ Stoyles, *West Britons*, chs. 4-5.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

On 23rd July, the King was looking to the Cornish for long-term assistance against 'that Northern Invasion, which... threateneth no lesse then the conquest of this whole Nation'.⁶⁷

As early as January 1644 *The Spie* had believed the King to be planning on using Cornish forces as a means of 'counterpoising the comming in of the Scots', and in his attempts to persuade the trapped Essex to convert to Royalism during the second week of August, the King told of how England would be at the mercy of the Scots if his subjects did not unite under the Royal banner.⁶⁸ The Royal interest, as conveyed to Essex, was the preservation of the kingdom 'from a conquest by the Scots', and for Charles this was an issue which could not be ignored even in the far south-western extremity of England.⁶⁹ As *Avlicvs* put it, Parliamentarians were Scotticised Englishmen who 'would Lord it over the Kingdome', since they were 'as false and insolent... as those that came over *Tweed*'.⁷⁰ Fear of Scottish influence and power spreading throughout the kingdoms and subduing the populations of England, Wales and Cornwall was thus an important factor in Royalism's patriotic pretensions, and it was also one which had the potential to formulate a more unified British identity. Unfortunately, it overlooked the cultural and religious links between England and Scotland, and Royalism's manipulation of anti-Scottish sentiments was arguably outflanked by English anxieties concerning the Irish.

If Royalism tried to establish itself as the cultural guarantor of the Welsh and Cornish, then its association with the Irish certainly undermined its credibility as an English cause. On several occasions during the 1640s, Charles was shown to be using Irish troops against his opponents. During the Bishops' Wars, Charles received

⁶⁷ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 10.

⁶⁸ *The Spie*, No. 1, 23rd-30th January 1644, p. 3; Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. 8, p. 496.

⁶⁹ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. 8, p. 497.

⁷⁰ *Avlicvs*, No. 32, 4th-10th August 1644, p. 6.

substantial financial support from the Irish Parliament, which agreed to pay him four subsidies totalling £200,000.⁷¹ As well as invading England with his Welsh forces, Herbert stood accused of using Milford Haven as a landing zone for Irish reinforcements who were meant to be ‘within eight houres sayle thereof’, thereby making Wales look like a gateway for an Irish invasion.⁷² During 1641 there had also been rumours of a ‘Popish’ army massing in Wales under the Earl of Worcester, and from the outbreak of the First Civil War allegations regarding a joint Irish and Welsh conspiracy were circulating in Westminster.⁷³ The Irish rebels under Sir Phelim O’Neil declared themselves to be operating under a Royal Commission, and the Cessation between the Marquis of Ormonde and the Confederates in 1643 provided Parliament with substantial material with which to attack Royalism as did the seizure of the King’s correspondence in 1645.⁷⁴

It is apparent that the Irish were positively terrifying figures in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English press. Irish Catholicism and Gaelic paganism had often been synonymous for Elizabethan writers, creating the impression that Ireland was an unenlightened country full of brutal people.⁷⁵ The very close presence of Catholicism to the west of England and Wales meant that Ireland was regarded as a potential threat, and one which could potentially form a key part in any Spanish invasion strategy. The outbreak of rebellion in 1641 cemented contemporaries’ fears

⁷¹ Bennett, M., *The Civil Wars In Britain & Ireland 1638-1651*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 51-55; Fissel, *Bishops’ Wars*, p. 115.

⁷² *The Spie*, No. 1, 23rd-30th January 1644, p. 8; *A Continuation of Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages*, No. 31, 6th-9th February 1643, p. 8; *Certaine Informations*, No. 6, 20th-27th February 1643, p. 8.

⁷³ Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 18-19; Stoye, M., ‘Caricaturing Cymru: Images of the Welsh in the London Press 1642-46’, in Dunn, D., (ed.), *War and Society in Medieval and Early Modern Britain*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2000; Bowen, L., ‘Representations of Wales and the Welsh During the Civil Wars and Interregnum’, in *Historical Research*, Vol. 77, No. 197, August 2004.

⁷⁴ *The Petition and Declaration of Sir Sir Philom Oneal Knight, Generall of Ireland, to the High Court of Parliament Now Assembled in England, and the Lords and Nobility Commanders of the Army of the Catholicks of Ireland*, London, 1641; *The Heads of Severall Proceedings in this Present Parliament*, 22nd-29th November 1641, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵ Canny, N.P., *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established 1565-76*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1976, pp. 124-125.

and provided Pym and his supporters with proof that a Popish Plot to destabilise England existed.⁷⁶ The very fact that the Irish rebels claimed to be acting with the King's consent did much to tarnish the projection of Royalism, and reports of Catholic conspiracies across England strengthened Parliament's image as the guardian of England.⁷⁷ Whilst the Scots could be presented as Protestant allies, the Irish seemed alien in ethnicity, religion and culture.⁷⁸

Unlike its approach to the Welsh, the Royalist press was duplicitous and implicitly uncomfortable in the few occasions when it attempted to deal with the Irish. What is striking is that whereas Pym and Parliamentary pamphleteers appear to have been relatively keen to promote the relationship between Parliament and Scottish Covenanters, both Charles and the Royalist press appear to have been more ambivalent, even deceitful, in their approach to the Irish.⁷⁹ The ongoing conflict in Ireland evidently remained an important issue even after war broke out in England, with newsbooks encouraging their readers to provide financial contributions towards the suppression of Irish Confederates.⁸⁰ It also appears that Charles was very much aware of the emotional and political importance of the Irish Rebellion, since he attempted to conceal his preparations for war under the claim that he was

⁷⁶ Dunlop, R., 'The Forged Commission of 1641', in *English Historical Review: Notes and Documents*, 1887; Lindley, K., 'The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion upon England and Wales, 1641-5', in *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 70, September 1972.

⁷⁷ *A Discovery of a Horrible and Bloody Treason and Conspiracie: Against the Protestants of this Kingdome in Generall, but Especially Against Divers of the Nobility, and Many of the Honourable House of Commons in Parliament, and also Against Some of the Citizens of London*, London, 1641; *A New Plot Against the Parliament. Englands Deliverance. Or A True and Great Discoverie of a Horrible and Bloudy Treason and Conspiracie*, London, 1641. Starkey, H., *A Royall Message from the Kings Most Excellent Majestie to the Honourable Houses of Parliament. With the Answer of the House of Commons Concerning the Said Message. Likewise the True Relation of a Bloody Conspiracy by the Papists in Cheshire. Intended for the Destruction of the Whole Countrey*, London, 1641; *Heads of Severall Proceedings*, p. 6; Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 233-236. Local authorities were clearly anxious about potential Catholic uprisings, e.g. C.R.O. A/B/2 Orders 520-540; G.R.O. GBR B2, f. 24.

⁷⁸ Malcolm, J.L., "All The King's Men: The Impact of the Crown's Irish Soldiers on the English Civil War", in *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 22, No 83, March 1979, p. 240.

⁷⁹ E.g. *The Discovery of a Late and Bloody Conspiracie at Edenburg, in Scotland*, London, 1641. The opening pages of this pamphlet contain a woodcut of Pym opposite news of Scottish affairs.

⁸⁰ *Kingdomes VWeekly Intelligencer*, No. 9, 21st-28th February 1643, p. 6.

assembling military assistance for the suppression of Irish Catholics. His attempt to seize Hull on 23rd April 1642, for example, was masked by the pretence of wishing to direct the supply of arms for Scottish troops fighting Irish Catholic rebels. A pamphlet that was composed by Charles' printer, Robert Baker, gave the impression that the King's actions at Hull were intended for the good of England.⁸¹ In this work, Charles was supposed to be 'The light of Israel' during a time of 'generall apprehension', and his alleged work to combat the Irish Catholics seems to have been intended to demonstrate this point.⁸² The problem was that Charles' attempts to build a war effort seemingly placed Royalism at odds with English interests. Royalist activity was seen to disrupt local and national defence, and the diversion of military resources into the King's hands prevented the suppression of the Irish rebellion. The Royalists' seizure of arms and munitions in and around Chester in 1643 was said to be obstructing the supply of much needed resources to the English soldiers in Ireland.⁸³ As implied in newsbooks such as *A Perfect Diurnall*, Royalist efforts to seize county magazines deprived localities of their means of defence at a time when England was shown to be threatened by a militant Popery which aimed to 'rid the Kingdome of all the English and Scotch, and to kill and destroy them'.⁸⁴

The fact that the Irish suffered from such a poor representation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English print makes it difficult to see how Royalism could have ever embraced them effectively. There are Royalist pamphlets from the Bishops' Wars which praise the 'good example' of the Irishman whose 'purse, and person is so

⁸¹ *The Humble Petition of the Gentry and Commons of the County of York, Presented to His Majestie at York, April 22. 1642. And His Majesties Message Sent to the Parliament, April 24. 1642. Concerning Sir John Hothams Refusal to Give His Majestie Entrance into Hull*, London, 1642, p. 6.

⁸² *Humble Petition*, pp. 2-3.

⁸³ *Speciall Passages and Certain Informations from Severall Places, Collected for the Use of All that Desire to be Truly Informed*, No. 3, 23rd-30th August 1642, p. 5.

⁸⁴ *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 15, 23rd-30th October 1643, pp. 1-5.

ample / To serve his royall majesty', but Royalist printed material from 1642 onwards appears to have been generally subdued in how it approached the Irish problem.⁸⁵ In fact, much of the initiative in addressing the Irish question seems to have rested with Parliamentary pamphleteers, who could easily draw upon popular fears and anxieties regarding the Irish, and in doing so wreck the Royalists' patriotic image.

Francis Coles, a leading printer in London, was particularly active in targeting Royalism's inconsistent and flawed concept of Englishness, and the King's Cessation with the Confederates provided him with substantial material for subsequent pamphleteering. His pamphlets, such as *A Perfect Relation, Or Svmmarie Of All The Declarations, Messages, And Answers, Passages and Proceedings between the Kings Majesty, and both Houses of Parliament*, stressed the point that the Royal army was growing only through the support of the Irish.⁸⁶ According to Coles, Royalist strongholds were said to house numerous Irish invaders, with Nottingham housing 'neere 500 Irish' and 'very many Commanders, Irish and Papists, and daily increased'.⁸⁷ Likewise, Chester was allegedly being turned into a beachhead for an invasion, with 'too many Irish' supposedly flooding into the city immediately following the Cessation of arms.⁸⁸ For pamphleteers like Coles, this influx of Irish soldiers into the Royalist cause was all part of a continental Catholic conspiracy led by

⁸⁵ *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 15, 23rd-30th October 1643, pp. 1-5; *A True Subjects Wish*.

⁸⁶ Coles, F., *A Perfect Relation, or Svmmarie of All the Declarations, Messages, and Answers, Passages and Proceedings Between the Kings Majesty, and Both Houses of Parliament*, London, 1642; Raymond, *Invention*, p. 33; Coles, F., and Leach, F., *A Continuation of Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament, and Divers Other Parts of the Kingdome*, No. 9, p. 4.

⁸⁷ Coles, *A Perfect Relation*, pp. 3-4. It also seems probable that Coles' pamphlet was either written or published in August 1642, since Nottingham became a Parliamentary stronghold soon after the King's departure that month.

⁸⁸ *Speciall Passages*, No. 7, 20th-27th September 1642, pp. 6-7; Barratt, J., *The Great Siege of Chester*, Stroud, Tempus, 2003, pp. 32-33.

the Spanish and French to conquer England by destroying Parliament.⁸⁹ Complete regiments and even entire armies serving under the King's banner were claimed to be of Irish origin, with Lord Dillon being said to have command 'over the Irish Rebels, and Irish Papists and Commanders about the King, of which there are a great number and none in greater favour then they'.⁹⁰ The army that Lord Byron commanded during the winter of 1643 to 1644 certainly acquired an Irish identity in the press, and its defeat at Nantwich in January 1644 was celebrated in the press as a victory over an invading force.⁹¹

In view of how emotionally charged the Irish question was, it is striking to notice that Royalism and Royalist print seem to have done little to either acknowledge or address the issue. For instance, *Avlicvs* sidestepped the alleged relationship between the King and Irish Confederates when it reported on Parliamentary legislation concerning shipping around the British Isles. Parliament was concerned about the possibility of the Royalists receiving arms and munitions from Ireland, and towards the end of March various orders were given for the seizing of ships suspected of transporting enemy supplies.⁹² Whereas *Certaine Informations* called for England to 'awake out of the Lethargy of security' and to recognise the threat it faced from the 'immane blood-suckers', *Avlicvs* simply overlooked the issue of Irish assistance and merely said that Parliament would 'fill the seas so full of Pirates' through its legislation.⁹³ Evidently, having the Royalists being seen to be protecting English waters from the Irish was not a concern for the Royalist newsbook.

⁸⁹ Coles, *A Perfect Relation*, p. 4.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Lord Dillon had apparently approached Charles in secret on behalf of the Irish Catholic Lords in November 1641, *ODNB*.

⁹¹ *Magnalia Dei A Relation of Some of the Many Remarkable Passages in Cheshire*, London, 1644, pp. 2-3.

⁹² *Journal of the House of Commons*, Vol. II, pp. 964-966; pp. 969-971; pp. 974-975; Capp, B., 'Naval Operations', in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, *The Civil Wars*, p. 165.

⁹³ *Certaine Informations*, No. 5, 13th-20th February 1643, p. 8; No. 6, p. 2; *Avlicvs*, No. 7, 12th-18th February 1643, pp. 1-5; No. 8, pp. 7-9.

At times *Avlicvs*' response to the Irish simply failed to engage with the paradoxes of Royalism's Englishness altogether. Following the massacre of a number of Irishmen in 1644, *Avlicvs* protested at Parliament's 'unparalleled murder'.⁹⁴ For *Avlicvs* to focus on the slaying of Irishmen inadvertently gave the impression that Royalism prioritised foreigners over the English, and it was not the only instance in which the Royalist newspaper openly championed the Irish. In an issue dated 21st September 1643, it triumphantly proclaimed that the 'Rebel Scots' had been defeated by the Irish near Castleblayney.⁹⁵ This was news that was hardly likely to have been well-received amongst many English readers, some of whom would have heard through other pamphlets that Charles had requested the army in Ireland to spare any rebels who surrendered to them.⁹⁶ Developments such as Rupert's decision in July 1644 to hang fourteen Parliamentary soldiers in retaliation for the seven Irishmen executed by Parliament reinforced the idea that the Royalists valued foreigners more so than they did Englishmen. Indeed, Rupert's orders prompted an impassioned response from the editor of *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, Richard Collings, who invited readers to observe 'the price that his Majesties party sets upon an Irish Rebel, the blood of two English Protestants for one of them'.⁹⁷ In many ways the Royalists' apparent relationship with the Irish justified Parliament's alliance with the Scots. English and Scottish forces were frequently shown to be closely working together against the Irish Confederates, and Scottish operations in suppressing the Irish rebellion and preventing massacres of the English population received

⁹⁴ Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, p. 68.

⁹⁵ *Avlicvs*, No. 38, 17th-23rd September 1643, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁶ *Journal of the House of Commons*, Vol. 2, pp. 700-703; *An Exact and True Divrnall*, No. 1, 8th-14th August 1642, p. 7.

⁹⁷ *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, No. 65, 23rd-30th July 1644, p. 2.

substantial coverage in the London press.⁹⁸ Pamphleteers commented on how a 'Bond of peace between England and Scotland' was necessary for the defence of Parliament and Protestantism, and it is clear that MPs considered the Scots to be 'well affected Brethren' who would fight the machinations of 'Forraigne parts' in the 'bowels of this Nation'.⁹⁹ In this respect, the King's association with the Irish was politically and culturally riskier than Parliament's connection with the Scots, since it could be perceived to be aligning Royalism with militant Catholicism.

As has been demonstrated in Chapters Three and Five, Royalist print essentially tried to construct a patriotic English cause around the King. Certainly after the humiliation of 1639, Charles was supposed to be the focal point for English resistance against the allegedly anti-monarchist Covenanting Scots. Indeed, Parliament's alliance with Scotland following the acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant in August 1643 also ensured that Royalist print could continue to portray the King's cause as a defence of England. This chapter, however, has explored the problems of the Royalists' English identity and the ways in which the Royalist press handled them. On the surface, the Royalist press could have had the opportunity to fashion a more British identity for the Royalists, as the King drew support from people in each of his kingdoms. Theoretically this was not implausible, since both Wales and Cornwall had effectively been integrated with England for centuries.

⁹⁸ *A perfect Relation of the Proceedings of the English Army Against the Rebels in Ireland*, London, 1642; *A Glorious Victory Obtained by the Scots Against the Rebels in Ireland*, London, 1642; *The Irish Occurrences. Comfortable News from Ireland, of the Brave Valour and Policie of VVare by the Lord Jones, and the Lord Diboney, Who Fought the Greatest Battell, with the Rebels; and Gave Them the Greatest Overthrow, as the Like Hath Not Been in Irelands this Hundred Yeers and More*, London, 1642.

⁹⁹ Coles, *A Perfect Relation*, p. 13; *Journal of the House of Commons*, Vol. 2, p. 780; *A Declaration of Both Houses of Parliament Sent to the Well-Affected Brethren of the Kingdome of Scotland*, London, 1642, p. 6.

In practice, both Parliamentary and Royalist pamphleteers appear to have segregated the Welsh and Cornish from the English, albeit for different reasons. Whilst Royalist print seems to have addressed the Welsh and Cornish as people distinct from the English in order to gain their support, Parliamentary pamphleteers identified them as foreigners, and then subsequently used them to undermine the notion that the Royalists were English. Meanwhile the Irish remained a real problem for the Royalists' image. Clarendon believed that the presence of the Irish in the King's armies 'made more impression upon the minds of sober and moderate men... than could be then imagined', and although their actual numbers were small they were nonetheless sufficient to destabilise Royalism's English image.¹⁰⁰ The Scottish Royalists were also problematic for the Royalist press, since much of its pro-English rhetoric was predicated on an anti-Scottish attitude to begin with. After all, how could an anti-Scottish, pro-English cause convincingly admit that it was in part relying on Scottish military assistance?

The examination in this chapter suggests that Royalist print tended to have three basic responses to the inconsistencies in its representation of the King's supporters. The first, and perhaps most effective method it ever used, was that it simply ignored such problems altogether, and this was often the case with regard to the Irish and Scottish Royalists. Secondly, it could try to argue to that the foreigners fighting under the King's banner were in some way collaborating with the English Royalists, as was the case with Welsh. Thirdly, the Royalist press could sidestep the issue of Royalist ethnicity by attempting to draw attention to the inhumane activities which Parliamentary soldiers allegedly engaged in. At times, however, the Royalist press also appears to have championed the interests of those who could be identified

¹⁰⁰ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, Vol. 1, pp. 399-400.

as enemies of England, and this of course undermined the English identity of the Royalists, and in turn may even have reinforced the Royalist stereotypes in the Parliamentary press.

Attempts to portray Royalism as the natural choice for Englishmen were inherently flawed, perhaps in part due to the paradox that the very monarch who appeared to be heading a supposedly pro-English cause was himself Scottish and ruled over multiple kingdoms. If anything can be observed about the patriotic pretensions in the Royalist press, then it is that they were consistently inconsistent, and that any profession of an English identity was complicated by the inherent uncertainty of what actually constituted Englishness in the first place. Whereas Parliamentary pamphleteers succeeded in isolating and defining the King's Welsh and Irish supporters, the Royalist press generally seems to have struggled to reconcile such people with the Englishness it tried to champion.

Whether fictitious or not, the numerous reports and allegations that Royalism depended on foreign assistance created the impression that England was facing 'some forraign designe', and it was an impression that the Royalist press does not seem to have tackled effectively.¹⁰¹ The seemingly lacklustre and flawed effort by the Royalist press to convincingly resolve the conflicts of identity amongst Royalists enabled Parliament to be presented as the true protector of English interests, with its armies becoming the one force that could 'cleansse the Countrey' of foreigners.¹⁰² The following chapter will pursue the issue of Royalist foreignness and attempt to explore the implications that lay behind Royalist stereotypes.

¹⁰¹ Coles, *A Perfect Relation*, pp. 6-8.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*; *Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, p. 2; Roberts, K., *Cronwell's War Machine: The New Model Army, 1645-1660*, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, 2005, ch. 8.

Chapter Seven:
The Royalist Stereotype

Whereas the previous chapter sought to examine the inconsistencies of the English identity of Royalists and Royalism, together with the Royalist press' responses to those inconsistencies, this chapter attempts to explore Royalist stereotypes. It will attempt to identify some of the characteristics of the Cavalier stereotype and read into their implications. This chapter will pursue the ways in which Royalists were reported in the press and relate the reports to the question of Englishness. To this end, the work that follows explores how the image of the swashbuckling Cavalier in part derived from an Elizabethan concept of an unruly soldier, and how this theoretically isolated Royalism from an English identity. It will identify two themes behind the negative Cavalier stereotype: the threatening, disorderly foreigner; and the amusingly effeminate man. The Cavalier stereotype presented Charles' followers as both a serious threat to England and as a foppish individual who was divorced from the masculinity of English Protestantism. As a result, the textual analysis that follows focuses not only on the person of the Cavalier, but also on the context in which the Cavalier was found. Place and action are thus considered to be as important as the person in terms of establishing the implications behind the stereotype. Royalism, it will be suggested, was easily subject to being interpreted as a malevolent force, as Royalists were visibly present in the disturbance of local and national peace. The consequence of Royalist actions and their reportage was that Parliament was able to emerge as the guardian of England and English interests.

The wars of the 1640s have often been remembered in terms of two binary figures: the Cavalier and the Roundhead. In some cases, these two characters have overshadowed the wars themselves and have transcended the boundaries of time, effectively becoming

vivid apparitions of an essentially fictitious interpretation of the past. The Cavalier in particular has been glamorised and romanticised over the centuries, and in some instances appears to have become an historical reality. In some living history groups the flamboyantly dressed and larger-than-life Cavalier maintains a hold over the imaginations of both participants and observers. In many respects, this is perhaps a symptom of a long-term Royalist cultural victory. But it is also a fixation which has emerged on the pages of history books, and it is one that is certainly enduring, giving the impression that appearance rather than political, cultural, religious or ideological outlook was the defining trait of a Royalist. Nineteenth-century studies of the Civil Wars in particular seem to have crystallised the image of the romantic, dashing Cavalier. Physical traits such as ‘Long flowing locks’ and ‘plumed hats’ frequently appear in Victorian studies, and even seem to have survived in more recent accounts of the period.¹

Much work has already been done on the Cavalier stereotype. Roebuck in particular has explored the issue in some depth, and military histories have also played a part in debunking the glamorous image of Charles’ supporters.² De Groot has read into the appearance of Royalists, exploring Royalist concepts of masculinity and Royalist anxieties regarding women.³ Roy has taken the investigation into the Cavalier a step further by examining proclamations and Royalist codes of conduct in order to establish exactly what martial ideals Royalism aspired to, and how military failure prevented such ideals from being sustained.⁴ More recently Stoye’s research has shown that Rupert and his infamous dog were focal points for the development of anti-Royalist stereotypes which sought to

¹ Warburton, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, pp. 334-335; Bence-Jones, *The Cavaliers*, pp. 1-8.

² Robuck, G., ‘Cavalier’, in Summers, C.J., and Peabworth, T.L., (eds.), *The English Civil Wars in the Literary Imagination*, Columbia and London, University of Missouri Press, 1999. For military histories see Young, P., and Holmes, R., *The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars 1642-1651*, Wordsworth, Ware, 2000, pp. 42-44; Barratt, *Cavaliers*, ch. 2.

³ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, ch. 5.

⁴ Roy, I., ‘Royalist Reputations: The Cavalier Ideal and the Reality’, in McElligott and Smith, *Royalists and Royalism*.

taint Royalists with an otherness that was predicated on the preternatural.⁵ In many ways, the primary aim of this chapter is not to continue to press the issue of historical truth over fiction, but to explore the fiction itself.

Although Chapter Two of this thesis has argued that the English soldier could be presented as a guardian of Protestantism, it is also evident that another type of soldier emerged in sixteenth-century England: the swashbuckling, violent rogue.⁶ As Hale, Cunningham and Grell point out, this type of individual constituted a separate and identifiable other in society.⁷ Machiavelli observed that a man ‘of violence does not believe he can wear civilian dress’, and that

... if someone plans to succeed in the soldier’s career, he not only changes dress immediately, but also departs from every civilian practice in his customs, usages, voice, and bearing.⁸

Shakespeare’s plays reflect a similar issue, with soldiers sometimes appearing to be ‘All plumed like ostriches’, distancing them from the rest of society.⁹ Obscene clothing signifies the soldier’s disdain towards society; he has to identify himself as existing outside of civilian conventions, and this leads him to regard civilians with contempt. Unusual clothing empowers the soldier, encouraging him to think that he can act outside of the law, rendering him a distinctly visible individual amongst the rest of the population.

Swearing, cursing and generally bad language reinforces the soldier’s difference in society and renders him a foreigner in an otherwise peaceful environment. Military

⁵ Stoye, M., ‘The Prince and the Devil Dog’, in *BBC History Magazine*, Vol. 12, No. 5, May 2011. See also Stoye, M., *The Black Legend of Prince Rupert’s Dog*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 2011.

⁶ Lindabury, R.V., *A Study of Patriotism in the Elizabethan Drama*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1931, p. 148; Jorgensen, P.A., *Shakespeare’s Military World*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 1956, pp.122-165. Whereas Lindabury argues that Elizabethan drama created a favourable impression of soldiers, Jorgensen focuses on the dramatists’ negative portrayal of military men.

⁷ Hale, J.R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, London, Fontana, 1985, pp. 127-137; Hale, *Artists and Warfare*, p. 2; Cunningham and Grell, *The Four Horsemen*, pp. 107-113. See also Fissel, M.C., *English Warfare, 1511-1642*, London and New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 39; pp. 95-113.

⁸ Machiavelli, N., *Art Of War*, Lynch, C., (trans. and ed.), Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 3.

⁹ Shakespeare, W., *Henry IV Part I*, London, c. 1597, IV.i.99-111.

characters like Pistol, who is a ‘swaggering rascal... the foul mouthedest rogue in England’, clearly stand out from the rest of society.¹⁰ With their exotic-sounding lexicon, public brawling and heavy drinking in the belief that ‘valour comes of sherry’, soldiers show little that suggests they are committed to any cause other than personal pleasure and social disorder.¹¹ Machiavelli believed that armies were recruited ‘according to the will of whoever wants to soldier’, and lamented that such people were

... scandalous, idle, without restraint, without religion, fugitives from their father’s rule, blasphemers, gamblers, in every part badly raised...¹²

So intrinsically related to military service were these individuals that Sir William Cecil stated that a man who aims to be a soldier could ‘hardly be an honest man, or a good Christian’.¹³ The objective of the bad soldier was thus to destabilise society, to crash through its social boundaries and upset the harmony and peace that existed within them. In many ways, the Elizabethan antithesis of the good soldier anticipated the Cavalier stereotype of the 1640s.

As with the odious Elizabethan soldier, the Cavalier stood out from the rest of society. Swearing and blaspheming was meant to be such an integral part of his identity that abusive words were welded into the Cavalier’s name. ‘Van Dammee’ was one such name given to a spoof Cavalier who emerged in the press during 1643, and it was applied collectively so that Royalist soldiers came to be reported as the ‘Dammee Bretheren’ or ‘Dammee-Blades’.¹⁴ Foul language and blasphemy distanced the Cavalier from the English language and Protestant religion, and by implication rendered him an outsider.

¹⁰ Shakespeare, W., *Henry IV Part II*, London, c.1597-1599, II.iv.68-71.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II.iv.176-80; IV.ii.99-111.

¹² Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 21.

¹³ Cecil, W., *Certaine Preceptes or Directions for the Well Ordering of and Carriage of a Man’s Life*, Edinburgh, 1618, pp. 10-11.

¹⁴ *The Speech of a Speech of a Cavaleere to His Comrades, in Answer to the Wardens Speech*, London, 1642, p. 1; *Most Hapy [sic.] and Welcome Newes from His Excellencie the Earle of Essex*, London, 1643, p. 8; *The Starry Messenger; or, An Interpretation of the Strange Apparition of Three Suns Seene in London*, London, 1645, pp. 55-56.

Uncontrollably aggressive language complimented violent actions. Rampant sex and a lust to penetrate flesh, sometimes even non-human flesh, was very much a staple of the stereotypical Cavalier's lifestyle. At their most basic level, these actions signified the Cavalier's baseness and lack of Christian morality, but they also revealed his supposed need to assert and confirm his own masculinity. Control over other people's bodies and the constant need to invade flesh create a grotesque and extreme interpretation of masculinity, and one which therefore appears to reveal an insecurity in sexual identity.¹⁵ The Cavalier's clothes compounded his otherness. Unlike the ideal soldier, the Cavalier prides himself on deliberately distinguishing himself from his peers by wearing unusual clothing. His style of dress defines his allegiance and makes him believe that he has some authority, causing him to wear it as if it is armour.¹⁶ The Cavalier is in essence the exact opposite of what a true soldier should be. He indulges himself in destructive physical personal pleasures; broader political and religious concerns are of precious little concern to him. The stereotypical Cavalier broke free from Christian teaching, embracing a chaotic dystopia which he threatened to introduce into the localities.

By consistently associating Royalists with foul language, violence and ludicrous clothing, Parliamentary pamphleteers were integrating the King's supporters with an already familiar image. The difference was that the Cavalier was alien not only in local terms, but also in national terms. As Roebuck points out, the term 'Cavalier' was exotic sounding and designed to imply that the Royalists were not English.¹⁷ Deriving from the Spanish word, 'Caballero', the word 'Cavalier' linked Royalism to England's nemesis, Catholic Spain. In one pamphlet, the Royalists' difference from the English was expressed by referring to the supposed ancient lineage of the British Isles' population. By creating a

¹⁵ E.g. *A Blazing Starre Seen in the West at Totneis in Devonshire*, London, 1642.

¹⁶ *Englands Selected Characters, Describing the Good and Bad Worthies of this Age. Where the Best May See Their Graces, and the Worst Discerne Their Basenesse*, London, 1643, p. 8; de Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 101.

¹⁷ Roebuck, 'Cavalier'.

Cavalier called Agamemnon, one pamphleteer identified the Royalists as Greeks, the legendary enemies of the Trojans who settled in Britain.¹⁸ The identification of the Cavalier as a foreigner was perhaps aided by the fact that news concerning the wars against Spain continued to circulate in England, with the result that England's image of being an embattled Protestant island remained prominent in the press.

Anti-Royalist pamphlets seem to have attempted to foster a collective English identity against which the Cavalier stood opposed. Various pamphleteers expressed anxieties that England was at risk of being invaded by foreign forces, with attention being given to English naval power and coastal defence.¹⁹ Judging by the content of these publications, England was still very much regarded as being an embattled country. The country's military past was revisited. Agincourt and memories of the Elizabethan era and Elizabethan heroes in particular remained prominent in the press, fostering the sense of an English Protestantism against which the Cavalier could be identified.²⁰ Pamphleteers repeatedly stressed the importance of defending England against foreign powers, and appealed to patriotic sensibilities. All 'true *English*' were supposed to defend Protestantism, and the strength of 'English spirits' would 'repell and conquer' any foreign design.²¹ Fear, or even paranoia, of an encroaching foreign force coloured the reportage of several newsbooks. *A Perfect Diurnall*, for instance, reported on how an Ambassador from Holland had supposedly divulged that there was 'great plotting in other Countryes against England', thereby creating the impression that England was once again in danger of

¹⁸ *Speech of a Cavaleere*, p. 1.

¹⁹ *Englands Safety in Navie and Fortifications: The Common Interest Both of King and People*, London, 1642, p. 7. This tract asserted that naval defences were paramount in preventing a Civil War, since they would limit the influx of foreigners into England. See also *Plots, Conspiracies and Attempts of Domestick and Forraigne Enemies of the Romish Religion, Against the Princes and Kingdomes of England, Scotland and Ireland*, London, 1642, esp. p. 20, and *A List of His Majesties Navie Royall, and Merchants Ships, Their Names, Captaines and Burthens in Every One, Now Setting Forth for the Guard of the Narrow Seas, and for Ireland this Yeare*, London, 1642.

²⁰ Drake is specifically mentioned in *Englands Safety*, pp. 5-8. The author of this pamphlet wrote 'Dulce et decorum pro patria mori' and translated it as: 'Oh, how sweet it is to spend our dearest blood, For our Native Countrey, her benefit and good'.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

destruction.²² Parliament was petitioned on 8th August to secure the country's ports in order to prevent an influx of foreign agents, and it was said that

...the Malignant partie having got such a head, that they doe daily seeek [sic] the utter ruine and destruction of this Iland, and long since had prevailed and brought their plots and conspiracies to perfection had it not been for the Honourable Court of Parliament.²³

The growing political and military tensions in England appear to have been presented as part of a broader continental struggle, enabling the Cavalier to be regarded as a popish bogeyman imported from abroad. Obviously, Parliament's publicists left readers in little doubt over the identity of England's enemies. Cavaliers were supposed to be executing a 'plot' to subvert England, and the first phases of this scheme was said to include the removal and replacement of individuals in local authorities and a disruption of the local peace. The Army Plots were an indication that this process was already underway, since they demonstrated that Cavaliers, or militant 'Hot-spurres' bent on 'Popish Innovations' were congregating around the King and attempting to impose their power on England.²⁴ *A Perfect Diurnall* similarly surmised that 'although this insurrection amongst our selves be termed Civill Warres, yet it was hatcht and set abroad in forraigne parts by the Jesuiticall Sect'.²⁵ From such assertions it is possible to observe how the conflicts of the 1640s were

²² *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, p. 5.

²³ *His Maiesties Message to Colonell Goring of Portsmovth. Wherein Hee Declares His Resolution in Coming to the Said Town*, London, 1642, p. 5; *Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, pp. 2-3. On 1st August 1642 MPs debated the reasons for taking up arms and decided that they would be doing so for defending the peace of the kingdom. *Journal of the House of Lords*, Vol. 5, pp. 248-251.

²⁴ *Brothers of the Blade*, p. 1; *The Svcklington Faction*; Russell, 'The First Army Plot', pp. 104-105; Hirst, D., *England in Conflict, 1603-1660: Kingdom, Community, Commonwealth*, London and New York, Arnold, 1999, pp. 172-174; Peacey, J., *Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum*, Aldershot and Ashgate, 2004, p. 208; *The Declaraton or Remonstrance of the Lords and Commons, in Parliament Assembled. With Divers Depositions and Letters Thereunto Annexed*, p. 1; *CSPD*, 1640, p. 84; Russell, *Fall of British Monarchies*, pp. 296-302; Kilburn, T., and Milton, A., 'The public Context of the Trial and Execution of Strafford', in Merritt, J.F., (ed.), *The Political World of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 235-236.

²⁵ *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 11, 25th September-2nd October 1643, p. 4.

very much interpreted as being the products of some form of Catholic conspiracy.²⁶ The Cavalier was thus a physical manifestation of Parliamentary fears: he represented chaos, and brought violence and war with him. His appearance in the localities wrecked any hope that England could maintain its peaceful state, and as such he existed outside of the English population.

In *A Collection of Records*, the author asks, 'who doubts but what the French Papists committed in their own Country, they would be glad to see done in this Kingdome'.²⁷ It was precisely this idea of foreign practices being imported into England which dominated the representations of Royalists and constituted a significant part of the Cavalier stereotype. From Kent news arrived which suggested that foreign legal powers were being introduced into the localities in the King's name, with twelve justices of the peace being displaced by 'many *Papists*'.²⁸ Goring was likewise said to be acting against every aspect of English society, which included 'the Kings sacred Person, the Houses of Parliament, the Protestant Religion, the Lawes of the Land, the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject, and priviledges of Parliament'.²⁹ His alleged use of arbitrary imprisonment and the infliction of 'insufferable injuries' were reminiscent of Spain's tyranny in the Low Countries, and as such removed him from an English identity.³⁰

Irish and Welsh troops were naturally important in Parliamentary efforts to develop Cavalier stereotypes. Both the Irish and Welsh were said to originate from supposedly dark, poor and desolate countries, and this made England appear as if it were a rich and attractive land for foreigners to invade. In much the same way as the Royalist

²⁶ For a discussion of contemporary popish and puritan conspiracy theories, see Lake, P., 'Anti-Popery: the Structure of a Prejudice', in Hughes, A., and Cust, R., *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics 1603-1642*, London and New York, Longman, 1989.

²⁷ *A Collection of Records*, p. 6.

²⁸ *Journal of the House of Commons*, Vol. 2, pp. 700-701; *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, p. 2.

²⁹ *A Trve Relation of the Severall Passages and Proceedings of Colonell Goring at Portsmouth*, London, 1642, pp. 3-5.

³⁰ *Exceeding Joyfull Newes from Dover, Wherein is Declared Hovv a Noble Man was Sent from the King to Demand the Castle to be Resigned to Him; But was Bravelly Repul'st by the Governor of the said Castle*, London, 1642, pp. 5-6.

press claimed that the Scots wanted to raid England for its riches, John Corbet asserted that the Welsh were ‘allured’ by the ‘hope of plunder’ in England. *The Welch-mans publike Recantation* likewise claimed that Welsh soldiers were enticed by the prospect of material enrichment.³¹ Similarly, *The English Irish souldier with his new discipline* claims that plundering and material gains are the defining characteristics of an Irish Royalist. Stolen goods substitute his weapons and equipment, distancing him from the identity of a true soldier and blatantly turning him into a villainous glutton who gorges himself on English property.³² Alongside material greed sat alleged Irish and Welsh violence. Irish soldiers commanded by Lord Byron were said to have been responsible for the massacre of villagers at Barthomley in Cheshire in December 1643, and Welsh soldiers under Sir Thomas Salisbury were involved in the storming of Brentford in November 1642.³³ In the latter case, the ‘universall’ killing which ensued was conveyed as being so ‘voyd of humanity’ and so alien that one pamphleteer was horrified ‘That in England such horrid acts should be done’.³⁴ Indeed, the alleged brutality of the Royalists was very reminiscent of the reports on the Irish Rebellion, and suggested that the Royalists had introduced a brutal, Celtic form of warfare into England.

A significant aspect of the foreign-style warfare that Royalists were supposed to indulge themselves in was physical violence against civilians. Whereas true English soldiers were meant to preserve their Protestant country, Cavaliers existed to disrupt society and to ‘threaten ruine and destruction to this Kingdome’.³⁵ Violence was the Cavaliers’ sport, and their desire was to annihilate law and order and obliterate the English population. Much like the bloodthirsty Spaniard that had haunted the pages of innumerable

³¹ Corbet, *Military Government*, p. 20.

³² *The English Irish souldier*, London, 1642.

³³ *Magnalia Dei*; Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, pp. 54-55.

³⁴ *A True and Perfect Relation of the Barbarous and Cruell Passages of the Kings Army at Old Brainceford, Neer London*, London, 1642, p. 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

pamphlets prior to the 1640s, the Cavalier desired to ‘swimme through a sea of blood’.³⁶ The alleged ‘great outrage & spoyle’ and attacks on civilians by Royalists were treated as an unknown and shocking introduction to England itself by Parliamentary pamphleteers.³⁷ Accounts of Northampton’s operations in Warwickshire, for instance, portrayed the Royalists as foreigners who sought to introduce foreign practices in order to destabilize and destroy communities.³⁸ Yorkshire civilians were likewise shown to be at the mercy of Royalist aggression and lawlessness, with ‘great damage’ being inflicted on the county by ‘the insolencies of the Cavaleers, who disarm, Pillage and take away all that they can lay hands on’.³⁹ Such a theme was echoed in news from Lancashire where it was said that the Royalists’ opponents were ‘much oppressed, pillaged and disarmed not being able to defend themselves, desiring the Parl, to take that county into consideration’.⁴⁰ The Royalists’ attempt to take control of Coventry, as with the failed efforts to seize Hull, was used by pamphleteers to confirm the anti-civilian image of Royalism, with Royalist tactics being shown to destroy civilian lives and property.⁴¹ This was a theme which was reinforced by stories of Royalist military engineers working to devise new weapons with which to attack settlements.⁴² In Chester the destructive effect of Royalism on civilians was demonstrated in the claim that Royalist recruitment officers did ‘much hurt in the city and countrey by their insolencies and evill demeanours to the inhabitants’.⁴³ In no small part Rupert was said to be at the forefront of these Royalist efforts against the civilian population. Brandtschatzung, the practice of threatening to burn towns if their inhabitants

³⁶ *A True and Perfect Relation*, p. 4.

³⁷ *Certain Speciall and Remarkable Passages from Both Houses of Parliament*, London, 1642, No.10, p. 6.

³⁸ Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, ch. 2; Hale, J.R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, London, Fontana, 1985, ch. 7; Donagan, *War in England*, ch. 2.

³⁹ *An Exact and Trve Diurnall*, No. 2, 15th-22nd August 1642, p. 8

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 3, 22nd-29th August 1642, p. 5.

⁴¹ *Certaine Speciall and Remarkable passages*, No. 10, 23rd-29th September 1642, p. 7.

⁴² ‘divers Engens of wilde-fire made in balls’ were described in *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 11, 25th September-2nd October 1642, p. 2. It was reported that another military engineer, a former Londoner, had been trying to build new war machines.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 3; *An Exact and Trve Divrnall*, No. 1, 8th-15th August 1642, p. 6; No. 2, 15th-22nd August 1642, p. 7.

failed to pay an army a specified sum of money, was associated with Rupert after his actions at Leicester in August 1642.⁴⁴ Similarly, the Prince's assault on Birmingham in April 1643 unsurprisingly gave Parliamentary pamphleteers another opportunity to show how Royalism was a direct attack on English people.⁴⁵ The title of the pamphlet, *Prince Ruperts burning love to England: discovered in Birminghams flames*, related Rupert's affections to his own military practices so that he appeared to be a violent, foreign pervert who was obsessed with ravishing the country and people that had so defied popery.

Cannibalism became a not uncommon feature of the Royalists described in the Parliamentary press. Recalling the sorts of imagery found in news emanating from Ireland, *The Copy of a Letter presented By A Member of the Commons House of Parliament Concerning Divers Passages at Portsmouth* related how one Royalist official in Portsmouth had said to a pregnant woman

...that he would not have her go, because if the Town should be so put to it, as to want victuals, then that in her belly would eat as sweet as a young sucking pig...⁴⁶

The Cavalier's actions are clearly subhuman; he is the 'very scumme of the Countrey'.⁴⁷ The vileness of his actions is what separates the Cavalier from English people. His craving to tear into human flesh suggests a grotesque and extreme form of sexual energy that in turn signifies his desire to consume the country and physically conquer its population. Cavaliers effectively prey on people's weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and by implication feed off England's enfeebled state. The pregnant woman is a defenceless target for the Cavalier: she represents a weakened and susceptible England; her unborn child is the

⁴⁴ Wedgwood, C.V., *The King's War 1641-1647*, London, Book Club Associates, 1974, p. 118.

⁴⁵ *A True Relation of Prince Ruperts Barbarous Cruelty Against the Towne of Brumingham*, London, 1643; *Prince Ryperts Burning Love to England Discovered in Birminghams Flames*, London, 1643.

⁴⁶ *The Copy of a Letter*, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁷ *His Maiesties Resolution Concerning the Setting Up of His Standard*, p. 5; *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester, and Cambridge: Declaring What the Kings Standard is, and the Time and Manner of its Setting Up. Also How Lichfield and Tamworth are Disarmed, and the Lord Gray His House Disarmed and Pillaged by the Traiterous Cavaliers. Together with Some Other Remarkable Occurerents*, London, 1642.

country's future. The Cavalier hunts English civilians in the hope that he can literally devour England, and thereby physically destroy Protestantism.

In her interpretation of the First Battle of Newbury, Purkiss argues that defeat feminises soldiers and compels them to reassert their masculinity by terrorising defenceless civilians.⁴⁸ This idea can be applied to the Cavalier stereotype, since it appears that the Royalists came to be presented as an effeminate force which was unable to withstand Parliamentary masculinity.⁴⁹ Royalists appear to be unable to either cope with or confront the masculine power and resolve of Parliamentary soldiers, and it is this lack of masculinity which seems to cause them to attack civilians. One Parliamentary commentator belittled and feminised Royalist forces when he mockingly described how Lichfield Royalists had 'most manfully fled' from the advancing forces under Lord Brooke.⁵⁰ Goring's actions were explained in terms of his lack of masculinity, since it was his inability to 'meete a man face to face' that had resulted in him betraying the 'trust reposed in him by the honourable Houses of Parliament'.⁵¹ It was reported that at Hull that Royalist soldiers were 'often beaten away', whilst in Warwickshire more Royalists were said to have fled from Lord Brooke, whose regiment had supposedly become the 'great terror of the Malignant party'.⁵² Royalists, it was claimed, were capable only of terrorising civilians, and incapable of fighting an opposing army, as the author of *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester, and Cambridge* wrote

For Gods and the Parliaments enemies are stout and courageous,
where they are feared, and not opposed; but feeble and cowardly
where manfully withstood.⁵³

⁴⁸ Purkiss, D., 'Dismembering and Remembering: The English Civil War and Male Identity', in Summers and Peberworth, *The Civil Wars in the Literary Imagination*.

⁴⁹ *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, p. 3.

⁵⁰ *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester and Cambridge*.

⁵¹ *An exact and Trve Divrnall*, No. 3, 22nd-29th August 1642, p. 4; *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 11, 25th September-2nd October 1643, p. 3.

⁵² *An exact and Trve Divrnall*, No. 1, 8th-15th August 1642, pp. 4-8; No. 2, 15th-22nd August 1642, p. 7; *Speciall Passages and certain Informations*, No. 3, 23rd-30th August 1642, p. 4.

⁵³ *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester, and Cambridge*.

At Nottingham it was alleged that the Royalists ‘ransackt Gentlemens houses’, committing ‘rapine and spoile’, whilst in Buckinghamshire Charles’ forces were said to have done ‘much spoile to the Countrey’.⁵⁴ Unlike the Royalists, the Parliamentary garrison in Warwick were shown to have honour and devotion in their purported resolution to ‘spend their dearest lives in the defence of both Houses, then to prove false and treacherous unto them’.⁵⁵ Similarly, in Wells in Somerset, Royalists under Sir Ralph Hopton and the Marquess of Hertford were shown to act cowardly and dishonourably when, after allegedly agreeing a cessation of arms with numerically inferior local Parliamentarians, they suddenly attacked them in a ‘treacherous manner’.⁵⁶ Even Rupert’s success at Powick Bridge was interpreted as evidence of Cavalier cowardice, as the approach of the much larger force under Essex caused the Royalists to flee ‘by the nimbleness of their heeles and horses’.⁵⁷ Cowardice in the face of real soldiers enables the Cavaliers to be defined as

...the men that must charge at distance, and stand for the good of that party that will pay best, and doubt not to defend them boldly against no resistance.⁵⁸

Goring’s Royalists lack enthusiasm for battle, having seen the arrival of Parliament’s forces outside Portsmouth.⁵⁹ This stood in stark contrast to ‘the Gentlemen that stood for the Parliament stood for the Parliament couragiously’, such as a Scottish trooper who

seeing the gates of *Portsmouth* open, sets Spurs to his Horse, holds up his hand to his fellowes, and away he goes into the towne, discharges his Carabine, after his Pistols, and with his sword fights for a halfe quarter of an houre with 6 or 7 men, and had not the

⁵⁴ *Remarkable Passages*, p. 1; *An Exact and Trve Divrnall*, No. 4, 29th August-5th September 1642, pp. 4-5; *Exceeding Happy Newes from Oxford*, London, 1642, pp. 3-5.

⁵⁵ *Exceeding Joyfull Newes from Warwick-Castle and Banburie*, London, 1642, p. 5.

⁵⁶ *More later and Trver Newes from Somersetshire, Boston, Nottinghamshire, and Warwickshire: Wherein is Declared the Treacherous and Barbarous Cruelty of the Cavaleers in Those Parts, by the Marquesse of Hartford; and the Taking of Colonel Gorings Lieutenant and 40. Cavaleers at Salisbury*, London, 1642, p. 7.

⁵⁷ *A Trve Relation of a Great Battell Fought Betwixt the Earle of Essex, and Prince Robert Their Forces, with the Manner of the Taking Prince Robert Prisoner, and Divers Other Commanders*, London, 1642, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁸ *Speech of a Cavaleere*, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Young, P., and Emberton, W., *Sieges of the Great Civil War 1642-1646*, London, Bell & Hyman, 1978, pp. 11-13; *The Copy of a Letter Presented by a Member of the Commons House of Parliament Concerning Divers Passages at Portsmouth*, London, 1642, pp. 4-6; *An Exact and Trve Divrnall*, No. 3, p. 6.

gates beene shut, had undoubtedly made an honourable retreat, but that being cut off became a prisoner....⁶⁰

Goring may have ordered his soldiers to 'shew your selves like men', but it was their enemies who were seen to display greater masculinity in their conduct, and it was supposed to be this show of masculine strength which resulted in numerous Royalist desertions.⁶¹ Facing Waller's army, Goring's men had supposedly disposed of their own weapons, an act which would soon after be legislated against in Royalist articles of war, and

absolutely refused to doe dutie: And though some of them were perswaded to return to their guards, yet they professed that if there should come assault they would not strike a stroke...⁶²

Indeed, Parliamentary efforts to establish the image of the cowardly Cavalier are further evidenced in the press' treatment of Welsh Royalists, who came to be presented as comical and effeminate individuals with little appetite for the manly pursuit of war.

The pathetic Welshman in 'The Welchmans dolefully ditty', 'Poore Taffy', is unable to cope with the stress of battle at Edgehill and does 'His poore Britches beshite'.⁶³ The pseudo-Welsh narrator in *The Welch-mans publike Recantation* is consistently referred to as 'her', and is distraught and traumatised by the battlefield.⁶⁴ He describes how 'the smoke of gunpowder spoiled her stomach, that her did wish her had been toasting Cheese by the fire side in her own Country'.⁶⁵ Rather than fight, the Welshman wishes to retire to the comfort and safety of his house: he cannot endure the masculinity of military and

⁶⁰ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory*, p. 5; *Speciall Passages*, No. 3, p. 6.

⁶¹ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory Obtained by Sir John Merrick's Regiment, and One Troop of Horse, Against the Towne and Castle of Portsmouth*, London, 1642, p. 5.

⁶² Griffin, M., *Regulating Religion and Morality in the King's Armies, 1639-1646*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2004, ch. 4; Donagan, *War in England*, p. 149; *A Declaration of All the Passages at the Taking of Portsmouth; Shewing the Reasons Why it was Surrendered up to the Committee of Both Houses of Parliament: Together with a True Copy of the Articles Agreed Upon Between the Committee and Colonell Goring*, London, 1642, p. 5.

⁶³ *Welch-mans publike Recantation*, p. 7.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* The word, 'her', also represents the Welsh accent.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

political action, and must instead remain within the feminine environment of the home. England, by implication, is masculine and the physical movement of the Welsh towards the ruling body of the British Isles signifies an uncontrollable, warped and misguided female urge. Royalist soldiers thus come to be known as those who will ‘upon the first appearing of any considerable power... will melt off’.⁶⁶ They have no substance, for they are mercenary in nature and unprepared to risk their lives in a real battle, and it is their lack of masculinity which means they are unable to withstand the manly courage of Parliamentary soldiers’ ‘English spirits’.⁶⁷

In the face of an inability to handle his own sword against an adversary, the Cavalier is seen to use language as an alternative weapon, with the true meaning of English words being replaced by non-English Cavalier meanings. The Commissions of Array were conveyed in the Parliamentary press as an innovation in English law, with their executors acting as if ‘they meant to set up a petty Parliament among us’.⁶⁸ Cavaliers perverted the law by indulging in plundering and bloodshed through ‘force of Proclamation’, effectively turning the King’s authority into a tool which they could use at will.⁶⁹ Like the Devil, Goring was also seen to operate through deception in his mission to win peoples’ ‘hearts and mindes’.⁷⁰ Not only had he tricked Parliament earlier in 1642 into letting him stay in control of Portsmouth, but he also supposedly deceived local militiamen into joining him in defending the town against Parliament. The very words spoken by the Royalist governor emanated from a forked tongue, so that truth and true meaning were lost. Goring may have made the inhabitants of Portsmouth think that they were fighting for ‘King and

⁶⁶ *The Reformed Malignants or, A Discovrse Vpon the Present State of Our Affaires. Betwixt a Cavalier and a Convert*, London, 1643, pp. 5-6.

⁶⁷ *A New Discovery of the Designe of the French*, p. 6.

⁶⁸ *Certaine Speciall and Remarkable Passages*, No. 10, 23rd-29th September 1642, p. 8; *Speciall Passages*, No. 3, 23rd-30th August 1642, p. 7.

⁶⁹ ‘Upon Sir John Suckling’s hundred horse’, ‘Sir John Suckling’s Answer’, and ‘Upon Sir John Suckling’s Northern Discoverie’, in Clayton, *Works of Sir John Suckling*, pp. 204-209; *The Svcklington Faction: or (Sucklings) Roaring Boyes*, London, 1641; Robuck, ‘Cavalier’, pp. 12-17.

⁷⁰ *True Newes from Portsmouth*, London, 1642, p. 1.

Parliament’, but only in a ‘contrary sence to that which he intended’.⁷¹ The implication of this was that the foreignness of Royalism was accentuated. Goring speaks the language of the Cavalier, and not of the Englishman. His interpretation and understanding of English words is false and foreign, but he disguises it within the English language so that he can deceive others and subvert the lawful authority of Parliament. Indeed, Goring’s supposed manipulation of the English language served as evidence of how the King had also been deceived and ‘seduced by wicked Counsell’.⁷² Goring’s alleged strategy of deliberately perverting language and meaning in order to deceive the listener is peculiarly effeminate. It implies that neither he nor any other Cavalier are capable of waging manly war, and that they must always remain distant from armed opponents. As demonstrated by Goring, the Cavalier relies on deception instead of honest and upfront confrontation with his enemies. Much like their physical crimes against civilians, Cavalier deceptions reflect a military impotence and an inability to confront the powerful thrust of Parliamentary power.

If Parliamentary newsbooks linked Cavalier military impotence with effeminacy, then they emphasised that effeminacy by challenging the masculine identities of Royalist commanders and inverting gender roles. The Marquis of Newcastle was characterised as a ‘sweet General’ who had little stomach for the demands of war and preferred to sleep and comb his hair.⁷³ The Earl of Derby’s manliness was similarly questioned by *Britanicus*, which maintained that he shirked military duties.⁷⁴ The fact that the Earl left the defence of his home, Lathom House, to his wife made him particularly susceptible to attacks on his masculine identity: it suggested that Cavaliers were so lacking in masculinity that Royalist women had to compensate for it. Cavalier uxoriousness was evidenced by the fact that women were perceived to be commanding Royalist soldiers. *The Weekly Account* mocked

⁷¹ *Exceeding Joyfull Newes from Dover*, p. 5.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷³ Bence-Jones, *Cavaliers*, p. 27. See also *ODNB*.

⁷⁴ *Britanicus*, No. 40, 1st-8th July 1642, p. 8.

the Royalist garrison in Lathom House, stating that dozens of Cavaliers were killed due to their unswerving obedience to ‘a woman’s suddain advice’.⁷⁵ But Cavalier effeminacy stemmed from the King, who was supposedly dominated by his wife.

Political commentaries which blamed the Queen for the war were not uncommon. At its most fundamental level, the Parliamentary press turned Henrietta Maria into the head of a Catholic conspiracy which was designed to bring England back into the fold of popery. Considering that Catholicism was in effect said to be the inversion of true religion, then it follows that one of its symptoms was a reversal of gender roles.⁷⁶ The whole portrayal of Henrietta Maria in the Parliamentary press seriously undermined the masculinity of the King and the Royalists. For some pamphleteers, the Queen had completely displaced Charles and taken over his office so that she was the ‘very president of the Councell Table’.⁷⁷ All Royalist activities were meant to have originated from the Queen, as *A Perfect Diurnal* asserted that ‘nothing is to be done in that or other matters without her consent’.⁷⁸ Those who surrounded Charles were supposedly the ‘Queens Agents’, and Henrietta Maria was said to have such ‘power’ over her husband that malignant foreigners were able to invade England with ease.⁷⁹ The author of *A Collection of Records* contrasted the reigns of Elizabeth and Charles, and implied that the King’s marriage to the French Henrietta Maria had allowed foreign influences into England.⁸⁰ Unlike Elizabeth, whose refusal to marry Philip II had equated to a resistance against the ‘thundering of the Pope’s Bulls’, Charles’ marriage to Henrietta Maria signified a surrender to Rome.⁸¹ Whereas a woman had been able to resist a foreign power to the

⁷⁵ *Weekly Account*, No. 64, 13th-20th November 1642, p. 3.

⁷⁶ Lake, ‘Anti-Popery’.

⁷⁷ *The Reformed Malignants*, p. 3.

⁷⁸ See White, M.A., *Henrietta Maria and the English Civil Wars*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, ch. 4.

⁷⁹ *The Reformed Malignants*, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁰ *A Collection of Records of the Great Misfortunes that Hath Hapned unto Kings that Have Joyned Themselves in a Near Alliance with Forreign Princes, with the Happy Successes of Those that Have Only Held Correspondency at Home*, London, 1642.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

extent that European Catholics were ‘never able to cut so much as the lap of her Coat, or to diminish one hair, much lesse the Crowne of her head’, Charles had not.⁸² Catholicism and its hatred of the Protestant English had penetrated England through its conquest of the King. Charles was thus implied to be a misguided monarch, or unfaithful partner, whose apparently feminine submission to Popery had resulted in England receiving the thrust of European Catholicism. Charles’ relationship with England was thus questioned, with the author stating that

...great Misfortunes that hath hapned unto Kings that have joyned themselves in a near alliance with forrein *Princes*, with the happy successe of those that have only held correspondency at home.⁸³

According to the logic of *A Collection of Records*, the King’s masculinity had been diminished by his marriage to Henrietta Maria. In this way, Charles’ rule rekindled the sort of anxieties regarding female rule that had been present during the Tudor period, particularly under Mary. Thus, Parliament appears to be given the role of a husband whose duty was to guide the King. *A Collection of Records* thus predictably concluded that England’s stability and prosperity could only be achieved with a productive marriage between King and Parliament, as the author wrote that

we may see that whatsoever the occasions of necessites of the Crowne bee, it will find more support by casting it selfe into the Armes of the Subjects, which are the two Houses of Parliamen, then by seeking to any foreign Foe, or Envious Enemy, whereunto whensoever we leave and trust, we shall find the Egyptian Reeds, and their Intentions, rather to supplant then to support us.⁸⁴

The Cavaliers who have emerged in England are therefore the result of the relationship between Charles and his wife. They are the monstrous births spawned by an unholy and unnatural marriage between the King of England and a Catholic foreigner, and it is

⁸² *A Collection of Records*, p. 4.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

precisely because Cavaliers are foreign that they perpetrate ‘Out-rages, and inhumane Acts’ on the English.⁸⁵

If the King had effectively given birth to the Cavaliers and unleashed them on England, then Parliament was portrayed as the one institution capable of safeguarding the ‘English Nation’.⁸⁶ The birth of the Cavalier triggered the rise of the patriotic Parliamentarian hero, who in part derived his identity from England’s legendary Elizabethan heroes. Whereas the King had the cowardly popish Cavalier, Parliament possessed ‘such Commanders and well affected Subjects as shall venture their precious blood’ in the fight to preserve Protestantism.⁸⁷ In a role which mirrored Elizabeth’s seadogs, Robert Rich, the second Earl of Warwick, emerged as an individual who would safeguard the English coast against ‘any Forraign enemy’ when he assumed command of the navy in March 1642.⁸⁸ Pamphlets dedicated to presenting news concerning the Earl’s actions, such as *The Earle of Warwickes Glorivovs Victory* and *The Daily Proceedings Of His Majesties Fleet on the Narrow Seas*, were being printed from May onwards, and he was characterised in a similar way to the legendary Elizabethan heroes.⁸⁹ As Drake had been feared among the Spanish, so too was Warwick presented as the scourge of foreign

⁸⁵ *His Maiesties Resolution*, p. 5; Donagan, *War in England*, pp. 162-163; *Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester, and Cambridge*. Tales of monstrous births and divine judgements were being printed in 1642, e.g. *A Strange and Lamentable Accident that Happened Lately at Mears-Ashby in Northamptonshire, 1642 of One Mary Wilmore, Wife to Iohn Wilmore Rough Mason Who was Delivered of a Childe Without a Head and Credibly Reported to Have a Firme Crosse on the Brest, as this Ensuing Story Shall Relate*, London, 1642; *Wonderfull Nevves: or, A True Relation of a Churchwarden in the Towne of Toscter, in Northamptonshire, Whose Wife First Died Wonderfull Strangely, and then Himself Fell Mad, and Died*, London, 1642. See also Crawford, J., *Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005; Kitch, A.W. 'Printing Bastards : Monstrous Birth Broad-sides in Early Modern England', in Brooks, D.A. (ed.), *Printing and Parenting in Early Modern England*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005.

⁸⁶ *All the Memorable & Wonderstriking Parliamentary Mercies Effected & Afforded unto this Our English Nation Within this Space of Less than 2 Yeares Past*, London, 1642.

⁸⁷ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory*, pp. 2-4.

⁸⁸ *Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁹ *Exceeding Joyfull Newes from the Narrow Seas, Dover, and the Irish Seas*, London, 1642; *The Earle of Warwickes Glorivovs Victory Over Fifty Ships of the King of Denmarke in the Narrow Seas*, London, 1642; *True Newes from Our Navie, Now at Sea: Shewing the Most Remarkable Passages There Since His Excellency the Earl of Warwickes Departure Thence*, London, 1642; *The Daily Proceedins of His Majesties Fleet on the Narrow Seas*, London, 1642.

naval forces. By 1642 Warwick had already built up something of a reputation as an anti-Spanish Protestant hero, with his privateering and colonial activities against Spanish shipping from the 1610s onwards, and in *Exceeding Joyfull Newes* his name was said to ‘maketh his Foes to tremble, even the proudest, hautiest, and most insultingst Enemy against *Great Britain*’.⁹⁰ The endeavours of Warwick, it was said, meant that ‘our greatest Enemies dares not strike Sail neer Britains Coast’.⁹¹ Unlike the popish Cavalier, Warwick was even attributed to having divine and natural support when the author of *Exceeding Joyfull Newes* described the ‘manner of his scouring the Seas, and all the Ports thereabouts, the charlish Waves seeming proud to bear his Famous Vessels’.⁹² Under Warwick’s command, the navy was effectively being shown to act as a barrier which would help protect England from being impregnated with foreign seed. Warwick was thus a protector against the Cavalier.

Soldiers under Waller were cast in a very similar light to Warwick, since it was claimed that they had ‘vowed either to win the Castle or to lose their lives’.⁹³ They were essentially the absolute opposite of the Cavaliers, and this sheer difference appears to have been based around a concept of overawing masculine English martial Protestantism. Such is the impression given in the final page of *A Famous and Joyfull Victory* leaving readers in awe of the sheer strength which is about to crush the foreign power that has emerged in Royalist Portsmouth:

The Parliament being informed of Marquesse Hertford’s intention to come and assist *Goring*, sent away Sir Iohn Merrick’s Regiment, and one Troop of Horse, which upon Tuesday last joined with the rest of the Forces before *Portsmouth* as also did a Trained Band of *Hampshire* jointly with the other Forces, to oppose Marquesse *Hertford* and his strength, in case they should come: And its writ, that the Saylor very suddenly intend to scale the Walls in one part,

⁹⁰ ODNB; Capp, B., ‘Naval Operations’, in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, *The Civil Wars*, pp. 158-160; *Exceeding Joyfull Newes*, p. 4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁹³ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory*, pp. 2-4.

Sir *John Merricks* Regiment in another, and the *Hampshire* men in a third place, all at once, and the Horse to second the execution and successe of the service.⁹⁴

Indeed, throughout the war the eradication of Royalist garrisons and fortresses was frequently conveyed as a reclamation of English soil. By the time Royalism had suffered an irreversible defeat at Naseby in 1645, Parliamentary observers could gloat on how the King's supporters were being 'bang'd up and down every day' with their fortresses being 'yielded by the dozen'.⁹⁵ For *Britanicus*, the collapse of Royalist strongholds signified that England was to be finally secured from foreign invasion.⁹⁶ Likewise, *The Parliament Scout* anticipated the total eradication of Royalist fortresses, and asserted that their destruction would improve the country's security and result in there being 'hardly... a good landing place for the so much expected and talked French, Irish, Orange, & we know not what powers'.⁹⁷ In some cases the suggestion was that Royalist fortresses were hideous, foreign creations imposed on the English landscape. Basing House in particular was described as a monstrous, sprawling edifice that had been 'cast up by the subtill art of the forraign engineers'.⁹⁸ Destruction of the Royalists' physical structures signified an ejection of the Cavalier and his popish designs from England. Royalist defeat represented a Parliamentary victory not over a fellow countryman, but against a complete foreigner, so that all 'true-hearted *Protestants*' could take 'joy and comfort' in it.⁹⁹ In this way Parliamentarianism could be associated with a natural defence of the British Isles against foreign aggression, whilst Royalism appeared to remain connected to corrupting anti-English or anti-British influences.

⁹⁴ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory*, p. 6.

⁹⁵ *Britanicus*, No. 100, 29th September-6th October 1645, p. 1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁹⁷ *The Parliament Scout*, No. 72, 31st October-7th November 1644, p. 6.

⁹⁸ *A Looking-Glasse for the Popish Garrisons: Held Forth in the Life and Death of Basing-House*, London, 1645, p. 1.

⁹⁹ *A Famous and Joyfull Victory*, p. 1.

Roy points out that military defeats impacted seriously on the Royalist war machine, resulting in an increased use of violence against the civilian population in order to acquire much-needed resources.¹⁰⁰ Thus, rather than being the loyal and patriotic Cavaliers who fought to preserve England, the King's remaining soldiers became enemies of the English people. Whether the assertions of Parliamentary pamphleteers and their characterisation of the Cavalier from the early stages of the war were based on fact or not is in some ways irrelevant. Their tales of Cavalier atrocities and crimes against the English people gained credibility with the King's military reversals, providing contemporaries with proof that the Royalists were a destructive and anti-English force.

In many ways, the importation of seemingly foreign practices made it look as if Charles was fighting an 'unnatural warre against his Subjects', and the apparent presence of non-English troops in Royalist operations made it seem as if Royalism wanted to 'establish an unlimited power over the free-borne subject of *England*'.¹⁰¹ The practice of war in England thus came to be shown as being similar to that which occurred in mainland Europe, and Royalism could be seen to be responsible for importing such ferocious conduct.¹⁰² Indeed, it was claimed in *Exceeding Joyfull Newes From Dover* that all 'Free borne *English Nation*' were at risk from 'Cavaliers who have designed all to slavery and confusion'.¹⁰³ The Cavalier thus represented tyrannical, sadistic and foreign government.

That it was Charles, not Parliament, who declared war, could have done little to dampen such an image either. Setting up the Royal standard was visual proof that the King was waging war against his people, thereby distancing Royalism and Royalists from English people. This was a major theme in the anonymous *A true and exact Relation of the*

¹⁰⁰ Roy, 'The Cavalier Ideal', pp. 108-111; Hutton, *Royalist War Effort*, pp. 191-203.

¹⁰¹ *Speciall Passages and Certain Informations from Severall Places, Collected for the Use of All that Desire to bee Truly Informed*, London, 1642, No. 7, 20th-27th September 1642, pp. 2-3.

¹⁰² See also Roy, I., 'England Turned Germany? The Aftermath of the Civil War in its European Context, in Gaunt, *The English Civil War*.

¹⁰³ *Exceeding Joyfull Newes from Dover*, p. 8.

manner of his Maiesties setting up of His Standard at Nottingham as the author described the King as ‘making a war with his owne people’ and threatening to turn ‘our peacefull England’ into a ‘field of blood’.¹⁰⁴ The author even anticipated Charles’ trial when he historicised the outbreak of war and asked how history might judge the King, and how ‘future times’ would ‘report that his Majesty was guilty of spilling so much of his owne Subjects blood’.¹⁰⁵ It appeared to be held by the author of this pamphlet that a King could only legitimately wage war if he was affronted by ‘forreigne Princes’ or his kingdom was ‘invaded by... forraigne forces’, and the case of Richard III was used to show how a King’s attempt to provoke civil war would only result in his destruction.¹⁰⁶ In this context, therefore, the King’s role was to protect his subjects from foreign threats, but the fact that he appeared to be surrounded by the seemingly foreign Cavaliers meant that such responsibilities lay with Parliament. Alleged Cavalier tyranny enabled Parliament to be fashioned as a liberator of oppression, as was the case with the Earl of Essex’s operations in the Midlands, which were styled as a mission to defend the localities from the ‘Barbarous insolence, and cruell oppression’ of the Royalists.¹⁰⁷ Hughes has argued that Parliamentarianism worked to incorporate a variety of individuals into its cause, and the reports published in Parliamentary newsbooks seem to tally this concept.¹⁰⁸ The cause was to protect England and its people from the evil schemes of militant Catholics, and the stereotypical Cavalier was the manifestation of militant Catholicism. As such, the Parliamentary press effectively drew on pre-existing concepts on what the duties of a true English soldier were supposed to be. In effect, the Parliamentary press was able to locate

¹⁰⁴ *A True and Exact Relation of the Manner of His Maiesties Setting Up of His Standard at Nottingham*, London, 1642, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰⁷ *The Trve Copie of a Letter Written by Captaine Wingate, Now Prisoner in Ludlow, Taken by the Malignant Partie, in the Late Battaile Fought at Worcester; and Sent to a Member of the Ho^{ble} House of Commons*, London, 1642.

¹⁰⁸ See Hughes, ‘The King, the Parliament, and the Localities’.

Parliament within England's legendary heritage of combating the forces of popery, whereas the Royalists appeared utterly divorced from any form of English identity.

Furthermore, defeat emphasised and reinforced the Cavaliers' repellent image. Obviously, given that the decline of Royalist military strength was closely followed by a reduction in the output of Royalist print, the Royalists were not able to effectively counter the foreign image they were acquiring. The singular lack of control the Royalists had over their own image during the war undermined the governance of textual space which the Royalist press sought to create. But, as suggested earlier in this chapter, defeat also worked at another level in pamphlet literature: it feminised those who were broken or beaten in battle. In much the same way as the rowdy soldiers depicted in Elizabethan literature use violence as a way of both establishing their identity and asserting their authority, the stereotypical Cavalier relies on an aggressive demeanour. It serves the purpose of asserting and confirming his own masculinity, and defeat in battle exacerbates his own crisis in sexual identity, thereby reinforcing his cowardly and barbaric approach towards English civilians. The fact that the Cavalier has been defeated and conquered in battle compels him to target more vulnerable and innocent flesh. As such, the textual space in Parliamentary print establishes two binary identities which reverse the patriotic pretensions found in Royalist print. Parliamentary force represents a masculine control and order founded on English Protestantism, and which promises stability and security, whereas the Royalists represent feminine chaos, the like of which is to be seen in war-torn Europe. Charles' alleged uxoriousness is seen to result in an enfeebled form of governance and leadership that nurtures and nourishes the cowardly, but brutal Cavalier. This consequently enabled Parliamentarianism to be easily portrayed as a masculine, conservative and patriotic cause, and as a result developed the concept of Parliamentary armies being protectors of English people. Whereas Charles had let the Cavaliers into England, figures like the Earl of

Warwick had a 'speciall care' in 'keeping out of any Forraign enemy'.¹⁰⁹ As a Sergeant Major in Essex's army argued, Cavalier depravity and 'baseness' meant that 'all true-hearted Englishmen' were 'conscientiously obliged' to defend England by fighting for Parliament.¹¹⁰ Cavaliers were identifiable precisely because they were seen to be actively disrupting and violently clashing with local populaces, and their alleged actions made them seem un-English.¹¹¹ The Royalists' purported lack of humanity towards the English population dented Royalism's credibility as a patriotic cause. Whereas Charles began a war in which it was claimed he was acting like a 'faithfull Physician' who was prepared to shed 'bad blood' for the 'preservation of the whole body', the Royalists ultimately looked like foreign tumours that were trying to disrupt the health of what the poet Edward Calver called the 'Eden' of England.¹¹²

Chapters Three and Five have suggested that the Royalist press attempted to portray the King's soldiers, and by implication the King's cause, as the guardians of England. Chapter Six has pointed out that the Royalist army used foreign soldiers, and that the Royalist press appears to have failed in formulating some form of discourse that could effectively resolve the Royalists' English identity with their non-English allies and supporters. This chapter, however, has explored the counter-fiction of the Royalists' English image. The stereotypical cavalier enjoyed considerable coverage in contemporary newsbooks, and this substantial presence in textual space naturally destabilised whatever control the Royalist press sought to exercise over the identity of the King's supporters. It is evident that a significant portion of printed material existed to challenge whatever patriotic

¹⁰⁹ *A Perfect Diurnall*, No. 9, 11th-18th September 1643, p. 3.

¹¹⁰ *CSPD, 1641-1643*, pp. 414-415.

¹¹¹ Stoye argues that disruption of the community was a pursuit of foreigners. Stoye, *Soldiers & Strangers*, pp. 1-8. See also Donagan, B., *War in England 1642-1649*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, intro. and chs. 1-3.

¹¹² Balcanquhall, *Large Declaration*, p. 5.

identity the likes of *Avlicvs* and the royal proclamations tried to fashion for the King's soldiers, with the result being that the Royalists failed to secure a credible English identity.

Conclusion

In his summary of the state of scholarly work on Royalism, McElligott asserts that our understanding of the Royalist cause is limited. He observes that our knowledge is largely restricted to interpretations of court culture and specific Royalist texts, notably *Eikon Basilike*.¹ It cannot be claimed that this thesis has in any way answered the numerous questions in relation to Royalism. There has been no attempt to second-guess how contemporaries would have read Royalist texts, nor has any substantial effort been made to reconstruct the readers of Royalist print. The answer as to how widely Royalist pamphlets circulated has not necessarily been accurately established, and the demographics, motives and patterns of allegiance have not really been examined. An in-depth analysis of individual Royalists is also noticeably absent. It is felt that such problems lie beyond the scope of the work here. What this thesis has attempted to achieve can be roughly split into two categories. Firstly, it has made an effort to explore the imagery within Royalist print during the First Civil War. Secondly, it has tried to read into what that imagery implied, and what Royalism and Royalists aimed to be.

It is apparent that there existed a fairly rich concept of a martial Protestant England by the 1640s. Although it was illegal for domestic news to be reported in England until the outbreak of war, it was permissible for pamphleteers to write about foreign events. One cannot compare print output during the sixteenth century to that of the 1640s, but there were nonetheless a number of emotionally charged pamphlets that were published during Elizabeth's reign, and their focus was relatively consistent. Judging by the content of these pamphlets, it is apparent that the Elizabethan era had indeed been marked by a sense that England was facing an apocalyptic war against militant Catholicism, the ultimate

¹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, pp. 1-7.

manifestation of which was Spain. The impression of this legendary struggle endured into Charles' reign, clashing with both Caroline foreign policy and the seemingly pacific image that was promulgated in the court. Combating the forces of Catholicism was supposed to be at the heart of England's heritage, and Charles' apparent distance from war against Spain seemingly went against English identity.

Charles' decision to wage war against Scotland at the end of the 1630s was significant in the formation of a patriotic Royalist identity in the Royalist press. Although the wars seemingly clashed with England's perceived role as a defender of Protestantism, those sympathetic to the King interpreted them as a defence of English interests.

According to anti-Covenanter literature, episcopacy was linked to the King, and the body of the King and the institution of monarchy were tied to England. Resistance to religious policies equated to a resistance to the King, which in turn shaped the wars in the form of medieval border conflicts. That the Bishops' Wars cannot be coloured in terms of Royalist and Parliamentary binaries should not necessarily prevent the application of the terms, 'Royalist' and 'Royalism', prior to 1642. In much the same way as Royalist pamphlets after 1642 defined Parliamentarians as destroyers of the monarchy, anti-Covenanter literature of the Bishops' Wars presented the Covenanters as an anti-monarchical force. Royalism existed so long as it had an opponent against which it could define itself, and the Bishops' Wars presented the King with that opponent. Royalist textual space attempted to present the King, his cause and his supporters as the defenders of English law, order and territory, and it was these principles which were central in the formation of Royalist identity during the conflict with Parliament. Within the context of Royalism, what the Bishops' Wars appear to have achieved is the undermining of the 1603 union between the English and Scottish crowns, with England emerging as the key focal point in Royalist identity. Fear of a Scottish invasion and conquest of England was prominent in Royalist

literature of the Bishops' Wars, and it was this theme which often coloured the content of Royalist pamphlets after war broke out with Parliament.

Throughout the conflicts, the Royalist press repeatedly tried to advertise the Englishness of the King's supporters, and indeed of the King's cause in general. Parliament was allegedly the source of all turmoil, and it was the presence and influence supposedly exerted by the Scots over English MPs which fuelled the conflict. Parliament's official alliance with the Scots from 1643 certainly gave Royalist pamphleteers evidence that Parliament was introducing foreigners into England, boosting the credibility of Royalism as an English cause. Indeed, Royalist print played extensively on the theme of invasion, drawing attention to the involvement of Scottish troops in various Parliamentary operations. The advance of Covenanter forces into England from January 1644 was clearly characterised as an invasion, with Royalist newsbooks stressing that Parliament's northern allies threatened both England and the English people. In the Royalist press, Scottish soldiers presented a material and spiritual danger to the body of England.

In terms of the physical danger, according to Royalist rhetoric, the tide of Scotsmen threatened to conquer English land and take possession of English property. But the Scottish threat went much deeper for Royalism. In collaboration with Parliament, the Scots were purportedly displacing the English people themselves. Deaths and casualties both sustained and inflicted by Parliamentary armies were destroying English families: the removal of men from English society opened up the possibility that Scotsmen would move southwards and replace them. In effect, this theory meant that the English population was being colonised, even ethnically cleansed, with the consent and approval of Parliament.² Those who remained under Parliamentary governance were to be subjected to Scottish influence. In this respect, Royalist print tried to engage with England's legendary

² See Chapter Five of this thesis.

Protestant past as it implied that the very identity of England was to be remodeled along Scottish lines. The established Church, which Royalism claimed to be defending, was to be reshaped according to Scottish doctrine. As conveyed in the Royalist press, this marked a blatant assault on the centre of English culture and enabled a counterpart to Pym's concept of the Popish Plot to be developed. Whereas Pym argued that the King's evil councilors sought to bring the forces of the Counter-Reformation into England and subvert the Elizabethan settlement, Royalist print asserted that Parliament aimed to destroy the English Church and Protestantism through its alliance with Scotland. Parliament's actions would ensure that the Scots would challenge England's historic dominance in the British Isles. England would thus lose its independence and be subject to Scottish rule, and it seems that fear of Scottish dominance was factored into the way Royalism addressed the Welsh and Cornish.

The content and rhetoric of both royal proclamations and *Avlicvs* indicate that Royalist print tried to relate fear of the cultural and political implications of the Scots to Welsh and Cornish interests. As with its attempts to engage with English people, the Royalist press stressed that the Scots were a clear and present danger to Welsh and Cornish culture. What we cannot be absolutely certain of is whether the Welsh and Cornish were motivated by Royalist rhetoric concerning Scottish influence, or whether they fought with the intention of resisting the English invaders of Parliament. It may well be that they were concerned about the threat which any foreigner might have posed to them, and that any apprehensions and anxieties arose not just from the Scottish shadow. Considering the reluctance of Cornish regiments to serve the King outside of their home counties, it seems possible that the Cornish were reacting against those they perceived to be a danger to their locality. After all, Hopton succeeded in securing Cornish support for the King when Parliament's attempt to execute the Militia Ordinance was regarded as a disturbance of the

peace.³ Whether apprehension of Scottish power played a powerful role in motivating Cornish Royalism or not, it is nevertheless apparent that it was used in Royalist print. In addressing the Cornish, the Royalist press created a patriotic Cornish identity, and in many ways separated the Cornish from the English.

The approach to the Welsh in the Royalist press was similar to that used with the Cornish. Loyalty to the King featured as a defining characteristic of the Welsh in Royalist print. It was also used to identify the Welsh from the English. In Royalist newsbooks, rebellion and betrayal seem to have become associated with the English, and as a consequence this rests somewhat awkwardly with the English patriotic identity which the likes of *Avlicvs* were simultaneously trying to create. Perhaps one resolution to this problem can be found in the way in which the Royalist press characterised the war of 1642 to 1646. The apparent paradox of an English Royalism that praised the Welsh whilst occasionally criticising the English is possibly explained when we once again consider the Scottish dimension of the conflict. Royalism's approach to Wales was predicated on the supposed power, influence and intentions of the Scots. To praise the Welsh for their loyalty whilst condemning the English for their rebellion made sense as long as the English were acting under the influence of the Scots. As is evident in *Avlicvs*, Parliament had supposedly fallen under Scottish power. Following this logic, those Englishmen fighting under Parliament's banners were thus rebelling against the King precisely because of the Scottish presence and influence south of the border, and not because of an inherent rebellious streak within their own blood. Royalism could therefore masquerade as a guardian of Wales and project itself as a defender of England whilst critiquing the English as long as Scotland remained in alliance with Parliament.

³ Edgar, *Ralph Hopton*, chs. 1-3.

Unfortunately, this theory only goes so far in reconciling the problem Royalism had as a patriotic English cause. The Welsh constituted an other in English society, and for Royalism to invite Welsh forces into England was no less of an invasion than that of Parliament's northern allies. The distinction between the two non-English forces must reside within contemporaries' perceptions and attitudes to the Welsh and Scots, but those perceptions are almost impossible to quantify. One way of unpicking the Welsh and Scottish problem may be found in the physical geography of the British Isles: Wales could have been perceived as a back door to England by Irish Catholics. Unlike in the north, where England obviously had a Protestant neighbour to help combat any Irish Catholic landings, Wales had the potential to give the Irish access to the heart of England. In the months prior to the outbreak of war rumours were circulating in London that popish armies were gathering in Wales in preparation for an assault on the border counties.⁴ Throughout the war Parliamentary newsbooks often claimed that the Welsh coast was being used by the Royalists to receive Irish troops.⁵ Furthermore, the continuing resistance of fortresses in and around Wales could in part be ascribed to an anticipation that reinforcements from Ireland would arrive in time to relieve them.⁶

The association with the Irish was particularly damaging to Royalism's image. It is evident that the Irish were very much perceived and portrayed in England as an extremely dangerous and frightening people. If the Parliamentary press was apprehensive about Welsh and Cornish Royalists, then the Irish were clearly an altogether far more terrifying prospect. Having long since been associated with Spanish plots and military operations, the Irish were in many ways the enemy lurking behind England's back. Despite the fact that relatively few native Irish troops ever landed in England to serve in the Royalist armies, Royalism's image was nonetheless tainted by the King's efforts to secure military

⁴ Stolye 'Caricaturing Cymru'; Bowen, 'Representations of Wales and the Welsh'.

⁵ See Chapter Six.

⁶ Phillips, *Memoirs of the Civil War*, Vol. 2, pp. 332-334; *Academicus*, No. 4, 5th-10th January 1646, pp. 4-5.

assistance from Ireland. It would not be wrong to suggest that the Parliamentary demonization of Royalism as a popish Irish cause was mere hyperbole. However, the association of the Royalists with the Irish and Catholicism was one that appears to have persisted throughout the wars. Moreover, the Cessation of 1643 seems to have rested uneasily amongst some Royalists. Arthur Trevor may have believed that ‘The expectation of English-Irish aydes is the dayly prayers, and almost dayly bread of them that love the Kinge and his business’, but there is evidence to suggest that the Irish were problematic for the King’s supporters.⁷ Sir Edward Dering is a case in point, with the Irish Cessation appearing to have been a factor in his second defection in 1644.⁸ Writing years after the war, Clarendon reflected that foreign soldiers and mercenaries were the ‘most offensive and dangerous instruments that the King could have employed’.⁹ They were dangerous to Royalism in the sense that, regardless of the actual composition of the Royalist armies, their presence fuelled anti-Royalist stereotypes.

Meanwhile, Parliament’s alliance with the Scots appeared to be designed for the resistance of the foreign Popish enemy. Edward Bowles, chaplain to Sir John Meldrum’s infantry from November 1642 to July 1643, described how the Irish Cessation was a part of the same historic struggle which had given birth to the Spanish Armada, and argued that Parliament’s alliance with the Scots was a ‘ballance’ which was necessary for the defence of Protestant England.¹⁰ From Bowles’s perspective, Scotland, unlike Ireland, shared a similar history and identity to that of England, and he spoke of the ‘Puritanes of England and Scotland’.¹¹ John Dillingham, the editor of *The Parliament Scout*, likewise praised the

⁷ Quoted in Barratt, *Cavaliers*, p. 168.

⁸ ODNB; Hirst, D., ‘The Defection of Sir Edward Dering, 1640-1641’, in Gaunt, *The English Civil War*.

⁹ Quoted in Malcolm, *Caesar’s Due*, p. 92.

¹⁰ Bowles, E., *The Mysterie of Iniquity, Yet Working in the Kingdomes of England, Scotland, and Ireland, for the Destruction of Religion Truly Protestant. Discovered, as by Other Grounds Apparent and Probable, so Especially by the Late Cessation in Ireland, No Way so Likely to be Balanced, as by a Firme Union of England and Scotland, in the Late Solemne Covenant, and a Religious Pursuance of it*, London, 1643, pp. 4-5.

¹¹ Bowles, *The Mysterie of Iniquity*, pp. 11-23.

‘fidelity’ of the Scots and their ‘justnesse to this Kingdome’, and eagerly anticipated their advance soon after Parliament’s acceptance of the Covenant.¹² Similarly in a sermon preached on 29th September at St. Margaret’s in Westminster, Thomas Coleman praised the ‘religious Union in one Covenant’ which would allow the English and Scots to ‘for ever be one people in this Iland of Great Britaine’.¹³ Contrary to its professed horror at Parliament inviting foreigners into the country, Royalism was being shown to be aligning itself with England’s traditional enemy, militant Catholicism, whilst Parliament had forged a Protestant union within the British Isles. For the Parliamentary press, Rupert’s defeat at Marston Moor marked the beginning of the end of that ‘Cloud’ of foreigners which included ‘Irish Rebels, Papists and other desperate Ruffians’.¹⁴

In the dying days of the Royalist war effort, the remnants of the King’s armies appear to have increasingly existed as a largely incoherent and destructive anti-civilian force. Defeated in the field and verging on total collapse, the Royalist military increasingly resorted to plundering, with the unsurprising result being the growth of Clubmen.¹⁵ Royalist actions seemingly contrasted with those of Parliament towards the end of the war. Looking at the conduct of the 1645 Western Campaign, it is clear that Parliament’s restrictions on plundering and violence towards the civilian population were effective in gaining either support or co-operation.¹⁶ The concept of Royalism as a patriotic English cause was hardly sustainable when the King’s forces were seen to be attacking the very people whose property, culture and identity they were purported to be championing. The issues of the promulgation of Royalist stereotypes, and how Royalist print contended with them, needs some consideration.

¹² *The Parliament Scout*, No. 13, 15th-22nd September 1643, p. 3.

¹³ Coleman, T., *The Hearts Ingagement: A Sermon Preached at St. Margarets Westminster, at the Publique Entering into the Covenant*, London, 1643, p. 30.

¹⁴ *Mercurius Britannicus*, No. 42, 1st-8th July 1644, p. 4.

¹⁵ Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, pp. 285-288.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

What emerges from a study of Royalist pamphlets during the First Civil War is that, as de Groot suggested, Royalist textual space appears to have been established on the principle of order and control. An apprehension of meaning being manipulated and transformed into something unknown, foreign and dangerous underlines the approaches of Royalist newsbooks. To challenge meaning in Royalist text was to subvert the English language and challenge the King himself, and to challenge the King was to divorce oneself from England. Printed text underpinned Royalist identity, securing that identity by trying to control language and meaning. Far from being what had traditionally been perceived as the dangerous instrument of knaves seeking to destabilise politics and society, print was a force for stability in the Royalist cause during the First Civil War. It is undeniable that the 1640s were a watershed in the history of print, and it is also clear that contemporaries were aware of the impact and potential implications of print. Publications such as *A Presse Full Of Pamphlets* appear to reflect an apprehension of printed textual space. The ‘Diversity of Prints’ and the ‘deformed and misfigured Letters’ so prevalent in textual space represent an attack on truthful and honest meaning.¹⁷ Print is seen to undermine political integrity and destabilise language, compromising the solidity of textual meaning, and it was precisely these issues which *Avlicvs* attempted to address. The very appearance of *Avlicvs* exuded a masculine order, with its controlled, uniform typefaces giving the impression that Royalism guaranteed stability of language and meaning. This apparent aim for consistency of language and meaning contrasted with the seemingly uncertain and chaotic nature of Parliamentary text, where an absence of textual consistency was generally noticeable. Multiplicity of interpretation and lack of regulation in the Parliamentary press was a key point in Royalist discourse. Without the King to guarantee meaning of language, textual space descended into chaos. Boundaries collapsed, creating an unruly and feminine space

¹⁷ *A Presse Full of Pamphlets*, London, 1642, p. 1.

in which the perverse political machinations of MPs could be exercised to the detriment of England. Security of language and its meaning underlined a Royalist aspiration for a stable government, and at the heart of Royalist textual space lay Royalism's relationship with Englishness. Whereas the inconsistencies and lies of Parliamentary were supposed to be disguised by language, Royalist language was supposedly the true English language with set meanings and definitions confirming the English identity of the King's cause.

Jonson claimed that 'Language most shewes a man' and that 'No glasse renders a man's form, or likeness, as true as his speech'.¹⁸ References to public openness, together with a professed willingness for the reader to judge Royalist actions, indicate that the Royalist press tried to use the English language as a means of projecting its honesty and righteousness.¹⁹ Its seeming fearlessness in the world of print implied that Royalism had nothing to conceal, and that it stood as a just and truthful cause in opposition to the alleged lies and inconsistencies of Parliament. Unfortunately, Royalist textual space unintentionally revealed the flaws and inconsistencies that resided within the Royalist cause. Obviously, *The Kings Cabinet Opened* undermined the Royalist desire to secure language and meaning: the exposure of the King's correspondence denied Royalist text the security it so desired and blatantly challenged the relationship between Royalists and Englishness. Without doubt, the King's own words revealed that Royalism's English identity was a façade. The meaning behind the language was irrefutable: Charles was actively seeking to introduce Irish troops into England for service against the English Parliament. But the King's correspondence was not the only instance where clarity of meaning worked against Royalist aspirations for textual and political integrity. One can point out that even *Avlicvs*' discourse occasionally contradicted itself on the question of

¹⁸ Loxley, *Royalism and Poetry*, p. 110; Jonson, B., *Timber; or Discoveries*, in Donaldson, I., (ed.), *The Oxford Authors: Ben Jonson*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 574.

¹⁹ See Chapter One of this thesis.

Englishness. Whereas *Avlicvs* praised the Welsh and Cornish for their loyalty, it was not shy in suggesting that rebellion was a characteristic peculiar to the English.²⁰

At several points in this thesis the anti-Scottish nature of the Royalist cause has been explored. It has also been noted that Royalist print often avoided addressing issues that rested uncomfortably with the projected Englishness of the King's cause. *Avlicvs* never resolved the King's use of non-English soldiers with the projected English identity of the Royalists, and its successor, *Academicus*, also appears to have been marked by similar issues. As with the assertions of *Avlicvs*, the royal proclamations and the response to the Nineteen Propositions, *Academicus* recognizes that established law and government constitutes the heart of England and secures the legal rights and freedoms of the English subject. If Parliament defeats the King, then the English people can 'bid farewell to *Magna Charta*, and all those Liberties and Priviledges which their Predecessors enjoyed'.²¹ Parliament is what threatens England, since its challenge to Charles marks an entry into the unknown, bestowing an unprecedented form of government upon the English people whilst placing them in an unquantifiable legal context. Yet *Academicus*' anticipation that forces under Montrose will advance southwards and bolster the ailing Royalist cause is inconsistent with the concept that Charles is the guardian of English law and liberty. Having spent several years attacking the Scots, using them as a focus for the creation of a patriotic English cause, the Royalist press at this point is looking towards them for support. Military desperation has resulted in the Royalist press quietly dropping the strong anti-Scottish rhetoric that has been so in evidence since the Bishops' Wars. The tension between a King who is supposed to be leading a defence of English interests and the anticipation of foreign assistance is not addressed, much like *Avlicvs*' silence on questions concerning the use of Irish and Welsh.

²⁰ *Avlicvs*, No. 30, 21st-27th July 1644, p. 9.

²¹ *Academicus*, No. 8, 2nd-7th February 1646, p. 6.

Yet the contradictions of constructing and maintaining an English identity whilst simultaneously using foreign support were reflected in Charles' decision to surrender to the Scots rather than the English. Lucy Hutchinson reflected that the King was

very failing in this action; for had he gone straight up to the Parliament and cast himself upon them, as he did upon the Scots, he had in all probability ruined them, who were highly divided between the Presbyterian and Independent factions. But in putting himself into the hands of the mercenary Scotch army, rather than the Parliament of England, he showed such an embittered hate to the English nation, that it turned many hearts against him...²²

By surrendering to the Scots, Charles placed a physical, political and ethnic distance between himself and the English. It instantly undermined the concept of Royalism as a patriotic English cause and was the ultimate contradiction to the, albeit flawed, English identity that had been constructed in the Royalist press. How could a King, who since 1637 had been supposedly championing English interests, suddenly place himself amongst those who had long been portrayed as England's enemies? It was an issue that was apparently identified in *Britanicus*, which reported

...the English nation are bold, gallant, undaunted spirits, and do not expect the contrary, they cannot endure to see their Parliament slighted, they cry, Why not come in to us as well as to the Scots? What's the meaning of it, sayes one? Why should he trust them more then us, sayes another? I am sure they have been worst abused by him of any, branded for Rebels by him long before us, and now at last as Invaders, and all the worst mockeries and scandals bestowed on them still at Court, yet the King presumes most upon them...²³

The point *Britanicus* seemed to be making was that Charles' surrender to the Scots was an outright insult to the English. At a stroke, Charles' surrender highlighted the inconsistencies that had plagued the Royalist cause since the 1630s. But *Britanicus'* commentary in this instance rings true and draws attention to flaws in Royalist identity.

²² Hudson, R., (ed.), *The Grand Quarrel: Women's Memoirs of the English Civil War*, Stroud, Sutton, 2000, p. 168.

²³ *Britanicus*, No. 129, 4th-11th May 1646, p. 1.

It certainly seems puzzling that Royalist newsbooks contain instances where anti-English rhetoric permeates textual space. Whilst these instances may very well be either accidental or unintentional flaws in Royalist pamphleteering, they also arguably explain the Royalist press' approach to the people of the British Isles. Royalist print appears to have been designed to appeal to the patriotic sensibilities of the individual areas of Charles' kingdoms. Royalism was not trying to appeal to the whole population of the British Isles by drawing them into a single, unified cause, but it was endeavouring to target English, Welsh and Cornish patriotism separately. Inconsistencies and problems inherent in such an approach were never fully resolved, and by appealing to more regional interests the King's cause was likely to only ever receive limited military support and assistance. If the supposed cultural and political threat of Parliament could be halted outside of the Welsh and Cornish borders, then the motivation Welsh and Cornish soldiers had for serving further afield was possibly diminished. Meaning of language was only substantiated by the urgency of action. Royalist patriotic rhetoric could thus in theory be effective provided an immediate Parliamentary military threat was visible. Parliamentary operations from 1643 provided that threat, but by 1645 the Royalist war machine was in total collapse and this had a serious impact on Royalist print, and by implication the Royalists' image.

The Cavalier stereotype had been in production since the very early stages of the war. Associated with violence, cowardice and outright brutality, the Cavalier was a highly visible character in the press, and the vulgarity and general strangeness of his conduct rendered him a foreigner in English territory. As Hutton points out, defeat at Naseby meant that Charles simply no longer had a field army with which to exert control and execute cohesive operations.²⁴ Rapidly declining fortunes meant that the remaining Royalist troops

²⁴ Hutton, *War Effort*, chs. 17-18.

increasingly became a menace to the localities. Loss of cohesion and power, coupled with the necessity of supplies and provisions to sustain what was left of the King's forces, resulted in Royalist soldiers plundering communities.²⁵ Royalist disorder thus gave credence to the Cavalier stereotype that had been created by the Parliamentary press, and provided pamphleteers with yet further material with which to emphasise the otherness and destructiveness of Royalism.²⁶ Far from being the defender of English property, Royalists emerged as the blatant violator of law and freedom of the individual. Unlawful imprisonment, the use of force and even torture to extort money and resources from local inhabitants came to be strongly associated with Royalist soldiers, isolating them from the rest of the English population.²⁷ Even the human identity of Royalists was denied, as they became known as 'Oxford creatures' who perpetually thirsted for plunder.²⁸

An implication behind the work in this thesis is that Royalist print targeted specific people. By constructing a reader, Royalist print also sought to construct and control meaning within textual space. In essence Royalist text aimed to control the English language itself. Whatever was written was supposed to exist in an incorruptible state, with counter assertions amounting to nothing but falsehoods. But as Chapter One suggests, stability of textual space was dependent on the sustainability of the war effort. Defeat evidently created insecurity in Royalist textual space, with *Avlicvs* in particular being affected by the aftermath of the Royalists' major reversal at Naseby. Royalist textual space was not completely destroyed, however. Rather, it was seriously challenged, destabilised, and in some respects its purposes transformed. In many ways, the original *Avlicvs* simply could not have survived beyond 1645 because the King's military power was much diminished at that point, and this meant that new newsbooks were needed in an attempt to

²⁵ Carlton, *Going to the Wars*, pp. 284-289.

²⁶ *The Kingdomes Scout*, No. 2, 2nd-9th December 1645; *Britanicus*, No. 95, 25th August-1st September 1645.

²⁷ *The Kingdomes Scout*, No. 2, 2nd-9th December 1645, p. 5.

²⁸ *Britanicus*, No. 95, 25th August-1st September 1645, p. 1.

regain some control over textual space. Having spent years publicizing Royalist martial prowess, the King's increasingly dire strategic situation meant that *Avlicvs* was unsustainable. For all of his journalistic talents, even Berkenhead could not maintain the façade of victory in the face of defeat. If, as was so often claimed by the Royalist press, *Avlicvs* was supposed to speak the truth, then the reality of the defeat at Naseby and its aftermath meant that *Avlicvs*' own identity was seriously undermined. For the newsbook to have continued to exist beyond the winter of 1645 would in some respects have eventually rendered it a parody of itself, for the increased necessity to conceal, even blatantly contradict, reality would have destroyed its self-assumed role as the champion of truth. Meaning with substance, and hence both command over the English language and overall textual integrity, would have been severely lacking in *Avlicvs* had it remained in production into 1646. By ceasing to exist, *Avlicvs* did not have to negotiate the difficulties of trying to sustain a cause which was increasingly unsustainable, and by doing so did not jeopardise its own integrity.

Although implicitly mourned by *Academicus*, *Avlicvs*' demise appears to have been left unexplained in the Royalist press. No obvious attempt was made in the Royalist press to clarify the reasons for *Avlicvs*' disappearance, perhaps not least because any such explanation would most likely have drawn readers' attention to the dwindling strength of the Royalist cause. But the absence of *Avlicvs* did not mark an absolute collapse in Royalist textual space. *Academicus* and, for a shorter space of time, *Anti-Britanicus* filled the void left by *Avlicvs*, though both titles appear to have had slightly different purposes. Although also edited by Berkenhead, *Anti-Britanicus* clearly had a different objective to *Avlicvs* in the sense that its focus was on regaining control of the King's texts captured at Naseby and attacking the language, style and rhetoric of *Britanicus*, rather than reporting on current events. *Academicus*, however, bore more of an obvious resemblance to *Avlicvs*

in that it in part tried to emulate *Avlicvs*' commentary on Parliamentary newsbooks. Whereas *Anti-Britanicus* expired after only a few issues, *Academicus* enjoyed greater longevity, and as such assumed *Avlicvs*' role as the main Royalist voice in the press. As with *Avlicvs* and *Anti-Britanicus*, a desire to control meaning was in evidence throughout *Academicus*' pages, and indeed on a number of occasions the newsbook focused more on asserting a supposedly truthful political interpretation than it did on reporting military developments.²⁹

Whilst *Avlicvs* was perfectly capable of countering Parliamentary rhetoric, military failure from 1645 weakened the Royalist newsbook. Decline in the output of *Avlicvs* and the comparative lack of Royalist print in the months following Naseby meant that Royalism simply did not have the weight of discourse with which to counter Parliamentary accusations. The launch of *Academicus* could do precious little to support *Avlicvs* and either offset or mask the desperate situation of the King's cause, and its last issues effectively conceded defeat.³⁰ In some ways the absence of *Avlicvs* enabled Royalist print to sidestep the problem of military defeat and instead draw attention to the moral, social and political chaos represented by Parliament. *Anti-Britanicus*, for example, was not so much concerned with the physical battlefield inasmuch as it was with the assertion of Royalism's moral superiority. But loss of territory affected Royalist print, and as Royalist print went into decline during the war of 1642 to 1646, the pro-English, patriotic Royalist faded away from the printed page and was replaced by the vulgar and troublesome Cavalier. Textual space was thus dominated by Parliament, leaving Royalism with little control over language and meaning. Without the capacity to control language, Royalism lost the ability to shape its own identity.

²⁹ E.g. *Academicus*, No. 8, 2nd-7th February 1646, pp. 1-3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 12, 2nd-7th March 1646, pp. 1-5; Seccombe and Nelson, *Short Title Catalogue*, p. 201.

If 1645 can therefore be seen to mark a point at which the Royalists lost power within textual space, then what of later years? In agreement with de Groot's theory, this thesis has suggested that the King acted as a kind of guarantor of language and meaning.³¹ Royal proclamations in particular evoked the sense that the King's word was the truth, and this was also echoed in *Avlicvs*. Since the King was central to Royalism, and since he was supposed to guarantee language, his demise meant that security of meaning was lost for Royalists. Unsurprisingly, the absence of the King, and in particular his eventual execution, had a major impact on Royalism, as reflected in Sir Henry Skipworth's musings:

Alas what are wee now that hee is gone,
though wee are number still we are a lone,
and so astonish't from our selues remayne
that few know where to meet themselues againe.
For by his death wee are all sett awry,
And by our false positions wee belye...³²

Without the King, the Royalist cause was hollow and its purpose completely uncertain. Royalism's identity was seemingly lost, and along with it the identity of its adherents. Lady Halkett observed that the execution of the King 'putt such a dampe upon all designes of the Royall Party that they were for a time like those that dreamed'.³³ Back in 1639 *The Complaint of Time* had suggested that monarchical power was an overawing and integral part of nature that could not be overcome: 'Truth doth say of old', wrote the author, that 'No warres can bee / Happie attempted against Soveraigntie'.³⁴ The apparent predictability and inevitability of the King's power was of course overcome by Parliament. Charles' death was unthinkable, but the fact that it had actually occurred changed the identity of England as a whole, rendering it a place that was alien, unfamiliar and completely

³¹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, ch. 3.

³² Quoted in Loxley, *Royalist Poetry*, p. 192.

³³ Corns, T., *Uncloistered Virtue*, p. 68; Loftis, J., (ed.), *The Memoirs of Anne, Lady Halkett and Ann, Lady Fanshaw*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 28.

³⁴ *Complaint of Time*, p. 8.

unknown to Royalists. The King was supposed to be the embodiment of law and order. He was, as Potter puts it, the one source of light for Royalism in an otherwise darkening world.³⁵ Charles' death changed England beyond recognition, and this perception was evidently expressed in Royalist pamphlets like *The Man in the Moon*.³⁶ Permanent political and social turmoil became the defining characteristics of post-regicide England for pamphleteers like Crouch, and the years prior to the wars came to be enshrined in cultural nostalgia. England's chaos enabled Royalists to reflect on pre-war England and create the Halcyon days of Charles' rule, as suggested by Clarendon's summation that

The happiness of the times... was enviously set off by this, that every other kingdom, every other province, were engaged, some entangled, and some almost destroyed, by the rage and fury of arms... whilst alone the kingdoms we now lament were looked on as the garden of the world...³⁷

War has crudely transformed England beyond a recognisable state. Meaning has been lost, as has identity. Royalism is left in a political and cultural limbo; its English identity cannot be reconciled with the England that now exists, and its adherents live in absolute uncertainty. Royalist language laments the loss of the past and questions the future, which it treats with undisguised trepidation.

Yet in spite of its dark and chaotic implications, Charles' death also clearly provided the Royalists with some degree of textual control. *Eikon Basilike* is of course the prime example of this reassertion of control. Commonly regarded as a huge success, spanning thirty-five editions in England, *Eikon Basilike* is an attempt to challenge the textual, legal, moral and political dominance of the King's enemies.³⁸ As de Groot observes, the book is

³⁵ Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 134.

³⁶ E.g. *Man in the Moon*, No. 1, pp. 1-3. See Chapter One of this thesis.

³⁷ Clarendon, *History*, Vol. I, p. 162.

³⁸ Daems and Nelson, *Eikon Basilike*, p. 14; Potter, *Secret Rites*, ch. 5; Ollard, *Image of the King*, pp. 184-185.

a desire to see the death of the King as something generically understandable, as part of a teleology or history of nation; it represented a hope for a national and spiritual afterlife.³⁹

Contrary to the implication of Skipworth's reflections, meaning and purpose do not necessarily collapse following Charles' death. Instead, meaning is reinforced. The political memoirs within its pages justify the King's actions to the extent that in later editions of the book he becomes 'th'unmoved rock' standing against the torrent of Parliamentary evil.⁴⁰ But the most important feature of *Eikon Basilike* is that it inverts the Royalists' defeat and transforms Charles' execution so that it becomes a triumph, and it is in this way that meaning is powerfully reasserted. *Eikon Basilike* has, as Sharpe describes, the effect of raising Charles above the political and legal turmoil of the 1640s so the 'fruits of victory' are denied to his enemies.⁴¹ It regains command and control of textual space, displacing Parliamentary rhetoric and cementing the King in the centre of England. Charles' death does thus not signify the end of meaning, but rather the consolidation of existing meaning. That *Eikon Basilike* should address the future Charles II suggests not an end to Royalism, but a continuation of it, and that endurance requires resistance to the legal, political and religious upheaval created by Parliament.

One of the ironies of the Civil War period is that Royalism ultimately embraced the very characteristics which it feared, and in doing so immortalised itself in history. Charles' capture and eventual execution marked a new development in Royalist identity. As Potter and Corns note, subversion emerges as a defining characteristic of Royalism following the end of the war.⁴² Whereas during the wars of 1642 to 1646 and 1648, Royalist print had illustrated that it was honourable and virtuous to die fighting for the King on the

³⁹ De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, p. 166.

⁴⁰ 'The Explanation of the Embleme', in *Eikon Basilike*, London, 1649.

⁴¹ Sharpe, K., '“An Image Doting Rabble”: The Failure of Republican Culture in Seventeenth-Century England', in Sharpe, K., and Zwicker, S., (eds.), *Refiguring Revolutions: Aesthetics and Politics from the English Revolution to the Romantic Revolution*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, p. 33.

⁴² Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 17, pp. 102-140.

battlefield, in the aftermath of his execution Royalist writers came to see subversive action against the newly established power as virtuous. The authorial voices in pamphlets like *The Man in the Moon* portrayed themselves as secretive and subversive agents of the deceased King. Instead of functioning as the upholder of established order, Royalist print acts as a guerilla fighter resisting the enemy that's invaded England's political, legal and cultural spaces. In his pamphlet, *Mercurius Elencticus*, George Wharton wrote of how he could 'carry a *Presse*' in his 'pocket' and was able to print in his 'closet'.⁴³ Crouch was similarly proud to proclaim to his readers that

as long as I have three sheets for a penny, and as many pens, fear not, but I shall make one Traytor or other doe penance every week.⁴⁴

Royalist pamphleteers are thus seen to improvise with whatever materials they have at hand in order to attack the new regime, and they appear to proudly present themselves as operating in an underground network of co-conspirators.

In the aftermath of the King's execution, Royalists faced two possible futures: resistance or submission to the new regime. Smith has explored the activities and effectiveness of Royalist agents, pointing out that subversive and clandestine resistance was only ever fully embraced by a minority, and that even then it was largely ineffective.⁴⁵ For Smith the major problems encountered by Royalism appear to be ascribed to a lack of clear, strong leadership and a shortage of money.⁴⁶ Considering that the Restoration was largely the product of Monck's actions, Royalist resistance even had limited influence in achieving what was supposed to have been its main objective.⁴⁷ One is left with the impression that Royalism was very much a fragmented cause with no set, coherent

⁴³ ODNB; *Mercurius Elencticus*, London, 1648, No. 23, p. 2.

⁴⁴ *Man in the Moon*, No. 1, 9th-16th April 1649, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Smith, *Royalist Agents, Conspirators and Spies: Their Role in the British Civil Wars, 1640-1660*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, p. 242.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 238-240.

⁴⁷ Smith, *Royalist Agents*, p. 238.

identity. Yet the Royalist cause was able to maintain a presence in the public arena through the press, and a general identity still emerged on the printed page. The massive armies and fortresses of Charles I may have been defeated and destroyed, but committed Royalists were able to withdraw from England's new legal space and exist as outlaws. Charles II was a key figure in this regard, since his flight from the New Model Army following the Battle of Worcester in September 1651 naturally gave him a fugitive status. Ollard has said the tale of Charles II's escape to the continent 'lent itself to the projection of an image identifying the monarch with the profoundest loyalty of his people'.⁴⁸ The uncrowned King of England inhabited an unknown and secret space that at times placed him on the same level as the English people, unlike his more aloof and distant father. Both Charles II and the English citizen lived under the watchful and oppressive eye of the Cromwellian establishment. Charles II's apparent ability to evade capture and outwit his enemies provided Royalist pamphleteers with the perfect opportunity to project the new King as a romantic figure and inspiration to those who resented 'Craftie Cromwell' and the new regime.⁴⁹

Unlike his father, the uncrowned Charles II had no real control over either his own image or the identity of Royalism in the press. In terms of the period in which he was in hiding, we seem only to get fleeting glimpses of Charles II. In pamphlets, word of the fugitive King is spread via third party narrators, and we are left only with traces and fragments of his activities. News of Charles II is largely left to the imagination following the Battle of Worcester, with rumours often overtaking reality. Charles II comes to be associated with outlaws and bandits, firmly placing Royalism and Royalists beyond the newly established boundaries of English society. But Charles' association with bandits does not diminish his prestige as a monarch. Instead, it illustrates the injustice of

⁴⁸ Ollard, R., *The Image of the King: Charles I and Charles II*, London, Pimlico, 1993, p. 86.

⁴⁹ *Craftie Cromwell*, London, 1648.

Parliamentary rule and honesty of Royalists. The highwayman James Hind is particularly noteworthy in this regard, since his actions carry with them a sense of social and moral justice that has supposedly become absent in post-Regicide England. In his declaration

Hind asserts

...Neither did I ever take the worth of a peny from a poor man; but at what time soever I met with any such person, it was my constant custom, to ask, *Who he was for?* if he reply'd, *For the King*, I gave him 20 shillings: but if he answer'd, *For the Parliament*, I left him, as I found him...⁵⁰

Hind effectively becomes a Robin Hood of the Interregnum, giving money to those left abandoned by Cromwell's regime in the aftermath of the war. Prominent amongst Hind's targeted victims are Parliamentary officers and committee men, and in later years the legend of Hind would develop so that even Cromwell came to be one of his victims. These figures represent a much more sinister type of criminal than anything Hind could ever be, for their raising of taxes turns them into far greater thieves than any highwayman. Moreover, the willingness of Parliamentarians to murder a monarch places them above and beyond the law, so they remain unaccountable and immune to the very legislation that they impose upon the common man. Whereas Parliamentarians appear to be selfish, Royalist actions support a greater good. Pamphlets such as *Craftie Cromwell* clearly suggest that self-advancement is a central characteristic of MPs. Hind, in contrast, is shown to be noble in intent: unlike the self-serving vagabonds in Parliament, the Royalist highwayman fights for other people, and in particular 'for so good and just a Cause, as adhering to the KING'.⁵¹ Hind's devotion is further emphasised by his alleged assertion that had he 'a thousand lives, and at liberty', he 'would venture them a'l for King Charles'.⁵² The very fact that Charles II was associated with outlaws naturally added to the romantic and

⁵⁰ *The Declaration of Captain James Hind*, London, 1651, p. 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁵² *Declaration of James Hind*, pp. 4-5.

subversive image of Royalism. The outlaw King works with those who live on the fringes of society, and he finds help from those who have been ostracised by Cromwell's regime. As Ollard points out, it is not noblemen and aristocrats who save Charles II, but those from the lower echelons of society.⁵³ Unlike Cromwell, Charles II is not backed up by the force and unaccountable power of an army: he is saved by individuals, and in the process arguably turns Royalism into the cause for individuals. Royalism offers an alternate reality in which the individual need not simply be a source of taxation for Parliament and its murderous leaders. As suggested by the characterisation of figures such as Hind or Charles II, an individual potentially has the ability to challenge or change an established power, and part of that ability stems from personal otherness.

One of the ironies of the post-Regicide years is that the negativity associated with the Cavalier stereotype of the 1640s was reversed. Whereas during the war years the Cavalier's otherness was a stigma, from the 1650s it becomes virtuous. Whilst the Cavalier of the 1640s manifested contemporary anxieties regarding foreign Catholicism and its oppressiveness, the Cavalier stereotype of later years is an inversion of itself. The Cavalier's otherness is liberating: flamboyant clothing, choice language and a carefree manner signifies not only resistance to Parliamentary power and its dour culture, but also an aspiration or fantasy for others. A Cavalier inhabits his own space, the boundaries of which cannot be set or defined by anyone other than himself, and he engages in whatever activities he so chooses. Resistance, scorn and plain dismissal of government control makes the Cavalier a hero for personal freedom and individuality.

However, the Cavalier's individualism stems not from a careless disregard of politics, but from a commitment to resist the arbitrary changes imposed by the Regicides.

⁵³ Ollard, *Image of the King*, p. 83.

In *The Terrible, horrible, Monster of the West*, Parliament's power is the beast which intends to consume England, as it describes the monstrous government and how it

...came to the Citie, and there it devour'd S. *Pauls* Church, eat the very Scaffolds and bones of the dead, Stones, Altar, Church, Steeple, Organ-Pipes, and all, and yet as hungry as ever. It came to *White-Hall*, and there it chopt up the Head of the *Owner*, our ever sacred King, banqueted in his bloud, eat up all his Revenues, Honors, Manors, Hereditaments, Forests, Parks, Chases, Trees, Venison, and all; and yet not satisfied, but it gobled up all the Kings, Queenes, & Princes goods, not sparing the very *Hangings*, but devoured all...⁵⁴

It is precisely this destruction of England which the Cavalier supposedly opposes. Instead of becoming slavishly subservient to the dogma of politicians and lawyers, the Cavalier is supposedly on a quest to correct the evils of the Regicides. Rupert is conveyed as a champion against the 'usurped power in England'.⁵⁵ He seeks justice for the 'bloody and inhumane murder' of Charles I, and wages his war at sea as part of an overall plan to combat the despotic power of the Commonwealth that has 'no *Law* save such as a *Rebellious Army of Sectarian Murtherers* will please to have'.⁵⁶ Robin Hood becomes a character against whom the Cavaliers are compared, and Potter notes that between 1656 and 1657 at least 10 ballads relating to the legendary outlaw were registered.⁵⁷ In one pamphlet Robin Hood is even given the physical attributes of Charles II when he is described as a 'tall young man'.⁵⁸ Charles' coronation in April 1661 was also celebrated in Nottingham by the acting of a political comedy in which Robin Hood is blatantly given a Royalist identity.⁵⁹ Charles II's Royalists may have existed outside of the establishment, but their disorder was of a far different sort to that of the stereotypical Cavalier in 1645.

The association of Charles II with outlaws helped to romanticise Royalism, and in so doing

⁵⁴ Quoted in Potter, *Secret Rites*, pp.35-36.

⁵⁵ *The Declaration of His Highnesse Prince Rupert*, p. 2.

⁵⁶ *Declaration of Prince Rupert*, p. 8.

⁵⁷ Potter, *Secret Rites*, p. 103.

⁵⁸ *Robin Hoods Golden Prize*, London, 1650.

⁵⁹ *Robin Hood and His Crew of Souldiers*, London, 1661.

had the power to access popular imagination and the potential to create a King and cause with which more people could empathise.

Indeed, Royalism's subversive and disguised nature during the Commonwealth endowed it with a mystique that would endure in popular literature throughout centuries. For instance, Dickens' *Bleak House* features the ghost of a Cavalier, and Conan-Doyle's *Hound of the Baskervilles* is based on the legend of a cursed Royalist officer. In these contexts, Royalists and Royalism inhabit the unknown. Royalist ghosts loom up from the mists of time and the sparsely documented history of Royalism gives way to tales that resonate throughout the ages. It is as if the Royalists acquired an identity that could not be defined. They championed the law, and yet they also defied the law. The Royalist press portrayed them as English patriots, and yet the Royalist cause was eagerly open to military assistance from foreigners. Royalists became others in English society, and yet they were also built into English folklore. Royalism and Royalists therefore inhabit an unknown or ill-defined space that is open to interpretation.

By existing outside of the law during the Commonwealth, Royalists were perhaps in a stronger position to be presented in more diverse ways than they could have been under Charles I. That the Royalist cause entered the more fictional realm of English legends perhaps gave it a degree of flexibility that enabled it to be interpreted and presented in more creative and romantic ways than it had been previously. Its ultimate success may reside not in the more centralized and controlled spaces of the printing press in Royalist Oxford, but in its embracement, intentional or otherwise, of otherness and individualism under Charles II. The irony may very well be that the Royalist press' apparent aspiration for the control of language and meaning during the First Civil War failed to establish a secure identity for the King's supporters, and that it was actually a less controlled textual space which enabled the Royalists to gain a more appealing and

enduring image. Whilst the Royalists had possessed an otherness under Charles I, the implications of their identity under Charles II were quite different. Royalists serving under Charles I acquired a reputation for violence, for which the evidence, however exaggerated or distorted, was ultimately the plundering by Royalist soldiers at the end of the war. Royalist actions could thus be presented and interpreted as a threat to Parliament's efforts to stabilise England, and indeed the New Model Army was central in creating an English identity for the new regime.⁶⁰ The Royalists of the Interregnum, however, could be perceived as champions of liberty in the face of a growing and arbitrary form of government.

What is ultimately striking about Royalism is the fact that it was able to survive in spite of its contradictions and inconsistencies. It was supposedly a patriotic English cause, and yet it was clearly anything except a specifically English cause. It was also a cause which championed English law, and yet it found refuge outside of the law. McElligott argues that Royalist pamphleteers were able to support any new policy or theory, regardless of any previous assertions which seemingly contradicted them, because they were attempting to target different readers.⁶¹ This thesis has attempted to argue that Royalism primarily wanted to be an English cause, but that it was also capable of addressing people from ethnically and culturally distinct backgrounds within the British Isles. The apparent contradictions within Royalist discourse between 1638 and 1646 may have created inconsistencies in Royalist identity, but it seems possible that these apparent flaws were deliberately made with the intention of addressing and appealing to different audiences. The Scots, however, do not ever seem to have been explicitly addressed as an intended audience. An overt dislike of the Scots did not have to be reconciled with the Scottish dimension of the Royalist armies, since Royalist print does not appear to have

⁶⁰ Wheeler, J.S., 'Sense of identity in the army of the English republic, 1645-51', in Macinnes, A.I., (ed.), *The Stuart Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century: Awkward Neighbours*, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2002.

⁶¹ McElligott, *Royalism, Print and Censorship*, chs. 1 and 3; pp. 225-227.

acknowledged their presence in the first instance. Moreover, the fact that Englishness seems to have been a strong and recurrent theme within Royalist print undermines neither de Groot's nor McElligott's theories. An English identity remained at the heart of Royalism, or at least that is what Royalist print generally appears to have aspired to, and as a result created a binary opposition to Parliament and its Scottish allies on a cultural and ethnic level. But that overall English identity provided the fundamental framework in which other Royalists could identify each other. The Royalist political spectrum existed within a basic identity which the overall image of the Royalists was predicated on, and that identity was to be based on a rather loose and inconsistent concept of English patriotism.

In a Covenanter pamphlet published in 1639, English readers were asked,

What will you fight for a Booke of Common Prayer?
What will you fight for a Court of High Commission?
What will you fight for a Myter guilded faire?
Or to maintain the Prelates proud Ambition?⁶²

The point in such questioning would seem to be that the King's cause lacks any meaningful substance. The issues for which Charles has gone to war are seemingly devoid of any national interest. Religion in the British Isles has been infected and subverted by foreign practices and teaching, with the inevitable result that Protestantism is in danger of being eradicated by the Counter-Reformation. In effect the identity of England, and indeed of the entire British Isles, is linked to religious doctrine and practices, and those practices introduced under Charles are utterly at odds with the interests of the King's subjects. To fight for Charles is to fight not simply against Scotland, but also against England. Such problems were carried into the 1640s, and they may well mark the beginning of a confusion or bewilderment over the Royalist cause that survives to this day. In his recent work, *Image Wars*, Sharpe asks whether Charles 'got his image or message wrong'.⁶³ This

⁶² *The Scots Scots Discoveries by Their London Intelligencer*, London, 1639, p. 43.

⁶³ Sharpe, K., *Image Wars: Promoting Kings and Commonwealths in England, 1603-1660*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2010, p. 137.

study has perhaps gone some way to answering a similar such question, since it has tried to reveal the flawed Royalist identity or image that was fashioned in the press.

At the beginning of this work it was observed that one of the problems which has faced our understanding of Royalists and Royalism during the Civil Wars is the issue of defining who a Royalist was, and what it was that he stood for. We know that Smith has offered us the term, 'Constitutional Royalism', but we also know that such a term is problematic since it can potentially become so all-embracing that virtually any contemporary may be described as a Constitutional Royalist. In light of this issue, more recent research has highlighted the factional nature of Royalist politics, drawing attention to the point that the Royalists were rife with political differences. This thesis, however, has made no direct or conscious attempt to challenge either of these basic arguments. Instead, it has taken an approach that is intended to shift the discussion of Royalists and Royalism away from high politics, but towards a more cultural context. In this regard, the work here lends itself more to de Groot and Stoye, although the concept of a patriotic English Royalist identity in some ways simply replaces that of Constitutional Royalism. But the point here has not been to identify, chart and explore a train of political thought or teaching. It has instead been to investigate what identity was created in the press, and what has emerged in this study is that the wars between 1638 and 1646 were to an extent marked by a struggle for control over Englishness.

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