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The impact of principal party strategies on the radical right: In search of a silver bullet?

Grant Mitchell

Keele University

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Abstract

Since the 1980s, many Western European countries have witnessed the rise of the radical right. Much has been written on the ideology of these parties, the tactics they adopt, the sorts of people that vote for them, and the reasons behind their electoral success. The growing electoral success of these parties represents a serious electoral challenge to major political parties or 'principal parties' and yet comparatively little has been written on how principal parties respond to the radical right and even less so on the impact that this has on the electoral success of radical right parties. Indeed, what has been written tends to focus on either a small number of parties or a particular party family.

What is thus far lacking is a comprehensive comparative account of how principal parties have responded to the radical right and to what extent these strategic responses have been successful. This thesis seeks to address this gap by adopting a multi-method approach that combines cross-case comparative analysis with qualitative case studies in order to identify the various strategies that principal parties employ and the degree of success, if any, they have. By building on the existing literature, it develops an enhanced model of party competition which is subsequently tested in an mvQCA analysis and two in-depth, qualitative case studies: France and Sweden. In doing so, this thesis will identify what strategies principal parties adopt, how successful they are, and whether or not a 'silver bullet' exists that can be employed against the radical right.

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1. Introduction

1.1. The Subject to be Explored

Throughout most of Western Europe, established political parties have had to come to grips with the widespread upsurge of radical right competitors, which have eschewed traditional, comprehensive policy platforms in favour of more extreme positions on a restricted set of political issues (Meguid 2005, 2008). In response to these challengers and to maintain their electoral advantage and, of course, their position within government, established political parties have employed a wide array of strategies. These include ignoring the new rivals, or trying to isolate them, or, by contrast, collaborating with them or attempting to steal away core personnel. They also involve taking opposing stances on the issues that the radical right competitors promote, or dismissing them, or even accommodating them.

Despite the growing presence of radical right parties throughout Western Europe, and despite the existence of work that focuses on specific parties (Copsey 2005; Art 2007; Dahlström and Sundell 2012; Heinze 2018) or specific strategies (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2005, 2008; van Spanje and van der Brug 2008; van Spanje 2010; van Spanje and de Graaf 2018; Hjorth and Larsen 2020; Spoon and Klüver 2020; Abou-Chadi et al. 2021), very few studies have actually considered the efficacy of particular party strategies. That is, few studies have sought to understand the effects and consequences of established party strategies on the radical right. Indeed, to date, Bonnie Meguid's (2005, 2008) seminal contributions to the study of competition between unequals – between established political parties and smaller, niche parties, of which the radical right is a part – remains the most substantive response to the efficacy of party strategies. Through her statistical analysis and case studies, Meguid argued that accommodative strategies were by far and away the most effective way for established parties to combat the radical right as such strategies would lead to a reduction in the vote share of the radical right. Meguid aside, there is a distinct lack of research on the efficacy of established party

strategies despite the relatively recently call for such work by Bale et al. (2010: 423; see also Schain 2006), who said that ‘which strategy (or, more likely, combination of strategies) works best is surely a subject for further research’.

In light of these gaps, the purpose of this thesis, then, is to not only identify which strategies established parties are employing in their fight against the radical right, but to also understand how effective these strategies have been in reducing the vote share of the radical right. As such, the thesis is concerned with three overarching questions. Firstly, what strategies have principal parties adopted against radical right competitors? Secondly, how successful (or unsuccessful) have these strategies actually been in combating the radical right? And thirdly, is there a ‘silver bullet’ or ‘magic formula’ that established parties can employ against the radical right?

In order to answer these three questions, this thesis will develop and then test an expanded model of competition. This new model takes into account and ultimately brings together a number of existing approaches to party competition, but it also augments existing models by including a new dimension of competition based on reputation. The model is tested through a two-step analytical approach. First an extensive phase explores the strategies of 38 established parties in 14 West European political systems through the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Then, an intensive phase focuses on two carefully chosen case studies – France and Sweden – and engages in an in-depth exploration of what strategies the established parties have chosen, why they have chosen them, and what the consequences of these choices have been. The adoption of a multi-method approach is not only recommended as a standard of good practice among QCA practitioners (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) but QCA allows for the identification of different combinations of strategies employed by established parties and the consequences that these different combinations have for the vote share of the radical right, while the in-depth case studies although for the contextualisation of party strategies.

1.2. The Contribution of the Thesis

The thesis makes a number of important contributions. Firstly, its chief conclusion is that there is no silver bullet or magic formula for established parties to use against the radical right. That is, there are no strategies that are routinely successful in curtailing the radical right. Rather, the same strategies employed in different countries or in the same country but at different times, can produce widely different results. As such then, as Gruber and Bale (2014: 237) have argued, the radical right is 'not so much a problem to be solved [by established political parties] as a situation to be managed'.

This overall conclusion is explained by a range of factors, and in identifying why a silver bullet does not exist, the thesis makes a number of additional contributions. Firstly, it demonstrates the importance of context on party strategies. Here, context is understood as those factors that impact upon the efficacy of party strategies, such as the issue agenda, voter attitudes to immigration and other policy areas, how trusting voters are of politicians and political parties, levels of voter satisfaction in democracy, and the spatial positioning of other parties. This context shapes what strategies are employed by established parties but also the extent to which these strategies are successful (or unsuccessful) in combating the radical right.

Secondly, it confirms other studies (e.g., Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van Kessel 2015) in showing the importance of radical right agency and organisation on the types and efficacy of strategies that established parties employ. Indeed, rather than radical right parties being seen as mere pawns in a game between established political parties, as per Meguid (2005, 2008), this thesis considers radical right parties to be key players in their own right, capable of navigating the political game to their own advantage. Radical right parties are, then, to a large extent, 'masters of their own success' (Carter 2005: 13).

The third contribution of the thesis is that it draws our attention to strategies that have so far been overlooked in the literature in the field. The thesis theoretically argues and empirically demonstrates that the reputation of political parties is an important feature of party competition. Reputations allow

parties to more effectively trespass on the issue territory of other parties, to convincingly sell particular policy positions, and to more easily reach voters. Reputations are therefore valuable investments that political parties protect and procure and can therefore be employed to enhance the effectiveness of established party strategies. More than this, however, reputational strategies can be employed by political parties to either enhance or undermine the reputations of other parties. In short, parties can manipulate their own reputation and the reputation of other parties; reputations are therefore a dimension of competition of their own. Importantly, though, reputations are dynamic features of party competition that do not always play out in favour of established political parties. Through manipulation and the use of reputational strategies, reputations can improve and weaken over time. This acknowledgement of the importance of reputation in party competition challenges Meguid's (2005, 2008) assumption that established political parties can rely on some supposed inherent reputational advantage over their radical right counterparts. This is not the case and radical right parties can, through careful manipulation and the use of reputational strategies, achieve stronger and more positive reputation than their established party counterparts.

1.3. The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured in nine chapters. The next chapter – Chapter 2 – is devoted to exploring what party competition is, how it plays out, and how it can be modelled. The chapter begins by discussing the concepts of issues and dimensions, before engaging in an extensive literature review of the different approaches to party competition that have emerged and developed over the years, and it pays particular attention to Meguid's (2005, 2008) influential and widely applied Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) model, and to studies that have subsequently built on Meguid's work. The chapter then considers the concept of reputation, and explains how reputation can improve our understanding of party competition. Having done this, the chapter then develops and presents an augmented model of party competition, which brings together the strategic approaches identified in

previous studies and also includes a new reputation dimension of competition. This new model presents an arsenal of strategies that established political parties can employ against a radical right challenger.

Which strategies the established parties choose to adopt, and how successful these strategies prove to be, will of course be affected by a range of factors. Chapter 3 explores these factors in some depth. It considers whether a party's origin or type might affect its choice of strategy, whether the internal balance of power within parties shapes which strategies are adopted, and whether organisations that are closely linked to parties exert any influence on strategy choice. The chapter also considers the goals that parties pursue and how these goals may impact on what strategies are pursued. In addition to these factors, which can be considered endogenous to the established parties, other factors are also likely to influence what strategies are chosen, and how successful they are. Of particular importance is the possible impact of the radical right competitors themselves, as well as the institutional rules that govern the game of competition. Thus, this chapter also examines whether and how the goals and organisation of the radical right parties might affect what strategies the established parties choose, and how these strategies work out, and it explores how the institutional environment within which party competition takes place may affect what strategies are adopted, and how effective these turn out to be.

Chapter 4 defines the key concepts with which the thesis is concerned, and identifies the parties that are to be investigated. It engages in a review of the different terms that have been used to describe important political parties – such as mainstream, establishment, and moderate – and it discusses what each of these mean. It then introduces the concept of the principal party, and explains and justifies why this concept is favoured over others. The chapter then also defines the concept of the radical right. On the basis of these definitions, the chapter closes by identifying the players of the game: it identifies 37 principal parties and 19 radical right parties in the 14 political systems under investigation.

In a last step before the analysis begins, Chapter 5 sets out the thesis' research design and methods. The chapter begins with an introduction to set-theoretic methods and then offers a discussion of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) specifically. This includes outlining the advantages of employing QCA in this type of research, and the benefits of using multi-value QCA (mvQCA) in particular. The chapter then explains how the mvQCA analysis will be carried out. The chapter then sets out the second part of the thesis' design, namely its case study design that allows for intensive analysis. It highlights the benefits of undertaking case study analysis following QCA analysis, and it then explains the process used for selecting the cases. Finally, it outlines the contextual conditions found in each of the cases that are most likely to be pertinent in shaping what strategies principal parties choose to adopt, and how successful these strategies end up being.

Chapter 6 engages in the mvQCA analysis. It starts by explaining how each of the different strategies available to the principal parties is operationalised, and it provides information on the data used in the mvQCA analysis. Then, the chapter analyses the strategies adopted by a single principal party and the effect of these strategies on the vote share of the radical right. This process is then repeated, but with a focus on the strategies adopted by two principal parties and their impact on the radical right vote share.

As noted above, one of the main contributions of this thesis is the finding – uncovered from the mvQCA analysis – that there is no silver bullet. In other words, there are no strategies that are consistently successful in curbing the radical right party vote, and instead the same strategies employed in different countries or at different times can have very different consequences. In light of this, and so as to explore in more detail why certain strategies are adopted and others are not, and why different strategies succeed or fail, Chapters 7 and 8 of the thesis engage in in-depth analysis of two cases, namely France and Sweden. Each chapter begins with an overview of each country's electoral and party system, and a discussion of the radical right challengers, outlining the origins of the National Front and Sweden Democrats, their development and their ideologies. This scene-setting

helps to establish the context in which the respective principal parties are competing. After this, the two chapters present a summary of the elections in each country in the time period under investigation, highlighting what issues were salient in the various campaigns, how the different parties dealt with them, and essentially, how competition played out. From this, the chapters then offer a review of the strategies that the principal parties in each country have adopted vis-à-vis their radical right competitors. Then the two chapters turn their attention to the importance of contextual factors, and consider which issues have been particularly salient in the two countries, where voters position themselves on the issues that the radical right parties promote, how satisfied voters are with the principal parties and how much they trust them and their leaders, as well as the reputations of parties and candidates. These factors are explored as they are all likely to affect what strategies the principal parties have chosen to pursue and how effective their strategies have been.

The thesis closes with a conclusion – set out in Chapter 9 – that summarises its main empirical findings and highlights its contributions. This chapter also proposes avenues for future research into party competition between unequals, and party strategies.

This introductory chapter has set out the questions that this thesis seeks to ask and explore, and has explained why these questions are important ones to pose. It has also outlined how the thesis proposes to go about addressing these questions, and how the thesis will be structured. Having done all this, the next chapter turns to the subject to be investigated. It begins by considering what issues and dimensions are, and then considers what party competition is, how it is played out, and how it can be modelled.

2. From Toolkit to Arsenal: The Expansion of Party Competition Strategies

2.1. Introduction

The academic literature on party competition is significant, and the purpose of this chapter is to critically review it so as to then propose a framework of analysis for this thesis. To do this, the chapter begins by considering some of the core concepts in party competition, namely 'issues' and 'dimensions', so as to establish a clear understanding as to what these terms actually mean. Then it proceeds by reviewing the classical spatial models of Hotelling and Downs, and by considering the criticisms of these, and adjustments such as directional spatial models. Next, the chapter turns to the saliency and issue ownership literatures, and to the Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) framework put forward by Bonnie Meguid (2005, 2008), and similar strategic approaches advanced by other scholars. It delves deeper into this strain of the literature through its exploration of dimensionally-oriented strategies. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on the concept of reputation and introduces the reputational dimension of competition, which, it is argued, establishes a new and dynamic plane of competition for political parties. Toward the end of the chapter, the various issue-, dimensionally-, and party-oriented strategies are brought together alongside the new reputational dimension in order to create a new model of competition which forms the analytical framework used by this thesis. The chapter ends by bringing together the various issue-, dimensionally-, and party-oriented strategies together with the new reputational dimension in order to make up the analytical framework used by this thesis.

2.2. Issues and Dimensions

The concept of a political issue is employed widely in both academia and the media and yet remains surprisingly ambiguous. While the concept has been employed in numerous subfields of political

science, there is little agreement concerning its definition and constitution, and little effort has been put into actually defining what an issue is (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014). Defining the concept here, then, is more a matter of extraction than review.

In one of the few attempts to define what constitutes an issue Budge (1993: 43) argues that an issue is either 'a point or topic emphasised by only one of the parties' or 'a point, topic, or position, whether or not stressed by the leaders, important in defining party support among electors or moving support between the parties'. This inevitably raises the question of what constitutes a point, topic, or position. Does it strictly refer to what are traditionally conceived of as issues (such as immigration or healthcare) or does it include personal characteristics such as the likeability of the party leader? The latter is often not considered an issue in and of itself (see Hinich and Munger 1994 for contrasting view), but is nonetheless important in determining party support among electors or indeed moving support between parties. Yet, the inclusion of personal characteristics, likeability, and the determinants of party support, possibly stretch the definition of issue so wide as to weaken the overall usefulness of the concept.

Turning to the issue competition (valence, saliency, and ownership) literature, two conceptions of 'issue' can be extracted. Firstly, issues can be conceived of as broad themes, categorisations, or policy areas such as welfare, foreign affairs, or healthcare (e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983; Bale et al. 2003; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). Secondly, issues can be conceived of as specific policy problems or goals such as the invasion of Iraq, preventative measures on crime, and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Holian 2004; Green and Hobolt 2008; Carter et al. 2017).

The major approaches to issue competition, as exemplified by the Comparative Manifesto Project and Comparative Agendas Project, locate political parties' positions on issues in line with the broad themes conceived above (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014). This approach has major implications for the conclusions drawn from such research. The issue ownership literature argues that political parties develop ownership over particular issues and will avoid those issues that their opponents own

(Petrocik 1996). The implication is that political parties will abandon and ignore whole swathes of issues instead of competing on them (Carmines 1991; Riker 1993).

The reality, of course, is that the majority of political issues are composed of a variety of 'sub-issues' that open up alternative avenues on which political parties can compete. Political parties therefore seek to reframe these broad thematic issues by reference to 'sub-issues' that are more favourable to them (Sides 2006). The effect, then, is to reframe the broad thematic issue in a manner that is congruent with the party's existing ideology, goals, and programmatic profile. For example, in the 1990s, the Democratic Party (United States), and in particular Bill Clinton, sought to challenge the Republican Party's ownership of the broad thematic issue of crime (Holian 2004). Clinton first neutralised the difference in policy between the Democrats and Republicans by accepting the Republican position on capital punishment before advocating greater crime prevention measures such as increasing the number of police officers patrolling the streets. This permitted the Democratic Party to demonstrate concern over the broad thematic issue of crime but in a manner congruent with its programmatic profile, ideology, and goals (Holian 2004). A focus on less broad, 'sub-issues' might therefore reveal considerably less issue overlap or contestation than might have been the case with a broader, thematic conception of issue (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014).

The definition of issue has implications for the categorisation of issues as either valence or positional issues. Consider, again, the issue of crime: everyone bar the mafia has a shared interest in reducing crime and therefore crime is often considered a valence issue. By contrast, can the increase in stop and search, the imposition of the death penalty, the increase in officers on the beat, or other 'sub issues' of crime, be categorised as valence issues? Each of these issues suffers from considerable contestation and controversy, and therefore, cannot be considered valence issues; rather, they are considered 'positional issues'.

Distinguishing between themes and issues is therefore crucial. In an attempt to do so, Guinaudeau and Persico (2014: 316) define issues as the following: 'a question of public policy, as demarcated,

defined, and specified by political actors, possibly giving rise to one or several positions'. This inductive approach to policy issues – in contrast to the deductive approaches seen in Budge and Farlie 1983, among others – has the benefit of permitting political actors to define what constitutes an issue. This is important when considering many of the non-positional strategies considered in this thesis such as Rovny's (2012) blurring strategy or the reframing of various issues (Jacoby 2000; Elias et al. 2015). That being said, it should be acknowledged that the major datasets (see the Comparative Manifesto Project) and indeed major party competition projects and studies regularly conflate theme and issue. By contrast to issues, the defining of dimensions is somewhat more complicated inasmuch as the precise constitution of dimensions can change across time and space. At its core, however, a dimension is merely the simplification of issue space; the clustering of issues by various political actors into single bundles (Robertson 1978; Benoit and Laver 2006). For example, the left-right dimension – the most well known and most widely applied dimension – can be conceived of as a bundling of various economic issues whose poles contrast a more redistributive with a market-oriented economic structure (de Vries and Marks 2012). Dimensions, therefore, depend upon a political actor's perception of the political space and might not be fixed and/or shared by all political actors (Budge 1993). To further complicate matters, the content of a given dimension might change over time due to natural evolutionary processes in the political space: the introduction of new issues by so-called 'issue entrepreneurs' (de Vries and Hobolt 2012), the death of old issues, the reframing of existing issues, and the linking of one issue to another. The very nature of the political space is therefore fluid. What is more, it can vary from country to country. The issues and dimensions that are important in one country may not hold importance in another, or the issues that constitute a dimension in one country may not do so in another.

That being said, the literature has identified a number of important dimensions of political competition that hold across both time and space: an economic left-right dimension (Robertson 1978; Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2001; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006); a cultural or social

dimension often conceptualised as a distance between liberalism and authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006); a European integration dimension (Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2001 – although Marks & Steenbergen 2002 argue that the European dimension can be fully integrated into the traditional left-right dimension); and even a territorial dimension based on support or opposition towards decentralisation (Basile 2015; Elias et al. 2015; Rovny 2015). In fact, Budge et al. (1987) have identified over twenty potential dimensions of political competition.

In practice, however, much of this political contestation can be reduced to two-dimensions: an economic and a social or cultural dimension (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Spies and Franzman 2011). Indeed, Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 19) argue that ‘virtually no substantive concern is observed by going beyond two dimensions’. Therefore, while one could explore potentially infinite dimensions, there is little to be gained from doing so unless there are case specific factors that warrant the inclusion of a multidimensional approach – such as religious or linguistic cleavages in countries such as Israel or Belgium (Lijphart 1979). In fact, the dimensionality of the political space is best conceived of as a heuristic tool through which political actors greatly simplify the political space, and which allows for analysis that might otherwise be overwhelming in complexity (Budge et al. 2001; Bakker et al. 2012). For voters, this simplification makes engagement with politics a simpler process – it is far easier to understand politics by reference to left-right positioning than a detailed understanding of potentially-infinite political space – while for political parties, the reduction of information costs aids in the mobilisation of both activists and voters (Bakker et al. 2012). To that end, then, the number of dimensions chosen is often reflective of the needs of the researcher rather than an attempt to completely accurately reflect the political space (Budge et al. 2001). Indeed, some have argued that a completely accurate representation is impossible and that the best that can be strived for is a sufficiently accurate representation (Budge 1994) which, as outlined above, is achieved through a two-dimensional approach.

Having discussed these core concepts of issues and dimensions, the chapter now moves to exploring the substantial literature on party competition. It begins by focusing on the early literature and the classical spatial models of voting behaviour through to the more recently presented strategic approaches.

2.3. Hotelling, Downs, and the Classic Spatial Model of Voting Behaviour

The origins of the classic spatial model of voting behaviour can be traced back to Hotelling (1929). Hotelling was primarily seeking to explain the spatial positioning of businesses within a given location and subsequently argued that the logic of his theory could be applied to other theatres of competition, including the political arena.

Suppose, then, a hypothetical Main Street within a hypothetical town. Along this street exists a uniform distribution of consumers who are considered to have inelastic demand for the homogenous products of two firms (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). That is to say, there is no differentiation between the products offered by the two firms and that each consumer purchases one unit of the product per visit in a given time at a given price. Further to this, consumers must also pay a given transportation cost reflective of the distance between their home and the firm they frequent. No consumer has any preference for either firm except on the grounds of price and transportation cost (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). Your average consumer, therefore, will prefer the firm whose store is essentially located at the consumer's address and therefore reduces transport costs to near-zero. By contrast, the average consumer will not consume the product if the utility derived from the product is lower than the cost of the transportation required to purchase it. Therefore, the consumer's utility is increased as transportation costs are reduced (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). Without resorting to incredulity, further assume that a firm's profit is solely dependent upon the number of sales that it makes. Given these established conditions, Hotelling (1929) sought to

determine the equilibrium point between two competing firms, that is, where they would situate themselves on Main Street.

To establish basic principles, we can devise two hypothetical scenarios: one in which a single firm establishes itself and subsequently anticipates further competition and another where two businesses are already established on Main Street but seek to maximise their market share.

For the first scenario, assume that a business establishes itself, seeks a location on Main Street, and anticipates competition from other competitors, where should this business locate itself? Given that the first firm is able to predict what a rational second firm would do, and knowing that a second firm could theoretically dominate a larger segment of the market if the first firm mislocates itself, the rational first firm will locate itself at the median point of the market, that is, centrally located along Main Street. In doing so, the first firm guarantees maximum market share. A rational second firm, supposing the same, would naturally locate itself in the same location, either next door or across the street, and therefore each will share the market equally (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990).

For the second scenario, however, let us imagine a situation wherein two firms have established premises on either ends of Main Street. Supposing that both businesses are capable of moving locations, have homogenous prices and goods, both businesses can increase their market share, and therefore profitability, by shifting towards the centre of Main Street, and thereby capitalise upon greater access to consumers who, to recall, seek to reduce transportation costs and are uniformly distributed along Main Street (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990).

The conclusion for both scenarios, then, is what has become known as the principle of minimum differentiation, the phenomenon that sees competitors bunching up as close as possible to one-another due to a shared desire to increase market share and therefore profits (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). Furthermore, this principle holds that firms will devise and produce goods and services that are, for the most part, homogenous, i.e., that the products and services offered by different firms will be extremely similar.

Hotelling (1929), while primarily occupied by competition between firms, believed in the applicability of his theory to other theatres of competition, and held that the general tendencies towards centripetal competition existed within the political sphere just as much as the economic sphere, arguing:

The competition for votes between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted positions between which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to make its platform as much like the other's as possible. Any radical departure would lose many votes.... Real differences, if they ever exist, fade gradually with time though the issue may be as important as ever (Hotelling 1929: 54-55).

Those who have extended Hotelling's work have done so through the relaxation of one or both of the assumptions made in Hotelling's original work. Smithies (1941), for instance, dispensed with the assumption of inelastic demand and argues, by contrast, that demand depends on price. For this reason, then, producers will experience pressures both centripetal – movement towards the centre to improve sales in the competitive arena – and centrifugal – movement away from the centre to improve sales in their respective 'hinterlands'. Applied to politics, then, Smithies (1941) argues that electoral demand is elastic in that a voter who feels both parties are too far from his or her ideological position can simply stay away from the polls. With this assumption in mind, Smithies believed that the model could explain why Democrats and Republicans were some distance apart in ideological terms.

While Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941) provide an anecdotal observation of how a spatial model of competition could be applied to political parties in democratic elections, it was not until Black (1948) that this concept was applied in the field of political science. Even then, however, Black (1948)

only sought to analyse equilibrium points in committee voting. It was not until Downs' (1957a, b) *An Economic Theory of Democracy* that a formal spatial model of party competition was developed.

For Downs, political parties are essentially political entrepreneurs that sell policies to voters in much the same way firms sell products to consumers. However, rather than seeking to maximise profits, political parties seek to maximise votes (Downs 1957a, b). Contrary to more recent research that considers political behaviour with regard to policy-seeking, office-seeking, and vote-seeking objectives (Müller and Strøm 1999), Downs maintained that political parties are purely office-seeking organisations with no preconceived policy interests. The formulation of policy, and the servicing of interest groups, is a mere formality in the pursuit of political office. For political parties, which are but teams of men – and presumably women – the ultimate goal is to enjoy the prestige, power, and income that comes from governing and holding political office (Downs 1957a, b). As with businesses in a marketplace, however, political parties are not solitary organisations. Not only must they compete with other political parties for these rewards, but they must also appeal to voters, without whom their dream of prestige, power, and income will go unfulfilled.

A key component in the Downsian spatial model is the rationality of voters. Each voter will view elections as the means by which to select the government most beneficial to them. In order to achieve the outcome that maximises their utility, defined by Downs as increasing benefits and income accrued from government policy, each voter estimates the utility income that they expect each political party will provide to them if it were in power, and votes on that basis (Downs 1957a, b). Of course, whereas consumers have the luxury of viewing any goods and services they intend on purchasing from a business before actually purchasing them, voters have no such ability. Therefore, the primary factor influencing a voter's estimation of each political party is not the promises made within a campaign, but the party's performance during the previous electoral period. The voters' decision is therefore based upon a comparison of the utility income they actually received during the last electoral cycle compared to what they believe they would have received had the other political party(ies) been in

office (Downs 1957a, b). Voters therefore engage in so-called retrospective voting (see Fiorina 1981) with the incumbent's record being the essential item under evaluation.

One of the central criticisms of this sort of approach to understanding voting behaviour is the degree to which voters actually have the information available that would permit such a detailed cost-benefit analysis. For Downs, imperfect knowledge and a degree of uncertainty are fundamental realities that one cannot escape, and are therefore incorporated into his spatial model. This means that political parties do not always understand what it is voters want; that voters do not always understand what the government or opposition has done, is doing, or even should be doing; and that the information required to overcome such ignorance is costly, that is, resources and time must be expended in order to achieve greater clarity (Downs 1957a, b). While democratic theorists might wish for voters to expend valuable resources in the pursuit of such information, the reality is that the levels of information required would be truly staggering for the average voter. Not only would voters require an understanding of the policy platforms offered by each party, but they would also need to further understand, in advance, the likely problems a future government would experience, and the solutions that said government would propose.

It is under these conditions that ideologies become useful heuristics employed by voters to simplify political decision making (Hinich and Pollard 1981).¹ Ideologies convey a wealth of information about the likely policy solutions that a political party would pursue once in government, and therefore permit the voter to make a rational choice in the face of considerable uncertainty and a lack of information (Downs 1957a, b). Indeed, detailed information on the policy positions adopted by various political parties is often lacking, with political parties often described in far more general terms by reference to established political labels such as 'fiscal conservative' or 'New Deal liberal' (Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984). These labels, tied to and akin to ideologies,

¹ It is often the case that scholars have misinterpreted Downs as referring to issues – see Grofman 1985 as an example of this – while in reality, Downs was concerned with ideologies (Downs 1957b: Chapter 7; see also Hinich and Munger 1994)

carry a substantial amount of information regarding the likely policy positions that political parties would adopt, and therefore serve to reduce information costs and uncertainty. For instance, a 'New Deal liberal' might be expected to favour increases in spending on social welfare programmes, additional regulation on business, favourable policies regarding labour unions, and even opposition to tax-cuts for the wealthy, among other things (Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984).

A lack of information on the part of voters therefore creates demand for ideologies and political labels that is ultimately supplied by political parties. To recall, in this model political parties are primarily motivated by office-seeking goals, and devise policy purely as a means of gaining office. The development of ideologies and political labels serves to reduce the costs associated with gaining information and reducing uncertainty. Once a political party has established an ideology, however, it cannot suddenly abandon or radically alter it. Having chosen an ideology, any position that a political party adopts must be congenial with its ideological profile. To radically alter this profile or adopt an inharmonious position would convey to voters that the political party is non-credible, unreliable, and perhaps even dishonest (Downs 1957a, b; Hinich and Munger 1994; Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982). Furthermore, at a more basic level, it would destroy the benefit of having developed the ideology in the first place and voters would be none-the-wiser as to what the party stood for. Just as political parties are committed to an ideology once it has been established, political parties cannot adopt ideologies identical to other political parties as they must provide 'product differentiation' in order to ensure they are distinguishable from their opponents and therefore encourage voters to turn out (Downs 1957a, b).

Downs' (1957a, b) conception of Hotelling's (1929) spatial market is therefore reflective of the need for ideologies as a heuristic and is conceived of as a linear scale representing the left-right spectrum. For this Downs (1957a, b) assumes that voters agree upon the order that political parties appear on the scale; that once placed upon the scale, parties may move either left or rightwards but do not leap

over other parties; and that the distribution of the voters along the scale differs between countries but is fixed within them. This last element represents a point of departure from Hotelling inasmuch as Hotelling concluded that political parties in a two-party system would inevitably converge upon the centre. Indeed, while it has become ubiquitous that the Downsian spatial model encourages centripetal competition, Downs (1957a, b) himself never claimed this – or rather, to be more accurate, he argued that the distribution of parties along the spectrum is dependent upon the distribution of voters. So, while Hotelling assumes a unimodal distribution of voters along the spectrum, with parties converging upon the peak within this distribution, Downs (1957a, b) further elaborates that countries may be characterised by bimodal or even multimodal distributions of voters. In these circumstances, one would expect to see political parties occupying the various peaks along the spectrum, with as many political parties as there are peaks. In certain circumstances, therefore, Downs (1957a, b) envisaged centrifugal competition especially among more polarised societies. This connection between the distribution of voters and political parties in Downs' spatial model is often overlooked and has led many scholars to erroneously characterise the Downsian model as predicting centripetal competition even though Downs (1957a: 142) himself argued that the 'conclusion that the parties in a two-party system inevitably converge on the center does not necessarily hold true'.

While there are numerous variants of the spatial model, for the most part, they are merely amendments to the traditional Downsian model (Green and Shapiro 1994). Oftentimes, these variations incorporate additional elements into spatial modelling or alter assumptions made within previous iterations. For instance, Adams et al. (2005) include party identification into their spatial model as well as the ability for voters to discount the claims of political parties, i.e., the likelihood of success in policy implementation, and the willingness, or lack thereof, of citizens to participate in elections when none of the political parties is an attractive option. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and MacDonald and Rabinowitz (1998) sought to incorporate valence issues into spatial models, while Aldrich (1983) included a second theatre of electoral participation, namely, the ability of citizens to become activists within political parties. By contrast, Grofman (1985) and Kedar (2009) propose an

alteration to the proximity assumption within traditional spatial models. They argue that what matters is not the exact position that parties take so much as the 'side' of the divide they are on. For instance, a left-wing party slightly further away on the spectrum might be more favourable to voters than a more proximate right-wing party. Other variations are, to be less than charitable, simply a response to 'a stylised fact coming into currency that calls into question the validity of earlier predictions' (Green and Shapiro 1994: 149). As a result, many spatial models are merely 'post hoc theorising' intended to address a very narrow criticism or empirical occurrence (Green and Shapiro 1994). Despite all these variations, however, these *proximity* spatial models are unified by a series of shared assumptions, namely, that political parties and voters can be located within an n-dimensional space; that political parties produce policy platforms or ideologies in order to win elected office; and that voters seek to maximise their utility by casting a ballot for the political party or candidate closest to them in the n-dimensional political space.

There are a number of problems with the traditional spatial model, however. More specifically, the ground over which political parties compete is not a physical space in the sense of Main Street and to treat it as such would be to introduce assumptions concerning the unidimensionality of the political space, the stability of its structure, and the existence of ordered dimensions (Stokes 1963).

The unidimensionality of the political space is not a reality in either Europe and America. A one-dimensional account of political competition would hold that positions regarding welfare provision, government intervention in the economy, foreign policy, among other issue areas, would be situated at the same location on a left-right or liberal-conservative spectrum (Stokes 1963). However, various pieces of research have proven that there is no relationship between these attitudes among voters; indeed, voters regularly support both an expanded welfare state and lower taxes (Budge 1982; see also Stokes 1963). The non-existence of unidimensionality can be further highlighted by reference to multiparty systems in Europe. While the socio-economic or class-oriented dimension is dominant (Wagner 2012), many European systems contain a variety of political parties that owe their existence

to religious, racial, ethnic, or linguistic cleavages that exist outside of a simple socio-economic interest (Lijphart 1977), and therefore it becomes difficult to plot them along a unidimensional spectrum (Stokes 1963). This criticism is resolved by Enelow, Hinich, Pollard, and Munger (Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and Hinich 1990; Hinich and Munger 1994) who drop the unidimensionality assumption of the traditional Downsian spatial model.

The assumption of fixed structure as represented by a business along Main Street depends on physical distance and therefore business structures are fixed. The distribution of consumers within these spaces may vary but the structures themselves will not. By contrast, the space in which political parties compete can be a highly fluid structure. Just as the parties may be perceived and evaluated on several dimensions so too may the dimensions that are salient to the electorate change over time; sometimes radically (Stokes 1963). However, the fluidity of this space should not be overstated. Political parties are tied down by their reputations and this introduces some semblance of a fixed structure inasmuch as political parties are not free to move throughout the political space; at least not without reputational damage (Downs 1957; Meguid 2005, 2008).

For the traditional Downsian spatial model to apply, both political party and voter must be able to place themselves on one or more common dimensions. There must be at least one ordered set of alternatives of government action that the parties can advocate and the voters prefer. At its most simple there is a position that one party supports and another opposes. Problematically for the traditional Downsian spatial model, however, is that not all issues can be boiled down to such dichotomous choices. In many instances both parties and voters are located at the same point: no one, for instance, supports unemployment, high inflation, or corruption (Stokes 1963; Budge 2015). Robertson's (1976) seminal study in quantifying the manifestos of British political parties – and attempting to subject them to a dimensional analysis in order to test policy convergence – determined the absence of pro- and con- position-taking. One therefore must distinguish between positional issues – those that involve advocacy of government action from a set of alternatives – and valence

issues – those that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by voters (Stokes 1963). Expressed more simply, then, valence issues are those where the differences between the political parties are not the positions they take but rather their perceived competence and performance in handling the most important issues/problems facing the country. To return to the above examples, then, which party is the most competent in achieving low unemployment, low inflation, and lower levels of corruption? (Stokes 1963). As the preferences of both party and voter must be distributed over an ordered set of policy alternatives for the spatial model to work, valence issues do not fit neatly within the traditional Downsian spatial model. That being said, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and MacDonald and Rabinowitz (1998) sought to incorporate valence issues into spatial models.

2.4. Directional Spatial Models

The first major challenge to the proximity spatial model came from Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) who pioneered the directional model of party competition. Borrowing from cognitive psychology they propose that political issues, much like symbols, should be understood with regard to the emotions that they trigger. In contrast to the proximity spatial model, which argues that voters make judgements on political parties based on proximity or closeness, the directional model of voting behaviour holds that what matters is the side that political parties and voters are on with regards to particular issues and the strength of their attachment to these issues. Voters, therefore, are not attracted to political parties that are proximate to them, but rather to those political parties that are on the same side of the debate and that espouse intensity with regards to that direction (Rabinowitz 1978; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). For instance, German voters should prefer the Left Party over the Social Democratic Party as the former espouses a more intense leftist agenda than the latter. Intensity, then, can be understood to mean the extremeness of the party's position and this has a direct impact upon voter evaluations of parties. If a voter is 'directionally compatible' with a

political party, then an increase in the intensity from that political party should further entice the voter. By contrast, if the voter is 'directionally incompatible', greater intensity should repulse the voter (Rabinowitz 1978; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). From the perspective of political parties, greater issue intensity can generate greater electoral support or opposition, depending on the direction the party takes. When the electorate has a clear policy preference, the political party that responds to that preference, and does so with intensity, will be victorious. The implication, then, is that the political party that adopts the more extreme position relative to its opponents, is the political party with the greatest chance of electoral victory (Iversen 1994b). And as Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) assume that political parties are vote-maximisers, the incentive is for political parties to adopt extreme positions.

Aware of this curious phenomenon, which sees voters reward extremism, Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) introduce the 'region of acceptability'. Voters are supposedly wary of political parties that espouse radical or extreme positions, and indeed, the extremist label can hamper the enthusiasm of potential supporters. Political parties outside of this region, therefore, lose support by virtue of being too extreme (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Being located outside of the region of acceptability does not automatically remove the potential for electoral victory, however. It merely implies some unstated penalty for having crossed the boundary (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Therefore, the centrifugal forces at the heart of the directional model of voting behaviour are checked by the need for political parties to appear moderate (Iversen 1994b). In practice, then, vote-maximising political parties should seek to locate themselves at or as close to the border of the region of acceptability as possible, regardless of the party system or distribution of voters (Iversen 1994b).

The rather arbitrary placement of the region of acceptability does have peculiar consequences, however. It requires that all voters agree on the location of the region of acceptability irrespective of whether that voter is positioned in the centre, close to the region, or beyond its borders (Iversen 1994b). Taken to extremes, the implication is that voters who are themselves located beyond the

borders of the region of acceptability would penalise parties for transgressing that border (Iversen 1994a). Reconceptualising the region of acceptability to be more theoretically sound has a curious consequence: the introduction of traditional spatial proximity. Suppose, then, as per Iversen (1994b), that in order to avoid the odd situation described above, each voter is given an individual region of acceptability with associated penalty for political parties perceived as extreme. Just as with the traditional spatial model, voters in the directional model are put off by extremist parties. This consequence leads Iversen (1994b) to conclude that spatial considerations are indispensable to directional theory and that both directional and spatial theory are not so much incompatible as complementary. Iversen (1994b) and Merrill and Grofman (1999) take this and argue that voters prefer parties with clear stances and the same direction, but that, as the distance between them and the party grows, the voter's support diminishes. Indeed, this introduction of directionality within spatial models is fundamental to the spatial models outlined by Grofman (1985) and Kedar (2009).

Furthermore, it is worth considering that the directional model fails to distinguish between different types of emotions. For instance, it does not distinguish between ambivalence and indifference (Thompson et al. 2009). An individual who is indifferent to an issue or issues, as a result of disinterest, say, is unlikely to have the same reaction as an individual whose interest is peaked but torn between equally positive and negative evaluations. By way of illustration, consider the example provided by Thompson et al. (2009: 381) regarding personal evaluations:

Consider, for example, the domain of interpersonal attraction. We know from past research that evaluations of others are multidimensional. One dimension can be characterised as affection or liking; the other as admiration or respect. Thus, although we often like and respect or both dislike and disrespect others, we all know people we like, but do not respect (for example, imagine a person who is warm and caring, but also dependent and not very assertive) as well as people we respect, but do not particularly

like (for example, imagine a person who is intellectually desirable or agentic, but not very socially desirable or communal).

Indifference and ambivalence are therefore quite distinct and, given the differences in emotional intensity vis-à-vis political issues, should produce different evaluations with regards to political parties. In the directional theory, however, they are both subsumed into the medium point, without distinction. This distinction is quite important, however. An individual who suffers from indifference may be less likely to engage in the voting process than someone who is ambivalent, and the responses of both individuals to party strategies may be quite distinct.

Finally, it is worth considering the logical result of the directional theory with regard to empirical reality. To recall, then, the directional approach holds that the centre has no competitive value. Operating on the assumption that voters demand a clear stance, the centre represents a losing position. The centre is therefore a vote-minimising strategy (Evans 2001). So, if they are assumed to be vote-maximisers, as Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) assume, then why do so many political parties exist at the centre or middle point? If one assumes directional logic, then political parties that hold at the centre should haemorrhage support and eventually disintegrate. However, research has shown that centre parties do not disintegrate when faced with polarising competition (Hazan 1997). Indeed, when this competition escalates, centre parties seek to present themselves as moderate alternatives to the now extremist parties (Hazan 1997). The problem of the existence of centre parties becomes even more pronounced when one allows for voters to *discount* the platforms of political parties (see Grofman 1985; Merrill and Grofman 1996). Voters may discount the platforms of political parties as a result of their perceived lack of effectiveness or because of the political structures limiting the degree to which political parties can actually shift from the status quo (Merrill and Grofman 1996). If we permit the discounting of party platforms by voters, the region of acceptability should be theoretically larger as voters would be more tolerant of (moderate)

extremism. A wider region of acceptability should punish centre parties even more strongly as they are even further away from optimum points within the political space.

2.5. Saliency, Issue Ownership, and Responding to the Policy Agenda

The origins of saliency theory are inextricably linked to textual content analysis. While most early content analyses were conducted on media reports (e.g., Madge 1953), it was Robertson's (1976) reading of party manifestos that established the dominance of manifestos within party scholarship and the notion of issue saliency as the primary component in party competition (Budge 2015). In classifying the contents of British party manifestos, Robertson (1976) discovered that very few sentences gave clear pro- or con- positions within the policy areas outlined. Rather, they stressed the importance of the policy area, the importance of the 'problem', the party's record on this issue, and an explicit promise to prioritise it should the party win the election (Robertson 1976; Budge 2015). Manifestos regularly failed to mention other political parties or the policies associated with them. The order of the day, then, was not direct competition over issues, but rather, selective emphasis on different issues (Budge 2015). Focusing on the saliency of individual policy or issue areas had the advantage of incorporating Stokes' (1963) original criticism of Downsian spatial analysis, notably, the failure to include valence or one-position issues such as corruption (Budge 2015)

This saliency approach was further developed by Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1996) who argued that election campaigns could be understood by reference to the differing emphases placed upon different issues by different parties, and by parties selectively emphasising their preferred issues while ignoring or de-emphasising those issues associated with their political opponents (Budge 1982; Budge and Farlie 1983; Carmines 1991; Green-Pedersen 2007; Lefevere et al. 2015). This de-emphasising applies quite widely inasmuch as the mere mentioning of other political parties runs the risk of increasing the saliency of unfavourable issues – even if such encroachment is to refute the policy area's importance (Budge 1982; Budge and Farlie 1983). The focus of political parties, therefore,

is priming voters to consider certain issues to be highly relevant and others irrelevant (Green and Hobolt 2008; Thesen, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2016). From this perspective, then, campaign messages, broadcasts, and press releases do not have the purpose of engaging the opposition in debate, but rather they seek to increase the salience of issues over which the party is perceived as the owner (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Once a political party has developed ownership (see below) over a specific issue, it should increase its vote share among voters for whom that issue is important (Holian 2004; Petrocik 1996). In other words, issue ownership should only impact voter choice when voters believe that issue is salient. As argued by Bélanger and Meguid (2008: 479) ‘why should knowing the Democrats ... are the owner of the healthcare issue matter for an individual ... if she thinks that healthcare is irrelevant?’ It therefore follows that when an issue becomes more salient, the greater the effect issue ownership is expected to have (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Lefevere et al. 2015).

There are four subdimensions to issue ownership. These are associative issue ownership, competence-based issue ownership, negative issue ownership, and incomplete issue ownership (Geys 2012; Walgrave et al. 2012; Lefevere et al. 2015; Meyer and Muller 2013; Wagner and Meyer 2015). Associative ownership is characterised by the ‘spontaneous identification’ of a particular issue with a political party in the minds of voters, irrespective of any competence-based assessment. By contrast, and as one might expect, competence-based ownership is developed by a political party when it is perceived as being most competent or proficient in managing a particular issue or problem (Walgrave et al. 2012). While there may be overlaps between associative and competence-based ownership, inasmuch as the party associated with an issue may also be considered the more competent, these are actually two very separate dimensions. Political parties can be considered competent on an issue without being spontaneously associated with it, and vice versa (Walgrave et al. 2012). This distinction is quite important in that it has strong implications for voting behaviour. Competence-based ownership is considered to have a strong direct effect on voting behaviour while associative ownership affects voting behaviour only when the issue is perceived as important or salient by voters (Walgrave

et al. 2012). That being said, political parties that are strongly associated with a particular issue do tend to enjoy higher levels of credibility on that issue as they are perceived as being sincere in their commitment to the issue (Sides 2006). There is also some evidence to suggest that associative issue ownership produces indirect electoral benefits. For instance, parties that are associated with salient issues tend to be given more coverage by the media (Hayes 2008), thus increasing their profile, and allowing them to more widely communicate their position to voters.

Issue ownership also affords parties some degree of flexibility when it comes to actual performance. For instance, an incumbent party may be able to overcome poor performance in the short term if it enjoys strong reputational advantages on the issue, derived from its history of attention to that issue, or indeed its past performance (Bélanger and Nadeau 2015). Poor performance can, however, lead to a political party developing what has become known as 'negative issue ownership' (Wagner and Meyer 2015). This is where a political party develops a reputation for being ill-suited or incapable of resolving an issue or problem, or becomes known for suggesting 'wrong-headed' solutions (Wagner and Meyer 2015). Given that individuals tend to focus on and place more emphasis on negative assessments than positive ones, negative issue ownership could have a stronger influence than positive issue ownership on overall evaluations and therefore voting behaviour (Wagner and Meyer 2015).

Finally, one should distinguish between complete and incomplete issue ownership. It may be the case that numerous political parties stake a claim and therefore compete over the same issue, even if they are not equally successful in that endeavour (Geys 2012). In a state of incomplete ownership, political parties that co-own particular issues are not guaranteed the benefits either relative or absolute, that is vote share or votes respectively, from an increase in the issue's saliency (Geys 2012). The difference between electoral gain and loss under these circumstances depends on the degree to which the electorate perceives a party's relative competence in handling the issue. Therefore, for the party with the weaker grip on the issue, emphasising it may become counter-productive and result in electoral loss (Geys 2012).

When notions of issue ownership, competition, and selective emphasis are taken to their logical conclusions the implication is that political parties focus upon different issues with little to no overlap (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015; Riker 1993). After all, issue ownership theories involve political parties selectively emphasising those issues on which they hold comparative advantage while downplaying all others. The optimum strategy, therefore, would be to ignore those issues that bestow no electoral advantage while only emphasising those issues that do convey electoral advantage (see Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Carmines 1991). The end result, therefore, is no overlap in issue focus. Yet it has been demonstrated across numerous studies that overlap does occur and that it can be quite sizeable (Sigelman and Buell 2004; Damore 2005; Green-Pedersen 2007; Dolezal et al. 2014). Therefore, while political parties may seek to emphasise only those issues that they own, while de-emphasising all others, the reality is that political parties do give due attention to those issues that are considered owned by their political opponents (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015). ‘The actual state of the world makes certain issues unavoidable’ (Budge and Farlie 1983: 129) and therefore the goal is to minimize the damage while continuing to emphasise one’s own issues (Petrocik 1996; Carmines 1991). While the notion of ‘incomplete issue ownership’ (Geys 2012) might explain some of this overlap, it does not and cannot explain all of it. Contestation over non-monopolised issues is common place but so too is contestation over issues that are clearly owned by other political parties. So why do political parties engage with the issues that competitors own?

Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010, 2015) argue that this overlap can be understood by reference to the policy agenda and agenda-setting processes. The agenda is a structural phenomenon characterised by a hierarchy of salient issues that all relevant political actors must engage with, even if they contest the future structure of this hierarchy (Dearing and Rogers 1996; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015). Failure to address the agenda and the issues and problems on it could result in electoral penalties (Sigelman and Buell 2004). Political parties need to be seen to be concerned and informed about all the major issues of the day (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Sigelman and Buell 2004). It is therefore within the interests of political parties to not only respond to the agenda, but to

also contest its future formation, with an emphasis on issues that are more favourable. This is particularly so given that the presence of highly salient issues on the agenda can result in increased voter support for the issue owner (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994).

2.6. Competition between Unequals: Position, Saliency, and Ownership, and Other Strategic Approaches

A number of other models of party competition require consideration and review here. More specifically, given that the focus of this thesis is on how mainstream political parties compete with niche party competitors, particularly those of the radical right, it is relevant to examine those models of party competition that concern themselves with competition between unequals. The first of these is the by-now influential position, saliency, and ownership model (PSO) developed by Bonnie Meguid (2005, 2008). Unlike in previous research, Meguid was concerned with how mainstream political parties compete with their niche party competitors, and had a particular interest in understanding how mainstream strategies influence niche party success. Building on the party competition literature reviewed above, Meguid argues that there are three important elements to party competition: the position that the party adopts, the saliency of the issue being contested, and the ownership of those issues. Mainstream parties, then, can change their positions on various issues, moving towards (policy convergence) or moving away (policy divergence) from specific competitors. They can also alter the saliency of given issues through selective emphasis. And finally, they can develop ownership or challenge a competitor's ownership of an issue (Meguid 2005; 2008). From these three elements, Meguid develops three strategies that mainstream political parties can adopt. These are: accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive strategies. Given the significant overlap between the strategies introduced by Meguid (2005, 2008) and those of Bale et al. (2010) and Downs (2001, 2012), these strategic approaches will be discussed in unison.

In accepting spatial logic and the notion of party positioning, the first two strategies are determined by convergence towards, or divergence from, a specific niche party competitor. The former, convergence towards, is an accommodative strategy while the latter, divergence from, is an adversarial strategy. An accommodative strategy is where the mainstream political party seeks to undermine the distinctiveness of the niche party through an extension of its own programmatic profile. Relying on the assumption that vote-maximisation is the primary goal of the mainstream political party, this strategy is essentially the proverbial bandwagoning: 'if you can't beat them, join them' (Bale et al. 2010: 413). In adopting this strategy, the mainstream political party seeks to claim ownership of the issue and therefore 'steal' voters that have drifted towards the niche party competitor. This process occurs as a result of the 'legislative experience' and 'governmental effectiveness' of the mainstream political party (Meguid 2005: 349). From the perspective of voters, then, the 'established party copy [would] be perceived as more attractive than the niche party original' (Meguid 2005: 349). Conversely, the adversarial strategy is a statement of opposition to the policy position of the niche party. The mainstream political party therefore seeks to increase the policy distance between it and the niche party (Meguid 2008: 24). The effect of such an approach is to reinforce the niche party's ownership over the issue and therefore the niche party's electoral support (Meguid 2005, 2008). While counterintuitive, Meguid argues that the mainstream political party that adopts this strategy seeks to bolster the electoral support of the niche competitor in order to weaken another mainstream political party by establishing a stronger competitor on its flank. To that end, then, the niche party is merely a tool employed by one mainstream political party against another (Meguid 2005, 2008).

Alternatively, mainstream political parties might determine a niche issue to be unimportant or too difficult to address. In these circumstances, the mainstream political party can pursue the dismissive strategy: in essence, ignore the issue. In doing so, the mainstream political party signals to voters that the issue lacks merit or importance (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2005, 2008; Bale et al. 2010). In adopting the dismissive strategy mainstream political parties seek to reduce the issue's saliency while

diverting attention to more favourable issues. The adoption of the dismissive strategy by a mainstream party should result in a weakening of the electoral support for the niche party competitor (Meguid 2005, 2008). Finally, if the mainstream party already holds a position on that issue, it might choose to 'stick to its guns' and maintain its existing position (Bale et al. 2010). This final strategy is known as the hold strategy.

These issue-oriented strategies might be the dominant tools that are employed in competition between mainstream and niche political parties (Meguid 2008: 50) but there exists a range of organisational and institutional strategies that have not yet been explored in this chapter. These strategies include isolation/ostracism; the imposition of legal restrictions; collaboration; and finally, denigrating the niche party. As above, these will be discussed with reference to Meguid (2008), Downs (2001, 2012), Bale et al. (2010), among others. None of the following strategies addresses issue ownership or the saliency of particular issues. Rather, they seek to prevent the niche party capitalising on its ownership of particular issues. Given this, then, the following strategies are quite distinct from the accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive strategies outlined above inasmuch as those are issue-oriented, whereas the following strategies are party- or actor-oriented.

When faced with a radical right niche party, a common tactic employed is that of isolation or ostracism. The formation of anti-niche blocking or grand coalitions among the established mainstream political parties, with the intention of excluding the niche party from participation in office, is a common practice in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2008; van Spanje and Weber 2019). Ostracisation can include non-participation in other forms of cooperation between political parties such as joint press releases, electoral alliances, or joint legislative activities (van Spanje and Weber 2019). For Downs (2001: 27), this *cordon sanitaire* forms a clear 'democratic front in opposition to extremism'. This strategy can, however, increase the niche party's outsider status, and increase its popularity among supporters, while also leading to radicalisation within the party (van Spanje and van der Brug 2007: 1023). While this strategy does not

focus on any particular issue, it is possible that it serves as an indirect method for increasing the saliency of the issues that the niche party emphasises.

Alternatively, mainstream political parties can seek to impose legal restrictions upon the niche political party. This can include outlawing the party, raising electoral thresholds, restricting the niche party's access to broadcast media, tightening the access niche parties have to public funds, support, and information, and changing the requirements for electoral participation, such as registration requirements, deposits, and/or signatures required (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2008). Putting aside normative claims regarding democracy and tolerance, the imposition of legal restrictions can be effective in tackling radical niche party challengers. Indeed, these approaches can often serve to reduce the targeted party's vote share, as its position and platform are delegitimised in the eyes of voters (Minkenberg 2006). A further consequence of delegitimation is that voters' perceptions of the party become more negative as their 'sympathy' towards the party decreases. While immediately successful, however, the long-term efficacy of legal strategies is not entirely clear. The imposition of legal restrictions often has the effect of provoking organisation reformation and the adoption of new strategies among the targeted parties in order to avoid or survive the imposed legal restrictions (Minkenberg 2006). Furthermore, failed legal action can have the unintended consequence of empowering the niche party challenger, which often proceeds to present itself as a victim of the establishment or a martyr for the cause, with increasing vote share often the result (Downs 2011: 108). The increased attention to the niche party, as above, might also have the consequence of increasing issue saliency.

Conversely, in certain circumstances, mainstream political parties may seek to collaborate with the niche party. Collaboration between mainstream and niche political parties can take place in three environments: electoral, legislative, and executive (Downs 2001). For the first, the mainstream political party can establish a cartel or joint-ticket with its niche party competitor. Less formally, political parties can agree not to compete in particular constituencies or contests and therefore 'stand

down' for their political ally. Secondly, in the legislative environment, the mainstream party and its niche party competitor can work together in supporting or opposing particular legislation, budgetary measures, or even votes of (no) confidence. Thirdly, in the executive environment, the mainstream political party can agree with the niche party to a confidence-and-supply arrangement or even a formal coalition in government (at whatever level – e.g., local, regional, national) (Downs 2001; Meguid 2008). Collaboration with a niche party challenger has the effect of legitimising the niche party and therefore does nothing to challenge it electorally. Rather, the mainstream party seeks an alternative avenue in the pursuit of power, that is, a new (formal or informal) coalition partner. Indeed, we have witnessed within Western Europe the increasing development of block politics, where mainstream social democratic parties have sought to ally themselves with green parties, while the mainstream right has made overtures to the radical right (Bale 2003). Collaboration can also have the effect of forcing the niche party to contend with the reality of office – something which has often resulted in leading to splits and division within the niche party (Heinisch 2003; Luther 2003; Bolleyer et al. 2012), between those who favour an outsider profile and those who value incumbency. At their peak, such divisions can lead the party to implode. Collaboration can therefore have the effect of castrating the niche party (Luther 2003).

Finally, the mainstream political party can engage in a series of organisational tactics. In one form, the mainstream political party can seek to pacify the niche party by co-opting the leader and elite through the offering of jobs, portfolios, and other roles within the mainstream organisation. In doing so, the mainstream political party can 'hollow out' the niche party (Meguid 2008). This is especially effective for incumbent parties as they can offer portfolios and other roles within the government to members of the niche party's elite.² If the niche party holds ownership over particular issues, then organisational accommodation can result in the transfer of some issue ownership to the mainstream political party

² For instance, the French Socialist Party engaged in an organisational strategy in 1988 when it established a junior ministry of the environment and selected Brice Lalonde, the leader of the French Greens, as the environment minister. This did not involve formal collaboration between the Socialist and Green parties, however, merely the co-optation of the leading figure within the Green Party (Meguid 2008: 31).

(Meguid 2008). Conversely, the mainstream political party may verbally denigrate the niche party and its leadership.³ The organisational strength of the mainstream party can be employed to damage the image of the niche party or suggest impropriety with regards to the sincerity of the party vis-à-vis certain issues (Meguid 2008). This approach can have unintended consequences, however, as doing this does nothing to delegitimise the niche party's arguments or issues. In fact, the attention that the niche party receives could increase the saliency of its issues and therefore increase its vote share (Meguid 2005, 2008).

2.7. Strategic Approaches Across Multiple Dimensions

Meguid's Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) theory accepts spatial distance as the underlying logic of party competition. As a consequence, Meguid assumes, like Downs, a unidimensional policy space. For Meguid, niche party support is dependent upon a single issue, and therefore tactics designed to undermine the perceived relevance of that issue, or indeed the distinctiveness or credibility of the niche party's position on it, will result in niche party vote loss. However, this relies on an unrealistic interpretation of what constitutes a niche party. A radical right niche party may not only focus on the immigration issue but may also address subsidiary issues such as housing, welfare, employment, and government spending, all of which are dealt with on a routine basis by mainstream parties, but which are often adopted by the radical right with a frame linking these issues within the context of immigration. Therefore, radical right niche parties often have expansive platforms but these are often focused on a single 'cultural' dimension of competition, whereas mainstream political parties tend to reserve competition to an 'economic' dimension of competition (Wagner 2012; Rovny 2013). Already, then, we can determine that party competition takes place on at least two dimensions of competition. The strategies devised by Meguid then depend upon the extent to which mainstream

³ For instance, the British Conservative Party engaged in this organisational strategy in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, when it used party resources to locate controversial statements made by officials and members of UKIP. These statements were subsequently leaked to the press ([The Commentator 2013](#)).

parties recognise the 'cultural' dimension – or even 'territorial' dimension in the case of Lega (Basile 2015) – and therefore dimensional strategies, not considered by Meguid, are required.

The dimensional approach outlined by Rovny (2012) borrows heavily from issue ownership and saliency theories (outlined above) in that political parties seek to influence voter preferences by position taking, issue emphasis, and voter priming (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Hobolt 2008). Further, the structure of political competition is not assumed to be a fixed stage, but rather, the subject of competition. This approach, then, considers political competition as a contest over the presence and bundling of issues into various issue dimensions. Put more simply, the various dimensions of politics, be they economic, cultural, territorial, or whatever else, are themselves the subject of political competition and therefore strategies need not be solely issue-based but can be dimensionally-oriented (Alonso 2012; Elias et al. 2015; Alonso et al. 2015). Political parties can therefore compete on their primary dimension – often the economic dimension for mainstream political parties and the cultural dimension for radical right niche parties – as well as their secondary or even tertiary dimension. The secondary dimension gives sizeable strategic flexibility to political parties inasmuch as their reputations are mostly tied to their primary dimension. Therefore, political parties can readily move and adopt new positions on a secondary dimension, even to the extent of leapfrogging between issues, which may not be possible without severe penalty on their primary dimension (Alonso 2012; Elias et al. 2015). Political parties therefore not only choose which dimensions to compete on (positioning⁴), but also the degree of emphasis they place on each dimension (selective emphasis) and how they define issues associated with those dimensions (issue framing) (Elias et al. 2015). Within this approach, then, Alonso et al. (2012), Rovny (2013), Elias et al. (2015), and Basile (2015) develop four strategies; albeit without the same theoretical expectations put forward by Meguid (2005, 2008).

⁴ While it is more common to use 'position' in reference to particular issues, Elias et al. (2015) and Rovny (2012, 2015) use position and positioning to also refer to political parties determining what dimensions to compete on.

The first strategy is the unidimensional one, where political parties selectively emphasise and position themselves on their core dimension, and associated issues, while at the same time ignoring the other dimensions of competition. Alternatively, in a second strategy, political parties can reframe issues belonging to the second dimension of competition in primary dimension terms (Alonso et al. 2015; Basile 2015; Elias et al. 2015). This subsuming strategy is essentially a rhetorical exercise whereby policy issues on a second dimension are reformulated within the context of the primary dimension. For instance, immigration may be reframed from a cultural issue into a solely economic one.

Thirdly, parties can adopt a blurring strategy, in which they seek to blur their position on the second dimension. Political parties may be in a position where, while they wish to concentrate on core economic issues, they may not wish to ignore secondary issues (Elias et al. 2015) or may even be compelled to respond to secondary issues as a result of the agenda (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015). Therefore, to dismiss these secondary issues would carry potential risks related to vote share. Parties therefore address these secondary issues but in such a way as to be ambiguous, vague, and/or even contradictory so as to not to divide their voter base (Rovny 2013; Alonso et al. 2015; Basile 2015; Elias et al. 2015).⁵

Finally, parties can pursue the two-dimensional strategy, where they position themselves on both their core and secondary dimension (Alonso et al. 2015; Elias et al. 2015). The implication of this strategy, by contrast to blurring, is a clearer and more consistent positioning (Alonso et al. 2015). Basile (2015) demonstrates that once a political party has adopted a two-dimensional strategy, the core issue-based strategies outlined by Meguid (2005, 2008) come into effect. That is to say, once a political party has focused on a secondary dimension, it can then adopt an accommodative, adversarial, or dismissive strategy on that dimension with respect to an opponent.

⁵ A tenuous example of this can be witnessed with the British Labour's Party's (autumn 2018) ambiguous positioning on the issue of (withdrawing from) the European Union.

2.8. An Expansion to the Expanded Toolkit: A New Conception of Party Competition

As has been seen, Meguid's work focuses mainly on the issue-oriented strategies that mainstream parties employ in the face of a niche party competitor. She does acknowledge the existence of non-issue-based strategies in her work too, in that she does employ some party-oriented strategies in her case studies, but these are largely overlooked, especially in her large-n analysis. This is a shame because there are sound theoretical reasons why these non-issue-based strategies are important, and why they therefore deserve to be included in any analysis.


Borrowing from the valence model of voting behaviour (see Clarke et al. 2011), it is proposed here that 'what' (the issue), 'how' (the position), and 'who' (the party) are equally important facets of party competition. It will be argued that 'who' is a fundamentally important feature of party competition; that 'who' is distinct from 'what' and 'how'; and that 'who', or more accurately the reputation of 'who', is subject to party competition, potentially independently of 'what' and 'how'. Given this, the following section will explain the importance of 'who' in party competition, including examples of how 'who' has been employed in competition between parties. It will then move on to exploring the concept of reputation that is fundamental to understanding 'who' in the context of competitive electoral politics.

2.9. The Importance of 'Who': Reputation in Party Competition

As just mentioned, the PSO theory of party competition as conceived by Meguid fully incorporates 'what' and 'how' but fails to properly address 'who'. Indeed, the PSO theory assumes that 'who' is not a dynamic element of party competition; that niche parties are pawns in a larger game between mainstream parties, easily manipulated, and with little agency of their own. However, while Meguid fails to properly incorporate 'who' into her model of party competition, it does nonetheless feature within her model. Consider the following hypothetical:

Within a given election, a radical right niche party is gaining votes by emphasising the issue of immigration, from an anti-immigration position. In order to secure its right flank, the mainstream conservative party shifts its position towards that of the niche party. In this scenario then, which is depicted in Figure 2.1, there is no longer any distinction between the issue position of the mainstream conservative party (represented by the broccoli) and the radical right niche party (represented by the fruitcake) on the issue of immigration.

Figure 2.1: The mainstream conservative party shifting its position towards a niche party competitor



Given that both parties now share the same position on the issue dimension, how are they distinguished by voters? The PSO theory holds that the ‘mainstream party copy’ will be the recipient of votes rather than the ‘niche party original’. This is because of the ‘governmental effectiveness’ and ‘legislative experience’ of the mainstream party (Meguid 2005: 249). As we know, a ‘reputation for policy performance and competence is an important ingredient for electoral success, with evaluations of parties’ ... handling of issues forming a key battle ground at election time’ (Jennings 2012: 47; see also Green and Jennings 2017). Returning to our example, it is because of the reputation of the mainstream conservative party that voters prefer it over its niche party competitor. By holding a stronger and more positive reputation, the mainstream party is able to usurp ownership over the issue of immigration. However, therein lies a problem with Meguid’s inclusion of reputation: it is a static condition. Mainstream parties are considered more reputable as a result of their mainstream status. This is quite an assumption to make and somewhat controversial given that a) reputation tends to feature in electoral battles between political parties, especially when issues do not feature strongly in

a campaign (see Arter 2007); and b) niche parties can also be considered competent issue owners (Abou-Chadi 2016). The inclusion of reputational evaluations and strategies becomes even more important when one considers the rise of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966) and the convergence of mainstream parties in some polities (Green 2007). In these circumstances, reputational evaluations become important elements of voter decision-making. As a result of this, one would expect strategically-minded parties to devote time and energy to strengthening their reputations, while also seeking to weaken or outright damage the reputations of their opponents.

By clearly delineating between ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘who’, a wider range of party strategies becomes available. This is especially apparent when one looks to case examples. For example, the British Conservative Party sought to dismiss the United Kingdom Independence Party by communicating to voters that UKIP was not a serious rival. Then leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard (2003-2005) dismissed UKIP as a party of ‘cranks and political gadflies’, while David Cameron, who succeeded Howard in late 2005, dismissed UKIP as ‘fruitcakes, loons, and closet racists’ (Lynch and Whitaker 2013: 299). The purpose of this strategy was to undermine UKIP as a political party but, importantly, the strategy is distinct from Meguid’s ‘dismissive’ strategy inasmuch as the issue position of UKIP was not the subject of the strategy, rather, the party itself was the target.

With regard to issue-oriented strategies, we witness a far messier picture. Under the leadership of David Cameron, the Conservatives withdrew (2009) from the European People’s Party and established a new grouping within the European Parliament; the Conservatives gave a ‘cast iron guarantee’ to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty; and pledged to negotiate ‘British guarantees’ and ‘restore key powers to Britain’ (Cameron 2009). These policies follow the development of a soft-Eurosceptic position by the Conservative Party, a position that had been in development since the leadership of John Major (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). This soft Euroscepticism was distinct from the ‘withdrawalist’

position of UKIP, and is therefore consistent with the hold strategy outlined by Bale et al. (2010).⁶ Importantly, however, while the Conservative Party sought to develop its soft-Eurosceptic position in contrast to UKIP, it also sought to reduce the salience of the issue, dedicating fewer manifesto statements to it (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). With regard to the European issue, then, the Conservative Party approach was two-pronged: it adopted an adversarial strategy with regards to positioning but a ‘defusal’ strategy with regards to the saliency of the European issue (see Bale et al. 2010). Lynch and Whitaker (2013) are correct, then, in their conclusion that party competition is often messier than what Meguid’s ideal-typical strategies allow for.

Similarly, during the 2017 General Election in the UK, assessments regarding the competence and reputation of the political parties and their leaders took pride of place, as the Conservative Party sought to reduce the election down to the ‘strong and stable’ leadership qualities of Theresa May (then-Prime Minister and leader of the British Conservative Party) or the inevitable ‘coalition of chaos’ that would follow the election of Jeremy Corbyn (then-leader of the British Labour Party). Indeed, these strategies were so prominent that the campaign slogan ‘strong and stable’ became widely derided by media and voters alike (Prosser 2018) while gaining new life as a ‘meme’ in the online political sphere. In fact, voting behaviour in the UK can be effectively modelled by considering just three factors: the reputation of both party and leader as well as the policies they pursue (Worcester et al. 2005). According to Stewart and Clarke (1992), the reputation of party leaders during the 1987 General Election had a greater influence on voters than voters’ opinion of economic conditions. Of course, it is not only within the British electoral context that reputational assessments overtake issues. In reporting the 2003 General Election in Finland, Arter (2003: 155) noted that ‘in the finest traditions of Finnish general elections, the campaign was as dull as ditch water – virtually an issue-free zone.

⁶ Lynch and Whitaker (2013) argue that the ‘soft Eurosceptic’ position of the Conservative Party during this period is consistent with the adversarial strategy developed by Meguid (2005, 2008). However, the adversarial strategy requires policy divergence, that is, movement away from the niche party position (Meguid 2008: 24 and 30). Given that the Conservatives reinforced their existing position rather than move further away from UKIP, the strategy employed is more consistent with the ‘hold’ strategy of Bale et al. (2010) than the adversarial strategy of Meguid (2005, 2008).

Moreover, with clear signs of an impending downturn in the economy, the parties competed among themselves to promise the voters as little as possible' (see also Downs and Riutta 2003). As with the UK, personalities and reputational qualities dominated (Nurmi and Nurmi 2003). The implication of this is that reputation must feature in any conception of party competition (Green 2007: 651).

What has thus far been argued is that reputation is a fundamentally important component of voter decision-making as well as party competition. Before moving onto the specific strategies that will be explored within the analytical chapters of this thesis, it is first prudent to understand what is meant by reputation. In essence a reputation is a 'characteristic or attribute ascribed to one actor by another' (Salonen and Wiberg 1987: 160). It is an aggregate of past behaviours and transactions that establishes in the minds of other actors an estimation of future behaviour drawn from prior observations (Salonen and Wiberg 1987; Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Bowler 1990; Herbig and Milewicz 1993; Fombrun 1996). For instance, if one is to say that an actor has a reputation for honesty, then one is making an historical observation of previous honesty by the actor as well as a prediction about likely honesty in the future (Salonen and Wiberg 1987: 160; Bowler 1990). Given this, therefore, reputation as a characteristic or attribute can be conceived of as a method for reducing the costs associated with decision-making. Indeed, the importance of reputation to decision-making can be witnessed in any transaction between individuals, individuals and organisations, or between organisations (Bowler 1990).

With regards to political parties, reputation can be conceived of in two ways. Firstly, as an issue-dependent conception and secondly, a more generalised conception that incorporates the totality of party behaviour. The next few paragraphs will explore and outline these two conceptions.

For the issue-dependent conception of reputation, let us return to the economic roots of spatial theory. Consider the following: Located at 1920 Main Street is Hotelling's Emporium for Amazing Goods. It is one of several businesses in the area specialising in providing consumers with a range of quality goods. When consumers visit the store, they peruse the aisles looking for high quality products.

Although consumers will make their decisions at the point of purchase, the quality of many products at Hotelling's Emporium will remain unknown until they are consumed (Weigelt and Camerer 1988). Producers of high-quality goods will therefore wish to signal to consumers the quality of their goods before consumers make a decision regarding purchase. Consumers themselves will use the reputation of the goods or store to infer the quality of the product (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Reputation therefore reduces the costs for consumers, with a positive reputation increasing the likelihood of purchase for producers and stores, and a negative reputation decreasing such likelihoods. Of course, in the event that the product does not live up to expectation, consumers can often return the product, and incorporate the quality of the product into future decisions, in essence, reducing the reputation of the producer or store in question, and thereby reducing potential future purchases.

Certain types of goods and services are rather unlike the ones previously mentioned inasmuch as they are bought prior to use. These 'credence goods or services' (Fombrun 1996: 7) are bought on reputation alone. For instance, one cannot know the quality of the service provided by a bank, law firm, hospital, or university, without first using that service. Paying thousands for a service without proof of quality is highly risky, and therefore, consumers will use the reputation of the business or organisation to infer the quality of their services. So, consider Downs' Publishing House and suppose that a consumer wishes to hire a writer to develop a better analogy for their work. The reputation of Downs' Publishing House will be instrumental to the decision-making of that consumer. While the Publishing House might be able to provide a portfolio of previous works, there is no guarantee of continued good service, nor indeed that the Publishing House has the capacity to provide the service required by the consumer. However, given the stellar reputation of the Publishing House, the consumer can infer the likely quality of the service provided. As with the above example, in extremis, the consumer can demand a refund if the Publishing House fails to deliver, and incorporate this experience into future decision-making.


In both examples, then, reputation provides a useful heuristic in aiding the consumer to reduce the costs associated with imperfect information in decision-making with regards to the purchase of goods or services. As a positive reputation is good for business, businesses and organisations value their reputations, and often invest considerable resources to build, sustain, and defend them, often hiring public relations firms and advertisers to help promote a positive reputation (Fombrun 1996). A business or organisation's reputation is thus an 'enlightened investment' that holds economic value derived from its ability to reinforce the business' competitiveness (Fombrun 1996: 6).

Of course, the transactions outlined above do not apply to the political marketplace in the same way. To maintain the already exhausted analogy, assume that political parties offer policies as products and that voters purchase these products through voting. Unlike the first example, the transaction is not simultaneous, that is, voters do not cast a vote at the same time that parties deliver upon policies. The delivery of the policy can often be months or years after the voter has voted and while this might be similar to the second example, the ability to demand a refund does not exist as a nuclear option. Voters must therefore trust that political parties will deliver upon the promised policies. This situation creates a lot of uncertainty for voters as while they might favour the policy offered by a particular party, they have no guarantee that the party will implement the policy should it win the election. As with businesses in a marketplace, then, political parties are incentivised to develop and maintain reputations for honesty and following through by delivering on promised policy. While maintaining a positive reputation might restrict the ability of the party to shift its policy positions (see Downs 1957; Klingemann et al. 2006; Meguid 2008), reputations represent enlightened investments that hold political value. As outlined above, not only do positive reputations reduce uncertainty for voters but they also offer a mechanism for differentiation when two parties espouse the same policy positions. Reconsider the example above: if the mainstream conservative party shifts its policy position towards that of the radical right party, on what basis do voters distinguish between the two parties?

Reputation can help here in that it allows voters to distinguish between two parties that share common ground on the same issue dimension. It also introduces the ability to political parties to manipulate both their own reputation and that of their competitors. In this way, the space becomes two-dimensional, and parties can manipulate the reputational dimension just as they would the issue dimension. Figure 2.2 illustrates this, and shows a successful reputational attack by the mainstream party on the radical right niche party. By seeking to damage the reputation of the radical right niche party, the mainstream conservative party in our example is attempting to gain ground by reducing the reputation of the niche party while also trying to establish competence-based issue ownership.

There are numerous sub-dimensions to the concept of issue-ownership including a competence dimension. However, it should be noted that a party's reputation on an issue is more than just its competence or performance. For instance, and has been outlined above, an incumbent party might be able to overcome poor performance if it enjoys a strong reputational advantage on the issue (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2015). Competence, honesty, and regular attention to issues or particular constituencies can all be considered facets of reputation.

Figure 2.2: A demonstration of the successful implementation of a reputational strategy against the niche party by the mainstream party



However, as has been alluded to throughout this section, reputation as a concept can be broader than just performance or advantage on a particular issue. Indeed, political parties have reputations that are broader than single issues. When American voters accuse the Republican Party of being ‘for the 1%’ this evaluation is not based on a single issue but is rather an aggregate of the party’s past behaviours and policy initiatives that have established in the minds of some voters an estimation of future behaviour. A single policy initiative, for a long-lived political party, is not enough to create such an enduring reputation. The reputation is the result of decades of similar policy initiatives surrounding taxation and government spending, as well as statements made by personnel, elected representatives, and the party central office. All these facets come together in the minds of voters, and culminate into their perception that the Republican Party favours the wealthy.

General reputations are open to manipulation by political parties. For example, when Theresa May attacked the leadership capabilities of Jeremy Corbyn, she was not focusing on his capacity to perform on particular issues but was condemning his perceived leadership qualities more generally, and by extension was damaging the reputation of the Labour Party – the reputation of party leaders can often be central to elections (Graetz and McAllister 1987) and while there is a great deal of reputational symbiosis between leader and party, research suggests that the greater transfer is from leader to party (Davies and Mian 2008), and therefore in condemning Corbyn May was attacking the Labour Party itself. Similarly, the modernisation agenda of the British Conservative Party under David Cameron (leader between 2005 and 2016) was an attempt to ‘undo’ the reputation that it had developed for being rather ‘nasty’ (Bale 2008). This reputation was the product of decades of Thatcherite policies as well as statements and positions made by leading Conservatives. By embodying a younger, fresher-faced leader, as well as repositioning on a whole swathe of issues, David Cameron sought to manipulate the general reputation of the Conservative Party.

2.10. From Toolkit to Arsenal: An Extensive Range of Mainstream Party Strategies

This discussion has shown that, when threatened by a niche party competitor, mainstream political parties have access to an array of strategies that focus upon the dimensionality of the political space, the issues that the niche party raises or emphasises, and the niche party itself. Importantly, mainstream political parties can also undermine niche party ownership over issues or indeed the niche party itself through the reputational strategies that were developed above. The following section will outline the analytical framework employed in this thesis. It starts with the dimensional strategies, then continues by presenting the issue-based strategies and how the two relate. It finishes by outlining the party-based strategies.

2.10.1. Dimensional Strategies

As argued above, radical right niche parties will contest elections on a range of issues but these issues will form part of a cultural, rather than an economic, dimension of competition. In response, mainstream parties can choose whether or not to position themselves on this cultural dimension, the degree of emphasis they place on this dimension should they decide to position themselves on it, and can even how they define the issues associated with that dimension. The dimensional strategies employed in this conception of party competition are as follows:

The unidimensional Strategy: the mainstream party will emphasise and position itself on the core economic dimension, and associated issues, and will ignore other dimensions of competition. While Alonso et al. (2012), Rovny (2013), Elias et al. (2015), and Basile (2015) do not consider saliency in their dimensional approach, it is likely that by playing down the importance of the cultural dimension, the salience of this dimension as a whole will decline, indicating that cultural issues 'lack merit' (see Meguid 2005, 2008).

The subsuming strategy: the mainstream political party will reframe issues belonging to the cultural dimension of competition in economic terms. Given that greater attention is afforded to these cultural issues, it is likely that the salience of these issues will increase, while the cultural dimension will lose saliency, given the reframing of the issues into economic terms.

The blurring strategy: the mainstream party will position itself on the cultural dimension in an ambiguous way. It is likely that such a strategy will increase the saliency of the cultural dimension to a moderate extent as the mainstream party does nothing to signal its lack of importance, but tokenistically recognises it as legitimate.

The two-dimensional strategy: the mainstream party will position itself clearly on both the economic and cultural dimensions. The saliency of the cultural dimension should increase.

2.10.2. Issue Strategies

The issue strategies employed in this conception of party competition are as follows:

The accommodative strategy: the mainstream party shifts its position on an issue towards that of the niche party and attempts to claim ownership over that issue. The effect of such a strategy is to increase the saliency of the issue and therefore increase the vote share of the issue owner.

The adversarial strategy: the mainstream party shifts its position on an issue away from that of the niche party and does nothing to challenge niche party ownership over the issue. As the mainstream party declares its opposition to the niche party and calls attention to the niche challenger and its issue, the saliency of the issue is increased.

The dismissive strategy: the mainstream party completely ignores the issue and in doing so, reduces the saliency of the issue by starving it of attention.

The hold strategy: the mainstream party maintains and reinforces its existing policy position. The effect on saliency of such a strategy is unclear. On the one hand, by the mainstream party reinforcing its existing position, one could envisage an increase in saliency, but on the other, by failing to draw attention to any change in the status quo, it is possible that saliency remains the same or decreases.

The reputational strategy: the mainstream party seeks to undermine the reputation of the niche party on a particular issue. This should increase the saliency of the issue by calling greater attention to it.

Before moving on to addressing party-oriented strategies, it is important to note the links between dimensional and issue strategies, as these two types of strategy are not wholly independent of each other. Rather, the adoption of a particular dimensional strategy will dictate what issue strategies can be employed. For instance, it would be impossible for a political party to adopt a dimensional blurring strategy and a strongly adversarial issue strategy at the same time. The former entails an ambiguous position on a particular dimension while the latter is an unambiguous position.

In work focused on the territorial dimension in party competition in Italy, and that demonstrates that once a political party has adopted a two-dimensional strategy then Meguid's (2005, 2008) issue-based strategies come into effect, Basile (2015) develops a typology that joins dimensional and issue strategies. In her typology, she distinguishes between what she calls directional certainty and saliency. Directional certainty concerns the issue-strategies that are used and is calculated as a sum of quasi-sentences drawn from party manifestos (see Chapter 6 for details). This scale runs from, in the terms of this thesis, strongly adversarial through ambiguous to strongly accommodative. Saliency, here, is conceived of as a scale ranging from 0 to 100 and demonstrates the level of interest that a party shows in a particular issue. As previously, it is based on the number of quasi-sentences in party manifestos, with zero quasi-sentences related to the issue indicating 'no interest', with between 0.1 percent and 3.3 percent of the total manifesto consisting of relevant quasi-sentences indicating 'minor interest', and with 3.3 percent and up indicating 'major interest'.

Figure 2.3 presents an adaption of that typology. The first column details whether the issue being contested is salient or not, while subsequent columns (adversarial, neutral, accommodative) describe the issue-oriented strategies that are adopted. The differing levels of saliency in Basile’s (2015) typology seemed to offer little beyond introducing additional categories for parties. The benefit of doing this is not immediately obvious nor provided by Basile, and for the sake of simplicity, then, has been dispensed with. Secondly, the weak, adversarial and accommodative strategies have been reconceptualised. Basile (2015) considers these strategies to be no different from the blurring strategy. In reality, however, a weak accommodative or adversarial strategy still indicates a directional preference and is therefore distinct from the blurring strategy which represents a party deliberately avoiding directional positioning. Finally, given that the reputational strategy is extremely flexible and can be employed in combination with any of the strategies developed above and below, it has been excluded from Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: The combined dimensional-issue strategies

		Dimensionality and Issue Positioning				
		Adversarial		No Direction	Accommodative	
		Strong	Weak	Ambiguous or no position	Weak	Strong
Salient?	No			One-dimensional, dismissive 1		
	Yes			Two-dimensional, adversarial 2		

By combining the dimensional and issue-oriented strategies, seven dimensional-issue strategy combinations are achieved. Importantly, by formulating combined dimensional-issue strategies, the majority of the dimensional and issue-based strategies outlined above are made redundant. That is,

all with the exception of the subsuming dimensional strategy and the reputational issue strategy no longer remain. These seven dimensional-issue strategies are thus:

[1] The one-dimensional dismissive strategy: The mainstream party does not devote any attention to the second dimension, making this a one-dimensional strategy, and by doing this it dismisses cultural issues.

[2] The two-dimensional adversarial strategy: The mainstream party devotes attention to the second dimension, making it salient, and meaning that it engages in a two-dimensional strategy. Moreover, it chooses to position itself on that second, cultural dimension in a position that is contrast to the radical right, meaning it adopts an adversarial position.

[3] The reluctant two-dimensional adversarial strategy: This strategy is similar to the last one, but is adopted with far less vigour and conviction.

[4] The blurring strategy: The mainstream party does pay attention to the cultural dimension but is unwilling to adopt a clear position on the issue(s) encompassed by this dimension. This suggests that the mainstream party might be paying attention to the cultural dimension and its issues – perhaps out of necessity or because it feels ‘forced’ to – but that it does not wish to risk upsetting supporters who might lose faith with the party should it adopt a position on this second dimension that is contrary to their own.

[5] The two-dimensional hold strategy: The mainstream party has previously recognised the dimension (i.e., it does not dismiss it), has a clear position on it with regards to specific issues, and has chosen to maintain that position.

[6] The reluctant two-dimensional accommodative strategy: The mainstream party is devoting attention to the second dimension and the issues on it but is unwilling to adopt a strong accommodative strategy. It does this because, while it wishes to indicate to some supporters that it is willing to accommodate the issues they care about or wishes to signal to potential supporters that

it cares about certain issues, it does so in a reluctant fashion only, so as to avoid upsetting other supporters who might not be so supportive a strong accommodative position and an overture to the radical right. Its reluctance to engage in a full accommodative strategy might also be explained by other factors, including previous policy announcements or reputation.

[7] The two-dimensional accommodative strategy: The mainstream party recognises the second dimension and thus competes on it and takes a position on the issues of this dimension. Moreover, its position is an accommodative one, in that it occupies a similar position to that of the radical right.

As noted above, to these we can add the two strategies that remain from the earlier list, namely, [8] the (dimensional) subsuming strategy, and [9] the (issue) reputational strategy (both as explained above).

2.10.3. Party Strategies

Turning to the party strategies, those employed in this conception of party competition are as follows:

[10] The ignore strategy: The mainstream party simply ignores the niche party. This can be as a result of deliberate policy or the perceived unimportance of the niche party either in terms of coalition potential, blackmail potential, or capacity to steal votes. The ignore strategy is distinct from the dismissive strategy in that it is a party-oriented strategy and is thus focused purely on the niche party as a party, not on the issue(s) that the niche party emphasises. The distinction between the ignore strategy and the dismissive strategy presented above [1], from the perspective of operationalisation, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

[11] The isolate strategy: The mainstream party cooperates with other mainstream parties to form anti-niche blocking or grand coalitions with the intent to exclude the niche party from office. The mainstream party will reject any form of cooperation with the niche party and might even engage in a *désistement républicain* or 'mutual withdrawal', where weaker mainstream candidates in

constituencies or races drop out in favour of a stronger candidate from a different mainstream party. This strategy therefore applies a *cordon sanitaire* to the niche party.

[12] The strategy of imposing of legal restrictions: The mainstream party, often in cooperation with other mainstream parties, will seek to i) ban the niche party outright; ii) raise electoral thresholds; iii) restrict niche party access to media; iv) restrict niche party access to public funds; v) alter registration requirements, deposits, or signatures required for candidacy to make these more difficult for the niche party; vi) change the ballot structure of the electoral system in a way that hinders the niche party; and/or vii) introduce any other institutional or legal requirements to restrict the success of the niche party.

[13] The collaborate strategy: The mainstream party seeks to cooperate with the niche party. This collaboration can take the form of joint tickets, standing down in certain races, electoral alliances, and formal coalitions.

[14] The co-optation of personnel strategy: The mainstream party can pinch the leaders, officials, or other personnel of the niche party through the offering of jobs, portfolios, and/or other roles within the mainstream party. The intention here is to hollow out the niche party as an organisation through a co-optation of personnel only (policy co-optation would constitute an accommodative strategy [6] and [7]).

[15] The party reputational strategy: The mainstream party directly attacks the reputation of the niche party, seeking to delegitimise it in the eyes of voters, and potentially avoiding a discussion of the issues with which the niche party is associated. This strategy is distinct from the issue reputational strategy [9] in that the issue reputational strategy is solely concerned with damaging another party's reputation on a particular issue, while the party reputational strategy [15] is concerned with damaging the reputation of the party without necessarily calling attention to issues.

2.11. Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed the large literature on party competition and in doing so has brought together several strands of research. This has enabled the development of an enhanced toolkit or arsenal of strategies that principal parties can employ against the radical right. Moreover, the chapter has also introduced a new dimension of competition on which both principal parties and radical right parties can compete, namely the reputational dimension. Together, all these strategies provide a framework for analysis that can be deployed in this thesis to identify which strategies principal parties adopt against the radical right. Before this analysis is undertaken, however, the next chapter (chapter 3) considers the various contextual factors that impact upon the sorts or types of strategies that mainstream political parties adopt, while chapter 4 considers which parties are relevant to this study.

3. Factors Influencing Party Strategies

3.1. Introduction

Following on from Chapter 2, which introduced a new model of competition between principal parties and radical right parties, this chapter will focus on the various factors that may influence the types of strategies that principal parties choose to employ. It is guided by two obvious but important observations: first, that parties are not unitary actors, and are instead groupings of actors, each with different concerns, interests and levels of influence; and second, that parties do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they compete with rivals, and exist within an institutional framework.

Addressing the first of these two observations, the chapter begins by exploring the evolution of parties, as organisations, from their origins as cadre or elite parties, through their development into mass parties, catch-all parties, and finally to cartel parties. This summary is of relevance because it provides an overview of how the different groups within parties, or the different ‘faces’ of party organisation (Katz and Mair 1993), have been empowered or constrained in different times and contexts. And this matters, because where power lies within political parties, and the extent to which different actors within parties exert influence, shape which strategies parties decide to pursue. Having sketched out this evolution of parties, the chapter then concentrates on party leadership. Party leaders are incredibly important actors in terms of intra-party organisation but also in respect of the leader’s ability to win votes, especially in the context of ever personalised or ‘media centric’ campaigns. The centrality of the leader has been reinforced through a number of processes including greater personalisation, presidentialisation, and even Europeanisation – each of which are discussed in turn – and each of which have contributed to the growing power and influence of leaders within their respective organisations. As a consequence, leaders are at the forefront of developing and executing party strategies.

As indicated, however, political parties play host to a range of different actors each with their own goals and interests. Therefore, having detailed the importance of leaders to the development of party strategies, the chapter then turns its attention to the impact that factions can have on party strategies. In particular, this section distinguishes between factions of interest and principle, and explores the potential impact that these different types of factions could have on party strategy. It also considers the relationship between factions and the leadership, the extent to which factions are a help or hinderance to party leaders, and how factions may influence party strategies.

Of course, parties do not exist in a vacuum and therefore this chapter will consider a number of additional factors, starting with auxiliary organisations. Auxiliary organisations are external to political parties but often have very close relationships with parties. These relationships can often affect the sorts of policies that parties pursue but can also impact on the overall goals of a party, including the sorts of strategies that a party adopts.

The discussion of all these facets of party life, and of their impact on party strategies clearly invites a closer examination of party goals, and it to this that the chapter turns next. It explores how certain goals encourage particular approaches with regard to strategies. Moreover, the chapter considers not only the goals of a single party, but also how the goals of another party can be influential in determining a party's goals and ultimately its strategies. This then leads into a discussion of radical right parties. That is, given the focus of the thesis, it is important to explore how radical right parties can influence the strategies that the principal parties adopt. In particular, the goals, leadership, organisation, and even level of institutionalisation of radical right parties are all likely to have a bearing on the sorts of strategies that principal parties might opt for.

Finally, the chapter considers the institutional environment in which principal parties exist, focusing in particular on the electoral system. It examines how electoral systems can influence the strategies principal parties pursue, and explores both the impact that electoral systems have on strategies as well as their impact on leadership, factions, and radical right parties.

3.2. Party Type

The parties of old, so-called cadre or elite parties, were leadership-dominated parties with minimal operations outside of the parliamentary environment (Wolinetz 2002). With the expansion of the franchise, new political parties came into being, primarily among newly activated constituencies, such as the working classes (Katz and Mair 1995). These mass parties (Duverger 1963) relied upon and engaged with a large pool of voters as supporters and members, often drawn from a single stratum of society (such as the working class), and sought to integrate that social group into the 'body politic' (Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2003; Sartori 2005a). Indeed, it is this integration that distinguishes mass parties from elite or cadre parties.

By contrast to the cadre party, then, the mass party was activist-dominated and required a strong commitment from members, bringing them into the wider, more extensive party organisation, and often providing them with a range of services (such as support and education) via ancillary organisations (Krouwel 2003). As a result of competition from the new mass parties cadre parties sought to appeal to wider constituencies (Koole 1996), inviting supporters to join as members but without restructuring their organisations to incorporate new members in the decision-making processes of the party.

In the years that followed, drawing upon the wider observations of Downs (1957a, b; see Chapter 2), Kirchheimer (1966; see also Wolinetz 2002; Krouwel 2003) noted that mass parties gradually began to abandon their dependence upon, and support for, particular social groups in favour of a wider pool of voters. This process occurred as social groupings and identities became less distinct due to changing social and economic contexts, and in light of these weakening cleavages, the ties between parties and specific groups of voters began to wane (Dalton 2004). Parties now had to appeal to a wider pool of voters, and this necessitated a dilution of the party's ideological appendages, and positional shifts towards the centre of the political spectrum. The process of 'de-ideologisation' was accompanied by the downgrading of the role of the individual party member – as party members served to constrain

the ability of parties to shift positions – and the strengthening of the party leadership, perhaps confirming the inevitable oligarchisation of democratic organisations (Michels 1962). In addition, party organisations were professionalised. As voters were no longer as committed or loyal to particular political parties, and as the new catch-all party was more reliant on transitory bases of support, it became increasingly more important to actively ‘sell’ the party to voters (Kirchheimer 1966). This marketisation of the party was accompanied by an increasing reliance on external technocratic actors such as marketing consultants, strategists, and psephologists (Kirchheimer 1966; see also Panebianco 1988). And as the catch-all party became increasingly professionalised, so too did it become increasingly capital intensive, relying more and more on state subsidies and interest group contributions (Kirchheimer 1966).

The success of the new catch-all party prompted other parties to reform their organisations in a similar fashion, thereby encouraging widespread de-ideologisation and a growing attention to leadership characteristics and popular issues (Wolinetz 2002). For instance, the social democratic parties of Norway and Sweden began erasing the distinctive elements of their programmatic profiles in favour of much more centrist orientations. Similarly, the communist parties of Italy and France abandoned their existing ideological commitments in favour of more moderate social democratic orientations (Krouwel 2003).

This, however, made catch-all parties particularly vulnerable to the whims of voters who were no longer bound to particular parties. Unable to rely upon the loyalty of such voters, and with party operations, campaigning, and activity generally becoming increasingly expensive, parties began co-opting the state apparatus, becoming progressively more dependent upon state resources and subsidies in order to not only compete but to actually survive (Katz and Mair 1995; Wolinetz 2002). Renamed ‘cartel’ parties, these parties were even more ‘catch all’ than the catch-all party in so far as they fished in a far wider pool, engaged in primarily capital-intensive campaigns, emphasised their managerial skills and efficiency, and were even further removed from their members, who became

barely distinguishable from ordinary voters (Katz and Mair 1995; Wolinetz 2002). Yet, what characterises the cartel party above all else, is its willingness to coalesce with rivals to ensure its continued access to state resources. The net effect, then, is the ‘toning down of competition’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 23) and therefore a reduced responsiveness to public opinion. At the same time though, and as was argued in Chapter 2, general reputations as well as perceptions of trust and competence became more important. At its extreme, the cartelisation of parties might also imply the absence of policy issues in party competition as parties emphasise managerial teams and competency. As such, programmatic differences are eroded, and the distinction between governmental and opposition parties are blurred or imperceptible (Katz and Mair 1995).

This brief summary of the processes of party evolution has highlighted the gradual strengthening of leaderships within parties over time, and it points to leaderships being particularly important in determining which strategies the parties choose to pursue. It is therefore worth examining the role of party leaderships, and how and why this has changed, in a little more depth.

3.3. Leadership: Growing Autonomy, Personalisation, Presidentialisation, and Europeanisation

While different leaders have different abilities and act on those abilities in different ways, it is generally assumed that leaders are instrumental in devising and implementing the strategies of parties (Harmel et al. 1995). After all, it is the leadership that generally controls the main apparatus of the party and establishes a sense of direction. Leaders are responsible for communicating the policies and messages of the party, in championing the party, and in defending it. Beyond this, party leaders are also responsible for overseeing relations with party members, for managing the party’s links with other parties and key actors and/or organisations, for directing relationships with voters, and for securing electoral victory (or perhaps limiting the impact of defeat). Indeed, owing to their position, leaders in political parties can have considerable influence over the organisations that they lead, at least theoretically (King 2002). This is especially so during a transition in leadership, which can

represent a 'natural entry point' for change (Gilmore 2003: 10-11), and while leadership changes can be destabilising influences, they provide an opportunity to reconsider the commitment to a particular agenda or set of issues (Gilmore 2003).

When thinking of party leadership, it is worth distinguishing between direct and indirect influence. Direct influence is the impact that leaders have as a result of who they are, how they appear, the manner in which they present themselves, as well as how charismatic they are, and the strength of their oratory skills (King 2002). For instance, former US president Barack Obama embodied a range of positive leadership traits from sociability to charisma, and something more symbolically important: he was a black candidate and then president in a country that has, for centuries, struggled with issues of racial inequality, identity, and racism. Obama's 'blackness' therefore reinforced his message of change.

Indirect influences, by contrast, are the product of what a leader does rather than what a leader is (King 2002). The leader who changes the ideology of their party or modernises its image is said to have exercised indirect influence (King 2002). A prominent example can be found in François Mitterrand, the leader of the French Socialist Party. Mitterrand won the French presidential election in 1981 not because of who he was – as King (2002: 5) wryly observes 'he had been François Mitterrand for a very long time and, as such, had lost two previous presidential elections' – but rather because of what he did with regard to the ideology of the Socialist Party: transforming its ideology and image (King 2002). This is not to suggest, however, that the personality of the leader – the direct influences – do not themselves impact upon the indirect influences that a leader has. Few would doubt that Margaret Thatcher's strength, sense of purpose, and tenacity in achieving her goals was not instrumental in reforming her party's policy platform and overall image (King 2002). The point is that just as leaders possess characteristics that can make them formidable – or useless non-events – a strong character is not in of itself a guarantee that the leader will achieve their desired goals. Indeed, there are a whole

range of obstacles or even veto-players (see Tsebelis 2002) that will prevent a leader from achieving meaningful changes (see below).

The impact that leaders can have is thus multifaceted. What is more, there is a lack of agreement in the scholarly literature about the actual impact that leaders have, particularly in terms of their direct influence. While some conclude that leaders do matter in terms of winning elections (Stokes 1966; Kelley and Mirer 1974; Miller et al. 1986; Stewart and Clarke 1992; Clarke et al. 2004; Worcester et al. 2005; Bittner 2011), others find leaders do not matter (Klingemann and Taylor 1978; Shanks and Miller 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996; Bartle et al. 1997; King 2002), and others are unsure (Graetz and McAllister 1987; Crewe and King 1994; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2013).

When presented with a range of options, voters will most often make up their minds on the basis of the parties, the policies on offer, and the qualities of the respective leaders (Worcester et al. 2005; Blais 2013). What is more, leaders have become increasingly important since the latter half of the twentieth century because of the rise of media and television in particular (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Blondel and Thiébault 2010; Blais 2013; Ohr 2013). Television is by its very nature a visual medium in which complicated exposition – which is perhaps more easily communicated through text – is often displaced by soundbites, simplified speech, and images, with a focus given to individual actors. Television, therefore, tends to favour the personalising of politics and this personalisation provides leaders with a structural advantage compared to other actors or institutions (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Ohr 2013). Indeed, ‘if one reduces politics to its bare bones, to what is most visible to most citizens, it is the national political leaders, both at home and abroad, that remain once everything else has been erased; they are the most universal, the most recognized, the most talked about elements of political life’ (Blondel 1987: 1).

However, it should be acknowledged that while television can provide a strong structural advantage for leaders, it can also prove to be a huge disadvantage as the failings or ‘quirks’ of an individual leader can damage a party’s entire campaign. A strange but prominent example of this is Ed Miliband (UK

Labour leader 25 September 2010 – 8 May 2015) whose general ‘dorkiness’ – including his inability to eat a bacon sandwich properly – proved surprisingly damaging. This of course can be mitigated by the personality of the leader in question. For instance, Boris Johnson is no stranger to gaffes, yet whether it be falling over in a pond or getting stuck on a zipwire, these media faux pas have done little to damage his image; indeed, they served to reinforce his desired image as the ‘lovable rogue’.

While this personalisation of politics, and accompanied mediatisation, has been said to have helped many mainstream politicians such as Tony Blair (Worcester et al. 2005) and Silvio Berlusconi (Blondel and Thiébault 2010) achieve electoral success, it is an especially important factor for radical right parties that often lack the resources of larger, more mainstream parties, and whose leaders often dominate their respective parties in terms of media image and voter association. It is difficult to imagine the success of the Pim Fortuyn List or the Austrian Freedom Party without Pim Fortuyn and Jörg Haider, respectively, for instance. Radical right parties tend to ‘create a minimalist structure around the party leadership’ (Mudde 2007: 270) and without that leader, the party can ‘fade into oblivion’ (Carter 2005: 65).

Having said all this, the influence of leaders should not be overstated. From the outset, political parties and the actors within them try and limit the range of individuals who can become leadership contenders, and even when candidates are (s)elected, parties still maintain some control over their leader (King 2002), albeit with notable variation across different types of parties. Even strong leaders who otherwise dominate their parties can be removed relatively quickly when their usefulness is exhausted. Margaret Thatcher’s influence on the Conservative Party was extraordinary, yet when she became an electoral liability, she was hastily replaced (Bale 2010).

The pre-eminence of leaders in ‘media-centred democracies’ (Swanson and Mancini 1996) is also a function of the need to simplify an otherwise complicated political reality (King 2002). Given the limited capacity of voters to understand the political world, reducing politics down to particular leaders and their personalities might well serve as a useful heuristic with which to understand and

communicate political information, especially during campaigns (King 2002). This complexity makes it difficult to identify the effect that leaders have in terms of direct influences.

The increased prominence of leaders resulting from the above-mentioned factors has also had consequences for the power of party leaders within their own parties, so much so that some scholars have begun to refer to the 'presidentialisation' of party politics (Aylott 2005; Calise 2005; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Webb et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2013; Passarelli 2015). The presidentialisation thesis holds that parties undergo a process in which they adopt characteristics more commonly associated with presidential styles of leadership (Poguntke and Webb 2005). This sees the leadership become imbued with additional 'power resources', it exercises considerable autonomy, and there is a (significant) personalising of the electoral process. Of course, this thesis has not gone unchallenged, with some arguing that parties in parliamentary systems cannot become truly presidentialised (Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, the point of relevance here is not the ultimate extent to which parties in parliamentary regimes can become presidentialised, but rather the gradual process of increased leadership autonomy, with leaders increasing their power relative to other actors within their parties (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Webb et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2013; Passarelli 2015).

The growing presidentialisation of parties is demonstrated in a number of cases, with one of the most prominent examples being Silvio Berlusconi and his 'Go Italy' (Forza Italia) party, which he founded in 1994, essentially as an extension of his corporate and media interests (Casile 2005). The senior echelons of the party were primarily filled by executives drawn from Berlusconi's companies, and the party itself served a single purpose: the election of Berlusconi as the prime minister of Italy (Casile 2005). Berlusconi held complete control over the organisational and communicative capacity of the party and therefore removed any boundaries between him and the party he created (Casile 2005). This reached a pinnacle in the 2001 Italian general election when the House of Freedoms – an electoral coalition consisting of Go Italy, the National Alliance, the (Northern) League, and a handful of other smaller parties – ran a campaign that heavily focused on marketing Berlusconi as Italy's next prime

minister. The campaign strategy itself focused on distributing billboards at key public locations such as town squares, railway stations, and airports, all depicting 'President Berlusconi' (Parker and Natale 2002). Furthermore, given the lack of spending limits during Italian election campaigns, Berlusconi sent a magazine copy of his autobiography, *An Italian Story*, to every lucky voter in Italy (Parker and Natale 2002). As Donovan (2001) observes: the electoral strategy was to marginalise issues in favour of presidentialisation.

Italy is perhaps an extreme case but other examples of presidentialisation at work exist. In Sweden, for instance, party leaders have increased their intra-party autonomy by making greater use of their ability to nominate persons external to parliament to ministerial posts, a process that bears remarkable similarity to the manner in which presidents appoint ministers in presidential systems (Aylott 2005). This power has been increasingly exercised in recent years by Social Democratic leaders in particular (Aylott 2005), with former prime minister Göran Persson having a habit of appointing ministers who had no base within the governing party and no principal other than that of the prime minister (Ruin 1991). Indeed, so common did this style of leadership become, that during the 2002 general election, Persson was regularly criticised as running a presidential-styled government (Madeley 2003).

Of course, the presidentialisation thesis also needs to be seen in the context of wider social change which, as discussed above, has seen a breakdown of ties between specific groups of voters and specific political parties and the consequent evolution of parties to more catch-all, and then cartel, organisations.

Alongside the deliberate moves by party leaders to increase their power within their parties, as reflected in the presidentialisation thesis, the changing nature of how politics is conducted in the modern era has also had the result of strengthening party leaderships. Indeed, in recent decades, many policies that focus on the most important issues confronting countries – from terrorism and climate change to immigration and security – are shaped at the international level, often through

intergovernmental or sometimes supranational organisations (Poguntke and Webb 2005). And because it is heads of government who are the actors operating and making decisions in these organisations, they have accrued power at the expense of other actors, including national legislatures and even cabinets. Often, national legislatures are reduced to merely rubberstamping agreements negotiated by national leaders, not least because while the possibility of accountability does exist *post facto*, the reality is that many of these negotiations are conducted in secrecy (Carter and Poguntke 2010). This is especially the case for member states of the European Union where growing 'Europeanisation' has resulted in national parliaments and parties being increasingly excluded from decision-making in many areas, thereby enhancing the power and autonomy of leaders (Raunio 2002; Carter et al. 2007; Carter and Poguntke 2010; Ladrech 2007a, b).

Here, Europeanisation is the process by which political parties adjust both behaviourally and organisationally as a result of increased European integration (Raunio 2002; Carter et al. 2007; Ladrech 2007a; Poguntke et al. 2007). The institutional structures of the European Union privilege national executives in as much as they are the key actors in both the European Council (heads of government) and the Council of the European Union (national ministers), and the influence of national parties is extremely limited in this system of governance. While MEPs, including those from parties in opposition at the national level, do exercise some power, the European Parliament is just one body in this overall institutional architecture, and it is a supranational one at that, meaning that MEPs take direction from their EP party groups as well as their national parties. These arrangements, along with the limited ability of national parliaments to exercise *ex-post* control over national leaderships as mentioned above, all work together to enhance national leadership autonomy and to produce an 'executive bias' (Carter and Poguntke 2010). What is more, in addition to this institutional logic, the ability of national parties to hold their leaders to account is exacerbated by 'informational asymmetries' between leaders and other actors (Raunio 2002). In other words, domestic actors 'do not fully know the competencies or preferences of their agents [i.e., their ministers] or the exact demands of the task at

hand ... [and nor can they] fully observe the actions of their agents' (Strøm 2000: 270 quoted in Carter and Poguntke 2010: 298).

Although their influence of course varies, leaders are clearly key actors within political parties, and are central in determining the strategies that their parties pursue. Moreover, the above discussions have highlighted that the power of leaders, both externally and within their parties, has increased in recent decades due to a plethora of social, technological and political developments. Having said that however, it is important to recognise that, although perhaps weakened, other actors within political parties have not gone away or simply laid down. In view of this, the next section seeks to understand the influence that intra-party factionalism can have on the strategies that political parties pursue.

3.4. Factionalism

Personalisation, presidentialisation, Europeanisation, and the general tendency toward stronger leaderships (Michels 1962) should not be taken to mean that the direction of travel with respect to leadership power and autonomy is unidirectional. Indeed, while there are forces encouraging the empowering of the party leadership vis-à-vis other actors or agents, there are also countervailing factors that restrict the power and autonomy of leaders, and which can in turn influence the strategies that political parties adopt, and the issues that they focus on. One of these important factors is factions. Just as politics itself concerns the interrelations of different groups, parties concern themselves with the interaction of different groups, engaging in consensus building or even conflict (Maor 1997: 147), and therefore factions are essentially an expression of difference within political parties (Rose 1964). Rival or competing factions often struggle for control of the party apparatus and the success or failure of one faction over another can lead to shifts in policy or issue focus (Harmel et al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003). And just as parties can be considered to have different goals (see below), so too do different factions (Strøm 1994; Maor 1997; Müller and Strøm 1999; Bettcher 2005; Köllner and Basedau 2005).

Rose (1964) distinguishes between factions, which for him are groupings characterised by high levels of organisation, and tendencies, which are defined by reference to a stable set of attitudes rather than any group of politicians. A tendency, therefore, lacks the organisational development of a faction and is rather more *ad hoc* in its operation (Rose 1964). By contrast, rather than focusing on organisational development, Sartori (2005), who builds on the work of Hume (1742), distinguishes on the basis of motivation. He concentrates on the outcome (policy, office, votes) with which the intra-party group is concerned, and distinguishes between interest- and principle-based factions. Interest-based factions are those that prioritise the advancement of power and careers and the allocation of office (Sartori 2005b). In short, they are defined by their attention to patronage over policy (Bettcher 2005). By contrast, principle-based factions are primarily motivated by policy-seeking goals (Bettcher 2005; Sartori 2005b; Boucek 2009). They are defined by a desire to seek 'true collective goods in the form of policies or ideological program[m]es' (Bettcher 2005: 344).

Building on these two different approaches, Bettcher (2005) proposes a typology that makes use of two dimensions: an organisational dimension (as per Rose) and a motivational dimension (as per Sartori). In doing so, he identifies four types of factions: clientele, tendency, a faction of interest, and a faction of principle (Bettcher 2005). The latter three types are defined according to the discussion above, while the clientele type is essentially an organisationally weak variant of the faction of interest – it is highly dependent on personal relationships which are developed and maintained through transactions and exchanges between different echelons of the faction. Lower-order members (the clients) deliver votes to higher-order members (the patrons) and in doing so receive incentives such as jobs and services (Bettcher 2005). In short then, clienteles and factions of interest are primarily motivated by patronage, while tendencies and factions of principle are motivated by policy, and while factions of interest and principle are strongly developed organisationally, clienteles and tendencies tend to be more fleeting or *ad hoc* in their organisations (Bettcher 2005).

Given these differences, we would expect organisationally well-developed factions to exert greater influence over their parties than organisationally less developed factions. Furthermore, we would anticipate that principle-based factions and tendencies will dedicate far more resources to influencing party policy than interest-based (patronage-oriented) factions or clienteles (Kollner and Basedau 2005). Therefore, the manner in which these two families of factions impact upon the issue emphases of parties, and the strategies that they pursue, are likely to differ. It should be noted, though, that while factions of principle might remain principled, it is also possible that they might change once they are in a position to distribute goods or 'spoils of office'. That is, at this point, they might transition toward becoming hybrids between interest and principle, or purely factions of interest (Sartori 2005a).

Any discussion of factionalism may give the impression that parties are barely cohesive organisations, with their constituent factions likely to burst at the seams at any time. Indeed, public displays of factionalism – such as those concerning the leadership crises of John Major – might well lend credence to this picture. However, this description would be simplistic and inaccurate because while parties do contend with centrifugal forces, such as factionalism, that might encourage splits, they are also characterised by centripetal forces that encourage cohesion and can restrict the influence and strength of factions. One such force is party discipline, often enforced via the whips' office or equivalent, which is an institutional means to maintain cohesion.

Furthermore, factions should not be simply seen as disruptive to the party leadership. Rather, they serve an important purpose in that they reflect the variety of views within the party, and effective leaderships will wish to remain informed about these views through various party channels (including the whips office and the party chair) and to gauge support and opposition to specific policy proposals and priorities (Bowler et al. 1999). Therefore, while factions can act as a constraint on the power of leaders, they also serve as weather gauges, providing the party leadership with important information and helping it navigate competing demands within the party.

The influence that factions exert over what strategies a party pursues is therefore likely to vary according to the nature of the factions, and their relative influence within the party. With reference to the strategies examined in this thesis, therefore, where a (principal) party is dominated by a faction of principle, a strategy of accommodation with a radical right party may simply not be countenanced. By contrast, if the dominant faction is a faction of interest, then preference will be for whatever strategy maintains the influence, power, and position of faction members within the party.

3.5. Auxiliary/Collateral Organisations

Not all factors or mechanisms that influence the strategies of political parties are internal to the party. Rather, some are external. These include a range of auxiliary or collateral organisations that maintain some level of close cooperation with parties and that can be influential on the deliberations and, ultimately, on the strategising of parties. Prominent examples include many religious organisations, which frequently have links with Christian democratic parties, and trade unions, which often have strong relationships with social democratic or socialist parties (Duverger 1963; Poguntke 2002; Allern et al. 2020; Otjes and Green-Pedersen 2021). Indeed, in many countries, social democratic parties not only held strong connections with trade unions, but, as Ernest Bevin remarked of the British Labour Party, the party often ‘grew out of the bowels’ of the trade union movement (Allern and Bale 2017: 5). As such, parties and unions have been considered the political and industrial wings, respectively, of the same movement (Howell 2001: 7; Allern et al. 2007) but with a clear division of labour: social democratic parties represented the working classes within the parliamentary arena, while unions represented and articulated the interests of workers in the economic arena (Allern et al. 2007).

These connections have been extremely valuable to both the party and collateral organisation in that both supplied resources or goods that the other desired. From the parties’ perspective, collateral organisations have, in the first instance, provided information and policy expertise, two things that parties traditionally lacked because of being organisations with few members of staff. Secondly,

collateral organisations provide funding to political parties to cover both routine running expenses and to contribute to the costs of election campaigns. Given the expense of modern election campaigns in particular, these sources of funding are invaluable. For example, over 90 percent of the British Labour Party's funding came from trade unions in 2019 (Audickas 2020). In addition to expertise and funding, collateral organisations also can act as a reservoir of personnel from which political parties can recruit. For instance, as of 2017, about one third of the Australian Labor Party's parliamentarians have previously worked in trade unions. This is still a sizeable proportion even though it is considerably less than in the past (Markey 2018). Or, collateral organisations can revert to being a destination for departing politicians. That is, collateral organisations can offer politicians personal rewards once their political career is over, such as lucrative positions. For instance, Steffen Kampeter, a CDU MP in the German Bundestag between 1990 and 2016, recently became the Executive Director of the Confederation of German Employers' Association (Klüver 2020). Finally, away from providing these specific resources, collateral organisations also fulfil an important wider function in that they mobilise their members to vote for specific parties at the polls. In this way then, they can provide parties with a sizeable support base that can be counted upon. That said, that base can evaporate if relations between the organisation and the party sour, and if, out of dissatisfaction, the one-time ally instructs its members to lend support to a rival. Klüver (2020) has empirically demonstrated that political parties are especially responsive to collateral organisations that can mobilise voters and therefore tend to emphasise issues that are prioritised by these organisations (see also Otjes and Green-Pedersen 2021).

In exchange for these resources, political parties traditionally devoted, and to some extent and with variation continue to devote, particular attention to issues and policy areas that collateral organisations favour. In addition, parties deliver general benefits to the members of these organisations, such as enhanced employment rights to trade union members (Klüver 2020), or the liberalisation of employment rules and regulations for business and employers' associations (Razuoli and Raimundo (2018).

In recent years, however, the relationship between political parties and collateral organisations has begun to weaken (Poguntke 2002), especially for social democratic parties and their trade union allies (Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). Economic and social changes have led to the breakdown of long-existing cleavages, characterised by a decline in group identification and weakened ties between particular social groups and specific political parties – i.e., to electoral dealignment (Dalton 2004). The number of working-class voters has shrunk, and an increasingly pluralistic middle class has emerged. In this context, social democratic parties have moved away from emphasising traditional issues and policies and have instead broadened their appeals in a bid to attract new constituencies beyond their traditional social base. Moreover, social democratic parties have abandoned many of their traditional left-wing economic positions due to the dominance of economic neo-liberalism, arguably exacerbated by global economic shocks and austerity, and because of the constraints that membership of the European Union brings to policy agendas (Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). In this context, these parties have less to offer trade unions, and the rewards for trade unions in the once close relationship have thus declined. There is also less in it for the parties. The precipitous decline in membership numbers has drastically cut the ability of trade unions to mobilise a meaningful number of voters, and the pressure to continue to emphasise traditional issues and pursue traditional policies now serves to hamstring the parties.

Given these changes, the traditional relationship between parties and collateral organisations is in decline. Some parties and organisations have kept more ad hoc arrangements, which are sometimes still close, but many have eschewed formal ties, and in a few instances, the relationships have been completely severed (Poguntke 2002; Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). In the British Labour Party, for instance, the number of trade unions affiliated to the party has fallen, the formal voting powers of trade union members have weakened, and the overall involvement of the unions in party decision-making has declined (Allern and Bale 2017). Similarly, in Italy, the relationship between the General Confederation of Labour and the Italian Communist Party weakened over time and became almost entirely ad hoc when the Communist Party formed into the Democratic Party in 2007 (Allern

and Bale 2017; Otjes and Rasmussen 2017). Even more marked is the example of the Netherlands, where traditionally strong connections between parties and collateral organisations have all but disappeared (Otjes and Rasmussen 2017).

These developments call into question the influence that collateral organisations have on political parties in the contemporary context. Historically, collateral organisations have exerted an impact on what issues parties have prioritised and even on the strategies that parties have pursued, favouring a goal of policy-shaping rather than one of vote maximisation or office seeking. Yet, given their declining positions in society and weaker links with political parties, collateral organisations are likely to be much less important in determining the overall strategies of parties today than they once were.

3.6. Party Goals

As has already been alluded to, different actors within parties are likely to wish to pursue different goals. Thus, the balance of power within a party – between the leadership and the party’s factions, as well as between the leadership, the parliamentary party, the party’s activists, and its members – and the influence of collateral organisations, all shape the goals of a party. Goals include maximising the vote share of the party, maximising the spoils of office to which the party has access, increasing the representation or participation of party members, and/or advocating or delivering particular policy prescriptions (Harmel and Janda 1994). While political parties will have numerous goals, each party is expected to have a singular ‘primary goal’, and this primary goal can vary not only across parties but also within parties across time (Harmel and Janda 1994: 265). The primary goals of parties will often dictate not only the issues that individual parties emphasise, but also the strategies that they employ around these issues.

The academic literature points to a number of trends or generalisations concerning what goals parties of different types tend to pursue. Left-wing parties are characterised as being policy-seeking

organisations and are said to aspire, at least historically, to public office in order to enact significant social change (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994). As a result, they ‘forgo ideological shifts that could confer short-term electoral advantages, because they instead aim to influence voter preferences in the long run’ (Adams et al. 2009: 615). By contrast, centre-right and right-wing parties tend to prioritise office-seeking considerations. Lastly, radical right parties are often primarily vote-maximisers (Akkerman et al. 2016: 13).

Depending on the primary goal of the party, the party will approach issues in different ways. For instance, consider a vote maximising party in the context of an electoral loss. Following such a loss, the vote maximising party might seek to adjust its electoral offering to voters in order to better reflect the policy preferences of particular electorates, and thereby enhance its capacity to increase its vote share next time round (see below). By contrast, an office maximising party might compromise its electoral offerings or even ideological purity, in order to open up potential avenues of collaboration with other parties. Indeed, this behaviour can be observed with centre-right parties in particular, which tend to shift their positions in line with public opinion in order to increase their chances of securing office. By contrast, a policy-seeking party is unlikely to change its policy positions, and this is borne out in the fact that left-wing parties are far less responsive to shifts in public opinion and often opt for policy purity over short-term electoral considerations (Adams et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2009).

As noted above, the primary goal of a party is most often dynamic; it can and often does change over time. The Sweden Democrats provide a real-world example of a party changing its primary goal and approaching issues in new ways. Prior to 2014, the party pursued a strategy of vote maximisation, and in a bid to increase its electability, it embarked on an effort to detoxify its brand, moderate its ideology, and evolve its policies, and it undertook a process of organisational reformation, all to present a more moderate face to Swedish voters (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Widfeldt 2014; Bolin and Aylott 2019). From 2014 onwards, however, the party changed its primary goal, and began to adopt a more office-focused strategy, building a foundation

from which it could begin to collaborate with the centre-right Moderate Party and Christian Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019).

This example also serves to underline the fact that parties do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they react to other competitors, and adopt their strategies with these in mind. Moreover, it illustrates that a change in the primary goal of one party can impact on the strategies of other parties. In this case, as the Sweden Democrats shifted towards a more office-maximising orientation, the Moderate and Christian Democratic parties began altering their goals in favour of collaboration with the now more ideologically moderate, but nonetheless still radical, Sweden Democrats.

3.7. Radical Right Parties

Given the subject and aims of this thesis, it is worth spending a little time exploring the strategies and goals of radical right parties, and how these parties go about pursuing them. As just noted, the goals of one party may well impact on those of another, and so the strategies that principal parties adopt vis-à-vis their radical right competitors will most likely be influenced by what these competitors do, and what strategies and goals they pursue, which as also noted, can change with time.

Like all parties, radical right parties harbour and pursue a number of goals. Above all else, however, radical right parties tend to be vote-seeking organisations (Akkerman et al. 2016: 13). This vote-maximisation agenda has been achieved, in part, through an ideological cocktail that consists of anti-immigration and anti-establishment rhetoric and positioning, as well as other opportunistic developments, such as focusing on issues relating to welfare, European integration, and even women's rights (Akkerman 2015). This potent ideological offering has been extremely successful for many radical right parties across Europe and their vote-maximisation goal has often been further improved by the presence of charismatic leaders. However, the most successful radical right parties

have also learned that in order to fully realise their goals, they need to engage in organisation building and they therefore often dedicate a great deal of time and resources to this function.

When it comes to the organisation of radical right parties, many scholars have argued that ‘the most successful radical right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic figures [and possess a] highly centralised organisational structure, with decisions being made at the top by a relatively circumscribed circle of party activists and transmitted to the bottom’ (Betz 1998: 9). Most successful radical right leaders not only possess charisma, but a whole host of other ‘external leadership’ qualities including rhetorical and oratory skills, media savviness, and communicative penetration (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011).

However, as well as needing leaders who have strong external leadership qualities, successful radical right parties also require their leaders to have internal leadership skills. Internal leadership is more oriented to intra-party considerations. It concerns the capacity of the leader to recruit and socialise political personnel, activists, and suitable candidates, his or her ability to communicate and issue instruction within an organisation that has not yet fully developed, a skill for developing and executing electoral campaigns, and the capacity to enhance the organisational capabilities of the party beyond their own authority (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012). Internal leadership, then, is vital in ensuring the long-term existence of the party, and in avoiding internal strife, or at least developing mechanisms to manage and address internal disagreements. Moreover, internal leadership has become all the more important as many radical right parties have begun to focus much more on office-seeking goals in recent years (Heinisch 2003; Luther 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012; Akkerman et al. 2016). A leader with strong internal skills is thus better able to ensure that the party is ready for the burdens of office, both in the sense of organisational adjustments required for collaboration with another party – especially given that radical right parties tend to enter government as junior partners – and in the sense of establishing a well-trained and well-organised group of recruits

and candidates for office (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012; see Luther 2011 for the consequences of failing to achieve this).

An internally strong leader, then, does not just ensure that the party is adapted for the burdens of office, but actively pursues the institutionalisation of the party. In the context of political parties, institutionalisation is the 'process by which an organisation, from being a means to an end, becomes an end in itself' (Gunther and Hopkin 2002: 196). For our purpose, this essentially concerns the extent to which different organs of the party have developed interdependence and how routinised party behaviour has become (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). This process of institutionalisation is dependent upon strong internal leadership and the application of that strong internal leadership to the recruitment, training, and most importantly the socialisation of activists, officials, and elites within the party (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012). Through the adequate socialisation of elites, officials, candidates and activists, a party can become 'value infused', that is the party develops value in of itself beyond a single policy or appeal of a particular leader (Levitsky 1998; Gunther and Hopkin 2002). This process is important for two key reasons. Firstly, as individual elites, officials, candidates, and activists perceive value in the party in of itself, the goals and needs of the party are become internalised, and therefore individuals within the party balance self-interest with the needs and interests of the party. This consideration is critical for parties that shift from being primarily vote maximising to office seeking, as the demands of office require compromise, collaboration with other parties, and a watering down of the potent ideological cocktail discussed above. An institutionalised party that holds value will be better able to manage this transition as elites, officials, candidates, and especially activists no longer perceive the party as 'a mere instrument to achieve a set of goals' and become 'more willing to prioritise the organisational interest [of the party] even when in conflict with their individual preferences (Levitsky 1998: 79). Secondly, institutionalisation ensures that the party is able to navigate future leadership changes and has the organisational capacity to install a new leader without a loss of personnel or support. In short, through institutionalisation, a radical right party can not only effectively manage a transition in its primary goal

from vote maximising to office seeking, but also 'can effectively respond to and profit from government participation' when that office seeking goal is realised (Bolleyer et al. 2012: 988).

The extent to which different radical right parties have successfully managed to transition from vote maximising to office seeking is mixed. Crucially, however, the organisational capacity and institutionalisation of a radical right party impacts upon the strategies that a principal party will likely pursue. This can be demonstrated by way of three illustrative cases that highlight different levels of organisational capacity (including external and internal leadership characteristics) and institutionalisation.

The first case is that of the Pim Fortuyn List, which can be described as a poorly institutionalised party with low organisational capacity. The LPF began participating in elections only a few months after being founded in 2002 by Pim Fortuyn. Given its youth, there was little party organisation to speak of beyond a series of friends and allies of Fortuyn who formed the core administration of the party and who recruited candidates (de Lange and Art 2011). Having performed strongly in the elections, as a result of Fortuyn's stellar external leadership, the party was invited to join in coalition with the VVD and CDA. In response, the LPF had to quickly expand its organisational capacity, developing the party in central and public office. However, the party had not yet socialised elites, ministers, or representatives, nor had it provided adequate training. As a consequence, elites and ministers operated as independent agents who acted according to their own goals and interests rather than that of the party (de Lange and Art 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). Many of those involved in the LPF had joined because of their relationship to Fortuyn himself, and therefore, without Fortuyn (who was assassinated just before the 2002 elections), the party lacked a common goal. As a result, the party was dominated by intra-party strife and ultimately collapsed (Akkerman and de Lange 2012). What this demonstrates, then, is the importance of internal leadership in developing the organisational capacity of the party and achieving a sufficient level of institutionalisation. Ultimately, this meant that the LPF was not ready for the success it experienced nor for its participation in

government; even when accounting for Fortuyn's untimely death (de Lange and Art 2011). This had a direct impact on other principal parties in that the office-seeking VVD and CDA formed a coalition with the LPF in order to achieve the number of seats required to form a government. However, the lack of institutionalisation and organisational capacity of the LPF proved to be a disaster and resulted in the coalition collapsing shortly after being formed. Ultimately, then, principal party collaboration with a weakly-institutionalised and weakly-led radical right party proved unworkable and given the coalition's collapse might discourage future collaboration between these principal parties and new entrants.

The Austrian FPÖ under the leadership of Jörg Haider was a party defined by high external leadership, low internal leadership, and insufficient levels of institutionalisation, especially with regard to party value and socialisation. Under Haider, the FPÖ shifted from vote-maximising to office-seeking. However, while the FPÖ was exceedingly effective in its initial vote maximisation strategy, its preparations for incumbency were far less effective as Haider failed to maintain internal unity over party goals and strategy (Luther 2007; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Heinisch 2016). This was made worse by significant discrepancies in party behaviour among party officials and elites, including Haider himself who resorted to strategies that proved successful during the era of vote maximisation but which proved counterproductive to the goals of office (Luther 2007; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). With regards to principal party strategies, it is entirely possible that, fearing an unpredictable or unstable partner, that the principal party might seek to avoid any form of collaboration. That being said, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), under the leadership of Wolfgang Schüssel, identified an opportunity to exploit the FPÖ in order to advance its own desires for office and sought collaboration as a means of securing office through the cannibalisation of the FPÖ (Bale 2003; Luther 2003). Interestingly, this was not the first time that experience in government had caused the party to fracture and suffer internal strife. Under the leadership of Norbert Steger (1980 to 1986), the FPÖ had adopted a less confrontational approach and liberalised its programmatic profile to focus on anti-statism, free markets, and individualism (Luther 2007; Heinisch 2016). It entered into coalition with

the SPÖ in 1983 but disagreements over party policy and focus eventually led Haider to replace Steger as leader (Luther 2007, 2011). As with the case of the LPF above, then, a weakly-led and insufficiently institutionalised party can often make for a poor choice of coalition partner.

Finally, the Dutch Party for Freedom, under its leader, Geert Wilders, not only expended considerable resources on institutionalising itself but had foregone the opportunity to participate in elections in order to achieve adequate institutionalisation.⁷ Founded in 2005, the PVV is an incredibly centralised but surprisingly small organisation. It has no local or regional branches, no auxiliary organisations, and unusually for political parties, does not permit members to join the party – it therefore has no ‘party on the ground’ (de Lange and Art 2011). Even the other faces of the party – the party in central and public office – are small units. Wilders, instead, focused on the socialisation and training of all personnel involved with the PVV. As a result of this significant focus on socialisation, PVV activists and representatives strongly identify with the party and its leader, and generally few conflicts have arisen from leadership decisions. Indeed, even in instances where aspiring candidates have been left off party lists or representatives have been disciplined, conflicts have remained largely absent, and those involved in the party rarely speak negatively about the party or its leader (de Lange and Art 2011). The PVV, then, is characterised by moderate levels of external leadership, and high levels of internal leadership and institutionalisation. Indeed, Wilders’ focus on organisation building was as a direct result of the failure and ultimate implosion of the LPF. Depending upon the arithmetic in parliament and the ideology of the radical right party, a radical right party that is well led (both internally and externally) and that is well institutionalised is likely to be an attractive prospect to principal parties. In other words, with a radical right party of this type, principal parties might well opt for strategies of collaboration, be this a formal coalition with the radical right as a junior partner, or some kind of confidence and supply arrangement. And this is precisely what happened with the PVV, as had also occurred in Denmark. Following the 2010 Dutch election in which the PVV won a large vote share and

⁷ Wilders publicly cited a lack of adequate candidates as his reasoning for refusing to participate in the 2007 provincial elections (de Lange and Art 2011).

became the third largest party in parliament, the VVD and CDA formed a minority government which depended on the support of the PVV. The arrangements lasted until 2012 when the PVV withdrew its support over proposed austerity measures. Interestingly enough, the experience of such an arrangement was such that following the 2012 and 2017 elections, all major parties declared that they would not repeat it, with all declaring they would not work with the PVV again.

These examples therefore demonstrate that radical right parties that are insufficiently institutionalised and lack internal leadership will find government participation to be highly destabilising events (see Heinisch 2003; Luther 2003, 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012, Bolleyer et al. 2012), and that principal parties will likely wish to keep such parties at arm's length unless there is some particular benefit in cooperation. By contrast, radical right parties that display high levels of (external and internal) leadership and institutionalisation can often be attractive partners for principal parties, either for coalition or confidence and supply arrangements. However, this will be mitigated by conditions such as the ideology of the radical right party and the extent to which other actors (including other coalition partners) are willing to tolerate a radical right party as a legitimate player. In circumstances where principal parties are unwilling to tolerate the ideology of the radical right and see it as beyond the pale, strategies of collaboration may be abandoned and a cordon sanitaire might be applied instead.

3.8. Electoral System

As has been underlined more than once before in this chapter, parties of course do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they respond to external actors, such as auxiliary or collateral organisations with which they have close links, as well as to their competitors. In addition, however, parties also respond, to varying extents, to the rules of the game – i.e., to the institutional environment in which they exist. A core feature of this environment is the electoral system, and it can be theorised that different

electoral systems may well influence parties, either by constraining them or by encouraging them, to pursue some goals and strategies over others.

The conventional wisdom regarding the impact of electoral systems on party systems is that majoritarian systems tend to produce convergent or centripetal pressures that tend to restrict competition to two large parties, with the expectation that a single party will secure office alone (Downs 1957a, b; Norris 1997; Dow 2001). As a result of these centripetal pressures, vote maximising locations are assumed to be centrally located along a hypothetical dimension – often a left-right dimension (although see Chapter 2), assuming a unimodal distribution of voters. Policy offerings and ideological expressions of parties are therefore often more limited (Downs 1957a, b; Dow 2001). The logic and pressures of such systems also make it difficult for smaller parties – such as those of the radical right – to gain a foothold, unless their support is geographically concentrated (Johnston and Ballantyne 1977; Norris 1997).

Majoritarian electoral systems therefore encourage larger parties to downplay and even ignore smaller competitors. Borrowing from the model of competition established in Chapter 2, it is thus likely that larger principal parties in majoritarian systems will favour disengagement strategies as there is little to be gained from collaboration or cooperation with smaller actors except in unusual or particular circumstances. As for issues, majoritarian electoral systems are likely to encourage principal parties to adopt a strategy of issue accommodation. Smaller parties might prime or encourage voters to consider other issues to be important but since the likelihood of representation for these parties is quite low, larger parties are likely to adopt these issues and positions themselves if they judge that there are electoral benefits to be had in doing so (see Meguid 2005, 2008).

It should be noted, however, that even in majoritarian systems, radical right parties can have considerable blackmail potential, not least because they can sometimes still win a sufficiently large share of the vote, even if this is not translated into large seat shares. This can occur because the psychological effects of the electoral system on radical right voters do not seem to be very strongly

felt (Carter 2002, 2004a; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). This is the case in France where the majoritarian electoral system – albeit a two-round one with its own particularities – has not prevented the National Front from securing a significant share of the vote in numerous elections. Under these conditions, the efficacy of an accommodative strategy can be called into question. Put simply, if the radical right party has such influence, voters who care about the issues that the radical right party promotes might prefer to vote for the radical right ‘original’ rather than the principal party ‘copy’.

Having said all this, it is clear that majoritarian electoral systems do not always produce centripetal forces and do not always encourage the development of a two-party system. An example that illustrates this well is Italy, which engaged in electoral system change in the mid-1990s, replacing its proportional system with a majoritarian variant of a mixed member system (wherein 75 percent of seats were allocated according to FPTP, while the remaining 25 percent were allocated supplementarily). This change did not result in a reduction in the number of parties or in convergence to the centre as might have been expected. Instead, there was a drastic increase in polarisation and a rise in the number of relevant parties (Sartori 1999). Indeed, during the proportional representation era, there were on average six relevant parties, while under the new electoral system, this had doubled to twelve (Sartori 1999).

By contrast, this same conventional wisdom holds that proportional systems tend to produce divergent or centrifugal pressures that encourage a wider array of electorally successful parties, with the expectation that multiple parties will secure office given the need for coalition governments (Dow 2001). As a consequence of the multitude of parties and the centrifugal pressures, proportional representation is often assumed to produce a polarisation of ideological positions, with vote maximising locations distributed along any hypothetical dimension in accordance with the multimodal distribution of voters (Downs 1957a, b; Norris 1997; Dow 2001). However, the extent to which proportional systems produce centrifugal pressures and ideological polarisation is a product of the number of relevant parties. A smaller number of relevant parties, regardless of proportionality, is still

likely to produce centripetal pressures as the underlying electoral logic rewards central positioning (assuming a normal distribution of voters) (Sartori 2005b: 310).

With regard to strategies, proportional electoral systems are quite likely to encourage greater collaboration and cooperation between principal parties and smaller parties – including those of the radical right – than would be the case in majoritarian systems. This dynamic does depend on how competitive the party system is, however, and is also only likely when the radical right party possesses coalition potential (see Sartori 2005b). This is clearly not always the case as some radical right parties have chosen to remain at the fringes of the spectrum, pursuing a radical programmatic profile and concentrating on solidifying their vote share among the more radical or extreme segment of the electorate. An example of such a party is the Alternative for Germany, which has increasingly radicalised its programmatic profile, moving from a Eurosceptic stance with populist inclinations, to becoming a more conventional radical right party, and now a more extreme radical right party beset by issues of racism and historical revisionism regarding Germany's Nazi past (Arzheimer and Berning 2019; Bochum 2020). There are, of course, particular historical and cultural reasons why German principal parties are very unlikely to engage in strategies of collaboration with the radical right anyway, but this example highlights the wider point that the more extreme the radical right party, the less likely principal parties are to consider a strategy of collaboration, even in proportional systems.

Collaboration is of course a party strategy (see Chapter 2), and if we turn our attention to issue strategies, then we can theorise that a proportional electoral system might encourage greater use of dismissive strategies by principal parties. This is because, in a proportional system, smaller parties have a genuine chance of securing representation, and therefore adversarial strategies, which increase the saliency of an issue and reinforce the radical right party's ownership of said issue, are often going to run counter to the electoral interests of a principal party – although, of course, a principal party might adopt an adversarial strategy out of principle. Accommodative strategies, by contrast, become much riskier in proportional systems. While the underlying logic of the

accommodative strategy still holds – that is, principal parties should be able to steal voters away from the radical right party owing to their ‘legislative experience’ and ‘governmental effectiveness’ (see Meguid 2005, 2008) – because proportional systems increase the chance of smaller parties gaining representation and of becoming involved in some form of governmental arrangement, voters can cast meaningful votes in favour of smaller parties without fear that that vote will be wasted, as is often the case in majoritarian systems. Moreover, even if the radical right party lacks coalition potential, in a proportional system it might possess considerable blackmail potential, meaning that it could secure policy objectives without the need for formal collaboration. In this context, then, an accommodative strategy would increase the saliency of the issue, but would not necessarily guarantee the transfer of votes from the smaller party to the principal one.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, proportional systems do not always produce multiparty systems. A particularly prominent example of this is Malta where the use of the Single Transferable Vote system exists alongside the purest two-party system in Europe – where the Maltese Labour Party and the Nationalist Party score around 98 percent of the vote in elections – and strong bipolarity (de Miño and Lane 1996; Cini 2002).⁸ Furthermore, as a result of the relatively small district magnitude of each constituency, the electoral system is quite disproportionate and minor parties which are unable to geographically concentrate their vote are routinely disadvantaged (de Miño and Lane 1996). As a consequence, principal parties in Malta need not worry about competition from smaller parties.

In addition, even where proportional representation does produce multiparty systems, it does not always encourage collaboration and cooperation between the principal parties and the radical right, even when the radical right party is quite sizeable. The case of Flanders illustrates this. Here the Vlaams Belang has experienced considerable, if variable, electoral success over the years, but the

⁸ Prior to the 1970s, Malta operated a multi-party system. However, following independence in 1964, the party system underwent a process of consolidation and ‘purification’ until a purely two-party system came about (Cini 2002).

principal parties have tended towards the application of a cordon sanitaire, mainly for ethical reasons and as a result of Flanders' highly cartelised party system (Downs 2012: 96-97). Furthermore, with regard to issue strategies, the principal parties have not tended to adopt dismissive strategies, as outlined above. Rather, some such as the Socialist Party have tended to embrace adversarial strategies, while others, including the centre-right parties, have favoured accommodative strategies. It could therefore be the case that the application of the cordon sanitaire might act as a 'suppressor' to the risks associated with an accommodative strategy. That is, by excluding and isolating the VB, principal parties can then go on to emphasise the issues of the radical right, and steal their votes.

The above discussion has explored the systemic effects that electoral systems can have, including on the direction of competition, the extent of ideological polarisation, and the format of the party system and resulting coalition demands. As has been argued, these effects are all likely to encourage or discourage particular party strategies. In addition, the last paragraphs have pointed to the effect that electoral systems can have on whether radical right issues are addressed by the principal parties, and if they are, whether these are accommodated or rejected, or whether principal parties prefer to dismiss such issues. A further facet of the electoral system might also matter. That is, the way in which voters choose which candidates are elected is also likely to have an impact on the ability of party leaderships to pursue their preferred strategy. This is determined by the format of the ballot, and different ballot formats impact, to some degree, on how much party leaderships can control which candidates end up being elected.

The format of the ballot is typically described as being 'categorical' or 'ordinal', and in list PR systems as being 'closed', 'ordered', or 'open' (Farrell 2011). Categorical ballots – be they in majoritarian systems like the UK or in proportional ones like Spain (Farrell 2011: 166) – offer a voter a simple either/or choice, while ordinal ballots enable a voter to express a preference, usually through ranking. By contrast, the distinction between closed, ordinal and open ballots relates to the extent to which

voters can have a say over which candidates are elected, and therefore also to the degree of party control over which candidates are elected.

In closed ballot structures, the ordering of the candidates is determined by the party and voters cannot express a preference for a particular candidate. This presents the party leadership with the advantage of being able to control the list, as loyal candidates can be placed high on the list, and dissident or troublesome individuals can be placed so low on it that they stand no chance of being elected (Farrell 2011: 78). In effect then, closed ballot structures empower the party leadership.

By contrast, in ordered and open ballot systems, the ballot structure is such that individual voters can express a preference vote for individual candidates within each party. The format of these ballots varies considerably from system to system, with some allowing voters to choose between whether they do indeed express a preference for a certain candidate or whether they simply opt for a party (and hence accept the party's ordering of candidates on the list, as in Belgium), and others requiring voters to choose between candidates, like in Finland. Moreover, the extent to which seat allocations are affected by preference votes varies. In some systems, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, the influence of preference votes is rather limited, and candidates require a huge number of preference votes to move up the list (Farrell 2011: 81-85). Elsewhere, however, preference votes really do matter. In Finland's open list system, 'preference votes alone determine the success of candidates within parties' (Raunio 2008: 481). Similarly, in the system used in Italy prior to the 1990s reform, voters could express preferences, and these preference votes could make all the difference (Farrell 2011: 86).

Voters may of course have a number of different reasons for expressing the preferences they do. They may simply prefer the personality or image of a specific candidate, or they may prefer the candidate's own political opinions and favoured policies, or they may wish to register dissatisfaction with a party's policy or leadership (Solsten and Meditz 1988), or a combination of these motivations could be at work. For the party and its leadership, however, a large number of preference votes for specific

candidates might present a challenge. This is particularly the case if the recipients of preference votes are candidates who are 'out of sync' with the party leadership, or if such votes go in large numbers to factions within the party that might contest the policies or control of the leadership. In short then, if the ballot format is such that preference votes do influence which candidates get elected, the party leadership's ability to control who ends up being its representatives in parliament can be constrained, and the level of factionalism within parties may also increase.

One prominent example that illustrates such tensions, is that of Rita Verdonk, who was a senior member of the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Having served as a cabinet minister from 2003, she contested the leadership of the VVD when Jozias van Aartsen stood down from the position in March 2006. However, she lost – to Mark Rutte – and in the subsequent general elections of November 2006, positioned second on the list behind Rutte, she mounted a very active private campaign, with her own staff, campaign bus, and slogan. This resulted in her winning a greater number of votes and more personal list preferences than Rutte (Van Holsteyn 2007). The tensions this created within the VVD, and the continued strains between Rutte and Verdonk (and their respective factions), ultimately led to Verdonk being expelled from the party's parliamentary group, and then going on to form her own Proud of the Netherlands party.

It is not just ordered and open list proportional representation systems that can lead to the development or strengthening of factions. Rather, factions can exert themselves in Single Transferable Vote (STV) ones too. In these systems the way voters express a preference is different in as much as the ballot structure is a preferential one, with voters ranking candidates in their order of preference (rather than simply choosing candidates). Yet the effects can be similar because parties will present multiple candidates in the same district, meaning that individuals from the same party are effectively competing against each other. In reality the extent to which this results in factionalism is hard to discern. In the case of Ireland, on the one hand, there is some evidence of growing internal party rivalry (Farrell 2011: 136). Yet on the other, a more pressing concern for parties is voter loyalty and

ensuring that voters express not only their first preference for a candidate of the party, but also a second (and subsequent) preference too. This affects the so-called 'transfer rate' – i.e., the votes that are surplus to the quota of elected candidates, which are then transferred to the remaining candidates. For parties, it is crucial to ensure that these surplus votes are also for its candidates, and so vote management strategies to maximise voter loyalty, which has been declining in recent years, have become particularly important (Farrell 2011: 135). These priorities may well quell the development of factions. Moreover, even if there has been some internal strife in Irish parties in more recent years, the level of factionalism has remained generally low as historically factions have tended to be weak in Ireland (Hine 1982).

This discussion has shown that it is not just the effects that electoral systems have on party competition and on the party system that might shape what strategies principal parties opt for, but that the format of the ballot might also influence the ability of principal party leaderships to pursue their preferred strategies. More specifically, closed ballots are likely to enable party leaderships to pursue their preferred strategy as these types of ballots empower leaderships and close down rivalries and factions. By contrast, ordered and open ballots (and possibly preferential ballots such as STV too) are likely to leave more room for other party actors to challenge the party leadership over its strategies, and for intra-party factions to develop and/or strengthen. And depending on who these other actors are, and/or on what type of factions gain influence (see above), it could be that party leaderships find themselves having adapted their strategies, perhaps paying more attention to policy, at the expense of vote maximisation or office. Equally, open or preferential ballots may well strengthen calls from within the party to adopt disengagement strategies. As Downs (2001) has shown, elected candidates who are able to develop a certain autonomy from the central party and build a loyal base (two things that open and preferential ballots enable) are more likely to favour 'clean hands' strategies vis-à-vis the radical right. This might be in tune with the preferences of the party leadership, or it might not.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a discussion of a range of conditions or intervening variables that might impact on what strategies principal parties pursue. It began with a discussion of party types and how the different ‘faces’ of party organisation have been empowered or constrained over time and in different parties, and why this matters for the formulation of party strategies. From here the chapter concentrated on party leaders and leadership and explored how and why leaders have been empowered in recent decades, and what this means for the formation of party strategies. Then, the chapter turned its attention to other party actors, and considered the type, role and power of intra-party factions and the ways in which, and extent to which, they may influence party strategies. After this, the discussion moved to focus on those conditions external to the party. The chapter examined the role of auxiliary or collateral organisations, and the ways in which these actors may influence the sorts of policies that parties adopt, and the strategies that parties pursue.

Having explored different actors within and beyond parties and their influence, the chapter then turned to discussing party goals, which are crucial to underpinning what strategies parties decide to adopt. Moreover, it was made very clear here that one party’s goals are influenced by the goals of other parties, and in terms of this thesis, the goals of radical right parties are especially important. The chapter therefore engaged in a substantial discussion of how the goals, leadership, organisation, and level of institutionalisation of radical right parties can influence which strategies principal parties decide to pursue.

Finally, the chapter considered how the principal parties’ choice of strategies may be influenced by the institutional environment, and in particular by the electoral system. It underlined the logic of different electoral systems and showed that in some systems principal parties do not need to pay that much attention to parties of the radical right or to the issues that these parties champion, whereas in other systems, principal parties cannot afford to ignore these competitors or their issues. It also showed that these latter cases might encourage strategies of collaboration or cooperation with the

radical right, or might prompt the adoption of cordons sanitaires. This section of the chapter also included an examination of how the structure of the ballot may influence what strategies principal parties pursue, and it distinguished between closed ballot formats which broadly enable the party leadership to pursue its preferred strategy, and open and preferential ones, which potentially constrain the party leadership in its choice of strategy.

Many of the factors discussed in this chapter are picked up in Chapter 7 on France and Chapter 8 on Sweden where they are covered in more detail. For the time being though, the thesis continues by turning to conceptual and definitional matters. The next chapter engages in a discussion of key terms, offers a definition of what a principal party is and what a radical right party is, and then identifies the parties relevant for the analysis.

4. Defining and Identifying Relevant Parties

4.1. Introduction

Before the strategies that principal parties adopt towards parties of the radical right can be explored, analysed and explained, it is necessary to spend some time thinking about what defines these two sets of parties, and what they should be called. These questions of definition and terminology are crucial because they point us towards our object of study. That is, clarifying the intension of the concept and deciding on its term allows us to then move on to identify the extension – i.e., to identify which parties we should be analysing. It is with these conceptual issues that this chapter concerns itself.

Throughout the academic literature on political parties, and indeed in the wider circles, the concept of the mainstream party is fairly ubiquitous. Yet, while universally applied, this concept can be rather problematic as far as consistent definitions go. Moreover, very rarely is the time taken to actually explore or define what is meant by mainstream or non-mainstream. The consequence is that a familiar subset of parties is regularly presented as mainstream, with little appreciation or understanding of why these parties are considered mainstream, and with little or no explanation of what the underlying theoretical basis for such a categorisation.

This problem is further compounded by the fact that a great number of scholars insist on using several synonyms for these parties: from mainstream to moderate, from established to establishment, and from major to conventional. While these terms are employed as synonyms, in actuality, each carries a rather different connotation (intension). For instance, one might intuitively classify the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) or indeed the Swiss People's Party (SVP) as established and even major, yet few would seek to describe these parties as moderate or mainstream. Each of these terms is (intuitively and in common parlance) connotatively different and therefore denotes a different subset of political parties. It is thus argued that the concept of mainstream party, or indeed any of the terms employed

as synonyms, can in fact be considered ‘bicycle concepts’ (Zimmerling 2005). Zimmerling (2005: 15) defines a bicycle concept as any concept that is ‘unproblematic as long as one does not stop to think about how exactly it works’.

This is not to suggest that one cannot get some mileage out of a bicycle concept or that such concepts have no value. Indeed, Arzheimer (2018) makes the point well that, actually, such concepts can have incredible value. By reference to research into the radical right party family, Arzheimer highlights that while there is an abundance of terms to describe what is essentially the same phenomenon (see also Carter 2005: 20-23; Mudde 2007: 11-12), research into radical right parties has produced some fruitful results. Mudde (1996: 233) argues that definitional problems in the radical right literature have been of limited relevance owing to near universal agreement among scholars on which parties should and should not be classified as radical right. However, as will be seen below, such agreement does not exist with regards to what parties are considered to be mainstream, establishment, and so on. The consequence is that we have considerably different subsets of parties linked to each term. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for classification – or the intension of the concepts – often differs as well. As a result, inferences or conclusions drawn from different studies can be difficult to generalise (Meyer and Miller 2013).

The following section, then, will seek to elucidate on each of these terms, explaining their connotation and definition. It begins with a quick overview of the definitions – or lack thereof – regarding mainstream parties, before moving onto looking at how the scholarly literature has defined major and minor parties, niche parties, and finally establishment and anti-establishment parties. Thereafter, the chapter will provide a quick summary of definitions for each of these concepts, before arguing that none of these concepts is wholly adequate for the purpose of this thesis. As a result of this, the chapter introduces the concept of the ‘principal party’ – parties that are the most important in their respective systems – in order to identify who the key players are; a list of which is provided. Having defined the concept of the principal party and identified principal parties in Western Europe between 1995 and

2017, the chapter turns its attention to the concepts of extreme and radical right parties. It engages in a brief review of the literature in order to establish a working definition for this thesis, before, again, identifying extreme and radical right parties that are relevant to this thesis.

4.2. Mainstream Parties

As noted, above, what makes defining the concept of 'mainstream' difficult is that very few scholars take the time to outline their definition. Often definitions are extremely short, tucked away in a footnote or in an easily missed sentence in the methods section of the study. There are even examples of studies that fail to provide any definition of the concept at all (e.g., Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016).

In addition, many scholars define the concept of mainstream – and also that of 'non-mainstream' – by reference to how the concept is operationalised. This can be by the parties' positioning in expert surveys, or their policy positions derived from the content analysis of their manifestos. For example, Meguid (2005, 2008) uses the Castles and Mair (1984) expert survey and defines mainstream parties as those that score between 1.25 and 3.75, and 6.25 and 8.75, while Norris (2005) makes use of the Lubbers 2000 expert survey and classifies radical right parties as those with a score of greater than 8.0. By contrast, Hino (2012) makes use of the Comparative Manifesto Project data and constructs a number of indices on which to position both New Politics Parties and Extreme Right Parties. While these authors provide clear details of how they have operationalised the concepts, and hence which parties are identified for analysis, what is nonetheless missing is a full discussion of what these concepts entail – i.e., what their content is.

A number of other scholars define the concept of mainstream by reference to party family (e.g., Abou-Chadi 2014), and point to which party families are to be considered mainstream. Those families that are most frequently seen as mainstream as the social democratic, the liberal, the conservative, and

the Christian Democratic ones. However, sometimes other families are also included as mainstream, be it the socialist and communist ones (Meguid 2005, 2008), the Green party family (Katz and Mair 2002), and even the radical right one (Katz and Mair 2002). The inclusion of so many families in the 'mainstream' category clearly has important consequences in that this category becomes very large and extremely diverse, and nearly nothing is left out of it. Furthermore, the fact that different scholars reach different conclusions as to which families should or should not be included in the mainstream category also presents difficulties.

Having said all of this, some authors do spend time discussing and defining the concept of 'mainstream'. For instance, Swenden and Toubreau (2013: 249) define mainstream parties as 'parties that represent one of the major ideologies of the state and that seek to gain polity-wide representation in elections across all levels of the state (federal or central, regional, municipal, etc.)'. Yet even though it is explicit, this definition is not without its problems. What constitutes a major ideology of the state is not explained, although one might hazard a guess that liberalism, social democracy, conservatism and the like, are considered major ideologies of the state. And if this is the case, then it raises the question of how different this definition actually is in practice from the party families approach mentioned above. The second element of the definition, which appears to point to some kind of relevance criterion, is also troublesome in that it implies that non-mainstream parties are not capable of gaining polity-wide representation across all levels of the state. This is clearly not the case; they are and regularly do.

4.3. Major and Minor Parties

By contrast, McDaid and Rekaewek (2010: 630) define a mainstream party as 'one that is often close to major party status, is a potential party of government, and not ideologically constrained from taking part in a coalition such as far-right or far-left parties often are'. They then go on to defer to Mair's (1991) conception of a major party as one that normally polls above 15 percent of the national vote.

By doing this, they therefore emphasise that major parties are defined by their size. Others have followed a similar approach. Indeed, Gerring (2005), Coakley (2010), and Copus et al. (2009) have all defined major party status by reference to size, although they express this in the form of the two, three, or four largest parties respectively, and then consider all other parties as minor.

Although simple, the approach does have some drawbacks. First, it means that minor parties are defined by a negative – that is, they are minor because they are not major. There is no reference to any other specific criteria that defines what ‘minor’ might constitute. Furthermore, the approach fails to appreciate elements of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ that are contained in the classical literature on political parties (Sartori 2005b; see also Kefford 2016). Indeed, within this literature the concepts of major and minor party relate not only to size but also to the relevance of the party in the party system. According to Sartori (2005b), a relevant party is one that possesses either coalition potential or blackmail potential. In other words, the party must be considered when a coalition is formed, or the party’s ‘existence or appearance affects the tactics of party competition’ (Sartori 2005b: 108).

Building on Sartori’s framework, Kefford (2016) proposes a distinction between major, minor, and ‘peripheral’ parties. Major parties are those that can regularly expect to form a government in their own right, or become the largest party in any coalition. This is an approach shared by Smith (2006) who argues that major parties are those that regularly achieve governmental inclusion. By contrast, minor parties are those parties that do not regularly expect to form a government in their own right or be the largest party in any coalition. They do, however, possess relevance in the party system, either through coalition potential or blackmail potential. Finally, peripheral parties are those parties that have no effect on the party system. While these parties may have parliamentary representation, they possess no coalition or blackmail potential.

However, while this typology has the advantage of distinguishing between major and minor parties based on how these parties affect the party system, it introduces a somewhat arbitrary element in its

inclusion of regular governmental participation. This, of course, raises the question of how frequent must participation in government be for a party to be considered major rather than minor?

Regardless of the exact nature of 'frequently', any party that regularly finds itself in government is more likely to have a moderate ideology, as a more moderate ideology would allow a party to participate in a wider range of possible coalitions. This, though, raises the question of what moderate actually means – as moderate can be difficult to define without reference to some arbitrary cut-off point based upon expert surveys or similar methodological approaches (such as the Manifesto Project). This carries the problem of putting quantification before concept formation (Sartori 1970). That being said, it is possible to suggest that nativism, racism, and other such ideological 'baggage' could exclude a party from being considered ideologically moderate. Though it should be noted that many parties of this type have participated in government and continue to do so.

4.4. Niche and Mainstream

In contrast to defining mainstream – or major and minor – parties by reference to their size and to the frequency with which they participate in government, a number of other scholars define the concept by focusing on the substance of politics, and on the issues or dimensions on which parties compete. In doing this, these authors (Wagner 2012; Meyer and Miller 2013; Meyer and Wagner 2013) juxtapose mainstream parties to niche parties.

The niche party concept was first introduced by Meguid (2005, 2008) in her seminal work on party competition. She considered niche parties to be parties that i) reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics; ii) raise novel issues that do not coincide with existing left-right dimensions of politics; iii) and are largely perceived as single-issue parties by voters and other parties. Other authors then simplified or added to her definition. For instance, Wagner (2012) introduced a simpler definition, suggesting that niche parties are those that focus on non-economic issues. This was

shorthand for arguing that niche parties concentrate on issues that are not dominant, but Wagner's specific identification of economic issues was problematic in that it rested on the assumption that the economy is the dominant issue everywhere, and would remain so. Indeed, Wagner himself noted the problem and pointed to a more general reformulation of the definition that focused on issues and/or dimensions often ignored by the majority of competitors in a party system rather than any specific dimension of competition. He noted (2012: 6):

The niche-party concept could arguably be rendered even more general if it referred to a 'main dimension' of political contestation instead of to economic ideology. The assumption in the proposed definition is that economic matters generally have primacy over other concerns, yet this need not be the case: party systems in some countries are defined more strongly by, for example, ethnic divisions.

Other scholars define the niche concept in other ways. For example, Adams et al. (2006), Ezrow (2010), and Ezrow et al. (2011) define niche parties by reference to party families, and argue that niche parties belong to ideologically extreme (communist and extreme right) or non-centrist (green) party families. This clearly represents quite a different approach to that of Meguid (2005, 2008) and Wagner (2012) in as much as the focus is no longer on the dominant dimension of competition. Instead, the focus is on the ideology of the parties, determined by party family, and the implicit argument is simply that if the ideology is extreme or non-centrist, then this constitutes a niche party.

This approach is problematic in so far as there can be a great deal of heterogeneity within party families. For instance, some Agrarian parties are essentially single-issue parties that focus on niche, non-economic issues, while others are quite conventional parties that have held prime ministerships in various European countries (Müller and Strøm 2000; Meyer and Miller 2013). For instance, Danish Venstre is an economically liberal catch-all party, while the Latvian Farmers' Union prioritises agricultural issues and draws its support primarily from farmers and rural workers (Nissinen 1999).

Similarly, Liberal parties can be quite distinct from one another: the German FDP heavily focuses on economic issues, while the Dutch Democrats '66 party was primarily concerned with political democratisation and later social (not economic) liberalism.

Either way, the practice of using party families to identify niche parties – as Adam et al. (2006), Ezrow (2010), and Ezrow et al. (2011) do – is the less common one, however, and most authors working in this field do make use of Meguid's definition or of subsequent ones that focus on whether or not parties compete on the dominant dimension of competition and the issues within this dimension. However, even with this relatively wide agreement that niche parties are those that compete on issues and dimensions that are neglected by their more mainstream counterparts, there remain problems in identifying niche parties. And this is because the whole definition rests on the salience of the dimensions of competition and the salience of issues.

Added to the fact that parties modify issue salience to maximise competitive advantage (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; see Chapter 2), Meyer and Wagner (2013) propose that parties can change their salience profiles and thus shift between niche and mainstream profiles. They argue that parties deliberately choose between these profiles due to strategic incentives and vote-seeking considerations. This means that niche parties could incorporate more issues into their programmes and thus become mainstream parties (as with the German Greens, arguably UKIP (Abedi and Lundberg 2009), and some ethno-territorial parties (see Elias 2009)) or that mainstream parties may seek to fill a more specific niche, such as with the Austrian Freedom Party, which shifted from a liberal-mainstream platform to a nationalist niche in the mid-1980s (Wagner 2012; Meyer and Wagner 2013).

Niche and mainstream can therefore be conceptualised as functions of issue emphasis. As a result, niche or mainstream status is a product of the attention that all relevant political parties pay to particular issues (or dimensions of competition), and not as a result of individual parties emphasising issues (or dimensions) independently of each other. Therefore, supposing that all relevant parties emphasise the main dimension of competition, and the relevant issues therein, then any party that

emphasises other dimensions of competition, and thus hitherto unaddressed issues, can be considered to be a niche party. By extension, if a mainstream party that has hitherto focused on the main dimension of competition (and those subsidiary issues) changes and now competes primarily on a secondary dimension of competition, and thus focuses on issues that have hitherto been ignored, then that party is considered to have transitioned from a mainstream to a niche status. Finally, supposing that a niche party maintains its focus upon secondary dimensions and issues, but that mainstream parties trespass onto this niche territory and focus their attention of these secondary dimensions and issues, the effect is the mainstreaming of these issues and dimensions, and thus the niche party loses its niche status and is considered to be a mainstream party as its issue emphasis no longer reflects a niche profile. Should the niche party wish to remain niche, therefore, it would need to adjust its programmatic profile to emphasise those issues that do not receive widespread attention from other political parties.

Meyer and Miller (2013) argue that the mainstream-niche dichotomy should not be considered a dichotomy at all. Rather, they argue that mainstream and niche represent extreme poles on a single continuum or spectrum. Here, if all parties emphasise the exact same issues as the average party (determined by the mean, weighted average of all party emphases in that system⁹) then it corresponds to the ideal-typical mainstream party (Meyer and Miller 2013: 262). By contrast, if a party emphasises issues that are completely neglected by its rivals, then it is considered to be an ideal-typical niche party (Meyer and Miller 2013). While useful, this approach does raise the question of how one actually distinguishes between mainstream and niche parties. Yes, we can determine their overall mainstreamness or nicheness, but at what point can we categorically declare that a party is mainstream or niche? Put simply, the focus upon continuums or spectrums, while useful, serves to ignore that mainstream and niche represent different classes of parties. While the spectrum might help us operationalise our definition of mainstream and niche, without clear boundaries between each

⁹ The exact calculation for this is described in Appendix A.

class, we cannot categorise parties as either mainstream or niche. Therefore, any continuum or spectrum must be intra-class, that is, we have two distinct classes of parties, but that within each class, we can have degrees of that class. Perhaps an obvious example is that of the pregnant woman. While she can be more (8 months) or less (3 months) pregnant, the fact remains that throughout she is pregnant. Thus, class comes before degree (Sartori 1970: 1038). Applied to our concept, then, a niche party can be more or less niche but must be first categorised as niche; and the same for mainstream, and the other concepts that we have considered here.

4.5. Establishment and Anti-Establishment

An alternative dichotomy for differentiating political parties is that of the establishment and anti-establishment party. The approach of Schedler (1996) and Abedi (2002, 2004) have been grouped together owing to their shared use of the same terms rather than their approach to defining those terms.

For Schedler (1996), this dichotomy exists as a result of a specific societal cleavage or conflict between the rulers on the one hand and the ruled on the other. While this cleavage can often be expressed through various terminology, such as the elite versus the common man, or the political class versus the people, the core message is the same: public officials and politicians form an 'anti-popular coalition', that is, they are a political class distinguishable from everyone else (Schedler 1996: 294). Abedi (2002, 2004) defines establishment parties as those parties that have i) participated in government or that other parties regard as suitable partners for coalition; ii) expressed a willingness to cooperate with other parties in terms of coalition. By contrast, anti-establishment are considered to be all those parties that fulfil three criteria: firstly, the party perceives itself to be a challenger to establishment parties. Secondly, that the party asserts that a fundamental divide exists between the establishment or political class (or whatever term is preferred) and the people (again, whatever preferred term) and while also implying that the establishment parties are essentially the same (Abedi

2002; 2004) or that they form some form of cartel (Schedler 1996; see also Katz and Mair 1995). Finally, and similarly to Meguid and others, that it introduces new or neglected issues.

While a useful heuristic or starting point, this approach does suffer from a conceptual boundary problem in as much as some radical right parties fulfil the criteria to be considered an anti-establishment party and yet still participate in government or confidence and supply arrangements. Thus, put simply, the two definitions are not exclusive, and thus some parties could hold joint membership in each category. Borrowing from Schedler instead, then, the essential characteristic of the anti-establishment party, be they 'new politics', left libertarian, green, populist, or right-wing radical, is a rejection of the existing system without breaching into anti-democracy. Indeed, anti-establishment political parties adopt similar language to the anti-authoritarian movements of old and frame their criticisms within the context of perceived democratic decay (Schedler 1996).

4.6. Summary of Concept Definitions

The following then considers in turn each of the concepts that have been explored above. Each is visualised as classes and degrees, with an accompanying explanation of how these concepts operate and relate to each other.

4.6.1. Mainstream and Niche

Following Meyer and Miller (2013), Meyer and Wagner (2013), and Wagner (2012), it is proposed that mainstream and niche represent the focus of party profiles. That is, the more 'commonly-owned' issues that the party focuses on, the more mainstream that party is, while the more 'neglected' issues that the party focuses on, the more niche that party is.

4.6.2. Major, Minor, and Peripheral

Following Kefford (2016), and thus building on Sartori (2005), what distinguishes major, minor, and peripheral parties is size and relevance. Major parties are those that regularly form a government in their own right or as the largest party within any coalition. Minor parties are those parties that do not

expect regular governmental inclusion nor expect to be the largest party in any coalition. Peripheral parties will usually be exceptionally small in size, often failing to gain parliamentary representation, or holding only a few seats. Thus, what separates minor and peripheral is the Sartorian (2005) notion of relevance. That is, they possess blackmail or coalition potential (see above).

Given this then, major, minor, and peripheral are to be operationalised as such: a major party is any party with 15 percent of the vote or over. A minor party is any party that scores below 15 percent of the vote and above 5 percent of the vote or polls between 1 and 5 percent of the vote but has regular government participation. A peripheral party is any party that polls below 5 percent of the vote and has no history of governmental participation.

4.6.3. Establishment, Anti-Establishment, and Anti-System

Building on Schedler (1996), anti-establishment parties, be they 'new politics', left libertarian, green, populist, or right-wing radical, reject the existing political system without breaching into anti-democracy. As Schedler (1996) argues, anti-establishment parties often adopt language similar to that of historical anti-authoritarian movements and tend to frame their critiques in the context of perceived democratic decay. By contrast, anti-system parties – which are discussed further below – are those that outright reject the system in which they operate and are thus considered (explicitly) anti-democratic.

4.6.4. Moderate and Non-Moderate

Moderate and centrist ideologies are to be operationalised using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2014, 2017) survey. Parties can be categorised as moderate left (scoring between 1.25 and 3.75), centre (scoring between 3.76 and 6.24), moderate right (scoring between 6.25 and 8.75) and non-moderate (scoring between 0 and 1.24 and 8.76 and 10) on the general left-right dimension. Given that the labels radical and extremist have specific ideological meanings in this thesis (see below), scores outside of the moderate ranges of the general left-right dimension are not considered inherently extremist or radical, merely non-moderate.

The concepts discussed above – major and minor, moderate and non-moderate, establishment, anti-establishment and anti-system, and mainstream and niche – all offer useful ways to identify different types of parties. However, as has been shown, these concepts also suffer from a number of problems, or throw up a number of challenges, and some of these are particularly pertinent for this thesis. That is, this thesis is primarily concerned with competition between, for want of a better term for the moment, ‘main’ party actors, and actors from the radical right. And yet some of the concept presented above that seek to capture these ‘main’ actors would include parties of the radical right. Indeed, some radical right parties (e.g., the FPÖ or the Lega) would fall into the major party category by virtue of their size and/or the frequency with which they have participated in government. Others might easily breach the arbitrary cut off point on any moderate-non-moderate spectrum. And others could well end up being defined as mainstream instead of niche given their emphasis of issues that belong to the dominant dimension of competition. For all these reasons then, a different concept is used in this thesis to differentiate between the ‘main’ parties and those of the radical right, and a different term is proposed, namely that of ‘principal parties’.

4.7. Principal Parties

The concept used in this thesis is that of the ‘principal party’. It is a concept derived from the other concepts discussed above, and is one that brings together some of the characteristics or elements of each. As such, it could be considered a portmanteau concept, by virtue of the fact that it blends together a number of concepts.

Principal parties are most important, traditional, party actors in any given system and are recognised by three characteristics. Firstly, they are economically mainstream. In practice, these parties advance economic policies that are broadly comparable to other mainstream parties. In other words, principal parties tend to coalesce around similar economic positions, notwithstanding specific differences in the implementation of those economic positions (for instance, a social democratic and conservative

party might both advance a commitment to the market, even if in the specifics, there are slight variations). Secondly, they are considered to be major parties. In other words, they are sufficiently large parties that regularly poll above 15 percent of the vote and can be expected to participate, regularly, in government. Thirdly, they have a moderate ideological profile. That is, they are not weighed down by ideological baggage or commitments such as nativism, racism, or anti-systemness.

It will be noticed that this concept of the principal party does not include any mention of whether or not these parties compete on the cultural dimension of competition, or whether they compete on other dimensions too, and hence whether they address salient issues only or also more neglected ones. In other words, this definition does not encompass this definition does not encompass the core definition of mainstream parties, as contained in the mainstream-niche literature, with regard to secondary dimensions of competition. This is because of the changing saliency of the secondary dimension and issues therein, as well as the fact that some of the core parties in any given system, especially social democratic parties, regularly express niche or perfectly average profiles on the cultural dimension the saliency of secondary dimensions and issues change over time, yet this need not change who the core players are.¹⁰

The term 'principal' is chosen to denote parties that conform to this definition. The term's common meaning is "a person or thing as first in order of importance" (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.; Collins Dictionary n.d.), and this fits well with the three characteristics just presented.

Naturally, which parties are considered principal parties can and does change over time. Parties can cease to be principal ones if they cease to possess any of the three characteristics listed above. They can stop being principal ones if their economic policies cease being mainstream; if their electoral fortunes wane so much that they no longer poll sizeable shares of the vote and thus fail to be frequent

¹⁰ The cultural dimension here having been created through the Comparative Manifesto Codes for Traditional Morality, Multiculturalism, and National Way of Life. The principal parties that express 'perfectly average' or niche profiles on this dimension are as followed: Norwegian Labour Party, Finnish Social Democrats, Flemish Socialist Party, Italian Democratic Party, Swiss Social Democratic Party, the Austrian Social Democratic Party, and the British Liberal Democratic Party.

partners in government; and if their overall ideology ceases to be moderate. Indeed, as is regularly observed with many social democratic principal parties in Western Europe, this traditionally dominant family is in what appears to be terminal decline. Overtime, therefore, it seems possible – perhaps even likely – that a number of social democratic parties are likely to cease to be principal parties as their vote share continues to decline.

The advantage of the principal party concept, then, is in its clear identification of relevant and important political parties that, hitherto, have been among the most important parties in their respective systems. Furthermore, it provides the vehicle by which these parties can be adequately differentiated from the radical right; a family of parties that have become, in recent years, increasingly important in their respective systems. And finally, it does not depend on the saliency of dimensions or issues, which makes it better than the concept mainstream, as is used in the mainstream-niche literature. The concept of the principal party is therefore more appropriate for the task at hand.

Table 4.1 lists all those parties contained within the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset, between 1995 and 2017, that meet the definition established above for categorisation as principal parties.¹¹ In a number of cases, owing to name changes, party reformation, mergers, and the like, some of the parties listed below are inclusive of previous iterations of that party or functional equivalents (such as the dominant party in any merger). These parties (tagged with an asterisk (*) in the table) have been treated as single, continuous organisations to simplify the analytical aspects of this thesis. Table 4.1 also reports the average vote of each party in the time period, as well as its placement on the left-right spectrum.

¹¹ The Norwegian Progress Party could be classified as a principal party in that it is a major party, having polled an average of 16.25 percent of the vote, is considered a moderate-right party (as operationalised by manifesto data), and has a mainstream economic profile. What excludes the Progress Party from inclusion within the principal party family, however, is its anti-systemness (see below). This raises the prospect that borderline cases such as the Progress Party might soon become fully-fledged principal parties (see Ignazi 2006: 256).

Table 4.1: Principal parties in western Europe, 1995-2017.

Country	Party Name	Abbrev.	Avr. Vote	Placement
Austria	Austrian Social Democratic Party	SPÖ	32.62	Centre
Austria	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP	30.12	Centre
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	S	29.29	Centre
Denmark	Liberals	V	26.76	Moderate Right
Finland	Finnish Social Democrats	SDP	23.04	Centre
Finland	National Coalition	KOK	19.91	Moderate Right
Finland	Finnish Centre	KESK	21.77	Centre
Flanders, Belgium*	New Flemish Alliance	NVA	18.78	Moderate Right
Flanders, Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Open VLD	24.40	Moderate Right
Flanders, Belgium	Socialist Party Differently	SP.A	20.85	Moderate Left
Flanders, Belgium	Christian Democratic and Flemish	CD&V	20.99	Moderate Right
France	Socialist Party	PS	21.89	Moderate Left
France	Republic Onwards!	LREM	28.21	Centre
France	The Republicans	LR	23.74	Moderate Right
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD	31.33	Centre
Germany	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU	36.93	Centre
Great Britain	Labour Party	Lab	36.12	Centre
Great Britain	Liberal Democrats	LD	16.16	Centre
Great Britain	Conservative Party	Con	36.00	Moderate Right
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	Syriza	35.90	Moderate Left
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	29.03	Centre
Greece	New Democracy	ND	34.39	Moderate Right
Italy	Democratic Party	PD	21.28	Moderate Left
Italy	Five Star Movement	M5S	25.56	Centre
Italy	Go Italy / People of Freedom	FI / PdL	26.52	Moderate Right
Netherlands	Labour Party	PvdA	20.84	Centre
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD	20.13	Moderate Right
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	19.77	Centre
Norway	Labour Party	A/Ap	32.52	Moderate Left
Norway	Conservative Party	H	18.45	Moderate Right
Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party	SAP	36.36	Moderate Left
Sweden	Moderate Coalition Party	M	23.36	Moderate Right
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	SP	20.44	Moderate Left
Switzerland	FDP.The Liberals	FDP	15.75	Moderate Right
Wallonia, Belgium	Socialist Party	PS	40.78	Moderate Left
Wallonia, Belgium	Reform Movement	MR	37.77	Moderate Right
Wallonia, Belgium	Ecologists	Ecolo	17.10	Moderate Left

Notes: Fuller details on those parties that have undergone name changes, reformation or mergers, with previous iterations included in parenthesis: Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Flemish Liberals and Democrats, Party of Liberty and Progress); Christian Democratic and Flemish (Christian People's Party); The Republicans (Union for Presidential Majority, Union for a Popular Movement, Rally for the Republic); Democratic Party (Democratic Party of the Left, Olive Tree); Go Italy (People of Freedom); Socialist Party

Different (Flemish Socialist Party, Socialist Party Different - Spirit).

* Flanders and Wallonia have been treated as distinct party systems. This was achieved by adding the vote shares of the Flemish parties for the provinces of Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, Vlaams-Brabant, and West-Vlaanderen to create a Flemish party system. For Wallonia, the same process was followed for the provinces of Brabant Wallon, Hainaut, Liège, Luxembourg, and Namur. Given that both Flemish and Walloon parties compete in Brussels, it was determined that the votes gained in Brussels from Flemish and Walloon parties would be divided by two and then added to their provincial totals.

4.8. Extreme and Radical Right Parties

Within the literature on extreme or radical right parties, it has become almost customary for researchers to begin any study with a declaration that there is no agreement among scholars on what to call these parties or how to define them. In fact, even the briefest survey of the literature reveals an abundance of terms to describe what is essentially the same set or class of parties. These labels include, but are not limited to: extreme right, far right, radical right, nativist, ethno-nationalist, fascist, reactionary tribalist, anti-partyist, anti-immigrant and many variants of populist (Carter 2005: 21; Mudde 2007). However, while there is little agreement over what to call these parties, there is more agreement over how to define these parties than is often assumed (Carter 2018). The purpose of this section is to outline the definition of extreme and radical right that will be employed within this thesis. This definition, employing the works of Carter and Mudde, creates two separate but related classes of parties: the extreme right and the radical right.

Throughout the literature on the extreme and/or radical right, authors have advanced a number of definitions that centre on the rejection of the established socio-cultural and/or socio-political system (Betz 1993; 1994), on anti-democracy (Carter 2005; 2018), on the mobilisation of xenophobic sentiments against immigrants (Husbands 1981; Kitschelt 2007), on the myth of a homogenous nation (Minkenberg 2000, 2017), and on nativist or nationalistic ideology (Eatwell 2000; Mudde 2007; Zaslove 2009). In his influential study, Mudde (1996) found no fewer than 58 features that contributed to defining the extreme or radical right, of which, five were mentioned in over half of the definitions. These are: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state.

As Carter (2005) notes, there are two problems to Mudde's (1996) approach of defining the extreme and/or radical right by seeing which features appear most regularly. Firstly, not all parties that are routinely considered extreme right share all these attributes. Indeed, Mudde himself acknowledged this in his 1995 article *Right-wing extremism analysed*. In looking at the ideology of the Austrian National Democratic Party (NDP), the Dutch Centre Party '86 (CP'86), and the National Democratic Party (NPD) of Germany, Mudde concluded that only one of these parties, the Austrian NDP, possessed all five features. The strong state aspect was missing from the CP'86, while anti-democracy was missing from both the CP'86 and German NPD.

Secondly, while routinely mentioned, these features do not necessarily define the concept of extreme and/or radical right party. Rather, they only permit intra-class categorisation. In concept formation, in order to advance an accurate definition of a concept, we need to first ascertain and identify those attributes that form necessary and/or sufficient conditions that define the boundaries of the concept (Sartori 1970; Gerring 1999; Goertz 2006). An important aspect of this procedure is the identification of taxonomic categories that represent appropriately the level of abstraction at which we wish to operate. Higher order classes represent more generalised and thus more abstract categories, and therefore require fewer necessary and/or sufficient conditions, while lower order classes, which represent more specific categories, require more necessary and/or sufficient conditions (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993; O'Kane 1993; Goertz 2006; Mair 2008). In regard to the definition put forward by Mudde (1996), four of the five regularly featured characteristics identified are in fact manifestations of a higher order concept, namely anti-democratic sentiment (Carter 2005; 2018). And indeed, the same applies to many of the other attributes identified by the other authors highlighted above. All this underlines the importance of identifying the level of abstraction at which we wish to operate, and of identifying necessary, rather than possible characteristics in coming up with an accurate definition of the extreme and/or radical right.¹² The importance of doing this is succinctly

¹² While the taxonomical approach to concept formation considers necessary and sufficient conditions, research into the extreme or radical right has tended to focus on necessary and possible conditions, while

captured by Carter (2005: 15) who points out that that while a racist party might well be an extreme right party, not all extreme right parties are racist.

Thus, in order to advance an accurate definition of the extreme and radical right, we need to first identify those features or attributes that are necessary to defining the concept of the extreme and/or radical right, while avoiding those attributes that do nothing to delineate it from other concepts. By way of example, consider the attributes populism and neoliberalism, both of which have been applied to the extreme or radical right (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2007; among others). While these attributes might help us distinguish between parties within the extreme and/or radical right party family, they do nothing to actually define the party family itself. Both populism and neoliberalism can be found within the new right parties of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and therefore fail to delineate between new right and extreme or radical right (Minkenberg 2000). As Carter (2005: 15) again rightly argues:

To get closer to identifying the defining features of right-wing extremism – that is, features that are common to *all* right-wing extremist parties – and to make out which parties belong to an extreme right party family, it is therefore important to focus on necessary features of right-wing extremism rather than on possible ones. Possible features only become important later on, when the extreme right party family is subdivided in some way or another.

In this vein then, Carter (2005) argues that the two necessary conditions by which we can adequately define the extreme right family are: anti-democratic sentiment and rejection of fundamental human equality. The former reflects the extremeness of these parties, and Carter (2005: 16) borrows from

ignoring sufficient conditions. This is not necessarily a deficiency, however, and there are good reasons for doing this, namely that none of the attributes or conditions put forward define the concept *sufficiently* – i.e., they are coupled together with other attributes or conditions.

Backes and Moreau (cited in Roberts 1994: 463) in conceiving of democracy as ‘fundamental values (human rights), procedures and institutions (free, equal, direct and secret elections; party competition; pluralism; parliamentarism; a state based on the rule of law; separation of powers) of the democratic constitutional state’. The second condition relates to the party’s right-wingness (Carter 2005: 17)

This approach to defining right-wing is particularly useful in that the extreme and/or radical right tend to compete on the non-economic dimension (Rovny 2012) and thus defining right-wing by reference to economics is unhelpful (Mudde 2007: 25; Carter 2018: 151).

The emphasis that Carter places on these parties’ rejection of democracy is put under pressure somewhat in her subsequent typology of extreme right parties. One category of this typology includes parties that are supposedly anti-democratic in nature but nonetheless advocate ‘more democracy and less state’ (2005: 42). Carter (2005: 47) acknowledges this herself, and recognises that the attitudes of these parties call into question their inclusion in the wider extreme right party family:

A third group of contemporary West European right-wing extremist parties also calls for significant reform of the existing democratic order, but unlike the second group of parties just discussed, parties in this third group believe that existing democratic institutions and procedures make for too little democracy rather than too much. In particular, parties of this third group are critical of the established parliamentary system and of the existing parties for not representing citizens adequately, and they call for substantial reforms to address these issues. Parties in this third group also favour a reduction (rather than a strengthening) of the role and reach of the state. They also differ from the first two groups of parties in that they do not maintain that individual rights and freedoms should be subordinated to the greater national interest.

A cursory reading of this category would suggest that parties that advocate less state and more democracy could not possibly be considered extreme right. After all, how can a party that advocates more democracy be anti-democratic? For Carter – and Ignazi (2003), from whom she draws – the answer is that these parties have a delegitimising impact upon the systems in which they operate. That is, these parties have a strained relationship with the more liberal, substantive aspects of modern democracy, rather than the procedural aspects. For instance, while the Danish Progress Party ‘never made a full-frontal attack on democracy by invoking authoritarian solutions, they certainly undermined the system’s legitimacy, not just by displaying contempt towards the parties and politicians, but by also considering them useless, backward, and even harmful’ (Ignazi 2003: 148). Thus, for Carter and Ignazi, these parties display anti-systemic qualities that are ‘sufficient to undermine the legitimacy of that state’ and thus while ‘their anti-systemness is less strong than that of some of the other right-wing extremist parties [they] nonetheless display contempt ... for the democratic system’ (Carter 2005: 53-54) and can therefore be reasonably considered to be extreme right parties.

It is worth acknowledging two points, however. Firstly, while many of these parties express a significant degree of anti-systemness or anti-pluralism, this has not prevented them from taking part in coalitions or confidence and supply arrangements in a variety of West European countries. Secondly, while many of these parties seek to devalue many democratic institutions through an enhancement of personalised leadership-oriented institutions, such as a presidencies or governorships, or through greater use of direct democracy, other parties, such as the Austrian FPÖ, seek to enhance the powers of national parliaments vis-à-vis the executive (Mudde 2007: 154). Thus, while these parties display anti-systemic qualities, their relationship to the systems in which they operate is often quite complex. The bottom line is that it is not entirely clear that these parties will undermine the system in which they operate, and often times, they have raised ‘legitimate democratic issues’ that have been ignored by conventional political parties (Eatwell 2000: 142).

The existence of this third category reveals a complex relationship between these parties and democracy, and between those parties that are explicitly anti-democratic, and those that actually advocate more democracy but present a challenge to the more *liberal* aspects of modern democracy, including pluralism (Mudde 2000, 2007, 2010; Betz and Johnson 2004; Kitschelt 2007; Zaslove 2009; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Minkenberg 2017). Borrowing from Carter (2018) – whose definition is a synthesis of Sartori (1987: 92), Collier and Levitsky (1997: 434), and Diamond and Morlino (2004: 20-31) – democracy can be conceived of as a concept with two core components. The first concerns a procedural definition of democracy defined as ‘fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association’ (Carter 2018: 170). The second concerns the substance of democracy and ‘includes a belief in the value of diversity and hence tolerance of difference (i.e., pluralism), the principle of political equality ..., and the valuing of, and respect for, civil and political freedoms’ (Carter 2018: 170).

Mudde (2007) distinguish between extreme and radical right parties on this basis and conceives of the extreme right as those parties that reject democracy in its entirety (its procedures and its substance), while he defines the radical right as a rejection of the substance of democracy only – that is, the rejection of all or part of the liberal values that underpin modern democracy. Therefore, unlike the extreme right, the radical right accepts the procedures of modern representative democracy.

Given these definitions, parties of the extreme or radical right will not be identified here by making use of data from expert surveys or manifestos. This is because this data does not reflect the parties’ attitudes towards democracy (procedures or substance) and the system in which they operate. Instead, this data focuses on policy, be it on the overall left-right dimension or on specific policy issues. Indeed, some of these parties sometimes embrace rather moderate policy on certain issues.

Table 4.2 lists those parties that are considered to be radical or extreme right parties, drawn from the relevant literature, on the basis of their attitudes towards the procedures and values of liberal

democracy. Table 4.2 does not include an exhaustive list of all radical and extreme right parties across the relevant cases, but rather, includes a list of radical and extreme right parties that are included within the analysis. The exclusion of any radical or extreme right parties, such as the French MNR, the Dutch CD and CP'86, and the Swiss FPS, is as a result of a lack of data (see Chapter 5) regarding principal party strategies. Table 4.2 therefore only reports those parties that feature, in some form, in the analytical stages of this thesis.

Of course, some extreme and radical right parties are borderline cases whose inclusion within Table 4.2 would be contested and therefore requires some justification. These parties are: The Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Pim Fortuyn List, and the Finns Party. While each of these borderline cases accept the procedures of democracy and none has criticised or attacked democratic systems of government, or advocated overtly authoritarian solutions, each has, to varying degrees, undermined the legitimacy of the system in which they operate, have advocated anti-system or anti-constitutional positions, or have expressed and embraced xenophobic attitudes, and have thereby rejected the principle of fundamental human equality.

The Norwegian Progress Party is sometimes discounted from studies of the radical right (see Ignazi 2006; Mudde 2007). Yet, as Ignazi argues, 'opposition to the basic values of Norwegian society, supplemented by its contempt for the political system and politics in general, and its propensity for authoritarian forms of social conflict management, including a xenophobic penchant, portray a party that undermines the system's legitimacy and is, in Sartori's terms, an 'anti-system' party' (Ignazi 2003: 157). Indeed, the Norwegian Progress Party expressed a clear xenophobia towards both Muslims and the Sami peoples of the north (Downs 2001; Bergmann 2017). While the Norwegian Progress Party has toned down some of its original propensity for authoritarianism, and adopted a more centrist profile, it has maintained its anti-immigration and anti-establishment elements (Jungar and Jupskås 2014; Jupskås 2016).

The United Kingdom Independence Party, originally conceived of as a hard Eurosceptic movement party, has been considered by a number of scholars to be a radical right party (e.g., Ford and Goodwin 2014; Gruber and Bale 2014; Webb and Bale 2014; Pareschi and Albertini 2016). Like the Progress Parties of Scandinavia, UKIP has a delegitimising influence on the party system. It portrays the principal parties as a homogenous block, the 'LibLabCon', whose policies are totally indistinguishable from one another, and thus appeals to the public to 'sod the lot' (Pareschi and Albertini 2016: 7). Equally, the party has appealed to voters on the basis that 'ordinary people are being sold out by an out-of-touch political elite' (Geddes 2014: 29) and in doing so have undermined the system's legitimacy by displaying contempt towards other parties and politicians (see Ignazi 2003). UKIP advocated a number of democratic reforms that would have reduced the power of parliament while empowering the people directly, such as through 'Swiss-styled referenda', and coupled this with exclusionary, often xenophobic, policies and rhetoric around immigration, immigrants, and refugees (Ford and Goodwin 2014). This trend reached a pinnacle under the leadership of Gerald Batton (2018-2019) who made clear overtures to a number of radical right individuals in British politics, including the founder of the English Defence League, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (also known as Tommy Robinson), and ratcheted up the anti-Muslim rhetoric.

The Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) also combined a mix of anti-systemic beliefs and rhetoric alongside xenophobic pronouncements against targeted minority groups. The LPF displayed a certain hostility and distrust of conventional parties, criticising the 'closed circuit of the Hague with its incestuous political elite', while denouncing the old parties and politics as elitist and undemocratic (Akkerman 2005). As with the parties above, this anti-systemic bent was tied to anti-Muslim prejudices, with Pim Fortuyn once stating that he would, if legally permissible, ban Muslims from entering the Netherlands (Akkerman 2005). Fortuyn feared that the Islamisation of the Netherlands would destroy Dutch culture and freedom, suppress individual autonomy, and undo the emancipation of women and homosexuals (Akkerman 2005). On the constitutional front, Fortuyn advocated the removal of Article 1 of the Dutch constitution, a provision for the prevention of discrimination, on the basis that it

infringes upon individual freedom of speech/expression (Akkerman 2005). This thus qualified it as undermining the democratic system and hence belonging to the radical right family.

Like the other parties listed above, the Finns Party combines strong anti-establishment rhetoric and messaging with equally strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies. A central pillar of the party's anti-establishment appeal is the juxtaposition of the good, ordinary people against the corrupt and unresponsive elite (Bergmann 2017). Indeed, the Finns Party regularly positions itself against the 'rotten gentlemen' – 'corrupt, wheeling and dealing politicians' and the 'theoretical gentlemen' – isolated, ivory tower academics with no sense of the real world (Jungar 2016: 125) – and presents all alternatives as a monopoly or cartel that suppresses any differing viewpoint; and in doing so, fundamentally undermines the system in which they operate. This is coupled with a hostility towards minorities both external – immigrants, particularly Muslims – and internal – the Sami people and Swedish-speaking minority (Jungar 2016; Bergmann 2017). Thus, while the Finns Party does firmly support the democratic institutions and processes of the Finnish state, its rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality is sufficient for it to be included within the radical right party family.

Table 4.2: Radical and extreme right Parties in western Europe, 1995-2017.

Country	Party	Abbrev.	Extreme or radical?
Austria	Freedom Party	FPÖ	Radical
	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	Radical
Flanders, Belgium	Flemish Interest (née Blok)	VB	Radical
Denmark	People's Party	DF	Radical
	Progress Party	FrP	Radical
Finland	(True) Finns Party (since 2003)	PS	Radical
France	National Front	FN	Radical
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD	Extreme
	Alternative for Germany	AfD	Radical
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	Radical
	Independent Greeks	ANEL	Radical
Italy	(Northern) League	LN	Radical
Netherlands	Pim Fortuyn List (ceased 2008)	LPF	Radical
	Party for Freedom	PVV	Radical
Norway	Progress Party	FrP	Radical
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (since 1995)	SD	Radical
Switzerland	People's Party	SVP	Radical
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party (since 2001)	UKIP	Radical
Wallonia, Belgium	National Front	FN	Radical

4.9. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to first define and then identify the key players or parties relevant to this thesis. The chapter achieved this by engaging with the scholarly literature that deals with the defining of the relevant concepts. Having determined that none of the concepts defined are totally appropriate for this thesis, this chapter introduced the concept of the 'principal party' – parties that are first in order of importance in their respective systems – and set about listing which parties in each country case is considered a principal party and therefore relevant to this thesis. Having done this, the chapter then turned its attention to the defining of extreme and radical right parties. It engaged with the relevant scholarly literature in order to arrive at a minimal definition based on parties' attitudes to the substantive and procedural dimensions of democracy. With a definition arrived at, the chapter once again identified the relevant extreme and radical right parties.

This chapter therefore represents the end of the theoretical groundwork required for this thesis. Chapter 2 introduced a new model of competition with a reputational dimension, Chapter 3 focused on factors that would influence the types of strategies that parties might choose, and this chapter, Chapter 4, has defined and identified the relevant players. With the theoretical groundwork accomplished, Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach of this thesis.

5. Research Design and Methods

5.1. Introduction

It should be recalled that the purpose of this thesis is to understand the competitive relationship between principal parties on the one hand and radical right parties on the other. More specifically, the thesis poses three related questions:

- I. What strategies do principal parties adopt against radical right competitors?
- II. How successful are these strategies in terms of reducing radical right vote share?
- III. Is there a 'silver bullet' that can be employed against the radical right?

In order to answer these questions, this thesis will employ a set-theoretic multi-method research design, that will be conducted in two distinct stages. The first will consist of an extensive stage that will employ multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), while the second, an intensive stage, will consist of case studies. The inclusion of case studies post QCA allows for the verification (or refutation) and evaluation of results produced during the QCA analysis. Indeed, this multi-method approach is recommended as a good standard of practice within the QCA community (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

Before proceeding to outline the way in which mvQCA has been employed, it is first worth considering set-theoretic methods and QCA generally, so as to understand the value-added of mvQCA for this thesis.

5.2. Set Theoretic Methods and Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Set-theoretic methods are a group of methods that share three characteristics. Firstly, they make use of data that is calibrated as set-membership scores. That is, any data of interest must be recalibrated

from its current state to that of full, partial, or full non-membership of the relevant set. Consider, for example, whether or not Turkey is a European country. If it is determined that European countries are defined by a shared Christian heritage, or denominations therein, then Turkey would receive a membership score of 0 in the set 'European religion/Christianity'. By contrast, Turkey might receive a set membership score of 0.33 in the set 'European location', indicating that while some of Turkey is geographically within Europe, most of it is not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

Secondly, relations between social phenomena are conceptualised as set-relations rather than correlations (Wagemann and Schneider 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Thus, while causal inference in regression analytical methods tend to structure solution terms as 'the more of X, the more of Y', or 'the less of X, the less of Y', or even 'the more of X, the less of Y', in set-theoretic methods a solution term would take the form 'if X, then Y'. For example, consider the claim that all NATO members are democracies. This observation is a set-relational statement as 'NATO members' and 'democracies' both represent sets containing different cases. As all NATO members must be (nominally) democracies, the set 'NATO members' is considered a subset of 'democracies' (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

Thirdly, set-relations are interpreted with reference to notions of sufficiency and necessity (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Legewie 2013). A necessary condition is one that is necessary for the outcome to occur. Therefore, no matter the number of causal paths to the outcome, the necessary condition must be present. By contrast, a sufficient condition is one which is *sufficient* for the outcome to occur but not *necessary*. This means that while the sufficient condition causes the outcome to occur, other conditions may do so as well.¹³

¹³ In addition to necessary and sufficient conditions, set-relations can also be interpreted by their more complex modifications, namely INUS and SUIN conditions. An INUS condition is one that is 'an *insufficient* but *necessary* part of a condition which is itself *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the result' (Mackie 1965: 246). INUS conditions are essential components of a configuration of conditions that is sufficient for the outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012: 25). A SUIN condition is a 'sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but *necessary* for the result' (Mahoney et al. 2009: 126). It is worth noting that INUS and SUIN make reference to more than a single condition. The first two letters in INUS capture the properties of a single condition while

QCA distinguishes itself from other set-theoretical methods – such as Mill’s classical methods of difference and agreement, explanatory typologies, and coincidence analysis – through its emphasis on causal interpretation as well as its employment of Boolean truth tables and minimisation. With few exceptions (e.g., Elman 2005; George and Bennett 2005), other set-theoretical methods tend not to focus on causal complexity, or even on outcome conditions (as is often the case with typologies), and none employs truth tables to aid the visualisation and analysis of causal complexity (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The core feature of QCA, then, is that it seeks to model social reality in terms of set relations, by reference to necessary and sufficient conditions, and that it is these conditions, perhaps in combination, that explain social phenomena. Indeed, the notion of causal complexity or equifinality – the idea that outcomes are produced through a configuration or combination of conditions and that different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome – is essential to QCA (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Rohling 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012)

It should be noted, however, that while a combination of conditions might explain the outcome, these same conditions do not necessarily explain its complement, i.e., the non-outcome. Set-relations, then, are considered *asymmetric* (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

This notion of asymmetry has some interesting consequences for the subject of this thesis. For instance, Meguid (2005, 2008) argues that the accommodative strategy, when employed by a mainstream party, should result in vote loss for the radical right party. For Meguid, then, the presence of cases where:

- I. the accommodative strategy has been employed but the mainstream party has not benefited electorally;

the latter two refer to the properties of a configuration of conditions. By contrast, the first two letters in SUIN refer to conceptual issues – that is, the attributes that make up a condition – while the latter two refer to the causal pattern (Rohlfing 2012: 58-59).

II. the mainstream party has benefited electorally from non-accommodative strategies

serves to undermine the theory as it weakens the correlation between condition and outcome. By contrast, for QCA, the presence of deviant cases – cases that deviate from theoretical expectations – does not undermine the hypothesis but rather indicates the presence of other causal paths to the outcome or even the asymmetry of causal paths. In other words, an accommodative strategy could lead to radical right vote loss when combined with other strategies (conditions) and lead to radical right vote gain when combined with others. The nature of causal complexity, then, is that '[p]arts are not viewed in isolation but in context of the whole they form. To change one or more elements often changes how the whole is perceived or understood, which, in turn, has an impact on the meaning of each individual part' (Ragin 2014: 23). Indeed, this is one of the strongest advantages of QCA: its natural capacity for dealing with causal complexity, such that Vaisey (2014) refers to QCA as 'complexity-oriented'. While there have been attempts to address equifinality in conventional quantitative methods (e.g., Braumoeller 2003), these approaches have often required stringent data requirements – very large-n – or have produced 'convoluted likelihood functions' (Vis 2012).¹⁴ Therefore, while it is technically possible to incorporate equifinality into conventional quantitative methods, the procedure is often far more cumbersome when compared to QCA (Vis 2012).

In addition, QCA handles issues of limited diversity quite well. Limited diversity is the QCA-equivalent of what Lijphart would consider to be the 'many variables, small-n' problem (Lijphart 1971: 686). Limited diversity is omnipresent in social science research and often poses a problem for research of all sizes (Lijphart 1971; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). In QCA, limited diversity manifests itself as logical remainders within the truth table. Logical remainders are empty rows within the truth table – that is, logically possible configurations or combinations of conditions that do not appear empirically (Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 757). These logical remainders are made visible

¹⁴ The likelihood is the probability of observing the data given the assumed model's parameter value. The likelihood function, then, is the method by which the likelihood is calculated (parameter values based upon a given distribution of data).

during the analytical process and provide researchers with an opportunity to engage in simplifying assumptions in a transparent and theory-driven way. Simplifying assumptions are essentially theory-driven assumptions based on counterfactuals – i.e., thought experiments in which the researcher theorises about how the event or outcome of interest might have changed should certain conditions be different (Legewie 2013). QCA is not unique in its use of counterfactuals. Indeed, they are ubiquitous in causal inference (George and Bennett 2005). However, the advantage of QCA in this regard is that it deals with counterfactuals in a transparent and systematised way (Ragin 2008).

The value-added of QCA for the purposes of this thesis is a combination of the above: a medium-n, case-oriented¹⁵, middle-ground methodological approach, that is rooted in set-theory. The majority of implementations of QCA in the social sciences have sought to explain its advantages in terms of its capacity for handling small or medium-sized n comparative research (Berg-Schlusser et al. 2009). Yet, while this is true (see Ragin 1987), such a justification disregards the set-theoretical foundations upon which QCA was developed, and further ignores the capacity of QCA to adequately address large-n comparative research (Vis 2012). Indeed, those at the forefront of developing QCA have long argued that the use of QCA should be justified not on its capacity to handle certain-n research but rather on the basis of its set-theoretic approach (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It has been argued that ‘[g]ood social science [should be] problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 242). More often than not this requires a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, achieving a balance between ‘over-generalizing and “universalizing” ... quantitative approaches, on the one hand, and purely individualizing case-oriented approaches, on the other’ (Berg-Schlusser and Cronqvist 2005: 172; see also Flyvbjerg 2006: 242). By employing QCA, this thesis not only achieves a balance between quantitative and qualitative methods, but also heeds Hall’s

¹⁵ Case-oriented research focuses upon a small number of cases and often a larger number of variables or conditions. By contrast, variable-oriented research focuses mainly on generalised relationships between variables (della Porta 2008). See della Porta (2008: 208, Table 11.2) for a summary of the primary differences between variable- and case-oriented approaches.

(2003) call to ensure the aligning of ontology and methodology. The logic underlying the way social scientists often understand the social world is set-theoretic (Ragin 2008; Wagemann and Schneider 2010; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Legewie 2013). Indeed, set-theoretical relationships are ubiquitous and implicit in most social science discourse (Ragin 2000), and therefore it is appropriate that the method and approach chosen reflect the set-theoretical reality of social phenomena, in this case, party competition.

The attractiveness of QCA as a methodological approach and novel set of techniques is demonstrated by its increasing popularity across a range of disciplines in the social sciences (Marx et al. 2013; Rihoux et al. 2013; Thiem and Duşa 2013). In fact, QCA has been employed in party politics quite a number of times. It has been used to explain the electoral success of populist parties in Europe (van Kessel 2015); to re-evaluate Kitschelt's theory of support for the new radical right (Veugelers and Magnan 2005); to determine why some parties fail and others succeed (Beyens et al. 2015); to explore ethnic mobilisation in post-communist countries (Gherghina and Jigla 2011); to elucidate on why some left-libertarian parties have succeeded while others have failed (Redding and Viterna 1999); to investigate the breakthrough of anti-establishment reform parties in Eastern Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2016); to analyse the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries (Bochsler 2011); to scrutinise gender balance in political parties in Western Europe (Lilliefeldt 2010); to expound upon Europeanisation and state reform in Belgium (Dardanelli 2012); and to detail the emergence of dominant parties in post-secessionist unrecognised states (Ishiyama and Batta 2012). Indeed, variants of QCA have been employed in comparative politics more than in other fields of study (Roig-Tierno et al. 2017).

5.3. Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)

To determine which (combinations of) strategies principal parties employ against the radical right, and to analyse the extent to which these strategies are successful (or not), this thesis will employ mvQCA.

mvQCA is essentially an extension or generalisation of crisp-set QCA (csQCA) (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009). What distinguishes these two variants of QCA is that csQCA is purely dichotomous while mvQCA permits the use of multinomial categorisation. By way of example, consider a traffic light. csQCA would assign a value of either 1, indicating that the condition is present, or 0, indicating that the condition is absent. In other words, each colour of the traffic light – red, amber, and green – would be given either a 1 or 0. By contrast, mvQCA would allow multiple values to be assigned, so that 0 could represent the colour red, 1 could represent amber, and 2 could represent green (Haesebrouck 2016). mvQCA therefore permits the use of multinomial conditions without resorting to creating a series of crisp-set or binary dummy conditions to achieve the same effect (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009). In our example, then, the use of three conditions in csQCA is reduced to a single condition in mvQCA.¹⁶ The capacity of mvQCA to handle multinomial conditions is extremely useful for this thesis in as much as the issue-oriented strategies themselves are multinomial in orientation. Principal parties have to choose an issue-oriented strategy – they can't not – but there are multiple options from which to choose. And indeed, it is the choice that principal parties make that is crucial to this thesis.

In theory, it is possible to configure csQCA so that it could handle what are essentially multinomial conditions. For instance, in the traffic light example above, each colour can be configured as an individual condition. However, doing so introduces a methodological problem, namely the configuration of conditions that are logically possible but empirically impossible, or what are termed 'impossible remainders' (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In the context of this thesis, an example would be for a principal party to adopt both an accommodative strategy and an adversarial strategy. This is logically possible. Yet it is empirically impossible because these are contradictory strategies, and cannot, in reality, be adopted by the same party at the same time. The presence of impossible

¹⁶ In practical terms, then, consider the example of a red light. In csQCA, this would be coded as: red = 1, amber = 0, and green = 0. While in mvQCA this could be colour = 2 (with 2 being red). Therefore, three conditions are condensed into one.

remainders can be mitigated through the re-evaluation or re-conceptualisation of conditions or through revisiting the case selection process (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) or even through the exclusion of impossible remainders from the analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2013). However, this does very much complicate the analytical process.

An alternative to csQCA and mvQCA is of course fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). fsQCA differs from both csQCA and mvQCA in that it allows for partial membership of particular conditions. Returning to the example of whether or not Turkey is a European country, in a fsQCA analysis, Turkey could be given a fuzzy-set score of 0.33 to indicate the fact that while some of the country is geographically within Europe, most of it is not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In its use of partial set-membership scores, fsQCA therefore allows for fine-grained analysis (Ragin 2000). However, while this is a distinct advantage in many instances, it is not one that is needed here. This is because this thesis is interested in what are essentially binary conditions – that is the presence or absence of particular strategies in a given context. It is not concerned with the degrees of a strategy – i.e., the extent or strength to which a strategy is used.

For the purposes of this thesis, then, there is no real advantage to using fsQCA. It would present additional methodological problems: it would complicate the analytical process; and its ability to use partial set-membership scores is not needed here. Moreover, mvQCA has a number of distinct advantages, the most important of which is its use of multinominal categorisation, which is essential to this thesis. Given this, mvQCA is the best method for this thesis.

Before moving on to detailing how exactly mvQCA will be used in this thesis, it is first worth considering the software chosen to conduct the mvQCA analysis. The choice of software is not a trivial matter as it not only dictates what functions are available to the researcher, but it also has a huge impact on the final results of the analysis. Many of the software packages available suffer from a number of deficits. For instance, the popular package *Tosmana* cannot provide the intermediate solution term (that is, one of the methods by which the various identified pathways are simplified); it cannot conduct tests

of necessity; and it does not provide parameters of fit (Thiem and Duşa 2013). Similarly, the other dominant software package, *fs/QCA*, cannot conduct mvQCA analysis; only has partial provision for tests of necessity; and has limited capacity for calibration (Thiem and Duşa 2013). Indeed, these software-related deficits are common among many of the available packages.

Perhaps more concerning than this, however, is the fact that very few of these packages actually reveal model ambiguity (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017; Kahwati and Kane 2020). Put simply, model ambiguity occurs when there are multiple, logically valid models that are capable of explaining the outcome of interest. In these situations, it is up to the researcher to determine how to interpret the presence of multiple models and the extent to which the presence of multiple models impacts upon the substantive interpretation of the solution terms derived from the minimisation procedure (Kahwati and Kane 2020). In cases where the software gives some indication of ambiguity, through specific routes for minimisation, the software ultimately produces a single model, hiding all other models that are equally valid in explaining the outcome, and thereby depriving the researcher of necessary information that will affect their interpretation of the solution terms. To put it bluntly, a failure to engage with model ambiguity correctly severely dampens the researcher's capacity to adequately and correctly interpret their results (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017). Of the software that is available, only those packages that are available in the R programming language adequately present model ambiguity, and of those packages, only one is fully resourced and capable of supporting a wide array of enquiries. This is the *QCA in R* package developed by Adrian Duşa (2018), and for all the reasons just outlined, it is this software that the thesis uses.

5.4. mvQCA: Analyses and Cases

In order to answer the thesis' research questions, the mvQCA analysis will focus on 14 countries between the years 1995 and 2017. In order to maximise the extent to which the results produced by the mvQCA analysis can be generalised, as many Western European countries as possible should be

included. Indeed, generalisations in comparative politics should be checked against 'all cases' where possible (Sartori 1970: 1035). The countries to be included within this study, then, are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.¹⁷ Belgium is treated as two distinct political systems in this analysis. This is as a result of the fundamental distinction between the party systems of Flanders and Wallonia (see Chapter 4, note 3 for further details). Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain all lack a relevant radical right party during the investigative period and will therefore be excluded.¹⁸

The mvQCA analysis will be split into two distinct stages. The first stage will examine a single principal party's strategy at each election, and the impact of this strategy on the vote share of the radical right. This stage will include all principal parties that were identified in Chapter 4, including moderate right, moderate left, and centrist principal parties. This stage, then, will incorporate the strategies of 38 principal parties, drawn from 14 countries, representing 76 different elections. Each election includes at least two principal parties, although some countries have more principal parties competing in each election (as demonstrated in Chapter 4, Table 4.1). In total, this yields 199 cases where each case represents the strategies of a single principal party, during a single election period, in a single country.

The second stage will examine the impact of the combination of strategies adopted by the two largest principal parties in each election on the vote share of the radical right. Following Meguid (2005, 2008), it is assumed that the strategies of one principal party can impact upon the effectiveness of the strategies of another principal party, and therefore by incorporating the strategies of two principal parties, the analysis will be able to explore the more complex dynamics of party competition. The analysis in this stage will be restricted to the strategies of two principal parties, one drawn from the moderate right and the other from the moderate left. In a few cases, there are no moderate left

¹⁷ Northern Ireland operates as an essentially independent party system from the rest of the United Kingdom, and given its lack of radical right party, has been excluded from the analysis.

¹⁸ Since 2019, Spain has gained a relevant radical right party in Vox, which gained 24 seats in the April 2019 congressional election and 52 seats in the November 2019 congressional election. However, this is outside of the timeframe for this thesis. Portugal looks set to gain a relevant radical right party in *Chega*, a radical right party that, as of 2019, gained a seat in the national parliament and in regional parliaments.

parties, and therefore the analysis will make use of the largest (by vote share) centrist party instead (see Chapter 4, Table 4.1). This restriction to two principal parties is primarily the result of methodological considerations. In short, each country has a differing number of principal parties, and therefore the analysis needs to be restricted to the lowest common denominator, otherwise a whole series of dummy variables would be required for those countries that do not have three or four principal parties. This would drastically increase the complexity of the analytical procedure and would hamper any substantive interpretation. This second stage will incorporate the strategies of 28 principal parties, again drawn from 14 countries, over 76 elections, yielding a total of 76 cases. Here, a case represents the combined strategies of two principal parties, during a single election, in a single country.

Undertaking the analysis in two stages means not only that it is possible to increase the number of observations, but it also makes for a point of comparison between the impact of the strategies of a single principal party and the strategies of two principal parties in combination. Put differently, the first analysis – that focuses on the strategies of a single principal party only – forms a point of reference against which the second analysis – that examines the strategies of the two principal parties in combination – can be compared.

For both stages, the analysis is carried out twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right and once for an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This means that the exact effect of principal party strategies can be detected; that is, whether particular (combinations of) strategies lead or otherwise contribute to either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of the radical right.

Furthermore, the introduction of both a decrease and an increase in the radical right vote share acts as a form of in-built robustness testing. Within the QCA process, it is good practice to not only test for the outcome of interest but also its negation. This ensures that the same set of conditions is not producing two opposing outcomes. In the context of this study, this robustness test can be incorporated into the analytical process itself and can be leveraged to deliver meaningful results for

substantive interpretation. The negation tests for each analysis have nonetheless been conducted and are included in Appendix G. These serve as additional robustness tests.

Finally, the dataset on which the mvQCA is based is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

5.5. Case Studies

As was highlighted above, the inclusion of case studies following any QCA analysis is a fundamental step that not only permits post-analysis verification and evaluation of the results produced, but is also considered a standard of good practice within the QCA community due to the capacity of case studies to support process-tracing (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The use of case studies is especially important in this study as the mvQCA analysis itself is not employed here to identify causal links between conditions and outcomes, but rather, to identify strategic pathways that are subsequently explored and elaborated upon in the case studies. Any casual claims made in the subsequent chapters are therefore based on a combination of the results of the mvQCA analysis and the case study analyses, rather than on the basis of just one of these.

In order to verify and evaluate the pathways identified within the mvQCA analysis, it was initially proposed that three case studies were to be conducted. These were France, Sweden, and Denmark. These three countries not only offer interesting examples of the competitive relationship between principal parties and radical right parties, but they also offer contrasting institutional arrangements, host differing attitudes towards immigration within their respective populations, and serve as broad examples of European polities. This is demonstrated in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: The context of the three case studies

Country	Institutional Arrangement	PP response	RR credibility	Immigration attitudes
France	Hostile	Hostile	Credible	Slightly negative
Sweden	Friendly	Hostile	(somewhat) Credible	Very positive
Denmark	Friendly	Friendly	Credible	Slightly positive

Table 5.1 shows that these three case studies differ in four important ways. Firstly, they vary in terms of their institutional arrangements. These relate to the practical capacity of smaller parties to win votes and gain seats at the national level. This includes, but is not limited to, whether or not the polity employs a majoritarian or proportional electoral system for national level elections, whether or not the state provides some form of funding for political parties, and whether or not the state funds media broadcasts for parties come election time. Taken collectively, then, these elements make up wider electoral laws (Bowler et al. 2003) that help determine the extent to which a system is classified here as institutionally hostile or friendly to smaller competitors such as parties of the radical right.

Secondly, Table 5.1 indicates the manner in which the principal parties in each country have responded to the presence of radical right parties. In short, a hostile response would be akin to the application of a cordon sanitaire or other exclusionary approaches, while a friendly response would take the form of collaboration and/or cooperation, or other types of inclusionary approaches. Thirdly, the table reports the degree to which the radical right party is considered credible. In practical terms, this is the degree to which the radical right party is well-organised and well-led (see Lubbers et al. 2002; Carter 2005; van Kessel 2015). Finally, Table 5.1 includes details of voter attitudes towards immigration in each country, with ‘negative’ pointing to a feeling within the population that immigration is overall a ‘bad’ thing, and positive suggesting that, by contrast, the population sees immigration as bringing more benefits than costs to the country. This is important because the issue of immigration is clearly highly salient to radical right parties. What is more, these parties often subsume other important issues (e.g., employment, welfare, crime, health) into the immigration issue (Hellström et al. 2012; Nordensvard and Ketola 2014; Norocel 2016; Abts et al. 2021; Engler and Weisstanner 2021).

To an extent then, given their differences, these three case studies – France, Sweden, and Denmark – together provide a representative picture of party competition in Western Europe. That said, there are clearly limits to this. For a start, no three cases could provide a full representation of party politics

across the whole of Western Europe. Moreover, national particularities and traditions that may turn out to be important in explaining the efficacy of principal party strategies employed against the radical right remain, be they the importance of *laïcité* in France or the tradition of *Folkhem* in Sweden.

Unfortunately, focusing on three case studies proved to be over-ambitious in terms of work, time, and even space within this thesis, especially given the amount of time that was dedicated to understanding the particular contexts of each case. As a result of this, and to maintain the in-depth nature of the case studies, the thesis focuses on France and Sweden.

There are a number of reasons to prefer comparison between France and Sweden than, say, France and Denmark, or Sweden and Denmark. Firstly, the France and Sweden comparison afforded the greatest variation in principal party strategies as well as the greatest variation in the contexts outlined above. Secondly, it was felt that the French case was particularly important owing to the long-term survival and presence of the National Front. Thirdly, a Sweden-Denmark comparison was avoided because a focus on two Scandinavian countries would harm the generalisability of the case studies. Finally, Sweden provides a particularly interesting example of a sizeable shift in the fortunes of the radical right compared to the other cases. Indeed, Sweden went from a 'negative case' (Rydgren 2002) to a particularly prominent case of radical right success by 2014.

5.6. Contextual Conditions in the Case Studies

Having chosen the case studies, it is important to outline the contextual conditions found in these cases, and in particular the specific contextual conditions that will be explored in greater depth in the case study chapters. The impact of four contextual conditions will be examined in each case study chapter. In addition, other factors pertinent to explaining the specific French or Swedish context within which the parties compete will be explored. These conditions and factors are very important for understanding the casual relationship between the strategies of principal parties and the effect

they have on the vote share of the radical right. Indeed, the mvQCA analysis is only designed to identify the strategic pathways that various principal parties pursue with regards to their radical right counterparts; it does not control for various contextual differences within the chosen systems. It is the case studies that contextualise the pathways explored within the mvQCA analysis, and they are therefore fundamentally important to the casual analysis of principal party strategies.

The first condition that will be analysed in the case studies (Chapters 7 and 8) is that of the issue agenda. In particular, the focus will be on understanding how the issue agenda influences the way in which principal parties compete, and on the impact that the issue agenda has on the efficacy of the strategies these parties adopt. The issue agenda is understood to mean those issues that are particularly salient within the public consciousness. It is measured through public opinion, and through data from surveys that ask respondents which issues they believe 'were the most important issues facing' the country.

The next condition that the case study chapters will explore is voter attitudes towards immigration. This condition is important because the issue of immigration is the one above all others that is championed by parties of the radical right, and the extent to which voters are concerned about immigration (i.e., the salience of the issue among the population) will not only influence the success of the radical right, but it is also likely to influence which strategies the principal parties choose to adopt in the face of the radical right challenge, and the efficacy of these strategies. As noted above, the parties of the radical right often subsume other issues into an immigration frame and/or link other issues to immigration. This is particularly so in Sweden, where the Sweden Democrats very often relate concerns about the funding of, and access to, the generous welfare state to immigration. Given this, this theme is explored in greater depth in Chapter 8. As with the issue agenda, voter attitudes towards immigration are measured through survey data.

The third contextual condition examined in the case study chapters is the level of satisfaction that voters express with the functioning of democracy within their country, and their levels of trust in

politicians and/or parties. These are important conditions to explore as previous research has shown that voters who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are much more likely to vote for radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Likewise, voters who display low levels of trust in politicians and political parties have also been seen to be more likely to support the radical right (Miller 1974; Billiet and De Witte 1995; Hetherington 1999; Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Doyle 2011; Rooduijn 2018). Again, levels of satisfaction with democracy, and levels of trust in politicians and parties are measured through data from public opinion polling.

The case study chapters also focus on the reputation of political parties and candidates – both that of the principal parties and of the radical right. This condition is not exogenous to the parties in the same way the last three were – although arguably, the issue agenda, attitudes towards immigration and levels of satisfaction in democracy and trust in politicians and parties are also all clearly shaped by the parties too – but it is crucial to exploring and explaining which strategies are chosen by the principal parties, and which turn out to be effective. Indeed, reputation forms the backbone of the enhanced model of party competition outlined in Chapter 2, and it is theorised that parties or candidates with a stronger reputation over an opponent will be more successful in the implementation of their strategies. Candidate and party reputation is measured through public opinion polling data.

These four contextual conditions are examined in Chapter 7 on France, and Chapter 8 on Sweden. However, the coverage is not identical in each chapter because national particularities and traditions inform these conditions. As mentioned above, for instance, in Sweden the issue of immigration is often related to welfare issues. As such then, Chapter 8 will pay attention to this. Similarly, the discussion of levels of trust in politicians and parties, and the coverage of reputation will differ slightly cross the two chapters. In the French case, the emphasis will be on trust in politicians and on the reputation of individual candidates rather than the trust in and reputation of political parties. This is in reflection of the personalised nature of political competition in this semi-presidential system. By contrast, in the Sweden chapter, the discussion will encompass trust in parties as well as in individual politicians, and

the reputation of parties as well as politicians. This reflects the greater importance of political parties in Sweden.

In addition to slight differences in emphasis across the two chapters when discussing these four contextual conditions, the Sweden chapter also includes coverage of a further condition which is particularly relevant to this case, namely the spatial positioning of parties. Unlike in France, in Sweden the principal parties have been far more hesitant to accept the issue agenda of the Sweden Democrats. For much of the period under study, they have sought to distance themselves from the Sweden Democrats through the use of dismissive or adversarial strategies. It is therefore important to understand the impact that this has had on the vote share of the Sweden Democrats. In particular, the principal parties' initial refusal to share the territory of the Sweden Democrats is likely to have provided ample opportunities for the latter to develop a strong niche within the electorate. This in turn might have enabled them to counteract the strategies of the Swedish principal parties. Chapter 8 will thus explore these dynamics of party competition in detail.

The differences across the two cases, and hence the differences in the focus of the discussion, mean that Chapters 7 and 8 are not structured in an identical fashion. Rather, in reflection of the particular conditions of each case, more or less coverage is devoted to each condition, and the sequence in which the conditions are discussed varies a little across the chapters. This is not a problem; in fact, on the contrary, it ensures that the research fits the cases, rather than the cases fitting the research. Moreover, the distinctive nature of the chapters reflects the very nature of case study research. That is, while some contextual conditions are identified as important in advance of conducting the research, others – like the importance of welfare issues and the concept of the *Folkhem* in Sweden – emerge as the research unfolds.

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter has explained and justified why QCA analysis, and mvQCA in particular, will be used in this thesis. It has also explained how this part of the research will be designed, namely through a focus on 14 political systems in the 1995 to 2017 period, and by undertaking the analysis in two stages – one that concentrates on the impact of a single principal party’s strategy on the radical right vote, and a second that analyses the combined impact of the strategies of two principal parties.

As is good practice, the QCA analysis is followed by case study research so as to enable a proper exploration of the casual relationship between principal party strategies and political context. The chapter has therefore discussed which case studies have been chosen for analysis, and why these have been selected. It has also then outlined the specific contextual conditions found in these cases that will be explored in depth in the case study chapters.

The stage is now set for the mvQCA analysis to begin. The next chapter thus starts with a discussion of the data to be employed in this analysis, before moving on to explain the manner in which this data is operationalised, and then presenting the results of the two analytical stages that have been outlined above.

6. mvQCA: Operationalisation and Results

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present and interpret the results of the mvQCA analysis. Before jumping into the results, however, it is first prudent to recall the purpose of this thesis and the steps taken thus far. The aim of this thesis is to determine what impact, if any, the strategies of principal parties have on the vote share of the radical right. To do this, Chapter 2 developed a theoretical model of party competition, focused on what Meguid (2005) would call 'competition between unequals'. The enhanced toolkit of strategies presented in that chapter incorporated an array of competitive approaches including issue-oriented and party-oriented strategies, as well as a more novel element: reputational strategies. Chapter 3 focused on those factors that are likely to influence the types of strategies that parties pick, while Chapter 4 defined and identified parties that are relevant to this thesis. Finally, Chapter 5 outlined the methodological approach of this thesis, which consists of mvQCA and case studies.

Moving on from those chapters, this chapter outlines the operationalisation of the various party strategies and the outcome conditions and provides details as to the various data sources used within the mvQCA analysis. Thereafter, it reports the results of the mvQCA analysis. It is split into two distinct sections – Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 – that represent two different analyses. The first, Section 6.3, is the analysis of single party strategies. In other words, it explores the impact that the strategies of one principal party have on the vote share of the radical right. This analysis is conducted twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, and once for an increase in the vote share of the radical right. The next section, Section 6.4, replicates the first analysis but instead of focusing on a single principal party, it analyses the impact that two principal parties have on the vote share of the radical right. As before, this analysis is split into two, with the first part focusing on a decrease in radical right vote share, and the second focusing on an increase in radical right vote share.

Ultimately, the results show that principal parties in Western Europe adopt a wide variety of strategies when faced by the radical right, and that these different combinations of strategies are inconsistent in the effect that they have on the vote share of the radical right. Put more simply, the strategies adopted by principal parties in one country or instance might produce a different result than when they are adopted by a different principal party in a different country, or even by the same principal party in the same country but at a different election. In view of this, the two chapters that follow this one focus on three case studies so as to incorporate what is currently missing from the analysis thus far: context.

6.2. Operationalisation and Data

Table 6.1 provides an overview of each of the strategies that will be explored in the mvQCA analyses. The first column reports the strategy in its expression form (i.e., the form that is used in the QCA analysis); the second names the strategy; and the third provides a short description of each strategy. A fuller, and more detailed overview of the various strategies is provided in Chapter 2.

When compared to the model of competition developed in Chapter 2, the number of strategies employed in the mvQCA analysis has been reduced. This is for technical reasons as well as data availability. More specifically, the strategy that involves principal parties imposing legal restrictions on the radical right has been excluded, as has the subsuming strategy. To the best of the author's knowledge, there is no data available on the legal restrictions that political parties have pursued, and given time constraints it is not possible to gather the relevant data for the countries listed over the time period under observation. As for the subsuming strategy, while the data exists, the nature of the strategy would require a significant amount of time to be invested in the reading of quasi-sentences for all manifestos for all principal parties in the relevant countries in the chosen time period. Each quasi-sentence would then have to be examined with regard to the interactions of different dimensions of competition with a particular emphasis on which dimension is being subsumed into the

other. This would require a huge amount of work, and it would also necessitate foreign language skills which the author does not have.

Furthermore, in order to manage the number of logical remainders, a number of strategies will be merged together. Firstly, the reluctant two-dimensional adversarial strategy [strategy 3] has been merged into the two-dimensional adversarial strategy [strategy 2], while the reluctant two-dimensional accommodative strategy [strategy 6] has been merged into the two-dimensional accommodative strategy [strategy 7]. Secondly, the party-oriented strategies have been condensed into engagement and disengagement strategies, respectively. The engagement category consists of collaboration [strategy 13], co-optation [strategy 14], and positive reputational strategies [strategy 15]. By contrast, the disengagement category is made up of the ignore strategy [strategy 10], the isolate strategy [strategy 11], and negative reputational strategies [strategy 15]. This approach has been adopted elsewhere (Weldon et al. 2017).

Having clarified which strategies will be employed in the mvQCA analysis, it is now important to explain how the thesis identifies the presence or absence of these strategies. That is, how do we know when a principal party adopts a one-dimensional dismissive strategy; how do we know when a party when embraces a two-dimensional blurring one; and how do we know when a party opts for an engagement strategy, for example?

Table 6.1: Principal party strategies used in the mvQCA analysis

mvQCA Code	Strategy	Description
ISSUESTRATEGY{0}	One-dimensional dismissive strategy	The principal party rejects the cultural dimension of competition, and the issues contained within it, in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension of competition.
ISSUESTRATEGY{1}	Two-dimensional adversarial strategy	The principal party competes on both the economic and cultural dimensions of competition, but adopts a position on the cultural dimension that stands in contrast to the radical right party.
ISSUESTRATEGY{2}	Two-dimensional blurring strategy	The principal party competes on both the economic and cultural dimensions of competition, but adopts a position on the cultural dimension that is ambiguous or tokenistic.
ISSUESTRATEGY{3}	Two-dimensional accommodative strategy	The principal party competes on both the economic and cultural dimensions of competition, and adopts a position on the cultural dimension that is consonant with the radical right party.
DISENGAGE{0}	Absence of disengagement strategy(ies)	The principal party does not adopt any disengagement strategies: ignore, isolate, or [negative] reputational.
DISENGAGE{1}	Presence of disengagement strategy(ies)	The principal party adopts one or more disengagement strategies (ignore, isolate, or [negative] reputational)
ENGAGE{0}	Absence of engagement strategy(ies)	The principal party does not adopt any engagement strategies (collaboration, co-optation, or [positive] reputational)
ENGAGE{1}	Presence of engagement strategy(ies)	The principal party adopts one or more engagement strategies (collaboration, co-optation or [positive] reputational).

To do this, for the issue strategies identified above, the thesis makes use of data derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2020), and it uses this data to calculate the position of each principal party. More specifically, to reflect the range of issues on which the parties of radical and extreme right compete, a bundle of cultural issues that are contained in the CMP data has been identified, and it is the position of the parties on this bundle that is used. This cultural issue

bundle is composed of three themes: national way of life, traditional morality, and multiculturalism. And as is the case with CMP data, each of these themes had two categories: one that represents pro-quasi-sentences and another that represents anti-quasi-sentences. These different quasi-sentences are added together to create a cultural issue bundle that represents a traditionalist and progressive position. This process is summarised as followed:

National Way of Life		Traditional Morality		Multiculturalism		Cultural Issue Bundle
Per601 (pro)	+	Per603 (pro)	+	Per607 (anti)	=	Traditionalist
Per602 (anti)	+	Per604 (anti)	+	Per608 (pro)	=	Progressive

The position of each party on this cultural issue bundle is then calculated by adding the traditionalist quasi-sentences, then subtracting the sum of progressive quasi-sentences, and then dividing this by the total number of quasi-sentences. Notionally, this takes the form:

$$(TQS-PQS)/(TQS+PQS)$$

Where TQS is the total number of traditionalist quasi-sentences, and PQS is the total number of progressive quasi-sentences.

The scores that result from this calculation allow for the identification of the different issue strategies. Scores that fall between -1 and -0.11 indicate the presence of a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. By contrast, scores of between 0.11 and 1 indicate a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. And scores that fall between these – i.e., of between -0.1 and 0.2 indicate the existence of a two-dimensional blurring strategy. This is because the very presence of (some) quasi-sentences demonstrates some saliency of the issues in party manifestos, and yet the low figures indicate a lack of direction to the strategies.¹⁹ Where there are no traditionalist or progressive quasi-sentences in the parties' manifestos at all, this is interpreted as a one-dimensional dismissive strategy.

¹⁹ The level of saliency of these issues in the parties' manifestos could have been further interpreted by introducing a cut-off point. That is, a cut-off point for the number of quasi-sentences could have been introduced to indicate high or low saliency. However, this was rejected as a rather arbitrary exercise, and one

Data to identify the party-oriented strategies is less easy to come by than data for the issue-oriented ones. Indeed, there is no existing dataset on party-oriented strategies on which to draw. In light of this then, evidence of engagement and disengagement strategies has been extracted from secondary sources, in particular from election reports produced for the journals *West European Politics* and *Electoral Studies*, from the *European Journal of Political Research's* political data yearbooks, and from the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network based at Sussex University, which produces working papers and election reports. A close reading of these reports and papers allowed for the identification the party-oriented strategies. For instance, Fallend and Heinisch's (2016: 329) statement that 'the SPÖ, Greens, and Liberals (who broke away from the FPÖ in 1993) – were always committed to a strategy of "principled non-cooperation or Ausgrenzung" (ostracization) towards the FPÖ' is taken as evidence of an isolation strategy at work. Similarly, van Kessel's (2010: 2) observation that in the 2012 Dutch election 'Mr Wilders was harshly criticised by the two coalition partners and by the Christian Democrat deputy prime minister Verhagen in particular' is taken as indicative of a (negative) reputational strategy on behalf of the VVD and the CDA.

Finally, it is necessary to outline the operationalisation and data pertaining to the outcome conditions. These outcome conditions are categorized as 'radical right vote share down' (RRVSD), 'radical right vote share up' (RRVSU), and 'radical right vote no change' (RRVNC). The first of these is operationalised as a decrease in the vote share of the radical right party of 0.5 percentage points or more between two election periods; the second is an increase in the party's vote share of 0.5 percentage points or more; and the third is a change in the party's vote share of between 0.49 and -0.49 percentage points. These cut-off points are chosen to reflect meaningful changes in the radical right's vote share, and to avoid marginal or trivial ones. The data for the vote shares of the radical right parties also comes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2020).

that could have major impacts upon the analysis. Instead, it was decided that the presence of some quasi-sentences on these issues in the parties' manifestos would be sufficient.

Having provided an overview of how the principal party strategies have been adapted to work within the mvQCA analysis, explained how the strategies are operationalised, and outlined what data has been used, this chapter now moves onto report the results of the two mvQCA analyses.

6.3. Single Party Strategies

As highlighted above, the purpose of this section is to first identify the (combinations of) strategies that individual principal parties adopt when in competition with the radical right, and to then analyse the impact that these strategies have had on the electoral performance of the radical right parties. This analysis is split into two parts: the first examines those (combinations of) strategies that lead to a *decrease* in the radical right vote share, while the second investigates those (combinations of) strategies that lead to an *increase* in the vote share of the radical right. These two elements are then brought together in a discussion section in order to identify common patterns of competition and (radical right) electoral outcomes.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is first worth explaining why this section starts immediately with the analysis of sufficiency and not, as is common, with the analysis of necessity. The reason for this is that the analysis of necessity did not produce any positive results. That is, no individual strategy or combination of strategies were identified as *necessary* for either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of the radical right. Therefore, the results of the analysis of necessity are presented in Appendix B rather than here. This section focuses on the analysis of sufficiency as it produced the most relevant results.

6.3.1. Analysis of Sufficiency [one principal party]

The analysis of sufficiency identifies which conditions, or combination of conditions, are sufficient for the outcome of interest. To recall from Chapter 5, a sufficient condition is a condition that causes the

outcome, but does not do so exclusively. In other words, while a sufficient condition might explain a particular outcome, other conditions might also explain that same outcome. In set theoretic methods, a sufficient condition is identified when the outcome is a superset of the condition. In practical terms, the presence of a sufficient condition is identified when the inclusion score (inclS in subsequent tables) is 1 or is close to 1. A high or perfect inclusion score indicates high or perfect consistency in the underlying data, while low inclusion scores indicate a high degree of inconsistency in the underlying data.

The analysis of sufficiency first involves the creation of a truth table – a table representing every possible combination of conditions, including those combinations that are not empirically present. The next step is the conversion of the truth table into an expression (e.g., $A * B \rightarrow O$; read as condition A and condition B leads to Outcome) that explains the outcome of interest. This minimisation procedure is achieved by removing irrelevant or superfluous conditions from the above expression. By way of example, consider the expression below:

$$A * B * C + A * B * \sim C \Rightarrow \text{Outcome}$$

No matter the value of Condition C (present or absent), the presence of Condition A and Condition B together is sufficient – perhaps even necessary – for the outcome. Therefore, Condition C can be removed as it is considered irrelevant or superfluous to any substantive interpretation. This minimisation procedure is conducted twice in order to first create the so-called ‘conservative solution’, and then to create the ‘parsimonious solution’. The conservative solution employs empirically present configurations only, while the parsimonious solution makes use of non-empirically present combinations as well as empirically present ones – so-called logical remainders – in order to create a more simplified expression, in the same fashion as the minimisation procedure above.

In the pages that follow, the analysis of sufficiency is conducted twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right as the outcome of interest, and once for an increase in the vote share of the radical right as the outcome of interest. Conventionally, in most QCA studies, the analysis of sufficiency

is accompanied by another analysis of sufficiency whose outcome of interest is the non-outcome or negation of that outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). However, since the present study focuses on both an increase in the vote share of the radical right and a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, it is essentially engaging in both analyses of sufficiency. That is, for the analysis of sufficiency for an increase in the vote share of the radical right, the negation of the outcome would be a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, while in the analysis of sufficiency for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, the negation of the outcome would be an increase in the vote share of the radical right. For this reason, then, there is little need to engage in the negation of either outcome as it would essentially duplicate the results.

6.3.2. Analysis of Sufficiency for a Decrease in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [one principal party]

As outlined above, this section examines whether or not there are any strategies, or combinations of strategies that, when employed by a single principal party, lead to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. This is done by first constructing a truth table of all possible combinations of strategies, which is then minimised into two solution terms representing the conservative and parsimonious solutions. As the truth table represents every possible combination of strategies, it is very large and is thus not reported here. Rather, it can be found in Appendix C. Instead, Table 4.2 shows the results for the conservative solution.

Table 6.2: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
1		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.017	-
	<i>Cases</i> Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront				

Notes: inclS: inclusion score; PRI: proportional reduction in consistency; covS: coverage score; covU: unique coverage score.

The conservative solution has produced a single expression or pathway:

Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows that a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in combination with an engagement strategy, and in the absence of any disengagement strategies, is sufficient for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. Put simply, the principal party dismisses the importance of a second, cultural dimension of competition, and those issues contained within it, in favour of competing on its primary dimension: the economy, and associated issues. The principal party supplements this issue-oriented strategy with a party-oriented engagement strategy (either collaboration or co-optation).

This pathway has an extremely high inclusion score (1.000) indicating that all cases that conform to this combination of strategies show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. However, it should be noted that the coverage score (covS), which measures the degree to which the outcome is explained by a particular expression or pathway (Duşa 2018: 136), is very low, at 0.017. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 6.2, only one case – that of Syriza and the Independent Greeks in the January 2015 General Election – is represented by this pathway.

When looking to the underlying data, no other cases conform to this expression or pathway. Five cases show parties adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with the vote share of the radical right decreasing; however, none of these cases, with the exception of the case reported in Table 6.2 also shows the party adopting an engagement strategy. Therefore, the Greek case presented in Table 6.2 is a unique case within the dataset. Moreover, when subsetting²⁰ the data for just a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, a range of cases are revealed, including several where the principal

²⁰ Subsetting is the process of retrieving a subset or small part of the data based on a set of conditions or requirements. In this case, a subset of data was selected on the basis of its outcome – here instances in which the radical right party suffered a decrease in vote share.

party has adopted an engagement strategy. However, the levels of consistency in these alternative pathways are low, and therefore no further claims of sufficiency can be made.

Before exploring the results of the parsimonious solution, it is first worth revisiting the purpose of the parsimonious solution. Unlike the conservative solution, which makes use of only empirically present information, the parsimonious solution makes use of theoretically possible but non-empirically occurring data. By incorporating hypothetical but plausible combinations of strategies, the parsimonious solution often produces a less complex solution term and allows for what Soda and Furnari (2012: 287) call the 'discovery of the plausible'; that is, using plausible counter-factuals in order to better understand the phenomena of interest (see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

The results of the parsimonious solution are shown in Table 6.3. As with the conservative solution above, the parsimonious solution has produced a single pathway or expression:

Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party combining a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with an engagement strategy. That is, the principal party rejects the cultural dimension of competition, in favour of competing exclusively on the economic dimension of competition (and its associated issues) but engages with the radical right party. As with the last, this pathway has a perfect consistency as measured by the inclusion score (1.000), indicating that all cases represented by this pathway also see a decline in the vote share of the radical right. However, also as with the last pathway, it covers a very small proportion of cases – namely one: the same case from Table 6.2 – Syriza competing against the Independent Greeks in the January 2015 election. Therefore, once again, this pathway is considered sufficient for a small part of the outcome but the remainder of the outcome remains unexplained by any consistent pathways. This suggests a significant degree of inconsistency in the configurational data. That is, a certain combination of strategies will produce one outcome in one case, but a different outcome in another case. Having said this, it is of course

possible that some contextual conditions that are missing from the analysis might contribute to explaining this inconsistency. This issue is covered in more detail below, and is also discussed in the case study chapters.

Table 6.3: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
1		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.017	-
	M1	1.000	1.000	0.017	-
<i>Cases</i>					
Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront					

Note: as Table 6.2

6.3.3. Analysis of Sufficiency for an Increase in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [one principal party]

This analysis follows the same steps as the last, albeit with a change in the outcome of interest. While the previous analysis focused on what strategies or combinations of strategies led to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, this analysis focuses on those strategies or combinations of strategies that lead to an increase in the vote share of the radical right.

As before, owing to its length, the truth table is not presented here but is instead contained in Appendix D. And as before, the next table – Table 6.4 – reports the results of the conservative solution. It shows that this solution produces three pathways.

Table 6.4: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
1		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
	ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}	0.767	0.767	0.452	0.452
	ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.008	0.008
	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.032	0.032
	M1	0.782	0.782	0.492	-

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party combining a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a disengagement strategy. In other words, the principal party has chosen to recognise and compete on the cultural dimension, and has adopted a position on cultural issues akin to that of the radical right party. That is, the principal party has shifted its position towards that of the radical right party. At the same time, however, the principal party has opted for one or more disengagement strategies, such as ignoring or isolating the radical right party. The inclusion score of 0.767 suggests that this pathway has reasonably high levels of consistency, yet, at the same time, there are moderate levels of inconsistency as reflected in the fact that this score is considerably less than 1. This all means that some cases that conform to this pathway or expression do not share membership of the outcome – i.e., they do not result in an increase in the vote share of the radical right. The results also show that this pathway has reasonably high levels of coverage (0.452). Indeed, 73 of the 199 cases in the data conform to this pathway. Of these 73, 56 hold membership in the outcome. The other 17 do not reflecting the less-than-perfect inclusion score. This pathway can therefore be identified as a likely sufficient pathway, although its level of inconsistency should be kept in mind.

Pathway 2: ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in conjunction with a disengagement and engagement strategy. Simply put, as concerns the first strategy, the principal party has recognised the cultural dimension of competition, but has positioned itself in contrast to the radical right party on this dimension. As regards the second and third strategies, which are party- rather than issue-strategies, the principal party has adopted a combination of disengagement and engagement strategies. This shows that it has an inconsistent approach when it comes to how to treat the radical right party, independent of which issues it competes on. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but it has extremely low levels of coverage (0.008). In fact, this pathway covers a single case, that of the Social Democratic

Party of Switzerland competing against the Swiss People's Party in the 2017 elections. This case – and the combination of engagement and disengagement strategies that the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland adopted in relation to the People's Party – can be attributed to the rather unique institutional arrangement of Switzerland, which essentially forces some degree of engagement between major parties (with the People's Party counted as a major party). This facet of competition in Switzerland is discussed in more detail below. Therefore, as concerns this pathway, while it is considered a sufficient one to an increase in the vote share of the radical right, its capacity to explain the outcome is very low. In other words, other pathways explain more of the outcome than this pathway.

Pathway 3: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0}

This pathway shows the principal party combining a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with a disengagement strategy – in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, the principal party has rejected the cultural dimension of competition (and associated issues) in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension. In addition to this, the principal party has adopted party-oriented strategies that are essentially hostile to the radical right party, such as ignoring it, demonising it, or otherwise seeking to isolate it, and has chosen not to cooperate with it or co-opt its personnel. This pathway has perfect consistency as reflected in its inclusion score (1.000). It also has higher levels of coverage (0.032) than the last pathway: it covers four cases.²¹ As with Pathway 2, then, Pathway 3 is considered a sufficient pathway to explain a rise in the vote share of the radical right, but again, it only explains a relatively small proportion of the outcome.

²¹ These four cases are: the Ecologists stance against the National Front in the 1995 Wallonian election; the Reform Movement's strategy vis-à-vis the Wallonian National Front in the 2003 election; the approach of the Socialist Party Different-Spirit against Flemish Interest in the Flanders 2003 election; and finally, the strategies of the Socialist Party against the National Front in the 1997 French election.

As can be seen from Table 6.5, the parsimonious solution produces results that are somewhat similar to the conservative solution just discussed, but there is some reduction in the number of conditions that make up two of the three pathways.

Table 6.5: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.032	0.032
2	ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}	0.767	0.767	0.452	0.435
3	DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.024	0.008
	M1	0.782	0.782	0.492	-

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party adopt a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy. That is to say that the principal party rejects the cultural dimension of competition in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension. It complements this by disengaging from the radical right party either by seeking to isolate it, demonise it, or otherwise ignore it. This pathway corresponds to the third pathway in the conservative solution described above, but without there being an absence of an engagement strategy. This latter condition is dropped as it is found to be a redundant or superfluous condition. When looking to the parameters of fit, the inclusion and coverage scores – 1.000 and 0.032 respectively – remain unchanged, confirming that the inclusion of the condition (absence of engagement strategy) has no impact on this pathway. Given that this pathway has a relatively low level of coverage, it is considered sufficient for the outcome (increase in radical right vote share), but only explains a small proportion of that outcome.

Pathway 2: ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy. That is to say, the principal party recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition, and positions itself closely to the radical right

party on that dimension. It supplements this issue-oriented strategy with a disengagement strategy, be it isolating the radical right party, demonising it, or otherwise ignoring it. This pathway corresponds to the first pathway in the conservative solution above, and as before the inclusion and coverage scores remain unchanged at 0.767 and 0.452 respectively. Once again, then, a significant number of cases (73 of 199) conform to this pattern of competition, although not all share a similar outcome. While most (56 of the aforementioned 73) see an increase in the vote share of the radical right, a significant (17) minority do not. That being said, as with the first pathway of the conservative solution above, this is most likely a sufficient pathway, although its somewhat high level of inconsistency should be noted.

Pathway 3: DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the principal party adopting a combination of disengagement and engagement party-oriented strategies, irrespective of what issue strategy it adopts. In other words, it chooses some combination of collaboration and/or co-optation as well as demonisation, isolation, and ignoring the radical right party.²² This pathway corresponds to the second pathway of the conservative solution discussed above, albeit with the crucial distinction that the issue strategy has been dropped here. By dropping the issue strategy, the parsimonious solution has increased the coverage of this pathway from 0.008 in the conservative solution above to 0.024. In practice, this means that three cases conform to this pathway. These are the Social Democratic Party competing against the People's Party in Swiss election of 2007; the French 2012 election where the Union for a Popular Movement competed with the National Front; and the 2007 election in Switzerland where the Radical Democratic Party was in competition with the People's Party. While this is a slight improvement (with three cases rather than just one in the conservative solution above), the coverage for this pathway is still quite

²² Obviously, some combination of these is not possible: a principal party cannot collaborate with a radical right party while at the same time ignoring it. This element of confusion is the product of an earlier decision to compress party-oriented strategies into two categories. This decision produced noticeable methodological benefits, as discussed above, but has caused some initial yet minor obfuscation.

low, and therefore the degree to which an increase in the vote share of the radical right is explained by this pathway remains low.

It should also be noted that while the coverage for this pathway has increased slightly, of the three cases represented by it, only the 2007 Social Democratic Party competing against the People's Party case is unique to Pathway 3. The Union for a Popular Movement versus the National Front and the Radical Democratic Party against the People's Party feature in Pathway 2 of the parsimonious solution. This is reflected in the unique coverage (covU) score for this pathway. At 0.008 it is noticeably lower than the raw coverage (covS) score of 0.024. When this happens – i.e., when the unique coverage score is lower than the raw coverage score – this is a sign of overlap between two or more pathways. The same is also evident in Pathway 2, just discussed, albeit to a lesser degree. Pathway 2 also had a unique coverage score (0.435) that was lower than its raw coverage score (0.452). This all leads to the conclusion that there is therefore some overlap in the cases represented by Pathways 2 and 3. Practically, however, this does not have much impact on the interpretation of the results other than to highlight the fact that minimising Pathway 3 (that is, the dropping of the issue strategy) did nothing to improve the explanatory power of the model as a whole (Pathways 1, 2, and 3 collectively) because the new cases represented by Pathway 3 were already represented by Pathway 2.

6.3.4. Discussion

The results thus far suggest a degree of variability in terms of what strategies single principal parties have adopted in regard to the radical right. The initial analyses of necessity – that is, the identification of conditions or combinations of conditions that are *necessary* for the outcome to occur – identified no necessary conditions. In other words, there are no strategies or combinations of strategies that produce a consistent increase or decrease in the vote share of the radical right across all cases (see Appendix B for full results of analyses of necessity).

Turning to the analysis of sufficiency – the results of which are summarised in Table 6.6 – a range of (combinations of) strategies adopted by single principal parties have been identified as sufficient in explaining either a decrease or increase in the vote share of the radical right. Starting with a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, the analysis of sufficiency (conservative solution) identified a single pathway: that the adoption of a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in conjunction with an engagement strategy, but in the absence of any disengagement strategies, by a single principal party leads to a decrease in radical right vote share. This showed the principal party rejecting the opportunity to compete on the cultural dimension of competition in favour of maintaining its focus solely on the economic dimension. At the same time, it did engage with the radical right party, through governmental collaboration. The explicit absence of any disengagement strategies initially suggests that the presence of a disengagement strategy would lead to a different outcome, even if the other strategies remained the same. However, given that the absence of disengagement strategies is dropped from the parsimonious solution, with the other strategies remaining the same, the inclusion of a disengagement strategy is unlikely to have a meaningful effect (i.e., it is a trivial condition in this arrangement).

However, this pathway explains very little of the outcome, as indicated by its extremely low coverage score (0.017, in Table 6.3). When subsetting the data – that is, retrieving a small amount of data based on a set of requirements – in order to identify further potential pathways, a great deal of inconsistency in the underlying data was revealed. In other words, while a combination of strategies adopted by one principal party in one case might produce a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, the exact same combination of strategies adopted by a different principal party in a different case might produce an increase in the vote share of the radical right. As a result of this underlying inconsistency, no further claims of sufficiency were made.

Table 6.6: Summary of results from the analyses of sufficiency for single principal parties

Analysis of sufficiency, RRVSU	Pathway (strategies)
Conservative/complex solution	Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{0}*engage{1}
Parsimonious solution	Issuestrategy{0}*engage{1}
Analysis of sufficiency, RRVSU	
Conservative/complex solution	Issuestrategy{3}*disengage{1}
	Issuestrategy{1}*disengage{1}*engage{1}
	Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{1}*engage{0}
Parsimonious solution	Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{1}
	Issuestrategy{3}*disengage{1}
	Disengage{1}*engage{1}

Notes: RRVSU: radical right vote share down; RRVSU: radical right vote share up.

The analysis of sufficiency for an increase in the vote share of the radical right produced three sufficient pathways that remained broadly the same when comparing the conservative and parsimonious solutions. While there was some variety to these pathways in terms of the strategies adopted by individual principal parties, one noteworthy feature was that the disengagement strategy featured in all pathways. This suggests that disengagement strategies by principal parties are associated with an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This finding dovetails with the analysis for the decrease in radical right vote share, just discussed, which suggested that engagement strategies are associated with a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. That said, it should be recalled that this pathway was based on a single case – Syriza and the Independent Greeks in the January 2015 election – and that extreme caution should therefore be taken before any extrapolation is undertaken.

Furthermore, while these results are interesting and noteworthy, it should nonetheless be emphasised that neither of the conditions just mentioned (disengagement and engagement strategies) are necessary for either an increase or decrease in the vote share of the radical right, respectively. Indeed, the analyses of necessity (see Appendix B) establish this. They show that there are 110 cases in which the principal party has adopted a disengagement strategy, and that of those, 79 show an increase in the vote share of the radical right, while 31 show a decrease or no change in the vote share of the radical right. Therefore, while the disengagement strategy might seem to be

associated with an increase in the vote share of the radical right, there is a significant number of cases that buck this trend. Similarly, there are 25 cases in which the principal party has adopted an engagement strategy, and of these, 10 show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, while 14 show an increase in the vote share of the radical right (and the remaining one shows no change). Therefore, no association appears to exist between engagement strategies on the one hand and radical right vote share on the other.

The last few points suggest that there is a great deal of inconsistency in the underlying data. That is, many principal parties conform to the same patterns of party competition, yet, as has been emphasised, the outcome of that competition on the vote share of radical right parties differs across cases. This inconsistency in the data suggests missing conditions. In other words, it suggests that specific contextual conditions might explain why a certain arrangement of strategies leads to a particular outcome in one case but to another outcome in a different case. All in all, then, it very much seems that context matters. And for that reason, once the QCA analysis has been completed, the thesis will engage in an in-depth study of two quite distinct cases so as to adequately contextualise individual patterns of competition.

6.4. Two Party Strategies

The purpose of this section, much like the section above, is to identify the strategies that principal parties adopt when in competition with the radical right, and to analyse the impact that these strategies have on the electoral performance of the radical right. The previous analysis focused exclusively on the strategies of a single principal party. In other words, no consideration was given to the impact that a second principal party might or might not have had. This analysis, then, introduces a second principal party into the equation, and analyses the impact that the strategies of two principal parties have on the vote share of the radical right. The strategies explored in this section are the same as those outlined in Table 6.1.

As was the case with the analysis of single party strategies, the analysis of necessity found no conditions or combinations of conditions that were *necessary* for either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of the radical right. As before then, while the analysis of necessity was conducted, its results are not reported here. Instead, they can be found in Appendix B. Structurally, this section is much the same as the previous one in that the analysis is split into two parts: the first examines those strategies that lead to a decrease in radical right vote share, while the second explores those strategies that lead to an increase in radical right vote share. Then the section offers a discussion that identifies common properties and that reaches conclusions.

6.4.1. Analysis of Sufficiency for a Decrease in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [two principal parties]

This analysis of sufficiency, like the previous ones, begins with the construction of a truth table that represents every possible combination of strategies. As it is very long, for reasons of space, this table is presented in Appendix E. From this table, two minimisation procedures are run: one that leads to the conservative solution, and the second that leads to the parsimonious one. The conservative solution is presented in Table 6.7. It identifies three pathways that lead to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right.

Table 6.7: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0} P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.091	0.091
2	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0} P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.045	0.045
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0} P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.136	0.136
	M1	1.000	1.000	0.273	-

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*

P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows the first principal party, Party 1, adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in the absence of either a disengagement or engagement strategy. The second principal party, Party 2, by contrast, combines a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with an engagement strategy – but in the absence of any disengagement strategies. Put more simply, Party 1 competes on the cultural dimension of competition as well as the economic one, but adopts a position on the cultural dimension that is ambiguous. Party 2 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition (as well as the economic one), and has positioned itself on that cultural dimension in a manner consonant with the radical right party. Party 2 has supplemented this by engaging with the radical right party either through collaboration and/or co-optation. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but has low levels of coverage (0.091). This shows that all cases that conform to this pathway show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right but that this pathway represents few cases (2 of 76). Indeed, it only represents the Labour and Conservative parties of Norway in competition with the Progress Party in the General Election of 2013, and the Democrats of the Left and Go Italy in competition with the Northern League in the Italian election of 2001. Therefore, while this pathway is sufficient, it only explains a small proportion of the outcome.

Pathway 2: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*

P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2, meanwhile, combines a two-dimensional adversarial strategy with a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. In short, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension of competition, but position themselves on that dimension in different ways. Party

1 positions itself closer to the radical right party, while Party 2 positions itself in contrast to the radical right party. Both parties supplement this by disengaging with the radical right party through isolation, demonisation, or ignoring it. The high inclusion score (1.000) for this pathway indicates perfect consistency among the cases that conform to this pathway. In other words, all cases that share this pattern of competition see a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. The low level of coverage (0.045), however, indicates that few cases conform to this pathway. In fact, this pathway represents a single case: that of the Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National Front in the Walloon elections of 1999. Thus, while sufficient, this pathway only explains a small proportion of the outcome.

Pathway 3: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*

P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is translated as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy, while Party 2 employs a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. In other words, Party 1 rejects the cultural dimension of competition in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension, while Party 2 chooses to compete on the cultural dimension (as well as the economic one) and adopts a position on that cultural dimension that is akin to that of the radical right party. Neither party adopts an engagement or disengagement strategy. As above, this pathway has perfect consistency as measured by the inclusion score (1.000) but has relatively low levels of coverage (0.136). It represents three cases, namely the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy in competition with the Independent Greeks in the June 2012 elections, the same two principal parties competing against the Popular Orthodox Rally in the same elections, and the same two principal parties facing the Independent Greeks in the September 2015 elections. Again, then, while sufficient, this pathway only explains a small proportion of the outcome.

The model, and the three pathways within it, covers a very small number of cases as shown by the model's coverage score (0.273). Practically, the model represents only 6 cases of a possible 76 and therefore only explains a small proportion of the outcome in question – here a decrease in radical right vote share. This indicates that there is a significant degree of inconsistency in the remainder of the data. In other words, the same pattern of competition produces one outcome in one case, but another outcome in a different case. This lends further weight to the notion that strategies adopted in different contexts produce different results. This phenomenon will be further explored within two country case study chapters.

Table 6.8 reports the parsimonious solution. It has produced two models (as indicated by M1 and M2). Model 1 is inclusive of Pathways 1, 2, and 3 while Model 2 is inclusive of Pathways 1, 2, and 4. The presence of multiple models often arises when the software is unable to make a conclusive decision regarding the inclusion or exclusion of particular conditions or combinations of conditions. In this particular case, the software was unable to determine whether a model inclusive of Pathway 3 (and exclusive of Pathway 4) was better at explaining the underlying data, or whether a model inclusive of Pathway 4 (and exclusive of Pathway 3) was better at the task. Two models are therefore reported.²³ Ordinarily, the presence of multiple models would introduce a degree of complexity into the interpretation of the results. Both models are equally viable in explaining a decrease in the vote share of the radical right and the parameters of fit (inclS and covS) are not sufficiently different in each model to make a determination in favour of one model over the other. In fact, the parameters of fit for Models 1 and 2 are identical. Similarly, when looking to the cases, there are no differences between Pathways 3 and 4; the two pathways are identical in terms of the cases they represent. This can be seen by looking at the unique coverage (covU) score for both pathways: the score of 0.000 for each

²³ The QCA in R package (Duşa 2018) reveals instances of model ambiguity while the dominant programmes – fs/QCA (Ragin and Davey 2014) and Tosmana (Cronqvist 2011) – do not. This is important as the failure to report model ambiguity often leaves researchers in the dark as to the true nature of their results (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017).

indicates that none of the cases is unique to either pathway. Given this, it is possible to integrate the two models into a single model through a joint interpretation of Pathways 3 and 4 – i.e., by merging these two pathways. The discussion of the pathways that follows is therefore concerned with integrated Model 1+2 (Pathways 1, 2, and 3+4).

Table 6.8: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit					
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091
2	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}	1.000	1.000	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.136	0.000	0.136	-
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.136	0.000	-	0.136
	M1 (Pathways 1, 2 and 3)	1.000	1.000	0.273	-	-	-
	M2 (Pathways 1, 2 and 4)	1.000	1.000	0.273	-	-	-

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy, while Party 2 employs an engagement strategy. In other words, Party 1 acknowledges and positions itself on the cultural dimension of competition but does so in a way that is ambiguous: its exact position is unclear. Meanwhile, Party 2 engages – either through collaboration or co-optation – with the radical right party. The inclusion score of this pathway (1.000) indicates perfect consistency, while a relatively low coverage score (0.091) shows that very few cases conform to this configuration or pattern of competition. To be specific, only two cases out of a possible 76 conform to this pathway. These cases are the Norwegian Labour and Conservative parties against the Progress Party in 2013, and the Democrats of the Left and Go Italy in competition with the Northern League in the 2001 Italian elections.

Pathway 2: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy, while Party 2 employs a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. That is, while both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension of competition, Party 1 positions itself in a manner consonant with the radical right party, while Party 2 positions itself in contrast to the radical right party. As above, the inclusion score (1.000) shows perfect consistency – meaning that all cases that conform to this configuration of strategies also show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right – while the low coverage score (0.045) indicates that very few cases conform to this pathway. In fact, only one case of a potential 76 does so: The Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National Front in the 1999 Walloon elections.

Pathway 3+4: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}

This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in the absence of any disengagement strategies, and Party 2 choosing not to adopt a disengagement strategy. In other words, Party 1 competes solely on the economic dimension of competition, and neither of the two principal parties ignores, isolates, or reputationally damages the radical right party. This pathway is not dissimilar to some of the pathways discussed above, which saw a one-dimensional dismissive strategy and an engagement strategy, in the absence of any disengagement strategy, producing a reduction in the vote share of the radical right. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000), but low levels of coverage (0.136) indicating that few cases conform to this pathway. Indeed, only three of the 76 cases are represented by this pathway: The Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy in competition with the Independent Greeks in June 2012 and again in September 2015, and the same two principal parties against the Popular Orthodox Rally in June 2012.

6.4.2. Analysis of Sufficiency for an Increase in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [two principal parties]

This analysis follows the same steps as the previous one, but the outcome of interest has changed from a decrease in the vote share of the radical right to an increase in the vote share of the radical right. As before, as a result of its length, the truth table is not presented here but rather is contained in Appendix F. The following table – Table 6.9 – reports the results of the conservative solution. It shows that this solution has identified 12 separate pathways. These are discussed in the order in which they appear in the table.

Table 6.9: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{1}	1.000	1.000	0.041	0.041
2	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}	0.812	0.812	0.265	0.265
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
5	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.041	0.041
6	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
7	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{1}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1}	0.800	0.800	0.082	0.082
8	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.041	0.041
9	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.041	0.041
10	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
11	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
12	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.041	0.041
M1		0.889	0.889	0.653	-

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy. Party 2, however, employs a two-dimensional accommodative strategy alongside both a disengagement and an engagement strategy. Put more simply, Party 1 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition, but adopts a position on this dimension that is counter to that of the radical right party. This issue strategy is supplemented with ignoring, isolating, and/or demonising the radical right party. Party 2 also recognises and competes on the cultural dimension but does so in a manner consonant with the radical right party. This issue-oriented strategy is accompanied by disengagement and engagement strategies. This pathway has a perfect inclusion score (1.000) indicating that all cases that conform to it show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. The coverage score (0.041) for this pathway is rather low, however, meaning that very few cases conform to it (2 of 76). These two cases are the Socialist Party and Union for a Popular Movement in competition with the National Front in the 2012 French elections, and the Social Democratic Party and Radical Democratic Party against the People's Party in the 2007 Swiss elections.

Pathway 2:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 using a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2 also adopts a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension of competition, and position themselves closely to the radical right party. Party 1 also ignores, isolates, and/or demonises (reputationally) the radical right party. Neither party collaborates with or co-opts the radical right party. This pathway has a high level of consistency (0.812) but the fact that this score is below 1 means

that a few cases that conform to it do not show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. These cases are the Danish Social Democrats and Liberals competing with the Progress Party in the elections of 1998; the French Socialist Party and the Union for a Popular Movement facing the National Front in the 2007 elections; and the Austrian Social Democrats and People's Party challenging the Freedom Party in the 1995 elections. Finally, this pathway possesses a coverage score of 0.265, indicating that a reasonable, though still limited, number of cases conform to it (16 of 76).

Pathway 3:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in the absence of any disengagement or engagement strategies. Party 2 employs a one-dimensional dismissive strategy, also in the absence of any disengagement or engagement strategies. In other words, Party 1 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition but adopts a position on that dimension that is markedly different to the position of the radical right party. Party 2, by contrast, does not recognise or compete on the cultural dimension of competition, favouring exclusive attention to the economic dimension. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but very low levels of coverage (0.020). Only one case of a total of 76 is represented by this pathway: the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy challenging the Popular Orthodox Rally in the Greek elections of October 2009.

Pathway 4:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is translated as both principal parties opting for two-dimensional adversarial strategies in the absence of any disengagement or engagement strategies. In other words, both parties compete on the cultural dimension of competition but adopt positions on that dimension that are in contrast to the radical right party. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but has very low levels of coverage (0.020). As above, this is a single case out of 76: the Labour and Conservative parties of Norway in competition with the Progress Party in the 2005 elections.

Pathway 5:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway shows Party 1 employing a two-dimensional adversarial strategy, while Party 2 adopts a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. Neither party chooses a disengagement or engagement strategy. Put differently, both principal parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension but do so in different ways: Party 1 adopts a position that is incongruent with the radical right party, while Party 2 adopts a position that is congruent with the radical right party. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy. As above, this pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) but low levels of coverage (0.041). It represents two cases out of a total of 76, namely the Norwegian Labour and Conservative parties against the Progress Party in 2009, and the Social Democratic Party and People's Party of Austria facing off against the Freedom Party in 2013.

Pathway 6:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2, by contrast, favours a one-dimensional dismissive strategy and a disengagement strategy, also in the absence of any engagement strategies. So, Party 1 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension but positions itself far away from the radical right party, while Party 2 rejects the cultural dimension in favour of focusing on the economic dimension only. Both principal parties supplement their issue positioning by disengaging from the radical right party: that is ignoring, isolating, and/or demonising (reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000), meaning that all cases that conform to it show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. But it has very low levels of coverage (0.020), indicating that few cases conform to it. Indeed, only one case of 76 is represented by this pathway: the Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National Front in the Walloon elections of 2003.

Pathway 7:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy and an engagement strategy, in the absence of a disengagement strategy. Party 2 employs a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and an engagement strategy, also in the absence of any disengagement strategies. In other words, Party 1 competes on the cultural dimension (in addition to the economic dimension) but does so in a manner incongruent with the radical right party. Party 2 also competes on the cultural dimension but does so in a manner congruent with the radical right party. These issue-oriented strategies are supplemented by both parties with an engagement strategy (co-optation or cooperation) and without the adoption of any disengagement strategies (ignore, isolate, and/or demonise). This pathway has relatively high levels of consistency, as measured by its inclusion score (0.800). As noted above, however, a score below 1 indicates that there are a few cases that, while

conforming to this pathway, do not show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This pathway has a relatively low level of coverage at 0.082. Indeed, only five cases are represented by it, and all five are derived from Switzerland.

Between 1995 and 2015 Switzerland held six federal elections (in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015). In each of these elections, excluding the 2007 one, the Social Democratic Party and the Radical Democratic Party/FDP. The Liberals pursued the same strategies vis-à-vis the Swiss People's Party (SVP) (see Pathway 7 description above). In 2007, these two parties maintained similar patterns of competition but included disengagement strategies in their repertoire against the Swiss People's Party. In each election except 2011, these combinations of strategies produced the same outcome: an increase in the vote share of the SVP. Yet in 2011, the same configuration of strategies produced a different outcome: a decrease in the vote share of the Swiss People's Party. Indeed, this was the first time since 1987 that the Swiss People's Party had actually lost votes in a federal election. What changed in this election, however, was competition from the new(ish) Conservative Democratic Party (BDP). Formed in 2008 by former SVP members following the suspension of Widmer-Schlumpf from the SVP,²⁴ the BDP profited from the drastic increase in the salience of economic issues, the popularity of former Finance Minister Widmer-Schlumpf (an early member of the BDP), and their image of consensus and moderation (Mueller and Dardanelli 2013).

Pathway 8:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

²⁴ Widmer-Schlumpf was elected to the Federal Council in place of and against the wishes of Christoph Blocher, the leader of the SVP. The SVP leadership formally requested that Widmer-Schlumpf resign – which she refused to do. The SVP leadership then requested that the Graubünden branch or cantonal party expel her – which it refused to do. In response, the SVP suspended the entirety of the Graubünden branch and it was this branch that eventually formed into the BDP (Mueller 2010).

This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in the absence of either a disengagement or an engagement strategy, and Party 2 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in the absence of either a disengagement or an engagement strategy. Put simply, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension but whereas Party 1 adopts a position that is ambiguous, Party 2 adopts a position consonant with that of the radical right party. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy towards the radical right. This pathway has perfect consistency as indicated by its inclusion score (1.000) – meaning all cases that conform to it show an increase in the vote share of the radical right – but has low levels of coverage (0.041). It represents only two cases out of a total of 76, these being the Labour and Conservative Parties competing with the Progress Party in the Norwegian elections of 1997, and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy competing against the Popular Orthodox Rally in the 2004 Greek elections.

Pathway 9:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in conjunction with a disengagement strategy, and in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2 adopts a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a disengagement strategy, also in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension, but Party 1 adopts an ambiguous position on this dimension while Party 2 occupies a position that is similar to that of the radical right party. Both parties either ignore, isolate, and/or demonise (reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) – that is, all cases that conform to it also show an increase in the vote share of the radical right – but low levels of coverage (0.041). Out of a total of 76 cases, only two conform to this pathway. These are the

Austrian elections of 2006 and 2008 where the Social Democratic Party and the People's Party were competing against the Freedom Party.

Pathway 10:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy, while Party 2 adopts a one-dimensional dismissive strategy. Neither party adopts a disengagement or engagement strategy. So, Party 1 positions itself on the cultural dimension and adopts a position akin to that of the radical right party, while Party 2 does not compete on the cultural dimension, favouring to compete exclusively on the economic dimension. Neither party adopts a party-oriented strategy (e.g. collaboration, co-optation, isolation, demonisation, or ignoring). This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) – i.e., all cases that conform to it show an increase in radical right vote share – but very low levels of coverage (0.020). In fact, this pathway represents only one case out of 76, namely, the Italian election of 1996, with the Democratic Party of the Left and Go Italy challenging the Northern League.

Pathway 11:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and a disengagement strategy, in the absence of any engagement strategy. Party 2, by contrast, employs a two-dimensional blurring strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy, also in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, both principal parties compete on the cultural dimension but while Party 1 adopts a position consonant with radical right party, Party 2 blurs its

position, making it ambiguous. Both parties supplement these issue-oriented strategies with disengagement strategies (ignore, isolate, and/or demonise). This pathway has perfect consistency, indicating that all cases that conform to it show an increase in radical right vote share, but very low levels of coverage (0.020). In fact, out of a total of 76 cases, only one case conforms to this pathway. This is the Labour Party and the Party for Freedom and Democracy competing against the new Pim Fortuyn List in the Dutch elections of 2002.

Pathway 12:

P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy and a disengagement strategy, and Party 2 pairing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a disengagement strategy. Neither party adopts an engagement strategy. Put simply, then, Party 1 rejects the cultural dimension of competition in favour of exclusively focusing on the economic dimension, while Party 2 not only competes on the cultural dimension but does so in a manner congruent with the radical right party. Both principal parties ignore, isolate, and/or demonise (reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect levels of consistency, meaning that every case that conforms to it shows an increase in the vote share of the radical right, but as with many of the previous pathways, the levels of coverage for this pathway are very low (0.041). Out of a total of 76 cases, only two cases conform to this pathway. These are the Socialist Party Different-Spirit and Liberals and Democrats competing against Flemish Interest in the 2003 Flemish elections, and the Socialist Party and Rally for the Republic party in competition with the National Front in the 1997 French elections.

These results, taken collectively, indicate a great deal of variability in terms of what configurations of strategies lead to an increase in the radical right vote share when considering the strategies of two

principal parties. Out of a total of 76 cases, only 36 are actually used to formulate the pathways. This occurs as a result of underlying inconsistency. In other words, within a particular pathway, some cases show an increase in the radical right vote share, but a great deal show no change or a decrease in the radical right vote share. This is further revealed by the fact that, of the 12 pathways generated above, five only cover a single case and another five only cover two cases. The only pathways that cover more than two cases are Pathways 2 and 7, and while these pathways cover more cases, they also have lower levels of consistency. That is, there are cases that conform to Pathways 2 and 7 that do not show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. What this indicates, then, is that there is a great deal of inconsistency in the underlying data, a finding that is confirmed by the parsimonious solution below, as well as by the previous analyses.

Turning to the parsimonious solution, a significant degree of model ambiguity is revealed. That is, the analysis has produced 16 separate models. As previously mentioned, the presence of multiple models often arises when the software is unable to make a firm conclusion as to which conditions or combinations of conditions should be included and excluded. Given that the inclusion and coverage scores are identical for each model, each model can be said to explain the underlying data equally well. Therefore, before any substantive interpretation is possible, some decision must be made regarding what model best explains an increase in the vote share of the radical right. In the previous instance of model ambiguity, it was found that the pathways exclusive to particular models represented the same cases, and therefore those pathways could be simplified by merging them, thereby creating a single, coherent model. In this instance, however, there are far more exclusive pathways in the individual models meaning that the previous procedure is not useful here. Another possible approach is to select a model based upon the parameters of fit. In other words, the model that has the highest consistency and coverage could be favoured. Unfortunately, however, each model has the same inclusion and coverage scores, which means that this approach is also unworkable. The final possible approach is to dispense with interpreting models in favour of interpreting individual expressions or pathways. Those pathways that feature in all models represent significant findings, and

therefore reoccurring pathways can be considered essential in any substantive interpretation, especially in cases of model ambiguity (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017).

The parsimonious solution identified 16 models that contain, in some combination, 13 different pathways, and of those 13 pathways, five are common to all models. While these five pathways do not account for all observed, empirical evidence, they do collectively account for over half of the observations. By contrast, the remaining pathways (those that are unique to individual models) are often made up of just one or two cases. Therefore, in order to manage the model ambiguity, the 16 models will be dropped, and the five pathways common to all models will instead be interpreted. These results are presented in Table 6.10, and the five reoccurring pathways are discussed below.

Table 6.10: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression (strategies)	Parameters of Fit			
		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ENGAGE{1}	0.833	0.833	0.102	0.082
2	P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}	1.000	1.000	0.061	0.061
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}	1.000	1.000	0.020	0.020
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1.000	1.000	0.082	0.082
5	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}	0.812	0.812	0.265	0.265

Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G.

Pathway 1: P1ENGAGE{1}

This pathway shows principal Party 1 adopting an engagement strategy. That is, Party 1 either collaborates with or co-opts members of the radical right party. The remaining strategies of Party 1 as well as the strategies of Party 2 are not considered to be important in this pathway. This pathway has a relatively high level of consistency as measured by its inclusion score (0.833) and relatively low levels of coverage (0.102). Indeed, when subsetting the data for ‘Party 1 adopting an engagement strategy’ and ‘increase in the vote share of the radical right’, only six cases are found, and all of these are from Switzerland (see Section 6.4.2: Pathway 7). As above, this pathway further challenges the notion that engagement strategies could be associated with decreases in the vote share of the radical right.

However, it should be noted that this pathway represents cases that are exclusively drawn from Switzerland, and the unique properties of Switzerland should not be taken to be representative of all cases (this will be discussed in more detail below).

Pathway 2: P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}

This pathway is understood as Party 2 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy. In other words, Party 2 competes exclusively on the economic dimension of competition and ignores the cultural dimension. As above, this pathway gives no consideration to the remaining strategies of Party 2 or to the strategies of Party 1. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000), indicating that all cases that conform to this pathway show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. However, it has relatively low levels of coverage (0.061). Practically, this means that out of a total of 76 cases, a mere three conform to this pathway. These are the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy competing against the Popular Orthodox Rally in the Greek elections of 2009; the Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party facing the National Front in the 2003 elections in Wallonia; and the Democratic Party of the Left and Go Italy fighting against the Northern League in the 1996 Italian elections.

Pathway 3: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}

This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and Party 2 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy. In other words, both principal parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension but do so in different ways: Party 1 adopts a position similar to that of the radical right party, while Party 2 adopts an ambiguous position. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) as measured by its inclusion score – indicating that all cases that are represented by it show an increase in radical right vote share – but has very low levels of coverage (0.020). In fact,

only one case of 76 is represented by this pathway: the Labour and Freedom and Democracy parties against the very new Pim Fortuyn List in the 2002 Dutch elections.

Pathway 4: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}

This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy and Party 2 employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in the absence of an engagement strategy. Expressed more simply, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension, but Party 1 adopts an ambiguous position on this dimension, while Party 2 opts for a position consonant with the radical right party but does not engage with it. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but has relatively low levels of coverage (0.082). Only four of the 76 cases are represented by this pathway. These cases consist of: The Norwegian Labour and Conservative parties against the Progress Party in the 1997 general election; PASOK and New Democracy against the Popular Orthodox Rally in 2004; and the Austrian Social Democrats and People's Party against the Freedom Party in 2006 and 2008.

Pathway 5: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}

This pathway is understood as both principal parties adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy, and Party 1 also adopting a disengagement strategy. In other words, both parties compete on the cultural dimension, and adopt positions akin to that of the radical right party. Party 1, however, supplements this with a disengagement strategy, either isolating, ignoring, or otherwise demonising (reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has relatively high levels of consistency (0.812) and comparatively high levels of coverage (0.265). Subsetting the data for this combination of strategies reveals 16 cases, but three of these do not experience an increase in the vote share of the radical right even though they share this combination of strategies. These three deviant cases are the same as those present in the conservative solution, Pathway 2 (section 6.4.2), namely the Danish

Social Democrats and Liberals facing the Progress Party in the 1998 elections; the French Socialist Party and UMP competing with the National Front in the 2007 elections; and the Austrian Social Democrats and People's Party fighting the Freedom Party in the elections of 1995.

6.5. Discussion and Conclusion

As with the analyses conducted for single party strategies above, the results of the analyses for two party strategies suggest a high degree of variability not only in terms of the strategies that principal parties adopt, but also with regard to the effect that these strategies have on the vote share of the radical right. The initial analysis of necessity – presented and summarised in Appendix B – identified no necessary conditions. That is, there are no strategies or combinations of strategies that produce a consistent decrease or increase in the vote share of the radical right across all cases.

Turning to the analysis of sufficiency for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, three pathways were identified in the conservative and parsimonious solutions respectively. Each of these pathways had perfect consistency as measured by their respective inclusion scores and had between very low and moderate levels of coverage. What these solutions revealed was that there is considerable diversity in the combination of strategies that principal parties adopt. Interestingly, the conservative solution suggests that the inclusion of the accommodative strategy – that is, competing on the cultural dimension and positioning closely to the radical right party – in a pathway was sufficient for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, a finding that is in keeping with the predictions made by Meguid (2005; 2008).

In one of the pathways, however, the issue-oriented strategies adopted by each of the two principal parties should have contrasting impacts on the vote share of the radical right. Pathway 2 of the conservative solution (section 6.4.1) shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in conjunction with a disengagement one, and Party 2 employing a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy. Now, according to Meguid (2005,

2008), accommodative strategies should reduce radical right vote share while adversarial strategies should increase it. The impact on the vote share should therefore, at least theoretically, be neutral in this instance, and yet the pathway shows a reduction in the vote share of the radical right: a consequence either of both parties adopting disengagement strategies or some other contextual condition not yet accounted for. This once again highlights the importance of situating party competition within a proper context, as will be done with the case studies presented in Chapters 7 and 8.

The parsimonious solution for a reduction in the vote share of the radical right identified three pathways, only one of which included the presence of a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. This pathway, Pathway 2, also showed the presence of a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. That is, while one principal party accommodated the radical right, the other opposed it. However, unlike the scenarios just discussed, disengagement strategies were not present, and therefore the expectation is that contextual conditions should explain why the presence of accommodative and adversarial strategies lead to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right when, theoretically at least, they should have no impact. The remaining pathways are none too extraordinary in as much as they do not reveal any particularly interesting trends or associations. That being said, the remaining pathways do serve to further highlight the diversity of strategies that principal parties adopt when faced by a radical right challenger.

Turning to increases in the vote share of the radical right, the conservative solution identified 12 sufficient pathways, most of which expressed perfect consistency but relatively low levels of coverage. These pathways show that a wide variety of combinations of strategies are in use by the principal parties. Some of these are dual accommodative strategies – that is, instances in which both principal parties adopt accommodative strategies – and they produce an increase in the vote share of the radical right. Indeed, as above, accommodative strategies feature very widely and are represented in almost every pathway. The ubiquitous presence of these strategies – where the principal party adopts

a position on the cultural dimension close to the radical right party – is a particularly interesting finding.

It could be that the widespread presence of these strategies is explained by simple incentive structures. That is, if the cultural dimension of competition gains saliency over time, then principal parties are incentivised to recognise and compete on this dimension as it increases the likelihood of gaining or maintaining votes. The presence of a successful radical right party competing on the cultural dimension might further encourage greater use of accommodative strategies by principal parties in order to retain votes that would otherwise go to the radical right party (Meguid 2005, 2008). Contrary to Meguid's expectations, however, the widespread adoption of accommodative strategies is shown above to increase the vote share of the radical right. Thus, while the instinct of principal parties seems to be accommodative, the consequences of such an approach is unfavourable to principal parties in that it seems to increase the vote share of the radical right. Indeed, if the radical right party is perceived as the owner of cultural issues, then any competition on the cultural dimension increases the saliency of that dimension over time, and therefore as the owner of cultural issues, the radical right party can be expected to be the beneficiary of any vote increases. If true, then the 'legislative experience' and 'governmental effectiveness' (Meguid 2005: 349) of principal parties is insufficient in supplanting the radical right party as the owner of cultural issues. This suggests, then, that accommodative strategies are more likely to be successful if they are accompanied by attempts to weaken or eradicate the radical right's credibility and reputation on cultural issues.

One of the most notable findings of the analyses conducted above – for both an increase and a decrease in the radical right vote share – is the sheer diversity of combinations of strategies that are employed by principal parties in Western Europe. Even among left-wing parties exclusively, or right-wing parties exclusively, or even among cases within a particular country (with a few noticeable exceptions, e.g., Switzerland), there seems to be little consensus on how to approach the radical right from a competitive perspective. While accommodative strategies are broadly popular, as evidenced

above, the impact that these strategies have on radical right vote share is inconsistent. In some cases, accommodative strategies have contributed to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, while in other cases they have led to an increase in the vote share of the radical right. Given this, one is forced to conclude that the same combinations of strategies will produce different results in different countries, and perhaps even at different times. Therefore, any reductive approach will miss a considerable amount of important information in explaining the success or failure of particular party strategies. In order to understand the impact that particular strategies or combinations of strategies have on the vote share of the radical right, the context in which these competitions occur must be incorporated into the analysis. The next two chapters seek to do precisely this by focusing in depth on very different countries.

7. France

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the results of the mvQCA analysis. The results for the analysis showed a high degree of variability both in terms of the strategies that principal parties adopt, and also the effect that these strategies have on the vote share of the radical right. Generally speaking, it seems that the efficacy of particular strategies is dependent upon the political contexts in which they are employed. In order to shed some light on this, this chapter will investigate the French case. Its purpose is to determine what effect certain contextual conditions have had on the effectiveness of principal party strategies. While the chapter explores the period 1995-2018, it focuses in particular on the accommodative strategies of Nicholas Sarkozy and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). During the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2012, the strategic approach of Sarkozy and the UMP was the same: direct overtures to the voting base of the National Front through the accommodative strategy, coupled with a rejection of all forms of cooperation (use of the so-called *cordon sanitaire*). Yet, while the accommodative strategy was successful in peeling away FN votes in 2007, it failed to achieve the same results in 2012.

In order to explore the strategies and their varying success, the chapter begins by outlining the French electoral and party systems, before providing an overview of the ideology of the National Front. The section thereafter goes through each presidential and legislative election between 1995 and 2017, focusing on the campaigns of the principal parties and the National Front, as well as providing the results of each election. Then, it contextualises the elections with reference to three political conditions: the issue agenda, the reputation of the party leaders, and voters' satisfaction in democracy/trust in politicians. The first two conditions are pillars on which this thesis' model of competition is built and thus the concern here is the extent to which these conditions affect the efficacy of principal party strategies. The third is designed to tap the openness of the political

environment to a 'mainstream copy'. In other words, higher satisfaction in democracy/trust in politicians might increase the efficacy of principal party strategies, while lower rates of satisfaction and trust might hamper the success of this accommodation.

7.2. The French Electoral and Party System

France is a semi-presidential state where both the president and the prime minister, through the National Assembly, hold and exercise political power (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). The president, as the commander in chief and head of state, has the power to call referendums, ratify treaties, and appoint and dismiss the prime minister (Hoyo 2018). By contrast, the prime minister, as the head of government, is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of government, national defence²⁵, the implementation of legislation, and proposing the cabinet for presidential approval (Hoyo 2018).

Elections to the National Assembly are contested through a two-ballot system in single member constituencies (Cole 2002; Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). The absolute number of constituencies can vary from election to election, but since 1998 there have been 577 constituencies. Of this, 555 are situated within metropolitan France while the remainder are in France's overseas territories and departments (Elgie 2008). In each constituency, candidates can secure victory in one of two ways. If the candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote on the first ballot, and if this number exceeds 25 percent of the electorate, then that candidate wins the election without the need for a second ballot (Cole 2002; Elgie 2008). The frequency with which this outcome occurs varies: while in 1968 166 candidates were elected in this way, in 1997 only 12 were (Elgie 2008). If no candidate wins in the first ballot, then a second ballot is scheduled for one week later. Only those candidates who secured the vote of 12.5 percent or more of the registered electorate in the first ballot may proceed to the second ballot (Cole 2002; Elgie 2008). No matter the number of candidates in the second ballot, the candidate with the

²⁵ While the prime minister is responsible for national defence on a day-to-day basis, the President often sets the broad guidelines (gouvernement.fr n.d.)

most votes (i.e., a plurality) wins – hence why this system is often referred to as a majority-plurality system.

Presidential elections operate in a relatively similar manner, in that the system used is also a two-round one. As with legislative elections, if a candidate achieves more than 50 percent of the vote on the first ballot, then he or she is elected president. This, however, has never occurred in the history of the Fifth Republic (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). In presidential elections the second ballot is held two weeks later, rather than one, and in contrast to parliamentary elections, only the top two candidates proceed. The candidate who wins the highest number of votes (and hence a majority given there are only two candidates) in the second ballot is elected president (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018).

The use of a two-ballot system in France has encouraged the formation of an alliance-oriented multiparty system, in presidential and especially parliamentary elections, that can be better characterised as bipolar multipartyism (Elgie 2008: 126; Bornschier and Lachat 2009: 362). The multiparty logic is associated with the first ballot, while the alliance-orientation is associated with the second. In the first ballot, every political party is incentivised to participate as they have nothing to lose by contesting this ballot. In fact, by participating in the first ballot, they have the potential to register sufficient support so as to become essential to the alliance-building of the second ballot (Elgie 2008; Bornschier and Lachat 2009). In this sense, small parties that participate in the first round have the chance of developing coalition potential (Sartori 2005b). As a consequence, despite France having the most disproportional electoral system in Europe (Sauger 2009; Gallagher 2019), a range of smaller parties from the radical right and left, from the centre, and with environmental and Eurosceptic ideologies have been able to establish themselves (Bornschier and Lachat 2009; Sauger 2009).

The second ballot, however, has the effect of punishing small or standalone parties – those parties that are either uncoalitionable or are not open to coalitions – unless they can muster a significant concentration of support in a particular geographical area; such as with the regionalist parties in France's overseas territories. However, even if a party is able to concentrate its vote, it will most likely

be defeated by candidates and/or parties that have developed alliances (Elgie 2008). Therefore, all parties are incentivised to participate in alliances with other likeminded parties, propagating the formation of left and right-wing blocks, such as the Plural Left under Jospin (Bornschieer and Lachat 2009).

The consequences of this dynamic can be illustrated by the case of the National Front, which, since its formation, has refused to participate in alliances with the mainstream right – not that the mainstream right has particularly sought any alliance with the radical right. The National Front has often achieved impressive results in the first ballot, but it has regularly failed to solidify those gains in the second ballot (Elgie 2008). This highlights another effect of this two-ballot system: it tends to reduce the support for the extremes in favour of more centrist or ‘pragmatic’ parties (Sartori 1997: 65). Indeed, as Elgie (2008: 128) argues: ‘under such a system extreme parties have to choose either to remain marginalised and risk winning no seats or join an alliance that will fight elections at the centre and risk compromising their principles. In both cases, the threat they pose to the system is diminished’.

7.3. The National Front

The National Front (FN) was formed in 1972 in order to project a more forward-focused and unified voice to what was then a variety of extreme and radical right groupuscules and ‘ineffective sects’ (Shields 2007: 190; Ivaldi 2016). Its purpose, from conception, was to provide the extreme/radical right movement in France with a respectable public face through which the messaging of these various groups could be delivered to a wider audience (Shields 2007). Jean-Marie Le Pen was chosen as the leader of this new party because of his parliamentary experience, his military record, his nationalism, and his capacity for public speaking. Given the desire of the new National Front to appeal to a wider audience, his relative moderate stance when compared to his more extreme contemporaries would help bestow upon the party a degree of political respectability (Shields 2007).

Traditionally, the FN has favoured the expulsion of illegal immigrants, strict controls on asylum seekers and refugees, the ending of dual citizenship, the rejection of the automatic acquisition of French citizenship by immigrant-descended children born in France, and greater restrictions on the employment of non-Europeans (Carter 2005). Indeed, the ideological heart of the FN lies in its hostility towards both immigration and immigrants and its desire to protect French identity from foreign influence. All policy areas covered by the FN are subsumed into the immigration issue and are thus presented with an anti-immigration or xenophobic frame. For example, when the FN deals with the issue of security, the party expresses its concern about the 'overrepresentation of immigrants in crime' (Stockemer and Barisione 2016). Similarly, according to the FN, the major problem facing the welfare system is that 'immigrants are taking advantage of the social welfare system and other advantages that they cannot find in their home countries', while the labour market is faced with 'massive and uncontrolled immigration [which] takes more than 1 million jobs away from the French and severely punishes our economy by imposing costs of over 300 billion francs' (Stockemer and Barisione 2016). While the FN avoids any 'blatantly racist formulations', it does stress immutable cultural differences that prevent the meaningful integration of (particularly north African) immigrants into French society (Carter 2005).

The illiberal attitudes of the party on immigration and integration, and on minority rights more generally, are matched in its views towards the democratic political system in which it operates. While the FN is a nominally democratic party, Jean-Marie Le Pen's support for the authoritarian regimes of Franco, Pinochet, and Videla (Marcus 1995: 114) calls into question the sincerity with which the party claims to support democracy generally. Furthermore, the party's condemnation of the supposed decadence and corruption of the political class, and its desire to impose greater controls on the media, call into question its support for French democracy (see Mudde 2007). Indeed, the FN considers the National Assembly to 'no longer [be] an element of a parliamentary democracy, but a screen for a bureaucratic and technocratic system' (Marcus 1995: 114) and therefore advocates for the comprehensive reform of the system in favour of proportional representation, the use of referendums

and popular initiatives as exercised in Switzerland, and the strengthening of the presidency (Marcus 1995; Carter 2005). While such reforms might indicate a superficial commitment to democracy, when they are taken together, and considered against the backdrop of subordinating the rights of the individual to the 'sacred rights of the collective', they are less of a vehicle for the enhancement of participatory democracy and more of a sign of 'the desire to suppress organised interests, and curtail the rights and freedoms of individuals' (Carter 2005: 45). In short, they are indicators of anti-pluralism.

In 2011, Marine Le Pen replaced her father as leader of the party, and she very quickly sought to shed the FN of its extreme or radical image and present a more mainstream one. This process of 'demonisation' involved the suppression and removal of more extremist voices within the FN, including her own father who had continued to make comments on extermination camps being a mere 'detail of history'. It also entailed publicly stating that the party condemned anti-Semitism in all its forms (Ivaldi 2016: 232). Furthermore, the process involved a rhetorical or communicative shift in the presentation of FN policies and positions. For instance, in a move away from the party's traditional position of privileging Catholicism, Marine Le Pen began incorporating secularism, or *laïcité*, into the profile of the party. This concept was used in a very particular way, however. While it conventionally refers to the separation of church and state in France, and to religion being relegated to a private matter for the individual with no place in the public realm, the FN presented *laïcité* as the bulwark against multiculturalism and a way to protect French identity, and in doing so it became a vehicle for the demonisation and suppression of those communities considered unFrench, in particular, Muslims (Almeida 2013, 2017). The traditional denunciation of the Islamisation of France was therefore maintained but under the guise of secularism.

This rhetorical shift can also be seen in other issues such as abortion and immigration. While the FN had traditionally advocated for the outlawing of abortion, under Marine Le Pen, the party dropped this stance. Instead, the party would respect the right of women to choose, although this was framed as a free choice not to abort the pregnancy. Any women who wanted to abort their foetus would be

expected to pay for the cost of the procedure themselves, and the legality of abortion would be determined by referendum, rather than a simple passing of legislation (Almeida 2013). Thus, while the party did shift its position on the issue, in practice and in moral terms, there was a great deal of continuity. On immigration, a shift was also evident in that the party no longer prioritised the issue front and centre. Instead, it subsumed all other issues into the immigration one, for example interweaving it into wages, purchasing power, and security. The frame therefore shifted from anti-immigration being an end in itself, to a reduction of immigration being the solution to all the other issues facing France (Stockemer and Barisione 2016). The de-demonisation strategy, then, should be perceived as a purely rhetorical device designed to alter the packaging of the party's ideology rather than its contents (Bastow 2018). If anything, the election of Marine Le Pen as leader of the National Front corresponds to a radicalisation of the party's policies in terms of their nativist, authoritarian, or populist characteristics (Ivaldi 2016: 228).

7.4. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in France: 1995-2017

7.4.1. 1995 Presidential Elections

The 1995 presidential election was a three-way race between Jacques Chirac (RPR leader and Mayor of Paris), Edouard Balladur (RPR), and Lionel Jospin (PS), with the competition between Chirac and Balladur a major feature of the campaign (Goldey 1996; Machin 1996; Szarka 1996). While Balladur had initially performed strongly, his popularity suffered a setback following strikes²⁶, a scandal²⁷, and

²⁶ Proposed reductions in student finance and restrictions on taking additional degrees provoked days of strikes and mass demonstrations by students. This harmed Balladur's popularity among young voters and those with sympathies and connections to the students, while his subsequent concessions damaged his reputation among those who thought he appeared weak and too willing to back down in the face of protest (Goldey 1996; Machin 1996).

²⁷ Balladur suffered from a corruption scandal involving the Director of Social Housing in Hauts de Seine, Didier Schuller, and a certain Dr Jean-Pierre Maréchal who would encourage his nephew, an anti-corruption judge, to drop an investigation into Schuller. Schuller and Maréchal maintained that the whole affair was a set-up by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua to get Judge Halphen to drop the exchange. Rather than taking strident action, Balladur backed his Interior Minister and suffered from a worsening reputation as a result.

the government's inability to tackle unemployment.²⁸ As a result, Chirac became the dominant candidate of the mainstream right. Jospin had the backing of a relatively well-organised party, but the Socialist Party suffered from a poor public image as a result of its governmental record and internal feuding (Szarka 1996).

Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front diversified their offerings, discussing issues beyond immigration and law and order, seeking to link social problems, such as unemployment, crime, and poverty, to immigration and advocated the repatriation of immigrants, the exclusion of immigrants from welfare benefits, and the prioritising of French nationals in employment and housing as an antidote (Machin 1996; Mazey 1996). Importantly, Le Pen wanted to be seen as a responsible and serious statesman and hoped that the FN would become indispensable as an ally for the mainstream right parties. Chirac, however, had little to gain from overtures towards the FN and in response Le Pen criticised Chirac as 'Jospin, [but] only worse' (Goldey 1996: 105).

The results of the first round of the elections, summarised in Table 7.1, show Chirac trailing somewhat unexpectedly behind Jospin, and only moderately in front of Balladur. Meanwhile, the comparatively strong performance of Jospin and other left-wing contenders (making up much of the 'Other' category) indicates that the mainstream left was able to maintain its position even against the attempts by Chirac to trespass on leftist territory. Jean-Marie Le Pen's 15 percent represents a marginal improvement on the 14.4 percent he secured in 1988, and came after a series of strong performances in regional and European elections (Mazey 1996).

²⁸ Many felt that Balladur and his government were doing far too little or were otherwise failing to tackle the issue of unemployment (Goldey 1996). This popular feeling was seized on by Chirac, who made the battle against unemployment and associated social ills the centre of his campaign. Chirac advocated for cuts in employers' social security contributions, 'special measures' for the long-term unemployed, as well as an increase in wages (Mazey 1996). During the Christmas of 1994, a group of homeless people occupied an empty apartment block within the centre of Paris. Chirac aligned himself with this issue, supported those who had occupied the apartment block, criticised the government of Balladur for failing to do enough to tackle homelessness, and advocated for the requisition of empty properties to house the homeless (Machin 1996; Mazey 1996).

Table 7.1: French presidential election results, 1995.

Candidate	Party	First ballot	Second ballot
Jacques Chirac	RPR	20.84	52.64
Lionel Jospin	PS	23.30	47.36
Edouard Balladur	RPR	18.58	–
Jean-Marie Le Pen	FN	15.00	–
Other	Other	22.28	–
Total		100	100

Sources: Elgie 1996; Szarka 1996

Chirac and Jospin proceeded to the second round, in which Chirac focused his line of attack on Jospin's socialist leanings and on the failures of socialism (Szarka 1996). While much of the left mobilised behind Jospin, the electoral arithmetic proved a shoo-in for Chirac. In the first ballot, approximately 60 percent of the vote went to parties of the right (including Le Pen's 15 percent) while 40 percent went to the left. For victory, Jospin would have needed to secure the entirety of the left's vote and an additional 10 percent from the right. Thus, although Jospin did make inroads into the non-left vote, the odds were stacked in Chirac's favour (Szarka 1996).

Ultimately, the FN has failed to secure a strong electoral breakthrough in these elections. However, the party continued to benefit from the legitimisation of its policy agenda by the RPR and UDF which, since the 1980s, had pursued an accommodative policy vis-à-vis the FN on issues such as immigration, law and order, and anti-communism (Mazey 1996). The results represented a slight increase on previous performances, but the FN remained isolated from other parties. Indeed, Chirac refused to confront the FN directly. By maintaining silence with regard to the FN, Chirac hoped to reduce the public's exposure to its ideas and sought to imply that the FN was irrelevant (Szarka 1996). Maintaining this 'radio silence' allowed Chirac to address issues of 'social fracture' without providing overtures to the FN or further legitimising it. This attempt to isolate the FN – the so-called *cordon sanitaire* – became a fixture of relations between principal parties and the FN.

7.4.2. 1997 Parliamentary Elections

In April 1997, Jacques Chirac announced the dissolution of the National Assembly with elections scheduled for 25th May and 1st June. The government of Alain Juppé had been dealing with a series of economic issues, including unemployment and a high budget deficit. By April 1997, there was a slowdown in strikes, Chirac and Juppé experienced a slight boost in their personal ratings, and economic indicators on inflation and interest rates were looking good (Hainsworth 1998). This was most likely the best time to call for a renewed mandate.

The RPR and UDF initially stressed the problems of cohabitation with regard to internal French politics but also with respect to France's role within the European Union. A vote for the Socialist Party was framed as an anti-European vote that would result in disruption and the renegeing of commitments already made. The RPR and UDF also focused on criticising the credibility of the Socialist Party generally, and especially its relationship to the Communist Party (PCF) (Hainsworth 1998). The RPR-UDF alliance promised measures of budgetary control, tax reductions, greater environmental protections, and legislation to focus on social cohesion. The Socialist Party wanted to reduce the length of the working week from 39 to 35 hours (without any loss of pay), halt the government's privatisation programme, reduce consumption taxes on essential goods, and make more resources available for culture and research (Hainsworth 1998). On the issues of taxes, support for small business, decentralisation, and other issues, there was a great deal of overlap between the RPR-UDF and PS. Where strong differences did emerge, such as on immigration reform, the RPR and UDF were uncharacteristically quiet. This ensured that such issues did not gain saliency in the campaign and was an attempt to quash the FN vote (Hainsworth 1998).

The FN's campaign targeted Chirac personally, criticising his motivations for dissolving parliament, and suggesting he should resign if the right failed to win a majority (Hainsworth 1998). The pro-European position adopted by Chirac resulted in him being accused of 'selling out the French nation', and the dissolution of the National Assembly was portrayed as a mechanism by which to make the French

people accomplices in ‘national suicide’. Jean-Marie Le Pen was presented as offering ‘the real alternative’ to the corrupt mainstream parties (Hainsworth 1998: 75).

The results of the election, as summarised in Table 7.2, show a resounding success for the Socialist Party. The PS won 23.5 percent of the vote in the first round, and increased its share to 38.6 percent in the second round (IPU n.d.-a). By contrast, the RPR and UDF performed poorly, and in the first round, they registered the lowest vote for the mainstream right since the creation of the Fifth Republic (Hainsworth 1998). While the two parties did improve their share of the vote substantially between rounds, the second ballot confirmed the general swing to the left.

These elections were once again characterised by the desire of the principal parties to downplay the importance of the National Front. Electoral alliances between the right-wing principal parties (RPR and UDF) and the National Front were never considered, and issues strongly associated with the National Front were downplayed and reduced in salience to prevent any electoral benefit for the FN. The FN secured around 15 percent of the vote, as it had done in the previous presidential election, but failed to convert this vote share into a significant number of seats, ultimately winning a single seat. This compares to the 113 seats won by the UDF on a similar share of the vote.

Table 7.2: French parliamentary election results, 1997.

Party	First round		Second round		Seats	
	Percent	+/-	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Socialist Party (PS)	23.53	5.94	38.6	9.95	250	196
Rally for the Republic (RPR)	15.7	-4.69	22.7	-5.57	140	-107
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	14.22	-4.86	21	-4.85	113	-100
Communist Party (PCF)	9.94	0.76	3.7	-0.91	36	13
National Front (NF)	14.94	2.53	5.7	0.04	1	1
Other	21.67	0.32	8.3	1.34	37	-3
Total	100		100		577	

Source: IPU n.d.-a

7.4.3. 2002 Presidential Elections

In the 2002 presidential elections, neither Chirac nor Jospin bothered to campaign vigorously in the first round. Both candidates considered their progression to the second round to be a mere formality. Indeed, Jospin only declared his candidature 60 days before the first ballot, while Chirac declared some 90 days before. In declaring so late, the two front runners were hoping to enjoy the benefits of incumbency for as long as possible, while also allowing the minor candidates to exhaust themselves before the final run (Cole 2002; Kuhn 2002).

The election campaign generally centred on the theme of insecurity, which covered national security and law and order, but also the impact of globalisation and immigration on French culture and identity (Kuhn 2002). A series of events had set the campaign agenda some months previously: violence and disorder in France, a crisis in the Middle East, and most pressingly, the terror attacks in the United States on the 11th of September 2001. While unemployment is usually the most important issue in French elections, polls showed that these events had caused a shift in the issue agenda in favour of insecurity, a theme that Chirac grasped eagerly and brought to the forefront of his campaign (Cole 2002; Kuhn 2002). The Jospin campaign suffered from a perceived lack of sincerity, as Jospin jumped between more centrist and left-wing positions (Cole 2002). Perhaps ironically, Jospin was also a victim of his own governments' success in that by reducing unemployment, the issue of unemployment had fallen in importance, and therefore allowed for a shift of the agenda toward insecurity, which was weaker territory for Jospin and the wider left (Cole 2002).

Other important issues such as European Union, pensions, healthcare, and public finances, were inconspicuously missing from the agenda. This was largely the result of the period of cohabitation between Chirac and Jospin, which robbed both candidates of the ability to distance themselves from one another for stronger strategic positioning (Fieschi 2002).

The theme of insecurity was fertile territory for the National Front and its leader, whose campaign focused on the usual issues: security, immigration, and identity. In this campaign Le Pen also adopted

a more sophisticated, elder statesman-like posture. He confidently expected that events and the campaign agenda – and Chirac’s eagerness to capitalise on the issue of insecurity in particular – would play well for him and his party (Cole 2002; Miguet 2002).

The results – which are reported in Table 7.3 – shocked both the nation and the international community. Jospin polled a mere 16.2 percent of the vote and was relegated into third place, behind Jean-Marie Le Pen who won 16.9 percent of ballots. And while Chirac topped the poll, the mainstream right collectively only won 31.8 percent of the vote in the first round. This was an historic low and Chirac himself polled the lowest result of any outgoing president of the Fifth Republic (Cole 2002).

Table 7.3: French presidential election results, 2002.

Candidate	Party	First ballot	Second ballot
Jacques Chirac	RPR	19.88	82.21
Jean-Marie Le Pen	FN	16.86	17.79
Lionel Jospin	PS	16.18	
François Bayrou	UDF	6.84	
Other	Other	40.24	
Total		100	100

Source: Kuhn 2002

This election was characterised by a significant fragmentation of the vote, a fact best highlighted by examining the total share of the vote won by non-principal parties in the presidential contests of 1995 and 2002. In 1995, non-principal parties polled a respectable 37.3 percent of the vote, or 22.28 percent when excluding the National Front. This compared to 57.1 percent and 40.24 percent respectively in the 2002 presidential election.

During the second round of the election, the only issue on the agenda was that of Jean-Marie Le Pen himself. The two weeks between the ballots were characterised by a significant mobilisation of civil society, with hundreds of thousands of people participating in anti-Le Pen protests across the country, and particularly in Paris (Kuhn 2002). The decisiveness of the second round spoke to this mobilisation

against Le Pen: Chirac was re-elected with the 'largest proportion of the registered vote in any democratic election anywhere in recent memory' (Cole 2002: 333; see also Fieschi 2002). Left-wing voters justified their support for Chirac as preferring *l'escroc* (the criminal) to *le facho* (the fascist) and in essence, the second round was a referendum on democracy and opposition to Le Pen (Cole 2002; Fieschi 2002).

7.4.4. 2002 Parliamentary Elections

The 2002 parliamentary elections were held on the 9th and 16th of June. They were dominated by the issue of cohabitation and by Chirac's demand for institutional and ideological coherence – i.e., the presidential party (now the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)) controlling both the presidency and the National Assembly. Therefore, for the right, 'cohabitation' was the main enemy and focus, and Chirac concentrated solely on asking voters for a parliamentary majority to support the presidency (Fieschi 2002). The Socialist Party made attempts to dissuade voters from handing the president such a majority. However, this message was undermined by the rather harsh criticism of cohabitation that Jospin and his aides had made during the presidential election (Cole 2002; Fieschi 2002). Furthermore, Jospin's defeat in that election, and his subsequent resignation as party leader, meant that the Socialist Party's upper organisation had collapsed and that there was little attempt to defend the government's record. What characterised the parliamentary campaign, then, was the complete absence of any real campaign (Fieschi 2002).

The results of these elections, reported in Table 7.4, show the UMP gaining seven percentage points since 1997, and winning 65 percent of all seats in the National Assembly. Chirac's desire for a strong UMP presence in the National Assembly was therefore granted by voters. By contrast, the fortunes of most other parties were somewhat bleak. While the Socialist Party only lost 3.4 percentage points, this translated to a loss of 101 seats. The UDF's losses were also large, as were those of the Communist Party. The results were also particularly negative for the National Front. The party's vote share in both

rounds was significantly lower than in 1997 (-3.6 and -3.9 percentage points respectively), and it lost its only seat in the National Assembly.

Table 7.4: French parliamentary election results, 2002.

Party	First round		Second round		Seats	
	Percent	+/-	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	33.3	19.08	47.26	24.56	364	224
Socialist Party (PS)	24.11	0.58	35.26	-3.34	149	-101
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	4.86	-9.36	3.92	-17.08	30	-83
Communist Party (PCF)	4.82	-5.12	3.26	-0.44	22	-14
National Front (FN)	11.34	-3.6	1.85	-3.85	0	-1
Other	21.57	-0.1	8.45	0.15	12	-25
Total	100		100		577	

Source: IPU n.d.-b

5.4.5. 2007 Presidential Elections

In 2007, neither the incumbent President, Jacques Chirac, nor his former Socialist Party challenger, Lionel Jospin, were willing or indeed able to run for the presidency, and therefore new candidates emerged. Nicholas Sarkozy, the former Minister of the Economy and Minister of the Interior, had been selected by an overwhelming majority (98.1 percent) of the UMP's selectorate, while Ségolène Royal emerged as the PS candidate (Kuhn 2007; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008). The two other leading presidential candidates were François Bayrou for the UDF and Jean-Marie Le Pen for the FN.

The campaign kicked off in December 2006 and was widely considered to be a contest between Sarkozy and Royal. In stark contrast to the approach of his predecessor, Sarkozy sought to make overt overtures to the voting base of the FN. He tried to capitalise on his tenure as Minister of the Interior, adopting a staunchly right-wing position on a variety of issues including immigration and law and order. He also proposed the creation of a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity. Alongside this, he adopted a distinctly neo-liberal economic programme that advocated tax cuts, greater work incentives, and a rejection of the 35-hour week introduced by Jospin (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a;

Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008). Royal advocated an increase in the minimum wage, the creation of 500,000 new jobs (especially for young people), and encouragements for employers to hire graduates. She also promised to review the 35-hour week (Spoon 2008). She too sought to entice FN voters by playing up the importance of the French flag and national anthem (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008).

Interestingly, François Bayrou (UDF) managed to emerge as a credible challenger, with his polling figures increasing from 6 percent in December 2006 to an impressive 20 percent in February 2007 – a figure sufficient to threaten Royal’s progression into the second round of voting (Marthaler 2007a; Sauger 2007). Bayrou’s advance in the polls was as a result of three factors: growing concerns regarding Royal’s suitability for the presidency and fears of Sarkozy’s authoritarian, even Bonapartist, personality; his focus on the educated, middle-aged, and middle-class elements of the electorate, groups that Sarkozy and Royal failed to appeal to sufficiently; and his ‘ambiguously populist’ style and rhetoric – denouncing the left-right cleavage of French politics, criticising the media for their supposed bias, and condemning the immorality of the other candidates, especially Sarkozy (Sauger 2007: 117).

The significant inroads made by candidates of principal parties had the effect of crowding out Jean-Marie Le Pen. The results for the election, reported in Table 7.5, show just how well Sarkozy did in capturing the mainstream right electorate as well as a significant chunk of the FN one (Kuhn 2007). He performed better than Chirac had done in 1988, 1995, and 2002, a fact partly attributed to his explicit appeal to FN voters (Kuhn 2007). Royal won 25.9 percent of the vote – an increase of 9.7 percentage points over Jospin in 2002 – while Bayrou polled a respectable 18.6 percent of the vote – an increase of 11.7 percentage points on his 2002 score. The first round of this election was therefore characterised by high levels of support for principal party candidates, and the failure of candidates from radical or extreme parties (Kuhn 2007; Spoon 2008). Indeed, not only did Le Pen fail to break through into the second round, as he had done in the 2002 contest, but the 10.4 percent of the vote he secured was his lowest in all presidential elections since the early 1980s. Indeed, in 2007 he lost over a million voters as compared to 2002 (Kuhn 2007).

Table 7.5: French presidential election results, 2007.

Candidate	Party	First ballot	Second ballot
Nicholas Sarkozy	UMP	31.18	53.06
Ségolène Royal	PS	25.87	46.94
François Bayrou	UDF	18.57	
Jean-Marie Le Pen	FN	10.44	
Other	Other	13.94	
Total		100	100

Sources: Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008

After the first round, Royal sought to secure Bayrou's voters, with some success, and while Bayrou did not openly tell his supporters which candidate to favour in this second round, he implicitly backed Royal. The majority of the UDF cadre supported Sarkozy, however, and this ultimately led to the splintering of the UDF. Following the election, the majority of the UDF deputies (25 of 29) joined the UMP in coalition, and created the New Centre (*Nouveau Centre*), while Bayrou and the remaining rump of the party formed the Democrats' Movement, or MoDem (Sauger 2007).

7.4.6. 2007 Parliamentary Elections

The 2007 legislative elections took place on 10th and 17th June. The UMP campaign was led by Prime Minister François Fillon, while the Socialist campaign was led by party leader François Hollande (Marthaler 2007b). The campaign was generally dominated by the issue of the size of the majority for the UMP (Marthaler 2007b; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008).

The results of the election are reported in Table 7.6. In the first round, the UMP won just shy of 40 percent of the vote and saw some 98 candidates elected to the National Assembly (IPU n.d.-c). The Socialist Party gained a much lower vote share, winning just under 25 percent of the vote – a result similar to its first round one in 2002. In this first round, the combined vote share for all non-principal roughly was similar to that in 2002, although the FN's vote collapsed from 11.3 percent in 2002 to 4.8 in 2007. This was the party's worst result since 1981 when it scored a low of 0.4 percent.

In the week between the two rounds of voting, Jean-Louis Borloo, the new Minister of Economics, Finance, and Employment, proposed an increase in VAT for most goods and services so as to reduce payroll taxes for employers (Marthaler 2007b; Spoon 2008). This move hurt the popularity of the new government and helped the Socialist Party make significant gains in the second round of voting. By the end of this second round, the UMP and its allies had managed to secure 343 seats (313 for the UMP itself), while the Socialist Party won 186 seats, or with allies, 205.

Table 7.6: French parliamentary election results, 2007.

Party	First round		Second round		Seats	
	Percent	+/-	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	39.45	6.15	46.36	-0.9	313	-51
Socialist Party (PS)	24.73	0.62	42.26	7	186	37
Communist Party (PCF)	4.29	-0.53	2.28	-0.98	15	-7
Union for French Democracy (UDF)	7.61	2.75	0.49	-3.43	3	-27
National Front (FN)	4.79	-6.55	0.08	-1.77	0	0
Other	19.13	-2.44	8.53	0.08	60	48
Total	100		100		577	

Sources: Sauger 2007; IPU n.d.-c

Note: FN score inclusive of other, smaller, extreme right parties

7.4.7. 2012 Presidential Elections

The two rounds of the 2012 presidential elections were held on 22nd April and 6th May. Incumbent president Nicholas Sarkozy was given a clear run within the UMP as other possible candidates, such as Prime Minister François Fillon, delayed their ambitions until 2017, while for the Socialist Party, François Hollande emerged as the presidential nominee (Kuhn 2013).

Sarkozy entered the campaign with the lowest popularity of any French president. His personal excesses, such as hosting a post-election celebration in a luxury restaurant, his pursuit of friendships with the wealthiest and most powerful people in business and media, his near authoritarian style of

governing, and his general rudeness to voters²⁹ and opponents, made many voters feel that he was unfit to hold the presidential office (Hewlett 2012; Cole 2013; Evans and Ivaldi 2013). In addition, and perhaps most damagingly, he also showed himself prepared to use his position as president to engage in the 'grubbier elements of [party] finance and patronage' (Evans and Ivaldi 2013: 16).

The 2012 campaign took place during an ongoing global economic crisis from which France was not spared (Cole 2013). France's economy had deteriorated substantially, GDP growth was virtually non-existent, the trade deficit was abysmal, and unemployment increased (Evans and Ivaldi 2013; Kuhn 2013). In response, the Sarkozy-Fillon government had engaged in a process of austerity, seeking to reduce the public deficit in part through spending cuts and additional taxes (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). The downgrading of France's credit rating (from Triple-A to AA+) by Standard and Poor was a particular blow to Sarkozy's re-election attempts. Unsurprisingly, this was leapt upon by the Socialists who argued that this was indicative of the president's failure to get to grips with the financial crisis, and of the harm that his policies had done to France (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). However, while the downgrading of the credit rating provided an avenue of attack for the Socialists, it also constrained the promises that they were able to make. Ultimately, the Socialists proposed additional taxes on the wealthy and additional Keynesian measures to increase youth employment (Hewlett 2012; see also Kuhn 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014).

Sarkozy sought to once again capitalise on the cultural issues that helped him secure victory in 2007. He promised to reduce immigration and, make it harder for immigrants to claim benefits, and he regularly suggested that immigration was strongly correlated with crime and declining prosperity (Hewlett 2012). Unfortunately for Sarkozy, voters for whom these issues were important had become disillusioned with him and the UMP, and therefore shifted toward the National Front. Not only did the FN promise to go much further than Sarkozy on these issues, but, under Marine Le Pen, it had also

²⁹ At an agricultural show in February 2008, Sarkozy reached out to shake the hand of a voter. The voter rejected this advance, and Sarkozy responded by saying 'casse-toi, pauvre con', which is politely translated as 'get lost then you bloody idiot, just get lost!' (Kirby 2008).

engaged in a process of detoxification, increasing its respectability and rendering it more mainstream (see above). This process was helped by Nicolas Sarkozy. He not only legitimised the issue agenda of the National Front, but he also described the National Front as a normal, ‘democratic’ party (Mondon 2013). Le Pen focused her campaign on national identity, law and order, immigration, and to a lesser extent, economics. She proposed a series of taxes to support French manufacturers, revive former industrial areas, and protect small businesses (Hewlett 2012).

The results of the election, as summarised in Table 7.7, show a reversal of fortunes for Sarkozy. In the first round, he polled 27.2 percent, 4 percentage points less than he had in 2007. By contrast, Hollande polled a slightly stronger 28.6 percent, which represented a minor increase of 2.8 percentage points on Royal’s 2007 score. The main winners, in terms of biggest increases in vote share, were Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the Left Front. Le Pen scored 17.9 percent of the vote, gaining 7.5 percentage points on her father’s 2007 score, while Mélenchon polled 11.1 percent, an increase of 9.2 percentage points on the Communist Party’s 2007 score.

Table 7.7: French presidential election results, 2012.

Candidate	Party	First ballot	Second ballot
François Hollande	PS	28.63	51.64
Nicholas Sarkozy	UMP	27.18	48.36
Marine Le Pen	FN	17.9	
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	PG	11.1	
François Bayrou	UDF	9.13	
Other	Other	6.06	
Total		100	100

Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2013

The campaign between the two rounds was dominated by the strategic need of both leading candidates to maximise their electoral appeal beyond their core support. Hollande had a clear lead in this regard in that candidates of the left, most importantly Mélenchon, explicitly called for their voters to back Hollande. By contrast, Sarkozy lacked any significant reservoir of support, and his attempts to

attract large numbers of FN voters were scuppered somewhat by Marine Le Pen saying she would cast a blank ballot (Hewlett 2012; Kuhn 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014). Sarkozy did manage to attract some Bayrou voters and many Le Pen ones, but he failed to secure them in sufficient numbers to win (Kuhn 2013).

Sarkozy had promised big in 2007, and had reaped the rewards thereafter. His attempts to repeat this success in 2012, however, were unsuccessful. For FN voters and sympathisers, if the 2007 presidential election suggested a preference for a principal party copy, the 2012 election confirmed a preference for the radical right original.

7.4.8. 2012 Parliamentary Elections

The parliamentary elections were their usual lacklustre affair, with greater emphasis placed on strategic considerations than on substantive issues. The Socialists and the newly elected president Hollande announced several reforms that built on the presidential campaign, including an increase in the minimum wage, a reduction of the retirement age, and new laws on sexual harassment (no doubt influenced by the storm created by the scandal surrounding former IMF managing director and one-time Socialist Party front-runner Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was accused of and arrested for sexually assaulting a maid in a New York hotel. The main initiative of the Socialists and Hollande, however, was trying to persuade German Chancellor Angela Merkel of the need for a package to stimulate Eurozone growth and the relaxation of the austerity regime (Kuhn 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014). The UMP, now rudderless following in the wake of Sarkozy's loss in the presidential elections, focused almost exclusively on the issue of immigration (Merle and Patterson 2014). In light of this, Marine Le Pen devoted substantial attention to convincing the UMP to drop the *cordon sanitaire* against the National Front, and directed directing local leaders of the FN to initiate talks with their UMP counterparts (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). While the *cordon sanitaire* was maintained by the

UMP at the national level, there was some indication that it faltered at the local level, with some local UMP leaders making overtures to the FN (Evans and Ivaldi 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014).

The results of the 2012 parliamentary election, as summarised in Table 7.8, show a strong performance by the Socialist Party, but nothing resembling the ‘hegemonic status’ achieved by the UMP in 2007 (Evans and Ivaldi 2013: 167). Indeed, the Socialist Party’s performance in the second round actually represented a decrease in its vote share of 1.4 percentage points on 2007. Fortunately for the Socialists, the UMP’s losses were even greater. The UMP polled 38 percent of the vote in the second round – a loss of 8.4 percentage points on 2007. This meant that even with a lower share of the vote in the second round, the Socialist Party was able to increase its share of seats from 186 in 2007 to 280 in 2012. Yet, while it could claim victory, this did not compare to the sheer dominance of the UMP in 2007. The National Front, by contrast, had one of its best showings in years. The party polled 13.6 percent of the vote in the first round and 3.7 in the second. This marked a drastic increase in its score compared to 2007 when it had polled a mere 3.8 percent in the first round, and just 0.1 percent in the second. This even translated into the election of two deputies. This was the first time the FN has won a seat in the National Assembly since 1997, and was the party’s strongest showing, in terms of seats, since 1986.

Table 7.8: French parliamentary election results, 2012.

Party	First round		Second round		Seats	
	Percent	+/-	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Socialist Party (PS)	29.35	4.62	40.91	-1.35	280	94
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	27.12	-12.33	37.95	-8.41	194	-119
Communist Party (PCF)	6.91	2.62	1.08	-1.2	10	-5
Democratic Movement (MoDem)	1.77	-5.84	0.49	0	2	-1
National Front (FN)	13.6	8.81	3.66	3.58	2	2
Other	21.25	2.12	15.91	7.38	89	29
Total	100		100		577	

Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2013

Note: PCF score is inclusive of the Left Party (PG) as both parties were in an electoral coalition

7.4.9. 2017 Presidential Elections

The 2017 presidential elections were held on 23rd April and 7th May. Benoît Hamon stood for the Socialists, while François Fillon was selected as the Republicans candidate.³⁰ The biggest shake up of the election was the presence of Emmanuel Macron, former minister for industrial renewal under Hollande, who reinvented himself as an outsider candidate attached to a new party, On The Move!³¹

At the outset of the campaign, there were four main candidates who had a realistic chance of making it through to the second round. Each represented a different ideological approach: Fillon, stood for economic liberalism and social conservatism; Macron offered pro-European (economic and social) liberalism; Le Pen put forward a somewhat incoherent blend of anti-liberal, anti-EU, right-wing radicalism; and Mélenchon, a former socialist who ran under the banner France Unbowed (a coalition of smaller, leftist parties), advocated an anti-liberal, Eurosceptic, left-wing radicalism (Gougou and Persico 2017; Kuhn 2017).

The campaign itself covered familiar themes: the minimum wage, the length of the working week, the deficit, immigration, as well as some other issues such as gay rights. Fillon proposed a fairly run-of-the-mill neo-liberal manifesto, which advocated lowering taxes, reforming benefits, and eradicating the deficit (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017). Much of this was echoed by the equally economically-liberal

³⁰ Of the Socialist Party's potential candidates, of prime importance were Manuel Valls, Prime Minister under Hollande; Benoît Hamon, former education minister within Valls' government; and Arnaud Montebourg, minister for industrial renewal under Valls. Valls advocated for business-friendly, supply-side reforms, a tough law-and-order approach, and greater restrictions on immigration, even going so far as to question whether or not Islam was compatible with French culture (Vinocur 2016). By contrast, Hamon and Montebourg were on the left-wing of the Socialist Party. Both advocated for an end to austerity, an increase in the minimum wage, and stimulus spending. What separated them was the generally protectionist platform offered by Montebourg and the introduction of a universal basic income by Hamon (Hewlett 2017). Ultimately Hamon won the Socialist Party's nomination, and maintained the same basic platform for the presidential election. The Republican primary included five candidates, the most important of whom were Nicholas Sarkozy, Alain Juppé, and Fillon. Initially, the primary was considered a closed contest between Sarkozy and Juppé but Fillon's strong performance boosted his polling numbers substantially (franceinfo 2016). Much like his 2007 and 2012 presidential contests, Sarkozy emphasised immigration, security and the incompatibility of Islam. These themes were also addressed by Juppé and Fillon, although Juppé adopted a less restrictive or less 'authoritarian' approach, while Fillon emphasised economic issues (Kuhn 2017). Fillon emerged victorious with some two-thirds of the registered vote.

³¹ The initials of which, EM, are the same as Emmanuel Macron's.

Macron. Macron also focused on the issue of employment opportunities for young people, something missing from Fillon's platform (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017). On the economic front, then, Fillon was somewhat crowded out by Macron (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017).

On Europe, Fillon suggested the 'eventual' renegotiation of the European Convention on Human Rights and an end to EU expansion (Lees 2017). Yet again, however, Fillon found himself crowded out. In essence, Fillon was not pro-European enough to prevent pro-EU centre-right voters abandoning him in favour of Macron, nor sufficiently Eurosceptical enough to avoid losses to the National Front and Le Pen (Lees 2017).

On social issues, Fillon adopted Sarkozian positions on immigration, designed to appeal to FN voters, as well as conventionally conservative positions on gay marriage, adoption, and Islam (Hewlett 2017). These were of course issues raised by Marine Le Pen and the National Front, who argued in favour of ending 'uncontrolled immigration', as well as promoting French secularism as an antidote to the 'Islamisation of French society' (Hewlett 2017). In the social sphere, then, Fillon was less radical than Le Pen but too illiberal for many centrist voters.

The biggest threat to Fillon's candidacy, however, was not the squeeze from Macron and Le Pen, but a publication from the satirical magazine *Le Canard enchaîné* that alleged that Fillon had paid his wife hundreds of thousands of euros, out of taxpayers' money, for work that she did not do, and his children sums for legal services before they had become qualified lawyers. The magazine also reported that he has accepted donations from a Lebanese businessman in exchange for being introduced to Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin (Hewlett 2017; Kuhn 2017; Lees 2017; Evans and Ivaldi 2018; Durovic 2019).

The results, summarised in Table 7.9, show a relatively tight contest in the first round between Macron, Le Pen, Fillon, and Mélenchon. The closeness of the result reflected the fact that both the Republicans and the Socialist Party had chosen relatively polarising candidates who ultimately failed to unify their parties behind them. As a result, Macron was able to steal centrist and right-wing

members of the Socialist Party, as well as centrist and more liberal members of the Republicans (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). Furthermore, the selection of relatively ideologically extreme candidates by the principal parties legitimised proximal radical alternatives such as France Unbowed and the National Front (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). In the end, with 24 and 21.3 percent of the vote respectively, Macron and Le Pen advanced to the second round of voting. Fillon was narrowly beaten into third place by Le Pen, a consequence attributed to a combination of his failure to effectively trespass on FN territory, the fact that he left his centrist flank open to Macron, and the scandal involving his financial impropriety. The results also show a shift among left-wing voters away from Hamon and the Socialist Party towards Mélenchon who came a close fourth.

Table 7.9: French presidential election results, 2017.

Candidate	Party	First ballot	Second ballot
Emmanuel Macron	EM	24.01	66.1
Marine Le Pen	FN	21.3	33.9
François Fillon	LR	20.01	
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	LFI	19.58	
Benoît Hamon	PS	6.36	
Other	Other	8.74	
Total		100	100

Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2018

Between the two rounds of the election a TV debate was held between Macron and Le Pen. This was widely considered to be a disaster for Le Pen, who was perceived as being aggressive and rude towards Macron. Her performance also contrasted markedly to the calmer and softer image that she had been cultivating as part of her de-demonisation strategy. This, and her supposed incompetence in the debate were considered by many to have cost her the presidency (Durovic 2017; Kuhn 2017; Meny 2017). An alternative reading, however, is that Le Pen's approach to these debates was rooted in a realisation that she could never win the election. According to this view, then, her aggressive tone was designed to demobilise potential Macron supporters, especially those from the Fillon and Mélenchon

camps, while at the same time positioning the FN as the official opposition to a future President Macron (Evans and Ivaldi 2018: 117).

7.4.10. 2017 Parliamentary Elections

The parliamentary elections, held just over a month later, brought a resounding success for Macron’s Republic on the Move. As reported in Table 7.10, the party scored an impressive 43.1 percent of the vote in the second round, and severely weakened the two principal parties, the Republicans and the Socialist Party, which scored 22.2 and 5.7 percent respectively. Both these parties had shifted their programmes towards Macron’s, abandoning some of their more radical proposals, including universal basic income (for the PS) and anti-immigration positions (for the LR). However, this proved insufficient, and both parties were severely divided during the campaign, with big hitters within both camps absent, and some leading Socialist figures, including Hamon himself, jumping ship (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). By contrast, the results were an improvement for the National Front. Not only did the FN manage to outpoll the Socialist Party, but it secured 8 deputies, its highest figure since 1986.

Table 7.10: French parliamentary election results, 2017.

Party	First round		Second round		Seats	
	Percent	+/-	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
The Republic on the Move (LREM)	28.21		43.06		308	
The Republicans (LR)	15.77	-11.35	22.23	-15.72	112	-82
Socialist Party (PS)	7.44	-21.91	5.68	-35.23	30	-250
France Unbowed (LFI)	11.03		4.86		17	
National Front (FN)	13.2	-0.4	8.75	5.09	8	6
Other	24.35	3.1	15.42	-0.49	102	13
Total	100		100		577	

Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2018

This section has provided an overview of the campaigns, the issues at stake, and the manoeuvrings of the parties and candidates in all presidential and parliamentary elections between 1995 and 2017. Now, the next section turns its attention more squarely to the strategies of the principal parties, and more specifically to their strategies in regard to the National Front.

7.5. An overview of principal party strategies

During the period 1995-2017, French principal parties have adopted a rather consistent approach in terms of their strategies vis-à-vis the National Front. Broadly speaking, the Socialist Party has tended to favour the two-dimensional adversarial approach – that is, it positions itself on the cultural dimension of competition as well as the economic one, and has adopted a position that stands in contrast to the National Front. The PS adopted this approach some decades ago so as to shut down competition between itself and the FN, and to instead encourage competition between the FN and the mainstream right (mainly the RPR) (Meguid 2008). The PS has deviated from this approach on occasion, yet even in these instances, it has adopted strategies that meant it did not directly compete with the National Front. For example, in the 1997 legislative elections it chose to use a one-dimensional dismissive strategy, ignoring the cultural dimension of competition, while in the 2002 elections it employed a blurring strategy. Neither of these strategies challenge the FN on the cultural dimension, and nor do they increase the saliency of cultural issues.

By contrast, the centre-right UDF (later the Democratic Movement) and RPR (later the Union for a Popular Movement, and then the Republicans) have tended to accommodate the National Front by adopting positions on the cultural dimension akin to those of the National Front (e.g., restrictionist positions on immigration). As with the PS, however, both the UDF and RPR have deviated from this approach. In the 1997 legislative elections, both the UDF and RPR adopted blurring strategies. The UMP did the same in the 2002 elections. Of particular interest, however, is the success and failure of the two-dimensional accommodative strategy employed by Nicholas Sarkozy and the UMP in 2007

and 2012 respectively. Sarkozy made immigration a key component of his election campaigns and was forthright in his overtures to the National Front. Ultimately, this approach helped him secure victory in the presidential and legislative elections of 2007. These elections, then, would seem to confirm Meguid's prediction that the adoption of an accommodative strategy against the radical right would reduce the latter's vote share. To recall from above, the FN's vote share in the presidential elections fell from 16.9 percent (first round) in 2002 to 10.4 percent in 2007, while its vote share in the legislative elections fell from 11.3 percent (first round) in 2002 to 4.3 percent (first round) in 2007. However, when Sarkozy sought to replicate this approach in 2012, the FN's vote share increased to 18 percent in the presidential elections (first round) while its vote share in the legislative elections increased to 13.6 percent (first round). The failure to steal FN voters meant that Sarkozy lost the election to Hollande (see above).

Despite the issue accommodation from the centre right parties, all the principal parties have also sought to politically isolate the National Front through the imposition of the *cordon sanitaire*. This, essentially, is an implicit agreement between the principal parties that none of them will make an electoral pact with the National Front. The aim of this is to make full use of the two-round electoral system so as to ensure that the National Front is limited in its ability to translate its vote share into seats in the National Assembly, or in its ability to progress into the second round of the presidential elections.

Of course, the strategies of the principal parties need to also be set in the political context of each election, and therefore the next section concerns itself with a number of factors that are likely to impact on the efficacy of principal party strategies (see Chapter 5). These are the issue agenda, French voter attitudes to immigration, the reputation of candidates and parties, levels of voter satisfaction in the functioning of democracy, and levels of (dis)trust that voters have in politicians.


7.6. Introducing Political Context, France.

7.6.1. The Issue Agenda

One of the fundamental pillars on which this thesis' model of competition is built upon is the notion that political parties selectively emphasise particular issues, while downplaying or ignoring others, and seeking to establish an ownership over issues considered favourable (Chapter 2; see also Carmines and Stimson 1980; Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Once a political party has developed ownership over a particular issue, it should increase its vote share among voters for whom that issue is important (Petrocik 1996; Holian 2004). Given the significant effort that Sarkozy and the UMP put into addressing the issue of immigration, one would expect it to be a relatively salient issue. However, when looking to French voters' perceptions of the most important issues facing their country, very few seem to believe immigration is all that important. Indeed, as is confirmed in Figure 7.1, cultural issues have tended to take second place to economic issues, particularly that of unemployment. In fact, unemployment has been the dominant issue in every French election for which there is available data (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b).

Given the relatively strong electoral performance of the National Front, the low ranking of immigration among the most important issues is somewhat surprising. Moreover, the data shows that overall, cultural issues are not considered the most important by French voters. Indeed, only crime is present in the top five issues (averaged over the three most recent electoral periods). The issues of terrorism and immigration, both represented by the cultural dimension, are ranked sixth and seventh respectively. The top four issues are all economic: unemployment (first), the economic situation (second), prices and inflation (third), and government debt (fifth).

Figure 7.1: Issue saliency in France, 2007-2017.



Source: European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b


While the attention devoted to the issue of immigration by principal parties and the National Front seems disproportionate to the general saliency of the issue, it is nonetheless clear that Sarkozy’s initial accommodation of the National Front in 2007 – and which was set in train during his stint as the Minister of the Interior (2005 - 2007) – successfully transferred a sufficient proportion of votes away from the Le Pens and the National Front. While the saliency of immigration between 2007 and 2012 did not change all that much – with some 5 percent of respondents believing it to be one of the most important issues in 2007, compared to 6 percent in 2012 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b)³² – the perception of who was best able to deal with the issue of immigration did change significantly. In 2007, 40.9 percent of voters believed that Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front were best placed to deal with immigration, while a somewhat lower 32.2 percent believed Sarkozy and the UMP were best placed. By 2012, however, this had changed quite

³² The Eurobarometer surveys give respondents two choices, and therefore totals add up to 200 percent. In the reporting of these, this section rescales the data to add up to 100 percent.

significantly with over 67 percent favouring Marine Le Pen and the National Front on the issue, as compared to 19.4 percent backing Sarkozy and the UMP (FES 2007, 2012; Carvalho 2019). In short, the extent to which the Le Pens and the FN were seen to own the immigration issue increased drastically during this period.

Even if the salience of immigration has been relatively low, the 2007 elections showed that this territory is still fertile enough to allow a principal party to win over sufficient voters from the National Front for the principal party to win the election. Indeed, anti-immigration feeling in France seems to be more widespread than the saliency of immigration might initially suggest. The Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index shows that France is below the Western European average when it comes to how accepting people are of new arrivals (Esipova et al. 2017). On this index, France ranks at 6.46 while the European average (and median) stands at 6.61 (Esipova et al. 2017). While this difference is small, it definitely puts France within the more immigration-hostile group of European countries, with only Austria and Belgium being less welcoming. Similarly, and as shown in Figure 7.2, a majority of voters between 1995 and 2017 believed that there were too many immigrants in France. The percentage of people who agreed with the statement that ‘there are too many immigrants in France’ ranged from 74.8 percent in 1995 to 55.8 percent in 2017, while the numbers who did not agree with the statement ranged from 25.2 in 1995 to 44.2 in 2017 (PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017). While this suggests a growing acceptance of immigration, the majority of French voters still tend to think that there are too many immigrants in France. Indeed, the number of people who believed that there are too many immigrants in France never fell below 52.1 percent in the 1995 to 2017 period (PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017). And ironically, more people disagreed with the statement that there were too many immigrants in France in 2007 than at any other point in the period under investigation, and it was this (presidential) election that was almost entirely defined by the anti-immigration rhetoric of Nicolas Sarkozy.


Figure 7.2: Percentage of respondents who felt that there were too many immigrants in France.



Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017

To further complicate the picture on immigration, it seems that the French people have somewhat warmer – perhaps even contradictory – views when it comes to the cultural impact that immigration has had on France. Given that a majority of voters feels that there are too many immigrants in France, one might have anticipated that French voters would also have a negative view of the cultural impact of immigration. Yet it appears that more French voters view immigration as enhancing rather than undermining French culture. As Figure 7.3 shows, between 2002 and 2016, the percentage of people who believed that immigration enhances French culture ranged from a low of 41.3 percent in 2004 to a high of 47.7 percent in 2016 (European Social Survey 2018). By contrast, those who viewed immigration as undermining French culture ranged from 31.9 in 2008 to 36.5 in 2006 (European Social Survey 2018). Curiously, the biggest drop in the number of people who felt that immigration undermines French culture occurred in a period during which the 2007 election took place.

Figure 7.3: Percentage of respondents who felt that immigration undermined or enhanced French culture.




Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017

In summary then, the available data suggests that immigration has not been a particularly important issue in France, and that the predominant view is that while the overall number of immigrants should be reduced, immigrants have culturally enhanced to France. This raises the question of why the accommodative strategy of Sarkozy was so effective in 2007. The answer has to be that either the territory was large enough and Sarkozy was skilled or lucky enough to attract a sufficient number of voters from the FN, or that something else was going on that explained the success of the accommodative strategy in 2007 and its subsequent failure in 2012.

While immigration is no doubt an important issue to the radical right and its voting base, it is not the only issue on which the radical right campaigns. It is therefore important to extend the focus of investigation and to also consider other cultural dimension issues, such as crime and terrorism. If we do this, then the percentage of respondents who name cultural issues as the most important is significantly higher. As Figure 7.4 shows, in 2007 20 percent of respondents named cultural issues as the most important. This then fell to 14.5 percent in 2012, but rose again to 30.5 percent in 2017.

Economics issues still predominate, however, with 64.5 percent of respondents naming these as the most important issues facing France in 2007. This then rose to 75.5 percent in 2012, but fell substantially to 53 percent in 2017 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b). The trends in these figures indicate that, not surprisingly, economic and cultural issues exist in an inverse relationship; that is, when economic issues are more prominent, cultural issues are less salient, and vice versa. The ebb and flow in the saliency of cultural or economic issues also helps explain why the accommodative strategy employed by Sarkozy was successful in 2007 – a period where cultural issues were particularly salient – and failed in 2012 – where economic issues were more salient.

Figure 7.4: Cultural and economic issue saliency in France, 2007-2017.



Source: PEF 2002; European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b

What Figure 7.4 also shows is that in 2002 and 2017, there is a reduction in the saliency of economic issues, and a relative growth in importance of cultural issues. It is through an exploitation of the growth in cultural issues that helps explain why Jean-Marie Le Pen was successful in 2002 and why Marine Le Pen was successful in 2017 – the years in which the two Le Pens, respectively, made it into

the second round of the presidential elections. But of course, there were limits to how much the Le Pens could exploit this as the dynamics of the electoral system are unfavourable to them and the National Front. The two-round voting system means that all mainstream voters can back principal party candidates in the second round, even if that candidate was not of the principal party that the voters favoured – i.e., the electoral specific to French presidential elections limited the extent to which the Le Pens could progress.

From the perspective of a centre-right or right-wing principal party that wishes to capture the vote share of a radical right party, however, the data would suggest an accommodative strategy towards the radical right makes most sense when cultural issues are particularly prominent in the public consciousness. By contrast, if the principal party were concerned with reducing the vote share of the radical right without necessarily wishing to engage with its preferred issues, a dismissive strategy might be preferable, while an adversarial strategy employed in this situation would most likely reinforce the radical right's ownership of the issue and therefore increase their vote share (see Meguid 2005, 2008).


7.6.2. Leadership Reputation

To recall from Chapter 2, when political parties or candidates share a similar position on the same issue dimension, the reputation of the parties or candidates allows voters to distinguish between them and choose accordingly. A reputation is essentially an indicator that allows actors (in this case voters) to make a choice or come to a judgement about another actor (in this case parties) based on prior observations and behaviour (Salonen and Wiberg 1987; Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Bowler 1990; Herbig and Milewicz 1993; Fombrun 1996). In the context of elections, a party or candidates' reputation is what allows voters to judge the sincerity of parties and candidates, and weight up the likelihood that they will keep their promises, including those made about tackling particular problems or introducing specific legislation. If a party or candidate shifts its/their position in a manner that

signals insincerity, then that party or candidate will likely suffer reputational damage and will be unlikely to win over voters as a result (Downs 1957b).

In 2007, the leader and presidential candidate for the then UMP, Nicolas Sarkozy, made a clear overture to the voting base of the National Front. It was his estimation that by accommodating the National Front's positions on immigration and law and order, his superior reputation, developed when he was Minister of the Interior under Jacques Chirac, would allow him to successfully trespass on FN issue territory, and steal away FN voters (Kuhn 2007; Sauger 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008; Carvalho 2019). As Figure 7.5 demonstrates, it was certainly the case that in 2007 Sarkozy enjoyed a higher personal net satisfaction rating than other candidates. He had a rating of 5.67, while Ségolène Royal held a rating of 4.65, and Jean-Marie Le Pen languished with a rating of 1.21 (CSES 2019). As discussed above, Royal also made overtures to the voters of the FN in this election, playing up the importance of the French flag and anthem (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008), and she too was able to use her reputation, more personal than tied to cultural issues, to successfully trespass on FN territory, albeit to a much lesser degree than Sarkozy. Therefore, as a result of the joint-accommodative strategies pursued by the candidates of the UMP and PS, and of their higher reputations, Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front were effectively crowded out (Kuhn 2007). Indeed, the extent to which Sarkozy seized the FN's electorate is adequately demonstrated by the fact that in the second round of voting, Sarkozy was able to secure 69 percent of Le Pen's voters from the first round (Carvalho 2019).

Figure 7.5: Reputation of the principal party and FN candidates.



Source: CSES (2019)

By 2012, however, Sarkozy entered the presidential race as one of the most unpopular presidents in the history of the French Fifth Republic. In an effort to retain his position, Sarkozy once again engaged in a strong accommodative strategy with regards to the National Front. However, his personal excesses, pursuit of celebrity, and general rudeness had diminished the office of the presidency in the eyes of many voters, and all served to undermine his reputation among French voters. As Figure 7.5 shows, Sarkozy's personal net satisfaction rating fell by 1.72 points in the period between 2007 and 2012, from 5.67 to 3.95 (CSES 2019). While he was still ahead of the leader of the National Front – now Marine Le Pen who had taken over from her father in 2011 – this gap was a mere 1.09 points, as compared to 4.46 points in 2007 (CSES 2019). The gap shrank not only as a result of Sarkozy's reduced personal rating, but also because of the higher reputation that Marine Le Pen's enjoyed as compared to her father. Her reputation rating was 2.86 in 2012, while Jean-Marie Le Pen's had only been 1.21 in 2007. Much of this improved rating has been attributed to the process of de-demonisation that Marine

Le Pen put into action. This process, which was largely focused on the party's rhetoric rather than on its programme or policies (Ivaldi 2016), sought to distance the FN from its extreme or radical status and portray it with a more moderate, mainstream image. While this clearly worked in that her reputation rose, it should be noted that, as illustrated in Figure 7.5, Marine Le Pen still came last in the reputation stakes in 2012, and the FN still trailed the principal parties (CSES 2019).

It therefore seems that one of the conditions behind Sarkozy's successful use of the accommodative strategy in 2007 was his high personal ratings, and his significant reputational lead on Jean-Marie Le Pen. The subsequent failure of the accommodative strategy to steal away FN voters in 2012, however, can be attributed to the fact that the difference between the personal ratings of Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen was considerably smaller. This suggests that the reputation of the party or candidate is fundamentally important in determining the potential success or failure of particular party strategies; in this case, the accommodative strategy.

Introducing the reputation of the leader or candidate into the equation might also have theoretical consequences for understanding the influence of differing principal party strategies. To recall from Meguid (2005), one principal party need not adopt the same strategy as another principal party, and instances in which principal parties adopt diverging strategies will result in conflicting effects on the saliency of a specific issue and on the vote share of the radical right party with which the principal parties are competing. Suppose, for instance, that one principal party adopted an accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the radical right, while another adopted an adversarial strategy. The accommodative strategy should, according to Meguid, transfer ownership of that issue from the radical right party to the principal party. By contrast, the adversarial strategy should reinforce the radical right party's ownership over that issue. In order to determine which strategy has the stronger effect, and therefore what the outcome is, Meguid argues that the tactic that is more consistently applied and that is applied over a longer period of time will be the one that prevails. In other words, if the accommodative strategy of one principal party is maintained for longer than the adversarial strategy of another

principal party, then the consequences of the accommodative strategy should be predominant: we should see an increase in the saliency of the issue and the transfer of issue ownership from the radical right party to the principal party.

In the French context, the centre-right has maintained an accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the National Front for some years, while the Socialist Party has been less consistent in its application of a single strategy, although it has adopted the adversarial strategy more frequently than any other (see above). Following the discussion above and Meguid's arguments, one would therefore expect the centre-right's long-term accommodation of the FN to be the more predominant one. And indeed, this is borne out in the 2007 presidential elections. However, in 2012, the more consistently applied accommodative strategy failed while the Socialist Party was electorally successful following its employment of an adversarial strategy.


This raises the question of whether or not longevity is really the best metric by which to determine the likely success of a particular strategy in scenarios where principal parties adopt opposing strategies. Given what happened in 2012, it seems more likely that leader and party reputation has more influence. François Hollande had a much stronger reputation during the 2012 elections than Sarkozy, and therefore his adversarial strategy against the National Front had a greater effect than the accommodative strategies of the centre-right. In keeping with Meguid's theoretical foundations, this approach helps explain why the National Front polled so well in 2012 compared to 2007. In 2007, Sarkozy and the UMP held a strong reputational advantage over Le Pen and the FN, and were therefore the beneficiaries of the saliency of cultural issues. By 2012, the reputation of Sarkozy and the UMP had fallen, the reputation of Le Pen and the FN had increased, and Hollande and the Socialist Party, which held a reputational advantage over Sarkozy and the UMP, implemented an adversarial strategy that reinforced the FN's ownership of cultural issues.

7.6.3. Satisfaction with Democracy and Politicians

Generally speaking, voters who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Moreover, if a radical right party is well organised and well led, then even people with a weaker sense of dissatisfaction are more likely to vote in favour of it (Lubbers et al. 2002). And this is the case with the National Front: it is considered a well organised, well-led, even credible, radical right party (Carter 2005; van Kessel 2015), and so even voters with lower levels of dissatisfaction are likely to consider voting for it over the Socialist Party or the Union for a Popular Movement/The Republicans. Given this then, principal parties such as the PS or UMP/LR should perform better in electoral terms when satisfaction with democracy is high, while conversely their strategies against the radical right are likely to be less successful when more voters feel dissatisfied with how democracy is working.

Figure 7.6 shows the levels of satisfaction with democracy among French voters in the years between 2002 and 2017 (CSES 2019). It shows that levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy were particularly low in 2002 and 2017, and this was reflected in what happened in the elections of those years. As discussed above, Jean-Marie Le Pen progressed into the second round of the presidential elections in 2002, while 15 years later, his daughter Marine did the same. In addition, the other candidate to go through to the second round of the presidential elections of 2017 (and the eventual winner) was Emmanuel Macron, another outsider candidate. By contrast, and in accordance with expectations outlined above, in the years in which French voters recorded high(er) levels of satisfaction with the functioning democracy, it was the principal parties that enjoyed success. In both the 2007 and 2012 presidential contests, the candidates who went through to the second round came from these principal parties. Moreover, in the 2007 parliamentary elections the UMP did particularly well and gained a huge majority in the National Assembly, while the FN recorded one of its lowest ever electoral results (winning just 4.8 percent of the vote on the first ballot, and ultimately securing no seats in parliament).

Figure 7.6: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in France.



Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017

However, this apparent correlation between levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and the success of the principal parties does not imply that particular strategies are always effective. This is evident if we examine and compare the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. While Sarkozy’s accommodative strategy had been successful in stealing away voters from the FN in 2007, it failed to achieve the same result in 2012. During both periods, voter satisfaction in the functioning of democracy was quite high, and thus it might be the case that high levels of satisfaction in democracy is a necessary condition for principal party strategies to be successful, but that other conditions, such as leader and party reputation, can still undermine the efficacy of those strategies. There remains an open question, however, regarding cause and effect with respect to democratic satisfaction and party strategies: did an increase in democratic satisfaction increase the potential for an accommodative strategy to be successful, or did the accommodation of the FN by Sarkozy and the UMP lead to an increase in democratic satisfaction? This is definitely a consideration that should be dealt with in


future research that addresses the influence that political context has on the efficacy of party strategies.

In the same way, it might also be the case that higher levels of trust in politicians increase the effectiveness of certain principal party strategies, while lower levels of trust decrease the effectiveness of such strategies. After all, if a polity is defined by high levels of distrust in the political class, then any accommodation made by the so-called 'political elite' toward a radical right challenger might well be interpreted as insincere or otherwise negatively perceived. With this in mind, then, Figure 7.7 displays the overall levels of trust that French voters have had in their politicians in the period 2002 to 2016. What it shows is that, generally speaking, French voters are very consistent in their distrust of politicians. Indeed, over this period no more than 18 percent of respondents reported trusting politicians, while over 60 percent indicated that they had little to no trust in politicians (European Social Survey 2018).

Against the background of high and slowly increasing levels of distrust in politicians, there was an increase in 2006 and another in 2014. The first increase occurs at the end of Chirac's second term as president – which could well be attributed to the general perception that Jacques Chirac and his government had achieved little beyond financial scandal. Thereafter, levels of distrust declined, which coincided with the campaign and election of Sarkozy. In keeping with the popularity of Sarkozy at this time, and the increase in democratic satisfaction reported above, it is no surprise that distrust in politicians fell between 2006 and 2008. While the reasons behind the second increase in 2014 are less clear, it does coincide with a corruption scandal involving Sarkozy and then Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi – a story widely reported in the French and international press. Therefore, while it is not possible to directly tie this increase in distrust in politicians to the financial scandals of Sarkozy, it would certainly make sense that a significant corruption scandal would have this effect. As with satisfaction in the functioning of democracy, however, it is not entirely clear what relationship this condition has in regard to the efficacy of party strategies. It might well be the case that higher levels

of trust in politicians increases the likelihood that certain strategies will be successful in reducing the vote share of the radical right. By equal measure, however, it might also be possible that certain strategies have an effect on voter feelings of trust in politicians. After all, if a candidate such as Sarkozy sincerely pursues a particular strategy, and one that requires recognition of an issue that many voters feel is important, then voter attitudes toward politicians might improve – or they might not, and the individual candidate might see an improvement in their personal ratings (see above) while politicians generally are distrusted. Put simply, it is not yet clear what the effect of this condition is on the efficacy of principal party strategies.

Figure 7.7: Levels of trust in French politicians.



Source: European Social Survey 2018

7.7. Summary and Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to identify the effect that contextual conditions have on principal party strategies. It began with a quick overview of the French political and electoral system, a brief history of the National Front, and a run-through of French electoral history from 1995-2017, with a

particular interest in the sorts of strategies that principal parties adopted vis-à-vis the National Front. The analysis of the three contextual conditions above – the issue agenda, the reputation of the party and candidate, and voter satisfaction with both democracy and politicians – provide some interesting insights into the efficacy of particular principal party strategies. Starting with the issue agenda, the issue of immigration was not perceived to be important to French voters relative to other issues. Rather, it was the issue of unemployment that was most salient throughout the period analysed. That being said, while economic issues – especially unemployment – always dominate elections in France, in those electoral periods where cultural issues became particularly salient, accommodative strategies were quite effective. By contrast, during periods in which cultural issues were not so important, the accommodation of the policy positions of the National Front by the principal parties was less successful. In short, the saliency of the cultural dimension seems to help determine the likely success or failure of an accommodative strategy. This is illustrated by the 2007 and 2012 elections where Sarkozy accommodated the policy positions of the National Front. In the 2007 election, where cultural issues were particularly prominent, the accommodative strategy successfully peeled away voters from the FN to the benefit of Sarkozy and the UMP. By contrast, in 2012, when cultural issues were not particularly salient, that same accommodative strategy failed to steal away voters from the FN.

As for the reputation of the party or candidate, it seems that the party or candidate employing an accommodative strategy will be more successful in trespassing onto the radical right's territory if they have a positive reputation. Indeed, Sarkozy employed a strong accommodative strategy in both the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections – successfully in 2007 and unsuccessfully in 2012. One of the conditions that differed between these two elections – aside from the relative saliency of the cultural dimension, as just mentioned – was the reputation of Sarkozy himself. While he was fairly popular in 2007 – and more so than any other candidate – his reputation had soured by 2012. Indeed, by this time Sarkozy had become one of the most unpopular presidents in the history of the French Fifth Republic. Importantly, though, it was not just that Sarkozy had become unpopular, but that the difference between his popularity and the popularity of Marine Le Pen had shrunk considerably.

Finally, with regard to voter satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, it seems that the accommodation of the National Front was more successful during periods in which satisfaction with democracy was higher. Conversely, when levels of satisfaction with democracy were lower, the National Front tended to perform more strongly. Having said that, it is important to note that previous research has suggested that not all radical right parties are as equally affected by level of satisfaction with democracy (van Kessel 2017). Therefore, it should not be assumed that higher satisfaction with democracy is automatically beneficial for the effectiveness principal party strategies employed against a radical right competitor.

This case study demonstrates that while principal parties might have greater legislative experience, governmental effectiveness, and superior access to voters, the 'principal party copy' is not always perceived as more attractive than the 'radical right original' (see Meguid 2005, 2008). The effectiveness of principal party strategies is affected by political conditions such as the issue agenda, the reputation of the party and/or candidate, the satisfaction that voters have with democracy, and the levels of trust (or distrust) that voters have in politicians. When these conditions are favourable, the results show that the use of accommodative strategies by principal parties can be effective in peeling away voters from radical right parties. However, when those same conditions are unfavourable, then that same strategy will likely be doomed to failure. This is well illustrated by Sarkozy's use of the accommodative strategy in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. Further, these results reinforce the idea that reputation should be considered a dynamic rather than a static condition (see Chapter 2). Indeed, just because the issue agenda is favourable, for example, does not automatically bestow upon a principal party the divine right to rule over particular issues. Without a positive reputation, any issue trespassing through the use of an accommodative strategy is unlikely to reap the expected rewards. This might be unwelcome news for principal parties, but at the same time, it is useful to remember that reputation is the one condition or feature that principal parties have the most control over. These parties can invest in safeguarding or improving their reputation, and in so doing can therefore prime voters for any future accommodative strategy. In short, by paying attention

to reputation, and by working to have reputational advantage over their intended target, principal parties can shift the odds in their favour.

8. Sweden

8.1. Introduction

The previous chapter concerned itself with the strategies that the French principal parties have adopted in competition with the National Front. The National Front has had a presence in French presidential and legislative elections since at least the 1980s, and in that time has had many electoral successors (and indeed failures). By contrast, this chapter considers the strategies of principal parties in a country that, hitherto, has been considered 'exceptional' for its lack of established radical right party (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). Indeed, the relatively recent electoral success of the Sweden Democrats (SD)³³ in 2010 not only marked the end of Swedish exceptionalism but also had considerable consequences on established political party behaviour in Sweden. The purpose of this chapter, as with the previous chapter, is to determine the effect that certain political contexts have had on the efficacy of principal party strategies employed against the radical right, in this case, the Sweden Democrats. To that end, in the same way that the last chapter was, this chapter is split into two halves. The first half provides an overview of Swedish politics and elections. In particular, it outlines the electoral and party system in Sweden, and details the birth, development, and ideology of the Sweden Democrats. Thereafter, it presents an account of each legislative election between 1998 and 2018, covering six elections in total, detailing the course that each election took, the issues that were prominent, and the electoral outcomes of each relevant party, before summarising the strategies that principal parties and relevant non-principal parties employed.

The second more analytical half of the chapter concerns itself with contextualising the strategies employed by principal parties in order to ascertain the effect that political context has had on the efficacy of these strategies, specifically on their capacity to restrict or otherwise suppress the electoral

³³ Throughout this chapter, Sweden Democrats and SD will be used interchangeably. SD should not be confused with the Social Democrats (SAP).

growth of the Sweden Democrats. This second half has five sections. The first explores the extent to which the issue agenda provided favourable terrain for the Sweden Democrats and it examines the success or failure that principal parties, and others, have had in suppressing salient issues. Next, it considers the spatial positioning of principal parties relative to the Sweden Democrats, on two issue dimensions (immigration and redistribution), in order to determine whether or not the Sweden Democrats have been subjected to sustained competition or have been left to their own devices, free to pursue voters from the periphery. The third section then investigates the attitudes of voters on prominent issues, focusing in particular on the degree to which public opinion is amenable to the programmatic profile of the Sweden Democrats. Then, the chapter turns to examining the impact that satisfaction with democracy, as well as voter trust in politicians and parties, has had on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Finally, the chapter considers the reputation of the various parties and their respective leaderships, and in so doing also explores the leadership and organisational development of the SD.

Ultimately, this chapter finds that the Sweden Democrats have been able to overcome a series of potential problems, from an increasing progressive and liberal population to a hostile political environment, by focusing on a small but significant segment of the population that is sufficiently anti-immigration and anti-establishment, and by undertaking necessary organisational reforms that permit the proper exploitation of this reservoir of potential support. While the principal parties have been historically successful in restricting the growth of radical right parties in Sweden (barring the initial success of the short-lived flash party *New Democracy*, 1991-1994), in recent years *the cordon sanitaire* established by the principal parties against the Sweden Democrats has proved ineffective and is even at risk of breaking down entirely. Disagreements among the principal parties have fractured any consensus that may have existed, while individual party goals to secure a greater share of the vote, and inconsistencies across the electoral and legislative arena, have served to increase the saliency of issues that are favourable to the Sweden Democrats. The chapter therefore considers several

intermeshing conditions in its path to discovering why the strategies of the Swedish principal parties have failed in recent years.

8.2. The Swedish Electoral and Party System

Sweden is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. Following the Instrument of Government 1974 – the part of the Swedish constitution that dictates the underlying principles of Swedish democracy – the monarchy has no, even nominal, executive functions. Instead, all executive functions rest with the Prime Minister or the Speaker of the Parliament (who acts as the formateur during coalition negotiations) (Möller 2016; Öberg 2016).

Elections to the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, are conducted using open list proportional representation. Practically, Sweden is broken up into 29 constituencies, with most constituencies electing between 10 and 12 members to the Riksdag. Outside this range, Stockholm elects 39 members, while Gotland elects 2 (Widfeldt 2011a; Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020). In total, the Riksdag is made up of 349 seats, of which 310 are fixed or permanent ones, and 39 are adjustment ones. Permanent seats are simply those won in a particular constituency, with their number reflecting the number of eligible voters within that constituency. The distribution between parties mirrors each party's share of the vote within those constituencies (Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020). Following the distribution of permanent seats, a second distribution is carried out, this time based on the parties' votes in the whole of the country. This second distribution is compared to the first, and any party obtaining more seats in the second distribution (as compared to the first) is awarded adjustment seats. These are allotted in the constituency where the party performed most strongly (Valmyndigheten n.d.). These adjustment seats are meant to ensure greater proportionality.

Since 1998 it has also been possible for voters to express a personal vote. The system accommodates personal votes by beginning the distribution of constituency seats with those candidates who have exceeded the 5 percent threshold for personal votes. The remaining seats are distributed after this, in the order of the party lists. While this could, theoretically, have a major influence on the operation of elections, in practice most personal votes tend to go to the candidates who are at the top of the party list anyway. What is more, only a minority of voters actually use personal voting (e.g., 1/4 of voters in 2010) (Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020).

In order to receive any seats, a party must achieve a national vote share of four percent or more, or of 12 percent in a particular constituency to be entitled to the seat distribution of that constituency (Widfeldt 2003, 2011a; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020; Hermansson 2016). This has meant that the major parties – particularly the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party – have tended to be over-represented in the Riksdag. However, the extent of this over-representation of major parties is small. For instance, in 2010, it only amounted to three seats for the Social Democrats and two seats for the Moderates (Hermansson 2016).

While Sweden operates a proportional representation system, and has had a fairly stable five-party system since 1917, for much of its history it essentially operated as a pre-dominant party system owing to the dominance of the Social Democrats (Sartori 2005b). Between 1940 and 1994, the Social Democrats won the majority share of the vote twice, and won more than 45 percent of the vote no fewer than ten times (Aylott 2016). Indeed, after 1917, no other party managed to break the 30 percent limit until 2010, when the Moderates scored 30.1 percent of the vote. (Widfeldt 2011a; Aylott 2016). In recent years, however, the predominance of the Social Democrats has waned, and in each election since 1998 it lost its electoral standing. At the same time, the number of parliamentary parties, stable at five for over 70 years, began to increase as the Greens, the Christian Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats gained representation in the Riksdag.

Despite the multi-party nature of the system, throughout much of Sweden's post-1917 Swedish political history, the parliamentary parties (five historically, and seven in the contemporary period) have tended toward two separate but fairly stable blocs. The socialist or leftist bloc consists of the Social Democrats and the Greens, joined often but not always by Left Party. The bourgeois or centre-right bloc, or 'Alliance', contains the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Centre Party (Berglund and Lindström 1978; Widfeldt 2011a; Berg and Oscarsson 2014; Aylott 2016). The growing presence of the Sweden Democrats, however, has somewhat destabilised the two-bloc system. The Alliance has particularly suffered: in 2019 it collapsed owing to intense disagreements regarding whether or not to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019; see also below).

8.3. Sweden Democrats: Origins, Development, and Ideology

The Sweden Democrats are a rather rare phenomenon in Swedish politics: an example of a successful radical right party. Prior to their breakthrough, extreme and radical right parties Sweden never garnered much support or exerted any impact.³⁴ For sure, there were extreme right parties and movements in the country, with the first Nazi party formed in 1924 and with others following in subsequent decades (Widfeldt 2008). Perhaps the most prominent example is the Nationalist Socialist Workers Party (NSAP). Formed in 1933, the NSAP was a fully-fledged Nazi party that adopted all of the symbolism associated with the Nazi Party in Germany: the salute, uniforms, and the Swastika (Widfeldt 2008). The NSAP advocated positions identical to the German Nazi Party and even went so far as to make preparations for a German invasion of Sweden. Most chillingly, this involved local branches of the party gathering information on Sweden's Jewish population (Schön 2012). In 1938,

³⁴ A notable exception was the New Democracy party which won 6.7 percent of the vote and 25 seats in the Riksdag in the 1991 general election. However, New Democracy proved to be nothing more than a flash party and fell into obscurity and irrelevance quite quickly. It should be emphasised, however, that New Democracy had little in common with the movements and parties mentioned in this section (Rydgren 2006).

the NSAP changed its name to the Swedish Socialist Gathering, and toned down much of its Nazi symbolism, even if it remained ideologically unchanged (Widfeldt 2008). Yet, none of these groups was particularly successful in either gaining votes, winning seats, or even eliciting sympathies from more moderate voters. They were thus condemned to irrelevance and isolation.

A new generation of neo-fascist and Nazi groups did emerge by the 1970s and 1980s. These groups were often more aggressive than their predecessors but were built on a foundation of relatively loyal and energetic activists. Of particular interest here is the radical – but not extremist – Progress Party (FsP), which was formed in 1968, and the Keep Sweden Swedish (BSS) party, which was established in 1979 (Widfeldt 2008, 2014).

While both of these parties were isolated at the right-wing fringes of Swedish politics, they were distinctly different to each other in their ideological profiles. BSS was born out of the racist and extremist fringes, while the FsP came from an attempt to unify the more moderate right-wing parties, but quickly developed into a populist, anti-establishment, radical right party (Widfeldt 2008). Despite these differences, however, by 1986, the two parties had merged to form the new Sweden Party, which was fairly active, which leafleted regularly, and which attracted a fair amount of media attention. As is common with these parties, however, the party was overwhelmed by internal conflicts and it split along its original organisational fault lines, that is, between the BSS and FsP factions (Widfeldt 2008). The BSS faction was better organised and it was from this faction that the Sweden Democrats emerged (Widfeldt 2008).

Given the origins of the party, the Sweden Democrats were heavily compromised by the presence of Nazi veterans within the party organisation and membership – including an internal auditor who had served the Waffen-SS in a voluntary capacity during the second world war – and by numerous connections with various other extremist movements in the post-war period (Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Widfeldt 2008, 2014). The party's first president (1989-1995), Anders Klarström, was formerly a member of the neo-Nazi Nordic Realm Party and had a criminal record that included many colourful

offences from the stealing of ammunition to vandalism and intimidation. Other representatives of the party's executive were members of extremist movements such as the White Arian Resistance (Hellström and Nilsson 2010). Indeed, around half of the party executive had criminal records, and 30-50 percent had some Nazi affiliation (Widfeldt 2008). In 1989, the Sweden Democrats published a bulletin that contained a list of allies outside of Sweden. These included the National Front (France), various South African pro-apartheid newspapers, journals associated with the Ku Klux Klan, and Spearhead, a journal published by neo-Nazi John Tyndall of the British National Front and British National Party (Hellström and Nilsson 2010).

It became clear to those within the Sweden Democrats that in order to achieve a national breakthrough, the party would need to shed its compromised image. In 1995, Klarström was replaced by Mikael Jansson as party leader. While Jansson was not a charismatic leader or even a particularly effective orator, he was not compromised by previous Nazi affiliations – having originally come from the moderate, agrarian Centre Party – and he presented a much cleaner image (Widfeldt 2008). Under Jansson, the party initiated a series of reforms designed to rid the Sweden Democrats of their Nazi affiliations and extremist profile. These included the banning of uniforms, the removal of executive members with criminal records or Nazi affiliations, and the expulsion of over 150 activists from the party (Widfeldt 2008; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Widfeldt 2014; Bolin and Aylott 2019). These expelled members eventually founded the National Democrats and, rather fortuitously, many of the Sweden Democrats' compromising contacts abroad were claimed by the National Democrats, thereby freeing up the Sweden Democrats to pursue contacts with the likes of the Danish People's Party, a radical right party with a significantly less compromising history (Widfeldt 2008; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Bolin and Aylott 2019). Overall, the split proved rather positive for the Sweden Democrats in that while they lost a number of committed and experienced activists, they also got rid of the hard-extremists, Nazis, and dedicated fascists (Widfeldt 2008).

In February 2000, the party publicly disowned Nazism and stated that pro-Nazi behaviour within the party would lead to expulsion. This public statement was seemingly triggered by a series of highly publicised violent acts by Nazis in the preceding months, including a bomb attack on journalists, the shooting of policemen following a bank robbery, and the murder of a trade unionist who exposed a Nazi infiltrator in a local trade union committee (Widfeldt 2008, 2014; Erlingsson et al. 2014). In making this public statement, the Sweden Democrats also took the opportunity to question why these acts had happened and in so doing therefore targeted the political establishment for its reluctance to allow an open debate on difficult issues, including immigration (Widfeldt 2008).

The gradual professionalisation of the party continued over the next years. In 2005, Jansson lost the leadership of the Sweden Democrats to Jimmie Åkesson, a young, university-educated activist who, like Jansson, was not compromised by Nazi affiliations or criminality (Widfeldt 2008). Åkesson was not much of an improvement in terms of charisma, but he was a competent performer who presented a professional image and performed well in TV interviews and debates (Widfeldt 2008).

The reform process that the party embarked upon also concerned its policy, and here one of the most significant changes that the leadership undertook related to the party's anti-immigration policies. While the party retained its strong anti-immigration stance, its policies were toned down significantly. For instance, in 1999 it abandoned the policy of enforced repatriation of all immigrants that had entered Sweden in the post-1970s period, and instead promoted a policy of repatriating immigrants who had not assimilated into Swedish society, unless they required protection according to international law (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Bolin and Aylott 2019). The presence of classical, biological racism within the party's official documentation also disappeared. Instead, the party began to embrace ethno-pluralism, which holds that all ethnic/cultural groups are equal, but should be nonetheless kept separate (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Bolin and Aylott 2019). Therefore, much like the National Front under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the Sweden

Democrats sought to drastically moderate the image that they project to voters, while maintaining much, although not all, of their anti-immigration profile.

Having outlined the main characteristics of the Swedish electoral system and party system, and having provided a brief history of the organisational and ideological development of the Sweden Democrats, the chapter now turns to offering a summary of Swedish general elections from 1998 to 2018.

8.4. Legislative Elections in Sweden: 1998-2018

8.4.1. 1998 General Election

The 1998 general election, held on 20th September, took place amid high levels of unemployment and state debt, both of which were a product of high public spending during the early 1990s recession (Arter 1999; Möller 1999). The governing Social Democrats sought to address these issues through tax increases and public spending cuts. Between 1994 and 1998 interest rates has been reduced, inflation had fallen, and growth had increased (Möller 1999). Going into the election, the Social Democrats announced a return to traditional social democratic policies with increased spending planned for healthcare, education, and welfare, while the centre-right Moderate Party favoured cutting taxes, reducing state spending, and privatisation (Arter 1999).

The election results, summarised in Table 8.1, show a significant loss for the governing Social Democratic Party. Indeed, its score of 36.4 percent of the vote was the party's lowest result since 1921 when universal suffrage was introduced (Arter 1999; Möller 1999). The election was also a blow for the opposition centre-right Moderate Party, which had anticipated gaining 30-35 percent of the vote following favourable polls conducted during the campaign (Möller 1999). The winners of the election were, without doubt, the smaller Left Party and Christian Democratic Party, which managed to increase their share of the vote by 5.8 and 7.7 percentage points respectively (Arter 1999; Möller 1999). The spending restrictions introduced by the governing Social Democratic Party between 1994

and 1998 proved to be a boon for the Left Party, and it became the primary beneficiary of the Social Democrats' losses, with some 30 percent of the Left Party's vote coming from the Social Democratic Party (Möller 1999). While the Moderate Party had managed to pick off some former Social Democratic voters, it too suffered a voter leakage, with 27 percent of the Christian Democratic vote coming from the Moderate Party (Möller 1999).

Table 8.1: Swedish general election results, 1998.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democratic Party	1,914,426	36.4	-8.9	131	-30
Moderate Party	1,204,926	22.9	0.5	82	2
Left Party	631,011	12	5.8	43	21
Christian Democratic Party	619,046	11.8	7.7	42	27
Centre Party	269,762	5.1	-2.6	18	-9
Liberal Party	248,076	4.7	-2.5	17	-9
Green Party	236,699	4.5	-0.5	16	-2
Other	137,176	2.6	0.5	0	-
Total	5,261,122	100		349	

Source: Möller 1999

Broadly speaking, Swedish voters tend to express low levels of political interest and are often indifferent to political happenings. Such is the state of democracy in Sweden that the Institute for Democratic Communication has described Sweden as a 'lukewarm democracy' (Möller 1999). This is in part a product of the significant number of voters who still vote along class lines, often having made their mind up before the campaign. All this was very evident in this election, with two-thirds of the working class backing either the Social Democrats or the Left Party, and with the Centre Party mobilising most strongly from agricultural communities. Likewise, the Liberal Party drew heavily from white collar workers and academics, and the Moderate Party was most popular among business owners (Möller 1999).

8.4.2. 2002 General Election

The 2002 general election, which took place on 15th September, can generally be characterised as a traditional left-right contest: the left supported a stronger public sector and greater welfare spending, while the right favoured a reduction in taxation and the introduction of more individual choice in public services (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003). The campaign did not start particularly well for the Social Democrats, who saw relatively low polling figures, coupled with accusations of complacency and presidentialism by Persson (Madeley 2003). The general message of the Social Democrats was that things had been going well and that they would continue to do so if voters trusted the party again. This message was slightly undermined, however, when government memos indicating the prospect of a deficit in 2003 were leaked to the media (Madeley 2003). By contrast, the Moderate Party proposed a range of reforms on salient issues including the right of parents/children to choose schools; the privatisation of state-owned companies; tougher measures against violent criminals; and significant reductions in taxation (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003).

Perhaps the most interesting innovation in the campaign – especially in terms of grabbing media attention – was that presented by the Liberals (the Liberal People’s Party), who set out a programme of ‘ethnic integration’, which included measures for a probationary period for immigrants (Aylott 2002; Widfeldt 2003). Göran Persson, Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, accused the Liberals of ‘fishing in troubled waters’ but the programme generally went down positively with voters (Widfeldt 2003).

The immigration issue received further attention when a team of investigative journalists travelled around Sweden posing as xenophobic voters communicating with local officials and campaigners from various parties. Controversially, very few of the local party officials and campaigners challenged the anti-immigrant views expressed, and in many cases, xenophobic comments were made in return (Widfeldt 2003). While most parties, excluding the Greens and the Left, were affected, the Moderate Party seemed to suffer most both in media coverage and in the polls, although the reason for this was

not exactly clear (Widfeldt 2003). The issue of immigration is taboo in Sweden, partly as a result of the politicisation of immigration elsewhere – particularly in Norway and Denmark – but also as a result of the short-lived radical right party New Democracy in the early 1990s (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003). As a result, the leaders of the principal parties in Sweden sought to avoid any discussion of the issue, and when measures were announced, they were more often phrased in the context of ‘ethnic integration’. It was in this context that the Liberals operated and while the party won immediate media attention, it was quickly criticised by other parties. It was accused of having policies that resembled those of the radical right Sweden Democrats, and it was compared to the Danish People’s Party (Aylott 2002).

The results of the election, summarised in Table 8.2, show a slight increase in both vote share and seats for the governing Social Democratic Party, while the Moderate Party lost a significant proportion of its vote share (-7.6 percentage points) and a sizeable number of seats (-27). These losses are best explained by the Moderates’ decision to focus on non-salient issues in their campaign – namely tax cuts – and by the considerable reputational damage they incurred following the media reports of party xenophobia (Widfeldt 2003). However, while the balance of votes and seats between the two principal parties shifted, the ideological balance in the Riksdag remained unchanged (Madeley 2003; Widfeldt 2003). This was because of the Liberal Party (a partner of the Moderates in the bourgeois bloc) experienced considerable gains. Indeed, the Liberals were the largest winners in this election, managing to almost triple their number of seats (gaining an additional 31) and increasing their share of the vote by 8.7 percent. These gains outweighed the losses of the Moderate Party. Finally, the Left Party lost some ground back to the Social Democrats, with its vote share falling by 3.6 percentage points and its seats by 13. The Sweden Democrats polled a meagre 1.4 percent of the vote, and remained excluded from the Riksdag. However, by Swedish standards, 1.4 percent for a radical right party was actually quite high (Widfeldt 2003).

Table 8.2: Swedish general election results, 2002.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democratic Party	2,113,560	39.9	3.5	144	13
Moderate Party	809,041	15.3	-7.6	55	-27
Liberal Party	710,312	13.4	8.7	48	31
Christian Democrats	485,235	9.1	-2.7	33	-9
Left Party	444,854	8.4	-3.6	30	-13
Centre Party	328,428	6.2	1.1	22	4
Green Party	246,392	4.6	0.1	17	1
Sweden Democrats	76,300	1.4	1	0	-
Others	89,090	1.7	-0.5	0	-
Total	5,303,212	100		349	

Source: Widfeldt 2003

8.4.3. 2006 General Election

Despite Sweden's improving economy, the governing Social Democratic, Green, and Left parties did not experience a happy period in office between 2002 and 2006. Firstly, the government lost a referendum in which it had advocated Swedish membership of the EMU (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). Secondly, the government failed to respond effectively to the aftermath of a tsunami in Asia during Christmas 2004, in which hundreds of Swedish tourists had died. An inquiry into the event was unexpectedly critical of the government, and laid direct blame on the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). Thirdly, the government suffered a number of scandals. These included the youth wing of the Social Democrats fraudulently claiming public subsidies, the foreign secretary resigning following her actions over the Danish cartoon crisis, and the government's use of patronage to state agencies and the civil service that reflected politics rather than competency. Ultimately, though, what harmed the government most was its failure to translate good economic indicators into higher employment despite promises to lower unemployment (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007).

Since 1998, the Social Democrats had developed a close but informal relationship with the Green and Left parties, which ensured that it had maintained its governing position and a majority in parliament (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). The growing radicalism within the Left Party, however, had begun to place a strain on this collaboration, even if cooperation had to continue out of necessity. By contrast, the centre-right block – consisting of the Moderates, the Centre Party, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats – formalised their collaboration into the Alliance for Sweden, in which the parties developed common policies on economic growth, education, foreign policy, welfare provision, labour market reform, justice, and even the more challenging area of taxation (Widfeldt 2005, 2006, 2007a; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). This has been made possible in part by the election of Fredrick Reinfeldt as leader of the Moderates following the party's 2002 defeat. He tempered the policies of the party, with 'several sacred cows cheerfully slaughtered on the way' (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Widfeldt 2006 Aylott and Bolin 2007). Going into the election campaign of 2006, the Moderates declared themselves the 'new workers' party' and, made employment the central issue of their campaign. They also challenged the Social Democrats on the issue of healthcare, promising large spending increases.

By contrast, the Social Democrats were especially vague on the issue of employment in part because they had a poor record on jobs growth (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). As for the Left Party, it adopted what was considered by many, including the Social Democrats, to be a wholly incredible policy: that the public sector should simply employ 200,000 more people (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). This mix of vague and unrealistic policies allowed the Alliance to emphasise the Social Democrats' and wider left bloc's failure to address unemployment properly (Widfeldt 2007a).

Just two weeks before polling day, the Social Democrats announced that repeated intrusions into their intranet – which had contained confidential details of the party's campaign strategy – had been traced to the Liberal Party's central office (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007b). It

quickly emerged that the Liberals' youth wing was responsible and while the party secretary, Johan Jakobsson, at first denied all knowledge of the event, he did later admit his complicity and resigned. He, other senior members of the party, and the party's youth wing, were all placed under investigation for suspected criminal activity (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007b).

The results of the 2006 election, summarised in Table 8.3, show a dreadful performance for the Social Democratic Party: its share of the vote fell by nearly five percent, and it lost 14 seats. This terrible performance was in part a result of the party's failure to tackle unemployment, but was also a reflection of the credibility of the respective party blocs. While the Alliance presented a joint manifesto and its constituent parties were clear regarding their intent to form a four-party coalition (Widfeldt 2007b), the Social Democrats failed to outline coalition intentions. Indeed, the official line was that the party sought a mandate for single-party government, a claim that lacked all credibility (Widfeldt 2007b).

The Social Democrats also suffered as a result of negative perceptions of their leader, Göran Persson. He was seen as authoritarian and arrogant, and this contrasted rather negatively with the more reasoned and thoughtful Reinfeldt (Widfeldt 2007b). The only party to poll worse than the Social Democrats were the Liberals, who suffered deeply as a result of the intranet hacking scandal, losing nearly six percentage points of the vote, and 20 seats. By contrast, the Moderate Party recorded its best result since 1928, and achieved the largest increase in support between elections of any political party in Swedish history (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007a). The radical right Sweden Democrats saw their vote more than double on 2002, rising from 1.4 percent to 2.9 percent.

Table 8.3: Swedish general election results, 2006.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democratic Party	1,942,625	35	-4.9	130	-14
Moderate Party	1,456,014	26.2	10.9	97	42
Centre Party	437,389	7.9	1.7	29	7
Liberal Party	418,395	7.5	-5.9	28	-20
Christian Democrats	365,998	6.6	-2.5	24	-9
Left Party	324,722	5.8	-2.5	22	-8
Green Party	291,121	5.2	0.6	19	2
Sweden Democrats	162,463	2.9	1.5	0	0
Others	152,551	2.7	1.1	0	0
Total	5,551,278	100		349	

Source: Widfeldt 2007a

8.4.4. 2010 General Election

Going into the election campaign of 2010, the Alliance pledged a continuation of the reform programme initiated in 2006 – a reduction in taxes and benefits – and it emphasised areas in which it judged itself to have an advantage: stability, continuity, and most importantly, competence (Widfeldt 2011a).

By contrast, the Red-Green bloc advocated increased spending on education and jobs training, a reversal of the Alliance’s reforms to benefits, and other expansions to the welfare state (Widfeldt 2011a). The Red-Green bloc adopted an aggressive strategy towards the Alliance, seeking to attack the Alliance parties for irresponsible tax cuts that hurt the most vulnerable in society. However, this strategy ultimately backfired for two reasons. Firstly, it gave the Alliance parties another opportunity to reinforce their reputation for calm and collected competence. Secondly, the Social Democrats had matched the Alliance’s promise to introduce tax cuts for pensioners. This not only undermined the Red-Green bloc’s attempts to criticise the Alliance’s ‘reckless tax cuts’, but also shifted attention to the issue of taxation, on which the Alliance performed more strongly (Aylott 2010).

The growing strength of the Sweden Democrats caused some civil unrest as protestors sought to disturb the party’s election rallies and meetings. The profile of the party increased in the media

following the banning of a television advertisement in which an old woman with a walking frame was harassed by a group of Muslim women in burkas (Widfeldt 2011a). The Sweden Democrats also staged election rallies with the leader of its Danish sister party, Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish People’s Party, who electioneered with Jimmie Åkesson (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a).

Overall, the results – as summarised in Table 8.3 – showed an endorsement of the Alliance government. The Alliance increased its share of the vote and widened the gap in vote share between itself and the Red-Green bloc (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The Moderate Party recorded its best ever result, coming within 35,731 votes (0.6 percentage points) of the Social Democratic Party (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). This success was not shared among other Alliance parties, however, as the Centre and Christian Democrats came awfully close to falling short of the 4 percent threshold, which would have seen them lose all their seats (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The Liberals, meanwhile, lost 0.4 percent of their vote share and four seats in the Riksdag.

Table 8.4: Swedish general election results, 2010.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democratic Party	1,827,497	30.7	-4.3	112	-18
Moderate Party	1,791,766	30.1	3.9	107	10
Green Party	437,435	7.3	2.1	25	6
Liberal Party	420,524	7.1	-0.4	24	-4
Centre Party	390,804	6.6	-1.3	23	-6
Sweden Democrats	339,610	5.7	2.8	20	20
Left Party	334,053	5.6	-0.3	19	-3
Christian Democrats	333,696	5.6	-1	19	-5
Other	85,023	1.4	-1.4	0	0
Total	5,960,408	100		349	

Source: Widfeldt 2011a

The losses among the smaller members of the Alliance, in conjunction with the breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats, served to deny the Alliance an outright majority of seats. Having again doubled their vote share, with 20 seats, the Sweden Democrats were now the sixth largest party (out of eight) in the Riksdag (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The entry of the Sweden Democrats into

parliament marked not only the failure of the *cordon sanitaire* that had been established by the principal parties, but also a failure of the principal parties' attempt to suppress the saliency of the immigration issue. Paradoxically, the silence on the issue of immigration, coupled with desperate attempts to deny or otherwise downplay any connection between immigration on the one hand and social problems on the other, only served to provide ample space for the Sweden Democrats to exploit what was hitherto essentially an untapped electoral market (Aylott 2010).

The presence of the Sweden Democrats in the Riksdag meant that any legislation that the Alliance wished to pass would require cross-bloc support from the Social Democrats, the Greens, or even the Left Party, or the government would have to hope that the Sweden Democrats were favourable to the Alliance's legislative agenda (Widfeldt 2011a). While cooperation with the Sweden Democrats had been ruled out, some future collaboration was not entirely out of play, as between 1991 and 1994, the Moderates had cooperated with the radical right New Democracy (Engström 2010).

The results for the Social Democrats in the 2010 election were disastrous. The party's meagre 30.7 percent of the vote reflected a long-term decline in party loyalty and party identification of working-class voters (Widfeldt 2011a). Moreover, the Social Democrats lacked credibility on election-defining issues, including unemployment and the economy on which the party had traditionally performed well. By contrast, the Alliance generally, and the Moderates in particular, were seen as competent on these fundamental issues (Widfeldt 2011a).

8.4.5. 2014 General Election

Going in to the 2014 election, the Moderate Party sought to maintain its governing position. It criticised the Red-Green bloc over a parent's right to choose their child's school, arguing that this right would be lost if the Red-Green bloc were to win the election. Furthermore, party leader and Prime Minister Reinfeldt politicised the issue of immigration, arguing that the influx of immigrants expected

as a result of the migrant crisis would be considerable and that ‘where many people arrive in a short time, it would create tensions in Swedish society’. At the same time, however, he asked ‘the Swedish people to have patience and to open their hearts for those vulnerable people who we see around the world’ (Aylott and Bolin 2015: 733). Several commentators suggested that Reinfeldt’s encroachment onto such a taboo issue was a deliberate attempt to recreate a sense of crisis – such as that which had existed in 2010 when the global financial crisis was well under way – that could be exploited by the Alliance. As expected, however, the speech drew serious condemnation from parties of the left, which roundly criticised Reinfeldt for providing an opening for the Sweden Democrats by increasing the saliency of the immigration issue (Aylott and Bolin 2015).

The Alliance also sought to question the competency of the Social Democrats on economic matters. It warned that it would ‘not wave through a government that has not shown it has the requisites to secure its budget’ and stated that it would submit its own budget, even if it were relegated to opposition status (Aylott and Bolin 2015). The main objective here was to force the Social Democrats, publicly, into the arms of the Left Party, and thereby recreate another feature of the 2010 election: Social Democratic incredibility (Aylott and Bolin 2015).

While the campaign was generally quite fragmented, the issue of education did capture the limelight. Education had been a big winner for the Alliance parties in 2006, especially the Liberal Party, which branded itself as the champion of a traditional, rigorous education. However, by 2014, this reputation fell a little flat when, after eight years of the Liberals being in charge of the Ministry of Education, Swedish pupils performed terribly in the international PISA tests (Aylott and Bolin 2015). By contrast, the issue of unemployment, which had also been a profitable issue for the Alliance in the last election, particularly the Moderate Party, was essentially pushed to the side-lines in 2010, preventing the Alliance from capitalising on it (Aylott and Bolin 2015). In short, having ‘owned’ some of the most important issues in Swedish politics, the Alliance entered the 2010 campaign with only the ‘government issue’ as its only advantage (Aylott and Bolin 2015).

The results, reported in Table 8.4, showed that the election was disappointing for the Alliance parties. The Moderate Party lost over 6 percent of the vote and over 20 seats, prompting its leader, Fredrik Reinfeldt, to resign (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). The results came as a blow to the Moderate Party as pre-election polls had suggested that voters were favourable toward the government's performance, especially on the economy. Indeed, exit polls had suggested that the Moderates were considered best at handling the national and personal economy (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). The election also proved to be rather disappointing for the Red-Green bloc. The Social Democrats, Left Party, and Green Party saw very little change in their voting figures on the previous election. Taken collectively, the centre-left parties saw no change in their share of the vote and gained a mere three seats. Following the election, Stefan Löfven, leader of the Social Democratic Party, formed a minority coalition with the Green Party. This coalition rested on only 138 seats out of a total of 349 in the Riksdag (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). While Sweden is accustomed to minority governments, this new coalition, in terms of parliamentary seats, was the fourth weakest in history (Berg and Oscarsson 2014).

Table 8.5: Swedish general election results, 2014.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democratic Party	1,932,711	31.0	0.3	113	1
Moderate Party	1,453,517	23.3	-6.8	84	-23
Sweden Democrats	801,178	12.9	7.2	49	29
Green Party	429,275	6.9	-0.4	25	0
Centre Party	380,937	6.1	-0.5	22	-1
Left Party	356,331	5.7	0.1	21	2
Liberal Party	337,773	5.4	-1.7	19	-5
Christian Democratic Party	284,806	4.6	-1.0	16	-3
Feminist Initiative	194,719	3.1	2.7	0	0
Other	60,326	1.0	-0.4	0	0
Total	6,231,573	100		349	

Source: Berg and Oscarsson 2014

The real election winners of the 2014 election were the radical right Sweden Democrats. The party more than doubled its share of the vote from 5.7 percent in 2010 to 12.9 percent, and secured an additional 29 seats, bringing its total number of seats up to 49. This made the third largest party in the Riksdag (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). While both party blocs refused to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats in any way, thereby stripping the party of any coalition potential, its sheer size provided it with a degree of blackmail potential. Indeed, the Sweden Democrats had already denied both blocs a majority in the Riksdag, and therefore a degree of political instability was almost inevitable, especially given that the Sweden Democrats would not be absorbed into the right-wing bloc in the same way that their sister parties had in Denmark and Norway (Aylott and Bolin 2015).

8.4.6. 2018 General Election

Following the 2014 general election, the minority Red-Green government of Löfven had failed to secure parliamentary approval for its budget, while the Alliance, with support from the Sweden Democrats, had secured a parliamentary majority for its alternative budget. As a result, Prime Minister Löfven called a snap election for 22nd March 2015. This never came to be, however, as the principal parties and the Greens reached an agreement in which the largest of two blocs would not be blocked in attempting to form a government. Furthermore, opposition parties would not introduce and subsequently vote for an alternative budget (Aylott and Bolin 2019). The December Agreement, as it became known, had a central aim: to create an anti-Sweden Democrats cartel. This cartel had been envisaged to last for several years, but in fact it began to fray within less than a year as a result of internal dissent within individual parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019). For instance, members of the Christian Democratic Party opposed the deal and voted for the party to withdraw from it, which it subsequently did (The Local 2015). In practical terms, however, the agreement continued to dominate the strategic approaches of Swedish parties for years to come. Indeed, during the early months of 2017, the Social Democratic-Green government suffered a major scandal when confidential

information that included the identities of undercover police operatives was accidentally leaked (Anderson 2017). As a result of this, two ministers resigned and Löfven came in for personal criticism. However, the Alliance was unable to bring down the government as this would have required the cooperation of the Sweden Democrats – action that the Moderate Party favoured, but which was intolerable for the Liberal and Centre parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019).

During the early stages of the campaign for the 2018 elections, immigration and law and order were central issues. While the attention on these issues proved favourable to the Sweden Democrats, the principal parties also agreed on the need to enlarge the police force to address organised crime, and to reform immigration and refugee policy. What is more, the principal parties all sought to distance themselves from the more restrictive policies of the Sweden Democrats (Eriksson 2019). Then, as the weeks progressed, the campaign shifted focus away from these cultural issues towards welfare and taxation (Eriksson 2019). The Left Party favoured fighting social inequality through higher taxes, and while the Social Democrats also promoted increases in welfare and healthcare, they also called for the abolition of religious schools and for a restriction to labour-oriented immigration. As for the Moderates, they proposed greater measures for the social integration of immigrants, including language tests and incentives to gain employment, while the Liberals the Liberals advocated lower taxes, higher education spending, and greater EU-level cooperation (Eriksson 2019). By contrast, the Centre Party set itself up in direct competition to the Sweden Democrats, advocating for the liberal and ‘humane’ approach to immigration and integration (Eriksson 2019). Indeed, during a television debate the leader of the Centre Party, Annie Lööf, slammed her fist on the table as she sought to riposte Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, for his suggestion that immigrants did not belong in Sweden (Eriksson 2019).

In spite of debates on all these matters, the fundamental issue in the campaign concerned which parties would form the next government, and whether the Sweden Democrats would be involved. All parties rejected collaboration with the Sweden Democrats, and the Alliance parties also pledged to

vote against the incumbent Red-Green government (Aylott and Bolin 2019). However, the Alliance parties were not united on the means necessary to achieve this outcome. While the Moderates and Christian Democrats sought to vote against the government under any circumstances, the Centre and Liberal parties insisted that the removal of the Red-Green government and the subsequent installation of the Alliance should not proceed if it brought any influence to the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019). Furthermore, the Centre and Liberal parties also argued that the Alliance should only form the government if it secured more seats in the Riksdag than the left parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019).

The results of the 2018 elections – as summarised in Table 8.5 – were a huge disappointment to both the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party. The Social Democrats continued their downward trend, this time losing a further 2.7 percentage points and 13 seats. This represented their worst performance since 1911 (Aylott and Bolin 2019). Similarly, the Moderates' share of the vote fell by 3.5 percentage points, to 19.8 percent. This was their lowest share of the vote in 30 years. The party also lost 14 seats (Aylott and Bolin 2019). By contrast, the Centre and Left parties both increased their share of the vote and representation in the Riksdag. In the end, the left-wing bloc – comprising the Social Democratic, Left, and Green parties – beat the Alliance, but only by a mere 30,000 votes out of a total 6.5 million. The real winners of the election were the Sweden Democrats who reinforced their third-party status with an increase in their vote share of 4.6 percentage points, and a gain of a further 13 seats in the Riksdag. The rise of the Sweden Democrats, coupled with the decline of the Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Moderate Party, had upset the balance between the two blocs, fragmented the party system, and as a consequence, weakened governments within Sweden.

Before a new government had even been formed, the post of speaker of the Riksdag was filled by a Moderate MP but only as a result of support provided by the Sweden Democrats. This led to claims by the left parties that the Alliance had violated the *cordon sanitaire*. Then, when parliament reconvened, the Alliance and the Sweden Democrats voted to end the incumbent Red-Green government. However, the Alliance parties were far from unified on how to form the next

government. While the Moderates and Christian Democrats favoured an Alliance government supported by the Sweden Democrats, the Centre and Liberals opposed any government put in place with the support of the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019). Tensions within the Alliance were such that, ultimately, the parties could not agree, and in the end the Social Democrats formed another minority coalition with the Greens, and supported by the Left, Liberal, and Centre parties. This outcome, and the events that had preceded it, resulted in the dissolution of the Alliance (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019).

Table 8.6: Swedish general election results, 2018.

Party	Votes			Seats	
	Number	Percent	+/-	Number	+/-
Social Democrats	1,830,386	28.3	-2.7	100	-13
Moderate Party	1,284,698	19.8	-3.5	70	-14
Sweden Democrats	1,135,627	17.5	4.6	62	13
Centre Party	557,500	8.6	2.5	31	9
Left Party	518,454	8	2.3	28	7
Christian Democrats	409,478	6.3	1.7	22	6
Liberals	355,546	5.5	0.1	20	1
Green Party	285,899	4.4	-2.5	16	-9
Feminist Initiative	29,665	0.5	-2.6	0	0
Others	69,472	1.1	0.1	0	0
Total	6,476,725	100		349	

Source: Widfeldt 2019

This overview of the general elections in Sweden in the period 1998-2018 has highlighted the ups and downs of each election campaign, provided an account of how the various parties approached each contest, and assessed the consequences of their behaviour. The next section of the chapter now turns to more explicitly consider what this means in terms of party strategies, and offers a summary of the strategies that principal and non-principal parties in Sweden have adopted in vis-à-vis the Sweden Democrats. Non-principal parties are included here because, as has been evident in the discussion above, the behaviour of the principal parties in Sweden is often strongly influenced by non-principal

parties within the same electoral bloc. As such, the strategies of non-principal parties are relevant to helping develop our understanding of principal party strategies in the Swedish case.

8.5. An Overview of Principal Party Strategies

The Swedish principal parties have been somewhat consistent in terms of the strategies that they have deployed with respect to the Sweden Democrats. Both the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party have long adopted two-dimensional accommodative strategies with respect to cultural issues. That is, they have regularly devoted attention to the cultural dimension of competition, and have taken a position on this dimension that is similar, even if more moderate, to that of the Sweden Democrats.

That the principal parties have occupied similar spatial territory to the Sweden Democrats might, at first sight, seem odd or even contradictory given what has been said above. Indeed, the discussion of the elections showed that the principal parties were fairly consistent in their desire to dismiss the immigration issue, an archetypical cultural issue. However, it should be observed that the cultural dimension itself has not been subjected to any form of prohibition, but rather, it is the issue of immigration specifically that is considered taboo in Sweden. Thus, the principal parties of Sweden have tended to adopt rather small-c conservative positions on cultural issues such as those relating to national way of life and traditional morality. In other words, the principal parties have tended to support established national ideas, have appealed to voters on the basis of patriotism and pride in Swedishness, have favoured policies that prohibit or suppress behaviour that is unseemly or otherwise immoral, and have maintained support for the traditional family unit (Volkens et al. 2020). That being said, there was a very noticeable shift in the 2014 general election, when the principal parties and other mainstream parliamentary parties changed their approach and moved to adopt very clear two-dimensional adversarial strategies against the Sweden Democrats on a variety of cultural issues such as law and order and traditional morality, in favour of small-l liberal positions. This move was in direct

response to the significant gains and electoral breakthrough that the Sweden Democrats had experienced in 2010. In such a context, all parliamentary parties remained committed to the exclusion and isolation of the Sweden Democrats.

While the principal parties and other parliamentary parties have been fairly conventional when it comes to most cultural issues, they have been far less willing to compromise on or otherwise accommodate restrictive positions on the issue of immigration in so far as election campaigning is concerned. In the context of radical right party success throughout most of Western Europe— and in particular in Norway and Denmark – and in light of the rapid rise of New Democracy in the early 1990s, the mainstream parliamentary parties of Sweden have sought to avoid the politicisation of immigration in election campaigns. This has primarily been achieved through the use of dismissive strategies and the downplaying of the importance of immigration in election campaigns. Deviation from this approach has been uncommon and when parties did occasionally campaign on the issue of immigration, as both the Liberals and Moderates did in 2002 and 2014 respectively, the remaining parties tended to push back against what they saw as divisive politics, regardless of the actual positions adopted on these issues.

For instance, the Liberal Party's proposals in the 2002 campaign for 'ethnic integration' were resoundingly criticised by the left parties as pandering to the cause of the Sweden Democrats (Widfeldt 2003). Yet the net result of the Liberal campaign and the denunciations that followed was an increase in the politicisation of immigration, all of which undermined the effectiveness of the dismissive strategies. Similarly, following the 2010 general election, the governing Alliance and Green Party reached a deal that would further isolate the Sweden Democrats in the Riksdag, but it included the further liberalisation of Sweden's immigration policy, so once again, it increased the politicisation of immigration. This undermined the existing dismissive strategies yet further, and in fact it amounted to the adoption of an adversarial strategy by the governing Alliance and Green Party.

The way in which principal parties in Sweden have handled the issue of immigration therefore seems to have pinned them into a corner. The dismissive strategy should only work if all the principal parties are committed to it, and if the issue of immigration is ignored consistently. But this is hard going, and demands consistency, and any mention of the issue by any of the principal parties breaks this silence and results in the issue becoming politicised and gaining salience. And if that happens, it is the SD who benefits.

In addition to the issue-oriented strategies adopted throughout the period 1998 and 2018, the parliamentary parties of Sweden, including the principal parties, have employed a clear *cordon sanitaire* against the Sweden Democrats. This desire to politically isolate the Sweden Democrats saw all moderate parties refusing to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats in any capacity. In the electoral arena, this took the form of refusing any and all pacts with the Sweden Democrats, while in the legislative arena, it meant pursuing cross-bloc arrangements to limit or erase the influence that the Sweden Democrats could have in the Riksdag. A prominent example of this occurred in 2015 with the introduction of the December agreement. As explained above, this was a formal agreement between all moderate, parliamentary parties that bound each party to accept the right of the largest political bloc to not only form the government following an election, but also to pass its budget through parliament (Aylott and Bolin 2019). The central aim of this agreement was to establish an anti-Sweden Democrat cartel. Years later, even when the December agreement had fallen apart, the Liberal and Centre parties destroyed the Alliance (of which they were part) in order to maintain the *cordon sanitaire* against the Sweden Democrats at a time when the Moderates and Christian Democrats (their partners in the Alliance) were considering an overture to the Sweden Democrats.

The *cordon sanitaire* does therefore remain in effect, but as this last example shows, it is increasingly under strain. Indeed, the Moderate and Christian Democratic parties have already begun to question ‘what [is] essentially an artificial constraint on the size of any right bloc in parliament’ (Bale 2003: 69), and thus the durability of the *cordon sanitaire* is an open question. Given that the Alliance has been

terminated by the Liberal and Centre parties, the ‘artificial constraints’ placed upon the Moderates and Christian Democrats have been removed. Going forward, then, it is entirely plausible that the Sweden Democrats may well become a more normalised member of a new right-wing bloc consisting of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats. Putting aside the optics of any such arrangement, the numerics of such a bloc would be favourable as it would contain two of the three largest parties in the Riksdag as of 2018. Furthermore, there is some form of precedent for this in as much as it might be recalled that the Moderates showed themselves willing to engage with radical right parties in the past, as their overtures to New Democracy between 1991 and 1994 suggested (see above).

8.6. Introducing Political Context, Sweden.

Having provided a summary of the elections in the period 1998 to 2018, and the strategies employed by principal parties in this period, it is useful to explore some of the more important contextual conditions of Swedish politics, namely the issue agenda; the spatial positioning of relevant parties and the Sweden Democrats; the attitudes of voters to the issues of immigration and welfare; voter satisfaction with democracy and voter trust in both politicians and political parties; and the reputation of parties and their respective leaderships. These conditions were chosen for further analysis as they are either fundamental to the model of competition employed in this thesis, or appear key to how amenable voters have been to the Sweden Democrats. As such then, these conditions are likely to affect the success or failure of particular principal party strategies.


8.6.1. The Issue Agenda

As with the previous chapter on France, the first condition to be investigated is the issue agenda. As has been argued previously (see Chapter 2), political parties will selectively emphasise issues that are

favourable to them and downplay or even ignore issues that are not (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Moreover, if a political party holds ownership over a particular issue, it will be especially keen to emphasise it, as the rewards for doing so are likely to be large among voters for whom that issue is important (Petrocik 1996; Holian 2004; Bélanger and Meguid 2008). In the context of Sweden, it stands to reason that by downplaying the issue of immigration, principal and other moderate political parties have sought to undermine the electoral potential of the Sweden Democrats, by reducing the importance of issues that the Sweden Democrats own or otherwise thrive upon.

However, as is shown in Figure 8.1, this strategy has been rather ineffective. Indeed, between 2006 and 2018, the number of respondents who said that immigration was one of the most important issues facing Sweden increased from a low of 3.5 percent in 2006 to a high of 12.5 percent in 2018 (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). The saliency of the issue has therefore risen over this period, and it was precisely over these years that the Sweden Democrats increased their vote and seat share. Thus, the strategy of downplaying the issue of immigration – which once contributed to Sweden being labelled as a unique negative case among scholars of the radical right (Rydgren 2002) – has in recent years failed to stave off the rise of the Sweden Democrats.

Figure 8.1: Issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018.




Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a

However, due attention should also be paid to the relative importance of cultural issues over economic issues. When cultural issues are considered more important by the electorate, then the issue agenda is likely to be more favourable to a radical right party like the Sweden Democrats, who emphasise cultural issues and downplay economic ones (Rovny 2013). Put another way, focus should not be paid exclusively to the immigration issue because other issues may be favourable or unfavourable to the Swedish mainstream on the one hand, and to the Sweden Democrats on the other. In light of this, Figure 8.2 illustrates the saliency of cultural and economic issues as determined by survey respondents. It shows a relatively clear and consistent picture, namely that a large majority of respondents considers economic issues to be more important than cultural ones. Indeed, roughly 70 percent of respondents saw economic issues as the most important issues facing Sweden between 2006 and 2014. This then dipped to about 60 percent in 2018 (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). By contrast, cultural issues were named as the most important issues facing Sweden by less than 20 percent of respondents in 2006. This then fell to 11 percent in

2014, before increasing to a high of 25 percent in 2018 (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a).

These trends would suggest a less than favourable issue environment for the Sweden Democrats, at least until the election in 2018, and might even imply some success in the dismissive strategies of the principal parties. However, this would seem an inaccurate account given the increased saliency of immigration, as discussed above. More likely then, is that the greater importance of immigration is lost in the declining importance of other cultural issues, as well as in the decreasing importance of traditional economic issues, such as unemployment, in Swedish politics.

Figure 8.2: Cultural and economic issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018.




Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a

Note: The cultural dimension consists of crime, terrorism, and immigration, while the economic dimension consists of the economic situation, prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, housing, government debt, pensions, healthcare, and education.

The decline in the importance of economic issues is further illustrated in Figure 8.3. This figure uses the same data, but instead of presenting health and education under the economic dimension, it presents them as if they were on their own dimension of competition: a welfare dimension. The logic

for doing so is two-fold. Firstly, as is highlighted below, welfare issues tend to hold central importance in Swedish politics, and are even intertwined with patriotism and notions of Swedishness. Secondly, the Sweden Democrats have sought to immerse themselves in the traditional narrative of *folkhem* (see below), of which welfare is a fundamental pillar.

Figure 8.3: Cultural, economic, and welfare issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018.



Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a

Note: The cultural dimension consists of crime, terrorism, and immigration. The economic dimension consists of the economic situation, prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, housing, and government debt. And the welfare dimension consists of healthcare, education, and pensions.

Figure 8.3 shows that economic issues, especially unemployment, have become considerably less important in recent years. While a high of 48 percent of respondents named economic issues as the most important in 2010, by 2018 this figure was just 15.5 percent. By contrast, the welfare issues of healthcare, education, and pensions have increased in importance over the same period. In 2010 27.5 percent of respondents considered them to be the most important, but by 2018 this had grown to 44.5 percent (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a).

The fall in the saliency of economic issues and the rise in the importance attached to welfare issues is important in the Swedish case because unlike many radical right parties in other parts of Europe,

which have economic platforms that have been described as neo-liberal (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), the Sweden Democrats have not embraced neo-liberal economic positions (Sunnemark 2014) and have instead long rooted themselves in a Sweden-specific social democratic tradition in which welfare is central (Hellström and Nillson 2010; Hellström et al. 2012; Nordensvard and Ketola 2014; Norocel 2016). The development and subsequent evolution of the welfare state in Sweden has, from the very beginning, been inextricably linked not only to the consolidation of democracy but also to the idea of a *folkhem* or ‘people’s home’ (Hellström and Nillson 2010; Hellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016). The *folkhem* served as the foundation from which a consensus could be built for the establishment of a ‘class-transgressive’, cradle-to-the-grave system that protected the Swedish people (Hellström et al. 2012: 195; Norocel 2016). Beyond simply wishing to preserve the idea of *folkhem*, the Sweden Democrats wish to restore it: ‘whereby the feeling of belonging is not founded on class solidarity but rather on national affiliation and identity, in which all citizens are guaranteed a physical, economic and social security’ (Sweden Democrats quoted in Norocel 2016: 9). Importantly, the restoration of the *folkhem* can simply be achieved, according to the Sweden Democrats, through the reallocation of resources that are currently spent on immigration (Nordensvard and Ketola 2014). For the Sweden Democrats, then, the way to preserve the *folkhem*, to preserve the welfare state as Swedes know it, is to end mass immigration and multiculturalism (ellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016). The welfare chauvinism of the Sweden Democrats, then, provides a clear connection between their culturally-oriented politics and the provision of welfare services in Sweden. This is coupled with a political mainstream that has hitherto refused to co-opt this exclusionary frame, providing the Sweden Democrats with the opportunity to present themselves as the ‘true social democrats’ (Hellström and Nillson 2010: 62; Hellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016).


Overall, the growth in the saliency of cultural and welfare issues has proved to be a boon for the Sweden Democrats and has provided them with fertile political territory from which to launch a breakthrough into the Riksdag. The increase in favourable cultural and welfare issues was helped by the fact that the mainstream political parties, including the principal ones, have been historically

unwilling to challenge the Sweden Democrats on territory it was perceived to own, most importantly, immigration. This provided the Sweden Democrats with what is an essentially monopolistic-niche on which to base their campaigns. It is to this political territory that the next section now turns. Using time series data, it shows where the Sweden Democrats are positioned in relation to the other parties in Sweden, and it highlights the niches in which the Sweden Democrats operate.

8.6.2. Spatial Positioning

With regard to the issue of immigration, as has been mentioned, the majority of Swedish political parties were committed to maintaining the taboo around the subject, at least as far as active campaigning or politicisation was concerned. However, they nonetheless developed policies on this issue. Their positions are illustrated in Figure 8.4, which displays the political space on the issue of immigration between the years 2006 and 2019. It shows that prior to 2019, the Sweden Democrats were the only party to offer a strongly restrictionist immigration policy. All other parties were fairly neutral on the issue. The Alliance parties tended towards a centrist approach in 2006 and 2010, and a much more liberal approach in 2014, while the Left and Green parties were consistently liberal on the issue (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). By 2019, however, there was a much greater spread of opinion on the issue of immigration. The Left and Green parties maintained their rather liberal approach towards immigration, and were joined by the Centre Party which had now defined itself as the anti-Sweden Democrats party. The Liberals, on the other hand, offered the only real centrist option, while the Social Democrats swung towards a more restrictive position – a position much more in keeping with their historical stance on the issue (see below). By contrast, following the collapse of the Alliance, the Moderates and the Christian Democrats were free to shift their positions, and they did so, moving significantly rightwards, in favour of a position much more similar to that of the Sweden Democrats.

Figure 8.4: Spatial positioning of Swedish political parties on the issue of immigration, 2006-2019.



Sources: Bakker et al. 2015, 2020

Other than illustrating a greater spread of opinion on the issue of immigration, the main trend evident in Figure 8.4 is the rather stark shift on the issue that took place first between 2010 and 2014 and then between 2014 and 2019. Between 2010 and 2014 a distinct liberalisation of immigration positions occurred, while in the years 2014 to 2019 a number of the mainstream parties changed their stances and adopted a much more restrictive position (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). These noticeable shifts can be attributed to two political events.

In the first instance, the shift that occurred between 2010 and 2014 can be explained in large part as a reaction by the moderate parties to the legislative breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats in 2010. The 2010 general election represented the first time that a radical right party had entered the Riksdag

since New Democracy in 1991, some 19 years earlier. The success of the Sweden Democrats, then, installed in the more moderate parties a desire to reinforce the *cordon sanitaire* and maintain the depoliticization of immigration, even if Moderate Party leader and then-Prime Minister Reinfeldt presented a break in this by politicising immigration in order to create a sense of crisis in the hope that such an environment would electorally strengthen the Moderates (see above).

By contrast, the second shift, which happened from 2014 to 2019, was a response to global events, and more specifically to the refugee crisis that beset Europe from 2015. While Sweden had historically been generous in its support to refugees, especially when compared to other countries, the sheer number of asylum applications that it received in 2015 led its leaders to reconsider matters. Indeed, in 2015, Sweden experienced a record-high of 163,000 asylum applications – primarily from natives of Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This amounted to about 1.6 percent of the country’s population (Tomson 2020: para 1). Put in perspective, if the United States were to accept 1.6 percent of its population in refugees, this would equate to over 5 million additional people; in reality, the United States only accepted about 83,000 applications in 2015 (Tomson 2020: para 1). In response to this unprecedented wave of migration, Social Democratic Party leader and then Prime Minister Stefan Löfven said ‘It pains me that Sweden is no longer capable of receiving asylum seekers at the high level we do today. We simply cannot do any more’ (Crouch 2015: para 5).


While this approach might seem out of kilter for a social democratic party, historically, the Swedish Social Democratic Party has tended to favour strict immigration policies to keep immigrant (and even refugee) numbers down (Hinnfors et al. 2012). For example, during the 2004 EU enlargement process, the Social Democrats argued in favour of imposing transitional controls on new member states. They believed that immigrants from new enlargement states would threaten the regulated labour market and the welfare state, even going so far as to suggest that new immigrants might ‘abuse’ the system through so-called ‘social tourism’, and that without transitional controls, Sweden would be pitting ‘foreign-born’ labour against native Swedes (Hinnfors et al. 2012). The Social Democrats’ position on

immigration is not informed by some underlying ethno-nationalism, as is the case with the Sweden Democrats. Rather, it draws on the tradition of *folkhem* discussed above, in which the Swedish welfare state is deeply rooted, and it reflects a desire to maintain the ‘institutional expression of the social democratic project: a heavily regulated labour market and generous welfare state’ (Hinnfors et al. 2012: 589). This also explains why the party’s approach to ‘ethnic integration’ has been rather more generous than its position on immigration. It has advocated positively for those who are already in Sweden (Hinnfors et al. 2012).

Given this, in order to better understand Swedish party positions on the issue of immigration, a measure that excludes ethnic integration is required. While there is no perfect or ideal dataset for this, some semblance of a measure can be developed by using the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2020) and the Parties Integration and Immigration Positions Dataset (Lehmann and Zobel 2018). Since 2014, the CMP has included an immigration category in its dataset – and therefore figures for the 2014 and 2018 general elections can be extracted – while the PImPo dataset contains an immigration category for the years 2006 and 2010.³⁵ Combining the two datasets thus allows for the position of Swedish political parties on immigration from 2006 to 2018 to be plotted. Figure 8.5 reports these results.

³⁵ The calculations used to arrive at immigration positions are somewhat different. The PImPo dataset calculates immigration positions by subtracting the share of restrictionist quasi-sentences from the share of liberal quasi-sentences, and dividing this figure by the sum of these two quasi-sentences and quasi-sentences that are neutral on the issue of immigration (Lehmann and Zobel 2018). The CMP dataset does not contain a category for neutral immigration statements, but rather, contains an unsorted category for any quasi-sentences that could not be meaningfully categorised elsewhere (Volkens et al. 2020). The share of quasi-sentences categorised as ‘unmeaningful’ is extremely low in the Swedish case with the majority of parties having no such categorised quasi-sentences. Unfortunately, the 2010 figure for the Social Democrats is missing – in this instance, an average of the 2006 and 2014 position has been used instead.

Figure 8.5: Issue of immigration exclusive of integration, 2006-2018.



Sources: Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020

Note: The position of a number of parties in 2018 is identical and hence difficult to see on the graph. In this year, both the Green and Left parties are both positioned at 1, while the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Sweden Democrats are both positioned at -1.

Figure 8.5 demonstrates two things that Figure 8.4 did not. Firstly, it shows a lack of consensus in 2006, when the Liberals ‘broke ranks’ and adopted a fairly restrictionist approach towards immigration, while the other mainstream parties all expressed a more liberal position (Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020). Secondly, it reveals a significant degree of liberalisation in the mainstream parties’ positions between 2010 and 2014, such that all of the principal and mainstream parties occupy the same territory. Thirdly, it shows that the significant liberalisation was followed by

a considerable shift towards more restrictive immigration policies from 2014 to 2018, especially from the Social Democrats and Moderate Party (Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020).

Sizeable though these shifts were, they are actually not that surprising. As discussed above, the Social Democrats have, for much of their post-war history, maintained a relatively strict position on immigration. While they have been fairly generous to those who have arrived in Sweden (i.e., they have been fairly liberal on the issue of integration), they have maintained a clear desire to limit the number of immigrants arriving into Sweden. In short, the Social Democrats more liberal positioning in 2006, 2010, and 2014 was out of kilter with their historical positions. By contrast, the Moderate and Christian Democratic parties' shift on immigration is in large part explained by their rather opportunistic approach to the Sweden Democrats. As explained above, up until 2019 the Moderates and Christian Democrats were held back from making overtures towards the Sweden Democrats by the fact that they were partners in the Alliance with the Liberal and Centre parties, two parties that opposed any collaboration with the Sweden Democrats. Yet with the weakening of the Alliance between 2015 and 2018, and its ultimate dissolution in 2019, the Moderates and Christian Democrats were now free to pursue their own strategies, including potential future collaboration with the Sweden Democrats.

In more general terms, Figures 8.4 and 8.5 demonstrate that while the mainstream parties in Sweden have sought to suppress the vote share of the Sweden Democrats through isolation and dismissive strategies, in reality, such an approach has given the Sweden Democrats a significant degree of freedom to operate within the restrictionist or anti-immigration niche. Unlike in other countries such as France (see Chapter 7), there has been no real alternative or lighter version of the Sweden Democrats' position on offer, at least until 2018. This space, coupled with the gradual increase in the salience of the immigration issue as discussed above, therefore proved a boon for the Sweden Democrats. However, since 2018, the Sweden Democrats lost their monopolistic position on immigration as the Social Democrats and Moderates accommodated their position.

Immigration has not been the only issue to gain prominence in Sweden over the period studied. Welfare has always been a fairly salient issue in Swedish politics, and as discussed above, its importance has grown in recent years. Therefore, this issue, and its impact on party competition is worth brief consideration. As mentioned above, the welfare state became intricately tied to the idea of Swedishness through the notion of the *Folkhem*. Throughout post-war history, Swedish elections have often featured arguments over the nature of the welfare state, with the centre-left bloc advocating protecting the welfare state in its current form and committing to continuing to fund it generously.


Figure 8.6 reports the attitudes of the Swedish political parties towards redistribution, and reflects the two different visions of the welfare state rather well. It reveals a great deal of cohesiveness within the two main blocs on the issue of redistribution. The three left-wing parties are all within the range of 0.5 to 3.5, while the mainstream right parties are even more concentrated between 5.5 and 7.5 (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). In addition, the figure shows the very consistent and centrist placement of the Sweden Democrats on the issue between 2010 and 2019. This is therefore another example of the Sweden Democrats adopting a specific niche on a very prominent issue domain.

One interpretation of the position of the Sweden Democrats on this issue is that the party has assumed a centrist position as a result of being squeezed by competition from the two main blocs. However, an alternative interpretation, is that the Sweden Democrats' relatively centrist placement gives the party access to the voters of both blocs on this issue. That is, the party can seek to attract less left-leaning Social Democratic voters as well as former Moderate voters. The latter interpretation corresponds to research that has suggested that Sweden Democrat voters are generally centrist on economic issues (Sannerstedt 2016; Jylhä et al. 2019).

The centrist position adopted by the Sweden Democrats on this issue also allows the party to embrace and advocate the narrative of *folkhem*. Yet it does so in a way that is different to the other political parties. More specifically, the Sweden Democrats adopt the narrative of *folkhem* in order to justify

their chauvinist stances on welfare, and their anti-immigration and anti-multicultural positions. This has been particularly successful because many of the arguments that the Sweden Democrats advance in favour of the *folkhem* and restricting immigration have, in previous years, been put forward by the Social Democratic Party, albeit without the ethno-nationalist undertones of the Sweden Democrats' presentation of the issue. In a sense, then, the Sweden Democrats have been able to piggy-back off the success of the Social Democrats and tie themselves to a fundamental concept underlying Swedishness and the Swedish approach to welfare – a concept essentially developed by the Social Democratic Party. And in putting forward this stance, the SD have been helped by the Social Democrats becoming gradually more progressive and inclusive in their conception of the *folkhem*, helping those immigrants who do arrive in Sweden.

Figure 8.6: Spatial positioning of Swedish political parties on the issue of redistribution, 2006-2019.



Sources: Bakker et al. 2015, 2020

The last two sections of this chapter have explored the issues that have grown in prominence over the years in Sweden, how these issues have been favourable to the Sweden Democrats, and how the positioning of other parties on the respective issue dimensions has provided potential competitive space to the Sweden Democrats. What has been missing so far, however, is an examination of the attitudes of Swedish voters. After all, certain positions on issue dimensions can only be truly competitive if a significant proportion of voters also share that position. The next section, then, considers the position of Swedish voters on the issues of immigration and welfare.


8.6.3. Voter Attitudes to Immigration and Welfare Issues

As was discussed above, and illustrated in Figure 8.1, the issue of immigration in Sweden increased in salience over the period 2006-2018. In 2006, just 3.5 percent of respondents named immigration as one of the two most important issues facing Sweden, but by 2018 the figure was 12.5 percent. In the most recent general election, then, immigration was one of the top five most important issues as judged by Swedish voters (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). What these salience figures do not reveal, however, is the position that Swedish voters take on the issue of immigration. After all, the increase in the salience of immigration should only be favourable to the Sweden Democrats if there is a sufficient reservoir of anti-immigrant feeling among the Swedish population. Likewise, the disposition of Swedish voters towards the immigration issue should influence the extent to which dismissive, adversarial, or accommodative strategies are successful (or not). The following paragraphs therefore focus first on the position of Swedish voters on the issue of immigration, and secondly on their attitudes to welfare, in order to determine the impact of such views on the strategies adopted by mainstream Swedish political parties.

Generally speaking, the Swedes are positively predisposed towards immigration. Indeed, Sweden ranks as the most accepting country in Europe on the Migrant Acceptance Index, scoring 7.92 out of 10, well above the European average (and median) of 6.61 (Esipova et al. 2017). This picture of an immigration-friendly Sweden is further reinforced when Swedish voters are asked whether immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of the country. Figure 8.7 illustrates their responses to this question in the period between 2002 and 2016, and shows that Swedes generally view the cultural impact of immigration as being positive. In 2002, just under 9 percent of respondents felt that immigrants undermined Swedish cultural life. While this rose slightly by the end of this period – to around 14 percent in 2016 – the numbers viewing immigration as having a negative impact on culture remained low (ESS 2018). The vast majority of respondents instead believed that Sweden is culturally enriched by immigration. In 2002 a full 75 percent thought this, and even though levels of support

dropped slightly by 2016 (to 71 percent), this view continued to be widely prevalent over the period (ESS 2018). Thus, Figure 8.7 shows both a very clear pattern as regards people’s opinions on the benefits and costs of immigration to Swedish culture, and a very consistent one.

Figure 8.7: Swedish perceptions of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, 2002-2016.




Source: ESS 2018

A similar picture is revealed when Swedes are asked for their view on whether or not immigrants make Sweden a better or worse place to live in. As Figure 8.8 shows, the number of Swedes who believe that immigration has made Sweden a worse place to live in increased marginally from just under 15 percent in 2002 to a high of 18 percent in 2016, averaging out at around 15 percent over the period (ESS 2018). By contrast, the number of Swedes who believe that immigration makes Sweden a better place to live in actually increased marginally, from around 57 percent in 2002 to just over 58 percent in 2016, with a peak of 64 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). While the number of respondents who thought that immigration made Sweden a better place to live in was somewhat lower than the number who considered immigration as something that enriched Sweden culturally, both sets of responses (i.e., the patterns reported in both Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8) demonstrate the same broad pattern: that

Swedes hold positive views on the issue of immigration and that this picture has not changed very much at all over the period under consideration.

Figure 8.8: Swedish perceptions of whether immigrants make Sweden a better or worse country to live in, 2002-2016.



Source: ESS 2018

The data, then, suggest that while the issue of immigration has been increasing in prominence, the Swedish view on immigration was, and remains, positive. That said, it should be noted that there is nevertheless a significant reservoir of anti-immigration feeling among the Swedish population, and as Demker and Sandberg (2014) have shown, those who ranked immigration as among the most important social issues were more likely to have anti-immigration views. Therefore, an increase in the saliency of immigration has at the very least made it easier for the Sweden Democrats to mobilise support among this segment of the voting population (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019).


This all points to the failure of the dismissive strategy adopted by the principal parties in Sweden. This strategy has not resulted in the saliency of immigration being suppressed in recent years – as theoretical expectations would have suggested (see Meguid 2005, 2008) – and it has not led to the

vote share of the Sweden Democrats being curbed. However, it is not just the dismissive strategy that is under fire in this period, because while the mainstream political parties in Sweden – including the principal ones – have tended to adopt dismissive strategies in election campaigns, in the legislative arena they often embraced somewhat different strategies. As mentioned above, the Social Democratic Party has a long history of pursuing restrictive policies on immigration. In other instances, mainstream parties have taken on stances in parliament that amount to adopting an adversarial strategy. This was the case following the 2010 general election when the governing Alliance struck a deal with the Green Party in order to further isolate the Sweden Democrats. The agreement also produced a liberalisation of immigration policy, contributing to an increase in the politicisation of immigration, and representing an adversarial strategy in the legislative arena (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). The impact of this adversarial strategy, then, was to increase the saliency of immigration, and in the process increase the Sweden Democrats' ownership over the restrictionist immigration position (see above; also, Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). The failure of the dismissive strategies in the electoral arena, then, could be attributed to a lack of consistency by mainstream parties across the electoral and legislative arenas, rather than something inherent to the dismissive strategy itself. In short, the principal parties have been inconsistent in their use of strategies, and this has undermined the effectiveness of their attempts to curb the rise of the Sweden Democrats.

Turning to public attitudes on welfare issues, a broadly similar pattern is also observed. Figure 8.9 illustrates that the percentage of people who believe that the government should engage in some form of (economic) redistributive policy-making has remained fairly constant over the period, even if a slight decline can be observed from 66 percent in 2002 to 61 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). Interestingly, the number of respondents who disagree with government redistribution also fell a little, from around 14 percent in 2002 to just under 11 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). These two slight declines are accompanied by a small rise in the percentage of people who felt relatively neutral on the issue. In 2002 17 percent of people felt this way, but by 2016 this had risen to 26 percent.

Notwithstanding these small changes, the main picture to emerge from Figure 8.9 is that attitudes towards redistribution remained broadly unchanged over the period.

Figure 8.9: Percentage of respondents who think that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels, 2002-2016.




Source: ESS 2018

While opinions on redistribution have not really changed over the period, there have been more noticeable shifts in the attitude of voters towards specific areas of welfare, notably education and healthcare. Figure 8.10 shows how respondents felt about the state of education in Sweden in the period 2002-2016. It reveals that, from 2002 to 2012, there was a relatively consistent rise in the percentage of respondents who thought that the overall quality of Swedish education was good, from 45 percent to around 57 percent (ESS 2018). As expected, there was a corresponding decrease over these years in the percentage of people who believed that the quality of Swedish education was bad. In 2002 35 percent of respondents thought that the quality of education in Sweden was poor; by 2010, only 23 percent did so (ESS 2018). In short then, between 2002 and 2010, Swedes considered that the quality of educational provision in their country had improved. However, this picture changed rather rapidly in 2014. While in 2012 57 percent of respondents thought that the Swedish education system was good, by 2014 only 42 percent thought so. This decline was accompanied by an increase in those

rating the quality of Swedish education as bad – from 26 percent in 2012 to 39 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). As discussed above, one possible reason for this sharp decline in satisfaction with the quality of education was the poor performance of Swedish schoolchildren in the international PISA rankings (Aylott and Bolin 2015).


Figure 8.10: Swedish perceptions of the state of education, 2002-2016.



Source: ESS 2018

A similar trend is observed with regard to perceptions of the state of healthcare in Sweden. As can be seen from Figure 8.11, the number of respondents who believed that the quality of Swedish healthcare was good increased from 42 percent in 2002 to a high of 68 percent in 2012, before falling to 57 percent in 2014. By contrast, the numbers who believed that the quality of Swedish healthcare was poor declined from 42 percent in 2002 to a mere 18 percent in 2010, before increasing once again to 27 percent in 2014, and 29 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). This can most likely be attributed to a series of scandals that were widely interpreted as putting profits before people in private healthcare facilities (Reuters 2014).

Figure 8.11: Swedish perceptions of the state of healthcare, 2002-2016.



Source: ESS 2018

Taken collectively, then, it is not clear what role Swedish attitudes to welfare have had on the efficacy of principal party strategies. The number of respondents who believed that the quality of education and healthcare in Sweden tended to increase between 2002 and 2010, before falling between 2012 and 2016. These attitudinal shifts, however, do not coincide with the failure of the dismissive strategies to prevent the growing strength of the Sweden Democrats. The Sweden Democrats began experiencing electoral successes as far as back as 2006, and a parliamentary breakthrough in 2010, while growing dissatisfaction in the state of healthcare did not occur until 2012. Rather, it seems likely that growing dissatisfaction with the state of education and healthcare after 2012-2014 directly contributed to the growing electoral strength of the Sweden Democrats.

It seems almost counterintuitive that the Sweden Democrats would experience their breakthrough into the Riksdag (2010) during a period characterised by relatively high levels of positive perceptions of immigration and positive attitudes towards the healthcare and education system. Yet this is what has happened, and it therefore points to the growing capacity of the Sweden Democrats to draw votes from the reservoir of long-standing anti-immigration sentiment that exists in Sweden.

Furthermore, changing attitudes to the perception of the quality of healthcare and education helps explain why the isolation strategies failed, especially after 2012. To recall, the Sweden Democrats have adopted a centrist economic position that is rooted in the social democratic tradition of Sweden. Dissatisfaction with the state of education and healthcare, then, might encourage many centre-right, pro-welfare voters to shift from the Alliance parties to the Sweden Democrats. This is certainly indicated by the fact that every third person who voted for the Sweden Democrats had previously supported one of the Alliance parties (Kielos 2014)


The next section shifts gear by turning its attention to the satisfaction that Swedish voters have with democracy, as well as the levels of trust that Swedish voters have in their politicians and political parties.

8.6.4. Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Politicians and Parties

As has been argued previously (see Chapter 5), voters who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are much more likely to vote for radical right parties, with well-organised and well-lead radical right parties reaching voters with even weak levels of democratic dissatisfaction (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Given this, it is reasonable to assume that principal party strategies will be more effective in periods in which there are high levels of satisfaction with democracy, and less effective during periods of low satisfaction with democracy. With this in mind, Figure 8.12 illustrates the levels of satisfaction that Swedish voters have had with the functioning of democracy between 2002 and 2016. The figure shows that levels of satisfaction with Swedish democracy increased over the period, from 60 percent in 2002, to a high of 78 percent in 2012. They then dropped slightly to 73 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). By contrast, levels of dissatisfaction are generally low. In 2002 only 21 percent of respondents said they were dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. This then fell further to 10 percent in 2012, before increasing slightly to 14 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). As was the case with patterns surrounding Swedish attitudes to welfare and immigration, we therefore have a superficially

counterintuitive result: the strategies of principal parties to suppress the vote share of the Sweden Democrats seemed to fail during a period in which we would expect to see low levels of support for the radical right – i.e., during a period when satisfaction with democracy was steadily increasing.

Figure 8.12: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Sweden, 2002-2016.



Source: ESS 2018


Of course, there are myriad reasons why satisfaction with democracy might increase, and the trend illustrated in Figure 8.12 need not favour mainstream political parties or politicians. After all, the connection between satisfaction in democracy and the success of mainstream political parties is not clear cut. In countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, where satisfaction in democracy is quite high, radical right parties have succeeded in squeezing the vote share of mainstream parties in recent years. By contrast, in countries such as Spain and the UK, where mainstream parties have tended to perform significantly better, satisfaction in democracy is rather low (Pew 2019). Furthermore, satisfaction in democracy is often intertwined with opinions regarding the long-term economic future. Low levels of satisfaction with democracy are especially prevalent among those who are pessimistic

about future economic performance (Pew 2020). It is therefore possible that high levels of satisfaction in democracy in Sweden are as a result of good economic performance.

However, it seems counterintuitive to think that the principal parties would experience relatively weak election results during a period of good economic performance and high levels of democratic satisfaction. Given this, it is worthwhile tapping Swedish attitudes to politicians and political parties directly, to see what influence these two factors have.

Figure 8.13 illustrates the levels of trust that Swedes had in political parties between 2002 and 2016 and shows that Swedes are generally distrusting of their political parties. That being said, it reveals that trust in political parties increased from 29 percent in 2002 to 36 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). Correspondingly, there was a modest decline in the percentage of respondents who distrust political parties, with levels of distrust falling from 46 percent in 2002 to 38 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). However, while these trends indicate growing levels of trust in political parties, it should be nonetheless noted that for a significant part of this time period – from 2002 to 2007 and from 2014 to 2016 – there were more respondents who indicated they were untrusting than there were respondents who reported they were trusting. Even between 2008 and 2012, which is the high point for trust in political parties, the percentage of respondents who said they had trust in the parties never exceeded 50 percent. In short, while more Swedes report having trust in their political parties since 2002, there are still more individuals who distrust parties than who trust them.

Figure 8.13: Levels of trust in Swedish political parties, 2002-2016.




Source: ESS 2018

A similar pattern is observed in levels of trust in politicians, as demonstrated in Figure 8.14. This figure shows little change in the number of respondents who said they trusted politicians. In 2002 37 percent reported trusting politicians, while in 2016 38 percent did (ESS 2018). Similarly, levels of distrust in the country's politicians also remained relatively stable with 40 percent of respondents saying they distrusted politicians in 2002, compared to 39 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). There was, however, a noticeable spike in levels of distrust in 2004. This could well correspond with the strong criticism that the government received following its poor handling of the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Asia (see above).³⁶ Generally, what this shows is that despite there being very high levels of satisfaction in the functioning of democracy in Sweden, there is a significant proportion of the population that is untrusting of political parties and politicians

³⁶ The tsunami occurred in December 2004, while the data collection for Sweden for the European Social Survey 2004 was not completed until the 19th January 2005 (ESS 2018).

Figure 8.14: Levels of trust in Swedish politicians, 2002-2016.



Source: ESS 2018

All in all, what the data has thus far shown is that, at least theoretically, the overall environment or political context is not propitious for a radical right party like the Sweden Democrats. And yet we see that the Sweden Democrats have increased their share of the vote and hence that principal party strategies have not worked. During the period under investigation, the Sweden Democrats have become increasingly astute, it seems, at cornering the segment of the population that remains sceptical or hostile toward immigration, fears its impact on society, and is generally distrustful of the political class. This suggests that the declining efficacy of principal party strategies could be explained, at least in part, by the growing competency of the Sweden Democrats. It is to this issue of agency that the next section of this chapter turns. More specifically, it explores the overall reputation of the political parties in Sweden, as well as the reputation of party leaderships, and it then briefly examines the increase in professionalism of the Sweden Democrats.


8.6.5. Reputation and Professionalism

As was argued in Chapter 2, when political parties or candidates share the same position on a given dimension of competition, voters are more likely to choose the one with the better reputation. Moreover, relative reputation might well have an effect on the success of particular party strategies. For instance, an isolationist strategy may well be more effective when the isolated party has a weaker reputation than the parties doing the isolating.

Figure 8.15 illustrates the overall reputation of the Swedish principal parties (the Social Democrats and the Moderates) and the Sweden Democrats, as measured on a 0 to 10 scale. The reputation score is based on the reputation ranking in the SNES (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017) and CSES (2019) data. Respondents were asked to rank each party leader on an 11-point scale with 0 being strongly dislike and 10 being strongly like. Each of these ranks were then multiplied by the number of respondents that selected it, thereby creating a weighted number of respondents. The weighted number of respondents were then added up to create a total number. This total number was then divided by the total number of respondents in the original surveys. It shows that the Social Democrats have enjoyed a fairly high level of reputation in the period 1998 to 2014, and that there has been little change in this. Indeed, the party's reputation score in this period has only fluctuated between a low of 5.77 in 1998 and a high of 6.63 in 2006 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). Interestingly, however, the (albeit small) drop in the reputation of the Social Democrats between 2006 and 2010 coincided with one of the worst electoral performances in the party's history. By contrast, there has been more change in the reputation of the Moderate Party. Over the period, the party's reputation fell a little (from 4.60 in 1998 to 4.05 in 2002), but then grew considerably to 6.10 in 2010, before falling once more to 5.57 in 2014. The party recorded its highest reputation (in 2010) at the same time that it experienced its best ever electoral results. As for the Sweden Democrats, their reputation is low, even if it has increased steadily from 2006 onwards, rising from 1.15 in 2006 to 1.90 in 2014 (Holmsberg

and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). These low scores indicate that a large majority of Swedes still view the Sweden Democrats quite negatively.³⁷

Figure 8.15: The reputation of the principal parties and the Sweden Democrats, 1998-2014.



Sources: Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019

Figure 8.16 illustrates the reputation of the party leaders, rather than the reputation of the parties in general. It shows that the reputation of the leaders of the principal parties rose and fell. More specifically, Social Democratic Party leader Persson saw his reputation rise from 4.65 in 1998 to 6.53 in 2002 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). While Persson had been regarded as an electoral liability in 1998, his reputation improved by 2002 as a result of the smooth operation of the pact with the Left and Green parties, and because most Swedes felt economically better off, unemployment had fallen, and the government had reversed many of the unpopular spending cuts required to address the financial problems of the 1994-1998 period (Aylott 2002). By 2006, however, Persson’s reputation had fallen to 4.50, most likely because of perceptions that his leadership style was arrogant and authoritarian (Widfeldt 2007b). In the wake of disastrous results in the 2006 election (see above),


³⁷ It should be noted, however, that within the chosen data (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019), sympathisers of the Sweden Democrats were largely underrepresented (Tryggvason and Hedberg 2015: 10), and therefore the actual figure could be moderately higher.

Persson stood down as party leader, and was succeeded by Mona Sahlin who took over as leader in 2007. She was unable to nurture high reputation scores, however. Indeed, in 2010 her reputation score was a mere 4.92. By the next elections, the leader of the Social Democrats – now Stefan Löfven, who had been elected party leader in 2012 – enjoyed a better reputational rating. His reputation score in 2014 was 5.67, and he presided over the party coming back into government (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019).

Turning to the three leaders of the Moderate Party during this period, Carl Bildt ended his thirteen years of leadership with a score of 4.60 in 1998. His immediate successor, Bo Lundgren, failed to make any real improvement and recorded a score of just 4.76 in 2002 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). Things improved with the party's next leader, however. Frederik Reinfeldt became leader of the party in 2003 and quickly set about recasting the Moderates as a more centrist political party. He developed a reputation as being thoughtful, reasoned, and calm and collected – qualities that were especially valuable during the 2010 general election which followed the financial crisis – and his reputation score increased from 5.48 in 2006 to 6.96 in 2010. Reinfeldt's reputation did then subside, falling to 5.57 in 2014. This coincided with his party's significant loss in the 2014 elections (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019).

The reputation data for Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, is restricted to 2010 and 2014, but nonetheless demonstrates a very low reputation score, and is much lower than that of the leaders for the Social Democrats and Moderate Party. However, Åkesson's reputation score – which is 2.32 in 2010 and 2.51 in 2014 – is higher than that of his party – which is 1.80 in 2010 and 1.90 in 2014 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019).

Figure 8.16: The reputation of the leaders of the principal parties and the Sweden Democrats, 1998-2014.



Source: Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019

Even though there is some slight difference between the reputation of the Sweden Democrats and the reputation of their party leader, Åkesson, the main trend is that there has been a small but noticeable increase in the reputation of both the party and its leaders since 2006. And interestingly this has happened at a time when the principal parties have sought to isolate the Sweden Democrats through the use of a *cordon sanitaire*. It is therefore worth briefly exploring what the Sweden Democrats and the party's leadership have done in this period to improve their image and strengthen their reputation.

In the main, the improvement in the Sweden Democrats' reputation can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, and as was discussed in more detail earlier in this chapter, the party has undergone a process of ideological moderation. This began under the leadership of Mikael Jansson (1995 to 2005) and continued when Åkesson took over. The party's policy programme was restructured, and in particular

anti-immigration policies were toned down, and arguments rooted in biological racism were removed. As such changes were implemented, extremist, radical, or otherwise undisciplined activists and members were expelled. These steps all contributed to the party being able to rid itself of its extremist image, and to present a more moderate and respectable one – and one which then improved the party’s reputation.

Alongside this ideological moderation, the Sweden Democrats also engaged in some significant organisational changes. Under Åkesson’s leadership the Sweden Democrats have become the most centralised party in Sweden (Junger 2016). Traditionally, the responsibility for the formulation of party policy was determined by the party congress, as in the Social Democratic Party, but since 2008 it has been delegated to the party board, which is under the control of Mattias Karlsson, a loyal friend of Åkesson and a member of the so-called ‘gang of four’ (Junger 2016). The other members of this group include Björn Söder, who held the position of party secretary from 2005 to 2015, and Richard Jomshof, who was the chief editor of the *Courier*, the party’s internal newspaper. The greater power of the party board, the domination by Åkesson loyalists, and the weakening of other party organs alongside the expulsion of troublesome members has all added up to the party leadership being in firm control of party. This has then enabled the party to pursue its aims of moderation without challenge, to go after those voters who do find the party’s message appealing, and to appear more organised and professional, including putting more emphasis on more modern campaigning methods than traditional ones (Widfeldt 2008).

Over the period, then, the principal parties and their respective leaderships have maintained a clear reputational advantage over the Sweden Democrats. Yet, this reputational advantage seems to have had no discernible impact on the efficacy of the primarily dismissive and isolationist strategies pursued by the principal parties against the Sweden Democrats. This is somewhat puzzling, but one reason for why this reputational advantage might not have improved the success of dismissive and isolationist strategies is that the principal parties have adopted a somewhat inconsistent approach between

elections and across political arenas (electoral and legislative). In other words, this inconsistency might have cancelled out any advantage that the principal parties might have derived from their superior reputations. It is also likely that the growing professionalism of the Sweden Democrats has also mitigated the effect of dismissive and isolationist strategies. It certainly appears to be the case that the Sweden Democrats are indeed 'masters of their own success' (Carter 2005: 13).

8.7. Summary and Conclusion

Until now the Swedish principal parties have sought to restrict the growth of the Sweden Democrats primarily through the use of dismissive and isolationist strategies. Until 2010, it seemed that this combination of strategies had proved successful, as the Sweden Democrats failed to achieve representation in the Riksdag. Between 2010 and 2018, however, the Sweden Democrats went from being the sixth largest party in parliament to the third largest. It is therefore clear that the dismissive and isolationist strategies adopted by the principal parties have failed to suppress the vote share of the Sweden Democrats in recent years.

In order to understand why these two strategies began to fail when they had previously succeeded, this chapter has examined a series of contextual conditions (or intervening variables) that are likely to have affected the efficacy of the principal parties' strategic approach. These conditions are the issue agenda; the positioning of various political parties on issue dimensions; the attitudes of voters to the issues of immigration and welfare; levels of voter satisfaction with the functioning of Swedish democracy; the trust that voters have in political parties and politicians; the reputation of the Swedish political parties and their respective leaderships; and the growing professionalisation of the Sweden Democrats themselves. The analyses conducted in the course of this chapter reveal that during the period 1998-2018, a number of these contextual conditions changed in favour of the Sweden Democrats.

Firstly, cultural issues, and the issue of immigration in particular, increased in saliency over time, as did welfare issues, while the dominance of economic issues began to wane. Not surprisingly, as an anti-immigration radical right party, the Sweden Democrats have thrived when the issue agenda has favoured immigration-related issues. Yet it is important to appreciate the increased saliency of immigration sits in a particular context in Sweden. That is, the issue of immigration has proved to be rather taboo in Swedish politics, not least since the rise and fall of New Democracy in the early 1990s. Moreover, while the saliency of this issue has increased over the period, Swedish attitudes to immigration, overall, have actually become more positive. In spite of this, however, there exists a significant pool of anti-immigration voters in Sweden, from which the Sweden Democrats can draw, and the increasing saliency of immigration has galvanised this group of voters in the Sweden Democrats' favour.

Secondly, the increasing saliency of welfare did not harm the Sweden Democrats as it might have other more neoliberal radical right parties. Perhaps unusually for a radical right party, the Sweden Democrats have also found welfare issues to provide a relatively fertile territory on which to campaign. In fact, the Sweden Democrats have rooted themselves in the social democratic tradition of the *folkhem*. By employing the concept of the *folkhem*, the Sweden Democrats apply a chauvinistic frame to their welfare policies, thereby advocating a generous but also very restrictive system of benefits.

Thirdly, turning to voter attitudes toward immigration, Swedish voters have been very positive regarding immigrants and the impact that immigration has had on Sweden. However, while the majority of Swedes hold pro-immigration views, there is a significant segment of the population that remains sceptical or even hostile to immigrants and/or immigration.

With respect to welfare issues, Swedish attitudes toward economic redistribution remained positive throughout the period under investigation. By contrast, perceptions of the state of education and healthcare were increasingly positive until 2012-2014 only. From 2014 these perceptions soured as a

number of scandals led to a sudden drop in the number of people who believed that the quality of education and healthcare was good.

In this context, the dismissive strategies of the principal parties – and other mainstream political parties – served to aid the Sweden Democrats, as these strategies prevented any direct competition. As a result, the Sweden Democrats were provided with a near monopoly on the anti-immigration position until around 2018, when the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats adopted strong accommodative strategies. Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats' centrist position on welfare allowed them to win over former Social Democratic and Moderate voters, especially after 2012-2014, while their chauvinism appealed to anti-immigration voters.

Turning to levels of satisfaction that voters have in the functioning of democracy, it is fair to conclude that Sweden has become a progressively more satisfied country. With regards to trust in politicians and parties, however, there is a significant number of untrusting and anti-establishment voters to whom the Sweden Democrats can appeal. This is especially the case with regard to levels of trust in political parties and politicians which, generally speaking, is rather low.

In short then, even though there has been no great increase in anti-immigration sentiment or in dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Sweden, there is a significant segment of the population that is particularly amenable to the messaging of the Sweden Democrats. What is more, the Sweden Democrats have helped themselves. Under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson, the image of the party has softened, and while the party and its leader are still widely disliked by most Swedes, organisational reforms and growing professionalisation enacted under Åkesson have proved invaluable in ensuring that the Sweden Democrats can effectively exploit that reservoir of potential support.

The failure of the dismissive and isolationist strategies of the Swedish principal and mainstream parties can therefore be attributed to both contextual conditions and an enhanced Sweden Democrats party machine. On top of this, inconsistency in which strategies were adopted also likely played a role. That

is, while the principal and mainstream parties in Sweden did primarily adopt dismissive and isolationist strategies with regards the Sweden Democrats, there were some (limited) instances in which they adopted other strategies. As the discussion above illustrated, the Liberals employed an accommodative strategy in 2002, while the Alliance and Greens engaged in an adversarial strategy in 2014, and in both instances the saliency of immigration increased. Thus, inconsistencies in the use of strategies by the principal parties are likely to have undermined the effectiveness of their dismissive and isolationist strategies.

Looking to the future, while the conditions that have been analysed have been favourable to the Sweden Democrats, the long-term political trends are not necessarily so auspicious. The Sweden Democrats are dependent upon a relatively small, albeit significant, segment of the population and up until now the party has benefitted from a lack of competition for these voters. However, the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats have, as of 2018, sought to compete more directly with the Sweden Democrats for these votes, thereby challenging the monopolistic position of the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, following the collapse of the Alliance in 2019 (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019), the Moderates and the Christian Democrats have indicated a certainly willingness to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats. As such then, the Sweden Democrats are likely to face more competition from the mainstream parties but at the same time may also soon find themselves finally being welcomed into a new right-wing bloc.

9. Conclusion

9.1. Introduction

The main goal of this thesis has been to understand the effect that principal party strategies have had on the vote share of the radical right. Despite the growing presence of radical right parties throughout Western Europe, very few studies have considered whether particular strategies or particular combinations of strategies have been more successful than others in combating the rise of the radical right. And this is despite the relatively recent call by Bale et al. (2010) for such work. Indeed, to date, Bonnie Meguid's (2005, 2008) seminal contributions remain the most substantive response to the question of the efficacy of principal party strategies.

The preceding chapters of this thesis have developed a model of competition between principal parties and their radical right competitors, tested that model in order to ascertain the effect that particular party strategies have had on the vote share of the radical right, and then sought to further develop our knowledge of party strategies by considering the political context in which these strategies are employed. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated that there is no silver bullet that principal parties can employ against the radical right. That is, there is no one strategy or one combination of strategies that routinely or consistently leads to a reduction in the vote share of the radical right. In addition, the thesis has found that the reputation of political parties and their leaders, which is an important element of the new model of competition advanced by this thesis, impacts upon the effectiveness of principal party strategies vis-à-vis the radical right. Furthermore, that the agency and organisational capacity of radical right parties themselves is critical to understanding not just whether certain strategies will be successful (or unsuccessful) but also what strategies principal parties are likely to employ in the first place. Finally, this thesis has found that political context is important in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies.

The purpose of this final chapter is to review these findings and to then consider their implications. As such, the next section of the chapter starts with a quick overview of Meguid's model of competition and its shortcomings, followed by an explanation of how the model of competition developed in this thesis resolves these shortcomings.

9.2. Developing a Model of Competition and Incorporating Context

In order to explore the effect that principal party strategies have had on radical right parties, the starting point of the thesis was the need to employ a model of competition that was up to the task. This was done by first engaging in a deep exploration of the literature on party competition and party strategies. Of chief importance here was the highly influential Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) model introduced by Meguid, which considered competition between unequals; that is, how mainstream parties compete with smaller, niche parties. To recall from Chapter 2, this model essentially brings together three dominant approaches to party competition, and argues that there are three important elements to party competition, namely the spatial position that the party adopts on particular issues, the saliency of the issues that are being contested, and the ownership of those same issues. It is from this foundation that Meguid proposes her three issue-oriented strategies: accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive.

However, in the course of this review of the existing literature it was also argued that, despite its influence and wide applicability, Meguid's model does nonetheless suffer from a number of shortcomings.

Firstly, it seems preoccupied with the issue-oriented strategies that parties employ, which are the strategies that parties employ on dimensions and issues, and devotes little attention to the party-oriented strategies, which are the strategies that parties employ directly against one another, that are available to principal parties. For instance, a cordon sanitaire is a popular weapon against the radical

right in some polities, yet this strategy does little to address particular issues nor does it seek to manipulate dimensions of competition. Rather, the strategy is squarely aimed at a political party directly. Secondly, it assumes that issue competition occurs in a unidimensional plane. This is problematic as radical right parties often compete solely on the cultural and not economic dimension of competition, and when radical right parties do address economic issues, these are often couched in cultural considerations. That is, economic issues become subsumed into the cultural dimension. Therefore, any model of competition that is concerned with how principal or mainstream parties compete with the radical right must also consider the cultural dimension of competition. Thirdly, it assumes that radical right parties, as niche parties, are 'by-product[s] of competition between mainstream parties (Meguid 2008: 22), that is, hapless victims with little to no agency of their own. However, as this thesis and other studies (Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van Kessel 2015) demonstrate, radical right parties do possess agential and organisational capacity, and can utilise this capacity to undermine or even mitigate the effect of principal party strategies.

In order to address these shortcomings, the thesis proposed its own model of party competition which built on Meguid's work but augmented it in three ways. Firstly, it incorporated the dimensional strategies of Alonso (2012), Elias et al. (2015) and Alonso et al. (2015) in order to create issue-oriented strategies that could take place over multiple dimensions of competition. Secondly, the model proposed incorporated an array of party-oriented strategies borrowed from Downs (2011, 2012) and Bale et al. (2010) in order to supplement the issue-oriented strategies in the PSO model. And thirdly, it developed a reputational dimension of competition in which parties compete against each other not on issues but on reputations. This new model of competition not only resolved some of the shortcomings of the PSO model, but it also identified a number of additional strategies that parties can adopt, and in so doing demonstrated that principal parties have access to a far greater range of strategies than was previously considered.

Of course, no matter how good a model is, it remains just a model. In other words, whether parties adopt one or another strategy, and whether these strategies prove to be effective or not, will be influenced by a whole range of other factors. Chapter 3 of the thesis therefore explored these other factors and examined how and whether a party's origin or type might affect its choice of strategy, whether and how the internal balance of power within parties – in particular the power of the leadership and the power of different factions – is of importance, whether and how organisations that are closely linked to parties exert any influence on the choice of strategies adopted, and whether the party's goals impact on what strategies are chosen. In addition, the chapter considered the 'target' of the strategies – i.e., the radical right parties – and explored whether and how the goals and organisation of these parties might also affect what strategies other parties adopted against them. Finally, the chapter also paid attention to the institutional environment within which this party competition takes place, and considered whether and how electoral systems may shape what strategies are adopted, and whether these strategies prove effective or not. Together, all these factors can be considered as 'intervening' factors or variables, likely to make the adoption of some strategies more or less probable, and likely to influence their efficacy.

The last stage in setting the theoretical groundwork was to be clear about a number of core concepts. Therefore, before it turned to analysing the effect that the strategies of principal parties had on the vote share of radical right parties, the thesis set out what it meant by the term 'principal parties' and by the term 'radical right', and then identified the relevant players. To recall, Chapter 4 defined principal parties as those parties that are economically mainstream, electorally large, and ideologically moderate. Meanwhile, following Mudde (2007), the chapter defined radical right parties as those that reject the substantive elements of democracy but not the procedural elements; that is, radical right parties support the institutions of democracy but reject some or all of the liberal underpinnings of modern democracy. On the basis of these definitions, the chapter then identified 37 principal parties, and 19 radical right ones, across 14 countries.

These three chapters thus laid the foundations for the analyses which were to follow. Together they established a new and augmented model of party competition, explored a range of intervening factors that might well impact upon what strategies principal parties choose to adopt and on how effective these strategies turn out to be, and specified what parties were to be considered.

Adopting this dual analytical framework or multi-method approach is not only recommended as a good standard of practice in the QCA community (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) but also allowed for the identification of relevant competitive pathways through mvQCA and the contextualisation of party strategies through case studies.

9.3. Analysing the Strategies of Principal Parties

Having laid the theoretical foundations, the thesis then turned to analysing what strategies were employed by principal parties, how often these strategies were employed, and the effect that these strategies had on the vote share of the radical right. The analysis was undertaken in two phases: one extensive one, and one intensive one. As explained in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the extensive stage (outlined in Chapter 6) involved multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) and was designed to identify the various combinations of strategies that principal parties employ and what impact these strategies had on the vote share of the radical right. This was followed by an intensive phase that involved the in-depth exploration of two contrasting cases: France and Sweden. This approach is not only good practice in the QCA community but also allows for the exploration of some of the intervening variables or contextual conditions that were identified in Chapter 3.

9.3.1 Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA)

The mvQCA was carried out in two analytical steps. The first focused on the impact of the strategies of a single principal party on the vote share of the radical right, while the second concentrated on the

effect of the strategies of two principal parties on the radical right's vote share. For each step the analysis was conducted twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right and once for an increase in the radical right's vote share.

Focusing first on the strategies of a single principal party, the results indicated that there was significant variability in terms of what strategies, or combination of strategies, principal parties adopted with respect to the radical right. Furthermore, the analyses identified no necessary conditions for the decrease or increase of radical right vote share. Put simply, the analysis identified no strategies or combination of strategies that *consistently* led to a decrease or an increase in the vote share of radical right parties.

However, the adoption of some strategies by a single principal party was sometimes related to a greater likelihood of a particular outcome. More specifically, the analyses suggested that a scenario in which a single principal party adopted a one-dimensional dismissive strategy – and hence competed solely on the economic dimension – and an engagement strategy with the radical right party saw the radical right vote decrease. The extent to which this finding can be generalised is severely limited, however, as it was based on just one case. More generalisable was the outcome of a situation in which a single principal party adopted a disengagement strategy vis-à-vis the radical right party – such as ignoring it or isolating it. This strategy was employed in 110 cases, and in 79 of these the radical right vote share increased. Of course, this leaves the remaining 31 cases which did not show this outcome – and where the radical right vote share either decreased or did not change. As such then, it cannot be argued that the outcome of this strategy is completely consistent, but with over 70 percent of relevant cases showing an increase in the radical right vote, the likelihood of such an outcome is relatively high.

When the strategies of two principal parties were examined, the results once again showed that there was a great deal of variability in the strategies, or combinations of strategies, that principal parties employ against the radical right. As before, however, there were no strategies, or combinations of

strategies, that were considered necessary for either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of the radical right. Again therefore, no strategies or combination of strategies consistently led to a decrease or an increase in the vote share of radical right parties.

Having said this, the analyses of the strategies of two principal parties did yield some interesting findings. In the first instance, they showed that, while the two principal parties did adopt a range of strategies against the radical right, and often in different combinations as just mentioned, accommodative strategies were used far more frequently than any other strategy. What is more, in a number of cases, the adoption of accommodative strategies by both principal parties was supplemented by disengagement strategies vis-à-vis the radical right parties – i.e., by strategies that ignore or isolate the radical right party.

However, the analyses also showed that the impact of these accommodative strategies in the radical right vote has been rather mixed, and in fact more often than not, their impact has been unfavourable. That is, there were 29 cases in which both principal parties adopted an accommodative strategy, but in 20 of these the outcome was an increase in the radical right vote share. Furthermore, the adoption of disengagement strategies in addition to these accommodative strategies, did little to combat the radical right either. In fact, in 15 cases the vote share of the radical right increased, while in a mere four cases the radical right's vote share decreased.

These findings therefore show that principal parties have often favoured a strategy of increasing the saliency of issues associated with the radical right (i.e., issues on the cultural dimension of competition) in order to usurp that territory and retain or win back sympathetic voters, and that they have then often coupled this with strategies that aim to ignore or isolate the radical right. But as noted, and contrary to Meguid's (2005, 2008) predictions, the results of such approaches are at best rather mixed. There is certainly no indication that such strategies constantly result in a decrease in the radical right party vote, and more often than not result in an increase in radical right vote share.

9.3.2. Findings from the Case Studies

The extensive phase of the analysis, undertaken by the use of mvQCA, was followed by an intensive phase that engaged in two in-depth case studies. As discussed above, this extensive-intensive approach allows for a deeper understanding of the strategies that principal parties choose and the reasons behind those choices, and a fuller examination of their effects on the vote share of the radical right. In particular, the case studies enable the context in which party competition occurs to be fully explored. The two countries that were chosen for analysis were France and Sweden. These were selected because, as was highlighted in Chapter 5 (section 5), they provide interesting but very different environments in which to understand how differing factors impact upon the efficacy of party strategies. Firstly, they differ with regards to institutional arrangements, including whether or not the country employs a majoritarian or plurality electoral system, whether or not the state provides funding for parties, and whether or not parties have access to funds for media broadcasts. Secondly, the radical right parties in each country differ in how 'credible' they are. Finally, they differ in respect of voter attitudes to immigration, with French voters more negative, and Swedish voters more positive.

The two case study chapters examined a number of contextual conditions. More specifically, they explored the effect of the issue agenda – understood to refer what issues were particularly salient – on the principal parties' choice of strategy and on the efficacy of those chosen strategies; they investigated the impact of levels of satisfaction with democracy and levels of trust in politicians and parties on which strategies were chosen and on whether these strategies proved effective; they considered the impact that the reputation of party candidates and parties had on the efficacy of party strategies; and they addressed how voter attitudes to immigration impacted on principal party strategy choice and the efficacy of those chosen strategies. In addition, the Swedish chapter also considered the consequences that spatial positioning of principal parties had on their strategies vis-à-vis the Sweden Democrats. This additional factor was considered in the case of Sweden because,

unlike in France, Swedish principal parties had been unwilling to accommodate the Sweden Democrats on the issue of immigration, and therefore they granted the Sweden Democrats ample opportunity to develop a strong niche within the electorate.

The issue agenda – i.e., which issues were salient – influenced which strategies the principal parties chose and the efficacy of those strategies in both countries, but in very different ways. The analyses showed that in France, the principal parties' strategies of accommodation of the radical right were more successful during periods when cultural issues were particularly prominent, and by extension less successful when economic issues were salient. By contrast, in Sweden, cultural issues remained relatively subdued until around 2014 as the principal parties had sought to dismiss these. Despite this approach of dismissing these issues however, and contrary to the theoretical expectations of Meguid (2005, 2008), cultural issues, particularly immigration, began to grow in prominence from 2014 onwards.

The differences between the French issue agenda and the Swedish issue agenda, and the differences in the strategies that the principal parties in each country adopted made for very different patterns of competition, especially with regard to the issue of immigration. In Sweden, the radical right was essentially gifted a monopolistic position on many of its preferred issues. This was because, with the exception of a few isolated incidences, the Swedish principal parties had maintained a taboo around the issue of immigration, and had simply not addressed it. As such, the Sweden Democrats were the only party to offer a strong and consistently restrictionist position on immigration. This did change after 2018, when there was much greater diversity with regard to party positioning on immigration, and when the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats all began to address the issue to a greater extent and began to adopt more restrictionist positions on it. However, since the Sweden Democrats had been occupying this territory for a long time and had become the owners of the issue, it was they who derived the greatest electoral benefit. By contrast, in France, the centre-

right parties had long been willing to occupy similar territory to the National Front and therefore their attempts to usurp that territory were sometimes more successful.

The Sweden Democrats were also able to capitalise in another way in that they were also able to take advantage of the position they had adopted on welfare, which was another salient dimension of competition in Sweden. The party had chosen to occupy a rather centrist position on welfare, which was in between that of the two main blocs. In short, the Sweden Democrats proposed redistribution but coupled this with a chauvinistic framing of welfare. In doing this, they were able to integrate issues of considerable concern to Swedish voters, namely welfare and education, into their existing anti-immigration profile. The tactic proved especially successful given the importance of the *folkhem*.

Ultimately then, the case studies demonstrated that the efficacy of principal party strategies can be heavily influenced by the issue agenda. What is more, the analyses showed that while the principal parties can of course influence the issue agenda, they are also subject to it. Furthermore, the strategies of the principal party strategies do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they are also influenced by the strategies of other parties. The Swedish case showed this especially clearly: the principal parties sought to shape the issue agenda including by dismissing the issues of the radical right, but they ended up also being influenced by it. In addition, the consequences of the actions of the principal parties ended up giving the Sweden Democrats a near monopoly from which to launch their electoral insurgency. As such then, the case studies showed that it is not just which issues are salient that matters, but it is also the positioning of all the parties on those issues that is also important.

The issue agenda is clearly linked to the attitudes of voters, given that if the issue agenda is understood to refer to those issues that are salient, then it is voters that make them, or consider them, salient. However, voter attitudes also matter in other ways. It is not just what issues voters consider important – or salient – that is of consequence, it is also the position that voters have on these issues that is relevant. The two case studies therefore also considered where voters were positioned on issues, and

they examined the position of voters on the issue of immigration in particular so as to ascertain whether or not the radical right parties were able to draw on a significant pool of voters.

Again the two case studies reflected interesting differences. In France, voters tended to be more hostile to immigration, while in Sweden they tended to be more progressive. Indeed, the majority of Swedes remained positive about the benefits of immigration in the time period under investigation. However, what this masked was a significant, if still limited, reservoir of anti-immigration feeling in the population.

The principal parties in both countries also addressed this in different ways. In France, the principal parties, and the Republicans and their previous incarnations in particular, were content to appeal to those voters who held anti-immigration views in order to win elections. In Sweden, by contrast, the principal parties preferred the use of dismissive strategies, which, according to Meguid (2005, 2008) should signal to voters that the issue of immigration lacks merit, and which should mean that the salience of immigration should fall. But this did not happen, and as the Sweden chapter demonstrated, these strategies proved unsuccessful in containing the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, the consistency with which the Swedish principal and mainstream parties adopted these dismissive strategies was in question. As the chapter explained, while these parties tended to adopt these strategies in election campaigns, in the years between elections they sometimes favoured other strategies. This lack of consistency in the approach of the principal and mainstream parties thus further undermined the effectiveness of their attempts to curb the rise of the Sweden Democrats.

The two case studies also addressed how satisfied voters were with how principal parties had delivered on important and salient issues. In France, Sarkozy was considered best able to handle the issue of immigration in 2007 but this had slipped considerably by 2012 where Marine Le Pen was considered by a majority of voters to be best placed to deal with immigration. This had a consequence for the accommodative strategy of Sarkozy, which was successful in 2007 in winning over FN voters, but which failed in 2012, owing in part to Sarkozy's perceived inability to address

immigration. Similarly, in Sweden, the Alliance parties were seen to have performed poorly on the highly salient issues of healthcare and education – issues which had been adopted by the Sweden Democrats sometime prior. The consequence was a further strengthening of the position of the Sweden Democrats and a continuation in the failure of principal party strategies to contain the Sweden Democrats.

Perceptions on delivery can also feed into a sense of anti-establishment feeling as well as trust in politicians and parties. While dissatisfaction with principal and mainstream parties and politicians were commonplace in both case studies – albeit more so in France than Sweden – it is not entirely clear what impact this had on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Similarly, the two case studies also paid attention to how (dis)satisfied voters have been with the functioning of democracy in their respective countries. This condition was explored because numerous studies have concluded that voters who are more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are much more likely to vote for radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). As with trust in politicians and parties, however, the case studies were inclusive with respect to the impact that voter (dis)satisfaction in the functioning of democracy had on the efficacy of principal party strategies.

The case studies showed that, by contrast to trust in politicians and parties, the reputations of parties and their leaders proved to be quite influential in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies. Indeed, the French case study demonstrated that a strong reputational advantage is a strong predictor of how successful an accommodative strategy is. In instances where two principal parties adopt diverging strategies, Meguid (2005, 2008) argued that the strategy that is more consistently applied and applied over a longer period of time will be the one that has the greatest influence. The French case study, however, suggested that in such instances, the strategy adopted by the principal party with the stronger reputation could have the greater effect. However, the same logic was not present in the Swedish case study. While the Swedish principal parties consistently maintained overwhelming reputational leads over the Sweden Democrats, their strategies did not prove to be that successful in

curbing their radical right competitor. Again, an explanation for this is the inconsistent approach of these parties, which might well have undermined any advantage that reputation might have bestowed on them. As such then, Meguid's point about the consistency with which strategies are applied seems to hold. What the case studies also demonstrated was that party and candidate reputations were not static variables but were rather dynamic elements of competition that served to increase the efficacy of principal party strategies. However, contrary to Meguid (2005, 2008), the Swedish case study demonstrated that principal parties cannot rely on supposed inherent reputational advantage and that reputation can be undermined by strategic inconsistency and radical right agency.

Indeed, perhaps the most significant conclusion that the case studies reached is that radical right party agency really matters – a conclusion very much in line with the findings of a number of other studies (Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van Kessel 2015). In short, this agency can and does impact the effectiveness of principal party strategies. A shortcoming of Meguid's theory of party competition is its treatment of radical right parties, which are seen mere pawns in a game between mainstream parties. But the case studies have shown that the National Front and the Sweden Democrats are, to borrow from Carter (2005: 13), to a great extent 'masters of their own success'. Both parties engaged in detoxification agendas designed to improve their appeal, and the Sweden Democrats went considerably further in making significant changes to improve their organisational capacity. Indeed, such has the change been in the Sweden Democrats that, as discussed in Chapter 8, the centre-right Moderate and Christian Democratic parties are now re-evaluating how they might approach their radical right competitor, including in the formation of government.

Ultimately, then, what the analysis showed was that there is no silver bullet or magic formula when it comes to competing against the radical right. What the analysis demonstrated is that the same strategy employed in another country or in the same country but at a different time period, might produce a different result. There is no guarantee that a particular strategy will work and the efficacy of any strategy is, in part, dependent upon the factors discussed above. Indeed, political context

proved to be very important in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies, as did the agential and organisational capacity of radical right parties, and the strategic choices of other principal and mainstream parties.

9.4. Avenues for Future Enquiry

While the case studies demonstrated the importance of a number of contextual conditions, the impact that voter (dis)satisfaction in democracy and voter trust in politicians and parties has had on principal party strategies was inconclusive. The Swedish case was especially muddy in this regard, as satisfaction in the functioning of democracy increased at a time when the Sweden Democrats were gaining popularity. This raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between the electoral success of radical right parties and satisfaction in democracy, but also what impact this has on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Indeed, if democratic satisfaction increases in response to radical right success, then this could have deleterious effects on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Therefore, additional work is required on the relationship between radical right parties and satisfaction on democracy, and then the impact that this relationship has on party strategies.

Furthermore, additional work should be done on the importance of reputation in party competition. Of particular interest to this thesis has been the introduction and testing of the reputational dimension, and therefore party and leadership reputations, as a method by which voters can differentiate between political parties that share similar political positions on issue dimensions. Indeed, the case studies demonstrated that reputation can be extremely important, especially in circumstances where principal parties engage in so-called issue trespassing, seeking to usurp ownership of an issue from another party. Going forward, research needs not only concern itself with reputation more broadly, but it is important that future research does not relegate reputation to a static condition, as Meguid does, but rather recognises reputation as a dynamic condition that changes over time, that is open to manipulation by political actors, and that serves as a dimension of

competition in of itself; especially in light of party cartelisation (see Katz and Mair 1995) where issue competition is replaced by what is essentially reputational competition.

Following on from this expanded conception of party competition, it is vital that future studies do not fall into the trap of assuming that radical right parties – and smaller, niche parties generally – are hapless victims of principal and mainstream parties. Indeed, as has been demonstrated here and elsewhere, radical right parties are important actors in their own right, and whose agential capacity can significantly impact on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Furthermore, and as has been argued previously, radical right parties are not always competitors in need of constraint but also potential partners in future coalitions. It cannot be assumed that radical right parties are not office-seeking entities and furthermore that the changing goals of radical right parties provide many potential avenues for success, through more inclusive right-wing blocs, for otherwise opportunistic principal parties that seek office. Additionally, further work should also consider the strategies and counter-strategies that radical right parties adopt vis-à-vis principal parties. Indeed, radical right parties have interests that they pursue and the strategies they employ in fulfilling these goals is important for patterns of competition, especially as radical right parties have become established actors in many European countries.

Finally, given that the analysis found no silver bullet for tackling the radical right and that the case studies demonstrated how important context is, more work needs to be done on the ways in which context not only influences the types of strategies that principal parties choose but also how context impacts upon the efficacy of party strategies. However, this work needs to be done in a meaningful and systemic way. Firstly, such work needs to include a broader range of contextual conditions than was considered in this thesis, such as the inclusion of economic conditions, other institutional variables, and perhaps even the impact of European integration, in order to meaningfully advance our understanding of how context impacts on party strategies. Secondly, work needs to be conducted in a systemised way that ensures comparability across cases and ensures that cases conform to the same

standards and procedures, so as to maximise generalisability. This also requires careful consideration of concepts and variables to ensure cases are not too particular and subsequent work can be conducted using the same conceptual framework. Core to this would be a shared understanding of what constitutes context. Given this, it is recommended that future work make greater use of multi-method designs that combine the extensive nature of large-n statistical methods with the intensive nature of case studies, as has been done in this thesis and was done by Meguid (2005, 2008). Such an approach allows for strong cross-case comparison and detailed within-case analysis.

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Appendix A: Mainstream/Niche calculation

Party p's nicheness in a given country is:

$$\sigma_p = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (x_{ip} - \bar{X}_{i,-p})^2}$$

With x_{ip} being party p's emphasis on policies on policy dimension i, and $\bar{X}_{i,-p}$ being the average emphasis of all other parties (excluding p) on policy dimension i, weighted by party size (Meyer and Miller 2013: 262).

Expressed more simply, then, Party P's Raw Nicheness Score is calculated by square rooting Party P's emphasis on a given dimension minus the weighted average of other relevant parties' emphasis on that same dimension squared. The raw nicheness scores of all other relevant parties is then summed and weighted, and then subtracted from the raw nicheness score of Party P.

$$\text{Raw Nicheness Score (RNS)} = \text{SQRT} ((\text{Party}_1_DE - (\text{Party}_2_DE * \text{Party}_2_VS + \text{Party}_3_DE * \text{Party}_3_VS + \text{Party}_n_DE * \text{Party}_n_VS) / (\text{Party}_2_VS + \text{Party}_3_VS + \text{Party}_n_VS) ^2))$$

Where DE is dimensional emphasis and VS is vote share.

$$\text{Mean nicheness (MN)} = (\text{Party}_2_RNS * \text{Party}_2_VS + \text{Party}_3_RNS * \text{Party}_3_VS + \text{Party}_n_RNS * \text{Party}_n_VS) / (\text{Party}_2_VS + \text{Party}_3_VS + \text{Party}_n_VS)$$

$$\text{Standardised Nicheness Score} = \text{RNS} - \text{MN}$$

A score of zero indicates that Party P's emphasis is identical to that of the average party in that system. Positive values indicate relative nicheness while negative values indicate relative mainstreamness.

Appendix B: Analyses of Necessity

Appendix B.1: Analysis of Necessary, Single Party Strategies, Decrease in Radical Right Vote Share

Expression	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
issuestrategy	0.915	0.119	-1.752
disengage	0.356	0.191	0.5
engage	0.169	0.4	0.921
~issuestrategy	-4.407	1.024	0.987
~disengage	0.644	0.427	0.683
~engage	0.831	0.282	1.67

Appendix B.2: Analysis of Necessary, Single Party Strategies, Increase in Radical Right Vote Share

Expression	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
issuestrategy	0.952	0.26	-3.136
disengage	0.637	0.718	0.742
engage	0.113	0.56	0.941
~issuestrategy	-2.089	1.02	0.989
~disengage	0.363	0.506	0.714
~engage	0.887	0.632	0.281

Appendix B.3: Analysis of Necessary, Two Party Strategies, Decrease in Radical Right Vote Share

Expression	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
p1issuestrategy	0.8636	0.1329	-1.1754
p1disengage	-0.3182	0.1795	0.5362
p1engage	0.0455	0.1667	0.933
p2issuestrategy	1	0.1078	-2.3704
p2disengage	0.3636	0.1951	0.5147
p2engage	0.3182	0.4375	0.8696
~p1issuestrategy	-3.1364	1.0299	0.9862
~p1disengage	0.6818	0.4054	0.6393
~p1engage	0.9545	0.3	0.1091
~p2issuestrategy	-5.9545	1.0234	0.9855
~p2disengage	0.6364	0.4	0.6613
~p2engage	0.6818	0.25	0.2623

Appendix B.4: Analysis of Necessary, Two Party Strategies, Increase in Radical Right Vote Share

Expression	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
p1issuestrategy	0.959	0.329	-2.31
p1disengage	0.592	0.744	0.787
p1engage	0.102	0.833	0.986
p2issuestrategy	0.939	0.225	-4.267
p2disengage	0.612	0.732	0.761
p2engage	0.163	0.5	0.882
~p1issuestrategy	-1.429	1.045	0.979
~p1disengage	0.408	0.541	0.696
~p1engage	0.898	0.629	0.188
~p2issuestrategy	-2.612	1	1
~p2disengage	0.388	0.543	0.719
~p2engage	0.837	0.683	0.457

Appendix C: Truth Table for Single Party Strategies, Radical Right Vote Share Down

Pathway	ISSUESTRATEGY	DISENGAGE	ENGAGE	OUT	n	Incl.	PRI
1	0	0	0	0	6	0.666667	0.666667
2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
3	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
4	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
5	1	0	0	0	16	0.3125	0.3125
6	1	0	1	0	7	0.285714	0.285714
7	1	1	0	0	24	0.208333	0.208333
8	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
9	2	0	0	0	7	0.428571	0.428571
10	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
11	2	1	0	0	8	0.375	0.375
12	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
13	3	0	0	0	38	0.421053	0.421053
14	3	0	1	0	14	0.5	0.5
15	3	1	0	0	71	0.183099	0.183099
16	3	1	1	0	2	0	0
Cases							
1	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_Goltaly Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_FiveStarMovement Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_NewDemocracy Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_PanhellenicSocialistMovement						
2	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront						
3	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_Ecologists Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_ReformMovement Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_SocialistParty						
4							
5	Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_NorwegianLabourParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_NorwegianLabourParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_NorwegianLabourParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_SocialistPartyDifferent, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_SocialistPartyDifferent, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_DemocraticParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_DemocraticParty, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft,						

	<p>Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty</p>
6	<p>Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland</p>
7	<p>Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_ModerateCoalitionParty, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_FinnishCentre, Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_NationalCoalition, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_LiberalReformationParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_ReformMovement, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishSocialistParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_Peoples'Union, France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_SocialistParty, France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_SocialistParty, Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany, Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_LiberalDemocrats</p>
8	<p>Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland</p>
9	<p>Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_NorwegianLabourParty,</p>

	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_NorwegianLabourParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_DemocratsoftheLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LiberalDemocrats
10	
11	Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_NationalCoalition, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_Ecologists, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac, France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_SocialistParty, France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforthePresidentialMajority, Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty
12	
13	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_ConservativeParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_Liberals, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_NewFlemishAlliance, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_NewFlemishAlliance, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_LabourParty, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_ChristianDemocraticAppeal, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_LabourParty, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_ChristianDemocraticAppeal, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_LabourParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_DemocraticPartyoftheLeft, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_OliveTree,

	<p>Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_NewDemocracy, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_NewDemocracy, Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_AustrianPeople’sParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianPeople’sParty</p>
14	<p>Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_ConservativeParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_GoItaly, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_GoItaly, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_PeopleofFreedom, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_PeopleofFreedom, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_NewDemocracy, Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_AustrianPeople’sParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_AustrianPeople’sParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_FDP.TheLiberals, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_FDP.TheLiberals</p>
15	<p>Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_ModerateCoalitionParty, Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_NationalCoalition, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_NationalCoalition, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre, Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre,</p>

Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishCentre,
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_LiberalReformationParty,
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_FrancophoneSocialistParty,
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_ReformMovement,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_ChristianPeople’sParty,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishSocialistParty,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_People’sUnion,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish,
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_NewFlemishAlliance,
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_LabourParty,
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_LabourParty,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_LabourParty,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_UnionforFrenchDemocracy,
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_RallyfortheRepublic,
France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforFrenchDemocracy,
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_SocialistParty,
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_DemocraticMouvement,
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_UnionforaPopularMovement,
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_DemocraticMouvement,
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_RepublicOnwards!,
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_DemocraticMouvement,
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_TheRepublicans,
Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_NewDemocracy,
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion,
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union,
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty,
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianPeople’sParty,
Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianPeople’sParty,
Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianPeople’sParty,
Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty,
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LabourParty,
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LiberalDemocrats,

	UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_ConservativeParty
16	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty

Appendix D: Truth Table for Single Party Strategies, Radical Right Vote Share Up

Pathway	ISSUESTRATEGY	DISENGAGE	ENGAGE	OUT	n	incl	PRI
1	0	0	0	0	6	0.333333	0.333333
2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	0	1	0	1	4	1	1
4	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
5	1	0	0	0	16	0.625	0.625
6	1	0	1	0	7	0.714286	0.714286
7	1	1	0	0	24	0.541667	0.541667
8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9	2	0	0	0	7	0.428571	0.428571
10	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
11	2	1	0	0	8	0.625	0.625
12	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
13	3	0	0	0	38	0.5	0.5
14	3	0	1	0	14	0.428571	0.428571
15	3	1	0	1	71	0.760563	0.760563
16	3	1	1	1	2	1	1
cases							
1	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_GoItaly, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_FiveStarMovement, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_NewDemocracy, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_PanhellenicSocialistMovement						
2	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront						
3	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_ReformMovement, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit, France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_SocialistParty						
4							
5	Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_NorwegianLabourParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_NorwegianLabourParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_NorwegianLabourParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_SocialistPartyDifferent, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_SocialistPartyDifferent, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_DemocraticParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_DemocraticParty, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft,						

	<p>Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty</p>
6	<p>Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland</p>
7	<p>Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_ModerateCoalitionParty, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_FinnishCentre, Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_NationalCoalition, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_LiberalReformationParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_ReformMovement, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_Ecologists, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_FrancophoneSocialistParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishSocialistParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_Peoples'Union, France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_SocialistParty, France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_SocialistParty, Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany, Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_Social Democratic Party of Germany, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_LiberalDemocrats</p>
8	<p>Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland</p>
9	<p>Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_NorwegianLabourParty,</p>

	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_NorwegianLabourParty, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_DemocratsoftheLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LiberalDemocrats
10	
11	Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_NationalCoalition, Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_Ecologists, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy, France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_SocialistParty, France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforthePresidentialMajority, Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty
12	
13	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_ConservativeParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_Liberals, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_Liberals, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_NewFlemishAlliance, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish, Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_NewFlemishAlliance, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_LabourParty, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac, Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_ChristianDemocraticAppeal, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_LabourParty, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_ChristianDemocraticAppeal, Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_LabourParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_DemocraticPartyoftheLeft, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_OliveTree,

	<p>Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_NewDemocracy, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_PanhellenicSocialistMovement, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_NewDemocracy, Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_NewDemocracy, Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_AustrianPeople’sParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianPeople’sParty</p>
14	<p>Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_ConservativeParty, Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_ConservativeParty, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_GoItaly, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_GoItaly, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_PeopleofFreedom, Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_PeopleofFreedom, Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_NewDemocracy, Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_AustrianPeople’sParty, Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_AustrianPeople’sParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_RadicalDemocraticParty, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_FDP.TheLiberals, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_FDP.TheLiberals</p>
15	<p>Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_ModerateCoalitionParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_SocialDemocraticLabourParty, Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_ModerateCoalitionParty, Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty, Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals, Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_NationalCoalition, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishSocialDemocrats, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_NationalCoalition, Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre, Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre,</p>

Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishCentre,
 Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_LiberalReformationParty,
 Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_FrancophoneSocialistParty,
 Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_ReformMovement,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_ChristianPeople'sParty,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishSocialistParty,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_People'sUnion ,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish,
 Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_NewFlemishAlliance,
 Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_LabourParty,
 Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_LabourParty,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_LabourParty,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocrac,
 Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_ChristianDemocraticAppeal,
 France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_UnionforFrenchDemocracy,
 France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_RallyfortheRepublic,
 France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforFrenchDemocracy,
 France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_SocialistParty,
 France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_DemocraticMouvement,
 France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_UnionforaPopularMovement,
 France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_DemocraticMouvement,
 France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_RepublicOnwards!,
 France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_DemocraticMouvement,
 France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_TheRepublicans,
 Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_NewDemocracy,
 Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion
 Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion
 Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty,
 Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianPeople'sParty,
 Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianPeople'sParty,
 Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianPeople'sParty,
 Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty,
 UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LabourParty,
 UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LiberalDemocrats,

	UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LiberalDemocrats, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LabourParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_ConservativeParty, UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_ConservativeParty
16	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement, Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty

Appendix E: truth table for two party strategies, radical right vote share down

	P1ISSUESTRATEGY	P1DISENGAGE	P1ENGAGE	P2ISSUESTRATEGY	P2DISENGAGE	P2ENGAGE	OUT	n	incl	PRI
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
7	0	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
8	0	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
9	0	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
10	0	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
11	0	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
12	0	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
13	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	1	1
14	0	0	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
15	0	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
16	0	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
18	0	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
19	0	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
20	0	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
21	0	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
22	0	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
23	0	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
24	0	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
25	0	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
26	0	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-

27	0	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
28	0	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
29	0	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
30	0	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
31	0	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
32	0	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
34	0	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
35	0	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
36	0	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
37	0	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
38	0	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
39	0	1	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
40	0	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
41	0	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
42	0	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
43	0	1	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
44	0	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
45	0	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
46	0	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
47	0	1	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	0
48	0	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
49	0	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
50	0	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
51	0	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
52	0	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
53	0	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
54	0	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
55	0	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-

56	0	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
57	0	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
58	0	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
59	0	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
60	0	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
61	0	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
62	0	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
63	0	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
64	0	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
65	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
66	1	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
67	1	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
68	1	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
69	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
70	1	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
71	1	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
72	1	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
73	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0.5	0.5
74	1	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
75	1	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
76	1	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
77	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
78	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	5	0.6	0.6
79	1	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
80	1	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
82	1	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
83	1	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
84	1	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-

85	1	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
86	1	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
87	1	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
88	1	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
89	1	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
90	1	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
91	1	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
92	1	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
93	1	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
94	1	0	1	3	0	1	0	5	0.2	0.2
95	1	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
96	1	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
97	1	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
98	1	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
99	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
100	1	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
101	1	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
102	1	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
103	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	0	0
104	1	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
105	1	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
106	1	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
107	1	1	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
108	1	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
109	1	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
110	1	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
111	1	1	0	3	1	0	0	9	0.22	0.22
112	1	1	0	3	1	1	0	1	0	0
113	1	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-

114	1	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
115	1	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
116	1	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
117	1	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
118	1	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
119	1	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
120	1	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
121	1	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
122	1	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
123	1	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
124	1	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
125	1	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
126	1	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
127	1	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
128	1	1	1	3	1	1	0	1	0	0
129	2	0	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
130	2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
131	2	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
132	2	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
133	2	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
134	2	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
135	2	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
136	2	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
137	2	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
138	2	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
139	2	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
140	2	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
141	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
142	2	0	0	3	0	1	1	2	1	1

143	2	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
144	2	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
145	2	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
146	2	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
147	2	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
148	2	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
149	2	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
150	2	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
151	2	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
152	2	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
153	2	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
154	2	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
155	2	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
156	2	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
157	2	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
158	2	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
159	2	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
160	2	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
161	2	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
162	2	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
163	2	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
164	2	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
165	2	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
166	2	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
167	2	1	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
168	2	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
169	2	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
170	2	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
171	2	1	0	2	1	0	0	2	0.5	0.5

172	2	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
173	2	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
174	2	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
175	2	1	0	3	1	0	0	2	0	0
176	2	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
177	2	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
178	2	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
179	2	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
180	2	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
181	2	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
182	2	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
183	2	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
184	2	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
185	2	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
186	2	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
187	2	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
188	2	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
189	2	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
190	2	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
191	2	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
192	2	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
193	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
194	3	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
195	3	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
196	3	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
197	3	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
198	3	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
199	3	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
200	3	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-

201	3	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
202	3	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
203	3	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
204	3	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
205	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	8	0.375	0.375
206	3	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	0.5	0.5
207	3	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	0.33	0.333
208	3	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
209	3	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
210	3	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
211	3	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
212	3	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
213	3	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
214	3	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
215	3	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
216	3	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
217	3	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
218	3	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
219	3	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
220	3	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
221	3	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
222	3	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
223	3	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
224	3	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
225	3	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
226	3	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
227	3	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
228	3	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
229	3	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-

230	3	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
231	3	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
232	3	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
233	3	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
234	3	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
235	3	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0
236	3	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
237	3	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
238	3	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
239	3	1	0	3	1	0	0	15	0.2	0.2
240	3	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
241	3	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
242	3	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
243	3	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
244	3	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
245	3	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
246	3	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
247	3	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
248	3	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
249	3	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
250	3	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
251	3	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
252	3	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
253	3	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
254	3	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
255	3	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
256	3	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
13	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy),									

	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
47	Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(RallyfortheRepublic)
65	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
69	Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
73	Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent)_P2(OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent)_P2(OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats)
77	Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
78	Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_P1(DemocraticParty)_P2(PeopleofFreedom), Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_P1(DemocraticParty)_P2(PeopleofFreedom), Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty), Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
94	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals)
99	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)

103	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)
111	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty), Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(TheRepublicans), Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)_P2(ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion), Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)_P2(ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
113	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement)
128	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty)
141	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
142	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_P1(DemocratsOfTheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)
171	Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforthePresidentialMajority)
175	Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty),

	Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
193	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_P1(DemocraticPartyoftheLeft)_P2(Goltaly)
205	Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
206	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_P1(OliveTree)_P2(Goltaly), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
207	Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
231	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)
235	Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)
237	Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
239	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty),

Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals),
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition),
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats),
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy),
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy),
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement),
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty),
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty),
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty),
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty),
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty),
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)

Appendix F: truth table for two party strategies, radical right vote share down

Pathways	P1ISSUESTRATEGY	P1DISENGAGE	P1ENGAGE	P2ISSUESTRATEGY	P2DISENGAGE	P2ENGAGE	OUT	n	incl	PRI
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
2	0	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
3	0	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
4	0	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
5	0	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
6	0	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
7	0	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
8	0	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
9	0	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
10	0	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
11	0	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
12	0	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
13	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0
14	0	0	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
15	0	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
16	0	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
18	0	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
19	0	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
20	0	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
21	0	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
22	0	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
23	0	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
24	0	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
25	0	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
26	0	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-

27	0	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
28	0	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
29	0	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
30	0	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
31	0	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
32	0	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
34	0	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
35	0	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
36	0	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
37	0	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
38	0	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
39	0	1	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
40	0	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
41	0	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
42	0	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
43	0	1	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
44	0	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
45	0	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
46	0	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
47	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	2	1	1
48	0	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
49	0	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
50	0	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
51	0	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
52	0	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
53	0	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
54	0	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
55	0	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-

56	0	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
57	0	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
58	0	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
59	0	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
60	0	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
61	0	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
62	0	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
63	0	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
64	0	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
65	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
66	1	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
67	1	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
68	1	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
69	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
70	1	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
71	1	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
72	1	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
73	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
74	1	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
75	1	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
76	1	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
77	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	2	1	1
78	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	5	0.4	0.4
79	1	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
80	1	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
81	1	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
82	1	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
83	1	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
84	1	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-

85	1	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
86	1	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
87	1	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
88	1	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
89	1	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
90	1	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
91	1	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
92	1	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
93	1	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
94	1	0	1	3	0	1	1	5	0.8	0.8
95	1	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
96	1	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
97	1	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
98	1	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
99	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
100	1	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
101	1	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
102	1	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
103	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	0.67	0.67
104	1	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
105	1	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
106	1	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
107	1	1	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
108	1	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
109	1	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
110	1	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
111	1	1	0	3	1	0	0	9	0.56	0.56
112	1	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
113	1	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-

114	1	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
115	1	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
116	1	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
117	1	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
118	1	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
119	1	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
120	1	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
121	1	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
122	1	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
123	1	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
124	1	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
125	1	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
126	1	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
127	1	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
128	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
129	2	0	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
130	2	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
131	2	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
132	2	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
133	2	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
134	2	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
135	2	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
136	2	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
137	2	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
138	2	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
139	2	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
140	2	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
141	2	0	0	3	0	0	1	2	1	1
142	2	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	0

143	2	0	0	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
144	2	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
145	2	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
146	2	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
147	2	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
148	2	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
149	2	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
150	2	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
151	2	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
152	2	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
153	2	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
154	2	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
155	2	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
156	2	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
157	2	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
158	2	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
159	2	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
160	2	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
161	2	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
162	2	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
163	2	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
164	2	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
165	2	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
166	2	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
167	2	1	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
168	2	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
169	2	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
170	2	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
171	2	1	0	2	1	0	0	2	0.5	0.5

172	2	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
173	2	1	0	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
174	2	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
175	2	1	0	3	1	0	1	2	1	1
176	2	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
177	2	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
178	2	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
179	2	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
180	2	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
181	2	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
182	2	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
183	2	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
184	2	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
185	2	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
186	2	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
187	2	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
188	2	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
189	2	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
190	2	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
191	2	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
192	2	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
193	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
194	3	0	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
195	3	0	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
196	3	0	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
197	3	0	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
198	3	0	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
199	3	0	0	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
200	3	0	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-

201	3	0	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
202	3	0	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
203	3	0	0	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
204	3	0	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
205	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	8	0.625	0.625
206	3	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	0
207	3	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	0.67	0.67
208	3	0	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
209	3	0	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
210	3	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
211	3	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
212	3	0	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
213	3	0	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
214	3	0	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
215	3	0	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
216	3	0	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
217	3	0	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
218	3	0	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
219	3	0	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
220	3	0	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
221	3	0	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
222	3	0	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
223	3	0	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
224	3	0	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
225	3	1	0	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
226	3	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
227	3	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
228	3	1	0	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
229	3	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	-	-

230	3	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
231	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
232	3	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
233	3	1	0	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
234	3	1	0	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
235	3	1	0	2	1	0	1	1	1	1
236	3	1	0	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
237	3	1	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
238	3	1	0	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
239	3	1	0	3	1	0	1	15	0.8	0.8
240	3	1	0	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
241	3	1	1	0	0	0	?	0	-	-
242	3	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	-	-
243	3	1	1	0	1	0	?	0	-	-
244	3	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	-	-
245	3	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	-	-
246	3	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	-	-
247	3	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	-	-
248	3	1	1	1	1	1	?	0	-	-
249	3	1	1	2	0	0	?	0	-	-
250	3	1	1	2	0	1	?	0	-	-
251	3	1	1	2	1	0	?	0	-	-
252	3	1	1	2	1	1	?	0	-	-
253	3	1	1	3	0	0	?	0	-	-
254	3	1	1	3	0	1	?	0	-	-
255	3	1	1	3	1	0	?	0	-	-
256	3	1	1	3	1	1	?	0	-	-
Cases										

13	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
47	Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(RallyfortheRepublic)
65	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
69	Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
73	Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent)_P2(OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/2010_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent)_P2(OpenFlemishLiberalsandDemocrats)
77	Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
78	Norway_(ProgressParty)_10/09/2001_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_P1(DemocraticParty)_P2(PeopleofFreedom), Italy_(NorthernLeague)_24/02/2013_P1(DemocraticParty)_P2(PeopleofFreedom), Austria_(FreedomParty)_03/10/1999_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty), Austria_(FreedomParty)_24/11/2002_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
94	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty),

	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals), Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals)
99	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)
103	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_14/09/2014_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)
111	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty), Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty), Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(TheRepublicans), Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)_P2(ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion), Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)_P2(ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
112	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement)
128	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty)
141	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
142	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty),

	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_P1(DemocratsoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)
171	Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforthePresidentialMajority)
175	Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty), Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
193	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_P1(DemocraticPartyoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)
205	Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_15/09/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_22/01/2003_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_06/05/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
206	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_10/04/2006_P1(OliveTree)_P2(GoItaly), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_06/05/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
207	Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
231	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)

235	Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)
237	Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty)
239	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty), Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals), Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition), Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats), Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(Peopleâ€™sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy), France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement), Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeopleâ€™sParty), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty), UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)

Appendix G: Full tables for the conservative and parsimonious solutions for a decrease and an increase in the vote share of the radical right.

As per Chapter 6 - mvQCA: Operationalisation and Results - inclS: inclusion score; PRI: proportional reduction in consistency; covS: coverage score; covU: unique coverage score.

Table 6.2: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.013	-
M1		1	1	0.013	
Cases					
1	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront				

Table 6.3: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.013	-
M1		1	1	0.013	
Cases					
1	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront				

Table 6.4: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}	0.767	0.767	0.452	0.452
2	ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.008	0.008
3	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.032	0.032
M1		0.782	0.782	0.492	-
Cases					
1	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_ModerateCoalitionParty Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_NationalCoalition Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishSocialDemocrats Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_NationalCoalition Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishCentre Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_LiberalReformationParty Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_FrancophoneSocialistParty Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_ReformMovement Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_ChristianPeople’sParty Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishSocialistParty Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats				

Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_People'sUnion
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_NewFlemishAlliance
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_LabourParty
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_LabourParty
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_LabourParty
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_UnionforFrenchDemocracy
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_RallyfortheRepublic
France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforFrenchDemocracy
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_SocialistParty
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_DemocraticMouvement
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_UnionforaPopularMovement
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_DemocraticMouvement
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_RepublicOnwards!
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_DemocraticMouvement
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_TheRepublicans
Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_NewDemocracy
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union

	Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_ConservativeParty France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty
2	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland
3	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_Ecologists Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_ReformMovement Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_SocialistParty

Table 6.5: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.032	0.032
2	ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1}	0.767	0.767	0.452	0.435
3	DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.024	0.008
M1		0.782	0.782	0.492	-
Cases					
1	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_Ecologists Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_ReformMovement Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_SocialistParty				
2	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_ModerateCoalitionParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_SocialDemocraticLabourParty Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_ModerateCoalitionParty Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_NationalCoalition Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishSocialDemocrats Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_NationalCoalition Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishCentre Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_LiberalReformationParty Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_FrancophoneSocialistParty				

Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_ReformMovement
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_ChristianPeople'sParty
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishSocialistParty
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_People'sUnion
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_NewFlemishAlliance
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_LabourParty
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_LabourParty
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_LabourParty
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_ChristianDemocraticAppeal
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_UnionforFrenchDemocracy
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_RallyfortheRepublic
France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforFrenchDemocracy
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_SocialistParty
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_DemocraticMouvement
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_UnionforaPopularMovement
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_DemocraticMouvement
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_RepublicOnwards!

	<p>France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_DemocraticMouvement France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_TheRepublicans Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_NewDemocracy Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianPeople’sParty Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LiberalDemocrats UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LabourParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_ConservativeParty UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_ConservativeParty France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty</p>
3	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland

	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty
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Note: as Table 6.2

Table 6.7: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)					
Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}*	1	1	0.091	0.091
2	P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}*	1	1	0.045	0.045
3	P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.136	0.136
M1		1	1	0.273	-
Cases					
1	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_P1(DemocratsoftheLeft)_P2(Goltaly)				
2	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)				
3	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)				

Note: as Table 6.2

Table 6.8: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	M1	M2
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091
2	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}	1	1	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.136	0	0.136	-
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.136	0	-	0.136
	M1 (Pathways 1, 2 and 3)	1	1	0.273	-	-	-
	M2 (Pathways 1, 2 and 4)	1	1	0.273	-	-	-
Cases							
1	Norway_(ProgressParty)_09/09/2013_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/05/2001_P1(DemocratsoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)						
2	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)						
3	Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)						
4	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_20/09/2015_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)						

Table 6.9: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}* P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{1}	1	1	0.041	0.041
2	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}	0.812	0.812	0.265	0.265
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.02	0.02
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.02	0.02
5	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.041	0.041
6	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.02	0.02
7	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{1}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1}	0.8	0.8	0.082	0.082
8	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.041	0.041
9	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.041	0.041
10	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.02	0.02
11	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.02	0.02
12	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.041	0.041
M1		0.889	0.889	0.653	-
Cases					
1	France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty)				
2	Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople’sParty)				

	Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty) Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty) Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty) Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals) Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition) Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats) Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy) Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy) France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement) Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople’sParty) UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
3	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
4	Norway_(ProgressParty)_12/09/2005_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
5	Norway_(ProgressParty)_14/09/2009_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) Austria_(FreedomParty)_29/09/2013_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople’sParty)
6	Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty)
7	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals)

	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals)
8	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy)
9	Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty) Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty)
10	Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_P1(DemocraticPartyoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)
11	Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)
12	Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_P1(SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats) France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(RallyfortheRepublic)

Table 6.10: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies)

Pathway	Expression	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	P1ENGAGE{1}	0.833	0.833	0.102	0.082
2	P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}	1	1	0.061	0.061
3	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}	1	1	0.02	0.02
4	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0}	1	1	0.082	0.082
5	P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}	0.812	0.812	0.265	0.265
Cases					
1	Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_22/10/1995_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_24/10/1999_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_19/10/2003_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_23/10/2011_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_18/10/2015_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(FDP.TheLiberals) Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland)_P2(RadicalDemocraticParty)				
2	Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_04/10/2009_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_P1(FrancophoneSocialistParty)_P2(LiberalReformationParty) Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_P1(DemocraticPartyoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)				
3	Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)				
4	Norway_(ProgressParty)_16/09/1997_P1(NorwegianLabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_07/03/2004_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy) Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty) Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty)				
5	Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty) Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty) Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty)				

Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty)
Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals)
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition)
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats)
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People'sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy)
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement)
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople'sParty)
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty)