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**An emerging mediator on the periphery:
Turkey's mediations in the Syrian-Israeli talks and in Somalia**

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PHD

March 2016

Keele University

I dedicate this thesis to my mother İnayet Arslansoy for her love and encouragement.



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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates to what extent Turkey's mediation differs from Western modes of mediation. It poses an example for understanding the ability of peripheral countries to challenge the prevalent modes of mediation and emerge as problem solving agents in the international system. The study examines Turkey's mediation in the interstate conflict between Syria and Israel between 2007 and 2008; and in the intrastate conflict in Somalia between 2012 and 2014. It suggests that Turkey's search for a new identity since 2002, in the context of domestic, regional and international changes, paved the way for the emergence of its mediator role by creating a sense of confidence leading Turkey to adopt a more proactive stance vis-à-vis the conflicts pertaining in its region. Turkey uses mediation as one element in its wider foreign policy which bears resemblance to Western mediators. Mediation enables Turkey to exert its interest in areas in which it has historical, geopolitical and relational ties. Turkey gains legitimacy as a mediator from its dual identity by presenting itself as both Western and non-Western. Its ability to present its insidership, inclusiveness and cultural ties as assets come to the fore as ways in which Turkey mediates differently. While cultural ties are advantages in gaining entry into conflicts; demonstrating commitment and dealing with the technicalities of mediation played a greater role in securing Turkey's credibility as a mediator. The Turkish model entails a broader understanding of mediation that includes aid as complementary to diplomatic talks, particularly in intrastate conflicts. There is also considerable room for civil society involvement. The thesis suggests that Turkey's mediator role has been too dependent upon more intangible aspects of cultural affinity and identity. As a result, its sustainability depends on the willingness of policy makers to improve the condition of Turkish mediation by investing in institutionalization, capacity building and expertise.

Keywords: Mediation, International Mediation, Turkish Foreign Policy, Syrian-Israeli Peace Talks, Somalia Conflict

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BISEG	Une Seule Humanité
BSEC	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
DÜNYEV	Foundation for World Orphans
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NORAD	Research Council of Norway

NOREF	Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NUPI	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
SAM	Strategic Research at Turkish Foreign Ministry
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TNG	Transitional National Government
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIW	Union of NGOs of the Islamic World
US	United States
ÜHDER	Physicians for Hope Foundation
WHO	World Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

1.1 Research Question and Rationale

The historical setting and the current state of the international system, to a considerable extent, specifies Western states and institutions as exclusive mediators and the rest as the subject of the mediation processes.¹ The rest are at most subordinate allies in the attempts at mediation in which Western imagery occupies a central place, just as “peace” is regarded as an international norm produced by the West. In this view, the West as the “centre” is a symbol of peace-bringing while the East as the “periphery” is generally regarded as the “realm of survival.”² Similarly, the possibility of an alternative mediator on the periphery is generally not perceived as a welcome development in the international system, since it challenges the prevalent modes of mediation. Actors associated with the periphery have long been characterized by instability, underdevelopment and disorder rather than as problem solving agents.

Until recent years, there had been limited involvement from the periphery in the resolution of major international conflicts that have the potential to destabilize international order. The general assumption had been that an ideal mediator should have an image of strong power based on military and economic capabilities and capacity for conflict resolution. In this view, only the powerful countries such as the United States (US), Britain, the Soviet Union or international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could play peacemaking roles. This perception has begun to

¹ Saadia Touval, “The Superpowers as Mediators,” in Jacob Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, New York: St. Martin’s, 1992, 232-247; Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery,” *Journal of Balkans and Near East Studies* 11, no.1, 2009: 29-41.

² Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?: An Introduction,” in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2010, 1; See also, James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Organization* 46, no.2, 1992: 467–491.

change with the emergence of European small-states, mainly Scandinavian, as legitimate peacemakers in international conflicts.

In recent years, peripheral countries such as Turkey, Brazil, India, Qatar, China, among others, have played important roles in peace attempts. These roles come to the fore mostly depending on the context of the dispute. Little research has been conducted so far regarding the mediation practices of these countries yet their mediation attempts signal the rise of alternative methods and practices to mainstream mediation mainly practised by the core countries.³

The end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the international order, bringing an end to the bipolar world system and triggering the emergence of peripheral states as influential actors in global politics. As indicated by Haas, “21st-century international relations will be characterized by nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one, two or even several states but rather by dozens of states and other actors possessing and exercising military, economic, diplomatic and cultural power.”⁴

According to Williamson and Gates, “the post-World War II global architecture created by Western allies to contain communism and promote peace and prosperity” is changing as a result of new geopolitical realities and shift of global power dynamics.⁵ They add that the international institutions fail to conform to the new realities and tend to cope with challenges by utilizing “ad hoc and regional arrangements instead of established institutions.”⁶ Coupled by the global economic crisis, it may be argued that the power vacuum created by the reluctance and inadequacy of these institutions in dealing with the

³ Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Journal* 65, no.4, 2011: 539-556.

⁴ Richard N. Haass, “The Restoration Doctrine,” *The American Interest*, December 9, 2011.

⁵ Richard S. Williamson and Jana Chapman Gates, “Rising Powers and a New Emerging Order,” *The Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, September 2012, 1.

⁶ *Ibid*, 5.

conflicts on the periphery of the international system created a need and opportunity for emerging powers to take on mediator roles.

These peripheral states usually come onto the stage when the resolution of a given conflict does not directly interest or benefit the core countries or they fail to resolve the conflict. Following the September 11 events, the countries at the core of the international system, most of whom may be considered established mediators, failed to resolve many of the subsequent crises of military aggressions, violent attacks, human security and human rights violations.

As Williamson and Gates note, “a growing number of influential states offer capabilities important to conflict and cooperation and could be more creatively engaged in order to create the conditions for a new era of peace and stability.”⁷ As the demand for alternative mediators increased, emerging powers began to play larger roles in conflict resolution. These roles vary from providing platforms for negotiations to actively mediating between the parties or offering broader peacebuilding or humanitarian facilities. Their roles have raised both curiosity and suspicions.⁸

Although there have been some mediation attempts by peripheral states in the past, such as Algeria’s mediation between Iran and the US during the hostage crisis in 1980, India’s mediation in Sri Lanka in 1987, or Egypt’s mediation in the Middle East, all these cases were ad-hoc and focused specifically on the immediate problem. The issue at stake in this

⁷ Ibid, 2.

⁸ E. Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak, “Turkey as a ‘Humanitarian State’,” *Project on the Middle East and the Arab Spring (POMEAS) Policy Paper*, no.2, July 2014; Oliver P. Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, “Emerging Actors in International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Status Quo or Critical States?,” *Global Governance* 20, no.4, 2014: 563–584; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects,” *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no.6, 2013: 865-870; Pinar Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia: The Limits of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” *Turkish Studies* 14, no.4, 2013: 735-757; Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 539-556; Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 29-41.

study is less about small-scale, technical mediations to resolve certain problems, and more about how some emerging states such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Brazil, or Turkey now regard mediation as part of their foreign policies.

This study explores the possibility for alternative mediation approaches of emerging mediators on the periphery of the international system. It aims to explore whether and how emerging powers are able to mediate differently from traditional or established mediators. As underlined by Roselle and Spray, “The ability to place a narrowly defined study that answers a specific question within a broader context of international relations (IR) scholarship is a distinguishing feature of research.”⁹ As such, this study seeks to understand how emerging powers position themselves in the changing international system by using mediation as one element in their wider foreign policies. In order to answer this question, the study focuses on Turkey’s experience as an emerging mediator in the international system. This thesis defines an “emerging mediator” as an actor outside the centre of the international system and is associated with the periphery. The question of whether emerging mediators offer anything novel and different or simply continue mainstream mediation practices constitute the core of this thesis.

This study is limited to tracing the difference of Turkey’s mediation as an emerging mediator. It does not aim to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Turkish foreign policy in its entirety. It rather aims to make a humble contribution to deepen the understanding of the motives behind Turkey’s mediation, its approach to and style of mediation, how mediation is situated in its broader foreign policy and whether or not it offers anything novel and different to international mediation practices, particularly in terms of mediation

⁹ Laura Roselle and Sharon Spray, *Research and Writing in International Relations*, London: Pearson; Longman, 2008, 2.

as foreign policy. Although the study draws comparisons with other mediators in order to sharpen the analysis of what is particular to Turkey, its central focus is Turkey.

The main research question of this thesis is, “To what extent does Turkey’s mediation differ from Western modes of mediation?” with sub questions such as:

How can difference in international mediation be identified?

What role does mediation play in the broader Turkish foreign policy?

Why and how does Turkey mediate?

What role does Turkey’s discourse on difference play in its foreign policy making?

What are the main determinants of Turkey’s role as a mediator on the periphery?

Is this a sustainable role or a temporary one based on certain internal or/and external factors?

In order to comprehend Turkey’s new mediator role, the study analyses the parameters of Turkey’s new foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government which have been determined by various international, regional, and domestic developments. The study highlights the principles, mechanisms and vision of the new Turkish foreign policy in order to understand whether they have really paved the way for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role as argued by Turkish foreign policy makers.¹⁰

Foreign policy makers in Turkey posit that Turkey’s mediator role is a consequence of an ethical concern based on taking responsibility to bring peace and order to its region; the “central country” role it has adopted; and an understanding that a stable and peaceful region will also bring stability and peace at home.¹¹ They have even identified Turkey as

¹⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” *Insight Turkey* 10, no.1, 2008: 77-96; Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 29-41.

¹¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Policy*, May 20, 2010.

an “order bringing country,” especially in the post-September 11 era, by highlighting its mediator role as an apparent indication and tool of this role.¹²

This study takes this discourse and its implementation in the field as a departure point to analyse the limits and potentials of Turkey’s mediator role. Turkey’s mediation is a current issue that is continuously evolving. The scope of this thesis mainly covers the period beginning with the AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002 until 2015 although the Arab Spring had obvious and challenging consequences for Turkey’s mediation role in the region. This period is particularly important since mediation has become an important policy tool after the AKP’s rise to power.

1.2 Literature Review

This section aims to locate the subject matter of this thesis within the existing literature. The thesis builds on three main sources of literature which include literature on international mediation, literature on change in Turkish foreign policy and literature on Turkish mediation. This study aims to contribute to the literature on mediation and on Turkish foreign policy by trying to uncover why and how Turkey mediates, and the role this plays in Turkey’s foreign policy. Despite the fact that Turkey’s new foreign policy has been discussed to a considerable extent in the literature there is still a significant gap with respect to its mediation particularly in terms of building a connection with the existing mediation literature.

1.2.1 Literature on International Mediation

Mediation is a method of alternative dispute resolution that is often studied within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies.¹³ It is used in various areas such as, “international relations,

¹² Ahmet Davutoğlu, interview by Scott MacLeod, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, March 12, 2012, <http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=143> (accessed May 21, 2014).

labour-management negotiations, community disputes, school conflicts, and legal disputes.”¹⁴ Despite the fact that it is generally studied under IR, international mediation crosses the borders of a range of disciplines including management, psychology, law, anthropology and sociology.

Bercovitch and Gartner list different methods of conflict management as the use of force and coercive measures such as military interventions; judicial and legal processes such as arbitration and trials; formal and informal bilateral methods and various forms of non-coercive, third-party interventions such as mediation.¹⁵ As such mediation is a “form,”¹⁶ a “mechanism,”¹⁷ an apparatus, a method, an instrument, of conflict resolution practised by a third party.

There are various definitions in the literature stressing different aspects of mediation. According to the UN, mediation is “a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements.”¹⁸ While some scholars emphasize the importance of voluntary presence and mutual consent of the parties during mediation,¹⁹

¹³ Parts of this section have been published by the author in Pınar Akpınar “Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring: Turkey, Qatar and Iran,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no.7, 2015, 10.1080/19448953.2015.1063270.

¹⁴ James A. Wall, Jr., John B. Stark and Rhett L. Standifer, “Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3, 2001: 371.

¹⁵ Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, “New Approaches, Methods and Findings in the Study of Mediation,” in Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner (eds.), *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2009, 4-5.

¹⁶ Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no.2, 1996, 360-389.

¹⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no.1, 1991: 8.

¹⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation*, September 2012, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf (accessed September 15, 2014).

¹⁹ Josephine M. Zubek, Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy and Helena Syna, “Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no.3, 1992: 546; Jacques Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” in Jacques Faget (ed.), *Mediation in Political Conflicts: Soft Power or Counter Culture?*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, 3.

others focus on the nonbinding nature of the process indicating the lack of force and authority of the third party²⁰ unlike, for instance, *arbitration* which is legally binding.²¹

For instance Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, and Syna define mediation as, “attempts by a third party to facilitate voluntary agreement between parties in conflict.”²² Faget offers a more comprehensive definition by referring to mediation as, “a consensual process of conflict regulation in which an impartial, independent third party without any decision-making power helps people or institutions to improve or set up relations through exchanges and, as far as possible, to solve their conflicts.”²³ Kleiboer underlines the non-coercive nature of mediation by defining it as “a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force.”²⁴

A similar definition is suggested by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille who define it as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”²⁵ Wall, Stark and Standifer refer to mediation as “assistance to two or more interacting parties by third parties who (usually) have no authority to impose an outcome.”²⁶ Moore as well emphasizes the non-coerciveness of mediation by noting that mediation is “the intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no

²⁰ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 8; Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 3; Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 360; Wall, Stark and Standifer, “Mediation,” 370-391; I. William Zartman, *Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2008, 155.

²¹ Marvin C. Ott, “Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases,” *International Organization* 26, no.4, 1972: 597.

²² Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, and Syna, “Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation,” 546-572.

²³ Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 3.

²⁴ Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 360-389.

²⁵ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 8.

²⁶ Wall, Stark and Standifer, “Mediation,” 370-391.

authoritative decision-making power, who assists the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.”²⁷

As the above definitions suggest, most of the definitions in the literature highlight common aspects such as voluntariness, consent, neutrality, impartiality and non-coerciveness of an ideal mediation. However, as Jones also posits, all these concepts are subject to discussion since “international mediation is conceived to be a complex phenomenon.”²⁸ As such, mediation is a political process, and as discussed throughout this thesis, when the mediator is a state, it may be biased, partial, coercive and the parties may be forced into the mediation process through political, economic and military pressure.

This study defines mediation as a process in which a third party assists the parties towards the resolution of a conflict through several measures including persuasion or coercion. In addition, the study refers to mediation in a broader sense; not only as official diplomatic talks but also as a long-term process that often needs to be supported by emergency assistance, development aid and overall peacebuilding to ensure sustainability, particularly in intrastate conflicts when people are deprived from long-lasting, devastating, protracted disputes. In intrastate conflicts, especially those that have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe, mediation and peacebuilding often go hand in hand. As Papagianni contends, a peace process does not end on the table. It is indeed the implementation process following the talks that is crucial in sustaining peace.²⁹

²⁷ Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003, 15.

²⁸ Deiniol Lloyd Jones, “Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory,” *Review of International Studies* 26, no.4, 2000: 649.

²⁹ Katia Papagianni, “Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” *Global Governance* 16, no.2, 2010: 243.

While the use of mediation goes back to the times of early civilizations, studies on mediation are only about six decades old beginning with Kerr³⁰ and Meyer,³¹ Schelling,³² Stevens,³³ Barkun,³⁴ Podell and Knapp,³⁵ Simkin,³⁶ and Kressel³⁷ who focused mainly on mediation in industrial or labour disputes. During this period studies on mediation also found their ways into anthropology with the works of scholars such as Gluckman,³⁸ Gibbs³⁹ or Bohannan⁴⁰ on Africa.

Studies on international mediation *per se* emerged during 1960s with the works of pioneering scholars such as Young⁴¹ who delivered one of the first accounts on the use of mediation in international crises and Burton⁴² who underlined the importance of communication in resolving international conflicts. The following years witnessed an

³⁰ Clark Kerr, "Industrial Conflict and its Mediation," *American Journal of Sociology* 60, no.3, 1954: 230-245.

³¹ Arthur Meyer, "Function of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 13, no.2, 1960: 159-165.

³² Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.

³³ Carl M. Stevens, *Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

³⁴ Michael Barkun, "Conflict Resolution through Implicit Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8, no.2, 1964: 121-130.

³⁵ Jerome E. Podell and William M. Knapp, "The Effect of Mediation on the Perceived Firmness of the Opponent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no.4, 1969: 511-520.

³⁶ William E. Simkin, *Mediation and the Dynamics of Collective Bargaining*, Virginia: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1971.

³⁷ Kenneth Kressel, *Labor Mediation: An Exploratory Survey*, Albany, NY: Association of Labor Mediation Agencies, 1972.

³⁸ Max Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954.

³⁹ James L. Gibbs, Jr., "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Disputes," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 33, no.1, 1963: 1-11.

⁴⁰ Paul Bohannan, *Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv*, London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1957.

⁴¹ Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

⁴² John W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations*, London: Macmillan and New York: Free Press, 1969.

increasing interest in international mediation with the works of Doob,⁴³ Ott,⁴⁴ and Stenelo.⁴⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rise of interest in the field of international mediation.⁴⁶ Other systematic studies ensued in the following years with the works of seminal scholars such as Bercovitch,⁴⁷ Zartman,⁴⁸ and Wall⁴⁹ with their footprints on a number of topics in the field that have been particularly helpful in this study in terms of understanding the general tenets of international mediation.

The literature that discusses mediation as a tool of foreign policy was particularly helpful in building the foundation of this thesis. As also criticized by Touval, the literature tends to refer to international mediation as a solitary and rather technical activity in isolation from the surrounding political context. He argues that, when the mediator is a state, mediation is often part of foreign policy and utilized to pursue foreign interests.⁵⁰ Scholars such as Zartman,⁵¹ Bercovitch and Jackson,⁵² Grieg and Dhiel,⁵³ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall⁵⁴ argue in a similar vein that mediation can be a tool of exerting a state's interests as part of its foreign policy. This thesis builds on the works of these scholars by arguing that

⁴³ Leonard Doob, *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

⁴⁴ Marvin C. Ott, "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases," *International Organization* 26, no.4, 1972: 595-618.

⁴⁵ Lars-Goran Stenelo, *Mediation in International Negotiations*, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1972.

⁴⁶ For a systematic account on some of the early studies on mediation please see, James A. Wall, "Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and Proposed Research," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no.1, 1981: 157-180.

⁴⁷ Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and Conditions of Successful Outcomes," *Cooperation and Conflict* 21, no.3, 1986: 155-168.

⁴⁸ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

⁴⁹ Wall, "Mediation," 157-180.

⁵⁰ Saadia Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Review* 5, no.4, 2003: 91.

⁵¹ Zartman, I. William, "Introduction: Bias, Prenegotiation and Leverage in Mediation," *International Negotiation* 13, no.3, 2008: 305-310.

⁵² Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009, 34.

⁵³ J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, *International Mediation*, Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2012, 83.

⁵⁴ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2012, 184.

mediation cannot be understood in isolation from the overall foreign policy of the mediator state.

In addition to the above, more specific literature on mediator states were also investigated during the thesis to be able to understand Turkey's difference more systematically. For instance, the works of Touval,⁵⁵ Quandt,⁵⁶ and Inbar,⁵⁷ were analysed to understand what role mediation plays in the foreign policy of the US as a great power. Among these, Quandt's work on US mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflicts was particularly insightful in understanding Turkey's difference in the Syrian-Israeli talks.⁵⁸ Similarly, the literature on small-state mediators was also consulted during the thesis. Among these, the works of Foster,⁵⁹ Skånland,⁶⁰ Waage,⁶¹ and Moolakkattu⁶² were focused upon to analyse what role mediation plays in Norwegian foreign policy.

In addition to the literature mentioned above, the literature that examines the role of culture in mediation was also insightful since scholars such as Avruch who has extensive work on the role of culture in conflict resolution often uses "culture" as an important indication of "difference" in mediation.⁶³ As such, analysing whether Turkey utilized culture in its

⁵⁵ Touval, "The Superpowers as Mediators," 232-247.

⁵⁶ William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 3rd Edition, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005.

⁵⁷ Efraim Inbar, "Great Power Mediation: The USA and the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no.1, Special Issue on International Mediation, 1991: 72.

⁵⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process*.

⁵⁹ Marcus Foster, "Small States in Peacemaking Roles: Applying the 'Norwegian Model' of Conflict Resolution in Sudan," *Research Discourse* 2, no.1, 2011, 22-32.

⁶⁰ Øystein Haga Skånland, "'Norway is a Peace Nation': A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian Peace Engagement," *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no.1, 2010: 34-54.

⁶¹ Hilde Henriksen Waage, "The 'Minnow' and the 'Whale': Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no.2, 2007, 157-176.

⁶² John Stephen Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States: Norway in Sri Lanka," *Cooperation and Conflict* 40, no.4, 2005: 385-402.

⁶³ Kevin Avruch, "Does Our Field Have a Centre?," *International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution* 1, no.1, 2013: 17.

mediation helped in understanding to what extent this creates a difference from Western mediators.

While some scholars such as Zartman;⁶⁴ Fisher and Ury⁶⁵ neglect culture as an important element in mediation, others such as Avruch see it as an indispensable element of mediation.⁶⁶ In this respect, Avruch's extensive work on culture in mediation was particularly consulted during the thesis. Some of the scholars, who underpin the importance of culture in mediation, or conflict resolution as a whole, criticize Western "liberal peace" for failing to give enough emphasis on culture.

For instance Richmond argues that, "prevailing liberal approaches to peacebuilding are based upon an assumption that governance, development, and indeed conflict resolution are 'before' culture."⁶⁷ Scholars also maintain that culture is a significant determinant for the process and outcome of mediation.⁶⁸ For instance, Bleiker and Brigg criticize Western approaches for failing to address conflicts effectively, "particularly when cultural difference is at play."⁶⁹ Drawing on the conflict resolution practices between the state and the indigenous peoples in Australia, they suggest that Western mediation approaches regard cultural difference as a threat rather than "valuable resource for helping to manage conflicts."⁷⁰

⁶⁴ I. William Zartman, "A Skeptic's View," in Faure and Rubin, *Culture and Negotiation*, 17-22.

⁶⁵ Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes*, New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

⁶⁶ Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998.

⁶⁷ Richmond, "Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding," 69.

⁶⁸ Stephen Bochner (ed.), *Cultures in Contact: Studies in Cross-Cultural Interaction*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1982; Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1997; Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*; Bleiker and Brigg, "Introduction;" Faure and Rubin, *Culture and Negotiation*.

⁶⁹ Bleiker and Brigg, "Introduction," 1.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Other scholars also draw attention to the importance of culture in the conflicts taking place between the state and the aboriginals in Australia.⁷¹ Among them, Rose criticizes the Australian state's approach to aboriginal claims over land and other rights by arguing that it lacks comprehensive solutions due to its neglect of local customs, cultures, and understandings that emphasise concepts such as "attentiveness to place, relatedness, violence, emotions, and the inclusion of ancestral and non-human others" in the process of conflict resolution.⁷² Similarly, scholars such as Connolly⁷³ and Harrison⁷⁴ condemn homogeneity as the actual source of conflicts and posit that the subordination of different communities into a unified culture, belief, or way of life would eventually stem conflicts.

In addition to the scholars who are critical of the lack of enough emphasis given on culture in mediation, some scholars criticize mediation studies, and to an extent mediation as a practice, for being dominated by Western approaches which are related to, and perhaps derive from, a universal conception of peace. Critics also draw attention to the dominance of ideas of "liberal peace" on the field of conflict resolution.⁷⁵ Some also agree that the Western approaches to mediation fails to cope with the needs and realities of peripheral settings.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Mary Graham, Morgan Brigg and Polly O. Walker, "Conflict Murri Way: Managing through Place and Relatedness," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 75-99; Carwyn Jones, "Māori Dispute Resolution: Traditional Conceptual Regulators and Contemporary Processes," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 115-139; Deborah Bird Rose, "Conflict Resolution and Decolonisation: Aboriginal Australian Case Studies in 'Enlarged Thinking'," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 100-115.

⁷² Rose, "Conflict Resolution and Decolonisation," 100.

⁷³ William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, 21-22.

⁷⁴ Simon Harrison, *Fracturing Resemblances: Identity and Mimetic Conflict in Melanesia and the West*, New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007, 99.

⁷⁵ Brigg, *The New Politics of Conflict Resolution*; Richmond, "Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding," 57-73.

⁷⁶ Roland Bleiker and Morgan Brigg, "Introduction," in Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, *Mediating Across Difference: Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011; Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution Approaches: Western and Middle Eastern Lessons and Possibilities," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 55, no.1, 1996: 35-52; George E. Irani, "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3,

In contrast, and perhaps in reaction to some of the early studies in the literature that presented peripheral ways of conflict resolution as immature and underdeveloped,⁷⁷ some recent thinkers underline the importance of understanding peripheral ways of thinking and practising.⁷⁸ Among these, while some scholars such as Abu-Nimer,⁷⁹ Irani,⁸⁰ Pely,⁸¹ and Al-Krenawi and Graham⁸² focus on the conflict resolution and mediation practices of the Bedouin Arabs, others draw attention to the Melanesian approaches,⁸³ as well as the East Asian,⁸⁴ the Indonesian,⁸⁵ the Japanese,⁸⁶ the Chinese,⁸⁷ the Malaysian,⁸⁸ and the Korean.⁸⁹

no. 2, 1999: 1-17; Joel Lee and Teh Hwee Hwee, *An Asian Perspective on Mediation*, Singapore: Academy Publishing, 2009; Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Cross-cultural Perspectives*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1991; Morgan Brigg, *The New Politics of Conflict Resolution: Responding to Difference*, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Roger Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no.2, 2008: 139-163.

⁷⁷ See Gluckman, *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa*; Gibbs, "The Kpelle Moot," 1-11; Bohannan, *Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv*.

⁷⁸ Christopher Honeyman and Sandra Cheldelin, "Have Gavel, Will Travel: Dispute Resolution's Innocents Abroad," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 19, no.3, 2002: 363-372; Irani, "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts," 1-17; Bleiker and Brigg, "Introduction."

⁷⁹ Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution Approaches," 35-52.

⁸⁰ Irani, "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts," 1-17.

⁸¹ Doron Pely, "Where East Not Always Meets West: Comparing the Sulha Process to Western- Style Mediation and Arbitration," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 28, no.4, 2011: 427-440.

⁸² Alean Al-Krenawi and John R. Graham, "Conflict Resolution through a Traditional Ritual among the Bedouin Arabs of the Negev," *Ethnology* 38, no.2, 1999: 163-174.

⁸³ Debra McDougall and Joy Kere, "Christianity, Custom, and Law: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Postconflict Solomon Islands," in Brigg and Bleiker, *Mediating Across Difference*, 100-115; Volker Boege and Sr. Lorraine Garasu, "Bougainville: A Source of Inspiration for Conflict," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 163-183.

⁸⁴ Lee and Hwee, *An Asian Perspective on Mediation*.

⁸⁵ Frans de Jalong and Muhadi Sugiono, "Crossing Borders: Indonesian Experience with Local Conflict Resolution," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 185-205.

⁸⁶ Jacqueline Wasilewski and Norifumi Namatame, "Mediating Difference in *Uchi* Space: Conflict Management," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 205-221.

⁸⁷ Chengxin Pan, "*Shu* and the Chinese Quest for Harmony: A Confucian Approach to Mediating across Difference," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 221-248; Neil J. Diamant, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in China: Beyond Mediation-Centered Approaches," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no.4, 2000: 523-546; Guy Olivier Faure, "Practice Note: Informal Mediation in China," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 29, no.1, 2011: 85-99.

⁸⁸ James A. Wall, Jr. and Ronda Roberts Callister, "Malaysian Community Mediation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no.3, 1999: 343-365.

⁸⁹ Roland Bleiker and Hoang Young-ju, "Korean Sources of Conflict Resolution: An Inquiry into the Concept of Han," in Brigg and Bleiker (eds.), *Mediating Across Difference*, 248-270; Dong-Won Sohn and James A. Wall, Jr., "Community Mediation in South Korea: A City-Village Comparison," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no.3, 1993: 536-543; Nam Hyeon Kim, James A. Wall, Jr., Dong-Won Sohn and Jay S. Kim, "Community and Industrial Mediation in South Korea," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no.2, 1993: 361-381.

As such, this literature which is somewhat critical of the mainstream studies and practices of mediation was also consulted during the thesis to be able to draw out certain inferences to analyse how one can identify “difference” in mediation. These discussions have been made more extensively in Chapter 2 in order to lay out a conceptual framework for the two case studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

Drawing on the above discussion, this thesis seeks to contribute to the field of international mediation as it sheds light on the roles of different states as mediators. The fact that it brings out the role of Turkey as an emerging mediator contributes to the field since the literature on mediation is still preoccupied with mediation by established mediators.

1.2.2 Literature on the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

This section will illuminate the literature on the new Turkish foreign policy by covering the period from the AKP’s ascendancy to power in 2002 until the current day. It will discuss the literature on the new Turkish foreign policy, from the AKP’s ascendancy to power in 2002 until the present day. It is in this period that Turkey emerged as a mediator; and hence, it is apparent that mediation was very much connected to a more assertive and exploratory Turkish foreign policy advocated by AKP. As Yalvaç posits, a great deal of work in the literature on Turkish foreign policy have “been dominated by state-centric, decision-making approaches adopting a positivist ontology and epistemology.”⁹⁰ Although this trend was more apparent during the Cold War period when scholars were largely influenced by “security-oriented” and “actor specific”⁹¹ approaches, one may still feel the

⁹⁰ Faruk Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis,” *Turkish Studies* 15, no.1, 2014, 130. Also see, Giray Sadık, “Magic Blend or Dangerous Mix? Exploring the Role of Religion in Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy from a Theoretical Perspective,” *Turkish Studies* 13, no.3, 2012: 313; Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: Turkish Foreign Policy 2009 and Beyond,” *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 15, no. 3-4, 2010: 1-20; Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40, 2009: 29-57.

⁹¹ Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy,” 119. Also see, Bayram Sinkaya, “Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits,” *Insight Turkey* 14, no.2, 2012: 137-156; Tanık Oğuzlu, “The

weight of realist and liberal approaches in the literature. A majority of scholars agree that there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy in which the long military tutelage and the Kemalist ideology lost their weight and Turkey has become a more active in its region. As such, the section aims to understand how scholars explain this change. For the sake of clarity this section classifies the literature into three approaches as realists, liberals and constructivists.

A common trend among realist and liberal scholars is to explain the change in Turkey's foreign policy as a pragmatic and rational choice rather than one driven by ideology.⁹² For instance, realist scholars such as Meral and Paris note that, "What drives the AKP is not an ideological realignment but a rational and pragmatic attempt to maximize Turkish national interests."⁹³ By drawing on former Turkish Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's doctrine of "strategic depth" Yalvaç argues in a critical realist vein that, "the concept of strategic depth is not only a 'discursive practice' utilized by 'intellectuals of statecraft', but is deeply embedded in different relations of hegemonic power both within Turkey and in the international domain."⁹⁴ He further contends that the

Changing Dynamics of Turkey-Israel Relations: A Structural Realist Account," *Mediterranean Politics* 15, no.2, 2010: 273-288.

⁹² E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2007; Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West," *Turkish Studies* 9, no.1, 2008: 3-20; Philip H. Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, *Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008; Akif Kirecci, "Turkey in the United Nations SC", *SETA Policy Brief*, no.28, 2009; Bülent Aras and Rabia K. Polat, "Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic Imagination," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.4, 2007: 471-488; Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no.3, 2008, 83-95; Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, "The Relations between Turkey and the Caucasus," *Perceptions* 16, no.3, 2011: 53-68.

⁹³ Ziya Meral and Jonathan Paris, "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no.4, 2010: 85.

⁹⁴ Yalvaç, "Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy," 175.

concept “is based on traditional realist geopolitical ideas of frontiers, territory, strategic belts, basins and conflict belts.”⁹⁵

Liberals also draw attention to the pragmatic impulse in Turkey’s new foreign policy. Among them, Oğuzlu contends that Turkey’s rapprochement with the Middle East is a “pragmatic/rational” choice rather than an “emotional/romantic” one.⁹⁶ By referring to the debates regarding whether there is a “shift of axis” in Turkish foreign policy he adds that, “Middle Easternization does not suggest a break with the West but rather the growing salience of the Middle East in Turkey’s relations with the West.”⁹⁷ Taşpınar follows the trend of defining the new Turkish foreign policy as pragmatic and regards Turkey’s soft power in the region as a diplomatic asset in its relations with the US.⁹⁸ Danforth also posits that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East is a pragmatic choice rather than an ideological one.⁹⁹

Scholars such as Keyman, who may be defined as a liberal, argue that although Turkey’s new foreign policy, and particularly proactivism, is based on pragmatism and rational choice and is independent from ideological concerns, it is still not clear whether this is a “realistic” and “sustainable” approach.¹⁰⁰ Keyman notes that, “it is only if proactive and multidimensional foreign policy is sustained by realistic choices and effective domestic support that success can be achieved.”¹⁰¹ As a realist scholar, Kardaş argues similarly that Turkey’s proactivism is “zero-sum” and eventually “Turkish foreign policy will be forced

⁹⁵ Ibid, 168.

⁹⁶ Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” 3-20.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 3.

⁹⁸ Ömer Taşpınar, “Obama’s Turkey Policy: Bringing Credibility to ‘Strategic Partnership’,” *Insight Turkey* 11, no.1, 2009: 13-21.

⁹⁹ Danforth, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP.”

¹⁰⁰ Keyman and Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World*; Gordon and Taşpınar, *Winning Turkey*; Hasret Dikici Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah,” *Turkish Studies* 9, no.3, 2008: 413; Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish–Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Rhetoric,” *Turkish Studies* 12, no.1, 2011: 55-77.

¹⁰¹ Fuat Keyman, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil,” *SETA Policy Brief*, no.39, 2009, 13.

to set more realistic agendas and prioritize the country's strategic relationships.”¹⁰² Öniş suggests in a similar vein that, “Over-assertiveness and over-confidence in international affairs can have significant pay-offs in the short term but can also be detrimental to national interest and to lead to isolation in the long term.”¹⁰³ Zarakol contends similarly that despite its high goals, there is a mismatch between Turkey's capacity and ambitions.¹⁰⁴ Likewise, Sözen contends that, the “AKP's Islamist reflexes in domestic politics and Turkey's relative lack of financial resources are the potential factors that can limit the success of the new Turkish foreign policy vision and strategy in the future.”¹⁰⁵

A considerable number of scholars on Turkish foreign policy also draw attention to the role of the European Union (EU) as a catalyst for change many of whom may be considered liberals.¹⁰⁶ EU studies have grown significantly in Turkey particularly as a result of the acceleration of the process during the early phase of AKP period.¹⁰⁷ The EU is often underlined as a promoter of domestic reforms and democratization in Turkey. For

¹⁰² Kardaş, “Turkish–Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and Nabucco,” 74.

¹⁰³ Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” *Insight Turkey* 13, no.1, 2011: 63.

¹⁰⁴ Ayşe Zarakol, “Problem areas for the new Turkish foreign policy, *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 40, no.5, 2012: 740-741.

¹⁰⁵ Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no.1, 2010: 120.

¹⁰⁶ Gencer Özcan, “Turkey's Foreign Policy under AKP: If Only Luck Stays on Their Side,” Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, Washington Office, 2; Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties,” 413; Aras and Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 471; Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no.2, 2005: 215-231.

¹⁰⁷ Mustafa Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation,” *The Review of International Affairs* 3, no.2, 2003: 306-331; Gülnur Aybet, “Turkey's Long and Winding Road to the EU: Implications for the Balkans,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8, no.1, 2006: 65-83; Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online* 9, no.3, 2009: 263-274; Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, “Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no.3, 2010: 405-427; Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Impact of ‘Democratization in the Context of the EU Accession Process’ on Turkish foreign policy,” *Mediterranean Politics* 9, no.1, 2004: 94-113; Çiğdem Üstün, “Europeanization of Foreign Policy: the Case of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Black Sea region,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 10, no.2, 2010: 225-242; Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European Union,” *South European Society and Politics* 16, no.2, 2011: 279-291; Burçin Uluğ-Eryılmaz, “The Myth of ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish Foreign Policy: the Cyprus Debacle as a Litmus Test,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 14, no.3, 2014: 431-462.

instance, Aydın suggests that the process of democratization “has been in part a by-product of Turkey’s desire to join the EU.”¹⁰⁸ Aras and Polat pinpoint that “the EU membership process enabled civil society organizations’ entry into politics, which in turn contributed to the widening of normal politics.”¹⁰⁹ They also outline that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East is a consequence of its EU accession process by arguing that Turkey’s journey towards the EU helped it gain confidence in its foreign affairs, making it more active in its region.¹¹⁰

Several scholars are informed by other approaches particularly by constructivism. Constructivist accounts of Turkish foreign policy mainly focus on how ideas, identities and interests of actors influence processes of foreign policy making. In the literature on Turkish foreign policy, constructivism finds its way into studies on the construction of identity,¹¹¹ processes of securitization,¹¹² desecuritization,¹¹³ foreign policy discourses¹¹⁴ and the identities and ideas of foreign policy actors.¹¹⁵

Among these, a considerable number of studies underline the role of the leaders particularly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu as the main actors of Turkey’s

¹⁰⁸ Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation,” 327.

¹⁰⁹ Aras and Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 475.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 471-488.

¹¹¹ Metin Aksoy ve Murat Çemrek, “Türk Dış Politikasında Kimlik Sorunu,” in Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efeğil, *Türkiye’nin Değişen Dış Politikası*, 151–169, İstanbul: Nobel Dağıtım, 2010.

¹¹² Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy,” 123. Also see, Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourse: The Challenges of Globalization,” *European Journal of Political Research* 4, no.1, 2005: 175-201; Ümit Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey,” *Middle East Journal* 57, no.2 2003: 213-230.

¹¹³ Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no.5, 2008: 475-495.

¹¹⁴ Yalvaç, “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy,” 125. Also see, Senem A. Düzgüt “Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye İlişkilerine Postyapısalcı Yaklaşım: Almanya Örneğinde Dış Politika ve Söylem Analiz,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 8, no. 29, 2011: 49-70; Beyza Çağatay Tekin, “The Construction of Turkey’s Possible EU Membership in French Political Discourse,” *Discourse and Society* 19, no.6, 2008: 727-763; Bahar Rumelili, “Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication and Subversion in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 38, no.2, 2012: 495-508.

¹¹⁵ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Working Paper*, Bilkent University and Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), no.8, 2010; Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, no.4, 2014: 404-418.

new foreign policy. While scholars such as Moubayed;¹¹⁶ Altunışık and Tür;¹¹⁷ and Sasley¹¹⁸ draw attention to the role of the leadership of Erdoğan in the development of Turkey's new vision towards the region, others point directly at Ahmet Davutoğlu as the main designer of Turkish foreign policy in line with his *Strategic Depth* doctrine.¹¹⁹ They agree that the ideational structure of Turkey's foreign policy is mainly built on the ideas of Davutoğlu and he, therefore, deserves the main credit. Most of these scholars regard Turkey's "zero-problems policy" as the main tenet of this doctrine.¹²⁰ For instance, Grigoriadis suggests that, "The implementation of Davutoğlu's foreign policy doctrine has contributed to a transformation of Turkish foreign policy and the rising importance of Turkey's diplomatic role, especially in the Middle East."¹²¹ By emphasising the proactive nature of the new foreign policy Aras suggests that, "Davutoğlu's attempts have aimed to open up new areas, to extend influence in neighbouring regions and to play a leading role in selective global issues."¹²²

Some scholars emphasize the role of domestic change on Turkey's new foreign policy.¹²³ Referring to the theory of *societal constructivism*, Aras draws attention to the importance of social norms and common historical experiences in the construction of Turkey's foreign

¹¹⁶ Sami Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations: The Erdoğan Legacy," *SETA Policy Brief*, no.25, 2008.

¹¹⁷ Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations," *Security Dialogue* 37, no.2, 2006: 229-248.

¹¹⁸ Brent E. Sasley, "Turkish Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Lobbying for European Union Membership," *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no.4, 2012: 553-566.

¹¹⁹ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no.6, 2006: 945-964; Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy;" Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited," 404-418.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy," 9.

¹²² Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited," 415.

¹²³ Ziya Öniş, "Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: the Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics* 14, no.1, 2009: 21-40; Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, New York; London: Routledge, 2003.

policy.¹²⁴ Similarly, Aras and Polat emphasize domestic factors, significantly the process of “desecuritization” at home and its impact on foreign policy perceptions, especially towards Turkey’s neighbours.¹²⁵ In this view, owing to the desecuritization process, issues such as the Kurdish conflict or political Islam, which had previously been considered within the limits of national security, have been desecuritized and entered the spheres of normal political discussions.¹²⁶

Scholars such as Sadık underline the role of religion in the formation of foreign policy “by examining the competing theoretical explanations on the role of Islam in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.”¹²⁷ Sadık contends that, “the transforming identity of Turkish foreign policy has paved the way for the construction of an identity-based foreign policy.”¹²⁸ As highlighted by Keyman, some scholars express scepticism about the AKP’s political agenda and contend that its foreign policy priorities are influenced by ideological concerns.¹²⁹ Other scholars suggest there has been a change in Turkey’s orientation by moving away from the West towards the East (mainly the Middle East). These scholars emphasize that Turkey’s foreign policy is based on “neo-Ottomanism” built on a historical- geopolitical imagination of its Ottoman inheritance embedded in cultural and religious ties.¹³⁰ Bilgin notes in a different vein that, “Ideologically, there might be Islamist considerations, but once in power, political interests

¹²⁴ Bülent Aras, “Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Towards a Societal Construction of Foreign Policy,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 23, no.4, 2000: 31-59.

¹²⁵ Aras and Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation,” 475-495.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Sadık, “Magic Blend or Dangerous Mix?,” 314.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East*, London: Palgrave, 2009; Soner Çağaptay, “AKP’s Foreign Policy: Misnomer of neo-Ottomanism,” *Washington Institute*, 2009; Deniz Gökalp and Seda Unsar, “From the Myth of European Union Accession to Disillusion: Implications for Religious and Ethnic Politicization in Turkey,” *Middle East Journal* 62, no.1, 2008: 93-116.

¹³⁰ Delphine Strauss, “Turkey’s Ottoman Mission”, *Financial Times*, 23 November 2009; Nora Fisher Onar, “Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish foreign Policy,” *EDAM Papers*, no.3, 2009.

apparently supersede religious values” and suggests that the AKP is rather pragmatic in its foreign policy calculations.¹³¹

1.2.3 Literature on Turkish Mediation

Studies on mediation are rather scarce in Turkish scholarship since mediation is relatively new to Turkey’s foreign policy. As such, despite its long use in domestic settings, studies on the field of mediation are rather new in Turkey. Only a handful of studies have been conducted so far which mainly focus on the role of managerial mediation in organizational conflicts,¹³² mediation in industrial conflicts,¹³³ peer-mediation in high schools,¹³⁴ mediation in environmental¹³⁵ conflicts, and Islamic mediation in local settings.¹³⁶ Similarly, only a small number of writings are dedicated to Turkey’s mediation in international conflicts *per se*.¹³⁷ Among them, only the works by Gürkaynak,¹³⁸ Altunışık

¹³¹ Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties,” 418.

¹³² M. Kamil Kozan and Selim S. İltir, “Third Party Roles Played by Turkish Managers in Subordinates’ Conflicts,” *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 15, no.5, 1994: 453-466; M. Kamil Kozan and Canan Ergin, “Third Party Role in Conflict Management in Turkish Organizations,” *Human Organization* 58, no.4, 1999: 405-415; M. Kamil Kozan, Canan Ergin and Demet Varoğlu, “Third Party Intervention Strategies of Managers in Subordinates’ Conflicts in Turkey,” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 18, no.2, 2007: 128-147; M. Kamil Kozan, Canan Ergin and Kadir Varoğlu, “Bases of Power and Conflict Intervention Strategy: A Study on Turkish Managers,” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 25, no.1, 2014: 38-60.

¹³³ Deniz İltir and Atilla Dikbaş, “An Analysis of the Key Challenges to the Widespread Use of Mediation in the Turkish Construction Industry”, *International Journal of Law in the Built Environment* 1, no.2, 2009: 143-155.

¹³⁴ Abbas Turnuklu, Tarkan Kacmaz, Dilara Sunbul and Hatice Ergul, “Does Peer-mediation Really Work? Effects of Conflict Resolution and Peer-mediation Training on High School Students’ Conflicts,” *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences*, no.1, 2009: 630-638.

¹³⁵ Ayşen Müezzinoğlu, “A Mediation Case for Resolving the Energy and Environment Dispute at Aliğa İzmir, Turkey,” *Environmental Management* 26, no.1, 2000, 47-57.

¹³⁶ Talha Köse and Nimet Beriker, “Islamic Mediation in Turkey: The Role of Ulema,” *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* 5, no.2, 2012: 136-161.

¹³⁷ Selin M. Bölme, “From Ankara to Annapolis: Turkey and the Middle East Peace Process,” *SETA Policy Brief*, no.5, 2007; Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Assessment and Reflections,” *Perceptions* 12, no.3, 2007: 89-108; Bülent Aras, “Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey’s Rising Soft Power,” *SETA Policy Brief*, no.15, 2008; Veysel Ayhan, “Irak-Suriye Arası Mekik Diplomasisi: Türkiye’nin Arabuluculuğu,” *Ortadoğu Analiz* 1, no.9, 2009: 8-15; Rahman G. Bonab, “Turkey’s Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” *Insight Turkey* 11, no.3, 2009: 161-175; Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 29-41; Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What Is the Big Deal?,” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no. 1, 2010: 26-30; Meliha Altunışık and Esra Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?,” *Mediterranean Politics* 15, no.3, 2010: 371-392; S. Güliden Ayman, “An Analysis of Turkish Mediation in the Middle East Turmoil”, *Dış Politika/Foreign Policy* 37, no.3-4, 2011: 7-24; Güliden Ayman, “Turkish Mediation Efforts in the Middle East,” *Turkish Review*, January 5, 2011;

and Çuhadar;¹³⁹ and Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu¹⁴⁰ are embedded in the mediation literature. Others mainly consider mediation within the broader scope of Turkish foreign policy often as part of Turkey's regional policy, its proactive foreign policy or soft power without any references to the theory of mediation.¹⁴¹ Studies mainly focus on its mediation in the Middle East despite the fact that Turkey has played active mediator roles in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Africa, Asia and even played a minor role in the Philippines.

The existing literature on Turkey's mediation mainly looks into why and how Turkey mediates, the regional and global implications of its mediation, what role mediation plays in the overall Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's difference as a mediator. Among the scholars, Gürkaynak focuses on Turkey's third party role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict highlighting what sort of third party role Turkey plays and should play.¹⁴² She argues that Turkey plays more of a facilitator role than a power mediator role. She also suggests that structural prevention and conflict transformation are the best third party intervention strategies for Turkey in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.¹⁴³

Similarly, Altunışık and Çuhadar explore Turkey's third party role in the Israeli–Syrian and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts concluding that Turkey's mediation has evolved from

George Friedman, "The Turkish Role in Negotiations with Iran," Stratfor Global Intelligence, January 11, 2011, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110110-turkish-role-negotiations-iran#axzz3ObO26oof>; Reina Zenelaj, Nimet Beriker and M. Emre Hatipoğlu, "Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia: A Focused Comparison," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 2015, DOI:10.1080/10357718.2015.1024200; Reşat Bayer and E. Fuat Keyman, "Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?," *Globalizations* 9, no.1, 2012: 73-90; Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative," *Turkish Policy Brief Series*, International Policy and Leadership Institute; TEPAV, no.6, 2012; Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections from the Field," *Middle East Policy* 20, no.1, 2013: 83-90.

¹³⁸ Gürkaynak, "Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," 89-108.

¹³⁹ Altunışık and Çuhadar, "Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts," 371-392.

¹⁴⁰ Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu, "Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia."

¹⁴¹ Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," 945-964; Aras and Polat, "Turkey and the Middle East," 471-488; Aylin Gürzel, "Turkey's Role as a Regional and Global Player and its Power Capacity: Turkey's Engagement with other Emerging States," *Revista de Sociologia e Politica* 22, no.50, 2014: 95-105.

¹⁴² Gürkaynak, "Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," 89-108.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

“neutral facilitator” into “principal power mediator” within a timeframe of eight years.¹⁴⁴ Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu focus on Turkey’s mediation in Bosnia by comparing it with that of the EU and the US.¹⁴⁵ They contend that Turkey’s “low intervention strategy” paid off in the Bosnian conflict rather than the power mediation of the EU and the US.¹⁴⁶ As such, all these studies refer to Turkey’s role as a facilitator rather than a power mediator.

By referring to Turkey’s co-mediation with Brazil during the Iranian nuclear talks, Ayman positions Turkey as an “interested insider” which is directly affected by the conflicts in the region and has a genuine interest in resolving them. She also refers to Turkey as an “emerging middle power” with a growing economy that uses mediation to secure stable markets.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, by referring to Turkey and Brazil as “middle-sized states,” Özkan suggests that the main implication of their mediation in the Iranian nuclear talks has been to change the existing “*political* and *discursive* arenas” in global affairs and to challenge the Western dominance.¹⁴⁸ Through an analysis of Turkey’s difference in the Iranian nuclear talks, Bonab underlines “trust” and “independence” as two important tenets that Turkey brought in to the negotiations which differentiate it from Western or Arabic countries as well as Israel.¹⁴⁹

This thesis, therefore, aims to combine literature from these different areas – international mediation, contemporary Turkish foreign policy and Turkish mediation – in order to make a contribution to understanding of how Turkey mediates, the role this plays in Turkey’s

¹⁴⁴ Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts,” 371-392.

¹⁴⁵ Gürkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 89-108; Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts,” 371-392; Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu, ““Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia.”

¹⁴⁶ Zenelaj, Beriker and Hatipoğlu, ““Determinants of Mediation Success in Post-conflict Bosnia.”

¹⁴⁷ Ayman, “An Analysis of Turkish Mediation in the Middle East Turmoil,” 9; Ayman, “Turkish Mediation Efforts in the Middle East.”

¹⁴⁸ Özkan, “Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue,” 29.

¹⁴⁹ Bonab, “Turkey’s Emerging Role as a Mediator on Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” 170-171.

recent foreign policy, and how and whether Turkey can exercise new and different practices in mediation, in contrast to more established “Western” mediatory approaches. Hence, it aims to place Turkey’s mediation in the context of its foreign policy, and recent academic literature on Turkish foreign policy; and in the context of recent academic literature on mediation.

1.3 Research Design and Methods

As introduced earlier in the study, the main research question of this thesis is: “To what extent does Turkey’s mediation differ from Western modes of mediation?” The concept of “difference” in this study stems from the criticisms raised by Turkish foreign policy makers regarding the current domination of mainly Western actors in shaping the international system.

As argued by Brigg and Bleiker, the mainstream literature “tends to see difference as a problem rather than a resource, leave little room for the possibility that difference can make a positive contribution to political order.”¹⁵⁰ As such, “difference” in this thesis also stems from the criticism of a mainstream, universalist notion of what constitutes mediation and how an “ideal” mediator, mediation process and outcome need to be. This study will explore the potential of mediation alternative to mainstream Western mediation practices and seek to what extent Turkish mediation deviates from these.

This thesis is informed by *constructivism* as an approach to understand international relations which holds that ideas and interests are important in the construction of the identities of policy makers who then determine the policies. Constructivism emerged as a reaction to neo-realism, by arguing that, contrary to the realist claim, reality is not given and is constructed upon perceptions, ideas, norms, and interests of actors. This study leans

¹⁵⁰ Bleiker and Brigg, “Introduction,” 23.

towards the liberalist strand of constructivism influenced by the works of scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Christian Reus-Smit and Emanuel Adler.

Constructivism claims that identities and interests of agents are not necessarily given by the structure but are under construction through continuous social and political interaction.¹⁵¹ As such, “systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and they exert a powerful influence on social and political action.”¹⁵² This view is also supported by Wendt who argues that, social structures are not only affected by “agents and their interactions” but also by “the shaping of identities and interests, which are conditioned by discursive formations by the distribution of ideas in the system as well as by material forces, and as such are not formed in a vacuum.”¹⁵³ In this view, the social structures consists of three determining element including “material conditions, interests, and ideas.”¹⁵⁴

As such, the study argues that ideas and interests of Turkish policy makers were important in the development of a new perception of Turkey’s position in the region and beyond. As such, the ideational background of Turkish policy makers were influential in their interest in post-Ottoman geographies, and a self-attributed responsibility to protect these geographies and to seek for new opportunities brought about a need for ways of engagement such as mediation.

Turkey’s search for a new identity under the imperatives of domestic balances and international structure paved the way for the emergence of its new foreign policy, and subsequently its mediator role. As such, the study also draws on the agent-structure debate

¹⁵¹ Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3, 1997: 324.

¹⁵² Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 196.

¹⁵³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge; New York; Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 138.

¹⁵⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 139.

in constructivism to explain the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a more proactive stance vis-à-vis the problems in Turkey's neighbourhood. Turkey's emergence as a mediator in its region was not only a result of the changing ideas, interests and perceptions of its policy makers but also a change in the regional and international structure as a result of developments such as the end of the Cold War, the September 11 events and US-led invasion of Iraq.

According to Reus-Smit, agents and structures continuously reproduce one another and "are mutually constituted."¹⁵⁵ Similarly, Wendt argues that "human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities."¹⁵⁶ In this view, the structure is constructed through the socialization of actors and vice versa. As such, structure is not given (as argued by neo-realists). Turkish policy makers utilized their relational links with the communities in their region and beyond particularly by underpinning Turkey's identity as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. As discussed further in the thesis, Turkish policy makers argue that particularly the Iraqi War left Turkey in a position either to become a part of the problem or emerge as a responsible problem-solving agent in its region and reclaim its influence in post-Ottoman lands.

There is also an emphasis on the importance of bringing "order" and "stability" to Turkey's areas of influence in the discourses of policy makers which is indicative of how Turkish policy makers perceive mediation as a tool of changing the regional structure towards a more stable and cooperative one which corresponds with Wendt's understanding that "Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.

¹⁵⁵ Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in S. Burchill et al. (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 197.

¹⁵⁶ Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, *International Organization* 41, no.3, 1987: 338.

Anarchy is what states make of it.”¹⁵⁷ In this view, anarchy is not a given and inevitable state of world governance but is rather constructed. As such, the image of a “responsible” and “collaborative” regional leader that Turkey tried to promote is suggestive of how Turkey tried to utilize mediation as a tool of socialization in its region.

The constructivist claim that power is not only material but can also be ideational¹⁵⁸ also well suits the emphasis on soft-power and diplomacy in Turkey’s new foreign policy which drives its legitimacy from a constructed identity based on the historical and geopolitical projection of Turkey as a former empire and the leader of the Islamic world.

Liberal constructivism also helped me in explaining the emphasis given on establishing mutual dialogue, encouraging trade, and promoting culture and shared norms in the new Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, although the main level of analysis of this thesis remains at the level of the state, I also examined the role of non-state actors such as NGOs, businesses and individuals in Turkey’s mediation. I was particularly interested in changing norms, changing forms of communication and changing discourse amongst policy makers and representatives of NGOs on the elite level in order to understand how they explained Turkey’s mediator role through language and symbolic interactionism. Constructivism also helped me explain how I used the interview material by looking for the ideas of Turkish policy makers about norms, practices and Turkey’s identity.

Drawing on constructivism, this study built on qualitative research methods including case study, semi-structured in depth interviews and analysis of texts. The case studies helped me assess the extent to which my research questions can be answered with reference to specific examples. I used the information gathered from interviews and from written

¹⁵⁷ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2, 1992: 395.

¹⁵⁸ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1, 1998: 177.

sources as well as the indicators from the literature in order to make judgements about Turkish mediation at certain key points.

As indicated by Hogan, Dolan and Donnelly, unlike quantitative research which relies on numerical data, qualitative research relies more on words, “either the research participants’ own words, the words written in documents or the words used by the researcher herself/himself to describe the activities, images and the environment observed.”¹⁵⁹ Qualitative research further relies “on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or in depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit.”¹⁶⁰ These methods enable scholars to “unearth enormous amounts of information” despite the small number of cases analysed.¹⁶¹ As also postulated by Duursma, “In contrast to quantitative studies, case-studies can examine the unique context in which mediation takes place.”¹⁶²

The research conducted in this thesis ties in with the debates in the mediation literature. Throughout the course of my research I have come across a range of themes and indicators in the mediation literature that enabled me to suggest inferences on the possible ways in which Turkey’s mediation could be considered as different to that of its Western counterparts. These indicators which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 2 include previous experience of the mediators, their motives for mediation, characteristics as mediators, style of mediation, means supportive of mediation such as aid, methods of mediation, and their progress as mediators. This study uses these inferences in order to

¹⁵⁹ John Hogan, Paddy Dolan and Paul Donnelly, “Introduction,” in John Hogan, Paddy Dolan and Paul Donnelly, *Approaches to Qualitative Research : Theory and Its Practical Application - A Guide for Dissertation Students*, Cork: Oak Tree Press, 2009, 8-9. See also, Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes and Malcolm Tight, *How to Research*, Berkshire; New York: Open University Press, 1999:60.

¹⁶⁰ King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 4.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Allard Duursma, “A Current Literature Review of International Mediation,” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 25, no.1, 2014: 85.

shed light on Turkey's ability to mediate differently. These indicators will be used to help in considering the cases discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

1.3.1 Case Selection

This thesis examines two different cases of Turkish mediation. In Chapter 4, it analyses Turkey's mediation in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations between 2007-2008. It will draw on the mediation literature mentioned above, and, in order to sharpen the assessment of Turkey's capacity to mediate differently, it will set Turkish mediation in the context of the much longer mediation by the United States between 1974-2000. It is impossible to understand why and how Turkey mediated without drawing out elements of this background. In Chapter 5, it will examine Turkey's ongoing mediation in Somalia, starting in 2012. Here, the thesis considers how Turkish mediation differed from mediation conducted by two very different "Western" mediators in Somalia, Britain and Norway.

This study aims first and foremost to understand how Turkey can mediate differently from the US, Britain and Norway in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations and in Somalia respectively. The thesis does discuss the mediation conducted by these other countries, but it does so in order to shed light on Turkish policy and consider how Turkey can mediate, and present itself, differently to these powers. In addition, the Syrian-Israeli talks, and Turkey's initiatives in Somalia, were very different from each other, and hence, provided the opportunity to comment on different kinds of Turkish mediatory practices; as well as to consider how these mediation efforts might fit together as part of Turkey's foreign policy.

Since I focused on Turkey, I made some references to mediation by other powers in order to bring this into clearer emphasis. Since I did not aim to compare Turkey to the entire "West" I did not, in any way, attempt to systematically contrast "West" and "non-West." However, throughout my research, I was struck by how much the idea of "non-Western"

featured in Turkey's rhetoric of its foreign policy; and hence, it is present as an important part of its identity construction and therefore its mediation policies.

Despite using these inferences to shed light on Turkey's difference by comparing it with Western mediators such as the US, Britain and Norway, this is not a comparative study. The study does not aim to make rigid comparisons among these actors. It rather aims to bring out Turkey's difference more clearly and systematically. As such, the main focus of this thesis is Turkey and the amount of data introduced on Turkey is visibly larger than the other mediators. Therefore, the primary source material consulted refers almost exclusively to Turkey, although the thesis does examine considerable amount of data on the US, Britain and Norway.

The US and Britain set suitable examples of great power mediators. The US has extensive power capabilities as a mediator and is also a major ally of Turkey. It had also been the lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks from 1974 until 2000. Comparing its mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks with that of Turkey's also offers a good opportunity to understand the limits of Turkey's independence as a regional actor as well as the use of mediation in its quest for more influence. It also enabled me to seek how Turkey mediates vis-à-vis US interests in the region.

The Syrian-Israeli case is also representative in that it offers an opportunity to analyse Turkey's role as a mediator in an interstate conflict. The longevity of the conflict and the difficulty to offer any kind of lasting resolution are reasons that makes this case interesting to study. It is also interesting regarding the broader debates it triggered with respect to Turkey's policies in a region where it has deep historical-geopolitical roots. As a result of its proximity to Turkey, the Syrian-Israeli case also allowed me to understand how Turkey mediates in a conflict that directly affects it. When I selected the Syrian-Israeli case, the

Arab Spring had not yet erupted. However, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that, one way or another, the course of the events did have an impact on Turkish foreign policy and similarly on Turkey's mediator role.

The Somali case offers an opportunity to analyse Turkey's role in an intrastate conflict where its mediation should be understood in a broader sense. As will be discussed in detail further in the thesis, Turkish policy makers emphasize that Turkey's mediation comes in "a package"¹⁶³ which entails that when necessary, it is supported by means such as development aid, humanitarian assistance or medical relief. As such, the Somali case offers an opportunity to test this proposition and understand in what circumstances Turkey combines these measures with its mediation and to what extent these means can be supportive of peacemaking.

Comparing Turkey with Britain offered me an opportunity to investigate Turkey's difference vis-à-vis an great power mediator that is also a former colonial power in Somalia. Norway, on the other hand, poses a sound example for a small-state mediator whose role was particularly interesting regarding its extensive work on the grassroots.

The Somali case also offers a ground to examine the role of non-state actors such as HNGOs or businesses in peacemaking. It also helped me understand Turkey's engagement with regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It is a sound case to analyze why and how Turkey uses mediation as a tool of opening up to regions such as Africa where it has limited or no previous engagements with. Choosing a case from two different regions also enabled me to wipe out the possibility of limiting my analysis to a single geopolitical context. It also gave me the opportunity to investigate different aspects of Turkey's

¹⁶³ Interview with Bülent Aras, former Academic Adviser to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Istanbul, October 16, 2014.

mediation policies and offered a variety of themes and indicators to bring to light its difference as a mediator.

1.3.2 Data Gathering

I gathered the majority of my original primary source material by conducting a number of semi-structured in-depth interviews with open-ended questions with Turkish officials engaged in Turkish mediation policies at various levels. The interview subjects were selected according to their relevance to Turkey's mediation as well as their availability. Despite the fact that the analysis of this study focused more on Turkish actors, and thus the number of Turkish subjects interviewed is visibly higher, I also interviewed people from other countries to be able to derive more insight on how Turkey mediates differently and how other mediators have operated in the same conflicts. Although most of the interviews were conducted in Turkey and in person, in certain cases I had to conduct interviews through phone due to logistical problems. The inability to reach some of the potential participants as a result of their reluctance to participate in the research, availability or logistical problems have appeared as limitations to the research.

Among the participants, Ufuk Gezer, former Head of Department of Directorate of Policy Planning at Turkish Foreign Ministry (the department that *inter alia* coordinates Turkey's official mediation attempts), provided invaluable insight about Turkey's official policy on mediation. Three Turkish diplomats who preferred to remain anonymous provided insight about Turkey's policy in Somalia. They were particularly helpful in understanding how Turkey utilizes mediation as a tool of foreign policy. Interview with former Academic Adviser in Chief to Turkish Foreign Minister Bülent Aras was particularly insightful about the theoretical and empirical background of Turkish foreign policy and mediation with specific references on Ahmet Davutoğlu's approach. Similarly, interview with Ertuğrul

Apakan, former Undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, was invaluable for understanding Turkish mediation. I also interviewed Head of Department of Public Diplomacy under Turkish Prime Ministry Cemalettin Haşimi, Head of Directorate for Strategy Planning at the Directorate for Religious Affairs Necdet Subaşı and Head of Strategy Development at the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities under Turkish Prime Ministry Zahide Erdoğan. Among these, Necdet Subaşı was particularly helpful in deepening my understanding of what role religion has in Turkish mediation.

In addition to Turkish bureaucrats I also interviewed Head of Department of Foreign Affairs at Turkish Red Crescent Bayram Selvi, Deputy Chairman and Board Member of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) Hüseyin Oruç, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy Coordinator of IHH İzzet Şahin and General Coordinator at The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW) Cihangir İşbilir. In addition, I also interviewed Şeyda Sever, former coordinator of Shifa Hospital in Somalia which was built by Doctors Worldwide in cooperation with Medical Park, a private hospital chain in Turkey. Her comments were insightful in understanding the impact of Turkish aid on the ground.

I have also embedded primary data gathered at a workshop on “The Role of NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding” held at Istanbul Policy Center on December 3, 2013 where 15 senior representatives of Turkish HNGOs participated. The data gathered from the workshop has also been compiled into a journal article I co-wrote with Bülent Aras.¹⁶⁴

From Britain I interviewed former British Ambassador to Somalia (1987-1989) Jeremy Varcoe who gave me valuable insight on Britain’s foreign policy in Somalia and what role

¹⁶⁴ Bülent Aras and Pinar Akpınar, “The Role of HNGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding,” *International Peacekeeping* 22, no.3, 2015: 230-247.

mediation has in British foreign policy. I also interviewed Thomas Wheeler and Mohamed Enow from Saferworld who are Conflict and Security Adviser and Somalia/Somaliland Field Coordinator, respectively. They have provided some valuable insight on Britain's policy and mediation in Somalia.

From Norway, I had the opportunity to interview Hilde Frafjord Johnson, former Minister of International Development of Norway, member of the Norwegian Government, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan. Hilde Frafjord Johnson mediated between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement in 2005 which resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Interviewing Ms. Johnson was particularly helpful in understanding Norwegian mediation approach.

From Somalia I interviewed Ambassador of Somalia to Turkey Mohamed Mursal Sheikh Abdurahman who provided with valuable information regarding Turkey's mediation between Somalia and Somaliland. In addition, I also interviewed three NGO representatives from Somalia including an anonymous representative, Somali Ambassador to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Abdirazak Siyad Abdi and Executive Director of Watchful Association for Relief and Development Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein. Their contribution was particularly significant in uncovering the local perceptions on Turkish involvement in Somalia.

I also had the opportunity to interview the Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government in Gaza Tahir al-Nunu which provided me with insight on the perception on Turkey in Gaza, to what extent Turkey is able to play a leadership role in the region and how influential it is as a mediator. The interview was also insightful in terms of understanding the civilian

dimension of Turkey's peace initiatives particularly with respect to the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis.

Finally, I interviewed William Quandt who is a scholar and former staff member on the National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter administrations who took active part in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations in 1978-1979. Interviewing Quandt gave me invaluable insight about US mediation in the Arab-Israeli negotiations which enabled me to deepen my chapter on the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. It also helped me draw on Turkey's difference as a mediator from the US.

In addition to the interviews conducted, I also weaved in data from the proceedings of former Turkish Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende on Turkish and Norwegian mediation approaches in three conferences and a workshop which I had the opportunity to attend. The conferences were the first and the second Istanbul Conference on Mediation held in Istanbul in 2012 and 2013 respectively by Turkish Foreign Ministry as part of the Friend of Mediation Initiative cofounded by Turkey and Finland within the UN. During the second conference, I also had the opportunity to interview former Deputy Foreign Minister of Somalia Jamal Mohamed Barrow which was later published on the weblog of the Center for Strategic Research at Turkish Foreign Ministry (SAM).¹⁶⁵ I used this published data on my thesis as well. The workshop I attended was entitled "Turkish and Norwegian Approaches to and Experiences in Mediation Seminar" which was organized in Ankara on November 6, 2013 by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research at Bilkent University, SAM and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF).

¹⁶⁵ Jamal Mohamed Barrow, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Somalia, interview by Pinar Akpınar, Istanbul, April 11, 2013, published on *Center for Strategic Research at Turkish Foreign Ministry Blog*, October 8, 2013.

Alongside the data from the interviews, conference and workshop proceedings, I also consulted press releases of Davutoğlu, former Turkish Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, British Prime Minister David Cameron, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende and a number of US Presidents and Secretaries of State which have provided valuable insight on the foreign policy and mediation approaches of respective countries. These press releases were accessible online mainly from the official websites of the respective institutions or in newspapers that published these speeches.

In addition, I also analysed text from books, journal articles, policy briefs, reports, newspapers and op-ed articles. Among these, particularly material written first hand by Davutoğlu such as his renowned book *Strategic Depth* or *Vision Papers* written by him and published by Center for Strategic research, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have provided me with insightful information on understanding Turkey's approach to foreign policy and mediation. While publications from the Turkish ministries, and speeches by Turkish politicians are likely to be biased, these are crucial sources in helping me to reconstruct the attitudes and policies of key Turkish decision makers. Indeed, in the absence of archival data, these are the only sources we have to glean information about Turkish intentions and policies, and therefore, it was essential to use these documents.

In February-March 2013, I also went to George Mason University, School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution in Virginia, USA as a visiting scholar in order to conduct library research and meet prominent scholars in the field of conflict resolution. My time in SCAR was particularly fruitful in terms of expanding my theoretical knowledge and my academic network. In addition, in July and August 2014, I attended a series of trainings on mediation, negotiation and alternative dispute resolution at Virginia Mediation Service, USA which enabled me to diversify my theoretical and practical knowledge in the field.

An ethical approval was sought from Keele University before beginning the interviews which was a challenging and educative process.¹⁶⁶ Longitude was a setback of timeframe and also might be thought to have diminished my room for manoeuvre, in some cases, as I had to wait for the approval before beginning interviews, and as the meaning of the official forms could be interpreted differently in a different cultural and political context. The obligation to sign a formal document acted as a repellent element with one of the potential participants, a mid-level Turkish bureaucrat, who could have contributed significantly to the thesis but rejected to participate since he was wary of signing the document.

1.3.3 Problems in the Course of the Research

All research necessarily has limitations and since the outcome of a research is influenced by the interpretation of observers based on their ideas, values and previous experiences, the evaluation process often bears the risk of being filtered by the subjective analysis of the researcher. Thus, knowledge is often political. In addition, it is also often a challenge, if not impossible, to gather sufficient amount of data and conduct a “perfect” research.¹⁶⁷ For instance, first-hand information is often limited and difficult to reach.¹⁶⁸ Although these handicaps may lead to “uncertainty about our conclusions,” they should nevertheless not hold researchers back from conducting research.¹⁶⁹

One of the challenges of this research was that most of the participants were elites from various ministries, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. As such, there is a danger of bias, because they are likely to say what their institutions want them to say, and are unlikely to be critical of Turkish policy. Similarly, they may also limit what they say

¹⁶⁶ See Appendix 6: Ethical Approval Letter.

¹⁶⁷ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994, 6.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

since there may be things they will not want to reveal. As argued by Moore and Stokes, elites are “individuals and collectives that form a separate and distinct echelon or grouping in a given society or section of society.”¹⁷⁰ As such, “they can be seen to have knowledge, influence, control and power in a given setting or situation.”¹⁷¹ It is nevertheless difficult to speak of a homogenous group of elites since their “knowledge, influence, control and power” may vary according to their status in the society or their given organization as well as the fluidity of a given context. For instance, given the volatility of the political environment in Somalia, it is difficult to speak of a stable and continuous elite structure. Nevertheless, the participants of this research were selected among key informants who were assumed to have first-hand information about the topic.

Even if there are biases, as also underlined by Delaney, elite interviewing also enables a researcher to understand the worldview of the decision makers providing them with valuable insights.¹⁷² As such, despite the fact that bureaucrats who are on active duty may be restrained to say everything about policy, what they say allowed me to interrogate how they talk about Turkish mediation, and therefore, gave me evidence about how people with a stake in its mediation articulate Turkey’s policy.

The interviews showed how officials interpret the parameters available to them in carrying out Turkey’s mediation policy. They also enabled me to see how difficulties are dealt with and potential contradictions smoothed out. In order to avoid loops in my analysis to the possible extent, I tried to crosscheck the data provided by the participants by comparing and contrasting it with that of other participants or the secondary resources to the possible

¹⁷⁰ Neil Moore and Peter Stokes, “Elite Interviewing and the Role of Sector Context: An Organizational Case from the Football Industry”, *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal* 15, no.4, 2012, 439-440.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 440.

¹⁷² Kevin J. Delaney, “Methodological Dilemmas and Opportunities in Interviewing Organizational Elites,” *Sociology Compass* 1, no.1, 2007: 208-221.

extent. This study is primarily based on data gathered from these interviews which provide a great deal of original information. This information was also supplemented with published sources that gave additional information in their own right. Using published sources also enabled me to cross check information.

As also argued by Zuckerman, conducting semi-structured interviews and asking open-ended questions are often essential and facilitative in elite interviews since elite subjects do not want to be restricted by structured questions.¹⁷³ Similarly, Moore and Stokes argue that elites “do not like to be strait-jacketed and cornered; rather they often wish to be diplomatic or measured in their responses.”¹⁷⁴ In order to ease the tension and make the participants feel more comfortable with the process, I started the interviews with more general and easier questions such as asking the participants how they define Turkey’s mediation or how this role has emerged before moving towards more difficult or challenging questions such as the ones on Turkey’s interests in mediation or its impartiality.

Laurila argues that gaining access to elite participants is also difficult.¹⁷⁵ I tried to be as resourceful as I could by utilizing my existing network among policy and academic circles to be able to secure interviews. Although I was always careful to explain that I was conducting an academic study based in a UK university, so there was no possibility of their thinking I was either a journalist, or another Turkish policy maker, there were, nevertheless, certain people I was unable to reach as a result of their busy schedule or unwillingness to participate in the research. I also chased conferences and meetings to meet potential participants. This was especially helpful in meeting people from Somalia

¹⁷³ Harriet Zuckerman, “Interviewing an Ultra-Elite”, *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no.2, 1972: 163.

¹⁷⁴ Moore and Stokes, “Elite Interviewing and the Role of Sector Context,” 444.

¹⁷⁵ Juha Laurila, “Promoting Research Access and Informant Rapport in Corporate Settings: Notes from Research on a Crisis Company”, *Scandinavian Journal of Management* 13, no.4, 1997: 407-418.

since I was unable to travel there due to security reasons and the likelihood that the university ethical review process would not have permitted it.

Another problem faced in the course of this research was the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The course of the Arab Spring changed the parameters of Turkish policy towards the region to a certain extent and particularly towards Syria. In a way, it brought Turkey's ambitious foreign policy to a halt. Subsequently, for Turkey, mediation has turned from being an instrument of expanding its area of influence to one of preserving its existing power. The Arab Spring also demonstrated the limits of Turkish foreign policy and its mediation thereof. Although, demonstrating an extensive analysis of Turkey's policy during the Arab Spring is out of the scope of this thesis, its mediation in the Syrian-Israeli case cannot be analysed in isolation from the changing context. Therefore, there are occasional references to the period of the Arab Spring throughout the thesis to be able to draw out certain inferences regarding the potentials and limits of Turkey's mediation.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to set out an introduction to the thesis. It discussed the research question and rationale, situated the subject matter within the existing literature on international mediation and Turkish foreign policy, and explained the research design and methods. This thesis will look into why and how Turkey mediates, and on what premises one is able to say that Turkey mediates differently. The following chapter will draw a comprehensive framework to answer the question of how difference in international mediation can be identified through different themes and indicators and how these indicators can be applied on different mediation cases. Chapter 3 will elaborate on the background that paved the way for the emergence of Turkey's mediator role as a result of a shift in Turkey's foreign policy. Chapter 4 and 5 will draw on two case studies namely,

Turkish mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks and in Somalia aiming to conduct an empirical study that will test the theoretical discussions brought out in the previous chapter. Chapter 6 will be a concluding chapter in which a final discussion will be raised regarding Turkey's difference as a mediator.

CHAPTER 2 – THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENCE IN MEDIATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the literature on mediation in order to draw out ways in which mediation can be assessed and to lay out a conceptual framework to understand how Turkey is able to draw on the existing traditions and establish new traditions of its own. This framework will then be applied in the case chapters to examine the specifics of Turkish mediation; in particular to think about how Turkey uses mediation in its foreign policy as well as make claims about its difference from Western mediators.

As such, the chapter intends to understand how difference in international mediation can be identified which is one of the research questions of this thesis. The chapter first investigates how mediation can be utilized as a tool of foreign by different mediator states. It then highlights certain themes and indicators through the various aspects of mediation to be able to shed light on how difference may be defined and understood.

These indicators range from the interests and motives of mediators to their previous experiences in mediation; their characteristics as mediators such as the power they bring into the mediation process and the determinants of their positions as mediators including their impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the conflict, previous relations with the conflicting parties, their insider/outsider position and historical record; methods they use while mediating such as direct talks, indirect talks or shuttle diplomacy, holding conferences or workshops; their style of mediation such as being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with other actors, bringing culture into mediation, adopting a normative approach or mobilizing regional mechanisms; whether they use other means to support mediation; and their progress as mediators.

2.2 International Mediation and Foreign Policy¹⁷⁶

International mediation is a form of international conflict resolution referring to “the diplomatic interventions of third parties into conflicts motivated by a combination of their desire to mitigate violence, establish peace, and protect their own interests.”¹⁷⁷ According to Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille international mediation is usually consulted in four main conditions when “disputes are long, drawn out and complex; the disputants' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute; the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some communication and contact.”¹⁷⁸ Similarly, Zartman suggests that parties to a conflict accept mediation when they have reached a level of “mutually hurting stalemate.”¹⁷⁹

As mediation gained popularity, different types of mediators emerged in the international arena such as individuals, organizations, and states.¹⁸⁰ Individuals refer to professional mediators who are either appointed by a state, an NGO or act independently to resolve a given conflict. While these individuals may be former politicians or career diplomats, they may also be religious leaders, opinion leaders, journalists, academics or as heads of clans or traditional elders. Some popular examples of this kind of mediation may be listed as former US president Jimmy Carter's initiatives in Haiti, Cuba, and North Korea or the American veteran civil rights advocate Jesse Jackson who served as a private mediator

¹⁷⁶ Parts of this section have been published by the author in Akpınar “Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring.”

¹⁷⁷ Greig and Diehl, *International Mediation*, 1.

¹⁷⁸ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 7-17.

¹⁷⁹ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*.

¹⁸⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Gerald Schneider, “Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no.2, 2000: 145-165.

between the US and the Taliban regime whose mediation was allegedly demanded by the Taliban representatives.¹⁸¹

Institutions or organizations refer to various non-governmental organizations, regional or international governmental organizations¹⁸² such as religious or humanitarian NGOs or charities (Quakers, the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, International Committee of the Red Cross), peace centres and institutes (Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy) or think-tanks (the Carter Center, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) working on the field of peace and conflict resolutions.¹⁸³ While a typical example of an international governmental organization that comes to mind may be noted as the United Nations, some regional organizations of such kind may be noted as the European Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union.

Another popular mediator in international conflicts is the state. A state may be invited to mediate by the conflicting parties, by other nation-states, organizations, the public, or in times it may take on a mediator role by itself. This thesis argues that states usually adopt mediator roles as a tool of foreign policy, if not as foreign policy itself. As argued by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, “governments are not always willing to shoulder a mediating role when their national interests are not at stake, and, where they are, mediation readily blurs into traditional diplomacy and statecraft.”¹⁸⁴

Touval criticizes the understanding of international mediation “as an autonomous activity that is impacted by politics but is not part of politics” and rather suggests that mediation

¹⁸¹ Michael J. Butler, *International Conflict Management*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2009, 124-125.

¹⁸² Holley E. Hansen and Stephen C. Nemeth, “IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no.2, International Organizations Count, 2008: 295-325.

¹⁸³ Butler, *International Conflict Management*, 127.

¹⁸⁴ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 184.

should be considered “as part of foreign policy”¹⁸⁵ when practiced by states. In this view, “the mediator's perceptions of the international system,” “its domestic needs,” and “its foreign policy objectives and strategies” are influential in determining the role of a state as a mediator.¹⁸⁶ This whole orientation eventually affects the outcome of a mediation process. Martin notes that, “much like a commercial sponsor who puts money into a football match because there are clear benefits from being publicly associated with a successful event, diplomatic power also seeks to profit from opportunities for peace.”¹⁸⁷

Another problem may stem with respect to a mediator’s flexibility in a mediation process.¹⁸⁸ In that sense, when a state mediates in a given conflict it sits on the table with its own interests which may affect its flexibility in terms of resolving the problem. The potential solution to the conflict may contradict with the mediator’s own interests making it difficult to come to a solution which *inter alia* affects the outcome of mediation.

When embarked on a mediator role, states often use mediation as a tool of foreign policy.¹⁸⁹ Bercovitch and Jackson indicate that, “mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent.”¹⁹⁰ The situation is not very different when states mediate. In this view, “mediation can serve as a means of advancing a state’s interests by expanding its sphere of influence or defending what is seen as a favorable status quo.”¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁵ Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” 91.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Harriet Martin, “Power in Mediation: Does Size Matter?,” Oslo Forum, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, June 1, 2007, 38.

¹⁸⁸ Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” 94.

¹⁸⁹ Zartman, “Introduction,” 305-310.

¹⁹⁰ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2009, 34.

¹⁹¹ Greig and Diehl, *International Mediation*, 83.

Mediation may sometimes serve as a tool to moralize or legitimize the interests of a state. For instance, Touval argues that while intervening in the domestic issues of another country by means such as using military force or applying economic sanctions is usually perceived as immoral, intervening by using peaceful, non-violent means such as mediation is often regarded as ethical and moral. In this view, it is often a wiser choice for a state to try peaceful means in order to achieve its political objectives rather than or before it actually takes on controversial measures and provoke public reaction.¹⁹²

A state's ultimate goal as a mediator, in this sense, may not always be solely altruism or to end a conflict but to achieve its foreign policy goals. As Wall suggests, "to enhance his reputation or to please his constituency" may be the goals of a mediator.¹⁹³ While this goal may sometimes be just to end a human tragedy, as Kamrava notes, it may as well be strengthening a state's regional role, enhancing its legitimacy, image, or prestige in the international arena.¹⁹⁴ In times, it may even be used as a "survival strategy."¹⁹⁵ In other words, the success of a mediation process may sometimes be "subordinate to the mediating state's primary domestic and foreign policy concerns."¹⁹⁶ When the mediator is a state, "mediation may well be seen as the continuation of foreign policy by other means."¹⁹⁷

Touval argues that mediation is actually part of domestic and foreign policy of a state, which also determines "the strategies and tactics of mediation."¹⁹⁸ Some examples may be the US mediation in the 1970 Israeli-Egyptian talks, which merely aimed to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East or the US mediation in the Bosnian crisis in 1995 with the actual intention to preserve the US-EU relations and protect its domestic image rather than

¹⁹² Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy," 93.

¹⁹³ Wall, "Mediation," 160.

¹⁹⁴ Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 57, no.1, 2013: 153.

¹⁹⁵ Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," 540.

¹⁹⁶ Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy," 92.

¹⁹⁷ Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*, 38.

¹⁹⁸ Touval, "Mediation and Foreign Policy," 92.

resolving the conflict.¹⁹⁹ Another example may be the Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan in 1965-1966 that aimed to improve relations with Pakistan and enhance its regional status vis-à-vis China.²⁰⁰ Evidently, states sometimes mediate to keep other actors out of the game.

States may sometimes adopt mediation as a national role conception. According to Holsti, national role conception “is their [policymakers] image of the appropriate orientations and functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.”²⁰¹ Holsti indicate 17 roles that states may conceive in international affairs one of which is the “mediator-integrator” role.²⁰² In this view, mediation may be a major role conception for a state that aims to position itself as a peacemaker in the international arena as discussed further in the text.

2.3 States as Mediators

The literature offers a variety of themes and indicators that may be utilized to highlight difference in mediation by comparing and contrasting mediation approaches and practices by different states. On the state level, the field of mediation is occupied either by established mediators that have significant experience and knowledge in the field as a result of having mediated a range of peace talks for a considerable amount of time or by emerging mediators that are relatively new in the field lacking substantial experience and knowledge. Each type of mediators bring with them certain advantages and disadvantages. This section aims to understand difference in mediation by comparing and contrasting mediation by these actors based on different indicators.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 93.

²⁰⁰ Zartman, “Introduction,” 305-310.

²⁰¹ Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no.3, 1970: 245–246.

²⁰² Holsti’s role conceptions include, “bastion of revolution-liberator,” “regional leader,” “regional protector,” “active independent,” “liberation supporter,” “anti-imperialist agent,” “defender of the faith,” “mediator-integrator,” “regional-subsystem collaborator,” “developer,” “bridge,” “faithful ally,” “independent,” “example,” “internal development,” “isolate,” and “protectee.” See, Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 260-270.

The history of international mediation is mainly dominated by established mediators most of whom are Western states. This study analyses established mediators under two subtitles such as “great powers” and “European small-states.” Great powers refer to those states that possess, or once possessed, considerable level of power in the international system and are able to shape the course of international affairs according to their needs and interests.

Some scholars, such as Faget, criticize great powers for using mediation as a tool of exerting their interests and tending to regard peace as the “ultimate objective” to sustain “international order and consequently the interests of the Great Powers.”²⁰³ Other scholars criticize studies on conflict resolution for depicting weak states as potential threats to the international order. For instance, according to Eriksson and Kostić, “weak and failing states, and the resulting wars and migrations, have been framed as one of the main threats to the United States-led international order.”²⁰⁴ This understanding creates a typology that legitimizes intervention into weak and fragile states.

Having extensive capabilities enables great powers to use diverse foreign policy tools ranging from military intervention to positive or negative sanctions as well as diplomacy to realize their goals. According to some scholars, great powers are the most “suitable” mediators in international relations. This view derives its legitimacy from the extensive political, economic, and military capabilities that great powers possess. According to Inbar, another advantage that a great power may have as a mediator is the “global perspective” it may have regarding the given conflict.²⁰⁵ Since a great power has a wide network and power of intelligence at a global scale, it may have greater ability to control the mediation

²⁰³ Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 5.

²⁰⁴ Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić, “Peacemaking and Peacebuilding: Two Ends of a Tail,” in Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić (eds.), *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding: Peace from the Ashes of War?*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013, 15.

²⁰⁵ Efraim Inbar, “Great Power Mediation: The USA and the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement,” *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no.1, Special Issue on International Mediation, 1991: 72.

process. However, it is also noteworthy to address the problem of coherence of overall foreign policy with respect to mediation.²⁰⁶ This problem usually pertains to great powers whose wide range of interests and policy tools make it difficult for them to sustain coherency in their policies. As discussed later in the text, in times being a great power may be a disadvantage in a mediation process.

In addition to great powers, certain European small-states may be regarded as established mediators in international crisis as well. The term “small-states,” in this context, refers to the states that do not possess “hard-power resources, such as the military and economic resources available to larger powers.”²⁰⁷ These small-states have gained prominence as mediators in recent years since the great powers no longer had a major interest in peacemaking as a result of the removal of the Soviet threat. The emergence of new kind of conflicts mainly on issues of identity, recognition or sovereignty created a need for the resolution of these conflicts opening room for new mediators. Some examples to these countries may be the Scandinavian or Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Another common example may Switzerland as a mediator.²⁰⁸

Emerging mediators are states that are relatively new in the scene of international mediation on the periphery in recent years. As discussed in Chapter 1, their emergence as mediators is in line with their emergence as more influential actors in global politics. Their mediation often plays an alternative or complementary role to that of the established mediators or they occupy the stage when established mediators are not particularly interested in a given peace process.

²⁰⁶ Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” 94.

²⁰⁷ Foster, “Small States in Peacemaking Roles,” 22.

²⁰⁸ Christen Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no.1, 2002: 11-23.

2.3.1 Previous Experience of Mediators

Previous experience of mediators is an important indicator in order to understand difference in mediation since it may affect the process and outcome of a mediation. In the field of mediation, established mediators are recognized for their extensive experience. Great powers, or more powerful countries within the international system may have greater institutional experience of mediation and hence a greater array of resources and expectations upon which to draw. Although European small-states have been less prominent on the international stage, they have developed considerable expertise and fame as mediators. Experienced mediators have the required capacity to conduct efficient mediation such as personnel trained in conflict resolution and mediation or institutions and NGOs that provide international mediation services and technical assistance owing to their long-term expertise in the field. Established mediators are also often experienced in terms of coordination and collaboration among different state and non-state institutions.

Emerging mediators, on the other hand, may lack substantial experience and knowledge in practices of mediation since they are new in the field. The lack of sufficient previous experience may appear as a disadvantage for them. The conflicting parties may be reluctant to believe in their capability to resolve problems. In addition, these powers may lack sufficient expertise and capacity in mediation unlike established mediators that have substantial capacity. It is also important for states to be aware of their capacities before embarking on multiple journeys in their foreign policy orientations. This problem becomes more apparent with the emergence of new mediators in global politics especially whose overall capacity may not allow them to pursue multiple goals of foreign policy.

2.3.2 Mediator's Motives

Analysing why states mediate can also be a way to assess whether it is possible for Turkey to mediate differently from other, more established mediators. Motives may refer either to the short term or more specific goals that states wish to achieve by mediation; and the motives associated with the place of mediation in wider foreign policy. As such motives here can be more wide ranging, and involve the quest for prestige or influence in a given area.

States may also be motivated to mediate in order to bring order, security and stability into a given region, usually where they have certain interests. For instance, a mediator may be motivated to prevent the spill over of a conflict into its territory or other countries that it has interests in. The mediator state may be either located geopolitically nearby or may be indirectly affected by the conflict as a result of consequences such as the flow of refugees, weapon and drug trafficking, spread of epidemics. The suspension of trade relations may also be affecting the mediator state. This is often the case with states that mediate in their own regions since they are directly affected by those conflicts.²⁰⁹ Ensuring energy security may also be important for a mediator state in a given region.

For instance, one of the similarities among emerging mediators is that they often benefit from stability. The stability of their region is important for their own security since a conflict in their region may affect them on many levels. As Kamrava notes, during the course of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia used mediation as a tool of containing the revolts and prevent them from challenging the regional status quo as well as its own regional stance.²¹⁰ Saudi Arabia has had the fear of experiencing its own Spring in the last few years. A possible spill over effect of the Arab Spring would inevitably challenge the status-

²⁰⁹ Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*, 41.

²¹⁰ Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," 156

quo of the Saudi regime. Therefore, containing the Arab Spring became a foreign policy objective for Saudi Arabia for which it has used the tool of mediation.

Emerging mediators may also take initiatives in regions outside their immediate neighbourhood particularly if they have certain economic or political interests. The involvements of Turkey, Brazil or India in Africa may be noted as examples to such initiatives.²¹¹ Their peacemaking activities in those regions offer them a safe entry into volatile zones providing opportunities for securing later deals such as Turkey's mediation in Somalia as will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5.

Fighting radicalism may be another priority for a mediator state. The mediator state may be a target for radical attacks, a recruitment venue for radical groups or a transit route for such elements. The post-September 11 era witnessed a visible rise in radicalism especially following the US "war on terror." This has also increased violence by radical groups particularly against Western countries. The US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan further fuelled tension. Some scholars in the field of conflict resolution such as Abu-Nimer²¹² and Irani²¹³ criticize Western mediators for using conflict resolution and mediation as a tool to fight radicalism in the Middle East. In this view, states sometimes use mediation to design an order based on Western ideals, such as imposing a moderate form of Islam, with more emphasis on allegedly Western norms and values.

Some scholars also criticize the use of mediation as a tool of promoting broadly Western interests in peripheral settings.²¹⁴ While Richmond²¹⁵ and Mac Ginty²¹⁶ criticize the use of

²¹¹ Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (eds), *The Rise of China and India in Africa*, London; New York: Zed Books, 2010.

²¹² Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution Approaches," 35-52.

²¹³ George E. Irani, "Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Peace in the Middle East," *The Search for Regional Cooperation* 7, no.1-2, 2000.

²¹⁴ Richmond, "Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding," 57-73; Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace," 139-163; Brigg and Bleiker, "Postcolonial

mediation as a tool to promote liberal democracy, Brigg and Bleiker²¹⁷ highlight its use by Western powers to pursue their neo-colonial ambitions. According to Richmond, liberal peace often follow “a top-down approach” that imposes Western norms, values, and concepts such as “secularism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and development” and reinforces “institutions rather than communities and society” by neglecting and undermining local traditions and cultures.²¹⁸ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall note that, “what is being constructed is not an emancipatory peace, but a liberal peace led by hegemonic powers, who may be concerned more to stabilize a world order dominated by the rich and powerful than to enable a liberating transformation out of violence.”²¹⁹

As mentioned earlier in the study, mediation may also be a tool of foreign policy, if not foreign policy itself. For instance, mediation is an integral part of Finland’s foreign policy.²²⁰ As in the words of former Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb, “to stand out from the crowd a small nation needs to be creative.”²²¹ In this sense, mediation serves as an ideal tool of foreign policy for small states to get involved with international politics without taking too much risk. Peacemaking also provides these states with a safe engagement and legitimacy in regions often regarded as “zones of conflict” such as Africa or the Middle East.

Conflict Resolution,” 19-38; Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution Approaches,” 35-52; Irani, “Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long- Term Peace in the Middle East.”

²¹⁵ Richmond, “Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding,” 57-73.

²¹⁶ Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace,” 139-163.

²¹⁷ Brigg and Bleiker, “Postcolonial Conflict Resolution,” 19-38.

²¹⁸ Richmond, “Local Conflict Resolution in the Shadows of Liberal International Peacebuilding,” 58-60.

²¹⁹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 232.

²²⁰ Finland’s first mediation experience was during the Cyprus crisis in 1960, a role appointed by the UN. Since then, it has mediated various conflicts including in the Northern Ireland, Georgia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan and the Horn of Africa. A notable Finnish mediator is former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari who was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 for his mediation efforts in Aceh, Kosovo and Namibia.

²²¹ Alexander Stubb, “Peace Mediation: Finland’s Guidelines,” *Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland*, Helsinki: Libris Oy, 2010, 5.

States may also use mediation as a survival strategy which is particularly the case with small-states. For instance, given its small-state position and lack of hard power, it may be argued that Norway has developed a survival strategy based on a discourse of peace. As also argued by Skånland, this discourse also underlines the notions of “self-interest” and “altruism” as other main motivations behind Norwegian peace.²²² Peace has also become a tool of ensuring Norway’s security in the international system.²²³ As Waage pinpoints,

A powerless international actor has many reasons for seeking a peaceful international order. Indeed, a small state is dependent on the existence of such a peaceful international community in many ways... A well-organized international community can be seen both as a counter to the exercise of raw military power and as a protector of small states in general. Norway’s support of the United Nations and its involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations should also be viewed against this background.²²⁴

Popular evidence of Norway’s ownership of peace may be the renowned Nobel Peace Prize given annually by Norway since 1901. As a result, peace has been an important part of Norwegian national identity construction.²²⁵

According to NORAD, the “Norwegian Model” of peace is “characterised by a commitment to long term engagement, involvement of Norwegian researchers and NGOs, and the pragmatic, flexible use of human and financial resources in support of peace processes.”²²⁶ According to Skånland, this model consists of four elements. The first one is the “small-state advantages” based on Norway’s lack of “colonial past, great power interests, historical or vested interests, and muscle to pressure the parties” which are significant inputs that secures its image as an impartial, neutral, and confident mediator.

²²² Skånland, “Norway is a Peace Nation’,” 39.

²²³ Jonas Gahr Støre, “Norway – a Peace Nation Myth or Fact?,” Speech held at the Nobel Peace Center, Oslo, April 24, 2006.

²²⁴ Waage, “The ‘Minnow’ and the ‘Whale’,” 159.

²²⁵ Skånland, “Norway is a Peace Nation’,” 36.

²²⁶ NORAD, *Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, 3.

The second element is Norway's multi-track approach to peace-building providing Norway with "flexibility, experience and contacts in conflict areas." Third is building "close contact" with the conflicting parties that enables Norway to gain their confidence. The fourth element is, "a long-term perspective on peace-building, including aid and economic support for reconstruction."²²⁷ These four elements constitute the backbone of the Norwegian Model of peacemaking.

As a small state, for Qatar as well the image of a peacemaker serves as a tool of ensuring national security in a volatile region such as the Persian Gulf by reducing "the number of regional or global opponents Qatar might face otherwise."²²⁸ As Ulrichsen also postulates, "The most convincing explanation of Qatari regional and peace-making efforts lay in a multifaceted strategy of political and economic liberalization, state-branding, and pursuit of an independent foreign policy."²²⁹

For small states, mediation is one of the major elements of their foreign policy as evident in Qatar's Constitution adopted in 2003. According to Article 7 of Qatar's constitution,

The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states;²³⁰ and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations.²³¹

²²⁷ Skånland, "Norway is a peace nation," 39.

²²⁸ Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," 542.

²²⁹ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "From Mediation to Interventionism: Understanding Qatar's Arab Spring Policies," *Russia in Global Affairs*, October 27, 2013, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/From-Mediation-to-Interventionism-16170> (accessed June 25, 2014).

²³⁰ Although, the constitution highlights the principle of "non-interventionism" in foreign policy, the course of the Arab Spring pushed Qatar towards a more interventionist foreign policy particularly by utilizing soft-power tools such as Al-Jazeera. Please see, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Qatar's Mediation Initiatives," *NOREF Policy Brief*, February 2013, 1.

²³¹ Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, "The Constitution," Article 7, <http://english.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=80> (accessed August 12, 2013).

Mediation serves Saudi Arabia as a tool of achieving its foreign policy objectives as well.²³² One of these objectives is ensuring regime security by enhancing its domestic and international legitimacy.²³³ In addition, mediation also serves as a tool to enhance Saudi Arabia's role conception as a "regional superpower and hegemon."²³⁴ Mediation also serves Saudi role conception as the "big brother" of the Islamic world. Mecca, the capital of Saudi Arabia, is the pilgrimage destination for all Muslims in the world. Being a central destination for the Muslim world has long become a tool of foreign policy as well as a role conception as a responsible protector of the Islamic world for Saudi Arabia which also polishes its mediator role.

Denmark followed *adaptive foreign policy* as a small state reaction during the Cold War based on "adaptation to great powers, pacifistic positions and a strategy of non-commitment within the alliance structures."²³⁵ This position was a result of an "interest-based foreign policy" which opposed "to the use of military force," supported "international law and order," and followed the principle of "non-involvement in international conflicts."²³⁶ It also gave Denmark a role as a peacemaker and peacekeeper in international conflicts especially based on its engagement with Western institutions such as the NATO, the UN, and the EU.

Since the shadow of the Soviet threat was removed from Danish foreign policy after the Cold War, Denmark started to follow a more *active foreign policy* based on "a strong defense of an international order, rule of international law and reinforcement of the role of

²³² Saudi Arabia has mediated among various factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine between Hamas and Fatah. Please see, Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," 158.

²³³ Kamrava, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," 158.

²³⁴ Ibid, 156.

²³⁵ Rasmus Brun Pedersen, "Danish Foreign Policy Activism: Differences in Kind or Degree?," *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no.3, 2012: 334.

²³⁶ Pedersen, "Danish Foreign Policy Activism," 334.

international organizations in the international system”²³⁷ which reiterated its mediator role in international conflicts; this time with an emphasis on the protection and extension of liberal ideas, norms, and values.²³⁸

Referring to Qatari foreign policy Kamrava notes that, “mediation appears to be an integral part of its toolbox.”²³⁹ As Kamrava indicates, unlike other ad hoc mediators, for emerging mediators, “mediation is not simply a response to specific, emerging developments.”²⁴⁰ According to Kamrava, Qatar uses mediation as a tool of enhancing its international prestige. In this view, mediation is a role conception for small-states such as Qatar.²⁴¹

2.3.3 Characteristics of Mediators

The characteristics of mediators serve as a way to analyse how states mediate differently from one another. In assessing how states mediate differently from each other, it can be useful to draw upon certain characteristics identified in the mediation literature. While Bercovitch lists the required characteristics of an ideal mediator as, “intelligence, stamina, energy, patience, and a sense of humor,”²⁴² according to Kleiboer, the literature on mediation converges in three main characteristics of a mediator that determine the acceptability as well as the success of mediation such as impartiality, leverage, and status.²⁴³ By departing from the discussions in the literature, this thesis analyses the characteristics of mediators with respect to their power capabilities such as their leverage, hard power/soft power, status, and legitimacy, and their positions by assessing their

²³⁷ Ibid, 332.

²³⁸ Ibid, 334.

²³⁸ Ibid, 336.

²³⁹ Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” 542.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Qatar has mediated in various countries until now including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen. See, Lina Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: the Limits of Pragmatism,” *International Affairs* 89, no.2, 2013: 418.

²⁴² Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

²⁴³ Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 368.

impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the conflict, previous relations with the conflicting parties, and their insider/outsider positions.

2.3.3.1 Power Capabilities of Mediators

Power in mediation is often defined as the ability of a mediator to exert influence on the conflicting parties and moving them to accept certain outcomes either by persuasion or coercion.²⁴⁴ “Power” is often used synonymous with “leverage” in the mediation literature. Kleiboer defines leverage as “a mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties to accept a proposed settlement.”²⁴⁵ While previous studies emphasize the importance of possessing hard power in forms of carrots and sticks,²⁴⁶ scholars such as Nye underpin the growing role of soft power in international affairs.²⁴⁷

Hard power criteria such as population, economic power, landmass, and military power are often used to explain power in international mediation. This study argues that although soft power criteria based on diplomatic, political and social power are influential in a mediation process they may not be sufficient to implement the decisions taken on the table. Drawing on the literature on social psychology, Shapira outlines different sources of power of a mediator such as being able to coerce or reward, the ability to provide expertise, the ability to identify with the parties, the power of having sufficient information, or the ability to manipulate the environment or the context of the mediation.²⁴⁸ According to Bercovitch and Houston,

²⁴⁴ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, 445–461, Washington DC: USIP Press, 1996, 455.

²⁴⁵ Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 371.

²⁴⁶ I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, “International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics,” *Journal of Social Issues* 41, no.2, 1985: 27-45; Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, 167.

²⁴⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.

²⁴⁸ Omer Shapira, “Exploring the Concept of Power in Mediation: Mediators' Sources of Power and Influence Tactics,” *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution* 24, no.3, 2009: 535-569.

to exercise any degree of influence, mediators need “leverage,” or resources to search for information and move the parties away from rigid positions. Leverage or resources buttress the mediator’s ability to facilitate a successful outcome through the balancing of power discrepancies and enhancing of cooperative behavior.²⁴⁹

Similarly, Ott suggests that, “If a mediator were in a position to put pressure on one or both parties to accept a proposed settlement, the chances of success would logically be enhanced.”²⁵⁰ While some scholars see leverage of a mediator as indispensable for mediation success others argue that in times lack of power may increase mediator’s credibility since a powerful mediator may sometimes be regarded a threat by weaker states.²⁵¹ According to a literature review conducted by Kleiboer,²⁵² there is usually a relationship between leverage and impartiality.²⁵³ In this view, when mediators are partial they should also have enough power to support their positions.

As discussed earlier, in the mainstream mediation literature great powers are often regarded as suitable mediators based on their power capabilities. These capabilities also enable them to have sufficient leverage over the disputing parties. For instance, while mediation may sometimes be a greater foreign policy priority for small-states or emerging mediators, in times even being the foreign policy itself, for great powers it may be easier to give up on their mediator role and replace it by different policy tools present in their toolboxes.

²⁴⁹ Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence” in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, 11-38, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, Pub, 1996.

²⁵⁰ Ott, “Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution,” 599.

²⁵¹ David A. Brookmire and Frank Sistrunk, “The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators on Time Pressure in Negotiation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no.2, 1980: 326; Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 15; Saadia Touval, “The Superpowers as Mediators,” in Bercovitch and Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations*, 233.

²⁵² Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 372.

²⁵³ Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – the Sudan Conflict (Westview Special Studies in Peace, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution)*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, 104.

Having enough carrots and sticks also enables them to keep the promises they make on the table.²⁵⁴ To that end, “power” comes to fore as an important concept of mediation by great powers. According to Fisher, what differentiates power mediation is “the use of leverage by an influential third party through promised benefits or threatened punishments.”²⁵⁵ Fisher further posits that, “pure mediation is typically practiced by esteemed persons, small powers, or international organizations, especially the UN, while power mediation is more likely to be employed by the major powers, such as the USA or the UK.”²⁵⁶

Martin indicates that bringing in too much power may sometimes halt the negotiations which may be defined as, “the dilemma of power of diplomacy in mediation.”²⁵⁷ He notes, for instance, that in the cases of South Sudan, Cyprus, and Northern Uganda the application of too much power by the US during the negotiations helped both in bringing parties to the negotiation table as well as intimidating and pushing them away.²⁵⁸ In this sense, great power mediation has both its advantages and disadvantages. On the other hand, lack of power may sometimes be an advantage for mediators. For instance, with respect to European small-states, the lack of hard power gives them considerable legitimacy and credibility as mediators especially in settings that have unpleasant memories of colonial or imperial legacies. Their reliance on soft power²⁵⁹ rather than hard power in their mediation activities also gives them an upper hand by providing them with a less threatening image.

²⁵⁴ Inbar, “Great Power Mediation,” 72.

²⁵⁵ Ronald J. Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no.3, 2001: 313.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Martin, “Power in Mediation,” 38.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*.

The power capability also determines whether mediators should be coercive or persuasive. Since great powers possess greater hard power capabilities they may be more coercive as mediators compare to small-states or emerging mediators. They are more able to apply pressure or offer incentives to manipulate the parties to accept an outcome. European-small states and emerging mediators, on the other hand, may rely more on their soft power capabilities since they lack sufficient hard power or “sticks” when compared with great power mediators. They have to be more persuasive and rely more on their discursive power in addition to their diplomatic activism. Wallensteen defines persuasion as, “developing confidence with the parties, finding intelligent propositions and, thus, attempting to transcend some of the difficulties.”²⁶⁰

While great power mediators may sometimes be more coercive in their mediation style, European small-states and emerging mediators may need to be more persuasive since they lack the necessary measures to coerce the parties into a solution. Soft power is also embedded in the foreign policies of these states. One of the instruments of soft power of these states may be cultural diplomacy such as the Bollywood of India²⁶¹ or the Turkish soap operas that have become considerably popular across the region in recent years. Instruments of soft power used by these states vary from education to health diplomacy or even religion.

Qatar is another state that utilizes soft power by using its international media organs, such as Al-Jazeera, to support its mediation activities by promoting peace in its areas of

²⁶⁰ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, Sage Publications: London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi, 2002, 284.

²⁶¹ Christian Wagner, “India's Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 66, no.4, 2010: 334.

interest.²⁶² One of the advantages of Qatar as a mediator is the amount of wealth the state possesses at its disposal. It has the highest gross domestic product per capita among rentier states.²⁶³ The economic power that it possesses enables Qatar to keep the promises it makes on the negotiation table by offering carrots to the conflicting parties. The ability to offer such financial incentives provides it with an image as a reliable mediator. Offering financial incentives also encourages the parties to take concrete steps towards peace.²⁶⁴

While emerging mediators may well have interests in the outcome of the conflict, particularly in the ones that take place in their own region, similar to European small-states, their lack of sufficient power may come to fore as an asset in terms of making them less threatening actors compared with great powers. It may also make them more accessible to other stakeholders to the conflict. For instance, reaching the Turkish foreign minister may be easier than reaching the US secretary of state.

It would not be fair to argue that the West is completely indifferent to the capabilities and the potential emerging mediators offer as peacemakers. In fact, the established Western mediators and the UN sometimes need mediation by these states as was evident in the Iranian nuclear swap mediated by Brazil and Turkey. Another leading example may be the US support for Malaysia's mediation in the conflict between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.²⁶⁵ Bush's call for India to assist him in his quest for democratizing North Korea or Myanmar is another example.²⁶⁶ As such, supporting

²⁶² Parts of the sections on Qatari mediation have been published by the author in the following articles: Pınar Akpınar "Qatar's Regional Aspirations: Changing Mediator Role during the Arab Spring," *POMEAS Brief*, no.6, February 2015; Akpınar, "Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring."

²⁶³ CIA World Factbook, "Country Comparison: GDP-Per Capita," 2012, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html> (accessed January 21, 2015).

²⁶⁴ Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," 553.

²⁶⁵ Ishak Mastura, "Geopolitical Games and Malaysian Mediation in the Philippines," *Jindal Journal of International Affairs* 1, no.1, 2011: 3-16.

²⁶⁶ Wagner, "India's Soft Power," 338.

emerging mediators may be a way of becoming more legitimate in some regions for Western actors who are sometimes seen as meddlers.

Another characteristic of international mediators is their status which refers both to the status a mediator state holds in the international platform and to the rank of its representatives within their institutions. The rank of mediators determines their ability to realize the promises they make by having the support of their institution.²⁶⁷ According to Bercovitch and Schneider, “(i) the position they [mediators] hold in their own country, (ii) the leeway given to them in determining policies, and (iii) the different resources, capabilities, and political orientations of their countries” are important determinants of a mediation process.”²⁶⁸

In some peripheral settings, due to the strong influence of patriarchal norms and values embedded in the culture, a mediator is often expected to have a certain degree of status and leverage in order to gain the respect of the parties.²⁶⁹ In this sense, it would be more effective in these settings to have high-level officials and/or recognized leaders as mediators rather than ad hoc professionals who have no power or positional status.

2.3.3.2 Positions of Mediators

In the mediation literature, the position of mediators refers to the impartiality and neutrality of mediators in a mediation process, their previous relations with the conflicting parties, and their insider/outsider position. The position of mediators is crucial since it *inter alia* affects their legitimacy, accountability and credibility.

The concepts of impartiality and neutrality receive considerable attention in the mediation literature. Despite being often used interchangeably there is still a difference between

²⁶⁷ Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 372.

²⁶⁸ Bercovitch and Schneider, “Who Mediates?,” 147.

²⁶⁹ Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution Approaches,” 47.

them. According to Cooks and Hale, in order to be neutral, a mediator should not have any prior relationship with the parties or interests in the outcome of the mediation that would prevent him/her from being “fair, unbiased and impartial.”²⁷⁰ According to Faget, impartiality refers to “an objective position which requires that mediators do not take sides, contrary to neutrality, a more subjective and probably impossible position as all mediators are ‘influenced’ by their own beliefs and values.”²⁷¹ In this view, while impartiality is more about not taking sides, neutrality refers to not having a stake in the outcome of mediation thus maintaining an equal distance from both parties. However, when the mediator is a state this is rather difficult since states often bring their interests and previous relations into the mediation process. For instance in intrastate conflicts, mediator may come onto the table with his own interests sometimes without thoroughly understanding the realities of the intervened country. The mediator may have his own agenda and may impose a deadline which could create unease among the parties and make them feel pressured.²⁷² As Bercovitch and Jackson note, “the relationship between a mediator and disputants is thus never entirely devoid of political interest.”²⁷³

Great powers are often criticized on the basis of their impartiality. Since great powers have an extended scope of interests in world affairs, reaching out to various regions of the world on highly diverse issues, they often have stakes in conflicts. Their frequent mediation attempts on a variety of issues may trigger suspicion regarding their interests as mediators.²⁷⁴ The mediation literature often considers impartiality as an indispensable

²⁷⁰Leda M. Cooks and Claudia L. Hale, “The construction of ethics in mediation,” *Mediation Quarterly* 12, no.1, 1994, 64.

²⁷¹Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 8.

²⁷²Papagianni, “Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” 245.

²⁷³Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*, 41.

²⁷⁴Inbar, “Great Power Mediation,” 72; Saadia Touval, “Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations,” *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no.1, 1975:62.

element of success in mediation.²⁷⁵ However, there are also critics who maintain that impartiality is not indispensable.²⁷⁶ Some even posit that at times it may be better to be partial in order to empower the weaker side.²⁷⁷ In this view, the impartiality of the mediator may balance out the power disparity between the parties. For instance Moolakkattu underlines that, “the desirability of such an impartial role is questionable in asymmetric conflicts, since there is no guarantee that the interests of the weaker parties will be protected, as the outcome of the Oslo Accords for the Palestinians has suggested.”²⁷⁸ Critics also suggest that in times, a partial mediator who empowers the weaker side may in fact offer a more fair solution. The empowerment of the weaker party could also help in balancing the asymmetric power relations usually endemic in conflicts taking place in peripheral settings.²⁷⁹

Similarly, by criticizing neutrality from a Turkish NGO viewpoint Hüseyin Oruç, Deputy Chairman and Board Member of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), maintains that,

If there is a crisis, there is an oppressor, a murderer, a massacrer. There is one whose rights are violated and one who violates. You cannot go there neutral and say you are at equal distance from both the parties because to be able to resolve [the conflict] you have to take from one and give it to the other. This work cannot be done in another way.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ Elmore Jackson, *Meeting of Minds*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952; Frederick S. Northedge, Michael Denis Donelan, *International Disputes: The Political Aspects*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971; Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars*.

²⁷⁶ Touval, “Biased Intermediaries,” 51-69; Thomas A. Kochan, “Step-By-Step in the Middle East from the Perspective of the Labor Mediation Process,” in Jeffrey Z. Rubin (ed.), *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East*, New York: Praeger, 1981; John D. Orme, “U.S. Mediation in Revolutionary Conflicts, 1944-1986,” *Mediation Quarterly* 7, no.1, 1989: 59:72.

²⁷⁷ John Groom and Keith Webb, “Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict,” *International Interactions* 13, no.3, 1987: 236-80; Paul Wehr, *Conflict Regulation*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979; Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” 370; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Young and Victor Asal, *Mediating International Crises*, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2005, 108.

²⁷⁸ Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States,” 386.

²⁷⁹ Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution Approaches,” 49.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Hüseyin Oruç, Deputy Chairman and Board Member of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Istanbul, September 2, 2013.

Another important issue of discussion in the mediation literature is whether an ideal mediator should be an insider or outsider referring to mediators' political, social, historical or geopolitical proximity to the conflict. Mainstream mediation scholars often argue that an ideal mediator should be an outsider and impartial.²⁸¹ Scholars who are critical of this thinking, on the other hand, argue that especially in mediation attempts taking place in peripheral settings, being an insider may be more advantageous for mediators since they may be considered more trustable and enthusiastic to resolve the conflict. As suggested by Faget, "mediators may be insider-partial, and not outsider-neutral, the acceptance of their action resting not as much on their distance or objectivity, but rather on their links with the conflict and their relations of trust with the warring parties."²⁸² Being an insider also helps with establishing rapport with the disputants, which can be vital to mediation.

Emerging mediators may also have deep historical and cultural ties with the parties which may come to the fore as an opportunity to relate with the problems and enhance their positions as insiders. They may also have better insight and understanding of the issues at stake as well as a well weaved network in their region which they can utilize during their peacemaking initiatives.

While being an insider appears as an advantage, in times it may be a disadvantage as well especially in terms of suspicions over their neutrality since they often have a stake in the outcome of the conflict. Having historical ties may not always be an advantage either particularly if the mediator has in the past been in a contested or colonial relationship with one or more of the parties. For instance, the mediator may be a former colonizer or an empire and the history could still be contested.

²⁸¹ Groom and Webb, "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict;" Wehr, *Conflict Regulation*.

²⁸² Faget, "The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking," 9.

On the contrary, small-states, for instance, lack such histories. As argued by Ingebritsen, their lack of colonial or imperial past coupled with their lack of hard power may give them potential legitimacy as mediators especially in those settings which have suffered from colonial or imperial legacies for centuries. In addition, their neutral and non-aligned political status further strengthens their image as honest and impartial peace-brokers.²⁸³ For instance, given its neutral position in international affairs, mediation seems to be an expected role for Switzerland which also allows it to act as a facilitator among those states who are not in direct contact with each other such as Cuba, Iran, and US.²⁸⁴ These characteristics also provide small-states with an image more of a facilitator than a power-mediator enhancing their non-threatening image.

The positive record in their domestic politics, usually based on a social-democratic outlook, and the application of aforementioned values at home are often highlighted by of the European small-states to legitimize their mediator roles. Also striking is the peace discourse that these countries have adopted both in their domestic and foreign politics. For instance Norway's discourse of peace has been employed by Norway's government to position itself in international politics since its independence struggle in the 1890s. Some other assets for the European small-state mediators are their "small bureaucracy, a consistent foreign policy and the geography to keep the talks secret without much publicity" as evident in Norway, among others.²⁸⁵ These traits provide them with the ability to respond quickly to calls for mediation as well as follow a more consistent approach in their mediation practices.

²⁸³ Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs," 14.

²⁸⁴ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Presence Switzerland, "Role as mediator," http://www.swissworld.org/en/politics/foreign_policy/role_as_mediator/ (accessed February 14, 2015).

²⁸⁵ Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 378.

2.3.4 Style of mediation

The mediation styles adopted by mediators are other indicators to understand difference in mediation. Being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with other actors, bringing culture into mediation, adopting a normative approach, mobilizing regional mechanisms or supporting mediation by other means are all discussed in this section as differences in style among mediators.

Being persistent or reluctant refers to a mediator's commitment to a mediation process. Mediation is a complex process that often needs the long term commitment and patience of mediators. Particularly, in international mediation, it may sometimes take decades to resolve a conflict. While mediators may be persistent and invest considerable time and money in a mediation process, they may in times be reluctant. The commitment of a mediator may be dependent on a number of variables ranging from the domestic conjuncture in mediator state's home country to the international context. The priorities of the mediator may change through the course of the conflict which may affect his/her willingness to resolve the conflict. For instance, there may be a change of government back home and a new representative may be appointed to mediate a conflict that may not be as persistent as the previous one.

Another indicator to understand different mediation styles may be the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the mediator. Particularly in intrastate conflicts, there are often a range of actors beside the government such as different clans, militia groups, regional administrations, opposition parties, ethnic groups, political parties. As Paffenholz and Spurk indicate, "civil society rarely has a seat at the negotiation table based on the assumption that the lower the number of actors involved in negotiations the easier it is to

reach agreement.”²⁸⁶ Studies reveal that the involvement of civil society in peace talks increases chances for sustainability.²⁸⁷ Excluding an actor from the peace process may create tension and resentment against the mediator which may fuel the conflict. However, the inclusion of a particular party into the mediation process may as well trigger problems by providing it with certain degree of legitimacy, enhancing its visibility and increasing its political power. This may also further fuel the conflict by raising criticism among other parties.

The inclusion of unrecognized actors may also challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the government. States as mediators usually refrain from engaging with illegitimate actors during peace processes such as certain militia groups since this may raise criticism among their public. Unlike great powers, European small-states and emerging powers are often more enthusiastic to invite different actors into peace processes by pinpointing the importance of inclusiveness in mediation. Norway’s mediation during the peace talks in Sri Lanka and Sudan,²⁸⁸ Turkey’s engagement with Hamas during the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks are some relevant examples.²⁸⁹

Mediation may sometimes serve as a tool of reproducing existing power relations and enhancing elite structures which may not serve long-term peace. Papagianni argues that compromises made by elites during peace agreements “often fail to address the causes of the conflict, do not take power away from those who started the conflict in the first place,

²⁸⁶ Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurr, “Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” *Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction*, no.36, 2006, 23.

²⁸⁷ Anthony Wanis-St John and Darren Kew, “The Missing Link? Civil Society, Peace Negotiations: Contributions to Sustained Peace,” Paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, March 23, 2006.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Hilde F. Johnson, former Minister of International Development of Norway and Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Ankara, November 6, 2013.

²⁸⁹ Interview with Aras.

and do not create the conditions for political and social reform.”²⁹⁰ In that sense, the mediator should encourage the participation of different political groups into the political processes.

Another indicator of difference in style may be whether or not a mediator follows a normative approach in mediation. European small-states often emphasise the normative aspect of their mediation highlighting “universal” norms and values such as peace, equality, freedom, human rights, gender equality and democracy. For instance, mediation plays a significant role for Denmark and its *active foreign policy* based on “a strong defense of an international order, rule of international law and reinforcement of the role of international organizations in the international system”²⁹¹ which reiterates its mediator role in international conflicts with an emphasis on the protection and extension of liberal ideas, norms, and values.²⁹²

Finland also follows a normative approach in mediation by framing itself as “a strong advocate of democracy and human rights” that “actively promotes the values of the Nordic and Scandinavian countries in the development of world peace and human well-being.”²⁹³ According to Christen, Scandinavian countries have become “norm entrepreneurs” in international relations on areas such as “the environment, international security, and global welfare” as a result of their “remote geographic position, limited material capabilities, and unique domestic institutions.”²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Papagianni, “Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” 254.

²⁹¹ Pedersen, “Danish Foreign Policy Activism?,” 332.

²⁹² Ibid, 336.

²⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Foreign Policy,”

<http://www.finland.org/public/default.aspx?nodeid=46124&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (accessed March 14, 2015).

²⁹⁴ Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs,” 13.

Similar to European small-states, in recent years, emerging mediators have also come to fore as “norm-defenders” in the international arena. Brazil’s advocacy of human rights or its introduction of the concept of “Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)” to replace the Western introduced concept of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),”²⁹⁵ India’s advocacy of democracy or Turkey’s advocacy of democracy and reformation of the existing international order may be highlighted as leading examples. These countries also indicate a need for “the reform of global governance institutions and the revision of global norms”²⁹⁶ as evident in the calls of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff²⁹⁷ or Davutoğlu for such reforms.²⁹⁸ They often have overlapping discourses on global affairs particularly with respect to their criticisms of Western institutions on issues such as the lack of comprehensive and all encompassing global governance schemes or the failure of these institutions to attend to the needs of people in global scale. For instance, according to Davutoğlu, “the UN system is unable either to accommodate current political conditions or to address the growing number of global challenges.”²⁹⁹ Rousseff indicates a similar concern by noting, “increasingly intense regional wars and conflicts, the tragic loss of human lives and the immense material losses for the peoples involved demonstrate the utmost urgency of undertaking the institutional reform of the United Nations, in particular of its Security Council.”³⁰⁰

Emerging powers also often call for global justice and equality for opportunity that unfolds, for instance, in their quests for securing seats in institutions such as the UN

²⁹⁵ Oliver Stuenkel, “Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The Responsibility While Protecting,” in Eduarda P. Hamann and Robert Muggah (eds.), *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: New Directions for International Peace and Security?*, Brasilia: The Igarapé Institute, 2013, 60.

²⁹⁶ Par Engstrom, “Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and Continuity under Dilma,” *Critical Sociology* 38, no.6, 2012: 838.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Global Governance,” Vision Paper, Center for Strategic Research, no.2, 2012, 8.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Dilma Rousseff, Statement at the Opening of the General Debate of the 6th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 25, 2012.

Security Council. These states often emphasize the importance of multilateralism and multipolar world order that leaves room for new players.³⁰¹ For instance in Davutoğlu's words: "The existence of multiple centers of power/authority can serve to prevent anyone from dominating the others. Governance, in this regard, means the mutual and respectful interaction of different actors."³⁰² The emphasis of emerging powers on the urgency and need for a novel and different approach to international relations and their claim that peripheral states should be allowed to play greater roles in doing so trigger the question of whether they would really be able to offer anything novel or alternative to the dominant norms and practices of international relations. More specifically in the Turkish case, Turkish policy makers often argue that they are different from previous Turkish elites and from Western powers in that they have a different mind-set and mode of operation.

While emerging powers defend norms and values such as human rights, justice, and equality on international platforms and criticize the West for failing to adhere to these norms on the practical level, unlike European small-states, they often have deficits on such issues on domestic level. For instance, while Brazil is a strong defender of human rights on the international level, its domestic human rights record is often subject to criticism. Similarly, while it defends equality on the global scale and claims to be colour-blind, its domestic elite mostly consists of white Brazilians.³⁰³ Similar examples may easily be noted for other emerging mediators as well.

Mediation is often confused with arbitration, which is a legal procedure for the settlement of disputes where an independent third party makes a decision that is binding on the disputants based on factual evidence. Mediators, on the other hand, are not interested in the

³⁰¹ Engstrom, *Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights*, 838; Davutoğlu, *Global Governance*, 5.

³⁰² Davutoğlu, *Global Governance*, 5.

³⁰³ Oliver Stuenkel, "Brazil in Africa: Bridging the Atlantic?," KAS International Reports, 1/2, 2013, 34.

“truth” as such which is often relative and contestable. Instead, they are interested in resolving the conflict in a fashion agreeable to both parties. According to the literature on mediation, value-based conflicts are the most difficult ones to resolve. For instance Moore argues that,

Many dissensual or value-based disputes focus on such issues as guilt and innocence, what norms should prevail in a social relationship, what facts should be considered valid, what beliefs are correct, who merits what, and what principles should guide decision makers. Parties who frame their differences in these terms often can only see outcomes in complete wins or defeats, or in terms of yes-or-no decisions.³⁰⁴

Moore further suggests that as difficult as it is, to be able to resolve a value-based conflict, a mediator should try to reframe “dissensual or value-based conflicts into consensual or interest-based ones.”³⁰⁵ Drawing on Moore’s analysis one may argue that the adoption of a normative and value-based discourse by a mediator may in fact hamper the mediation process. As such, it could be more effective to highlight the common interests of the parties towards a resolution.

Established mediators often build partnerships during their peacemaking initiatives while emerging mediators seem to be relatively more independent. For instance, European small-states mainly operate within the UN system by effectively utilizing the UN tools for mediation. The UN is a significant partner for Norway and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry indicates that, “the UN has an advantage because of the breadth of the tools at its disposal, and we [Norwegians] are therefore a strong supporter of UN efforts to assist these countries.”³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 4th Edition, 356.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 357.

³⁰⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, Common Solutions,” *meld. st. 33 (2011–2012) Report to the Storting (White Paper)*, 2013, 32.

The institutionalization process at the foreign ministries of European small states are often complemented by close collaboration with NGOs in terms of capacity building including the training of the official personnel as well as trainings of the relevant stakeholders in conflict zones. These NGOs often go on to the field to train opinion leaders, NGO representatives, education personnel, and even religious leaders in conflict resolution and mediation. For instance, Peace and Reconciliation Unit operating under its foreign ministry govern Norway's official peace initiatives. In addition, several other institutions operate in collaboration with the ministry such as the Christian Michelsen Institute, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), Fafo Applied International Studies, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the Research Council of Norway (NORAD). Norway is also the first country that established a state funded peace institute.³⁰⁷

Another NGO actively working on international conflict resolution may be noted as Crisis Management International founded by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari who received the Peace Prize in 2008. Ahtisaari mediated the Helsinki Talks between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) in 2005. The Helsinki Talks also set example to cooperation between European small-states. In that sense Switzerland supported Finland in these talks by coaching the GAM during the negotiations. Another leading example may be cooperation between Switzerland, Norway, and Spain to facilitate the talks between the ELN and the Government of Colombia in 2005.³⁰⁸

Like Norway, Finland's mediation approach is also based on partnerships with "parties to a conflict, other mediators, governments, the civil society and international

³⁰⁷ Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 387.

³⁰⁸ Thomas Greminger, "Mediation and Facilitation in Today's Peace Processes: Centrality of Commitment, Coordination and Context," *Mediation Retreate of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*, February 15-17, 2007, 6-7.

organizations."³⁰⁹ According to Finnish policy makers, "working in isolation is a recipe for failure."³¹⁰ As the Finnish Foreign Minister points out, "a prominent individual can bring the necessary political weight with useful networks and resources to the process, whilst those closer to the conflict can bring the capacity to create a dialogue and the necessary in-depth expertise to find solutions to the situation. The better we combine our strengths, the stronger the chances are to reach sustainable peace. If we can rely on cooperation, each of us can focus on deepening our particular competences, instead of trying to master all areas."³¹¹ In that sense, European small-states often rely on networking and partnership with other actors. Cooperation with other European small-states is also part of their mediation style. Cooperation between Finland and Norway in Myanmar is notable in that sense.³¹²

Emerging mediators often rely more on regional mechanisms to resolve conflicts. The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform or Iraq's Neighbouring Countries Process, both initiated by Turkey, are examples to such mechanisms. They also often call on or cooperate with regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community, or the Arab League to take initiative in regional peacemaking. While in times these organizations play a direct mediator role, in other times they assist or complement the mediator states by creating the conditions necessary for peacemaking.³¹³

³⁰⁹ Erkki Tuomioja, "The Role of Member States in Mediation," Statement at a High-Level Meeting on Mediation, New York, May 23, 2012, <http://formin.finland.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=249818> (accessed June 21, 2014).

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Roxana Cristescu, Augustin Nicolescu and Agus Wandu, "ASEAN and Peace Mediation: Progress, Challenges, and Cooperation," Paper presented at ASEAN-EU High-Level Expert Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and International Peace Mediation, Bali, Indonesia, 2012.

Emerging mediators also call on the Western organizations to cooperate and collaborate more with regional organizations on relevant matters.³¹⁴ This call has so far been returned on various occasions such as the EU's support for the African Union in capacity building in mediation through NGOs such as the Crisis Management Initiative or the HD Centre.³¹⁵

These states also initiate the establishment of various mechanisms within the UN that contribute to global peacemaking such as the Mediation Support Unit and the Standby Team of Mediation Experts initiated by Norway and the Friends of Mediation Initiative established by Finland alongside Turkey. These establishments promote the use of mediation as a nonviolent tool of conflict resolution. The Friends of Mediation Initiative is also a good example of cooperation between European small-states and emerging powers in terms of conflict resolution and mediation.

Some of these states also encourage civil society involvement in their peacemaking or peacebuilding initiatives. Some of the leading examples are Turkey or Brazil. For instance, the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation often encourage cooperation and collaboration with the civil society in member states.³¹⁶

2.3.4.1 Bringing Culture into Mediation

Definitions of culture vary across the literature.³¹⁷ While some define it as a set of customs and tradition, others define culture more as intellectual and aesthetic accumulation of knowledge.³¹⁸ Williams defines culture in two levels as both “a whole way of life” and

³¹⁴ Davutoğlu, *Global Governance*, 9.

³¹⁵ Cristescu, Nicolescou and Wandt, “ASEAN and Peace Mediation,” 15.

³¹⁶ Ibid, 9.

³¹⁷ For a brief history of different definitions of and approaches to culture please see, Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, 6-9.

³¹⁸ Nestor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005: 30.

“the special process of discovery and creative effort.”³¹⁹ While Ting-Toomey defines it as, “patterned ways of thinking, acting, feeling, and interpreting,”³²⁰ for Faure and Rubin, “Culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behaviour.”³²¹

Zartman considers culture as irrelevant to a mediation process and argues that there is a common international diplomatic culture that dominates the world of diplomacy. He argues that, “In this internationalized world, is it not clear that previous national differences prevail any longer, because many have disappeared into a homogenized cosmopolitan culture of international negotiations.”³²²

This approach is problematic on two levels. Firstly, it limits mediation (or negotiation) to a process that takes place in a vacuum and in isolation from its overall context. Particularly, in intrastate conflicts, the involvement of grassroots plays an important role in the resolution of conflicts in which culture becomes a significant determinant. In that respect, the subject matter is not only the cultural background of the official actors but also the grassroots.

Secondly, the idea of “a homogenized cosmopolitan culture of international negotiations”³²³ reminds us of the discussion on “the end of history”³²⁴ which once argued that liberal democracy would dominate the world into a homogenized cosmopolitan political culture. Recent developments in international politics have proved Fukuyama

³¹⁹ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, London: Fourth Estate, 1988, 4.

³²⁰ Stella Ting-Toomey, “Towards a Theory of Conflict and Culture,” in William B. Gudykunst, Leah P. Stewart and Stella Ting-Toomey, *Communication, Culture, and Organizational Processes*, London: Sage Publication, 1985, 75.

³²¹ Guy Olivier Faure and Gunnar Sjöstedt, “Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction,” in Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1993, 3.

³²² Zartman, “A Skeptic’s View, 19.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.

wrong. Today we are faced with a world where even the nature of conflicts has changed from interstate to more of an intrastate characteristic and more often than not, conflicts emerge from cultural differences. In such instances, it would be misleading to ignore the role culture plays in mediation. As argued by Bercovitch and Schneider, since culture plays a crucial role in a mediation process, parties may be more likely to accept a mediator who comes from a similar cultural background with the parties.³²⁵

Some scholars criticize Western approaches for failing to address and consider the issue of culture while resolving conflicts. Scholars such as Bleiker and Brigg imply that, the “imposition of Western values upon culturally diverse conflict situations can lead to a regime of domination that is resented by those who are subjected to its ethnocentric implications.”³²⁶ They criticize the neglect of local traditions and homogenous approaches to political life and conflict in Western practices of conflict resolution.

This literature also emphasizes the importance of understanding the needs and realities of peripheral settings and criticizes the failure of Western approaches in achieving it.³²⁷ Cultural differences constitute a major block of this failure. For instance, Hall differentiates between “high” and “low-context” cultures.³²⁸ By “high-context cultures” he refers mainly to non-Western societies which are more collectivists, emotional, hierarchical, and relational. In high-context societies the insider-outsider division is strong; the style of communication is mainly non-verbal and implicit (rituals are important); feelings, intuitions, and trust-building are important components of cultural interaction. In low-context societies, on the other hand, communication is more verbal and implicit; the

³²⁵ Bercovitch and Schneider, “Who Mediates?,” 150

³²⁶ Bleiker and Brigg, “Introduction,” 2.

³²⁷ Bleiker and Brigg, “Introduction;” Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution Approaches;” Irani, “Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Peace in the Middle East;” Lee and Teh Hwee Hwee, *An Asian Perspective on Mediation*; Avruch, Black and Scimecca, (eds.), *Conflict Resolution*; Brigg, *The New Politics of Conflict Resolution*; Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace.”

³²⁸ Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture*, New York; Toronto: Anchor Books, 1976.

society is more individualistic, rational and logical; knowledge is more factual; and the society is more action oriented.³²⁹

This study argues that culture is a significant determinant in the process of mediation. Understanding cultural differences is significant both in the process and outcome of a mediation attempt.

2.3.5 Supporting Mediation by Other Means

Particularly in intrastate conflicts, it is often necessary to support mediation by a range of other tools such as aid, humanitarian assistance, medical relief or peacebuilding in a broader sense. While mediation refers to the process of “peacemaking” between parties to the conflict, peacebuilding is the “implementation” process of mediation outcomes.³³⁰ According to recent studies, about a third out of 69 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2000 recurred as civil wars, which indicates the importance of long-term commitment to peace which can be achieved by combining different tools.³³¹

As underpinned by Papagianni, “Third-party engagement can create the political space within which long-term reconstruction, development, and reconciliation issues can be discussed among national actors.”³³² Mediation is vital for building sustainable peace since it encourages parties to come out of the sphere of violence and enter the sphere of political discussion. Mediation, in this sense, “tries to keep the signatories of the peace agreement engaged, to bring new parties in the process, and to expand as much as possible political participation.”³³³

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Papagianni, “Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” 244.

³³¹ Eriksson and Kostić, “Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, 5.

³³² Papagianni “Mediation, Political Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” 243.

³³³ Ibid, 245.

In fact, peacebuilding in itself is a sort of mediation in that, as argued by Richmond, peacebuilders “should endeavour to see themselves as mediatory agents of empathetic emancipation, whereby their role is to mediate the global norm or institution with the local before it is constructed.”³³⁴ As Bercovitch and Jackson contend, complementary to mediation, “peacebuilding is a holistic concept aimed at no less than the complete transformation of the political, economic, and social structures within a nation that can lead to violent conflict.”³³⁵ In this view, peacebuilding is “a comprehensive, multidimensional, and long-term conflict transformation project.”³³⁶

Combining different tracks is important in achieving comprehensive and sustainable peace. It is however important to ensure coherence among different tracks based on a horizontal logic and a “systems-based approach to conflict resolution.”³³⁷ Studies increasingly find “that only the involvement of a variety of different actors and approaches can succeed in sustainable peacebuilding, including grassroots organisations or other civil society actors.”³³⁸ As also highlighted by Richmond, “NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid responses and commitment in local environments necessary to provide essential services, and they have to capacity to inform and mobilize opinion.”³³⁹

In post-ethnic conflicts, especially in those where there is a government collapse, mediation and peacebuilding are often accompanied by statebuilding. The implementation of decisions taken on the negotiation table requires the establishment or resurrection of certain institutions particularly in terms of ensuring security and governance. Often, a

³³⁴ Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 164.

³³⁵ Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*, 168.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, “What is Multi-track Diplomacy?,” <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/about/84-about/131-what-is-multi-track-diplomacy> (accessed December 1, 2014).

³³⁸ Paffenholz and Spurk, “Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding,” 18.

³³⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, “Introduction: NGOs, Peace and Human Security,” *International Peacekeeping* 10, no.1, 2010: 5.

number of transitional governments need to be established before a viable political system is in place. These transitional governments are often recognized as the legitimate authority by the international community which may create some problems. Drawing on the Somali example Papagianni highlights that the desire to make the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) viable created a dilemma among the international community that refrained from criticizing it for the sake of protecting its legitimacy. Menkhaus suggests that in times statebuilding may deteriorate the mediation process since “it is seen by local parties as taking sides”³⁴⁰ through the empowerment of the internationally recognized government.

Complementing mediation by peacebuilding also encourages the participation of the grassroots into peace processes. As also argued by Atashi, “peace dividends can create incentives and convince people that they are stakeholders, thereby increasing public support at different stages of the peace process.”³⁴¹ Faget postulates in a similar vein that, “the peace process must involve not only high officials and notables, but all the societal and cultural strata.”³⁴² In this view, peace should be mass driven rather than elite driven to be able to ensure sustainability. It should nevertheless be noted that, while in some cases inclusiveness solidifies the peace process, in others it may trigger certain problems. For instance, in intrastate conflicts, there are often a range of actors such as different clans, militia groups, regional administrations, ethnic groups, political parties, and the state.

³⁴⁰ Ken J. Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 10.

³⁴¹ Elham Atashi, “Ending the ‘Troubles: Brokering Peace in Northern Ireland,” in Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. And William J. Lahneman, *From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict*, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013, 43.

³⁴² Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 14.

2.3.6 Methods of mediation

Another indicator which may be used to understand difference in mediation may be the methods applied by mediators such as direct talks, indirect talks or shuttle diplomacy, summit diplomacy by holding conferences or workshops or supporting local conflict resolution mechanisms.

A mediator may choose among a number of methods based on reasons such as the relations between the parties regarding whether they recognize each other as legal, legitimate entities and accept to speak face to face; or the nature of the conflict regarding whether it is an intrastate conflict between various ethnic groups or an interstate one which maybe between two or more nation-states.

One of the most common methods is direct talks where parties sit together with the mediator in order to solve their problems. This kind of talk usually occurs when parties recognize each other as legal, legitimate entities or their relationship has come to a point where they are ready to sit face to face.

Another method used is indirect talks or shuttle-diplomacy which refers to delivering information back and forth between conflicting parties through a number of diplomatic visits. The term “shuttle-diplomacy” was first used to describe Kissinger’s style of mediation “shuttling back and forth” between the various Arab states and Israel to resolve the conflict.³⁴³ As noted by Hoffman, “mediators often use private caucus sessions, in which the mediator shuttles between or among the parties in conflict, using these separate meetings to discuss the conflict and to advance the negotiation.”³⁴⁴ Shuttle diplomacy is mainly used to conduct indirect talks usually consulted in situations where parties do not

³⁴³ David A. Hoffman, “Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy,” *Negotiation Journal* 27, no.3, 2011: 268.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, 265.

want to engage in direct talks. However, there may be a positive side to indirect and secret talks as well. According to Assefa, there is a greater chance for the parties to compete with each other in negotiations with higher visibility.³⁴⁵ Since the parties do not see each other in indirect talks, the risk of stubbornness is potentially lower.

Summit diplomacy through holding international conferences or workshops are other common ways of practising international mediation where parties join the conference or workshops usually together with other stakeholders to the conflict under the auspice of the mediator state(s) in order to discuss their problems extensively with the hope to come to a solution or at least to improve their relations. These kinds of conferences may or may not be open to media based on a strategic decision of the mediator and the parties for the sake of the mediation process.

Another commonality among these mediators is their support for local conflict resolution and mediation initiatives. For instance both Finland and Norway offer mediation and conflict resolution training courses for local opinion leaders, clan leaders, traditional elders, teachers, security personnel. They also empower locals to utilize their traditional mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms.³⁴⁶ In addition to promoting UN norms and values, European small-states are also strong advocates of gender equality and inclusion of women in conflict resolution, mediation and peacebuilding processes.

The imposition by the mediators of a top-down approach instead of empowering grass-roots and encouraging a bottom-up process may also raise criticism. There is also a risk that the mediation process may be exploited by the ruling elites to legitimize their political

³⁴⁵ Hizkias Assefa, "The Challenge of Mediation in Internal Wars: Reflections on the INN Experience in the Ethiopian/Eritrean Conflict," *Security Dialogue* 23, no.3, 1992: 101-106.

³⁴⁶ Tuomioja, "The Role of Member States in Mediation."

positions instead of achieving an inclusive peace process. In that sense, it is significant to include grassroots into the peace process in order to ensure durability of peace.

Teaching conflict resolution and mediation skills to influential grassroots figures such as opinion leaders, clan leaders or religious leaders may also be an effective and feasible way of peace. This would enable parties to build their own capacities in term of peacemaking. In certain indigenous settings, there are often existing traditional conflict resolution and mediation methods such as certain rituals that people utilize to resolve conflicts pertaining inter or intra-group or clan conflicts. Empowerment of these mechanisms may also contribute to local containment of local conflicts preventing them from spreading and growing into regional or national conflicts. Mobilizing local mechanisms of conflict resolution also creates and enhances local ownership of the peace process.

In intrastate ethnic disputes, the conflict often exists on multiple levels such as local, national and sometimes even regional and international with the involvement of external stakeholders. In this kind of situations, it might be necessary to pursue a multilevel mediation initiative including mediation on the grassroots level through the use of above mentioned mechanisms, on the national level through national peace talks and on the regional or international level through the utilization of more inclusive mechanisms such as holding international conferences or workshops. In this sense, a range of methods of mediation may be utilized to achieve peace.

2.3.7 Progress of mediators

Progress of mediators is another indicator that may be used to understand their difference. This study prefers to use the term “progress” rather than “success” because success can be measured against what a mediator state attempts to do in a mediation process. As such, it is

challenging to measure the success of a mediator state independent from its initial goal. As Faget argues, trying to define success in mediation,

raises more methodological questions than provides definite answers. It reveals an “instrumental” approach to mediation which gives more importance to the short to mid-term objective result-signing a treaty, a ceasefire, an arrangement, opening talks, curbing violence- than to the operating mode or its mid to long-term subjective consequences – the quality of communication, a change in the population’s attitude, the building of common projects.³⁴⁷

The literature diverges visibly on the definition of and the criteria for mediation success. For instance, Frei, one of the early scholars on mediation, argues that mediation is successful “when both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator and a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt.”³⁴⁸ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille rather focus on the outcomes of mediation by articulating that success in mediation means a “ceasefire, a partial settlement or a full settlement.”³⁴⁹ Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, and Syna point out “reaching agreement, goal achievement, and immediate satisfaction with the agreement”³⁵⁰ as the determinants of short-term success of a mediation attempt while Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Castrianno note that, “compliance with the agreement, improved relations between the parties, and the absence of new problems between them” determine the long-term success of mediation.³⁵¹

³⁴⁷ Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 10.

³⁴⁸ Daniel Frei, “Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness of International Mediation,” *Peace Science Society* 26, 1976: 69.

³⁴⁹ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” 8.

³⁵⁰ Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy and Syna, “Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation,” 546.

³⁵¹ Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy, Gary L. Welton and Lynn M. Castrianno, “Long-Term Success in Mediation,” *Law and Human Behavior* 17, no.3, 1993: 314.

According to Siniver, success in mediation does not always bring effectiveness which may be more crucial to ensure the sustainability of a settlement.³⁵² For instance drawing on the example of the Oslo Accords, he notes that “the conclusion of political settlement (let alone the reduction in the level of hostilities) does not necessarily translate to effective results. The 1993 Oslo Accords is perhaps the most pertinent example of an objective mediation success (a binding political agreement), while the issue of its effectiveness to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains highly contentious.”³⁵³

The above discussion reveals the difficulty of reaching an objective criterion for determining success in mediation. As a result, the study will instead focus on the progress of mediators by looking into whether they were able to achieve their initial goals. In some cases, progress may be measured based on criteria such as the ability of the mediator to commence direct talks, sign disengagement agreement, constitute confidence building measures, or urge sides to consider unconditional talks. In other cases it may be related to the broader foreign policy goals of the mediator state.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter drew a conceptual framework by drawing out certain themes and indicators in order to answer the research question, “How can difference in international mediation be identified?” These may be listed as the previous experiences of mediators; their characteristics including the power they bring into the mediation process, the determinants of their positions as mediators including their impartiality and neutrality, proximity to the conflict, previous relations with the conflicting parties, their insider/outsider position and historical record; methods they use while mediating such as direct talks, indirect talks or

³⁵² Asaf Siniver, "Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East," *Political Studies* 54, no.4, 2006: 808.

³⁵³ Ibid.

shuttle diplomacy, holding conferences or workshops; their style of mediation such as being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, building partnerships with other actors, bringing culture into mediation, adopting a normative approach or mobilizing regional mechanisms; whether they use other means to support mediation; and their progress as mediators.

These themes and indicators will be considered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to examine the cases of Turkey's mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks and in Somalia to be able to answer the questions of "Why and how does Turkey mediate?", "What role does Turkey's discourse on difference play in its foreign policy making?" and "What are the main determinants of Turkey's role as a mediator on the periphery?".

In this chapter, mediator states were divided into two main categories as "established mediators" and "emerging mediators according to their experiences as mediator. "Established mediators" were further divided into two subcategories as "great power" and "small-state" mediators based on their international status, power capability and experience as mediators.

An important finding of this chapter has been how mediation relates to foreign policy. As such when mediation is foreign policy, its priorities, criteria and objectives often follow a parallel route to the overall foreign policy of the mediator state. Intrinsically, mediation becomes political which affects its main tenets as neutrality, impartiality or legitimacy. When the mediator is a state, mediation may become a tool of intervention, extending interests or achieving certain foreign policy priorities. This study considers mediation as a tool of foreign policy. The thesis will build on this assumption by drawing on Turkey's experience as a mediator in order to understand its difference as a mediator from its Western counterparts. In the following chapter the study will examine the background that

paved the way to the emergence of Turkey's mediator role and what role mediation plays in its foreign policy.

CHAPTER 3 – CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EMERGENCE OF TURKEY’S ROLE AS A MEDIATOR³⁵⁴

3.1 Introduction

Turkey’s mediator role is a new phenomenon that has emerged in line with its new foreign policy. In the last decade or so, Turkey has mediated a number of peace talks including the ones between Syria-Israel, Iran-the West, Croatia-Bosnia-Yugoslavia in the Balkans, the Sunni-Shia groups in Iraq, Somalia-Somaliland, Palestine-Israel and Georgia-Russia. While its mediator role has been both praised and criticized among various circles, Turkish foreign policy makers defend it as a means of bringing peace, stability and order to its areas of influence.

For instance, as also underlined by Bülent Aras, former Academic Adviser to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish policy makers argue that the only way to achieve peace and stability at home passes through achieving these ideals outside.³⁵⁵ In the words of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s former foreign minister and current prime minister, “Turkey’s strategic interests lie in peace, stability, security, and prosperity in its neighborhood and beyond.”³⁵⁶

Although, there had been a few mediation attempts of Turkey before the AKP government, its mediator role has come to the fore mainly in the last decade. During the coalition government of 1999-2002, Turkey was enthusiastic to play a facilitator role between Israel and Palestine under the auspice of former Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem.³⁵⁷ Its

³⁵⁴ Parts of this chapter have been published by the author in Akpınar “Mediation as a Foreign Policy Tool in the Arab Spring.”

³⁵⁵ Interview with Aras.

³⁵⁶ Davutoğlu, interview by Scott MacLeod.

³⁵⁷ Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts,” 372.

efforts, however, were brought into practice during the AKP government. Similarly, while Turkey had some minor peace initiatives during the 1990s, especially in the post-Soviet countries, its mediation efforts have increased significantly in recent years, becoming an important focus of its foreign policy.

As a result, Turkey appraised its advantages by repositioning itself as a peace and stability promoter, and a soft power in neighbouring regions. It reconstructed its identity by referring to its historical-geopolitical depth in addition to its social and cultural affinities. It pursued a “multidimensional” foreign policy by extending even to regions such as South America, South East Asia and Africa which were once considered as distant parts of the world both physically and mentally. Concepts such as “peace,” “cooperation” and “proactiveness” have replaced “threat” and “enmity” which had once dominated Turkish foreign policy discourses. Accordingly, hundreds of strategic partnerships, free trade, free mobilization and security agreements have been signed even with protracted enemies such as Syria and Greece.

This study argues that the ideas and interests of actors have been influential in the formation of the new foreign policy. The turn in Turkish foreign policy has been informed by Turkey’s response to domestic, regional and international developments. It has also been part of a search for identity within the dynamics of the new world order. In this respect, this chapter aims to understand the reasons behind the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role.

3.2 Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

3.2.1 The Domestic Context

One of the catalysts for the emergence of a new foreign policy in Turkey was the change in its domestic environment. As also underlined by Aras, “The significance of Turkey’s domestic transformation is the consolidation of stability in the country, enabling it to emerge as a peace-promoter in neighbouring regions.”³⁵⁸ A few triggers may be listed to understand domestic change such as the AKP’s ascendance to power in 2002; the rapid economic growth in the last decade; Turkey’s EU accession process; the process of democratization and the rise of the civil society in Turkey. By drawing on the change in Turkey’s domestic environment, this section aims to analyse some of the underlying reasons for the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role.

3.2.1.1 The Rise of the AKP and the Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

The 2002 elections was a milestone in Turkish politics resulting in the AKP’s ascendance to power. A few reasons may be noted for its apparent success such as the wide scale charm of its leader Erdoğan; the AKP’s promising neo-liberal economic program which attracted many businessmen and entrepreneurs at a time when Turkey had been struggling with a severe economic crisis; its discourse on democracy which appealed to a large audience; and its conservative and Islamic references. These elements may have paved the way to the AKP’s victory as a party appealing to masses and a visible majority of the population.

The AKP was founded by a group of politicians, businessmen, academics and miscellaneous civilians who, according to Erdoğan, are proponents of “conservative

³⁵⁸ Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 33.

democracy”.³⁵⁹ The party hosts members from various backgrounds including the “reformist wing” of the Welfare Party, a political embodiment of the National Outlook Movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969 whose followers had come from religious and conservative backgrounds.³⁶⁰

The AKP’s conservative democratic outlook provided it with popularity not only in Turkey but also abroad particularly across the Islamic world. Turkey’s democratic and secular image also prepared the ground for its mediator role. Although, *realpolitik* played an important role on the decisions of Turkish foreign policy makers on a daily basis, the overall policy vision was highly influenced by a wider perspective based on making Turkey a “leading country” by 2023 – a target set by the AKP government.³⁶¹

3.2.1.2 The Economic Developments in Turkey

The AKP’s successful and stable economic policy is one of the important reasons for its consequent electoral victories. A number of scholars draw attention to the economic dimension of change in Turkish foreign policy.³⁶² For instance, Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu suggest that, “Turkey is becoming a ‘trading state’ and increasingly this is having an important impact on Turkey’s domestic politics as well as foreign policy.”³⁶³ The economic developments in Turkey also deserve attention since they were influential in the emergence of Turkey’s mediator role on a few levels.

³⁵⁹ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Uluslararası Muhafazakarlık ve Demokrasi Sempozyumu, January 15, 2004.

³⁶⁰ Some of the members were Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, President Abdullah Gül, and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, among others from the current government.

³⁶¹ AKP, “Türkiye Hazır: Hedef 2023,” 12 Haziran 2011 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi, 2011, 146-158, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname2011.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2012).

³⁶² Ziya Öniş, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisinin Ekonomi Politikası,” in Hakan Yavuz (ed.), *Ak Parti: Toplumsal Değişimin Yeni Aktörleri*, 2010, 266-269; Mustafa Acar, Ömer Demir and Metin Toprak, “Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no.6, 2004: 170.

³⁶³ Kemal Kirişçi and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 47, no.5, 2011: 705.

Firstly, these developments enhanced Turkey's confidence and its search for new markets making it more active both in its region and beyond. Secondly, the increasing level of prosperity fostered Turkey's charity activities which subsequently extended abroad. These activities constitute an important part of Turkey's mediation model. Thirdly, Turkey's economic record even at the time of global crisis increased its stability, credibility and its ability to keep the promises it makes on the table as a mediator.

According to Öniş, there are a few reasons for the AKP's economic success. These may be listed as the political stability that came with its electoral success in three consequent terms; the initiation of Turkey's EU accession process which *inter alia* attracted foreign investment; the AKP's commitment to the economic program of the IMF followed by a growth rate of 14 per cent in the first quarter of 2004, a rate higher than the expectations of the IMF; the improvement in the banking and finance sector; the government's promise at the time to fight corruption and its support for the small and middle size enterprises.³⁶⁴

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Exports	73,476	85,535	107,272	132,002	102,143	113,883	134,969	152,462	151,803
Imports	116,774	139,576	170,063	201,961	140,929	185,544	240,838	236,545	251,661
Trade Volume	190,251	225,111	277,334	333,963	243,072	299,428	375,807	389,007	403,464
Trade Balance	-43,298	-54,041	-62,791	-69,959	-38,786	-71,661	-105,869	-84,083	-99,859

Turkish Foreign Trade (in US Dollars)³⁶⁵

³⁶⁴ Ziya Öniş, "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisinin Ekonomi Politikası," 266-269.

³⁶⁵ The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency, "Foreign Trade," Invest in Turkey, <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/InternationalTrade.aspx> (accessed May 28, 2013).

The implication of the AKP's economic performance on foreign policy has been significant. As a member of G-20, the OECD, the EU Customs Union, and BSEC, Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world and the 6th largest in Europe. It has free trade agreements with more than 50 countries worldwide. In the last decade, Turkish exports have diversified and increased more than 20 times in volume exceeding 300 billion dollars, in more than 200 countries.³⁶⁶

As such, the economic developments that took place in Turkey were important in boosting the confidence of policy makers. As a result, by 2023, the 100th anniversary of its republic, Turkish government aims at raising its exports to 500 billion dollars, and its total trade volume to 1 trillion dollars.³⁶⁷ To be able to achieve this goal, Turkey needs to diversify its markets and grow its trade volume and mediation is an ideal tool to bring stability to Turkey's areas of influence and build a trustable image to encourage further involvement with its neighbours and beyond.

3.2.1.3 Turkey's EU Accession Process

Turkey's EU accession process has been a significant catalyst in terms of change in its foreign policy and the emergence of its mediator role. Following the recognition of its EU candidate status in 1999, a series of democratic reforms were launched in Turkey. Aydın suggests that, "European pressure in terms of the Copenhagen Criteria has provided the

³⁶⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Economic Outlook of Turkey," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-ekonomisindeki-son-gelismeler.tr.mfa> (accessed March 30, 2012).

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

necessary external impetus to overcome, firstly, existing inertia within the country and, more importantly, resistance among Turkey's traditional elite to further reforms.”³⁶⁸

The accession process has also increased Turkey's regional and international credibility by enhancing its democratic image as well as making Turkey a more active player in its region and beyond. In addition, the adaptation of EU policies, such as its neighbourhood and security policies, paved the way for the emergence of Turkey's peace-brokering role in its region. For instance, Turkey's “zero-problems with neighbors policy” is an interpretation of the EU's neighbourhood policy which aims to avoid problems and conflicts in neighbouring lands by encouraging cooperation and integration.

Likewise, the concept of “security for all” in EU foreign policy is clearly visible in Turkey's new foreign policy understanding, which enhances its image of a peacemaker.³⁶⁹ According to Polat and Aras, Turkey's activism in the Middle East is a consequence of its EU accession process.³⁷⁰ They argue that Turkey's journey towards the EU helped it gain confidence in its foreign affairs, making it more active in its region.

In terms of economy, it was a period when regional trade had also surged and since then the EU has become the largest trade partner and the largest foreign investor of Turkey. Former Head of Department of Directorate of Policy Planning at Turkish Foreign Ministry Ufuk Gezer underscores that there is a vision of integration with the EU based on economic interdependence; the EU's policy of transforming its neighbourhood through soft power, projects of transportation corridors, and policy of communication and energy

³⁶⁸ Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation,” 327.

³⁶⁹ Hakan Fidan, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards Central Asia,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.1, 2010: 109.

³⁷⁰ Aras and Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 471-488.

lines.³⁷¹ He notes that this is the EU's way of transforming and stabilizing its surroundings through integration and exporting its values. In this view, Turkey's vision, interests and discourse overlap with that of the EU's.³⁷² Gezer further pinpoints that Turkey and the EU can cooperate in mediating crisis. He notes, "I believe Turkey and the EU have complementary powers in terms of providing stability in our common areas of neighbourhood. And we also have common interests."³⁷³

So far, there has been cooperation between Turkey and the EU in terms of establishing mediation mechanisms. For instance, Turkey and Finland together established the Friends of Mediation initiative on September 24, 2010 within the UN aiming to promote mediation as a tool of peaceful resolution of conflicts.³⁷⁴

Despite its important role as a catalyst in the emergence of its mediation, recent years have witnessed a decline of enthusiasm among policy makers in Turkey's EU accession process. As Bilgin contends, "the initial enthusiasm towards the EU lost pace in the later period."³⁷⁵ By the same token, Meral and Paris argue that despite an initial enthusiasm towards EU membership in the period of 2002-2004, "prolonged talks without tangible success and other priorities for the AKP have resulted in 'accession fatigue'."³⁷⁶

³⁷¹ Interview with Ufuk Gezer, former Head of Department of Directorate of Policy Planning at Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara, August 26, 2013.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ UN Peacemaker, "Group of Friends of Mediation," <http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation>

³⁷⁵ Bilgin, "Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties," 414.

³⁷⁶ Meral and Paris, "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity," 79.

3.2.1.4 The Process of Democratization and the Rise of the Civil Society

According to Mardin, civil society secures the free flow of the non-state life and the autonomy of economic practices in a country.³⁷⁷ Although the history of civil society in Turkey dates back several centuries, until recent years it had served rather as a top-down mechanism of furthering state control over the society. The civil structures and institutions were allowed to exist as long as they had remained in a predetermined space. Some of these institutions were even initiated by the state authority itself.

The progression of the civil society took place vis-à-vis the process of democratization in Turkey. The 1999 earthquake was another milestone for Turkish civil society which revealed the inadequacy of the state to provide with the necessary services and subsequently resulted in the mobilization of civilians to help rescue efforts. The success of the NGOs also had a positive influence on the state, helping it overcome its hesitancy to make more space for them.³⁷⁸

The late 90s witnessed two other developments for Turkish civil society including the recognition of Turkey's EU candidate status starting a series of democratic reforms and the introduction of the internet to wide public use. The internet became a popular space for networking and getting organized for civil initiatives. It also made people more aware of the surrounding problems. The civil society agents that are influential in the process of foreign policy making may be listed as charities, NGOs, academics, think tanks, business federations and the public.

³⁷⁷ Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2006, 12.

³⁷⁸ Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Political Change in Turkey: Assessment and Comparison with Eastern Europe," *Political Studies* 50, no.4, 2002: 761-778.

The rise of civil society has been important for Turkey's mediator role in that it has served as a mechanism which pushed the government into certain decisions such as opening up to new regions and taking on more proactive roles in certain issues. For instance, the involvement of Turkish businessmen and HNGOs in Africa created a demand on the government to deepen its involvement in the continent by opening diplomatic missions, signing various agreements, lifting visas or starting Turkish Airlines flights.

Civil society's involvement is significant for peacemaking for a number of reasons. First, civil society usually has extensive networks within the target countries, not only among officials but also among non-state actors and grassroots, affording them significant advantages. For instance, NGOs, charities and sometimes even businessmen may have access to people that the official channels do not. Second, civil society often has more mobility and flexibility than officials. It can build direct contacts with actors that the officials cannot due to issues of legitimacy. Third, since civil society, especially NGOs and charities, usually have hands-on experience in the field, they can have better insight into the needs and demands of the people at a grassroots level. Fourth, aid by NGOs and charities or investments by corporate entities help the government uphold the promises it makes at the negotiation table.³⁷⁹

Turkish foreign policy was supportive of expanding Turkish business and charity organisations in different parts of the globe, and policy makers later described this as strength of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey's diplomatic missions embraced this new notion, facilitating the international activities of Turkish NGOs, including humanitarian organisations.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia," 735-757.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

3.2.2 The Regional Context

In addition to domestic developments certain regional developments have also been effective in the formation of Turkey's new foreign policy and the emergence of its mediator role. These developments opened up space for Turkey to become more influential in their regions. This section will focus on the regional environment that prepared the ground for the emergence of Turkey's mediator role.

3.2.2.1 The Emergence of a New Regional Role

Although there was a positive atmosphere and motivation for the emergence of a new regional policy, one incident particularly expedited the pace of adaptation of a new policy line namely, the US-led invasion of Iraq. The invasion was in line with the new US policy of making the world a "safer" place through war on terror. However, this invasion was a largely unilateral military move, which was not authorised by the UN mechanism. It also failed to generate a wide or lasting international and regional support indicating the lack of its legitimacy.

The invasion also increased the anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in this region and in some of the Muslim majority states in the world. As a result of such developments, the US-led invasion of Iraq posed enormous problems to tackle with for Turkey, as it had been a traditional Western ally. This section elaborates on the new regional atmosphere during the Iraqi War and its impact on the emergence of Turkey's mediator role in the region.

The invasion of Iraq had serious repercussions on Turkish politics both domestically and externally. Before invading Iraq, the US had asked Turkey for support by opening Turkish military bases for its use as well as by providing with troops. Although in the initial phase,

the AKP government was planning to support the invasion it had to change its policy due to a number of developments.³⁸¹ Firstly, there was a serious criticism from the opposition parties. Secondly, large scale public rallies triggered massive reaction against the invasion of Iraq and Turkey's support for it.

As Oruç notes, Davutoğlu's personal initiatives to convince the members of the parliament to vote against the decree were also very influential. Oruç postulates that the reason for the AKP's support for the US was the fact that during the initial phase of its rule the government did not have much to lose even if it had failed in its policy. Also, the public opposition had become more visible in the coming days.³⁸²

Turkey's policy makers failed to prevent the invasion but also avoided cooperation with the US despite a long history of strategic partnership. However, Turkey was not able to prevent the negative consequences of the war for itself. The American invasion of Iraq, the collapse of the Saddam regime, and the ethnic and sectarian disputes that broke out consequently affected Turkey by directly jeopardizing its own security, stability and peace. While trying to respond to the new situation, policy makers recognized that the old pattern of foreign policy would not be sufficient to counter the challenges of the new environment.³⁸³

The first implication of the regional change was on domestic politics. The invasion of Iraq was likely to further strengthen Kurdish autonomy if not lead to independence. The Kurdish question in Turkey had been a serious issue at home both political and security wise and policy makers had concerns about further deterioration of the problem. It was necessary to have reforms at home and resolve Turkey's protracted Kurdish problem by

³⁸¹ Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004.

³⁸² Interview with Oruç.

³⁸³ Interview with Aras.

giving more rights to Kurds. The domestic reforms eased the hands of policy makers in their Iraqi policy. Consequently, Turkey adopted a renewed perception towards its neighbourhood in light of changes on the ground based on an understanding of cooperation and opportunity.

The second implication was on the style and content of foreign policy. Turkey's regional policy had a new experience based on shuttle diplomacy and regional ownership. This policy envisioned increased contact with countries in the region and a more proactive role in regional and international organisations. One consequence was Turkey's establishment of the Platform for Iraqi Neighbours in 2003 aiming to bring Iraq's neighbours together to discuss issues pertaining to peace and stability in the region.³⁸⁴

At first, shuttle diplomacy and promoting regional ownership were results of the policies developed vis-à-vis the Iraqi situation but subsequently have become important components of Turkey's mediation style. For instance, Turkey later on initiated the Istanbul Process for Afghanistan, the Friends of Syria, the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform following the Georgian-Russian crisis and two trilateral mechanisms which included Turkey, Bosnia, Croatia and Bosnia, Serbia, Turkey. Davutoğlu maintains that regional ownership,

can be achieved only through a more effective regional cooperation and active engagement with all regional systems in our neighborhood. This, in turn, necessitates enforcing existing regional integration structures, and forging new ones as necessary. This is why Turkey supports and seeks to promote regional cooperation in its neighborhood and to boost the profile of regional organizations for that purpose.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁴ Aras, "Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East," 39.

³⁸⁵ Davutoğlu, interview by Scott MacLeod.

As Özkan underscores, “Turkey’s reconciliation efforts in the domestic politics of Iraq and Lebanon, championing for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and its mediation role between Syria and Israel in 2008, are some of the examples of Turkey’s re-integration with the region.”³⁸⁶ Regional mechanisms also create platforms for the discussion of regional problems under Turkey’s mediation in addition to enhancing its legitimacy, visibility and credibility which are important characteristics of a mediator. Promoting regional ownership also aims to contain the problems and develop a sense of confidence for the resolution of problems within the region as well as preventing a possible international spill over effect. It also encourages the creation of channels through which the international actors find counterparts to communicate with as they may look for legitimate structures for involvement.³⁸⁷

The third implication was on the actor preferences of the foreign policy makers. Turkey’s Iraqi policy was centred on preserving Iraq’s territorial unity and having close relations with all sides within the country. Turkey developed a close relationship with the central Iraqi government in addition to pursuing good relations with the Sunnis, different Shia groups and the Kurdish Regional Government. As a result of its Iraqi policy and rejection of the US request of sending troops to Iraq, Turkey aimed to increase its credibility, accountability and legitimacy in Iraq paving the way for its mediation between the leader of Iraq’s Hizbul Islam Tariq al-Hashimi and the US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad conducted in Istanbul by then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül.³⁸⁸ These were important steps that led to Turkey’s future mediator roles such the one between Syria and Israel.

³⁸⁶ Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey-Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What Is the Big Deal?,” *Strategic Analysis* 35, no.1, 2011: 29.

³⁸⁷ Interview with Aras.

³⁸⁸ Semih İdiz, “Türkiye'nin ‘kolaylaştırıcı’ rolü ağırlık kazanıyor,” *Milliyet*, December 5, 2005.

Developing relations with sub-national actors and getting involved in their relations were new traits of Turkish diplomacy. Initially this attitude was adopted as a reflex to manage the situation in Iraq but later on has become a cornerstone of Turkey's regional policy. As argued by Gezer, mediation was one of the tools of Turkey's foreign policy in search for regional integration.³⁸⁹ Being able to speak to all parties also corresponds with the "all-inclusive" approach in Turkey's mediation. As Cemalettin Haşimi, Head of Department of Public Diplomacy under Turkish Prime Ministry maintains, "regarding mediation, being able to speak to all parties simultaneously is an important asset and Turkey is the only country which is able to do that."³⁹⁰ Similarly, Aras argues that,

Turkey has access both to the North and the South. Of course, this has its limits. Its relationships are not perfect neither with the North nor with the South but it has access to both which makes Turkey a unique actor. It is both transatlantic and regional which provides Turkey with a large area to manoeuvre. Its main capacity is being able to reach everyone, talk to everyone and bring them together.³⁹¹

As also evident in the words of Turkish foreign policy makers, the emergence of Turkey's new and more proactive regional role was *inter alia* shaped around an understanding that places significant importance on the concept of "historical-geographical depth" which refers to the fact that Turkey has a long historic role in the region and is also part of the region.³⁹² This view is underpinned by Davutoğlu who argues that,

Our [Turkey's] long history provides us with a unique set of relations with countries and communities all around us. Our geostrategic location in the midst of a vast geography, on the other hand, places us in a position to relate to and influence the developments that are key to the future of the world. So the question is not achieving the strategic depth, but using it for regional and global peace. This requires us to engage with the countries with which we share a common past and geography in a

³⁸⁹ Interview with Gezer.

³⁹⁰ Interview with Cemalettin Haşimi, Head of Department of Public Diplomacy under Turkish Prime Ministry, Ankara, August 27, 2013.

³⁹¹ Interview with Aras.

³⁹² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 24th Edition, 2008, 6-7.

way that will promote our shared interests and create a mutually beneficial framework for cooperation and dialogue.³⁹³

In an attempt to highlight the roles the AKP government has conceived in its foreign policy in the Middle East, Aras and Görener adopt six role conceptions from Holsti including “regional leader,” “regional protector,” “regional sub-system collaborator,” “global sub-system collaborator,” “example,” and “bridge.”³⁹⁴ They argue that “the AKP foreign policy elite hold multiple role conceptions, and this is consistent with the theory’s prediction that multiple roles are associated with foreign policy activism.”³⁹⁵

While these concepts explain Turkish policy in the Middle East in recent years, another role conception could easily be added to the list. “Mediator-integrator,” one of Holsti’s role conceptions, may be appropriate to explain Turkey’s peace-brokering initiatives in recent years. According to Holsti, “the themes for this national role conception indicate perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences.”³⁹⁶ The role as a peacemaker and mediator also helps Turkey in the consolidation of its self-claimed “order instituting” role in the region in line with its new foreign policy.³⁹⁷

Turkey is directly affected by the conflicts in its region and is a party to a considerable amount of them. As maintained by Haşimi, “when Norway mediates the Palestinian conflict, it would not be directly affected by the outcome. This is why its mediation can remain on a technical level. But both our [Turkey’s] lives and politics are directly affected

³⁹³ Davutoğlu, interview by Scott MacLeod.

³⁹⁴ Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: the Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12, no.1, 2010: 82-85.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, 86.

³⁹⁶ Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.”

³⁹⁷ Bülent Aras, “Düzen Kurucu Aktör,” *Sabah*, September 30, 2009.

by the duration and outcome of such mediation process. This is the reason why there is a huge difference.”³⁹⁸ Haşimi further notes that,

The process in Egypt is a matter of democracy for us [Turkey]. The problem in Syria is the massacre of humanity and the transformation of the region into an island of instability. The problem in Iraq seems to be the effort of Maliki to maximize his power despite the north and the south and to keep the Sunnis out of the process. We are a party to each of these cases. Not as a matter of choice but directly a party to the conflict. We have been a party to the process of the Palestinian-Israeli issue since Israel did not keep its promises during the process of mediation. Subsequently, we are directly party to each of these cases. But despite all these examples, Turkey still continues its mediation. Being a mediator does not mean not having a position about a given issue. It means to be a party whose word would be wanted by both parties to be included.³⁹⁹

By referring to its historical ties, Oruç posits that being the last centre of the caliphate has a vast significance on Turkey’s image as a mediator. He notes,

For the last twenty years, we [IHH] have been visiting geographies all around the world; places we had never heard of yet faces massacres, such as East Turkestan. In every place that we go, there was hope that Turkey would come. Wherever you go, Turkey is where people turn to. I think the most important factor is that the last centre of the caliphate was here [Turkey] and that people’s old habits persist. Back then too, it [the caliphate] was a structure that people turned to whenever they got into trouble. It was such a structure that its verbal intervention was sufficient even if it had not done anything *de facto*. It was a structure that was much stronger than USA of today even in its weakest times.⁴⁰⁰

Necdet Subaşı, Head of Directorate for Strategy Planning at Directorate for Religious Affairs, notes in a similar vein that, “For instance, in the Balkans people tell us, ‘You are our predecessors, the ones we used to be affiliated with.’ People demand Turkey to act as an elder brother in disputes and there begins an effective process.”⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁸ Interview with Haşimi.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Oruç.

⁴⁰¹ Interview with Necdet Subaşı, Head of Directorate for Strategy Planning at Directorate for Religious Affairs, Ankara, August 27, 2013.

3.2.2.2 Turkey's Regional Policy

The situation in Iraq was a catalyst for Turkish policy makers to revise their regional policy. As also put forward by Altunışık and Çuhadar one of the consequences of the Iraqi War was that, “the decline of traditional Arab powers, such as Egypt, left room for non-Arab countries like Turkey and Iran to fill in this regional vacuum.”⁴⁰² Tocci argues in a similar vein that the regional vacuum and the unfolding disputes were significant in the emergence of Turkey's mediator role. She notes that, “Turkey's efforts in mediating the manifold conflicts in the region can be credited... mainly to the lack of effective mediation in the region.”⁴⁰³ As also argued by Yalvaç, “Turkey tries to increase its international effectiveness by using foreign policy tools that are ignored by great powers and focusing on issue areas those are not addressed by the great powers.”⁴⁰⁴

Gezer maintains that Turkey's mediator role was self-attributed in line with its regional interests. As he notes, “Turkey wanted to contribute to the resolution of conflicts in its region as a requisite for its regional vision within the framework of its own interests.”⁴⁰⁵ Turkey's regional policy is formulated around four principles. First is promoting high-level political dialogue among political actors in the region by signing high-level strategic cooperation council agreements, establishing dialogue and regional cooperation mechanisms. Building regional mechanisms is a strategy aiming to create legitimacy and encourage burden sharing through regional ownership of regional problems.

⁴⁰² Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts,” 373.

⁴⁰³ Nathalie Tocci, “Foreword,” in Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar, Henri J. Barkey, Eduard Soler i Lecha and Hassan Nafaa, *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy From a Transatlantic Perspective*, Mediterranean Paper Series, The German Marshall Fund; Institute Affari Internazionali, October 2011, 4.

⁴⁰⁴ Hasan Basri Yalçın, “The Concept of ‘Middle Power’ and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism,” *Afro Eurasian Studies* 1, no.1, 2012: 195-213.

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with Gezer.

The Second premise is developing economic interdependence to back political dialogue through various trade agreements and the policy of lifting visas. The Third premise is building comprehensive security frameworks. The last premise is to promote and support multi-cultural co-existence in the region through the inclusion of all actors in the processes.⁴⁰⁶ It could be argued that these principles were effective in the formation of Turkey's mediation approach.

A considerable body of literature has also flourished on Turkey's policy in the Middle East in line with Turkey's activism in the region.⁴⁰⁷ While some of this literature highlight Turkey's rapprochement with its neighbours,⁴⁰⁸ others discuss the possibility of its leadership role in the region⁴⁰⁹ and concepts such as "model country"⁴¹⁰ or "central country."⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁶ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

⁴⁰⁷ Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities," *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no.1, 2005: 1-17; Aras and Polat, "Turkey and the Middle East," 471-488; Bezen Belamir Coşkun, "Turkey's Iraq Policy on the Brink of Civil War," *Peace and Conflict Review* 2, no.1, 2008: 1-9; Meliha B. Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," *Turkish Studies* 12, no.4, 2011: 569-587; Kemal Kirişci, "Turkey's Engagement with Its Neighborhood: A 'Synthetic' and Multidimensional Look at Turkey's Foreign Policy Transformation," *Turkish Studies* 13, no.3, 2012: 319-341; Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest," *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 3, 2012: 45-63; Emel Parlar Dal, "Assessing Turkey's 'Normative' Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region: New Dynamics and their Limitations," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.4, 2013: 709-734; Crystal A Ennis and Bessma Momani, "Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no.6, 2013: 1127-1144; Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model' in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective," *Turkish Studies* 15, no.2, 2014: 258-282; Defne Günay and Kaan Renda, "Usages of Europe in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 16, no.1, 2014: 47-67; Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq: New Tools of Engagement," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 27, no.3, 2014: 538-552; Ziya Öniş "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East," *Mediterranean Politics* 19, no.2, 2014: 203-219; Burak Bilgehan Özpek and Yelda Demirağ, "Turkish Foreign Policy After the 'Arab Spring: From Agenda-setter State to Agenda-entrepreneur State," *Israel Affairs* 20, no.3, 2014: 328-346.

⁴⁰⁸ Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations;" Altunışık and Tür, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners?," 229-248; Aras and Polat, "Turkey and the Middle East," 471-488; Kirişci, "Turkey's Engagement with Its Neighborhood," 319-341; Altunışık and Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP," 569-587.

⁴⁰⁹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 2, 2008: 41-54.

⁴¹⁰ Abdullah Gül, "Turkey's Role in a Changing Middle East Environment," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15, no.1, 2004: 1-7; Emad Y. Kaddorah, "The Turkish Model: Acceptability and Apprehension," *Insight Turkey* 12, no.4, 2010: 113-129; Dal and Erşen, "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model' in the Post-Cold War Era," 258-

Turkey's Iraqi policy played an important part in the constitution of its mediator role in line with its regional policy. According to policy makers, Turkey played a constructive role by defending the territorial integrity and national unity of Iraq.⁴¹² One of the reasons why it was against a sectarian war in Iraq was a possible spill over effect it could have on its own unity, which is composed of a diverse population of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, among others.⁴¹³ As such, Turkey followed a stance on behalf of the unity of Iraq by emphasizing the role of using diplomacy and soft power instead of hard power and military intervention.

In line with its policy on dialogue and cooperation, in 2008, High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was also signed between Iraq and Turkey which aimed to strengthen ties on issues ranging from security to energy and trade. Turkey also mediated between the Sunni and Shia groups to promote democratic elections and the inclusion of the Sunni groups into the electoral process. As also argued by Erdoğan, at the time, Turkey had been the only country that had good relations with all groups in Iraq and with all of Iraq's neighbours, at least until the Arab Spring.⁴¹⁴

3.2.3 The International Context

The change in the international context was a result of certain developments such as the termination of the Cold War and the September 11 events.⁴¹⁵ The new imperative created a widening room for manoeuvring for regional powers, such as Turkey, to become more

282; Oğuzhan Göksel, "Perceptions of the Turkish Model in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia," *Turkish Studies* 15, no.3, 2014: 476-495.

⁴¹¹ Şaban Kardaş, "From Zero Problems to Leading the Change: Making Sense of Transformation in Turkey's Regional Policy," *Turkey Policy Brief Series*, International Policy and Leadership Institute; Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, no.5, 2012.

⁴¹² Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Foreign Policy on Iraq," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-on-iraq.en.mfa> (accessed March 30, 2012).

⁴¹³ Coşkun, "Turkey's Iraq Policy on the Brink of Civil War," 2.

⁴¹⁴ Bülent Aras, "Iraqi Partition and Turkey's War on Terror: A Wider Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 9, no.3, 2007: 62.

⁴¹⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Three Major Earthquakes in the International System and Turkey," *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* 48, no.2, 2013: 1-11.

proactive in the resolution of conflicts. As such, Turkey positioned itself as a candidate for cooperation in dealing with problems in its region.

This section will dwell on the change in the international context, its impact on Turkish foreign policy and the subsequent emergence of Turkey's mediator role. It focuses on two major incidents including the end of the Cold War and the September 11 events in order to understand how Turkey's mediator role in international crisis has come to the fore.

3.2.3.1 The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War triggered major political, economic and social shifts in the international system. The prolonged bipolarity in the international system was replaced by a multipolar international order. According to Davutoğlu, as a result of the new distribution of power among “multiple” and “overlapping centers,” the concept of governance replaced the previous “notions of government, hegemony, or imperialism” thus, the dichotomist perceptions of “insider/outsider, or center/periphery or above/below” has become much more elusive.⁴¹⁶ The end of the Cold War has also pushed countries towards a search for new regional and international identities and roles.

Turkey was positioned in the Western bloc during the Cold War. Due to its geopolitical position, it had served rather as the buffer zone between the Western and Eastern power blocs which strengthened its role in world politics. Its NATO membership made it a component of the Western defence strategy. Furthermore, the deployment of the U.S. forces on its territory made Turkey a strong U.S. ally.⁴¹⁷ Under the confines of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy operated within the limited boundaries of Western interests.

⁴¹⁶ Davutoğlu, “Global Governance,” 5.

⁴¹⁷ Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish-American Relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters of Partnership?,” *Perceptions* 16, no.3, 2011: 29.

The end of the Cold War also resulted in the emergence of various conflicts in the post-Soviet countries. Turkey had historical, cultural, religious or national affiliations with most of these states most of which were former Ottoman lands. It utilized these links in order to increase its influence in these regions and took on mediator roles in a number of conflicts pertaining in these countries. As also argued by Aras, the new foreign policy emerged as a result of “a redefinition process that has been underway since the end of the Cold War.”⁴¹⁸

In the wake of the Cold War, Turkey had to reposition itself in the international system. Several concepts have been proposed so far in the literature to explain Turkey’s new position including *regional power*,⁴¹⁹ *middle power*,⁴²⁰ *central country*,⁴²¹ *emerging power* or *bridge country*.⁴²² All these terms including *middle power* as a popular term of the Cold War era are polemical among scholars and policy makers. *Middle power* is often criticized for being too categorizing.⁴²³ On the other hand the terms “regional power” and “emerging power” have become relatively more popular in recent years the latter mainly used to indicate countries that are becoming more influential in the global economic and political arena such as the BRICS countries, Malaysia or Indonesia. Bridge country has also been criticized by some. Yet these concepts, particularly the concept of “bridge country” have often been associated with Turkey’s mediator role. Altunışık and Çuhadar highlight that, “The bridge metaphor provided a suitable framework for third party activities as well, which encompassed notions like ‘impartiality’, ‘in-betweenness’, and reaching out to ‘all

⁴¹⁸ Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited,” 415.

⁴¹⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, 75.

⁴²⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books, 1997, 124-135.

⁴²¹ Interview with Haşimi.

⁴²² Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts,” 376.

⁴²³ Andrew Fenton Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997, 1.

sides.’’⁴²⁴ Haşimi, on the other hand, attributes a higher role for Turkey that exceeds the label of “bridge country.”⁴²⁵ He argues that,

Mediation has such a dimension: Turkey has been labelled as a bridge country since the past. Our emergence, meaning the vision of the Public Diplomacy Department, has been built on the perception that Turkey is more than a bridge country. We are a central country; this is the argument; this is the main framework. The activities are shaped around this.⁴²⁶

As also evident in the above discussions, labels such as central country or bridge country also fortify some of Turkey’s certain characteristics as a mediator such as legitimacy, status, position, connectivity, insiderness and inclusiveness. As such, after the Cold War, Turkey has been in an effort to reposition itself within the new world order. As will be discussed more in depth later in the text, mediation *inter alia* was a role conception adopted by Turkey to reidentify itself as an influential actor in world politics.

3.2.3.2 The September 11 Events

The September 11 was yet another rupture in world politics. One major impact has been the change it has created on the perception of security. Although, low-intensity conflicts have long been recognized phenomena on the periphery of the international system, they were novel and shocking experiences for Western countries. Having been attacked on the heart of US financial and military infrastructures, President George W. Bush declared a “war on terror” and contended that any state which was not with the US in its “war on terror” would be regarded against it.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Altunışık and Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts,” 376.

⁴²⁵ Interview with Haşimi.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ “You are either with us or against us,” *CNN.com*, November 06, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/> (accessed May 25, 2014).

In light of these developments, Turkey has been portrayed as a “model country” to the Muslim world with its moderate form of Islam and democratic outlook. As Kaddorah argues, “The combination of modernism and traditionalism, secularism and Islamism, and its dual Western and Eastern orientations is unique to Turkey.”⁴²⁸ Turkey’s unique characteristics which include being both a liberal democracy, the only Muslim majority country affiliated with Western institutions such as the NATO and being an EU candidate were frequently emphasized by Turkish policy makers to be able to attribute it a role as a mediator. As such, “the example of Turkey as a pro-Western secular Muslim state with a multi-party political system and free market economy”⁴²⁹ has been consolidated on the aftermath of September 11. Turkey’s portrayal as a model country also brought it forth as a suitable candidate for a mediator role in various disputes that took place particularly in the Middle East.

Turkey’s mediation was generally welcomed by Western countries such as the US as well as regional actors. It was also seen as an opportunity by the foreign policy makers to be able to become more influential in regional issues. As noted by Apakan, there has been a demand from the West for Turkey’s mediation in Syria, Libya and Iraq. Similarly, sometimes conflicting parties consult Turkey for mediation.⁴³⁰ Haşimi maintains that,

The historical tradition, the Islamic modernity, the West-the East, Islam and politics, the tradition and modernity that Turkey represents, the discussion on global war against terror in the Middle East and the situation that the world found itself in following the September 11... There emerged an experience as “the Turkish experience” as a result of all these.⁴³¹

⁴²⁸ Kaddorah, “The Turkish Model,” 115.

⁴²⁹ Dal and Erşen, “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-Cold War Era,” 264.

⁴³⁰ Interview with Ertuğrul Apakan, Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006-2009) and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, Istanbul, 11 Nisan 2013.

⁴³¹ Interview with Haşimi.

The moderate form of Islam that Turkey promotes in the Muslim world made it an ideal candidate as a mediator. For instance, Subaşı posits that many conflicts today pertain as a result of religious disagreements and the only institution that sets an example to the Muslim world is Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs.⁴³² He notes that,

There is no clarity in Islamic countries as to how the religion-state relations should be. Muslim countries do not have such structure as Vatican... The Presidency has an institutional power. On one hand it is modern; on the other hand it is warm-hearted to tradition and builds itself on a moderate ground. Thus, it has many buyers and followers... They [Muslim countries] send us officials and we give them information on the structure of the Presidency.⁴³³

According to Prof. Görmez, the President of the Directorate, “Turkey’s rational and liberal approach to the issue of religion has made very strong contributions to the extension of peace and happiness in Turkish society as well as in other Muslim communities.”⁴³⁴ Görmez also notes that Turkey’s domestic and global capacity “is supported by Turkey’s unique interpretation of secularism and freedom of thought and faith which are legally guaranteed.”⁴³⁵ In this respect, it may be argued that Turkey aims to set an example for the Muslim world with its liberal and secular interpretation of Islam. This attitude does not only aim to set a role model but also to promote liberal, secular Islam as a shield against the spread of radical Islam especially the Wahhabi, Salafi, and the Shia of Iran which fuel polarization and consequent conflicts in the Middle East. In addition to radical Islam, Görmez also lists traditional orientalism and Islamaphobia as other problems that increase polarization which are in the agenda of the Directorate.⁴³⁶

⁴³² Interview with Subaşı.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Mehmet Görmez, “Religion and Secularism in the Modern World: A Turkish Perspective,” *SAM Paper*, no.2, 2012, 11.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Ibid, 9-11.

Tahir Al-Nunu, Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government in Gaza, postulates that currently there are two models in the Islamic world.⁴³⁷ He elaborates, "The first model is al-Qaida, Taliban and other similar fundamentalist groups. The second model is Turkey. You ask anyone in the Arab countries and they prefer Erdoğan. Also the West prefers Erdoğan. Hamas also prefers to work with Erdoğan because he is moderate."⁴³⁸

Turkish policy makers argue that the concept of "moderate Islam" Turkey promotes may offer a possible solution or somewhat of a "middle way" to the Sunni-Shia divide which fuels conflicts in the Islamic world. They further posit that Turkey tries to fulfil this role of setting an example to the Muslim world with a moderate Islamic identity in peace with Western norms and values such as secularism and democracy. For instance, by referring to the "model partnership" that Turkey and the US could build to overcome problems that pertain as a result of "tensions between cultures" Barack Obama noted in a speech,

Where there is the most promise of building stronger US-Turkish relations is in the recognition that Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation, a predominantly Muslim nation - a Western nation and a nation that straddles two continents -that we can create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous, that there are not tensions- inevitable tensions between cultures, which I think is extraordinarily important.⁴³⁹

Similarly, by referring to Turkey as an "example," Haşimi notes that,

Turkey sets an example to Eastern countries with its story of democratization and its Muslim identity. It also shows the West that Islam can enter politics and develop a positive relationship with politics. We give out the message that secularism and Islam can coexist. In terms of experience, culture and the current government Turkey may be called Eastern, that is; non-Western, that does not fictionalize Westernism as a

⁴³⁷ Interview with Tahir Al-Nunu, Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government in Gaza, Istanbul, June 15, 2013.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ "Obama says U.S., Turkey can be model for World," *CNNPolitics.com*, April 06, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey/index.html?iref=hpmostpop> (accessed April 26, 2014).

political representation yet has a Western face in terms of its relations with the European Union and the United States. It is located in the East end of the West and the West end of the East.⁴⁴⁰

İzzet Şahin, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy Coordinator of IHH, pinpoints in a similar vein,

It is a natural consequence that the West often utilizes its relations with Turkey to reach out to the East, since Turkey, rather than any other Muslim country, approached the West following the establishment of its republic, wanted to enter the EU and built a bridge between the West and the East. There is nothing more natural than you becoming a bridge or a mediator in times of crisis between two parties if you have close relations with both of them.⁴⁴¹

Apakan emphasises that Turkey is a trustable mediator in the East, its Western ties do not create suspicion or resentment and it does not use its Western ties against the East.⁴⁴² These attributes have brought Turkey forth as a suitable mediator in crises that have emerged on the aftermath of the September 11. As such, it may be argued that Turkey have acted as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West. As Haşimi notes,

Turkey does not have a particular, strategic, growing fight neither with the East nor the West. It is politically Northern yet reflexively Southern. It resembles the Northern countries with its parliament, liberal democracy and its electoral system yet it resembles the Southern countries with the political reflexes it adopts. It talks about the Palestinian issue, about Somalia and Africa. It talks about the inequities and the problem of representation in the international system. There is no other Northern country that talks about such things. No other country exists that belongs to the North with the structure of its parliament yet belongs to the South with its reflexes.⁴⁴³

3.3 The Principles of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

The developments discussed above laid the foundation for the emergence of Turkey's new foreign policy, and subsequently its mediator role. The end of the Cold War, the September

⁴⁴⁰ Interview with Haşimi.

⁴⁴¹ Interview with İzzet Şahin, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy Coordinator of IHH, Istanbul, September 2, 2013.

⁴⁴² Interview with Apakan.

⁴⁴³ Interview with Haşimi.

11 events and the Iraqi War paved the way for Turkey to take initiatives regarding issues concerning the international society, its region and Turkey itself. The new foreign policy had been designed according to certain principles which were also influential in determining Turkey's mediation approach.

Davutoğlu is often regarded as the main architect of Turkey's new foreign policy. He was chief adviser to the prime minister prior to his appointment as the foreign minister in 2009 and as the Prime Minister in 2014. Davutoğlu's personal attributes and his academic background as professor of international relations have been influential in the formation of the foreign policy.

According to Aras,

There is a person who is very important in understanding Turkey's mediation: Ahmet Davutoğlu. His foreign policy vision foresees a Turkey that has resolved its problems with its neighbours and a foreign policy that is multidimensional. His understanding of diplomacy foresees diplomats active in the field. One of the tasks of the diplomat in the field is to understand and grasp the problems, convey them to the centre and implement the solutions produced by the centre in the field.⁴⁴⁴

Davutoğlu's academic background, his proactive personality and his capacity as foreign minister gave him the ability to bring his ideas into practice. His policies have received both admiration and criticism. The emphasis on peace, diplomacy and cooperation in his discourse was interpreted by some as over idealistic while others criticized it for being cover for a hidden agenda. These attributes, nevertheless, were effective in paving the way for Turkey's adoption of a mediator role in international conflicts.

⁴⁴⁴ Interview with Aras.

Turkish policy makers often suggest that Turkey offered a new sort of ethics in world politics. For instance, Haşimi argues that Turkey brings up issues that others, particularly Western actors as dominant players, refrain from talking. Haşimi underlines,

Understanding the practices of Turkish foreign policy requires going completely out of the frame of the current discipline [of international relations]. This is extremely important to us. What others consider unusual are very very critical and precious for us. But we know that this is how it goes in this field and geography. That is why there is a difference. This is the biggest reason why the practice that Turkey has produced in the last decade has been subject to intense discussion in such a short period. We talk about the issues that others ignore and the language that others overlook. It is not about the prime minister just doing rhetoric or speaking outloud, as some criticize. The A, B, C countries have been criticized for hundreds of years in this geography. The same sentences have been spelled out a thousand times on different platforms. But this [Turkey's discourse] has a ground. Because it is said by prime minister Erdoğan or foreign minister Davutoğlu. They speak on a ground; there is a certain story of success.⁴⁴⁵

Aras notes in a similar vein that, “Turkey’s position represents an alternative voice from the periphery for solutions to the decades-long conflicts in a number of problem-prone regions.”⁴⁴⁶

According to Davutoğlu, three “earthquakes” have been determinant in the emergence of Turkey’s role as a mediator. These are; the end of the Cold War, the September 11 events and the global economic-political crisis referring to the financial crises and the Arab Spring.⁴⁴⁷ In this view, Turkey is geopolitically, historically, and culturally at the centre of these earthquakes which makes it vulnerable to these emerging challenges of security since it is surrounded by conflicted regions. Davutoğlu argues that instead of being a part of the conflict, Turkey prefers to be a part of the solution by resorting to peaceful diplomatic

⁴⁴⁵ Interview with Haşimi.

⁴⁴⁶ Aras, “Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East,” 29.

⁴⁴⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, Istanbul Conference on Mediation, Istanbul, February 25, 2012.

means such as mediation.⁴⁴⁸ As Meral and Paris underlines Davutoğlu, “envisioning a proactive Turkey that will be a mediator, guarantor, and stabilizing force in the region.”⁴⁴⁹

In Davutoğlu’s words,

We [Turkey] suffer from a perception that other powers design regional politics and we only perform the roles assigned to us. We need to do away with this psychological sense of inferiority which has permeated in many segments of our society and amongst political elites.⁴⁵⁰

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s new foreign policy is shaped around three methodological and five operational principles. The methodological principles are; adopting a “visionary” instead of “crisis-oriented” approach towards issues; following a “consistent and systematic framework around the world” and adopting “a new discourse and diplomatic style” in foreign policy.⁴⁵¹ These principles are achieved through the use of soft-power as a diplomatic resource. Apakan notes similarly that Turkey has an area of geopolitical impact which it influences *inter alia* with its soft-power.⁴⁵² This view is also maintained by Haşimi who notes that,

There is a changing process and equilibrium in global politics. Countries like Turkey are in rise. These rising powers have such concerns as explaining themselves. Symbolically speaking, we do not have tanks, cannons or airplanes neither are we a nuclear power. We do not have underground treasures or oil. The only thing that would enable us to have a say in global politics is the perception that we can create. One dimension of this perception is conscience; what we call humanitarian diplomacy. Another dimension is becoming a new voice, a new breath in politics. Another dimension is talking about the issues that others do not put emphasis on. There are many dimensions to it.⁴⁵³

As such, Turkey’s lack of sufficient hard power to realize its goals motivates it towards relying on its soft power in its foreign policy. Mediation, in this respect, emerged *inter alia*

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁹ Meral and Paris, “Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity,” 80.

⁴⁵⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,” *Vision Papers*, SAM, no.3, 2012, 6.

⁴⁵¹ Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy;” Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision,” 77-96.

⁴⁵² Interview with Apakan.

⁴⁵³ Interview with Haşimi.

as an instrument for resolving problems without having to exert hard power and taking too much risk.

In addition to methodological principles, five operational principles determine Turkey's new foreign policy approach. The first one is achieving "balance between security and democracy."⁴⁵⁴ According to this principle, Turkey aims to establish security without compromising democracy. In this view, "the legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens and this should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country."⁴⁵⁵ This principle has lost its persuasiveness to a considerable extent particularly owing to Turkey's domestic democratic deficit. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey has the highest number of journalists in jail.⁴⁵⁶

In addition the right to assembly and protest has been severely limited in the last couple of years particularly since the Gezi protests of 2013. The Gezi protests also witnessed severe violations of human rights by the government.⁴⁵⁷ Although at the onset of its rule the AKP government and Erdoğan promoted democracy and human rights, in the last few years their promotion remained outside of Turkey rather than inside. As Oruç notes, "In the last ten years, Turkey has become the spokesperson of the oppressed; of those who have been massacred up until today which attributes it a natural mediator role."⁴⁵⁸ However, it failed to apply these norms domestically while it defends them internationally.

⁴⁵⁴ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

⁴⁵⁵ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision," 79.

⁴⁵⁶ "211 Journalists in World's Jails in 2013 - with Three Countries Holding Most," *The Guardian*, December 18, 2013.

⁴⁵⁷ Amnesty International, "Turkey accused of gross human rights violations in Gezi Park protests," October 2, 2013, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/turkey-accused-gross-human-rights-violations-gezi-park-protests-2013-10-02> (accessed May 12, 2014).

⁴⁵⁸ Interview with Oruç.

The second operational principle is Turkey's "zero-problems with neighbors policy."⁴⁵⁹ According to Şahin, "Turkey tries to resolve problems more with diplomacy and soft power than trying to resolve them with weapons; different than many other Western countries. Particularly in the last ten years, we have seen such examples in line with its zero-problems with neighbors policy."⁴⁶⁰

This principle, however, has been one of the most contested ones particularly during the Arab Spring. Zero-problems with neighbors policy could be realized to a certain extent during its initial phase. Turkey signed strategic partnerships with many of its neighbours even with its old enemies such as Greece and Syria. However, Turkey's recent policies towards Libya and Syria have been criticized as violations of this policy. For instance Oruç postulates that,

Turkey's zero-problems with neighbors policy emerged during a transitional period. No one can have zero-problems with anyone. Having zero-problems means accepting everything. This policy was meaningful at the time it was first crafted. Now, it has lost its meaning. We were not able to practise it in every period. For instance, Turkey could not side with the people in Libya. It was not able to side by the oppressed. It sided by those that moved alongside Kaddafi.⁴⁶¹

Oruç further notes that not siding with them created resentment among the people of Libya and Turkey lost considerable credibility in the country accordingly. This gap was eventually filled in by Western actors such as France. He highlights that it is the French and Italian contractors now who secures deals in Libya rather than the Turkish. Turkey's attitude also damaged its impartiality.⁴⁶² It may be argued that, zero-problems with neighbors policy indicates more of an ideal situation rather than a fully achievable operative principle on the practical level.

⁴⁵⁹ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

⁴⁶⁰ Interview with Şahin.

⁴⁶¹ Interview with Oruç.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

Many studies written after the eruption of the Arab Spring suggest a deviation in Turkish foreign policy from the zero-problems policy which aimed at developing good relations with neighbouring countries. For instance, Hursoy suggests that the zero-problems with neighbors policy could not cope with the unfolding challenges of the Arab Spring. She notes that, “The good relationship between Turkey and former authoritarian leaders in the Middle East is no longer sustainable through the zero problems policy” and “forceful and confrontational rhetoric has become the more recent style of Turkish foreign policy.”⁴⁶³ Regarding the change in Turkish foreign policy after the Arab Spring, Çağaptay suggests that the Arab Spring indeed resulted in the consolidation of Turkey’s traditional Western stance. He notes that, “Ankara has lately pivoted away from its neighbors, and the corresponding notion of Muslim solidarity, and toward NATO and Washington.”⁴⁶⁴

While some scholars suggest a change in Turkey’s foreign policy after the Arab Spring, others argue that the main doctrine has remained the same.⁴⁶⁵ For instance, unlike many scholars Şaban argues that indeed the main tenet of the new foreign policy was, and still is, the concept of “central country” rather than the zero-problems which, according to Kardaş, “was hardly a policy, strategy or the doctrine. It was only one among several principles that have collectively made up Ankara’s regional policy.”⁴⁶⁶ Oğuzlu, on the other hand, suggests that the Arab Spring is likely to “offer Turkey the opportunity to elevate its” zero-problems policy to “the 2.0. version, in which normative and humanitarian considerations

⁴⁶³ Hursoy, “Changing Dimensions of Turkey's Foreign Policy,” 159.

⁴⁶⁴ Soner Çağaptay, “Defining Turkish Power: Turkey as a Rising Power Embedded in the Western International System,” *Turkish Studies* 14, no.4, 2013: 798.

⁴⁶⁵ Kardaş, “From Zero Problems to Leading the Change.”

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 3.

are likely to become more salient” in parallel with “the spirit of Turkey’s liberal democratization process already underway at home.”⁴⁶⁷

The Arab Spring has posed significant challenges for Turkish foreign policy as well as its mediator role. It came as a surprise for policy makers and the regional turmoil created a setback for Turkey’s policy in the region. Chances for using soft power and mediation have decreased as a result of refusal of actors such as Assad to resolve issues through diplomacy.

The Arab Spring also resulted in a change of actors and emergence of different systems of governance in the region. The weakening of the Syrian state and the emergence of a strong opposition in Syria, the recent invasion of parts of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State, the establishment of Rojava, a *de facto* regional Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria are examples of such change. It is very likely that this change will continue in the future and Turkey will have to build new alliances and coalitions thereof.

Aras argues that,

The main difficulty that Turkey’s mediation has faced with the Arab Spring is being located within the scope of the nation state system. The system of nation state has been dissolved in this geography as a result of the Arab Spring. You do not have a state as an addressee. In one day, the prime minister of Iraq changes. There are authorities such as the central authority, the Sunni authority or the Kurdish authority. When there is no authority as a nation-state you cannot bring about peace between nation states. Turkey played the role of facilitator between Syria and Iraq. But now if there is a problem between Syria and Iraq, what are you going to do? Who will you invite from Iraq, who will you invite from Syria? The methods of conflict resolution and mediation that we used to be familiar with have become ineffective with the collapse of the nation state system. Perhaps Turkey needs to restructure its mediation according to the new realities of the region and bring together smaller, micro groups and gain new experiences of peacemaking. It should extend to the grassroots. The kind of mediation conducted by the foreign minister or the undersecretariat of the foreign ministry is not that relevant in the Middle

⁴⁶⁷ Tarık Oğuzlu, “The ‘Arab Spring’ and the Rise of the 2.0 Version of Turkey’s ‘zero problems with neighbors’ Policy,” SAM Papers, no.1, 2012, 3.

East anymore. It is perhaps an era of empowering the civil society and NGOs and conduct a kind of mediation that is spread more to the grassroots.⁴⁶⁸

Although it is too early to speak of a systemic change in the Middle East, one may still witness the emergence of aforementioned formations in the region. The Syrian regime has lost considerable power and legitimacy. As Aras notes, this creates a lack of authority in the region as well as a condition where it is difficult to find an addressee for potential conflict resolution attempts.

It is difficult to achieve peace through mediation under such conditions since the actors keep changing. As such, a noteworthy development during the Arab Spring was the emergence of IHH as a mediator in the region. IHH's mediation in Syria between the opposition and the Assad government for the release of the Iranians held by the former as well as the release of the Turkish journalists held by the Syrian intelligence are examples of its mediation.⁴⁶⁹

In this respect, the real challenge for Turkey's mediation during the Arab Spring has not been its inability to find addressees or to diversify its type of mediators. The example of IHH suggests that Turkey is able to find shortcuts to resolve conflicts, in times even by utilizing its civilian capacity. The real challenge, however, has been its partial image. Turkey has taken the side of the oppositions during the Arab Spring which raised criticism vis-à-vis its impartiality. As Aras notes, "Taking sides during the Arab Spring has changed

⁴⁶⁸ Interview with Aras.

⁴⁶⁹ "Syrian Rebels Free Iranian Hostages in Swap," *Al Jazeera*, January 9, 2013, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/01/201319102949949456.html (accessed May 12, 2014); "Humanitarian diplomacy in Syria," *IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation*, www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/humanitarian-diplomacy-in-syria/314 (accessed April 15, 2015).

Turkey's all-inclusiveness which is its main asset as a mediator. Turkey will be successful [as a mediator] so long as it can protect this asset."⁴⁷⁰

The third operational principle is following a "proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy" aiming to prevent crises before they actually erupt or worsen into an unmanageable level.⁴⁷¹ As Altunışık and Çuhadar underscore, "Turkey's new geopolitics also meant that it was surrounded by unstable states and regions, endemic with armed conflicts that risk spilling over across its borders."⁴⁷² The principle of proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy puts emphasis on diplomacy and soft power and how these could be utilized to prevent the growth of conflicts. For instance, "security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence" are concepts that Turkey utilizes to apply this principle in regional politics.⁴⁷³ Turkey's reconciliation between the Sunni and the Shia groups in Iraq and Serbia and Bosnia in the Balkans may be highlighted as examples to such efforts.

The fourth operational principle that Davutoğlu outlines is following a "multi-dimensional foreign policy."⁴⁷⁴ In recent years, in line with the changing political and economic dynamics in world affairs, Turkey has adapted a multi-dimensional foreign policy engaging with multiple actors globally. According to Davutoğlu, this engagement has been aimed "to be complementary, not in competition."⁴⁷⁵ In addition to its long liaison with the US, NATO and the EU Turkey has also been trying to improve its relations with BRICS as well as many countries in the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, South America, and the like. Multi-dimensionalism in Turkey's foreign policy is an important feature for its mediator

⁴⁷⁰ Interview with Aras.

⁴⁷¹ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

⁴⁷² Altunışık and Çuhadar, "Turkey's Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conflicts," 373.

⁴⁷³ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision," 82.

role as well since it increases its visibility, mobility and its ability to talk to multiple actors simultaneously. Consequently, it increases Turkey's credibility as a mediator.

The fifth operational principle of Turkish foreign policy is pursuing "rhythmic diplomacy" which corresponds to following an active diplomatic role by engaging with key actors in the international arena.⁴⁷⁶ This principle also suggests an understanding of taking advantage of opportunities if they arise. For instance, Turkey's non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, its memberships in G-20, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), its active dialogue with the Arab League, African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council may be listed as some examples of this principle. Following rhythmic diplomacy also enhances Turkey's international status.

Turkey's status and mediator role feed one another. While Turkey's international status provides it with certain legitimacy and credibility as a mediator, its mediator role provides it with international visibility and fortifies its status. For instance, Turkey is an active member of various international organizations which makes it influential in the international arena. It also has strong relationships with global players such as the US, the EU and Russia which provides it with considerable status and leverage in international affairs that further enhances its role as a mediator. Its affiliation with Western institutions also fosters its international status. As Gezer notes,

One of the important dimensions of Turkey's soft power is its institutional relations with the transatlantic and European institutions. Although it is not a member of the EU, Turkey is a member of all of the EU's political and economic institutions. It is also a member of the NATO. Such affiliations affect perceptions on Turkey. Having both Eastern and Western ties also enable Turkey avoid having to make a choice [between the West and the East]. For instance, Turkey's relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should not be regarded as a deviation from the West but rather as complementary pieces of Turkey as a rising regional and global power.

⁴⁷⁶ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy."

Turkey's affiliations with these institutions also play an important role within the process of becoming ripe as a mediator.⁴⁷⁷

The above discussion constitutes the background of the emergence of Turkey's mediator role as a tool of foreign policy. In line with this new understanding, Turkey sought to make sense of its mediator capacity and the possibilities for using it.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter elaborated on the change in Turkey's foreign policy which, as argued here, paved the way for the emergence of its mediator role. Turkey's search for a new identity under the imperatives of domestic balances as well as the changing regional and international dynamics paved the way for the emergence of a new vision for Turkish foreign policy. The end of the Cold War, the September 11 events, the Iraqi War, the AKP's ascendance to power, Turkey's EU accession process, and the increasing level of prosperity in the country are some of the developments that triggered such turn.

In terms of domestic developments, the EU accession process, the AKP's ascendance to power, the economic growth and the process of democratization have come to fore. The AKP's single party rule provided a relatively stable political-economic environment on the domestic scene which helped build a certain level of confidence by the policy makers and become more active on the international arena. Turkey's mediator role developed in conformity with the EU's neighbourhood and security policies. Turkey's *zero-problems with neighbors* and *security for all* policies were results of its EU accession process. This process also increased its regional and international credibility and contributed to its image as a peacemaker.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with Gezer.

The process of democratization triggered by the EU accession process and the subsequent rise of the civil society in Turkey were also important for Turkey's mediator role particularly with respect to the increase in humanitarian activities in conflict zones *inter alia* those that Turkey mediates in such as Africa or the Balkans. As such, Turkish foreign policy has significantly relied on domestic political and economic stability which was also necessary to consolidate the position of the new elite in Turkey and explains why the government was unable to further bend a towards deepening democracy. Instead the Turkish elite preferred to secure domestic stability by deepening their ties with the global economy.

In terms of regional developments, the Iraqi War was a milestone that paved the way for the emergence of Turkey's mediator role. Turkish foreign policy makers decided to take on a more proactive role in resolving the problems pertaining in their region to avoid a spill over effect, bring order and stability to Turkey and pursue its interests in the region. Turkey acted as an *insider* mediator with an *all-inclusive* approach among various parties in Iraq.

Turkey's regional policy became influential in the formation of its mediation approach. Principles such as promoting high-level political dialogue, building regional mechanisms, developing economic interdependence, building a comprehensive security framework and support multicultural coexistence through the inclusion of all actors in the processes were effective in building its mediation framework. Turkey exists in its region with its economy and diplomacy and mediation is an important instrument for implementing its goals.

In terms of the international context, the end of the Cold War and the September 11 events brought about a need for countries to reposition themselves in the international system and created an opportunity for peripheral countries to take on more proactive roles in

international affairs, as was the case with Turkey. The September 11 created a change in the perception of security and Turkey's mediator role was a welcome development in the face of such unrest with its moderate Islamic, liberal, democratic and secular outlook.

The chapter has also shown that the response given to these developments by Turkish foreign policy makers based on their identities and interests, particularly by former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, played a significant role in the emergence of Turkey's mediator role. His belief in the virtue of reigniting Turkey's historical-geographical links embedded in its Ottoman past played a particular role in the adoption of a proactive foreign policy based on investing in peace and stability in post-Ottoman areas.

However, the evidence provided in this chapter suggests that Turkey's newly constructed identity rests upon a delicate balance and has not always been able to work. One of the challenges to Turkey's mediator role has been the Arab Spring. The failure of Turkey's Syrian policy during the Arab Spring offers a new context to analyse its previous performance as well as the future of its mediator role. It also offers an opportunity to inspect the sustainability of this role. Although the following chapter will cover only the period of the Syrian-Israeli talks, I will conduct a more detailed discussion on the possible consequences of the Arab Spring in the final conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER 4 – TURKEY’S MEDIATION IN THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TALKS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to understand the parameters of Turkey’s role as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks which began in 2007 and were suspended in 2009 following Israel’s attack on Gaza. This role was first requested by the Syrian President Bashar Assad during his visit to Istanbul in 2004 and was brought to life in 2007.⁴⁷⁸ The Syrian-Israeli case offers a sound example to analyse Turkey’s mediation in an interstate conflict. It is also a case which was limited to diplomatic negotiations unlike, for instance, the Somali case which also includes several other means supportive of mediation such as aid and the involvement of the civil society.

In order to bring Turkish mediation into sharper focus, the chapter considers how Turkish mediation compares and contrasts with US mediation in the same dispute that took place in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and between 1991 and 2000. It is not possible to examine Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks without considering how the US mediated since it has been by far the most influential mediating power in the region. It has been the lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks, has mediated frequently and across many different time frames. It is impossible to talk about Turkey’s mediation without this context; and it is instructive to consider how Turkey has managed to mediate despite its obvious drawbacks such as extensive economic and military power. Therefore it is only sensible to offer some kind of comparison with what has gone before.

Analysing a case from the Middle East is also interesting in that it offers a ground to understand how Turkey mediates in its immediate neighbourhood in which it has deep

⁴⁷⁸ Akiva Eldar, “Background: How the Covert Contacts Transpired,” *Haaretz*, January 16, 2007.

historical-geopolitical roots. Any conflict that takes place in the region has direct impact on Turkey because of the cultural, political, economic impact it may have on it. In addition, solving the Syrian-Israeli conflict would also bring considerable prestige to Turkey in terms of its support for the Palestinian cause since no Arab-Israeli conflict can be considered independent from the overall context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Supporting that claim is the evidence that the Syrian-Israeli talks were suspended upon Israel's attack on Gaza in 2008.

It should, nevertheless, be noted that there have been significant changes in the region since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Turkey is now faced with a different region and different Syria. As such, there will be a discussion on the sustainability of this role vis-à-vis the unfolding reality of the Arab Spring in the final conclusion of the thesis. The Arab Spring offers an interesting case to discuss the potential for the future Turkey's mediator role.

Keeping these questions in mind, this chapter will first illuminate the background of the conflict by analysing its actors, issues, its context and dynamics. It will then investigate Turkey's difference as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks by drawing on different themes and indicators brought out in Chapter 2 such as previous experiences of mediators, mediator's motives, characteristics of mediators, their style of mediation, methods of mediation and finally the progress of mediators.

4.2 Background on the Syrian-Israeli Conflict

The Syrian-Israeli conflict, which started upon the establishment of the state of Israel on the Palestinian territories in 1948, is one of the tracks of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Following Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 the issue ceased to be only a matter of ideology but gained a new dimension as a matter of

territorial sovereignty. Unlike the Israeli-Egyptian or the Israeli-Jordanian conflicts, the Syrian-Israeli conflict is noteworthy for not having attained a solution in almost half a decade.

Syria positioned against Israel in all Arab-Israeli wars including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Lebanon War. According to Rabinovich, "Syria's bitter relationship with Israel has expressed both its genuine attachment to Arab nationalism and to the Palestinian cause and its acute sense of rivalry with Israel for hegemony in the Levant."⁴⁷⁹ As argued by Ma'oz, considering that Egypt and Jordan are in a state of negative peace with Israel, Iraq struggles with its own internal problems, and Palestine poses more of a political rather than a military threat, Syria and Iran constitute the main threats for Israel in the region.⁴⁸⁰ As Kissinger notes, in the Middle East there can be "no war without Egypt, no peace without Syria."⁴⁸¹

4.2.1 Actors of the Conflict

Understanding the actors of the conflict is important for understanding how Turkey determines its approach vis-à-vis the interests of these actors. For instance, Turkey's previous relations with these actors or to what extent they are included in the mediation process may be important in understanding its mediation approach.

There are various actors that have been involved in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The primary actors to the conflict are Syria and Israel. While Israel considers Syria as a threat to its existence, Syria considers it as an enemy in violation of its right to sovereignty. The conventional power disparity between the two actors coupled with the supremacy of Israel

⁴⁷⁹ Itamar Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs and the Middle East 1948-2012*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013, 3.

⁴⁸⁰ Moshe Ma'oz, "Syrian-Israeli Relations on the Eve of the Peace Process," in Joseph Ginat, Edward Joseph Perkins and Edwin G. Corr (eds.), *The Middle East Peace Process: Vision Versus Reality*, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002, 211.

⁴⁸¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

has led Syria to support low intensity conflicts and paramilitary forces in the region which created a security threat for the former.

One of the secondary actors to the Syrian-Israeli conflict is Iran which is also a strategic partner of Syria. Iran and Syria constitute a major block of the Shia axis in the Middle East alongside Hezbollah. According to Ma`oz, some of the reasons why Syria cooperates with Iran is to be able to receive more aid from oil rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, to legitimize the Ba'athist-Alawi rule of Assad in a Sunni majority country like Syria, and to gain the support of the Shia community in Lebanon.⁴⁸² As a result, a possible peace deal between Syria and Israel largely interests Iran. Such an agreement could also bring Syria closer to the US in which case Iran would lose its closest ally to its biggest enemy. As Moubayed notes, "Syrians went to Maryland [the peace talks under the US mediation] despite loud objections from both Iran and Hamas."⁴⁸³

Another secondary actor is Hamas which is an important stakeholder in the Syrian-Israeli conflict as a result of its close relations with Syria and Iran. Hamas is regarded a "terrorist organization" by many actors including the US, the EU, and Israel and is considered a security threat for Israel.

Hezbollah also comes to fore as a secondary actor in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The organization was founded in 1982 subsequent to Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. Its ideology is based on Shia-Islamism, anti-Imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Supported by Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is an important stakeholder in the Syrian-Israeli dispute. One of the reasons behind the Syrian government's support for Hezbollah is to foster the Shia axis.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸² Moshe Ma`oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 188.

⁴⁸³ Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," 6.

⁴⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, "International Religious Freedom Report 2006: Syria," *Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm> (accessed October 17, 2011).

4.2.2 Issues of the Conflict

There are four main issues in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. These are; the Golan Heights, the asymmetric exercise of power, the Jewish minority in Syria, and the soldiers abducted by Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

The Golan Heights is probably the most important issue in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The Heights are located in Hauran region in the south-western part of Syria.⁴⁸⁵ Israel invaded the Heights during the Six Day War in 1967 and annexed it in 1981. Israel's annexation of the Heights is declared "null and void and without international legal effect" by Resolution 497 of the UN Security Council.⁴⁸⁶ The occupied territories are the Mount Hermon in the north, the Yarmuk Valley in the south, the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) in the west and the borders determined by the ceasefire agreement in May 1974 in the east.⁴⁸⁷

Among these, the 2814 meters high Mount Hermon is the highest and most strategic one from which Damascus, Syria, and Lebanon can be easily monitored which makes it much more strategic than Sinai. In addition, there is a much larger demilitarized zone in Sinai than Golan which makes it harder for Egypt to attack Israel.⁴⁸⁸ Israel has established 33 Jewish settlements with a total population of 19,000 in the Golan.⁴⁸⁹ If Israel withdrew from the Golan, it would have to pay high amounts of compensation to the residents and reallocate them.

⁴⁸⁵ "Regions and territories: The Golan Heights," *BBC*, August 30, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/3393813.stm (November 12, 2011).

⁴⁸⁶ UN Security Council S/RES/497, December 17, 1981.

⁴⁸⁷ Robert G. Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon*, London; Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, 169-170.

⁴⁸⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, "Peace and War: Israel versus Syria," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2000, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/peacewarisraelsyria.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2011).

⁴⁸⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross, "Occupied Golan: nurturing ties with the rest of Syria", February 15, 2011, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2011/golan-update-2011-02-15.htm> (accessed July 21, 2011).

In addition the above mentioned reasons, the Golan Heights are also crucial for their natural water resources. The Jordan River consists of four currents which are; Hatzbani and Iyon flowing through Lebanon, Banyas flowing through Syria, and Dan originating from Mount Hermon.⁴⁹⁰ These four currents meet in Huleh Valley, pass through the Sea of Galilee, join Yarmuk and Jabok rivers and flow into the Dead Sea. The Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee together constitute 40 per cent of Israel's main water supply.⁴⁹¹

Based on the above information, the Golan Heights is the primal issue of the Syrian-Israeli conflict and should be resolved as a prerequisite to a sustainable peace between Syria and Israel.

Syria's link with organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah is another important disputed issue between Syria and Israel. Israel considers these organizations as "terrorist organizations" and it has always stood both against them and against the supporters of these organizations. Israel's withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in Lebanon during the 1982 Lebanon War was considered a success for Syria gained through Iran and Hezbollah.⁴⁹²

Supporting the militias in the region may be seen as a kind of survival strategy of the Assad government. In addition, the asymmetric power disparity between Syria and Israel may be a reason why Syria supports militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah rather than

⁴⁹⁰ Arnon Soffer, *Rivers of Fire: The Conflict over Water in the Middle East*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, 119; Marwa Daoudy, "A Missed Chance for Peace: Israel and Syria's Negotiations Over the Golan Heights," *Journal of International Affairs* 61, no.2, 2008: 216.

⁴⁹¹ Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection, "Sea of Galilee (Kinneret)", April 11, 2013, http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/env_topics/MajorBodiesOfWater/Pages/SeaOfGalilee.aspx (accessed June 10, 2015).

⁴⁹² Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel*, 188.

counting on its conventional power.⁴⁹³ The asymmetric and unpredictable nature of the Syrian-Israeli conflict is a handicap for the resolution of the conflict.

The situation of the Jewish minority in Syria is one of the issues that were discussed during the negotiations between Syria and Israel. While the number of Jews in Syria was recorded as 30,000 in 1947 and 5,000 in 1949, as of 2011, it was under 100 residing in Damascus and Aleppo.⁴⁹⁴

The Jewish neighbourhoods and synagogues in Aleppo were attacked and burned down by angry crowds to protest the establishment of Israel in 1947 and 75 people lost their lives.⁴⁹⁵

A synagogue was bombed in Damascus following the 1949 War resulting in 12 casualties. Jews were prohibited to travel outside Syria after 1947 except for special conditions. Despite the ban, Jews kept fleeing Syria and a vast majority of them settled in USA and Israel.⁴⁹⁶

During the peace talks following the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 the US started pressing Syria to lift the travel barriers and reduce restrictions on property ownership by Jews. 1262 Syrian Jews immigrated to Israel in an undercover operation in 1994. Most of the remaining Jews were freed by Syria as a result of heavy pressure. The participation of the remaining Jews in political and economic life is under heavy restrictions and they are officially banned from public and military service.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹³ Neil Quilliam, *Syria and the New World Order*, UK: Itacha, 1999, 142.

⁴⁹⁴ Robert Tuttle, "The Jews of Syria", *Syria Comment*, October 24, 2005, <http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2005/10/jews-of-syria-by-robert-tuttle.htm> (accessed October 22, 2011); American Jewish Committee Archives, "Condition of the Jews in Syria", April 1949, http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/ARB37.PDF (accessed October 22, 2011).

⁴⁹⁵ Daniel Pipes, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 57.

⁴⁹⁶ Tuttle, "The Jews of Syria."

⁴⁹⁷ Mitchell Bard, "The Jews of Syria," *Jewish Virtual Library*, 2003, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/syrianjews.html#5> (accessed November 11, 2011).

The abduction of Israeli soldiers by Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah is another issue of contention between Syria and Israel. Israel demanded Syria to provide information on the soldiers and use its leverage on Hamas and Hezbollah for their return. The soldiers in question are; Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, and Zvi Feldman abducted by Syria in 1982; major Ron Arad abducted by the Lebanese Shia militia group Amal in 1987; Joseph Fink and Rahamim Alsheich abducted by Hezbollah in 1986; the businessman and reserve colonel Elchanan Tenenbaum and Israeli soldiers Adi Avitan, Benyamin Avraham and Omar Sawaid abducted by Hezbollah in 2000; Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeviki whose abduction by Hezbollah resulted in the outburst of the 2006 Lebanon War; and Gilad Shalit who was abducted by Hamas the same year.⁴⁹⁸

While the situation of Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, Zvi Feldman and major Ron Arad is still unclear, the bodies of Joseph Fink and Rahamim Alsheich were returned in 1996, the bodies of Adi Avitan, Benyamin Avraham, and Omar Sawaid' were returned together with Elchanan Tenenbaum in 2004, the bodies of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeviki were returned in 2008, and Gilad Shalit was returned in a prisoner exchange swap in 2011.⁴⁹⁹

4.2.3 The Context and Dynamics of the Conflict

The Syrian-Israeli conflict is a long-standing one that has been on-going since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1947. Although it has been exposed to several interventions in the past, to date, it has not reached a comprehensive settlement. The context surrounding the Syrian-Israeli conflict is determined by a region that is rich in

⁴⁹⁸ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Missing in Actions", October 23, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Israeli+MIAs.htm (accessed November 9, 2011); Carol Migdalovitz, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, July 29, 2010, 44.

⁴⁹⁹ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Missing in Actions;" Migdalovitz, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations," 44.

conflict over power, sovereignty, territory and resources while poor in security and communication let alone cooperation.

The context of the Cold War further fuelled the conflict by turning the region into a zone of proxy wars between the USSR and the US. Although the USSR supported Israel upon the establishment of the latter, throughout the Cold War its position changed on behalf of the Arab states while the US sided with Israel to counterbalance the Soviet influence.⁵⁰⁰

The nature of the Syrian-Israeli conflict indicates an issue of sovereignty, ideology, territory, natural resources and security. It is protracted and intractable. The quality of communication between the parties is poor and indirect. As Stein notes, “the history of the Middle East is littered with aborted peace proposals”,⁵⁰¹ and there is no doubt that the Syrian-Israeli conflict got its share from this trend.

The first and second Iraqi Wars also had negative impact on the security and stability of the region. As Salem underlines, after the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and the subsequent American presence across its borders, the Syrian regime started to feel under threat.⁵⁰² The establishment of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq also raised concerns over the possible uprising of Syria’s own Kurdish population. Syria also felt cornered upon allegations of its involvement in the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. Although the 2006 July War between Lebanon and Israel resulted in the self-claimed victory of Hezbollah, the organization lost considerable power during the war which also put Syria at unease.⁵⁰³ These developments fed Syria’s enthusiasm to revive the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Israel would also benefit from a peace treaty since it

⁵⁰⁰ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 4.

⁵⁰¹ Janice Gross Stein, “The Fundamentals of Peacemaking: A Retrospective Analysis,” in P. Marantz and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Peace-making in the Middle East*, London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1985, 218.

⁵⁰² Paul Salem, “Syrian–Israeli Peace: A Possible Key to Regional Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Foreign Policy for the Next President Series, December 2008, 2.

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

carries the potential of weakening the Shia axis in the Middle East by integrating Syria into the Western alliance.

Ideologically, the Syrian-Israeli conflict signals a conflict of two opposite ends as pan-Arabism against Zionism. Syria's Ba'th regime has been one of the pioneers of pan-Arabism and anti-Zionist rhetoric while Israel has always considered pan-Arab ideology as a threat to its survival. The antagonism between the two ideologies constitutes one of the dynamics of the Syrian-Israeli dispute.⁵⁰⁴

In terms of the nature of the conflict, the Golan Heights make the Syrian-Israeli case an issue of territory, sovereignty and natural resources. The asymmetric exercise of power and the abducted soldiers make it an issue of security. In addition to being strategic in terms of security and natural resources, the Golan Heights also has a symbolic significance. For Syria it is a symbol of "national pride"⁵⁰⁵ and "sovereignty"⁵⁰⁶ while for Israel it has historical and religious significance and is within the borders of Israel designated in the bible.⁵⁰⁷ According to Slater, Israel's argument stems from its efforts to gain historical legitimacy for its expansionist policies.⁵⁰⁸ By returning the Golan to Syria Israel would not only lose an epic value but also a strategic military superiority, more than thirty settlements, and a vital natural water resource.

On the other hand, by gaining the Golan back, Syria would not only get a strategic territory and vital water resources back but also regain the credits and prestige that the regime had

⁵⁰⁴ Moshe Ma'oz, "Syria's Role in the Region: Mediator, Peacemaker, or Agressor?," A Century Foundation Report, The Century Foundation, 2008, 3.

⁵⁰⁵ Jerome Slater, "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001," *International Security* 27, no.1, 2002: 84.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid, 90.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

lost since the Heights were lost during Hafez Assad's term as the Minister of Defence.⁵⁰⁹ In addition, the Golan Heights and the rift with Israel had often been used as the scapegoat for the shortcomings and weaknesses of the Assad regime.⁵¹⁰ The Arab-Israeli conflict and especially the Palestinian issue have been used as an excuse to legitimize their status-quo by many regimes in the region including Syria and Israel.

Looking at the Syrian-Israeli conflict one may also notice a low quality of communication between the parties. The absence of diplomatic relations between the two states is a factor that complicates the course of the negotiations often leaving them as indirect and secret.

4.3 Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Talks

4.3.1 US Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Conflict

The US has been the frontrunner of the Middle East peace process ever since the eruption of the conflict. It had also been the lead mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks until Turkey's mediation. Egypt and Saudi Arabia played minor mediator roles during the 1974 negotiations by convincing Syria to accept US mediation or to prepare the list of the Israeli prisoners to be handed over to the US.⁵¹¹ Switzerland played a brief mediator role in secret informal talks in 2007 to negotiate the repatriation of the remains of Eli Cohen to Israel, a former Israeli spy executed by Syria in 1965.⁵¹²

The US mediated several rounds of negotiations between Syria and Israel from 1974 until 2000. The first one of these was the peace talks that took place in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The renowned US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger under Richard Nixon mediated between Syria and Israel through shuttle diplomacy as part of the peace

⁵⁰⁹ Quilliam, *Syria and the New World Order*, 208.

⁵¹⁰ Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors*, 33-34.

⁵¹¹ Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982, 254-255.

⁵¹² Assaf Uni and Akiva Eldar, "Switzerland says it mediated in informal Israel-Syria peace talks," *Haaretz*, January 22, 2007.

negotiations between Israel and the parties to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulting in a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974.⁵¹³

The US used indirect talks through shuttle diplomacy, summit diplomacy and direct talks as methods of mediation across the years. Probably the most notable one among these was Kissinger's signature "step-by-step" approach used during the Arab-Israeli peace talks of 1974.⁵¹⁴ During the negotiations Kissinger concluded that there was lack of sufficient points of convergence between Egypt, Syria, and Palestine to reach a comprehensive peace with Israel. He was not satisfied with the previous approaches such as the memorandum of Gunnar Jarring during the 1971 Arab-Israeli talks which "asked Israel for a commitment to withdraw to the pre-June war Egypt-Israel border, in return for Arab commitments to peace."⁵¹⁵ Kissinger therefore decided to follow a step-by-step approach with the idea to resolve each track separately before reaching a final comprehensive peace. He started by negotiating the separation of the armies of the three allies. He then conducted separate tracks of negotiations with the parties through shuttle diplomacy. The step-by-step approach also diverted attention from the main issues that were more difficult to resolve in the short run such as the recognition of Israel, the Palestinian issue, or the boundary issues into more doable issues such as disengagement agreements or prisoner swaps. In this sense, Kissinger followed a more "gradual approach" rather than a "comprehensive approach."⁵¹⁶

⁵¹³ Ezzedine Choukri-Fishere, "Against Conventional Wisdom: Mediating the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Center for Humanitarian Dialogue*, 2008, 2.

⁵¹⁴ Hoffmann, "A New Policy for Israel," 405.

⁵¹⁵ U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976 Volume 25, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 80, 80. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 24, 1973.

⁵¹⁶ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 272.

In an attempt to explain Kissinger's "step-by-step" approach Stein notes, "Beginning generally with the issues most amenable to solution, he postponed indefinitely those he considered most resistant to compromise, expecting that progress in negotiation would itself generate momentum and change the bargaining environment to permit further progress." Stein further notes with a criticism that, "What he [Kissinger] kept off the agenda was far more important than what he put on the table."⁵¹⁷ According to Seale, Kissinger's step-by-step approach broke the Arab unity and dragged Egypt out of the coalition giving Israel considerable leverage in the negotiations.⁵¹⁸

The first direct talk between Syria and Israel was mediated in Washington following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference that was initiated by the US, hosted by Spain, and sponsored by the US and the USSR. The conference consisted of several tracks including bilateral talks between Israel and Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan.⁵¹⁹

The talks were held in Washington on November 3, 1991 and were mediated by the US Secretary of State James Baker under George Bush based on the principle of "land for peace" and resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the UN Security Council.⁵²⁰ Israel was represented by Yosi Ben-Aharon from the government of Yitzhak Shamir and Syria was represented by Muwafiq al-Alaf from the Syrian government. While security was Israel's priority during the talks without addressing the issue of land, Syria sat on the table with the precondition that Israel returns to its borders of before June 4, 1967. The

⁵¹⁷ Stein, "The Fundamentals of Peacemaking," 231.

⁵¹⁸ Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989, 260-261.

⁵¹⁹ Salem, "Syrian-Israeli Peace," 4.

⁵²⁰ Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors*, 199; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by President Clinton on Meetings between PM Barak and FM al-Shara," December 16, 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1998-1999/Statement%20by%20President%20Clinton%20on%20Meetings%20between> (accessed November 11, 2011); Helena Cobban, *The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-96 and Beyond*, USIP Press: Washington, D.C., 1999, 15; Ma'oz, "Syrian-Israeli Relations on the Eve of the Peace Process," 224.

negotiations remained unresolved since both sides sat on the table with "zero-sum" solutions and were reluctant to make any concessions.⁵²¹

The projected eagerness towards peace of the Yitzhak Rabin government, which came to power in the 1992 Israeli elections, was a new light of hope. The Rabin government accepted to withdraw from the Golan in exchange for Syria's word for peace and security. Syria, on the other hand, did not only give its word for peace, it also agreed on developing diplomatic relations, cooperating on tourism and commerce, allowing the Jewish minority in Syria to leave the country, and allowing the Banyas River to flow into the Jordan River.⁵²² The favourable atmosphere was disrupted by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a radical Israeli citizen, following a peace march held in Tel Aviv on November 4, 1995.⁵²³

Shimon Peres, Israel's then Foreign Minister, took over the government and continued the negotiations following Rabin's assassination. The parties met for another time at the Aspen Institute's Wye River Conference Centers on December 27, 1995 hosted by the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher under President Bill Clinton. Promising decisions were taken such as the normalization of relations, the establishment of economic relations, and normalization of Israel's relations with other Arab countries including Lebanon. Despite certain ambiguities regarding the Golan and security, the discussion of these issues

⁵²¹ Yossi Ben-Aharon, "Negotiation with Syria: A First-Hand Account," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4, no.2, 2000: 1-13.

⁵²² Eyal Zisser, "Israeli-Syrian Peace Negotiations (December 1999-March 2000): A Missed Opportunity?," in Ginat, Perkins and Corr (eds.), *The Middle East Peace Process*, 230.

⁵²³ "1995: Israeli PM shot dead," *BBCHome*, On This Day: November 4, 1995, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/4/newsid_2514000/2514437.stm (accessed October 8, 2014).

were postponed to subsequent negotiations. However, as in past negotiations, the decisions were not implemented.⁵²⁴

The election of Ehud Barak as the prime minister in 1999 was well received in terms of the peace process. The talks were subsequently resumed in December 1999 and January 2000 under the mediation of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during Bill Clinton's presidency. However, the negotiations did not achieve any concrete results. According to Rabinovich, although prospects were higher during 1990s for resolution compare to that of the Palestinian track, US mediation collapsed in 2000 as a result of reasons such as lack of mutual political will in terms of making concessions, the death of Hafiz al-Assad, change of government in Israel and in the US.

Although, Basher Assad's rise to power following the death of his father on June 10, 2000 had raised hopes and was thought to bring a new pulse into the peace talks, the negotiations were not resumed until Turkey's mediation in 2008.⁵²⁵ The fact that Ariel Sharon preferred to spend his energy on the Israeli-Palestinian track, US growing hostility towards Syria, its accusation of Syria for the assassination of Rafic Harriri, and the growing tension between Israel and Hezbollah may be listed as reasons of the suspension of the talks.⁵²⁶

In 2010, the US briefly mediated between Syria and Israel under the mediation of Frederic Hof, a former US diplomat and special coordinator for Lebanon and Syria and Dennis B.

⁵²⁴ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 52-54.

⁵²⁵ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel and Syria Resume Peace Negotiations," December 9, 1999, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel%20and%20Syria%20Resume%20Peace%20Negotiations> (accessed November 8, 2011).

⁵²⁶ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 163-171.

Ross, special assistant to President Obama on the Middle East. The talks were suspended as a result of the eruption of the Arab Spring.⁵²⁷

4.3.2 Turkish Mediation in the Syrian-Israeli Conflict

Turkey's mediator role was first requested by Syrian President Basher Assad who brought up the issue to Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Istanbul in January 2004.⁵²⁸ Assad's request was heard by Israel's former ambassador to Turkey Alon Liel who was staying at the same hotel as Assad. A few days later Liel was invited to the residence of Feridun Sinirlioğlu, then Turkish ambassador to Israel who conveyed that Assad asked Turkey to convince Israel to enter negotiations by using its good relations with the latter. In return, he asked Liel to convince the Israeli regime. However their efforts did not pay off at the time due to Israel's reluctance to enter official talks. According to Uni and Eldar,⁵²⁹ and Hof⁵³⁰ there were a few round of informal covert talks carried out between 2004 and 2007 on the academic level in under Swiss auspices. However, although, according to Haaretz, the Israeli and Syrian officials had been involved in the talks, according to BBC, the spokesperson for the Ehud Olmert government announced that they were not aware of such talks.⁵³¹

The official talks were resumed under Turkey's auspice on February 2007 and continued through 2008 in a total of four rounds of talks,⁵³² which took place on May 21,⁵³³ June 15-

⁵²⁷ Isabel Kershner, "Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit," *The New York Times*, October 12, 2012.

⁵²⁸ Interview with Aras.

⁵²⁹ Uni and Eldar, "Switzerland says it mediated in informal Israel-Syria peace talks."

⁵³⁰ Frederic C. Hof, "Mapping Peace between Syria and Israel," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 219, Washington, D.C., March 2009, 4.

⁵³¹ "Suriye-İsrail görüştü, Türkiye arabulucu," *BBC Turkish.com*, January 16, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2007/01/070116_syria_israel_tr.shtml (accessed August 18, 2015).

⁵³² Ofra Bengio, "Altering Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel," *Insight Turkey* 11, no.2, 2009, 51.

⁵³³ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Release Regarding the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel under the auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)," No.81, May 21, 2008,

16,⁵³⁴ July 1-3,⁵³⁵ and July 28-30⁵³⁶ respectively. The method of mediation used was indirect talks and shuttle diplomacy since the parties were not ready to sit around the same table at the time of the negotiations. Parties either sat in different rooms without seeing each other or were on different phone lines under Turkey's mediation.⁵³⁷

Turkey was the sole mediator during the talks.⁵³⁸ The Israeli side was represented by Advisers to the Prime Minister Shalom Turjeman and Yoram Trubovitz while the Syrian side was represented by Adviser to the Foreign Minister Riyad Dawudi. According to Salem, one of the reasons for Israel's acceptance of resuming the talks was its failure to defeat Hezbollah during the Lebanon War in 2006.⁵³⁹

According to Aras, several issues had reached a point of resolution during the final negotiations including the Golan Heights and Syria's assurance of Israel's security by ceasing its support for Hamas and Hezbollah as well as distancing itself from Iran.⁵⁴⁰ The fifth round of talks was planned to be held following the Israeli elections in February 2009. However, the negotiations were suspended indefinitely as a result of certain developments one of which was the destruction of an alleged nuclear reactor in Kibar, Syria by Israel

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-81---21-may-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa (accessed August 25, 2015).

⁵³⁴ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Release Regarding the Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)," No.106, June 16, 2008,

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_106---16-june-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey.en.mfa (accessed August 25, 2015).

⁵³⁵ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Release Regarding the Third Round of the Indirect Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation)," No.119, July 3, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_119---3-july-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-third-round-of-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa (accessed August 25, 2015).

⁵³⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Release Regarding the Fourth Round of the Indirect Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey," No.136, July 30, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_136---30-july-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-fourth-round-of-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey.en.mfa (accessed August 25, 2015).

⁵³⁷ Interview with Aras.

⁵³⁸ "Erdogan: Palestine an open-air prison," *Ynetnews.com*, 31 January 2009, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3664532,00.html> (accessed October 21, 2014).

⁵³⁹ Salem, "Syrian-Israeli Peace," 4.

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with Aras. Also see, Akiva Eldar, "Israeli, Syrian Representatives Reach Secret Understandings," *Haaretz*, January 16, 2007.

allegedly built by North Korea. The air strike came as a surprise to Syria. According to Itamar Rabinovich, former Israeli chief negotiator in the Syrian-Israeli talks between 1993 and 1996, Israel, Syria and the US all minimized the chance of the attack being publicized. Assad refrained from being forced into retaliation. He also wanted to prevent the publicity of cooperating “with a member of Bush’s axis of evil.”⁵⁴¹ Israel kept it unpublicized to prevent Syria from being forced into retaliation. The US was worried that the publicity would endanger its nuclear talks with North Korea.⁵⁴²

Although the talks were resumed later on in 2008 the atmosphere was soured as a result of the crisis. Suspicions of both sides over the sincerity of one another grew larger. While Israel focused on the prospects of Syria’s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, Syria kept on with its territorial claims. While the talks to be held on December 22, 2008 were planned as direct negotiations, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem did not turn up for the meeting. According to Rabinovich, “Syrians were deterred by the fact that Olmert had resigned in August because of the scandals he faced, and at that point headed a caretaker government.”⁵⁴³ Syria was also not satisfied with the map drawn by Israel during the previous talks.⁵⁴⁴

Subsequently Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert met Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül by himself.⁵⁴⁵ Another development that took place five days after Olmert’s visit to Turkey, which resulted in the suspension of the talks, was the launch of Operation Cast Lead by Israel on Gaza on December 27, 2008.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴¹ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 174.

⁵⁴² Ibid, 175.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁵ “Olmert’ten veda ziyareti,” İhlas Haber Ajansı, December 22, 2008, <http://www.ihb.com.tr/NewsDetail.aspx?nid=47842&cid=8> (accessed November 8, 2011).

⁵⁴⁶ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 175.

The fifth round of talks was nevertheless planned as a direct talk under Turkey's mediation. Despite the fact that in January 2010, Davutoğlu declared in a press conference that Turkey was ready to mediate again,⁵⁴⁷ the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis that broke out on May 30, 2010 resulted in the halt of Turkey's mediator role between Syria and Israel.

4.4 Turkey's Difference as a Mediator in the Syrian-Israeli Talks

This section aims to examine Turkey's mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks in order to understand the ways it is able to mediate differently from Western mediators, in this case from the US. As such, the study will dwell into the specifics of Turkey's mediator role by drawing on the different themes and indicators brought out in Chapter 2.

4.4.1 Previous Experience of Mediators

When Turkey took on the mediator role between Syria and Israel, it had limited previous experience. It is an emerging mediator which is still not sufficiently institutionalized in terms of mediation. For instance, Turkey's mediator capacity currently consists of those who learn the job mainly by practice without prior professional training. Aras posits that although the establishment of a general secretariat for mediation within Turkish Foreign Ministry was foreseen as a result of an amendment to the law in 2010, the secretariat is still to be established. Turkey's mediation is still undertaken by the Department of Policy Planning. He adds that,

Although diplomats that mediate are in the process of emergence, the work is mainly undertaken by the Foreign Minister's [Davutoğlu's] own initiative. In this regard, it is difficult to talk about a trained group of diplomats or institutional infrastructure. The expansion of foreign policy to such a wide area has aggravated the workload of the foreign ministry. The gap between the importance given to mediation and the institutional infrastructure signals a dilemma.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁷ "Turkey offers to resume mediation in Israel-Syria talks," *Haaretz*, January 29, 2010.

⁵⁴⁸ Interview with Aras.

However, Aras argues that Turkey's commitment to the Syrian-Israeli talks compensated for its lack of experience. In his words, "the main problem was not capacity but the lack of trustable actors that could achieve peace and secondly the lack of willpower of the parties for peace."⁵⁴⁹ This understanding suggests that Turkey relied more on its relational ties and credibility in the region rather than professional capacity and technical expertise in mediation. This view is further underpinned by Aras who argues that, "Turkey's projection of its mediation role relies, to a large extent, on the assumption of itself being a credible actor, the promotion of regional ownership, and inclusiveness."⁵⁵⁰

Despite the fact that the US is much more experienced in mediation vis-à-vis Turkey, there were instances that it was rather underprepared and some officials had knowledge gaps regarding certain topics regarding the negotiations. For instance, according to William Quandt, former staff member on the National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter administrations and who was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, both former US President Bill Clinton and US Secretary of State under Clinton administration Warren Christopher knew little about the Middle East when they came to power. When Christopher went to Israel in 1993, Rubin told him that if he could get the Syrians to agree with certain issues, he would accept the 1967 borders.⁵⁵¹ Quandt notes that when Christopher conveyed this message to Syria,

Assad asks "what do they mean to withdraw to the 1967 border? Does that literally mean 1967 line or does that mean the international border?" Christopher does not know what he is talking about. He does not know the difference between the two but for us [the US] it is very very important because when he says "the 1967 line" it means that Syrian

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Aras, *Turkey's Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative*, 2.

⁵⁵¹ Interview with William Quandt, former staff member on the National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter administrations, Istanbul, October 27, 2014. Quandt was actively involved in the negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

sovereignty will go up to the water line on the Sea of Golan. It would have meant that Israel would have completely continued to have sovereignty around the lake and this becomes a real issue and Christopher thinks it is a minor issue. He goes back and reports to Rubin and Rubin seems very frustrated. He is angry at the Americans for having made the concession too quickly, told Assad what the bottom line was and refuses to confirm his view. He decides that Assad argues over the little things he is not serious, it is better to go with the Palestinian track and very quickly puts his support behind Oslo. The Syrian issue is put back on the back burner.⁵⁵²

As suggested by Quandt, Christopher's knowledge gaps or comparative inexperience in the Arab-Israeli peace process may have contributed to the suspension of the Syrian-Israeli talks in 1992. Similarly, by referring to US involvement in the Oslo Accord Egeland draws attention to the lack of sufficient budget and resources spared for mediation in the US government by postulating that,

International diplomacy is surprisingly underprepared in terms of providing the personnel, the expertise, and the material support necessary for effective multiparty peace facilitation... It is a paradox that there seem to be more such discretionary funds available in the Norwegian humanitarian assistance budget than in the enormous U.S. foreign and security assistance budget.⁵⁵³

The above discussion also suggests that the lack of willingness of the leaders and of necessary resources at their disposal may hamper mediation processes. As such, experience *per se* may not always be a relevant reason for failure in a mediation process.

4.4.2 Motives for Mediation

This section aims to shed light on to what extent Turkey's motives to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks may be indicative of a difference. To be able to draw a more systematic analysis regarding its motives, indicators such as search for prestige, bringing order,

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Jan Egeland, "The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel," in Crocker, Hampson and Aall (eds.), *Herding Cats*, 543.

security and stability, energy security, keeping other actors out of the game, domestic demand, and legitimizing foreign policy will be focused upon.

4.4.2.1 Search for Prestige

One of the motives for Turkey to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks was its search for prestige which would help in its identity construction as a reliable, credible and capable actor. Turkey was aware that had it succeeded in resolving the Syrian-Israeli conflict, it would have closed a major track of the broader Middle East peace process which would enhance its regional and international status. This view is also supported by Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's chief negotiator with Syria between 1993 and 1996 who argues that, "It [mediation] was a suitable role for a country [Turkey] seeking regional influence, and it must have been flattering to fill a role performed in the past solely by the United States and denied to such powers as Russia and France."⁵⁵⁴ Moubayed postulates similarly that, "If the talks succeeded, Turkey would forever be remembered and hailed as the nation to bring peace to the Syrian-Israeli front, something that all US Administrations since Jimmy Carter have failed to achieve."⁵⁵⁵

As highlighted in Chapter 3, one of the triggers for the emergence of Turkey's mediator role in the region, and also in the Syrian-Israeli talks, was the Second Iraqi War which drove Turkey to become more involved with the problems in its neighbourhood. As such, Turkey's new regional policy that emphasized principles such as promoting high-level political dialogue, building regional mechanisms, and all-inclusiveness have been influential in paving the way to its mediator role. For instance, Turkey's promotion of Syria's participation into the Iraqi Neighbors Platform was part of its all-inclusive approach to regional problems and was in line with its new regional policy.

⁵⁵⁴ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 172.

⁵⁵⁵ Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," 5.

The mediator role also enables a rhetoric of peacefulness, helpfulness, and also helps Turkey emphasise its new identity in line with its historical and geopolitical position, and its connections to the region. As Aras notes,

Middle Eastern politicians recognise that Turkey is working to resolve Middle Eastern problems. And because these problems have global implications, the rest of the world is paying attention to Turkey, too. The combination of Turkish politicians' political will at home and receptive audiences abroad, means Turkish soft power is in ascendance.⁵⁵⁶

Search for prestige was a similar motive for the US as well. For instance, at the time of its mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks of 1992-1996, the US had just come out of the Gulf War which provided it with an image of a war wager without offering any significant gains. The image of a peacemaker would improve its credentials in the region. As Campbell notes, it has often projected itself as the “advocate and promoter of peace” in the region.⁵⁵⁷

As also argued by Haşimi although people attribute an automatic, intrinsic positive value to it, mediation is *inter alia* something political.⁵⁵⁸ Similarly, Gezer pinpoints that mediation is a “political project” that accompanies economic integration, communication and contact among people which also underlines how mediation is used as a tool of foreign policy.⁵⁵⁹ As such, despite the positive image attached to mediation, mediation indeed does seem to be a tool of achieving the political interests of a state.

⁵⁵⁶ Bülent Aras, “Turkey's Soft Power,” *The Guardian*, April 14, 2009.

⁵⁵⁷ John C. Campbell, “American Efforts for Peace,” in Malcolm H. Kerr (ed.), *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, 249-310, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975, 249.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview with Haşimi.

⁵⁵⁹ Interview with Gezer.

4.4.2.2 *Bringing Order, Security and Stability*

The aim to bring order, security and stability is another motive for Turkey given its geopolitical, social, and psychological proximity to conflicts in the region. Many Turks live in neighbouring countries including Syria and vice-a-versa. As Haşimi argued, Turkey is affected by conflicts in the region, *inter alia*, as a result of its diverse population that includes many ethnicities such as Arabs and Jews.⁵⁶⁰ He notes,

Speaking to both of the parties is enough to be a mediator but you also should have a perspective. The Israeli-Syrian talks were conducted for the sake of bringing peace into the Middle East and resolving the problems in one way or the other. You have a perspective on the Middle East, which entails, politically speaking, the transformation of the Middle East from a zone of conflict into a region of trade and an island of peace. This was the initial target. This is why Turkey was mediating, not simply to provide a platform. The practices in the West are generally limited to providing a platform whereas the political agenda and political priorities of our mediation is predetermined which is inevitable here in the Middle East and there is no other way. This is why our Prime Minister has to take a position when one of the parties does something that damages the political relationship and the process of partnership.⁵⁶¹

Compared to the US, for Turkey there is always a greater risk of spill-over which has become more evident, for instance, during the Arab Spring. According to a recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey hosts the highest number of refugees in the world with about 2 million Syrians, and a financial cost of about \$6 billion.⁵⁶² Turkey has also become a transit route for militants and faces the threat of being dragged into the war. It seems obvious that Turkey would highly benefit from stability in the region.

A Syrian-Israeli peace deal would also have a positive impact on the Turkish economy. For instance, the opening of the Syrian-Israeli border would have significant impact on

⁵⁶⁰ Interview with Haşimi.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² UNHCR, "World at War," *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2014*, 2015.

Turkey's trade with the region. As noted in Chapter 3, economic and domestic stability are two of the main catalysts for consolidating the position of Turkey's new elite. As Aras contends, Turkey's mediator role started as a result of its quest for regional stability which is also significant for its economic growth. He notes,

Turkey wants to have influence in its region and utilize those markets. Therefore, it [mediation] is significant for adding value to the economy. Secondly, Turkey is a country which is very much affected by the developments in neighbouring geographies. Turkey cannot be stable unless the neighbouring geographies are stable which is apparent, for instance, in the spill-over of the events in Kobani.⁵⁶³

Turkish policy makers have underlined in a number of occasions that Turkey's own future is bound up with the future of the region and its neighbours such as Syria in a way that the future of America or other Western mediators are not. Turkey has vested interest in mediating to resolve the problems that could threaten its stability. As Gezer postulates, Turkish policy makers maintain that Turkey would be able to maximize its interests much more in a cooperative atmosphere. Contributing to regional cooperation would enable a sustainable environment that would serve Turkey's national interests.⁵⁶⁴ The mediator role also provides positive input for Turkey in dealing with its own problems that have regional dimensions such as the Kurdish issue.

Similar to Turkey, the US would benefit from a possible order, stability and security in the region considering its political and economic interests.⁵⁶⁵ Looking at all instances of its mediation between Syria and Israel, it may be argued that the US was weary of the conflict in the Middle East. The on-going disputes only dragged it further into problems with costly

⁵⁶³ Interview with Aras.

⁵⁶⁴ Interview with Gezer.

⁵⁶⁵ E. L. M. Burns, "Peace in the middle east," in Kerr, *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, 337.

consequences attached. As argued by Quandt, many of the crises that erupted within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict have challenged American interests in the region.⁵⁶⁶

This view is also supported by Kurtzer and Lasensky who argue that a possible Arab-Israeli peace would serve US national interest. They note that, “September 11, Iraq, and increasing instability in the Middle East have made US leadership in the peace process more, not less, important.”⁵⁶⁷ Salem contends similarly that a Syrian-Israeli peace deal would widely serve the US interests in the Middle East that “include a more stable Iraq, a weaker Iran, progress in the Arab–Israeli peace process, a stable Lebanon, a weaker Hezbollah, a weaker Jihadi movement, and an improved American image.”⁵⁶⁸ Moore argues in a similar vein that “The United States has had longstanding political, economic, and strategic interests in the Middle East and assertively intervened as a broker in attempts to promote stability in the region.”⁵⁶⁹

Quandt suggests that during the Cold War the US feared a large-scale war in the Middle East, similar to that of the 1973 War, and a possible Soviet intervention. Despite the fact that the Soviet threat was removed with its collapse, the intifadas and the rise of radicalism in the region emerged as new challenges.⁵⁷⁰ Quandt contends that,

After the intifadas there was a feeling that this kind of violence was going to be hard to contain. It could spill over into Lebanon, into Jordan; Arab governments would be destabilized by either supporting the intifada in which case the Israelis would see them as enemies or not doing anything in which case their public might have turned against them. So there was a fear that if this was left unresolved, radicalization in the Middle East would go further. Of course you know when al Qaida came along it played on this issue. In some ways, you wanted to take the Palestinian

⁵⁶⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 415.

⁵⁶⁷ Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East*, USIP Press: Washington, D.C., 2008, 26.

⁵⁶⁸ Salem, “Syrian–Israeli Peace,” 5–6.

⁵⁶⁹ Moore, *The Mediation Process*, 51.

⁵⁷⁰ Interview with Quandt.

issue off the agenda of radical Islamic movements. Not that it would solve the issue but that it is one less issue for them to play with.⁵⁷¹

One of the motives for the US to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks during the Gulf War was that it wanted the support of Syria in Iraq and Hafez Assad proposed the Syrian-Israeli talks as a precondition for joining the coalition forces of the Gulf War.⁵⁷² Quandt says that Syria became an objective ally of the US against Saddam during the Gulf War. He notes,

Syrian troops were actually going and fighting alongside the Americans. Unbelievable; you cannot imagine it now. So, for the first Bush administration, the relationship with Syria, this was largely the president and Secretary Baker himself, seemed strategically quite important while coming out of the Gulf War. Of course, Egypt was already at peace with Israel. So, the next building block was going to be Syria, not the Palestinians. And so, the Syrian-Israeli relationship began in 1991 with Bush and Baker and it led to the Madrid Conference.⁵⁷³

Quandt argues that while the main justification for the US to mediate conflicts in the Middle East before September 11 was to “promote stability, bolster pro-American regimes, and help to avoid conflicts that could prove costly to the United States,” it has later become to reverse “the rising tide of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world, that it might reduce the number of recruits for extremist political organization, and that it might facilitate the spread of democracy and political reform.”⁵⁷⁴ These examples demonstrate that Turkey and the US had similar motives in wanting to bring order, security and stability to the Middle East from which they would largely benefit.

4.4.2.3 Energy Security

Any conflict also negatively affects the energy security in the region which would have negative impact both on the US and Turkish interests. Ending the oil embargo initiated by

⁵⁷¹ Ibid.

⁵⁷² Salem, “Syrian–Israeli Peace,” 4.

⁵⁷³ Interview with Quandt.

⁵⁷⁴ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 416.

the Arab states during the 1973 War was one of the main motives of the US to mediate the Syrian-Israeli talks.⁵⁷⁵ The Arab states pressured the US to advance in the Syrian-Israeli track as a prerequisite to lift the embargo. Their pressure bore fruit and the embargo had been formally lifted upon the conclusion of the talks.⁵⁷⁶ Likewise, its mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks in the 1990s had similar reasons particularly considering the situation in Iraq at the time and its possible consequences on the US oil supply.

With respect to Turkey's mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks, one may speak of similar reasons since the conflict indirectly effects the oil supplies in the region especially with respect to Iraq. In addition, any conflict in the region may hamper Turkey's role as an energy transit route between the Middle East and Europe by threatening the security of the pipelines. As Meral and Paris also postulate,

Ankara had to pursue the EU as it was still in its strategic interest, yet it had to diversify its economic and political ties to strengthen its own hand, especially in energy. It had to seek stability in its neighborhood and emerge as a neutral economic and diplomatic bridge between parties in conflict.⁵⁷⁷

The image of a secure energy corridor gives Turkey credibility in its EU accession process as well. In this respect, for Turkey, the role of a peacemaker contributes to its EU membership endeavour. For instance, in line with the East-West Energy Corridor Project, Turkey hosts three important pipeline projects including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, the South Caucasian natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline) and the Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas pipeline project.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, New York; London; Toronto; Sydney: Simon and Schuster, 1982, 747.

⁵⁷⁶ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 251.

⁵⁷⁷ Meral and Paris, "Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity," 80.

⁵⁷⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Economic Outlook of Turkey."

With respect to the US, Migdal maintains that since the US has become more self-sufficient in oil and it feels rather frustrated with its role in the Middle East, there is a great chance that it may “pivot away” from the region towards South Asia in the near future, partially if not fully.⁵⁷⁹ Although rather unlikely in the near future, such possibility may create a vacuum and a greater role for regional actors such as Turkey to take on mediator roles in regional issues.

4.4.2.4 Keeping Other Actors out of the Game

One of the reasons why the US mediated the Syrian-Israeli talks or the overall Arab-Israeli talks during the Cold War was to keep the USSR out of the game or to at least minimize its role.⁵⁸⁰ The USSR was the second most likely actor to mediate the talks in 1974 had the US not mediated. It could gain significant leverage in the Middle East if it played a mediator role which was a risk that the US wanted to avoid. As argued by Kurtzer and Lasensky, during the Cold War the Arab-Israeli conflict was a matter of national security for the US as was the case with the Suez Crisis and the October 1973 war. In this regard, “Successful US diplomacy often carried with it monumental strategic benefits, as in Washington’s shuttle diplomacy in the mid-1970s and the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, both of which sharply reduced the Soviet role in the region.”⁵⁸¹ This may also have increased US enthusiasm to take on a larger role which resulted in its push towards the resolution of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict.

As indicated by Freedman the mediator role, “has been a key to American influence in the Arab world since the 1973 war, for it demonstrated to the Arabs that it was the United

⁵⁷⁹ Interview with Joel Migdal by Pinar Akpınar and Melisa Mendoza Vasquez, *POMEAS*, Istanbul Policy Center, June 20, 2014, <http://www.pomeas.org/Home/index.php/interviews/432-interview-with-joel-migdal> (accessed May 16, 2015).

⁵⁸⁰ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 747; Stanley Hoffman, “A New Policy for Israel,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, 406.

⁵⁸¹ Kurtzer and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 26.

States, and not the USSR, that was able to secure Israeli territorial withdrawals.”⁵⁸² Furthermore, had the conflict escalated, chances were that the US and the USSR would be dragged into a regional war in the Middle East. The US wanted to avoid war with the USSR.⁵⁸³ A peace treaty between Israel and its neighbours would therefore serve its interests by keeping the USSR out of the game.

For instance, referring to the Egyptian-Israeli peace Rabinovich argues that it was “one of Washington’s greatest Cold War accomplishments: Egypt’s transition from a Soviet ally to a nation in the American orbit.”⁵⁸⁴ Similarly by referring to the US mediation during 1991 Madrid Peace Conference which took place at the end of the Cold War, Kurtzer and Lasensky postulate that it “cemented the US role as the sole power broker in the region.”⁵⁸⁵

Despite the above discussion, it should be remembered that the 1974 talks occurred within the dynamics of the Cold War in which the rivalry between the US and the USSR determined international relations. Turkey’s mediation, however, took place in a different context in which the Cold War dynamics no longer existed. Perhaps a more relevant example could be diminishing Iranian sphere of influence in the region which is important both for Turkey and the US. Iran gained significant leverage from the Syrian-Israeli conflict by supporting Syria and securing its alliance in the region. As also underlined by Salem, “A Syria at peace with Israel would be less useful to Iran; the anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-peace alliance that Iran has built would be broken at its midpoint.”⁵⁸⁶ Peace between Syria and Israel could curb Iran’s influence in the region, a situation which would benefit both Turkey and the US.

⁵⁸² Robert O. Freedman, “The USSR and a Middle East Peace Settlement: A Case Study of Soviet Policy during the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and its Aftermath,” in Marantz and Stein (eds.), *Peace-making in the Middle East*, 160.

⁵⁸³ Kyle Beardsley, *The Mediation Dilemma*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2011, 134.

⁵⁸⁴ Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict*, 4.

⁵⁸⁵ Kurtzer and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 3.

⁵⁸⁶ Salem, “Syrian–Israeli Peace,” 6.

Starting negotiations with Israel was a precondition proposed by the Syrian President Hafez Assad to ally with the Gulf coalition during the first Iraqi War which was accepted by the US.⁵⁸⁷ Similarly, Syria again used the negotiations mediated by Turkey as a means to end its isolation, be integrated into the international system and improve its relations with the West. This would also interest the US since it would distance Syria from the Iranian sphere of influence and turn Syria into a more benign actor. For the US, the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli dispute could also mean ceasing Syria's support for Hamas and Hezbollah, two obstacles for its interests in the region.

4.4.2.5 Domestic Concerns

According to Aras, one of the reasons for Turkish government's enthusiasm to push the talks through was to divert attention from domestic politics and return home with a success story.⁵⁸⁸ In April 27, 2007, the government was faced with an "e-memorandum" wired by the military against its "anti-secular" advancements and the presidential election that took place on the same day in which AKP candidate Abdullah Gül was the sole runner.⁵⁸⁹ The election was annulled by the Turkish Constitutional Court as a result of a boycott imposed by the parliament which prevented Gül to attain the two-thirds of the vote necessary to become president. Subsequently, the government called for early general election, increased its seats in the parliament, and Gül became the president in the third round of presidential elections.⁵⁹⁰ As Aras argues, the Syrian-Israeli peace talks provided the Turkish government with a positive image both internationally and domestically.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid, 4.

⁵⁸⁸ Interview with Aras.

⁵⁸⁹ "Excerpts of Turkish army statement," *BBC News*, April 28, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm> (accessed August 18, 2015).

⁵⁹⁰ "Turkish parliament cancels presidential election," *Reuters*, May 9, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/09/us-turkey-president-idUSL0972419420070509> (accessed August 18, 2015).

Another reason may be to secure domestic support for foreign policy which envisioned becoming more active in the Middle East, a region that used to be avoided by many of the previous governments for being seen as problematic. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue has been a popular issue in Turkey ever since its emergence as a result of its symbolic value for the Muslim world. As also noted by al-Nunu, “the issue that unites all parties in Turkey is the Palestinian issue.”⁵⁹¹ Referring to the death of Turkish activists during the Gaza flotilla crisis al-Nunu contends that,

Turkey was the only country which gave us political, economic support through programs and projects in Gaza. Turkey is the only country in the world that gave us martyrs at a time when no one came to help us. No one was ready to sacrifice themselves for Gaza.⁵⁹²

As such, the Gaza flotilla crisis is seen as a demonstration of the lengths that Turkish people went for the Palestinian cause. For Turkey, the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflict would create favourable environment for the Palestinian question. The government has long relied on its ownership of the Palestinian issue which also helps it gain the domestic support it needs for its broader regional politics. The Palestinian issue has also been exploited by the government in almost every one of its electoral campaigns.

Gezer suggests that there is a public demand for Turkey to take on more active roles in peacemaking. He notes that there is a domestic discussion on a societal model that is more pluralistic which reflects on Turkey’s mediation. He further argues that the recent statistics on humanitarian aid suggests more involvement of NGOs, which rely on public donations, accounting to about half of the official aid.⁵⁹³

Although there is US popular demand to resolve conflicts in the world, it would still be rather difficult to talk about a strong willpower for the US to take on a mediator role in the

⁵⁹¹ Interview with Al-Nunu.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Interview with Gezer.

Arab-Israeli conflict. As also highlighted by Stokes, “Americans simply do not believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a major threat to the United States.”⁵⁹⁴

According to a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, American people believe that China or Iran pose a much bigger threat for the US than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁵⁹⁵

Stokes further argues that,

Future U.S. peace efforts will also have to contend with the American public's disinterest in the Middle East, disbelief in the achievability of a lasting peace, lack of impartiality and long-standing sympathy for Israel, and a deep partisan divide on anything regarding these issues.⁵⁹⁶

In this respect, it may be argued that there is more public demand in Turkey with respect to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

4.4.3 Characteristics of Mediators

This section will focus on Turkey’s characteristics as a mediator in order to analyse to what extent these may be helpful in bringing out its difference as a mediator. As discussed in Chapter 2, characteristics of mediators are analysed in two sections in this study. The first is the power of mediators referring to concepts such as leverage, hard power and soft power, positional of mediators and their legitimacy. The second section is the position of mediators referring to their impartiality and neutrality, their proximity to the conflict, and their previous relations with the parties.

4.4.3.1 Power Capabilities of Mediators

One of Turkey’s important differences as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks is the lack of its power capabilities when compared with a great power as the US. As also discussed in

⁵⁹⁴ Bruce Stokes, “Americans Simply Don't Care About Peace in the Middle East,” *Foreign Policy*, May 9, 2014.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

Chapter 3, lack of sufficient hard power drove Turkey to rely more on its soft power and diplomacy. The frequent emphasis laid on Turkey's "difference" as a mediator by the participants of this research may be indicative of a way of maximising Turkey's power in the region to compensate for its lack of hard power.

As also contended by Quandt, while the US was in times rather coercive as a mediator,⁵⁹⁷ Turkey had to be more persuasive and depend more on its discursive power. Moore argues similarly that,

The United States has played the role of a mediator with muscle. Its representatives have at various times persuaded, cajoled, or aggressively pressured involved parties to seek a permanent peace; they have offered both arms and resources for development to help achieve these ends.⁵⁹⁸

For instance, during the 1974 negotiations the US provided incentives to Israel such as supplying tanks and converting 1 billion US Dollars of loan it had given Israel into a grant.⁵⁹⁹ To Syria it offered economic incentives to be delivered upon the signing of the disengagement agreement.⁶⁰⁰ As Touval notes, the US also assured Syria that it "did not regard the disengagement line as a final boundary and that the US would work for the full implementation of Resolution 338, together with a promise to help arrange for the Palestinians to join the negotiations."⁶⁰¹ Regarding Kissinger's partial success during the 1974 negotiations Stein notes,

Kissinger disposed of resources as secretary of state that were unavailable to any other mediator. He was able to build a bargaining triad in part because the United States was able and willing to assume the functions of insurer, guarantor, trustee, and benefactor, functions that

⁵⁹⁷ Interview with Quandt.

⁵⁹⁸ Moore, *The Mediation Process*, 51.

⁵⁹⁹ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 256.

⁶⁰⁰ Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 255.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

were critical to the success of the negotiating process and quite beyond the scope of the usual mediator.⁶⁰²

The US was also able to exert power over the parties when deemed necessary.⁶⁰³ Quandt argues that,

The American role in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiation really has to be understood as starting in its more or less intense phase and the aftermath of the 1973 war and it was built around this idea that we [the US] could uniquely reassure the Israelis on security issues. The other side of the coin was we could also uniquely pressure them in a way that no other country could. We just could not do it very publicly, we could not do it very often but if you look at the nature of the US-Israeli relationship we had some influence in a way that maybe Norway would not. Norway could be neutral, a safe place where we could talk but it could not twist arms or reassure in the same way. During the Camp David and the Clinton period there had always been this notion that there is a unique American role because we could say to Israelis “If you do not do this we are going to do this,” and that nobody else can do. That is what makes the American role a little bit different.⁶⁰⁴

As also evident in Quandt’s words, one of the elements that made US mediation different than that of Turkey’s was its ability to offer incentives, twist Israel’s arm and provide with security reassurance. However, despite the emphasis on the leverage that the US had during the negotiations, given that it was not able to resolve the conflict raises questions regarding the importance of leverage in mediation. As such, it may be argued that the willingness of the parties may be more important in achieving results in mediation.

While being a great power gives the US some advantages, it gives certain disadvantages as well. For instance, the involvement of the US in the conflict during the 1974 negotiations worried the USSR resulting in the escalation of an arms race between the two super powers. According to Campbell one of the determinants of the Arab-Israeli conflict,

⁶⁰² Stein, “The Fundamentals of Peacemaking,” 231. Stein adopted the concepts of “insurer, guarantor, trustee, and benefactor” from Touval, *The Peace Brokers*, 259-71.

⁶⁰³ Kurtzer and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 10-11.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview with Quandt.

particularly during the Cold War, was the arms race between the US and the USSR as the two main arms suppliers in the region. In an effort to maintain regional balances and protect Israel from losing its upper hand in the region, the US did not refrain from shipping weapons to Israel every time the USSR further armed the Arab states such as Egypt and Syria. This vicious cycle only contributed to further paranoia and adversary among the conflicting parties as well as the questioning of the US impartiality as a mediator.⁶⁰⁵ As Quandt notes, it also raised concerns that “the United States would make only half-hearted diplomatic attempts to promote settlement.”⁶⁰⁶

Drawing on the literature, great powers often face difficulties in sustaining their impartiality since they usually have their fingers in too many pies. They also usually have an interest in the outcome of the conflict.⁶⁰⁷ The impartiality of the US in the Syrian-Israeli talks has been often questioned due to the close relations between the US and Israel. Since it also has vast oil interests in the region, as a super power it could manipulate the resolution of the conflict in line with its own interests. As also highlighted by Kurtzner and Lasensky, “Unlike other outside actors, Washington is already deeply enmeshed - politically, strategically, and economically - across the entire set of Arab-Israeli relationship.”⁶⁰⁸

Another issue that deserves attention is the relationship between Turkey and the US. US-Turkish partnership had started in 1947 in line with the Truman Doctrine and was consolidated with Turkey’s entry into the NATO in 1952. During the Cold War, Turkey was more of a buffer zone between the Western block and the USSR. The collapse of the USSR brought about new challenges and opportunities for the US for which its partnership

⁶⁰⁵ Campbell, “American Efforts for Peace,” 302.

⁶⁰⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 85.

⁶⁰⁷ Inbar, “Great Power Mediation,” 72; Touval, “Biased Intermediaries,” 62.

⁶⁰⁸ Kurtzner and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 11.

with Turkey again played an important role.⁶⁰⁹ As Larabee postulates, Turkey's "capacity to provide a bridge to the Muslim world and serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and the Caucasus/Central Asia" consolidated this partnership.⁶¹⁰ For instance, while US military bases in Turkey are significant for its interests in the region, Turkey needs this alliance to be able to survive in such a volatile region. The US is also Turkey's main arms supplier providing around 80 per cent of its total arms supply.⁶¹¹

As bold as it is on the discursive level, Turkey's ability to act independently as an actor and thus, as a mediator in the region is limited to the consensus it can build with the US. For instance, when Israel declined Davutoğlu's demand to visit Gaza in 2009, Ankara retaliated by barring Israel's participation to an air exercise to be held in Turkey with the participation of the US alongside other NATO forces. As a reaction, the US cancelled the whole practice.⁶¹²

Similarly, the US was regularly informed during Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel. Aras notes that the US did not need to give any technical assistance since the talks had not reached that level of difficulty yet but the peace process was significant for the US and there was a very close process of informing and coordination with the US right from the beginning. Aras notes that,

It was very important to inform the US and have its support because one of the main motivations for Syria was that peace would lift the isolation over Syria and reintegrate it into the international system. This was the carrot offered to Syria. Coordination with the US was important and so it was facilitated.⁶¹³

⁶⁰⁹ F. Stephen Larabee, *Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010, 3-4.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid, 4.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Julian Borger, "Turkey Confirms it Bars Israel from Military Exercise Because of Gaza War," *The Guardian*, October 12, 2010.

⁶¹³ Interview with Aras.

Moubayed postulates that,

Turks realized early on, however, as did both the Israelis and the Syrians, that Ankara alone cannot pull through with a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty. The Turks can lay the groundwork for negotiations, and even get both countries into direct talks, but it will take a committed White House to sign a peace deal. Only the Americans can provide the economic, security, and political guarantees for a peace acceptable to both Damascus and Tel Aviv.⁶¹⁴

These examples demonstrate that Turkey cannot go too far against what the US wants it to do and this then helps to explain that Turkish “difference” is perhaps a way for Turkish policy makers to manage their own lack of power while maximising their influence in the region. For instance, Haşimi contends that Turkey has a symbolic power based on its imperial and caliphatic heritage. He notes that, “In terms of its area of influence, maybe not in terms of its economic power but more so of its symbolic power, America is the only country that Turkey could be compared to.”⁶¹⁵

As bold as it is on the discursive level, the above statements rules out the fact that “symbolic power” is not always enough to implement the decisions taken on the table. As Kurtzer and Lasensky argue, one of the reasons why the US role is essential in Arab-Israeli conflicts is that “large asymmetries of power require a robust third-party role”⁶¹⁶ a quality that Turkey lacks. Meral and Paris also maintain that,

Although Middle Eastern and Caucasus states see Turkey as a strong country that needs to be befriended and not offended, no country sees it as the ultimate bridge or trusted negotiator in the long-standing conflicts of the region. Actual Turkish power in the region is nowhere close to that of the United States.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ Moubayed, “Turkish-Syrian Relations,” 6.

⁶¹⁵ Interview with Haşimi.

⁶¹⁶ Kurtzer and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 9.

⁶¹⁷ Meral and Paris, “Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity,” 84.

Had Turkey been an entirely neutral outsider to the conflict, perhaps a non-threatening and neutral European small-state mediator, it could have been more effective as a mediator. However the extent of independence that it is willing to operate with, the contentious attitude it adopts and the fact that it is an insider to the conflict that has vested interests in its outcome require a certain level of hard power.

For instance Oruç contends that,

There is something we know in the entire field. Problems cannot be resolved with justice, equity and human rights. There is only one thing that resolves problems and that is power; being powerful. More than economic power, this pertains to armament, military power; being tough. Those who craft Turkey's foreign policy know this very well. You cannot become an actor without fighting and demonstrating your power. Turkey has not been able to attain that level yet.⁶¹⁸

The above discussion suggests that since Turkey lacks large scale military power, it has to rely more on soft power. As such, mediation comes to fore as an important policy tool for Turkey. In addition, in order for Turkey's mediator role to be sustainable Turkey will need US support as long as the latter is an influential actor in the region. This situation may nevertheless change had the US drifted away from the region. Such a scenario would widen the power vacuum already in place in the region as a result of the Iraqi War and the subsequent US exit from Iraq. For instance Parsi contends that,

The US is less dependent on oil and because strategically it recognizes that the real peer challenge to the US is coming from China in the next decades in the East and just getting yourself involved in the Middle East weakens you for that challenge. The US is disengaging, not entirely, but to the extent that it is clearly not capable of recreating a new order. So that job falls into the regional states.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁸ Interview with Oruç.

⁶¹⁹ Interview with Trita Parsi, by Bülent Aras, *POMEAS*, Istanbul Policy Center, August 29, 2014, <http://www.pomeas.org/Home/index.php/interviews/447-interview-with-trita-parisi> (accessed June 2, 2015).

The above analysis suggests that in such a scenario, there would be more room for regional actors to take on greater roles *inter alia* as mediators. However, as Migdal,⁶²⁰ Salem⁶²¹ and Parsi⁶²² all suggest, this scenario is not likely to happen anytime soon if it happens at all. Furthermore, the unfolding events in Iraq and Syria that was triggered by the Arab Spring signal a possible increase in US involvement in the region. This view is also supported by Quandt who contends that,

I am a bit hesitant to say that we [the US] will ever completely turn our back to Arab-Israeli issues partly because so many Americans now have some kind of special interest not in the Arab-Israeli peace but in Israel itself. It is a little country but has a huge profile in America. When anything happens and Israel gets reported on in the US, people in the congress are interested in.⁶²³

Quandt also postulates that,

It is very hard for the Americans to say we have no interest in this, it does not concern us. Because we are after all providing the arms and the money to the Israelis and if we just stand by [it would seem as if] we are implicitly supporting whatever they do and that has implications for our relations with some Arab countries who want us to intervene and like [during] the Gaza war there was pressure on the US to bring it to an end. And if we had not done anything I think the Jordanians and I think some others would have begun to feel uneasy... Some conflicts in the world, we really can almost turn our back to such as south Sudan or Congo where there is very little American interest. Not this one. If the conflict flares up [in the Middle East], we feel the need to do something.⁶²⁴

As discussed in Chapter 2, status is another important indicator in mediation. As Abu-Nimer notes, status is often considered an important trait in some non-Western settings in order to have the respect of the parties.⁶²⁵ Quandt points out a similar concern by

⁶²⁰ Interview with Joel Migdal by Akpınar and Mendoza.

⁶²¹ Interview with Paul Salem by Pinar Akpınar, *POMEAS*, Istanbul Policy Center, August 30, 2014.

⁶²² Interview with Parsi.

⁶²³ Interview with Quandt.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution Approaches," 47.

underlining that in the mediation attempts of the US in the Arab-Israeli talks, “The president and his top advisers must be involved and must work in harmony. Unless the prestige and power of the White House are clearly behind American policy initiatives, leaders in the Middle East will not take them seriously.”⁶²⁶ He further notes that in all instances where the US policies succeeded in the Middle East the special envoys and the president “were seen to be working closely together” such as Nixon and Kissinger during the peace talks of 1974.⁶²⁷

Turkey was represented by former Adviser in Chief to the Prime Minister (later Foreign Minister and Prime Minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu who was fully backed by Prime Minister Erdoğan who was personally involved in all levels of the process.⁶²⁸ In terms of their personality traits, both Davutoğlu and Erdoğan were prominent political figures in the Middle East and the Muslim world.

Similarly, the US was represented by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the 1974 talks, by Secretary of State James Baker during the 1992-1993 talks, by the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher during 1995 talks and by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during 2000 talks. Among them, Christopher is known for his negotiator role during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980-1981 resulting in the release of the American hostages. He was also the one who persuaded the Clinton administration to resume the Arab-Israeli negotiations and was particularly active in the Syrian-Israeli track.⁶²⁹

This section illustrated that power and status has been an important determinant in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. It found that although Turkey was committed to its mediator role in

⁶²⁶ Quandt, Peace Process, 417.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Interview with Aras.

⁶²⁹ Ibid, 324-325.

the Syrian-Israeli talks, its lack of sufficient power to twist arms or offer incentives came to fore as a significant obstacle for resolution.

4.4.3.2 Position of Mediators

As discussed in Chapter 2, the position of mediators refers to their previous relations with the conflicting parties, their impartiality and neutrality, and their insider/outsider position.

Turkey's relations with Syria were sour until only a few years before the peace talks. When Turkey's borders were drawn following World War I, Hatay province with a majority Syrian population was included within its border lines starting a conflict with Syria. Syria never recognized Turkey's official borders and always placed Hatay within its borders in its official maps. Syria's alleged support for the PKK, a Kurdish militia group recognized as a terrorist group by Turkey, as well as Turkey's construction of a number of dams over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate in Turkey and flow into Syria, dragged the two neighbours to the brink of war in 1998. As a result, Turkey summoned its troops on the Turkish-Syrian border and demanded Syria to deport Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK who found safe haven in Syria at the time. Syria accepted Turkey's ultimatum and Öcalan fled the country soon to be captured in Kenya in a Turkish-Israeli covert operation.⁶³⁰

Although the negative record of the Turkish-Syrian relations had been a challenge for Turkey, the rapid improvement in bilateral relations, particularly after the AKP came to power, was helpful in eradicating Syrian suspicions.⁶³¹ Turkey's rejection of sending troops to Iraq to support the US-led operation, its criticism of the US policies in the Middle East and Erdoğan's rejection of an invitation by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to

⁶³⁰ Moubayed, "Turkish-Syrian Relations," 2-3.

⁶³¹ Ibid, 4.

visit Tel Aviv created a sort of excitement on the part of Syria towards Turkey. However, the main reason for this rapprochement was Turkey's new regional policy which aimed at boosting relations with neighbours by fostering bilateral relations. Subsequently, Bashar al-Assad was the first Syrian President to visit Turkey in 2004 during which he planted the seeds of Turkey's mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks. Furthermore, between 2003 and 2009, more than 80 agreements were signed between Syria and Turkey including scientific, economic, military and political agreements such as free trade agreement and high level strategic partnership agreements.⁶³²

According to Aras, before the talks were resumed, Assad made a statement that only Turkey would be able to mediate the talks which is indicative of the level of trust Turkey was able to build with Syria. Even after the talks were suspended in 2008, Syria mentioned its willingness to resume the talks under Turkey's auspices.⁶³³ Although, the relations had been severed during the Arab Spring, at the time of the negotiations Turkey and Syria were rather close.

As also argued by Quandt, "Turkey is capitalizing on its strong economy, its geostrategic location, its historical role, and its 'soft power' to expand its influence in the region."⁶³⁴ In order to achieve that, the government intended to improve relations with its neighbours such as Syria, open up into new markets through new channels and enhance political and social relations with the region and beyond through diplomacy and soft power, as discussed extensively in Chapter 3.

⁶³² Interview with Aras.

⁶³³ Interview with Aras.

⁶³⁴ William Quandt, "Preface," in Quandt (ed.), *Troubled Triangle*, 17.

In addition to having close relations with the Syrian government, Turkey also had good relations with the other stakeholders of the Syrian-Israeli conflict such as Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, three actors that the US does not have good relations with if not any relations at all. The relations between the US and Syria has been sour throughout the years. Syria was a Soviet ally during the Cold War and has never welcomed American friendship unlike other Arab countries such as Egypt or Jordan. There have been several unresolved issues between the two states throughout the years such as Syria's alleged support for terrorism, its close alliance with Iran, its alleged possession of chemical weapons, conflicting interests in Iraq, and the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Although the relations are currently more severe, at the time of the US mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks in 1974 and the 1990s, the relations had been comparatively better until 2005 when the US imposed sanctions on Syria and claimed it a "rogue state."

Unlike its relations with Syria, the US has close relations with Israel. Since World War II, Israel has been the recipient of the largest US aid.⁶³⁵ Although it had doubts about the establishment of Israel, as it did not want a destabilising force in the region, the bilateral relations were significantly solidified during the Cold War years particularly owing to the rapprochement between the USSR and Iraq, Syria and Egypt.⁶³⁶ However, it should also be noted that during the Cold War years, America's close alliance with Israel not only damaged its image of impartiality as a mediator, but also pushed some of the Arab states, such as Syria, further towards the USSR thus solidified the latter's position in the Middle East. As Quandt suggests, "By granting economic and military aid to the enemy of the

⁶³⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," *Congressional Research Service*, 7-5700, April 11, 2013, 1.

⁶³⁶ F. Gregory Gause, III, "The US-Israeli-Turkish Strategic Triangle: Cold War Structure and Domestic Political Processes," in William Quandt (ed.), *Troubled Triangle: the United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East*, Just World Books: Virginia, 2011, 26.

Arabs, the United States was providing the USSR with an opportunity to extend its influence in the Middle East.”⁶³⁷

Turkey had had positive relations ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948. Turkey was the first Muslim dominated country to recognize Israel in 1949 and had been its closest ally in the Muslim world until recent years. Their traditional Western alliance and good relations with the US made them regional allies. However, the relations got strained as a result of Turkey’s criticism of Israel’s attack on Gaza right after the fourth round of the Syrian-Israeli talks; the subsequent crisis between Erdoğan and Peres during the Davos summit; and the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid in which nine Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli soldiers in international waters onboard a ship which was part of a humanitarian flotilla aiming to break Israel’s Gaza blockade by delivering aid. As a result, Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel and decreased its representation in the country to the level of Second Secretary. Despite the tension on the political level, the economic relations between Israel and Turkey have skyrocketed in recent years in an average of a 10 percent year-to-year increase in trade since 2011.⁶³⁸

One of Turkey’s important differences as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks was its insider position. Turkey is geopolitically located very close to both countries. It shares its longest border line with Syria while Israel is only miles away from Turkey. Both lands used to be parts of the Ottoman Empire. Many Turkish citizens still have relatives in Syria and for instance as Haşimi also indicates, the land registry and cadastre system of Israel is still in Ottoman language.⁶³⁹ Turkey has social, historical, and cultural links with both countries.

⁶³⁷ Quandt, Peace Process, 84.

⁶³⁸ Dan Arbell, “Turkey-Israel relations: a political low point and an economic high point,” Brookings, February 19, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/19-israel-turkey-trade-business-economy> (accessed August 19, 2015).

⁶³⁹ Interview with Haşimi.

Turkey also has religious links with Syria. Furthermore, it has a prominent Jewish Diaspora that often refers to Ottoman Empire's welcoming of Jews escaping the Spanish massacre in 1492 and Turkey's welcoming of European Jews escaping the Holocaust during World War II with gratitude. Haşimi argues that when an outsider mediates the process can be limited to providing a platform however it is not possible for an insider such as Turkey to mediate just by providing a neutral platform. An insider, in this view, has to be more engaged with the process.⁶⁴⁰ He postulates,

For us, mediation is a direct part of our identities. For instance, people can give this example when the Palestinian, the Syrian or the Somali issue are spoken: "Of course Turkey will do it [the mediation] because the system of land registry and cadastre in Israel is still in Ottoman language." For instance I, alongside many other people in Turkey, cannot write the history of my region independent from Baghdad because the moment I do that, it would be deficient... There are strong family relations in Hatay⁶⁴¹ and Syria. This is how this geography extends from one end to the other. This is what we mean by Turkey's geographic position. The moment you isolate that region, you cannot construct your identity, your area of interest. This is why it [Turkey's mediation] is different and it depends on a different kind of interest [than that of the West].⁶⁴²

As evident in Haşimi's account, mediation is part of Turkey's identity building process *inter alia* as a result of its "insiderness." That is to say, Turkey is part of the region and a natural party to many of the conflicts. The relational ties and trust-building play significant part in this role which was also confirmed by Aras.⁶⁴³ As also noted in Chapter 2, the "high-context/low-context" division of Hall implies that in high-context cultures, which are often non-Western, relational ties are important in human interaction.⁶⁴⁴ This then affects the socialization of actors and their decision making processes. As such, "insiderness" comes to fore as an important difference of Turkey.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁴¹ A province of Turkey that used to be part of Syria before the partition following World War I.

⁶⁴² Interview with Haşimi.

⁶⁴³ Interview with Aras.

⁶⁴⁴ Hall, *Beyond Culture*.

This view is also confirmed by Apakan who argues that being a party to certain conflicts fosters Turkey's enthusiasm in terms of resolving them.⁶⁴⁵ The geopolitical, social and cultural proximity also makes the region an important area for Turkish interests. The debate on Turkey's "historical-geographical depth" comes to fore in this respect which has become a popular topic following Davutoğlu's use of the concept "Strategic Depth."⁶⁴⁶ In this view, Davutoğlu highlights the historical, geopolitical, and cultural depth of Turkey's relations with the countries in the region.

Insiderness is also regarded as an asset that enables Turkey to understand issues comprehensively and build empathy with other actors. Subaşı argues that, "if you have the information on the codes of both parties, your policy of reconciliation pays off."⁶⁴⁷ Gezer contends that instead of being a neutral, objective outsider that does not have any interest in the outcome of the conflict, Turkey is a regional mediator that understands the dynamics of the region well and emphasizes the fact that it is a regional actor. He notes, "We [Turkish foreign policy makers] sometimes use the term 'insider mediator' in our discourse. As an actor that is sometimes a party to the conflicts and has a direct interest in their outcome, Turkey tries to contribute to their resolution."⁶⁴⁸

Gezer further underlines that there are both advantages and disadvantages to being an insider mediator. He notes, "Turkey has an advantage in terms of long-term commitment. Instead of paying conjunctural or periodical attention to the resolution of conflicts, Turkey is able to engage long-term as an actor of the region."⁶⁴⁹ He suggests that there is a global trend in terms of change in the nature of conflicts towards being more intrastate with more

⁶⁴⁵ Interview with Apakan.

⁶⁴⁶ Davutoğlu, *Strategic Depth*.

⁶⁴⁷ Interview with Subaşı.

⁶⁴⁸ Interview with Gezer.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

multi-layered and complex dynamics attached. Identity plays a significant role in these kinds of conflicts through elements such as sect, religion and ethnicity.

According to Gezer, an actor such as Turkey, that knows the region well and has historical, cultural and relational ties with it, is able to display long-term commitment to the resolution of problems.⁶⁵⁰ He notes, “We have the aim of becoming an actor that is able to speak with everyone and make sophisticated contribution [to the resolution of conflicts].”⁶⁵¹ This comment is also indicative of Turkey’s enthusiasm to become more influential in the region by using mediation as a tool. In addition, both Aras and Gezer seem to be aware of the dilemma that Turkey is in, aware of the pitfalls and that Turkey is taking advantage of being able to present itself in a certain way.

As the above discussion suggests, for Turkish policy makers, Turkey’s insider identity is more important than neutrality in mediation. Şahin maintains that, Turkey’s historical and geopolitical mission takes away its chance of being neutral. “We are communities [the communities in the region] that have lived together for centuries under the same state [as the Ottoman Empire], under the same flag in our near geography and in the broader Middle East,” he emphasizes.⁶⁵² Mediation emerged as a tool of identity building for Turkey and being an insider plays a significant role in this process.

Despite the positive value attached to Turkey’s insiderness as a mediator by Turkish policy makers, the Arab Spring revealed that there may sometimes be disadvantages to being an insider mediator since it raises questions with respect to neutrality and impartiality. For instance, during the course of the Arab Spring, Turkey has been blamed for taking the side of the Sunnis and pursuing sectarian politics. Its support for the Muslim Brotherhood in

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² Interview with Şahin.

Egypt, the opposition in Syria in addition to its alleged reluctance to fight the ISIS have been regarded as indications of its sectarian policies.⁶⁵³ It seems certain that Turkey's credible image as a mediator deteriorated during the Arab Spring, partly because the tensions in its own policy were exposed, and partly because the rapidly worsening circumstances eroded any remaining support for mediation in Syria and Israel. Hence, Turkey needed to cast around for policies other than mediation in responding to the Arab Spring.

Regarding the drawbacks of Turkey's insider identity during the Arab Spring, Gezer contends that chances are much less for a mediator from outside the region to face such "unfair" accusations as being partial.⁶⁵⁴ In an attempt to advocate Turkey's position Gezer posits,

There is no tendency in Turkey's foreign policy to defend a particular group and act in line with its interests. We have no such traditional foreign policy. We have no such genetic coding. We are trying to act as an island of stability amid such volatile environment. In such an environment, our area of manoeuvre is shrunk as an insider actor. We have to accept that.⁶⁵⁵

In addition to its insiderness and the level of trust it was able to build with Syria, Turkey's Western ties were also significant in triggering Syria's request for its mediation. Gezer postulates that Turkey's relations with the West have a positive impact on its mediator role. He notes,

Turkey's institutional relationship with the Transatlantic and European institutions is one of the important dimensions of its soft power. Turkey is party to all of Europe's political and economic structures apart from the

⁶⁵³ Cengiz Çandar, "İçeride 'demokrasi açığı' dışarıda 'nüfuz kaybı'..." *Radikal*, November 2, 2014, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz_candar/icerde_demokrasi_acigi_disarida_nufuz_kaybi-1222680 (accessed November 6, 2014).

⁶⁵⁴ Interview with Gezer.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

EU. Similarly, it is a significant member of the NATO alliance. This creates an important impact on how Turkey is perceived. As a result, Turkey does not have to make a choice. One of the important tenets of the new foreign policy is this multi-dimensional foreign policy; the ability to look around with a perspective of 360 degrees.⁶⁵⁶

Turkey's close relations with the West, coupled with its non-Western identity, had a positive impact on its mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks before the Arab Spring. Although, it has deep Muslim, Asian and Middle Eastern characteristics and culture, Turkey also has serious engagements with the West. For instance, being "Muslim but secular"⁶⁵⁷ or being "a Muslim country and member of NATO"⁶⁵⁸ have been considered assets for Turkey as a mediator between Israel and the Arab world. As such, Turkey's mediation was demanded by Syria as an actor that could help achieve its goal of reintegrating into the international system by using its Western links.

For Israel, Turkey was both a Western ally and a Muslim actor that had good relations with Israel's foes. Despite being a Muslim dominated country, Turkey's strong ties with the Western world might have made it a more legitimate mediator for Israel compared to other possible mediators in the region such as Egypt. The fact that Turkey was able to talk to all actors in the region including Hamas and Hezbollah that the US considers as terrorist organizations also enhanced its legitimacy. As such, Turkey's relational ties with the region comes to fore as a more important asset in international mediation than insidership.

The impartiality of the US both in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations as well as the broader Arab-Israeli peace talks have also been largely questioned due to its close relations with

⁶⁵⁶ Interview with Gezer.

⁶⁵⁷ "Turkey offers to resume mediation in Israel-Syria talks," *Haaretz*.

⁶⁵⁸ Ethan Bronner, "Israel Holds Peace Talks With Syria," *The New York Times*, 22 May 2008.

Israel.⁶⁵⁹ According to Jones, “There is considerable evidence that American policy is deliberately skewed in particular directions in the politics of the Middle East and that rather than being a mediator in these conflicts the US is a key player with strong interests of its own.”⁶⁶⁰

On the other hand, the example of US mediation also reveals that, impartiality *per se* may not always be the most important asset in international mediation. In this vein Quandt suggests that,

It is of course true that the US is very closely aligned with the Israelis and usually has supported a kind of basic Israeli security concern and so forth. But the reason that successive Arab parties have wanted the US to be involved is not because we are seemed as so fair but because of this hope that the US, for its larger strategic interest, would limit its support to Israel to what we might call pre1967 Israel. On things like borders and Jerusalem [US formal position is] not so different from what might be called moderate Arab position. We never recognized the annexation of East Jerusalem. We never recognized Jerusalem as the official capital; our embassy is still in Tel Aviv. We never recognized the annexation of the Golan Heights. So, an Arab leader like Sadat could say “well of course the Americans are close to the Israelis but they never said the Sinai should not go back to Egypt and since that is our major goal maybe we can count on their support for that.”⁶⁶¹

Quandt also contends that as an asset, the leverage of the US over Israel is often considered more important than neutrality or objectivity in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. He notes,

We [the US] always had this feeling that the special role we could play as mediator is not that we would be the most neutral or most objective but at the end of the day we could say to Israelis “if you do so and so we would reassure you with aid or technology transfers or intelligence cooperation or arms support. So that you

⁶⁵⁹ Campbell, “American Efforts for Peace,” 301-302.

⁶⁶⁰ Jones, “Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory,” 652.

⁶⁶¹ Interview with Quandt.

can compensate for giving up territory with some sense that your security is still intact.”⁶⁶²

According to Kurtzer and Lasensky, the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict “have always leaned on Washington to help them bridge differences, walk the last mile, provide off-the-table incentives to reach agreement, and to be an involved stakeholder in implementing accords.”⁶⁶³

4.4.4 Style of Mediation

This section aims to understand to what extent Turkey’s style of mediation may demonstrate a difference from other mediators by drawing on some of the indicators discussed in Chapter 2 such as being persistent or reluctant, inclusive or exclusive, bringing culture into mediation, and adopting a normative approach.

In the Syrian-Israeli talks, Turkey was persistent and committed throughout the entire process unlike the US which, according to Quandt, assumed the Palestinian-Israeli track as more important and with bigger potential than the Syrian-Israeli track.⁶⁶⁴ As Aras also underlines, its commitment to the process was demonstrated through its high-level involvement in the process and its enthusiasm to continue the talks even after their suspension following the Gaza outbreak.⁶⁶⁵ As a demonstration of Turkey’s willingness to continue the talks Davutoğlu noted early in 2010 that,

If the two countries agree to restart it [peace talks], we can do it. As Turkey, we are ready. The Syrian side already declared they want to continue from where we left (off). The Israeli side, they have different views. Some coalition members are against, some are in favor. We will see. If we see a strong political will, both in Israel and Syria, we will

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Kurtzer and Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace*, 11.

⁶⁶⁴ Interview with Quandt.

⁶⁶⁵ Interview with Aras.

continue to support (peace efforts). We will support every attempt, step in the direction of peace.⁶⁶⁶

According to Quandt, an important aspect of Turkish mediation was that it was more to the point and precise.⁶⁶⁷ He notes,

I have been told people say they [Turks] have done a very good job mediating. They have got into details that were never discussed before. Particularly the exact question of “what is meant by withdrawing to the 1967 line?” that nobody quite knows where it was on the map. They knew where it was not but they did not quite know where it was. I think the moving toward a clear definition on the territorial, what it would mean to withdraw to the 1967 line and what else needs to be done... Those are the main contributions [of Turkey’s mediation].⁶⁶⁸

This comment also sheds light on Quandt’s previous criticism of Christopher’s ignorance regarding the details of the agreement. According to Quandt’s observations, Turkey’s interest in the details of the agreement may be indicative of its willingness and commitment to the process.

Quandt also suggests that Turkish style was much more “non-public” in the sense that it was easier to control the media during the peace talks. He postulates,

I think the style of mediating was very non-public. One of the problems with the American style of mediation is that it tends to come into the public arena too much. Secretary of the state and the president get involved and all of a sudden we have to start explaining what the issues are. Sometimes an effective mediator has to mediate below the radar so that it is not being reported in the press. I think that is something that the Norwegians have done effectively with the Palestinians in Oslo. Americans are not very good at this kind of very low-key mediation.⁶⁶⁹

In this view, Turkish mediation style is different in the sense that it is easier for Turkey to control its domestic media which may be an advantage in a mediation process in which

⁶⁶⁶ “Turkey offers to resume mediation in Israel-Syria talks,” *Haaretz*.

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with Quandt.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

confidentiality is of critical value. However, the ability of the government to control the media is also indicative of the lack of press freedom in the country.

Another difference is that Turkey followed an all-inclusive approach during the process. Although there was not any particular need to include a non-state actor in the Syrian-Israeli talks at the time, having side talks with Hamas or Hezbollah could have been necessary had the talks not been resumed and developed into the next stage. Turkey's mediation style is in favour of the inclusion of all actors based on its willingness to present itself as having an all-inclusive style of diplomacy. For instance by referring to a conversation he had with Olmert regarding the Israeli-Palestinian talks, Erdoğan notes, "When I was talking with Prime Minister Olmert, I said regarding the Palestine-Israeli talks it would not be correct not to include Hamas in the negotiations. They entered the election in Palestine and won the majority of seats in the parliament."⁶⁷⁰ He adds that Olmert did not agree to speak with Hamas.⁶⁷¹

Unlike Turkey, the US rejected to have any communication with stakeholders such as Hezbollah or Hamas on the basis that they are terrorist organizations. Furthermore, US anti-terrorism law and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) of 2001 bring restrictions to such encounters. This has the potential to make it harder for the US to have an effective mediator role in the Arab-Israeli conflict which may require to keep the communication channels open with such parties as Hamas or Hezbollah, both of which it recognizes as terrorist organizations.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷⁰ "Erdogan: Palestine an open-air prison," *Ynetnews.com*.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Doug Noll, "Another International Mediation Fiasco in Libya," *The World Post*, 6 June 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-noll/another-international-med_b_872106.html (accessed August 14, 2012).

As highlighted in Chapter 2, culture comes to fore as an important indicator to understand difference in mediation. As analysed in the above discussion on insiderness, Turkey's cultural links with the region was important in paving the way for its mediator role. As also noted by Al-Nunu, the religious sensitivities of the Turkish leadership, and the moderate model of Islam Turkey was able to offer to the Muslim world, played a significant role in its being accepted as a mediator in regional conflicts. By referring to Turkey's peacekeeping role in Afghanistan Subaşı argues in a similar vein that, "when a Turkish soldier goes to the Friday prayer in Afghanistan and prays with his uniform on that cultivates a relationship."⁶⁷³

As discussed earlier in the text, Turkey's Muslim and secular identity was important in the emergence and approval of its mediator role in the region. However, Aras notes that, probably Turkey's cultural ties with Syria or Israel did not have too much impact on the talks *per se* since they were rather technical with a clear agenda.⁶⁷⁴

As discussed in Chapter 2, emerging powers have come to fore as "norm-defenders" in recent years. They also pursue advocacy on the international platform on certain issues. As also argued by Parlar, "In accordance with its rising 'value-driven' and 'ideational' posture in its region, Turkey then added a normative dimension to its evolving soft power, promoting democracy and humanitarian values in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region."⁶⁷⁵ Turkey's criticism of Israel following the suspension of the Syrian-Israeli talks as a result of the Gaza crisis may be seen as an example of such advocacy. In addition, Erdoğan walked out from the panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos in

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with Aras.

⁶⁷⁵ Dal, "Assessing Turkey's 'Normative' Power in the Middle East and North Africa Region," 709.

2009 protesting the Israeli President Shimon Peres for defending Israel's Gaza blockade.⁶⁷⁶

During the panel Erdoğan said by pointing his finger at Peres,

Mr. Peres, you are older than me. Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience... When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill... And so Davos is over for me from now on.⁶⁷⁷

Erdoğan skipped the Davos summits in the subsequent years. In June 2012, he organized the World Economic Forum in Istanbul as the host country. During his speech, Erdoğan criticized the situation in Gaza by noting, "People are being jailed in the world's largest open-air prison."⁶⁷⁸ During the following years Erdoğan accused Israel "of a policy 'based on lies,'"⁶⁷⁹ for attempting a "systematic genocide,"⁶⁸⁰ and declared it "a 'threat' to the Middle East."⁶⁸¹ According to Haşimi,

It [Erdoğan's anti-Israeli discourse] started after one of the parties [Israel] lied to the prime minister of the country [Turkey] that took all sorts of associated risks and conducted the mediation. Furthermore, that party adopted a contrary behaviour in the field. It was Turkey that lost its trust and even its willingness to mediate... The Prime Minister [Erdoğan] started talking after the issue had been over; after Israel "betrayed the process by not keeping its promise," finalized and destroyed it [the peace talks] and created a negative atmosphere. He did not talk while the talks were still ongoing. You enter a different equation when you look at it this way. There is no point in constantly blaming the Prime Minister.⁶⁸²

The normative discourse and advocacy in Turkish foreign policy has been prevalent on the Turkish government's domestic policy as well. The AKP has used such discourse a

⁶⁷⁶ "Recep Erdogan storms out of Davos after clash with Israeli president over Gaza," *The Guardian*, 30 January 2009.

⁶⁷⁷ Katrin Bennhold, "Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel," *The New York Times*, 29 January 2009.

⁶⁷⁸ "PM Erdoğan ties economy to democratization at WEF," *Todays Zaman*, 5 June 2012.

⁶⁷⁹ "Erdogan Slams Israeli 'Lies' Over Hamas Aggression," *Arutz Sheva*, 11 July 2014, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/182800#U-KM72ePLcs> (accessed August 14, 2012).

⁶⁸⁰ Ariel Ben Solomon, "Erdogan accuses Israel of attempting a 'systematic genocide,'" *The Jerusalem Post*, July 18, 2014.

⁶⁸¹ Adrian Blomfield, "Nuclear Israel is a 'threat' to Middle East, says Turkey's Erdogan," *The Telegraph*, October 11, 2011.

⁶⁸² Interview with Haşimi.

number of times, particularly before elections. For instance, it often depicts its followers as people that had been “oppressed,” “discriminated,” and whose “rights had been violated” by previous administrations.⁶⁸³ It also draws a parallel between its “oppressed” followers and the “oppressed Muslims” around the world. Similarly, some of Turkey’s missed opportunities have been attributed to the “unfairness” of the international community or external actors rather than its own shortcomings by policy makers. For instance, regarding the lack of Turkey’s mediation in Egypt Haşimi contends that,

The order logic of events is constantly interpreted on behalf of Israel at the international equation. This is a wrong and unfair interpretation. The statements about Egypt are in a similar vein. For instance, they say, “Turkey could have mediated the Egyptian dispute but the opportunity has been missed due to the harsh statements by its prime minister.” Now, our foreign minister has explained, our prime minister has explained, our deputy undersecretary [of Prime Ministry] İbrahim Kalın has explained. They have given a number of examples from the talks. The Council of Wisemen [on Egypt] has come [to Turkey] and a roadmap of seven articles has been agreed upon to be conveyed to the Egyptian side. A council of 6-7 people including Amr Moussa came here representing the Arab League. It was said [by the Turkish representatives] that a process which would engage the parties into dialogue should be initiated to avoid its evolution towards a negative process. But none of the promises were kept.⁶⁸⁴

The above discussion also suggests another insight with respect to Turkey’s mediation which is its lack of ability to influence the parties. Unlike the US, Turkey lacks sufficient leverage to make its voice heard over which *inter alia* is indicative of the limits of its soft power.

Although the discourses of policy makers is normative, Turkey’s foreign policy has so far been more pragmatic than normative.⁶⁸⁵ Gezer pinpoints similarly that Turkey’s efforts

⁶⁸³ “Erdoğan: Yeni Türkiye’den beklentim yeni muhalefet,” *Akşam*, 14 August 2014; “Erdoğan: Ezen ve ezilen vardı,” *Haber 7*, 18 June 2006, <http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/164619-erdogan-ezen-ve-ezilen-vardi> (accessed August 14, 2012).

⁶⁸⁴ Interview with Haşimi.

⁶⁸⁵ Interview with Aras.

“are not just about altruism that aims to bring justice to the entire world. There is a dimension to it that is directly related to national interest.”⁶⁸⁶ He further highlights that,

The emphasis we [foreign policy makers] put on values in an accelerating tone would overlap with Turkey’s interest in the long run. As an actor that defends values and follows a consistent policy within this framework, and as a constructive actor on the regional level, we believe that Turkey’s emphasises leave positive marks on the parties. Our prime minister and other policy makers have been putting an emphasis on justice since the past which is a consistent approach with the value-based foreign policy. The emphasis on values in a way helps you find your course in a turbulent sea amid a period of regional and systemic transformation. It enables you to put forth certain values and follow a consistent approach instead of changing position according to conjunctural circumstances. Mediation is not too different than this.⁶⁸⁷

Haşimi postulates in a similar vein by noting that,

Those who discuss and criticize Turkish foreign policy claim that Turkey pursues politics of ideology and does not think around the concept of interest. A state thinks around the concept of interest. Everyone thinks around this concept wherever there is politics. But the problem is how we define interest; what interest is. I do not think like the white Western man; like the rational man. He has an issue of military power derived from patriarchy. The issue of “We are the most powerful nation, we have the missiles,” and so on.⁶⁸⁸

Haşimi’s quote is also indicative of how Turkey uses this normative discourse to construct its non-Western identity. It also emphasizes the importance of soft power against the hard military power and degrades rationality as a quality. However, this critical discourse may be serving as a facilitative device for Turkey to legitimize its policies domestically as well as regionally. Yet, the extent to which Turkey’s normative discourse and its claim to be offering something new and alternative to “Western” practices contributes to its mediation seems to be contestable.

⁶⁸⁶ Interview with Gezer.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Interview with Haşimi.

4.4.5 Progress of Mediators

As discussed in Chapter 2, progress of mediators refers to their ability to achieve their initial motives to mediate a given talk. There is no doubt that a full-fledged resolution of the conflict with an agreed upon agreement, as well as its implementation, was what Turkey hoped to achieve in mediating the conflict. However, the talks were suspended and Turkey failed to achieve this goal. Yet, owing to the talks, Turkey was able to earn a certain level of reputation and legitimacy as a mediator in the region. In fact, the Syrian-Israeli talks, and the Iranian nuclear talks, became its most remembered mediation attempts in the region. Turkey made fame as a trustable and committed mediator.⁶⁸⁹ As such, it may be argued that, to a certain extent, Turkey was able to achieve its motive of “search for prestige” in the region. Furthermore, at the time, the talks also helped Turkey to further enhance its relations with Syria. As such, political and economic relations flourished as a result of the talks, which was another motive for Turkey to mediate the talks.

However, the eventual failure of the talks had negative consequences on Turkey’s motive to ‘bring order, security, and stability’ to the region. In fact, despite other reasons, Turkey’s relations with Israel were strained partially as a result of the talks. Furthermore, had the talks reached a comprehensive resolution, this could have ended Syria’s international isolation, pushed its government towards reforms, and perhaps prevented the current crisis in the country, which has had dire regional consequences. Similarly, the failure of the talks also halted Turkey’s other motives such as ensuring energy security or diminishing Iran’s influence in the region.

Nevertheless, it may be argued that, owing to the talks, Turkey was able to help build a certain level of confidence between the two parties at the time. The resumption of the

⁶⁸⁹ Interview with Al-Nunu; Interview with Aras; Interview with Apakan.

negotiations after years of suspension may be seen as a progress. In addition, Turkey also brought direct talks into the agenda after seven years of suspension. According to Turkish officials, the Syrian-Israeli talks under Turkey's mediation ended right before reaching a peace deal. The parties had reached consensus on several articles before the talks ended.⁶⁹⁰

Erdoğan argues that, during their meeting, Olmert promised him that Gaza would not face a humanitarian crisis.⁶⁹¹ Erdoğan was disappointed and upset that the crisis broke out right after Olmert's promise and the bilateral relations began to decline. Erdoğan notes that, "Olmert's last sentence (as he left meetings in Ankara) was, 'As soon as I get back I will consult with my colleagues and get back to you.' As I waited for his response, on December 27, bombs started falling on Gaza."⁶⁹² Subsequently, Turkey's mediator role was suspended indefinitely and despite Davutoğlu's call for the resumption of this role during the brief negotiations in 2010, Israel preferred the US as the mediator. This is also indicative of the limits of Turkey's power and what Turkish mediation has achieved.

When compared to Turkey, the US seems to have achieved more progress as a mediator such as convincing the parties to commence direct talks. This was a considerable progress given the previous lack of any diplomatic relations. As Cobban highlights, the Madrid Conference "was the first time that an official from the Syrian Arab Republic had ever, in the forty-three years of Israel's existence as a modern state, sat down openly with Israeli negotiators to discuss a final resolution of the conflict between them."⁶⁹³

In addition to achieving direct talks, US mediation also resulted in a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel. As Asaf pinpoints, "Although limited, the two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt in January 1974 and September 1975,

⁶⁹⁰ Interview with Haşimi; Interview with Gezer; and Interview with Apakan.

⁶⁹¹ "İsrail, Türkiye'ye yalan söylemiş!," *Milliyet*, December 29, 2008.

⁶⁹² "Erdogan: Palestine an open-air prison," *Ynetnews.com*.

⁶⁹³ Cobban, *Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks*, 15.

and the one between Israel and Syria in May 1974, resulted for the first time the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory.”⁶⁹⁴ However, although there have been some progress throughout the years, the fact that the US failed to thoroughly resolve the conflict, despite having mediated for a lot longer period of time than Turkey, raises questions regarding its mediation.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter focused on Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks in order to understand to what extent it was able to mediate differently compared to the US. The chapter found that, Turkey’s acceptance of mediating the Syrian-Israeli talks was in line with its new regional policy which entailed a proactive approach towards the surrounding problems in order to help establish "a region of trade and an island of peace.”⁶⁹⁵

As such, the evidence demonstrated in this chapter confirmed the finding in Chapter 3 arguing that mediating the Syrian-Israeli talks was also part of a process of identity construction as a reliable, credible and capable actor, which then would help Turkey to boost its regional influence. This was also a result of the increasing role of soft-power in Turkish foreign policy in recent years. In addition, its mediator role emerged as a result of the relational links and the level of trust it was able to build with Syria which is indicative of the success of its regional policy at the time.

Turkey was an emerging mediator that was new in the field with limited experience. In addition, it lacked sufficient institutionalization and capacity in mediation. Although policy makers are aware of this, they attribute the failure of Turkey’s mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks to external factors such as lack of willingness of the parties towards resolution.

⁶⁹⁴ Siniver, "Power, Impartiality and Timing," 816-17.

⁶⁹⁵ Interview with Haşimi.

Turkey is also faced with the danger of the spill over of the surrounding conflicts as a result of its geographical proximity and close historical, social, political and economic ties with the region. This would also have a negative impact on the image Turkey has been trying to build as a secure and reliable energy transit route in the region.

Turkey's lack of sufficient hard power to twist arms or offer incentives came to fore as an important difference in this chapter when compared with the US. The study found that US ability to offer incentives, twist Israel's arm and offer security reassurance provided it with a more stable mediator role over the course of the Arab-Israeli peace process and helped it achieve partial results. In this respect, contrary to the mainstream mediation literature that praises the importance of neutrality and impartiality, leverage came to fore as a more important element for mediation in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Turkey had to be more persuasive and rely more on its discursive power. In this respect, Turkish "difference" is perhaps a way for Turkish policy makers to manage their own lack of power while maximising their influence in the region.

The Syrian-Israeli case also validates that culture was important in the acceptance of Turkey's mediator role both by the parties and in the region. Turkey gained its legitimacy as a mediator in the Syrian-Israeli talks from its dual identity which is both Western and non-Western. This dual identity played an important role by raising Turkey's credibility in Syria as a possible actor that could help reintegrate it into the international system and in Israel as a trustable Western ally that is able to access all actors in the region including those such as Hezbollah or Hamas. In this respect, Turkey's presented *insiderness* and its *all-inclusive* style of diplomacy came to fore as important assets as a mediator. The fact that Turkey had improved its relations with Syria at a time when the US still considered

the latter a “rogue state” also enhanced its legitimacy as a mediator which signalled an increased level of self-confidence on Turkey’s part.

In terms of its progress, despite the suspension of the talks, Turkey was able to gain a certain amount of reputation and legitimacy as a mediator in the region as a result of the talks. However although its mediator role enabled Turkey to enhance its relations with Syria, its relations with Israel were significantly strained, partially as a result of the suspension of the talks which poses an example to understand how mediation cannot be analysed in a vacuum, in isolation from the political context. As such, it may be argued that, Turkey achieved partial results with its mediation.

However, the fact that Israel preferred the US to Turkey during the brief 2010 peace talks with Syria is indicative of a missed opportunity with respect to Turkey’s mediation. It also gives clues about the limits of Turkey’s ability to convince the parties into a resolution. Therefore, when contrasted to the extensive diplomatic, military and economic resources available to the US, Turkey’s power as a mediator is limited. Furthermore, the extent of independence that it is willing to operate with, the contentious attitude it adopts, and the fact that it is an insider to the conflict that has vested interests in its outcome require a certain level of power which Turkey lacks. As such, the study found that Turkey cannot act too independently in its region against the US will. It needs the US support in its mediation since the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflicts have always wanted the guarantee of the latter in peace talks.

CHAPTER 5 – TURKEY’S MEDIATION IN SOMALIA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on Turkey’s mediator role in Somalia which has been ongoing since 2012.⁶⁹⁶ This role was requested by the governments of Somalia and Somaliland, and as argued by Turkish diplomats, its large scale presence and commitment during and after the famine 2011 triggered such demand by positioning Turkey as a trustable actor in the country.⁶⁹⁷ Turkey’s then Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia during the deadly famine in 2011, as the first non-African leader to visit the country in 20 years. His visit triggered the flow of substantial Turkish aid into the country in a relatively short time, which played a significant role in the development of its mediator role in the country.⁶⁹⁸ As such, Turkey’s sudden robust interest in Somalia should be seen as part of its broader Africa policy which was reignited following the declaration of 2005 as “Year of Africa,” aiming to flourish political, economic and social relations with the continent.

Understanding Turkey’s mediator role in Somalia is important since the Somali case comprises an example of an intrastate conflict. It also enables the thesis to examine, not just mediation between two states but also types of mediation conducted on regional and grassroots levels among different actors such as clans or opinion leaders, which offers different avenues to analyse Turkish mediation.

Somalia is a very different example from the Syrian-Israeli case, and a very different environment, in which Turkey could mediate. The Somali case comprises a worthy area of study to examine how Turkey utilizes mediation as a tool of extending into new regions

⁶⁹⁶ Parts of this chapter has been reproduced in Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 735-757; and Aras and Akpınar, “The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding,” 230-247.

⁶⁹⁷ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1, Istanbul, March 20, 2015; Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 2, Istanbul, March 20, 2015.

⁶⁹⁸ Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 735-757.

that are not in its immediate neighbourhood. Mediation was one of the tools that Turkey used in order to achieve its policy of normalization in Somalia through the eradication of problems. This would then enable Turkey to increase its influence in the country as well as in Africa. Turkey would largely benefit from a stable Somalia and mediation enables it to present itself as a trustable and responsible actor. Somalia also sets a case for investigating the role of non-state actors such as humanitarian NGOs and businesses in Turkey's peace initiatives. The Somali experience also offers an opportunity to examine the understanding of Turkish foreign policy makers which considers mediation in a broader sense or as a "package"⁶⁹⁹ that includes several supportive means such as humanitarian assistance and development aid. What role do these different means play in Turkey's mediation? How and why Turkish policy makers refer to Turkish mediation as a "package"?

In order to deepen the understanding on Turkey's mediation, the chapter also draws some comparisons to British and Norwegian mediation in this country, asking whether Turkey could be said to have a different style of mediation to these countries with more established mediation records. While examining British mediation offers an opportunity to reflect on Turkey's mediator role against a former great power, Norwegian mediation sets an example to small-state mediation that is also involved more on the level of grassroots.

The chapter first analyses the background of the conflict. It then briefly analyses past attempts for mediation in Somalia and why these attempts failed. After a brief introduction of the mediation initiatives of Turkey, Britain and Norway, the chapter dwells deeper into Turkish mediation by drawing on the indicators discussed in Chapter 2. These include previous experiences of mediators, mediator's motives, characteristics of mediators, their style of mediation, means supportive of mediation, and finally the progress of mediators.

⁶⁹⁹ Interview with Aras.

5.2 Background on the Conflict in Somalia

This section aims to give a brief background on the conflict in Somalia by examining its causes, actors, context and dynamics. Since the Somali case consists of a number of sub-conflicts, it is difficult to identify common issues pertaining to all conflicts. As such, unlike in Chapter 4, there will not be a separate section on “Issues of the Conflict.” As a summary, Turkey’s mediation between Somalia and Somaliland has so far focused on promoting dialogue between the parties, distribution of international aid, and cooperation on security issues.⁷⁰⁰ These issues will be discussed in different intervals throughout the theses.

A country labelled as “the most failed state,”⁷⁰¹ Somalia is faced with a number of problems that have triggered various conflicts including the longest civil war of the post-Cold War era. It had been ruled by nomadic and clan based, decentralised rulers until Britain colonized what is now Somaliland and Italy colonized the south-central part of the country in late 19th century. In 1960 the country was decolonized and the British and Italian territories unified as Somali Republic until the military coup d’état of 1969 orchestrated by General Mohamed Siad Barre.

As with the rest of Africa, colonialism is a serious baggage for Somalia. One of the outcomes of colonialism was the sloppy drawing of borders in Africa. As a consequence, Somali people were split into four different countries including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. According to Mengisteab, “the partition of ethnic groups into different countries often involves the disruption of social and cultural ties.”⁷⁰² As Mengisteab further pinpoints, “partitioned ethnic identities tend to face relatively greater levels of

⁷⁰⁰ See Appendix 2.

⁷⁰¹ The Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index Rankings 2013,” <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings> (accessed February 20, 2014).

⁷⁰² Kidane Mengisteab, *The Horn of Africa*, Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press, 2014, 11.

marginalization, ethnic struggles and civil wars.”⁷⁰³ During the Cold War, Somalia also became a zone of proxy wars between the USSR and the US such as the Ethio-Somali War of 1977-1978.⁷⁰⁴

Somalia was dragged into civil war in 1988 as a result of uprisings by several clan-based armed groups who also founded the Somali National Movement against the military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre.⁷⁰⁵ The collapse of Barre’s regime in 1991 created a power vacuum that triggered conflict. In 1992 the UN intervened *via* the United Nations Operation in Somalia, a humanitarian mission, and the Unified Task Force, a peacekeeping taskforce. However, it had to withdraw from the country following the failure of the US-led Operation Restore Hope.⁷⁰⁶

5.2.1 Actors of the Conflict

In ethnic conflicts it is often a difficult task to identify the actors and the identification itself may yield controversy and affect the outcome of the peace process since gaining recognition may often be one of the reasons for conflict. However, defining actors accurately is central to the efficient resolution of a given conflict. As also discussed in Chapter, it is also important in understanding how mediators may relate to these actors or how whether they include them in the peace process, which would then give clues regarding their mediation approaches.

Despite several different actors that had been influential across the years, the main actors may be summarized as the various Somali central governments, the regional autonomous

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Ken Menkhaus, Hassan Sheikh, Ali Joqombe and Pat Johnson, *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, Nairobi: Interpeace; The Center for Research and Dialogue, 2009.

⁷⁰⁵ Menkhaus, Sheikh, Joqombe and Johnson, *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, 9.

⁷⁰⁶ Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, “Endless war a brief history of the Somali conflict,” *Accord*, no.21, 2010, 10-14.

administrations, such as Somaliland, established by the various clans, and the rebel militia groups, such as Al Shabaab.

The central governments are the administrations that are internationally recognized as the legitimate representatives of the Somali people such as the current Federal Government of Somalia. These governments are unrecognized by some militia groups, clans or regional authorities, which is one of the causes of the conflict.

The civil war resulted in the establishment of regional autonomous administrations by various clans such as the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia founded in 1998 in the Northeastern part of the country, Galmudug in central Somalia, the Republic of Somaliland self-declared in the Northwestern part of the country, and smaller regions such as Ximan, Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a and Xeeb. While Somaliland⁷⁰⁷ is seeking international recognition as a unitary state, Puntland, Galmudug and others consider themselves as parts of the Federal State of Somalia.⁷⁰⁸ Considering itself as the successor state to the British Somaliland protectorate, Somaliland has been one of the parties of the peace talks conducted by Turkey, and Britain.

Another group of actors are the rebel militia groups such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, the Islamic Courts Union, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab that fight the central governments to exert influence and control over a certain or the entire territory of Somalia. Since these groups are numerous in number, this study takes Al-Shabaab, or *the Youth*, as the main focus since it is the only one of these groups that participated in the talks that Turkey has mediated so far.

⁷⁰⁷ Since 2004, Somaliland has been a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). See UNPO, "Somaliland," March 25, 2008, <http://www.unpo.org/members/7916> (accessed June 6, 2012).

⁷⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State, "2011 Human Rights Reports: Somalia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, May 24, 2012; Crisis Group, "Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia," *Africa Briefing*, no.928, October 2012, 8.

Founded in 2006, Al-Shabaab is currently assumed to control a third of Somalia, mainly the south-central part of the country.⁷⁰⁹ The official cause of Al-Shabaab is to defeat the central government, the African Union Mission, “seize power throughout Somalia, reincorporate Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya and Ethiopia, and create an Islamic caliphate.”⁷¹⁰ It announced its merger with al-Qaida in 2012 and is considered a “terrorist organization” by a number of Western states including Britain and Norway.

Al Shabaab has a decentralized structure led by its leader Ahmed Godane. As Jackson and Aynte argue, the group considers itself as a “government in waiting”⁷¹¹ and is a significant gatekeeper in the country especially for humanitarian aid agencies operating on the ground. It has an Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies that regulates the activities of the humanitarian aid agencies through its Humanitarian Coordination Office whose duty is “to negotiate access, collect ‘taxes’ and monitor aid agency activities.”⁷¹² With regards its perception of foreign humanitarian NGOs, an official of Al-Shabaab notes, “whether they call themselves humanitarian or not, we know who they are: they are the civilian face of the infidel forces.”⁷¹³

5.2.2 The Context and Dynamics of the Conflict

The context of the Somali conflict is determined by clan clashes, extreme poverty, frequent famines, and political struggles both on national and regional levels. There is also a serious problem in centre-periphery relations as a result of issues of legitimacy and disconnectedness. The volatile political climate in the country was coupled with the deadly famine as a result of the 2011 East Africa Drought, the worst drought of the last sixty

⁷⁰⁹ “Al-Shabaab rebuilds forces in Somalia as African Union campaign stalls,” *The Guardian*, October 28, 2013.

⁷¹⁰ David Shinn, “Al Shabaab's foreign threat to Somalia,” *Orbis* 55, no.2, 2011: 204.

⁷¹¹ Ashley Jackson and Abdi Aynte, “Al-Shabaab Engagement with Aid Agencies,” *Humanitarian Policy Group and the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies Policy Brief*, no.53, 2013, 4.

⁷¹² *Ibid*, 2.

⁷¹³ *Ibid*, 4.

years. The drought only added to Somalia's problems by creating health problems, a refugee crisis as well as economic and political problems affecting more than 40 per cent of the population.⁷¹⁴

It would be misleading to analyse the Somali conflict without understanding the regional context. The Eritrean – Ethiopian War of 1998-2000 and its repercussions have had negative consequences on Somalia. According to a report by NUPI, Somalia has turned into a venue of a proxy war between these states in addition to becoming “one of the battlefields of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ and the accompanying struggle to contain radical Islam.”⁷¹⁵

Somalia has become a venue of proxy wars between Ethiopia, Egypt and the Gulf states as well. According to Menkhaus, while “Arab states seek a strong central Somali state to counterbalance and outflank Ethiopia; Ethiopia seeks a weak, decentralized client state, and is willing to settle for ongoing state collapse rather than risk a revived Arab-backed government in Mogadishu.”⁷¹⁶ This rivalry further adds to the intractability of the conflict in Somalia.

The nature of the Somali conflict indicates an issue of sovereignty, territory, natural resources and security. It is an intrastate conflict involving a range of actors and the quality of communication between the parties is poor. The conflict is fluctuating, protracted, dynamic and multidimensional. According to former Turkish Ambassador to Mogadishu, Kani Torun, in the Somali conflict, “there is a resource factor, there is a clan factor, there is an ideology issue, there is a foreign interest factor, there is a leadership factor or a lack of

⁷¹⁴ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, “DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa,” 2. See also, UNHCR, “Ethiopia Opens New Camp for Somali Refugees,” December 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4ed8d89a6.html> (accessed January 13, 2014).

⁷¹⁵ Axel Borchgrevink and Jon Harald Sande Lie, “Regional Conflicts and International Engagement on the Horn of Africa,” *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Report*, 2009, 21.

⁷¹⁶ Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*, 9.

leadership factor, there is the absence of state institutions factor and there is the issue of shifting alliances.”⁷¹⁷ These factors make it difficult to bring about normalization in Somalia.

5.3 Mediation in Somalia

There have been various mediation attempts in the Somali conflict on local, regional and national levels by various mediators such as Djibouti, the UN, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Yemen, the IGAD and the Arab League.⁷¹⁸ Most of these attempts failed to bring about long lasting peace. Hilde F. Johnson, former Minister of International Development of Norway and Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, argues that “Individual leaders’ choices on whether to engage seriously in a peace process always involve their respective domestic political agendas.”⁷¹⁹

Domestic voices in Somalia, on the other hand, often blame outsiders for having their own agendas and interests in the country that ultimately hamper peace. Ethiopia, in this respect, is one of the most frequently blamed scapegoats.⁷²⁰ For instance, an anonymous Somali NGO representative argues that interference of external actors made the Somali conflict more complex leading to the failure of the mediation attempts. He also notes that the polarization within Somalia is another element that hampered the peace process.⁷²¹ According to Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein, Executive Director of Watchful Association

⁷¹⁷ Kani Torun, “Mediation in Somalia: The Turkish Way,” Conference Proceedings, II. Istanbul Conference on Mediation, Istanbul, April 12, 2013.

⁷¹⁸ Menkhaus, Sheikh, Joqombe and Johnson, *A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988*, 6.

⁷¹⁹ Hilde F. Johnson, *Waging Peace in Sudan*, Sussex Academy Press: Brighton; Portland; Toronto, 2011, 16.

⁷²⁰ AMISOM, “Somali Peace Process,” <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/> (accessed February 12, 2015).

⁷²¹ Interview with an anonymous Somali NGO representative, Istanbul, December 14, 2013.

for Relief and Development, having a Muslim identity is one of the reasons why Somalia's neighbours turn against it, as they are all non-Muslim.⁷²²

Other critics blame the lack of sufficient international will and commitment to restoring peace in Somalia. For instance, while the UN is often blamed for arriving too late in the country, the US is blamed for lacking enough will for peacemaking in Somalia.⁷²³ In addition, while some critics blame lack of sufficient insight by the mediators into the realities of Somalia, others suggest inadequate security measures taken to secure the negotiations.⁷²⁴ As such, opinions on the failure of previous talks in Somalia vary considerably.

The following section will give a brief account of mediation attempts by Britain, Turkey and Norway in Somalia in order to sharpen the understanding on Turkish mediation and draw inferences on the ways that it is able to mediate differently.

5.3.1 British Mediation in Somalia

Britain mediated between Somalia and Somaliland on June 20, 2012 in London following the First London Conference on Somalia. The talks were sponsored by the British government and the EU. The delegations from Somalia and Somaliland were appointed by the presidents of the two states Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo respectively. The Somali delegation was led by Somalia's Minister of Interior and

⁷²² Interview with Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein, Executive Director of Watchful Association for Relief and Development in Somalia, Istanbul, December 14, 2013.

⁷²³ AMISOM, "Somali Peace Process."

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

National Security Abdisamad Maalim Mohamud while the Somaliland delegation was led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Abdullahi Omar.⁷²⁵

Some of the issues discussed were the secession of Somaliland from Somalia; the acknowledgement of the massacre of Somalilanders allegedly staged by the Somali military regime between 1988 and 1991; the encouragement of dialogue between the parties; facilitation and distribution of international aid; and security cooperation on issues such as extremism, piracy, and the environment.⁷²⁶

Subsequently, the parties published a joint declaration in Dubai on June 28, 2012 aiming “to formally endorse the process of the talks between the two sides.”⁷²⁷ Originally they were meant to involve six mediators including Britain, Turkey, Norway, South Africa, the EU and Switzerland. Although the process started under Britain’s mediation, according to Thomas Wheeler, Conflict and Security Adviser at Saferworld, there is a perception among some circles in Somaliland that Turkey hijacked the process.⁷²⁸ An anonymous Turkish diplomat rejects this assertion by arguing that it is not possible for Turkey to hijack the process since the parties themselves requested its mediation in the first place.⁷²⁹

Alternatively, Ahmed argues that Britain ceased to be a mediator in the talks after Somaliland’s rejection to attend the Second London Conference on Somalia.⁷³⁰ Subsequently, Britain pressured Somaliland either to attend the conference or agree to have

⁷²⁵ Adnan Hussein and Barkhad Dahir, “Somalia-Somaliland negotiations open in London,” *Sabahi*, June 21, 2012, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/06/21/feature-01

⁷²⁶ Qalinle Hussein, “UK Facilitates First Ever Somaliland-Somalia Direct Talks,” *Somalilandpress*, June 18, 2012, <http://somalilandpress.com/uk-facilitates-first-ever-somaliland-somalia-direct-talks-30505> (accessed January 20, 2014).

⁷²⁷ See Appendix 1: Dubai Statement.

⁷²⁸ Interview with Thomas Wheeler, Conflict and Security Adviser at Saferworld, Istanbul, May 26, 2014.

⁷²⁹ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁷³⁰ Abdalle Ahmed, “Somalia: The motive behind Somalia-Somaliland talks in Turkey,” *Turkish News*, April 8, 2013, <http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2013/04/08/somalia-the-motive-behind-somalia-somaliland-talks-in-turkey/> (accessed June 15, 2014).

talks with the Somali Federal Government before the conference. Britain suggested the mediation of “Qatar, UAE or Turkey to avoid that new talks might taint London atmosphere days before the London Conference II.”⁷³¹ Consequently, Somalia and Somaliland chose Turkey as a mediator for the peace talks and, in line with Britain’s suggestion; the final communiqué was drafted by Turkey, Britain, Somali Federal Government and Somaliland.⁷³²

Britain’s involvement on the grassroots level is minimal. Saferworld, a British NGO, is the only British originated organization which carries out a project that targets the grassroots in collaboration with the EU and the Department for International Development (DFID). As part of the project, public consultation meetings are held among civil society actors. According to Mohamed Hussein Enow, Somalia/ Somaliland Field Coordinator at Saferworld, non-state actors are brought together from Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia through three “non-state actor platforms” that includes Somalia South-Central Non State Actors, Puntland Non State Actors Association and Somaliland Non State Actors Forum.⁷³³

5.3.2 Turkish Mediation in Somalia

As part of its peacemaking attempts in Somalia, Turkey hosted two international conferences aiming to bring together different actors from Somalia and end Somalia’s isolation on the international platform by raising awareness about the famine and the ongoing conflict in the country. Among these, the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Somalia that was held on May 31 - June 1, 2012 was particularly important in that it brought together

⁷³¹ Ahmed, “Somalia.”

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ Interview with Mohamed Hussein Enow, Somalia/ Somaliland Field Coordinator at Saferworld, Istanbul, 26 May 2014. Please also see Saferworld, “Listening to the People: Developing a Constitution for Somalia,” August 2, 2012, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/case-study/26-listening-to-the-people-developing-a-constitution-for-somalia> (accessed June 15, 2014).

representatives from various segments of the Somali society including 300 civil society representatives and 135 traditional elders from Somalia, Somaliland, Ximan, Xeeb, Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a.⁷³⁴

Turkey has conducted a total of four rounds of talks between the Somali government and Somaliland. The first round of talks took place on April 12-14, 2013 when the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the President of Somaliland, Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo, were brought together in Ankara by then Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

The Ankara meeting was the first meeting between Somalia and Somaliland at the presidential level initiated upon mutual request from the parties and resulted in the signing of the Ankara Communiqué.⁷³⁵ The meeting aimed “to reopen the dialogue after the change in the leadership of the Somali Federal Republic, and to establish a way forward for the dialogue.”⁷³⁶ It also aimed to galvanize international development aid to Somaliland, establish cooperation between the governments of Somalia and Somaliland on security issues to fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, toxic dumping, maritime crime and serious crime.⁷³⁷

The second round of talks took place in Istanbul on July 7-9, 2013 resulting in the signing of Istanbul Declaration. While the Somali delegation was headed by then Minister of Interior Abdikarim Hussein Guled, the Somaliland delegation was headed by then Minister of Commerce Mohammad Abdullahi Omar. The third round of talks was held in Istanbul

⁷³⁴ Crisis Group, “Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia,” 5.

⁷³⁵ See Appendix 2: Ankara Communiqué. Also see, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Historic Somalia Summit in Ankara: Presidents of Somalia and Somaliland met in Ankara,” <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/historic-somalia-summit-in-ankara-presidents-of-somalia-and-somaliland-met-in-ankara.en.mfa> (accessed May 21, 2014).

⁷³⁶ Ibid.

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

on January 16-19, 2014 resulting in the signing of the II. Istanbul Declaration.⁷³⁸ The Somali delegation was headed by Guled while the Somaliland delegation was headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Bihi Yonis. The fourth round of talks took place on March 1-3, 2015 in Istanbul.⁷³⁹

Apart from these main talks, the civilian aviation representatives of the parties also met in Istanbul on April 4, 2014 to discuss technical issues on civil aviation.⁷⁴⁰ Parties also came together in Dubai on December 21, 2014 to express their willingness to proceed with the fourth round of talks.⁷⁴¹ The seeds of these meetings were sown on July 7-9, 2013, when parties came together in Istanbul as a follow up of the Ankara meeting.⁷⁴² Turkey also mediated between the Somali government and Al-Shabaab. The talks took place in the form of indirect talks under Turkey's mediation and Norway's support. During the process, Turkey and Norway collaborated in disengaging the leader of Hezbul Islam and his party from Al-Shabaab to foster his entry into the government.⁷⁴³

5.3.3 Norwegian Mediation in Somalia

Norwegian mediation in Somalia takes place mainly on the grassroots level. Norwegian organizations conduct workshops and trainings on mediation and conflict resolution to teachers, opinion leaders, traditional elders and the Somali diaspora. One such project carried out by Norway in cooperation with the University of Somalia aimed to build mediation and conflict resolution capacity around the city of Baidoa and “contribute to promoting peaceful and religious co-existence and prevent extremism in the

⁷³⁸ See Appendix 4: Istanbul II Communiqué.

⁷³⁹ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁷⁴⁰ See Appendix 5: Communiqué of the Technical Committees Meeting.

⁷⁴¹ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁷⁴² See Appendix 3: Communiqué of the Somaliland-Somalia Dialogue held in Istanbul on July 7-9, 2013.

⁷⁴³ Interview with anonymous senior Turkish diplomat, Istanbul, May 26, 2014.

population.”⁷⁴⁴ Similarly, Norwegian Church Aid conducts projects to promote the roles of Somali authority figures, such as religious and traditional leaders, in terms of their roles in conflict resolution and mediation inter alia to educate and mobilize Somalis in combating piracy in Puntland.⁷⁴⁵

Norway also organizes workshops within Norway to train influential Somali diaspora figures in conflict resolution and mediation. One such initiative was the visit paid by the Somali Institute for Peace Research, a Minnesota based non-profit Somali group, to Oslo to attend a one-week program with Norwegian peacemaking experts including former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, who was the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa in 2006-2007, members of the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights and the Nansen Center for Peace and Dialogue as well as the leading figures of the Somali community in Norway.⁷⁴⁶

The Nansen Center brought together members of the Somali Diaspora in Norway from clashing clans in Somalia such as the Hawiye and Daord.⁷⁴⁷ The aim of these meetings is “creating a neutral space in which the different parties can meet, as well as providing useful training, for example in dialogue skills.”⁷⁴⁸ Norway’s Directorate of Integration and Diversity funded the meetings and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also involved in the organization process.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁴ NORAD, “Somalia,” November 14, 2013 <http://www.norad.no/en/countries/africa/somalia>

⁷⁴⁵ Norwegian Church Aid, “Somalia,” May 4, 2013, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/en/What-we-do/Where-we-work/Eastern-Africa/somalia/> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁴⁶ Douglas McGill, “Somali-Minnesotans travel to Norway for peace-building discussions,” *Twin Cities Daily Planet*, March 20, 2012, <http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2012/03/20/somali-minnesotans-travel-norway-peace-building-discussions> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁴⁷ Cindy Horst, RojanEzzati, Matteo Guglielmo, Petra Mezzetti, PäiviPirkkalainen, Valeria Saggiomo, Giulia Sinatti and Andrea Warnecke, “Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development,” *Peace Research Institute Oslo*, Report, no.2, 2010, 24.

⁷⁴⁸ Horst et al., “Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development,” 24.

⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.

Engaging the Somali diaspora is an important feature of Norwegian peacemaking in Somalia. A Norwegian policy paper notes, “Norwegian society will benefit from a policy that utilises the positive effects of migration, for example through increased participation in foreign policy and development cooperation.”⁷⁵⁰ Diaspora engagement brings in knowledge on the culture and language of the field, transnational networks, bridging function, long-term commitment, motivation, access to inaccessible zones and legitimacy of external engagement.⁷⁵¹ For instance, unlike other Norwegian organizations, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is able to operate in South/Central Somalia through its Norwegian staff with Somali origin.⁷⁵² This would enable Norway both to have a better cultural and social outreach and also help in overcoming the prejudice against “the white man.”

5.4 Turkey’s Difference as a Mediator in Somalia

This section aims to deepen the understanding on the ways that Turkey was able to mediate differently than Britain and Norway in Somalia by drawing on different indicators brought out in Chapter 2.

5.4.1 Previous Experience of the Mediator

As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey lacks experience, institutions, technical assistance and capacity with respect to mediation. According to Jamal Mohamed Barrow, former Somali Deputy Foreign Minister, “Westerners have a lot of details about the Somalis. So, the

⁷⁵⁰ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Report No. 15 to the Storting: Interests, Responsibilities and Possibilities: Main Contours of Norwegian Foreign Policy*, 2009, 77.

⁷⁵¹ Horst et al., “Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development,” 10-14.

⁷⁵² Ibid, 13.

Turkish should do the same. They must understand. They must learn about Somalis. They must get more information about the Somalis.”⁷⁵³

In addition to its lack of sufficient experience in mediation, Somalia is also a new arena for Turkey. Despite historical links dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the bilateral relations have flourished only in the last couple of years. As a result, Turkey lacks sufficient knowledge about the local dynamics. For instance, regarding Turkey’s confusion with respect to the titles of the people invited to the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Barrow notes, “Some that were invited [to the conference] as elders were actually politicians; some invited civil society members were politicians. Why? Because you [Turkey] do not know who is who.”⁷⁵⁴

According to anonymous Turkish diplomat 2, Turkey needs urgent capacity building in mediation in order for its mediator role to be sustainable.⁷⁵⁵ Despite the fact that it is rather new in Somalia, Turkey has become very active in the country in a relatively short period of time. Turkey had been in Somalia since 1980s however its embassy was closed following the outbreak of the civil war. On the non-state level Turkey has been operating in Somalia for about 15 years, IHH being the first Turkish NGO to arrive in the country.⁷⁵⁶

Compared with Turkey, Britain has more experience as a mediator. It has mediated a number of conflicts throughout the history. Some of the early accounts are its mediation between Imperial Russia and Persian Empire during the Russo-Persian War which concluded with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813,⁷⁵⁷ between Spain and its colonies in 1811-

⁷⁵³ Interview with Barrow by Akpınar.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 2.

⁷⁵⁶ Interview with Şahin.

⁷⁵⁷ Touraj Daryaee, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 323.

1813,⁷⁵⁸ during the American Civil War in 1862,⁷⁵⁹ in the Vilnius dispute between Poland and Lithuania in 1923,⁷⁶⁰ and in the Indo-Pakistani clash over the Rann of Kutch region in 1965.⁷⁶¹

Similarly, although Norway's mediation history is relatively newer, it has considerable experience in the field and takes the lead as a mediator among European small-states. According to a report by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has the largest annual budget for mediation among European small-states with around 90 million Euros (2009).⁷⁶²

Furthermore, Norway invests considerably in expertise and institutionalization with respect to mediation. At the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the institutionalization process is often complemented by close collaboration with relevant NGOs for capacity building, including trainings for official personnel as well as relevant stakeholders in conflict zones.⁷⁶³

5.4.2 Mediator's Motives

As noted in Chapter 2, states often have interests when they embark on peacemaking missions. As discussed in earlier chapters, in line with the principles such as *multi-dimensionalism* and *proactivism* of its new foreign policy, Turkey has become more active in distant regions. As such, Turkey's Somali initiative should be viewed as part of its search for a role in new arenas such as Africa. Although parts of Africa used to belong to

⁷⁵⁸ John Rydjord, "British Mediation between Spain and Her Colonies: 1811-1813," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 21, no.1, 1941: 29-50.

⁷⁵⁹ Kinley J. Brauer, "British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration," *The Journal of Southern History* 38, no.1, 1972: 49-64.

⁷⁶⁰ Donatas Kupčiūnas, "When Mediation Fails: Britain, France, and the Settlement of the Vilnius Conflict, 1920-1922," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 22, no.2, 2011: 181-199.

⁷⁶¹ Jonathan Colman, "Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, 1965," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no.3, 2009: 465-482.

⁷⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Peace Mediation: Finland's Guidelines," 13.

⁷⁶³ NORAD, *Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, Evaluation Report, no.5, Final Executive Summary, 2008, 3; Moolakkattu, "Peace Facilitation by Small States," 385-402.

the Ottoman Empire, these lands were lost during World War I. Turkey lacked interest in the continent until 1998 and a process of rapprochement began in 2005 which was declared as “Year of Africa.”⁷⁶⁴ Consequently the number of Turkish embassies in Africa has risen from 12 in 2005 to 39 in 2015.⁷⁶⁵

Africa is an important venue for emerging powers with vast potential as a dynamic market with various natural resources and a dense population. Turkey’s priorities in Africa are to establish high-level political dialogue, develop economic relations through business channels, and to foster the involvement of non-governmental organizations.⁷⁶⁶ Strategies such as developing strong relations with the Horn of Africa and influential countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania, Sudan and South Africa; having widespread diplomatic representations; establishing high-level dialogue with Africa’s international organizations,⁷⁶⁷ the most important being the African Union are important thereof.

As Haşimi notes, taking on a leading role in mediation and peace processes means strengthening and extending your area of influence.⁷⁶⁸ Mediation is among Turkey’s important policy tools in Africa. Turkey has so far mediated in Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea, and in Mali.⁷⁶⁹ Mediation comes to the fore as a legitimate policy tool for Turkey and also offers a legitimate ground for its activities in a region from which it has been distant for several decades. To that end, the role of peacemaker offers Turkey a safe entry into a region where politics is often defined by volatility. It also offers Turkey regional and international visibility and leverage on the continent in addition to domestically

⁷⁶⁴ Özkan, “A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey’s Engagement with Africa,” 113.

⁷⁶⁵ *Turkish Foreign Ministry*, “Turkey-Africa Relations,” <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa> (accessed March 24, 2015).

⁷⁶⁶ Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Africa Policy,” *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, On Turkey Series, October 7, 2013, 1.

⁷⁶⁷ Aras, “Turkey’s Africa Policy.”

⁷⁶⁸ Interview with Haşimi.

⁷⁶⁹ Aras, “Turkey’s Africa Policy,” 2-3.

legitimizing its activities beyond its borders. Somalia sets an example for understanding Turkey's engagement with regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. While at times this engagement manifests itself simply as political or economic relations, at other times it is embedded in Turkey's peacemaking efforts.⁷⁷⁰

Turkey's role as a mediator in Somalia also coincided with its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, which furthered its initiative. Furthermore, African votes are important for Turkey in its international endeavours, such as the non-permanent Security Council seat in the UN⁷⁷¹ or the Cyprus issue.⁷⁷² As such, one of the aims and intended outcomes of Turkey's Somali initiative may be to secure Somali votes on pertinent issues. Barrow suggests that a similar advantage can be achieved by Turkey by paying the contribution fees for Somalia to have a seat in international forums, which could secure Somali votes.⁷⁷³

In addition to political interests, Turkey also has economic interests in Somalia as an unexploited market for its emerging businesses in search of new markets. Most of these businesses are active in the construction sector, and post-conflict countries offer ideal zones to secure new deals. Somalia is an emerging market for Turkey, with significant mineral resources, including iron, titanium and uranium. It is also estimated to have a considerable amount of untapped gas and oil reserves.⁷⁷⁴ Somalia also has a strategic location in the Horn of Africa that makes it a gateway to the rest of the continent. The power vacuum in the country creates an opportunity for foreign investors. Providing peace

⁷⁷⁰ Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia," 735-757.

⁷⁷¹ Matthew T. Gullo, "Turkey's Somalia Adventure: the Quest for Soft Power and Regional Recognition," *Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)*, London: Research Turkey, June 2012.

⁷⁷² Numan Hazar, "Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Afrika Ziyareti," *Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM)*, January 14, 2013, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=4185> (accessed January 24, 2014).

⁷⁷³ Interview with Barrow by Akpınar.

⁷⁷⁴ Al Jazeera, "Country profile: Somalia," September 9, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201281985222499991.html> (accessed June 15, 2014).

and stability in the country is crucial in tackling the issue of on-going piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.

Turkey, Britain and Norway have similar official policies in Somalia. Britain's Somali policy is based on four main pillars including supporting development; increasing international support; reducing conflict and increasing stability; and providing humanitarian assistance.⁷⁷⁵ Norway has similar policies such as rebuilding; good government; support to local capacity building; prevention of humanitarian catastrophes; and peace and reconciliation.⁷⁷⁶ Likewise, Turkey's policies include eliminating Somalia's international isolation; providing intensive and comprehensive humanitarian aid; rebuilding the infrastructure by realizing medium and long-term development projects; helping to restore security in the country by supporting Somali security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia⁷⁷⁷ and supporting the process of political consensus and state building in the country.⁷⁷⁸

Security is vital in post-conflict zones for a range of reasons such as ensuring the delivery of the aid, the security of the people in need of the aid and the security of the aid personnel. Turkey, Britain and Norway all consider restoring security a top priority in Somalia and a prerequisite for peace. Tackling extremism, fighting piracy and preventing illegal migration from Somalia are among both Britain and Norway's security priorities in the country which have direct consequences on their domestic security as a result of immigration they receive from Somalia.

⁷⁷⁵ Gov.uk, "UK and Somalia," <https://www.gov.uk/government/world/somalia> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁷⁶ NORAD, "Somalia."

⁷⁷⁷ The African Union Mission in Somalia is the Regional Peacekeeping Mission created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council, with the Approval of the United Nations. See, AMISOM, "AMISOM Background," July 9, 2013, <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background/> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁷⁸ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Somali Bilgi Notu: Ülke Notu ve İkili İlişkiler," *Internal Circulation Notes*, 2012.

The characterization of collapsed states as challenges to international peace and security has portrayed them “as threats to international security in the broadest sense of the word – as breeding-grounds for disease, refugee flows, arms-trafficking, transnational crime, environmental destruction, regional instability and other problems.”⁷⁷⁹ This type of portrayal is often overemphasized by the international community as an excuse to legitimize its interventions into post-conflict zones.

According to Wheeler, national security, its wider anti-terrorism strategy and promoting stability overseas are some of the most important motives of Britain in Somalia.⁷⁸⁰ Being the largest funder of AMISOM, Britain’s main “goal is to help Somalia move beyond a situation which requires humanitarian support and peace enforcement, and address threats to Britain from terrorism, piracy and migration.”⁷⁸¹ According to a report by DFID, Somalia is a priority country for the UK National Security Council.⁷⁸² In the words of British Prime Minister David Cameron,

Somalia is a failed state that directly threatens British interests. Tourists and aid workers kidnapped. Young British minds poisoned by radicalism. Mass migration. Vital trade routes disrupted. Meanwhile Somalis themselves suffer extreme famine, made worse by violence and some of the worst poverty on earth. We shouldn’t tolerate this. Somali pirates aren’t invincible: they are violent and lawless men in small boats and it is time we properly stood up to them. That’s why British vessels can now carry arms. But there is a real and pressing need to pull together the international effort. That is why Britain will host a major conference in London next year, to focus attention on protecting merchant ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, tackling pirates, pressurising the extremists, supporting countries in the region and addressing the causes of conflict and instability in Somalia.⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁹ Menkhaus, Somalia, 7.

⁷⁸⁰ Interview with Wheeler.

⁷⁸¹ Gov.uk, “Reducing Conflict and Increasing Stability in Somalia, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,” March 24, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/reducing-conflict-and-increasing-stability-in-somalia> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁸² DFID, “Operational Plan 2011-2015,” 3.

⁷⁸³ Gov.UK, Prime Minister's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, Cabinet Office and Prime Minister's Office, November 14, 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-lord-mayors-banquet> (accessed June 15, 2014).

Both Norway and Britain are important recruitment venues for Al-Shabaab.⁷⁸⁴ The Somali community in Britain is the largest in Europe with around 250.000 members in total.⁷⁸⁵ According to Former Minister of British State for Africa, Asia and the United Nations Lord Mark Malloch Brown, “The main terrorist threat comes from Pakistan and Somalia – not Afghanistan.”⁷⁸⁶ Former British Ambassador to Somalia (1987-1989) Jeremy Varcoe also notes that fighting extremism is a significant motive for Britain in the country, “We are in Somalia partly for our own security. British government is conscious of the fact that Somalia is a breeding ground for extremism.”⁷⁸⁷ Varcoe further pinpoints that resolving the conflict in Somalia serves Britain’s immigration problem, “If we succeeded [to bring about peace] in Somalia, a number of them [Somali immigrants] would go back home.”⁷⁸⁸

There are some cases when the Western media portrayed the Western originated recruits of militia groups such as Al-Shabaab as being brainwashed. In other cases they are portrayed as ignorant extremists who misinterpret the real teachings of Islam. The media overlooks the possibility that social inequalities, being stigmatized, labelled and pushed towards the margins of the society fuel anger and tension among immigrant youth who then look for groups to join and satisfy their need for belonging.⁷⁸⁹ There is also the possibility that some Western countries such as Britain overplay connections between radicalisation and a wider Muslim community or Islamic identity in order to build domestic support for their anti-terror/anti-extremist policies.

⁷⁸⁴ Pınar Akpınar, “Searching for the Garden of Eden,” *POMEAS Oped*, July 15, 2014; Shinn, “Al Shabaab's foreign threat to Somalia,” 211.

⁷⁸⁵ Shinn, “Al Shabaab's foreign threat to Somalia,” 213.

⁷⁸⁶ Mary Riddell, “Lord Malloch-Brown interview: ‘This dangerous gridlock that taints our politics,’” *The Telegraph*, July 22, 2009.

⁷⁸⁷ Telephone interview with Jeremy Varcoe, former British Ambassador to Somalia (1987-1989), February 21, 2014.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Akpınar, “Searching for the Garden of Eden.”

British policy in Somalia has been criticized by some for putting overemphasis on the issue of security. For instance, regarding the Second London Conference on Somalia, Beck Charlton, a journalist from Somaliland press blamed David Cameron for choosing “to use anti-terrorist rhetoric in the Somali context in order to draw parallels between the two countries and to justify British interest in Somalia’s long term vision.”⁷⁹⁰ He further claimed that Britain’s Somali initiative may be “part of a *realpolitik* agenda that seeks to exploit Somalia’s natural resources and investment opportunities by offering aid and humanitarian assistance.”⁷⁹¹

In a similar vein, Dowden criticized Britain for placing its own security before the people of Somalia. Referring to the London Conference in Somalia he notes,

From the start it was clear that piracy and the subsequent cost to the City of London's marine insurance business, as well as the fear of terrorism, were the main drivers for David Cameron's concern. The interests of the Somali people were always going to be secondary. Since Britain had done nothing during the past 20 years of war and suffering, it seemed unlikely that concern for Somalis would be the top priority.⁷⁹²

He also criticized the conference reports for indicating Al-Shabaab as the main cause of the conflict in Somalia and rather argued that “the roots of Somalia's state failure lie in its social structure not in Islamic extremism.”⁷⁹³ The Second London Conference on Somalia was also protested by groups such as *Hands off Somalia* and *Fight Racism Fight Imperialism* during the conference. The groups protested about “pillaging of Somalia through proxy wars and exacerbation of tribal differences, the criminalisation of Somalis in

⁷⁹⁰ Beck Charlton, “Somalia: Britain Takes Centre Stage at the London Somali Conference,” *Somalilandpress*, <http://somalilandpress.com/somalia-britain-takes-centre-stage-at-the-london-somali-conference-41773> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁷⁹¹ Charlton, “Somalia: Britain Takes Centre Stage at the London Somali Conference.”

⁷⁹² Richard Dowden, “Somalia and the London Conference - the Wrong Route to Peace,” *African Arguments*, All Africa Website, February 27, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201202271220.html> (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

Britain and the ever-growing heist to snatch natural resources from across the region.”⁷⁹⁴

One of the highlights of the protest was the case of Mahdi Hashi, a British citizen of Somali origin who was arrested in Somalia by US troops allegedly for being an Al-Shabaab element. Hashi is among the 16 people who have been stripped off their British citizenship since 2010 on the grounds of national security which has raised severe criticism in Britain.⁷⁹⁵

As with Britain, one of the main reasons for Norway’s engagement with failed states, such as Somalia, is the security threat that may emerge from them. As former State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway Vidar Helgesen notes,

Security has become globalised. We, meaning we in the West, no longer have the luxury of pretending that we can carry on with our way of life and uphold our values regardless of what the rest of the world is doing. This was made abundantly clear to us all on 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks on the epicentres of economic and military power were organised from mountain caves in one of the world’s poorest and most conflict-ridden countries. The lesson we should draw is that trying to resolve conflicts and addressing security threats in far-away places is in our own interest as well as being a humanitarian imperative.⁷⁹⁶

The population of the Somali community in Norway is approximately 30,000.⁷⁹⁷ According to Norwegian Foreign Ministry, “It is in Norway’s interest that problems in a distant country do not become global.”⁷⁹⁸ For instance, “The piracy off Somalia, with the threat it

⁷⁹⁴ Hands off Somalia, Protest against British Conference on Somalia, May 7, 2013, <http://handsoffsomalia.co.uk/2013/05/11/photos-protest-against-british-conference-on-somalia-7-may-2013/> (accessed September 15, 2014).

⁷⁹⁵ Corinne Purtill, “The Curious case of Mahdi Hashi,” *Global Post*, August 9, 2013, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/united-kingdom/130808/britain-immigration-citizenship-mahdi-hash-i> (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁷⁹⁶ Vidar Helgesen, “Peace, Mediation and Reconciliation: The Norwegian Experience,” Government.no, May 21, 2003, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2003/peace,_mediation_and_reconciliation-the.html?id=267693 (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁷⁹⁷ “Norway’s Somali Community Rattled by Reports of Young Members Joining Jihadist Groups,” *Fox News*, October 24, 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/24/norway-somali-community-rattled-by-reports-young-members-joining-jihadist/> (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁷⁹⁸ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway and the United Nations,” 32.

poses to Norwegian shipping, is an example of a situation where Norway has an obvious and direct interest in the stability and development of another country.”⁷⁹⁹

Given its small-state position and lack of hard power, it may be argued that Norway has developed a survival strategy based on a discourse of peace and mediation has become a tool of ensuring its own security.⁸⁰⁰ This discourse also highlights the notions of “self-interest” and “altruism” as other main motivations behind Norwegian peace.⁸⁰¹ In addition, “security” may also be listed as an important motivation behind these efforts.⁸⁰²

Piracy as a transnational organized crime is another issue at stake in terms of Britain’s and Norway’s involvement in Somalia. In 2010 Norway chaired the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, a group established by the UN Security Council “to coordinate the international efforts to suppress piracy in these waters.”⁸⁰³ Norway also cooperates with the UN in terms of the prosecution of the arrested pirates. Norway supports the Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Office for Project Services. The project aims to build prisons in Somalia and transfer Somali pirates prosecuted abroad to these prisons.⁸⁰⁴

As with any country involved in global marine trade, piracy poses a threat for Turkey as well which is why it has contributed to the anti-piracy operations in Somalia by utilizing its marine forces *via* the US-led Combined Task Force 151.⁸⁰⁵ In addition to its anti-piracy activities, Turkey has also delivered \$2 million to the African Union Mission in Somalia in

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Støre, “Norway – Peace Nation-Myth or Fact?”

⁸⁰¹ Skånland, “Norway is a Peace Nation,” 39.

⁸⁰² Støre, “Norway – Peace Nation-Myth or Fact?”

⁸⁰³ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway and the United Nations,” 40.

⁸⁰⁴ NORAD, “Somalia.”

⁸⁰⁵ Teri Murphy and Onur Sazak, *Turkey’s Civilian Capacity in post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, Istanbul, 2012, 11.

2013. It has signed two bilateral treaties on security with the Somali government, including a military cooperation pact.⁸⁰⁶

A former Somali diplomat and ambassador Mohamed Sharif Mohamud blames the international community for supporting colonization of Somalia by saying that they are "planning to end the mandate of the transitional government and replace it by a committee of 15 states, this is direct colonisation."⁸⁰⁷ One of the reasons for increased Western interest in Somalia may be to balance out the growing interests of Turkey, Iran and other Muslim countries in the country. It should be noted that countries such as Canada have already been conducting oil research activities in Somalia through companies such as Africa Oil.⁸⁰⁸

Another motive for Britain's presence in Somalia is its partnerships with Ethiopia and Kenya which is also related to its broader policy in the Horn of Africa.⁸⁰⁹ Another important motive is the push from the British civil society particularly by the large Somali immigrant community and NGOs on the government to take on larger responsibilities in the country with respect to its humanitarian diplomacy. As Varcoe notes, elements of guilt of Britain as a former colonizer may also be playing a part in its humanitarian initiatives in Somalia.⁸¹⁰ Considering the vast pledges made by the UK, coupled with the employment of Nicholas Kay, a British diplomat, as the new UN Special Representative for Somalia, one may expect Britain to deepen its involvement in Somalia.

⁸⁰⁶ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Somali Bilgi Notu."

⁸⁰⁷ "Somalis Raise Concerns About London Conference Agenda," *The Guardian*, February 20, 2012.

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁹ Interview with Wheeler.

⁸¹⁰ Interview with Varcoe.

5.4.3 Characteristics of Mediators

One of Turkey's differences as a mediator in Somalia is its power capabilities with respect to Britain and Norway. While Britain is a former great power with considerable ongoing influence in Somalia, Norway is a European small-state and Turkey may be labelled as an emerging mediator. For instance, in terms of institutional status, while Britain is member of the UN Security Council, Turkey and Norway are not. Turkey's membership in a number of international and African organizations is supportive of its mediator role in the Somali conflict. For instance, Turkey has been a strategic partner to the African Union since 2008. It is also diplomatically accredited to the ECOWAS and the East African Community, and is a member of the International Partners Forum of the IGAD and the African Development Bank.⁸¹¹

While Norway, as a small-state, utilized more of its soft-power in Somalia, Turkey and Britain combined elements of soft and hard power. Britain's former great power status may also be indicative as to why it gave up on its mediator role in Somalia. As noted in Chapter 2, it is sometimes easier for great powers to give up on their mediator roles and replace them by different policy tools present in their toolboxes.

In terms of legitimacy, it may be argued that Turkey has considerable legitimacy as a mediator in Somalia. Britain's close links with Somaliland, which is a former British colony, also raises scepticism. For instance, according to an anonymous diplomat from Turkish Foreign Ministry, one of the reasons why Britain ceased to mediate the talks between Somalia and Somaliland was because the former had suspicions over its

⁸¹¹ Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in Africa: Frontiers of a New Imagination," *Hürriyet Daily News*, June 1, 2012.

impartiality. As such, there is a lack of trust on the side of Somali government towards Britain.⁸¹²

There is a bitter memory attached to colonial history in Africa. Varcoe notes, “We may have power but we are distrusted [in Somalia]. A country like Turkey would appeal to Somali politicians and people as a growing Muslim country.”⁸¹³ The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, did not have a high level of engagement with Somalia. It responded to the calls of Somalis for help during the Portuguese and Ethiopian invasion attempts to help what was then the Adel Sultanate. In 1548 part of what is now Somaliland (Zeila and Berbera) was captured by the Ottoman Empire and was under its nominal rule for 300 years. Abdirazak Siyad Abdi, Somali Ambassador to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, argues that the Ottoman Empire left a positive mark in Somalia compared to European colonizers which enhances Turkey’s legitimacy as a mediator.⁸¹⁴ He notes,

The Europeans were different because firstly, Turks had the same religion while the others were Christian. Somalis considered the Ottomans as the big brother that has come to watch and look after us. Also, the colonizers used to appoint white man to stay there and rule. However, the Turks used to appoint the most influential clan leader to represent the Sultan. So, all the names that are left behind are Somali names while the others forced people to change the names of their children to call them “John” or “Maria.” The Turks never changed a name. They said, “We worship the same God and we are here to protect you.” Lastly, the Turkish left many buildings behind them whereas the British, for example, never left any legacy behind.⁸¹⁵

Similarly, religious ties and Turkey’s non-Western identity serve as a legitimate ground for Turkey’s mediator role in the country. For instance, Wheeler highlights that “Somalis do not trust Christians. Turkey’s not being Western is an asset for Turkey. Somalis remember

⁸¹² Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁸¹³ Interview with Varcoe.

⁸¹⁴ Interview with Abdirazak Siyad Abdi, Somali representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Istanbul, December 14, 2013.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid.

the Ottoman links.”⁸¹⁶ An anonymous senior Turkish diplomat underlines in a similar vein that the Ottoman Empire has a very positive history in Somalia as a result of its positive marks such as the defence of the Somalis against the Portuguese and the construction of Somalia’s water infrastructure and its mosques.⁸¹⁷ An anonymous Somali NGO representative notes that Turkey’s being Muslim has a positive influence but its influence in Somalia is based mainly on the tangible work executed on the ground.⁸¹⁸

Abdi notes that, “The Somalis believe in Turks because they can never forget the intervention that happened at the right time. Erdoğan visited with his cabinet and all other leaders came after him. They are doing lots of projects such as building roads and airports. There is no other initiative that goes parallel to that of Turkey’s. We believe that Turks are helping us because we are brothers, we are Muslims.”⁸¹⁹

Varcoe also highlights that being Muslim and having much more understanding of the Islamic culture is an asset for Turkey. On the other hand, he adds that, “Turkey has much less knowledge about the African culture whereas because of historical ties Britain does have knowledge.”⁸²⁰ In this view, although understanding Islamic culture is an asset for Turkey, understanding the diverse and the unique traits of African culture is also important in Somalia.

Regarding the different ways in which Turkey can mediate in Somalia, İşbilir postulates that, Turkey is not perceived as a “white man” in Somalia because of its Muslim identity. He notes that, “the impact of the Caliphate still continues particularly in places like

⁸¹⁶ Interview with Wheeler.

⁸¹⁷ Interview with anonymous senior Turkish diplomat.

⁸¹⁸ Interview with anonymous Somali NGO representative.

⁸¹⁹ Interview with Abdi.

⁸²⁰ Interview with Varcoe.

Somalia.”⁸²¹ However, he also underlines that Turkey does not have the capacity to fully respond to and satisfy such expectations. He notes,

When the perceptions are so high, expectations turn out to be high as well. A great excitement, enthusiasm and romantic discourses follow but mutual interactions do not fulfil the expectations. The reason is that Turkey’s capacity, its human capital is not compatible. The human capital is trying to be acquired but we [Turkey] need another eight to ten years.⁸²²

One of the obstacles that Turkey could face in Somalia is the reaction it receives from the region. The peoples of Africa are inclined to resolve their own problems by achieving increased self-reliance.⁸²³ Although Turkey’s relatively non-Western image in Africa, based on its non-colonial past, as well as its historical, religious and cultural ties with the continent increases its legitimacy, it is still a non-African state.⁸²⁴ This situation may create a perception that Turkey is attempting to cultivate an international image by using Africa’s vulnerabilities.

5.4.4 Style of Mediation

As discussed in Chapter 2, style of mediation is another indicator that may shed light on understanding difference between mediators. Turkey has been persistent and determinant in its mediation approach in Somalia. While Britain quit mediation following the first round of talks it had conducted, Turkey has completed four rounds of talks. Erdoğan’s

⁸²¹ Interview with Cihangir İşbilir, General Coordinator of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World (UNIW), Istanbul, September 2, 2013.

⁸²² Ibid.

⁸²³ Sammy Kum Buo, “Africa’s Lesson in Self-Reliance,” *The New York Times*, April 22, 2013.

⁸²⁴ Mehmet Toroğlu and Özlem Şahin Şakar, “Beyaz Türkiye’nin Kara Afrika’daki İmajı,” *Haber 7*, September 22, 2010, <http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100922/Beyaz-Turkiyenin-kara-Afrikadaki-imaji.php> (accessed November 15, 2014).

second visit to Mogadishu on January 25, 2015 as the President was intended to be a demonstration of Turkey's commitment to peace in Somalia.⁸²⁵

Turkey's mediation style in the Somali conflict has so far been facilitative mediation which relied on a more persuasive style as opposed to a coercive one. As argued by an anonymous Turkish diplomat from Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turkey provided administrative and logistical support rather than content wise. One of the reasons for such an approach was that the talks have not yet been ripe for a more full-fledged mediation attempt. However, the last time when parties came together in Istanbul, they asked Turkey to be prepared to provide political and content wise contribution in the next round of talks which are to be held in 2015.⁸²⁶

As outlined earlier, Turkey utilizes means such as development aid and humanitarian assistance to support its mediation attempts. This style is also similar to that of Britain and Norway. As such, all three countries follow a "multi-track"⁸²⁷ approach to peace that opens room for a range of actors such as the state, civil society, businesses, and the like. Development aid and humanitarian assistance play important roles in their peacemaking attempts.

According to Torun, the multifaceted and complex nature of the Somali conflict requires a novel approach to mediation and the Turkish model "could be summed up as deploying aid and development rather than smooth-talking diplomats."⁸²⁸ In this view, as also underlined by Mustafa Şahin, Head of Center for Development Research, Turkish Ministry of

⁸²⁵ Abukar Arman, "Erdogan: The hero of Somalia," *Al Jazeera*, 21 Jan 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-2015121124331818818.html> (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁸²⁶ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁸²⁷ Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 3rd Edition, Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 1996.

⁸²⁸ Torun, "Mediation in Somalia."

Development, aid and development prepare the ground for mediation and help Turkey realize the promises it makes on the negotiation table.⁸²⁹ According to Apakan, Turkey has a broader vision of mediation which includes preventive diplomacy, conflict management, peacebuilding, economic development, institution building and empowerment of people.⁸³⁰

Although Turkey offers many incentives in the form of aid, it does not impose a particular outcome on the parties. According to Abdi,

Turkey's mediation approach differs. Turkey said, "Whatever you guys decide, whether united or disunited, that is your internal decision. For us, we see you both as our brothers and we want to be a channel of interest for you; we want to give you an accommodation, an umbrella, a platform for you to resolve your problems and talk. Turkey is trying to resolve a sensitive issue. They say, "Delay the issue of secession and talk about economic mutual interest, talk about what you share."⁸³¹

Another distinctive element in Turkey's style of mediation is the emphasis on the importance of human touch based on building empathy and deploying sincerity as core to the mediation process. Turkey's mediation style in Somalia is based on "winning hearts and minds of people." The fact that Turkey draws the attention of the parties on more tangible and, in a way, resolvable issues during the talks without meddling into issues of identity by not passing judgement, is appraised by the parties.

Sharing cultural space, celebrating religious holidays together, opening social spaces and sharing them with the people are other important inputs in Turkey's style.⁸³² Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Somalia also provided him with an image of a

⁸²⁹ Mustafa Şahin, Head of Center for Development Research, Turkish Ministry of Development, cited in Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia," 746.

⁸³⁰ Interview with Apakan.

⁸³¹ Interview with Abdi.

⁸³² Kathryn Achilles, Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, Auveen Elizabeth Woods, "Turkish Aid Agencies in Somalia Risks and Opportunities for Building Peace," *Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center Joint Report*, March 2015, 29.

conscience advocate of the poor and the subordinated. In Erdoğan's words the Somali crisis,

...tests the notion of civilization and our modern values... Nobody with common sense and conscience can remain indifferent to such a drama... The tears that are now running from Somalia's golden sands into the Indian Ocean must stop. They should be replaced by hopeful voices of a country where people do not lose their lives because of starvation and where they express their eagerness to develop and restore peace and stability.⁸³³

For instance, Abdi expresses how "touched" he was with a statement made by Davutoğlu in the Somali parliament,

Davutoğlu said during his speech: "You are 90 million [in population]. You are 10 million Somalis, 80 million Turks; we are 90 million together." Our population is one. Everybody in Somalia, young or old, talks about Turkey all the time. In the biggest ceremonies, for example in the day of independence, people don't wave just the Somali flag. They wave the Somali and the Turkish flag together. The Somali intellectuals and communities living abroad have paid visits to the nearest Turkish embassies, met the Turkish ambassador and given him red roses and flowers. They say "Thank you Türkiye [Turkey]!" They established the "Turkish-Somali-American Friendship Association."

Turkey's style is also risk-taking. For instance, Turkish Embassy is located in the heart of Mogadishu which is a significant difference compared to Norway and Britain. Norway does not have an embassy in Somalia while the British Embassy is located at the Mogadishu Airport. In addition, on June 1, 2014, Turkey opened a consulate in Hergesa, capital of Somaliland. It is one of the three countries, alongside Yemen and Ethiopia, which has a consulate in Hergesa.⁸³⁴

According to Abdi, the level of risk that Turkey takes and the commitment it has impress the Somalis. He notes,

Saudi Arabia gave \$ 50 million to Somalia through the UNDP. 30 per cent of that money goes to administration costs because the directors are based in Kenya, Nairobi staying in nice five star hotels. When they

⁸³³ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Tears of Somalia," *Foreign Policy*, 10 October 2011.

⁸³⁴ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

come, they come by air. Their salaries are unimaginable. Because they say that Somalia is a very dangerous area. So they have to have full coverage insurance. They stay at expensive hotels and take bonuses. The Turks, on the other hand, build institutions; they build primary schools. Some Turkish engineers bring their families and they enrol their children to small Turkish schools in Mogadishu. They do not charge us for insurance. They say, “We trust Allah. You kill me; I am *shaheed* [martyr].” When you bring your family that shows you are committed. The level of commitment is very high. When someone brings their children, that means they want to share the pain with you. They put their own families at risk. No one else is willing to do that. That’s why with Turkey we have to turn a blind eye to the small negative things.

As noted in Chapter 2, inclusiveness may be used as another indicator to understand difference among Turkey, Britain and Norway. In terms of inclusiveness, one may notice that Turkey, Norway and Britain all tried to follow an inclusive approach in terms of peacemaking in Somalia. By highlighting the importance for Britain of following an inclusive approach in Somalia Cameron noted during the London Conference on Somalia,

We have leading figures from governments in every continent of the world, leading organisations from the African Union and European Union to the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation and the United Nations. And most importantly of all, Somali delegations – representing almost every region of Somalia not under terrorist control... I am delighted that we have with us together for the first time today, the Presidents of almost all those regions. It is vital that this whole process is as inclusive as possible with a Constituent Assembly chosen by the Somali people leading to a more representative government.⁸³⁵

Inviting a diverse set of actors including a range of states, international and regional organizations and the leaders of various regional administrations from Somalia is a manifestation of Britain’s inclusive approach in Somalia. However, as evident in Cameron’s speech Britain invited “almost every region of Somalia not under terrorist control” excluding Al-Shabaab and some others from the process. Both Britain and Norway recognize al-Shabaab as a “terrorist organization” whereas Turkey still has not

⁸³⁵ David Cameron, “David Cameron Somalia speech in full,” *politics.co.uk*, February 23, 2012, <http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2012/02/23/david-cameron-somalia-speech-in-full> (accessed June 15, 2014).

made such official statement. Drawing a parallel between Britain's own peace process in Northern Ireland and Somalia Dowden notes,

Cameron does not appear to have learned from Britain's own experience in Northern Ireland and the decolonisation process of the 1960s. In both cases Westminster tried to build coalitions of moderates and exclude the extremists and "men of violence". But in the end in Northern Ireland peace came when the extremists were brought into the process, just as Britain 40 years earlier had been forced to release the jailed 'terrorists' throughout its empire and hand power to them. Not inviting elements of Shabaab to London [Conference on Somalia] (and threatening to continue bombing them) has ensured that the war will continue. Excluding the Eritreans, major players in Somalia was also a mistake.

Dowden further criticizes the Western countries for providing too many privileges for Somali politicians by noting,

The agenda of the Somali politicians at Lancaster House on Thursday [during London Conference on Somalia] was clear: to get the British and Americans to fight their war for them or pay others to do it and bomb their enemies. That will enable them to hold office - even though they have little power - and keep stealing the aid.

By referring to the exclusion of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from the peace processes in Somalia Varcoe postulates that,

The West rejected the ICU in Somalia. It [the rule of the ICU] was the only time there was some kind of order in the country. If we had not opposed them, we might have had less radicalization. The reason why we refrained for so long was that we lacked cultural knowledge.

According to Wheeler, one of the differences of Britain in Somalia from Turkey is that it operates more through multilateral channels than Turkey does such as the UN and the EU.⁸³⁶ Building international partnerships is a significant feature of both Britain and Norway whereas Turkey operates more independently in Somalia apart from briefly collaborating with some actors on certain issues such as the collaboration it had with Norway during the talks between Al-Shabaab and the TFG and providing platforms for encouraging international support for Somalia. In this respect, Hilde F. Johnson, former

⁸³⁶ Interview with Wheeler.

Minister of International Development of Norway and Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, underlines that there is a lot of potential for cooperation between Turkey and Norway as mediators who can play complementary roles as mediators.⁸³⁷

5.4.5 Means Supportive of Mediation

As noted in Chapter 2, particularly in intrastate conflicts, it is often necessary to support mediation by other means such as development aid, humanitarian assistance, medical relief or peacebuilding in a broader sense. In the case of Turkey's mediation in Somalia, aid was significant in terms of building trust. As also underlined by an anonymous Turkish diplomat, when the parties saw what Turkey had done on the ground they sought for its mediation.⁸³⁸ This view is also supported by the Ambassador of Somalia to Turkey Mohamed Mursal Sheikh Abdurahman.⁸³⁹ As such, aid plays an important role in building trust, credibility, displaying commitment and constituting legitimacy as a mediator. As Schloms puts forth, these tools also enable peacemakers to implement the decisions taken on the table, play important roles in the phases of rehabilitation, reconstruction and development and strengthen the capacities for peace.⁸⁴⁰

As also argued by Turkish policy makers, Turkey's mediation in Somalia is not confined to diplomatic talks.⁸⁴¹ It rather carries out a variety of activities on the ground ranging from providing development aid to humanitarian assistance, capacity building and statebuilding shaped around its policies in the country which hold similarities with the policies of Britain

⁸³⁷ Interview with Johnson.

⁸³⁸ Interview with anonymous Turkish diplomat 1.

⁸³⁹ Interview with Mohamed Mursal Sheikh Abdurahman, Ambassador of Somalia to Turkey, Istanbul, March 20, 2015.

⁸⁴⁰ Michael Schloms, "Humanitarian NGOs in Peace Operations," in Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003, 40.

⁸⁴¹ Interviews with Aras; and Gezer.

and Norway. This section will examine what role these policies play in Turkey's mediation, in times by comparing and contrasting them with those of Britain and Norway in order to better understand to what extent Turkey's mediation differs in Somalia.

5.4.5.1 Development Aid as a Peace Dividend

Development aid is an important component of peacemaking activities of all three actors. While the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) is the main body that coordinates Turkey's official development assistance (ODA),⁸⁴² British aid is coordinated by the DFID and the Norwegian aid is coordinated by the NORAD. In line with the new Turkish foreign policy, TIKA has diversified its operations not only among post-Soviet regions (mainly the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans) but also in Africa, the Middle East and Asia.⁸⁴³ It has become an important policy instrument for Turkey in recent years.⁸⁴⁴ As noted on the website of Turkish Foreign Ministry,

Official development assistance (ODA) has increasingly become an integral part of Turkey's proactive foreign policy... As part of its policy of utilizing a wide range of soft power instruments such as assuming a mediator role in regional conflicts, Turkey also boosted its ODA to various countries affected by conflicts and other sources of instability such as natural disasters.⁸⁴⁵

As evident in the above statement, ODA is an important instrument for Turkish mediation.

Aras underlines similarly that,

When Turkey proposes mediation to parties in conflict, it proposes them a package. It gives out the message, "We come there as

⁸⁴² TIKA was established in 1992 under Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an international technical aid organization to help in the reconstruction of the former Soviet countries with Turkish origins. It was transferred to Turkish Prime Ministry in 1999. See, TIKA, "History of TIKA," http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526 (accessed March 18, 2015).

⁸⁴³ Füsün Gür, Murat Oral, Şafak Özdemir, Leyla Erdek, İsmail Bıçaklı and Murat Kaygusuz, *TİKA 2010 Faaliyet Raporu*, Ankara: TİKA, 2011, 8.

⁸⁴⁴ Emrah Denizhan, "Türkiye'nin Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Politikası ve TİKA," *Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi* 2, no.1, 2010: 21.

⁸⁴⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry, "Turkey's Development Cooperation: General Characteristics and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Aspect," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa (accessed March 18, 2015).

diplomats and mediate. If you accept peace, in return we resolve your problems such as development or emergency assistance.”⁸⁴⁶

In this sense, Turkey uses aid as a means to promote peace and keep the promises it makes on the table.⁸⁴⁷ In addition, empowering the parties by offering development aid also increases Turkey’s legitimacy in conflict zones. Turkey’s hands-on approach, which entails opening offices in Somalia and Somaliland and deploying Turkish staff on the ground, was also significant in building credibility as a mediator. For instance, unlike Turkish institutions, DFID does not have any personnel based in Somalia and operates from the British Office for Somalia in Nairobi and from the Somalia Unit in London.⁸⁴⁸

On the other hand, having a hands-on approach may sometimes be a disadvantage. Oruç suggests that being active in field is not always beneficial particularly considering the security challenges. He argues that one of the reasons for the attack on the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was its poorly picked location exposing it to potential attacks.⁸⁴⁹

He notes,

You have to safeguard your king while playing chess. Sometimes you even have to give up on your queen to protect your king. If you go and place your king in the least safeguarded spot of the city just to say “I am in Somalia” those who want to interfere with your work can easily topple it.⁸⁵⁰

According to a report by IPC, Saferworld and Oxfam, Turkey’s aid is tangible and it reaches the beneficiaries whereas aid from traditional donors is delivered through a very bureaucratic channel and in the end only about 10 per cent reaches the final beneficiaries. An anonymous Somali NGO representative notes that,

⁸⁴⁶ Interview with Aras.

⁸⁴⁷ Şahin, cited in Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 746.

⁸⁴⁸ DFID and UK Aid, “Summary of DFID’s work in Somalia 2011-2015,” June 2013, 3.

⁸⁴⁹ Interview with Oruç.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

Countries such as Britain or Norway have lots of words but not as much tangible work. Turkey has done much tangible work especially in the field of education, water and infrastructure. For instance, the Mogadishu Airport and the ports have been built by Turkish companies. There was a lot of competition among the British, the Norwegian and the Turkish companies over these constructions but the Somali parliament preferred the Turkish based on the tangible work executed on the ground.⁸⁵¹

While this approach has its own benefits, such as acting in a timely manner and avoiding leakages on its way as a result of illegal acts, it has also been criticized by some Somali officials for bypassing the government.⁸⁵² Somali Deputy Foreign Minister Barrow considers that foreign agents should cooperate more with the government when delivering aid. Barrow notes, “for example, there is an NGO working in the water sector. As the government, I know where the problem is. Because, sometimes scarcity of water can cause conflict. But if the NGO digs a well somewhere there is no conflict, it doesn’t contribute to the solution. What the government can do is that it guides you to the place where there is no water.”⁸⁵³

Oruç, on the other hand criticizes this approach and notes that one of the mistakes that Turkish officials made in Somalia was working too close with the central government and getting stuck with the central bureaucracy and thus losing flexibility. He notes,

Turkey could be very successful in Somalia if it could follow the roadmap that was initially drafted by our prime minister; but it could not because, it got stuck with the status-quo in Mogadishu. It did not do anything to overcome it. There is a secluded structure there completely under the control of USA and Britain. The central government controls the area with a radius of 6-7 kilometres and does not allow anyone operate outside this area.⁸⁵⁴

Similar to Turkey, a closer look at European small-state mediators reveals that they follow a multi-track approach to peace and consider development aid as complementary to peace initiatives. The peace-brokering roles, humanitarian and development aid initiatives of

⁸⁵¹ Interview with an anonymous Somali NGO representative.

⁸⁵² Crisis Group, “Assessing Turkey’s Role in Somalia,” 8.

⁸⁵³ Interview with Barrow by Akpınar.

⁸⁵⁴ Interview with Oruç.

these countries are often intertwined.⁸⁵⁵ As a European small-state, Norway as well considers development aid as an integral part of its peace initiatives.⁸⁵⁶ Peace-brokering roles, humanitarian and development aid initiatives of these states are often intertwined.⁸⁵⁷ The peace initiatives of Norway are closely linked to its development initiatives; a case often summarized in the motto, “sustainable development promotes peace and sustainable peace promotes development.”⁸⁵⁸ In addition, while in the past peace was treated as a tool of Norway’s development aid; from 1995 onwards it has become a distinctive “goal” and “part” of Norwegian South policy.⁸⁵⁹ As noted by Skånland, a multi-track approach is an important element of the Norwegian model of peacemaking,⁸⁶⁰ and this is also the case in Somalia. For instance in 2012, Norway delivered around \$77, 7 million (472 million NOK) to Somalia of which \$37 million was delivered through multilateral organizations such as the UN, \$32 million through Norwegian non-governmental organizations, \$8, 3 million through international and local NGOs, and the rest through Norwegian public and private sector.⁸⁶¹

Some of the organizations through which Norway delivers aid to Somalia are the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Norwegian Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the NRC, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, the UNHCR, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, Concern Worldwide, Norwegian Church Aid, Save

⁸⁵⁵ Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States,” 386.

⁸⁵⁶ NORAD, “About NORAD,” October 27, 2010, <http://www.norad.no/en/about-norad> (accessed November 15, 2014).

⁸⁵⁷ Moolakkattu, “Peace Facilitation by Small States,” 386.

⁸⁵⁸ NORAD, *Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building*, 3

⁸⁵⁹ Skånland, “Norway is a Peace Nation,” 39.

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ Government. no, “Norway increases its assistance to Somalia to NOK 500 million,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, July 5, 2013, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/Nyheter-og-pressemeldinger/pressemeldinger/2013/assistance_somalia.html?id=726719 (accessed January 13, 2015).

the Children, the NRC's disaster preparedness force, Norwegian People's Aid, World Food Program and World Health Organisation (WHO).⁸⁶²

Referring to the multi-track nature of Turkey's Somali initiative, Haşimi pinpoints that "Turkey is very active in the field with its NGOs, businessmen, all of its institutions and municipalities."⁸⁶³ NGOs and charities are among important agents that have influenced the course of Turkish foreign policy in recent years.⁸⁶⁴ Turkey's humanitarian NGOs pursue a number of activities in the field. Although their work sometimes overlaps with that of the government, Turkish NGOs operate fairly independently from the state. Their work mainly entails providing services such as emergency assistance and medical relief, building infrastructure and investing in social and human capital.⁸⁶⁵ A number of Turkish NGOs are currently active in the field in Somalia such as the Humanitarian Aid Relief Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, KimseYok Mu?, the Cansuyu Foundation, the Nile Foundation, the Helping Hands Foundation, the Deniz Feneri Foundation, the Hasene Foundation, the Foundation for World Orphans (DÜNYEV), the Beşir Foundation, the International Anatolian Health Federation, the Physicians for Hope Foundation (ÜHDER), the Deniz Feneri Foundation, Une Seule Humanité (BISEG), the Dost Eli Foundation, the Dosteller Aid and Solidarity Foundation, Sadakataşı Foundation and the KutupYıldızı Foundation.

Turkish businesses are also active in Somalia particularly in developing the infrastructure of the country. The businesses that have been trading in the country have been small and medium sized enterprises. Agriculture, livestock and fisheries are the main trade resources.

⁸⁶² NORAD, "Somalia."

⁸⁶³ Interview with Haşimi.

⁸⁶⁴ Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, "Turkey's Opening to Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, no.4, 2010: 525–546.

⁸⁶⁵ Aras and Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding," 230-247.

While Turkish exports to Somalia were around \$2.3 million in 2007, they reached \$40 million in 2011.⁸⁶⁶ The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) is the most active Turkish business agency in Somalia. On April 7, 2012, the first business forum for Somalia in 20 years was held by the Bahçelievler Businessmen's Association (an offshoot of the TUSKON) in Mogadishu with the participation of businessmen from various sectors which was concluded with the establishment of the Somali-Turkish Business Association. Somalia's other foreign trade partners are the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa member states, India, Italy and the United Kingdom.⁸⁶⁷

While both Britain and Norway are "g07"⁸⁶⁸ countries, Turkey is not although the share of ODA in its foreign policy has grown visibly increasing by 30 times since 2003. In 2011 and 2012, Turkey's development aid was the fastest growing in the world. Considered an "emerging donor" by the World Food Program, Turkey will also host the 1st World Humanitarian Aid Summit in 2016.⁸⁶⁹ Turkey currently delivers development aid to 81 countries worldwide.⁸⁷⁰ Britain's overall ODA reached £11.3 billion in 2013, 0.7 per cent of its gross national income⁸⁷¹ while Norway allocates one of the highest percentage of

⁸⁶⁶ Turkish Statistical Institute, "Foreign Trade Statistics Yearbook 2011," 2012, 46, www.turkstat.gov.tr/IcerikGetir.do?istab_id/48946 (accessed January 20, 2014).

⁸⁶⁷ Global Trade, "International Trade in Somalia," <http://www.globaltrade.net/international-trade-import-exports/m/c/Somalia.html> (accessed June 18, 2014).

⁸⁶⁸ The countries that keep the promise of spending 0.7 per cent of their GNI on development aid are considered "g07" countries in the international arena. This promise has so far been kept only by Britain among G20 countries. Other g07 countries are Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Denmark. See, I Love g07, "About g07," <http://g07.org/en/section-page/> (accessed November 18, 2014).

⁸⁶⁹ Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, "Acil insani yardımlar sıralamasında dünyada 4. Sıraya çıkan Türkiye, 100'den fazla ülkeye yardım eli uzatıyor," December 4, 2013, <http://kdk.gov.tr/haber/acil-insani-yardimlar-siralamasinda-dunyada-4-siraya-cikan-turkiye-100den-fazla-ulkeye-yardim-eli-uzatiyor/338> (accessed June 17, 2014).

⁸⁷⁰ Interview with Haşimi.

⁸⁷¹ "Aid: how much does the UK spend, why it's important and how it Works," *The Guardian*, March 30, 2013.

gross domestic product in the world to development aid by more than 1 per cent.⁸⁷²

Turkey's ODA is around 0.21 per cent of its total gross national income.⁸⁷³

In 2012 Norway's bilateral assistance to Somalia was around 472 million NOK. While the total amount spent for emergency assistance was 322 million NOK, 101 million NOK was spent for good governance, 37 million NOK spent for education, 10 million NOK for health and social services, and 2 million NOK was spent for economic development and trade.⁸⁷⁴ In that sense, emergency assistance and good governance received the main bulk of Norwegian aid in Somalia. In 2013, Norway increased its aid to Somalia to 500 million NOK.⁸⁷⁵

While Turkey's total development aid is lower than both Britain and Norway, the aid it has delivered to Somalia so far is higher than both actors. In 2011 – 2012, Somalia received the lowest of Britain's aid to the Horn of Africa by £44 million (around \$72 million) compared to £290 million for Ethiopia and £93 million for Kenya. DFID's total budget for Somalia for 2013-2014 is around £60 million of which 39.65% goes to projects on government, 29.82% to projects on disaster, 16.14% on health, 3.51% on education, 2.11% on industry and 8.77% to projects on other sectors.⁸⁷⁶ In 2012 Norway delivered around 360 million NOK (around \$60 million) of total aid to Somalia increasing it to 500 million

⁸⁷² OECD, "Aid to developing countries rebounds in 2013 to reach an all-time high," April 8, 2014, <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm> (accessed June 8, 2015).

⁸⁷³ Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, "Uluslararası yardımlarda 'en cömert ülke' unvanını taşıyan Türkiye'nin yardım seferberliği sürüyor," <http://kdk.gov.tr/haber/turkiyenin-dis-yarimlari-2013/494> (accessed June 5, 2014).

⁸⁷⁴ NORAD, "Somalia."

⁸⁷⁵ Government. no, "Norway increases its assistance to Somalia to NOK 500 million."

⁸⁷⁶ DFID and UK Aid Development Tracker, "Somalia," <http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/SO/> (accessed May 20, 2015).

NOK in 2013.⁸⁷⁷ Turkey's total aid to Somalia, on the other hand, exceeded \$365 million in 2012.⁸⁷⁸

The main focus of Britain's policy of supporting development in Somalia is "to provide humanitarian assistance, beat poverty and prevent conflict."⁸⁷⁹ The UK implements this policy through the DFID by focusing "on governance and peace-building, wealth and job creation, health care, particularly for women and children, and humanitarian assistance."⁸⁸⁰

Turkey as well has similar policies in Somalia.⁸⁸¹ Education has been the flagship of Turkey's peacebuilding policy in Somalia. Educational aid is important for Turkey in contributing to Somalia's capacity building as well as constructing affinity in long term among those students that study with Turkish scholarships. According to Abdi, "Turkey should provide jobs in Somalia for the Somali youth who are educated in Turkey. This would also ensure loyalty towards Turkey. And al-Shabaab would lose recruitment."⁸⁸²

Turkey has provided free education and training to more than 4,200 people in Somalia in various fields. Its educational aid is delivered through official⁸⁸³ and non-state channels that provide scholarships and training alongside opening schools, institutions and

⁸⁷⁷ Government.no, "Norway increases its assistance to Somalia to NOK 500 million."

⁸⁷⁸ "Turkish aid to Somalia totals \$365 million," *Todays Zaman*, February 22, 2012.

⁸⁷⁹ Gov.uk, "DFID Somalia," <https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/dfid-somalia> (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁸⁸⁰ DFID and UK Aid, "Summary of DFID's work in Somalia 2011-2015," 3.

⁸⁸¹ The ministries that have been involved in Turkey's Somali initiative are Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock, Ministry of Transportation, Maritime Affairs, and Communications, Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, Ministry of Development, and Ministry of Science, Industry, and Technology. Some of the state institutions are the Office of Public Diplomacy, the Directorate for Religious Affairs, Foundation for Religious Affairs, Housing Development Administration of Turkey, Turks Abroad and Related Communities, and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, all of which operate under Prime Ministry.

⁸⁸² Interview with Abdi.

⁸⁸³ The Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Council of Higher Education, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, Turks Abroad and Related Communities and the Directorate of Religious Affairs are some official bodies that coordinate and provide scholarships to students and vocational training for professional staff.

vocational centres in Somalia.⁸⁸⁴ Norway supports education in Somalia as well. For instance, the NRC has two educational programs in Somalia including the Alternative Basic Education (ABE) program and the Youth Education Pack program aiming to reintegrate Somali youth into the school system or offering vocational training for older students.⁸⁸⁵

Construction constitutes a significant element of Turkey's development policy both domestically and externally. It has been a growing line of work for Turkey's new elite in recent years.⁸⁸⁶ Rebuilding infrastructure, transportation, construction, and refurbishment of various buildings, including government offices, schools, hospitals and orphanages, are notable in Turkey's efforts in Somalia. Abdi notes that, "There are roads now in Somalia being built by Turkish companies. Before that, the city was muddy in the rain and had very ugly roads full of holes. Now you can see in the city how many kilometres of roads the Istanbul Municipality alone has built in our capital city. None of the other countries ever did that to Somalia."⁸⁸⁷

Britain operates in Somalia mainly through the DFID in close cooperation with organizations such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank alongside a number of non-state organizations such as the ICRC, CSOs and the UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Program, Care International and Oxfam. From October 2011 to March 2013 the DFID delivered around £108 million to Somalia of which 34 per cent went through UN OCHA Common

⁸⁸⁴ The Turkish Red Crescent, the Humanitarian Aid Relief Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, KimseYok Mu?, the Cansuyu Foundation, the Nile Foundation, the Helping Hands Foundation, the DenizFeneri Foundation, the Hasene Foundation, DÜNYEV, and the Beşir Foundation are some of the organizations delivering educational aid to Somalia.

⁸⁸⁵ In 2012 and 2013, total of 27,808 students were supported through the ABE program while 790 were supported through the YEP program. See, Norwegian Refugee Council, Somalia - Fact Sheet, October 2013, 2, http://www.nrc.no/arch_img/9686509.pdf (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁸⁸⁶ An extensive number of construction projects are currently undertaken in Turkey as part of the mass scale process of "urban transformation." The magnitude of these projects has raised criticism among Turkish public as a result of their environmental and social impact. The most visible of these has manifested itself in "Gezi Uprisings" which took start in May 2013 in Istanbul and has been ongoing.

⁸⁸⁷ Interview with Abdi.

Humanitarian Fund, 54 per cent through other UN agencies and ICRC and 12 per cent through a range of international civil society organizations. In this respect, the DFID follows a multilateral approach to its engagement with Somalia. World Health Organization is another agency the DFID cooperates with in Somalia. Save the Children, Christian Aid, Merlin, Action Against Hunger, OXFAM, Concern and UNICEF are among the civil society organizations the DFID works with in Somalia. Progressio, Saferworld, Maginternational and Islamic Relief are other UK based NGOs that operate in Somalia.⁸⁸⁸

According to Wheeler, although British NGOs are independent, sometimes they are significantly funded by the British government.⁸⁸⁹ Norwegian NGOs are also often funded through tender bids initiated by the government. Turkish NGOs, on the other hand are completely funded through public donations. In 2011, the UK also initiated the establishment of a pooled fund for Somalia called the Somalia Cash Consortium during the crisis to foster cooperation among different countries and agencies in delivering cash and vouchers to the families in need.⁸⁹⁰ The Consortium consists of four NGOs including Action Contre la Faim, Adeso, Danish Refugee Council and Save the Children and is funded by ECHO, Danida, IOM, SDC, SIDA and UNICEF alongside the DFID⁸⁹¹ which is the largest contributor to the fund.⁸⁹²

5.4.5.2 Providing Humanitarian Assistance

Providing humanitarian assistance is another common feature among all three actors. In line with its policy in Somalia, Britain's target is to reach out to over one million people

⁸⁸⁸ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa," 10-16.

⁸⁸⁹ Interview with Wheeler.

⁸⁹⁰ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa," 13.

⁸⁹¹ Erik Bryld, Christine Kamau and Dina Sinigallia, "Gatekeepers in Mogadishu: Research Consultancy," *The Somalia Cash Consortium*, January 31, 2013.

⁸⁹² Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "DFID's Humanitarian Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa," 15.

through humanitarian assistance by “improving the overall emergency responsiveness in saving lives, alleviating human suffering, and maintaining the dignity of people affected by civil strife and natural disasters such as drought.”⁸⁹³ DFID reaches out to three identified regions including Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia which receives 75 per cent of the total humanitarian assistance. It focuses on “designing a multi-year humanitarian programme with a focus on improving resilience to humanitarian crises, as well as responding to urgent needs”⁸⁹⁴ in cooperation with the UN Common Humanitarian Fund as well as a range of international NGOs.⁸⁹⁵

Turkey’s humanitarian assistance in Somalia is mainly coordinated through the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) which provides emergency assistance and delivers humanitarian aid, particularly during the initial phase of crisis.⁸⁹⁶ The provision of emergency assistance is particularly important since it increases the public visibility of actors during the initial stage of the crisis when the media attention is at its peak. It also paves the way for further involvement by legitimising the intervention.⁸⁹⁷

Medical relief is another important aspect of Turkey’s humanitarian assistance in Somalia which by far has been by far one of the biggest recipients in the last few years. Health has been a significant instrument of Turkey’s soft power. Building hospitals, providing

⁸⁹³ Gov.uk, “Providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” 24 March 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/providing-humanitarian-assistance-in-somalia> (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁸⁹⁴ DFID, “Operational Plan 2011-2015,” *DFID Somalia*, June 2013, 4. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209263/Somalia.pdf (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁶ AFAD is “an umbrella organization, collaborating with the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Forests and Hydraulic Works and other relevant ministries as well as non-governmental organizations, depending on the nature and magnitude of the disaster or emergency.” See, Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey, “About Us,” <https://www.afad.gov.tr/EN/IcerikDetay.aspx?ID=1> (accessed July 16, 2014).

⁸⁹⁷ Aras and Akpınar, “The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey’s Peacebuilding,” 230-247.

medical relief in camps, prisons and orphanages, carrying out circumcision surgeries, providing training for medical personnel and scholarships to study medicine in Turkey are part of Turkey's medical relief. The importance Turkey puts on health is also evident in the appointment of a medical doctor Dr. Cemalettin Kani Torun (also a former board member of Doctors Worldwide) as Turkish ambassador to Somalia.

To that end, TİKA, the Ministry of Health, the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Turkish Red Crescent as a semi-official actor are some official agents delivering medical relief to Somalia alongside several humanitarian NGOs, among which the Turkish Red Crescent, the Doctors Worldwide, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, and the KimseYok Mu are the most active.⁸⁹⁸

Conducting cataract surgery is a significant part of Turkey's medical relief in Somalia as well as in the rest of Africa. Cataract surgeries are particularly significant since they enable rapid and extensive outreach. The results of these surgeries are also concrete, positive and long-term. Noteworthy campaigns include: Kimse Yok Mu's Cataract Project;⁸⁹⁹ IHH's Africa Cataract Campaign carried out in partnership with the Islamic Development Bank in South Sudan and Sierra Leone; TİKA in Ethiopia and Sudan, Al Birr at-Tawasul Foundation in Sudan; the World Health Organization in Somalia.⁹⁰⁰

Norway also delivers medical relief to Somalia, although in a smaller scale when compared to Turkey. The Norwegian Red Cross is one of the organizations active in the

⁸⁹⁸ The Turkish Red Crescent, the Doctors Worldwide, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, KimseYok Mu?, the International Anatolian Health Federation, the Helping Hands Foundation, ÜHDER), the DenizFeneri Foundation, the UneSeuleHumanité (BISEG), the Dost Eli Foundation, the Dosteller Aid and Solidarity Foundation, and the KutupYıldızı Foundation are some of the Turkish NGOs delivering medical relief to Somalia.

⁸⁹⁹ Kimse Yok Mu operated on 10,717 cataract patients between 2008 and 2012 only in Darfur in line with its Cataract Project carried out across 5 countries in Africa. Kimse Yok Mu, "Devam Eden Projeler," www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/?p=projeler&gl=kampanya_proje&cl=devameden_projeler&ci=153&i=232 (accessed July 16, 2014).

⁹⁰⁰ Aras and Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding," 230-247.

country since 1991 mainly in partnership with the Somali Red Crescent and the International Red Cross.⁹⁰¹ It also supported the organizational development of the Somali Red Crescent.⁹⁰² Britain also cooperates with the Somali Red Crescent and the International Red Cross in Somalia.⁹⁰³

One of the active Norwegian NGOs in Somalia is the NRC which focuses mainly on emergency response and preventing the recurrence of conflict by providing relief on “shelter and infrastructure construction; water, hygiene and sanitation; emergency education including youth education; protection; food security and livelihoods” operating mainly in Puntland, South Central Somalia and Somaliland.⁹⁰⁴

Norwegian Church Aid is another NGO that has been operating in the country since 1993 focusing mainly on “right to water and health, as well as the right to peace and security.”⁹⁰⁵ It works mainly in Gedo region, Mogadishu and Puntland. Norwegian Church Aid is also a founding member of ACT Somali Forum, a platform that consists of a range of organizations active in Somalia such as Diakonie of Germany, Christian Aid, the Lutheran World Federation and Finn Church Aid.⁹⁰⁶

5.4.5.3 Eliminating Somalia’s Isolation by Encouraging International Support

Turkey has taken significant steps in terms of ending Somalia’s international isolation by encouraging international support. Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during the famine in 2011 rapidly brought Somalia into headlines. The fact that despite high security risks he visited

⁹⁰¹ Ahmed Mohamed Hassan, “Thirty years of working within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in a country affected by conflict,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 94, no.888, 2012: 1245.

⁹⁰² Hassan, “Thirty years of working within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in a country affected by conflict,” 7.

⁹⁰³ ICRC, Plan 2010-2011: Somalia, 3, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/annual10/MAASO00110P.pdf> (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁹⁰⁴ Norwegian Refugee Council, “Somalia - Fact Sheet,” 1.

⁹⁰⁵ Norwegian Church Aid, “Somalia.”

⁹⁰⁶ Norwegian Church Aid, “Somalia.”

the country along with his family and a delegation of 200 businessmen, politicians, civil society representatives, and even celebrities created a huge impact.⁹⁰⁷

According to Abdi, “Erdoğan in Mogadishu has turned the eyes of international attention to Somalia. He came in the right time, with the right intention, as we believe, and he did not come alone. He came with his family and members of his cabinet. Somalis were very happy.”⁹⁰⁸ Abdi also notes, “The Somalis believe in the Turks because they can never forget the intervention that happened at the right time. Erdoğan visited with his cabinet, and all other leaders came after him.”⁹⁰⁹

Erdoğan’s visit took place at a time when other leaders refrained from visiting the country with the excuse of poor security measures. The visit also coincided with the month of Ramadan, during which millions of Muslims around the world were fasting and were able to empathize with their counterparts in Somalia. According to Enow, Turkish government’s move in Somalia “met the momentum. Turkey was quick in action which promoted its credibility.”⁹¹⁰

Another significant initiative by Turkey in terms of eliminating Somalia’s international isolation was starting international flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu on March 6, 2012.⁹¹¹ Regarding the impact of this initiative Abdi notes,

When the [international] elites want to come to Somalia they ask, ‘How can we come? You don’t have national air carrier.’ Then we tell them, ‘Turkish Airlines has weekly flights to Mogadishu.’ That answers everything. They say, ‘Oh that means that it is safe.’ Turkey opened an

⁹⁰⁷ Akpınar, “Turkey’s Peacebuilding in Somalia,” 735-757.

⁹⁰⁸ Interview with Abdi. Also see, Abdalle Ahmed, “SOMALIA: Mogadishu residents commend the role of Turkish agencies in Somalia development,” *RBC Radio*, January 7, 2014, <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/01/somalia-mogadishu-residents-commend-the-role-of-turkish-agencies-in-somalia-development/> (accessed July 24, 2014).

⁹⁰⁹ Interview with Abdi.

⁹¹⁰ Interview with Enow.

⁹¹¹ As the first major commercial airline to fly into Somalia in more than 20 years,⁹¹¹ Turkish Airlines, Turkey’s national flag carrier airline, currently flies twice weekly between the two cities.

international window for us. For all those who want to come from Europe or America, Turkish Airlines made their trip possible. The trip used to be very difficult before. People had to go to the neighbouring countries and travel from there.⁹¹²

The reopening of the Turkish Embassy in Somalia after 20 years was another initiative that ended Somalia's isolation. Holding international conferences to encourage international support for Somalia is another method used both by Turkey and Britain. Turkey has held two international conferences on Somalia. The first Istanbul Conference on Somalia was held on May 21-23, 2010, within the framework of the Djibouti Agreement. The conference set up a roadmap for peacebuilding and development in Somalia.⁹¹³ Bilateral agreements were signed between Turkey and Somalia in fields of military, education, and technical and scientific cooperation.⁹¹⁴ According to Davutoğlu, the conference was concluded with a strong message for Somalia built on three major dimensions. The first dimension highlighted the future of Somalia, focusing on peace, political reform, security and economic development in the country. The second dimension was about regional ownership, and called on Somalia's neighbours to give their full support for peace in the country. The third dimension concerned international ownership, and called on the international community to support peace in Somalia.⁹¹⁵

According to Apakan, as a result of Turkey's mobilization of the international community for Somalia, there has been a shift of balance in the Horn of Africa. He adds that the Somali Conference was significant because it encouraged local ownership of the problem.⁹¹⁶ The Istanbul Conference on Somalia was considered a significant achievement for Turkish-Somali rapprochement. A year after the conference, on May 9-13, 2011, the

⁹¹² Interview with Abdi.

⁹¹³ "İstanbul conference raises hopes for war-torn Somalia," *Today's Zaman*, May 24, 2010.

⁹¹⁴ Turkish Foreign Ministry Representative, Press Conference Proceedings, Istanbul Conference on Somalia, May 22, 2010. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-istanbul-somali-konferansi-sonrasi-bm-genel-sekreteri-ile-yaptigi-ortak-basin-toplantisi_-22-mayis-2010.tr.mfa (accessed July 8, 2014).

⁹¹⁵ Davutoğlu, Press Conference Proceedings.

⁹¹⁶ Interview Apakan.

Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, of which Somalia is a member, was hosted by Turkey in Istanbul.⁹¹⁷ The Istanbul Conferences and the LDC Conference triggered further interest in Africa followed by the deadly famine. Owing both to the heavy level of drought in the country as well as misgovernment, the situation in Somalia quickly hit global headlines, accompanied by lack of comprehensive international solution for the tragedy. The rising Turkish interest in Somalia generated the flow of over \$365 million in aid into the country, nearly double the amount that Turkey had pledged during the conference to deliver annually to all of the LDCs. Accordingly in 2011 Somali became the fourth country, following Pakistan, Syria and Afghanistan, where Turkey's development aid has been highly concentrated.⁹¹⁸ As mentioned before, Turkey also hosted the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Somalia and organized the OIC Conference on Somalia, where countries pledged \$350 million, plus another \$500 million for Somalia. In March 2011 the OIC opened its Humanitarian Coordination Office in Mogadishu.⁹¹⁹

Promoting international support for Somalia is a priority for Britain as well. The British Embassy Mogadishu, which has been operating from its compound on Mogadishu Airport since April 25, 2013, is the main agent of this policy in collaboration with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, and the Ministry of Defence.⁹²⁰ Britain has also hosted two international conferences for Somalia including the First and the Second London Conferences on Somalia. The former was held on February

⁹¹⁷ Davutoğlu, "A New Vision for Least Developed Countries," *Vision Paper*, Center for Strategic Research, no.4, 2012, 4-5.

⁹¹⁸ TİKA, *Türkiye Kalkınma Yardımları Raporu 2011 [Turkish Development Aid Report 2011]*, 7.

⁹¹⁹ Erdoğan, "Tears of Somalia."

⁹²⁰ Gov.uk, "British Embassy Mogadishu," Gov.uk, <https://www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/british-embassy-mogadishu> (accessed August 21, 2014).

23, 2012 with the participation of fifty-five delegations from around the world.⁹²¹ The Somali Diaspora in the UK raised some criticism on the conference on the basis that their concerns had not been addressed; the agenda had been “preordained” and “the focus should have been on investment, jobs, gender, and the humanitarian crisis rather than international security and piracy.”⁹²² Coordinator of the Somali Relief and Development Forum Rahma Ahmed claimed that, “When the British government decided to step forward it should have asked what Somalis wanted. What they did instead was to identify a few areas. It failed to respect the process and priorities set by Somalis.”⁹²³ Some Somalis such as the founder and head of the Somali Diaspora UK and a Somali activist Amina Souleiman criticized the conference for not sufficiently addressing the issue of women.⁹²⁴ This criticism though was addressed during the Second London Conference on Somalia which included the issue of gender equality on the conference agenda.

The Second London Conference on Somalia was jointly hosted by the UK and the Federal Government of Somalia on May 7, 2013 “to provide international support for the Somali government’s immediate priorities as they rebuild their country.”⁹²⁵ The conference focused on supporting the realisation of social and economic rights through development programmes, working to address inequalities especially with respect to gender inequalities, and improving inclusion and accountability.⁹²⁶ It aimed to support FGS on areas of security, justice and public financial management. Another focus of the conference was

⁹²¹ Gov.uk, “London Conference on Somalia: Full coverage, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” February 23, 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/london-conference-on-somalia-full-coverage--2> (accessed August 21, 2014).

⁹²² “Somalis Raise Concerns About London Conference Agenda,” *The Guardian*.

⁹²³ Ibid.

⁹²⁴ “Somalis Raise Concerns About London Conference Agenda,” *The Guardian*.

⁹²⁵ Gov.uk, “Worldwide priority: Increasing international support for Somalia,” Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 24 March 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/increasing-international-support-for-somalia> (accessed August 21, 2014).

⁹²⁶ DFID, “Operational Plan 2011-2015,” 14.

eliminating sexual violence in Somalia. The international community committed to provide expertise and funding of over \$300 million during the conference.⁹²⁷

Another conference that was organized by Britain for Somalia was the AMISOM Diaspora Meeting that was held in London on May 9-10, 2013. The conference aimed to, “engage the views of the Somali Diaspora on the situation in Somalia; mobilise Somali Diaspora support for the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM, the peace process including the implementation of the government’s six-pillar priorities with a view to enhancing the stabilisation of Somalia; and mobilise the necessary skills from the Somali Diaspora and facilitate their return home in order to provide skilled manpower for the rebuilding of the Somali state.”⁹²⁸ In addition to the Somali Diaspora, the conference also included civil society and media organizations from Somalia, members of the Federal Government of Somalia and a range of international partners.⁹²⁹

As part of its policy on increasing international support for Somalia, the UK government supports the Federal Government of Somalia to develop a New Deal compact aiming to define and encourage partnership between the FGS and international community. It also supports the National Development Plan of Somaliland in addition to the creation of the Somaliland Development Fund together with Denmark. A similar cooperation is established with Puntland in the production of the National Development Plan.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁷ Gov.uk, “Somalia Conference 7 May 2013: key outcomes, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” May 13, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/somalia-conference-7-may-2013-key-outcomes> (accessed August 21, 2014).

⁹²⁸ AMISOM, “AMISOM Diaspora Meeting London 9-10 May 2013,” <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-diaspora-meeting-london-9-10-may-2013/> (accessed August 21, 2014).

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ DFID, “Operational Plan 2011-2015,” 7.

5.4.5.4 Religious Aid in Somalia

One of Turkey's differences in Somalia is delivering religious aid. The religious activities of the Turkish state and NGOs may be summarized as distributing copies of the Quran, distributing meat during Eid al-Adha [the Feast of Sacrifice], as well as conducting free circumcision surgeries, refurbishing mosques and opening Quran courses.⁹³¹

According to Subaşı, one of the aims of Turkey's religious aid is to prevent religion from becoming a source of conflict. He notes that different interpretations of religion trigger conflict. Subaşı posits that, "there is a *sui generis* radicalism in Somalia that triggers the clash between the Salafis, the Sunnis and the liberals."⁹³² He further notes that Turkey offers a moderate model of Islam that tries to resolve the conflict by offering scholarships and providing employment for the youth.⁹³³ This assertion also suggests that Turkey interprets religious extremism amongst youth not as an issue of religion but as an issue of poverty and lack of opportunity.

Similarly, the religious edge in Turkey's mediation also accentuates the sentiments. For example, distribution of aid by the Turkish state and NGOs during religious holidays increases significantly which wins the hearts and minds of the people in Somalia as well as other Muslim countries. Abdi notes, "I think the Turkish Prime Minister told his people during his speech, 'Instead of slaughtering one sheep for your family this holiday, how about you donate it this year to the people who are dying [in Somalia]?'". This and other similar sentimental talks by Turkish officials find their way through the hearts of people in need.

⁹³¹ Among the NGOs and charities, the Humanitarian Relief Foundation and Kimse Yok Mu? stand out with their religious aid, along with the Beşir Foundation, the Helping Hands Foundation, the Deniz Feneri Foundation, the Hasene Foundation, the Dost Eli Foundation, and the Cansuyu Foundation. Please see their respective websites for more information.

⁹³² Interview with Subaşı.

⁹³³ Ibid.

Having religious similarities with Somalia is also an asset for Turkey in terms of constituting legitimacy based on its Muslim identity. Although this may become an advantage on many levels, on some levels it may trigger problems as well. According to Abdi, Turkey's religious activities in Somalia raise concerns among secular Somalis. He notes,

Some secular Somalis are not happy with the Turkish role [in Somalia]. Because they think that the Turkish state is pro-Islamic. They do not want Somalia to get support from a strong partner. Because they think that Turkey will strengthen the role of the Islamic existence and the Islamic values in Somalia. Somalia is more Islamicized than Turkey but because it is a very weak country and because Turkey came with technology, with finance, with expertise, this would give the Islamics in Somalia a door, a room to manoeuvre and also international relations. Seculars do not want that. They try to disconnect them by making propaganda in Somalia by saying "Why is Turkey coming to Somalia? What do they want from us? What is the agenda behind Turkish involvement? There must be a hidden agenda." But when they are asked for a proof, they do not give us proof. They are only suspicious. They say, "We are a sovereign state. We do not belong to the Ottoman Empire anymore. So why are they trying to recapture us?"⁹³⁴

Delivering religious aid from multiple channels, each of which with potentially different interpretations of Islam, may create incoherency and confusion that could lead to criticism of Turkey and decrease its credibility in the long term.⁹³⁵ Although the Turkish government often promotes secularism in the Islamic world, civil society may carry out a different agenda or at least their activities may be interpreted in a different way on the ground. Abdi notes,

The Turkish NGOs who came first showed Islamic affection and passion to the Somali people such as IHH and many others from the Gülen movement. They said, "We [Turks and Somalis] are Muslim. We can marry each other." And actually, some Turkish guys got married in Mogadishu. Usually the Somalis do not marry other nationalities. They are a bit racist in that sense but they opened their hearts to the Turks. The seculars say, "Turkey is a growing economy. They must have an economic agenda even if they are sincere. Don't think that they have come because we are Muslims. They have come because we have many

⁹³⁴ Interview with Abdi.

⁹³⁵ "Türkiye'nin yardımı Somali'yi ikiye böldü," *Milliyet*, February 20, 2012.

resources and their economy needs our raw material that we have over here. They will give one hundred and take one million.” The other people who are against that debate says, “When I am dying or my children are dying the one who feeds me saves my life.” So there are these two debates. But generally, Turkey’s role is acceptable and it is welcomed.⁹³⁶

5.4.6 Progress of Mediators

As highlighted in Chapter 2, with respect to the progress of mediators, the study examines to what extent mediators were able to achieve their initial goals. Progress, in this sense, is not solely about short to mid-term objectives such as signing an agreement but also about mid to long-term ones such as improving “the quality of communication, a change in the population’s attitude, the building of common projects.”⁹³⁷

Turkey, Britain and Norway have all had progress in their Somali peace initiatives on different levels. For instance, Britain was able to conduct the first direct talks between Somalia and Somaliland in more than twenty years which was an important progress. Norway’s contribution is also noteworthy in terms of generating peace talks on the grassroots by bringing together various clan leaders, religious leaders, youth and other significant figures of the Somali society. Turkey took over the mediator’s hat from Britain and achieved to bring together the Somali government with Somaliland as well as Al-Shabaab for a round of talks, the latter with support from Norway.

Turkey’s initiative resulted in the signing of the Ankara Communiqué, the first peace agreement between Somalia and Somaliland.⁹³⁸ As noted earlier, it was also the first time the parties came together at the presidential level. Referring to Turkey’s progress Haşimi notes,

At a time when its mediator role was considered ended, Turkey mediated between Somalia and Somaliland – the two actors that everyone had

⁹³⁶ Interview with Abdi.

⁹³⁷ Faget, “The Metamorphosis of Peacemaking,” 10.

⁹³⁸ See Appendix 2: Ankara Communiqué.

thought would have never come together. There is a moving, effective and successful process. But in the end, its success is to be determined by the equation there [in Somalia]. At the moment, we know that we are able to speak with both parties.⁹³⁹

One of Turkey's significant achievements was bringing Somalia onto the international agenda and triggering the flow of massive aid into the country which raised hopes and normalized life to a certain extent in Somalia.⁹⁴⁰ Turkey's projects aim to have long-term impact in the country. Regarding the sustainability of Turkish projects, Hussein notes that, "Turkish projects are sustainable but the European projects focus on emergency aid and are not really sustainable. Turks are building ports, airports, hospitals, schools which are all sustainable."⁹⁴¹ Abdi notes in a similar vein,

In the port city of Bebera, the Turkish had built a pipe that provides the ships with drinking water. It was built a long time ago and still operates. Before that, they [sailors] used to bring drinking water from their own country thinking they could not drink the water in Somalia but the Turkish solved that problem. Also, the fruits that are famous in Somalia never had market for it but Turkey now buys fruits such as lemons and oranges that are abundant in Somalia. Turkey buys a big quantity and brings her currency to us. The other countries do not buy Somali products. Turkey asks us, "Why don't you have fishing companies. We need fish. You have the longest shore in Africa." So Turkey is encouraging the Somalis to invest in their shores.⁹⁴²

Ensuring sustainability is a common concern among many Turkish NGOs as well. Investing in the education and training to build local capacity is often emphasized as a prerequisite for sustainability. For instance, Karaman argues that training medical personnel in conflict zones can contribute to the sustainability of medical aid.⁹⁴³ Deniz Feneri also underscores the importance of sustainability, for instance by providing vocational training to local people in a range of areas, from goat farming to fishery.⁹⁴⁴ In

⁹³⁹ Interview with Haşimi.

⁹⁴⁰ Interview with Abdi.

⁹⁴¹ Interview with Hussein.

⁹⁴² Interview with Abdi.

⁹⁴³ İhsan Karaman, former chair of the board of Doctors Worldwide, cited in Aras and Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding," 9.

⁹⁴⁴ Ali Karayılan, General Director of Deniz Feneri Foundation, cited in Bülent Aras and Pınar Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding," 240.

order to ensure sustainability and contribute to capacity building, Turkey requires that the recipients of scholarships return to Somalia once their studies are completed. According to Doctors Worldwide, sustainability is important in the Turkish model.⁹⁴⁵

With respect to Turkey's overall foreign policy goals in mediating the Somali conflict, one may argue that it has so far achieved several of them. Turkey achieved to earn considerable amount of prestige and recognition, both in Africa and internationally as a result of its Somali initiative. As also noted by an anonymous senior Turkish diplomat, Turkey's Somali initiative coincides with its rising role as an emerging power, "Somalia brought Turkey to the fore in the international arena. The African public evaluates Turkey based on its Somali initiative. From Botswana to Mozambique, everyone praises Turkey now. We have taken solid steps," he notes.⁹⁴⁶

Despite the fact that its Somali engagement helped Turkey construct an identity as a credible and trustable actor in Africa, only time will show whether one may speak of a sustainable Turkish role in the country.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to understand Turkey's mediation in Somalia in order to examine to what extent it may differ from Western mediators such as Britain and Norway. Similar to the Syrian-Israeli case, mediation was part of Turkey's broader foreign policy interests in the Somali case as well. Mediation, and the peaceful image, helped Turkey increase its visibility and legitimacy both in Somalia and in Africa. Africa is a dynamic market with its natural resources and dense population. Mediation offers a legitimate ground for Turkey to achieve its political and economic goals.

⁹⁴⁵ E-mail correspondence with an anonymous representative from Doctors Worldwide, December 22, 2012.

⁹⁴⁶ Interview with anonymous senior Turkish diplomat.

Similar to the Syrian-Israeli case, in the Somali case as well, Turkey is an emerging mediator which lacks sufficient experience. However, the chapter found that the level of commitment Turkey demonstrated and the trust it was able to build since 2011 has come to fore as more important criteria for the parties to consult its mediation. Therefore, the study found that experience *per se* may not always be sufficient or necessary for a state to have legitimacy as mediator. However, the chapter also found that Turkey does need further institutionalization and capacity building to ensure the sustainability of its mediator role.

Similar to the Syrian-Israeli case, in Somalia as well, Turkey has followed a persuasive approach, rather than a coercive one, and its mediation has been rather facilitative. However, the fact that during the last round of talks Somalia and Somaliland requested Turkey to prepare itself to become more involved in the next round of talks is indicative of the level of trust Turkey has been able to build probably as a result of the commitment it has demonstrated as well as the level of influence it has exerted.

Turkey is considered a legitimate actor in Somalia. The positive memories attached to the Ottoman past in the country and its Muslim identity provided Turkey with significant legitimacy at the entry stage. As such, the Somali case confirms the argument put forth in Chapter 2 that culture plays an important role in mediation. Compared to the Syrian-Israeli case, culture played a larger role in Somalia. However, the study also found that, while cultural ties were important in opening up channels and gaining entry into Somalia, delivering sustainable, visible and solid projects was more important in preserving Turkey's legitimacy and credibility.

The Somali case also demonstrates that means supportive of mediation, such as development aid and humanitarian assistance were also important in Turkey's mediation. Turkey utilizes these tools for the realization of its goal of normalization in Somalia.

Turkey would benefit from a stable and secure Somalia as a new market for its economic goals, and as a gateway to the rest of Africa which is a continent that Turkey aims to increase its engagement with.

The Turkish model also promotes the involvement of non-state actors in peace processes, which also helped Turkey foster its credibility as a mediator in Somalia. Turkey also followed an inclusive mediation approach in Somalia by bringing together various actors including the state, regional administrations, clans, traditional elders, and even Al-Shabaab.

For Turkey, security in Somalia is limited to securing its activities on the ground whereas for Britain and Norway, the consequences of the conflict in Somalia such as extremism, piracy, and migration are considered a threat to their own national security. While Britain and Norway are criticized for using security concerns as a cover to legitimize their presence in Somalia, Turkey indicates religious links and the direness of the situation as reasons for its engagement.

Although Somalia is still far from reaching comprehensive peace, it may be argued that, Turkey has achieved a number of foreign policy goals with its engagement in Somalia. However, its engagement is still new and the complexity of the conflict and the volatility in the country may hamper the positive image it has been able to portray so far. Its long-term success as a mediator will largely depend on demonstrating commitment on the institutional level and its ability to execute sustainable projects on the ground.

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated to what extent Turkey's mediation differs from Western modes of mediation. In order to answer this question the thesis tried to understand how difference in international mediation could be identified, what role mediation plays in the broader Turkish foreign policy, why and how Turkey mediates, the main determinants of Turkey's role as a mediator, and whether this is a sustainable role or a temporary one based on certain internal or/and external factors.

To be able to identify Turkey's difference in mediation, the study drew on the mediation literature and applied certain indicators such as previous experience of mediators, their motives, characteristics, style, and progress on the cases of the Syrian-Israeli talks and the Somali conflict. These indicators helped me make judgements about Turkey's difference vis-à-vis the more traditional Western mediators such as the US in the Syrian-Israeli talks, and Britain and Norway in Somalia. For instance, some of the motives of states brought out in the literature were search for prestige, exerting influence, preventing spill-over of the conflict or legitimizing foreign policy. These indicators were then tested in the two cases to understand to what extent Turkish mediation may differ. Similarly, power capability of mediators was another indicator which provided significant insight for identifying Turkey's difference in its mediation approach.

The study sought to examine Turkey's mediation against the background of change that has taken place in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade or so, which, as argued here, paved the way for the emergence of Turkey's mediator role. Drawing on a *constructivist* approach, the thesis has shown that Turkey's search for a new identity under the imperatives of domestic balances as well as the changing regional and international landscape paved the way for the emergence of a new vision for its foreign policy. This

understanding is also supportive of the agent-structure debate in constructivism which argues that the two are mutually constructive. As such, Turkey's mediator role emerged *inter alia* as a result of the responses of Turkish policy makers to the changing regional and international structure in line with developments such as the end of the Cold War, the September 11 events and the US-led invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, Turkey's approach to the problems pertaining in its region was determined by the ideas and interests of policy makers who envisioned Turkey a role as a regional leader.

In this respect, the identities and interests of Turkish foreign policy makers, particularly Ahmet Davutoğlu, have been influential in the formation of this vision based on the idea of becoming more active and influential in post-Ottoman lands by reigniting Turkey's historical-geographical links therein. His vision of mediation, in a way, underlines the new sense of Turkish identity as the elements he emphasises well suit the idea of positioning Turkey as a sensitive, responsive and culturally attuned regional power.⁹⁴⁷ As such, mediation was a role conception for Turkey and part of its expanding foreign policy. It was also a tool of achieving its "zero-problems with neighbors" policy while also enhancing its regional status and international prestige.

Turkey's mediation, and the idea of Turkish policy makers of being able to approach mediation differently, is to a large extent part of a deliberate identity construction on Turkey's part. Given the changing international circumstances and the regional difficulties, mediation provides an opportunity for Turkey to enhance its influence and position itself based on a mixed identity as Western, enabling it to be more influential, and non-Western, enabling it to utilize its shared historic ties and being able to act in a new way. In this regard, the thesis confirmed its initial argument that when the mediator is a state, its

⁹⁴⁷ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation," 83-90.

motives to mediate a given conflict are in parallel with its foreign policy interests such as enhancing prestige, exerting influence or identity construction through the portrayal of a peaceful image.

Turkey's mediator role was not only self-attributed but, as evident in the Syrian-Israeli and the Somali cases, also developed in response to the demand coming from conflicting parties. This demand is indicative of the relational links and the level of trust that Turkey was able to build with the parties, which was one of the objectives of the new Turkish foreign policy. In the Syrian-Israeli talks, Turkey capitalized on its dual identity as Western and non-Western. Turkey was a mediator that could help to reintegrate Syria into the international system as well as have access to all actors in the region including Israel's foes such as Hamas and Hezbollah. As such, its dual identity also offers an effective way of exerting influence while securing itself in a volatile region. In the Somali case, the demand came as a result of the trust Turkey was able to build and the commitment it demonstrated on the ground with instruments such as humanitarian assistance and the development aid. As such, in intrastate conflicts, Turkey's mediation comes as "a package"⁹⁴⁸ that includes aid and assistance as peace dividends. This model also promotes the involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs and businesses.

Mediation is also a tool of increasing Turkey's visibility and legitimacy in its quest to become more active and influential in its immediate neighbourhood and in distant geographies. While Turkey's mediation in the Syrian-Israeli talks enhanced its visibility and legitimacy in the Middle East, its involvement in Somalia became a show case which enabled it to portray an image as a credible, committed and legitimate actor in Africa which is a new market for Turkey as an emerging power.

⁹⁴⁸ Interview with Aras.

This thesis has shown that domestic concerns also played an important role for Turkey to take on a mediator role. In the Syrian-Israeli case, its mediation role enabled Turkey to bring home a “success story” which in turn would divert attention from the contested 2007 parliamentary elections, legitimize its foreign policy of becoming more active in a region such as the Middle East which the previous administrations had avoided, and enhance its image as the defender of the Palestinian cause. Similarly, its mediation enabled it to legitimize its policy in Somalia and Africa. As such, one of Turkey’s differences was that while Britain and Norway securitized their involvement in Somalia by drawing attention to extremism, piracy, and migration as threats to its national security, Turkey drew attention to the direness of the situation and underlined its religious links with the Somali people. However, despite the difference in their portrayal of their motives, one of the similarities among them is that the foreign policy goals such as becoming more involved in Somalia lie at the root of their interests.

Turkey preferred to apply a persuasive and facilitative mediation style in both cases. Its lack of sufficient hard power prevented it from being coercive and press parties towards a resolution, unlike for instance, the US in the Syrian-Israeli talks which was able to pressure the parties by using carrots and sticks. Being the only actor that is able to twist Israel’s arm or offer incentives such as ensuring security or delivering substantial amounts of aid provided the US with a more stable mediator role in the Arab-Israeli talks across the years.

The Turkish experience also demonstrates that since emerging mediators lack sufficient power and leverage compared to more traditional mediators such as the US or Britain, they need to be more resourceful and invest more on capacity building, institutionalization, and expertise. Similarly, preserving their impartiality is also significant in sustaining their image as accountable mediators. As such, emerging mediators need to adopt an impartial

image since taking sides and pressing an outcome requires certain power capabilities. As a result emerging mediators need to be more persuasive in their approach. For instance, the fact that Turkey, Qatar and Iran all took sides during the Arab Spring affected their credibility as mediators, which is indicative of the importance of preserving neutrality as a mediator.⁹⁴⁹

In the Somali case, however, Turkey's courage to enter the country despite all the security concerns and its commitment on the ground provided it with a stable mediator role. The fact that the parties demanded the expansion of its contribution into a more involved mediator role demonstrates the level of trust it was able to build as a mediator.

One of the important differences of Turkish mediation has been the promotion of Turkey's *insiderness* and *all-inclusiveness*. The fact that policy makers frequently highlight Turkey's insider characteristics as an asset for its mediation is also indicative of a deliberate identity construction which enables Turkey to be more involved in regional issues. The all-inclusive approach also enables Turkey to enhance its relational links with various actors as part of its new foreign policy.

Turkey's experience in the Syrian-Israeli talks suggests that emerging mediators tend to be more enthusiastic in resolving problems pertaining in their regions and their mediator roles are generally welcomed as insiders to the problems. The fact that they are more vulnerable to a possible spill-over effect of the conflicts in their region and have more insight about their dynamics and context brings them forth as preferable mediators in their region.

This thesis also suggested that culture plays an important role in Turkey's mediation. Turkey capitalizes on its cultural ties as a mediator, particularly on its Muslim identity. In

⁹⁴⁹ Akpınar, "Mediation as a Policy Tool in the Arab Spring," 252-269.

both the Syrian-Israeli and the Somali case, Turkey's cultural links played an important role. However, the study has shown that while culture was important in gaining entry into the talks, Turkey's demonstration of its commitment and determination played a larger role during the talks. For instance, the solid projects that Turkey was able to execute on the ground played a more important role in Somalia.

Turkey's Somali experience illustrates that trust and commitment are two important elements in building a credible image as a mediator. It also exemplifies that capacity generation through the utilization of both state and non-state actors is significant in achieving concrete results particularly in intrastate conflicts. Inclusiveness and the involvement of the grassroots are also important elements in building rapport and a credible image. In this respect, unlike some other emerging powers such as India or China that prefer to concentrate on a bilateral approach in their Africa policy, Turkish government is supportive of the involvement of Turkish humanitarian NGOs. This approach, which promotes grassroots engagement, is likely to achieve more sustainable results particularly in countries, such as Somalia, which lack stable state institutions as a result of lengthy civil war. In these circumstances official and civilian capacity coordination comes to fore as an important element to consider.

Despite the positive picture drawn by them, Turkish policy makers seem to be aware of the potential contradictions and points of controversy regarding Turkey's mediation. One of the obstacles facing the sustainability of Turkey's mediator role is the lack of sufficient institutionalization and capacity regarding its mediation. Although, there has been noteworthy effort to increase the capacity of Turkish Foreign Ministry in recent years,⁹⁵⁰ these efforts failed to find their way into mediation. The ministry still lacks a department

⁹⁵⁰ Bülent Aras, "Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Ministry," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 17, no.3, 2015: 269-286.

dedicated to mediation as well as experts in the field. In addition, Istanbul Conference on Mediation which was being co-organized with Finland annually since 2012 under the framework of the Friends of Mediation was not organized this year.

As such, the level of institutionalization does not live up to the high expectations set for Turkey by Turkish policy makers. The degree of confidence, praise and at times defensiveness adopted by Turkish actors suggest an exaggerated role for Turkey as a regional leader. However, the extensive vision of the current foreign policy, the bold rhetoric it is based on coupled with the lack of sufficient institutional infrastructure indicate a mismatch of means and ends which is likely to affect the sustainability of Turkey's mediator role. In this respect, the Turkish experience suggests that it is important for new players to set realistic goals in their quest for becoming influential actors in global politics.

In a similar vein, mediator states also need to show coherence in their rhetoric and practice particularly vis-à-vis the balance between their domestic and foreign policies. As also indicated in the study, a common aspect among some emerging powers is their rise as norm entrepreneurs on the global stage. Countries like Turkey, Brazil and India criticize the existing conduct of international relations and institutions such the UN Security Council, the NATO and the EU. They often advocate human rights, democracy and equality on international platforms and criticize the West for having double standards.

While part of their criticism addresses the existing problems on realistic grounds, part of it is suggestive of an intention to acquire a bigger share of the cake. On the other hand, they have a rather poor domestic record with respect to the norms they advocate in their foreign policies. Unlike, for instance, Scandinavian countries, which display a similarity to emerging powers in their normative stance, emerging powers fail to employ these norms

sufficiently in their domestic politics. It is, however, necessary that they achieve balance between their rhetoric and practice to be able to project a credible and reliable image as mediators.

Another obstacle lying ahead is the confrontational attitude that Turkey adopted vis-à-vis certain actors in recent years. For instance, Erdoğan's harsh criticism of Israel regarding its attack on Gaza as well as its overall attitude in the Palestinian conflict, were the main reason why Israel rejected the renewal of Turkey's mediator role in the Syrian-Israeli talks. The Syrian-Israeli case signals that leverage and the ability to influence the parties may be more important characteristics for mediators. In this regard, the "symbolic power"⁹⁵¹ derived from its heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate that Turkey relies on may not always be sufficient to influence the parties in a mediation process as well as implement the decisions taken on the table. In this respect, the Syrian-Israeli case is also indicative of the limits of Turkey's ability to influence the parties into a resolution. It also shows that Turkey needs US support in its mediator role in the region.

This attitude was also apparent during the Arab Spring in which Turkey has been accused of pursuing sectarian politics and taking sides. As such, Turkey's insiderness, which is put forth as a significant tenet by policy makers with respect to its mediation, has turned into a disadvantage for Turkey. Until the Arab Spring, the main objective of Turkey's foreign policy was to expand from being a regional power to an international one. To be able to achieve that aim, Turkey tried to utilize mediation as an instrument of instituting order by ensuring stability and security in the region. The Arab Spring came as a surprise and created a setback for Turkey's regional policy. It has also indicated the limits of Turkey's

⁹⁵¹ Interview with Abdi; Interview with Haşimi.

capabilities.⁹⁵² For instance, Turkey failed to predict the fall of the Ghaddafi regime and the endurance of the Assad regime. The failure of Turkey's Syrian policy during the Arab Spring offers a new context to analyse its previous performance as well as the future of its mediator role. It also offers an opportunity for future research to inspect the sustainability of this role.

Turkey had a number of mediation attempts during this period in which it achieved mixed results. For instance, while its mediation echoed positive response in Bahrain, it achieved partial results in Libya and Iraq. Furthermore, it was not able to achieve any results in Syria or Yemen. Furthermore, the Libyan and the Syrian experiences demonstrated that Turkey cannot go too far against its Western allies and has limited independence as a regional player. Regardless of Turkey's ambitions to evolve into an international player, this seems rather difficult for an actor that is unable to control even its backyard. As such, it may be argued that, during the Arab Spring, mediation has turned from being a tool of instituting order and expanding Turkey's area of influence to one of preserving it.⁹⁵³

Mediation has become part of Turkey's identity building as an insider actor and it has to have a long-term vision in order to secure that role. Turkey's mediator role has been too dependent on its new foreign policy which may challenge its sustainability. The change of leadership at the Turkish Foreign Ministry as a result of Ahmet Davutoğlu's appointment as the Prime Minister may be seen as one of the reasons why Turkey seems to have lost its enthusiasm in mediation. In addition, the fact that the government has been through certain domestic challenges as a result of the corruption scandal it has been facing, its inability to resolve the Kurdish issue, and its democratic deficiencies have the potential to challenge

⁹⁵² Öniş, "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions," 211-212.

⁹⁵³ Akpınar, "Mediation as a Policy Tool in the Arab Spring," 252-269.

its foreign policy. All these elements may risk Turkey's image as a mediator in the days to come.

Turkey's experience as an emerging mediator on the periphery illuminates that there is now more room for other players to become influential in the international system. The approaches of these players may have both similarities and differences from more traditional players. Tentatively, the Turkish experience could set an example for understanding the roles of other emerging powers particularly as agents of peace.

Despite certain setbacks, Turkey needs to embrace mediation as an important policy tool in such a volatile region. As the recent report by the UNHCR also reveals, Turkey is currently home to the largest number of refugees in the world which is a direct result of the conflicts in the region.⁹⁵⁴ The dire consequences of the Arab Spring signal the value that mediation deserves as a non-violent tool of conflict resolution. The future of Turkey's mediator role is dependent upon the willingness of policy makers and also the improvement of the current condition of Turkish mediation by investing in institutionalization, capacity building and expertise. So long as the necessary measures are taken, mediation would be an integral part of Turkish foreign policy.

⁹⁵⁴ UNHCR, "World at War."

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Dubai Statement

DUBAI STATEMENT

28 JUNE 2012

1. Following the London and Istanbul communiqués that the international community would support dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (or its replacement) and the government of Somaliland to clarify their future relations, and following the meeting held in Chevening House, London, the Presidents of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and of the president of Somaliland met on 28 June, in Dubai.
2. The meeting was hosted by the government of the United Arab Emirates, at the request of the two sides.
3. The purpose of this meeting was for the two presidents present, President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and the President Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo, Somaliland, to formally endorse the process of the talks between the two sides that were started in Chevening on 20-21 June.
4. Both parties agreed to the continuation of this dialogue, and agreed to allow the two committees, formed by the presidents, to continue the talks in order to clarify the relationship between the two sides.



H.E. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

President,
Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia



H.E. President Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo

President,
Somaliland

Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Appendix 2: Ankara Communiqué

Ankara Communiqué 13 April 2013

Following the meeting at Chevening House (UK) of June 20-21, 2012 and the Dubai (UAE) of June 28, 2012, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of the Somali Federal Republic and President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo of Somaliland Government met on 13 April 2013 in Ankara.

The meeting is hosted by the Government of Turkey at the request of the two parties.

The purpose of this meeting is to reopen the dialogue after the change in the leadership of the Somali Federal Republic, and to establish a way forward for the dialogue.

The two parties:

1. Expressed their commitment to the continuation of the Dialogue.
2. Endorsed the content of the Chevening house Declaration agreed on 21 June 2012, and the Dubai Statement signed on 28 June 2012.
3. Stated that the Dialogue is between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland. The international community that is supporting this process will only provide facilitation when is needed.
4. Agreed to encourage and facilitate International aid and development provided to Somaliland.
5. Agreed the need to consolidate a cooperation on security sector through sharing intelligence, training as well as sharing scholarships for security sector professionals in order to become more effective in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing toxic dumping, maritime crime and serious crime.
6. Proposed to meet within 90 days in Istanbul at a date later to be agreed by the parties.
7. Agreed to refrain from using any inflammatory language and any other act which may put the continuation of the Dialogue at risk.



H.E. Abdikarim H. Guled
Minister
The Federal Government of Somalia



H.E. Mohamed A. Omar
Minister
The Government of Somaliland

Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Appendix 3: Communiqué of the Somaliland and Somalia Dialogue

Communiqué of the Somaliland and Somalia dialogue held in Istanbul on 7-9 July 2013

In accordance with the framework agreements reached in Chevening, Dubai and Ankara, delegations from The Government of Somaliland and The Federal Government of Somalia met in Istanbul between 7 and 9 July 2013 with the assistance of the Turkish Government. In accordance with the agreements codified in the Ankara Communiqué of 13 April 2013, this round of the dialogue attempted to establish additional parameters to further clarify the relations between the two sides and gave a particular attention to issues that have arisen since the previous meeting.

Somalia and Somaliland:

1. Agreed to the return of the air traffic management from the the UN and decided to establish a joint control body that is based in Hargeisa to lead the air traffic control of both sides. It is also agreed that this body will propose a mechanism for equitable revenue-sharing.
2. Committed to the continuation of the talks.
3. The next meeting will be held in Turkey within 120 days.


**The Federal Government of
Somalia**
Abdikarim H Guled
Minister

**The Government of
Somaliland**
Mohamed A Omar
Minister



Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Appendix 4: Istanbul II Communiqué

ISTANBUL II COMMUNIQUE 18 January 2014

Document for the process of political dialogue between the Government of Somaliland and the Federal Government of the Somalia on future relations

In accordance with framework agreement reached in Chevening, Dubai, Ankara, and Istanbul I, delegations from the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland met in Istanbul between 16-19 January, 2014 with the assistance of Turkish Government.

I. DIALOGUE PROCESS DESIGN

Overall Framework

- i. This is a dialogue process between the Government of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia to reach agreement on future relations
- ii. The parties are committed to continuing their dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect.
- iii. The dialogue will focus on resolving future relations between the two entities.
- iv. The parties commit to resolving all problems and disputes in an exclusively peaceful manner.
- v. The parties agree to abide by commitments made in the Code of Conduct and Declaration of Principles.
- vi. The parties agree to work diligently and in good faith and to ensure full implementation of the agreements reached.
- vii. The parties recognise the crucial role that the government of Turkey is playing in promoting the dialogue.

II. Agenda and Substance

- i. The focus of the agenda will be the nature of future relations of the two parties.
- ii. The parties will agree to dialogue on other issues of mutual importance and necessity as the need arises.
- iii. The parties agree to set agendas in advance of each dialogue session.
- iv. The parties will review implementation status of issues that have previously been discussed or agreed upon.
- v. The parties agree to update each other on implementation progress with regards to past agreements at the start of each dialogue session.

III. Decision Making

- i. The parties will reach decisions by consensus between the negotiation teams.

- II. The negotiation teams of the parties will be guided by the inputs and decisions of their principals.
- III. Whereas further input and technical assistance is required, the parties jointly communicate their decisions to their hosting partner.
- IV. As necessary meeting of the principals may be called by the two negotiation teams or their agreed partner to resolve deadlock.
- V. A joint secretariat will be established in Turkey and its functions shall be following:
 - a. Ensure proper dialogue coordination;
 - b. Provide logistical, administrative and record keeping to support the process;
 - c. Support implementation of decisions reached by the negotiating parties.

IV. Sequencing considerations:

- i. The parties agree on the framework for the process of dialogue, declaration of principles and code of conduct and commonly agreed international facilitation, establishment of a secretariat in Turkey and select areas of cooperation based on need.
- ii. The framework for the process will establish a regular schedule of meetings of 90 days for the negotiation teams.
- iii. The heads of the two negotiation teams shall either communicate with each other or hold meeting in six weeks period for follow up purposes and in order to determine the agenda.
- iv. In between talks, the parties will agree on initial terms of reference, roles and composition of international facilitation to the process.
- v. In advance to any round of dialogue, the parties will develop a preliminary draft declaration on expected outcomes.

V. Participation

- A. The partners in the dialogue are the Government of Somaliland and the Federal Government of the Somalia, represented by their delegated negotiation teams.
- B. Appreciating the central role that Turkey has played in facilitating previous rounds of dialogue, and recognizing the support received from other international partners, the Parties will decide the scope of the desired continued support they might be in need to advance the process..
- C. The parties may seek jointly technical support from neutral and impartial expert organizations for legal advisory purpose.

VI. Implementation

- a. The parties agree that the negotiating entities are the immediate implementing authorities of whatever agreements maybe reached.

- b. Participation in this implementation process will be confined to the parties in dialogue.
- c. The parties will adopt decisions to insure timely and effective implementations of any agreed outcomes
- d. In order to ensure full implementation of agreements, the parties will develop implementation plans, including milestones and agreed oversight, for agreements reached. Progress on these plans will be monitored by the Turkey government

Code of Conduct:

The Parties agree to:


- 1. Open meetings by the reciting the holy Quran
- 2. Refrain from inflammatory statements and behavior that will impinge on the objectives and progress of the dialogue and avoid making public statements compromising or undermining the spirit of the negotiation..
- 3. Agree in advance on joint public statements relating to the dialogue.
- 4. Develop in advance the agenda for each session and adopt the agenda at the commencement of discussions.
- 5. Conduct the discussions in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding.
- 6. Respect and uphold the confidentiality of the process and correspondence between the two parties and discussions must be treated as strictly confidential by all involved parties and hosting partner.
- 7. Commit to peaceful relations and mutual respect and avoidance of all kinds of hostilities.


Declaration of Principles:

Both parties agree to the following principles:

- 1. The Parties will pursue dialogue towards agreed outcomes and approved the contents of previous agreements which are in the best interests of both parties.
- 2. The parties enter into the dialogue firmly committed to resolving issues and finding mutually acceptable outcomes.
- 3. The parties agree to act in accordance with the Code of Conduct and other agreements.
- 4. The parties will fully facilitate and jointly define areas of cooperation which can meet practical needs of both parties.
- 5. The parties make a firm commitment to the resolution of differences through exclusively peaceful means and dialogue.
- 6. The parties agree with Turkish Government to provide regular briefing to the international communities.

7. Referring to the Communiqué of the two parties Dialogue in Istanbul, Turkey on 7-9/July 2013. The parties agreed to nominate Air Traffic Control Board to establish within 45 days.
8. The parties agreed to appoint an ad-hoc technical committee composed of 4 members, (two from each party) to prepare the terms of reference of the Air Traffic Control Board. The Technical Committee work will be supervised by the respective two Ministers.
9. We share the pain inflicted upon the Somali people by the military regime in Somalia before the year 1991. We condemn all the atrocities committed by that regime throughout all Somali people particularly the people in Somaliland.


H.E. Abdikarin Hussein Guled
Minister
The Federal Government of Somalia


H.E. Mohamed Behi Yonis
Minister
The Government of Somaliland



Appendix 5: Communiqué of the Technical Committees Meeting

Communique of the Technical Committees Meeting

Meeting of the Technical Committees from Somalia and Somaliland, regarding Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Board of Management, held in Istanbul, Turkey, 31/03/2014 – 04/04/2014

Agreements:

1. The airspace F.I.R management to be returned to Somalis, latest by January 2015 and managed by a joint board.
2. The difference between parties regarding the terms of reference as to the function and the shape of the Management Board.
3. That the respective parties will consult to their higher authorities, Somalia and Somaliland, on the key issues discussed during the session; both supervising Ministers must attend the next Somalia-Somaliland talks in Istanbul whereby both parties are to come to agreement on airspace issues.



Said J. Ali Korshel

**Somali Minister of Transport and Civil
Aviation**



Mohamud Hashi Abdi

**Somaliland Minister of Civil Aviation and Air
Transport**

Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Appendix 6: Letter of Ethical Approval



RESEARCH AND ENTERPRISE SERVICES

21st August 2013

Pinar Akpinar
Emin Ali Pasa Cad
83/13
Bostanci
Istanbul
34744
Turkey

Dear Pinar,

Re: Turkey's multiple mediation attempts: An alternative mediator on the periphery?

Thank you for submitting your revised application for review.

I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel.

The following documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows:

Document	Version	Date
Application Form	1	05/08/13
Summary of Proposal	1	05/08/13
Letter of Invitation	1	05/08/13
Information Sheet	1	05/08/13
Consent Form	1	17/08/13
Consent Form for use of quotes	1	05/08/13

If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, you must notify the Ethical Review Panel via the ERP administrator at uso.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail.

If there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an 'application to amend study' form to the ERP administrator stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via <http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/>

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