

This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s.

"HENRY VII'S EXPEDITION TO FRANCE OF 1492:
A STUDY OF ITS FINANCING, ORGANISATION AND SUPPLY."

By IAN TANNER

M.A.

1988

AN ABSTRACT OF THE STUDY

The study of Henry VII's expedition is divided into six categories. The first examines the sources for 1492, for which unfortunately there are so few. The main source, William Cope's Account, gives us an insight of what was to follow later in the reign with regard to financial matters.

The second chapter traces the Expedition from the conception of the idea to its conclusion with the King and his army safely returned to England. Henry was well satisfied with the Treaty of Etaples, and with the savings from the Expedition's expenses.

Thirdly the study examines the Military and Naval forces involved. Both are difficult to assess, given on the one hand a missing section from the accounts, and on the other the problem of double entries in the account.

The problem of supplies forms the basis for the fourth chapter and reveals the depth of preparations and a surety that the troops would not suffer from the lack of any commodities.

The largest and singularly significant chapter deals with the finance. This is what most scholars have noted this expedition for and the fifth examines the debit and credit side of the accounts, their balance, and indicates the surplus that has been made so much of by so many!

The sixth chapter examines the level of support Henry VII received for the expedition, which sections of society were most behind his plans and to what extent were these the King's traditional supporters.

Whether this was a successful expedition is a question tackled in the conclusion, while the Appendices contain some interesting extracts from some of the main sources plus some other relevant information.

CONTENTS

	PAGE NO.
AN ABSTRACT OF THE STUDY	1
Chapter	
1. THE SOURCES FOR 1492: A SUMMARY AND BRIEF ANALYSIS.	3
2. THE EXPEDITION 1492: AN OUTLINE OF THE EVENTS FROM ITS CONCEPTION TO ITS CONCLUSION.	9
3. THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES INVOLVED IN 1492.	33
4. SUPPLY FOR THE ARMY	49
5. THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT: A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS?	59
6. THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT.	85
7. CONCLUSION.	102
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY.	108
9. CONCLUSION	113

CHAPTER ONE:

THE SOURCES FOR 1942: A SUMMARY AND BRIEF ANALYSIS

By 1492 the Anglicising process, accelerated by the Hundred Years War, has left the major proportion of sources for the expedition written in English. Many official documents such as Tellers' Rolls and Exchequer Receipts were written in Latin, but no significant details were to be found there. This has simplified the analysis, although English Court Hand of the late fifteenth century presents its own problems, some of which prove extremely difficult even for the experts. I am indebted to these experts, namely the officers of the Public Record Office, for their help and patience with me, especially considering the often untidy nature of some of the sources. My main indebtedness is to Margaret Condon at P.R.O. She has been especially responsible for the repair and recataloguing of many of the sources I found relevant for the expedition and she particularly helped in deciphering some of the more difficult passages. Her work continues; indeed during my research Miss Condon brought several documents to my attention, most notably 'Hatcliffe's Account'¹ and the 'Ordnances for the Invasion of France 1442'.²

The most valuable of all sources relevant to 1492 has undoubtedly been that found under Class E36 part 285. It is now contained in a large bound book, originally many gatherings, put together through the work of Miss Condon, and to which sections are occasionally being correctly inserted after recataloguing. This is the 'Account of William Cope, Deputy of Reynolde Bray, Treasurer of War'.³

NOTES

1. Public Record Office E36/208, The Account of W. Hatcliffe. All references to manuscript material are to documents in the Public Record Office. Hereafter, therefore, they are cited without the prefix P.R.O.
2. E/163/22/3/3; E163/22/3/15; E163/22/3/23 (colophm).
3. William Cope 1450-1513, a yeoman of the Crown 1485-95, M.P. for Ludgershall 1491-2. He received many appointments, both prior to and after the invasion. Cofferer of the Household 1495-1507 and Constable of Porchester June 1509.

It contains accounts of money appertaining to the 1492 expedition and is dated from 31 January 1492 to 31 January 1501, indicating the problems which the Benevolence Collectors found. All entries are by Cope and his sole responsibility is reinforced by the lack of entries signed, countersigned, annotated or in any way marked by Bray. It is incomplete, that is, there are two major omissions. The first falls within the section on Benevolence payments¹ and the second terminates the wages accounts abruptly before they are completed.² Here, in the second omission, a complete gathering of wages entries is estimated to be missing³ which could be as much as thirty two pages. More importantly these contain the sum totals, making analysis of the complete expeditionary army extremely difficult. Elsewhere the account is a detailed statement for numerous aspects of the expedition. It accounts for part of the financial income for the invasion and precisely how this sum of money was expended, the final account indicating a surplus which was removed to the King's Chamber.

The account lists, albeit incompletely; names of retinue leaders, numbers in their retinues, wages and in some cases distances travelled to reach the musters and ensuing travel expenses. Interestingly, the fleet necessary to ship the army to France is extensively detailed for English vessels, though not for the Dutch fleet engaged where only numbers are given.⁴

NOTES

- 1 E36/285, f14a, f14b. These contain only parts of a number of entries and more is still to be found.
- 2 E36/285, f50 the wages end abruptly in payment to William Middleton.
- 3 Miss M. Condon's estimate.
- 4 The details contained could form the basis of a study of English shipping c1492, entries include ship's name, musters or owners and ports of origin. Although exact vessel tonnage was not included there are details in Hatcliffe's Account E36/208. E36/285,f63-72.

The account contains extensive details of expenses for the Navy, both stores and wages, and some repair work.¹ Sections bear reference to 'Ordnance'² and the 'Kings Work'³ while supplies destined for the troops in France are listed under large global payments to individuals and groups such as John Dawtry, William Hatcliffe and the Merchants of the Staple.⁴ Significantly this account is in English, is readily decipherable and contains some remarkable information. So extensive is its coverage of the expedition that this source has formed the basis for this work.

Complementary to Cope's Account is one that was brought to my attention late in my research due to incorrect cataloguing. This is 'Hatcliffe's Account'.⁵ William Hatcliffe was the King's Avener, a 'muster roller' and a man with many other financial responsibilities during the expedition. His account is in Latin and contains numerous entries supplementing many of the omissions of Cope's Account. One instance of this is where Cope lists payments for shipping the force to France he fails to give details of vessel size and tonnage. Hatcliffe list many of the same ships used in the repassage of the army and some other duties, but includes their tonnage, the numbers of troops they carried (not in the repassage lists unfortunately) and the size of their crews. In the repassage lists he also names retinue captains on board returning to England and in so doing, confirms the participation of many to whom only allusions can be made through Cope or elsewhere.

NOTES

1. E36/285, F59-72
2. E36/285, f72
3. E36/285, f73
4. E36/285, f76
5. E36/208, The Account of William Hatcliffe and hereafter simply E36/208.

Consequently a more precise analysis of the expeditionary force can be attempted, yet its nature remains somewhat imprecise many details are still lacking.

Hatcliffe' Account contains interesting details of the composition of mercenary artillery batteries employed at the siege of Sluys, the victuals purchased to supply the army in France, and travel expenses and wages of some contingents not found in Cope, presumably contained within the missing gathering.

The third source which has been instrumental to the analysis is found in E101 Bundle 72 files 3, 5, and 6. These are the Indentures for War and Provision made between Henry and his subjects between 25 February 1492 and 12 August 1492. There are ninety-seven indentures to provide retinues and three to supply provisions. The retinue indentures indicate that a much smaller force was gathered than the wage account reveals, but there were probably other indentures which have not survived. However, they do give retinues not included in either Cope or Hatcliffe and assuming promises were kept, these can be used to augment the incomplete section in Cope.

One final comment needs to be made about sources available for 1492. A document survives which is of such a nature that it could not be included in detail in the final analysis. This is 'Ordnances for the Invasion of France 1492'.¹ Information contained within this document requires a wider analysis than this work sets out to cover. It is apparent from this document and from references to it in both the Indentures and the Statute relevant to the expedition, that Henry issued this Book of Ordnances to all his retinue captains. It contains rules

NOTES

1 E163/22/3/3; E163/22/3/15; E163/22/3/23 (colophm).

that were most prescriptive and were to be read to all troops and strictly enforced while on active duty during the campaign. To what degree Henry based the idea for such 'ordnances' upon earlier theories and enactments, such as Vegetius and Henry V's Rules, requires extensive research. Briefly, the Book of Ordnances contains twenty-nine pages of codes relating to the behaviour of troops in many situations; behaviour in camp, during enemy raids, the capture of hostages and division of the ransom, and the exclusion of all women from within a three mile radius of their camps. This book was printed between 17 October 1491 and the army's departure in October 1492 by Richard Pynson. Unfortunately time has taken its toll and it is in an imperfect condition, many pages being damaged or entirely lacking; more problematical, however, is that it has not been preserved in its original order, except the first and last pages. An attempt has been made to indicate its ordering,¹ but the writer's emphasis is on its being an early printed book rather than on its place within a history of war.

Mention has been made of this source, and an example given in the Appendix, as it was felt that the existence of such a unique document should be more widely known. Research into this document's origins would have required more than this work entailed and was therefore not attempted.

NOTE

1. D.E. Rhodes, 'The Statutes and Ordinances of War', The Library, 6th sc., iii, 340-3

CHAPTER TWO:

THE EXPEDITION OF 1492:
AN OUTLINE OF THE EVENTS FROM ITS CONCEPTION
TO ITS CONCLUSION.

Henry VII's expedition to France in 1492 is not the most well-known invasion of France during the latter Middle Ages, and is considerably overshadowed by that of his namesake seventy years previously. Henry VII could not have wished involvement in international affairs so early in his reign, with his own position only just secured. His diplomacy confirms this. The intention had been to secure Anne of Brittany's position without recourse to arms, or at least with only minimal English involvement. In April 1489, 6000 English archers had been despatched to Anne in the hope that they would dissuade any further French intervention. The Treaty of Medina de Campo one month earlier had seen the signing of an agreement supposedly to frighten the French off.¹ Yet, Henry had underestimated the parties involved. Maximilian was too involved elsewhere to be more than a 'proxy' ally, the Spanish only sent token aid, while Charles VIII was determined to bring the Breton Lamb into the French fold in spite of the English Lion and the Hapsburg Wolf. Anne herself was unable to resist the King's advances.

Even before Charles had pushed the matter beyond doubt and married Anne 'personally' in December 1491, Henry and his council had realised that diplomacy had failed and military action was needed. It was hoped that this would be joint Austrian, Spanish and English, with as little emphasis upon the English as Henry could possibly manage. In June 1491 the Great Council made their decision and authorised Henry to go to war with France and partly finance it with a Benevolence, the confirmation stating 'Ad instancium et specialem requisicionem tam dominorum spiritualium et temporalium quam aliorum nobilium'.²

NOTES

1. S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, 1972, p 80.
2. Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae...Ed., T. Rymer (2nd.edn., 20 vols., London, 1726-35), xii, p 466.

Henry's first action was towards collection of the money necessary to raise an army. On 7 July 1491 a commission was granted to many officials around England 'to go...and require the assistance of the King's subjects there in this arduous affair, each one according to his means.'¹ The request for a benevolence, although significant itself, gives the earliest documentary evidence of Henry's intention. He claimed the throne of France as 'Charles of France not only unjustly occupies the king's realm of France and his duchies of Normandy, Anjou, Touraine and Aquitaine.'² Henry also tried to involve a sense of fear of French invasion once Brittany was lost, stating Charles 'threatens the destruction of this his realm of England.'³ His full intention was 'to defend his English subjects and to enter France with a power and indicate his rights.'⁴ Henry probably hoped that this threat would be sufficient and the necessity for an invasion would not arise. The collection of finances continued and was to be fully documented, each commissioner had to record each individual payment and 'certify the King and Council what they do.'⁵ This level of documentation would appear excessive but was rigidly adhered to. Most of the country was to be visited and is confirmed upon inspection of the register of payments kept by William Cope in his accounts.⁶

Cope's register does not date each payment but the whole account was completed between 31 January 1492 and 31 January 1501. The amounts received vary considerably from group to group and within each group.

NOTES

1. C(alendar of) P(atent) R(olls) 1485-94 (1914) Vol.1.pp 353-355.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. E36/285/, f6-15. See also Appendix A and for comparison Appendix B which contains a selection from E36/285 f6-15.

Financial analysis is dealt with later, but it is interesting to note here that the country's distribution of wealth is clearly demonstrated. Winchester and London stand out, their Bishops paying £1500 and £666 respectively, the Prior of St. Swithin's in Winchester gave £333.6s.8d. while the Dean of St. Paul's gave £200.¹ In comparison Chester and Worcester were either poor or more reluctant to help. Their Bishops only gave £100. In total the clergy gave £5523.6s.8d. Of the Lords Temporal, unsurprisingly the King's mother, the Countess of Richmond, was most generous giving £666.13s.4d.² The Benevolence eventually totalled £48489.16s8d. and was necessary as the original Parliamentary grant was unable to raise sufficient funds to launch the invasion the King originally intended.

Parliament had been requested and had agreed to supply £100,000 to pay for the maintenance of 10,000 archers for one year. It was apparent by October 1491 that the earlier grants had not succeeded in raising this sum. The fourth Parliament of the reign meeting on Monday 17 October agreed to raise £75000 through a further tenth and fifteenth. The final £25000 was agreed by the Convocation of Canterbury.

This Parliament did not only consider the financial side of the invasion. A number of laws pertaining to the collection of the army were passed. Concern was shown that the nobles would supply only the best troops and all were to be fully equipped.³ Reference to the troops' behaviour and the duty of both his captains and soldiers while engaged during the campaign was also made. Notwithstanding this, Henry ordered the printing of a book which contained all the regulations and

NOTES

1. E36/285, f6 also Appendix B.
2. E36/285, f7.
3. The Statutes at Large, 1763, ed., Robert Banket, Henry Woodfall, William Straham, p 80-81.

more, instructing they were to be read to and familiarized by all his troops. These regulations were despatched to the printer Richard Pynson on the same day as the fourth Parliament opened, no time was to be wasted. They were considerable and survive in sufficient detail to give a clear picture of the King's code of behaviour and a selection have been reproduced in the appendix for the reader.¹

These preparations were intended to force Charles VIII to back down, but had quite the opposite effect. Charles married Anne, in person, 6 December 1491, seemingly sealing the matter. Henry was now in a quandary, he had promised Anne and Brittany their liberty and now both were apparently lost. Henry also did not know how far Maximilian would go to keep his side of the agreement and assumed both he, and presumably Spain, would be prepared to fight. In 1491 this was probably what their respective Ambassadors led him to believe. Preparations continued accordingly, the intention to cross the channel and force the issue in person being made widely known. Deep down Henry probably secretly hoped his allies would take some action of their own which would save him the trouble. Henry found his requests for such action were only met with promises and later excuses.

Henry had cast the die; preparation continued and the invasion set for late May or early June. This early invasion date is confirmed through commissions issued early in 1492 for collection and manufacture of military supplies. On 20 January 1492 James Hede was issued with a writ, by Henry personally, to take 'houses, land, vessels, wood, coals and other fuel, and also artificers, labourers, and workmen for the making of saltpetre for the King's ordnance.'² Guns had become import-

NOTES

1. E163 22/3/3 & see Appendix E.
2. C.P.R. 1485-1495. Vol.1, p 395

ant and a siege train would play an important role in Henry's plans. Transport was not neglected either. It was as significant in the late fifteenth century as it is today. On 24 February 1492 Henry issued numerous commissions for the provision of 'charyat horse...sumpter horses... draught horses and labourers and carters for transport of the King's ordnance.¹

February was a period of intense activity at Westminster. Supplies and transport were two aspects of the army. The intention to have 3000 mounted troops, either knights, demilancers or mounted archers would require sizable quantities of special supplies. On 24 February Thomas Woodrow, clerk of the King's ordnance, and Richard Bright, purveyor of the avenary² and livery of the King's horses, received a special commission. They were to proceed to Southampton, the intended port of departure, and there buy 'liveries, hay...litter...provender...Carts of barrels and nets...slynges...and briggs...sycles...and sithes.'³ It would take time for such a large force to muster so such stables and local supplies would have been necessary. The nets, slings and bridges indicate the physical problem associated with loading animals on board ship with the minimal amount of fuss and harm to them. 'Sycles and sithes' reinforces the May date, French hay would be ready to harvest and would solve the problem of taking such supplies with them.

NOTES

1. Ibid. pp 394-395. Yet these commissions were only for the Midland and Southern counties, issued by pairs of counties to groups of three individuals, for example; Richard Slyhurst, John Wytton and Robert Cotis for the counties of Oxford and Berkshire.
2. The avenary was the stable.
3. C.P.R. 1485-94 Vol.1, p396.

The May invasion plans are further supported by four other references. William Cope accounts for a payment to John French, yeoman of the crown, for retaining ships in the counties of Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincoln for the King's navy on 10 February 1492.¹

William Paston, in his letter to Sir John Paston, observed that the King's preparations were well under way, the King was daily gathering supplies and ordnance on the coast and that the whole expedition 'Wol be goyng sone upon Easter.'² The letter was dated 18 February 1492. The haste is further attested to as William mentioned he would be buying all his equipment in Calais, he had no time to do so in England.

The indenting of supply further supports the May invasion date. Edward Newchurch, a pewterer of London, was contracted to supply three pipes of wheat flour, fifteen pipes of beer, one pipe of beef for the Royal Army when it left the country on 20 May.³ This indenture was signed on 25 February and is a clear statement of intent. A second indenture reinforces this. William Attlayn, John Prowde and John Lappe, Haberdasher of London, also contracted to supply provisions for 20 May, signing their agreement on 16 March.⁴

Final confirmation for an invasion during late May, or even early June, are the Indentures with the nobility, knights and squires to provide troops for the army. All troops musters were to be taken between 24 May and 20 June, the majority, 72 out of 88, falling within the period 1 June and 9 June. These indentures are signed between 6

NOTES

1. E36/285/, f62. For this he received £6.13s.4d.
2. The Paston Letters, vol.6, pl43, ed. J. Gairdner, (1910).
3. E101/72/3 No 1.
4. E101/72/3 No 5.

March 1492 and 10 June 1492.¹

Henry's intention was an invasion in May, but doubts had begun to creep into his mind from the middle of May onwards. The indentures themselves help foster this impression as 25 were not dated. Yet May was the original intention and Southampton the port to launch it from. Woodrove and Bright were to arrange supplies there, 39 indentures state Winchester for their muster, but five state Portsmouth. It is most probable that both would have been necessary to launch such a large force. Portsmouth is referred to in other references. Commissions refer to equipment and stores destined for Portsmouth while additional docking facilities were needed to make this possible and for the future increase in the Royal Navy. William Cope registers the account of Robert Brickesdon, King's shipwright, ordered by Reynolde Bray to build a dock at Portsmouth for the King's ships.²

At what point May had become an impossible date for the invasion is difficult to decide. Circumstances had changed and news of them came from Christopher Urswick, Dean of York, and Sir John Risely. These had been sent to Maximilian's court to liaise with the Emperor, inform him of Henry's plans and request Maximilian's own plans. They sent Henry news he least wanted to hear. Henry's court had been a hive of activity, as has been shown, and Urswick and Risely would have expected similar at Maximilian's. When they arrived in Flanders 'they reported

NOTES

1. E101/72/3, 4, 5 and 6. Only one is dated 10 June; Thomas Darcy and he agreed to bring his troops to Winchester the previous day, 9 June 1492!
2. E36/285, f78. The work also included 'doing something to the Sovereign' and he was paid £241.13s.4d. Robert also built a beer house and a tower and blockhouse at Portsmouth for a total payment of £2099.16s.4d. f73. Professor Mackie has stated that three breweries were built at Portsmouth and this is confirmation of at least one. The Earlier Tudors 1485-1558 (Oxford 1952) p107.

that Maximilian was...unprepared to undertake operations and that consequently the King should not rely upon Maximilian's assistance.¹ It is difficult to date when Henry received this news, but clues do exist. Most indentures are dated up to 21 May 1492, while 25 have no date so this information must have arrived on or soon after this date.

This news would have shocked and angered Henry, but he probably expected something of the sort given earlier excuses. He was now in a trap. Maximilian's inability to fulfil his promises meant Henry could not successfully invade in May. Alternatively to back down would damage his own precarious position. Much of the money had been collected and was in the treasury with a second tenth and fifteenth due on St. Martin's, 11 November 1492. If the invasion was abandoned Henry could expect to be accused of defrauding people and never really countenancing the invasion. Henry would lose face and English pride would be mocked. Additionally there were those who might capitalise on a decline in the King's popularity. Perkin Warbeck was beginning to gain notoriety in foreign courts and there were those who would risk anything to replace the House of Tudor with the House of York. In fact between late 1491 and early 1492 Warbeck was in Ireland attempting to stir rebellion at the precise instigation of Charles VIII.

Henry kept this news secret, only a handful of his closest advisers would have been privy to the information. Operations had to be slowed down unobtrusively and indicative of this Henry moved his court to Shene during May. On 7 May the Keeper of the Privy Purse paid £12.5s.6d. for 'sphere, spherehedes and vanplates'² for the King's

NOTES

1. The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil 1485-1537, ed. D. Hay, Camden Society, 3rd Ser., LXXIV1, (1950), p53.
2. Excerpta Historica, ed. S. Bentley, (London, 1833), p85.

personal armour while at Shene during May. On 8 May Gilwyn Ap Rice appeared at Shene with a number of horses and was paid £47.6s.8d. for them¹ while on the same day Henry bought a new sword case and new harp case for James Hides.² Henry did not remain at Shene all the time. He travelled back to Westminster when the occasion demanded to keep up the outward appearance that preparations were still under way. On 9 May he issued a commission to John Gervys to gather a group of carpenters and buy timber for the invasion,³ while on the same day Henry indicated his intention to dramatically increase the size of his invasion army and at the same time delay its departure. Two new officials were despatched to either reinforce or replace John French's earlier work in retaining ships. Anthony Legs and Henry Broke visited the same areas as French, but added to them the county of York.⁴ With this evidence one can work out when Henry planned his new invasion. If French needed four months to gather ships in time for May or June then so too would Legs and Broke, indicating an invasion in late September, early October. This confirms the dramatic change in plans in May.

Henry spent some time at Shene, probably over the despatches from Urswick and Risely, not perhaps with the same 'fear and despair' that Vergil attributed to him.⁵ Here in greater privacy he could discuss the

NOTES

1. E36/285, f74
2. Excerpta Historica, p85.
3. C.P.R. 1485-1494. Vol.1., p397.
4. E36/285, f62.
5. Angelica Historia p54.

situation with his councillors, probably Morton, Bray, Daubeney, Lovell and Robert Guildford. Here also discussion most likely took place to increase the army, and equip a force to send to Sluys, perhaps hoping that Maximilian might take some action if Henry helped him in some way. A second expeditionary force was subsequently ordered, fitted out and sent against the pirates at Sluys. These were a problem for both Maximilian and any seafaring nation such as England, and the Emperor had been unsuccessfully attempting to reduce their stronghold. Sluys had been taken by Philip Mounsure, Count of Ravenstein, leader of the Hooks, turned into a base for the pirates and filled with Danish mercenaries. Trying to dislodge them had been a steady drain on the Emperor's reserves. During the summer of 1492, Ravenstein was leading a staunch resistance to Maximilian's general, Albert of Saxony, and Henry decided to send a small fleet and army, led by Sir Edward Poynings, to help in the siege. Hall in his chronicle mistakenly puts the departure of this force in Henry's sixth year; more conclusive evidence is found in Cope. Under the section of payments to 'John Underdale captain of 12 ships sent to Scluse' we discover Poynings and the company were paid wages and travel expenses for arriving between 13 July and 25 July 1492.¹ After gathering in London during that period it was marched to Sandwich where it took ship for the siege. Poynings was commander and Sir John Turbervill, treasurer of the town and marches of Calais, was in charge of finance and supplies. Turbervill received £2000 from Thomas Warley for wages and a further £141.6s.8d. for 1885 Jagnettes for the troops.²

NOTES

1. E36/285, f74-75.
2. Ibid. A jagnette was a type of quilted jacket, perhaps reinforced with plates of metal, for protection for archers.

This indicates that the size of the force was at least 1885 troops, but more likely nearer 2500 troops.

Poynings' force acquitted itself well, it helped in the fall of the castle of Sluys in October. Most probably it arrived in August when Albert of Saxony and Poynings spent some time in discussion as to the best utilisation of the fresh troops and the English fleet. The plan decided on had the English fleet and troops attacking Sluys from the seaward side; the Germans attacked by land.¹ Hall's account describes the harbour protected by castles on either side of the river mouth, joined by a bridge of boats. The assault began 24 September and took twenty days; during this time Sir George de Vere, brother of the Earl of Oxford, and fifty other Englishmen were killed. The lesser of the two harbour castles was heavily assaulted and the boat bridge fired by Poynings' men. Such losses made it impossible for Philip Mounsure to hold out, yielding soon after to Poynings. Hall states that Poynings remained at Sluys for some time, yet Cope's accounts do not agree. Payments of wages and travel expenses were paid to Poynings from as early as 11 October 1492, but the siege only officially ended 15 October 1492. The majority of Poynings' force joined up with Henry outside Bolougne on 22 October with Poynings arriving on 23 October.²

Among Henry's preparations he had to safeguard the realm during his absence. A regency council was necessary, Prince Arthur was too young to be left otherwise. Henry VII's council registers are lost

NOTES

1. Edward Hall, Chronicle containing the History of England, Ed., H. Ellis, (London, 1809), p452.
2. E36/285, f26-37. Two archers of Sir Sampson Norton's retinue at Sluys arrived and were paid separately in the accounts from 11 October. Probably they brought messages of the impending fall of Sluys.

except for a worn parchment which has been traced to this period.¹ It does not bear date or direction, yet its references clearly put it in 1491-2, certainly no later than August 1492.² This ordinance created Arthur's regency council for the preservation of peace and justice, yet it also contains a justification for the invasion and propaganda against the 'great tirany of France'. Who were members of this council remains unknown and only speculation is possible. M. Condon speculates upon fifteen, possibly including the chancellor, John Morton, the treasurer John, Lord Dynham and perhaps Jasper duke of Bedford, the King's uncle.³ Reference to Prince Arthur and his councillors was made on 5 May 1491, but this was too early to refer to a specific council set up for the King's absence.⁴ It was not until 2 August 1492 that the King made the normal proclamation concerning the defence of the realm during his absence.⁵ This ordered the Sheriff of Kent, Mayor of Canterbury, Philip Lewes, Lieutenant of Dover Castle and the Cinque Ports to be prepared in the event of a French raid during the King's absence.⁶

During the latter stage of preparations Henry was most likely agitated, nervously ensuring all was ready. He was clearly restless and mobile. On 2 August he was in Canterbury, probably having seen the troops for Sluys leave earlier from Sandwich. On 12 August, possibly back at Westminster, he issued another indenture of supply to John

NOTES

1. C.82/329/53 as quoted by M. Condon in 'An Anachronism with intent' Henry VIII's Council ordinance of 1491-92', (Unpublished paper).
2. Ibid, Miss Condon shows this through the King's sign manual, his first rather than his second which he adopted inconsistently from 18 July and exclusively from 28 August 1492.
3. Ibid, The evidence for Bedford remaining in England is not conclusive. He did not sign the petition for peace, and his retinue was led by his squire, Owen Ap Janken, E30/612, f45.
4. C.P.R. 1485-1494, Vol.1.pp356-8.
5. Ibid, p400.
6. Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol.1 The Early Tudors 1485-1553 pp30-31, ed. P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin, C.S.V. 1964. Such an order required a search for all able bodied men to be registered together with the equipment they could furnish and the list dispatched to the King.

Warne, a buterer of Calais.¹

On 28 August the King was at Greenwich where he received his new 'hede peces' from John Shaw the King's Goldsmith.² On 24 August Henry was back at Westminster issuing commissions for more transport horses, this time in counties not previously covered.³

With preparations under way the court moved closer to the port of departure, changed by August from Portsmouth or Southampton to Sandwich, important in its proximity to France with the advancing season. On 7 September Henry was at Maidstone, but for most of the month he based himself at Canterbury.

Preparations for the invasion had taken nearly a year, the date had been postponed at least once and the actual crossing of the channel was to take in total nearly a month. From 4 September regular shipments of supplies and ordnance were made to Calais from various English ports, notably Southampton where much of it had been stockpiled.⁴ Kent had become the centre of operations during the autumn 1492; ships arrived from 2 September, the King's 'beofe and multons'⁵ arrived from Buckingham and other places in the South of England. The first troops to arrive were of the retinue of Sir Maurice Berkeley, 13 September at Canterbury, having travelled 150 miles from Grantham. The remainder of the army gathered either at Canterbury or mustered directly at Sandwich during the last two weeks of September. Only a small number of retinues

NOTES

1. E101/72/6 No.18. John Warne agreed to supply 3 lasts of flour, 20m pipes of beer, 20 quarts of oats, ten weyes of cheese, and ten pipes of beef.
2. E36/285, f74. These were expensive items decorated in 'golde, perle and stone' and cost the sum of £1970.7s.9d.
3. C.P.R. 1485-94. Vol.1. p404.
4. E36/285, f56, p56 & p61. John Solen shipped 6 tonnes of wine and 2 buttes of salt on the 4th September, '3 charottes' on 7 September. John Dawtreys shipped ordnance 8 September.
5. Ibid, f54, p54. Multons were whole sheep for eating.

arrived late, that is in early October, most notable amongst these being Robert Willoughby Lord Broke, steward of the King's House, who arrived by 1 October.¹

While overseeing preparations Henry issued two special licences, unusual in that considering their nature there were only two. On 14 September Charles Somerset, captain of the King's guard, was allowed to alienate a number of manors, without paying a fine to the crown, during his time abroad with the King. The second on 20 September allowed William More, a King's sergeant at arms, to stay in England with John Morton, the Archbishop of Canterbury, without paying the fines as prescribed by Act of Parliament.²

Final preparations were made during the last week of September. On 23 September Robert Willoughby de Broke, was made Marshal of the Army in his absence. Supplies had been underestimated; between 24 and 30 September a further five merchants were licenced to 'purvey victuals' for the army.³ The increased army must have increased beyond the councillors' expectations.

By October all was ready, or almost all. Two items remained; a favourable wind, something outside Henry's control; and the licence giving Prince Arthur authority while the King was abroad. The council ordinance establishing the regency has been mentioned, yet this was only empowered through a special licence. This was not issued until the last moment which was on 2 October. Arthur's duties were specifically outlined beginning with his religious duties; 'to grant licences to elect to conventual, but not Cathedral Chapters... to receive fealties

NOTES

1. Ibid, f21.
2. C.P.R., 1485-94. Vol.1, p405. The Statutes at Large, p80-81.
3. C.P.R., 1485-94. Vol.1, p415. John Taillow of Satflete Haryn, Co.Lincoln; 27 September; 27 September Nicholas Dyker and John Mathen; 30 September John Hammond and Thomas Freyr.

or election of minor prelates, but not....greater prelates, without the King's command.' Arthur was made Keeper of England and Henry's Lieutenant, and given the power to appoint a 'fitting person to hold the pleas of Marshalsea.'¹ Considerable though these duties were, for a boy of six, they were only theoretical. His presence would be required for observation and education into the art of kingship, but the licence was in effect only a limit upon the powers of the regency council. The council ordinance confirms this by only concerning itself with the upholding of justice and with the dispensation of patronage. Henry was clearly not prepared, even in this instance, to delegate any of his prerogative powers and it is doubtful whether Arthur's council was ever intended to exercise major administrative duties,²

The army and fleet which gathered at Sandwich will be discussed in detail later. Suffice to say, the fleet consisted of the Sovereign and Regent, approximately 335 Dutch ships and 300 English ships. Legs, Broke and French had executed their tasks well, while Sir Richard Nanfan and Philip Loker were responsible for the Dutch Hoyes.³ A fuller discussion of the army will be made later; it was by my reckoning in excess of 14000 troops, the largest army to have left England in the fifteenth century.

The date of Henry's departure causes debate. Power was handed over to Arthur and his council on 2 October 1492 and from 9 October to 15 december 1492 all entries on the Patent Rolls were attested by the young Prince of Wales.⁴ The Privy Purse expenses put Henry in Calais at 11 o'clock 2 October, having crossed the channel in a vessel called

NOTES

1. Ibid, pp407-8.
2. M. Condon's paper on Council Ordinance.
3. E36/285, f59 & f78.
4. C.P.R. 1425-94 Vol.1, pp401-402.

the Swan.¹ Yet, if we believe Vergil and John Stowe² (who used Vergil extensively), Henry had been in France since 6 September, this must be a simple confusion of months. The Chronicle of Calais agrees with 2 October³ while Hall and the Chronicle of London prefer 6 October. My preference is 2 October with Henry arriving in Calais at 11 p.m. The crossing appears to have been peaceful and pleasant; minstrels and Deigo the Spanish fool entertained the King suitably; they were rewarded with 13s.4d. and 6s.8d. respectively. Even the sailors were rewarded, receiving £6.13s.4d., while the boat crew who rowed the King ashore received 40 shillings.⁴ Henry was well pleased when he landed in Calais; so far the omens appeared in his favour.

The main body of the army took much more time to cross. The first two weeks of October saw considerable fleet activity. During this time, in the safe confines of the Marches of Calais, Henry arrayed his order of battle and sent out scouting parties to watch for the French. Henry need not have worried, Charles VIII apparently had not expected Henry to invade despite all the arrangements to the contrary. While Henry was at Calais, Urswick and Risely returned from their mission. It became plain to all that Maximilian would give no assistance. This, according to Vergil, did not shake the English in the least, it strengthened their resolve, but surprised them that Maximilian 'could remain passive'.⁵ It is doubtful whether the English were as resolute as Vergil states, but

NOTES

1. Excerpta Historica op cit, p85.
2. Annales, or a General Chronicle of England (1631). John Stowe, p476.
3. The Chronicle of Calais in The Reign of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the Year 1540, ed. J.C. Nichols, Camden Series (1144), p2.
4. Excerpta Historica, Op cit, p85.
5. Anglica Historia, p55.

their morale probably improved considerably when the news from Sluys arrived. The port did not fall until 13 October but the situation had been grave days earlier and some of Poynings' men arrived in Calais from 11 October onwards.¹

Charles VIII had not been prepared to take any military action against Henry. He was too embroiled with the prospect of Italy and so was contented with simply ordering all towns to defend themselves. His main initiative was diplomacy. Philippe de Querdes, governor of Artois,² was despatched to Calais with instructions to make a peaceful settlement. Vergil states that this was before Henry crossed the channel; Hall agrees (unsurprisingly), but the Chronicle of Calais states the meeting did not take place until Henry actually laid siege to Boulogne. Philippe des Querdes was met by Giles Lord Daubeney and later joined by Richard, Bishop of Exeter. If des Querdes had only arrived when the siege had begun (18 October according to the Privy Purse, 19 October by Stowe, 23 October in the Chronicle of Calais) then the terms were concluded very speedily by 27 October when Henry showed his army the memorial purporting to be a request from his captains and councillors advising him to accept the peace terms offered through des Querdes.³ Henry probably used this document to smooth the way for the eventual announcement of peace. For this to be so, some activity had clearly taken place between Charles and Henry before the latter had crossed the channel. This document does not read as one drawn up in a short space of time, and while on march in enemy territory.

NOTES

1. See n.2 p20.
2. Philippe de Creveccour, Seigneur des Querdes et Lancy, Marshal of France, Lieutenant and Captain General in Artois and Picardy Foedera, p497.
3. E30/612, printed, with a severely truncated and bowdlerized list of signatories in Foedera, XII 490-4. The signatures are badly galled and sometimes illegible, so that it is difficult to be precise about numbers.

Despite the distinct probability that negotiations for peace were well under way, the forward battle still left Calais before 14 October. It attacked the town of Ardes on the border between the March of Calais and France. This 'Betinge downe of the towne of Ardes'¹ cannot have been difficult as the battle commanders met up with Henry and the main army at the small village of Margyson (or Margeson)² on 15 October, Henry had spent the previous night at Sandy fields (or Saunderford). The forward battle had been led by the Earl of Oxford, together with an impressive array of nobles.

Morale must have been high, first the victory at Sluys and now a victory at Ardes. On 16 October both the forward and the King's wards marched in four columns to Wimelle,³ a town only four miles from Boulogne and fitting in with the average marching rate for an army of this period: 5 miles a day. The rate of only four to five miles a day appears rather slow, but was not considering the ordnance, siege train and supplies being moved; the lateness of the season hampering progress; and the tentativeness of moving in enemy territory.

By 18 October Boulogne was under siege, engines and bombards placed in position. The siege, however, was not to be a great victory for the English. Firstly, the town was 'a very strong place, contrary to all expectations' as Henry informed the Pope later on.⁴ If the

NOTES

1. The Chronicle of Calais, op cit, p2.
2. Ibid, p2. All the details of Henry's movements are taken from this source, but for the dates my preference lies with the Privy Purse account in Excerpta Historia, p85, and John Stowe's account op cit., p476. The names are from the Chronicle, those in brackets are alternative spellings from the Privy Purse or Stowe.
3. The Privy Purse account disagrees with this time scale. It puts the army at Brytenvyle on 17 October and at a village called Wimelle half a mile from Boulogne on 18 October. Excerpta Historia, p91. Stowe agrees with the Chronicle, stating that after the night at Wimelle the next night was spent outside Boulogne, Annales, p476. There is a small French town of Willmille only four miles from Boulogne and would appear to be the town the army occupied on 17 October.

for the English. Firstly, the town was 'a very strong place, contrary to all expectations' as Henry informed the Pope later on.¹ If the memorial from the captains was not prewritten then they too were surprised by the strength of the town. These captains, including the earls of Dorset, Oxford, Shrewsbury, Kent, Essex and Devon, stated that Boulogne was only supposed to be feebly defended and should have been taken 'within three or four daies at farthest',² In spite of this as Henry's intention had been known 'by the space of yer holle and moore',³ the town had been heavily fortified. The depth of fortification was surprising. Boulogne was reported to have 'doble minaylys, countermines, castellis, Towns Bulwerkis, dry Deches and watred',⁴ well provisioned and garrisoned with large numbers of 'gunners, gunpowdre with shot for the same, with all maner of Artillerie, Capitainyas, and men of Warre, the best of Fraunce furnysshed and preparid'.⁵ An undoubted bastion and one which would have proved difficult to take, to such an extent that the English declared it 'one of the strongest Townes of Picardie'.⁶ Despite the impressive nature of Boulogne's defences it was daily assaulted by the siege train, yet Hall states this only 'defaced the Walles' and no breaches are recorded.

If all the rules and regulations Henry ordered in his Ordinances were adhered to, life in the English camp was probably dull during the siege. The men's only encouragement was the prospect of booty when the town fell, although it could not have been accomplished without 'greater damage to the realm of England'.⁷ Feelings in the English camp probably

NOTES

1. Calendar of the State Papers and Manuscripts Venetian; 1202-1509, ed., Rawden Brown, G. Cavendish Bentinck and Horatio F. Brown Vol.1, p214.
2. Foedera, xii, p490.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

changed dramatically to those of surprise, shock and anger when the rumours of peace spread. This rumour had been rife before Henry left England and the memorial of 1 November added substance. When peace was declared the anger and sense of loss became volatile. Hall describes the men in 'great fumes, angry, and evil content, rayling and murmurings amongst themselves' while many claimed Henry had sought peace through fear. The nobles were also greatly aggrieved, hoping to win their spurs; many had borrowed large sums of money and 'sore grudged and lamented this sodeyne peace'.¹

The Treaty Henry agreed to is well known. The Treaty of Etaples gave Henry 745,000 gold crowns at the rate of 52,000 crowns a year. According to the Privy Purse the peace was cried on Sunday 4 November. Stowe and the Chronicle of Calais state that the siege continued until 8 November. The Lord Mayor of London received news of the Peace Treaty on 9 November announcing it to the aldermen in the Guildhall on the same day.² It is possible the document was signed on 3 November, the generally accepted date, but was not announced to the whole army until 4 November. It then took until 8 November for all operations to cease and troops to be removed from the vicinity of Boulogne.

Henry viewed the expedition as a success. There had not been a major English victory, but neither had there been a great loss of life. The only recorded casualty was Sir John Savage and that was through his own stupidity, or bravery. During a daily ride inspecting the defences, he and Sir John Risely rode too close to the town and were ambushed. Hall and Vergil state he was captured but 'being inflamed with yre'³ he

NOTES

1. Hall, op.cit., pp457, 458.
2. Ibid, p459.
3. Ibid.

refused to surrender although heavily outnumbered. He fought to his death, his action though, created a diversion sufficient for Risely to get away 'on a most speedy horse'.¹ Another knight killed was Sir Thomas Milbone in uncertain circumstances. It was early on in the campaign. The wages of his retinue, a demilancer and twenty-four archers,² were all paid to the demilancer from 12 October until 7 December. Other losses appear only minimal, no more than twenty, judging from reductions in the wages bills in Cope's account.³

Henry could claim to have been more successful than Edward IV. He had invaded France during the worst part of the campaigning season, whereas Edward went during the height of summer. Henry captured four towns, including Ardes and Mountorye, Edward none. Henry marched twenty miles into French territory and 'made daily war against the French'⁴ all without allies. Edward was supported by the Dukes of Burgundy and Brittany and the towns of Picardy as far as the Somme. More remarkably Henry achieved this in only twenty-four days, Edward had taken fifty-six.

These were the successes Henry claimed. He could not claim achievement in his main goal, the relief of Brittany. He had failed there, even before he had begun. What had been at stake was firstly English pride and secondly, perhaps more importantly, his own position.

NOTES

1. Anglica Historia, p59
2. E36/285, f32. These were considerably less than he had promised. In his Indenture, E101/72/3 no. 21 he promised 1 spear, 1 demilancer, 305 archers and 60 others.
3. E36/285, These were 1 spear, 3 demilancers, 2 Yeomen and 14 Archers. The bulk of the losses were 13 archers from Poynings' force after they arrived. Evidently his experienced troops took the brunt of any action.
4. Foedera, XII, p4691.

The first was not fully satisfied. English troops had not been put to the test, much to their personal annoyance. With the latter Henry did have some success. As part of the Treaty of Etaples, Charles VIII accepted Henry as King of England and promised not to give any assistance to foreign pretenders, a reference to Perkin Warbeck. This in itself was a significant coup for the House of Tudor.

Henry did not return to England as quickly as one would have expected. He was back in Calais 7 November, according to the Privy Purse, or 12 November if one prefers the Chronicle of Calais. On 10 November he made a short trip to Genes (Guines) and returned on 11 November. Probably this visit was for a final meeting with Philippe des Querdes; who, following the English withdrawal, had moved north from Etaples.¹

Henry returned to England 17 December,² although the Chronicle of Calais states 27 November, and Vergil and Hall put it as late as early 1493. The letter from the King to the Pope dated 12 December 1492 was written at Calais and exposes the date in the Chronicle of Calais. John Shirley was back in London 13 December buying £60 of food for the 'King's diette'.³ Other of the 'King's Stuffe' was freighted back to England from 16 December and we can assume Henry left near that time. Henry was certainly in London before Christmas, according to Fabyan and the Chronicle of London. On Saturday 22 December Henry rode into London in triumph accompanied by the Mayor and Aldermen. They had met the

NOTES

1. Further evidence for this is found in Cope. 10 November John Shirley, Clerk of the King's kitchen, a person not likely to be far from the King, bought £20 of food for the 'King's diette' in Calais. E36/285, f57.
2. Fabyan, New Chronicles of England and France, ed. H. Ellis, (1811), p684.
3. E36/285, f57.

King at Blackheath and, dressed in scarlet, these officials had led him through streets of rapturous crowds of commoners, dressed in violet, to the thanksgiving service at St. Paul's. An obviously stage-managed event, with which Henry, no doubt, was delighted.

Only the repassage of his army remained. This appears to have been carried out without mishap, considering the season. The main body was back in England and paid off by the middle of December 1492. The problem of numbers meant some did not return until January 1493. Henry by then had moved to Greenwich, there no doubt, he pondered over the terms of the treaty and how he was to get Parliament to ratify it.

The expedition of 1492 was not one that would be used to inspire the hearts of Englishmen in the future, such as those of Crecy and Agincourt could do. Despite this, it was not a failure. Henry had his pension from the King of France, and he made a profit from his expenses. Henry could be well satisfied, he was secure in his position; in fact he had made it appear even more secure, with the knowledge of Charles' recognition and that Perkin Warbeck was no longer welcome. We must not underestimate Warbeck's threat in 1492; on the basis of later events, it was very real in that year and had events progressed differently, Henry could have faced a more serious invasion and rebellion of his own much sooner than he did.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES INVOLVED IN 1492

Analysts of English invasion armies of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are fortunate in the quality of available information. The armies of 1417 and 1475 are fully documented. For 1492 we are not so fortunate. The ravages of time have left only fragments. Changes in accounting procedures meant the Tellers' Rolls were not used as in previous reigns. In 1492, although the tellers themselves were used, all accounting went through the office of the Treasurer for War, Reynold Bray, but were documented by his deputy William Cope.¹ Unfortunately, incomplete as this source is, we are forced to make several assumptions with regard to the actual size of Henry's army: I will attempt to show how such assumptions can be made.

Cope accounts for the wages and travelling expenses of 117 retinue captains, 1218 men-at-arms and 6658 archers.² These figures we can supplement with the account of William Hatcliffe,³ a teller, whose payments would eventually have been included in Cope and may indeed be contained within the missing gathering. Hatcliffe was responsible, together with many other tellers, for the actual payments, yet his account is the only known survivor. With a little duplication he accounts for a further 18 previously unaccounted retinue captains, 33 men-at-arms and 502 archers. This amounts to a total of 135 retinue captains, 1251 men-at-arms and 7160 archers, considerable though it was, but well short of the various estimates made for Henry's army. These have varied from 12,680 troops including 3200 horse⁴ to 26000 troops.⁵

NOTES

1. E36/285.
2. Ibid., f18-50 ending abruptly in the account of William Middleton.
3. E36/208.
4. M. Van Cleeve Alexander, The First of the Tudors (1981), p102.
5. P.B. Wernham, Before the Armada (1966), p36; J.A. Williams, The Tudor Age (1979), p35.

Vergil and Hall state Henry 'assembled an enormous army',¹ but what was meant by 'enormous'? Was it 12,000 or 26,000? Examination of typical Hundred Years War forces which fought at Crecy, Poitier and Agincourt, and Edward IV's army of 1475, results in considerable variation, 15,000, 6000, 10000 and 12000 respectively; only two were classified as 'enormous'; Edward III's at Crecy and Edward IV's of 1475. Assuming Vergil had information concerning the size of earlier invasion armies, especially that of 1475, he might have used these for comparison. Consequently, Cope and Hatcliffe's wages bills for 8411 troops seems inadequate and only the missing gathering can give the full answer.

Powicke, in his description of armies of the Lancastrian period of the Hundred Years War,² relies heavily upon Indentures and Warrants of Issue, both extensive in their content and preserved in large numbers. For Henry VII, Warrants of Issue were not used and the Indentures have either been lost in significant number or were not completed during their issue in June, due to the change in circumstances.³ The possible explanation for the latter is

NOTES

1. Anglica Historia, p56.
2. M.R. Powicke, 'Lancastrian Captains' in Essays in Medieval History presented to B. Wilkinson, (Toronto 1969), p371-382.
3. E101/72/3, 4, 5 and 6. There are only 78 completed indentures whereas up to 230 retinue captains could have been present.

connected with the failure of Maximilian to come up to expectations. The intended invasion was for June, but this became clearly impossible in May, so Henry ceased making contracts until new plans had been made. New contracts were never completed. The Indentures were still important, they help fill many gaps left by Cope's Accounts. Of the 86 Indentures, only 78 are relevant.¹ Examination provides an Indentured force of 4449 troops comprised of 1053 men-at-arms and 3396 archers or others. Evidently Henry was only half way through raising the force of 10,000 archers he had persuaded Parliament to finance.

By cross referencing the indentured captains with Cope's accounts we can trace 43 who were paid wages. I do not doubt that the remaining 35 attended and we must presume so, they would not dare, or even wish to flout the King's wishes and break a promise. Closer examination of the 43 reveals, in most cases, the captains increased their promises in line with the King's demands for a larger force, necessary since Maximilian's failure to uphold his side of the agreement. On average this increase was 1% for men-at-arms and 17% for archers. Assuming that all the indentured retinues attended, the 35 unrecorded retinues should also be assigned a similar percentage increase. This group provided 348 men-at-arms and 901 archers increasing, with our assumption to 352 and 1054

NOTES

1. Ibid. The remaining eight have duplicates, presumably the results of failed contract attempts, each contains simply the name of the captain, three additionally contain excuses, on the reverse, for none attendance.

respectively. Adding these troops to Cope's total and Hatcliffe's, the army would have totalled 9817 troops, still somewhat short of an 'enormous army'.

Thus our first assumption has been that the missing gatherings of 32 pages contained only 35 indentured captains; many of whom we do know attended from other sources.¹ It is evident that 35 retinues would not fill 32 pages in Cope's accounts and so more must have attended. Other evidence is necessary to continue the investigation.

Hatcliffe's account lists many payments made during the campaign; payments for mercenaries, wages and travel expenses and most significantly lists of retinues shipped on the repassage. Numbers of the retinues are not included, but the retinue captain was named. Some of these confirm the presence of indentured retinues,² which were otherwise unrecorded; most refer to retinues mentioned in Cope, yet a further twenty-nine retinues listed are new. Most notable amongst these are seven lords; four examples being John de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Edmund Dudley, Lord Dudley, Edmund de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, and the retinue of the Earl of Northumberland³

Signatures to the memorial of November 1492 indicate three further retinues. while additional references in Cope

NOTES

1. Lords Latimer, Powis & Audley, Sir Reynold Bray and Sir Hugh Conway were present identified through their signatures on the memorial 1 November 1492.
2. Such as Lords Latimer and Powis, Sir Reynold Bray, Sir John Crocker, Robert Belingham and Henry Mountford.
3. The other three were: John, Lord Zouche, the Lord of Clunne and a Lord Curtod?

suggest another two.¹ A sixth is inferred by Sir William Paston's letter to Sir John Paston 18 February 1492² and a seventh through the action of Sir George de Vere, John de Vere's brother, and his subsequent death at the Siege of Sluys.³ These references allow for a further thirty-six retinue captains in total who, attributing to them the average retinue,⁴ could have led up to 2199 troops.

To further assist us in our assumption there is a document which purports to be a list of the King's Army into France. This is folio 43 of the Burton Abbey Register.⁵ It commences with the statement 'The King's retinue into France whereof the fourth part to be on horseback, and the other to be on foot at his wage'. Although not dated it is assumed to date from 1492⁶ and it details an army of 12,660 men including seven earls, 12 barons, and 64 knights. Closer examination shows that of the 107 individual retinues itemized some six lords and 30 knights and gentlemen are new names not found in any of the other sources. However, the register also fails to mention ten lords and numerous other retinues known to have participated through Cope, Hatcliffe or the Indentures. Therefore this is not the definitive list as are none of the sources. More significantly, when the numbers of troops each retinue comprised are compared with both the Wages and Indenture lists they hardly compare. Of 107 entries only eight show a less than 20% discrepancy with the Wages or

NOTES

1. E30/612. There is a probable total of eighty-one names in all, but the signatures are badly galled and sometimes illegible making naming impossible. Three are clearer than most of those not previously mentioned; Sir John Carew, Sir John Barnard and John Jones.
2. E36/285, f75. Sir John Metonham and John Rayneford Esquire, Captains.
3. The Paston Letters Vol.vi, p143. 5. Hall op.cit. p452.
4. The average retinue based upon retinues in Cope and Hatcliffe was nine men-at-arms and fifty-two archers.
5. Nottingham University. Middleton MSS Mi De7, f43.
6. A. Cameron, 'The Giving of Livery and Retaining in Henry VII's reign'. Renaissance and Modern Studies, vol.18 1974, p23.

Indentures and only one, John Halwell's retinue, is exactly the same on all three.¹ The question arises what is this document and does it bear any relation to 1492? The evidence does point to 1492, but when in that year was it drawn up? The mention of a quarter of the total force being mounted dates it to about the time of the Indentures which also mention mounted archers, other sources make no mention of such troops. In my opinion, this list is similar to lists ordered drawn up by sheriffs and other local officials to indicate a county's readiness to aid the King. In this instance this was a preliminary list showing the country's ability to raise an army of invasion.

Considering over 66% of the retinues mentioned are known to have attended, can we safely assume the remaining 34% or 36 retinues did so? These would add a further 217 men-at-arms and 1638 archers. What makes me doubt this document is no more than a preliminary survey is that the list total shows 12660 men, but adding the retinues together they only amount to 7586. There is no indication where the extra 5000 were to come from. I have my reservations as to whether the details of this document should be included in my calculation. It will only be included in the total in parenthesis. Given that of the 107 retinues on the list 42 were paid wages, 15 sent less while 27 sent more than the list indicated, I will also attribute the same percentage increase given to the Indentures. That is 1% and 17% respectively men-at-arms and archers. Thus a further 219 men-at-arms and 1916 archers can be added to the grand total.

Altogether, seventy-one extra [107]² retinues can be

NOTES

1. Two men-at-arms and forty archers.
2. Including the extra 36 Burton Abbey Register retinues.

identified and could have led up to 3605 [5150] troops. Adding these to known figures we have a force of 206 [242] retinue captains (135 known through wages and 71 [107] deduced through other references), 1,930 [2149] men-at-arms, and 10,086 [12,002] archers a total of 12016 [14,151] troops to which should be added technical personnel, attendants (custrells and pages for knights and senior men-at-arms), secretaries and royal servants; a grand total of 14,504 [16,886]. This is more like the 'enormous army' the sources talk of; one to compare with the armies of Crecy and Edward IV in 1475. Calculations based on the wages will confirm this; the wages bill can be calculated for a total of 12,278 troops.¹

Alternative to the above calculations for the probable size of the army, the size of fleet can be examined and the army calculated from fleet numbers. Crown agents for the collection of the fleet had been dispatched in February 1492,² with further agents dispatched in May to increase its' size with the changed plans. Generally the fleet was gathered from ports and coastal towns along the South and East coast, though some did come from Bristol and Ilfracombe and other Western ports.³ The majority of these vessels would have been small coastal barques. Ketches and a few larger caravels and cogs were also available, but even so these were not sufficient to carry the large numbers of men and equipment during a quick crossing. Consequently Dutch ships were also engaged, especially 'hoyes, cogships and plaits.'⁴ Most, like the hoyes, were presumably rigged as sloops and

NOTES

1. See p72 and Appendix C for a complete breakdown of these calculations.
2. E36/285, f63.
3. E36/285, f63-72.
4. E36/285, f61.

adapted to carrying passengers on short sea journeys along coastal routes. These would have been ideal for the channel crossing between Sandwich and Calais

Altogether 300 English ships and 335 Dutch vessels were employed for the crossing. The Dutch were only engaged for fifteen days and their role was, presumably, solely for assisting in the initial landing. Henry would have been wisely advised to land as many men as quickly as possible, the return journey could have been carried out more leisurely, safe behind the defences of Calais. English ship contracts varied between two and four months, similar to those of the English troops, some of each were still in service in France during 1493, two months after the peace treaty had been signed.

It is difficult to determine how many troops this fleet could have carried in one single crossing. Two references indicate possible carriage capacity. Hatcliffe indicates a variable carriage capacity of between 38 and 230 for ships carrying troops to the siege of Sluys.¹ A second fragment of a document referring to ships watching the sea gives a variation of between 80 and 290.² The importance of both these pieces of evidence is that in addition they refer to the cost of carrying these numbers. Cope does not mention the carriage capacity of any of the vessels he lists, yet he does list individual payments. Correlation of the hire charges in Hatcliffe and the fragment with those in Cope result in a possible breakdown of the English fleet as

NOTES

1. E36/208, f41-43.
2. E36/15, Account of Military Stores and Payments to soldiers and marines on board 5 ships, fragment. Between 11 May and 7 June 1492 five ships were hired and crewed presumably to watch the sea for French activities during preparations for the invasion.

in the following table.

<u>Wages</u>	<u>No. of English Ships hired through Cope.</u>	<u>Possible carriage capacity of each ship.</u>
a) Under £5 a month	245	Under 75 troops
b) £5-£10 a month	46	75-150 troops
c) £10-£20 a month	6	150-300 troops
d) Over £20 a month	3	300-500 troops maximum ¹

The Dutch fleet was paid £3760 12s.8d. for fifteen days service or an average of £11 each or £22 per month. Assuming they were not paid at any higher rates as they were mercenaries, their carriage capacity falls in group c, but most likely it varied between a and b.

Not all these ships would carry troops. Even given the necessity of landing as many troops in one instance as possible, a percentage would have been needed for other important purposes. Horses, wagons, ordnance, victuals, munitions, beer and wine all had to be transported across the channel to ensure no imbalance in any department occurred.

Another factor that must be considered was the protection of the fleet. Was it to be heavily or only superficially protected during the crossings? A certain proportion of the fleet would certainly have been detached for protection duties. Henry had in fact been sending out ships for such duties all through the summer, but whether these patrols were greatly increased during the crossing is almost impossible to ascertain. What size were these ships? To use the largest would result in a decrease in carriage capacity, whilst the use of smaller ships reduced the protective value. In all

NOTES

1. These figures assume an average crew on board each ship of ten, fifteen, twenty and at least fifty for the respective categories. The maximum is calculated from a payment for 'victuals' for 1000 men on board the two largest ships in English waters, the Regent and the Sovereign. E36/285, f77.

probability the vessels used would simply have been those most readily available. As previously calculated, there were 635 vessels available. Therefore if we assign a relatively high proportion of say 50% to protective and other duties, the remaining 317 vessels would be left for carrying troops. The possible carriage capacity of such a fleet could have varied from anywhere between 16000 to as high as 45000. This is an impossible method of calculating the army's size, yet it does suggest the exceptional organisation that must have gone into the preparation of gathering such a fleet, and points to its tremendous potential.

The army was clearly large by whatever calculations we use. Of greater value is its efficiency and I turn my attention to that problem.

The method of assessment must surely be that which both Powicke and Lander use in their analyses of the armies of Henry V and Edward IV respectively.¹ Powicke maintains that at the height of English success the most desirable ratio of archers to men-at-arms was three to one, but after 1415 the contingents raised declined in quality with the ratio rising to four to one for the greater nobles and to as high as fourteen to one for others.² Many companies became little more than bands of archers. Lander has shown that this decline continued into Edward IV's army with some ratios as high as ten to one, the army as a whole being seven to one.³

Obviously it is difficult to make such an assessment of the army of 1492 given so many missing details. Yet, examination of those

NOTES

1. M.R. Powicke, op.cit.; J.R. Lander, Crown and Nobility (1976), pp223-241.
2. Powicke, op.cit. pp380-382.
3. J.R. Lander, op.cit. p239.

available reveals some interesting facts. The Indentures for 1492, giving total of 1053 men-at-arms and 3396 archers, indicate the ratio of three to one; the very ratio Powicke states was desirable.¹

For Henry V this was achieved with all retinue captains from the 'Greater Companies',² down to the lower companies complying with the ratio. This was not the case in 1492. On closer analysis of Henry VII's captains we do not find such compliance with this ratio. Henry's captains retinues varied from pure archer bands to even some pure men-at-arms groups.

What these figures for 1492 do show are the many privately maintained armies that existed. On the other hand it was impractical for the King to keep such large numbers of soldiers continually in his pay. The royal yeomanry had been established in 1485, but was very small, styled on the French model seen while Henry was in exile.³ This group was led by Sir Charles Somerset in 1492 and even this did not subscribe to the desirable ratio. It amounted to eight demilancers, 157 yeomen at 12d a day, four yeomen at 8d and 101 archers at 6d.⁴ Even by the end of Henry's reign it had not been increased to more than 500 strong.⁵

On close examination of the ratio identified by the wage accounts we find 1258 men-at-arms were present with 7160 archers, a ratio of almost six to one, not as great as that of 1475, but still

NOTES

1. Powicke, op.cit., pp371-373
2. That is a retinue of more than 20 men-at-arms. For a more detailed account of these figures see pp77-89 below.
3. J.R. Hooker, Notes on The Organisation and Supply of The Tudor Military under Henry VII, Huntingdon Library Quarterly, vol.23, 1959 p19.
4. E36/285, f23-24.
5. A. Cameron, op.cit., p18 n 4. This bodyguard must have seen some action as it incurred losses of 2 demilancers, one yeoman, one archer sergeant and one archer.

well above the desirable ratio. Looking for 'Greater Companies' we find less than had been promised. Many of the indentured great captains had problems in raising the 20 men-at-arms.¹

Despite these problems it has been suggested that this force was the largest that invaded France during the fifteenth century, yet it was never fully put to the test. It had more success than Edward IV's had,² but like Edward IV, Henry did not face a French field army. Like Professor Lander, I do not feel we should be dogmatic about its success and efficiency. With a ratio of more than five archers to every man-at-arms overall, the probabilities would also 'seem to lie strongly against military distinction'.³ Most of the soldiers had far less experience than those of Henry V, there was no training, no government could sustain the charges nor would it have been wise to encourage the existence of large numbers of armed men. Large privately owned armies frightened Henry VII on more than one occasion, even when they were kept by such supporters as John de Vere, Earl of Oxford. Having to therefore fall back on the military indenture system left Henry VII with an army resembling a feudal levy corresponding little to the armies developing in France and Italy.⁴

Of course, Henry had invaded late in the season and expected, and hoped, not to have to face the French army. It has been hinted at previously that it is believed he knew this, given that peace

NOTES

- 1.. See below p84-99.
2. Henry entered 20 miles of French territory and sacked a number of fortresses and two French towns; Ardes and Mountoye, E36/612.
3. Lander, *op.cit.*, p239.
4. J.R. Hooker, *op.cit.*, p19.

negotiations were possibly under way with Des Querdes before Henry even left England. Presumably he hoped the expedition would only need to be a short one with a gallant return home and action restricted to a few sieges. This premise is supported by numerous references to quantities of ordnance being moved to the coast and shipped to Calais from as early as February 1492,¹ to 8 September 1492 when William Fournesse and John Jernes of Southampton were engaged for this purpose.² The type of ordnance is not clear, only once was anything specifically referred to; Robert Baynebridge was paid 20s. for 'carriage of a shot of Irene for bumberdelles and curtowes and other gunnes for the town of Cales and Boleign for the siege there.'³

Henry intended to use more cannon and other firearms. Poynings' force sent to Sluys reveals this fact. It was equipped with the following list of supplies for a force of 2500 men:-

'5300 demi wade (wadding for cannons)
 1300 half 100 lbs of gunpowder
 700 demi loade (charge for firearms)
 1300 demi tampoons, (discs or cylinders of wood to
 fill the bore of muzzle loading
 guns, rammed between the charge and
 the missile.)
 plate and bolte (missiles)
 lanterns
 Tallows (tallow candles used for igniting charges in
 cannons),⁴

NOTES

1. The Paston Letters, vol.VI, pl43.
2. E36/285, f54.
3. E36/285, f55. Bumbardelles were small bombards, curtowes were short bombards like mortars, Irene - iron shot.
4. E36/285, f58.

These are significant amounts for only 2500 men who were presumably mostly archers. Hatcliffe reinforces this use of artillery. He accounts for numbers of mercenaries hired during the siege of Sluys, significant among them were 200 individuals as gunners. These were accounted for under twelve individuals of obvious German, Flemish or Dutch origin, such as Henry Von Howe or Stephano Stump, Captain of Flemish troops, but more significantly according to their pay they are identifiable as cannon crews. Of the twelve entries, eight are identical in that the master gunner was paid 12d. a day, two others at 10d., six at 8d. and seven at 6d. Presumably this identifies at least one, or more probably, two ordnance pieces per entry.¹ Whether these men were additionally used at the siege of Boulogne is not revealed.

Sufficient gunpowder was another problem and stores kept at the Tower were inadequate in 1492. Large amounts had to be made or bought. Thomas Overey, one of the tellers, paid Thomas Franconer £100 at one time and £50 at another for making gunpowder in Southampton.² There were considerable quantities, as confirmed by examining a second reference. Thomas Overey also paid for 'dives stuff of ordernances' amongst which he paid £53.12s.10d. for 30 carts of gunpowder.³ Presumably Overey paid equal sums for equal amounts, he had bought 120 carts of gunpowder or the equivalent of 487,500 lbs of gunpowder, sufficient for any bombardment.⁴

NOTES

1. E36/208, f36-40.
2. E36/285, f73.
3. E36/285, f73.
4. See page 50, note 3. in the Chapter on Supply for how this equation is calculated.

Originally, Henry had intended his force to amount to the equivalent of 10,000 archers (assuming some men-at-arms were included in this figure); this, however, depended upon Maximilian's support. Without this Henry found he had no choice but to go alone, but with an increased force. Many writers lead us to believe that this force was over 25,000 men and the fleet numbers do not rule out the possibility of such a figure. However, I do not believe this possible, given the logistics of the time or the support of Henry's captains. Yet, the King did increase his army by up to 50% to a maximum of 15000 troops (rounding up the totals as shown in Appendix C). To transport this force, a fleet of 635 English and Dutch vessels of varying quality was gathered from English and Dutch towns like Antwerp and Amsterdam. The artillery train was clearly impressive, perhaps the largest that had crossed the channel, or was to cross it for many years to come. Nevertheless, this train was unable to destroy the defences of Boulogne, although daily it 'rased and defaced the Wallis.'¹ This was not surprising as Boulogne had been strongly fortified in anticipation, so much so that it had become 'oon of the strongest townes of Picardy.'² Artillery of Henry VII's period was still not sufficient to destroy a heavily fortified town; yet it had proved efficient enough to aid the capture of Sluys and smaller French fortresses and towns like Ardes and Mounteroyes. Despite these successes this army did not face the French on the field of battle. The French, rejuvenated since Joan of Arc, were experienced in continental warfare against the Empire and Spain by 1492, to the extent that the English were now novices. It is very uncertain whether an English army would have fared well and doubtful it would have acquitted itself with honour and distinction.

NOTES

1. Hall, p459.
2. E36/612.

CHAPTER FOUR:

SUPPLY FOR THE ARMY

'An army marches on its stomach', but food was not the only problem of supplies. The requirements for fifteenth century campaigns, like others, were almost endless.

Stocks of certain requirements; longbows, arrows and artillery, were maintained in the Tower. Extensive as these were, they were insufficient for prolonged campaigns and between November 1491 and November 1492 Henry issued commissions for the manufacture of such equipment and its delivery to either the Tower or to his person in France.¹ The bow was still the main weapon of English troops, supplemented by the stake for personal protection against mounted attacks. Evidence in 1492 for the 'bills' as either a separate weapon group within the English army, or as an additional weapon for archers, is inconclusive. The indentures suggest a small number of troops either attended with bills or were double armed with bills and bows, but in the wage accounts neither type were indicated. There was only one request for the manufacture of bills, but no record of any specific payment.² There was, however, only one similar contract for the manufacture of arrows in the same period, but this is not conclusive proof.³ Additionally, only one payment for supply refers to bowstaves.⁴

Many supply payments made by Cope were simply for 'Ordnance and sundry charges' making it difficult to evaluate accurate

NOTES

1. As shown by several commissions; William Lovell for manufacturing arrows. C.P.R. 1485-92, p258. William Austen for manufacturing bows. Ibid., p392.
2. Ibid, p392, to John Russell.
3. Ibid, p392, to Gilbert Foreman.
4. E36/285, f76. £3467.14s.11d. paid to John Dawtry for bowstaves, Saltpeter, Malmsey and other charges.

quantities of supplies of bowstaves, arrows and more especially of bills. £6653.11s.4d.¹ was made in global payments. Speculation as to quantities presumably contained within these global amounts can lead to estimates of large numbers of bowstaves, bowstrings, arrows and possibly bills being purchased. These items were inexpensive; bowstaves cost 20d. each and a sheaf of arrows 16d., while a bill cost only one shilling.² Consequently it appears strange that large purchases of such items were not individually accounted; 10,000 bowstaves would have cost £833.6s.8d., 20,000 sheaves of arrows £1333.6s.8d. and 2000-5000 bills between £100 and £250.

Although the quantity of bows and bills was indefinite, the quantity of gunpowder and other artillery accessories was more clearly accounted for. On three occasions Thomas Overey bought gunpowder, twice from Thomas Franconer in Southampton.³ £203.12s.10d. was spent on gunpowder and, assuming equal amounts were paid for equal quantities, this amounts to 9750 barrels, alternatively 487,500 lbs. of gunpowder, a significant quantity, but not all that would have been required for a prolonged campaign.

Artillery needed more than just gunpowder. Other purchases were unaccounted for, yet we do gain one insight into the requirements. William Comersault was charged with equipping twelve

NOTES

1. E36/285, f76. £251.10s.6d. for Ordnance to Richard Butler, teller of the receipt of the King's exchequer. £3467.14s.11d. for bowstaves, Saltpeter, Malmsey and other charges to the Merchants of the Staple. £674.6s.8d. to Richard Guildford, Master of the King's Ordnance.
2. E36/285, f60. In the year 1492-3 Lord Overey paid £30.3s.4d. for 120 bows, 280 sheaves of arrows and bow strings for a ship's company bound for Ireland on board The Barke of St.Ives. Additionally he paid 12d. each for six dozen bills, suggesting over half the archers could have been equipped with a bill as well as their bow.
3. E36/285, f73. In one purchase of £53.12s.10d. he bought 30 cartloads of gunpowder. f58 indicates the cost of a barrel of gunpowder at 5d. for one 50lb. barrel. On this basis a cart could carry 85 barrels amounting to 9750 barrels in total, or 487,500 lbs. of gunpowder.

ships and troops sent to the siege of Sluys.¹ Equipping the force with food and gunpowder the list also includes '5300 demiwade, 700 demiloads, 1300 demi tampons, plate and bolte, lanterns and tallows.' This suggests that amongst Poynings' force some men were equipped with arqubuses for which the 'plate and bolte' were the projectiles. Yet, when Poynings' force was paid on arrival at Boulogne none of his retinue was specifically referred to as anything other than men-at-arms and archers.²

We are compensated for these inadequacies by the references to other supplies, especially food. The problems of food supply had been analysed in detail and the initial contract, predating all indentures for troops, was for the supply of victuals for the army. Everard Newchurch, a pewter of London, signed contracts with the King for the provision of small, but significant quantities of victuals on 25 February 1492.³ He was to supply three pipes of wheatflour, fifteen pipes of beer, and one pipe of beef. More significant than the quantities, are the details of the contract and the conditions both parties agreed to. Newchurch was to take the victuals to Portsmouth by 20 May, incurring all the risks and financial burdens in the channel crossing until the supplies arrived in France. Here, he then had the opportunity of recouping his outlay and realising a profit. On arrival in France, at the King's camp, Newchurch could set 'such

NOTES

1. E36/285, f58. Comersault was clerk of the King's ships.
2. One possible explanation is that these munitions were for the ships' armament, but for what would have been twelve poorly armed merchant ships this quantity does seem excessive.
3. E101/72/3 No.1.

resonnable prises....upon his vitaille....as the said Everard shal wele live and be right wele content and plesed.'¹ These were, moreover, couched in strict terms. Newchurch was not allowed to sell independently in France and had to make the deadline and places set by the Provost Marshal of the Army. The food had to be '...good and suffissaunt and holson for mannes body',² the penalties if it were not were extreme. Should any conditions be broken Newchurch forfeited double the value of the promised commodities and surrendered himself 'at the King's wille.'³ Failure to meet such a fine was covered through forfeiture of all he owned 'body, lande and goode and to be at his (the King's) yeste disposicion and wille.'⁴ All possible circumstances, such as the ship's capture during the channel crossing, were covered in the agreement. If anything happened outside Newchurch's control, the King agreed to cover half the cost of any lost supplies. Finally, Newchurch agreed to pay all shipping costs across the channel and to the army's forward base. An apparently one sided contract. This was not so in reality. Upon arrival in France, Newchurch would be 'poynted and lymeted a place'⁵ to store his goods safely until the provost marshal informed him where to take them. The journey to the forward camp would be under guard, protecting Newchurch and his goods from 'jeopode of enemys at al tymes.'⁶ Once in the camp Newchurch would be well treated, given a favourable position to sell his goods and allowed to make a reasonable profit. Here he would have competed with other royally approved victuallers set up like market stall holders throughout the camp.

NOTES

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Other conditions in the contract benefited Newchurch enabling him to make a handsome profit. Certain passages were directed towards royal officials in England, especially those at the ports. These commanded all the King's 'Officers ministers and subgiettes as shrieifs Maires Stewarde Constables'¹ to give Newchurch as much help as possible in collecting and shipping the supplies in England. Moreover, once at the port, this instruction was extended to the 'comptrollers serchers kept of porte' to allow quick and uninterrupted passage through customs 'without paying to (the King).. or any oyer for us any mener customer or charges.'² Henry required a great deal from his subjects, but was wise enough to dispense with the normal red tape to encourage their help.

Only three indentures of supply have survived. The other two were with William Attkyn, John Prowde, John Lappe, Haberdashers of London and John Worme of Calais.³ These agreed to supply quantities of Malmsey, bacon, oats, cheese, beans and salt. Others were commissioned to supply food varying from wheat, beer and fish, yet no record survives to indicate their payment.⁴

NOTES

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. E101/72/3, No.5. E101/72/6, No.18. The Haberdashers signed on 16 March while John Worme signed much later on 12 August. The three contracts amounted to 5 pipes and 3 lasts of Wheat flour
 - 41 pipes of beer,
 - 13 pipes of beef,
 - 3 buttes of Malmsey
 - 10 flitches of bacon,
 - 30 quarters of oats,
 - 14 weyes of cheese,
 - 2 quarters of beans,
 - 4 barrels of salt.
4. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.1, p415. The commissions were issued to John Tailow, Nicholas Dyker, John Matheu, John Hamond and Thomas Freyer. The goods to be supplied were: Wheat, beans, peas, oats, beer, flesh, salted and fresh fish, cheese, butter and other victuals.

£13,431.15s. was spent on victuals during the campaign, a further £488.1d. on shipping supplies, mainly wine from England to Calais.¹ Purchases of victuals varied from oxen, beef, multons (sheep for eating), hoggesflesh, fish, wheat or bread and large quantities of beer. This last item necessitated the building of a special brewery and purchases of 569 tonnes and 64 pipes of beer.² Other purchases included spices and biscuits, but the major portion of the £13000 accounted for unspecified quantities of victuals; £9192.7s.1d. between five suppliers.³

Supply was one major problem and another was transport. No fewer than ninety-one carts were purchased, with other references indicating the collection of larger quantities of carts, carters, 'chariot' and draught horses, 'sumpter' (pack or baggage) horses, wheelwrights and other workmen for manufacturing and maintaining carts. Commission for these began on 26 November 1491 and continued

NOTES

1. E36/285, f76-77 and various other pages throughout the section on Yet Necessities, f52-58. The wine varied in quality from King's wine to simply Household wine. Shipments totalled 89 tonnes, 1 pipe and 1 hoggeshead of wine, 160 Buttes of Malmsey, 280 pipes of beef, 180 barrels of flour, 2 buttes of salt and charges of £474.13s.4d. for undisclosed quantities of wheat. Of the £488.1d. only £6.20d. for shipment of 280 pipes of beef from Porchester can be directly linked to a purchase, that of 292 pipes of beef bought by William Cope at Porchester. All other purchases are either lost or presumably contained under the payments for sundry supplies bought.
2. E36/285, f73 and f76/77.
3. E36/285, f76-77. These were:-

William Hatcliffe	£3089.19s.10d.
Richard Butler	£ 372. 20d.
John Dawtry	£3467.14s.11d.
The Merchants of the Staple	£1759.19s. 4d.
Nicholas Moreton	£ 502.11s. 4d.

up to 29 August,¹ intensifying in February 1492 when thirty-four men were commissioned to collect horses of all categories for transport from the counties of the South, South-West and East of England.²

Obviously feeding such large numbers of war and transport horses was another problem. On 24 February Thomas Woderobe, clerk of the King's Ordnance, and Richard Bright, purveyor of the avenary and livery of the King's horses, gained commissions to proceed to Southampton and 'entreat with the people' there for the purchase of liveries, hay, litter and provender for 3000 horse.³ They were also able to buy items necessary for loading horses onto ships; slings, nets and 'brugges' (movable landing stages), scythes and sicles. They were successful in their task; Cope accounts for payment to them by Thomas Overey for 450 cartloads of hay, 1500 pipes of oats, 100 scythes, 400 sicles, 332 slings and 12 'Brugges.'⁴

NOTES

1. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.1, ff393-415. Thomas Fawkenor to Alexander Galyon, Sergeant of the King's carriage.
2. Ibid, pp394-5. All commissions were issued in pairs of counties to a group of three people except in one case where it was to four people:
Oxford and Berkshire, Norfolk and Suffolk.
Northampton and Rutland, Bedford and Buckingham,
Warwickshire and Leicester, Huntingdon and Cambridgeshire,
Somerset and Dorset, Nottingham and Derby, to four people,
Gloucester and Worcester, Surrey and Sussex,
Essex and Hertfordshire.
Harnesses for these horses and the carts, whipcord, bear and ox hides were also purchased in considerable quantities.
E36/285, f52.
3. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol 1, p396.
4. E36/285, f73.

One final necessity remains to be mentioned; tents. There was no reference to any payment for tents of any description in Cope's accounts yet these were purchased and taken to France. They would have undoubtedly been required particularly with the late departure of the expedition. There are two references to the movement of tents though; one is in the Paston Letters, the second in Hatcliffe's account.

On 18 February William Paston wrote to Sir John Paston mentioning the daily movement of the King's ordnance to the coast. He includes reference to the manufacture of 'tentes and alys (pavilions)...and many of them to be made' and that a 'grate provysyon' was made for all the equipment for the gentlemen 'that shoulde goo wythe Hys Grace.'¹ The list given by William Paston included 'hors, harness, tents, halys, gardvyanes (knapsacks) cartes and other things.'

The second reference mentions two vessels being required to carry 'pavilions from Calais to London', in the section in Hatcliffe on the repassage of troops from France. No reference is made to the size of the vessel or the quantity of tents carried, yet the number would have been considerable to have required two vessels as it did.²

One essential piece of equipment for an army since 1800 was the field kitchen. During earlier campaigns, cooking was left to individuals or groups using open fires, but one necessity that could not be produced in this manner was bread. This problem was foreseen and on 4 September 1492 an oven was shipped to Calais for the army.

NOTES

1. The Paston Letters, vol.1, p143.
2. E36/208, f56-57. The vessels were 'del Jesus del Grifith' Master John Blunt and 'Trustie ofWadebrigge' Master Robert Lymms.

How large was it? It cost 51s. and was freighted at a cost of 6s.6d., but its portability was not referred to.¹

One of the more unusual references made by Cope is also one of the earliest listed under 'Necessities for Warre'. Wages were paid in coin and large numbers of bags were needed for shipping and carriage. 30lb. of canvas and two great bags were bought for this purpose costing 13s.6d., with 8d. charged for making the bags.² Another necessary item in this respect was the paper and parchment for making the account book together with fourteen yards of green cloth for tolling and accounting the money on.

There was evidently a clear awareness of the importance of sufficient supplies. Careful preparation had been made early on in the plans for the invasion. Consequently no reference can be found to the troops suffering through lack of any necessity. In the memorial, from Henry's captains and councillors on 1 November at Boulogne, lack of food or any other necessities do not feature as reasons why the peace terms should have been accepted.³ It was therefore possible to give greater significance and consideration to the problem of taking Boulogne and its defences. More concern was shown for freighting supplies across the channel than to their need at that time. Vergil states that the men were more occupied with the fact that Henry had made peace than with a lack of comforts or of food, or more importantly beer.⁴ Consequently, I believe, all aspects of supply were kept under close control.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f73.
2. E36/285, f53.
3. E30/612.
4. Anglica Historia, pp53-59.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS?

Many words are synonymous with Henry VII. Most reflect his attitude towards money and claims have been made with justification for his later years that any legal method was used to financially secure the crown. Such claims have been levelled against the expedition. Dietz, stating Henry made 'ingenious use of foreign complications for his own pecuniary advantage'¹ infers this was his sole motive for the invasion. Others such as Mackie, Chrimes and Van Cleeve Alexander give the expedition attention because of the profit gained. Dietz's account is most widely accepted for the finances and amongst other authorities is perhaps hard to improve, even though it was composed without the aid of certain sources now available. With these it is my intention to clarify the financial account for 1492.

Dietz's account shows between October 1489 and October 1491 Parliament made several grants aimed at raising sufficient funds to keep 10,000 archers in the field for one year. The first grant failed to raise the required £75,000, only raising something less than £27,000.² As a consequence Henry was allowed to call for a Benevolence. These were allowed under certain circumstances and enabled the King to call for the support of the country in his patriotic cause, either through military aid or financial assistance in lieu of attendance, which is precisely what was required in July 1491. Dietz states this raised more than £48,000.³ Additional

NOTES

1. F.G. Dietz, English Governmental Finance 1481-1558, 1920, p53.
2. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 1820, vi p438.
3. Dietz, op cit., p57.

revenue came from the church, the Convocation of Canterbury granted first £25,000 and later both Canterbury and York allowed a tenth for the King's cause.¹ These grants in theory should have raised £15,200 and £2000 respectively², adding a further £17,200 to the war chest. Dietz continues with his account and shows that Parliament granted a further two tenths and fifteenths, with the promise of a third should the army stay abroad for more than eight months.³ Dietz does not give a sum total for all these grants. Taking each of the Parliamentary grants of tenths and fifteenths equal £29,000 net⁴ the total would have been £87,000. Altogether the King would have received £204,420 but Dietz does not give such a figure. On the debit side, Dietz puts the cost of the expedition at £48,802⁵, which, by assumption, results in a profit in excess of £155,000, yet again this is not a figure quoted by Dietz; we are left to account for the figure ourselves. Other authorities accept Dietz's account but fail to quote global amounts.

Dietz believed in Henry's profit motive, he used the war to increase the Royal coffers, his subjects apparently oblivious to 'how disingenuous were the purposes until after the event'.⁶ Dietz infers Henry cut corners and economised to make this possible. It is my second intention to show this was not the case. That ultimately

NOTES

1. Ibid, p55.
2. A.K. McHardy, Clerical Taxation in Fifteenth Century England: The Clergy as Agents of the Crown, in The Church, Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth Century, ed. R.B. Dobson, 1984, p169-70.
3. Dietz, op cit., p56.
4. A grant of a tenth and a fifteenth was a specified sum of £31,000 gross as fixed in 1334. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p196.
5. Dietz, op cit., p57.
6. Ibid, p53.

savings were made, although not repaid, was more a testament to the methodical approach to the organisation and a statement on the problems of collection in a short period of all the grants, than to deviousness or any grand scheme to defraud Parliament and the people of England.

My first intention is to show how close Dietz came to the income for the expedition. The Parliament assembled in January 1489 granted the King £100,000 for the expedition,¹ £25,000 of which was supplied by the Convocation of Canterbury.² The £75,000 was to be raised through a tenth of annual value of 'issued and profyttes of all maners of Honours, Castelles, Lordships, Manors, Landes, Tenements, Rentes....',³ plus a tax of 1s,8d, on every ten marks of movable goods. On reassembling in October 1489 it was evident this tax had failed. Not quite £27,000⁴ had been collected and Parliament expressed their indebtedness to his majesty to the amount of £48,000.⁵ Consequently they hoped a grant of a tenth and fifteenth would make up the shortfall, with the proviso that £6,000 be deducted for the 'relieff and discharge of the pore Townes, Cities and Boroughs, wasted, desolate or destroyed, or over gretely impoverysshed.'⁶

NOTES

1. Rotuli Parliamentorum, VI, p421.
2. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p198 and A.K. McHardy op cit., p189.
3. Rotuli Parliamentorum, VI, p421.
4. Ibid, p438. J.R. Lander, in Government and Community in England, 1450-1509, (1980) p341. Lander states this figure could have been as low as £20,736.
5. Rotuli Parliamentorum VI, p438.
6. Ibid.

This grant would clearly not meet the required amount and in 1491 the 'Benevolence' or Benevolent loan was called. This, invited by Signet letters, was very difficult to refuse, but at least the recipient had the choice of aiding the King financially in lieu of personal service.¹ Consequently in July 1491 a commission was issued for raising a Benevolence from the people.² Eventually, this raised £48,488.16s.8d.,³ but, as many people were slow to pay up, or at least the machinery of collection proved slow, there were *still insufficient* sums in the war chest by October 1491. By 1495 arrears for the Benevolence were so outstanding it received retrospective parliamentary sanction in the content of statutory authority for their collection under heavy penalties if collectors or individuals failed.⁴ Even so, Cope's account outlines this problem showing it was not fully collected until 1501.⁵

Due to the previous shortfalls and the slow receipts of the Benevolence Parliament again looked at the finances in October 1491. With the prospect of military action getting closer two tenths and fifteenths were granted (less the normal deductions for poor and impoverished towns)⁶, with a third promised should the army be in France more than eight months.⁷ Altogether these parliamentary grants would have raised a total of £112,735 (£106,471 if the low figure of £20,736 for the first grant of 1489 is accepted). To this must be added the Benevolence and the Church's contributions. The

NOTES

1. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p203. In fact many people did both. See below p81.
2. Foedera, vol xii, p435-443.
3. E36/285, f1 and f15.
4. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p204 and n.1.
5. E36/285, f1.
6. Rotuli Parliamentorum., VI p442.
7. Ibid, p443.

Convocation of Canterbury had granted £25,000 in 1489 but this was not the sole contribution of 1489. The Province of York also granted two tenths, a total of £4,000. In 1492 a further tenth was granted by both, totalling £17,200. These sums thus total £207,423 (or £201,1159, taking the lower figure for 1489) which is very close to the figures which can be worked out from Dietz's account.

Responsibility for these sums fell to Reynold Bray, Treasurer of the War, but most of the accounting was left to his deputy, William Cope. The survival of Cope's account has enabled this analysis to be undertaken. It covers the period 31 January 1492 to 31 January 1501.

Although generally accepted are the amounts collected from the various Parliamentary grants, none feature in total in Cope's account. £9828.10s.4d. is listed raised through fifteenths and tenths ('guinzisenies and difince') while a further £2073.9s.4d. came from the tenth of the clergy.¹ This is not strange as Cope was only accounting for the money transferred to him for use with the expedition. Strangely though, the account lists receipts from sales of goods: animals, wine, grain and other perishable commodities; totalling £21,174.19s.1d.² As these are referred to as 'King's oxen' or 'the King's wine', Henry was either being generous or an alternative explanation must be sought.³ The King would not be so generous; plausibly these goods were those received in lieu of earlier taxes and sold in 1492 to raise ready cash for the expedition, or they were goods returned from the expedition and sold with the money returning to the account as income. Adding these accounts together we have £33,076.18s.9d.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f1-6.
2. Of this amount £17,392 was at the King's mint, put there by John Shaw 1491-2. E36/285, f15.
3. E36/285, f15-18.

The second feature of Cope's account of receipts for the expedition was the Benevolence. In 1491 it was supposed to supplement the failed Parliamentary grant. Cope's account shows it took until 1501¹ to fully collect. Yet when totalled it did amount to £48,488.11s.8d. It itemises the 'loans' beginning with the Clergy,² who gave £5523.6s.8d., followed by the nobility³ with £3431.6s.8d. showing even less generosity. Thus the two supposedly wealthy sections of the community contributed only £8954.13s.4d. The remaining £39000 came from the section entitled 'Yet Sundrie personnes of the Laisee',⁴ and they are indicative of how widespread the loan collectors spread their nets. Twenty-five counties are individually mentioned; such as Yorkshire (£969.7s.1d.),⁵ Nottinghamshire (£1337.1s.6d.),⁶ Gloucestershire (£3004.4s.5d.)⁷ and Lincolnshire (£3356.8d.).⁸

Unfortunately, as with other sections of Cope's account, there are missing files in this section. The sum total is given, but the files are missing in the returns of the commercial centre of England,

NOTES

1. E36/285, f1.
2. E36/285, f6. For a breakdown of payments by the clergy, nobility, and some selected others see Appendix B.
3. E36/285, f14-15.
4. E36/285, f16-31.
5. E36/285, f28.
6. E36/285, f27.
7. E36/285, f25.
8. E36/285, f27.

London.¹ According to the Chronicle of London and the Chronicle of England, London gave £9682.17s.4d., many individuals, most notably the Mayor John Matthew, giving £200, while 'some of the meaner sorte £100.'² No such sum or individual amounts survive in Cope. Despite recent discoveries and correct insertion clarifying the picture, £3126.10s.5d. is still missing from this section, but how much can be attributed to London is uncertain. London contributions are identifiable in a number of entries; London Merchants, Individuals of London and Foreigners, yet these only total £2360.10s.8d.³ Neither the Mayor nor his aldermen are specifically referred to; the single largest contribution of a Londoner was £40 from John Winger.⁴ Even attributing the missing £3126 to London we are still £4000 short of the £9682 supposedly given.

£81,565.15s. was paid into the war accounts,⁵ £125,858 short of the full allowance through all sources. Yet we must remember some of this was not fully accounted for in 1492, the second tenth and fifteenth granted by Parliament in 1491 was not due to be collected till 11 November while the Benevolence took till 1501 to collect. Therefore the majority of this sum assumably went directly to the King's Chamber, or to the Exchequer.⁶ Yet it does not show up as any single large increase in Chamber receipts between 1489 and 1495. The yearly average receipt was only £27,000 in that period compared to

NOTES

1. E36/285, f29.
2. Annales, p474. Chronicles of London, p197.
3. London Merchants £1059.11s.8d. Foreigners of London £400.19s. E36/285, f29.
4. E36/285, f10.
5. E36/285, f18.
6. It was more likely the Chamber even though the Exchequer had regained its supremacy between 1485-9. The preference of the Chamber is confirmed by the closing accounts in Cope where he states payments made by either Thomas Lovell or John Heron into the King's Chamber, E36/285, f79-80.

£17,000 between 1487 and 1489, and that has been attributed to more careful collection of the King's income.¹ Given the growing preference of the Chamber though, it is doubtful the money was accounted elsewhere.

If it had been Henry's sole aim from the outset, to save a good proportion for his coffers, then expenditure would have reflected this. My contention is that this was not the case. Examination of the accounts reveals that it was never intended to place a token force, ill-equipped and ill-supplied, aimlessly on French soil. Every aspect was meticulously covered and one is left with the strong impression that considerable foresight went into the preparations.

The only aspect wanting in the section entitled 'Yet Necessities' is missing and damaged pages caused by the ravages of time. Eighty pages do survive of which the majority (f18-80) fall within the section on expenditure, pages are still to be discovered and correctly replaced. In some sections it is only possible to calculate amounts through examining them in reverse. It is my intention to examine expenditure in reverse rather than chronologically.

Expenditure is divided into seven sections: Wages of War, Navy and Stores, King's Ordnance, King's Work, The Sluys Expedition, Victuals for the Army, and payments into the King's Chamber. The sum total only partly survives, beginning with the notation for £81,000, the remainder missing. Meant to be a definitive account it would be fair to assume expenditure would equal income. Thus the expenditure should also read £81,565.15s.

NOTES

1. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p125.

The end section is littered with payments for which very few details are given. Some can be identified as entries through inefficient book-keeping, the sums not figuring in expenditure, one more correctly belonging under income. Some of the remainder give only tantalising glimpses of what they were for; £1759.19s.4d. for 'sundry things' to the Mayor and Fellowship of the Merchants of the Staple, £3467.14s.11d. to John Dawtry for 'salt-petre, bowstaves, Maluesis and other charges'.¹ Precise details are impossible to enumerate except for one instance. One payment of £3089.19s.10d. was made to William Hatcliffe, the King's Avener, for victualling the army.² Still extant is a book of charges accounted for by Hatcliffe for the expedition, but not solely for victuals.³ It comprises charges for travel expenses for troops at the Siege of Sluys, Wages for troops, both English and foreign at the Siege, victuals for the army, and expenses for the repassage of troops from Calais at the end of the campaign. The total in the book does not tally with that paid to Hatcliffe, being in excess of £5600, yet it can be accounted for through other entries in Cope of payments to Hatcliffe for aspects of the Siege of Sluys and the cost of shipping troops back to England. The sum he received was thus for victuals and the charge book reveals a great variety including quantities of biscuits, flour, bread and

NOTES

1. E36/285, f76-77. Also recorded were Richard Butler £623.13s.2d. for victuals and Ordnance. Nicholas Morton £502.11s.3d. for victuals. Richard Guildford (master of the King's Ordnance) £674.6s.8d. for ordnance.
2. E36/285, f76. An Avener was Chief Officer of the Stable.
3. E36/208.

beer, Gascon wine, salt beef and fish, stock fish and bean flour, considerable quantities of hay and oats for horses together with unusual items such as candles, anchor cable, hooks for bending crossbows and harness.¹

Interestingly, Hatcliffe's references to shipping are more detailed than Cope's. In addition to details of ownership and name, hire terms and places of origin, Hatcliffe refers to the size, tonnage and ship's complement. Some ships listed by Hatcliffe appear to be Spanish in origin whereas the majority from Cope hail from ports around the English coast from Bristol to Hull. Shipping ordered to 'watch the sea' during July and August appear Spanish in origin; 'Katherine de Ranteria' and the 'Spanish ship Marie Grace', but their captains Thomas Fogge and John Clarke infer otherwise.² The naval aspects of both accounts require deeper study than is desirable here.

One further item that warrants mentioning is beer. References to English relying on beer have been made by other authorities, most notably Mackie. Evidence is not conclusive, yet beer was bought in considerable quantities in 1492. Breweries had earlier been built at Portsmouth, but this was a mistake because of the changes that later took place. Consequently beer had to be purchased from among the local 'bere bruers'. Eight individuals are listed as providing 217 tonnes of beer at a cost of £195.6d., each tonne costing 18s.³ This was expensive considering a later entry for the purchase of 352 tonnes and 3 hogsheads at £200, which puts the price of beer per tonne at 11s.4d.⁴ The economic pressures of supply and demand played their

NOTES

1. This could either mean armour or bridles and saddles.
2. E36/208, f44.
3. E36/285, f75. These men were Thomas Aldy, Thomas Bever, Gerard Byser, Robert Bennett, William Cudborough, Lawrence Capley, John Osborne, John Stonbrigg.
4. E36/285, f76.

role in defining prices during September 1492. This does not reflect a reliance on beer, rather its essential nature in the ordinary man's diet at that time.

Provisioning an army, even for a short period, was expensive. £16805.8s.3d. was spent on supplies while at Sandwich or in France. Even more was spent and recorded under 'Navy and Stores'. There was to be no risk of food shortages such as those suffered in earlier campaigns, even for one as short as this was intended.

'Navy and Stores' formed an expensive section amounting to £13,695.9s.11d. If reliance upon the sea for defence was a simple solution, the converse was so of launching an army on the continent. This problem had been realised early on 10 February 1492. John French had been despatched to gather ships from Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincoln.¹ French's work was insufficient once plans had been changed and two further officers were sent; Anthony Legs and Henry Broke, who extended the search area to include Yorkshire. Their powers were further advanced, enabling them to pay retainer fees for lost income and travel expenses. This cost £933.² These three were undoubtedly not the only officials at work as ships arrived from outside their areas. They had, nevertheless, performed their duties well as the largest blocks of ships did come from their area; '10 ships of Lynne...10 ships of Kingston-upon-Hull...24 ships of Southwark...15 ships of Lowestoft...'³ 168 ships came from their counties alone.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f62. He was paid to £6.13s.4d.
2. E36/285, f62.
3. E36/285, f63-72

The remaining 132 came from as far afield as Middlesborough and Hellsmouth in North Wales, covering in addition the counties of Somerset, Devon, Cornwall and Dorset. The fleet was paid a further £2944.12s.11d. which included wages for the Masters and crews, victuals, and the ships tonnage. Additionally, twenty-two masters were rewarded for their service, varying from 6s.8d. to 30s., but for what service, we are not told.

Only one reference gives precise details as to what the amounts were paid for. The Master of the Erasmus received £27 for wages and victuals for his crew of 72 for six weeks service. £10.10s. was paid for tonnage. It can be calculated that Erasmus was a 210 ton vessel.¹ Hatcliffe's account differs in that the ships tonnage was detailed precisely.

300 ships were insufficient for the revised plans and Dutch ships were hired to supplement the fleet. They were retained only for the outward journey, a period of fifteen days, sufficient for their passage to England, the embarkation and disembarkation at Calais. The exact number of Dutch is difficult to interpret, three entries indicate the figure of 335 vessels; two payments made by Thomas Overey, and a third by Thomas Warley.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f72. Allowing the same rate of 2s. a ton per quarter as received by ship during the Hundred Years War, from C.F. Richmond 'The War at Sea' in Hundred Years War, ed. K. Fowler (1971), p108.

Warley's entry stands out as an example of bad planning costing money. It cost £1157.7s.3d. for an indeterminate number of 'hoyes and other ships of the Dutch Navy' and was paid on 26 June 1492, the approximate date of the original planned invasion.¹

Overey's payments were more accurate. Shipping was numbered originating from ports such as Antwerp, Malines, Middleburg, Arnhem, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft and Dordrecht. 335 ships from fifteen ports.² Two payments were made by Overey, but confusion in the accounting does not give a precise amount as they also included payments for English shipping.³ It can be stated though that 335 Dutch ships cost between £2900 and £4600.

The operation to cross the channel cost £13,695.9s.11d., the largest proportion of £12,663.15s.7d. being for wages, victuals and tonnage of the fleet. £779.12s.4d. was spent on food while the remaining £252.2s. was for sundry items: rigging a galley to carry ordnance, the purchase of ordnance, bows, sheaves of arrows and bills for a ship for Ireland; and royal official's expenses.

The section entitled 'Yet Necessities' covers payments of £4177.12s.4d. under three entries. Initial figures for the first entry are missing, falling with the missing gathering of wages. The total, though, is present; £749.2s.10d., individual items amount to £738.10s.11d.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f59.
2. E36/285, f59-60. The full list includes places difficult to identify their modern equivalent: Barowe, Remeswall, Rossyndale, Upterbare and Tergose.
3. E36/285, f59-61.

so only £10.11s.11d. is unaccounted for.¹

The entry is interrupted in the middle of payments for the carriage of the King's money. It lists expenses for the collectors of the Benevolence together with a payment of 20s. for the carriage of money to the King at Boulogne. Knowing it took until 1501 for the final collection of all money, this could indicate the King's desperate need for ready cash during the campaign.²

Two further entries give an interesting insight into the routine of fifteenth century accounting. The first itemizes equipment:

'greencloth for tolling and accounting upon... 44s.4d.

cost for heating the counting house at St.Paul's....2s.2d.

three paper books for use in accounting.....5s.

the parchment necessary for the indenture bills....12s.

12 lbs of Candles 18d.

30 lb of canvas for making Bags for the King's money 12s.6d.

making the bags..... 8d.

With carriage costs this totalled £4.11s.8d.³

The second entry concerns John Clerk and his assistants' expenses for copying Benevolence payments, at the Bishop's Palace in London, during

NOTES

1. E36/285, f51-56.
2. E36/285, f51-52.
3. E36/285, f53.

a forty week period. This is not interesting in itself except that it details their exact expenses over the initial three weeks. The cost of accounting for each county such as Essex at 6s.8d. and Rutland at 3s.4d., their dinners at 2d. a dinner, 36s. in all,¹ manufacture of the book including copies, and binding, girding and buckling them at 16s.8d. Although it was an intense period, not all the work was completed. John Clerk and two of his assistants continued work after the expedition had returned. Their duties, working from the 'eighth day of purification of our Lady (9 February)...unto the first day of Saint Andrew (30 November)' were poorly rewarded at 4s. a week, no more than 1s.4d. each.²

This section also contains significant references to transport, especially the cost of transporting the King's household goods. John Philip, a London wheeler, supplied 21 'close carts or chariots' for £81.13s.4d., which, adding all the necessary accoutrements of coverings (bear hides) horses, harness and whipcord, cost a staggering total of £228.2s.³ The King's personal diet also formed a considerable single payment between 24 September and 13 December 1492. This included entertainment expenses and personal meals. John Shipley, Clerk of the King's Kitchen, was responsible for the King's diet and spent £602.10s.7d., while John Reading, Clerk of the King's Spicery, spent £80 on spices in Bruges for the King's food.⁴

NOTES

1. This was for six days' work.
2. E36/285, f52.
3. E36/285, f55.
4. E36/285, f57.

In the list of freighting charges for food, individual prices for 1492 can be deduced. An oxen cost 16s., whole dead sheep 21d., a pipe of beef between 40s.8d. and 43s.4d.¹ Fish categorised either as salted cod or line cod² were sold according to quality. Salted cod varied between 40s. and 53s.4d. the 100, while line cod (also salted) cost between £3.5s. and £4 the 100.

Freighting these commodities caused problems, especially the wine. One entry indicates these problems. Richard Cokke, a cooper of London, shipped 50 tonnes from Portsmouth to London, unloaded it at 'Hatter Quay' and 'Haydoke Quay' and 'Waterlane', and carried it to cellars to await shipment elsewhere, presumably France. He charged for fitting 268 hoops on the casks, and 'sponging' 424 hoops at a cost of 35s.4d. 'Sponging' was the act of securing the wine from spillage by tightening the casks with chips of wood.³

These expenses, 'victuals', 'Navy and Stores' and 'Yet Necessities', all entitled 'Foreign Payments', amounted to £48,802.18s.11d. Omitting, for the present, money paid into the King's chamber, £22,277.15s.10d. remains.⁴ This is the most significant portion

NOTES

1. E36/285, f58. Dependent upon whether Cope purchased them at Porchester or London.
2. Cod caught by a line rather than by a net.
3. E36/285, f54. The total bill was 103s.2d., carriage of the wine cost only 40s.
4. See Appendix E for the breakdown of these sums.

of the expenditure; the wages bill. Unfortunately no correlation of this amount has survived as the page containing the sum total is missing. By the process of elimination this figure is calculated and is as accurate as possible until the missing gathering is found. Over sixty-five pages do survive, twice as many as are assumed lost. For the pages we can examine, the wages total is £14,295.3s.1d., thus leaving a similar proportion of wages missing as there are pages missing (one third or £7982.12s.9d.)¹

The wages are listed according to rank, commencing with Thomas, Marquis of Dorset, and ending abruptly during the account to a minor esquire, William Middleton and his four archers. The list is irrefutably incomplete, omitting many lords known to be present such as John de Vere, earl of Oxford. Yet given the rank order of the list, these should have been included with the eighteen lords who were accounted for. This anomaly can be resolved. Contemporary accounts indicate the army marched in a number of battles or army groups, varying from two to four, depending on which source is examined.² Once the army left the pale of Calais it divided into two sections, the main battle, with the King, advanced upon Boulogne. A smaller force, under Oxford, was detached upon a wider sweep into French territory sacking the towns of Ardes and Mountorye. Conceivably, as Oxford's wages together with a third of the total are missing, they comprise those made to this detached force and were treated separately in Cope's accounts. A large force would not have been committed for this purpose, one third would have been appropriate,

NOTES

1. E36/285, f18-50.
2. Vergil, p57, states four battles while the Chronicle of Calais, p2, refers to two.

commanded as it was by the trusted Oxford. This theory has one flaw. All Oxford's force should be missing yet we know he was accompanied by the Lords Shrewsbury, Devon, Suffolk, Essex, Strange and Hastings and wage payments exist for all of these.¹ Why are these Lords' accounts present and Oxford's missing? There is a possible explanation.

All the Lords mentioned were young men, or rather they were not older than thirty-four years of age in 1492. They had seen little military action, especially upon foreign soil. Desire for military success could have driven them to request participation in any action and wishing to placate their fervour, the King could have granted them permission to temporarily attach themselves to Oxford's group. Their contingents would have remained with the King's battle. This problem is only a minor one and should not distract us from what valuable information is contained within the wages accounts.

Such information varies from the period of service to travel expenses and areas that exhibited support for the monarch to individual support for their King.

Some retinues were gathered from just one locality, for example that from which the captain received an income. Others had their living and estates spread across England and raising their retinues must have been minor feats of organisation in themselves. Thomas, Marquis of

NOTES

1. Chronicle of Calais, p2. Annales, p476. Excerpta Historica, p85.

Dorset had a following of 222 men, comprised of himself, as a knight, four spears, ten demilancers and 174 archers.¹ These men came from as far across the country as Lancashire, Shropshire and Cornwall and were paid 6d. for every twenty miles travelled, no distinction being made between those on foot and those on horseback.² Ten travelled 235 miles between Lancashire and Canterbury, while the largest group, of 73 men, unsurprisingly, travelled the fifty miles from London. £13.18s.3d. was paid in travel expenses to Thomas' men.

Each soldier's daily wage was listed; 2 shillings for a knight, 18d. for a spear, 9d. for a demilancer and 6d. for an archer. Thomas, Marquis of Dorset's retinue served from 17 September to 5 December 1492 receiving £450 in wages. Eleven weeks and three days service meant individually they received £8 for Thomas, £6 for a spear, £3 for the demilancers, while the archers received £2. To this would have been added other indeterminate sums such as rewards of battle, ransom and shares of captured booty. For anyone below the rank of retinue leader, this only amounted to a third share of the total value of their personal capture. One further third was given to their retinue captains, the final third

NOTES

1. E36/285, f18. The remaining 13 were presumably 'Custrels and pages' attendant upon a knight and other men-at-arms.
2. E36/285, f18. The complete list reads - London 73 men, Cornwall 45, Somerset 8, county of Warwick 52, Wiltshire 8, Hertfordshire 2, Northampton 3, Shropshire 5, Lancashire 10, Essex 6, Oxfordshire 8.

went to the King.¹

The single largest payment of wages, other than the King's guard, was made to Sir John Savage's retinue, or rather his deputy considering Savage was one of only three named casualties during the expedition.² Savage's wages bill of £782 was matched by his travelling expenses for £48.10s. as the largest payment. His retinue of 368 men travelled considerable distances to reach Canterbury.³

Of the 118 entries extant in Cope, 62 did not receive travel expenses. Of these, sixteen came from Sluys, and were presumably paid earlier, while a further six joined at Calais.⁴ Conceivably the remaining forty travelled less than fifty miles to join the musters at Kent and so could not claim. The bill for travel expenses for the fifty-six permitted to claim came to £715.3s.3d. These expenses form only 5% of the surviving wages. Given a similar percentage in the missing pages £399.2s.7d. would allow for expenses there. The accuracy of such a sum is doubtful, but with no other means of account, one has no choice but to extrapolate such an amount.

NOTES

1. E163 22/3/3 Ordnances for War, p28. E101 72/3, 4, 5 and 6. This was an ancient custom reinforced through each captain's agreement.
2. Anglica Historia, p159. The other two were George (?) de Vere. Hall, p452-3 and Sir Thomas Milbone E36/285, f32.
3. E36/285, f27, 200 men travelled 220 miles from Clifton (Derbyshire ?), 174 travelled 200 miles from Mansfield (Macclesfield ?) in the county of Chester. The greatest distance travelled was 320 miles by Sir John a Musgrave from Bowcastle and Clement Shelton Esquire from Carlisle. E36/285, f30 and f41.
4. These were Giles Lord Daubeney, Gracion de Alnezade, Sir James Tyrell, Roland de Bella Ville Esquire, John Soidrac and Pierre Champagne, E36/285,, f20, 23, 44 and 45.

The extant wages, less expenses, amounted to £13,569.16s.10d. The King's Royal guard received the greatest single payment. For accounting purposes they were listed under their captain, Sir Charles Somerset and on their behalf he received £1109.18s. The guard contained Somerset, as a knight, eight demilancers, 157 yeomen at 12d. four yeomen at 8d., presumably archer sergeants, and 101 archers. Losses during the campaign reduced their numbers by two demilancers, one yeoman, one archer sergeant and one archer. Two archer sergeants and the yeomen remained on the payroll until the last possible moment, while the remainder ceased to be paid after 18 December. Considering Henry had returned to Dover by 17 December he would have been accompanied by some of his bodyguard and it was presumably these that carried out this duty, that is eight demilancers, one archer sergeant and 100 archers.¹

Among the wages one anomaly remains. William Bulstrode and eleven men attended the muster at Canterbury, travelling 150 miles and were paid 28s.6d. for their expenses. However, they were not retained for the King's service, either they were not suitable or they arrived too late for the passage, but were still paid for their trouble.²

The wages bill accounts £13,569.16s.10d. for 7876 men. We know that a further £7982.12s.9d. is unaccounted for and must fall within the missing gathering covering wages. By a simple equation, deducting 5% for travel expenses leaving £7583.16s.2d. a further 4402 soldiers can be

NOTES

1. E36/285, f23-24.
2. E36/285, f45.

assumed to be contained within the missing gathering. Thus a total force of 12,278 troops should be contained within the wages accounts on this basis.

Finally the wages accounts detail some of those who paid out the wages to the individual captains. William Hungat was the most frequently mentioned 'muster-roller', as Cope terms these men, but this term was only used twenty-six times out of 118 and only six men were so named.¹

All that remains to be discussed is Henry's profit. With the account not being concluded until 1501, a profit was not immediately apparent, yet £8300 was paid into the King's Chamber by Thomas Lovell on 12 January, through a bill by John Heron. Heron appears to be responsible for collecting together these amounts, two other entries of money, paid to Lovell, are under his name. In 1493 Heron was Lovell's assistant accountant, and in 1506 he succeeded Lovell in the capacity of Treasurer of the Chamber. Could it be that his appointment had been influenced by his work in the year 1492-3?² Nearly £1000 appears in the form of twenty-six bills of rewards, gifts and expenses returned to the Chamber by Heron. Apparently these were unclaimed and returned to the King. One can only speculate as to why, and whether Henry was happy to see his gifts returned? £10,485.9d. was delivered into the Chamber as his surplus for

NOTES

1. The others were Thomas Stoke, Nicholas Kirkham, Humphrey Sarrard, John Lee and William Hatcliffe.
2. The date of Heron's appointment to Treasurer is difficult to ascertain and could conceivably have occurred earlier than 1506. J.R. Hooke's article 'Some cautionary notes for Henry VII's Household and Chamber System' Speculum XXXII (1958), pp69, 75 cited in S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, p126, n.3.

the expedition, but this was not the total profit.¹

There are entries in Cope that indicate the inclusion of certain expenses that, arguably, belonged in other accounts such as Household or Privy Accounts. Alternatively, no one at the time knew exactly where these should have been incorporated.

The King's diet cost £602.10s.7d. while in France, yet one payment of £100 was dated from when Henry was back in England.² Gilwyn Ap Rice received £47.6s.8d. at Shene on 8 May 1492 for horses bought by Henry. Given that £1 to £2 was a good price for a horse this appears to be excessive. Either these were exceptional horses, or a considerable number for the King's personal use.³

Payments for the King's Guard on campaigns was justified, but the majority served for four months rather than the average three. Additionally, Charles Somerset was credited with a separate payment of £18.13s.4d. for the guard from 1 September to 18 September. At this time Henry was on his way to the musters, the invasion had not yet begun.⁴

One cannot argue over the payment to John, Yeoman of the King's robes, of £304.4d. for coats of arms, banners, royal Standards and other apparel, these were necessary for a Royal army. However, the following entry could appear wrongly placed. £1970.7s.9d. was paid to John Shaw, the King's goldsmith, for embellishing the King's personal armour. The armour had been decorated with considerable quantities of gold, pearls and

NOTES

1. E36/285, f80.
2. E36/285, f57.
3. E36/285, f74.
4. E36/285, f73.

other precious stones, in addition to gilding the horse harness and other pieces. This flamboyant armour was necessary as Henry would have wanted to impress the French Ambassadors, important considering the later negotiations.¹

Also included were the expenses for the construction of the dock and harbour defences at Portsmouth, costing £2343.2s.9d.² This construction was necessary because of the growing importance of naval power during the Tudor period, but such a programme was not a short-term project and justifying it on the grounds of the expedition in 1492 is questionable, but perhaps not unexpected.

£10,485 was the sum of income over expenses paid into the Chamber from Cope's account, but with the above entries a further £5490.1s.5d. could be added. But should it be?

Finally, to this sum must be added a further £125,858 which Cope was not responsible for, but was granted in one form or another. Altogether a total of £136,343, a massive sum which rivals the sum Henry gained through the Treaty of Etaples.

In conclusion, we can only be impressed by the thought and planning taken over the expedition. The accounts exhibit a high degree of complexity, of which most of the responsibility must be credited to the King's advisers and counsellors, yet we cannot overlook Henry's undoubted role in the planning.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f74.
2. There were four entries concerning the dock's construction:-

E36/285, f73	£1369. 4s. 6d.
f73	£ 595. 11s. 7d.
f76	£ 136. 13s. 4d.
f78	£ 241. 13s. 4d.
	<u>£2343. 2s. 9d.</u>

Cope's Receipts are a detailed and exact account of the collection and expenditure of the money for 1492. Unfortunately there are arithmetical mistakes, not surprising considering the chequered cloth system was still used 300 years after its conception. Despite these crude problems, the final debits and credits balance (we must make this assumption as there is insufficient evidence to prove otherwise) and £136,343 profit appears an excessive amount and one that would have been talked about at the time, or referred to in contemporary accounts. It was far from intentional; a small part consisted of returned rewards, and how many others were accepted and have not been accounted thus reducing the amount of the profit? The fact that such a large amount was accrued over the expedition was testament more to the problems of raising money quickly. In all probability this sum was unknown to Henry and I have many reservations about its accuracy. Henry had set out for reasons other than profit in 1492, his domestic and international standing were more at stake than his monetary requirements. A treaty such as gained by Edward IV in 1475 would have been uppermost in his thoughts, while any extra gained through prudent management or otherwise was a bonus.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT

Determination of the level of support, both financial and military, which Henry VII received for the expedition involves complex analysis. Evidence for earlier expeditions has survived to a greater degree and subsequent knowledge of their levels of support have been more accurately deduced. In his work on the subject, Powicke¹ has indicated the level of support Henry V received, and has shown that with the withdrawal of this support and loss of interest in the French wars, the loss of the Hundred Years War and English territory inevitably followed. He concludes by saying it was 'causally related..(to)..the decline of parliamentary taxation'² that accelerated this loss. Interestingly, A.E. Goodman's work on Yorkshire³ takes this further and is able to illustrate the level of response, ability to serve and explanation for refusal to serve in Henry V's armies and can do so through the survival of relevant documentation.⁴ It is more difficult to assess the support for Edward IV's campaign in 1475 and is closer to the problem of 1492, yet it too has more extant sources and a detailed survey has been completed by J.R. Lander.⁵

Compounding the problem of 1492 is not simply the lack of sources, but additionally the incompleteness of surviving ones. Consequently, Powicke can confidently state that twenty peers supported Henry V with over half the total force of the Agincourt campaign,⁶ while Lander can reflect similar support for Edward IV.⁷ For Henry VII we cannot be so

NOTES

1. Op.cit.
2. Ibid, p382.
3. A.E. Goodman, 'Responses to Requests in Yorkshire for Military Service under Henry V' Northern History, vol. XVII (1981).
4. The work is based upon a document catalogues as a 'Role of excuses from Military Service (York)', Public Record Office, Exchequer Various Accounts.
5. J.R. Lander. Crown and Nobility, pp223-241.
6. M.R. Powicke - op.cit. p373.
7. 37 peers led 7667 troops out of a total of 13020 (59%) Appendix E J.R. Lander op.cit.

precise and can only speculate given available evidence. Yet, surprising details do emerge. Of fifty-six peers known and old enough to serve in 1492¹ twenty-five (45%) can be positively identified as present with the King,² a further three indentured lords most probably did, making the attendance 50%. Significant as this is it is not as high as we might expect. The Burton Abbey Register suggests the attendance of a further six lords; three were Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, Thomas Stanley, Earl of Derby and John Ratcliffe, Lord Fitzwalter and together this would make thirty-four nobles or 61% attendance. Were the remainder expressing their dissatisfaction towards the King for his failure to employ them in administrative posts, during his early years, in the only way they dared to? Some might conceivably have been employed on the Regency council. No list has survived to confirm even Bedford's presence and the council could conceal other missing nobles.³

What of the numbers of troops these peers led? Unfortunately only sixteen have their retinues recorded and these account for 2058 troops out of 7843, only 26%. If we include the three indentured lords, where presence and exact retinue is unconfirmed, this figure rises to 2311. To do this we must also add other indentured persons and so the total also increases to 9095, thus reducing the lords proportion to 24.5%.⁴ This

NOTES

1. Although Henry Algernon, Earl of Northumberland's retinue was repassaged he was only 15 in 1492 and it is doubtful he was present.
2. These are peers referred to either in Cope, Hatcliffe, the Memorial outside Boulogne or the Chronicle of Calais.
3. Jasper Tudor, Duke of Bedford, was thought to have attended although 61 in 1492. Miss Condon's work suggests he was on Prince Arthur's council. He was not a signatory to the Memorial for peace at Boulogne, as would have been expected. Cope mentions that Bedford's retinue was led by his esquire, Owen Ap Janken (two spears and sixty archers from South Wales, E36/285, f45).
4. If we also add the Burton Abbey Register figures, the lords' total rises to 2956 out of 11,806 or 25%, a consistent proportion of the total force.

would appear to support the premise that the nobility were showing dissatisfaction, and were unwilling to support the enterprise. Alternatively, they were unable to. Comparing this with the expeditions of Henry V and Edward IV reveals a stark contrast. The peers of both monarchs raised retinues that constituted half of their respective forces and with fewer individual retinues. This can be explained. Both Henry V and Edward IV found considerable support from their brothers. For Henry V, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, led 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers, while Thomas, Duke of Clarence, contracted for the largest single company of 240 men-at-arms and 720 archers. John, Duke of Bedford, was entrusted as guardian of England and ably supported the King in that capacity.¹ Although such quality of support was lacking for Edward IV, the quantity was not. Richard, Duke of Gloucester and George, Duke of Clarence, each led ten men-at-arms, one hundred lancers and one thousand archers.² Henry VII had no such brothers nor any peer capable of leading a retinue approaching these figures.

Additional to the support of brothers for Henry V, Powicke classifies retinues of more than twenty men-at-arms as 'Greater companies'.³ For 1492 there are only eleven such companies identifiable amongst the indentures, only four of which were lords; Lord Powis, 61 men-at-arms/10 archers, Viscount Welles23/29, and twenty halberdiers, George Earl of Kent, 22/81, and Lord Hastings 20/66 and twenty others.⁴ The remainder, bar one, were knights. The largest were Sir Rhys Ap Thomas, 259/60 plus 200 spears,⁵ Sir Richard Pole 101/20 and 20 others,⁶

NOTES

1. M.R. Powicke, op.cit, p373.
2. J.R. Lander, op.cit, p237 and Appendix E.
3. Op.cit, p373.
4. E101/72/3 nos. 2, and 7;/5 no.23;/6 no.3 respectively.
5. E101/72/6, no.9. The 200 spears could have been men-at-arms as the term spear was often used to denote them. In this case the word was 'sprete' meaning the long pole spear used by foot soldiers traditional to North Wales.
6. E101/72/4, no.14.

Sir John Savage 60/140¹ and Sir Reynolde Bray 36/308.²

The fact was very different from the promises. There were only eight 'Great companies' identifiable through Cope with only one led by a lord, Lord Strange 53/357.³ One other was listed under the section heading of 'Barons', but this was led by a foreign mercenary recruited at Calais; Gracion de Alnevezarde leading 45 spears, 49 demilancers, seventeen men at 13d a day and sixteen men at 6d a day.⁴ The remaining companies which can be called 'Great' were led by knights; Richard Pole 102/195,⁵ John Savage 36/330,⁶ Rhys Ap Thomas 298/292,⁷ James Tyrell 41/120 and 31 crossbows,⁸ and Edward Borough 27/148.⁹ Apart from Tyrell, all ratios varying significantly away from the preferred one. On examination of other lords known to be present, only Thomas, Marquis of Dorset, comes close to the title of 'Great Captain' with 15/194,¹⁰ while George, Earl of Shrewsbury 7/283,¹¹ and Edward, Earl of Devon 5/174,¹² reveal ratios in excess of thirty to one. Even Bedford's retinue led by Owen Ap Janken amounted to only 2/60.¹³

Although knights like Thomas and Savage brought significant numbers of men-at-arms, most of the remainder brought small retinues of men-at-arms, even a knight like Sir Edward Poynings could only find four in his retinue of 4/189.¹⁴

NOTES

1. E101/72/4, no.16.
2. E101/72/3, no.10. The others were Sir John Grays 70/32, E101/72/3, no.14, Sir Walter Herbert 25/100, E101/72/6, no.2 and the 'other'; Richard Clifford 25/6 E101/72/5, no.7.
3. E36/285, f22.
4. E36/285, f23.
5. E36/285, f25. Overall a slight decrease compared to his indenture.
6. E36/285, f27. A large drop in the number of men-at-arms he promised, compensated by the considerable increase in archers.
7. E36/285, f35. An increase on both counts except archers replaced spearmen.
8. E36/285, f28.
9. E36/285, f34.
10. E36/285, f18.
11. E36/285, f19.
12. E36/285, f19.
13. E36/285, f45.
14. E36/285, f26. Only one other knight led a substantial force; Robert Curzon 8/203, E36/285, f33.

The squires and other gentlemen fared little better. The largest were John Morton 4/126,¹ William Stanley 0/82,² and John Huse 4/37,³ all squires; Mathew Baker with 1/31⁴ was the leading gentleman.

Even the King's guard, led by Sir Charles Somerset, did not follow the traditional ratio with nine men-at-arms, 156 yeomen at 12d a day, four yeomen at 8d a day and 101 archers.⁵ Additionally, men from the King's household, led by Christopher Vincent, amounted to 19 men-at-arms and 161 archers.⁶ The only Bishop to lead a retinue was the Bishop of Bath with 13 men-at-arms and 131 archers.⁷

Although large retinues were lacking the army was achieved by numerous small retinues led by knights, squires and gentlemen. So far up to 162 retinues of this type can be positively identified, but only sixty could be called men of prominence, that is, having retinues of at least twenty men. The remainder either led smaller retinues or their presence is known but their retinue size is not. While such attendance and retinue size is not impressive it is considerably more than that which Lander ascribes to the expedition of 1475.⁸ It is not, however, sufficient to indicate major support, or indifference, or hostility to Henry VII's war policy, as Lander feels confident in reflecting so for Edward IV in 1475.⁹

Although these figures do not show the King could call on a few individuals for maximum support, they do give evidence for the widespread existence of sizable retinues. This confirms Cameron's argument in his article; yet some of his details are incorrectly stated due to his reliance on The Burton Abbey Register rather than Cope's Wages accounts.¹⁰ However, both do reflect the potential of these retinues and must not distract us from the excellence of Cameron's article.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f48.
2. E36/285, f41.
3. E36/285, f41.
4. E36/285, f47.
5. E36/285, f23-4.
6. E36/285, f37-41. Vincent was Marshal of the King's Hall. Interestingly all those he led were named, some with their positions in the Household and five at their own cost; John Shirley, Clerk of the Kitchen, William Ratcliffe, Sergeant of the Cellar, Edward Sharpe and Thomas Barnard of the Acatric, and Ralph Woodward.
7. E36/285, f37.
8. Lander, op.cit., p239.
9. Ibid.
10. A. Cameron, The Giving of Livery and Retaining in Henry VII's reign, op.cit., p22-3

The analysis of finance is also indicative of ability or inability to support the King. The nobility's contributions to the Benevolence were recorded. Twelve peers and three peeresses donated £3431.6s.8d. out of the total £48,488.16s.8d., only 7.1%, but even half of this sum came from the three peeresses. However, nine of these lords actually attended with retinues, two probably did so, only John, Lord Denham did not, but he was on Arthur's regency council. Unsurprisingly the most generous donation came from Henry's mother, the countess of Richmond; £666.13s.4d; the Duchess of York gave £100, while the Duchess of Norfolk gave £326.13s.4d. John, Lord Denham led the noble payments with £400, while Edward, Lord Hastings could manage only a meagre £28 in comparison.¹ Notable in their absence from the list of nobles were John de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Thomas Grey, Marquis of Dorset and George Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury to name but three. Yet in theory payment was in lieu of attendance and these did attend, but then how does this explain those nine lords who did both? Altogether 44 peers did not contribute towards the Benevolence. Cross referencing these with those who attended, excluding John, Lord Denham and Jasper, Duke of Bedford who were on Arthur's council, we are left with 19 lords who neither contributed nor attended; thus 34% of the nobility did nothing to assist the King in 1492. These included Edward Stafford, Earl of Wiltshire, William Beaumont, Viscount Beaumont and Richard Beauchamp, Lord Beauchamp. 66% support appears substantial, but when it only amounts to 20% of the army and 3.3% of the Benevolence this significance dwindles. It would appear that by 1492 the English nobility was either depleted financially, their ability to support the monarch limited, or they just did not wish to support him. Nevertheless, they did attend in comparatively large numbers, between 50% and 60%, but nowhere achieving the retinue numbers of their counterparts for Henry V and Edward IV.

NOTES

1. E36/285, f7. See also Appendix B.

In 1415 the nobility were wealthier, Henry V had no problems raising finance for his campaign, but Edward IV also faced financial problems of the same nature as Henry VII. In 1475 the nobility only contributed £246l.3s.4d. of the Parliamentary levy of one tenth.¹ This appears to support the argument that the decline of the position of the nobility had been a gradual process between the reigns of Henry V and Henry VIII and was not something peculiar to Henry VII. Alternatively, the nobility were simply not interested in foreign enterprises of a military nature. Can we see here the beginning of the insular attitude of the English as a whole?

Examination of the clergy reveals a similar pattern. Although not expected to lead retinues, although one did,² they would have been expected to support the King financially. Clerical taxation showed considerable support amounting to over £40,000. However, individually this was not the case through the Benevolence. Only nine Bishops recorded payments towards the Benevolence, varying from £100 from the Bishop of Chester to £1500 from Piers Courtney, Bishop of Winchester.³ For the lower clergy, Winchester again appears wealthier; the prior of St. Swithin's contributed £333.6s.8d. Only four ordinary priests are mentioned⁴ while monastic houses varied considerably from Waverley's £20 to Chertsey's £133.6s.8d.

The total clerical contribution amounted to £5523.6s.8d. Why so few clergy paid and little was raised is difficult to ascertain. Neither Archbishops are mentioned, which is strange considering John Morton's support for Henry, and only half of the Diocesan bishops contributed.

NOTES

1. Lander, op.cit., p226.
2. Richard Fox, Bishop for Bath and Wells led 10 spears, 3 demilancers and 131 archers. He also donated £266.13s.4d. to the Benevolence, but then he was Keeper of the Privy Seal. E36/285, f36 and f6-7.
3. E36/285, f6-7. Full details can be found in Appendix B.
4. Bostock priest £60. Martin Priest £50. Thomas Burwelt £33.1s.8d., and Robert Tyworth 66s.8d. E36/285, f7.

Financial support from the ranks below the nobility and clergy appears to be more decisive. The Parliamentary grants raised in excess of £27,000: the Benevolence achieved more than £48,000. As has been stated, only a small proportion of these sums came from the nobility, that is, both temporal and spiritual. Consequently, the major portion came from the lower classes in society; knights, merchants and commoners; the very people whom Lander would have us believe were 'hostile to the war policy in 1475'. Can it be that most of the population were "Lancastrians" deep down, or had popular opinion of foreign involvement changed so dramatically over sixteen years? This could be the case and with a just cause, an even more plausible argument. The modern analogy of the Falklands crisis shows how popular anti-war fervour can very quickly change and how flagging support for a leader can be revived through taking an openly hostile attitude towards an apparent aggressor. Similarly, Henry V had a just cause in 1415. Edward IV though was trying to deflect the energies of his more military minded subjects and Parliament itself was clearly suspicious of his motives. In the Parliamentary grant for that expedition the members added a proviso that any money not spent was to be returned to the taxpayers.¹ Henry VII did not have a cause so glorious as Henry V (yet he did make allusions towards Henry V in his use of designs on the cover of his Book of Ordnances, see Appendix D), nor a Falklands of Mrs. Thatcher. However, the cause of Anne of Brittany may have stirred the hearts of the ordinary tax-paying Englishman.

NOTES

1. Lander, op.cit, p226.

£39,534.3s.4d. was donated and promised by the knights and commoners. Why such a large sum when they had already paid one tenth, and one tenth and fifteenth amounting to a sum approaching £60,000? Could this reflect the deep changes occurring in English society during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? Alternatively, the 'Hundred Years War' and the 'Wars of the Roses' may have taken such a toll on the wealth and motivation of the nobility they found it difficult to support the crown, while the wealth of the knights and merchant classes had grown so considerably that they could afford to, and wished to, financially support ventures by the crown. This is evident from the sums received. Of 72 individual entries entitled 'Sundry Personnes of the Laisee',¹ contributions varied from £500 by Sir Reynolde Bray, to 23s.4d. by Johanne Couper, a widow of Southampton.² £4543.11s.6d. came from such individuals, an average of £40.³ The remainder in global sums came from county contributions. Lincolnshire showed either great wealth or great support or both, giving £3356.8d., while Hereford showed the reverse with only £49.10s.⁴

NOTES

1. E36/285, f7-16.
2. E36/285, f7-8.
3. This is a modal average. The median is £250.11s.8d. and the mean £63.2s.1d.
4. E36/285, f14a and f14b. For Herefordshire individuals were named, the Prior of Hereford £34, Sir Edward Nime 20s and Sir John Fortescue £14.10s.

The ranks of knights, gentlemen, squires and the merchant classes were therefore sufficiently motivated for them to provide the largest financial and military proportions of the largest army that had left England since the campaigns of Edward III. Henry could not have achieved this without considerable backing for the principles behind the expedition. Vergil goes further.¹ He states that when the English heard of Maximilian's failure to support their venture against Charles VIII:

'all who heard the story were astonished that (the) man...could remain passive and not aid the English in their attack upon the common enemy.'²

This eagerness for the cause, or could it be simply anti-French feelings or a lust for booty, also finds more support from Vergil through his references to the necessity to publish the document outlining the reasons for declaring peace before the cause had been won. The declaration upset the English army and the soldiers were:

'immeasurably grieved that this unreasonable agreement should deprive them of the occasions of successful action - an occasion...they had...long and earnestly sought, and which they despaired of readily coming upon afterwards. Wherefore they were indignant and angry with Henry.'³

Vergil is referring to the Memorial outside Boulogne,⁴ The publication of this, with its numerous references to the hazards of continuing the campaign, reflects there was a level of support for continuing the action that had to be pacified in order to allow peace negotiations and the subsequent declaration of peace to have a smooth

NOTES

1. Unsurprisingly Hall reflects this point, only more strongly.
2. Vergil op.cit., p55. Hall, however, puts it: 'they marvayled and wondered greatly...Maximilian's receavyng such great vilany not longe before at the hand of Kyng Charles was not present to pricke them forward, to cry and call, to move and excite the Englishman?'
3. op.cit., p57.
4. Foedera, p490.

passage. Signed by eighty-one leading nobles, knights and gentlemen it indicates the spread of support for the King's action. It purports to be a memorial from these captains entreating Henry to accept the terms offered by the French. It was more a document produced to explain to the ordinary soldier and captains why the cause was being abandoned, hoping to placate them. The army had to be reminded that their successes were greater than those of Edward IV, with greater added problems to face. The peace terms were generous, it was pointed out that to refuse would have caused uproar in England. Worded in such strong terms it was expected to encourage the King's acceptance of the treaty and speedy return to England. But Vergil and Hall, the ordinary soldiers, and many in England, were not so easily convinced. Is this indicative of support for the expedition's cause and anger at its premature conclusion? Conversely it could indicate anger for expending money and resources for very little gain and a mistrust of the King's true motive for the invasion. Nevertheless it is recorded that Henry returned in triumph to his capital, the Mayor and Aldermen and the commoners dressed in violet, meeting him at Blackheath and leading him to St. Paul's, through streets of cheering crowds no doubt.¹ This was either a spontaneous show of loyalty, affection and joy at the King's safe return and success, or a well stage-managed affair by the King's agents, or the councillors of London were afraid anything to the contrary would have angered his majesty.

From the sources it is difficult to assess the true nature of support for the venture. Even the Paston Letters, normally forthright in their version of feelings, leave only ambiguous evidence. William Paston, stating his intention to join the King, does so in such a matter-of-fact way that could indicate indifference, a sense of duty or simply

NOTES

1. The Chronicle of London, ppl97-8.

inevitability about his participation.¹ Roger L'Estrange, in his letter to Sir John Paston, conversely gives a sense of desperation, almost fear, that if he did not reach his quota of troops he would suffer the King's anger. He beseeches Sir John's help and even that of Sir Terry Robart, a neighbour of the Paston's, to raise or find him three archers, promising them not only the King's wages but 'some what elles' besides.²

It is also unclear whether the Parliament of 1491, which voted the grants for the expedition, had any depth of support for Henry. Edward IV found his Parliament had deep reservations for his expedition, requiring the repayment of unspent money and not even trusting him with the money: any amounts raised were not to be paid into the Royal Exchequer, but a committee of trustees including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Ely.³ There were no such conditions upon Henry. His Parliament appeared more concerned with guarantees that Captains, appointed to lead contingents, did so properly and ensured the correct payment of their soldiers. Superficially it appears Henry had the full backing of Parliament, both Lords and Commons. At least six of his thirteen chief ministers were present on the campaign and over half of the Lords (temporal). Yet when we examine the Commons it is a different matter. Of 294 M.P.'s present in 1491,⁴ only 28 (9½%) can be positively identified as supporting the King through their presence with a retinue, through giving money in the Benevolence, or both.⁵ Only six sheriffs mentioned in the

NOTES

1. The Paston Letters, p143.
2. Ibid.
3. Lander op.cit, p226.
4. History of Parliament, 1439-1509, J.C. Wedgwood, 1938, p551. There were no M.P.'s for Bath.
5. Only four can be identified as doing both: Sir John Fortescue led 9 demilancers/58 archers and gave £14. Sir Thomas Lovell 5 spears, 13 demilancers/174 archers and gave £400. Thomas Knight Esquire and Sir Reynolde Bray led retinues as shown by Hatcliffe and gave £160 and £500 respectively.

Parliamentary rolls for 1491 can be similarly identified, although their lack of leading retinues is not surprising as they would need to be present in England to watch and protect the country.¹ This duty did not exclude them from giving monetary aid. Only one did so, Sir Edward Berkeley, sheriff of Hampshire, gave £120.² This reflects only limited support. Parliament had been prepared to vote money, but very few members went so far as to assist personally.

Contradictory evidence can be found, such as the Commissioners required to enlist the support of the men of their counties or Lordships.³ Of 96 named commissioners, 39 (41%) personally raised and led retinues and more presumably did so, but so far the evidence evades us. This is still a significant proportion, but not sufficient on its own to be indicative of overwhelming support. It could be expected that those required to persuade others to join the King should raise and lead retinues of their own to lead by example, and it could be as many as 59% did not do so.

It does begin to be apparent that enthusiasm was there amongst some of the King's subjects, but was not the same as that for the campaigns of Henry V. In 1492 England was no longer a land of military adventurers as could be said of 1415. Was it that already these men had been replaced by men better versed in trading skills than martial ones and were attracted more to ventures and expeditions such as those of the Cabots at the end of the fifteenth century? Perhaps the process of making England 'a nation of shopkeepers' as Napoleon believed, had already begun by the end of this period.

NOTES

1. C.P.R. 1485-94, vol.1, p400. The sheriffs of the Southern counties were order to keep ready and watch at all times.
2. E36/285, f8.
3. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.1, pp348-9.

Perhaps one explanation for the lack of participation by the nobility could be their age. Either lords were too young or too old and infirm to take part. Analysis of their known ages reveals interesting details. The oldest peer attendant was 57 years of age, a place of virtue held jointly by Thomas Stanley, Earl of Derby and Henry, Lord Grey of Codnor. The youngest could have been Henry Algernon, Earl of Northumberland, 14 in 1492, today he would have been classed too young. His attendance was not certain, the references only talk of his retinue as if he was not with it. The youngest positively identified could fall to either George Neville, Lord Bergavenny, or Edmund, Duke of Suffolk. It is difficult to say which as neither have a confirmed birth date. George Neville is believed born in 1471 while Edmund was supposedly born in 1472, making him the younger, but both or either could be a year out either way.

Consequently youth nor old age stopped lords attending, but what of the non-attenders. The youngest identifiable was Lord Beauchamp of Powicke at 17, the oldest was Reynold, Lord Grey of Wilton, at 71 a grand age even by today's standards of longevity. Of the 34 known to have attended the age of 27 is known,¹ the average age being 36 (fifteen were actually aged between 20 and 36). Of the 19 lords who nether attended nor gave Benevolence money² the age of 12 is known. Their average age was 44, but seven were either 50 or over, four were under 30. Only two over 50 attended and eight under 30 years.

It can therefore be stated that age was not a significant factor as to attendance or non-attendance, but it could be said that the ideal age for attendance was between 30 and 50. In this case only one lord, Henry Clifford, Lord Clifford, was notable for his absence. On this basis support from the nobility was virtually unanimous.

NOTES

1. Of the remaining seven, four have the dates of their death known.
2. This also excludes Bedford as his retinue was there.

The evidence therefore has generally shown rather a lack of enthusiasm and overwhelming support for the expedition, yet we are unfortunate in not knowing all the reasons why most people were not so inclined. Explanations have been recounted for those not prepared to join Henry V at a time when military fervour was at its height.¹ Such evidence is lacking for Henry VII. Those not wishing to join Henry V needed good excuses not to do so, by Henry VII's reign there were no great expectations and the commissioners did not need to record reasons for refusal in such detail. Despite this some did show their disinclination openly and felt a need to explain themselves.

Henry had begun his preparations early. Indentures indicating the willingness and agreement to raise retinues were issued and the earliest were signed from 6 March 1492 onwards.² In appearance these documents seem to have been signed at or near the King's residence after discussion with his majesty. They form a stylised pattern throughout. Each indenture was a prewritten agreement with space left for the contracted to add in the precise details of their retinue. It is more likely though that these were issued in duplicate, via the King's commissioners, to the most prominent men in each county or Lordship, and left for them to read and complete at their convenience. Upon completion they would be signed and sealed and returned to the King. This is supported by the evidence of a number of duplicate copies amongst the Indentures for 1492, but is incomplete, that is no retinues were entered, only the recipients' names having been included.

NOTES

1. A.E. Goodman, op.cit.
2. E101 72/3, 4, 5 & 6.

There are ten sets of duplicates,¹ only two of which were signed. None are identified by the indentured person being referred to in any other source. In all probability the recipient decided he had no intention of organising a retinue and was not sufficiently in awe of the King to keep such an opinion from him. In one particular case the recipient even went so far as to have his opinion recorded in writing on the reverse of one of the copies. 'Arthur Kenys' stated his case thus:

'he hath paid all his money and (that) he never promised man, but only to pay his money as he was sessed by my lord chancellor'.²

Two others were also inscribed with messages for the King. Sir Edward Morris told the King that he:

'hath nothing wherewith to do the King service without help of his grace and as for his presence he is ready at all times.'³

John Parker, esquire, had an even better excuse, if it can be called that, for not finding a retinue. It was his wife who spoke for him stating that John:

'dwelleth in Chepstowe and he is in the north country and there lieth in peril of death by a fall off a horse.'⁴

It is apparent that Henry did not receive unmitigated support, the evidence though indicates to the contrary that the population was generally willing to see the King support a good cause. The money was found and the largest army to leave England since Crecy was put upon French soil and gained at least financial success!

NOTES

1. E101, 72/3 no.1092 & 72/4 no. 1107, 72/4 nos.1098 & 1099, 1100 & 1101, 1110 & 1111, 1112 & 1113, 1114 & 1115, 1116 & 1117, 1118 & 1119, 1120 & 72/5 no.112/72/5 nos. 1122 & 1123. The duplicate no.1122 and no.1123 were for Walter Hungerforde, yet he is identified as present though through payments of wages in Cope. Why he should return both copies, only one of which was signed, will remain a mystery. Most probably it was an oversight on his part.
2. Ibid, no.1099.
3. Ibid, no. 1101.
4. Ibid, no. 1119.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis can we now state confidently and resolutely that Henry had organised the expedition of 1492 for one sole aim? What were its achievements? It was not a glorious incursion upon the French like some of its predecessors; no major engagements were fought; no great territories won and its stated aim was lost long before it departed. True, it was more successful than its immediate predecessor, the expedition of Edward IV in 1475, but its main success lay in the terms won at the Treaty of Etaples. That Henry Tudor gained official recognition from Charles VIII was no mean feat, while the removal of Warbeck as a threat with French support, a real one in 1492, helped secure Henry's position and was the major achievement of the expedition. Financial success was more obvious, there was the pension from France and careful management and organisation had secured the bonus of a profit from the Parliamentary Benevolence. That this occurred was conceivably a greater surprise to Henry than to us, given our benefit of hindsight. All are important considerations when evaluating the nature of the success of the expedition, but what other conclusions can be drawn?

Despite the problems in precisely calculating the size of the army and navy, it is evident that both were approaching figures somewhat larger than any force that had previously sailed from England for more than a century. However, given the nature of continental military progress by 1492 it is doubtful whether the English force could have matched up to any foreign opponent squarely without significant loss. Poyning and his troops had acquitted themselves well at Sluys, but the evidence is indicative of a force of picked troops, experienced and well equipped, possibly more so than the main army. Poyning, additionally, was fighting alongside experienced continental soldiers (against mercenaries of dubious quality) of the calibre of troops found in French armies of the period. The main English army, longbowmen and lesser men-at-arms, would not have

found the French so keen to commit military suicide against well defended English positions as had happened at Agincourt and in other minor engagements during the Hundred Years War up to 1429. The French had learnt their lessons well, the English in contrast had still to learn theirs.

Cope's account sheds valuable light upon the care and thought expended upon the well being of the army. The amounts spent and quantities of supplies purchased reveal this; the troops would not suffer the indignities of food shortages and disease as had been the case in more than one previous invasion. Neither would they be dependent upon the locality for supplies except in desperate situations where fodder might have been required for the horses, and even then they took with them their own scythes.

Purchases show considerable thought, planning and foresight. Certain items reveal continuity of method within the accounting procedure such as the expenditure upon fourteen yards of green cloth to toll and account money on; the purchases of paper books to write in receipts and rolls of parchment for indenture bills.¹ Other purchases indicate the progress made in military arts with expenditure on gunpowder and the necessary items for cannon and firearms.

The expedition proved to be a good testing ground both administratively and practically for this branch of Henry's army. Lessons were learnt and mistakes made that were not forgotten. The army collected for the war against Scotland reflects these lessons, the artillery arm was strengthened. Certain equipment was also included which was either

NOTES

1. E36/285, f53.

neglected in 1492 or the references have been lost, that is rammers and charge ladels for the artillery, and scaling ladders should any siege be undertaken.¹

Financially the organisation of Cope's account reveals interesting facts for 1492. The increased use of the Chamber and its officials points to the slow return to dominance it enjoyed over the Exchequer during the Yorkist monarchies. Was the failure of the first Parliamentary grant to raise the required sum for the expenditure due to a lack of money in the country? Only approximately £27,000 was raised compared to the £75,000 required. Yet there was wealth in England, the Benevolence raised nearly £50,000 yet Henry had to resort to the use of tenths and fifteenths in the end.

The tax and Benevolence returns indicate that by 1492 the decline in England's nobility was not simply in numbers. Either their ability to support the crown financially had seriously depreciated or they were unwilling to do so and also unable to provide the large retinues needed and expected by the King. Although fifty-six peers were eligible to serve in 1492, thirty-four (61%) probably followed the King to France, none did so with a retinue approaching the size Henry V or Edward IV expected or received from their respective nobility. Significantly Henry V and Edward IV received considerable support from their brothers while Henry VII had no brothers or relatives capable of such support, even his uncle Jasper, Duke of Bedford, only sent a small force, he had to remain in England to assist the Regency Council.

NOTES

1. Naval Accounts and Inventories of the Reign of Henry VII, ed.,M. Oppenheim in Naval Records Society, vol.VII, 1896, p84.

Financially, the nobility gave very little money to aid the King in 1492. Of £48,488.16s.8d. collected through the Benevolence only £3431.6s.8d. came from the nobility, over £1500 from three women members (the Countess of Richmond and the duchesses of York¹ and Norfolk). Only 7.1% of the major financial source originated with the nobility, 3.1% from the male side. Had the aristocracy declined so much during the fifteenth century? It would appear so.

The key element here was that major financial and military support came not from those whom the King would most expect it, but from the lesser elements of the country; the knights, merchants and commoners. Militarily they supplied (of known retinues) 85.7% of the retinues providing 75.5% of the army. Financially they were significant, of the Benevolence alone they found 82% of the revenue, while in all probability they paid the largest proportion of the Parliamentary grants.

Expenditure reveals details in some variance with those who have believed the expenditure brought great profit for the King. No authority has categorically stated any amount, yet many have hinted at one. Dietz, accepted by most, indicates it was in the region of £155,000², while Michael Van Cleeve Alexander³ comes closest when he refers to £132,000. The actual expenditure was higher than either assumed, but the overall profit of potentially £136,343 was significant. This sum was not realised at one time and was probably never known as such by Henry VII.

NOTES

1. The Duchess of York was Cecily, wife of Richard, duke of York, (1411-1500) mother of Edward IV and grandmother of Elizabeth, wife of Henry VII. She was born in 1415 and died in 1495.
2. English Governmental Finance, p57.
3. The First of the Tudors, pp103-4.

Of course we can be quite cynical about the whole expedition. We could see through the thin veneer of the preparations and organisation and see an entirely different picture. One of an army taken across the channel late in the season, in the knowledge that no French army would be present to oppose it, contrived to go through the motions to save the King's face which was in danger of getting egg all over it through the failure of diplomatic negotiations to persuade allies to take the field with him. One which was intended to make money, not lose it, and did so quite successfully. Henry was an astute and extremely capable administrator, if not a military tactician. The idea of speculating to accumulate would have appealed to him and in effect this is what he accomplished. Perhaps this is too cynical an attitude to take?

The success of the analysis has depended upon the survival of two sources, William Cope's Account, and William Hatcliffe's Repassage and Victuals Account. That they have survived has made this possible; that a significant part of the wages section in Cope has not has made a fuller analysis impossible. Yet together they have clarified the success of the expedition and the financial benefits reaped by Henry. They have allowed an insight into the problems faced in organising and supplying a late Medieval army as it embarked upon a campaign and how the finances were raised. That I term it Medieval rather than Renaissance is indicative of the military tactics it would have employed had it been called upon to take the field of battle, rather than a reflection of the thought and procedures employed in its organisation. In comparison to the campaigns of earlier monarchs the invasion of 1492 was a damp squib, yet financially and organisationally it reveals the potential for the later more spectacular expeditions which were undertaken after 1492.

CHAPTER NINE:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Public Records Office E36/15, Henry VII: Account of Military Stores and payments to marines and soldiers on board five ships.

P.R.O. E36/208, Account of William Hatcliffe for Travel Expenses, the Repassage of Troops and Victuals, etc. for 1492.

P.R.O. E36/285, Account of William Cope, Deputy of Reynolde Bray, Treasurer of War, from 31 January 1492 - 31 January 1501.

P.R.O. E101/72/ f,3,4,5, and 6. Indentures of War for 1492.

P.R.O. E103/22/3/3, Ordnances for the Invasion of France, 1492.

B.PRINTED SOURCES1. PRIMARY SOURCES

Analecta Hibernia Vol.X (1941) Irish Manuscripts Commission.

The Anglia Historia of Polydore Vergil 1485-1537, ed. D.Hay, Camden Series, (1950).

Annales on a General Chronicle of England, ed. John Stow, 1530.

Burton Abbey Register, Nottingham University, Middleton MSS. MiDe7, f43r.

Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Venetian 1202-1509, vol.1, ed. Rawden Brown, G. Cavendish Bentinck and Horatio F. Brown.

Calendar of the Patent Rolls....., Henry VII. 1914-16, vol.1, 1485-1494.

Calendar of the Close Rolls....., Henry VII. 1955-63, vols. 1 and 2.

Chronicle, Containing the History of England, Edward Hall, ed.
H. Ellis, (1809).

The Chronicle of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and Henry
VIII to the year 1540, ed. J.G. Nichols, (Camden Series),
(1864).

The Chronicle of London, ed. C.L. Kingsford (1905).

Excerpta Historica, ed. Samuel Bentley, (1831).

Foedera, Conventiones Literal Etc., ed. Thomas Rymer 1727-35,
vol.XII.

The Great Chronicle of London, Robert Fabyan, eds. .AH. Thomas,
and Isobel D. Thornley. 1938.

The Historical Collections of a Citizen of London, ed. J.
Gairdner, (Camden Society), vol.XVII, (1870).

Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Reigns of Richard III
and Henry VII, ed. J. Gairdner, 1861.

Naval Accounts and Inventories of the Reign of Henry VII, ed.
M. Oppenheim (Navy Records Soc. vol.VIII, 1906).

The New Chronicle of England and France, Robert Fabyan, 1542
ed. H. Ellis, 1811.

Ortelius Gallia Orbit, Abraham Ortelius, (1509).

The Paston Letters, ed. J. Gairdner, vol.6, (1910).

The Statutes at Large, 1763 eds. Robert Blanket, Henry Woodfall
and William Straham.

The Statute of the Realm, ed. Alexander Luders, et al. 1810-28,
vol.II.

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

- M. Van Cleave Alexander, The First of the Tudors, (1981).
- F. Bacon, Henry VII, ed. J.R. Lunby, 1885.
- A. Cameron 'The Giving of Livery and Retaining in Henry VII's Reign'. Renaissance and Modern Studies, vol.18, 1974.
- C.R. Cheney, ed., Handbook of Dates for Students of English History, 1970.
- S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII. 1972.
- G.E. Cokayne. Complete Peerage, vol.12, (1910-1982).
- P.S. Crowson. Tudor Foreign Policy, (1973).
- Dictionary of National Biography, vol.II.O.U.P. 1917.
- F.G. Dietz. English Government Finance. 1485-1558. 1920.
- J. Gairdner. Henry the Seventh. 1892.
- A.E. Goodman, 'Responses to Requests in Yorkshire for Military Service under Henry V' in Northern History, vol. XVII. 1981.
- L.C. Hector. The Handwriting of English Documents. 1958.
- J.R. Hooker. 'Notes on the Organisation and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII.' Huntingdon Library Quarterly. vol.23,1959.
- P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin, eds. Tudor Royal Proclamations. vol.1 The Early Tudors, 1485-1553, C.S.V. 1964.
- C. Johnson, Hilary and Jenkinson. English Court Hand A.D. 1066-1500. 1915.
- M.H. Keen. The Laws of War in The Late Middle Ages, (1965).
- D. Knowles & R. Neville Hadcock. Medieval Religious Houses; England and Wales, 1983.

- J.R. Lander. Conflict and Stability in Fifteenth Century England 1977.
- " " Crown and Nobility 1450-1509. 1976.
- " " Government and Community 1450-1509. 1980.
- J.D. Mackie. The Earliest Tudors. 1485-1558, 1952.
- A.K. McHarding. 'Clerical Taxation in Fifteenth Century England. The Clergy as agents of the Crown.' Church, Politics and Patronage in the Fifteenth Century. ed. R.B. Dobson, 1984.
- C. Oman. The Art of War in the Middle Ages. 1885.
- J.H. Parry. The Age of Reconnaissance. 1450-1650. 1963.
- A.F. Pollard. The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary Sources. 1913.
- M.R. Powicke. 'Lancastrian Captains'. Essays in Medieval History, ed, Sandquist and Powicke, (toronto 1969).
- D.E. Rhodes. 'The Statues and Ordinances of War'. The Library, 6th sc.,iii, 340-3.
- C.F. Richmond. 'English Naval Power in The Fifteenth Century'. History L11, (1967).
- J.C. Wedgwood. History of Parliament 1439-1509. 1938.
- R.B. Wernham. Before the Armada; The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588. (1966).
- J.A. Williamson. The Tudor Age 1979.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

THE APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Extract from the

CALENDAR OF PATENT ROLLS HENRY VII 1485-93, Vol.1, pp348-53.

7 JULY 1491 WESTMINSTER COMMISSIONERS TO REQUIRE BENEVOLENCE OF KING'S
SUBJECTS SENT TO THE FOLLOWING AREAS. THE COUNTIES OF:

CAMBRIDGE AND HUNTINGDON
PEMBROKE, CARMARTHEN AND CARDIGAN IN SOUTH WALES
DERBY
LINCOLN, KESTEVEN
NOTTINGHAM
LANCASTER
CHESTER
HEREFORD
MIDDLESEX
BEDFORD AND BUCKINGHAM
RUTLAND
STAFFORD
DEVON AND CORNWALL
LINCOLN, LINSEY
LINCOLN, HOLLAND
SALOP
SURREY

THE LORDSHIPS OF:

BISHOP CASTLE
PRESTHEND, MELHENNETH, RADNOR, COMYTODER AND RADNOR,
ELWELD, CANTERSELLE, HAY OVYAS AND TALGARTH
BROMFORD AND BELT
MERYWNETH, CAERMARTYN AND ANGLESEA
BREKENOKE
MOUNTGOMERY, KYRRY AND KYDDEWYN
POWES
DENBYGH AND CLONNE
HAWARDYN AND MOLLESDALE IN WALES
CARDIFF, GLAMORGAN AND MORGANNOK IN WALES
GOWER, ILANDE, USKE AND CARLYON,
OVERWENT, NETHERWENT AND COUNTY OF MERYONNTHIN

Extract from the list of Benevolence payments made between 31 January 1492 and 31 January 1501 found in E36/285, ff12-31.

LORDS SPIRITUAL BISHOPS OF:

LINCOLN £500

SALISBURY £400

ELY £400

BATH £266.13s.4d.

LONDON £666.13s.4d.

WINCHESTER £1500

CHESTER £100

WORCESTER £100

SAINT DAVID'S £133.6s.8d.

LORDS SPIRITUAL AND OTHER CLERGY:

PRIOR OF LEWES £100

ABBOT OF SAINT MARY'S ABBEY IN YORK £66.13s.4d.

PRIOR OF SAINT MARY'S ABBEY £66.13s.4d.

DEAN OF CHURCH OF SAINT PAUL'S £200

ABBOT OF CHERTSEY £133.6s.8d.

ABBOT OF WENSLEY¹ £20

PRIOR OF NEWARK £33.6s.8d.

ABBOT OF BERMONDSEY £20

ABBOT OF CHICHESTER £66.13s.4d.

PRIOR OF SAINT SWITHIN AT WINCHESTER £333.6s.8d.

EDMUND CHADERTON PROVOST £100

THOMAS RADLEY PROVOST £10

JOHN COKE ARCHDEACON OF LINCOLN £120

CHRISTOPHER TALBOT £40

<u>CLERKES:</u>	BOSTOCK PRIEST	£60
	MARTIN PRIEST	£50
	THOMAS BURWELT	£33. 6s. 8d.
	ROBERT TYWORTH	<u>66s. 8d.</u>
	Sum	<u>£5523. 6s. 8d.</u>

NOTE

1. This is interesting. Knowles and Hadcock in their book Medieval Religious Houses, state it was a small college licenced in 1400 for Richard Lord Scroope of Bolton, for chaplains and 22 poor persons, but nothing was done until 1420 when his grandson Richard made a bequest for the building and endowment, but died the same year. Through this, and as nothing was heard of it, until now, Knowles and Hadcock have assumed, wrongly, that nothing came of the bequest. The fact that the Abbot could afford £20 is proof enough that it was a going concern in 1492.

LORDS TEMPORAL:

COUNTESS OF RICHMOND, THE KING'S MOTHER	£666.13s.4d.
DUCHESS OF YORK	£600.
DUCHESS OF NORFOLK	£326.13s.4d.
EARL OF DEVONSHIRE	£200
EARL OF ARUNDEL	£333. 6s.8d.
EARL OF ORMOND	£300
LORD DENHAM, TREASURER OF ENGLAND	£400
LORD BERGAVENNY	£ 66.13s.4d.
LORD FITZWALTER	£100
LORD WELLES	£ 42
LORD WILLOUGHBY de BROKE	£ 68
LORD HASTINGS	£ 28
LORD STRANGE	£ 70
SIR WILLIAM HODY, BARON OF THE KING'S EXCHEQUER	£ 60
WILLIAM HUSE, CHIEF JUSTICE THE KING'S BENCH ¹	£100
<u>'YET SUNDRIE PERSONNES OF THE LAISSEE'</u>	
SIR THOMAS PORLAND, KNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COMMON PLEAS	£100
SIR REYNOLD BRAY	£500
SIR THOMAS LOVELL	£400
SIR THOMAS WEST, KNIGHT LORD DE LA WARE	£200
SIR THOMAS COOKSEY	£100
SIR ROGER CARROT	£200
SIR EDWARD BERKELEY	£120
SIR WILLIAM UVEDALE	£ 66.13s.4d.
SIR WILLIAM 'RORES'	£100
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE	£ 14
SIR RHYS AP THOMAS	£ 42
SIR WILLIAM 'DAWTENEY'	£100
PIERS EDGECOMBE	£ 50
JOHN SHAW	£100
JOHN ZOUCHE	£ 30
JOHN KNIGHT 'AUDITO'	£ 10
ROBERT WHITE	£ 48
JOHN AUDLEY	£ 60
PIERS 'CARVONETT	£ 40
BRONNE 'ESQUIRE'	£ 20

NOTE

1. These last two appear to be strangely placed as they were judges and not lords, but this is exactly as Cope lists them!

PIERS CURTIS	£ 60
JOHN SPEKE	£ 80
JOHN COKE	£ 30

...(THERE FOLLOWS A FURTHER 48 INDIVIDUAL ENTRIES)....

MASTER OF THE KING'S HOWES	£432. 6s.
ALSO OF THE COLLECTORS OF THE LIKE BENEVOLENCE OF THE KING'S SUBJECTS IN THE COUNTY OF:-	

KENT	£193. 6s 8d.
SURREY	£1312. 5s.10d.
SUSSEX	£1740.10s. 2d.
HAMSHIRE	£2472. 12d.
OXFORD, WILTSHIRE & BERKSHIRE	£5748. 7s.10d.
SOMERSET, DORSET	£2439.16s. 3d.
DEVONSHIRE	£ 179. 8s. 7d.
GLOUCESTERSHIRE	£3004. 4s. 5d.
HEREFORDSHIRE	£ 959.10s.
WORCESTERSHIRE	£1786.19s.10d.
SHROPSHIRE	£ 190.13s. 8d.
WARWICKSHIRE	£ 150.13s. 4d.
LEICESTERSHIRE	£ 948.11s. 1d.
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE	£1337. 18d.
DERBYSHIRE	£ 652. 8d.
LINCOLNSHIRE	£3356. 8d.
YORKSHIRE	£ 969. 7s. 1d.
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE	£ 91.
LONDON MERCHANTS	£1059.11s. 8d.
FOREIGNERS OF LONDON	£ 400.19s.
ESSEX	£ 194.19s.10d.
HERTFORDSHIRE	£ 49.10s.
NORFOLK AND SUFFOLK	£2737. 9s.10d.

SUM OF ALL BENEVOLENCES

£48488.16s. 8d.

APPENDIX C

TABLE SHOWING NUMBERS & RATIOS OF MEN-AT-ARMS TO ARCHERS IN THE ARMY OF 1492

INDENTURED CONTINGENT LEADERS	No.	MEN-AT-ARMS#	ARCHERS*	AVERAGE NO. PER LEADER		RATIO OF ARCHERS TO MEN-AT-ARMS
				MEN-AT-ARMS	ARCHERS	
1. LORDS	13	226	794 322	17+	61	3½
2. KNIGHTS	43	667	2199 623	15½	50½	3
3. SQUIRES	12	88	265 62	7½	22½	3
4. GENTLEMEN AND OTHERS	10	72	138 14	7	14	2
5. TOTAL	78	1053	3396	13½	43½	3
<u>ACTUAL CONTINGENTS AS SHOWN BY COPE & HATCLIFFE</u>						
6. LORDS & SPIRITUAL LORDS	18	309	1749	17	97	5½
7. KNIGHTS	60	787	4034	13	67	5
8. SQUIRES & RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL	20	71	551	3½	27½	8
9. OFFICERS & MINISTERS OF ROYAL HOUSEHOLD	1	19	161	19	161	8½
10. GENTLEMEN & OTHERS	36	65	665	2	18½	9
11. TOTAL	135	1251	7160	9	52	5½
<u>ACTUAL INCREASE OVER PROMISES BY LEADERS INDENTED & PAID WAGES</u>						
12. LORDS	7	-4	+146	-½	+21	+1½
13. KNIGHTS	25	+20	+329	+½	+13	+½
14. SQUIRES	7	-8	-52	-1½	-7½	—
15. GENTLEMEN & OTHERS	4	-1	—	—	—	—
16. TOTAL INCREASE	43	+7(1%)	+423(+17%)			
Of the remaining 35 Indentured Retinue Leaders 11 can be positively identified as present through Hatcliffe's account or through references in Cope.						

* Including those listed as others, shown Separately as

Including spears and demilancers

APPENDIX C (continued)

INDENTURED CONTINGENT LEADERS	No.	MEN-AT-ARMS #	ARCHERS*	AVERAGE NO. PER LEADER		RATIO OF ARCHERS TO MEN-AT-ARMS
				MEN-AT-ARMS	ARCHERS	
17. ATTRIBUTING THE SAME % INCREASE TO THE REMAINING INDENTURED CAPTAINS	35	352(+4)	1054(+153)	10	30	3
18. OTHER RETINUE CAPTAINS ARE KNOWN THROUGH COPE & HAT-CLIFFE BUT THEIR RETINUES ARE UNKNOWN ∴ ALLOWING THE SAME RATIO AS 11. WE HAVE:-	36	327	1872	9	52	5½
19. THE TOTAL ARMY SIZE CAN BE CONSTRUCTED ADDING 11 + 17 + 18 ∴ :-	206	1930	10,086			
20. OR AS SHOWN BY THE WAGES CALCULATION	208	2125	10,153			

THE PARAMETERS FOR THE ARMY ARE BETWEEN 19 & 20

TOTAL MEN-AT-ARMS, LEADERS AND ARCHERS

ADD CUSTRELLS, PAGES AND OTHER ATTENDANTS

ADD TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (TRANSPORT MINERS, BLACKSMITHS, CARPENTERS AND MEDICAL)

PLUS SECRETARIES, COUNCILLORS, ROYAL SERVANTS

POSSIBLY 10% - 12%

GRAND TOTAL

	FOR 206 RETINUES	FOR 208 RETINUES
TOTAL MEN-AT-ARMS, LEADERS AND ARCHERS	12016	12278
ADD CUSTRELLS, PAGES AND OTHER ATTENDANTS	603	677
ADD TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (TRANSPORT MINERS, BLACKSMITHS, CARPENTERS AND MEDICAL)	561	561
	13240	13516
PLUS SECRETARIES, COUNCILLORS, ROYAL SERVANTS	1324	1352
GRAND TOTAL	14564	14868

IF WE ALSO INCLUDE THE BURTON ABBEY REGISTER RETINUES, TOTAL MEN-AT-ARMS, LEADERS AND ARCHERS
ADD CUSTRELLS, PAGES AND OTHER ATTENDANTS
ADD TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (TRANSPORT MINERS, BLACKSMITHS, CARPENTERS AND MEDICAL)


242 RETINUES
14151
639
501
15351

PLUS SECRETARIES, COUNCILLORS, ROYAL SERVANTS, POSSIBLY 10%-12%
GRAND TOTAL

1535
16886

APPENDIX D

EXTRACTS FROM THE BOOK OF ORDNANCES ISSUED BY HENRY VII BETWEEN OCTOBER
1491 AND OCTOBER 1492. E163/22/3/3.



As moche as it is osten seen by man-
 nys reason wherby he shulde discern the
 good from the euyl and the right from
 the wronge/ is many tymes by seduc-
 tion of the beuyl/ worldly couetise and sensual
 appetites repressed and vanquysshed/ wherup-
 pon continually ensueyn discordes. murders. rob-
 beries. diuisions. disobedience to soueraignes.
 subuersion of royalmes. and destruction of peo-
 ple/ so that wher they reigne victorie in tyme
 of warre and iustice in tyme of peax be utterly
 dampned and exilled. Therefore Emperoures
 princes and gouernours of tyme past for refray-
 nyng of suche inordinat appetites and punys-
 shement of thoes folkes whiche rather excheue
 to offende for fere of bodily peyn or losses of go-
 des then for the loue of god or iustice ful wise-
 ly and polletiquely ordeyned diuerse lawes ser-
 vyng to the same purpos aswelle in tyme of war-
 as peax. Semblably oure soueraigne lord
 Henry of this name the. viij. by the grace of god
 kinge of Englonde and of Fraunce and lord
 of Irland eintenynge by the same grace with
 al goodly speede to passe the see in his owne per-
 sone with an armye and oster royalle for there

Consideratōn wherof he willet̄ and straitly
 chargith his said subgettes to haue them self in
 to gode awaite in no wise they offend the said
 statutes and to thentent they haue no cause to
 excuse them of their offences by pretense of ig-
 nance of the saide ordenances/ his highnesse
 our and aboue the open proclamation of
 statutes commaunded and ordeyned by
 prynte diuerse and many seueral bo-
 okyng the same statutes to be made
 and deliuered to the capitaignes of his ost char-
 ginge them as they wyl a doyde his greate dis-
 creasure to cause the same to be or ones at the
 every weke booke to be redde in the prese-
 nce of the reuerend.

Here endeth certeyn statutes & ordenances of
 warr made ordeined enacted & establisshed by
 the most noble victorius and most cristen prin-
 ce oure moste graue souerayn lord kyng Henry
 the vii. kyng of fraunce & of Englonde by the ad-
 uyce of his noble & discrete councel holdyng than
 his high Courte of his parliament at his paleis
 of Westmynster the vij. day of October in the
 yere of oure lord god M. C. C. C. lxxii. and

of his most noble Reigne the Du. per. For the
 Wele surtie good Rule a sauffegarde of his ho-
 norable lordes capitaignes & of his true sub-
 jecttes And also for suche of his Realme of fraunce
 herafter wol be true subgettis being in his most
 Royall penst his ancient Enmyes of fraunce
 Empranted by his hys h. Comen
 By his owne propre handys Belyue
 char. Pynson Prynter of this boke.

APPENDIX EFINANCE FOR HENRY VII'S EXPEDITION ACCORDING TO COPE'S ACCOUNT

f.	<u>INCOME</u>	£	s.	d.
1 - 4	Sum of tenths and fifteenths from the Clergy	9828	10	4
4 - 5	Sum of the tenths of the Clergy	2073	9	4
6 - 7	Sum of the Benevolences of Lords Spritual and Clergy	5523	6	8
7 -14	Sum of the Benevolences of the Lords Temporal and others	39838	19	7
	Benevolence money accounted on missing pages	3126	10	5
14	Sum of all Benevolences	48488	16	8
14	At the King's Mint during the 7th year	17392	15	0
15-17	Foreign receipts	3782	4	1
17	Sum of Foreign receipts	21174	19	1
17	Sum of Almaner receipts	£81565	15	6
<u>EXPENDITURE</u>				
18-50	Wages of War. (No sum mentioned).	14295	3	1
	With up to 32 pages of Wages of War missing total should include	7982	12	9
50-78	Yet Necessities. All foreign Payments	48802	18	11
71-80	Money delivered to the King's Chamber	10485	0	9
80	Sum of Almaner Payments	£81(565	15	6)

Amounts shown in bold type are those presumably found upon the missing pages, or are unclear due to damage in the original.