Collective memory, space and performativity among the Turkish-speaking community in North London

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Abstract

The Turkish-speaking community refers to migrants from Turkey and Cyprus. Although it is commonly mistaken as a monolithic group, they are from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Moreover, although the collective memory and interactions with home country play a role in identity construction, post-modern identities are hybridised and fragmented. Therefore, there is no longer a fixed and unified Turkish/Kurdish diaspora identity, but there are multiple and fluid identities. Using Judith Butler's (1988) theory of performativity, Erving Goffman's (1990a) dramaturgy, concepts by Homi Bhabha (1994) such as 'hybridity', 'third space' and Baudrillard's (2001) 'hyper-reality' and 'simulacrum', the aim of this thesis is to explore identity performances in an everyday life context.

This thesis explores the following questions; how identity is constituted and maintained in a foreign culturalscape; how Turkish-speaking individuals negotiate between home and host chronotopes and how they perform their identities in everyday life via cultural practices. Through analysis of ethnographic field study and in-depth interviews, this thesis contributes to the understanding of identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community and hybrid identity forms in thirdspace.

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> *'Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan topluma sonsuz teşekkürü bir borç bilirim...'.*

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Per aspera ad astra…

INTRODUCTION

A Brief Life Story

Alongside my academic interest some personal experiences have played a crucial role for me to study hybrid identities. I was born in a former Greek town currently populated by Turkish people in an ethnically diverse family. The residents of the neighbourhood were migrants from the lost territory of Ottoman Balkans. One can hear Bulgarian, Bosnian, Albanian, and Greek words during the conversations in this neighbourhood. In this pluralistic context, I grew up with the stories and the nostalgia of the lost, distant homeland, Thessaloniki, and the painful forced migration story of my grandparents. In daily life, we spoke mainly Turkish, however our songs always referred to our lost and distant homeland. It was not only us however. For instance, at the weddings in this neighbourhood the songs people dance refer to distant lands such as Vardar, and Kosovo. I grew up listening to the migration stories of my grandparents and their songs about the lost homeland of Thessaloniki. My identity and collective memory are shaped by these stories and oral history narratives. I have always been interested in their stories of living in a distant homeland, experience of war and the trauma of displacement and resettlement.

Growing up, I developed an interest in Greek culture, and tried to reconnect to it. I remember as a child asking my father whether we are Greek, or would we ever go back to Thessaloniki, and why we were speaking Turkish. People asked me where I was originally from since they thought where I lived could not be my city of origin. I noticed that I could not escape from my family history. We were not at 'home' and you cannot feel yourself at home in someone else's house. Whether it was the identity crisis of an existentialist or a third generation migrant, I never feel at home wherever I go. As once Baudelaire (2012) said it seems to me that I will always be happy in the place where I am not. Since then I travelled and live in different

countries. I am more disconnected from Turkey yet, I have never totally connected with Greece. I was somehow overfamiliar with and strange to both cultures.

My academic interest was triggered when I encountered people from different backgrounds around the world, feeling the same way, that they did not belong to a singular home and define themselves with multiple identities.

Aims and Objectives of Study

Following my personal story, the overall objective of this research is to understand how the Turkish-speaking community in London construct identity through everyday performances and cultural practices. Using Judith Butler's (1988) theory of performativity, concepts by Homi Bhabha (1994) such as 'hybridity', 'third space' and Baudrillard's (2001) 'simulacrum' this research questions how identity is constituted and maintained in a foreign culturalscape. It asks: how diasporic individuals negotiate between home and host cultures? And how they perform their identities in everyday life via cultural practices? In order to answer the research questions posed, ethnography is used to access the members' everyday lives and the following objectives are assessed:

- The participants' self-description of identity. How do they define themselves and to where do they feel a sense of belonging?
- Collective memory and migration story. To what extent the stories of the past affect identity performances today.
- Encounters with the host culture and the extent of their involvement.
- Connections to their country of origin and its contemporary issues.
- How do they negotiate between home and host cultures while performing their identity?

The Turkish speaking diaspora in the UK has been studied so far in three major groups; Turkish Cypriots, Mainland Turks and Kurds from Turkey. This research aims to break this overgeneralising categorisation. The rationale of naming the topic of this thesis as the 'Turkish-speaking Community' is that the group is ethnically, religiously and politically very diverse. Naming the group as 'Turkish' excludes Kurdish people who originate in Turkey, while calling them immigrants from Turkey excludes Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, calling them Turkish and Kurdish immigrants is problematic as the latter category includes the Kurds from Iraq, Syria and Iran which has no relevance to this research's objective. Although Kurdish people have their own language (Kurdish); Turkish Cypriots have their own dialect; and younger generations of the community in the UK speak English as their first language, the *lingua franca* of the group is Turkish. Thus, the research subject is defined as a linguistic group. Moreover, the community is referred to with this name in official documents in the UK and it is widely used in academia as well (Kucukcan, 1999; King et. Al. 2008; Mehmet Ali, 2001; Aksoy 2006; Atay 2010; Issa 2005, Sirkeci et.al. 2016).

Major Claims of the Thesis

Through an exploration of the Turkish-speaking community's migration narratives, this thesis advances four major claims. First, the collective memory and migration stories play a significant role in identity reconstruction. Second, the myth of return has evolved into a new phase among the Turkish-speaking community. Desires to return to country of origin is replaced by regular visits which offers four new patterns. Third, during performativity of identity in everyday life, different spaces and cultural practices are used which I will analyse in three pillars. Finally, there is not a fixed and unifying Turkish migrant identity. In London, in-between identities are performed which are diasporic identity, economic migrant identity, postmodern cultural creole identity and expat identity.

The first claim based on my analysis of the collective memory and migration stories of the Turkish-speaking community in order to discuss their role in identity reconstruction. Dessí (2008) argues collective memory is the shared experience of a community which dates back a long time but still has a significant impact on the current norms, behaviour and beliefs of the community. Individuals retrieve memories and images of the past with reference to collective memory. Thus, Halbwachs (1992) argues memories are acquired within society. Developing on this Cinar (2015) argues, once certain historical narratives such as the migration story of a community become dominant, they provide a repertoire of collective memory and play a significant role in identity reconstruction. I will analyse migration stories and narratives about the home country in order to understand the reconstruction of identity in diaspora place. Even though postmodern theories argue identities are fluctuating and arbitrary, I argue that the influence of collective memory on human consciousness and identity should not be underestimated. Therefore, I will combine both aspects of identity reconstruction (collective memory and performativity) in order to interpret identity performances in postmodern conditions. Thus, I will investigate the influence of the first-generation's migration stories and narrations of the home country on the second and third generations' perceptions of cultural identity and values in Chapter 5.

Based on Anwar's (1979) and Baldassar's (2001) theories, I argue that among the Turkish-speaking community, the myth of return evolved into return visits and regular travel to country of origin. These visits are ritualistic and sanctified. As Eliade (1987:204) claimed modern man still retains a large stock of camouflaged myths and degenerated rituals. I argue that these ritual-like visits are *'mundane pilgrimages'*. I argue that there are four patterns of homeland visiting: frequent travels, periodic travels, intermittent travels and being fugitive. Moreover, I argue that the myth has evolved into desiring to be buried in country of origin among the elder members. I will discuss it in detail in Chapter 5.

By analysing everyday life in three pillars; culturalscape, religioscape and politicalscape, I aim to discuss the use of space and cultural practices in everyday life as performativity of identity which is the third claim of my thesis.

Finally, drawing on Stuart Hall (1990) and Homi Bhabha's (1994) claims of heterogeneity, diversity and hybridity of identity living in diaspora I argue there is not a fixed and unifying Turkish migrant identity. Bhabha (1994) states that hybridisation is inevitable among diaspora communities even though they insist on the purity of their doctrines. Therefore, I argue that the Turkish-speaking community is not a monolithic group as no migrant communities are. Therefore, identity experience of migrant communities should not be discussed under fixed and unifying ethnic categories but reinterpreted around cultural practices under postmodern conditions. The Turkish-speaking community should not be defined and discussed under ethnic categories such as Turkish Cypriots, Mainland Turks and Kurds anymore. As Hall (1988) argues living abroad or in a diaspora is an unsettling recombination, hybridisation and 'cut-and-mix' experience. Therefore, I argue that London diaspora is a space of hybridity or the third space where members of the Turkish-speaking community negotiate between cultures and identities. During this negotiation, new forms of identity, *in-between* identities are created. I categorised these in-between identities as, diasporic identity, economic migrant identity, postmodern cultural creole identity and expat identity. By Diasporic Subjects I referred to a categorisation beyond an essentialist form of ethnic group which is a mobilised political project and trying to influence political situation in their home countries (Anderson, 1992 & 1998; Baser and Swain, 2010). Economic Migrants refer to those motivated by only economic purposes and they tend to have romantic views about their homeland. Expats refers to well-educated members who arrived in the UK relatively recently. Their migration can be described as brain drain. They remain distant to the majority of the members of Turkish community who are in the lower social strata of British society. Post-modern Creoles refers to those who have

limited Turkish language skills and are highly involved with British culture. I will discuss these categories in more detail in Chapter 7.

Research Rationale

As mentioned above, my identity questions are rooted in the diverse ethnic background of my family which evolved into existential questioning reflected in my creative writing. Later it evolved into an academic interest.

After spending a year living in the Netherlands with its Turkish community, I decided to take a closer look at minority and migrant identities. For practical reasons such as speaking the language and being accepted for a Ph.D. research position at a British university, I decided to study the Turkish-speaking migrant community living in London.

I spent 10 months in North London strolling the streets, visiting coffeehouses, shops, kebab shops, community centres and mosques, researching various aspects of cultural life of the Turkish-speaking community.

As a research method, participant observation is applied to gain an insider's perspective (emic) of the research subjects' culture. I have chosen to study my 'native' community, not because I consider Turkish culture is more interesting than others, but to see the story from the other side. My grandparents and my family experienced coming from a different ethnocultural background and being naturalised in Turkish culture, so I was curious about how Turkish people would reconstruct their cultural identity while living in a foreign cultural landscape. On the one hand, studying my 'native' people made things easier for me as I already hold the knowledge about taboos and certain barriers. On the other hand, there was the risk of blindness or indifference to the field. As social anthropologist Kate Fox (2004:2) claims most people obey the unwritten rules of their society instinctively, not being aware of doing so:

Native speakers can rarely explain the grammatical rules of their own language. In the same way, those who are most 'fluent' in the rituals, customs and traditions of a particular culture generally lack the detachment necessary to explain the 'grammar' of these practices in an intelligible manner.

Instead of seeing people in fixed categories such as 'migrants' or 'diaspora' and studying them with what is called 'scientific detachment', I attended their social space to interact with them while they were shopping, drinking tea, chatting with their fellow village men, watching football or celebrating a festival. At some points, I could not decide whether I was working or hanging out with a group of Cypriots/Turks/Kurds in London and that made long working hours in the field colourful rather than exhausting. Even though I was studying my 'native' community, I was discovering cultural groups among them that I was not familiar with before. Throughout the thesis I look at the way of life, behavioural patterns, customs, values and beliefs of the community.

I look not only at consistent patterns and regularities in their behaviours but also compare them with the way they are practiced in Turkey or Cyprus. Any findings I discuss do not mean these characteristics are shared by all the members of the Turkish-speaking community in north London, but it means it is common or marked enough to be noticeable.

The following themes spontaneously emerged in the field not as the result of my personal focus on specific aspects: people smuggling; chain migration; post-mortem displacement of body; shame as social control; cultural or religious cherry-picking; practices of beliefs and superstitions; transfer and reinterpretation of disputes in homeland to Britain; cultural and nostalgic attributions of ornaments used; idealisation of ethnic food; visiting patterns to homeland; weddings ceremonies; and dressing patterns.

Even though 'British values' or 'Turkishness' are very controversial terms, most of us define certain manners in our daily life as 'Very British' or 'Typically Turkish'. During my field work I heard statements such as 'I am very Turkish in that sense', 'I am partly British', 'I

feel quite English when I am around Turks' and so forth. That means we have concepts of Turkishness or Britishness and degrees of them in our mindsets.

I found cultural cherry-picking amongst younger generations, who pick and choose desirable aspects of both Turkish and British culture and avoid undesirable ones with small manoeuvres such as saying, 'it is too old-fashioned Turkish' or 'It is how British people act, we are different'. Or they follow some rules of Islam such as not eating pork but ignore the prohibition to drinking alcohol. They chose to 'go native' when they want and yet avoid some of the customs. Furthermore, the First-generation, despite steadfastly refusing to adopt local cultural aspects, calibrate their 'Turkishness' according to local conditions and take practical aspects of British manners as their own. Therefore, although religion was not the focus of this study, it emerged many times during the field study and so is reflected throughout the analysis chapters.

Collective Memory of the Turkish-speaking Community

Interpretation and narration of the past is an important aspect of the construction of cultural and national identity. During the recollection of memories people cannot escape from the influences of collective views. Rothstein (2000) argues the 'collective memory' is based on shared experiences of a community induces a common social behaviour in the present regarding an individual's attitudes. Diaspora communities assume a collective past as well as a shared historic location. Therefore, migration stories, and historical events such as a civil war are part of the collective memory of the Turkish-speaking community. For instance, the second and third generations' experiences with Turkish culture is limited to annual visits to Turkey or Cyprus which tend to be no longer than a few weeks. Their perceptions about their country of origin or ancestral homeland are solely based on collective memory which sometimes challenges their first-hand experience. Yet, memory is not always something to cherish and pass to descendants (Neal, 1998; Pennebaker et.al, 2013). Some groups among the community

hold traumatic experiences in their collective memory. For instance, the Turkish Cypriots experienced a civil war and the Alevi community became victims of number of pogroms. Also, the Kurdish community escaped from a conflict zone in south eastern Turkey. I aim to combine postmodern analysis with the influence of collective memory to understand the identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community.

Hybridity, Postmodernism and the Turkish-speaking Community

The Turkish-speaking community in the UK is an invisible, silenced and under-researched group compared to Caribbean and South Asian diaspora due to its small population (Sonyel, 1988; Enneli et al., 2005; Mehmet Ali, 2006). Current literature tends to analyse the community with overgeneralising categories such as ethnic background. The Turkish-speaking community is very diverse, and its cultural identity is fragmented.

Identity has been questioned for centuries and identity issues are still problematic in the contemporary world (Bauman, 1996). Prior to the globalisation, historic developments lessened the links between geographic location and identity. For instance, with the fall of feudalism, people who are formally tied to the land of their masters, were freed and started to wander the land. Modern identities are mostly influenced by nationalism which ties identity to soil. However, human mobility dramatically increased with global technologies in the late modern period. In addition, the boost in migration across the world gives rise to cultural encounters. Cultural encounters result in hybridity of cultural identities especially for transnational communities. According to Homi Bhabha (1994) hybridisation is inevitable among diaspora communities. Various cultural identities in one's self are not in conflict and one does not lose an identity when adapting another. Diaspora space is *third space* where cultures interact and are hybridised where an *in-betweens* identity is constructed (Bhabha, 1994). The Turkish-speaking community encounter with various cultures in North London and negotiate between home and host chronotopes. Therefore, they construct their *in-betweens*

identity in the *third space* of London. Bakhtin (1996:84) defines *chronotope* as "the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature". Therefore, chronotope binds time and space. Identity of the community members cannot be defined by essence or purity such as Turkish Cypriots or Kurds, but by diversity and hybridity. They are estranged from the traditions of their home country in some levels and adopt themselves a new home.

Moreover, postmodern identity theories avoid fixed and unifying concepts to comprehend identity. Therefore, instead of explaining identity with a common origin or essence, postmodern theories focus on the process of identity construction or performance. The Turkish-speaking community did not bring an essence of identity with them when they were migrating but did bring some cultural practices and experiences in their collective memory. As all other identities, the Turkish-speaking people's identities fluctuate and constantly change. London's cosmopolitan setting allows multiple identities to be performed and offers a sense of belonging with a Londoner identity. Meanings and representations are renegotiated, and *in-betweens* identities are performed. While discussing *in-betweens* experiences of identity, I named expatriate Turkish identity as '*gurbetçi*' which I will discuss in Chapter 7. *Gurbetçi* is not a formal category but a concept to define Turkish citizens living abroad. I discuss the concept with its similarity to cultural creole. Like a creóle, the *gurbetçi* was a member of the Turkish society when in the homeland, then migrated to a foreign cultural landscape and, through adaptation, became different from homeland citizens. Similar to 'gurbetçi' Turkish Cypriots living in the UK are called '*Londrezli*' by homeland citizens. Both concepts are exclusionary and derogatory in their public use, however in this research the concepts are used to discuss cultural hybridisation.

The Overview of the Thesis

The thesis opens with three literature review chapters: "The Concept of Diaspora and Historicity of Migration of the Turkish-speaking Community to the United Kingdom", "Collective Memory and Space" and "Postmodern Identity Theories: Self, Identity and Performativity". In the first literature review chapter, I discuss the definition of the research group and describe the historical background of migration from Cyprus and Turkey to the UK in four major waves with distinct characteristics of each. Moreover, not every migrant group can be referred to as a diaspora (see Sartori 1970; Tölölyan 1996). Therefore, I aim to discuss the concept of diaspora and its relation to home regarding identity construction. The second chapter explores the role of collective memory and embodied experience of space in identity construction of the Turkish-speaking migrants. Diasporas are assumed to share a collective past and a historic location. Collective memory or the shared experiences of a community date back a long time but still have a significant impact on the current norms, behaviour and beliefs of the community (see Dessí, 2008). Moreover, space both as a physical space and mental space, is not only used to root a diaspora community to a geographical space, but also cultural identities are performed in social spaces and thirdspace. Therefore, in this chapter I aim to discuss the role of collective memory and use of space in identity construction.

In the third chapter, postmodern identity theories and identity performances, performativity as well as the conceptual shift from the modernist fixed and unifying subject to fragmented and dislocated subject are investigated. Moreover, the changing phases of identity with high mobility of people and migrant communities' *in-betweens* identities in third cultural space are discussed. The theoretical framework presented in the literature review chapters is applied to the case of the Turkish-speaking community in North London throughout the analysis chapters.

Chapter four, "Methodology" presents the reasons why I chose to conduct ethnographic research for this topic and discusses several research methods combined including 10 months

of ethnographic fieldwork, in-depth interviews, visual methods, as well as walking/*flanerie* method to comprehend the everyday life of the Turkish-speaking community. I conducted interviews with 29 people from a range of social backgrounds representing fragments within the community. These interviews were split across almost an equal number of men and women (age 18 and over), who have or whose parents have migrated from different regions of Cyprus and Turkey. The field study has consisted of attending countless cultural events, rituals and religious ceremonies throughout London. Participant observation in semi-public and private places provided me with the ability to capture a snapshot of participants' daily life in their own settings. Visual methods were used to aid me in recalling events and observations that I conducted while walking through various neighbourhoods in London. In addition, I have kept a diary where I have written my observation, and records of encounters in the field. With the data collected and observations made during the fieldwork period the thesis aims to identify characteristics of the cultural life of the community and how they perform their identity through everyday practices as well as negotiating between home and host cultures. Also, it explores the ethical considerations of *autoethnoraphic* research. The methodology chapter is followed by three analysis chapters where I present the research findings.

Chapter five, "Collective Memory, Migration Stories and the New Phase of the Myth of Return" discusses the collective memory of the Turkish-speaking community; traumatic experiences as well as coding and recalling memories in different languages. The chapter continues outlining the migration path to the UK; people smuggling and chain migration. In the last section of the chapter, home country visiting patterns as a new phase of 'the myth of return' is explored under four categories Frequent travellers; Periodic travellers; Intermittent travellers and Fugitives. Moreover, the chapter cultural materials that members of the community bring from home country visits and the meaning attached to them are examined to address the identity reconstruction process in diaspora space.

Chapter six, "Everyday Life of the Turkish-speaking Community in London" illustrates performativity of identity within an everyday life context via three pillars; Culturalscape, Religioscape, and Politicalscape which are inspired by Arjun Appadurai's (1996) model of global 'ethnoscapes'. In the culturalscape I describe flaneurie experience of walking through cultural spaces; villages associations and *kahvehanes;* iconic representations of cultural identity such as Turkish tea and coffee ceremonies as mundane rituals as well as observation of a wedding and shame as a social control mechanism. In the religioscape subsection I present practices of beliefs and superstitions. In the politicalscape section I analyse Kurdish identity politics and Newroz festival as well as collective memory and construction of national identity via myths.

In chapter seven, "In-betweens, Symbolic Ethnicity and Simulacrum" I discuss *in-betweens* identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community in third space of North London. I discuss these identity performances in four categories: economic migrants, diaspora, post-modern creoles and expats. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss performativity of identity; retrogressive approach; being encapsulated in time and practices of symbolic ethnicity. In the final section of the chapter, I will discuss simulacrum of Turkey in London.

Following the analysis chapters, the conclusion chapter establishes the significance of themes emergent from ethnographic data and locate my analysis within postmodern identity theory discussions. These findings suggest that hybridity of identities and multiple identities within the performativity is inevitable in postmodern conditions especially in a cosmopolitan urban context where various cultures encounter.

Researcher Disclosure: Insider, Outsider, the Stranger and Flaneur

An ethnographic study that does not reflect the insights and experiences of the researcher is problematic and biased although it claims of objectivity (see Tsuda, 2003). This research

started from the ethnographer's lifestory although his experience is not the main focus. In this way, I found my personal connection with the research subjects. The inspiration for this research stems from experiences of growing up in a foreign cultural landscape as a third generation migrant. Personal reflection adds context and layers to the narration and lives of the research participants (Ellis, 2004). I positioned myself as an autoethnographer from the beginning of the study. I attended cultural events and observed the community life as a member of it. However, membership of a community does not necessarily mean being a native member of it and I was not always very welcomed as an insider ethnographer. I was distant from the 'native' members of the group especially among the political groups and Kurdish activists, despite living in and participating in the community life as a member of it. Among these contexts I was a *Simmelian* and stranger my presence was unnerving. I was not an outsider or wanderer because the outsider has no specific relation to a group, and the wanderer comes today and leaves tomorrow (Simmel, 1971). Also, while I was strolling on the streets of North London, I was an anonymous face in the urban crowd. I affiliated myself with a more artistic position, a *flâneur*, watching people with a distant and curious eye to reach a literary description of daily life in North London. Therefore, throughout the thesis, you will read variation or even dichotomy of the researcher's position shifting according to contexts. I do not see these various roles as dichotomous because first of all the research field is fragmented. Secondly, I adopted a cultural relativist and pluralistic perspective in this postmodern study.

As it is an autoethnographic study, I shall mention that my identity is not the same as it was when I started this Ph.D. Since I came to the UK (November 2014) many developments happened in Turkey and Cyprus. The Turkish government became more authoritarian and shut down a number of newspapers in 2015. In July 2016, a so-called 'coup attempt' happened which ended with the shutting down of 15 universities including the university in which I used to work; more newspapers were shut down; and hundreds of thousands of people were arrested

without any evidence including journalists, academics, teachers and civil society activists. Some of my friends were arrested, some of them escaped, and sought refuge in various countries, all due to a *thoughtcrime*. In this *Orwellian* and dystopian context, I have been able to visit my family only once because of the risk of being arrested due to my civil society activities, opinions, and publications criticising the Turkish government's authoritarianism. Therefore, inevitably my identity has evolved into a different one after these developments. I have been more alienated from Turkish culture and society and alas disconnected from my family. The journey I started as a Ph.D. researcher shifted to the life of an exile.

THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA AND HISTORICITY OF MIGRATION OF THE TURKISH-SPEAKING COMMUNITY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Introduction

Diaspora is defined as people living outside their countries of origin (Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1986). However, this broad definition covers every migrant community which makes the concept overstretched almost to the point of being useless (Sartori,1970; Tölölyan, 1996). Therefore, not every migrant group can be referred to as a diaspora because some of them are economic migrants or expatriates. This chapter discusses how the research group is defined and the historicity of migration from Cyprus and Turkey to the UK. It explores the concept of diaspora and its relation to home and identity construction. The chapter starts by outlining the definition of the research group. This is followed by reviewing the literature on diaspora and relationship with home such as the *myth of return* (Anwar 1979). It is followed by the history of migration from Cyprus and Turkey to the UK. The dynamics and different groups within the community are described to frame various identity constructions. The final section of the chapter describes the precarious life of the community in the UK and their involvement with Turkey or Cyprus' social political developments as well as visiting patterns.

1.1 The Concept Diaspora

In the contemporary world, millions of people live either outside of the country they were born in or outside of their ancestral homeland. Even though the concept of diaspora is very old, with the formation of first diaspora dating back to the expulsion of Jews from the land of Israel (Deuteronomy)[1], it has been used to refer to a larger number of communities in recent decades with the increase of human mobility due to globalisation. Paul Gilroy (2002:330) claims that

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[1] "thou shalt be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth" (Deuteronomy 28:25).

"nation states approach diaspora as a temporal and ambiguous exile and offers the possibility of reconciliation with either the place of origin or sojourn". The translocating experiences of modernity such as colonialism, industrialisation, the World Wars, and mass migration broke the rigid bonds of nation. After spending decades in a host country, the idea of a single home is dissolved. The question that needs to be asked is which cultural characteristics are maintained and adapted into local conditions after spending decades abroad.

Historically speaking, the term 'diaspora' is associated with Jews, Greeks and Armenians. Over time it has been extended to refer to various other ethnic groups, such as Irish migrants and the Afro-Caribbean community, who have scattered around the world for different reasons. Today, there are at least thirty ethnic groups who have declared themselves, or are described by others, as diaspora (Cohen, 1996: 507, also see Sheffer 2003). Sheffer (2003) claims that some economic migrants, such as Italian and Mexican migrants in the US or Polish, Indian and Turkish migrants in Europe can be conceptualised as diaspora due to their ongoing links to their home countries. However, there is an old argument in literature claiming that the meaning of the concept stretched to the point of being useless as every immigrant group are addressed as diaspora. (Sartori,1970) Tölölyan (1996: 8) argues that the concept is "in danger of becoming a promiscuously capacious category".

Definition of the concept

Ambiguity around the definition of diaspora is inherent even in its earliest usage in Ancient Greece. The word 'diaspora' is derived from the Greek verb 'διασπείρω' (diaspeirō), which means scattering, was used in the form of *diaspora* to refer to citizens of major Hellenic city-states who emigrated to conquered lands such as Asia Minor with the purpose of colonising and assimilating the territory into the empire (Tetlow, 2005). On the other hand, another form

of the word 'diaspeirein' refers to an abrupt but natural process, the fruitful scattering away of seeds from the parent body that both dispersed and reproduced the organism (Tölölyan, 1996).

Although, diaspora has come to refer mainly to historical mass-dispersions of an involuntary nature, dispersal results from a combination of compulsion and choice (Van Hear, 1998). Its use in social sciences refers to a group of people who live outside the area which they previously inhabited or lived for a long time, or from an area in which their ancestors lived (Safran, 1999). William Safran (1991:83) defines diaspora as a "segment of people living outside the homeland" while Gabriel Sheffer (1986:3) defines it as "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homelands". Some of the push factors behind diaspora are war, poverty, ethnic cleansing, enslavement and political repression (Kucukcan, 1999; Gilroy, 2002). Cohen (2008) states that the classical diasporas such as Jews, Africans and Armenians, were scattered following catastrophic event(s) which forced them into exile. Van Hear (2006) categorises the people moved to neighbouring territories as *the near diaspora*, and those spread further afield as *the wider diaspora.*

Safran (1991) suggests that the concept of diaspora is applied to expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following characteristics. First, they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center". Second, they maintain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their country of origin. Third, they feel partly alienated and insulated from their host society. Fourth, they idealise their ancestral homeland and believe that they or their descendants would eventually return to there. Five, they believe that they should contribute to the maintenance or restoration of their country of origin homeland. Six, they maintain a relationship with the country of origin.

Referring to Safran (1991), Cohen (1996:8) consolidates lists of the 'common features' of diaspora as follows:

"1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;

2. Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;

3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland including its location, history and achievements;

4. An idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation;

5. The development of a return movement which gains collective approbation;

6. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a common fate;

7. A troubled relationship with host societies suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;

8. A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and

9. The possibility of a distinctive yet creative and enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism."

Rogers Brubaker (2005) summarises and combines Safran and Cohen's arguments with three core elements; dispersion in space, orientation to a homeland and boundary-maintenance. He indicates the emphasis on boundary-maintenance, the preservation of a distinctive identity, in diaspora studies (Armstrong 1976, Safran 1991, Tölölyan 1996, Cohen 1997) and questions to what extent and what forms boundaries are maintained by second, third and subsequent generations. In this research, I aimed to investigate similar questions about identity reconstruction, transmission and negotiation between generations.

One of the key points of discussion on diaspora, which this chapter assesses, is whether diaspora is an essential category or a social construction (Koinova, 2007). This discussion is based on the question of whether diaspora groups are natural outcomes of mass migration (Adamson 2008, Koinova 2006) or constructed political projects (Anderson 1992, 1998). According to the first approach "diaspora is a monolithic body, a group related to the people in the home country by affinity ties; kin and common descent" (Koinova, 2006: 3). While the second view defines it as a political project of identity construction mobilised by elites (Anderson 1992, 1998; Brubaker, 2005). Brubaker (2005) suggests perceiving 'diaspora' as a category of practice, which is to be used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate the identities and loyalties of a population. I argue in this thesis that self-description as a diaspora is a political decision taken by the community members rather than a status ascribed by others. In this regard, individuals perform a version of themselves in everyday life according to theirgroup identification (Clifford, 1997; Ang, 2003). This process could be led by a political party, leader or elites. Alternatively, based on the way members of a community interpret their migration story such as economic migration to expelling, they identify themselves as a diaspora or migrant community.

When talking about a diaspora, there is always a reference to a shared location or ancestral land. Smith (1986) claims that there is an alleged and felt symbiosis between a certain piece of earth and its community. Migrant communities perform and reconstruct their identity in relation to a geographical place which they call homeland or country of origin. The first use of the concept of diaspora refers to the idea of living away from the ancestral homeland. Migrants carry some aspects of the homeland to a new destination and continue their former ties with the country of origin through annual visits and financial support to the people there (Levitt, 2003). Diaspora and homeland are inseparable; homeland's culture and history are inevitably referred to while defining diaspora groups. The common ground of diaspora comes from the

idea of a shared homeland. Diaspora is the place that is not homeland thus, it is the rest of the world. In order to avoid the vagueness of the diaspora concept that has been put forward and in order to comprehend diasporic identity, it is important to discuss what is 'home(land)' or 'fatherland' especially in relation to diaspora as the place of not-home, exile or non-place (see Werbner 2002b). Paul Gilroy (2002:301) discusses diaspora and identity in his article, quoting French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau:

> When he first opens his eyes, an infant ought to see the fatherland and up to the day of his death he ought never to see anything else. (…) when he has ceased to have a fatherland, he no longer exists; and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.

According to Gilroy (2002), Rousseau argues that disorganised and diverse groups had been formed into a unity around the idea of fatherland that is called 'nation'. As a political body, the idea of the nation also ties these diverse groups to each other and even to the unseen, 'imagined' fellow (Anderson, 1991). Therefore, the idea of nation and fatherland are social constructions rather than being natural phenomena. Anderson (1991:49) explains that nations are imagined communities since "even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".

Turkish people living abroad are called as *gurbetçi* (expatriate) in public discourse. Art works of the Turkish diaspora in Europe refer to concepts of *gurbet* (abroad), *vatan* (fatherland) and *memleket* (homeland) which indicates their orientation to the country of origin in identity construction. As Lewis (1991: 526) observes, "The use of the word watan in a political sense, equivalent to the French patrie, the English country, or the German vaterland, dates from the late eighteenth century, and is clearly due to European influence and example". Therefore, Turkey, a political entity as the fatherland of the imagined 'Turkish nation' is formed in the geographic location of Asia Minor.

Members of diaspora communities are affected by and try to have influence on developments in their home country. They can lobby in favour of or against a homeland issue and organise mass movements within the diaspora Their ability to intervene in the politics of their homeland is enhanced with development in the media industry. For instance, Turkish/Kurdish diasporas can play an important role in disseminating evidence of human rights violations, police brutality and censorship in Turkey by using social media to inform politicians, civil society and media in their host countries (see Baser 2015a). Benedict Anderson's concept 'long-distance nationalism' is used to describe some diaspora communities' involvement in homeland politics including support of ultra-nationalist or terrorist groups in civil war such as Kurdish and Sri Lankan diasporas (Sheffer 1986, 2003; Bhatt and Mukta 2000, Glick-Shiller, 2005; Baser, 2015b).

Boundary-maintenance

As both Safran (1991) and Cohen (1996) argue, maintaining boundaries with host nations is one of the common features of diaspora communities. Armstrong (1976) states that diasporas maintain boundaries with deliberate resistance to assimilation through self-enforced ethnic endogamy or other forms of self-segregation (see Chapter 7). In this way, diasporas maintain their cultural identity while living in a foreign cultural landscape. Even though boundary-maintenance is emphasised to reconstruct identity, the experience of being a diaspora community includes hybridity, fluidity, creolisation and syncretism. On this point, Stuart Hall (1990) states that diaspora experience is not defined by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity, diversity and hybridity of identity.

Myth of return and relationship with home

Expanding on Safran (1991) and Cohen (1996), Gabriel Sheffer (2003) claims that members of diasporas or numerous ethno-national groups permanently residing outside of their countries

of origin share one common aspect which is maintaining contacts with people back in their old homes. However, Sheffer's definition is a very broad definition which can include any community. Therefore, there is a need for a more specific description of forms and means of contact with people back in their homelands and their purpose. For instance, a British expat in Spain communicating on the phone with their family back in the UK or a Turkish guest-worker in Germany regularly sends remittances to their hometown for investment can be categorised in Sheffer's definition. However, neither of them carries the same diasporic motivation as a Kurdish political refugee sponsoring Kurdish insurgent groups for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The latter one carries the characteristics of a mobilised diaspora group with a political goal regarding the future of their country of origin. Therefore, s/he engages in long-distance participation in the resistance to achieve that goal (Baser and Swain, 2010; Demir, 2012; Baser, 2011; 2015b; Galip, 2014; Cakmak, 2018).

The relationship between a migrant community living abroad and the society in their country of origin is not always straightforward or the same for all migrants because not every migrant comes from their homeland with good memories. Some migrants may have problematic relationships with the government or society of their country of origin and do not visit their country of origin. This is the case especially for those who escaped from their home country due to a civil war or another catastrophe. On the other hand, some migrants may maintain their strong links with the society in their country of origin by visiting it regularly during holidays, sending remittances, and even investing in property or land in their hometown with the purpose of living there after retirement (Levitt, 2003). Based on this argument, Kunz's (1981) theory argues that, in any refugee waves, people experience different encounters in the host country based on their marginality within or identification with former home county. Kunz classifies displaced communities under three categories. The first group is majority-identified who identify themselves enthusiastically with the nation they have left behind. The second

group is event-alienated refugees who are ambivalent or embittered in their attitude to their former compatriots, such as religious or ethnic minorities who have been marginalised or discriminated against by the majority population of their country of origin. The third group is self-alienated refugees who for various ideological reasons have no wish to identify themselves with the nation (see, Al-Rasheed, 1994; Weiner, 1996; Bloch, 2002). In London diaspora, one can find Turkish or Cypriot migrants who left their country of origin 40 years ago yet still identify themselves with their home nation as well as finding those who want to forget the country they left behind due to their traumatic experiences.

In addition to diaspora communities' non-linear relationship with their countries of origin, immigration itself is not a linear or one-stage journey. It is a process of leaving one's homeland and adjusting to life in a new country (see Van Hear, 1998). According to many researchers most immigrants think of their presence outside their home country as a temporary phase even after many years abroad (Kay 1987; Talai 1989; Hirschon 1989; Voutira 1991) which leads the discussion towards to diaspora's desire to return to the homeland which is called the *myth of return* (Anwar 1979; Watson 1979). According to classical diaspora literature, migrants move to another country with the intention of returning to their home country one day. In literature in sociology and anthropology, while there are nuances, almost all immigrant communities are portrayed as people who are motivated with the idea of return and always struggle to maintain links with their homeland (Dahya 1973; Jeffery 1976; Anwar 1979; Robinson 1986; Shaw 1988, Van Hear, 1998; Levitt, 2003; Cohen, 2008; Eylem et.al. 2016; Cetin, 2016). As an example to this, Dahya (1973) claims that the myth of return acts as a cohesive force with the purpose of consolidating the kinship boundaries of the community and their links with their homeland.

> "The myth of return is an expression of one's intention to continue to remain a member of both of them. We do not have to question whether the myth is true or not. Rather, we have to look at it in the same way

as a social anthropologist who investigates a people's beliefs does not set out to verify their beliefs about the existence of, say, a deity or a 'spiritual being'; he looks instead at the effects of such beliefs on the people's social organization. Here the myth enables the migrants to keep alive social relationships, the chain of communication and movements between the village and Britain, which in turn enable the migrant and his village-kin group to persist as a cohesive group for mobilizing socio-economic resources and for social control" (Dahya 1973:268-9).

As I discussed before, diasporas assume themselves as sharing a historical location as well as a collective past. And Cohen (1996) argues that, diaspora groups do not desire to abandon their pasts.

In terms of migrant communities' relations with their home countries and boundary maintenance in diasporic place, there are different concepts an migrants' identities. Integration refers to migrant groups preserving their own distinct identity when adapting the host country's culture. The integration process includes acculturation which is the process of social, psychological, and cultural change that stems from blending between cultures (Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Sam and Berry, 2010, Bendel, 2014). In acculturation or integration migrants accept single elements of the core society without giving up an original identity of their home nations/cultures (Nowotny, 1981; Berry, 1997; Kastoryano, 2002; Alba and Nee, 2005; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009; Scholten, 2011, 2013; Ali and Gidley, 2014, Scholten et al., 2017, Kraal and Vertovec, 2017). On the other hand, another identity theory called assimilation requires a weakening of salience in expressing a cultural identity (Jackson, 1986; Harbottle, 1997; Brubaker, 2001; Waters and Jiménez, 2005; Amiraux and Simon, 2006; García and Schmalzbauer, 2017). Between two social-political theories, integration and assimilation, diasporas reconstruct their identity with reference to the history and culture of their country of origin. With the advanced transportation and communication technologies of the globalised world, migrants/diaspora communities can keep their connection with both home and host countries, socially, culturally, economically and/or politically rather than breaking their

attachment from one to join the other (Levitt, 2003). Parallel to Cohen's (1996) argument, Lie (1995:304) states that "it is no longer assumed that immigrants make a sharp break from their homelands". Some of them travel regularly; some of them go back and forth and/or engage in transnational working relationships while living abroad. The second and third generations, who do not have any first-hand experience or memory of their ancestral homeland have received their primary socialisation from a 'host' country and build a sense of having multiple homes with these visits (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002). They visit their ancestral homeland and become re-acquainted with relatives which Levitt (2003) calls *'roots journeys'*. I will discuss the homeland visiting patterns of the Turkish-speaking community and its impact on identity construction in Chapter 5.

Like migrants from many other communities, migrants from Turkey and Cyprus arrived in the UK with the intention of returning to their home. However, only a few of them returned whereas most of them settled down in the UK with their families buying houses and setting up businesses as the early study shows (George and Millerson, 1976). Contemporary studies show that return migration from Western Europe to Turkey is very low/limited (Keles, 2016; Kunguroglu et.al. 2018; Tezcan, 2018). What Anwar (1091) argued about the myth of return has weakened and slowly faded away as for many other migrant communities since they uprooted their families to the host countries. On the other hand, like many other migrant communities, Turkish-speaking community's sense of belonging to the UK is partial or in other words their loyalties are *'divided'* (see Lechner, 2008). Even though most of them do not have any feasible plans of returning to Turkey or Cyprus, many invest in properties in their hometowns and villages with the intention of living off that income when they retire. In addition, regular visits which Baldassar (2001) calls 'return visits' is an attempt to keep the myth of return alive. Baldassar (2001) coined the term to describe the visiting experience of Italian diaspora in Australia to the country of origin. Based on Anwar's (1979) and Baldassar's

(2001) theories, I argue that among the Turkish-speaking community, the myth of return evolved into return visits and regular travel to country of origin. These visits are ritualistic and sanctified. As Eliade (1987:204) claimed modern man still retains a large stock of camouflaged myths and degenerated rituals. I argue that these ritual-like visits are *'mundane pilgrimages'*. Margry (2008) states that those taking a pilgrimage seek an encounter with a particular cult object at the shrine in order to acquire spiritual, emotional or physical healing benefits. In this example, migrants visit their homeland to escape a profane environment of diaspora to gain the spiritual and nostalgic experience of memories in their ancestral land and heal the identity crisis or help the identity construction of a younger generation. I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 5 with visiting patterns of the community.

However, some scholars criticise the emphasis on homeland orientation and teleology of return in diaspora discussions (Hall, 1990; Clifford 1994; Anthias 1998; Falzon 2003). Clifford (1994) claims that many aspects that Jewish diaspora experienced do not fit other dispersed communities such as African, Caribbean or South Asian. These diasporas are not oriented to a specific place nor have no desire to return. Hall (1990) notes that diaspora does not mean scattered people whose identity can only be secured in connection with some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return. According to these latter interpretations, diasporas are not simply scattered communities that are passionate and pine for their lost homeland, rather members of diasporas can be described as cosmopolitan and transnational individuals (Werbner 2002a; Hall 1990; Gilroy 1993). Therefore, I argue that, not all of them grieve for their lost homeland for the rest of their lives. Like the Turkish-speaking community many of them enjoy the culture of more than one country and they are highly mobile without being totally disconnected with their country of origin.

In this regard, Tölölyan (1991:4) states that "The term that once described Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with a larger semantic domain that includes words

like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, oversea community, ethnic community". According to Tölölyan (1996:19) only a small minority of the population who are political or cultural entrepreneurs form a diaspora. According to him for example, 'the Armenian diaspora' in the US, is, not very diasporic at all and is becoming less rather than more over time because the large majority of those who identify as Armenians distance themselves from diasporic stances, from links to the homeland and from links to Armenians in other countries (Tölölyan (1996:15). I argue that the case is similar for some groups among the Turkish-speaking community. Their 'Armenianness' or 'Turkishness' or 'Kurdishness' is closer to what Herbert Gans (1979) calls 'symbolic ethnicity' rather than a diasporic identity. Gans (1979: 9) defined symbolic ethnicity as "a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior". Moreover, some members of these communities do not define themselves as refugees or diasporas but as voluntary migrants, expatriates or sojourners who chose to settle in the UK in search of new economic or other opportunities.

Critique of diaspora

The critics of the term "diaspora" disagree with the ways the concept may suggest homogeneity and a historically fixed identity, or a continuation of shared values and practices within a dispersed population (Vertovec, 2005). Moreover, it is always problematic to define borders, asking who belongs within and whether membership is related to descent or language. As Hazel Smith (2007:5) argues "diaspora groups are internally heterogeneous… and different parts of the same diaspora can and do have different interests, defined among other things by class, gender, generation, occupation and religion...". Parallel to this argument Homi Bhaba claims that 'there is no such whole as the nation, the culture, or even the self'

(quoted in Tambiah 2000:178) in which case why should there be any such whole amongst Turkish migrants or any other diaspora?

Members of a diaspora may have multiple identities. The same individual may define themselves to be part of a global Muslim population or Sunni (sect), originated from Turkey (nation-state), Eastern Anatolian (region), a dispersed community of Kurdish (ethnicity and language), a British citizen or/and working-class (socio-economic class). None of these identities eliminate each other.

In addition to the discussion on diaspora communities' belonging, Pnina Werbner (2002b) asks what makes a diaspora community that settles in a particular country 'diasporic' rather than simply 'ethnic'? What turns a country (for example, Great Britain) from a permanent place of settlement or an adopted home, into a place of diaspora? It is discussed in the analysis chapters why some groups among the Turkish-speaking community define themselves as diaspora, whereas some others do not see themselves as migrants but citizens of former British Empire such as Cypriots.

1.2 Historicity of Migration of Turkish-speaking People

In order to interpret identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community and decide whether it is a diaspora community, it is important to discuss the historicity of the presence of the community in the UK. This discussion would also provide a context for the discussion on collective memory in the following chapter. Moreover, it will enable me to identify characteristics of different waves of immigration which have an impact on identity performances.

In the last century, technological developments have enhanced the mobility of human beings. Therefore, as Massey et. al. (1993: 431) argues, over the last three or four decades, immigration has emerged as a major force across the world (. Social, economic and political

factors cause displacement and countries opening their borders for free flow of goods and people, globalisation and further advancements in technology and transportation triggered more immigration waves (Čiarnienė and Kumpikaitė, 2008). The displacement or movement of a population within a political border is defined as internal migration while cross border movement is defined as international migration. However, migration as a convoluted term refers to more than just a physical displacement. It includes cultural, political, religious interaction between an individual or social group and the social settings. Massey et. al. (1993) argue that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone. Rather, its complex, multifaceted nature requires a sophisticated theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels, and assumptions. Therefore, in this research I combined various methods from auto-ethnography to indepth interviews to comprehend the dynamics of migration of Turkish-speaking people.

1.2.1 Turkish Migration to Western Europe

Turkish migration to the UK is not a unique example. In the second half of the twentieth century, industrialisation and rapid economic developments resulted in a new epoch of labour migration from rural to urban and from the global south to the north. After World War II, industrialised West European countries lacked the labour power needed for economic development. Foreign workers migrated to West European countries with economic motivations in the early 1950s and 1960s. Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Great Britain have a long history of a voluminous influx of foreigners as workers, refugees and asylum seekers (Rudolph, 1994, p. 113). Between 1960 and 1968, Germany signed agreements with different countries to meet its labour needs and Turkey was one of these countries. Turkey was known as a country for sending migrants until the 1990s. Most of these migrants were economically motivated. The first organised labour migration wave from Turkey to Western Europe was to Germany in 1961 with the agreement for the recruitment of Turkish workers. This labour recruitment program is also known as the guest

worker programme (*Gastarbeiterprogramm*). This is why Turkish workers migrating to Germany are referred as guest workers *(Gastarbeiter)* (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Castles et al., 1984; Steiner, and Velling, 1994; Constant and Massey, 2003; Akgündüz, 2008; İçduygu and Sert, 2016; Ceylan, 2017; Yanasmayan, 2017). Both Germany and Turkey thought the migration was temporary (Steiner and Velling, 1995; Constant and Massey, 2003; Schiffauer, 2005; Avci, 2006; Faas, 2009; Lanz, 2009; Icduygu and Sert, 2016; Ceylan, 2017). Following this, similar agreements between Turkey, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands were signed in 1964, with France in 1965 and with Sweden in 1967. According to Sassen (1996), migrant labour is engaged with specific jobs which are mostly manual jobs and heavy industry. These early comers earned well working in Europe compared to Turkey. Moreover, there was an economic recession in Turkey in the 1970s (Schiffauer, 2005; Onder, 2016) which did not only make returning more difficult but also triggered further migration to Europe. Furthermore, the military coup that took place in Turkey in 1980 and the civil war that followed in the Kurdish region in later years contributed towards the immigration trend from Turkey to Europe (Schiffauer, 2005). The migrant workers brought their families to host countries country in the years that followed, and the number of Turkish migrants multiplied with the union of these families. Kin and social networks were, and are, being reproduced as a result of these family reunifications (see Kucukcan 1999). These migrant communities congregated in industrialised cities such as Rotterdam, Bern and Cologne (Böcker, 1994; Kucukcan, 1999; Alba, 2005; Schiffauer, 2005; Lecher, 2008; Faas, 2009; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009; Lanz, 2009; Düvell, 2010; Hackett, 2013, Bendel, 2014; Ceylan, 2017).

Germany still hosts the majority of Turkish immigrants in Europe with around 2,5 to 4 million (Barker 2017, Conradt, and Langenbacher 2013). The Netherlands, Sweden and Austria follow it as popular destination countries for Turkish migrants. Today the Turkish diaspora is the largest single immigrant group in the European Economic Area (including Switzerland)

with a population of 3.7 million (ICT 2004). According to the statistics of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017) the number is estimated at around 4.6million when including the second and third generations born to Turkish parents outside of Turkey (De Bel-Air, 2016).

1.2.2 Migration to the United Kingdom

The UK has never signed a labour recruitment agreement with Turkey. However, the UK has a long history of receiving migrants from different parts of the world. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain was undergoing industrialisation and required further labour power. This labour need was first met by recruiting people from the countryside, and then by recruiting workers from Ireland (Virdee, 2014). The next migration wave to hit Great Britain was the Jewish resettlement between 1875 and 1914 as refugees who had to leave Russia to escape religious and political persecution arrived in the country (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Solomos, 2003).

The historical background of Turkish migration to Great Britain dates back to Ottoman times. There are records of these encounters from the early sixteenth century, when Ottoman ambassadors, merchants and travellers came to Europe and Great Britain, some of whom settled in trading capitals like Amsterdam and London (Gilliat-Ray, 2010). For example, the famous British diarist, Samuel Pepys wrote in 1662 how the Earl of Sandwich brought "a little Turke and a Negro for his daughters as presents, in addition to a parrot and other novelties" (1986:10). Soysal and Eren (1977:137) note that the first Turkish bath (hamam) was opened in 1679 in London. Yet, it does not necessarily mean there was a Turkish population living in London at that time and a *hamam* was built to meet the community's needs. It does however indicate a cultural interaction between Turkish and British cultures which is one of the main arguments of this research study.

More accurate sources date back to the late 18th century and concern political asylum seekers such as members of Yeni Osmanlılar (Young Ottomans) and Genç Türkler/Jön Türkler

(from French: Les Jeunes Turcs, in English; Young Turks), who were a group of intellectuals who endeavoured to replace the absolute monarchy of the Ottoman State with a constitutional monarchy (Çiçek, 2010, Hanioglu, 2001). Most of them were exiled and settled down in Paris and London. They published political journals and newspapers criticizing the absolute power of the Ottoman Sultan, such as *Muhbir* published in London between 31 August 1867 and 3 November 1868.[2] In the years following the republican revolution of 1923 another wave of Turkish refugees, mostly Ottoman elites, escaped from the new regime to Europe (see Sonyel 1988). However, before the 1960s, Turkish migration to Europe and the UK was very limited, and as a result my research focuses on more recent waves of migration from the 1940s and onwards. Initially, men came to the UK with a renewable work permit and then brought their wives and children (Kucukcan, 1999).

Following World War II, numbers of immigrants from old colonies immigrated to Great Britain while other Western European states received migrants from East and Southern Europe as well as from former colonies (Brubaker, 2001; Ali and Holden, 2006). The post-war wave of black and Asian migration to Great Britain started in the late 1940s and gathered momentum in the 1950s and 1960s (Kucukcan, 1999:17). The numbers of immigrants in Great Britain doubled between 1951 and 1961, rising from 250,000 to 541,000 (Castle and Kosack, 1973:31). After the 1950s, Turkish migrant workers (Gastarbeiter-guest workers) flowed into Western Europe. Labour demand for unskilled or semiskilled sectors had already been met in Germany and other Western European countries. The United Kingdom became a new destination for economic immigrants and political asylum seekers, but it was never the main destination for Turkish migrants (Kucukcan, 1999; Schiffauer, 2005). Heisler (1986) contends that the foreign workers, migrant workers or guest workers of the 1950s and 1960s had become permanent or

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[2] Muhbir was originally published in Istanbul (2nd of January 1867) but after the exile of the journalists and intellectuals, Ali Suavi, a political activist and members of Young Ottomans, moved publication to the free press environment of Great Britain. The motto of the newspaper was: "Muhbir will find a country where telling the truth is not forbidden and will be published there." (Tütengil, 1969).

at least quasi-permanent settlers in the 1980s, and their number has been continuing increasing since that day (Stewart, 2004; Woodbridge, 2005; Erdemir and Vasta, 2007; ONS, 2008; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010; Burrell, 2010; Volmer, 2010, 2011, Blinder, 2016; Home Office, 2014, 2016). Even though the influx of Turkish migrants to the UK dates back to the 1940s, the Turkish community in the UK is not as large as in other Western European countries such as Germany or the Netherlands. Migration from Turkey to Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland has been structured and controlled mobility based on recruitment of labour, whereas the migration to the UK has resulted from personal initiatives of Turkish citizens (Kucukcan, 1999; Schiffauer, 2005; Hackett, 2013).

The migrant workers have brought their culture to hosting countries, and it has resulted in the change of cultural landscape of the host countries. These foreigners have established multi-cultural communities in Western Europe with their language, customs, values, religions, cuisine, dressing patterns and political opinions. London has a vivid Turkish culture (life) due to the size of Turkish-speaking community. With its high diversity, the Turkish-speaking community makes invaluable contributions to the vibrant cultural life and already enriched social environment of London.

1.2.4 A Closer Look at the Turkish-speaking Community

Recent migration (from the 1940s onwards) of Turkish people to the UK can be summarised in four stages (see Table 1): The first wave is identified by the arrival of Cypriots and covers the period from the 1950s until 1979. Turkish speaking Cypriots were the first arrivals of the Turkish-speaking diaspora due to Cyprus' colonial links with the British Empire (Xypolia, 2017). However, the proportion of Turkish Cypriots was very low among Cypriot migrants until the early 1960s (Thomson 2006). The second wave refers to the immigration wave from mainland Turkey after the 1980 coup d'etat. Most of these migrants were political asylum seekers. The third wave is characterized by the arrival of Kurdish immigrants from mainland Turkey, which corresponds to the 1990s when the conflict between the Turkish Army and the

paramilitary Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) reached its peak and caused displacement of thousands of Kurds from their villages. The fourth wave (covering the early 2000s to the present) shall be referred to as undocumented Turkish and Kurdish migration from mainland Turkey that included entrepreneurs and students settling down after they graduate (see also Düvell,2010; Kucukcan,1999). Despite increasingly restrictive immigration legislation in the UK, Turkish citizens continue coming to the UK with self-employment visas based on the Ankara Agreement (Sirkeci, et al., 2016). The Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 between Turkey and the European Economic Community and enables Turkish citizens to live and work in EEC (now EU) countries (Sirkeci, et al., 2016). Although the agreement is signed by all EEC countries de facto, it is applied only in the UK, therefore Turkish migrants use its advantages to live in the UK.

The number of asylum applications by Turkish citizens in European countries has decreased substantially over the last decade (Sirkeci & Esipova 2013). However, recent unrest in Turkey, the Gezi Protests against the authoritarianism of Turkey's then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan in 2013; the corruption investigations of 17-25 December 2013; ceasefire and the restarting of conflicts between PKK and the Turkish Army; the failed military coup of 2016; and the constitutional referendum in 2017 triggered more migration and asylum to European countries including Britain (Sirkeci et al. 2016).

The figures on the population of the Turkish-speaking community in the UK are disputed. Estimates vary between 180,000 to half a million. It is important to state that the size of the population is difficult to pin down. According to Sirkeci and Esipova (2013) the number is between 180,000-250,000 and other statistics lack credibility. In addition, around 92,000 Turkish citizens have been naturalised in the UK between 1980 and 2016 (Sirkeci et.al, 2016:16-17).

Today the population of the Turkish-speaking community in the UK is estimated to be between 180,000 and 400,000 many of whom are concentrated in North London (Enneeli et.al. 2005; Thomson, 2006; Mehmet Ali, 2006, Sen et.al. 2008; Home Office, 2011 census). According to the report that the Home Affairs Committee published in 2011, in total approximately 500,000 Turkish-originated people live in the UK, and 300,000 of them are of Turkish Cypriot origin (Home Affairs Committee 2011). It is also very difficult to know specific numbers since categories are not clearly distinguished. For instance, the category of Cyprus-born migrants includes both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, answers given to the question of nationality were shown to be Turkish, Cypriot or British which makes identification of number through the ethnicity category in the census difficult to distinguish (Düvell, 2010). British-born Turkish or Cypriot people are not counted as part of the Turkish-speaking community in these censuses unless they self-identify as Turkish or Turkish Cypriot. In addition, those who described themselves as being of Kurdish ethnicity could be from mainland Turkey or other parts of the Kurdistan region. However, inter-marriage between different subgroups among Turkish diaspora members and other nations make the description of 'Turkish-speaking community' more meaningful and comprehensive.

First Wave	1950-79
Second Wave	1980-89
Third Wave	1990-99
Fourth Wave	2000-present

Table 1: Waves of Migration from Cyprus and Turkey

Migration from Cyprus to the UK had started before Turkey, due to colonial links. Britain one-sidedly annexed Cyprus when the Ottoman State engaged in World War I in opposition to

Great Britain. This annexation was not recognised by the Ottoman State. However, Turkey recognised Britain's 1914 annexation decision at the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1925. Thus, Cyprus was declared a British Colony in 1925 (Persianis, 2003: 355, see also Yilmaz, 2005). It gave the option for Turkish Cypriots to choose either Turkish or British citizenship. This was the beginning of Turkish Cypriot immigration to Britain.

Cypriot migration to Britain started in the 1930s, and increased steadily in the 1940s, reaching its peak in 1960-61 when the British army withdrew, and the economic situation deteriorated (Oakley, 1970). Early immigrants from Cyprus were exclusively Greek- Cypriots (Oakley, 1987, p. 31). The political strain and economic recession in Cyprus had contributed to a migration wave. Inter-ethnic fighting broke out in 1963, and as a result 25,000 Turkish Cypriots (approximately a fifth of the Turkish Cypriot population) became internally displaced (Cassia, 2007: 236). The Great Britain became the main destination for cross-border immigration (Alicik, 1997; Manisali, 2000). Turkish military intervention in Cyprus took place in 1974 to end the civil war and protect Turkish Cypriots from the ethnic cleansing of EOKA[3]; as a result, thousands of Cypriot refugees defected to Britain. King (1982:93) argues that the number of the Cypriot population (regardless of their ethnic origin) was 160,000 in the 1980s, of which 20-25 percent are said to be Turkish-Cypriots.

Ethnic tension and migration from Cyprus to the UK continued during the 1970s. After unsuccessful negotiations with the Greeks, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared their independence on 15 November 1983 under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This was rejected by the UN and the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, an economic embargo against the Turkish Cypriots was held that deprived Turkish Cypriots from foreign investment

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[3] EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston in English"National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters") was a Greek Cypriot nationalist guerrilla organisation that fought a campaign for the end of British rule in Cyprus, working towards the island's self-determination and for their eventual union with Greece. After the withdrawal of British Army, they attempted an ethnic cleansing against Turkish Cypriots.

as well as exporting to the international market. Consequently, the Northern Cyprus economy remained stagnant and undeveloped (Tocci 2004: 61). Because of all these economic and political reasons, an estimated 130,000 Turkish Cypriots have emigrated from Northern Cyprus to the UK since its establishment (Cassia 2007: 238; Manisali 2000, Taylor, 2015). Most of these migrants were motivated by economic reasons or security concerns. The people who tended to migrate were the service and white-collar workers, those who had received a primary education but came from rural areas where employment opportunities, other than farming were absent (Oakley, 1972).

According to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2001, 200,000 Turkish Cypriots were living in the United Kingdom (TRNYC, MFA 2001). The Turkish Cypriot community is considered to be well-integrated into economic life in London. They are involved in some businesses including kebab shops, supermarkets, bakeries, boutiques, video stores, estate agencies, insurance agencies, dry cleaners, cafes and restaurants (Issa, 2004, Inal et.al., 2007). According to Robins and Aksoy (2001) Turkish Cypriots' emphasis is on adapting or feeling close to the British way of life, a strategy of acceptance or social approval. Turkish and Greek Cypriots' migration occurred alongside similar motives and patterns (Constantinides, 1977; Taylor, 2015).   During the settlement process -from accommodation to job- they cooperated with Greek Cypriots in the UK earlier. The Turkish Cypriot identity of the migrants enables them to interact with both Greeks and Turks. Despite the previous civil war in Cyprus, there is not any recorded conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in London according to literature and my field findings. The residential scattering of second and third generations from the core areas of the community makes them a more invisible community as their number is very small (Taylor, 2015).

Immigration from mainland Turkey to the UK did not start until the late 1960s and was mostly based on economic motivation (Safi, 2012:180). Mainland Turks chronologically

followed Turkish Cypriots in the early 1970s. They were mostly young single men who brought their wives and children to the country in the following years. After the military coup in 1980 the second wave of Turkish migrants flowed to the UK. According to Erdemir and Vasta (2007) most of them were intellectuals, students, trade union activists and professionals, with mainly urban origins. The Turkish Cypriots who were the first group to settle in the country provided job opportunities to mainland Turks in their shops and businesses. However, there is a pattern of ethnic economy repeating itself there. Enneli and Modood (2009) describe Turkish-speaking young people's employment in their family businesses or in other Turkish speaking employees' jobs as strong dependency on the ethnic economy. opportunity of upward mobility.

Franck Düvell's (2010) article claims that the second generation entered university, notably Middlesex, London Metropolitan, East London and Essex which refers to fragmentation from the ethnic economy (see also, Issa, 2004; Mehmet Ali, 2006). Other cohorts, however remain at the bottom of society, notably immigrants from rural mainland Turkey who arrived during the 1970s and Kurdish refugees who arrived from the mid1980s. (Düvell, 2010: 7).

Since the 1970s, the Kurdish diaspora has emerged in Europe in the context of the military conflict for an independent Kurdistan. The Paramilitary Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been conducting a guerrilla war against Turkish state authorities since 1984 (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005). This conflict resulted in the erasure of villages and expulsion of the residents. This compulsory and forced movement of the population from south-eastern and eastern Turkey to central or western regions and assimilation policy of the Turkish state over Kurds caused a mass number of people to leave the country from the 1980s onwards (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005). The second reason that lay behind the emergence of Kurdish diaspora was the economic boom in Western Europe in post-World War II era. Kurdish people, like most Turkish migrants, travelled mainly to Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden with the guest workers scheme and this was followed by irregular migration and asylum in the

late 1980s and 1990s. The UK was one of the main destination choices after these countries for the Kurdish asylum seekers in the 1990s. Due to the economic conditions of the period, in example the decline in the textile industry, they had difficulties in reaching the labour market. Available jobs were low-paid band casual jobs demanding long working hours. Their late arrival and political exile position offered them a different migration experience than the other two groups had experienced (Wahlbeck, 1999). They organised themselves around associations that were politically motivated with the ideal of an independent Kurdish nation state. According to Wahlbeck (1999) London offers Kurds a free environment to perform Kurdish identity and lobby for recognition of a Kurdish nation and rights.

In comparison to migration into Germany and the Netherlands, it became the individuals' initiative to immigrate to the UK. The first migrants in the community assisted their relatives and fellow villagers with their journey to the UK which is called chain migration (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964). In this way, the early arrivals both gained a prestige among the community since they helped their fellow men, and gained economic benefit from it (Choldin, 1973). This benefit came about through a transmission cycle, as the later arrivals would rent rooms or shed space in the gardens of the earlier arrivals keeping the income in a support system that benefitted all, as the later arrivals paid a cheaper rent to people from their homeland communities (Ryan et al., 2008).

Ibrahim Sirkeci and his colleagues (2016) edited book suggests that late comers of the Turkish-speaking community were helped by early movers, the ethnic institutions they established in London already and the social network of '*hemsehrilik*'. They add that Turkish migrants face tension of preserving religious, ethnic and religious identity while values of home and the host country are conflicting. The book also suggests that these social networks are transferred to the economic field and ethnic enclave economy defines the Turkish migrants' position in the labour market. My research findings suggest a similar pattern. Ethnic enclaves

created based on social capital and result of chain migration. Therefore, economic relations as well as social relations are all based on this *hemsehrilik*' network.

Family and relative networks play a significant role in settling down and adapting to life in London. Today, there are still thousands of Turkish-speaking people living in illegal residences like sheds or in the backrooms of kebab restaurants (Datta, 2009). Single female immigrants are very rare in the Turkish-speaking community. Most of the women migrated with, or to join, their husbands or fathers who were regarded as the primary migrants and breadwinners (Ladbury 1977). The number of single female immigrants has increased among the Turkish-speaking community especially those with high education degrees. Yet, the migration pattern I found in the field indicates the domination of single male migration. According to Manavoglu (1982) the first arrivals tended to keep their culture, religious faith and traditions. They also preserved their social networks in Turkey. The first Turkish migrants were mostly mature adults who socialised and were educated in their home countries. They brought their culture, traditions and beliefs with them into a counterculture environment (Ulug, 1981; Mirdal, 2006). This trend has continued throughout the years. For example, male members of the community who are active in public space, organises football leagues to preserve cultural identity of the younger generations (Unutulmaz, 2015).

Despite forming a significant minority, the Turkish-speaking diaspora in the UK is under-researched. As Baker and Eversley (2000) claimed Turkish is one of the six largest language groups in London. However, in terms of data collection in the Census the Turkish-speaking community is still invisible (Sonyel, 1988; Enneli et al., 2005; Mehmet Ali, 2006). While some local authorities such as Hackney, Enfield, Southwark, Lewisham, Islington, and Haringey provide detailed statistical data for example on the educational success of Turkish-speaking young people, other authorities still group Turkish-speaking community under the "Other" or "Other European" category. That situation is defined as a forced state of invisibility upon the

Turkish-speaking community by Mehmet Ali (2006). According to Mehmet Ali (1985) and Sonyel (1988) the Turkish-speaking community in the UK are a silenced minority due to their small number. They are also neglected because of the general perception of them as a highly self-sufficient group. Therefore, most racist attacks or problems in the community stay unreported. Enneli et.al. (2005) added that they are invisible, disadvantaged and under-researched in comparison to larger and more visible communities like the Caribbean and South Asian diaspora.

1.2.6 Location of the Turkish-speaking Community

The 2011 census statistics indicate that, 53% of London Turks and Kurds live in inner boroughs of North London. 23% of the Turkey born Londoners solely reside in Enfield which constitutes the 4.5% of the total population and 25% of the foreign-born population living in the borough (Sirkeci et.al., 2016). If the second and third generations were included the figures would be higher.

The residence pattern of the Turkish-speaking community in the UK is predominantly concentrated in the inner city boroughs of the North and East London such as Hackney, Haringey, Islington and Enfield while in other European countries they are scattered to formerly industrialized urban areas. For example, in Germany the communities are visible around Berlin, Frankfurt, Cologne, Hamburg, Munich and Stuttgart. Turkish and Kurdish immigrants from mainland Turkey imitated the settlement patterns of early comer Cypriots. However, Turkish Cypriots are most likely to live dispersed in London now. There are also a small number of Turkish-speaking people living in Barnet and Walthamstow (see, Alicik 1997; Smith, 2000; Issa, 2005; Wets 2006, Avci, 2006, Inal et.al. 2007; Enneli and Modood 2009, Kucukcan, 2009; Holgate et al., 2012). The creation of ethnic ghettos is both related to the residential concentration of migrants through chain migration and discrimination towards them in regard to housing.

In the neighbourhoods where Turkish speaking immigrants are concentrated, the crime rates are very high (Mehmet Ali, 2006). There are also some Turkish gangs which are involved with illicit drug trafficking, racketing Turkish shop owners, and fight with each other to gain control over the streets. In these districts, nearly all goods and services can be purchased within the community. It offers newcomers a soft transition and integration into the life in the UK but also leads to the construction of ghettos or gentrification which results in the social reproduction of poverty. Green Lane in North London is a snapshot of all these variations within the community. Turkish Cypriots are an additional variation in Britain, as there is not a visible Cypriot community in other European countries (Enneli and Modood, 2009). However, it is not a fully isolated or closed community especially due to economic motivations and compulsory physical factors, such as sharing the same neighbourhood. Therefore, members of the Turkish-speaking community act in alliance with different ethnic groups in example the Polish community, according to necessities.

1.3 Framework of the Identity Fragments

The disputes between various fragments of the Turkish-speaking community such as Turks, Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis are transferred from Turkey to Britain (Keles, 2015b; Cakmak, 2018). Cultural, political and religious organisations of the community in north London reflect the cracks of political tension. The Alevi diaspora is the most prominent group among the Turkish-speaking community. In the case of Alevi diaspora in the UK, Kurdish and Alevi identities overlap, but are not always mutually inclusive.

In literature as well as the official records, the Turkish-speaking community is classified within three main categories: Turkish Cypriots, Mainland Turks and Kurds from Turkey. Cypriots did not hold Turkish citizenship when they immigrated in to the UK but were classed as subjects of the British Empire (Xypolia, 2017, Ozkul et al., 2017). Kurds are classed as

Turkish citizens but are an ethnic minority group. Their cultural identity has been suppressed by Turkish state authorities and most of the Kurdish immigrants are political refugees in the UK. My preference of this categorisation is based on the ethno-cultural differences and the migration patterns within the community. Historically speaking, the Turkish-speaking Cypriots are ethnic Turks that were brought from Central Turkey (Anatolia) and settled down on the island after the Ottoman State took control over there in 1570 (see Orhonlu 1971). The island has been shared by Greeks and Turks together and as a result of being an island Turkish Cypriots' interaction with mainland Turks has been limited. After World War I the island was annexed by the British Empire and Turkish Cypriots experienced being part of a British colony. As a result of various reasons such as interaction with the Greek community; experience of being part of the British Empire and geopolitics of being an island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, Cypriots developed a unique culture and lifestyle that is different from cultural life in Mainland Turkey in many ways.

Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish with a dialect and they have a Sunni Muslim background; most of the population are secular. That is the rationale behind my categorisation of them as Cypriot not simply as Turks. They were also some of the first arrivals among the Turkish-speaking community in Britain.

Kurds or Kurdish people are indigenous people of Mesopotamia in the Middle East. As an ethnic group, they were subjects of the Ottoman State until World War I. They have never managed to establish an independent state and remain a marginalised ethnic group in Turkey (Galip, 2014). Today the Kurds inhabits the border of four different states in the Middle East: Eastern and South-Eastern Turkey, Western Iran, Northern Iraq and North-eastern Syria. This territory is referred to as Kurdistan which means land of the Kurds. However, it is not a *de jure state* with borders, rather it is an ideological concept. There is also a significant Kurdish diaspora across Europe. Kurds have a distinctive culture and speak their own language. They

are not categorised under a single category of Kurdish diaspora but as Iraqi Kurds, Iranian Kurds or categorised under the Turkish-speaking community referring to the citizenship they held when they immigrated to Britain. The Kurds from Turkey have a Sunni Muslim or Alevi background and speak Turkish. Some of them do not speak Kurdish as a result of the Turkish state's assimilationist policies for decades. There are also different dialects within the Kurdish language resulting in cultural fragmentation within the community due to living under different sovereign states. Therefore, most of the Kurds from Turkey are still in alliance with ethnic Turks. They speak Turkish, hold dual citizenship and visit their hometowns in Turkey. Thus, I have categorised them within my research group.

1.3.1 Alevism

Unlike the demographic distribution in Turkey, among the Turkish-speaking community in the UK Alevis are not in minority position. Large numbers of Alevis had to flee from their villages due to numerous pogroms (Eral, 1993) which created an Alevi diaspora in Europe (Massicard, 2010, 2012; Keles, 2014). Therefore, it is important to define Alevism in order to understand the community in the UK before discussing their identity.

Alevism is a heterodox and syncretic school of thought in Islam. In this mystic branch of Islam, people follow Hz. Ali (4th Caliphate of Islam, cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad), their descendants (Ahl al-Bayt/ Ehl-i Beyt), the Twelve Imams, and the 13th-century saint Haji Bektash Veli. Even though it is related to Shiism due to the Twelve Imams thought, their practice is based on Sufi elements of the Bektashi tariqa (Bektashism) (Eröz, 1977; Üzüm, 1997; Shakland, 2003, Kutlu, 2006). It is also known as Alevi-Bektashi tradition in Turkey. The word Alevi (Alawi) derived from the word Ali refers to people devoted to his path. Alevi people believe in the unity of Allah, Muhammad, and Ali in which the latter two are the representation of the light of Allah. Even though Alevism is rooted in Islam, some aspects of it are contradictory to mainstream Islamic teachings; therefore, it is accepted as a

heterodox belief (Eröz, 1977; Üzüm, 1997; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Jenkins et al., 2017). For instance, the Alevi Federation's online booklet on Alevism (2013) states the following about their faith:

> Therefore, Alevis do not fear God but only bear love for him and they do not believe in paradise or hell but an infinite circulation until one reaches the status of perfection and reunion with where he or she comes from. (pg.3)

On the other hand, the Quran (29:57-58) suggests the opposite of Alevi faith. In mainstream Islamic teaching, there is paradise and hell in which people will be sent after the day of judgement, and there is not any infinite circulation of life and death.

Alevism as a faith includes various communities speaking different languages and from ethnicities in a broad geographical space reaching from Central Asia to the Anatolian peninsula and the Balkans of Europe (Eröz, 1977; Üzüm, 1997; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Massicard, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2017). Alevi people are also called Qizilbash (Kızılbaş in Turkish means Redheads) by Sunni Muslims in Anatolia since Ottoman times (Eröz, 1977; Yörükan, 1998). Although, Alevism is very common in Anatolia, and it is the second main branch of Islam in Turkey, Alevi people have experienced several attacks and pogroms during their history (Keles, 2014). Because of that, some of them hide their identity, and even pray in secrecy in Turkey. Although it is a religious movement, because of these suppressions, Alevism has also developed a political aspect. Due to numbers of pogroms, Alevis migrated to Europe and today it is estimated that approximately one million Alevi people are living in Europe (Bruinessen, 1996; Massicard, 2010, 2012; Online Alevism Booklet, 2013). European diaspora provides Alevis a free environment where they can practice their faith. Therefore, while discussing identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community I paid special attention to the Alevi community. Teachings of Alevism are based on an oral tradition, as they do not have written books due to keeping it secret from outsiders. However, currently, there are several academic

and religious publications about Alevism (see, Eröz, 1977; Bruinessen, 1996; Üzüm, 1997; Yörükan, 1998; Arabacı, 2000; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Massicard, 2010, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2017; Onder, 2017; Kinesci, 2017, Okan, 2017). Teachings of Alevism are narrated by ashiks playing *saz/bağlama* (instrument) and singing *deyiş (songs of mystical love)*, *nefes (hymns) and türkü (folk song)*. These songs have spiritual meaning and aim to teach the participants important lessons. Playing *saz* and singing *deyiş* are common cultural/religious practices among the Alevi diaspora in London. Moreover, *saz* and folk songs play an important role in identity construction of younger generations as well as transmitting collective memory which will be discussed at the next chapter. In Turkey, Alevis also display the picture of Ali's sword called Zulfiqar (Zülfikar) in various ornaments. However, among the Alevi diaspora in the UK, it is rarely used even in the *Cemevi*.

Figure 1: Saz/Baglama

Figure 2: Zulfikar Necklace

Another important aspect of the Alevi cultural life in London is *Cem* ceremonies. Even though it is rooted in Islam, Alevis do not pray in the traditional way (salah in five times a day) but perform a different religious ceremony called "*cem*" and their assembly houses are called "*cemevi*" (Cem House). *Cemevi* has a central role in community life in London (See Keles, 2014). Religious figures leading their religious services are called *dede* (grandfather) and they have a respectable status in the ecommunity. Cem ceremonies include music (saz), singing (deyiş, nefes, türkü) and dancing called *semah*. Like playing *saz*, *semah* dance is an important part of cultural/religious life of the Alevi diaspora in the UK. Alevi children are taught how to dance *semah* at weekend schools. Semah is performed by both men and women together turning and swirling while ashik plays saz/bağlama. Semah dance symbolizes the revolution of the planets around the Sun and uniting yourself with Allah. Saz is accepted as a sacred instrument and it is known as *"the stringed holy book"* (Online Alevism Booklet, 2013:6).

At the ceremonies, Alevis eat *lokma*, a communal meal, and towards the closing section of the *cem* ceremony the *dede* who leads the ceremony engages the participants in a discussion which is called *sohbet*. Alevis call one another as *'can'* meaning soul/live in Turkish, which is a gender-neutral term. Anyone who is born in an Alevi background is accepted as Alevi but is required to follow the moral rules of Alevism. Having a *müsahip,* a companion or an eternal brother of the path, is another important requirement of the belief. It is a lifelong commitment to care for the spiritual, emotional, and physical needs of each other. It helps to develop a strong solidarity among the members of the Alevi community. In addition to that, the social control mechanism is very advanced among Alevi communities. For instance, in the traditional way *dedes* ask each participant before the *cem* ceremony whether s/he has any complaints about any members of the community including their spouse. The community collectively judges any incidents and if the person violated moral principles, varying sanctions are applied such as organising a communal meal or if the incident includes a violation of main values (in example adultery) then the person might be declared as *düşkün* and excommunicated from community life. This process is called *görgü cemi* meaning the manners ritual (Online Alevism Booklet, 2013). As it can be seen in this example, *dedes* as spiritual leaders do not only guide religious ceremonies but also all manners of social life. However, in the 20th century with urbanisation, this hierarchical structure is broken. So, today *dedes* only lead religious rituals and give advice (see, Eröz, 1977; Bruinessen, 1996; Üzüm, 1997; Yörükan, 1998; Arabacı, 2000; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Massicard, 2010, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2017; Onder, 2017; Kinesci, 2017, Okan, 2017). Although, social control mechanism is quite strong among the Alevi community in the UK, I have not seen any evidence of people being declared as *düşkün* and excommunicated from the community.

Alevis confirm all holy books and prophets and prioritise rationality over religious dogmas. Haci Bektash Veli's saying "the end of the path would be dark if the path is not science" is

commonly referred to. Alevis emphasise humanism, egalitarianism, mutual assistance, and gender-equality. Although, as I observed in London diaspora, some practices challenge these teachings. The historical experience of being a victim of unfair treatments to Ali, Husayn and other great personalities of the belief resulted in stand-point or resistance against injustices, which can be summarised as *"allegiance with the oppressed (mazlum)"* and *"standing up against the tyrant (zalim)"* (Bruinessen, 1996). This teaching or social attitude also resulted in a *de facto* politicisation of the community towards socialism. Among the Alevi community, political activism is significant as I observed in London. On the other hand, this narration and positioning which is at the core of their belief turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy and causes victimisation of Alevis for centuries. The pogroms Alevi communities experienced are the *raison d'être* of Alevi diaspora in Europe (Massicard, 2010, 2012). These massacres are; Kocgiri (1921), Dersim (1937-38), Maras (1978), Corum (1980), Sivas/Madimak (1993) massacres and Gazi Quarter Riots (1995). These massacres are part of Alevi collective memory and referred by the Alevi diaspora in London.

There are two main festivals among Alevis; *Newroz* and *Muharram*. As it is discussed at Chapter 6, *Newroz* is a very common celebration among Middle Eastern and Central Asian societies, Alevis are one of them. Different to the Kurdish community, Alevis do not refer to the *Kawa myth* but the birth of Ali in the narration of the importance of the day.

Muharram is a mourning period (20 days) for the Alevi community. It is called *Muharrem Mâtemi* which in Turkish means Mourning of Muharram. It is a mourning period as they commemorate the martyrdom of *Husayn*, one of the two sons of Ali who is also the grandson of the Prophet Muhammed, in Karbala region. During this period Alevis fast for 12 days and towards the end they have the *Festival of Aşure*, which is a special dish prepared from a variety of fruits, nuts, and grains. When I attended the *cem* ceremony during my field study it was the end of the *Muharrem Mâtemi* and some of the participants were fasting. In addition to these

traditional festivals, Alevis in diaspora also celebrate cultural festivals, the one in Britain is called *"Alevi Festivali"* and has been celebrated since 2010.

1.3.1.1 Britain Alevi Federation

Britain is one of the destinations for Alevi people taking refuge to Europe. Even though an exact number of the Alevi population is unknown in official statistics, the community leaders and academics estimate the number of Alevi population in the UK between 200,000 and 300,000 (Online Alevism Booklet, 2013). Although, demographically Alevi community is dominant among the Turkish-speaking community, this figure seems exaggerated. The biggest Alevi association in the UK is called "Britain Alevi Federation and London Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi" which is an umbrella organisation. It was established in 1993 to meet basic social and cultural needs of the newly emerging Alevi population. During the weekends, it provides courses for students like a supplementary school including mathematics, Turkish, science and English. In addition, cultural courses related with Alevism are provided such as *semah* (ritual dance) and *saz* (instrument).

Alevis also actively lobby in Britain and they established an Alevi group in British Parliament (All Party Parliamentary Group). Alevism was recognised as a religion by British Authorities in 2015 (Yetkinlioglu, 2015). However, in Turkey Cem houses or "Cemevis" are still not recognised as places of worship and receive no government funding. This tension is visible between the Alevi and Sunni population of the Turkish-speaking community in London (Keles, 2014;2015).

Celia Jenkins and Umit Cetin's (2017) article analyses how the assimilation experience of Alevi-Kurds in Turkey has been transmitted through generations in London in the form of the 'negative identity'. Their article suggests that despite not having experience of the trauma of being an Alevi in Turkey, the second generation in the UK feel invisible in British society and a feeling of not belonging in the wider British society. Eylem et.al. (2016) and Cetin (2016)

discuss the impact of segmented assimilation/adaptation trajectories, lack of integration and identity crisis on the incidences of suicide among the Turkish-speaking youth in the UK. The articles claim that social exclusion from British society as well as shame and stigma within the Turkish community may lead suicide (see also, Bhugra, and Jones, 2001; Claasen et.al. 2005).

1.3.2 The Kurdish Diaspora

The idea of home and sense of belonging are two of the main discussions around diaspora groups. It includes both their relationship with the societies they left behind and the new societies they arrived in. As Demir (2012: 816) argues most Kurds in London, however, do not originate from the Kurdish region of south-east Turkey which experienced village evacuations and the most intensive fighting between the army and the Kurdish guerrillas. They instead originate from central Turkey and the boundary areas between central and eastern Anatolia, from around towns such as Maraş, Malatya and Sivas majority of whom are part of Alevis sect. Östen Wahlbeck (1999) claims that London offers Kurds a free environment to perform Kurdish identity and lobby for recognition of Kurdish nation and rights (see also Keles, 2014).

Ipek Demir (2012) discusses London's Kurdish diaspora's relationship with Turkey and describes it as 'dual-home construction'. On the one hand Kurds politically struggle with Turkey and on the other hand they maintain their sentimental ties with *'memleket'. 'Memleket'* can be translated from Turkish as homeland; however, it is not a nationalist tone. It may refer to either the country itself or, a city or even a village. It is a sentimental word that refers to an emotional tie or a sense of belonging to a place. But it is not a political or nationalistic identification as the word '*vatan*' has which should be translated as fatherland. Demir (2012) claims that Kurds emotional ties with Turkey as *memleket* continue even though they battle with Turkey as a nation state and carry the idea of imagined Kurdistan as a *vatan* Therefore, Demir (2012) claims that Kurds in diaspora Britain are battling against Turkey as well as harbouring an attachment feeling to it as *memleket*. Demir's later research (2017) discusses

what she calls 'de-Turkification of Kurdish diaspora' focusing on how an identity is being shed, rather than gained. Demir (2017) claims that self-definition amongst Kurds in London is shifting as previously self-identified 'Turkish economic migrants' over time become 'Kurdish diaspora'. According to her findings by unlearning Turkification rather than learning Kurdishness, a Kurdish identity is constructed in diaspora.

Even though Kurds are the biggest minority group in Turkey and a fifth of the whole population, their ethnic and cultural rights have been suppressed for decades and they are still a disadvantaged group in Turkey (see Van Bruinessen 1998; Demir 2012). As a result of political suppression, economic disadvantages and physical displacement due to civil war in the Kurdish region, huge numbers of Kurds have migrated from Turkey to mostly European countries since 1980s. As the Home Office statistics show, asylum applications of Turkish nationals from 1980s and 1990s is counted with thousands (see Wahlbeck 1998).

Even those who have not involved themselves in conflict or civil war zones directly, experienced what Sirkeci (2006) calls 'environment of insecurity'. The population of Kurds in the UK is estimated to be between 100,000 and 180,000 (Demir, 2012, Sirkeci et.al.2016, Cakmak, 2018). Until the late 1980s, Turkish and Kurdish migrants in London used to work with a similar left-wing agenda under the same association, the *Halkevi* (Cakmak, 2018). However, the early 1990s, ethno-politically motivated Kurds, which outnumbered Turks and Cypriots, achieved hegemony in the politicalscape (Griffiths 2000; Cakmak, 2018). This also caused a sharp division among the community as the latter group's orientation towards Kurdish nationalist PKK is not approved by the Marxist oriented ethnic Turks. Therefore, what Anderson (1992) calls 'long distance nationalism' became significant among the Kurdish diaspora. According to Demir (2012), as a result, many self-identified 'Turks' turn into self-identified Kurds instead of 'British' which is similar to Leggewie's (1996) observation on Kurds in Germany. A Euro-Kurdishness is emerging in cosmopolitan cities of Europe (see also

Hassanpour and Mojab 2014; Soguk 2008, Demir 2012). The Kurdish language is not only promoted through community centres, but Kurdish national identity is also constructed in the diaspora. Janroj Keles (2015a) argues that the media has become a site for the clash of representations in both Turkish and Kurdish languages, especially for those based in the diaspora in Europe. International Kurdish satellite TV named Med-TV launched in 1999 in London by Turkey originated Kurds and broadcasts in Kurdish and Turkish. This broadcasting both connects diaspora to the homeland and also strengthens Kurdish identity. Med-TV offers an experience of Kurdish national identity to its audience with its national language, flag, anthem and music. In this way, Turkey originated British Kurds find themselves as citizens of a non-existent country (Kurdistan). Med-TV's relation with Turkey is hostile. Turkey attempted to jam broadcasting of the channel due to their propaganda of the PKK and the war against Turkish authorities (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005).

1.4 Precariousness of Community Life

Many members of the Turkish-speaking community have experienced being refugees or asylum seekers, and thus have experienced the fear of authorities, uncertainty, marginalisation and humiliation by the immigration office and other officials (Bloch et al., 2014). Decision-making processes about asylum seekers take years, and it causes both uncertainty (precariousness) and high mobility between accommodation residences (Crawley, 1999, 2009; Bhabha and Finch, 2006; Spicer, 2008; Sirriyeh, 2016; Blinder, 2016; Goodman et al., 2017). The process of settling down in the UK is an unfinished journey for the Turkish diaspora. Some of the members of the community do not have a legal status and so live with the fear or risk of deportation (Bloch et, al., 2014). Members of the Turkish-speaking community are also becoming victims of people smuggling mafias and gangs called "Şebeke". According to Bennetto (2005), around 40% of the total of the Turkish and Kurdish population has been smuggled into the UK. Although, legal ways of immigration such as Ankara Antlasmasi is

more preferred than in the past, people smuggling is still common among the Turkish-speaking community. Therefore, "*Şebeke*" is one of the frequently used words by the research participants in the narration of life stories during the interviews which I will discuss in Chapter 5.

According to Düvell (2010), among the Turkish-speaking community those who left Turkey in response to the military coup are often of a well-educated, middle-class background. Most of them are now occupying posts in public, health and education services as managers, teachers, and nurses. Other cohorts however remain at the bottom of society, notably immigrants from rural mainland Turkey who arrived during the 1970s and Kurdish refugees who arrived from the mid1980s (Düvell, 2010:7).

The quality of life among members of the Turkish-speaking community also varies with their social background and length of stay in the UK. Turkish Cypriots are the most advantageous and self-sufficient group among them as the first arrivals in the country. Kurds as the most recent arrivals have refugee status, faring worse than the others (Enneli and Modood 2009; Düvell 2010). There are interdependency and mutual benefits within the Turkish speaking community. Basic needs such as finding a place to live, a school for children, finding a job, being treated in hospital and finding a lawyer is met among the community due to a lack of social capital and language skills from outside sources. Financial and strategic support from the state institutions to the organisation of the community are very limited. Most of these organisations are financially supported by members of the community. All of these reasons result in a concentration of Turkish speaking population in specific neighbourhoods or regions. However, this situation is not unique to the Turkish-speaking community. As Werbner (2012) argues moving from one country to another is a dislocating experience. Transnational migrants set themselves apart socially and culturally. Migration experience might cause a 'paradigm shift' between generations but parents try to protect their children from assimilation by sending

them to community centres to learn a traditional musical instrument or encourage their attendance at mosques to learn how to read the Qu'ran or organising sports events. In this way, they aim to transmit their values and traditions to the younger generation (Jackson, 1986; Unutulmaz, 2015).

As a response to this dislocating experience, the Turkish-speaking community created their own social spaces. One of the main public places or third spaces where community members socialise is community centres or fellow-village men (hometown) associations. These places are used mostly as a coffeehouse setting but also provide space for cultural events and gatherings. Some of these associations are politically or religiously active. For instance, Dersimliler Kultur ve Dayanisma Dernegi (Association of Culture and Solidarity) is very active regarding religious (Alevi), ethnic and political identity construction. Kahvehaneler/coffee-houses are mostly in semi-basements in East and North London. The patriarchal discourse is reproduced in this space (*kahvehanes*) and some of these venues are accused of hosting illegal gambling sessions, distribution of narcotics and enabling prostitution (see also Mehmet Ali, 2006).

In addition to *kahvehanes*, community centres occupy a central stage in community life. In order to attract younger people, most of these community centres have their own football teams consisting of Turkish-Kurdish youth and they even created Turkish-Kurdish leagues. Onur Unutulmaz (2014, 2015) has analysed Turkish football leagues in the UK to discuss the renegotiation of identity based on communal bonds among politically and ethnically very diverse Turkish-speaking community. Unutulmaz (2015) states that the ethnic community leagues in London were created by the first generation to save the youth from assimilation into British culture. According to Unutulmaz's findings, Turkish leagues operate as socio-political spaces wherein collective identities are reproduced and transmitted to younger generations. In my research, sports events as well as cultural events were emphasised by older members of the

community as a preventative strategy against assimilation and saving youth from drug use and violence.

1.6 Involvement with the Homeland and Visiting Patterns

Like many other diaspora communities, the Turkish-speaking community is a transnational community. Members of the community belong to and negotiate between two or more societies at the same time. Technological and transportation developments such as the internet, satellite television, and cheap air travel enhanced the Turkish diasporas' connection with their home country. Some of these transnational activities include marriages with partners from their home town or within the diaspora community in London, regular visits to Turkey, and exchanges of resources or information take place between members of a diaspora itself or with people in their homeland (Vertovec, 2005).

According to Werbner (2002b) one of the key features of diasporas is co-responsibility across nation states. She summarises it as: supporting the homeland politically and sending cultural goods and humanitarian aid; not always having a single centre; and that are usually highly politicized social formations. In order to prove their associations with the homeland, they show off their existence in public acts through donations. Concerning developments in the home country is also one of the indicators of this attachment. In the time of disasters or conflicts, humanitarian aid flows from diasporas to home. For instance, when the earthquake hit Turkey in 1999 and caused devastation, Turkish diasporas supported their nationals in their home country with donations (Vertovec, 2005). Members of the diaspora also mobilise politically to defend, or protest injustices and human rights abuses suffered by co-diasporics elsewhere. They raise money and donate ambulances, medical supplies, blankets, toys and essential resources for them and they visit them to celebrate Eid together (see Werbner 1996a). Immigrants support home countries generally through homeland associations. In the Kurdish

case, this includes political motivation, since there is a Kurdish paramilitary group fighting for an independent Kurdistan. Turkish/Cypriot organisations sometimes resort to political mobilisation in the community to revive the 'collective identity'. They aim to become a 'politically conscious community' rather than a 'silent ethnic community'. Some people among the Turkish-speaking community as a part of global Muslim diaspora set up religious circles. There is also a fraternity with other Muslim communities. For instance, they initiate humanitarian aid to Syria, a country that is suffering as a result of civil war. Such initiatives are not governed by any supra-organisation rather they are derived from the co-responsibility of diasporas (Vertovec, 2005). Some research positions the Turkish-speaking community in the UK as part of Muslim diaspora emphasising the role of religion in their identity with references to Islamic institutions (Kucukcan, 1999; Safi, 2012; Costu and Ceyhan Costu, 2015). Yakup Çoştu and Feyza Ceyhan Çoştu's (2015) research analyses ten religious organisations established by the Turkish-speaking communities in the UK to understand identity construction. They suggest that religious organisations do not only function only as places of worship but also demonstrate cultural, religious and ethnic aspects of heritage identity. Çoştu and Ceyhan Çoştu (2015) claims that faith-based organisations play an important role in preserving national identity and cultural heritage in diaspora. There are several studies on Turkish diaspora in Europe claiming that religion is an important aspect of identity construction (see also Kucukcan, 1999; Yagmur and van de Vijver, 2011; Gungor et.al., 2011). However, these analyses do not include secular groups or alternative faiths within the community. Safi's research (2012) supports my research findings claiming that young generations in the UK live a minority culture at home and British culture in schools thus they have a third hybrid culture. According to Safi's (2012) findings nearly 70 percent of the young people chose multiple identities for themselves rather than choosing only Turkish or British as an identity. Less than 5 percent of them chose religion as their only identity. According to Robins and Aksoy

(2001:690) Turkish Cypriots emphasis on adapting or feeling close to the British way of life is a strategy to be accepted or social approval.

A diaspora's multiple groups distributed across different locations are connected to each other as well. Turkish diasporas are not oriented to just the homeland anymore, but also towards co-expatriates (other members of the diaspora) around the world. Turkish diaspora communities establish links with similar local entities accross the UK and around the world. It weakens the homeland orientation among them and advances globalisation of the diaspora. Furthermore, living in global cities like London also enables Turkish diaspora to be a part of the global civil society rather than being enclosed in nationalistic projects of the homeland (see Sassen, 2005, Ryan et al., 2015). New technologies strengthen transnational networks among the diasporas and homeland as well. The states are not the only actor in these relations anymore with the participation of nongovernmental organisations and diaspora institutions taking their place in the arena.

Like the Turkish-speaking community, in many migrant communities, families arrange regular contact with their home country to ensure their children reproduce their national identity (Levitt, 2002). This is also supported by ritual-like daily activities such as watching Turkish soap-operas and eating traditional Turkish food. While doing that, they also encourage their children to gain a British education in British institutions and in this way, they try to keep their feet in both worlds. Some migrants consult their religious leaders in the home country quite often, even on a weekly basis (Levitt, 2003). They are highly involved in their home country's religioscape. Some of the immigrants do arranged marriage and/or find partners from their hometown for their children. This kind of ethnic endogamy aims to ensure reproduction of ethnic identity and tradition in the long-term (Armstrong 1976). During my field study, many members of the Turkish-speaking community mentioned ethnic endogamy which I will discuss in analysis chapters. In such cases, they celebrate weddings in their home countries, showing

off the wealth gained in the host country and bringing their partners to diaspora through family unification. Although, there is not any literature on or statistics about marriages among the Turkish-speaking community in the UK, according to Strassburger (2001) in Germany over half of the second-generation Turkish people have partners from Turkey (cited in Schiffauer, 2005:1134).

There is an ongoing discussion on home and emotional, ontological attachment to it. To outsiders, foreignness of the members of the Turkish-speaking community is visible through skin colour, accents, or name which generates questions about where they are originally from. This question concerning origins questions their belonging with any place. According to Taylor (2009) home is an on-going project entailing a sense of hope for the future. Feeling at home does not necessarily generate positive and warm feelings (Hesse, 2000:17) but a more complicated emotional and mental state. Immigrants' relationship to their country of origin becomes more complicated with a longer stay in Europe as identification with the host country increases. Sonyel (2000:149) argues that "As they could not maintain their own culture owing to differences in language, morals and religion, they had to develop a dynamism of their own and gradually adopt a new version of their Turkish culture". This new version of Turkish culture is somewhere in between Turkish and British cultures. Sonyel's argument is parallel to Bhabha's theory of hybridisation which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3. Belonging to country of origin could be perceived as either positive or a negative thing (Pratt, 2003; Tzanelli, 2007; Lacroix and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013). So, the discourse is not always a nostalgic one for a yearned home. Turkish-speaking migrants might identify themselves as belonged to either home or host community. They might be proud of their origin and feel that they belong to it, or they might prefer to be away from their home community and avoid labelling accordingly. As Yuval-Davis (2011) argues different people who belong to the same community can feel

varying degrees of attachment. Furthermore, some people feel that they belong to a particular collective, while others may construct them as being outside of these collective boundaries.

The diaspora communities' attachment to the homeland or their willingness to be involved in nationalist movements in the homeland is described as *long-distance nationalism* by Anderson (1998) or transnational loyalties (see Anderson, 1992,1998; Schiller, 2005; Baser and Swain, 2010; Cakmak, 2018).

> …today's long distance nationalism strikes one as a probably menacing portent for the future. First of all, it is the product of capitalism's remorseless, accelerating transformation of all human societies. Second, it creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he need not fear prison, torture or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in zones of their ultimate destinations. (Anderson, 1998:74)

Statistical data indicates the extent to which diasporic Turks and Kurds affect homeland political election through sponsoring, voting and lobbying and demonstrates a significant attachment to homeland parties. In return, political parties encourage their citizens abroad to actively participate in politics in both the home and host country (Cakmak 2018). For instance, since German laws forbid dual citizenship, Turkish authorities advise Turkish diaspora to cancel their Turkish passports to keep their German ones, however, they offer them a special status with ID card that gives them all the rights of a Turkish passport holder such as voting in Turkish elections. Diasporas are not managed by home countries, and they are independent of any centres. Moreover, home countries' relations with its diaspora vary. For instance, Israel and Armenia use their diasporas strategically and politically while Turkey and India show a general appreciation due to economic contributions of diaspora communitites such as

transferring money to relatives in country of origin as well as making investment. Recently, Turkish authorities have been trying to manipulate and organise diaspora over religious (Diyanet mosques) and cultural (homeland associations/ hemsehri dernekleri) institutions (Cakmak, 2018). In order to keep the diaspora politically interested as well as to sustain financial flows, politicians in migrant-sending countries produce propaganda and political rallies in the host countries. For instance, in 1990, Irish President Mary Robinson proclaimed herself the leader of the extended Irish family abroad. Moreover, in Mexico, Vincente Fox declared himself as the first president "to govern for 118 million Mexicans" - including 100 million in Mexico and 18 million living outside the country- at his campaign among Mexicans in California in 2000 (Vertovec, 2005). Similarly, Turkish dictator Recep Tayyip Erdogan said to diasporic Turks in his speech at a rally in Germany: "You are part of Germany, but also part of our Great Turkey" (Spiegel Online International, February 28, 2011). He referred to 'Great Turkey' as being beyond official borders and includes diasporas.

Some people, especially politicians, claim that transnational involvement with the homeland and assimilation are incompatible and criticise what is called the divided loyalties of migrants (Lechner, 2008). According to this view, one must choose a place to belong. Such as Homeland nation states and migrant-receiving countries' political interests contradict the dual citizenship/nationality issue. The cricket example that conservative politician Norman Tebbit gave in 1990, assumed that immigrants who support their country of origin when they are playing against England in cricket game indicates lack of integration. In order to increase immigrants' loyalty to the host nation, governments initiate different policies. In the UK, more history classes are given to the pupils at schools with this purpose (Verkuyten, 2014). While homeland nation states consider members of their nations living abroad politically vital assets; some policymakers in migrant-receiving countries believe that people should have an allegiance to only one flag and a loyalty to one state (Vertovec, 2005).

Another significant concept is annual homeland visits. Among the Turkish-speaking community *izin* (vacation) time is mostly spent in hometowns and other cities of Turkey. For working class families summer vacation is planned a year in advance. It is not just of importance because of the nostalgia to reconnect with their hometown but also for practical/ cost-effective reasons like spending time at beaches. Both touristic places and relatives in the hometown are visited. For the second and third generation Turkey nostalgia is a placebo effect since what they experience of Turkey reminds them of their parents' stories, not their own memories. Visiting Turkey at *izin* times is necessary for identity reconstruction and transmitting memories, values and traditions to younger generations.

The urge to keep their primordial roots and the recent history constant and vibrant in members' minds is particularly important for stateless diaspora groups (Sheffer, 2003:153). Their interest with political developments in their country of origin is always vivid. For instance, within hours of the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of paramilitary Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK) by the Turkish intelligence service in Kenya in 1999, massive protests were organized in London and other major cities in Europe and across the world. Diasporic members have a kind of consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly claimed origins. There are also cultural attributions to these origins. It includes emphasizing ethnolinguistic, regional, religious, national, or other features (Vertovec 2005). According to Vertovec (2005) most self-described diasporas celebrate a culturally creative, socially dynamic, and often romantic meaning of diaspora rather than emphasising the melancholic aspects of it such as longing which is associated with the classic Jewish, African, or Armenian diasporas.

Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter was to discuss the definition of the research group; provide the overview of migration history from Cyprus and Turkey to the UK and reflect the theoretical discussions on the concept of diaspora. Some fragments of the Turkish-speaking community hold diasporic characteristics however, not all migrants from Cyprus and Turkey can be called a diaspora. Therefore, I will classify them as Diasporic Subjects, Economic Migrants, Creoles and Expatriates which will be discussed in Chapter 7 in detail. I have also summarised migration form Cyprus and Turkey to the UK in four waves.

The Turkish-speaking community's involvement with their home country varies from long-distance nationalism and diaspora politics to homeland visits. I will classify the Turkish-speaking community in four categories according to their homeland visiting patterns as follows: Frequent travellers, Periodic travellers, Intermittent travellers and Fugitives. I will discuss these categories in Chapter 5 in detail.

Members of the Turkish-speaking community, like other migrant groups, define their identity referring to a collective past and a historic location. Therefore, within the next chapter I am going to discuss collective memory and space regarding identity construction in the London diaspora.

CHAPTER 2

Collective Memory and Space

Introduction

Diasporas are assumed to share a collective past and a historic location. Migration stories, historical events such as a civil war, massacre or famine are part of the collective memory of migrant communities, thus collective memory is an important aspect of identity construction. In this chapter, I will discuss embodied experience, and the contemplation of place, space, memory and identity. The use of space and sense of belonging to a place, or simply a landscape itself plays an important role in identity construction. Diasporas sometimes associate themselves with landscapes or a remarkable city in their ancestral homeland. For example, for migrants from Turkey, Istanbul plays a significant role in narrations of home (Caglar, 2001). In some cases, diasporas highly affiliate themselves with a diaspora space such as Peckham in London as in the case of British Nigerians[4] and Kreuzberg in Berlin, for German Turks (see Lanz 2009, Faas 2009). Diasporas also refer to famous historical figures from their home country to construct their identity. Such heroic references enable them to idealise their national identity. For instance, for Turkish migrants Sultan Mehmet II (The Conqueror of Constantinople) is a prominent figure, whereas the Kurdish and Alevi diaspora refer to riot leaders who protected their ethnic and national identity (see also Keles, 2014). Furthermore, tragic events, such as famine for the Irish diaspora or the 1915 massacres for the Armenian diaspora, serve a central role in the presence of these diasporas in the world (see Safran 1999, Tölölyan 2000). Collective memory is also reflected upon and transmitted to younger generations via story-telling, diasporic literature and artworks. For instance, Reggae Music has an important function in construction of group identity for Jamaican/Caribbean diaspora in the

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[4]See BBC Born Abroad: An Immigration Map of Britain
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/nigeria.stm

UK and USA (Rose, 1994; Brenick and Silbereisen, 2012; Werbner & Fumanti 2012). Rap music has a similar role for second-generation Turkish immigrants in Europe (see Ickstadt 1999, Soysal 2004, Kaya 2002). Rap Music with Turkish musical influence and/or Turkish lyrics tell the experience of younger generation working class Turkish immigrants, their identity crisis as well as referring to their group identity (Kaya, 2002).

Space, both as a physical space and mental space, is not only used to root the community to a geographical location, but it also operates a stage for identity performance. Migrant communities refer to specific historic locations to root their ethnic identity. They also demonstrate various levels of belonging to respective host countries as diaspora place. Therefore, their sense of belonging is divided into multiple homes and diasporic identities are formed with interaction to host cultures which is different to their fellow nationals in their homeland. In addition, social spaces are used as a stage to perform cultural identity. The physical site could be a pub, coffee house, or a religious institution where diasporic subjects strengthen or remember their cultural identity. Such places are not only gathering places for diaspora members but are also places where their native language is spoken, homeland issues are discussed, ethnic foods are served, and stories from the last visit to 'home' are narrated. Therefore, they perform their ethnic identity and show fellow diaspora members that they are still a part of the authentic community. In this chapter, I aim to discuss the role of collective memory and use of 'space' in identity construction of the Turkish-speaking migrants. The chapter starts with Halbwachs' (1992) theory on collective memory and links it with Bakhtin's (1996) concept of chronotope. Later, the chapter discusses space theories including physical space and mental space. Oldenburg's (1991) concept of third place is combined with Edward Soja's (1996) theory on space.

2.1 Collective Memory

How the past is narrated and interpreted is an important part of the transmission and construction of cultural and national identity. The practices of memory are collective (Dessi, 2008), so during recollection of memories people cannot escape from influences of collective views about other people, the region they live in, and the period they have been living away from the homeland. Narratives are transmitted both on the individual and collective level, and provide a link between past, present and future as well as between the individual and collective.

According to Halbwachs (1992), everybody has personal memories which are not learned from someone else but acquired through personal life experience. Halbwachs (1992) argued that memories are acquired within a society and recalled, recognized and localized in society. For instance, we recall our memories when our family members or friends ask us trigger questions. This explanation paves the way to a social framework of memory which is called 'collective memory' by Halbwachs. One recalls their memory when asked. People consider themselves a member of the same group as the one questioning them. Thus, one's individual thought places itself in this framework. They recollect their own memory inrelation to the memory of others. Various capacities for memory help reciprocate each other and what is called a collective framework for memory is "the result, or sum, or combination of individual recollections of many members of the same society" (Halbwachs, 1992:39). According to Halbwachs (1992) an image of the past is reconstructed alongside the mainstream thoughts of the community using such collective frameworks.

Further to this, Halbwachs (1992) argued that memories are part of a totality of thoughts common to a group, and we place ourselves in this group to recall the memories. In this way, memories are also localised. Memories of the same occasion can be placed within different frameworks as people can be members of different communities at the same time. Even though

people experience events personally, retrieval of the memories about the same event changes with the group people are positioned in. Therefore, the same event can be remembered in different ways even by the same individual in different contexts due to multiple affiliations with various groups. Recalling of memory strengthens the position of the individuals within the group and group identification forms retrieval of the memory or in other words the past is remembered according to the group one belongs to. For instance, among political groups, sufferings to achieve the political ideals as well as any encounters with opposing groups are interpreted through the lens of group ideology. Therefore, being a member of such groups result in totality of thoughts and memory. Yet, people may recall the memory about the same events in different way such as remembering their friendly relationships with the hostile group.

In this regard, individual memories are part of an aspect of collective memory and each member of a community recollects the common past in their own manner through constant exchanges of ideas and interpretations of frame memories. Halbwachs (1992:47) states that:

> We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated. But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods of our lives, they have lost the form and the appearance they had once.

As Halbwachs claims above, meanings are renegotiated during recalling of memories which also leads to renegotiation of identity. For instance, among diaspora groups memories of their past in the home country might be recalled more negatively or positively than they are experienced at the time. It is because people renegotiate their identity and belonging through years they spent in diaspora place. People do not wait passively for memories to revive but take action to retrieve or produce them by talking to other people and going through old pictures or letters. In this way, they reshape their memories. Thus, memories are not static but reinterpreted via narration. Over time, the same events would be remembered in different ways. Certain

aspects of past or place of origin are recovered and idealised as nostalgia replaces memory. Feelings of happiness or sorrow may be caused by such memories. Identity reconstruction is linked with memory via nostalgic preferences, and it is aimed to keep certain aspects of identity alive (Schneider, 2000; Bucholtz, 2003; Milligan, 2003; Parveen, 2017).

Following Halbwachs, Dessí (2008) defines the collective memory as the shared experiences of a community that can date back a long time but still has a significant impact on the current norms, behaviour and beliefs of the community:

> In every society and every country, the collective memory transmitted to the young by the older generation, through a variety of channels (e.g. school textbooks, the media, monuments and commemorative rituals), influences their perception of their cultural identity and values, and their willingness to invest in them - with major economic as well as political and social consequences. (Dessi, 2008:534)

Here Dessi (2008) provides context for the identity reconstruction in diaspora communities. Migration stories, oral history narrations, religious rituals, names given to places and children assure the transmission of collective memory. In this way, past is connected to the present and even to the future. Older generations play a key role here as transmitters of collective memory and cultural practices. Older generations aim to transmit the cultural identity to younger generationss while younger generations renegotiate their identities in a cosmopolitan context. In almost every migrant group this tension between first and following generations is visible. Therefore, it is important to discuss collective memory while analysing identity performances among the Turkish-speaking community.

According to Rothstein (2000), the 'collective memory' of a community is the result of shared experiences in the past that affects the entire community and that still induce a common social behaviour in the present on individuals' attitudes. For instance, Noriel (1995) argues that

the influence of collective memory on younger generations of a community may influence admiration and loyalty to their group and its ideals as well as being hostile towards rival groups and its members even before they meet.

Official historical narrations which effect the formation of collective memory are dominated bye states' discourse. For instance, how certain events happened in the past, whether it is a war, massacre or change of state borders; or who are the enemy or rival group of the nation are constructed via school books. In order to understand the past, nation states form representations of history which provide only one version of the past. In that way a collective and national identity are constructed. Therefore, nation-states construct collective memories using history such as via commemorations which bind their citizens together (see Nora 1989, 1996 and 2002). However, collective memory in the diaspora is not only and directly fed by official history but also shaped by migration stories and cultural encounters in the host country (Agnew, 2005; Eder and Spohn, 2016). Therefore, Turkish diasporic identities are not directly shaped by the official historical narration of Turkey, although it has an impact on the collective memory of the community. Thus, there is always a negotiation between formal and informal narration of the past which forms identity construction.

Meral Ugur Cinar (2015) links narration with *living tradition*. As Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) defines it *living tradition* is a historically extended, socially embodied argument. Thus, traditions are constructed through narration and transmitted to the younger generation via storytelling. Later in this thesis I combine these theories of memory to analyse migration stories, narrations about country of origin, collective memory and their impact on reconstruction and transmission of cultural identity. During my interviews, I asked my first-generation participants about their migration stories and asked second and third generations about their parents' narratives of their home country.

As previously noted, a single event may be remembered and narrated differently by different people in a community. Each of these remembered aspects contributes to the collective memory like a mosaic on a wall, which in turn produces re-identification. Some events, like war or migration are experienced by a multitude of individuals, and each person remembers them differently according to the situation in which they were positioned in (see Halbwachs, 1992; Noriel, 1995). During the process of constructing 'collective memory' people try to be consistent thus, individuals link their personal memories to a collective representation of the past through story-telling and the narration of history. For this research case, it can be said that migration to the UK is a turning point in the lives of the Turkish-speaking community in London. However, it is not homogenous experience, and its impact on individuals' lives is as diverse as the experience itself. An assumption of migration as a traumatic or negative experience for everyone is therefore an overgeneralisation (see Hall, 1990; Noriel, 1995). For instance, migration to the UK can be experienced as a success story for a freelance artist while a political asylum seeker may find it a traumatic experience or indeed as an emancipatory one.

According to Cinar (2015) once certain historical narratives become dominant, it provides societies with a repertoire of collective memory. Even though diasporic subjects may have common experiences in their relationship to their home country such as being expelled from it or a shared experience of an historical event such as genocide, famine or civil war, there is not a single narration of diaspora experience or migration stories. Also, because their encounters in host culture and society is not a monolithic experience, this research attempts to present multiple collective memories and narratives among the Turkish-speaking community in London and analyse their impact on identity construction. For instance, Turkish Cypriots experienced living as a British colony and then a civil war with Greek residents of Cyprus. Whereas mainland Turks carry in their collective memory the loss of imperial prestige after

World War I. On the other hand, Kurdish diaspora is formed in Europe a result of denial and suppression of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Moreover, Kurdish community experienced displacement within Turkey before they migrated to the UK thus, they are twice diaspora. Each of these groups carry these experiences in their collective memories. Although, each member of any of these groups may have different experiences of these events, there is a dominant narrative framing the collective memory. For example, Turkish Cypriots had to fight to preserve their ethnic identity in Cyprus and Alevis were targeted in Turkey because of their faith. These dominant narrations are transmitted to the younger generations. However, they exclude memories of other experiences such as some Greek Cypriots helping their Turkish neighbours.

Jan Assmann (1992:19), draws upon Maurice Halbwachs's theory on collective memory to coin the term *cultural memory* defining it as the "outer dimension of human memory". Here, he differentiates two different concepts: 'cultural memory' (*Erinnerungskultur*) and 'reference to the past' (*Vergangenheitsbezug*). The first term refers to the way a society maintains cultural continuity by preserving and transmitting its collective knowledge from one generation to the next. In this way, it reconstructs the next generation's cultural identity with the help of cultural mnemonics (references to the past). The latter term ensures the members of a society of their collective identity by creating a sense of a shared past. In this way, it establishes an awareness of unity and singularity in time and space. In other words, historical consciousness is generated for the members of society. So according to Assmann, collective memory is not simply about transmitting some historic 'facts' to younger generations. It ensures the transmission of living tradition and continuity of cultural practices. Reference to the past roots this collective identity into shared historicity.

Further to this, Pierre Nora (1989:8) distinguishes between history and memory, seeing them in binary opposition:

> Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.

Therefore, according to Nora, memory is renegotiated, evolved, and sometimes forgotten. Whereas history is about events that are no longer there. Thus, a civil war is history, the narration of it by people who experienced is a renegotation of its meaning. Narration is open to manipulation depending on the period the memory is revived. Thus, collective memory is not simply narration of historic events. It links the past to present via value-laden memories.

Referring to Moreno and Garzon (2002) Cinar (2015:3) argues that a historical narrative transmits the dual message that first, the people of the nation have existed in the past and still exist in the present and, second, that this legacy from the past demands a commitment to carrying out a future plan. It is clear from this analysis that, cultural memory reinforces the collective understanding of the distant past that is then reinterpreted by people within a given social and cultural context of the present (see also Holtorf 1996). It is therefore, about making meaningful statements about the past and commitment to carry out a future plan. It is not intended to briefly and objectively summarise the past events, but their consequences and the meaning for the community. As Ang (1994) argues that history is ambiguous because people always remember and construct past in ways that their present need for meaning.

Therefore, incidents such as a war are not remembered with its objective consequence such as victory or defeat, but its meaning to the community such as a catastrophe or miracle. Individuals learn collective memories through socialisation processes with the ability to reject some parts of it or to interpret it as they choose. Therefore, I asked my research participants about their migration stories in order to understand different collective memories among the community and interpret identity performances.

Both collective memory and cultural memory indicate the fact that personal recollections of memory by individuals are possible but limited to the recently lived past and not detached from social factors. Memory is not simply a storage place for information that can be retrieved later on. Rather, the past is actively constructed within certain social and mental conditions such as perceptions, emotions and thoughts. It is re-membered, re-shaped and re-constructed while talking/interacting with other people's memories. Here Elsner (1994:226) argues that:

> What matters ... is not that [a particular account of the past] be correct by our standards or anyone else's, but that it be convincing to the particular group of individuals ... for whom it serves as an explanation of the world they inhabit. ... [W]hat matters about any particular version of history is that it be meaningful to the collective subjectivities and self-identities of the specific group which it addresses. In other words, we are not concerned with 'real facts' or even a coherent methodology, but rather with the consensus of assumptions and prejudices shared by the historian ... and his audience.

In this regard, authenticity or objectivity do not matter for collective memory. What matters is the function of the memory for the collective identity of the group. Therefore, when historic events such as migration are narrated, this is based on the emotional framework of those who experienced it, the narration is re-constructed. Later in this thesis I will analyse migration stories from this perspective and discuss what they say about collective identities in Turkish London diaspora.

Assmann (1997) uses the term 'mnemohistory' to explain the way the past is remembered. He states that *mnemohistory* investigates the history of cultural memory. Based on this argument, Geoffrey White (1991) claims that stories of the past are always discourses of identity. Knowing, narrating, and interpreting the past is embedded in the present context and not independent from politics. Migration experience results in remembering and transmitting certain historical events in certain ways such as the events forming reasons of migration. In that way, collective memory is not only formed but also transmitted from generation to generation. Therefore, narrations of migration among the Turkish-speaking community are *mnemohistories* as it is narrated from older members of the community based on their worldviews (Assman, 1997). These *mnemohistories* are also discourses of identity which I am analysing (See White, 1991). For instance, identities of the younger generations Turkish Cypriot or Kurdish community; their attitudes towards Greek or Turkish commuinties are formed by these *mnemohistories*.

The memories of homeland and the migration stories which people narrate are not just stories of the past, but they are stories of people negotiating between cultures and forming their identity in the present. As Geoffrey White (1991:8) states, "the past recounted from the standpoint of the present is then a strategy of identity construction". Therefore, past events are reimaninged while being retrieved as a way of identity construction. In this research, the role of collective perceptions of the past in constructing, performing or challenging national/cultural identity is questioned.

Returning to Dessí (2005) one can argue that the beliefs of a new generation are strongly influenced by information on social norms, values, or institutional qualities learnt from an older generation. Collective memory transmitted from ancestors influences the young generations' attitudes and behaviour in the present. Common historical experiences and culture shape

collective memory. Furthermore, transmission of memory may result in a *virtual sense of nostalgia* or as Poupazis (2014) argues transmission of memory creates a loaned feeling which he calls *placebo nostalgia*. Second-generation migrants hear their parents' migration stories and experiences in their home country. Their perception of the country of origin is formed by older generations' value-laden narratives rather than by a first-hand experience which results in a virtual sense of/placebo nostalgia. What they miss or long for is a memory or period that is narrated within the conditions of present. For instance, a second-generation Turkish origin person who was born in London, was socialised in Britain and who is more comfortable with using English than Turkish, might long for Turkey as a 'homeland' describing their own status as living in *'gurbet'* (being in exile or expatriate). However, this discourse is adopted from an older generation since they do not have any first-hand experience of Turkey other than episodic visits. This virtual sense of belonging and nostalgia is formed by ancestral narration of life in their home country with contributions from their episodic visit to their parents/grandparents' country of origin (Poupazis, 2014). So, while one cannot be an exile in the city they were born in and have spent the entire life while being free to visit their ancestral homeland, as such feelings of nostalgia are about narration of a historic period not lived by those who are nostalgic about it. Nostalgia is therefore the dominant narration that represents the repertoire of collective memory of the group (see Cinar, 2015).

Scholars analyse monuments as part of collective memory. They ink commemorations with monuments, therefore link collective memory with space. For instance, Assmann (1992:56-59) argues that certain places or sites of cultural importance, such as ancient monuments function as time-marks and sites of memory. Savage (1997) argues that historical narratives and commemorations are embedded in the landscape via monuments. Further to this Cinar (2015) questions whose ethnic identity is part of the cultural landscape and who is deemed undesirable.

During the construction and reconstruction of nationhood, it is decided who is able to join the community with their ethnic identity and who is excluded from the cultural landscape.

How history is narrated is important to understand how the nation defines and perceives itself thus who is accepted and included in this narration. The narration of past events is as important as the events themselves. Balibar (1992:86) argues that the past reaches us through the interpretive process, and narratives attribute separate, objective facts, the continuity of subject. Paul Ricoeur claims in *Narrative Time* that these narrative plots, with their beginnings and ends, enable us to gain a certain sense of time that goes beyond chronology (Cited in Cinar, 2015:2). The past is always linked to the present and future with narration. Thus, this sense of temporality can be linked to Bakhtin's concept of chronotope, and also also related to the question of how migration stories are narrated and illustrated.

The term chronotope, coined by Mikhail Bakhtin, prompts a view of the temporal and spatial categories that are represented in narratives. Chronotope relies on certain kinds of past (narration) and claims for the future (see also HadžiMuhamedović, 2018). Specific chronotopes represent particular worldview or ideology. Chronotope approach to migration narratives handles diasporic identities as a multi-dimensional notion which differs from classical diaspora studies which focus on only host country or country of origin. In most definitions of diaspora, there is a physical displacement from a homeland which is perceived as temporal. Chronotope is a more dynamic social practice that includes both space and time dimensions. According to Bakhtin, chronotope is tightly interwoven with meanings since meaning is what is written into time and space. Chronotope emphasise different connections between time and space in narratives. There is no universal chronotope but various chronotopes in terms of construction and interpretation. Migrant cultures are an amalgamation of home country's chronotope, displacement of it, and encounters with dynamics of host culture and its chronotope.

Esther Peeren (2006) expands Bakhtin's definition of cultural and social concepts which I apply to diaspora studies. Even though she argues that immigrants leave their primary social relations behind; they maintain bonds with their previous 'home' in narrative level as well as building bond with host their 'adopted homes'. As a consequence, an eclectic and diverse cultural identity is formed in discourse level. Here, chronotope is used to explain the cultural practices of members of a diaspora group whose perceptions of time and space are influenced by emotions and values related to their past life which Bakhtin calls chronotopic values. Peeren, then studied the link between space and time in migrant narratives in terms of the production and reproduction of diaspora consciousness.

Perren (2006:69) states "A chronotope may be specific to a historical period, culture, nation, social class, or any other group of individuals -however small and insignificant- as long as they are united within a particular perception and practice of time-space organization". In this regard I argue that, Perren's definition of chronotope completes the collective memory discussion. It combines the influence of a period in history with geographical place and analyses the narrations from that perspective. Therefore, migration stories or other narrations of collective memory are interwoven with the time-space of the event experienced and time-space of narration.

Every tradition constructs its own choronotopes. These are not constructed by individuals or by collective consciousness, but instead are constructed at the level of practice. In other words, chronotopes are embodied when practiced by a group within certain contexts in example narration of migration stories. Therefore, in this research, migration stories, collective memory and identity construction, with reference to multiple sites within and transcending home country and adopted home, will be analysed via chronotope. According to Clifford (1994), diaspora primarily focuses on preserving tradition and reproduces the community in this way. However, I argue that by focusing on chronotopes in narratives one can see that there are

different cultural, and social practices therefore different identities even within the same community which supports the argument that there is not a homogenous Turkish community or cultural identity in Britain. Therefore, diasporic identity is constructed in and through the tradition rather than being master of it and form it. Peerren (2006: 71) states that "Negotiation between different types of time and space, different chronotopic values, different constructions of identity, and different mnemonic structures, that characterizes the diasporic chronotope as a whole". Therefore, people coming from a shared homeland may live differently in diasporic context. The concept of diaspora is closely tied to displacement and the myth of return, both of which reference a physical distance from a specific location. Here the homeland is distant, passed and left behind. The chronotope underlies that temporality of displacement. A chronotope may include more than one location in space. Multiple places can share the same organising chronotope. Displacement from the homeland does not always mean a complete loss of lifestyle and subjectivity. Migrant communities may create a virtual or even hyper-real homeland in respective host countries. As such Fortier (1999:47) says that "Diasporic communities show how a homeland chronotope or tradition of time-space can be re-enacted or 're-membered' in the various time-spaces of dispersal through the creation of 'habitual spaces' where habit and memory indicate the vital temporal dimension".

In this regard, Peeren (2006) argues that a chronotopic approach to diaspora means considering the homeland not as 'left behind', 'static', 'pure' or an 'untouched state' but as something that can be gained by returning to its location. It is a construct symbolically kept in place by external subjects. Even though migrant communities leave their home country physically, there is a continuity of its culture. The chronotope travels with a diasporic community via narratives. A diasporic community negotiates with chronotopes of the places travelled to and then they can bind themselves to each other, diasporic place and to the homeland by a shared chronotope.

A singular homeland and the myth of return are the predominant notions used while describing a diaspora according to litereature. However, chronotope analyse diaspora place over practices and does not stick to definite spatial and temporal coordinates. Chronotope expresses that there is no return, but a continuity of practices that results in change. Diasporic life in a host society therefore results in the hybridity (Bhabha 1994). Diasporic people are neither wholly part of their home nor host chronotopes. Their negotiation with different chronotopes results in duality in a singular way of life. Thus, the chronotopic approach to diaspora gives one the ability to consider identity as a phenomenon that is under negotiation.

2.2 Space

The powerful sense of being 'rooted' and having a connection to a geographic place as 'home' plays a significant role in identity constructions. Nostalgia as one of the most important aspects of collective memory also bounds memory with space. Alison Blunt (2003) looks at how nostalgia works to transform places. She argues that nostalgia is firmly place bound even if it is usually described in temporal terms rather than in spatial terms. She examines its embodiment and enactment in practice through what she calls the geography of nostalgia. Blunt (2003:722) indicates that productive nostalgia refocuses on the desire for both proximate homes and more distant homes rather than focusing on the temporality of home as a site of origin and an unattainable past. It is oriented towards the present and future as well as towards the past. There can be an attachment to both homes, current and ancestral. Therefore, the impact of nostalgia and virtual nostalgia on cultural identity of the members of the Turkish-speaking community, and the importance of north London as the diasporic place will be examined in analysis chapters.

The "sedentary metaphysics" of nation states assumes that people and social groups are attached to fixed locations (Malkki 1992). This sedentary metaphysics divide the world up into

clearly bounded territorial units and finds social groups attached to fixed locations (Cresswell, 2004). In other words, geographical and cultural thought territorialises identity into assumptions about region and nation. National identities are described with reference to place of birth. People tend to be categorized in relation to space, such as Western, Asian, South-African and so forth. But Massey (1995) argues that place identity is constituted through connections to other places and imaginations of the past as articulations of the future. Nation-states justify their national borders by claiming that nation has occupied a certain territory for a long time. This past experience, whether it is imaginary or real, gives them a right to use the landscape and inherit or transmit it to future generations. Regional identities and belongings are also constructed based on this imagination and exclusion from others. For instance, Western identity is constructed through its relation to the Orient and excluding itself from the rest of the World (Hall 1992; also Said, 2003).

Rembold et.al. (2011:363) argue "Human geographers notably questioned the assumptions that territorial space is commensurate with national space, and that space and place are static containers in which cultural traditions evolve". With multicultural socieites, temporarily stabilised identity categories are challenged in a world of flow and hybridity. In these conditions of constant change and hybridity, Kim Dovey (2010:6) rejects sedentary metaphysics and suggests:

> "[W]e replace the Heideggerian ontology of being-in-the-world with a more Deleuzian notion of becoming-in-the world. This implies a break with static, fixed, closed and dangerously essentialist notions of place, but preserves a provisional ontology of place-as-becoming: there is always, already and only becoming-in-the-world."

Dovey's argument acknowledges constant change and hybridity of both people and places. As diaspora studies shows us, national space where one culture is performed, reproduced and transmitted to younger generations could go beyond a country's borders. For instance, today

Irish culture is described and performed beyond Ireland. Also, the identity of stateless diasporas is constructed in the diaspora place. For example, Kurdistan is not a static territorial space. It is re-imagined and reconstructed over time in the Kurdish diaspora.

Later in this research, in Chapter 6, I will challenge sedentary metaphysics and apply Arjun Appadurai's concept of ethnoscape while discussing the spatial aspect of national identity. Appadurai (2005) coined the term ethnoscape in his discussion on the migration of people from different cultures across the world. His approach does not consider communities as static. So, it mirrors my argument that group identities are floating rather than being tightly territorialized or spatially bounded and they are performed in relation to time-space. Diasporic people define their identity as being rooted in an ancestral homeland and living in a diaspora place. In narrative level, an identity is linked with multiple sites and times with chronotope. Space is not static in diasporic identity construction but negotiated or floating between different spaces. In the analysis chapters, while applying Appadurai's theory, I critically assess whether all aspects of traditions and culture in diasporic communities are invented tradition and floating or if some of them are inherited or transmitted from ancestral home/culture.

Further to Appadurai's conceptualisation of ethnoscapes as spaces of transformation, Massey (1993:66) offers an alternative interpretation to place as follows: "what gives a place its specificity is not some long, internalised history but the fact that it is constructed out of particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus". Thus, according to Massey, identities are not only multiple but are also constructed in relation to multiple sites. Based on these theories, I argue that, north London as a diasporic place has a specificity in Turkish-speaking community's life because it accommodates majority of the community in the UK and cultural life is reconstructed there. Therefore, the members of the community in the UK display a sense belonging to north London. Moreover, they perform their identity in references to both country of origin and north London which I will discuss in analysis chapters.

In addition to external space, people construct the interior and exterior arrangements of buildings and in doing so, embody their own identity. People reflect their identities at their private spaces/homes mainly achieved through decoration (see Hart 2008; McCracken 1988). These decorations are used in everyday performances of identity which are then transmitted to younger generations. Location-based memories, stories, landscape objects, thoughts, and sights that people are familiar with from birth and through living have an impact on their identity construction. Lozano-Hemmer quotes Cicero in an interview with José Luis Barrios (2005) "We make buildings and buildings make us". Therefore, the interior design of a migrant's house often represents a break from mainstream culture. Interior design of a house function as a décor of an identity performance which links a cultural practice into a context.

Further to this idea, French philosopher and phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard (1969) gives primacy to a living space which is simultaneously inside and outside. Bachelard defines our own 'corner of the world', our lived space in a nostalgic and romanticised way, a house has both harmony and complexity. It consists of memories and experiences where each room triggers different sensations, and it constructs a unified, intimate living experience. Each object in the house or indeed in a community centre carries a mental experience (a combination of thought, emotion and imagination) and memory. Later in this research (in Chapter 6), I will analyse interior decors of houses and community centres and their impact on identity reconstruction.

Michel de Certeau (1984) also distinguishes space from place. He defines place as 'the order' in accord once with which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. Two things cannot be in the same place but should each be situated in its own distinct location. His conceptualisation of space/place implies a stability or fixity of relationships, where space refers to the composition of intersecting mobile elements and considers vectors of direction, velocities and time variables, 'in short, space is a practiced place'. To explain this point, he argues that:

(…) thus the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers. In the same way, an act of reading is the space produced by the practice of a particular place: a written text, i.e., a place constituted by a system of signs. (De Certeau, 1984:117)

De Certeau's thesis presents an opportunity show how meaning is practiced in relation to place. For example, one location in my fieldwork was Green Lanes which is geometrically defined street in an urban place. However, with the participation of the Turkish-speaking community, it turns into a space that is heart of community life. Some members of the community describe their identity with references to Green Lanes.

Spatial practices therefore structure the determining conditions of social life. Merleau-Ponty claims that 'There are as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences' (Cited in Certeau, 1984:118). According to de Certeau (1984), then spatial practices structure the determining conditions of social life. Therefore, analysis of spaces will tell us about experiences of diaspora place. Hence, in analysis chapters I will discuss, religious spaces, community centres and coffee houses to understand experiences of diaspora place and to understand these spaces primary role in identity construction.

De Certeau (1984) moves on to say that everyday modes of action are a 'kind of rhetoric that leaves behind not only material, visible traces in space, but also invisible ones'. He argues that stories, dreams, histories and myths connect people to particular places and make that place concrete and habitable. Hence oral history and collective memory narrations are embedded in spaces. As a result, the identity at the core is rooted to those spaces.

Following de Certeau's discussion on space, Henri Lefebvre (1991) discusses spatial concepts in three main groups; mental, social and physical spaces. These spaces are bound to each other and inherit implications from each other. A pure mental space that is isolated from social relations and physical perceptions cannot be talked about. It can be analysed with social

events and physical surroundings. The physical space, also, can be understood as a consequence of mental and social spaces. According to Lefebvre, the notion of space is simply a representation. This representation occurs in our mental space, our cognitive powers and imagination. To imagine this mental space as a blank piece of paper on which we write our cultural history is also a misconception. Our mental space is full of past experiences (collective memory), previous knowledge, beliefs and history. Mental space is constructed stories and memories about a place are told and, in this way, a metaphorical geography of the city is created. According to de Certeau (1984:105) "cities become meaningful and habitable through the legends, memories, and dreams that accumulate in and haunt places". Both de Certeau and Lefebvre provide a way to think physical spaces bounded with with memories and narrations about the space. I will apply these two theories through the analysis chapters to understand the role of North London as a diaspora space in identity reconstruction of the Turkish-speaking community. I will discuss how third places are constructed as physical space that is bounded with collective memory therefore mental space and located at the heart of the community life therefore bounded with social space.

Based on de Certeau and Lefebvre's theories, I argue that, identification with places can be gained through stories, legends or/and spatial performances. Group identity is formed as a historical image of belonging, in reciprocal interaction with the contemporary political and economic context within a particular region (see Hedberg & Kepsu, 2008 cited in Rembold et al. 2011:368). For instance, in Jewish folklore, a golem is a legendary, anthropomorphic being that is created magically from inanimate materials (Idel, 1990; Kieval, 1997). In a famous narrative, it is believed that a rabbi created a golem to defend the Jewish ghetto of Prague from anti-Semitic attacks or pogroms[5]. These stories do not only narrate the history and presence of

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[5] Idel, Moshe (1990). *Golem: Jewish Magical and Mystical Traditions on the Artificial Anthropoid.* Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

the Jewish community in Prague, but also root Jewish collective memory and identity into a physical space. During reconstruction of cultural identity in a diasporic place, bonding identity and collective memory (mental space) of the community to the physical space in a diaspora place is crucial for the community life. Social space is bounded to these physical and mental spaces that provides a bridge between ancestral homeland and diaspora; past and the present.

2.2.1 Social Spaces or Third Places

In community life, alternative surroundings to the social environments of home and the workplace are important for identity performance. Class, ethnic identity and gender are performed and practiced in social spaces. This is especially important for migrant communities living in a foreign culturalscape, social spaces are where they come together with their community and perform the ethnic identity.

Edward Soja's spatial theory 'Thirdspace' is developed from the work of Henri Lefebvre and focused on cultural geography. According to Soja (1996, 2000), third space is a way of thinking about and interpreting socially produced space, where the spatiality of our lives, our human geography, has the same scope and significance as social and historical dimensions. According to Soja's classification 'Thirdspace' combines three interacting urban 'spaces':

- Firstspace is the 'real' space – the urban-built form of physical buildings that can be mapped and seen.

- Secondspace is the 'imagined' representational space – in example how the space is perceived, seen and argued over. In urban settings, this would be evident through the role of marketing and redevelopment projects.

- Thirdspace takes this thinking further – it combines First and Secondspace to create what is described as, 'a fully lived space, a simultaneously real-and-imagined, actual-and virtual locus of structured individuality and collective experience and agency' (Soja: 2000:11).

The notion of thirdspace is often used when discussing disadvantaged groups in urban life 'who reclaim these real and symbolic spaces of oppression and make them into something else' (Smith, 2005: 19).

Different than Soja's thirdspace theory, Ray Oldenburg's theory on third place only focuses on physical space which can be mapped and seen, and which occupies central role in community life. Oldenburg emphasises the importance of third places in his book *The Great Good Place* (1991). Third places are a 'place on the corner' that can balance the increased privatisation of home space. It is a break in a shuttle between home and work. According to Oldenburg, the characteristics of residential areas that are built in the post-war period can be described as anti-community since they have been designed to protect people from the community instead of connecting them to it. Essentially all the ways of encountering and getting to know one's neighbours have been disposed of. For this reason, in the suburban landscape, there is a need for space that people can easily gather in and that is cheap or free.

According to Oldenburg (1991) one's home and the people they live with is their first place. The second place is the workplace, and the third place is where interactions among community members happen. These are informal meeting places. Oldenburg also summarises the characteristics of third place as: free or cheap, highly accessible (walking distance), consisting of both new friends and old, a place people frequently visit, could be found there, welcoming and comfortable. Food and drink are also important but optional rather than compulsory in the third places. A pub, bookstore, bowling alley or community centres are examples of third places. There is an emphasis on socialisation without generating any additional costs. During my preliminary research, I noticed that community centres, mosques, *Cemevi*, village associations, youth centres and other third places have a significant role in the Turkish-speaking community's socialisation. Also, these places are where cultural identity is

performed and transmitted to younger generations. I will discuss them in detail in analysis chapters.

Oldenburg (1991:22-39) defined the characteristics of third place as a neutral ground where occupants have little to no obligation to be there. Individuals are free to come and go as they please. It is a neutral place to gather where no one is required to play host and in which all feel at home and comfortable. However, my interaction in the field shows that they are not neutral. For instance, in Turkish coffee houses, kahvecis perform the role of the host which I will discuss in Chapter 6. Also, third place is a leveller which means it is an inclusive place where no importance is put on an individual's status in the society. Economic or social status of individuals are ignored and that allows a sense of commonality among its occupants. Different than Oldenburg, I argue that in third places among the Turkish-speaking community, social class as well as political views decide who are allowed participating. The only purpose of people to gather is joy, vivacity and relief. They engage their personalities beyond the contexts of purpose, duty or role. Even though not being the only activity, the conversation is the main activity in third places. There are even some rules of conversations to ensure that everyone speak the right amount, and everybody is expected to contribute to the chat. Accessibility and accommodation are other key features. Third places must be open and readily accessible to anyone. Turkish third places are open to those who knows their presence. Anyone may go alone at almost any time of the day or evening and encounter some acquaintances. Third places are ready to serve people's needs for sociability and relaxation in the intervals before between and after their mandatory appearances elsewhere. Third places have their regulars who give the characteristic of the place and ensure the participation of a group. They also dominate the space. The third places attract newcomers and regulars make it come alive, help newcomers to feel welcome and accommodated just because they were also newcomers in the past. Third places generally have a low profile and they are characteristically plain as a

physical structure. The inside of a third place is unimpressive looking without extravagance or grandiosity. They are not even elegant. They fall short of the middle-class preference for cleanliness and modernity. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, in third places among the Turkish-speaking community ethnic references to rural Turkey and ideological symbols display itself in decorations. Third places are mostly not impressive for the uninitiated ones. Whether it is obvious or subtle, the spirit of the third place is a playful one. Joy and acceptance reign over anxiety and alienation. Third place compares to a comfortable home, and it is even more homelike than home. Participants of third places will often have the same feelings of warmth as they would in their own homes. Ordinary citizens have the opportunity to express their opinions and discuss them with others in third place. Local stores such as butchers, groceries, bakers or libraries, museums and hotels can also be examples of third place. One can chat with anyone s/he encounters there, and people know each other on a first name basis. By its own definition, third spaces are local, preferably in walking distance and tend to remain local.

Oldenburg (1996) summarises the functions of third places as follows:

- It contributes to community cohesion in the neighbourhoods.

- Third places are the entrance of the community for newcomers where they can be inducted into the neighbourhood and obtain quick knowledge about communal life.

- Any kind of group can be arranged easily around a specific hobby or interest in the third place.

- People gather in times of emergency to support each other.

- Third places are civil society centres where people discuss politics.

- People do not only entertain but also provide support mechanisms in which people do things for others, such as giving advice.

- People establish friendships without any prior arrangements or excuses in an easy come and go facility.

- They are invaluable places for socialisation for retired people.

In this research, third places in diaspora and their role in identity reconstruction of the Turkish-speaking community will be analysed. In diaspora, third places are not only a break in the shuttle between home and work, but also break in the mainstream culture where cultural identity is performed.

Concluding Remarks

The way in which the past experiences of a community and their ideas about homeland are narrated plays a significant role in construction and transmission of identity. In this chapter, I have discussed the role of collective memory, migration stories and homeland narratives on identity construction. In these narratives, homeland as a historic location, memory and imagined place has a central role. In my analysis chapters, I will apply these theories to discuss the role of collective memory and space for the Turkish community in North London. For instance, the notion of '*vatan*' (fatherland) or '*memleket*' (homeland) is constructed in diaspora through various forms of narrations and transmitted to second and third generations. However, the role of space in identity construction is not limited to homeland narratives. Third places in diaspora where the community spend time together or as an individual in a collective space is an important aspect of community life and identity performances. The coffehouses, mosques and community centres are some of the third places within the community where cultural identity is performed. From the decoration of such spaces, to activities and rituals people conduct or participate in, these places are contrubuting to part of their identity performance. This chapter discussed the role of collective memory and space in identity construction. In the next chapter I will discuss identity performances and performativity as well as postmodern

identity theories in order to understand performativity of Turkish cultural identity in diaspora London.

CHAPTER 3

POSTMODERN IDENTITY THEORIES: Self, Identity and Performativity

I propose that while it is true that identity 'continues to be the problem', this is not 'the problem it was throughout modernity'. Indeed, if the modem 'problem of identity' was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the postmodern 'problem of identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open. (Bauman, 1996:18)

Introduction

According to Bauman (1996), identity issues are still problematic in the contemporary world. However, the discussion on identity has shifted from a fixed and unifying subject to fragmented and dislocated one (Harvey, 1990; Rattansi, 1994; Bauman, 2001). Postmodern subjects investigate and pursue authenticity in their identity and avoid fixation (Bauman, 1996). In this chapter, I aim to discuss identity performances, performativity and postmodern identity theories as well as explaining the conceptual shift from the modernist subject. I will discuss the changing phases of identity with high mobility of people and migrant communities' *in-between* identities in *third cultural space*, as well as the late modernist invention of a cosmopolitan identity in order to understand performativity of Turkish cultural identity in diaspora London. A theoretical framework on identity will be presented which will be applied to the case of the Turkish-speaking community in North London throughout the analysis chapters.

3.1 Postmodern Identity Theories

Modernism is a vague term which does not refer to an exact period or geography. One of the few points of consensus about the modern era is that it begins in seventeenth-century Europe; developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and evolved into postmodernism in the twentieth century (Levenson 1984). Modernist concepts of 'nations' and 'fixed identities'

have been challenged by postcolonialism and other social theories during the late modern period. According to Stuart Hall (1990:225) "identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past". Further to this, Benedict Anderson (1991:67) defines the nations as 'imagined communities' and adds that 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them'.

Anderson (1991) argues that national identities are accepted as imagined and are therefore socially constructed. Based on Anderson's argument I argue that national identities are constructed via practices and belief. In return, national identities construct people's identity performances. Many scholars have critiqued concepts of nation and national identities in the late modern period. For example, Mary Fulbrook (1999:1) states that:

> National identity does not exist, as an essence to be sought for, found and defined. It is a human construct, evident only when sufficient people believe in some version of collective identity for it to be a social reality, embodied in and transmitted through institutions, laws, customs, beliefs and practices.

Fulbrook discusses national identity as a social construct that only exist when it is embodied by practices and transmitted via collective memory. Here we see that the idea of a fixed and unified subject of modernity are challenged in the period of 'postmodernity' or what some other theorists call it 'late modernity' (Lyotard, 1986; Bauman, 1987, 1991; Connor, 1989, Harvey, 1989; Boyne and Rattansi, 1990; Smart, 1992, Kumar, 1996). Significant and rapid social, economic and cultural changes are key features of the postmodern period. In this period, we have witnessed the erosion of older and settled collective identities alongside invention and re-invention of other identities (Rattansi 1994). Many scholars claim that globalisation has lessened the importance of nation states and disrupted older senses of national identity (Habermas, 1992; Pieterse, 1995; Oommen, 1997; Hobsbawm, 2007; Ariely 2012, Crouch, 2017, Mann and Fenton, 2017). According to postmodern theories, individuals occupy multiple

positions such as ethnicity, class, gender; thus, they have a range of identities which they perform in different contexts (Harvey, 1990; Rattansi, 1994; Bauman, 2001). Moreover, this multiple positioning enables individuals to construct hybrid identities.

National and gender identities were vital to defining the subject until late modernism (Bauman, 1991; Giddens, 1991; Rattansi, 1994, Beck et al., 1994, Bhambra, 2007). New identity forms are constructed in postmodern times such as 'pansexual' or 'post national' identities which make the identity question even more complex. Post-colonial immigration waves increased human mobility and also fragmented fixed and unified national identities. In postmodern theories identities are seen as always in process and a state of formation rather than being fully and finally 'established' (Harvey, 1990; Rattansi, 1994; Bauman, 2001). In this regard, a theory of discursive practice is needed instead of a theory of the knowing the subject. Hall (2000) states that in common understanding, identification is based on the recognition of common origin or shared characteristics or with an ideal. However, in discursive approaches, identification is perceived as a construction, a never completed process which is always open to articulation and suturing. It can always be 'won', 'lost', maintained or abandoned.

When reconstructing and transmitting national identity, heroic historical stories are comonly retrieved. In this way, a sense of togetherness is created, and new traditions are invented that fit modern conditions. What Eric Hobsbawm (2000:13) calls 'exercises in social engineering' includes 'recent historical innovations such as nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest'. As discussed in the previous chapter, only certain aspects of past or a place are recovered and idealised (Schneider, 2000; Bucholtz, 2003; Milligan, 2003; Parveen, 2017). A shared history (even if it is mostly constructed through narration) and collective memory are indispensable and essential conditions of a national identity. Transmission of collective knowledge ensures continuity and reconstruction of cultural identity. References to

the shared past ensure younger generations, enabling unity and singularity in time and space with older generations, and develop a collective identity (Berberich 2008).

During the postmodern period ethnic identity has been differentiated from cultural identity (Hall, 1990; Bauman, 1996; Hall and Du Gay, 2011). Cultural identity is described by Stuart Hall (1990) as collective or true self hiding inside the many other, superficial 'selves' of a people with common ancestry and shared history. Further to this point Hall (1996b:502) describe the cultural identity as:

> […] is not fixed, it's always hybrid. But this is precisely because it comes out of very specific historical formations, out of very specific histories and cultural repertoires of enunciation, that it can constitute a 'positionality', which we call provisionally, identity.

It is widely accepted that members of an ethnic community generally carry the culture of that community. However, ethnic identities are defined as a more stable term with reference to skin colour or being a native speaker of a language, whereas culture is accepted as open to change. Thus, ethnic identities are given, whereas cultural identities are performed. According to Verkuyten (2005) sense of belonging to an ethnic group is based on a shared origin, history or descents. Furthermore, speaking the language and having biological descents are the main features required to hold or claim an ethnic identity. In their research, Ferrari et.al (2015) emphasise the influence of parents' language and socialisation on transmission of ethnic identity to the second-generation. While analysing identity performances of my research group, I paid special attention to language preferences of younger generations when they were interacting with me and each other. I will discuss the role of language in recalling of memories in Chapter 5.

Ethnic groups may keep their ethnic identity while they lose their original culture (Roosens, 1989; Verkuyten, 2014). Ethnic identity and culture are strongly connected, but not the same. According to Verkuyten (2014:10) "People often hold on to their ethnic identity, to what

they feel is a continuity with their ancestral past and a loyalty towards their community, although their culture changes and intermingled with that of others". On the other hand, people performing the same cultural practices may construct a shared cultural identity independent from their ethnic or racial background. Based on this argument, in analysis chapters I will discuss notions of 'British identity' and 'Cosmopolitan Londoner identity' as a shared cultural identity in the case of the Turkish-speaking immigrants. I will also discuss whether there is a Turkish ethnic identity reserved and reproduced after loss of home culture.

The internal dynamics of a community, such as intense commitment to and involvement with the group, enhances identification within an ethnic community, whereas lack of involvement and commitment reduces ethnic identification (see Ting-Toomey et.al. 2000). For instance, it is widely argued that the Kurdish nation building process and armed conflict in Middle East has intensified a sense of belonging within the ethnic group among Kurdish diaspora (Wahlbeck, 1999; Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005; Baser, 2010, 2011, 2015b, Galip, 2014).

Among any migrant groups, hybridisation with the host culture increases in correlation with the time spent in the host country (Weiner, 1996; Scholten, 2013; Bendel, 2014; Kraal and Vertovec, 2017, Scholten et al., 2017). In addition, religious affiliation could be an important component of identity construction, especially when inter-religious encounters happen. For instance, when a Muslim migrant community encounters a Christian community in a diasporic space, the migrant community's reference to Islamic identity becomes more prominent in most of the cases (Werbner, 2002a; Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2012; Hackett, 2013). In this way, Muslim migrants both reconstruct their identity in a foreign cultural landscape and differentiate insiders and outsiders of their community. Here Alba (2005) states that Islam creates 'bright boundaries' which involve no ambiguity about membership and separates Muslim migrants from their host societies. Thus, many scholars who have studied Turkish immigrants in Western

Europe have analysed the role of religion in identity formation. According to these studies, religious practices and education reinforces cultural identity for the members of the Turkish-speaking community (see, Kucukcan, 1999; Gungor, et.al., 2011; Martinovic & Verkuyten 2012). On the other hand, deviation from the mainstream religious view of the ethnic community may cause disassociation with ethnic identity such as the case of Iranian diaspora constructed before Iranian revolution and their relationship with Islamic Iranian identity (see Soleiman, 2017). For example, in their study on ethnic identity, psychologists Phinney and Ong (2007) claims that identity is dynamic and reconstructed over time and spatial context. Thus, it could be summarised that fixed and unifying subjects in modernist theories as well as linking identity with soil and blood has shifted to become a fluctuating and fragmented subject. In postmodern theories, identities are only representations of constructed positions. Therefore, identity is no longer seen as something possessed but as a contextual positioning.

As stated, in modernist identity theories, identities were perceived as fixed and unified which are constructed through difference and exclusion (Sökefeld, 1999, 2001). Thus, difference is the constitutive aspect of identity and identities are defined by its negative content or in other words by its differentiation from other identities. An outsider or 'Other' lacks certain characteristics that insiders have (see also Schlesinger 1987; Morley and Robins, 1989, 1995). Thus, claiming to share a culture with a specific group based on distinguishing it from other cultural groups with binary opposition of 'us' and 'them'. With their capacity to exclude, arbitrary identification functions as unity. The discourse constructs positions and identities are performances which are temporally attached to them (see Hall 1995). People tried to establish fixed and unifying identities, both individual and national identities, during the modernist period which is less common in the postmodern period. Moreover, the desire for authentic identity and of anxiety of inauthenticity or in other words identity crisis has emerged during

modernity and its contradictions during the twentieth-century (see Evans 2000). Therefore, in the postmodern period people seek authenticity via performances.

During identity reconstruction, there is always an interaction between an individual and their social structures (Bakhtin, 1981). Individuals negotiate between socially-imposed identity and an 'authentic' self (Costas and Fleming, 2009). Turner (1967) defines a person being in between two identity constructions or in other words, not fully adopting neither one identity nor the otheras calls 'betwixt and between'. Dialogical construction between self-identity and social-identity is the process of the individual agent which constitutes and is constituted by their social setting and the discourses available to them and those around them (Ybema et al., 2009). Hall (1996:5-6) defines identity as "the point of suture between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to 'interpellate', speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be 'spoken'". Therefore, there is not a fixed and unifying identity anymore but the subject constantly 'suturing' itself to different articulations between discourse and practice (Cohen, 2000, Bauman, 2001).

3.2 Performance and Performativity of Identity

Erving Goffman's (1990) dramaturgy theory explains everyday life as a performance where actors behave differently on the stage and backstage. According to Goffman, the self is presented and performed in everyday life. This dramaturgic performance of the self includes front stage performances, backstage preparation, identity-constructing decors and impression management. According to Goffman (1990:26) people present themselves to be perceived in a certain way in front stage: "When an individual appears before others he will have many motives for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation". Also, during that presentation of the self, individuals try to fit in the social context: "When an individual presents

himself to others, his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so in fact, than does his behavior as a whole" (ibid. p.35). For migrant groups, there are two societies they need to incorporate values with and they try not to be totally excluded from one when trying to fit in the other. Another important aspect of presentation of the self is making the performance realistic and making the audience believe the only self the individual has: "[I]ndividuals often foster the impression that the routine they are presently performing is their only routine or at least their most essential one" (ibid. p.48). Identity is therefore constituted through style, cultural practices and rituals; thus, it is a never completed position. Identity is not fixed but rather it is fluid and has variable changes in different spatial and time contexts.

Postmodern identity is a constant effort to imitate its own idealisations to reconstruct itself. It is not arbitrary in a way people wake up in the morning and decide which identity they want to be that day, and in the evening, they can change it again. Although, one is nor condemmed to act out a structurally determined identity, s/he is not free to choose an identity the way s/he might chose an outfit. Identity is always provisional rather than a complete moment. Performativity cannot be reduced to performance. The degree of the individual choice in identity construction makes it appear like a natural process. As Butler (1992) emphasises "Performativity has to do with repetition, very often the repetition of oppressive and painful gender norms". Therefore, identity construction is not a theatrical performance per se to act out but performativity which means repetitive act coming from discourse. In line with Butler's (1990) thesis I argue that Turkish identity "is an act which has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the particular actors who make use of it, but which requires individual actors in order to be actualized and reproduced as reality once again" (p.160).

As Butler (1990:25) argues that "[I]dentity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results". In her famous work Gender Trouble (1990) she

discusses gender identity via the performativity that is defined by *speech act* and communication. Although Butler's discussion is focused on gender identity, one can apply her theoretical frame to a broader discussion of identity. According to Butler's theory, identities are constructed by performative actions, gestures and behaviours. A discourse about cultural identity regulates and strains identities. Repetitive statements have power on the actions of individuals which are reinforced by social norms. According to Butler gender is a self-making identity which can be used to define cultural identities. Later in this thesis, I will apply her theory to the migration setting via analysing perpetual identity performances in everyday life. Here, I claim that cultural identity is self-making. Especially in a diaspora context, cultural identity is embodied by perpetual practices. In Butler's theory of performativity, identity performances are not theatrical like in Goffman's dramaturgy. Instead they are more long term or consistent performances based on actions to fulfil an identity status. There is a difference between 'performance' and 'performativity'. The former is a conscious act or the acting out of what is perceived to be belonged to that cultural identity. Whereas the performative act is unconscious, not freely chosen but rather the outcome of a discourse of cultural identity and repetitive acts (Sullivan 2012; Pratt 2009; Lloyd 1999). In performance, an actor consciously follows or refuses to follow a script. According to Butler, identity is enacted in daily experience through the 'forced reiteration of norms'. Based on Butler's (1990) theory I argue that cultural identity is something that one becomes but can never be. Therefore, cultural identity is itself is becoming and it should not be perceived as a static marker of being. I argue that diasporic Turkish or Kurdish identity is produced through a set of acts, narrative (chronotope) and gestures.

In Butler's theory, there are two forms of performativity: mimicry and citation. The second one is more relevant to this research's theoretical framework. Citation is the process of enacting a self-identity that is linked to a wider imagined community and tradition (see McKinlay,

2010). In line with this theory, I argue that, the members of the Turkish-speaking community pursue of an imaginary which is being 'Turkish' or 'Kurdish'. There is no written script of this role. However, a widely accepted set of norms and traditions exist. Therefore, *citation* refers to that members of the community performing an identity pursuing this ideal.

For Butler (1988:520) gender is "a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief". As McKinlay (2010), I argue that performativity theory can be applied to other identities. Individuals perform their ethnic or social identities in a performative accomplishment. Parallel to Butler I argue that those identities are real only to the extent that it is performed. During identity performances, cultural practices are replaced by the social meanings they take on. Some of these performances are traditional roles or practices that are being acted out to be perceived as holding that identity whereas some of them are performative and individuals do them as a member of their community. These sediment practices are rooted in collective memory of the community as repetitive acts.

Butler (1990:145) argues that "The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects". As Butler (1993:208) argues, naming is identity constituting because it "orders and institutes a variety of free-floating signifiers into an 'identity', the name effectively sutures the object". Therefore, while calling some cultural practices as 'Turkish' or 'Kurdish', free-floating signifiers are pinned down an identity that effectively shapes individuals. Further to this Butler (1993:226) argues that:

> recognition is not conferred on a subject, but forms that subject. Further, the impossibility of a full recognition, that is, of ever fully inhabiting the name by which

one's social identity is inaugurated and mobilized, implies the instability and incompleteness of subject-formation.

In analysis chapters I will discuss how migrants' performativity of identity sometimes reveals itself in the form of jewellery, for example a crescent moon and star necklace or a piece of cloth like a union jack jumper. In this way, they perpetually perform an identity in everyday life. However, this performativity is not independent from public discourse therefore, individuals react or enforce the discourses in relation to society within the context of time and space. For instance, ethnic aspects of their identity are emphasised on national commemorative days, whereas religious identity is highlighted on holy days such as Christmas, Eid or Diwali. Butler (1990) argues that all identities operate through exclusion, through the construction of outsider and marginalised subjects. Identities do not only function as norms but also as regulatory practices. She adds that identifications belong to the imaginary and these are never fully and finally realised, therefore they are incessantly reconstituted into new forms.

3.2 Fluctuating Identities and Simulacrum

Postmodern theories discuss identity as a construction process rather than as a completed, permanent and fixed entity. Thus, identity fluctuates and constantly changes. Identities and all the alleged roots or essence of identities are socially constructed, and invented traditions. Therefore, as Butler, et al. (2000:1) argues "'[I]dentity' itself is never fully constituted; in fact, since identification is not reducible to identity, it is important to consider the incommensurability or gap between them".

The re-articulation of identity positions under the concept of postmodernism undermines the false cohesion and unity of identities. Hybridisation of cultures inevitably undermine the certainty of identities. Modernist ideas and the grand narratives are the *passés* (Lyotard 1986). Postmodern theorists offer replacement meta-narratives with diverse local language games which constitutes the subject (Lyotard, 1986). However, Ernest Gellner (1992:29) describes

postmodern condition as a "kind of hysteria of subjectivity" and adds that; "everything in the world is fragmented and multiform, nothing really resembles anything else, and no one can know another" (ibid.: 45). Although some scholars claim homogenisation of cultures with globalisation (See Ritzer, 1992), others claim enormous heterogeneity (Appadurai, 2001). Brubaker and Cooper (2000), this definition identity lacking explanatory power. Moreover, some theorists criticise fragmented and fluctuated postmodern identities and claim that the individuals need a unifying purposeful identity (McAdams, 1988; Côté and Schwartz, 2002).

Baudrillard (2006) offers an important way to look at how postmodern identities are constructed yet rootless. He states that the death of the real and rational opened the age of simulation. According to Baudrillard (2001, 2006) illusions are not possible anymore because the real is not possible. He gave the example of the simulation of a theft in a store. Since there is not any objective difference from signs of real theft, it is not possible to persuade the security guard that it is a simulated theft. To discover an absolute level of real is as impossible as staging an illusion. In other words, one cannot differentiate the copy from the original as both are identical. So, we cannot talk about reality. There are copies without origin, or what Baudrillard (2001, 2006) calls *simulacrum.* The real can be reproduced unlimitedly since it is produced from miniaturised units and matrices. It is not measured against some ideals thus, it is independent from rationality. It does not refer to or imitate a reality. Like a hyperspace without an atmosphere, it is hyperreal since it is not surrounded by the imaginary. Based on Baudrillard's theory, I argue that a cultural identity performance in diaspora context could be acted out more realistically than the way it is performed by holders of this cultural identity in the country of origin. This performance is more realistic and leaves no room for the imaginary, hence it is hyperreal. I call this *über*-identity as it no longer belongs to or resembles anything but the representation. Since cultural and ethnic identities are invented in first place. They are all imaginary, and performative (Butler, 1990; Anderdson, 1991; Fulbrook, 1999). In diasporic

place, these identities are reconstructed as copies without an original, thus they are simulacrum. They are hyperreal as they are not surrounded by imaginary.

Baudrillard (2001) summarizes the phases of the image. In the first phase, the image reflects and represents a basic reality. In the second phase, it masks and distorts a basic reality. In the third phase, it masks the absence of reality and plays at being an appearance. In the fourth phase, it has no relation with any reality but purely a simulacrum. There is no longer any reality. In this theory Baudrillard asserts that reality becomes gradually displaced by its complete simulation and *simulacrum* and maintains the illusion of the presence of reality. The *simulacra* are free to construct any simulated virtual reality as there is no true referent to validate them. There is no objective distinction between the real and the imaginary. Baudrillard (2001, 2006) gives the example of illness to explain simulation. Someone can simulate illness and produces the symptoms with themselves. In such a simulation, not only the reality is masked but also the difference between reality and imaginary is threatened since s/he produces the true symptoms. Thus, medicine loses its meaning since it can treat true illness by their objective causes while it is not possible to the simulator to be considered as objectively ill or healthy. I would like to change illness in this example with identity. Someone can simulate an identity and perform certain practices to produce it. In such a simulation, not only the reality is masked but also the difference between reality and imaginary is threatened since s/he performs same practices. As Baudrillard (2006:1) states; "The simulacrum is never what hides the truth, it is truth that hides the fact that there is none. The simulacrum is true". When identities are fluctuating in postmodern conditions it cannot be asserted that any immigrant groups keep their national identity pure in *third space*. Yet, it cannot be claimed that they purely adopt the identity of the host culture.

3.3 Changing Phase of Identity with High Mobility of People

Until the end of the feudalism, the subject was defined as tied to the soil and the church. The fall of feudalism resulted in "increasing numbers of people, formally tied to the land of their masters, were freed from feudal ties and started to wander the land" (Cresswell, 2004:111). The self was connected to the soil again with the invention of nationhood. In the global era, borders of nation states are transgressed as human beings are more mobile than ever. People moved out or were expelled from their homelands making new homes for themselves. For instance, on average eleven per cent of the population within Europe was born in a country other than the one in which they are currently living (Verkuyten 2014:3) An increase in migration around the world and the growth of diasporic communities make identity and belonging discussions far more important. After 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and 7 July 2005 bombings in London, the dual loyalties of migrants began to be re-examined in many migrant-receiving countries (Aksoy, 2006; Naujoks, 2010; Hackett, 2013). Alienated individuals being recruited by extremist groups and increase in far-right ideologies make identity politics more crucial in the contemporary world. On the one hand, the cultural values of migrants are protected and encouraged with multicultural policies; on the other hand, there are concerns about national solidarity and integration of immigrants to host cultures (Amiraux, 2006; Avci, 2006; Scholten, 2011, 2013; Hackett, 2013; Ali, 2014; Bendel, 2014; Kraal and Vertovec, 2017; Scholten et al., 2017).

Liisa Malkki (1992) argues that more people identify themselves, or are categorised, in reference to deterritorialised homelands, cultures and origins. Yet, it does not mean people living abroad fix their identity to their country of origin. Instead, while living in a foreign cultural landscape they keep their feet in both countries. Pieterse (1995) claims that the role of nation-states as a source for identity construction has decreased which enabled "multiplied and intensified experiences of being several selves at once" (Cited in Scholte, 2000:180). What

Schiller et.al. (1995) call *transmigrants* are people whose identities are constructed in relationship to multiple nation-states and whose daily lives are interwoven with cross border connections. *Transmigrants* are different from *sojourners* as *transmigrants* are settled into their country of residence both economically and politically and maintain their links with the countries of origin. When migrants construct their identities, both transnational and translocal relationships play a role and deconstruct a fixed sense of belonging (Glick-Schiller et.al.1995; Dwyer 2000; Vertovec 2001). Therefore, transmigrants' sense of belonging is not towards a single nation state (neither country of origin nor residence) or one geography but it is divided between homes, geographies and cultures. When participating in cultural, political and financial lives in their country of residence, they do not abandon their links with their country of origin. Displacement from the home country does not necessarily mean a complete loss of its culture. As I discussed in the previous chapter, a continuity of practices is established in narrative level by chronotope. Thus, the homeland is not perceived as left behind, static, pure or an untouched state which can be gained by returning to this location. Hybrid diasporic identity is constructed between chronotopes of country of origin and residence (see Peeren 2006). Migrant communities link their home country's chronotope by preserving one aspect of culture such as dress code, food or language.

Thomas Sullivan (2012) conducted a study that explored the importance of language in maintaining identity. He tried to comprehend why individuals, most of whom were latter-generation Irish Americans, learned a language that they never speak in daily life. He also analysed ethnic choices of individuals in order to indicate why and how they maintained the bounds with imaginary places. Sullivan focused on ethnic spaces that took shape in the form of short-term events such as parades, festivals, pub sessions, and language workshops. His analysis discussed construction of identities in reference to multiple sites, whereas in traditional ethnographic studies there is a static site. According to his research findings, ethnicity among

third generation Irish Americans evolved into individualised form. People not only knowingly construct their ethnic identities, but also unconsciously adjust to an ethnic discourse based on their perception of authenticity and tradition. It can be summarised as people move across borders, establish multi-sited identities and during their daily practices more than one culture are referred to. Therefore, they create a *third space* (Bhabha, 1990) in diaspora where hybrid identity forms are performed. These identities are different than the host culture yet not the same as home culture anymore. For instance, the Turkish-speaking community in London define themselves as Turks/Kurds/Cypriots living in London or use hyphenated identities such as British-Turks. In this way, they differentiate themselves from homeland nationals with reference to Britain, yet they do not define themselves as only British. It results in a *sui generis* identity with a combination of multiple sites; North London and their hometown in Turkey or Cyprus as well as the cultures lived in those sites.

3.4 Migrant Communities' 'In-between' Identity and Third Cultural Spaces

When discussing a migrant's identity, the concepts of 'crisis', 'conflict', 'loss' and 'fragmentation' are often referred to. Immigrant groups perform their identity in relation to multiple homes and belongings. On the one hand, they carry the idea of a shared origin 'collective diasporic memory' (Charliand and Rageau, 1991). On the other hand, they adapt the culturalscape of the host country and perform their hybrid identity in this context of *third space*. We can return to Homi Bhabha (1994) who discusses hybridity of cultural identities with his theory of 'third space' and 'in-betweens'. Instead of seeing various cultural identities in one's self as in conflict or loss of one identity when adapting another. Bhabha (1994) argues that hybridisation is inevitable among diaspora communities even they insist on the purity of their doctrines. As Bhabha (1990:211) argues hybridity is not an identity but identification, 'a process of identifying with and through another object, an object of otherness'. Therefore, diaspora is a space of hybridity or *the third space* where cultures and identities encounter and

construct *the in-betweens*. Bhabha (1994:13) defines *the third space*, as "halfway between being not defined" and "a subject that inhabits the rims of an 'in-between' reality". Bhabha (1990:211) also argues that "[…] all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity […] the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace tow original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to is the 'third space', which enables other positions to emerge."*The third space* is where *in-between*, hybridised identities are constructed. Encounters are not limited to 'the home' and 'host' cultures, especially in this research case in cosmopolitan London where over 250 languages are spoken (see Baker and Eversley, 2000). In diaspora *third space*, cultures of migrant communities' encounter and interact with one another. In this way, new forms of culture and identity are constructed. Diaspora experience is not defined by essence or purity, but by heterogeneity, diversity and hybridity. As Bhabha (1996a:204) argues that "in […] cultural translation there opens up a 'space-in-between', […] both the return to an originary 'essentialist' self-consciousness as well as a release into an endlessly fragmented subject in 'process'. Hybridity thus does not allow for endless fragmentation: there are boundaries to the subject, some essence that remains even while it is being remade."

Werbner (1997:15) criticises hybridity theories and argues that "All cultures are always hybrid […] To speak of cultural 'mixing' makes sense only from inside a social world. Hybridity is meaningless as a description of 'culture', because this 'museumizes' culture as a 'thing'".

Diaspora is an unsettling recombination, hybridisation and 'cut-and-mix' experience. (see Hall 1988, 1990). Diaspora communities do not bring an essence of an identity with them when they are migrating. Diasporic identity is constructed via negotiating between cultures during daily encounters. During performativity of an identity, references to country of origin does not claim to hold an essence of it but shares a collective memory. Hence, despite being dispersed,

deterritorialised and hybridised in foreign culturalscapes, diasporas consider themselves as sharing a collective past and a common destiny or as what Werbner (2005) calls "a simultaneity in time". Yet, there cannot be any simple return to or recovery of the ancestral past as it is transformed in the conditions of the present. Sometimes this *in-betweenness* of different cultures or past and the present leads migrants being divided between them. Especially for the second and third generations being in exile is imagined or a hyperreal sentiment. Richard Kearney (1988:14) describes Irish authors' writing in transit between two worlds as follows:

> They often write as emigrés of the imagination, conveying the feeling of being both part and not part of their culture, of being estranged from the very traditions to which they belong, of being in exile even while at home.

Robert Young (1995:26) argues that "Hybridity thus makes difference into sameness, and sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer simply different." When discussing transnational processes Itzigsohn et al. (1999) gives the example of a Dominican student in an American university whose identity is defined with the country of origin but whose performativity of identity in everyday life is different. Thus, he or she cannot live in the Dominican Republic any more. As this example indicates, migrants' identities are hybridised and that is different than home culture, yet not the same as the host culture. It is an *in-between* identity that is product of *third space* and its existence is only possible in diaspora space.

In addition, some immigrants avoid associating themselves with their ancestors' ethnic background. Instead, they emphasise locality and define their identities over the neighbourhood or city they live in which is described as 'neighbourhood nationalism' by Les Back (1996) (Cited in Verkuyten, 2014:11). That shows the intense level of sense of belonging to the diasporic *third space*. Yet, it is still *in-between* belonging as identity is not defined referring the entire host nation but only via a specific neighbourhood which carries the aspects of home culture. For instance, Turkish migrants in Germany identify themselves with *Kreuzberg* in

Berlin with no denial of Turkish identity. It both refers their country of origin because Turkish migrants concentrated in this neighbourhood, and their current home in diaspora. Therefore, what Back (1996) calls *neighbourhood nationalism* is a sense of belonging to *third space* and *in-between* identity. This theory will be examined in the case of the Turkish-speaking community and their relationship with North London.

As a result of the significant increase in migration, social scientists started analysing globalisation in more intense level (see Giddens 1991; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994). Mike Featherstone (1995) claims that sense of belonging to a physical and social space is blurred with globalisation and identities are defined independent of the nation-state. He describes this new sense of belonging as "third cultures", "sets of practices" and "lifestyles". However, it does not mean a "unified and homogeneous" global culture or sense of belonging (Featherstone 1995:102) but more of fragmented cultural identities. It also results in multiple homes and belonging for the second and third generations (see McLachlan 2004). The increasing interconnectedness of various local cultures and reducing the link between cultures and locations result in development of a world culture (Hannerz 1990). The *deterritorialisation* is one of the important aspects of globalisation which refers to a weakening of ties between culture and place (see Scholte 2000). As a result of an intense level of mobility and cross-border residence, cultures are transferred to different locations. Therefore, not only nation states but also national identities lose their significance which is called *postnationality* (Spiro 2007). People across the world listen to the same music, wear the same clothes and eat the same food. That contributes to construction of a new global or cosmopolitan identity. In the globalised world, people adopt cross-cultural values rather than tying their identity to locations. These people perform a lifestyle that transcends local conditions.

Even though cosmopolitanism is a relatively new phenomenon, it is rooted in the Ancient Greek philosopher Socrates' teaching. Plutarch quotes Socrates as he is not defining himself

an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world (De Exilio 5). And Diogenes of Sinope's response to a question about his place of origin is "I am a citizen of the world (κοσμοπολίτης/cosmopolites)" (Laërtius and Hicks, 1925). Hannerz (1990:239) defines cosmopolitanism as "an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other". Cosmopolitan identity is defined with plurality of cultures that individuals are engaged with. Cosmopolitans are differentiated from other migrants with their detachment from location as well as openness to different cultures. Glick-Schiller et.al. (2011:399) define cosmopolitanism as "simultaneous rootedness and openness to shared human emotions, experiences and aspirations". The Kantian, enlightenment origins of cosmopolitan theory refers to abstraction from local and cultural belonging resulting in the critiques of rootlessness and the lack of attachment or commitment to the local culture (Hannerz 1990; Delanty, 2000). Yet, Pnina Werbner (2008) argues that the new cosmopolitanism combines both local and global commitments in its diversity. Cosmopolitans are perceived as open to change, extensive travellers and open-minded individuals (Holt, 1997; Riefler & Diamantopoulos, 2009; Yoon, 1998). Cosmopolitanism still includes a mode of attachment, but it is a (re)attachment with multiple, uneven and non-exclusive affiliations which challenges the traditional forms of belonging and locality (see Clifford, 1998; Caglar, 2002). Cosmopolitan identity does not lack attachments, but attachments are directed to multiple locations and cultures. Some others see cosmopolitanism as a moral and political project defining cosmopolitans as individuals whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings rather than a single nation (Lu, 2000; Nussbaum, 2010). Discussing cosmopolitanism Gerard Delanty (2009) states that there are three forms of cosmopolitanism. The first one is moral cosmopolitanism that states every human belongs to the same moral community and a global ethic (*Weltethos*), which also means being responsible for other human beings. The second form is a political cosmopolitanism, which suggests institutional reforms on a global level to reach goals of moral cosmopolitanism.

In Immanuel Kant's theory, it can be reached by establishing a republican government of a global federal alliance of all states and nations. The third form is cultural cosmopolitanism which refers to being open to other cultures and having positive relations with them (see also Beck, 1994, 2010). In this research, the last meaning of the concept is applied to discuss identity performances.

Because of transnational cultures in the global era, nowadays many people are influenced by multiple cultures and cultures interact with each other more intensely. Therefore, everybody is 'more or less cosmopolitan' as Dick Hebdige (1990:20) emphasises "'mundane' cosmopolitanism is part of 'ordinary' experience". Further to this Rapport (2012:101) claims that cosmopolitanism liberates people "to become themselves" and Woodward and Skrbis (2012:130) define being cosmopolitan as "a culturally located competency, perhaps even a strategy, that affords individuals the capacity to see, identify, label, use and govern dimensions of social difference in ways which reproduce patterns of cultural power". According to Roudometof (2005) cosmopolitans have cultural competence which enables them to engage or disengage with multiple cultures according to social expectations or the way they want to present themselves. Through a sense of global civility, the cosmopolitan "refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language" (Waldron, 1991:754). According to Abu-Rabia (2008) cosmopolitans remain open and interested in other cultures while identifying themselves belonging to one particular group. They present a nomadic feature enjoying the privileges of their financial, social and cultural capital in liquid modernity. As Hannerz (1990) claims, expatriates have the ability to experiment or in another word negotiate regarding self and belonging and hold the right to be able to return to home if they want. Cosmopolitans are able to live ethically and culturally in both global and local contexts. They negotiate with other cultures as equals in their own cultural dispositions (Tomlinson 1999). Yet, not all migrants are necessarily cosmopolitan. For instance, for

ordinary migrant workers, involvement with another culture is not a benefit but maybe a necessary cost of working in a foreign cultural landscape (see Hannerz 1990). Thus, during my analysis I am going to classify cosmopolitan or expat Turks in a separate category instead of discussing them with the overgeneralising concepts of diaspora or migrants.

Concluding Remarks

In the globalised world, a growing number of people live outside of their country of birth. The question of how to live together in difference whilst preserving our own culture is at the centre of identity politics. Transmigrants transgress borders of nation states and as a reaction to this there is an enormous backlash against hybridisation, multiculturalism, globalisation and migration, such as the resurgence of nationalism and far right extremism (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Cave and Roberts, 2017; Doerr, 2017). It results in growing prominence of identity politics. Therefore, the boundaries of identities are questioned since the weakening of nation states and national identities: who are allowed to be 'included' or 'invited in'. How can one claim an ethnic and/or racial identity? In this chapter, I aimed to discuss postmodern identity theories; fluctuating and hybrid identities as well as performativity and performances of cultural identities in everyday life. Therefore, the theory of performativity and performances of identity as well as identity construction via collective memory partially constitutes the theoretical framework of this research. The cultural identity of the Turkish-speaking community in North London will be analysed in everyday contexts using this theoretical framework throughout the analysis chapters. Within the next chapter I am going to discuss my research methodology and methods of data collection.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to unpack the reasons why I chose to conduct ethnographic research to understand how members of the Turkish-speaking community in North London perform their identity through cultural practices in everyday life. My research questions how identity is constituted and maintained in a diasporic environment and asks: how do members of the diaspora negotiate between home and host cultures; how do they reinterpret the cultural landscape to perform identities; and how does collective memory and narration of the past affect the younger generation's sense of belonging?

In order to answer these questions, I conducted ethnographic research which comprised of several different methods; 10 months of ethnographic fieldwork [between 23.09.2015 and 23.07.2016], visiting coffeehouses, off-licences, kebab shops, community centres, mosques and assessing various aspects of cultural life of the community. During my study, I was based in Birmingham but stayed in North London almost every weekend to spend extended time in the field and attend cultural events. Also, during these three years I strolled the streets of North London as a *flâneur* living within the research. I observed everyday life; analysed visual materials and their relation to place and identity. By adopting this broad qualitative empirical approach, I observed the subjects in everyday settings sometimes as a tourist or as a *flaneur,* but always as a fellow member of the Turkish-speaking community.

In addition to observation, I also used oral history to gather experiences and memories of the community. Most members of the community were willing to talk, so I used this opportunity strategically and wrote anonymously the anecdotes or stories narrated spontaneously. I also recruited some of the participants for in-depth interviews, which I

conducted at their work spaces or third places. I photographed home decorations and the clothes of my subjects as well as recording videos of cultural practices, events and rituals in order to understand the use of cultural materials in identity performances.

4.1 Justification of Methodology

4.1.1 'Ethnography is the new black': Why my study is ethnographic

There is a trend in the field of sociology in which researchers use the term 'ethnography' rather than 'participant observation'. Despite calling their method 'participant observation', researchers often mean to include other methods of data collection in addition to observation. These include interviewing, photographing and document analysis. However, it should be noted that not all qualitative research that includes participant observation is ethnography. For example, Nightingale (1989) has criticised ethnographic studies for using only semi-structured interviewing, focus groups and document examination stating that these are not ethnographic methods because they do not involve even a short-lived immersion in the life of a research group. In my study, I spent a significant portion of my time spending extended periods of time within the community thus immersing myself in the ambiance of the research field.

Anthropologists George Marcus and Michael Fischer (1986) define ethnography as a research process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records and engages in the daily life of 'the other cultures'. That 'other cultures' refers to 'exotic', non-Western societies, in early anthropological studies. This mirrors Lévi-Strauss's (1966:126) definition of anthropology as "the science of culture as seen from the outside", which saw early anthropologists recording the differences between the 'other' culture against that of Western civilization. The most well-known figures in anthropology travelled to distant places to study cultures of 'exotic' tribes. For instance, two of the most well-known figures of anthropology, Bronisław Malinowski (1915-18) and Margaret Mead (1925) carried out studies in the Trobriand Islands and Samoa. However, this practice has diminished with the changing

relationship between Westerners and non-Westerners for various reasons such as decolonisation; the disappearance of isolated tribal groups with globalisation and migration waves to the West. Postcolonial theory criticises the polarisation of the west as 'ordered' and 'rational' and the orient as chaotic and irrational. Non-Western anthropologists are trained to carry out ethnography in their native communities, thus postcolonial literature is created which is the literature of otherness and resistance and written with local experience (see Bhabha 1994, Said 2003, Spivak 2008). Anthropologists now study cultures that are closer to their own rather than studying tribes in far-off, 'exotic' lands whose lifestyle is 'primitive' and 'different from us'.

Postcolonial critique of anthropological methods encouraged it to review its philosophy. In response, ethnography emerged as a new type of method. David Fetterman (1998:1) describes ethnography as "the art and science of describing a group or culture". However, Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson's (1995:1) definition is more comprehensive:

> In its most characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating, overly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions- in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research.

Ethnography is a social scientific method used to describe and explore how a cultural group works, what their beliefs are, their traditions, language and behaviour codes. In its traditional use and as characterised by Van Maanen (1988), ethnography is defined as the study of the situation including the collection of data from the research participants at the site of study from a third person's perspective. John Brewer (2000) defines ethnographic study as researching people in naturally occurring settings to capture their ordinary activities and social meanings. The ethnographer gives a detailed report of everyday life of the individuals under study and describes the various categories for cultural description such as social network or relationship

patterns. Ethnographers analyse relational practices, common values and beliefs, and shared experiences of the communities to understand the culture of it (Maso, 2001). They use methods of *participant observation;* taking *field notes* of cultural happenings; interviewing members of the group. They also assess artefacts and visual material such as clothing; and examine texts such as books, films, or photographs, as well as analysing the uses of space and place by the community (Geertz, 1993; Corey, 1996; Goodall, 2001; Lindquist, 2002; Makagon, 2004; Berry, 2005; Denzin, 2006).

My research is ethnographic because my main method of data collection involved living within the community, participating and observing daily life. In that way, I aimed to understand the cultural life of the community and the social meaning behind the settings and practices. Using only an observation method would not have enabled me to provide emic insight. Also, just producing field notes would have only reflected my subjective observation, not the views of the community members. Without interviews this study would not go beyond a simple report about what Turkish-speaking people are doing and the researcher's interpretation of the activities. Therefore, interviews were a *sine qua non* to comprehend social meanings attached to daily practices and the community members' self-perception on identity (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 2004; Ritchie et.al., 2014; Spradley, 2016). What Baudrillard (1988) calls simulation of reality is the current society replacing all reality and meaning with symbols and signs. He sees the 'self' as a pure screen in postmodern conditions. Therefore, analysing an identity performance without photographing any visual material or recording of videos rituals would have resulted in incomplete findings and gaps in the research as use of visuals are one of the most important characteristics of postmodern age.

Despite being a member of the Turkish-speaking community and having an intimate familiarity with the community (in Turkey), I was a latecomer with a lack of social capital within the community in the UK. Therefore, I was easily spotted as a Simmelian *stranger*, both

because of my dress pattern, cultural capital and my lack of previous networking among the group members. According to Simmel's theory the stranger is different than *'the outsider'* or *'the wanderer'. The outsider* has no specific relation to a group and *the wanderer* comes today and leaves tomorrow while *the stranger* comes today and stays tomorrow. The stranger is a member of the group in which he lives and participates and yet remains distant from the 'native' members of the group. In comparison to other forms of social distance and difference (such as class, gender, and even ethnicity) the distance of the stranger has to do with his 'origins' (Simmel, 1964). The stranger is perceived as extraneous to the group and even though he is in constant dialogue with other group members he is distanced and the ability to take a dispassionate view of events and relationships gives him some level of detachment. The stranger combines the seemingly paradoxical qualities of nearness and remoteness. They are connected to the community by only the most general of commonalities (in this case by language and country of origin) yet is still relied on by large groups of people. Oxymoronically, the stranger may also be someone who is a close confidant because their social distance from the group prevents them from judging the group too harshly (For discussion on insider/outsider research see Bonner and Tolhurs, 2002; Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; McNess et al., 2016). For instance, I was connected to the group as I speak Turkish, yet I am not part of North London's Turkish-speaking community. I was a stranger, a new face within the community who was not engaged in group dynamics. I was not allied with or hostile to any fragments of the community. However, among the different segments of the community, I was received differently. Not having any alliances did not make me a confidant or insider. I was perceived as a threat by some members of the community.

In addition to adopting the role of stranger or intimate outsider, while I was strolling on the streets of North London, I was an anonymous face in the urban crowd. Thus, I was a *flâneur,* watching people with a distant and curious eye. When I attended events as an ethnographer, I

was also a *Simmelian* stranger. I was a member of the community, yet I was distant from the 'native' members of the group. In some contexts, I was very welcomed, being offered food and tea generously, which made me feel more like an insider as an autoethnographer. However, in certain contexts being a stranger also put me under the spot light as a potential spy of the Turkish National Intelligence Service collecting information against dissidents of the Turkish State. Considering the Turkish government's current involvement in its diaspora such as profiling and even kidnapping of dissidents abroad via the intelligence service, their concerns were well-grounded (Cakmak, 2018). It became clear during my time in the field that my presence unnerved some members of the community, especially the political groups and Kurdish refugees. Throughout the analysis, you will read variation or even dichotomy of my position as a researcher shifting in different contexts because of the fragmented nature of the field. When I was strolling the streets, I affiliated myself with a more artistic and literary position, a flâneur. It was a deliberate choice to reach an artistic description of daily life in North London. In order to capture the nuance of lived experience, I positioned myself as an autoethnographer from the beginning of the study I was a member of the community during participant observation and attendance of cultural events. Yet, membership of a community does not necessarily mean being a native member of it. At times, I wanted to isolate myself from the community and be a tourist enjoying cosmopolitan London. I did not see these various roles as dichotomous, but as pluralistic perspectives within the study. It also fits with this thesis claims that there is not a monolithic Turkish-speaking community or diaspora experience. My position as a researcher in the field has been constantly renegotiated. I have reflected on my experience of diaspora throughout the analysis chapters. Therefore, these changing epistemological positions enabled my study to represent my multiple experiences in and of the field. Ethnography is not only a field method but also "something you may do, study, use, read or write" (Ellen, 1984). Therefore, writing is an important element of ethnographic study.

Fieldnotes or diaries provide enormous amounts of data to the ethnographer and play an important role as *aide-mémoires*.

It is not possible to observe every aspect of a group's social life and, informants fill this niche. If the data collected from the informants via interviews is a solicited account, then the data collected without a direct request from the ethnographer is an unsolicited account (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). During the time, I spent in the field I interacted with members of the community and they provided me with information about themselves and the community after they learnt what I was studying. I recorded them as anecdotes. I have written a couple of hundreds of pages of fieldnotes and diary extracts which are made up of these anecdotes, my observations and comments.

4.1.2 Is it academic to be part of the story: Why autoethnography?

Most sociologist and other social scientists problematise their own experiences with their sociological imagination. For instance, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was born in the South French countryside to a lower-middle class family where French is spoken with the Béarnese dialect. Bourdieu climbed up the social ladder via his education and entered the academically elite *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris (Breslau, 2002). In his master piece *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* which was published in 1979, he analyses the class system in French society embedded in the cultural field. Drawing on his own experiences Bourdieu discusses the importance of education and language dialect as well as taste in the form of cultural capital, all contributing to a definition of class distinction.

Following this social science tradition of self-reflection, I understand my particular ethnic identity to be central to the way that I interpret the world around me. My research interest started with my family's migration story. As outlined in the introduction, I grew up in an immigrant household where the stories and songs that were heard told of the lost and distant homeland *Selanik* (Thessaloniki, Greece). As such my (collective) memory is shaped by these

stories and narration of a past I never knew. Under the influence of French existentialist philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's nihilism I started questioning the identity I inherited from my parents and the identity I perform within society. That ebb and flow reflected on the field study where I sometime felt myself as an indigenous member of the community, sometime as a *Simmelian* stranger, or an ethnographer. Later in life, my existential and philosophical questionings developed into an academic interest and sociological queries. Thus, I am using my own experiences to study others and analyse social conditions. During the field study, I asked questions to the participants that I have been asking of myself. I reflected on my own experience of diaspora and identity comparing it with that of research participants.

It is commonly discussed in public discourse, if not that much in academia, that people who live outside of their native culture lose certain characteristics that their fellow nationals living in their native land maintain. After spending a year living in Netherlands within its Turkish community, I decided to look closer into diasporic identities. I started researching the perception of self and the changing description of self-identity around the concepts of culture, sense of belonging and memory such as hyperreal references to 'glorious' imperial past of Turkey. Therefore, I designed my research study as self-consciously value-centred rather than alluding to it being falsely objective.

Hammersley and Atkinson (1983:128) states that "Most events in our own society and especially settings with which we are familiar seem 'natural' and 'obvious'. We have already learned the culture and we find few things problematic". So how can researchers conduct ethnographies of their 'own community'? Or in what sense does the ethnographic research that is conducted by an indigenous insider of the community differ from an outsider researcher's study? Defining a researcher as an indigenous insider is tricky especially in a research project about postmodern identity performances. According to Lewis (1973:599) the outsider-insider

difference in ethnographic study is "not so much a dichotomy as a continuum". My perception of 'native' or an 'indigenous insider' ethnographer is of someone having a decent amount of knowledge of the research group they are assessing and their culture as well as communicating with their language or as David M. Hayano (1979) defines it, 'the ability to be accepted to some degree or to pass a native member'. Therefore, I adopted some aspects of what is called autoethnography.

Autoethnography is a method used by contemporary social scientists that is characterised by using a more self-reflexive approach to research, fieldwork, and writing, as well as exploring the researcher's personal experience and connecting to the wider cultural and political context. Thus, it introduces a unique perspective to identity construction (Maréchal 2010; Butz and Besio 2009; Crang 2005; Ellis 2004; Ellis and Bochner 2000; Meneley and Young 2005; Reed-Danahay 1997). *Autoethnography* is a research and writing method that combines characteristics of *autobiography* and *ethnography* and aims to understand cultural experience through systematic analysis of personal experience (Ellis, 2004; Ellis et.al. 2011; Holman-Jones, 2005). It challenges canonical methods of conducting research by representing the research subject and researcher-audience-text relation (Spry, 2001). David M. Hayano (1979) defines autoethnography as "conducting and writing ethnographies of their own people." Ellis (2004:31-32) observes that it is "part *auto* or self and part *ethno* or culture" and "something different from both of them, greater than its parts". Autoethnography rejects the binary oppositions of the researcher vs. the researched, objectivity vs. subjectivity, process vs. product, self vs. others, and art vs. science (see Ellingson and Ellis 2008).

As Hayano (1979) defines it the written style of most of auto-ethnographies is not problem oriented but holistic and descriptive. In Herbert Blumer's (1956) words auto-ethnographers describe the full picture and breadth of *their* people. Or if I use Clifford Geertz's (1993)

terminology autoethnographers, produce aesthetic 'thick descriptions' of personal and interpersonal experience.

There are different types of autoethnography, the most common example demonstrates how ethnographers study the cultural or social group that they belong to, which is the most obvious defining characteristic of their identity. Everett C. Hughes (1945) defines this belonging as their 'master status'. Sherri Cavan's (1972) study about hippie groups in San Francisco or Manisha Roy's (1975) research on Bengali women are useful examples of how the researcher study the community they are belonged to. The second type of autoethnography is that carried out by ethnographers on the groups they have intimate familiarity with. For example, Thomas Michael Walle's (2013 and 2014) assessment of Norway's Pakistani community and their identity construction around cricket are written from the perspective of a researcher who has intimate familiarity with the researched group. Different than autoethnography, in ethnography and anthropology researchers could have a strong knowledge about the community, but they cannot be considered as native unless they have these certain kinds of links (Spry, 2001; Ellis, 2004; Jones, 2005; Butz and Besio, 2009; Marechal, 2010). For instance, Malinowski would not be accepted as an indigenous insider in Trobriand island society or Mead would not be considered as native by the Indian tribes of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia as they lack this 'master status' identity or intimate familiarity with their research groups. However, the boundaries are ambiguous as there is no regulation that asserts who can carry out autoethnography and who cannot. My emphasis is on the fact that the researcher should hold the characteristics of a permanent group identity or be recognised as an internal member by the community in order to conduct an accurate autoethnography. As the research group is defined by spoken language and country of origin, I was recognised as an insider because of speaking Turkish and coming from Turkey. Yet, I was not an indigenous member of the community as I have different cultural aspects in my identity and Turkish identity is not my master status.

In (auto)ethnography, intensive participant observation in the field is the most crucial part of the research. Thus, I spent 10 months in the field until I reached a high level of data saturation. Saturation is defined as "no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop the properties of the category" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 61).The classical social scientific methods in which the researcher enters a culture, exploits cultural members, and then leaves the field, disregarding relational ties to the group members, merely writing about their culture for sole career benefit are criticised in literature. Auto-ethnographers appreciate and keep interpersonal connections with the community members they study post-research fieldwork as they are part of the community.

In European and American institutions, social scientists of foreign background tend to study an aspect of their ethnic origin state or community. It is very common among Turkish social scientists in Europe researching on the Turkish immigrants in Europe, especially in Germany (see Soysal, 2004; Ceylan, 2017; Yanasmayan, 2017). So how would I avoid falling into a repetitive research cycle? First of all, my research is about postmodern identity performances and Turkey itself is not the core of my research study. The Turkish-speaking community of London has been selected as a case study for various reasons: the Turkish community in Britain is under-researched; I have a full access to the community and can therefore reflect an emic perspective due to my special position within the community as both a member and Simmelian stranger. This means that I have clear advantages over my non-Turkish colleagues working in a similar research field due to my subtle and deep knowledge about the culture. Despite a common perception in academia in Turkey about Turkish diaspora in Europe, the Turkish-speaking community of Britain is under-researched and there are not many publications that discuss their cultural identity, especially focusing on second and third generations. My research aims to cover that niche in social sciences literature. As Hayano (1979) claims, some field locations are not that easily accessible to non-native researchers. For instance, Abdulla M.

Lutfiyya (1966) wrote about the ethnography of a Jordanian village where he grew up. Even though he had the advantage of being a native member, he was suspected of being a spy by some members of his community. So, in these kinds of field locations, conducting research is more difficult for an outside researcher because of the social and political context.

I chose North London's Turkish community instead of another city as it is the biggest Turkish community in the UK in number. My research is auto-ethnographic as I am member of the Turkish-speaking community and I have intimate familiarity with the community even though Turkish identity is not my master status. I have never defined myself as Turkish or belonged to any ethnic group due to both my family background and existential questioning as a subject in postmodern conditions. I used the advantage of having the linguistic skills in Turkish and a familiarity with customs in my cultural baggage as well as being part of the community life. Yet, at times I alienated myself from the community by identifying as a citizen of the world. Therefore, during the field study I negotiated between insider and outsider roles.

4.1.3 Postmodern study: Why were my interviews semi-structured?

Some scholars criticise studies using only semi-structured interviewing of not being ethnographic due to lack of a short-lived immersion in the life of a research group (see Nightingale 1989). Yet, living within the research group is not enough to comprehend all the aspects of community life. For instance, the body movement in an ethnic dance performance or costume can be described by observation. But the true meaning attached to them can only be understood by asking the holder of that object and the performer. Hence an interview method is a complimentary part of ethnographic study and it fills the gap in the details. An interview is a method of collecting data from a subject or a group by asking questions in a face-to-face situation, on the phone, by postal mail or by computer. Depending on the level of control the researcher exercises over the research subjects' responses there are three broad types of interview. These are; structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews. The first two

types are differing from each other with use or not use of a pre-set list of questions and instructions by the interviewers. Structured interviews are easy to replicate and quick to conduct but prevents the researcher from communicating freely with key informants and produces gaps in the details (Bernard, 2006; Bryman 2012; Spradley, 2016). In unstructured interviews, researchers do not have any formal structure or set questions, giving the participants free rein and the ability to explain things in their own terms, often providing the researcher with in-depth data (Bernard, 2006; Bryman 2012; Spradley, 2016). However, it is very time consuming and often produces too much detail and even some unnecessary data which is hard to structure into a theme or pattern. As Bernard (2006:212) argues semi-structured interviews have "much of the freewheeling quality of unstructured interviewing, and requires all the same skills, but semi-structured interviewing is based on the use of an interview guide." (The interview guide is a written list of questions and topics to be covered during the interview however, it is less rigid than an interview schedule used in structured interviews. Questions can be asked in different orders or/and new questions may emerge during the flow of conversation, while some questions can be eliminated during the interview. Therefore, it gives both the researchers and the participants the flexibility to discuss new topic areas but also keeps them on track with the help of the interview guide. Thus, each subject is discussed around the same themes in the participants own terms and pace. (Bernard, 2006; Bryman 2012, Spradley 2016)

Being a member of the research community enables me to understand cultural interpretation of visual material. However, in order to avoid presumptions and being biased by overfamiliarity with the research area, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews and asked the participants about their self-description of identity, and the meaning they attribute to performative actions and objects. Semi-structured design allowed both the participants and I to discuss new aspects of the research issue in a spontaneous order (Bernard, 2006; Bryman 2012; Spradley, 2016). I asked additional questions to some participants whenever it would trigger

a new discussion or open another dimension to my research questions. For instance, young participants mentioned that their parents who lived in London were stricter and more protective than their relatives living back in Turkey or Cyprus. So, I asked more about it to explore further which will be presented in my results analysis. Furthermore, women participants mentioned their experiences of living in a patriarchal community. As these topics triggered a new direction to the discussion, I asked them about their experiences regarding dating and marriage.

In this research, semi-structured in-depth interviews have been conducted with those chosen from informal conversation and following their consent to be recorded. I aimed to collect detailed data from the informants and explore the identity construction experiences of the group members. Collective memory is an important component of identity construction and transmission. Migration stories are the most significant part of the collective memory of immigrant groups. Because of this factor, during interviews I asked the first-generation participants about their migration experiences and asked the second and third generations how migration stories were narrated back to them.

Interviews were held in natural settings such as at coffee houses on street corners, community centres or other social spaces. Some of the interviews were conducted at the research subjects' houses or places of work. Before the interviews, subjects were asked which language they would feel more comfortable with expressing their ideas in and talking about their feelings thus the interviews were adjusted accordingly. Switching from one language to another during the conversations was very common. First-generation migrants tended to speak in Turkish, however they did use some words in English most of which were job related. On the other hand, second and third generation migrants mostly spoke English but used some Turkish words especially when it came to topics related with religion and Turkish culture. I did not meet with any subject that spoke only Kurdish therefore I did not need an interpreter.

4.1.4 Visual methods: 'Photograph it or it did not happen'

Visual cultural materials are used as a complementary part of identity performances. Wearing costumes in rituals or accessorises in daily life as well as the use of ornaments as home decorations are some examples of these performances. In addition, one of the most important aspects of the postmodern age is the rise in the display of images (Murray, 2015). According to current research, more pictures are taken every two minutes than were taken throughout the 1800s and we take more than 380 billion photos a year (Nov et al., 2009; Kesselman, 2014). Approximately 140 billion photos have been uploaded to the online social platform Facebook which is 10,000 times the number of photos held in the Library of Congress (2012).[6] People photograph what they eat and share it on social media to pursue distinction with their taste or present pictorial forms of identity and self. Therefore, it was inevitable for me as an ethnographer to use visual methods and record visual cultural materials as part of this research.

Visual methods or visual ethnography, as Sarah Pink (2001) states, enables the pairing of narrative with photographs and video to assist the researcher in documenting and symbolizing the self-representations of the participants. Visual methods allow researchers to gain a deep understanding of how identity interacts with the place. Pink (2001:51) argues that:

> [T]here are no fixed criteria that determine which photographs are ethnographic. Any photograph may have ethnographic interest, significance or meanings at a particular time or for a specific reason. The meanings of photographs are arbitrary and subjective; they depend on who is looking. The same photographic image may have a variety of (perhaps conflicting) meanings invested in it at different stages of ethnographic research and representation, as it is viewed by different eyes and audiences in diverse temporal historical, spatial, and cultural contexts.

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[6] For more information see: https://www.buzzfeed.com/hunterschwarz/how-many-photos-have-been-taken-ever-6zgv?utm_term=.ac97AOB6m#.riAVablEk
https://fstoppers.com/other/stats-how-many-photos-have-ever-been-taken-5173

I used visual methods to develop a stronger understanding of how the self is presented, how identity is performed and to reach what Geertz (1993) calls a 'thick description' of rituals in community life. Geertz (1993) defines *thick description* as explaining not just the behaviour, but its context as well which includes the way the behaviour becomes meaningful to an outsider. In this research, visuals aided my understanding the performance in its context. Also, they are taken by me thus they reflect the researcher's point of view and how behaviours become meaningful to the researcher. Observations included making video records and taking photographs of the street views, coffee houses and restaurants, as well as recording celebrations. The visual records I took focused on how identity is displayed and performed through dress codes, decorations or behaviour cycles. I photographed accessories the members of the community wear, the ornaments used as decorations in homes and restaurants, spatial arrangements in third spaces, street views, and interior designs of the community and religious centres. I also video recorded rituals such as prayers, *mewlid* and *semah*; ceremonies, which included weddings and funerals; and celebrations such as *Newroz* festival, Anatolian Fete, and Eid Reception. I captured some stills from these video records and used them in my analysis.

4.1.5 The Flâneur Researcher and the WalkingMethod

Use of space and cultural landscape is an important aspect of identity performances. In order to gain deep insight into the daily life of my research subjects and immerse myself in the local conditions, I spent a significant portion of my time 'walking through' the chosen neighbourhoods. In order to analyse the identity performances and cultural practices in the spatial context, I adopted the *flâneur* researcher role. "*Flâneur*" can be translated from French as stroller, idler or walker (Collins Dictionary, Larousse Dictionary; Benjamin, 1983). In literature, *flâneur* has been portrayed as a wealthy, educated, idle man strolling the streets of Paris (see Baudelaire 1964; Benjamin 2002). In some texts, a *flâneur* is described as someone who is unnoticed by others and remains an anonymous face in the crowd. Thus, it helps him to

consider the people and the objects he passes by as texts. As Burton (1994:1) claims, the *flâneur* as an observer is both active and intellectual. The *flâneur* participates physically in the text that he observes but he is distant to the crowd and observes them with a "cool but curious eye" (Rignall, 1989:112). *The flâneur* is distant to the crowd in terms of his temporary relationship with but still empathise with them. The *flâneur* has the ability to float freely in the present tense as Mellencamp claims (1988), due to their role both as protagonist and audience.

The *flâneur* is physically positioned within a context. However, their civil inattention is supported with a cool glance that gives them the ability to look at the crowd from the outside. In this way, their positioning is ambiguous. In its traditional meaning, the *flâneur* looks for a solution to the ever-threatening ennui/boredom. The *flâneur* is enthusiastic in observation like a detective without a lead. Baudelaire (1964) states that *the flâneur* strolls at leisure, observes people, building facades, objects for sale, entertains and enriches his mind with the secret language of the city.

In my case, I was both an anonymous face and a member of the community. While I was strolling the streets of North London, I was an anonymous face in the cosmopolitan crowd. Despite of temporality of my relationship with the community, I was able to empathise with them as I come from same home country and speak Turkish, which defines me as a member of the researched community. In order to describe the scenery of everyday life artistically and to avoid overfamiliarity, I adopted *flâneur* position. Yet, when I attended to cultural events of the community or when I recruited people for interviews, I was using my insider position as an autoethnographer. As such I was also performing an identity: a Turkish-speaking researcher. Therefore, the tension between different roles was always there and I renegotiated my identity in the field.

The performance of walking, wandering or window shopping, the activity of passers-by, are important aspects of city life and give diverse meaning to places. The urban text and everyday practices can be read within the operation of walking. In *The Practice of Everyday Life* de Certeau analyses the production of urban space and the way it is experienced and written as a text by walking through the everyday practices of a city's inhabitants. He associates the physical act of walking with writing as space organised by the spatial order and written texts as being organised by the grammar of a language. Walking is perceived as the embodied form of experiencing urban space. De Certeau (1984:93) investigates the spatial logics of the urban in everyday life and cultural consumption. As he claims the walk is an elementary form of experience of the city. The ordinary practitioners of the city are walkers, what he calls '*wandersmanner*' whose body follows the urban text they write without being read. While we are walking in the streets and interacting with people, we engage in various networks without knowing it. De Certeau (1984) considers walking in the city as in search of a '*proper*' and acting out of place, being a lack of place. David Pinder (2001) claims that walking is a highly specific experience that will differ according to the mood and circumstances of each person on a particular day. It cannot be experienced by different people in the same way. Michel de Certeau's 'pedestrian speech acts' considers the act of walking as 'improvisation' a literal 'spatial acting-out of the place' in which walkers go beyond 'constructed order'. Brian Morris (2004) criticises de Certeau as providing an overly simplified top-down model of power consisting of a set of binaries: the official versus the every day, the authorities versus the ordinary people, the symbolic versus the unconscious, strategies versus tactics, and compliance versus resistance. In this ethnographic research, the *flâneur* researcher position was adopted to satisfy my intense desire as a researcher to comprehend the community life; analyse social interactions and provide a snapshot of everyday cultural life in London. The walking method also gave a dynamic dimension to carrying out the field work and enabled me to see daily life

in a geographically vast field (see O'Neill and Roberts, 2017). Adopting the role of the *flâneur* enabled me to gain insight into the ebb and flow of the neighbourhoods. It both includes quick glances of the Turkish speaking people in their daily life with an etic look and understanding their performances from an emic perspective while I participated in their daily life. I collected notes and reflections from urban life to analyse and reach a *thick description* about community life.

In order to avoid being a full member of the community which has its roots in my existential questionings, I stepped backed, watched people with a distant and curious eye, strolled at the streets of North London, and spent my time in their cafés like a dandy author in Paris. The difference is that I was not in upmarket neighbourhoods like Montparnasse, but I was sat in nameless 'underground' coffee houses in the far less wealthy Hackney borough. During these moments, I was not positioned as a member of the community but as a bohemian writer.

4.1.6 Is Value Neutrality Ever Possible in Social Research?

In the 1980s, postmodernism triggered a crisis of confidence in the social sciences as scholars started to discuss the limitations of social research. Thomas Kuhn (1996) pointed out the paradigms that scientists use is the inseparable part of 'facts' and 'truths' that scientists 'found'. What the researcher looks for and how they interpret it dependent on not only the paradigms but also the values and beliefs of the researcher. Personal experiences also influence the research process in various ways. For instance, in my research area, some scholars define the Turkish-speaking community as a Muslim group and base their research on that parameter. As a result, their findings present the community as a religiously-defined group which overlooks the secular cultural identity (Kucukcan, 1999). Some others present it as a unified group sharing the same destiny and carrying the same aims, living in solidarity, which underestimates the intra-group conflicts (Kucukcan, 1999). On the other hand, some scholars handle the Kurdish community within the Kurdish Diaspora and present the disputes and

conflicts within the Turkish-speaking community but ignore the fact that most of the Kurds that migrated from Turkey have a more intense level of relationship with ethnic Turks rather than Iraqi or Iranian Kurds (Demir, 2012). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the fact that what the researcher finds is limited by his/her experience and stance.

After lengthy discussion about objectivity in social sciences it is now accepted that despite applying any methods or research techniques, objectivity in social research is improbable. The researcher's role and position in society, and past experiences as well as their world view make entirely objective knowledge improbable in social research. The choice of an issue to problematise, the study approach taken and reporting on the research findings are influenced by personal factors such as social class, gender, political affiliations and so forth. In order to keep value neutrality and a certain level of detachment from the community, ethnographers adopt different strategies. Morris Freilich (1970) calls this attempt being the 'marginal native'. In that sense, the pluralistic socio-cultural background of my family helped me to emotionally detach and feel uninvolved with my natal community. However, I do not claim to be objective or value neutrality as I do not believe that it is ever possible. The interpretation of same events and phenomena could vary and even contradict with each other depending on the indigenous insider researcher's position within the community. Throughout my fieldwoek and analysis I have always kept in mind that I am looking from one perspective and try to avoid the bias of being too familiar with the researched culture. I use an ethnographic reflexivity and adopt a multi-dimensional view of things. Also, I keep in mind that there are certain disadvantages of conducting autoethnography including over-looking observation, blindness to some daily activities, and taking for granted assumptions about some behaviour due to my close familiarity with the field (see also, Lewis 1973, Hayano 1979).

The dichotomy between scientific detachment and bias comes from personal beliefs and values of the researcher and comes into play again in the process of interpreting and reporting

data. Naturally, being an insider puts the researcher into a position within the community which automatically brings opposition and bias towards some other members, especially if the community is as big and diverse as the Turkish-speaking community. Therefore, because of my birthplace, accent and appearance I was positioned in a certain place within the community, and I was reminded of my cultural-political baggage which was with me all the time. There are certain characteristics that a researcher cannot neutralise for instance; I was born in the western province of Turkey into a family that has European descents and I was educated in good schools. I could not be accepted as indigenous by some fragments within the community such as by the Kurdish and Alevi groups as their group identity is based on certain ethnic links tied with regionalism. Inevitably just like everybody else, I was under influence of my experiences and primary socialisation.

So how would I describe members of certain groups? Would I describe them as criminals, terrorists, far-right extremist, freedom-fighters or patriots? When I went to a *Newroz* celebration, which is the most important national and cultural day for Kurdish people, an event that is also highly politicised, I saw children dressed in PKK 'guerrilla' costumes what I could identify because as I was growing up I used to be dressed in soldier costumes and made to carry Turkish flags on Turkish national days possibly because my parents wanted to provide social acceptance for me within Turkish society. I describe the context that I faced at the *Newroz* celebration as 'reflection symmetry' because I was taught that PKK guerrillas are terrorists and Turkish soldiers are heroes, whereas I found that these children were taught to idealise PKK guerrillas as freedom fighter heroes and Turkish soldiers as fascist oppressors. It was an ideological decision that I had to make, and I decided to use legal definitions. I defined the community as Turkish-speaking because it is the legal definition of the group recorded by the Home Office in the UK. Likewise, the PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by the European Union, therefore I used that legal term. However, I could not define people that I met in North

London as 'terrorists' because they are unarmed and non-violent people singing national songs, waving their 'flag' and dancing the *halay*. They were people whom I sat with and we drank tea together. It would be an ideological bias even if I call them terrorist supporter/sympathisers which is the official discourse in the mainstream Turkish media. Therefore, regardless of which group they are supporting I preferred to define these people based on their actions I observe and interactions with me. Thus, I defined them as them pro-Kurdish or Kurdish nationalists.

4.1.7 Choices Why did I observe certain events but not others?

Participant observation refers to participating in the life of the people one is studying, to understand the culture from 'native' perspective while trying to stay detached. It is an uneasy combination of risks of field-blindness and biases. I have chosen to study the complexities of the everyday life of my own culture which increases the risk of field-blindness. However, I also spent much of my time studying relatively unfamiliar subcultures of the Turkish-speaking community in North London. Therefore, when I arrived in North London, I have let the community direct me in the field, because I was participating in their lives rather than they were participating in my research. Thus, all the events I observed were events and places where I was allowed to attend and invited by the native community. During one of my first interviews with Turkish Cypriots, the theme of attending a religious cultural ceremony called *mevlid* emerged. Then I was invited to attend a *mevlid* event in Haringey which I accepted without hesitation. An attempt to understand a social group's way of life, beliefs and values requires an active involvement. Later, members of the community mentioned the importance of the weekend school and cultural events at Turkish mosques which also complies with what Kucukcan (1999) claims. Therefore, I visited Turkish mosques to understand reconstruction of Turkish culture in North London. While I was familiar with *mevlid* events and mosques as religious space, I did not attend these events and spaces because their practices complied with my life style or what I used to in do in Turkey, nor was I particularly looking for religious

aspects of the community life. Instead, I recognised the importance of these events and spaces for some community members and included them in my research.

Participant observation helped me to comprehend how cultural forms and practices are used in identity construction such as, dress, food, religious rituals and symbols. For instance, traditional clothes are not just consumption objects for diasporic communities but identity-constructing objects that are embodied when worn. Some cultural practices are performed just on particular occasions i.e. *halay* dance performed at weddings, *ağıt* songs at funerals. I aimed to find the meaning of cultural forms and practices from the eye of the community members themselves by participating in community life.

During my research I was often asked by people which group I was specifically looking at among the Turkish-speaking community. I think this question includes the presumption that I would not be interested in or be allowed in some segments of the community. Some of the members of the community such as Kurdish academics tried to convince me to focus only on Turkish migrants and leave Kurdish and Alevi diaspora out. This attitude refers to a claim of monopoly over the space and research subject. However, I ignored the barriers that some people established for me and actively participated in the field. I visited *Cemevi* because some participants defined it as the heart of the Alevi community. Therefore, an analysis of the Alevi diaspora would be incomplete if I had not visited *Cemevi* and attend a *cem* ceremony in order to understand how Alevi identity is performed.

Literature on Kurdish cultural identity states that *Newroz* is a key event for the members of the community (see Yanik, 2006; Tursun, 2014; Baser, 2015b). I visited the Kurdish community centres as I was directed by my gatekeepers to these spaces where Kurdish people gather. During interviews, Kurdish interviewees emphasised the importance of *Newroz* for

them (Mahir, Rojda, Guler). In this aspect, the field matches with what literature on Kurdish diaspora suggest.

In line with the classical ethnographic field studies I planned to attend Eid celebrations and weddings. As they are two of the most customary celebrations among the Turkish-speaking community, as an ethnographer I would not avoid participating in them. Therefore, attendance of events unfolded naturally through my interactions with members of the community. For instance, during interviews, a few of the participants mentioned weddings and their importance for the community. Thus, when a friend of mine invited me to his wedding I was eager to attend both in my capacity as a researcher and a friend of the groom. The field proved that weddings are very private events and only open to friends and families. To be more precise, I was declined access to a Kurdish wedding despite going there with reference from my gatekeeper. Thus, I attended another wedding instead where I was invited.

When it comes to Eid celebrations, I came to the UK with the knowledge in my cultural luggage that Eid celebrations were an important part of Turkish culture. Therefore, I choose to observe these events to see how they were celebrated in diaspora.

When I was designing my research plan, I did not have the slightest intention to watch oil wrestling, sword and shield dances or listen to *Mehteran* band and present it as Turkish identity. I only aimed to immerse into the field, participating in cultural events. When I saw on the billboards of the community centres and mosques that Anatolian Cultural Festival was going to take place in Clissold Park, I decided to attend. Although, some of the practices at the festival were displays of what I call an uber-belonging, that event represents cultural identity performances of a certain group among the Turkish-speaking community. No matter how pretentious it was, I could not have ignored the celebration of Turkish culture in a big park at the middle of London.

There are different approaches for the role of a researcher in field studies. Bryman (2012) lists them according to the involvement and detachment in the field as follows: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant and complete observer. *The complete participant* refers to the researcher being fully part of the setting, posing as 'ordinary members' and often observing covertly. The *observer as a participant* refers to the case when the researcher has only minimal involvement in the social setting being studied (see Gold 1958; Junker, 1960; Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Bryman 2012). In this research study, the observer as participant role has been adopted when attending cultural events. Yet, there have been times where I was the complete participant thus observation was not the overt or main purpose but the secondary function. For instance, when I was contemplating in a Turkish mosque, or having dinner at a Turkish restaurant in north London after a tiring day in the field, I was the complete participant which also provided me some field data.

I observed my research subjects and made interviews in their 'third spaces'. These are defined as social spaces where they spend time outside of home or work. Religious rituals are one of the most important aspects of the reproduction of identity especially for Turkish-speaking immigrants as they are from a Muslim background living in a Christian country. In a diaspora space when a Muslim migrant community encounters a Christian community, the references to Islamic identity becomes more prominent (Werbner, 2002a; Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2012; Hacket, 2013). Therefore, regardless of whether they practice daily prayer or not, they try to keep their Muslim identity and see it as an indicator of not being assimilated or degenerated. In this way, Islamic identity creates 'bright boundaries' separating Muslims from their host society (Alba, 2005). In addition to that, the Alevi community experienced suppression and even numbers of pogroms in Turkey because their sect is heterodox. Most of the Alevi diaspora in Europe is a result of these suppressions (Keles, 2014). Therefore, keeping and performing Alevi identity is crucial for the members of the community. Also, on special

days of the Islamic calendar such as Eid, Muslim identity is emphasised within the group. Thus, I visited holy places for the Turkish-speaking community in London which includes mosques for Sunni/mainstream Muslims and Cemevi for Alevis. I attended religious ceremonies, rituals and celebrations such as Eid Prayers and celebrations which are the two most important days for Muslims, celebrated annually. The *Cem* ritual which is the main prayer form for the Alevi community is different to Salah which is performed in mainstream or Sunni sect in Islam. *Iftars* which are fast-breaking dinners in Ramadan mark a time in which community members gather and again this is performed by Sunni Muslims. By attending these, I aimed to see how religious identity performed in the diaspora context and what importance is attributed to each event.

I attended cultural events including festivals such as the *Newroz* and *Anatolian Cultural Fete*. The first one is the most important festival for the Kurdish community and is celebrated as a national day in order to praise Kurdish cultural identity. Like *Cem* rituals, *Newroz* has been banned several times by Turkish authorities during its history. Therefore, it is performed as a form of demonstration and is even embedded in Middle Eastern and Central Asian culture. Today it is highly politicised and transformed into a brand mark of Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, the *Anatolian Cultural Fete* is a Turkish culture festival where traditional and local food from Turkish cuisine is sold. Turkish music is played and cultural performances such as traditional Turkish shadow plays (*Karagöz ve Hacivat*) and oil wrestling (*Yağlı güreş*) are performed. The festival praises Turkish culture and a number of artists and artisans from Turkey come to London to attend this festival. Even though the festival is not politically motivated like *Newroz,* there are political references such as praise of the Ottoman State marked by a performance from the Ottoman Arm Band (*Mehteran*) along with the abundant use of the Turkish flag. By attending these cultural events, I aimed to observe performances of culture and the flagging of nationalism or national identity in a diasporic environment. I also

attended a wedding and a funeral as these are significant events for identity performance where culture and religion are interwoven.

I also investigated space and place to analyse identity performances. I not only strolled the streets but also visited community centres which play a key role in the continuum of cultural identity and transmission of it to younger generations. Coffee houses (*kahvehanes*) are an imperative third space for male socialisation, while kebab restaurants are one of the logos of Turkish culture for anyone with an external gaze, and Turkish shops are where traditional products and Turkish brands are sold. I aimed to analyse how space is used in identity performance, how social interactions happen among the community members and which products are prioritised and eulogised.

'Getting in', 'staying in' and 'getting out' are key moments in ethnographic research. There are stories about the difficulty and disappointment of leaving the research field and ending the relationship with the participants. In my case, I did not leave the field; I am staying in touch with them not only in personal capacity but also as an academic and as a Turkish-speaking expatriate living in the UK.

4.3 Research Field

Ethnographic fieldwork in an urban context has its own challenges in defining the borders of the field especially when the geographical area is vast like London and the population is large. Defining the geographic boundaries does not limit my fieldwork but provide a vantage point from where my research questions will be traced.

Leisure activities are often a crucial signifier of taste and can be where people pursue individual distinction from the masses. The third space (see Oldenburg, 1996) where people spend time together, or as an individual in a collective space is an important aspect of community life and identity performance and is crucial in conducting this doctoral research. A

barber shop, a mosque or a community centre could be a third space for a member of the Turkish-speaking diaspora. The decoration of such spaces, activities and rituals people conduct or participate in at these spaces are significantly important. The sense of belonging to a landscape, a historical narration and/or third spaces' role in identity construction and reconstruction needs to be considered.

According to the 2011 Census from the Office for National Statistics the boroughs in which the Turkish-speaking community is more likely to be found in larger numbers are: Hackney, Haringey, Enfield, Islington, Waltham Forest, Lewisham, Southwark, Barnet, Croydon, Greenwich and Redbridge. Due to the time constraints of PhD study I had to limit my field work to the following six districts of North London, where the density of the Turskish-speaking population is the highest. These six areas are: Barnet, Enfield, Hackney, Haringey, Islington, and Waltham Forest.

Figure 3: Map of London Boroughs

London is a multilingual city in which English is the main language. However, only 78% of Londoners speak English as a first language in comparison to 92% across the rest of England and Wales. Turkish is one of the 20 most reported majority languages spoken in England and Wales.[7] The table below shows in which boroughs Turkish is the most frequently spoken:

**Location Quotient
Main Language**

- 0 - 0.5
- >0.5 - 1
- >1 - 3
- >3 - 6
- >6 - 12
- >12

Table 2: Location Quotient of Turkish Language [8]

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[7] See 2011 Census by Office for National Statistics table QS204EW for Main language (detailed) http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/2011censusquickstatisticsforenglandandwales/2013-01-30#main-language.

[8] Adam Dennett 'London's Changing Population'. (http://adamdennett.co.uk/2013/04/08/londons-changing-population/ , 19 April 2017). Original data sourced from 'Home Office 2011 Census', Office for National

4.4 Research Sample

During the sampling process of my research, I had theoretical considerations rather than statistical. After sixteen interviews, I identified the main categories. I conducted five more interviews and saw that the new data supported the previous themes. But in order to balance overall gender distribution I recruited eight more female interviews which have led to data saturation.

Therefore, in total I conducted interviews with twenty-nine people. Fourteen of the interviewees were first-generation, twelve of them were second-generation, and three of them are third generation. Nine of the participants were from the first wave of Turkish migration, five of them from the second wave, eleven of them from the third wave and four of them from the fourth wave. Overall, eight of the research participants were Turkish Cypriot, eleven of them were Turkish and ten of them were Kurdish (see Appendix 1). With this sampling, I aimed to avoid underrepresentation of any group.

The selection criterion is based on the objectives of the research and involvement/interaction with British culture. Thus, only those members of the community who have been living in the UK for at least ten years were invited to take part in interviews however, others were included in the participant observations.

4.5 Access to Field and the Boundaries

Involvement in the lives of the research group and access to the social life of the community is the most essential part of an ethnographic study. It is not an easy process to capture even though one studies his or her own group, especially if the research group is as big and diverse as the Turkish-speaking community. The field that the ethnographer is trying to get access to

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Statistics, Main language (detailed). Table REF. QS204EW
(https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/qs204ew).

can be a formal setting such as a school or informal such as a religious cult or a subculture group such as a crime gang. The most well-known way of accessing a field is by using a gatekeeper as well as personal contacts. In my study, my language skills and being classed as member of the researched community made my access to the field easier. However, the risk of being seen as a spy was always there especially among the political dissidents. My gender identity enabled me to access male-dominated, public and semi-public spaces such as coffeehouses and religious institutions. However, it was also a drawback because as a male researcher, I faced barriers in approaching Muslim/pious women. In the Turkish-speaking community interaction with the opposite-sex strangers is limited especially among conservative groups. I conducted most of my fieldwork in public and semi-public spaces as that my research could have been dominated by male voices. Therefore, in order to avoid this bias, I approached Turkish-speaking women with the help of male participants and gatekeepers.

Furthermore, marital status and age created another barrier. In Turkey, some restaurants allocate different parts of their venue for singles and families. So, clients who come without a female partner cannot access the *'Aile Salonu'* (family saloon). The same practice has been transferred to the UK and some Turkish restaurants separate their venues accordingly. I observed it in a few restaurants in North London such as Nehir Restaurant in Enfield. Furthermore, some activities within the community life such as visiting each other's homes during Eid are practiced by families only. In general, the home is a very private space in the community and it is not open to strangers especially to single men. Therefore, I could not conduct any house visits except visiting the houses of my friends as anticipated at the beginning of the research. In addition, one family invited me to their house for dinner and whilst there I conducted an interview. They also invited one of their relatives, who is a police officer, to their house. So, during my presence at the house she was effectively checking whether I was conducting espionage.

Despite being a member of the community, maintaining an objective approach to all political, religious and ethnic groups within the community, I faced the issue of confidentiality during the field work especially during my contact with political groups. Some people were sceptical about my research as they thought I might be a spy from the Turkish Intelligence Service. For instance, before I visited the Kurdish Community Centre where Kurdish nationalists, pro-Kurdish left wings, and political exiles gather, I emailed them to ask permission to access to venue. One of the trustees replied by email and invited me to the centre. When I got there, he was present and was very helpful to me. However, he was sceptical about my presence on the *Newroz* Celebration day as there were lots of political messages which were displayed that would not normally be allowed at a charity venue. As a result, he asked me not to take photographs and I obliged his request. When I was taking photos and recording videos, I noticed that he was often monitoring me and checking whether or not I was recording the political banners. At another visit to the Kurdish Community Centre I met some of the members of staff who again were welcoming and helpful. I asked the host whether he could help me to recruit someone for interviews and he introduced me to an old Kurdish Alevi man from Dersim. He was sceptical about being interviewed and asked where I was from. In my experience both in Turkey and the UK, this is one of the key questions frequently asked among the Turkish-speaking community as the hometown or village of a person reflects their ethnic and religious background (see Sirkeci, et.al.2016). After I said my hometown, he went quiet and looked suspicious of me as he made the conclusion that I was not Kurdish or Alevi. He said that the Turkish state sent some people to these kinds of places to spy and that when they visit Turkey the police then detain and interrogate them due to the Turkish judiciary starting to take action against them without even notifying them. I was aware I needed to build a rapport and blend into the field, thus I was practicing the culture with the participants. However, when the only way to be accepted as an insider was proving the ethnic root, I was excluded. It put

me in a nervous and fragile position because he thought I had a hidden agenda. It is a major problem among the Kurdish and Alevi diaspora in the UK. Many political dissidents are targeted abroad by Turkish Intelligence in different forms such as being profiled and reported to Turkey; even some extreme cases of being assassinated. For instance, in 2013, three female PKK activists were murdered in Paris. According to Le Monde newspaper, there was some evidence to suspect the implication of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in the instigation and plotting of the murders. [9] In addition, numbers of Turkish citizens living in diaspora are kidnapped by MIT in various occasions (see Cakmak, 2018). I noted that I understood his concern, but I could give him my institutional details. However, he said that a spy would say the same. This experience resulted in my raised awareness of being suspicious to some members of the Kurdish community as a non-Kurdish or Alevi person who wants to learn about them. Alevi people are very sceptical towards the Turkish state and Sunni people as they have the psychology of being a minority and experienced pogroms several times during their history. After that point, I put my notepad and pen into my rucksack to avoid being misunderstood or perceived as a Turkish spy. I was scared because such misunderstandings might result in actions taken by the community including arrangements for the mob to lynch me before I could prove I was not a spy. It does not necessarily mean the group was violent. However, in such context of national euphoria, misunderstanding of being part of their enemy could easily lead some members to feel threatened or revive their memories of victimisation and lead them to physically attack me. Furthermore, my curiosity as a researcher asking questions, taking notes and photos made me look like a detective. Also, when I visited other institutions like Halkevi, or Daymer, a number of people refused to have their voices recorded

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[9] Radio France Internationale, 'French inquiry implicates Turkish secret services in Paris Kurds' murder' (http://en.rfi.fr/europe/20150723-french-inquiry-implicates-turkish-secret-services-paris-kurds-murder, 28 June 2017).

so I could not conduct interviews with them. Not wanting their voice to be recorded by an outsider or stranger was a common reaction among the political dissident groups.

However, there were also some situations where the hospitality of the community made it difficult to put a barrier between my roles as ethnographer and community member. I was invited to people's dinner tables and offered free food and drink which is rude to refuse in Turkish culture. Also, there is a generous hospitality towards students and travellers. So, I ended up eating food from Turkish cuisine and drinking cups of Turkish tea. I was aware of the prejudice among the Sunni community towards Alevis which is why they do not eat the meat dish Alevis cook. Therefore, when I was with Alevi participants, I had to eat meat despite being vegetarian in order not to upset the hosts and avoid make them feel discriminated.

4.6 Gaining and Maintaining Access to the Field: Gate Keepers

Building trust and rapport is crucial for continuously securing access to the field. Therefore, I had to build trust with community members especially with strategic people. Continuously securing access to the field means researcher's position in the field being negotiated throughout the field study (Ergun and Erdemir, 2010). As Van Maanen (1988) claims that while researchers move among strangers, they should be ready for episodes of misfortune, partial or vague revelation, deceit, confusion, isolation, fear, concealment and always possible deportation. While I was flaneuring I secured myself from some of these feelings because of my distance. However, when it comes to participate in cultural events in the field, I had to continuously secure access to the field. My position is negotiated in the field; sometimes I was 'just one of them'; sometimes a 'stranger' and even sometimes a potential threat. The last one triggered feeling of fear and risk of being excluded from the research field. When moving between different field settings such as from the Cypriot community centre to Kurdish political events, this continuous negotiation becomes more crucial. Differences such as ideological or religious always carry the risk of conflict in the fieldwork. I positioned myself as impartial in

order to build rapport in the field. When there were similarities between me and participants in terms of age, class, ethnicity and gender, it was easier to access the field. However, without exception in every field setting, strategic members' approval plays the key role in access to the field. Other than technicality of getting a consent form, if you are a newcomer to a group, members establish relations with you parallel to strategic members' relation with you. So, for instance, in a visit to kahvehanes, the coffee shop owners' (kahveci) consent is required for me to conduct a field study because of ethical regulations of the university. Moreover, visitors of coffee shops treat me depending on how the kahvecis treat me. For instance, if a kahveci is helpful towards me thinking of helping a Turkish student's assignment at university (this was one of the common misunderstanding about me during my research), people I approach treat me in the same manner such as addressing me as 'nephew' (*yeğen* in Turkish). In the settings where the strategic members are sceptical about me, the rest of the members were hesitant to talk to me or take a part in my research. Therefore, 'trust' and 'scepticism' were transferrable from one strategic member of the community to the rest (Barbalet, 2009).

Part of building rapport in the field is fitting in such as adapting a dress code, language code and referencing common points with the participants (Conti and O'Neil, 2007). More importantly, having existing relations in the field is crucial for easy access (Ostrander, 1993). Thus, I first spoke with 'people in the know' such as my friends, their friends and relatives to get advice and names of potential participants. Such strategic members are gatekeepers or door openers for the researcher. A regular presence in the field is also very important to build rapport and trust therefore continuously secure access to the field. However, I was not living in north London which was a challenge for me. It also made the role of gatekeepers even more crucial for my study.

I have a profound understanding of the Turkish culture, language and what it feels like to move, or be exiled from your country of birth and begin life in another country. My

experience of displacement, identity renegotiation and loss of belonging enable me to be more reflexive on my experience and comprehend the participants' experiences. However, being an 'insider' does not mean staying there forever. As Acker (2001) claims researchers simultaneously shift back and forth being an insider and outsider. Therefore, I had to renegotiate my position during the field research. Although I practiced their habitus to blend and construct rapport, among some groups I faced unexpected exclusion which demonstrates the importance of gatekeepers to keep continuous access to the field.

4.7 Ethical Considerations

Different strategies were used for the different dimensions of my field work in order to gain the consent of the research subject group. In the interview stage, I used informed written consent either in English or Turkish obtained individually from all who had been asked to participate. The interviewees were given the right to opt out of the interviews at any time or to withdraw consent at a later stage. The consent form also included consent for the use of quotations. In order to provide anonymity, personal information concerning them was kept confidential. Non-identifying pseudonyms were chosen by the participants at the beginning of interviews and specific or sensitive place names were not used/recorded.

In the observation stage two different strategies were applied to public and private or semi-public spaces. At private and semi-private events written consent was obtained from the organisers of the event or owner/manager of the venue as it is standard practice in collecting ethnographical data. The organisers were expected to inform the invitees about my presence before any observation took place. During private events, photography was used to capture the visual material culture such as decoration, clothing and food. Participants attending had the opportunity to opt out of being photographed. Those who did not want to be photographed were clearly informed when objects around them were being visually recorded. If anyone

should be visible in the images taken of other participants who have given consent, these would either be deleted, or Photoshop software was used to edit the images accordingly. In addition, certain captions and comments, which could distort the reputation of the places I visited, were avoided not to damage the field such as an image of a butcher shop with a caption like 'This butcher's meat is terribly unhealthy according the community' or 'Drug dealing, and other illegal businesses happen at this coffee house'.

Visual methods focused on how identity is displayed and performed through dress or social interactions. Participants would not be identified in any way. On the other hand, in public places another strategy was also used. As Henderson (1988) states, it is not always possible to gain consent from everyone who will be observed or subjected to visual data. According to UK laws, anyone can take photographs in public places and/or anywhere they have been given permission (McPherson, 2004). Unless there is a legal restriction, researchers can take photographs and record video in public places such as the streets. It is neither possible nor required to inform everyone in a concert or a crowded street before observation. It also cannot be predicted who will enter the observation area. Some areas of social life cannot be researched unless the research is covert because overt observation distorts the purpose of showing normal people doing normal things. (Harper, 2005:759) I tried to both overcome this bias and act ethically by observing only social interactions and cultural forms or practices that did not result in individuals being identified. As such I followed the usual protocol of full anonymity for my research subjects such as removing major identifying details, like place and company names; removing all identifying details i.e. first names and other real names; and replacing these details with pseudonyms. [10]

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[10] The British Sociological Association's (BSA) Statement of Ethical Practice and Guidelines for Good Professional Conduct; The Social Research Association's (SRA) Ethical Guidelines; The British Psychological Society's (BPS) Code of Conduct, Ethical Principles for Conducting Research; The Association of Social Anthropologists' Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice;

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I discussed my research methodology and data collecting methods. I aimed to apply an experimental method combining walking, memory and artistic practice which could provide useful tools for both cultural and urban sociologists in future projects. By combining these methods, I aimed to uncover the cultural life of an (in)visible community, Turkish-speaking migrants, and their identity performances in the diasporic environment of London. As the starting point of the research is my life story, I used an autoethnographic method. During the field study, I negotiated between insider and outsider roles. At times, I felt as a *Simmelian* stranger, an ethnographer, or a *flâneur* with sometimes feeling as an indigenous member of the community. Throughout the analysis chapters the readers will see my personal reflections on cultural encounters. In analysis chapters I am going to discuss a new phase of the myth of Return and homeland visiting patterns of the Turkish-speaking community; identity performances in everyday life; and collective memory as well as use of space.

CHAPTER 5

COLLECTIVE MEMORY, MIGRATION STORIES AND NEW PHASE OF THE MYTH OF RETURN

Baudelaire: Il me semble que je serais toujours bien la ou je ne suis pas.

In other words: It seems to me that I will always be happy in the place where I am not. Or, more

bluntly: Wherever I am not is the place where I am myself. Or else, taking the bull by the horns:

Anywhere out of the world.

Paul Auster- The New York Trilogy pp.110-111

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss collective memory and how this affects the identity construction of the younger generation. While discussing this, I will refer to coding and recalling of memories in different languages. The movement of migrants between their country of origin and country of settlement is more fluid in the 21st century. Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the migration paths of Turkish-speaking people from Cyprus or Turkey to the UK including pattern of illegal migration; chain migration and movement of skilled workers. Turkish-speaking people migrate to the United Kingdom with various motivations that result in different migration stories. According to classical diaspora literature, migrants move to foreign countries with the intention of moving back to their home countries after a period (Anwar 1979, King, 1984; Safran, 1991; Bolognani, 2016). This is usually when they have saved enough money or when the war in their home country is over. They keep the desire to return alive in their everyday life, which is conceptualised as the 'myth of return' (Anwar, 1979; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Ali and Holden, 2006; Bolognani, 2007; Bolognani, 2016). However, the rate of return migration, which means migrants returning to where they came from, is very small and many migrants stay in a country of settlement (Keles, 2016). Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the migration paths of Turkish-speaking people from

Cyprus or Turkey to the UK, asking why they stayed despite coming with the purpose of return. In this chapter I will also explore the contemporary forms of the 'Myth of Return' in cosmopolitan London amongst the Turkish-speaking diaspora. This will be achieved by analysing home country visiting patterns of the community in order to comprehend this new fluid form of the transnational movement of people. This includes, return visits or homeland visiting patterns and the post-mortem travel of the body as a new phase of the 'myth of return'. Furthermore, cultural materials that members of the Turkish-speaking community bring from home country visits and attach meaning to are discussed by addressing a reconstruction of identity in diaspora space. In the final section of this chapter, I will analyse the cultural materials people bring back from their countries of origin and how they are used as completing objects during identity performances in everyday life. Therefore, I aim to discuss the migration stories of the community; settlement in the UK; how identity is tied to their country of origin; homeland visits as well as how the myth of return maintains this tie.

5.1 Collective Memory of the Turkish-speaking Community

As it is discussed in the Chapter 2, the 'collective memory' of a community is the result of shared experiences in the past that affected the entire community and that still induce a common social behaviour in the present regarding an individual's attitudes (Rothstein, 2000; Noriel, 1995).

> Home is London, but I was born in Turkey, I moved to England when I was three, but it's still my homeland because the first time I went to Turkey after we migrated, I remember my parent's reactions. How much they missed Turkey so… For example, my mother went on to floor and kissed the ground outside of the airport. I remember that reaction, it affected me a lot. Because it's been a long time and all my relatives living in the UK went to Turkey, we did not have a chance to go. She was a bit jealous as well, and missed it, all her parents were there in Maras. Her reaction affected me a lot. So, I do view Turkey as my homeland.

Ayhan, an 18-year-old, second-generation Kurdish participant from the third wave, told me how his sense of belonging was affected by his parents' attitudes when they visited Turkey with this statement above. As Blunt (2003) claims productive nostalgia refocuses on the desire for both proximate homes and more distant homes rather than focusing on the temporality of home as a site of origin and an unattainable past. There can be an attachment to both current and ancestral homes. Like Ayhan, other members of the community that are second and third generation, visit Turkey or Cyprus annually for no longer than a few weeks. Therefore, their knowledge about their country of origin and its culture is limited to their parents' narration and representation of it. Their perceptions about country of origin or ancestral homeland is solely based on collective memory. As I discussed in the Chapter 2, narration of past events is an important aspect of transmission and construction of cultural and national identity. Halbwachs (1992) states that memories are acquired within society. As I observed, in diasporic communities, migration stories and the first-generation's childhood memories remembered and acquired while being narrated in the community. Once certain historical narratives become dominant and be a part of their collective memory, these memories play a significant role in identity reconstruction (Cinar, 2015). As Elsner (1994:337) claims, what matters is not that [a particular account of the past] be correct by our standards or anyone else's, but any particular version of history to be meaningful to the collective subjectivities and self-identities of the specific group which it addresses.

Transmission of collective memory in this way may result in a virtual sense of nostalgia or *placebo nostalgia* (Poupazis 2014). For instance, a few of my second and third generation research participants narrated their parents' hometown/village as their own hometown even though they were born or/and spend entire their life in London. Memories they narrate are handed down stories, some of which contradict with their encounters in real life. Thus, their

longing of hometown as well as nostalgia is a kind of virtual emotion. Hande narrated her first visit to her parents' hometown in Southern Cyprus as follows:

> We went back to where my parents grew up [Greek side] and they showed us the school that they went to and the houses that they grew up in and it was a very emotional time for my parents you know. Especially when they saw how small it was cause as children they thought it was huge, so I remember my mum saying, previously when she was explaining her school, she'd said all these stairs, so many, we had to constantly walk in order to get to our school we had to go up these stairs. And she used to say "cikardik, cikardik bitmezdi!" [We were climbing up and up, but it wouldn't finish]. And then when we actually went there it was like five stairs or something (laughing). In her mind, it was huge and then actually going there it was not that big, it was a funny experience in that sense. But it was lovely to go and kind of visually see the places that had been explaining to us. (Hande, 29, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

As Hande's story shows, collective memory is not just transmission of historic events (Nora, 1989). Authenticity or objectivity do not matter for collective memory; what matters is the function of the memory (Elsner, 1994). Thus, when historic events such as migration are narrated, this is based on the emotional framework of those who experienced it. Meanwhile, memories are re-constructed while they are retrieved among the community (Halbwachs, 1992). These narrations are reinterpreted based on the world views of the older generations thus they are *mnemohistory* (Assman, 1997).

Also, collective memory about struggles in the home country for preserving cultural identity, or any other form of oppression experienced by the community, shape the younger generations' identity performances. Therefore, such narrations are not just referring to the past, but they are what Assmann (1992) calls cultural memory. They maintain cultural continuity by preserving and transmitting it to the younger generations.

5.1.1 Memory to Forget: Traumas in Collective Memory of the Community

Memory is not always something to cherish and pass to descendants especially those traumatic ones (see Neal, 1998; Pennebaker et.al., 2013). Some of my younger generation research participants narrated to me that their grandparents or parents do not talk about their home country. In a few cases, participants told me they do not visit their country of origin at all. Some of those people who escaped from a conflict zone or/and experienced civil war, want to forget about their home country and its memories. I did not interview directly with any of those people, but I learnt about them via their children and grandchildren. Such traumas stay in the collective memory of the community; however, people do not talk about their personal tragedies. They only talk about it via putting a distance between themselves and the tragedy such as telling the stories of a relative or neighbour. Transmission of collective memory contribute to younger generations reconstructing their parents' cultural identity such as in Kurdish and Alevi diasporic communities. On the other hand, first-generation migrants' effort to forget their homeland decreases the younger generations' sense of belonging to ancestral homeland. For instance, Bob, a 26-year-old, second-generation, first wave, Turkish Cypriot man said, he has never been to Cyprus and his grandparents have never talked about their home country. Whereas Alice, a 27-year-old third generation, first wave, Turkish Cypriot woman, told me that she visits Cyprus once in a few years, but her grandmother does not go there at all.

> I think my grandmother has quite bad memories, and she doesn't see North [Cyprus] as her home. They had to leave their house in the southern side, and also you know she doesn't have good memories, she doesn't have a nice home to go back to. And she does not associate it with nice things. But because my grandparents wanted to still have Turkish connection, they bought the house in Turkey. That's not typical; most Turkish Cypriot families have summer houses in Cyprus. And they go back for summer. We just go to Turkey because my grandmother prefers Turkey. She also hates the heat and Cyprus is very hot.

On one occasion, I interviewed a middle-aged man who had not been to Turkey for over a decade. He used to be member of a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group and was sentenced

with the death penalty in Turkey. After 8 years, his penalty was cut short and he took refuge in the UK in 1988. He only mentioned Turkey when he talked about political subjects. When I asked about his feelings when he visited Turkey for the first time after he came to the UK, it triggered an emotional outburst. Nearly crying, he took a big sip from his beer and told me the following before walking away, leaving me alone in the *kahvehane*:

> When I was in prison in 1982, my mum passed away. As I had to escape from Turkey straight after I was temporarily released, I was only able to visit my mum's tomb 17 years later. (Kazim)

After this incident, I never again probed into any stories that might remind the participants of tragic feelings they want to forget.

5.1.2 Language of Feelings: Coding and Recalling Memory among a Bilingual Community

Halbwachs (1992) claims that personal memories are revived collectively. One of the original concepts that emerged from my field study was that second and third generation participants do not only retrieve but also code feelings collectively and in different languages (see also Besemers, 2006). Thus, when they are expressing different emotions they switch from English to Turkish and Kurdish or vice versa. Ayhan, a second-generation Kurdish man said that he cannot link English with sentimental materials such as religious texts or romantic poetry. On the other hand, he said that he appreciates humour in English more.

> So, when I am reading something in English if it's about love or religion, affections or stuff I can't relate to. But if it is humorous, comedy stuff in English then I can relate to it. So even if it is an Islamic religious book in English, I can't relate to it as much, I would prefer reading in Turkish. When I am reading sports news or comedy novels for example, I prefer reading them in English. Or even news articles I would prefer English. But I can't relate to any of the poems in English. It wouldn't make me feel anything. (Ayhan, 18, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Mary, a second-generation Turkish woman from the first wave who experienced a patriarchal, conservative upbringing, associates oppression and being emotional with the Turkish language,

whereas being rational and expressing more positive feelings with the English language. She said that she expresses negative feelings such as anger or fear in Turkish whereas her problem-solving and expression of love is in English.

> I think language is the way to articulate how you think and feel about yourself and the world around you. So, because I think and feel this kind of array of cosmopolitan Londoner approach, then the words come out in English more fluently than in Turkish. I find that funny because psychologically if I am telling someone off, I usually do it in Turkish. For instance, if my sons upset me and I need to articulate kind of a more melodramatic emotion, I tend to say it in Turkish. But my problem solving is definitely in English because I don't even know what the problem-solving approach is in Turkish. I love in English. Because I learnt to love through British poets so that's how I love. My approach to love is like that which is difficult to connect then with Turkish people because they love in a different way. Hmm, yeah what else? I love in English. I am excited in English too, I am excited and ambitious in English. I can't think or feeling excited and ambitious in Turkish because of even growing up within a very closed Turkish family mentality, to be excited and ambitious was not fitting of a girl. Fear; I am scared in Turkish, for sure! And that goes back to all the childhood stories of fear. (Mary)

In addition, some of the interviews are held in English during field study by the request of the participants. And among those some of whom cannot even speak Turkish fluently switched to Turkish or used Turkish words when talking about issues like religion, morality and some ethnic practices. I argue that even for those who use English as their primary language, Turkish remains as the language of sacred topics. I think this is because there is not an English equivalent of some religious terms that originated from Arabic and respondents experienced these concepts only within the Turkish community.

5.2 Migration Paths to the UK

The migration stories of the Turkish-speaking community vary, like their movement patterns. Despite the two primary reasons behind Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish migration to the UK being political and economic, migration experiences vary in different respects. For

instance, Turkish Cypriots suffered from ethnic tension in Cyprus with the Greek community, resulting in their displacement from their villages during and following the civil war because of de facto separation of the state. Almost all Turkish Cypriots living in the south of the island moved to the northern part, which is controlled by Turkish forces. This displacement was followed by migration waves to mainland Turkey and Britain as Turkish Cypriots were subjects of the British Empire at the time (Oakley, 1970, 1987; Orhonlu, 1971; Ladbury, 1977; Jennings, 1993; Manisali, 2000; Robin and Aksoy, 2001; Inal et al., 2007; Nevzat and Hatay, 2009; Taylor, 2015; Xypolia, 2017; Ozkul et al., 2017). During the interviews, narrations of the first-generation Turkish Cypriots who migrated to the UK between the 1950s and 1970s (the first wave) mainly presented their experiences of living with the Greek community in peace, followed by the rise of ethnic tension, the civil war, displacement within Cyprus and then moving to the UK (see Thomson, 2006).

> Because my parents were born in southern side of Cyprus, on the Greek side so during the war they had to migrate to the northern side, so there was all the you know everything happened around there, how they had to leave their belongings behind, and they had to migrate different villages and constantly keep on the move, protect themselves from Greek military that may come and stop their way. (…) my parents, that was in 1964, went to Turkey for one year, and they stayed in Anamur and then they came to the UK. (Hande, 29, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

First-generation Turkish Cypriots of the first wave have experience of living with Greek Cypriots which is generally narrated positively until the period of civil war. They also have experienced displacement within Cyprus before they became diaspora in Turkey or the UK. The second and third generation Turkish Cypriots do not have the experience of living in Cyprus or with Greeks, yet they have the civil war in their collective memory. When the younger generations are talking about Turkish Cypriot identity or Cyprus, they retrieve their collective memory. Based on Moreno and Garzon's (2002) argument I argue that such historical narratives transmit a dual message. First, Turkish people existed in Cyprus and still

exist. Second, this legacy from the past demands a commitment to preserve Turkish Cypriot identity in the future (Cinar, 2015).

Migration of Turkish Cypriots was smoother than other people in the Turkish speaking community due to colonial links with the Empire (Thomson, 2006). Therefore, these interviewees' experiences of migration were smoother and more positive than most of other members of the community such as the Kurds. Some of the Turkish Cypriot participants denied the term migration to explain their case and told me that they are not migrants but have always been British citizens and subject to the British Empire. For instance, when I asked about her migration story, Filiz (60) a first-generation Turkish Cypriot lady of first wave, refused being labelled as migrant:

> We are not immigrants. We have always been subject to the Queen. When it became the Republic of Cyprus, we came here as we already had British passports. And that's it! We don't have a migration story.

Filiz (60) rejected my interview request as she does not interpret her experience of moving from Cyprus to the UK as a migration. A comment that supports her argument was made by Mustafa (83) during the interview. He told me that at the time flying from Cyprus to London was like flying between Turkish cities which is a domestic flight. This should be interpreted within the light of colonial experience. Among the first-generations of the Turkish-speaking community the first wave Turkish Cypriots are the only group who do not describe moving to the UK as leaving home. Some other diaspora groups such as the African-Caribbean community had a similar experience (see Gilroy 1993). When they came to the UK from oversea British territories, they had knowledge of British institutions and language (Hansen, 2000; Karatani, 2003; Bhambra, 2007). Thus, it did not feel like migrating to a foreign country. Interestingly, although moving within the borders of a state is called migration, the first wave

movers from British oversea territories do not use the term migration and avoid being labelled 'immigrant' (see Bhambra, 2016).

Members of political groups such as socialist unionists, ethnic and religious minority communities such as Kurds and Alevis have political motivations behind their migration to the UK (See Keles, 2014). They experienced similar conflicts to the Cypriots, especially during the military coup in Turkey on September 12, 1980. In the years that followed after the coup, the armed conflict between paramilitary Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish Army in eastern and south-eastern Turkey caused the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the displacement of even more people from their villages (Cakmak, 2018). Almost all Kurdish and Alevi members of the Turkish-speaking community in London migrated from eastern and south-eastern Turkey wherein the Kurdish people were mostly based, forming an indubitable (prominent) majority population. This geographic region is referred to as Kurdistan by the residents, which is terminology that is banned by Turkish state authorities. Kurdish and Alevi minority communities have experienced various massacres, and their cultural identity has not still been recognised in Turkey. Therefore, several hundred thousand Kurdish and Alevi people were displaced and some of them took refuge in Europe, including the UK (Keles, 2014). When narrating these stories, most of the participants defined it as a compulsory thing to do at the time.

Ela (37) is a very active member of the community, working as a local politician and volunteering at *Cem Evi*. She shared the collective memory of the massacres and oppression of the Alevi community due to their religious identity and she defined their migration as compulsory. Her father had come to the UK in the 1980s with the second wave and she joined her father with her mum at the 1990s. Her narration is parallel to Keles' (2014) argument about the Kurdish and Alevi minorities.

> We did not come here willingly; the circumstances made it inevitable. After September 12 [Military coup in 1980] it was tough, and most members of TDKP [Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey in Turkish: Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi] escaped. Turkey used to leave the border open as they want to get rid of us. And England needed cheap labour power, so they both condoned us to come to here. Not only us but also the Kurdish community have the same thing particularly the Alevi community. We all had to leave our homes because we were not allowed our political identity. (Kemal, 57, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

The main characteristic of migrants of the second wave is escaping from the military regime after the coup of 1980. Kemal, a labour unionist and political activist, narrated his migration story as a compulsory one and linked his experience of not being allowed his political identity with the experience of the Kurdish and Alevi diaspora.

In addition to political reasons, economic motivation is another leading force behind migration from Turkey and Cyprus. Almost all the research participants mentioned an economic dimension to their or their families' migration to the UK. Political and economic motivations are interwoven in most of the cases. Among these motivations included mainland Turks who moved within the country before migrating to the UK. This was a common practice, mostly adopting the pattern of moving from rural to urban and from east of the country to west.

Some of the participants talked very broadly about the economic conditions motivating them to leave from Turkey. Including Gizem (30), a second-generation of second wave Kurdish Alevi woman from Maras, Pazarcik:

> The only reason why we are here in this country today is because there is no proper living opportunity were given to us in Turkey. That's why we left our country, our homeland and we came to this country.

Despite being second-generation and having her primary socialisation in the UK, Gizem referred to Turkey as her home country and referred to her parents' migration story as if it were hers. This is less common in second and third generation participants especially those from

first and second waves. Yet, among the Kurdish and Alevi diaspora, this is a common pattern. Younger generation Kurdish and Alevi people grow up with their parents' stories of struggle and oppression due to their ethnic or religious identity (see Keles, 2014). This collective memory creates a stronger sense of belonging to ethnic identity among the younger generations (For a similar study about young Palestinians' identity in Jordan see Hart, 2004). Especially, among Kurdish diaspora, the Kurdish nation building process and civil war in South-eastern Turkey have a major impact on identity construction. Thus, younger generations of Kurdish and Alevi participants have almost as strong sense of belonging as the First-generation. Their sense of belonging is rooted in collective memory rather than a first-hand knowledge or experience in their country of origin. Kemal summarised his and his comrades' conditions as follows:

> In addition to these political struggles we came here to save up a bit. We had thought the country would have been better and we would have returned. We are stuck here, and our country has become worse. When we first arrive here people were saving up to and counting down how much left to buy a tractor. How much tractor money have we saved up, but nobody has been able to return.

As I mentioned above, political and economic reasons are interwoven in most of the migration stories. Political instability and civil war deteriorate economic conditions lead especially those who are already displaced from their villages to migrate to foreign countries.

> Most of the Cypriots came to here when the ethnic tension started on the island at 1962-63. People are expelled from their villages you know? And after the war, people had no money, no job so they moved to here. Not only here, but they also moved to Canada and Australia. (Mustafa, 83, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Civil war or/and ethnic tension in a region generally brings financial instability. Therefore, financial reasons are very frequently narrated alongside political reasons for migration during the interviews.

Among the Turkish-speaking community, there are some members who are mostly ethnic Turks of Sunni background from the countryside of central Turkey that are patriotic. They migrated to the UK only with economic motivations and kept their sentimental ties with Turkey. Most of them have a romantic view of the *memleket* (homeland). Yasar from *Pekün* village which is located in central Turkey emphasised that the economic motivations are the only reason for him and his family to be in the UK. During the interview, he mentioned that he would return to Turkey without delay if he had enough savings. However, his return plans were very vague like most members of the community.

> We are here because of economic reasons like everybody and that's all, only economic. Our fathers came here to work and save some money. At the time, we used to have a relative in Germany, and you know in the 70s everybody wanted to go to Germany. He went there first and then came to this country and we stayed over, that's it really. This picture is our reason to come here [pointing out the picture of their village Pekün on the wall] it is very dry, you can't grow crops. What can villagers do if agriculture is not possible? Animal farming is also very hard because winters are too long and challenging. Six months freezing in the winter, and six months burning in the summer. Therefore, people of our village spread out to neighbouring cities, and some of them moved to Europe.

He differentiated himself from the political and ethnic diaspora by emphasising that his family moved to the UK solely due to economic reasons. Although he described the conditions of his hometown village as not being ideal to live in, he romanticises life in his home country and talks about returning there one day.

5.2.1 Illegal Migration to the UK: *Şebeke* or People Smuggling

Many of the research participants came to the UK via irregular means, such as through people smugglers. Therefore, the word *şebeke,* which means network in Turkish and is used to refer to people smugglers in this context, was one of the most common words in the migration stories. People smuggling is defined by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as follows:

(a) 'Smuggling of migrants' shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident;

(b) 'Illegal entry' shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State (General Provision, Article 3, Use of terms section a and b, pg. 2).

Turkey joined the European Commission in 1957 and in 1960 Turkish citizens started using their rights to free movement in Europe. Three military coups in Turkey in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the following political instability resulted in Germany, France and other western European countries restricting Turkish citizens travel to their countries. Since 1980, Turkish nationals need to get a visa to live or work in the UK.[11] Those who do not hold a permit but want to move to Europe for work and those who are oppressed by the Turkish state and wish to escape from the authorities use the irregular route of people smuggling. Following the 1980 military coup socialist unionist and left-wing activists fled from Turkey. The military junta's authoritarianism and human right violations triggered the Kurdish issue evolving into an armed conflict and the establishment of the PKK. The armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK resulted in thousands of Kurdish people being displaced within Turkey and some of them seeking asylum in European countries. During the 1980s and 1990s the numbers reached 3500 applications per year.[12] There was a clear drop in the number of asylum applications of Turkish nationals between 2015 to 2016. However, in the aftermath of the July 2016 coup attempt, Turkish citizens' applications for asylum in European countries such as Germany and Britain have soared.[13] According to quarterly immigration figures released by the Office for

[11] http://t24.com.tr/haber/turkiyenin-vizesiz-avrupa-seruveni,245781
[12] http://habernewspaper.co.uk/2017/06/04/turkish-asylum-applications-rising-again/
[13] http://habernewspaper.co.uk/2017/06/04/turkish-asylum-applications-rising-again/
http://www.dw.com/en/report-shows-rise-in-turkish-asylum-seekers-in-germany/a-19450252

National Statistics asylum applications by Turkish passport holders in the UK is the highest level in ten years.

UK asylum bids from Turkish citizens
Applications by quarter, 2005-2016

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Jan-Mar	244	126	68	69	65	18
Apr-Jun	186	107	66	44	48	43
Jul-Sep	174	86	64	45	38	39
Oct-Dec	151	107	52	35	36	55
Total	**755**	**426**	**250**	**193**	**187**	**155**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Jan-Mar	60	35	68	63	65	71
Apr-Jun	24	48	66	70	46	76
Jul-Sep	35	57	64	68	67	72
Oct-Dec	51	50	52	70	55	102
Total	**170**	**190**	**250**	**271**	**233**	**321**

Source: UK ONS   habernewspaper.com

Table 3: UK Asylum Bids from Turkey [14]

Almost all the refugees come to the UK via irregular means. According to statistics approximately 40% of the total Turkish and Kurdish population has been smuggled into the UK (see Bennetto 2005). As my research participants narrated to me, those who use this irregular route are mainly men who travel to the UK by paying exorbitant prices to people smugglers. They travel through a number of countries before coming to the UK, which mostly

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[14] http://habernewspaper.co.uk/2017/02/23/turkish-asylum-applications-reach-10-year-high/

includes crossing borders in dangerous ways, such as travelling in an overload plastic boat in the sea or hiding at the back of a lorry without any food or sufficient fresh air. Another common aspect of this irregular migration path is that the journeys take weeks and even months before reaching to the UK. These people pay three to five thousand pounds to people smugglers that they call *şebeke* for illegal travel to the UK. *Şebekes* take them to a European country that is close to Turkey such as Bulgaria or Greece. After there, they either go to Albania and take a boat to Italy or go to Germany in the back of a van or lorry. In either one of these scenarios, France is the last step before taking refuge in the UK. Irregular Turkish or Kurdish migrants come either hiding at the back of a lorry or getting on the train without authorization. For instance, an Alevi family that hosted me at their home told me about their migration story and experience with people smugglers. In 2002 this lady and her husband went to Germany and then France with people smugglers. They then came to the UK lying in a hidden compartment in the ceiling of a lorry trailer with 10-12 other refugees. They described it to me as a tiny space for 15 people, very hot, and without sufficient fresh air. They were sweating so much that when the British police stopped the lorry to check its trailer, they noticed the sweat dripping from the ceiling. They also said to me that they had to stay in this hideous compartment for nearly 24 hours. Almost all these people hold British citizenship now. I heard many similar narrations during my field study. However, that was only one version of irregular migration to the UK; there are many others told and untold, such as walking through Russia and Belarus to Europe through forests for months. Mehmet, a first-generation Kurdish man of third wave from Maras, informed me of his illegal travel to the UK 19 years ago:

> I was 17 and decided to immigrate to England. Two of my friends and I agreed with the şebeke. Firstly, they got visa permission for us to stay in Bulgaria for 15 days. We stayed in Bulgaria for approximately 16 days. Then they drove us to a village and at night we crossed the Macedonian border. We stayed there just one day and at night time they again drove us somewhere. We were going through a mountain path at full darkness. Some of the women in the group were crying, and a few of them fainted. We carried

them on our shoulders and walked tens of kilometres. We [men] were also scared, but there was no option. Then we reached a village house. They locked us in a room which was full of immigrants; gypsies, Romanians, some Turks and so forth... We stayed there for days; I guess it was Albania. I was fed up; but we were stuck there. Later they drove all of us to the seacoast. However, before we get on the boats to go to Italy, they asked for extra money. We said that we had already paid for travel from Turkey to France. They threatened us with guns, so we gave them more money. The boats were plastic like balloons, and we all get on the same boat. It was full of people and floating on the ocean [Adriatic Sea] dealing with the waves. If it blew heavily, we would all have died. The journey was not safe at all, and we were very scared. When we saw the lights on the Italian coast, we were so glad. Then all of a sudden, a helicopter appeared in the sky and hovered above our boat. It shed light upon us, and we were clearly visible. We were scared as to whether they would shoot us. After a while, another boat came next to us and asked the Turks to jump up. We didn't know the reason why, either it was something good or bad. We had to do it. All the Turks did, and I was the last one. It was not close enough; I would have fallen into sea. It was too dangerous, but then I did jump. Our boat and the other boat that was full of migrants of other nationalities went in opposite directions. Luckily the helicopter followed the other boat. We succeeded to escape. Our boat stopped at a very close distance to the coast then they asked us to jump and swim the rest of the range. One of the Turkish men who was sitting at the front of the boat said it was too deep and we would not jump. They threw him into the sea first. Then the rest of us one by one. We swam and reached the Italian coast even though none of us knew how to swim. (…) We entered a forest and dispersed in different directions. I hide myself between two trees. I was exhausted, and I fell sleep over there. I woke up with a noise and saw a gun pointed towards me when I opened my eyes. It was the Italian police. They took me to a refugee camp. I met my other friends over there since they had also been captured by the police. After a while they questioned us; gave us asylum seeking documents and let us leave the camp but not the country. We went to a northern city close to France border. We stayed in a park for just a few days, and it was full of migrants. We got on a train and travelled to a French city close to Italy, and then we went to Paris. I had relatives over there and spent some time with them. Then I got on a train and took refuge in England. It took two months in total to arrive here.

Mehmet, a transmigrant who went through five countries before coming to the UK, summarised his two months long irregular journey to London at the hands of people smugglers. His

migration story illustrates the dangerous journey of refugees between countries. Although, they are paying extortionate amounts of money to travel cross borders illegally they are open to being abused and threatened by people smugglers. The same Alevi family told me that irregular migrants pay around 5.000 to 10.000 Euros or Dollars per person to people smugglers in order to come from Turkey to the UK. The journey could be interrupted by the police at any point, yet people smugglers get their payment in advance and claim no responsibility. As Mehmet and other participants told most of the time people smugglers demand extra money during the journey.

As the journey is very dangerous, in most of the cases, men travel alone with people smugglers and then bring their family afterwards when they have a legal status in the UK. I was told many stories of children continuing to live in Turkey after their parents had moved to the UK and would then join them years later. In some cases, children came via legal means after their parents had received their residence permits as their dependants. However, asylum application in the UK is often followed by a period of uncertainty of legal status which results in a precarious life for five to ten years (see Stewart and Mulvey 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010). Therefore, some of the asylum seekers bring their children to the UK illegally. Elif told me how her parents brought her and her sister to the UK using people smugglers after three years:

> After my mum and dad came to the UK, they found a lady and paid her £6,500 to bring me here. She took me away from my grandma; I had to live with her for a week. As she taught me her background, her kids' names, her daughter's name and what my name was. So basically, I came with a fake identity. I had to wear a hijab around my head and then their cultural clothes. I had to look like her daughter. They made me wear high heeled boots, so I was her height. And it was weird because even though they are my parents they left me at age 3, I didn't know them really. They just said you are gonna go to your mum and that was the main thing, and I was like oh I am going to see my mum, but I didn't even know what

my mum looked like. That's how I came in. And six years later they brought my sister over in the same way.

Elif does remember events vaguely but she heard the story many times from her parents and narrated it to me as she heard. I found it traumatic that she has been left behind when she was three. Her sister told me about her parents leaving her behind when she was a year old. I sensed resentment of their choice to take her sister (Elif) first and that she saw her parents only once until she came to the UK at age 10. Similar stories are narrated to me during the field study. Children being left behind, fraudulent documents, dangerous travel in inhuman conditions are part of the refugee experience and it is shared in the collective memory of certain fragments of the Turkish-speaking community.

It is also frequently mentioned that the path most people take with the *şebeke* intersects with Germany before coming to the UK. It is because that a bigger Turkish population lives there which means the people smugglers could use these links with Turkish diaspora and also Germany is easier to access by highway transport, whereas Great Britain has stricter borders with being an island. Moreover, according to the statistics, Germany is the most popular destination for refugees.[15]

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[15] http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

Note: the y-axis is interrupted with a different interval above the interruption from that below it.
(*) 2015: not available.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappctza)

Table 4: Eurostat asylum statistics

I noticed that first-generation participants especially from the third and fourth waves who experienced irregular travel to the UK have not mentally legitimised their presence in the country yet, despite gaining British citizenship. The traumatic experience of being smuggled into the UK remains with them and many of them still regard themselves as refugees (see Brettell, 2003; Amaye et.al., 2010). In other words, they were granted the status of being a refugee and naturalised to British citizenship after living there for decades. However, during the interviews they still referred to themselves as refugees. They reproduce this power relationship with the state and the British society.

5.2.2 Chain Migration

Another common pattern found with Turkish-speaking people's migration to the UK is chain migration (Kucukcan 1999, also see Böcker 1994). This is defined as being a situation in which migrants have 'initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary

social relationships with previous migrants' (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964:82). Migrating to the UK from Cyprus or Turkey as a means of a family reunion is also very common because marrying with a partner from their home country and even in some cases from their hometown village is the most preferred marriage practice among the Turkish-speaking community. In addition to family reunion, almost all the research participants mentioned during the interviews that they got help from a family member, relative or a local hometown person during their migration process or/and they helped a relative to come to the UK. (For similar research in Netherlands see Böcker 1994). It is basically the use of social capital to meet primary needs during migration process and settling down. In other words, migration from a particular town or village of Turkey or Cyprus to London is followed by other people from the same town. Hence why there are village associations such as Limasollular, Pekünlüler, and Dersimliler solidarity associations in London (see Issa 2005, Sirkeci, et.al., 2016).

> A year after I came, I brought my sister here, and then my mum, my brother. (Turkan, 51, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

> All my family is in London. My father brought all our kin and relatives here after he came too. (Begum, 42, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Chain migration is practiced as an act of solidarity as well as resulting from favouritism among relatives and people of the same town. Social capital or network is an important aspect of migration. As Sirkeci et.al. (2016) claims, late comers of the Turkish-speaking community were helped by early movers, the ethnic institutions they established in London already and the social network of '*hemsehrilik*'. Knowing someone who migrated to the UK facilitates migration arrangements. As a result, people from certain towns and villages gathers in same European cities. For instance, in London many people from Maras, Aksaray and Gumushane are gathered. But as a result, each population does not represent Turkish society demographically. For instance, Kurdish and Alevi diaspora have a prominent number among

the Turkish-speaking community in the UK, yet Kurds and Alevis are in minority status in Turkey.

5.2.3 Movement of Skilled Workers from Cyprus and Turkey

The migration of Turkish-speaking people to the UK is not limited to refugees. Many high-skilled migrants of Turkish, Cypriot or Kurdish backgrounds move to the UK either to work at a British company or as self-employed entrepreneurs, using their rights defined by the European Community Association Agreement, or as it is known in Turkish *Ankara Antlaşması*. *Ankara Antlaşması* is frequently mentioned during the interviews especially by participants that I categorise as expats.

> Most of the mainland Turks came here after the late 60s. I remember that towards the 1960s those who knew art or craft came here with Ankara Antlaşması. (Mustafa, 83, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Although the UK restricts migration rules, Turkish citizens continue coming to the UK with self-employed *Ankara Antlaşması* visas as discussed before. During the interviews and informal anecdotes many members of the community told that *Ankara Antlaşması* has become much more popular since the 2000s whereas at the 1980s and 1990s Turkish and Kurdish people were mostly coming to the UK to seek asylum. During and after my field study I met with numbers of self-employed Turkish-speaking people living in the UK with this visa (see Sirkeci et.al., 2010). However, I did not recruit them for interviews because they do not meet the selection criteria of living in the UK for at least 10 years. Turkish-speaking people came to the UK for various reasons and ways with the aim of returning to Turkey or Cyprus after a period. However, as it emerged from the interviews, most of them have stayed over in the UK. Therefore, the following sections of this chapter will discuss concepts of return migration and the 'myth of return' as well as exploring the mobility of Turkish-speaking people in transnational space.

5.3 The Myth of Return among Turkish-speaking Community

In classical diaspora literature, the 'myth of return' has a significant place. It is believed that the 'myth of return' is embedded in the minds of immigrants from their arrival. According to my research findings, there are two main reasons behind the migration of Turkish-speaking people to the UK; economic and political. Almost all of them came to the UK for a limited period in their mind with the purpose of returning to home country like other diaspora communities. For the economically motivated group the primary purpose of moving to the UK was to save enough money to build a better life back in their home country. Therefore, they keep the 'myth of return' alive both as a motivation to work abroad and reconstruct their cultural identity. The politically motivated group came to stay until ethnic and political tension in their home country has reduced. They have a more romantic view of their home countries as they had to leave from there, so they see it as a lost land, and they view the 'myth of return' as a desire in diaspora (Watson 1979; Safran 1991; Cohen 1996). Economic migrants' departure of their home country is not always voluntary such as in the time of economic recession, yet it does not necessarily mean their life is under direct threat such as political groups face after a coup, revolution or civil war. Political refugees are generally alienated in their country of origin after a political change or a civil war. Many of them told me that their country of origin has changed since they left, which is generally a negative change from their point of view. What they desire to return to is not the contemporary state of their home country, but instead, a nostalgic version or the utopic future where they achieved the political change they wished for. People from both categories are unwilling to move forward. Thus, what is known as the 'myth of return' (Anwar, 1979) refers to more than a demographic movement, it is the emotional tie that diasporic communities keep with their home countries around which they renegotiate their identity.

> Diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return, even if it means pushing other peoples into the sea. (…) Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. (Hall, 1990:235)

Hall (1996) argues that there is not any return to the country of origin or roots because diasporic subjects are not able to return. For the Turkish-speaking community, this is not because of a legal restriction except for some political subjects but because of other reasons such as their home country has changed since they left, and they personally have changed and got used to their lifestyle in London. During our interviews and conversations, most of the participants explained that either they or their parents had come to the UK for a limited period in their mind but then they decided to stay over to provide a better future for their children. Or that they feel that they cannot fit into the system in Turkey or Cyprus any more.

> The community I grew up in is a community of Turkish people who came here struggling to make money and go back. So, there was a deep sense of having to escape from this country as fast as they could. So, there was not a lot of joy in that. (…) Although they are trying to extract themselves from England and go back to Turkey they very much held on to the 'but we need to live for our children'. (Mary, 45, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish)

As Mary narrated, the first-generation of the first wave consisted of economic migrants who came to the UK in order to save up to invest in Turkey. She is sceptical of their claim that they remained to provide better opportunities for their children in the UK. She believes that people stay because they get used life in London and prefer it over their home country.

Even the political refugees who came to the UK with the idea of going back to their home country once the political situation becomes more stable and keep the romantic view about *memleket* as a lost land, decided to stay over. They participate in political activities in diaspora

to make an impact on the political sphere in their home countries and change it in a way they desire (Cakmak, 2018). However, they are not planning to return in the near future.

> Because when we first came to this country, we were saving every penny because we were going to go back. (…) Because my parents are Alevis and they just had to sort of hide it and they didn't feel safe, and that's why they started to come here for work, so they could make money and have enough capital to buy themselves a house in Mersin to hide there. And then they thought this place [London] is safer and they stayed. (Ela, 37, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Ela and many other Alevi participants narrated to me the security concerns of Alevi diaspora as a main motivation not to return to Turkey. Therefore, for Alevi diaspora there is no going back.

Some of my research participants especially members of political groups expressed their interest in returning to Turkey or Cyprus. However, none of them provided any precise or applicable plan about when they would move back to their home country. One of the main reasons for the delay or procrastination to return was due to political instability in Turkey and Cyprus.

> I am not planning to spend the rest of my life in this country; I do not think I will waste it here. But I am not planning to move to Turkey now, maybe 10-15 years later, it would be better to return to our own land. We will die sooner or later, better to die over there, isn't it? North London is like a second refugee camp. (Rojda, 27, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Leaving behind their country of origin places refugees in a condition of 'social nakedness'. This precarious situation could be described with its undefined social status, rights and responsibilities (Bauman, 2002). As Agamben (1998) argues, refugees are like '*a werewolf*' neither a beast nor a man, an outlaw that can be exposed to violence without facing legal sanctions. Refugee camps are a biopolitical zone of indistinction, refugees are banned and excluded from society (Diken 2004). Rojda, a Kurdish political activist, defined the ethnic

neighbourhoods in North London as a second refugee camp where the community is excluded from society and forced to survive in an open-ended period of incarceration. She talks about ultimately returning to Turkey, however, like most of the other participants her return plans are very vague. She wants to keep the idea of a homeland alive because she does not want to permanently settle down in the UK. Camp is a temporary residence until she reaches her destination; the imagined Kurdistan. Almost all the participants either have vague plans about returning to their home country or not planning to settle down in Turkey at all. It was also narrated to me during my field study that there are some Turkish people who have moved back to their home countries and settled down successfully. However, it is not very common among the community (Keles, 2016). In addition to that, some of returning attempts among diasporic subjects ended with immigration back to the host country, which is the UK. Some of my research participants told me about their stories of failed attempts to settle down in their country of origin and 'returning' to the UK. Interestingly, they referred to both processes of moving to Turkey to settle down and coming back to the UK as a 'return' which indicates their sense of belonging to multiple homes and a feeling of 'in-betweenness' (Bhabha, 1994a). Therefore, adopting Peeren's (2006) chronotopic approach while discussing diaspora would be more inclusive. In this approach, 'home' is not perceived as left behind, static, pure or untouched but as something that can be gained or lost. The theory of chronotope discusses diasporic identities as a multi-dimensional notion instead of just focusing on static home and host. There are multiple sites within and transcending home country and adopted home.

> I moved to Turkey for ten years for business. In the 2010 crisis, I lost like 6 million pounds. I had to sell up everything to pay off my debts. And then I wanted to come home [London]. (Mary, 45, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish).

Mary had moved to Turkey from London to re-adopt her former home. Yet after spending 10 years there she returned to London which she considers her actual home. I argue that, she has

multiple homes representing her multiple identities. For the second-generations moving to Turkey or Cyprus is like achieving their parents' aims. However, for the third generation it is just a romantic attempt. Younger generations are not familiar with institutions or social norms in Turkey or Cyprus. Therefore, their idea of 'returning' to their ancestral homeland is similar to Jewish diaspora's desire to return to the promised land. It is indeed not a return but moving to a foreign geography and uniting with a society that they share very limited common aspects. Mary is not the only one who narrated to me about the failed attempt of moving to Turkey among the second-generations. Some of other participants of younger generations told me that they considered moving to Turkey or Cyprus at certain points in their life and then decided not to move there. Therefore, as their answers to the interview question about their future plans show, the 'myth of return' is not a valid theory to explain the attitudes of younger generations of the Turkish-speaking diaspora because it is totally abandoned.

> (…) before I started my PhD, I had two options. My auntie is an MP in Cyprus, as I am barrister, I had an offer from her to go and do some legal work for her in Cyprus, work with some NGOs, etc. I thought it would be my interest. So, I went, God many years ago, it must be 2008. I went to Cyprus to decide if I could live there for a little while. I went for a week, saw my grandparents, looked at flats, talked to my auntie about what the job might be like. And decided 'I can't live here!' (Laughing). (…) So that was the one moment I think where I considered it for a moment but thought I don't know if I could. I don't have any aspiration to be there. I'd rather live in the States. (Meltem, 30, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

Meltem told me that her father has been in Thailand for a few years. She travels around the world and wants to live in the United States. Considering these aspects, her identity could be defined as global elite or cosmopolitan. Mustafa told me some of those first-generation migrants who attempted to return Cyprus ended up coming back to London. Even for first-generation migrants who planned to stay in the UK for a limited period, returning to county of

origin is not an easy process after spending decades in London and adopting it as their new home (see Smith and Guarnizo, 2002).

> Some of us had returned, and some of them came back to here because they used to live here. Also, in Cyprus, everybody knows each other and talks about who did what, it is a small place. And here it is better both socially and economically. (Mustafa, 83, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

Furthermore, one of the most frequently given answer to the question about future plans was that they do not plan to move to their home country in the near future:

> All my family from mother's side live in London. I don't think any of them planning to go back to Turkey. We know we belong to here. We are used to system and lifestyle here. (Efe, 26, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish)

Even though myth of return is very commonly referred to in diaspora literature, most of my research participants from any generation told me that they do not have any plan or desire to move to Turkey or Cyprus.

As my research findings show most of the members of the Turkish-speaking community decided to stay over in the UK and made it their permanent home. This is both because their country of origin has changed since they left, and they have got used to the cosmopolitan cultural environment of London. Also, encounters with foreign cultures and the *zeitgeist* of postmodern and global era broke the barriers of closed identities that is rooted in a promised land and could only be achieved by returning to there. Yet, it does not mean diaspora is dead and every community is cosmopolitan in the globalised world. It means that the classical diaspora definition as it refers to the Jews, Armenians and Greeks cannot be applied to every community.

During the interviews, none of the participants told any precise plans about moving back to Turkey or Cyprus whereas many of them said they visit their countries of origin in holidays.

Hence, the 'myth of return' among the Turkish-speaking community in London transformed into short-term, annual returns during vacations. What Khan (1977) calls 'institutions of migration' such as travel agencies, connect the diaspora with the homeland. Immigrants go to the country of origin for a vacation or on every possible occasion. According to Kings et.al. (2000), these episodic holidays act as a stepping stone to a permanent return but merely play out as an illusion of return. Thus, they have an alleviating impact on their desire to return (also see Khan 1977; Ali and Holden 2006). These agencies are part of the ethnic economy and based on migrant communities longing for their country of origin.

Many immigrants keep their connection with both home and host countries, socially, culturally, economically and politically rather than breaking their attachment to one for the other. Some migrants take an active part in homeland politics, economy and religious life while others are highly involved in country of settlement and engage in certain transnational activities such as economic investments (see Levitt, 2003). There are various levels of cross-border engagement and home-host mobility. For instance, there are some members of the community that consult and/or follow their religious leaders in their country of origin quite closely. They are highly involved in the home country's religioscape (spiritual life). Some members of the community travel regularly while some of them go back and forth and/or engage in transnational business while living abroad. Many of the members of the community have properties in hometowns villages which they aim to live in off their income earned in the host country when they retire to Turkey. In that way, they keep their feet in both home and host countries. In addition, some of them see it as a way of creating a sense of belonging to home countries for younger generations. The importance of homeland visits to understand Turkish/Kurdish culture better and transmit it to younger generations is emphasised by many of the members of Turkish-speaking community.

For instance, we always encourage our members (Kurdish Community Centre) to take their children with them when visiting Turkey and show their village and land to them, not to cut that links with their land. Also, we encourage people to buy a house in their village even though they only visit once a year. Therefore, at least their children would know that the land and country belong to them. We want them to keep these links with Kurdistan, and visit it to teach our culture, customs and tradition to their children. (Mahir, 57, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Although, Turkish, Kurdish or Cypriot culture is reproduced in London, most members of the community believe in that that country of origin is where their culture is lived authentically. Annual visits to their home country have the purpose of seeing family as well as teaching the culture and customs to younger generations. Mahir, a politically very active member of the Kurdish community in London, spoke of the political importance of visiting Turkey. He is concerned not only about younger generations' cultural identity but also linking Kurdish identity to land or soil. As a diaspora, he does not want to leave his homeland behind, but he wants to keep the right to live there one day. However, he has not moved there yet, and defers his return to an unknown date. For Kurdish diaspora having properties in Kurdish regions of Turkey is significantly important as the Kurdish nation building process is ongoing and Kurdistan's borders are not set yet. Therefore, having a house which they will visit once a year is marking the Kurdish land as their own. They believe in that, Kurdistan will be built, and they will return to 'the promised land' like Jewish diaspora. Moreover, that practice promotes the younger generations adopting multiple homes.

The tourism pattern of Turkish speaking diaspora is based on visiting Turkey or Cyprus in every *izin* (vacation). As it has emerged from my in-depth interviews, many of the Turkish-speaking immigrants especially those from the first-generation maintain their sentimental links with their home country. Baldassar (2001) coined the term 'return visits' to describe the migration experience of Italian diaspora in Australia to the country of origin. What Levitt (2003) calls 'roots journeys' refers to visiting the ancestral homeland and becoming re-

acquainted with relatives. On the other hand, home country visits are not limited to visiting family and relatives. There are some pragmatic reasons such as going to enjoy holiday resorts and historical sites. Some of them even have very practical purposes for visiting Turkey or Cyprus such as the purchase of goods and use of cheaper services, in an environment where people speak the same language and the food is familiar to their taste.

> Well, I go there 3-4 times a year. But I don't usually go to village and stay for that long. I know from previous experience how boring it gets. So, maximum I go for like a few days and then to holiday like beach somewhere and then I come back. I prefer to go there for my holidays because I love going to Turkey for holiday. I love the beach, I love the weather, I love the food and the people. So that makes me enjoy my holiday basically. I have been to other holiday destinations, but it just doesn't feel same. I went to Spain and France I didn't like it. So, I always prefer to go back home to Turkey for a holiday. (Gizem, 30, Second-generation, Second Wave, Kurdish)

Second and third generation participants approach visits to Turkey or Cyprus pragmatically. Gizem and Alice told that they only visit Turkey as a holiday destination where they are familiar with culture and food from their annual visits. I argue that these visits cannot be classified as what (Baldassar 2001, Kings et.al. 2000) call 'return visits' because visitors do not attach sentimental meanings to it as first-generation does.

Some of the community members are involved in transnational jobs that include visiting their home country to buy or sell goods and products. Some of them bring traditional or cultural Turkish products from their home country and sell them in London. Items brought back include ornaments or liturgical objects.

> So, I grew up in the culture, my father was one of the first to import Turkish music, cassettes, books, tespihs, circumcision suits (laughing) all of the kind of stuff that culturally originated from Turkey. (Ekrem, 57, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Ekrem told me about the influence of Turkish music on him as he was growing up. He is from the first wave which means during his childhood there was not a vibrant Turkish culture in London as it is today or satellite TV to watch Turkish soap operas. The first-generation migrants were producing Turkish culture by importing cultural materials from Turkey. Currently, one can find many Turkish cultural materials and food products in Turkish shops in North London.

Even though some Turkish-speaking migrants left Turkey or Cyprus 20 to 40 years ago, they are not forgotten by their contemporaries and update themselves about the life of the community in Turkey or Cyprus by asking who visits it recently or by visiting themselves. They gossip about what is going on at home during their last visit and in that way, they collect drips and drabs of information about life in their homeland.

Some of the immigrants visit their countries of origin for marriage purposes. Some young members of the community visit their home country and find partners themselves while some other parents make arrangements for their children and find partners from their hometown village for them. This kind of ethnic endogamy aims to ensure a continued reproduction of identity and tradition (see Böcker 1994).

5.4 Return Visits: Homeland visiting patterns

Some of the members of the Turkish-speaking community save their money and go to their home country for a summer vacation every year almost as a ritual (Mehmet, Begum, Guler, Turkan, Yasar, Ela, Emel, Kemal). Turkey or Cyprus is also the place where they forget business life and return to themselves and enjoy sweet memories of the past. Based on Eliade's (1987) and Margry's (2008) argument I argue that these ritual-like visits are *'mundane pilgrimages'*. Margry (2008) states that those taking a pilgrimage seek an encounter with a particular cult object at the shrine in order to acquire spiritual, emotional or physical

healing benefits. In this example, migrants visit their homeland to escape a profane environment of diaspora to gain the spiritual and nostalgic experience of memories in their ancestral land and heal the identity crisis or help the identity construction of a younger generation. In my research case, Turkey or Cyprus are sanctified with the nostalgia of the past and images representing or remembering cultural identity. The pilgrims of diaspora travel not for the sake of heaven or other transcendental benefits but to find assistance with their existential or identity questions with linking their identity to collective memory and ancestral homeland. Visiting relatives has more meaning than simply keeping social networks; it strengthens a sense of belonging to nationhood. In this dichotomous relation, Turkey or Cyprus with the symbols and memories it carries represent the sacred, while diaspora life in London is involved with mundane individual concerns.

> Such a feeling to visit Turkey! [said euphorically and enthusiastically] Let me tell you an anecdote, a Turkish man living in Germany sees a car parked on the street that came from Turkey. He removes the cap from the tyre valve, starts to deflate car's tyre and inhales the air. The owner of the car sees him and asks what are you doing hemşerim (fellow villageman)? The man responds I am taking the smell of memleket (homeland). Our case is similar, when I visit Turkey, I feel blessed. Going to memleket is special for me! (Yasar, 54, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish).

Yasar was very enthusiastic and euphoric when he was talking about his visits to Turkey. He is an ethnic Turk and Sunni Muslim from central Turkey. I argue that his quote summarises conservative Turkish economic migrants' romantic view of Turkey. According to that view, Turkey's air and soil is idealised and breathing its air or touching its soil metaphorically refers to living in Turkey. Therefore, they visit Turkey on every *izin* (vacation) to satisfy their desire for Turkey and its culture. Throughout our conversations in the interviews I asked the interviewees about their home country visits and mapped out their visiting pattern as follows:

Frequent travellers: those still firmly tied to the homeland. They have land or property in their hometown or village and go back and forth between home and host countries regularly. *Periodic travellers* visit their home country for the same period of the year (annually and generally summer time) as a duty or a kind of profane pilgrimage. *Intermittent travellers* are those immigrants whose lives are rooted mainly in the host country and visit their home country intermittently. However, they keep contact with people in the homeland and track the life of the community in the homeland by asking who has visited it recently. They do not have enough time or money or enthusiasm to visit their home country frequently. *Fugitives* are those people who have escaped from their home country for various reasons and have taken refuge in the UK. Their situation is precarious, and they are not allowed to visit Turkey for a certain period (until they have a residence permit from British authorities) or even in their lifetime (in case they are sentenced by the Turkish authorities for any crime). People from any generation, any wave or any ethnic group could be a part of any of these categories as this classification is not based on the practice of travelling and performativity rather than an ascribed status.

5.4.1 Frequent Travellers

Frequent travellers visit the homeland more than once a year for business or for a holiday. However, they tend to stay for a shorter period in comparison to periodic travellers. Their visits are generally no longer than a week. They are mostly those with financial security and legal resident status in both countries that enables them to travel without any problem. They tend to visit the touristic places of their home country as well as the financial centres rather than visit their hometown village.

> I go to Turkey many times throughout the year for a few days for business. Also, when we have a break from work, we talk about going to some European countries. But at the end of the day, we say come on what are we gonna do in Germany or Belgium? Let's go to Istanbul for three days and chill. (Efe, 26, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish)

Frequent travellers visit Turkey or Cyprus often because they are familiar with it and like its culture. However, Efe's approach to Turkey is not a romanticised view. He told that it is cheaper to go on a holiday to Turkey, and that he does not need to worry about getting lost or finding food for his acquired taste. These regular visits can be defined as 'return visits' (see Baldassar 2001). They replace the actual and permanent return to their home countries with episodic visits.

5.4.2 Periodic travellers

Something which was frequently mentioned by my participant was visiting homeland in every *izin* (annual leave). At many gatherings of Turkish-speaking people, the theme of travelling to Turkey or Cyprus emerges. Recent trips are discussed, and future trips are planned or dreamed about (see also Mandel, 1990). The key timings of such periodical visits are during summer vacations or on religious days such as Eids. The duration of these periodic visits varies from between two weeks to two months.

> In July you cannot find anybody here (North London) for 4-6 weeks until the schools start. Everybody goes to Turkey. (Yasar, 54, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish).

As Yasar told me many of the members of the Turkish-speaking community visit Turkey or Cyprus annually. Especially for economic migrants it is something they look forward to and save up for throughout the whole year.

Many of the first-generation participants emphasised the importance of visits to their home country to catch up with both family and friends they left behind as well as creating a sense of belonging that can be transmitted to young generations. In that way, first-generation migrants aim to form younger generations' opinions towards the home country and transmit Turkish, Kurdish or Cypriot identity to them. Families arrange regular contact with their home country to ensure them and try to ensure that their children reproduce their national identity or get to know family members and relatives in the homeland. There are two motives behind this

practice; first introducing children to family in the homeland and strengthen family bonds. Secondly, visiting elderly members of the family and relatives is a custom in Turkish tradition especially in rural parts of Turkey. With visits to their ancestral homeland they become re-acquainted with relatives, thus these visits can also be called 'roots journeys' (see Levitt 2003).

Moreover, the Turkish-speaking migrants save money to go to Turkey or Cyprus for summer vacations nearly every year in a ritualistic fashion. Turkey or Cyprus is also the place where they forget the stress of business life, living in a foreign culturalscape and they return to themselves hence why I call these visits as *'mundane pilgrimages'* (see Eliade, 1987; Margry, 2008).

As Begum said, first-generation migrants attribute a sentimental meaning to visits to their home country, such as bridging the gap between younger generations and their ancestors. In this way, they aim to strengthen the collective memory and reproduce cultural identity. However, frequent homeland visit, and the duration of visits decrease as their children grow older.

> When we were kids, as soon as it was the summer holiday, we were on the plane to Cyprus and we come back 31st of August as we went back to school on 1st of September. Now it's like a week, ten days that's it. See the grandparents, aunties, uncles, cousins, go to the beach, and come home. (Meltem, 30, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Second and third generation participants told that they used to visit Turkey or Cyprus more often and for a longer period with their parents when they were young. Also, first-generation participants told me about their children's reluctance of visiting Turkey or Cyprus every year.

Many of the first-generation members of the community mentioned having a house in their hometown village or in a holiday resort that they stayed in during periodic visits, coupled with a vague plan of settling down there in the future. They build houses in their home country,

leading to an ostentatious reputation of showing off the wealth they have gained through their diasporic experience (For a similar study about Bangladeshi community see Gardner and Ahmed, 2006).

5.4.3 Intermittent travellers

Some members of the Turkish-speaking community visit their country of origin less frequently, such as once every few years. One of the most common themes in the interview analysis was the young generations' lack of interest with homeland visits, as was narrated by the first-generation immigrants. Also, the second and third generation members of the community frequently described their hometown village as the place that their parents or grandparents came from. Many of them described hometown villages as boring and said that they only visit them once in a few years to see relatives out of family necessity.

> (…) maybe once of every two years, we visit because we have elderly relatives in North [Cyprus], so we
> go. The last time I went was two years ago. (Alice, 27, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Dessi (2008), Rothstein (2000) and Noriel (1995) argue that collective memory still induces a common social behaviour. However, my findings challenge their argument and demonstrates that there are limits of the influence of collective memory on behaviours of younger generations. Visits to Turkey are not frequent among the second and third generation. Many of the younger generations described their parents' hometown villages as boring, small and had a lack of attraction. First-generation migrants desire to visit their home country is rooted in childhood or youth memories whereas the second and third generations have these stories in their collective memory, yet their first-hand experiences contradicts with those stories. Therefore, when they get older, they lose their interest with their parents' hometown villages.

5.4.4 Fugitives

In some cases, immigrants are not allowed to visit their home country for years because of political reasons, legal status issues, or civil war. Nearly all the political refugees have not been

to Turkey for years after they came to the UK either because of ongoing case/trials, they are sentenced by Turkey for any crime or simply because of the ambiguity in their legal status in the UK as asylum seekers. This final reason was very common among Kurdish and Alevi members of the community whereas Cypriot Turks experienced ethnic cleansing and civil war in Cyprus and could not visit their home country during that period. Furthermore, Cyprus is now divided following the civil war which resulted in Greeks living in the south of the island and Turks living in the North. Those Cypriot Turks living in the south of the island had to leave their hometown villages, and they were not able to return for decades. It seems like those who are not allowed to visit Turkey romanticise it more. Mahir told he constantly thinks of his hometown in Kurdish region when he goes to bed. When he was talking about his only visit to Turkey after 24 years his eyes lit up with joy and excitement.

Some of the political refugees escaped from Turkey or Cyprus as they were sentenced because of their political activities and have not been able to visit their home country for decades.

> I got my British passport very quickly however I couldn't go to Turkey for 11 years because of ongoing trials over there. (…) My mum died when I was here, and I visited her grave ten years later… (Kazım, 54, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

When stating these words, he was nearly crying; had a big sip of his beer and walked away. He left the *kahvehane;* I waited for a while then started packing up. He came back 5 minutes later; I apologised for digging into such a sensitive issue and thanked him for participating in my interview.

In addition to this four-category homeland visit patterns, there are some elderly members of the community that live three to six months in Turkey or Cyprus and spend the rest of the year

in the UK after they are retired. In that way, they both appease their longing for their homeland and keep up with their children and grandchildren living in the UK.

Some people among the first-generation had traumatic experiences during the civil war in Cyprus or Turkey, and they have not visited their home country since they left. Also, there are some exceptional cases of second or third generation 'Turkish origin' people, mostly children of mixed marriages who have never been to Turkey or Cyprus in their entire lives. These are mostly people who weakly identify themselves as Turkish because they do not see Turkey or Cyprus as their homeland but as the ancestral land of one of their parents.

In both Alice's and Bob's cases, they share the traumatic experience of a civil war in their collective memory. They associate Cyprus with this trauma which they want to leave behind. Alice's grandmother has not been back to Cyprus after they came to the UK and Bob's grandparents do not talk about Cyprus at all. He did not even know which city his mother was born in until very recently.

5.4.5 Post-mortem Travel of Body: Another Form of Myth of Return *"Take me back to homeland dead or alive!"*

As I have discussed above the 'myth of return' or in other words desire to settle down in home countries has been transformed into episodic holidays that play out an illusion of return (Kings et.al. 2000). However, some sentimental links with country of origin or family living there were still frequently articulated by the research participants. This feeling is referred to as *Özlem* which means longing in Turkish.

> I live in England missing my country, my family. I wake up some nights missing my country, my land.
>
> (Mahir, 57, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Elif, a second-generation woman who spent her childhood in London, finds her parents' hometown boring and does not want to visit Turkey every summer. Yet she feels *özlem* for Turkey. I think this feeling of *özlem* towards a place that she does not even desire is a virtual

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emotion reflected from collective memory as well as everyday talks about hometown (Poupazis, 2014). Whereas Mahir's feeling of *özlem* is a combination of romanticised and politicised views about his homeland. He is missing the Kurdish land, the imagined Kurdistan.

As for plans of moving back to country of origin are very vague and procrastinate the longing or desire to return displays itself in the form of wanting to be buried in their hometown village when they die. Most of the first-generation research participants expressed their wish to return to their country of origin before they die or to be buried there after they die.

> Even though I am British citizen, I belong to there. Unless I go there alive, only Allah knows what will happen tomorrow; my body will definitely go there, alive or dead. (Turkan, 51, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)
>
> I testified to my children to bury me in Kurdistan when I die. I cannot detach from that land. (Mahir, 57, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Transferring a corpse from the UK to Turkey is an expensive process, and there is not any religious requirement to do so. In Britain, designated areas in cemeteries are allocated for Muslims, and there are not any restrictions for Muslims to be buried in non-Muslim cemeteries. Also, in the Islamic faith, space does not have any role in sending prayer, so people can pray from Turkey or Cyprus for those loved ones buried abroad. However, it seems it has a symbolic value rather than religious for members of the community to be buried in their place of origin. It seems they see it as a return to their roots or as a display of showing that they belong to their country of origin. Also, some members of the community see it as a last duty towards their beloved ones. For them, transferring deceased bodies seems to meet the ultimate wish of every migrant subjects, returning to homeland.

> Well, some people bury their dead here. It is okay, in most of the Christian cemeteries, there is a section allocated for the Muslims. But being buried in a Muslim country is different. I went pilgrimage to Mecca, but I don't even want to be buried over there. I want to be buried in my homeland. Would you not want

to be buried in Turkey? Your relatives would pray for you when they visit the cemetery. The cemetery is at the centre in our village, so when people pass by they can pray for you. We say take me back to homeland dead or alive, you know. We don't want even our dead bodies to stay over here. (Yasar, 54, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

As a further response to these demands, the Turkish Religious Foundation (TRF) created Funeral Services Solidarity Fund to help Turkish citizens living abroad to transfer the corpse of their family member to their villages. The TRF's UK branch offers the same service to Turkish-speaking people living in diaspora. This fund works as a kind of insurance where people pay annually for themselves or their family and when they pass away, the Turkish Religious Foundation cover all the funeral expenses and send the deceased one to the hometown village they assigned before. The same participants expressed his delightfulness with this service:

The expense of a funeral in London is around £3000. If you transfer the corpse to Turkey, it costs around £5000. But if you register this fund, you annually pay small amounts of money. And when you die they start your funeral proceedings here like registration with Turkish Consulate, washing up the body, doing the prayer at the Turkish mosque, and then transferring your corpse to wherever you want to be in Turkey with an attendant. (Yasar, 54, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

5.5 Bringing Cultural Material from Homeland Visits

When I was living within the Turkish-speaking community before I started my fieldwork, I observed many Turkish-speaking people bringing materials from Turkey or Cyprus as ornaments to use for home decoration, or accessories representing their local culture. Some people simply bring herbs and spices to make meals from traditional Turkish cuisine. Bringing objects from Turkey is beyond a simple importing or trade activity; it is a reinforcement of identity performance in diaspora space. In theatrical terms, the ornaments that are brought from the home countries are used in private spaces including things such as the evil eye or *kilim* (rug) or *zulfikar* ornaments (Sword of Ali), which are the décor of the stage or as it is called in

theatres, *set dressing*. These are not actually used by anyone, but which make performance look more realistic like the curtains over a window, or a bowl of flowers on a table, and so on. These objects are there for their symbolic value such as representing Turkish, Kurdish, Cypriot or Alevi culture rather than for their use value in daily life. Even though houses are private spaces and in Erving Goffman's dramaturgy theory it is the backstage where performers can relax, drop their front, and step out of character (see Goffman 1990) in diasporic spaces the home is where identity is performed in a most pretentious manner. The public space is where they encounter other cultures and negotiate to fit in whereas private is where they are entirely in charge of the space. Therefore, they can display and perform cultural identity freely and openly. For a Turkish-speaking family the living room of their home is a *front stage* or *front of house* where cultural identity is displayed most, and in that way, it is transmitted to children in the household. Items that members of the Turkish-speaking community bring from home country when they visit vary from cultural accessories and ornaments to ethnic food and liturgical items such as *tespihs* or *takkes* (hat).

> What I would bring back from Cyprus? In the village, I told you my dad comes from there is a lot of women that make things called *Lefkara işi* [Lefkaritika or Lefkara Lace]. They are really nice, and you can put them into like *tepsi* [tray], that's really kind of a Cypriot, iconic kind of a something you can have in your house. I do have that, and everyone has that Cyprus *tepsi*, with a picture of Cyprus [map] on it. It is like the only souvenirs you can find in Cyprus. I think every Turkish Cypriot person has got one of these *tepsi*s in their house. (Hande, 29, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

I have seen lots of these *tepsis* and Turkish coffee sets with the map of Cyprus on them in many of my visits. These objects are in households for display purposes rather than for their actual use.

Figure 4: Cyprus Tepsi

Some of the items that are brought from the homeland are highly sentimental, such as piece of soil which represents to the people that they are rooted in this homeland. Especially among nationalist or patriotic groups soil metaphorically refers to a sense of belonging to Turkey and the smell of the soil and air of a hometown village are romanticised narrated. Some of my research participants even have first-hand experience of kissing the soil of Turkey when they visit or bringing a piece of soil and rock from the homeland.

> When I am returning from my first visit to Turkey after 20 years later, I brought a piece of rock and soil with me. I still save it in my house. (Mahir, 57, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

First-generation migrants who have not been to Turkey for years almost sanctify the soil of their home country. That strong sentimental attachment to the soil strengthens cultural identity and contributes collective memory of the community. Mahir's attachment to soil has political motives behind as well. Because that soil represents the imagined Kurdistan he has been fighting for and Kurdish identity can be secured in diaspora only if it is linked to that land.

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Not every participant narrated romantic and almost sanctified views about objects from Turkey or Cyprus. Many of the participants told that they bring food and herbs to use in cooking. A few participants (Begum, Guler, Ela, Hande) told me during the interviews that before the restrictions on the transfer of animal products via plane, they used to bring halloumi and traditional meat products such as *sucuk* (sausage) and *pastırma* (air-dried cured beef). It does not necessarily have any political or romantic connotations, it is just about taste. However, taste tells us a lot about identity as well. Because food is an important part of a culture and with their food preference the Turkish-speaking community maintain an important aspect of their culture.

The most common items that are brought from home countries by the members of Turkish-speaking community are ethnic food products. Turkish cuisine seems to be recognised as the essential component of cultural identity performance. Even though their taste varies in music or fashion, many of the research participants talked very highly about Turkish food. It seems food is the easiest form of displaying identity. Or it could be the hardest thing to change in one's cultural identity. Like many other aspects of culture, food is perceived as being the best when it is from its country of origin. Therefore, most of the members of the community mentioned bringing food from home country visits. It is similar for many other migrant communities (see, Narayan, 1995; Harbottlle, 1997; Vallianatos and Raine, 2008; Rabikowska, 2010)

> Don't we bring the smell of *memleket* with us? *Tarhana* [a dried food based on a fermented mixture of grain and yoghurt], species, dried dolma [stuffed pepper dish], dried aubergine, herbs and nuts. We used to bring *sucuk* and cheese as well in our suitcases, but now we are not allowed to. So, we transport it with lorries. (Güler, 39, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Güler defined food as the smell of *memleket* (home country). Many participants told that they bring ingredients to make traditional Turkish or Cypriot cuisine. With this food, an aspect of

cultural identity is reproduced. It can be even analysed within the context of assimilation and integration discussion. For instance, Alice told me that her grandparents do not eat anything other than Turkish dishes and stated it as an example of not being integrated into British culture. First-generation participants see eating traditional cuisine as not being assimilated. Although in many aspects Britain is perceived as more developed than Turkey and Cyprus by my participants, all of them describe Turkish cuisine as refined and sophisticated whereas British cuisine is seen as limited with only fish and chips. Moreover, the older generations criticise the younger generations' practice of eating fast-food such as fish and chips instead of traditional Turkish food as an indicator of cultural assimilation (see Harbottle, 1997)

Some of the research participants emphasised being a Turkish Muslim, and they said that they bring liturgical items that are unique to the Turkish understanding of Islam. As I understand from this, they use such items to both support their religious identity performance and tie perceptions of sacred with homeland.

> I also bought a *takke* (religious hat) and those leather socks, not the ones you can have wudu [ablution, ritual cleansing or washing] just normal, short socks. And it's just because my brother is part of this like erm, a different religious group and when I went to their centres, everyone was usually wearing them and mainly after the wudu to keep their foot clean and keep the centre, the mosque clean. And I really liked it, so I bought it for myself. It just reminds me of my home country because in England, some of your friends and teachers in college are Muslims, but not all of them are Turkish. So, it reminds me of where I come from. (Ayhan, 18, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Figure 5: Liturgical object Takke

Figure 6: Liturgical object Tesbih

These objects can simply be found in any Islamic shop in Britain. Yet these are not just any *tesbih* or *takke* but that of came from Turkey. In that practice sanctifying Turkey is strengthened with sacred objects. Religious identity is reconstructed and combined with ethnic identity. They do not perform any Muslim identity but a Turkish Muslim identity.

When I asked about bringing memorabilia from their home country, a few participants opposed the way I asked the question and said they did not need to remember their country of origin as they live there already even though they are in London. In this way, they emphasised their rootedness in the country of origin by expressing that they live the same lifestyle.

> No need to bring any memorabilia to remember *memleket*. It is always inside us; we don't need them to remind us. We know physically and spiritually that it [*memleket*] belongs to us. (Begum, 42, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Begum claimed that memorabilia would be distancing herself from the homeland and she thinks she always carries the homeland with her. She told that she does not bring any objects from her homeland but carries its memories with her all the time.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I aimed to discuss the migration motives and stories of the Turkish-speaking community in North London as well as their transnational mobility after they settled in the UK. I comprehensively discussed the current phase of the 'myth of return' among the community and how has it been transformed into episodic homeland visits. I discussed how the procrastination of return migration has evolved into the wish of be buried in their hometown village. I analysed community members' homeland visiting patterns in four categories as well as analysing how identity is tied to a place of origin and the desire to return reproduces this link. Within the next chapter I am going to discuss everyday life of the Turkish-speaking community.

CHAPTER 6

SPACE AND EVERYDAY LIFE OF THE TURKISH-SPEAKING COMMUNITY IN LONDON

Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to analyse everyday life of the Turkish-speaking community in order to present their cultural practices in a context such as the way in which people attribute meaning to objects and places, or cultural references of a ritual in diaspora space. Based on Appadurai's (1996) model of global 'ethnoscapes', I will analyse the everyday life of the community via three pillars; Culturalscape, Religioscape, and Politicalscape. Appadurai's original theory does not include 'religioscapes'; this pillar was introduced by other researchers such as Elizabeth McAlister (2005) and Bryan Turner (2008). While taking into consideration McAlister and Turner's research I refer to religioscape as the manifestation of religion in physical space. Some other scapes can be added such as economicscape or cyberscape however, I limited it to three scapes that are most directly related to the identity performativity. In the section on culturalscape, I will discuss walking through cultural spaces such as village associations and kahvehanes. I will discuss Turkish tea and coffee ceremonies as mundane rituals. I will include observations on Turkish weddings; praying in an unconventional form of mosque; and shame as a social control. In the religioscape section, I will discuss religion as a distinctive cultural characteristic and practices of beliefs such as Eid celebration. Moreover, I will analyse *mevlid* as a form of popular religiosity; the Alevi community's *cem* ceremony and some superstitions among the community. In the politicalscape section, I will discuss transfer and reinterpretations of homeland disputes, as well as Kurdish newroz festival as a practice of diaspora politics in a folkloric form. Within this theoretical framework, I aim to discuss practices of the community members in everyday life, and performativity of identity.

6.1 Culturalscape

Discussion of cultural identity is based on assumptions of British and Turkish cultural traits. Even though there is no concrete definition of 'Turkishness' or 'Britishness', most people define certain manners in their daily life as 'very British' or 'typically Turkish'. During my fieldwork, I heard statements like 'I am very Turkish in that sense', or 'I feel quite British when I am around other Turks' many times. That means we have concepts of *Turkishness* or *Britishness* and degrees of them in our mind-sets. In this section, I will discuss the culturalscape of the Turkish-speaking community or in other words, Turkish cultural practices alongside British cultural life.

There is a cultural cherry-picking among the second and third generations of the Turkish-speaking community, which means they pick and choose desirable aspects of both Turkish and British culture and avoid what they perceive to be undesirable ones with little room to manoeuvre. When they are faced with aspects of British or Turkish culture that they do not want to be associated with, they avoid situations using phrases such as 'it is too old-fashioned Turkish' or 'it is how British people do, we are different'. Alternatively, they follow some rules of Islam such as not eating pork but ignore the prohibition of drinking alcohol. So, they choose to 'go native' when they want, but they still avoid from particular aspects of the customs. When it comes to the first-generation especially that of first and second waves, despite steadfastly refusing to adopt local cultural aspects, I argue that they calibrate their 'Turkishness' according to local conditions and adopt practical aspects of British manners as their own.

6.1.1 Walking through Cultural Spaces

As is discussed in the literature review chapters, Certeau (1984:105) claims that cities become meaningful and habitable through the legends, memories, and dreams that accumulate in and haunt places. Lefebvre's and Certeau's theories link physical space with memories and narrations about the space. I argue that North London represents more than just an urban space

for the Turkish-speaking community. Community associations, kahvehanes (coffeehouses) and religious institutions are not neutral spaces but ethnic places where cultural identity performances are encouraged. I spent a significant portion of my fieldwork visiting community associations, *kahvehanes*, religious institutions, ethnic shops, and 'walking through' the ethnic neighbourhoods to analyse cultural landscape. Based on de Certeau's (1984) theory, I analyse religious spaces, community centres and coffee houses to understand experiences of diaspora place and to understand these spaces' primary role in identity construction.

Location-based memories, stories, landscape objects, thoughts, and sights that people live within, have an important role in identity construction (Hart, 2008; McCracken, 1988). North London has a significant role for the Turkish-speaking community. Different than the rest of the UK, Turkish culture is visible in North London because of the size of the Turkish-speaking community. Based on Back's (1996) theory of 'neighbourhood nationalism' I argue that members of the Turkish-speaking community display a sense of belonging to North London. Third places like community centres, religious spaces and coffee houses offer a break in a shuttle between home and work as well as a break from the mainstream culture flowing on the streets of London (Oldenburg, 1991).

6.1.1.1 Travelling to the Heart of Turkish Community Life: Village Associations

Among the Turkish-speaking community the home town is central in self-definition of identity. When someone newly comes to the community, the first question asked of this person is the city, town and/or village of origin. Since Turkey is a multi-ethnic country, asking about someone's home town aims to explore other aspects of their identity such as ethnic origin and religion. There is also an intense level of favouritism among the community called '*hemşericilik*' (fellow villagemen). This refers to the unfair support of fellow villagers, where they are prioritised in social relations. It is a way of understanding and organising social relations among the community. During my fieldwork, I was always asked about my home

town. Therefore, I argue that, home town/village associations play a major role in community life. First-generation migrants keep up with developments in their home country village. Moreover, they aim to make the second and third generations socialise with fellow village people from Turkey while they are in the UK. In this way, cultural identity is reproduced through generations. Verkuyten (2014:11) defines the process of 'ethnicization' referring to the social process of defining and marking ethnic distinctions and developing forms of solidarity. It involves the process "by which a group of persons comes to see itself as a distinct group linked by bounds of kinship or their equivalents, by a shared history, and by cultural symbols that represent their peoplehood" (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998:34). Community associations provide a platform for the community to spend time outside of home or work and enable them to socialise with other community members. Supporting Fuligni et.al.'s (2005) argument, I argue that group identification is more intense if the group identity is based on cultural, ethnic or racial labels.

Village associations have lounges that are similar to a coffeehouse and are used as a gathering place. Being from a particular village is the only requirement to be a member of these associations. In addition to catching up with developments in the hometown/village, people play card games, watch Turkish TV channels and talk about popular politics. Most of the associations organise cultural activities for younger generations such as teaching an instrument or folkloric dance and organise trips or other social events. Like *kahvehanes* this space is only open to men.

Figure 7: A village association's lounge

Figure 8: Flaneur enjoying his tea at the lounge of a village association

There are also community centres run by political groups. They have similar functions with village associations, with the only nuance being that their membership is not based on hometown but on an ideology. Most of them have an anti-assimilationist agenda, hence they organise cultural courses and activities to reproduce cultural and political identity (see Unutulmaz, 2015). As Demir (2017) claims Kurdish identity is being shed in diaspora via ethnic institutions. Also, most of the community centres and village associations have secondary functions. For instance, some of them have big lounges that are used as wedding

venues by the community. Also, on religious days, the lounges can be utilized for religious ceremonies or for a funeral when a member of the community passes away.

> Every Eid we have prayers in our community centre. People usually go there early in the morning, we start prayer and after the prayer you know we all congratulate each other and then we have like a little feast. We eat together, spend some time together. It is just a way of getting together with people that you haven't seen for a long time and not forgetting where you come from and the people from your country. Just getting together living a bit of life together that you might live in Turkey at Eid. (Ayhan, 18, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

In addition, most of these associations lobby for its members and some of them organise demonstrations in London. As membership of these associations brings social capital, volunteering at them helps to build prestige within the community. For instance, *dedes,* who lead the religious rituals, are highly respected among the Alevi community. That gives them a prestige that could be instrumentalised in social or economic relations. It is similar for the chairmen of any associations among the community.

Most of these associations have identity politics in their agenda. Their activities aim to encourage and reconstruct cultural identity. The Kurdish community is the most active group among the Turkish-speaking community as promoting Kurdish identity is the main political agenda for the Kurdish diaspora across the Europe. Rojda a 27-year-old second-generation Kurdish woman, from the third wave told me the importance of Kurdish Community Centre for the Kurdish youth in London.

> We have Newroz celebration, festivals, and conferences for youth. Actually, we aim to bring Kurdish youth around Kurdish identity. Teach their culture and you know, we try to keep them away from harmful activities, addictions etcetera with directing them towards their own identity with these activities.

Figure 9: Lounge of Cemevi

Figure 10: Wall of a village association

6.1.1.2 Kahvehanes: Turkish coffeehouses as Third Place

Kahvehanes play a major role in men's socialisation in Turkey. However, it has a class dimension as well as it is related with having lack of cultural capital. For instance, within Turkey's and Cyprus' social strata, people of my generation and educational background do not socialise in *kahvehanes* but at Western style cafés and pubs. I recognised that in London diaspora *kahvehanes* play an even more significant role in working-class males' socialisation. *Kahvehanes* carry the characteristics of all three representations of space Lefebvre (1991) argues. They are physical spaces, however located in the heart of community life, therefore they are social spaces. Moreover, they are result of collective memory therefore bounded to mental space. Based on de Certeau's (1984) theory I argue that kahvehanes are places that are practiced as third space which connect Turkish-speaking community with collective memory and structure the determining conditions of social life. *Kahvehanes* has similar functions to Irish pubs for first and second-generation of Irish diaspora; they link the home country to diaspora. Yet, the more Irish diaspora become settled in the UK, the less significant the role of Irish pubs become. For the Turkish-speaking community *kahvehanes* still play a significant role as they gather, catch up with community life and developments in the homeland and most importantly reconstruct cultural identity. Kahvehanes as third places are local, preferably in walking distance to where community members live therefore, they are 'the places on the corner' (see Oldenburg 1991). During my fieldwork, I went to many *kahvehane* in North London. Some of them are underground and nameless with no board or sign indicating the presence of a coffeehouse. Therefore, these *kahvehanes* serve only regular visitors as there is no signs for outsiders to find them.

I argue that, *kahvehanes* carry many aspects of what Michel Foucault (2002) calls heterotopia. Heterotopic spaces function in non-hegemonic conditions and they are spaces of otherness, which are neither here nor there (Foucault, 2002). London *kahvehanes* are

heterotopic space because firstly, they are only open to men. Secondly, they break mainstream culture flowing outside, on the streets of London. They are neither in Turkey nor in prevailing cultural life of London. They take place out of sight when one enters and provide a subculture environment. *Kahvehanes* are parallel space which exists in time but also exist outside of time. In this way, these spaces resist change and cultural identity is strengthened from the point time paused on leaving Turkey. Moreover, killing time and cutting the connection with the outside world or actual time is the main purpose of people visiting *kahvehanes*. Kahvehanes carry many of the characteristics of a third place Oldenburg (1991) discusses. The spirit of the *kahvehanes* as third place is a playful one. The main purpose is killing time with limited activities like watching a soccer game, playing card or board games such as *tavla* (backgammon) or *okey* (rummikub) and talking about popular politics or daily life. The main purpose of people gathering in *kahvehanes* as a third place is joy, and relaxation (see Oldenburg 1991). *Kahvehanes* have their own subculture accordingly to its regular visitors. Their visitors' profile is mostly working-class or classless men with limited cultural capital. Oldenburg's (1991) theory argues that third plaes are neutral places to gather where no one is required to play host and in which all feel at home and comfortable. However, in kahvehanes, the kahvecis perform the role of hosting and accommodating. Moreover, *kahvehanes* are isolated from the outside world and some of them are not freely accessible as a public place, as there is no signage or any announcement letting the public access. In order to get in, one must have certain networks and knowledge and once entered one is supposed to make certain gestures. *Kahvehanes* as third places have their regular visitors who give the characteristic of the place, dominate it and make it feel alive (Oldenburg 1991). Even though I was breaching certain codes with my clothes and with not knowing anybody inside, I imitated the behavioural patterns and was welcomed as a Turkish speaking man. *Kahvehanes* are only accessible for men, all the guests and waiters were men. In a few cases, I witnessed women staff in their late 40s working at *kahvehanes* who have

kinship ties with the owners of the venues. In this space, I used the advantage of my gender identity. I argue that, any non-masculine researchers would not be able to access the space. However, I do not fit the overall profile of *kahvehane* visitors. Hence why in most of my *kahvehane* visits a few people, sometimes everybody turned and looked at me wondering who I was and why I was there. In *kahvehane* space, I was easily spotted as a Simmelian *stranger*, both with my dress pattern and other manifestations of cultural capital and lacking network/social capital among the group. According to Simmel's (1971) theory, *the stranger* is different than *outsider* or *wanderer*. *The outsider* has no specific relation to a group, and *the wanderer* comes today and leaves tomorrow while *the stranger* comes today and stays tomorrow. As a researcher, I was not a 'native' member of the *kahvehane* community. However, speaking Turkish and coming from Turkey helped me not to stay an *outsider* or *wanderer*. I was *the stranger* who will 'not leave tomorrow' in my case after the field study. *The stranger* is a member of the group in which he lives and participates and yet remains distant from the 'native' members of the group. In comparison to other forms of social distance and difference (such as class, gender, and even ethnicity) the distance of the stranger has to do with his 'origins'. My distance with the community was rooted in both my social-cultural background for example being educated in European institutions and my ethnic background. Because I was not a native member of the Turkish-speaking community of London but a Turkish citizen with Greek heritage who came to the UK recently. The stranger is connected to community by only the most general commonalities that is language and country of origin in my case; yet is still relied on by large groups of people. Oxymoronically, the stranger may also be a close confidant because their social distance from the group prevents them from judging the group too harshly. Also, when I overcame their primary suspicions members of the community felt comfortable about telling me some personal stories due to my social distance to them. They knew that as a *stranger* I was not in a position within the community to judge or

criticise them. Therefore, throughout the field study I flipped between insider and outsider roles.

When I visited kahvehanes I always went first to the managers known as *kahveci* and told them about my research. *Kahveci*s play a key role in community life as they know all visitors, hear their conversations and witness interactions of the community. I argue that *kahvecis* have intimate and informal interactions with the guests as members of the same community. The guests address them with their names or nicknames. In one of the *kahvehanes*, guests were politer towards the only female staff member, addressing her as 'Matmazel' (Mademoiselle). In many occasions, *kahvecis* offered me free drinks as a gesture, as I was both 'their guest' and a student. In some other cases I was the stranger sitting and taking notes. I felt they expected me to finish my drink and leave.

Most *kahvehanes* in London are not big places. Numbers of tables vary from 6 to 15. Some of them have billiard tables or slot and other casino gambling machines. Most of *kahvehanes* serves alcohol and food which is different than their counterparts in Turkey. In Turkey mostly tea and coffee are served, and alcohol is prohibited in *kahvehanes*. In London *kahvehanes* men play card games or *okey* or *tavla* sitting around tables, watch horse racing or the Turkish teams' soccer games. Even only a few people watch it actively, the TV is always set up on a Turkish channel that is part of the ambiance and *kahvehane* subculture. If the *kahvehane* is run by a political group, the TV would be set up for Turkish or Kurdish news channels according to political view of the group. One of the characteristics of *kahvehanes* is the fast circulation of beverages. As people spend a long time and do not pay to play games, *kahvecis* ask guests very often to top up their drink. It is a behaviour code to know when visiting *kahvehanes*. If one does not top up the drink frequently, *kahveci* would get annoyed and that person would be excluded from the space. Therefore, in order to avoid annoying the *kahvecis* I sometime ended up drinking five or six cups of bitter Turkish tea during two hours of field study in a *kahvehane*.

As I mentioned before in Turkey mostly working-class and classless men spend time in *kahvehanes*. The profile of the people visiting *kahvehanes* in London was similar which could be described as lower-class, uneducated, middle-aged men. From a cultural sociologist's perspective, I would say the iconographic preferences of lowbrow taste are represented in painting, photography, *kilim*, *cicim* (a type of rug) and kitsch ornaments of London *kahvehanes*. Similar to Oldenburg's (1991) argument, the inside of *kahvehanes* as a third place is unimpressive looking without extravagance or grandiosity. All the *kahvehanes* I have been to have simple tablecloths and chairs of which I would describe as kitsch. Most of them have pastoral pictures on the wall that are either picture of a hometown/village or random green, far, rural places represent Anatolia as their homeland. Some of them have political posters, flags or maps on the walls. And almost all of them have Turkish football teams' posters.

Based on Oldenburg's (1991) theory of third place, I argue that the *kahvehanes*' function as third places can be summarised as follows: they contribute to the cohesion of the community enabling them to engage in dialogue with each other. The newcomers are inducted into the neighbourhood and obtain knowledge quickly about communal life via *kahvehanes*. They are civil society centres where people discuss politics. People establish friendships in *kahvehanes* without any prior arrangements or excuses in an easy come and easy go facility. For retired or unemployed people, *kahvehanes* are invaluable places for socialisation and which help them to keep in touch with others.

Figure 11: Kahvehanes in London

The spoken language is Turkish in London *kahvehanes*, but there can be groups talking Kurdish among themselves. People play card games and chat about the game and occasionally make some comments about the soccer game on the TV. They catch up with community life such as is health and well-being of relatives or are there any members of the community starting a new job. If there is anyone recently who has visited the home country, they ask him similar

things about people in their country of origin. In this way, they update themselves with life in the homeland. As *kahvehanes* are very local third spaces on the corner, outsiders or those who are not regular are easily spotted when they visit.

Turkish tea and coffee are served in their traditional glasses. One can also find unique ethnic beverages at these places such as *ayran*, or *şalgam suyu* (a beverage made of turnip), or Turkish brand beers in London *kahvehanes*. All the setting and audience is set up as a display of cultural identity. Being part of a kahvehane community is not merit-based but tied to essence such as ethnicity and kinship links with the community. On the other hand, groups within the community reconstruct themselves very dynamically. For instance, they establish small groups to play card games. When the game is over some people leave the team and some others from the community replace them quickly. Thus, performance is carried by replaceable actors. Slang and vulgar language including swear words are used often in this space which made me uncomfortable to be in and in fact I would not go these places unless I was researching. Hence why I did not stay in touch with anybody I met at *kahvehanes* when my field study was finished.

6.1.2 A Hundred Cups of Turkish Tea and Coffee

In almost all my visits to community centres, associations, work places or homes of the research participants, I was offered a cup of Turkish tea in its traditional glass. Offering tea is a gesture to express well-intention and hospitality whereas accepting the offer is almost socially necessary. During the field study having cups of tea with the members of the community and bounded with my participants. I usually prefer an earl grey tea with milk over bitter Turkish tea, yet in order to establish these links I drank maybe a hundred glasses of bitter Turkish tea in three years visiting community members in North London.

In Turkish and Kurdish culture drinking tea and coffee are almost ritualistic practice with its preparation, service and all the symbols in the process. For instance, tea, *çay* in Turkish is brewed in *çaydanlık* (a metal kettle) and served with special small glasses called *ince belli çay*

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bardağı (thin waist tea glasses), accompanied with teaspoons and tea plates. Soon after one's tea is finished; the host tops it up which is a way of showing hospitality to the guests. Until the guest takes the teaspoon out of the glass and puts it horizontally on the glass to cover it. This routine of topping up after the guest finishes his drink continues. Placing the spoon horizontally means that the person is okay and does not want to drink anymore. However, it is perceived rude to drink less than two glasses because it is interpreted as the guest did not like the tea the host brewed for them. I had this information in my cultural baggage when I came to the Britain as a researcher. However, I am only discussing these practices as I observed them among the Turkish-speaking community of London. Tea is a very popular beverage both in Turkish and British societies. However, its presentation is different in two cultures and as Kalem (2016) argues adding milk to tea is perceived as immersing British culture among the Turkish-speaking community. I argue that in diaspora context presentation of Turkish tea is a mundane ritual which is also in dichotomy with British tea bags. Turkish tea represents the tradition whereas teabags represent British culture. Turkish and Kurdish cultural identities are reproduced everyday with such mundane rituals. Drinking Turkish *çay* in *ince belli çay bardağı* is a performance of cultural identity whereas drinking British tea with milk is perceived as being assimilated. Especially among younger generations those who try to perform a strong Turkish or Kurdish identity there is an emphasis on visiting Turkish cafés and drinking *çay*.

Figure 12: Turkish Tea I am offered during field study

As I observed, another mundane ritual is the Turkish coffee '*kahve*' ceremony. Different than *çay*, *kahve* is not offered to everyone but only special or respected guests. I am only offered it on two occasions and both hosts knew me for a while. Its material, preparation and service make it different than the ordinary serving of filter coffee or other types of coffee. Turkish *kahve* is cooked in special metal pots called *cezve* on fire and served in special small glasses

with handles called *fincan,* placed on a small coffee plate. Mostly, but not always, a piece of Turkish delight is served with it. A *fincan* of Turkish *kahve* is served on special occasions thus, *kahve* ceremony is a more vivid and value-laden cultural practice. For example, when a man and his family visit the family of the woman he wants to marry, a *fincan* of Turkish *kahve* is served to the guests before talking about marriage arrangements. This ritual is still well practiced both in Turkey and the UK. I will discuss this further in the following section about marriages.

Figure 13: Turkish Kahve

6.1.3 A Wedding without Music? Attending a Conservative Turkish Wedding

During my field study, I was informed that some of the community centres are used as a venue for weddings of community members. I was also informed that Turkish/Kurdish music and dances were performed at weddings of the Turkish-speaking community. Therefore, when I was invited to the wedding of a couple in the community whom I have known for three years, I attended it both as a guest and an ethnographer. The wedding was in a big banquet hall in North London. The bride is second-generation Turkish from the second wave of migration and the groom, is first-generation Kurdish from the fourth wave. There were at least three hundred

guests and according to my observation almost all of them were Turkish or Kurdish. I was informed that the Turkish-speaking community organises extravagant weddings with live music of *davul* (drum) and *zurna* (clarion) and performance of traditional dances like *halay* (see Timmerman et.al. 2009). However, at this wedding there was no music or dancing as the couple and their families are religious and music or dance is not accepted as being Islamic. For me it was a new experience as I have never been to a wedding without music before. Although there was no music as a religious preference, male and female guests sit together like in secular weddings; the space was not allocated separately for women and men which is the Islamic way to use the space. A *ney* (flute) player performed mystic music for a while and an *imam* recited passages from the Quran.

The wedding started with the serving of food to the guests. The dishes were examples of traditional Turkish cuisine. The bride and groom walked in to the hall together to greet the guests and then the groom kissed the bride on her forehead on the stage. That is the traditionally approved form of intimacy between opposite sexes in public. The bride was wearing a red cover on her head over her bride's veil. Brides generally wear a piece of red colour cloth either a belt or scarf used in Turkish/Kurdish weddings in Turkey. Culturally it refers to the virginity of the bride which is a taboo in Turkish and Kurdish cultures.

Towards the end of the wedding guests queued to pin money or gold jewellery on the clothes of the bride and groom which is a very traditional practice in Turkish culture. In this wedding, the behavioural code was that people who are not family of the bride or groom put money in envelopes with their names on it and throw it into the box on the stage whereas family members pin gold jewellery. As a guest and friend of the groom I put some money in an envelope as well.

Figure 15: Pinning Money

Figure 16: Mystical Music and Citation of Quran

6.1.4 Praying at an Unconventional Mosque

In the early days of my time in Britain I visited London often as a tourist and to make preliminary observations in the field of research. When I was looking for a Turkish mosque at prayer time, I found the Sheikh Nazim Sufi Centre and Mosque in Hackney. The building used to be a church that was bought by Turkish Cypriots and they converted it into a mosque. Even though the building was repaired and restored; signs from former usage are visible like the big cross on the top and a statue of Jesus Christ. New signage for the mosque hangs below the statue. Also, when I visited the venue, there was an advertisement of an Islamic clothing shop attached to the exterior wall. In that way, a new cultural text was written on the building. It carries certain aspects of both British/Christian and Turkish/Islamic cultures after encounters in diaspora context. Hybridisation of cultural materials and identity performances are interconnected and reproduce each other. This building is significantly important for this research as a manifestation of cultural negotiation, and hybridisation. Based on Lewes' (2008) argument, I call this building a palimpsest.

Figure 17: A palimpsest mosque

In the Macmillan English dictionary (2007:1079), palimpsest is defined as "a very old document that writing was removed from and the surface written on again". In other words, a

palimpsest is a 'multi-layered record'. Palimpsests are the product of a layering of texts over a period. However, the meaning it refers to is more than that. As Lewes (2008: xi) argues it is a 'culture overwriting other culture'.

I argue that, the Sheikh Nazim Sufi Centre and Mosque represents encounters of several cultures within a diasporic context. The building is no longer a church, but not a usual form of mosque either. Visiting this mosque became a symbolic representation of my field research and of my encounters with the Turkish community in London. Many people may pass by or use the building with indifference. However, I came to the UK with up-to-date knowledge of mosques in Turkey. Therefore, when I visited the venue, I easily recognised its unconventional form.

6.1.5 *Ayıp*: Shame as a Social Control Mechanism

During field study, many first-generation respondents used *ayıp,* the Turkish word for shame, to describe different attitudes. Moreover, the younger generation participants told how they feel their behaviours are restricted by social norms of the Turkish-speaking community. As some female participants (Guler, Begum) narrated to me, certain behaviours or subjects are labelled as shameful among the Turkish-speaking community whereas the same behaviours are acceptable in British society. I argue that *ayıp* (shame) is the most efficient social control mechanism among the Turkish-speaking community in London. Yet, what is considered to be shameful varies across the cultures. For instance, sexuality is one of the taboo subjects among the Turkish-speaking community, however in British schools, sexual education is taught. Mary a second-generation Turkish woman from first wave narrated to me the tension she experienced between two cultures when growing up:

> For example, very early at school we were given sexual education. And some of that had to do with sex but most of it had to do with sexuality like knowing yourself and your body and how it works. And I remember coming home so scared that this information was now in my head I didn't want to because I

came home thinking oh my God, did I really need to know this? I felt scared that I knew things that I was probably not allowed to know or shouldn't have known. And then I couldn't share any of it, so it's kind of secrecy started around knowledge (…) I went to a girls' school. And there was a boys' school right next door, so my parents sent me to girls' school obviously to keep me contained, just girls only not to be mixed with boys. But then my school would have mixed days when the boys came to our school or we go to their schools and the idea was to try to integrate schools together. I would not go home and say that we had a mixed day with boys. I was too scared and though they would know and find out, then I would be in trouble. But then it wasn't my decision how I could not participate? It was so much, tearing me apart, not knowing which part was right which part was wrong.

When Turkish and Kurdish people first came to the UK from mainly traditional, Muslim, and rural areas of central Turkey in the second half of the 20th century, they encountered a highly industrialised, Christian-dominated society. Therefore, they adopted various strategies to preserve their tradition, culture, and identity. Labelling certain behaviours as *ayıp* enable them to ensure boundaries are not transgressed living in a foreign cultural landscape. The moral system categorising certain subjects as taboo and behaviours as shameful is the system of codes they brought with them when migrating from Turkey to Britain. As I observed, in any wave of Turkish migration, mostly men were the first to arrive, their wives and children joining them later. This is generally explained with economic circumstances such as first-generation migrants did not have enough resources to bring their family with them thus, they came by themselves first to save up. However, as the field data revealed there is another dimension in this migration pattern. Some of the first-generation migrant men were either very reluctant to bring their wives and children or very protective once their family arrived in the UK. During my field study, I met some Turkish/Kurdish men from fourth wave who have lived in the country for over ten years and they have not brought their wives and children to the UK yet. Instead, they visit their family every summer in Turkey whilst working in the UK for instance

in *kebap* restaurants rest of the year. Nazim who works in a kebap shop in north London and lives in the room above it told me why he did not bring his family to the UK:

> You study at university, you see how the environment is. How can I bring my family here? I have a teenage daughter. (Nazim, 51, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish)

When I probed with further questions, I understood that his unwillingness to bring his wife and children is to protect them from the perceived 'low moral state' of British society. Especially, British society's sexually liberal culture and high rates of alcohol or drug abuse which contrasts with traditional and rural Turkish/Kurdish Muslim culture. The general moral state in Britain is labelled as depraved or with a more general Turkish term '*pislik*' by the community. All the first-generation participants form any waves whose families are already in Britain mentioned their endeavours to protect younger generations from that filth. On the other hand, second and third generation respondents frequently mentioned restrictions they face around preserving their culture and identity. Sexual relations before marriage, the nakedness of the body, dating, or even marrying different ethnic background partners, disrespecting elders or customs, or not speaking Turkish well are perceived as *ayıp* (shameful) or *rezil* (scandalised/ disgraceful). As I observed, restrictions on sexuality are stricter towards women and includes not letting them go out or be seen out at night time. Some female participants (Begum, Guler, Ela, Alice, Meltem, Mary) told me during the interviews that some of the early comers of the community that even include third wave, did not allow their daughters to go to school or let them go to public places out of their *mahalle* (neighbourhood) on their own in order to protect them from the *pislik*. These restrictions are weakened by generations as my second-generation respondents told they are more liberal towards their children. Moreover, as I observed the first and the second wave migrants have more liberal approaches towards sexuality. Yet, the third and fourth waves of Turkish-speaking migrants perceive them as being assimilated or '*anglicised*'.

Gretty M. Mirdal's (2006) research on Turkish-Kurdish women in Denmark lists the certain circumstances provoking feelings of shame among the community. According to her research, there are three main categories of situations that are perceived as shameful: situations related to sexuality; situations related to trespassing boundaries or being 'out of place', and socio-economic inequality. Her research mirrors my findings from the Turkish-speaking community in London. I argue that, not following customs, or the morals and norms of Turkish/Kurdish society disgrace both individuals and their families. I was even told some stories about family and relatives not attending some community members' weddings because they were mixed marriages with non-Muslim partners.

Even though shame is triggered by an external source, for many it is rooted in their upbringing hence why it is instilled in their subconscious from a young age. Informal means of social control is the internalisation of social norms and values during the socialisation process. As Morris Janowitz (1975) defined it, social control refers to societies' ability to regulate itself. According to Edward A. Ross (2009), belief systems act as an informal means of social control exerting a greater control on people's behaviour than any formal means. Social control is succeeded by the invention of custom, norms, and mores and these are applied to society by culture during socialisation processes. Informal means of social control including sanctions for those who are not following norms vary from criticism and disapproval to shame and social exclusion. In different groups, the volume and the form of sanctions can change, and in extreme cases, depending on which social norm is breached, the sanctions may be violent. For instance, sexual disloyalty of women in traditional Kurdish tribes in Turkey is punishable by killing that individual which is known as an honor killing (Sev'er and Yurdakul, 2001; Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009).

Another social control mechanism among the Turkish-speaking community that is collectively performed to encourage each member to stick to custom and tradition is *dedikodu*

(gossip) or as commonly used, *laf olur* (they would talk about us). When someone is seen doing 'shameful' things, gossip circulates about that individual and their family. This can result in disapproval or even exclusion from the community. For instance, gossip spreads about families whose children are assimilated. In most cases, the gossip regarding a scandal can even spread to hometowns back in Turkey or Cyprus as it is the root of the customs or norms that the community follows. Based on Lindzey's (1954) argument, I argue that, in this way, continuity/permanence of tradition and reproduction of cultural identity in diaspora are ensured. In that way, within an enormously wide range of behavioural potentialities, community members are led to develop certain behaviours which are confined to the narrower range of what is acceptable for them by the group standards.

> For instance, when I take my children to their schools, I wear my tracksuit. Other Turkish parents say 'Aa! Did you run off the bed? Why did not you dress up properly?' Foreigners [British people] do not judge you like this; it is in our culture. It is same when you go to weddings, they judge you with how much money you donated to the couple, and what you wear. Even in funerals it is like that. (Güler, 39, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish)

Güler was very unhappy about the social control mechanism within the community. She told me that she has been suffering within the community th entire of her life. She is not an economically independent woman and her English skills are limited. Hence, she is dependent on the Turkish-speaking community and her husband to survive. This vulnerable position leaves her no space to negotiate and she is very susceptible to informal control mechanism. However, she is not the only example and many Turkish-Kurdish women without economic independence or ability to work out of the community are in a similar position. Living in a cosmopolitan city like London makes it physically difficult if not impossible to monitor one another's attitudes constantly. However, I argue that concentration of the Turkish-speaking community in certain boroughs London and their dependency on social capital within the

community makes it difficult to avoid from these social control mechanisms. Moreover, if someone does not possess general cultural norms of the community, they are negatively labelled or stigmatised. Stigma is another informal means of social control as the community limits and regulates the behaviours of the individuals via them. As Goffman (1990) argues stigma differentiates outsiders from insiders and in that way, provide group solidarity (see Falk 2001).

6.2 Religioscape

The role of religious institutions in diaspora space goes beyond the sole purpose of worship. Religious institutions are one of the few spaces where home culture is reproduced and transmitted to younger generations (see Van der Veer 1995; Warner and Wittner 1998). Theological education is taught to children such as reading of Arabic script and/or memorising sections of the Quran. However, in their counterparts in diaspora, culture and religion reinforce each other and practices around these two are performed together (see Kucukcan, 1999; Yagmur and van de Vijver, 2011; Gungor et.al., 2011, Costu and Costu, 2015). For instance, *Cemevi* is not only a place of worship, but it is also a space where the Alevi cultural identity is performed and strengthened. Turkish is the main spoken language, and cultural courses from Turkish language to folklore dances are given to children. Likewise, in mosques, Turkish language is taught, in addition to theological education. Ethnic shops are concentrated around the religious institutions and cultural identity is demonstrated explicitly and in abundance. As I discussed in the previous chapter, displaying of religious identity is perceived as not being assimilated, therefore being visible at religious institutions is identity performance itself. Turkish children going to Turkish mosques at the weekends to learn how to read the Quran is a common practice among the community. For the Alevi community *cemevi* plays this role as children learn ritualistic *semah* dance and playing traditional stringed instrument *saz*.

I bring my children to *cemevi* because when we are here, they witness practices. For instance, if there is a funeral or *kirk yemegi* [meal given at the fortieth day of someone's passing away] they see it. That is how they learn our faith and culture. My daughter taking *semah* courses, she learns the meaning of it as well. (Begum, 42, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Figure 18: Some Turkish mosques in North London

6.2.1 Religion as a Distinctive Cultural Characteristic

One of my earliest research findings about the Turkish-speaking community was that practices around belief and religion are an important component of their cultural identity. Many other scholars studying Turkish immigrants in Western Europe analysed the role of religion in identity formation (see, Gungor et.al., 2011; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). Religious events are special occasions when the group identity is displayed most explicitly and reproduced. In that way, religious identity is performed and transmitted to younger generations. As research findings indicate, both Sunni and Alevi communities see religion as a kind of safety net of cultural identity in diaspora. Therefore, religious education is considered as a preventive measure against assimilation. Muslim identity is emphasised among the community as an essential component of cultural identity (see Alba, 2005). When I visited religious institutions such as mosques, I heard many times sermons and speeches about maintaining Muslim identity and not becoming a degenerate youth. As I observed, not displaying religious identity is perceived as being lost or degenerated in diaspora (see Costu and Costu, 2015). I argue that, for Alevis, keeping the Alevi tradition and transmitting it to the younger generation is the most important agenda in diaspora as they had to leave Turkey because they were not allowed to

display their identity. Therefore, diaspora is the place where they can perform and reconstruct their religious identity. For Turkish Cypriots, Muslim identity is the distinctive feature of the community that distinguishes its culture from Greek Cypriots. During a religious event, I attended in the Turkish Cypriot Community Centre in 2016, a hodja (religious leader), who was leading the ceremony, started his speech with references to the importance of Islam for Turkish Cypriots both in Cyprus and in diaspora. Hodja said that Turkish Cypriots have not been assimilated in the UK and still practice their customs and traditions. I think his words were advice and wishful thinking rather a description of the real case. And then he added:

> What distinguishes us from the other community [Greeks] on the island [Cyprus] is our religion, salah prayer and our devotion to Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Otherwise, there won't be any difference between them and us. We should not forget that and should teach it to younger generations.

As some of Cypriots respondents narrated to me, Islam is performed as a cultural practice among the Turkish Cypriot community such as getting male children circumcised or not eating pork. Religious practices are amalgamated with cultural practices. Even secular members of the community perform some religious practices in the form of Turkish culture or some Turkish cultural aspects performed as a religious practice.

> There are certain roles that Turkish Cypriots abide by, and some that they don't, when you look at religion. For example, not eating pork is something that you probably will find in many households where as the consumption of alcohol is okay. Then you will find many families that perhaps fast during the month of Ramadan and may even pray during that month. I guess it's amalgamation of religion and culture that creates blurred lines between what is culture and what is religion. And a lot of the cultural practices in the Turkish Cypriot community are taken from their religion whether they realise that or not. Like respecting parents, being very loyal, and there are a lot of strong cultural characteristics in the Turkish Cypriot culture which are derived from the religion, but then the core religious practices are lost, like daily prayer or pilgrimage. (Hande, 29, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

6.2.2 Some Practices of Belief

6.2.2.1 "Bayramınız Mübarek olsun!": Attending Feast Celebration in London

Among the Turkish-speaking community there are two main festivals which are rooted in mainstream Islamic tradition which are *Ramazan Bayramı* (Ramadan Feast) and *Kurban Bayramı* (Sacrifice Feast). The first festival is celebrated at the end of the holy month of Ramadan when Muslims fast. During this month, which changes every year because of the difference between the traditional Islamic lunar calendar and the solar calendar, Turkish associations organise fast-breaking dinners for its members and people also host dinners for each other. During the Sacrifice Feast, Muslims who can afford to do so sacrifice an animal (mostly a sheep or cow) and donate its meat to poor people in the society (see Smits et.al., 2010). During both festivals, spending time with family and the community is highly appreciated. As I observed, the Turkish Mosques are always full for the feast prayer and space is dominated by men as women are not obliged to perform this prayer. Some people bring their sons with them, so they can learn the *bayram* tradition as they personally experienced in the homeland. In this way, they aim to transmit collective memory to the younger generations in diaspora. After the prayer and greeting in the mosque, people celebrate it with their family in their households and then visit one another's houses.

I attended the *Kurban Bayramı* prayer and reception on 24th of September 2015 at *Mevlana Rumi Mosque,* established by Turkish community and located in Edmonton, Enfield. After the prayer in the morning, people greeted each other by saying *Bayramınız Mübarek olsun!* (May your festival be blessed) and *Bayramınız kutlu olsun!* (May your festival be happy). They announced that there would be an afternoon reception. I went to this reception where approximately forty men attended with their families. Women gathered in a different room than the men, and I was among the male group as a male researcher. Children were walking and playing around, and the younger ones were mostly with their mothers while male children older

than 10 were in the men's room. However, women's attendance to mosques for *bayram* celebration is not common practice neither among the Turkish-speaking community nor wider Muslim diaspora. This mosque is run by a progressive Muslim group named *Gulen* or *Hizmet* movement. Their members are education activists and their female members are as active as men. In the room I was in, everybody shook each other's hands to greet. It was a behaviour cycle repeated by everyone and the new comers greeted those already sitting rather than greeting each other according to age hierarchy as in the traditional practice in Turkey. After asking how each other's family is and sharing conversations about work or school, conversation led to the recent developments in Turkey and the Muslim world. Everybody was speaking in Turkish, and the ambiance was very friendly.

Figure 19: Greetings in Bayram

Figure 20: Traditional Eid Dish

They served *lokum* (Turkish delight) first and then *bayram* food for the guests which consisted of meat, rice, salad and Baklava which are tradition among the Turkish-speaking community. However, it was served on disposable plates which is not the traditional way in Turkey. In a traditional form of the practice, food is served on the most elegant plates in a household as accommodating guests is essential in Turkish culture. It is believed the relationships will last a long time as the memory of accommodating the guests and serving the food on elegant plates or silverware sustains this positive recollection. I interpreted serving the ritual food on disposable plates as a reinvention of home country tradition in diaspora. I argue that, disposable plates demonstrate that the *bayram* tradition they perform in diaspora is the simulation of the one in their homeland which first-generation migrants would easily notice. However, younger generations who have not experienced *bayram* tradition in Turkey would learn it from its simulation for the first time. Also, for younger generation, disposable plates are a metaphorical representation of ephemeral cultural identity and memory which they can just throw away when they are leaving the mosque.

6.2.2.2 Visiting one another at Bayrams

Another important practice among the Turkish-speaking community during the festival time is visiting one another's home. This is a very common practice in Turkey and it is transferred the UK culturalscape. As I observed, visits are mostly limited to family, relatives, and neighbours in the form of short house visits. In the traditional form, younger members of the community visit the elderly which is perceived as a display of respect to them. These visits tend to be short, so as to allow for visits to all relatives and neighbours. These visits are practiced with families, thus single members of the community such as me can visit restricted number of friends. During my Eid visits to the houses of friends I observed that among the Turkish-speaking community in London, visits are around half an hour, where one often runs into other relative visiting the same house at that time. During the house visits, hosts serve candies to guests called *bayram şekeri* or chocolate in a glass or silver bowl called *şekerlik,* or *lokum* while pouring perfume/cologne to their hands, called *kolonya*. All these items are sold in ethnic shops meeting the demand of the community. Following this, a dessert that is traditionally *baklava* or *kadayıf* is served to visitors accompanied with tea or Turkish coffee. In *Kurban Bayramı*, the meat of a slaughtered animal is also most likely to be served. People whose houses I visited did not slaughter animal but donated the money to a charity abroad which is either Turkey or another Muslim country to be used to buy and slaughter an animal. The main topics of conversations during these visits are generally about the health and well-being of family members of guests and hosts. In my case, hosts asked me about my study and whether I was adjusted to life in the UK. People also update each other about recent developments in the community such as who are engaged, and whose children are graduated so on and so forth. Dressing pattern of these visits is new and elegant clothes. Men are expected to be clean-shaven unless they are old or retired while women wear make-up. Another behaviour cycle of the feast celebration in Turkey is that the younger people kiss the right hand of the elderly members and put the elderly's hand to their own forehead and then kiss their

cheeks. If the younger person is a child, elderly people give them pocket money in return. In London I observed that the practice is only applied to the children. And only very elderly members of the community receive kisses on their hands.

6.2.3 Mevlid as a Form of Popular Religiosity

As mentioned in the previous section, in some cases religion is blurred with culture. Some forms of religious rituals are taken out of the main context and performed as cultural identity practice such as *mevlids*. *Mevlids* are not mundane cultural ceremonies as they include a belief in an occult power. It is a ritual form of Turkish Muslims gathering to sing Islamic hymns on special occasions in order to bless people. These occasions include holy nights, such as on the aniversary of someone's death, when someone comes for a from Mecca after pilgrimage or when someone is get married or when male children are circumcised. Singing hymns is not the main form of prayer in Islamic tradition even though its lyrics are about God and the Prophet Muhammad. *Mevlids* are more of a practice of popular religiosity. As some of my Cypriot participants (Gemma, Emel, Hande, Meltem, Alice) told me during the interviews that *Mevlids* are very common in London among the Turkish-speaking community, especially among Turkish Cypriots. In *Mevlids* mostly men and women sit separated and sometimes the ritual is only practiced by women. As I observed in the field, women are more active in initiating *Mevlids*. For instance, women gather at each other's houses and perform *Mevlids* with the belief that angels visit the house, and in this way, both the house and people inside will be blessed.

> So, on Friday I went to a *mevlid,* but it was my first one I have been to since my mum died. My grandmother does that every year for my mum and I don't go. The prayer is in Arabic and they say a little bit in Turkish. They are singing and talking and serving food. But for men it's different, that's the other thing. Because I am so feminist, and the guys are sitting outside and having a chat and we are all inside with headscarves on and men don't have to do anything. So, the way they do it at the mosque, the men do the prayer. And at the cemetery everyone stands and does whatever. But at the actual *mevlid* the men and women are separate. Women do all the prayers, honestly. On Friday it was sunny, all the men

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were outside talking about football and women were inside doing the prayer. Maybe we are doing it wrong in London I don't know. (Meltem, 30, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

Meltem summarised her reflections on the *mevlid* ritual as a third generation woman. After her comment, she added that they might be doing it different than it is practiced in homeland. During the interviews some Cypriot participants (Meltem, Nes, Hande) told me that even though most of the Turkish Cypriots are secular and do not pray regularly on a daily or weekly basis, they appreciate *mevlids* very much, and they cover their head with a scarf tentatively during the event. Mevlids are an important cultural identity practice with all the hyperreal ethnic and religious symbols used during the performance.

> As a child, I used to go to regular mevlids, it's like when somebody passes away there will be a gathering. Mainly women get together and pray for that person. This is very popular in Turkish Cypriot culture. They find it very important to attend these. So, they may not do the other things the obligatory ones but going to mevlids is very important. (Hande, 29, Second-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

As Hande told the members of the Turkish-speaking community consider mevlids as important. Attending *mevlids* is a vivid memory from her childhood. She informed me about the next mevlid which I attended on 7th of April 2016.

That day was one of the holy nights in the Islamic calendar called *Regaip Kandili Gecesi.* These holy nights are known as *kandils* in Turkish. They are not mentioned in the Holy Quran, but Muslims attribute meaning to them and send a special prayer on these days for any beloved ones they have lost. This *mevlid* was for both the commemoration of a young man who passed away recently and for the holy night. The family of the dead person sponsored the event and provided the food as a donation. Among the Turkish-speaking community in London there is a belief that the deceased receive a blessing from such donations from the families. The venue for the event was the Turkish Cypriot Community's building on Green Lanes which is the most

important association for the community in London. In Oldenburg's (1991) terms, it is their place on the corner. As I observed in my previous visits, the hall of the TCCA functions like a *kahvehane* where people play card games and chat during the day. It is used for various events such as celebrations one of which was New Year's Party that I attended. There is a Cypriot kitchen next to the hall where they also serve alcohol. Thus, it was an unusual place for a religious ritual based on my previous experience and observations with *mevlids* in Turkey.

There were more guests than I was expecting, with approximately 70 people in attendance and most were middle-aged women. There were only ten men, including the *hodjas* running the ceremony, the organisers and me as a researcher. Only two of the women were wearing headscarves at the beginning and the rest of them seemed very secular. Some of the women covered their head tentatively when they entered the place while others keep it on their shoulders until the *hodja* started the Quran citation. Men (except the hodjas) and women greeted each other by shaking hands and kissing each other on the cheek. It was again unusual for me as during religious rituals in Turkey women and men are always separate and physical contact with the opposite sex is avoided.

Figure 22: The Guests before the Start

Figure 23: Opening Hands to Prayer

The main table where the hodjas sat and led the ritual was decorated with mystical, nostalgic and ethnic materials which I found very interesting. There were a few candles which again did not come from the Islamic tradition itself. There were also a silver bowl and various ornaments, on the table including a fez, Quran, date palm and a photo of the young man who had died. Apart from the Quran none of the other items are liturgical in traditional way. They were more like the decoration of a theatrical performance with their mystical, ethnic and nostalgic attributions. The Ottoman fez on the table and Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags hanging on the wall were indicators that it was a cultural identity performance rather than solely a religious ceremony. All these objects were just there to make the performance seem more realistic as a religious and Turkish performance. Therefore, it can be argued that the *mevlid* ritual itself, was more of a cultural practice than a religious ceremony. When I asked why they were wearing a fez, one of the organisers said it is what their great-grandfathers and seyhs (religious leaders) used to do, hence they do it at religious ceremonies. This is because apart from recitation of

the Quran the rest of the practices were not necessarily Islamic such as display of ethnic visual cultural materials. Hence why, I call it a hyperreal religiosity or performativity culture. As Butler (1990) argues, during performativity, there is an interaction between an individual and their social structures. In this way, they are gaining or retaining a good name. In my research context, people seeking to gain and retain a good name such as 'being proper Turkish/Kurdish/Cypriot' or 'not assimilated'. Therefore, they display an 'über' belonging to a culturally informed identity position. As is discussed in Chapter 3, each object in a house or community centre carries a cognitive experience and a memory is attached. In diaspora, interior design of a migrant's house or a community centre represents a break from the mainstream British culture. The décor completes identity performance and embeds a cultural practice into context and ensures transmission of an identity (See Hart, 2008; McCracken, 1988).

Figure 24: The table with semi-liturgical objects

Figure 25: Nostalgic Items on the Table

Figure 26: Photo of the decesed on the main table

At the beginning of the event when the *hodja* made a speech on the meaning of *kandil*s (holy nights) in Cypriot culture. He said that in Cyprus different than other Muslim countries it is mostly women that go to the mosques on holy nights. Based on my observations in Turkey, I would say women are active in organising religious rituals in domestic spaces whereas men

are in charge of the mosques and use it more frequently. He then began the citation of the Quran which did not take longer than 15 minutes and some of the guests followed the hodja using their own copies of the Quran. The rest of the event was based on listening and accompanying the singing of the hymns in Turkish. I argue it was a kind of theatrical performance. For example, during the singing of the hymns guests stood up and turned their face to the direction of Mecca (Qibla) at the part where the lyrics of the hymn refer the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, as Mecca is his place of birth. When the lyrics refer to the smell of heaven's gardens, one or two of the women started walking among the guests and poured *Gül suyu (*a non-alcoholic perfume made of rose leaves) into the guests' hands. *Gül suyu* is a semi-liturgical object that has a mystical meaning attributed to it. When the lyrics refer to the fruits of in the heaven, they gave away food to the guests. Such metaphors and performances offer a simulation of heaven and a hyperreal spiritual experience for the guests. I argue that those who lead a secular lifestyle perform their Muslim identity in this hyperreal form. The guests were euphorically enjoying their role in performance which was mainly singing along the hymns. A lady in her 50s who I believed to be a family member of the deceased young man was crying during the ritual.

The food they served to the guests was very traditional Turkish Cypriot including *sarma* (wine leaves with rice in it), Turkish *Köfte* (meatball), chicken, *fırın makarnası* (pasta bake), cherry tomatoes, *börek* (baked filled pastries) and *lokma* (a pastry made of deep-fried dough soaked in syrup).

Figure 27: Communal meal and lokma

Moreover, different to any other religious ceremonies I have attended in Turkey, there was a raffle and ornaments for sale. The raffle prizes consist of mundane objects such as beauty products whereas ornaments were decorated with religious references such as Arabic calligraphy. When I asked, the lady volunteering at the event told me that, they saw it at schools in London and they liked it. So, they decided to do the same with their own cultural items. Therefore, this practice is borrowed from British culture.

Figure 28: Plate with religious calligraphy for sale

Figure 29: The raffle prizes and religious ornament for Sale

6.2.4 *Jan* Researcher at the Cem Ceremony

On the 13th of October 2016, I attended a *cem* ceremony in London Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi which is an umbrella organisation for community activities. That date was also a holy day for the community; the final day of a mourning period known as *Muharrem Mâtemi*. As I discussed in Chapter 1, it is called mourning as they commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussain.

Before the ceremony I talked with members of the Alevi community at the *cemevi* about the meaning of *muharrem* for them. As discussed in Chapter 1, Alevism is a heterodox and syncretic school of thought in Islam. Alevi community do not pray in the traditional Islamic way which is *salah* performed five times a day. They perform a different ceremony called *cem* at their assembly houses are called *cemevi*. Religious figures leading their religious services in these rituals are called *dede* (grandfather). These *cem* ceremonies include music (saz), singing (deyiş, nefes, türkü) and dancing called *semah. Semah* is performed by both men and women turning together and swirling while the *aşık* (folk singer) plays *saz/bağlama* (a stringed instrument). Haydar a second-generation Alevi man told me during his interview that the *Semah* dance symbolises the revolving of the planets around the Sun and uniting yourself with Allah. Moreover, *Saz* instrument is accepted as sacred and is even known as the *"the stringed holy book"* (Online Alevism Booklet, 2013:6; see also, Eröz, 1977; Bruinessen, 1996; Üzüm, 1997; Yörükan, 1998; Arabacı, 2000; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Massicard, 2010, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2017; Onder, 2017; Kinesci, 2017; Okan, 2017).

Some of the respondents I chatted with were fasting that day, and they told me it was a mourning period rather than a feast for the community. Chairperson of the Britain Alevi Federation and *Cemevi* told me that religious services like funerals and monthly *cem* ceremonies which originally was once a week (every Thursday night) are performed in *Cemevi.* Alevi women are not required to wear headscarves or bodily covers, and there was a visible

emphasis on gender equality among the Alevi communities (Okan, 2017). However, my female respondents narrated their conservative upbringing and restrictions during their interviews. Alevism has forty teachings and during both informal conversations and interviews, participants mentioned that teachings. They summarised them as "*eline, diline, beline sahip olmak*" which means being in full moral control of one's own hands, tongue and loins. Controlling one's own hands refers to not doing any harmful thing or committing sins by your hands such as the example of killing someone or stealing someone's money. Controlling one's own tongue means not telling lies, not gossiping or hurting someone's heart with unpleasant words. Controlling one's own loins refers to not committing adultery or approaching someone else's wife, sister or daughter with sexual desires. Many Alevi participants narrated to me these as being the core of Alevism (Begum, Guler, Turkan, Ali Haydar). Also, these teachings were hanging on the wall of *cemevi.*

> I was brought up with this teaching; eline, beline, diline sahip ol! Be responsible for your house, work and food/income. This is Alevism, and I teach that to my children. (Turkan, 51, First-generation, Second Wave, Turkish)

The teachings of Alevism are based on an orally transmitted tradition, as they did not have written sources. Yet, as I noticed currently there are numbers of academic and religious publications about Alevism. The teachings of Alevism are narrated by *aşıks* who play a traditional instrument called *saz or bağlama* and sing *deyiş (songs of mystical love)*, *nefes (hymns) and türkü (folk song)*. These songs have spiritual meaning and aim to teach the participants valuable lessons. In Turkey, Alevis use the figure of the sword of Imam Ali named *Zülfikar* on various ornaments. Some of the Alevi respondents criticised the references to the sword as it is not perceived as a peaceful object. I have not seen *Zülfikar* symbols in *Cemevi* but only in the household of an Alevi family that invited me there for dinner. Some of the interviewees criticised the references to the sword as it is not perceived as a very peaceful object.

Ali Haydar, a 22-year-old second-generation Turkish Alevi man who is also active at the events in the Cemevi, described to me what Alevism was for him:

> I see this faith as a belief that stands for the oppressed, stands up against oppressors, liberal which also prioritise education. I see Alevi lifestyle as being close to me because it appreciates art and science. It does not have strict rules but is always open to change. As a faith, it is rooted in human-beings, that is why I find it close to myself. We do not have a term like piety. Everybody lives their faith personally, in themselves and it cannot be compared or measured. Being Alevi does not mean you have to come to the Cemevi.

Before starting the *cem* ceremony the *dede* asked each participant whether they had any complaints about any members of the community including their spouses. It can be argued that this is a social control mechanism because if anybody raises a concern the community judges collectively addressing this incident. An old member of the Alevi community told me as an anecdote that if the community decide that the person has violated any moral principles, various sanctions are applied against this person such as sentencing him/her to give a meal for entire community. In the Alevi tradition almsgiving is generally performed with food donations. In one of my visits, I am offered food, and am told I cannot refuse it as it is "hayırlık" meaning someone donated it for goodness. If the incident is concerning a serious violation of the main values of Alevi teaching such as committing adultery, then this person might be declared as a *düşkün* and excommunicated from community life. I did not hear any example of it among the Alevi community in London, however during the anecdotes in Cemevi some community members told me that it was the traditional way. This process is called *görgü cemi* and is roughly translated as the manners ritual (Online Alevism Booklet, 2013). After this the *dede* asked for the door to be shut and everybody inside not to leave until the ritual had finished.

The ceremony started with the *dede* playing his *saz* and singing a *deyiş* and then the *aşık*s accompanied him with their *saz*. Twelve people performed the ceremony and the rest of the

community only watched it. These people are called *12 Hizmetli* (servants). The *dede's* role is known as *Mürşid*, and he is in charge of leading the ceremony.

One person performed the role of *Peyikçi* who is responsible for making announcements. Another person performed the role of the *Rehber* who prepares people for the ritual and leads each servant to the stage when they are performing their parts. The *Gözcü* was responsible for making sure the ceremony was carried out in tranquillity. He was holding a stick in his hand that had a fake rose attached to the end of it. He was directing the stick to people to ask them to be quiet. I interpreted the stick with a rose as a friendlier interpretation of a disciplinary power. I did not have a chance to ask *dede* at the time of event and after the event despite my numerous attempts such as calling the *Cemevi* management via phone, I did not learn the meaning of this stick and rose. People who I spoke to at *Cemevi* told me that they do not know the meaning of it either.

The *Kapıcı* was the person who was responsible for showing people to their seats and not letting anyone leave the venue before the ritual was completed. The *Zâkir* or *Aşık* is the second person after *dede* that accompanies him with her saz and sings the hymns. The rest of us were watching the ceremony as *canlar* (souls) as it is addressed in Alevism, or as guests.

Figure 33: Souls (Canlar) Watching the Ceremony

The Süpürgeci or Ferraş was a woman with a broom in her hand. She stepped on to the stage where the ceremony was being performed, and symbolically swept the ground three times for purification and said some sentences. After her performance, she went to the floor, sat back, put her hands on her chest, kissed her thumbs and then took her thumbs to her forehead which is called *niyaz*. Every servant repeated this action after their performance. Afterwards the *dede* said a prayer to each of them.

Figure 34: Supurgecis sweeping the ground

Figure 35: Each servant going to ground after their performance

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The Meydancı walked in and put a fur rug on the ground at the centre of the stage. The Çerağcı or *Delilci* was responsible for lighting the candles and incense. He walked in and put the lights on the candles.

Figure 36: Meydanci purring the fur rug on the ground

Figure 37: Ciragici lighting the candles and going the ground

The İbrikçis were one teenage girl and boy. The female *ibrikçi* was carrying a washbowl and ewel/pitcher called *ibrik*. She poured water on to male servant's thumbs and then dried his hands with a towel. The male servant then did the same to her which I interpreted as demonstration of the gender equality in the Alevi faith. Some of the participants were accompanying the hymns by slapping the tops of their thighs and chanting *"Lâ İlahe İllalah, Ali mürşid Ali şah, Eyvallah Şahım Eyvallah, Hak Lâ İlahe İllallah"*.

Figure 38: Ibrikcis

When the *zakir* and *dede* were playing and singing hymns, all the servants except the *dede* came into the middle, created a circle and started performing *semah*. *Semah* is a ritual where a mixed group of men and women whirl around, symbolising both the journey of the human-being searching for the truth, love and searching for maturity and perfection as well as representing the whirl of the world around the sun. The *semah* ritual started with 12 servants and then a few people among the participants watching the ceremony joined the circle. Male servants were wearing black trousers and white shirts and female participants wore black skirts and shirts whilst all of them were wearing red belts. When they were whirling, they were also stopping and turning their faces to each other regularly. It was a kind of meditation for God with melody and dance like movements (see During and Sellheim, 2010).

After the *semah,* the *dede* said a prayer, and the Sakacı distributed water and *şerbet* to the guests. However, the group was huge so the *sakacı* distributed to only a few of them starting from the *dede*. Towards the closing section of the *cem* ceremony the *dede* said he was supposed to engage the participants in a discussion which is called *sohbet*, however because it was late at night and the people were supposed to go work the next day, he skipped that section. However, during the ceremony, he preached about the meaning of each ritual. Finally, the *dede* said a prayer over the communal meal called *lokma* which were provided as the food donations from the community. The *dede* finished the ceremony by blowing out the candles, and the *Niyazcı* distributed the *lokma* to guests when they were leaving.

Figure 40: Lokma and Communal Meal

6.2.5 *Nazar Boncuğu* and other Superstitions

During my field study, I observed several cultural practices among the Turkish-speaking community in London in the form of superstition. In these practices, there is a belief in supernatural causalities, yet they are not rooted in the mainstream religious teachings of Islam. Among Muslim communities, there are many superstitions inherited from traditional or national culture after the groups converted to Islam from paganism, such as the adaptation of the Nowruz tradition for Iranian Muslims. One of the most common superstitions I observed among the Turkish-speaking community in London is the use of *Nazar Boncuğu* (Evil Eye) as an ornament displayed in houses as well as shops. The origin of the evil eye stems from a supernatural belief in Turkish culture. According to the folk belief that is narrated to me by respondents if a person is jealous of something new or beautiful this may trigger misfortune or injury, usually upon their first envious glance. In order to protect themselves from the jealous gaze of others, a colourful amulet is displayed. In this way, the purpose of the evil eye amulet is to detract from the envious glance with its colourful and distinct features (see Ross, 2010). *Nazar Boncuğu* is used very commonly among the Turkish-speaking community in various forms such as bracelets, necklaces, jewellery, or ornamental decorations. As a house decoration, *nazar boncuğu* completes Turkish identity rather than Islamic identity and transmit it to young generations (see Hart, 2008; McCracken, 1988).

Hande, a second-generation Turkish Cypriot told me during her interview that among the Turkish Cypriot community, there is the superstition of lighting of olive leaves to remove negative energy or spirits from a place and/or person. She narrated to me the practice her mum used to do:

> (…) some of the cultural practices conflict with the religious practices and that is where I draw a line. For example in Turkish Cypriot culture there is something if you want to ward of the evil eye they light olive leaves and they kind of say "Gozu olan ciksin" [If any one's eye is on it, it shall leave out] they kind of pull the olive leaf over your head and they believe this is gonna kind of ward off the evil eye which is very un-Islamic and that is actually a form of shirk [deification of anything other than Allah] in a way because what is protecting you? Practices like that I stay clear from. While I was child, we used

to do that in my family on a regular basis (laughing). I remember my mom would do that and walk around the house (laughing) putting it over mine and my brother's heads and everyone would do this every now and then, and I don't know what would trigger the reason for to do that? But it is a common practice, I think it is a Cypriot practice, I think Greek Cypriot people do that as well. Olive leave is clearly the symbol or emblem that kind of identifies Cyprus.

Hande thinks olive leaves are a reference to Cyprus. She described the practice as un-Islamic and puts distance to such practices.

6.3 Politicalscape

According to my research findings, political disputes in Turkey and Cyprus are transferred to the diaspora space and reinterpreted. In London, I observed activities of almost all the movements active in Turkey's politicalscape. As I observed, most of the Turkish-speaking people who took refuge in the UK were politically active in Turkey often through being members of workers' unions or socialist parties. Respondents observed that mass arrest of people, unfair trials and torture under arrest after the military intervention of 1980 in Turkey and change of constitution afterwards resulted in numbers of left-wing unionists fled from Turkey to seek asylum in Europe. These people became politically active in diaspora. The majority of those who took refuge in the UK established *Halkevi* in the 1984 which was the biggest institution and a convention centre for the community at the time, hosting cultural and political events (Cakmak, 2018). The numbers, which reached 3500 applications per year in 1990s, suggests many Kurdish refugees arrived in the UK in the 1990s due to armed conflict in east and south-east Turkey (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005) As my participants narrated, after those Kurds became members of *Halkevi*, they demographically dominated and pushed its leftist and pro-Kurdish line towards Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish diaspora has successfully transnationalised its agenda since the first migration wave of Kurdish migrants to Europe (Baser 2011). However, this has resulted in the dissolution of coalition among Turkish and

Kurdish political groups in the UK. Kazim a left-wing Turkish participant told me that some members have resigned to establish their own organisations and he was among them. *Halkevi* changed its name and numbers of other political associations have been established since then, and the politicalscape has become very fragmented (Cakmak, 2018).

After leaving Cyprus because of ethnic tension and civil war, Turkish Cypriots moved to the UK, and established the *Kıbrıs Türk Cemiyeti* (Cyprus Turkish Association) in 1951 (see Eren-Nijhar 2012). Since then, Turkish Cypriots have been involved in lobbying activities for civil rights of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, and post-1980s for the increased recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the removal of the embargo over the island. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots contribute to local politics. There are numbers of Turkish Cypriot councillors as well as mainland Turkish and Kurdish councillors in North London boroughs. In the UK's general elections two members of the Turkish-speaking community run as candidates, yet neither of them could win a seat.

Alongside left-wing politics, I observed nationalist movements among the Turkish-speaking community in London which I define with Benedict Anderson's (1998) concept of 'long distance nationalism'. Nationalist in diaspora established various legal and illegal associations pursuing their political agenda. Grey Wolves or, in Turkish *Bozkurtlar* an ultra-nationalist or neo-fascist political organisation established in the 1960s in Turkey by Turkish nationalists (see Atkins, 2004; Sullivan, 2011; Canefe & Bora, 2004). With the formation of Turkish diaspora in Western Europe, they organised their membership across Europe including Britain. They were involved in conflict with Asala[16] in the 1980s and are still clashing with PKK-affiliated institutions in Europe. Respondents narrated anecdotes of members of Grey Wolves having street fights with Kurdish nationalists in London. Currently, Grey Wolves institution

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[16] The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was an Armenian militant organisation that used to involved in assassination targeting Turkish diplomats in Europe in 1970s and 1980s.

in Britain is called the "London Islamic Turkish Association" and they use the basement floor of their institution to function as a mosque (Cakmak, 2018).

In addition to these groups, political Islamists have become active in community life in the UK and diaspora since the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching its peak when an Islamist party, AKP, came to power in Turkey in 2002. The *National Vision* or *Millî Görüş* in Turkish is a religiopolitical movement and is founded on a series of Islamist parties inspired by Turksih politician Necmettin Erbakan. As their activities are banned in Turkey, they reorganised themselves in Europe. Among the Turkish diaspora in Europe, *Milli Görüş* became one of the major, religious movements, controlling numerous mosques (see Carkoglu and Robin 2006).[17] In addition, the Union of European Turkish Democrats is politically active in London pursuing conservative Turkish government's agenda (Cakmak, 2018).

As I observed, Turkish-speaking diaspora lobby politicians in Britain to internationalise their agenda and to influence their homeland politics. According to Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti (2013) diasporas play the role of 'cultural brokerage' thus translating the local messages to a global audience when seminal moments occur in the homeland. For instance, Gezi protests started in a small park in Taksim Istanbul in June 2013 and then quickly spread across the country. It extended to transnational space with the involvement of diaspora with the protests they organised in front of parliamentary buildings in their countries of residence (Baser, 2015a). However, not all members of the Turkish-speaking community in London are politically active. Shain and Barth (2003) divide the members of diaspora communities into three categories regarding activism: core, passive, and silent members. I argue that, the Turkish-speaking community can be categorised parallel to this. Some members of the community who also identify as diaspora are core members, whereas some others are more

passive members who follow the lead of core members. Moreover, there are silent members who are generally identified as economic migrants and they are not involved in politicalscape.

6.3.1 *Newroz Prioz Be!*: Kurdish Identity Politics

Newroz is considered to be the most important festival in Kurdish folklore, and it is rooted in Kurdish mythology. Seasonal festivals have been a tradition since the Babylonian period. Newroz is one of them and as it has been celebrated for over 3,000 years across a vast geography from Asia Minor to the Middle East and Central Asia (Gunter 2010, Melton 2011). Although having Zoroastrian origins, Newroz has been celebrated by various societies. Newroz in Kurdish and Nowruz in Persian means "New Day". It is celebrated on 21st March every year, which is the day of the spring/vernal equinox in the Northern Hemisphere. It marks the beginning of spring among the Kurdish community while in traditional Kurdish culture and Iranian culture it is celebrated as the New Year (Melton 2011, see also Kurdistan Regional Government Website). In this section, I examine contemporary manifestations of Kurdish cultural identity in the context of the Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith, and Newroz festival.

6.3.1.1 Collective Memory and Constructing National Identity via Myths: The Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith

As discussed in Chapter 2, "the past recounted from the standpoint of the present is then a strategy of identity construction" (White, 1991:8). Keles (2015b) argues that the rapid growth in the use of communication technologies by Kurdish diaspora, such as satellite TV and internet has strengthened social ties and political participation across nation states' borders. Hassanpour and Mojab (2005) discusses the role international Kurdish satellite TVs in connecting diaspora to the homeland and also strengthen Kurdish identity. Based on Keles (2015b) and Hassanpour and Mojab's (2005) argument, I argue that Kurdish TV channels offer an experience of Kurdish national identity to its audience with the national language, flag, anthem and music. In this way, Turkey origin British Kurds feel themselves as citizens of a non-existent country. Moreover, TV programs also transmit what Assmann (1992) and Dessi (2008) call collective

memory and cultural memory. Kurdish nation-building process is performed via these broadcasts and oral transmission of stories, the *Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith* is one of these stories. Firstly, Newroz festival is the most significant celebration in Kurdish culture and it is based on this myth. Secondly, the myth has been adapted into the current conditions of Kurdish people. Therefore, the myth is one of the main driving forces behind Kurdish nation building and identity. The political Kurdish movement aims to realise that myth by establishing an independent Kurdistan.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Halbwachs (1992) argues that recalling of memory strengthens the position of the individuals within the group and group identification forms retrieval of the memory. As Dessi (2008) claims, the collective memory is transmitted to the young by the older generation, through a variety of channels such as school textbooks, the media, monuments, commemorative rituals, migration stories, oral history narrations, religious rituals. Myths as part of collective memory and oral history ensure the transmission of the cultural identity and values. In this way, the past is connected to the present and even to the future.

Kawa is the most famous of Kurdish mythological characters that was in resistance against the ruthless king in Mesopotamia, the ancestral land of the Kurds as it is believed. He is a symbol of resistance for the Kurdish people. There are a few versions of the Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith (Demirci Kava in Turkish or Kawayê Hesinker in Kurdish) but I will narrate the version I listened from a Kurdish community leader. According to the myth, once upon a time (2500-2600 years ago) there was an Assyrian monster King named *Zuhak* (also known as *Dehak*) ruling Mesopotamia for one thousand years. His evil reign was also preventing the coming of the spring to the Kurdish land (Murphy 2004). He had serpents growing from his shoulders, and two young men were sacrificed every day to feed the serpents with their brains which were said to alleviate *Zuhak*'s pain (Warner & Fernández-Armesto 2004). The Kurdish people were exhausted with the tranny of *Zuhak*. One day two Kurdish men named *Armayel*

and *Garmayel* managed to get into *Zuhak*'s castle as cookers/chefs. They were supposed to sacrifice the two young men every day for *Zuhak*'s meal but instead they killed only one man a day and mixed their brains with those of a sheep to save one person every day. Those saved men went to mountain and joined the army Kawa the Blacksmith (also known as Kaveh) created. When *Kawa*, who also had lost six sons to *Zuhak*, built his army; he led a revolt and marched to *Zuhak*'s castle. *Kawa* killed the king with his hammer, and his army eventually set fire to the hillsides to celebrate the victory. Spring returned to Mesopotamia the next day which was 21st March. According to the myth, these people are ancestors of the Kurds. As a reference to this myth Kurdish people still light bonfires at Newroz celebrations and jump across the fire. (see Ozoglu 2004). Moreover, as I mentioned before, the Kurdish political movement associates the myth with current conditions of Kurds in the Middle East. For instance, the Kurdish guerrilla fighters are associated with Kawa's army in the mountains. The narration of this myth transmits the collective memory and links the Kurdish nation's present situation to its past. The narration of this myth in diaspora aims to idealise cultural identity and reconstruct it (Schneider, 2000; Bucholtz, 2003; Milligan, 2003; Parveen, 2017).

6.3.1.2 At the Kurdish Newroz Festival: Diaspora Politics of Folklore

As I observed Kurdish migrants are the most disadvantaged group among the Turkish-speaking community of the UK. The majority of Kurdish community live in the poor neighbourhoods of North London such as Haringey and Hackney (Smith, 2000; Holgate et al., 2012). Some of the Kurdish respondents associate the standards of area they live in with refugee camps. As Madanipour (2011) argues, more restrictions on people's access to their surroundings bring feelings of being trapped, alienated and excluded from social space. The Kurdish community is at the margins of British society with its high unemployment rate, poverty and precarious legal status of its members due to long asylum process (see Stewart and Mulvey 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010). There happens a two-sided social segregation. Ethnic

minority communities tend to cling on to each other as a survival strategy in foreign cultural landscapes (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964; Kucukcan, 1999; Ryan et.al., 2012).

Like most migrants, once Kurds arrived in the UK they were pushed into the worst paid and least desired jobs and given residence in the slums. Furthermore, discrimination in the rental housing or estate market makes migrant communities stick together in their enclaves and live in cheap accommodation such as shed houses (Walks and Bourne, 2006, Bloch and McKay, 2016).

Young people among the Turkish-speaking community are vulnerable to drug and alcohol abuse as well as involvement with criminal and violent activities (Mehmet Ali, 2006; Eylem et.al., 2016; Cetin, 2016). Unemployment and a language barrier when accessing the labour market results in Kurdish migrants like other migrant communities being dependent on ethnic economy (Borjas, 2000; Johnston et al., 2002; Edin et al., 2003; Bloch and McKay, 2016).

As many elderly members of the community during my visits to community centres drug use, violence and crime rates are high among the Kurdish community (see Eylem et.al., 2016; Cetin, 2016). Therefore, the celebration of the Newroz festival in London can be defined in the way Hall (1991:9) described the Caribbean community festivals "the sound of marginal peoples staking a claim to the New World". Many Kurdish respondents defined their status as 'twice diasporised' as they were already displaced in Turkey before coming to the UK. With the rise of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey in the late 1970s, the myth has been revived and has become a symbol of the Kurdish national struggle. As Kurds started associating themselves more with Newroz and its historical-political meanings, Kurdish diaspora in Europe adopted that tradition as well (Yanik, 2006). Today, Newroz is one of the most significant expressions of the Kurdish identity and the Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith is the major axis of the Kurdish nation's building process. The Newroz festival is banned in Turkey and each year celebrations

turn into a political rally and a clash with the police. In Turkey Newroz festival is more of a chaotic gathering of angry Kurds who are disenfranchised from their rights rather than a flowering expression of Kurdish cultural identity. I argue that London, on the other hand, provides a platform for the expression of Kurdish identity in a neutral territory. Thus, Newroz festival in London turns into a celebration of collective identity. The Newroz festival functions as an event of celebration, protest, resistance, solidarity and praise after years of denial and censorship of Kurdish identity in Turkey. The Newroz celebration has a unifying function as a political expression. Kurds in London celebrate the Newroz both as a national day and a way of demonstrating their support for the Kurdish issue in Turkey (see Wahlbeck 1999). Moreover, people carry green, yellow and red coloured flags which many participants told me during the interviews and that they are the traditional colours of Kurdish people as well as PKK flag. I observed many Kurdish men wear a traditional costume that resembles the uniform of PKK guerrillas (see figure 43). For these reasons, Newroz celebrations are criticised by Turkish state authorities for being political rallies rather than cultural celebrations.

Figure 42: Newroz Event Leaflet

Figure 43: Traditional Kurdish Costume Identical to Guerrilla Uniform

I attended a Newroz Festival in the Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey, London at 2016 to observe celebrations with the community. The festival included various musical and dance performances which also incorporated visual displays of costume, jewellery and other ornamentation. I argue that, traditional food and clothes are not just viewed as consumption materials for diasporic communities but are identity-constructing objects that are embodied when someone wears them. In the late afternoon, people started gathering in the garden, and newcomers greeted the existing attendees by saying "Newroz pîroz be!" which means "Newroz may be blessed" or "Happy Newroz" in Kurdish; shaking hands and kissing each other on the cheek. There was also kebab served in the garden. Kurdish women wore coloured dresses mostly green, yellow and red, the traditional colours of Kurdish people as well as wearing spangled head scarves. The men wore their national dress; the baggy trousers called *şalvar* and scarf called *poşu*. Then the guests went indoors, and the event began with a Kurdish and English

welcome speech delivered by the presenters. The presenters were a young Kurdish boy and girl dressed in traditional Kurdish clothes.

Figure 44: Gate of Kurdish Community Centre with a Kurdistan Map and Flag on it

Figure 45: Presenter in Traditional Kurdish Costumes

After the speech, a Kurdish band came to the stage playing both traditional instruments like the *baglama* and *zurna* and Western instruments such as the guitar and drums. They sang Kurdish songs which I did not understand the lyrics to, but I recognised a few words like 'Azadi' which means freedom in Kurdish as I heard many times in political slogans; 'Kurdistan' and 'Ocalan' (Imprisoned leader of the PKK).

Figure 46: Kurdish music band, traditonal Zurna is on the right

Figure 47: Man Wearing Posu

After a short while, a *halay* chain started spontaneously that continued until the end of the event. The circular dance that Kurds perform is called the *halay (Govend* in Kurdish*)* and is performed during the festival with the accompaniment of musical instruments called the *zurna* and *davul*. During the dance, men and women form a circle or a line while holding each other either by the little finger, or hand to hand, or shoulder to shoulder, with the last and the first dancers of the line holding a piece of cloth to shake. The *Halay* begins slow and speeds up (Hartong 2006). Dancers revolve around the centre which was traditionally marked by a bonfire if it is in outdoor while making rhythmical movements with their bodies, legs, feet, and arms. These movements lead to the creation of multiple circles around each other which seemed to form a spiral (Shiloah 2002). During moments of ecstasy while they are dancing women yell *zılgıt* or *tilili* which are improvised exclamations and are created with the fast movement of the tongue. There are no rules as when to perform *zılgıt* as it is improvised. *Zılgıt* is used as an

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expression that shows both sorrow like a dirge, or cheer during moments of high emotional excitement. In either form, it is a strong reflection of Kurdish cultural identity and a part of the Kurdish folk music tradition. People were raising their hands to form a V (victory) sign which is a political symbol of the Kurdish resistance around the world. Moreover, the dancing crowd frequently shouted out political messages in Kurdish such as *Biji Serok Apo,* which means Viva Leader Apo.

Figure 48: Dancing Halay

Figure 49: Smaller halay dance groups spontaneously gathered

When I was walking around interacting with people, I witnessed an elderly Kurdish man

get upset and complain about the festive spirit. He mainly criticised the Kurdish people dancing

and celebrating Newroz in London while their fellow nationals were fighting in Turkey. At this

time (spring 2016) paramilitary Kurdish groups engagement in armed conflict with the Turkish

military and police in the Kurdish cities had hit its peak, and he was expecting the community to mourn instead of celebrating.

A trustee of Kurdish Community Centre told me before the Newroz event that, the songs sung at festivals like *Newroz* are called *sitran* in Kurdish folk music. Their subjects differ from love and longing of their beloved to the subject of politics. Music is an essential element of cultural identity, especially folk music with its ethnic attributions. Music is used very effectively during national identity construction, like Zdzislaw Mach (1997) claims in his study on the vital role of Chopin's music in the creation of the Polish national identity. I argue that, *zılgıt* as a symbol of Kurdish cultural identity is also used as a propaganda tool in the arena of politics and for protests/demonstrations. The *zılgıt* and *halay* dances are bound up in the idea of roots and culture for the Kurdish people. It goes beyond the art of performance; it is a protest manner. I also argue that, although they are different genres of music, the improvisation of *zılgıt* and the broader Kurdish folk music has the same function of rap for Afro-Americans or reggae for Caribbean people which is a reconstruction of cultural identity (Jones, 1988; Hall, 1990; Hebdige, 2003). And *halay* has the same meaning for Kurds that Capoeira has for Brazilians which is expressing and reinforcing and oppressed cultural identity (see Duarte, 2005).

Eventually, presenters started speaking in Turkish as well. Also, a member of the community was invited to make a speech in Turkish in a socialist tone with lots of references to class conflict and revolution. The group was a politically motivated and secular group. There were only a few women with headscarves. There were a few English people with their Kurdish partners. However, the rest of the guests were Kurdish, including the journalist photographing the event.

Small children were dressed up in Kurdish national clothes which could be read as a form of reproduction of the Kurdish national identity and transmission of it to the younger generation in diaspora. As I mentioned in methodology chapter, male children are dressed in soldier uniforms on national days in Turkey and encouraged to develop a national consciousness. What Kurdish diaspora does in London during their festivities is parallel to it. The parents at the festival were motivating their children with Kurdish nationalism by dressing them in guerrilla uniforms. Kurdish national identity was being performed euphorically throughout the event also through a display of political messages and flags.

Figure 50: Kurdish Flags and Colours Decorated Everywhere

Figure 51: Kurdish Slogan Representing Kurdish Resistance states Enough is Enough!

I approached a group of Kurdish teenagers and chatted with them for a short while. They were all telling me about how much they stick to Kurdish culture and lifestyle in a hyperreal way. The bias of the context was very prominent, as national ideology was strongly displayed and there was clearly a direct effect on individuals' behaviours and attitudes. When I ask them about their identity, they said in one voice, 'We are Kurdish not British'. However, they were

speaking in English with each other, mirroring second-generation Turks and Cypriots. They said they would like to go and serve their country once Kurdistan is established but none of them seemed very keen on leaving England. Ironically, they stated that they have been to their parents' home villages once or twice in their life, and they would not want to go there again because it was so boring for them. It seems they have a romantic view of a utopian homeland. However, this discourse is adopted from an older generation since they do not have any life experience in Turkey and/or a migration story. During the tranmission of collective memory only certain aspects of past or place of origin are recovered and idealised. It may cause various feelings either happiness or sorrow because of loss of this. Identity reconstruction is linked with that memory and it is aimed to keep that aspect of identity alive (Schneider, 2000; Bucholtz, 2003; Milligan, 2003; Parveen, 2017). Therefore, there was a political decision to move to Kurdistan but not the motivation to do this while it is still part of Turkey.

> I went once to my village; Maras, Pazarcik and I won't go again. (laughing). I don't like Turkey; it's boring. [5min later] If Kurdistan is established, of course, I will go and if I have the chance, I will settle down to there. For our generation, most of the time I say, study hard, learn a skill because one day that country will be established, and these kinds of people are required for it. Professional, skilled people, that's what a country needs, and that's gonna be us, youth, one day. (Rojat, 17, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

The second and third generation Kurds' identity is more fragmentised. Their feeling towards Turkey, the Kurdish region and the UK is convoluted. I argue that what Hall (1991:11) says about Rastafarians is valid for the Kurdish community: "it was not the literal place that people wanted to go back to, it was the language, the symbolic language for describing what suffering was like, it was a metaphor for where they were". They do not speak much Kurdish; their main sources of identification with Kurdishness are folklore, music, and food. They borrow a form of nostalgia of the Kurdish land from their parents and elder members of the community produced through folk-memory, oral tradition, and political demonstrations. Thus, they want

to go 'back' to an imagined Kurdistan, not the literal geographic place in the Middle East. Kurdistan is a metaphor they keep referring to inorder to reproduce cultural identity.

Figure 52: Kurdish Traditional Dresses for Sale

Figure 53: Kurdish Political Objects for Sale

The event began in the afternoon, and towards the night a bonfire was lit at the garden which people danced around and jumped across which is a tradition and reference to the Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith. There were many political posters in the venue, however, I was asked not to photograph them.

Figure 54: Jumping across the Fire

Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter was to analyse the everyday life of the Turkish-speaking community in North London. I conducted ethnographic analysis of cultural life of the community based around three pillars; the culturalscape, religioscape and politicalscape. Within culturalscape I discussed village associations and kahvehanes as third places; tea and coffee rituals; weddings

as well as *ayip* as a social control mechanism. In religioscape, I discussed religious identity and practices such as *Bayram* celebration and *Cem* ceremony as well as practices of popular religiosity and superstitions. In the final section, political activities of the community are discussed around the Kurdish festival of Newroz.

In Chapter 7, I analyse the use of these spaces as a stage for identity performances. I also discuss the impact of the narration of the past and collective memory on identity reconstruction and transmission to younger generations. Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated to discussion around identity performances.

CHAPTER 7

IN-BETWEENS IDENTITIES, SYMBOLIC ETHNICITY AND SIMULACRUM

Introduction

The enormous growth and spread of mass media and social media, new information technologies, increased movement of people across the world resulting new, multi-layered, fluctuating and fragmented identities which crosses national boundaries (Harvey, 1990; Anthias, 1998; Giddens and Sutton, 2017). In this chapter, I will discuss the identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community in North London from the perspective of a postmodern researcher and a *Simmelian* stranger.

When individuals are presenting and performing themselves in everyday life, there are two main dynamics that operate in identity reconstruction. These are the transmission of cultural identity via collective memory, and renegotiation of identity via various cultural encounters. In the first section of this chapter I discuss the *inbetween* identities of the members of the Turkish-speaking community. In literature Turkish-speaking immigrants in the UK are categorise based their ethnic backgrounds which is exclusive, fixed and unifying categories (see Kucukcan, 1999; King et. Al. 2008; Mehmet Ali, 2001; Aksoy 2006; Atay 2010; Issa 2005, Sirkeci et.al. 2016). Instead of overgeneralising the research group in identity categories of mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds from Turkey, I will classify them based on their performative actions displaying identity. These categories are; economic migrants, diaspora, post-modern creoles (*gurbetçis*) and expats. The chapter will continue with peformativity of identity. Here, I categorise my observations as (1) a retrogressive disourse and (2) encapsulated in time. In this final part of the chapter I will discuss performances of symbolic ethnicity and simulacrum of Turkey.

7.1 Diaspora experience of In-betweenness and third space

As discussed in Chapter 2, Soja's spatial theory 'Thirdspace' is developed from the work of Lefebvre and focused on cultural geography. According to Soja (1996, 2000), third space is a way of thinking about and interpreting socially produced space combining both social and historical dimensions of the spatiality of our lives. According to this theory, Firstspace is urban-built form of physical buildings; the secondspace is the 'imagined' representational space. And thirdspace combines First and Secondspace to create what is described as, 'a fully lived space, a simultaneously real-and-imagined, actual-and virtual locus of structured individuality and collective experience and agency' (Soja, 2000: 11). When discussing diaspora Bhabha (1994) refers to diaspora as a *third space* where cultures interact and are hybridised where an *in-betweens* identity is constructed. Bhabha (1994:13) defines the third space, as "halfway between...being not defined" and "a subject that inhabits the rims of an 'in-between' reality". Bhabha (1990) adds that hybridity is the 'third space' which enables other positions to emerge. Diaspora North London is a *third space* is where British culture is combined with Turkish culture. Meanings and representations are renegotiated, and *in-between* identities are performed. London's cosmopolitan setting allows multiple identities to be performed and offer a sense of belonging with Londoner identity. Members of the Turkish-speaking community perform their in-between identity in there based on their "experiences of identity" (see Sassen, 2002). It challenges what Malkki (1992) calls *sedentary metaphysics* which divides the world into bounded territorial units and assuming people as attached to fixed locations.

I argue that different dynamics are involved among the different segments of the Turkish-speaking community during the construction of *in-between* identity in *third space*. For instance, mainland Turks come from a place where they were the dominant ethnicity and they renegotiate their identity in a minority status in the UK. For the nationalist groups among those who are proud of glorious Ottoman history encounters with 'the West' triggers the similar emotions

what Paul Gilroy (2004) calls 'postcolonial melancholia'. That feeling can be summarised as the remembering of lost imperial prestige with every day encounters. For the religious subjects which is mostly mutually inclusive with Turkish nationalism, encounters with British culture also represents Islamic resistance towards Christian domination/lifestyle (see AlSayyad and Castells, 2002). And for well-educated, secular Turks, encounters with British culture includes a postcolonial insight to their identity and combination of dichotomous feelings such as admiration to and disapproval of British culture; shame of backwardness of Turkey yet pride of its modernisation. For the Kurdish and Alevi people who already experienced being in an ethnic and religious minority position in Turkey, encounters with British culture in *third space* have different connotations. Moreover, they come from a cultural landscape where their ethnic identity is deemed undesirable and not part of what Cinar (2015) calls the repertoire of collective memory. Firstly, for them London as the *third space* is where oppressed ethnic and religious identities can be freely performed. During this performance, the Turkish and/or Sunni Muslim identity play the rival role, whereas British culture represents both the secure place harbour Kurdish cultural identity and 'the Other'. For Kurdish diaspora *third space* is where they can perform their national identity freely. However, practised Kurdistan in *third space* is imaginary or a simulacrum as there is not an established Kurdistan in the place of origin. That differentiates Kurdish diaspora from the other diaspora groups such as Indian or Greek. The practiced sense of belonging in *third space* is oriented to an imaginary Kurdistan (Galip, 2014). The Kurdish identity performed in *third space* in opposition to Turkish identity is an *in-between* identity that is enabled and reconstructed in diaspora London (Bruinessen, 1996, 1998, 2012; Demir, 2012). The Turkish Cypriots represent another case. On the one hand, they are one of the two societies that constitutes Republic of Cyprus, yet they are in the minority position against the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. Furthermore, they have the experience of British culture due to be a British colony in the past. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots had familiarity with British

culture and institution when they first moved to the UK which means a more intense level of hybridisation. On the other hand, the north of Cyprus is also referred as 'yavru vatan' (baby land) by 'motherland' Turkey (Kaliber, 2005). And Turkey's relationship with the island is protective which is remnant of imperial political culture. Therefore, Turkish Cypriot identity is based on differentiating their culture from mainland Turkey as well as Greek Cypriot cultures. Therefore, the Turkish-speaking community form a new *in-between* cultural identity with the combination of all these cultural, political, historical dynamics; interaction of different cultural identities, and hybridisation with British culture in *third space*. This *in-between* identity is hybridised and fragmented (see also Bhabha, 1994).

7.2 Four Main Identity Categories

Modernist identity theories are based on binary oppositions (Schlesinger, 1987; Morley and Robins, 1989, 1995) and perceived identities as fixed and unifying. According to these theories, identities are constructed through difference and exclusion (Sokefeld, 1999; 2001). Classical diaspora or migration studies tend to categorise Turkish-speaking immigrants in the UK by their ethnic backgrounds that are exclusive, fixed and unifying categories: mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds from Turkey (see Kucukcan, 1999; King et. Al. 2008; Mehmet Ali, 2001; Aksoy 2006; Atay 2010; Issa 2005, Sirkeci et.al. 2016). Postmodernism undermines the false cohesion and unity of identities with expanding on plural identities and positioning in global spaces. As Gellner (1992) argues, everything in the world is fragmented now and nothing resembles anything else. Therefore, Identity discussions shifted from a fixed and unifying subject to fragmented and dislocated ones (see Harvey, 1990; Rattansi, 1994; Bauman, 2001). Thus, this overgeneralising approach towards the Turkish-speaking community needs to be challenged and reinterpreted under the contemporary conditions of postmodernity such as multiple identities and high mobility of individuals.

At the beginning of my research study I assumed that the Turkish-speaking community in the UK is a diaspora. However, as Sartori (1970) and Tölölyan (1996) argue, the concept diaspora is stretched, and many immigrant groups have been addressed as diaspora. Therefore, the concept is not distinctive anymore. Based on my own encounters with different fragments of the community, I argue that only some of my participants can be classified as diaspora. The internal dynamics of the community such as intensified commitment to ethnic culture and national ideals increases the identification and involvement with the group, whereas lack of commitment decreases ethnic identification, reconstruction of national identity and orientation towards the home country (see Ting-Toomey et.al., 2000). Tölölyan (1996) argues that 'the Armenian diaspora' in the US is not very diasporic at all and is becoming less rather than more over time. Based on his argument I argue that some fragments among the Turkish diaspora are not diasporic at all. Kurdish nation building and the armed conflict in the Middle East increases the community members' sense of belonging to Kurdish identity (Wahlbeck, 1999; Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005; Baser, 2010, 2011, 2015b; Galip, 2014). However, among the Cypriot community, diasporic identification is very low. My findings support Safran's (1991) argument that diaspora includes various categories of people in modern societies such as expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic-racial minorities *tout court*.

Migrants' transnational and translocal links deconstruct their fixed sense of belonging (Glick-Schiller et.al. 1995; Dwyer, 2000; Vertovec, 2001). What Schiller et.al. (1995) calls transmigrants are those whose identites are constructed in relationship to multiple nation states and whose daily lives are interwoven with cross border connections. As Levitt (2003) they are settled into their country of residence but keep their links with their countries of origin economically, politically or culturally. Depending on different levels and forms of involvement with both countries, different identity is performed and constructed. Displacement from the home country does not mean complete loss of its culture. Homeland is no left-behind, static,

pure or untouched. Hybrid identities or different identity forms are constructed negotiating between chronotopes of the country of origin and residence in thirdspace (Peeren, 2006). I argue that while negotiating between home and host cultures, members of the Turkish-speaking community perform various identities. Therefore, they cannot be categorised anymore as mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds because there is not a unified diaspora identity. Therefore, I argue fournew identity experiences which are: economic migrants, diaspora, post-modern creoles or *gurbetçis* and expats.

7.2.1 Economic Migrants' Identity

One of my interview questions for the first and second-generation participants was the migration story of their family. Even though each wave of migration has its own features, economic motivations is the most common characteristic. Some of the participants shared with me that they were solely economically motivated, whereas others had differing reasons in addition to economic motives such as, escaping from a civil war. The latter group will be discussed in following sections; this section focuses on the economic migrants. As I also discussed in Chapter 5 ', there are some members of the community who live in the UK solely for economic purposes. This is especially the case for ethnic Turks from the first and fourth waves; as well as Turkish Cypriots who arrived after the 1980s. Therefore, I argue that they fit in the identity category of economic migrants. This group of people have relatively better relations with the Turkish state and its institutions in the UK. For instance, they are invited to receptions in the Turkish consulate, or/and delegates from the Turkish embassy visit economic migrants' organisations and shops. Also, they are the group who visit Turkey or Cyprus regularly and their standpoint is close to Turkish state's formal discourse on history and politics. Their political involvement is limited to voting in elections except the political Islamists among them. Political Islamists receive some financial support from and recruit members among Turkish economic migrants who have conservative and nationalist tendencies.

Some of them are more politicised, especially after the failed coup in Turkey on July 2016 (see Cakmak 2018). However, I argue that they do not display diasporic aspects or define themselves as diaspora. Therefore, they cannot be discussed under Turkish diaspora category. Yasar, a member of Pekunluler Association, first-generation Turkish man from the second wave, has differentiated his community (people from Pekun village) from more politically active and antagonistic groups such as Kurds and Alevis (see Keles, 2015b). Firstly, the concept diaspora connotates Armenians therefore they avoid associating with it. Secondly, they have nationalistic sentiments towards Turkey. They do not challenge or criticise any aspect of Turkey or Turkish politics. From their perspective Turkey is idealised and romanticised as '*Cennet Vatan*' a heavenly fatherland. They respect officials representing Turkish State and develop friendly relations with them. In return, Turkish officials support and visit them on a regular basis whereas diasporic Kurds are being monitored by Turkish spies and they have antagonistic relations with Turkish state (Cakmak, 2018). Yasar, has summarised the close relationship his group has with Turkish officials during the interview:

> Our consul general always invites us to consulate at Bayrams and other occasions. He visits our association. Also, we are the first people who signed an agreement with the Turkish Religious Foundation for Funeral Services Solidarity Fund.

7.2.2 Diaspora Identity

As I discussed in the literature review chapters, according to Saffran (1991) and Cohen (2008) there are some common features of diaspora communities. I argue that some fragments among the Turkish-speaking community hold several characteristics of a diaspora. For instance, among the first wave of Turkish migration to the UK, there are a few political activists some of whom even fought in paramilitary Turkish nationalist groups during the civil war in Cyprus. In the second wave, there were a number of socialist unionists who escaped from military junta after the 1980 military coup in Turkey (Cakmak, 2018). Among the third and

fourth wave (who migrated at the 1980 and 1990s), there were many Kurdish and Alevi refugees who escaped from the Turkish state's oppressive security measures which includes banning the use of the Kurdish language and armed conflict between the Turkish army and paramilitary Kurdish fighters (Keles, 2014; Cakmak, 2018). Common aspects of these groups are; being dispersed from their country of origin; having a prospect of a political change in their homeland that would enable them to return; having a strong group consciousness as a diaspora community and fellow people in homeland; idealising their home country yet having problematic relations with its current regime or government. As discussed in Chapter 2, only certain aspects of past or place of origin are recovered and idealised. In that way, only specific aspects of the identity are reconstructed (Schneider, 2000; Bucholtz, 2003; Milligan, 2003; Parveen, 2017).

According to Demir (2012) Kurds in diaspora Britain are battling against Turkey which ranges from criticism of Turkish policies towards Kurds to hunger strikes and collecting money from Kurdish businesses in Britain to sponsor Kurdish guerrillas fighting against the Turkish army. On many occasions, I witnessed that some community members dressed as Kurdish guerrilla during political demonstrations or celebrations like *Newroz* to show their support with armed conflict. However, the relationship with Kurdish diaspora and Turkey is not unidimensional. My research findings support Demir's (2012) argument that for the Kurds in Britain, Turkey is not identified as *vatan* [fatherland] as they dispute with it but identified as *memleket* [home country] which they still feel attached to.

> *(…) Kurds' relationship with Turkey cannot be reduced to the battling they engage in, but that Kurds' diasporic 'battling' needs to be understood and examined in the context of the memleket feelings they continue to harbour.* (Demir, 2012: 828)

The dynamics of this relationship include hatred towards state institutions and officers as well as a romanticised view of *memleket* [home country]. I argue that, the majority of the diasporic

people took refuge in the UK after political struggle and in some cases armed conflict in their home country. However, they did not give up their desire to change political structure in their countries of origin for a better future according to their political views. Thus, they keep their feet in both home and host countries and most of them keep up political activities in diaspora. They are Turkey or Cyprus oriented, and follow developments in country of origin closely. The Kurdish diaspora attend political demonstrations almost weekly and lobby with British politicians about the Kurdish question in Turkey. They organise cultural activities coloured with identity politics such as screening films, performing plays, music, folkloric dances, playing instruments and so forth. Some of them give Kurdish names to their children instead of Turkish or Muslim names, which I argue is an indicator of a rupture of their relationship with Turkey. However, supporting Demir's (2012) argument, I argue that even though the Kurdish identity is oppressed in Turkey, and Kurdish people have been experiencing a civil war in south eastern Turkey, the majority of Kurds still feel they belong to Turkey as *memleket* and are involved in its contemporary political and financial issues. For instance, the majority of the Kurdish people from Turkey who I interviewed, watch Turkish TV in their homes, kebab shops, cafés or other third places. Even Kurdish TV channels, mostly broadcast in Turkish. Moreover, the pro-Kurdish newspaper *Telgraf* is published in both Kurdish and Turkish. Also, many Kurds send money to their relatives in Turkey to support them and make investment in Turkey such as buying a house.

Almost all Kurdish refugees I spoke with regarded their exile in Britain as temporary as well as acknowledging they have no home to go back to (Mahir, Kazim, Ela, Kemal, Begum, Rojda, Gizem). The myth of return is deeply rooted in their mindsets regarding imaginary Kurdistan. This explains their orientation towards the home country as well as the UK remains the same even after many years living in the UK. For example, whenever a group of Kurdish refugees meet in their community centres or coffeehouses, they discuss what is happening at

home. Most of them define themselves as guests or refugees in the UK who did not choose to come to London, but circumstances led them to flee Turkey. Most of them did not feel they belong to British society but are in exile hoping to one day go back to where their roots are (Rojda, Mahir, Kemal, Kazim). This is the case for late comers and first-generations who have been living in the country for 10 to 20 years as well as the second-generation. Even those who came to the UK with economic motives link their presence in the UK with politics such as accusing Turkey of not investing in the Kurdish region and leaving them in poverty. Those who fled Turkey due to their link with the PKK regard themselves as carrying a noble mission; contributing Kurdish nation-building process or 'defending the homeland against evil forces' (see Smith 1986). However, they do not feel estranged from the people they have left behind in Eastern Turkey. Yet their status to stay in the UK depends on political changes in Turkey and the Middle East. Therefore, I argue that the nation building is kept fresh in their collective memory and the political agenda to reproduce cultural identity. In addition, among the diasporic groups there were some passive individuals who feel defeated after their political struggle in Turkey or Cyprus which ended up with them becoming refugees in the UK.

The place they want to return to is a defined geography, landscape and intact territory. When the left-wing or Kurdish diaspora refer to their place of origin, they refer to it as *memleket* (homeland). They do not need to clarify or define which political governance they are talking about. However, they do not use the word *vatan* (fatherland) which is a more nationalistic word which refers to Turkish ruling and devotion to national symbols like the flag. The meaning they ascribe to *memleket* as a territory is sentimental. Their discourse is not only a reference to a physical location from which they have come from. *Vatan* as a concept is endowed with symbolism relating to nationalism, whereas *memleket* gives them an identity and a sense of belonging. As Halbwachs (1992) claims, memories are acquired within the society and

preference of the words represents the dominant discourse among the repertoire of collective memory (Cinar, 2015).

As first-generation members of the diasporic community are politically active and oriented to home country's issues, younger generations of this group have a stronger identity consciousness. For instance, second-generation Kurdish or Alevi participants who spent most of their lives in the UK displayed a diasporic identity with their engagement with Turkey's politics. Most of them did not define themselves as British although they have British passports. Rojda, a 27-year-old second-generation Kurdish participant told me she has only Kurdish identity when I asked her whether she defines herself as British:

> I do not [define myself as British] if I am honest. Yes, we may be born and raised in this country, but we are attached to Kurdish culture, identity, to our Kurdish origin. We have our own identity it cannot be denied. Our parents had to migrate because of this identity.

Rojda's statement also carries the sentiments I discussed in the literature review as placebo nostalgia (Poupazis, 2014). This nostalgia of Kurdistan is about a narration, a historic period or/and an ideal that has never experienced first-hand by those who carry these sentiments.

7.2.3 Postmodern Creoles: *Gurbetçiler* and *Londrezliler*

When Turkish-speaking people started migrating to Western European countries to meet labour demands in the late 1950s, both people in home and host countries thought the migrant workers would stay temporarily. Hence, why they were named as guest workers in host countries. In Turkish public discourse, people going to Europe to work are labelled as *gurbetçi* which means expatriate. The concept of being a guest is kept fresh both by Turkey and the host countries.

The term *'gurbetçi'* [plural*: gurbetçiler*] has become the general name defining Turkish-speaking communities living abroad instead of diasporic Turks (see also Mandel 1990). As I

argued before the word 'diaspora' has negative connotations as the Armenian and Greek communities use it often. During my field study, only a few participants defined their community as diaspora even though they carry many aspects of it. The term *gurbetçiler* refers to temporality of the state of being abroad because *'gurbet'* in Turkish is a value-laden word that means absence from home. It carries the desire of return to '*sıla'* (home). The meaning of '*sıla'* is home that is longed for. The notions of 'émigré' and 'expatriate' refer to someone who has departed to live elsewhere for an open-ended period. The Turkish-speaking community in Britain and elsewhere in Europe generally do not describe themselves in this way, thus they I argue that keep the myth of return alive.

I also argue that, once people leave the home and start living abroad, they are put in the category of *gurbetçi* which is similar to creole by residents of the home nation state. *Gurbetçiler* is not like a legal category like *allochtonen* (the Netherlands) or *omogeneis* (Greece), however it is commonly used in public discourse and even by politicians. It carries a similar meaning with creole or *omogeneis*. The *'omogeneis'* refers to Greeks living abroad. The word is derived from *omogeneia* which means coming from the same genes or ancestry. *Omogeneis* refers to ethnic Greeks born and raised abroad and not carrying Greek citizenship. *Omogeneis* people generally do not have Greek citizenship, but they are pseudo-citizens who are not subject to the state but a member of the nation (see Stewart 2006). I argue that for the Turkish *gurbetçis* the case is the opposite as *gurbetçiler* generally carry double-citizenship or only Turkish citizenship with a resident permit of the host country. However, they are not perceived as members of the nation anymore.

Turkish ethnic identity is not only grounded in the faith of Islam but also having Turkish as a first language and keeping up traditional cultural practices. It also has an ethno-nationalist feature that belief in coming from Ottoman descent. However, I argue that those who have lived abroad for a long period are perceived as having lost some of the national characteristics.

It supports Bhabha's (1994) argument that hybridisation is inevitable while living in diaspora, third space, where cultures and identities perpetually encounter. Although they are accepted as coming from same descent, they are blamed for having a lack of certain characteristics that homeland citizens have. Stewart (2006:69) argues that "Like a *creóle*, an *omogeneis* was once 'one of us' in the homeland, who then migrated to distant cultural and environmental surroundings and, through adaptation, becomes somewhat different from 'us'". Thus, I argue that *'gurbetçi'* is not a neutral term describing diasporic Turks but an exclusionary word that differentiate those living in foreign culturalscapes from homeland citizens.

Creoles originally refers to descendants of the Spanish and Portuguese settlers who were born and raised in South American overseas colonies. They were not allowed to go back to the mainland and they mixed with the local communities/tribes (Duany, 1985; Brading, 1993). However, I argue that, Turkish people are cultural creoles who are in contact with their homeland via global technologies such as internet. They are also allowed to return however, because of cultural hybridisation they do not fit in to the cultural and social context in Turkey anymore. Like many other migrant groups, among the Turkish-speaking community hybridisation with host culture increases in correlation with the time spent in the host country (Weiner, 1996; Scholten, 2013; Bendel, 2014; Kraal and Vertovec, 2017).

> When I first visited Turkey, it felt different to me, you know. I felt like I was in a different world. I felt like a foreigner in my own country basically. I speak the same language, but the lifestyle was different. I remember even going to the shops for the first time, *bakkal* [shop] that felt weird as well. Because it's fixed really, it's all same in Turkey. You go in and you have the bread shelf on the side and it's all same wooden shelf with a glass door. (Ayhan, 18, Second-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Almost all first-generation migrants from any wave defined their state as being abroad (in *gurbet*) as their primary socialisation was in Turkey or Cyprus. And almost all of them defined visiting Turkey or Cyprus as going home. Some of them narrated to me that people in their

home country treat them differently as they live abroad. Also, similar to the original use of the term creole, most of them told me that they cannot move back to their country of origin as they think they cannot fit in there anymore (Begum, Guler, Mustafa, Ela, Gamze).

> I cannot live in Turkey if I go back there. I definitely cannot live there. Neither in Dersim [her hometown] nor in the big cities of Turkey. Because we are really used to the system and everything here. We say we aren't used to this, but we are. We cannot live in Turkey anymore, but we like to visit in the summer. (Begum, 42, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

When it comes to younger generations, the *gurbetçi* concept is applied more intensely because of the presumptions about people living abroad based on the entrenched *gurbetçi* concept in the collective memory of homeland citizens. I argue that, most of the second and third generations especially from the first and second waves are highly involved in British culture. Their experiences with Turkish culture are limited to episodic home country visits and interactions with the Turkish-speaking community of London. Thus, many of them are more embedded in British culture than Turkish culture. Therefore, when they encounter homeland citizens on visits to Turkey or Cyprus, cultural differences semerge. Acknowledging the Turkish-speaking community of London that their visits to Turkey or Cyprus is temporary is about losing right to live in the homeland. As my participants narrated to me, homeland citizens do not see them as part of the country or society but as tourists (Ayhan, Meltem, Efe, Ela). All my participants from first and second wave told me they do not fit in Turkish society anymore as they are used to life in Britain. They see Turkey or Cyprus as country of origin that they do not belonged to anymore. Therefore, I categorise this group as cultural creoles (see Duany, 1985; Brading, 1993).

First-generation participants still have the 'myth of return' vaguely. However, second and third generations do not define themselves as part of Turkish society and most of them do not plan to live in Turkey or Cyprus in the future. Most of them still define themselves as Turkish

with hyphened identities such British-Turk, Turkish-British, Turkish origin British, British with Turkish Cypriot heritage and so forth. Therefore, they perceive themselves as being part of the broader Turkish nation but not part of Turkish society. According to responses from many of the second and third generation participants from the first and second wave, homeland citizens do not perceive them as part of the nation or as 'proper' Turkish.

> They see us like tourists in Turkey. For instance, in a taxi they once charged me 150 liras for a distance which normally costs 15 liras. I said are you kidding me? Do you not see I am Turkish as well? I am not a tourist! (Efe, 26, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish)

First-generation participants from the third and fourth wave have more vivid memories of Turkey and Cyprus and stronger sense of belonging to it as they came to the UK in the late 1980s and afterwards. However, they mentioned being treated as a *gurbetçi* as well. Younger generations of these waves are more oriented to country of origin compared to their counterparts from the first and second waves. The Kurdish and Alevi youth romanticised Turkey with ideological motivations and they display more of a diasporic identity rather than a creole identity. However, they mentioned being treated as *gurbetçi* by homeland citizens as well.

> Last summer I went shopping with my cousin in Adana, we went to a shop and she bought something and came back. I went back to same shop, they saw me, and they gave me it for 35 TL. I said no my cousin just bought it for 20 TL. She goes oh, but you look very touristy, so we just put the price up. They see and spot us straight away I mean I don't speaki English, I don't act anything but as soon as I walk in, they put the price up. It is the way you get treated there. That's why you don't feel it's your home any longer. You experience that's happening you just feel you are not part of the furniture anymore. When I first came to this country, the first time I had chance to go back to Turkey was four years later. Even at the time I was being told here we go tourist is here. And I was like I can't even speak the language [English] properly why you are calling me that way. Most the people have same sort of experience. (Ela, 37, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

Turkish Cypriot participants told me that people in Cyprus address them as *Londrezli*. It is a derogatory made up word consists of a mix of Turkish words for Londoner and Cypriot. Similar to Turkish word *gurbetçi* it has connotations of not being like homeland citizens. Different than *gurbetçi*, *Londrezli* also refers to a state of not being fully integrated in British society according to homeland citizens' perspective. Hence why they do not address the Turkish Cypriot community of London as Londoners. Yet, they are not Turkish enough to be called *Kibrizli* [Cypriot]; therefore, I argue they are *Londrezli* as cultural creoles. Many of the Turkish Cypriot participants think they are perceived by homeland nationals as being pretentious and showing off wealth as well as a European lifestyle. That is again similar to perceptions of *gurbetçi* in Turkey. For instance, *gurbetçis* who went to Germany as guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s are represented in Turkish cinema with the stereotype of a fedora hat with a feather, and the technology products they bring to Turkey from Europe. Although, the word *gurbetçi* was invented at the 1950s and has historical context. I argue that Turkish diaspora is still named as *gurbetçi* in public discourse (Mandel, 1990).

Figure 55: A gurbetci visiting her mum at his village with his hat and mixer as a gift source: Gurbetci Saban film 1985

Meltem, a third generation Turkish Cypriot, told me about her fluctuating identity and positioning in different contexts as follows:

I have two Turkish Cypriot friends; one is very traditional. I am so different. We are the same age and she is married and pregnant, she used to live with her parents and she's done very traditional, work for her father, very traditional Turkish style. When I am around Turkish friends, I am quite English, quite an English Turk. I don't have a lot of the Turkish values. But when I am around my English friends, I am really not English. So, I am a bit in the middle somewhere. When we are going to Cyprus as well, we are clearly 'Londrezli' as they call us which is very complementary about us (!).

I argue that, there is not a fixed and unifying identity anymore but the subject constantly 'suturing' itself to different articulations between discourse and practice (Cohen, 2000, Bauman, 2001). As Meltem's example demonstrates, subjects can choose between different identities and belonging. While Meltem is performing herself, her multiple identities interpellate (Hall, 1996a). Based on Costas and Fleming's (2009) argument, I argue that second and third generations, negotiate between socially imposed identities and their 'authentic self'. And this negotiation between identities result in them sometime not fully adopting neither Turkish nor British identities. Thus, I argue '*gurbetçi*' is not a fixed and unifying identity position but the experience of being 'betwixt and between' (Turner, 1967) or 'in-betweens' (Bhabha, 1994). Therefore, '*gurbetçi*' identity is a post-modern creole identity and it is multiple. There are as many multiple 'gurbetçi' identities as there are multiple experiences of diaspora thirdspace.

7.2.4 Expats

In literature, expatriates are defined as individuals who take a work or study assignment in a foreign location, independently or sent by a multinational institution (Inkson et.al 1997; Harzing, 2001). According to my research findings, some members of the Turkish-speaking community who are elites look down upon the community and abstain contacting them. These are mostly well-educated and secular people oriented to European or cosmopolitan identity rather than Turkish identity. The elite are people who have higher social status, wealth and power. They share similar social background and differ from ordinary people (see Mills, 1999).

I refer to this group of people as expats instead of immigrant or diaspora, as they are more flexible with their transnational movements. I ague that, expat identity is not related with generation or migration wave but mindset. Some of these expats moved to the UK in the last ten or twenty years, after they finished university education in Turkey. They are not part of the ethnic economy and generally have high-profile jobs in British companies and they do not live in ethnic neighbourhoods either. During my encounters and anecdotes, quite a few of them told me that they have British partners. I argue that, mixed marriage is most common among this group in the Turkish-speaking community. For instance, a Turkish lady I met during one of the events said she was married with a French diplomat and they lived in Chelsea.

When I contacted a Turkish man working at the council of a North London borough who iss at his mid-60s with a posh Turkish accent. He has graduated from *Galatasaray Lisesi* which is the equivalent of Eton College in Turkey. He came to London for a university education in the 1970s. He emphasized that he has graduated from *Galatasaray College,* not University as the latter one is more open to the middle classes. When I asked him whether he could help me to reach some Turkish Cypriots and recruit them for interview he told me the following anecdote:

> What could they tell you? They know nothing. I am not looking down on them, but they don't know anything. Old Cypriot women coming here who used to stay at home to do tailoring work when they were young. They didn't go out and see what is happening in London. They have nothing to tell you. They can only give you information about Cyprus. They started going out after their husbands died. And now they are staying in care house/elder house. They are in the building whole day, so what can they tell you? If you give them surveys, Turkish people will fill them randomly. It happened before. Or some of them picture themselves with very negatively as they believe the more problematic, they seem, the more benefit they could gain from the government (…) When I came here at the 1970s, there was not that much Turks around. When I was studying at University of London, we were just four Turks in the entire university. Now unfortunately there are a lot. I haven't seen the economic situation of England that bad

in last 40 years. Turkish people claim benefit when they don't need. I know people driving Mercedes but getting benefit. (…) Turkish A-Level is withdrawn now, who cares? They [Kurds] know protesting the Turkish state in front of BBC. But they are not interested in their own children's future or education. (Teoman, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish)

Teoman described the increasing number of the Turkish-speaking people in the UK as an 'unfortunate' fact. I argue that, as this example shows, expatriates avoid being affiliated with the rest of the community. Expats visit Turkey as they are not hostile towards the Turkish state.

As one of my participants Mustafa said, rest of the Turkish-speaking community perceive expats as elitist who distinguish themselves from economic migrants and refugees with their cultural capital. They are seen as jet-set or elites by rest of the community and there are rumours about them.

There are some among Turkish Cypriot community living outside of London. They are jet-set, living in big mansions. They do not contact with the Turkish community, they live like English people. (Mustafa, 83, First-generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot)

When I attended the reception of the Republican People's Party's (CHP) Britain representatives, I met several of them and I collected some anecdotes that enabled me to make this analysis. However, I could not recruit any of them for interview for two reasons; firstly, they do not see themselves as part of the Turkish-speaking community, so they do not want to participate in this study. Secondly, I was not 'high-profile enough' for them to be in touch with. Although I could not recruit any of them for an interview, their abstain from participating a research on the Turkish-speaking community and separating themselves from majority of the rest of the community is an important data. Thus, these analyses in this subsection based on the data which was a result of multiple interactions as well as rest of the community members' view on the expats.

There are similarities between what I call as expats identity and what is discussed in the literature as cosmopolitans. Cosmopolitans refuse to think themselves as defined by their location, ancestry, citizenship or language (Waldron, 1991) which is similar to Turkish expats' avoidance form being identified with Turkish community. As Beck (1994, 2010) claims cultural cosmopolitans are open to other cultures and having positive relations with them. Among the Turkish-speaking community, mixed marriages and living outside of ethnic enclaves are most common among this group. Thus, they are open to British culture like cultural cosmopolitans (Beck, 2010). Like cosmpolitans, expats have cultural competence which enable them to engage multiple cultures and to experiment or renegotiate their sense of belonging and identity as they combine both local and global commitments in their diversity (Hannerz, 1990; Roudometof, 2005; Werbner, 2008). Cosmopolitans are open-minded individuals and open to change (Holt, 1997; Yoon, 1998; Riefler & Diamantopoulos, 2009). But they are criticised of rootlessness and the lack of attachment or commitment to the local culture (Hannerz 1990; Delanty, 2000). However, cosmpolitans are not necessarily viewed negatively as 'jetset' who try to isolate themselves from rest of their community as expats are perceived by the Turkish-speaking community in north London. There is an emerging class theme at this point which needs further research and elaboration because it is beyond this thesis' theoretical framework.

7.3 Performativity of Identity

As I discussed in Chapter 3, according to postmodern theories, identities are in process and a state of formation rather than being fully and finally established (Rattansi, 1994; Bauman, 2001). Therefore, I argue that, identities are fluctuating. Diasporic individuals occupy multiple positions and have a range of identities (Harvey, 1990; Rattansi, 1994; Bauman 2001). According to Butler (1990), identity is performatively constituted by the expressions that are said to be its results and performativity has to do with repetition identity norms. Cultural

identity is a self-making and it is embodied by perpetual practices. They are long term, consistent, unconscious practices that are outcome of a discourse (Sullivan, 2012; Pratt, 2009; Lloyd, 1999). In line with Butler's thesis (2004:160) I argue that Turkish identity "is an act which has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the particular actors who make use of it, but which requires individual actors in order to be actualized and reproduced as reality once again". Turkish cultural identity is real only to the extent it is performed (see Butler, 1988). Turkish-speaking migrants' performativity reveals itself in the form of jewellery or a piece of cloth. In this way, they perpetually perform their cultural identity in everyday life (see Butler 1990). This performativity intensifies on national or religious commemorative days. According to Butler et. al. (2001:1) "'[I]dentity' itself is never fully constituted; in fact, since identification is not reducible to identity, it is important to consider the incommensurability or gap between them". Also, a pseudo-nostalgic loyalty to the culture of ancestors is performed through clothing, food, music, visiting country of origin and symbols like playing a traditional instrument or socialising around certain institutions such as a Turkish mosque. Although people who discard most of cultural aspects of Turkish tradition and successfully integrate into British culture reproduce Turkish identity with symbols like an item of traditional clothing or celebrating weddings in the Turkish way with *davul* (drum), *zurna* (clarion) and *halay*. Gans (1979) called such performances as 'symbolic ethnicity' which is a voluntary role that individuals assume.

7.3.1 A Retrogressive Approach

Fear of being assimilated and losing Turkish or Kurdish identity results in some fragments of the Turkish-speaking community being an insular group. it was narrated to me during the field study that first-generation migrants from any wave came to the UK with a motivation of going back to their country of origin after a period. Hence, they tended to protect their culture, identity and values stringently. In this regard, I argue that they have a retrogressive approach

towards culture of the country of origin that is reactionary to any change coming from the host culture. This is particularly applied to younger generations in the form of anti-assimilationist measures as well idealising the culture in the country of origin, such as its language, dressing pattern or behavioural codes. This is not the contemporary form of the culture but the form the first-generation migrants used to live in, I argue that it is a simulacrum of the home culture. As I discussed in Chapter 2, idealising the culture of the past results in a state of being encapsulated in time. Among first and second wave immigrants a retrogressive approach is limited to the First-generation, whilst younger generations adapt to local cultural life in a more intense level such as adopting its clothing and food culture. Moreover, they discard their parents' reactionary defensiveness. To illustrate this I refer to Mary, a middle-aged, second-generation Turkish woman from the first wave, who spoke with disapproval about her conservative upbringing.

> I guess my parents were fearful of us children being assimilated and then there would be a gap between them and us. Obviously growing up and feeling like you are being monitored, controlled to stay as you are and not change goes against everything that British culture is about. So, you have this encapsulated home life with these ideas of not allowed to change and then you step outside the door and there is this entire city, world, life, BBC telling you something else. They are telling you that you need to change, change is good, university is good, you need to challenge yourself. And you try to live in this structure, it was very very difficult. When I grew up I didn't wanna belong to the struggling, fearful group of 'what is gonna happen to our future, what are our children gonna become over in this country'(…) You know the way we taught Turkish was to make sure, we understood it so well; we didn't dare to try being English.

Throughout her interview, Mary displayed a more cosmopolitan Londoner identity with her multiple belonging and homes (see McLachlan, 2004). However, this quote illustrates that parental influence restricts younger generations' identity performances to a certain level even among the first and second wave. Alice, a third generation Turkish Cypriot woman told me about the tension she felt about anglicising her name on official documents:

> Everyone knows me as Alice, not as Ayse. I considered changing my name then I thought, you know, I do not think my grandparents would never forgive me if I do not use my full name.

As this quote indicates, tension among generations around preserving the cultural identity is still there even for third generations. On the other hand, I argue that Turkish-speaking immigrants that arrived in the UK in the late 1980's and afterwards, which I categorise as the third and fourth wave are keener on the retrogressive approach. That should be considered both under the local conditions of postcolonial Britain and the groups' migration motives. For instance, this era corresponds with the third and fourth wave of Turkish migration, and most of these immigrants are Kurdish or Alevi political refugees that abandoned Turkey because they were not allowed to display their cultural identities. Thus, identity politics is the *raison d'être* of their diaspora community. I argue that, younger generation of Kurdish and Alevi immigrants from the third and fourth waves are as retrogressive as the First-generation. Another dynamic is the Kurdish nation building process in the Middle East that affects Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Therefore, I argue that, Kurdish and Alevi identities are very politicised, and explicitly displayed in diaspora London which influences younger generations of Kurdish and Alevi youth (see also Keles, 2015b; Jenkins and Cetin, 2017).

> I am Kurdish, my children are Kurdish and even my grandchildren are Kurdish. We are not English or British. Yes, they were born in England, study and live here; they can also work for British state, but I am not English, and my children or grandchildren can never be either. We are Kurdish, we have our own nation and values, we carry Kurdish blood, we shall keep it. (Mahir, 57, First-generation, Third Wave, Kurdish).

While spending time with this community I found that Turkish Cypriot youth are perceived to be assimilated and considered a 'lost generation' by many members of the Turkish-spekaing community.

I have always defined myself as Turkish and I will always define myself as Turkish, I have never

adopted anything from English culture. I say I am Turkish, I live like a Turk and I raised my children

as Turkish. I have never admired to or imitated English lifestyle. Also, most of my villagers are like

me. You cannot find anyone among my fellow villagers who is assimilated. We are not like Cypriots,

we cannot live like English people. Also, that is why 99% of my villagers married people from our

home village. But I know some Turkish families who do not teach children Turkish well and raise them

as English. And these are our youth but degenerated. (Yasar, 54, First-generation, Second Wave,

Turkish)

Also, I argue that among this group, Turkey or one of its regions such as Anatolia, always

remains home or *memleket.* This sense of cultural belonging results in a political engagement

with Turkey as homeland, for example a few participants claimed that they would go and fight

if war erupts in Turkey. This group is mostly oriented to their home country and follow its

developments closely. They follow Turkish TV channels both for news and soap operas. One

of my participants, a first-generation Turkish man, told me that he makes his children watch

Turkish historical fiction so that they can learn about Ottoman history and never forget their

heroic ancestors. Thus, he maintains a sense of cultural belonging for later generations.

Therefore, it can be summarised as when the group identity is based on cultural, ethnic or racial

labels, identification with it is stronger and identity is transmitted to younger generations

successfully (Fuligni et.al., 2005).

7.3.2 Desiring the Past in the Present: Encapsulated in Time

As I observed during the field study, cutting the links with their home country's culture is

perceived as being degenerated or lost in diaspora. Therefore, members of the Turkish-

speaking community want to keep certain aspects of their culture and tradition alive. This

sometime results in the adoption of a conservative community structure. One of the themes that

emerged from my fieldwork is being 'encapsulated in time'. Especially women and young

generation respondents narrated to me that their upbringing in London is more conservative than their peers back in hometowns in Turkey or Cyprus.

> So, there is a group of Turks in London who came over in like the 1960s and 70s and they think they are preserving some sort of Turkishness. So, they are very strict with their children. And when you go to Cyprus, you see your cousins have more freedom than you have here. Because they are not living the 70s, 80s lifestyle in Cyprus; they moved on, things have progressed. So, it's a very weird dynamic here when some people still have a very old mentality, and think they are preserving something even the Cypriots in Cyprus are not trying to preserve anymore, they are not interested, they moved on. Here you find, Turkish families say to their children 'you can not to date', 'do not worry about marriage we will find you somebody', that still happens here. You go to Cyprus, and your cousin says bye I am going out with my boyfriend (laughing). I think it's about preserving the culture. I think in Cyprus, it's safer according to them; if you are dating, you are dating somebody Turkish. Here there is a fear of like mixed marriages, mixed heritage; that's still very aware within the community. (Meltem, 30, Third generation, First Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

Meltem defined the first-generation Turkish migrants' case as being trapped in time. She told me that Turkish families are scared of assimilation and they try to hold on to their home country's values. However, the values they brought with them to life in London are the values of the 1970s-80s Turkish or Cypriot society. Another interviewee, Mary told me that her parents and other Turkish families do not visit their home countries enough to adapt with the homeland nation's up-to-date values. Therefore, they have become stuck in values of the past which are no longer valid in their homeland. Begum a first-generation Kurdish woman, who came to the UK at 1988 when she was a 12, told me that the values they live within the Turkish-speaking community in London are abandoned in her hometown.

> When I first went to Turkey in 1996, I noticed that it was not same as I had left. We were growing in an environment like England, my mother and father were restricting us; you cannot go here or there. They did not let us go to cinema or theatre or out to meet with friends. But when we went to our hometown after eight years, my friend had a boyfriend. I was like what? Because when I had left there, we have

older brothers and sisters around keeping eye on us. My parents did the same in England. When we went Turkey and saw that lifestyle, we understood that things have changed, Dersim is not as we had left. Going out and finding a boyfriend? That is a huge change.

However, this is not the case for the fourth wave Turkish-speaking migrants as later comers have knowledge of a more contemporary phase of Turkish and Cypriot society. Also, as some third generation participants informed me, restrictions are lessening with the new generations.

But I bet if you compare my mother's experience with somebody of a similar age in Cyprus, they probably had a more liberal upbringing. Because for my grandparents there was the fear of not being Turkish Cypriot, so they brought their daughter up in the most conservative way they could think of when everybody back in Cyprus was progressing. People in Cyprus are actually more confident in their identity, and they were able perhaps to evolve a bit more. (Alice, 27, Third generation, Third Wave, Turkish Cypriot).

7.3.3 Symbolic Ethnicities

All cultural identities are socially constructed and evident only when sufficient people believe in some version of collectivity of it, so it can be embodied (see Fulbrook, 1999). As Hall (1988, 1990) claims that diaspora is an unsettling combination, hybridisation and cut-and-mix experience. Therefore, members of the Turkish-speaking community perform a cultural identity in which mundane social audience including the actors themselves believe and perform in the mode of belief. In that way, they gain and retain a good name, in this context 'being proper Turkish/Kurdish/Cypriot'. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are certain pieces of jewellery that some young members of the community wear, such as a ring with an Ottoman emblem on it, which displays an 'über' belonging to a culturally informed identity position. I call them as symbolic ethnicity. Gans (1979:9) defined symbolic ethnicity as "a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior". Another feature of symbolic ethnicity performances is that, either a very nostalgic perspective

or a foreigner's view to cultural identity is displayed by the members of the community in everyday life. References to the glorious Ottoman past or commodified ethnic identity is represented, for instance through Turkish supplementary schools or cultural associations that organise Turkish cultural days/nights or festivals. In these instances, it is common to find Turkish food, ethnic materials, and ornaments for sale, the same as which can be found in many souvenir shops in both Turkey and Cyprus that targets tourists only. Most of them are not everyday objects that an ordinary Turkish/Kurdish or Cypriot family use in their everyday life.

Figure 56: Leaflet of a Turkish school's Cultural Event

Figure 57: Cyprus and Turkey Corners at the event

I observed the practice of 'selling' Turkish culture back to the Turkish-speaking community in London in the same way as one would sell to tourists in Turkey. Ironically, both the seller and consumers of that culture claim to be native, although the objects are symbolic, iconic and touristy.

In addition to these events, the annual festival *Anatolian Cultural Fete* in London is organised with participation from several Turkish associations and the Turkish Embassy. I attended the festival in 2016 based in Clissold Park between 27th and 30th May. There were many participants from Turkey selling their ethnic, traditional products on the stalls, which varies from Turkish food and beverages to ornaments and clothes. On the one hand, it was realistic as the performers came from where the culture is originated and still lived. In other words, it was just performativity and performances at the festival are expressions that are said to be its results (Butler,1990). The programme of the festival included cultural performances of Turkish artists and dancers such as a performance from the Ottoman Military Marching Band '*Mehteran*'; Sword and Shield folk dance '*Kılıç Kalkan'*; traditional Turkish shadow play '*Karagöz and Hacivat'*; and a Turkish sport Oil Wrestling '*Yağlı Güreş*'. Based on Gans' (1979) theory, I argue that all these practices are 'symbolic ethnicity' as they adopt iconographic presentations of their ethnic identity.

The festival was opened by the Ambassador and Consul General of Turkey and the singing of the Turkish national anthem. The event is financially supported by Turkish state officials, and it is parallel to Turkish state's historical and political discourse, hence why it represents nationalist-conservative interpretation of Turkish culture. There was not any representation of Kurdish or Alevi cultures, which are components of Anatolian culture. Therefore, it shows which ethnic identity is part of the cultural landscape and which is deemed undesirable (Cinar, 2015). Thousands of guests visited the festival during the four days and, according to my observations they were mainly ethnic Turkish families from central and rural Turkey that I distinguished from their accents. The festival included several symbolic ethnicity performances. For instance, *Mehteran* band played epic songs with heroic and legendary lyrics praising glorious Ottoman past. Another performance of symbolic ethnicity was *Kılıç Kalkan* folk dance performed by men with swords and shields. They raided the stage representing the

Ottoman soldiers' conquest of cities. The performers danced with rapid and brave body movements dressed in early Ottoman battle wear. During the performance, there was not any music, but the sound of clashing swords and shields could be heard, as well as performers' yelling heroic words that were responded by the guests' exclamations in national euphoria. This is followed by a round of a Turkish traditional sport '*Yağlı Güreş*'. These performances boosted nationalistic feelings for the guests as well as presenting a romantic Turkishness for the youth (For discussion on significance of cricket for identity construction of Pakistani youth in Norway see Walle's 2013 and 2014). In addition, Turkish shadow play and theatre performed in Turkish for the kids. Overall, this festival promoted Turkish cultural identity in form of symbolic ethnicity for the purposes of romantic representation of Turkish culture and transmission of cultural identity to the younger generations.

Figure 58: Festival on Billboards

Figure 59: Sword and Shield Dance

Figure 61: Ottoman Mehteran Band

Figure 62: Play for Kids

Figure 63: Tent decorated with ethnic material

Figure 64: Nostalgic objects as decor in the tent

Figure 65: Some ethnic objects for sale tile and jars

Figure 66: Turkish Traditional handcrafts

Figure 67: Calligraphy Ornaments

Figure 68: Turkish coffee mugs fincans

Figure 69: Ultra nationalist objects/ rings

Figure 70: Ultra nationalist objects/ Ottoman emblem ornaments and miniature Mehteran band

Figure 71: Waiter with Fez

Figure 72: Festival Guests Panorama

Figure 73: Children with flags and Ottoman Fez

7.4 Simulacrum of Turkey

Although, all identities are performative, I argue that in diaspora context, some performativities are simulacrum as they fail to link the performance with an 'original'. They are not rooted in a shared collective past, but they are anachronically cut-and-mixed. Based on Baudrillard's (2001) theory I argue that, traditions invented in diaspora are copies without original.

Diasporic people open restaurants or cafés and give them names of landmarks from the country of origin such as Istanbul Restaurant (Stoke Newington) or Taksim Café (Green Lanes). These places are physical spaces however linked with what Lefebvre (1991) calls *mental space* due to their references to history and collective memory as well as bounded to *social space* because the community's social life is organised around them. Like *kahvehanes*, these places are heterotopic since an imported Turkish culture is living inside even though they are located in North London. They offer a break from mainstream culture flows outside which is British culture and a break in time. As a researcher who came from Turkey in 2014, I felt as

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though the version of Turkey or Cyprus they present is an imagined place, not representative of contemporary Turkey, but a more nostalgic, romanticised version of it. I argue that spending time in these heterotopic third spaces becomes an identity performance where customers experience a hyper-real Turkey-like simulation. These places offer a miniaturized pleasure of their homeland. Like Baudrillard's (2006) famous Disneyland example, these hyper-real places seem very realistic and take visitors' imagination to a glorious imperial past. They present desired aspects of past but in an anachronistic way. It is a hyper-real Turkey that does not represent 'actual' Turkey, or it has no relation with it but just a simulacrum. Therefore, I argue that, with all these aspects, these places are simulacrums that offers a more admirable and attractive image of Turkey which visitors cannot find in real life. In this way, it reconstructs an idea of homeland and makes cultural identity performance more desirable to ensure transmission of this to the second and third generations. During this performance visitors do not differentiate real Turkey with the simulacrum, and they enjoy this Disneyland-like experience. The post below is shared on Facebook by one of my participants:

iste bu Ya suan istanbul Taksimde Kahvalti Zamani

7 Likes · 2 Comments

Figure 74: Social media share about Turkish breakfast

He says in the post in Turkish; *"That's it. Time to breakfast in Istanbul, Taksim"*. He shares his post as if he is really in a café in Taksim borough of Istanbul. However, Facebook reveals the location where the picture is shared as London. This not a unique example as many members of the community go these places to savour the smell of *memleket* [homeland] for a short while.

It is a complete simulation of Turkey without an origin since there is not a specific 'Taksim café' in Turkey that is represented, and with this aspect it turns into a simulacrum of Turkey. That is not 'actual Turkey' in 'present time' but an idealised version of it presented in a foreign culturalscape. The Turkish, Kurdish or Cypriot cultural identity is performed in these places

independently while enjoying romanticised aspects of the culture. I argue that, simulacrum does not only alleviate their identity crisis but also satisfies their fantasies. Many members of the community love these places because they cannot find this experience outside of the doors. As Baudrillard argues, simulacrum makes people believe what they see is real. Visitors construct that romanticised version of homeland in London, and then they believe that 'actual Turkey' is the same as what they created. In this way, diasporic subjects start to construct a hyperreal homeland in diasporic spaces. These spaces are not a simulation of actual Turkey in present time but an idealised and romanticised version of it that once existed and changed or was abandoned or has never existed beyond imagination. One can enjoy a 'Turkey experience' over there with Turkish speaking neighbours, markets and coffee houses. Based on Baudrillard's (2001) theory, I argue that hyperreal 'Turkey experience' is a total simulation, without origin, past and future. Mental, spatial and temporal coordinates are diffused in this context. It is neither real or unreal but a universe of simulation. Everyone in this space is part of the performance and makes the simulacrum more realistic.

During presentation of the self an external gaze to identity is adopted by the performers. Mahmut's photo is an outsider's gaze to Turkish identity and using a very iconographic *fez* hat. Thus, he fulfils the expectations of outsiders about Turkishness and differentiates himself from this 'other culture' to reconstruct a Turkish identity for himself in third space. However, the markers of Turkish culture he uses in his performance are replicas of Turkish culture and this performance is a simulation of a hyperreal Turkish identity. This hyperreal identity surpasses the 'original' Turkish identity that is lived in present time in Turkey or Cyprus, therefore it is simulacrum.

Figure 75: Fez

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I aimed to discuss the identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community in North London in everyday context from a postmodern researcher and *Simmelian* stranger's point of view. The *Simmelian* stranger is perceived as extraneous to the group although he is in constant relation to other group members. He is distanced, and able to take a dispassionate view of events and relationships. He combines the seemingly paradoxical qualities of nearness and remoteness. I analysed *inbetweens* in diaspora space where the cultural identity is performed and negotiated. Instead of overgeneralising the research group as migrants or diaspora I classified them with new identity categories. Moreover, I discussed migration stories and traumas as part of collective memory. I analysed how second, and third generations' identities are influenced by the collective memory of the group and a virtual sense of nostalgia is formed. Finally, I looked at use of space as a stage in cultural identity

performances and use of visual cultural materials. The role of village associations and coffehouses are discussed in detail within this framework.

CONCLUSION

The Turkish-speaking Community's Collective Memory, Narratives on Belonging, Identity and Place

As established in the first literature review chapter of this thesis, not every migrant group can be referred to as a diaspora. Regarding their experiences of migration and relation to home, identity of the Turkish-speaking communities can be classified in many dimensions. For instance, regarding their ethnic origin they are categorised as Cypriots, Mainland Turks and Kurds (Kucukcan, 1999; Mehmet Ali, 2001; Aksoy, 2006; Issa, 2005; Enneeli et.al. 2005; Thomson, 2006; Sen et.al. 2008; King et. al, 2008; Düvell, 2010; Atay 2010; Cakmak 2018, Home Office, 2011; Sirkeci et.al, 2016) with historicity of their migration they are classified as first, second, third and fourth waves (Kucukcan, 1999; Thomson, 2006; Düvell,2010). In addition, research findings of this study illustrate that the community also can be classified regarding their relationship with and visiting patterns to their home countries in four categories: Frequent travellers, Periodic travellers, Intermittent travellers and Fugitives which is demonstrated in chapter five. Moreover, the analysis of migration experience and performativity of identity demonstrate that not all members of the community are diasporic. In addition to Diasporic Subjects, there are also Economic Migrants, Postmodern Creoles and Expatriates, which I discussed in chapter seven.

Despite being dispersed, deterritorialised and hybridised in foreign cultural landscapes, like many other diaspora groups, the Turkish-speaking community consider themselves sharing a collective past (Charliand and Rageau, 1991), a historic location and a common destiny or as what Werbner (2005) calls 'a simultaneity in time'. In this way, they link themselves with a shared native land and history (see Safran 1999, Tölölyan 2000). Migration stories and historical events such as a civil war, are part of the collective memory of the community and

the transfer of these narratives shape the identity of younger generations (Halbwachs, 1992; Cinar, 2015), which I discussed in chapter two. In addition, space is explored in the same chapter regarding not only as a place where the community root its origin but also a stage for identity performances. Chapter three questions the identity issue from a postmodern perspective avoiding fixed and unifying concepts, discuss hybridised *in-between* identities as well as performativity (Butler, 1990). Chapter seven applies the theory discussed in chapter two and three and demonstrate the research findings regarding collective memory, space and identity among the Turkish-speaking community. An attempt to understand everyday life, cultural practices of the Turkish-speaking community and performativity of identity require a three-pillar analysis; culturalscape, religioscape and politicalscape as I discussed in chapter five. While conducting the research I reflected my identity experiences on the participants' narratives, which I discussed in methodology chapter with various other research techniques I have used.

The challenge of drawing "conclusions" in this multi-layered and complex research topic about a fragmented and diverse community reminds me that Ph.D. is not a final project, but the first step of my academic career and I will spend the next few years expanding and publishing these research findings some of which were not included due to word count limitations.

The Turkish-speaking community and The Myth of Return

Migration stories and narratives collected from members of the Turkish-speaking community revealed some key characteristics about the myth of return. According to classical diaspora literature, migrants move to foreign countries with the intention of moving back after a period for example, when they have saved enough money or when the war in their home country is over. Meanwhile they keep the desire to return alive in their everyday life which is conceptualised as the 'myth of return' (Anwar, 1979; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Ali and Holden, 2006;

Bolognani, 2007 and 2016). Indeed, empirical data from the field study indicates that most of the community members live in the UK indefinitely with a vague plan or hope to return, which is similar to what Werbner (1990) claimed about the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. Moreover, as analysis of community members' homeland visiting patterns revealed that identity is still tied to a place of origin and the desire to return reproduces this link. However, the 'myth of return' among the community has been transformed into episodic homeland visits in every *izin* (vacation) and the wish to be buried there. The Turkish-speaking migrants do not have the romantic view of their home country where they must return whatever it costs. They adopted Britain as their new home. These findings also indicate that the movement of migrants between their country of origin and settlement is more fluid because transnational mobility is more enhanced with global developments. Migrants are able to keep their connection with both home and host countries, socially, culturally, economically and politically.

As the ethnographic field data demonstrates the exchange of materials is very common among the community. It is performed in two ways; The Turkish-speaking people carry objects from Britain to Turkey and Cyprus to give their relatives as a gift. In return, they bring materials to the UK that have sentimental meanings to them which varies from ornaments and accessories representing their local culture to herbs and spices as ingredients of traditional dishes. This exchange of objects is beyond a trade activity. Gift giving strengthens the solidarity with their homeland citizens whereas bringing objects reinforces identity performance in the diaspora place.

Turkish-speaking people migrate to the United Kingdom with various motivations and have different migration paths as analysis of migration stories illustrates. First of all, Cypriots experienced migration smoothly and more positively due to colonial links with Britain whereas mainland Turks and Kurdish people's transmigration includes illegal travel and *şebeke*, people smuggling network. Initial accommodation and employment arrangement provided by a kin or

relative migrated before which is called chain migration is another common pattern among the community (Kucukcan, 1999; Böcker 1994). In addition, many highly-skilled migrants whom I categorise as expats migrate from Cyprus and Turkey to work in British companies or as self-employed entrepreneurs, using *Ankara Antlaşması* visa.

Everyday Life of the Community

Observing everyday life of the Turkish-speaking community and their cultural practices in diaspora space (both physical and mental) provided me an enormous amount of data which I analysed via three pillars; culturalscape, religioscape and politicalscape inspired by Appadurai's (1996) model of global 'ethnoscapes'. As discussions around culturalscape indicate that there is a cultural cherry-picking among the second and third generations of the Turkish-speaking community, which means they pick and choose desirable aspects of both Turkish and British cultures and avoid what they perceive as undesirable. Although there is no concrete definition most participants have the concepts of Turkishness or Britishness and degrees of them in their mind-sets. In various contexts, they choose to 'go native', and still avoid from some other aspects of that customs. Moreover, despite steadfastly refusing to adopt local cultural aspects, the first-generation participants calibrate their Turkishness according to local conditions and adopt practical aspects of British manners as their own. Research findings regarding taste indicate that almost all research participants are very passionate about Turkish cuisine. The food practice is the cultural trait that has lasted longest in the diaspora. Although it belongs to the private and more eclectic taste often displayed in public. Turkish *çay* (tea) and *kahve* (coffee) are consumed in cultural associations almost in a ritualistic way. Moreover, *çay* represent the dichotomy between Turkish tradition and British culture. Turkish and Kurdish cultural identities are reproduced everyday with such mundane rituals. Furthermore, *ayıp* (shame) as a social control mechanism restricts the behaviours of community members on certain subjects such as sexuality.

As research findings indicate, religion is perceived as a kind of safety net of cultural identity in diaspora. Therefore, religious education is considered as a preventive measure against assimilation (Kucukcan, 1999; Gungor et.al., 2001; Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2012). Religious practices such as Bayram (Feast) celebration, Mevlid ritual and Cem ceremony performed theatrically among the community to reproduce cultural identity as well as transmit it to younger generations. Bayram celebration includes Islamic prayer and the cultural practices following the prayer such as eating semi-communal cultural food such as Baklava and visiting each other's home. As it is revealed during the interviews, *Mevlid* ritual is very important for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, it is a form of popular religiosity and more of a cultural practice as with all the mystical, nostalgic and ethnic ornaments used during the performance. Cem ceremonies are significant for the Alevi community as their tradition is based on oral transmission. During the Cem ceremony *aşıks* (folk singers) play saz/bağlama (a stringed instrument) and sing the songs named *deyiş, nefes* and *türkü* while people perform ritualistic *semah* dances (Eröz, 1977; Bruinessen, 1996; Üzüm, 1997; Yörükan, 1998; Arabacı, 2000; Shakland, 2003; Kutlu, 2006; Massicard, 2010, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2017; Onder, 2017; Kinesci, 2017; Okan, 2017).

According to my observations, politicalscape of the community reflects the elements and movements active in Turkish and Cypriot politics. Also, the political disputes are transferred from Turkey or Cyprus and are reinterpreted in diaspora. Left-wing unionists who fled from Turkey after 1980 military coup are active in politicalscape with associations they established such as *Halkevi*. As field data indicates, other political movements such as ultra-nationalist Grey wolves (*Bozkurtlar*) and political Islamists with their organisation Union of European Turkish Democrats are active in diaspora politics with their own agendas. Kurdish diaspora has successfully transnationalised its agenda since the first migration wave of Kurdish migrants to Europe (Baser 2011) and they are politically the most active group among the Turkish-speaking

community in London. Kurdish ethnic identity is performed in folkloric and political *Newroz* festival. Celebrating Newroz festival in London is "the sound of marginal people" with its cultural presentations such as traditional *halay* dance (*Govend* in Kurdish), improvised exclamations of *zılgıt* or *tilili* while dancing and references to the Myth of Kawa the Blacksmith such as lighting a bonfire and jumping across it.

Collective Memory

Fieldwork data indicates that narration of the past and collective memory affect identity reconstruction of the community as well as transmission of identity to the second and third generations. First of all, memories are acquired within the society (Halbwachs, 1992). Migration stories and childhood memories of the first-generation are remembered and acquired while being narrated among the community. The dominant historical narratives become a part of the collective memory and play a significant role in identity reconstruction (Cinar, 2015). Among the political groups and ethnic minorities, struggles to preserve cultural identity, or experience of any other oppression in Turkey and Cyprus continue shaping their collective memory as well as reconstructing their identity. Secondly, the second and third generations' cultural identity is influenced by the collective memory. Although their experience in country of origin is limited to their episodic trips, their sense of belonging to and perceptions about it is shaped by the First-generation's narratives. Transmission of collective memory in this way results in a virtual sense of nostalgia or *placebo nostalgia* (Poupazis 2014). Their longing for their parents' hometown; sufferings and nostalgia are kind of virtual emotions. Moreover, some of these narratives contradict with their encounters in real life. As the interviews illustrated, most of the second and third generations find their parents' hometown in Turkey or Cyprus boring which challenges idyllic narrations of their parents.

Yet, as narratives of the participants revealed, memory is not always something to cherish and pass to descendants especially those traumatic ones (see Neal 1998; Pennebaker et.al 2013). Traumas stay in the collective memory of the community, but people only talk about them via putting a distance between themselves and the tragedy such as telling the stories of a relative or neighbour. Furthermore, some members of the community especially those who escaped from a conflict zone and/or experienced civil war, want to forget about their home country and its memories. As the field data illustrated, transmissions of traumatic collective memory results in the younger generations of Alevi and Kurdish communities developing a stronger political identity and belonging to their cultural identity (see Keles, 2014, 2015; Demir, 2017).

Performativity of Cultural Identity

Postmodern theories discuss identity as a construction process rather than a completed, permanent and fixed entity. Thus, Turkish identity fluctuates and constantly socially reconstructed (Butler et. al, 2000). As the field work conducted amongst the community and analysis of cultural practices indicate Turkish-speaking diaspora includes various categories of people which are: economic migrants, diaspora, post-modern creoles or *gurbetçis* and expats. These categories will be discussed in length in "Contributions". The Turkish-speaking community negotiate between both home and host cultures and both discourses. Meanings and representations are renegotiated, and *in-between* identities are performed in *third place*. This *in-between* identity is multi-vocal, hybridised and fragmented (see also Bhabha 1994).

While identity is performed in everyday life, a pseudo-nostalgic loyalty to the culture of ancestors is performed through clothing, food, music, symbols and visiting country of origin. Even those who discard most of the cultural aspects of Turkish tradition and successfully integrate into British culture perform a 'symbolic ethnicity' (Gans, 1979). Therefore, identity

is constituted through style, cultural practices and rituals. It is a 'never completed' position but something fluid that needs to be reconstructed by performative actions, gestures and behaviours (Butler 1990). As my observations demonstrate members of the Turkish-speaking community both consciously act out of what is perceived to be belonged to that cultural identity and do the performative repetitive acts which are unconscious not freely chosen and the outcome of a discourse of cultural identity. Cypriot, Turkish or Kurdish cultural identity is performative which is performed in everyday life. They are "real only to the extent that it is performed" (Butler, 1998:527). Analysis of the performativity of cultural identity indicates two main themes: a retrogressive approach and hyperreality. The first one stems from fear of assimilation which also makes some fragments of the Turkish-speaking community being an insular group which is reactionary to any change coming from the host culture. It is reflected in idealisation of the culture in the country of origin and transmit it to younger generations. Research findings indicate that the second and third generations of the first and second waves adapt to local cultural life in a more intense level and abandon their parents' retrogressive approach. However, those who arrived in the UK in the late 1980's and afterwards, (the third and fourth waves) are keener on the retrogressive approach especially that of politically motivated ones such as Kurds and the Alevis. The second theme refers to the hyperreal behaviours or performances within the community to gain and retain a good name, which is 'being proper Turkish/Kurdish/Cypriot' or 'not assimilated'. These practices are not only performativity of the cultural identity but also hyperreal because of the anachronic display of an 'über' belonging to the culture. These hyperreal performances vary from wearing jewellery such as a ring with an Ottoman emblem on it to organising events where only ethnic materials and ornaments are sale. In this way, the Turkish cultural identity is promoted for the purposes of romantic representation of culture and transmission of identity to the younger generations.

Use of Space in Identity Performances

The *flânerie* method as well as spending a significant portion of my fieldwork in North London analysing cultural landscape reveal that the Turkish-speaking community uses space as the stage for identity performances. Community associations, *kahvehanes* (coffeehouses) and religious institutions are not neutral spaces but ethnic places where cultural identity performances are encouraged. As the findings indicate only certain aspects of the cultural identity is presented in public most of which are easy to compromise such as food culture. Whereas other aspects of cultural identity such as language is performed in private. In this way, the Turkish-speaking community perform their cultural identity most explicitly in private space and third places and teach it to younger generations. Moreover, as my observations demonstrate that Turkish culture is more visible in North London because of the size of the community. Therefore, they display a sense of belonging to North London as a third place which can also be defined as 'neighbourhood nationalism' (see Back, 1996).

Field data indicates that among the Turkish-speaking community the home town is central in self-definition of identity. *Hemşericilik* (fellow villagemen) the favouritism among the community is a way of understanding and organising social relations. Therefore, home town/village associations play a major role in community life. These associations develop forms of solidarity as well as reproduction of cultural identity through generations. Membership of these associations brings social capital. Being from a particular village or town is the only way to be a member of these associations. Most of them have an anti-assimilationist agenda which are visible in their cultural courses and activities. Also, most of these associations lobby for its members and some of them organise demonstrations in London.

The findings indicate the role of religious institutions in diaspora space goes beyond the sole purpose of worship. Culture and religion reinforce each other and practices around these

two are performed together. In addition to theological education, cultural practices are taught in Turkish mosques and *Cemevis*. Turkish is the main spoken language in these places, and cultural courses from Turkish language to folklore dances are given to children there. Moreover, display of religious identity is perceived as not being assimilated, therefore being visible at religious institutions is an identity performance itself.

Finally, *kahvehanes* play a significant role in working-class males' socialisation where they gather, catch up with community life and developments in the homeland and most importantly cultural identity is reconstructed. *Kahvehanes* as third places are local, and in walking distance to where community members live therefore, they are 'the places on the corner' (see Oldenburg, 1991). Also, London *kahvehanes* are a heterotopic space because they break mainstream culture flowing outside, on the streets of London. They are neither in Turkey nor in prevailing cultural life of London. They take place out of sight, when one enters and provide a subculture environment. *Kahvehanes* are parallel spaces which exist in time but also outside of time. Therefore, these spaces resist change and cultural identity is strengthened from the moment when time paused on leaving Turkey. *Kahvehanes* carry all the characteristics of a third place. For instance, they are a neutral ground where occupants have little to no obligation to be there. Visitors are free to come and go as they please (see Oldenburg 1991). *Yet, a*s *kahvehanes* are very local and places on the corner, outsiders or those who are not regular are easily spotted when they visit. The settings and audience are set up as a display of cultural identity.

Major Claims and Contributions

As the above summary of findings indicates this thesis set out to better understand performativity of identity in everyday context within the case of the Turkish-speaking community in London. Through an exploration of the Turkish-speaking community's

migration narratives, this thesis advances four major claims; first, the myth of return has evolved into episodic homeland visits in every *izin* (vacation) and the wish to be buried in Turkey or Cyprus. Second, only a certain fragment of the Turkish-speaking community is diaspora. There are also economic migrants, postmodern cultural creoles, and expats. Third, narratives of past or the collective memory plays a significant role in identity reconstruction of the second and third generations and memories are retrieved with different languages. And finally, a third place is constructed in North London where *in-between* identity is performed, and a simulacrum of Turkey is constructed.

The myth of return as it is conceptualised in classical diaspora literature refers to migrants' desire to move back to their home countries after a period (Anwar, 1979; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Ali and Holden, 2006; Bolognani, 2007; Bolognani, 2016). However, as my research findings demonstrate although the migrants fulfil their main purpose in migration such as saving enough money or staying safe until the war is over in their home country, the majority of them stay in the UK. Moreover, transnational movement of people and communication are enhanced with global technologies which enables a more fluid status for the Turkish-speaking community. Therefore, the 'myth of return' is transformed into different forms of mobility such as annual visits. Even though there is not any legal restriction on the Turkish-speaking community preventing them returning to Cyprus or Turkey except for some political subjects, there is no going back (see Hall, 1996a). Because members of the community changed and got used to a new lifestyle. Their home country has changed since they left, and they adopted a new home. The future plans of returning to Cyprus or Turkey to settle are very vague. There are returning attempts to their old home some of which end up in failure and moving back to their new home, the UK. The second and third generations are not familiar with institutions or social norms in Cyprus or Turkey. Therefore, their desire for 'returning' to their ancestral homeland is similar to Jewish diaspora's desire to return to the *'promised land'*. It is indeed not a return but moving

to foreign geography and uniting with a society which they share very limited common aspects. Many members of the community engage in social, cultural, economic or political activities in both their home and host countries, or in other words, they keep their feet in both countries (see Levitt, 2003).

The regular/episodic visits which I call 'return visits' with reference to Baldassar (2001) replace the actual and permanent return to their home countries. There are various levels of cross-border engagement and home-host mobility and four patterns emerged with analysis. Frequent travellers refer to those still firmly tied to their homeland most of which have business investment there and travel between home and host countries repeatedly throughout the year. Their period of stay tends to be shorter in comparison to other travellers. In addition, most of them have financial security and legal resident status in both countries that enables them to travel without any problems. Periodic travellers visit Cyprus or Turkey annually as a duty or kind of a profane pilgrimage in every *izin* (vacation) which is generally summer time. The duration of these periodic visits varies from between two weeks to two months. These visits are almost ritualistic or 'mundane pilgrimages' (see Eliade, 1987; Margry, 2008). It is something they look forward to and save up for throughout the year. With these visits, it is aimed to introduce children to family in the homeland and strengthen family bonds and sense of nationhood. Therefore, the second and third generations become re-acquainted with relatives via these 'roots journeys' to their ancestral homeland (see Levitt, 2003). Many of the first-generation mentioned having a second house in their hometown or in a holiday resort that they stayed in during periodic visits. The frequency and duration of visits decrease as their children grow older. Intermittent travellers are those whose lives are rooted mainly in the UK and visit their home country occasionally because of the lack of time, money or enthusiasm. This is especially the case for the second and third generations who find their parents' hometown as boring, small and lack attraction. This example illustrates the intergenerational difference as

well as the limits of the influence of collective memory over practice. Yet, the first-generation still keep contact with homeland citizens and track the life of the community there by chatting with whom have visited recently. Fugitives refer to those who have escaped from their home country for various reasons and their status is precarious. Most of them are not allowed to visit Cyprus or Turkey for a certain period for instance until they have a residence permit from British authorities or the rest of life if they are a sentenced for a crime issued by the Turkish authorities. All the political refugees have experienced being unable to visit Turkey for a long period because of ongoing case/trials; or they are sentenced by Turkey for any crime; or simply because of the ambiguity in their legal status in the UK as asylum seekers. Also, a change in borders in Cyprus after the civil war resulted in some Cypriots not being able to visit their hometowns in the south for decades due to political tension between governments in the North (Turkish side) and South (Greek side). Those who are not allowed to visit their hometown romanticise about it more. Vague plans, procrastination of moving back to their country of origin display itself in the form of wanting to be buried in their hometown when they die.

In addition to these four-category of homeland visiting patterns, there are some elderly members of the community who live three to six months in Turkey or Cyprus and spend the rest of the year in the UK after retirement. Also, there are some people among the first-generation who had traumatic experiences during the civil war in Cyprus or Turkey and have not visited their home country since they left. In some exceptional cases of second or third generation 'Turkish origin' people, who are mostly children of mixed marriages have never been to Turkey or Cyprus.

Secondly, moving from the migration stories and identity performativity, this thesis contributes also to a better understanding of experiences of identity and in which ways these experiences can be categorised. Despite of the tendency in literature to categorise the Turkish-speaking community in the UK with reference to their ethnic background such as mainland

Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds, various other categories emerge from the field study such as expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic-racial minorities (see Safran, 1991). Four main identity categories emerge from the fieldwork which are: economic migrants, diaspora, post-modern creoles or *gurbetçis* and expats. Economic Migrants refer to those members of the community who live in the UK with sole economic purposes. This is especially the case for ethnic Turks from the first and fourth waves as well as Turkish Cypriots who arrived after the 1980s. They are not in political dispute with the Turkish state or its institutions and their standpoint is close to Turkish state's formal discourse on history and politics. Among the community they are the ones who visit Turkey or Cyprus regularly. Their political involvement is limited to voting in Turkish elections except the political Islamists who are more politicised, especially after the failed coup in Turkey in July 2016 (see Cakmak 2018). Diaspora refers to those members of the community who are dispersed from Cyprus or Turkey; have a prospect of a political change in their homeland that would enable them to return; have a strong group consciousness as a diaspora community and fellow people in homeland; idealise their home country yet have problematic relations with its current regime or government. Among those groups in addition to political activists there are former members of paramilitary groups who fought during the civil wars in Cyprus and Turkey. As the field data reveals they are the most home country-oriented group and they follow developments in their country of origin closely. Among the community, the Kurdish diaspora is the most active group in the politicalscape with their weekly political demonstrations, lobbying with British politicians about the Kurdish question in Turkey and cultural activities coloured with identity politics such as screening films, performing plays, music and folkloric dances. The myth of return is deeply rooted in Kurdish diaspora's mindsets regarding imaginary Kurdistan. Moreover, the sense of belonging they display is towards is a defined geography, landscape and intact territory, to *memleket* (homeland) which is different than *vatan*

(fatherland) as the latter refers to Turkish ruling and national symbols like the flag. Ethnographic data illustrates that the Turkish diasporic identities can be categories as Postmodern Creoles or as they are called in Turkish Gurbetçiler or Londrezliler. The term *'gurbetçi'* is the general name defining Turkish-speaking communities living abroad (see also Mandel 1990). *Gurbetçi* and *Londrezli* are similar to creole who was once one of the members in the homeland, who then migrated to distant cultural and environmental surroundings and, through adaptation, become somewhat different from homeland citizens (Stewart, 2006:69). They are perceived as losing some of the national characteristics after living abroad for a long period and being inevitably hybridised (Bhabha, 1994). Being treated as *gurbetçi* or *Londrezli* during Cyprus or Turkey visits are narrated by many participants. So, this category is based on the perceived behaviour codes against the community by the homeland citizens. The final category 'Expats' refer to highly skilled individuals who take work or study assignments in London, independently or sent by a multinational institution (see also Inkson et.al 1997; Harzing, 2001). As field data indicates these people abstain contacting or being affiliated with the Turkish-speaking community. They display more of a cosmopolitan identity and are more flexible with their transnational mobility.

Thirdly, as discussed above, narration of the past and collective memory affect identity reconstruction of the community as well as transmission of identity to the younger generations. Moreover, various feelings are coded in different languages. Thus, when retrieving memories or expressing different emotions, people switch between English, Turkish or Kurdish. Therefore, even for those who use English as their primary language, Turkish/Kurdish remains as the language of sentimental topics such as religion and love. Or in other words, Turkish remains as the language of private topics such as religion, morality and some ethnic practices whereas English is used to discuss practical issues and business. Moreover, those who

experienced conservative upbringings express negative feelings such as anger or fear in Turkish and associate English with problem-solving or being rational.

Finally, a third place is constructed in North London where in-between identity is performed. Village associations, kahvehanes and religious institutions are some of the *thirdspaces* where members of the community gather. They are not neutral spaces but ethnic places where cultural identity performances are encouraged. Diaspora North London is where Turkish culture is renegotiated and combined with British culture. In this third place, a hybridised, multi-vocal and fragmented in-between identity is constructed.

Here, third places present a hyper-real Turkey or Cyprus with more admirable and attractive images. These places reconstruct an idea of homeland and makes cultural identity performance more desirable to ensure transmission of this to the second and third generations. These spaces are not a simulation of actual Turkey or Cyprus in present time but an idealised and romanticised version of it that once existed and changed or was abandoned or that has never existed beyond imagination. One can enjoy a 'Turkey experience' there with Turkish speaking neighbours, markets and coffee houses. This hyperreal 'Turkey experience' is a total simulacrum, without origin, past and future (see Baudrillard 2001, 2006). The hyperreal identity presented there surpasses the 'original' Turkish identity that is lived in present time in Turkey or Cyprus.

Impact of the Study

This research is designed and written as an authoethnography on a silenced migrant group in the UK, the Turkish-speaking community. I wrote my thesis from a postmodernist perspective and self-consciously value-centred rather than alluding to objectivity. Therefore, my ethnic identity and self-reflection is central to the way that I interpret the world around me. My personal reflection adds context and layers to the narration and lives of the research

participants. Therefore, I aimed to comprehend experiences of the Turkish-speaking community from an emic perspective as a member of the community (Maréchal 2010; Butz and Besio 2009; Crang 2005; Ellis 2004; Ellis and Bochner 2000; Meneley and Young 2005)

I aimed to challenge the colonialist perspective of seeing non-Western migrants as monolithic or 'all the same' by illustrating the fragments and cultural differences among the Turkish-speaking community. The Turkish-speaking community is invisible, and a silenced community compared to other minority groups although it is equally disadvantaged (Sonyel, 1988; Enneli et al., 2005; Mehmet Ali, 2006). This thesis is a result of an intense three-years study, based on analysis of data collected living among the community as a member of it. The enormous data the community provided me is discussed in depth to understand identity experiences of the community. As the thesis suggests, there is no singular experience of identity but multiple and hybridised identities. In postmodern conditions, it cannot be claimed that any identity is monolithic or authentic. There is not a singular British identity thus, why should there be a singular migrant identity. There is a vibrant, vivid, colourful and fragmented culture performed in North London and the Turkish-speaking community's is part of it.

I claim that migrants should write their stories themselves to resist orientalist and/or colonial stereotypes. In that way, they should produce the knowledge instead of being passive subjects. I aimed with this research study to make a migrant community's voices heard and eventually empower a silenced community.

Challenges and Limitations of Research

The challenges that arose during the research can be classified in two categories; firstly, theoretical ambiguity around the subject such as definition and population of the group. Secondly, difficulties faced during the field study such as recruiting women and suspicion of political groups of my possible connections with Turkish State. First of all, defining the

research group was challenging because it is ethnically, religiously and politically a very diverse community. Naming the group as 'Turkish' excludes Turkey originated Kurdish people, while calling them immigrants from Turkey excludes Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, calling them Turkish-Kurdish migrants includes a population that has no relevance to this research's objective which is Kurds from Iraq, Syria and Iran. Thus, the research subjects are defined as a linguistic group the Turkish-speaking community which is the way they are being referred to in official documents in the UK and it is widely used in academia (Kucukcan, 1999; Mehmet Ali, 2001; Issa, 2005; Aksoy 2006; King et. Al. 2008; Atay 2010; Sirkeci et.al. 2016).

Moreover, because the categories are not distinguished well, there are controversial numbers about the population of the Turkish-speaking community in the UK. For instance, the category of Cyprus-born migrants includes both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. British-born Turkish or Cypriot origin people are not counted either. In addition, those who described themselves as being of Kurdish ethnicity could be from Turkey or other parts of the Kurdistan region. Thus, the figures vary between 180,000 to half a million. Sirkeci & Esipova (2013) accuse of all other researches as lacking credibility in their statistics and estimates the population between 180,000-250,000. Other researchers estimate the number above 250,000. It is important to state that the size of the population is uncertain. I give an estimated number of 300,000 to 400,000 with reference to other researchers.

Secondly, carrying out the flânerie method meant spending a significant portion of my time in public spaces. Because of the patriarchal social structure and gender roles among the community, public space is dominated by men whereas the domestic or private space is allocated for women. Therefore, I struggled to recruit women to interview. In order to avoid overrepresentation of the male perspective I stopped recruiting male participants and extended the field study by a few months to recruit more women. In addition, especially among the

political groups and Kurdish or Alevi minorities I was suspected of being a spy collecting information against dissidents of the Turkish State because I spoke Turkish with a Western Turkey accent, asking questions to people and recording their voices. Even my researcher ID and field study documents did not reassure them.

There are two particular limitations present in this thesis that should be addressed here. The first refers to sample size. Although the population of the research group is estimated between 300,000 and 400,000, because of the time and word count considerations/restrictions of the Ph.D. study, I limited the sample size to 29. I preferred to focus on a limited number of participants and analyse data in depth to reach a thick description of the community life (Geertz, 1993). However, homogenising and overgeneralising descriptions were not intended. It is aimed to indicate heterogeneity and fragmentation of the group; therefore 29 interviews were sufficient to reach that research goal.

The second limitation is the sample composition. I aimed to recruit participants from a range of social backgrounds representing fragments within the community. These interviews were split across almost an equal number of men and women. Fourteen of the interviewees were First-generation, twelve of them were Second-generation, and three of them are third generation. Nine of the participants were from the first wave of Turkish migration, five of them from the second wave, eleven of them from the third wave and four of them from the fourth wave. Overall, eight of the research participants were Turkish Cypriot, eleven of them were Turkish and ten of them were Kurdish. However, there are more fragments among the community that I could not access and/or was uncertain whether to include them. For instance, there are Christian people with Turkish or Kurdish background among the community. I have only met one Christian Turk and I could not recruit her for interview as she was not meeting the criteria of living in the UK for a minimum ten years. It is a small and invisible community which makes it extremely difficult to know their presence as they do not have any organisation

such as Turkish Churches or associations. Although I know about their presence based on anecdotes, I did not have access to the community and I could not collect any empirical data about them. Secondly, there are ethnic Turks from Western Thrace such as Greek or Bulgarian citizens living among the community and working at Turkish shops. Although they are part of the community life and linguistic category, I limited myself to migrants from Turkey or Cyprus. Thirdly, as the Turkish society is remnant of the Ottoman Empire, there were Jewish, Armenian, Greek and other minorities living in Turkey most of which migrated elsewhere in the world. I met an Armenian man whose grandparents migrated from Turkey and I acknowledge the presence of such a diaspora community in the UK. However, theoretical problems arose for instance, the members of these groups do not speak Turkish, and they are not affiliated with Turkey. Yet, there are second or third generation Turkish, Kurdish or Cypriots who do not speak Turkish or affiliate with Turkey either who I included in the research subject. In fact, sociologically speaking non-Muslim members of the Turkish society had different habitus than Muslim members since Ottoman times. It was already extremely difficult to represent all the fragments among such a diverse community and locate all these experiences empirically within the methodological framework. Therefore, it was a methodological decision that I had to make, and I decided to focus on the Cypriot, Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi population for this research study.

Future Research Considerations

This thesis discusses and analyses identity performances of the Turkish-speaking community in everyday life based on data gathered during the time of this research. In pursuit of timely completion and restriction of theoretical framework, it is inevitable that not all the aspects of everyday life are included in this analysis. Observations of everyday life and semi-structured interviews provide an abundance of data covering a wide range of topics. I have prioritised the overarching themes that are directly linked with my theoretical framework. This

section highlights three areas as particularly worthy of future research consideration: gender identity, bigger sample group, and more focused to one group.

As discussed in chapter seven, stories about gender performances repeatedly came up during the field study, even though gender was not my main focus within this research. The first-generation and second-generation female participants from all waves indicated a tension they felt growing up in London between traditional or conservative Turkish mores and liberal British lifestyle. Restrictions around female sexuality and dating/flirting impact identity construction of the women among the community. The main migration pattern is men moving to the UK and then bringing their families. This dynamic of the construction of the community legitimises dominant position of men within the community which also results in the subordination of women and men organising their social interactions. Many of the female participants narrated their experiences that articulates tensions between 'old' and 'new' culture/home, restriction of female sociality and identity crisis. The stories vary from parents not letting their daughters to study at British schools to arranging marriages for their daughters at age 15. However, the theoretical framework was already wide including space, collective memory and postmodern theories therefore I could not situate gender theory within it. In future research, I would like to provide a more focussed study on the women's experience of identity among the community.

This research makes use of a sample group of 29 people in order to have in-depth analysis. I observed hundreds of people and collected many anecdotes from the field. However, in-depth interviews provide plenty of data and with the additional data collected via the walking method and visual ethnography, it was too much data to discuss all the findings within the time frame of Ph.D. study. Therefore, I had to limit my sample size with twenty-nine. However, considering the population and composition of the community with its ethnic, generational and migration waves, future researches would benefit from using a bigger research sample.

Moreover, it has a priority on my research agenda to invest greater time and attention to focus on each migration wave, generations and ethnic groups among the community separately after completing my Ph.D.

Conclusion

This thesis comprises ten months of ethnographic fieldwork; visiting public and semi-public places; participant observation; walking method; visual ethnography; oral history and in-depth interviews. Analysis of research data and overview of the literature review presented over the previous seven chapters. By presenting these chapters I was able to address the main objectives of the study: The participants' self-description of identity; How do they define themselves and to where do they feel a sense of belonging; To what extent collective memory and migration story affect identity performances today; Encounters with the host culture and the extent of their involvement; Connections to their country of origin and its contemporary issues; and how they negotiate between home and host chronotopes while performing their identity.

Analysis of the ethnographic field data centred upon multi-layered everyday life and performativity of identity with cultural practices. Analysis of interviews with members of the Turkish-speaking community from various migration backgrounds suggested the ways in which cultural identity is reconstructed and hybridised negotiating between home and host cultures. Various identity experiences such as expatriate or diaspora, and homeland visiting patterns such as periodic or fugitive suggest that there are multiple identities of Turkish-speaking migrants. The collective memory and narration of the past affect the younger generations' sense of belonging which form a virtual sense of nostalgia. Analysis indicates that the Turkish-speaking community construct an in-between identity at third place of North London. This third place is a simulacrum of Turkey and has heterotopic aspects.

These findings suggest that hybrid and transmigratory/multiple identities within the performativity is inevitable in postmodern conditions especially in a cosmopolitan urban

context where various cultures encounter. Therefore, the study of performativity of identity in the postmodern conditions within the case of Turkish-speaking community in London provides an insight into cultural identities. In a world where cultural interactions are increased enormously with global technologies and popular culture, the contribution of these insights into literature will be significant.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Participants Demographic Details

Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet and Consent Forms

Appendix 3: Ethical Approval from Keele University Ethics Committee

Appendix 1: Interview Participants' Demographics

	Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Generation	Wave	Ethnic category
1	Kebab Boy	M	19	2	4	Turkish
2	Bob	M	26	2	1	Cypriot
3	Ahmet	M	19	2	3	Turkish
4	Mustafa	M	83	1	1	Cypriot
5	Ayhan	M	18	2	3	Kurdish
6	Mahir	M	57	1	3	Kurdish
7	Seval	F	34	1	4	Kurdish
8	Ekrem	M	57	2	1	Cypriot
9	Ali Haydar	M	22	2	3	Turkish
10	Begum	F	42	1	2	Kurdish
11	Guler	F	39	1	3	Kurdish
12	Turkan	F	51	1	2	Turkish
13	Yasar	M	54	1	1	Turkish
14	Hande	F	29	2	1	Cypriot
15	Kazim	M	54	1	2	Turkish
16	Ela	F	37	1	3	Turkish
17	Efe	M	26	3	1	Turkish
18	Alice	F	27	3	1	Cypriot

19	Meltem	F	30	3	1	Cypriot
20	Gemma	F	18	2	3	Cypriot
21	Emel	F	40	1	3	Cypriot
22	Kemal	M	57	1	2	Turkish
23	Mary	F	45	2	1	Turkish
24	Rojda	F	24	2	3	Kurdish
25	Elif	F	18	2	3	Kurdish
26	Pelin	F	18	1	4	Kurdish
27	Gamze	F	18	1	4	Turkish
28	Gizem	F	30	2	2	Kurdish
29	Mehmet	M	37	1	3	Kurdish

	First Wave			Second Wave			Third Wave			Fourth Wave	
	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen	3rd Gen	1st Gen	2nd Gen
Cypriot	1	3	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Turkish	1	1	1	3	0	0	1	2	0	1	1
Kurdish	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	3	0	2	0

Information Sheet – For Interviewees

Study Title: Identity Discussions on Turkish Speaking Immigrants in North London

Aims of the Research
This project aims to provide a case study of the Turkish speaking immigrants in North London. It intends to explore their construction of identity within their daily cultural practices. It also examines various migration stories and the impact of collective memory on identity and is particularly interested in how members of the community negotiate identity between British and Turkish cultures.

Invitation
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study Identity Construction of the Turkish Speaking Diaspora in North London. This project is being undertaken by *Mustafa Cakmak.*

Before you decide whether you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information carefully and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information.

Why have I been invited?
You have been chosen to participate in this study because you are a member of Turkish speaking diaspora in North London. Furthermore, you have been living in the UK for at least ten years. Thus, your encounters with and experiences about British culture are important for this research.

Do I have to take part?
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for our records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons. If you withdraw, all the data you provided will not be evaluated and will be deleted.

What will happen if I take part?
If you take part in this study, you will be participating in a one to one interview with the researcher in a public space. The interview will be about your experiences and memory of migration and your Turkish identity and takes around one hour. The interview will be audio recorded and you have right to stop recording anytime or cancel the interview. There is also the possibility that the researcher will ask permission to take photographs of your accessories, clothing or any objects of value to you.

What are the benefits (if any) of taking part?
Turkish Speaking diaspora in the UK is under-researched (insufficiently researched). In taking part you will be able to inform a piece of research designed to help understand the experiences of the Turkish speaking diaspora in North London.

What are the risks (if any) of taking part?
You will be asked about your memories of migration and life in the UK which could potentially be upsetting. However, you do not have to divulge sensitive details or potentially distressing information. Any identifying information about you or third parties will not be declared. You have right to refuse answering any question. If you become upset due to the recollection of such memories, the researcher can provide information on groups who can be contacted to help discuss these issues. Furthermore, contact details for the researcher and their supervisor are included on this information sheet. No other risks are foreseen.

How will information about me be used?

Visual and oral data will be collected using different methods. Interviews will be recorded on audio tape and after being transcribed the recording on audio tape will be deleted to prevent unauthorised access by third parties. The researcher may also ask to take photographs of your clothing or of objects that are important to you. This data will then be used to answer questions posed in their PhD thesis on the Turkish speaking diaspora. There is a possibility that the data from these interviews will be retained for use in future research projects and publications. Visual materials will be used to during the analysis. Some of the images can be used in thesis, publications and academic presentations after persons are anonymised.

Who will have access to information about me?
- The data collected for this study will only be accessed by the researcher Mustafa Cakmak and his supervisor Dr. Siobhan Holohan.
- Transcribed interviews and digital photographs will be stored securely in password protected files on a password protected computer. Any hard copies of data will be secured in a locked filing cabinet.
- Information on you will be kept confidential and anonymous. This means that the researcher will protect your identity as a participant by ensuring that you remain unidentifiable in the research. The information you provide will not be disclosed to any third party e.g. other members of the Turkish speaking communities. When discussed in the research you will be given a pseudonym (a false name) that does not refer to any identifying characteristic of you so that you remain unidentifiable.
- In accordance with Keele University guidelines, the data from this study will be retained and securely stored by the principal investigator - Mustafa Cakmak for five years. After this period of storage, the data will be securely destroyed.

Who is funding and organising the research?

I am conducting this research in the name of Keele University.

What if there is a problem?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher who will do their best to answer your questions. You should contact *Mustafa Cakmak* on *m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.* Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may contact Dr. *Siobhan Holohan on s.holohan@keele.ac.uk.*

If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please write to Nicola Leighton who is the University's contact for complaints regarding research at the following address:

Nicola Leighton
Research Governance Officer
Research & Enterprise Services
Dorothy Hodgkin Building
Keele University
ST5 5BG
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk
Tel: 01782 733306

Contact for further information
Mustafa Cakmak
Email address: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.

Supervisor: Dr. Siobhan Holohan
Email address: s.holohan@keele.ac.uk

CONSENT FORM- For Interviewees

Title of Project: Identity Discussions on Turkish Speaking Immigrants in North London
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: *Mustafa Cakmak,*
Keele University, Claus Moser Building 1.02, ST5 5BG email: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk

Please tick box if you

agree with the statement

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 24.08.2015 ☐
   (Version no 2) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time ☐

3. I agree to take part in this study. ☐

4. I understand that data collected about me during this study will be anonymised before ☐
   it is submitted for publication.

5. I agree to the interview being audio taped. ☐

6. I allow photographs to be taken. ☐

7. I agree to allow the researcher to use audio taped interview and taken photographs to be used ☐
   for this research project.

8. I agree to allow the dataset collected to be used for future research projects. ☐

9. I agree to allow my quotations to be used. ☐

10. I withhold my consent. ☐

_____   _____   _____
Name of participant   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____
Researcher   Date   Signature

Bilgi Formu – Mülakat Yapılan Kişi İçin

Konu Başlığı: Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan gocmenler uzerine kimlik tartışmaları

Araştırmanın Amaçları
Bu proje Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan gocmenler hakkında bir örnek inceleme yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Günlük kültürel pratikleri aracılığıyla kimlik inşalarını keşfetmek niyetindedir. Ayrıca onların göç hikayeleri ve toplu hafızalarının kimliklerine etkileriyle ilgilenmektedir. Özellikle topluluğun üyelerinin Türkiye ve Britanya kültürleri ile nasıl müzakere ettiğiyle ilgilenmektedir.

Davet
Mustafa Cakmak tarafından yürütülen "Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diasporanın kimlik inşası" isimli araştırmaya katılmaya davetlisiniz.

Katılmak isteyip istemediğinize karar vermeden önce bu araştırmanın neden yürütüldüğünü ve neleri kapsadığını anlamanız önemli. Lütfen bu formu dikkatlice okuyunuz ve danışmak istediğiniz kişilere sormaktan çekinmeyiniz.
Yeterince açık olmayan ya da daha fazla bilgi almak istediğiniz kısımları sorabilirsiniz.

Neden ben davetliyim?
Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diasporanın bir parçası olduğunuz için bu araştırmaya davet edildiniz. Üstelik on yıldan fazla süredir İngiltere'de yaşamaktasınız. Bu yüzden İngiliz kültürüyle karşılaşma/etkileşimleriniz ve tecrübeleriniz bu araştırma için önemli.

Katılmak Zorunda mıyım?
Katılmak isteyip istemediğiniz konusunda karar vermekte tamamen özgürsünüz. Eğer katılmayı kabul ederseniz iki onay formunu imzalamanız istenecektir. Bu formlardan biri sizde diğeri ise kayıtlarımız için bizde kalacaktır. İstediğiniz zaman hiçbir sebep belirtmeden araştırmadan çekilebilirsiniz. Araştırmadan çekildiğiniz takdirde sizden toplanan bilgiler degerlendirmeye alinmayarak silincektir.

Katılırsam ne olacak?
Araştırmaya katılırsanız sizinle uygun bir sosyal mekanda birebir mülakat yapılacaktır. Mülakat sizin göç anılarınız ve tecrübeleriniz ile günlük yaşam pratikleriniz hakkında olup yaklaşık bir saat sürecektir. Araştırmacı kıyafetinizin, aksesuarınızın yada sizin için önemli olan bir nesnenin fotoğrafını çekmek için sizden izin isteyebilir.

Katılmamın faydaları nelerdir?
İngiltere'de yaşayan Türkçe konuşan topluluk hakkında yeterince araştırma yapılmamıştır. Katılımınız Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diaspora hakkında bilgi edinmemize yardımcı olacaktır.

Katılmamın riskleri nelerdir?
Sizin için potansiyel olarak üzücü olabilicek anılarınız sorulabilir. Ancak, ayrıntılar, hassas veya üzücü bilgiler istenmeyecektir. Sizin veya herhangi bir kişinin kimliğini açık edecek bir bilgi ilan edilmeyecektir. Herhangi bir soruyu yanıtlamayı reddetme hakkına sahipsiniz. Eğer üzücü anıları hatırlamanız dolayısıyla moraliniz bozulursa, araştırmacı, bu konuları tartışmak ve size yardımcı olmak için gerekli gruplar hakkında bilgi verebilir. Ayrıca, araştırmacının ve danışmanın iletişim bilgileri bu bilgileri bu formda yer almaktadır. Başka herhangi bir risk öngörülmemektedir.

Hakkımda toplanan bilgiler nasıl kullanılacak?
Sesli ve görüntülü bilgiler çeşitli metotlarla toplanacaktır. Görüşmelerin ses kayıtlarına yetkisiz üçüncü kişilerin erişimi önlemek için transkript edildikten sonra silinecektir. Fotoğraflar bu doktora

araştırması kapsamında sorulan sorulara cevap bulmak için kullanılacak olup araştırmacının kişisel bilgisayarındaki şifreli bir dosyada muhafaza edilecektir. Araştırmacı ileriki araştırmalarında ve yayınlarında bu bilgilerden tekrar yararlanabilir. Görsel malzeme analiz sırasında kullanılacaktır. Bazı görseller anonimleştirilerek ileriki araştırmalarda ve yayınlarda kullanılabilir.

Hakkımdaki bilgilere kim ulaşabilir?
- Bu araştırma kapsamında toplanan bilgilere sadece araştırmacı Mustafa Cakmak ve danışmanı Doktor Siobhan Holohan ulaşabilir.
- Ses kayıtların transkripsiyonları ve fotoğraflar güvenlikli olarak şifrelenmiş bir dosya içinde araştırmacının şifre ile korunan kişisel bilgisayarında saklanacaktır.
- Verdiğiniz bilgiler kimliğinizi ortaya çıkarmayacak şekilde kullanılacaktır. Araştırmacı katılımcının kimliğinin gizli tutulmasını garanti eder bu kapsamda isminiz kullanılmayacak olup size bir kod ad verilecektir. Paylaştığınız bilgiler üçüncü bir taraf ile örneğin Türkçe konuşan diasporanın diğer üyeleriyle paylaşılmayacaktır.
- Keele Üniversitesi araştırma prensipleri gereği bu araştırma kapsamında toplanan bilgiler Mustafa Cakmak tarafından 5 yıl boyunca güvenli bir şekilde muhafaza edildikten sonra ortadan kaldırılacaktır.

Bu araştırmayı kim sponsor etmektedir?
Bu araştırmayı Keele Üniversitesi adına yürütmekteyim.

Bir sorun çıkması durumunda ne yapabilirim?
Bu araştırma hakkında herhangi bir kaygınız oluşur veya araştırmacıyla konuşmak isterseniz, sizi yanıtlamak için elinden geleni yapacaktır. *Mustafa Cakmak* ile *m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk* mail adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Alternatif olarak araştırmacıyla iletişime geçmek istemezseniz danışmanı Doktor *Siobhan Holohan ile s.holohan@keele.ac.uk* adresi üzerinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz.

Araştırma ile ilgili veya araştırmacının size davranışı ile ilgili şikayette bulunmak isterseniz üniversitenin ilgili bölümünde görevli olan memur Nicola Leighton'a aşağıdaki adresten ulaşabilirsiniz:

Nicola Leighton
Araştırma Yönetimi Memuru
Araştırma ve Kurumsal Hizmetler
Dorothy Hodgkin Building
Keele University
ST5 5BG
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk
Tel: 01782 733306

Daha fazla bilgi için:
Mustafa Cakmak
Email adresi: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.

Danışman: Dr. Siobhan Holohan
Email adresi: s.holohan@keele.ac.uk

ONAY FORMU- Mülakat Yapılan Kişi İçin

Konu Başlığı: Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan gocmenler uzerine kimlik tartışmaları
Araştırmacının iletişim bilgileri: *Mustafa Cakmak, Keele University, Claus Moser Building 1.02, ST5 5BG email: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk*

Lütfen ilgili kutucuğu 'Evet' manasında işaretleyin

1. 24.08.2015 (version no 2) tarihli bilgi formunu okuyup anladığımı ve soru sorma fırsatım olduğunu onaylıyorum. ☐

2. Katılımın gönüllü olduğun ve istediğim zaman araştırmadan ayrılabileceğimi anadım. ☐

3. Bu araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum. ☐

4. Bu araştırma kapsamında benim hakkımda toplanan bilgilerin yayınlanmadan önce anonimleştirileceğini anladım. ☐

5. Araştırmacıya mülakatın ses kaydını alması için izin veriyorum. ☐

6. Araştırmacıya fotoğraf çekmesi için izin veriyorum. ☐

7. Araştırmacıya çektiği fotoğraf ve aldığı ses kaydını araştırmasında kullanması için izin veriyorum. ☐

8. Toplanan bilgilerin gelecekteki araştırmalarda kullanılmasına izin veriyorum. ☐

9. Araştırmacıya sözlerimden alinti yapmasi için izin veriyorum. ☐

10. Rızamı geri çekiyorum. ☐

_____   _____   _____
Katılımcının ismi   Tarih   İmza

_____   _____   _____
Araştırmacı   Tarih   İmza

Information Sheet – For Event Gatekeeper

Study Title: Identity Discussions on Turkish Speaking Immigrants in North London

Aims of the Research
This project aims to provide a case study of the Turkish speaking immigrants in North London. It intends to explore their construction of identity within their daily cultural practices. It also examines various migration stories and the impact of collective memory on identity and is particularly interested in how members of the community negotiate identity between British and Turkish cultures.

Invitation
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study Identity Construction of the Turkish Speaking Diaspora in North London. This project is being undertaken by *Mustafa Cakmak.*

Before you decide whether you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take your time to read this information carefully and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information.

Why have I been invited?
You have been chosen to participate in this study because you are a member of Turkish speaking diaspora in North London.   Furthermore, you have been living in the UK for at least ten years. Thus, your encounters with and experiences about British culture are important for this research. Also, you are currently organising an event that I would like to attend as part of my research.

Do I have to take part?
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for our records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons. If you withdraw, all the data you provided will not be evaluated and will be deleted.

What will happen if I take part?
If you agree to take part, as the organiser of the event you are consenting to the researcher accompanying you and other members of the Turkish-speaking community to the event that you are arranging. In light of this, prior to the event, it is advised that you tell the people you are inviting that the researcher will be present, and parts of the event may be photographed for the purpose of the project.

What are the benefits (if any) of taking part?
Turkish Speaking diaspora in the UK is under-researched (insufficiently researched). In taking part, you will be able to inform a piece of research designed to help understand the experiences of the Turkish-speaking diaspora in North London.

What are the risks (if any) of taking part?
You may find that some people may not want to attend your event due to my presence.

How will information about me be used?
Visual and oral data will be collected using different methods. Digital photographs that are taken with a smartphone will be deleted after being copied to a secure computer to prevent unauthorised access by third parties. This data will then be used to answer questions posed in their Ph.D. thesis on the Turkish speaking diaspora. There is a possibility that the data from these interviews will be retained for use in future research projects and publications. Visual materials will be used to remind me street

scenes and interactions during the analysis. Some of the images can be used in the thesis, publications and academic presentations after persons are anonymised.

Who will have access to information about me?
- The data collected for this study will only be accessed by the researcher Mustafa Cakmak and his supervisor Dr Siobhan Holohan.
- Digital photographs will be stored securely in password-protected files on a password protected computer. Any hard copies of data will be secured in a locked filing cabinet.
- Information on you will be kept confidential and anonymous. This means that the researcher will protect your identity as a participant by ensuring that you remain unidentifiable in the research. The information you provide will not be disclosed to any third party e.g. other members of the Turkish-speaking communities. When discussed in the research you will be given a pseudonym (a false name) that does not refer to any identifying characteristic of you so that you remain unidentifiable.
- In accordance with Keele University guidelines, the data from this study will be retained and securely stored by the principal investigator - Mustafa Cakmak for five years. After this period of storage, the data will be securely destroyed.

Who is funding and organising the research?
I am conducting this research in the name of Keele University.

What if there is a problem?
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the researcher who will do their best to answer your questions. You should contact *Mustafa Cakmak* on *m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.* Alternatively, if you do not wish to contact the researcher you may contact *Dr. Siobhan Holohan on s.holohan@keele.ac.uk.*

If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please write to Nicola Leighton who is the University's contact for complaints regarding research at the following address:-

Nicola Leighton
Research Governance Officer
Research & Enterprise Services
Dorothy Hodgkin Building
Keele University
ST5 5BG
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk
Tel: 01782 733306

Contact for further information
Mustafa Cakmak
Email address: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.

Supervisor: Dr. Siobhan Holohan
Email address: s.holohan@keele.ac.uk

CONSENT FORM- For Event Gatekeepers

Title of Project: Identity Discussions on Turkish Speaking Immigrants in North London
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator: *Mustafa Cakmak,*
Keele University, Claus Moser Building 1.02, ST5 5BG email: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk

Please tick box if your answer is 'Yes'

1   I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study dated 27.05.2015 (Version no 1) and have had the opportunity to ask questions.   ☐

2   I understand that participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time.   ☐

3   I agree to take part in this study.   ☐

4   I consent to the researcher being present at my event.   ☐

5   Prior to my event, I agree to inform those attending that the researcher will also be present.   ☐

6   I understand that data collected on members of the Turkish-speaking community during this study will be anonymised before it is submitted for publication.   ☐

7   I allow the researcher to take photographs at my event.   ☐

8   I allow the researcher to use these photographs in his research.   ☐

9   I agree to allow the data collected to be used for future research projects and publications.   ☐

10   I withhold my consent.   ☐

_____   _____   _____
Name of participant   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____
Researcher   Date   Signature

Bilgi Formu – Etkinlikteki Anahtar Kişi İçin

Konu Başlığı: Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan gocmenler uzerine kimlik tartışmaları

Araştırmanın Amaçları
Bu proje Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan gocmenler hakkında bir örnek inceleme yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Günlük kültürel pratikleri aracılığıyla kimlik inşalarını keşfetmek niyetindedir. Ayrıca onların göç hikayeleri ve toplu hafızalarının kimliklerine etkileriyle ilgilenmektedir. Özellikle topluluğun üyelerinin Türkiye ve Britanya kültürleri ile nasıl müzakere ettiğiyle ilgilenmektedir.

Davet
Mustafa Cakmak tarafından yürütülen "Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diasporanın kimlik inşası" isimli araştırmaya katılmaya davetlisiniz.

Katılmak isteyip istemediğinize karar vermeden önce bu araştırmanın neden yürütüldüğünü ve neleri kapsadığını anlamanız önemli. Lütfen bu formu dikkatlice okuyunuz ve danışmak istediğiniz kişilere sormaktan çekinmeyiniz.
Yeterince açık olmayan ya da daha fazla bilgi almak istediğiniz kısımları sorabilirsiniz.

Neden ben davetliyim?
Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diasporanın bir parçası olduğunuz için bu araştırmaya davet edildiniz. Üstelik on yıldan fazla süredir İngiltere'de yaşamaktasınız. Bu yüzden İngiliz kültürüyle karşılaşma/etkileşimleriniz ve tecrübeleriniz bu araştırma için önemli. Ek olarak, şuan bir etkinlik organize ediyorsunuz ve ben araştırmamın bir parçası olarak buna katılmak istiyorum.

Katılmak Zorunda mıyım?
Katılmak isteyip istemediğiniz konusunda karar vermekte tamamen özgürsünüz. Eğer katılmayı kabul ederseniz iki onay formunu imzalamanız istenecektir. Bu formlardan biri sizde diğeri ise kayıtlarımız için bizde kalacaktır. İstediğiniz zaman hiçbir sebep belirtmeden araştırmadan çekilebilirsiniz. Araştırmadan çekildiginiz takdirde sizden toplanan bilgiler degerlendirmeye alinmayarak silincektir.

Katılırsam ne olacak?
Eğer katılmayı kabul ederseniz, bu etkinliğin düzenleyicisi olarak bir araştırmacının etkinliğinizde yer almasını kabul etmiş olacaksınız. Katılımcılarınızı araştırmacının varlığı ve fotograf cekimi yapacağı konusunda bilgilendirmeniz beklenmektedir.

Katılmamın faydaları nelerdir?
İngiltere'de yaşayan Türkçe konuşan topluluk hakkında yeterince araştırma yapılmamıştır.
Katılımınız Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diaspora hakkında bilgi edinmemize yardımcı olacaktır.

Katılmamın riskleri nelerdir?
Bir araştırmacının varlığı nedeniyle etkinliğinize gelmek istemeyenler olabilir.

Hakkımda toplanan bilgiler nasıl kullanılacak?
Sesli ve görüntülü bilgiler çeşitli metotlarla toplanacaktır. Fotoğraflar bu doktora araştırması kapsamında sorulan sorulara cevap bulmak için kullanılacak olup araştırmacının kişisel bilgisayarındaki şifreli bir dosyada muhafaza edilecektir. Araştırmacı ileriki araştırmalarında ve yayınlarında bu bilgilerden tekrar yararlanabilir. Görsel malzeme analiz sırasında araştırmacıya sokak sahneleri ve etkileşimleri hatırlatmak için kullanılacaktır. Bazı görseller anonimleştirilerek ileriki araştırmalarda ve yayınlarda kullanılabilir.

Hakkımdaki bilgilere kim ulaşabilir?
- Bu araştırma kapsamında toplanan bilgilere sadece araştırmacı Mustafa Cakmak ve danışmanı Doktor Siobhan Holohan ulaşabilir.
- Fotoğraflar güvenlikli olarak şifrelenmiş bir dosya içinde araştırmacının şifre ile korunan kişisel bilgisayarında saklanacaktır.
- Verdiğiniz bilgiler kimliğinizi ortaya çıkarmayacak şekilde kullanılacaktır. Araştırmacı katılımcının kimliğinin gizli tutulmasını garanti eder bu kapsamda isminiz kullanılmayacak olup size bir kod ad verilecektir. Paylaştığınız bilgiler üçüncü bir taraf ile örneğin Türkçe konuşan diasporanın diğer üyeleriyle paylaşılmayacaktır.
- Keele Üniversitesi araştırma prensipleri gereği bu araştırma kapsamında toplanan bilgiler Mustafa Cakmak tarafından 5 yıl boyunca güvenli bir şekilde muhafaza edildikten sonra ortadan kaldırılacaktır.

Bu araştırmayı kim sponsor etmektedir?
Bu araştırmayı Keele Üniversitesi adına yürütmekteyim.

Bir sorun çıkması durumunda ne yapabilirim?
Bu araştırma hakkında herhangi bir kaygınız oluşur veya araştırmacıyla konuşmak isterseniz, sizi yanıtlamak için elinden geleni yapacaktır. *Mustafa Cakmak* ile *m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk* mail adresinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Alternatif olarak araştırmacıyla iletişime geçmek istemezseniz danışmanı Doktor *Siobhan Holohan ile s.holohan@keele.ac.uk* adresi üzerinden iletişime geçebilirsiniz.

Araştırma ile ilgili veya araştırmcının size davranışı ile ilgili şikayette bulunmak isterseniz üniversitenin ilgili bölümünde görevli olan memur Nicola Leighton'a aşağıdaki adresten ulaşabilirsiniz:

Nicola Leighton
Araştırma Yönetimi Memuru
Araştırma ve Kurumsal Hizmetler
Dorothy Hodgkin Building
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E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk
Tel: 01782 733306

Daha fazla bilgi için:
Mustafa Cakmak
Email adresi: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk.

Danışman: Dr. Siobhan Holohan
Email adresi: s.holohan@keele.ac.uk

ONAY FORMU- Etkinlikteki Anahtar Kişi İçin

Konu Başlığı: Kuzey Londra'da yaşayan Türkçe konuşan diaspora uzerine kimlik tartışmaları
Araştırmacının iletişim bilgileri: *Mustafa Cakmak, Keele University, Claus Moser Building 1.02, ST5 5BG email: m.cakmak@keele.ac.uk*

Lütfen ilgili kutucuğu 'Evet' manasında işaretleyin

1	27.05.2015 (version no 1) tarihli bilgi formunu okuyup anladığımı ve soru sorma fırsatım olduğunu onaylıyorum.	☐
2	Katılımın gönüllü olduğun ve istediğim zaman araştırmadan ayrılabileceğimi anadım.	☐
3	Bu araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.	☐
4	Araştırmacının etkinliğimde bulunmasına rıza gösteriyorum.	☐
5	Etkinlik öncesi katılımcıları araştırmacının varlığı konusunda bilgilendirdiğimi kabul ediyorum.	☐
6	Bu araştırma kapsamında Türkçe konuşan topluluk hakkında toplanan bilgilerin yayınlanmadan önce anonimleştirileceğini anladım.	☐
7	Araştırmacıya etkinliğimde fotoğraf çekmesi için izin veriyorum.	☐
8	Araştırmacıya çektiği fotoğrafları araştırmasında kullanması için izin veriyorum.	☐
9	Toplanan bilgilerin gelecekteki araştırmalarda ve yayınlarda kullanılmasına izin veriyorum.	☐
10	Rızamı geri çekiyorum.	☐

_____ _____ _____
Katılımcının ismi   Tarih   İmza

_____ _____ _____
Araştırmacı   Tarih   İmza