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## PART FOUR

### INTERNAL MIGRATION PATTERNS IN SPAIN - CAUSE AND EFFECT

#### INTRODUCTION

We have seen in Part Two of this thesis how the pattern of internal migration in Spain up to 1960 evolved through three phases which coincided approximately with three periods of industrialization. The first modern migration phase was accompanied by urbanization; the second by the further characteristic of more evident industrialization; while polarization became an additional feature of the third phase. We saw how the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions brought in economic, social and demographic changes which were first felt in areas in close proximity to Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid, with the flames of massive out-migration then spreading ever further to engulf a northern block of eleven contiguous provinces in the 1901-1930 period, before burning their way southwards to consume a further seven provinces between 1931 and 1960. In Part Three, we saw that the fire, far from burning itself out, gained fresh momentum from the fuel of economic liberalization which was poured on the flames after 1960. Massive out-migration spread southwards and westwards to reduce to ashes a further three provinces. Significant changes took place, too, in the volume and rate of immigration as well as in the socio-economic character and geographical destinations of migration streams; changes which have been spelled out in detail in Part Three. It remains now to attempt to explain in Part Four the patterns and trends noted in Parts Two and Three.

The procedure adopted will be to isolate (as far as is possible) each major migration stream type and to attempt a critical analysis of the socio-economic, demographic and other factors which account for its existence. For this purpose the "zoom technique" will be employed, working on a factor by factor basis from a national to regional or provincial level before "zooming in" to selected local case studies which should support or refute

hypotheses made on a more generalized scale. In testing hypotheses the Spearman rank-correlation coefficient will mainly be used (1), largely because of the unreliability of Spanish statistics (2), the technique being invaluable "for obtaining a generalized estimate of correlation" (3). A preliminary analysis by means of the Spearman coefficient of rank-correlation of the relationship between García Barbancho's net migration statistics for 1961-1965 and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística's net directly-recorded data for the same period (4) shows that the two are highly correlated ( $R_s = +0.915$ ). The impression gained in Part Three that patterns of in- and out-migration produced by seemingly incompatible methods were comparable is thus statistically confirmed. Armed with this newly-gained confidence, ranked migration statistics for the 1961-1965 period obtained by the directly-recorded data method, will be mainly used as a "sheet-anchor" to test hypotheses in the search for useful and meaningful correlations at a national level of investigation.

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### A/ RURAL-TO-URBAN OUT-MIGRATION STREAMS. "PUSH" FACTORS OPERATING IN OUT-MIGRATION AREAS

#### 1) AT A NATIONAL LEVEL

Between 1900 and 1960 non-urban municipios (with a population of less than 10,000) showed a net loss of population of 24.58% (1). This population group showed a further net migration loss of 34.43% between 1961 and 1965 (2), although by 1969 the net loss had fallen to 21.44% from a peak of 36.21% in 1964 (3). Rural exodus forms but a part of rural out-migration (4), yet even if we play down the emotional importance of éxodo rural there is no escaping the cold fact that two out of every three Spanish out-migrants come from a rural municipio. During the 1961-1965 period, for example, 64.06% of all registered out-migrants came from rural areas (5). Any discussion of the socio-economic "push-pull" factors inducing migration must thus begin with the "push" factors operating in out-migration areas (6).

#### (a) In agriculture

Franklin has shown that in post-war Western Europe flight from the land has not always been associated with a flight to the towns (7). In Spain, while the phenomenon of worker-peasants is not unknown, an average of 105,000 left the primary sector annually during the 1961-1970 period (8), which was equivalent to 28.23% of all internal migrants. Since during the decade the net migration loss of non-urban municipios was 29.73% (9), it can be safely assumed that most left not only agriculture but their municipios of origin (10).

It is with conditions in agriculture, therefore, that our investigation must begin. The hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between socio-economic conditions in agriculture and net internal migration is substantiated.

Table XXIII suggests that the relationship between manpower and income in agriculture is a close one. Moreover the 66-67% inverse



Table XXIII

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN AGRICULTURE, SPAIN

Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs *	
	Direct	Inverse
Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1962 (11).		-0.666
Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1964 (12).		-0.550
Percentage of provincial economically active population in agriculture, 1960 (13).		-0.675

\* Values above 0.280 and 0.369 are significant at the 95 and 99% levels respectively.

correlation with net internal migration is perhaps to be expected when two out of three internal out-migrants are rural ones (14). As the proportion of rural out-migrants declined, as it did between 1964 and 1969 (15), so the degree of correlation with agriculture should decline. Table XXIII shows a fall of 0.116 in one variable in only two years. Confirmation of this trend is obtained from Fundación FOESSA (16). Of 46 variables tested against migration indices for the 1950-1960 and 1960-1967 periods, 33 showed a lower degree of correlation in the latter period - eloquent evidence of the changing pattern of Spanish migration. Significantly, most of the 13 indices with improved correlations 1960-1967 were indices associated with urbanization - during a period towards the end of which, it will be remembered, internal migration became more urban-to-urban in nature.

Shryock has remarked that if migrants or potential migrants are allowed only one reason for moving when interviewed, then an economic reason is usually given (17). In fairness, where migrants are allowed more than one

reason for moving economic motives still predominate. A CESA survey in 1958 found "push" motives accounting for at least 42.6% of moves (18). A FOESSA survey of rural housewives conducted in 1969 (19), found that they thought that 57% of migrating males moved because "in the countryside one earns little". In a Delegación Provincial de Trabajo survey carried out in Orense in 1964 on migrants going to Europe (20), 85.51% of the males and 90.91% of the females questioned gave "push" motives. An Instituto Español de Emigración survey in 1966, however, gave migrants the possibility of choosing both "push" and "pull" motives, an invitation which was readily accepted by over 90% of all interviewees (21). Kade is of the opinion that at least two different types of migrant are attracted to West Germany from Andalucía - 47.2% of his sample encountered economic difficulties before leaving their homeland, while 36.6% were attracted by motives of upward social mobility (22). "Push" and "pull" become a matter of personal emphasis - whether a migrant chooses to answer an open-ended question with a pessimistic "because one cannot earn a living" or a more optimistic "to earn more". "Push" and "pull" reflect the bias of the investigator (23), or the type of migrant (24). It becomes, therefore, impossible to measure accurately the relative importance of "push" and "pull" (25); moreso when migrants have difficulty of recall as to their motivation or give the emotionally distorted answers expected of them. The "push-pull" hypotheses then become united into one in which rural-to-urban migration is reduced to "a function of expected rural-urban income differences" (26). Such a hypothesis produces the expected correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the per capita income (calculated at a provincial scale) for 1962 ( $R_s = +0.779$ ) (27) and 1964 ( $R_s = +0.819$ ) (28) respectively. Clearly, in our search for correlations in the agricultural sector we must by-pass the "push-pull" obstacle, and follow Porter's advice of not thinking of the phenomenon as an unit but breaking it down

into its component elements (29).

(i) Latifundios and minifundios

These "two opposite and extreme types of landed property" (30) have often been blamed for rural depopulation. Goltz's law, for example, states that "an arithmetic increase in the proportion of latifundios leads to a geometric increase in rural out-migration". (31).

While the evils of latifundismo have been universally denounced, latifundios defy rational definition. They have been variously defined as large estates of over 100 (32), 150 (33), 200 (34), 250 (35), 300 (36), or even more than 500 hectares (37). Using Carrión's definition of 250 hectares or over, then 23 of the 27 provinces he surveyed had more than 50 holdings of this size (38). Thirty-seven provinces had more than one third of their total areas occupied by estates of over 300 hectares in 1962 (39). About 29,000 land-owners laid claim to roughly 49% of the total land-surface, cultivated and uncultivated (40). Latifundismo is thus so widespread it is easy to name it as a correspondent in the perpetual divorce proceedings between peasant and the land. Thus Tamames (41), writing about rural depopulation in the 1951-1960 period, subdivided the 18 provinces concerned into 7 latifundio and 11 minifundio ones. Anlló is right to point out that of the remaining 22 out-migration provinces in that decade (which did not suffer an absolute fall in population), 10 at least were provinces "in which agriculture presents grave structural deficiencies" (42).

A latifundio must have certain basic credentials other than size. To merit that title in Carrión's eyes a large estate must be "exploited extensively and deficiently" (43). To Malefakis it must be associated with high indices of agricultural peonage (44); to Sancho Hazak with spectacular rates of endemic unemployment (45). Historically, some proprietors have not been beneath leaving large parts of their estates uncultivated for a time, thereby actively encouraging unemployment as an economic device in the war

waged by capital against labour to substitute pittance for pay (46). In such an environment, for decades the latifundio has been to the campesino a symbol of social injustice (47). The demand for labour in a latifundio system is inelastic so that as population increases so wages tend to fall (48). The growth of population thus intensifies demands for reform. Rural class antagonism became particularly strong after 1840 (49) in the Andalusian campiña, where social inequalities were most intense and the results of monoculture most exaggerated (50). The agrarian anarchist intellectual movement (51), which had as its main remedy for social-misery the redistribution of large estates, has, however, been overtaken by the events of the last thirty years (52). "Agitation"<sup>x</sup> has given way to emigration; today the Andalusian braceros vote with their feet not their fists. Giner doubts whether rural class antagonisms have lost intensity (54), but now what Martínez Cachero calls "la hostilidad del medio ambiente" (55) causes peasants to flee the countryside, in Pérez Díaz's words "like St. Michael from the Devil" (56). "It is significant", notes the O.E.C.D. report on agriculture in Spain, "that the regions where large estates are most numerous display the greatest migratory surplus (Andalucía, Extremadura)" (57). Kade likewise finds out-migration negatively correlated with latifundismo (58).

Brenan (59) and Madariaga (60) see a correlation between large estates, short-term leases and drought; Martínez Alier does not approve of such "ecological determinism" (61). Moreno Navarro, rather than highlighting the excesses of los señoritos (62), as others have done (63), sees the most significant division much lower down the social ladder in Andalusian society - between those with sufficient salaries not to supplement their agricultural activities as hired harvest hands and those without (64). It is our contention that latifundio is an enigma as elusive in its effects as in its definition. Fundación FOESSA found no significant correlation

<sup>x</sup> Reference (53) was omitted.

between "indices of concentration" or "concentration-lack of resources utilization" and other agricultural indices (65), perhaps because of the great heterogeneity of latifundian regions (66). Using a mean index of estates 200 hectares and over in 1962 crudely to define latifundismo, we find only a weak negative correlation with net internal migration during the 1961-1965 period ( $R_s = -0.367$ ); and no statistically significant correlation at all if estates of 300 hectares and over are used instead ( $R_s = -0.196$ ) (67).

Learned authorities, while almost unanimous in seeing latifundismo as an active agent in the migration process, agree less about the role of minifundios in the same process. Goltz in fact saw a relationship between small properties and decreasing migration (68); while Habakkuk has taken up an opposite stance (69). García Fernández, while recognizing the importance of minifundismo as a factor inducing emigration, qualifies his statement by declaring that "the land ties". Possession of a small property makes a peasant more conservative and therefore likely to consider carefully the risks involved in emigration (70). Kade, nevertheless, finds out-migration from Andalucía negatively correlated with minifundismo (71); and on purely economic grounds this would appear to be logical relationship. The lack of capital for more rational and intensive cultivation of the soil, the loss of useable land between plots, time lost in transit between scattered strips (72), endless disputes with neighbouring small land-owners leading sometimes to wasteful and time-consuming law-suits (73) - these are some of the most obvious deficiencies of minifundismo (74) without mentioning specific regional problems like that of the fuero Gallego (75).

Minifundios have been variously defined as small farms of less than 5, sometimes 10, or, if one employs one of the categories sometimes used by the Ministerio de Agricultura, even under 20 hectares (76). According to the Primer Censo Agrario, 45.5% of the farms in Spain in 1962 were in fact

microfundios of less than 2 hectares (77)! Siguán doubts the existence of such farms as separate viable entities, 2 hectares of secano giving a return of only 3,000 ptas. annually (78). García de Oteyza (79), in a survey of 66 representative areas in the Duero (Douro) basin conducted in 1963, has been able to show that such plots are often rented to other small land-owners. He found that while 13.2% of the properties in his survey were under 5 hectares only 1.8% of the explotaciones (or farm enterprises) were within this category (80). Excessive sub-division of land is such in Spain that 14 strips per farm enterprise was the average in 1961 compared with 6 in Portugal and only 4 in Italy (81). Minifundismo with all its various facets is regional and much less widespread than latifundismo. Only 16 provinces had more than 10% of their total areas occupied by farms of less than 5 hectares in 1962 (82), and in only one of these - Pontevedra - was more than one-third of the province affected (83). But minifundismo is above all else a problem of people; 52.24% of all the proprietors in Spain in 1959 have farms of less than 1 hectare and a further 30.14% 1-5 hectares (84). The 14 provinces where more than 90% of the properties (although not necessarily the farm enterprises) are less than 1 hectare (85), are all contained in the north-western quadrant of the country.

Traditionally, much of the north-western quadrant of Spain has been the source-region for transoceanic migrations or temporary, seasonal movements to other parts of the peninsula. Internal migration of a more permanent character is, however, a tradition for some (86) in the heartland of Old Castile (87). There should therefore be some correlation between net migration in the 1961-1965 period and minifundismo. Only one of the variables in Table XXIV, however, shows a significant degree of correlation, and then a weak one. Curiously, it is not one of the refined indices of minifundismo devised by Fundación FOESSA but the straight-forward percentage of the provincial land-surface in farms of 5 hectares or less ( $R_s = +0.446$ ).

Table XXIV

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED INDICES OF MINIFUNDISMO, SPAIN

Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	
	Direct	Inverse
Number of strips under 1 hectare, 1962.		-0.051
Number of strips per farm enterprise, 1962.		-0.006
Number of farm enterprises under 2 hectares, 1962.		-0.069
Number of farm enterprises under 20 hectares with more than 10 strips, 1962 (88).	+0.062	
Percentage of provincial surface in farms of 5 hectares and under, 1962.	+0.446	

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Primer Censo Agrario de España, Año 1962. Resultados Provisionales. Primera Parte: Totales Provinciales, Madrid, 1963.

While neither latifundismo nor minifundismo appear to be strongly correlated with internal migration, García Fernández has noted that although both favour migration they only become important factors if rural population densities are high (89). It is to some of the important aspects of minifundismo and latifundismo, therefore, that our investigation must now turn.

(ii) Rural population densities

Two indices of rural population density were tested against net internal migration for the 1961-1965 period in an attempt to corroborate García Fernández's statement. In the first instance, the number of active agricultural persons per 100 hectares of cultivated land in 1964 (90) was used as a measurement of rural population density. A correlation with net internal migration for 1961-1965 of  $R_s = +0.419$  was found and for 1964 - the peak year for internal migration - a somewhat higher  $R_s = +0.596$ . In the second instance, rural population was simply defined as that of the provincial total minus that of the capital and any other municipio with over 50,000

inhabitants (91). Here there was found a correlation between imperfectly defined rural population in 1960 and net migration 1961-1965 of only  $R_s = +0.379$ . Thus, all that can be said in favour of García Fernández's hypothesis is that the case is really not proven. Indeed using a third measure of rural population (92), no correlation was found between changes in the density of rural population 1940-1960 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.190$ ) (93).

(iii) Land-owners and landless labourers

The lack of structural economic reform in much of Spanish agriculture has resulted in a preponderance of jornaleros (wage-earners) within the traditional system, the denial of upward social mobility counting heavily as a factor in emigration amongst the peasantry (94). In purely economic terms there can be little to choose between the lot of a small land-owner and that of a landless labourer (95). Indeed, within the minifundio zones of Spain there is often a confusion of roles. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to measure land-ownership or the lack of it as factors conducive to migration - moreso in Spain where agricultural statistics are often so confusing. Fundación FOESSA claim that "the truly significant change in Spain has not been so much the fall of the agricultural population as the decline of the salaried agricultural population. In 1950, one in four of the active population in the primary sector was a salaried worker. In 1965 only one in ten finds himself in that situation" (96). Between 1950 and 1965, according to this source, there was a fall of 46.42% in the number of landless labourers compared with only 25.59% for land-owners (97). The lack of land would thus appear to be a factor of some relevance in the phenomenon of rural exodus.

In our investigation, we found no significant correlation between the ownership of land and migration. The relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of agriculturalists por cuenta propia (98)



as a percentage of the total active agricultural population in 1962 was  $R_s = -0.244$  (99). In contrast, there was a much stronger inverse correlation with the number of agriculturalists por cuenta ajena (100) as a percentage of the total active agricultural population in 1962 ( $R_s = -0.614$ )(101). This correlation is based on the Banco de Bilbao's statistics for 1962 which give the percentage of salaried agriculturalists as 31.44% of the total active agricultural population. Fundación FOESSA's statistics for the same year give a percentage of 29.00 and, unfortunately, a much poorer negative correlation ( $R_s = -0.397$ ) (102). Whatever the true statistics, it is probably safe to say that since the dominant trend in the number of landless labourers both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total active agricultural population is downwards (103), lack of land like rural exodus itself is becoming a factor of diminishing importance in internal migration.

(iv) Casual labour and seasonal unemployment

There is more agreement in Spanish statistical sources about the number of casual agricultural labourers as a percentage of the hired labour force (see Table XXV).

Table XXV

CASUAL LABOURERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE SALARIED  
AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, SPAIN

Estimations	Year	Per cent
García Valcárel	1955	79.52
<u>Encuesta Agropecuaria</u>	1956	79.48
<u>Consejo Social Sindical</u>	1958	78.38
Carnillieri	1958	78.26
<u>I Informe FOESSA</u>	1962	76.00
<u>Mutualidad de Previsión Agraria</u>	1963	76.13
<u>Mutualidad de Previsión Agraria</u>	1964	76.37

SOURCES: J. García Valcárel, "Causas de la emigración española interior y exterior", Documentación Social, No.4, Centro de Sociología Aplicada, Sección Social de Cáritas Española, (Suplemento del

Boletín de Cáritas, Las Migraciones en España), Madrid, 1958, pp. 21-41; Junta Nacional de Hermandades de Labradores y Ganaderos, Encuesta Agropecuaria de 1956, cited in J. Anlló, Estructura y Problemas del Campo Español, 2nd ed., Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, Madrid, 1967, p.86; Consejo Social Sindical, Campo (2), 1959, cited in J. Anlló, op. cit., p.86; A. Carmilleri, "Las realizaciones agrícolas", Comercio, (2nd series), Vol.34, No.112, Nov., 1959, p.8; Fundación FOESSA, Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social de España, Editorial Euramérica, Madrid, 1966, p.52; and Mutualidad de Previsión Agraria, statistics cited in Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Memoria sobre la Ejecución del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social. Año 1964, Madrid, 1965, p.136.

The connection between latifundismo - monoculture - casual labour - seasonal unemployment and migration should thus be easier to prove or disprove. The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of casual labourers as a percentage of the salaried agricultural population in 1962 is an unrewarding (although statistically significant)  $R_s = -0.284$  (104). Statistics for the same year but taken from a different source (105) produce a correlation with the number of casual, remunerated (106) labourers as a percentage of the total active agricultural population of  $R_s = -0.310$  (107).

The low degree of correlation is at first surprising in view of the importance accredited to casual agricultural employment as a causal factor in migration by most Spanish sources. It must be remembered, however, that we are not dealing with the agricultural "push" factor en bloc but only with one of its component elements. To illustrate this point, statistics from the Mutualidad de Previsión Agraria suggest that 177,547 active agriculturalists emigrated in 1964; 52.21% were salaried workers (108), although according to our calculations no more than 40% of the total could have been casual agricultural labourers (109).


Warriner has emphasized the importance of agricultural unemployment rather than rural-urban income differentials as the main cause of rural-to-urban migration (110). Floristán and Bosque writing of Spanish conditions, see "the unemployment of workers, the main driving-force of rural exodus,

becoming worse... in regions of monoculture" (111). Thus Kade found unemployment an important motivating force in the decision to emigrate; 32% of his sample of male Andalusian workers in West Germany having been unemployed for a time in the year prior to emigrating (112). The problem of agricultural unemployment can reach enormous proportions within the latifundio - monoculture zones of the south and south-west. Only 13% of the salaried agricultural workers of Andalucía in 1956 had permanent jobs (113), seasonal or permanent unemployment seriously affecting the rest. The proportion of unemployed agricultural workers in the province of Sevilla, for example, "rarely falls short of one-third and often exceeds three-quarters of the total labour force" (114) during the 1965-1968 period. Similarly, an average of 52.11% of the casual agricultural labour-force of Badajoz was unemployed in 1949 according to Brugarola (115). Nor are Sevilla and Badajoz the worst provinces for seasonal agricultural unemployment in La España del Sur ! According to the 1950 Census, Jaén and Córdoba accounted for 54.75% of the total (116) number of workers unemployed in Andalucía at that date (117).

Again, there is a considerable amount of "disguised unemployment" (118) or underemployment in Spanish agriculture. According to Tanames underemployment in 1955 affected 2 million agriculturalists and in 1962 1.2 million (119). In 1956, according to the FAO Mediterranean Development Project, there was only a 55% effective employment rate in Spanish agriculture (120). The underemployment rate in agriculture in Jaén about 1950 was around 60% (121), while 30% of the agricultural population of Badajoz in 1961 was surplus to requirement (122). According to estimates produced by the Servicio de Empleo y Colocación for 1958 (123), 251,380,574 work-days were lost in Spanish agriculture as a result of unemployment and underemployment (124), which, to our manner of thinking, would imply that at least 1,092,959 hands were surplus to requirement in the sector in that

year (125). Despite the excesses of rural exodus in the 1961-1965 period the position changed but little! In 1966, according to calculations made by the Dirección General de Empleo, (126), 20% of the economically active agricultural population was technologically superfluous, rising to 25% with mechanization and 47% with structural reform. In the words of Fundación FOESSA "in normal circumstances, about a million more economically active persons still have to leave the countryside" (127).

Statistics for both underemployment and unemployment are notoriously unreliable in Spain. The officially registered unemployed in 1955 represented only 37.21% of those revealed by a national sample survey for the same year conducted by the Servicio de Empleo y Colocación (128). Occasional agricultural workers are not entitled to unemployment benefit in Spain and, according to Drain (129), are not included in official unemployment statistics; yet it is with registered unemployment figures we must work for no other national ones exist. These reveal that approximately one-third of the registered unemployed in most years are from the agricultural sector (130). We must not, therefore, expect a perfect correlation with net internal migration. The correlation between the percentage of the economically active population unemployed on the 31st of December 1964 and net internal migration 1961-1965 is an encouraging  $R_s = -0.518$  (131). A less encouraging correlation is obtained with the total net migration balance (saldo migratorio total) per thousand population in 1964 ( $R_s = -0.341$ ). The causal connection between latifundismo - monoculture - casual labour - seasonal unemployment and migration is not proven - for adequate statistics do not exist to prove it (132) - but at least the link between migration and unemployment is substantiated (133). Further proof of this link comes from Giménez Mellado (133), who has sub-divided Spain into in-migrant and out-migrant zones and graphically demonstrated the inverse correlation between unemployment and internal migration (see Fig.61).



Should it be possible to show a statistical correlation between internal migration and monthly unemployment figures, the relationship between internal migration and the agricultural cycle will be proven. In the olive-growing regions of Spain where monoculture is practiced there is little work between March or April and the harvest from November to February (134), while in the wheat-growing areas employment possibilities are limited except in the June to September harvest season. Southern Spain has then been likened to a "gigantic summer labour sponge" (135), with migrant rural labour traditionally becoming "a satisfactory means of ironing out regional inequalities in the seasonal distribution of manpower... [and] a solution to the problem of seasonal unemployment in peripheral upland, pastoral and vine-growing areas" (136). Many zones unassociated with monoculture have two periods of maximum agricultural activity separated by two periods of approximately three months duration each with little work (137). Seasonal unemployment in Jaén (the province where this problem is usually greatest) is generally lowest in January and February when the olives are harvested and in June and July when the wheat harvest is in full swing (138). Kade found highest out-migration rates in Andalucía in municipios with equal amounts of extensive wheat and olives, and lowest rates (with even some in-migration in certain instances) in municipios with monoculture of either wheat or olives (139).

Analysing statistics for 1964, internal migration flows were at their maximum in November, October and December in that order, and at their minimum in July, June and May. In 1965, maximum flows occurred in January, February and March - the result of a disastrous olive harvest (140) - with minimum movements in December, June and July (141). The relationship between migrant movements and the agricultural cycle is shown to be quite close, and when monthly net internal migration statistics for 1964 and estimated monthly unemployment statistics for the same year are compared

a positive correlation of  $R_s = +0.769$  is revealed (142). Supporting evidence for this correlation is supplied by statistics for 1965 - an year with somewhat different climatic characteristics from 1964 but with a convincing correlation between monthly net internal migration statistics and estimated monthly unemployment statistics of  $R_s = +0.713$  (143). The importance of agricultural unemployment as the main driving-force of rural-to-urban migration is thus shown by this indirect method of calculation. It should be emphasized, however, that while inter-provincial migration flows are related to the agricultural cycle intra-provincial flows are much more complex (144).

(v) Mechanization

Siguán has written that "it is absurd to continue speaking about the Spanish countryside, of latifundios and minifundios, agricultural labourers and seasonal unemployment, as if we were still in 1930. Emigration from the countryside is no longer purely and simply flight from misery. Now, to a great extent, peasants abandon the countryside because the tractor has made them unnecessary..." (145). The rural exodus of landless labourers is thus often accredited to mechanization or fear of imminent mechanization (146), with small proprietors being forced to leave because they cannot afford to mechanize (and without mechanization their farms are uneconomic, it is often claimed). Wolfe, writing of Latin American conditions, sees mechanization on large estates as one of the "four key factors at the rural end of the migration process" (147). There is little doubt that "technological unemployment" (148) results in a reduced demand for labour. It is a factor in the decline of temporary, seasonal migration in Spain, as well as leading to the abandonment of cortijos in Andalucía previously frequented by seasonal migrant labourers at ploughing and harvest time (149).

An O.E.C.D. economic survey on Spain (150) emphasizes that until rel-

actively recently the economic basis of a large part of Spanish agriculture was the availability of very cheap labour. Pérez Díaz has rightly pointed out that no mechanization was necessary when cheap labour was abundant (151). Thus, in 1955 there were only about 28,000 tractors in Spain (152). Bradshaw has stated that mechanization of Spanish agriculture only really begins from 1958-1960 (153). According to another O.E.C.D. survey (154), there were 47,100 tractors in Spain at the end of 1959; the number of tractors and motor-cultivators increasing by 18.10% between 1958 and 1959, 30.22% 1959-1960, 26.07% 1960-1961 and 32.63% between 1961 and 1962 (155). These trends are confirmed at provincial level. Of 672 tractors in Segovia in 1962, 26.9% were bought before 1950, 3.9% between 1950 and 1954, 27.2% between 1955 and 1959, 16.4% in 1960, 10.4% in 1961 and 15.2% in 1962 (156). These statistics suggest that at both national and provincial levels 1960 marks the point of take-off for the mechanization of agriculture. Pérez Díaz has hypothesized that mechanization was forced upon landowners by the lack of cheap labour (157). He sees a correlation between estabilización 1959-1960, strong overseas migration, the slowing down of temporary, seasonal migration at harvest time in Spain, and the speeding up of rural exodus from 1961 (158). In confirmation of this hypothesis we found no statistically significant correlation between the number of tractors in 1959 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = -0.166$ ) (159). López Muñoz concludes that "the mechanization of the countryside does not correspond in its evolution with the process of emigration from the countryside to the city" (160). The number of tractors in Spain increased by 13.74% between 1963 and 1964 and 12.00% between 1964 and 1965, while the number of internal migrants in the first period increased by 12.01% but decreased by 10.03% in the latter (161). The lack of correlation is not surprising in view of the fact that an estimated 48% of all rural migrant workers were small proprietors (162). "The slow spread of mechanization", notes



Payne, "did not reach the ordinary peasant farmer, who... was caught in the urban-rural 'price scissors'..." (163), and therefore quite unable to afford mechanization - (164) although unable to escape from its consequences. Thus massive migration in the 1961-1965 period began with salaried agricultural workers, with small proprietors and their families joining the flood from 1962 (165). In a complex situation in which a feedback mechanism operated, mechanization was probably the effect not the cause of the migration of casual day-labourers (166), although it helped cause the migration of small proprietors and their families. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is some statistical correlation between agricultural mechanization in 1964 and net internal migration 1961-1965 - but it is a positive relationship ( $R_s = +0.337$ ) (167). This is explained by the fact that despite the existence of strong rural-to-rural migration streams and the highest salaries in agriculture, there is a shortage of agricultural labour in the richer provinces of the north-east which can only be compensated by mechanization (168).

(vi) Land consolidation and agricultural co-operatives

Land consolidation (concentración parcelaria), according to López Muñoz (169), has been one of the results of the agricultural crisis which has affected small proprietors; rural exodus aiding the "spontaneous consolidation" (170) of land within the minifundist zones of Spain.

It should be emphasized that all the land consolidation measures taken since 1952 have been concerned merely with the regrouping of plots of land, without varying in any way the size or the number of farm enterprises (171). Moreover, as Tamames has noted (172), agricultural reform of this type has done nothing to alleviate the misery of those without land, and has done little for those whose farms are too small even after consolidation (173). From 1964 the Servicio Nacional de Concentración Parcelaria has been concerned not only with land consolidation but also with rural reform (ordenación rural) (174); notwithstanding, at least

until 1971 and the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma y Desarrollo Agrario (IRYDA) (175), it could be claimed that the S.N.C.P. had done too little (176), too late (177), in too small an area of Spain (178). Between 1953 and 1968, more than 5 million hectares were affected by concentración parcelaria in thirty-eight provinces of Spain, 79.69% being in eleven provinces of the Castilian Meseta (179). Not surprisingly, we found no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 in the thirty-eight provinces concerned and the total areas within them affected by land consolidation schemes 1953-1968 ( $R_s = -0.173$ ) (180).

A sample survey of 375 explotaciones in the Duero (Douro) basin showed an almost 30% decline in their number between 1962 and 1966 (181), as a result of rural exodus and the technological revolution in agriculture. Rural exodus has resulted in a shortage of labour even in the minifundio zones, the need for mechanization becoming more relevant after land consolidation. The exorbitant cost of mechanization for the vast majority of small proprietors led to the appearance of various types of agricultural co-operative, especially in the areas affected by ordenación rural. Thus, between 1965 and 1971 no less than 36.7% of the total aid given as part of the land consolidation programme went to co-operatives (182), 59% of the total funds (to both co-operatives and individuals) going for the purchase of farm machinery (183). The Duero (Douro) basin appears to have been the area most affected by the appearance of agricultural co-operatives, as with land consolidation (184). There can be no correlation, therefore, with national net internal migration statistics; and it would be pointless to search for statistical relationships in this instance.

(vii) Climatic "push"

Climate is often a factor of great socio-economic significance in agriculture. Siguán has calculated that the profit accruing to the owner of a typical farm of 24 hectares of secano mainly devoted to wheat, was

only 33,525 pesetas annually (circa. 1964), or less than the modest salary of a building-worker (185). Since it can be shown that 98.05% of all Spanish wheat-farmers had farms less than 22 hectares in size (186), it can be concluded that the overwhelming majority of agriculturalists live precariously near to the breadline. Despite the cushioning effect of guaranteed wheat prices (187), such peasants are very susceptible to climatic disasters - and always have been. Thus de Hoyos Sainz was able to see a correlation between the number of people per sq. km. and the return per hectare (188) and de Miguel and Salcedo were able to write that migration proceeds mainly from "the zone most rural, least populated, least urban and most poor" (189) - for it is in this type of region that climatic "push" factors are felt most acutely. Utrillo has shown in his studies of rural Cataluña (190) that once rural depopulation is started by agricultural disasters (like phylloxera or drought), it is all but impossible to contain. Nor are crises of disaster proportion necessary to set in motion a small number of the rural population each year. Pérez Díaz sees a correlation between out-migration and wheat production in Camino Viejo (Guadalajara) between 1943 and 1960 (191). We tested his statistics and found a correlation of  $R_s = +0.289$ , which has no statistical significance (192).

It is one thing to speak of correlations between harvest and out-migration at a local level, but do such correlations exist at a macro-scale of investigation? Malthus, as early as 1803, was able to see a connection between the Swedish death-rate and the quality of the harvest (193). But this was in an era when "nature audited her accounts with a red pencil" (194), when long-term population changes in pre-industrial Europe produced a "switchback" pattern in response to good or bad harvests (195). Swaine Thomas, notwithstanding, has been able to confirm the correlation between demographic phenomena and the state of the harvest in Sweden as recently as 1933 (196). So much for Sweden, but what of Spain? It is suggested here

that if there is a correlation between migration and the agricultural cycle - as we have shown to exist (197) - there should also be one with the yearly state of the harvest. The difficulty is in measuring this correlation. It is rather dangerous to take wheat as an index crop and to measure either acreages sown or crop yields obtained. The former is related to political factors (198); the influence of the climatic factor on the latter is obscured by the increasing use of chemical fertilizers which have greatly increased crop yields from about 1962 (199). It was thus decided to use climate as an index of good or bad harvests, and to give the climatic factor more relevance in socio-economic terms by using hydro-electricity production figures to measure damp or drought conditions. The Spanish electricity supply industry was until relatively recently basically a hydro system. Hydro-electric power-stations were mainly empowered with the task of supplying base-load electricity (200). It can be assumed, therefore, that such stations would be used to maximum capacity wherever possible. Unfortunately, from about 1968 the system begins to become a thermal one (201). To measure hydro-electric production as an index of climatic change, it becomes necessary to compare the percentage of total national production generated by hydro-electric stations against percentage of installed capacity in hydro stations. When these variations in production from the norm of installed capacity were ranked in order for the 1961-1971 period and compared with ranked, national internal migration statistics for the same period, no statistically significant correlation was produced ( $R_s = -0.264$ ) (202). As a final resort it was decided to use indices of agricultural production for the 1961-1969 period (203), and when these were compared with national internal migration figures for the period a correlation of  $R_s = +0.583$  was obtained (which was not quite significant at the 95% level of confidence). Since the Spearman Rank formula cannot be applied accurately in an example with less than ten cases (204), the data was re-tested

using Kendall's correlation coefficient (205). An association of  $r = +0.500$  was produced which is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence (206). It is our premise, therefore, that in pre-industrial societies (and much of Spain is still pre-industrial) (207) a correlation does exist between the state of the harvest and out-migration. García Fernández was probably right when he hypothesized that the main cause of the emigration of workers from the countryside in 1960 was the disastrous agricultural year (208).

(viii) Political "push"

The 1st Economic and Social Development Plan (1964-1967) - and the Stabilization measures which preceded it - was based on advice contained in the I.B.R.D. report on The Economic Development of Spain, 1962. Among its recommendations regarding agriculture the report suggested a change of emphasis from uneconomic wheat cultivation to the production of beef and fodder crops like maize and barley. At a time when the primary sector was still employing about 40% of the nation's economically active population but producing only 24% of the country's Gross National Product (209), the report encouraged rural exodus as a means of solving the sector's ills by declaring it "a major task... to facilitate by all possible means the movement of excess farm population into more remunerative employment elsewhere in Spain and abroad" (210). Moreover, the report defended "the necessity of contributing to the mobility of labour as a partial solution to regional problems" (211).

Many of the objectives of the 1st Plan with reference to agriculture have been exceeded, especially the negative ones. It was forecast that 340,000 workers would leave the agricultural sector between 1964-1967 when, in actual fact, 330,000 left (212). The percentage of the economically active population to be employed in agriculture and fishing by 1967 was to be 35.1, when, in actual fact, it was 29.4% (213). The bad weather of

1964 (214) and the dislocation caused by excessive rural exodus had much to do with the positive goals of the 1st Plan not being fully reached (215). Beef production, maize and barley production, the use of chemical fertilizers and mechanization all failed to achieve the targets set for them. Seventy-two per cent of the total funds for agriculture were to be invested in irrigation, but although four-fifths of the capital was invested thanks to galloping inflation only two-thirds of the programme was completed (216).

There is no empirical evidence to suggest that the political "push" factor had any great effect on migration. The evidence given above would suggest that since positive goals were not reached migration flows from agriculture should have been less than the predicted not 11.76% greater. Stabilization and deflation certainly had no effect on agricultural salaries, the wage-freeze affecting only those employed in the industrial and service sectors of the economy (217). It is true that the concentración parcelaria programme was speeded up following the recommendations of the I.B.R.D. report (218), but this was mainly the case of shutting the stable door after the horse had bolted. Land consolidation was a by-product of rural exodus. It has been suggested that small landowners were too tradition-bound to take advantage of fiscal benefits to modernize their enterprises (219). Certainly large landowners were the first to benefit from irrigation schemes (220) or from credits to aid farmers to mechanize their estates (221). It should be emphasized, however, that only about 7% of the agricultural labour force are employed on latifundios (222). The effect of the latifundio system on migration, therefore, could be but limited - political "push" or not. Finally, little appears to have been done to move agricultural labour from regions of labour surplus to regions of labour deficiency (223), at least within Spain.

There is little doubt that migratory movements during the period of the

1st Plan did increase (224), but there is no proof that the political "push" factor in agriculture was a decisive force for change (225). Doubt can even be cast upon the 1st Plan's intention to speed up the diminution of the active agricultural population. The planned annual rate of decrease of 1.5% for the 1964-1967 period differed but little from the real rate of decrease of 1.43% per annum between 1950 and 1960 (226).

(ix) Summary

In this section dealing with socio-economic "push" factors in agriculture at a national level, thirty hypotheses have been tested of which twenty-one proved to be statistically significant. The twelve most significant correlations are summarized in Table XXVI. There is no mention here of latifundismo, minifundismo, mechanization, or casual agricultural labourers. Collectively these may play an important role in the migration process, but individually they are not as important factors as many Spanish writers would have us believe. The connections between agricultural production, the climatic cycle, unemployment and internal migration are close. The picture that these statistics paint is one of too many employed on the land; of men earning their daily bread by being employed for too few days in the year and earning too little; of men voting with their feet and choosing the certain path of economic betterment. In 1960, 214,976 workers (or 1.8% of the active labour-force) changed their place of residence (227). The net migration of workers in this year (228) correlates significantly with net internal migration statistics for 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.842$ ), reinforcing and confirming the predominantly economic base of the migration process. What role the State played in this inevitable process is open to doubt for the dye had been cast a long time before the planned intervention of the State in the affairs of men. One thing is certain, that despite the State's avowed aim "to facilitate by all possible means the movement of excess farm population..." control of the weather in that disastrous

Table XXVI

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INTERNAL MIGRATION AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC  
VARIABLES CONNECTED WITH AGRICULTURE, SPAIN

Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	
	Direct	Inverse
(a) <u>Net internal migration 1961-1965 and</u> <sup>*</sup>		
Per capita income, 1964.	+0.819	
Per capita income, 1962.	+0.779	
Percentage of active population in agriculture, 1960.		-0.675
Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1962.		-0.666
Percentage of hired labourers in active agricultural population, 1962.		-0.614
Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1964.		-0.550
Percentage of total active population estimated unemployed, 31-12-1964.		-0.518
Number of active agriculturalists per 100 hectares of cultivated land, 1964.	+0.596 †	+
(b) <u>Internal migration (various years) and</u> <sup>•</sup>		
Percentage of total active population estimated unemployed, 31-12-1964. ‡	+0.769	
Percentage of total active population estimated unemployed, 31-12-1965. ¶	+0.713	
Changes in index of "final agricul- tural production", 1961-1969. §	+0.583	
Changes in index of "final agricul- tural production", 1961-1969. §	+0.500 /	

\* All calculations were made at the level of fifty provinces.

† The correlation here is with net migration, 1964. The correlation with net migration 1961-1965 was lower (Rs = +0.419), although still significant at the 99% level of confidence.

• All calculations for 1964 and 1965 were made at the level of twelve months; those for 1961-1969 at the level of nine yearly totals.

‡ Internal migration 1964.

¶ Internal migration 1965.

§ Internal migration 1961-1969.

/ Kendall's correlation coefficient.

agricultural year of 1960 was not one of those means. Moreover, the correlation between the net migration of workeres and net internal migration 1951-1960 is confirmed for a period (1957-1958) when the climate was better,



State intervention in economic affairs less obvious - but 3% of the active population changed residence annually for job reasons (229). The Ministerio de Trabajo's figures for 1957-1958 (230) show a significant correlation with García Barbancho's net migration statistics for 1956-1960 (Rs = +0.735) (231), as well as with Tamames' similar statistics for the same period (Rs = +0.679) (232).

(b) Ruralization of the countryside

Lowenthal and Comitas in a paper on rural depopulation note that "the smaller the... social unit, or community, the more likely it is to be losing population" (233). Two of the key factors in this process are the lack of services and the decline of economic opportunities with increasing rurality. Thus Fundación FOESSA speaks of a need to "deruralize" the smaller villages (234), and emphasizes that it is in municipios with less than 2,000 population that the housewives they interviewed expressed the greatest desire to bring in industries and to prevent emigration, to improve housing and communications, to introduce piped water-supply and modern means of sanitation (235).

The increasing ruralization of the smaller villages is to some extent counter-balanced by the increasing modernization of the larger ones, particularly the cabeceras de comarca. This contrast between small and large rural municipios can be expressed even simply in terms of percentage population changes (see Table XXVII)

Table XXVII

DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL MUNICIPIOS ACCORDING TO THEIR LEVEL OF POPULATION

Size of rural Municipio	1950 Census			1960 Census			1970 Census		
	No. of mun.	%		No. of mun.	%	% var.	No. of mun.	%	% var.
Under 100 pop.	64	0.69		124	1.30	+0.61	451	5.21	+3.91
101-500	2,975	32.20		3,216	32.61	+3.24	3,117	36.01	+3.40
501-1,000	2,077	22.55		1,881	20.45	-2.10	1,555	17.97	-2.48
1,001-2,000	1,623	17.62		1,479	16.23	-1.39	1,262	14.58	-1.65

\* Percentage of all municipios, rural, non-urban and urban.

SOURCES: R. Sancho Hazak, "La Sociedad Rural Hoy", in M. Fraga Iribarne, J. Velarde Fuertes and S. del Campo Urbano, (ed.), La España de los Años 70, Vol.1, La Sociedad, Editorial Moneda y Crédito, Madrid, 1972, Table 2, p.234; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Censo de la Población de España. Año 1970. Poblaciones de Derecho y de Hecho de los Municipios, Madrid, 1971, Table II.2.b), p.124.

Thus the number of small municipios with less than 500 population increased during both the last two decades in Spain.

(i) Declining economic opportunities

There is a parallel in present-day Spain with nineteenth-century England and Wales. The increasing ruralization of small English parishes with less than 500 population, which began in the first quarter of the last century, was a consequence of the decline in the demand for rural craftsmen, industries and services due to the steady decline in rural population. The technological revolution which followed later in the century, especially the communications revolution, made it possible to introduce cheap, mass-produced factory goods into the countryside to the detriment of the rural craftsman (236). The empirical evidence suggests that the decline in employment opportunities was much greater for women (and children) than for men. Between 1861-1901, the number of young people employed in agriculture fell from 428,000 to 195,000, and the number of women from 436,000 to 52,000 (237). The increasing ruralization of the countryside increased still further the monotony of English village life, as well as depressing the economic condition of agricultural labourers and village craftsmen alike, and forcing them to emigrate (238).

Until about 1940, more than half the Spanish population still dwelt in rural and non-urban areas, earning their living from the land at a low subsistence level without the means to purchase factory-made goods (239). In Spain (as in England and Wales) (240) the number of people living in those areas remained more or less static in absolute terms until 1960 (241). Rural exodus, affecting municipios of less than 2,000 population,

accelerated rapidly from 1950 (242), sounding the death knell of rural isolation and closed subsistence economies. "As an economy undergoes industrial-urban development", writes Nicholls, "it accelerates the rate of agricultural progress in many important ways" (243). More favourable market conditions for agricultural products tend to break down the barriers of the closed, stagnant subsistence agricultural sector, stimulating the production of cash crops. Thus Hinderink notes the fact that from 1950 "ever increasing numbers of people have left the Sierra de Gata, clearly shows that even in this remote mountain area modern ideas on labour-productivity and [the desire for] a higher standard of living have become accepted" (244). Peasants were getting tired of living at a bare subsistence level (245). As we have seen, the first to go were the agricultural labourers, followed later by small land-owners. In many of the small rural municipios there are few agricultural labourers left (246); there is less work for them to do than in large villages (247) while small land-owners can hardly afford paid casual labour even at harvest time (248). In the non-agricultural sectors, the sons and daughters of small industrialists, shopkeepers, artisans and the like traditionally had often emigrated on growing up - the former to become priests, magistrates, petty bureaucrats, waiters etc., the latter mainly going into service (249). Now the declining demand for their goods and services persuades whole families to migrate. Conservative by nature, "the declared dream" of this social group, eulogizes Sigüán, "is to obtain a portería in Madrid, and with it security (250). The "ruralization" of small towns and villages increases apace as their servicing, marketing and administrative functions are eroded away in this manner (251). Selective emigration of this type, as Kiser has noted, "does not stop short at certain theoretical levels of potential productivity" (252), but little by little becomes erosive. In this way communities lose their structure while their economic systems visibly disintegrate.

Thus was Pitt-Rivers able to detect *a* general decline in prosperity among the towns of the sierra (253) near Ronda (Málaga).

The visible disintegration of economic systems in rural Spain is a relatively recent phenomenon. Ruiz Almansa has drawn attention to a continuous zone of twenty provinces, each one with more than one hundred small municipios with less than 1,000 population, which stretches across northern Spain (254). This, it has been suggested, was the demographic heartland of the peninsula from which the reconquest and resettlement of Andalucía and Valencia was undertaken; this was the zone later to provide Barcelona and Bilbao with much of their industrial labour. Yet the population of this zone remained more or less static at 1.9 million or thereabouts from 1860 to 1940, with only the natural increase being creamed off. If decay was taking place, like that associated with the death-watch beetle it was slow and hardly visible. Economic structures were reasonably adjusted to processes of slow change.

A sample survey conducted by the Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local between 1941 and 1943 found that the economic structures of small rural municipios (with less than 1,000 population) differed most markedly from those of larger ones (up to 15,000 population), although the percentage of cultivated land was approximately the same. There were more small landowners and fewer paid wage-earners in the former, less irrigation and fewer workers per 100 hectares of cultivated land. The latter had more horses, asses, cows and pigs, fewer mules, sheep and goats (255). The ruralization of the former is convincingly illustrated by statistics from the industrial and service sector (see Table XXVIII). Small rural municipios on this evidence would appear to be eight times as worse served as large ones, and this in an era before the acceleration of the economic process!

As in nineteenth-century England and Wales, increasing "ruralization"

Table XXVIII

MUNICIPAL INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS

Type of establishment (1941-1943)	<u>Average per municipio</u>	
	Under 1,000 pop.	1,001-15,000 pop.
Industries of agricultural origin	1.3	6.7
Other industries	0.5	2.7
Commercial establishments	1.7	20.8
Bars, cinemas and other recreational establishments	1.7	8.8
TOTAL	5.2	39.0

SOURCE: J. Ruiz Almansa, Análisis Estadístico de los Municipios Minúsculos de España, Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, Madrid, 1950, pp.64 and 68.

from 1950 has been accompanied by the selective migration of females and the young which has radically affected economic structures in the countryside. Between 1965 and 1970, for example, the percentage of the economically active agricultural population over the age of forty-four increased from 42.50 to 49.00 (256). Over the same period, the number of young people under the age of twenty employed in agriculture fell by 1.7% (257), although the position of the under-fourteens had stabilized itself as in more advanced countries (258). The position of women was more complex, the number under the age of forty-five declining, those over that age being forced to take a more active part in agriculture due to the large-scale migration of the young (259). Bracey found that the rural areas of England and Wales are still losing more women than men (260). The position in Spain is more confusing. Kenny has noted that women's wages have risen much faster than men's since 1939 (261); while according to Salustiano del Campo Urbano ten out of every twelve new jobs created in 1960-1970 were filled by women (262). Despite these "pull" factors, according to statistics provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (263), only 125,535 more females

than males over the age of ten changed their municipio of residence during the decade - a sex discrepancy of only 1.40%. Comparing the sex ratios of migrants, as García Barbancho has done, more men than women appear to migrate but many more than women go abroad (264) - the ratio is about 150 men per 100 women. The picture that emerges in the in-migrant regions is of 80.66 men per 100 women in the 1901-1930 period and 63.33 men per 100 women in the 1931-1960 period, proving quite conclusively that the female has become more migratory at the present time than previously (265).

(ii) Lack of services

The overall impression which emerges from a study of the Spanish countryside is of marasmo rural (rural stagnation) (266), "monotonous desolation" (267), of dust, dirt and flies. In rural municipios with less than 5,000 population, 49.45% of the houses were built before 1860 and a further 25.58% between 1861 and 1900. Nor is the position much better in municipios with 5,001-10,000 population (268). Neither is the position changing; six times as many new dwellings have been constructed in urban zones during the 1958-1966 period as in rural ones with under 10,000 population (269).

As far as services generally are concerned the picture is even more depressing. Cristóbal de Castro writing earlier in the century noted that 80% of all Spanish municipios were without running water, 90% without modern sewage systems, 75% without rail communication, 40% without roads and 20% without any form of communication (270). The position had changed little by 1941-1943. An Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local survey found 94% of all municipios with less than 1,000 population without modern sewage systems, 94.9% without piped water supply in the homes, 85% without rail communication and 13.5% without roads (271). Municipios with 1,001-5,000 population were somewhat better served (272), although indices of urbanization and communication are generally lower than those associated

with health, cultural and economic services in all rural municipios (273). Little was done to improve the lot of the small village until the passing of the Ley de Presupuestos in December 1957 (274). It became increasingly necessary for the State to collaborate in "works and services of local interest"; partly because, as Medhurst notes, the highly centralized administrative system had "concentrated the making of important decisions in the hands of Madrid-based functionaries and... left little scope for local initiative" (275), partly because of the pitiful budgetary funds of small rural municipios (276).

It should not be expected that a magic threshold exists above which small rural municipios fail to lose population. Neither should it be assumed that lack of economic opportunities or services necessarily heralds out-migration (277). Moreover, some kinds of services are not quantifiable. The monotony of rural life in the aldea and cortijo zones of dispersed habitat, for example, is increased by the enforced separation of married couples for periods of up to a fortnight's duration (278). Where quantifiable statistics exist there is often no statistically significant correlation - perhaps because the statistics themselves are suspect. Areas of dispersed population have the poorest services yet there is no statistically significant correlation between the percentage of the provincial population living in demographic clusters of less than 500 population in 1950 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.235$ ) (279). There is a suspicion that the statistics - in so far as they attempt to measure dispersion - are suspect. "There does not seem to be any doubt", note Murillo and others, "that a direct correlation exists between the decreasing size of municipios and the increasing volume of emigration" (280). Confirming evidence is received from a study of La Siberia (a comarca in Extremadura) undertaken by Benítez Cano (281). There is little opportunity for non-agricultural employment in the smallest, most ruralized villages,

where services also are often rudimentary. Thus, while municipios of over 3,000 population grew by 8.77% between 1951 and 1960, those with less than 3,000 population decreased by 5.82% and those with under 100 population lost 70.60% (282).

In our search for statistical correlations between the lack of services and internal migration, three municipal and three domestic service indices were tested against net internal migration 1961-1965. The results were conflicting and inconclusive. In the case of the municipal indices, in two instances out of three there was no statistically significant correlation (see Table XXIX).

Table XXIX

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED MUNICIPAL AND DOMESTIC SERVICE INDICES, SPAIN

Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	
	Direct	Inverse
(a) <u>Municipal service indices</u>		
Percentage of <u>municipios</u> with piped water supply in the homes, 1962.	+0.451 *	
Percentage of <u>municipios</u> with modern sewage systems, 1962.	+0.022	
Percentage of <u>municipios</u> possessing a cinema or theatre, 1962.		-0.074
(b) <u>Domestic service indices</u>		
Percentage of dwellings with piped water supply, 1960.	+0.797 *	
Percentage of dwellings possessing electricity, 1960.	+0.514 *	
Percentage of dwellings built before 1861, of those existing in 1967.		-0.318 ↓

\* Significant at the 99% level of confidence.

↓ Significant at the 95% level of confidence.

SOURCES: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Primer Censo Agrario de España. Año 1962. Servicios de Municipios, Madrid, 1965, pp.15 ff.; Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Censo de la Población y de las Viviendas de España, 1960, Vols.III and IV, Madrid, 1969; and Universidad Comercial de Deusto, Riqueza Nacional de España, Bilbao, 1968, pp.333 ff.



This may have been because of the inclusion of all provincial municipios rather than only the rural ones within our statistics. Alternatively, it may have been because of the problem of the Andalusian "agro-towns" which are sufficiently large to be relatively well-endowed with certain services, especially those associated with urbanization. When domestic indices were used better luck was achieved. This is confirmed by one index - the possession of piped water supply in the home - which was tested at both municipal and domestic levels at the scale of fifty provinces, and produced a correlation of  $R_s = +0.451$  in the first instance and  $R_s = +0.797$  in the second. It would appear from this, that it is the lack of services at the domestic rather than at the municipal level which influences out-migration. This hypothesis will be tested later at a regional level of analysis.

(c) Demographic "push" factors

The concept of population pressure on resources (PPR) has attracted the growing attention of geographers in recent years (283). The development of refined indices of PPR (284) have then led some geographers to see migration as a response to population pressure on resources (285). Geographers are doing no more than following economists who have seen migratory movements as "essentially the result of differential population pressure" (286) and "expressions of a trend towards equalization of economic density" (287). To classical economists, therefore, the effect of out-migration is beneficial. The departure of migrants diminishes population pressure on resources so that the per capita income increases (288). Out-migration is thus a mechanism for correcting regional imbalances with regard to economic or population resources (289). Insufficient migration results in unemployment, under-employment and, in certain circumstances, in the increasing sub-division of land (290). The "impulse towards the rationalization and mechanization of agriculture" (291) is thus weak in

areas with little out-migration which have a labour surplus. The benefits of out-migration to such economic theorists, as a result of a reduction of the pressure of population on land supply, include a fall in the real value of agricultural land as well as speeding-up of the process of land consolidation (292).

As far as Spain is concerned, Giner has pointed out that the demographic "push" of population pressure on resources in the rural areas becomes evident after 1840 and does much to explain strong external and internal migration flows after that date (293). Although population statistics only become reliable after the first official Census in 1857, it is clear that between 1833 and 1860 there was a sudden upsurge in population consequent on the transition from demographically primitive to an "early western" demographic cycle (see Table XXX) (294). Clearly, "demographic transition" was paralleled by "mobility transition" (295).

Table XXX

PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF POPULATION, SPAIN 1594-1900

Census	Population	Increase in period	Annual increase
1594	8,206,791	-	-
1768/9	9,159,999	+11.61%	+0.07%
1797	10,541,221	+15.08%	+0.52%
1833	11,962,767	+13.48%	+0.37%
1860	15,645,072	+30.78%	+1.14%
1900	18,617,956	+19.00%	+0.47%

SOURCES: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España, 1970, Madrid, 1970, Table 1.1.1., p.49; and J. Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1969, pp.617-619.

Brinley Thomas has been able to show that cyclical increases in European birth-rates during the nineteenth century resulted in such severe population pressure on rural resources that major international migration flows resulted (296). The empirical evidence from Spain is that the towns were unable to absorb increased migration flows, nor could sufficient new lands be brought into cultivation.

be brought under cultivation (as a result of the laws of disentailment) to cope with increased population pressure in the countryside. From 1873 unrestricted overseas emigration was allowed in order to relieve some of the demographic, socio-economic and political tensions which had built up (297). The natural increase of population was kept down by an estimated net loss of nearly one million emigrants between 1850 and 1950 (298). Thus, the maximum period of emigration to the Americas (1901-1910) coincided with a fall in the average annual increase of population from 0.94% (1897-1900) to 0.74% (1901-1910). From 1914, however, "the gates of America", as Martí Buñill puts it, "are seen closing little by little" (299). At the same time a boom industrial period in Spain, which coincided with the First World War, led to increased rural-to-urban migration and a resultant lowering of infant mortality rates (300). The stage was prepared for a reversal in the downward trend of average annual population increases, which changed from 0.76% (1911-1920) to 1.09% (1921-1930).

Population pressure on resources becomes very great from 1930 (301), reaching crisis proportions from about 1950. From 1930 "the access roads to the American continent have been practically closed" (302). High rates of natural increase have resulted from a fall in infant mortality rates, but with decreases in fertility rates from the era of the Civil War (1936-1939) not yet having had time to work their way through the economic system (303). The War itself had a more drastic effect on the economic system than on population growth. Agricultural production stagnated or even declined (304) while population increased by 18.73% between 1930 and 1950. Per capita agricultural production, according to Flores (305), declined by 34.7% between 1929 and 1950. Statistics supplied by the Instituto de Investigaciones Agrícolas and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística show that the effect of population pressure on national resources was

most seriously felt in the countryside itself - the "index of social well-being" falling by 17.8% between 1935 and 1950 (306). In a situation where agriculture was a declining industry, with mechanization soon likely to make the demand for agricultural labour still less, the total annual surplus of births over deaths ought to have migrated to the towns. Statistics for 1950 show that the necessary flow of young males (0-14 years of age) per year as a percentage of the total active males in agriculture was 2.89. Total male entrants to the productive age group (15-64 years of age) averaged 206 per 100 departees, proving quite conclusively that rural out-migration at that date was totally inadequate (307). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that so many Spanish academics - Cazorla, García Barbancho, de Miguel, Murillo Ferrol, de la Cueva Alonso, del Campo Urbano and Tames, for example (308) - have highlighted population pressure as a factor in out-migration.

Between 1921 and 1930 the infant mortality rate fell by 29.09% (after an increase in the previous decade), while there was a growth of 86.88% in the rate of natural increase (309). Badajoz, Jaén and Córdoba (the three provinces with the most massive net out-migration 1961-1965) all had birth-rates above the national average in 1931-1935 (310), with Andalucía generally having a rate of natural increase during the 1941-1950 period of 40-50% above that of the rest of Spain (311). The rate of natural increase in Córdoba grew from 13.33% (1911-1920) to 18.33% (1921-1930), and in Jaén from 12.45% to 13.86%. In Badajoz, however, the rate fell from 8.96% in the first decade to 5.71% in the second (312). Higuera Arnal has pointed out that provinces like Córdoba and Jaén would need to invest about 75% of their total annual income in order to create enough jobs to absorb their annual natural increase in population (313). In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that according to one source nearly 75% of Córdoba's natural increase (1941-1950) migrated (314). If these

provinces were unable to cope with the pressure of population on resources neither was the nation as a whole. The 1st Economic and Social Development Plan (1964-1967) could not create sufficient new jobs to absorb surplus population, so that when the European flood-gates were thrown open to massive Spanish emigration from 1960, on the recommendation of the I.B.R.D. report, emigration was both planned and officially stimulated as a partial solution to rural problems (315). The 3rd Plan (1972-1975) could only envisage a growth of 130,000 jobs annually, which, to our manner of thinking, meant that 48% of the natural increase of population reaching an economically active age would still have to be prepared to emigrate abroad in order to obtain work (316).

Segal, following the International Labour Office, has commented that "the rapid growth of population in an agrarian society with its attendant problems of under-development and unemployment drives people away from the land and sets off a high rate of rural-urban migration" (317). That point was reached in Spain some time between 1930 and 1950 as a result of a drastic decrease in the death-rate (especially the infant mortality rate), the subsequent increase of potentially active adults becoming too great to be absorbed by the economy all at once (318).

Empirical evidence suggests that the average male migrant, ceteris paribus, emigrates at least after the age of twenty-one and the completion of national service. Assuming a mean age of twenty-five for migrants (319), if there is to be a connection between migration and population pressure on resources it is with vital statistics a quarter of a century before the period of study that we must concern ourselves (320). For the 1961-1965 period, birth-rates between 1936 and 1940 are relevant. In view of the distorting effect of the Civil War we are forced to use birth-rate statistics for the 1931-1935 period. These are significantly correlated with net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = -0.724$ ) (321), especially since an

estimated 0.4% of the 1965 population emigrated abroad this period (322). A somewhat lower correlation with net internal migration 1956-1960 ( $R_s = -0.584$ ) (323), suggests that our choice of 1931-1935 statistics for the first calculation - effectively raising the mean age of migrants to thirty - was a wise one. At all events, both calculations substantiate the connection between demographic "push" and internal migration.

There is evidence that rural population adjusts itself over a period of time to economic conditions, and that rural areas of monoculture have less fertile populations than those of more intensive agriculture (324). Thus Houston was able to recognize population "gradients" within the peripheral areas of Spain and various population "levels" within the interior (325). Likewise Hoyos Sainz was able to see a connection between population densities and increases in population 1900-1950 (326). There is further evidence that rural societies seem able to adjust themselves to the removal of severe population pressure on resources, which seems to encourage earlier marriage and an increase in the birth-rate (327). In this way Old Castile remained a reservoir of labour for the industrial regions of the northern and north-eastern periphery for so long - despite continuing out-migration - due to high rates of natural increase (328). Rural fertility in the region is in fact higher than birth-rates imply because migration has reduced the number of females in the 20-40 age group (329). In the Sigüán study of rural Castile, the author is able to show that the birth-rate in seven villages surveyed fell by an average of 53.08% between 1930-1935 and 1960-1964 (330). The population of one village fell by 42.21% between 1950 and 1963, but the number of potentially fertile women 20-35 years of age as a percentage of the total population fell by 71.05% (331). Pinchemel's "biological depopulation" had obviously set-in (332).

Ros Jimeno (333) divided Spain into two birth-zones - a western zone

of high births and an eastern one of low births - separated approximately by the Iberian Cordillera. Likewise, Leasure found that the region of high fertility in 1950 stretched from north to south in western Spain (334). It was this western region with high birth-rates during the 1931-1935 period (see Fig.62) which unleashed its migrant hordes upon the main in-migrant provinces 1961-1965 - all of which (with the exception of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife) are included within the zone of low birth-rates 1931-1935. During the 1931-1935 period, seven of the eight provinces of Old Castile were still contained within the area of high birth-rates, with four having birth-rates more than 10% above the national average. The movement of massive out-migration southwards and westwards during the 1931-1960 and 1961-1970 periods was partly a response to demographic factors, for it is in these parts of Spain that most of the provinces with birth-rates 10 or even 20% above the national average lie (see Fig.62).

The area of high birth-rates in 1964 was centred on twelve southern provinces (see Fig.62), showing the extent to which prolonged out-migration has depopulated the northern half of the peninsula. The rural population of Andalucía grew by 38% between 1930 and 1950 compared with the Spanish average of 24% (335), producing a region of high population density characterized by "distributional inertia" (336) and little out-migration before 1940. Despite the fact that between 1941 and 1960 an estimated 900,000 emigrated from Andalucía, this only represented about 54% of the region's natural increase (337). Fig.63 suggests that Andalucía in twenty-five to thirty years time will have completely taken over the functions of Old Castile as "the reservoir of labour for the industrial zones" (338).

The statement that migration proceeds from regions with a great excess of births over deaths to those of low natural increase (339) needs modification. Internal migration is correlated with past demographic indices not




Fig.62 Internal Migration: Past and Present Birth-rates

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 MILES  
0 40 80 120 160 200 KILOMETRES

Net Out-Migration 1961-1965  
High Birth-Rates 1931-1935  
• 10% } above National Average  
• 20% }  
+ Birth-Rate above National Average, 1964






Fig.63 Expected and Observed Out-Migration  
Jaén Province 1962-1965

present ones. There is no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and live births per thousand population 1964 ( $R_s = -0.096$ ) (340). Neither is there a correlation with natural increase per thousand population 1964 ( $R_s = -0.133$ ) (341). There was a correlation, it will be remembered, between net internal migration 1961-1965 and birth-rates during the 1931-1935 period ( $R_s = -0.724$ ).

Kingsley Davis has shown that in nineteenth-century Europe with mortality-rates higher and birth-rates lower than in rural areas, urban growth could only be sustained through rural-to-urban migration (342). In mid twentieth-century Spain there is no causal relationship between mortality rates and internal migration (343). Infant mortality rates are highest in the out-migration regions and cannot, therefore, influence internal migration flows in the same way as in nineteenth-century Europe. The statistically significant correlation between infant mortality per hundred live births 1964 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = -0.386$ ) has socio-economic rather than demographic implications (344).

Despite the importance of demographic "push" factors, somewhat surprisingly there is a very poor correlation between the percentage of provincial municipios which lost population 1951-1960 and net internal migration during the same period ( $R_s = -0.300$ ) (345). There is, however, a much better correlation between the percentage of provincial municipios with regressive or stagnant population characteristics 1961-1969 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = -0.492$ ) (346).

(d) Lack of communications

According to Birot (347), rural depopulation reaches its maximum intensity in places near to a road which have not benefitted directly from it. Since no point in Spain is more than 20 kilometres from a national highway while most places are much nearer to a provincial road (348), Birot's hypothesis is extremely difficult to prove or disprove. This is especially

true in a country where rural folk are still prepared to walk 4-5 kilometres to catch a bus or train. While there is much evidence that migration decreases as some function of the "friction of distance" (349), there is no proof that lack of communications is a "push" factor encouraging out-migration.

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### A/ RURAL-TO-URBAN OUT-MIGRATION STREAMS. "PUSH" FACTORS OPERATING IN OUT-MIGRATION AREAS

#### 2) AT A REGIONAL / PROVINCIAL LEVEL

Throughout the discussion of socio-economic and demographic "push" factors operating in out-migration regions at a national level, it has become more and more apparent that the traditional demographic heartland of the north is being displaced by a new demographic heartland in the south. At a regional level of analysis, therefore, it is suggested that contrasts and comparisons between Old Castile-León on the one hand and Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura on the other hand should prove relevant to our study (1).

Forty-three hypotheses were tested at a national level at the scale of fifty provinces, twenty-nine of which proved to be statistically significant. At a regional level, only eleven of those hypotheses proved to be statistically significant in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura, and only seven in Old Castile-León. The main conclusions reached are as follows:

- (a) The null hypothesis can safely be rejected in only one instance, a statistically significant correlation being obtained between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the per capita income, 1962, at both national and regional levels at the 95% level of confidence. A correlation of  $R_s = +0.779$  was obtained at national level compared with  $R_s = +0.507$  in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura and  $R_s = +0.554$  in Old Castile-León.
- (b) The null hypothesis can safely be accepted in nine instances, no significant correlation being obtained at either national or regional levels (see Table XXXI).
- (c) In five cases there were no statistically significant correlations at a national level although there were in one but not both of the regions investigated (see Table XXXII). Correlations which are uncorroborated inspire no great confidence. It comes as no great

Table XXXI

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICES AT BOTH  
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	
		Nat. Level	Reg. Level
			(a) (b)
2.	Percentage of self-employed agricultur- alists ( <u>por cuenta propia</u> ), 1962.	-0.244	-0.161 -0.436
3.	Percentage of provincial population living in demographic clusters of less than 500 population, 1950.	+0.235	+0.086 -0.227
4.	Percentage of provincial surface in estates 300 hect. or over, 1962.	-0.196	+0.246 +0.495
5.	Changes in rural population density, 1940-1960.	+0.190	-0.332 +0.027
6.	Number of tractors, 1959.	-0.166	-0.232 -0.409
7.	Natural increase per thousand popula- tion, 1964.	-0.133	-0.111 +0.254
8.	Birth-rate per thousand population, 1964.	-0.096	-0.109 +0.145
9.	Percentage of <u>municipios</u> possessing a cinema or theatre, 1962.	-0.074	-0.434 +0.329
10.	Number of farm enterprises under 20 hect. with more than 10 strips, 1962.	+0.062	+0.018 -0.100

SOURCE: Tables XXVIII-XXIX.

(a) Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura; (b) Old Castile-León.

Table XXXII

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT NATIONAL LEVEL

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	
		Nat. Level	Reg. Level
			(a) (b)
11.	Total area affected by land-consolida- tion schemes, 1953-1968.	-0.173	+0.545 <sup>x</sup> -0.364
12.	Number of farm enterprises under 2 hect., 1962.	-0.069	-0.746 <sup>x</sup> +0.209
13.	Number of strips under 1 hect., 1962.	-0.051	-0.057 -0.764 <sup>x</sup>
14.	Percentage of <u>municipios</u> with modern sewage-systems, 1962.	+0.022	-0.114 +0.882 <sup>x</sup>
15.	Number of strips per farm ent., 1962.	-0.006	+0.193 -0.654 <sup>x</sup>

\* Significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence (see f.8).

↓ Only eleven of the fifteen provinces of this region were affected by concentración parcelaria.

(a) Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura; (b) Old Castile-León.

SOURCE: As Table XXXI.

surprise, however, that minifundismo should be a factor of regional importance in Old Castile-León, while there is evidence from Table XXXIII that at least one index of minifundismo is of national significance. One index of minifundismo (the number of farm enterprises under two hectares) shows a statistically significant correlation with net internal migration only in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. Lest we cast doubt on this finding, Kade supports the negative correlation between minifundio and out-migration in Andalucía (2). Again, it is hardly surprising that the percentage of municipios with modern sewage-systems in Old Castile-León should be positively correlated with net internal migration. Indices of social significance are invariably of greater import here than in the more backward south (see Tables XXXI-XXXIV). The significant correlation between concentración parcelaria and net internal migration in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura is quite inexplicable, especially in view of the fact that this region accounted for only 23.13% of the total area affected by land-consolidation schemes (1953-1968) compared with 63.71% for Old Castile-León (3).

- (d) In seventeen cases statistically significant correlations at national level were not substantiated at regional level. Since ten of the correlations were significant at the 99% level of confidence there can be no reason to doubt their validity. In ten instances higher correlations (although not statistically significant ones) were obtained in Old Castile-León, and in seven cases in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. A pattern emerges which can be traced

Table XXXIII

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT REGIONAL LEVEL

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs	Value of Spearman's Rs	
			Nat. Level	Reg. Level
			(a)	(b)
16.	Birth-rate per thousand population, 1931-1935.	-0.724*	-0.378	-0.500
17.	Percentage of active population in agriculture, 1960.	-0.675*	-0.336	-0.445
18.	Number of active agriculturalists per 100 hect. of cultivated land, 1964.†	+0.596*	+0.432	+0.222
19.	Birth-rate per thousand population, 1931-1935.●	-0.584*	-0.396	-0.164
20.	Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1964.	-0.550*	-0.375	-0.391
21.	Percentage of the economically active pop. estimated unemployed, 31-12-1964.	-0.518*	-0.368	-0.100
22.	Percentage of provincial <u>municipios</u> with regressive or stagnant pop., 1961-1969.	-0.492*	-0.375	+0.432
23.	Percentage of provincial surface in farms of 5 hect. and under, 1962.	+0.446*	-0.064	+0.504
24.	Number of active agriculturalists per 100 hect. of cultivated land, 1964.	+0.419*	+0.154	+0.222
25.	Percentage of salaried agriculturalists of the total agri. pop., 1962.‡	-0.397*	-0.395	+0.086
26.	Percentage of the provincial surface in estates 200 hect. and over, 1962.	-0.367*	-0.143	+0.427
27.	Percentage of economically active pop. estimated unemployed, 31-12-1964.¶	-0.341*	-0.118	-0.109
28.	Number of horse-power in tractors and motor cultivators per 100 hect. of cultivated land, 1964.	+0.337*	+0.261	+0.345
29.	Percentage of dwellings built before 1861, of those existing in 1967.	-0.318*	+0.075	-0.427
30.	Number of casual, remunerated labourers as a percentage of total active agricultural population, 1962.	-0.310*	-0.193	+0.155
31.	Percentage of <u>municipios</u> which lost population 1951-1960.‡	-0.300*	-0.046	-0.400
32.	Number of casual labourers as a percentage of the salaried agri. pop., 1962.	-0.284*	-0.395	+0.127

† Correlated with net migration 1964.

● Correlated with net migration statistics 1956-1960.

‡ I FOESSA (1966) statistics.

¶ Correlated with saldo migratorio total per thousand population, 1964.

‡ Correlated with net migration 1951-1960.

\* Significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

(a) Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura; (b) Old Castile-León.

SOURCE: As Table XXXI.

through Tables XXXI-XXXIV. Two variables connected with estimated seasonal unemployment and three variables associated with casual and salaried agricultural labour are strongest (although not statistically significant) in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura (see Table XXXIII). No refined statistics regarding seasonal unemployment exist, but (presumably) improved statistics of salaried agricultural employment show a significant statistical correlation with net internal migration both nationally and in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura (see Table XXXIV).

Likewise with indices of minifundismo, latifundismo and mechanization of agriculture: although correlations made at national level are not substantiated regionally, in each instance the strongest (although not statistically significant correlations) are made in Old Castile-León (see Table XXXIII). This trend is confirmed elsewhere - for latifundismo and mechanization of agriculture in Table XXXI, for minifundismo in Table XXXII. We commented earlier in this thesis on the lack of adequate statistics to prove a direct causal connection between latifundismo-monoculture-casual labour-seasonal unemployment and migration. Clearly, where statistically significant correlations are made at national level which are not substantiated at regional level (or vice-versa), it is not necessarily our reasoning which is at fault. Rather it is that we can have no great confidence in artificial statistical definition of latifundismo or minifundismo, of the estimated unemployed, casual remunerated labourers or saldo migratorio total. It is in<sup>x</sup> statistical morass of official and semi-official Spanish sources that reasoned calculations are often likely to go astray (4).

One index of social significance - the percentage of dwellings built before 1861, of those existing in 1967 - is strongest



(although not statistically significant) in Old Castile-León (see Table XXXIII) thus confirming the trend noted in Tables XXXII and XXXIV.

Six indices in Table XXXIII are concerned directly or indirectly with rural population densities. Four of the six are strongest (although not statistically significant) in Old Castile-León, a trend which is confirmed in Table XXXIV where a statistically significant relationship between rural population density in 1960 and net internal migration is found both nationally and in Old Castile-León.

Finally, both the percentage of the active population in agriculture, 1960, and the percentage of the gross provincial income in the primary sector, 1964, are more strongly correlated (although not significantly) in Old Castile-León.

- (e) We have been gradually leading up to the conclusion that there are some variables of regional significance as far as internal migration is concerned. Those that are corroborated by statistically significant correlations at national level are the most trustworthy. Eight variables are significantly correlated with net internal migration (1961-1965) both nationally and in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. A further three variables are statistically significant both nationally and in Old Castile-León (see Table XXXIV).

Four of the eight statistically significant variables in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura are more strongly correlated at regional than at national level, compared with two out of three in Old Castile-León. Four of the eight statistically significant variables in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura are negatively correlated with net internal migration 1961-1965, hinting perhaps at the complex

Table XXXIV

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965 AND SELECTED  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT NATIONAL AND ONE REGIONAL LEVEL

		Value of Spearman's Rs		
No.	Variable	Nat. Level	Reg. Level	
			(a)	(b)
<u>Statistically significant in (a)</u>				
33.	Net migration of workers as a percentage of economically active pop., 1960.	+0.842*	+0.828*	+0.191
34.	Per capita income, 1964.	+0.819*	+0.671*	+0.500
35.	Net migration of workers as a percentage of economically active pop., 1957-1958.†	+0.735*	+0.796*	+0.234
36.	Net migration of workers as a percentage of economically active pop., 1957-1958.‡	+0.679*	-0.972*	+0.373
37.	Percentage of gross provincial income in primary sector, 1962.	-0.666*	-0.459*	-0.127
38.	Percentage of salaried agriculturalists ( <u>por cuenta ajena</u> ) of the total agricultural pop., 1962.§	-0.614*	-0.711*	+0.082
39.	Percentage of dwellings possessing electricity, 1960.	+0.514*	+0.457*	+0.191
40.	Infant mortality per thousand pop., 1964.	-0.386*	-0.446*	-0.073
<u>Statistically significant in (b)</u>				
41.	Percentage of dwellings with piped water-supply, 1960.	+0.797*	+0.300	+0.554*
42.	Percentage of <u>municipios</u> with piped water-supply in the homes, 1962.	+0.451*	-0.075	+0.764*
43.	Rural population density (excluding provincial capital and <u>municipios</u> with over 50,000 pop.), 1960.	+0.379*	-0.093	+0.618*

† Correlated with net migration statistics 1951-1960 (A. García Barbancho).

‡ Correlated with net migration statistics 1951-1960 (R. Tamames).

‡ Banco de Bilbao statistics.

\* Significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

(a) Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura; (b) Old Castile-León.

SOURCE: As Table XXXI.

"push-pull" aspects of migration from the south. All three of the statistically significant variables in Old Castile-León are positively correlated with net internal migration, emphasizing perhaps the "pull" aspects of migration in this region. Houston has drawn

attention to the fact that population in the north is more mobile than in the south. In 1950, 72.4% of the population of Old Castile-León were living in their municipio of birth compared with 76.0% in Andalucía and 82.8% in New Castile-Extremadura (not including Madrid) (5). The geographic position of the south was a greater barrier to migration. Many of the provinces of Old Castile-León were contiguous to industrial areas and therefore more susceptible to "pull" factors (6). Be this as it may, there is more than a suggestion from Tables XXXI-XXXIV that people migrate more for social reasons than in the south. Confirming evidence is received at the level of twenty provinces with more than one hundred small municipios. Two hypotheses tested at national and regional levels are retested at the level of twenty provinces. In both instances the null hypothesis can be safely rejected. There is a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and both the percentage of municipios with modern sewage systems in 1962 ( $R_s = +0.833$ ) and the percentage of municipios with piped water-supply in the homes in 1962 ( $R_s = +0.839$ ) (7). Kendall's correlation coefficient was then employed to retest the significance of both these hypotheses for the nine of the twenty provinces with small municipios included in Old Castile-León, producing results of  $r = +0.750$  and  $r = +0.611$  respectively, which were significant at the 99% and 95% levels of confidence.

- (f) A higher degree of correlation was obtained at national than at regional level. Twenty-two of the hypotheses tested at national level (or 51.16% of the forty-three investigated) proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence, compared with six (or 13.95%) in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura and three (or 6.98%) in Old Castile-León. A further seven hypotheses (or 16.28%) proved to be significant nationally at the 95% level of confidence,

compared with five (or 11.63%) in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura and four (or 9.30%) in Old Castile-León (8).

- (g) The inverse relationship between socio-economic conditions in agriculture and net internal migration noted at national level is substantiated at regional level. Of the sectorial factors in agriculture only one of the variables - the percentage of salaried agriculturalists - is included among the twelve most significantly correlated with net internal migration at national level - and then only in tenth place. In Old Castile-León, two indices of minifundismo are included with one of rural population density within the seven significantly correlated variables in that region. In Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura, the sectorial factors in agriculture which had the greatest statistical significance were indices of minifundismo, the percentage of salaried agriculturalists and concentración parcelaria. Latifundismo was of no statistical significance in either Old Castile-León or Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura, and was in fact more strongly correlated (although not significantly so) with net internal migration 1961-1965 in the former region not the latter!

In view of this rather surprising finding the correlation between latifundios and net migration was retested for Andalucía. Carrion's statistics for 1930 were taken as a constant (the assumption being made that there has been little socio-economic change in the region since that date) and the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant correlation between the number of estates of 250 hectares and over and net internal migration during various periods was tested using Kendall's correlation coefficient. The null hypothesis can be safely accepted for 1921-1930 ( $r = +0.393$ ), 1931-1940 ( $r = +0.107$ ), 1941-1950 ( $r = +0.321$ ) and 1951-1960 ( $r = +0.429$ ). For

post 1960 data, however, the null hypothesis must be rejected. A statistically significant correlation between latifundismo and internal migration exists for the 1961-1965 period at the 95% level of confidence using García Barbancho's statistics ( $r = +0.536$ ), and at the 99% level of confidence employing the Instituto Nacional de Estadística's directly-recorded data ( $r = +0.643$ ). Statistics from this latter source for the 1961-1970 period reveal a correlation which is again significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +0.679$ ) (9).

The economic nature of out-migration from Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura is confirmed by the strong statistical correlation between net internal migration and the movement of workers in both 1957-1958 and 1960. Further proof of the economic nature of out-migration from Andalucía is obtained from Cazorla. Using the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient he finds statistically significant relationships between the net migration rate 1956-1960 and both the percentage of the active population in agriculture in 1957 ( $r = -0.81$ ) and the percentage of the active population which was working-class in the same year ( $r = -0.72$ ) (10).

- (h) The tentative hypothesis proposed at national level that out-migration is influenced by the lack of services at the domestic rather than at the municipal level is not substantiated at a regional level of investigation. Two municipal and one domestic indices proved to be significantly correlated with net internal migration in Old Castile-León; one domestic index in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura.
- (i) The relationship between net migration and past birth-rates was not substantiated at regional level. In fact, when the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between past birth-rates and net internal migration was retested substituting García Barbancho's statis-

tics for the 1961-1965 period for those obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística there was little to choose between the two regions. The null hypothesis can be accepted regionally although rejected nationally. A significant inverse relationship at the 99% level of confidence nationally ( $R_s = -0.661$ ) has to be weighed against insignificant results regionally in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura ( $R_s = -0.300$ ) and Old Castile-León ( $R_s = -0.291$ ) (11).

- (j) The lack of statistical relationships between current demographic data (other than infant-mortality rates) and net internal migration is substantiated at regional level. Moreover, confirming evidence is obtained from an analysis of net migration per thousand population 1945-1958 for the province of Ciudad Real. In each instance the null hypothesis could be safely accepted. There was no statistically significant correlation between net migration and the birth-rate per thousand population 1945-1958 ( $R_s = +0.231$ ), the death-rate ( $R_s = -0.160$ ) or the rate of natural increase ( $R_s = +0.248$ ) (12).

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### B/ RURAL-TO-URBAN IN-MIGRATION STREAMS. "PULL" FACTORS OPERATING IN IN-MIGRATION AREAS

#### 1) AT A NATIONAL LEVEL

"City dominant" theories which see the city as a centre of change have characterized western thinking from the nineteenth century down to the present day. Such theories have emphasized three aspects of western urbanization. Firstly, the function of the city as an agent of social change (1). Secondly, the close connection between urbanization and economic development (2). Thirdly, that the city is central to the theory of demographic transition - population growth being maintained mainly as a result of in-migration (3). Ward has noted that "while urbanization and industrialization are closely related, they are nevertheless generically distinct processes" (4). It is our contention here that it is not urbanization per se which attracts migrants but urban economic opportunities, urban services and the possibility of upward social mobility. The correlation between urbanization and net migration should therefore be less than with the aforementioned indices.

#### (a) Urbanization, Industrialization and Tertiarization

##### (i) Urbanization

Following Kingsley Davis it is possible to calculate the contribution of net in-migration to the urbanization process in Spain (5). Only 40.38% of the growth of Spain's towns and cities between 1900 and 1960 can be attributed to urbanization per se, while for municipios of 100,000 population and over the growth that would have occurred if rural-to-urban migration had been the only factor was 51.53% (6). This method of calculation probably under-estimates the contribution of net internal migration in the urbanization process. According to Díez Nicolás net migration averaged 70.66% of the total growth of all municipios of 100,000 population and over during the 1900-1960 period; while according to Fundación FOESSA for Madrid during the 1900-1965 period the average was 80.28% (see Table XXXV).

Table XXXV

CONTRIBUTION OF NET INTERNAL MIGRATION TO THE INTERCENSAL GROWTH  
OF POPULATION IN MADRID AND IN MUNICIPIOS OF 100,000 AND OVER

Urban category	Net migration as a percentage of total growth							Average
	1901-10	1911-20	1921-30	1931-40	1941-50	1951-60	1961-5	
Madrid	92%	95%	84%	90%	72%	65%	64%	80.28%
Municipios 100,000 pop. or over, 1960	78%	98%	74%	87%	47%	40%	-	70.66%

SOURCES: Fundación FOESSA, Informe Sociológica sobre la Situación Social de Madrid, Editorial Euramérica, Madrid, 1967, Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8, pp.45 and 47; and J. Díez Nicolás, "Problemas Demográficos de las Areas Metropolitanas", unedited work to be published in Las Grandes Ciudades Españolas, quoted by J. Díez Nicolás, in "La Urbanización y el Urbanismo en la Década de los 70", in M. Fraga Iribarne, J. Velarde Fuertes and S. del Campo Urbano, (ed.), La España de los Años 70, Vol.1, La Sociedad, Editorial Moneda y Crédito, Madrid, 1972, Table 5, p.170.

In our investigation into the correlation between net internal migration the calculation was complicated by the difficulty of defining what is "urban" in the continuum between large agglomerations and dispersed settlements (7). There are large numbers of "agro-towns" in the southern half of Spain. There especially "the typical life of Greece and Rome still persists", according to the Naval Intelligence Handbook, agricultural workers travelling long distances to work and returning at night "to the protection of the walls and the society of the market-place" (8). According to the same source, "even in the largest towns, like Murcia and Valencia, many quarters of the town are really nothing but a collection of agricultural villages in which the houses are joined to stables and have space for farm carts" (9).

In view of these difficulties three separate definitions of "urban" were tested against net internal migration 1961-1965. Firstly, a Fundación FOESSA "índice de urbanización" revealed a correlation of  $R_s = +0.213$  which had no statistical significance (10). Secondly, the standard Instituto Nacio-



nal de Estadística definition of "urban" produced a correlation  $R_s = +0.299$  which was significant at the 95% level of confidence (11). Thirdly, Díez Nicolás' more refined definition of "urban" resulted in a correlation of  $R_s = +0.516$  which was significant at the 99% level of confidence (12).

Clearly there is some correlation between net in-migration and urbanization, although not all municipios of 10,000 population and over are in-migration centres. According to Cabo Alonso (13), twenty-three Spanish provinces had a net migration loss in respect of their urban population. According to the Plan C.C.B., only one hundred and thirty-three municipios with 10,000 population and over (excluding provincial capitals) showed net migration gains between 1951 and 1960, all the remaining urban municipios having net migration losses (14). Nor were provincial capitals as a group exempt from migration losses. According to the same source (15), twenty-six provincial capitals (sixteen according to García Barbancho) (16) displayed a net migration loss for the 1951-1960 period. Barbancho has calculated that fourteen provincial capitals experienced net migration losses in the 1961-1965 period (17). Since capitals experiencing a net migration loss during the latter period varied in population from 19,726 (Teruél) to 301,048 (Málaga) in 1960, it is our hypothesis that there is no correlation between the size of provincial capitals and net internal migration. The null hypothesis can be safely accepted for the 1951-1960 period, the correlation between net internal migration and the size of provincial capitals in 1950 being a statistically insignificant  $R_s = +0.214$  (18). This is confirmed for net internal migration during the 1961-1965 period, which produced a statistically insignificant correlation with the size of provincial capitals in 1960 of  $R_s = +0.266$  (19).

It is our contention that the urbanization process is connected not with the size but the growth of municipios. The correlation between net internal migration and the growth of provincial capitals during the 1951-

1960 period is  $R_s = +0.502$  which is significant at the 99% level of confidence (20). Confirming evidence is obtained from the growth of provincial capitals 1951-1960 and the percentage of growth which net migration represented during that period, the correlation between these two variables being a highly significant  $R_s = +0.882$  (21).

Between 1951 and 1960, the percentage contribution of net migration to the growth of urban municipios (with 10,000 or more population in 1960) was in forty-five instances greater than for Madrid (22). Only one of these forty-five municipios was a provincial capital - Vitoria. In 1950, only twenty-seven of these municipios (or 60% of the total) had achieved urban status, although all had done so by 1960. Clearly net migration is an important factor in the urbanization process and a means whereby small municipios achieve urban status - at least in purely statistical terms. According to Díez Nicolás, thirty-one urban municipios (with 10,000 or more population in 1950) grew more rapidly than Madrid between 1951 and 1960 (23). The correlation between the percentage growth of these thirty-two municipios during the 1951-1960 period and the percentage contribution of net migration to their growth during that period was a statistically significant  $R_s = +0.810$  (24).

Confirming evidence of the lack of correlation between the individual size of municipios and net migration is obtained from Factores Humanos y Sociales. In absolute terms, thirty-two municipios received more than 5,000 net migrants each during the 1956-1960 period according to this source (25). While in geographical terms fifteen of those in-migration centres were concentrated in the provinces of Barcelona and Vizcaya, in statistical terms they were spread over the entire range of the urban spectrum (see Table XXVI).

This Table shows that while only 0.79% of the municipios in the 10,001-20,000 population group received more than 5,000 net migrants in the 1956-

Table XXXVI

MUNICIPIOS WITH MORE THAN 5,000 NET IN-MIGRANTS 1956-1960  
CLASSIFIED BY URBAN POPULATION GROUPS

Urban population group	A No. <u>municipios</u> in group, 1960	B No. receiving 5,000 net migrants, 1956-60	$\frac{B}{A} \cdot 100$
10,001- 20,000	254	2	0.79%
20,001- 30,000	76	4	5.26%
30,001- 50,000	32	7	21.87%
50,001-100,000	35	7	20.00%
100,001-500,000	23	9	39.13%
Over 500,000	3	3	100.00%
TOTAL	423	32	---

SOURCES: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España 1970, Madrid, 1970, Table 1.1.6., p.55; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Factores Humanos y Sociales. Anexo al Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social 1964-1967, Madrid, 1964, Table 4.5., p.184.

Table XXXVII

MUNICIPIOS RECEIVING MORE THAN 1,000 IN-MIGRANTS  
ANNUALLY 1956-1960, 1964 AND 1969

Municipios	A Net in-migrants (in '000) 1956-1960*	B Gross in-migrants (in '000) 1964	C 1969	$\frac{C}{B} \cdot 100$
Madrid	52.04	46.34	27.08	58.44%
Barcelona	16.54	42.76	17.73	41.48%
Hospitalet	5.56	16.65	10.88	65.32%
Valencia	+	16.53	8.70	52.65%
Zaragoza	6.22	12.33	7.71	62.53%
Badalona	2.48	7.29	2.88	39.56%
Sta.Coloma de Gramanet	1.18	6.12	5.75	93.89%

\* Annual average figures; + Net in-migration statistics are very inaccurate due to errors in the 1950 Census figures.

SOURCES: Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Factores Humanos y Sociales. Anexo al Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social 1964-1967, Madrid, 1964, Table 4.5., p.184; Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España 1965, Madrid, 1965, Table 3.3.1., p.515; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España 1970, Madrid, 1970, Table 3.3.7., p.464.

1960 period, the probability of mass in-migration affecting urban municipios increased with the increasing size of population group, although factors other than urbanization are obviously involved, no more than 39.13% of the municipios in the 101,000-500,000 population group receiving more than 5,000 net migrants in the period. This is confirmed by statistics for 1964 and 1969. Thirteen municipios received more than one thousand gross migrants in 1964, eight in 1969, absorbing 35.82% and 21.69% of all internal migration in those years respectively (26). Although net and gross migration statistics are not strictly comparable only seven municipios were centres of massive in-migration in 1956-1960, 1964 and 1969. Two of these had between 100,001 and 500,000 population in 1960 and three over 500,000. Table XXXVII shows that while national gross internal migration in 1969 represented only 78.26% of the total in 1964, six of the seven municipios had even greater rates of decline than the national average. This is further testimony of the switch in migration flows between 1964 and 1969 to provincial capitals and cabeceras de comarca (27).

In this section of our thesis we have seen that migration is an important factor in the urbanization process, accounting for much of municipal population growth, although only 35.66% of urban municipios (excluding provincial capitals) grew as a result of net in-migration between 1951 and 1960. We commented earlier on the difficulty of defining what was "urban", Table XXXVI seeming to confirm the lack of economic opportunities in small urban municipios, with only 0.79% of those with between 10,001 and 20,000 population receiving more than 5,000 net in-migrants in the 1956-1960 period. Confirmation is obtained when the hypothesis is tested that there is no relationship between net migration and agriculture in urban areas. The null hypothesis must be rejected, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the index of active agricultural population in urban zones with over 10,000 population in 1960 being significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.619$ ) (28).

(ii) Industrialization

The close connection between urbanization and economic development is well-documented (29). In Spain, the correlation between urbanization and industrialization during the 1901-1970 period was tested using the Kendall correlation coefficient and found to just fail to satisfy the requirements for statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence ( $r = +0.524$ ) (30). A similar lack of correlation for the same period was found between urbanization and net internal migration ( $r = +0.429$ ) (31). The relationship between net internal migration and industrialization for the same period was found to be significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $r = +0.714$ ) (32), thus confirming the hypothesis that it is not urbanization per se which attracts migrants but urban economic opportunities.

Hoselitz has argued that in the developed countries of Western Europe and North America a "logical sequence to the growth of cities, the growth of industry, and the growth of the economy" occurred between 1850 and 1915 (33). According to Kuznets, the switch to a capital intensive, urban-industrial infrastructure from a more simple, less specialized base resulted in the per capita product growing twice as rapidly as population, both economic and demographic expansion being much greater during the nineteenth century than in pre-industrial times (34). This "logical sequence" has been maintained; the strong correlation between urbanization and economic opportunities being apparent in one hundred and thirty-eight member countries of the World Bank in 1970 (35).

There is evidence from Latin America that the drift to the towns precedes industrialization (36). "Pseudo-urbanization" (37) characterizes the developing world generally, with urbanization outpacing industrialization so that there is a direct shift out of agriculture into tertiary employment (38). In 1960, Spain was in many respects still a developing country. In that year twenty-eight of its fifty provinces were still in

the pre-industrial phase with more than 50% of their active population employed in agriculture (39). The urban proportion of population in twenty provinces was less than 38% in 1960 - the median urban population for forty of the richest developing countries in 1970 (40)! Many of the cities of Spain in 1900 were "parasitic" rather than "generative" (41), "pre-industrial" rather than "industrial" or "metropolitan" (42), nineteen provincial capitals having more than 50% of their active population employed in services (43). Some of these provincial capitals - Madrid, Valladolid and Pamplona, for example - have since 1950 developed into industrial growth-centres, in the words of Moore:

"...simply because they are there and provide both pools of labour and various public facilities" (44).

Notwithstanding, it is our hypothesis that in Spain still bearing the stigma of underdevelopment in 1960, there is less relationship between internal migration and the industrialization process than many political and economic experts expect. The null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant correlation between internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage increase in the number of persons employed in the secondary sector during that period was proven by means of the Kendall correlation coefficient ( $r = +0.200$ ) (45), and confirmed by statistics for the 1961-1969 period ( $r = +0.278$ ) (46). These calculations made at a national level are further substantiated by results obtained at the level of fifty provinces. There was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the percentage change in the number of persons employed in industry during the same period ( $R_s = +0.196$ ) (47). The relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage change in the number of persons employed in industry during the 1961-1967 period again proved to be statistically insignificant ( $R_s = +0.276$ ) (48). These results do not confirm the findings of Kariel who found a

statistically significant correlation between net migration between communities in the United States 1951-1960 and changes in the number of employees in manufacturing (49). These findings for Spain do not necessarily prove that the "pull" of industrial opportunities failed to act as a stimulus to migration during the last decade, but rather suggests that either immigration is insensitive to economic change or, more likely, that migration has now become so massive that migrants cannot be fully absorbed in the expanding industrial sector. This latter suggestion is confirmed by the efforts of the government - on the instigation of the World Bank report (50) - to encourage planned, assisted emigration to continental Europe from 1960 as a partial solution to employment problems. Moreover, Spanish "pseudo-urbanization" is confirmed by the relationship between internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage increase in the number of persons employed in the tertiary sector, which proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +1.000$ ) (51). These findings made at a national level are confirmed by statistics for the 1961-1969 period ( $r = +0.722$ ) (52).

While net internal migration is not sensitive to annual changes in the economy there is, nevertheless, a close correlation between migration and industrialization. Thus the correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the percentage of persons employed in the secondary sector in provincial capitals in 1950 was significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.653$ ) (53). Similar statistics for 1960 produced a correlation with net internal migration 1961-1965 which was slightly lower although still significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.513$ ) (54). A somewhat higher degree of correlation was produced when the percentage of persons employed in industry in provincial areas in 1960 was substituted for municipal areas in the same year ( $R_s = +0.693$ ) (55). The correlation between net migration 1951-1960 and the percentage of persons

employed in industry in 1950 at a provincial scale of analysis was  $R_s = +0.775$  (56). Thus both municipal and provincial statistics for industry show a higher degree of correlation with net migration in 1950 rather than 1960. Organización Sindical Española statistics for the number of women employed in industry in April 1957 point to the constancy of female migration flows, showing a statistically significant correlation at the 99% level of confidence with total net internal migration statistics in both 1951-1960 ( $R_s = +0.675$ ) and 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.680$ ) (57).

According to the O.E.C.D. the consumption of electrical energy increases at a rate nearly double the Gross National Product (58). The consumption of energy is, therefore, one of the best indicators by which to measure economic development, energy being an indispensable element both for industrial development and the raising of living standards (59). Since more than 75% of the electricity produced in Spain is consumed within the industrial sector (60), electrical energy is most suitably considered as an index of industrialization rather than as an index of rising living standards (61). Thus the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 (in the five richest and poorest provinces in 1962) is higher with the per capita electricity consumption, 1966 ( $r = +0.733$ ) (62) than with the Gross National Product per capita 1966 ( $r = +0.600$ ) (63), although both are significant at the 99% level of confidence. The correlation between the consumption of electricity in 1971 and net internal migration 1961-1970 confirms these findings by being significant at the 99% level of confidence at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.567$ ) (64). A somewhat higher correlation is produced between electricity consumption in 1967 and net internal migration 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.589$ ) (65).

The consumption of steel is another good barometer by which to measure economic development. Thus the per capita consumption of steel in Spain increased from 42 kilograms in 1953 to 188 kilograms in 1968 (66). The



correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 in the ten most important steel consuming provinces (accounting for 87.7% of the steel consumed in Spain in 1965) proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +0.644$ ) (67).

The consumption of cement is a third important indicator of economic progress. In Spain, the per capita consumption of cement rose from 88 kilograms in 1953 to 295 kilograms in 1964 (68). This index of economic development has not been used here. A more relevant index for migration studies is the number of persons employed in the construction sector, especially since many rural-to-urban migrants obtain their first "regular" employment as peones eventuales (casual labourers) in the construction industry (69). The correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the percentage of the active population employed in construction in 1960 proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.588$ ) (70). The relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage of the active population employed in construction in the 4th quarter, 1968 was not statistically significant ( $R_s = +0.046$ ) (71). The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1970 and the number of persons employed in the building and public works sector (edificaciones y obras públicas) in 1971 was statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.324$ ) (72). Cairncross has referred to the building cycle as "little more than a migration cycle in disguise" (73); while Brinley Thomas has noted that "when internal migration was high... it was in those years that building, with a lag, expanded... the swings in housebuilding conforming to the swings in the migration-dominated curve of population change" (74). Be this as it may, the relationship between the migration and building cycles in Spain during the 1961-1971 period proved to have no statistical significance at a national level of investigation ( $r = +0.289$ ). When a time-lag of one year is allowed,

however, the relationship becomes statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +0.833$ ) (75).

Sovani found a much higher degree of correlation between urbanization and industrialization in lesser developed countries ( $r = +0.850$ ) than in highly industrialized ones ( $r = +0.395$ ). "The pace of urbanization in the underdeveloped countries", he concludes, "is much more closely dependent on the pace of industrialization than in the highly industrialized areas" (76). Spain in our period of study (1961-1965) occupied an intermediate position between that of a lesser developed and highly industrialized country. It can be computed that 68.61% of the posts created in the industrial and service sectors during the 1951-1960 period were due to expansion (the remaining 31.39% being filled by a straight transfer of labour from the agricultural sector). In 1961-1965 only 35.02% of the new posts were due to expansion, and in 1966-1970 only 55.89% (77). The picture which emerges, therefore, is of declining industrial opportunities (especially in the 1961-1965 period), with migrant population being forced to seek economic opportunities abroad or simple service jobs at home in provincial capital or metropolitan city. Thus 61.70% of the increased active population in the non-agricultural sectors was absorbed in industry during the 1951-1960 period, but only 51.38% in 1961-1965 and 53.58% in 1966-1970 (78).

Díez Nicolás has noted that urbanization in Spain was especially rapid in the 1921-1930 and 1951-1960 decades of "maximum industrialization" (79). De Miguel and Salcedo think it worth drawing to our attention the fact that the brake on economic progress which occurred between 1930 and 1950 was not in any sense accompanied by a reduction in the urbanization process (80). "Pseudo-urbanization" grew unchecked in this period, Spain re-acquiring the characteristics of a lesser developed country with more people being employed in services than in industry (81). Rapid industrial-

ization during the 1961-1970 period was cancelled out by even more rapid expansion in tourist facilities, so that the service sector accounted for 50.2% of the Gross National Product in 1970 (82) - eloquent testimony of the "pull" of services rather than of industry on net internal migrants.

(iii) Tertiarization

The objectives of the 1st Economic and Social Development Plan (1964-1967) were more than exceeded in terms of the transfer of labour from the agricultural to non-agricultural sectors (see Table XXXVIII). Since only 10.53% of the unplanned transfer of labour from agriculture was absorbed in the industrial sector, it might well be argued that there was a spontaneous transfer of labour from agriculture to petty jobs in the service sector.

Table XXXVIII

PLANNED AND UNPLANNED RESULTS OF THE 1st ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION IN SPAIN, 1967

Sector	Objectives of I Plan	Results of I Plan	Difference	Index of un- planned change
Agriculture and Fishing	35.1%	29.4%	-5.7% (A)	-100.00% (A)
Industry	35.7%	36.3%	+0.6% (B)	+ 10.53% $\left\{ \frac{B}{A} \cdot 100 \right\}$
Services	29.2%	34.3%	+5.1% (C)	+ 89.47% $\left\{ \frac{C}{A} \cdot 100 \right\}$

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría de Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Memoria sobre la Ejecución del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social. Año 1967, Madrid, 1968.

We have seen that there was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration and the percentage increase in the number of persons employed in the secondary sector at either the national level ( $r = +0.200$ , 1961-1965;  $r = +0.278$ , 1961-1969) or at the level of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.196$ , 1951-1960;  $R_s = +0.276$ , 1961-1967). In each instance there was a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration and the percentage increase in the number of persons

employed in the tertiary sector at both the national level ( $r = +1.000$ , 1961-1965;  $r = +0.722$ , 1961-1969) and at the level of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.395$ , 1951-1960;  $R_s = +0.434$ , 1961-1967) (83).

We have seen that both municipal (ie. provincial capitals and metropolitan areas) and provincial statistics for industry show a higher degree of correlation with net migration in 1950 rather than 1960 (84). As with industry, the correlation between net internal migration and the percentage of persons employed in the service sector was higher in 1951-1960 ( $R_s = +0.643$ ) than in 1961-1965 ( $R_s = +0.546$ ) (85), although both these calculations made at the level of fifty provinces proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence. There was no statistically significant correlation, however, between net internal migration 1951-1960 and 1961-1965 and the percentage of persons employed in the service sector in provincial capitals and metropolitan areas in 1950 ( $R_s = -0.011$ ) and 1960 ( $R_s = -0.162$ ) respectively (86). Since net migration flows are mainly directed to provincial capitals and major metropolitan areas, the implication is that migrants are mainly attracted by the prospects of obtaining employment in the industrial sector, although many in fact end up with petty service jobs. There is more than a suggestion that many migrants, unsatisfied with such service jobs or unable to obtain permanent employment, are tempted to migrate elsewhere including abroad.

Accurate official statistics for the number of workers employed in the tourist sector do not exist in Spain (87). According to Turismo, II Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, (88) an estimated 118,710 new jobs were to be created in this sector between 1968 and 1971. Since, according to Renta Nacional de España y su Distribución Provincial 1971, there were 373,942 salaried workers employed in this sector in 1971 (89), this would give an estimated increase of 46.51% in the labour force between 1968 and 1971. It can be statistically shown that approximately one in four of the

new jobs created in the tourist sector during this period went to net internal migrants (90). A detailed analysis of the correlation between net internal migration and services must therefore begin with the tourist sector, a growth industry accounting for 11.0% of the salaried labour force employed in tertiary activities in 1971 (91).

The null hypothesis that there was no relationship between international tourist flows into Spain and changes in net internal migration 1962-1970 was tested at a national level using Kendall's correlation coefficient. The null hypothesis had to be rejected, a correlation of  $r = +0.444$  being obtained which all but proved to be significant at the 95% level of confidence (92). Between 1960 and 1969, income from international tourism grew from 2.9 to 4.6% of the Gross National Product, an increase of 58.62% (93). Income from this source was equivalent to 25.4% of Spain's exports by value in 1960 rising to 33.6% in 1969 (94). Tourism after 1959 (95) became, in the words of a Banco Central report, like "... manna falling from heaven, impelled by the favourable winds of stabilization" (96). All the empirical evidence suggests that the Spanish government came to recognize the fundamental role of tourism as "the main financing force of the 1964-1967 Economic and Social Development Plan" (97), and took all necessary legislative, fiscal and other measures to encourage its expansion and development.

At first glance there is no obvious relationship between net internal migration and tourist facilities in Spain (see Table XXXIX). Yet the hotel industry is responsive to changes in international tourism. Despite the fact that the number of foreign tourists visiting Spain increased by 26.16% between 1966 and 1969, the number of persons employed in the hotel industry remained relatively constant at 0.37-0.39% of the total number of foreign tourists arriving annually during that period (98). It is our contention that cheap migrant labour is largely responsible for the build-

ing and servicing of new tourist facilities (99). In confirmation of this hypothesis, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and

Table XXXIX

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION AND THE NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY IN SPAIN, 1966-1969

Year	<u>No. internal migrants</u>		<u>No. employed in hotel trade</u>	
	Absolute No.	% change	Absolute No.*	% change
1966	280,082	-	68,443	-
1967	383,259	+36.84	71,043	+3.80
1968	370,523	- 3.32	74,271	+4.54
1969	389,980	+ 5.23	80,666	+8.61

\* Average monthly figures.

SOURCES: A. de Miguel and J. Salcedo, Dinámica del Desarrollo Industrial de las Regiones Españolas, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1972, Table 6, p.38; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico de España 1970, Madrid, 1970, Table 1.5.1., p.351.

the increase in the number of new hotel places 1964-1966 (100), proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.487$ ) when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces.

Two of the main characteristics of urban economies throughout the developing world are high rates of unemployment and a very large tertiary sector bloated through an excess of petty traders, shoe-shine boys and the like (101). "Pseudo-urbanization", we have seen, is a phenomenon not unknown in Spain. It seems appropriate at this point, therefore, to consider the impact of this phenomenon on the Spanish service sector.

Open unemployment affects 15-25% of the total (102) and 20-30% of the young (103) urban labour force of the Third World, although Herrick (for Chile in 1963) (104) and a CEDE survey (for Colombia in 1967) (105) have both shown that unemployment rates for migrants are much lower than for natives. The individual migrant can usually find some kind of employment

by selling his services below the urban market price (106). Spanish unemployment statistics are notoriously unreliable. An Instituto Nacional de Estadística sample survey for the 4th quarter of 1968, for example, found only 1.13% of the economically active population unemployed (107). At all events, it would appear that unemployment in Spain conforms to the Western rather than the Third World norm in being "cyclical" rather than "chronic" (108).

Weeks has drawn attention to the mistake often made by western social scientists and economists that an individual in the developing world unable to find a wage job is unemployed (109). Someone once said that the only ones unemployed in the developing world are the dead! The possibilities for casual and self-employment within the developing-world urban areas are numerous. C.G. Clarke, for example, has elaborated on the themes of "cotching" and "scuffing" on the "dungles" of Kingston, Jamaica (110). Berry has estimated that between 25 and 40% of the urban labour force in the Third World exist at a minimum subsistence level within the "individual enterprise"; "street economy" sector; a further 35-45% in the "family enterprise" "bazaar-type economy"; and only 15-50% in the "corporate enterprise" modern, "capital intensive" sector (111). In Spain, no relevant statistics exist with reference to the petty service sector. The Encuesta sobre Población Activa, Año 1968, for example, lists 16.86% of the economically active population in the 4th quarter of that year under otros servicios, which together with a further 1.13% unemployed would appear to form the absolute ceiling for this type of activity (112). It is not suggested for one moment that 17.99% of the economically active population is engaged in petty service jobs of a casual nature - the category otros servicios including all jobs within the service sector except those associated with commerce transport and communications (113) - the statistics are merely cited to show that the numbers employed in "street"

and "bazaar-type" economy enterprises in Spain can in no way approximate to the very high numbers engaged in such activities within developing-world urban areas (114). Nowhere are Spanish statistics more confusing than in Madrid, the city with the most bloated tertiary sector: no less than 63.5% of the economically active population being engaged in service activities according to the 1960 Census (115). According to a Fundación FOESSA report (116), 1965 statistics indicated that 30% of the economically active population of the city was classified as peones (labourers including builders' labourers) and unqualified manual workers within the service sector. Yet, according to the Plan General de Ordenación Urbana del Area Metropolitana de Madrid published in 1961, 31% of the active population was engaged in the construction industry (117)! Using these two sources in conjunction either much of the building trade or most of the lower echelons of the service sector disappear completely. How could this be in

"...this Madrid of the thousand and one ambulatory salesman, of beggars, mercenaries and jobless..." (118).

which has existed at least from 1625? How could this be in the Madrid of 1797 when travelling salesman represented 75.66% of those actively engaged in commerce or 0.65% of the total population censured (119)? How could this be in the Madrid of 1843 when beggars represented 4.54% of the active population of the capital (120)? How could this be in the Madrid of the 1940s and 1950s, when any visitor to Spain would have noticed the superabundance of street-traders and the like, no doubt an aftermath of the Civil War and economic blockade which followed it? "Pseudo-urbanization" has declined in Madrid in recent years but can it have disappeared completely?

Sample surveys of two blocks of flats in the Arganzuela and Carabanchel districts of Madrid (representative of the Centro and Periferia socio-



economic zones of the city) (121) were conducted by the author in 1961 (the former containing twelve and the latter sixteen families respectively) but failed to reveal the existence of anyone engaged in casual, petty service activities. Notwithstanding, "individual", "family" and "corporate enterprise" types of activity may be seen side by side in certain areas of Madrid. In the Rastro district (122), for example, modern furniture and domestic-appliance shops co-exist with stall-holders who eke out an existence buying and selling old clothes, second-hand articles and junk from each other, while lone street-vendors pass through the milling crowds plying their wares of black-market watches, imitation Parker fountain-pens, illegal contraceptives and contraband cigarettes. How though to calculate the numbers of such petty service traders?

Hart has suggested a typology of formal (i.e. "corporate enterprise") and "informal income opportunities" - the latter including both legitimate\* branches (123). Statistics for the city of Barcelona (circa. 1962) indicate a minimum illegitimate group of 25,400 persons, concerned with prostitution, homo-sexuality, pimping, chronic alcoholism and drug-trafficking, mainly concentrated in the Barrio Chino and representing 3.72% of the active or 1.56% of the total population of the city in that year (124). It is our contention that the legitimate "informal income" group are also strongly represented in the central areas of the cities. In Madrid, they abound in the central parks and squares where people like to linger a while over a glass of beer or wine as in the Parque de Retiro, Plaza de España, Plaza de Santa Ana or Plaza de Oriente. Blind lottery-ticket vendors, boot-blacks, cigarette, sweet and pina (125) salesman are strategically placed around the Puerta del Sol and main shopping thoroughfares like the Avenida de José Antonio, Calle de Alcalá, Calle Mayor or Calle Arenal. In the Calle de Postas (near the Plaza Mayor) groups of street salesmen vie with each other in the sale of flints and wicks for cigarette-lighters. Casual street-traders are most numerous, however, in the

\* and illegitimate

squares of the barrios bajos (working-class zones) of the Centro as in the Plaza de Tirso de Molina, Plaza de Lavapiés or Plaza del Rastro (126). The author has calculated that the minimum number of street-traders in the Plaza de Tirso de Molina oscillates between 30 and 40 consisting of newspaper vendors, sweet, cigarette and pipa salesmen, shoe-shine boys, lottery-ticket vendors, prostitutes and Metro-ticket salesmen (127). In many instances there is a locational relationship between bars and taverns and casual salesmen. Applying the Tirso de Molina index of 4.29-5.71 casual street-traders per bar or tavern to all of Madrid's 9,975 restaurants, cafeterías, bars and taverns in 1971 (128), a global sum of between 42,793 and 56,957 street-traders is produced. The "legitimate informal income" group would then represent between 3.33 and 4.44% of the active population of the city in that year (129). On logical grounds it hardly seems likely that the "illegitimate informal income" group would form a smaller proportion of the active population in Madrid than in Barcelona (130), where it was 3.72% in 1962. It is possible, therefore, that the total "informal income" group in Madrid is between 7 and 8% of the active population.

It is our hypothesis that migrants of recent arrival are associated with three levels of work:

- (a) unemployment, casual and self-employment,
- (b) temporary contractual employment (usually as a peón de construcción),
- (c) permanent contractual employment (usually as a peón de industria o de servicios) (131).

Candel has noted that recent migrants before getting wage-earning employment seek casual jobs like begging, opening car doors, carrying cases in the railway station or streethawking (132). Such is the demand for builders' labourers now (133), and such are the contacts that migrants have with relatives and friends in the big city that most succeed in obtaining a

paid job within a few days of their arrival - assuming there is no business recession. Few migrants, therefore, remain long within the "street-economy" sector. García Fernández has written of the attractions of Madrid as a work-centre for potential migrants (134). Thus, only 4.8% of Siguán's chabola population were unemployed (135), 11% of Fundación FOESSA's sample-survey of chabola dwellers in 1969 (136), and 1% of Barcelona's barraca population (circa. 1963) (137). Some peripheral marginal groups remain in the "individual enterprise" sector of free choice. Thus 17.17% of the chabola population of Madrid (circa. 1967) were gitanos while a further 4.37% were "habitual delinquents" (138). Most of the "legitimate informal income" group of the Centro are not migrants of recent arrival. They represent the "deprived", the "trapped" and the "downward mobile" elements (139) as well as the "ethnic villagers" (140), of central city "slums of despair" (141).

Three street-vendors of cigarettes, sweets and pipas known personally to the author included an old lady whose "stall" was about 150 metres from Her flat; an elderly man who lived about 250 metres from his stand; and a married man in early middle age whose stand was about 1,500 metres from his home. The elderly man had arrived in Madrid from Linares in the early 1950s and presumably found it difficult to obtain regular employment because of his age. The other two were castizos (or pure-bred madrileños). The married man had a regular stand in a bar behind the Gran Via. From the way that he dressed and the life-style of his family it would be reasonable to assume that he had a lucrative and probably illicit sideline.

The rest of the "legitimate informal income" group include the blind, the old, the sick and the lame, the lazy and the ingenious, the unfortunate... who depend on oficios menudos (petty jobs) and "modos de vivir que no dan de vivir" (142). Among examples of oficios menudos are the zapateros remendones (cobblers) who set up trade (after due consultation

with the tenants) in the darkened corners of the crumbling portals of some ancient block of flats; the trinket sellers; the rag-and-bone men; toasted-chestnut vendors; street musicians; and itinerant water-sellers who charge a nominal sum for a cooling drink from their botijos (earthenware drinking vessels), although naturally relying on the greater generosity of their customers.

The exception to the rule is the sereno (night-watchman), the one petty service job which has been formalized. Traditionally the sereno in Madrid is of migrant (Asturian or Galician) stock - not usually of recent arrival for the office is lucrative and carries respect so that it is often handed down from father to son. The "illegitimate informal income" group of the Centro represent the flotsam of society, often of migrant origin (143) who have sought refuge in the central city areas from the winds of ridicule, censure and scorn generated by a strict, uncompromising, hierarchical social structure (144). Traditionally both "legitimate and illegitimate informal income" groups were joined from May 15th onwards by a regular seasonal influx of bullfighters and their cuadrillas (retinues), musicians, beggars, peddlars, confidence tricksters, churro and horchata salesmen, and a whole host of other itinerant streethawkers (145), attracted by the ferias and verbenas of the summer season (146). In recent years the Madrid municipal authorities have banned the traditional verbenas of the barrios bajos (although the feria de San Isidro still flourishes) on the grounds of crime, noise, nuisance and pollution, removing them to peripheral sites where they are less popular, thus reducing seasonal itinerant migration.

"Pseudo-urbanization" (temporary or permanent) is perhaps in relative decline in present-day Spain. If the percentage of the active population in the urban areas employed as unskilled workers, servants etc. and the unemployed increased by 1.3% between 1950 and 1964 (147), the number of small businessmen, "white-collar" workers and skilled workers increased

three to five times faster (148).

Spanish statistics, we have mentioned again and again, are often unreliable. At one place in this section of our thesis we have said that "pseudo-urbanization" in Spain appears to be increasing here that it is in relative decline. Statistics can be produced to prove either case; but where does the truth lie? Berry, taking statistics from Turnham and Jaegar to show that industrial employment is increasing by 4.4% per annum (149), and data from Kingsley Davis to show that urban growth rates are more than 5.0% per annum (150), has argued that the phenomenon of "pseudo-urbanization" characterizes the lesser developed countries, the bulk of new manpower being absorbed in casual and self-employment or in open unemployment (151). We believe that the rate of urbanization ceteris paribus has to be greater than the rate of industrialization. The former involves the transfer of both active and inactive dependent population from the countryside to the town; the latter mainly a straight transfer of active population from the other two sectors of the economy. The device employed here, therefore, to analyze the phenomenon of Spanish "pseudo-urbanization" is to adjust urban growth-rates by converting them into active urban growth-rates (see Table XL) (152). by subtracting the index of active urbanization from the index of industrialization and then multiplying the answer by one hundred it become possible to obtain average annual indices of industrialization and "pseudo-urbanization" for each period since 1900. A positive index indicates industrialization, while a negative index indicates "pseudo-urbanization". It will be seen from Table XL that only the 1931-1940 and 1941-1950 periods were characterized by chronic "pseudo-urbanization". Industrialization characterized all the other periods but was most rapid during the 1921-1930 and either the 1951-1960 or 1961-1965 periods (depending upon the sources consulted). Active urbanization has been most rapid from 1961 when the migration process gathered momentum. It is from

Table XL

ANNUAL INDICES OF INDUSTRO- AND PSEUDO-URBANIZATION IN SPAIN, 1900-1970

Period	A Industrializa- tion	B Tertiariza- tion	C Urbaniza- tion	D Active Urbaniza- tion	E Industro- and Pseudo-Urban- ization Ind. (A-D) • 100
	% change	% change	% change	% change	
1901-10	+0.118	+0.237	+0.280	-0.013	+ 13.1
			+0.325	+0.002	+ 11.6
1911-20	+0.539	-0.037	+0.369	+0.242	+ 29.7
			+0.325	+0.227	+ 31.2
1921-30	+0.947	+0.256	+0.418	+0.159	+ 78.8
1931-40	-0.765	+0.287	+0.594	+0.176	-117.8
1941-50	+0.143	+0.086	+0.327	+0.239	- 9.6
	+0.103	+0.205		+0.271	- 16.8
1951-60	+0.603	+0.192	+0.470	+0.172	+ 43.1
	+0.566	+0.253		+0.195	+ 37.1
1961-65	+0.716	+1.210	+0.990	+0.462	+ 25.4
	+0.870	+0.820	..	+0.352	+ 51.8
1966-70*	+0.622	+0.556	+0.946	+0.346	+ 27.6
	+0.684	+0.556		+0.346	+ 33.8

\* Based on estimated figures for 1970.

SOURCES: Fundación FOESSA, Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social de España 1970, Editorial Euramérica, Madrid, 1970, Table 3.59, p.169; M. Fraga Iribarne, J. Velarde Fuertes and S. del Campo Urbano, (ed.), La España de los Años 70, Vol.1, La Sociedad, Editorial Moneda y Crédito, Madrid, 1972, Table 4, p.21, and Table 3, pp.612-613; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Anexo al II Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Madrid, 1967, Table 16.1, p.267.

this date also that the most rapid rates of tertiarization occur. The available evidence points to a great growth in the tourist sector from 1961, but this does not necessarily mean the death of "pseudo-urbanization". Table XXXVIII showed that 89.47% of the unplanned transfer of labour from agriculture was incorporated in the service sector. There is empirical evidence which suggests that some of the unplanned transfer of labour was associated with an unanticipated growth of the modern tourist sector (153). Much of the labour in the tourist industry, however, is seasonal and casual (154). Moreover, there is more than a suggestion that some petty service personnel have transferred their attention from the provincial capitals

and metropolitan areas to the booming tourist resorts, at least during the holiday season (155). There is little to suggest that Colin Clark's law - that economic development in normal circumstances is accompanied by a transfer of active population first from agriculture to industry and then later from industry to services (156) - is operating with any force in Spain (157). Indeed, if statistics relating to the "index of relative increase" of service population (1960-1971) are taken the reverse appears to be true (158). The maximum increases per '000 active population (1960) occurred in some of the most backward provinces like Toledo, Guadalajara, Albacete, Cuenca, Orense, Badajoz, Granada, Cáceres, Huelva, Lugo, etc. This seems to indicate that "pseudo-urbanization" still flourishes in those provinces, especially in their provincial capitals (159). The relationship between net internal migration 1961-1970 and the "index of relative increase" of service population per '000 active population 1960-1971 proved to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = -0.573$ ) (160). This negative relationship seems to suggest that migration occurs by stages, firstly to provincial capitals where in-migrants are forced to find casual employment in construction (161) or the petty, personal services sector, with migrants then being "pushed" by a sense of dissatisfaction with their situation up the urban hierarchical ladder to national in-migration centres like Madrid or Barcelona. Confirmation of this migration by stages comes from an analysis of sixteen "agro-towns" (with over 20,000 population in 1970) which lost population between 1950 and 1965 (162). Despite strong out-migration (seven of the municipios losing between 11 and 30% of their 1950 populations), eleven "agro-towns" saw an increase in the percentage of their active populations engaged in industry while eleven experienced a parallel percentage increase in services. In Orihuela (Alicante), Baena, Priego de Córdoba, Puente Genil and Montilla (Córdoba), Baza (Granada),

Jumilla and Yecla (Murcia) expansion was greatest in the industrial sector. In Tomelloso (Ciudad-Real), Cabra (Córdoba), Guadix (Granada), Martos (Jaén) and Carmona and Osuna (Sevilla) the greatest growth occurred in the service sector. In Loja (Granada) the economic structure remained fossilized despite a 30% loss of population. In Alcalá la Real (Jaén) where a 32% fall in population occurred "ruralization" of the economic structure set in. Finally, further proof of migration by stages comes from the chabola population of Madrid (circa. 1967), of whom 51.25% had arrived from other urban centres and only 14.18% had come direct from their native villages (163).

(iv) Summary

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Spanish urban society still bears many characteristics of its rural origin. The "shared poverty system" of the countryside (164) has been carried over into the migrant communities of the towns (165). Twelve percent of the chabola families of Madrid in 1969 shared their hovels with one or two other families (19% in the lowest income group)(166). In the early 1960s it has been estimated that more than 600,000 families shared overcrowded accommodation in Spanish cities (167). Nor is the "shared poverty system" confined to working-class housing and the petty service occupations. Within the fields of administration and commerce generally there is gross over-manning (168). Spanish legislation guarantees security of tenure to all workers other than casual ones (169). Firms wishing to dismiss workers have to apply to the Ministry of Labour for permission first (170). Spain, therefore, in many respects occupies an intermediate position between that of a lesser developed and developed country. The mean correlation between urbanization and industrialization in lesser developed and industrialized countries (as calculated from Sovani's statistics) was  $R_s = +0.622$ , which approximates with the correlation between urbanization and industrialization in Spain (1901-1970)



of  $r = +0.524$  (171). Despite the fact that to some extent under-employment in the countryside is being exchanged for casual and self-employment in the towns, there is no proof that migration bears no relationship to urban economies and opportunity, as Mountjoy believes is the state operative in the Third World (172). Twenty indices of industrialization we have tested against net internal migration in this section of our thesis reveal an average degree of correlation of  $+0.513$ . The "pull" of industrialization appears to be about 10% stronger than that of urbanization in present-day Spain, nine indices of urbanization producing an average degree of correlation of  $+0.461$  with net internal migration. Eleven tertiarization indices revealed an average degree of correlation with net internal migration of only  $+0.356$ . In three instances where tertiarization indices were negatively correlated with net internal migration (although only once significantly so) there was some proof that "pseudo-urbanization" acted as a "push" rather than a "pull" factor. The broad implications of our research is that migrants are attracted in the first instance by industry, in a second more restricted sense by urbanization and only in a limited sense by tertiarization. The relative impact of "push" and "pull" factors on rural-to-urban migration flows will be discussed later in this work. Suffice it at this stage to say that the "push" from out of agriculture appears to be stronger than either the "pull" of industry or of services. The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage of the gross provincial income in the primary sector in 1962 was  $R_s = -0.666$  (see Table XXIII), compared with  $R_s = +0.556$  in the secondary sector and  $R_s = +0.457$  in the tertiary sector (173).

In our study of socio-economic "push" factors operating in agriculture we emphasized qualitative differentials both regional and otherwise. Our researches into socio-economic "pull" factors operating in the urban

areas in both the secondary and tertiary sectors confirm the importance of qualitative rather than of quantitative factors:

- (a) There was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of "urban" municipios as a percentage of the total number of provincial municipios in 1960 ( $R_s = -0.033$ ) (174). There was a correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the size and "degree of domination" of provincial capitals in 1960, which proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.462$ ) (175).
- (b) In the industrial sector the "pull" of large, well-known national and multi-national industrial concerns on potential migrants is well-documented (176). A statistically significant correlation at the 99% level of confidence was produced between net internal migration 1961-1965 and twenty-four provinces containing at least ten large industrial firms employing over 250 workers in 1963 ( $R_s = +0.638$ ) (177). When the qualitative aspect was removed the correlation between net migration and large industrial firms in all fifty provinces fell to  $R_s = +0.431$  (although it was still significant at the 99% level of confidence).
- (c) There was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the salaried labour-force as a percentage of total provincial active populations in 1962 ( $R_s = +0.172$ ) (178). Salaried migrant labour from the agricultural sector was obviously looking for upward social and occupational mobility in its innovating flight from the land (179). Initially it set its sights high, although later it was often forced through economic circumstances to seek salaried (sometimes casual) employment in the construction and petty service sectors. Neither was there a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the absolute provincial active populations in 1960

(Rs = +0.098) (180). When the qualitative factor of job potential was considered, however, a statistically significant correlation was produced between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the active population as a percentage of total provincial populations in 1962 (Rs = +0.627) (181).

(d) A further aspect of the qualitative factor was the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the "degree of bureaucratization" of active provincial populations in 1960 (Rs = +0.632) (182). An even stronger correlation was produced between net internal migration 1951-1960 and bureaucratization in 1950 (Rs = +0.664) (183), the implication being that not all migrants were forced to take low, badly paid jobs. While it should be emphasized that these statistically significant correlations relate to potential jobs the employment statistics referring to the immediate pre-migratory period in both instances, Pinilla de las Heras has confirmed the existence in Cataluña of "...another migration which is making its way mainly towards the technical and managerial jobs of the non-manufacturing sector" (184); few would doubt that such a movement is nation-wide as bureaucratization and desarrollismo has spread outwards in ever-increasing circles from Madrid.

(b) Occupational change, social mobility and the attractions of the "consumer society".

There can be little doubt that three of the strongest "pull" factors attracting rural-to-urban migrants are the prospects of upward social mobility through occupational change (185) and the magnetic appeal of the "affluent society" (186). It is our contention that these three factors are very closely interconnected in present-day Spain.

Before the connection between geographical mobility and social / occupational mobility can be proved or disproved, an objective, socio-economic occupational class-structure has first to be agreed upon. Such an objective

appraisal of Spanish society has bedevilled Spanish social scientists throughout the course of this century, partly because of their obsession with the size and composition of the "middle class" (187), and partly because of their reluctance to marry two social systems together - the rigid, hierarchical, "ascribed status", rural class-system and the more open, modern, "achieved status", industrial class-system" (188). In our opinion it is useless defining the rural élite unless they can be fitted into their correct place within the national stratificational structure. Granted that 0.86% of the landowners still possessed 53.5% of the land surveyed in the Catastro de Rústica, 1959 (189); granted that in many economically backward parts of Spain (especially in Andalucía and Galicia) well-established, agrarian oligarchical situations have fossilized around a small number of prominent families (190); los ricos of the average Castilian village are far removed from the Duques de Medinaceli rural élite (191). It is our contention that one national stratification system is at last emerging in Spain in response to modern, twentieth-century technology, the influence of the mass media and the ideological appeal of materialism enshrined in the "affluent society" cult (192), although it is not denied for one moment that "structural pluralism" based on "ethnocultural areas" (193), still characterize different parts of Spain (194).

The method adopted here in achieving a national occupational stratification structure is to measure the economic worth of fifteen socio-economic classes recognized by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística in terms of the realized acquisition of consumer durables - one composite "index of acquired, material wealth" being obtained from the possession or non-possession of ten consumer durable items (195). While it is realized that there are dangers in this method, the "upper working class" of industrial and urban Spain being more geared to the "consumer society" mentality than, for example, the "rural middle-class" (196), it is felt that this

objective approach is the only feasible one to adopt within our particular field of research (197). The use of 1968 "indices of acquired material wealth" has the added advantage of supplying data to measure post-migratory (1961-1965) social mobility and occupational change experiences. The fifteen socio-economic classes are listed in Table XII in descending order of importance within our objective occupational stratification structure, and cross-tabulated with educational status - although educational achievement is still not on a par with patronage as a means of attaining upward social mobility. It will be seen from Table XII that the "rich" land-owners (empleadores agrarios) had a realized economic worth of only about 58% of that of managing directors (directores de empresa y sociedades), while small land-owners (empresarios individuales agrarios) and agricultural labourers (obreros agrícolas) lie right at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. Clearly, geographical mobility for the rural middle and lower classes when it is associated with occupational mobility (i.e. movement out of agriculture) always involves upward social mobility (198).

Now that the fifteen socio-economic classes have been ranked in descending order of importance it becomes possible to calculate inter-generational occupational social mobility (see Table XLII) (199). The main conclusions reached are:

- (a) The rigidity of the class system within the agricultural sector, an average of 79.67% of heads of household within the three rural socio-economic classes having the same occupation as their father. Within the twelve industrial socio-economic classes only 24.0% of heads of household had the same occupation as their father.
- (b) Where "rich" land-owners (empleadores agrarios) were prepared to move out of agriculture upward social mobility was five times more likely than downward mobility (25% as opposed to 5%).
- (c) The lot of the small land-owner (empresarios individuales agrarios)

Table XII

NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL STRATIFICATION STRUCTURE: " INDICES  
OF ACQUIRED MATERIAL WEALTH" BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS AND  
EDUCATIONAL STATUS, SPAIN, 1968

Socio-economic class		Index A.M.W.*	Educational Status		Index A.M.W.*
1. <u>Directores de empresa y sociedades</u> †	30.7				
2. <u>Cuadros superiores</u> ‡	30.0	-----			
3. <u>Profesiones liberales y asimiladas</u> ‡	28.7	Higher education		29.9	
4. <u>Empleadores de la industria y servicios</u> ‡	26.6	-----			
5. <u>Empleados de oficina</u> ‡	22.3	-----	Secondary education		24.5
6. <u>Cuadros medios</u> ‡	21.2	-----	Intermediate education		22.1
7. <u>Empleadores agrarios</u> §	17.9				
8. <u>Empresarios individuales y trabajadores independientes de la industria y los servicios</u> ‡	15.8				
9. <u>Empleados subalternos</u> •	15.3				
10. <u>Obreros cualificados</u> •	14.5	-----			
11. <u>Personal de servicios</u> •	11.3	Primary education		12.3	
12. <u>Obreros sin cualificar</u> ¶	11.0				
13. <u>Inactivos</u> ¶	8.5				
14. <u>Empresarios individuales agrarios</u> *¶	8.0	-----			
15. <u>Obreros agrícolas</u> *¶	7.2	Illiterates		5.1	

Index A.M.W. - " Index of acquired material wealth".

\* Expressed as a percentage of heads of household possessing ten consumer durables (see f.195).

† Upper industrial class; ‡ middle industrial class; § upper rural class;

• upper lower industrial class; ¶ lower lower industrial class;

\* middle and lower rural class (after M. Navarro López).

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia, Vol.1, Tablas nacionales, Tables 2.1-2.4, pp.123-124, and Table 10.1, p.144.

is precarious. Of the three rural socio-economic classes they are the most tied to the land. Eight per cent have moved downwards to join the ranks of the agricultural labourers while only 5% have moved upwards.

- (d) The highest downward social mobility rate within the active population - of 31% - was experienced by the petty service class (personal

Table XLII

OCCUPATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY, SPAIN, 1968

Socio-economic class	Static status*	Upward mobility	Downward mobility
1. <u>Directores de empresa y sociedades</u>	13%	+87%	-
2. <u>Quadros superiores</u>	32%	+67%	- 1%
3. <u>Profesiones liberales y asimiladas</u>	31%	+62%	- 7%
4. <u>Empleadores de la industria y servicios</u>	38%	+58%	- 4%
5. <u>Empleados de oficina</u>	18%	+73%	- 9%
6. <u>Quadros medios</u>	18%	+66%	-16%
7. <u>Empleadores agrarios</u>	70%	+25%	- 5%
8. <u>Empresarios individuales y trabajadores independientes de la industria y los servicios</u>	30%	+64%	- 6%
9. <u>Empleados subalternos</u>	12%	+76%	-12%
10. <u>Obreros cualificados</u>	37%	+53%	-10%
11. <u>Personal de servicios</u>	9%	+60%	-31%
12. <u>Obreros sin cualificar</u>	26%	+55%	-19%
13. <u>Inactivos</u>	1%	+59%	-40%
14. <u>Empresarios individuales agrarios</u>	87%	+ 5%	- 8%
15. <u>Obreros agrícolas</u>	82%	+ 8%	-

\* Heads of household with the same occupation as their father.

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia, Vol.1, Tablas nacionales, Table 3.1, p.126; and Table XII.

de servicios). We have already referred to the "deprived", the "trapped" and the "downward mobile elements" of central city "slums of despair".

- (e) Fifty-five per cent of the unqualified industrial workers (obreros sin cualificar) at the bottom of the modern occupational class ladder must have risen from the ranks of the agricultural workers.
- (f) The upward social mobility rate from the three rural socio-economic classes was twice as high as the downward social mobility rate. Within the twelve industrial socio-economic classes, however, the upward social mobility rate was six times as high as the downward one.

What is not apparent from Table XLII is that while 55% of the fathers of present heads of household were agriculturalists (200), there have been very strict limits on upward social mobility. Only a slight loosening of the rigidity of the class systems, both traditional and modern, has occurred in recent years (201). Limited step-by-step upward social mobility has been the general rule:

- 1) Of agricultural labourers to unskilled industrial workers.
- 2) Of unskilled industrial workers to the petty service class.
- 3) Of petty service personnel to swell the ranks of office-workers (empleados de oficina).
- 4) Of office-workers to senior and middle management posts (202).

It should be emphasized that our findings are broad and general ones (203). In detail, many of the conclusions reached need to be modified. Giner has rightly observed that "whatever upward mobility there is in the working class is still outbalanced by the steady expansion of this stratum" (204), due in the main to heavy in-migration from the rural areas. Again Pinilla de las Heras has drawn attention to the fact that in Cataluña such factors as the size of firm, sector of economic activity, migrant and non-migrant differentials, etc., all affect upward social mobility (205).

So much for inter-generational occupational social mobility. It remains now to estimate present-day occupational mobility. Unfortunately the fifteen socio-economic classes recognized by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística in Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia do not conform perfectly with the five socio-economic groups recognized by the same Institute for internal migrants. The method adopted here has been to apportion the fifteen classes mentioned to one or other of the five migrant groups (206). The net internal migration statistics have also been adjusted (207). This becomes necessary because the unadjusted figures



include all migrants so that the inactive group is over-high when compared with heads of household statistics. Once these corrections have been made it will be seen that the statistics in columns B and C of Table XLIII are crudely comparable. It can be shown that the most migratory groups were

Table XLIII

A COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES FOR INTERNAL  
MIGRANTS 1961-1965 AND HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD 1968

Socio-economic class	A Int. Migrants (1961-5)	B Int. Migrants (1961-5)*	C Heads of house- hold, 1968
1. <u>Empresarios, altos cargos y profesiones liberales</u>	2.8%	6.1%	14.0%
2. <u>Empleados, dependien- tes y similares</u>	4.4%	9.5%	11.9%
3. <u>Personal de servicios</u>	1.9%	4.1%	3.6%
4. <u>Jornaleros</u>	30.4%	65.7%	54.9%
5. <u>Inactivos</u>	60.5%	14.6%	15.6%

\* Adjusted statistics.

SOURCES: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Migración y Estructura Regional, Madrid, 1968, Table 1.2.1., p.30; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia, Vol.1, Madrid, 1968, Tablas nacionales, Table 1.1, p.121.

the lower occupational classes, in this case petty, service personnel and labourers (jornaleros); while the least migratory group was the senior and middle management category (empresarios, altos cargos y profesiones liberales) (208). Since two out of three migrants come from a non-urban municipio, since 55% of the fathers of present heads of household were agriculturalists, and since 55% of the unqualified industrial workers at the bottom of the modern occupational class ladder in Table XLII must have risen from the ranks of the agricultural workers (including small land-owners), it can be safely assumed that (in the 1961-1965 period of more rapid than usual out-migration from the countryside) the vast majority of

the 65.7% jornalero migrant class\* from the rural areas. It would be equally safe to assume that the vast majority of these achieved their immediate aim of upward occupational social mobility by progressing to the rank of unskilled industrial worker (209). Increasingly more rapid flows out of the countryside between 1961 and 1965 were powered by the winds of "rising expectation" and the magnetic "pull" of the "consumer society". When "indices of acquired material wealth" for 1968 are tabulated, not by socio-economic class but by agricultural and non-agricultural household, by urban and non-urban categories, the statistics are most instructive and need no comment (see Table XLIV).

Table XLIV

INDICES OF "ACQUIRED MATERIAL WEALTH", 1968: CLASSIFIED BY AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD, AND URBAN AND NON-URBAN CATEGORIES

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(a) <u>Household category</u>			
<u>Agricultural</u>	7.65%	<u>Non-agricultural</u>	14.8%
(b) <u>Municipal category</u>			
<u>Mun.</u> under 2,000 pop.	7.70%	<u>Mun.</u> 10,001-50,000 pop.	12.75%
<u>Mun.</u> 2,001-10,000 pop.	11.45%	<u>Mun.</u> over 50,000 pop.	17.65%

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SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia, Vol.1, Madrid, 1968, Tablas nacionales, Tables 2.1-2.4, pp.123-124, and Table 9.1, p.143.

Castillo (referring to 1964 statistics) has written "... that our country does not yet find itself in the mass consumption stage: only some social classes in certain geographical zones enjoy 'a choice of conduct' (210). In the impoverished rural areas where that freedom of choice does not exist people have often chosen to migrate, the psychological attraction of the city being like a lamp which attracts moths by night. " In the eyes of the peasant", wrote de Roda y Jiménez in 1926, " the city is light and happiness" (211). The bright lights of the " consumer society"

have burnt much more fiercely in the consciences of the peasantry thirty years after 1926. Hardly surprising, therefore, that the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the index of "acquired material wealth" in 1968, as calculated at the scale of fifty provinces, should prove to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.670$ ) (212). The correlation with the four most representative consumer durables - washing-machine, refrigerator, television receiver and car - was a slightly lower  $R_s = +0.652$  (213). Turning to individual indices, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of telephones per thousand provincial population in 1966 was  $R_s = +0.791$  (214). The correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the number of cars per thousand provincial population in 1960 was  $R_s = +0.704$  (215), and between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of cars per thousand provincial population in 1967 an even higher  $R_s = +0.820$  (216).

The boundaries of the twelve socio-economic regions suggested in the Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia can be challenged. What cannot be disputed is the correlation between the per capita income in 1964 and the index of "acquired material wealth", as calculated at the scale of twelve regions, which was significant at the 99% of confidence ( $R_s = +0.874$ ) (217). The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the per capita income 1964, as calculated at the scale of twelve regions was  $R_s = +0.853$  (218). The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the index of "acquired material wealth" in 1968, as calculated at the scale of twelve regions was  $R_s = +0.790$  (219). A somewhat lower correlation, which was significant at the 95% level of confidence, was produced between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the four most representative consumer durables as listed above ( $R_s = +0.573$ ) (220).

Critics of the use of indices of "acquired material wealth" might

very well argue that only some social classes in certain geographical regions of Spain are geared to the demands of the "consumer society". The connection between internal migration and mass consumption patterns, however, is undisputable. The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the average annual per capita consumption 1964-1965, as calculated at the scale of fifty provinces, was  $R_s = +0.702$  (221), and when household was substituted for person it became  $R_s = +0.707$  (222). Varying mass consumption patterns for each of the occupational social classes are, in turn, related to specific salary thresholds. Three such thresholds suggested by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística for 1964-1965 show a correlation with net internal migration 1961-1965 which was significant at the 99% level of confidence, when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces. For households with an annual income of more than 36,000 pese-tas the correlation was  $R_s = +0.766$ ; for those with more than 60,000 pese-tas  $R_s = +0.788$ ; and for those with over 96,000 pesetas annually  $R_s = +0.754$  (223). Similarly, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the "index of potential savings" in 1965 was  $R_s = +0.847$  (224). Lest we forget the "push-pull" aspect of internal migration, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage of the household budget spent on food 1964-1965, proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = -0.522$ ) (225).

Fifteen indices associated with mass consumption have been tested against net internal migration 1961-1965 and revealed an average degree of correlation of  $+0.660$ . Acquired material wealth, be it in consumer durables or income, is a "pull" factor of greater force than industrialization, urbanization or tertiarization. The rapid spread of consumer patterns similar to those in more highly industrialized countries, has been accompanied by more rapid social change in the last two decades than in the whole of

the 1860-1950 period (226).

(c) Demographic "pull"

While Kenny has argued that urbanization in Spain can be correlated with falling reproductivity rates (227), and Díez Nicolás has proposed a provincial classificational scheme which links the process of "demographic transition" with economic progress (228), there is little proof in Spain (except possibly in the case of Barcelona) that lower urban birth-rates act as a demographic "pull" factor encouraging in-migration (although they may have done in the past). Demographic patterns in Spain are complex (229). Leasure has suggested that regional patterns of fertility in 1950 were quite independent of industrialization and urbanization (230). Between 1901 and 1941 the average number of children per thousand women of child-bearing age (15-44 years) fell by 45.80% in Spain as a whole. In the most highly industrialized provinces the birth-rate fell ~~more~~ rapidly than this, partly, Ruiz Almansa suggests, because of more women going out to work (231). Provincial averages, however, often mask reality. A DATA sample-survey in 1968 found no great difference between urban and rural fertility rates. Fertility, according to this source, was greatest in the poorest provinces; in the peasant classes; and in the highest and lowest income groups (232).

It has been argued that selective in-migration leads to an increase in urban birth-rates (233). Vitoria, the provincial capital with the most rapid rate of population increase during the 1950s, saw its birth-rate increase by 40.21% during the decade largely as a result of massive in-migration (234). Petersen, however, has argued that in the long-term in-migration will lead the natives of an area to lower their birth-rates(235). The argument put forward is that since there is an inverse relationship between class or occupational position and fertility, in-migration may actually hasten the decline of the native birth-rate by enabling natives

of towns to improve their social status (236). They are released from less-skilled and lower-paid jobs which are now occupied by migrants (237). In support of this theory rural exodus in the last decade has been accompanied not only by an expansion of blue-collar workers as a result of geographical, occupational mobility but also by an even greater expansion of a new, white-collar urban middle class (238). Moreover, Ros Jimeno, as early as 1946, found fertility in Madrid and Barcelona cities least in the middle classes and greatest (because of educational and religious differentials) in both extremes of the social scale (239).

In the 1961-1965 period, birth-rates per thousand population in Spain were higher in provincial capitals (26.30 per thousand) ~~than~~ the nation as a whole (21.26 per thousand). These findings are supported by evidence from each of the fifteen historic regions with the exception of the Basque country (Vascongadas) (240). Díez Nicolás has argued that the higher proportion of young adults in urban areas, consequent on in-migration, results ceteris paribus in crude birth-rates in cities being higher than in the countryside (241). Birth-rates are higher in provincial capitals than in municipios with over 200,000 population, we would suggest, not necessarily because of higher in-migration rates but because of the habit of women from other municipios of the province going to their provincial capital to give birth (242). It has been calculated, for example, that the urban birth-rate in the city of Madrid in 1972 was inflated by 28.57% due to this factor (243).

It can be shown that the relationship between migration and natural change components of urban growth vary regionally. While it can be shown that in the case of the city of Madrid the birth-rate per thousand inhabitants did not exceed the national average in the post-Civil War period until 1955 (244), the city of Barcelona despite massive in-migration has maintained a birth-rate below the national average (245), while in Bilbao

the exact opposite has occurred (246).

Internal migration, we suggested earlier in this thesis, is connected with past demographic indices not present ones. In urban areas with low birth-rates and no tradition of recent in-migration then it may very well be that demographic "pull" factors are important, but where there are rising birth-rates associated with past migrations - as in usually the case in the higher echelons of the urban hierarchy in present-day Spain - there can be no demographic "pull". Hardly surprising that net internal migration 1961-1965 should be negatively correlated with birth-rates during the 1931-1935 period ( $R_s = -0.724$ ) (247).

Notwithstanding, the Banco Urquijo has been able to estimate the demand for labour in Cataluña in both 1965 and 1970 with a fair degree of accuracy. This involved taking three factors into account. Firstly, deaths produced in the potentially active population resident in Cataluña during the period of study involved - 1961-1965 and 1961-1970. Secondly, forecasting male and female activity rates within the potentially active population. Thirdly, estimating the residual demand for labour which could only be satisfied by net internal migration, and, by implication, indirectly estimating net internal migration itself (248). The backward-looking calculation made in 1967, estimated the total mean hypothetical population in Cataluña in 1965 (including 193,117 estimated net migrants who had arrived between 1961 and 1965) as 2,049,186 (249), which was only 3.56% greater than that recorded in the Dinámica del Empleo, 1965 for the region, and therefore acceptable at the 95% level of confidence. The forward-looking calculation made in 1967 estimated the mean balance of labour to be supplied by net internal migrants (arriving in Cataluña between 1961 and 1970) to be 312,808 (250). Assuming a net migrant activity-rate of 45.63% in the 1966-1970 period like that recorded in the 1961-1965 period, this figure was only 0.16% greater than that given in official statistics of

the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, and therefore acceptable at the 99% level of confidence. The Ponencia de Desarrollo Regional has been less successful in estimating net internal labour migration for the 1967-1971 period. For Cataluña an estimated 258,500 net active migrants were expected to arrive during this period (251). Assuming a net migrant activity-rate of 45.63%, only 98,748 net active migrants arrived in Cataluña during the 1967-1971 period according to official statistics as issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (252). There is a 38.18% discrepancy between the two sources.

There can be little doubt that of the three variables associated with an accurate estimation of the demand for labour - mortality within the potentially active resident population, male and female activity rates, and net internal migration - the latter is the most elastic and the means whereby vacancies in the labour market are filled (253). Clearly here we are dealing with job availability statistics, an area of study which is only indirectly concerned with demographic "pull" factors.

(d) Climatic "pull"

Naylon, comparing regional disparities in Spain and Italy has drawn attention to parallels in the situation of Andalucía and the Mezzogiorno. It is, he writes, "as though latitude alone were sufficient to draw the line between progress and stagnation, affluence and poverty" (254). While it is true that only one of the nineteen provinces with a per capita income above the national average of 59,508 pesetas in 1970 was situated to the south of Madrid - namely Valencia (255); it is equally true, as one Spanish economist has noted, that "Italy is lucky. It has only the Mezzogiorno to support. We have a Mezzogiorno and a Scotland" (256) - and that Scotland (Galicia) has a northerly latitude. Clearly, latitude has little influence on the Spanish economy. Naylon, for example, emphasizes that many of the physical problems of Andalucía are shared by Cataluña (257).



It would be rather pointless, therefore, to apply a climatic adjustment to net internal migration flows as Kariel has done for the United States (258). If "climatic desirability" enters into the argument it is certainly not related to the position of the mean winter isotherm of 45°F (7.2°C) (259). If this isotherm were plotted for Spain it would correctly bring out the "pull" of periphery over interior (260) - although many of the southern interior provinces like Badajoz, Cáceres, Córdoba or Jaén share the high winter temperatures of the periphery (261). "Seasonal aridity", Houston has written, "constitutes probably the major factor of Mediterranean landscapes" (262). "The history of the problems of Spanish agriculture", Cánovas García has stated, "has revolved around the supply of water" (263). Brennan has drawn attention to the coincidence of areas of large estates and short-term leases with drought, of areas with small-holdings and long-term leases with sufficient precipitation (264). Only 22.4% of the surface of Spain receives more than 800 millimetres (31.5 inches) of precipitation annually (265); while applying Thornthwaite's formula only 21% of Spain is classified as humid (266). Here, to measure the climatic "pull" of moisture requirements, we have used Fundación FOESSA's índice de humedad agrícola utilizada (index of moisture utilized in agriculture), 1962. This index was significantly correlated with net internal migration 1961-1965 at the 99% level of confidence, when calculations were made at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.430$ ) (267). This produced a better correlation than the percentage of the provincial surface permanently irrigated in 1962, which was only significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.287$ ) (268).

The "pull" of the coastal periphery is perhaps understandable given the physical and socio-economic resources for the development of irrigation (269). Rural-to-rural migrations from secano to regadío are well-documented both here and towards the long-established, irrigated vegas of

interior regions. Mir de la Cruz has noted that 25% of the intra- and 62% of the inter-provincial migrants in Castellón are attracted to the rich agriculture of the coastal lowlands (270). Likewise, Higuera Arnal has drawn attention to the growth in population of semi-urban "irrigated villages" in Logroño like Haro, Cenicero, Rincón de Soto, Arnedo and Cervera mainly at the expense of villages over 700 metres above sea-level (271). It is an undisputed fact that under the first two Spanish Economic and Social Development Plans (1964-1967 and 1968-1971) the Dirección General de Obras Públicas (General Directorate of Public Works) and the Instituto Nacional de Colonización, ignoring the advice of the World Bank and Plan directives, have concentrated their resources on grandiose, expensive irrigation schemes in the interior (272). For at least twenty years (1939-1959) irrigation and land-settlement schemes were seen as the solution to the socio-economic problems of the over-populated, poverty-ridden, secano lands of the interior (273); with an average of one dam being completed monthly, Franco starring in the Nodo (cine newsreels) by inaugurating them, and Spain being converted into an artificial, lake-dotted Finland (274). We might ask whether such schemes have fulfilled their main function of absorbing surplus rural manpower.

Naylon has noted that regions are much more "open" than nations. Obstacles to hinder the free transfer of capital, labour, goods and services are usually lacking, with the result that a region's life-blood drains slowly but imperceptibly away (275). In such circumstances, how can regional development plans which are based almost exclusively on irrigation and land-settlement act as a brake on out-migration? Such schemes as the Plan Badajoz and Plan Jaén are costly (276), slow-working (277), unco-ordinated (278) and only indirectly related to national plans (279), and offer at best but a partial solution to rural problems. Any cost-benefit analysis would reveal that they are costly compared with results achieved and have

failed to trigger-off economic growth (280). Of 70,000 new jobs to have been created by the end of 1967 in the Plan Badajoz 57,500 (or 82.14%) were in the agricultural sector (281)! Between 50 and 75% of newly-irrigated land is retained by the latifundistas (282). Ninety per cent of the cultivated land in Badajoz will still be secano (283). In 1950, there were 640,000 people in the province of Badajoz earning 8 pesetas or less daily, and 260,000 with a daily income of less than 3 pesetas (284). In 1964-1965, 32.0% of family incomes in the province were less than 100 pesetas daily (compared with the national average of 22.5%); indeed 10.9% had less than <sup>\*</sup>minimum wage of 60 pesetas a day (285). While it is true that the conversion of secano to regadio increases production ten-fold (286); while it is true that the labour requirements of irrigated land is four to six times that of non-irrigated land (287); while it is true that the crude income per hectare rose from 3,000 pesetas (secano) to 17,000 pesetas (regadio) between 1952 and 1957 under the Plan Badajoz - the average individual income of a colono in the village of Valdecalzada rising from 17,000 pesetas annually in 1952 to 48,000 pesetas in 1956 (288); never has so much been spent on so few for so small a return (289). The rosy picture painted by Hills of "men who in their youth had been driven by the desperation of hunger into anarchism, were [now] living at peace with the world and comfortably off their produce..." (290) is rather misleading. The economically viable irrigated family-farm should no longer be 5 hectares (as it was in the 1940s when thoughts of land-hunger and reparto (share-out) still fogged the official mentality), but 20-30 hectares, 80-100 hectares or even more (291)! The empirical evidence suggests that newly-created irrigated farms are only large enough to satisfy the needs of first generation colonos (292). The Badajoz and Jaén plans have only a minimal effect, therefore, on reducing net out-migration flows (293). Firstly, second generation colonos migrate. Secondly, those agricul-

tural labourers without land migrate. Indeed, the higher standard of living (which working on an irrigated farm entails) (294) provides them with an effective financial springboard for future migration. Drain, for example, has shown that emigration is much higher from the irrigated valley of the Guadalquivir (in the province of Sevilla) than from the sierra (295).

Thirdly, latifundistas who had previously let land now begin to realize the full potential of newly-irrigated land. Increasingly, and especially in the province of Sevilla, they fail to renew tenancies getting rid of the colonos to work the land themselves using modern, mechanized methods (296). Fourthly, the vast majority - agricultural labourers without land - unable to wait 10-20 years for an irrigation scheme to be completed are eventually forced to migrate. In the 1940s, all fifteen partidos judiciales within the province of Badajoz gained population (although only four experienced net in-migration. In <sup>x</sup>1950s only seven partidos gained population (only two - Mérida and Badajoz where most of the newly-irrigated land was situated - showing net in-migration). Between 1961 and 1965, and in spite of the Badajoz plan, all fifteen partidos lost population - even the irrigated areas being characterized by net out-migration (297). All that can be said in favour of irrigation is that net out-migration was least from the vegas altas and bajas of the province - Badajoz losing 0.44% of its 1960 population by 1965, Villanueva de la Serena 2.44%, Don Benito 2.88% and Mérida 5.39%; compared with a maximum loss of 20.63% in Llerena partido, and 10.83% for the province as a whole (298).

Another aspect of the climatic "pull" factor has been seasonal labour migrations (emigraciones golondrinas) which have always formed a traditional part in Spanish agriculture (299). Borregón Ribes has distinguished between "emigración temporal" and "emigración golondrina"; the former being related to an economic cycle, the latter to a climatic cycle in which the first date of departure can be accurately forecast (300). Within Spain,

traditional seasonal labour migrations have been north-south - of flocks of transhumant sheep and their shepherds from Zamora, Salamanca and León, Soria, Segovia and Cuenca to Ciudad Real, Extremadura, Andalucía and back (301); of casual rice planters and harvesters northwards along the Mediterranean litoral (302). Other traditional movements have been from secano to regadío - the seasonal influx of migrants into the labour-intensive huertas of the Middle Tagus, Jarama and Henares reaching flood proportions in some instances in the mid-1940s (303). Wheat, sugar, olives, rice, grapes, oranges etc., all attracted migrant hordes at harvest-time, even when local labour was abundant (304). Not unconnected with the climatic cycle was the migration of "carreteros de carreteras" (305), of muleteers whose roots were in the open road ("raíz arriera y carretera") (306).

Despite the fact that by 1957 migrant seasonal harvest-workers had fallen to an estimated 6.25% of the total harvest labour-force (307), it is our contention that "circular migrations" linked to the climatic cycle are not dead, but merely diverted to new channels. There are also traditional migrations which still persist. More than 14% of the 1950 population of Acebo (Cáceres), for example, were away from the village for nine months of the year selling lace (encaje de Bolillos); while most of the men from Peñalver (Guadalajara) as recently as 1971, were away from the village most of the year selling honey (308).

Massive out-migration from the countryside of England and Wales between 1851 and 1871 increased the need for more seasonal harvest labour (309). While the Gang System continued to supply farmers with a cheap and plentiful supply of labour there was little incentive for mechanization to be introduced (310). There are parallels with mid-twentieth-century Spain. Massive out-migration has led to a shortage of labour and an increase in agricultural labourers' wages (311). Until at least 1957 high wages at harvest-time "pulled-in" hordes of seasonal migrant labourers. Regions

like Andalucía, where until recently cheap labour was plentiful, were the slowest to mechanize (312). Yet, there are contrasts with early nineteenth-century England, for much Spanish migration is "circular" in type and does not always involve a permanent movement from the countryside (313). Drain, for example, has noted that the decision not to migrate permanently from Andalucía is often related to seasonal emigration abroad (314).

The decline in seasonal labour migrations within Spain circa. 1957 was related to migration flows of this type being diverted to new channels. In that year a labour agreement was signed with France to take Spanish workers in place of Italians who had been switching to the more lucrative West German labour markets (315). The inflow of permanent Spanish workers to France increased by over 300% between 1955 and 1956 and by 162% between 1956 and 1957. The corresponding increase in seasonal Spanish workers was 211% in 1955-1956 and 69% in 1956-1957 (316). Seasonal emigration abroad did not affect Andalucía in a big way until 1962 (317), but, by 1965, 72% of the assisted seasonal migrants from Spain to the sugar-beet planting areas of France came from this region (318) - there being little work in Andalucía at this season (March to May) sandwiched between olive and wheat harvests (319). Andalucía accounted for 29.21% of assisted seasonal migrants to France in 1965 (320), the bulk of cheap labour in the French rice-fields coming from Valencia (73%) and Tarragona (19%). These two provinces together with Murcia, Alicante and Castellón accounted for 83% of the assisted seasonal flow to the French grape-harvests (321).

A second type of seasonal labour migration which has grown in Spain in recent years is what Spencer and Thomas call "labour transhumance" (322). Much of the labour in the tourist industry is seasonal and casual in nature, flows being clearly related to the "pull" of climatic factors (323). The tourist boom has even led to the seasonal migration of fishermen from Aguilas (Murcia) to holiday resorts and fishing ports along the

Costa Blanca like Villajoyosa, Campello, Calpe, Torrevieja and Santa Pola (Alicante) (324).

Occasionally, but only very occasionally, seasonal labour migrations have ceased due to the elimination of the problem of seasonal unemployment. this is often true in the areas of long-established irrigation as, for example, in the vegas around Logroño. Food-processing and slipper factories in the provincial capital provide winter employment for casual labour prepared to commute distances of 7 kilometres or more (325).

It is our contention that "ambulatism" (326) is ingrained in the Spanish rural character accustomed through long centuries of climatic hardship to migrate seasonally like the swallows. Far from dying out after 1957, seasonal labour migrations were merely diverted to new channels (327). In 1965, for example, seasonal assisted migrations to Europe (almost entirely to France) (328) totalled 108,712 (which represented 7.54% of the hired, agricultural labour-force in Spain in that year) (329). Wages and prices still vary considerably in Spain, not only demonstrating the physical isolation of some localities, but also their economic independence (330), which is still based on what Clout calls a "medieval scale of economy and mobility" (331). Where great differences continue to exist between casual labourers' wages at harvest-time then seasonal migration ought still to continue, unless it has been diverted elsewhere. In 1960 the annual salary of hired agricultural labourers in Western Andalucía averaged only 37.97% of that in the Asturias-Santander region (332). Again in 1971, according to statistics supplied by the Hermanidad Sindical Nacional de Labradores y Ganaderos for the June to September period, casual agricultural labourers' salaries in Huelva, for example, were only 31.91% of those in the province of Salamanca (333). It is even more profitable to emigrate abroad for an agricultural season of 3-4 months duration and then to return home to live on the "profits" for the rest of the year, as many Andaluces do (334). The

empirical evidence suggests that (in Andalucía at least) it is the married men of the older generation who partake in this seasonal movement to France; the young and the single taking the more drastic step of migrating permanently to Barcelona or Madrid (335). Even "semi-nomadism" (336), which is common among Andaluces, is related to the climatic cycle, for bridge-building, railroad, highway and tunnel construction, work on flood control schemes and storage dams, labouring on building sites, begging and scavenging around tourist resorts, or being casually employed in the tourist industry can be realistically considered "fine-weather activities" which are often more profitable than back-breaking work in the harvest fields.

(e) Political "pull"

Writing of the pre-conditions necessary for economic take-off Rostow noted that:

"Although the period of transition between the traditional society and the take-off saw major changes in both the economy itself and in the balance of social values, a decisive feature was often political" (337).

Agricultural progress is only an essential pre-requisite for industrial development in a closed economy (338). The recent Spanish "economic miracle" has largely been financed by capital from abroad. The government made foreign capital investment possible by liberalizing the economy in 1959, by encouraging emigration to Europe from 1956-1957 and by attracting international tourists to Spain from 1959 (339).

As far as migration is concerned, the first political moves were not deliberate ones but a consequence of the Civil War. The growth of urban population (municipios of 10,000 population and over) averaged 0.563% annually between 1931 and 1940, compared with 0.291% in the decade before the war and 0.352% in the decade after it (340). Although the 1940 Census



results are notoriously unreliable, there is sufficient proof that in certain war-affected zones population fled to the towns for greater security. Recent (1975) happenings in Phnom Penh and Saigon amply illustrate this factor (341). Some towns also acquired great numbers of soldiers because of their strategic importance - Zaragoza, for example (342). Equally, in many war-affected rural zones population was dispersed and did not always return after the conflict (343). In the battle of Brunete (Madrid), for example, which lasted for three weeks in July 1937, the village was completely destroyed; the Nationalists losing 12,000 troops and 100 planes, the Republicans 25,000 troops and 23 planes (344). Brunete lost 47% of its 1930 population between 1931 and 1940, while a further ten municipios in the war zone lost between 21 and 99% of their population, and many municipios to the south and east of Madrid gained in population (345). There is some justification also perhaps in assuming that in the "psychological war" when Madrid was bombed with loaves of bread (346) that some attempt was made to improve agricultural production and means of distribution within the Nationalist-controlled areas during the duration of the war, as, for example, during the Napoleonic War in England and Wales (347). Military service both before, during and after the Civil War (348), brought the raw recruit into contact with urban society often for the very first time. Since many thousands more were involved during the Civil War, there can be little doubt that this exceptional type of temporary migration prepared the way for more definitive moves later - the thought of going to the city being neither strange nor frightening to them (349). Before the Civil War few villagers (other than the rural élite) could have travelled further than the provincial capital, transport outside the village being still mainly by bicycle, mule, donkey or horse, or even on foot (350).

After the end of the Civil War deliberate attempts were made to control

population movements. Candel speaks of "la invasión del silencio" (the silent invasion) - the attempt of the victors to "decatalanize" the vanquished (of Cataluña) with three hundred persons leaving Jaén daily at the instigation of the Dirección General de Empleo (351). The available evidence is inconclusive. If attempts were made to "decatalanize" the region they were only half-hearted ones, for later officials were detaining all those in Barcelona bus- and railway-stations "con cara de paleta y maleta de madera" (with yokel faces and wooden suit-cases) and packing them off to where they came from (352). Again, Andalucés were usually sent to Cataluña to do their National Service (353) and often migrated there of their own volition later. The empirical evidence at least suggests that equally half-hearted attempts to tie population to the soil in the 1940s and 1950s failed (354) and were followed by measures to channel migrants from the population-surplus regions to the main national industrial regions (355).

After the end of the Civil War, special economic concessions were given by a centralist and authoritarian government to encourage the spread of industry on the Meseta as a deliberate attempt to undermine the economic supremacy of Cataluña (356). Madrid, already the national capital and centre of the transport system (357), was singled out for "favoured son" treatment. Banks and financiers who had actively supported the Nationalist cause were amply rewarded in one way or another, Madrid being converted in the words of García Delgado and López Muñoz into "la capital del capital" (358). By 1965, the Madrid banks had acquired 57.77% of the nation's capital. Such is their monopolistic control over the nation's secondary and tertiary activities (359) that the percentage of the country's limited companies having their headquarters in Madrid increases from 20.0% in 1940 to 27.6% in 1967, and their share of capital invested in this sector of the nation's economy from 42.3% to 49.6%. Such is the complex web of polit-

ical patronage, privileges, favours and "recomendaciones", such is the need for government "autorizaciones" and "permisos" that 48.2% of the nation's leading financiers and 46.7% of the country's most important heads of companies find it necessary to have their permanent abode in Madrid (360). This is the background to the deliberately induced birth of industrialization in Madrid in the late 1940s (361).

While all this was happening, official policies of the Ministerio de la Vivienda combined with those of private speculators and land-developers to usher-in a construction boom in Madrid from 1944 (362), a process which became self-feeding as more and more migrants were drawn in to work in the construction industry (363) - especially after 1954 when the government was forced to change its policies and subsidize the building of "cheap" housing for the masses (364). By these means Madrid became an "absurd megapolis" (365) situated in the middle of the "Spanish desert", five hundred kilometres from the nearest large seaport, lacking in raw materials and, initially, in sources of power, cut-off by high mountains and remote from other main markets. Artificially, deliberately, Madrid became (according to some sources) the most important economic force in the nation (366), the financial capital, the chief in-migration centre (367) - but a Madrid converted by the politicians, bureaucrats, financiers, speculators and land-developers from an earthly paradise:

"de Madrid al cielo y de allí un agujerito para poder verlo" (368) into a sprawling, polluted, congested metropolis. Madrid is a city "which grew like Topsy"; a city characterized by urban anarchy; a city suffering from an acute (almost deliberate) lack of planning (369), a cannibalistic city which has consumed its first and second green belts and which is in the process of devouring its third one (370).

The political bias towards Madrid is difficult to substantiate. One example will suffice as an illustration. If the population of the province in 1964 is compared with the number of dwellings "con protección oficial"

completed in that year (371), a positive bias of 100.11% is produced - compared with only 39.12% for the province of Barcelona! Valencia y Vizcaya, however, had similar figures to Madrid with 91.63% and 118.22% respectively, although neither was able to claim Castilian patronage. By 1970, Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia had lost their powers of attraction for the construction of this type of dwelling, recording negative indices of 10.60%, 37.94% and 80.00% respectively. Vizcaya (80.33%) continued to attract together with Oviedo (78.71%) and some of the first generation of "growth-poles" - namely Zaragoza (42.86%), Burgos (157.55%) and Valladolid (204.92%). If all dwellings "con protección oficial" completed during the 1964-1967 period are considered (372), 52.6% were in the five leading immigration provinces (1961-1970) of Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Vizcaya and Alicante, which, allowing for the discrepancies noted above, would appear to be crudely just.

In the post-Civil War period internal migration was minimal during the years 1940-1945. Net out-migration from Andalucía, for example, was less than 44,000 (373); net in-migration into the city of Barcelona totalling less than 36,000 between 1940 and 1944 (374). After 1945, as the economy slowly recovered, the population became more responsive to both climatic "push" factors and economic "pull" factors. A succession of poor harvests in Andalucía between 1945 and 1950 accounted in part for an increase of 269.34% in net out-migration from the region during the 1946-1950 period (375). Massive net in-migration into the city of Barcelona was greater in 1945 than in the whole of the preceding five years. Massive net in-migration before 1954, however, was only occasional. There was an increase of 258.81% in the number of net in-migrants to the city in 1945 when compared with 1944; an increase of 411.44% in 1948 when compared with 1947; and of 337.04% in 1954 when compared with 1953 (376). The capital city of Madrid which received 33,478 net in-migrants between 1946

and 1950 saw an increase in net in-migration of 255.44% in the 1951-1955 period (377), with peaks in 1954 and 1955. From 1954, migration movements in Spain began to respond to the more active role played by the State in expanding the national economy. Rapid industrialization was encouraged by the government from 1951 (378), a separate Ministry of Industry being set-up for this specific purpose. The next year saw major developments taking place to facilitate both the production and the distribution of electricity and the first attempts at regional planning in the Plan Badajoz. Foreign tourists were made increasingly welcome from 1951 and American economic aid was eagerly seized from 1953 (379). Yet all this was but a prelude to the orchestration of the economy which followed the liberalization measures of 1959. From 1954 net internal migration expanded in response to direct legislative acts. The 1954-1957 period, we noted above, saw a "construction boom" which was partly consequent on earlier migration waves, partly on direct legislative acts which drew-in hordes of new migrants. The 1964-1967 period saw the appearance of the First Economic and Social Development Plan and the "planned" transfer of labour from agriculture to the modern sectors of the economy. The government had never set in motion the first movement of population off the land after the Civil War, but once ignited the rocket motors proved difficult to control and gave too much thrust when the State attempted to open the throttle. Unplanned movements off the land during the duration of the Plan exceeded official forecasts by 11.67% (380), with the consequence that thousands of workers were forced to take up employment in the expanding tourist and bloated petty-service sectors.

From 1958, the government began to play a much more active part in labour relations (381) and in social welfare. There is much evidence that from this date rural-to-urban migrants began to migrate for social as well as economic reasons (382). Unemployment benefits were introduced in November 1959 but they did not extend to agricultural workers or to obreros eventuales generally (383). This became an attractive differential "pull" factor

for migrants, eventually forcing the government in 1966 to extend some at least of the urban welfare system to the countryside for the very first time (384). We cannot underestimate the illusion of being paid family allowances or social security benefits, nor the peace of mind which the protection of having health insurance brings. The great fear of the peasant is not unemployment (which is seasonal) but an accident or tuberculosis (385). The new minimum wage legislation in 1963 had little influence on migration, agricultural labourers' wages (when employed) being usually above the minimum official rate (386). Collective bargains (convenios colectivos) struck after 1958 often included additional social benefits for the lower-paid workers - for example attendance allowances ( "plus de asistencia" ) (387). The convenio colectivo of the 24th of July, 1970 which affected the 140,000 construction, glass and ceramics workers of the province of Madrid increased the "plus de transporte" to 15 pesetas and a "plus de distancia" of one peseta daily was added for each kilometre travelled over and above 8 kilometres (as measured from the centre of the Puerta del Sol) (388). Political measures of this type have not only facilitated the centrifugal movement of population in Madrid (which had already begun) but also the growth of new commuter flows like that of construction workers from the province of Toledo.

Despite the important political "pull" factors mentioned above there is some justification in surmising that some at least of the migration of population to the towns was to escape the social and political pressures within the countryside (389). Peasants felt that they could disappear into the anonymity of the rabbit-warrens of the barrios bajos of Madrid and Barcelona. A "voting with the feet" - type mentality developed which cannot be under-estimated after the loss of the Civil War by the clases bajas (working-classes).

Chisholm has noted the important role which governments have in helping or hindering the mobility of labour and capital (390). According to

Lluch and Giralt the liberalization measures of 1959 increased the attractive force of Barcelona (391). Be that as it may, it appears that from at least 1951 the government, in directing labour whenever possible to the national growth-centres of Madrid, Barcelona, Vizcaya and to a lesser extent Guipúzcoa provinces (392), seem to have ignored Myrdal's doctrine that "the play of the forces in the market tends to increase rather than to decrease the inequalities between regions" (393), in its desire to modernize the economy, to release surplus labour from the land, and artificially to close the "income gap" between developing and developed regions (394). The four provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa which had 12% of the national population in 1900 and 18% in 1950 had increased their share to 27.45% of the total by 1970. Despite some closing of the per capita income gap between the poorest and richest provinces between 1955 and 1970 (395), the tendency towards the concentration of population and production continued (396). The net capital transfer from backward to progressive regions noted by Insuén in 1962 (397), made financial aid for investment much more readily available in the urban / modern sector than in the rural / traditional one (even without the interference of governments) (398), thereby increasing regional and urban-rural disequilibrium as the national economy expanded (399), and, as a consequence the net flow of migrants, selective or otherwise (400). Indeed, it was the common complaint of Castilian peasants, with reference to the First Economic and Social Development Plan (1964-1967), "que nos han olvidado en Madrid" ("they have forgotten us in Madrid") and that the Plan "sought to develop that which was already fairly well-developed" (401).

Frightened no doubt of the history of "Paris and the French desert" repeating itself in Madrid (402), and taking a leaf out of the book of French planners, Spanish experts attempted to erect flood-dams to check the stage-by-stage flow of migrants beyond regional to national centres.

"Pôles de croissance" (403), were to become "agents of social and economic transformation" (404) - "polos de desarrollo y promoción industrial" - "trigger areas where investment and development would be concentrated" (405). The choice of location of the first generation of "growth poles" can be criticized on the score that there are large interior regions without any at all (406), while Zaragoza according to Isbert Soriano (director del Gabinete Técnico del Consejo Económico Sindical Nacional) (407) was situated in the Alto Ebro "prosperous" economic region - benefiting from "spread effects" emanating from Bilbao and Barcelona down the Ebro "economic growth-axis". The number of new jobs created by the end of 1970 in the seven "development poles" could not have amounted to more than 2.8-3.4% of the total expansion of the nation's active population between 1964 and 1970 (408). Despite the fact that they were located in zones of "relative development" (with a view to rapid results) (409), the number of new jobs created by 1970 varied from an equivalent of only 0.4% of the 1965 active population of the province of La Coruña to 7.92% in the case of Valladolid (410).

Analyzing the political effect of "growth-pole policies" on internal migration, net in-migration flows (per thousand inhabitants) fall into three categories. Net in-migration into Zaragoza and Valladolid during the 1964-1967 period increased by 146.67% and 137.32% respectively when compared with the 1960-1963 period. Zaragoza and Valladolid were already expanding industrial centres before selection, although it should be noted that increases into the national growth-centres of Madrid, Barcelona and the Basque country were only 74.40%, 28.43% and 27.96% respectively. In contrast, there was a 41.28% increase in net out-migration in Sevilla, of 53.33% in Burgos and 82.20% in Huelva. Pontevedra (411) and La Coruña formed an intermediate category with 39.29% and 15.09% decreases in net out-migration respectively. By 1969, Zaragoza and Valladolid were still the only two net in-migration "growth-pole provinces". Net in-migration (per thousand inhabitants) into



Valladolid had increased by 200.0% compared with 1964. In Zaragoza, however, a decrease of 71.43% had occurred (412). Although the other five "growth-pole provinces" were still net out-migrant ones, net out-migration had been cut by between 52.94% in Huelva and Pontevedra to 83.95% in Sevilla. It would appear that the "growth-pole policy" was beginning to bite for a corresponding decrease in net in-migration occurs in the national growth-centres with falls of 48.10%, 66.56%, and 77.02% for Madrid, Barcelona and the Basque country respectively in 1969 when compared with 1964 (413). As with per capita incomes a slight closing of the gap must be weighed against the cumulative gain in absolute number of migrants in the traditional receiving-centres.

According to Kayser (414), while the deliberate industrialization policy of the "development poles" does create new industrial development there is little chain reaction and certainly no obvious manifestation of a "growth mentality" (415) among local business-men. Traditional industries tend to decline, he says, and feverish activity in the building industry (416) flares up only to suddenly fade away. Despite a valid criticism of the unco-ordinated nature of "growth-pole planning" (417), at the very least the policy of containment of population in certain regional centres was much more successful than that of accommodating "overspill population" from Barcelona and Madrid in remote polígonos de descongestación (418).

Despite the creation of five new "growth-poles" between 1970 and 1972 (419), despite the greater emphasis on selectivity in the Second Economic and Social Development Plan (1968-1971) and especially on the social problems of the countryside (420), the out-flow of migrants from the rural areas of Spain diminished but little (421). To a certain extent the Third Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1975) abandoned some of the policies of the first two Plans although still paying lip-service to the ideal of reducing inter-regional imbalances in living standards. The

"growth-pole strategy" in particular has been abandoned (although investment was still continued in those already created), and a hierarchical, urban approach adopted to problems of regional development. To a certain extent the sub-division of the urban hierarchy was based upon the five-fold one developed for the second Plan (422), although complicated through the downgrading of polos de desarrollo y promoción industrial and polígonos de decongestión, the appearance of new "areas metropolitanas de primer rango" (first rank metropolitan areas) (423) and "metrópolis de equilibrio" (424), and the complication of "Great Areas of Industrial Expansion" "Great Tourist Areas" and new planned cities, while at the rural level proto-urban settlements of strategic importance were to be developed as "cabeceras comarcales" (425).

Theoretically then, more dams have been constructed to contain population and more channels to divert out-migration flows away from the major national in-migration centres (426); but, with the Spanish genius for the grandiose and the complicated, it seems obvious that migratory movements to the "Great Metropolitan Areas" will continue to be encouraged by the over-concentration of scarce national resources on improving the social conditions of such areas (427). With more and more migrants moving for social reasons, it seems once more that the state will play a prominent role, as it has done in the recent past, in initiating (not always deliberately) and channelling migratory flows. One thing is certain, that while a state of disequilibrium exists between one province or region and the next, and while industrial development is still "related to the lack of inter-regional balance" (428) migration is bound to continue. In such circumstances, the dream of the Fourth Economic and Social Development Plan (1976-1979) that "Labour should not have to move to the capitals, but the capitals to the labour" (429) might very well remain a Spanish "pie in the sky" - "well-suited to the national temperament of "mañana"

and big dreams" (430).

(f) The "pull" of communications

(i) Education

Adams has shown that even educated urban residents have limited mental maps of the city in which they live (431). It seems plausible, therefore, to argue that uneducated rural residents will have even more limited mental maps of the spatial distribution of opportunities. Thus Chambers and Mingay refer to a state of "deep ignorance of any kind of life more than ten or twenty miles away" (432), which existed in southern England until the middle of the nineteenth century. Similarly, Bogue and Zachariah found that in mid-twentieth-century India the propensity of rural folk to migrate to urban areas within the sub-continent was much higher among the literate and the educated, (433). Clearly education makes rural dwellers aware of the urban environment as well as the attractions of city life. Thus the registrar-general in his Thirty-Second Annual Report of 1871 was able to pin-point "the increasing knowledge of workmen" (434) as a factor facilitating the flow of labour from rural to urban areas. Increased knowledge and universal primary education sounded the death knell of that "deep ignorance" which traditionally existed in rural society. Massive migration in many countries, we have seen, begins in the more industrialized, more urbanized areas; rural-to-urban migrants in these regions being better-educated and better-informed.

In Spain, as in all countries, lack of educational knowledge acts as a mental block on migration. As illiteracy rates have fallen so out-migration from the countryside has increased. Compulsory primary education (for six to nine year olds) began in Spain from 1857 (435). From this date literacy became a factor of great importance in migratory movements. In a crude and approximate way it becomes possible to correlate sudden spurts of educational interest with profound economic and social changes

taking place in Spain (436). The first "spurt" in the number of students registered ("matriculados") for the Bachillerato General (secondary education) course occurred during the 1860-1863 period when an annual increase of 10.69% was recorded. This coincided approximately with the first period of rapid urbanization, industrialization and migration in Spain. The second "spurt" occurred in the 1927-1932 period when the annual increase was 16.76%. This followed the 1911-1920 decade of rapid urbanization, industrialization and migration, the empirical evidence suggesting that the economic and political troubles of the 1930s in no way detained the process of urbanization or the drive towards more widespread literacy (437). The surge in educational interest stimulated under the reforming zeal of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), in part prepared the way for a better-educated rural proletariat to be unleashed on the cities in greater numbers than ever before during the post-1945 period. The third "spurt" occurred during the 1950-1955 period when an annual increase of 8.64% in the number of students registered for secondary education was recorded, becoming after 1960 (like migration itself) a fully sustained roar as the planners liberalized the economy and the processes of modernization gathered momentum (438).

Empirical evidence suggests that migrants are not a random sample of the population, education being one important selective variable. According to the Encuesta de Población Activa 1965 7.7% of the population (over the age of fourteen) were illiterate (439). Statistics of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística for the 1961-1965 period indicate that only 4.22% of recorded internal migrants (over the age of fourteen) were illiterate (440), and the percentage is falling - statistics from the same source for the 1961-1963 period indicate a figure of only 3.99% (441). In Andalucía, however, official illiteracy rates are rather misleading. The "effective" rate is increased through many poor Andaluces failing to complete their primary education and lapsing into effective illiteracy (442).

The null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between illiteracy and internal migration must be rejected. The relationship between illiteracy rates per 10,000 population in 1968 and net internal migration 1961-1965 was tested at the level of fifty provinces and found to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.500$ )(443). Literates are not only more likely to migrate than illiterates but also to travel further. In an era when recorded internal migrant illiteracy rates averaged 4%, only 0.52% of the migrants arriving in the city of Madrid in 1968 were illiterate, in 1969 only 0.48% and in 1971 only 0.27% (444).

Massive out-migration in Spain first began from the "demographic heartland" of Old Castile-León. In 1880 only thirty-one provinces had over 50% of their populations (between 4-14 years old) registered for primary education. The average for the eleven provinces of Old Castile-León was 71.33%, which was superior to Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and Vizcaya and surpassed only by Avila. In Andalucía, from which there was little out-migration, only Sevilla had more than 50% of its population of school-age registered for primary education. By 1932 the position had hardly changed. Only thirty-three provinces had over 50% of their school-aged populations registered for primary education. The average for the eleven provinces of Old Castile-León was 72.90%, which was surpassed only by Madrid and Guadalajara. Córdoba had replaced Sevilla as the only province in Andalucía with over 50% of its population registered for primary education, and there was still little net out-migration from the region (445). "The contemporary schoolmaster", wrote Aznar in 1930, "is an unconscious agent of the depopulation of the countryside" (446). Without actually desiring it, the village schoolmaster - by making the children aware of the attractions of modern society - produces a growing feeling of contempt for work on the land, Aznar believes (447). Emrys Jones has noted that education

was an escape-route from Welsh rural communities as well as a means of attaining status (443). The evidence from the traditionally high birth-rate provinces of Old Castile-León is that education was not so much a psychological escape, as Aznar suggests, but rather an escape valve to relieve the pressure of population on meagre resources (449). The small shopkeepers and landowners of Old Castile-León educated their sons and daughters to leave. Some were educated for the priesthood, others for the army. Elementary education prepared girls for service and boys for apprenticeships - or, if they had sufficient social standing, for careers as funcionarios or guardias civiles (450).

By 1951 the pattern of elementary education on the map of Spain had hardly changed. Only twenty-seven provinces now had more than 50% of their populations of potential school age registered for primary education. The eleven provinces of Old Castile-León had increased their average percentage to 75.93, which was against the overall national trend. Almería had replaced Córdoba as the only "enlightened" province in Andalucía. Surprisingly there is no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the percentage of provincial populations (six to seventeen years old) registered for primary education in 1951 ( $R_s = -0.132$ ) (451). These findings are confirmed by net internal migration statistics for the 1961-1965 period which showed no significant correlation with the percentage of provincial populations (six to thirteen years of age) registered for primary education in 1965 ( $R_s = +0.150$ ) (452). Clearly, although education itself may broaden horizons, primary education facilities do not act as a migrational "pull". Indeed, the prospects of finding a vacant school place is more likely in demographically declining out-migrant provinces than in Madrid or Barcelona where the authorities have been unable to cope with the social costs of the post-war migration avalanche (453).

Turning to secondary education, the provinces of Old Castile-León still led the way in 1863-1864 - showing the valuation placed on education by the "traditional" middle-classes - (454) although less markedly so than was the case with primary education, the rural élite in the latifundio zones of the south and the middle classes of the large urban areas also appreciating its value (455). By 1950 the educational pattern had crystallized into two social as well as economic Spains:

- 1) All of the provinces with over 1% of their total population registered to study bachillerato general in 1950 - with the exception of Valencia - lay to the north of Madrid (456).
- 2) Only ten provinces had over 50% of their populations (eleven to fourteen years old) registered to study bachillerato elemental (457) in 1967, and they were all northern ones including Madrid (458).
- 3) All of the provinces with over 65% of their populations (six to twelve years old) registered for primary education in 1951 - with the exception of Cáceres - lay to the north of Madrid (459).
- 4) A block of fourteen provinces, including all eight Andalusian ones, Badajoz, Ciudad Real, Albacete, Murcia, Alicante and Cuenca, with illiteracy rates of over 20% in 1950 - all lay to the south of Madrid (460).

The line of division, which runs approximately to the south of Salamanca-Madrid-Alicante, separates not only socially and economically developed and deprived Spains (461) but also delimits "religious" and "non-religious" Spains - a factor of key importance in the educational history of the peninsula (462). The line of division is to some extent illusionary. The division between "modern" and "traditional", "urban" and "rural" exists also at a micro-level. As far as education is concerned facilities for studying bachillerato are usually centralized in provincial capitals (463), size of municipio of origin (as well as social class) being an

important educational differential (464). Elizaga in a study of non-dependent migrants in Greater Santiago (Chile) found 9.5% of his male and 10.4% of his female interviewees giving "education" as a reason for moving to the "primate city" (465). Rarely is "education of the children" given as the most important motive for migration in Spain (466). Until recently, primary education alone remained within the grasp of the average Spaniard (467), and that, to a greater or lesser extent, was available locally (468). In Old Castile-León, we have seen, parents prepared their children to emigrate by giving them the best education that they could afford. In southern Spain, peasants fleeing with their families from an immediate economic crisis pay less attention to social motives (except those connected with welfare) (469). It is probably true to suggest that, in an atmosphere of rising expectation (470), more peasants than formerly (especially from the south) would be prepared to migrate to the provincial capital or distant metropolitan area in order to give their children a chance of obtaining adequate secondary education. The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of students registered to study bachillerato general per 10,000 provincial population in 1960 was, correspondingly, significantly higher ( $R_s = +0.645$ ) (471) than that between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the number registered in 1950 ( $R_s = +0.486$ ) (472).

(ii) The mass media

Increasing technology plays an important role in diminishing intervening obstacles - one of the most important of which is rural ignorance. Universal education has still not been achieved in Spain. It was estimated in 1967 that 31% of the population over the age of eighteen (who had completed their education) had reached a level of "less than primary" (473). Mass communication media to a certain extent help to fill some of the educational gaps, although probably only the sufficiently educated are able



to make effective use of the information given (474). It is doubtful whether the rural masses are sufficiently educated. While the percentage of illiterates amongst the rural population has fallen dramatically over the last three generations, the number of rural-dwellers with only primary education has stagnated at 85% (475). A Servicio Sindical de Estadística survey in 1962 found that only 8.1% of families in municipios with 3,000 population or less read a daily newspaper regularly (476), the average for Andalucía being only 4.0% (477). What is more the influence of newspapers is further reduced through a lack of public confidence in the press as an independent news medium. An Instituto de la Opinión Pública survey in 1966 revealed that 65% of the people interviewed did not believe the news which they read in the newspapers (478). Notwithstanding, the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage of families in municipios with 3,000 population or less who read a daily newspaper regularly in 1962 was significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.451$ ) (479). The circulation of newspapers in Spain as a whole increased from sixty-seven per thousand population in 1953 to one hundred and fifty-nine in 1967 (480). The influence of newspapers probably increased, therefore, especially after the "relaxation" of press censorship after 1962 (481).

It is more difficult to assess the importance of radio. While it is true that radio stations have fairly restricted service areas (482) and that little serious information of any use to a prospective migrant is given out - especially about a distant national in-migration centre which lies outside the service area of the local station, it is equally true that most Spanish homes now possess a radio and even the occasional listener is open to the incessant manipulative influence of mass consumption propaganda. Many radios and transistors are only <sup>\*</sup>recent purchase, however, the Encuesta Rural of 1962 revealing that only 34.5% of Spanish homes in municipios of

3,000 population or less possessed such items (483).

In contrast to radio, television services are of national coverage. Unlike the cinema which deals mainly with "far-away countries" or, to the peasant, politically-biased and irrelevant news items, television spells out the attraction of Madrid and Barcelona; while, through the medium of the T.V. commercial, the peasant is transported into the kitchen or the living-room of the middle-class urbanite and made fully aware of a superior life-style. Possessing a television receiver brings great social prestige upon the village or the individual villager which has one (484). In 1962, only 8 out of every 1,000 rural households possessed a T.V. set (485), but its influence is out of all proportion to the number of receivers owned. Most villages have at least one set now (the limiting factor being only the lack of an assured electricity supply) (486), and, unlike radio the popular T.V. programmes have avid audiences that hang upon every word that is spoken. Television is the one mass communication medium which has the greatest effect on ignorant peasants. They may not believe what they read in the newspapers or hear on the radio, but they cannot ignore the evidence of their own eyes. In 1926, de Roda y Jiménez wrote of migrants recently-arrived in the city writing to their relatives and friends "of fantastic riches, of a life of pleasure and luxury etc." (487). It may have been that some of this propaganda bore fruit in the minds of some of the most ignorant and credulous of rural cultivators, but the vast majority dismissed such reports as the work of "fantasmas" (escapists) and "fanfarrones" (braggarts). Now it is there for all to see. Television is revolutionizing the social life of villagers, with even the women flocking to the bares and tabernas as never before to watch T.V. (488), while at the same time "tele-clubs" are springing up all over "comarcas de ordenación rural" (489) and elsewhere. Between 1958 (when television first made its appearance in Spain) and 1972, the number of

receivers increased from 0.2 to 130.4 per thousand population (490), to reach an estimated 60-70% of the population (491). The decade of the 1960s is thus an era of rural enlightenment when the role of television in stimulating internal migration flows cannot be under-estimated. A great expansion in the number of receivers in 1960 and 1961 cannot be unconnected with the great increase in internal migration in 1962 (492). To a certain extent the change in migration flows after 1964 is connected with increasing prosperity in the countryside. While the number of families possessing T.V. sets increased by 11.5% between March 1968 and March 1969 the greatest increase was experienced by agricultural families with a growth of 22.9% (493). The correlation between the absolute annual number of internal migrants (1962-1971) and the annual percentage increase in the number of T.V. sets licensed per thousand population during the same period was tested at the national level by means of Kendall's rank correlation coefficient and found to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +0.467$ ) (494).

(iii) Rail and road communication

The role of the mass media has been to make peasants increasingly aware of opportunities in the outside world beyond the pales of their rural parishes. It is the function of road and rail communication to make physical contact with the outside world so much easier leading to what Janelle has termed "time-space convergence" (495).

There can be little doubt that in both nineteenth-century Western Europe and North America railways played an important part in transforming society and re-distributing population (496). It was the railways on the one hand that put an end to the isolation of rural life and encouraged rural depopulation after 1840 (497); it was the railways and fixed steam-driven machinery on the other hand that contributed to the increasing "concentration" (498) of economic activities in the towns (499). It was

the railways which increasingly contributed to the long-distance mobility of labour - the spread of the Irish in England and Wales, for example (500). Yet, it is an undisputed fact that, with the exception of London, sixteen other large cities in Great Britain with over 100,000 population grew most rapidly before the railway age (501).

In Spain, the first railway lines linking Barcelona and Mataró and Madrid with Aranjuez were opened in 1848 and 1851 respectively (502). During the nineteenth century the maximum period of urban growth in the city was between 1845 and 1857 with an annual growth-rate of 3.0% (503). This was before the Plan Castro of 1857, and it pre-dated the great rail boom era of 1857-1868 when an average of 596 kilometres of track was laid annually (504), population growth falling to 2.07% annually between 1857 and 1877 (505). Similarly, the city of Barcelona lost population between 1842 and 1854 (506), then increased by only 3.88% between 1854 and 1857 (507). Rural depopulation (at a provincial level) decreased dramatically between 1860 and 1877 (508), the 1865-1875 period being one of economic stagnation with an average of only 49 kilometres of track being laid between 1867 and 1875 (509). At all events, unlike England and Wales where rail transport was relatively cheap (510); it is unlikely that many Spanish migrants could afford to travel by rail before the 1880-1884 period (511). It is all but impossible to assess the importance of rail communication as a factor in inducing in-migration during the "paleo-technic era" (512), which lasted in Spain until 1930 or 1940. Medina del Campo which became a "rail-town" in 1860, saw its population increase between 1860 and 1877 by 0.95% annually, before falling into economic decline between 1877 and 1900. Although it remained a net in-migration centre of minor importance until 1930, the partido of which it formed a part was strongly net out-migrant (513). Venta de Baños, another "rail-town", experienced only a modest increase in population until the station

was upgraded in 1922. Population growth accelerated from 0.4% annually (1901-1910) to 9.4% (1911-1920) and a massive 47.23% (1921-1930) (514). The partido judicial of Alcázar de San Juan remained a strong in-migration centre until 1930 largely due to the function of its "capital" of the same name as a rail junction centre (515). In Alcalá de Henares, which also saw the arrival of the railway in 1860, the picture is complicated by the withdrawal of the University to Madrid in 1836 and its choice as a "garrison-town". Thus the population grew by 8.02% annually between 1842 and 1857, by only 2.04% in the 1857-1877 period, and by a mere 0.44% between 1901 and 1930 (516). In most instances the death-knell of the "paleo-technic era" in Spain is heralded by strong net out-migration from "rail-towns" generally, although Venta de Baños is an exception to the general rule. In 1964, the peak year for internal migration in Spain, motor coaches carried 65.21% of the regular internal passenger traffic in Spain (517) and were therefore more likely to have been used by migrants than the railways (518). It is our hypothesis, therefore, that there is little or no correlation between net internal migration and rail communication at the present time, although few would doubt its importance as an accelerating factor in the past - especially in Old Castile-León where the rail network was relatively dense (519) and out-migration massive for mainly other reasons. In 1962, 46% of all Spanish municipios had a railway-station near them (520), although Ruiz Almansa had unearthed the fact that 85.0% of municipios with 1,000 population and less had no railway-station in 1941-1943 compared with 69.7% for those with between 1,001 and 15,000 population (521). The null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and municipios with a railway-station near them in 1962 must be accepted. When tested at the level of fifty provinces the relationship was only  $R_s = -0.002$  (522).

The "neo-technic era" in Spain evolved through two stages. In the first stage there was a rapid development in the use of electricity, even in rural areas (523). The 1898-1910 period saw the electrification by autoproducers of nearly every watermill in the country, with surplus power from local industry being used to light up "the secular darkness of villages which had known no other light but the tallow candle and the oil lamp" (524). The most important effect of electricity was to liberate urban population and industry from "paleo-technic" locational constraints (525). The intense programme of electrification of the central zones of metropolitan cities like Madrid and Barcelona (completed between 1898 and 1901) was followed by the evolution of the "street-car suburbs", although in the case of Madrid at least the typical star-shaped form (526) was already in existence in 1875 thanks to the introduction of the first horse-drawn trams in 1871 (527). The opening of the Metro, in Madrid in 1919 and in Barcelona in 1924, together with the development of the internal combustion engine completed the process of "deconcentration" (528) or suburban sprawl. The second stage of the "neo-technic" era was much slower in reaching the countryside. In 1969, only 12.08% of cars registered in Spain belonged to a rural household (529); 38% of the rural élite (the empleadores agrícolas) owning a car in 1968 compared with only 1% of agricultural workers (530). Guadalajara and Cuenca were the first two provincial capitals to have regular coach-line communication with Madrid (531), but the village bus was relatively rare before 1930. Ruiz Almansa in a survey conducted in 1941-1943 (532), found that 58.3% of villages with less than 1,000 population and 47.1% of those with 1,001-15,000 population had no regular coach-line service. Hardly surprising, when 127 municipios in Guadalajara alone circa. 1960 (or 37.80% of the provincial total) lacked communication with the outside-world (533)! After fits of frenzied highway construction in the 1800-1808 and 1856-1868 period (534), the first

class road was relegated in the official mind below the more "fashionable" railways and little was added to the national network other than carreteras comarcales y locales (regional and local roads) until the time of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) (535). Incidentally, Old Castile still comes off best in terms of road density per kilometre (536).

In recent years, emphasis has been on inter-city and tourist routes mainly through the ambitious REDIA and PANE plans (537), although some concern has been shown also for improving the modality of cabeceras comarcales. Yet, Ruiz Almansa found that 13.5% of municipios with less than 1,000 population were without roads in 1941-1943 compared with 4.4% of those with between 1,001 and 15,000 population (538), and the position had hardly changed by 1971. An official survey of 1,491 municipios (containing 44% of the Spanish population) made in that year found that 13.2% of the villages studied did not have roads (539). The relationship between the 86.8% which were connected to the outside world by roads in 1971 and net internal migration 1961-1965, was tested at the scale of fifty provinces and proved to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.811$ ) (540). These findings would appear to confirm Siguán's statement that "communications precipitate emigration, because contacts increase as, therefore, do comparisons, and, moreover, because they facilitate displacements (541) "of population". A Fundación FOESSA survey of housewives in 1969 found that visits to Madrid, Barcelona or the provincial capital were least frequent from the rural areas. Moreover, frequency of contact with the provincial capital depended upon economic development (542). Twelve per cent of housewives interviewed who lived in provinces which were still in the pre-industrial stage said they had never visited the provincial capital, compared with only 1% of housewives from provinces which were in the industrial and post-industrial stages (543).

Rose has remarked that although "economic development pushes people

out of agriculture... in a more static society peasants are too tradition-bound to emigrate until they have had some experience with city life" (544). Education, the influence of the mass communication media especially television, the intergration of rural and urban economies consequent on industrial-urban development (545), improved physical communications - all these help to break-down the "static society" and give the peasant some indirect experience of urban life.

(iv) Personal communication

Sociologists have emphasized the revolutionary rather than the evolutionary aspects of the process of social change. Given that the "before-and-after" dichotomous framework (546) adopted has certain basic flaws (547), nevertheless the polar distinctions made by Tönnies between pre-industrial and urban-industrial societies serve some useful purpose here. Tönnies argued that rural society was based upon kinship and a community of interests - a state which he christened "Gemeinschaft" (or community). Primary groups are more important in rural society, relationships are more personal, intimate, and, above all, face-to-face than in the city. Associative relationships - "Gesellschaft" (society or association) - are more important in the urban environment. Specialized interests predominate; relationships are more impersonal, more formalized (often contractual) than in rural society (548). The point being made here is that peasants are unlikely to be finally influenced in migration-decision situations by some indirect experience of urban life (549). It is the instinctive reaction of most Spaniards, but more especially rural ones, to mistrust all things official (550). Direct and frequent information on conditions of life in the city are supplied through military service and more frequent visits to the provincial capital; while, for those who do not often leave the village, there are face-to-face situations with those that have in informal gatherings at the fuelle, lavadero, taberna or plaza mayor (551), while



there is also the visible example of those that have prospered in "la vida por ahí" (552) and returned to the village on holiday or for the fiesta mayor. Leslie has noted that "it would be difficult to find a single African who arrived in Dar-es-Salaam knowing not a soul" (553). Can we honestly believe that it would be any different in Barcelona or Madrid? For the majority of prospective migrants it is a relative or a friend already established in the city who encourages them or offers them material help. "Without that 'pull'", Siguán emphasizes, "they would never decide" (554). The enigrant kinsman thus plays a crucial role in the migration process. Freeman has suggested that "because enigrants assume roles in both worlds at once and move with frequency between the two physical settings, they are perhaps the most important vehicles of constant communication between different segments of the society..." (555). It is possible to test these theories at the scale of fifty provinces and to show that the correlation between net migration and forasteros (or non-natives) improves over a period of time, as more and more relatives and friends of prospective migrants establish themselves in the main in-migrant centres. The relationship between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the percentage of those born in provinces other than the one where they were censused in 1940 was  $R_s = +0.586$  (556). The relationship between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the number of non-natives per thousand provincial population in 1950 was  $R_s = +0.623$  (557). The relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of non-natives per thousand provincial population in 1960 was  $R_s = +0.695$  (558). All three correlations were significant at the 99% level of confidence. Since most migrants before 1965 were rural-to-urban ones, a better correlation is produced between net internal migration and forasteros in urban rather than provincial areas. Thus, the correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the number of non-natives in urban areas per thousand provincial population in 1950 was

$R_s = +0.449$  (559). Similar statistics for 1960 showed a correlation with net internal migration 1961-1965 of  $R_s = +0.725$  (560). Concentrating on urban population, there was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and the number living in urban areas born in other municipios of the province per thousand provincial 1950 ( $R_s = +0.105$ ) (561), although there was between net internal migration 1961-1965 and similar statistics for 1960 ( $R_s = -0.525$ ) (562). The correlation between net internal migration 1951-1960 and natives of urban areas per thousand provincial population 1950 ( $R_s = -0.394$ ) (563), and between net internal migration 1961-1965 and similar statistics for 1960 ( $R_s = -0.489$ ) (564), clearly demonstrate the increasing influence of larger municipios on smaller (even urban) ones in the urbanization-industrialization process with which internal migration is so intimately associated. Finally, if any further proof is needed that migration is largely connected with personal contacts, there was a very high degree of correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and population density per square kilometre 1960 ( $R_s = +0.918$ ) (565). Clearly, prospective migrants would have more potential contacts in the most densely populated areas, especially the urban zones. In 1960, for example, there were more natives of the provinces of Toledo, Jaén, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Avila, Segovia and Cuenca living in Madrid than in the capital cities of each respective province (566). In such circumstances, it must have been relatively easy for the natives of those provinces to seek out personal contacts in Madrid, especially where migration was a stage-by-stage process from municipio of birth-place to provincial capital to the metropolis of Madrid.

Given the importance of direct information to the vast majority of rural-to-urban migrants, it is not too much to expect that most migrations should depend upon previous ones with regard to both distance and direction (567) - the twin "co-ordinates" of destination. The "feed-back

process" (568) in migration often makes it a social rather than an economic phenomenon. Indeed, personal contacts can become so numerous that a threshold is reached in both physical and psychological senses (569). When that point is reached out-migration then becomes a massive, "self-feeding process" (570) which is only indirectly related to economic forces. The historical continuity of "mean migration fields" (571) can be likened to a permanent magnetic field; the constant stream of information traveling back to out-migrant regions acting as a source of energy and attraction to be fed-upon by new potential migrants (572). The vast majority of these potential migrants will - if they decide to move - become "passive" (573) ones following trails blazed out for them by previous migrants with whom they are acquainted. There will, however, always be at least two phases in the development of any major migration stream (574). "Active" trail-blazers will move out from the safe confines of the "mean migration field" seeking "methodically for a suitable destination guaranteeing future prosperity" (575) not only for themselves but also for "passive" migrants of the "conservative group" who follow later. Most "active", "innovating", "pioneer" migrations - because of the "friction of space", the mechanics of message diffusion, the concept of the "principle of least effort", or what-have-you - will be short-distance (576). Yet, there will always be occasional long-distance moves which, if successful, will eventually produce a remote migrant cluster and a "leptokurtic" (577) distribution to the evolving pattern of internal migration. Deviations from the inverse distance rule (578) are thus largely due to the development of effective long-distance information links (which have improved over the course of time thanks to increasing technology), and the ability of the most ambitious, adventurous or well-educated rural-to-urban migrants to seek out new "opportunities" (579) as well as to guide successive imitators over "intervening obstacles" (580). These are the main

characteristics of the migration process which remain to be proved or disproved in Spanish conditions.

Firstly, two gravity models were used to test the hypothesis that the volume of migration over distance declines as some function of distance. Inter-provincial migration into the city of Madrid during the 1962-1965 period was analysed employing the formulae:

$$M_{ij} = \frac{P_i P_j}{(D_{ij})} - 1 \quad (1)$$

and

$$M_{ij} = \frac{P_i P_j}{(D_{ij})} - 2 \quad (2)$$

where  $M_{ij}$  is the force of "interaction" (in this instance the expected internal migration) between centres  $i$  (Madrid) and  $j$  (each of the other provinces),  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  is a measure of the "mass" (i.e. population) of the two centres, and  $D_{ij}$  some measurement of the distance separating them (581).

The exponent  $-2$  as used by Reilly (582) gave the best fit in thirty-two provinces, confirming Hagerstrand's hypothesis that it is the one best suited to European conditions (583). The exponent  $-1$  as used by Stewart (584) and Zipf (585) gave the best fit in the remaining seventeen provinces. Fifteen of these seventeen provinces form a continuous block around Madrid - stretching from Zamora to Soria in the north, Huelva to Jaén in the south, containing only two "windows" in Avila and Ciudad Real, and producing a distribution pattern which is in no way accidental (586). The relationship between recorded inter-provincial migration into Madrid during the 1962-1965 period and that forecast by use of the gravity models on 1960 provincial population statistics proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence when tested at the level of forty-nine provinces, with results of  $R_s = +0.845$  (formula 2) and  $R_s = +0.811$  (formula 1) respectively (587). The gravity models proved, therefore, to be relatively successful in confirming ranked "contacts" (588) between Madrid and the various provinces, although they could not forecast the rate of migration

with any great degree of accuracy (589). The exponent  $-2$ , while providing the best overall fit, greatly over-exaggerated the hyperbolic relationship between population movements and distance. At the two extremes, it under-estimated expected in-migration from Santa Cruz de Tenerife by 90.36% and exaggerated that from Toledo by 78.40% (590); and, if intra-provincial movements had been included, an expected 31.29% of in-migration into Madrid would have been from its own province compared with a recorded 10.9% between 1962 and 1965 (591). Deviations from the inverse distance rule fell into two categories. Firstly, provinces where recorded moves were much greater than those expected; secondly, provinces where they were much less than anticipated. In the first category were included provinces with strong traditional or recent links with Madrid like Toledo, Segovia, Córdoba, Badajoz or Jaén, where the mechanism of the "feed-back process" could perhaps be expected to mask simple inverse distance relationship. In the second category were included provinces outside Madrid's traditional migration-field which experience the gravitational "pull" of some large centre (often within the province itself) as in Barcelona, Vizcaya, Valencia or even Sevilla and Zaragoza.

Having found gravity models of some relevance to migration studies, secondly, Stouffer's theory that there is not necessarily a relationship between migration and distance was investigated. Simply stated, Stouffer's hypothesis is:

"... that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities" (592).

Out-migration from the province of Jaén during the 1962-1965 period was taken to test Stouffer's formula:

$$\frac{y}{x} = \frac{a}{x}$$

where  $y$  = number of persons moving from an origin  
(\* Stouffer's original triangular symbol could not be typed  $\Delta$  )

to a circular band of width  $\Delta s$ ; where  $x$  = the number of intervening opportunities; where  $\Delta x$  = the number of opportunities within the band of width  $\Delta s$ ; and where  $a$  = the constant of proportionality.

The province of Jaén was specifically chosen partly because it was the third most important one for gross inter-provincial out-migration during the 1962-1965 period (593), and partly because it is a "problem province" where Stouffer's model could be expected to face a severe credibility test. In this context, there has been a dramatic switch in main out-migration currents from Madrid to Barcelona since 1940 - especially after the bad harvests of 1945 and 1946 (594). In 1940, no less than 28.6% of life-time migrants from Jaén province lived in Madrid compared with only 6.5% in the province of Barcelona (595). These represented 17.47 per thousand population censored in that year in the city of Madrid who were born in other provinces compared with only 4.07 per thousand in Barcelona (596). Between 1946 and 1955, Jaén had the largest absolute (128,055) and percentage (8.48) loss of population of any province in Spain (597), and it has continued to lose population heavily since 1955. During the 1962-1965 period of maximum loss 45.78% of inter-provincial migrants left Jaén for Barcelona compared with only 12.06% to the province of Madrid (598).

The method adopted to analyze out-migration from Jaén has been taken from a modification of Stouffer's original technique suggested by Bright and Thomas (599). While major discrepancies exist between the number of expected and observed migrants both by distance bands of 100 kilometre intervals (see Fig.63) and for individual provinces (see Table XLV), the relationship between the ranked statistics proved to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence when tested at the level of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.655$ ) (600). No attempt has been made to recalculate expected and observed migration from each province, leaving Barcelona entirely out of the picture by subtracting it from both opportunities

Table XLV

INTRA- AND INTER-PROVINCIAL OUT-MIGRANTS COMPARED WITH THOSE EXPECTED  
ACCORDING TO STOUTER'S THEORY, BY PROVINCES, JAÉN PROVINCE 1962-1965

Province	Observed *	Expected *
Alava	220	147
Albacete	89	581
Alicante	2,120	1,004
Almería	105	1,535
Avila	13	113
Badajoz	97	409
Baleares	693	204
Barcelona	29,467	3,291
Burgos	79	204
Cáceres	18	281
Cádiz	62	928
Castellón	2,246	251
Ciudad Real	313	2,912
Córdoba	969	4,025
Coruña (La)	13	177
Cuenca	68	119
Gerona	1,958	166
Granada	538	15,310
Guadalajara	36	153
Guipúzcoa	524	511
Huelva	18	323
Huesca	239	151
Jaén	6,244	10,002
León	62	253
Lérida	1,262	261
Logroño	73	140
Lugo	2	72
Madrid	7,759	10,338
Málaga	300	3,707
Murcia	153	1,429
Navarra	1,107	175
Orense	0	86
Oviedo	88	347
Palencia	21	164
Palmas (Las)	27	63
Pontevedra	4	158
Salamanca	44	194
Santa Cruz de Tenerife	17	92
Santander	50	192
Segovia	4	81
Sevilla	254	5,233
Soria	49	59
Tarragona	3,168	290
Teruél	77	123
Toledo	74	920
Valencia	8,294	1,509
Valladolid	15	318
Vizcaya	1,150	926
Zamora	5	105
Zaragoza	363	559

\* Migrants to Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded.

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Migración y Estructura Regional, Tables 1.2.3.1. and 1.2.3.2., pp.43-48.

and intervening opportunities. Migration to Barcelona unlike that to California is not of a "hedonistic rather than a primarily economic character" that "... has been motivated more by climate and legend than by superior job opportunities" (601). The lack of correspondence between observed and expected out-migration by distance intervals (see Fig.63), is not only due to the economic and psychological "pull" of Barcelona but also of the intervening opportunities of Valencia, Castellón and Tarragona on the Levantine coast route between Jaén and Barcelona. Significantly, in the 300-400 kilometre distance interval which includes Madrid, observed migration was less than expected migration, Madrid no longer being an intervening opportunity (as it was during the railway era) on the direct route to Barcelona.

Thirdly, Hagerstrand's feed-back model was used to test in-migration into Madrid during the 1962-1965 period. Hagerstrand's hypothesis was that the number of migrants going to a given destination during a short-term period was directly proportional both to the "vacancy-density" at that location and to the "number of existing private contacts" between that destination and potential migrants at source. This may be expressed by the formula:

$$M_{ij} = K \frac{(V_j I_j)}{P_j}$$

where  $M_{ij}$  represents the number of migrants from  $i$  to  $j$ ,  $V_j$  the number of vacancies at  $j$  (602),  $I_j$  is the measure of information or contact between  $i$  and  $j$  (603), and  $K$  is a constant.

In our estimation, "vacancy-density" and "the number of existing private contacts" (604) cannot be perfectly defined. Three different definitions were incorporated within the basic model and tested for comparabil-



ity in ten provinces which accounted for 67.11% of inter-provincial migration into Madrid during the 1962-1965 period (605). In the most successful case, "vacancy-density" was defined as the total number of non-natives residing in the city of Madrid in 1960, the "number of existing private contacts" being defined as the number of natives of Toledo, Badajoz, Ciudad Real etc., residing in the city of Madrid in 1960 (606). Estimated in-migration into the province of Madrid during the 1962-1965 period from the nine provinces concerned averaged 94.86% of the observed total (607). It should be emphasized that while in only one instance was estimated in-migration within 10% of that of observed in-migration (608), when the ranked statistics for estimated and observed in-migration into Madrid were examined by means of Kendall's coefficient of correlation, a statistically significant relationship at the 95% level of confidence was found ( $r = +0.571$ ) (609). The formula was then used to test in-migration into the province of Madrid during the 1962-1965 period from each of the fifteen historic regions of Spain. Estimated in-migration averaged 84.17% of the observed total (610). This time in only two instances was estimated in-migration within 10% of that of observed in-migration (611). The relationship between the ranked statistics was tested by means of Spearman's coefficient of correlation and produced a result which was statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.911$ ) (612), at the level of fifteen regions.

Given the inadequacies of Spanish official and semi-official statistics, ranked data for observed internal migration during the 1962-1965 period and estimated migration for the same period as produced by gravity, intervening opportunity and feed-back models all proved to have a statistically significant relationship at the 99% level of confidence. The feedback model adapted from Egerstrand gave the best degree of correlation ( $R_s = +0.911$ ) (613). Significantly, the data which gave the "best fit" in the

adapted model were place-of-birth statistics, thus confirming the correlation between internal migration and non-natives (that is, "life-time migrants") especially in provincial urban areas (614), re-inforcing the importance of direct information in the migration-decision process.

### Conclusion

In this section dealing with socio-economic "pull" factors operating in in-migration at a national level a number of important conclusions have been made. Migrants are not attracted by urbanization per se but by urban economic opportunities, urban services and the possibility of upward social mobility. Acquired material wealth, be it in consumer durables or income, proved to be a "pull" factor of greater force than industrialization, urbanization or tertiarization. There was no proof that demographic "pull" factors had any relevance to internal migration flows except in Cataluña. It was difficult to measure the full impact of political "pull" factors on net internal migration. It appears that political measures to slow-down migration from the countryside through irrigation and land-settlement schemes have failed, and that the State has concentrated more and more of its attention to economic growth within the main in-migration, development-pole and tourist areas. While not initiating massive migration, the State in its drive for economic modernization (and growth) has been responsible for speeding up its momentum, although it would appear to have failed to control the rate of out-migration. The massive out-migration of the 1960s has only been partly related to the innovating effect of the Civil War and the modernization liberalization policies of the State from 1954 or 1958. The rapid spread of mass communication media (especially of television after 1962) and increasing personal contacts with provincial capitals and metropolitan cities have brought a new dimension to the life of the rural poor, fatalism and apathy being replaced by fantasy and awareness. Above all, the cumulative effect of the increasing number of "life-time migrants" to provincial capitals and metropolitan cities by 1960 has

made possible the movement of countless thousands more since that date. The mechanism of the feedback process converts migration into a massive self-feeding process which, by 1964-1967, had grown beyond the impersonal control of the State. In confirmation of this finding, the feedback model adapted from Hagerstrand (incorporating "life-time migration" statistics) gave a better degree of correlation between ranked statistics for observed and estimated internal migration during the 1962-1965 period than either the gravity - or intervening-opportunity models - reinforcing the importance of direct, personal contacts in the migration-decision process(615).

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### B/ RURAL-TO-URBAN IN-MIGRATION STREAMS. "PULL" FACTORS OPERATING IN IN-MIGRATION AREAS

#### 2) AT A REGIONAL / PROVINCIAL LEVEL

Throughout our earlier discussion of socio-economic and demographic "push" factors operating in out-migration regions two main conclusions were reached. Firstly, that a higher degree of correlation was usually obtained at national than at regional level. Secondly, that there were some variables that were of regional significance.

The method adopted in this section of our thesis to consider "pull" factors operating in in-migration regions at a regional level is firstly to consider all fifteen net in-migrant provinces of the 1961-1965 period as a regional entity (1) for checking the validity of hypotheses already tested at a national level. Secondly, to bring out regional contrasts, as well as to illustrate that the degree of correlation depends very largely upon the scale of analysis, the hypotheses were re-tested in two compact regional blocks consisting of five provinces each - Cataluña-Baleares and Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza.(2).

One hundred and one hypotheses were tested at a national level, usually at the scale of fifty provinces, seventy-nine of which proved to be statistically significant. Of the seventy-nine hypotheses which were testable at a regional in-migration level, forty-eight proved to be statistically significant. At a more restricted regional level only nineteen hypotheses proved to be statistically significant in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and thirteen in Cataluña-Baleares. The main conclusions reached are as follows:

(a) The null hypothesis can be safely rejected in only six instances (see Table XLVI).

(b) The null hypothesis can be safely accepted in seven (perhaps eight instances, no significant correlation being obtained at either national, "macro-regional" or "micro-regional" levels (see Table XLVII).

Table XLVI

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICES AT  
NATIONAL, MACRO-REGIONAL AND MICRO-REGIONAL LEVELS

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's <sup>o</sup> Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level (b)	Micro-level (c)
1.	Estimated inter-provincial migration to Madrid, 1962-1965 (gravity model - 1). <sup>+</sup>	+0.811*	+0.742*	+0.800*	+0.900*
2.	31 urban <u>municipios</u> with faster growth than Madrid, 1951-1960. <sup>+</sup>	+0.810*	+0.824*	+0.722 <sup>a</sup> *	+0.821 <sup>o</sup> *
3.	Percentage of provincial active population employed in industry, 1950. <sup>†</sup>	+0.775*	+0.761*	+0.800*	+1.000*
4.	Percentage of provincial active population employed in industry, 1960.	+0.693*	+0.807*	+0.800*	+0.800*
5.	The number of women employed in industry, 1957. <sup>‡</sup>	+0.675 <sup>a</sup> *	+0.846 <sup>u</sup> *	+1.000 <sup>s</sup> *	+1.000 <sup>z</sup> *
6.	The consumption of electricity, 1971. <sup>§</sup>	+0.567*	+0.904*	+0.800*	+0.900*

(a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;  
(c) Cataluña-Baleares.

o Kendall's rank correlation was used at micro-regional level.

\* Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

† Correlated with observed inter-provincial migration to Madrid, 1962-1965.

‡ Correlated with the percentage contribution of net migration to their growth, 1951-1960. Madrid was included in the calculations.

‡ Correlated with net migration 1951-1960.

§ Correlated with net migration 1961-1970.

o Nine municipios; 2 Eight municipios.

a At the scale of twenty provinces.

u At the scale of thirteen provinces.

z At the scale of four provinces.

SOURCE: Part Four I. B/ 1), pp.189-273.

(c) In eight instances there were no statistically significant correlations at national level although there were at a "macro-regional" level of analysis. In only one case, however, was correlation at this level corroborated at a "micro-regional" scale (see Table XLVIII). Clearly, most rural-to-urban migrants go to swell the

Table XLVII

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC INDICES AT  
NATIONAL, MACRO-REGIONAL AND MICRO-REGIONAL LEVELS

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's <sup>•</sup> Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level (b)	Micro-level (c)
7.	Percentage change in the number employed in industry, 1961-1967.	+0.276	-0.293	-0.200	-0.200
8.	Size of provincial capitals, 1960.	+0.266	+0.404	+0.200	+0.200
9.	Percentage change in the number employed in industry, 1951-1960.†	+0.196	+0.354	+0.600	+0.500
10.	Percentage of provincial populations (6-13 years old) registered for primary education, 1965.	+0.150	+0.125	-0.200	0.000
11.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in services in provincial capitals and metropolitan areas, 1960.	-0.162	-0.241	-0.200	-0.100
12.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in construction, 4th quarter, 1968.	+0.046	-0.273	-0.400	+0.200
13.	Number of urban <u>municipios</u> as a percentage of total number of provincial <u>municipios</u> , 1960.	-0.033	-0.125	+0.800*	+0.400
14.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in services, 1950.†	-0.011	-0.132	0.000	0.000

{a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;  
(c) Cataluña-Baleares.

• Kendall's rank correlation coefficient was used at micro-regional level.

\* Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

† Correlated with net internal migration 1951-1960.

SOURCE: As Table XLVI.

ranks of the proletarian working class (3).

(d) In twenty-three cases statistically significant correlations at national level were not substantiated at regional level (except in two instances at a "micro-regional" level in Cataluña-Baleares). Since twenty-two of the correlations were significant at the 99% level of confidence there can be no reason to doubt their

Table XLVIII

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT NATIONAL LEVEL

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level (b)	(c)
15.	Size of provincial capital, 1950.†	+0.214	+0.514*	+0.200	+0.400
16.	Fundación FOESSA index of urbanization, 1960.	+0.213	+0.600*	+0.400	+0.600
17.	Percentage of provincial populations (6-17 years old) registered for primary education, 1951.†	-0.182	-0.584*	-0.200	-0.200
18.	Salaried labour force as percentage of active provincial pop., 1962.	+0.172	+0.821*	+1.000*	+0.800*
19.	Number living in urban areas born in other <u>municipios</u> of the province per thousand prov. pop. 1950.†	+0.105	-0.521*	+0.200	+0.100
20.	Total provincial active pop., 1960.	+0.098	+0.679*	+0.400	+0.600
21.	Number of professional men, clerical and managerial staff, salesmen members of armed forces per thousand active persons in non-agricultural sectors of provincial urban areas, 1960.	+0.091	-0.529*	-0.400	0.000
22.	Percentage of provincial <u>municipios</u> with a railway station, 1962.	-0.002	+0.589*	+0.600	+0.400

(a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;  
(c) Cataluña-Baleares.

\* Kendall's rank correlation coefficient was used at micro-regional level.

† Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

‡ Correlated with net internal migration 1951-1960.

SOURCE: As Table XLVI.

validity. Clearly, some hypotheses are of national significance (see Table XLIX) others of regional importance (see Table L and Table LI).

(e) The most reliable correlations which proved to be statistically significant at national, "macro-regional", and "micro-regional" level in both Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and Cataluña-Baleares

Table XLIX

THE LACK OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT REGIONAL LEVEL

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level	
				(b)	(c)
23.	Number of cars in province per thousand provincial pop., 1967.	+0.820*	+0.393	+0.600	+0.200
24.	Percentage of provincial <u>municipios</u> with roads, 1962.	-0.811*	+0.237	-0.400	-0.200
25.	Provincial households with an annual income of over 60,000 ptas., 1964-1965.	+0.788*	+0.268	+0.200	+0.200
26.	Provincial households with an annual income of over 36,000 ptas., 1964-1965.	+0.766*	+0.239	+0.600	+0.200
27.	Provincial households with an annual income of over 96,000 ptas., 1964-1965.	+0.754*	+0.321	+0.200	+0.200
28.	Average annual consumption per provincial household, 1964-65.	+0.707*	+0.371	+0.200	+0.600
29.	Number of students registered to study <u>bachillerato general</u> per ten thousand prov. pop., 1960.	+0.645*	+0.104	+0.400	-0.200
30.	Active population as a percentage of total prov. pop., 1962.	+0.627*	+0.125	+0.400	+0.200
31.	"Index of relative increase" of service pop. per thousand active prov. pop., 1961-1970.	-0.573*	-0.282	-0.200	-0.200
32.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in services, 1960.	+0.546*	+0.311	+0.400	+0.800*
33.	Percentage of provincial household budget spent on food, 1964-1965.	-0.522*	-0.250	0.000	0.000
34.	Growth of provincial capitals, 1951-1960.	+0.502*	-0.004	0.000	+0.400
35.	Illiteracy rate per ten thousand provincial population, 1968.	-0.500*	+0.007	-0.500	+0.600
36.	Increase in number of new hotel places in Spanish prov., 1964-66.	+0.487*	-0.014	0.000	+0.400
37.	Number of students registered to study <u>bachillerato general</u> per ten thousand prov. pop., 1950.	+0.486*	+0.318	+0.200	+0.400
38.	Percentage of gross provincial income in tertiary sector, 1962.	+0.457*	+0.254	+0.400	+0.400
39.	Percentage of families in <u>municipios</u> under 3,000 population reading a newspaper regularly, 1962.	+0.451*	+0.357	-0.200	+0.900*
40.	Number of non-natives in urban areas per thousand provincial population, 1950.	+0.449*	+0.429	+0.200	+0.200



41. Percentage change in number of persons employed in services, 1961-1967.	+0.434*	+0.064	+0.200	+0.200
42. " <u>Índice de humedad agrícola utilizada</u> ", 1962.	+0.430*	+0.018	-0.200	+0.200
43. Percentage change in number of persons employed in services, 1951-1960.†	+0.395*	+0.104	+0.400	+0.600
44. Number living in urban areas born in <u>municipio</u> of the province where censored per thousand population, 1950.‡	-0.394*	-0.036	0.000	0.000
45. Percentage of provincial surface permanently irrigated, 1962.	+0.287*	-0.116	-0.200	0.000

(a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;  
(c) Cataluña-Baleares.

• Kendall's rank correlation coefficient was used at micro-regional level.

\* Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

† Correlated with net internal migration, 1951-1960.

‡ Correlated with net internal migration, 1961-1970.

SOURCE: As Table XLVI.

were listed in Table XLVI. We can have almost as much trust in a further fifteen correlations which are statistically significant at national, "macro-regional", and "micro-regional" level in one area - eleven in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and four in Cataluña-Baleares (see Table III). A little less reliable are nineteen correlations which are statistically significant at national and "macro-regional" but not at "micro-regional" level (see Table IV).

(f) As with rural-to-urban out-migration streams a higher degree of correlation was obtained at national than at regional levels. Seventy of the hypotheses tested at national level (or 69.31% of the one hundred and one investigated) proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence, compared with twenty-six (or 32.91% of the seventy-nine analyzed) at "macro-regional" level, five (or 6.41%) in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and five (or 6.49%) in Cataluña-Baleares at "micro-regional" level. A further nine

Table L

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT NATIONAL,  
MACRO-REGIONAL AND ONE MICRO-REGIONAL LEVEL

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level (b)	Micro-level (c)
46.	Population density, 1960.	+0.918*	+0.643*	+0.900*	+0.600
47.	Growth of provincial capitals, 1951-1960.†	+0.882*	+0.761*	+0.800*	+0.600
48.	Estimated inter-provincial migra- tion to Madrid, 1962-1965 (gravity model - 2).‡	+0.845*	+0.708*	+0.800*	+0.500
49.	Number of non-natives in urban areas per thousand provincial population, 1960.	+0.725*	+0.851*	+1.000*	+0.600
50.	Number of non-natives per thous- and provincial population, 1960.	+0.695*	+0.845*	+0.800*	+0.400
51.	"Degree of bureaucratization" of active prov. populations, 1950.†	+0.664*	+0.686*	+0.600	+0.800*
52.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in services, 1950.†	+0.643*	+0.571*	+0.600	+0.800*
53.	"Degree of bureaucratization" of active prov. populations, 1960.	+0.632*	+0.721*	+1.000*	+0.600
54.	Number of non-natives per thous- and provincial population, 1950.†	+0.623*	+0.607*	+1.000*	+0.200
55.	Electricity consumption, 1967.*	+0.589*	+0.776*	+0.800*	+0.200
56.	Percentage of those born in prov- inces other than where censor- ed, 1940.†	+0.586*	+0.643*	+0.800*	+0.400
57.	Díez Nicolás' index of urbaniza- tion, 1960.	+0.516*	+0.486*	+0.900*	+0.600
58.	Percentage of provincial active pop. employed in industry in prov. capitals and metropol- itan areas, 1960.	+0.513*	+0.561*	+0.200	+1.000*
59.	Number of large firms with over 250 employees, 1963.	+0.431*	+0.880*	+0.600	+0.800*
60.	<u>Instituto Nacional de Estadística's</u> index of urbanization, 1960.	+0.299*	+0.462*	+0.800*	+0.600

(a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;  
(c) Cataluña-Baleares.

\* Kendall's rank correlation coefficient was used at micro-regional level.

\* Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.

† Correlated with the percentage that the migration balance represented of  
the growth of provincial capitals, 1951-1960.

‡ Correlated with observed inter-provincial migration to Madrid 1962-1965.

† Correlated with net internal migration 1951-1960.

\* At the scale of forty-seven provinces.

e At the scale of twelve provinces.

g At the scale of four provinces.

SOURCE: As Table XLVI.

Table LI

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN NET INTERNAL MIGRATION 1961-1965 AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES AT NATIONAL AND MACRO-REGIONAL LEVELS

No.	Variable	Value of Spearman's <sup>e</sup> Rs			
		Nat. Level	Macro-level (a)	Micro-level (b)	(c)
61.	"Index of potential savings", 1965.	+0.847*	+0.454*	+0.200	+0.600
62.	Number of telephones per thousand provincial population, 1966.	+0.791*	+0.604*	+0.400	+0.600
63.	Number of cars per thousand provincial population, 1960.†	+0.704*	+0.514*	+0.600	+0.600
64.	Average annual per capita provincial consumption, 1964-1965.	+0.702*	+0.509*	+0.100	+0.600
65.	Number of women employed in industry, 1957.	+0.680 <sup>e</sup>	+0.874 <sup>g</sup>	+0.677 <sup>g</sup>	+0.677 <sup>g</sup>
66.	"Index of acquired material wealth", 1968.	+0.670*	+0.668*	+0.200	+0.600
67.	Percentage of prov. active pop. employed in industry in prov. capitals and metro. areas, 1950.†	+0.658*	+0.479*	+0.600	+0.600
68.	Expected intra- and inter-provincial out-migrants from Jaén, 1962-1965 (Stouffer's model).‡	+0.655*	+0.761*	+0.600	+0.600
69.	Percentage of prov. households with a washing-machine, refrigerator, T.V. set and car, 1968.	+0.652*	+0.682*	+0.200	+0.400
70.	Steel consumption, 1965.	+0.644 <sup>g</sup>	+0.733 <sup>g</sup>	-	-
71.	Number of large firms with over 250 employees, 1963.	+0.638 <sup>g</sup>	+0.778 <sup>g</sup>	+0.600	-
72.	Index of active agricultural pop. in prov. urban areas, 1960.	-0.619*	-0.514*	-0.400	-0.300
73.	Percentage of prov. active pop. employed in construction, 1960.†	+0.588*	+0.441*	+0.600	+0.400
74.	Percentage of gross provincial income in secondary sector, 1962.	+0.556*	+0.686*	+0.400	+0.600
75.	Number living in urban areas born in other <u>municipios</u> of the province per thousand prov. pop., 1960.	-0.525*	-0.752*	0.000	0.000
76.	Number living in urban areas born in <u>municipio</u> of province where censored per thousand pop., 1960.	-0.489*	-0.452*	-0.500	0.000
77.	"Degree of dominance" of provincial capitals, 1960.	+0.462*	+0.486*	+0.400	+0.200
78.	Prov. pop. employed in construction and public works, 1971.‡	+0.324*	+0.532*	+0.400	+0.600
79.	Expected intra- and inter-prov. out-migrants from Jaén, 1962-5 (Stouffer's mod.).	+0.311*	+0.739*	+0.400	+0.600

- (a) Fifteen in-migrant provinces; (b) Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza;
  - (c) Cataluña-Baleares.
  - Kendall's rank correlation coefficient was used at micro-regional level and where indicated.
  - \* Values significant at the 95% or 99% levels of confidence.
  - + Correlated with net internal migration, 1951-1960.
  - ± Correlated with observed intra- and inter-provincial out-migration from Jaén, 1962-1965.
  - ✓ Correlated with net internal migration, 1961-1970.
  - At the scale of twenty provinces.
  - ♢ At the scale of thirteen provinces.
  - ⊖ At the scale of four provinces.
  - At the scale of ten provinces.
  - ⌘ At the scale of six provinces.
  - ⊗ At the scale of twenty-four provinces.
- SOURCE: As Table XLVI.

hypotheses (or 8.91%) proved to be significant nationally at the 95% level of confidence, compared with twenty-two (or 27.84%) at "macro-regional" level, fourteen (or 17.95%) in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and eight (or 10.38%) in Cataluña-Baleares.

- (g) The positive relationship between socio-economic factors and net internal migration noted at national level is substantiated at "macro-regional" level in the fifteen in-migrant provinces of the 1961-1965 period. Of the seventy-nine hypotheses tested at both national and "macro-regional" levels sixty-three (or 79.49%) proved to be significant at national level compared with only forty-eight (or 61.54%) at "macro-regional" level. At "micro-regional" level, however, only nineteen hypotheses (or 24.67%) proved to be significant in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza and twelve (or 15.79%) in Cataluña-Baleares. When the thirteen most significant correlations at national and "macro-regional" level were compared a number of interesting facts emerged. Firstly, at national level four of the thirteen most significant correlations - the "index of acquired material wealth" 1968 and the per capita income 1964 (both at the level of twelve socio-economic zones), the "index of potential savings" 1965, and the number of cars per thousand

provincial population 1967 - underline the importance of affluence as a "pull" factor (4). Secondly, at "macro-regional" level the main attractive force is industrialization. Within the in-migrant provinces eight of the thirteen most important correlations were concerned with industrialization (5). Thirdly, the one or two variables common to both lists were concerned with urbanization - the growth of provincial capitals, and of thirty-two urban municipios with the most rapid growth-rates (both during the 1951-1960 period). At "micro-regional" level the five most significant correlations in Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza were varied - two dealt with industrialization, one with tertiarization, and two with personal factors involved in the urbanization process (6). In Cataluña-Baleares, also at "micro-regional" level, three of the four most significant correlations were connected with industrialization, the fourth with urbanization (7). Thus, the findings made at national level that acquired material wealth is a "pull" factor of greater force than industrialization, urbanization and tertiarization is not fully borne out within the main in-migration regions at "macro- and micro-regional" levels. Here the "pull" of industrialization is all important.

- (h) The vast majority of rural-to-urban migrants achieve not only geographical mobility but occupational upward social mobility. The following statistics for the city of Madrid show that during the 1968-1971 period it was an attractive in-migrant centre for the upper and middle-classes and for service personnel, but less so for the jornalero migrant class from a rural background who were most affected by the economic recession in 1968 (8). When adjusted in-migration statistics for 1968-1971 (9) are compared with adjusted Fundación FOESSA figures for 1965 (10) the socio-economic constancy

of migration flows is underlined (see Table LII) (11).

Table LII

A COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES FOR IN-MIGRANTS TO MADRID 1968-1971, NATIONAL HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD 1968, AND THE ACTIVE POPULATION OF MADRID 1965

Socio-economic class	In-migrants		H. of household	Active pop.	
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1. <u>Empresarios, altos cargos y profesiones liberales.</u>	6.2%	15.3%	14.0%	12.0%	16.6%
2. <u>Empleados, dependientes y similares.</u>	8.2%	20.3%	11.9%	25.0%	22.0%
3. <u>Personal de servicios.</u>	3.9%	9.5%	3.6%	63.0%	51.1%
4. <u>Jornaleros.</u>	19.1%	47.1%	54.9%	-	10.3%
5. <u>Inactivos.</u>	62.6%	7.8%	15.6%	-	-

(a) 1968-1971; (b) 1968-1971 (adjusted statistics); (c) National statistics 1968; (d) 1965; (e) 1965 (adjusted statistics).

SOURCES: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, Secretaría General, Sección de Estadística, Resumen Estadístico Año 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, Madrid, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972; Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Encuesta de Equipamiento y Nivel Cultural de la Familia, Vol.1, Madrid, 1968, Tablas nacionales, Table 1.1., p.121; and Fundación FOESSA, Informe Sociológico sobre la Situación Social de Madrid, Editorial Eura América, Madrid, 1967, Table 2.27, p.60.

- (i) There was no proof that urban birth-rates acted as a demographic "pull" factor.
- (j) The climatic "pull" factor of some importance in seasonal labour migrations including tourism and temporary movements abroad is of little relevance regionally for internal migration generally. There was no relevance, for example, between the percentage of the provincial surface permanently irrigated and net internal migration 1961-1965 at regional (although there was at national) levels of investigation (12). The timing of rural-to-urban migrations is, however, strongly influenced by the agricultural cycle at "macro-regional" as at national level. Maximum movements into Vitoria during the 1961-1963 period were according to López de Juan Abad and

others (13), between August and February (14). Maximum in-migration into the province of Madrid during 1968 was during October, September and November, with minimum flows in May, July and June (15).

There was, however, a significant correlation between in- and out-migration from the province which was significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.652$ ), showing the relevance of the climatic cycle even in highly-urbanized, industrialized regions (16).

- (k) The political "pull" factor was extremely important but all but impossible to measure accurately nationally, let alone regionally.
- (l) The "pull" of communications sometimes operated differently at national and regional levels, notably in the case of road and rail communication, and primary and secondary education (17), although in the all important field of direct personal communication statistically significant correlations were invariably obtained at both national and "macro-regional" levels (18). While road communication appears to be more important than rail communication as a factor in present-day internal migration, it does not necessarily imply that motor coach communication has any significant influence on internal migration except locally between village and provincial capital. We found no statistically significant correlation between in-migration into Madrid 1962-1965 and the number of regular inter-provincial bus and coach-line services originating in the capital in 1971 ( $R_s = +0.200$ ) (19).

This discussion of socio-economic "pull" factors operating in in-migration regions has emphasized important differences based upon areal-unit scale differences (20). It should be emphasized that area is but one scale; the time factor is an important other one. Illustrating this point, if the six largest cities in Spain in 1970 are examined and their rates of urbanization in each decade of the twentieth century compared, it will be seen

that they fall into three categories (see Table LIII).

Table LIII

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH-RATES BY DECADE 1901-1970 FOR  
THE SIX LARGEST URBAN MUNICIPIOS IN SPAIN, 1970

Period	Municipio					
	Barcelona	Bilbao	Madrid	Sevilla	Valencia	Zaragoza
1901-1910	1.02%	1.23%	1.11%	0.67%	0.93%	1.27%
1911-1920	2.09%	2.66%	2.52%	2.98%	0.77%	2.65%
1921-1930	4.16%	4.36%	2.69%	1.13%	2.74%	2.31%
1931-1940	0.75%	2.05%	1.43%	3.65%	4.08%	3.71%
1941-1950	1.84%	1.75%	4.87%	2.07%	1.29%	1.08%
1951-1960	2.17%	2.99%	3.96%	1.74%	-0.08%	2.35%
1961-1970	3.84%	3.87%	5.18%	1.08%	2.91%	5.44%

SOURCES: J. Díez Nicolás, Tamaño, Densidad y Crecimiento de la Población en España (1900-1960), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, 1971, Appendix 1-6, pp.43-101; and Presidencia del Gobierno, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Censo de la Población de España Año 1970. Poblaciones de Derecho y de Hecho de los Municipios, Madrid, 1971, Table III.2., p.126.

Firstly, those that grew most rapidly between 1921 and 1930. Bilbao and Barcelona represent the traditional industrial regions, and this decade, we have seen, was a period of rapid industrialization. Secondly, those that grew most rapidly between 1931 and 1940. Sevilla and Valencia were clearly affected by the economic and political dislocation which characterized the decade and seriously plagued by chronic "pseudo-urbanization". Thirdly, those that grew most rapidly in the 1961-1970 period. Madrid and Zaragoza represent cities where political factors have clearly influenced recent industrialization and tertiarization. Here there is almost a parallel with the developing world, with industrialization (due to autarchy and nationalism) not evolving independently of political organization (21). In conclusion, therefore, we will concentrate on Madrid which was not included in our survey at "micro-regional" level and examine the factors which have influenced its growth during the recent past.



Wrigley has argued that "the presence of large tertiary populations may stimulate the growth of secondary manufacturing industry, rather than vice-versa" (22), and nowhere is this more true than in the case of Madrid. It should be noted, however, that urbanization pre-dates industrialization in Spain not only historically but in many instances even at the present day. Burriel de Orueta cites the instance of Castellón de la Plana during the recent decade (23). He argues most convincingly that once a sense of inferiority ("conciencia de desnivel") develops as a fundamental "pull" factor, population will be attracted even into quite small urban areas despite the apparent lack of a major industry as an attractive force. Once attracted, he postulates, the abundance of (cheap) labour accelerates the creation of industrial opportunities and of tertiary employment.

We will examine the psychological nature of the "conciencia de desnivel" later in this thesis, but we have already seen that its tangible manifestation - the desire for "acquired material wealth" - is an important "pull" factor, especially at national level. It is possible to study the relative "pulls" of urbanization and industrialization at a "micro-regional" level in a unique way, for the building construction industry forms a bridge between the two, an industry which is very sensitive to market and political forces, a means of upward social mobility for rural-to-urban migrants escaping from backward rural areas and, moreover, a means of adjustment to urban society (24). By its very nature the building industry differs from fixed manufacturing industry in that it is nomadic, having to shift material, equipment and labour to the sites where they are required (25). The construction industry, therefore, is an important factor in geographical mobility (or lack of it) (26). Up to 20,000 workers were employed, for example, in the construction of the iron and steel plant at Avilés (Oviedo) in 1950, but by 1956 the labour-force had been reduced by at least three-quarters (27). In 1966, no less than 23.27%


of the total labour-force within the industrial sector was employed in construction and public works (28), being exceeded, according to the Encuesta de Población Activa, 1965 (29), only by the numbers employed in agriculture and commerce. Moreover, the industry could be considered as a "growth industry" in that the numbers employed were expected to increase by 54.64% between 1966 and 1971 (30), traditionally being the main source of attraction for in-migrants (31). Between 1958 and 1965 the numbers employed in construction and public works increased by 56.12% (32), Barcelona the chief in-migrant province (1961-1965) increasing its share of construction workers from 10.98% of the national total in 1961 to 13.82% in 1965 (33). In the province of Madrid the number of workers employed in construction grew from 109,657 in 1960 to 161,880 in 1971 (34). Clearly, these two provinces lead the way in construction as in net internal migration (35). Finally, the building trade is worthy of our attention in that it is the "growth industry" which needs the least capital investment per new job created (36) - a great source of attraction for any lesser developed country on the road to economic development.

The State has played an active role in directing the construction industry ever since 1939 when the Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (National Housing Institute) was created. The interventionist, paternalistic attitude of the State was almost immediately revealed after the cessation of hostilities through the reserving of all benefits (under the Law of the 19th of April 1939) concerning viviendas protegidas (officially-sanctioned dwellings) to municipal, syndicalist and other organizations associated with the Movimiento engaged in house-building activities (37). In the immediate post-war period the construction industry was mainly concerned with reconstruction work. For this purpose the Servicio Nacional de Regiones Devastadas y Reparaciones (National Service for Devastated Regions and Reparations) had already been set up in 1938 (38). In Madrid, the Junta de

Reconstrucción de Madrid (Madrid Reconstruction Board) - a subsidiary of the Dirección General de Regiones Devastadas - was immediately concerned with redevelopment work in outlying villages like Las Rozas, Majadahonda, Aravaca, Pozuelo, Carabanchel Bajo and Villaverde and more especially with urban infrastructure and rehousing in right bank Barrios (districts) of the capital along the main roads to Toledo, Extremadura and Andalucía (39). The empirical evidence suggests that little was actually achieved in the field of providing cheap housing for the masses even in the war-affected zones (40). Only 10.09% of the viviendas protegidas built in the capital by municipal, syndicalist and other official bodies during the 1939-1973 period were constructed between 1939 and 1953 (41). The annual rate represented no more than 0.72% of the global total for the whole period! The effect that reconstruction had on in-migration during this fourteen-year period is difficult to assess (42). Peripheral municipios (to be annexed during the 1943-1954 period) which had been gradually filling up from 1921-1930 (43) became the main focus for in-migration after 1945, most vacant spaces in the old Madrid having been taken up (44). Clearly, we are dealing here with the mechanism of urbanization. Great cities increase in size like giant stock-companies, not only as a result of natural growth but also of "take-over bids". Urban building draws in migrant hordes from the rural areas of Spain. These occupy the cheap housing areas within the city and then, when all the vacant spaces have been filled up, new arrivals "buy up stock" in the peripheral municipios, preparing the way for a "take-over bid" by the great city. Díez Nicolás has calculated that 19% of the growth of municipios with 100,000 population or more (in 1960) during the 1941-1950 period was due to annexation (45). At all events the first "mini-construction boom", both nationally and in Madrid, occurred in 1944 and was the direct result of the Law de viviendas bonificables (concessionary dwellings) of the 25th of November

which extended the benefits of official "protection" to the private enterprise sector of the construction industry (46). Between 1944 and 1955 no less than 32,964 middle-class dwellings of this type (or 27% of the national total) were built in Madrid mainly in the show-piece barrios of Niño Jesús, Estrella, Mirasierra and Barrio de la Concepción (47). These and similar schemes largely stimulated the in-migration waves of 1945, 1948, 1950 and the whole of the 1948-1954 period generally (48). During this era of the vivienda bonificable it became all but impossible to obtain cheap housing, rented or otherwise, in Madrid (49). At the same time the periphery with its low density housing beckoned prospective chabola dwellers (50). Shanty-towns mushroomed all over the periphery but especially in the south - Palomeras, Doña Carlota, Orcasitas, Entrevías, El Pozo del Tío Raimundo, etc. (see Fig.64) (51). The population density of Vallecas increased by 55.46% between 1950 and 1955 (52) making the social problems of the periphery acute.

We have seen that from 1954 the government was forced to change its housing policies and subsidize the building of "cheap" housing for the masses. Nor were the measures adopted specifically unique to Madrid (53). The main measures adopted included the establishment of the category of dwellings of a social nature (viviendas de tipo social) under the Decree-Law of the 14th of May, 1954 - especially the viviendas de renta limitada (limited income dwellings) authorized under the Law of the 15th of July, 1954 (54). The appearance of the famous I Plan Nacional de la Vivienda (1st National Housing Plan) setting a target of 550,000 dwellings to be built in a five-year period (Decree-Law of the 1st of July, 1955) (55) and of the infamous Ley sobre el Régimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana (Land Management and Urban Planning Law) which was supposed to solve the land speculation problem which had bedevilled social housing plans in the past (Decree-Law of the 12th of May 1956), were other measures taken (56).



Approximate Limit of  
Built-Up Area

Fig.64 Chabolismo in the Southern Periphery of Madrid






Fig.64 Chabolismo  
Madrid



in the Southern Periphery of





The Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda was removed from under the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Trabajo (Ministry of Labour) and accorded full ministerial status in 1957 under the Decree-Law of the 25th of February. The same year saw the appearance of the Plan de Urgencia Social de Madrid (Madrid Social Urgency Plan) which set out, amongst other things, to build 60,000 low-cost homes in the capital in a two-year crash programme. This Plan was approved by the State (as a model for other metropolitan areas with grave housing and social problems) under the Decree-Law of the 12th of November, 1957, and a new type of social dwelling - the vivienda subvencionada (subsidized dwelling) - was authorized (Decree-Law of the 22nd of November, 1957) to meet acute housing needs, first experimentally in Madrid, later nationally (57).

Between 1954 and 1961 a total of 227,265 dwellings de protección oficial of one type or another were completed in Madrid (58). No less than 60.61% of those built in the capital by municipal, syndicalist and other official bodies during the 1939-1973 period were completed between 1954 and 1961 (59). These represented 31.05% of all the viviendas protegidas built (60). This was the era of official attempts to tackle the shanty-town problem within the shanty-town areas themselves. As part of the Plan de Urgencia Social de Madrid a Servicio de Vigilancia del Extrarradio de Madrid (Peripheral Madrid Vigilance Service) was set-up, with the Guardia Civil (Civil Guards) who patrolled the zone authorized to prevent clandestine building and empowered to return illegal migrants to their native villages (61). Poblados de Absorción, poblados mínimos and poblados dirigidos appeared, to "soak up" and to "direct" chabola-dwellers to "minimum standard" housing estates some of which were built by their own sweated labour (62). Fourteen of the twenty-seven poblados (in a sense "urban villages") built between 1938 and 1966 were in the southern periphery (see Fig.64) (63), where the cost of building-land was cheapest (64)

and the social problems greatest. No less than 60.72% of the 21,302 dwellings completed in poblados dirigidos during this period were built in 1959 and 1960 (65) after the failure of the Plan de Urgencia Social de Madrid to keep out illegal migrants (66). Much publicized (67), higher quality housing estates were also built between 1954 and 1961 - by syndicalist groups like the Obra Sindical del Hogar (Syndical Homes Project) in Gran San Blas (68), or by private-enterprise firms as in Moratalaz, Barrio de Pilar and Ampliación del Barrio de la Concepción (69).

The encouragement which private builders had received from the State to build flats of modest prices (viviendas de renta limitada) from 1954 proved in fact to be a vicious circle. The housing problem, in a labour-intensive industry with little or no mechanization, could only be "solved" by bringing in masses of rural unskilled labour to work on the construction sites (70). Most of these new arrivals settled in chabolas, and by 1959 when severe inflation had resulted in rocketing land prices, the vast majority certainly could not afford a modest privately-constructed flat (71). The self-feeding nature of migration helped to intensify this problem. It became urgently necessary to provide cheap housing - to build poblados de absorción from 1955 and of poblados dirigidos from 1959, and to supplement the modest viviendas de renta limitada with even more modest viviendas subvencionadas from 1957, but to little or no avail. A Ministerio de la Vivienda publication claims that while "this effort [from 1957] produces a new pull of labour towards Madrid it is inferior to that of 1954-1957, because of the greater rationalization of work in the traditional construction sector..." (72). Ministerio de la Vivienda publications are riddled with slogans, dogma and platitudes (73), and there is certainly no justification in fact during the 1955-1960 period for stating that annual rates of in-migration into the city of Madrid slackened (74). To our knowledge no official survey of the number of chabolas and the like in urban areas has been made at national level. A Factored Humanos y Socia-

les report (75) produces an irrelevant partial survey of chabolas and cave-dwellings in rural areas (76). Official approaches to housing problems have always been disjointed and half-hearted. The failure of official policies to solve the housing problem can be deduced from the fact that despite intermittent fits of frenzied house-building in Madrid since 1940 the province had the third greatest deficit of dwellings in Spain in 1960 (77).

As if in answer to this criticism the II Plan Nacional de la Vivienda (1962-1976) was approved under the Law of the 23rd of December 1961. The avowed aims of this plan were to link housing policies more directly with economic development planning, and to build 1,550,828 homes during its period of operation (78). The four chief in-migration provinces of 1961-1965 - Barcelona, Madrid, Vizcaya and Valencia - built the most viviendas de protección oficial during the period (79), but even the construction of 170,678 dwellings of this type in the province of Madrid between 1961 and 1965 failed to solve the housing deficit. The Plan had calculated the deficit in 1961 at 96,000 (or 10% of the national total) (80), but had seriously under-estimated net in-migration to the capital which increased by 89.02% during the 1961-1965 period when compared with 1956-1960 (81). As part of the Plan de Absorción de Chabolas, 1961 (Plan for the Absorption of Shanty-dwellings) the Obra Sindical del Hogar was entrusted with the construction of six Unidades Vecinales de Absorción (Neighbourhood Absorption Units) - a total of 6,585 pre-fabricated dwellings being erected in the space of three months in 1963 within the periphery (82), three of which were in the southern extremities of the capital (see Fig.64)(83). These were only provisional "shelters" and have been much criticized. Moneo has thundered that they are "nearer to a concentration camp than any other thing" (84).

Between 1962 and 1972 a total of 231,708 dwellings de protección oficial

of one type or another were completed in Madrid (85). No less than 29.30% of those built in the capital by municipal, syndicalist and other official bodies during the 1939-1973 period were completed between 1962 and 1973 (86). These represented only 10.38% of all the viviendas protegidas built (87). The municipal, syndicalist and other official organizations engaged in house-construction concentrated their waning energies within the traditional zones of activity within the periphery - San Blas, Entrevías, Moratalaz, Caño Roto, etc. (88) while private builders concerned with social housing (viviendas subvencionadas) were forced to move further and further away from the capital (usually southwards) in search of cheaper building land - to Getafe, Móstoles, Coslada, Parla, Alcorcón, etc. (89).

Between 1962 and 1972 State influence in housing has become progressively less important (90) especially since 1965 (91). There was evidence in 1964 and 1965 that the attractive benefits accruing to private builders (especially of luxury viviendas de renta limitada, grupo 10) (92) were helping to cause inflation in the economy and diverting scarce national resources from vital areas of economic development (93). Increasingly, the housing industry has been used as an economic regulator (94) to correct inflationary tendencies, and as such is extremely vulnerable to economic fluctuations. (Here-in lies one of the main reasons why most of the labour force is casual, so that it can easily be off-loaded) (95). In 1968, for example, there was a fall of 3-4% in the total number of construction workers in Cataluña compared with 1967. There was an increase of 54.10% in the number of assisted migrants (who were declared construction workers) leaving the region for Europe (96), and a 40.05% decrease in the number of net in-migrant compared with 1967 (97). In contrast, during 1971 when there was an upswing in the economy the construction industry was the first to react, with 51.62% of the new jobs created in the industrial sector that year in the province of Madrid (98). Again in 1973 - after an economic


recession in 1972 - unemployment in the construction industry fell nationally by 35.2% compared with 27.2% in manufacturing and 14.1% in services (99). It can be demonstrated that the building industry re-acts to economic forces up to 9-10 months before that of industry generally (see Fig. 65).

This detailed survey of the construction industry has been undertaken to emphasize the very active role - for better or for worse - that the State has played in directing the construction industry ever since 1939. Official policies, we have seen, were largely responsible for increasing in-migration (especially to Madrid) both in 1954 and again in 1957. From 1965 the State has increasingly used the public-sector housing industry as an economic regulator, and as such the construction industry has been much quicker to respond to touches on both the brake- and accelerator-pedals than other sectors of the economy. Proven the causal relationship between political and economic factors within the industry it remains to underline the correlation between net internal migration and construction. The variable and inconclusive findings regarding the relationship between net internal migration and construction made at national and "macro-regional" level (100) do not support the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant correlation between these two variables at "micro-regional" level in Madrid. The null hypothesis can be categorically rejected. The relationship between viviendas de protección oficial completed in the capital between 1961 and 1965 and the number of net internal migrants received during the same period was tested by means of Kendall's coefficient of correlation and found to be statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $r = +0.800$ ) (101). Just as conclusive was the relationship during the 1961-1971 period which was tested by means of Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation and found to be significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.736$ ) (102). These findings are not unique to Madrid. María de Bolós y Capdevila, writing of in-migration into

1970      1971      1972      1973

# Fig.65 The Construction Industry as an Economic Indicator

Unemployed in construction(b)



the city of Barcelona during the 1951-1957 period, has commented that since 30% of the migrants are employed in construction there must be a relationship between construction rates and in-migration (103). That relationship is illustrated in Fig.66. In statistical terms the correlation was significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $r = +0.905$ ). We found no statistically significant relationship, however, between the number of migrant arrivals in the twelve administrative districts of the city in 1957 and either the number of buildings destined for dwellings in the same districts and year ( $R_s = +0.062$ ) or the number of new industrial buildings completed in the various districts in 1957 ( $R_s = +0.472$ )(104). There was a statistically significant correlation between net migration into the province of Vizcaya 1961-1965 and the number of dwellings de protección oficial completed during the same period ( $r = +0.800$ ) (105). Economic conditions were changing from 1964 (106). There was no statistically significant correlation between the number of dwellings de protección oficial completed in either the province of Madrid or the region of Cataluña during the 1964-1968 period and the number of net internal migrants received by each. The figures were  $r = +0.400$  (107) and  $r = +0.200$  (108) respectively. In Vizcaya, which did not lose its powers of attraction for the construction of this type of dwelling to the same extent as Madrid and Barcelona (109), there was a significant correlation between net internal migration 1964-1968 and the number of dwellings de protección oficial completed during the same period ( $r = +0.800$ ) (110). In no instances did we find a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration and the total number of dwellings constructed. The correlation between the total number of national dwellings constructed during the 1962-1970 period and the total number of national internal migrants during the same period, for example, was  $r = +0.333$  (111). Since the State has much less control over the "free" (112) luxury flats






Fig.66 Relationship between Migration and Construction in Barcelona

constructed than it exercises over those of "official protection" it must be concluded that the political factor is an extremely important influence in the public-sector, housing-construction industry, influencing moreover the lives of so many thousand prospective migrants and migrant families who depend upon this form of economic activity for their existence. This political factor, we have seen, does not always seek to "pull" migrants in from the rural areas but periodically, when the economy or the urban areas are in need of respite, seeks to keep them out by almost every means at its disposal.

The political factor operates at many different levels - moreso in Spain with its centralized administrative tradition. "The creation by government departments of a multiplicity of ad hoc supra-provincial administrative units" (113) affects urban planning and housing policies in a complex and confusing way, with even agencies dependent upon the same ministry tending to go their separate ways (114). In Madrid the Comisaría General para la Ordenación de Madrid y sus Alrededores (General Commission for the Planning of Madrid and its Environs) had been tackling the problem of chabolas since 1954 (115) and more grandiose planning matters from 1946 (116). In 1961, a new Plan General de Ordenación Urbana del Area Metropolitana de Madrid (General Plan for the Urban Arrangement of the Metropolitan Area of Madrid), finally approved by the Decree of the 28th of September, 1964, proposed a much wider and more radical solution to the urban problems of Madrid by recognizing the de facto existence of an economic hinterland consisting of twenty-two municipios (117). The basic philosophy of the plan was enshrined in the doctrine of "decongestion". Two separate development arcs were to be created - a south-eastern one of decentralized industry and a north-western one of residential and recreational development (118). Only seven of the twenty-two municipios were considered suitable for new industries, while at the same time it was seen as desirable to keep new industries out of the capital itself.

No less than 58.7% of the increase in the total number of contribuyentes (industrial tax-contributors) in the Metropolitan area (excluding Madrid) during the 1962-1966 period have been in these seven municipios - namely Alcobendas, Getafe, Leganés, Majadahonda, San Fernando de Henares, San Sebastián de los Reyes and Torrejón de Ardoz (119). The existence of new industries attracted migrants who first obtained jobs in the various development and housing schemes and then hoped for more secure employment within factories (120).

The political factor has thus been of considerable influence in the decentralization of industry and the dispersal of population within the Metropolitan Area. Getafe had more than 40% of the contribuyentes of the area (excluding Madrid) in 1966, but the greatest growth took place in San Sebastián de los Reyes (with an increase of 264.71% between 1962 and 1966), Alcorcón (192.31%) and Coslada (148.38%) (121). The fantastic increases in population between 1961-1970 - Getafe (217.08%), San Sebastián de los Reyes (361.10%), Alcorcón (1,272.11%) and Coslada (262.98%) (122) - now begin to make sense. They are clearly industrial decongestion and working-class residential zones (123) brought into being by market factors and official policies (124). It will be noted that Coslada was not included in the list of seven municipios suitable for industrial development planning. About 1967 between three hundred and four hundred industrial concerns were moving out of Madrid annually in search of larger and more adequate sites (125). Two factors influenced them in their choice of site namely, distance from and ease of communication with the capital (126). Thus 76.4% of the increase in the number of contribuyentes in the Metropolitan area (excluding Madrid) during the 1962-1966 period were in the ten municipios (including Coslada) which lay on both rail and national road communications emanating from the capital (127). Indeed, if three other municipios in the Metropolitan area (which lay on nation road communications but had no rail links with the capital) are included, 91.9% of the

increase during the 1962-1966 period is accounted for (123).

The effect that such changes are having on the decentralization of population can be gauged from the fact that during 1971 no less than 70.97% of all intra-provincial movements out of the capital were to ten of these municipios (129). The periphery (which had 60.40% of the capital's population in 1970) claimed 75.42% of all intra-provincial movements out of the capital (130). Clearly the movement outwards from the periphery is mainly a working-class one in search of better accommodation and work opportunities.

The importance of the relative "pulls" of urbanization and industrialization at a "micro-regional" level have been analyzed within the province and city of Madrid. The empirical evidence suggests that secondary manufacturing industries were stimulated into development not only through the presence of a "large tertiary population" but also through direct government measures. Given the unique role of the construction industry in preparing many rural-to-urban migrants for more skilled and more remunerative positions within manufacturing industry, by 1965 the State had come to recognize the leading part which it played within developing economies and has increasingly used the public-sector housing industry as an economic regulator - being much more successful in curbing net in-migrant flows into the capital through economic means rather than through direct, police-state measures which had been tried previously and which had failed. It is all but impossible to disentangle political and economic factors within present-day Spain (131). Both sets of forces are responsible for the decentralization of industry in Madrid, with the scene of active urbanization and industrialization now moving out into the Metropolitan area and beyond; working-class people moving out of the periphery in search of better accommodation and work, the feedback mechanism of the migration process acting to bring-in countless friends and relatives from a rural environment.

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### C/ INTRA-PROVINCIAL IN- AND OUT-MIGRATION STREAMS

The factors involved in intra-provincial migration cannot differ radically from those we have described in inter-provincial migration (1). The correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and intra-provincial migration as a percentage of total internal migration 1962-1970 proved to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence when tested at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.875$ ) (2). It would be pointless therefore to repeat the style of analysis adopted earlier to analyze inter-provincial migration. Rather our aim will be to bring out at a micro-scale analysis other factors which are relevant to internal migration both intra and inter in type.


While at the scale of fifty provinces there are in- and out-migrant regions, these movements of population are mirrored in miniature within the confines of each individual province or in-migrant region. Only eighty-seven of Madrid province's one hundred and eighty-three municipios (or 47.54% of the total) increased in population between 1961 and 1970 (3), while in Cataluña - another in-migrant region - only three hundred and eighty-four out of nine hundred and seventy-six municipios (or 39.34% of the total) showed a population increase during the same period (4). To-and-fro movements of population, "push" and "pull", are experienced therefore even in in-migrant areas whatever the scale of analysis.

The simplest pattern of intra-provincial migration has been described in Part Three of this thesis (although all migratory flows are exceedingly complex in detail) (5). Basically a centripetal movement of population takes place within the administrative confines of the municipio from outlying cortijos and aldeas (or their equivalents) to the municipal capital (6), and from thence usually to the provincial capital or national in-migration centre. In the case of the largest provincial capitals a noticeable centrifugal movement of population also takes place whereby the capital

eventually expands through annexing surrounding municipios. Such movements may be illustrated within the out-migrant province of Sevilla, within the in-migrant province of Madrid, and within the Metropolitan area of Barcelona - the province with the greatest intensity of intra-provincial movements in Spain during the 1962-1970 period (7).

In the case of Sevilla there were only thirty in-migrant municipios benefitting from both intra- and inter-provincial migrations during the 1961-1970 period (8). Only two municipios more than 30 kilometres from the provincial capital (and therefore presumably outside commuting distance) (9) showed a growth of population during the decade (10) - Las Cabezas de San Juan with 24.5% and Martín de la Jara with 8.0%. Municipios experiencing the greatest losses of population were invariably peripheral ones, usually in the sierra (11). Almadén de la Plata, for example, lost 40.2% of its 1960 population, El Castillo de las Guardas 35.5% and Cazalla de la Sierra 33.7%. Those municipios which showed growth-rates of over 30% were in six instances out of seven within the Metropolitan area of Sevilla on the western and southern sides of the provincial capital on the two main economic growth-axes along the routes to Huelva (N 431) and Cádiz (N IV) respectively. These were San Juan de Aznalfarache (+91.7%), Los Palacios y Villafranca (+47.6%), Dos Hermanas (+43.2%), Camas (+38.8%), Tomares (+34.2%) and Gínés (+36.6%) (12). The exception - Mairena de Aljarafe (+78.4%) - was just outside the Metropolitan area (see Fig.67).

In the case of the Barcelona Metropolitan area a T-shaped region centred on Barcelona (the alignment of which is related to the coast and to road and rail communications to Lérida-Zaragoza-Madrid - N II) received most intra-metropolitan movements of population in 1972 (see Fig.68)(13). Barcelona itself accounted for nearly 28% of such short-distance moves with adjoining Hospitalet and Santa Coloma de Gramanet with nearly 9% and over 6% respectively. Other important centres were Sabadell, Cornellá and






Fig.67 Growth of Population in Sevilla Province 1961-1970







Fig.67 Growth of Population in Sevilla Province 1961-1970




0 50 Kms.



Fig. 68 Intra-Provincial Migration  
within  
Barcelona Metropolitan Area  
1972

Gain Per cent



0 50 Kms.





Fig. 68 Intra-Provincial Migration  
within  
Barcelona Metropolitan Area  
1972

Gain Per cent




Esplugas de Llobregat with just over 3% each of the total; Tarrasa and Badalona with just under 3% each (14). Clearly the chief centres for inter-provincial migration are also the most important for intra-provincial movements (15).

In the case of Madrid thirty-five municipios had growth-rates greater than the provincial capital itself and must therefore be considered as immigration centres for both inter- and intra-provincial movements (16). We have already drawn attention to the centripetal and centrifugal movements of population which led to a congregation of population within and on the edges of the metropolitan area. Suffice it here to say that the greatest growth of population occurred in municipios traversed by the main roads to Badajoz (N V), Toledo (N 401), Jaén (N IV) and Burgos (N I). Seven of the eight municipios with growth-rates of over 159% during the 1961-1970 period were located here - namely Alcorcón 1,272.11%, Leganés 573.81%, Móstoles 518.02%, Parla 473.44%, Alcobendas 423.23%, San Sebastián de los Reyes 361.10% and Getafe 217.08%. The exception - Coslada with a growth-rate of 262.93% - formed an enclave on the eastern outskirts of the capital and was traversed by the main road to Zaragoza and Barcelona (N II) (see Fig.69).

All three patterns of intra-provincial migration described have certain features in common - namely the importance of communications and distance from the provincial capital as major controlling factors (17). This is borne out by case studies of other provinces. In Zaragoza, for example, the few "progressive municipios" which gained in population between both 1951-1960 and 1961-1970 were situated in the Ebro valley communications corridor within 25 kilometres of the provincial capital (18).

In the case of Madrid a 20% sample survey of the municipios of the province was conducted (19) to emphasize the importance of some of the factors influencing intra-provincial migration. It will be seen from







Fig.69 Growth of Population in Madrid Province, 1961-1970






Fig.69 Growth of Population in Madrid Province, 1961-1970






Table LIV that the municipios selected were almost equally divided into nineteen which gained population between 1951 and 1970 and eighteen which suffered from rural depopulation during the same period. Ten of the eleven

Table LIV

TWENTY PER CENT SAMPLE SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPIOS OF MADRID PROVINCE, CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION GROUP AND LOSS OR GAIN OF POPULATION, 1951-70

Size of <u>municipio</u>	Total <u>municipios</u>				Population	
	in province		in sample		gain	loss
0- 100 pop.	10	(5.5%)	2	(5.4%)	0	2
101- 500 "	51	(27.9%)	10	(27.0%)	1	9
501-1,000 "	39	(21.3%)	10	(27.0%)	4	6
1,001-2,000 "	36	(19.7%)	4	(10.8%)	4	0
Over 2,000 "	47	(25.6%)	11	(29.8%)	10	1
TOTAL	183	(100.0%)	37	(100.0%)	19	18

SOURCE: Cámara Oficial de Comercio e Industria de Madrid, La Economía de Madrid en 1971. Memoria Comercial e Industrial, Madrid, 1973, pp. 53-57.

largest municipios in the sample experienced population growth while eleven of the twelve municipios with less than 500 population suffered a loss of population, proving quite conclusively that population size is a factor of some importance in the migration process (20), at least in a province like Madrid where great discrepancies in size of municipio do not exist to conceal this relationship. An attempt nationally to show a relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the average size of provincial municipios 1970 (excluding the provincial capital and all municipios with over 50,000 population) failed ( $R_s = +0.078$ ) (21).

Comparing the nineteen municipios which gained in population 1951-1970 with the eighteen in our sample which lost population during the same period, altitude proved to be a differentiating factor of some importance, the average height of the former being 703 metres above sea-level compared with

912 for the latter (see Tables LV and LVI).

Table LV

TWENTY PER CENT SAMPLE SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPIOS OF THE PROVINCE  
OF MADRID, CLASSIFIED BY MUNICIPIOS GAINING POPULATION 1951-1970  
AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Municipio	Popula- tion (1970)	Growth (1951- 1970)	Alti- tude (m.)	Dis- tance (km.)*	Bus ser- vice	Rail stat.	No.Ind. contrib. (1971)
Alcobendas	25,000	1,242.64 <sup>†</sup>	670	14	Yes	No	202
Brunete	956	9.01	656	31	Yes	No	13
Casarrubuelos	599	25.31	622	32	Yes	Yes	3
Cobena	464	32.57	696	27	Yes	No	1
Collado Mediano	1,160	24.33	1,030	48	Yes	Yes	28
Galapagar	4,067	146.93	361	37	Yes	Yes	75
Griñon	1,042	7.87	671	23	Yes	Yes	19
El Molar	1,914	7.35	817	40	Yes	No	13
Morata de Tajuna	4,005	2.46	559	36	Yes	No	42
Navalcarnero	6,212	34.55	671	31	Yes	Yes	126
Parla	10,213	708.63	631	21	Yes	Yes	119
San Lorenzo de El Escorial	8,446	17.60	1,028	49	Yes	Yes	125
Sevilla de la Nueva	679	61.23	675	38	Yes	No	4
Tielmes	1,828	7.91	590	42	Yes	No	26
Torrelaguna	2,442	11.92	744	56	Yes	No	31
Valdemoro	6,263	101.06	616	27	Yes	Yes	73
Villa del Prado	2,747	5.61	510	60	Yes	Yes	26
Villanueva de la Cañada	607	21.40	652	36	Yes	No	6
Villaviciosa de Odón	3,118	92.35	662	20	Yes	Yes	47
Average	-	-	703.21	35.42	-	-	52.32

\* From Madrid.

† Per cent in each case.

SOURCES: A. Cantó Tellez, El Turismo en la Provincia de Madrid, Deputación Provincial, Oficina de Prensa, 2nd rev. ed., Madrid, 1958, pp.109-501; and Cámara Oficial de Comercio e Industria de Madrid, La Economía de Madrid en 1971. Memoria Comercial e Industrial, Madrid, 1973, pp.53-57 and 149-154.

La Acebeda (1,269 metres) and Horcajuelo de la Sierra (1,141 metres) recorded the greatest losses of population 1951-1970 with 65.00% and 60.70% respectively. There were exceptions to the inverse relationship between altitude and population growth (22), notably where tourism has been developed in the sierra. San Lorenzo de El Escorial at 1,028 metres above sea-level increased its population by 17.60% in the period concerned, while Collado Mediano

Table LVI

TWENTY PER CENT SAMPLE SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPIOS OF THE PROVINCE OF MADRID, CLASSIFIED BY MUNICIPIOS LOSING POPULATION 1951-1970 AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Municipio	Popula- tion (1970)	Loss (1951- 1970)	Alti- tude (m.)	Dis- tance (km.)*	Bus ser- vice	Rail sta- tion	No.Ind. contrib. (1971)
La Acebeda	105	65.00 <sup>†</sup>	1,269	86	No	No	2
Ambite	531	47.63	682	63	Yes	No	7
El Atazar	101	20.47	995	83	No	No	1
El Berrueco	301	19.95	933	60	Yes	No	2
Cadalso de los Vidrios	2,088	8.50	802	73	Yes	No	19
Chapinería	659	19.44	679	50	Yes	No	13
Fresnedillas	421	12.66	901	55	Yes	No	1
Horcajuelo de la Sierra	90	60.70	1,141	90	No	No	0
Lozoya	534	18.22	1,114	85	Yes	No	11
Manjirón	269	36.71	1,012	77	No	No	0
La Olmeda de las Fuentes	181	56.90	794	51	Yes	No	1
Pezuela de las Torres	641	39.47	854	49	Yes	No	11
Pozuelo del Rey	293	28.36	809	40	Yes	No	1
Redueña	96	27.27	818	55	No	No	0
Robregordo	181	36.93	1,300	89	Yes	No	3
Santorcaz	557	17.36	878	47	Yes	No	4
Valdeavero	532	10.59	716	50	Yes	No	4
Valverde de Alcalá	278	15.90	723	42	No	No	2
Average	-	-	912.22	63.61	-	-	4.56

\* From Madrid.

† Per cent in each case.

SOURCE: As Table LV.

at 1,030 metres grew by 24.33%. Fig.69 shows that only two municipios in the northern sierra had gains of over 80% in population during the ten-year period 1961-1970 - Patones (107.12%) and Soto del Rey (71.32%) - neither of which was included in our sample (23). The greatest losses of population 1961-1970 were usually experienced in the remote northern sierra zone. Fig.69 shows that all the municipios losing more than 39% of their 1960 populations (with the exception of Olmeda de las Fuentes, 45.48%) were located in the partido judicial de Torrelaguna (24).

Tables LV and LVI show that distance from the provincial capital of

Madrid is also an important differential, the average distance of the eighteen municipios which lost population 1951-1970 being 63.61 kilometres compared with only 35.42 kilometres for those that gained in population. Most of the latter were within commuting distance of Madrid (25). None of the eighteen which lost population were within 35 kilometres of the capital! La Alcebeda and Horcajuelo de la Sierra with the maximum losses were in fact 90 and 86 kilometres away from the capital respectively.

Tables LV and LVI show important communications differentials. All nineteen of the municipios which gained in population had "regular" village bus services while ten also had the benefit of rail communication. None of the eighteen municipios which lost population had rail communications while six - including La Acebeda and Horcajuelo de la Sierra - could not afford the luxury of the village bus.

While services were generally poorer in smaller more remote municipios, Madrid as a province was sufficiently attractive to encourage certain services. There were in 1962, for example, an above national average of doctors and vets resident within the municipios of the province (26). Nationally there was no statistically significant relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of "poor" municipios in 1967 as a total of all provincial municipios ( $R_s = +0.033$ ) (27).

The predominantly economic nature of internal migration is revealed in Tables LV and LVI from the number of industrial contribuyentes in 1971 which averaged 52.32 in the municipios which gained population compared with only 4.56 in those which lost (28). Municipios with poor communications usually had the least opportunities for non-agricultural employment and the heaviest losses of population. Invariably these same municipios were high altitude ones remote from Madrid and with small residual populations. At local municipal level a combination of factors therefore account for population growth or decline (29). Rarely is there one precipitating

factor in the economic sphere which leads to out- or in-migration, although we have seen at both national and regional levels that vagaries of climate can often upset the precarious economic balance which exists in the Spanish countryside. In our sample the relationship between population growth 1951-1970 and each of the variables in Tables IV and LVI proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence (30). The best correlation was with the size of population in 1970 ( $R_s = +0.810$ ) (31). Altitude ( $R_s = -0.751$ ) and distance from Madrid ( $R_s = -0.707$ ) were also highly significant factors. It was difficult to estimate the importance of bus and train communications because of the large number of tied values; even so communications ( $R_s = +0.689$ ) would appear to be more important than the "pull" of industrial opportunities as measured through the number of industrial contribuyentes existing in each municipio in 1971 ( $R_s = +0.685$ ) (32).

# I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

## D/ URBAN-TO-URBAN MIGRATION STREAMS

Little research has been done on urban-to-urban migration in Spain.(1). Official Instituto Nacional de Estadística statistics for the 1961-1970 period indicate that two out of three recorded internal migrants leave a rural municipio for an urban one with more than 10,000 population. As far as urban-to-urban migration is concerned it can be shown that for each urban population group at least two out of three migrants left for another urban municipio (see Table LVII). It can also be demonstrated that urban-

Table LVII

### URBAN-TO-URBAN MIGRATION BY URBAN POPULATION GROUPS OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1961-1970

Urban population group of arrival	No. of urban-to-urban migrants *			
	1961	1964	1967	1970
10,000- 19,999 pop.	71.91%	74.43%	73.96%	73.00%
20,000- 99,999 pop.	75.44%	77.54%	75.63%	75.02%
100,000-499,999 pop.	76.81%	80.83%	77.58%	80.36%
Over 500,000 pop.	65.30%	74.39%	72.85%	65.23%

\* Number of migrants leaving urban population group of departure for an urban municipio as a percentage of total migrant population leaving group.

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Las Migraciones Interiores en España. Decenio 1961-1970, Madrid, 1974, Table II.I, p.98.

to-urban migration (measured as a percentage of total arrivals to all urban municipios) increased from 39.84% in 1961, to 37.98% in 1964, to 46.45% in 1967, to 47.72% in 1970 (2).

Between 1961 and 1970 urban municipios with between 10,000 and 19,999 population grew by 10.91%. those with between 20,000 and 99,999 population by 15.26%, those with between 100,000 and 499,999 population by 53.75%, and those with over 500,000 population by 40.94% (3). We have seen that urbanization per se was not a sufficiently attractive force to account for population growth by net internal migration, migration streams being

largely concentrated on provincial capitals, Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao where migrants felt that most of the economic opportunities lay. Urban infrastructure costing exercises in 1964 showed that some economies of scale could be obtained for cities with populations of 200,001-500,000 with costs rapidly escalating for "million" and "multi-million" cities (4). Partly because of this, partly because of recent migration experience, partly because of the desire to keep population away from the "natural growth-poles", the III Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1975) envisaged 12.1% of the new housing being built in the period going to rural municipios, 34.2% to municipios with 10,000-100,000 population, 28.7% to those with 100,000-500,000 population and only 25.0% to those with over 500,000 population (5). Whether this policy of containment will prove successful time alone will tell. In many respects the movement of population is as inevitable and as irreversible as the waves which faced King Canute. Migration in our opinion is largely a stage-by-stage movement (not necessarily in the life-time of one migrant) up the urban hierarchy, with the largest cities containing the most population showing the greatest growth and receiving the largest number of migrants. Thus Elizaga found that 42.4% of his sample of migrants to Santiago (Chile) came from towns with over 20,000 population (6). Likewise in Madrid at the top of the Spanish urban hierarchy, 40.92% of its recorded internal in-migrants in 1971 came from municipios with over 20,000 population (7). Data from Estébanez and Puyol suggests that in those regions of Spain where the number of recorded intra-regional in-migrants as a percentage of total internal migrants (1961-1970) was highest, migration was at least a two stage process - from rural to urban municipio and then on to a national in-migration centre. In proof of this theory we found a correlation with net extra-regional migration (1961-1970) which was significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.708$ ) (8). As far as the urban

hierarchy is concerned, it can be demonstrated that Madrid and Barcelona form one "oligarchic rank-size regime" (9), Having a larger share of the total urban population than would be expected according to Zipf's rank-size rule (10), and exercising a strong "pull" on all municipios below them in the hierarchy with populations of between 1,000,000 and 185,000 (see Fig.70) (11). Out-migration from the city of Sevilla, for example, increased from 8.1% of the provincial total in 1965 to 19.2% in 1967 - Barcelona receiving 64.18% of the province's extra-provincial out-migrants in 1965 and 63.49% in 1967 (12).

It would be wrong to conclude that urban-to-urban migration in Spain is entirely a socio-economic movement up the urban hierarchical ladder. Rather it is a more complex "snakes and ladders movement" with constant goings to and fro. Spain has not yet reached the American state of "megapolitan society" (13) with "corporate gypsies" (14) of the white-collar variety moving often for job-related reasons - owing allegiance to a corporation or a profession rather than to family or place (15). Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the industrialization / concentration process is giving way to modernization / decentralization (16). It was dormitory / industrial satellite towns like Alcorcón (Madrid), Ripollet (Barcelona), Paiporta (Valencia), Portugalete (Bilbao) and San Juan de Aznalfarache (Sevilla) which grew most rapidly in the 1960s (17). Nor was urban-to-urban migration<sup>x</sup> short-distance, "least-effort" movements of population within major metropolitan areas as described in the section on intra-provincial migration (18). In 1971, 38.06% of Madrid city's recorded internal out-migrants left for an urban municipio with 20,000 population - 12.75% within the province of Madrid itself, 25.31% to other parts of Spain (19). Yet, the movement of qualified people to new industrial regions, or even between existing industrial regions, is a limited one. In 1961 movements of this type represented 7.83% of total recorded internal migration


<sup>x</sup> only



Fig.70 Rank-Size Relationship

the

Spanish Urban Hierarchy



in that year, falling in 1964 to 7.26% and increasing to 8.39 and 9.57% of the total in 1967 and 1970 respectively (20). Within the four most important net in-migrant provinces of Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and Vizcaya this type of migration remained relatively constant as a percentage of total recorded in- and out-migration for each province (see Table LVIII). Collectively, these four provinces accounted for 21.97% of total, recorded, "qualified out-migration" in 1964, rising to 23.53% in 1967. As far as "qualified in-migration" is concerned the percentage in 1964 was 56.88 and in 1967 a somewhat lower 49.70. There was a net balance, therefore, in favour of these four provinces which was reduced by 8.74% in 1967 as "growth-pole" and other economic strategies began to bite and more migrants remained within the confines of their native province. In absolute figures the number of "qualified" migrants showed a net increase in all four provinces, with Barcelona and Madrid having the largest net balances in both 1964 and 1967 (21). As a percentage of total in- or out-migration from each province, however, all four provinces lost in qualitative terms although as Table LVIII shows the net losses were reduced in 1967. When each of the three migration streams we defined as "qualified" was examined separately it was found that Empresarios y altos cargos (Managers and high officials) and Profesionales técnicos y afines (Professional men, technicians, etc.) migrated in appreciable numbers from and to Barcelona and Madrid but not Valencia and Vizcaya (22). When Empleados administrativos, dependientes y similares (Administrative and clerical staff and the like) were considered all four provinces were the most important for this type of movement (23). The net balance in all three instances and for all four provinces was a positive one in both 1964 and 1967 (24). The flow of capital, goods and services from the "periphery" to "economic core regions" is thus paralleled not only by the migration of skilled and unskilled workers but also by that of professional and educated people (25).

Table LVIII

QUALIFIED IN- AND OUT-MIGRATION BY SELECTED PROVINCES, 1964 AND 1967

Year	Province	In-migration *	Out-migration *	Net balance *
(a) 1964				
	Barcelona	6.39%	7.03%	-0.64%
	Madrid	10.00%	12.65%	-2.65%
	Valencia	10.25%	11.89%	-1.64%
	Vizcaya	3.36%	6.23%	-2.87%
(b) 1967				
	Barcelona	7.53%	6.88%	+0.65%
	Madrid	10.15%	11.09%	-0.94%
	Valencia	9.46%	11.10%	-1.64%
	Vizcaya	5.48%	7.35%	-1.87%

\* As a percentage of the total in- and out-migration of each province.

SOURCE: Presidencia del Gobierno, Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Las Migraciones Interiores en España. Decenio 1961-1970, Madrid, 1974, Tables III.3 and III.4, pp.122-141.

Our calculations suggest that "qualified" migrants are least mobile in Vizcaya, of the four main net-in-migrant provinces. De Miguel and Linz were able to calculate the importance of net in-migration within the management sphere by comparing the percentages of empresarios and urban masculine population born in the same province where censored in 1962. In the case of Madrid empresarios were 19% more mobile than the urban masculine population of the province, and in the case of Valencia 6% more. In contrast, the empresariado class was 21% less mobile than the urban born population in Barcelona, and 2% less in the case of Vizcaya (26). In another paper Linz and de Miguel found that the "eight Spains" contributed very unevenly to the recruitment of different élites, particularly in the case of Cataluña and the Basque provinces (27). They found the recruitment of bureaucratic and military élites centred mainly on Madrid and "clases medias" (28) and "gentry Spains" (29). Thus 25.51% of the professional military were born in "gentry Spain" and 25.18% in "clases

medias" Spain (30). No less than 15.5% of the university professors came from Andalucía and 12.8% from Madrid (31). The ranks of the higher echelons of the civil service were filled mainly from Madrid, the middle and lower ranks from "clases medias" Spain where the traditional middle class has its historic roots. For government ministers in office under the republic (1931-1936) 17.2% came from Andalucía, while for this in office under the Franco régime (1938-1960) no less than 32% were born in Madrid, 14% in Andalucía and only 2% in Barcelona! For Magistrados del Tribunal Superior (High Court Judges), 22% were born in Andalucía and 16.4% in Madrid, while in the case of Abogados del Estado (Civil Service Lawyers) 22.7% were born in Madrid and 13.7% in Andalucía (32). Seminary students came mainly from "clases medias" Spain and also from (peasant) "bourgeois" (33) Spain (34). In a sample survey of empresarios managing firms with over 1,000 workers (and representing 77.3% of managers of large firms) de Miguel and Linz found that 18.7% were born in Barcelona and 10.7% in Vizcaya (35). These differences in recruiting patterns they found were related to the prestige value assigned to various élitist occupations in different socio-economic regions of the country (36).

Within "clases medias" and "gentry" Spain it has been traditional in the former for some sons and daughters at least to leave the countryside, while in the latter it has become increasingly customary for the sons and daughters of the land-holding élite not to wish to return to the countryside on graduating (37). Education and "influence" have provided a gateway to professional careers in the Church, army and bureaucracy at different levels for the two distinct social groups. Many on qualification have been banished to a career in the countryside. Increasingly, however, more and more have turned towards careers in industry. Pinilla de las Heras, for example, has been able to trace a small but important movement of non-Catalans to technical and managerial jobs in the non-manufacturing

sectors of the Catalan economy (38). This is very largely an urban-to-urban movement of labour (39).

Within the old-established industrial regions a traditional bourgeois middle class exists - like the Catalan menestralia - which is characterized by low rates of geographical mobility. This group in Cataluña controls smaller firms, especially in traditional branches of industry like textiles and where firms are sufficiently large is able to achieve its goal of upward social mobility through both technical and administrative channels without the need for much geographical mobility - the latter channel being usually denied to non-natives (40).

In recent years a third type of middle class has been growing more and more important. The new, technocratic middle class includes skilled workers, technicians, managers and professional men within the expanding industrial and service sectors of the economy. This group is the most mobile in terms of urban-to-urban migration. They represent the "qualified" migrants referred to earlier. They are the "corporate gypsies" of the future. They are well-represented in new industrial regions and centres of expanding tertiary and quaternary activities like Madrid. They have moved freely to I.N.I. developments like Puertollano or Avilés (41), to planned "growth-pole" regions, and to new tourist regions of spontaneous growth. Increasingly, however, as our statistics for 1964 and 1967 have shown, they have been drawn into the capital / intensive industrial vortex of Cataluña and to a lesser extent Vizcaya. Pinilla de las Heras has found that within the white-collar, socio-professional categories in Cataluña, employment flows between industrial and service sectors in both directions were important for Catalans and non-Catalans alike (42). There is more than a suggestion from this and from our own researches that desarrollismo is beginning to break down the traditional barriers to geographical mobility of the inter-regional type for middle-class, urban-to-urban migrants (43). While it is true "that the main centres of economic activity are like

widely separated islands, imperfectly linked by a sparse transport system, so that industry is [still mainly] orientated towards regional rather than national markets...." (44), there is now some hope that at last the national economy will become more integrated and that marked regional differences in incomes and prices, etc., even within the developed "islands" will disappear (45). Whether this greater inter-regional mobility will rub-off on the more traditional "clases medias" time alone will tell (46). Place-of-birth statistics for the diocesan clergy for the archdiocese of Madrid-Alcalá for 1968 reveal that 39.28% were born in the diocese of Madrid itself, 15.15% in the rest of New Castile, 19.39% in Old Castile, and 6.44% in León. In contrast, only 5.51% were born in Andalucía, 1.17% in the Basque provinces, 0.69% in the Valencian region, and 0.47% in Cataluña. Diocesis of origin statistics for extra-diocesan clergy should perhaps reveal greater inter-regional mobility if the process of change has begun to affect the clergy (47). Extra-diocesan statistics can only be compared with diocesan ones if the latter are corrected after excluding those from Madrid-Alcalá itself. The corrected figures do in fact indicate the greater mobility from all historic regions with the exception of New Castile, Andalucía, Canarias and Murcia (see Table LIX). The greatest increases appear to have occurred in the case of extra-diocesan clergy "migrating" to Madrid-Alcalá from dioceses within the historic regions of Baleares (+257.89%), the Basque provinces (+229.74%) and Valencia (+205.22%); with Asturias, Aragón, Cataluña and Navarra all showing higher percentage increases than the traditional "supply-regions" of Old Castile and León. Although diocesan (place-of-birth) and extra-diocesan (diocese of origin) statistics are not strictly comparable, careful interpretation of corrected data in Table LIX suggests that greater inter-regional mobility characterizes ecclesiastics as well as the laity (48).

Table LIX

DIOCESAN AND EXTRA-DIOCESAN CLERGY WITHIN THE ARCHDIOCESES OF MADRID-ALCALÁ, COMPARED BY PLACE-OF-BIRTH AND DIOCESE OF ORIGIN, 1968

Region of origin	Dioc. clergy <sup>*</sup>		Ext.D. clergy <sup>†</sup>		Difference	Mobility Ind.
	A	B	C	D	(E = B-C)	(F - $\frac{E}{B}$ . 100)
New Castile	54.83	25.91 <sup>‡</sup>	8.50 <sup>‡</sup>	10.14 <sup>‡</sup>	+15.77 <sup>‡</sup>	+60.86 <sup>‡</sup>
Old Castile	19.89	33.15	31.54	37.63	- 4.48	- 13.51
León	6.44	10.73	9.80	11.70	- 0.97	- 9.04
Andalucía <sup>§</sup>	5.62	9.36	5.89	7.02	+ 2.34	+ 25.00
Extremadura	2.58	4.30	4.08	4.87	- 0.57	- 13.26
Galicia	2.47	4.12	3.59	4.29	- 0.17	- 4.13
Murcia	1.64	2.73	1.31	1.56	+ 1.17	+ 42.86
Navarra	1.40	2.33	2.94	3.51	- 1.18	- 50.64
Aragón	1.28	2.13	3.75	4.48	- 2.35	-110.33
Basque provinces	1.17	1.95	5.39	6.43	- 4.48	-229.74
Foreign countries	0.70	-	7.03	-	-	-
Valencia	0.69	1.15	2.94	3.51	- 2.36	-205.22
Cataluña	0.47	0.78	1.15	1.36	- 0.58	- 74.36
Asturias	0.47	0.78	1.63	1.95	- 1.17	-150.00
Baleares	0.23	0.38	1.14	1.36	- 0.98	-257.89
Canarias	0.12	0.20	0.16	0.19	+ 0.01	+ 5.00
The Army	-	-	9.16	-	-	-
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	-	-

A Diocesan clergy classified by diocese of birth;

B Corrected figures for diocesan clergy classified by diocese of birth. }<sup>\*</sup>

C Extra-diocesan clergy classified by diocese of origin;

D Corrected figures for ext.-dioc. clergy classified by diocese of origin. }<sup>‡</sup>

<sup>‡</sup> Excluding the diocese of Madrid-Alcalá.

<sup>§</sup> Including the diocese of Ceuta.

SOURCE: Oficina Técnica de Sociología Religiosa del Arzobispado y Sección de Estudios de Caritas Diocesana, Guía de la Archidiócesis de Madrid-Alcalá 1968, Madrid, 1968, pp.350-365 and 367-377.

## I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

### E/ THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF "PUSH" AND "PULL" FACTORS OPERATING IN IN- AND OUT-MIGRATION REGIONS

The "push-pull" mechanism is essentially a dual one in which it is difficult to measure accurately the relative importance of the two separate movements involved, moreso when many separate and not always quantifiable "push" and "pull" factors are involved.

The most important separate element within the "pull" factors is perhaps the generally higher level of urban incomes (1). Certainly economists and others have paid much attention to measuring the incomes gap between urban and rural areas (2). Bellerby has been able to show that the "crude wage ratio" between agriculture and industry in the United Kingdom during the last hundred years has oscillated around 50%, reaching a minimum of 44% between 1850 and 1857 and a maximum of 78% between 1946 and 1947(3). Throughout the Third World at the present time annual urban incomes tend to be between two and three times those of agricultural ones (4), as is confirmed by case-studies from Nigeria (5), Kenya (6) and elsewhere. In Spain the average agricultural labourer's wage was 9,805 pesetas annually in 1955, which represented a mere 40.48% of that of a worker in the industrial sector (7).

It is difficult to be certain how the gap between rural and urban incomes or wages in a country like Spain changes over a period of time. As far as other countries are concerned most authorities conclude that the gap increases. Rossi-Doria, for example, has argued that in the prolonged period of economic stagnation and steadily increasing over-population which affected the countryside of Western Europe after the Second World War the gap increased slowly without any great movement of labour off the land while urban unemployment was rife nearly everywhere, but when post-1950 the economy entered a phase of rapid and dynamic economic development the gap between agricultural and other incomes increased enormously leaving farmers with but two alternatives - either to modernize and mechanize their farms or to migrate (8).



Turning to Spain, the available evidence seems to suggest that it was sometime during the 1949-1953 period that the index of industrial production accelerated at the expense of that of agricultural production, the gap widening to 29.8% in favour of the former compared with only 7.7 and 8.7% in the two immediate five-year periods before 1949 (9). While agricultural production had increased by 38.08% in the twenty-nine years (1906-1935) before the Civil War compared with 42.87% in the twenty-four years (1939-1963) after it, industrial production increased by 64.55% in the former period and a massive 213.24% in the latter (10). Granted that we are working with crude statistics from various sources, it is doubtful if the error is more than 5% either way and so does not affect the picture we have drawn. Between 1951 and 1955 the percentage of the Gross National Product derived from the agricultural sector fell from 36 to 28%, that for the secondary and tertiary sectors expanding by 4% each to 31 and 41% respectively in 1955 (11). By 1955, we have seen, the average per capita wage of agricultural labourers was only 40% of that of industrial ones, conditions having become all but intolerable in the Spanish countryside. The "index of farm-workers' well-being" which attempts to measure this factor of tolerability had declined by an average of 1.00% annually between 1935 and 1942, risen fleetingly between 1942 and 1945 by an average of 2.5% annually before falling by 3.38% annually between 1945 and 1950 and returning to par for the course (that is 1935 conditions of tolerability described so lucidly by Gerald Brenan) (12) by 1956 (13).

Hoover has rightly pointed out that "the greater a family's need the less may it be able to surmount the threshold of migration" (14), while Friedlander has argued convincingly that a minimum per capita income level is a pre-requisite to large-scale emigration (15). Empirical evidence from Western Europe in the nineteenth century shows that massive out-migration first affected the most prosperous areas. Moreover, Cairncross has been

able to show that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned agricultural labour moved out of the countryside en mass during the most prosperous decades of the third quarter of the nineteenth century (16). While not disagreeing with the conclusions reached by other authors it is our hypothesis that social as well as political "revolutions" occur at times when "people's actual need satisfaction and expected need satisfaction suddenly and sharply increases to intolerable proportions" (17). Enduring poverty does not promote massive out-migration; rather it is a prolonged period of economic and social development followed by a short period of sharp reversal when rising expectations are likely to be frustrated which sets population in motion (18). It is our contention that there is a built-in factor within the mechanism of the Spanish economic system which makes such sharp reversals frequent occurrences. No one would doubt that from at least 1956 agricultural salaries have improved considerably (19). Table IX shows that agricultural salaries in real terms increased at the expense of those in the industrial sector in 1959 and 1960 (when stabilization measures affected salaries in industry but not in agriculture) (20). In 1961 and 1962, however, when the economy began to expand once more the lot of the peasant was measurably worse than that of the average industrial worker. In 1963, agricultural salaries increased by 14.7% in real terms compared with only 5.8% for industrial salaries, the "relative deprivation" of 1964 helping to fan the flames of mass out-migration (21). The built-in factor within the mechanism of the Spanish economic system which is largely responsible for such sharp reversals of "fortune" is the climate (22).

The standard of living of the Spanish peasantry is so low that they are unable to counteract the strong "pull" of the city-life when expectations rise and suddenly - due to a bad climatic year - they are more unable than ever to satisfy them (23). An O.E.C.D. report on the situation

Table IX

PERCENTAGE PER CAPITA ANNUAL SALARY INCREASES IN REAL TERMS 1959-1964

Sector	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Primary *	9.8	8.1	5.7	6.3	14.7	4.7
Secondary	-2.2	5.4	8.4	10.3	5.8	4.4

\* Excluding fishing.

SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, cited in Presidencia del Gobierno, Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Factores Humanos y Sociales del Desarrollo. Resumen de la Monografía, Madrid, 1965, p.85.

of Spanish agriculture has underlined the fact that a 10% variation in the Gross Agricultural Product (as occurred in 1964 - a bad climatic year) has the effect of modifying consumption in the other two sectors of the economy by at least 2% (24). Expressed in statistical terms we have calculated that the Gross Interior Product agricultural sector . 100 per industrial sector active person in the sector, valued at 60.88% in 1960, fell to 56.94% in 1961, rose to 59.34% in 1962 and 61.43% in 1963 before falling back to 56.72% in 1964 (25). Harvests in 1960 and 1961 were poor, in 1963 good, and in 1964 particularly bad.

The author agrees with Bogue, Shryock and Hoermann that theories of economic determinism in migration are bound to be incomplete (26). Massive flight from the land must be seen not only as a matter of mounting pressures against landless labourers and small farmers caught in a urban-rural "price-scissors" (27), but also as a matter of "relative deprivation" (28). One of the great drawbacks of the "push-pull" hypothesis is that it "assumes rational behaviour" (29), when behaviour patterns often have an irrational element.

Thormann has argued that government policies have increased wage differentials between urban and rural areas while at the same time making the "pull" of cities stronger through concentrating public and social

service investment within the urban areas (30). While there can be no doubting the fact that the Spanish government has played an increasingly more active role in widening the social security gap between urban and rural areas from 1959, the national minimum wage agreement of 1963 had little influence on agricultural salaries (which were generally above the minimum level), while the law of supply and demand has had the effect of reducing rural-urban income differentials by pushing up agricultural salaries as migration became more and more fashionable and labour increasingly scarce in the Spanish countryside (31). As an example, the average per capita income in the agricultural sector rose to 71.72% of that in the industrial sector in 1962 (32). In 1964 it represented 56.96% of the per capita income of the total active population, in 1965 it increased to 58.14%, and 1966 to 60.93% (33). Salaried agricultural labour was able to organize itself and to benefit greatly from Convenios Colectivos (collective bargaining contracts) as a result of the Government's Reglamentaciones Provinciales de Trabajo en el Campo (Provincial Labour Regulations in the Countryside) of 1959 (34), that year and 1963 being particularly fruitful ones in real terms for salaried agricultural labour (35). Nineteen fifty-nine and 1963 were particularly bad years for agricultural proprietors mainly because of inflated labour costs (36), small landowners being forced to migrate in those two years very largely as a result of official policies (37). Small landowners were also increasingly hit by changes in guaranteed prices paid for agricultural commodities - especially for wheat from the 1967-1968 harvest (38).

Kayser has written that "it is crucial to detect what underlies national averages; in statistical form these conceal local phenomena that are often contradictory and at very different stages of development" (39). Even national statistics within the developing world (and we could include Spain in this context here) have been likened by Dryer to "a dangerous

crutch, more likely to crumble under any administration or research worker that placed weight upon them... " (40). Applying the hypothesis of "relative deprivation" it becomes apparent from what has been stated in the preceding paragraph that the peaks of massive out-migration of landless labourers and agricultural proprietors cannot coincide, given the high percentage labour costs represent within the total costs of agriculture (41).

Regional differences in agricultural salaries are comparable with those between agricultural and non-agricultural ones! Average agricultural salaries in 1960 in the poorest agricultural region (Galicia) represented but 48.31% of those in the richest (Rioja-Navarra) (42). The salaries of agricultural proprietors and self-employed agriculturalists in Galicia, where farm units were smallest and most subdivided in strips, represented only 27.55% of those in Western Andalucía the home of latifundismo. As far as salaried agricultural labour was concerned, salaries in the poorest regions of Aragón, Western and Eastern Andalucía represented 36.29, 37.97 and 40.51% respectively of those in the richest region (Asturias-Santander). Agricultural labourers' salaries were generally highest near the main industrial areas and lowest where salaried labour was most abundant (43). Similarly there are great regional differences in wages in the non-agricultural sectors. One example will suffice to illustrate this point. There was a 30.2% variation in the daily labour costs in the construction industry in June 1965 between Almería (where costs were lowest) and Pontevedra where (costs were highest) (44).

At a local level Siguán Soler found that agricultural salaries in five Castilian villages during the 1963-1964 season showed the greatest differences for permanently employed workers. The lowest salaries for this class of agricultural labourer represented only 55% of that of the highest. For casual labour the percentage was 78.57. Despite these differentials, in one village studied he found that the increase in permanently-employed

agricultural workers' salaries between 1945-1950 and 1963-1964 was exactly paralleled by that in casual labourers' salaries (45). Such balance is surely unique! Nationally, daily average wages for permanently employed agricultural labourers increased to 98.82% between 1964 and 1970 compared with only 83.14% for casual agricultural labourers (46).

Simple comparisons made between agricultural and urban salaries must be qualified. Despite the fact that the average salary of any person employed in the agricultural sector in 1964 was 34% less than that of a person employed in construction and 73% less than that of any one engaged in manufacturing (47), yet the wages of a casual agricultural labourer at harvest-time are much higher than those of an industrial peón (48), while Bueno Gómez found that 56% of a sample of farms in Castile produced an income of less than 40,000 pesetas annually, more than half the farmers concerned earned supplementary incomes from non-agricultural sources (49). Again, pluri-employment is rife in the urban areas and non-agricultural sectors, making simple comparisons difficult. Within the rural areas there are numerous examples of incomes being supplemented by remittances sent by relatives who have migrated or gone abroad, and of others who return to the village after a season abroad and live off their savings (50). Cazorla is of the opinion that out-migration from many regions of Andalucía would be much greater but for financial assistance received from relatives who have migrated (51). Yet, despite all these qualifying statements, it cannot be disputed that the vast majority of those fundamentally involved explain out-migration from the countryside in cold economic terms - "en el campo se gana poco" (in the country one earns very little) or "en la ciudad se vive mejor" (in the city one lives much better). The majority vote approximately 2:1 in favour of rural "push" rather than urban "pull" (52). While there is little doubt that their minds are troubled by changing normative attitudes and personal feelings of "relative deprivation", the

"push" factors are little prodding ones which are not easily identifiable at national or even regional level. There is a parallel with English agricultural labourers at the end of the eighteenth century. The "last straw which broke the camel's back" then was the loss of the agricultural labourer's auxiliary resources. The enclosure movement resulted in a fall in his income in real terms by reducing him to the level of a simple wage-earner without the benefit of his own tilled strip, the cow that he grazed on the village meadow and the firewood that he picked on the village common (53). In mid-twentieth century Spain, sometimes it was the Ley de Montes (Law concerning Upland Areas) of the 8th of May 1956 which was a local grievance. This law led to an immediate decrease in the income of stockholders in upland areas affected by reafforestation schemes. They also lost auxiliary resources like charcoal (which was made from heather and used as winter fuel) and because of the lower stock-carrying capacity of forested areas had less manure to put on their arable and olive crops (54). In some parts of Andalucía agricultural systems have been changed to the detriment of the poorest braceros. Previously garbanzos (chick-peas) had been sown in the barbechos (fallow land) to improve the soil, the crops being given free to the landless labourers (55). On the dehesas (ranches) of Extremadura peasants have lost important animal by-products with the appearance of centralized, industrial slaughter-houses (56), while the recent emphasis on stock-rearing in Western and coastal Spain has led to a reduction in the agricultural labour-requirements (57), which in itself is no small inducement to emigration.

In this section of our thesis we have endeavoured to illustrate that - despite the inadequacies of Spanish statistics, official and otherwise, the hypothesis of "relative deprivation" is proven with reference to internal migration in the recent past (1959-1964). We emphasized the due importance of "climatic accidents" and the direct interference of governments in the economic affairs of men as relevant factors in the out-migra-

tion of rural folk, conditioned not only by normative attitudes and personal feelings of "relative deprivation" but founded also on the solid economic fact that agricultural salaries represent but 60% of the per capita income of the total active population (58). "Push-pull" factors thus work in unison (59), the potential "pull" of urban economic opportunities and services being intensified during a short, sharp "recession" in the countryside when a feeling of "relative deprivation" rather than of economic hardship helps to expel population from the rural areas. Confusing, contradictory statements made earlier in this thesis now become more intelligible. At first hand the correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the percentage of the gross provincial income in the primary sector in 1962 of  $R_s = -0.666$  would seem to underline the "push" aspects of out-migration (60), the correlation with the percentage of the gross provincial income in the secondary and tertiary sectors in 1962 being only  $R_s = +0.556$  and  $R_s = +0.457$  respectively. The "pull" of tertiarization ( $R_s = +0.356$ ), of urbanization ( $R_s = +0.461$ ) and even of industrialization ( $R_s = +0.513$ ) pales to insignificance when compared with this strong economic "push" out of agriculture, although some of the highest individual degrees of correlation were encountered in the field of personal communication. One hundred and seventy-five variables tested against internal migration at the national level (mainly in the 1961-1965 period) revealed average degrees of correlation of  $R_s = +0.555$  for "pull" factors and  $R_s = -0.345$  for "push" ones. The relationship of "push" to "pull" was 62.16% which is approximately the same as that between the average income in the agricultural sector as a percentage of the per capita income of the total active population. This, to our manner of thinking, indicates quite conclusively that "pull" is more important quantitatively than "push" (61). A feeling of "relative deprivation" can only develop when degenerating or stagnating rural conditions are compared to rapidly expanding ones in the other two



sectors of the economy. If ignorance is bliss then the agony of the Spanish peasant becomes increasingly heightened as a growing awareness of rural-urban and agricultural-non-agricultural differentials are made apparent to him through the visible example of those who have triumphed over despair.

One hundred and seventy-three municipios (representing 2% of the total in 1970) were randomly selected in July 1972 for our Rural Questionnaire-Official (see Appendix) to study the relative importance of "push-pull" factors at local level. Although only ten replies were received they showed a wide geographical distribution, and were fairly representative of the distribution of municipios by population group. In 1970, for example, 44% of Spanish municipios with less than 10,000 population had under 500 inhabitants, compared with 40% in our sample.

The most significant points emerging from an analysis of the statistics contained in the sample were the following:

- 1) There was a statistically significant correlation between size of municipio and municipal service indices, which was significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.863$ ).
- 2) There was an inverse correlation between estimated net internal migration and estimated per capita income, which was significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.727$ ).
- 3) Although there was no statistically significant correlation between estimated net internal migration and either the size of municipio ( $R_s = -0.539$ ) or municipal service indices ( $R_s = -0.533$ ), the migration of population from smaller, badly-served municipios was suggested, and with more accurate migration statistics would have been confirmed.
- 4) This lack of statistical correlation was partly due to local factors. La Sagrada (Salamanca), for example, with a population of only 339 in 1970 - lacking in basic municipal services like paved roads

streets, piped water supply and modern sewage facilities, without a municipal doctor, vet or parish priest and with the nearest coach-line service passing five kilometres from the village - had practically no out-migration. Indeed its population increased by 29% between 1960 and 1965, thanks to the establishment of an Instituto Nacional de Colonización poblado at Carrascalejo de Huebra in the latter year.

- 5) Mechanization of agriculture (which became important from 1962 or 1963) was not felt to have had any influence on migration, except in Lérida-Huesca-Navarra where it was emphasized. In La Sagrada, where there was practically no out-migration, there was one tractor per thirteen population. In Falces (Navarra), where it was emphasized as a factor influencing out-migration, there was one tractor per twenty-two population. In Santiago de Alcántara (Cáceres), in a latifundio zone of massive out-migration, there was only one tractor per two hundred and sixty-seven population.
- 6) In no instance was it officially felt that communications or lack of communications had substantially influenced migration.
- 7) There was a 60% difference between casual hired-labourers salaries in the poorest and richest municipios in our sample. In two instances the annual salary of permanently-employed labourers was 20-25% higher than that of small landowners.
- 8) Where the economy was diversified, as in Villavert (Tarragona), there was little out-migration, and even some substitute in-migration from Andalucía.
- 9) In the new massive out-migration zone of Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura the phenomenon of family groups emigrating en masse became commonplace from about 1962.
- 10) Only one reply emphasized the importance of sequía (drought) as a

climatic "push" factor - and then from Navarra in humid Spain!

- 11) The complex nature of the relationship between "push-pull" factors was revealed at Bagá (Barcelona). The existence of textile factories and coal mines within the locality acted as a "pull" factor in some years, periods of economic crisis served to reverse the flow of migration streams and "push" population out of the municipio. The relationship of bajas to altas (in a sense counterstream to stream) in the municipal padrón, varied from a maximum of 38.13% in 1961 (when there were thirty-four net in-migrants) to 545.16% in 1966 (when there were one hundred and thirty-eight net out-migrants).
- 12) There was little in the Rural Questionnaire - Official to confirm the importance of either "push" or "pull" factors in the official local mentality. Perhaps it was refreshingly different that officials should not be aware of the factors involved. Better this than totally biased and bigoted viewpoints.

Turning to the relative importance of "push" and "pull" factors at an individual level, a sample survey Rural Questionnaire - Personal was undertaken in July 1972. One survey was completed in the provinces of Huesca and Lérida on my behalf, by the students of the Geography Department at the University of Keele, under the direction of Dr. John Naylor. Persons interviewed were allowed to choose more than one answer to Q.54 - the reason why people migrate (see Appendix). Only 63% of the sample answered the question - mainly because of the limited time allowed and the length of the questionnaire. Of the thirty-seven who did reply, 70% chose as their most important reason the fact that people migrated mainly to improve their salary. Fifty-seven per cent chose the improvement of their children's education as the second most important reason. In our estimation, these were "pull" factors. They proved to be twice as strong as "push" factors like poorly paid jobs (35%), the desire to obtain more secure employment (35%)

or paro permanente (13%). This confirmed the suggestion made earlier in this section of our thesis that "pull" is twice as important as "push". Personal factors like family problems (3%), unpleasant work relationships (3%) and sheer restlessness (cualquier otra razón - 11%) were also mentioned.

Two further surveys were conducted by the author in Old Castile-León and Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura in July and August of 1972. The Keele findings were broadly confirmed but with important regional differences. The "pull" aspect of internal migration was emphasized in Old Castile-León with 84% believing that migrants left mainly to improve their salary. Fifty-nine per cent gave improving the education of their children as the second most important motive. Declared political motives were less important (4% as against 8%), as was sheer restlessness (9% as opposed to 11%). Health and family problems were comparable (4% as against 5% and 4% as against 3% respectively). One in three again emphasized the importance of rural "push". Rather interestingly, a negligible percentage in both instances thought that people migrated to pay off debts. Not so Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. In this survey 15% thought that people migrated to pay off debts. The "push" aspects of out-migration from this region were more important. Thirty-one per cent thought that paro permanente was an important factor. Sixty-five per cent thought that obtaining more secure employment was important and 73% that poorly-paid jobs influenced people to migrate. Rather significantly, 81% still believed that people migrated mainly to improve their salary. Less people thought that improving the education of their children was important (36%). Twenty-one per cent mentioned family problems. Women were almost twice as likely as men to mention personal problems of this nature. This was particularly true for young married women who (presumably) found it difficult to get on with their in-laws and whose sense of "non-belongingness" seemed to make them

more likely to be potential migrants. Sheer restlessness (15%) may also have concealed problems of a personal nature like this. Less people (2% as against 4%) were prepared to mention politics as a motive for migration in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura than in Old Castile-León, perhaps suggesting a lower participation in voluntary associations within this region.

While they were not claimed to be representative sample surveys in the strictest sociological sense, the three studies produced a number of important results which help to substantiate some of the tentative suggestions made at national and regional / provincial levels regarding the complex nature of the mechanism of migrant decision-making.

The questionnaires showed that there were some answers that peasants were not prepared to reveal (to foreigners at least). Q.11 on salaries was ignored or, when it was answered, the variation even within the same socio-economic group in the same locality was so great as to render the statistics suspect.

There were some questions where difficulty of recall rendered the findings suspect. In one village, for example, the sample interviewed could not agree as to whether there were two or three T.V. sets in the municipio (Q.40). Nor could they agree when the first one was installed (Q.41). On the other hand, in other villages persons interviewed could immediately write down the number of sets - say 68 - without any hesitation!

There were some questions where the sample could not agree on the answer. Where out-migration was not massive, for example, an almost equal number of persons thought that it was a problem in the village as those who did not (Q.55).

There were, however, some questions where opinion was almost unanimous. Mechanization was beneficial (Q.27). It improved farming techniques and made work easier (Q.28), so that very few mentioned it as a "push"

factor expelling population - even in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. Opinion was equally undivided regarding improvements in the standard of living. More than 90% thought that life was better than five years previously, and only 4% thought that it was worse (Q.12). There were, however, some interesting correlations here with objective measurements of affluence on a "micro" scale. In the Huesca-Lérida survey, 71% of those questioned in the Ebro basin had a T.V. set installed in their homes (Q.39), 67% claimed to possess a car of their own (Q.35) and 96% thought that the standard of living had improved over the last five years. In the High Pyrenees 45% had a T.V. set, 45% possessed a car and 90% thought that the standard of living had improved. Fifty-eight per cent in the former region and 54% in the latter thought that migration had decreased (Q.63). In the Limestone Pyrenees the lowest percentage (71%) thought that the standard of living had improved over the last five years with 75% thinking that migration had actually increased.

When out-migration was identified as being massive in character, people interviewed could usually point to an approximate date when the process had begun (Q.80) - usually 1950 or 1960 - but very few could mention a specific "push" factor involved (except for drought in one or two instances - Q.81).

In the Huesca-Lérida survey 88% thought that out-migration had harmed villages (Q.53), the percentage falling to 35% in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. Some concern was shown in Old Castile-León about the massive nature of out-migration. Many felt that it had benefited rural society in the past but were not so sure now.

The vast majority thought that continued out-migration was inevitable (Q.56). Eighty-nine per cent expressed this view in Huesca-Lérida, 84% in Old Castile-León and 92% in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura.

There was a difference of opinion regarding the role of responsible

elements within the villages as factors encouraging or discouraging out-migration (Q.57). It would appear that there was some correlation between increasing rurality and discouragement - presumably in more closed, integrated societies - although there was more than a suggestion that there was some connection with the education of the person questioned. Those in authority tended to say that out-migration was officially discouraged, those with secondary education that it was encouraged, those with limited education were often uncertain of their attitude here.

Most recognized that it was the young, the agriculturalists, the persons occupying inferior social positions etc., who were most likely to migrate (Q.65), although they had little idea as how to curb out-migration (Q.64).

Migration was obviously ill-prepared. They were ready to work at anything (lo que venga), with few mentioning a specific type of job even within the construction industry (Q.68). If it was the desire of migrants to obtain secure employment within a factory they usually did not have the confidence to declare so. They had little real idea of how much they could earn or how much they would need to live in the city (Q.69). They were convinced of the inferiority of rural life (Q.67), generally unambitious (Q.70), but invariably not prepared to make a definitive move without the personal "pull" of a relative or friend in the city to help them (Q.71). In less than 5% of the total sample would potential migrants choose a venue where they did not have a friend or some member of their family already installed (Q.95). The vast majority stated that they received news regularly - rather surprisingly often weekly - from relatives who had already emigrated (Q.99). Between 90 and 95% thought that migrants had gained through migrating. Furthermore, three out of four thought that they were telling the truth about their success and only 10% that they were lying (Q.100). Potential migrants in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura were less certain that those who had already migrated<sup>\*</sup> telling the truth (only 67% thought so), although more from this region thought that they had gained

\* were

from the experience (96%).

In the Huesca-Lérida survey 27% thought that they would only have sufficient funds to pay for the journey, were they to decide to migrate. Thirty-two per cent thought that they would have sufficient to put a down-payment on a flat as well, while 41% considered that they would be able to pay not only the costs of the journey but also the full price of a flat (Q.97). Rather similar percentages were recorded in Old Castile-León but in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura, 62% thought that they would only be able to pay the cost of the journey. These were qualified answers which were conditional on the sale of all their possessions. Ninety-four per cent in the Huesca-Lérida survey thought to retain something in the village should they wish to return. Many said that it was impossible to sell their houses (which were invariably their own property) and they were forced to let their land because of the uneconomic price they were offered for its sale (Q.73). A similar picture was painted in Old Castile-León, but not in the latifundio zones of Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura where potential migrants had less possessions to dispose of.

While the personal "pull" factor was all-important as mentioned above, the influence of the cinema (Q.60), television (Q.61) and military service (Q.62), was more controversial. In the Huesca-Lérida survey 57% thought that T.V. was influential, 54% that military service was important and 37% that the cinema acted as a "pull" factor. There were, however, great regional differences within the region. Proportionally more people thought that military service was important in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura (72%) and that television was important in Old Castile-León (65%). The importance of personal visits could not be overlooked either. In the Ebro basin and in Old Castile-León, potential migrants claimed to have visited an average of seven or eight provincial capitals, the number falling to two or three in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura and the High Pyrenees



(Q.89). An average of 76% from the three surveys had personal experience of provincial capitals and large cities acquired through private visits, only 19% from military service and (surprisingly) only 5% from the Civil War (Q.90). Thirty-nine per cent in the Huesca-Lérida survey had seasonal work-experience outside the village, rising to forty-five per cent in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura (Q.88).

The overwhelming evidence suggested from our surveys is that potential migrants have sufficient awareness of the attractions of urban life acquired through personal experience, to be influenced by its psychological and socio-economic gravitational "pull". Despite the overall importance of "pull" factors, the component parts of the "push-pull" mechanism (as we demonstrated earlier) work in unison. The irrational, ill-prepared nature of out-migration suddenly executed, suggests a "push" aspect as does the stated intention to seek any kind of employment. Despite the attractions of city life, however, we found only 6-10% of our sample professing the declared intention to migrate in the foreseeable future.

## II. NORMATIVE FACTORS OPERATING IN OUT-MIGRATION AREAS

### 1) AT A NATIONAL LEVEL

Stone has written that more research is needed to clarify the links between "macro-scale theoretical research" of the socio-economic "push-pull" type and "behavioral research" at the scale of the individual (1). It is our belief that a study of normative attitudes at the scale of the community will do much to bridge this gap.

"Normative social influences" have been defined as "an influence to conform with the positive expectations of another" (2). There is more than a suspicion that "the more uncertain the individual is about the correctness of his judgement, the more likely he is to be susceptible to both normative and informational social influences in making his judgement" (3). Certainly normative social influences have the greatest effect upon individual judgements where group feelings are strongest and pressures exerted upon the individual to conform, as they are in the Spanish countryside (4).

All such feelings are crystallized in the one word pueblo. Membership of the pueblo is acquired only by birth. Those born within a particular pueblo remain its sons until their death, no matter where they live (5). Any outsider is at a disadvantage because he is a forastero (stranger) who does not belong to the community, even though he may have resided in its bosom for many years (6). The pueblo transcends class distinctions (7). External pressures have produced a sense of compactness as different social groups have been drawn together and compressed into one community - the pueblo (8).

Most Spaniards tend to see things - especially in politics - in terms of black and white. They suffer from what Menéndez Pidal (9) has called a "todo o nada" (all or nothing) attitude (which perhaps betrays their recent rural origin), for the pueblo begets a mentality which Caro Baroja has described as seeing "everything of one's own... [as] best, and everything of others' worse - particularly everything of others in neighbouring

communities" (10). It is an attitude of mind which automatically suspects and resists any change from without. There is a sense of "belonging" which all non-migrants to a greater or a lesser extent possess (11), and which also characterizes all "integrated societies" (12). "Human conduct", Giner has rightly pointed out, "is basically normative....Groups are constantly establishing the rules of the social game and institutionalizing them" (13). The pueblo is but one of the most important of these institutions. To Durkheim the essence of group life was that it was a conservative, constraining, coercive force which tended to limit individual variations from group norms (14). Parsons spoke of the "common value system of the community" (15), which in the eyes of the pueblo, is enshrined in the two words vergüenza and honor (16). Vergüenza is the "regard for the moral values of society....a mode of feeling which makes one sensitive to one's reputation and thereby causes one to accept the sanction of public opinion" (17). Honor was closely connected with manliness (18); vergüenza in turn checks the aggressive individualism of hombria (manliness) (19). "To be considered honrado", writes Lison-Tolosana, a man must "have vergüenza, a knowledge of what his honour dictates". Both the positive and negative aspects of honor and vergüenza respectively "tend to promote the virtues of co-existence and co-operation, and the community's cohesion" (20). Group village life was concentrated in the bares and tabernas, the lavadero and the plaza mayor (21). Here the rules of the social game were laid down. Here the deviants from local norms were cast in the role of sin-vergüenzas - social outcasts who were exposed to village cotilleo (gossip) (22) and "made the butt of group jokes and mischief" (23).

Many towns and villages until at least 1950 remained fundamentally the same as they were centuries ago. These, in the words of Gutkind, were "forgotten and forsaken places of historical interest, where life stagnated in the rigidity of outdated habits and superstitions" (24). Such a traditional society had looked upon the occasional migrant as a "viva

rebeldía ( a person of a rebellious nature) (25), and had dismissed migration as a solution to its pressing economic problems. "The rift between urban and rural Spain", in the words of Mendoza Ruiz, "was deep and derivative" (26). Town and country lived in two mutually hostile worlds. A rural-urban continuum could hardly be said to exist in Spain (27). Despite this basic dichotomy there has been a tendency (which is by no means exclusive to Spain) to romanticize the lot of the peasant.

"A time there was, ere England's grief began,

When every rood of ground maintained its man...

His blest companions, innocence and health;

And his best richest ignorance of wealth....

"I see the rural virtues leave the land..." (28)

The "little community" as described by Redfield was distinctive, small, homogeneous and self-sufficient (29), while his idyllic "folk culture" was peopled by well-adjusted, contented, socially cohesive individuals who were at peace with man and the world (30), and who certainly would have found no place in Peyton Place (31)! In Spain, "the 'Generation of 98'", according to Aceves, "helped create a myth about Castile that still lingers on" (32). According to this romanticized view the peasants are still seen as the "moral backbone of the nation", and there is genuine nostalgia for the simple life of the pueblo (33). Such attitudes still colour official thinking - the resistance to change, the slowness to improve rural services, an all-too-ready willingness to crush internal migration at its source for its evilness in undermining the moral fibre for the nation; these are its main characteristics. Nor are the desires of planners to keep the countryside quite unchanged, for emotional rather than rational reasons, unique to Spain (34). Ordinary townsfolk though, still see the peasant as a paleto or a tonto del bolo (35).

According to Beijer, a general change in mentality is probably one of

the prime factors encouraging rural-to-urban migration (36). E.M. Rogers has proposed a five-stage model to explain the process of adoption of an innovation and has suggested a parallel five-fold typology of adoptors from "innovators" to "laggards" (37). In the context of migration studies, migration as a solution to the economic problems of a rural community becomes an innovation; the first innovator the first "aspiring" young migrant; the last laggard the most reluctant "resultant" migrant. Lazarfeld has drawn attention to the importance of the "opinion leader" as a channel for new information and a source of advice to which others may turn in situations of doubt and uncertainty (38). The opinion leader in the context of migration studies is often cast in the role of the successful migrant who has returned to his native village on holiday to persuade by visual example the more reluctant of his kinsfolk and friends to follow his successful path. The Open University Understanding Society booklet has stressed the importance of the credibility which recipients attach to sources of information (39). In Spanish conditions the most credible sources of information for potential migrants are personal ones. Information received through "inter-personal channels" via the mass media is less credible and makes much less impact. Strong correlational evidence of links between social change and three factors have been obtained from case-studies in many countries. These three factors are literacy, exposure to urban experiences and exposure to the mass media (40). In our opinion, and we have emphasized it in this Part of our thesis (41), these three are surpassed in importance by exposure to personal persuasion (42). Opinion leaders and innovators occupy an important role, but the chain migration they inspire is still limited (43). Who, for example, has ever received hundreds of postcards after sending on a "chain letter"? Invariably the chain is broken. Of greater impact we feel is group discussion (44). The group acts as what Mabogunje calls a "control subsystem" (45), positively

encouraging migration or sometimes exercising a neutral influence by passively accepting it. Migration motivation at the normative level has been likened by Germani to a description of the way in which the community as a whole perceives and evaluates migration as an alternative solution to its economic problems (46). Usually it is only when all other possibilities of adjustment have failed that a radical change in the value-pattern occurs - value-change in the direction of development and modernization not coming from official, institutionalized quarters within the rural community but rather from some radical innovator with a following especially among the young (47). Undoubtedly there is a personal aspect and a development, of what Lerner calls a state of "empathy" (or "psychic mobility") by which the individual becomes transposed and is able to see himself in the shoes of an urban resident (48). Merton has spoken of psychological tensions of social origin which look upon migration as the only means of personal promotion (49); yet, as Petersen has aptly noted, "when emigration has been set as a social pattern, it is no longer relevant to [speak of] individual motivations" (50). It becomes relevant only to examine the mechanism by which the traditional social order is transformed and replaced by the "climate of mobility" - the social momentum of such collective behaviour which often results in massive out-migration (51).

The overall impression given by many writers is that social change (which is inevitably a slow, evolutionary process usually) expressed in changing group attitudes is the result of three factors - increasing literacy, increasing exposure to urban experiences and increasing exposure to the mass media (52). It is generally summarized in the one word awareness (53). A number of examples will illustrate this point.

"Housing and sanitary conditions, the level of social and cultural amenities, the precariousness of the labourer's independence in relation both to the farmer and the landlord have all been adverse factors in the

labourer's environment which, as awareness grew and consciousness developed, began to weigh more and more heavily upon the labourer himself" (54).

Ginsburg notes an increasing "awareness among rural dwellers [in Japan] of the existence and nature of an urban way of life" (55).

Kosiński, writing of "pull" factors, refers to the "spread of information and the extent to which people became aware of the possibilities. Awareness and susceptibility depend in turn on the level of education", he notes, "on contacts with the outside world, and on changes in attitudes" (56).

"The breakdown of isolation", notes Mabogunje, "brings the rural areas within the orbit of one or more urban centres and sharpens the awareness and desire of villagers for the ever-increasing range of goods and services which the urban centres have to offer" (57).

Hinderink, writing of Spanish conditions in the 1950s, states that "a number of typically local factors have contributed to migration apart from such general factors as a growing awareness of better conditions of living in other places and a better understanding of an economic concept such as labour-productivity, as a result of which peasants and agricultural labourers are no longer satisfied with the traditional poor yields and low incomes" (58).

It is our contention that the change in group attitudes is a much more sudden (sometimes revolutionary) shift of opinion. It can be likened to a government losing a number of Parliamentary by-elections once the "honeymoon period" after a successful general election is over and the public becomes suddenly aware of some unpopular measures which have been taken or election promises blatantly broken. Economists and sociologists speak of a "disequilibrium between urban-rural standards of living" (59) -

"una conciencia de desnivel" (60) - as a motivational force in migration. Siguán has rightly emphasized that out-migration is "not simply the result

of an economic mechanism. In order for the peasant to emigrate, he says, it is necessary for him to become conscious of the disequilibrium which exists between town and countryside, and in this realization his own life-style becomes devalued" (61). Surely what characterizes this mechanism is a slow unsteady see-saw movement followed by a sudden lurch. Borregón Ribes is quite correct when he maintains that internal migration is always a traumatic experience (62) - violent and sudden. While the prime cause of migration in Beaujeu-Garnier's opinion is absolute poverty - from which state man is driven by a simple desire to survive - "a sudden accident which upsets an already precarious equilibrium has much greater and more rapid effect than perpetual gnawing hunger, which dulls the spirit of reaction" (63). In sociological and psychological terms, it is "sudden upward changes in the standard of living...which puts norms in flux" (64). Conceptually models from catastrophe theory could perhaps prove fruitful for future lines of research in this field (65). Certainly Runciman has drawn attention to the effectiveness of war as an agent of social change (66). The Spanish Civil War did much to break the vicious circle of correlation between poverty and conservatism. The war provided the sudden external impetus so necessary to make countless peasants aware of their "relative deprivation" in relation to new "comparative reference groups" (67), with whom they had come into contact during the period of hostilities.

In our opinion, it is grossly over-simplifying the problem to state, as Mitchell has done, that "the key factor is the economic one; all other causes of migration can be removed save the economic one, and there would still be migration" (68). Important as the economic motive is, the rational element in migrant decision-making is only partial (69). Rather the decision to migrate results "from a cumulation of many hopes and fears - from the interaction of many collective forces" (70). "We have observed...", note Lansing and Mueller, "the occurrence of moves for non-economic factors



(including sheer restlessness), probably somewhat more frequent than people's explanations of their motives would lead one to believe" (71). R.C. Taylor (72) has attempted to include these ill-defined social and psychological factors (73) within a conceptual scheme for migrant motivations - the first factors within his model being "a degree of structural conduciveness or strain" (74), and the individual's perception and evaluation of that strain. In stable societies aspirations tend to adjust themselves to that which is attainable (75). The individual tends to respect collective authority (76). In Durkheim's words "relative limitation and the moderation it involves makes men content with their lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it" (77). The equilibrium of man's happiness (78) is disturbed when severe structural strains are imposed upon society by sudden upward surges in the standard of living (79). Disruption of the collective order then results in a state of "normlessness" (likened by Clinard to anomie in the individual) which allows the individual's aspirations to rise beyond all possibility of satisfaction (80). Such an unstable state has been variously described - "a revolution of rising expectation" (81), "relative deprivation" (82), and a growing "frustration gap" (83). "The 'mass-consumption' society", writes Borja, "creates a series of necessities far superior to the effective means..." (84) of supplying them. This is particularly so in the countryside. Contact with modern industrial societies creates needs and aspirations which are quite impossible to satisfy in the countryside (85), given the widening income gap which exists between urban and rural sectors of society in developing countries with dualistic structures (86). Dissatisfaction then acts as "a stimulus to search behaviour" (87), and a massive innovating flight from the land often results (88). Wolpert has conceived this change in terms of "migration elasticity". The catalyst which prompts the decision to migrate arises from stress caused by discordance between an individual's needs and aspirations and the environment in

which he lives reaching a critical point (89). Other writers have also emphasized how the breakdown of rural isolation and self-sufficiency associated with the stage of "economic take-off" leads to the weakening of social pressures and control mechanisms. Disintegration at the community level is associated with family crises and quarrels as different members take up opposing attitudes. Psychological stress is suffered by the individual as he wrestles with his own conscience. He becomes aggressive and violent - a latent migrant in a state of dynamic unequilibrium (90).

Thus economic, normative and psychological factors are intertwined with each other and all but impossible to untangle (91). It is not only "felt cash needs" (92) which account for rural-to-urban migration but also the level of aspiration of individual peasants (93) - although empirical evidence suggests that ordinary rural folk are "orientated towards neighbourhood and community norms" (94) in the process of formulating their aspirations. Personal contacts are most influential at this stage of evaluating migration as a solution to economic, social or psychological problems, as they are in the evaluation of all innovating behaviour (95).

There is sufficient evidence from what has been written about the individual enterprise "street economy" sector in Madrid earlier in this thesis (96), and from the evidence of one's own eyes in other towns and cities, to suggest that Spain conforms more to the pattern for the developing than the developed world in that a larger number of rural migrants aspire to urban wage-earning jobs than there are openings available in the "modern" sectors of the economy (97). "Assisted" emigration abroad, return migration to the countryside, casual employment in construction and "street economy" jobs (98) have the effect of lowering official unemployment figures within the urban areas to reasonable proportions, although it is our contention that "disguised unemployment" in the towns is every bit as much a problem as it is in the countryside.

We have endeavoured to show earlier in this work that the relationship of "push" to "pull" was 62.16% (99). Internal migration, therefore, is hitched to the star of urban "pull". "Desires are raised", writes Mountjoy, "that can become the spur of betterment" (100); the biggest "pull" of all being the aspiration of the peasant classes, able through "empathy" to transpose themselves and see themselves more clearly than ever before in the shoes of urban residents, caring little about urban unemployment rates, housing problems and the like, strengthened instead by an inner conviction that in the city todo es posible (everything is possible) (101). While it is true that the urbanization process requires "the setting aside of old norms and the development of new ones" (102), social change in our opinion is not a gradual imperceptible process. Rather it is sudden upward changes in the standard of living followed by short, sharp economic depressions which strain traditional norms to breaking point.

García Barbancho bewails the fact that "emigration seems to have mobilized the persons who traditionally were the most sedentary" (103). Rural exodus has become pathological - an almost incurable disease (104). Recent Spanish literature is garnished with oft repeated phrases - contagio psicológico colectivo (105), huida colectiva (106), la falta de un futuro colectivo (107), emigrantes [que abandonan el campo]... más por contagio que por necesidad (108). The growth in mass consumption patterns during the 1960s was impressive in all social classes, but especially in the peasant classes (109). The percentage of peasants thinking that their standard of living was going to be better in the next five years was higher than that of non-peasants in both 1968 and 1969 (110). Yet, despite this material prosperity, despite some basic optimism in the countryside, a veritable toma de conciencia (examination of conscience) had taken place in rural society (111). As a result, anti-migration prejudice (which previously had been very common) disappeared (112).

This examination of conscience has many separate aspects. "Our farmer ...", writes Aznar, "feels ashamed of his profession" (113). A similar attitude was encountered by Pérez Díaz in the Tierra de Campos; 63.8% of a sample of agriculturalists questioned declared that they did not want their sons to be farmers or farm-labourers (114). Agricultural labourers particularly were more and more troubled by the lack of social mobility in the countryside (115). Old sanctions within peasant villages have lost much of their power (116). Fewer and fewer are resigned "to a system where the only horizon is poverty" (117). "A very considerable part of social conflict", notes Giner, "is the conflict of classes...." (118). While in a previous generation landless labourers had been dependent and submissive as a class (119) (although occasionally testing the social order by armed revolt) (120), feelings of servitude (121) have broken down, the old submissive attitude on the latifundios giving way to a new sense of independence (122), and traditional patronalistic relations being replaced by (123) contractual and more impersonal ones enshrined in the convenio colectivo. The social legitimacy of the latifundio (124) is now put to the test by organized labour "striking" for higher wages and either getting them or emigrating (125) - to a certain extent those peasants "voting with their feet" giving more "power" to those day-labourers that remain (126).

While it is true that to a certain extent the "rural élite" have lost their social prestige (127) - the dwellings and life-style of urban middle and lower classes being generally better than the vast majority of rural landowners of both upper and middle classes (128) - in other respects (and without consciously wishing to do so) the "rural élite" have become opinion leaders who have dramatically helped to modernize "traditional" society (129). The fact that their sons and daughters have gone out of the village to be educated and do not wish to return to live there is important (130). So also is the fact that they are the first to have cars or a television

set, the first to mechanize in agriculture etc., (131) for these are all positive aids towards the "mental urbanization" of the peasantry (132).

Massive out-migration, once it is in full flood, produces a growing sense of inferiority amongst all those who remain (133). Goods and services within the countryside are devalued too, as also are rural distractions (134) until:

"The acute impression that in the village one lives worse than in the city forms part of the collective mentality of agricultural people, and is an essential element in their actual situation" (135).

Even at a personal level women begin to dislike village gossip and to praise Madrid (or any other city if it comes to that) for the impersonality and independence of private life. "Cada uno va a lo suyo, y nadie la dice nada" (Everyone goes his or her own way and nobody interferes) (136). Lack of personal freedom within the rigid framework of traditional rural institutions is a heavy cross to bear at the best of times (137); when feelings of "relative deprivation" become strong its weight becomes all but insupportable. Notwithstanding, only a small proportion of the population is both willing and able to leave during any period of time (138).

## II. NORMATIVE FACTORS OPERATING IN OUT-MIGRATION AREAS

### 2) AT A REGIONAL / PROVINCIAL LEVEL

The normative influences on out-migration theorized at a national level of analysis can be substantiated by case-studies undertaken at regional or provincial levels - although it should be emphasized that the results are by no means uniform and must be interpreted with some degree of caution. We have selected examples from Old Castile-León and New Castile-Andalucía - "traditional" and "new" massive out-migration regions respectively.

In Old Castile-León the harvests in 1961 and to a lesser extent 1962 were poor ones, the lot of all those employed in agriculture becoming noticeably worse as the other two sectors of the economy expanded rapidly during this period of national "economic take-off" (see Table XLVII). Nineteen sixty one and 1962 were years of "relative deprivation" after the "good year" of 1959 and the "windfall" of 1960 (1). Hardly surprising, therefore, that normative attitudes among the small landowning and landless labouring classes should view migration so favourably. A Servicio Sindical de Estadística survey conducted in Segovia in 1962 found that 19.52% of the province's active agricultural population wished to leave agricultural employment, 31.43% desiring to leave the countryside itself. In the 15-24 age group the percentage of those wishing to migrate was 69.35, and the under 15 age group an overwhelming 74.87% (2).

It is the young who dream most about migration. Casildo Ferreras, writing of Aldea del Puente (León), notes that despite the revolution in agriculture in recent years (post 1963) and "in spite of increasing prosperity, a large part of the youth dream of leaving the village" (3).

To some extent ownership of land acts as a deterrent to out-migration in the minifundio zones of Old Castile-León (4). Thus the number of agricultores (landowners) among out-migrants from the Tierra de Campos during the 1961-1964 period represented only 4% of that group resident in the comarca in 1960 compared with 16.7% for agricultural labourers (5). Pérez Díaz in a survey of the region in 1964 - a particularly bad year for small

agricultural proprietors whose labour costs had been greatly increased by inflationary wage settlements (in 1963) and which culminated in a bad harvest - found that 17.3% of small landowners with farms of less than 20 hectares and who were under the age of forty-five thought to emigrate (6). Yet the statistics are an illusion. Normative attitudes in the countryside have changed (7). Were they twenty years of age again (and presumably with no family responsibilities), 70.7% of the small land-holding class with less than 20 hectares of land would emigrate, and even 51.6% of those with farms over 100 hectares would follow in their wake (8).

Traditionally in Old Castile-León it is the young who cannot expect to succeed to land who are educated and prepared for out-migration (9). No less than 54.9% of all the agricultural labourers who migrated from the Tierra de Campos during the 1961-1964 period came from the 15-30 age group (10). Even those likely to succeed to a small plot of land in the distant future could not be persuaded to remain. Many were the doting fathers who bought a tractor that they could ill-afford and which they could not viably employ on their small estates as a vain inducement to persuade a restless heir to stay. An investigation of one hundred and fourteen farms in Guadalajara (New Castile) in 1965 found that 44.7% of the farmers did not have successors (11).

A sample survey conducted in thirty municipios within the Duero basin in December 1965 revealed that more than half of those questioned in every one of eight age-groups over twenty-five did not think to emigrate. Significantly, 23.75% of all those under the age of fifty-five were in an "unstable state of equilibrium" not knowing whether they wished to migrate or not (12). It is this group that is most likely to be influenced by changing normative attitudes. It is this group which will be affected by feelings of "relative deprivation". It is this group that will be eventually be drawn into the out-migration vortex. Yet the timing of out-migration will depend upon many factors including personal ones of character.

The most rural, most agricultural, smallest villages are most affected by out-migration. Within them it is the landless labourers and the young who are most affected. Feelings of "relative deprivation" are by no means confined to the dispossessed and the impatient young. No less than 52% of all Spanish farmers possess less than one hectare of land and find it all but impossible to eke out an existence even in a good agricultural year (13). "Relative deprivation", we have seen, affects all the echelons of rural society at one time or another. Statistics extracted from Siguán show that even in one anonymous village - probably Calzada de Don Diego (Salamanca) - differentials of this type are all important. Small landowners within the village were most seriously struck by an annual rise in casual harvest labourers' wages of 28.57% between 1962 and 1964. Larger landowners with some permanent labourers noted the pinch particularly between 1958 and 1960 when labour costs in this particular area increased by 25% annually. Landless labourers suffered more than usual between 1960 and 1962 when average salaries for casual employment rose by only 4.17% (14).

In Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura normative attitudes towards migration have changed dramatically in recent decades (15). Individuals are now much less likely to be denigrated as vivas rebeldías who were forced to migrate from the villages rather than conform to local norms (16). Strong feelings of subordination towards the señorito land-owning class, linked to a fatalistic, pessimistic attitude towards economic progress, are things of the past. An extensive Instituto de Desarrollo Económico sample-survey of men over the age of twenty-one conducted in Andalucía in the mid-1960s found only 6.8% of those questioned thinking that their standard of living was worse than five years previously, 63.9% maintaining that it was better (17). Provincial statistics indicate that per capita incomes as a percentage of the average national income fell drastically in most Andalusian provinces between 1955 and 1964 (although recovering somewhat between 1964 and 1969 thanks to strong out-migration) - in the case of Sevilla by



26.04% (18). Only 10.4% of those questioned in the survey thought to emigrate and only one per cent were undecided (19). Rather than indicating an improvement in economic conditions in Andalucía (post 1964) and a decline in out-migration, these statistics are indicative of a different way of life in the south. In the latifundist zones landless labourers do not prepare their sons and daughters for migration by educating them. Andalucía and Extremadura had a very low percentage of their 6-13 year old population registered for primary education when compared with Old Castile-León (20).

In the south migration is a family affair, often ill-prepared and suddenly executed in response to feelings of "relative deprivation" after an above average squeeze of economic "push" factors - groups of fifty persons or more fleeing by lorry with a few treasured possessions as if the end of the world were nigh. The sudden sharp pinch of economic misfortune found many of these people suffering from "mental malnutrition" and quite unable to resist the killer disease of out-migration when it struck. Normative attitudes had already been made up, potential decisions to migrate lay dormant in the minds even of those who thought not to migrate - until disaster struck (21). No less than 43.9% of men questioned in the sample survey cited above already thought that out-migration benefitted the villages (22). A rural survey conducted in eleven Andalusian municipios by the same Institute found that 83.1% of the men questioned thought that an industrial worker had a better life than that of a permanent agricultural worker, while 80% thought that the lot of a small, urban shop-keeper to be better than that of a small, rural landowner (23).

Despite the fact that potential migrants from Andalucía followed the familiar pattern for Old Castile-León in coming from the ranks of the economically worst-off, from the youth and from the rural areas (24), there is some suggestion from Andalucía that potential migration affected the ranks of rural youth with "less than primary education" to a greater extent than any other socio-economic group (25), and that in Extremadura where

"the sense of frontier life, of scorched earth" (26) was stronger even than in Old or New Castile, the ownership of land did not act as a deterrent to out-migration as it did in those two regions (27). In the minifundist zones of Guadalajara (28) and to a lesser extent in eastern Andalucía life has much in common with that in Old Castile-León. Thus, in Camino Viejo (Guadalajara) 64.18% of a sample survey of villagers thought that life was better in 1962-1963 than ten years previously, yet 70.15% did not want their children to have anything to do with agriculture (29). Garrido found a similar attitude amongst a sample of women she interviewed in Mesa de Ocaña (Toledo) (30). In Toledo and Guadalajara but not in eastern Andalucía parents prepared their sons and daughters for migration by educating them (31).

Social differences between eastern and western Andalucía are less than those between the region as a whole and the rest of Spain (32). New Castile in many respects occupies an intermediate position between those of Old Castile and Andalucía. As far as migration is concerned the contrast between aspiring "purposive-rational" migration from Old Castile-León and resultant "short-run hedonistic" migrations from Andalucía should not be over-emphasized. Family migrations are much more common in Old Castile now than previously (33). Nevertheless Table LXI does show significant regional differences in in-migration types into Barcelona, the only city with a truly national in-migration field (see Fig.37). Single migrations from Andalucía represented only 15.12% of the total in 1971. Those from Old Castile and León, where single migrations formed part of the traditional fabric of rural life, were 30.89 and 27.13% respectively. New Castile and Extremadura occupied intermediate positions with 19.61 and 20.16% respectively (34).

Regional differences in migration patterns can ultimately only be explained in terms of differing normative attitudes (35). Forni and Mámora

Table LXI

IN-MIGRATION INTO THE CITY OF BARCELONA CLASSIFIED INTO  
SINGLE OR MULTIPLE ARRIVALS, BY HISTORIC REGION, 1971

Region	Single arrivals	Multiple arrivals
Andalucía	15.12%	84.88%
Aragón	26.07%	73.93%
Asturias	29.69%	70.31%
Baleares	16.67%	83.33%
Canarias	10.71%	89.29%
New Castile	19.61%	80.39%
Old Castile	30.89%	69.11%
Rest of Cataluña	9.11%	90.89%
Extremadura	20.16%	79.84%
Galicia	35.64%	64.36%
León	27.13%	72.87%
Murcia	30.43%	69.57%
Navarra	35.55%	64.45%
Valencia	19.85%	80.15%
Vascongadas	28.57%	71.43%

SOURCE: Elaboration of data contained in Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, Boletín de Estadística Municipal, Año 1971, Barcelona, 1971, Table 10, p.77.

have conceived out- and in-migration being governed by urban and rural control sub-systems. "Open", "integrated" communities associated with the acceptance of innovations and dynamic development are the main centres for in-migration; while heaviest out-migration is from "closed", "disintegrated" communities with "stationary" economic situations (36). The degree of openness and integration of a community is obviously related to social norms. This model is not unlike that proposed by Mitchell (37), and does much to account for apparently inexplicable differences in migration rates between adjoining villages at a local level of analysis.

### III. PSYCHO-SOCIAL FACTORS

"Correlation", notes Kosiński, "cannot be identified with causation and consequently other means and methods are necessary....There is no doubt that purely statistical measures especially helpful in earlier stages of analysis have to be supplemented by others if meaningful results are to be obtained" (1). Analysis must proceed at three levels - objective, normative and psycho-social - as suggested by Germani (2). This approach, according to Chapman "the most crucial advance during the past decade" (3), has been largely ignored in migration research. Few behavioural scientists have attempted to link psycho-social, normative and economic motives within one transportation model. Still fewer have attempted to catalogue the evolving chain of events which culminated in a decision to move or not to move (4). There can be little doubt that there are psychological as well as economic costs involved in out-migration (5). The balance in favour of out-migration must be strong enough in the mind of the potential migrant to counteract human inertia or what has sometimes been called "social gravity" (6). There can be little doubt either that there are important psychological differences in potential out-migrants' make-up as well as socio-economic ones (7).

In apparent contradiction to the general distaste for rural life and a feeling of inferiority which characterizes normative attitudes in the Spanish countryside, 74.0% of a rural sample survey in Andalucía thought that migrants would return one day (although there were great discrepancies between the eleven municipios concerned), nearly half thought that strong out-migration had a bad effect upon their village, and most spoke in favour of locating industrial plants in the countryside (8). A Fundación FOESSA survey of housewives found 56% of rural and 61% of non-rural ones declaring that life was happier in the countryside. Although a bare majority admitted that one ate better in the city, 97% thought that there was more vice in

the city, 86% that there was more delinquency, 80% that one died sooner in the city, and only 6% that general health was better in an urban environment (9). One can only assume that the Spaniard continues to love the countryside although he does not wish to work in agriculture. Evidence from Andalucía suggests that married men - older and more traditional in their attitudes than single men - postpone permanent migration to Barcelona by seeking seasonal employment in French agriculture during periods of low employment in the home region (10). The sense of attachment to home region and soil must be much greater in the minifundia zones of Old Castile-León. According to Olza Zubiri small landowners have relegated to their subconscious the desire not to work in agriculture, and by so doing have been able to accept the traditional way of life; it emerges, however, in their desire for their children not to work in agriculture (11).

Many potential migrants thus find themselves in two minds. A psychological attachment to home region and sometimes to the soil is counterbalanced by normative feelings of "relative deprivation" that have grown fat on economic "push" and "pull" factors. The individual finds himself torn between two courses of action, and psychologically in what Lindberg calls an "unstable state of equilibrium" (12). In such circumstances his actions are as rational and unpredictable as those of a young lover towards a loved one whose love one moment he is prepared to die for, the next to put in question. Young lovers often finish with each other after a quarrel. When a potential migrant finds himself in an "unstable state of equilibrium" then "a small impulse in either direction decides his course" (13). The slightest aggravating factor can trigger off migration (14). Migrants are particularly prone to move after a quarrel or a dispute of some kind (15). Many writers have testified to the importance of precipitating or "trigger" factors (16). Oscar Lewis, the anthropologist, noted that "one of the most interesting finds of our study was the realization that the

precipitating factor for leaving Puerto Rico was most often a personal social-psychological crisis" (17). House and Willis, both geographers, remark that "in reality single motives are rare but nevertheless most movement tends to be triggered off by a particular cause among many that might have been significant" (18). Clyde Mitchell, the sociologist, felt that the rate of migration was determined by economic factors but that "last straw" factors of a personal / psychological nature affected the timing of migration (19).

While it is broadly true that the older the migrant, the lower his social rating, the more likely he or she will move for an immediate reason (20), in reality few are psychologically unprepared (21). Rossi, for example, refers to "windfall movers" - persons whose predispositions to move crystallised into almost immediate action when opportunities presented themselves (22).

As an illustration of the importance of precipitating factors Siguan's case study of ninety-nine migrant families in the peripheral suburbio of Madrid may be cited (23). While this study emphasizes the all-important economic motive for migration, careful sifting of the facts reveals that at least 39% of migrant decisions were related to changes - often brusque ones - in personal circumstances. At least 14% of the sample seem to have left their native villages after a family quarrel or a personal dispute of some kind. Even amongst those with allegedly economic motives for migrating the desire for an independent existence away from the constraining influence of in-laws (with whom the family had been forced to share a dwelling and often a means of livelihood in the village) is often declared. At least a further 6% had left because of social disgrace - the love affair of a mother, the drinking problem of a husband, the treble shame of a family whose daughter later had to be institutionalized, falsely claiming that she was pregnant, a young couple having to get married, a family running out of goodwill

through its complete failure to pay back ever-mounting debts. At least 15% had come to Madrid for pressing health reasons, including economic and psychological dislocation associated with the death of a father or husband. "Relative deprivation" at the personal level is often associated with an irreversable change in personal circumstances of this type. Perhaps it is the death of a much-loved señorito and the inability to get on with his successor. Perhaps it is an accident which permanently incapacitates the breadwinner, forcing him to seek less arduous work outside agriculture. More often it is the death of a father or husband - the economic keystone upon which the arch of meagre family sustenance was supported. Finally, at least a further 4% had left for personal reasons such as the desire to reunite the family.

It is our contention that questions usually asked of migrants hardly ever reveal anything about the true (psychological) reasons why they move (24). Indeed migrants consider them to be so unimportant that they frequently forget to mention them, although "trigger factors" in our view are essential to a proper understanding of the migration process and the way that latent migrants are stretched to breaking point before they decide to move.

It need not concern us overmuch that migration is "triggered off" at the psycho-social level by so many irrational factors related to the uniqueness of each individual's private milieu (25). It should warn us, however, of the danger of what Emyr Jones calls "apparent determinancy at the macro-level [which] hides indeterminacy at the micro-level" (26). Individual decisions made at the psycho-social level can, however, be included within our migration transportation model, in that innumerable isolated decisions made on the part of individuals lead us to a better understanding of a general behaviour pattern which can be nominally seen as group behaviour at the aggregate normative and socio-economic levels of analysis.

Since we interviewed latent or non-migrants in our Rural Questionnaire - Personal it is a little premature to speak of "precipitating factors" and "indeterminacy at the micro-level", although we did detect stress conditions in a number of instances. More research in depth needs to be conducted into this aspect of the migration-decision process by trained psychologists.

Our case studies found 23% of potential migrants in the Huesca-Lérida sample in an "unstable state of equilibrium", rising to 29% in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura. The basic conflict between "traditionals" and "moderns" in village society was recognized by many, although few were prepared to talk about personal problems. From the replies that we received to Q.75 it would appear that "traditionals" are totally demoralized as a group and are becoming increasingly more introverted and defensive in their attitude towards migration. Individually, however, they were prepared to admit that they were contented with rural life (Q.92). Few had the courage to declare "Me quedo porque tengo miedo" ("I will remain because I am afraid of leaving").

From the psychological point of view, potential migrants were already prepared to migrate in many instances, although they did not realize it. None could mention more than a handful of return migrants (at most), who had returned to the village (Q.78). The vast majority of these few, we were told, were just as dejected and as demoralized as the "traditionals". Through invariably maintaining a closed and defensive attitude to their failure rather than denouncing out-migration, they contributed to the inevitability of the Spanish rural-to-urban migration process.



## PART FIVE

### THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MIGRATION

#### INTRODUCTION

"Sociologists studying the adjustment of rural migrants to city life", writes Abu-Lughod, "have been trapped in a dilemma of their own making" (1). While Wirth's time- and culture-bound concept of "urbanism as a way of life" was accepted as an article of faith by a whole generation of sociologists, it is to some extent discredited to-day. A simple idealistic dichotomy - between an idyllic folk culture centred in some rural heaven and a heterogeneous urban one characterized by impersonality, isolation, anomie, alienation and deviance (2); and with all who dared migrate from the arcadian to the plutonian either being forcibly assimilated in the urban "melting pot" or being consumed by the flames of social malaise (3) - just does not exist. Gans, Lewis, Redfield and others (4), have been able to point rather to the existence of a rural-urban continuum (5), with rural traditions being maintained and adopted within many cohesive, ethnic, urban sub-cultures producing a "mosaic culture" (6) and "marble cake" (7) effect within major urban areas, while at the same time the "culture of poverty" transcends rural-urban boundaries. Yet, even after the replacement of the rural-urban dichotomy by the rural-urban continuum, "the sequence and dynamics of adjustment", Abu-Lughod complains, "have still been deduced as though the dichotomy were valid..." (8).

The choice between black and white, urban and rural, social structures which are always disorganized or organized, between "a completely kinship - orientated society on the one hand and the absolute breakdown of all extended kinshipties, even the loss of kinship, on the other" (9), is a ridiculous one. Likewise, the evaluation of the attributes of migrants from the vantage point of the already-urbanized population is utterly biased (10). What is more, a World Bank paper has noted that "surveys on assimilation

of migrants are biased in that they are positively selective of the migrants to any given area, neglecting those who do not stay" (11). It is doubtful whether it is conceptually useful to compare migrants to non-migrants who remained in the region of origin. The evidence on migration selectivity is conflicting to say the very least (12). Moreover, both Börsing (13) and Bogue (14) have argued that migration streams change in character over the course of time. A more worthwhile exercise, it would appear to us, would be to study the socio-psychological processes whereby "latent migrants" are converted by stages into active ones. Clearly there are a number of important technical and conceptual difficulties here. Notwithstanding, "migration is an appealing index of the development process [in a field] ...where valid statistical indicators are scarce" (15), and to neglect the social-political implications of migration would be a cardinal sin. Our attempt must be to assess the "degree of development" at both the level of the individual and the society. Our task in this section of our thesis must be fourfold. Firstly, to measure the degree of assimilation into the host society. Secondly, to express assimilation in more realistic terms by comparing migrants' current situation to that prior to migration. By measuring assimilation with both urban and rural yardsticks a balanced assessment may be made. Thirdly, to link the two strands together in an assessment of the role of migration in social change. Fourthly, to measure the social-political consequences of migration on main out-migration regions. Assimilation into the host society - the aspect which has been most considered by sociologists - will be dealt with first.

## I. ASSIMILATION INTO THE HOST SOCIETY - AN URBAN VIEW

Our conceptual framework for measuring assimilation are: a number of objective adjustment / non-adjustment factors (1) by reference to which the social distance which separates individuals and collective migrant groups from the host society can be gauged. As a geographer by academic training our concern will be to express social distance graphically in terms of the twin co-ordinates of vertical and horizontal mobility (2), attempting to convert this two-dimensional concept into valid "social distance spaces" of areal significance. Since there is at least a third dimension to the assimilation process - the time-scale - use will be made, where appropriate, of Gordon's seven-stage assimilation model (3).

### Adjustment and non-adjustment factors

#### (a) Profession and employment

Integration into the host society, in the opinion of Böhning (4), is very much a function of the level of the skills and education of each individual migrant. The average migrant from a rural background has a struggle on his hands to achieve some measure of economic security and social acceptance (5). In the words of Fried, "the rungs of the mobility ladder [are spaced] so wide apart..." (6), that he has little prospect of advancing far. There is little doubt, however, that geographical mobility resulting in occupational mobility does involve some degree of upward social mobility, at least in Spain (7). The 1962-1965 period of maximum in-migration, for example, saw manual workers fall from 72% of the total active population in 1962 to 69% in 1965, and the fall was in absolute numbers as well as in percentage terms (8). Notwithstanding, upward social mobility is limited. The average Spanish migrant lacks the ability to progress beyond the rank of unqualified industrial worker (peón industrial sin calificar).

Migrants are very much conscious of the need to cross the social-distance chasm which separates them from the host society. In view of the inferior social position which unskilled industrial workers occupy (9), Spanish

"target workers" who have emigrated abroad seek not to join the ranks of the industrial labour force on their return (10). The average Spaniard abroad wants to save as much money as possible, for only money will ensure him a better social position on his return. The outward signs of distinction and honor are ownership of property or land - perhaps a restaurant, a bar, a small shop, or at least a decent place to live (11). The internal migrant has little prospect of acquiring sufficient capital to cross urban "social distance spaces". When he returns to his native village on holiday, however, the pretence that he has succeeded must be gone through. He must (like his African cousin) be prepared "to eat bush money" (12) as well as giving some other outward signs of his new-won prosperity (13).

According to the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (Marzo 1963-Marzo 1964) (14), the average family income of manual workers was 58,353 pesetas per annum and of families living in the suburbano 60,478 pesetas per annum. According to this source, 57.77% of all Spanish homes had a declared annual income of less than 60,000 pesetas (or 5,000 pesetas monthly) (15). In the in-migrant zone of La Cañada (Valladolid) average monthly incomes in 1965 were 5,600 pesetas (16). In Madrid, 65% of over 30,000 suburban families at the end of 1961 earned less than 2,000 pesetas a month, while 23% earned between 2,000 and 4,000 pesetas monthly (17). The average monthly income of peones y obreros sin calificar in the capital in 1966 was 5,440 pesetas (18); while the chabola population of the city in 1969 still only had an average monthly family income of 5,700 pesetas (19). In 1966, Fundación FOESSA had drawn attention to pockets of poverty throughout Spain choosing as an index of identification the percentage of homes with average monthly incomes of under 2,500 pesetas (20). Three years later, 17.86% of the "socially trapped" chabola families of Madrid still earned less than this amount monthly (21). When these families are classified by place-of-birth of the ama de casa, it is revealed that only 4.76% of Madrid-born house-

wives\* families earned less than 2,500 pesetas monthly compared with 21.43% for migrant families (22).

Migrant zones are characterized by low activity rates (23), and a high percentage of manual workers especially unskilled casual labourers. In the province of Madrid in 1965, 24.21% of the active population was unqualified; with the construction industry having 32.69% of its labour force unqualified, rising to 34.55% in "other services and activities not well specified" (24). Within the city of Madrid the manual population (skilled and unskilled) represented 74% of the total active population of the periphery in 1965, with the highest percentages in the net in-migrant districts of Vallecas (86%), Villaverde (76%) and Carabanchel (74%) (25). According to Pavón Guerrero, 32.67% of the salaried industrial labour force in the city were employed in construction and public works (26).

Chabola zones are revealed as extreme forms of marginal migrant areas. Only very rarely does the head of family have an occupational status which surpasses the level of obrero o trabajador de servicios (27). The vast majority have casual jobs either within the service sector (28) or in construction. In 1965, 44.44% of the male active population of La Cañada (Valladolid) were employed in the building industry (29). In 1962, 58.8% of chabola heads-of-families in Madrid were employed in construction; while in 1967 it was 53.73%. In the latter year, 66.00% of those employed in construction were peones (unskilled labourers), 23.90% albañiles (bricklayers), and only 10.10% qualified craftsmen (30). Only 20.90% of the active barraca population of Barcelona were employed in the construction industry in 1963 (31), and there is some evidence that in this city at least migrants (having a wider job spectrum than in Madrid) were more easily integrated within the host society (32).

Generally speaking, the chabola and barraca districts of Madrid and Barcelona are characterized by job instability and the constant circulation

of a fair proportion of the population (33) which finds it difficult to adapt to urban civilization after the "uprooting" from rural areas. Invariably they lack the recomendaciones and other "credentials" which are so necessary in Spanish society if they are to get on in the world (34). The main in-migrant administrative districts themselves are migrant resorting centres. In Madrid, for example, we found a correlation between net intra-urban changes of residence per thousand population and net inter-municipal migration per thousand population. Calculations made at the scale of twelve administrative districts in 1968 and 1969 and of eighteen districts in 1971 proved to be statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence in each instance - 1968 ( $R_s = +0.689$ ), 1969 ( $R_s = +0.652$ ), 1971 ( $R_s = +0.404$ ) (35). As far as inter-municipal migration (36) was concerned, the most important net in-migrant districts in 1968 of Carabanchel, Vallecas, Tetuán, Arganzuela-Villaverde and Ventas received a disproportionate number of "declared jornaleros" (37) representing 81.75% of that migrant group. Carabanchel, for example, with 21.11% of total in-migrants to the city in 1968, received a disproportionate 23.47% of all "declared jornalero" in-migrants. Similarly, the respective percentages in Vallecas were 15.06 and 19.90% respectively. To some extent the "proletariatization" of these migrants zones was counteracted by high rates of inter-municipal out-migration. The five administrative districts mentioned above accounted for 82.03% of the out-migration of "declared jornaleros" in that year. Carabanchel, for example, with 18.27% of total out-migration from the city in 1968, saw the departure of a disproportionate 21.92% of "declared jornaleros". In Vallecas the respective percentages were 15.75 and 21.42, and in Tetuán 11.15 and 13.94% (38). These simple statistics show the difficulty of adaptation for marginal groups especially in Tetuán, Carabanchel and Vallecas where chabolae and sub-standard housing abound (39).

In Barcelona, Districts IX, XII and X (located in the eastern periphery

of the city) received the largest percentages of the total in-migrants during each year of the 1959-1962 period (40). In 1963 District IX received 34.54 in-migrants per '000 population, District XII 27.94 per '000 population and District X 13.2 per '000 population, while District II (centred on Montjuich in the western periphery of the city) established itself in fourth place with 13.0 per '000 population (41). Rather surprisingly it would seem, there was no statistically significant correlation between net in-migration per '000 population in 1963 and the percentage of families with combined incomes of less than 40,000 pesetas per annum, the calculation being made at the level of twelve administrative districts ( $R_s = +0.272$ ) (42). This lack of correlation between income and in-migration for the lowest marginal groups is perhaps related to the fact that there is a relationship between family income and size of family. A Fundación FOESSA survey in 1965 found that 60% of families earning less than 2,500 pesetas monthly had only one or two members, while 57% of those earning more than 20,000 pesetas monthly had more than five members (43). Generally speaking, and with the exception of District II where a fair proportion of Barcelona's barracas are situated, the main in-migrant zones of the city had a below average number of persons (including servants) in each family (44). There was a statistically significant correlation, however, between net in-migration per '000 population and the percentage of families with combined incomes of between 40,000 and 80,000 pesetas annually, which when calculated at the level of twelve administrative districts proved to be significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.664$ ). Moreover, assuming that the Asociación Católica de Dirigentes figures of 202.23 pesetas daily or 72,821 pesetas per annum (45) (the minimum income needed to sustain a married couple with one child) to be correct, then the relationship between the total number of families with incomes of less than 80,000 pesetas per annum and net migration per thousand population was statistically signif-

icant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.622$ ).

This brief résumé of employment as an adjustment or non-adjustment factor has drawn attention to the fact that chabola- and barraca-dwellers form marginal sub-populations within peripheral working-class districts; although the latter, with their high net in-migration rates, form part of the suburbio which is separated from the rest of the city by measurable social distances (46). Even within the chabola or barraca sub-populations, however, there are degrees of marginality. We have not referred to the fact that 12.95% of heads-of-families within the chabolas of Madrid in 1967 were females - mainly widows (47). We have not referred either to much less legitimate marginal groups in both Barcelona and Madrid who live al margen de la ley (48). Gitanos (gypsies) represented 17.17% of chabola heads-of-families in Madrid in 1967, while "habitual delinquents" represented a further 4.37% (49). These last two groups included the tirititeros (wandering players), saltibancuís (tumblers) and pedigüeños (beggars) so characteristic of the suburbio (50); rateros, carteristas, choriceros, mecheras, (51) prostitutes and homosexuales (52). Again we have not referred to the nine hundred and eleven private rag and bone men and dustmen who lived and operated within the Madrid suburbio (53).

Pinilla, in a study of industry in the metropolitan area of Barcelona during 1970-1971, found little promotion in the building, public works and service sector industries (54). According to this source 88% of all peones recruited during the 1960-1970 period were migrants who still remained at the level of unskilled worker at the time of the survey in 1970-1971. For those recruited between 1952 and 1959 only 73% were still peones, while for those recruited between 1946 and 1951 only 44% were still unskilled in 1970-1971 (55). The latter group in fact had better upward mobility rates than Catalan unskilled workers recruited between 1946 and 1951; findings which were confirmed by Larrañaga and Iruretagoyena for migrants who arrived



in Hernani (Guipúzcoa) before 1940 (56). Clearly, the contrast between long-standing family migrants with varied occupational ranges and recently arrived migrants with much more restricted ones is an important factor in economic adjustment or non-adjustment (57).

Amando de Miguel considers average migrants to Barcelona to be of a lower "cultural" (and presumably educational) standing than those to Madrid (58). There is some evidence that obreros sin calificar in the province of Barcelona have found it especially difficult to progress up the rungs of the occupational mobility ladder. An Instituto Nacional de Estadística survey in 1968 found 36% of this occupational group having the same occupation as their fathers, compared with only 22% in Valencia, 22% in Vizcaya and 21% in Madrid, the other main in-migrant provinces (59). In the case of Madrid the main pockets of suburban poverty are in the southern outskirts of the city, especially in Vallecas. These southern districts have high residential segregation indices for migrants from Andalucía, Extremadura and New Castile (60) many of whom are poor landless peasants. Migrants from Old Castile are generally better off. They have been able to sell their small farms or businesses and acquire a flat and sometimes even a small business (61). They have lower residential segregation indices, and are less likely to be confined to the peripheral suburban zone. They are well-represented in a sector of the city stretching northwards from the Centro, through the districts of Latina, Universidad, Chamberí and Tetuán (62).

Allied to time and geographical differentials in adjustment there are also the personal characteristics of migrants. Hanson and Simmons classify migrants on arrival into "thrivers", "stumblers", "strugglers" and "losers" (63). "City experience trends" in Madrid and Barcelona indicate that few can be classified as "thrivers". "Losers" become associated with downwardly mobile, often habitually delinquent, groups or move on to some other environment to try their luck anew. Few have the courage to admit

their failure by returning to their native villages (64). Most are "stumblers" or "strugglers" who manage somehow to eke out a living at a very low level of socio-economic existence.

The "stumblers" and the "strugglers" are often poor for no fault of their own. Rowntree in 1899 found the causes of poverty to be the death of the chief wage earner or his incapacity through accident, illness or old age; unemployment or chronic irregularity of employment; low wages; large families (65). Somewhat similar findings were made by Abel-Smith and Townsend in 1960 (66). Successive generations of the poor have been caught in the poverty cycle. Lack of occupational skill leads to poverty resulting from low or irregular wages and unemployment. Poverty leads to poor accommodation and overcrowding. Poor physical surroundings lead to physical ill-health and psychological stresses. These in turn provide a poor educational background for children who, as a result, lack occupational skills when they come on the labour market - thus perpetuating the cycle (67).

Thanks to internal migration, the traditional rural poverty cycle in Spain has been transmitted like some epidemic and endemic disease to the great urban areas. All the characteristics of poverty described by Rowntree, Abel-Smith and Townsend, and the Social Science Research Council, can be easily identified amongst the chabola and barraca populations of Madrid and Barcelona. Conditions of grinding rural poverty described by Marvaud (68) and Gerald Brenan (69), are in a sense better than those associated with suburban poverty (70). For those that have come direct from rural habitats and have escaped the benefits of stage-by-stage acculturation (71) to urban ways of living, the transition from a basically subsistence to a money economy is difficult (72). Their desire to prove to both themselves and their friends that they have succeeded, leads them to buy costly consumer durables like television sets which they can ill afford (73). A cycle of borrowing and indebtedness is then initiated which serves only to pull them below an urban poverty line, a self-perpetuating crisis which is partly of

their own making (74).

Without a shadow of a doubt it is employment which determines the standard of living of the migrant and his family (75). Employment is the key to unlocking the adjustment / non-adjustment problem. Unfortunately, grinding poverty does little to oil the wheels of the adjustment process. Most male migrants begin as casual unskilled labourers in the building industry; and while, in the words of Siguán, unskilled "labouring in the building industry allows adaptation at a low level which can prove satisfactory for the protagonists,...Fit I is not socially" (76).

(b) Environment (including housing)

"Marginal man" has been defined as "one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures" (77). In Madrid, it has been estimated that between 4 and 6% of the total population of the city could be classified as marginal (78), the vast majority of the marginal population being accommodated in the suburbio - itself a marginal area. In the words of Fundación FOESSA:

"The suburbio signifies a peripheral zone of extreme poverty, with a lack of minimum health conditions (water, sewage disposal, and housing, above all) and in which a marginal population little integrated and in a majority derived from the countryside, tries to respond to the work opportunities of the great city" (79).

Factores Humanos y Sociales defines the suburbio as a zone:

"...inhabited predominantly by a population which is not integrated socially or normatively like a local group nor which is integrated or adapted to the global society and the culture of the city in which they reside" (80).

Cáritas Diocesana de Barcelona sees the suburbio as:

"...a zone where there are problems of housing and of non-

integrated communities" (81).

In the opinion of Siguan:

"The suburbio I to the city-dweller I appears to be a marginal zone, marginal legally, marginal morally, marginal hygienically, marginal in everything. The suburbanites, los chavolistas, are suspicious beings to begin with, who do not participate in urban normality through incapacity or malice" (82).

While to Negre Rigol the suburbio is:

"...a zone separate from the influence of the city. It depends on the city for much of its functions and its secondary services. But it is somewhat differentiated from residential zones: in its inferior social equipment, its culture, its prestige; in its deterioration and, in its population, the high proportion of manual workers" (83).

Echarren Ysturiz has seen the suburbio as a barrio (district) inhabited by:

"...a population characterized by its non-integration social and normative, by its non-integration with the urban agglomeration and by its inadaptation to certain urban lifestyles". It is "a migrant population sociologically localized and socially marginal - in relation to the city where it is localized - predominantly, but not exclusively rural in origin..." (84).

Yet, if the suburbio is a marginal area - an "urban" zone which is insufficiently developed and which has evolved naturally in a period of rapid urbanization without proper planning and control (85) - its precise limits are difficult to define in that continuum which stretches between rural and urban ways of living (86). Sometimes it consists mainly of single-storey houses, half rural still and somewhat provisional in nature; and at other times of low quality, abysmally constructed cheap blocks of flats (87).

Nothing has given greater difficulty of definition than the chabola or barraca, its most representative marginal dwellings. The barraca has been defined as:

"...that accommodation or space, in which one or more persons live, not situated in a permanent building dedicated to housing" (88).

Fundación FOESSA define a chabola as a dwelling unit in a street without a name, usually consisting of one storey, and not built by a state organization or a building constructor. It usually has no number on the main outside door, has no clearly defined rooms, and is built of low quality building materials. Moreover, the head of family has a low occupational status not rising above the level of obrero o trabajador de servicios (manual worker or lowly-paid service worker) (89). While admitting the difficult of precise definition a Ministerio de la Vivienda survey recognized that chabola had to be defined in terms of quality, size and manner of construction. Their maximum size was 18 sq. metres. They always consisted of one storey, subdivided at most into two or three sections (90), and with the maximum height of the ceiling 2.2 metres. They had no running water and no mains services other than electricity (91). Their outside walls were badly constructed of waste building material while internally they often had only dirt floors (92).

Turner has proposed a typology of settlements based on five levels of physical development and five levels of security of tenure. Fourteen types of settlement are recognized although theoretically twenty-five are possible (93). Rosenbluth López identifies fifteen varieties of dwelling (or community) associated with the lower economic classes of Santiago (Chile), although they conveniently group into three main categories. The Conventillo type corresponded to the classic inner city slum. The Callampa type corresponded to the typical peripheral, squatter settlement of illegal land occupation, segregated from the main urban nucleus. The "suburban" type, although usual-

ly peripheral and semi-segregated from the main urban nucleus, is associated with the legal acquisition of land by migrant groups (94). In Spain, three marginal suburban types of settlement have been recognized - núcleos rurales insuficientemente urbanizados, núcleos de crecimiento espontáneo, and parcelaciones ilegales (95). Each type can be further subdivided into núcleos puros (consisting only of chabolas) and núcleos mixtos (where chabolas are mixed with other buildings).

The Ministerio de la Vivienda has subdivided the peripheral administrative regions of Madrid into six zones for the purpose of trying to eradicate chabolas (96). Rural nuclei which are insufficiently urbanized include villages like Hortaleza and Fuencarral which were annexed in 1943-1954 period. Temporary dwellings have mushroomed in the orchards and vegetable gardens, the farmyards and the patios of permanent rural dwellings. Old stables, coach-houses and hen-houses have been taken over as temporary dwellings by poor migrants. Most of the suburbio's nine hundred and eleven traperos (rag and bone men) and basureros privados (private dustmen) inhabit this zone. They keep piles of decaying and fermenting refuse in their own backyards either to feed their pigs and ducks on or to produce fertilizers. This problem of insanitary, fly- and rat-infested, mixed, rural nuclei is especially intense in three zones - Chamartín-Hortaleza, Villaverde, and Tetuán-Fuencarral. The worst affected areas are Corrales de Madrid, Manoteras, Valdebelas and Los Angeles el Querol (Chamartín-Hortaleza); Casablanca, Dos Amigos, and Parque Sur on both sides of the road to Toledo (Villaverde); the zone to the north of Tetuán de las Victorias and la Ventilla (Tetuán-Fuencarral) (97). This "suburban type" situation is found also in Barcelona, for example, in the Paseo de la Zona Franca (where barraca-dwellers are in the process of being expelled to make way for the new Gran Puerto de Barcelona development scheme) (98). "The suburbio", writes C. de Castro, "is born in the midst of wheatfield and orchards" (99). El Pozo del Tío Raimundo

(Vallecas) was like that in 1940 (100), and Palomeras Bajas (also in Vallecas) in 1950 (101). Annexation in 1950 followed by rapid urbanization has all but removed the last vestiges of rural settlements; a process which is inevitable in Hortaleza, Fuencarral and Villaverde in the not too distant future.

Núcleos de crecimiento espontáneo (or suburban nuclei of spontaneous growth) have invariably mushroomed in railway and industrial zones as well as in zones far from dwellings. Characteristically they are núcleos puros consisting of groups of chabolas between one hundred and one thousand in number. They occupy land unsuitable for development like the municipal rubbish dump at La China (Vallecas-Mediodía), the minor ravine occupied by the intermittent stream el Arroyo Abroñigal (San Blas-Moratalaz) (102), and the aptly named Entrevías (Vallecas-Mediodía) situated between the railway lines to Barcelona and Alicante (103). Then there are numerous cave dwellings like those at Ribera del Manzanares (104). The Madrid pattern is repeated in Barcelona. Close on seven hundred barracas were situated in Campo de la Bota to the east of the city, between the mouths of the Besós and the Riera de Horta rivers on the one hand and between the railway line and the sea on the other hand (105). Then there are those of La Fosa named after the paupers' burial ground over which they have been built (106). Above all, there are those situated on the western slopes of the Montaña de Montjuich especially near the municipal rubbish dumps at Can Clos, Polvorín, etc. (District II) (107). These spontaneous suburban nuclei generally have higher-density, more inferior quality chabolas than those within zones of parcelaciones ilegales (108). A Fundación FOESSA survey in 1969, found that 50% of all the chabolas in Madrid built by owner-occupiers had been completed in less than a week and a further 18% in less than a day (109). Shades of the Welsh ty un nos (house built in one night) and the Turkish gecekondu (literally "night-placed") (110)!

Unlike spontaneous suburban nuclei where squatters have simply occupied public or "unwanted" land, parcelaciones ilegales (illegal plots) have a semi-legal validity. They are invariably found in rural and semi-urban zones which were prematurely designated for urban development and thus exposed to fiscal pressures (111). Land was sub-divided into plots by unscrupulous land speculators who then sold it at exorbitant prices to eager migrants seeking secure land tenure as their first priority (112). Invariably the migrant could only afford to pay for his plot of land in installments ( a plazos ). Once the price had been agreed, the migrant proceeded to build a chabola on his newly-acquired plot; usually with the aid of a credit-loan from a mutual-aid society like the Sociedad de Crédito de Santa Lucía (113), and without prior planning permission having been obtained. The lower-density, better-quality, semi-legal chabolas known as parcelaciones ilegales (114), born out of a concept of "self-help" (115), and the "expression of a constructive goodwill in face of difficulties" (116), engenders a sense of ownership and control of property within the minds of their occupants (117) which makes it difficult for municipal or government organizations to demolish without spirited opposition. Self-help housing often "married" to self-employment to create what Clarke has called "do-it-yourself urbanization" (118) is always sensitive to local needs. For this reason chabola-dwellers will often try to retain their homes at all costs resisting imposed "institutional" solutions (119), as well as often appealing to municipal authorities for minimal service facilities to be installed (120) as a progressive, community spirit develops (121). For these and other reasons, the parcelaciones ilegales of Cerro de la Vaca, Cerro del Maño and Camino de Leñeros (San Blas-Moratalaz), las Palomeras Altas, las Palomeras Bajas, Cerro del Milano and el Pozo del Tío Raimundo (Vallecas-Mediodía), Pozoblanco, La Meseta, Orcasitas and la Colonia Carranza (Villaverde), and of Mataderos (Latina-Carabanchel) etc., largely remained untouched (122).



To a certain extent these parcelaciones ilegales are associated with the highest socio-economic group of chabola-dwellers, although there are many exceptions to the general rule, and it is extremely dangerous to generalize about the socio-economic characteristics of any spontaneous settlements, as Dwyer has rightly emphasized (123).

The location of chabolas and barracas in Madrid and Barcelona is dictated not only by availability of vacant land (often in a designated green belt) and land unsuitable for development, but also by communications, unskilled job-opportunities and family or community ties. In the words of Poethig "where he lives is more important to the squatter than the kind of house he lives in" (124).

In 1961, Madrid had a discontinuous, peripheral ring of chabolas grouped in one hundred and sixty nuclei of irregular size, 59% of the total number of turquios lying in the south-east (125). A diocesan enquiry in 1966 revealed that seven of the capital's eleven parishes suffering from the phenomenon of chabolismo were situated in Vallecas (126). In 1969, a Fundación FOESSA survey concentrated on a working-class belt of traditional chabolismo in the southern outskirts of the city crossed by railway lines to the south and east and the River Manzanares (127). A 1973 survey revealed that 38.25% of the city's chabolas (and those in San Diego and el Pozo del Tío Raimundo were excluded from the calculation) still lay in Vallecas-Mediodía (128). Clearly a pattern of continuity exists. Despite the mixture of industry and shanty-towns there was no correlation between net inter-municipal migration per thousand population 1963 and the number of industrial establishments ( $R_s = +0.378$ ). Neither was there a statistically significant correlation with the number of large industrial establishments ( $R_s = -0.494$ ) (129). Most industry in Madrid is light and modern and needs skilled and semi-skilled labour. The location of industry has little direct effect therefore on net internal migration patterns. Only the construction

industry can absorb the large number of unqualified migrant workers. There was no correlation, however, between net inter-municipal migration per thousand population 1968 and the number of dwelling (de promoción oficial) completed in the 1939-1973 period in the eight administrative districts of the city most affected by chabolismo ( $R_s = +0.417$ ) (130). There was, however, a significant correlation between net inter-municipal migration per thousand population 1968 and the number of talleres artesanos (craft workshops), which was significant at the 99% level of confidence at the scale of twelve municipal districts ( $R_s = +0.950$ ) (131).

According to Fundación FOESSA, 48% of the active population of the city in 1965 spent more than an hour travelling to and from work, 13% taking more than two hours (132). Clearly, casual migrant labour could not be assured of finding work within close proximity of its place of abode (133). Migrants (134) had to be prepared to travel, and despite the discomfort of journeys by camioneta, metro or tram, they were able to do so because of the cheap, subsidized price of public transport and the desire of private operators to remain competitive (135). In our estimation communications and family and community ties are the important factors involved. Migrants with their low economic thresholds can only afford to live in areas of minimal choice and these are mainly peripheral ones (136). They need the assistance of cheap transport and the financial security of the "shared poverty system" to sustain them in their marginal existence (137). In both Madrid and Barcelona the price of dwellings has lagged behind the cost of living, making it more and more difficult for recently-arrived rural migrants to acquire a modern flat (138). A rule of thumb for housing that can be afforded is 2-2.5 times a family's annual income (139). With marginal families earning less than 40,000 pesetas annually in 1963, this would mean that they could only afford flats costing between 80,000 and 100,000 pesetas. Flats in the peripheral bloques of Barcelona's Districts

IX and X in 1962 cost an average of between 150,000 and 175,000 pesetas (with an entrada or downpayment of 40,000-60,000 pesetas). (140). Small wonder that many marginal groups turn to the barraca, the chabola and the shared dwelling, although in the latter perhaps up to 50% of the family income would be taken up to pay the rent.

In Barcelona, although one administrative area (District II) has an overwhelming majority of the city's barracas (41.90% of the total in 1960) (141), the number of dwellings of this type (unlike Madrid) has steadily declined since 1957 as the standard of living has risen (142). The switch to more capital intensive methods in industry in recent years has reduced the influx of unskilled, rural labour (143), even the construction industry beginning to recruit most of its labour from within the sector (144). Barcelona with its more modest urban growth and its tradition of assimilating more migrants within the industrial sector proper has had less need for barracas than Madrid (145). As with Madrid, however, there was no correlation between internal migration and the number of buildings constructed at the level of the twelve administrative districts (146).

It should be emphasized that while this section on chabolas and barracas has concentrated on Madrid and Barcelona where the problems are greatest, the suburbio is a national problem associated with the twin phenomena of industrialization and urbanization. "Barrios de alojamiento" consisting of chabolas, barracas, cuevas etc., are just as characteristic of southern provincial capitals with high rates of urbanization like Sevilla, Granada, Málaga or Almería, as of highly-industrialized provinces like Barcelona, Vizcaya, Madrid or Oviedo (147).

Factores Humanos y Sociales..., refers to "suburbios interiores" within inner central city zones (148). We found little evidence in Madrid of much initial movement of migrants to central city zones. Only 1.81% of in-migrant arrivals to Madrid in 1968 and 2.17% in 1969 went to the Centro (149). The Centro is saturated and, as such, does not attract large numbers

of migrants (150). Notwithstanding, the average sized nuclear family in the Centro in 1965 was smaller than in the Ensanche or Periferia, although the extended family was slightly larger. The base statistics suggest that one family in two had a relative (often a migrant) living with them (151). An above average number of dwellings were shared by two or more families in the Centro (although not all multi-family dwellings were necessarily shared by migrants) (152).

Single migrants often do make their way to the Centro, those without relatives or friends ending up in pensiones, casas de huéspedes, residencias and albergues etc. In the 1975 Guía Telefónica de Madrid, according to our calculations 24.51% of the pensiones etc., advertized were situated in the Centro - an administrative district of the city which occupies only 0.83% of the total municipal area (153). In the Calle de Toledo in 1970 there were fifty hostales and pensiones together with one hotel, 65% of the total being in the section between the Calle de la Cobada / Calle de López Silva and the Glorieta de la Puerta del Sol section in a distance of approximately half a kilometre (154). There were also many lodgers in this zone - the attraction being work in the many shops, the two railway stations, the markets, and the Rastro (155). Similarly in Bilbao the Casco Viejo (old city core) has many bed-sit flats and pensiones occupied by in-migrants (156). In Barcelona, the Districts with the most accommodation in pensiones, hostales etc., are I and V. In these old zones of the city it is generally cheaper to rent accommodation, multi-occupation being almost as common here as in the barracas of District II (157). Multi-occupation is also quite common in Valencia (158). It would seem that central city slums perform an useful economic function for recently-arrived migrants.

According to Chombart de Lauwe, social space has three horizontal dimensions "economic space", "neighbourhood space" and "familial space" (159). In an analysis of residential conditions in Paris he found that

63% of working-class families had less than 10 sq. metres of "familial space" per person, with 7% having less than 3 sq. metres (160). He found that where residential density was less than 8-10 sq. metres per person that crime-rates, anomie and tension increased dramatically, probably as a result of overcrowding (161).

In the four main in-migrant provinces of Barcelona, Madrid, Vizcaya and Valencia, the average-sized dwelling inhabited by obreros\* in 1963 sin calificar was 62 sq. metres, 46 sq. metres, 60 sq. metres and 62 sq. metres respectively. Overcrowding was most serious in Madrid with an average of 11 sq. metres per person, compared with 14 sq. metres in both Valencia and Vizcaya and 17 sq. metres in Barcelona (162). In the city of Madrid, 20% of the population in 1966 had between 6-10 sq. metres per person, a further 2% less than 6 sq. metres (163). The average space per person was significantly correlated with the size of family at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.988$ ) (164). The poorest socio-economic group (with a family income of less than 5,000 pesetas monthly) had the fewest number of rooms per dwelling (165). In 1961, a study of the chabola-population of Madrid revealed an average-sized family of 4.97, with an average of 5.24 persons per chabola, 2.07 rooms per chabola, 2.52 persons per room and 3.70 persons per bedroom (166). In Vallecas, where chabolismo is most rampant, there was the least number of rooms per dwelling and the largest number of persons per room (167). In Palomeras Bajas, one of the classic chabola zones of Vallecas, 36.06% of the dwellings (circa. 1963) were less than 20 sq. metres, with 21.18% of the families of the barrio having less than 10 sq. metres of living-space per family (168). According to the Ministerio de la Vivienda the maximum sized chabola was 13 sq. metres, a survey in 1967 producing a residential density of 3.30 sq. metres per person (169). In Barcelona, an average of 4.8 persons per barraca was recorded in 1960 (170), the average-sized barraca in Campo de la Bota in \* obreros sin calificar in 1968...

the late 1960s being about 20 sq. metres (or 3.5-4.0 sq. metres per person) (171). All these statistics cited serve only to emphasize the fact that an appreciable "familial space", social-distance gap exists between the chabola- and barraca-dwellers of Madrid and Barcelona respectively on the one hand, the obrero sin calificar socio-economic class and the peripheral suburbano zones with which they are associated on the other hand.

The worst chabola- and barraca-zones of Madrid and Barcelona lack at least three of four main urban services - piped running-water, electricity, modern sewerage disposal facilities, pavements (172). According to the Plan General de Ordenación Urbana del Area Metropolitana de Madrid, these urban services are uneconomic to provide in zones with low population per hectare (173). Moreover, public authorities have been reluctant to provide these services for this would imply the de-facto recognition of illegal squatter communities (174). Lack of services make the already over-crowded chabolas all but intolerable to live in. In 1966, only 70% of the dwellings in Vallecas (built between 1951 and 1960) had piped running-water, and only 72% modern toilet facilities (175). In the city of Madrid as a whole, only 64% of the pobre class possessed running water in their homes (176). In marked contrast, only 1% of the chabola population of the city in 1961 possessed piped running-water and 4% modern toilet facilities (177). This appalling contrast - even within the suburbio itself - serves to emphasize the fact that a huge "physical urban environment" (178) gap exists, the quality of life being infinitesimally low within the chabola- and Barraca-zones of Madrid and Barcelona respectively (179).

#### (c) Health

Nationally and internationally there is a close correlation between mortality-rates (especially infant ones) and the standard of living, both being related to conditions of sanitation, personal hygiene and nutrition levels. In Madrid, the mortality-rate fell from 30.12 per thousand population in 1900 to 7.14 in 1970; the infant mortality-rate falling from 52.8

per thousand live births in 1941 to 23.5 in 1970 (130). In Barcelona, the mortality rate fell from 26.53 in 1900 to 7.89 in 1960; the infant mortality-rate from 60.5 in 1940 to 23.3 in 1960 (131). Deaths from infectious diseases are now minimal, accounting for only 3.25% of all deaths in Barcelona in 1962 (132). Tuberculosis which was responsible for 10.77% of all deaths in the city in 1930 only accounted for 2.51% in 1960 (133). In Madrid, deaths from tuberculosis in 1968 only amounted to 1.23% of the total (134). Notwithstanding, 10.80% of the hospital beds in Spain in 1960 were reserved for tuberculosis cases (135). Although no longer a killer disease it is still rife amongst the migrant communities. Their low nutritional standards, poor living and working conditions and previous lack of contact with this disease in the rural areas make them most susceptible to infection (136). In Madrid, 56.06% of all the deaths from tuberculosis in 1968 occurred in the district of Tetuán, Retiro-Mediodía accounting for 12.12% and Arganzuela-Villaverde for 5.30% of the total (137). In 1965, there were 478 cases of notifiable infectious diseases reported to the Laboratorio Municipal de Higiene (Sección de Epidemiología). Of these, 18.83% were reported in Tetuán, 17.99% in Vallecas and 12.13% in Carabanchel (the three main in-migrant districts) compared with only 2.93% in Chamberí and 3.77% in both Latina and Universidad (districts with comfortable, middle-class living standards) (138). These statistics are remarkably constant. In 1971, for example, 473 cases were reported (139). There was a significant correlation between the percentage of notifiable infectious diseases and Fundación FOESSA's index of social well-being which proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence ( $R_s = -0.717$ ), when calculated at the level of twelve municipal districts (190).

Few<sup>\*</sup> have read Candel's Apuntes para una Sociología del Barrio and his vivid descriptions of "biblical plagues", of

"...rats, rubbish, open sewers, dust, mud, water, [especially] stagnant pools of dirty water, fumes, bad smells etc.

\* (who)

In the etc. are included flies, foci of infection, mosquitos escombrosos, open spaces converted into public rubbish-dumps, invasions of blackbeetles into the ground floors..."(191)

can doubt that the barraca-zones of Barcelona, or the chabola-zones of Madrid for that matter, must have very low indices of public-health and sanitation. Yet, in no official or private publication dealing with such zones are any statistics directly connected with public-health and sanitation, tuberculosis or other infectious diseases quoted. In Barcelona, the worst conditions are found in Districts II and V. In those districts, Cáritas Diocesana de Barcelona estimated that 36 and 20% respectively of the population living there lacked the most rudimentary ideas about personal hygiene. Furthermore, 48.9 and 75.0% of the dwellings respectively ought, in their opinion, to have been condemned as unfit to live in (192). Statistics supplied by the Oficina Central del Niño for the city as a whole, show that 58.08% of the 3,700 cases of children needing care and attention investigated in 1960, were living in homes with subnormal hygienic living conditions. Indeed, in only 2.03% of the cases were children exposed to densities of less than 3 persons per room. In 3.84% of the cases investigated a recently-born child was found living with a member of the family suffering from tuberculosis, while in a further 6.65% of cases children were exposed to infection from this source by visiting relatives who had this disease (193).

Poor living conditions and low standards of nutrition (194) (related in the main to low salaries and high incidence of unemployment) have a cumulative effect on health. Basabe Prado, in a study of 13-18 year old boys born in Barcelona of Murcian or Almerian parents and living in barracas and realquilados (shared accommodation), found that such children were shorter and lighter than those reared in the South (195).



So much for the physical health, what of the mental health of migrant communities? Any conclusions made here are distorted by two factors - the length of time since migration and two contradictory themes concerning migrant group and individual behaviour.

As far as the time factor is concerned an "acute" psychological condition aptly termed "psychological arrival" (196), may make itself apparent the first few days or weeks after migration. Among the most common symptoms are morriña (home-sickness), lack of appetite, poor sleep, a change in attitude expressed in anxiety, depression and the lack of desire to work. The recent arrival will sometimes appear inhibited, sometimes aggressive. "Chronic" psychological symptoms may lie latent for periods of between six months and a year before making themselves apparent in migrants who cannot adjust to the new surroundings (197). These include symptoms like chronic depression and more serious conditions like delinquency, paranoid and schizophrenic behaviour and even suicide (198).

As far as migrant group and individual behaviour are concerned there are two contradictory schools of thought. The first, represented by the Plan C.C.B., points to high rates of social breakdown, stress, anomie, frustration, poverty, misery, alcoholism, violence, prostitution, immoral behaviour, the break-up of family life etc. (199). The second, represented by Mangin amongst others, emphasizes opposite characteristics, family continuity, co-operative effort and community organization enabling the peasant to adjust to urban life in spite of everything (200). According to Sigüán, adjustment (when it occurs) takes between six months and two years, although the vast majority only achieve a state of relative equilibrium at a mere "biological subsistence level" (201), marginal to the main urban community.

Adjustment or non-adjustment is not<sup>\*</sup> related to the time factor but to many other variables including such "arrival attributes" (202) as below

\* (only)

average economic status, age and health (203). A disproportionate number of widows over the age of fifty - 12.95% of heads of family in 1967 were female - inhabit the chabola-zones of Madrid (204). Nine per cent of Madrileñan families in 1966 had a total income of less than 2,500 pesetas monthly, yet a disproportionate 31% of the families in this income group had a member of the family who was chronically sick or invalid. Although the highest percentages were recorded in some of the working-class, in-migrant districts like Arganzuela-Villaverde (22%), Ventas (21%), Retiro-Mediodía (20%) and Vallecas (20%) (205), there was no statistically significant correlation at the level of twelve municipal districts between the percentage of families with one or more chronically sick or invalid persons in 1966 and net in-migration 1968 ( $R_s = -0.089$ ) (206).

Early studies of migrant mental illness ignored the all important variable of age at the time of first admission to a mental hospital. This resulted in distorted results - there being more mental ill-health amongst the young and, of course, more young migrants (207). Struening, Rabkin and Peck, in a study of 176 health areas of Brooklyn and the Bronx in New York with a total population of over four million, found that migrants displayed similar patterns of behaviour to permanent residents of the same ethnic group living within the same health area. These findings related not only to mental but also physical illness, family disruption, deviant behaviour, infant mortality etc. (208). This would seem to imply that migrants were not disturbed before they moved, and that the process of migration did not precipitate unsurmountable psychiatric difficulties in most cases. It would also seem to imply that urban-orientated viewpoints expressed, for example, in the Plan C.C.B.

"...if the inhabitants of caves, without more ado, succeed in inhabiting a newly-constructed block of flats, they do not delay in converting them into a state similar to that which they lived-in previously" (209)

are biased (210). In confirmation of this conclusion, we found no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the number of illegitimate babies born per hundred live births 1961, when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = -0.221$ ) (211).

Supporting evidence is provided from Barcelona where there was no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1963 and the number of illegitimate babies born per hundred live births when calculated at the level of twelve municipal districts in 1962 ( $R_s = -0.238$ ) (212).

Neither did we find a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the Plan C.C.B.'s index of delinquency 1962, when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = +0.204$ ) (213).

Too much emphasis has been placed upon the role of migration in precipitating psychiatric difficulties. Recent evidence from Srole suggests that mental disorder frequencies are not greater in cities than in the countryside (214). Too much emphasis has been placed also upon the rural migrant's inability to cope in an urban environment. Astrup and Ødengaard, in a study of in-migration in Oslo, found higher illness rates among urban-to-urban migrants to the capital than among rural-to-urban ones (215). Escape migration can often be satisfying if discontent with the home environment was sociological rather than psychological in origin (216). Adapting Wolpert's concept of "migration elasticity" unbearable stress is relieved through the act of migration. Goal-striving, upward socially mobile individuals within the host community are especially prone to suffer from stress and associated mental and physical disorders (217). Madrid, bustling capital of Spain with 9.30% of the country's population in 1970, recorded a disproportionate 12.91% of the nation's psychiatric cases in 1967 (218).

While it is broadly true that the development of behaviour disorders in migrants is the result of the interaction between individuals and the

host society, that stress is greatest where cultural differences are most marked and that further strains are imposed upon the migrant in those communities where there is pressure for rapid assimilation (219), in the marginal suburbio "accommodation" (220) to the urban way of life is achieved through a social existence apart from the city. Here the family-kin network to a greater extent serves as a "buffer mechanism" (221) between the recent arrival and the urban community at large reducing the "cultural shock" experienced. In the opinion of Schwarzweller and Crowe the family-kin network acts as a stabilizing factor giving the migrant a normative reference frame which discourages deviant behaviour (222).

Despite the "buffer mechanism" of the "urban village" many rural migrants do find difficulty in adjusting to urban life. Hill has noted that any migratory movement contains at least three strands of conflict - between migrants and non-migrants; between migrants prepared to accept new values and those who will not; between migrant children who learn to accept local cultural norms and their parents (223). An analysis of persons suffering from psycho-pathological illnesses in Barcelona found great discrepancies between the percentage of regional groups resident in the city and the percentage of the same regional groups within the mental-illness sample. Natives of Barcelona and the Rest of Catalonia were disproportionately under-represented in the sample. In contrast, natives of Old Castile who represented 2.1% of the resident population of the city had 6.0% of the sample concerned. Andalusia with 7.0% of the resident population had 16.6% of those affected with mental illness (224). Significant as these figures appear to be national statistics concerning mental illness appear to be very suspect. The four main in-migrant provinces of Barcelona, Madrid, Vizcaya and Valencia recorded indices of 24.63, 16.85, 16.93 and 13.46 per ten thousand inhabitants respectively in 1967, three being below the national average of 19.45 (225).

When the mental health of housewives was measured through subjective indices like happiness, a statistically significant correlation was produced between the index of happiness and per capita income, which proved to be statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of seventeen regions ( $R_s = +0.652$ ) (226). The percentage of housewives declaring themselves to be "very happy" was greatest in the metropolitan areas and the highest socio-economic groups (227). Highest indices of malestar psicológico (anxiety) were recorded in the lowest socio-economic groups (especially in the metropolitan areas), with metropolitan housewives likely to express feelings of worry, depression and loneliness as opposed to rural ones who suffered more from boredom and restlessness (228). In the chabola-zones of Madrid 70% of housewives claimed to be "happy enough" or "very happy" - a higher percentage than for the pobre socio-economic class nationally (229). These statistics suggest that life is happier in the urban and metropolitan areas where the standard of living is higher and rising more rapidly than in the countryside. Even among the chabola-housewives of Madrid the minority percentage expressing themselves to feel "unhappy" falls dramatically when the monthly family income surpasses 6,500 pesetas (230), reminding us once more of the inherent danger of generalizing about the collective socio-economic characteristics of in-migrant communities.

We conclude that conditions of social and mental well-being in the chabola- and barraca-zones of Madrid and Barcelona are much higher than urban-biased experts imagine. We referred earlier to the huge "physical urban environment" gap between those zones and the parent cities. This is undisputable; but to what extent are the chabolistas and barraquistas conscious of that gap? We referred earlier to chabolas in Madrid having an average density of 2.52 persons per room. What should be borne in mind is that those chabolistas came from provinces like Cádiz, Sevilla, Málaga,

Córdoba, Salamanca, Cuenca, Huelva, Albacete and La Coruña - provinces where the provincial average density of over 2 persons per room varied between 13 and 29% of the total number of homes (231).

In confirmation of our conclusions, Barcelona, Madrid, Vizcaya and Valencia the four main in-migrant provinces recorded homicide rates in the 1963-1967 period of 0.39, 0.83, 0.32 and 0.21 per ten thousand inhabitants, which, in three instances, were below the national average of 0.75 (232). Suicide rates have fallen dramatically in the five largest cities of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla and Zaragoza since the beginning of the century (233). Suicide-rates are lower in provincial capitals than in provinces as a whole (234). "Anomic suicide" (235) is more characteristic of the countryside than of the towns, for it is in the countryside that people have been most conscious of the breakdown of traditional life and most disturbed by the conflict of norms (236). We found a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the suicide-rate per ten thousand inhabitants 1967, which proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of fifty provinces ( $R_s = 0.772$ ) (237). It was confirmed by a correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the average number of suicides per hundred thousand population during the same period, which proved to be significant at the 95% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of sixteen main net in- and out-migrant provinces ( $R_s = -0.598$ ) (238). There was no significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and the suicide-rate per ten thousand inhabitants 1967 either at "macro-regional" in-migration level at the scale of fifteen provinces ( $R_s = -0.343$ ) or at "micro-regional" level in Cataluña-Baleares ( $r = 0.000$ ) and Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza ( $r = -0.200$ ), suggesting once more that "anomic suicide" is a product of disruption of the social order in the countryside. Sudden upward and downward changes in the standard of living (related in part to brusque changes of climate from year to year in the countryside) are partly to blame for

rural-urban suicide-rate differentials (239). Spanish suicide statistics are unique in a number of ways. Higher suicide-rates for married people, for example, would suggest that it is not only traditional rural norms which are under attack but the very fabric of group family life. There is more than a suggestion from the statistics that women (more conservative than men by character) although they have suicide-rates which are less than half the male-rate are much more likely to be affected by changes of residence including migration (240).

(d) Social order

Despite the fact that conditions of social and mental well-being are much higher than expected, in the chabola- and barraca-zones of Madrid and Barcelona respectively are, originally at least, ciudades sin ley (lawless towns) as their nicknames - of Mau-Mau, Pequin, El Congo, Argel, Dallas, Wichita, Ciudad Fronteriza and Tejas - imply. They are characterized initially, as Candel has noted, by violence, quarrels, violent disputes, drunkenness, fist-fights, knife-attacks, open homo-sexuality, prostitution, drug-taking and trafficking, juvenile delinquency, nightly disturbances which disturb the peace of the neighbourhood. Yet do they evolve in any way different from frontier-towns of the nineteenth century which lay outside the law? Candel hypothesizes that over a period of time conditions improve (as they did in the towns of the wild-west), a conciencia de barrio (community spirit) develops amongst the silent and honourable majority (241). He argues that when people live in the street more than in their homes because of the cramped, crowded conditions, they are more likely to intervene in disputes and to impose themselves upon social outcasts and trouble makers. It is when working-class people are encapsulated in high-rise development blocks that they just do not want to know when trouble breaks out in the street below (242).

We would argue that the chabola- and barraca-zones are rural enclaves

within an urban world and that the violencia so characteristic of such zones is partly the result of the direct transfer of rural modes of behaviour (243). We found no statistically significant correlation to substantiate this theory when we examined the relationship between net internal migration 1961-1965 and delitos contra la persona (physical crimes against the person), when calculated at the scale of sixteen main net in- and out-migrant provinces ( $R_s = +0.173$ ). Neither was there a correlation with delitos contra la honestidad (crimes against a person's honour) ( $R_s = +0.375$ ). In contrast, there was a significant correlation with the more urban-based delitos contra la propiedad (crimes against property) which was significant at the 95% level of confidence ( $R_s = +0.556$ ) (244).

Juvenile delinquency is reported to be highly related to migration. Serrano Gómez, in a study of 750 juvenile delinquents below the age of twenty-one, found that in 61% of the cases investigated the father was not a native of the city where the juvenile delinquent lived (245). Bearing in mind that 50% of the population of Barcelona in 1970 and 57% in Madrid in 1965 were life-time migrants, these statistics are meaningless (246). As mentioned previously, we found no statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1961-1965 and juvenile delinquency. This lack of correlation was confirmed at "macro-regional" in-migration level ( $R_s = -0.153$ ) and at "micro-regional" level in both Cataluña-Baleares ( $r = +0.700$ ) and Vascongadas-Navarra-Zaragoza ( $r = +0.600$ ).

Approximately 85% of juvenile delinquents come from the working and "very poor" classes. Of 2,495 juvenile delinquents with known places of abode placed in care (ingresados bajo tutela con medidas duraderas), 57.07% came from urban homes and a further 29.62% from the suburbio (247). More than 80% came from large families (of over four persons) and the vast majority from overcrowded conditions (248). Juvenile delinquency is concentrated in areas "of physical deterioration and neighbourhood dis-



organization" (249), especially where slum "transition zones" located near to rich central areas provide some degree of protection for young criminals (250). In Barcelona, such activities are concentrated in the Barrio Chino in District V (on the outskirts of District I) and the Barrio Chino Perfumado in District XI (on the outskirts of the rich District III) (251). In Madrid, such activities are mainly concentrated in the Centro District especially in the back-streets behind the Avenida de José Antonio, around the Puerta del Sol, Plaza de Santa Ana and Plaza de Tirso de Molina. None of these districts either in Madrid or Barcelona are characterized by high rates of net in-migration although they perform an important function as reception centres for certain types of young, single migrants. If indeed there is a connection between crime and migration as some authorities argue, there is ample evidence also of "neighbourhood effect" (252), criminology values in "downtown" zones of multiple deprivation being transmitted from one generation to the next (253). These zones in Madrid and Barcelona would appear to conform to the latter rather than the former theory (254).

The "anti-urban" view of sociologists, in the opinion of Sjoberg (255), is due to the "high visibility of urban problems" like poverty, disease and slum housing conditions. Is it not possible to transfer this "anti-urban" prejudice to the social pathology of migrant adjustment? Juvenile delinquency rates ought to be higher than among the resident population given the youthful bias of most migrant streams (256). Moreover, when migrants commit crimes they are more likely to commit them against the person than against property (257). Spectacular and violent crimes like those claimed to have been committed by "El Lute" (258) in 1972 get into the newspapers and create the impression in the popular mind that all migrants are gente mala (259). This is just not so. In Calcutta where at least 2 million people (mainly of migrant origin) live in very poor

cramped housing conditions or even sleep on the streets "conventional crime"; in the words of P.K. Sen (retired chief commissioner of police for the city), "has never assumed alarming proportions" (260). Neither has it in Madrid or Barcelona.

(e) Social belonging

As with social order so also with social belonging; urban sociologists have often adopted biased, entrenched attitudes. The suburbio:

"...has no ideas, no traditions, no customs....

The only things which are valued are money,

hypocrisy and violence" (261).

Such is the christian attitude of Ciritas Española echoed in the words of Srta. Laura Arregui, a social worker! According to this view the suburbio lacks community spirit. It is a veritable zona asocial completely lacking in any integrating mechanism which could lead to the forging of a community spirit. It is a disturbed, disorganized nomless society characterized by anomie - a socio-pathological condition in which delinquency and anti-social behaviour is common. Social disorganization manifests itself negatively through the lack of pressure groups, voluntary associations or even group leaders (262). Such attitudes are common among modern experts who see rural-to-urban migrants only as despicable "displaced persons of the development process... a human flotsam and jetsam that has been displaced from traditional agricultural life without being incorporated into modern industrial life" (263). It is the classical nineteenth-century attitude which castigated poverty as the result of individual depravity or character deficiency (264).

In answer to these views expressed above we would ask the so-called experts a number of leading questions. How did the suburbio of yesteryear become incorporated into the city (in the sociological sense) if it was such a disorganized zone? How did it acquire its ideas, its customs, its

traditions? How do the experts explain the non-existence of group co-operation in the suburbio when traditional rural life on the one hand is organized on the group principle (265) and working-class norms in the urban areas on the other hand are "collectivist" (266)? Or would they deny that the migrants of the suburbio are either rural or working-class in origin? It is ridiculous to point to the low number of formal voluntary associations when empirical evidence exists from a number of industrialized countries (including the United States and Britain) that there is an inverse relationship between membership of associations and socio-economic status (267). There are also urban-rural and regional differentials in voluntary association membership rates (268). Regional membership rates were highest in 1960 in Madrid, Cataluña, Baleares, Navarra, Vascongadas and Asturias; and generally lowest in the new massive out-migration regions of Andalucía, New Castile (excluding Madrid) and Extremadura (269).

In the city of Barcelona, there were fifteen Casas Regionales (Regional Centres) in 1963. Although there were only 6,050 life-time migrants from Oviedo living in the city the Casa Asturiana had 200 members (or the equivalent of 3.31% of the resident Asturian population). In contrast, membership of the Casa Valenciana represented only 1.31% of the resident Valencian population of the city (270). In Madrid, the Casas Regionales existing in 1970 were thirteen in number (271). Empirical evidence, such as it exists, suggests that these regional centres do not perform the same essential function for poor migrants as did the mutual aid societies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for poor immigrants - the Centros Gallegos in Buenos Aires and many other Latin American cities, the Italian, Greek, German, Russian and Polish centres in so many North American cities (272). Rather is this function performed by less imposing and more informal mutual aid societies, or what Gutkind terms "association-based networks" (273). These are a typical product of the "shared poverty system"

exported from rural to urban areas. One of the Spanish immigrant workers interview by Hermet and Marquet in the département de l'Oise in 1959 remarked:

"When there is nothing left to eat in the house, you ask for something from the neighbours. They never refuse while they still have some food themselves, because next week they may be in need of something from us" (274).

As Anderson has divulged (275), slum areas display intricate patterns of "social mobilization" (276) that often go unobserved by urban social scientists. To deny the existence of social organization in the suburbio is to deny the existence of friendship and obligation in Spanish society. Haciendo favores, as Pitt-Rivers has rightly pointed out (277), cements the bonds of friendship and natural confidence. Such are the ramifications of Spanish urban society that favour-based networks of association transcend social and economic barriers. It is the "particularist" attitude of the countryside transported to the towns (278). It is a belief in the importance of favouritism, of nepotism, in enchufes and the luck to know someone of importance and influence, it is the haggling of the African or Asian street-market formalized in the rebajas de diez por ciento (ten per cent discounts) through personal contact or the production of the impersonal carnet (credit-card) (279). It matters little that 10% of Margulis' migrant sample in Buenos Aires belonged to a club or voluntary association (280), for as Epstein has noted, "the vast majority of recent immigrants to towns are not 'joiners'..." (281) in the formal sense of the term. Migrant communities have their own traditional sub-culture which in some respects is resistant to change and to participation in modern city life (282). It is only strongly separatist groups like the Gallegos, Basques and Catalans who preserve their regional identity through regrouping in formal clubs and voluntary associations (283), but all migrant-

communities close ranks within their "urban villages" to preserve their security in both the physical and psychological sense. The ecology of poverty dictates that this should be so; that brother should give a helping hand to brother.

Migrant communities usually display passive and fatalistic attitudes to their environmental conditions; attitudes which are interpreted by persons in authority (and often by the citizen in the street) to be the result of their individual depravity or collective deficiency rather than of their high tolerance levels. Yet, migrant communities are capable of employing violent tactics when they feel that their vital interests are under attack, their security put in doubt (284). They are capable of organizing themselves like the Comisión Gestora de la Asociación de Vecinos de las Barracas de Montjuïc to get a hearing for their grievances. Indeed the Asociación de Cabezas de Familias de la Fortuna (within the municipio of Leganés 10 kilometres from the centre of Madrid) even produced a book to draw attention to their grievances (285)! New blocks of flats populated by migrant communities soon form their juntas de vecinos or their junta de inquilinos to protect their interests. If there is no portería then rotas will be drawn up for essential tasks like sweeping the stairs. There will be considerable apathy, much petty bickering and even violent quarrels, but somehow everyone will muddle through. In short, the contrast between what Hollnsteiner calls "anti-city theory and pro-city practice" (286), could not be greater.

Sociologists bewail the fact that there are thirty-three suburbios in Barcelona, thirty in Madrid. The segregation of such communities (287), their physical isolation and marginality with reference to the host community, their non-integration into the urban mainstream, enables many separate sub-cultures to mushroom thrive and expand. These semi-rural sub-cultures are seen as malignant cancers which will kill the main urban culture.

Madrid is losing its culture is the cry (288), Barcelona is being "decatinized" (289) and "denaturalized" (290). But is there such a thing as a madrileña culture? Hemingway saw the city as the least Spanish and yet the most Spanish of Spanish cities (291). He at least saw the function of Madrid capital of Spain as the national urban melting pot. The castizo in Madrid is as localized and as difficult to define as the codney in London. Galdós that most castizo of Madrileñan novelists was a provincial. Again, as Simancas and Elizalde have pointed out there is a tendency for the non-madrileñan urbanite of many years standing (as opposed to suburbanite) to wish to be identified with casticismo. Rather to be identified as castizo than as paleto. In order to emphasize their separatism from recent, marginal migrant groups they attempt to become more madrileñan than the madrileños (292).

What is this culture which Madrid and Barcelona are losing? Much of our urban ways of thought and behaviour patterns are still rural. McIver and Page have hypothesized that a "cultural lag" characterizes urban modes of behaviour (293). Likewise, Ogburn distinguishes between material and non-material culture, the latter tending to lag behind so that changes in the non-material environment never keep pace with those in the modern, technological environment (294). Technological innovations may be readily accepted, but any innovations which are likely to affect social structures or cultural values are resisted (295). It is not surprising, therefore, that many Spanish women, urban by birth and middle-class by background, still prefer to shop in the plaza (market) rather than in the supermarket. They prefer fresh meat to frozen or chilled meat. They are suspicious of canned and quick-dried foods. They prefer to make their own soups. They love to haggle with shopkeepers and stall-holders.

Urbanization is so recent "that even the most urbanized countries", according to Kingsley Davis, "still exhibit the rural origins of their

institutions" (296). Face-to face situations - whatever Wirth may have said (297) - are innumerable in the urban world (298). Many of the experts who decry the "ruralization" of the cities are themselves no more than first or second generation migrants from a rural background. In Madrid there is a saying:

"Cuanto menos madrileño, más madrileñista" (299).

In Cataluña too some migrants become more Catalan than the Catalans themselves (300). Negre Rigol refers to young migrants who dress up like middle-class men on Sundays, frequent bars used by burgueses and travel from one part of the city to another by taxi (301).

#### Adjustment and non-adjustment factors: objective conclusions

In view of the subjective distance separating "anti-city theory and pro-city practice" social distance between migrants and non-migrants must be measured in objective terms. Sauvy has proposed three objective indices - geographical dispersion, mixed education and mixed marriages (302) - to which may be added a number of others including income.

##### (a) Geographical dispersion

We have seen that for ecological reasons rural migrants from the same region, province or even village (303), tend to congregate in the same urban zones forming distinctive suburban subcultural nuclei. Lack of income as well as propinquity were decisive factors. Multi-occupation of chabolas and barracas (and of high-rise blocks of flats) in the marginal suburbio was one device by which the "shared poverty system" supplied its housing needs. Density of population per room in the Centro of Madrid was only 30.16% of that in the chabolas and 46.82% of that in the Periferia (304).

When chabola- or barraca-dwellers move to a modern block of flats they often do so collectively - as in the case of the U.V.A.S. and the poblados dirigidos. In such circumstances few return to the shanties (even though financially they may be worse off). Of 6,774 flats built for

barraquistas by the Obra Sindical del Hogar in the Barcelona region, only 2.95% were traspasados (transferred to other tenants), the occupants then returning to the barracas (305). Yet this is hardly proof of integration into the urban main-stream since social housing schemes of inferior type dwellings are invariably occupied mainly by migrants of low socio-economic status.

(b) Economic segregation

A mass of evidence exists to show that recent migrants have inferior, often casual jobs. Even those who manage to obtain more secure employment within the industrial sector usually do so in badly-paid, dirty or unsociable jobs. Malquer, in a study of a textile factory in Tarrasa (Barcelona), found that while 65.79% of the total labour force was migrant, the percentage of migrants rose to 87.23 of the unqualified labour employed (306). There is a considerable amount of evidence which suggests that migrants on the factory floor are discriminated against (307). Old, skilled Catalan workers consider the coreanos as they call them, to be dirty, lazy and irresponsible. The Andaluz is singled out for more severe discrimination. He is reputed to be dirty, ignorant and violent, to have an easy come easy go attitude to money, to show no initiative in work situations, to have no interest in promotion and to be suitable only for low-grade, unskilled work. Above all he is criticized for being over-fond of wine, for being a juerquista (playboy) and one who revels in fights and bitter quarrels. "He does not possess qualities which permit him to live in a civilized society and he is practically incapable of acquiring them" (308). Friction within work situation is all the greater because there is more contact between host and migrant communities. In housing and in social life generally there is much less contact. It is in work situations that xenophobic tendencies are most evident. The migrants are the "noble decadent" (309); those, in Candel's words, who "have come to eat the bread



of the Catalans" (310). Integration in such circumstances is all but impossible. The chamengo or coreano avoids trouble wherever possible - hence his defensive, closed attitude towards Catalan hostility. Similar socio-economic discrimination against coreanos or maketas as they are insultingly termed, is found in the Basque country (311). In Madrid it is much less strong, partly because the city has no easily identifiable regional culture or separate language which is under attack, partly because industrialization is more recent and lighter in nature (so that there are less unskilled jobs on the factory floor for migrants), partly because Madrid has traditionally been a national melting pot. The worst thing that a migrant can get called in Madrid is "paleta", which is something on a par to being called a "hillbillie" in the United States. Evidently the price that Madrid has had to pay for its function as national capital is the emasculation of its local culture. Madrileños do not feel that their cultural virility is being put under attack as natives of Barcelona and Bilbao do.

Despite the economic discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants empirical evidence exists that such migrants have given a good account of themselves in, for example, the car-assembling factories of West Germany. Modern Spanish industries (following the western pattern) have divided and automated industrial processes enabling rural manpower to be easily absorbed and trained for repetitative semi-skilled, production-line tasks (312). Farina Jamardo, General Director of Administration of Barreiros Diesel S.A., reported to an O.E.C.D. seminar that 91% of the workers in his survey of the plant labour force who had emigrated abroad had been unskilled when they left Spain, 43% coming off the land. On return their newly acquired industrial skills had enabled them to obtain jobs in the company, 29% as "specialized" labour, 39% as skilled workers, 14% as supervisors and 5% as charge-hands (313). In contrast Angel Pascual, in a study of ninety returnees from abroad who were working in Catalan industry when interviewed,

found surprisingly little upward mobility after the international experience. In fact, some workers on their return were even forced to seek accommodation in Barracas and realcuilados (314).

Most returnees from Western to Southern Europe drift back into agriculture or into some self-employed job in the service sector like running a grocery shop, a taxi business or a bar (315). Despite the fact that two-thirds of FIAT's work force in Turin are migrants the proportion of former emigrants abroad in Italian industry is small, the big companies preferring cheap, more easily coerced labour from the South. FIAT at least have begun to change their views after increasing labour disputes in their plants and the revelation that massive reliance on migrant labour results in a 25% inefficiency factor (316). Iasuén has argued that labour in the underdeveloped south of Spain (where productivity is on average 300% below that of the north) is relatively overpaid (317). Should migrants from Andalucía ever be used in appreciable numbers in northern factories, then presumably the inefficiency factor will be at least as great as in Italy.

(c) Mixed education

It is a little unfair to employ level of education as an index of assimilation. Firstly, because the migrant arrives in the city with or without education. If he has none and is of economically active age, he has neither the time nor usually the means to acquire it. Secondly, because the vast majority of Spaniards have only received a primary education.

We may denigrate the lack of education of migrants, yet illiteracy is more connected with age and with sex rather than with migration. It is usually those migrants with above average education who decide to make a definitive move. We saw earlier in our thesis that there was no statistically significant correlation at either national, "macro- or micro-regional" in-migration level between net internal migration 1961-1965 and illiteracy per ten thousand provincial population in 1963 (318). In Barcelona

we found no correlation between net internal migration 1963 and illiteracy as a percentage of the total population in the same year, when calculated at the level of twelve municipal districts ( $R_s = +0.063$ ) (319). In contrast, in Madrid there was a statistically significant correlation between net internal migration 1968 and the percentage of the population illiterate in 1965, which proved to be significant at the 99% level of confidence when calculated at the scale of twelve municipal districts ( $R_s = +0.839$ ) (320). Does this suggest that uneducated Spaniards with no likelihood of obtaining a secure, decently-paid factory job make their way to Madrid, where there are proportionally more unskilled jobs (especially in the construction industry) than in Barcelona or Bilbao?

It is a little unfair to quote figures about the percentage of children of school-going age not attending school regularly as an index of lack of integration in the in-migrant zones. In some out-migrant regions with dispersed habitat, it is often difficult to get to school as, for example, in the cortijo zones of certain parts of Andalucía. Attitudes to school attendance (or non-attendance) are often transferred to the new locale after migration. Furthermore, there are often insufficient school places within the in-migrant zones. Above all else, the child is an essential economic unit within the shanty towns with specific tasks like looking after the pigs and hens (321). Finally, many children within these zones are forced to leave their education prematurely because of dire economic circumstances (322).

(d) Linguistic assimilation

Education is undoubtedly an important factor in the assimilation process especially for second generation migrants, although empirical evidence from many societies suggests that full integration does not occur until the third generation. Basques and Catalans stress the importance of language as an integrating factor, no doubt because they feel that their traditional cultures are being eroded away. Malquer found that it took

migrants an average of 29 years 7 months residence in Barcelona to learn to speak Catalan well, while those who averaged 5 years 2 months residence in Barcelona still understood virtually nothing of the language (323). It is claimed that speaking Catalán or Vasqueune (Basque) is essential for social promotion. To a certain extent migrants realize this, but few make any attempt to learn the languages of their adopted regions - although 91% of a sample undertaken by Duocastella in 1961-1962 would like their children to learn Catalan (324). The school is, therefore, an important integrating factor although Catalan or Basque, the languages of social promotion, are not taught as part of the curriculum (325). Candel (himself a migrant), emphasizes the importance of learning Catalan, although Sigüán considers the language barrier to be but one difficulty amongst many for the recent arrival (326). Language can hardly be taken as an objective index of assimilation since it is the vehicle which consciously emphasizes distinction and separateness rather than being an integrating force (327).

(e) Religious differentials

Certain Spanish social scientists have made important contributions to the study of religious differentials of migrants and non-migrants. The Church is obviously concerned about the growing anti-religious tendencies associated with the processes of modernization, industrialization and materialism. It sees the devotee turned migrant cut off from his traditional cultural background with its emphasis on regular church-going, exposed instead to the influence of urban and suburban workers who live outside any religious influence. Yet the Church itself is partly to blame for this situation. In Galicia, the Church has traditionally set itself apart from the people. The priest is looked upon as yet another member of the middle-class cacique who can read and write, while the mass is heard in Castellano (328). In Andalucía, it is doubtful whether the region was ever suffi-

ciently christianized. The ratio of priests to population is much lower here than in the more prosperous regions of the north and north-east. Duocastella, in a sample survey of a region with dispersed population in rural Andalucía, found only 3.4% of the population attending mass regularly, 49.8% never attended at all (329). Traditionally the Church has recruited its priests from rural Castile. Such priests have found it difficult to identify with the urban proletariat and have tended to lose touch with their parishioners when based in urban parishes. Above all the established Church identified itself with the Franco régime and the propertied upper and middle classes, and as such, alienated itself from the urban proletariat of Madrid and Barcelona - those elements which lost the Civil War. Small wonder that a Hermanidades Obreras de Acción Católica (Catholic Working men's Association) survey in 1957 found 90% of 15,000 workers interviewed describing themselves as "anti-clerical" and 41% as "anti-religious". Small wonder that in a middle class suburb of Madrid 30-40% of the population attended mass regularly while in a working class suburb of Barcelona only 2.5% did so (330). Negre Rigol in a study of a working-class suburban parish of Barcelona found 8.7% of the censored population attending mass; age of population, duration of residence in Barcelona and region of origin, being important variables (331). Duocastella notes that changes of an outward social nature - like not taking part in religious processions or more irregular attendance at mass - did occur, but that more intimate and personal forms of religious life - like individual prayer - were hardly affected by the uprooting process of migration (332). In our opinion so many factors are interwoven that it is impossible to see a clear relationship between internal migration and regular attendance at mass, although Fundación FOESSA were able to detect some relationship - housewives who had only lived in the municipio where surveyed for more than ten years were two-thirds more likely to attend mass regularly than those who had lived there for less than a year (333).

It should be emphasized that as with so many of the integrating factors studied in this section of our thesis, objective conclusions are difficult to come by. Anti-religious behaviour in many instances is yet another problem - like rural poverty itself - which has been transferred from rural to urban areas (334).

(f) Fertility differentials

Applying Hope's hypothesis that "the fertility of socially mobile couples is halfway between the fertility of the class from which they remove and the fertility of the class into which they move" (335) to internal migration, we see little adjustment to lower urban birth-rates approximating with those of the region of adoption. In Mataró (Barcelona), Doucastella found that in-migrants from the south of Spain had an average of 3.13 children (an average which was higher than in the region of origin, where it was 2.84). In-migrants from the centre of Spain had an average of 3.16 children (compared with 3.21 in the region of origin), while Mataró as a whole had an average of 1.8 children per family (336). Alonso Kinojal, in a study of Poblado Dirigido de Orcasitas in Madrid, found families where the father was a native of Extremadura having an average of 2.3 children, Andalucía 2.0 children and New Castile 1.9 children, compared with an average of 1.7 children for Madrid as a whole (337). These statistics seem to confirm the adaptation rather than the integration of rural-to-urban migrants to urban life-styles, as well as emphasizing the economic worth of children in the "shared poverty system" (338).

(g) Mixed marriages

One of the least objectionable indices of assimilation is the number of mixed marriages. In Madrid, as the percentage of madrileños within the total population of the city fell so did the percentage of marriages where both partners were native-born - from 22.11% of the total in 1967 to 19.99% in 1971. A corresponding increase occurred in the percentage of

marriages where both partners were non-madrileños - from 41.60% of the total marriages contracted in 1967 to 43.22% in 1971. The increase in mixed marriages over the period rose from 36.29% of the total in 1967 to 37.79% in 1971, the percentage increase being less than the increase of marriages between non-madrileños and less than the decrease of marriages between madrileños (339). In Barcelona, the percentage of marriages between natives of the city of Barcelona fell from 34.73% in 1962 to 26.89% in 1968, the number of marriages where neither partner was born in the city increasing from 33.11% to 44.73% over the same period (340). Significantly, as was the case with Madrid, the percentage of mixed marriages during the period increased less than the increase of marriages between non-natives and less than the decrease of marriages between Barcelona-born residents of the city. These findings confirm our conclusions that by and large natives and migrants live separate lives in two mutually hostile and suspicious worlds. It is futile, therefore, to look further for integrating factors which assimilate the migrant into the host community.

## II. ASSIMILATION INTO THE HOST SOCIETY - A "SUBURBAN" VIEW

Most Spaniards (that I have come across) will never admit that they are wrong. It is yet another aspect of the todo o nada attitude which traditionally has bedevilled Spanish political life. No migrant is going to lose face by returning in abject poverty to his village because this act would be a public admission of his failure. Bad enough to return in triumph from America after a life-time's exile and be scornfully labelled an indiano! It is my belief that few migrants in the chabolas and barracas of Madrid and Barcelona are going to admit that he or she is unhappier there than in the native village, for that too would be a loss of face. Still fewer, I venture to suggest, would go back to where they came from. The rural areas are "slums of despair" the suburbios are "slums of hope".

Olza Zubiri, in a study of rural psychology in Navarra, found that agriculturalists had relegated the desire not to work in agriculture to their subconscious, and, by so doing, had been able to accept the traditional way of life without any major criticism. Their sublimated desires, however, were transferred to their children, in that they expressed strong views that their children should not follow them into an agricultural occupation where the future was dark and dispondent (1). It is my belief that in a similar way chabola- and barraca-dwellers have relegated to their subconscious the desire to return to their native villages. They see little prospect of social advancement for themselves but they are prepared to put up with things for the sake of the children - and history has proved them right. Migration may, in Amando de Miguel's opinion, lead to impoverishment, unemployment and delinquency, but it prepares for upward social mobility in the second or third generation (2). There may be a long-term aspect to Todaro's "expected income" rural-to-urban migration model that is buried deep in the subconscious of the average migrant (3).

It is virtually impossible, therefore, to discuss migrant adjustment objectively by comparing migrants' current situation to that prior to migration. Rather is it a matter of subjective assessment of migrants'



hopes and fears, concealed lies and half-truths.

There is undisputed evidence, as we have shown, of major rural-urban economic differentials. Moreover, the quality of life even in the chabola- and barraca-zones of the suburbio is better than in the countryside. The lack of work, the hunger and cold, the hardness of physical work, the boredom, the lack of protection against sickness, accident and ill health, the limited future prospects in the countryside - all these negative factors make the quality of life better in the suburbio. Above all there is hope for the future in the suburbio - if not for themselves then for their children. Diet is probably worse than in the countryside; services in the suburbio probably no better; overcrowding (with its associated effect on health, mental health and social behaviour) not necessarily worse - for few take kindly to living in the fish-bowl conditions of the enclosed village community where one's every action is open to comment, criticism and abuse. But incomes are generally higher than in the countryside - and, where they are not, the disreputable poor group together in shared barracas, chabolas and in realquilados to mitigate against the worst effects of individual poverty - enabling them to partake of some of the benefits of the consumer revolution in a primitive form of "enbourgeoisement" (4). It matters little if the quality of life in the suburbio is higher or not, as long as the recent migrant believes it to be so; the possession of consumer durables (which he could not afford in the village) going a long way to prove to him that it is higher. I know of no sample survey where the majority of recent migrants questioned consider conditions to be worse in the shanty towns than where they came from. Mangin (reviewing Latin American squatter settlements) writes, "at least one source from every country surveyed stated that the squatters were more satisfied with their housing and economic situation than with that they had had in the rural areas, small towns and in the central city" (5). Flinn, for example, in a survey

of the Barrio El Carmen (a shanty town on the outskirts of Bogotá, Colombia) found that the vast majority of peripheral slum-dwellers in the barrio considered the quality of life to be better than in their previous rural residence. They considered income, housing, sanitation facilities, health services, and educational opportunities for their children to be better and few expressed any desire to return to their region of origin (6). These findings were confirmed in an Asociación Colombina de Facultades de Medicina survey of the squatter settlements of Juan XXIII and Policarpa (Bogotá). Eighty-seven per cent of heads of household interviewed thought that living standards were better than where they had come from and only 2.6% worse (7). Likewise, Browning and Feindt found that 92% of their sample interviewed in Monterrey (Mexico) were satisfied with the move and only 3% unsatisfied (8). Nor are these findings unique to Latin America. An International Development Research Centre study of rural-to-urban migration in a number of developing countries, found that 95.4% of migrants questioned in Kuala Lumpur were satisfied with their new life (the average for seven separate studies being 85%) (9).

Few migrants give education as a motive for migrating - in seven Latin American studies, for example, the average was 4% (10) - yet the availability of educational and health facilities within the large towns is an important secondary motive (11). Wilkening and Elizaga did find, however, that rural-to-urban migrants gave education as a motive for migration more frequently than urban-to-urban ones (12). Urban poverty is a less heavy cross to bear than its rural counterpart because there is a better chance of upward social mobility - especially for the children. In the International Development Research Centre study, 88.9% of migrant parents interviewed in Istanbul thought that prospects for their children were better than in their region of origin (13). Survey after survey confirms the basic optimism of migrants. Cornelius found migrants in Mexico completely obliv-

ious "to structural obstacles to vertical mobility", 87% confidently expecting to improve their status (14). Mangin found the slum-dwellers of the shanty towns of Blas and Carmen in Lima (Peru) with quite unrealistic aspirations for their children, sacrificing everything for their education in the hope that they would become doctors, teachers etc. (15). Similar findings were made by Bonilla among the favela-dwellers of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) (16).

The pieces of the suburban jig-saw puzzle are beginning to fall into shape:

- 1) The inhabitants of the suburbio claim to be happier than where they were before. Few will admit to wanting to return to their village of origin. Most would make the same move again if they had to. An average of 95.44% of migrants questioned in Sant Genís dels Agudells said they liked to live in Barcelona. Eighty per cent of the remaining ~~under~~ wished to return to their region of origin (40% for family reasons and 50% just because it was su tierra) (17). A Círitas survey of the chabola-dwellers of Madrid in 1961, found 55.6% of those interviewed wishing to remain in the same barrio, 12.9% wishing to move to a similar barrio and 22.8% indifferent. The 8.7% who did not answer the question presumably were the ones who wished to return to their region of origin or to migrate elsewhere (18).
- 2) One reason why migrants declare themselves to be happy in their new place of residence is that they have chosen a destination as closely related as possible in social organization to their place of origin (19). The social integration of the chabola- and barriada-zones is relatively high. Although 83% in one survey would like to exchange their present dwelling for a better one if the opportunity arose, 45.4% would like to live near their present neighbours (20). Harvey has suggested that low-income groups identify very closely

with their environment so that the psychological costs of moving are greater for them than the more mobile middle class (21).

Propinquity is all-important in working-class social relationships although not as important as kinship. Loss of kinship can even cause return movements in certain instances (22). Forty-seven per cent of the chabola housewives interviewed by Fundación FOESSA in 1969 had brothers or sisters living in the same barrio, while 31% had their parents living there (23).

- 3) Rural-to-urban migrants are able to put up with hardship within the suburbio, not only because of objective social and economic improvements in their way of life compared with the former milieu, but also because of their basic optimism. Unlike Dick Whittington they did not migrate believing that the city streets were paved of gold - although 28% of people living in rural areas in 1966 did think that luck was the most important quality for success in life (compared with 23% in urban and 19% in metropolitan areas). Rather interestingly, people in strong out-migrant region like Extremadura-Andalucía, the South-East and Galicia, expressed the strongest belief in luck with 40%, 31% and 27% respectively (24). To some extent out-migration becomes a game of chance from these regions - one only has to consider the Gallego who emigrated to America in order to make his fortune. This particularist attitude towards life has another aspect also. Perhaps conditions in the shanty towns are not too good. Perhaps the migrant only has a casual job in the building trade, but perhaps his luck will change. Personal connections, bribery and recomendaciones are open to all in theory (25) - all that is needed is a little luck. One cannot underestimate this factor in the life of the poor. Consider, for example, the great importance given to the lotería in Spain especially el gordo and el niño at Christmas-time.

- 4) Migrants set great store by the future of their children. Careful questioning by Fundación FOESSA of unqualified workers' wives in the province of Madrid, revealed a 33% "frustration gap" between the percentage of sons who they would like to study "beyond primary level" and those that they expected to. The "frustration gap" in the upper and upper middle class stood at only 1%, increasing to 10% in the middle class, 27% in the working class and widening to an enormous 47% in the poor class (26).
- 5) Migrants absorb some of the values and norms of the host society especially those associated with the norms, values and deprivation of a consumer society (27). The possession of consumer durables is of great psychological importance to them - it was one of the reasons why they migrated in the first place - for they are then able to prove to themselves and to demonstrate to family and friends in the pueblo, that they are "successful" and that the decision to migrate was a correct one. Angels Pascual found a fair proportion of the returnees from West Germany who he interviewed in Barcelona, considered the international experience worthwhile because it had enabled them to accumulate consumer durables (28). Migrants set great prestige value in the possession of a T.V. receiver. Fundación FOESSA found that only 61% of those who had lived within their present municipio for less than one year possessed a T.V. set, but for those who had lived there for more than one year 85% possessed a receiver (a higher percentage than those who had lived in the municipio for more than twenty-five years, or who were natives of the municipio). Even 26% of the poor families of the province (who earned less than 2,500 pesetas monthly had a T.V. set) (29). The chabolas and barracas of Madrid and Barcelona sprout their T.V. aerials like any other middle- or working-class area, visibly dam-

onstrating to the outside world that they are slurs of hope rather than of despair. In the words of Higuera Amal, the possession of a T.V. set is to the migrant "an external sign of social consideration" (30). An estimated 60% of Madrid's chabolas in 1969 possessed television receivers, which compares favourably with the 57% of provincial unskilled workers who possessed T.V. in their homes in 1968 (31).

Yet there are some pieces of the jig-saw puzzle missing, perhaps because the chabola- and barraca-dwellers never want us to complete the full picture. Hermet found that 39% of the migrants he interviewed in a Bilbao factory would not return to their own region, but 27% would do so if a similar firm was established there (32). Clearly there is nothing disreputable returning to one's home region endowed with the social prestige of being a factory worker.

Many migrants choose to spend a season abroad or, more recently, in the Spanish tourist resorts rather than make the definitive act of migration. This way they get the best of both worlds. They do not risk failure. They can live in their loved home environment and, at the same time, live off the money they made during the season. This used to be especially true for older, married (more conservative) migrants from Andalucía, although recently the young of both sexes have been attracted to the tourist resorts as an escape from the social pressures of village society. Nor is this movement confined to Andalucía.

Migrants reveal their dissatisfaction in other ways. Sixty-one per cent of workers earning less than 5,000 pesetas monthly and 59% of unskilled workers revealed that they were unsatisfied with what they earned in 1966 (33). Had migrants in the chabola-zone of Madrid (who sometimes earned half this sum) been questioned, their answer would have been most revealing.

Ninety-four per cent of the chabola housewives interviewed in Madrid thought that they would be living in the same place during the next twelve months, only 21% thought that they would be moving in search of better accommodation (34). When Rossi's "complaints index" is applied (35), however, 83% of families in the chabola-zones reveal themselves to be potential movers (36). Mobility rates within such zones are very high. Mobility is a response to environmental stress and the concealed dissatisfaction of the migrant. For those with no family and other ties there is a constant to and fro movement between the village and the big city. For those with family ties who have sold all their possessions in the village, there is a greater likelihood that the family will move on to some other suburbio, or to some other town or city in search of that which eludes them. For a few there is the unenviable return to the native village. Havens and Usandizaga found that only 17.75% of people interviewed in three barrios in Baranquilla (Colombia) had not lived previously in other parts of the city, 55.03% having made at least two moves (37). Similarly, only 14.18% of the non-native population of the chabolas of Madrid in 1967 had come direct from their native village, 14.80% had come from some other part of the capital, the remaining 51.25% having moved up the urban hierarchy to Madrid (38). Nine per cent of the chabola population of Madrid in 1969 had lived less than a year in the barrio and a further 27% between one and four years (39). Such evidence as exists suggests that the number of chabolas in the city did not change substantially between 1961 and 1973, nor the chabola population in absolute terms. This taken in association with the high mobility rates suggests, that the chabolas perform an important function as "stations" along migrant "time-space paths" (40). It has been suggested that residential segregation takes place in towns and cities of the developed world along three dimensions - socio-economic status, family status and migrant status. Migrants can only live where their socio-economic status allows them which, in the case of chabola-dwellers, means

the shanty-town zones. Much of the movement of population within the chabola -zones is undoubtedly related to changes in the life-cycle, or the possibility of making a profit on the sale (or renting) of a chabola (41). A maximum of two moves within the migrant's lifetime can, however, be explained in terms of limited upward social mobility - firstly from the rural environment to some urban area (including at least one physical move up the urban hierarchy to Madrid or Barcelona), and secondly from the chabola to some inferior, high-rise block (42).

In so far as it is possible to measure migrant adjustment objectively, our Urban Questionnaire - Personal provided some useful results.

In terms of economic adjustment, only 11% had improved their situation by obtaining permanent employment in the city after being casually employed in the countryside (Q. 10 and 15). Migrants' economic situation was a little better in Barcelona than in Madrid (13% having obtained permanent employment as against 9%). Twenty-two per cent declared themselves to be unemployed in the countryside for at least an average of three months prior to migration (Q.11), so perhaps some gain was made here even in casual employment. Thirty-seven per cent of the male migrants interviewed in Madrid were employed in the construction industry and most of the remainder were employed in service jobs of one type or another (Q.14). Only 2% were unemployed (although many of the unemployed may have returned to their villages on holiday or to help in the harvests in August 1972 when the survey was undertaken), and a mere 5% were employed in manufacturing industries (mainly in unskilled jobs). In Barcelona, the percentage employed in construction was lower (17%) and that in manufacturing industry much higher (51%).

For those prepared to declare what their total family income was before and after migration, it would appear that the average migrant family was 43% better-off. This was moreso in Barcelona and especially for migrants



from Andalucía (Q.43 and 44), although the calculation could only really be applied to the 10% or so of our total sample who had migrated in the previous twelve months.

Of nine possible consumer durables listed in the questionnaire (Q.47), migrants possessed an average of three or four in the pueblo and five or six in the ciudad. This would imply that migrants were 50-66% better-off in terms of "acquired material wealth", broadly confirming our findings in Tables XLI and XLIV. Migrants in Barcelona appeared to have gained most by the migration experience, but perhaps this was partly due to the fact that there were more migrants from Andalucía in the Barcelona sample (34%) than in the Madrid one (12%).

Twenty-five per cent of the accommodation investigated in Madrid and 31% in Barcelona was shared by two or more families, the average being 1.2 families per dwelling in the former and 1.3% in the latter. Chabolas in Madrid were more crowded than barracas in Barcelona, with an average of 2.6 persons per room in the former and 2.4 in the latter (Q.50-52). Approximately 20% of both samples were selected from chabola- and barraca-dwellers (Q.49). Most of these dwellings only had electricity, but the other dwellings in our sample were usually of relatively recent construction and invariably had all main services (Q.53).

As far as sociological adjustment is concerned, eighty-seven per cent in Barcelona and eighty-three per cent in Madrid had not changed their favourable impression of city-life (Q.63 and 64). More than three-quarters said that they liked the natives of Barcelona and Madrid (Q.57), but were more reluctant to voice an opinion as to what natives of those two cities thought of them (Q.58). Eighty-seven per cent of those questioned in Madrid and 93% in Barcelona had friends from their own region or province (Q.59), and only 21% in Madrid and 26% in Barcelona would like their children to marry a native of those two cities (Q.60). The vast majority

of our sample in Barcelona said that they did not speak catalán and only 7% claimed to understand it (Q.61).

We found that 55% of our sample in Madrid and 59% in Barcelona had relatives living in the city (Q.25 and 26). This in part explained the overall happiness of migrants. Sixty-nine per cent of our total sample claimed to be contented with their present jobs (Q.38). Only 11% thought it possible to obtain a better job for themselves in Barcelona and 17% in Madrid (Q.39).

Dissatisfaction with the new environment could only be measured by indirect means. Only 8% in Madrid and 5% in Barcelona thought to migrate again (Q.31). Very few (mainly older people) thought to return to the pueblo (Q.34). Migrants to Barcelona had had an average of four different jobs since arrival and those to Madrid an average of six (Q.37). Frequent job changes were accompanied by high rates of geographical mobility as part of the continuing saga of migrant search behaviour.

### III. THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE

There are some parallels between the role of migration in social change and the work of running water as an agent moulding the landscape. There is the erosive effect of migration on traditional rural society. There is the depositional effect of migrants and migrant sub-cultures in modifying and ruralizing modern urban society. There is the feedback transportation effect of migrants returning to the home region on holiday - their visible example as innovators aiding the active urbanization of the countryside. It is no longer possible - not even in Spain - to speak of "urbanism" or "ruralism" as we did in the past, for neither is a matter of place or of location. Rather, as Gwyn Jones has pointed out, are they to be considered as "ways of thinking and behaviour... extremities of a series of continua, over which a collection of socio-psychological, sociological, demographic, economic and political traits gradually change" (1).

Anti-urban theorists would argue that the role of migration in social change is a negative one, given the marginality of migrant groups to the host society, given the social disorganization of the suburbio, given the increase in crime, delinquency, marriage breakdown and other manifestations of social maladjustment.

There can be little doubt that social change does lag behind economic change. Economic growth has tended to intensify the structural dualism which characterized developing countries, depriving large sections of the population of an equitable share of what the 1970 Report on the World Social Situation calls "the material fruits of progress" (2). Structural dualism characterized the English economy in 1815 (3). It no longer does. We would agree with Giner that rural exodus and the trend towards increasing urbanization and modernization are "definitely putting Spanish society on the way to achieving a stratificational system comparable to the classical North-West European pattern" (4). In Part Four of this thesis, we attempted to show through the use of an objective "index of acquired material wealth" that it was possible to produce a national (as opposed to a duo-

national) occupational stratification structure which demonstrated that the vast majority of the jornalero migrant class achieved their immediate aim of limited upward occupational social mobility by progressing to the rank of unskilled industrial worker (5).

All geographical changes are accompanied by social and psychological changes, although it is our belief that "geo-psychological" changes occur in the countryside thanks to "psychic mobility" and the ability of many individuals to transpose themselves to an urban environment. Many of the subsequent moves are social in nature - the desire to escape from a strict, traditional social environment. De Miguel, in an analysis of the attitude of Spanish rural youth, found that many wished to leave their native villages even when they liked everything about them. He concluded that it was the desire for social ascension - which could not be fulfilled in the village - which drove them to leave (6). Acculturation (if not assimilation) begins in the countryside through the desire for upward social mobility, which often expresses itself through the norms and values of relative deprivation associated with the consumer society. The migrant hopes to show by outward signs such as the purchasing of consumer durables (which lie beyond his reach in the countryside) where his place in the social scale lies.

Economic changes can only occur when the social conditions are favourable (7). The desire for change became very strong after the end of the Civil War, nor was desire for change entirely associated with political changes at the top. There was a strong desire for change at grass roots level, the growing awareness of the rural proletariat - their desire for education, increasing literacy and access to the mass media, being partly the result of the temporary movements of population which occurred during the conflagration. The concept of the "city as a centre of change" (3) has dominated western thought. According to this theory, economic and

social changes spread outwards from these "communication centres and storehouses of information" (9) like ripples on a pond. This is all very well, but one is tempted to ask the question: "Who threw a stone into the pond in the first place?" Granted that many of the rural populous visited a town for the first time as a result of the War, but can it honestly be said that the War was the result only of dissent between fractious urban groups? Rather was it a conflict between "las dos Españas" (10).

The role of migration in social change in the countryside is in many respects revolutionary. The traditional economic system has visibly disintegrated since 1950, previously isolated rural communities fast losing their structure from that date. This has been especially true where rural depopulation has been most rapid - the erosive effect being not only confined to population. Integration of urban and rural economies stimulates the growth of cash-crop farming and encourages greater efficiency and higher productivity in agriculture, but it also increases conflict within the rural community between "traditionalists" and "moderns" - closer contact with the outside world raising the felt cash needs of the latter. Given the all-embracing role of kinship within rural communities, conflict resides not only in the market-place but also in the hearths and homes and even in the hearts and minds of men. Migration is often the solution of the modern, more outward-looking younger generation to stresses imposed through inability to conform to the traditional economic and social codes of conduct. The Church and the land-owning classes too have lost much of their former authority. This is especially true of the latter within the latifundio zones. The rapid disappearance of under-employment has eroded the traditional hold of the señorito class over braceros. Labour is so scarce (especially at harvest time) that braceros have been able to use their new political power to strike for higher wages or to emigrate, and there are those flush with money after a season in France who are prepared to do neither.

Migration is correcting the structural defects in Spanish agriculture, it is lowering the cost of land, it is enabling the consolidation of uneconomic plots, the mechanization of large estates, the removal of seasonal unemployment, the reduction of rural population densities and the raising of per capita incomes. Yet not all of its effects are beneficial. Land is often not farmed as intensively as previously, "social fallow" is increasing, land is abandoned. The migration of the young, innovating class is a permanent loss. The agricultural labour force is a visibly aging, demoralized fatalistic one. Family and inter-community conflicts are distressing.

The role of migration in social change in the urban areas is much more controversial and much less obvious. At greatest dispute is the function of migration in changing the character of the urban core-culture itself. To some the city is a "catalyst of change" (11); to others it is being attacked by the malignant "cancer" of migrant hordes who are rapidly "ruralizing" its institutions, its attitudes and its behaviour patterns.

There can be little doubt that cities like Madrid and Barcelona have been engulfed by migrant waves. Natives are now in the minority. It matters little that 55.28% of Madrid's in-migrants in 1971 came from an urban municipio (12), movement up the urban hierarchy being achieved in most instances with minimum assimilation to urban values, norms and behaviour patterns. Within Madrid and Barcelona, we have shown, the two communities live a separate existence, city authorities no doubt anxious to keep some physical as well as social distance between marginal chabolas and barrios groups and the city proper to prevent the cancer from spreading. Cancer kills. There is no evidence of any city anywhere - not even Calcutta - having been "destroyed" by migrant hordes. Why should they wish to destroy a life-style which they consider to be superior to their own? Psychologically as well as economically it is the urban core-culture which is dominant. The distinctive, small, homogeneous (although no longer self-

sufficient) "little communities" described by Redfield have been transposed to the suburbio. Here distinct migrant sub-cultures have developed with rural institutions, values and behaviour patterns being adapted to the specific requirements of the urban milieu. Full assimilation does not occur until the second or the third generation, and then as a result of education rather than of time. It is during the assimilation process that some degree of ruralization is bound to occur, not before it when the two societies are socially distinct and separate. In the sense that the majority of native Madrileños are themselves the sons and daughters of migrants, and in the sense that we inherit many of our values and behaviour patterns from our parents, the urban core-culture is already ruralized in many subtle ways. This is so in other major Spanish cities, and I suspect that it is true throughout the developing world. A number of examples will suffice to prove my point. I know of Madrileños born and bred who a few days before Christmas will buy a live chicken in the plaza, feed and fatten it up themselves in their flat, before killing it and preparing it for the festive feast. Many of the older generation still prefer to use washboards for doing the laundry. They claim that they get a better result than with a washing-machine. Go into a Madrileño's home when the family are sitting at table and someone will ask you:

"¿Gusta Vd?"

to which you politely reply

"¡Qué aproveche!"

Similarly, at a bull-fight you may be offered a swig of wine from a botín by a complete stranger. If you are invited to a meal it is considered bad manners to refuse a second helping, and an unforgivable sin to leave something on the plate untouched. Is this not a carry-over from the rural "culture of poverty" when food was too precious to be wasted? Again you will not go far in Spanish urban society without enchufes and recomendacio-

nes. Personal face-to-face contacts are all important. There are examples also of present-day ruralization of modes of behaviour. In the villages where everyone knows everyone else it is customary to use the familiar form of address tú rather than the more formal Vd. In Madrid, such has been the influx of migrants that the younger generation now use the informal tú to address all and sundry - even teachers and older people to whom in the past they would have shown more formal respect.

Surely social change is to be welcomed. Out-migration from the countryside has done more to correct structural defects in agriculture than centuries of planned reform. Out-migration has gone some way to reduce social tensions in the countryside, emigration becoming a substitution for "agitation" and revolution. In the words of Mangin "migration to cities has been the most successful adaptation for peasants under pressure" (13). In-migration also prevents the fossilization of urban occupational structures. Geographical and social mobility are inseparably linked in that migrants not only achieve limited upward social mobility for themselves, but by taking the lower status positions, enable the natives themselves to move up in the occupational structure. Migrants have been welcomed by industrialists in both Barcelona and Bilbao (despite fears of cultural contamination) because of the economic value of cheap labour (14). Unfortunately, the inability of cities to provide sufficient housing and sufficient jobs in the modern sectors of the economy, forces the recent migrant to resort to desperate but resourceful measures in self-help housing and self-employment. It is claimed that the marginal productivity of migrants in marginal service jobs is then zero or negligible, that in-migration in the short term reduces the per capita income of receiving regions, that migration results in inflation and puts a severe strain on housing and public services. Certainly it is only now that the main in-migrant regions are having to come to terms with the social consequences



of economic dependence on cheap migrant labour. In view of the inability of cities to provide the housing, public services and employment opportunities at the rate desired, the "do-it-yourself urbanization" (15) of the chabola- and barraca-dwellers is to be encouraged not denigrated. "I have never come across a home-building family in barriadas...", writes Turner, "that was not building for their children and that did not also hope and expect their children to achieve a higher social status" (16). They are investing not only in their own future and that of their children but in that of the urban community as a whole.

#### IV. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

The "core" and "periphery" characteristics of "dual-spatial economies" (1), are reproduced on a small-scale within the major cities of Spain. Rural poverty, isolated and dispersed in the countryside, has been exported to the cities through the transmitting medium of migration, where it is much more conspicuous and much more concentrated a problem. Traditionally, social tensions in Old Castile-León and other minifundio zones had been relieved through the mechanism of the migration of the young and the dispossessed. In more recent decades social tensions have been relieved in the latifundio zones of New Castile-Extremadura-Andalucía by the migration of landless labourers in countless thousands. Where the situation differs from the past is in the scale of migration - the export of social tensions to the cities being massive in proportion. The syndrome of poverty - the unemployment and underemployment, the overcrowding, the low incomes - is now centred in low socio-economic status areas mainly inhabited by migrants. Low wages and lack of skills allied with poor housing conditions, give rise to great mobility, not only between rural and urban areas, but from in-migrant zone to in-migrant zone, and from one barrio to another within an in-migrant zone. For how long mobility of this kind (including emigration to Continental Europe) will succeed in minimizing the worst effects of social tension, time alone will tell. Geographical mobility on its own, which is not linked to definite upward social mobility, will not suffice.

The empirical evidence which exists from other countries of the world tends to reject the myth of migrant disruption. Migrants have no strong involvement with riots or extreme political parties (2). Their "strong present-time orientation" (3), their concern with the problems of the immediate future, gives them little time for revolution. They are characterized by resignation and fatalism; their anger is turned inwards on themselves (4). The sense of satisfaction that they get from their kith and kin, the hope that they have building for the future of their children, serve to outweigh their frustrations and their anger. Migrants do not

belong to trades-unions or actively support political parties. Cornelius found that only 2% of the recent migrants he interviewed, and 8% of those who had been in Mexico City more than twenty years, were members of political organizations (5). Bonilla found that nearly half of the favelados he interviewed in Rio de Janeiro could see no political benefit to be gained by political activity (6). "A discontented urban proletariat", Mountjoy has pointed out, "can become a far more effective force for change than ten times its number of dissatisfied farmers" (7). Sewell in Turkey (8), and Turner amongst the Peruvian barriada-dwellers and the Venezuelan rancho inhabitants (9), found that migrant communities adopted conservative attitudes towards their governments - tinged no doubt with a certain degree of cynicism. Turner hypothesizes that the political attitudes of migrants fall into two categories - the "bridgeheaders" who are concerned only with personal problems of the immediate future, and the "consolidators" who participate in politics but in a conservative way (10). The latter are presumably not recent arrivals.

There can be little doubt, as Nelson has shown (11), that urban workers' aspirations for better jobs, housing and upward social mobility, increase with length of urban residence - the migrants absorbing some of the norms, values and behaviour patterns of the host society especially feelings of relative deprivation associated with a consumer society. There is a genuine fear throughout the Third World, that the political apathy and cynicism of first generation migrants, will turn to violence and political unrest amongst unemployed and underemployed second generation migrants, who feel their natural desires for upward social mobility and social justice to be thwarted (12). Exposure to the modern mass media carrying their world-wide message of affluent materialism in the West on the one hand, increasing education and awareness on the other hand, are factors which can only put more pressure on governments for even more

rapid economic and social change (13). Economic development by itself does not lead to political stability. Frey found that while the Italian "economic miracle" had reduced the worst aspects of underdevelopment in the South, rural poverty was merely exported to the towns. Urban poverty became a serious problem in the rapidly industrializing North (14). The massive Communist vote in the recent (1976) Italian General Election is an ominous portent for the future.

Rapid modernization, economic development and social change produce many institutional contradictions and anachronisms (15). In Spain, a new class conflict has developed between a socio-economic and political élite (whose achievements were based on individual achievement and superior education) and a more traditional group (whose socio-economic strength lay in kin-group relations and whose political power was based on personal patronage and patriotism). In political circles this conflict crystallized in the struggle between the technocrats of the Opus Dei movement and the more traditional military and "party" members. In everyday life it expresses itself in the conflict between the traditional clases medias, making ends meet by pluriempleo in administration, traditional industry and commerce, and a technically well-educated, new middle class, spearheading the drive towards the high consumption society in new modern service and industrial growth industries (16). Giner believes that the "definite establishment of a solid new middle class... is one of the pre-requisites for the reduction of violent social tensions in Spain" (17). I am not so sure. "It is not the guerrilla that is taking over Latin America", a Colombian sociologist has said, "it is the middle class" (18). Far from being the reforming, farsighted new political force that some say will neutralize the extremes of right and left the middle class are the "middle-men" the "buyers, speculators, agents and sub-agents who lower prices for the producer and raise them for the consumer". They are the bureaucrats,

"the petty tyrants who man the chaotic, swollen apparatus of State". They are "the property jobbers and slum profiteers, who feed on urban growth" (19). In Spain the situation is no different. The Civil War was basically a class war - and "three forces lost the Civil War", according to Anton Canellas, "the working class, the Basques and the Catalans" (20). Are all three forces lying in the wings waiting to wreak vengeance on their enemies, each in its own way? Time alone will tell. Given sufficient upward social mobility from manual to non-manual classes, allowing first and second generation migrants to pass from the ranks of unskilled to skilled worker, a bloodbath can yet be avoided.

Another complicating factor is emigration to Continental Europe. Out-migration from the countryside (and especially emigration to Europe) was an escape valve to reduce political and social tensions (21). There is always the fear that exposure to foreign political and religious customs will lead to return migrants coming back with liberal ideas opposed to official State and Church dogma (22). That fear must be stronger after the oil crisis which led to the expulsion of many Spanish gastarbeiter (guest workers). Aceves, however, found return emigrants in El Finar (Segovia) contributing little that was new to the economic life of the comarca (23). We can only assume that the fears of government and Church officials are groundless.

The author of this thesis has spoken to many Spanish immigrants in England. I have not found one with conservative, right-wing views of Spanish politics. One can only assume that rural-to-urban migrants especially those from the South, will have similar left-wing or anarchical views (where they have a political opinion at all). Certainly there is a curious historical link between anarchist movements in Andalucia and Barcelona (24), Andalusian migrants taking their "anarchistic chialas" with them when they migrated to Cataluña in the 1910s (25). Little is known of the political

attitudes of migrants, although Ramírez Jiménez has studied political attitudes in rural and urban areas (26). Hernet, through the ingenious use of abstentions in the municipal elections for the "family third" in 1970, has been able to show that there was a fairly close relationship between the electoral geography of February 1936 and November 1970 (27), at least at provincial level. Comparing the election of "procuradores familiares" to the Cortes in September 1971 with the election of 1936, he found that abstentions seem to indicate that the Right and Centre still dominated the same provinces, but that there were some changes in the pattern of "non-conformity" in Cataluña and both Andalucía and Extremadura. He concluded that the combined factors of out-migration and upward social mobility of more than half the rural proletariat, have had a moderating influence on radical political attitudes (28). Indirect evidence of regional differences in political attitudes comes also from a Fundación FOESSA survey in 1966. When asked who they thought had done the most for workers in recent years, the lowest percentage thinking that it was the State were recorded in the Basque region and Cataluña-Baleares (together with the Macizo Iberico). These two regions together with Extremadura-Andalucía did not hold much favour for the government-controlled sindicatos either. Basques and Catalans tended to give more weight to the efforts of the workers themselves and, in the case of the former, to the influence of the Church and industrial firms (29).

Clearly there are important regional differences in political attitudes. This is hardly surprising considering the enormous socio-economic and, in certain instances, cultural differences. Inter-generational mobility varies considerably between rich and poor provinces. Fundación FOESSA data for 1965 show that the most mobile inter-generational migration stream was that flowing out of rural occupations in the provinces with the highest per capita income; the weakest a return movement to rural occupations in

the richest provinces (30). In most instances, we have tried to show, limited upward social mobility in the life-time of an individual is related to migration. To what extent the new urban proletariat will be lulled into political inactivity to "visualize change mainly in terms of further personal material improvement and gratification" (31), time alone will tell. The "artificial integration of the working-class in capitalist society... through the disappearance of the conscience of working-class interests...", which Abad appears to deplore (32), may prove to be a blessing in disguise.

While it is generally true that little as yet is known about the impact that the new and enlarged urban proletariat will have on the political and social life of the country, two things must be borne in mind. Firstly, the Spanish temperament. The Spaniard, as de Madariaga has noted, is "above all a man of passion... his awakenings are sudden and even violent ... although in general they are quite brief and the people fall rapidly back into their apathy" (33). Secondly, it must be remembered as Brennan has pointed out, that although the peasantry (and, if it comes to that, the urban proletariat) have turned their backs on politics, "at regular intervals in the course of its history, whenever it has considered its deepest interests to be threatened, it has risen and carried everything before it" (34). The very low degree of participation of the proletariat both rural and urban in political and para-political organizations is, therefore, misleading. The revolutionary potential exists not only in regions with backward rural social structures but also in the Basque country and Cataluña, regions with immense economic but no political power (35). Whether the urban proletariat can remain aloof from such situations should they arise is doubtful. Social tensions there undoubtedly are, with strikes periodically breaking out in the most highly-industrialized provinces like Barcelona, the Basque provinces, Madrid and Oviedo; attitudes becoming more active and belligerent towards excessive State intervention in the process of collective bargaining, as is witnessed by the appearance of illegal

Comisiones Obreras in 1962 (36). Recent migrants can play an active role in reducing such tensions. They are the most mobile elements in Spanish society. Their horizontal, geographical mobility can help "dilute" regional political differences - as they did in Catalonia in the election of February 1936 (37), and as we suspect they did in that of September 1971. Their upward social mobility can become the momentum for satisfying social change, enabling the expansion of a solid lower-middle class stratum from the ranks of skilled manual workers. Many in Latin America migrate to the towns to escape from violencia (38). While there is less violence in the Spanish countryside social unrest there is. Many migrants we feel move to escape from líos and disgustos personales associated with increasing conflict within Spanish rural society. In a restricted sense they are like the "social conservatives" who left the United Kingdom for North America during the nineteenth century (39). After the world-shattering experience of the Civil War and the disorganization (40) and disorientation of traditional society which followed it, they only want to get away from it all to rebuild their lives painfully and difficultly, brick upon brick, as they do with their chabolas and barracas.

If their commendable self-help attitude to life is not severely frustrated they can be a great moderating influence in Spanish society (41). Should their natural desires for self-improvement be frustrated, should a second generation grow up more Catalan than the Catalan, should the majority think:

"A mí me da lo mismo ser una cosa que otra... pero lo que no puedo soportar es el que se hable mal de Barcelona" (42)

then perhaps all will be lost.



## PART SIX

### CONCLUSIONS

Some description of the geometry of spatial form - despite its subjective shortcomings - must continue to form an integral part of the language of geography. Geographical description continues to be a necessary prerequisite in any attempt to explain or understand spatial variations in the geometry of aggregate human behaviour.

Three internal migration phases were recognized in the evolving pattern of the Spanish modernization process, each of which was associated with important social, economic and political changes. A broad correlation existed between improvements in technology, the diffusion of information and the migration of people. The first phase was characterized by urbanization and mainly by local migration. Industrialization became a further characteristic of the second phase, when migration became more regional in character. Polarization became an additional feature of immigration during the third phase, when out-migration became national in character. The flames of massive out-migration, concentrated in Old Castile-León during the second phase, spread southwards during the third to reduce to ashes a block of seventeen contiguous provinces some of which now lay in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura.

The switch from indirect to direct methods of measuring internal migration in 1961 led to initial difficulties of interpretation. Our eventual conclusions were:

- 1) The under-estimation of net internal migration by García Barbancho for the 1961-1965 period was comparable with the Instituto Nacional de Estadística's under-registration of internal migration for the same period. The errors of one method effectively cancelled out the errors of the other method; suggesting that in the recent past gross internal migration closely matched net internal migration,

labour "circulating" between points of origin and destination with a minimum of recorded moves being made. Employing 1970 Census statistics (which were subsequently published), it was shown that I.N.E.'s directly-recorded data under-estimated internal migration for the 1961-1970 period by at least 32.05% (1).

- 2) Despite the existence of a "statistically suspect Spain" in the western two-thirds of the country where migration statistics were most inaccurate, careful manipulation of net and gross figures at provincial level proved that patterns of in- and out-migration produced by seemingly incompatible methods were comparable.
- 3) The delimiting of "effective migration fields" for each of the sixteen net in-migrant provinces for the 1961-1965 period provided useful information on the evolution of such fields. Newer net in-migrant provinces had weaker, geographically more restricted and even discontinuous fields when compared with older ones within the same region.
- 4) The peninsula was subdivided into northern and southern halves characterized by short and long distance migration respectively.
- 5) Efficiency of stream and counterstream was much higher for Madrid than Barcelona. Proportionally less migrants returned from Barcelona than Madrid. This would suggest that migrants had more difficulty in "fitting in" in the case of Madrid and were more likely to move on to other in-migrant centres - hence the greater under-registration of migrants than in Barcelona.
- 6) There was some evidence of a stage-by-stage movement of population (even within net out-migrant provinces) and a general "shuffling up the urban hierarchy".

Following Germani, we believe migration decision-making to be a three stage process. The interpretation of the geographical patterns recognized had to be conducted, therefore, at national, regional and individual levels,

taking account of the importance of socio-economic, normative and psycho-social factors involved. Our main conclusions were:

- 1) While socio-economic factors were the most important ones involved, we felt that they became progressively less important as one progressed from national to "macro- and micro-regional" levels, from global to sectorial variables. This was partly due to the inadequacy of official statistics, although we felt that normative and psycho-social factors became increasingly more important as the scale of analysis decreased.
- 2) Social factors were often more important in the traditional massive out-migration region of Old Castile-León; economic "push" factors in the new massive out-migration region of Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura.
- 3) As far as socio-economic "push" factors are concerned, the causal connection between latifundismo-monoculture-casual labour-seasonal unemployment and migration was not proven - for adequate statistics did not exist to prove it - but at least the link between migration and agricultural unemployment was substantiated. The causal connection between minifundismo and internal migration was not convincingly demonstrated. In a complex situation in which a feedback mechanism operated, mechanization was probably the effect not the cause of the migration of casual day-labourers, although it helped cause the migration of small proprietors and their families. The importance of demographic and climatic "push" factors were acknowledged; the influence of political "push" factors more guardedly so.
- 4) The "pull" of industrialization appeared to be about 10% stronger than that of urbanization in present-day Spain, with a similar differential being maintained between urbanization and tertiarization. "Acquired material wealth" be it in consumer durables or

income, revealed itself to be a "pull" factor of even greater force than these three. The importance of political and communications "pull" factors were acknowledged. While there was a strong statistical correlation at national level between the absolute annual number of internal migrants (1962-1971) and the annual percentage increase in the number of T.V. sets licensed per thousand population during the same period (2), the compulsive "pull" of television paled to insignificance when compared with the more direct "pull" of friends and relatives.

- 5) In- and out-migration movements of population at a macro-scale were mirrored in miniature within the confines of each individual province or in-migrant region. "Push" and "pull" factors were experienced even at this micro-scale of analysis. In the province of Madrid, there was an inverse relationship between altitude and population growth (except where tourism had been developed in the Sierra Turística)(3). Distance from the provincial capital was another important "push" differential. Good communications and opportunities for non-agricultural employment were major "pull factors".
- 6) Urban-to-urban migration was mainly of unskilled workers - migration for them being at least a two-stage movement from rural birthplace. Desarrollismo was, however, beginning to break down the traditional barriers to geographical mobility of the inter-regional type for middle class, urban-to-urban migrants, as well as leading to an increase in this type of migration.
- 7) Enduring poverty did not promote massive out-migration; rather it was a prolonged period of economic and social development followed by a short period of sharp reversal when rising expectations were likely to be frustrated which set population in motion. "Push-pull" factors thus worked in unison. A built-in factor within the mechanism of the Spanish economic system made such sharp reversals frequent

occurrences - namely "climatic accidents". "Relative deprivation" was, however, related to econo-legislative as well as climatic factors.

- 8) An analysis of one hundred and seventy-five variables tested against internal migration at the national level showed that the relationship of "push" to "pull" was 62.16%. This was approximately the same as that between the average income in the agricultural sector as a percentage of the per capita income of the total active population, demonstrating that "pull" was more important than "push". "Pull" factors proved to be twice as strong as "push" factors as motives for migration in our Rural Questionnaire - Personal.
- 9) Around 1950 a general change in mentality had occurred in many homogeneous and previously self-sufficient rural communities especially in Andalusia-New Castile-Extremadura. The breakdown of rural isolation, bringing agricultural regions more effectively within the economic and social spheres of influence of urban areas and sharpening the awareness and desires of country people was a decisive influence for change in group attitudes at the normative level. The mechanism of social change whereby the traditional order was transformed and replaced by the "climate of mobility" was sudden (sometimes revolutionary). Traditional norms were put in flux by sudden upward changes in the standard of living. The Civil War provided the sudden external impetus so necessary to make countless peasants aware of their "relative deprivation" in relation to new "comparative reference groups" with whom they had come into contact. Dissatisfaction then acted as a stimulus to search behaviour. The catalyst which prompted the decision to migrate arose, therefore, from stress caused by discordance between an individual's needs and aspirations and the environment in which he lived reaching a critical point. Our Rural Questionnaire - Personal revealed that many

potential migrants were conscious of the difference in attitude between "traditionals" and "moderns", old and young; although even those who opposed it considered migration to be inevitable.

- 10) Disintegration at the community level during the stage of "economic take-off" was associated with family crises and quarrels as different members took up opposing attitudes. Psychological stress was suffered by the individual as he wrestled with his own conscience. He became aggressive and violent - a latent migrant in an "unstable state of equilibrium". Few potential migrants in our Rural Questionnaire - Personal were prepared to talk about personal problems, although our Urban Questionnaire - Personal revealed that "trigger factors" were extremely important for those who had actually migrated. Up to 40% in Andalucía-New Castile-Extremadura gave personal reasons of one kind or another (especially family problems) as a reason for migration, compared with 26% in Old Castile-León.
- 11) There were important differences between the motives of potential and definitive migrants. More of the latter than intending migrants appeared to move for social reasons, although the opportunity for multiple choice answers meant that economic motives were still all-important.
- 12) The Rural Questionnaire - Personal justified our subdivision of regions of massive out-migration into two regional types. The Urban Questionnaire - Personal revealed important adjustment differentials between in-migrants in Madrid and Barcelona.
- 13) Geographical mobility was invariably accompanied by occupational mobility, the latter on the evidence of an objective index of "acquired material wealth" resulting in limited upward social mobility.

- 14) Employment was found to be the key to unlocking the adjustment / non-adjustment problem. Migrants were generally happier in Barcelona where there was more opportunity for employment in manufacturing, higher wages and access, therefore, to better housing. Geographical region of origin and the time factor were also important employment adjustment differentials.
- 15) Three types of marginal housing were recognized each a response to different locational factors and, to a certain extent, housing different socio-economic groups. In Madrid, there was a separation of marginal housing and employment centres. The main zones of construction now lay in the Metropolitan Area beyond the traditional chabola zones of the 1950s and 1960s. The capital in some respects, therefore, corresponded to Turner's late-transitional type of city (4).
- 16) While appreciable "familial space", social-distance gaps separated chabola- and barraca-dwellers even from the peripheral suburbio zones in which they were contained, economic discrimination was greater than social discrimination - especially in Barcelona. In housing and in social life generally there was little contact between migrant groups and the host society, as was revealed by high indices of geographical segregation and mixed-marriage statistics for Madrid and Barcelona.
- 17) Most migrants claimed to be happier than where they were before. Three factors were important. Firstly, the social integration of the shanty environment with its emphasis on family and kin ties was an important adjustment factor. Secondly, the high tolerance levels of shanty-dwellers which was due to an optimistic, "particularist" attitude to life and the hope for the real upward social mobility of their children, as opposed to their own very limited social

progress. Thirdly, the possession of consumer durables was of great psychological importance, for they were visible manifestations of material "success". Notwithstanding, the high mobility and even higher potential mobility rates of the shanty zones was an objective index of dissatisfaction with the environment - especially with housing.

- 18) The overall impression gained from our Rural and Urban Questionnaire was that social change had benefited the towns and cities at the expense of the villages. While selective out-migration was impoverishing rural areas it had gone some way to reducing social tensions in the countryside. In-migration had prevented the fossilization of urban occupational structures.
- 19) The ruralization of cities was most likely to occur during the assimilation process (which took two or three generations), not before it when the two societies were socially distinct and separate. Urban core-cultures were already ruralized from prior migrations in many subtle ways.
- 20) The socio-political consequences of the migration process are open to conjecture. There is the hope that geographical mobility will "dilute" regional political differences and that the "social conservatives" of the development process may yet save Spain from itself.

Bunge has written that it is "only by the complete rejection of uniqueness, can geography resolve its contradictions" (5). Surely it is the "where" not the "now" and the "why" of internal movements of population that is of most immediate concern to the geographer. We have demonstrated that it is the "pull" of direct personal communication which decides where the vast majority of people migrate to. The highest correlations of all with net internal migration were obtained from a modified version of Hagerstrand's feed-back model and the simple use of population density.



The use of sample surveys on their own, however sophisticated, are of limited value for the answering of the questions "how" and "why". Migration streams change as do potential migrants' perception of migration and migration-distances.

No economic model has yet been devised that can successfully predict the rate of out-migration with any great degree of accuracy. Moreover, such models are of limited use without the "where" component. As an example, net out-migration during the 1961-1970 period increased by 33.80% but net in-migration grew by 109.41%!

The use of economic regulators and political measures to curb out-migration are of limited value, therefore, given the inevitability of the process. Rather must more attention be paid to the geographical aspects of the problem and more attempts made to divert migrants to new overflow channels. The adaptation rather than assimilation of first-generation migrants, their dissatisfaction with present housing and income, their high mobility and potential mobility, the desire of at least one in three to return to their home region in certain circumstances, must be acted upon to persuade some migrants to move out from the large cities. Economic and social investment in provincial capitals, metrópolis de equilibrio, cabeceras de comarca and the like, must be paralleled by fiscal measures to persuade human capital to invest itself in those centres, for only then can there be some partial respite from chain migration in Barcelona and Madrid. Planners would do well to remember that policies are for people.