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THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ITS DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1982,

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO IRAQ

BY

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## ABSTRACT

During the past few decades the non-aligned movement has come to be recognised as the voice of the Third World in the international arena. In addition, the aim of securing the peace of the world recreates a more cohesive co-operation among the Third World countries themselves if their organisation within the movement is to be effective.

It is in the light of the above that this study seeks to present the evolution of the movement through the analysis of its commitments, and the resolutions which emanated from its major conferences.

The theoretical aspects of non-alignment and the points necessary to enable a country to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, such as socio-economic and political development, are discussed in the introduction.

In Chapter One, the history of the movement in terms of the development of its ideas and potential lines of co-ordination are presented, with particular emphasis on the international circumstances around which the movement was established. The evolution of the movement since the Bandung conference in 1955 and the development in its thinking and membership are points dealt with in Chapter Two. The changing priorities of the movement in addressing itself more closely to economic problems of its member countries and the Third World in general are discussed in Chapter Three, with particular proposals in the major areas of reform for a new international economic order. The revitalization of one of the original principles of the non-aligned movement in supporting liberation movements in Third World countries is the subject of Chapter Four. The last Chapter concentrates on the contribution of one particular country, Iraq, to the non-aligned movement.

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G.S. NAHAR



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INTRODUCTION:

THE THEORETICAL CONNECTIONS

NON-ALIGNMENT/DEVELOPMENT AND

UNDERDEVELOPMENT - AN OVERVIEW

## INTRODUCTION

### The theoretical connections : non-alignment, development and underdevelopment - an overview.

One of the main issues around which the members of the non-aligned movement have rallied is that of development. This issue, over the lifetime of the movement has featured in every one of its conferences, and gatherings, and in the literature of the movement. It was only natural to have this focus on socio-economic and political development because all members of the movement were underdeveloped and unless independence secures some form of better living, the process of independence itself cannot be secured and maintained. Therefore, development became a matter of survival for Third World countries. This was reflected in the thinking of leaders of the Third World countries and of their intellectuals. In 1956, for example, Nehru declared:

"We are not going to spend the next hundred years in arriving gradually, step by step, at the stage of development which the developed countries have reached today. Our pace and tempo of progress have to be much faster".<sup>1</sup>

Such a statement may explain the frame of mind which the leaders of the movement at the time were in. Not only was development needed, but also at a pace much faster than it had previously taken. This statement also leads one logically to ask: how can one define "development"?

Some writers believed, "Development means creating the conditions

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1) Cited in Gunner Myrdal, Asian Drama, Pantheon, 1968, p.716.

for the realisation of human personality. Its evaluation must therefore take into account three linked economic criteria: whether there has been a reduction in (i) poverty (ii) unemployment (iii) inequality".<sup>1</sup>

Another view is expressed by Henry Bernstein who considered that "underdevelopment" or "backwardness" was identified with the heritage of imperialist rule by the independence movements of Asia and Africa, and saw the achievement of national sovereignty not only as an end in itself but as a condition necessary for "National Development", which he defines in the following terms:

"The notion of 'national development' and the assessment of its prospects encompasses the following: (1) The accumulation of capital under national control, promoting the development of the productive forces and the capacity for self-sustained growth; (2) The expansion of productive employment and the achievement of higher levels of income and social welfare of health and nutrition, of education and participation in the political life of the nation; (3) The prospects of achieving national development are influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the position Third World countries occupy in the international economy".<sup>2</sup>

It seems to me that the last argument or definition is more valid because Bernstein gives more explanation of development. Also, we can conclude from the above identifications that, among the world's societies, there are different groups of countries differing widely in their socio-economic and political circumstances. These differences make one ask: why and how have they come about?

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1) Seers, 1972, quoted from Souza, R.A. and Porter, P.W. ; "The underdevelopment and modernisation of the Third World", Washington D.C., 1974, p.2.

2) Bernstein, H., "Industrialisation, Development and Dependence", in : Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies", Edited by: Alavi, H., and Shanin, T., The Macmillian Press Ltd., London, 1982, p.219.

It has always been the case that underdeveloped countries blame developed nations for their poverty. While such an accusation may have some truth, it is not always the main reason for underdevelopment. Such truth stems from the recognition that developed nations had privileged access to raw materials; freedom to "impose" their products on Third World markets; control of world market mechanisms to their own advantage; ability to disrupt internal efforts at industrialisation by poor countries through dumping and other means, and finally; capacity to attract trained personnel away from the underdeveloped world. Most of these factors were at work in the 'forties and 'fifties and they are still at work now. Over the years new factors have come to the fore. Factors such as the blocking of the transfer of appropriate technology etc. This is by no means to suggest that such factors provide a scapegoat for all the developmental problems faced by Third World countries but rather to explain a state of affairs.

Also, one may add at this point that there are many reasons that may be cited as causes of underdevelopment. Many underdeveloped countries were late starters in the development process, they neither have the means to develop nor have they found the necessary help to do so. Others had no absorptive capacities for the help they got.

However, in relation to definitions of development and underdevelopment, it seems to me that it is important not merely to analyse reasons why underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped, but also having understood the reasons, to consider how they might suggest policies for achieving development. In other words, the aim is to understand how and what the non-aligned countries need to do to achieve their own socio-economic and political advancement.

Therefore, there has been a large number of approaches to development devised by development thinkers in the developed world \*. These include theories such as those of The Stages of Economic Growth, Balanced and Unbalanced Growth, the Damar-Harrod Model of Dual Economy, to name but a few. It has always been fashionable among development economists to try to identify the major factors of growth and development. Three major stands of thought emerged: saving and capital theories; human factors; and some suggested socio-economic and political factors. I suggest that it is a combination of all these factors that makes for development and growth. (For more details see later).

In the case of historical and sociological explanations of socio-economic development, one can state that, there are two main rival theoretical approaches which can be seen as, on the one hand, pro-Western and on the other, pro-Eastern, but they are not merely the ideologies of rival power blocs. There are in the academic world rival intellectual interpretations of events. One of the best known types of historical explanation of socio-economic development in Western social science is that of the "stages of economic growth". Among these theories I will discuss as an example Rostow's, book "Stages of Economic Growth". From the other type of theoretical approaches, broadly Marxist, I will discuss as an example Frank's theory of "The Development of Underdevelopment".

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\* For more details of such theories see: Meier, G.M., Leading Issues in Economic Development, first and second edition, Oxford University Press, 1964, and 1975. Baldwin, R.E., Economic Development and Growth, 1966. Elkan, W., An Introduction to Development Economics, 1973, Also Chilcote, R. and Johnson, D., Theories of Development, Mode of production or dependency?, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1983.



I choose these theories of Rostow's and Frank's for many reasons among which are that, they are perhaps the best known and most popular theories on socio-economic development, and they both try to offer a comprehensive historical explanation from opposed points of view. While Rostow sees the highest stage of this process not as socialism, but developed capitalism, Frank's approach is clearly socialist. In what follows I will discuss both theories, first the pro-Western theory.

W.W. Rostow, : "The stages of economic growth : A non-communist manifesto".<sup>1</sup>

Rostow argued:

"This book presents an economic historian's way of generalising the sweep of modern history ... It is possible to identify all societies in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories : the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption ... These stages are not merely descriptive. They are not merely a way of generalising certain factual observations about the sequence of development of modern societies. They have an inner logic and continuity, they constitute, in the end, both a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history as a whole".<sup>2</sup>

By this Rostow analysed the process of economic growth into five stages. These were:<sup>3</sup>

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1) Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960, 1961, 1969 and second Edition, 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1977.

2) Ibid., 1960, pp.1,3,4 and 12.

3) Sources: See Rostow, W.W., op.cit. Also, Culbertson, J.M. : Economic Development, Donald Dewey, New York, 1971, pp.265-270 and Tadarō, M.P. : The Struggle For Economic Development, Longman, New York, 1983, pp.28-29.

(1) The "Traditional Society" stage: primitive society, productivity limited because of insufficiently developed economic techniques. In other words, it is characterised by a lack of systematic development of technology and productivity. A minimum of 75% of the working population is engaged in food production, and the national income, apart from consumption is wasted mostly on unproductive ends.

(2) The "Transitional" stage: The preconditions for take-off. Development of a 'Leading Sector' in the economy positively influences other sectors; agricultural productivity increases to support leading sector activities; there is improvement in transportation and other forms of social overhead capital.

(3) The "Take-off" stage: A period when the old blocs and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome and growth becomes a normal condition for all sectors of society; the main feature is an increase in the ratio of savings and investment to national income from 5% or less to 10% or also there emerges a political, social, and institutional framework to facilitate impulses towards expansion.

(4) The "Drive to maturity" stage: A long interval of sustained if fluctuating progress, with 10% to 20% of the national income steadily invested; new leading sectors supplement older ones. There is a spread of growth from leading sectors to other sectors.

(5) The stage of "High mass consumption": Structural change no longer takes place at a rapid rate; leading sectors shift towards consumer goods and services.

A quick glance over Rostow's theory of five stages, shows that he attempts to define the various stages of economic growth by certain economic and social characteristics, but in spite of his strong stress on the importance of social and political factors and their effects on economic development - e.g. he emphasises that the realisation of the preconditions for take-off "requires a major change in political and social structure and, even, in effective cultural values"<sup>1</sup>- it seems to me that in discussing the change he has in mind from what he called traditional to essentially capitalist structures and values he does not reveal how, on what basis and with the agency of what forces this change takes place in the political and social structure. He does not make it clear why the propensities vary from society to society and even from one class to another within the same society.<sup>2</sup>

Tomas Szentes considered this theory of Rostow's as a theory of the industrial revolution. He said:

"This theory of five stages is practically a theory of the industrial revolution interpreted in a particular way, in which the first two stages are seen as being preparatory to the industrial revolution and the last two as its result, i.e. self-sustained growth. The fact of the industrial revolution, of the "take-off", however, can only be inferred from its result, from sustained growth.<sup>3</sup> Thus the "take-off" has only seemingly a positive definition"

Besides the above, Rostow concentrates on the growth of productive forces, or on certain manifestations and prerequisites for this growth.

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1) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., p.157.

2) Szentes, T., The political economy of underdevelopment, Akademia; Kiado, Budapest, 1973, p.90.

3) Ibid., p.90.

Also, he investigates the growth of productive forces from the aspect of social development and by illustrating the historical changes in this growth, and he attempts to present capitalism as the highest stage of social evolution.<sup>1</sup> In opposing this argument, Magdoff considers that capitalism is not the highest stage of social evolution but takes the form of imperialism and he divides imperialism into five stages as follows:<sup>2</sup>

1. From the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century: the rise of commercial capital and the rapid growth of world commerce.
2. From the middle of the seventeenth century to the later part of the eighteenth century: commercial capital ripens into a dominant economic force.
3. From the late eighteenth century to the 1870s: the rise and eventual victory of industrial capital under the spur of the industrial revolution.
4. From roughly 1880 to the end of the first world war: the rise and victory of monopoly capital, the territorial division of the globe and the first struggle for redivision.
5. Since the end of the first world war: the beginning of socialism as a rival social system, eventual decolonization and the rise of the multi-national corporations.

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1) Szentcs, T., op.cit., p.89.

2) Magdoff, 1974, p.7, quoted from R. Sav, Unequal exchange, imperialism and underdevelopment, Oxford University press, 1978, pp.5-7

He added that "the tactics of imperialist exploitation have also changed with the stages".<sup>1</sup>

Also Rostow supposed that the state of 'backwardness', which in fact results from exploitation, was an original primitive state. Such an interpretation is not justified. On this point, A.G. Frank argued:

"Rostow's stages and thesis are incorrect primarily because they do not correspond at all to the past or present reality of the underdeveloped countries whose development they are supposed to guide. It is explicit in Rostow, that underdevelopment is the original stage of what are supposedly traditional societies; that there were no stages prior to the present stage of underdevelopment. It is further explicit in Rostow that the now developed societies were once underdeveloped, but all this is quite contrary to fact. This entire approach to economic development and cultural change attributes a history to the developed countries but denies all history to the underdeveloped ones. The countries that are today underdeveloped evidently have had a history no less than have the developed ones".<sup>2</sup> He added: "It is impossible, without closing one's eyes, to find in the world today any country or society which has the characteristics of Rostow's first, the traditional stage".<sup>3</sup>

As for the "preconditions for the take-off" stage, Frank says this stage can be ignored. He says "if Rostow's first, traditional stage cannot be found in any underdeveloped country today, his second stage, which contains the preconditions for take-off into economic development, is even more conspicuous by its absence".<sup>4</sup> In the same view Habakkuk argued:

"In many cases the increase of agricultural output and the creation of overhead social capital are not conditions whose pre-existence explains the acceleration of growth; they are part of the acceleration which needs to be explained".<sup>5</sup>

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1) Ibid., p.7

2) Frank, A.G., Sociology of development, 1971, op.cit., p.19.

3) Ibid., p.20.

4) Ibid., p.21.

5) Habakkuk's, H.J., "Review of Rostow's stages of economic growth", in Szentcs, T., op.cit., p.92.

Cairncross considered that the definition of the various stages and the overlapping of their characteristics was incorrect. He argued "If the various stages overlap, what is then the meaning of a stage".<sup>1</sup> He also points out the tautological character of the definition of "take-off" :

"A definition in these terms tells us nothing about the factors at work since we can only deduce their existence from the fact of take-off, never the likelihood of take-off from the ascertained fact of their existence".<sup>2</sup>

Frank also criticizes the third stage of Rostow's theory, namely the "take-off stage". He argued:

"Rostow would have us believe that in his third stage, the take-off, he has theoretically synthesized the dynamic qualitative change between the structure of underdevelopment and that of development. However, his theory is not dynamic and he does not isolate structural characteristics or change. Least of all, does he incorporate the real structure of underdevelopment and development into his theory. On the contrary, he fails to consider it altogether. Like most, but not all, stage theories of history, Rostow's is an exercise in comparative statics. While he identifies stages of development, he does not say anything about how to get from one to the other. This is no less the case for the third stage than it is for the four others. The unreality of Rostow's dynamic should not surprise us: for as we have seen, even his statics are entirely unreal; his stages correspond to no reality in the underdeveloped countries at all. How, then, could his development from one stage to another correspond to the underdeveloped world's reality?".<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the above criticisms of Rostow's theory. Culbertson pointed out four problems with Rostow's approach which could be summarised as follows:-<sup>4</sup>

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1) Cairncross, A.K., cited in Szentes, T., op.cit., p.93.

2) Ibid., p.93

3) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.23.

4) Culbertson, J.M., Economic Development: An Ecological Approach, New York, 1971, pp.266-68.

1. Rostow does not seem to justify the specification of discrete stages. What are called stages may not involve structural changes in the economy that have significance for causal analysis, but may merely involve description of what things look like at different points in a continuous process.

2. The Rostow framework does not seem accurate even as a description of symptoms. The inadequacy of efforts to fit broad historical processes into a set of stages has often been noted. The vagueness of the specification of Rostow's stages has been criticised: the take-off can only be confidently identified retrospectively; one can only tell if growth is going to be self-sustaining if in fact it has been sustained for a long period. Counterexamples to the theory abound: cases of societies seemingly at the take off stage but somehow not taking off, of societies seemingly having achieved self-feeding development, which then proved abortive.

3. In the Rostow characterization of economic development, special importance is given to the distinction between pre-take-off and post-take-off societies. Thus this approach might have been represented as basically a two-stage or dualistic theory. The proposition that economic development, once attained is not only irreversible, but inevitable is readily testable, and we are immediately struck by the extent to which such a proposition is inconsistent with experience.

4. Rostow's definition of the conditions required for the focal act of take-off involves some difficulties.

S. Kuznets, also criticised Rostow's theory by emphasizing that<sup>1</sup>: "Any division of growth into "stages" sets the minimum requirement that a given stage must display empirically testable characteristics; the characteristics of a given stage must be distinctive, the analytical relation to the preceding stage and to the succeeding stage must be indicated, but Rostow's classification does not meet this requirement. The characteristics of the individual stages are far from being distinctive. Yet much of what Professor Rostow would attribute to the take-off has already occurred in the precondition stage. The line of division between the take-off and the following stage of self-sustained growth or drive to maturity is also blurred; given the distinctiveness only in the statistical level of the rate of productive investment, there is no solid ground upon which to discuss Professor Rostow's view of the analytical relation between the take-off stage and the preceding and succeeding stages".

He added that:-

"It seems to me that Rostow .. defined these social phenomena as a complex that produces the effect he wishes to explain and then treats this identification as if it were a meaningful identification".<sup>2</sup>

However, two decades after he first published his theory of the stages of economic growth, and despite the many criticisms made by scholars against the principles he set forth, Rostow does not seem to be convinced that over that period academic researches and analysis have brought any evidence strong enough to make him change his mind about his basic approach.

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1) Kuznets, S., cited in: Meier, G.M., : Leading issues in development economics, London, 1964, 1st ed., pp.25-33. See also, Szentes, T., op.cit., p.92.

2) Kuznets, S., in: Thirlwall, A.P., : Growth and development, 2nd ed., London, 1978, p.46.



Also, Rostow believed that Professor S. Kuznets has led the attack on the stages of growth on this question of the appropriate degree of disaggregation; and quite properly his extraordinary scholarship as a statistical analyst of growth has influenced others.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, Rostow took this argument adopted by Kuznets:

"Thus Kuznets concluded, "All that is claimed here is that aggregative data for a number of countries do not support Professor Rostow's distinction and characterisation of the 'take-off' stage. On the other hand, the fact that the evidence is confined to aggregative data does not limit their bearing. Economic growth is an aggregative process; sectoral changes are interrelated with aggregative changes, and can be properly weighted only after they have been incorporated into the aggregative framework; and the absence of required aggregative changes severely limits the likelihood of the implicit strategic sectoral changes".<sup>2</sup>

To which Rostow replied:<sup>3</sup>

"With this I disagree. Modern economic growth is essentially a sectoral process. It is rooted in the progressive diffusion of the production functions modern technology can provide. These changes in technique and organisation can only be studied sectionally."

He added:<sup>4</sup>

"In presenting the notion of the take-off, I pointed out the following factors which might alter what we might call 'pure Arthur Lewis' (or 5-10 per cent) behaviour of the investment rate during the take-off. (1) variation among nations in the rate of population increase. (2) variations in the level of investment required for social overhead capital (mainly transport) in the pre-take-off and take-off decades. (3) variations in the capital output ratio. (4) The enclave case; that is, a high rate of investment in a narrow region or export sector, with very damped effect, if any, on the economy as a whole".

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1) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., second ed. 1979, px.

2) Kuznets, S., represented in Ibid, p.191.

3) Ibid, p.191.

4) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., p.192.

However, despite the criticisms levelled at his theory, Rostow insists on believing the approach used in the "stages" is not only legitimate but fundamental to making the analysis of growth a useful science.<sup>1</sup> He does not appear to have made any considered reply to the basic Marxist argument that the world market system is exploitative and the real cause of underdevelopment. Also he argued:

"I am not inclined to alter the basic approach to the stages of growth; and I regard the evidence accumulated over the past decade on the past and on the contemporary world as, on the whole, reinforcing not weakening, the concept of stages of growth".<sup>2</sup>

Rostow defended his above argument by asking and answering two questions: The first question he asked was: what is basic about economic growth? He believed that all agreed growth is the consequence of the progressive, efficient absorption into the economy of new technologies. In his own words:<sup>3</sup>

"I believe, we all agree: growth is the consequences of the progressive, efficient absorption into the economy of new technologies. Or, as Kuznets put it: 'Behind all this is the increasing stock of useful knowledge derived from modern science, and the capacity of society, under the spur of modern technology, to evolve institutions which permit a greater exploitation of the growth potential provided by that increasing stock of knowledge'".

The second question Rostow asked was: what is universal about the process of growth? His answer is: "Technologies are, essentially uniform at particular times in modern history".<sup>4</sup> (for more details about this point see, Rostow op.cit., in Appendix B).

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1) Ibid., p.179.

2) Ibid., 1977, Preface, pix.

3) Ibid., p.179.

4) Rostow, W.W., op.cit., pp.179-180. In opposition to Rostow's above argument see for example: Schumacher, E.F., Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, Blond and Briggs Ltd., London, 1973, reprinted 1983.

Finally, Rostow tried to present capitalism as the highest stage of social evolution <sup>1</sup>. I disagree with Rostow's claim that developing and underdeveloped countries must follow the capitalist system to achieve their development, simply because they need to gain economic independence from foreign influence and following the capitalist model leads to deeper involvement in the world market system within which the underdeveloped countries are at a serious disadvantage. (for more details see later).

Having discussed and criticised Rostow's theory an attempt will be made to discover the economic roots of underdevelopment of the Third World countries, and additional factors including the impact of developed capitalist countries will be taken into account and consideration.

The pro-socialist theories and thinkers consider the underdevelopment of today's Third World resulted from the relationship between the capitalist developed world and the underdeveloped one. Since Marx's discussion of foreign trade and the expansion of capitalism, his theory has been variously elaborated by many scholars, the better known amongst whom are Lenin, Paul Baran, I. Wallerstein and A.G. Frank \*. Those thinkers referred to a two-way connection between the development of both the developed and underdeveloped world.

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1) Szentes, T., op.cit., p.89.

\* Lenin, V.I. : Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1916. Baran, P.A. : The political economy of growth, 4th ed. Review Monthly Press, New York, 1967. See also, Wallerstein, World-systems analysis, Theory and methodology, Beverly Hills, 1982, and Frank, A.G., Sociology of Development, Monthly Review Press, London, 1969.

They considered that the West developed precisely because it was "underdeveloping" the Third World on the one hand, while on the other hand, the Third World became underdeveloped by being obliged to aid the ascendancy of the West. Also, they considered this relationship unfolded in three distinct stages: a mercantilist - capitalist stage; a colonial stage and a neo-colonial stage.<sup>1</sup>

Because the above scholars have adopted a broadly similar point of view, I will choose as an example, Frank's theory, because he tried to expand Lenin's theory on the one hand, and on the other hand, his theory has been widely influential in recent years.

A.G. Frank's : Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 1969

Frank, as a Marxist, seeks to discover what the "contradictions" are in the social structure he is studying. By contradictions he means the opposing tendencies leading to conflict and change. In common with other Marxists, he holds that a fundamental contradiction in the capitalist system is that of the expropriation and appropriation of economic surplus, i.e. a class of non-producers which owns the means of production is seen as expropriating value (wealth) from a class of producers whose work creates that wealth; and then they appropriate the wealth to their own benefit. This view is then applied to nations as well as to classes within nations. He also put forward the idea of another contradiction which takes the form of a metropolis-satellite polarization<sup>2</sup>. Also, Frank believes that:

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1) Hoogvelt, A.M., The Sociology of Developing Societies, Second Ed., The Macmillan Press, London, 1978.

2) Frank, A.G., op.cit., 1971, p.32.

"It is capitalism, both world and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates underdevelopment in the present. Extractive industries, a sharp division between country and industry, poverty and finally starvation, are not unfortunate accidents in the capitalist control of wealth in 'poor' countries, but inevitable products of it".<sup>1</sup>

It is obvious from the above argument that, Frank believes capitalism produced underdevelopment in the undeveloped countries in the past and maintains it in the present. To substantiate this point Frank also, on the one hand, divides the history of international economic relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries into three distinct periods, and on the other hand, he asserts that there is in the world capitalist system at any point in time an international metropolis, i.e. nowadays the United States of America, which possesses national and international satellites.<sup>2</sup> By this he means, the United States not only possesses her own country, cities and towns, villages etc., as any nation does but also, she possesses other international satellites, i.e. Third World countries incorporated into the world capitalist system.

We can summarise Frank's theory of metropolis/satellite contradictions as follows:-<sup>3</sup>

(1) Satellite states have always been subject to a high degree of external and internal monopoly;

(2) The structure of the world capitalist system as a whole, as well as that of its peripheral satellites, has been highly monopolistic throughout the history of capitalist development;

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1) Ibid., Preface.

2) Moridi, S., Foreign Trade and Theories of Development, with Specific Reference to Iran, M.A. Thesis, Keele University, 1976, pp.37-38.

3) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.31.

(3) The monopoly capitalist structure and the surplus expropriation/appropriation contradiction run through the entire satellite states' economies past and present;

(4) This exploitative relation extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world metropolis and national metropolises of the satellite states and then to regional centres, and from these to local centres, from local centres to towns to villages and from villages to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants and tenants. On this point, Frank argued:

"The metropolis/satellite contradiction exists not only between the world capitalist metropolis and peripheral satellite countries; but it is also found within these countries among their regions and between 'rapid development of the towns and industrial centres and lagging and decline in the agricultural districts'".<sup>1</sup>

Frank, means by the above argument that, the international satellites are national metropolises in their own countries. The metropolis/satellites relationship encompasses provincial, regional and local levels all over the world capitalist system. Therefore at the bottom of this system, a few villages are the satellites of a local commercial centre. Considering this hierarchical system, Frank argues that in the metropolis/satellite relationship the development of the metropolis is at the expense of, and therefore causes the underdevelopment of its satellites. In other words, the economic surplus flows out of the satellites and is directed to the development of the metropolis.

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1) Frank, op.cit., p.34.

As previously mentioned, Frank refers to this flow of economic surplus as another "contradiction", as expropriation/appropriation in the world capitalist system.<sup>1</sup>

(5) At each step along the way, the relatively few capitalists above exercise monopoly power over the many below, expropriating some or all of their economic surplus and, to the extent that they are not expropriated in turn by the still fewer above them, appropriating it for their own use;

(6) As a result of this, at each point, the international, national and local capitalist system generates economic development for the few and underdevelopment for the many.

Also, according to Frank, the history of international economic relationships of developed and underdeveloped countries is divided into <sup>1</sup> (a) The mercantilist era, when international trade backed by military force was monopolised by the metropolitan countries (b) The nineteenth century or liberal era, the basis of metropolitan monopoly became industry and textiles. Satellites were permitted now to trade, but not to produce industrial products; (c) At the turn of the twentieth century, light industries as the basis of monopoly were replaced by monopoly production of capital and intermediate goods. Satellites were denied the right to produce these goods; but they were permitted and even forced to produce light industrial goods by metropolitan factories set up on their soil. In order to produce textiles and other light industrial goods, the satellites had to import machinery and equipment from metropolitan countries.

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1) Frank, A.G., represented in Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.34-39.

Therefore the export of these goods, since it was monopolised by metropolises, led the satellites to be dependent on the monopoly of capitalist countries, and (d) From the middle of the present century, the basis of the metropolitan monopoly changed from the monopoly of heavy industries to the monopoly of technology. From this point onwards, satellite countries could even establish factories to produce capital goods. However, due to the metropolisation of technology by the metropolis, the metropole/satellite structure remains the same that is, through technology satellites are dependent on the metropolis.<sup>1</sup>

One can see here that, Frank in his above theory retains the fundamentals of Marxist/Leninist theories and supplements it with a metropolis/satellite contradiction in the world capitalist system. Frank, considered that the relationships between the developed and underdeveloped countries was "inherently exploitative" and that this was the main obstacle to the development of the underdeveloped countries. These relations were also, an essential part of the structure and evaluation of the capitalist system in the world. Thus Frank argued that:

"Capitalism's essential internal contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited appears between nations no less than within them".<sup>2</sup>

By this Frank means that, underdevelopment in the satellite countries is generated by the same process that produces the development of capitalism in the advanced countries.

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1) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.34-39.

2) Frank, A.G., Latin America : Underdevelopment or Revolution, p.227, represented in Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Lowe and Brydone printers limited, London, 1977, p.22.



This exploitative relationship between the two groups, i.e. Metropolis and Satellite is, he believes, the main contradiction in capitalist imperialism. From this argument, Moridi derived two conclusions, on the one hand, class contradiction is supplemented by the contradiction between metropolis and satellite and on the other hand, the contradiction between exploited and exploiters remains the main characteristic feature of the capitalist mode of production.<sup>1</sup> In opposing Frank's above argument, Laclau considered that not only capitalism but also every class society has been characterised by the contradiction between exploited and exploiters. In his own words:-

"But this does not take us very far, since not only capitalism, but feudalism and indeed every class society has been characterised by the contradiction between exploiters and exploited".<sup>2</sup>

Also, Laclau believed that Frank's theory is weakened by its exclusion of the mode of production in the definition of capitalism. In his own words:-

"Frank's claim that his conception of capitalism is the Marxist one seems to be based on nothing more than his desire for this to be the case. He was accused precisely of ignoring the mode of production in his definition of capitalism".<sup>3</sup>

Frank replied with two quotations from Marx which he claimed, proved his case:-<sup>4</sup>

"In the second class of colonies - the plantations, which are from the moment of their inception, commercial speculation centres of production for the world market - a regime of capitalist production exists, if only in a formal way, since slavery among the negroes excludes free wage - labour, which is the base on which capitalist production rests. However,

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1) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.30-39.

2) Laclau, E., op.cit., p.22.

3) Ibid., p.25.

4) This quotation is taken from the History of Economic Doctrines: See Ibid., p.25.

those who deal in slave trading are capitalists. The system of production introduced by them does not originate in slavery, but was introduced into it. In this case the capitalist and the landlord are one person".

In reply, Laclau argued:<sup>1</sup>

"In reality, the quotation proves exactly the reverse of what Frank intends, since what Marx says is that in the plantation economies the dominant mode of production is only formally capitalist. It is formally capitalist because its beneficiaries participate in a world market in which the dominant productive sectors are already capitalist. This enables the landowners in the plantation economy to participate in the general movement of the capitalist system without, however, their mode of production being capitalist, but what is the essential condition for such a situation is its exceptional character".

The second passage from Marx quoted by Frank was:<sup>2</sup>

"However, this error is certainly no greater than that of e.g. all philologists who speak of the existence of capital in classical antiquity, and of Roman or Greek capitalists. This is merely another way of saying that in Rome and Greece labour was free, an assertion which those gentlemen would hardly make. If we talk of plantation owners in America as capitalists, if they are capitalists, this is due to the fact that they exist as anomalies within a world market based upon free labour".

Laclau argued:<sup>3</sup>

"By no means. Feudal dependence and urban handicrafts remained the basic forms of productive activity. The existence of a powerful commercial class which greatly enlarged its stock of capital through overseas trade did not in the least modify the decisive fact that this capital was accumulated by the absorption of an economic surplus produced through labour relationships very different from those of free labour".

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1) Laclau, E. op.cit., p.25.

2) Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, London, 1964, pp.118-19, cited in Laclau, ibid, pp.25-26.

3) Laclau, E., op.cit., p.26.

The particular issue between Frank and Laclau over whether or not the colonial plantation mode of production is feudal, is not important from my point of view, but the main point is that Laclau thinks Frank's argument does not sufficiently analyse the mode of production within colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Also, Laclau explained 'mode of production' as follows:-<sup>1</sup>

"We understand by 'mode of production' an integrated complex of social productive forces and relations linked to a determinate type of ownership of the means of production".

He added:<sup>2</sup>

"From among the ensemble of relations of production, we consider those linked to the ownership of the means of production to be the essential relations, since they determine the forms of canalization of the economic surplus and the effective degree of the division of labour, the basis in turn of the specific capacity of the productive forces for expansion. Their own level and rhythm of growth depends in turn on the destination of the economic surplus".

He therefore designates as a mode of production the logical and mutually co-ordinated articulation of: "(a) a determinate type of ownership of the means of production; (b) a determinate form of appropriation of the economic surplus; (c) a determinate degree of development of the division of labour; (d) a determinate level of development of the productive forces".<sup>3</sup>

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1) Ibid., p.34.

2) Ibid., p.34.

3) Ibid., p.34

It has to be mentioned here that, most criticisms of Frank's approach have concentrated, as he himself recognised, on the following points\* :

The first is that Frank's approach emphasises 'external' exchange relations to the virtual exclusion of 'internal' mode of production. On this point concerning his exclusion of the mode of production he proposed to analyse dependence through the 'internal' relations if not the mode of production, accounting for their mutual determination of and relations to 'external' relations of exchange, particularly though not exclusively with the metropolis.<sup>1</sup>

The second point is that it does not take adequate account of the differences in various parts of Latin America and the world or of different levels of development. On this point, he attempted to examine the 'internal' determining dynamic of the historical process of capital accumulation or de-accumulation and its distinguishable stages of development or underdevelopment.<sup>2</sup>

The final point is mostly Frank's own criticism which he pointed out in a new preface to his work written in 1978, in which he stated that it was necessary to study the historical development of the single world capitalist system.

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\* Frank recognised the importance of these critiques. He regarded them as inadequate but consequently, he attempted to face these three critiques simulatenously in his work in 1978: See: Frank, A.G., Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. The Macmillian Press Ltd., London, 1978.

1) Ibid., pp. preface, xii-xiii.

2) Ibid.

Criticism on this particular point emphasised the failure of Frank's approach to achieve a dialectical dynamic analysis of the world-wide historical process of capital accumulation in which both metropolitan economic development and dependent peripheral underdevelopment should be analysed as part of a single process.<sup>1</sup> On this point, he seems to offer an answer to the criticism by combining the first and second points above, that is to place all these elements within the single historical process of the development of a single world capitalist system, which he said:-<sup>2</sup>

"Meant emphasising the process of capital accumulation but so far as possible examining its different modalities in the various parts of the world simultaneously at each stage of the single world historical process, instead of doing the regional or country histories serially one after the other, each only tangentially related to the process as a whole and not at all related to each other.

In order to develop, according to Frank, there is no other choice for the underdeveloped countries except to break out of the metropolis/satellite relationship. This is because, on the one hand, the relationship which is based on expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus by the metropolis, has actually limited the potentialities for development of these countries, while on the other hand, as the history of the economic relations of these countries has shown, they cannot remain in the world capitalist system and at the same time not be subjected to this metropolis/satellite relationship.

Frank argued that:

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1) Amin, S., *L'Accumulation a l'Echelle Mondiale*, Anthrops, Paris, 1970, (Accumulation on a world scale) cited in Frank, 1978, op.cit., preface.  
2) Frank, A.G., op.cit., preface.

"The only way for an independent development to occur, is to break out of the existing capitalist world system, and adopt a socialist form of development, like 'the Soviet Union' (which has) broken out of the capitalist system by socialist revolution".<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, I agree with Frank, that the underdeveloped countries must liberate themselves from the capitalist system's domination by taking full control of their own economies and natural resources and by taking political decisions independently of the super-powers' influence. Having done that they can learn from the experiences of any developed country and begin to create their own paths to development in co-operation with each other \*.

On the other hand, if Frank's argument implies that liberation from the world capitalist system and following a socialist policy of development means close alliance with the Soviet bloc, then I disagree with him, because if the underdeveloped and developing countries follow the Soviet model they will in my view become satellites just as much as with the capitalist one. This is because they will be identified by the West as being politically committed to the Soviet bloc and would become sucked into the political - military rivalry of the super-powers and be forced by Western hostility into military and even economic dependence on the Communist world, as seems to have happened in the case of Cuba.

In addition, I disagree with both Frank and Rostow, in their above arguments, because what may be valid for the United States of America, or the Soviet Union, may not necessarily be valid for Latin America, Asia and Africa.

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1) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.81 and 346.

\* For more details see later.

The structural conditions of the Third World economies do not resemble necessarily those of today's developed countries in their earlier stages.

It seems to me that it is strange to find even the well educated planners in these countries, in their endeavour to develop their countries, very quickly taking over development theories evolved in the West for the West as the only appropriate models of development, without questioning their applicability to their own conditions.

I believe that underdeveloped countries, and particularly those of the non-aligned movement, have their own structural problems which need to be tackled in their own terms, whether it be because of the exploitation of the old colonial rulers or not. There is a need for co-operation on the one hand between developed and developing countries with an open, though suspicious, mind being kept by the latter, and on the other hand, between developing countries themselves to overcome their own difficulties together. The developed world of course also has an interest in what happens. In such a framework there is an important role for the non-aligned movement in forming the bridge for this co-operation.

From this discussion, one must conclude that, a genuinely independent foreign policy i.e. "non-alignment" needs a genuinely independent economic/social and political policy. In other words, in order for it to be possible for a country to be genuinely non-aligned, it needs to achieve development under its own control and on its own terms and to break free from influences which cause the development of her underdevelopment.

To do that, the non-aligned countries must take what they find appropriate from both capitalism and socialism and also, they must cooperate with each other, taking account of each others' experiences in achieving their development.

What I mean by taking what is appropriate from both systems is that America, Britain, Western Europe, Japan, Russia and Communist China have experienced the national incomes that development and industrialisation engender. What can a non-aligned country learn from the economic history of the developed economies that might help them to understand what development is at present underway in the Third World? For example, the Japanese development was based on many components which could still serve as a model for today's developing countries \*. Among these components are: widespread agricultural improvements; a high rate of capital investment (financed principally from domestic profits and taxation); the rapid growth of export industries and a consequent ability to import advanced technology; a highly literate and skilled population capable of technological ingenuity and finally, a capable political leadership committed to development and industrialisation. It also created a modern banking and taxation system and initiated sweeping social changes to accommodate commercial and industrial needs, etc.<sup>1</sup>

Another example from which the non-aligned countries could profit is China.

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\* For more details see: Kunio, Y., Japanese Economic Development, Oxford University Press, 1979.

1) Dalton, G., Economic Systems and Society, C. Nicholls and Company Ltd., London, 1979, p.209.



The Chinese government adopted its own principles to achieve development such as nationalism - to rid China of interference and exploitation by foreigners, and socialism to bring about reforms and a better life, especially for the millions of Chinese peasants. Also, the Chinese government adopted an Agrarian Law in 1950, by which almost all the land was collectivised, most of it in the form of communes, which originated in 1958 and which grouped the collective farms into larger units for more thoroughgoing economic organisation, linking agriculture and industry and, at the same time, providing units for local government, education and Marxist indoctrination. In addition, one of the Chinese government's actions was to bring banking and trade under government control and to halt the inflation which had set in under Chiang Kai Shek.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, one can say here that, development went on in China, power supplies developed rapidly and industrial complexes grew in the 1960s in several parts of the country. The emphasis was still on capital goods rather than consumer goods and in many ways China remained a developing country. Nevertheless, at the UNCTAD Conference of 1972, for example, she was able to offer some aid and technical assistance to some poor nations such as Zambia and Tanzania in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

In referring to the internal and external factors which impede the development of the developing and the underdeveloped countries, one cannot specify typical underdeveloped countries because the differences among more than the hundred such countries are too wide.

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1) Watson, J., Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs, Fletcher and Son Ltd., London 1981, pp.229-236.  
2) Ibid., pp.229-236.

The more underdeveloped a country is, the more likely it is to have low output per capita (G.N.P.); heavy reliance on agriculture; low literacy rates and life expectancy and early marriage. Birth rates and death rates in underdeveloped countries today are roughly twice as high as in developed countries, which means a larger proportion of children and fewer women in the wage earning labour force, etc. One cannot quantify the economic costs of such divisions, but it is certain that they seriously impede development.

To the above points should be added the super-powers' influence in the Third World countries in the past during the colonial rule, and their domination of the international monetary system, trade, the transfer of technology and energy use in the present which give the imperialist countries new ways and means\* of dominating the Third World countries. These points together act greatly to the disadvantage of underdeveloped and developing countries.

To solve these problems and achieve development the Third World countries, particularly those of the non-aligned movement, must adopt and follow:-

Firstly, pursuit of political and economic independence by national leaders and national movements, because the country will not be able to achieve any appreciable level of development if it is still subject to external influences. On this point Tom Nairn has argued:-  
"The concept of nationalism is a generally necessary stage of development for all societies".<sup>1</sup>

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\* For more details see Chapters Three and Four of this thesis.  
1) Nairn, T., "Nationalism and Development", in: Alavi and Shanin, op.cit., p.430.

Secondly, government control. By this I mean, the government must adopt planning to achieve the desired level of development on the one hand, and the government role should not be merely to the extent of formulating the plan but also of securing the implementation and monitoring of the plan by creating the necessary organisation, with qualified personnel regulating and controlling the foreign trade sectors, controlling the banking system and credit facilities, and regularising and determining the participation of any permitted private sector in the economic development process. The government must do that because leaving such things to market forces would not be desirable, i.e. because such a policy would lead straight back to dependence and continued underdevelopment.

In addition to political and economic independence there is a need for strategic planning for development by means of productive investment and trade. In other words, the underdeveloped countries led by appropriate national leaders must control and use productive investment in a useful and successful way. The level of this investment must be sufficient to provide for a rise of national income in excess of the rise in population, but this discussion leads one to ask: where can a country get the initial investment from and how can it allocate the investment in order to ensure development?

There have been two major economic approaches to development devised by development thinkers in the developed world, namely the theories of Balanced and Unbalanced Growth. Balanced Growth theory advocates widespread government intervention in economic activity within the compass of an economic plan to offset the effects of the price system.

This policy was advanced by Rosenstein-Rodan for the first time in 1943.<sup>1</sup>

Unbalanced Growth theory, recommends large scale government investment in key sectors of the economy and relies on the price mechanism to allocate investment to different sectors of projects. Also, the thinkers of this theory suggested three choices for an underdeveloped country pursuing a policy of unbalanced growth.<sup>2</sup> The first is to invest directly in productive activities, e.g. a steel mill or other factories; the second choice is to set up "Last stage" industries, i.e. investment in the final stages of industrial activities such as the assembly of industrial products; finally, the choice to invest in the social overhead capital or infrastructure and services. The aim of this policy is to supply services and facilities which in one way or another will induce investment in the production of industrial products. These services and facilities are usually provided by the central government or public authorities and are free to citizens.

We can conclude in relation to these theories that the choice of which one is preferable has to be left to the leaders of individual countries according to their local conditions, but in choosing they need to be constantly aware of the need to avoid economic dependence on more powerful developed or developing countries.

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1) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.15-30.

2) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.15-30.

It is known that the Third World countries' natural resources have been and often still are dominated by the multi-national corporations. Also, there are countries enjoying good returns from exporting their one or more raw materials, for example, the oil producing countries, and there are other countries which receive less return than those of the oil exporting countries which already have the financial ability to provide the required investment. Where such countries' exportable resources do not exist or exist in only small quantities they have to go through a period of austerity in imports i.e. cutting down of imports of consumer goods. These countries sometimes need foreign aid to provide part of the needed investment, which is a great risk to their independence, because aid is often used as a weapon of the foreign policy of the 'donor' country. For example, President Kennedy said:-<sup>1</sup>

"Foreign aid is a method by which the U.S.A. maintains a position of influence and control around the world, and sustains a good many countries which would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc."

Therefore, the non-aligned countries must recognise such aims and weapons and must keep themselves free of the 'donor' country's influence. Also, after getting foreign aid, the problem which has sometimes faced and still faces the underdeveloped countries is how to allocate investment so as to secure socio-economic and political development. One can say here that, to solve this problem, the Third World countries and particularly those of the non-aligned movement must adopt strategic investment planning.

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1) President Kennedy, Speech in 1961, cited in: Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, London, 1971, p.5.

Also, as previously mentioned, they must take into account other allocations for their development, such as investment in agriculture to increase food production in order to feed the part of the population working in industries and transport, the production of industrial goods directly; and investment in industries producing consumer goods. This investment is necessary because as industrial employment expands, demand for these goods will expand as a result of a rise in the standard of living on the one hand, and on the other these two kinds of investment are necessary because it will not be good for the country to meet the demands for these goods by increasing imports.<sup>1</sup> In addition to these investments, there are other investments needed such as in the infrastructure of the country, i.e. roads, transport and communication; and in training, education, etc.

Finally, the governments of underdeveloped countries must recognise the role of foreign trade and its influence on their development. The terms of trade are considered a serious obstacle to the development of the underdeveloped countries. The trade gap between developed and underdeveloped countries is continually widening, (for more details see Chapter Three of this thesis). The recognition of dependency in the world markets and the need of the non-aligned countries for close co-operation and unity in the United Nations to apply pressure within the current institutional framework that governs world trade should also be taken into account. Specifically this means that GATT and UNCTAD, as mechanisms in world trade, may need reconstructing if the world trade situation is to be prevented from further deterioration.

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1) Puttruss, B.A., The performance of the Iraqi National Development plan 1970-1974, 'An Economic Analysis', M.A. Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1978, p.10.

Also, I need hardly add that these organisations need to be freed from the domination of the developed countries and to be transformed into means for promoting development in the Third World, which they are not at the moment.

The above discussion must lead one to conclude that, if any developing country wishes to be genuinely non-aligned, it needs to solve these problems by achieving socio-economic and political development, taking into consideration that the aim and goal is to become a genuinely independent country. A good example nowadays, as I see it, of a country achieving such things is Iraq.

However, these ideas will be subject to discussion and detailed argument in the later chapters of this thesis.

## CHAPTER ONE

THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ACCOMPANYING THE EMERGENCE OF  
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND NON-ALIGNMENT?  
THE AIMS AND IDEAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.



## CHAPTER ONE

### The international Circumstances Accompanying the Emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. How do we understand Non-Alignment? The Aims and Ideal of the Non-Aligned Movement.

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

In the Introduction it was argued that for any Third World country to be able to become genuinely non-aligned in its foreign policy towards the super-powers and their military blocs it was necessary for it to possess certain characteristics chief among which is full independence in the socio-economic as well as the political sense through successful achievement of socio-economic development.

At this point, however, it is necessary to ask what is meant in this thesis by "genuine non-alignment"? I wish to make it clear that for the purposes of my argument in this thesis "genuine non-alignment" is seen as an ideal and a goal formulated by the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement which means far more than mere membership of the Movement. It is a principal contention of my theoretical argument that the actual practice of countries which are members of the Movement has tended to diverge from the ideal since the disappearance of the Movement's founders. The reasons for this divergence will be looked at in chapters which deal with the development and expansion of the Movement, changes in the world economic conditions and the strategies of the main power blocs. But the principal aim is to show not simply why countries fail to live up to the ideal but to examine the socio-economic and political conditions which are conducive to a country's successful pursuit of the ideal. In my view these are conditions to

which only a small minority of the Movement's members have approximated so far.

It is in the light of the above that this chapter seeks to present the identification of what political ideas have been put forward under the name of non-alignment. Also, in this chapter the world-wide circumstances within which the non-aligned movement emerged are described. The review covers the characteristics of the "Third World" at the time historic, political, economic or otherwise.

In section one, the history of the movement in terms of the development of its ideas and potential lines of co-ordination are presented, with particular emphasis on the international circumstances around which the movement was established, namely, the Cold War. This is because the Cold War was one of the main reasons which led to the foundation and established of the non-aligned movement. The United Nations' foundation and its structure are points dealt with in section two. The importance of this discussion lies in the fact that, the U.N.O. is considered a very important organisation for the Third World countries in many ways, the most important of which is that directly after getting independence, a new country normally joins the United Nations because this sets the final seal on its independence with the achievement of international recognition and the granting of formal equality in the U.N.

There is disagreement among historians in explaining the non-aligned movement, or identifying it. Therefore, the definitions of non-alignment in international affairs will be the subject discussed in section three. Before the birth and rise of the non-aligned

movement in the international setting, most of the Third World countries were occupied and their economies exploited by colonial powers, such as Great Britain, France, Spain, Belgium and Portugal. The second half of the twentieth century particularly after World War II, has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of liberation movements against colonialism, seeking or struggling for the independence of their countries. Also, the leaders of the non-aligned countries realised that alliance with any of the existing military pacts would bring them under the direct control of the super-powers. Because of these points beside others, the founders of the non-aligned movement, such as Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Sukarno, established the non-aligned movement under the aims and ideals of: Anti-colonialism and Anti-neo-colonialism, which are the subject of sections Four and Five; Section Six, will then discuss and explain the confusion between the concepts of Non-Alignment and Neutralism. This is followed by concluding remarks.

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a radical change in world politics and the emergence of new political and military strategies in a merciless race which divided the world into military camps. This happened because of fear of and defence against the opposing blocs. More explicitly the world, particularly since the Second World War has been dominated by two major blocs, led by the two super-powers. The first includes most of Western Europe and the United States of America, under the military organization called N.A.T.O.\*. The second under the leadership of the Soviet Union, in

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\* N.A.T.O.: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S.A. and West, 1949.

the military pact called the Warsaw pact\*. Both blocs, i.e. the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, as they are sometimes called, have been involved in an arms race and the struggle between the two has been going on since the second world war and the failure of Hitler's Germany to dominate the world.

The great antagonistic struggle between these two powers trying to dominate the world led them to attempt to ally other countries with them, especially 'developing' and newly independent nations. To do so, the super-powers have followed many methods. Firstly, there has been fighting between them within the Third World countries, (for more details see later), and secondly, they have used indirect involvement by employing economic dependence, weapons supply, food supply, etc., as tactics towards the Third World countries to ally them to their side\*\*.

In what follows therefore, I would like to shed some light on the origins of this rivalry in the cold war between the super-powers.

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\* Warsaw Pact: Military alliance between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1955.

\*\* More details see: Chapter Four, (The non-aligned movement and the N.L.Ms.)

## 1.1:1 THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many writers trace the origins of the cold war back as far as the mid 1940s. For example, N.D. Shulman argued that:

"The matrix of the cold war is to be found in the years 1945 to 1950"<sup>1</sup>.

Towards the end of April 1945 the advancing Russians met their American and British allies in the centre of Germany, and a week later, Hitler shot himself. By May 7th, the war in Europe was all over. Germany surrendered to her enemies, but Japan was still fighting on. Two atomic bombs were then dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killing many thousands of people. After that the Japanese government surrendered and World War II was over, and all peaceloving people hoped that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would work together in friendship in the United Nations to improve world relations. But it soon became clear that they were bitter rivals, their differences made it almost impossible for the Security Council to do its job.\*

In 1945, the United States of America and the Soviet Union were clearly the most powerful nations in the world. The United States of America was especially strong because she had the atomic bomb besides other advantages such as material wealth and no war damage. The Soviet Union had the largest army in the world but had no atomic bomb at that time.

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1) Shulman, M.D., Beyond the Cold War, London, Newhaven, Yale University Press, 1966, p.2.

\* The U.N. was to be a kind of World Parliament. The work of peace keeping would be carried out by a smaller body called the Security Council. Security Council, Five members (countries) including the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were to be permanent members.

However, the Soviet Union had swept over East Europe; Germany and France and to a lesser extent Britain, lay in ruins, all three of them were in need of help. For that matter, the United States of America was the only country in the world which World War II had made better off. She had plenty of all the things that Europe needed, such as food and raw materials, but Europe was too poor to buy them. To get round this, the American government put forward a plan of aid, the Marshall plan.\* Moreover, the Americans gave millions of dollars, and food, raw materials and machinery flowed into West Europe. The Americans also gave similar help to many other countries in Asia and Africa. It could be said that the Americans' aim was to win friends for the United States. That is patently obvious when we consider that in 1949, after two years of the Marshall plan aid, President Truman invited most West European Countries to join the United States in a military pact called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), and most of those invited to do so signed the Treaty.

However, the Soviet Union did not like the Marshall plan because the plan involved interference in the home affairs of the recipient countries. In 1949, the Soviet Union discovered how to make the atomic bomb. They had practically recovered from the damage of the war and they too began to send help to poor nations in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently the United States had lost her greatest advantage.

However, both great powers spent millions of pounds in other countries in the hope of winning their friendship and support. Furthermore, in reply to N.A.T.O., the Soviet Union organized

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\* The Marshall plan was launched in 1947 and named after the man in Charge of Americas' foreign affairs General George Marshall.

the Warsaw pact in 1955, an alliance of the Communist nations of East Europe who joined with Russia. Having briefly described the background we may then ask why all these things happened and what were the international world-wide consequences of the setting up of the military pacts?

I would say that the behaviour of the Americans and Russians may be explained by the fact that each believed the other guilty of trickery and deception. The Russian leader Stalin \*, as a Communist, believed that a nation's land and factories - what are called its means of production - should be owned by the state as they were in Russia. The U.S.A. however was a Capitalist country, its way of life being based upon "free enterprise". In government too, there were big differences, in America people had a choice in deciding who should rule them, but in Russia only Stalin and his fellow Communists had any say in running things.

To Truman, the Communist way of running things was cruel and wrong. He intended to do his best to stop it from spreading. Stalin disliked Capitalism because it was thought to be based on exploitation and he believed that the United States of America's need for help against Hitler had made them friendly towards Russia and now that Hitler was finished, he thought that they might turn on Russia and attack her. In addition, these differences divided Europe which even in the 1980s is still divided into these two armed camps. But what about the other countries in the world in Asia, Africa and Latin America?

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\* Stalin: For more details and information see: Laine, David., Socialist Industrial States, London, 1978, p.143.

In China in 1949, Mao-tse-Tung and his Communist armies defeated Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang. Russia gave some help to Mao, while America helped the Kuomintang both on the mainland and in Taiwan. During World War II, Korea was part of the Japanese empire but when the war ended, American troops moved into the country from the South and Russian troops from the North and Korea stayed divided. In the South a government favoured by the Americans took over; in the North the Russians set up a Communist government. During the Korean war in 1950-1953, the Americans struggled with the North Koreans and the Chinese inside Korea, and both sides claimed that they had won, but whoever won, the people of Korea certainly lost. Millions of them were made homeless and many of them were killed. Moreover Vietnam in South East Asia, after the end of the war between the French and the Communists in 1954, was divided into two, The Communists ruled the North and Non-Communists the South. The United States of America supported South Vietnam while the Soviet Union supported the North.

In addition, the United States of America joined other alliances namely, S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. She aimed to stop the spread of Communism in the Middle East and in Asia, in the same way that N.A.T.O. was thought to have done in Europe. The influence of the super-powers in the Middle East was very strong, if we take examples in the Arab World during the 1950s and the 1960s, we find a difference in policy over the representation of the people's Republic of China in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, as Table 1.1, shows, some Arab governments like Jordan and Saudi-Arabia, (who favoured the United States of America), voted for the representation of Taiwan (i.e. Nationalist China), while others such as Egypt voted for the Peking Government's admission. In the case of Egypt this was because under Nasser she favoured the Soviet Union. On the other



TABLE NUMBER 1.1

THE MAIN QUESTION: TAIWAN OR PEKING?  
 SELECTED FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : THE ARAB WORLD (COUNTRIES)

Country	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
ALGERIA	-	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
IRAQ	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
JORDAN	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
KUWAIT	-	-	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
LEBANON	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
LIBYA	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
MOROCCO	P	P	P	P	O	O	P	P	P
SAUDI ARABIA	O	O	O	O	T	O	T	T	T
SOUTH YEMEN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	P	P
SUDAN	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
SYRIA	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
TUNISIA	O	P	P	O	O	O	O	O	O
EGYPT	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
YEMEN (NORTH)	P	T	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
U.S.A.	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
SOVIET UNION	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P

- T : In favour of representation of Taiwan.  
 P : In favour of representation of Peking.  
 O : Abstained, did not participate in the vote or absent.  
 - : Non member in the United Nations.

Chinese representation in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, by Bailey, Sydney, D., first series, number one, University of Sussex, Table No. 2, p.24-25.

hand there were some Arab States who voted in favour of Peking but at the same time were unsympathetic towards the Soviet Union, but were sympathetic towards Egypt especially since Nasser's Egypt was a leader in the Arab world and in non-aligned countries, particularly countries such as Sudan.

By the end of the 1960s the world had been living with a 'hot' war rather than a 'cold' war, in Hungary, Vietnam, in the Middle East and many other places. But a leadership clash between Russia and America had been avoided and many more people who might have died, lived.

In the light of the above discussions, it is understandable that in their search for self-identity, the Third World countries have found a common ground in dissociating themselves from the domination of the two super-powers. Among the things these countries have in common, their similar socio-economic conditions have proved conspicuously decisive in the ideological orientation of non-aligned countries. While the non-aligned countries represent over 70% of the world's population they acquire less than 20% of the world's wealth<sup>1</sup>, therefore containing among themselves the poorest countries in the world. This is in spite of possessing huge deposits of raw materials which are being exported to the industrialised world at unstable and low prices.

By contrast, developing countries in general, in their attempt to move up the ladder of industrialisation, depend to a large extent on

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1) Alwan, S.A., (Tatawer Haraket Addam Al-Inhyaz), Political Development of the non-aligned movement, Iraq, 1978, p.13. (In Arabic).

the importation not only of the necessary technology for development, but also manufactured consumer goods from the industrialised world. Therefore as a response to this prevailing situation, a new movement emerged called "non-alignment" which very rapidly became of world-wide importance, because it included countries with more than 70% of the world's population as we said earlier. Also, the non-aligned member countries joined the United Nations. However, before we define non-alignment it seems to me that it is important to shed some light in the United Nations' foundation and its structure and so on.

### 1.1:2 THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations came into being officially after the San Francisco conference in 1945, which brought together fifty-one countries. All the governments represented at San Francisco signed the Charter of the United Nations, which says that the international organization was established:

"To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in large freedom and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples etc."<sup>1</sup>

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1) Department of public information, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Internal Court of Justice, reprinted in United Nations, 1956, p.1.

While the basic aims of the United Nations as stated in its Charter were noble ones acceptable to everyone who attended the conference, it was obvious from the start that there were two groupings among which differences appeared. On the one hand, there were differences between the great powers, notably the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, and other newly independent Third World countries such as Egypt, India, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, etc.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, there were two different ideologies, which perceived the role of the international organisation differently, i.e., the communist one led by the Soviet Union, vis-a-vis the capitalist one led by the United States of America.

Ever since the United Nations Organization was established, the latter division of nations based on the above mentioned ideologies has been clearly recognised in that supporters of each ideology have tried to make gains at the expense of the other on the world scene through the United Nations. As previously stated, as early as 1947 the United States of America, for example, launched the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe. This was followed later in 1949 by the establishment of the N.A.T.O. alliance.



On the other hand, the U.S.S.R.'s counter move was the establishment of the Warsaw pact in 1955. Since then, the two powers have engaged in different forms of confrontation most notably the Cold War. Not only have the two alliances divided the world at large into two distinct camps, but there have been several instances when they divided some nations into two separate states, Korea, Vietnam and China are the most obvious examples, as Chart Number 1.1 on the next page shows.

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1) Jansen, G.H., Afro-Asian and non-alignment, London, 1966, p.14.

CHART NO. 1.1

THE SUPERPOWERS INVOLVEMENT IN SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (THE COLD WAR)



Despite the increase in membership of the world organization, brought about particularly by the newly independent countries of the Third World, the super-powers were able to safeguard their interests by using their veto option. Thus it became clear over the years that no matter how many new members joined the United Nations, the democratic process of the World Organization was neutralised in the sense that the interests of the super-powers could not be jeopardized.

Moreover, the right of veto made sure that the super-powers not only secured their own interests, but directed the outcome of the United Nations resolutions to help their own causes.


It was only natural for some newly independent countries of the Third World which fought Western colonialization in their respective countries, to side with the Eastern bloc. However, some countries considered their own interests as well as those of the world in not siding with either bloc, particularly Egypt, India and Yugoslavia. The following chart should clarify the position (see next page) Chart No. 1.2.

The super-powers' domination of the whole organization through their right of veto in the Security Council was seen with dissatisfaction by Afro-Asian leaders. They feared that such a domination would reduce the World Organization to no more than a great powers' club and hence would end up like its predecessor the League of Nations.<sup>1</sup>

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1) Jansen, G.H., op.cit, p.41.

THE UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS DURING THE PERIOD 1945-1950s



However, over the last three decades the organization has experienced considerable expansion on two fronts, namely the number of member countries and the widening scope of its operations through a wide and varied range of institutions covering almost all international economic and social needs.

Over the years, not only has the structure of the organization changed, but the relative importance of its organs has changed, particularly in the eyes of the developing countries. Because of these changes, more recently the attitude of developing countries towards the World Organization has altered.

The fact that these countries, through their own groupings have been gathering strength within the World Organization's structure may have strengthened the United Nation's ties to the Third World. Here the non-aligned movement, as the most important grouping representing the Third World's views within the organization, has an important role to play.

In the fifties and sixties, as was said before, the developing countries viewed the outcome of the organization's organs' attempts to gear their operations to benefit the Third World. The non-aligned movement through its voting power has been the driving force behind this redirection, however small it may be. A good example of this is the role played by the "group of 77" in the GATT, ILO, FAO, and other U.N. organisations\*.

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\* For more details about the United Nations Organisations, see for example: Hajal, P.I., Guide to U.N. Organisation, Documentation and Publishing, for Students, Researchers, Librarians, New York, 1978, p.xxx.



However, after discussing the cold war and the influence of the super-powers among the United Nations structure and the appearance of the non-aligned movement, the question which is to be asked at this juncture is: How do we understand "Non-alignment"? In what follows therefore, our analysis will examine the definition of "Non-alignment".

## 1.2 HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND NON-ALIGNMENT? THE DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT

A quick glance over the goals and the structures of the military pacts shows their danger or threat to world peace and security, in contrast to human values and freedom. But could we say that non-alignment constitutes another military pact opposing or against N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw and other pacts? Or could we define it as an ideology different from the capitalist and the communist ideologies? Or even an instrument of foreign policy for its members?

It seems that non-alignment cannot be defined as a unified ideology<sup>1</sup>. If we take a closer look at the membership of the non-aligned movement we find it is composed of nations, with different policies and ideologies, nations from Asia, Africa and Latin America, with capitalist and communist ideologies and policies. It includes among its members "Socialist" countries such as Cuba, Syria and others with Western capitalist policies such as Pakistan and some Arab Countries.

It is difficult also to say that it could be considered an

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1) Singham, A.W., Non-alignment and World Politics, U.S.A., 1976, preface p. II.

economic system. On the other hand, it could not form a military pact against the other military pacts, because it includes among its members, countries which have strong relationships with the Warsaw pact such as Cuba and South Yemen, as well as other countries such as Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan and Jordan which have relationships with the opposing pact, N.A.T.O.<sup>1</sup>.

It is obvious therefore that this movement differs completely from the well known military pacts. It has two very different meanings in international affairs. On the one hand, non-alignment refers to the participation of a state in the formal non-aligned movement, whether it is closely aligned with a super-power or not. Cuba for example, has a close alignment with the Soviet Union bloc and yet it gained in 1979 the chairmanship of the non-aligned movement.

On the other hand, according to its principles in short, we may describe non-alignment as a social and political ideal. It is perhaps more accurate to describe it as a contemporary ideal and aim of changing the system of economic and political relations at present prevailing among the world community of nations to be more oriented towards the needs and demands of a human society based upon freedom and equality, among all nations all over the world.

Through its orientations and activities the movement which has grown from this ideal tackles the main problems concerning social development, and argues that these problems can be solved only within a

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1) Kimche, D., The Afro-Asian Movement, Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World, Jerusalem, 1973, pp.64-65.

new world-wide system based upon reciprocal help (and aid) between nations, and equality, democracy and peace instead of military grouping and pacts.

In the light of the foregoing definitions of non-alignment, I would say that it is a contemporary social phenomenon which has appeared in recent times, it is an ideal and hope for the future, expressing strong and fundamental needs of the nations which have long suffered the threat and the experience of colonial domination and the exploitation of their wealth, their national personalities and their national cultural heritage amongst other things, under the guise of protection and other forms of old colonialism. Another no less important aim for this movement is the achievement of economic development, political independence, and positive participation in the world community.

Having discussed earlier the origins of the Cold War and the United Nations' structure, also the definitions of the non-aligned movement, it would be very helpful now to shed some light on the aims of the non-aligned movement.

### 1.3 THE AIMS AND IDEAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI-NEO-COLONIALISM: AND ALLIANCE OR NON-ALIGNMENT

There is disagreement among historians in explaining the non-aligned movement, or identifying it. While some have found the Cold War a suitable stimulus for the birth of the movement<sup>1</sup>, others have

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1) Al-Azies, A., Al-Mossa, "Non-aligned Movement and the Role of Iraq", Al-Jamhoriah, Iraqi Newspaper, May 12, 1981, p.3 (In Arabic).

simply not identified any beginning for the movement other than the Belgrade summit conference of 1961.<sup>1</sup> Similarly there are contentions which attribute the birth of the movement to the cause and effect relationship which characterized the struggle between the eastern and western ideologies and led to the outbreak of the Cold War. This view seems to imply that the non-aligned movement was a "legacy" which international political developments of recent centuries had largely helped to shape.

Despite this inaccuracy about a precise identification of the time horizon at which the non-aligned movement appeared, there is nevertheless wide agreement that the movement is essentially a social, economic and political response to contemporary international political events. The most distinguished founders of this idea of non-alignment were, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of Indonesia.\* Those founders came together and established the non-aligned movement on the following basis:-

Firstly, the essence of the policy of non-alignment was a deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the super-powers or to permit foreign military bases on one's territory. The positive objective of this refusal was to retain substantial freedom of policy and action in international affairs, especially in relation to the policies and actions of the super-powers.

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1) Willetts, Peter., The Non-aligned Movement, London, 1978, p.3.

\* For more details about these founders see later.

On the other hand, the non-aligned countries did not seek to establish a third bloc or force of nations, as they themselves were stridently opposed to the bloc system of international politics.

Secondly, most of the non-aligned countries were economically underdeveloped and their people had a very low standard of living. Therefore, it was a major goal of their foreign policies to promote rapid economic development for which, however, they lacked capital and technical skills. For this reason, their external economic policies were directed to the acquisition of both these needs from whatever source was willing to provide them and able to offer them without any strings.

From the above discussion we can draw out the following points. Firstly, the non-aligned countries adopted non-alignment in opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. Secondly, after getting their political freedom, the newly independent nations were looking for economic development and wished not to be aligned with super-powers. Therefore, in what follows we will examine the meaning and devote some analysis to these aspects.

### 1.3:1 ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI-NEO COLONIALISM:

The issue of colonialism and neo-colonialism is considered a very important one. It is one of the major problems from which most of the Third World countries were suffering or had suffered and there are still countries which are suffering from direct dependence on and dominance by a foreign power at the present time.

Therefore, some writers have described neo-colonialism as the

survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, which have become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical force.<sup>1</sup> Others see neo-colonialism as an economic force and they list its characteristics as:

"Continuing economic dependence on the colonial powers, integration into colonial economic blocs, economic infiltration through capital investment loans, aid, unequal concessions and finances directly controlled by colonial powers".<sup>2</sup>

However, whatever the definitions of colonialism and neo-colonialism, it seems to me that it is not important merely to know the above definitions without also knowing the motives of neo-colonialism and its relation to the non-aligned countries. Our aim is to know why, among the societies in the world that remained traditional longer than the West, some have made the transition to economic development sooner than others. This has happened despite the fact that technical knowledge adequate for economic growth has theoretically been available to any society in the world since at least the end of the eighteenth century.

It could be said that this has happened because colonial and neo-colonialist powers occupied and dominated other nations. The colonial powers would not require to be positively set in motion after the grant of independence, but they would have to be positively stopped by the successor government if the ties of economic as well as political dependence were to be loosened.<sup>3</sup> In other words we could say that perhaps most of the mechanisms of neo-colonialism work automatically.

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1) Barrat-Brown, M., The Economics of Imperialism, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974, p.256.

2) Ibid., p.256.

3) Ibid., p.256.

Therefore, some writers see that colonial rule, wherever it was imposed, created extreme psychological pressures on the subjected people not only as a result of deliberate policy, but also inescapably by virtue of what the colonial administrators were and what their presence in the colonial area represented.<sup>1</sup> Others also saw the result of neo-colonialism as the use of foreign capital for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world:

"Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world".<sup>2</sup>

Nkrumah added and traced back colonialism and neo-colonialism to the capitalist system, and considered that colonialism declined because of the appearance of nationalism and its revolt against the capitalist systems on the one hand, and the appearance of the communist system in the world supporting nationalism against the capitalist systems on the other hand.<sup>3</sup>

Others saw neo-colonialism as existing in order to further the economic interests of the Western, developed capitalist states. These economic interests are served by a transfer of resources to the West, through the international banks, multi-national companies, interests on financial resources and unequal trading relationships, based on high priced manufactured goods being exchanged for low priced primary products.<sup>4</sup> As a result, according to Willetts:

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1) Hagen, Colonialism and economic growth on the theory of social change, U.S.A., 1962, Chapter 17, p.411.

2) Nkrumah, K., Neo-colonialism, the last stage of Imperialism, London, 1965, pp.IX-XII.

3) Ibid., p.225.

4) Willetts, P., The non-aligned movement, op.cit., pp.213-214.

"Western economic and political power in alliance with whatever domestic interests there may be that benefit from the system, will be used to maintain governments that support the capitalist system and in order to maintain ideological consistency, governments under neo-colonial control will have a pro-western foreign policy<sup>1</sup>.

It seems to me that the above argument "governments under neo-colonial control will have a pro-western foreign policy" is true in the case of regimes which took power supported by the colonial power (the puppet regimes). This idea is unacceptable to the nationalist leaders in the non-aligned countries, because the main aims of the nationalist leaders were to pursue an independent foreign policy, not following a pro-western or pro-eastern policy. In line with the following therefore, one of the non-aligned founders, namely Nasser, President of Egypt argued that:

"One of the fundamental aims of Arab nationalism in independence means freedom to make our own decisions, freedom to keep outside anybody's sphere of influence".<sup>2</sup>

Non-alignment can be seen therefore as essentially a manifestation of a primordial urge for freedom. It is an expression of a perennial attitude of opposition to foreign domination and resistance to the great powers' spheres of influence. These orientations influence most

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1) Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.213-214.

2) Nasser, "Where I stand and Why", Washington D.C., U.A.R. Embassy Reprint, 1959, p.2.



developing countries to adopt the formal principle of non-alignment, but with differences between one country and another and from time to time.

However, while some writers saw post-war nationalism and anti-colonialism and the pressing problems of economic underdevelopment as the background circumstances in which non-alignment has flourished<sup>1</sup>, others saw no room for, or tolerance of states that attempt to remain neutral or non-involved in bloc conflict.<sup>2</sup> In what follows therefore, we will shed some light on the concept and identity of non-alignment.

### 1.3:2 THE CONCEPT AND IDENTITY OF NON-ALIGNMENT : ALLIANCE OR NON-ALIGNMENT.

There are many different arguments about the motives of non-alignment. While some writers have seen the poverty in developing and underdeveloped countries, the urgent need for increasing standards of living, and the consequent importance of industrial growth as strong motives for non-alignment,<sup>3</sup> others saw some non-aligned countries as adopting non-alignment as a means of obtaining maximum economic concessions from both blocs.<sup>4</sup> In other words the latter argument means that the motive of non-alignment is to play off one power against the other and thus to acquire economic and technical assistance not otherwise available.

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1) Burton, J., International Relation : A General Theory, London, 1967, p.186.

2) Holsti, K.J., International Politics, second edition, London, 1974, p.108.

3) Burton, J., op.cit., p.193.

4) Holsti, K.J., op.cit., p.108.

It seems to me that the first argument above is true simply because most developing nations are struggling and have struggled to get their independence and to develop their countries.

The second argument is superficial because the aid received by some non-aligned countries has been small compared with aid reaching those that were aligned. For example, U.S.A. aid over the ten years up to 1961 was : Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, \$28.8, \$15.00 and \$13.0 million respectively, while aid received by some non-aligned countries from the U.S.A. in the same period was only : Indonesia \$6.70 million, India \$6.20 million, Burma \$4.80 and Iraq \$3.30 million.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore obvious that the first argument is valid. This situation therefore lead one to consider and discuss the meaning and the aims of alliances. There are always several reasons for alliances other than economic ones.

From time to time states co-operate with each other under certain conditions. This co-operation may take various forms. One obvious form of co-operation among states is the creating of military alliances. The essence of every military alliance is that it aligns one set of countries against another and is called collective defence.<sup>2</sup>

The term 'alliances' generally denotes the commitment of a certain number of states under certain conditions: they will act against another state or set of states, and this is the main feature of an

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1) Published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1962, p.199.

2) Joyce, J.A., End of Illusion, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, p. IX.

alliance between states. The clearest example of alliances are in the form of agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the Warsaw Pact.

There are many forms of co-operation among states which can take the form of one set of states against another state or set of states without being formally allied, but the non-formalised co-operation between two states or more by means of a treaty is usually called alignment.

For instance there is the case of a small state that depends on a great power in almost all its economic and military needs or receives political orientation directly or indirectly. Thus we may say this small state can be or is considered as an aligned state with that super power, it is "said to be aligned with it rather than allied with it".<sup>1</sup>

In contrast, the new states provide perhaps the best example of rejection of this form of co-operation when they do not tie themselves with either military bloc in the Cold War. But in fact each of these non-aligned states finds itself under a certain amount of pressure from the super-powers to make it leave or move away from non-alignment, because when a nation moves away from the Western bloc, it could of course be welcomed by the Eastern bloc and vice versa.<sup>2</sup>

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- 1) Edwards, D.V., International Political Analysis, New York, 1969, p.206.
  - 2) Liska, G., Nations in Alliance, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, pp.26-41.

In the light of the above discussion it might be argued that states need to join alliances for several reasons and aims at the same time. That is to say, because alliances between states though usually shaped by military functions, often function in non-military domains to. Therefore, states follow an alliance policy in order to construct military alliances, as they assume that they cannot achieve their goals, protect their national interests, and stop any threat to them without entering alliances to mobilize their own capabilities for it is clear to them that they face problems similar to those of their allies. Accordingly, traditional alliances have been considered to perform one or more of the following functions:

"A" allies with "B" because:

- (1) "A" does not want "B"'s power to be added to "A"'s enemy. This formula is  $[A \quad C - B]$ ;
- (2) "A" for the purpose of using "B"'s territory for its strategic considerations.

The reason for alliance, therefore, is that it adds to an allied state's power, the power of other states and vice versa. The common perception of a common threat is probably the most obvious urge for creating military alliances, that can preserve the existing political and social structure. N.A.T.O. can provide an example, when the European countries were threatened by the expansion of the U.S.S.R. in Europe after the Second World War.

The second reason for forming alliances is a geographical one. When states want to form an alliance they aim to disperse their rival's power in order to fight it on two or more fronts.

The third reason for forming alliances is that some small states choose alliances because they have no other choice, they join an

alliance because in the case of any confrontation between the super-powers, they would be subjected to occupation.

The fourth reason is that the super-powers' decision makers may seek from forming alliances with small powers both political and military advantages, while small states may seek from alliances with super-powers assistance in domestic matters such as aid in protecting the existing regime from collapse.

It might be argued that alliances are also not the norms of international relations, partly because most states are not allied, nor have they been so in the past, and partly, because an alliance policy has never been effective in keeping peace nor has it been successful in eliminating external threats. On the contrary, it has always had the opposite effect, as the creation of an alliance even for defensive purposes will be perceived by others as offensive and that leads them to create a counter-alliance. This opens the way for an arms race and probably an increase in conflicts has always been the case between East and West.

There is always an arms increase, each wants to increase its capacity in order to deter its rival. This race results from the feeling of insecurity from both or all sides involved in a struggle for power and this in turn makes them feel threatened rather than secure. Therefore, it seems that states following a non-aligned policy avoid alliances not by entering a different alliance but by following the non-aligned policy which is only a response to alliances.

The non-aligned policy is neither defensive nor offensive, seeking co-operation and avoiding and rejecting alliances and arms races.

It may be valid to remark that the non-aligned movement follows ideal policies in a far from ideal world.

However, in the light of the above discussion, we must conclude that the Asian, African and Latin American nations struggled and are still struggling against colonialism and imperialism. On the other hand, the newly independent nations are looking towards non-alignment as they do not wish to be aligned with super-powers. The most important fathers of this idea of non-alignment are, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of Indonesia. In what follows, therefore, we will shed some light on those founders.

#### 1.4 THE FOUNDERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The second half of the twentieth century particularly after World War II, has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of liberation movements against colonialism, seeking or struggling for the independence of their countries. The United Nations Organization provided an ideal place from which the voice of these liberation movements could be heard and where the leaders of the Third World could come into contact. While aware of the incapacity of their countries to enter into confrontation with the super-powers, they also realised that alliance with any of the existing military pacts would bring them under the direct control of these powers. They decided to keep a neutral position vis a vis the conflicting powers in the world.

The most distinguished founders of this idea of positive non-alignment, as we saw earlier were:-

G.A. Al-Nasser, President of Egypt.

J. Nehru, Prime Minister of India.  
A. Sukarno, President of Indonesia.  
J.P. Tito, President of Yugoslavia.

These founders came together and established the non-aligned movement as we saw earlier under the basis of refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the super-powers and anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism and so on. Because of the importance of these leaders in their theorizing for the non-aligned movement, a brief consideration of them is warranted.

#### 1.4:1 G.A. AL-NASSER, PRESIDENT OF EGYPT

Egypt has always been of importance on the world stage, even before Nasser came to power. This is particularly so simply because of its geo-strategic position in the Middle East, which is bound to allow it to play some role in the area. Because of this reason, Egypt has always been subject to threats of foreign domination for many reasons, perhaps not least since 1869, because of the importance of the Suez Canal.

In its recent history, Egypt was successively dominated at one time or another by France, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain. Britain's main interest was the domination of the Suez Canal as a strategic and commercial route.<sup>1</sup>

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1) Allen, Philip M., and Segal, Aaren, op.cit., p.159.

When the Cold War began casting its shadow over Egypt, that country was still passing through the last phase of its national liberation struggle. The question of unity of the Nile valley and the question of evacuation of the British bases in the Suez Canal Zone were dominating Egyptian domestic and foreign policies.<sup>1</sup> No Egyptian government could have retained its legitimacy if it had acquiesced in the British presence either in the Sudan or in the Suez Canal Zone.<sup>2</sup>

When Nasser came to power on July 23, 1952\*, he was faced with immense problems among which were huge unemployment, the highest rate of population growth in the world and meagre resources. Added to this was the international interest in dominating Egypt in order to secure the use of the Suez Canal, particularly for military purposes. Moreover, the question of national economic development also influenced the domestic and foreign policy of Nasser.

Initially, Egypt's economic links were mostly with the Western countries, particularly Britain. For the economic development of Egypt, Nasser preferred to seek economic assistance from the West. The most visible demonstration of that policy was the Egyptian willingness to seek loans for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan from the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the World Bank, but Egypt received a public rebuff from the U.S.A. and her allies.<sup>3</sup>

Egypt then developed trade relations with the Soviet Union in

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1) Singh, K.R., "Egyptian non-alignment", Journal of international studies, volume 20, number 1-2, January-June, 1981, p.316.

2) Ibid., p.316.

\* In July 23, 1952, Nasser with a group of officers deposed King Faruk and sent him into exile (Initially the revolution was headed by M. Negib).

3) Singh, K.R., op.cit., p.317.



1955, and the Czech arms deal was officially acknowledged in September 1955. After a great deal of negotiation, the Soviet Union finally agreed to finance partly the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.

Thus Nasser's policy involved a refusal to align with the West. Nasser's greatest anti-imperialist victory was his nationalization of the Suez Canal in the face of the tripartite aggression of Britain, France and Zionism in 1956. Indeed, his participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 and his visit to some non-aligned countries like India boosted his popularity. As Nasser himself admitted:

"My visit to India was a turning point in my political understanding. I learned and recognised that the only wise policy for us consisted in adopting positive neutralism and non-alignment. On my return home, the reception that greeted this policy convinced me that it was the sole possible policy that could attract the broadest support of the Arab people".<sup>1</sup>

As a result of this, Nasser became a hero not only to the Arab people, but throughout the Third World, and Cairo emerged as the Mecca of revolutionary leaders, particularly those from Africa.

Nasser understood non-alignment not to be forming a bloc or a "Third Force" in the world, but as a gathering of states to work for easing the tension of the cold war and laying the foundations of peace. Such a policy (non-alignment) had to support the right of self-determination and so on. He argued that:

"We do not wish to insinuate directly or indirectly that the states following the policy of non-alignment aim to create a Third bloc".<sup>2</sup>

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1) Bahgat, Korany., Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour, Geneva, 1976, pp.265-266. (2) Nasser's speech at the Conference of the non-aligned movement at Belgrade, 1961, Belgrade 1961, p.44.  
2) Nasser's speech at the conference of the non-aligned movement at Belgrade, 1961, Belgrade, 1961, p.44.

He added:

"As for our international policy, it is one of work for easing tension now that humanity has reached a stage where it has become a necessity to end the cold war and lay the foundation of peace. We support the right of self-determination; we stand by all the nations that are struggling for their independence and work towards ending the power policies pursued by the big powers. We work for the liquidation of the spheres of influence, bearing in mind that the independence gained be real so that the smaller nations would not be toys in the hands of the big ones. We are struggling for the prevention of atomic weapons and for disarmament so that all efforts can be directed towards development".<sup>1</sup>

From the above setting, Nasser emerged as a potentially natural leader of the non-aligned movement, and certainly his foreign policy was designed on three doctrines, that is: Anti-imperialism, Arab Nationalism and Non-Alignment with either of the two super-powers.

#### 1.4:2 J. NEHRU : PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA

Nehru the then Prime Minister of India, is also regarded as one of the first people to call for non-alignment by avoiding the bloc systems and international confrontations and conflict. He did not mean non-alignment as neutrality and a negative policy, but he meant non-alignment with the military blocs. He once said in this respect that:

"We have proclaimed during these past years that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or anything else or passivity. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral ... we are not going to join a war if we can help it, ... we have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or another".<sup>2</sup>

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- 1) Nasser's speech to the General Co-operation Conference, November 17, 1958, pp.54-55, Cairo, 1958.
  - 2) Poplai, S.L., Select Documents of Asian Affairs: India 1947-1950, Volume 11: External Affairs (Oxford University Press, 1959), p.1.

The above statement shows clearly Nehru's conviction in favour of non-alignment even before it was solidly established. He condemned for example the British, French and Zionist invasion of Suez as a "naked aggression" in 1956 and the Soviet Union's interference in Hungary in 1956.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Nehru conceived non-alignment as not entering into military alliances with any country and in particular with any country of either the western or the communist bloc. He also conceived it as an independent approach to foreign policy, not being tied down to any particular line of action because of membership of a cold war bloc, and finally, he considered it as an attempt to maintain friendly relations with all countries, whether belonging to military blocs or not. All the above conceptions were clear in his argument when he was defining non-alignment in the following speech:

"When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously, it means non-alignment with military blocs. You cannot have a negative policy. The policy is a positive one, a definite one, and I hope a dynamic one, but in so far as the military blocs today and the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves with either bloc. That in itself is not a policy; it is only a part of a policy ... one has to lay stress on the fact that we are not parties to the cold war and we are not members of, or attached to, any military bloc. The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgement and furthering the principal objectives and ideals that we have ..." He added that "non-alignment meant trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries".<sup>2</sup>

However, despite the fact that India was one of the first countries to lead the non-aligned movement, it was still a member of the British Commonwealth.

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1) Appadorai, A., "Non-alignment: Some important Issues", International Studies, op.cit., p.5.

2) Nehru, J., His Speeches, September 1957-April, 1963, Delhi : Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1964, Vol.4, p.381.

Thus it could be said that, India was not strictly following the fundamental principles of the non-aligned movement.<sup>1</sup> It is well to bear in mind, however, that Nehru did not see the Commonwealth organization as an equivalent to the major blocs, and therefore saw no conflict in India's membership of the Commonwealth and its major role in laying down the foundations for the non-aligned movement at the same time.

As one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement, India foresaw its role as a country looking not only for peace and freedom for itself, but also as helping other countries to achieve their own independence from the dominance of the imperialist countries.

Some writers interpreted Nehru's intentions as a need for him to lead other small countries.<sup>2</sup> Being aware of such interpretations and the damage that may be caused to the newly established movement, Nehru strongly rejected such an idea. In his own words:

"Our policy is not a passive policy or a negative policy ... certainly we have done nothing in India to merit leadership of anybody. It is for us to lead ourselves, then only can we lead others properly and I do not wish to place the case of India at any higher level, we have to look after ourselves".<sup>3</sup>

This clearly indicates that while India was looking outwardly to encourage the Third World countries to organize themselves in the non-aligned movement, it was at the same time looking towards the building of its own society if it was to play any significant role on the international stage.

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1) Al Mossa, A., op.cit., p.3.

2) Willetts, P., op.cit., p.6.

3) Pola, S.L., op.cit., pp.24-26.

### 1.4:3 AHMAD SUKARNO : PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA

Indonesia gained independence at the end of 1949 and joined the United Nations a year later. There was a combination of factors which, taken together played an important part in shaping the Indonesian approach to international relations. Such factors included, for example, the Japanese anti-western indoctrination particularly during the Second World War, and their own struggle for independence in the immediate post-war period.<sup>1</sup> These factors among other things, helped to direct Indonesian foreign policy into alienating itself from the world blocs on the one hand and into becoming anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist on the other hand. This is obvious from the words of President Sukarno when he stated that:

"We know a colonialist when we see one. We shall deal as effectively with new colonialism as we have dealt with and are dealing with the old ones. Do not try to divert our attention from the present cancers attacking our bodies ... we shall be equipped to deal with any new imperialism that may try to rear its ugly head".<sup>2</sup>

It is clear from the above that from the start, Sukarno in a way committed Indonesia to fight all colonialism and imperialism in the world at large, whereas by contrast Nehru was in favour of world peace.

It is perhaps true to say that Sukarno's drive against colonialism was helped by certain internal factors on the domestic front. On the one hand there was his desire for a close, friendly relationship with China.

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1) Kimche, D., The Afro-Asian Movement, Jerusalem, 1973, p.41.

2) Sukarno, Dr. A., The Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned Countries, September 1-6, 1961, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, pp.26-30.

On the other hand, there were grave economic, political and security problems from which he intended to distract the public's attention.<sup>1</sup> These internal factors played their part in projecting a militant image of Sukarno at least in so far as world affairs are concerned.

These internal factors were magnified by domestic party squabbles. At first, there was a coalition government dominated by the Muslim Masjumi Party which was headed by Muhammad Nazir. This government by nature was more inclined to follow a policy of Muslim solidarity. Later a new government was led by the National Party in a coalition with the Socialist Party. The two parties in the new government represented a, much more militant and anti-western mood and therefore were more inclined towards regionally and internationally directed foreign policy. In that sense, the government tried to gather around a number of countries with similar international views particularly those with neutralist views.\*

Indeed, Indonesia started asserting itself in world affairs on issues concerning Asia and Africa. The outcome of these efforts was the first Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955, described as "a milestone in Asian-African solidarity".<sup>2</sup>

According to David Kimche in The Afro-Asian movement, the

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1) Kimche, D., op.cit., p.41.

\* For an in depth analysis of the world views held by the Indonesian ruling elite belonging to the three generations of 1928, 1945 and 1966, See: Weinstein, Franklin B., Indonesia Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence : From Sukarno to Socharto, New York and London, 1976.

2) Arora, B.D., "Indonesian non-alignment", International Studies, op.cit., p.278.

foreign policy of Indonesia in the 1950's-1960's was as follows:-<sup>1</sup>

- (1) Indonesia renounced membership of any bloc or military pact.
- (2) It favoured Asian problems being solved by the Asians themselves including the question of Vietnam.
- (3) Indonesia always supported every struggle for independence whichever it was; the strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity was the principle part of the independent and active foreign policy of Indonesia, a policy which was anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. This was in conformity with the firm policy of Indonesia in respecting and applying the ten principles of the Bandung Conference.

The above shows clearly that Sukarno was one of the leaders to introduce the main principles of non-alignment into the framework of his country's foreign policy, in addition to his preaching such principles to the world at large.

#### 1.4:4 J.P. TITO : PRESIDENT OF YUGOSLAVIA

Tito was known as one of the most distinguished fathers of the non-aligned movement but, as Peter Willetts argues, Tito's non-alignment came as late as the beginning of the 1960's. "Thus until 1961 the key concept in Yugoslavia's foreign policy was not non-alignment but peaceful and active co-existence".<sup>2</sup> In another passage he suggests that the major reason which made Tito opt for non-alignment was the fear of the Soviet Union's threat to Yugoslavia. This argument of Peter Willett's does not seem to correspond to Tito's declaration in the United Nations in the early 1950's when he said:

"We oppose the division of the World into blocs ... and the race for armaments; which tends to create a state of supremacy ... for the solution of some problems through the use of force. This would surely lead to the creation of a state of confrontation"<sup>3</sup>

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1) Kimche, D., op.cit., pp.230-236.

2) Willetts, Peter., op.cit., pp.230-236.

3) Shariefy, Bo. Alam., "Tito the hero of freedom and non-alignment", Almajahed, volume 1031, May 9, 1980, p.19 (In Arabic).

Tito's adoption of socialism did not divert his attention from seeking the independence of his country and he was able to keep Yugoslavia in a neutral position as regards N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw pact. His ideology was communist but he broke from Moscow in 1948 for many reasons, some of which, according to David Lane, were the following:-\*

- (1) The Yugoslavian Socialist leaders, Tito and his followers, believed in the triumph of communism, and that the party should be the ideological vanguard and the organizer of the workers' movement.
- (2) They criticised the development of Socialism in the Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, whom they had previously admired, because of its over-centralisation and bureaucratic control.
- (3) They split from the Soviet Union because they believed that the Soviet model had become distorted but did not attempt to find out what were the principle causes of that distortion. Instead they formulated a system that sought to overcome the deficiencies of the Soviet model, such as bureaucratic over centralisation.
- (4) They rejected the authoritarian dominance of the communist party of the Soviet Union over communist parties in other countries.
- (5) They rejected the idea that the Soviet model of development could be the only model. It was true for them that the Soviet had developed their own socialism, but they held that there were possibilities for other roads to be followed in the development of socialism.
- (6) They accepted co-operation with the democratic socialist parties in advanced capitalist countries. On this point David Lane says:

"In advanced capitalist countries", argue the Yugoslavs, "the forces of socialism are much stronger than they were before the Second World War, and social democratic parties and trade Unions have an important part to play in achieving Socialism. In this situation therefore, communist parties should co-operate with social democratic parties".

During the 1950's Tito had a close relationship with Nasser of Egypt. He supported Egypt against the aggression of Britain, France

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\* For further reading on the split of 1948 between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, See for example, David Lane, The Socialist Industrial State, London, 1976.



and Zionism following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956; and he was of much help and support to the movements of liberation in the world such as the Algerian revolution against French colonialism in 1954-1962.<sup>1</sup> In addition he was against the interference of countries in the internal affairs of others and so he broke off his country's relations with Zionism after its 1967 war against the neighbouring Arab countries and the occupation of some of their territories.<sup>2</sup>

The above outlines, though very briefly, the grounds on which the leaders met to build the base for the non-aligned movement. It was perhaps not only their own aspirations for the independence of the small countries in the Third World, but also the historical circumstances with which they were confronted either domestically or internationally, which were vital factors for them in finding common grounds for the establishment of the non-aligned movement.

However, after having discussed earlier the definition of non-alignment and the theoretical basis in relation to non-alignment and the founders of the non-aligned movement, we may ask, what are the differences between non-alignment and neutralism. In what follows we will see the main differences between these.

### 1.5 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND NEUTRALISM

The study of neutralism in international relations gains considerable importance particularly in the attempt to understand non-alignment as a concept. This importance comes about because sometimes there seems to be some confusion between the two concepts.

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1) Shariefy, Bo. Alam., op.cit., p.17.  
2) Willetts, P., op.cit., p.17.

We have already defined non-alignment in the present chapter as a "social and political movement aiming at changing the system of the present economic and political relations in the world". By contrast Black for example, defines a neutral state as follows:-

"A neutral state is one whose political independence and territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a collective agreement of great powers, subject to the conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another state except to defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which may compromise its neutralized status".<sup>1</sup>

Now, in reading the above definition, one could find distinctive aspects of neutralism. For one thing the neutral state's territory is guaranteed by a collective agreement of great powers. On the other hand, there are specific conditions to be met for a country to be neutral, particularly the fact that such a country must not take up arms against others except in self defence. Also, it must not enter into another agreement which contradicts its neutral status.

The above clearly shows that neutralism and non-alignment are quite different concepts. Having established the basic conditions for neutralism, it is important to note that neutralism does not apply only to states, but also to uninhabited areas such as waterways and such like.

As was said before, for a state to be neutralized there needs to be an agreement between two or more great powers to guarantee its neutral status as the diagrams No. 1.1 and No. 1.2 on the next page show.

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1) Black, Cyril E., Falk, Richard, A., Neutralization and World Politics, New Jersey, U.S.A., 1968, p.13.

DIAGRAM NO. 1.1





DIAGRAM NO. 1.2



In addition, in the case of waterways there is usually more than one great power, hence a bilateral or multilateral agreement is reached among interested countries so that the waterway in question can be neutralised. Diagram No.1.2 on the first page explains this idea.

However, while the above mentioned cases, that is, the case of a territory or that of a waterway, may be within an internationally recognised state, yet a third kind of neutralism may be found in inhabited areas without international recognition as in the case of Kashmir.

Moreover, while neutralism could be seen to play a negative role in world activities, non-alignment by contrast is viewed as playing a positive role particularly in its support for liberation movements either against colonialism or any other sort of suppression.

From the view point of a neutral state, the effect of neutralisation is to support its military security and neutralisation may stop them from engaging in military actions. A neutralised state must not adhere to any treaty, including defensive alliances and must not join a customs or economic union, which might in any way jeopardize its independence of political action.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, some writers have argued that "a neutral state cannot join a military alliance in time of peace, because in so doing it would destroy its ability to remain neutral in time of war".<sup>2</sup> Further, a

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1) Ogleby, R., The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, London, 1970, p.184.

2) Ogleby, R., op.cit., p.41.

neutral state must bar foreign military bases from its territory and its military capability may be positively used as part of the peace keeping forces of the United Nations and regional organisations.

It could be said that, from the viewpoint and definition above the neutral states will not take up arms, but then the question that should be asked is who will be responsible for the neutral states if any aggression arises?

It is obvious that it is the responsibility the other signatory powers, when the neutralized status of that state has been violated by deliberate aggression. The signatory powers will support them in three ways, collectively, individually or both. While the guarantor must support them against any aggression, he must not support any domestic revolutionaries against the government of a neutralized state or vice versa.

Finally, the difference between the neutralized state and non-alignment is clear. Whereas neutral states are concerned with keeping out of war when it comes, non-alignment is an active policy in the sense that a non-aligned state, unlike a neutral one, can fight its own wars and still be non-aligned, as India has done with Pakistan in the 1970s and Iraq with Iran in the 1980s while neutral states cannot do that.

## 1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

It was argued in this chapter that the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a radical change in world politics and the emergence of new political and military strategies in a merciless race

which divided the world into military blocs. The Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, have been involved in an arms race and the struggle between the two has been going on since the Second World War. They attempted to ally other countries with them, especially 'developing' and newly independent nations. The super-powers followed tactics of direct and indirect involvement towards the Third World countries to ally them to their side. They divided some nations such as Germany, Vietnam, Korea and others under claims of stopping other ideologies.

Also, in the United Nations Organization, the super-powers were, as they still are, dominating the whole organization through their right of veto in the Security Council and through their financial support. Given these facts, despite the increase in membership of the world organization, brought about particularly by the newly independent countries of the Third World, the super-powers were able to safeguard their interests.

In opposing the Cold War and the super-powers' attempts to ally other countries with them, the Third World leaders such as Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Sukarnu, came together and established the non-aligned movement. This movement is different completely from the well known military pacts. The non-aligned movement as the most important grouping representing the Third World's views within the United Nation's Organizations, has an important role to play through co-operating with each other and negotiating with the super-powers if they can, aiming for changes, or gaining more representatives in the Security Council or such like.

Non-alignment has two different meanings, on the one hand, it

refers to the participation of a state in the formal Non-aligned Movement, whether it is closely aligned with a super-power or not, such as Cuba with the Soviet Union bloc.

The other meaning, based on its founding principles I would say is that it is a contemporary social phenomenon which has appeared in recent times, in the form of an ideal and hope for the future, expressing strong and fundamental needs of the Third World nations for disassociation from the major power blocs, achievement of economic development, political independence, and positive participation in the world community.

This movement was established under the following aims:

Firstly: The essence of the policy of non-alignment was a deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or political commitment with any of the super-powers or to permit foreign military bases on one's territory.

Secondly: The non-aligned countries adopted non-alignment in opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. Also, after getting their political freedom, the newly independent nations were looking for economic development and wished not to be dependent on super-powers.

They followed the above aims and ideals because most of the Third World countries were suffering or had suffered, as some countries still suffer, from direct dependence on and domination by a foreign power.

It seems to me that to achieve the above aims and ideals as we saw earlier in the introduction the non-aligned countries need national leaders whose aims and ideal are to be genuinely non-aligned and independent in foreign policy as was the case with Nehru, Nasser, Tito, and Sukarnu.

Those founders of the Non-aligned Movement came together and established the Movement as a vehicle of a positive foreign policy different from that of neutralism.

The differences between the concepts of Non-alignment and neutralism were explained as follows:-

(1) Neutral states are concerned with keeping out of war when it comes, while non-alignment is an active policy. In other words, neutrality involved abstention from all conflicts, whereas, non-alignment only involves abstention from the cold war between the super-powers.

(2) The neutral state's territory is guaranteed by a collective agreement of great powers. Also, such a country must not enter into another agreement which contradicts its neutral status. Whereas non-alignment is an independent foreign policy.

(3) Neutralism does not apply only to states, but also to uninhabited areas such as waterways and such like, while non-alignment applies only to states.

Having discussed the meanings of non-alignment, its aims and ideals, the reasons which led to the establishment of the Movement



and the major differences between the concepts of neutralism and non-alignment, our analysis will concentrate in the following chapter on examining the evolution of the movement from the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1955 until the early 1980s.

## CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ITS AIMS, PROBLEMS  
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT WHICH EMERGED FROM ITS SUCCESSIVE CONFERENCES

## CHAPTER TWO

### The evolution of the non-aligned movement: Its aims, problems, and its developments which emerged from its successive conferences

#### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

In chapter one the world-wide circumstances within which the ideal of 'non-alignment' emerged were described and also it was argued that 'non-alignment' should not be equated with neutralism, but seen as a more active independent foreign policy in world affairs. Furthermore, the founders of independent foreign policy, i.e. non-alignment, aimed to achieve socio-economic and political development by following their aims of anti-colonialism and anti-neo-colonialism and non-alignment to the military power blocs. Also, we saw the differences between non-alignment according to its original principles and non-alignment as membership and participation of a state in the formal Non-aligned Movement whether it was clearly aligned with a super-power or not, as was the case with Cuba.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent the non-aligned countries have followed the ideal and aims of genuine non-alignment. In other words, we will see in this chapter whether the Non-aligned Movement have put the principles of non-alignment into practice or not.

In section one, our analysis will be to examine and concentrate on the beginnings of non-alignment as a group of countries defined and discussed their aims and principles of non-alignment at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. The founders of the Non-aligned

Movement went on to establish their movement, not against any particular type of social system or against any blocs, Western or Eastern, but rather the non-aligned states perceived the actions of both groups, i.e. the West and the Communist bloc in similar terms. These points are dealt with in section two.

The Non-aligned Movement was not a stationary organization, but rather a movement that responded to developments in the world's affairs. While the changes in the movement's thinking and orientation changed during the 1960s to accommodate both internal and external changes, i.e. from within the movement and from the rest of the world, yet further changes that appeared during the 1970s warranted a fresh look on the part of the movement at the new issues. Hence, section three, focuses on the response of the movement to developments during the Seventies.

Also, during the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen which may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement and its continuity. One such issue is the Iraqi-Iranian war. This war between two member countries has certainly brought to the fore two issues:-

Firstly, that some of the movement's member countries aligned themselves directly or indirectly with one of these countries against the other; and,

Secondly, this war put the credibility and authority of the movement to solve its internal problems at stake.

It is therefore rather important to discuss such developments, even though the period is a relatively short one, because the outcome may affect the future of the movement. This discussion will be in section four.

The fact is that, over the last three decades or so, the subjects addressed by the movement have appealed to most of the Third World countries, because they concerned each and every country separately and all countries collectively. Moreover, the movement has become an international forum for developing countries, since the movement's membership has increased several times whether the new members are following the principles of non-alignment or not. This is the subject of section five. This is followed by concluding remarks.

#### The Afro-Asian Conference (The Bandung 1955 Conference)

At no time in the history of the conferences of the Afro-Asian countries has non-alignment been discussed so seriously as in the early period. The views in these conferences showed different tendencies as to what should concern the camp's policy. It is worth noting that in this Conference three different directions of thinking emerged which affected the later history of the Non-aligned Movement. On the one hand, some new marxist writers saw most if not all, Third World countries as being bound to the West by a complex network of links to maintain capitalist exploitation.<sup>1</sup> This approach builds its basic idea on the West's maintaining a new form of economic colonialism even after such countries have achieved some sort of political independence.

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1) Willetts, P., The Non-aligned Movement, op.cit., p.209.

On the other hand, others postulated that each state had its own interests and therefore had a degree of alignment with the West depending on the particular government's perception of such interests.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the above, it is clear that in the Bandung conference such differences were in the forefront of the debate. Some countries were inclined to the West, and the holders of this view were the Philippines, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Thailand, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Liberia.\* The second group i.e. North Vietnam and the representatives of the Republic of China was adamant in rejecting the idea of aligning the movement more to the West.

In addition to the above tendencies, there was a third group which represented a different attitude, preferring non-alignment as defined in Chapter One and these were, Egypt, India and Indonesia.

Despite the fact that there were different degrees and variations from one country to another, some of the countries which attended the conference were still either under colonial rule or members of alliances such as SEATO or CENTO. The number of fully independent countries, i.e. neither colonies nor dependencies, who attended the conference was relatively small compared to the subsequent conferences of the non-aligned movement. Because of the importance of the Bandung conference, in what follows the countries represented at the conference in April 1955 are listed.

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1) Ibid., p.209.

\* Romulo, C., The meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill, N.C. 1956, pp.3-4.

The Bandung conference was held from 18 to 24 April 1955, in Indonesia and twenty-nine Afro-Asian countries were called to attend. Twenty-three countries represented Asia and only six countries represented Africa, because most African countries were under Western colonial rule. The Bandung conference was attended by representatives of the governments of:-

Indonesia	Pakistan	Afghanistan	The Republic of China
Burma	Ceylon	India	Egypt
Laos	Ethiopia	Iran	The Philippines
Iraq	Japan	Jordan	The Gold Coast
Lebanon	Libya	Liberia	Syria
Nepal	Sudan	Thailand	Saudi Arabia
Turkey	Yemen	Nth. Vietnam	Sth. Vietnam
			Cambodia

This gathering took into consideration some very important issues concerning the members of the movement and all other less-developed countries. The discussions revolved around three, main issues: The identity of non-alignment, colonialism, and economic co-operation. These three issues, represented the common denominators shared by the Afro-Asian countries.

The issue of colonialism was considered a very important one. It was one of the major problems from which most of the participating countries were suffering or had suffered, from foreign dependence and dominance. However, it was felt that there was disagreement over the definition of the concept of colonialism and the determination of its nature.

Some delegations saw colonialism as the result of Western domination only, that is, colonialism in the sense that countries lack political independence. Red China for example stated that, "The sin of

colonialism was peculiar to the West and that they were above it".<sup>1</sup>

Others saw colonialism as more general and attacked communism as a form of colonialism: "Fadhel Jamali of Iraq then unlimbered his guns for a withering attack on communism, as a form of colonialism more deadly than the old".<sup>2</sup> Also, Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon attacked "communist colonialism". He declared himself against all forms of colonialism, including communist domination of satellite states in Europe.<sup>3</sup> Colonialism for others, such as Egypt and India, was any type of dominance either from the East or the West.

However, the debate over defining colonialism continued until it was agreed to use the term "colonialism" in the more general sense. This agreement brought about a solution to the differences among the participants in such a way that since then, colonialism as a concept has been treated as a single undivided issue, that is, all forms of aspects of colonialism from whatever quarter they come are dealt with on the same basis.

When debating the concept and identity of non-alignment there were big controversies about the meaning of the concept of alliance and non-alignment, because many of the participating countries saw the necessity for their own alliance to one of the super-powers. They were very much influenced by the consequences and the general climate left by the cold war and its effects on the Third World countries.

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1) Romulo, C.P., The meaning of Bandung, op.cit., p.15.

2) Ibid., p.22.

3) Ibid., p.27.



This idea was defended by Fadhil Jamali, the delegate of Iraq, Charles Malek, the delegate of Lebanon, and General Romulo of the Philippines. Their argument was based on the following points:-<sup>1</sup>

Firstly, some small countries have no choice, but to ally with one of the big powers to protect themselves; they are not big enough as India is, to manage to protect themselves on their own without alliance with any other country. Secondly, the Afro-Asian countries which gathered in Bandung did not represent an alternative to the military pacts, which other countries could join. Therefore, they found a justification for their alliance to pacts of other, militarily stronger, countries.

The other group, represented by Nehru, stood very firm in defending the idea of non-alignment, stating clearly the danger and humiliation which could result from the alliance of any Afro-Asian country to the conflicting super-powers. At that stage Nehru argued at the Bandung conference that:

"We are not yes men sitting here saying "yes" to this country or that, saying "yes" even to each other. We are great countries, who like having freedom without dictation in the future. No "yes men" in Asia or Africa. We have had enough of that in the past".<sup>2</sup>

However, in an effort to end the long-lasting arguments, the conference finally reached a relatively satisfactory solution acceptable to both groups, that is, the recognition of the policy of pacts. This has meant the recognition of the right of each country to

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1) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., p.58.

2) Babaa, K.I. and Crabb, C. JR., "Non-alignment as a deplomatic and ideological credo", "The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume 363, November 1965, p.7.

defend itself individually and collectively, according to the United Nations Charter.

On economic co-operation, the Afro-Asian conference focused on the necessity of promoting economic development and economic co-operation between the Third World countries, but in areas of interest to each nation, to the extent that it would not interfere with their individual integrity and sovereignty.

In addition to that, the countries stressed the need for economic co-operation, the flow of more resources, stabilization in world trade, i.e. commodity prices and demand, changing the nature of demand for primary commodities and the development of infrastructures. In pursuit of that aim the influence of member countries present at the United Nations resulted in the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and the establishment of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), within the framework of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRID), to promote equity investment i.e. capitalism and joint ventures in the Afro-Asian countries.<sup>1</sup>

The non-aligned countries were already looking to the United Nations and the World Bank to promote their economic development. In addition, some countries while recognising the political and ideological differences among the wide range of member countries, argued very strongly at the Bandung conference that close co-operation and co-ordination among them within the movement was not only feasible, but necessary. This was reflected for example in Chou En Lai's

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1) Watson, H.A., The Non-aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit., p.135.

statements:

"We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries we do have different ideologies and different social systems, but this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being "United"  
"We should leave aside our different ideologies, our differing state systems, and the international obligations which we have assumed by joining this side or that side. We should instead settle all question which may arise among us on the basis of common peace and co-operation".<sup>1</sup>

Despite the fact that there were diverging trends and tendencies, the conference made a great effort, and achieved many positive results. The conference as we have already stated contained pro-western as well as pro-communist countries, but it succeeded in not only narrowing the gap between these two diverging trends, but also succeeded in convincing some countries such as Iraq to change their policies (from pro-western to pro-Soviet when the Qasim regime took over in 1958) and others to take a milder position towards their alliances.

The decisions reached at the Bandung conference were stated in an official publication on April 24th, 1955. The decision emphasized an increase in mutual aid between the Afro-Asian countries in order to find the best ways to confront their economic crisis. It also called for cultural aid, because it said, colonial domination was delaying this aid or making it impossible. Today when most countries have become politically independent it is now possible to make available increasing aid by establishing universities, professional and specialized centres.

While the points discussed above are general and necessarily cover a wide range of issues, it is clear that in the Bandung conference, the

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1) Uinacke, H.M., "The Annals of the American Acadamy, op.cit., p.116.

movement was looking for a definite identity. This is particularly apparent if one notices the regional flavour of most of the issues presented and tackled in the conference.

The final communique of the conference identified the "Ten Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence", which in a sense laid down the basic principles on which the movement would start. These principles are summarized as follows:-

AGENDA NO. 2.1

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The Bandung Conference Principles\*, April 1955, (Bandung-Indonesia)

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1. Respect of the basic rights of man and the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. Respect of the sovereignty and integrity of the lands of all states.
3. Recognition of equality among all races and states large and small.
4. Refraining from interference in the internal affairs of other states.
5. Respect of the right of every state to self defence individually or jointly according to the United Nations Charter.
6. Refraining from using joint defence arrangements for the benefit of any of the super-powers, and any state to refrain from using pressures on any other state.
7. Refraining from threat, aggression or use of force against the integrity of lands or the political independence of any state.
8. Resolving all international differences by peaceful means, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
9. Encouragement of joint interests and co-operation.
10. Respect of international friendship and commitments.

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\* In addition, the conference discussed other things, such as problems of dependent peoples and cultural co-operation.

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SOURCE: See C. Romulo, op.cit, pp.91-102

The period between the Bandung conference and the Belgrade Summit conference, 1955-1961, witnessed a close relationship between Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia, particularly after the

Suez crisis. They worked together as non-aligned countries. They held a meeting between all of them in July 1956 in Yugoslavia. This meeting was important because subsequently it had a wide ranging impact on the development of the movement as already hinted in Chapter One.

Yugoslavia was a communist European country and by becoming non-aligned it widened the international context of the movement. On the other hand, it meant that the movement was not only for the countries which had suffered direct colonialism, but was also open to all the countries not wishing to enter the military pacts of the super-powers. Also the acceptance of the membership of Yugoslavia, introduced new policies different from those of both East and West.

The meeting of the leaders of the non-aligned countries, held in July 1956 in Yugoslavia, between Nasser, Nehru and Tito, resulted in the call for a preliminary meeting for a conference at Belgrade. Also, they adopted "positive neutralism" as their definition of non-alignment, by which these states declared they were not going to be involved in the cold war. One of the many things that these three founders of non-alignment had in common was their opposition to Great Powers alliances. For example, Egypt and India were opposed to the Baghdad pact and SEATO, while Yugoslavia was opposed to the Warsaw pact.

As we saw earlier, the non-aligned countries at the Bandung conference were divided into three groups, pro-western, pro-eastern and the genuinely non-aligned group. In the 1960's, the movement witnessed new developments such as international definition, stability and a new constitution. In what follows therefore, we will shed some light on the non-aligned movements development during this period.

## 2.2 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE 1960s : PRIORITIES, STABILITY

### INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION AND NEW CONSTITUTION

In the 1960s, the movement's attention was diverted for the first time from focusing on regional issues towards an emphasis on international issues, such as the movement's international definition and aims. At the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961, the non-aligned countries declared that, the non-aligned movements establishment was not against any countries or against any blocs, Western or Eastern or against any particular type of social system. It was a social movement looking for international peace and freedom; equality and so on. This is clear from Sukarno's words at the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961, when he said:

"Non-alignment is not directed against any one country or against any one bloc or against any particular type of social system. It is our common conviction that a policy of non-alignment is the best way for each of us to make a positive contribution towards the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions".

Sukarno also added:

"We mean that all nations must become independent. All nations must have the freedom to be free. We mean that no power shall interfere in the struggle of any other nation to find its own national concept, that no power shall attempt to force any other nation to change its ideology".<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, during 1960s, there was general agreement that the basic tenet of non-alignment had crystalized: no military or political alliance with super-powers and an active role in the international system.

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1) Sukarno, A., Speech at the Belgrade Conference 1961, The Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-aligned Countries, Belgrade, 1961, pp.26-30.

The movement's role and activity in the United Nations General Assembly was made known in the following argument:

"We are not neutral, we want it understood that we do not welcome this appellation of being called neutral or ... neutralist whatever it means. We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialism and other countries ... our position is that we are ... unaligned and uncommitted, in relation to the Cold War, we do not belong to one camp or another".<sup>1</sup>

It could be said that during the 1960s, the non-aligned movement was led and dominated by its founders, Nasser, Nehru and Tito and that the movement became more stable in that period, perhaps because of the absence of countries which were members of pacts with super-powers from the non-aligned conferences, such as Pakistan, China and the Philippines. Taking a quick glance over the agenda of the non-aligned movement conferences during the 1960s, we can see that most of Nasser's proposals passed into the non-aligned movement's communiqués during that decade. For example, the responsibility of the non-aligned movement to work among themselves for peace and so on.\* Figure 2.1 shows that Nasser and Nehru dominated most of the non-aligned movement between them. Because the non-aligned movement was led by its founders during the 1960s, the member states evaluated the West and the Communists in the same terms.


The non-aligned states perceived the actions of both groups also in similar terms. In addition, the non-aligned states' actions towards

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1) U.N. General Assembly Official Record, 1960 pp.444-446.

\* For more details See: Nasser's proposals at the Belgrade Conference 1961. The Conference of Heads of State or Government, op.cit., pp.48-51.

FIGURE 2.1 Shows that: Nasser and Nehru dominated most of the non-aligned movement in the 1960s



SOURCE: Jansen, G.H., Afro-Asian and Non-alignment, London, 1966



East and West did not differ significantly and did not display differing levels of co-operation.

The actions of non-aligned states were congruent with their attitudes; overt behaviour and perceptual assessments were not incongruent with official policy. In addition, after the 1960's conferences and meetings of the non-aligned countries, two more important issues were more or less clear to the movement. On the one hand, the movement defined its identity as one based on a long cultural tradition redefined to cope with the challenges of modern life. On the other hand, they redefined their international role and function as one of mediation between conflicting parties in the world as well as reducing tension and instability at international level.<sup>1</sup>

This was a clear departure from the past conferences in the sense that the emphasis shifted from a regional, inward looking discussion to broadly based international issues that concerned the world at large. Since then, the movement has presented itself to the world as an international grouping that, while it has been so far on the receiving end, should have a bearing on world issues as well.

Also, in the 1960s, the world witnessed many events, such as the attempts at disarmament, the building of the Berlin Wall and other events. Under the above circumstances, when the non-aligned summit conference opened at Belgrade in 1961, the question of security and disarmament was immediately relevant to the conference.

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1) Chouri, N., "The non-alignment of Afro-Asian States, Policy, Perception and Behaviour", Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 11, March 1969, pp.3-5.

The Belgrade Summit Conference adopted a special 'statement on the danger of war and an appeal for peace and sent Sukarno and Keito to Moscow and Nehru and Nkrumah to Washington as special emissaries with letters appealing for further talks between Kennedy and Khrushchev.<sup>1</sup>

The non-aligned summit conference at Belgrade in 1961 discussed many important issues in addition to the question of security, such as anti-colonialism; problems of unequal economic development; promotion of international economic and technical co-operation besides others. (For more details see the Agenda of the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961 in Appendix No.1).

As for the anti-colonial problem it could be said that from the beginning anti-colonialism was one of the criteria of non-alignment. Despite the fact that the letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev made a great impact, we can see from the agenda of the summit conference in 1961, that the main declaration devoted the first eight of the twenty seven specific points with which it ended, to anti-colonial issues.<sup>2</sup>

The economic problem received very little attention in 1961, perhaps because at the time, the non-aligned countries were looking for world security, peaceful existence and disarmament.

The Cairo conference communiqué in 1964, gave even more attention to security problems with eight separate sections on the codification of peaceful co-existence, on respect for sovereignty, on settlement of

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1) The Collected Documents. op.cit., pp.1-2.

2) Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.24-26.

disputes without force and disarmament as shown in the Agenda in Appendix No.1.

The economic problem received much more attention at the Cairo summit conference in 1964 than at the Belgrade summit conference in 1961 as the agendas show. At the Lusaka summit conference in 1970, anti-colonialism, apartheid and imperialism were raised to being the main items on the agenda, besides the forces of racism. It can be seen from the 1961-1970 summit resolutions that it was the African countries that took the lead in most of these resolutions, because most of the African countries were in those years emerging from colonial rule. Also, the section on 'economic development and co-operation' in the 1970 final document was second only to the section on colonialism in length.<sup>1</sup>

The proposals adopted were mainly a reiteration of previous demands on the U.N. and the developed countries for an increase in development decade targets, more and better aid, better terms of trade, a new U.N. industrial agency and so on.<sup>2</sup> At the third summit conference in Lusaka in 1970, the disarmament and the general security questions received relatively little attention perhaps because some dangerous events in the world had settled down such as the Cuba missiles crisis.

However, this process of change in attitude as well as the level and scope of the movement's orientation to the issues was further elaborated on and enhanced in the period 1961-1964, i.e. from after the

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1) Ibid., p.26.

2) Ibid., p.26.

Belgrade conference up to and including the Cairo and Lusaka summit conferences.

Furthermore, the 1960's summit conferences of the non-aligned countries, particularly the Lusaka summit conference adopted a non-aligned constitution by which the non-aligned countries agreed to follow the following:-<sup>1</sup>

Firstly, they decided to hold meetings on a regular basis at a variety of levels of representation. This now means that summit conferences are held every three years. They have been held for example in 1973, 1976 and in 1979 at Algiers, Colombo and Havana. The participating countries at the sixth summit conference at Havana in 1979 decided that the seventh summit conference would be held at Baghdad in 1982, but because the war between Iraq and Iran was still going on, they agreed to change the place to India and the date to 7-11 March, 1983.

The second measure taken at the end of the 1970 summit conference was to appoint as official spokesman, the Chairman President of the movement. This role as spokesman or leader of the non-aligned countries was given for a three year period until the following summit conference, for example, the leader of the non-aligned countries during the period 1979-1982 was F. Castro of Cuba.

Thirdly, they agreed to re-establish a permanent executive committee for the movement to maintain liaison and co-ordination with

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1) For more details see: The Documents of the Non-aligned Movement, op.cit., and Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.36-38.

Zambia to prepare for the summit conference. (For more details see later.)

Finally, they agreed to develop an active group to work at the United Nations. It could be said that the non-aligned group started to operate after 1971 and became more active from 1973, but we may add, however, that these decisions were not always put into practice, particularly the activity in the United Nations.\* For more details of the Lusaka Summit Conference in 1970 Resolutions, See Appendix No. 1.

In addition to the 1960's summit conferences, there were other conferences and meetings in different places in the world. These meetings and conferences were held in the context of an international situation characterized by an intensification of the struggle of the peoples of the world for their political and economic independence and for an economic order based on universally accepted principles.

The non-aligned movement was not a stationery organization, but rather a movement that responded to the development in the world's affairs. While the changes in the movement's thinking and orientation have changed during the 1960s to accommodate both internal and external changes, i.e. from within the movement and from the rest of the world, yet new changes that appeared during the 1970's warranted a fresh look on the part of the movement at the new issues.

Hence, we continue our discussion in what follows, focusing on the response of the movement to the developments during the seventies.

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\* For more details see: Willetts, P., op.cit, pp.34-40.

## 2.3 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE 1970s : NEW LEADERS AND NEW DEVELOPMENT.

After the Lusaka 1970 Summit Conference, the non-aligned movement had to face two important new situations. On the one hand, the movement lost some of its founders such as Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno and on the other hand the movement tried in the 1970s to project its views and functions to the international community through negotiation at the United Nations with the Northern countries in an attempt to change the international economic system, and the international information order, and other problems in the world, to promote peace.

Firstly, in the 1970s the non-aligned movement faced new development. The movement lost more of its founders and for that reason perhaps, allowed new leaders such as Fidel Castro and others from the pro-communist camp to play a role in the movement. These in turn tried to steer the movement towards their own aims. In other words what happened gave some leaders the chance to pull the movement towards the communist bloc and away from the capitalist one. This was clear when Fidel Castro argued at the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973:

"I want to remind you that Cuba is a socialist country, Marxist-Leninist, whose final goal is communism. We are proud of this! The theory of "Two imperialisms", one headed by the USA and the other allegedly headed by the Soviet Union has been echoed by leaders and spokesmen of non-aligned countries. Any attempt to put the non-aligned countries against the socialist camp is profoundly counter revolutionary and benefits only imperialist interests. Inventing a false enemy can have only one aim, to evade the real enemy. Any enstrangement from the socialist camp means weakening and exposing ourselves to the mercy of the still powerful forces of imperialism. It would be a stupid strategy, a case of severe political short sightedness".<sup>1</sup>

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1) Leo Grande, William M., "Problems of Communism", January-February, 1980, Edited by Smith, Paul A., JR, Volume XXIX 1980, p.42, U.S.A.

From Castro's argument, it is clear that the new international leaders such as Castro himself tried to steer the movement away from its original aims. This point gave the non-aligned nations in the 1970's conferences no less a problem than how to define the future course of their movement. In the light of Castro's arguments to steer the non-aligned movement away from its principle of non-alignment between the super-powers, we may ask the question: How did the Cuban government come to the leadership of the non-aligned movement in 1979?

Historically, Cuba had been among the original 21 countries invited in April 1961, by President Nasser and Tito to a conference that was to oppose the military pressures of the super-powers.<sup>1</sup> The Cuban government took part and sent representatives to the summit of the non-aligned movement during the 1960s, but made no attempt to exercise leadership in that period, perhaps because of the attendance of the non-aligned movement's founders. The absence of the non-aligned movement's founders in 1970 gave Cuba a chance to take on a new role. This happened after the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973.\* The summit set up a new co-ordinating Bureau\*\* and Cuba was elected a member and the second ministerial conference of the Bureau was held in Havana in March 1975. Later in that year, the non-aligned movement's meeting in Peru recommended acceptance of a Cuban offer to host the sixth summit conference and a definite decision to go to Havana in 1979 was taken by the participating countries at the fifth summit conference at Colombo in 1976.

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1) Jankowitsch, O., and Sauvart, K.P., The Third World without Super-Powers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, New York, 1978, vol.1, pp.12-28 and pp.33-34, and vol.11, pp.922-948, and vol.11, pp.759-760.

\* For the invitations sent out in April 1961, see volume 1, pp.33-34 and for the delegation to the Summit, see volume 1, pp.12-28.

\*\* The first summit Castro attended was the Algiers Summit in 1973.

While the Colombo decision represented the high point of Cuba's position, 38 of the 85 countries opposed this decision, perhaps because of Cuba's policy and her attempt to steer the movement towards the communist bloc.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, because of the fact that the non-aligned movement encompassed nearly every shade of political opinion, it was divided on most issues, its members falling into three broad groups. The radicals generally leaned towards the Soviet Union or China, the conservatives, usually leaning towards the West especially the United States of America and the Independents sticking to the original purpose of the movement - non-alignment with any super-powers.<sup>2</sup>

The second development of the 1970s summit conferences, was the non-aligned countries' attempt to put their role into practice, by discussing at the conferences of the 1970s, in addition to the issues debated at the previous conferences, new issues such as demands to change the international information order, the international economic system, the establishment of the co-ordinating Bureau, and other matters.

In 1972, the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries had a meeting at Georgetown and they formulated declarations and programmes of action. Two major economic declarations were adopted at Georgetown. Firstly, an action programme for economic co-operation among non-aligned countries. Secondly, action for international co-operation for the economic development of developing countries.

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1) See Jankowitsch, O., and Sauvart, K.P., op.cit., volume 11, pp.922-48 and Willetts, P., op.cit., p.9.

2) See: Newsweek, "Alignments of the Non-Aligned", September 17th, 1979, p.14.



In other words there was a call for action on the problems of primary commodity producers in the areas of raw materials; manufacturing; development finance and co-operation between countries with different economic systems.<sup>1</sup>

The Algiers Summit Conference in 1973 saw the emergence of a new economic and political awareness. In effect the conference continued at the United Nations.\* However, two quite different matters were raised in Algiers-political concepts formulated by members of the non-aligned movement and economic proposals accepted by the United Nations General Assembly. In the political concepts, while the movement equated the Soviet Union and the United States of America as "imperialist super-powers", some new leaders saw the world as being divided into governments which supported imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism and governments which were opposed to these tendencies. With that conception, Fidel Castro argued at the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973 that:

"Different ways of dividing the world have been presented at this meeting. For us, the world is divided into capitalist and socialist countries, imperialist and socialist countries, reactionary and progressive countries, governments that support imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and governments that are against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism".<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, in its economic proposals the Algiers summit conference in 1973 also carried over into the sixth and the seventh special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, which passed Resolution No. 321-S-U1, on the establishment of a new international economic order.

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1) Watson, Hilbourn, A., op.cit., p.136. \* See later.

2) Blanco, A., The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit., p.18

3) Watson, H.A., op.cit., p.137.

It recognised the sovereignty of states, supported the right of countries to use their natural resources, freedom from foreign domination, and others. Secondly, Resolution No. 3202-S-U11, concerned the programme of action on the establishment of a new international economic order. Other problems were identified and solutions proposed, the problems being commodity trade, food, transportation, insurance, monetary reform, industrialization, transfer of technology, regulation etc.

Finally, at this conference the non-aligned countries seemed to believe in the importance of the United Nations, and that perhaps they had a part to play within the United Nations to solve certain problems, for example, to change the international economic order. However, for more details about the Algiers Summit Conference see the agenda of this conference in Appendix No.1.

After the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973, a number of meetings and conferences were held to put the working principles agreed by the non-aligned countries into practice. Between February and June 1975, at least six such meetings were held in Dakar, Algiers, Lomé, Nairobi, New Dehli and Georgetown. By the mid seventies the whole international situation had changed, particularly on the economic front, which called for a more positive participation from the movement in world affairs.

The fifth summit conference of the movement was held in Sri Lanka in August 1976. The inflationary pressures and oil-price boom in the 1970s brought the movement closer to demanding a role in the management of international economic affairs, since the member countries and the Third World countries in general were hardest hit.

For example, the oil price boom in the 1970s increased inflation from 0.1% in 1976 to 1.4% in 1980 and was expected to be 3.6% in 1980-1984 and the average of inflation exported by the industrialized countries to developing countries increased from 1.0% in 1976 up to 12.7% in 1980 and was expected to be 122.2% between 1980-1984.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from political declarations on matters such as sovereignty, the right of self-determination and disarmament, the main outcome of the Sri Lanka conference was the emphasis placed on the new composition of its membership, the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, and the establishment of the co-ordinating Bureau. A further dimension was added to the conference in so far as the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations lent great importance to the movement, especially since he saw the movement as being part of a growing international trend (towards non-alignment). Waldheim's speech at the Sri Lanka Summit was one of the landmarks of the conference, since he reviewed the major areas of conflict in Southern Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus, referred to disarmament and the threat of war throughout the world and indicated the importance he attached to the non-aligned movement's views on these questions.

In other words he argued that the non-aligned movement should be complimented for conducting its diplomacy within the framework of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Alwaytes, R., The Iraqi Role in the Non-Aligned Movement, France Ph.D., 1982, Table No.2, p.168.

2) Singham, A.W., The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit., p.226.

In a declaration, the Sri Lanka Summit Conference rejected very strongly the claim that the world could be divided into two geographical divisions such as those expressed in the "North-South conflict" or the "East-West conflict". They stated that the problems of the world and its poverty were not because nations were born poor, but because human beings had created an unequal distributive system of the world's resources. The Heads of State or Governments created an economic co-ordinating committee. The following list of co-ordinators on its sub-committees is as follows:-\*

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SUBJECTS

1. Raw Materials
2. Trade, Transport & Industry
3. Financial and Monetary Co-operation
4. Scientific & Technological Development
5. Technical Co-operation & Consultancy
6. Food and Agriculture
7. Fisheries
8. Telecommunications
9. Insurance
10. Health
11. Employment & Human Resources Development
12. Tourism
13. Transnational Corporations
14. Sports
15. International Co-operation for Economic Development

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\* For the member countries at the above co-ordinating Bureau, see the collected documents of the non-aligned countries op.cit.p.222.

The Sri Lanka Summit Conference also adopted recommendations for the establishment of the co-ordinating Bureau. The co-ordinating Bureau was to be composed of representatives of non-aligned countries - up to 25 - chosen by the conference of Heads of State and Governments of non-aligned countries.

The co-ordinating Bureau was to meet at the level of ministers of foreign affairs or special government representatives once a year or as necessary, and on a continuing basis at the level of permanent representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations Headquarters in New York once a month as a rule. The conference decided that the Bureau would consist of 25 seats and that these seats would be allocated between the different regions in the following manner:-<sup>1</sup>

AFRICA	12
ASIA	8
LATIN AMERICA	4
EUROPE	1

In addition the conference further decided that a co-ordinating Bureau elected during one summit conference would hold office till the next election at the following summit conference. The following countries were elected to membership of the new co-ordinating Bureau at Sri Lanka in 1976:<sup>2</sup>

- |                            |                |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| 1. Algeria                 | 13. Liberia    |
| 2. Angola                  | 14. Niger      |
| 3. Bangladesh/Afghanistan* | 15. Nigeria    |
| 4. Botswana                | 16. Peru       |
| 5. Chad                    | 17. P.L.O.     |
| 6. Cuba                    | 18. Sri Lanka  |
| 7. Guinea                  | 19. Sudan      |
| 8. Guyana                  | 20. Syria      |
| 9. India                   | 21. Tanzania   |
| 10. Indonesia              | 22. Vietnam    |
| 11. Iraq                   | 23. Yugoslavia |
| 12. Jamaica                | 24. Zaire      |
|                            | 25. Zambia     |

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1) See: The Collected documents op.cit., p.497.

2) Ibid., p.224.

\* It was agreed that Bangladesh would occupy the seat for the first half and Afghanistan for the second half of the three year term of office.

In addition, the co-ordinating Bureau has operated at two levels. The permanent representatives in New York formed a U.N. caucus group, while the foreign Ministers started to meet once a year in a non-aligned capital city for a short conference. The country holding the chairmanship of the movement as a whole has always been elected to the Bureau and taken the Chair in the Bureau.

Since 1976, the Bureau has needed its own preparatory committee and ministerial meetings have been preceded by ambassadorial meetings of the Bureau members. Also, since 1976, the documentary output of the Bureau has sharply increased. The final declarations and resolutions together, for example, became on average three times as voluminous as before.<sup>1</sup> For more details about the Sri Lanka Summit Conference in 1976 declaration, see Appendix No. 1.

In the 1970s summit conferences also, the non-aligned countries recommended the establishment of a non-aligned news agencies pool, to help compensate for perceived shortcomings in the existing system of international news supply for developing countries. Therefore, it seems to me that this problem is important enough to require an examination of the historical background of the international information system and the non-aligned countries' demand for a change in this system.

The fact is that the world information system was dominated by the 'Big Four' Western news agencies: two American agencies, Associated

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1) See: Willetts : The Non-aligned Movement, op.cit., & ibid, The Non-aligned in Havana, London 1981, p.39. Also see the collected documents of the non-aligned countries, op.cit. (the co-ordinating Bureau).

Press and United Press International; the British agency Reuters; and the French agency, Agence France Press. Its job was to collect and distribute news from and to most countries and territories in the world.

When the non-aligned movement was established in the period 1955-1961, most of the non-aligned countries had no television receivers, few radios etc. For example, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Jordan and others had no television receivers as Table 2.1 shows, while United Press International had 238 bureaus in 62 countries employing about 10,000 people, serving more than 6,500 subscribers in more than 100 countries, and circulating world-wide about 4.5 million words every day.<sup>1</sup>

It is also therefore obvious, that the capitalist "consciousness industries", the news multi-nationals have become, especially since the end of World War II, one of the principal weapons of imperialism. For example, an American committee "found that at least 29 per cent of C.I.A'S covert actions over the years were for media and propaganda projects".<sup>2</sup> This figure translates into secret C.I.A. expenditures in the billions of dollars aimed at making other countries conform to the covert American propaganda line.

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1) Mitra, Asok., "Rulership of Media Giants", in the Ceylon Daily News, Colombo, August 11, 1976, p.9.

2) Marks, John., "Media in the Third World", Washington Post, August 27, 1976. See also, Final Report of the select committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, U.S. senate, Church Committee, Book 1, April 26, 1976; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, pp.179-203.

TABLE NO. 2.1: Daily Newspapers copies, Radio Receivers, Cinema seats, Television Receivers in some non-aligned countries during the 1950s.

Countries	Daily News-Papers Copies Per 100	Radio Receivers Per 100	Cinema Seats Per 100	Television Receivers Per 100	Number of Dailies	Number of Radio Transmitters
Algeria	2.4	6.0	1.8	0.6	8	16
Basutoland (U.K.)	-	0.6	-	-	-	-
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chad	0.03	0.3	0.1	-	1	2
Cameroon Republic	0.2	0.3	-	-	2	7
Ethiopia	0.2	0.5	-	-	10	6
Ghana	3.2	1.9	1.0	-	4	7
Morocco	2.2	4.6	0.8	0.04	12	19
Somalia	0.1	1.2	0.7	-	1	4
Togo Republic	0.4	0.4	0.1	-	1	3
Tunisia	1.9	6.3	0.9	0.5	4	5
Zanzibar & Pemba	0.3	1.6	1.1	-	3	2
Afghanistan	0.5	0.2	0.07	-	12	4
India	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.01	465	59
Indonesia	1.1	1.3	0.6	-	94	62
Iraq	1.0	2.1	1.3	0.7	16	5
Jordan	1.8	3.8	-	-	6	4
Costa Rica	9.4	6.6	6.3	0.6	6	48
Guatemala	2.3	5.4	1.9	0.9	6	82
Honduras	2.4	2.6	2.2	0.2	6	23
Argentina	15.5	19.0	5.2	3.3	233	78
Bolivia	2.6	7.3	1.3	-	6	43
Ecuador	5.6	3.9	2.0	0.1	24	135
Paraguay	3.7	8.3	0.8	-	7	12

SOURCE: See Schramm, Wilbur, Mass Media and National Development, the Role of Information in the Developing Countries, California, 1964, pp.275-281, Selected Countries.

Unless otherwise stated, figures given in the following Table are for 1961, except for the last column. Indicates a figure less than 0.1 (usually nil).



For such reasons and benefits, the Western multi-national, in particular the U.S.A., information agencies dominated and try still to dominate world information. For example in this respect, John Foster Dulles declared that:

"If I were to be granted one point in foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information".<sup>1</sup>

The non-aligned countries therefore, since the 1955 Bandung conference up to the Lusaka Summit in 1970, reiterated and reaffirmed the principle that:

"All the nations have the right of unity, self-determination and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural aims".<sup>2</sup>

And also added that:

"Culture helps to widen the mind and enrich life, that all human cultures have their special values and can contribute to the general progress that many cultures were suppressed and cultural relations interrupted under colonial domination etc."<sup>3</sup>

But the non-aligned countries took different steps at the 1970s summit conferences towards the international information system. The Algiers summit conference in 1973, stressed "the need to reaffirm national cultural identity and eliminate the harmful consequences of the colonial era"<sup>4</sup> Also the conference argued that:

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- 1) Quoted in Schiller, Herbert I., Communication and Cultural Domination; White Plains, New York. International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976, p.24. See also, Tran van Dinh, op.cit., p.30.
  - 2) See: The non-aligned movement documents op.cit., The Belgrade Summit 1961, pp.3-9.
  - 3) Ibid., the documents of the Cairo Summit Conference in 1964, pp.17-30.
  - 4) Ibid., the documents of the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973, pp.89-119.

"The Secretary General of the United Nations established a special chair of non-alignment at the proposed United Nations University, so as to facilitate research on the historical evolution and the present<sup>1</sup> and future role of non-alignment in the changing world order".<sup>1</sup>

In May 1975 and in 1976, the non-aligned countries' representatives at Belgrade and later at Tunis agreed to discuss the following points:

1. The promotion of mass information media between non-aligned countries.\*
2. The role to be played by the information organs in encouraging cultural interaction between non-aligned countries.
3. The role to be played by the information organs in reinforcing economic and social co-operation between non-aligned countries.

The first point has been partially met already since January 1975 by the pool of news agencies of non-aligned countries in Belgrade. The pool has worked out 26 co-operative agreements with 26 official news agencies from non-aligned countries, and UNESCO were using Tanjug's\*\* service and by the autumn of 1976, Tanjug announced that 62 non-aligned countries were participating.<sup>2</sup> Also Yugoslavia said it was spending \$13 million to improve Tanjug's capabilities and had opened four 38,000 watt transmitters near Belgrade and Tanjug sends pool information in five languages mostly in English and some in Russian.<sup>3</sup>

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1) Singham, A.W., and Dinh, Tran van., op.cit., p.161 and 199.

\* The 1975 Lima Conference of Non-aligned Foreign Ministers proposed an intergovernmental meeting to discuss press-pool arrangements. This led to the New Delhi Conference in July 1976.

2) Sussman, L.R., Mass News Media and the Third World Challenge, U.S.A. 1977, p.29.

\*\* Tanjug: Yugoslavian News Agency established in Belgrade, October 1944. See: UNESCO in commission for the study of communication problems, Mnograph, No.12, pp.1-10.

3) Sussman, L.R., op.cit., p.29.

In addition the non-aligned countries in Tunisia resolved to authorise a limited budget for UNESCO'S liaison with the press pool. The allocation of approximately \$130,000 out of the UNESCO budget and another anticipated \$370,000 in special grants from member states would mainly cover feasibility studies and other planning costs.<sup>1</sup>

However, after the Tunisian and the New Delhi non-aligned meetings, the non-aligned movement had other meetings and conferences which discussed and demanded the "decolonialization of information" and the creation of a new international order for information was as necessary it was said, as the new international economic order. For more details see the declarations made in the 1970s at the end of this thesis or the documents.

At the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, the non-aligned countries discussed very carefully the attendance of Egypt after the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and the international settlements in Palestine, (Zionism). This agreement was made between a member country of the non-aligned movement on the one hand and the Zionist movement on the other hand.

Egypt of course as we discussed earlier, was considered the leader of the Arab non-aligned countries on the one hand and on the other, Nasser the President of Egypt was a founder member of the non-aligned movement.

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1) An early draft of the Tunisian resolution 19C/Dr.19, September 7th, 1976 called for UNESCO to co-ordinate research on the "Right to Communicate" with some examination of the "Independence of Information" Director General M'Bow declared that "Independence" could indeed be considered in such studies but he did not consider that "more prominence" should be given to this aspect than to others included in the "Right to Communicate" concept.

After his election as president of Egypt in October 1970, after the death of Nasser, Al Sadat declared that "his policy will be as in the time of Nasser", "as a positive policy, with the principles of the non-aligned movement".<sup>1</sup> However, years later Al Sadat's policy witnessed step-by-step regression from non-alignment. He broke Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union and became tied closely to the United States of America and he signed the Camp David Agreement with the Zionist movement in 1978. By this agreement, Al Sadat gave the Zionists a free hand permanently to colonize the West Bank and Gaza Strip as she did in Palestine before.

The Egyptian action therefore, gave the non-aligned movement no choice but to condemn the Camp David Agreement of September 17th, 1978 and the Egyptian-Zionist Treaty of March 26th, 1979 and to suspend Egypt's membership of the non-aligned movement.<sup>2</sup> It may be mentioned here that the non-aligned movement condemned the Camp David Agreements and suspended Egypt's membership of the movement because the non-aligned movement had time and again equated "the racist regime in occupied Palestine" with that of South Africa.\*

Within this context, the Heads of State or Governments at the Havana Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries considered the proposal that the government of Egypt be suspended as a member of the non-aligned movement for having violated its principles and resolutions.

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1) See: Agwain, M.S., "The Arab World and Non-alignment", International Studies", Quarterly Journal of the School of International Studies, Volume 20, No.1-2, January-June 1981, p.376.

2) Ibid., pp.376-77.

\* For more details: See the Palestine question, the non-aligned documents op.cit, pp.429-433.

The Conference decided to entrust the co-ordinating Bureau, acting as an ad hoc committee with the examination of the damage caused to the Arab countries, particularly the Palestinian people by the conduct of the Egyptian government in signing the Camp David Agreements and the Egyptian-Zionist separate peace treaty. The ad hoc committee would report on this matter to the Ministerial Conference to be held in New Delhi, which would take a decision regarding the status of Egypt in the movement.<sup>1</sup>

The non-aligned countries at the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, discussed very carefully the question of the representation of Kampuchea. The conference recognized the existence within the movement of three positions with respect to this problem. Firstly, that of those who upheld the view that this representation devolved on the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea. Secondly, that of those who hold that this representation devolved on the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea and thirdly, that of those who proposed that the seat should not be occupied by either of the parties.<sup>2</sup> However, the conference decided to refer the question of the representation of Kampuchea to the co-ordinating Bureau, which would act as an ad hoc committee to continue analyzing this question and to submit a report to a subsequent Ministerial Conference.

Clearly, while the conference reaffirmed the need for strengthening the basic principles on which the movement was based, it addressed itself, perhaps for the first time, to more specific problems on which action could be actively mobilized.

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1) The Collected Documents, op.cit. p.431.

2) Ibid., p.452.

The conference identified the importance of European security and its impact on the Mediterranean member countries of the movement and the positive contribution the latter had made to the former. However, the decision of the Sixth Conference in that context in considering the Mediterranean a zone of peace and co-operation was ratified and confirmed, hence forging stronger links between the movement and European nations. This was further enhanced by the conferences' resolutions concerning Cyprus, and Malta's elimination of foreign bases from its territory.

Furthermore, it was for the first time suggested and in fact actively supported that the movement had an important role to play in securing a modification of the international economic system in what came to be known as the New International Economic Order. On the other hand the movement which had begun as a small regional grouping had become a major international force in world politics and its increased membership included a new group of socialist countries such as, the Republic of Vietnam, Angola led by Agostinho Neto, Laos and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.<sup>1</sup> The presence of these countries at the 1970s Summit Conferences made a new qualitative difference in the proceedings of the conferences and made the non-aligned countries question the principles and the definition of non-alignment.

The Havana Summit Conference in 1979 decided that the membership of the co-ordinating Bureau should be increased to 36 seats to permit the following regional distribution:<sup>2</sup>

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1) For more details See the collected documents of the non-aligned countries. *op.cit*, p.435.

2) For more details about the Functions, The Chairman, Convening of Meetings, Composition and Size of the Bureau, See *Ibid.*, pp.497-498. and p.453.

Africa	17 seats
Asia	12 seats
Latin America	5 seats
Europe	1 seats

The conference decided that the next conference of foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries would be held in New Delhi, India in 1981 and the next conference of Heads of State or Governments of the non-aligned countries would be held in Baghdad, Iraq in 1982. For more details about the non-aligned Summit Conference held at Havana in 1979, see Appendix No.1.

After the 1970s summit conferences, a number of meetings and one summit conference were held to discuss the problems facing the non-aligned movement during the 1970s and to solve such problems. Between the Havana summit conference in September 1979 and March 1983, three meetings were held in Havana, New Delhi and Kuwait.

During the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen which may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement and its continuity. One such issue is the Iraqi - Iranian War. This war between two member countries has certainly brought to the fore two issues. First, that some of the movement's member countries aligned themselves directly or indirectly with one country against the other; and secondly, such a war put the credibility and authority of the movement to solve its internal problems at stake.

It is therefore rather important to discuss such developments, even though the period is a relatively short one, because the outcome may affect the future of the movement.

## 2.4 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT : ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE EARLY 1980s

The fact is that, during the past three decades, so many developing countries, particularly those which joined the non-aligned movement have changed or transformed their own governments and socio-economic systems according to their own needs. Some changed kingdoms into republics such as Iraq and Libya and others have changed their systems from military dictatorship to democracy or from democracy into dictatorship or semi-dictatorship. Indeed such internal changes or transformations have resulted in some kind of problems in relationships among members of the movement. Such as the crisis of leadership, a crisis of identity and a crisis of objectivity of the non-aligned movement.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand and at the same time, the cold war antagonists, who have been watching the progress of the non-aligned movement with a certain degree of discomfort, have been making attempts to draw some non-aligned countries into their respective orbits.<sup>2</sup> It seems to me that these things among others have made the non-aligned movement complex and varied in the early 1980s.

In the light of the above, one could mention here that the non-aligned movement has had to face further new developments in the early 1980s. On the other hand, the movement has faced internal conflicts among its member countries such as the war between Iraq and Iran. The movement has also faced external problems, such as the struggle or demand for the establishment of a new international economic order.

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1) Tadic, B., "The policy and the movement of non-alignment in the eighties", Journal of Institute of International Politics and Economics Review of International Affairs, Belgrade 1982, p.417.

2) "Far Eastern Economic Review", March 10, 1983, pp.26-27.



The conflicts between the non-aligned countries are considered some of the most serious problems facing the non-aligned movement in contemporary conditions, simply because these conflicts threaten the unity of the non-aligned movement and impair the prestige enjoyed by it in the world, and because they amount to a departure from the principles of non-alignment, endanger the realization of common interests of the non-aligned countries and open the door to direct or indirect interference in the non-aligned movement by the super-powers and bloc systems of states. Therefore, maximum efforts need to be exerted as a matter of urgency with a view to settling these conflicts by political means as rapidly as possible. To do so, the non-aligned movement also needs to search for methods of prevention i.e., timely solving of problems conducive to conflict, so as to avoid them.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, during the past ten years or so, the non-aligned movement has witnessed many conflicts between some non-aligned countries such as the armed conflicts between Mali and Upper Volta; Angola and Zaire; Ethiopia and Somalia etc.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, at the present time we are witnessing the conflict between Iraq and Iran. It could be said that if these inclinations to conflict cannot be minimised, the movement would be weakened. However, it seems to me that the war between Iraq and Iran is important enough to shed some light on these conflicts, simply because this has happened between two oil rich countries on the one hand and on the other because Iraq had been elected as a host country to the Seventh Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries in 1982. As the war is still going, the summit

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1) Tadic, B., "The policy and the movement of the non-aligned movement, op.cit., p.417.

2) Dabo, Bangaly., "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflicts between the non-aligned", Review of International Affairs, Belgrade 1980, op.cit., pp.373-374.

conference was held at New Delhi in March 1983 instead.

The Iraqi-Iranian conflict is considered as old as is the history of its region. After occupying Arabistan since 1925, Iran modified the name of this territory, calling it Khuzestan in an attempt to deprive it of everything that made it Arab. Moreover, the Iranian authorities prevented the Arab language from being taught there. However, "events have shown that most of the tribes living in these regions refused to collaborate with the Persian authorities".<sup>1</sup>

The occupation of Arabistan since 1925 has been a step allowing Iran to take control of a part of the Shatt-al-Arab water way. Also to weaken Baghdad, the Shah of Iran, the U.S.A. and the Zionist movement supported the Kurdish movement, fighting against the central power of Iraq.<sup>2</sup>

After the construction of refineries in Abadan, close to the east coast of the Shatt-al-Arab, Iran extended its claims to the islands in the Gulf, immediately after Great Britain's declaration regarding its retreat from the zone, eastward of the Suez Canal.<sup>3</sup> In 1971, the Shah occupied the three islands in the strait of Hormuz, belonging to the United Arab Emirates, believing that he was to become the policeman of the Gulf.<sup>4</sup> Iraq was the only Arab country to protest against this annexation but this objection was not followed up by other Arab countries.<sup>5</sup>

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1) Saleh, Akkad., "Colonialism and Oil in the Arab Gulf", International Political Review, No.8, Cairo, April 8, 1967, p.234 (in Arabic).

2) Le Point, C.F., No. 419, September 29th, 1980.

3) Firzli, N., The Iraq-Iran War, Paris 1981, p.103.

4) Le Monde, September 29th, 1980.

5) Firzli, N., op.cit. p.103.

The tension in the relations between the two countries continued until a climax was reached towards the beginning of 1975, after which both sides were brought to the negotiations table upon the initiative of the later Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, which led to the Declaration of Algiers on March 6th, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the Algiers agreement was not to be respected by the Iranian side any more than the preceding ones. It is incontestable that relations between Iraq and Iran have deteriorated since the return of Khomeiny to Tehran and even before, as a study of each country's declarations will confirm.<sup>2</sup> For the Arab countries it was clear that since the return of Khomeiny to Iran, neighbourly relations with that state also started to deteriorate, which led the two countries towards war in early September 1980. It could have been expected that the Iranian Revolution, which had upheld the cause of the Palestinians, would proclaim that the Shah had illegally conquered Arab lands in the Gulf. It ought to have decided to restore these lands to their Arab and Muslim inhabitants since it had announced its revolutionary nature to all Muslims. It was also expected that Iran would apply the agreements signed with Iraq by which it promised to maintain courteous relations and not to threaten the security of neighbouring countries. These hopes proved to be in vain.

The fact is that, the new Iranian leaders have taken it upon themselves to undermine the security of the other Arab and Muslim countries. They have declared that the territories forcibly annexed by

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1) Firzli, N., op.cit., p.105. (For more details about the Algerian agreement see Ibid., p.111.

2) Ibid., p.105.

the Shah would remain Iranian.

They even went so far as to claim Iraq and even the Arab Gulf countries as Persian territories. Furthermore, they have adhered to a policy of interference in the internal affairs of the Arab regimes, especially that of Iraq. For example, the Iranian forces had committed 244 border violations or acts of aggression against Iraq by air, sea and land in the period from February 23, 1979 to July 26, 1980.<sup>1</sup> Among these acts should be included bombing of Iraqi border posts, the capture of soldiers belonging to border units etc. The Iraqi forces answered these aggressions by trying to limit them. Meanwhile, Iraq sent 240 official notes to the Embassy of the Iranian Republic, in Baghdad, giving an account of the aggressions, their date, form and consequences.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Iraq sent official notes to most of the regional and international organizations such as the Arab League, the United Nations, the non-aligned movement, the conference of Islamic Nations etc.

Even though these organizations were informed of the events having taken place on the Iraq-Iran border, Tehran did not take the notes of protest into consideration, thus violating international laws and rules as well as the conventions concluded between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> The Iranians were still doing so until the Iraq army was moved in September 1980 to the border and following a violent struggle, forced the Iranians to retreat from Iraqi land called Zein Al-Qaws.

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1) Official memorandum about the Iraq-Iran border conflict. See: Firzli, *op.cit.*, pp.105-115.

2) C.F. Iraq-Iran conflict, "Course on French Linguistics of Professor Georges Matore" at the University of Paris IV - Sorbone, Appendix IX, p.217.

3) *Ibid.*, Appendix X, p.219.

Later Iraq demanded by way of an official note that Iran return the Iraqi territories it occupied in violation of the agreements concluded between the two countries, in particular the 1975 Algiers agreement. That note was left unanswered and Iran multiplied its acts of aggression against Iraq.<sup>1</sup> This situation led to the war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980.

International circles attentively observed the evolution of the war and its effects upon the world situation. On September 22nd, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, sent out an appeal to both countries inviting them to cease fire and to open negotiations. This request was transmitted to the representatives of the two countries in the United Nations. Iraq responded favourably to this invitation, but put three conditions upon the stopping of the combat:<sup>2</sup>

- A. Respect of Iraqi sovereignty over the frontier zone separating it from Iran.
- B. Respect and recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the Shat Al-Arab
- C. Iran's retreat from the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs.

The Iranians failed to reply to Kurt Waldheim's appeal.

An appeal from Europe and the Security Council on September 23rd, was also made to stop the war, and the efforts of the Islamic conference and the initiative of the non-aligned countries etc.<sup>3</sup>

The fact is that the initiative of the non-aligned countries was no more successful than the two preceding ones.

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1) Firzli, N., op.cit. p.109.

2) Al-Nahar, September 23, 1980 (In Arabic).

3) Le Monde September 25, 1980.

Following the visit of the Cuban Foreign Affairs Minister to Iraq on September 26th 1980, an official spokesman announced "Iraq has accepted Cuba's 'goodwill mission', the aim of which is to put an end to this conflict".<sup>1</sup> The visit of the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iran ended in failure. The Iranian Leader M. Rajai explained: "Castro has misunderstood the revolution of our people if he is asking us to sit at the negotiation table with Iraq".<sup>2</sup>

We have seen the reasons which led to the war between Iraq and Iran, one could mention here that, this war led to the following points. First, both sides, Iraq and Iran lost and are still losing hundreds of people in addition to millions of pounds buying weapons and damaging their economics. Second, Iraq elected at the Havana Summit Conference in 1979 to be a host country for the Seventh Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries in 1982, spent millions of pounds to make every thing ready for the Summit conference, but when the Iraqi leaders saw some non-aligned member countries which favoured Iran did not want to come to Baghdad, and because the Iraqi government was concerned about the solidarity of the non-aligned countries, the Iraqi government suggested and agreed to change the host venue from Baghdad, Iraq to New Delhi, India in March 1983. Finally, to the non-aligned countries, this war between two oil rich member countries, in the non-aligned movement meant that the movement has lost and is still losing some assistance from these countries on the one hand and this conflict between member countries of the non-aligned movement weakened the movement on the other hand.

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1) Al-Nahar, September 28, 1980.

2) Al-Nahar, October 3, 1980.

To put an end to this war between Iraq and Iran, the Vice President of Iraq, Taha Moheiddin Maarouf proposed at the Seventh Summit Conference at New Delhi in March 1983 that the non-aligned summit should set up an arbitration committee whose decision would be binding on Baghdad and Tehran. He said:

"Iraq pledges itself in advance to abide by the results of arbitration. The committee should be established by agreement between Iraq and Iran with the help of the Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Chairman of the non-aligned countries. Its task, he added, would be to determine which side started the war in September 1980, and which was responsible for continuing it, as well as arbitrating all issues related to the conflict and formulating a comprehensive and final settlement".<sup>1</sup>

The Iranian delegate at the non-aligned summit conference at New Delhi, refused the Iraqi proposal arguing that "The damage caused by Iraqi troops in Iran up to three months ago exceeded \$200 billion. We demand at least one-fourth of this sum as a cash deposit, so that we have an assurance the Iraqis are really serious" about ending the war.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, the New Delhi Summit Conference also failed to put an end to the Iraq-Iran war.

What is really at issue is not a discussion of the causes of the war itself, but rather the impact that such a war between two member countries has on the movement. It is clear that the Iraqi rights are unquestionable. However, the movement was unable to make one solid stand to end the conflict. Such an outcome is a serious failure on the part of the non-aligned movement.

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1) International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1983, p.4.

2) Ibid., p.4.

Resolving conflicts among member countries by way of peaceful means forms the very basis of justification for the movement's existence. It is therefore very important for the movement to make a move to solve this conflict, otherwise its very existence may be questioned. Moreover, if the war drags on, then it would be only natural to see some countries aligning themselves with one country against another, and such a development may also put the continuity of the movement at stake. It also may prevent it from making any further progress on other issues, because most of the time the issues are interconnected. Finally, such a conflict if not stopped or solved once and for all by the movement, may lessen its credibility in the world, a damaging effect which would need a very long period of time to be checked.

While the Iraqi-Iranian conflict was not the only one, it was the most important issue that has faced the movement in the last few years. What is really needed at this stage is for the movement to maintain solidarity among its member countries over the major issues and at the same time re-establish countries. Simply what is needed is for the movement to put its house in order, because then and only then it will be able to provide a united front on dealing with the most important issues on the world stage. Without doing this, the next conference will need great effort on everybody's part for it to convince and produce any tangible results. This period in between would then be considered a breathing space for all concerned to reconsider their positions in the interest of keeping the movement going for the good of all member countries as well as for world peace.\*

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\* For more details about the non-aligned summit conference held at New Delhi in 1983, see Appendix No.1.



However, over the last three decades or so, the subjects addressed by the movement have appealed to most of the Third World countries, because they concerned each and every country separately and all countries collectively. Moreover, the movement has become an international forum for developing countries, since the movement's membership has increased several times over. This is the subject of the following section.

## 2.5 THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOVEMENT'S MEMBERSHIP

After the Bandung conference there emerged a set of principles for any country which wanted to join the non-aligned movement. Some of these principles are as follows:-<sup>1</sup>

Firstly, the member country of the non-aligned movement should not be a member of any of the military pacts of the super-powers.

This principle has a considerable importance and represents one of the fundamental principles of the movement in its international relations, because one of the reasons behind the creation of the non-aligned movement was to avoid any kind of participation in the cold war between the big powers and hence avoid the destructive consequences such as those experienced in Korea and Vietnam during recent decades. Therefore, any country that participated in one of the military pacts would have deviated from the principles of non-alignment.

The members may sign defence agreements among themselves such as

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1) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., pp.71-72.

the defence agreement between the members of the Arab League, but not with any of the super-powers. Mutual defence agreements would not affect the signatories' status within the movement.

Secondly, a member country of the non-aligned movement should not have a mutual agreement with any of the super-powers which might affect the policy of the former country.

It could be said that the aim of this point is to protect the developing countries from the domination of the great powers. However, there are countries which try to find justification for these agreements under the cover of aid and friendship, which they argue do not affect the policy of the developing country, providing there is a nationalist leadership which understands the interests of their country, for example, agreements between the Soviet Union and countries in the Third World such as, India, Iraq in the 1970s and Syria in 1980.

Thirdly, the member countries of the non-aligned movement should not permit the existence of military bases on their territories.

Permitting the establishment of military bases by the super-powers is considered to be against the principles of non-alignment. Therefore, no member country should allow such bases. There have been some deviations from this principle under various justifications and titles, such as, military facilities. These bases are aimed at minimising the involvement of the super-powers, for example, military facilities to the Americans in the Arab countries, such as Oman and Egypt in the 1980s to counter the Soviet presence in the region. Such facilities

perhaps bring conflict in the Middle East and divert the country from non-alignment.

However, if the military bases are forced upon the country by one of the super-powers, this does not affect its position within the movement and with the rest of its members who should help it to get rid of the foreign military bases.

Finally, the member country of the non-aligned movement should support the National Liberation Movements.

A brief look into the history of the Third World countries shows that most of them have been under colonial rule. Support and aid from the non-aligned movement's members for their National Liberation Movements would help them gain their independence and give them the opportunity to participate and play a role in the world community. The question of support to the National Liberation Movements had a great effect in distinguishing the non-aligned countries from the supporters of alliances.<sup>1</sup>

As far as membership of the non-aligned movement is concerned, the number of member countries increased from 25 at the first summit conference in Belgrade in 1961 to 47 at the second summit conference held in Cairo in 1964 and further to 53 members at the third summit conference held at Lusaka in 1970. Since then, the membership has increased considerably from 75 members at the fifth summit conference at Colombo. By the sixth summit conference in Havana in 1979, the total number of non-aligned countries had risen to 92, and at the New

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1) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit. p.73.

Delhi summit conference held in 1983, the total number of non-aligned countries increased to 102 members.<sup>1</sup>

This increase was debated by delegates at the Colombo, Havana and New Delhi Summit Conferences. These conferences debated the widening of membership that is, the basis on which membership of the movement could be obtained. This was because the number of member countries had increased dramatically since the foundation of the movement, and because any country wishing to obtain membership of the movement had been accepted regardless of whether or not the member country applied and respected the movement's principles. In addition, debates over this issue led to a division among the participants, between what we can call fundamentalist or strict members and those who might be considered as moderate. Others argued in favour of the acceptance of new members even if they were allied to other political pacts on the grounds that once they joined the movement, they could be persuaded to leave these political pacts, for example, Romania, Portugal, the Philippines etc., over whose membership there were heated debates.<sup>2</sup>

The other group which opposed the easy acceptance of new members without being strict about the movement's principles, argued that the acceptance of the membership of new countries might lead to conflicts within the movement and this division would affect the movement's status and strength. This in turn would lead to some member's trying to direct the movement towards one or other of the super-powers, because of their membership of military pacts and their disregard for the non-aligned movement's principles.

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1) For more details about the number of non-aligned countries increases see: Appendix No.2.

2) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., pp.95-96.

In addition to the full-members, there were other countries' provisional governments, liberation movements and organizations, which attended the summit conferences of the non-aligned movement as observers and guests.\*

Perhaps it could be said that the participation of the liberation movements and the international organizations played a considerable role in their struggle against colonialism as they were allowed to speak on behalf of their people, which to a certain extent gave them a kind of legitimacy for their existence.

In addition to the above discussions, the agendas in Appendix No.2 show more details about the member countries attending the non-aligned summit conferences.

## 2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

We saw in this chapter that the mobilizing themes of Third World solidarity have evolved since 1955. Anti-colonialism was the central bond in the early years, to be supplemented by the aspiration to genuine autonomy from the great-powers. Therefore, we divided the evolution of non-alignment in the period 1955-1982 as follows: (1) The Afro-Asian Conference, 1955 (2) The Non-aligned Movement in the 1960s (3) The Non-aligned Movement in the 1970s (4) The Movement in the early 1980s and finally (5) The expansion of the Movement's membership.

The Afro-Asian countries represented at Bandung in 1955, were deeply divided in their foreign policy orientations.

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\* For more details about the number of these organisations, see: Appendix No.2.

Several were formal members of the western alliance system, such as Pakistan, Iraq, Philippines and Thailand, while China and North Vietnam had a comparable relationship to the communist bloc. The other group such as India, Egypt, Indonesia took a middle course between these states, i.e. pro-Western and pro-Eastern, and advocated a genuine non-aligned policy.

However, despite this diversity the Bandung Communiqué pointed to the two main principles that have remained the foundation of Third World solidarity - decolonization and economic development. One can say here that the Bandung Conference was, then, an augury of a future protest against the subordinate status of the developing countries in the international system. In the following years, various leaders of the non-aligned movement sought to materialize the spirit of Bandung in more concrete terms.

In the 1960s, the non-aligned movement's concerns were as follows:-

(a) The movement's attention was diverted for the first time from focusing on regional issues towards an emphasis on international issues.

(b) The non-aligned movement's establishment was not against any particular type of social system or bloc. Therefore, the non-aligned countries perceived and evaluated the action of both groups, i.e. the West and the Communist in the same terms.

(c) In this period the movement was still led by its founders, therefore it was a very stable movement, and there was general

agreement that the basic tenet of non-alignment had crystalized: no military or political alliance with super-powers.

(d) In the 1960s also, two more important issues were more or less clear to the movement, (1) The movement defined its identity as one based on a long cultural tradition redefined to cope with the challenges of modern life, (2) They redefined their international role and function as one of mediation between conflicting parties in the world as well as reducing tension and instability at international level.

(e) The non-aligned countries adopted a non-aligned constitution by which they agreed to follow the following: (1) They decided to hold meetings on a regular basis at a variety of levels of representation. This now means that summit conferences are held every three years, (2) The second measure taken by the non-aligned countries was to appoint as official spokesman, the chairman-president of the movement, (3) They agreed to re-establish a permanent executive committee for the movement, (4) They agreed to develop an active group to work at the United Nations.

However, as we argued earlier, the non-aligned movement was not a stationary organization, but rather a movement that responded to developments in the world's affairs. Hence, we continue summarizing the movement's developments during the 1970s.

In the 1970s, the non-aligned movement faced many important developments among which were:

(a) The loss of some of its founders such as Nasser, Nehru and

Sukarno and for that reason perhaps, new leaders such as Castro and others were able to play a role in the movement. Such leaders tried and are still trying to steer the movement out of its original principles as we have argued.

(b) The movement established the co-ordinating Bureau.

(c) The non-aligned countries in 1979 suspended Egypt's membership of the non-aligned movement, because Egypt signed the Camp David Agreement in September 17th, 1978 and March 26th, 1979. This event is very important because, Egypt was considered the leader of the Arab non-aligned countries on the one hand, and on the other, Nasser the former president of Egypt, was a founder member of the non-aligned movement.

(d) The non-aligned countries discussed at the conferences of the 1970s, in addition to the issues debated at the previous conferences, new issues such as demands to change the international information order, the international economic system, and other matters.

During the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen which may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement and its continuity. One such issue is that the movement has faced internal conflicts among its members such as the Iraq-Iran war. The conflicts between the non-aligned countries are considered some of the most serious problems facing the non-aligned movement in contemporary conditions, simply because these conflicts threaten the unity of the Movement, and because they amount to a departure from the principles of non-alignment, endanger the realisation of the common interests of



the non-aligned countries and open the door to direct or indirect interference in the non-aligned movement by the super-powers and bloc systems of states.

The fact is that, the Non-aligned Movement was unable to make one solid stand to end the conflict. Therefore, maximum efforts needs to be exerted as a matter of urgency with a view to settling these conflicts by political means as rapidly as possible. Resolving conflicts among member countries by way of peaceful means forms the very basis of justification for the movement's existence. It is therefore very important for the movement to make a move to solve this conflict, otherwise its very existence may be questioned.

Finally, after the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1955, as we saw earlier, there emerged a set of principles for any country which wanted to join the non-aligned movement. Some of these principles are as follows:-

(a) The member country of the non-aligned movement should not be a member of any of the military pacts of the super-powers.

(b) A member country of the non-aligned movement should not have a mutual agreement with any of the super-powers which might affect the policy of the former country.

(c) The member countries of the non-aligned movement should not permit the existence of military bases on their territories.

(d) The member country of the non-aligned movement should support the National Liberation Movements.

As far as membership of the non-aligned movement is concerned, the number of member countries increased from 25 at the first summit conference in Belgrade in 1961 to 102 members at the New Delhi Summit Conference held in 1983. This increase was debated by delegates at the Colombo, Havana and New Delhi Summit Conferences. These conferences debated the widening of membership, that is, the basis on which membership of the movement could be obtained.

It seems to me that the easy acceptance of new members without being strict about the movement's principles, led and might further lead to conflicts within the movement and this division would affect the movement's status and strength. This in turn would lead to some members' trying to direct the movement towards one or other of the super-powers, because of their membership of military pacts and their disregard for the non-aligned movement's principles.

This chapter has therefore sought to show that since approximately 1970 the Non-aligned Movement has tended to move away from the ideal of genuine non-alignment as defined in this thesis and as advocated by the Movement's founders.

Furthermore, our analysis in the present chapter has shown that the movement has concentrated in its many conferences on two main issues. On the one hand, the movement contributed, perhaps significantly, in its various political declarations towards increasing the world's awareness of the suffering of peoples seeking independence. Its support for the many national liberation movements world-wide, has lent credibility to the recognition of the just causes of such organizations and their admission to the non-aligned movement gave

liberation organizations the stage to explain their causes to the world.

On the economic front, the movement followed a path of bringing to the surface the main economic problems, of the movement's member countries as well as those of the Third World countries at large.

There have been debates within the movement as to the cause and effect of the existence of such problems not only for developing countries, but also their impact on the world economy at large.

As we said before, many declarations in the various Conferences of the movement were issued concerning each and every major economic matter. This will be subject to analysis in Chapter Three.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Non-Aligned Movement and the International Economic System

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the first two chapters I discussed the international circumstances within which the ideal and goal of non-alignment and the Movement itself were initiated and the divergence of the Movement from the original ideal during its evolution over the past three decades.

I also argued in the Introduction that in order to be able to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, the Movement's member countries had to liberate themselves from the superpowers' domination and exploitation by achieving independent economic and socio-political development. In the light of this argument the present chapter focusses attention on international economic problems which hinder the economic development of Third World countries and on the role which that the Non-aligned Movement can play in promoting independent economic development. It is obvious that the Movement could therefore grow in importance as a major grouping in reshaping the international economic system.

Therefore, section one gives a chronological assessment of the development of international monetary management which, in the view

of the vast majority of developing countries, is the source of complaint. This is followed up in section two by an analysis of the resultant adverse effects on developing countries with particular attention given to the most prominent issues, leaving aside the less important ones. Such issues include trade; aid; transfer of resources; energy and transfer of technology.

In section three the role of the Non-aligned Movement is carefully scrutinized with emphasis placed on the potential as well as the more current positive action that the movement can actively take. This is followed in two consecutive steps:-

(1) an outward looking approach on what members of the movement have done and can do concerning world economic issues as partners particularly through the United Nations' various organs, and

(2) an inward looking approach in which the interrelationships among the movement's member countries could be developed on the basis of their mutual interests. Some concluding remarks are then given.

Ever since the second world war, the economic problems of developing countries, and in particular for our purposes, those of the members of the Non-aligned Movement have been compounded by two main issues. These are (1) the fact that they have been neither directly nor indirectly involved in the management of the international economy and (2) the oil price boom since 1973 coupled with

international inflationary pressures have affected their economic position drastically. However, the resultant impacts of the two issues are different from each other so far as concerns the source of the level of impact as well as the time dimension involved.

The international economic system has always been managed by developed countries which have economic, political and military power. The fact is that the developing countries, including of course the Non-aligned Movement have suffered from the adverse effects of this control because the whole system has been geared to serve the interests of the industrialized world, a matter which the poorer countries have had no power to affect or change, for a very long time, even in a very limited way.

However, the changing political and economic situation in the world in the last decade has introduced new factors in the light of which the developing countries have felt, for the first time, that reshaping the international economic system in such a way as to lessen their disadvantages seemed less remote than they had always assumed.

This potential change has prompted them to try to put their weight behind these possibilities of change. On the other hand, the world

oil price boom which is incidently one of those new factors on the world stage, while paradoxically badly hitting developing countries the most, yet provided some of them with some sort of a bargaining power in order to change the adverse effects of the whole international system. Within this prospect it is perhaps important to note that both the oil producing and the poor developing countries are members of the Non-aligned Movement, a fact which the Movement's leaders felt needed to be explored in order to lessen the oil price effect within the Movement among its own members on the one hand, and a card to be played in the whole matter of producing a fairer economic system less biased against the Third World countries on the other hand.

### 3.2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MANAGEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT DEBATE

The origins of the current international economic system, or rather the management of the present system, go back to the late Second World War period. In 1944 it was recognised that a new economic system would be needed to cope with the world economy during the aftermath of the war. Then, with the European economy in a shambles, the famous Bretton Woods agreement was reached. The two most important points to be mentioned concerning that agreement are the roles and the instruments. Firstly, the agreement set a fixed exchange rate, according to which all countries agreed to establish a parity of their currencies in terms of gold and to maintain exchange rates within 1% plus or minus of parity. The rules further sought to encourage an open system by committing member countries to the convertibility of their respective currencies into other currencies and to free trade.



Secondly, for the first time both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were required to perform a central bank function for the international system.<sup>1</sup>

As became very clear during the following three decades the system itself seemed to have built-in self-destructive points. Due to the fact that most of the two institutions' finances came mainly from the U.S., as well as some other European countries, coupled with the weighted voting according to their shares, effectively these institutions were directly manipulated by these countries. If this is looked at in perspective - that is, the main function of the IMF was to give credit to member countries in times of balance of payments deficits on the current account on the one hand, and the IBRD was to give long and medium term loans for development projects - then it would seem fairly clear that those developing countries in difficulties were susceptible to the direct impact of the dominating countries on the two institutions. As will be made clear, despite the changes and evolution of the system, this was one of the basic complaints, particularly of the Third world countries.

Originally, in 1944, it was felt that this system needed no more than five years to adjust to international conditions during which time the world economy would recover. However, by 1947, it was clear that Bretton Woods Institutions were not enough to cope with the international economic problems arising out of the war, particularly in

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1) Gardner, Richard., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order, New York, McGraw Hill, 1969, pp.xxii-xxv.

saving the European countries' economies from virtual collapse. Hence, with its economic power and immense resources the United States stepped in unilaterally to manage the system by providing the much needed resources, in what came later to be known as the dollar standard. The willingness of the Americans to carry out the job was perhaps enhanced by the need, as they saw it, to prevent the Soviet Union from taking advantage of the world's economic and political circumstances.<sup>1</sup> More importantly, the willingness as well as the capability of the Americans unilaterally to take over was more than welcomed by the Europeans and the Japanese, both of whom were in desperate need of resources-injection to revive their industrial bases.

After that time and up to 1960, the international system was managed unilaterally. As is the case in any national economy, the international system needed a convertible, powerful and stable currency characteristics which neither gold nor the pound was able to provide due to weaknesses of the British economy at the time as well as the international gold market.

Here the American dollar filled the gap. Since the American balance of payments was in a state of immense surplus, it was necessary for the Americans to run a deficit to allow a flow of resources to Europe and the rest of the world economy. This was eventually done through huge economic grants to Europe as well as a vast increase in America's military expenditures. During the period 1946-1953, the

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1) See for example, Acheson, D.G., Present at the Creation or my Years in the State Dept., New York; Norton, 1969, See also Garwood, E.C., Will Clayton: A short Biography, Austin, University of Texas at Houston Press, 1958.

United States transferred to the rest of the world through grants and loans, \$33 billion of goods and services, exclusive of military items. By 1959, the Japanese and European economies were in full recovery and they were building continuously high reserves equal to those of the Americans. Whereas American gold reserves had fallen, from \$24.4 billion at the end of 1948 to \$19.8 billion at the end of 1959, dollar reserves overseas had increased from \$7.3 billion to \$19.4 billion within the same period.<sup>1</sup>

During this period the dollar was weakening, reflecting the weaknesses of the American economy after a long period of outflow of resources. This came to a peak during 1960 when the U.S. experienced the first run on the dollar.<sup>2</sup> This "dollar crisis" signalled the first need for a change in the management of the international economic system particularly due to the fact that the international economic forces had been changing very rapidly.

From 1959 therefore, it was clear that the forces of change were powerful enough to produce proposals for reform directed at correcting three alleged weaknesses in the international system.

These are related to the adjustment mechanism to deal with payments disequilibria; liquidity in the international economic system; and confidence in the international currencies.<sup>3</sup>

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1) Spero, Joan, E., The Politics of International Economic Relations, London, Allen & Unwin 1977, p.38.

2) Solomon, Robert, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976, An Insider's View, New York; Harper & Row Publishers, 1977, pp.19-20.

3) Ibid., p.38.

These necessary changes in the effectiveness of the international economic system were also complicated during the sixties by detente between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. during which the lessening of the Soviet threat argument, particularly over Europe, led to a decline in European security needs which had been met by the Americans and, by implication, brought the submerged economic tensions to the surface.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the world political and military tensions during this period, i.e. the Vietnam conflict etc., along with the weaknesses in the American economy led to the growth in international monetary interdependence. This monetary interdependence which was created by the industrialized world returning to convertability led to a relaxation in the instruments of management of the world economy. The recovery of Europe and Japan with strong economic power meant that the U.S. was no longer the sole dominant economic power it had been for almost two decades.<sup>2</sup>

However, while there had been expressions of concern about such problems immediately after 1959, it was only in 1963 that official multilateral negotiations actually got underway and continued for several years. This took the form of a declaration by the Group of Ten that they would undertake a thorough examination of the functioning of the international monetary system.

At the same time the IMF started its own investigation.<sup>3</sup> Between then and up to 1967, this period witnessed the emergence of national

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1) See Spero, Joan, E., op.cit., pp.37-49.

2) Ibid., p.48.

3) Argy, Victor, The Postwar International Money Crisis, An Analysis, London, Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp.45-53.

interests, but the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) managed to put through two specific proposals for credit creation in order to solve the problem of world liquidity. One was to extend automatic rights within the Fund, and the other was a more radical proposal, i.e., members would acquire claims (resources) on the International Reserve Fund (IRF), an affiliate of the IMF, expressed in IRF units of gold weight.<sup>1</sup> The main outcome of this was the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

Despite such reforms it was clear by the early seventies that the system was under heavy pressure. The United States of America was no longer willing to lead the international system. Although the U.S.A. did not wish to see a fundamental change in the system, it was disappointed with the weak response from its European and Japanese partners to its initiatives. The upshot was that on August 15, 1971, President Nixon without consultation with anyone else, announced his new economic policy of non-convertability of the dollar into gold as well as a 10% surcharge imposed on dutiable imports. These measures marked the end of the Bretton Woods period and the beginning of a new era in the international system.<sup>2</sup>

It is clear from the above that the problems of the international system were magnified by the early seventies and the end of the Bretton Woods agreement threw the system into chaos. Perhaps the two most

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1) For details See, Cohen, S.D., International Monetary Reform, 1964-1969 : The Political Dimension. New York, Praeger 1970, 110-11; See also De Varies, M.G., The IMF 1966-1971, The System Under Stress, Volume 1, Narrative, Washington, D.C., IMF, 1976.

2) Spero, Joan, E., *op.cit.*, p.51.

important features of the seventies were the Smithsonian agreement, which did not last more than a year, and the oil-price boom later in 1973. Despite the short life of the said agreement, it was however, the first clear approach to multilateralism in international monetary management. The oil-price increases brought new unknown powers into the system i.e. the oil producing countries who started accumulating huge surpluses. As Table 3.1 below shows, foreign exchange reserves oil exporting countries started an upward increase almost matching that of the industrialised countries which remained stable.

TABLE 3.1 Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1973-75. (\$ Billion)

End of Year	Oil-Exporting Countries	Industrial Countries*	Other Countries
1973	12.7	66.2	43.8
1974	43.7	68.0	43.9
1975	51.1	70.2	40.0

\* Group of Ten plus, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Norway.

SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics, June, 1976, p.24.

Moreover, the world witnessed the inflationary pressures of 1972-1974 and together with the oil shock, may explain the troubles of the international system since then. The aftermath of the developments which took place in 1973 i.e. the oil-price boom, was a period in which the voice of Third World countries was heard for the first time concerning the problems and the injustice that the monetary system inflicted on such countries.

More importantly, it was the first time that a linkage between the prices of raw materials of developing countries and manufactured products and technology of the industrialised world had come to the surface, and the developing countries called for international negotiations for the creation of a "New International Economic Order". It was recognised by developing countries that being outside inter-national monetary management for such a long time, was an important factor which eventually produced the biases of the system against them in favour of the industrialised world.

The world recession which was cutting deep into the international economy put pressure on the industrialized countries to open negotiations, with the developing world, be it through the OPEC Organisation, those of the U.N., or other international fora. The important thing to be mentioned here is that such global negotiations were this time concentrating on all the major aspects of the international economy, be it trade, aid, flow of resources etc.

These issues however, are further elaborated on in section two of the present chapter in order to see how they affected developing countries, and in section three in the discussion of the role of the non-aligned movement in participating in the process of lessening the biased effect or the resulting impact in these major areas. This was surely one of the main areas of emphasis of the movement in world affairs particularly during the seventies.

### 3.3 THE NEED TO CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: MAIN AREAS OF COMPLAINT

As was argued in the previous section, through the post-war period developing countries played no role in the management of the international economic system. It is therefore not surprising perhaps to argue that this has resulted in gearing the system away from the needs of such countries to favour those countries who have the power and control. This bias in the system created a huge set of problems particularly affecting almost all Third World countries and very severely hit and shattered a number of them. It is perhaps ironic that developing countries recognised the impact of the arising problems as early as the 1950s, yet were in no position to redress their effect until the early seventies when the world at large felt the impact of the oil-price boom. It was only when the Western World had felt the impact of the world recession, that it showed the slightest recognition of the developing countries plight. Accordingly new initiatives for the improvement of the system have been examined, despite the relatively long period of time this has taken, and undoubtedly it will take an equally long time to materialize.

In the light of the above, the present section focuses attention on a number of problems which collectively should be dealt with as a priority, taking into consideration the fact that these are the most important issues but not all the issues. Such issues include trade; transfer of resources; aid; energy and transfer of technology. These will be examined briefly in turn, making way for the discussion in section three of the role of the non-aligned movement in addressing these problems and alleviating their impact on developing countries.<sup>1</sup>

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1) The arguments presented in this section highlight the main issues, rather than the details of each issue.



### 3.3.1 INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY TRADE

One of the main complaints against the current international economic system lies in the area of trade. The majority of developing countries found themselves taking a relatively minor share of overall world trade as well as experiencing ever-deteriorating terms of trade. Despite the efforts made over the past three decades or so, the developing countries' share in world trade has remained virtually stagnant and even dropped significantly during the 1960s. As Table 1 demonstrates, the share of the industrialized countries in world trade has increased steadily from 63.5% in the early 1950s to about 68% by 1979, whereas the share of developing countries decreased during the same period from about 29% to only 22% by 1979. Given the fact that most developing countries have small open economies dependent in most cases on one or two export-oriented commodities, their share in world exports is of particular importance.

TABLE 3.2 Share of Selected Regions in World Trade (per cent).\*

	1950	1955	1965	1970	1975	1979
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
World Developed Market Economies	63.0	65.5	69.1	72.0	67.1	68.4
Developing Market Economies	28.7	24.8	16.4	17.3	22.3	22.2
OPEC	5.3	5.3	4.5	4.3	9.3	9.3
LDCs	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.5
Centrally Planned Economies	7.8	9.7	15.5	10.7	10.6	9.4

SOURCE: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade. Statistics, 1979. Table A.P.1067.

\* Averages of the shares of each region in imports and exports of the World.

This is perhaps mainly because such products play a vital role as foreign exchange earners. Therefore, changing world economic conditions result in an equal deterioration in their domestic economies, be it on account of changing world demand or fluctuations in world prices. Such fluctuations more often than not result in instability in domestic revenues and cause undesired internal frictions and disrupt economic and social development. Table 3.3 shows that between 1950 and 1978, despite the fact that the share of the major oil exporting countries' share in world exports has increased, the overall share of 'developing' countries in world exports decreased from 30.8% in 1950 to about 23% by the end of 1978. This decrease has eventually taken its toll on those developing countries, other than the oil-producing countries, with a meagre share of about 11% of total world exports by 1978.

**TABLE 3.3 Share of 'Developing' Countries in World Exports, 1950-1978 (Selected Years) (Percentages).**

Year	All 'Developing' Countries (a)	Major Petroleum Exporters Only (b)	Other 'Developing' Countries
1950	30.8	6.2	24.6
1955	25.5	7.1	18.8
1965	19.6	6.4	13.2
1970	17.8	6.0	11.8
1975	24.2	13.7	10.5
1977	25.7	13.9	11.8
1978	22.9	11.6	11.3

SOURCE: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1979 New York, U.N., 1979.

Represented Sauvart, M.K.P., op.cit, p.238.

NOTES: (a) Excluding 'socialist' countries in Asia whose share, since 1965, has been under 1%.

(b) Including those countries for which petroleum and petroleum products accounted for more than 50% of their total exports in 1974.

In addition to the decline in the share of 'developing' countries in world trade, the terms of trade have been deteriorating as well, especially for these developing countries. Taking 1970 as a base year, the terms of trade index decreased from 96% to 91% for developed market economies during the period 1960-1978. Despite the fact that the index for all developing countries has increased considerably, such an increase seems artificial for the simple reason that it was only oil producing and exporting countries which benefited and the rest of the developing world's relative prices for exports declined while those for their imports increased, hence leaving them at a poorer level still. (Table 3.4 below).

TABLE 3.4 Terms of Trade of Developed and Developing Countries  
(Selected Years, 1970 = 100)

Year	Developed Market Economies	All	Major Petroleum Exporters	Other Developing Countries
1960	96	100	113	95
1963	97	94	109	89
1966	98	97	101	95
1970	100	100	100	100
1973	99	105	123	96
1976	89	170	362	88
1978	91	151	324	86

SOURCE: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development  
Statistics 1979, New York, U.N. 1979. *Ibid*, p 239

Moreover, the recent economic contraction in the world economy has led to acute unemployment problems particularly in the industrialised western countries which gave way to the emergence of protectionist policies.

These changes taken together have led raw material producers to demand the establishment of producers' associations or product cartels.

The success story of OPEC in the area of petroleum products has certainly activated the ideas of controlling world demand on the part of such producers in order to protect their foreign exchange earnings through increases in raw material prices. The measures employed so far have taken many different forms: decreed prices; production cutbacks; selective embargoes; increased royalty payments; negotiated prices, etc.<sup>1</sup>

However, the success or otherwise of such moves depends to a large extent on world economic conditions concerning the demand for commodities; the possible alternatives to each product; the demand elasticities, i.e., the response of demand on the world market to changes in prices; and above all the agreement among exporting countries on a given policy designed to serve their collective interests as well as the domestic economic problems of those countries.

Since the main idea behind trade associations sprang from emulating OPEC'S success, one may question the applicability of such a

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1) Sauvart, K.P., Changing Priorities on the International Agenda, New York, Pergamon Press, 1981, p.122.

proposition in view of the above mentioned obstacles. The main serious question which might be asked is whether the same conditions available to OPEC are also available to other commodity producers. More important perhaps is the fact that, particularly in the area of mineral products, the developed countries have a large share in production as well as the possibility of substitution and contraction in consumption. This much said, it is perhaps very important to acknowledge the fact that there is a wide range of interdependence among developed and developing economies. This is precisely why developing country commodity cartels' can generate successful leverage on developed countries.

Before embarking on any such scheme, developing countries seeking stabilized commodity prices supported international trade agreements. This is exemplified by UNCTAD'S integrated programme for commodities that proposes a network of such agreements for all raw materials exported by developing countries.<sup>1</sup> This approach assumes commodity prices are to be stabilized, price fluctuation to be eliminated and prices to be increased in the long run.<sup>2</sup> But such negotiations have so far produced little of value to Third World economies. Therefore, the use of cartels may be the best available leverage for change, however, much they may be disapproved of in orthodox economic theory.

Since the ultimate aim of developing countries is that of securing a steady flow of stable revenues in order to ensure the implementation

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1) Sauvart, M.K.P., Changing Priorities on the International Agenda, New York, Pergamon Press, 1981, p.161.

2) Ibid., p.161.

of their development plans, and if reforming the international system through such agreements is feasible, then there is no reason to believe that forming producers associations is the best alternative, but unfortunately without cartels the developing countries may find it difficult to exert the necessary pressure for reform on the developed countries.

It is perhaps more important to increase the productive capacities of developing countries, particularly in the area of manufactured goods in order to diversify their economies and alleviate the susceptibility of such small open economies to the vagaries of world market. In actual fact, whether forming cartels in the product markets is the answer for the needed structural changes is still an open question.\*

Some even go further and refer to the current problems facing OPEC's price structure as an example of the eventual failures of such a method. While current OPEC problems reflect, in essence, the short-run world economic conditions, particularly world recession as well as the world oil glut, it is nevertheless not clear whether this is a temporary or a permanent problem. Again the elasticity of world demand may prove to be the vital link in the success or otherwise either for OPEC or any other potential producers.

The recognition and eradication of dependency in the world markets and the need for stabilization in developing countries must be considered the over-riding objectives sought after. This might be

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\* For more details See Mikesell, R., "More Third World Cartels Ahead?" Challenge, November-December, 1974, pp.24-31.

properly addressed through improvements in the current institutional framework that governs world trade. Specifically this means that GATT and UNCTAD as mechanisms in world trade may need re-construction if the world trade situation is to be prevented from further deterioration. In this area, it will need to be made clear that the non-aligned movement has a vital role to play, both within its member countries and in negotiating a better deal for developing countries through the U.N. and its affiliated agencies.

### 3.3.2 THE INFLOWS OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Perhaps one of the main constraints on economic and social development in developing countries is the availability of capital. Due to their own characteristics, developing economies in general, tend to have considerable consumption needs so that little is left for savings and capital formation. Moreover, in addition to the lack of adequate savings, the lack of foreign exchange makes it a lot more difficult for developing countries to attain a reasonable rate of economic growth.

It is in the light of the above constraints on economic growth in developing countries, that the need for foreign resources arises.

Early in the 1950s, developed countries realized the need of the Third World countries for economic assistance for several, and sometimes independent motives.

Economic aid is usually given for humanitarian, economic or political motives. Whatever the main motive of aid, the fact remains that the need for the lessening of the gap between the poor and rich countries of the world is in the interest of world development and stability, in addition to the fact that mutual interdependence among the two groups is something which is undeniable. Poor countries want to improve the quality of life of their people, develop their economies which after all, represents an important market for the products of rich countries. The latter on the other hand, would like to continue receiving raw materials, as was discussed in the previous section, as well as ensuring political and economic 'stability', let alone the humanitarian aspect of it all.

UNCTAD proposed that developed countries should allocate at least one percent of their gross national product to assistance purposes. Despite the pleas of Third World countries, the Pearson Report on international development by the end of the 1960s, complained that "in the last years of this decade, the volume of foreign official aid has been stagnant. At no time during this period has it kept pace with the growth of national product in the wealthy nations."<sup>1</sup>

Despite the call of the said report for action on the part of developed countries to increase the real flow of resources to developing countries, available data indicate that official transfers declined during the mid seventies.

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
1) Pearson, Lester, B., Report of the Commission on International Development. Partners in Development, 1969, p.4.



Throughout the period 1969-1975 for example, the share of total official development assistance from the OECD countries which was devoted for concessional aid declined from 0.42 percent to 0.30 percent of GNP between 1967 and 1973. On the other hand, the share of the U.S. in total official development assistance fell steadily from 58% to 32% during the same two years.<sup>1</sup>

The sources of aid are of particular importance. This is because the transfer of resources does not come only from government sources, but also from the private sector in different forms i.e. either in cash or in kind. It is important to note that while official aid has been declining since the mid 1970s, private transfer increased relative to the total transfer of resources as Figure 3.1 below indicates. While the need for private transfer of resources is always present and in fact welcomed in developing countries, these resources should be considered complementary rather than a substitute for official transfers. At worst they may involve, or lead to, sheer exploitation.

**FIGURE 3.1**  
A Comparison of the Volume of Private and official Aid Flows between 1961-1977.



SOURCE: Mountjoy, Alan B., "International Aid, Donations and Receipts." *Third World Quarterly*, January 1981, vol. 3 No. 1, p.128.

1) For some detailed data see, OECD, *Development Co-operation*, 1974, Review, Nov. 1974, p.14.

The problem does not only lie in the total volume of aid, but is also multiplied by aid tying. The experience of many developing countries indicates that the tying of aid either to the importation of specific products from the donor country or to programmes specified by the donor country, reduces the benefits that recipient countries could achieve, had foreign aid resources not been tied, as well as increasing the cost of aid. According to Bhagwati, "The limited general evidence available indicates that the direct costs alone of aid-tying are equivalent to a significant proportion of the value of tied aid and almost certainly accounts on the average for as much as one-fifth of the value of aid."<sup>1</sup> More recently developments in the world economy seem destined to lead even smaller amounts of aid on the one hand and a new dimension of political and economic pressures on the other hand.

This has not only been applied to bilateral relations between donor and recipient countries, but also through international agencies particularly IBRD and its affiliate IDA (International Development Association). Several ex-officials of the IBRD have criticized the control of top management of this important international institution, because this eventually manifests itself in the policies adopted. As a scholar and Canadian diplomat who served for several years as a bank senior official noted; "The World Bank Group is now a very unequal partnership between the rich and the low-income countries. In 1973, nationals of rich countries held 68 of the top 80 positions in the management staff of the bank and its affiliate IDA."<sup>2</sup>

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1) Bhagwati, J.N., The Tying of Aid, Study prepared for UNCTAD, Nov, 1964, pp.1-3.

2) Yost, Charles, W., Chief U.S. delegate to the U.N. 1968-71, "Growing Sentiment for isolationism" Washington Post, November 7, 1971, p.6.  
Reid, Escott, "McNamara's World Bank", "Foreign Affairs, July 1973, pp.794-810 and also Reid" The World Bank Group : An unequal partnership Co-operation Canada, Nov-Dec, 1973, pp.15-21. Also see: Mikdashi, Z., The International Politics of Natural Resources, 1976, London.

In that respect, this control reflects the political control of the design and implementation of the institution's policies. This is particularly relevant to the United States as well as other western countries. A former administrator of USAID observed for example that "We must have agreement with the recipient on the appropriate policy package which will move the system away from enclaved development and towards a more broadly based participation of its people in productive and innovative activity."<sup>1</sup> Specifically, this argument calls for the donor country to divert its aid package from helping public sector development in developing countries to follow market economies regardless of their own circumstances, social needs or ideology. Here economic ideology comes into it more strongly than ever. As was indicated above, this is not only applicable to bilateral relations but to international agencies as well. The more recent economic problems in the Western World have brought this argument to the fore.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its arm IDA, moved down towards not only accepting but applying the American argument, because of the leverage the United States has on their financial resources. Such institutions provide much needed soft loans to developing countries, the absence of which will certainly aggravate the economic and social development of Third World countries and may also result in destabilizing a great many of them. The McNamara era seems to have been shelved now and replaced by a more dogmatic ideological one based on monetarism which will do more harm than good to developing countries. Surplus countries, in particular OPEC, may have an important role to play in transferring more resources to developing countries through which the non-aligned movement may prove to be a key factor as will be discussed later in this Chapter.

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
1) Ranis, Gustav., "Why Foreign Aid?" Ventures, Fall, 1968, p.25.

However, one must not forget for a moment that the need for a more direct transfer of resources from OPEC countries to other Third World countries must be complementary to, rather than a substitute for, any genuine aid from the U.S.A. and other Western Countries. But insofar as much so-called "aid" from the developed world has an underlying exploitative purpose, OPEC aid needs to substitute genuine aid which enables other Third World countries to move towards the economic independence necessary to underpin a truly non-aligned foreign policy. Whatever the contribution of the OPEC countries this must not obviate the need for more rather than less real resource transfer from developed to developing countries and this may not be used as an excuse to cancel the responsibility of the developed world for the achievement of a more equal international economy. The international transfer of real resources must also be viewed in a wider perspective in the quest for a new international economic order. Moreover, it is important to note that in spite of the fact that there has been this inflow of foreign aid to developing countries, their outstanding loans have been growing over time as well.

Once the period of grace for such loans expires, then this leads to an outflow of much needed resources. As Figure 3.2 indicates, between 1960 and 1977 the total debt of developing countries increased considerably from about \$17.9 billion to a staggering \$244 billion. Of course this dramatic increase in the overall volume of external debt was accompanied by an equal increase in debt service payments to the developed countries which increased from a low of \$2.6 billion in 1960 to as high as \$36.6 billion in 1977. Such an increase in the outflow of resources in terms of interest and principal repayments has caused a lot of problems for a large number of developing countries whose economies did not grow fast enough during the last two decades to

FIGURE 3.2

TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT (DISBURSED) AND DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (a), 1960-1977



SOURCE: OECD, Development Co-operation : 1978 Review, Sauvart, M.K.P., op.cit, p.105.  
 (a) Includes intra-DC and Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.  
 (b) Provisional.

ensure that such payments would cause few problems. Perhaps an outstanding example to that effect is the case of Poland and the instability it created which not only affected the country itself, but other countries and world financial institutions as well.

### 3.3.3 ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

The energy problems facing the industrialized world, serious as they may be, pale in comparison with those facing developing countries. In the well-off countries of Europe and in Australia, New Zealand and Japan the energy consumption per capita exceeds the equivalent of 5 tonnes of coal per year, and in North America it is more than double this. In most developing countries energy consumption is barely the equivalent of a quarter tonne of coal per capita annually.<sup>1</sup> While on the other hand, primary energy consumption in the developing countries during the early seventies was approximately 15% of the world total outside communist areas.<sup>2</sup> Once the stage of economic and social development proceeded to a new level, undoubtedly this share would increase.

While energy consumption was not a problem after World War II up until the early seventies, an era which was characterized by cheap energy sources, the picture has changed drastically since the oil-price increases of 1973. Given the fact that energy is, naturally, the prime mover of economic growth and development, then obviously the quest of

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1) Smil V., & Knowland, William, "Energy in the Developing World", in Smil, V. & Knowland, W., eds. Energy in the Developing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

2) For data on production and consumption shares see: World Energy Statistics, New York, UN Publications, annually; see also OECD, Statistics of Energy, OECD, Paris, annually.

developing countries for the achievement of any acceptable level of development will be accompanied by ever-rising energy costs.

In view of the above, it is acknowledged that the availability of financial resources as well as highly developed technology would allow the developed world to develop energy alternatives to oil, either conventional energy sources such as coal and natural gas, or in the form of solar and nuclear energy resources. If this is coupled with the potentiality of reducing their consumption needs, as was the most recent experience in Western Europe and the U.S.A., then one would be inclined to think that no matter how hard the energy situation is for the industrialized world nowadays, it is potentially and practically feasible for such countries to ease the problem off. The fact remains, however, that the growth in the consumption of energy for developing countries during the past two decades and the high dependence on imported sources of energy make them prone to the vagaries of the international market situation because essentially, they are in most cases price takers and have no leverage whatsoever on the price and sources of supply of their imported oil. This situation has created acute problems of economic instability in a number of developing countries; halted the advance towards development for others and generally brought about balance of payment problems.

Table one provides data on net energy petroleum product imports for a number of developing countries divided into four groups of countries according to the level of their imports. It is acknowledged that OPEC countries, particularly those Arab countries with substantial surpluses recognised the need of developing countries and provide significant sums in grants and concessional loans. This is evident from data provided in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which show that three of the

TABLE 3.5

NET ENERGY PETROLEUM PRODUCT IMPORTS, 1974 (MILLION TONNES FUEL OIL EQUIVALENT)

Country	Imports	Country	Imports	Country	Imports
<u>GROUP A</u>					
Brazil	28.63	Panama	0.91	Laos	0.13
India	14.72	Jordan	0.68	Malawi	0.12
Philippines	8.18	Surinam	0.69	Togo	0.10
Yugoslavia	7.74	Tanzania	0.69	Dem. Kampuchea	0.09
Thailand	7.97	Bangladesh	0.56	Mauritania	0.09
South Korea	10.81	Cyprus	0.61	Niger	0.09
Sub-Total	78.05	El Salvador	0.61	Benin	0.08
<u>GROUP B</u>					
Singapore	3.05	Nicaragua	0.61	Haiti	0.08
Chile	3.78	Ethiopia	0.54	Mali	0.08
Pakistan	2.88	Costa Rica	0.54	Somalia	0.08
Jamaica	2.60	Sub-Total	9.04	Nepal	0.07
Morocco	2.36	<u>GROUP E</u>			
Argentina	2.81	Liberia	0.46	Central Africa	0.06
Sub-Total	17.48	Honduras	0.41	Empire	0.06
<u>GROUP C</u>					
Lebanon	1.91	Senegal	0.49	Upper Volta	0.05
Uruguay	1.70	Guyana	0.48	Chad	0.04
Kenya	1.41	Papua New Guinea	0.43	Burundi	0.03
Sudan	1.45	Guinea	0.39	Cape Verde	0.02
Sri Lanka	1.20	Afghanistan	0.39	Equatorial	0.02
Peru	1.69	P.Democratic	0.40	Guinea	0.02
Dominican Republic	1.31	Yemen	0.40	Gambia	0.02
Ivory Coast	1.16	Uganda	0.34	Grenada	0.02
Bahamas	1.05	Cameroon	0.27	Rwanda	0.02
Sub-Total	12.89	Guinea	0.27	Samoa	0.01
<u>GROUP D</u>					
Zambia	0.80	Paraguay	0.28	Comoros	0.01
Guatemala	0.93	Madagascar	0.33	Guinea Bissau	0.01
Ghana	0.87	Burma	0.24	Sao Tome	0.01
<u>TOTAL</u>					
					125.13
<u>TOTAL</u>					
					125.13

SOURCE: Energy Policy, Volume 6, Number 4, December 1978, p.259.



TABLE NO. 3.6

ACTUAL CONCESSIONAL LOANS AND GRANTS PROVIDED BY OPEC COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS, 1970, 1973-1977. (FIGURES PAID IN MILLIONS \$)

Country	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Algeria	1.0	25.4	46.9	40.7	53.6	46.7
Iran	3.6	1.9	408.3	593.1	752.5	202.1
Iraq	2.0	11.1	422.9	218.1	231.7	53.4
Kuwait	130.0	345.2	621.5	975.3	614.3	1441.8
Libya	63.0	214.6	147.0	261.1	93.6	109.4
Nigeria	-	4.7	15.3	13.9	82.9	63.6
Qatar	-	93.7	185.2	338.9	195.0	117.6
Saudi-Arabia	155.0	304.9	1029.4	1997.4	2407.1	2373.0
U.A.E.	-	288.6	510.6	1046.1	1060.1	2261.8
Venezuela	2.5	17.7	58.8	31.0	95.9	71.5
TOTAL	357.1	1307.8	3445.6	5515.9	5586.8	5740.9

TABLE 3.7

FIGURES AS % OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

Country	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977*
Algeria	0.01	0.31	0.39	0.30	0.33	0.24
Iran	0.02	0.01	0.88	1.10	1.13	0.24
Iraq	0.04	0.21	3.99	1.66	1.46	1.28
Kuwait	1.30	5.76	5.70	6.52	4.34	10.18
Libya	1.14	3.32	1.23	2.13	0.61	0.63
Nigeria	-	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.27	0.19
Qatar	-	15.62	9.26	15.62	7.95	4.71
Saudi-Arabia	1.69	3.75	4.56	6.01	5.84	4.82
U.A.E.	-	12.03	6.66	11.79	10.94	10.97
Venezuela	0.02	0.11	0.23	0.12	0.31	0.20
TOTAL	0.43	1.41	2.01	2.71	2.29	2.10

\* 1977 Figures preliminary.

SOURCE: OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, November 11, 1978, quoted from OECD, Observer, Brussels, 1978

OPEC countries, namely, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, provide the bulk of OPEC grants and concessional loans.

For example Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia each provided about 10% of their GNP in 1977. Moreover, since the 1973 oil price increases, most Arab oil producing countries have created their own financial institutions to provide more concessional loans to developing countries other than the direct government bilateral agreements. The figures pledged by such institutions for the period 1973-1977 for which data is available are provided in Table 3.8 below:

TABLE 3.8 Major OPEC Financial Institutions' Pledges of Concessional Loans for the Period 1973-1977 (In U.S. \$ Millions)

INSTITUTION	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development.	-	55.1	46.2	169.4	138.1
The Arab Fund.	-	127.3	200.8	336.3	362.6
The Arab Bank for African Economic Development.	-	-	-	79.5	76.0
The Islamic Development Bank.	-	-	-	-	120.3
The Kuwait Fund for Economic and Social Development.	59.5	143.4	343.1	324.5	411.8
The OPEC.	-	-	-	42.7	243.0
The Saudi Fund for Economic Development.	-	-	282.7	458.3	841.1
TOTAL	59.5	325.8	872.8	1,410.7	2,192.9

SOURCE: OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, Nov.11, 1978, Quoted from OECD, Observer, Brussels, 1978

However, this is not to suggest that the geographical distribution

of grants and concessional loans provided by these institutions or directly by governments benefited all developing countries. The largest share of these grants and loans went to non-OPEC Arab countries.

This was perhaps for two main reasons. Firstly, the current volatile political and military upheavals in the Middle East, which need to be contained, even if it is only for the sake of oil producing countries themselves, and secondly, for the fact that donor OPEC countries have the full knowledge of both the economic and political situation in neighbouring Arab countries. But this biased geographical distribution has been changing in recent years, however small and gradual it may be. For example while one third of the countries receiving OPEC funds in 1973 were Arab countries, this percentage dropped to one quarter by 1976 and less later on. This is also reflected for example in the change in the basic enabling statutes of the Kuwait Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund, both of which were originally geared to the countries of the Arab League.<sup>1</sup>

One of the improvements needed in the workings of these financial institutions is not only the geographical distribution of their funds, but perhaps the avoidance of overlapping activities in developing countries. This problem may perhaps be avoided by a possible specialization among these institutions either in the form of sectoral specialization, that is one or more specializing in granting loans for the industrial sector, others for agriculture and so on. Or even it is feasible to direct each Funds' resources to a particular region or group of developing countries. Such an approach needs a great deal of

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1) OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1978.

close co-ordination of activities and even more the political will on the part of the governments concerned.

So far as the developing countries themselves are concerned it might be of prime importance that current consumption be more efficiently used. Price subsidies which are a widely used policy in most developing countries because oil is a politically sensitive issue, may have to be gradually abandoned if efficiency in reducing or conserving energy is to be achieved.

Finally, what is perhaps needed on the part of the non-aligned movement in alleviating the adverse effects of the energy problem of its member countries is dealt with in some detail in the rest of this chapter.

#### 3.3.4 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

The combination of the problems of developing countries coupled with their open economies and their adverse effects have led them to view industrial development as the backbone of any future development. However, despite the efforts made during the last two decades or so, while the developing countries accounted for two thirds of the world population their share in world manufacturing value accounted for less than 10% by 1975. Equally important is the regional distribution of the origin of this output. As Table 3.9 indicates, over 50% of the developing countries' share came from Latin American countries which are basically dominated by one or two large producers, namely Brazil and Argentina. South East Asia also accounted for over 30% and the rest by Africa and West Asia.

TABLE 3.9 Share of Developing Regions in World Manufacturing Value Added, 1960-1975. (Percent)

Year	All Developing Countries (a)	Africa	Latin America	South & East Asia	West Asia (b)
1960	6.9	0.7	4.1	1.9	0.3
1966	6.8	0.7	3.9	1.9	0.4
1972	7.7	0.7	4.4	2.1	0.4
1975	8.6	0.8	4.8	2.5	0.5

Represented in Sauvant, M.K.P., op.cit, p.282.

SOURCE: United nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World Industry since 1960: Progress and Prospects. Special Issue of the Industrial Development Survey for the Third World General Conference of UNIDO. New York: U.N., 1979.

NOTES: (a) 85 Developing Market Economies.

(b) Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Turkey.

During the period 1960-1972, the developing countries' total output grew at a respectable average annual growth rate of 7% compared to 6% for the developed market economies and 9% for the communist countries.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless these relatively high rates of growth of capital and know-how were achieved through the multinational corporations (MNCs) and their subsidiaries in developing countries. Such capital transfer could be transferred directly rather than through (MNCs) and this needs to be done if benefits to developing countries are to be maximised.

Over the past two or three decades, few economic issues have generated more rhetoric than the role in and relations of MNCs with developing countries. For some, like former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger "the multinational corporation represents one of the most effective engines of development"; for others such as Ronald Muller, the MNC is "one of the most powerful impediments to Third World development".<sup>2</sup> Between these two extreme views lie a host of opinions differing according to the impact of MNCs in each particular case.

Despite the conditions favourable to foreign investment in developing countries originally designed to attract such investments, most MNCs' activities are located in the developed world.

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1) See United Nations, Restructuring of World Industry: New Dimensions for Trade Co-operation, New York, U.N. 1978, p.3.

2) Address by Henry Kissinger on "Global Consensus and Economic Development", delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the U.N., Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 1, 1975; Ronald Muller, "The Multi-national Corporation and the Exercise of Power: Latin America", In Abdul A. Said and Luize R. Simmons, eds. The New Sovereigns : Multi-national Corporations as World Powers, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975, p.55.

As is apparent in Table 3.10 below, the global distribution of direct foreign investment (DFI) seems to be heavily concentrated in developed market economies.

TABLE 3.10 Stock of Direct Investment Abroad of Developed Market Economies, By Host Country, 1967-1975.

	1967	1971	1975
Host Country & Country Group			
Total Value of Stock (Billions of \$)	\$105	\$156	\$259
Distribution of Stock (Percentage)			
Developed Market Economies	69% a	72% a	74%
Canada	18	17	15
United States	9	9	11
United Kingdom	8	9	9
Germany (Federal Republic)	3	5	6
Other	30	32	33
Developing Countries	31	28	26
OPEC Countries (1)	9	7	6
Tax Havens (2)	2	3	3
Other	20	17	17
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%

SOURCE: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination, E/C 10/38 March 20, 1978, p.237.

- (1) Algiera, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.  
 (2) Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands, Antilles and Panama.

a. Details do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

In 1967 for example, about 69% of DFI was located in developed market economies, from which about 40% was concentrated in four countries namely, Canada, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and 30% of the total went to developing countries, 9% of which was invested in OPEC countries. This situation even worsened from the point of view of developing countries, since the share of developed market economies increased to 74% by 1975 leaving 26% in developing countries.

According to United Nations data in 1973, about three-quarters of the affiliates of MNCs had their head quarters in the developed nations in 1967.<sup>1</sup> Despite the fact that by world standards the volume of investments, the size of the MNCs' affiliates, and the scale of their activities are relatively small, foreign direct investment is frequently an important factor in the economic life of a developing country. What is considered a small operation by New York or London standards can be crucial for a small developing economy.

The tensions between MNCs and host countries in the developing world are not a new phenomenon. There has always been a dispute concerning the impact MNCs have on domestic economies despite the fact that developing countries' leaders, in most cases look for new direct foreign investments. There has been exploitation on the part of MNCs, the degree of which is not easy to quantify and perhaps as a result of lack of legislation, the capacity of developing countries' administrators to negotiate the need for investment for development, or a combination of these factors. The need nowadays is more for self-reliance as well as control of our flow of capital, not to mention the need for a better distribution of the fruits of development to all segments of society rather than to the elite.

Despite the fact that the developing countries' legislation as well as their capacity to bargain have developed in more recent years, they are still a long way from reaching an acceptable level of benefits to be drawn from direct foreign investment.

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1) United Nations, Multi-national corporations in World Development, Document St /ECA /190, 1973, p.147.



On the other hand, over the years MNCs have failed to clear the suspicions of developing countries which are looking for a better deal consistent with concessions they provide, be it in the form of tax havens, physical facilities, raw materials, cheap labour or other advantages.

### 3.3.5 INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

It was only relatively recently that the importance of the transfer of technology emerged as an issue seen as relevant to development. Originally, exchange earnings, capital inflow or domestic savings were commanding the main emphasis. Technological development and diffusion in the industrialized world largely remained an "Intra-Norther" experience. The technologies and know-how diffused were those which reflected the market mechanism, the price structure and the physical environment in which they operated. None of these factors was necessarily appropriate to developing countries. Whatever technologies were diffused to developing countries by private firms or institutions with interests in these countries remained relatively of minor importance.

Accordingly this has led those most concerned with developing nations' interests to assess (a) the size and nature of the efforts to transfer appropriate technologies; (b) Whether and where the technological "system" of the developed countries is harmful or beneficial to developing countries.<sup>1</sup>

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1) Bhagwati, J.N., (ed), The New International Economic Order, the North-South Debate, Cambridge, the MIT Bicentennial Studies, 1977.

In actual fact the current diffusion of technology to developing countries is not so much "transferred" as sold. This has led to many questions, ranging from "what is the appropriate technology that is needed and relatively easily absorbed in developing countries?" to "what price in the current imperfect world technology market should developing countries pay?".

Recent studies of costs and restrictive practices in the transfer of technology field have noted: the burden of financial payments, the widespread use of restrictive practices embodied in the agreements on the transfer of technology, the inappropriate character of some of these technologies, the host country's lack of control of technological development, and hence the costs of the absence of an effective indigenous scientific-technological capacity through which innovations can be absorbed, disseminated and reproduced.<sup>1</sup>

Among the United Nations organisation's network, UNCTAD undertook a pioneering work in bringing together a wide range of material bearing on these issues,<sup>2</sup> focusing on transfer of technology, especially on ways and means to improve the terms and conditions on which developing countries acquire technology. In order to facilitate the transfer of technology to developing countries, a programme in the form of a code of conduct for the transfer of technology was devised by the United Nations, and a wide range of regional conferences was held during 1978 and 1979 to discuss the major issues.

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1) For detailed discussion of these issues see, Stewart, Frances, Technology and Underdevelopment, Boulder, Colo, Westview Press, 1977.

2) See Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNCTAD, Technology Transfer, a Bibliography of Material available in the ECE/UNCTAD Reference Unit, Geneva, 1975.

The main objective of this code of conduct was to restructure the legal and juridical environment governing the transfer of technology.<sup>1</sup> Despite the progress made under the pressure of UNCTAD for its proposed code of conduct, there have been rival drafts prepared by the group of 77 and by the developed countries. These drafts contain substantial areas of agreement, hence the question now is not whether there is to be a code of conduct, but rather when, and what it will contain.

The main points, however, still at issue between developing and developed countries, are both definitional as well as procedural such as:

- (a) What constitutes a "restrictive business practice",
- (b) Whether the code should be legally binding,
- (c) Whether it should contain special preferences for developing countries.
- (d) Who is the legal reference in disputes, is it international court, host country or what?
- (e) What sort of guarantees should be offered by the supplying firms to host countries and so on.

Without resolving such issues, it is doubtful whether a code of conduct so limited in application would be more than a token gesture by the multinational corporations and developed countries who have the technology.

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1) See UNCTAD, Restructuring the Legal and Juridical Environment; Issues under Negotiation, Report by UNCTAD Secretariat, TD 1237, January 29, 1979 and April 12, 1979.

The mobilization of resources from within the non-aligned movement and transferring such resources on reasonable terms from the haves to the have nots may provide the missing link in the chain of economic and social development in Third World countries. It is in the light of this perspective and the emergence of the movement on the international scene as a force to be reckoned with, particularly during the 1970s, that this issue is analysed. I am of the view that the non-aligned movement's action must be directed on two fronts, and more vigorously if it is to be effective. In the first place, the movement's voice at the international level must be reinforced, particularly through the United Nations and its agencies, with particular importance given to such institutions as the IBRD, UNCTAD, GATT, etc., if a better deal for the member countries and Third World in general is to be achieved.

On the other hand, there needs to be an inward looking approach directed towards greater co-operation on a wide scale in order to ensure a reasonable degree of self-reliance even if it may be of a medium to long-term nature. This redirection of efforts from a totally outward looking approach, i.e. one which concentrates on the movement's relation with the North, to one with a two-tier strategy taking into consideration the importance of interdependence among the movement's member countries, may in the long run, prove to be the linch-pin of the movement's success in achieving its declared objectives.

As I outlined in Chapter Two, the movement for over two decades concentrated on political issues as its top priority and therefore was seen as no more than a political club for its member countries. This attitude within the movement dominated its activities until the early seventies as is clear from its resolutions and conference agendas.

Since as was said earlier, there has been a number of drafts with a wide range of accepted principles it is in the interests of all concerned to compromise on the issues still outstanding. The non-aligned movement still has a great role to play in bringing about a final agreement on the code of conduct for the transfer of technology with particular emphasis on two major issues, that is (1) it should be enforceable to be effective; and (2) it should not result in either increasing the cost of technology or the volume of transfer to developing countries but rather the reverse.

#### 3.4. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ITS INITIATING ROLE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL FOR CO-OPERATION

In the previous two sections attention has been given to the management of the international monetary system as well as the main problems facing Third World countries in general and the movement's member countries in particular.

In the present section our attention is devoted to the role that the movement may play on the international scene in the wake of the intense discussion on the New International Economic Order.

We have argued in the previous section that a substantial increase in raw material prices which ensures stable revenue flows for developing countries, reinforced by a reduction of debt and debt service obligations and an increase in foreign aid inflows along with more favourable terms for transfer of more appropriate technology, constitute the best means for improving the chances of Third World recovery.

The first signs of change were apparent during the early sixties, but by 1970 this change was more noticeable. The emergence of economic issues as important factors in international relations was deeply reflected in the shifting of the emphasis in the movement from addressing itself totally to the political questions into becoming an economic pressure group for its member countries and the Third World at large.

As determined at the Algiers Summit, the Bureau at the ministerial level was entrusted with supervising a group of co-ordinating countries for the Action Program on Economic Co-operation among non-aligned countries (see Chapter Two). The co-ordinating countries emerged later as those who carry out a substantial part of non-aligned movement activities as well as being the driving force for their implementation.<sup>1</sup>

More importantly, as a signal of a more active movement towards the implementation of its resolutions, the co-ordinating countries, can call on the results of expert groups that have sprung up in the aftermath of the 1973 Algiers Summit. These groups of experts have included those on science and technology, information on research in the field of economic co-operation, private foreign investment etc. As these groups' activities indicate, most of them have concentrated on development issues, and their work is particularly important because it shapes the detailed policies of the non-aligned movement.

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1) For a detailed account of the role of co-ordinating countries see for example, Jankowitsch, O., & Sauvart, M.K.P., (eds), The Third World without Superpowers: The collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana, 1978. see also, the Collected Documents of the non-aligned countries, op.cit, pp.119-124.

The result of these changes has not only been the increasing of the movement's appeal for more countries to join, but also the production of increasingly subject oriented, comprehensive and detailed proposals.

These changes were gaining impetus by 1975 during the Dakar Conference which accelerated the trend. The "Declaration of Non-alignment and Economic progress", which was adopted at the 1970 Lusaka Summit gave for the first time a detailed and concrete meaning to self-reliance and co-operation among developing countries. Most important of all perhaps, this changing balance in the activities of the movement infused a new, much needed vitality into the movement, reflected by both increased numbers of member countries, and more regular participation. The non-aligned movement had transformed itself from an informal gathering of like-minded leaders, to a highly structural and organized movement with the aim of promoting economic development.

While the main areas of complaint were more or less clear by then, more future activities of the movement in its new formation and attitude were concentrated on how to approach such problems both at the inter-member country level and in the movements' relations with the rest of the world.

One of the major forces working for differentiation among the non-aligned movements' member countries is the nature of their external economic relations - the differences between surplus and deficit. Such differences have a deep impact not only on the socio-economic structures prevailing in these countries, but also on co-operation and coherence within the movement.

These differences are not likely to disappear, but can be reduced, if only slightly, if the political will to do so exists and if countries are committed to the movement's basic principles, they may be narrowed even if only by a small margin.

While it is important to consolidate the gains achieved at the international level, even if it has been so far presenting the Third World's case more powerfully, equally important is the fact that similar steps must be taken from within the movement if a fruitful co-operation with a long-lasting effect of mutual benefit is to be achieved.

Mutual co-operation could only materialize in that respect on any significant scale if two fundamental conditions are met to begin with. First, a move towards co-operation should take into account the varied, even divergent, interests of member countries, and secondly, each country should be free to choose the socio-economic system that suits its interests. This will ensure the adherence of all concerned to the basic principles of the movement as well as achieving the desired results with the least interference from one country in another's affairs.

One of the main areas of co-operation in which the movement has particular responsibility is the channelling of surplus resources from surplus countries to deficit countries in the movement which is dealt with in some detail. It is no more than stating a fact to say that the main form of such transfer of resources will come from OPEC countries to the rest of the movement's member countries. There has been a great number and various sources of estimates of OPEC surpluses.



For example, the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin estimated them at \$37.2, \$33.3 and \$11.9 billion for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978 respectively, while the OECD Economic Outlook has estimated them at \$37.0, \$31.5 and \$11.0 billion for the same years.<sup>1</sup> Despite the drop that occurred during 1978, all projections indicate the acceleration of these surpluses in the future, despite the necessary qualifications which need to be made given the current crisis facing OPEC. While the volume of the surpluses is important, the deployment of these surpluses is of equal importance. As Table 3.11 indicates, the share of the developing countries and the communist bloc together, did not add up to more than one fifth of the total OPEC surpluses during the period 1974-1978.

TABLE 3.11 The Disposition of OPEC Investment, 1974-1978

Country	Billion \$	Per Cent
U.S.A.	44.92	22.8
U.K.	7.30	3.7
Other Industrial Countries	33.75	18.2
Euromarket	55.10	28.0
Developing Countries and Communist Bloc	43.30	22.0
International Financial Institutions	10.35	5.3

SOURCE: Sobhan, op.cit., p.723.

1) See for example Sobhan, R., "Institutional Mechanisms for Channelling OPEC Surpluses within the Third World", Third World Quarterly, Vol.2, No.4, 1980.

However, over 50% of the surpluses were deployed in the United States and the Euromarket. It may be argued that developing countries absorptive capacity of financial resources into productive investments is still limited in nature, however unless there is a gradual transfer of funds such a capacity will not be enhanced. The irony lies in the fact that while the OPEC surpluses are invested in the Euromarket, other developing countries' debts to this market have been increasing, and the outlook for such countries is bleak. According to one analyst<sup>1</sup>, the combined current account deficit for LDCs may mushroom from its already dangerous level of more than \$60 billion to over \$200 billion in 1986. There are ample reasons to believe that a basis for sound investments in developing countries does exist and must be explored.

Here a system of general criteria for investment needs to be established among OPEC member countries - and among the richer non-aligned countries generally - in order to ensure the flow resources from the surplus countries to the deficit ones without their needs to pass through a third party in the developed world. Decision of this kind would be necessarily political ones and not ones determined by market forces. The question of stability and conditions for sound investment that ensure the repayability of such funds may arise. Without oversimplifying such an issue, however important, one may argue that if necessary conditions exist for the increase in Eurodollar loans for developing countries that has occurred it surely must equally exist for direct transfers of resources for OPEC countries to the rest of the movement's member countries.

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1) Parkin, Adam, "The LDC Debt Burden may be impossibly heavy by 1986", Euromoney, march 1980, p.118.

OPEC has already been willing to give generous though not unlimited assistance to developing non-oil producing countries. However, two issues remain to be elaborated on in this respect. Firstly, for obvious reasons the distribution of loans from OPEC specialized financial institutions is still geared disproportionately to favour non-oil producing Arab countries. For example, as Table 3.12 demonstrates, one of the leading institutions in this field i.e., the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development gave about 69.4 per cent of its loans to Arab countries between 1962 and 1977, with about 20 per cent to Asian countries and less than 10 per cent to African countries. While it is important to keep up the volume of loans granted to the Arab countries, it is perhaps desirable to increase the shares of the rest of the developing countries of such concessional loans. Moreover, what is needed is perhaps a more systematic approach to aid-giving in general on the part of the OPEC countries.

Given the fact that non-oil producing developing countries have been the hardest hit by the oil-price increases, a comprehensive package can be fashioned combining at least partial compensation for future oil price increases; support for oil and gas exploration and development; and finally guarantees of secure, relatively low-cost supplies.<sup>1</sup>

So far there have been several proposals for the acceleration of resource transfer from OPEC to other low-income countries.

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1) Rahmani, Bijan Mossaver, "OPEC and no OPEC oil in South Relation", Journal of International Affairs, Vol 34, No.1, 1980, pp.41-58.

TABLE 3.12

LOANS BY THE KUWAIT FUND, JANUARY 1, 1962 TO JUNE 30, 1977

(IN MILLIONS OF KUWAIT DINARS)

Region	Agriculture	Trans.Comm	Electrification	Industry	Total	%
Arab Countries	71.09	98.53	52.84	19.84	302.30	69.4
African Countries	13.31	10.60	13.47	4.50	14.88	9.6
Asian Countries	12.20	8.80	52.70	16.35	90.05	20.7
European Countries	-	1.13	-	-	1.13	0.3
<u>TOTAL</u>	96.60	119.06	119.01	100.68	435.35	100.0
<u>PER CENT</u>	22.2	27.4	27.4	23.1	100.00	-

SOURCE: Jorge Lozoya and Hector Cuadra, Africa, The Middle East and the New International Economic Order, New York, 1980. Appendix Table 12, p.141.

In fact OPEC itself has realised such a need as is documented in the report of a group of its experts early in 1980.<sup>1</sup> The said report made a number of recommendations the most important of which in this context is the following:-

1. The OPEC Special Fund should be transformed into a development agency with a substantially increased initial authorized capital. The agency would undertake to: finance developing countries' balance of payments deficits; finance under favourable terms, economic development projects recognized by the recipient countries as priority projects; finance projects that ensure integration among developing countries; and projects designed to up-grade the raw materials in these countries.

2. The non-oil producing developing countries should be given assurances about the security of their oil supplies at official prices as a matter of priority.

3. OPEC should assist non-oil producing developing countries in meeting the costs of their oil bills through a service of loans and grants. Developing countries oil bills have been increasing considerably, particularly since the 1973 oil-price increase. This is evident from data presented in Table 3.13.

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1) OPEC, "Report of the Group of Experts Sub-committee; to and approved by the Fourth Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on long-term Strategy", London February 22, 1980.

TABLE 3.13

PETROLEUM IMPORT BILL FOR OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1973-1980

(BILLION \$)

	1973	1975	1977	1979	1980
Low Income	0.06	1.8	2.0	2.7	3.3
Middle Income	6.1	20.3	26.1	40.4	54.5
TOTAL	6.7	22.1	28.1	43.1	57.8

SOURCE: The Times (London), March 16, 1980, p.16.

As Table 3.13 shows, the total oil-bill of non-oil producing developing countries increased considerably from only \$6.7 billion in 1973 to reach a peak of \$57.8 billion by 1980, with a percentage increase of over 30% between 1979 and 1980 alone, while such proposals lie at the heart of the matter, and if realized may well alleviate a lot of developing countries' problems, the need remains for their formalization and the putting of such proposals into active implementation.

Notwithstanding the fact that OPEC has been responsive to the needs of recycling its surpluses through international agencies particularly the IBRD, IMF and the regional development banks, as it has been argued in the previous section, the distribution of these institutions' funds has been questioned. While this must not be taken to mean less support should be given to international institutions, indeed more support needs to be directed towards them, it needs to be made sure that a better utilization of their funds by developing countries can be achieved.

While supporting their activities, however, the need remains for direct investment in needy developing countries i.e., more direct transfer of resources has to be attempted. One of the major channels through which such resources could be directed by surplus countries is through subscription to developing countries' issues of development bonds, available data suggests that the share of developing countries of world external bond issues is still meagre at best. As Table 3.14 indicates, the share of developing countries of world external bonds was as low as 3.5 per cent in 1975.

TABLE 3.14

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BONDS ISSUED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1972-1978. (MILLIONS OF \$)

Item	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Total Foreign Bonds	339	751	722	548	908	1600	1058
Total International Bonds	493	442	96	243	986	2412	2939
Total External Bond Issues	832	1193	818	791	1894	4013	4998
Oil-Exporting Countries	85	125	63	68	177	794	1715
Non-Oil Exporting Countries	747	1068	755	723	1717	3219	3283
Higher-Income	667	891	714	682	1230	2975	2801
Middle-Income	50	108	41	33	486	244	482
Lower-Income	30	69	-	9	-	-	-
Developing Country Share of World External Bond Issues (Percentage)	7.3	11.9	6.7	3.5	5.5	11.1	13.6

SOURCE: World Economic Survey, 1978, Current Trends in the World Economy, U.N., New York, 1980, p.58.



Despite the fact that since then, this share had increased to about 14% by the end of 1978, it is clearly still a very small share and needs to be increased to a more reasonable level. While it is recognized that economic as well as political conditions and stability in these countries dictate the matter, yet it is conceivable that adverse political or economic conditions could be eased in order to ensure better development opportunities and larger absorptive financial capacities in these countries.

It could be argued, however, that if the non-aligned movement is to be able to implement its principles in this respect, then it could help in creating a new financial facility utilizing its unique position as a group that includes both surplus and deficit countries. Such a facility may aim at medium - term financing which may not be in conflict with OPEC's short-term financing objectives through its own financial institutions or the long-term financing through the international bank. Such a facility, it is believed, would serve the objectives of both the OPEC countries in releasing additional funds to least developing countries and at the same time, meeting the needs of the latter for new funds which otherwise are not available.

Such a proposal may take into consideration the objectives set out by the group of experts' reports cited earlier as well as laying down conditions that may ensure the safety and repayability of such resources through guarantees from within the movement. Project financing may be the best way in this respect, by means of which sound projects with long-term economic impact on the recipient developing countries may be considered on their merits as investment propositions for an acceptable level of rates of return for both lender and the developing country itself.

The experience of other world facilities and programmes in this field could be best utilized by avoiding their acknowledged mistakes as well as the use of their judging and following up of such projects. What is meant by sound projects is those projects which would prove valuable for the developing countries concerned and at the same time have a good outcome on the internationally agreed economic criteria. This is because it makes it more acceptable for international financing.

While the inflow of real resources lies at the heart of the matter since unless such resources are made available, developing countries can do little in the way of improving the conditions of life for their peoples, there are other important issues to be tackled simultaneously if it is at all possible. On top of these is the trade problem.

I have argued earlier in this chapter that the developing countries' pattern of trade as well as the terms of trade with the industrialized world have not been favourable for a long-term development strategy, and the idea of "trade not aid" of the 1960s did not materialize. In addition to the positive efforts needed in correcting this imbalance at the international level, there is wide scope for improvement from within the movement's member countries and the developing world in general.

Developing countries viewed the solution to their major problem as moving into industrialisation, or more specifically into import substituting industries as well as export orientated ones.

However, the industrialised world's markets are not readily available for such products for a wide range of reasons, be it, the unemployment problems in those countries, the level of technology in developing countries' productivity, transportation and the like. This makes the development of their own markets, however small they may be, one of the pre-requisites for future development.

One of the areas of reform from within could be approached through a scheme similar to the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) which during the last few years has constituted the central concern of UNCTAD and of the Third World in general. This programme endeavours to tackle the major problems. Its central element is the common fund which will be used to finance buffer stocks, designed to intervene in the market so as to ensure remunerative and just prices to producers while being equitable to consumers.<sup>1</sup>

On the same lines the development of international trade among the non-aligned movement's member countries could prove to be of prime importance for the mutual development of all participating countries. Such an approach would not only satisfy the consumer needs of most countries, but also provide the necessary markets for producer countries which otherwise may not be easily available. It combines a number of small markets to provide a potentially lucrative source of industrial expansion, as well as the base for a minimum degree of economic intergration which may be designed to benefit all

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1) Tomassini, L., "Industrialization, Trade and the International Division of Labour", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No.1, 1980, pp.137-153.

participating countries as well as by passing both the tariff and non-tariff barriers of developed markets.

Given the fact that the non-aligned movement's priority has been changing over the years from that of a political platform into that of an economic pressure group serving the interests of its member countries, as well as the Third World at large, this orientation towards enhancing the trade links between its member countries could also serve the achievement of its principal objectives.

Moreover, one way of supporting the previous proposals of mutual interdependence either in resource mobilization or trade dependence is to ensure that payments among the movements' member countries from one country to another be made direct rather than passing through third party intermediation. This might require the enhancement of the role of existing financial institutions. As was indicated earlier, OPEC countries have created their own financial institutions and regional development funds.

Therefore, instead of creating new institutions to handle the expansion anticipated in capital markets, the existing institutions' functions could be enlarged in such a way that it will make it easier for them to work as clearing houses for the rest of developing countries transactions. This should be considered against a background of grants and loans which would be made by OPEC financial institutions or by other multinational ones yet to be created to finance the balance of payments deficits of developing countries as well as to finance newly created industrial and agricultural projects.

This is not to suggest, however, that such steps are meant to be isolationist in nature, that is, seeking to isolate the non-aligned movement collectively from the international economy, but rather a way through which to formalize and integrate the economic activities in these countries in a harmonized manner. The appreciable growth of experience by many developing countries in recent years which has accompanied the intensification of their links with the world economy could best be utilized and such links could be enhanced with a more equitable distribution of mutual benefits.

However, initial efforts by the movement's member countries to insulate their political systems from foreign interference could be complemented by economic interdependence which serves to lessen political, economic and social instability, provided the members conform to the movement's original ideals.

It is well to keep in mind, however, that unless technology devised and used within member countries is made freely available for the benefit of other countries, the achievement of other objectives could be severely hampered. As mentioned earlier, the level of technological development and absorption in developing countries is not sufficiently developed to meet the requirements of the high technology of the industrialized world. However, since some of the efforts in a number of these countries have been successful enough in devising technologies which could easily be absorbed by others at lesser costs either in capital or human resources, then it is only reasonable to expect that such technologies be made available to the rest of the movement's member countries.

There has been a number of success stories in a number of Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina in areas like

manufacturing technology, armaments, and the industrial base in general which could be highly beneficial to other developing countries. Ironically, in many cases nationalism has increased as a result of these efforts to promote economic development and unity of interests.<sup>1</sup> This is a problem which will have to be vigorously faced, and it is by no means an easy one, yet if it could be shown that mutual co-operation could work for the good of all member countries then, and only then, national interests could be ensured at the same time.

### 3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the first two sections of this chapter attention has been given to the developed countries' management of the international monetary system as well as the main problems facing Third World countries in general and the Non-aligned Movement's member countries in particular, and we argued that this has resulted in gearing the system away from the needs of such countries to favour those countries who have the power and control. This bias in the system created a huge set of problems particularly affecting almost all Third World countries and very severely hit and damaged a number of them.

Also, it was argued earlier in the theoretical introduction that if the non-aligned countries wished to be genuinely non-aligned, they needed to achieve socio-economic and political development, or in other words to be genuinely non-aligned, they needed to achieve economic as well as

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1) See for example, Anderson, Charles, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967. See also Mazrui, Ali., "Tanzania versus East Africa", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.3, November, 1965, pp.209-222.

political independence. Therefore, in section three our attention was devoted to the role that the movement may play on the international scene in the wake of their intense discussion of a possible New International Economic Order.

We have argued in section three that a substantial increase in raw material prices which ensure stable revenue flows for developing countries, reinforced by a reduction of debt and debt service obligations and an increase in foreign aid inflows along with more favourable terms for transfer of more appropriate technology, constitute the best means for improving the chances of Third World recovery.

While the main areas of complaint were made more or less clear in the first two sections, more action is needed in future by the Movement in promoting its aims and tackling the problems both at the inter-member country level and in the movements' relations with the rest of the world.

One of the major forces working for differentiation among the Non-aligned Movements' member countries is the nature of their external economic relations - notably the differences between surplus and deficit. Such differences have a deep impact not only on the socio-economic structures prevailing in these countries, but also on co-operation and coherence within the movement.

These differences are not likely to disappear, but can be reduced, if only slightly if the political will to do so exists and if countries are committed to the movement's basic principles, they may be narrowed

significantly.

While it is important to consolidate the gains achieved at the international level, even if it has been so far only in presenting the Third World's case more powerfully, equally important is the fact that similar steps must be taken from within the movement if a fruitful co-operation with a long-lasting effect of mutual benefit is to be achieved.

Mutual co-operation could only materialize in that respect on any significant scale if two fundamental conditions are met to begin with. First, a move towards co-operation needs to take into account the varied, even divergent, interests of member countries, and secondly, each country has to be free to choose the socio-economic system that suits its interests. This will ensure the adherence of all concerned to the basic principles of the movement as well as achieving the desired results with the least interference from one country in another's affairs.

One of the main areas of co-operation in which the movement has particular responsibility is the channelling of surplus resources from surplus countries to deficit countries in the movement, which is dealt with earlier in some detail. It is no more than stating a fact to say that the main form of such transfer of resources will come from OPEC countries to the rest of the movement's member countries.

Also, a system of general criteria for investment needs to be established among OPEC member countries - in order to ensure the flow of resources from the surplus countries to the deficit ones without



their needing to pass through a third party in the developed world. Decisions of this kind would be necessarily political ones and not ones determined by market forces.

So far there have been several proposals for the acceleration of resources transfer from OPEC to other low-income countries. As we saw earlier some reports made a number of recommendations the most important of which in this context is the following:-

1. The OPEC Special Fund should be transformed into a development agency with a substantially increased initial authorized capital. The agency would undertake to: finance developing countries' balance of payments deficits; finance under favourable terms, economic development projects recognized by the recipient countries as priority projects; finance projects that ensure integration among developing countries; and projects designed to up-grade the raw materials in these countries.

2. The non-oil producing developing countries should be given assurances about the security of their oil supplies at official prices as a matter of priority.

3. OPEC should assist non-oil producing developing countries in meeting the costs of their oil bills through a service of loans and grants. Developing countries oil bills have been increasing considerably, particularly since the 1973 oil-price increase. This is evident from data presented in the previous section.

While the inflow of real resources lies at the heart of the matter, since unless such resources are made available, developing

countries can do little in the way of improving the conditions of life for their peoples, there are other important issues to be tackled simultaneously if it is at all possible. Such issues include trade; transfer of material resources; aid; energy and transfer of technology.

I have argued earlier in this chapter that the developing countries' pattern of trade as well as the terms of trade with the industrialized world have not been favourable for a long-term development strategy, and the idea of "trade not aid" of the 1960s did not materialize. In addition to the positive efforts needed in correcting this imbalance at the international level, there is wide scope for improvement from within the movement's member countries and the developing world in general.

The development of international trade among the Non-aligned Movement's member countries could prove to be of prime importance for the mutual development of all participating countries (as discussed earlier in this chapter). Also, the recognition and eradication of dependency in the world markets and the need for stabilization in developing countries must be considered the over-riding objectives sought after. This might be properly addressed through improvements in the current institutional framework that governs world trade. Specifically this means that GATT and UNCTAD as mechanisms in world trade may need re-construction if the world trade situation is to be prevented from further deterioration. In this area, it will need to be made clear that the Non-aligned Movement has a vital role to play, both within its member countries and in negotiating a better deal for developing countries through the U.N. and its affiliated agencies.

As I outlined in Chapter Two, the movement for over two decades concentrated on political issues as its top priority and therefore was seen as no more than a political club for its member countries. This attitude within the movement dominated its activities until the early seventies as is clear from its resolutions and conference agendas.

Since, as was said earlier, there has been a number of drafts with a wide range of accepted principles it is in the interests of all concerned to compromise on the issues still outstanding. The non-aligned movement still has a great role to play in solving economic problems, the transfer of technologies, energy and other problems by co-operating much more among themselves and negotiating with the industrialized countries on a unified basis as was argued earlier in this chapter.

If the Non-aligned Movement is to enter a new era of co-operation and is to implement its intended policies, which so far have been put only in the form of resolutions, then the issues discussed above, *inter alia*, could be considered guide lines for a package deal. While some countries may be negatively affected in one area, the benefits they may achieve in other areas could possibly offset such adverse effects. More importantly, while it is important for the movement to play its initial role in the world forum, representing Third World interests, it is perhaps equally important that moves and positive action on areas of co-operation within the member countries have to be initiated. It is not enough for the movement to indulge itself only in the political arena.

The changing priorities of the Non-aligned Movement from being

a political gathering to an important group of mutually dependent countries in the economic field, necessitate a firm commitment to closer economic co-operation. Unless "internal" relations within the movement, be they of a political, economic or other nature, are seriously addressed, it is doubtful whether its international appeal can last long in an already, volatile world situation, particularly if one takes into consideration the recent moves on the part of some member countries to change the face of the movement in leaning towards one bloc or another.

The movement on the other hand, has been and still is considered a champion of liberation movements for those who are looking for political independence. The activities and initiatives of the movement in securing a better deal for those already politically independent, should not obscure the fact that reactivating the non-alignment initiatives on behalf of the Third World people still seeking sovereignty is of equally vital importance. The changing emphasis of the movement's orientation towards discussing world economic strategies could lead it to ignore the political needs of peoples that have still not attained political independence.

It is in the light of the above that attention is given in the following chapter to the discussion of the past achievements of the movement in supporting the liberation movements in the Third World countries, as well as pinpointing areas of political instability in which the movement can lend its support for a better future. This would certainly be reflected not only on the movements in question, but on the credibility of the non-aligned movement as a whole and world peace in general, one of the main concerns and sources of inspiration to the movement in its relatively short history.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The Non-Aligned Movement and the National Liberation Movement

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

We saw in the previous chapter that the international economic system has always been managed by developed countries which have economic, political and military power. Also, in the previous chapter the role of the non-aligned movement in attempting to create a new international economic order to tackle the problems of developing countries was discussed.

A few decades ago direct military interference in order to subjugate developing countries and small countries was the principal means used by the super-powers to control others. Given the fact that the world's great powers are still always competing to dominate other parts of the world not only in the economic system but also by other means, it is only natural that new ways to achieve these objectives have been adopted in the new circumstances of Third World political independence.

It is in the light of the above that the present chapter treats as a continuous process the struggle of national liberation movements

for political independence and the subsequent struggles of newly independent nations to avoid other forms of dependence that can result from the use by the super-powers of new methods for continuing their dominance.

The role of the Non-aligned Movement in relation to both these phases of the struggle for independence is discussed with some analysis, firstly with particular emphasis on lessons gained from two national liberation movements, namely the Algerian and the Palestinian movements, and secondly by an analysis of three important aspects which together form a way of lessening the effect of political independence of emerging nations and discussing the possible reactions of the Non-aligned Movement to face such problems. These include armaments dependency; food supplies and financial pressures, and the emigration of qualified people to the developed world.

The bulk of these problems combined, deepen the problems of developing countries, and are means through which independent decision making in small developing countries can be threatened in times of hardship, and therefore the political independence given to certain countries after a military struggle may be curtailed even after such military action has ended.

The idea behind discussing these important issues within this chapter is that they have a direct influence on the emergence of National

Liberation Movements because they are, most of the time, cited as the main reasons behind such movements. Also, as we argued in the discussion of theoretical connections of non-alignment and development in the introduction, to be genuinely non-aligned the Third World countries must pursue both political and economic independence by national leaders and national movements, because a country will not be able to achieve any appreciable level of socio-economic development if it is still subject to external influences, nor can it be genuinely non-aligned.

Finally, while the initial direction of influence went from the Non-aligned Movement to the National Liberation Movements in the form of international support for independence struggles, in the latter stages, once these movements achieved their objectives, they joined the Non-aligned Movement as independent states and began to feed back support.

This section is concluded by some remarks on the chapter and lessons for the future.

#### 4.2 THE BASIC CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

It is a well known fact that the emergence of the national liberation movements, hereinafter referred to as NLMs is not



unconnected with the situation in the world at large. During the early years of this century, the world was dominated directly by the main powers particularly Great Britain, when it was at its most powerful, and France.

After the First World War, Great Britain dominated a large proportion of the Third World countries for many purposes, most obvious of which were the extraction of raw materials to supply its imperialistic economy at the time and to extend its power both politically and militarily to the widest area possible in the world. The result of this policy was that at the end of the Second World War, there were a large number of colonies. Semi-colonies and dependent territories formed about 72% of the territory of the earth, and over 69% of the world's population.<sup>1</sup> For example, as Table 4.1 shows, when the United Nations was created in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was made up of 51 countries of which only 31 were developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, but this later changed so that it included at the end of 1976, more than 100 developing countries. (see table 4.1 at the end of this chapter).

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1) See: Magubane, Ben., "The Non-aligned Movement and the National Liberation Movements", In the non-aligned Movement in World Politics, New York, 1978, pp.208-209.

One can appreciate that things have changed since the Second World War, in as much as there has been a change in the composition of Third World countries, and there has been a similar change in world power.

The main change has been the diminishing role of Great Britain and other European nations in world affairs and at the same time, the emergence of the United States of America facing the Soviet Union as the leader of what is usually called the "Free World" against communism.

During this period, a number of policies emerged, each of which involved an attempt by a nation or group of nations to shape the world according to its own desires and needs. Firstly, there was the communist policy adopted by the Chinese communist party and Soviet communism, a policy which presented itself as the champion of poor countries in their struggle to free themselves from capitalist domination. It advocated to that end a policy of people's war against imperialism taking its lessons from the Chinese experience. This was not merely a national war, but also a revolutionary struggle seeking to achieve a transformation of class structure in China itself and in the worlds' emerging nations. It was in essence presented as a socialist revolution with a definite effort to create a new international order that openly identified with the communist bloc and its leader namely, the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, another policy was advocated by a number of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa led by India. These countries which were among those that had suffered from colonialism and domination, advocated a policy of political independence without necessarily having a content of social transformation. Such countries

provided the basis for the creation of the non-aligned movement.

The group of non-aligned countries argued that the task of a nation entering an imperially dominated world was to select what was good from socialism and capitalism.<sup>1</sup> Despite the new developments on the world's stage in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western capitalist countries were in no mood to leave the old territories (old colonies) or other areas in the world to communist domination. It was therefore rather obvious, as it is obvious nowadays, that the struggle between Western capitalism and Eastern communism to dominate the world would have to take a new shape and use different ways and means.

#### 4.2.1 LESSONS FROM THE ALGERIAN AND THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENTS AND THE REACTION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

##### 4.2.1a ALGERIA

From 1830 until 1962, Algeria was occupied by France. When the French colonial rule in Algeria came to an end, a new state was born and its foreign policy became oriented towards the non-aligned movement. It is therefore pertinent that we should briefly examine the pre-independence period in which Algeria's non-aligned status began to take shape.

As a matter of fact, the French always considered Algeria constitutionally a part of France. Hence France sent over a million French settlers to Algeria as a new motherland, hoping that the latter would become genuinely French.<sup>2</sup> In addition, France sent troops and

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1) See: Dinh Tran Van., Singham, A.W., From Bandung to Colombo, New York, 1976, pp.208-209.

2) Ogunsanno, Dr. Alabo, "The Foreign Policy of Algeria", The Foreign Policies of African States, London, 1977, p.24.

police forces to rule Algeria.

The Algerian people started resistance to the colons (i.e. colonists) to get their independence in the earlier days of the colonization under the leadership of Emir Abdelkader and other political movements. On February 10th, 1943 Abbas Ferhat and fifty other Algerians asked the French Government to let Algeria become an independent country. The French Government refused these demands and arrested Abbas.<sup>1</sup>

In 1954, which was a time of eclipse for Abbas Ferhat, there began a time of preparation and underground organization for a small group of Algerian people, mostly in their twenties. These young Algerians some of whom had served in the French Army during the Second World War, and who had acquired some measure of cosmopolitanism and a knowledge of other revolutionary techniques, created and organized the National Liberation Front (FLN), under the leadership of Ahmad Ben-Bella.<sup>2</sup> The FLN was set up in Cairo in November 1954, it aimed to wrest independence for Algeria from the French. They defined their aims as national independence through:

- (1) The restoration of the Algerian State, Sovereign, Democratic and Social, within the framework of the principles of Islam; and
- (2) The preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion.

France also opposed the above aims and the FLN opened a guerrilla

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1) Mansell, G., Tragedy in Algeria, London 1961, p.3.

2) See Laqueur, W., A Dictionary of Politics, London 1971, pp.8-11.

campaign early in 1955 and waged war until France conceded independence under the Evian Agreements in March 1962.

The FLNs armed forces were recruited both from secret supporters in Algeria itself and from Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, which gained their independence from France in 1956. Also the leaders of the FLN needed all the external support they could muster in the areas of political, diplomatic, financial material and military equipment. The immediate support for them and their movement came from the Arab states particularly from President Nasser of Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait and others. \* Other support came from Asian, African and East European countries. Such support took two forms. On the one hand, when the FLN appointed a provisional government in exile in September 1958, all the Arab countries and the people's Republic of China immediately recognised it and the Chinese government and the Egyptian government gave some aid to the Algerian revolution. \*\* On the other hand, the non-aligned countries invited the FLN representatives to the non-aligned movement conferences. \*\*\*

It could be said, that such support from the non-aligned countries and other Eastern countries to the Algerian Revolution assisted the Algerian Revolution to gain its independence and to join the non-aligned movement. Indeed, the Algerian Government held the leadership of the non-aligned movement in the period from 1973-1976. This situation may lead us to ask about the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's role.

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\* The support came to the FLN from the Arab States which came by official and unofficial support.

\*\* China gave the FLN \$12 million, while Egypt's aid was \$10 million.

\*\*\* More details, see, the non-aligned movements' agendas.

#### 4.2.1.b THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

From the beginning of the sixteenth century until 1918, the Arab World including Palestine was occupied and dominated by the Ottoman Empire.

During that period, the Arabs established some secret societies asking for an independent Arab World, such as al-Fata which was founded in Paris in 1911. \* During the Arabs' revolt against the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain supported the Arabs, but we may ask at this juncture: Did Great Britain support the Arabs to help them become independent?

According to Briton Busch, Great Britain did not want to give all the Arabs a single independent state, because she thought that a strong Arab State might be more dangerous to Western interests in the Middle East than a strong Ottoman State.<sup>1</sup> Great Britain therefore divided the Arab World under the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France on May 16th, 1916. On the other hand, she created the question of Palestine under the famous Balfour Declaration in 1917. Indeed the outcome of the above agreement was that the Arab World was divided up between Great Britain and France. Also by the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain "looked with favour on the setting up of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine." \*\* Therefore, the question should be asked: What were the British motives and what were the considerations which induced the British Government to issue the Balfour Declaration? It may be said that, the government of Great Britain were moved by many considerations

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\* See Busch, Briton Cooper, Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-1921, London 1971, p.92.

1) Ibid, p.92.

\*\* It seems to me that Great Britain had no right to issue the Balfour Declaration, simply because Palestine was not a part of Britain.

among which were: firstly, political considerations and secondly, imperialistic motives.

The political strategic reason was that Great Britain hoped to win over the powerful Zionist elements in Germany and Austria and to mitigate the hostility of Jews in allied countries towards Russia and give those Jews who had been active in overthrowing the Tsarist regime an incentive to keep Russia in the War and also to persuade the Jews to use their financial and political influence to bring the U.S.A. into the War on the side of the anti-German entente.

The imperialistic motive was that it had been first propounded by Kitchener, of securing Palestine or a portion of it as a bulwark for the British position in Egypt, and an overland link with the East.<sup>1</sup> It was perhaps these motives that were the important ones and whatever role other considerations, whether financial, religious or humanitarian may have played, there is no doubt that they sufficed by themselves to bring about the Balfour Declaration.

The Arabs refused to accept (the Balfour Declaration) and started negotiations with the British Government to gain their own independence while on the other hand to occupy Palestine, the Zionist movement followed two policies: political activity in European countries, especially in Great Britain, to get support for their movement; and also encourage the migration of hundreds of thousands of persons from many parts of the world to Palestine. By the end of the 1935, the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine in one year reached about 150,000 persons.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Intonious, Arab Awakening, London, 1969, p.261.

2) Fraser, T.G., The Middle East, 1914-1979, London 1980, pp.4-13.

The years 1936-1939 were a period of Arab organisation and the use of violence in Palestine as a means of pressurising the mandate authorities to accede to the objective of keeping Palestine an Arab country. This objective included demands for the following:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) An end to Jewish immigration.
- (2) Prohibition of the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews.
- (3) The establishment of a national government responsible to a representative council.

The Zionist immigration to Palestine and the struggle between Great Britain and Zionism on the one hand and the Arabs' revolt on the other hand was still continuing when the British Government referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. The United Nations was at that time a new organisation and it was still a quite compact body of some fifty-five members, within which the United States of America and the Soviet Union were both committed to support for a Zionist State in Palestine, and in fact these two super-powers wielded as they still do, a powerful influence in the United Nations.

After the 1948 War between the Arab Governments and the international Zionist Settlements in Palestine, a younger generation of Palestinian leaders appeared whose dispersion had led them to identify with various ideological currents in the area, such as Nasserism, Baathism, Communism and Conservatism. All of them aimed to liberate Palestine from the international Zionist Settlements. They established

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1) Abbas, A.M., Palestine, 1933-1939, in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, eds., Condit, D.M., and Cooper Jr., B.H., Washington D.C., the American University, Centre for Research in Social System, March 1967, p.68.



in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) at the Arab summit conference in Cairo, which considered the PLO as the official voice of the Palestine people, and shortly thereafter it proceeded to organise a military component, the Palestine Liberation Arm (PLA).

In addition, Ahmad Al-Shuqairy the Head of the PLO at that time addressed to the Arab governments three demands:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) Freedom for the PLO to function as a Supra-national entity, among the refugees in every state.
- (2) Freedom to draft the refugees into a Palestine Liberation Army.
- (3) The right to levy taxes upon them.

Also the Palestine National Council (PNC) adopted a Palestine National Charter in July 1968 which in a series of articles, formally codified the ultimate aim of the movement as the total liberation of Palestine from Zionist control.<sup>2</sup>

Having seen the establishment of the PLO and the PNC and their aims, I am led to ask the question: Did the PLO and the PNC put their aims into practice? In other words, did the Palestinian Liberation Organisation liberate Palestine, as the FLN had liberated Algeria?

The fact is that the world knows the answer, the Palestinians could not put their aims into practice for many reasons among which were and are still the following:

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1) Cooley, J., Green March, Black September : The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, London, Frank Cass, 1973, pp.90-91.

2) O'Neill, B.E., Armed Struggle in Palestine, A Political Military Analysis, London 1978, pp.6-7.

Firstly, the PLO could not achieve its aims because the Zionist settlers in Palestine had great fighting experience. The settlers came from the whole world, particularly from the U.S.A., U.K., France, the Soviet Union and other countries with great experience of fighting from their original home armies.

Secondly, the great powers supported the Zionists against the Palestinian people starting with the 1948 recognition and giving full support, technology, new weapons etc., while the Palestinian Liberation Organisation had little experience of fighting and old weapons were received from the Arab States or the Soviet Union.

However, the non-aligned movement had played different roles towards the PLO. During the period 1969-1975, they invited the PLO to attend the non-aligned movement meetings and summit conferences as observers, while the Lima Ministerial conference of the non-aligned countries on August 25-30, 1975, recognized the PLO as a member of the movement (see agenda 4.1 next page). Also the non-aligned movement adopted many resolutions towards the Palestinian question. For more details, see the documents of the non-aligned movement op cit).

The discussions of the national liberation movements lead us to the following results:-

- (1) Most of the Third World countries gained their own independence and joined the non-aligned movement.
- (2) The super-powers lost their old forms of colonialism and followed new ways to dominate or to lead the Third World countries, new ways such as military dependence. In what follows therefore, we

AGENDA No: 4.1

Attendance by PLO at Non-aligned Meetings and Summits as an Observer or Guest.

1. Consultative Meeting of special government representatives of non-aligned countries - Belgrade, July 8-12, 1969.
2. Preparatory Meeting of non-aligned countries - Dar Es-Salam, April, 13-17, 1970.
3. Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries - Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970.
4. Conference of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries - Georgetown, August 8-12, 1972.
5. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries - Algiers, September 5-9, 1973.
6. Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, Algiers - March 19-21, 1974.
7. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - Havana, March 17-19, 1975.

Attendance by PLO as a member

1. Ministerial Conference of non-aligned countries - Lima, August 25-30, 1975.
2. Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - Algiers, May 30, June 2, 1976.
3. The fifth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - Colombo August 16-19, 1976.
4. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - New Delhi, April 7-11, 1977.
5. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of non-aligned countries - Havana, May 15-20, 1978.
6. Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries - Belgrade, July 25-30, 1978.
7. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - Maputo, January 26, February 2, 1979.
8. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - Colombo, 4-9 June 1979.
9. The Sixth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - Havana, September 3-9, 1979.
10. Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries - New Delhi, 9-13 February, 1981.
11. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of non-aligned countries - Algiers 16-18 April 1981.
12. Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the non-aligned countries - New York, September 25-28, 1981.
13. Extraordinary Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries - Kuwait, April 5-8 1982.
14. The Seventh Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - March 7-11, 1983.

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SOURCE: The Non-aligned Movement: Especially studied for the non-aligned Movement through its Conferences and Meetings  
Foreign Affairs, Iraq, 1930, pp.61-62.

will shed some light in the new imperialism: the new ways and means.

#### 4.3 The NEW IMPERIALISM : THE NEW WAYS AND MEANS

Given the fact that the world's great powers are always competing to dominate other parts of the world, it is only natural that new ways and means to achieve these objectives have been adopted in the new circumstances of Third World political independence. A few decades ago direct military interference in order to subjugate developing countries and small countries was the principal means to control others. Developments on the world stage, in the form of relationships between the super-powers; economic and cultural advancement in poor areas of the world; or international political conditions made it necessary for the super-powers to change their ways and means of dominating others.

Most recently, developing countries have realized that there is a wide range of instruments through which their political and economic independence can be threatened and their societies can be subjugated to a series of pressures, by means of which their ability in decision making can be severely restricted or hindered. Their dependence on advanced countries in strategic areas such as food, military equipment and the like, may not be compatible with the fulfilment of the interests of their people and the national sovereignty of their nations.

Despite the fact that the number of developing countries has been increasing over time, their full independence both economically and politically is most of the time questionable. In what follows we will discuss three important areas, namely food security, military supplies

dependance, and financial pressures, areas through which independent decision making in small developing countries can be threatened in times of hardship, and therefore the political independence given to certain countries after a military struggle may be controlled even after such military action is done away with.

It is not intended to say here that these are the only areas of importance in this respect, but rather to emphasize these priority aspects and therefore we consider them in some detail. The idea behind discussing these important issues within this chapter was that they have a direct influence on the emergence of National Liberation Movements because they are, most of the time, cited as the main reasons behind such movements. At the same time they form part of the major issues on the non-aligned movement's agenda in its relationship with the rest of the world. It is therefore important to discuss the interrelationship among the two movements through an open discussion of these three major areas, the effect of which will certainly go deep into both the NLMs as well as the NAM.

#### 4.3.1 NATIONAL SECURITY OF EMERGING NATIONS AND THE DIRECTIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEPENDENCY

It is well understood that once a national liberation movement succeeds in gaining independence in the political sense, it does not mean that the dominating power be it regional or international will completely leave this newly established country. There are ways and means of staying in without necessarily using military power. In the old days, one of the ways of dominating emerging nations was to give the people some kind of political independence, but at the same time

creating puppet regimes so that they were totally dependant on the world power which created them.

With developments in education and knowledge, these emerging nations have developed in such a way that direct involvement by outside powers is no longer acceptable. Therefore, more discreet ways have been developed either deliberately or otherwise.

Most recently it has been recognised by developing countries that even if they have gained political independence, they are still dependent on outside powers in a wide range of important areas. Up to the early 1970s, national security for a particular country was usually defined by its military power available to defend its existence. However, the objective circumstances that have emerged lately have led to the emergence of new changes in the definition and meaning of this security from the purely military aspect so that it includes other aspects, such as, economic, political and social ones.

National security gained its present day importance within the current world circumstances, which are gradually leading to the continuous internationalising of economic life, through introducing the concept of mutual dependance among various countries of the world. In the past, developing countries used to be subjected directly to the old imperialist system, yet with the gradual phasing out of this system, it has been replaced by new forms of dependency from which small emerging nations can find it difficult to escape.

#### 4.3.1a FOREIGN MILITARY CHALLENGES AND MILITARY DEPENDENCE

In what follows our analysis will be concentrated in these areas

of concern in the Arab World. This will be done for a number of inter-related reasons, the most important of which are: firstly most of the Arab countries are relatively newly independent in the sense that almost all of them emerged as independent countries after World War II. Secondly, they have two of the most well known liberation movements one of which dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, namely the Algerian FLN which gained independence for Algeria in 1962, the other being the Palestinian Liberation Movement which is still struggling to achieve its goals.

Thirdly, and most importantly, Arab countries are members of the non-aligned movement, and one of them, namely Egypt, was a founder member of the movement. Finally, the circumstances in which the Arab World finds itself today are similar to those of other developing countries. Having this in mind, one cannot look into Arab military supply dependencies without taking account of military challenges from the occupying Zionist forces on the one hand and the international eagerness to control Arab resources, particularly oil, on the other hand.

At the start of this century, the Arab World was, as indeed it still is, faced with pressures from colonialist countries. The area was subject to European colonial occupation from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Gulf in the East. France entered Algiers in 1830 and then occupied the rest of North African Arab countries along with Spain, while Britain and France gained control of the Arab Middle East countries. Since then there have been continuous military challenges despite the fact that they have taken different forms, differing according to the particular historical period. Nowadays the Zionist movement has served as the direct instrument of Western colonial

strategy to dominate the Middle East area, hence creating the need for the Arab World to arm itself to face the quantity and quality of arms guaranteed to the Zionist State by Western powers, particularly the United States of America.

The net outcome of this is necessarily the draining of Arab resources under continuous military threat, and therefore helping Western military industries out of their current problems as well as affecting the international military situation in general. It is therefore obvious that this military dependency by the Arab world in particular, and the rest of the developing countries in general, has military, strategic economic, and financial effects.

It seems that the second aspect is usually ignored in the analysis of Arab armaments dependency, yet it is considered by Western military analysis a very important aspect, related directly to the overall economic situation in the countries exporting military equipment, and it gains much more importance during periods of economic recession such as that which is hitting such industries very hard nowadays.<sup>1</sup>

These conditions of hardship which have hit these industries have led certain exporting countries to create specialised agencies to supervise military trade. For example, the United States of America

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1) It is worth noting in this respect that the American military industry was directly affected and in a very negative manner after the ending of the Vietnam war, particularly the aviation industry. Also, this sector was negatively affected during the period 1969-1975 because of the decrease in military spending which led the American government to subsidise six large corporations to avoid the risk of liquidating such companies. For further information See: Hoagland J.H., "The USA and European Aerospace industries and military exports to the less developed countries", In Arms Transfers and the Third World : The Military Build Up in Less Developed Countries, ed. by Ra'anan V., et.al Boulder, Colorado : Westview, 1978, p.215.



gave this responsibility to the Defence Ministry (the Pentagon) or one of its departments to cater for special contracts for the Middle East. This department made large profits from trade in military equipment with the Middle East of the order of \$15 billion during the period 1977-1978 alone.<sup>1</sup>

It is necessary, in order to analyze the Armament Dependency relationship, to look into the volume of military expenditures.

Available figures indicate that the Arab countries spent some \$25,685 million on armaments in 1979, although the exact figures are very difficult to calculate because of the secrecy problem as well as their being spread over a medium period of time. Nevertheless such figures make it clear that very large amounts of capital have been spent by the Arab World on armaments. If we take Saudi Arabia for example, we would find that its declared military spending has been increasing very rapidly from \$6.8 billion in 1979 to over \$20 billion in 1980 or about \$2,518 per capita, as Table 4.2 shows.

The nature of the Arab/Zionist movement confrontation along with the strategic importance of the Arab world, either from a geo-political point of view or its oil and financial resources, in addition to the international confrontation between the two super-powers to dominate the area, make armaments dependency much more important than a purely economic relationship despite the importance of the economic aspects. It is a strategic relationship which tends to strengthen and widen this military dependency, which in the end plays an important role in

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1) Arab Development Institute, "On the Strategy of Arab Armament Dependency", Majalt Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Vol.1, 1980, . (In Arabic).

TABLE 4.2

A comparison between Military Expenditures and Military Power in a number of Arab Countries, 1975-1980.

Country	Military Budget Million (\$)			Per Capita (\$)			% of Gov. Expenditures			% of GNP		No. of Armed Forces		
	1975	1979	1980	1975	1979	1980	1975	1979	1980	1975	1979	1975	1979	1980
Algeria	285	605	705	17	32	36	4.7	6.3	5.3	2.2	1.9	63.0	88.8	101.0
Egypt	6.103	2.168	-	163	54	-	42.0	-	-	50.4	13.2	322.5	395.0	367.0
Iraq	1.064	2.328	-	107	183	-	43.7	30.1	-	7.9	10.9	135.0	222.0	242.2
Jordan	155	380	-	57	125	-	22.0	22.2	-	12.2	-	80.2	67.2	67.2
Libya	203	-	-	83	-	-	13.7	-	-	1.7	-	32.0	42.0	53.0
Morocco	224	917	676	13	47	34	4.5	16.8	20.7	2.8	6.0	61.0	98.0	116.0
Saudi Arabia	6771	14.184	20.704	1.193	1.404	2.518	20.0	29.9	28.1	18.1	15.0	47.0	44.-	47.0
Sudan	120	-	-	7.0	-	-	15.1	-	-	-	-	48.6	62.9	68.0
Syria	706	2.036	4.040	96	243	409	25.3	35.6	54.9	15.1	22.1	177.1	277.5	247.5
Kuwait	-	2.060	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.-

NOTE:- (-) indicates data is not available

SOURCES: The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1980-1981, London 1980.

changing the mutual Arab international unequal relationship into one of dominance and dependence. This dependency does not only have an economic side, but also has other aspects forming in the end an introduction to pressure to redirect developing countries' policies. This takes several forms, for example:

(1) Banning highly advanced military equipment and attaching a wide range of strings to their use, which eventually limits their effectiveness.

(2) There are specific conditions laid down as to the possibility of transfer or re-export or of lending such equipment; conditions which in their scope totally limit the options available to developing countries

(3) Since the international market for military equipment is of a monopolistic nature, this limits the margin of choice facing developing countries, and in the end leads to the imposing of certain limits on the quality, quantity and effectiveness of military imports.

(4) Technological advancement has its impact in transferring the real costs to the "consumer" countries which leads to the inflating of the military budgets of developing countries in an unprecedented way.

The net outcome of this dependency has its impact on the societies of small developing countries not only through their devoting high percentages of their national income to armaments, but also through the limiting of their range of manoeuvre at the international and regional levels. Wherever we look nowadays, we find local and regional conflicts around the Third World, the beneficiaries of which are no doubt clear from the analysis.

#### 4.3.1.b FOOD SECURITY: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRODUCING SECTOR AND THE HIGH DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED FOOD

While the direct and indirect military involvements over time have brought to the surface the dimensions of the armaments problem and armaments dependency as one of the main problems facing newly independent countries and most developing countries, yet the problem of

Food Security is a new phenomenon. It is only relatively recent that decision makers in the Third World countries have given it some consideration.

In the Arab World, the recent economic developments brought this problem to the fore and it has been given high priority as representing one of the major areas which need to be tackled. This is because this problem not only relates to the daily problems of the people, but more importantly is strongly connected to a number of other issues raised by the development process. It is also connected to a wide range of political and security aspects which are raised by the dependency of the Arab world as well as most other developing countries on food imports from foreign sources in order to fill the gap of consumer needs in these countries. It is because of these dimensions that this problem takes on its importance, an importance which is becoming from day to day equivalent to that of armaments dependency.

Despite its obvious importance, one may ask oneself, why discuss this issue in relation to the non-alignment movement? The simple answer to this question lies in the important role that the non-aligned movement plays nowadays on the world stage in representing the developing countries' interests in world politics. Moreover, there is a very important potential role that the movement can play among its member countries in the form of co-ordinated policies in order to face up to the effects of such a problem. It is also relevant in that it makes countries more dependent and therefore less able to be genuinely non-aligned. We can now proceed in discussing the problem itself.

There is no doubt that the food problem is escalating to the extent that doubts have been cast on the capabilities of developing

countries to face it. In the case of the Arab World, which forms a significant part of the non-aligned movement, as well as in that of the developing countries facing this problem, some writers have noted that "The Arab world, with a total population now of 142 million, would not be able to meet its food requirements within the coming ten years, unless real efforts are strongly put to achieving that effect, efforts which so far do not appear on the horizon".<sup>1</sup>

This presents one side of the problem, that is the population explosion expected in the near future. This is a war, if we consider the spread of hunger all over the world.

The hungry people in the world are increasing by 450 million a year, or about 11% of the total population of the whole world, in addition to the existence of nations of which almost the total population suffers from hunger and malnutrition and distribution of food namely, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Honduras, etc.

To come back to the Arab countries, they, like every other developing country, face population increases. In 1975, their population was estimated at 138 million, with an average rate of growth of about 2.7% for the period 1970-1975. This rate of growth may reach 3.1% in 1985 as Table No.4.3 shows. This would make the Arab world population about 186 million by 1985 and 268 million by the year 200, therefore it would double in the 25 years 1975 - 2000.

Population size is accompanied by irregular population distribution and structure. Some countries suffer from lack of national

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1) "Considering the Food Sources in the Future Spread Over the Arab World", Middle East Journal, February, 1976.

TABLE NO. 4.3

The Development of the Arab Population from 1970-1985 in Millions.

Country	1970	1975	1985	1970-1975	Projected 1985 %
IRAQ	9.74	11.41	15.63	3.3	3.2
ALGERIA	14.14	15.75	22.68	3.2	3.2
SAUDI ARABIA	6.05	7.29	11.69	3.7	3.7
LIBYA	1.94	2.68	4.37	6.7	5.0
KUWAIT	0.74	1.00	1.40	6.1	3.0
OMAN	0.66	0.77	1.03	3.0	1.5
QATAR	0.11	0.18	0.30	8.4	5.2
BAHRAIN	0.22	0.30	0.46	6.4	4.5
U.A. EMIRATES	0.27	0.56	0.96	15.6	5.6
MOROCCO	14.00	16.70	22.90	2.4	2.4
EGYPT	33.08	37.10	47.36	2.32	2.4
SUDAN	14.00	15.60	19.40	2.2	2.2
TUNISIA	4.99	5.58	7.01	2.36	2.11
SOMALIA	2.74	3.09	3.96	2.5	2.5
MAURITANIA	1.16	1.30	1.73	2.9	2.9
LEBANON	2.13	2.40	3.24	2.9	2.9
SYRIA	6.30	7.36	10.20	3.3	3.35
NORTH YEMEN	4.60	5.24	6.64	2.4	2.4
SOUTH YEMEN	1.44	1.69	2.29	2.1	3.1
JORDAN	1.67	1.90	2.60	3.1	2.1
TOTAL	120.82	137.98	186.40	2.69	3.1

SOURCE: Dr. M. BasBoos and Moreise Freniyah, "Western Europe and the Arab World", Rome, 1980. (Translated from Arabic).

resources per capita, others face inappropriate relations of population to land size and resources and on the other hand revenues which can be directed to serve the individual.

It should be added that the social demographic changes which accompanied economic development were represented by initial internal migration from rural to urban centres. Rural population decreased about 65.3% of the overall population in 1970 to 59% in 1975, and it is expected to decrease to 45% in 1985.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, there is also migration within the Arab states especially towards the oil-rich countries. There is another kind of migration from heavily populated countries to developing Arab countries, e.g. emigrants from Jordan, instead of local migrants, to oil rich countries.

Those elements which are related to population size and distribution play an effective role in the increased demand for food in all the Arab countries and create a variation of size of food demand from one country to another. No doubt the increase of Arab money surplus created, will create an increase in Arab national income. In 1975 G.N.P. was \$143 billion; it increased in five years to over \$400 billion in 1980.<sup>2</sup> The fact is that financial and economic dependency among Arab states keeps the door open to spread the income between the rich and the poor. It should be mentioned that there is a problem of desertification that creeps into Arab agricultural land, which

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1) "The Security Foods in the Arab World", Ministry of Information, June 18-29, Iraq, 1981, (In Arabic).

2) Smadi, M., "Problems Facing the Arab World", Jordan, 1982, pp.25-33, (In Arabic).

indicates a decrease in the land available for food production and pressure to import food stuffs. There is a rapid increase in the demand for food created by the increase of income and population growth. Available data on gross demand for food items in the Arab countries indicates that the increase in the annual average demand for agricultural production reached about 4.6% in the periods 1968-1970 and 1977-1979. Because of the increased demand and shortage of production the gap has widened, which has stimulated increased food imports to satisfy the demand.

Self-sufficiency has decreased between the beginning and the end of the past decade. The Arab countries reached 84% self-sufficiency of grain in 1968-1970, but this had dropped to 60% by 1979. This result can be said about all food items, sugar dropped from 40% to 30%, rice 104% to 70%, beef 97% to 86% and animal production dropped from 81% to 56% as Table No.4.4 shows.

It should be mentioned that shortage of production to satisfy the increased demand has led to increased imports of food items. Wheat imports increased from 3,394 tons in 1970 to 10,961 tons in 1979.\* Beef imports increased from 8,000 tons to 109,000 tons for that period. During the time when the volume of imports had become important, we should not forget that the increased prices of imported goods act as a stimulus to the transfer of inflation through the price increase of finished and intermediate goods. Average price increases for agricultural products between 1970-1978 reached for example 52% for orange juice and 43% for beef as Table No.4.5 shows.

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\* For more details see Table 4.5.



TABLE 4.4.

Self-Sufficiency of the Arab World from Main Foodstuff Commodities  
(1968-1979) (Selected Years) In Million of Tonnes.

Commodities	Average of Pure Imports		Volume of Production		Aggregate Demand (2)		Percentage of Self-Sufficiency		Average of Pure Imports	
	1968-70	1977-79	1969-71	1977-79	1968-70	1977-79	1968-70	1977-79	Self-Sufficient	Demand
Cereals	4300	16230	22650	24150	26950	40380	84	60	0.7	4.6
Wheat	4300	12500	8500	9000	12800	21500	66	42	0.6	5.9
Rice	100	1100	2700	2600	2600	3700	104	70	0.04	4.0
Barley	100	950	4250	4400	4150	5350	102	82	0.4	2.9
Maize Corn	200	1700	3050	3700	3250	5400	94	86	2.2	5.8
Sorghum & Millet	-	-20	4150	4450	4150	4430	100	100	0.8	0.7
Sugar	1300	2600	850	1150	2150	3750	40	30	3.4	6.4
Animal Production	2.55	6100	8670	11510	10725	17610	81	56	3.2	5.7
Beef	60	325	1700	2050	1760	2375	97	86	2.3	3.9
Poultry & Eggs	40	375	470	960	510	1335	92	72	8.3	11.3
Dairy	1955	5400	6500	8500	8455	13900	77	61	3.0	5.7
Coffee, Tea and Tobacco	240	430	47	53	287	483	16	11	1.3	6.0

(1) Imports - Exports

(2) Imports + Production

SOURCE: Arab Bank of Social and Economic Development and Arab League, Unified Arab World Economic Report, Jordan, 1980 (In Arabic).

See Also: Dr. A. Smadi "Arab World Facing Problems", Jordan 1982, p.33 (In Arabic).

TABLE 4.5.

## Agriculture Commodity Imports (1970-1979) in the Arab Worlds

Commodities	1970			1979			Percentage of annual evolution %		
	Quantity Thousands of Tons	Price \$ Ton	Costs Million of \$	Quantity Thousands of Tons	Price \$ Ton	Costs Million of \$	Quantity	Price	Cost
Wheat	3394	69	235	10961	177	1948	14	11	26
Rice	544	159	88	1624	470	762	13	13	27
Barley	402	59	23	1292	172	222	14	13	29
Corn	239	68	16	2018	150	2.3	27	9	39
Sugar	813	107	87	1646	332	547	8	13	23
Oranges	183	113	21	447	304	136	10	12	23
Orange Juice	18	230	4	365	504	184	40	9	52
Coffee	76	712	54	118	3210	380	5	18	24
Tea	136	879	120	210	2233	468	5	11	16
Tobacco	50	1880	94	127	3992	507	11	9	21
Cotton	25	569	14	93	1217	114	16	9	26
Cows Beef	190	120	23	385	451	174	8	16	25
Chicken	20	639	13	326	1300	424	36	8	47
Eggs	37	520	14	93	1343	125	11	11	23
Butter	49	371	18	140	1750	246	12	19	34
Milk	85	309	26	240	968	233	12	14	28
Cheese	33	715	23	112	1853	208	15	11	28
Beef	88	984	8	109	1900	207	33	8	43

SOURCE: See A, Smade, op.cit., p.34.

It must be asserted that some of the Arab states' imports have come to represent a high ratio of international export which has its economical and political implications, especially if we consider the strategic fact that only certain countries have a surplus. Wheat imports constitute 85% of the needs, 40% from the U.S.A., Canada 20%, France 10%, Austria 10%, Argentina 5%.<sup>1</sup> No doubt the exporting countries have considered these items in the same way as technology and weapons, as in the case for exporting wheat to the Soviet Union from the United States of America in the past few years.

We cannot therefore regard the strategic point for food items, since the increased demand and decreased surplus makes it difficult to satisfy the increased needs.

#### 4.4 FINANCIAL PRESSURES AND EMIGRATION OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE:

##### THE "BRAIN DRAIN"

The problem of emigration of qualified personnel from Third World countries to developed countries has been the subject of wide international debate. The main reason for this interest is the important role that these qualified people are supposed to play in development. Therefore, some people look at this emigration of skilled and scarce talents as a backward step in the development of the Third World countries. Most published works on the subject have been concentrated on the countries which have gathered information and published statistics on this area. Besides, most of the published material take into consideration only economic ideas which are mainly concerned with the costs and benefits.

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1) See: Smadi, M., op.cit., pp.20-25.

Such a problem has been subject to wide interest and debate in the Arab world particularly during the 1970s. According to some available statistics, the percentage of emigrated physicans and engineers and Arab scientists to Western Europe and the United States up to 1976 were 50, 23 and 13 percent respectively, out of the grand total of qualified Arabs. In figures, there were 24,000 physicans, 17,000 engineers and 7,500 of those working in natural sciences.<sup>1</sup> The total number was 70,698 person, as Table No.4.6 shows.

This has been the case in the Arab world despite the fact that projects in most areas like defence, transportation, industry and civil engineering which depend on high qualifications have been growing fast. For example, the estimated expenditures on engineering projects under-way at present in the Arab countries is around \$400 billion. However, the problem lies in the fact that most such projects are being planned, designed and implemented by foreign companies for consultations and engineering. This process usually takes place on a "turn-key" basis with very limited participation from local institutions and manpower. Moreover, the on going pattern of such contracts does not include the transfer of technology in a proper way. Since most Arab countries as well as most developing countries do not have a science and technology policy, such projects do not open the door for engineers and scientists to gain the know how, except on a very limited basis. In other words, there is no link between the educational system and development applications. Moreover, the national help given to research and development activities is still very low, despite the high demand for knowledge and know how which is being bought on the international markets.

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1) Zahlan, Antoine, "Arab Brain Drain", Jordan, Paper Presented to the Seminar on Population and Development in the ECWA region, UN, ECWA, E/ECWA/POP/WG, 12/p.B19, 1978.

TABLE 4.6.

Total and Professional Arab Immigrants Admitted to the U.S.A. by  
Country of Birth 1972-1976.

Emigrants to U.S.A. 1972-1976  
% in Professional, Technical  
and Kindred Category

Country	Total No.	1972-1975	1975-1976	1977 *
Arab World	70,698	12.6	11.4	11.9
Oil Countries	11,740	14.0	12.1	15.7
Poor Countries	58,958	12.3	11.3	11.4
<u>Oil Countries</u>				
Bahrain	116	7.3	31.7	28.6
Iraq	6,848	16.9	5.1	7.5
Kuwait	2,342	40.4	18.6	14.3
Libya	667	42.9	34.8	34.5
Oman	60	35.7	26.6	18.2
Qatar	79	25.7	45.2	13.5
Saudi Arabia	1,424	25.1	25.4	28.3
U.A.E.	204	33.3	8.8	22.2
<u>Poor Countries</u>				
Algeria	238	35.3	18.9	33.3
Egypt	10,763	28.6	29.4	18.7
Jordan	14,771	6.8	5.6	6.8
Lebanon	23,066	10.1	8.7	9.7
Mauritania	14	44.4	66.6	20.0
Morocco	1,133	14.3	16.1	11.3
Somalia	80	12.5	9.7	18.8
Sudan	197	17.7	21.4	5.1
Syria	4,823	16.3	17.2	11.7
Tunisia	201	28.0	26.9	15.4
Yemen AR	3,279	0.6	0.7	1.4
Yemen PDR	393	0.3	0.0	7.7

\* Estimated

SOURCE: Department of Immigration and Naturalization, U.S. Government  
Microfiche, ASI, 1979, .

This is just a quick sketch of the reasons behind the emigration of qualified people from developing countries to the developed world, taking into consideration in addition to the above, a wide range of issues such as the standard of living, the opportunities in both groups of countries, etc. In total there are a number of pushing factors from developing countries and other pulling factors from the developed world. Accordingly, there have been a number of models and ways which have studied this problem, each of which looks at the issue from a different perspective.

Glazer, for example, in his study *Brain Drain*, commissioned by the United Nations Institute for R & D, looked at the pushing factors for foreign students, their distribution according to their fields of specialisation, their connections with their countries of origin and emigration. Here he sheds light on the receiving countries and what they provide those emigrants, but the country of origin has a very limited role in this model. He considers the main reasons to be the result of the lack of changes in the systems on the part of developing countries<sup>1</sup>. J. Bhagwati, exceeds this point of view by making some connection between the pushing and pulling factors. He says:

"In short the possibility of emigrating to the outside world, and the chance for qualified people, stops the process of "internal spread" which takes, even if only slowly, these skilled talents to where it has larger social impact".<sup>2</sup>

However, whether the reasons for absorbing highly skilled people into developed worlds, comes from the country of origin or from the receiving countries, is not the main issue, which is that such a

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1) Glazier, W., *The Brain Drain, Emigration and Return*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1978, represented in Smadi, op.cit., pp.28-30, (In Arabic).

2) Bhagwati, J.N., "International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Economics, Ethics and Taxes", "Third World Quarterly, Vol.1, 1979, p.20

brain drain is costing developing countries dearly both in financial and human terms as well as in terms of future development. The non-aligned movement may provide the forum for discussing the issues concerned and provide solutions both among the member countries or with the developed world through multi-lateral agreements, perhaps through the North-South Dialogue.

In view of the above therefore, some non-aligned countries' planners, such as Iraq's have realized the importance of emigration and the 'brain drain' from Iraq to developed countries, and they take it very seriously.

The Iraqi Government has tried to reverse the 'brain drain' and employ highly qualified immigrants to their home country. To do so, for example, Iraq has followed two methods. First, it has issued Law No. 154 to qualified personnel returning to Iraq, and secondly, it has issued another law by which it binds the qualified to research inside Iraq. For emigrant Iraqis with an equivalent of an M.A. and above, Law 154 provides the following incentives for return.<sup>1</sup>

- (1) The travel expenses of the professional and his dependants from abroad to Baghdad.
- (2) Transportation costs of his personal and household effects and their entry free of duty.
- (3) Tax exemption for one year.
- (4) A grant of a month's salary if the returnee gets married in Iraq, plus an advance equivalent to 6 months' salary.

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1) Shaw, R.P., "Manpower and Educational Shortages in the Arab World, an Interim Strategy", World Development, New York, July 1980, Vol.9, No.7, pp.649-650.

- (5) A piece of land and a loan to build a home.
- (6) A number of other incentives related to the recognition of his previous experience abroad.

As a result of the above law, within 18 months, 705 professionals returned to Iraq. This number may equal one-third of the total number of highly qualified professionals residing in Iraq with the equivalent of an M.A. Degree and above, as Table 4.7 shows.

Secondly, the Iraqi Government made a law to bind their qualified people inside Iraq. This law contained the following points:-<sup>1</sup>

- (1) University graduates are not handed their degree until several years of work has been completed in Iraq.
- (2) The Government restricts undergraduates who study abroad, forbids Iraqis to work abroad in the United Nations Organisations, except for limited cases.
- (3) Requires that travelling physicians and engineers submit a guarantee to return.

It seems to me that the Iraqi way of keeping or attracting back their qualified people may perhaps be used by other developing countries to get some benefits from their qualified citizens.

#### 4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has discussed the support of the Non-aligned Movement for national liberation movements trying to achieve political

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1) Shaw, R.P., op. cit., pp649-650.



TABLE NO. 4.7.

Qualified Personnel Returning to Iraq in Response to Law 154 by Degree, Specialization and Country of Study, 1975.

Part A, Country of Study

Degree	U.S.A.	U.K.	West Germany	France	Other Western	U.S.S.R.	Other Socialist	Arab Countries	Other	Total
P.H.D.	115	177	34	16	15	17	19	19	-	412
M.A.	94	120	1	1	5	8	1	7	1	238
High Diploma	3	5	46	-	-	-	-	1	-	55
TOTAL	212	302	81	17	20	25	20	27	1	705

Part B, Field of Specialization

Degree	Science	Medicine	Engineering	Agriculture	Humanities	Petroleum	Total
P.H.D.	137	70	81	47	71	6	412
M.A.	33	19	106	15	62	3	238
High Diploma	1	39	12	1	2	-	55
TOTAL	171	128	199	63	135	9	705

SOURCE: Compiled from detailed records of the Iraqi Commission for Qualified Personnel, up to November 1975, See ECWA, 1978 and R. Paul Shaw, op.cit., pp.649-650.

independence for their countries, and has also outlined some of the new ways and means followed by the super-powers to maintain the dependence of newly independent developing countries together with a consideration of the possible responses of these countries individually and of the Non-aligned Movement collectively to these new methods of domination.

The significance of this is that just as the Non-aligned Movement's support for national liberation movements eventually led in most cases to a feedback of support for the Movement when national political independence was achieved, so collective assistance by the Non-aligned Movement to countries attempting to avoid other forms of dependence could also help to create the conditions necessary for individual member countries to pursue genuinely non-aligned foreign policies and thereby strengthen the whole Movement's chances of promoting its original ideals and achieving its goals.

A quick glance over the agenda of the non-aligned movement summit conferences, historically shows that the non-aligned movement supported the National Liberation Movements in different ways.

On the one hand the non-aligned countries invited the representatives of the National Liberation Movements to attend the Non-aligned Movement summit conferences as observers and guests. Such moves gave the national Liberation Movement a kind of legitimacy for their existence\*. On the other hand, the non-aligned movement also adopted many resolutions supporting the National Liberation Movements in their right to act against any kind of occupation and foreign domination, such as happened in the Middle East. For example, the non-aligned countries at the Havana summit conference in 1979 resolved that

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\* For more details, see chapter two.

"The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people".<sup>1</sup>

They added that

"All measures taken by Zionists in the Palestinian and Arab countries since their occupation, including all arrangements, constructions, modifications and alterations designed to transform the political, cultural, religious, physical, geographic and demographic features are illegal and null and void".<sup>2</sup>

At the United Nations also, the non-aligned countries have supported the National Liberation Movements in their own struggles against colonialism and imperialism. This happened against the old colonialism and neo-colonialism (as we saw earlier).

From the discussions of food security, armaments and the emigration of highly qualified people, we conclude that the super-powers' new methods are:-

(1) Food Security:

(a) The world food problem is not a technical problem but a political one. The onus of responsibility for resolving it lies not just with the developing countries but also with the industrialised nations.

(b) As a result of the various relations which the industrialised countries have established with the developing countries and their adverse consequences, the industrialised countries are partly to blame for the existence of hunger and malnutrition in the world.

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1) The collection documents of the Non-aligned Countries, op.cit., pp.430.

2) Ibid., p.430.

(c) The industrialised countries ought to import agricultural produce only from the developing countries whose export earnings are used primarily to secure their own food supply.

(d) It would benefit the developing countries if the industrialised nations were to make greater efforts to encourage them to be self-sufficient in the raw materials for the production of their foodstuffs.

(e) The ultimate aim of the national governments and international organization should be to make the food supply of the world's population independent of the operation of market forces.

One can conclude that the issue of food security brings out two closely linked problems: food dependence, and the use of food as a weapon\*.

The second problem is armaments and military dependency: we saw in the previous sections that the Third World countries are spending many times as much on weaponry as they receive in development aid. On the other hand, arms imports make the developing countries dependent not only on the economic side, but also have other aspects forming in the end a pressure to redirect developing countries' policies. This takes several forms, for example:-

(a) Banning highly advanced military equipment and attaching a wide range of strings to their use, which eventually limits their effectiveness.

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\* For more details see for example: What chance for development: Options for the left, agenda 91, December 82, January 84, pp.19-29.

(b) There are specific conditions laid down as to the possibility of transfer or re-export or of lending such equipment; conditions which in their scope totally limit the options available to developing countries.

(c) Since the international market for military equipment is largely monopolised by developed countries, this limits the margin of choice facing developing countries, and in the end leads to the imposing of certain limits on the quality, quantity and effectiveness of military imports.

(d) Technological advancement has its impact in transferring the real costs to the "consumer" countries which leads to the inflating of the military budgets of developing countries in an unprecedented way.

(e) Weapons are used to maintain domination especially in the case of military dictatorships. With tiny élites defending their privileges and the great mass of the people subject to brutal repression, the supply of weapons for armies and police to stabilise the position of the ruling groups, in the interest of the West or the East, whereas real stability can only come from improved social and economic conditions.

The net outcome of this dependency has its impact on the societies of small developing countries not only through their devoting high percentages of their national income to armaments, but also through the limiting of their range of manoeuvre at the international and regional levels.

Finally, the issue of "Brain Drain" is considered a very important problem facing the development of developing countries both in financial and human terms as we argued earlier.

What can the non-aligned countries now do against the super-powers new methods of imposing dependence on developing countries? It can be said that the non-aligned countries, may work individually or collectively to face the new ways followed by the super-powers to increase the dependence of developing countries.

Collectively the non-aligned countries may co-operate together to solve the above problems, by negotiations instead of fighting and buying weapons from the super-powers. On the other problems, they may provide the forum for discussing the issues concerned and provide the solutions both among the member countries or with the developed world through multi-lateral agreements and through negotiations as argued earlier.

Individually the non-aligned countries may face the problems mentioned, perhaps by following the points below:-

(1) By developing their economic, agricultural, industrial, trade and so on, under national and government control as argued in the Introduction (theoretical connections: development and non-alignment etc.).

(2) By solving their internal problems by democratic means.

(3) Solving their external problems by negotiations with others,

instead of fighting, according to the non-aligned movement's principles.

(4) Taking lessons from others' experiences in the world, especially those who are successful in achieving their economic and political development (as mentioned earlier in the theoretical section).

Iraq's economy for example was dependent on multi-national oil companies, for its arms supplies it was dependent on the Soviet Union; and internally it was an unstable country. During the 1970s, it has solved these problems and so has been able to become a more truly non-aligned country. In what follows therefore, we will discuss the Iraqi case as regards development and non-alignment.

TABLE NO. 4.1 MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AND RELATED AGENCIES

(1)

Organization (a)	UN(b)	FAO	GATT	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICJ	IDA	IFC	ILO	IMCO	IMF	ITU	UNESCO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO
Members (c)	144	135	85	106	127	129	141	114	100	126	88	128	147	135	156	145	61	143
Countries	1946	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Afghanistan	1955	X		X			X						X	X	X			X
Albania	1962	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Algeria	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Australia	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Austria	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bahamas	1973	X			X		X					X	X		X	X		X
Bahrain	1971	X			X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X		
Bangladesh	1974	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Barbados	1966	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Belgium	1965	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Benin	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bhutan	1971						X								X			
Bolivia	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Botswana	1966	X			X		X	X				X	X		X	X		X
Brazil	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bulgaria	1955	X		X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Burma	1948	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Burundi	1962	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Byelorussian SSR	1945			X			X			X			X	X	X	X	X	X
Cambodia	1955	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Cameroon	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Canada	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cape Verde Islands	1975	X																
Central African Republic	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Chad	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Chile	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
China, Peoples Republic	1945	X				X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X		X
Colombia	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Comoro Islands	1975																	
Congo	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Costa Rica	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X



TABLE NO. 4.1 Cont'd

(2)

Organization	UN	FAO	GATT	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICJ	IDA	IFC	ILO	IMCO	IMF	ITU	UNESCO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO	
Cuba	1945	X	X	X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	
Cyprus	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Czechoslovakia	1945	X	X	X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	
Denmark	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Dominican Republic	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Ecuador	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Egypt	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
El Salvador	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Equatorial Guinea	1965				X	X	X	X			X	X	X						X
Ethiopia	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X
Fiji	1970	X			X	X	X	X		X		X	X		X	X	X		X
Finland	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
France	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gabon	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gambia	1965	X	X		X		X	X				X	X	X	X	X			X
German Dem. Rep.	1973			X			X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
West Germany	1973	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ghana	1957	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Greece	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Grenada	1974	X			X		X					X				X			X
Guatemala	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X
Guinea	1958	X			X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X			X
Guinea-Bissau	1974	X					X							X	X	X			X
Guyana	1966	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X
Haiti	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X
Honduras	1945	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Hungary	1955	X	X	X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland	1946	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
India	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Indonesia	1950	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Iran	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Iraq	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Ireland	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Israel	1949	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Italy	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X
Ivory Coast	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

TABLE NO. 4.1 Cont'd

(3)

Organization	UN	FAO	GATT	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICJ	IDA	IFC	ILO	IMCO	IMF	ITU	UNESCO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO
Jamaica	1962	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Japan	1956	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Jordan	1955	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kenya	1963	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kuwait	1963	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Laos	1955	X			X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Lebanon	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Lesotho	1966	X			X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		
Liberia	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Libya	1955	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Luxembourg	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malagasy Republic	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malawi	1964	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Malaysia	1957	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Maldives	1965	X				X	X				X		X		X	X		
Mali	1960	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Malta	1964	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Mauritania	1961	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Mauritius	1968	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Mexico	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mongolia	1961	X		X		X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Morocco	1956	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mozambique	1975														X	X		X
Nepal	1955	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Netherlands	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
New Zealand	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nicaragua	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Niger	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Nigeria	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Oman	1971	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Pakistan	1947	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Panama	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Papua New Guinea	1975	X			X							X	X		X	X		
Paraguay	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X

TABLE NO. 4.1 Cont'd

(4)

Organization	UN	FAO	GATT	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICJ	IDA	IFC	ILO	IMCO	IMF	ITU	UNESCO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO
Peru	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Philippines	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Poland	1945	X	X	X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X			X
Portugal	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Qatar	1971	X			X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Romania	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Rwanda	1962	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Sao Tome & Principe	1975																	
Saudi Arabia	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Senegal	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sierra Leone	1961	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Singapore	1965		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Somalia	1960	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
South Africa	1945		X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X
Spain	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sri Lanka	1955	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sudan	1956	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Surinam	1975														X			X
Swaziland	1968	X			X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X		X
Sweden	1946	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Syria	1945	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tanzania	1961	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Thailand	1946	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Togo	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Trinidad & Tobago	1962	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tunisia	1956	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Turkey	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Uganda	1962	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Ukrainian SSR	1945			X		X	X			X			X	X	X	X	X	X
U.S.S.R.	1945			X		X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
U.A. Emirates	1971	X			X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
U.K.	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
U.S.A.	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Upper Volta	1960	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Uruguay	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X

TABLE NP. 4.1 Cont'd

(5)

Organisation	UN	FAO	GATT	IAEA	IBRD	ICAO	ICJ	IDA	IFC	ILO	IMCO	IMF	ITU	UNESCO	UPU	WHO	WIPO	WMO
Venezuela	1945	X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Yemen Arab Republic	1947	X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
Yemen People's Democ. Republic	1967	X			X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X		X
Yugoslavia	1945	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Zaire	1960	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Zambia	1964	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X

(a) Organisations: For details see the United Nation System, Chapter 1, p.30.

(b) Dates are those of each member's admission to the United Nations.

NOTICE: These Tables show each Member's Admission to the United Nations and its Specialized and Related Agencies.

## CHAPTER FIVE

IRAQ - NON-ALIGNMENT AND RELATIONS WITH THE SUPER POWERS AND THE  
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND NEW DEVELOPMENT

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Iraq - Non-alignment and Relations with the Super-powers and the Non-aligned Movement: Historical Background and New Developments.

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

We discussed earlier the points necessary to enable a country to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, such as political independence, economic and social development, leaders committed to the ideal and goal of non-alignment, internal stability and so on. Also, we found in chapter two some non-aligned countries for example Cuba have tried and are trying to steer the non-aligned movement into alliance with one or other of the super-powers, while others have tried and are trying to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment by solving their internal problems, achieving new development and becoming closer to the other non-aligned countries. This of course leads one to seek an appropriate example from the foreign policies of developing countries, which is a particularly informative case. It seems to me that the best example to examine for my purpose is the foreign policy of Iraq for many reasons, the most important of which are the following:-

Internally, during the 1950s and 1960s, Iraq's socio-economic and political experience was that of underdevelopment. Her economy was exploited by Western multi-national oil companies; there was a low standard of education, her political parties were engaged in power struggles, etc. During the 1970s, Iraq's aim was to become developed, by promoting economic development, gaining control of her own oil by nationalising it, achieving internal stability, making social improvements, etc.

Externally, in Iraq's relations with the super-powers and with the Third World countries, the Iraqi leaders have seen non-alignment as a means of enhancing the country's security and maximizing national ambitions. The Havana Summit Conference in 1979 elected Iraq host country for the next Summit Conference in 1982, (this has been changed to the eighth Summit Conference because of the war between Iraq and Iran), thus initiating a three year period of Iraqi chairmanship of the movement.\*

In what follows therefore, we will shed some light on Iraqi foreign policy towards non-alignment. Iraq's shift towards non-alignment can be examined and explained in the following terms: Firstly, through an account of the historical background of her relations with the super-powers namely, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. during the period 1950s-1960s and its development in the 1970s. Secondly, we will shed some light on Iraqi development internally in the domestic and economic fields and finally, we will look at relations with non-aligned countries.

## 5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERVENTION OF THE USA AND USSR IN IRAQ WITHIN THE KURDISH REVOLT AND IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY

From the time Iraq achieved independence in 1932, she entered into an alliance with Great Britain. The British forces were allowed to use Iraqi territory against rival powers that might threaten the region and Nuri al Said, the Iraqi leader before the 1958 Revolution, who depended heavily upon British and American support to remain in power.

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\* The Lusaka Conference in 1970 appointed President Kaunda as spokesman for the movement until the next Summit Conference and ever since the leader of the host country of each summit has been recognised as Chairman of the Non-aligned, until the following Summit.

The Iraqi economic links also with Western Europe were of major importance, while there were yet no significant Iraqi economic ties with the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc nations.<sup>1</sup>

However, when Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952, Nuri and his Western allies tried to convince Nasser of the necessity of entering into a Western sponsored pact against the Soviet Union. Nuri tried to justify his policy for joining in a Western sponsored alliance by arguing that:

"Iraq was weak and therefore needed the friendship of a Great Power which would provide her with weapons and technical assistance in order to stand on her feet. Also it needed protection against communist aggression".<sup>2</sup>

Negotiations between Nasser and Nuri al Said to convince Nasser to enter into a Western alliance met with complete failure.

After he had reached an impasse with Nasser, Nuri al Said decided to concentrate on negotiations with Turkey. At that time, Turkey already was a N.A.T.O. member, and strong supporter of Western policy in the Middle East. In fact after intensive negotiations between Iraq and Turkey, they announced on January 12th 1955, their decision to conclude the Turkish - Iraqi defence pact.<sup>3</sup> The pact would be open to all Middle Eastern countries with the exception of the Zionists regime. By her alliance with Western countries, perhaps Iraq aimed to entice small Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to join.

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1) Peretz, D., "Non-alignment in the Arab World", "The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", Vol.363, Novemebr 1965, p.38.

2) Nash, M. Bou, National Interest and Neutralism in Nasser's Foreign Policy, Chaptel Hill, 1977, p.68.

3) The New York Times, January 18th, 1955.



On the other hand, such action would have effectively isolated Egypt from leadership of the Arab States. It was clear therefore, why during his visit in January 15th-18th, 1955 to Syria and Lebanon, Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, argued that they should join the pact and also why the Egyptian leaders were the obvious target of his criticism due to their violent attacks on the proposed pact.<sup>1</sup>

The Egyptian reaction was indeed strong. She invited the premiers of five other Arab collective security pact nations (members of the Arab League) to meet in Cairo to discuss Iraq's proposed action. They announced on January 16th, 1955 that the pact threatened the Arab League and Arab Unity.<sup>2</sup>

It could be said that the activities of Iraq and Egypt showed that both of them were seeking to entice other Arab countries to join their own side. Nevertheless, Iraq failed to induce any Arab country to join the pact and the other Arab efforts to dissuade Iraq from signing the pact with Turkey in February 1955 also failed.

On February 24th, 1955 therefore the Iraqi Government signed and joined the Baghdad pact. This pact was made up as shown in table no. 5.1 in the next page.

The period between the Baghdad pact, February 24th, 1955 and July 14th, 1958, witnessed important events, such as the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the nationalisation the Suez Canal and the Suez invasion

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1) The New York Times, January 14-18th, 1955.

2) For more details on the above Conference see the New York Times, January 28-30th, 1955 and February 2-6th and 16th, 1955.

TABLE NO. 5.1

The Baghdad Pact, February 24th, 1955.  
Power Shifts in the Middle East in 1955.

January - February 1955		
Proponents	Uncommitted	Opponents
IRAQ	SYRIA	EGYPT
TURKEY	LEBANON	SAUDI ARABIA
BRITAIN	JORDAN	SOVIET UNION
U.S.A.	YEMEN	INDIA
IRAN	SUDAN	YUGOSLAVIA
PAKISTAN	ARAB NORTH AFRICAN STATES	COMMUNIST
	FRANCE	CHINA

SOURCE: M.B. Nash, *op.cit.*, p.71.

in 1956 and the Union between Egypt and Syria (the United Arab Republic) in February 1958.

Such events made Nasser a hero in the Arab World and isolated Nuri al Said of Iraq. Also, it might be added that such events among others led to the overthrow of Nuri which happened on July 14th 1958.

When the July Revolution took place in 1958, the new leaders declared Iraq to be a republic and also a people's republic elected by and for the people. Also, three points were stressed in its proclamation towards Iraq's foreign policy, as follows:-<sup>1</sup>

- (1) Respect for agreements and pacts which were in the interests of the country, including the Bandung Conference principles.
- (2) Conformity with the United Nations Charter.
- (3) Co-ordination of brotherly ties with Arab and Muslim states.

In view of the above points, it seems that the new regime preferred Iraq to be a non-aligned country. With regard to agreements with other powers, such as the Baghdad pact, it did not repudiate any essential commitments and made it clear that agreements which were consistent with Iraqi interests would be respected. Therefore, the question will be asked: did Qasim and Arif, who made this proclamation, put it into practice? If they could not put it into practice we might add another question: why could they not do so?

In fact they could not put it into practice because two of the

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1) Khaduri, M., Republican Iraq, a Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1968, London, New York, 1969, pp.180-183.

ideological groups\*, the Pan-Arabs and the Iraqi Communist Party demanded an immediate withdrawal from the Baghdad pact and other Iraqi-Western agreements, such as that for American military and technical assistance. Indeed as a result of these demands, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad pact on March 24th 1959.<sup>1</sup> This step was considered the first break in the relationship between Iraq and Western Europe.

The Qasim - Arif regime also found that the Kurdish Democratic party demanded complete internal autonomy and also opposed union with Egypt. It could be said that the United States of America, Iran and the Zionists found their opportunity to act against the new regime in Iraq. They supported the Kurdish Democratic Party against Qasim and Arif's regimes, aiming perhaps to stop Soviet influence in Iraq and on the other hand to win Iraq to their own side.

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\* In terms of ideology, inside Iraq there were many political parties, the most important of which were the Arab Ba'ath Party, the Communist Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party. The most powerful of these were the Iraqi Communist Party and the Arab Ba'ath Party.

The Arab Ba'ath Party favoured close relations with Egypt and an ultimate union of the two countries, while the Iraqi Communist party favoured close relations with the Soviet Union. One can mention here that the Qasim era was an important period in the history of the Iraqi Communist Party. The party for example, created both para military formations and various front organisations which encompassed such diverse elements as the peasants, workers and university students and they carried out the Kirkuk massacre. The 1959 Kirkuk massacre was a seventy-two-hour long, savage, large scale battle in 1959 in which many civilians were killed.

Qasim and Arif were officers in the Iraqi Army. They were not members of any Iraqi political party. They played Iraq's political parties off against one another (The Communists against the Pan-Arab Groups). It could be said that while Qasim's regime succeeded in the short run in playing Iraq's political parties off against one another, that regime failed to do so in the long term.

For more details see: Smolansky, O.M., A Study in Arab Politics: State and Politics, London 1972, pp.151-179.

1) Khaduri, M., op.cit., p.183.

However, the year 1959 witnessed a new development in the political life of Iraq. On the one hand, it witnessed the growth of Communist strength, while on the other hand, there had been a gradual decline of Arab Nationalist influence. For example, on February 7th, 1959, six Pan-Arab Ministers resigned from the Iraqi cabinet because of the differences of views between the Iraqi Communist party and the Pan-Arabs on Arab Unity.<sup>1</sup> In fact their departure left the Iraqi cabinet without Arab Nationalist representation and marked the failure of one of the first steps in Qasim's drive to maintain and consolidate the unity of the Iraqi people. The new regime's increasingly heavy dependence on Soviet military, economic and cultural assistance becomes understandable.\*

The honeymoon of the Communist Party in Iraq did not last long. Qasim himself was quite aware of the Communist influence in Iraq and the nationalists started moves to throw out Qasim and the Communist Party, because they considered them guilty of betraying the principles of the July 1958 Revolution. The first nationalist revolt against Qasim's regime was in March 8th, 1959 led by colonel Abdal Wahab Al-Shawwaf and started from Mosul, but Al-Shawwaf failed.<sup>1</sup>

It could be said that the domestic problems and the bad relations between Iraq and other Arab States, beside other problems, brought a corresponding growth of the nationalists in Iraq.

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\* For more details about Iraq-Soviet relationship see later.

1) The New York Times, March 9th, 1959. Also Hottinger, A., "Mosul-Failure of a revolt", "Swiss Review of World Affairs", April 1959, pp.16-17.

Therefore, when Qasim ordered the arrest of some leaders of the Arab Ba'ath Party between 3-8th February 1963, such as Saleh Mahdi-Ammash, the Ba'ath Party threw out Qasim's regime and formed a government on February 8th, 1963.<sup>1</sup>

During Qasim's rule in Iraq, three developments arose, firstly, the Kurdish problems promoted by the United States of America, the Zionists and Iran; secondly, the Pan-Arab/Communist problem and finally, Iraq became more tied economically and militarily to the Soviet bloc.<sup>2</sup>

When the Arab Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963, they faced these problems and tried to solve them, but within a few months, the Arab Ba'ath Party was faced with a further big problem. Arif took power and arrested most of the Ba'athist leaders.\*\*

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1) M. Khadouri, op.cit., p.190.

2) Ibid., p.190 (and for more details see later).

\*\* The Arab Ba'ath Party began as an intellectual movement in Syria and was organised into a political party by Michel Aflag and Salah Aldin al Baytar, who received their education in France after World War II. The party advocated Arab Unity, freedom and socialism. Arab Union became the principle goal in the party's programme and its aim was not only to establish political union, but the creation of an Arab Society forming a single nation based on nationalism, freedom and socialism. The Ba'ath Party appealed to the Arab people in all Arab countries to work for the realisation of Ba'athist ideals. The Ba'ath ideology entered Iraq after World War II through Syrian teachers and students who went to teach in Iraq. Its regional leader Fuad al-Rikabi having informed Aflag, leader of the national command of the founding of an Iraqi Ba'ath, the Iraqi group became the regional branch of the national command whose headquarters were in Damascus (Syria). Rikabi's chief task from 1952 to July 1958, was to consolidate the party and to attract to it young men in civil and military ranks. In 1957, the party participated in the founding of the National Union Front, a step which enabled it to play a more active role in the internal politics of the country. After the collapse of Shawwaf and the rising tide of communist influence, Ba'athist leaders became restless and began to consider the possibility of eliminating Qasim by assassination. Assassination was opposed by some Ba'athists but it seemed to others the only way to eliminate Qasim and to put an end to the communist  
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Under Arif's rule the trends in the internal and external politics of the country may be characterized as follows:-<sup>1</sup>

(1) Arif like Qasim was an Army officer and he had no desire to rely on political parties, but while Qasim played off one party against another, Arif ordered their dissolution and relied on a set of Pan-Arab officers for support.

(2) Arif continued to call for union with Egypt and it was the official policy of his regime. Iraq's foreign policy had a definite pro-Egyptian orientation, and Arif publicly supported Nasser in the Arab Summit Conferences and in international councils.

(3) Arif showed no initial interest in socialism and insisted that his social and political views derived from Islam rather than from foreign sources.

(4) From 1963 to July 1968, there were serious attempts at bringing Iraq back to the Western fold by ignoring Iraq's treaty with the Soviet Union and resuming economic and commercial relations with Western countries. For example, Premier Bazzaz's visits to Britain and the U.S.A. in 1966-67, to promote economic and technical co-operation with the West on the one hand and to end the Kurdish War on the other hand.<sup>2</sup> This was brought to an end by the 1967 War between Arabs and Zionists when America supported the Zionists, as it is still doing.

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\*\* (cont'd) influence in the country. Therefore a group of activists from among members of the party was selected to carry out the plan. One of them was Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq at the present time. The group attacked Qasim on his way to attend the celebration of a national day at the Embassy of East Germany on October 7th, 1959. The group thought that Qasim had been killed for he fell inside the car but he was still alive though seriously wounded. Saddam Hussein was hit in that attack. Qasim remained in power until the Ba'athists' took power in 1963.\*

\* More details see: Devlin, J.F., The Ba'ath Party a History from its Origins to 1966, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, U.S.A. 1976. See also: Moalla, The Long Days, Baghdad, Iraq, 1980.

1) Khadouri, M., op.cit., pp.220-221.

2) Khadouri, Socialist Iraq, U.S.A., 1978, p.172.

It can be said that from the rise of Qasim and throughout Arif's rule northern Iraq witnessed daily bloodshed with no foreseeable end between the Arabs and the Kurds. During this time, the U.S.A., Iran and the Zionists supported the Kurdish movement against Iraqi governments.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the U.S.A. supported and is still giving support to the Zionist movement against the Arabs in general and against the Palestinian people in particular. Such events among others made the Iraqi government break off any relations with the U.S.A. and such events led the Arab Ba'ath Party to overthrow the regime and take power in July 1968.

The Arab Ba'ath Party was opposed and is still opposed to the recognition of Zionism in Palestine and diplomatic relations were not resumed with the U.S.A. Also, they nationalised Western oil interests in 1973 and reduced trade relations with the United States of America and some Western European countries replacing these by trade with countries considered friendly because they refused to support Zionism in the wars of 1967 and 1973, such as France, Italy and Spain.\* On the other hand, to get more stability and to stop the foreign powers such as Iran, the U.S.A. and Zionism intervening in its country, the Iraqi government seriously considered the Kurdish question and tried to solve this problem. Because of the importance of the Kurdish question in Iraq, our analysis will now be concentrated on the solution of this question.

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1) Iskander, A.I. Saddam Hussein, the Fighter, the Thinker and the Man, Iraq, 1980, Chapter 10, pp. 101-109

\* For more details see: The Economic Section.



### 5.2.1 THE ARAB BA'ATH PARTY'S SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH QUESTION:

The Kurdish Democratic Party was an offshoot of the Kurdish Nationalist movement which became active after World War II. Under Nuri al Said's rule, the Kurdish movement was discouraged. After the July 1958 Revolution, a group of Kurds began to co-operate with the Communists in the hope that the cause of their people might be served by this party if it ever achieved power, but such hopes were dashed. After 1960 there started a struggle against Qasim's regime and their demands, as they stated them were:

"We struggle to obtain for the Kurdish people the right of representation and service in all Government Departments and in all official and semi-official organizations in proportion to the percentage of the Kurdish population in Iraq".<sup>1</sup>

In fact the struggle between Qasim's and Arif's regimes on the one hand and the Kurdish movement on the other hand continued until 1968. Since the July Revolution the Ba'ath Party Government has striven to solve the Kurdish question which grew extremely complicated as a result of numerous factors, particularly foreign intervention, the high handed chauvinism with which earlier dictatorial and reactionary regimes had handled the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people, the long years of fighting, the situation in the Kurdish movement itself and so on. Therefore the Arab Ba'ath Party's views on the Kurdish question and its efforts to solve it were based on many considerations, the most important of which was the recognition of the Kurdish movement as a nationalist movement within the limits of its demands for the legal and national rights of the Kurdish people of Iraq.

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1) al-Durra, M., Al-Qadiya al-Kurdiya, Beirut, 1966 pp.290-295.

The Arab Ba'ath Party Government stated that it understood the legal rights of the Kurdish people, on the one hand, and the government had the basic responsibility of legally and constitutionally securing these rights. In order to secure and guarantee these rights, and to stop as much as they could, the foreign powers' intervention in Iraq on the other hand, the government issued a practical and political formula to solve the Kurdish question. The government invited the leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party to join the progressive patriotic and national front in Iraq. This solution consisted of two main elements: 1. The maintenance and strengthening of Iraq's National Unity and 2. The granting of National rights to Iraqi Kurds including autonomy, to be achieved over a period of four years.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear from the Arab Ba'ath Party's efforts to solve the Kurdish question that, the Ba'ath Party leaders by no means ignored the mistaken policies pursued by some Kurdish Democratic Party factions, such as their suspect connections with imperialism and reaction, or their isolationist tendencies. Also, it may be said that this effort is considered a historic turning point not only in the struggle of the Kurdish people for their rightful nationalist aspirations, but also in the struggle of the Iraqi people, Arabs and Kurds alike, to build a progressive democratic society.

However, the efforts were not put into practice as effectively as the Ba'ath party had hoped. Indeed, the traditional leadership of the Kurdish movement was not content to oppose the effort, but they took up arms against it.

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1) See the Eighth Congress, Political Reports, op.cit., p.62.

Perhaps for historical reasons, the Kurdish people were drowned in ignorance, fanaticism and religious loyalty to their leaders. On the other hand, they refused such efforts at reconciliation because many Kurdish leaders regarded these efforts and alliances with the Arab Ba'ath party as provisional tactics from which the Ba'ath party might win advantages and improve their position while waiting for an opportunity to make more demands.<sup>1</sup> In addition, certain Arab elements, particularly within the Iraqi armed forces, even at commanding level opposed the policy or at least did not believe in its essence. This was because they were considering their own positions in the ranks and regarded this effort as tantamount to stripping them of any means of self defence because of the conditions within the Iraqi society, as President Saddam Hussein himself said in this respect:-

"The Party Leader therefore had a difficult struggle with himself and with Society to produce the proclamation of March 11th 1970."<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the March 11th 1970 proclamation guaranteeing the national rights of the Kurdish people, it was followed by a series of laws passed by the Revolution Command Council. These guaranteed cultural rights for all other national minorities in Iraq, which in terms of population have little weight. These other minorities such as the Turkomans had the right to be educated in their own languages - although everyone would still learn Arabic - to retain their heritage and traditions and to express themselves through their own press.

Also on March 11th 1974, the autonomy law for the Kurdish movement was declared by which it gave the representatives of the Kurdish

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1) The Eighth Congress, op.cit., p.63.

2) Hussein, Saddam, Ahdath fil Qadhaya al Rahina, (Events at the Present Time), Iraq, 1976, p.36.

Democratic party two weeks grace to join the Progressive Patriotic and National Front.<sup>1</sup> The Kurdish Democratic Party's representatives gave no reply even after two weeks. They continued to take refuge in the mountains and maintain their ties with the Shah of Iran and with the U.S.A. and Zionism. The fight between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish movement grew more savage. During one year for example, there were more than 60,000 casualties from both sides.<sup>2</sup>

The leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party refused all solutions offered by the Iraqi Government until March 6th, 1975, when a meeting was held between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran during the OPEC Summit in Algeria.<sup>3</sup> They made an agreement to solve the border problem between Iraq and Iran and have relations based on mutual respect for sovereignty. In fact, the signing of this agreement by the two sides settled the question of border control and put an end to the assistance being given to the Kurdish movement. It may be added that this agreement put an end to the Kurdish question itself because assistance and support from the U.S.A. and the Zionists also came across the Iranian border.

It must be admitted however, that the errors of the period under review did great damage to the progress of Iraq. But despite the errors and the damage, the government's preference for a peaceful democratic approach to the Kurdish question was the right one and yielded significant results.

It is clear that after a few years of indefatigable searching for

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1) Iskander, A., op.cit., Chapter 10, pp.101-109.  
2) Iskander, A., op.cit., Chapter 10, pp.101-109.  
3) Ibid., Chapter 10, pp.101-109.

a peaceful and democratic solution, the political and economic orientation of the Kurdish people is not what it was before the Declaration of March 11th 1970. Indeed, many of the Kurdish people enjoy more security and satisfaction in their lives than ever before. Moreover, the Iraqi Government created new economic conditions in the Kurdish area, which means that many more Kurdish people are now involved in agriculture, industry and commercial activity linked to a greater or lesser extent to the economic life of the Iraqi people.<sup>1</sup>

It can be seen why the above solution is considered an important step in the political life of Iraq towards stability. Such stability was necessary it can be argued, as it gave the government some chance to solve another problem i.e. the control of Iraq's oil by means of nationalisation and altogether made the Iraqi Government able to play a role in the non-aligned movement and to lead the more committed non-aligned countries. On the other hand, the solution of the Kurdish question ended the intervention of Iran, the United States of America and the Zionist movement in Iraq within the Kurdish area. But the Iraqi Government still faced the intervention of the United States of America in Iraq via the multi-national oil companies. (For more details see later in, the economic section of this chapter).

As we stated in the previous section, during Qasim's rule in Iraq, three developments arose, and we have seen the Arab Ba'ath Party's solution to the first question namely the Kurdish question. Now we may ask: What about the other problems such as the Pan-Arab/Communist problem? In what follows therefore, we will discuss this issue.

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1) The Eighth Congress, op.cit., pp.61-64. For more details on the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970, see for example: Sa'ad N. Jawad: The Kurdish Question 1958-1970, A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D., Aberyswyth, 1977.

Its importance stems from its impact on the role of Iraq in the non-aligned movement nowadays, and its impact on the period prior to Iraq's active role in the movement. This effect has its working mechanism on both the domestic level and in Iraq's international relations.

#### 5.2.2 THE ARAB BA'ATH PARTY AND THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY : DEFICIENCIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT IN IRAQ AFTER THE 1968 REVOLUTION

As we argued earlier, during Nuri al Said's rule in Iraq, there were no significant relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union, because Iraq was aligned to the Western bloc. When Qasim took power in 1958 in Iraq, the new government turned its relations towards the Soviet Union, but there were two schools of thought concerning this relationship: the Iraqi Communist Party preferred full co-operation with the Soviet Union, while the Pan-Arabs warned against this and sought resumption of relations with the West.<sup>1</sup> Qasim's policy was supported by the Iraqi Communist Party, perhaps because he preferred Iraqi independence rather than Arab Unity.

Against this background Qasim became increasingly dependant on Soviet military, economic and cultural assistance which is understandable. To do so, he chose as his Minister of Economics, Ibrahim Cubba, who was persona grata to the Communist Party, to head an Iraqi delegation to the Soviet Union to negotiate an agreement for Soviet economic assistance.

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1) Khadouri, M., Socialist Iraq, op.cit., p.143.

The negotiations between Iraq and the Soviet Union began in Baghdad early in 1959. The negotiations dealing with Soviet economic assistance lasted from February 25th to March 16th 1959. They signed the agreement in Moscow on March 16th, 1959 and Khrushchev, explaining the purpose of this agreement, said:-

"The agreement provides for the construction in Iraq, with our technical assistance, of metallurgical, engineering and chemical plants, light and food industry enterprises, irrigation installations and other projects. We are helping the people of Iraq in a fraternal way to eliminate in the shortest possible time, the grave aftermath of colonialism. Our economic and technical assistance to Iraq is friendly and disinterested; It has no political, military or other strings attached".<sup>1</sup>

In addition after his return from the Soviet Union, Cubba said that:-

"Soviet assistance was to enable Iraq to carry out some twenty-five economic projects, including the construction of steel, cement, chemical and other related industries".<sup>2</sup>

Despite Khrushchev's claim and Cubba's claim that the agreement would help lay the foundation of a sound national economy for Iraq without involving dependence, it seems to me nevertheless that Iraq under Qasim's rule, having left her alliance with Western powers, became more economically and militarily dependant on the Soviet Union.

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1) For Khrushchev's speech and Cubba's reply in Arabic see: Itti had al Sha'b, March 17th, 1959.

2) The economic assistance agreement was the first of a series in which Iraq sought Soviet economic as well as military and cultural assistance. It consisted of twelve articles plus a preamble, a final act and two agendas. Soviet experts would help Iraq in geological exploration and in a variety of other technical matters and the Soviet Union would grant Iraq a loan of 550 million roubles (about £150 million) at 2.5% interest per annum. This credit would be used within seven years from the coming into force of the agreement.

\* For the text of the Agreement, see United Nations Treaty series, Vol.346, 1959, pp.142-52 and annexes, pp.154-64.

During Qasim's rule though hundreds of Communists were tried for their alleged role in the Kirkuk disturbances and other riots in 1959. But it was not until the violent overthrow of the Qasim regime in February 1963 that there came a suspension of Communist activities in Iraq. Between February and November 1963, the Ba'athists who came to power in Baghdad carried out a policy of persecution and of vengeance against their erstwhile allies.<sup>1</sup> During the regimes of the Arif brothers, however, (November 1963 - July 1968), the Communists did not fare too badly, considering that the Arifs reputedly were fiercely anti-Communist. Although they were not allowed to function openly, the Communists were not hunted down by state policy. There seemed to be a cautious truce between the military regimes and the Communists during this period. Perhaps one reason was Arif's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Another reason could be that there was a real desire on the part of the government to unite the Iraqi people, regardless of their ethnic and ideological orientations.<sup>2</sup>

The second Ba'ath government which came to power in the July 1968 Revolution, at first manifested much more tolerance towards the Communists. From the beginning, it endeavoured to form a united front of the various political factions in the country. In other words, the Arab Ba'ath Party was the first to extend its hand to the other political forces including the Iraqi Communist party, in order to unite progressive nationalist political action among the Iraqi people. On

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1) For more details see: McLaurin R.D., and Mughisuddin, M., The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Washington, D.C., American Institute for Research, 1974, pp.275-314.

2) Mughisuddin, M., Ibrahim, R., Wagner and McLaurin, R.D., Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, "Iraq Foreign Policy", U.S.A. 1977, p.140.



July 30th 1968 for example, Saddam Hussein invited all the progressive forces to join the government. He said:

"All progressive forces are called upon to be aware of their responsibilities in this delicate stage in the life of our people and our nation and to make a serious contribution to defending the Revolution and maintaining its progressive path by active participation in bearing the burden of responsibility. In following this route, the Revolution will not take off from positions of weaknesses, but intends to confirm its belief in the need to have wider mass participation in pushing the wheels of the Revolution forward".<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that the above invitation to all forces to participate in the responsibilities of patriotic action, as Saddam said, was not because of a position of weakness of the Ba'ath party, but because the Ba'ath party's leaders believed that the struggle by a united front against opposing forces and domination by multinational oil companies and Zionist aggression was the only formula capable of meeting the needs of the Arab struggle during this stage, which had been made more complex and significant by Zionist imperialist aggression.

However, the above invitation was not the last one, it was reiterated more than once by the Ba'ath party leaders. In December 1968 and in July 1970, the Arab Ba'ath Party invited others to join the government.<sup>2</sup> In spite of these efforts and invitations, the Iraqi Communist party refused.

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1) From Communiqué No.27, from the Revolution Command Council on July 30th, 1978 on the Flank Movements by the Counter Forces to the Revolution.

2) Aziz, T., Thawrat at-Tariq al-Jadid, (The Revolution of the New Way) Iraq, 1974, p.108.

From the above situation, we may ask: Why did the Communists refuse to join the front and what were the factors ruling their attitude at this stage just after the Revolution? In reply to these questions, it may be said that their attitude was due essentially to the differences between the two political parties about many things, among which was that of Arab Unity. The main aim of the Arab Ba'ath party was Arab Unity in a single state, while the official Arab Communist parties did not devote any time to Arab Unity and their advisers came directly from Moscow.

In addition, on its attitude towards the Palestine issue, the Iraqi Communist Party followed the Moscow line and called for a peaceful solution of the conflict. For example, when the Ba'ath Party Government of Iraq rejected the Rogers peace plan in 1970, the Iraqi Communist party called for a peaceful solution of the Arab - Zionist conflict.<sup>1</sup>

It may be added that on the organizational level, the Iraqi Communist Party was suffering the effects of internal divisions of which no Communist movement in any Arab country is free except that of South Yemen, perhaps because of the Arab people's belief in God and religion.

It could be said that the rivalry factor for the leadership in Iraq also led the Iraqi Communist Party to refuse to join the Arab Ba'ath Party in the National Front at that time.

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1) Mughisuddin, M., and Mclaurin, R.D., op.cit., p.141.

It is clear that during Qasim's period there was a struggle between the Communists and the Arab Ba'ath Party to rule the Iraqi people. When the Ba'ath party's leaders first invited them and called for a national front, the Communists refused, while later they demanded equal leadership for the different parties within the front.<sup>1</sup> This was, to the Ba'aths, neither practically nor theoretically acceptable, because in relation to front action, the Arab Ba'ath Party, which brought the Revolution to life and held power, always has a leading role irrespective of whether a front has been established or not.<sup>2</sup>

The Iraqi Communist Party refused the above invitations and others in 1971, and was still doing so until Iraq signed a friendship and co-operation treaty with the Soviet Union in 1973. After this agreement the Iraqi Communists agreed to join the Iraqi cabinet and two members of the Communist Party's central committee, namely Amir Abdullah and Makram al-Talbani, subsequently did so. In addition, after the above treaty, the Iraqi Communist Party issued a communiqué on the occasion of the treaty which said:

"The Iraqi Communist Party expresses its great welcome of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty. It has followed with interest the development of the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union, particularly after the visit of the Iraqi party and government delegation to the Soviet Union in February 1973. Today, the efforts of the two friendly sides have cumulated in success with the signing of the treaty of friendship and co-operation. The Iraqi Communist Party truly values this positive step and declares its total willingness to work with all its energy and without restraint to co-operate with the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, so that the banner of Iraqi-Soviet friendship remains flying high.<sup>3</sup>

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- 1) Al-Thawra, Iraqi Newspaper, July 10th, 1970.
  - 2) Iskander, A., op.cit., pp.264-265.
  - 3) Ibid., pp.264-268.

A few months later, after a series of meetings between the Arab Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party, the latter joined the National Front on July 17th 1973 and the Communists made open acknowledgement of the fact that the Arab Ba'ath Party had a distinctive position in the leadership of the Front and its different bodies and it had the leading political authority in the State and its constitutional establishments.<sup>1</sup> The text clearly stipulated a commitment from all parties, other than the leading party of the Revolution to refrain from activity within the armed forces. This was because the latter represents an important Revolutionary Organization and any intrusion into its ranks by other political parties and organs constitutes a threat to this unity.

It could also be said that the Arab Ba'ath - Communist agreement can be considered an important achievement of the Iraqi Revolution after 1968. This was because the Ba'ath Party leaders perhaps aimed to import policy ideas from this ideology along the road to positive interaction between the two streams of thought in the Arab World and on the other hand, the interaction between the political parties in Iraq and the solidarity between all of them could give Iraqi leaders a chance to play a role in international affairs within the non-aligned movement.

Unfortunately, such aims and hopes to make Iraq a non-aligned country were unacceptable to the Communists, because the Communists' aim was to steer Iraq closer to the Soviet Union.

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1) Iskander, A., op.cit., pp.264-270.

It is clear from this discussion that only after Iraq signed the friendship agreement with the Soviet Union, did the Communists in Iraq immediately join the National Front, they issued a communiqué on the occasion of the treaty and so on.

After this discussion, we may ask: Does the National Front in Iraq still exist, and what happened to the relationship between the Arab Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party? In answering this question, we must examine Iraqi - Soviet relations after 1975, which we shall proceed to do.

### 5.3 IRAQI - SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1975

#### 5.3.1 INTRODUCTION

During the period 1968-1975, the Iraqi Government signed many different agreements with the Soviet Union to improve its economic base, to buy weapons and make trade agreements apart from friendship and co-operation agreements. Such agreements with the Soviet Union perhaps assisted Iraq to attain substantial economic and military power along with firm control at home \*, but from the non-aligned point of view, could we consider that such agreements made Iraq more aligned to the Soviet Union ?

In fact, Iraq has adopted an independent foreign policy despite her agreement with the Soviet Union, perhaps because her aims and principles are different from the aims and principles of Communism.

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\* Since such an agreement led ICP to join the National Front in Iraq.

For example, the Arab Ba'ath Party aims to unite Arab countries in a single state, while it seems to the Iraqi leaders that the Communists aim to spread their ideology throughout the world, by means of which they divide up the world between themselves and the United States of America. Iraqi radio therefore has warned of events and developments, planned and supervised by the United States of America \*\* and the Soviet Union, which are tending to divide the world between them.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, the Iraqi leaders have long aspired to keep the super-powers out of the Middle East oil region, because Iraq saw that the Soviet Union was interested in the Arab countries, such as the Arab Gulf States, South Yemen, and so on, not because of their resistance to imperialism as they claim, but rather because they are strategically situated to serve as a bridge by which to enter the region.<sup>2</sup> Also the Iraqi Government rejected the Soviet policy in Somalia, Eritrea and Afghanistan.

Since 1977 for example, the Soviet Union has used South Yemen as a base for intervention in Ethiopia. The Iraqi Government disliked this situation and they have supported the Somalis and the Eritrean rebels against Soviet-controlled Ethiopia.

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\*\* Under the "Carter Doctrine", the USA was increasingly willing to use military force to achieve its aims in the Gulf region, and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Iraqis repeatedly expressed concern over a potential U.S. military response or at least mobilization to counter the Soviet move and they warned other Arab States not to allow the Soviet intervention to serve as a pretext for signing mutual defence pacts with the U.S.A. See Kashkett, S.B., op.cit p.489.

1) Voice of the Masses (Baghdad), as quoted in FBIS, daily report, (Middle East and North Africa), January 24th 1980, p.E.1.

2) Iraq Ministry of Information, Iraq, 1980, p.28.

On the other hand, the Iraqis have announced the formation of a united front of all groups opposed to the Soviet-supported Marxist regime of South Yemen with the intention of "Liberating South Yemen from the Communist agents and their masters".<sup>1</sup> In March 1980 also, the Iraqi Government gave aid of about \$300 million to the North Yemen Government to prevent her from moving closer to the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran War have worsened Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union even more. The Arab Ba'ath Party leaders condemned the intervention calling it "blatant interference, political expansion" and totally unjustifiable.<sup>3</sup> In the war with Iran, while publicly stating their neutrality, Moscow have offered military aid to Tehran and on the other hand, Moscow chose Iraq's moment of maximum danger to enter into a new political and military relationship with Syria one of the few Arab countries openly critical of Iraq in its war with Iran.<sup>4</sup>

On the diplomatic level, there has been some trouble between Iraq and the Soviet Union. For example, because of the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad was close enough to the Presidential Offices to spy on the Palace, the Iraqi Government forced them to accept quarters elsewhere after they had refused to move.<sup>5</sup>

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1) Dawish, A., "Iraq the West's opportunity", "Foreign Policy", Nu.41, Winter 1980-81, p.138.

2) Ibid., pp.137-138.

3) Al-Thawrah, January 4th, 1980, (Iraqi Newspaper).

4) See: "Arab Communism at Low Ebb", Problem of Communism, July-August 1981, p.22.

5) See: Financial Times, May 23rd, 1978.

Also in the same year in 1978, Iraq refused to permit overflights of Soviet transports destined for the Horn of Africa, and Iraqis have refused Soviet requests for a naval facility at Um-Qasser.<sup>1</sup> The military issue has caused deep concern in Iraq and the Iraqi leaders threatened to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over this issue.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, on the military issue, the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union has also declined. It seems to me that the military relation is revealing because this issue is important on many levels such as economic, defence, security and so on. In what follows therefore, we will examine the Iraqi-Soviet relationship on the military issue.

### 5.3.2 IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AFTER THE 1968 REVOLUTION IN IRAQ

As stated earlier in Chapter Four, the super-powers are following new tactics (such as armaments dependency) to make developing and non-aligned countries dependant on them. From this argument we ask: Is Iraq dependant on a super-power over this issue?

During the period 1968-1972 indeed, Iraq military supplies were nearly 95% from the Soviet Union, for example the number of tanks which were received from the Soviet Union during the period 1971-1972, increased from 200 T54-55 heavy tanks to 1300 tanks including T62 tanks.<sup>3</sup>

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1) See: "World Affairs", Report, Vol.8, No.4, p.427.

2) Al-Siyasah, (Kuwait Newspaper), May 26th, 1978.

3) International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1971-1972 and 1974-1975, London: IISS. p.28.



The dependence perhaps happened for many reasons among which were the fact that the Western multi-national oil companies controlled Iraqi oil and on the other hand, the United States of America and her allies supported Iran and Zionism against the Arab countries. Because of these facts, Iraq considered the United States and her allies as the enemies of the Arab nation. After 1972, the Iraqi Government controlled her oil because of the nationalisation. By means of this she increased her military expenditure in current prices from 153 million Iraqi dinars to 790 million Iraqi dinars during the period 1972-1979, a jump of 637 million Iraqi dinars as Table No.5.2 shows.

As she increased her expenditure to this huge sum, and because France and other Western European countries refused to support Zionism against the Arab countries in 1973, Iraq gradually warmed to Western Europe politically and bought more of its weapons. French arms sales to Iraq during 1978-1979 for example amounted to \$2.2 billion and the figure should prove to be even higher in 1980 when figures are known.<sup>1</sup> France has supplied Iraq with a nuclear research centre containing two reactors and three years' supply of enriched uranium \*. Iraq has also signed agreements with Brazil and Italy for the supply of uranium and nuclear technology.

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1) See: Dawisha, A.I., op.cit., pp.136-137. Because of security reasons, I could not find figures for weapons in the 1980s.

\* France sold Iraq 24 Mirage F1 aircrafts in early 1980. Also France sold to Iraq more than 100 AMX-30 medium tanks, scores of light armoured cars equipped with SS-11 anti-tank missiles and a large number of helicopters. Eventually, France may become Iraq's main supplier. At the same time, Iraq agreed to become France's principal oil supplier. Also, Iraq received 60 Mirage 2000s, a sophisticated radar system etc. See for more details: "Iraq shops around for arms", "Middle East", June 1979, p.20.

TABLE NO. 5.2

World Military Expenditure in Current Prices:

Figures for Selected Countries for the Period (1972-1979)

Country	Currency	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Bahrain	Mn dinars	4.9	5.8	9.3	5.8	9.3	14.3	19.6	22.0
Egypt	Mn dinars	650	1250	1530	1631	1564	1845	1300	1200
Iraq	Mn dinars	153	199	422	470	520	593	587	790
Jordan	Mn dinars	44.1	47.3	50.2	55.2	103	94.5	95.3	130
Kuwait	Mn dinars	61.3	70.9	147	190	250	298	296	267

SOURCE: SIPRI, Yearbook 1981, London 1981, Table 6A.3. p.163.

In addition, according to the "Middle East Journal", "Spain is expected to become Iraq's third biggest supplier of weapons under a projected five year deal worth around \$900 million".<sup>1</sup> From this discussion we can see why Iraqi military supplies from the Soviet Union declined from 95% in 1970-1972 to 63% in 1979.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the more distant relationship between the Iraqi Government and the Soviet Union resulted in the following events:

- a) A break in the relationship between the Arab Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party which led to;
- b) Most of the Iraqi Communists leaving Iraq for Syria, Moscow and other Eastern bloc countries, and the ICP is therefore no longer a member of the National Front, or of any importance in the country.
- c) Iraq's trade with the Soviet bloc over the last few years has declined, whereas its trade with the Western countries, particularly Western Europe and Japan, has increased markedly. (For more details see the economic section in this chapter).
- d) As stated above Iraq's military imports from the Soviet Union fell from 95% in 1972 to 63% in 1979, perhaps even lower in 1980, especially after the war with Iran started.

Alongside the above discussed facts, there are other facts that affect the external relations of Iraq and its role in the non-alignment movement. One of the major factors is the state of the economy. It is therefore rather important to discuss economic developments in the Iraqi domestic market hand in hand with the political developments that have been taking place.

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1) See "Middle East", op.cit., p.20.

2) Ibid., p.20.

#### 5.4. THE IRAQI ECONOMY BEFORE AND AFTER THE JULY 1968 REVOLUTION

Through the Qasim-Arif period, Iraq played no role in the management of Iraqi oil. It is therefore not surprising perhaps to argue that this resulted in leaving the Iraqi economy controlled and dominated by the foreign multi-national oil companies. This basis for domination created a huge set of problems especially in the industrial and agricultural sectors in Iraq. In addition, the Qasim-Arif regimes left an economy tottering into chaos and an almost empty treasury.<sup>1</sup>

It could be said that the Iraqis recognized the impact of the emerging problems as early as the 1960s, yet were in no position to redress their effects until the period between 1972-1973, when the new revolution nationalised Iraqi oil. In the light of the above, the present section will place attention on a number of problems which collectively should be dealt with as a priority, taking into consideration the fact that these are the most important issues, but not the only ones. Such issues include oil nationalisation and the agricultural and industrial sectors.

##### 5.4.1 THE IRAQI OIL SECTOR

The Iraqi economy during the 1950s up to 1968, was marked by the complete domination of the multi-national oil companies over the oil resources in terms of extraction, production, marketing and transportation. Its oil interests for example were distributed equally between the share holders of the operating oil companies as follows:-

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1) The Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'ath Party, 1974, Iraq, Chapter 4, p.52.

TABLE NO. 5.3

The Multi-National Oil Companies in Iraq before 1968

Company/Nationality	Percentage
(1) Near Eastern Development Corporation (American)	23.75
(2) Royal Dutch Shell Group (British-Dutch)	23.75
(3) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British)	23.75
(4) Compagnie Française Des Pétroles (French)	23.75
(5) Other participation and Exploration Companies	5.00
TOTAL	100.00

SOURCE: F.I. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957, Part III, Chapter 8, p.130.

American 23.75%, British 23.75%, French 23.75%, British/Dutch 23.75% and others 5.00% as Table 5.3 shows.

Consequently, the oil sector was isolated from the rest of the Iraqi economy during this period, because the foreign oil companies concentrated on the difficulties which might face their productive operations and also their primary aim was always obtaining profits. They paid attention to the needs of the world oil markets rather than to the needs of the economies of the producing countries. In fact, Qasim's government tried to get more benefits from Iraq's oil, by inviting representatives of the companies to discuss points\* of differences, but these discussions between them resulted in nothing new.

After this invitation by Qasim, there were several meetings between the Iraqi Government and the representatives of the oil companies \*\*. The principle points of discussion centred on Iraq's

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\* The points of difference which the Iraqis submitted for discussion were as follows:-

1. Calculation of the cost of oil production and its elements to ensure Iraq's rights.
2. The method used in fixing prices, according to which Iraq's oil royalties are calculated.
3. Abolition of the discount taken by the companies.
4. Appointment of Iraqi Directors and their participation in the Board of Directors in London and control of the companies' expenditures by the Iraqi Government in a manner which would safeguard Iraq's interests.
5. Relinquishment by the companies of the unexploited areas so that Iraq would benefit from them.
6. To guarantee the use of Iraqi tankers in transporting Iraqi oil.
7. The necessity of Iraq's participation in the share capital of the companies to minimum extent of 20% of the general total.
8. The necessity to increase Iraq's share of oil royalties.
9. Payment of royalties in convertible currency that would guarantee Iraq's interests.

\*\* In April 1961 for example there were two meetings and in August another meeting.

demand for an increased share of profits.<sup>1</sup>

No agreement was reached and at the final meeting on October 11th 1961, Qasim stated that:

"The oil companies will keep their existing wells and relinquish 90% of the concessionary area and the government's share of profits should be increased. The government and the companies will be partners in the remaining 10% of the relinquished area on a new basis to be negotiated. There will be share participation in existing companies, but there will have to be an increase in the share of profits".<sup>2</sup>

A month later, on December 11th 1961, Qasim issued Law No.80, designed to dispossess the oil companies of all land not yet used for oil production, and its enforcement amounted to the dispossession of 99.5% of the area over which the companies held prospecting rights under the oil agreements.<sup>3</sup> It was neither in Qasim's interest to go beyond the enforcement of this Law, nor could the companies do anything other than register a protest on the matter, because of the absence of planning for economic development in the Qasim-Arif eras. In fact, oil production continued as before and both Iraq and the companies dealt with each other on the basis of the de facto situation pending future arrangements.

The Arab Ba'ath Party took power in July 1968 in Iraq under the following aims:

"Economic independence is one of the central aims of the 1968 Revolution. It is as important as political independence and complementary to it, for without it political independence loses its principal support and essence and remains exposed to constant danger".<sup>4</sup>

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1) Khaduori, M., op.cit., pp.162-164.

2) Khaduori, M., op.cit., p.164.

3) See: Statement giving the reasons for the enactment of Law 80, Shawwaf, pp.189-200. Iraq.

4) The Eight Regional Congress, op.cit., p.49.

In accordance with these aims and principles, the Iraqi Government nationalised the country's oil. The question which needs to be asked at this juncture is: Why and how did she do it?

The fact was that the Government's position in Iraq was not against the multi-national oil companies' purely commercial operations, but against their policy of reducing oil output which was based on political motives besides economic ones. The companies kept the production of Iraqi oil at a low level in comparison with other neighbouring countries whose production reached the levels of 168.1, 148.6 and 129.5 million tons in Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait in 1969, while Iraq's oil production was just 73.3 million tons for the same year.<sup>1</sup> It seems that this policy of the oil companies actually caused Iraq a material loss of I.D. 450 million or about 1.3 billion dollars for the period from 1961-1970. Also, the oil companies' investments dropped sharply from I.D. 23 million in 1961 before Law No.80 to only half million in 1971.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the companies refused to give Iraq the benefit of the royalty - expensing agreement negotiated by OPEC and given effect in the other exporting countries and on the other hand, the level of oil output was low, particularly from Basrah, where production was below the export capacity of the port facilities. Therefore, the Iraqi Government recognised that in view of this serious situation it would either have to take firm action against the companies or the latter would have to respond to its demands, but before it nationalised the Iraqi oil, the government of Iraq renewed its demands for the increase in both oil production and government royalties etc.

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1) I.N.O.C. Publications, Oil in Iraq from the Concessions to the direct National Development, 1961-1972, Baghdad, April 1973, pp.10-11.  
2) Almosawi, M., Iraq's Oil, the Peoples' Struggle Against Oil Companies Covets, Ministry of Information, Iraq, 1973, p.129.



These demands failed to produce an adequate response. (For more details about the Iraqi demands see earlier).

After the failure of negotiations between the government and oil companies, the government took two steps, firstly it signed an oil agreement with different countries in the World, the most important of which were agreements with the Soviet Union and with France. Secondly, it started to prepare for nationalisation.

On the 4th July, 1969 the Iraqi Government signed an oil agreement with the Soviet Union. This agreement was important because it gave the Soviet Union the first foothold for influence in the Middle East oil producing countries. It also gave Iraq some self-confidence for its ability to operate the oil industry without reliance on the I.P.C. or its associates and increased the skill and efficiency of the Iraqi cadres in operating the oil fields. Moreover, it guaranteed an immediate market for the Iraqi National Oil Company.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, to be a more committed non-aligned country and to get more benefit from Western technology, Iraq had also signed many friendship agreements with Western Europe and Japan, the most important of which was the ten years friendship agreement between Iraq and France. This agreement was announced under the following points:-

1. The Compagnie Française des Petroles, would be able to contract to buy 23.75% of the production of the former I.P.C. fields.

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1) Stoking, G.W., Middle East Oil, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, Part II, Chapter 14, pp.314-315. Also See: Khwater, Ali., The Oil Development in Iraq, 1968-1978, Keele University, 1980, p.46. (Thesis M.A.).

2. France also promised to increase technical and financial assistance for oil and other projects in Iraq and later agreed to guarantee bank loans direct to Iraqi importers for the finance of Iraqi industrial projects.
3. France agreed to extend credit valued at \$500 million to Iraq for specified projects to be implemented by French firms in many sectors of the economy, including oil.
4. In addition, the two Governments were to develop more relationships between the two countries over a wide area, including cultural co-operation and the diffusion of the French language in Iraq and the Arabic language in France.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the above agreement, the Iraqi Government signed many agreements with different countries in Western Europe. In May 1974, Iraq and Italy signed a general economic co-operation agreement. The value of this agreement was reported to be over 3,000 million dollars and Italy received an additional 10 million tons of oil a year for ten years over and above the 20 million tons contracted for in March 1972.<sup>2</sup>

Iraq did not neglect the less industrialised countries in Europe and the Third World in her widespread search for assistance and markets from countries able and willing to provide the goods and services needed to develop her oil industry and her economy generally in return for supplies of crude oil.

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1) Le monde, June 20th, 1972. For a useful summary of the discussion communiqué and agreement see: MEES, 1th-28th June 1972, and June 30th 1972.

2) Penrose, E., Iraq: International Relations and National Development. London 1978, p.420.

As to developing countries, agreements were made with a large number of countries, among which were China, India, Brazil and others.<sup>1</sup>

The second step taken by the Iraqi Government against the multi-national oil companies was nationalisation. Indeed, after the failure of negotiations between the Iraqi Government and the multi-national oil companies, on June 1st 1971, the Revolutionary Command Council headed by A. Hassan Al-Bakr, issued Law No.69 of 1972, by which the government nationalised the I.P.C. and set up the Iraqi company for oil operations. I.C.O.C. to take over the I.P.C. facilities in the North of Iraq.<sup>2</sup>

After the communiqué issued by the Iraqi Government, new development immediately took place. On the one hand, the companies refused the Iraqi proposals and a spokesman for the I.P.C. stated that: "The company would take legal action against anyone buying the nationalized oil".<sup>3</sup> On the other hand the Syrian government also immediately issued her own legislative Decree No.40 which nationalised the I.P.C. pipelines and other I.P.C. property in Syria, including the Banias terminal and the I.P.C. share of the oil stocks therein.<sup>4</sup>

After the nationalisation or even before, the Iraqi Government had signed a large number of trade agreements in addition to the general

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1) Ibid., p.439.

2) The Ministry of Information, Baghdad, Iraq, 1978, p.103.

3) Nadim al Pachachi, Secretary General of OPEC, issued a statement in support of Iraq's action and condemned the I.P.C. for reducing production of its Northern oil as a deliberate and premeditated measure, aimed at punishing Iraq and exerting pressure. See Penrose op.cit., p.420.

4) Ibid., p.420.

loan, co-operation and technical agreement such as those we have described earlier. Furthermore, hundreds of contracts and sub-contracts had been signed connected with the general investment programmes of the country. In reply to the questions asked earlier: Why did Iraq sign all those agreements? and why did she nationalise Iraqi oil? It could be said that there were many reasons and considerations underlying these moves by the Iraqi Government in the 1970s. The most important of which were two. There was the economic necessity of finding markets for oil in return for supplies of goods and services it wanted in order to develop its economy or to increase its military strength, and there was the political consideration by which Iraq extended general friendship and co-operation arrangements.

On the political level, Iraq was the first country to bring oil into the arena for a political purpose when on October 7th, 1973, she decided to retaliate against the United States for her support of Zionism by nationalising with compensation the American interests in the Basrah Petroleum Company. In addition, Iraq also called on Arab countries to nationalise American interests in their lands and to withdraw funds from United States Banks and employ them in the development of Arab countries or deposit them in the banks of friendly countries.<sup>1</sup> The Iraqi demands that withdrawn funds should be used to develop Arab or African countries could only increase, directly or indirectly exports from the U.S.A., since oil revenues in foreign exchange can be spent only on foreign goods and services.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Penrose, E., op.cit., p.507.

2) Ibid., pp.507-508.

As for the economic consideration, after nationalisation, the government's royalties rose from 50 to 100% from the national oil resources, the revenues from oil amounted to \$7.42 billion in the same year as nationalisation 1973-1974, as Table 5.4 shows.

The nationalisation of oil in Iraq transferred the industry from foreign to national control and it helped to overcome some difficulties in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Having discussed the oil sector in the Iraqi economy, our analysis will now examine the agricultural and industrial sectors in Iraq and some developments to solve Iraq's economic problems during the 1970s which gave the Iraqi Government support in shifting its policy towards genuine non-alignment.

#### 5.4.2 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ AFTER THE 1968 REVOLUTION

Iraq since ancient times has suffered from the major problem of land fertility deterioration. Its annual loss of fertile land for example is estimated at 70,000 donums.<sup>1</sup> Also the fertile land in Iraq was controlled by small groups of people while millions of Iraqi people were without land. For example, of 94,398,115 donums, the private land belonging to Iraqi people was only 1,236,236 donums, while the other land was registered as public land, Waqfs and Miris.<sup>2</sup>

When the Arab Ba'ath Party took power in Iraq after the 1968 Revolution, it faced serious agricultural problems in Iraq and it had

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1) The Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.63.

2) "Middle East Annual Review 1976-1977", by the Middle East Review Co. Ltd., 1977, p.308.

TABLE 5.4

Iraq's Oil Production and Revenues Between 1968-1977

Year	Oil Production (Million tons)	Revenues (Million \$)
1968 - 1969	72.6	476.2
1969 - 1970	73.3	483.5
1970 - 1971	77.0	521.2
1971 - 1972	82.4	840.0
1972 - 1973	71.1	575.0
1973 - 1974	97.8	1,317.0
1974 - 1975	95.5	5,700.0
1975 - 1976	109.2	7,600.0
1976 - 1977	119.2	7,700.0
TOTAL	798.1	25,212.9

SOURCE: Ali Kuwater, op.cit., p.53. Table 2.9.

to plan to solve these problems and to develop this sector. To do so for example, the government issued a new agrarian reform Law No.117, by which they reduced the maximum holding of irrigated land to between 10 hectares and 150 hectares depending on the type of irrigation, crop and type of land; and of non-irrigated land to 250-500 hectares depending on the average rainfall of the region.<sup>1</sup>

Before we examine the new developments in the agricultural sector in Iraq after the 1968 Revolution, it seems to me that it is worth shedding some light on the condition of this sector before the 1968 Revolution.

#### 5.4.2a: THE IRAQI LAND: TOTAL AREA, SOIL CONDITIONS AND LAND USE

The total area of Iraq is 438,446 square kilometres, which includes deserts, mountains and rivers. In fact, in accordance with the widely differing soil conditions and vegetation, some writers divide Iraqi land into six areas.<sup>2</sup> Firstly, the alpine region in the high mountains; secondly, the forests on the mountain slopes; thirdly, the grasslands of the Northern plateau, fourthly, the great deserts in the West and South-West and the Jazira desert between the rivers; fifthly, the alluvial plains of central Iraq composed of silt deposited by the two great rivers; and finally, the marsh lands of the extreme South, subject to regular annual flooding.

In addition, the Iraqi land in terms of land use is divided into, arable land about 75,364 square kilometres; pasture land 230,000;

1) For more details about Law No.117, see: Agricultural Development in Iraq after the 1968 Revolution, Iraq, 1978, (In Arabic).

2) Kelidar, A., The Integration of Modern Iraq, London 1979, p.138.

woodland 51,000 and fruit and vines about 1,280 square kilometres.<sup>1</sup> Also the actual cultivable area is estimated at 23 million donums. Table 5.5 shows the classification of cultivable land according to the method of irrigation.

Faced with the above features of the Iraqi land and its problems, the Qasim-Arif regime tried to solve the country's agricultural problems. They announced they intended to carry out progressive land redistribution. But despite the fact that they issued some agrarian reform laws, it seems to me that they did no more than in the oil sector, perhaps because of the political instability in Iraq during their rule and on the other hand the empty treasury of Iraq at the same time.\* Such factors meant that the Qasim-Arif regimes played no role in solving agricultural problems in Iraq.

#### 5.4.2b NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN IRAQ UNDER THE RULE OF THE ARAB BA'ATH PARTY AFTER 1968.

The Iraqi Government led by the Arab Ba'ath Party recognised the importance of the agricultural sector and they tried to solve the problems which faced this sector. Also the leaders of the Arab Ba'ath party knew that efficient agriculture requires skilled management and this is especially true of irrigated agriculture under conditions such as those imposed by nature in Iraq.

A new agrarian reform law was issued, (Law No. 117). The purpose of this law was to reduce the area open to private ownership in

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1) Kelidar, A., op.cit., p.138.

\* As we discussed earlier, the main sector of the Iraqi economy namely the oil sector was then dominated and controlled by the multi-national oil companies.



TABLE NO. 5.5

The classification of cultivable land according to the method of irrigation in Iraq

Type of Irrigation	Area 1000 donums
Area Irrigated by Rainfall	11.000
Area Irrigated by Flow	7.000
Area Irrigated by Water-Pumps	4.600
Area Irrigated by Water-Wheels	200
Area Irrigated by other means	200
TOTAL	23.000

SOURCE: The Economy of Iraq, Development and Perspective, Ministry of Information, Iraq, 1978, p.29.

TABLE 5.6

Proposed and Actual Expenditure by the Development Plan in the  
Agricultural Sector in Iraq, 1973-1975 (Thousands of Iraqi Dinars)

	1973 - 1974	1974 - 1975
Annual Plan Expenditures	310,000	1,169,000
Annual Plan Expenditure - actual	243,985	565,511
Actual as % Estimate	79	48
Agricultural Expenditure - estimate	65,000	190,000
Agricultural Expenditure - actual	37,786	77,751
Actual as % Estimate	58	41

SOURCE: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1975, Ministry of Planning, Iraq

TABLE NO. 5.7

Agriculture Education in Iraq Between 1974-1980

Year	No. of Classrooms	No. of Teachers	No. of Students
1974 - 75	150	237	4,176
1975 - 76	205	327	5,784
1976 - 77	289	439	8,268
1977 - 78	409	626	11,986
1978 - 79	554	851	19,490
1979 - 80	722	1,138	21,650
Total Increase	572	901	17,474 (418%)
Average Increase	114	180	3,495 (84%)

SOURCE: From Ministry of Information op.cit., pp.143-144.

accordance with the general policy of the Ba'ath regime to bring agriculture as well as industry largely into government hands. Thus, up to 1975, 2.6 million hectares had been sequestered. This was nearly 46% of the agricultural area.<sup>1</sup>

To manage the above land, the Government established a number of collective farms, the number of these farms increased between 1972 and 1975 from 6 to 78 farms, in which year collective farms accounted for 144,000 hectares and 10,543 farmers. Also there were 8 state farms with a total area of 9,408 hectares.<sup>2</sup> The Government made efforts to invest money in agricultural development. Indeed the proposed and actual expenditure under the development plan in agriculture 1973-1975 was increased from 310,000 to 1,169,000 in thousands of Iraqi dinars, as Table 5.6 shows.

In addition, and to improve the agricultural sector in Iraq, the government made some canals, such as Al-Tharthar canal, about 40km.; also a canal in Shat al Basra made about 40km long and 60m wide. Also the government increased the number of schools and students to improve agricultural education between 1974 and 1980. In 1974-5 the agricultural schools had 237 teachers and 4,176 students. This number has increased in 1979-1980 to 722 classrooms, with 1,138 teachers and 21,650 students as table 5.7 shows. Despite their efforts to develop agriculture in Iraq, the government faced the problem of migration of workers and the highly skilled within Iraq from the countryside to cities and towns, leaving agriculture in order to work in industrial sectors.

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1) See the Ministry of Information, op.cit., "Agriculture Sector" pp.140-144.

2) Ibid., pp.140-144.

On the other hand it also faced the problem of migration outside Iraq in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. During 1975, for example, while Iraq received about 15,200 migrant persons from the Arab countries, it lost about 20,625 persons in the same year, as Table 5.8 shows.

The Iraqi Government recognised the emigration problem and to stop this, it issued laws in 1975 to retain its skilled people inside Iraq.\* Indeed as a result of these laws, the number of Iraqi migrants declined from 20,600 in 1975 to 18,000 persons in 1976.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5.4.3 THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN IRAQ:

Until the July 17th 1968 Revolution, the industrial sector in Iraq suffered from neglect. Before reviewing the important developments in this sector during the years since then, we should present a historical review of this sector's growth and problems and the difficulties it faced in the course of its development.

At the end of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century there was no industry worth mentioning in Iraq. Consumer goods and other things came from abroad or were produced by traditional methods. During the 1950s, the government witnessed a significant increase in oil revenue. Following the advice of British experts, a so called "Development Board" was established in 1950 to lay down the planning and execution of government industrial projects.

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\* For more details about Iraqi Laws: See Chapter 4, The Non-aligned Movement and the National Liberation Movements.

1) Source: Birks, J.S., and Sinclair, C.A., International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, op.cit., p.166.

TABLE NO. 5.8

## ARAB MIGRANT WORKERS BY NATIONALITY IN CAPITAL-RICH STATES, 1975

## COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN (% DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF EMPLOYMENT)

COUNTRIES OF EMPLOYMENT % FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN (% DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF EMPLOYMENT)												
	EGYPT	YEMEN (Y.A.R.)	JORDAN AND PALESTINE	YEMEN (P.R.D.Y.)	SYRIA	LEBANON	SUDAN	TUNISIA	OMAN	IRAQ	SOMALIA	ALGERIA AND MOROCCO	TOTAL
SAUDI ARABIA %	95,000 (23.9) (13.6)	210,400 (96.6) (40.1)	175,000 (66.1) (25.0)	55,000 (77.9) (7.9)	15,000 (21.3) (2.1)	20,000 (40.3) (2.9)	35,000 (76.3) (5.0)	-	17,500 (45.6) (2.5)	2,000 (9.7) (0.3)	5,000 (76.4) (0.6)	2,500 (98.2) (0.8)	699,000 (100) (100.0)
LIBYA %	229,000 (57.9) (73.9)	-	14,150 (5.3) (33.3)	-	13,000 (18.5) (4.2)	5,700 (11.5) (1.8)	7,000 (15.3) (2.3)	38,500 (99.6) (12.4)	-	-	-	47 (1.8) (0.0)	310,350 (24.0) (100.0)
KUWAIT %	37,558 (9.4) (26.2)	2,757 (1.0) (1.9)	47,653 (18.0) (33.3)	8,658 (12.2) (6.0)	16,547 (23.4) (11.5)	7,232 (14.6) (5.0)	873 (1.9) (0.6)	49 (0.1) (0.0)	3,660 (9.5) (2.6)	17,999 (87.3) (12.7)	247 (3.8) (0.2)	-	143,280 (11.1) (100.0)
U.A.E. %	12,500 (3.1) (20.2)	4,500 (1.6) (7.3)	14,500 (5.5) (23.4)	4,500 (6.4) (7.3)	4,500 (6.4) (7.3)	4,500 (9.0) (7.3)	1,500 (3.2) (2.3)	-	14,000 (36.4) (22.5)	500 (2.4) (0.8)	1,000 (15.2) (1.6)	-	62,000 (4.8) (100.0)
JORDAN & WEST BANK %	5,300 (1.3) (16.2)	-	-	-	20,000 (28.4) (61.0)	7,500 (15.1) (22.8)	-	-	-	-	-	-	32,000 (2.4) (100.0)
IRAQ %	7,000 (1.8) (46.1)	-	5,000 (1.9) (32.9)	-	-	3,000 (6.0) (19.7)	200 (0.4) (1.3)	-	-	-	-	-	15,200 (1.2) (100.0)
QATAR %	2,850 (0.7) (19.2)	1,250 (0.4) (8.4)	6,000 (2.3) (40.3)	1,250 (1.8) (8.4)	750 (1.1) (5.0)	500 (1.0) (3.4)	400 (0.9) (2.7)	-	1,870 (4.9) (12.6)	-	-	-	14,870 (1.1) (100.0)
OMAN %	4,600 (1.2) (52.3)	100 (0.0) (1.1)	1,600 (0.6) (18.2)	100 (0.1) (1.1)	400 (0.6) (4.5)	1,100 (2.2) (12.5)	500 (1.1) (5.7)	100 (0.3) (1.1)	-	-	300 (4.6) (3.5)	-	8,800 (0.7) (100.0)
BAHRAIN %	1,237 (0.3) (20.0)	1,121 (0.4) (18.1)	614 (0.2) (9.9)	1,122 (1.6) (18.1)	68 (0.1) (1.1)	129 (0.3) (2.1)	400 (0.9) (6.5)	-	1,383 (3.6) (22.2)	126 (0.6) (2.0)	-	-	6,200 (0.5) (100.0)
YEMEN (YAR) %	2,000 (0.5) (85.1)	-	200 (0.1) (8.5)	-	150 (0.2) (6.4)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,350 (0.2) (100.0)
TOTAL %	397,545 (100.0) (30.0)	290,128 (100.0) (22.4)	264,717 (100.0) (20.4)	70,630 (100.0) (5.5)	70,415 (100.0) (5.4)	49,661 (100.0) (3.8)	45,873 (100.0) (3.5)	38,649 (100.0) (3.0)	38,413 (100.0) (3.0)	20,625 (100.0) (1.6)	6,547 (100.0) (0.5)	2,547 (100.0) (0.2)	295,750 (100) (100.0)

SOURCE: See: Birks, J.S., and Sinclair, C.A., "International Labour Migration in the Arab Middle East", In "Third World Quarterly", Vol.1, No.2, April 1979, Table 4, p.98.

The policy adopted by the royal regime in the field of industry was mainly based on the idea that Iraq was an agricultural country and therefore, should not expand in the industrial field. This was clearly evident from the volume of investments. For example, on the industrial projects, the government had spent only I.D. 2.58 million from the original I.D. 14 million allocated in the first amended programme.<sup>1</sup>

After the 14th July, 1958 Revolution, the industrial sector experienced some development and occupied the leading position among the sectors which the revolutionary regime began to develop in accordance with the 1961 detailed economic plan. The industrial sector received I.D. 160 million from the I.D. 5562 million allocated to various economic sectors \*. The regime did not give any importance to the development of the oil sector and did not take the necessary political and economic measures to free the country from the control of the multi-national oil companies.

After the 1968 Revolution and the rise in oil prices, the nationalisation of the industry made large additional funds available to the economy and the financial allocations to the plan were greatly increased. The 1970-1975 development plan introduced by the Ba'ath Government was designed to promote an even faster rate of industrial investment, yielding a 75% increase in value added in manufacturing between 1970-1975, or a 12% annual rate between 1971 and 1975, 85% of the allocations for industry were in fact spent.<sup>2</sup>

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1) Economic Development in Iraq after 17th July Revolution, op.cit., p. \* The industrial sector received I.D. 160 million of which I.D. 95 million was covered by two agreements signed with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, i.e. 30% of the total allocations. See: Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.69.

2) Hashim, J., Development Planning in Iraq, Historical Perspective and new Directions. Six Lectures, Baghdad, April 1975, and the Abstract of Statistics, 1975.

In addition, the government nationalised about 30 large industries, all of the banks and insurance companies and this was accompanied by other decrees allocating 25% of corporate profits to workers, providing for workers representation on boards of directors, a limitation on the size of individual share holdings in large companies, and the formation of an economic organisation to own and operate the nationalised establishments in the public sector.

Furthermore, the government policy of admission to industrial schools was defined on the basis that the share of these schools in 1974-1975 was to be 590 teachers and 8,719 students. The number had increased by 1979-1980 to 3,337 teachers and 42,272 students. See Table 5.9.

During the period 1970-1975, Iraq had already witnessed some significant development in the industrial sector. While Table 5.10 shows the production increase in the industrial sector during 1970-1975, we can add that the percentage of the industrial sector's participation in the national income for example amounted to 12%. In addition, the activity of the processing industries in the region grew at an average of 14% during 1969-1974. This growth was reflected in the averages of employed manpower which increased from 2.4 million persons in 1969 to 2.87 million in 1974. Besides this, the general quantitative unit number of industrial production in 1974 rose from that of 1969 \*.

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\* For more details of statistical data, see: Economic development in Iraq, Al-Thawra publications or from the special file on the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, Baghdad, 1978. (In Arabic).

TABLE 5.9

Industrial Education in Iraq between 1974-1980

Year	No. of Students	No. of Classrooms	No. of Teachers
1974 - 75	8,719	277	590
1975 - 76	13,259	429	730
1976 - 77	18,540	608	1,035
1977 - 78	25,250	840	1,425
1978 - 79	33,105	1,102	1,870
1979 - 80	42,272	1,409	3,337
Total Increase	33,553 (385%)	1,132	1,747
Average Increase	6,711 (77%)	226	349

SOURCE: Ministry of Information, op.cit., pp.143-144.



Further to the earlier discussion of the problems of the Iraqi economy and their solution under the Arab Ba'ath Party after the 1968 Revolution, we may add that despite its nationalising Iraqi oil in 1972-1973, it did not immediately control the majority of its oil resources. It was not until the end of 1975 that Iraq gained full control of the large Basrah Petroleum Company. Expanded export pipelines have taken years to construct and exploration for new oil did not commence fully until 1977.<sup>1</sup> In addition, in recent years, new oil reserves have been discovered and some estimates of proven and probable Iraqi oil reserves have increased from thirty-five billion barrels in 1978 to as many as ninety billion barrels, which would make Iraq the world's second richest country in oil, after Saudi-Arabia.<sup>2</sup>

To protect its oil wealth from becoming totally dependent upon the U.S. dollar or upon Western economies, Iraq has adopted the following:-

1. The Iraqis have carefully controlled the ratio of oil production to capacity in order to maximize revenues in the long term, particularly when they expect the real value of oil to be higher.
2. It has tended not to keep its surplus funds in U.S. dollars, preferring its holdings to be in a mixed basket of currencies.
3. Iraq has attempted to channel its oil revenues into direct investment projects.
4. It has transferred large sums into gold holdings under Iraqi control.

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1) Kashkett, S.B., op.cit., p.480.

2) See: Wright, C., "Iraq New Power in the Middle East", "Foreign Affairs", Winter 1979-1980, pp.257-277.

TABLE 5.10

## Important Items Produced by the Public Sector in Iraq, 1970-1974

Item	Unit	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74
Cement	1000 ton	1,542	1,575	1,591	2,800
Concrete products	1000 ton	76	108	229	-
Asbestos Products	1000 ton	21	22	25	-
Bricks	Millions	45	55	58	2,000
Glass	1000 ton	-	8	9	20
Dairy Products & Milk	1000 ton	25	29	84	66
Sugar	1000 ton	51	91	104	70
Canned Vegetables	1000 ton	4	7	14	20
Vegetable Oils	1000 ton	62	83	71	100
Detergents & Soap	1000 ton	29	36	32	60
Cigarettes	1000 carton	14,818	15,575	15,768	23,000
Matches	1000 carton	189	157	169	-
Chemical Fertilizers	1000 ton	0	76	99	200
Paper & Other Products	1000 ton	-	-	-	41
Shoes	1000 pairs	3,272	2,653	2,727	29,500
Ready-made Garments Socks & Bandages	1000 dozens	375	916	835	3,8 million units

SOURCE: Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.74, Table No.5.

5. It has arranged bilateral "oil for imports" barter agreements with some Western European States and Japan, by which Iraq receives needed military or development product in exchange for crude oil.<sup>1</sup>

This policy has allowed Iraq to use oil for political leverage without fearing economic repercussions and generally to pursue Iraqi national interests independently of super-power related concerns. For example it used it against the U.S.A. for supporting Zionism. On the other hand, as oil prices climbed and Iraq's revenues increased, the Iraqi leaders also began to exert greater independence of the Soviet bloc in economic policies. Indeed to do so, it had decreased its imports from the Eastern bloc and increased them from Western Europe and Japan.

For example between 1973-1975, Iraqi imports declined from 23.8 to 12.1; from 14.9 to 10.3 and from 6.4 to 2.1 from three major Eastern bloc countries namely, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, while they increased from 10.8 to 105.3; from 18.2 to 102.6 and from 15.0 to 60.9 from West Germany, Japan and the U.S.A. in the same years, as Table 5.11 on the next page shows.

The Iraqi armed forces during 1970-1977 were completely supplied by the Soviet bloc, but after oil nationalisation, Iraq widened its policy, buying some arms and weapons from Western Europe, especially from France \*. Also, the financial independence of Iraq made the Iraqi Government ambitious to develop projects within Iraq.

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1) New York Times, September, 17th, 1980.

\* For more details of Iraqi Military Supplies: see the section on Iraq's arms supplies.

TABLE NO. 5.11

Imports by Countries in Millions of Iraqi Dinarsin the period 1973-1975

Imports by Country	1973	1975
West Germany	10.8	105.3
Japan	18.2	102.6
U.S.A.	15.0	60.9
France	22.7	34.4
U.K.	23.3	31.7
Italy	8.8	20.2
India	5.4	13.8
U.S.S.R.	23.8	12.1
Sweden	4.9	10.9
Czechoslovakia	14.9	9.1
Belgium	11.6	7.5
Netherlands	4.3	7.2
China	10.8	5.2
Poland	5.0	5.4
Switzerland	3.4	5.4
Australia	1.2	5.4
South Korea	0.1	5.0
Canada	0.6	4.8
Austria	3.0	4.6
Spain	6.1	4.1
Hungary	2.4	3.8
Bulgaria	3.2	3.2
Romania	1.6	2.7
Yugoslavia	1.6	2.2
East Germany	6.4	2.1
Total Inc. Others	270.3	545.5

SOURCE: "Middle East Annual Review, 1976-1977", by the Middle East Review Co. Ltd., 1977, p.198.

The benefits of these projects and of high public spending from the treasury, have included a greatly improved standard of living for Iraqis, full employment, free medical care and education, also a relatively low inflation rate and a virtual absence of food shortages. All these benefits have led to a degree of domestic stability and this stability has also made the Iraqi leaders able to act more freely in the international arena.

Furthermore, nationalisation of oil gave them a sense of power and superiority within the Third World, enabling them to assert a demand for a new international economic order and for the establishment of more extensive Third World economic co-operation. After the above discussion of Iraq's relations with the super powers and Iraqi development projects, we will look at Iraq's relations with the non-aligned movement.

#### 5.5. IRAQ - RELATIONS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

In the two sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 we have discussed the relationship between Iraq and the super-powers and came to the conclusion that genuine Iraqi non-alignment started only in the early 1970s. From this conclusion therefore, we may ask: Did Iraqi non-alignment policy work together with the non-aligned countries? Or in other words, what did the Iraqi non-alignment policy do towards the non-aligned movement?

It seems to me that in answering this question, we should consider Iraqi assistance to the other non-aligned countries on the one hand and her suggestions and plans for changing and establishing more co-

operation among the non-aligned countries on the economic level in relation to information and so on, on the other hand.

Firstly, Iraq as a developing country needs all its natural resources for its development and the evolution of its economy, but is convinced at the same time that the developing countries and first and foremost, those of the non-aligned movement cannot get out of underdevelopment except through aid from other countries. Such aid (as we discussed in Chapter Three), has made and is making some underdeveloped countries liable to accept the political influence and intervention of imperialism because their economic dependence can only be overcome by aid and loans. Therefore, the Iraqi Government has given aid and assistance to the non-aligned countries as a humanitarian policy and according to the non-aligned principles of "co-ordinating among the non-aligned countries" etc. In this respect Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, said that:

"It is our duty to make unusual economic sacrifices in order to help the Third World countries, and thus it is that Iraq honours its engagements vis-à-vis its principles, its nation and humanity".<sup>1</sup>

The aid advanced by Iraq and also the development loans made by the intermediary of its external development budget have attained from its foundations in 1974 up to January 1981, about 516 million Iraqi dinars for 27 developing countries, and this in order to participate in

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1) Hussein, Saddam., Speech to the Council of Ministers, July 10th 1979, See: Althawrah, Iraqi Newspaper, September, 11th 1979, Iraq, (In Arabic).

the execution of development projects in these countries.<sup>1</sup>

Iraq also participates with important aid to regional and international budgets destined for the development of developing countries, for example, the Arab budget for African loans, Islamic Bank of Development, the OPEC Budget for International Development. The Iraqi donations and loans granted to the developing countries within OPEC, during the period 1974-1980, was increased from \$422.8 million in 1974 to \$854 million in 1980, while the total loans and donations during 1974-1980 was \$2827,8 million as Table 5.12 shows. All the financial engagements of Iraq including the loans given to the above budget, and other international organisations attained in 1979 the equivalent of 3.2 of the G.N.P.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Iraq as a non-aligned country has elected to work with 19 co-ordinating Bureaus such as those for: co-operation in Raw Materials, Transport, Marketing, Industry, Fishing, Tourism, Health, Insurance, Sports etc. (For more details see the documents of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned movement). In addition, Iraq has hosted two smaller conferences of the non-aligned movement, one dealing with the status of women in the Third World and the other a gathering of Information ministers from member states of the non-

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1) This loan was given by the Iraqi Government to the non-aligned countries at the Havana Summit Conference 1979. The interest rates on this loan are symbolic and do not exceed 3%, the period of refunding varies between 10-20 years according to the nature of the project and means of the State that benefits. It varies between 3 and 7 years. The benefiting countries were 5 countries in Asia, 11 in Africa and countries in Latin America. For more details see: Always, R., The Iraqi role in the non-aligned movement, France, 1982, pp.160-169.

2) Interview with Dr. Al Anbari, Abdel Amir, President of the Management Council of the Iraqi Budget. For External Development, published by the Review of OPEC and Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 1975.

PREFERENTIAL TABLE NO: 5.12

Donations & Loans granted by the OPEC Countries to other Developing Countries from 1974 to 1980

COUNTRY	1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1980		TOTAL	
	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m	GNP%	\$m
NIGERIA	0.6	15.3	0.04	14	0.19	83	0.13	64	0.066	38	0.04	31	0.05	42	0.3	287.3
ALGERIA	0.41	46.8	0.28	41	0.33	54	0.24	47	0.18	44	0.87	272	0.28	83	1.5	587.8
IRAN	1.58	408.3	1.12	593	1.16	752	0.29	221	0.37	278	0.03	21	0.03	29	6.1	2302.3
VENEZUELA	1.66	58.8	0.11	31	0.33	103	0.14	52	0.27	109	0.17	82	0.23	130	1.5	565.8
IRAQ	4.14	422.8	1.64	218	1.44	232	0.33	61	0.76	172	2.60	868	2.19	854	75	2827.8
SAUDI ARABIA	7.02	1029.1	5.62	1992	5.13	2407	4.09	2409	2.27	1470	3.01	2298	2.60	3033	38.7	4643.1
LIBYA	2.21	147.1	2.3	261	0.63	94	0.65	115	0.99	169	0.46	108	0.92	281	3.1	1175.0
KUWAIT	10.8	622.5	8.11	976	4.52	616	10.02	1517	7.36	1268	4.08	1053	3.87	1186	19.1	7238.5
ARAB EMIRATES	11.12	510.6	11.68	1046	9.21	1059	8.05	1175	4.82	684	6.17	1113	3.96	1062	17.6	6649.6
QUATAR	10.9	185.2	15.63	339	7.90	195	7.90	197	3.56	106	5.89	277	4.5	299	4.2	1598.2

Figures cited by the International Bank: "Report of development by the year 1981" Pg.160. The 1974 figures are based on development and international marketing statistics - UNUCED 1980. Tables from "The influence of inflation exported over the developing economics and the propositions concerning their resolution (solving)".

A study presented by the Iraqi delegate to the meeting of the experts of the "Group of 77" from the 1st to 4th March, 1982. p.35.



aligned movement.<sup>1</sup> Also, Iraq was elected at the Havana Summit Conference in 1979 to host the next Summit Conference in 1982, and she spent much time and money preparing to host it.

In spite of this, when the Iraqi Government found that some countries were trying to divide the movement, for example Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba and others, who have different policies from those of Iraq, Iraq agreed to change the hosting place from Baghdad to New Delhi in March 1983. (For more details see Chapter Two, the Non-aligned movement in the early 1980s). Secondly, Iraq has made suggestions and plans for changing and establishing more co-operation among the non-aligned countries on the economic level in relation to information etc., as illustrated in table 5.12.

Iraq considers today that energy is one of the real forces in the Third World's hands, and by this, developing countries should know how to exploit this power. She believes that countries should fully and freely dispose of their natural riches and have the right to the nationalisation of their resources, their exploitation for the independent development of their people, and the elimination of foreign domination such as that of the multi-national oil companies. It is from that angle that the nationalisation of oil companies in Iraq in June 1972 could be explained. It estimates that economic negotiations cannot be serious unless they have a solid base. In the absence of power, the movement can only exercise moral pressure on international public opinion and with this means cannot realize real justice. In this respect, Saddam Hussein the President of Iraq, declared to the other delegations at the Havana Summit Conference in

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1) Kashhett, S.B., op.cit., p.491.

1979, that 'it was in the movement's interest for all non-aligned countries to preserve the right to control their natural resources through producers' cartels and price fixing'.<sup>1</sup>

By encouraging others to form cartels for their own raw materials, he hoped to generate a kind of reciprocal approval for the OPEC cartel and its high prices which have produced hardship in many developing countries.

The Iraqi Government also called for a search for solutions to counter the effects of inflation in industrialised countries, exported to the developing countries. During the period 1974-1980, the inflation exported to developing countries from the developed countries and also from the oil exporting countries was remarkable. For example, that of Benin increased from 25.2 in 1974 to 105.7 in 1980 in Ethiopia from 57.3 in 1974 to 134.7 in 1980 and so on in other developing countries as Table 5.13 shows. Iraq questions the attitude of the industrialised countries vis à vis OPEC, and holds it responsible for the monetary inflation and the world wide stagnation.<sup>2</sup>

At the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, the Iraqi delegation was extremely outspoken in its suggestions for the achievement of a new international economic order, such as termination of all bilateral debt negotiations of all foreign owned enterprises on Third World soil, and a long term inflation fund. Also, Iraq would still like to see the establishment of more extensive Third World economic co-operation,

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1) Ibid., p.483.

2) Althawrah, Iraqi Newspaper, November 21, 1981.

TABLE NO. 5.13

Financial Burdens inflicted by Inflation on the Developing Countries.  
1974-80. Some examples in Millions of Dollars.

Countries	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Benin	<u>25.2</u>	10.2	1.6	15.3	20.2	60.0	<u>105.7</u>
Cape Verde	1.5	0.4	0.1	0.6	1.9	7.3	13.6
Central Africa	9.2	2.2	1.2	3.8	4.8	13.3	21.8
Chad	20.9	3.5	1.4	7.6	11.1	10.6	5.5
Ethiopia	<u>57.3</u>	13.3	6.3	18.8	22.8	80.8	<u>134.7</u>
Liberia	<u>60.1</u>	18.0	6.1	32.1	31.2	083.0	<u>286.0</u>
Togo	21.4	8.4	1.5	21.3	33.1	82.3	110.7
Haiti	29.1	7.4	5.0	13.5	12.9	83.6	125.8
Honduras	79.4	18.1	9.2	27.7	37.9	121.1	176.5
Arab Republic	28.6	8.7	5.6	37.7	45.9	164.3	258.3
Malta	91.4	19.5	10.9	36.3	37.7	145.3	225.4
Argentina	<u>235.6</u>	158.4	37.0	221.7	252.3	877.8	<u>1974.5</u>
Chile	<u>371.4</u>	55.9	34.7	86.2	88.3	588.9	<u>1057.6</u>
Guatemala	119.6	33.4	11.4	58.1	85.2	172.0	235.7
Lebanon	428.7	79.3	2.8	100.4	132.7	37.3	554.6

SOURCE: R. Alwayies, op.cit., Table No.3. p.169. (In French).

which would solve some problems facing the non-aligned countries. For example, at the non-aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in New Delhi in February 1981, Saadoon Hammadi the Iraqi foreign Minister stated that:-

"Iraq considers economic co-operation among the non-aligned states to be among the principal factors in establishing a new International Economic Order.<sup>1</sup>

## 5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we saw earlier in the theoretical introduction the conditions necessary to enable a country to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment include political independence, economic and social development, leaders committed to the ideal and goal of non-alignment internal stability and so on. In this chapter a particularly informative case was chosen from the foreign policies of developing countries as an example to support my argument. I chose Iraq for many reasons, some of which are, Iraq's socio-economic and political experience was that of underdevelopment, her economy was exploited by multi-national oil companies, her political parties were engaged in power struggles, and so on. I examined Iraqi non-alignment in terms of: (a) an account of the historical background of her relations with the super-powers, namely, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. during the period 1950s-1960s and developments in the 1970s. (b) a discussion of Iraqi development internally in the domestic political and economic fields and finally, (c) we looked at her relations with non-aligned countries.

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1) Iraq News Agency, February, 10th, 1981.

From the earlier discussion on Iraqi non-alignment during the 1950s and 1960s we saw that:

During the 1950s and up to 1958, Iraq under Nuri was aligned to the West, namely with the Baghdad Pact. When the new leaders took over in 1958, they declared a people's republic elected by and for the people. Also, three points were stressed in its proclamation towards Iraq's foreign policy, as follows:-

(1) Respect for agreements and pacts which were in the interests of the country, including the Bandung Conference principles.

(2) Conformity with the United Nations Charter.

(3) Co-ordination of brotherly ties with Arab and Muslim states.

In fact they could not put the above points fully into practice but instead they became more close to the Soviet bloc. During that regime in Iraq, three developments arose, firstly, the Kurdish problems promoted by outside powers; secondly, the pan-Arab/communist problem; and finally, Iraq became more tied economically and militarily to the Soviet bloc.

Under Arif's rule in 1963-1968, the trends in the internal and external politics of the country may be characterized as follows:-

(1) Arif like Qasim was an Army officer and he had no desire to rely on political parties, but while Qasim played off one party against another, Arif ordered their dissolution and relied on a set of pan-Arab officers for support.

(2) Arif continued to call for union with Egypt and it was the official policy of his regime. Iraq's foreign policy had a definite pro-Egyptian orientation, and Arif publicly supported Nasser in the Arab summit conferences and in international councils.

(3) Arif showed no initial interest in socialism and insisted that his social and political views derived from Islam rather than from foreign sources.

(4) From 1963 to 1968 there were serious attempts at bringing Iraq back to the Western fold by ignoring Iraq's treaty with the Soviet Union and resuming economic and commercial relations with Western countries. (For more details see earlier).

As we stated earlier, during Qasim's rule in Iraq, three developments arose. The Kurdish problems, the pan-Arab/communist relations and the multi-national oil companies. When the Arab Ba'ath party took power in 1968 Revolution in Iraq, they started to tackle these problems aiming for more internal stability and to stop foreign powers intervening in the country. So the Iraqi government seriously considered the Kurdish question and reached a solution under the 1975 agreement with Iran.

Also, the Iraqi government after the 1968 Revolution started negotiations with Iraqi communist party to join the Iraqi National Front, and they reached an agreement by which the Iraqi Communist Party joined the National Front in Iraq as mentioned earlier.

It could be said that the Arab Ba'ath partys' solutions to the Kurdish problem on the one hand and to that of the communist Iraqi

party gave stability to the country and such solidarity between all of them could give Iraqi leaders a chance to play a role in international affairs within the non-aligned movement.

Alongside these moves, a major factor affecting the external relations of Iraq and its role in the non-aligned movement was the state of the economy. The Iraqi leaders took this problem very seriously and they tried to solve it by nationalising Iraqi oil. Apart from achieving the exclusion of the multi-national oil companies, this move meant that after nationalisation the government's royalties rose from 50 to 100% from the national oil resources, the revenues from oil amounted to \$7.42 billion in the same year as nationalisation 1973-1974.

The nationalisation of oil in Iraq transferred the industry from foreign to national control and its revenues helped to overcome some difficulties in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Also, to protect its oil wealth from becoming totally dependent upon the U.S. dollar or upon Western economies, Iraq has adopted the following:-

(1) The Iraqis have carefully controlled the ratio of oil production to capacity in order to maximize revenues in long term, particularly when they expect the real value of oil to be higher.

(2) It has tended not to keep its surplus funds in U.S. dollars, preferring its holdings to be in a mixed basket of currencies.

(3) Iraq has attempted to channel its oil revenues into direct investment projects.

(4) It has transferred large sums into gold holdings under Iraqi control.

(5) It has arranged bilateral "oil for imports" barter agreements with some Western European states and Japan, by which Iraq receives needed military or development products in exchange for crude oil.

This policy as we argued earlier has allowed Iraq to use oil for political leverage without fearing economic repercussions and generally to pursue Iraqi national interests independently of super-power related concerns.

Furthermore, nationalization of oil gave them a sense of power and superiority within the Third World, enabling them to assert a demand for a new international economic order and for the establishment of more extensive Third World economic co-operation.

Having settled the above problems, one can say here that, Iraq became a more stable state. The Arab Ba'ath party was strengthened by several measures after 1976 that broadened national Ba'athist control over the regional parties and increased co-operation between civilian and military elements within the Arab Ba'ath Party. These measures included expanding the Revolutionary Command Council from five to twenty-two members in order to include all members of the Ba'ath regional commands as well as a Ba'athisation of military. Elections took place for a National Assembly in 1980.

These points perhaps have allowed the Iraqi government to turn her attention increasingly to international affairs particularly within



the non-aligned movement and to follow a more genuinely non-aligned foreign policy.

My purpose in this chapter has been to use the example of Iraq as a revealing case study to illustrate some of the most important conditions needed to enable any Third World country to follow a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy. As argued in the theoretical introduction, a genuine non-aligned policy, as I see it, requires full independence, which means that a country must be succeeding in achieving economic social and political development on its own terms.

## CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF THE  
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

## CHAPTER SIX

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION : VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The non-aligned movement is the institutionalised embodiment of co-operation agreements among developing countries. It was originally established when most of the Third World countries were still subject to colonialism and their human and natural resources were utilised to benefit those colonial powers. The world at large was in the late 'forties and early 'fifties just recovering from the destructive consequences of the Second World War and the new development era especially in Europe was on its way. By then the super-powers were in the process of formation and they were trying as they are still doing today, to divide the world into spheres of influence. These pressures on the Third World countries made these countries realise what was happening, and an effort on their part was necessary to free themselves both from colonialism and from de facto domination by such super-powers through the exploitation of their resources.

In this international situation, the non-aligned movement was created by intellectual leaders from the Third World who were well aware of these developments and who took it upon themselves to bring developing countries together on a basic philosophy that entailed freedom, development and respect for human beings. Co-operation rather than confrontation was the theme of such gatherings.

Questions were asked at the time as to why there was a need for such an organisation.

Do we not have the United Nations? In fact, the understanding was and I believe still is, that the United Nations Organisation serves a need in international relations but the non-aligned movement specifically serves the interests of Third World countries both within and outside the United Nations system.

The latter in actual fact is a system which is still dominated to a large extent by a small number of developed countries. To that extent it should not be surprising that part or all of the system may be geared to meet the requirements and interests of those countries. The right of veto in the Security Council is one aspect of this domination, and the control of the United Nations institutions through their financing is another aspect.

Such an attitude towards the United Nations Organisation alongside the then existing world circumstances may have strongly helped the formation of the non-aligned movement, and later on supported its continuity and development.

Non-alignment was taken to mean a social and political ideal around which the Third World countries gathered. It was taken to mean that a member country rejected the danger created by the established military pacts, and for that matter rejected alignment with such pacts. Non-alignment was meant to be the basic understanding among Third World countries that they were facing similar problems coming from the same quarters, and by the same token this needed a unified stand in order to alleviate their consequences. Non-alignment was recognised as giving future hope for Third World countries, of independence, development and a lessening of human sufferings, and therefore providing the basic needs for these countries.

Non-alignment was seen as an essential manifestation of a primordial urge for freedom and an expression of solidarity and mutual understanding.

Credit for the establishment of the movement belongs to a few distinguished leaders of Third World countries who lived the sufferings of their people and took the responsibility to minimise them for others to the largest extent possible. It was the open mindedness, understanding and political wisdom of people like, Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Tito which brought the other leaders and nations to share with them their understanding of the needs of Third World countries. The non-aligned movement started from their initiative and it is a fact that their political, social, human and economic understanding of the world system were reflected strongly in the basic philosophy of the movement.

Because of the occupation and exploitation of most Third World countries, the issue of ending colonialism was a top priority one. Freedom from external influence and individual countries' development, be it economic, political, social or cultural, was in the forefront of the non-aligned movement's mandate. It was the dominating factor during the fifties. It was a period during which, finding an identity for the movement, and agreeing on the basic principles and approaches to solve the problems confronting them were essential. Recognising the then wide spread ideological differences among member countries and dealing with them logically was a basic necessity at least until the movement stood on its feet. Only then did a deep argument as to the relevance of such ideological differences and their impact on the movement take place.

The member countries were basically the poor countries of Asia and Africa and it was therefore not surprising to see the issue of economic development as an overriding objective, if the sufferings of the peoples of those nations were to be alleviated. It was therefore a period for building the movement, and for identifying objectives, aims and needs of Third World countries. It was simply an inward-looking phase in which the member countries wanted to understand themselves and the participating countries' problems. It was at best a period of identification with others.

The 1960s provided new challenges and therefore the movement faced the first crisis of its own development. This was because new problems necessitated new approaches and a fresh look was needed to confront such arising problems. It was a period in which the movement freed itself from looking only inward to one that started looking at regional issues. Emphasis on international issues was necessary if the movement was to establish itself as a social and political structure which had a role to play in the world's international affairs. This period was characterized by a relative stability and certainly the movement had its founder leaders. World peace was of major concern and by having it as a major issue the movement departed significantly from its original self-centred thinking and approach. Disarmament and world security were the main issues occupying its leaders' minds on the level of the worlds at large, and the movement's member countries foresaw themselves as having a major stake and therefore as having a major role to play.

These two issues received more attention than the development problem simply because development in those countries was thought to be going on satisfactorily and the flow of resources seemed to be enough to get such development going.

There was also a change in the developed world which at least at the time believed in mutual dependence and the mutual benefits of co-operation between developed and developing countries for the benefit of all. By the mid 'sixties and early 'seventies, with the world facing huge economic problems, the issue of development came back to the forefront of debate. By the mid 'seventies, especially after the oil price boom and the economic difficulties faced by developed countries which were going through a depression, the problems of Third World countries were compounded. Hence economic development and capital transfers were of main importance. However, it was perhaps recognised for the first time, that the movement should work as a group within the United Nations system in order to push forward the needs of its member countries. It was therefore rather obvious that such a development could bring with it some misunderstandings between member countries on the issues presented in the United Nations.

By the end of the 'seventies and in the early 'eighties, more problems arose and the movement was not seen to be highly effective in attending to such problems even if they fell within its basic domain of interest. The problems of the Iraq - Iran war is an outstanding example. By this time questions had been raised as to the effectiveness of the movement in handling its affairs.

Over the last few decades, as has been discussed in this thesis, the economic development issue has been and still is the main issue. The international monetary system which regulates the world economic system has been subject to wide debate. Among the main issues of this debate was the fact that the international monetary system had always been dominated by advanced countries with huge economic and political power.

This control not only compounded the problems of developed countries, but also created new ones. Right after the war and up to the early 'sixties, the system was unilaterally managed by the United States of America. Its economic power was needed in Europe for the latter to get out of the war's aftermath. The world needed also a convertible, powerful and stable currency, characteristics which were to be found in the United States dollar. However, like the currencies of most industrialised countries, the dollar was weak by the early 1960s, reflecting the weaknesses of the American economy.

Such developments on the world economic stage had their bearing on the economies of developing countries. It was the first time that some developing countries started having liquidity problems. The IMF was interested in lending to these countries only after close examination of each country's economy. By the early 'seventies, when the United States terminated the Bretton Woods agreement, the whole monetary system was in a chaotic state. This was followed by the oil price increase in 1973 and the subsequent inflationary pressures which resulted from the U.S. action. However, despite the negative impact of oil prices on developing countries, it was for the first time clear that the voice of the Third World countries was beginning to be heard.

It was apparent by then that the available institutional framework in the international system was not enough to cope with the arising economic problems. Therefore, calls for the creation of a new international economic order were voiced.



Such an international order would potentially involve fundamental change in areas like international trade; inflows of international resources to developing countries; energy and development; multinational corporations and transfer of technology. It is clear that such issues were not the only issues, but rather the most important. Trade between developed and developing countries was against the latter both in volume and in value. The terms of trade were deteriorating against developing countries. Developed countries were slowing down the volume of aid given to developing countries, and the international institutions were also reluctant to expand their lending operations because of what they thought were increasing risk factors. On the other side of the issue, the multinational corporations were exploiting the natural resources of developing countries and at the same time expanding the absorptive capacities of those countries' markets for consumer goods. Developing countries on the other hand identified the technological difference between developed and developing countries as the area which needed great improvement. Without the transfer of appropriate technology, the production capabilities of developing countries would not be increased and their problems would be increased rather than decreased.

It was within this international economic fragmentation that the non-aligned movement's role in development came into effect. It was felt that the movement should operate in two directions. Firstly, great leverage should be sought after in the international institutions, especially those of the United Nations. This was of vital importance if issues of regulating the international trade market and solving the aid problem by lessening the debt and debt service obligations on the one hand, and increasing the flow of resources on the other hand were to be tackled.

Secondly, a better co-ordination and co-operation among the movement's member countries should take place. This was important because the movement had among its ranks two extremes. At the one end there were oil producing countries with large surplus funds; and at the other end there were a number of the poorest countries of the world who badly needed such funds. The question was why should such surplus funds be circulated to the needy countries through the international institutions? Why not establish institutions within the regional boundaries of these developing countries? This move was welcomed by all concerned because while it provided the necessary rate of return to lender countries it also provided the liquidity needed for development by the borrower countries. It was felt that it was an era in which the non-aligned movement could and should play an important role.

Apart from economic development and raising the living conditions of the people of the member countries, one of the objectives, dear to the non-aligned movement was that of freedom for Third World people. In the early stages of the movement's establishment, freedom was taken to mean political independence of all nations from direct control by the great military powers. However, the disappearance of this direct colonisation did not necessarily mean that gaining independence by itself guaranteed freedom. We live in an ever changing world in which dominating countries do not easily leave developing countries once they are simply asked to do so. They find other ways and means to keep their interests alive as long as it is necessary to do so. Therefore, once a developing area gains political independence these new means are put into operation. Among these ways and means three are outstanding. Firstly, newly independent countries are usually kept dependant on the previously colonizing country for their security and means of survival.

Hence, even if these countries leave the area physically, they re-enter through the back door and they have enough leverage to continue their domination of the independent country. Secondly, a newly independent country would not normally have enough productive capacity to feed its people, therefore food dependency is usually used to enhance this dependency. The need for financial aid in the early stages of independence is inevitable if new institutions are to be established and development is to start. This obviously increases the political clutch the dominating country would still have even after independence. The National Liberation movements in most cases find themselves as dependent on their occupiers after independence as before.

The role of the non-aligned movement is one of two parts. On the one hand it helps National Liberation Movements to achieve independence through their armed struggle by helping them politically, economically and sometimes militarily. But the need arises more after independence for the non-aligned movement to provide the necessary help to these newly established countries. However, once these new countries are well established then they may form the backbone of the non-aligned movement. It is therefore rather obvious that this relation is a two-way one, and such interaction is highly needed for the non-aligned movement to achieve its objectives.

In several parts of this thesis, there has been discussions of the role of member countries in global terms. However, focusing on one specific country entails a review of the whole process of interaction between the member country and the movement in both directions. Iraq was taken as a case study in order to examine in some detail how this process takes place.

In the mid 'fifties, Iraq was a member of the non-aligned movement, but at the same time it joined the "Baghdad Pact", a move from the regime at the time to align the country more closely to the Western World. By the late 'fifties a new regime came to power and tried to re-align the country with the Eastern bloc. This 'tug of war' process between the West and East brought back the Western World to try to regain influence through supporting the Kurdish movement. This process was also supported by the fact that the Iraqi economy was dominated by the multinational companies. It is therefore rather obvious that at this stage, even though Iraq was a member of the non-aligned movement, it was nevertheless not in a position to contribute significantly to the movement.

This situation dragged on until 1968 when the Arab Ba'ath Party gained power. The top priority for the party was to finish the Kurdish revolt hence eliminating Western influence from the country. This was done alongside a process of nationalisation during which the country regained control of its national resources. By the mid-'seventies with a stable political system and growing economy backed by enormous financial resources, the time had come for Iraq to enhance its position in the non-aligned movement. Adhering to its principles, the government and the party started sharing their resources with needy developing countries through a significant package of aid. On the political scene, Iraq came to play a significant role in revitalizing the non-aligned movement. This role was recognized by the movement's member countries when Baghdad was selected as the venue for the 1982 non-aligned movement's conference.

This process of interaction between the country and the movement may be considered a representative case for a wide number of developing

countries. Iraq's emerging role within the movement came to be recognised though it took a relatively long period of time for Iraq to play such a role. However, as was discussed earlier in this thesis, without a strong economy; a stable political system and a strong belief in the movement's aims and objectives no serious participation could have been expected earlier.

Having discussed the above, one can safely argue that the movement is now subject to heavy pressures emanating from world economic and political factors. There are two potential scenarios for the future of the movement. One is that the pressures might be more than the movement can handle hence it may be subject to disarray. The second is that the movement may be able to cope with the arising problems and sooner rather than later, it will overcome these problems. The facts involved in both cases and their impact are discussed below, in order to give some future perspective for the movement.

As has been argued, it was very obvious that during the 1970s and early 1980s, the non-aligned movement faced and is still facing a wide range of serious dangers. Some of these dangers emanate from today's international relation variables, others stem from accumulated negative aspects that the movement has faced during its history of a quarter of a century. On that basis, the first scenario, which suggests that the movement is facing great problems that it cannot handle was presented.

Certainly the movement is facing problems from outside factors and from within, as was said above. There are factors coming from the current international situation, which has deteriorated drastically over the last decade or so.

Detente between the super-powers and the relations between them have been loosening and accordingly, competition over spheres of influence in the world has been increasing very rapidly. This is aggravated by the re-emergence of an era of cold war of the 1950s type which in turn threatens once again the independence of the non-aligned countries and their sovereignty. These facts have been increased by the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and Poland on the one hand and on the other, a new conservative American administration which increasingly is resorting to force or threats of using force to solve problems.

More importantly, there is a wide range of internal difficulties that the non-aligned movement is facing which may be summarized as follows:-

- a. The movement's membership has increased significantly to include almost all Third World countries. This entails the gathering together of all ideological and political backgrounds with all the problems that come with this.
- b. The movement has not been following the original principles of non-alignment that were set out in the first conference of the movement as criteria for country's membership.
- c. There has been a significant number of member countries whose governments have been toppled by military and political takeovers and who therefore have gone back to their original spheres of influence and alignment. But because a country can stay a member until it decides otherwise, those countries have remained members of the movement.
- d. Friction among the movement's member countries has been increasing and their relations deteriorating to the extent of going to war as was

mentioned earlier in the case of the Iraq - Iran conflict. This has been a new experience in which the movement has so far failed to have any leverage to solve this problem.

e. It has been obvious over the past few years that the movement has been avoiding difficult problems by deferring them for a long time, either not wanting to solve them or being unable to do so. This approach has accumulated wide and varied problems to which there is no obvious or quick solution.

Because of the extent of these internal facts, combined with the previously discussed external facts, this scenario suggests that the movement has not been able to face up to these problems nor is it expected to be able to face up to them. Therefore, the movement sooner or later will go into disarray and the 1980s may witness the disruption of all the non-aligned movement's activities.

We have noted that the second scenario assumes that the non-aligned movement will succeed in overcoming the problems it faces. This assumption is founded on a number of facts drawn from the history of the movement on the one hand and on the nature of the international situation and the facts affecting it on the other.

One of the above mentioned facts is the understanding that non-alignment was born after the cold war, and since the original cold war era is over, it might be thought that there is no more need for the movement. However, as has been discussed in this thesis, even though the cold war ended long ago in the formal sense, yet new developments in the international situation in the early 'eighties have more or less returned the super-powers to a new cold war era.

Moreover, Europe's role as a new centre of gravity beside the two super-powers has never materialised and it has continued to back the United States position on all or at best most major issues. Such a situation may enhance the chances for the non-aligned movement to survive its difficulties. In actual fact member countries feel more in need of the non-aligned movement in times of challenges and problems, therefore this scenario assumes that the more the problems, the more member countries will feel the need to stick by the movement.

It was obvious that during the 'sixties and 'seventies international power centres moved from having only the two super-powers into multidimensional ones. During the 'eighties this has been more pronounced in the fact that international relations have changed significantly in that independence is seen not so much as following a particular ideology, but rather as looking after the interests of the state concerned. This makes it easier for the movement to revitalise its role on the world stage.

Finally, it should be acknowledged that an agreement needs to be reached on the nature of the non-aligned movement. Is it a leading force in the Third World or is it a grouping on the bare minimum of issues? In actuality it is my belief that it has been and should always be a leading force in the Third World and in the issues which concern it.

To conclude, one tends to suggest that since the major weakening factors of the movement are internal ones, and since the member countries tend to rally behind the movement in times of hardship and difficulties, then it is reasonable to suggest that the movement will pull itself together and solve its problems.



If this is coupled with some relaxation of world tensions, along with a better relationship between the super-powers, then the Third World countries would be under less pressure to spend money on armaments which could otherwise be used for development and will lend support to the internal factors. In order to hold the second scenario as I believe, the non-aligned movement needs to keep free from the super-powers' domination and to do so, as we argued earlier in the theoretical discussion of development and non-alignment in this thesis, the non-aligned countries must respect the following principles:-

- 1) The movement needs: independence, development, peace and disarmament because as I believe, without independence there is no non-alignment, without development, there is no independence and finally, without peace and disarmament, there is insufficient development.
- 2) The problems of borders between the member countries must be resolved by means other than armed clashes.
- 3) The dialogue between the developed and developing countries should be resumed on a new basis that would lead to the establishment of a New International Economic Order. To ensure the success of this dialogue, more co-operation among the non-aligned countries should be carried out, in order to enable them to exert effective pressure.
- 4) Finally, the non-aligned countries need national leaders, or in other words, they need leaders committed to the ideal and goal of non-alignment.

From a sociological point of view one cannot be content with seeing non-alignment as simply an abstract fine ideal merely requiring well intentioned leaders in order to carry it out. It has to be seen as a widely held set of social values and aspirations which emerged within a particular condition of the world's social structure at a

certain historical period; and its subsequent history and future prospects must also be seen as being conditioned by, and linked with, the changing structure of world society.

The most salient aspects of this world social structure during this period has been, and continue to be:-

- 1: Political and military rivalry between two big power-blocs and
- 2: Economic exploitation and cultural domination by colonial and neo-colonial developed societies, which are also ranged against each other in the two power-blocs.

To avoid involvement in super-power military rivalry -i.e. Non-alignment- necessarily requires liberation from the super-powers' economic and cultural domination also if it is to stand any chance of long term success.

It should be clear from the discussion of theories of development in the introduction of this thesis that in general terms, though not necessarily in detail, I tend to agree with the type of theory put forward by A.G. Frank in so far as he sees underdevelopment as a process involving domination and exploitation of dependent societies by more powerful societies which developed at their expense, and in so far as he argues that in order to develop Third World countries need to free themselves from this domination.

But I differ from him if he is seeing the Soviet model as a means of liberation from domination. Rather I see that as another form of domination which also has to be avoided by means of socio-economic

and political development of the Non-aligned countries on their own terms and through co-operation with each other.

Success in achieving such development and so being in a position to pursue genuine non-alignment will continue to depend on the internal social structures of each member country and on the condition of the world social structure in all its aspects.

APPENDIX ONE : The Agendas of the Conferences of Heads of State or  
Government of the Non-Aligned Countries.

The First Summit Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-  
Aligned Countries.

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1. Belgrade 1st - 6th September 1961

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- 1.a - Exchange of views on the international situation.  
International problems facing the developing countries.
  - 1.b - Establishment and strengthening of international peace and  
security.
    - 1.b.1 Respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-  
determination, struggle against imperialism,  
liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
    - 1.b.2 Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity  
of states; non-interference and non-intervention in  
internal affairs of state.
    - 1.b.3 Racial discrimination and apartheid.
    - 1.b.4 General and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear  
tests; problem of foreign military bases.
    - 1.b.5 Peaceful co-existence among state with different  
political and social systems.
    - 1.b.6 Role and structure of the United Nations and the  
implementation of its resolutions.
  - 1.c - Problems of unequal economic development; promotion of  
international economic and technical co-operation.
    - 1.c.1 Economic development and trade between the developed  
and developing countries.
    - 1.c.2 Economic and technical assistance to the developing  
countries.
  - 1.d - Other matters
  - 1.e - Communique of the Conference
- 

SOURCES: The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned  
Countries, Belgrade, 1961. See also, Willetts, op.cit., p.240 and the  
Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, op.cit., p.10.

The Second Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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2. Cairo 5th - 10th October 1964.

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- 2.1 General discussion of the international situation.
  - 2.2. The safeguarding and strengthening of world peace and security, promotion in the settlement of international problems of the positive role of New States and of National Liberation Movements.
    - 2.2.a Concerted action for the liberation of the countries still dependent; elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.
    - 2.2.b Respect for the right of people to self-determination and condemnation of the use of force against the exercise of this right.
    - 2.2.c Racial discrimination and the policy of apartheid.
    - 2.2.d Peaceful co-existence and the codification of its principles by the United Nations.
    - 2.2.e Respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity; problems of divided nations.
    - 2.2.f Settlement of disputes without the threat of use of force, in accordance with the principles of United Nations Charter.
    - 2.2.g General and complete disarmament; peaceful use of atomic energy; banning of all nuclear weapon tests; establishment of nuclear-free zones, prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of all nuclear weapons.
    - 2.2.h Military pacts, foreign troops and bases.
    - 2.2.i The United Nations; its role in international affairs, implementation of its resolutions and amendment of its Charter.
  - 2.3 Economic Development and Co-operation.
    - 2.3.a Effects of disarmament on world economic development.
    - 2.3.b United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
  - 2.4 Cultural, Scientific and Educational co-operation and consolidation of International and Regional Organizations working for this purpose.
  - 2.5 Any other subjects.
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SOURCE: The Collected Documents of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1982, op.cit., p.18.

The Third Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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3. Lusaka 8th - 10th September 1970

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- 3.1 Charter for peace, freedom, development and international co-operation and general discussion of the international situation.
  - 3.2 Preservation and strengthening of world peace and security in the changed world situation.
    - 3.2.a The role of the non-aligned Nations.
    - 3.2.b Strengthening of the United Nations.
    - 3.2.c Problems of disarmaments.
    - 3.2.d Military pacts, foreign troops and bases.
  - 3.3. Preservation and strengthening of national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality among states and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.
    - 3.3.a Action for the liberation of countries under colonial domination and support to liberation movements.
    - 3.3.b Obolition of all forms of racial discrimination and apartheid.
    - 3.3.c Neo-colonialism.
    - 3.3.d Presevation and strengthening of the independence of non-aligned countries.
  - 3.4 Economic Development and Economic Independence (Dependence on one's own resources).
    - 3.4.a Bilateral, regional and inter-regional co-operation between non-aligned countries and developing countries
    - 3.4b Trade and assistance policy.
    - 3.4c The second decade of the United Nations development.
  - 3.5 Strengthening of co-operation among non-aligned countries.
  - 3.6 Miscellaneous.
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SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, op.cit., pp.44-45.

The Fourth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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4. Algiers, September 5th - 9th, 1973.

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- 4.1 General review and appraisal of the international situation.
- 4.2 Role of non-alignment and future prospects for the movement in the light of the evolution of the international situation.
- 4.3 Consideration of political issues and co-ordinated action of non-aligned countries for strengthening world peace and security.
  - 4.3.a Promotion of positive trends in international relations, efforts for relaxation of international tension, democratization of international relations and the universal application of the principles of peaceful co-existence.
  - 4.3.b Joint measures and concerted efforts for combating aggression, eliminating foreign occupation and threats to independence and security of non-aligned countries, including all forms of interference and subjugation.
  - 4.3.c Intensification of measures to combat colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination and to provide effective support for national liberation movements.
  - 4.3.d Strengthening of international security, creation of zones of peace and intensification of efforts directed towards general and complete disarmament.
  - 4.3.e Measures to combat threats to permanent sovereignty of states over their natural resources including in particular the threat posed by the activities of trans national corporations.
  - 4.3.f Co-ordination of policies in relation to the forthcoming conference on the law of the sea.
  - 4.3.g Measures to assist people and countries which are victims of aggression, colonialism and foreign occupation.
  - 4.3.h Strengthening of the role and efficacy of the United Nations.
  - 4.3.i Advancement of co-operation and solidarity among the non-aligned countries and co-ordination of their action at the United Nations and other international bodies.
- 4.4. Consideration of economic issues and international action aimed at accelerating economic and social progress of non-aligned countries.
  - 4.4.a State of international economic relations and deterioration of the economic position of the developing countries, commitments of the developed world in international action of development.

- 4.4.b Biennial review and appraisal of the implementation of the international development strategy and the need for urgent solution of problems arising as a result of subsequent development in international economic relations including in particular the multilateral trade negotiations and the reform of the international monetary system.
  - 4.4.c Follow-up action on the Lusaka Declaration on non-alignment and economic progress and the Georgetown Action programme for economic co-operation among non-aligned countries.
  - 4.4.d Special measures in favour of the least developed including the land locked among developing countries.
  - 4.4.e Promotion of favourable trends in regional, inter-regional and international economic co-operation.
  - 4.4.f Advancement of co-ordination of action of non-aligned countries on economic issues at the U.N. and other international forums.
- 4.5 Measures for promoting co-operation and co-ordination among non-aligned countries, including Educational, Cultural, Scientific, information and other areas.
- 4.6 Future meetings of the non-aligned countries including the date and venue of the next summit conference.
- 4.7 Any other Business:
- 4.7.a War damages.
  - 4.7.b The problem of mercenaries.

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SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, op.cit., p.91.



The Fifth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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5. Colombo, August 16th - 19th, 1976.

5.1 General review and assessment of international political situation and the role of non-alignment with special emphasis on the following:-

- 5.1.a Southern Africa and other colonial situations.
- 5.1.b Situation in the Middle East.
- 5.1.c The question of Palestine.
- 5.1.d The question of Cyprus.
- 5.1.e The question of Korea.
- 5.1.f Latin America questions.
- 5.1.g The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
- 5.1.h International implications of detente.
- 5.1.i Interference in the internal affairs of states.
- 5.1.j Disarmament and international security.

5.2 Review and appraisal on international economic situation and development problems, with special emphasis on the sixth and seventh special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, establishment of the New International Economic Order, the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, meeting of Finance Ministers in Kingston, United Nations Conferences of Food and Population, second General Conference of UNIDO, UNCTAD and the Paris Conference of International Economic co-operation.

5.3 Survey and evaluation of measures to strengthen economic solidarity and co-operation among non-aligned countries and other developing countries with particular reference to the following:-

- 5.3.a The Lima programme of mutual assistance and solidarity of non-aligned countries.
- 5.3.b Resolutions of the Dakar Conference.
- 5.3.c Trade and assistance policies.
- 5.3.d Agriculture and food production.
- 5.3.e Financial and monetary co-operation.
- 5.3.f Industrialization, science, technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- 5.3.g Foreign investment.
- 5.3.h Transnational corporation and information centre on transnational corporation.
- 5.3.i Management of public enterprises.
- 5.3.j The Solidarity Fund for economic and social development of non-aligned countries.
- 5.3.k Assistance for the reconstruction of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
- 5.3.l Assistance to countries exposed to foreign economic pressures.
- 5.3.m Consideration of the report of the countries co-ordinating the action programme of developing countries, adopted at the Algiers Summit Conference.
- 5.3.n United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea.

- 5.4 Strategy for the strengthening of peace and international security and measures for the promotion of solidarity and mutual assistance among non-aligned countries with a view to countering more effectively threats, pressures, aggressions, etc., taking into account their political and economic aspects.
  - 5.5 Measures for the promotion of co-operation and co-ordination among non-aligned countries in the field of education, information and in other fields.
  - 5.6 The strengthening of non-alignment and joint action of non-aligned countries in international relations : strengthening of the role of the United Nations and promotion of co-operation and solidarity among non-aligned countries and co-operation of their activity in the United Nations and elsewhere.
  - 5.7 Future gathering of non-aligned countries, including the date and venue of the next summit; constitution and mandate of the co-ordinating Bureau.
  - 5.8 Miscellaneous.
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SOURCE: The collected documents, op.cit., pp.187-188.

The Sixth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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6. Havana, September 3rd - 9th, 1979.

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- 6.1 Strengthening of the role and policy of non-aligned movement as an independent, positive and equitable alternative to bloc policies and great power rivalries in international relations.
- 6.2 General review and appraisal of the international political situation and of the measures of solidarity of the non-aligned countries in the implementation of their policy, and decisions with particular reference to:-
  - 6.2.1 The situation in Southern Africa - Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa: the system of apartheid; the aggression of the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia against the front-line states and assessment and implementation of the decisions adopted at the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the co-ordinating bureau in Maputo.
  - 6.2.2 The question of Western Sahara.
  - 6.2.3 Other colonial issues such as the Camorian Island of Mayotte and intensification of the struggle against colonialism, racism and racial discrimination.
  - 6.2.4 The question of Palestine.
  - 6.2.5 The situation in the Middle East.
  - 6.2.6 Latin American issues.
  - 6.2.7 The question of Cyprus.
  - 6.2.8 The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
  - 6.2.9 The Mediterranean as a zone of peace and co-operation.
    - 6.2.9a Withdrawal of foreign military bases from Malta as of March 31st, 1979.
    - 6.2.9b New concerted efforts by the Mediterranean non-aligned countries in matters of security and co-operation in accordance with paragraph 144 of the Belgrade Declaration.
  - 6.2.10 Promotion of positive trends in international relations, efforts to bring about a relaxation of international tension, democratization of international relations and the universal application of the principles of peaceful co-existence.
  - 6.2.11 Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
  - 6.2.12 Peaceful settlement of disputes between non-aligned countries on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and decisions of the non-aligned movement, including the recommendations of the ministerial Conference in Belgrade.
  - 6.2.13 The question of Korea.
  - 6.2.14 Situation of South East Asia.

- 6.2.15 Disarmament and its implications for international security and economic and social development. Implementation of the decisions of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament convened on the initiative of the non-aligned countries.
- 6.3 General review and appraisal of the world economic situation, international economic relations and the position of developing countries in the world economy, and intensification of efforts by non-aligned and other developing countries for the establishment of the New International Economic Order, with special reference to:-
- 6.3.a The negotiations in the United Nations system for the establishment of the New International Economic Order.
  - 6.3.b Assessment of the fifth session of UNCTAD.
  - 6.3.c The contribution of the non-aligned movement to the formulation in the context of the establishment of the New International Economic Order of an International Development strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.
  - 6.3.d Formulation of guidelines for the preparations for and the joint stand of non-aligned and other developing countries at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1980.
  - 6.3.e The United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea.
  - 6.3.f The position of the least developed countries.
  - 6.3.g The position of the land-locked, islands and most seriously affected developing countries.
- 6.4 Analysis of the measures and further action, including programmes of mutual assistance, designed to strengthen the solidarity and social and economic co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries, taking into consideration the report of the co-ordinating countries on: Raw materials, Trade, Transport and Industry, Financial and Monetary co-operation, Fisheries, Health, Insurance, Sports, Tourism etc.
- 6.5 Strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations in the promotion and preservation of international peace and security and in equitable international co-operation and the enhancement of the pivotal role of non-aligned countries in the United Nations system.
- 6.6 Ways and means of strengthening unity, solidarity and co-operation among non-aligned countries on the basis of the principles of non-aligned movement and improving the functioning of and decision making in, the non-aligned movement with reference to the initiative taken at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade relating to Agenda item XV.
- 6.7 Co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries in the field of information and concerted action by them directed towards the establishment of a new, more just and effective world information and communication order.

- 6.8 Further gathering of non-aligned countries, including the date and venue of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries.
  - 6.9 Composition and mandate of the co-ordinating Bureau.
  - 6.10 Other matters.
- 

SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, op.cit., pp.500-501.

The Seventh Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries.

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7. New Delhi, 7th-11th, 1983.

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1. The economic question of the non-aligned countries occupied a central position in the discussions, and overshadowed the political ones. They called for a New International Economic Order.
2. The question of armament in the Third World was discussed, especially that the developing countries spent on armament more than 81 billion dollars.
3. The relations between the advanced industrial countries and colonialism and neo-colonialism, on one side, and the developing countries on the other were also discussed in the conference.
4. The question of the deterioration of International Relations was discussed. The discussions dealt with the cold war atmosphere and the emergence of new tendencies threatening with nuclear war.
5. Other matters were discussed.

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SOURCES: 1) Dr. Ghaleb, M., "The Seventh Non-aligned Conference", "The Arab Alternative Futures Dossier Third World Forum - Middle East Office", U.N. University, No.9, July 1983, pp.6-9.

2) The Times, March 12, 1983, p.6.

3) International Tribunes, March 5-14th, 1983.

APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences.

African Countries	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Algeria	A*	A	A	A	A	A
Angola	-	-	-	-	A	A
Benin	N	A	N	A	A	A
Bostwana	-	-	A	A	A	A
Burundi	-	A	A	A	A	A
Cameroon	N	A	A	A	A	A
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	A	A
C.A.R.	N	A	A	A	A	A
Chad	N	A	A	A	A	N
Comoros	-	-	-	-	A	A
Congo	N	A	A	A	A	A
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	A
Egypt	A	A	A	A	A	A
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	A	A	A	A
Ethiopia	A	A	A	A	A	A
Gabon	N	N	N	A	A	A
Gambia	-	-	N	A	A	A
Ghana	A	A	A	A	A	A
Guinea	A	A	A	A	A	A
Guinea Bissau	-	-	-	-	A	A
Ivory Coast	N	N	N	A	A	A
Kenya	-	A	A	A	A	A
Lesotho	-	-	A	A	A	A
Liberia	N	A	A	A	A	A
Libya	N	A	A	A	A	A
Madagascar	N	N	N	A	A	A
Malawi	-	A	N	N	N	A
Mali	A	A	A	A	A	A
Mauritania	N	A	A	A	A	A
Mauritius	-	-	N	A	A	A
Morocco	A	A	A	A	A	A
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	A	A
Niger	N	N	N	A	A	A
Nigeria	N	A	A	A	A	A
Rwanda	-	N	A	A	A	A
Sao Tome & Principe	-	-	-	-	A	A
Senegal	N	A	A	A	A	A
Seychelles	-	-	-	-	A	A
Sierra Leone	N	A	A	A	A	A
Somalia	A	A	A	A	A	A
Sudan	A	A	A	A	A	A
Swaziland	-	-	A	A	A	A
Tanzania	N	A	A	A	A	A
Togo	N	A	A	A	A	A
Tunisia	A	A	A	A	A	A
Uganda	-	A	A	A	A	A
Upper Volta	N	N	N	A	A	A
Zaire	A	N	A	A	A	A
Zambia	-	A	A	A	A	A

\* The Algerian Representation in 1961 was a provisional Government.

KEY: A: Attended as a full member. G: Guest.  
 N: Not Represented. O: Observer.  
 -: Not Independent. SS: "Special Status".

APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences.

Asian Countries	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Afghanistan	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bahrain	-	-	-	A	A	A
Bangladesh	-	-	-	A	A	A
Bhutan	-	-	-	A	A	A
Burma	A	A	N	A	A	A
India	A	A	A	A	A	A
Indonesia	A	A	A	A	A	A
Iran	N	N	N	N	N	A
Iraq	A	A	A	A	A	A
Jordan	N	A	A	A	A	A
Kampuchea	A	A	N	A *	A	N
Korea (North)	N	N	N	N	A	A
Kuwait	-	A	A	A	A	A
Laos	N	A	A	A	A	A
Lebanon	A	A	A	A	A	A
Malaysia	N	N	A	A	A	A
Maldives	-	-	N	N	A	A
Nepal	A	A	A	A	A	A
Oman	N	N	N	A	A	A
Pakistan	N	N	N	N	N	A
Philippines	N	N	N	N	G	O
Qatar	-	-	-	A	A	A
Saudi Arabia	A	A	N	A	A	N
Singapore	-	-	A	A	A	A
South Yemen	-	-	A	A	A	A
Sri Lanka	A	A	A	A	A	A
Syria	-	A	A	A	A	A
U.A.E.	-	-	-	A	A	A
Vietnam	-	-	-	-	A	A
Yemen	A	A	A	A	A	A

\* The Kampuchean Representation in 1973 was the Royal Government - in exile.

Caribbean Countries	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Barbados	-	-	O	O	O	O
Dominica	-	-	-	-	-	O
Grenada	-	-	-	-	O	A
Guyana	-	-	A	A	A	A
Jamaica	-	O	A	A	-	A
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	-	O
Surinam	-	-	-	-	N	A
Trinidad & Tobago	-	O	A	A	A	A

Bahamas has never been associated with the non-aligned movement.



APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences.

European Countries	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Austria	N	N	G	G	G	G
Cyprus	A	A	A	A	A	A
Finland	N	O	G	G	G	G
Ireland	N	N	N	N	N	N
Malta	-	N	N	A	A	A
Portugal	N	N	N	N	G	G
Romania	N	N	N	N	G	G
San Marino	N	N	N	N	N	G
Spain	N	N	N	N	N	G
Sweden	N	N	N	G	G	G
Switzerland	N	N	N	N	G	G
Yugoslavia	A	A	A	A	A	A

Latin American Countries	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Argentina	N	P	P	A	A	A
Bolivia	O	O	O	O	O	A
Brazil	O	O	O	O	O	O
Chile	N	O	O	A	N	N
Columbia	N	N	N	N	N	O
Costa Rica	N	N	N	N	N	O
Cuba	A	A	A	A	A	A
Dominican Republic	N	N	N	N	N	N
Ecuador	O	N	O	O	O	O
El Salvador	N	N	N	N	O	O
Haiti	N	N	N	N	N	N
Honduras	N	N	N	N	N	N
Guatemala	N	N	N	N	N	N
Mexico	N	O	N	O	O	O
Nicaragua	N	N	N	N	N	A
Panama	N	N	N	O	A	A
Paraguay	N	N	N	N	N	N
Peru	N	N	O	A	A	A
Uruguay	N	O	O	O	O	O
Venezuela	N	O	O	O	O	O

Other Groups accord- ed full recognition at some point	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Angola FNLA	O	A	N	O	N	N
Belize	-	-	-	-	SS	SS
Namibia SWAPO	O	?	N	O	O	A
Palestine PLO	-	-	G	O	A	A
South Vietnam PRG	-	-	O	A	-	-
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front *	O	?	G	O	O	A

\* The participants from Zimbabwe before 1979 were the forerunners of the patriotic front, namely the National Democratic Party in 1961, ZANU and ZAPU in 1970 and 1973 and the ANC in 1976.  
SEE: Willetts, Peter., The Non-aligned in Havana, London, 1981, p.65-67.

APPENDIX THREE: Number of attendance Governments at each Summit Conference of Non-aligned Movement Conferences.

SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Venue	Date	Number of Members Attending	U.N. Document Number
1. Belgrade	1-6 September 1961	25 a	NO UN DOC
2. Cairo	5-10 October 1964	47 b	A/5763
3. Lusaka	8-10 September 1970	53	NV/209
4. Algiers	5-9 September 1973	75 c	A/9330
5. Colombo	16-19 August 1976	85 d	A/31/197
6. Havana	3-9 September 1979	92 e	A/34/542

NOTES: (a) Including the Algerian Provisional Government; (b) Including Holden Roberto Leader of the FNLA from Angola; (c) Including the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and a representative of Prince Sihanouk's Cambodian Government - in exile; (d) Including the Palestine Liberation Organization, but not including Belize which was granted a special status including the right to address the Summit; (e) Including the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and SWAPO, not including Belize which was again given special status: including P.L.O.

SUMMARY OF ATTENDANCE AT EACH SUMMIT CONFERENCE

	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
Full Members						
Countries	24	46	53	73	84	89
Provisional Govern- ments	1	0	0	2	0	0
Liberation movements	0	1	0	0	1	3
Special status	0	0	0	0	1	1
	<u>25</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>OBSERVERS</u>						
Countries	3	10	9	8	9	12
Provisional Govern- ments	0	0	1	0	0	0
Liberation movements	17	?	0	15	6	2
Other NGO or INGO	17	?	0	2	2	2
U.N. Organization	0	0	1	1	1	1
O.A.U.	0	1	1	1	1	1
Arab League	0	0	0	1	1	1
Islamic Conf.	0	0	0	1	1	1
	<u>37</u>	<u>12+</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>

Cont'd..

SUMMARY OF ATTENDANCE AT EACH SUMMIT CONFERENCE Cont'd

Full Members	1961 Belgrade	1964 Cairo	1970 Lusaka	1973 Algiers	1976 Colombo	1979 Havana
<b>GUESTS</b>						
Countries	0	0	2	3	7	8
Liberation Movements	0	0	10	0	0	0
Other NGO or INGO	0	0	1	0	0	0
U.N. Organization	0	0	0	0	0	7
Other IO'S	0	0	0	0	0	4
	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>19</u>
Total Governments*	28	56	65	86	100	109
Total of all Organizations	62	59+	78	107	114	132

+ For the Lusaka Summit different sources identify different numbers of liberation movements present as guests: Ten includes all these mentioned in the separate sources.

\* Governments here include full members, observers and guests that were widely recognised countries, plus the provisional governments, but not including the liberation movements or Belize.

See: Willetts, Peter., Non-aligned in Havana, 1981, op.cit, pp.60-63.

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