ECONOMY AND THE STATE IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA: A SOCIOLIGICAL APPROACH

Luis Valenzuela

VOLUME I

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D.
of the University of Keele, Staffordshire.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the development of economic and ideological forms of domination of the state over the exploited classes, Indians, African slaves and poor whites, in colonial Spanish America.

Agriculture was throughout the colonial period the main economic activity both in terms of the labour force employed and its economic value. The initial control of the productive process by the Indian communities was slowly replaced by the increasing production of the big landed estates owned by Spaniards. The expansion of Spanish production was more rapid in those regions where urban centres and mining production created substantial markets for agricultural production.

Gold and especially silver mining was the main export economic activity during the period. It used a relatively small labour force but its value was high and it stimulated commodity production in agriculture and industry. Industry was of little importance, both in terms of its economic value and the labour force employed, and was limited by both European imports and domestic production.

The forms of labour used by Spanish enterprises were determined mainly by the existence or absence of an abundant and politically organised aboriginal population, the impact of the regional or world market, and political factors including the pressure of the colonists, the resistance of the exploited and the regulating action of the state.

The Catholic church was the main state ideological apparatus in colonial Spanish America. It had control over education

and health care and during the 16th century it legitimised the Spanish conquest, regulated Indian-Spanish relations and gave ideological support to the process of conquest. The importance of these functions decreased as the civil state apparatuses developed, the process of conquest receded and the church developed sources of income which created interests in common with the colonists.

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Preface

The characterisation of the dominant mode of production in colonial Spanish America has been the object of a long debate among Latin American Marxists. A large part of the difficulties encountered in solving the problem rests on the misunderstandings derived from different conceptions of society and history which are, furthermore, not always explicit. Another substantial part of the difficulties results from the relative lack of empirical studies of Spanish American economic history and materialist studies of the superstructure. In this thesis we attempt to make a contribution to this task, clearly specifying our assumptions and the limits of the data collected.

We will begin by stating our conception of society and history within the framework of historical materialism and we will then outline the constituent elements of the Spanish American colonial social formation; that is, the prehispanic societies, the social structures of Castille at the time of the conquest and the process of conquest itself.

In the second part of this thesis we will analyse the economic structure of colonial Spanish America. Here we will start by analysing the labour systems imposed by the Spanish colonists on the aboriginal population and African slaves and the limitations imposed by the state on the exploitation of these peoples. We will also examine the limits imposed by demographic factors, the impact of the markets, profitability of the enterprises and availability of capital in the labour system employed.

We will then go on to study the development of the agrarian structure and the formation and expansion of the landed property of the big Spanish landed estates (haciendas) and the consequent weakening of the Indian landed patrimony. We will then examine the economic performance of the hacienda and its connection with other agricultural producers such as Indian communities, tenants and so on. Here we will consider the specific forms of labour used by the haciendas, their markets and profitability, access to capital and the stability of the landowning class.

To round off our study of the economic structure we will analyse mining and industrial production, their dynamics, the types of labour force employed, capital formation and technological developments. We will argue that the commercial policies of the Spanish state constituted an important element in both the relative success of mining production and the virtual collapse of the most dynamic sector of industry, the textile sector.

In the last part of this thesis we will deal with the dominant ideological state apparatus of the Spanish empire, the Catholic church. Here we will start by examining the politico-ideological conjuncture of 16th century Spain in relation to the rights of the Spanish crown to rule in the Indies and the debate about the legal rights of the Amerindians. Then we will go on to examine the expansion of the church in the Indies, both in terms of the creation of a secular hierarchy and the missionary work of the religious orders who were in direct contact with the Indian flock. We will show that this missionary work was an effective means of

'domesticating' the aborigines, spreading the Spanish system of values and beliefs and thus cementing the military conquest.

We will then examine the economic resources of the church and its policies in relation to the exploitation of the Indians. It will be shown that during the period both the secular and religious arms of the church amassed substantial wealth, through the acquisition and management of productive enterprises, lending money and levying the tithe. This created an economic independence in relation to the civil administration and at the same time created economic interests common to the Spanish entrepreneurs. This was to a large extent reflected in the increasingly compromising attitude of the church vis-a-vis the exploitation of the Indians.

Finally we will examine the effects of religious indoctrination on the Amerindian peoples. It will be shown that the world view and practices of the colonial Amerindians were still permeated by religious values and beliefs which reflected and articulated their conformity, accommodation or rebellion vis-a-vis the political order.

PART I: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter we attempt to define the main concepts used in the following chapters and outline the theories which guide our research. This will show the reader the theoretical limits of the research as well as, in part, the criteria for the selection of the facts which are presented and organised in the following chapters. Obviously the outline presented below touches on a series of theoretical problems which have been debated at length within Marxist thought. We have avoided a detailed discussion of these issues here limiting ourselves to referring to our sources, but we will take up some of these problems in relation to colonial Spanish America in our conclusions.

Below we deal successively with the economic structure, the modern state and religious ideology.

a) The economic structure

To provide for their needs human beings appropriate and transform nature by applying to an object of labour (nature itself or an already transformed natural object or raw material) their physical and intellectual ability (labour power) with the help of instruments of labour (tools, machinery or any other thing(s) which mediate between the labourer and the object of labour and are necessary for production). Production, the result of the labour process, does not exhaust the 'economy' which is also formed by exchange, distribution and consumption. Although the latter are far from irrelevant and react on production, they are determined by production in so far as (a) there is no exchange without a division of labour corresponding to a particular stage of the process of production, (b) only

the results of production or the means of production (objects and instruments of labour) can be distributed and (c) production provides the objects of consumption.

The labour process considered in abstract above does not exist historically but under the determination of specific relations of production and a specific development of the productive forces. The relations of production are defined by the possession or non-possession of the means of production by the direct producers. These relations imply, in exploitative relations of production, the existence of a class of direct producers, dispossessed of the means of production, and a class of owners of the means of production and non-direct producers who extract surplus labour from the direct producers. In cooperative relations of production (those of the primitive community and communism) the difference between necessary labour (the proportion of labour time necessary to cover the reproduction of labour power both at the level of the individual and society, that is the production of new direct producers over time) and surplus labour remains, but surplus labour instead of being appropriated by a class of non-producers serves purposes of accumulation or is socially redistributed. The productive forces are the way in which the producers appropriate nature and this involves the degree of technical development of the means of production and the form in which production is technically organised (i.e. autonomy of the producer, simple or complex cooperation, etc.)

Historically relations of production and productive forces appear indissolubly combined in specific modes of production. The fact that relations of production and productive forces always appear combined means that they do not have a separate

existence but this does not imply a strict correspondence between them. The mode of production constitutes the economic structure of a society and determines in the last instance its superstructure, viz. its political and ideological instances. It does so by creating in the process of production itself different classes with objectively opposed interests (particularly in relation to the augmentation or decrease of surplus labour) and exacerbating these contradictions in critical periods.(i) These contradictions and crises are reflected in the superstructure which in turn reacts on the infrastructure by creating the possibility of a transformation of the relations of production or a reduction in the antagonistic character of the class contradictions by mediation or repression. The superstructure also has effects on the reproduction of the mode of production under 'normal' conditions. Thus the ideological apparatuses provide the conditions which ensure that the direct producer becomes a good worker both in terms of the acceptance of the relations of production and technically. It also provides for the reproduction of labour power over time through the family or the community.

The reproduction of the relations of production therefore is not only tendentially ensured by the economic dynamic of the mode of production, which will be studied below, but also by the superstructure. This implies that the study of modes of production requires the study of the social formations where historical modes of production are born, reproduced and disappear. The location of a mode of production in its concrete

(i) In cooperative modes of production the social possession of the means of production and the direct or social control over the process of production tend to eliminate the conditions of emergence or reappearance of social classes. This tendency is reinforced by a political instance and an ideology which reproduce these relations of production.

site permits a study of the transformations in its necessary relations with the superstructure and its relations of subordination or domination with other modes of production. It also permits us to think the effects of the class struggle (struggle between classes generated by the same or different modes of production) and the manifestations of this struggle (economic, political and ideological) in the social totality.(1)

This conception of history and society implies for the researcher the primacy of the study of the relations of production in concrete social formations, the relations of domination/subordination between different relations of production and their combination with specific productive forces. This permits a definition of social classes in specific social formations, their material contradictions and, in the last instance, provides the key to understanding political and ideological practices. Obviously no research starts in a vacuum. Marxist research has studied the dominant modes of production of a number of historical social formations and although serious disagreements exist over the usefulness of some of them as theoretical tools, the definition of the concept (or notion) of specific historical modes of production will provide us with a starting point for our analysis of colonial Spanish American social formations. Below we outline the main characteristics of precapitalist modes of production.(ii)

1) The primitive Community.

In this mode of production the productive forces are

(ii) We will refer here only to those modes of production which have relevance for the colonial Spanish American social formations. Thus we will not deal with the ancient mode of production or pre-agricultural modes (Nomadism, hunting and gathering).

reduced to human energy and instruments of work which are produced and used individually. Agriculture is the main productive activity and this presupposes the knowledge of techniques which, in particular ecological environments, permit the production and storage of food necessary for the physical reproduction of the community over time (e.g., in between harvests, in times of drought, etc.). The possession/ownership of the means of production (lands, seeds) appears linked to membership of the community through real or adopted relations of kinship (affinity or filiation). These not only imply relations of production characterised by cooperation between the members of the community but also a system of power and an ideology which gives cohesion to the community and which permits the reproduction of the relations of production. The structure of power within the community is determined by the control of the means of production and reproduction of individuals, i.e. food and women, by the elders and is reinforced by an ideology which exalts the elders and the ancestors and imposes sexual prohibitions which make the control of women by the elders effective. The distribution of the product is determined within the community by the principles of reciprocity and redistribution. This means a system of advances and restitutions of seeds and foodstuffs which operates cyclically (that is from older to younger generations) and does not tend to create social classes. A surplus product does exist but instead of being appropriated by a specific social group is spent on sacrifices or ritual feasts.(2)

2) The tributary or 'Asiatic' mode of production.

In this mode of production the ownership of land is in the hands of the ruler of the state. This presupposes the

non-existence of private property in land (as opposed to its possession which is more or less recognised by custom) and the existence of a system of political domination based on the use of the threat of violence. The primitive communities under the political domination of the ruler, who is usually the head of a community which is linked by ties of kinship, pay a tribute in kind or in labour to the ruler. Within the dominated communities the relations of production remain those of the primitive communities with the difference that part or all of the surplus product or labour is appropriated by the dominant community through the state. The productive forces are developed by using part of the tribute for works which permit an increase in the productivity of labour and the social division of labour (hydraulic works, roads, etc.). These works imply forms of simple cooperation in the labour process but remain relatively external to the community. Thus co-operation in major public works is performed under the command and the direction of the state by the communities or by personnel paid by the state. The reproduction of the mode of production is based on the continued existence of the threat of force, the growth of the productive forces (expansion of land under cultivation, submission of their communities, public works, etc.) and a system of legitimation which incorporates the political and ideological background of the subjected communities into a comprehensive system (religion, a transformed and exploitative version of the principles of reciprocity and redistribution, etc.).(3)

3) Slavery.

In the slave mode of production the relations of production are defined by the ownership of the means of production and

of the direct producers (the slaves) by a class of slave owners who, because they have possession of all the objective conditions of labour, appropriate the product and realise it in the market. This process presupposes (a) the development of private property in land and its relative concentration, (b) the development of commodity production to a significant extent and (c) the existence of a state which politically recognises and guarantees the exploitation of the slaves by their owners. The slave owner completely controls the process of production and the slave is separated from the means of production both legally (he or she has no property) and technically (they have no control over the productive process). As a counterpart the slave owner, to maintain the physical strength of the worker, is compelled to provide food, clothing and lodging for the slaves or to allow them to spend time and energy in the provision of them themselves. This necessary labour, the cost of obtaining the slaves and the surveillance necessary to make them work are factors which limit the expansion of slave relations of production. Therefore these relations of production can only be dominant in a social formation where the local population is insufficient to provide labour power or surplus product under other relations of production,or where political and economic circumstances impede this (e.g. the existence of self sufficient free peasants with real rights over the land they work). These limitations are counterbalanced by the possibility of a higher degree of development of the productive forces in the slave mode of production. The concentration of significant numbers of permanent full-time workers in one productive unit permits simple cooperation, the specialisation of labourers in specific

tasks and the specialisation of entire agricultural enterprises in the cultivation and processing of crops which are highly demanding technically and very rewarding in terms of returns for the slave owner. (4)

4) Feudalism.

In the feudal mode of production the relations of production are defined by the ownership of the land by a class of feudal lords and the extraction of surplus from the masses of serfs or semi free peasants (the direct producers) by means of rent in the form of labour, kind or money. The units of production are constituted by the lands of the direct producers, usually family plots, which provide for their subsistence needs (and in the case of rent paid in kind or money also the surplus) and the demesne of the feudal lord worked by the serfs which provides the surplus product. The technical independence of the direct producer in the production of his means of subsistence and the existence of areas of uncultivated land mean that the use of extra economic coercion to extract the surplus from the direct producers is essential. This coercion varies from monopoly rights over certain services (grain milling, baking etc.) to total adscription to the land or serfdom. (5)

5) The transition to capitalism.

The transition from feudalism or other modes of production to capitalism can only be analysed in relation to specific social formations with their own concrete combination of modes of production, forms of state, development of the class struggle and so on. Here we will limit ourselves to pointing out the preconditions of existence of the capitalist

mode of production. Firstly the capitalist mode of production presupposes the existence of a mass of juridically free labourers, secondly capitalism presupposes the separation of these labourers from the means of production, thus compelling them by economic means to sell their labour power in order to obtain their means of subsistence. Thirdly and partially as a consequence of (b) capitalism presupposes a high development of commodity production. Finally it presupposes the concentration of money wealth in the hands of a capitalist or would be capitalist class able to purchase the means of production and labour power in the market for use in productive consumption. (6)

b) The Modern State[iii]

As we have seen, the reproduction of the mode of production requires the intervention of the ideological and political structures in the economic structure. This intervention takes place through the mediation of the bearers or supports of the structures (e.g. the agents of production) who are organised in social classes and, through their economic, political and ideological practices, maintain or transform these structures. In class societies the juridico-political structure of a social formation is constituted by the state which is its centre of power. The power of the state, or more strictly the power of the social class(es) whose interests the state serves, gives cohesion to the different levels of the social formation regulating the practices of the existing social classes and permitting the reproduction of the social conditions of production. The achievement and maintenance of such cohesion requires the relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis society. This means that to accomplish the objective, long term interests of the ruling class(es) the state may act

(iii) By modern state we understand the late feudal (absolutist) and the capitalist type of state.

against the immediate interests of members or fractions of these classes but does not mean neutrality in the struggle between the exploited and ruling classes.

The state maintains the unity of the instances of the social formation by imposing or encouraging those class practices which are considered to serve the interests of the ruling class(es) and discouraging or banning those which do not serve them by means of repression, ideological indoctrination and, to a lesser extent, by direct and indirect intervention in the economy. These functions are embodied in specific state apparatuses which include all those institutions which serve or could serve the interests of the ruling classes, whether they are juridically public or private. Within the modern state repressive state apparatuses (government, army, police, courts, etc.,) increase their size and importance and become the core of the state. They centralise the means of repression and the control of repressive practices under unified command. On the contrary the ideological state apparatuses (the churches, the educational and cultural systems, etc.,) and their branches tend to acquire a relative autonomy first from the dominant ideological apparatus, which during the middle ages was the church, and later from the government. A consequence of this relative autonomy of the Ideological State Apparatuses is that it creates a space for the influence of the ideology of the non-hegemonic classes or fractions within the ruling class(es).

c) Religious Ideology, Religious Apparatuses, Religious Practices

The religious field, that is the set of religious practices produced and reproduced by relatively coherent religious apparatuses bearing a particular group of explicit or implicit

assumptions about the world, society and their process of development, stands relatively associated with/separated from/ opposed to/congruent with the constituted political power, other ideological practices and the forces operating in the economic structure. The contradictions generated in these three spheres, important as they are, do not totally determine the religious field. The constitution of the religious field itself, and to a greater extent, the constitution of a hierarchal, coherent religious apparatus with an organised corps of priests, body of doctrine and set of regulations, both for the cult and relating to important aspects of private and social life, eliminate or tend to eliminate as legitimate the competition of other religious practitioners (magicians, diviners and prophets and priests of other cults). To acquire monopoly over the control of legitimate religious practices, the apparatus in question (in this case the church as opposed to sect or ecclesia) needs the support of the political power and a degree of sophistication, in terms of doctrine and practices, which gives the religion a plausibility and emotional impact and which at the same time makes it impossible for the layperson to fulfil the same functions without a process of initiation into the 'secrets' of the cult and doctrine. Once the apparatus has been established, it has to maintain this monopoly by constantly repressing the external danger represented by popular religion and prophets as well as keeping their own more 'deviant' ranks in line.(iv) This,in turn,

(iv) In medieval Christianity, the Order of St. Francis presented a case of special concern for the established church. Their emphasis on apostolic poverty in contrast with the worldly attitude of the church led to two major breaks within their ranks. The 'Spirituals' in the 13th century and the Fraticelli in the 14th and 15th centuries, both created parallel organisations and were repressed by the Catholic church. However, a

requires the setting up of special tribunals to deal with systematic religious deviance, a recorded body of doctrine and a special training system which can homogenise the practices of the church everywhere and reproduce and expand the corps of priests to cover a larger flock. In order to retain or to impose this monopoly the church (or would be church) requires the concurrence of the politically constituted power. This is in order to carry out the material destruction of non-authorised religious practitioners as well as to acquire or retain the economic basis which permits the maintenance of a corps of specialised, non-productive priests (beneficees, dowries, monasteries, etc.), and the means of performing the cult (temples, symbolic paraphernalia etc.). As a counterpart to this the church provides the means of legitimation of political power and the social order and 'domesticates' the masses by standardisation, not only of religious but also of moral and social practices through the cult, its doctrine and the institutions under its control (schools, hospitals etc.). These practices are the realisation of social (moral, productive, political etc.) codes which are objectified to a greater or lesser extent and are products of previous practices accumulated by mere repetition and recognition of its actuality and which are later legitimised as 'necessity' by the ideological practitioners. The symbiotic relationship between the church and political power is however imperfect. The historical forms of this relation: theocracy, hierocracy and caesaropapism - to use Weberian terminology - and the more or less secular state, along with the transformation of one into the other, reveal the

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substratum of non-conformity towards the opinions of the popes, who considered as heresy the assertion of the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles, persisted in the division between the 'observants', Franciscans maintaining a strict rule of poverty, and the more worldly 'conventuals'.(8)

struggle between church and political power in order (a) to control the means of legitimation and the other ideological apparatuses and (b) on the part of the church to retain a set of privileges (administrative, judicial, economic etc.).

While the second case resembles the corporate needs of all bodies of specialists (the army, the bureaucracy, the professions, etc.) the first one has a societal scope and aims at monopolising the control of the principles which guide the construction of social reality.

The interdependence of the religious field and apparatuses and the economic structure can be established on three main counts:

(a) the increasing relative autonomy of the religious field and the emergence of religious specialists and the consequent sophistication of religious ideology (monotheism, systematisation of morals, etc.) are strongly associated with the social division of labour, society's split into classes and the process of urbanisation,

(b) the division between intellectual and manual work, of which the dichotomy religious/lay is only one aspect, rests on the privileged position of the church as regards the allocation of economic resources (stipends paid by the secular power, levying of special taxes, landed property, investments of almsgivings etc.).

(c) Finally, the following of a new religion, or the religiosity/irreligiosity of the 'flock' of an established church, varies according to economic practices (for instance the paganism of the peasantry) and each strata of society emphasises different aspects of the religion according to their own mental schema.

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At the ideological level the religious apparatus tends

to control (by means of patronage, suppression or censorship) the whole ideological field, stimulating or inhibiting the development of autonomous ideological fields (art, jurisprudence, science, etc.)

Religious ideology, as other forms of ideology, operate through cognitive and normative principles. Myths, cosmogonies and, in a more sophisticated way, theology, incorporate history, the social order and an explanation of both in their discourse. At the same time religious ideologies, prescribe a set of practices, compatible with that explanation, which help to reproduce the social order. The cognitive content of religion involves special (arbitrary) assumptions about the social order and its organisation, thus religion privileges (or sanctifies the privileges of) certain lineages, ethnic groups or classes. The consolidation of these assumptions into unquestionable social reality (doxa) implies a process of legitimation which transforms the de facto result of economic practices, kinship practices, wars, etc., into objective necessity. The questioning of the 'doxa' by disaffected groups or individuals can result in either the constitution of a new church and possibly a reorganisation of the social relations or, more likely, a sophistication of the orthodox discourse by enlarging its explanatory power and eventually incorporating within it the heterodox 'gods continuing to live on as demons'[v]. In its daily practice the constituted

(v) Cohn brilliantly traces back the witch stereotype, usually associated in the minds of the persecutors with the cult of the devil, to the beginnings of Christianity. At that time the emergent Christian church was accused of slaughtering small babies, orgies, etc., by the Romans. Conversely, for the Fathers of Christianity, the persistence of pagan religions was the work of the devil. The witch-stereotype, Cohn demonstrates, was applied in the Middle Ages to emerging Christian heresies (the Fraticelli, Waldesians), practitioners of ritual

church finds and deals with unsystematic deviations (as opposed to organised religious deviations such as heresy and apostasy. In these cases methods of therapy, i.e. communion/penitence, are used to correct heterodox practices and beliefs.) Both the elimination of organised deviation (theoretically and practically) and the therapy of unsystematic deviations contribute to the reinforcement of the effectivity of the doxa as an unquestionable area of arbitrary assumptions, while the appearance and maintenance of heterodox practices, and even more so organised deviation, removes the dogmas from the terrain of necessity (doxa) to that of possibility (orthodoxy/heterodoxy) in which both religious discourses compete for legitimacy. This competition involves the natural questioning of the legitimising power of both systems (heterodoxy/orthodoxy), that is their capacity to explain the social order and their implicit strategies to keep it as it is or to transform it. In this process whole areas of what was considered unquestionable may be put into question, opening up the experiential and therefore cognitive universe of society, particularly for the social sectors materially interested in transforming the social order[vi].

Finally the domination of the religious field over the rest of the ideological fields in pre-secular societies implies the active participation of the church in the processes

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magic and eventually enemies of the political power. The Christian devil travelled to America in the minds and writings of the Spanish clergy and laiety and was quickly assimilated with the pre-hispanic deities. This did not lead to massive burnings and witch-hunt hysteria as in some countries in 17th century Europe. The Spanish clergy both in America and the peninsular did not lose a sense of reality, and accusations and self-accusations of sorcery were treated leniently in Spain. Likewise in America, pagan practices did not imply capital punishment for the Indian practitioners unless they were clearly associated with political revolt. (9)

(vi) The supremacy of the pope and the whole machinery established

of political transformation (wars, class struggle, liberation movements etc.) and, conversely, the expression of political thought in the categories elaborated by the religious ideologies. (vii)(11)

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by the papacy to administer the church is a case in point. Its rejection was common-place in medieval heretic movements, and the protestant schism gave it a material realisation. This erosion of papal economic, political and ideological power and the consequent concession of privileges in ecclesiastic matters to Catholic kings led to the further deterioration of papal power, (cf Gallicanism and the overwhelming Catholic regalism of the 18th century). (10)

(vii) cf. 'The middle ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology - philosophy, politics, jurisprudence - and made them sub-divisions of theology. It thereby constrained every social and political movement to take a theological form. The sentiments of the masses were fed with religion to the exclusion of all else, it was therefore necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious guise in order to produce an impetuous movement'. (12)

It is necessary to qualify this assertion. Firstly, the list of medieval mass movements, revolts etc. with clerical participation, direction or religious ideology is impressive, however there is a core of mass movements in the late middle ages in which clerics and religious ideology played little or no part, while juridical ideology seems to have played an important role.

As Maravall has pointed out for the Spanish case there seems to be no unilinear development of secularism. He observed that Spanish kingship from the 10th to the 13th century had a secularised vision of power while Ferdinand V and Charles II (16th century) gave their rule religious connotations. We are faced, in Spain, with a contradictory process. On the one hand the monarchs (at least from the 16th century onwards) tried to curtail the power of the church while at the same time making great political use of it, (repression of real or potential enemies of the political unity of Spain through the Inquisition, domesticating the American Indians through missionaries etc.). On the other hand ecclesiastics, while defending their prerogatives put forward theological positions which differentiated temporal power and spiritual affairs thus giving a powerful impulse to secularisation (13).

Chapter 2: Constituent elements in the formation of colonial Spanish America

In this chapter we will examine the origins of colonial Spanish America, namely the prehispanic Amerindian societies, Spanish society at the time of the conquest and the process of conquest itself.

Colonial Spanish America emerged during the 16th century from modes of production and, to a lesser extent, political forms of organisation and systems of beliefs and values which were already established on American soil before the conquest. Despite the fact that the Spaniards introduced new political and ideological structures and, in some cases, new relations of production, the geographical expansion and acceptance of the new order by the Amerindian peoples was conditioned by the social structures and practices already in existence before the conquest. The capacity of the conquerors to establish a form of domination which related to the ideologies and practices of the conquered was also conditioned by the interests and strength of the conquering nation in the economic, political and ideological fields. The adequate supply of personnel, instruments of production and weaponry and communications with Spain also depended on these interests and strength. Finally, colonial Spanish America was also the result of the process of conquest itself which cannot be reduced to the social structures of the conquered and conquering peoples. Important factors in this process were for instance the alliances between different Amerindians or Spanish factions, the intervention of the state to regulate the conquest, the different strategies adopted in different times and places to subordinate the Amerindian societies, etc.

a) Prehispanic America.

Prehispanic American societies cannot be considered as a unity. In the area which is now known as Spanish America several human groups with different characteristics existed. They ranged from nomadic hunters and gatherers with no social organisation apart from the nuclear family and the occasional hunting band to the sophisticated social organisation of the Inca empire and the Aztec confederacy. Between these two poles a variety of societies of different degrees of social complexity existed. We will limit ourselves to the analysis of prehispanic Mesoamerica and the central Andean region, both of which played a key economic and political role during the colonial period, and will give a rapid overview of the remaining Amerindian societies at the time of the conquest.

1. Mesoamerica.

Mesoamerica is formed by Central and Southern Mexico and territories of present day Guatemala and Honduras (see map). It is made up of three plateaux cut across by valleys and mountains and separated from the inhospitable coastal plains by the eastern and western Sierra Madre. The central plateau is the site of the Valley of Mexico, the most fertile area of Mesoamerica and which had a remarkable economic and political importance before and during the colonial period. The southern central and southern plateaux (Oaxaca and the plain of Guatemala respectively) also have fertile valleys but their agricultural potential is more limited. (1)

Mesoamerica was very early the place of settlement of advanced cultures. By 1500 B.C. agricultural villages began to develop and by c. 200 A.D. this had led, through a process which has yet to be established, to the formation of city states.

These city states reached a relatively high level of development in scientific and technological matters which permitted the construction of gigantic buildings, the presence of a system of writing, a calendar and probably sophisticated systems of irrigation. Social stratification also emerged with military or theocratic rulers and nobilities, traders, commoners and slaves. The population of these city states might have reached, in some cases, 100,000 or more inhabitants but unfortunately the level of political integration (territories controlled by each city state, formation of empires or confederacies etc.,) of the whole area during this period is unknown, although the city state of Teotihuacan in the central plateau seems to have played a key role. (2)

By the beginning of the 10th century A.D. all the big city states had lost their power and had been abandoned or destroyed (Teotihuacan, Monte Alban in the central south plateau and the Maya cities), although minor cities survived. This collapse is attributed by Katz to a combination of factors, among them the deterioration of agriculture, revolts and external attacks from the south and, more importantly, the invasion of the Toltecs from the north in the 9th or 10th century A.D. The Toltecs, an agricultural but relatively unsophisticated people, rapidly came to dominate most areas in Mesoamerica ranging from the peninsula of Yucatan to the central plateau where they founded their capital, Tula. However, the empire rapidly disintegrated into several city states. Major internal conflicts and new invasions in the 11th and 12th centuries destroyed Tula and its citizens withdrew to small cities. The new invaders, among them the Aztecs, were far more barbaric than the Toltecs and their immediate achievements were also small. They con-

quered the north eastern part of the Valley of Mexico, which was of little agricultural value, and received the patronage of other city states usually as mercenaries or allies. (3)

By c. 1330 the Aztecs had settled in Tenochtitlan, an island in the middle of the Texcoco lake which was of great agricultural value and had received the patronage of the powerful Atzcapotzalco city state as mercenaries. As tributaries and allies of Atzcapotzalco they took part in the military campaigns which resulted in Atzcapotzalco controlling the whole Valley of Mexico and some other regions. The rule of Atzcapotzalco over the Valley of Mexico came to an end in 1433 when his old allies, the Aztecs, and former tributary states (Texcoco and Tacuba) successfully rebelled and established their own rule over the Valley of Mexico. In the mid 15th century military expansion outside the Valley of Mexico by the triple Alliance (the Aztecs of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tacuba) began. By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards they had extended their dominion over most of central Mexico from coast to coast, although some city states managed to avoid their control (Tlaxcala for instance), and on the West they were effectively stopped by the Tarascan of Michoacan in 1480. Also free from Aztec domination were the Huaxteca and Meztitlan on the north eastern border of Mesoamerica, Tlapaneca and Tototepec on the southern Pacific coast, Zapoteca and Coatzacualco in the isthmus of Tehuantepec and the major areas of Yucatan, southern Mexico and Guatemala. Some of these societies (i.e. Michoacan and Tototepec) were small empires resembling the triple Alliance but having less economic and political power, while most of the other territories were the site of small states loosely connected politically, like

Tlaxcala or the Mayas at the time of the conquest. (4)

Within the territories controlled by the triple Alliance several semi-autonomous states existed. They had arable land, urban production and a tribute system which permitted them to maintain local bureaucracies or nobilities as well as to pay tribute to the confederation or other semi-autonomous states which were in turn tributary to the Alliance. States that refused Aztec domination and were defeated militarily lost their independence and their leadership was replaced by governors sent by the triple Alliance. (5)

Social organisation among the Aztecs changed a good deal between the time prior to their settlement in the Valley of Mexico and the Spanish conquest (1519-21). The original basic social unit of the Aztecs was, as in most of central Mexico, the calpulli. The calpulli was a semi-democratic social unit based on real or ideological links of kinship. Ownership of the land was vested in the calpulli and its members (or macehualtin) cultivated and used it but could not sell or lease it. Failure to cultivate the land led to its loss and its subsequent distribution to non members of the calpulli. Its leader was elected but always from the same lineage and was assigned a plot of land which other members of the calpulli worked on his behalf. (6)

The structure of the calpulli changed little until the arrival of the Spaniards but inequalities between different calpulli arose. Very soon after the Aztec settlement in the Valley of Mexico functional differences among the calpulli seem to have developed. Some were dedicated exclusively to agriculture while a minority were dedicated to government and religious affairs. These differences increased even more later

on with the appearance of calpulli traders and craftsmen. In parallel to this the supra-calpulli organisation of the Aztecs was radically modified. In 1376, long before their independence from Atzcapotzalco (1427), the Aztecs nominated a chief speaker, representative of all the calpulli, to whom special lands were assigned which were cultivated by different calpulli chosen on a rota system. Apart from this the chief speaker had his own lands (i.e. different from those attached to his office) which were cultivated by bondsmen (or mayeques). The original power of the chief speaker was, however, limited. His successor was elected from his lineage and to declare war he had to have the favourable vote of the war council which was constituted by different representatives of the calpulli and outstanding warriors. The nobility was initially recruited according to war services and the chief speaker had nothing to do with their nomination. However the descendants of the chief speaker became an adscribed aristocracy as did the descendants of the successful warriors when military expansion began. (7)

Aztec conquests in the Valley of Mexico permitted the appropriation of lands by the state and the nobility. State lands were worked by the commoners of the calpulli on a rota basis while the lands of the nobility were cultivated by mayeques who, while retaining the right to usufruct of the land, paid part of their produce to the nobles as rent. The rights of these nobles could be transferred to other nobles or to merchants. Apart from this, representatives of the triple Alliance with military, judicial and administrative duties were appointed in each calpulli. They were assigned lands within the calpulli and a number of workers (teccaleque) to cultivate them. The teccaleque was a group of members of the calpulli

only differing from the common macehuales in that they paid their tribute to a representative of the triple Alliance instead of directly to the state. (8)

To round off this outline of the social structure of the triple Alliance it is necessary to mention two other social strata: the merchants (pochteca) and tlatacotin. The merchants were an influential class among the states of the triple Alliance. They controlled the long distance trade between the Valley of Mexico and the southern lowlands of Mesoamerica importing valuable items such as cacao, cotton, gold, etc., and exporting manufactured goods. They had a wide network of commercial contacts throughout Mesoamerica and were able to obtain commodities that the empire could not obtain through conquest and the subsequent tributes. The pochteca class obtained extensive rights from the rulers of the triple Alliance who appreciated their council, services as spies in foreign territories, their presents and tributes which were paid in kind. Tlatacotin was, in contrast to pochteca, not a hereditary status. They were people who as punishment for criminal acts or through economic need became servants of a buyer or the person affected by the crime until the tlatacotin or his family could redeem the debt or the crime. In cases of grave offences tlatacotin could be kept indefinitely until they were sacrificed. (9)

The state created by the triple Alliance was based on military expansion and the tribute paid by the dependent states and communities. Additional duties of the dependent units were the contribution of warriors and foodstuffs for the military campaigns, and the acceptance of traders of the dominant states on their territories. For these purposes

tribute collectors and governors were appointed by the rulers of the Alliance and the army had to be increased by extensive recruitment within the calpullis. The maintenance and expansion of such political organisation needed a sound economic base which was developed through the use of the privileged environment of the Valley of Mexico and the construction of dams, channels and irrigation works for which tribute labour was used. This permitted not only an impressive population growth (300,000 people in Tenochtitlan alone) but also the political integration of the Valley through the dependence of its states on common hydraulic systems. (10)

By the eve of the Spanish conquest the triple Alliance controlled vast territories which were probably inhabited by over 8 million people. (11) The level of social complexity at the top levels of society (i.e. the hegemonic states) was high although at the bottom a semi democratic and relatively backward society of peasants continued to exist. The link between these two poles was weak and existed mainly through tribute exacted by means of the threat of, or actual, conquest. Its dissolution or reconstitution needed only further conquests.

2. The central Andean region and the Inca empire.

The central Andean region comprises what is today Peru and the north-western part of Bolivia. It is bounded by the Pacific Ocean in the west and by the tropical Amazonian basin in the east. The southern and northern limits of the region are less clear. South of the present Chilean border coastal valleys become scarcer and agriculture virtually impossible. In the north, beyond Tumbez on the border with Ecuador, the desert like coastal plain interspersed with valleys typical of

the region's coast gives place to tropical jungle. Within the region 3 natural areas can be distinguished: 1) the narrow coastal plain, 2) a series of plateaux and mountains full of deep valleys which have different climatic characteristics and 3) the hot and humid areas of the tropical jungle. This ecological setting created a complementary agricultural system where cotton and maize were produced on the coast, potatoes, quinua (a grain) and meat and wool from llama and other cameloids in the high plateau (or puna) and a combination of potatoes and maize in the deep valleys (sierra). (12)

The first important human settlements in the region seem to have been established around 1500-2000 B.C. on the central coast and were associated with fishing but also an incipient agriculture. After 1000 B.C. to 1300 A.D. a long, uneven and still unconvincingly explained process of development of the productive forces and social organisation occurred. These developments consisted of class differentiation, the formation of theocratic or military states and the emergence of multi-state organisations and at the technological level, the control of water resources through irrigation systems, the building of great terraces to avoid soil erosion and so on. (13)

Information about the region in the period before and following the Inca invasions (c. 1438) is more abundant although its interpretation is still a matter of controversy. By 1460 the Chimu kingdom controlled the north coastal plains probably down to the Lima Valley and possessed some enclaves in the northern highlands. As for their predecessors on the coast, the Mochica culture, the economic and political power of the Chimu rested on the development of irrigation works on a large scale which permitted the expansion of the areas under

cultivation, the emergence of marked class differences and the development of urban centres, among them Chan Chan with a population of 50 to 100,000 inhabitants. Urbanisation and warfare encouraged building on a large scale and the expansion of crafts, however trade seems to have been controlled by the state and so no independent merchant class appeared. (14)

Before the Inca expansion other political units reaching relatively high demographic density (i.e. of around 20,000 households) existed; there were probably state structures in the region as well. They were the Lupaca west of Lake Titicaca, the Wanka and Cajamarca in the central and northern highlands, Chincha on the southern coast and the Incas in the valley of Cuzco. For the rest of the many ethnic groups of the region the information available suggests their independence from major political organisation, democratic generation of their leadership and constant territorial or ritual warfare. (15)

In their beginnings the Incas were organised in ayllus (clans) and communities of ayllus. Ownership of the land was vested in the ayllu and it was redistributed periodically according to family size. Land was communally worked by all members of the ayllu excepting the old, the young and the sick. At the top of the community of ayllus there was a Sapay-Inca or chieftain with limited functions elected from only one ayllu by an assembly and a council of ayllu elders or warriors who made the decisions. By 1438 or soon afterwards this semi democratic system changed. A nobility of military or theocratic character emerged and the Inca rulers started imposing their own successors. (16)

Inca territorial expansion began in 1438 after the Chancas, a federation of tribes of the southern highlands, had attacked

and been defeated by them. The Incas then proceeded to conquer the surrounding ethnic groups of Cuzco, the central and northern highlands and most areas of Ecuador. From that strategic position they attacked the Chimu kingdom whose major fortifications were in the south and turned the situation against the Chimu by occupying the water sources in the highlands and threatening to block their supplies. In the following decades (1471-93) the empire expanded through the southern coast of Peru, eastern Bolivia and Argentina and Chile down to the Maule river where their expansion was halted militarily by the Mapuches. Conquest at a more limited level continued until 1525 including Cajamarca in the northern Peruvian highlands and the rest of highland and coastal Ecuador. There again expansion was effectively checked by the Pasto of southern Colombia. Thus an ethnic group of c. 100,000 members which controlled only part of the Valley of Cuzco grew, in about 90 years, into the dominant group of a vast empire which was comprised of territories stretching for over 3,000 miles with an estimated population of well over 12 million people before the arrival of the Spaniards. The key to the success of Inca territorial expansion did not reside in their military strength but in their political skill which enabled them to integrate the conquered people into their armies, to retain and develop already existing local structures of power, to establish multiple marital alliances, to construct a system of legitimation based on the categories of Andean thought and to permit, through a 'Pax Incaica', the retention or development of pre-Inca economic patterns. (17) A brief analysis of the social structure of the Inca empire on the eve of the conquest will substantiate these assertions.

The socio-economic organisation of the Inca state has been characterised as a combination of a) the pursuit and achievement of vertical control of different ecological levels by the ethnic groups, and b) the principles of reciprocity and redistribution. The former was based on the need of the ethnic groups to have access to products of different ecological areas (the high plateaux, main valleys, sub-tropical valleys). In the case of the Lupaca kingdom, with its centre on Lake Titicaca, cotton, maize and fertilisers were produced on the Pacific coast by ethnic colonies, potatoes and wool were produced on the high plateau around the lake and wood and coca were produced by the Lupaca colonies in the eastern tropical or subtropical plains or valleys. Other ethnic groups pursued the same ideal of self-sufficiency although this was achieved in many cases in more limited territories which contained within a relatively small area warm valleys and high plateaux. The Incas seem to have extended this pattern of ethnic self-sufficiency beyond the central Andean region. This is certainly true as far as Ecuador is concerned.

Circulation of goods and labour within the ethnic groups operated through relations of reciprocity and redistribution. (19) Thus the work done by members of one ayllu on the lands of another was recompensed by gifts such as food and by the promise of future cooperation on their lands. In the case of the lands of the chieftains (sometimes up to 50 or 100 times the normal size of the commoners' land) communal work (or mita) was enforced. All participants received food and drink as a form of reciprocity. This implied a process of concentration of wealth in the hands of the chieftain. However it seems

that the chieftains provided for the needs of the communities or specific commoners in times of difficulties (bad harvests, widowhood etc.) so the community chieftains must be considered as agents of redistribution. (20) The Inca invaders assimilated this scheme keeping it formally unaltered but in fact radically modifying the principles of reciprocity and redistribution. As a result of the conquest all land became legally the property of the Inca state which returned most of it in usufruct to the ayllus for their subsistence needs and kept a variable proportion for the cult of the sun (the Inca religion) and the state. This principle was also applied to the herds of cameloids possessed by the ayllus although in this case the proportion of animals actually appropriated by the Incas was far higher. As in the case of the chieftain's lands the state lands were worked by the community (excluding the chieftain) and the workers were recompensed with food and drinks. This real reciprocity, which was of course uneven since the objective was to provide a surplus for the state, was reinforced by the fictional generosity of the Inca who allowed the communities the usufruct of 'his' lands. In the case of state lands these seem to have been kept by yanes or serfs whose origin is obscure. Although the Inca state did not look after the welfare of the communities (this was the duty of the communities themselves and their chieftains) it did give back part of the surplus to them via the chieftains who received gifts (herds of cameloids, textiles and women,etc.) from the Inca. The state laid down duties for the communities which included service in the army, mines, manufacture of textiles, construction works,etc. These services (mita) were carried out on a rota basis and the Inca made retribution with

extra fibre for personal use in the case of textile manufacture, textiles and special food in the case of the army, and food and drink in all other cases. (21)

The management of an empire of such huge dimensions required the development of a military, religious and civil bureaucracy. Apart from the ethnic chieftains who organised the mita and dealt with the internal problems of the ayllus, nobles were in charge of the central and provincial government and they ensured that the different types of mita were performed, recorded the amounts of grain, textiles etc., in the state depots and organised warfare and the cult. This nobility was composed of the members of 10 ayllus of royal origin and the ayllus of Cuzco, the Inca capital. They enjoyed several privileges, among them exemption from the mita, a separate, more lenient, system of justice, allocation of yanas to work their lands and the right to use special types of symbols of prestige (jewelry, vicuna textiles etc.). On top of this they received the gifts of the Inca (jewelry, textiles, women, etc.,) because of their kinship relation to the Inca or their functions in the bureaucracy. The local chieftains were to a certain extent assimilated into this nobility. (22)

The 'generosity' of the Inca was only part of the expenditure of the Inca state. Military campaigns and the maintenance of garrisons on the frontiers demanded heavy expenditure, particularly given the privileged character of the army. The religious cult involved the sacrifice of animals, burning of textiles, heavy drinking of maize beer, the erection of temples and the maintenance of a non productive class of priests. Finally the construction and maintenance

of the agricultural, military and administrative infrastructure and services (roads, bridges, terraces, irrigation works etc.,) absorbed the remaining surplus of the empire. Here again redistribution reappears in the form of ritual consumption and public services which were imposed and controlled by the state and which legitimated Inca domination. (23)

The rapid expansion in its last 50 or 60 years increased the need of the state for specialists. The nobility had provided the state from its beginnings with able full time generals, priests and bureaucrats who supervised and organised the mitas of non specialists in the communities. Towards the end of the Inca period however full time weavers, silversmiths, shepherds and warriors who were either partially or totally under the control of the state or the nobility appeared. Their social status is not clear but they seem to have belonged to two main categories: mitimaes and yanas and acllas. The mitimaes were colonists sent by the Inca to peripheral areas to establish garrisons or to develop special crops. They produced their own means of subsistence but otherwise they can be considered professional soldiers or specialised producers since they had no mita obligations. In theory they retained links with their original ethnic groups but in fact they formed enclaves depending only on the state. Yanas and aclla were on the other hand truly servants of the state or nobility, they could be granted by the Incas to the nobility or the local chieftains. They served for life but their status was not truly hereditary. Thus yana status was inherited only by one descendant, the others were probably assimilated by the ethnic communities of origin, while acllas (mainly weavers) were either celibate

or the concubines of the Inca or the nobles. As servants of the Inca or the nobility they were exempt from the mita and they could specialise in what their lords saw fit, weaving, herding, growing special crops,etc. It seems that the yana stratum never constituted more than 1% of the population in the peripheral areas but reached higher proportions in the administrative centres, especially in Cuzco. Mitimaes were, on the other hand, much more important numerically outnumbering the original local population in some areas. (24)

By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards (1532) the society under Inca domination was suffering radical transformations. At the level of the communities a separation between the commoner and the chieftain was developing through the 'generosity' of the Inca, which increased the power of the chieftain. The community was also feeling the disruptive effects of forced emigration or immigration of mitimaes and the subjection of the community to units between the ayllu and the Inca empire which were not based on kinship. The demographic expansion of a polygamous nobility increased the pressure on the lands and human resources of the communities while the cessation of expansion at the beginning of the 16th century diminished the spoils to be taken by the nobility. According to Katz this would have provoked the rivalries between the nobility which ended in the civil war of 1525-32 between the two sons of the Inca for the succession. Weakened by the war and with an Inca just beginning to legitimise himself the empire was relatively easy prey for the Spanish conquistadores. (25)

1. Mesoamerica
2. Central Andean region
3. Confederations and Chiefdoms
4. Tropical forest villages
5. Non-tropical forest villages
6. Hunters and gatherers

Map 1: Native peoples of Spanish America

3. Other prehispanic social formations.

None of the social formations considered in this section reached the level of political organisation and development of the productive forces which existed in Mesoamerica and the central Andean region. However, state or proto-state organisation occurred among some of these peoples and different degrees of development of the productive forces can be discerned among them. These social formations can be classified into 1) Chiefdoms, 2) Non-tropical farming communities, 3) Tropical forest villages and 4) Nomadic hunting and gathering lineages.(i)

1) Chiefdoms were of different types and importance but their main features were surplus production and a high population density which were made possible by a privileged environment. This in turn permitted a division of labour, class formation and state development to varying degrees. The main productive activity among these peoples was intensive farming which in some cases required terraces and irrigation. Domestication of small animals and hunting and fishing complemented their diet. The relatively large population which inhabited the villages made technical specialisation (pottery, textiles, rudimentary metallurgy with prestige or ritual purposes, etc.,) and engineering works of some complexity (irrigation, road systems etc.) possible. A high population density also made hierarchical differentiation possible which might or might not be hereditary but which implied privileges

(i) This classification and most of the content of this section is taken from Steward and Faron 1959 passim. We have relabelled their 'Farmer and pastoralists' category as Non-tropical farming communities so as to include in it the peoples of north west Mexico who did not practise stock raising.

such as the reception of tributes, the practice of polygamy and the use of symbols of prestige by the upper echelons of the hierarchy. This hierarchy consisted of the chieftain, 'nobles' of military or theocratic character and the commoners. (26)

These chiefdoms were located around the Caribbean and the northern Andes, although proto chiefdoms also existed in eastern Bolivia (see map). The most important of these chiefdoms in terms of population and political organisation were those of the Muisca or Chibcha in the central Colombian highlands. They were organised into two big confederations or 'realms': the Zape around Bogota and Zaque around Tunja. Together they formed a population of 300,000 to 500,000 people at the time of the Spanish conquest and were politically and economically integrated through payment of tribute both in produce and labour. Regular trade within and outside their territories was practised to obtain gold (used in coins, jewelry or for ritual purposes) crafts, salt and so on. The basic unit of organisation of the Muisca was the 'parte' or 'capitania' with leaders of a probably hereditary character. One or more 'partes' formed a village (cacicazgo or chiefdom) which was under the rule of a hereditary chieftain who received the tribute of the 'partes' and had access to other privileges. By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards (1537) the chieftains of Bogota and Tunja had subjected around 40 other chiefdoms, some of which were already organised in confederations, to tribute and were about to fight each other to obtain total hegemony over the area. (27)

2) Non-tropical farming communities existed in the southern Andes

and north west Mexico. Their main characteristic was the lack of hereditary classes and political organisation beyond the isolated village or hamlet; the latter was probably formed by only one lineage. Among these people sedentary agriculture was the main activity supplemented by hunting and fishing and in the southern Andes by the raising of cameloids. The economy was simple with only restricted forms of commerce with the exception of the Atacamenos people bordering the central Andean region. Villages or hamlets were of low demographic density probably due to the absence of a suitable environment for intensive agriculture. The exception was the southern Andean region where the habitat provided for a population estimated to consist of between 500,000 to 1,500,000 inhabitants by the time of Spanish contact. In this case however the population was dispersed and villages remained small. (28)

3) Tropical forest villages. Like non tropical farming communities tropical forest villages lacked states, hereditary social classes and their population was sparse. Their economy was based on slash and burn agriculture as well as fishing and hunting. This type of agriculture in a tropical forest environment created the need for constant displacement of the villages in order to reach new lands which had not been exhausted by extensive cultivation. It seems that where communications between the village and their fields were eased by navigable rivers or the proximity of the coast the village population reached sizeable proportions. The social structure was based on kinship and sex and age differences. Prestige derived from participation in warfare provided additional social differentiation but was not heritable. (29)

4) Nomadic hunters and gatherers. The environments inhabited by these people were characterised by low food productivity and could therefore only support small populations. These societies depended on wild plants, animals and fish. Technology and material culture were poor due to constant mobility and the isolated and competitive practice that hunting and gathering implies. The scarcity of big mammals tended to diminish the importance of hunting bands who jealously protected their territories and, therefore, no social units beyond the multilineal band appeared. Their social structure was based on kinship, sex and age differences with no hierarchical or technical full time specialisation among their members. (30)

b) Castile before 1500

During the second decade of the 8th century Arab and Berber armies destroyed the Visigothic kingdom, gained control of most of the Iberian peninsula and turned it into a province of the Caliphate of Damascus. The Christian kingdom formed in the mountains of Asturias by the Visigothic refugees and later its off-shoots, Castile and Portugal,and in the eastern part of Spain the off-shoot of Charlemagne's empire, the Catalonians, fought to conquer or reconquer the whole peninsula until the last Moslem enclave in Granada was subjected in 1492.

This prolonged war and the Christian repopulation process that ensued created peculiarities in the development of the Spanish social formation and deserve to be dealt with in some detail. As the conquest of America was a process controlled exclusively by the crown of Castile we will limit ourselves to an analysis of the development of the reconquest of the territories which became part of this kingdom, that is modern

continental Spain minus the provinces bordering France and the Mediterranean provinces down to Alicante.

The first wave of Christian resettlement occurred in the 9th and 10th centuries in the desolate frontier area between the Cantabrian mountains and the river Duero. This colonising process was in part directed by the crown which delegated the power to organise settlements to the nobles and magnates. Probably in the majority of cases this process took place by 'spontaneous' colonisation, with or without the authorisation of the crown, which was then taken up by families, monasteries or lords and their dependants. To stimulate migration to these zones vast concessions in terms of personal freedom and rights were made to the settlers bringing about semi-autonomous communities of a democratic character, especially in Old Castile. A second period of territorial expansion occurred in the 11th and 12th centuries when Christian forces conquered the Muslim kingdom of Toledo in 1085 and reached and went beyond the Tagus river. The process of settlement that accompanied and followed military conquest was marked by increased state participation in the organisation of the settlements which included the choice of the site and the convocation of the new settlers. The settlements they founded were organised with town councils and endowed with rights and privileges and a vast territorial base which permitted them a high level of autonomy. South of the Tagus however, the military orders created in the 12th century were granted vast territories for their participation in the reconquest and they started a slow seigneurial colonisation. A third phase of reconquest can be identified for the years 1212-70. In this period Castile increased its territory by just over 50% reaching the western

south Atlantic coast and Murcia in the Mediterranean. The colonisation process that ensued also combined the efforts of the crown and the military orders and religious and lay magnates, but in this case the participation of the latter prevailed. This gave rise to enormous latifundia in Murcia and particularly Andalucia and Extremadura. (31)

The last phase of the Spanish reconquest, that of the kingdom of Granada in 1482-92, had a very different character from the previous ones. Firstly the kingdom retained its dense population (c. 500,000) and according to the terms of its capitulation was to retain its laws, customs and religion. It was only in the western part of the kingdom which was taken by force by the Castilians before surrender, that lands became immediately available for the Spanish settlers. In the central and western areas of Granada land was retained by the Muslim population although a slow process of expropriation of lands by the Castilian crown began in 1559. This was done by demanding title deeds from the land holders and in those cases where they were absent selling the land as royal property. This and other grievances (forced conversion to Christianity, from 1502 taxes and subsidies demanded by the crown and in 1567 the total ban of the Arabic language and customs) provoked a massive rebellion in the 1560's which ended with forced resettlement of the Muslims in other areas of Castile. (32)

The Muslim invasion and the slow reconquest by the Spanish kingdoms caused a late formation of the feudal system in Castile. During the first centuries of reconquest the small size of the territories under the control of the Christian kings made it unnecessary to delegate powers with a hereditary character to feudal lords. Later on, especially from the

mid 14th century, delegation of powers did occur through the concession of jurisdictional seigneuries with judicial and tributary rights over their domains. The Castilian crown however reserved for itself the right to mint coin and judge certain cases. Furthermore war conditions and royal legislation impeded a total adscription of the peasants to the land up until the late 13th century. From then on the seigneurial nobility enlarged and consolidated its power by subjecting former free villages to their exactions, restricting the freedom of movement of the peasantry and, from the mid 14th century to 1475, by obtaining seigneuries from the Trastamara kings. By around 1500 the power of the (lay) seigneurial nobility was impressive. They controlled, by means of jurisdiction or as proprietors, 52% of the Spanish soil while the other 48% belonged to high ecclesiastics, church corporations, the urban aristocracy and the knights. (33)

The lower nobility, or simple 'hidalgos', was immediately below the upper nobility in terms of prestige and privileges (exemption from taxes, torture, imprisonment for debts,etc.). In theory its status was defined in terms of lineage rather than function (knighthood) or economic power, but it seems that many a commoner reached the nobility via economic power and royal favour. The economic power of this sector varied enormously from the modest rural hidalgo, whose life style and wealth differed little from the surrounding peasants, to the owners of vast landed estates and rents. Very close to the status of the hidalgos were the caballeros (knights) of non-noble origin who, during this period due to their function, gained privileges such as tax exemptions and reservation of

municipal office in the towns. These two groups provided the church, the army and the bureaucracy with their high rank officials and, in many cases, were linked through kinship with the higher nobility. (34)

A merchant class of importance only appeared with the development of export-import trade in Castile in c. 1300. This trade was linked to the development of wool production, the basic Castilian export during the period, and the opening of the Mediterranean and South Atlantic trade after the conquest of Andalucia and Murcia. Merchants and ship owners were mainly based in Burgos and Bilbao in the north and Seville in Andalucia. In the north they carried on active trade with Flanders and France, exporting wool and Basque iron and importing manufactured goods, while in the south they participated in the African trade in gold and slaves and exported wool in exchange for Genoese manufactured goods. There were several factors impeding the development of a powerful merchant class during this period. Firstly it seems that the richest merchants operating in Castile were mainly foreigners (Genoese and French). An important exception to this was provided by the Castilian merchants and financiers of Jewish religion or Jewish descent. The former however were expelled from Spain in 1492. Secondly successful merchants usually ended up as landowners and rentiers and became members of the lower nobility or even became related to the upper nobility. (35)

Castilian industry during this period seems to have experienced a moderate expansion. The main industrial sector was textiles and by 1500 textiles of high quality were beginning to be manufactured using a relatively advanced

technical division of labour. Textile production had been practised on a more domestic scale since the 12th century and occurred in most areas of Castile. The desire to protect this emergent industry explains the attempts of the Cortes (parliament) of Castile, which usually represented the interests of the towns, to ban the import of textiles and the export of wool during the 14th and 15th centuries. This protectionism was, however, against the interests of the nobility who controlled wool production, most of which was sold for export, the big merchants who exported it and the king who taxed the 'profits' of the merchants and nobles.(ii) Thus the route to industrialisation and the formation of a bourgeoisie remained hampered and these measures failed. (37)

By 1500 the Castilian nobility although temporarily reduced to a passive political role (1480-1505) was in full control of the economy. This control was achieved by carving out for themselves property or jurisdiction over enormous territories during the reconquest and the enlargement and consolidation of these properties through marital alliances and mayorazgos (inheritance by primogeniture.) This in turn permitted them to control wool production and to benefit from the wool trade. The urban classes were no political or economic match for the nobility and the kings were in no position to challenge the privileges of the nobility. Furthermore the relative openness of the nobility to the inclusion of former commoners in its ranks and the propensity

(ii) The seriousness of this contradiction was exposed in the active participation of the 'textile' towns in the 1521 rebellion of the 'commoners' which included in its programme textile protectionism along with other demands (curbs on the feudal burdens, reduction of taxes, limitation of royal power and so on). The nobility whose rights were attacked, sided with the king and put down the rebellion together with the royal forces. (36)

of merchants to merge into the nobility limited the revolutionary character of the towns. Also the territorial expansion with its sequel of booty and expectations of social advancement and the channelling of social resentment against successful ethnic minorities (Jews and Muslims) on Castilian land probably tended to defuse popular discontent against the nobility. (38)

c) The Conquest.

By 1492 Castile was able to engage in major exploration and conquest expeditions overseas. The reconquest of Granada was about to be completed, the Canary Islands had been partially conquered and colonised and maritime incursions of piracy and trade in northern Africa and Granada were actively practised by the Castilians of Andalucia and Murcia. This created in southern Castile a population which was trained in, or at least mentally prepared for, war with religious overtones, commercial and piratical expeditions and the quest for booty which was to be an asset in the conquest of the Indies. Trade in south eastern Andalucia, the base of Castilian expeditions of discovery and conquest, was also well developed. Genoese merchants and navigators were well established there by the mid 15th century providing its commercial and nautical expertise and operating with large capital. By 1500 they were financing enterprises of discovery and conquest in the Indies and the Canary Islands and beginning the commercial exploitation of the latter. The trade conjuncture of late 15th century Europe was marked by the search for highly profitable and scarce commodities (spices and other

exotic products of the East, and bullion). The Genoese seaman and merchant Christopher Columbus was no exception. Although he agreed with the Castilian crown that he would discover a new route to the East Indies and discover or conquer (ganar) islands and mainlands, he was also entitled to barter, purchase, take, etc., 'pearls, precious stones, gold, silver, spices and other things and commodities of all sorts.' In the pursuit of this commercial aim, Columbus and the crown had the full financial support of the Genoese merchants resident in Sevile. (39)

From 1492 to c. 1550 the Castilian crown 'discovered' and conquered the most densely populated territories of the Americas. Christopher Columbus initiated this process by exploring the Major Antilles, part of the Venezuelan coast and the Caribbean coast from Panama to Honduras and starting the colonisation of Hispaniola (present Dominican Republic and Haiti) between 1492 and 1504. Other explorers, conquerors and colonisers followed suit and by 1519 they had explored the Atlantic coast from Tampico in northern Mexico down to the river Plate, and had crossed the Isthmus of Panama and reached the Pacific Ocean. By that time Spanish settlements were established in all the Major Antilles and in and around the Isthmus of Panama (Tierra Firme). Hispaniola was a commercial, productive and bureaucratic centre of some importance with several towns, a governor and an Audiencia (royal court), sizeable gold production and regular contact with Spain. This, however, constituted only the beginnings of the future Spanish empire in America since the conquest of the areas of dense population and mining wealth was only about

to begin.

In 1519 Hernan Cortes sailed with 600 men from Cuba to conquer Mexico, whose importance was only vaguely known. After being joined by c. 1,500 more Spaniards and Indian allies he seized Tenochtitlan and the Aztec state in 1521. In 1532-3 Francisco Pizarro with less than 500 men entered Peru, captured the Inca ruler and the empire surrendered, although Spanish dominion was not completed until the crushing of the Indian rebellion of 1536-7.

The conquest and settlement of central Mexico and Peru (as Hispaniola and Tierra Firme before) meant that two new powerful centres were established from which new conquests could be undertaken. The Aztec and Inca treasures which were easily plundered, attracted Spaniards from the peninsula and elsewhere, and this reinforced the initial groups of conquistadores. The expectation of new treasures and rewards compelled the more adventurous or the less favoured of both the newcomers and old settlers to undertake new conquests. Groups of allied or enslaved Indians provided the guides and war auxiliaries which complemented the Spanish retinues in these enterprises.

Thus, Pedro de Alvarado, one of Cortes' captains, went southwards from central Mexico conquering Guatemala (1523-4) and then attempting the conquest of Honduras but without success. In 1534 he abandoned the government of Guatemala and sailed southwards to the recently conquered lands of Peru. Finding the land occupied by other conquistadores and therefore offering no possible rewards for his efforts he sold his navy to

the Peruvian conquistadores and returned to Guatemala. Cortes himself, from 1524-6, successfully undertook the conquest and settlement of Honduras. In the meantime, the men from Tierra Firme reached the southern limit of Alvarado's conquest. To the north several expeditions put the Spaniards in touch with northern Mexico, Florida, the Mississippi river, Texas and California. Although these expeditions were unsuccessful from the point of view of conquest, easy plunder and settlement (with the exception of New Biscay, north west of Mexico) it opened the way for future colonising enterprises.

From Peru the conquistadores dispersed through South America in every possible direction. Diego de Almagro, Pizarro's partner in the conquest of Peru, explored Chile in 1535-7, a new expedition commanded by Pedro De Valdivia conquered and settled central Chile in the early 1540's. Belalcazar, one of Pizarro's captains, conquered and settled Quito (1533-4) and later southern Colombia (1536-7) and in 1539 reached the Chibcha kingdom (Valley of Bogota) which had already been conquered by the retinues of Quezada (from Tierra Firme). In the 1540's and 1550's expeditions from Chile and Peru conquered and settled the western parts of the river Plate basin, while another expedition started from Quito and, following the rivers Coca and Napo, sailed down the Amazon river and reached the Atlantic. Thus the conquistadores from Peru explored and conquered practically all South America in a few years. Their only competitors were the men from the settlements of Tierra Firme and Venezuela, the Portuguese and a group of Spanish conquistadores who explored the river Plate basin from the Atlantic and reached and settled in Paraguay in the late 1530's. (40)

The conquest of Spanish America was almost exclusively financed by private enterprise. The main exception to this was the first voyage of Columbus (1492) which was financed by the crown although Columbus and his associates contributed up to an eighth of the cost of the expedition which amounted to c. 1.6 million maravedies or 15 kilos of gold. In Spain private investors consisted of ship owners, adventurers backed financially by merchants and associations formed by merchants, rentiers, professionals, etc. In the Indies rich settlers of the main colonies 'invested' resources obtained in gold mining, commerce, public office or previous conquests in future ventures of conquest. For instance the expedition which conquered Mexico was financed by the prosperous agricultural and mining entrepreneur Hernan Cortes and Diego de Velazquez,conqueror of Cuba and by then its governor. The spirit of private enterprise was not only concentrated in a few magnates who invested resources in the expeditions but existed in vast sections of the population, both in Andalucia and especially in America. Thus the members of the bands of conquest or the crews of the voyages of discovery and trade were usually not paid a salary but obtained a share of the spoils of war, (slaves, gold, lands, servants, etc.,) or of the profits of the trade. These shares were previously determined and were substantially larger in the case of the leaders who usually paid for the expenses of the venture. (41)

To compensate for the effort and expenditure of the conquistadores the crown granted generous rights to the prospective conquistadores or discoverers. Thus Columbus obtained through the capitulaciones (contract) of 1492 the hereditary office of

admiral with civil and criminal jurisdiction over the islands and mainland to be discovered, the temporary office of viceroy and governor of these, 10% of all the net profits to be made in them,etc. Later on the concessions were more modest but remained large enough to encourage the prospective conquerors to carry out the enterprise. For instance the capitulaciones of the crown with Francisco Pizarro in 1529 granted the latter and his associates the offices of governor, captain general and adelantado for life (these were not hereditary offices), lieutenancies, bishoprics, etc., which were to be paid from the proceeds of the colony together with other minor concessions (exemption from taxes for 10 years, the concession of several charts of nobility or hidalgia, etc.). However, once the conquest and settlement of the new territories were achieved the crown systematically curtailed the rights of the conquistadores, especially in administrative matters. (42)

During the 16th century Spain conquered vast territories, including developed states with large populations, with relatively small contingents of Spanish men. This was to some extent due to the technical advantage of the Spaniards over the Indians. Among these we can count the possession of superior instruments of destruction, such as fire and iron arms, horses, which were unknown to the Indians, and better lines of communication and supply, which were provided by ships and horses. Some credit should also be given to the tactics developed by the Spaniards in fighting in an expanding frontier for prolonged periods. However the key to the success of small groups of Spaniards in the conquest of large states seems to rest on the conquered societies themselves and the skillful use

of these by the Spaniards. Firstly the Indian peoples did not present a united front against the invaders. Thus the Tlaxcala of central Mexico, traditional enemies of the Aztecs, allied themselves with the Spaniards and, according to Konetzke, might have provided the Spaniards with an auxiliary army of 100,000 people for the conquest of the Aztec state. Secondly the Spaniards exploited the immense power and the almost sacred character of the rulers of the native states to obtain their surrender or at least to weaken their defences by simply capturing or killing them. Finally after a conquest the Spaniards made use of their position as rulers and the vertical structure of power of the Indian states to raise Indian armies against other Indian peoples. (43)

The social formation of colonial Spanish America resulted from the practices of the groups of conquerors, colonists and representatives of the Spanish state and the effects of these practices on the economic, political and ideological structures of the Amerindian societies during the process of conquest and colonisation. Of these the determinant factor was the character of the social formations already in existence in America. They determined, in the main, the direction, rhythm and outcome of the conquest. Firstly the conquerors desperately looked for treasure to plunder and this led them directly to the most politically and economically developed of the Indian societies. Secondly, plunder or exploitation of the conquered Amerindian peoples provided the means of continuing the process of conquest and therefore determined its rhythm. Finally, the relations of production and the political system of the societies to be conquered determined the outcome and the methods of the process of conquest. Thus, in those social formations where state

development and tributary relations of production were deeply rooted (the Aztec confederacy, the Inca empire, Chibcha chiefdoms etc.,) submission to Spanish rule was rapidly achieved and the cost, in terms of Spanish resources, was relatively small. In these cases, after the war of conquest was over the conquerors merely replaced the dominant native classes and started a slow process of transformation of the Indian economy and the corresponding political and ideological structures. On the other hand pre-state societies not previously submitted to tributary relations resisted militarily or evaded Spanish control for longer periods and once conquered, their social structures were radically modified or destroyed by the Spaniards. In these cases slavery or harsh forms of serfdom and the mission system were the strategies used by the Spaniards to control and exploit these peoples. (44)

The social practices of the Spanish conquerors, colonists, bureaucrats and churchmen during the process of conquest and colonisation were, however, far from irrelevant. The Spaniards were bearers of social structures which were at least partially reproduced in the Americas and their social practices transformed the Amerindian societies in several respects. During the 16th century political, economic and ideological structures and practices were brought into being which persisted in the main for the rest of the colonial period and beyond. We will deal extensively with the process of development of the colonial Spanish American social formation in the main body of this thesis. In part II (Chapters 3 - 6) we will study the transformations of the economic structure which came about as a result of the

practices of the colonists and the state. Finally, in part 3 (Chapters 7 - 13) we will analyse the transformation of the ideological structures of the Indian peoples under the impact of the dominant ideological state apparatus of the Spaniards, the Catholic church.

PART II: THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

In this section we will analyse the formation and development of the economic structure of colonial Spanish America under the impact of the practices of the colonists and the regulatory role of the Spanish state. By far the most important economic activity during the period was agriculture in which the overwhelming majority of the population was engaged. Scarcely less important from the point of view of its value, although a relatively small number of workers was employed, was silver and gold mining which gave dynamism to the trans-Atlantic and internal trade as well as to agricultural commodity production. On the other hand industry (i.e. non mining and non agricultural production) was a marginal economic activity involving a small number of workers whose production had a limited commercial value.

We begin this part by analysing in Chapter 3, those forms of exploitation of the labour force in which the state had an important regulatory role, slavery, 'encomienda' and 'repartimiento'. In Chapter 4 we analyse the agrarian structure of colonial Spanish America in relation to land ownership by Spaniards and Indian communities and the main types of production in this sector. In Chapter 5 we continue our analysis of colonial Spanish American agriculture based on the study of agrarian enterprises, mainly the 'hacienda' or big landed estate, their economic performance, the forms of labour employed, markets and returns.

In Chapter 6 we deal with mining, its impact on the Spanish American economies, the forms of labour employed, the economic performance of mining enterprises and their capital investments and returns. A note on industry at the end of this chapter rounds off our study of production in colonial Spanish America.

Chapter 3: State administration of the labour force in Spanish America

In this chapter we will attempt a characterisation of the mode of exploitation of the subjected peoples and the different restrictions/stimuli imposed by the state in order to structure the economy and society in the Indies. As shall be noted, the impact of these policies was neither chronologically nor geographically homogeneous. Socio-economic factors operating at the time of the conquest permitted effective state control in certain areas and the virtual elimination of the more destructive colonial practices in a few decades (slavery of the aboriginal population, unregulated forced labour etc.). Other regions presented characteristics which permitted the survival of these 'primitive' forms of colonial exploitation for a longer period and a parallel underdevelopment of the control of the state over these economic social formations.

There were many factors operating in Spanish America during the conquest and thereafter which determined the different character of the relations of production in the different colonies: state (both governmental and ecclesiastical) policies and practices, strategical factors (vis-a-vis the other European powers),the timing and circumstances of the conquest in different territories, but, above all, we will argue, the presence or absence of an abundant and politically organised population and the presence of mineral wealth or the suitability of the colonies for the production of crops which were highly valuable in the external market. The state had an important role to play in the provision of labour power for the colonists, it channelled

human resources to the production of what it saw as most important and to those colonists it wanted to favour. But in relation to the degree and the forms of exploitation of the labour force, very strict limits were imposed on the crown by the productive patterns and the size of the native populations, the potential wealth of the colonies and the expectations and pressures of the colonists. Torn between its long term economic and political needs of preserving an abundant Indian population (tribute payers and eventually defenders of the empire) and the more immediate ones (high returns from the colonies and the insurance of the loyalty of the colonisers through a variety of grants) the crown gave way to compromise. Indian slavery (from which the crown received a fifth of the value of the slaves) and forced labour under the 'encomienda' and later the 'repartimiento' systems were basic mechanisms to satisfy the colonists and improve royal finances. African slavery represented until the late 18th century an expensive solution for the scarcity of labour power, a result of the wasteful character of early colonisation which only a few colonies could afford. In this case the impact of the royal policies was indirect. The slaves' exploitation was only limited by the economic interests of the owners, but fiscal factors (heavy taxes, the sale of virtual monopolies over the trade, etc) prevented an expansion of African slavery to the extent the colonists desired.

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miento.We have left for the next chapter those relations of production not so clearly regulated by the state and basically connected with the Spanish enterprises, especially the hacienda (debt peonage, free labour and the different forms of enfeoffment).

(a) Indian Slavery

By the time of the discovery of America, the slave trade was a well established institution in Spain. At least from the end of the 14th century African slaves were imported into Spain and with the opening up of West Africa by the Portuguese in the second half of the 15th century the traffic increased enormously. Portuguese and Spanish entrepreneurs competed in organising slave-raid expeditions to West Africa until the treaty of Alcafovas (1479) restricted the trade to Portuguese raiders only. Despite this, the importation of African slaves into Spain did not stop and during the 16th century Seville was an important slave market, second only to Lisbon, with over 6,000 slaves out of a total population of 85,000 (or 7.4%). In addition to the black slave trade, during the 15th century the aboriginal population of the Canaries suffered the slave raids of the Portuguese and Spanish alike, while the wars of reconquest permitted the enslavement of the Muslims who actively resisted the advance of the Spanish armies. The legal principles governing the traffic and which were widely accepted in 15th century Europe were (a) the right to enslave non-Christian enemies captured in a just war and (b) the purchase of slaves from a third party. Although the loose interpretation of these principles could legitimise the enslavement of any group of people of whatever race or continent, outside Christianity, through them the state had an important instrument to regulate the trade

according to its own interests, by means of applying its discretion in the interpretation of the law. Thus many aboriginies of the Canaries who had been enslaved illegally (not in a just war) were declared free by the crown under pressure from the church. In the same way, royal practices concerning the enslavement of the American Indians at first rather loosely conformed to these principles, but later severely restricted their application under pressure from the church and the realisation of their own long term interests.(1)

During the first decades of American colonisation, Indian slavery was widely practised by the colonists. Spanish explorers and conquistadores from Columbus onwards, in the absence of gold and other precious objects to barter with or to plunder from the Indians, engaged in slave raids. By 1520 many areas on the Caribbean coast from Cape San Agostinho (north of Brazil) to Yucatan and the Antilles had been subjected to slave raids, either to supply the Spanish markets or to meet the colonists' need for labour power in places where the production of a marketable product (gold mining, pearl diving, agriculture) was not accompanied by the presence or survival of docile Indian workers. By 1520 the unbridled exploitation of the Indians of the greater Antilles had virtually annihilated them. The subsequent importation of slaves and naborias[i] from the Bahamas, lesser Antilles and Caribbean mainland brought about the

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(i) The legal status of these Indians is not clear. Zavala, following Las Casas, asserts that they were domestic slaves not liable to be sold or bought. Sauer defines them as life-long serfs while Fernandez assimilates these Naborias into the category of encomienda Indians, that is a serf considered legally free working for the Spaniards with the consent of his chieftain(2).

extinction of the aboriginal population in certain islands and both triggered off the mistrust towards Spaniards and created mechanisms of self-defence everywhere else. The Spanish settlement of Castilla del Oro (Caribbean Columbia and Panama) lacked a docile Indian population reducible to encomiendas so slave raids were extended to the recently discovered Pacific coast of Central America. Thus during the 1520's, 1530's and 1540's slave raids in that area provided Panama, and the recently discovered Peru, with the Indians the conquistadores needed for campaigning and production, and the bureaucrats and adventurers in Central America with a profitable export 'product'. Panama, the obvious route to the South Pacific, was therefore converted into an important market for Indian slaves brought particularly from Nicaragua although the raids reached as far as El Salvador. The conquistadores of Mexico and Guatemala, after distributing the more politically organised Indian nuclei in encomiendas among their followers, engaged in the slave trade in the peripheral areas of their 'kingdoms'. These slaves were acquired either by wars of conquest waged against (real or supposed) rebel Indians, or by 'rescate', that is the purchase or donation from the Indian chieftains of Indians supposedly having slave status in pre-hispanic society, but even encomienda Indians were submitted to slavery and sold.(ii)

(ii) During the first decades of colonisation the legal differences between slavery and encomienda were not clearly marked let alone enforced. Encomienda Indians were used as war auxiliaries, performed exhausting corvees for their encomenderos and could eventually be sold as slaves. Only the installation of local mechanisms of government made the legal differentiation clear and the actual condition of both categories of Indians significantly different.

In the rest of Spanish America no important groups of Indians were enslaved with the exception of Chile and Paraguay. The Indians of the former Inca empire were submitted to the encomienda system and firmly controlled by the encomenderos who effectively checked the attempts of other conquistadores to enslave their Indians. However, in fringe areas of the Inca empire (eastern Peru and Bolivia and northern Argentina) different Indian peoples suffered the slave raids of the conquistadores from the 1530's to the end of the 16th century. In southern Chile, the early slave raids of the 1540's continued throughout the century reaching enormous proportions and attaining a legal character in the 17th century, supplying central and northern Chile as well as Peru and Upper Peru with slaves. Equally serious were the Portuguese raids on the Indians of the Jesuit reductions of Paraguay in the first half of the 17th century, which were only stopped by the effective self-defence of the missions. (3)

Royal legislation about Indian slavery was, during the first half of the 16th century vacillating and contradictory. The first Indian slaves exported to Spain were favourably received by the crown but before the close of the 15th century the queen ordered the suspension of Indian enslavement until a group of theologians and jurists could decide about the justice of the trade. This cautious policy began to change in 1503, when the queen declared that the Indians of certain islands and territories of northern Colombia, supposedly cannibals, could be subjected to enslavement. In 1511 permission was extended to all the Caribbean coast from the gulf of Darien (Panama) to the Orinoco delta. A year later

the crown authorised the transportation of Indians of any territory so far discovered to the Islas Utiles (useful islands) that is the islands where precious metals were available for exploitation: Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Trinidad. This forced emigration consisted of the enslavement of the rebel Indians and the granting of 'naboria' status to those Indians who submitted to the Spaniards willingly. The Junta of Burgos (1512-3) introduced the formality of the requirement for every conquest expedition in the Indies. This grotesque procedure gave nothing more than a legal appearance to slave raids now disguised as 'just war'. The regency of Cisneros (1516-8) and then the rule of Charles I opened a period of revision and more strict regulation of the trade. In 1518 a serious judge was appointed to discern the characteristics of the Indians of the territories discovered (friendly or warlike) and to determine the legality of the enslavement of the Indians. His findings however did not lead to any practical measure. In 1520 several restrictions of the trade were imposed: the branding of the slaves (which made them legal slaves) was to occur in the presence of royal officials. Legal enslavement was limited to those Indians obstructing the propagation of the Catholic faith or the exploitation of mines by the Spaniards. The traffic between the Islas Utiles and the rest of the discovered territories was stopped and revisions of the titles of property of Indian slaves by the authorities were ordered. Finally in 1530 the crown forbade Indian slavery under all circumstances (purchase, just war, etc.). In the following years however, under the pressure of the colonists, the crown permitted the trade again, under certain

conditions: adult males captured in a just war or the purchase of Indians originally enslaved in a just war. Once again in 1542, and this time for good, the crown banned Indian slavery under any conditions in the future. The new laws of 1542 also provided measures to liberate those slaves whose owners were not able to provide evidence that they had been enslaved in a just war notwithstanding the slaves' brands or the title of purchase of the owners. Exceptions to these laws were made in 1569 for the Caribs of Venezuela, whose enslavement continued to be legal until the second half of the 18th century, the Chilean Mapuches, subject to legal slavery from 1608 to 1674, and other minor groups for variable periods. (4)

To ensure the implementation of the New Laws as far as Indian slavery was concerned, the crown sent high officials who were empowered to act drastically to America in order to enforce the legislation. They included a new Viceroy for New Spain, a new president of the Audiencia of Guatemala and another official to Panama. The thoroughness and the commitment of the officials in charge of the enforcement of the New Laws varied. In Guatemala the new president acted drastically in removing the old judges - themselves owners of slaves - and went to the provinces to inspect and free the Indians in situ. As a result in the small province of San Salvador he liberated 500 Indian slaves, a large number, probably several times higher than this, in Santiago, and virtually eliminated Indian slavery in two years (1548-50). On the contrary in Mexico the process was slow and the commitment of the royal bureaucracy half-hearted. Although all the judges, officials and prelates of the religious orders were ordered to collaborate

in denouncing the existence of Indian slaves held illegally, after two years spent dealing with the problem the Audiencia of Mexico had freed only 700 out of some 3,000 for the whole period (1551-61) (5).

Quantitative estimations: Contemporaries estimated the enslavement of the Indians in Spanish America up until the 1550's in figures as far apart as three or four millions (the Indigenist Las Casas) and 200,000 (the pro-colonist friar Motolinia). Recently Simpson has discarded Las Casas' figure as exaggerated and estimated the total as some 300,000. More recent research however suggests that this figure is extremely conservative. For instance, MacLeod asserts that in Nicaragua alone more than 200,000 Indians were enslaved, while Radell claims that 'it is likely that between 1527 and 1548, 450,000 to 500,000 Indians were removed from Nicaragua by the slave trade'. This last figure is substantially the same as that given by Las Casas for Nicaragua and therefore would suggest that his estimation for the whole of Spanish America was closer to the truth than Simpson believes. The importance of the different colonies in providing slaves in the last decades of Indian slavery can be appreciated by looking at the categories of Indian slaves in the two major centres of the slave trade at the time. In Panama in the mid 16th century, half of the 820 remaining slaves were Indians from the Venezuelan coast, a fifth were from Panama and its surroundings, another fifth were from Nicaragua and the rest were from other areas of Central America. In Peru a sample of Indian slaves taken by Lockhart from the archives and corresponding to the years 1533-43 shows that two-thirds of them were aborigines from Nicaragua

and the rest were evenly distributed between Mexico and Guatemala, while by the late 1540's the Venezuelan coast occupied a prominent place as a source of Indian slaves for the Lima market. (6)

The manumission of the Indian slaves represented a significant loss for the colonists despite their reduced numbers. Slaves performed tasks which were prohibited for encomienda or free Indians. These included the heavy and unhealthy work in mines, cloth mills and sugar mills, that is some of the most profitable lines of production in the colonies. The complaints of the colonists and their unsuccessful lobbying before the crown is therefore understandable, but even the royal officials and acclesiastics attempted to impose devices which prolonged the captivity of the Indians. On this point, the crown acted firmly. The institution, as the number of freed Indians indicates, was on the wane.

The ability of the colonists to enslave Indians was disappearing through the improvement of the checking capacity of the state to control the blatant abuses of the colonists, the exhaustion of easy sources of enslavement (un-warlike peoples), the wasteful character of the institution, and the precarious character of the property which it implied. Thus the age of 'plunder-colonisation' ended, at least in the nuclear areas, to be replaced by a more rational exploitation of the Indian labour force under the encomienda and repartimiento systems and the increase in the import of African slaves.

(b) <u>African Slavery</u>

African slaves were introduced into Spanish America from the very beginning of colonisation but they did not acquire

numerical importance until the Indian population had substantially declined, the royal regulations in protection of the Indians had been at least partially enforced (i.e. abolition of Indian slavery, limitation of Indian forced labour etc.,) and the mechanism of provision of African slave labour had been created. In this provision the state played a regulating role limiting or stimulating the importation of slaves to different colonies according to its contradictory fiscal and political needs. These were on the one hand the need to satisfy the colonists' demands for slaves, which in turn meant an increase in royal income through taxation of a higher volume of production, and on the other hand, the need to stop the flow of bullion to other European powers in control of the Atlantic slave trade. The liberalisation of the slave trade in the second half of the 18th century partially overcame the contradiction. The crown renounced its short-term high income which was provided by the lease of quasi-monopolistic rights of importation of African slaves, for a more realistic policy encouraging Spanish subjects to participate in the trade and giving foreign traders facilities not enjoyed before. This, plus a favourable political and economic conjuncture in the world economy, created favourable conditions in the remaining Spanish American colonies (Cuba and Puerto Rico) in the 19th century for the development of dynamic plantation economies based primarily on slave labour.

We will leave aside the characterisation of the African slave trade and its importance for the world economy. It is however important to assess the effect of this trade in relation to the provision of labour in the Americas and especially in

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the Spanish Indies. Despite the scarcity and unreliability of the statistics on the trade some provisional estimates can be accepted in order to appreciate the colonists' need for labour in the different colonies, the economic characterisation of each area and its evolution in terms of its dominant relations of production. In Table 1 we present a recent quantitative estimation of the Atlantic slave trade. It shows a relatively low participation by Spain in the trade (16%), a decreasing proportional participation in the trade over the period prior to 1810 vis-a-vis the other European colonies, but at the same time a constant absolute increase in the numbers of slaves imported into Spanish America up until the 19th century. The regional distribution of black slaves inside Spanish America is shown in Table 2. Despite the fragmentary character of the information presented and with the help of estimates of slave populations at the end of the colonial period, the main trends of development of African slavery can be discerned. Firstly, there was no homogeneity of development of the institution in Spanish America. Thus Mexico heavily relied on slave imports in the 17th century, however by the end of the 18th century slave imports and the total slave population were insignificant in the context of the Mexican economy. While Puerto Rico and especially Cuba, where slavery was secondary up until the 18th century, transformed themselves into quasi-slave societies. Secondly, the bulk of the slave imports are concentrated in a few colonies (Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia), although the importance of slaves as a proportion of the total labour force differs markedly. Finally for the cases of Peru, Venezuela

and Colombia the figures suggest a rapid increase of imports in the early 17th century but no dramatic changes thereafter.

TABLE 1 - Estimated Slave Imports into the Americas (1451-1870) (in thousands)*

Regions and Colonies	1451-1600	1601-1700	1701-1810	1811-1870	TOTAL
British North America	-	-	348.0	51.0	399.0
Spanish America	75.0	292.5	578.6	606.0	1,552.1
British Caribbean	-	263.7	1,401.3	-	1,665.0
Jamaica	-	85.1	662.4	-	747.5
Others (Barbados, Leeward Islands etc.)	-	178.6	738.9	-	917.5
French Caribbean	-	155.8	1,348.4	96.0	1,600.2
Saint Domingue (Haiti)	-	74.6	789.7	-	864.3
Others (Martinique, Guadaloupe, Louisiana, French Guiana)	-	81.2	558.7	96.0	735.9
Dutch Caribbean	-	40.0	460.0	-	500.0
Danish Caribbean	-	4.0	24.0	-	28.0
Brazil	50.0	560.0	1,891.4	1,145.4	3,646.8
Europe and Atlantic Is.	149.9	25.1	-	-	175.0
TOTAL	274.9	1,371.1	6,051.7	1,898.4	9,566.1

* Slightly modified from Curtin 1969: 268

Table 2 - Estimates of black slaves imported into Spanish America (+)

Colonies	TOTAL (1) 1521-1870	1521-1550	1551-1595	1595-1640	1641-1773	1774-1807 (2)	TOTAL (3) up until 1807
Cuba	702,000	(C.16 - 3,000)[4]		(C.17 -8,000)[4]		119,000	132,000
Puerto Rico	77,000					14,800	20,100
Mexico	200,000	(1521/94-36,500)[5]		(74,025)[5]		5,000	200,000
Central America	21,000						21,000
Venezuela	121,000	(5,000)[7]	(6,900)[7]	(18,775)[7]		30,000 (24,900[7])	121,000
Santo Domingo	30,000					6,000	30,000
Chile	6,000						6,000
Peru	95,000		(9,350)[6]	(53,550)[6]		30,000	95,000
Colombia) Panama) Ecuador)	200,000			(80,000)[8]			200,000
La Plata Area (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia)	100,000			(44,000)[8]		20,300	100,000
TOTAL	1,522,000	15,000	36,300	132,600	516,100	225,100	925,100
Average p.a.	4,349	500	810	2,880	3,880	6,620	

(+) Source: Curtin 1969: see notes to this table. Additional estimates have been written in brackets and do not necessarily agree arithmetically with Curtin's estimations.

1. Curtin 1969: 46-7 - Curtin estimates an error of 20 per cent on either side of this total. This total seems to be conservative. Mellafe for instance estimates the total for the whole period as 3,000,000. Estimations of the imports to particular areas or periods made by other authorities also suggest an under-estimation. (Mellafe 1975: 73 and notes below).

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3. This column has been calculated subtracting the slave imports from 1808 onwards from the totals of Cuba and Puerto Rico (Curtin 1969: 40, 44) from the first column. For the rest of the areas we have assumed a total suspension of the traffic. This seems to be valid for most of the new republics. Imports to Peru, Colombia and Argentina seem to have been important but we lack estimates (Rout 1977: 124-6, 239, 249-50, 261-2, 279, 186-7, 217-8, 228-9; King 1942: 56).

4. Perez 1978: 111. Moreno estimates the total slave imports into Cuba as 1,008,376, from which 138,006 would have arrived in 1789 or before, 105,611 in the period 1780-1809, 761,547 in the period 1810-69 and 3,222 in 1870 and after (Moreno in Rubin et al (eds.) 1977: 188-9).

5. Palmer 1976: 28. The total he gives for the whole of Spanish America is 73,000 for the period 1521-94 and 151,205 for the period 1595-1604. Thus, according to him almost half (49%) of the slaves landed in Spanish America up until 1640 would have been received by the Mexican colonists. Vila on the other hand, after researching the Spanish slave trade exhaustively during the period 1595-1640 estimates for that period a total importation of 268,644, but gives for Mexico (Veracruz) a figure similar to Palmers' (70,000) (Vila 1977: 209).

6. Figures based on the allegedly rough estimates of Bowser. The first corresponds to 1555-88 and the second to 1594-1611 and 1615-40 (Bowser 1977: 113-15).

7. The figures come from Brito 1963: 115-7, 134, 136-7 on which Curtin based his estimations for Venezuela. The disagreement for the years 1774-1807 derives from Curtin's assumption of an increase in slave imports due to the expansion of the economy during the last decades of the 18th century.

8. Very rough estimates based on the dates and estimates provided by Vila. For the La Plata region we have accepted her estimation for Buenos Aires and assumed that there were no exports to other areas. For Colombia, Panama and Ecuador, we have accepted her estimations of imports through the port of Cartagena (Colombia) of 135,000 slaves and subtracted 55,000 for the re-exports to Peru and Chile. (Vila 1977: 197-209).

TABLE 3 - Estimated slave population in the Spanish American colonies around 1800

Colonies	Year of the estimation or census	Slave population	Total population	Percentage
Cuba (1)	1774	38,879	171,620	22.8
	1827	286,942	704,487	40.8
Puerto Rico (2)	cal800	13,333	174,192	7.6
Mexico (3)	cal803	10,000	5,800,000	0.2
Venezuela (4)	1800	87,800	898,043	9.7
Santo Domingo (5)	1794	30,000	100,000	30.0
Chile (6)	1790's	4,000	308,043	1.3
Peru (7)	1812	87,800	1,400,000	6.4
Colombia (8)	1779	53,788	800,000	6.7
Ecuador (9)	1800	8,000	424.037	1.9
La Plata Region				
Paraguay (10)	1782	3,945	97,480	4.0
Argentina (11)	1778-1810	14,850+	400,000	-
Montevideo (12)	1803	899	4,676	18.0

SOURCES:
(1) Knight 1970: 22
(2) Mintz 1959: 276
(3) Humboldt 1811, I: 64-5, 130
(4) Brito 1973: 160
(5) Rout 1977: 95; Vicens (ed) 1974, IV: 273
(6) Villalobos (et al): 252-4. Total population does not include some 100,000 Mapuche Indians not under Spanish dominion.
(7) Rout 1977: 95; Vicens (ed) 1974, IV
(8) Jaramillo 1963: 7
(9) Rout 1977: 95; Vicens (ed) IV: 275
(10) Rout 1977: 95; Vicens (ed) 1974, IV: 277
(11) Rout 1977: 95; Vicens (ed) 1974, IV: 277 - Slave population includes provinces of Buenos Aires and Cordoba and the town of Mendoza only.
(12) Rama 1970: 31 - At the time Montevideo had almost half the total population of Uruguay.

These marked regional and chronological differences in the development of the slave system in the Indies were the result of a combination of factors among which we can count the unavailability of other sources of labour, the profitability of the exploitation of certain commodities in high demand on the regional or world market, the capacity of the colonists to invest capital, the royal regulations concerning the slave trade, the differential prices of African slaves in particular regions due to difficulties of transport or the facilities for contraband,etc. To disentangle this complex set of relations and to evaluate the social and economic impact of the slave system we turn now to an analysis of the institution in those colonies in which it was quantitatively important. These were Hispaniola island, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba.

The concentration of Spanish settlers in the island of Hispaniola during the first two or three decades of colonisation and the unchecked exploitation of the natives resulted in rapid depopulation of the Indians and therefore a scarcity of labour which was already acute in the mid-1510's. Black slaves had started their forced emigration to the island since at least 1501. However these arrivals were occasional and not necessarily aimed at providing the labour market with slaves for productive purposes. Only after 1510 with the pressure of the colonists, officialdom and ecclesiastics were significant numbers of slaves sent from Spain and later from Africa to supply the labour market. By 1514 the Indian population of the island had dwindled to a mere 30,000 while the black population (c. 1,000) was slightly higher than the Spanish.

At that time the basis of the export economy of Hispaniola had started to switch from gold mining to agriculture and by the 1520's sugar was one of the two main pillars of the island's economy. Despite the decreasing importance of the island in the expanding Spanish economy, emigration of its settlers to the mainland etc, the plantation economy of the colony, based on slave labour, saved the island from economic mediocrity during the 16th century. The success was however relative. Data from the early 1570's indicates the presence of some 5,000 slaves engaged in sugar production (or 34 sugar mills with an average of 150 slaves each) and an almost complete dominance of the sugar interest over the economic and political life of the island. But for reasons not clearly known, sugar production markedly declined in the mid-1570's and finally collapsed at the beginning of the 17th century after the depopulation of 1605-6.[iii] (7)

The Spanish settlement of the Antilles was soon extended to the mainland. Mexico was the logical target of most of the colonists due to its dense population and economic potential. After two or three decades of colonisation New Spain was experiencing economic expansion and diversification. In addition to the indigenous agriculture, European livestock, new crops and productive systems were introduced, silver mining was being developed and the basis of a manufacturing industry was being laid. However, the rapid process of expropriation of the

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(iii) Ramos explains this decadence of Hispaniola's sugar production at the end of the 16th century by the effects of the competition of Cuban sugar and more importantly by the exclusion of Hispaniola from the return voyages of the Spanish fleet. (8)

Indian labour force which permitted this expansion together with the environmental and cultural changes brought about by the conquest, provoked a dramatic demographic collapse of the Indian population. Thus the original Indian population (estimated at 25 millions) had shrunk to a fourth of this figure by 1548 (6.3 millions) and less than a twelfth (1.9 million) by 1580, beginning to recover only in the mid-17th century. The shortage of labour thus created was further aggravated by royal legislation and its enforcement: elimination of Indian slavery, banning of the use of Indian labour in particularly heavy or unhealthy tasks (sugar mills in 1544, 1551, 1590's, workshops in 1601 and 1608). As a consequence of this, for both colonists and royal officials, an abundant and cheap supply of African slaves became a panacea from as early as 1525 to at least the mid-17th century. The clamour for the provision of African slaves was especially strong in the 1540's after the crisis provoked by the New Laws and the plague of 1545 and again after the plagues of the late 1570's.

Black slaves were introduced into Mexico with the retinues of the conquistadores. Later colonists and officials brought their black slaves with them as servants, but it is probably in the 1540's that African slaves began to be imported into the colony in significant numbers. Despite the high numbers involved in the trade in the early 17th century, black slaves were never numerically important in the context of the Mexican economy as a whole and never surpassed 2 per cent of the total population. Moreover the geographical pattern of residence, 50% living in urban areas, mainly Mexico City, in 1570, suggests a high incidence of non-productive work (servants, bodyguards etc) or specialised labour (artisans) among them.

Qualitatively, however, their importance was higher than their number suggests since they were an important source of labour power in some of the more dynamic sectors of the economy. In 1570 black slaves constituted a fourth of the labour force in the mines and by the end of the century, 16%, and the requests of the miners for cheap slaves in the 1630's suggests that they were still important in mining. (9)

Sugar plantations relied throughout the colonial period on a combination of African slaves and Indian labour (first slave, then repartimiento and free labour). We have quantative information for only one of the two or three major sugar enclaves in Mexico, Morelos. There the slave population working in the sugar mills was 300 in 1600 (or 18.8% of the labour force), 2,000 in 1700 (or 36.7%) and 1,000 in 1800 (or 10%). The data elaborated by Barret for the hacienda of Atlacomulco in Morelos (Table 4) shows us in more detail the evolution of the labour force in a typical Mexican sugar plantation.

Table 4 indicates a notable increase in the participation of slaves in the labour force around 1600 which corresponds to the period during which it was difficult for the sugar planters to obtain Indian forced labour. As a result the hacienda had to buy 47 slaves between 1589-1600 and another group of 37 was bought between 1614-23. From then onwards new acquisitions of slaves were few and the hacienda had to rely on Indians for the supply of labour power. By 1800 only ten able-bodied slaves (or 4% of the labour force) remained on the hacienda. A further indication of the decline of the participation of slaves in sugar production in the 18th century is provided by the slave holding practices of the Company of Jesus. In 1645 they owned

Table 4: Slave and Indian participation in the labour force in the Hacienda of Atlacomulco, Morelos during the colonial period, (in man/days worked) (*)

Years		Slaves	%	Indians	%	White	%	TOTAL
1580's (5 years, 1581.1583, 1587-89)	Total	116,700		276,275		20,924		413,899
	Average	23,340	28.2	55,255	66.7	4,185	5.1	82,780
Early and mid 1590's (5 years 1592-3,1595-7)	Total	105,000		248,928		17,468		371,396
	Average	21,000	28.3	49,786	67.0	3,494	4.7	74,279
1598		27,000	34.8	47,051	60.6	3,575	4.6	77,626
1599		30,000	38.0	45,075	57.1	3,825	4.9	78,900
1600		35,400	39.2	51,016	56.6	3,810	4.2	90,226
1602		36,300	52.3	28,945	41.7	4,150	6.0	69,395
1620-4	Total	100,500		41,268		6,467		148,235
	Average	20,100	67.8	8,254	27.8	1,293	4.4	29,647
1644-5	Total	20,300		59,544		2,019		81,863
	Average	10,150	24.8	29,772	72.7	1,010	2.5	40,932
Last quarter of the C18th (1779-80,1782, 1785 and 1795)		14,400		312,211		33,279		359,890
		2,880	4.0	62,442	86.8	6,656	9.2	71,978

(*) Source, Barret 1977: 232-3, adapted. The years averaged are relatively homogeneous.

six plantations and a total of 1,200 slaves, by the 1760's they had only 181 slaves who were concentrated in the most profitable haciendas. By then cheap Indian labour power, low rates of reproduction of the slaves and their constant escapes had transformed slavery into an unprofitable institution in all sectors of the economy. This was reflected in scarce new imports and a small slave population at the end of the colonial period. (10)

Second only to Mexico in demographic and economic potential, Peru reproduced the Mexican model of conquest with its sequel of Indian depopulation and expansion of commodity production and Spanish capital accumulation. Black slaves arrived in the retinue of the Spanish conquistadores in the 1530's and very rapidly formed a cushion between the conquered and the conqueror, being employed in many cases as overseers of Indian labour gangs. Others were employed as artisans or unskilled labourers, and in the urban centres, especially Lima, in all sorts of services. This pattern was partially altered in the 1570's. By this time, Indian depopulation had seriously affected the provision of labour power especially in the coastal valleys.(iv) Furthermore, administrative measures impeded the use of the Indians of the sierra in the coastal regions and restricted the use of 'repartimiento' Indians of the coast to the few entrepreneurs connected with the Lima bureaucracy. Coastal

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(iv) The original population of c. 6,000,000 Indians in 1525 had shrunk to one and a quarter million in 1570 and continued to diminish to under 600,000 in 1620. The coastal areas lost 43% of their tributaries (adult males) between 1570 and 1620 while the loss of tributaries in the Peruvian sierra (mountainous interior areas) was only 34%. The disproportion of this demographic decline seems to have been more acute before 1570 expecially in the late 1540's for which date a loss of 1,000,000 (or 90% of the total population) is estimated for the coastal areas. (12)

valleys had developed an early market economy and had already in the 1540's started using black slaves in their haciendas. The high cost of importation of Negro slaves compared with the virtually free repartimiento Indians, who received a nominal wage, limited the expansion of slavery, but by the 1570's no repartimiento Indians were available and free labour was extremely expensive so that coastal entrepreneurs, if profits permitted, had to rely even more on slave labour.(11) From the late 1570's onwards the demand, prices and actual imports of black slaves increased enormously. These imports must have been concentrated in the coastal valleys since an estimation of the labour force in three coastal valleys (Lima, Pisco and Ica) gave a population of around 65,000 blacks (most of them slaves) and only 1,500 Indians subjected to labour drafts for the year 1600. The conditions which made possible the high investment represented by these slaves were the proximity to the largest market in South America (Lima) and environmental conditions suitable for the cultivation of highly profitable crops (sugar and vineyards) which were non-existent in the Peruvian sierra and in most parts of the vice-royalty. The dichotomy, coastal areas based on African labour and interior sierra dominated by Indian labour, grew sharper in the 17th century when blacks virtually disappeared from the sierra while Indian or mestizo labour, still necessary at harvest time, remained scarce and expensive on the coast. This pattern is clearly shown in the properties of the Jesuit Peruvian haciendas at the time of their expulsion (1767). Of a total of 5,224 slaves owned by the company, 29.8% worked on their coastal vineyard haciendas and 62.8% on sugar haciendas of which

14 out of 18 were on the coast. 31 of their remaining haciendas (or 59.6%) were on the sierra and operated mainly with Indian labour. The size of the slave population of eight major haciendas in Peru, which more than doubled between the 1670's and 1760's (from less than 800 to more than 2,000 slaves), and their reliance on purchases rather than natural reproduction of the slaves, suggest a continuous importation of slaves into Peru throughout the colonial period. The high slave population in Peru in the early 19th century and the resumption of the slave trade to Peru in the 1830's confirm the dependence of the coastal productive enterprises on new imports of slaves. The sierra which was well supplied with cheap forced or semi-free Indian labour, did not use slaves to any significant extent. Silver mining for instance, a key factor in the Peruvian economy, never used more than a few slave supervisors and relied mainly on forced labour paid at a low rate. In this case heavy investment in slaves for the sierra entrepreneurs made no economic sense. (13)

The process of Indian depopulation of New Granada (present Colombia) is far less documented than that of Mexico and Peru, however, population estimates and regional analyses indicate that the native population declined from some 3,000,000 at the time of contact with the Spaniards (1537) to 156,193 at the time of the census of 1778. The stages and the degree of depopulation of different areas of New Granada are unclear but Villamarin suggests a lower demographic decline in the eastern highlands (around Bogota) which was more controlled by the crown as compared with the Indian population in other areas which declined more rapidly. During the 16th century, slaves introduced by the colonists had little numerical significance

although they were already replacing the Indians in certain economic enterprises. In the 17th century the more intensive exploitation of mines and haciendas, the restrictions on the use of Indian labour dictated by the crown and the abundant supply of slaves through the port of Cartagena resulted in an expansion of slavery in New Granada. During 1595-1640 Cartagena received around 135,000 slaves to be distributed in New Granada or re-exported to Ecuador, Peru and Chile. At the end of the 17th century, the province of Cartagena alone had 5,700 slaves, a figure which was probably higher than the total Indian population of the province (5,786 in 1610-1). However, in the context of the whole of New Granada, its importance was still low. (14) It was in the 18th century that slave labour reached numerical significance especially in the more dynamic sectors. Contemporary estimates of the Colombian population in 1789 gave a figure of some 53,000 slaves or 6.5% of the total. The importance of the figure is higher if we consider that over half of those slaves were in the western gold-mining provinces of the kingdom where they reached 21.2% of the population and surpassed the size of the Indian population. Gold, mined almost exclusively by slave hands, constituted, in the last decades of the 18th century, well over half of the exports of New Granada, and its exploitation was a very profitable investment. Apart from mining, Colombian slaves were conspicuous on sugar and livestock raising haciendas in the 17th and 18th centuries, and these three sectors continued to be dominated by slave labour up until Independence and beyond.

By the 1790's however the slave system ceased to expand, the importance of new slaves seems to have diminished despite the liberalisation of trade regulations, while manumissions

and slave escapes and rebellions became frequent. The reasons for the ending of the expansion of slavery are various. Studies of the Choco gold mines (a province with almost 6,000 slaves) indicate that the expansion of the number of slaves, continuous for almost a century up to 1782, reached an over-capitalisation which rendered their investments less profitable. The miners' response was to reduce the size of the slave gangs and increase their efficiency. Interestingly enough the royal measures of the late 1780's to cheapen slaves and expand their numbers increased manumissions in the Choco. Slave owners were attracted by the mechanism of cohartacion (self-purchase of the slaves' freedom). Slaves bought in the early 1780's or before were manumitted after the payment of 500 pesos (the price originally paid by the owner) while a new one would cost him only 300. In the sugar haciendas the same freedom of commerce decree put the slave owners in a difficult situation. The consequent importation of cheap Spanish spirits shrunk to a third the demand for products derived from sugar cane, and only the small producers using their own labour force or cheap free labour were able to cope with the loss of demand. Last but not least, the Colombian ruling classes were not totally committed to the ideals of a slave society and economic, ideological and political factors were creating, by the end of the 18th century, favourable conditions for a slow transformation of slave relations of production into enfeoffment or free labour. Hacienda owners without slaves stimulated the slaves to escape from their owners and eventually lent them money to buy their manumission in order to increase their own labour force. The abortive Creole rebellion of the 'comuneros' in 1781 appealed to the black slaves, promising them freedom to gain support

for their struggle and abolitionist ideas were slowly taking root among the upper strata of society, no doubt because of the fear of a revolution 'a la Saint Domingue' and the relatively scarce number of slaves in the colony. (15)

We have no serious estimates of the original Indian population of Venezuela. By the mid 17th century there were some 150,000 Indians in contact with the Spaniards and some 125,000 more in marginal areas. In 1800 the first group had decreased to just over 100,000 and the second to 60,000. It seems that the slow pace of Spanish colonisation in Venezuela, covering initially coastal and western areas, prevented a rapid destruction of the Indian population. However, in the areas effectively settled by the Spaniards the demographic consequences were similar to those which occurred elsewhere in Spanish America. Thus, according to the testimonies of Spanish settlers, the Indian population of the valley of Caracas declined from between 9,000 and 30,000 to between 4,000 and 12,000, or on average to some 40% of the original in the years 1567-89. The early slave raids of the Spaniards, the warlike character of some ethnic groups, Indian escapes from the territories settled by the Spaniards, and forced labour, account for the small size of the groups of Indians granted in encomiendas to the Spaniards. The difficulties of appropriating Indian labour power in the Venezuelan territory meant a heavy reliance of the colonists on slave labour. The key economic activities of 16th century Venezuela (pearl fishing and gold and copper mining) were developed to a great extent by African slaves. The development of cacao and tobacco in the 17th and 18th centuries boosted the importation of

African slaves. By the second half of the 18th century, however, two related processes were undermining the basis of the slave system in Venezuela. On the one hand slave escapes and rebellions meant a heavy loss of capital (in labour force or other assets, through theft or destruction) which the slave holders and the state were unable to recover. Thus an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 black maroons remained in places which were inaccessible to the Spaniards, committing petty thefts in the plantations and threatening their discipline with further escapes due to the contact between the slaves and the runaway blacks. On the other hand, the 18th century expansion of cacao production signified a hunger for new lands and a desire to gain property from the state. The composicion (recognition of the right of property) of lands required the actual cultivation of the land, so the planters manumitted (in fact sold freedom to their slaves) on condition that they till the land and give the master a half or more of the production. Thus a process of enfeoffment of slaves was brought about as a product of the need of the planters to appropriate new lands and, partially, the result of the slaves' struggles which raised the average cost of maintaining slaves in the plantation. (16)

The ethnic composition of the Venezuelan population in 1800 (Table 5) reflects the importance of the importation of slaves into the colony and the effects of maronage, manumissions and miscegenation on the slave system. The negroid population constituted the absolute majority of the population of 1800 and this proportion is even higher (65.9%) if we consider the population under Spanish rule only. Slaves were still an important demographic element but the percentages of maroons

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TABLE 5 - Ethnic composition and legal status of the Venezuelan population in 1800 *

	Number	Percentage	
Spaniards	12,000	1.3	
Creoles	172,727	19.0	
Mulattos (Pardos)	407,000	45,0	61.3
Freedmen and manumitted blacks	33,362	4.0	
Black slaves	87,800	9.7	
Black maroons	24,000	2.6	
Tributary Indians	75,564	8.4	
Non-tributary Indians	25,590	3.3	
Indians in marginal areas	60,000	6.7	

* Source: Brito: 160.

and freedmen suggest a rapid dissolution of slave relations in the preceding decades, for which the diminishing imports of the late 18th century were not compensating. Finally the high incidence of mulattos in the total population probably reflects the same tendency over a longer period combined with a process of miscegenation between blacks and the other races. (Under Spanish law children born from a free mother were free, whatever the legal status of the father.) (17)

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population (c. 100,000 Indians) was decimated in a decade or so during a period of gold rush and by 1550 only some 3,000 Indians survived. The exhaustion of the Cuban gold deposits and the settlers' emigration to the richer kingdoms in the mainland condemned the island to economic stagnation. During the second half of the 16th century Cuba was rescued from absolute decay by economic assistance from the crown, the strategic position of La Habana and the raising and export of livestock. In the 17th century the expansion of the demand for tobacco in Europe and the Indies stimulated its cultivation in Cuba and thousands of Canary islanders settled in the island with economic aid from the crown and engaged in small scale tobacco production. This immigration constituted the bulk of the imports of labour in Cuba in the 17th century and permitted a population growth from a mere 10,000 inhabitants in 1600 to 50,000 in 1700. Tobacco cultivation in Cuba did not go beyond the small-scale production level during this period and depended along with the livestock haciendas, basically on free labour. During these two centuries 'pastoral' Cuba imported a few thousand African slaves who were concentrated in the urban areas where they were engaged in artisanship, domestic chores, construction works, commerce and other services. (18) A boost in slave imports occurred in the second half of the 18th century when in only one year (1762) over 4,000 slaves were introduced by the British in occupied Havana, the crown stimulated the trade from the 1770's onwards and favourable political and economic conditions in the world economy permitted a boom of sugar and coffee production in the island. During the hundred years from 1760-1860 Cuba underwent a social and economic transformation which revolutionised pastoral Cuba,

which was based on small farms and plantations and backward cattle haciendas, changing it into a (spurious) capitalist society based on slave labour. Thus the population increased eight-fold between 1775-1852 and sugar production almost 90 times between 1760-1860, and mechanisation of sugar production and transport was quickly introduced in the first half of the 19th century. The expansion of slave imports was no less dramatic, despite international pressure to stop the trade from 1807 onwards. Slave imports reached an estimated total of 804,003 in the period 1790-1859, being at its peak between 1835 and 1839, with an estimated importation of 120,000 slaves.(v) Consequently the slave population increased from 38,879 (or 22% of the total population) in 1774 to 436,495 (or 43% of the total) in 1841. The profound changes in the Cuban economy and Cuban society in the century 1760-1860 were the result of a variety of factors: increases in the price of sugar (at least during the second half of the 18th century), the influx of emigres from Saint Domingue, Louisiana and later Spanish America after independence, heavy royal expenditure in the island in the late 18th century, changes in trade regulations, natural conditions appropriate to the extensive cultivation of sugar cane, the development of an entrepreneurial oligarchy, the failure of French colonialism and sugar production in Saint Domingue, the switch of American commercial interests from the British West Indies to Cuba etc. (20)

However, the key factor in Cuban economic expansion was the capacity of the Cuban entrepreneurs to acquire cheap labour, or,

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(v) We accept here the import estimations of Moreno. Figures given by Knight are slightly higher while Curtin's are substantially lower. (19)

in 18th century Cuban conditions, slaves. Little is known about the Cuban slave trade during the economic take-off period of 1760-90, when sugar production trebled and the slave population more than doubled. Moreno estimates that only to satisfy the sugar plantation needs, imports must have been in the region of 2,000 per year. The slave flood of 1762 and the successive concessions to the slave traders which culminated in the cedula (royal order) of free trade of 1789 are compatible with these estimations. Now the primitive technology of the Cuban sugar mills in 1760 permitted an enormous expansion of production merely by adding new slaves to the existing installations, therefore the sugar planter's capacity to acquire slaves (that is the equation between prices, credits, capital available to invest etc.) virtually determined the sugar output. Sugar production expansion continued into the 19th century and became the main export product (e.g. in 1855 it constituted 83% of the value of the total exports) as did the expansion of slavery until the 1840's. From the late 1790's Spanish Cubans managed to obtain a share of the slave trade and by the 1820's they had displaced foreign merchants in the slave market making profits 200 or 300% above their investments. The international legal restrictions of 1817 and 1835 brought about an enormous rise in the price of slaves, from an average of 300 pesos in 1800 to over 1,000 pesos in 1860. By that time, however, the sugar planters were well on the way to replacing African slave labour by legal indentured servants brought from China and elsewhere. Between 1848 and 1874 over 120,000 Chinese indentured servants were imported into Cuba. Although the conditions of work and the high mortality rate in crossing the Pacific ocean were similar to those suffered by the black slaves, the indentured servant, in

theory under a contract of limited length, and receiving a wage, eased the transition to a free-labour system. Moreover, mechanisation of the processing and transport of sugar cane relegated slave labour to the unskilled tasks of the cane fields, leaving the now specialised tasks of processing and transporting the sugar cane to free or indentured workers. Thus when Spain passed legislation drastically punishing slave traders in 1866 and abolishing slavery in 1880, allowing the owners eight years of patronage, it produced no major commotion among the Cuban ruling classes since the second measure only affected 100,000 slaves or 7% of the population.(21).

One major result of the sugar and commercial revolution between 1760-1860 was the radical change in the slave system itself. Urban slavery, characterised by a certain degree of patriarchy, better treatment, participation in monetary profits, access to law courts, opportunities for manumissions etc., which was still numerically more important than rural slavery until c. 1830, lost its importance and was reduced by the late 1850's to a mere 17-19%. Furthermore, rural slavery became increasingly dominated by the sugar plantation especially after the 1840's,and by the late 1860's nearly 50 per cent of all the slaves in the colony worked on sugar estates. The working conditions in these plantations in the 19th century were appalling. Slaves worked between 17 and 20 hours per day all the week through and had a death rate of over 6% per annum, high morbidity and rate of accidents, sexual imbalance of the population since women were considered bad workers, etc. In contrast, in coffee plantations, which before their decline in the 1840's employed as many slaves as the sugar plantations, conditions were better for the slaves,

tasks were not arduous, women were employed along with males, and the slaves were used to cultivate other crops so providing their own food. This progressive deterioration of the working conditions of the slaves was also reflected in the legislation. The Slave Code of 1842 represented a less liberal attitude towards slaves compared with the 1789 laws, emphasising discipline, restriction of the movement of slaves etc. Thus the sugar revolution of the 19th century which depended on a constant import of slaves, stamped out in a few decades the semi-patriarchal character of Cuban slavery which had been predominant until the mid 18th century, transforming it into a 'calculated and calculating' system which aimed to accumulate capital at an increasing rate and provide favourable conditions for sugar production in the world economy.(22)

The preceding analysis indicates a correlation between the decrease in the original populations and the import of African slaves to replace a dwindling labour force. However, the correlation is relative. Geographical, economic and political conditions imposed limitations on the number of Africans that the colonists were able to count on at different times. Apart from the limitations imposed by international trade itself, internal conditions in the colonies prevented or stimulated the consolidation of the slave system. They can be reduced to three main factors which we will analyse briefly in the following pages: 1. Profitability and local capacity of capital investment, 2. slave resistance and political conflict among the ruling classes or colonial powers, and 3. the legal framework.

1. Leaving aside the domestic slaves, bought or acquired by civil and religious officials or rich colonists, and slave

artisans, which in small numbers provided help for other artisans or a secure rent (through the hiring out of the slaves) to modest colonists, a sizeable number of African slaves were found in Spanish America. This occurred when, in the absense of cheap Indian labour (whatever its legal status), particular economic activities rendered profitable the investment of capital in slaves and this capital was available[vi]. Thus Mexico and Peru, the richest colonies of Spain, received well over half of all the imports of slaves to Spanish America in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, although the need for labour was higher in Central America, Chile and probably elsewhere in the Indies. On the contrary by the 18th century, New Spain, by then the richest colony of Spain, managed virtually to do without slave imports, and the number of slaves diminished to an insignificant proportion of the labour force due to the plantiful supply of cheap Indian labour, a product of the demographic expansion of the Indian population in the late 17th and 18th century. In Cuba the early extinction of the Indian population, a favourable economic and political conjuncture in the world market, the availability of capital obtained through heavy royal expenditure in the island and favourable trade legislation made the expansion of slavery in the sugar and coffee plantations indispensable. In Colombia the slave population in the 18th century was concentrated in the gold producing districts where high returns

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(vi) The importance of capital formation in the expansion of the slave system has been pointed out by Kiehrer, MacLeod and Goveia for Central America and the West Indies & in a wider context by Patterson. It is not a coincidence then that the church, with an enormous capacity for capital investment was at the same time the major slave holder in Spanish America up until the 18th century.(23)

permitted capital accumulation which was superior to the rest of the kingdom. Finally, in Venezuela the proximity to the Dutch colonies of Curacao and Bonaire permitted, from the 17th century, a profitable barter of local production (salt, tobacco, hides and cacao) for the much needed black slaves and manufactured goods, avoiding through contraband, the taxes on both imports and exports. The unusual inter-colonial trade between Mexico and Venezuela, which was a product of the expansion of cacao production, permitted the latter to obtain, during the late 17th and 18th centuries, an important share of the Mexican silver, which in turn enhanced the capacity of the Venezuelan colonists to participate in the slave trade. (24)

The profitability of Spanish colonial enterprises derived basically from the interaction of three main factors: the cost of labour, the value of the products, and the value of the means of production (lands, tools, installations etc). The initial appropriation by the Spaniards of a plentiful labour force (without compensation or for a nominal wage) made the African slave into a luxury item very rarely used directly in material production.[vii] The decline or disappearance of the Indian population rendered labour power scarce and expensive and then slave labour became an alternative despite its high price, depreciation, maintenance costs, etc. We have only two estimations of slave profitability in Spanish America. Sharp has calculated the net

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(vii) Exceptions during the early period of colonisation were provided by the small gangs of slaves working in the gold placers throughout Spanish America, the incorporation of blacks as supervisors of production which was carried out by gangs of Indians, and finally the training and use of expert artisans whose value increased with their skills.

profitability of the total investments (around 75% in slaves) in gold mining in the Colombian Choco in the 18th century to be an average of 15.8% per annum. The range of variation for the five years considered (1724, 1779, 1778, 1782 and 1804) was 5.2% to 34.3% which compares favourably with the usual lending rates in 18th century Colombia (5%). The second case is that of the Jesuit haciendas of coastal Peru. Cushner explains the financial recovery of the Company in Peru from mid-17th century to early 18th century by the acquisition, through loans at 5% interest, of its coastal haciendas. Macera has calculated the gross profit of nine of these coastal haciendas in the 1760's (8 sugar plantations and one vineyard farm) and they fall within a range of 24.6 to 64.9%. Our own estimate of the net returns of 4 of these haciendas during the 18th century falls within a range varying from 4.0 to 14.4% (see Appendix 3, cases 32-35). (25)

2. Slave resistance (26) and political conflicts among the ruling classes or imperial powers throughout the colonial period.

From the beginnings of colonisation, slave holders in Spanish America were faced with slave resistance in the form of petty crimes and temporary escapes, rebellions in the places of work and, eventually, the constitution of independent villages of maroons outside the control of, and in conflict with, the colonial order. The fear of slave uprisings and the need to submit the black population to a rigid discipline brought about several regulations imposed either centrally or locally. One of the first devices to diminish slave resistance was to balance the ratio of males and females in the colonies. After the complaints about the rebelliousness of the slaves of

Hispaniola in 1514, the crown decided to stop sending male slaves to the colonies. Later a ratio between the sexes of 50:50 was established for the importation of slaves into the Indies and in 1528 it was definitely established that at least a third should be female slaves. The rationale behind the measure was to alleviate the tensions of the slave population through the constitution of slave families which would result in social conformity and, incidentally, the reproduction of the labour force of the colonies. A short-lived measure (1526-8) forbade the imports of slaves from Spain, since they were supposed to be more prone to disobedience. Later other categories of slaves were banned under the same suspicion, the Wolofs in 1532 and the mulattos in 1543, and at the same time the crown commanded that the black population should not exceed a third of the Spanish population. Apart from these measures, such as the role of the church in socialisation (see Chapter 10), measures limiting the power of the slave holders (see below) and the regulation of major conflicts involving slaves, the colonial state dealt with slave resistance through repressive apparatuses and legislation.(27)

Local government, very early during the colonial period, legislated against slave resistance and established harsh penalties. The punishments varied according to the gravity of the offence and included lashes, mutilation, torture and death. During the 1570's the legislation against slave resistance was semi-codified for the whole of the Indies and finally included in the code of 1680. For runaway slaves the code demanded a punishment varying between 50 and 200 lashes according to the time absent from their place of work, the death penalty

in the case of absences longer than six months which were aggravated by other offences, and extreme penalties in the case of robbery, murder or rape. In New Spain and Peru, and probably elsewhere in the Indies local legislation imposed severe limitations on the movements of slaves (curfews, prohibition of the use of horses) and prohibited the carrying of arms. Slave holders and the state dealt with runaways through control and punishment in the work place and through the normal means of suppressing social deviance, the police and eventually the army. However the extent of the escapes in certain places created the need to organise special bodies to capture and return runaways to their owners. In Mexico, Peru and Cuba, holy brotherhoods were created for this purpose and were financed through a tax on the slave-holders. Although they had a nucleus of specialised slave hunters, the efficiency of these institutions does not seem to have been great and eventually groups of freelance slave hunters came into operation.(28)

Slave resistance took the form of petty crime and temporary escapes, long-term escapes, mass rebellions and finally the constitution of independent villages or palenques out of the control of both the state and the slave owners, which posed the threat of further escapes by the slaves of the plantations who were attracted by the possibilities of freedom given by the palenque to the slave runaways, the assaults on Spanish haciendas etc. Obviously there was a continuity between these forms of resistance. Slaves in revolt, after being partially crushed by the superiority of Spanish arms, found refuge in isolated areas which were inaccessible

to the Spanish troops and established sometimes sizeable maroon communities. These isolated palenques protected by natural defenses, palisades (hence the word palenque), systems of security, counter-attack and escape, permitted many such communities, enlarged by new runaways or even free blacks, to exist for long periods of time and eventually to be recognised by the colonial state. Slave rebellions and rebellion plots differed markedly in scope and aim. While some aimed at eliminating Spanish rule altogether, others merely aimed at getting better conditions of work (better feeding, more resting hours, etc), although most of them were designed to provide a chance of gaining freedom. In every case the colonial state reacted by smashing the revolt and, if possible, killing the leaders, capturing the runaways and bringing the survivors back to the old conditions of work. Maroon communities proved to be more difficult to deal with. Two examples of such palenques and the attitudes of the state and the colonists towards them casts light over a situation which was general in several regions of Spanish colonial America.

(i) Maroon communities around Cartagena (Colombia) in the 17th century.

In about 1600, some 30 slaves revolted, ran away and settled south of Cartagena. Abducting and attracting slaves from nearby plantations and assaulting farms and ranches, they managed to subsist and repel Spanish attacks until 1619 when peace was achieved and the maroons were declared free because of the impossibility of reducing them, and the high costs of the campaigns. Not all the maroons accepted the truce, and escapes from the haciendas continued. By 1680 Cartagena was

surrounded by eight palenques, half of them with an estimated population of 200 blacks each. These communities subsisted by means of land cultivation, gold mining and its barter and robbery. Its members were runaways from Cartagena's haciendas and the mere existence of the palenques instigated a relaxation of the discipline inside the production units, since slaves threatened the slave holders with escape if conditions of work deteriorated. During the 1680's unsuccessful armed expeditions were sent to the maroon villages to destroy them or negotiate a treaty which included the devolution of the slaves recently escaped and freedom for the rest. At the same time, a priest negotiated a peace treaty with the maroons which offered more favourable terms, including freedom for all the maroons and their descendants and the concession of lands to cultivate. The maroons for their part were to give back runaway slaves who had escaped after the signing of the treaty, to obey royal authority and to pay tributes. After lobbying at court he obtained in 1691 a royal order accepting the conditions of peace negotiated with the maroons. Cartagena's slavocracy however did not give up their rights to the runaway slaves and imposed the decision to totally destroy the palenques on the local government notwithstanding the royal order. Thus during 1693-4 all the eight communities were destroyed, their members killed, re-enslaved or disbanded by the governor and Spanish colonists. The problems for the Cartagena slave holders did not stop there, since again in 1713-7, the local government was negotiating with maroon communities located in the same area as the villages which had been destroyed in the 1690's. This time, bishop-governor

Casiani signed a treaty similar to the one negotiated in the 1690's which was observed to the letter thereafter.(29)

(ii) The Mandinga-Amapa Maroon community (Mexico): sugar and tobacco plantations in southern Veracruz were shaken by five major slave revolts from 1725 to 1768. The second one in 1735 gave rise to several palenques in the area, one of them was Mandinga. Links with the local population (both whites and blacks) provided them with information about slave hunting expeditions and the means to develop some trade. Influential whites used the maroons to intimidate sectors of the population for their own interests (one of them being to dispossess Indian communities of their lands), and in 1762 the maroons obtained a short-lived decree of freedom from the Viceroy after volunteering to defend the port of Veracruz from the English threat. In the interim five different expeditions (1748-59) had tried unsuccessfully to reduce them to slavery, the population had grown due to natural reproduction and new runaways, robberies against the Spanish haciendas continued and agriculture in the village improved. By the 1760's two factions had developed inside the community. The old maroons and their families who were in favour of negotiation with the Spaniards and the legalisation of their precarious freedom, and newly arrived runaways who were mostly single males or men with their families still in bondage and who were in favour of continuing the hostilities with the Spanish state and were unprepared to negotiate. Open war broke out among the factions and after defeating the 'radicals' the moderate faction handed over their ex-partners to the Spaniards and accepted a peace treaty with

them in 1769. This included freedom for all the villagers and their descendants (the rebels excluded), the concession of lands, the subjection of the community to royal authorities and the promise to periodically carry out searches for runaway slaves who were to be handed to the authorities. Thereafter, both sides honoured the treaty and the ex-maroons were integrated into Mexican society. (30)

These two cases show the degree of ambivalence displayed by the colonial order and slaves alike towards slavery and emancipation. The Spanish colonial ruling classes were not always united in the pursuit of the 'ideals' of a slave society (no limitation on the slave holders' rights over their chattels, total segregation etc). This was natural enough, since the slave population was a small fraction of the labour force and correspondingly slavocracy was not strong enough to impose its class interests over the whole society. The case of Cartagena in the 1690's is atypical, since slaves at the time probably constituted over half of the total labour force (see above). Yet even in this case compromises were made with the maroon communities in the early 17th and 18th centuries. On the side of the slaves and ex-slaves, the pursuit of freedom was limited to the level of the individual and his/her kinship groups and it seems that only in the cases of slaves recently arrived from Africa did a sense of ethnicity with a revolutionary character develop. (31) As in the case of Mandinga and the palenques of Cartagena, several maroon communities became settled under Spanish rule after promising to hand over runaways to the authorities. In many cases the Spanish state solved the conflict of interests created by

the palenques by protecting the general interests of the slave holders but sacrificing their immediate interests through the transformation of the maroons into slaves themselves.

International wars and political conflicts among the ruling classes encouraged slave resistance by creating favourable conditions for rebellion or escape or by providing resourceful allies in their struggle against the slave owners. Slave rebellions occurred in Lima, Havana and Buenos Aires in 1578, 1726 and 1806 when the British attacked, threatened or occupied these cities, and local black slaves helped in the 1538 looting of Havana by the French troops. Some 1,500 slaves, abandoned by their Spanish masters in Jamaica in 1655, fought alternately with the Spanish guerrillas or with the British invaders and retained for decades their independence from both as separate communities. The rebellion of the free zambo Andresote in the 1730's, who had the support of a large band of negroid freedmen and runaways in Venezuela, had the financial backing of the Dutch of Curacao and initially the support of many creole planters. On the other hand, Indian-black alliances had no political relevance in the period under study. Both ethnic groups occasionally worked out mutually beneficial relations, miscegenated and eventually resisted Spanish domination for decades on the coasts of Ecuador and Honduras, the latter with the help of the British. But under Spanish rule, blacks and Indians excluded each other from their uprisings and the state used them both to repress and exploit each other. Thus, while the black maroon was chased by Indian and white troops (and sometimes black slaves!),

during the Indian rebellions the slave had to side with his master.

The major slave upheaval in the Americas was the Saint Domingue (Haiti) revolution of 1789-1803 which totally eliminated the colonial power and its main consequence, slavery, from the rich colony. The differences between Haiti and Spanish America around 1790 do not need to be emphasised. While in the former colony slaves totalled almost half a million and the French a mere 30,000, cushioned by a minority of free negroids, none of the Spanish colonies had a slave population above 45% of the total population. Furthermore, the French revolution weakened the unity of the planters and the colonial state and spurred on the instincts of the black masses for freedom with its egalitarian ideology. At the same time a long international confrontation in Europe and elsewhere prevented a military restoration of the colonial order. During this long period the slave masses grew ideologically and militarily, learned at a high cost the treacherous character of the colonial powers, forged the unity of slaves and free negroids and successfully eliminated colonialism and slavery. These conditions did not occur in colonial Spanish America. Only in a few cases did the slave population surpass the Spanish population and this was during early colonisation and in Cuba in the 1840's. In the former cases their numbers were limited and the possibility of subsistence was reduced to primitive and isolated maroon villages which were always liable to be destroyed by the superiority of Spanish arms. In mid-19th century Cuba, the commercial and agricultural prosperity of the island prevented any major confrontation among the ruling classes up until the late 1860's and by then the slave population had dwindled

to well below the number of whites. Furthermore, throughout the period the majority of the slave population lived under conditions similar to modern concentration camps, and escapes and revolts were prevented by means of the total seclusion of the slaves and high security measures. (33)

The Spanish American wars of independence presented, in certain cases, opportunities for escape, rebellions and manumissions, and in the long-run accelerated the dissolution of the system. Apart from fairly effectively stopping the slave trade and half-heartedly legislating against slavery itself, some independence movements in continental America acted as a dissolver of slavery by recruiting slaves for their armies. In the 1810's Argentinian and Chilean rebel governments and the Uruguayan guerrillas enlisted slaves in thousands to enlarge their armies under the promise of immediate or future emancipation. On the contrary, in Venezuela, the slave and colour issues were initially agitated around by the royalists. They effectively recruited coloured freedmen to fight their exploiters, the hacienda owners, who constituted the core of the independence movements, and eventually declared the slaves belonging to the patriots to be free. After serious defeats, the creole leadership realised that the negroid masses represented an important military force, and, prejudices apart, promised lands to the predominantly mulatto llaneros (cowboys) and freedom to the slaves volunteering in the rebel armies. However, as in the case of the abortive Cuban independence movement of 1868-78, an enthusiastic response from the slaves was not forthcoming. In both cases, the initial hesitation of the creole leadership to ally with the slaves alienated the latter from participation in the confrontation. The Spanish forces, for their part,

further weakened this possibility by making overtures towards emancipation.(34)

3. The Legal Framework. Much of the legislation in force in the Indies derived from Castilian law, although with the progress of colonisation specific measures applying only to the colonies became more important. In relation to slavery, the 13th century Castilian code (las siete Partidas) in force at the time of the conquest created several restrictions on the property rights of the slave owner. Assassination and castration of the slave by the owners were severely punished, slaves could marry without the consent of their owners and, if they belonged to different masters, they had to be sold in order to have a common owner to ensure family life. Manumission was recognised in two forms, by the owner's own will or by the state when the slave had performed a service to the state or his master. Abuses of the slave (excessive punishment, castration etc) entailed the freedom of the slave or the forced change of master, and other dispositions provided further avenues for slave manumission (marrying his/her owner, inheritance of part of his/her owner's property etc) and some recognition was given to the slave's right to own property.

Sixteenth and 17th century legislation in the Indies dealt basically with repressive measures against maroons (see above), against abuses of the Indians by black people (free or slave) and the Christianisation of the slaves, but the basic principles of the Castilian code were retained with only minor changes, e.g., the slave's right to own property was fully recognised, but marriage to a free person did not entail his/her manumission. The slave code of 1789 reiterated

the need for religious indoctrination of the slaves, protection of the family etc. The importance of the code, however, rests in the standards of physical and social welfare that its enforcement ensured for the slaves of the Indies. Its measures included the reduction of the working day to daylight with a break of two hours at midday, exemption from full field labour for women, the very old and the very young, proper feeding and clothing, respect of festival days, establishing of a protector of the slaves (legal representative), reduction of punishment to a maximum of 25 lashes etc. As in all cases of radical royal legislation, the protest of the interested parties was immediate and the code was at least temporarily suspended in 1794. Finally, in the heyday of slavery in the remaining Spanish colonies, Spanish legislation hardened the conditions of exploitation of the slaves (and incidentally the free non-propertied classes) as a recognition of the importance of the plantation economy in Cuba and Puerto Rico, although it retained the rights of manumission and the protectorship. (36)

More important than the formal rights of slaves as reflected in the codes is the actual enforcement of these rights and the actual conditions of work and life experienced by the slaves.[viii]

(viii) The excessive or absolute reliance of some writers on formal law (Tannenbaum, Elkins and in a modified way Klein) led them to spurious comparisons between Hispanic slavery and Northern European colonial systems. Such comparisons emphasise the acceptance and encouragement by the Iberian church and government of the enforcement of slave rights such as religious and family life, manumission etc. As shown below, these rights were purely theoretical for certain categories of slaves in Spanish America. In fact these broad generalisations overlook the size and productive functions of the slave population in

(footnote (viii) continued)

Spanish America and the British, French and Dutch colonies, and their changes over time. Indeed Klein, in his analysis of Cuba pointed out the more diversified character of the Cuban economy as compared with non-Hispanic plantation colonies and briefly noted, as an exception, the evils of the sugar plantations of the 1830's and 1840's. However, he failed to realise that these conditions were becoming generalised for Cuban slaves by the mid-1840's and that their further development was only stopped by the difficulties of the slave trade, the importation of indentured servants and the progressive mechanisation of the sugar industry. Taking into account the developments of 19th century Cuban sugar mills, the elimination of food plots tilled by the slaves for their own consumption, the virtual elimination of the unproductive services of priests and religious activities from the plantations, the sexual imbalance of the slave population (only a third were females in all coffee and sugar plantations in the period 1823-44 and less than a sixth before that period), the confinement of the slaves to sordid prison camp style barracoons and the maximising of the hours of work of the slaves, we can conclude that the rights of the slaves to a religious and family life, personal property, manumission etc, were nothing but a legal fiction for at least a third of the 19th century Cuban slaves. If the annual rate of decline of the slave populations (deaths minus births compared to the total slave population) means anything in respect to these rights, then the welfare of Jamaican slaves would compare favourably with Cuban plantation slaves. Thus the rate of decline of the Jamaican slave population during the 18th century was 2-3% per annum, while in Cuba it was 4.4% per annum in the period 1835-41 and 3.3% in 1856-60 when planters were trying to create favourable conditions for the natural reproduction of the slave population. The conclusions that we can draw from this are provisional and need further elaboration by comparing a series of slave economies, slave legislation and its enforcement (measured by means of statistical indicators), the political forces acting in these particular social formations etc. Our analysis suggests that the formal rights expressed in the legislation were a dynamic reflection of the forces operating at the economic level. The semi-patriarchal character of slavery and its relative insignificance (especially plantation slavery) in Spain and colonial Spanish America until the 18th century permitted a relatively 'liberal' approach to it, although the enforcement of the law varied according to economic and political conditions. The development of a dominant plantation economy in the Spanish colonies in the 18th century led to a hardening of the legislation concerning slaves, not to mention the actual conditions of the slaves themselves. Had the plantation economy developed earlier and dominated the whole economy of the colonies the legal framework ruling the life of the slaves might have developed along the harsh, brutal lines which governed the behaviour of slaves and masters in the other 18th century plantation societies. (37)

In the following pages we will deal with the conditions which most directly weakened or reinforced the slave system, manumission (and self purchase), treatment of slaves and family life.

In the present state of research on slavery in Spanish America, there is no way of estimating the proportion of slaves manumitted in a particular period in relation to the total slave population in the Spanish colonies. A clue to its importance, however, is provided by the proportion of free coloured population to the total negroid population (over 50% for most colonies at any particular period). However, the first category included not only manumitted slaves and their descendants, but also the kin of black slaves and free families and maroons and their descendants which makes the relation spurious. Nevertheless, some characteristics of the process of manumission are known for at least some areas and this permits some generalisations. (38)

Manumission was basically an urban phenomenon. The access of the slaves to a money economy, knowledge of the avenues of emancipation, proximity to the Spanish courts, personal contact with their masters, etc, permitted the resourceful slave eventually to obtain freedom after litigation, hard work or a stroke of good luck. In probably two out of three cases the manumission of the slave involved payment of the price of the slave to the master, either by the slave him/herself or a third party (usually a relative), or the promise of future service for the master or his/her family. Finally, the institutionalisation of the practice of self-purchase in the 17th and 18th centuries and evidence from some Spanish

American areas indicates that manumission was, for some categories of slaves (urban artisans, servants etc) a real possibility by the end of the colonial period.

Slave treatment and the possibilities for enjoyment of family life depended on the characteristics of the owners and the type of work which they were forced to do. Thus, the Company of Jesus had a reputation, validated at least by the orders given by the superiors to the managers of their haciendas, of treating the slaves well (proper food, clothing and health care, limited punishment and encouragement of family life) while in general the welfare of the slaves was considerably lower in rural areas than in the urban areas. Historical evidence shows that the state (local government and church) acted favourably to the slave when confronted with obvious contraventions of the law by the masters, but took no active steps to enforce the law through periodic inspections, encouragement of the slaves to denounce abuses etc. Slave treatment and family life were crucial factors in the biological reproduction of the slaves and therefore should be taken into account as a factor of the expansion or dissolution of slave relations of production. Rural enterprises, especially big plantations, failed to reproduce their slave labour force and had to rely on slave imports to maintain or enlarge it. Among the reasons for this decrease of the slave population are overwork, dietary deficiencies, work and punishment during periods of pregnancy and above all the sexual imbalance of the slave population. Thus, even in the 18th century Jesuit Peruvian haciendas which provided adequate food, clothing, health care and stimulated family life, slave deaths equalled

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slave births, and since infant mortality (0-6 year old children) accounted for some 40% of the total mortality they had to rely on new purchases. In this case the more even male/female ratio was counter-balanced by the scarcity of women of child-bearing age. The situation seems to have been worse elsewhere in rural Spanish America. Bowser, in a sample of slaves owned by rural enterprises in Peru up until 1650, found over 80% males and less than 5% of children below the age of eight, a situation which contrasts with the sexual parity in Peruvian urban areas. For Mexico Barret's analysis of slave labour in the sugar hacienda of Atlacomulco between 1535-1800 indicates that the average active life of a slave was between 10 and 20 years in different periods, and that only half of the slaves used in the haciendas in these three centuries were born in the hacienda while the rest were purchased at different times. A slightly better situation occurred in the sugar hacienda of Xochimancas which belonged tothe Jesuits. From 1660 to 1674 the slave population, despite parity of the sexes in 1660 and a high proportion of children, failed to replace the labour force in 1674 which in fact declined by 33%. As we have seen above, 19th century sugar plantations were the Spanish epitome of these trends. The evidence of the incapacity of the rural slave population to reproduce naturally is not conclusive, though, and needs qualification and further research. The slave populations of the gold placers of the Colombian Choco and some Jesuit cattle haciendas in Cordoba (Argentina) exhibited natural reproduction in the second half of the 18th century and the same is true for some tobacco farms in 18th century Cordoba (Mexico). In

the case of the Cordoba Jesuit haciendas it seems that the purpose was to breed slaves for their other haciendas, but for the other two cases, the reasons for what seems to be an anomaly remain obscure. (39)

The development and decline of slavery in Spanish America was conditioned by a set of political factors which stimulated or retarded its expansion. The decline or extinction of the Indian labour force created, especially in certain geographical areas and economic sectors, a high demand for and importation of African slaves. The only barrier this faced was the incapacity of the Spanish crown to organise the trade efficiently and make their fiscal interest and the colonists' needs for slave labour compatible. During the period of union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns (late 17th century to 1640) this contradiction was partially superseded and consequently the trade increased. But it was only in the last decades of the 18th century and the 19th century that the Spanish slave trade reached a size comparable to the imports of the French, British and Portuguese American colonies.

Slavery was in Spanish America a diverse and changing institution. A crucial distinction to be made in order to characterise slavery in the Indies is that between productive and non-productive slavery and, in the former category, between small and large scale production. Although statistical series are lacking, the predominance of urban dwellers among the slave population of Mexico and Peru up to the 1570's and in Cuba up until the early 19th century suggests that a high proportion of Spanish American slaves developed non-productive

activities (domestic chores, acting as body-guards and other services) or were engaged in small scale production (artisans, construction and manufacturing workers etc). This predominance of urban settlement amongst the slave population seems to have changed by the end of the 16th century with more emphasis on rural production, and for mid-19th century Cuba statistics show not only a predominance of rural slavery but also a concentration of the slaves in big sugar mills, while in 18th century Venezuela and Colombia the majority of the slave population was engaged in the production of minerals, cacao, sugar and other crops. Parallel to this urban/rural change there seems to have been a double process of concentration of the slave population into large scale production units, as in 19th century Cuba and Puerto Rico and 18th century Peru, and of dissolution into servile relations, as in Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico. The political events of 1808-25 reinforced these trends. The ruling classes of the faithful colonies (Cuba and Puerto Rico) profited from a continuation of the slave trade up until the 1860's and from legal slavery until its progressive abolition in the 1880's. On the other hand, the independent new republics more or less successfully stopped the slave trade, and in most of them 'free womb' laws had been enacted by 1825 although effective freedom was restricted by laws of patronage. Abolition was decreed in the 1820's in all those countries with a small slave population (Chile, Mexico, Central America), but where the slave holders' interests were a significant economic and therefore political force (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Argentina) slavery remained legal until the 1850's.

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Given the incapacity of the slave population to reproduce naturally, the suppression of the slave trade in the first decades of the 19th century in continental Spanish America and in mid-19th century in Cuba and Puerto Rico, condemned slavery to a natural but slow death which was accelerated in certain areas by legislation, conscription for the rebel armies and opportunities for maroonage. However, the slave system managed to persist longer in those economic sectors where profitability allowed the purchase of new slaves internally, despite the high prices. Thus, the concentration of slaves in sugar production in Cuba and Puerto Rico and in the gold placers of Colombia, and the imports of African slaves from Colombia and Ecuador to coastal Peru, permitted the persistence of important slave enclaves as late as the 1850's in continental Spanish America and the 1870's in the Spanish colonies.

Finally, where the economic conditions for slavery (high profitability of the exploitation of certain products and the lack of cheap labour in the regions concerned) persisted but the political conditions did not (international treaties banning the African slave trade and its enforcement), the slavocracy resorted to the Chinese indentured servant, as in the case of the Cuban sugar mills and coastal Peru (ix) or the compulsion of the whole non-proprietary classes to work in the plantations, as in Puerto Rico. (41)

(ix) The imports of indentured servants to coastal Peru are estimated at over 84,000 for the period 1850-74, precisely at a time in which slavery was abolished (1855). According to Perez the 120,000 or more Chinese servants imported into Cuba made up 50% of the labour force deficit in the sugar industry between 1853-7 and after that date, 75%. Despite the different legal status of indentured servants, figures relating to the Chinese servants indicate work conditions similar to or worse than those of the black slaves (high mortality and suicide rates, extreme sexual imbalance of the population, widespread maroonage etc). (40)

(c) The encomienda system

The encomienda (literally commendation) of Indians was the most important mechanism of appropriation of Indian surplus in 16th century Spanish America. Although there were clear legal precedents in Spain, where the encomienda holder (or encomendero) had civil and criminal jurisdition and received feudal rents from certain territories, the institution had a different development in the expanding Spanish dominions. The encomienda was born out of the need for the colonists of Hispaniola to control the Indian labour force, which until then had been only submitted to royal tributes and the informal exactions of the Spaniards. The colonists' rebellion of 1497-99 imposed acceptance of the allocation of Indian villages to particular settlers,who were entitled to force the Indians to work for them,on the representative of the crown (the Adelantado Colombus). The crown did not immediately recognise the arrangement and only in 1503 gave legal form to a modified procedure. The principle of Indian forced labour (they were legally free) was recognised, but Indians had to be paid wages which were established and controlled by the royal officials, receive religious instruction, and work in the mines for a maximum of eight months per year.(42)

The allocations of Indians to encomenderos during the period 1503-14 were temporary ones. The mining economy of the island and the interests of the crown demanded an increasing gold out-put so Indians were allotted to those colonists with the highest return in gold. It was only in the allocation of 1514 that the right to retain the encomienda for life and for it to be inherited for a second generation seems to have been

established. In these conditions (prior to 1514) it is understandable that the encomenderos tried to use the Indian labour force intensively thus producing a drastic decline in the Indian population. This demographic collapse and the Indianist campaign of the Dominicans in Hispaniola (see Chapter 7) gave rise to the laws of Burgos (1512-13) which reiterated previous orders for religious indoctrination and established numerous restrictions on the use of the Indian labour force. They banned the use of Indians as carriers of heavy loads, women over four months pregnant, Indians below 14 years old and in theory they improved the conditions of work of the Indians. They ensured the provision of hammocks, garments (to the value of one gold peso per Indian), banned corporal punishment for the workers except by the royal inspector of each Indian village, and prohibited the removal of the Indians from their place of work (the new encomendero was supposed to acquire the property of the old one in order to use the encomienda labour). The laws also established limits on the number of Indians in each encomienda. Each was allowed between 40 and 150 Indians, at least a third of whom were to be employed in the mines. They granted privileges to the Indian chieftains, established a maximum of five months of continuous work in the mines, followed by a period of 40 days of rest etc. (43)

Between 1510-13, the encomienda system was introduced into the new territories that had been incorporated into the Spanish crown, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Jamaica and the Gulf of Darien in Panama. In these islands gold mining and/or agriculture for export had fallen to an insignificant level by

1520 while in Darien, the brutal methods of conquest with their sequel of Indian resistance and enslavement, resulted in an equally drastic decline of the Indian population and the resulting limited relevance of the encomienda. The realisation by the central administration of the short sighted policy of colonisation carried out so far and the pressure of the Indianists brought about attempts to eliminate the system after 1516. The governors of Hispaniola attempted to create Indian villages without encomenderos but without success, and in 1518-20 orders were sent to Hispaniola and Puerto Rico to relieve Indians from encomiendas and charge them with a tribute instead but again it was not really implemented.(44)

At the time that the encomienda in the Antilles was disappearing because of the extinction of the Indians the institution was being introduced in the newly conquered territories. In Mexico, after the defeat of the Aztecs, Cortes hurried to allocate Indians to encomiendas in 1524. Despite the royal order against the encomiendas, the conquistador confirmed and regulated these allocations by establishing the encomendero's rights and duties. Apart from religious indoctrination and good treatment of the Indians, the encomenderos were to have the necessary military power (men in arms, horses etc.) to defend the land in proportion to the size of their encomiendas, to reside in Mexico for at least eight years and to get married or bring their spouses from Spain. Male Indians over 12 years old, were commanded to work for the Spaniards for periods of 20 days with intervals of 30 days to take care of their own cultivations and for a nominal wage. The work was restricted to the area surrounding

the Indian villages and the use of Indian workers in the mines was forbidden. Finally the encomiendas were regulated by royal judges and involved the ideas of perpetuity and inheritance. The favourable reports about the system given by the Mexican colonists and ecclesiastics changed the position of the crown from a total rejection of the system in 1523 to a total acceptance of it by 1528, its acceptance included a promise of perpetuity but was restricted on minor points. This tendency of the crown to accept the institution began to be reversed around 1530, and several restrictions on the power of the encomenderos began to be imposed. Firstly, from c. 1525 important encomiendas began to fall into the hands of the crown (see Table 6), and in 1530 the local administration was ordered to establish the post of corregidor (Spanish magistrate in charge of the collection of tributes, religious and justice duties) in them. They were to be paid from the Indian tributes and in the 1550's the post was extended to all encomiendas (royal or private). More importantly, in the same period, 1530's - 1550's, several assessments of tributes (tasas) to be paid in kind, money or labour to the encomendero or the crown were made and enforced bringing to an end the unchecked exactions of the primitive encomienda. During 1535-40 a new series of orders which favoured the encomenderos were sent by the crown to the colony. They included the possibility of commuting tribute in money into service in the mines, the concession of the right of inheritance to the holders, permission to interchange encomiendas, attempts to raise the rate of Indian tributes etc. (45)

The New Laws of 1542-3 introduced a radical legal development that, had it been implemented, would have eliminated

Table 6: Tributary Indian population in Colonial Spanish America. *

Provinces or Areas	Period					
	1548-57	1560-70	1597	17th century	18th century	Beginning of 19th century
Valley of Mexico (1)	n.d.	106,908	n.d.	c.25,000 (1692)	47,080 (1787-94)	64,487 (1797-1804)
% of Indians under crown control.	70.1	70.4	76.0			
New Spain (2)	n.d.	1,051,175	583,917	n.d.	316,099*	763,813 (1807)
% of Indians under crown control	42.5 **	55.6	63.1			
Yucatan (3)	58,144		48,125 (1601)	36,020	42,147	70,000
% under the crown	28.0**					
Guatemala (4)	n.d.	34,425 (1572)		53,879 (1664)	47,780 (1778)	70,305 (1811)
% under the crown	40.4**					
Honduras (5)	n.d.	8,100* (1571-4)	4,864 (c. 1590)			
% under the crown	7.7**					
El Salvador (6)	n.d.	n.d.				14,800
Nicaragua (7)	n.d.	6,250 (c. 1570)		4,716 (1685)		10,471
Costa Rica (8)	n.d.		1,126 (1583)	400 (1681)		
Colombia (9)		325,400 c. 1560				39,048
Peru (Lower and Upper) (11)	n.d.	315,335 (1561)	275,078 (1591)	231,008 (1628)	143,130 (1754)	267,955
% under the crown	2.5** (1557)					
Central & Northern Chile	n.d.			2,345 (1614)	4,775 (1777-8)	
Central, Northern & Southern Chile	n.d.	112,500 (1570)	57,500 (1600)			
Argentina	n.d.	n.d.	56,500 c.1596	12,994 c.1673	c.2,400 (1719)	
Paraguay	n.d.		7,050 (1610)	3,783 (1674)		

Notes to Table 6

* Usually includes Indian males between 18 and 50 years old paying tribute to either the crown or private encomenderos.

** Valladolid, II 1975: 498, based on tributes and not actual tributaries.

(1) Area around Mexico City and included in New Spain. Percentages for 1548 and 1597 are estimated assuming that the population in the different encomiendas varied in the same proportion. Population of 1692 has been rounded up to allow for 2 towns without information. (Gibson 1964: 63-4, 142-3).

(2) Simpson 1950: 163; Gibson 1964: 142-3.

(3) Garcia Bernal 1978: 160; Garcia Bernal 1972: 31.

(4) Solano 1974: 92, 111, 174, 182-3.

(5) MacLeod 1973: 59; Solano 1974: 182.

(6) Solano 1974: 53; Solano 1974: 182

(7) MacLeod 1973:53; Solano 1974: 182.

(8) MacLeod 1973: 332.

(9) For 1560, Colmenares 1978: 90-2. For the early 19th century our own estimate based on an Indian population of 156,193 (Villamarin 1974: 84) assuming a dependent population of 3 people per tributary.

(10) Vicens 1974, III: 336 for 1570, Brito 1973: 126-7 for 1612, Arcila 1966: 179-92 for 1660-2. For the early 19th century our own estimation based on the total Indian population who paid tributes (75,594) given in Brito 1973:160, assuming a dependent population of 3 people per tributary. The population increase from the mid 17th century to 1800 was a result of the incorporation of an increasing number of Indians under Spanish dominion and as tributaries.

(11) Steward (ed) 1963, II: 334 for 1561, 1591, 1628 and 1754. For 1795 to 1799 we have determined the tributary population by adding the total Indian population of Lower Peru (648,615) and Upper Peru (423,204) and dividing the total by four. Thus we assume a ratio of tributary to total Indian population of 1:4.

(12) Tributary population for Chile in 1570 and 1600 has been estimated by dividing the total Indian population in those years (450,000 and 230,000 respectively) by four (Villamarin 1975: 96). For Indian tributaries in central Chile in 1614, Moerner 1970: 294. Tributary population for 1777-8 in central Chile has been estimated by dividing the total Indian population (18,301) by four (Moerner 1970: 296).

(13) Zavala 1935:327-8; Assadourian et al 1972:192-7.

(14) Population of 1612 estimated by dividing the total Indian population of Asuncion and its surroundings (28,000) by four. (Mora 1974:54.) Population of 1674 in Mora 1974:59. Figures do not include the population of the Jesuit missions.

in a few years the encomendero class, leaving a thin stratum of rentiers paid by the crown and without any control or rights over the Indian population. Apart from the classical recommendations of indoctrination and good treatment of the Indians and the banning of new Indian enslavements, elimination of the tributes paid by the Indians of the Antilles etc., the laws commanded: (a) that the encomiendas held by the royal officers or the church should revert to the crown; (b) similarly those encomiendas held without a proper title; (c) reduction of all the major encomiendas to a 'moderate and honest' size, the rest of the Indians reverting to the crown, part of the tributes of the latter could be allocated to conquistadores without encomiendas; (d) encomenderos responsible for the mistreatment of Indians or involved in rebellions should be dispossessed of their Indians who would revert to the crown; (e) royal officials were forbidden to grant new encomiendas and all the existing ones were to revert to the crown once the present holders died, although the widow or children of the holder could receive a rent from the crown, if needed; (f) the encomendero should live in the province of the Indies where he held Indians, otherwise the encomienda should revert to the crown; (g) royal officials were commanded to assess the tribute to be paid by the Indians to the encomenderos and those exacting more tribute than the established amount should lose their encomiendas in favour of the crown.(46).

The pressure of the encomenderos, church and officials of Mexico (see Chapter 10) and the rebellion of the Peruvian colonists impeded the full enforcement of the New Laws. In relation to the encomienda the crucial order of reversion to

the crown after the death of the present holder was suspended in 1545 and officials in America were authorised to grant new encomiendas. However, the crown remained committed to the restriction of the power of encomenderos through moderate and progressive measures. Thus in 1549, it was ordered that no encomienda should include tribute in labour, and in 1551 the crown reiterated its order to assess the Indian tribute everywhere in the Indies, recommending that it be smaller than that paid to the Indian authorities before the conquest. The question of succession of encomiendas remained unresolved but with time inheritance to one successor and, in special cases, up to four was accepted.

Thus through a long period of vacillating experimentation and legislation from 1503 onwards, the main characteristics of the encomienda began to be fixed despite the numerous exceptions accepted by the crown. The laws relating to the encomienda included in the Code of the Indies of 1680 summarise the final legal configuration of the institution. It was defined as a temporary grant of Indian tributes due to the crown to particular people. These tributaries included all Indian males between 18 and 50 years old, excluding chieftains, their elder sons and some other categories of Indians (e.g. Indians pacifically submitted to the crown for an initial period of 10 years). Tributes could be in money or kind, but not labour, and it was assessed by a Spanish magistrate whose decisions could be appealed against by the parties involved (Indians, encomenderos or the crown as an encomendero) before the local Audiencia. The encomendero was charged with the indoctrination of the Indians and the defence of the land, for which the possession of arms and horses in proportion to the size of

the encomienda was required. The Indians were in theory not allowed to leave their villages, but had full usufruct of communal and inheritable personal lands. The encomenderos were banned from economically exploiting the villages of their encomiendas. The carrying out of this was in charge of corregidores, a post which was incompatible with encomiendas, as were those of royal officials and ecclesiastics. Finally, encomiendas were inalienable on all counts (sale, donation, barter etc.). (47)

This legal configuration which defines clearly the normative framework (or 'ideal' encomienda) which the crown established for the majority of the Indian population in the 16th century tells us very little about the real development of the institution in the different Spanish colonies, thus it is necessary to analyse concrete cases in order to evaluate the actual productive regime to which the Indians were submitted. Before entering into such an analysis we will present a quantitative overview of the factors involved in the different evolution of the system in Spanish America, these are basically the Indian (tributary) population, rentability of the encomiendas and the intervention of the state. Table 7 summarises statistical information and estimates of the Indian population subjected to tribute from the mid 16th century, which as a general rule includes male Indians from around 15 to 50 years old. It does not include Indians in the first stages of Christianisation (which usually lasted ten years, but sometimes over a century, see Chapter 8), Indians not under Spanish control, or those who had escaped from their villages to evade tribute or forced labour and worked in Spanish

economic units or lived in towns or villages other than their own. In some cases we present the proportion of Indians paying tributes to encomenderos or to the crown.

Table 7: Rentability of the Indian tribute in Spanish America in 1631 as estimated by a contemporary royal official (in ducats of 375 maravedies). *

		%	
Peru	419,000	48.1	Tribute changed to every tributary 4 pesos (1591) (1) 7 - 10 pesos in Upper Peru 1799.
Colombia	74,000	8.5	6 pesos (1635 onwards)(3)
Venezuela	30,000	3.4	13 pesos (1687)(4)
New Spain	150,000	17.2	1 - 3 pesos (mid 18th century)(5)
Yucatan	100,000	11.5	
Guatemala	50,000	5.7	
Rio de la Plata	30,000	3.5	
Paraguay	6,000	0.7	
Chile	12,000	1.4	9.5 - 10.5 pesos (1620) (6)
Total	871,000	100.0	

* Source: Zavala 1935: 329 and notes below.

(1) Average calculated from Zavala 1935:325.

(2) Sanchez Albornoz 1978:62.

(3) Colmenares 1978:154-5.

(4) Arcila 1966:267.

(5) Semo 1975:88.

(6) Korth 1968:111.

economic units or lived in towns or villages other than their own. In some cases we present the proportion of Indians paying tributes to encomenderos or to the crown.

Table 7: Rentability of the Indian tribute in Spanish America in 1631 as estimated by a contemporary royal official (in ducats of 375 maravedies). *

		%	
Peru	419,000	48.1	Tribute changed to every tributary 4 pesos (1591) (1) 7 - 10 pesos in Upper Peru 1799.
Colombia	74,000	8.5	6 pesos (1635 onwards)(3)
Venezuela	30,000	3.4	13 pesos (1687)(4)
New Spain	150,000	17.2	1 - 3 pesos (mid 18th century)(5)
Yucatan	100,000	11.5	
Guatemala	50,000	5.7	
Rio de la Plata	30,000	3.5	
Paraguay	6,000	0.7	
Chile	12,000	1.4	9.5 - 10.5 pesos (1620) (6)
Total	871,000	100.0	

* Source: Zavala 1935: 329 and notes below.

(1) Average calculated from Zavala 1935:325.

(2) Sanchez Albornoz 1978:62.

(3) Colmenares 1978:154-5.

(4) Arcila 1966:267.

(5) Semo 1975:88.

(6) Korth 1968:111.

Table 8 presents an estimation of the Indian tributes in 1631 in each colony and some information on the amount of tributes paid per tributary. It appears clear from the reading of these tables that both financially and demographically, and as a consequence politically, Peru, Upper Peru and New Spain played a key role in the Spanish empire.

Table 8: Average Indian tributaries per encomienda in selected Spanish American colonies (encomiendas held by the crown excluded.)

Colony or area	Average number of tributaries	Number of encomiendas
Valley of Mexico (1560)(1)	1,216.5	26
New Spain (1560-70) (2)	1,171.0	480
Guatemala (1548) (3)	274.0	84
Peru (1561) (4)	832	477
Paraguay (1688) (5)	10.3	305
Venezuela (1660-2) (6)	21.6	97
Central and Northern Chile (1612) (7)	78.1	30
Rio de la Plata-Tucuman (1673) (8)	51.7	251

(1) Gibson 1964:64

(2) Total number of tributaries from Simpson 1950:163. Number of encomiendas in 1560 from Zavala 1935:313.

(3) Solano 1974:32-5, 83.

(4) Zavala 1935:323-4. Includes 50 encomiendas under the crown or vacant.

(5) Villamarin 1975:109.

(6) Arcila 1966:179-92.

(7) Moerner 1970:294.

(8) Zavala 1935:327-8.

We shall see that in both areas the crown endeavoured more or less successfully to exert a firm control over the Indians and encomenderos, through escheatment of encomiendas to the crown, tribute assessments, elimination of personal services for the

encomendero and direct control of the Indian communities through the corregidores. In these two administrative units, after a severe demographic contraction of the tributary population, a result of the exactions of the encomienda and then the repartimiento system, miscegenation, escapes from the Indian villages, etc., the communities managed to recover and expand demographically during the last part of the colonial period. On the contrary in colonies which lacked a dense and politically organised population (Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile etc.) the Indian communities did not survive the impact of the encomienda system and they suffered (missionary territories apart) a double process of physical extinction and biological and cultural miscegenation. This was the result of the continuation throughout most of the colonial period of conditions of unchecked exploitation which in New Spain and Peru had been mitigated by 1600. In the colonies of scarce population, it was impossible to reward the Spanish settlers according to their expectations without suspending the enforcement of the royal legislation on Indian encomiendas and allowing the encomenderos higher rates of exploitation of the Indians than were allowed in Mexico or Peru. As can be seen in Table 8, the average size of encomiendas in New Spain and Peru permitted the commutation of labour tributes to payments in money or kind, leaving the encomendero with a handsome income, equal if not superior to the minimum salary of a bishop in 16th century Spanish America (1,853 pesos). On the contrary, the commutation of tributes in the colonies of less demographic potential would have meant a rent for the encomendero well below subsistence level or an enormous money tribute to be paid by the tributaries. The latter actually

happened in Venezuela when labour tribute was abolished in 1687. Royal officials estimated that the value of the labour paid by the Indians was 33 pesos per tributary per annum which the crown considered too high and so reduced it to 13 pesos, which was still a very high rate compared with the tributes in Mexico and Peru.(48)

The case of New Spain (central-south Mexico) is the closest to the ideal type of encomienda defined by the royal legislation on encomiendas. The early escheatment of encomiendas to the crown (see Table 6), the rapid development of state institutions and the economic development of New Spain and Mexico, made possible a more strict enforcement of the law. During the 1550's and 1560's royal officials re-assessed tributes, Indian communities were able to reduce the amount of tribute to be paid, abolition of personal services (forced labour for the encomendero) was effectively enforced and Indian tribute was fixed at a rate of one peso and half a fanega (c. 12 gallons) of maize per tributary, with some local variations. This, plus the intervention of the corregidores, who were in permanent contact with and had jurisdiction over the Indians, meant the effective displacement of the encomendero class as an overwhelming economic and political force before the 1550's into a dwindling rentier class by the end of the 16th century. Parallel to this transformation was the transformation of the Mexican economy. Diligent encomenderos invested the tributes received in the most varied economic enterprises, mining, livestock raising, agriculture, commerce etc. The discovery and exploitation of silver mines in the centre north of Mexico was a powerful stimulus to commerce and Spanish enterprises which were producing for the

mines and markets in the major urban centres, eventually creating a small stratum of free Indian mine workers. The important markets thus created in Mexico city and the mining towns permitted an easy commutation of labour tribute to tribute in kind (realisable by the encomenderos in these markets) or money, while the shortages of labour for the enterprises of the encomenderos were at least partially solved by the repartimiento system, free or semi-free labour and African slaves.(49)

In Peru the process of institutionalisation of the encomienda according to royal legislation, was slower. The civil wars of 1537-48 impeded all attempts at assessment of Indian tributes, the establishment of a loyal civil bureaucracy and the enforcement of the law. President La Gasca in charge of pacifying the colony resorted in 1549 to reallocating the encomiendas to loyal subjects and ordered the first assessment of Indian tributes. This seems to have diminished the amount paid by the Indians by a third but personal services were retained and the communities and the crown itself still considered it too high. The situation was not altered until the late 1550's when assessments eliminating personal services in the newly allocated encomiendas were carried out. It was only in 1570-75 that a general reassessment of tributes was carried out. It eliminated personal services in the majority of cases but at the same time established harsh measures which in the long run involved an increasing burden for the Indian communities. Firstly, the tribute was fixed for each community and not for the individual tributary, so any demographic loss (emigration, deaths not compensated for by births etc.) resulted in the increase of

tribute for each of the remaining commoners. To cope with this extra burden, community funds (cajas de comunidad) from the profits of communal enterprises or other incomes were established and they were liable to be appropriated by the crown when the need arose. Finally tribute was extended to other categories of Indians who were not included in former tributary rolls (yanaconas, mitimaes, mitayos and the Indians working for the Spaniards), and the responsibility of collecting the tribute was given to the corregidores.(50)

A series of factors weakened the economic and political power of the Peruvian encomenderos. Apart from the suppression of personal service, the assessment of tributes, the intervention of the corregidores and escheatment of encomiendas to the crown(which was far slower than in Mexico), the encomienda income was taxed at 20% by 1591 and at a third from 1619. The decline of the Indian population affected the whole of the Peruvian economy but especially the encomenderos, since the tributaries ran away from the communities in order to avoid tribute payments and found employment in the haciendas or mines of the Spanish entrepreneurs. Sanchez-Albornoz has calculated the magnitude of these tributary evasions for some areas of Upper Peru between 1573 (time of the general assessment) and 1683. In these areas the tributary population diminished from 34,601 to 14,858 tributaries (or a decrease of 57%). However in the same areas another 12,138 'forastero' Indians lived. These Indians were males who did not belong to the communities and who were not affected by tribute payments or repartimiento drafts. The natural outcome of this process was the weakening of the communities and the decrease of the value of the encomiendas, until in 1734 forasteros were forced to

make payments of tribute again. By 1600 only a few Peruvian encomiendas provided an income superior to the salary of a royal judge (oidor) of Lima of 4,875 pesos, while the concession of major encomiendas to holders resident in Spain further diminished the importance of encomenderos as a class. Although retaining social prestige, the encomendero class was overwhelmed by, or fused with, the more dynamic entrepreneurs who had to rely, as their Mexican counter-parts, on repartimiento Indians, black slaves or free or semi-free labourers.(51)

This process of fusion and suppression of the encomendero class, all powerful up until the 1570's, must be understood against the background of the social fabric of the colony. While the Indian population shrank and the number of encomenderos remained around 500 for the whole of the 16th century and beyond, the total Spanish population expanded from some 2,000 in 1536 to 8,000 in 1556 and to over 14,000 in 1628. Rich silver mines, especially in Potosi, provided from the 1540's onwards, opportunities to gain sudden wealth for both encomenderos and non-encomenderos either in association or separately. This created a large market in Lima and Potosi and gave value to their hinterlands through the stimulation provided by high prices and demand for agricultural products, livestock, manufactured goods, etc. The suppression of personal service, the establishment of the repartimiento system and the enfeoffment of Indians separated from the communities in the 1570's diminished the power of encomenderos, encouraged mining (vital from the fiscal point of view) and consolidated the economic situation of the non-encomendero entrepreneurs.(52)

The moderation of the encomienda exactions in late 16th century Mexico and Peru was implemented with far less effec-

tiveness in other colonies. In the Audiencia of Guatemala (Central America north of Panama) a tribute assessment which excluded personal service was carried out around 1550. The enforcement of the assessment was however not very strict since in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras personal service was included in the Indian tribute as late as 1600. There the decline of the power of the encomenderos was mainly brought about by the decline of the tributary population, the concession of major encomiendas to holders living outside the Audiencia, the burden of fiscal and ecclesiastical levies on encomienda income and the escape of tributaries to nearby haciendas. In the Bogota savannah, suppression of personal service and the establishment of corregimientos occurred around 1600, but personal services continued to be exacted in other Colombian areas which were not so close to the administrative centre (Audiencia of Santa Fe de Bogota) until the mid 17th century. In Venezuela, personal service was only abolished in 1687, while in Chile, Argentina and Paraguay personal services continued well into the 18th century (53).

The regional differences in the encomienda system could be extended ad infinitum if we consider the categories of Indians submitted to encomiendas (sex and ages), the types of work which the Indians were allowed to perform (they worked as carriers, agriculturalists, miners etc.), the period of time to be worked for the encomendero, etc. The crucial issue in characterising the encomienda system is, however, the presence or not of personal service to the encomendero, the exaction of which the crown repeatedly tried to abolish (1549, 1573, 1595, 1601 etc.). Without personal service the encomendero became a simple rentier, the receiver of a

decreasing tribute expressed in kind or money with fewer possibilities for exactions beyond the tribute assessment than in the case of personal service. In this slow transformation of Indian tribute, regional government had an important role in enforcing or suspending the execution of royal orders. Trapped between the demands of the crown to reduce the power of the encomenderos, and, at the same time, force the Indians to work in the context of the colonial economy and the pressure of the colonists to retain their rights over Indian labour, local government gave way to compromise and so did the crown. The defeat and killing of Viceroy Nunez, who tried to suppress Peruvian encomiendas in 1546, was a lesson quickly learned by royal officialdom. Thus President La Gasca, Nunez's successor, had to ensure the loyalty of Peruvian Spaniards by granting them new encomiendas. The suspension of the order of escheatment of encomiendas to the crown after the death of the present holder, which had been commanded by the New Laws, and a flexible rule of escheatment of encomiendas after two or more generations was another step in that direction. It permitted the division of the encomendero class into those threatened immediately and those threatened in the future with the loss of their encomiendas, and ensured the loyalty of the former through the hope of a renewal, or the concession of appointments as corregidores, pensions, and in some colonies grants of repartimiento Indians. This compromising attitude was expressed in those colonies with less economic and demographic potential by the suspension of royal legislation dealing with the protection of the Indians and especially with that suppressing the personal services. The relatively scarce and politically unorganised Indian population, in

combination with the lack of mineral wealth or other exportable products of high value, which could have improved the conditions of the colonists and created a sizeable market economy, seem important causes for the retention of personal service. Thus Arcila explains the acceptance of the suppression of personal service in 1687 by the authorities and colonists of Venezuela, after the suspension of several previous orders in the same direction, by the expansion of cacao production and export in the mid 17th century, at first with encomienda labour and later with African slaves. Likewise in Paraguay the lack of marketable products and the retention of a subsistence economy throughout the colonial period made the transition from labour tribute to tribute in kind or money impossible. In Chile and Argentina a situation of commercial isolation, ameliorated by exports to Peru and Upper Peru, prevailed until the 18th century. The small size of the encomiendas combined with the 'open frontier' character of these colonies, with a sequal of military expenditure, Indian slavery, loss of property by the Spaniards and the consequent poverty of the colonists, impeded enforcement of the suppression of personal service. (54)

The encomienda was, then, a powerful mechanism to reward and settle the Spanish colonists in the Indies. Its evolution shows the adjustment between the expectation of the conquistadores, the socio-economic potential of the Indian communities and the long-term interest of the crown. Where large and politically organised Indian communities existed conquistadores allocated encomiendas to their retinues, settled a Spanish population, created the rudiments of the Spanish state, eliminated Indian slavery, developed diversified economies, appropriated from their communities and, under an increasing

controlling capacity of the crown, had to give up their direct control of the Indian labour force which had been granted by the primitive encomienda. In the colonies of scarce and politically unorganised communities the worst conditions of exploitation of the Indians predominated during, virtually, the whole colonial period; i.e. Indian slavery and personal service. This same scarcity of Indian populations and the lack of sizeable market production prevented the commutation of labour tribute into tribute in money or kind and impeded or retarded the introduction of African slavery. For the Indian communities the elimination of personal service meant a check on their disintegration and permitted the retention of many of their own cultural and economic patterns. On the contrary the continuation of personal service exactions tended to break up the pre-hispanic structures more rapidly, uprooting the Indians from their villages for periods of time, stimulating escapes, miscegenation and acculturation. From the state viewpoint, the moderation of the encomienda exactions, apart from the political aim of limiting the power of encomenderos, signified a secure source of income where the communities were vigorous.

Thus in 16th century New Spain, Indian tribute was the major source of income for the crown, in the first half of the 18th century it represented between 14 and 17%, and even in 1803 more than 8%, despite the enormous increase of silver production and the taxes derived from them. In Upper Peru Indian tribute represented in 1820-25, some 33% of the royal income of the colony, while in 18th century Guatemala it varied from 36 to 81% of the total fiscal income.(55)

(d) The Repartimiento

The repartimiento (literally allotment) of Indians was a mechanism devised by the royal bureaucracy to compel Indians not affected by personal service through encomiendas to work for the colonists, the church or the government for a nominal wage in enterprises beneficial to the 'common weal' for fixed periods of time. It was, then, a continuation of the forced labour of the primitive encomienda which was now totally separated from the control of the encomendero and favoured a wider range of colonists. Although it had a common and contemporary historical basis to the encomienda, the repartimiento system only began to take shape immediately after the suppression of personal service to the encomendero and was only implemented in those colonies which effectively enforced this suppression, (New Spain, Central America, Colombia and Peru). In general the repartimiento consisted of a forced drafting by a royal magistrate (with the help of the Indian authorities) of a variable proportion of the tributary population of the communities for a period of time, usually allocated to the Spanish colonists at the discretion of the local bureaucrats. Once that period was over new tributaries in the same proportion and from the same communities were drafted and allotted.

In New Spain the first repartimiento of Indians quickly followed the 1549 royal order to compel the Indians to work for the Spaniards and the abolition of the encomiendas' personal services. Thus in 1550, repartimientos for agricultural enterprises were conceded to the colonists in the Valley of Mexico and by the early 1560's some 2,400 Indians were allotted every week to 114 employers (note that at the time the number

of encomenderos in the valley was only 25). Repartimientos in other parts of New Spain and in other economic sectors (mining, manufacture, public works etc.) soon followed. By 1575 probably all the Indian communities of New Spain were involved in repartimiento tasks, providing a variable percentage (according to the season) of their tributaries at one time. With the decline of the Indian population the proportions of the tributary population drafted for repartimiento rose dramatically. For instance, the original maximum of 2% of the tributaries established for the agricultural repartimiento of the Valley of Mexico had risen to 10% in the 1590's (56).

The heavy burden imposed on a shrinking tributary population through the repartimiento system was soon condemned by the royal bureaucracy and the church and in 1601 the crown attempted to eliminate the system for all types of enterprises except mining. The frauds committed by the colonists and bureaucrats alike rendered the measure ineffective. Realising its failure the crown established in 1609 ordinances which would gradually eliminate the repartimientos. They were banned in sugar mills, pearl fishing and tasks of carriage and only partially permitted, at the discretion of the viceroy, for cloth mills. They were permitted in the mines (provided that they were profitable), cattle ranches and agriculture. The draft was not to exceed a seventh of the Indians, work was to be performed in places close to the community, Indians were to be paid in cash, etc. Finally in 1632 the viceroy abolished all repartimientos except those for mining, public works and the church. As might be expected the enforcement of the order was not rigid and repartimiento labour continued to be used in agriculture in some regions of New Spain up until the

second half of the 18th century (e.g., Oaxaca). However, from the early 17th century repartimiento labour played a declining role in the economy of New Spain. More than the royal orders of 1601, 1609 and 1632, economic circumstances made repartimiento labour unimportant for the private entrepreneurs in the first decades of the 17th century. Hacienda and cloth mills owners were, from the late 16th century depending increasingly on salaried or indebted workers, tenants paying for the land in labour etc. For them the repartimiento drafts affecting their workers had become, by the early 1630's, a disruptive diversion of their labour force to other entrepreneurs and they welcomed its abolition. In the case of mining, the labour force was by the end of the 16th century, composed mainly of free Indian workers (61%) and repartimiento Indians accounted only for 22% of it, the rest being black slaves. By the 18th century, repartimiento for mining was still levied on certain communities but was clearly insignificant. The richness of the silver mines permitted the owners to attract free Indians through the payment of wages and bonuses several times higher than those usual in agriculture.(57)

In Peru from 1553 onwards, a series of administrative orders established the repartimiento in agriculture, stock herding, domestic service etc., and later on in the mines. The latter was the most exacting and painful service of all and due to its importance for the interests of the crown, was enforced rigorously up until 1812, despite the numerous protests of royal officials, churchmen and the Indians themselves. Two mines were pivotal for the fiscal interests of the crown: the rich silver mines of Potosi and the mercury mine of Huancavelica. In the latter 620 to 3,280 repartimiento Indians were drafted

from a radius of 40 miles around the mine. Although it was an unhealthy and exacting job it only involved a small proportion of the Peruvian population recruited locally. The case of Potosi was different. Its repartimiento included at its inception (1570's) 16 provinces stretching from Cuzco (southern Peru) to Tarija (southern Bolivia) and affecting 81,000 tributaries or roughly a fourth of the whole Peruvian tributary population. These provinces sent to Potosi every year 13,500 male Indians between 18 and 50 years old, who worked in the mines under the repartimiento system for one out of three weeks and provided the miners with a total available labour force of 4,500 who were payed at a very low wage. During the two weeks of rest the repartimiento Indians could be employed freely in the same mines but now they sold their labour power at the market price. This flood of cheap labour combined with the technological improvements derived from the introduction of the amalgamation process using mercury, brought about a three or four-fold increase of silver production in Potosi from the 1570's to the end of the century. Extremely bad working conditions, low wages and long distances from the place of origin (in some cases 600 miles) made this repartimiento a heavy burden for the communities affected. Many tributaries resorted to escape from the communities or preferred to pay cash for their exemption from the repartimiento draft. These factors caused a sharp decline in the tributary population of the provinces affected by the levy (see Table 9) and indirectly contributed to the constant decline of Potosi silver output from the beginning of the 17th century to the 1720's. The extreme social cost that the system meant

Table 9: Tributary population and Indians drafted for the Potosi repartimiento in the areas affected *

Year	Tributary population in the provinces affected	Indians drafted every year	Repartimiento effective labour force in the mines	Percentage of tributary population drafted every year
1570's	81,000	13,500	4,500	16.5
1633	41,115	9,300	3,100	22.6
1662	16,000	-	-	-
1680's	10,633	4,200	1,400	39.5
1802 (1)	-	2,008	c. 1,840	-

* Sources: Konetzke 1976: 186; Sanchez-Albornoz 1978: 70, 150-1; Arze 1979, 229 ff.

(1) includes only 14 provinces. The number of Indians drafted had diminished but according to the document reproduced by Arze repartimiento Indians were forced to work (for low wages) virtually the whole year through.

for the communities made royal officials attempt to reform or abolish the Potosi repartimiento in 1659, 1670, 1690's etc. However, fiscal reasons necessitated the continuation of the repartimiento in Potosi, Huancavelica and other mines until the end of the colonial period and, it seems, in a more brutal way. On the one hand the crown could not do without the income provided by the production of Potosi (more than a third of all the Peruvian silver output in its worst periods), which was taxed initially at 20% and in the 18th century at 10% of its total production. The Potosi miners on the other hand had to be subsidised with cheap labour which was compelled to work by the state in order to maintain the exploitation of increasingly unproductive mines (17th and 18th centuries). (58)

The development of the repartimiento system in the Audiencia of Guatemala and the Colombian highlands combined in specific

ways the characteristics of the institution in New Spain and Peru on which vice-royalties they respectively depended. In the Colombian highlands repartimiento was established around 1600 and involved agriculture, urban work and especially mining. By the late 1620's some 2,000 tributaries were sent yearly to the silver mines although this number greatly decreased later on. The 'Mariquita' silver mines however retained an important repartimiento labour force throughout the 17th century. Established in 1606, this repartimiento affected the 30,000 tributaries of Tunja and Bogota which provided 600 (or 2%) tributaries annually. By the last decade of the 17th century, the number of Indians sent to the mines yearly had been drastically reduced to an average of 216 per annum, but the period of service in the mines had been increased, so miners were still provided with an average annual number of Indians close to 500. This was a reflection of the decline of the Indian population which suffered heavy demographic losses because of the repartimiento, a high mortality rate in the mines (6% per annum during the last three decades of the 17th century) and especially the escape of the drafted Indians away from the mines and the communities (20% per annum in the same period). This process, plus the declining yields of the silver mines, the interest of the crown to retain a sizeable population in the communities with the consequent tributes, and the pressure of the hacienda owners to retain the labour force diverted to the mines for their own enterprises, gave rise to the abolition of the mining repartimiento in 1729. Later on in the 1740's the rural repartimientos which drafted a fourth of the tributary population of Colombia for the local landowner (usually an

encomendero) and the already unimportant urban repartimiento were abolished.

In Central America repartimientos were established in the 1550's but reached overwhelming importance only in the period 1570's - 1630. Only Indians under the crown were drafted and mining, sugar, indigo and cloth mills were excluded from the grants of repartimientos, although mill owners or miners received them by posing as agriculturalists or used these Indians by renting them from the 'legitimate' holder. Despite the attempts of the royal bureaucracy to abolish the system in 1671, and the pressure of the hacienda owners who were more interested in retaining the Indian workers through debt peonage than relying on the local bureaucrats for the concession of a repartimiento, it persisted at least until the end of the 18th century.(59)

The preceding institutional and regional analysis permits us to summarise the initial trends of development of the appropriation of the labour power of the submitted peoples by the Spaniards in the Indies. It must be born in mind that the scheme of slavery/encomienda/repartimiento in no way exhausts the variety of the relations of production existing in Spanish colonial America. As far as the Indian population is concerned these also included the missionary system (see Chapter 8) and the many production relations which the hacienda and urban centres developed (debt peonage, enfeoffment, free work, independent artisans, etc.). However, the triad slavery/encomienda/repartimiento had an overwhelming predominance during Spanish America's formative period (16th and early 17th century), when relations of production which essentially excluded extra-economic coercion were just beginning to develop

and the population was predominantly Indian (both racially and culturally). The early Spanish colonists compelled the Indian population to work in their enterprises, with the acceptance and regulation of the state, in the continuum slavery/encomienda/repartimiento which gave way slowly to enfeoffment and free labour. The rapidity of the development of the cycle or the absence of the extreme links of the triad were basically an effect of the level of socio-political organisation and demographic density of the aboriginal populations and the presence/absence of abundant mineral wealth or highly valuable products which were marketable either internally or in the world economy. Thus in New Spain and Peru and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala and the Colombian highlands the exaction of surplus from the communities in pre-Colombian times as a form of tribute for a centralised state, the existence of a dense population and a developed economic infrastructure, permitted a rapid replacement of the pre-conquest social structure by the colonial order, which was organised at the economic level in terms of encomiendas and later on repartimientos; this took place without enslaving significant sectors of the aboriginal population. This rapid transition from encomienda to repartimiento and then to non-coercive economic mechanisms was boosted by the mineral wealth of New Spain and Peru, which created vast local markets and the conditions for the commutation of tributes, the transference of tributes from encomenderos to the crown and the creation of a dynamic non-encomendero entrepreneurial class which escaped the cycle encomienda/repartimiento and relied on black slaves, enfeoffment and free labour. In contrast, the colonists of territories inhabited by nomads and primitive agriculturalists who had limited

political organisation and were not used to tribute practices, relied on slavery as a form of accumulation and provision of labour power, and the encomienda persisted as a form of forced labour for the encomendero despite the attempts of the crown to suppress it. African slavery represented, during the colonial period, a heavy investment which only a few colonies could afford in significant numbers. The wasteful character of slavery as a relation of production (high mortality rates, escapes and so forth), heavy taxation on slave imports and the lack of dynamism of the Spanish commercial bourgeoisie who were incapable of obtaining a share of the Atlantic slave trade, did not permit the participation of the Spanish colonies in the trade in significant proportions until the late 18th century. Only the richest colonies (Mexico and Peru) could afford the purchase of significant numbers of black slaves at the time of the massive decline of the Indian population (16th century). The rest of the colonies had to resort to contraband slaves or wait for the creation of the necessary conditions for the development of an export economy whose products were valuable enough to make profitable the enormous investment represented by the purchase of slaves in the absence of other sources of labour power (exemption of taxes, freedom to engage in the trade, capital accumulation etc.).

In this chapter we have dealt with those forms of exploitation of the Indian and black labour force in which the state played an important role. In the following chapter we will study the types of agrarian production and the methods of appropriation and concentration of land by the Spaniards in four representative areas of colonial Spanish America.

Chapter 4: Agriculture 1: The Agrarian Structure of Colonial Spanish America

The conquest and settlement of America by the Spaniards brought about a slow but radical transformation and, in many cases,destruction of the aboriginal agriculture. The expropriation of surpluses in the form of labour, in kind or as money weakened the demographic and political power of the communities, as did the expropriation of lands, royal and ecclesiastical control of the communities and the participation of the Indians in the wars of conquest. Aboriginal agriculture had been basically a subsistence one based on indigenous crops (maize, potatoes, beans, etc.) and in the absence of draft animals it relied almost exclusively on labour power. After the conquest the encomenderos, recipients of large tributes in kind or labour, commercialised these surpluses in the incipient Spanish markets and introduced new products and technology (livestock, wheat, sugar, etc.). Later on, Indian communities, liberated from tributes in labour, had to compete with the Spanish entrepreneurs by selling their products on the market to pay their tributes or seek employment with them to obtain the needed cash. Thus directly or indirectly Indian communities or individual Indians began to participate in commodity production. At the same time Spanish entrepreneurs were increasingly controlling the natural and human resources (land and water and Indians and slaves), depriving the communities of their economic basis and reducing them to real reservoirs of labour power. As we shall see, this process had a different tempo and intensity in the various regions of Spanish America and, in many of them, the Indian communities successfully survived the attack of the Spanish

economy up until independence and beyond. The over simplified scheme presented above needs to be elaborated, taking into account the political and economic struggle between Indian communities and landowners and their respective allies inside and outside the state apparatuses, the increase of commercial agriculture in certain areas due to temporary booms or long term expansions and its consequence for the social structure and so on. In the first part of this chapter we will describe the legal framework within which the colonial structure was formed and its changes over time. In the second part we will analyse in some detail the expansion of Spanish agriculture and the concrete formation of the colonial agrarian structure in four areas of Spanish America.

A. Legal Framework

As a result of the conquest the land, water rights, subsoil, mountains, etc., in the Indies belonged to the crown unless specific royal grants had been made to individuals, Spanish towns or Indian communities. In order to reward the discoverers and conquistadores the crown granted lands in the settled (or to be settled) territories to the leaders and members of the expeditions (before or after the conquest) through a formal contract or 'capitulacion'. The discoverer or conqueror was usually granted vast land rights and the right to allot additional land to the rest of the settlers on the condition that they lived in the territory for a certain period of time, usually between four to eight years. These rights gave no jurisdiction over the aboriginal population of the settled territories and in theory left untouched the property of the

Indians.[i]

The initial variety of land rights granted to the settlers tended to become homogenised in the legal texts as the 16th century progressed. Thus in the ordinances of discovery of 1573 they reached a quasi-definitive form, and were incorporated, with minor changes, into the Code of the Indies of 1680. According to these ordinances every new settlement in the Indies would be granted 16 square leagues of land (or c. 110 square miles). From this a part was to be converted into common land for the villagers and sites for their houses while the rest was to be divided into four equal parts, one for the leader of the settlement ('adelantado') and the other three to be divided among the rest of the settlers. Each settlement had to have at least 30 citizens ('vecinos'), and the land allotted to each particular settler was contracted between the adelantado and the settlers and was not to exceed 3 'caballerias'.[ii] (2)

Apart from the capitulaciones contracted between the king or the governor of a territory in the king's name with the purpose of settlement of new areas, the king or his representatives could grant lands up to three caballerias in areas already settled as a reward for past or future services to the crown. In both cases (capitulaciones and grants), the definitive title to the land was subjected to a royal confirmation within a short period. As land had little value

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and the cost and time involved in these confirmations was high, the colonists did not apply for them and remained for decades as simple possessors of their lands.

The expansion of Spanish agricultural enterprises, the growth of the Spanish population, the consolidation of markets and the consequent increase in the price of land, made the crown consider a new land policy. Up until the end of the 16th century, land allotments and grants were an important incentive for the Spaniards to settle in the Indies. Both were free and involved at least in theory an obligation on the grantee to live in the new settlement for a period of time and/ or to actually use the land for agricultural production within a certain period after the concession. After 1591 the land grant became mainly a financial mechanism to obtain additional revenues for the crown. All properties without a proper title were to revert to the crown and would eventually be 'granted' (actually sold) to another colonist or otherwise subjected to a financial arrangement ('composicion') which cleared the title. The properties subjected to composicion or eventual confiscation were those whose grant had not been confirmed by the royal authority, grants made by unauthorised bodies or encroachment on lands of a third party, (the crown, Indian or Spanish town's lands). The composiciones therefore provided a legitimate title to these on condition that a fee was paid, whether or not they were occupied legally. The land rights of the Indian communities and Spanish towns damaged by these composiciones were considered in the light of what they could cultivate in the case of the former, and according to the estimations of the viceroy or governor as to what was convenient in the latter case. The laws of 1591 were slowly enforced

in the Indies and free grants were issued up until the 18th century in some poor colonies. In the same way colonists with faulty titles were able to avoid the payment of composiciones for a similar period in these areas. The crown, always short of cash, reiterated these orders on several occassions (notably 1631 and 1754) and each time the landowners of new territories were charged with the payments of composiciones. (3)

The concrete development of the process of clearance of land titles and the formation of the colonial agrarian structure needs separate, regional treatment and we will deal with it in part two of this chapter. To round off this section however a short comment is necessary in relation to the encomiendas and their relation with landed property. The land grant was, in theory, a concession totally separated from the rights granted through encomiendas of Indians. The legal figure of the encomienda did not include property rights to the lands of the Indian communities given in the encomiendas and, conversely, no rights over Indians were bestowed through land grants. However, encomienda holders could acquire lands belonging to their encomienda Indians through a separate land grant, by purchasing it from the Indians or indeed, illegally.(iii) Thus, juridically the

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(iii) This is the point of view of Zavala, which is generally accepted. Gongora, recognising the absolute validity of the assertion for the period after the conquest, shows that at least for the case of early colonial Chile, encomienda and land grants were conceded through the same document, thus implying a right of seigneury over lands and Indians. The Mexican conquistador, Cortes, by then Marquis of the Valley, claimed in the 1530's property rights over the lands of his encomienda Indians. This attempt consisted of transforming the personal tribute owed to him by the Indians of his encomienda into an emphyteutic rent to be paid to him by the Indians. The Marquis' attempt failed through the intervention of the Mexican Audiencia. Similarly in Chile the Audiencia of Lima discontinued the practice. (4)

subjection of the Indians to their Spanish encomenderos was not mediated by land property relations but consisted of a direct personal dependence regulated by the state. A form of dependence of the Indians on the Spaniards, mediated by the land rights of the latter appeared legally in the case of the Peruvian 'yanaconas' (see below) and de facto elsewhere in Spanish America. But in these cases the constitution of a serf-like relation was precisely a way of overcoming the limitations imposed by the encomienda institution and its derivatives (the repartimiento system and tributes).

B. The Formation of the Colonial Agrarian Structure in Some Areas of Spanish America

In this section we will analyse the expansion of Spanish agriculture and the formation of the agrarian structure in four macro-regions of Spanish America: Mexico, Peru, New Granada and Chile. These have been chosen because of the availability of relevant data. At the same time they are fairly representative since the two former regions contained over half of the population of the whole of Spanish America throughout the colonial period and, within their limits, different physical environments, population densities, degrees of economic development, etc. New Granada and especially Chile present a contrast with the two former in the sense that they were relatively backward as political and economic centres and this makes the sample more representative. Finally, some aspects of Cuban and Venezuelan agriculture have been dealt with in Chapter 3.

In each of the four cases to be studied we will start by describing the types of agricultural production in the colony and give an idea of its importance within the context of the agricultural sector of the economy in general. We will then proceed to analyse the mechanisms of appropriation and concentration of land by the Spaniards and finally we will give quantitative data related to this process for specific regions within the colony. The method of exposition of this chapter might seem repetitive given the similarities of the development of some aspects of the Spanish American agrarian structure, but it is the only way to grasp the specific character of these developments in each colony.

(a) Mexico

Although allotment of lands to the Spaniards started with the conquest itself, cultivation under direct Spanish management did not occur on a significant scale until the mid-16th century. In the interim Spaniards obtained their grain (especially wheat) from Spain, from tribute in kind from the encomiendas (especially maize) and from the few Spanish enterprises established around Mexico City and Puebla. Wheat production, a basic item in the Spanish diet, was constantly encouraged by the viceroys, through land grants, repartimiento of Indians, etc, and thus wheat production increased steadily throughout the 16th century. This expansion was reflected in wheat prices in Mexico City which decreased from c. 1530 to the mid-1540's when they became comparable with prices in Spain. In the 1550's the expansion of silver mining in northern

Mexico and the labour shortages brought about by the limitation of the use of Indian forced labour around 1550 again created scarcity and high prices of wheat and foodstuffs in general, especially in the mining districts. From around 1560 to the 17th century prices stabilised within a moderately rising trend with occasional sharp increases due to crop failures, which were aggravated by famines and the consequent shortages of labour. The higher prices in the mining areas continued but in turn they generated an agricultural expansion to the north and reinforced the development of central areas like the Puebla and Mexico City hinterlands. (5)

Maize was the staple food of the Mexican Indians before and during the colonial period. After the conquest it became integrated into the Spanish economy as food for Indian slaves, animals and, in times of scarcity, for the Spaniards themselves. The expansion of Spanish enterprises (mining, ranching, farming, trade) using a dependent Indian labour force and large numbers of draft animals increased the value of maize and transformed it slowly into a cash crop subjected to speculation and widely cultivated in the Spanish enterprises. According to Gibson, in the Valley of Mexico the process of gaining control of the maize supply by the Spaniards took 50 years (1580-1630). By the latter date the city of Mexico was totally supplied with maize by Spanish entrepreneurs, while Indian maize agriculture had been relegated to the subsistence level. This was an early case but the trend was the same in almost every urban hinterland: Merida de Yucatan, Guadalajara, the Bajio, etc. In the far north, the scattered nature of Indian settlement and therefore the lack of maize as tribute, made the Spaniards enter the maize supply business as a complement to their mining

or ranching endeavours or as an enterprise in its own right. Thus by the 18th century most of the Spanish haciendas grew maize either for internal consumption or for the market. (6)

The expansion of livestock raising preceded that of wheat cultivation and the control of maize production by the Spaniards. The pigs and sheep the Spaniards brought during the conquest or imported immediately afterwards multiplied very quickly but the numbers of cattle and horses increased at a slower rate. In the late 1530's, 1540's and 1550's a sudden increase in the number of cattle and horses occurred (see Table 1). Herds of cattle, sometimes in a semi-wild state, spread to the plains and areas of Indian cultivation in central Mexico and then into the south and especially the far north where their numbers increased very rapidly. As a result the price of beef in Mexico City fell from 17.5 maravedies per pound in 1532 to 1 maravedi per pound in 1540 picking up again towards the end of the century (2 maravedies per pound in 1575 and 4.25 in 1622). By the beginning of the 17th century livestock expansion had reached a ceiling and stabilised for the rest of the century. During the 18th century complaints about the scarcity of cattle to be slaughtered were numerous in central Mexico. However, this seems to reflect a situation of increasing population, the switching of ranching estates to cultivation and the displacement of the herds to the north rather than an absolute fall in the number of cattle in Mexico as a whole. Thus the Intendancy of Guadalajara alone had over two million head of cattle and an even higher number of sheep at the beginning of the 19th century. (7)

Table 1: Estimates of numbers of head of cattle, sheep and goats in New Spain in the 16th century (in thousands) (*)

Year	Cattle	Sheep and Goats
1536	15	500
1550	20	600
1560	100	1,100
1570	220	2,100
1580	400	3,100
1590	600	4,600
1600	800	6,000
1610	980	7,000
1620	1,000	8,000

(*) Source L B Simpson, 'Exploitation of land in Central Mexico in the 16th Century', Berkeley 1952, as reproduced in Chaunu 1959, VIII, 1: 720.

Apart from stock raising and grain production a series of other agricultural items acquired importance at some stage in colonial Mexico. Although they cannot be compared with grain production or stock raising from the point of view of the number of workers engaged in their production, the acreage used, etc, they deserve attention because their production, by being almost totally commercialised, constituted a large share of the total commodity production. We will refer below to cacao, silk, dyestuffs, sugar and pulque.

In prehispanic Mesoamerica cacao was reserved for the consumption of the Aztec upper class. The conquest and the end of restrictions on its use by the commoners, increased the demand and provided the encomenderos of the producing regions with handsome profits. By the mid-16th century severe labour shortages, which were the product of the demographic crisis of the post-conquest, had put the cacao plantations of Colima and Tabasco practically out of business. By that

time the demand was increasing because of the addiction of the creoles to the beverage and increasing cacao imports from Guatemala, Quito and Venezuela were necessary to supply the Mexican market. Equally ephemeral was silk production in Mexico. It started gradually in the 1530's and reached a certain level of importance after the mid-16th century, when it was exported to Peru and Sevile and its manufacturing infrastructure was developing. However, the start of the trade between Acapulco and Manila and the imports of cheap Chinese silk almost eliminated Mexican silk production in a few decades. (8)

Dyestuffs had on the contrary a more sustained importance for the Mexican colonial economy. The expansion and sophistication of the textile industry in Europe and Mexico during the period provided excellent markets for Mexican cochineal, indigo and other dyestuffs. Cochineal was produced by prehispanic Aztecs and Mexico retained a virtual monopoly over its production throughout the colonial period. The care and techniques cochineal production required made it impossible for Spaniards and other Europeans to expand its production beyond the area of prehispanic production (Mexico and certain areas of the Audiencia of Guatemala) during the colonial period. Cochineal exports to Spain started in the mid-16th century and reached a considerable volume by the beginning of the 17th century, when its value was second only to Mexican silver exports. After the mid-17th century cochineal exports fell drastically and did not recover until the early 18th century (see Table 2). By the beginning of the 19th century, and probably during the last decades of the 18th century as

Table 2: Estimates of Mexican Cochineal and Logwood legal exports to Spain (in pesos) (*)

	Period	Cochineal Total Value	Cochineal Annual Average	Logwood Total Value	Logwood Annual Average
(1)	1561-95	8,270,216	236,292		
(1)	1601-10	3,229,933	322,939		
(1)	1611-20	6,369,746	636,974		
(2)	1650-99	88,521	1,770	74,633	1,492
(3)	1717-38	21,031,686	955,985	206,167	9,371
(3)	1748-78	65,533,609	2,048,550	3,361,087	108,422
(4)	1786	3,757,219	3,757,219	588,999	588,999
(5)	1796-1820	32,090,300	1,283,612		

(*) The figures for all periods, except 1796-1820 are those of exports from Mexican and non-Mexican ports to Andalucia, which we assume are of Mexican origin. The figure for the period 1796-1820 is that of Cochineal exported through the port of Veracruz which probably includes all the Mexican cochineal exported.

(1) Chaunu 1959, VII, ii:980-1.

(2) Garcia Fuentes 1980: 331, 337. The value has been estimated taking into account the price of first class cochineal or 37,100 maravedies (136.4 pesos) per quintal. Logwood price has been estimated averaging the prices of the dyestuff in Seville in the two years for which data is available: 1675 (680 maravedies per quintal) and 1698 (510 maravedies per quintal).

(3) Garcia-Baquero 1976, I: 340-1; II: 272-5. Values for both periods have been estimated according to the average prices of cochineal and logwood in Seville during the years 1747-78.

(4) Hamnett 1971b: 174.

(5) Ortiz de la Tabla 1978: 253.

well, cochineal was again the Mexican agricultural export par excellence and constituted 60% of Mexican export other than silver. Production was entirely in the control of the Indians but its commercialisation was dominated by the local bureaucrats and their partners, the local merchants. The latter benefited from the difference between the price at which the Indians were forced to sell cochineal to them and its market price; this difference was sometimes as great as 100%. Despite this, some of the prosperity of the cochineal trade seems to have reached Indian communities and especially Indian chieftains. Thus the Indians of Tlaxcala were reputed to be earning 100,000 ducats (135,000 pesos) per annum during the 1550's, and the Indian government sought to ban cochineal production believing that it was bringing too much money to the Indians and disrupting the social hierarchy of the communities. In 18th century Oaxaca, Indian chieftains' lands were profitably employed in cochineal production. (9)

Indigo was also in high demand in the European and Spanish American textile industry but in this case Mexican production met effective competition from other regions in the Spanish Indies and East Indies. Cultivated and manufactured since the 1550's in Yucatan, indigo production expanded there until around 1580. By that time entrepreneurial encomenderos had set up 48 indigo mills at a total cost of some 120,000 pesos and were producing around 15,000 pounds of indigo per annum. Thereafter indigo production in Yucatan and other Mexican regions (notably Michoacan) diminished to the level of the internal demand. The royal order of 1581 banning the use of Indian labour in the indigo mills probably had some

effect on this decline but a much greater influence was the competition of the Central American dyestuff. The production of Yucatecan logwood, in competition with the production of English logwood cutters and subjected to monopolistic restrictions by the crown, did not reach importance as an export until the 18th century, when these restrictions were lifted and tax exemptions granted.(10)

Sugar was a product of continuing importance in Mexico. Its cultivation started in the 1530's and expanded continuously throughout the colonial period. However, within this continuity several changes occurred. In the first place sugar production became concentrated in the area which is today the state of Morelos and it accounted for over half of the Mexican sugar production. Secondly there was a concentration of production in fewer mills with higher capacity and finally there was a dramatic increase over time in the output per worker (see Table 3). Thus the semi-domestic character of the industry in 16th century Mexico changed into one dominated by large scale, efficient mills comparable to the ones in existence in the sugar islands of the Caribbean at the time. In terms of value, the annual sales of Morelos' sugar in Mexico City (virtually its sole market) represented around 1,000,000 pesos in the early 1790's. This figure probably increased substantially by the early 1800's to 1.5 million or more as, during that decade, Morelos' production increased by almost 50% and sugar prices were rising. By that time the town of Cordoba was producing 200,000 arrobas of sugar or a value of 500,000 pesos per annum and the bishopric of Michoacan levied 21,000 pesos on the sugar tithe (4% of the production) which represented a production

of 525,000 pesos. Finally in relation to the external market sugar ranked high in the agricultural exports (14.5% during the period 1796-1820) with an average value of 728,000 pesos per year from 1796 to 1804, although this decreased in the following years.[iv] (11)

Table 3: Sugar Production and Exports in Colonial Mexico

	Mexico		Morelos			
	No of Mills	Export p.a. (tonnes)	No of Mills	Production Capacity p.a.	No of Workers	Price per Tonne (pesos)
c. 1600	50-60(1)	c. 9(2)	13(5)	240(5)	1,300	688.9 (7)
c. 1700	n.d.	0.018(3)	43(5)	1,000(5)	3,410	206.7 (7)
c. 1800	n.d.	c. 651 (4)	37(6)	6,263(6)	10,899	206.7 (7)

(1) Chevalier 1963: 78.
(2) Average for the period 1568-1616, Chaunu 1959, VI, ii: 1,004.
(3) Average for the period 1796-1804. Ortiz de la Tabla 1978: 253.
(4) Garcia Fuentes 1980: 347. Average for the period 1690-9.
(5) Florescano (ed) 1975: 152-3.
(6) Altman et al (eds) 1976: 163.
(7) Florescano (ed) 1975: 565.

Pulque, like cacao was a prehispanic Aztec beverage limited in its use to a certain stratum of society, in this case the aged. With the relaxation of morals and psychological trauma

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(iv) Estimation based on a price of 20 reales or 2.5 pesos per arroba. The average price of sugar in Michoacan was 21 reales per arroba during 1792-8, while in Morelos its price was c. 18.5 reales per arroba in 1800. For an (inflated) estimation of the value of sugar produced in Mexico around 1800 see Table 4.

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produced by the conquest, the alcoholic drink became widely consumed by the Mexican Indians. Until the 18th century, its production and commercialisation remained almost entirely in Indian hands. Later, Spanish landowners moved into the pulque business participating increasingly in its production. By the end of the 18th century Spanish hacendados controlled the major part of the production and distribution of the pulque consumed in Mexico City, although in Oaxaca and Puebla, the two other major centres of pulque consumption, Indian producers and traders were still in control. The crown started taxing the pulque that was introduced into major cities in 1668 and in 1803 the tax was producing for New Spain's treasury 800,000 pesos annually or 7% of its annual revenue. The figure given in Table 4 (p.156) for the value of pulque corresponds to 1791 and, as it was estimated at its retail price, includes the margin pocketed by the bar owners, taxes and the cost of processing the maguey plant into pulque. However many of the maguey producers were also involved in pulque production and commercialisation. An illustration of the profits derived from pulque production is provided by the Jesuit hacienda of Santa Lucia which entered the pulque business in the early 1740's. By the mid 1760's it was the second major producer for the Mexico City market accounting for 18% of the pulque legally sold. Its net income derived from pulque increased from 5,883 pesos per year in the early 1740's to 32,000 pesos p.a. in the mid 1760's, despite the fact that they did not participate in its commercialisation.(12)

To round off this overview of the agrarian production of colonial Mexico, we present in table 4 a rough contemporary estimation of the colony's economic production at the beginning

of the 19th century. This shows a clear predominance of agriculture over mining and industry and within agriculture, internal consumption over exports. In the internal sector livestock and its by-products predominated while grains and orchard products constituted over two thirds of the farming sector. These figures would change substantially if we consider only commodity production, since a part of the grains produced (especially maize) was consumed directly on the hacienda and subsistence farms. The same happened, probably to a larger extent, with orchard products and livestock. Conversely cash crops like tobacco, cacao, sugar, etc., would increase their relative importance in the total market production.

Appropriation of land by the Spaniards. During the 16th century three main ways of acquisition of lands were available to Spanish settlers in Mexico: land grants, purchase of lands from Indians, Spaniards or the crown, and the use of power associated with officialdom or encomendero status. Most of these practices were in principle illegal but became tacitly accepted by the crown, were incorporated into the legislation as lawful practices or were banned when the mechanism fell into disuse.

Harvest land grants were assigned very early in colonial Mexico but did not reach numerical importance until the mid 16th century. The early economy of Mexico, based primarily on encomienda tribute left little space for agrarian enterprises except around Mexico City and Puebla. From the 1550's onwards, the expansion of mining in the north brought about an increase in the demand for agricultural products and a series of colonisation projects in the Bajio and the far north. Due to the risks

Table 4: Rough estimates of annual Mexican economic product around 1800 (in pesos)(*)

			%
1.	Agriculture		
	a) Internal consumption		
	i. Farming		
	Maize and wheat	24,000,000	
	Barley	945,000	
	Vegetables and seeds	12,000,000	
	Fruit	4,650,000	
	Vegetable oil	500,000	
	Cotton	731,250	
	Tobacco	626,319	
	Sugar and sugar cane by-products	9,000,000	
	Pulque	3,784,931	
	Other alcoholic drinks	1,800,000	
	Hemp, cacao, wild wax, etc.	1,700,000	
	Total farming	59,737,500	
	ii. Livestock and its by-products		
	Poultry and eggs	9,000,000	
	Cattle (including hides, milk and cheese)	30,000,000	
	Sheep and goats (including hides and wool)	11,325,000	
	Hogs	13,000,000	
	Tallow	11,403,125	
	Horses, mules and donkeys	1,187,000	
	Total livestock	75,915,125	
	iii. Other products		
	Hunting	100,000	
	Fishing	150,000	
	Wood, charcoal, etc.	7,350,000	
	Total	7,600,000	
	b. Agricultural exports		
	Cochineal	1,525,000	
	Sugar	533,818	
	Other exports from New Spain	1,523,517	
	Cacao from Tabasco	287,500	
	Other exports from Tabasco	96,820	
	Exports from Campeche (logwood, salt etc.)	1,021,841	
	Total agricultural export	4,988,496	
	Total agricultural sector	148,241,121	65.2
2.	Industry	43,411,618	19.1
3.	Transport	6,400,000	2.8
4.	Mining	29,301,000	12.9
	Grand Total	227,353,739	100.0

Notes to Table 4

(*) Source Quiros 1973 (1817): passim, especially 261-4. Not all the figures presented have the same value since the criteria of estimation are not uniform. In some cases (i.e. cattle), he estimates Mexican production by extrapolating per capita consumption in Mexico City to the whole colony, including therefore commodity production as well as production of the subsistence economy, and the non-marketed production of the haciendas. In others (i.e. pulque), only the legally marketed production at retail prices is included. In still other cases (i.e. tobacco) the value indicated corresponds to that received by the planters and not the retail price which was several times higher. The many shortcomings of his estimations have been pointed out in Ladd 1976:26 and Florescano (et al) 1980: 175-8.

involved in these settlements because of the existence of hostile Indians in the areas and the private character of the colonisation schemes, land grants were generously distributed. The allotment of harvest land grants was nothing but chaotic. The official in charge of government was in theory the only one to issue these grants, but municipal councils established the custom of granting lands by themselves and, in isolated areas, the practice continued until the end of the 16th century.

The first move towards rationalisation of land grants was made in the mid 1530's by viceroy Mendoza who standardised the units of measurement in which land grants were to be allotted (see Table 5). Mendoza also settled the problem of land in respect to herding by establishing pasture grants which involved clear property rights over the soil. So far, and in accordance with peninsular practices, no property rights had been granted for livestock raising purposes, and herds were allowed to graze on the crown lands (i.e. common land) and the lands of the farmers after the harvest. Grants were made to specific ranchers to build huts and pens in an area and forbidding other ranchers to establish their herds within a

radius of 1 league (2.6 miles), although farmers could establish their crops and fence fields inside that circle. The fact that municipal councils had already granted property rights over pasture lands and the need for a stimulus to a growing and necessary activity was probably in the mind of the viceroy. Moreover the pasture grants issued from around 1540 onwards merely gave a legal status, precarious as it was since it did not have the crown's approval, to a de facto situation; the occupation of lands by the ranchers five or ten years prior to the grant. Although herds continued to be allowed to graze on crown lands and the common land of the villages, ownership of land became a condition for ranchers to operate, since Spaniards were forbidden to have herds without possessing estancias (pasture lands). To protect Indian cultivation from the damage produced by the herds, grants were made from the late 1540's with the approval of local justices, chieftains and encomenderos and, later on in 1567, the viceroy commanded that grazing lands could not be less than half a mile from Indian villages or a quarter of a mile from crop lands. These arrangements did not however solve the contradiction between ranches and Indian communities who were both interested in expanding or preserving their land possessions, and these conflicts brought about constant litigation and encroachment throughout the colonial period. (13)

Encomenderos and royal officials. The more dynamic encomenderos (as opposed to simple rentiers) acquired lands in the same way as any other colonist, through land grants, purchases or simple encroachments into Indian lands, both inside and outside the territories of the communities under

their control. These practices, recognised by the local authorities, were increased by the right to forbid other Spaniards to acquire lands within the boundaries of their encomienda villages. From the mid 16th century, however, lands in the encomiendas' territory began to be granted to Spaniards other than the local encomendero and the acquisition of land by them was restricted. Finally in 1631 encomenderos were forbidden to have lands within the limits of their encomiendas. By that time however the political and economic power of the encomenderos had been severely eroded by the escheatment of encomiendas to the crown, taxation and the introduction of local judges (corregidores) into the Indian villages.(14)

Together with encomenderos high officials, like viceroys, judges of the Audiencia, governors, etc., were in an excellent position in early colonial Mexico to acquire vast areas of land due to their status and income, which was second only to major encomenderos. Although forbidden to become entrepreneurs in 1549 many high officials engaged in ranching, agriculture and other ventures. Some officials bought land on the market but others were granted land through proxies and at least one 16th century Mexico judge participated in the encroachment of Indian lands. A more discreet way of gaining power and prestige was the concession of grants to immediate dependents. For instance, Viceroy Velasco (1549-64) probably the most righteous viceroy of 16th century Mexico, granted around 100,000 acres to 22 of his servants.(15)

Table 5: Land grant measures in colonial Mexico since the 1530's (*)

Grant	Varas de Castilla	sq miles	acres
1. Estancia de ganado mayor (for cattle and horses)	5,000 x 5,000	6.78	4,338
2. Estancia de ganado menor (sheep raising)	3,333 x 3,333	3.01	1,928
3. Caballeria (harvest land grant)	1,104 x 552	0.17	105

(*) Source, Gibson 1964:276

Land sales. Recipients of estancias were able to sell their lands almost at once and many poor Spaniards did so. At the same time influential patrons used their power to obtain grants for their proteges who transferred the lands thus acquired to their patrons. When caballerias were involved the grant title forbade its sale for a certain period (usually 4 - 6 years), but many grantees felt free to alienate their lands all the same and in the 1580's the viceroys themselves began to make dispensations in certain cases. Finally, during the 17th century these grants were issued with specific clauses permitting immediate sale. The alienation of Indian lands was submitted to several restrictions which Spaniards slowly eroded during the colonial period. Lands belonging to the community of the office of chieftain were considered inalienable; this applied in particular to the town site (fundo legal) which was equivalent to around 250 acres. Indian land sales, when permitted, were to be performed in such a way as to ensure that the Indians were selling of their own free will and at fair prices. This protective legislation became increasingly meaningless as

the communities became eroded demographically and politically, the trend towards agricultural enterprises increased and the colonial state compromised with the Spanish landowners' interests through the mechanism of composicion. Inside the native communities chieftains and nobles (principales) were able to sell their lands thus weakening the position of the whole community by admitting Spanish property rights within their boundaries and exposing themselves to future encroachments. At the same time chieftains were able to appropriate community lands for themselves and sell them to Spaniards. The drastic demographic decline of the Indian communities helped in many ways to erode their landed patrimony. Firstly Indian municipal councils unable to pay tributes due to the diminishing number of tributaries, felt compelled to sell unoccupied community lands to meet the tributary requirements. Secondly, the congregation system or forced resettlement of scattered Indian hamlets in bigger units, with the consequent new allocation of lands according to the needs of a dwindling Indian population, diminished the acreage of community lands and opened new space for Spanish farmers. Finally even the town site was liable to alienation if the Indian villages lost their status through population losses or dependence on nearby haciendas. (16).

The sale of crown lands, ordered by the cedula of 1591 (see above), was enforced only slowly. During the first decade of the 17th century the first sales began to take place although free grants continued to be issued. In the next two decades the process became generalised and produced a significant income for the treasury. The payments of fees for the regularisation of property titles (composiciones) was even slower and orders had to be reiterated by the crown in the 1630's.

The first composiciones started to appear later that decade and continued throughout the century. In New Spain (central Mexico) the process had been completed by the 1670's and in New Galicia by the late 1690's. Sparsely populated frontier provinces did not complete the composicion process until later, but by around 1700 all major estates throughout Mexico had final title deeds. (17)

The preceding description of the lines of agricultural production and the mechanisms of formation of Spanish landed property in Mexico provide a qualitative framework within which we can analyse the role of the big landed estates (haciendas) in the following chapter. Before this we will survey the degree of control of agricultural areas by non-Indians in general and haciendas in particular. In the absence of statistics or even estimates for the whole colony we include below estimates of Hispanic/Indian land control for some regions for which data is available. We have divided the regions to be studied into three macro-regions: southern, central and northern Mexico.

i) Southern Mexico. Recent research has suggested that the Indians of Yucatan, Chiapas and Oaxaca retained a substantial degree of land control throughout the colonial period. The hacienda, which tended to control both land and labour in other regions of Mexico, grew slowly and late in the period in the south and seriously affected the land rights of the Indian towns only in the hinterlands of two or three major urban centres. Far from being left untouched by the Spaniards, the Indian economic surplus was appropriated by Spanish encomenderos, merchants and bureaucrats through higher tributary rates than in the rest of Mexico (Chiapas, Yucatan), forced commerce with

the Spanish authorities and its associates, the merchants, (Oaxaca, Chiapas) and, eventually, labour repartimientos (Oaxaca). This weakness of the hacienda in the south seems to have been due to the lack of important mineral resources or highly marketable crops suitable for a plantation type of exploitation, and the relative isolation of the area from the main trade routes which resulted in a sparse Spanish population and a consequent lack of significant markets.

The Indian population of Yucatan was concentrated in the districts of Valladolid and Merida where the administrative centre was located. The Spanish population was concentrated in Merida and Campeche. The district of Valladolid isolated from the commercial route between Merida and its port, Campeche, remained virtually untouched by Spanish land encroachments, purchases or grants throughout the period. Around Merida and on the route to Campeche, big Spanish landed estates tended to develop. By the second half of the 17th century a belt of 20 to 30 miles of cattle haciendas surrounded the city of Merida. By the 18th century maize haciendas were beginning to displace the traditional suppliers of the grain, the Indian communities. This indicates a degree of land appropriation by the Spaniards sufficient to create a landless Indian labour force, a process which does not seem to have occurred in the district of Valladolid. In Chiapas the Indian population remained in full control of the landed resources throughout the colonial period, although they were subjected to the extortions of the local bureaucrats through forced commerce (repartos). Expansion of haciendas on a significant level only occurred at the beginning of the 19th century and again centred around the main urban centre, Ciudad Real. (18)

For the Valley of Oaxaca in the intendancy of the same name more concrete data is available. In the valley, Indians remained the owners of over half of the lands, including the best farm land, until independence. They also owned more head of livestock than the Spaniards. This did not represent a fair distribution of land since Indians represented around 80% of the total population and an even higher percentage if we include only the rural population. However by the end of the colonial period only three or four villages (out of well over 50) were forced to seek employment in Spanish haciendas due to lack of land, and a few others had to engage in a share cropping arrangement with haciendas for the same reason. Villages with scarce land resources were located, as would be expected, around Antequera, the administrative centre and the most fertile part of the valley. As in Chiapas the lack of substantial control over the land and labour by the Spaniards was compensated for by the 'reparto' trade in cochineal and other commodities. The most profitable repartos practised by the Alcaldes Mayores (Indian justices) in New Spain were those of the intendancy of Oaxaca at least one of which was within the limits of the valley.(19)

ii) <u>The centre</u>. Within this region there was a variety of patterns of Spanish settlement and land appropriation, some of which were similar to those of the other regions. Demographic, geographical and political traits specific to this region, however, made the appropriation of a significant amount of Indian land and its direct exploitation the dominant pattern. The area comprises, apart from coastal areas and semi-tropical valleys, the central high plateau which was the core of the Aztec political system and the most densely populated region

in Mexico. This obviously accounts for the concentration of the Spanish population there as they needed to be close to their sources of tribute and later the labour supply for their haciendas, industries, businesses and their personal comfort. Another factor reinforcing the preference of the Spaniards to settle in central Mexico was the relative fertility of the soil and the closeness of the mining centres in the north which, lacking sufficient agricultural production, had to rely on the centre for an important part of the foodstuffs it required. We will study six regions for which pertinent data is available. Although the sample is small it seems to be representative since it includes regions of different ecology, Indian population density and economic interest for the Spaniards.

1) The Indians of the Valley of Mexico were the ones most affected by Spanish appropriation of lands in 16th century Mexico. Gibson has estimated Indian land losses as over half of the total land area and some three quarters of the arable land resources of the valley between 1520-1620. As demographic losses during that period were even higher no immediate scarcity of lands for the Indian communities occurred. The demographic recovery of the late 17th and 18th centuries accompanied by still further minor land losses created, by the end of the 18th century, a sizeable stratum of peasants without enough land resources for subsistence. It also brought about, from the mid 17th century onwards, a series of legal and illegal confrontations between the hacienda owners and the neighbouring Indian villages. The prevailing situation of the Indian communities of the valley at the end of the 18th century is characterised by Tutino as one in which 'a sizeable minority

held nothing more than their house lots; half of the community or a little more had additional agricultural plots, but insufficient to produce subsistence for the average family; another minority enjoyed generally adequate subsistence holdings; and a tiny elite had extensive lands'. There was then, a sizeable surplus population able to supply labour to the haciendas both on a permanent or a seasonal basis. This was the effect of a growing Indian population faced with limited land resources and productivity, a situation which forced the Indians to take up employment in the haciendas or to emigrate to Mexico City or the far north.(20)

2) The city of Puebla was founded in 1531 in a virtually uninhabited place with the purpose of avoiding conflicts with the Indian communities and creating a stratum of Spanish farmers without encomiendas. This expanded rapidly due to the favourable geographical situation in between Mexico City and Veracruz, the main port of the colony, and the services of Indians of the surrounding areas, especially Tlaxcala, granted in an early form of repartimiento. Understandably little or no appropriation of Indian lands occurred in the jurisdiction of Puebla. However Puebla settlers rapidly incorporated lands of neighbouring jurisdiction of dense Indian population to their patrimonies (notably Atrisco and Cholula) and established wheat and livestock haciendas which entered into conflict with the Indian communities. Within Puebla itself, the settlement of a sizeable number of poor Spaniards with land grants ranging from one to two caballerias and the non existence of encomiendas limited the expansion of the latifundia in the jurisdiction. Poor Spaniards successfully opposed the acquisition of vast land grants by a few powerful

individuals, a process which was very common in 16th century Mexico. On the other hand, the lack of encomiendas and the relatively democratic character of the allocations of repartimiento Indians among the settlers, seem to have given strength to these small farmers throughout the period. This was facilitated by the favourable location of the jurisdiction and the early establishment of commerce and industry there, which created a good market for Puebla's agricultural products and, in turn, raised the price of land making its concentration in a few hands difficult. (21)

3) The province of Tlaxcala, only a few miles to the north of Puebla was, like the valley of Mexico, densely populated at the time of the conquest. Unlike the Indian states of the Valley of Mexico, they fought on the side of the Spaniards and, as a former ally, obtained a number of concessions from the crown, among them exemption from encomiendas and from land grants to Spaniards within their territory; the latter was not strictly enforced. In the 1550's infiltration of Spaniards into Tlaxcala society, including acquisition of lands was in progress and it seems to have reached its peak in the early 17th century at the time the Indian population reached its lowest level for the whole colonial period. Tlaxcalan Indian government legally fought this infiltration but to no avail, since Tlaxcalans themselves were selling land to the Spaniards and were keeping enough for their subsistence needs. We do not know the extent of land appropriation by the Spaniards in the 18th century but it must have been significant since in 1791 there were 243 haciendas and wheat farms and the non-Indian population stood at 19,175 (3/7 of whom were Spaniards) or 27% of the total in 1777. (22)

4) In Meztitlan some 100 miles north east of Mexico City, Spanish land appropriation followed a pattern similar to that in the Valley of Mexico, although the pace was slower and its extent more limited. During the 16th century Spanish acquisition of land was modest but it accelerated rapidly during the early 17th century, a period of drastic Indian depopulation. In the 1630's Indian litigation to retain lands which had been encroached by the Spaniards started and many of their claims were favoured by the royal judges, although a bias towards the Spaniards was always present. By the end of the 18th century Indians retained little over half of Meztitlan's lands. Of this only about 6% was of high agricultural value, an additional 36% was pasture and marginal farming land and the rest was of little economic value. Osborn's estimation of the agricultural product available per Indian in the 18th century indicates that it reached or surpassed the minimal subsistence requirements. However as Indian population increased (by 65% between 1753-1803), the balance between arable land and Indian population became increasingly critical. This was expressed towards the end of the 18th century in disputes over the distribution of land within the communities and in the proportion of Indian tributaries permanently employed by the haciendas which reached 6.6% (or 232 tributaries) in 1803. The latter figure although not indicative of a total dependence of the Indians on the hacienda resources reflects a higher degree of dependence than in the rest of central Mexico where the proportion was only 2.8% (see table 7).(23)

5) As in other Mexican regions large haciendas sprang up in the intendancy of Michoacan at the beginning of the 17th century after the reduction of Indians to towns and population

losses left free spaces for the Spanish haciendas. By around 1800, the 260 Indian villages of the intendancy controlled some 60,000 acres or more which were made up of their 'fundos legales' or minimum legal land allocation, 250 acres per village, some 1,100 acres in small plots, 16 orchards and just over 2,000 sq miles of pastures. Indian communities also owned 18 out of 426 haciendas (or 4.2% of the intendance haciendas) and 353 ranchos (small size landed estates) out of the 1,243 in the intendancy (or 28.4% of the total). As the size of these haciendas and ranchos is not known it is impossible to determine the percentage of lands available to the Indian villages on average or the acreage available per Indian. However the totals for irrigated land and its distribution are known and this gives us a clue to the land structure of the intendancy. Of a total of 24,599 irrigated fanegas (a fanega is on average 10.9 acres), 5,754 or 23.4% were controlled by 51 communities and the rest by 110 haciendas. The absence of irrigated lands for over 200 Indian villages points to an inequality between the communities themselves, not to mention the contrast between the Indian and the hacienda sectors. This is confirmed by data on the fundo legal lands. Forty eight villages (18.4%) lacked part of the 250 acres defined by the crown as the minimum subsistence requirement of an Indian village. The average number of acres missing from the fundo legal in these communities was 79 but in two of these villages the proportion missing from the fundo legal was over 50%. Most of these communities with scarce land resources were located in the area around the administrative centre and ecclesiastical see of Valladolid where cereal haciendas had developed more quickly. A

comparison between two micro-regions within Michoacan can illustrate this imbalance further. The 8 communities surrounding the city of Valladolid in the high plateau had a total of 1,014 acres and 1 rancho. Leaving aside the latter they lacked 996 acres to complete the fundo legal requirements. On the other hand in the lowlands of Tepalcatepec in Tacintaro, the ten Indian communities had full access to their 'fundos legales', owned 3 haciendas, 41 ranchos and some pasture land and house plots. Despite this favourable situation the villages of Tepalcatepec had lost over a third of their original lands by the beginning of the 18th century and in the well watered areas this amounted to over three quarters of the land. These land losses were accompanied by population decline in the 16th and 17th centuries with no demographic recovery in the 18th century. As a result of this the sugar haciendas of the micro-region had to rely on African slaves and their mulatto offspring for the supply of labour.

This pattern of development of the agrarian structure was probably common to the whole of lowland southern Michoacan (Motines, Cinagua, Xiquilpa) where sugar, indigo, cacao and cattle haciendas imported large numbers of negro slaves after the demographic decline of the 16th and 17th centuries. The 37 communities of these three jurisdictions had almost full fundo legal allocations and only three of them lacked land. They also controlled five haciendas, 56 ranchos, 178 acres of arable land plus around 450 sq miles of pastures. In contrast to this in the northern highlands the Indian demographic increase and the expansion of the cereal haciendas created a surplus population of vagabonds and laborios (hacienda workers)

which by 1800 accounted for 23.4% of the Indian tributaries, the highest proportion in the whole central region (see Table 7). (24)

6) Unfortunately we know little about the land structure of the sugar producing area of Morelos. The available information indicates that during the reduction of Indians to villages in the 1550's and 1560's and in 1600-5 former Indian lands became available for sugar growing and livestock haciendas. Most land grants to Spaniards were given in the early 17th century and definitive titles arranged by the composiciones of lands in the 1640's. Drastic Indian population decline during the first century of colonisation permitted the process of appropriation of land by the Spaniards to proceed relatively smoothly. However the Indian recovery of the 18th century accompanied by an expansion of the sugar haciendas by the end of the century had created a shortage of lands for the communities close to the sugar producing areas. This was reflected in the increase of litigation over land from the 1780's. With respect to the control of the labour force of the region, haciendas employed, on either a temporary or permanent basis, around 12% of the population and this percentage would increase if we considered only the population able to work. Since the Indian population was only 66% of the total, we cannot arrive at any conclusion in regard to the degree of dependence of the Indians on the hacienda land resources. However the difficulties encountered by the haciendas in obtaining seasonal labour and the coercive methods used to procure it point to a relative sufficiency of land resources for the communities. (25)

iii) The north. Probably the main characteristic of this macro-region during the colonial period was the scarcity of the pre-

hispanic Indian settlements, their lack of political organisation and their hostility towards the Spanish conquistadores. A second feature retarding Spanish settlement was the aridity of the region. Lack of moisture, except round the river basins, made agriculture difficult although pastures were plentiful during the rainy season and permitted the raising of huge herds of livestock. Finally the rich silver mines of Zacatecas, Sombrerete, Parral, etc., constituted a powerful attraction for the Spanish settlers despite the difficulties created by the two other factors mentioned. In the absence of organised, sedentary communities, except in Guadalajara, the tributary mechanism of the encomienda had little success and the appropriation of Indian labour took on a more brutal aspect. Indian slavery and forms akin to it were practised where the hostility of the Indians legitimised it or the colonists had a free hand to practise it. Jesuit and Franciscan missions on the other hand permitted a more pacific acculturation of the Indian tribes and their settlement in villages which occasionally provided labour power and foodstuffs to the neighbouring Spanish settlements. Indian communities from the centre of Mexico also helped in the acculturation of the northern tribes, thus providing agricultural surpluses and labour for the Spanish settlements and securing the frontiers of the empire. (26)

The sparseness of the Indian population permitted a rapid and virtually unchallenged legal appropriation of land by the Spaniards. Actual possession and exploitation was a different matter since landed estates and towns in the north were constantly threatened by warlike Chichimecs, Apaches and other tribes and suffered from shortages of labour. The private



Map 2: Latifundia, agricultural markets and administrative divisions of colonial Mexico (c. 1800)

character of the conquest in the far north (Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon) enhanced the possibilities for the Spaniards to acquire big landed estates. Successive governors financed and led small private armies and slowly settled the kingdoms of the far north. They allotted generous grants to the settlers, entrepreneurs of central Mexico and themselves. In Nuevo Leon normal land grants consisted of 40 to 50 sheep estancias (or 120 to 150 sq miles) and they could be as large as 70 estancias. After approximately a quarter of a century of colonisation (1625-50) the best agricultural regions of Nuevo Leon had been granted to a few rich sheepmen. In New Vizcaya, although land grants seem to have been smaller, governors managed to carve out large estates for themselves. Outstanding among them was the governor Francisco de Urdinola (1603-12 or 15) who amassed a latifundium of 16,626,850 acres or over 18,000 sq miles in Coahuila. His descendants through marital alliances and purchases increased this area to over 22,000 sq miles by the mid 18th century. Other latifundia in 18th century Coahuila included the Vazquez Borrego estate which amounted to over 2,000 sq miles, the Jesuit 'hacienda de los hornos' with over 1,000 sq miles and the Garza Falcon estate which controlled 714 sq miles . (27)

In the rest of the macro-region (New Galicia and the Bajio) landed estates were of a more moderate size. Thus in the Bajio no single hacienda seems to have covered more than the 364 sq miles reached by the 'Corralejo' hacienda by the early 18th century, while in the Guadalajara hinterland the biggest estate, 'Cuisillos', covered only 78 sq miles in the 18th century. More important from the point of view of its production and value, was the 'Cienaga de Mata' estate which

extended over 1,341 sq miles of more fertile land and was located in a more central position in the north of the intendancy of Guadalajara. As can be seen in map 2, the capacity for accumulation of land was in inverse proportion to the proximity of the administrative and economic centres (Mexico City, Guadalajara, Guanajuato). This relation becomes more complex, however, if we consider the provision of labour, Indian settlements, Indian land retention and other variables. We will outline such questions by analysing three areas within the macro-region for which pertinent data is available: the Bajio, the Guadalajara hinterland and eastern San Luis de Potosi. (28)

1) The Bajio. This region was composed of the intendancy of Guanajuato and the southern part of the jurisdiction of Queretaro and it lay just outside the limits of the pre-hispanic Aztec settlement. In contrast with other northern areas inhabited mainly by hostile Indians it was made up of fertile lands which soon became the granary of the mining north. Local silver mining in Guanajuato and textile industries in Queretaro, Leon and so on increased the market for the agricultural products of the area. Since only small pockets of sedentary Indians existed during the conquest the importance of encomiendas was virtually nil. The Spanish settlement of the region began in the second half of the 16th century. The Indian labour force was provided by Tlaxcalan Otomi, Tarascan and Mexican Indians brought from the south as part of a planned colonisation scheme and individual Indians who followed later. Indian villages and Spanish towns were provided with land, in the latter case individual allotments

seem to have been between 2 and 4 caballerias per citizen and in the case of Indian villages they were far more modest. As in Puebla a stratum of small farmers emerged and maintained independent production (either as proprietors or tenants) until the end of the colonial period although an important process of land concentration seems to have occurred in the 18th century. Away from the Spanish and Indian towns, however, accumulation of land through generous grants started around 1600 and land occupation was completed by the 1790's. At that time almost all of the 52 Indian communities of the intendancy of Guanajuato had lost most of their lands and depended on the haciendas for subsistence in the form of peonage, tenancy or seasonal employment. In the absence of concrete data on land occupation, the list of Indian tributaries of c. 1800 (see Table 7) permits us to infer the degree of land deprivation in the Guanajuato intendancy. According to this over two thirds of the Indian tributaries (which with their families represented around 278,000 individuals) were vagabonds or laborios employed by the haciendas. The enormous amount of surplus population that this figure represents can be explained by at least three factors. Firstly the small size of the original allocation of lands for the Indian villages of San Miguel and Coecillo received 367 acres each (or around 3.5 caballerias) while at the same time the Spanish town of Leon got the lion's share, 22,000 acres, each citizen being entitled to 3½ caballerias. Secondly an impressive growth of the Indian population in the Bajio during the late 17th and 18th centuries, especially before the mid 18th century, was due in part to immigration from central Mexico.

Finally the even higher increase in the non-Indian population (Spanish, mestizoes and mulattoes), which comprised more than 55% of the total population in 1793, and the profitability of agriculture in the area left little space for the Indian villages to subsist, let alone expand.[v] (29)

2. The Guadalajara Hinterland Before the conquest this region belonged to the area of influence of the Aztecs and its population shared with them basic cultural traits, the practice of sedentary agriculture and a high degree of political organisation. The region was situated on the north-west borders of the central high plateau and geographically as well as historically belonged to central Mexico rather than the north. We have included it in the northern macro-region because its urban centre (Guadalajara) extended its judicial authority, commercial and financial influence and diocesan jurisdiction towards the north, reaching in some cases the northernmost frontiers of the empire. Data on population and encomienda are scarce, but they suggest a less dense original population than in the core of central Mexico and a relatively low importance of the encomienda system. However, compared with the Bajio and the rest of the macro-region population density was high. (30)

The patterns of land distribution within the region indicate the retention of sufficient land resources by the Indians throughout the colonial period and that only a few

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(v) See Chapter 4 below for an explanation of the vulnerability of the Indian village in a situation of dominant commodity production.

Indian communities suffered severe shortages of lands by the end of the 18th century. However, it is clear that by that time the resources for the subsistence of the communities (water, wood, etc) were severely restricted by the hacienda owners, and that communities who had rights to free access to these resources had to do without them or pay for them. As in other Mexican regions Indian population decline and the reductions of Indians to towns in the 17th century preceded a series of land grants to the Spaniards and, in the late 17th century, a process of composiciones. By around 1700, ownership of large landed estates had been consolidated and, subsequently only minor changes occurred. These involved partition of small landed estates among heirs, encroachment of some Indian arable land by the haciendas, disputes among Indian communities over land and so on. As might be expected scarcity of land for the Indian communities occurred around Guadalajara city and especially towards the fertile lands of the south and east. Data for the intendancy of Guadalajara as a whole (Table 7) confirm the relative sufficiency of land resources for the Indian communities. Only 12% of the Indian population had to depend mainly on resources other than the communities' for their subsistence.(31)

3. Eastern San Luis de Potosi Before the conquest the territory was occupied by the Pame Indians, a branch of the Chichimecs who were also hunters and gatherers but less bellicose than the other Chichimec tribes. From around 1600 Indians from the south, livestock owners from Queretaro and Franciscan friars established Indian towns, haciendas and missions. Indian towns and Spanish settlers were given land grants, and Pames and other Chichimecs were settled among

the southern Indian towns, and were rapidly assimilated by them. The case of the Indian town of Rio Verde suggests that by the 1680's the Indian population of the area had severely declined. By the end of the 18th century, however, the Alcaldia Mayor of San Luis de Potosi (east and west) was expanding its Indian population which almost doubled between 1743-4 and 1800 and this must have put pressure on Indian land and water resources. Thus the Indian pattern of residence (see Table 6) shows a clear dependence of the Indian population on the Spanish estates. Almost half of the Indians lived and worked on Spanish estates. The rest lived in 9 Indian towns, each of which seem to have been allocated 4 sq leagues of land (6.76 sq miles or 4,326 acres).[vi] It is worth noting that the biggest estates were concentrated in the most fertile area of Rio Verde and that there almost two thirds (63.7%) of the Indian population lived in the haciendas. In the other two areas only around a third of the Indians depended on the resources of the haciendas. (33)

The previous analysis permits us to discern the patterns of Indian land retention/Spanish appropriation in Mexico. Table 7, which divides the Indian tributary population between community Indians, vagabonds and hacienda workers, allows us to check our case analysis against a more general background. The southern Indian communities retained enough land to provide for their subsistence needs and the appropriation of Indian

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(vi) This was the case of the town of Rio Verde whose initial grant of 36 sq leagues was reduced to 4 sq leagues after its population decline. The 'fundo legal' in new Galicia was precisely 4 sq leagues. In New Spain, however, whose jurisdiction covered the area under study, the fundo legal was only 250 acres. (32)

Table 6: Town and Hacienda Population in Eastern San Luis de Potosi, 1800 (*)

Sub-Regions		Non-Indians	%	Indians	%	Total	%	Average
1. Valle del Maiz	2 towns	1,138	34.8	1,070	72.1	2,208	46.4	1,104
	15 estates	2,135	62.2	414	27.9	2,549	53.6	170
	Total	3,273	100.0	1,484	100.0	4,757	100.0	
2. Rio Verde	3 towns	3,286	32.3	2,859	36.3	6,143	34.0	2,048
	18 estates	6,891	67.7	5,009	63.7	11,900	66.0	661
	Total	10,177	100.0	7,868	100.0	18,043	100.0	
3. Highlands	4towns	1,446	40.7	3,322	71.7	4,768	58.2	1,192
	13 estates	2,108	59.3	1,310	28.3	3,418	41.8	263
	Total	3,554	100.0	4,632	100.0	8,186	100.0	
Combined sub-regions	9 towns	5,870	34.5	7,251	51.9	13,121	42.3	1,457
	46 estates	11,134	65.5	6,733	48.1	17,867	57.7	388
	Total	17,004	100.0	13,984	100.0	30,988	100.0	

(*) Source: Frost et al (eds) 1979: 348.

surplus labour operated through tribute, repartos and repartimientos and not directly through the monopoly of land property by the hacendados. In areas of some development of the hacienda system (Merida, Antequera) a landless peasantry was emerging but its weight within the context of the whole macro-region was insignificant (less than 1%). In central Mexico the proportion of landless Indians was hardly higher (2.8%) but two trends in operation in this macro-region suggest that the limitation of land resources of the Indian communities was higher than this percentage indicates. Firstly, the constant emigration of Indians of the area towards the north to work in the mines and haciendas diminished the burden of an increasing population on constant land resources. Secondly the need to supplement the income from their own lands with payment obtained through seasonal work in the nearby haciendas indicates that the communities were in an unstable situation,

constantly threatened by famines and epidemics. In the north, the reliance of the Indians on the haciendas was considerable. Only 59.3% of the tributary Indians of the macro-region lived in the communities and this proportion would diminish to about 50% if we excluded Guadalajara where conditions similar to central Mexico prevailed. In the rest of the intendancies, Arizpe excluded, the haciendas had by 1805 severely reduced the land and water rights of the Indian communities and created in the far north coercive mechanisms to retain Indians in their domains (debt peonage, slavery, congregations, etc). In the more fertile areas (the Bajio, southern San Luis), land rentals and better wages attracted Indian immigrants from the centre and the surplus population of the local communities.(vii)

(b) Peru

As in Mexico the encomienda system in the first years of colonisation provided the Spanish colonists with the foodstuffs necessary for survival and surpluses to barter for bullion or coin and spend on luxurious consumption or investment. Thus aboriginal crops and animals (maize, potatoes, llamas, etc) were integrated rapidly into the circulation network established by the Spaniards and headed by the encomenderos. The cultural dependence of the Spanish population on the consumption of wheat, beef and other European items which were expensive imports in this early period, and the formation of incipient markets in Lima and, later on, in the mining town

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(vii) In Arizpe the control exercised by the Jesuits over the communities and their land resources, to the exclusion of the colonists, retarded the advance of the hacienda in the intendancy until the 2nd half of the 18th century. By the beginning of the 19th century however the Indian communities were rapidly disintegrating and Spanish haciendas and mines were flourishing.(34)

Table 7: Tributary Population in Mexico around 1805 (*)

Intendancy	Indians						
Northern Mexico (1)	Living in Communities	%	Laborios and Vagabonds	%	Total Indians	Free Negroids	Total
Arizpe	1,841	100.0	0	0.0	1,841	2,214	4,055
San Luis	12,415	64.8	6,742	35.2	19,157	10,544	29,701
Zacatecas	5,900	64.5	3,246	35.5	9,146	12,786	21,932
Guanajuato	15,961	32.0	33,865	68.0	49,826	10,930	58,896
Guadalajara	28,285	98.8	351	1.2	28,636	15,217	43,853
Total N. Mexico	64,402	59.3	44,204	40.7	108,606	51,691	158,437
Central Mexico (2)							
Mexico	223,720	98.5	3,332	1.5	227,052	10,948	238,000
Puebla	100,776	99.3	728	0.7	101,504	2,496	104,000
Michoacan	26,372	81.5	5,971	18.5	32,343	12,892	45,235
Veracruz	29,018	96.3	1,100	3.7	30,118	1,321	31,439
Total C. Mexico	379,886	97.2	11,131	2.8	391,017	27,657	418,674
Southern Mexico (3)							
Oaxaca	83,139	99.3	611	0.7	83,750	3,489	87,239
Yucatan	69,300	99.0	700	1.0	70,000		
Total Mexico	596,727	91.3	56,646	8.7	653,373		

(*) Source: Cook and Borah 1971: 283-4, 290, 269.

(1) It does not include the intendancy of Durango which had no tributaries. Also excluded are the areas of Coahuila Nuevo Leon and Texas which fell under the jurisdiction of San Luis de Potosi.

(2) We have included the whole intendency of Veracruz in the centre since we do not have separate data for centrel and southern Veracruz.

(3) Excludes Chiapas. For Yucatan the percentages were calculated on the total population and therefore we assume that the ratio tributary/total population was the same in the communities and outside them. Total estimated tributary population in Yucatan in Bernal 1972: 31.

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of Potosi, stimulated the production of European livestock and crops on an increasing scale from the late 1540's. The formation of these markets was the result of a combination of factors which included: the growth of the Spanish and hispanised population (blacks, mulattos and mestizos), who were either non-direct producers or workers without means of production, the drastic demographic decline, which led to a decrease in the surplus received by the encomenderos as tributes, and the development of silver mining, which created a significant mass of landless consumers and, at the same time, the means of payment for commercial transactions and the financing of non-productive activities (government, church, services, etc). A corollary of the formation of an agricultural market was the increase in the value of land and the interest of the colonists in land appropriation through different mechanisms which we will analyse below. (35)

Old world livestock arrived in Peru with the conquistadores in the early 1530's or soon afterwards. However, it was only after c 1550 that livestock raising acquired importance when encomenderos, other farmers and Indians became involved in ranching. This was reflected in the falling prices of livestock and its by-products shown in Table 8. Initially livestock raising was concentrated in the coastal valleys close to Lima but later it was displaced to the sierra and the tropical valleys of the north by the more profitable intensive agriculture. The lack of vast pastures suitable for livestock grazing combined with the increase of demand for livestock and its by-products created a deficit in its supply which,

from the late 16th century, had to be made up with cattle brought from Ecuador and later Argentina, tallow and hide from Chile and mules, which replaced the native llamas as pack animals, from Argentina. It is only with respect to sheep that the area seems to have been self-sufficient providing wool for the numerous textile mills.

Wheat, the staple food of the Spaniards, was cultivated in Peru where climatic conditions and local demand permitted. Difficulties of transport and the relatively low price of the grain impeded mass production, although the markets of Lima and Potosi generated an important amount of wheat production. The valleys surrounding Potosi and the valleys of Cochabamba, despite their remoteness provided Potosi with over 100,000 bushels of wheat p.a. in the early 17th century and the farmers with high returns. Lima, with a higher demand for wheat, had a hinterland which was suitable for wheat cultivation but had to import over half of it from other coastal valleys in central and northern Peru. Here, relatively cheap maritime transport allowed the grain easily to reach Lima and eventually Panama and Ecuador. After the 1687 earthquake and the consequent smut epidemic, wheat farmers in the coastal valleys switched to sugar cane or other crops which were not affected. From then until the end of the colonial period the Lima market heavily depended on imports of Chilean wheat to cover its shortfall. (36)

Sugar and wine production in colonial Peru were capital intensive and profitable enterprises which provided the only significant agricultural export of the colony. The high prices commanded in 16th century Peru by Spanish wines and the

Table 8: Livestock, Beef and Wheat Prices in 16th Century Lima (*)

Year	Horses Average Prices (in pesos)	Mules Average Prices (in pesos)	Beef (in Maravedies per lb)	Wheat Bread (in Maravedies per lb)
1535	900			
1537	590	624		
1540				
1548	350			34
1550	165			9.7
1554		470	21.24	13.6
1556		294		
1570's		170		
			4.25	

(*) Source: Mellafe 1969: 23-4; Keith 1976: 60, 66, 69.

suitability of the southern coastal valleys for their production induced many small and medium sized farmers to engage in wine production in the late 16th century. The privileged location of the valleys close to the Lima and Potosi markets, the lack of competition in Spanish America (Chile excepted) and the quality reached by the product ensured the profitability and expansion of production. Thus during the first half of the 17th century probably one million jars of wine of around 3 gallons each with a total value of 3.5 million pesos were produced annually in Peru. We do not have production figures for the 18th century but the information available suggests a state of constant overproduction, which the Peruvian producers tried to overcome by smuggling wine into the Mexican and Central American markets which were reserved by the crown for Spanish wine from 1714 to 1774.

Sugar production was concentrated in the coastal valleys north of Lima and to a lesser extent in other coastal valleys and the warm valleys around Cuzco. Production in the latter was

orientated towards Potosi and Upper Peru in general while the coastal valleys supplied mainly Lima but also reached Chile and Ecuador. The increase of the areas under cultivation along the northern coast during the late 17th century saturated the existing markets and put the profitability of the crop in the coastal valleys at risk by lowering the sugar prices. The response of the big sugar haciendas was to increase production in order to retain their levels of income thus depressing prices still further. Thus the price of an arroba (25 lb) of sugar in Lima fell from 4.6 pesos in the early 1690's to 3.3 pesos in the next four or five decades and to 1.7 pesos in the 1750's and early 1760's. During the last 50 years of the colonial period sugar prices seem to have risen again, (i.e. 2.5 pesos per arroba before 1818), transforming the crop into the most profitable in Peruvian agriculture. (38)

Potatoes and maize were the basic staples of Indian agriculture in Peru. Before and after the conquest potatoes dominated the agriculture of the high plateaux where it was almost impossible to grow other crops, while maize was grown in the warm coastal and Andean valleys. Both continued to be mainly Indian food throughout the colonial period. They were despised by the Spaniards as nourishment but valued as a source of income in the form of Indian tribute or as commodities to be traded or even produced. The geography of maize in Peru was very similar to that of wheat. Coastal valleys produced basically for the Lima market and the Andean valleys for that of Potosi. Its market was wider however and covered the sierra and high plateau areas where Indian communities, deprived of their colonies in the warm valleys in the course of the colonial period, had to import the grain through the market mechanism.

The degree of commercialisation of potatoes was more restricted, probably due to their accessibility and low status even among Indians. They reached the main valleys of the high plateau and the coast but the main markets were the mining centres of the high plateau. A third native crop, quickly adopted and commercialised by the encomenderos and later hacendados, was coca. In prehispanic times it was reserved for the Inca hierarchy, chieftains and fighting armies, but under Spanish rule it became widely consumed by the Indian masses as a stimulant and hunger suppressant. Despite moral condemnation of the use of coca leaves by the church, by the 1560's the crown had to accept the participation of Spanish entrepreneurs in the profitable business of coca production. This had previously been limited to a few communities whose encomenderos enjoyed a tribute of enormous value given their monopoly over the stimulant. The dimensions of the trade can be appreciated if we consider that in 1603 Potosi alone consumed 60,000 sacks of coca at 6 pesos each. Two centuries later consumption in Potosi amounted to a value of only 160,000 pesos but other mining centres made up for that loss. According to the estimates of Klein this represented only c. 10% of the annual production of Upper Peru to which it is necessary to add the coca production of lower Peru (Cuzco, Huamanga, etc.). (38)

Formation of the agrarian structure. The distribution of land grants among the settlers began with the interest of Spaniards in commercial agriculture in the late 1540's. Governors and viceroys who were entitled to issue land grants, and also municipal councils who were not, allocated land grants to encomenderos and other settlers. The process of distribution of land grants to the Spaniards seems to have been

more organised in the coastal areas which were better controlled and where Indian depopulation, far more drastic than in the sierra and high plateau, had left many areas uncultivated. After the creation of Spanish towns in the coastal valleys (Caneto, Santa, Ica, etc.), measures were taken to ensure the provision of enough cultivable land for the Indian population. We do not know the amount of land reserved for Indian families but an indication is given by the fact that in the valley of Huara in the early 18th century Indian families were supposed to have access to around 22 acres (one third of it for communal use). Spanish settlers on the contrary were entitled, on the foundation of new towns to around 300 acres of land each and repartimiento labour from the nearby communities. As in Mexico therefore it was intended that Indians remained small peasants and worked for the Spanish landowners. In the Peruvian sierra and the high plateau of Upper Peru the access of the Indians to cultivable land seems to have been more limited as the number of landless Indians suggest. There the issue of land grants by the municipal councils which did not respect Indian land possession was aggravated by the relatively slow decline of the Indian population and the migratory process started by the repartimiento drafts of Potosi. (39)

During the early decades of colonisation lands were valueless unless they were equipped with buildings, irrigation works, etc., provided with labour and situated close to a major town. The development of urban centres and their markets and the exhaustion of free sources of land appropriation (land grants) in their hinterlands created, around 1570, an incipient

land market in Peru. Land sales between Spaniards presented little problem and permitted the concentration of several land grants into one hand or the provision of lands to newcomers. Indians had a free hand to sell their lands to Spaniards up until the 1570's. After that period they had to have the permission of the royal officials to sell their lands and usually had to auction them to ensure that they received a fair deal. Finally after 1591 uncultivated Indian lands started to be considered vacant and therefore the property of the crown. The sale of vacant lands by the crown was accompanied, as the decree of 1591 commanded, by a revision of the titles of all proprietors in order to obtain cash for the royal treasury through composiciones. This was inevitably a long and continuous process since it involved a virtual agrarian census, litigation and negotiations between the parties involved (Indians, Spaniards and royal officials) and revisions of the land possessions of the Indian communities up until the 18th century. Still in the early 18th century a major public auction of Indian lands seems to have taken place in Peru when the Indian population was at its lowest. The population recovery of the late 18th century occurred at a time of full occupation of the land in most of Peru and this stimulated new migratory waves towards unsettled areas and created a landless labour force for the Spanish haciendas. (40)

Apart from land grants and purchases the Spaniards managed to appropriate Indian land in Peru by other devices, marriages with Indian heiresses, renting or mere occupation of Indian lands which were later claimed as property and recognised by the crown through composiciones, etc. (41) The process of appropriation of Indian lands by the Spaniards should be put

in the wider context of the colonial pressures which militated against the survival of the communities and which have been analysed in detail elsewhere (Chapter 3). Firstly the forced resettlement (reductions) in the 1570's of many Indian hamlets into bigger villages with fewer land resources, a process which made space for the land grants to the Spaniards, secondly the Indian population decline was aggravated by tributary and repartimiento obligations which induced the Indians to emigrate to Spanish towns or haciendas leaving the community further weakened. This left no alternative for the communities but to dispose of their lands by means of rentals or sales to pay the tributes. Thirdly the 'reparto' or forced commerce with the corregidores compelled the Indians to seek employment in the Spanish haciendas or dispose of their lands in order to pay the required cash. Finally Indian chieftains themselves used their powers in order to appropriate the lands of the community or individual commoners to sell, rent or cultivate on their own behalf. (42)

It is difficult to evaluate the process of land appropriation by the Spaniards without solid statistical data on land property in the different Peruvian regions at different stages of their development. However a rough estimation of the number of landed and landless Indians can be derived from the fiscal categories of Indians existing in Peru. We will use such data to complement the limited data on landed property when dealing with specific Peruvian regions and for an overview of access to land by the Indians in the mid 18th century (see Table 9).

The category of 'originario' (native of the community) included the descendants of the Indians who were assigned

Table 9: Originario and Forastero Indian tributaries in Peru c. 1754 (*)

Ecclesiastic jurisdiction	Originarios	%	Forasteros	%	Total
Upper Peru					
Mizque	3,182	86.3	506	13.7	3,688
Chuquisaca (+)	11,589	43.0	15,359	57.0	26,948
La Paz (+)	10,550	43.6	13,644	56.4	24,194
Lower Peru					
Cuzco (+)	20,711	63.2	12,053	36.8	32,764
Arequipa	3,083	82.2	667	17.8	3,750
Huamanga	8,587	81.6	1,933	18.4	10,520
Lima	17,720	76.7	5,371	23.3	23,091
Trujillo	12,788	70.4	5,387	29.6	18,175
Total	88,210	61.6	54,920	38.4	143,130

(*) Source Sanchez Albornoz 1978:52.

(+) Affected by the mining repartimiento of Potosi.

lands by viceroy Toledo in the inspections of the 1570's and continued to live in their original communities. 'Forasteros' (aliens) included several sub-categories: yanaconas (serfs) or Indians working on Spanish haciendas, 'agregados' (attached) Indians living in the communities but with no rights over the land of the community since they or their ancestors had arrived in the community after the 1570's inspections, 'vagos' (vagabonds), etc. The correlation between land possession and the fiscal categories of forastero and originario is not perfect but is close enough for our purposes. Thus landless originarios did occur but were the exception. Equally forasteros could buy or rent lands from the Indian communities but they

suffered fierce competition from the Spanish entrepreneurs, so most remained landless. As can be seen all regions of Peru had substantial numbers of forasteros who averaged 38% of the population. They were particularly in evidence in the southern Peruvian sierra (Cuzco) and the western jurisdictions of Upper Peru (La Paz and Chuquisaca), all three were subjected to the Potosi repartimiento drafts. This would indicate that the labour drafts were a major factor in the Indian migration process but, as we shall see below, does not deny the importance of the other factors which produced the migration/landlessness phenomenon. (43)

To make our analysis of the Peruvian colonial agrarian structure more specific we turn now to the analysis of this process in three regions for which we have pertinent data. The regions covered represent most of the Peruvian areas of economic importance during the colonial period: the coastal valleys, the high plateau and sierra areas and their adjacent warm valleys. All these regions were relatively integrated into the Peruvian economy and its main markets. Finally their Indian populations represented over a third of the total population of Peru.

a) Coastal Peru. Two main factors characterised the valleys of coastal Peru during the colonial period, the drastic demographic decline of the Indian communities and the suitability of their soil and climate to products in high demand in the Lima market. Both factors created the need for imports of African slaves while the former created favourable conditions for the Spaniards to appropriate lands with relatively

little damage to the dwindling Indian communities. In the various coastal valleys however the agrarian structure had a different evolution and without comprehensive data it is difficult to arrive at definitive conclusions. It seems that in the prosperous southern valleys a 'democratic' pattern of land distribution prevailed while in the depressed northern valleys concentration of land in a few hands was the norm. In the latter whole valleys were almost totally controlled by only one owner. Thus the Viru and Jaquetepeque valleys were virtually owned in the 18th century by the Marquises of Bellavista and the Augustinians respectively. In the south, although large estates existed, the small or medium size farm predominated. Finally in the central coastal region a mixture of communal land, small Spanish farms and sizeable haciendas was present. Table 10 presents estimates of land distribution

Table 10: Estimated land distribution in the Huara valley c. 1700 (*)

Owner type	acres	%
Spaniards		
Jesuits	8,210	37.3
370-1556 acres	3,791	17.3
30-198 acres	2,210	10.0
Indians (c. 350 tributaries)		
family plots	5,187	23.6
community land	2,593	11.8
Total	21,991	100.0

(*) Source Cushner 1980: 34.

in the central coastal valley of Huara which is probably representative of this whole area. In this valley big landowners concentrated 54% of the land, small farmers an additional 10% and Indian communities the rest. (44)

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b) Cuzco. From 1591 to the land inspection of 1657 probably the majority of Spanish land possessions were regularised through composiciones. By 1689 the area of the intendancy of Cuzco, created in 1784, had a rural population of 106,229 Indians of which at least 12,383 or 11.6% lived in haciendas (see Table 11); this indicates a high Spanish control over Cuzco lands. In 1786 the Indian population of rural Cuzco had increased to 14,234 but the number of haciendas had fallen to 647. At that time Indian tributaries (adult males) classified as forasteros and therefore landless were 6,386 or 8.9% of the total male population of rural Cuzco (some 71,750) and made up a far higher percentage if compared to the total tributary population. The different nature of the categories used by the censuses of 1689 and 1786 does not permit a comparison which would make it possible to establish the trends of development of the haciendas and Indian communities in relation to land. However, partial information derived from these censuses and qualitative information allow us to discern some other changes occurring in rural Cuzco at the time. Firstly, a concentration of haciendas around the 'royal road' which connected Lima and Upper Peru, occurred. Secondly the floating forastero population of the 17th century tended to acquire the status of yanacona or serf on the haciendas and they were paid with a token salary and the usufruct of a plot of land. Thirdly a different pattern of demographic growth occurred in the parishes, this depended on the presence or absence of haciendas. In the parishes without haciendas demographic growth was strong, while in those with haciendas, especially sugar estates, population growth was weak or actually negative. Finally, at least in

the late 18th century, some Indian communities participated actively in the production of wheat which was geared to the Spanish markets. (45)

Table 11: Indian population and haciendas in rural Cuzco, 1689 (*)

	Indian population	Indians living in haciendas	%	No of haciendas	Average Indians per hacienda
Parishes with data (25)	29,766	12,383	41.6	315	39.3
Parishes without data (69)	76,463	n.d.	n.d.	390	n.d.
Total parishes (94)	106,229			705	

(*) Source, Moerner 1978: 19,46-7. City of Cuzco excluded.

e) La Paz. By the end of the 18th century the intendancy of La Paz was comprised of five districts: Omasuyos and Pacajes in the high plateau, Sica-Sica and Larecaja still in the high plateau but in an area containing warm valleys and, finally, Chulumani an area of tropical valleys. The agricultural production of these two ecological levels (valleys and high plateau) before the conquest was different but complementary. The potatoes, quinoa and llamas produced in the high plateau were exchanged with the coca and maize of the warm valleys. The integration of the 2 ecological levels was forged through kinship and political ties which were slowly eroded during the colonial period. The many ethnic colonies working in the valleys but depending politically on 'kingdoms' or communities with their bases in the high plateau acquired autonomy from their centres. This was achieved in Larecaja in the 17th century as a result of the pressure of the

Spanish farmers, who needed the labour power of the valley Indians. The attraction exerted by Spanish haciendas and farms which liberated the commoners from tributes and repartimiento corvees was reinforced in both valleys and high plateau by the tendency of the Indian chieftains to appropriate the lands of the community or of the commoners and rent or sell them to the Spaniards or establish their own haciendas. By the end of the 17th century this process was well under way and yanaconas and forasteros doubled the number of landed originarios in Sica-Sica and trebled them in Chulumani. The situation of the Indian labour force in relation to haciendas and communities at the end of the 18th century is shown in Table 12. All but one of the districts had a third or more

Table 12: Haciendas and Indian population in the intendancy of La Paz c. 1790 (*)

District	Date of information	No.of haciendas	No.of yanaconas	%	Yanaconas per hacienda	Forasteros in the communities (1)	Total Indian population
Chulumani	1786	336	18,786	60.6	55.9	22	31,004
Larecaja		370	14,669	36.7	54.3	15	29,946
Sica-Sica		206	17,190	41.4	83.4	16	41,542
Omasuyos		169	20,487	47.6	121.2	39	43,075
Pacajes		91	9,071	20.3	99.7	33	44,777
City of La Paz (3 parishes)		28	2,458	35.0	87.8	n.d.	7,025
Total		1,100	82,661	39.7	75.1	---	207,369

(*) Source, Klein 1980: 198.

(1) As a percentage of the total Indian population. Date derived from Klein 1975: 217. Omasuyos' percentage is based on tributary population and not total population.

of its Indian population working on the haciendas as yanaconas, while a further fraction of the Indian population was alien to the community and generally landless. The high percentage of

yanaconas in Chulumani is explained by the fact that it was a region which had recently been converted to coca production (18th century) and which attracted many Indian immigrants. Thus between 1683 and 1786 the originario population increased by 127% while the total population increased by 251%, a difference which cannot be attributed to a higher fertility among the originario population since the opposite was the case. At the other extreme Pacajes with its traditional Indian crops did not attract many prospective Spanish entrepreneurs and their communities retained almost 80% of the population. The other 3 districts of La Paz had an intermediate position of a large but not predominant yanacona population. In Larecaja and Sica-Sica Spanish interest was justified by the suitability of the land for the production of commercial crops. The strange case of Omasuyos which was ecologically similar to Pacajes but had a higher percentage of yanaconas, is attributed by Klein to its accessibility and proximity to the city of La Paz.

Within the hacendado class of La Paz two main criteria can be used to analyse the information provided by the tributary censuses: the types of hacienda owners to be found and the concentration or dispersion of yanaconas among these owners. Table 13 provides information for the categories of owners which occurred. The number of haciendas owned by Indian chieftains or communities and the number of yanaconas controlled is in this context insignificant (19 haciendas and 2.5% of the total of yanaconas). It is worth noting however that of the 16 haciendas which belonged to the communities, 9 of them were owned by three communities including a yanacona population of 1,275 of all ages. One of these communities,

Table 13: Categories of hacienda owners and number of yanaconas in the intendancy of La Paz c. 1790 (*)

Category	No of owners	No of haciendas	Average of yanaconas per hacienda	Total yanaconas	%	
Spanish hacendados	654	980	71.1	69,729	84.3	94.7
Church	27	75	114.4	8,583	10.4	
Indian chieftain	1	3	62.3	187	0.2	2.5
Indian communities	11	16	115.9	1,855	2.3	
Unknown	26	26	88.7	2,307	2.8	
Total	719	1,100	75.1	82,661	100.0	

(*) Source, Klein 1980: 209.

Table 14: Number of yanaconas in La Paz's haciendas. (*)

No of yanaconas per hacendado	No of hacendados	No of haciendas	Total yanaconas	%	Total tributaries
1000 or more	5	62	7,664	9.3	1,542
500-999	14	82	10,195	12.3	2,165
300-499	36	117	14,137	17.1	2,876
200-299	50	108	11,822	14.3	2,372
100-199	143	224	20,001	24.2	4,445
50-99	159	181	11,391	13.8	2,332
20-49	184	196	6,128	7.4	1,401
10-19	70	71	1,024	1.2	300
1-9	58	59	299	0.4	110
Total	719	1,100	82,661	100.0	17,543

(*) Source Klein, 1980: 200.

Jesus de Machaca in the province of Pacajes, presents a paradoxical case since it combined a large proportion of landless agregados living in the community (more than a third of it) with the ownership of two large haciendas in the province of Larecajas. Here the ownership of haciendas and the exploitation of agregados created a favourable situation with respect

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to land resources for the originario population (the community proper).(viii) The means of acquiring these haciendas, which were owned in fee-simple unlike the other community lands, seems to have passed through the device or accidental occurence of purchase or recognition through composiciones of lands by the community chieftains. Among the Spanish or hispanised hacendados (viz., creoles and mestizos) the landed property of the church is conspicuous, not so much because of the number of haciendas they owned as the concentration of yanaconas within them (10.4%). For instance three nunneries and monasteries alone owned 37 haciendas with a yanacona population of 3,637, ranking first, 6th and 7th among the yanacona holders of the whole intendancy of La Paz. Concentration of yanaconas (and therefore lands) occurred within the hacendado class as a whole (see Table 14). Five large hacendados, or less than 1% of the total, controlled almost a tenth of the yanaconas or slightly more than the 312 hacendados with 49 or less yanaconas. (47)

(viii) The exploitation of 'agregados' by the communities of originarios is somewhat relative. The former payed a rent to the community but as landless Indians they paid a smaller tribute to the crown and were exempted from repartimiento drafts. Sanchez Albornoz's analysis of the partido of Tapacari (intendancy of Cochabamba) suggests that this exploitative relationship could have operated at the level of production but his data do not specify the type of arrangement used (salaries? rent paid in labour or kind?). The relative land sufficiency of Jesus de Machaca in relation to the other 12 communities of Pacajes has been derived from the following facts: a) there were only two haciendas (non-Indian) in the area with a total of 270 yanaconas living in Jesus de Machaca against an average of 7 haciendas and 600 yanaconas per community in the whole province, b) Jesus de Machaca had the second largest number of both originarios and agregados, c) the performance of this community in both respects would be enhanced if we consider only those communities close (100 km or less) to the city of La Paz which was the commercial and administrative centre of the intendancy and a market second only to Lima and Potosi in late 18th century Peru. As might be expected Spanish haciendas tended to concentrate near the city of La Paz decreasing in importance as the distance from this centre increased. (46)



Map 3: Agricultural markets and administrative divisions in colonial Spanish South America (c. 1800)

Although data on the actual distribution of lands among Indian and Spaniards in Peru is scarce or indirect, some provisional conclusions can be derived from the previous analysis.

1. The main characteristic of the Indian population of colonial Peru was its lack of participation in the possession of land. Forasteros and yanaconas lacked free access to land and had to pay a rent for it in labour, in kind or in money either to the Spanish hacendados or to the communities of originario Indians. Figures for the 18th century presented above indicate that over a third of the Indian population of Peru as a whole was in this situation and a far higher proportion of landless Indians was present in Upper Peru.

2. The social forces which compelled the Indians to leave their lands were not limited to individual Spaniards wanting to acquire rights over them. They also included a full system of exactions, organised by the colonial state and supported by the colonists and, to some degree, the Indian chieftains, which made it preferable to the commoners to give up their rights to community land and to emigrate to Spanish haciendas, mines or towns or other Indian communities. Among these factors we have singled out the mining repartimiento, the forced commerce with the corregidores, tribute and informal exactions by the chieftains, corregidores and hacendados.

3. The communities of originarios seem to have become an alternative to the haciendas. By accepting tenants on their lands the communities (or rather their chieftains) behaved as the incipient hacendados, but lacking the ownership of the land in fee-simple they were subjected, unlike the hacendados, to sporadic agrarian reforms.

c) Colombia

The economy of colonial Colombia was characterised by three main features:

1. isolation of the main areas of settlement from each other and, if we exclude Cartagena, from the European markets,
2. relatively low density of the Indian population, especially towards the end of the colonial period,
3. domination of the economy by the production and export of gold.

All three contributed to the relegation of commercial agriculture to a second place, the first by preventing the specialisation of certain areas in agricultural production for export to the mining centres or to the world market, the other two characteristics by limiting the labour force available for agriculture. During the decade 1784-93 Colombia exported 1.8 million pesos worth of agricultural products, compared with 19.2 million in gold, and in around 1800 the tithes of the archbishopric of Bogota produced some 220,000 pesos annually which indicates that there was an annual agricultural production of over two million pesos. These figures show that the internal agricultural market was by no means unimportant and compared favourably with other colonies of roughly the same population (Chile and Venezuela).[ix] (48)

(ix) Ecclesiastical tithes in Chile in 1800 were 154,000 pesos and agricultural exports were far higher than Columbia's in the late 18th century. Tithes in the see of Caracas amounted to an average of 327,000 pesos per year in the last decade of the 18th century but agricultural exports 10 or 20 times higher than Colombia's certainly reduced the importance of the Venezuelan internal market below that of Colombia. (49)

Spanish interest in the ownership of land developed earlier in the areas of large Indian population in the Colombian highlands (Bogota, Tunja, Popayan, Pasto). The lowlands,where the Indian population was scarce, acquired economic importance for as long as gold strikes occurred or livestock in a wild state populated a specific area. In the highland core areas, land previously cultivated by the Indians passed into the control of the colonists by methods similar to those used elsewhere in Spanish America: grants of lands vacated by the dwindling Indian population, de facto usufruct by the encomenderos of the lands of their encomienda Indians, which were later recognised in property and, from the 1560's, forced reduction of the Indian population to towns with the loss of their lands in favour of the Spaniards.

Land grants for Spanish settlers were substantial and tended to become concentrated in the hands of a few Spaniards by means of successive grants from different governors or purchases. The measures used to allocate land grants give us an idea of the acreage involved. Before 1585 livestock estancias and farming estancias allotted in Bogota amounted to 6,276 and 1,570 acres each respectively. After that date they were reduced to 808 and 223 acres respectively and to similar areas in other towns of New Granada (Eastern Colombia). In the governorship of Popayan (Western Colombia) the 'legua' of over 4,000 acres and the caballeria, of varying dimensions but far larger than in New Spain were used. In mining and military frontier zones they were far more generous and could reach as much as 190 sq miles (57,600 acres). In contrast with this, lands allocated to the Indian communities from 1593 could not exceed c. 3.7 acres per tributary in New Granada. (50)

The decree of 1591 ordering the regularisation of land titles and sale of crown lands was gradually applied in Colombia. Land inspections carried out in the 1590's in New Granada resulted in the composicion of a few large landed estates whose owners paid small sums totalling some 19,000 pesos. In 1633 a new land inspection covered all Colombia (Popayan included) and subjected to composicion virtually all land occupied by the Spanish in the colony. Landed estates were evaluated in each town and a fee of 2.5% of their value was charged directly to the town which later on received a fee from the individual landowners according to the value of each property. The amounts paid by each town give an idea of their economic importance. New Granada, Tunja and Bogota, the major centres of Indian population paid 18,000 and 12,000 pesos respectively and other towns of New Granada paid between 1,000 and 5,500 pesos. In the governorship of Popayan land seems to have been less expensive and of the 4 towns which contracted composiciones with the crown only Pasto arranged a payment comparable to those in New Granada (7,000 pesos) and the other three were under 3,000 pesos each. (51)

During the land inspections carried out from th 1590's to the 1640's, inspectors were instructed by the crown to allocate reservation lands (resguardos) to the Indians. As indicated above, lands allocated to the Indian communities were just within the limits of subsistence agriculture. Indian population decline however permitted the communities during the 18th century to possess lands in excess of their immediate needs and to rent out the surplus land to poor whites and mestizos. From the 1640's up until 1755 no major

changes occurred in the possession of lands by the communities. The resguardos, which were the property of the crown but were given in usufruct to the communities, ensured the latter their subsistence and the payment of tribute to the crown. However, the decline of the Indian population and the increase of non-Indian tenants within the community lands created a change of policy. From 1755 the Audiencia of Bogota attempted to eliminate the growing pressure of non-Indians on land by alienating the excess land of the communities and selling it to the colonists and, in the case of Indian villages with less than 100 Indians, liquidating the whole resguardo and transferring these Indians to other villages. The results of this attempt seem to have been negligable since it affected only 9 villages and only 35,000 pesos were collected through the sale of resguardo lands. A more ambitious reform took place in 1776-9 when the crown sold the lands of 29 resguardos, 6 in Bogota and the rest in Tunja, displacing over 5,200 Indians and ordered the extinction of 21 other resguardos although the execution of the latter was suspended by the crown.

The financial results of the reform of the 1770's were again unimportant since the crown collected only 60,000 pesos through land sales, but its social consequences were not. Firstly, the reform directly affected around a fifth of the Indian population of Tunja (nearly 5,000 Indians out of the 27,500 counted in 1757) by actually eliminating their resguardos, and an even bigger proportion through the accomodation of these Indians in other communities whose availability of lands thus decreased. Secondly the reform which aimed at benefitting poor non-Indian farmers was equally beneficial to rich entrepreneurs. They bought around half of

the lands of the resguardos which were auctioned thus consolidating the already existing latifundia structure in New Granada. Thirdly the transfer of whole communities to other villages without sufficient land resources tended to accelerate the disintegration of these communities, which was already under way due to the acceptance on their lands of non-Indians. Finally the discontent over the reform among the Indians who were affected contributed to the comunero rebellion of 1781 which demanded among other things the restoration of the resguardos and their property in fee-simple and not as mere usufruct. Once the rebellion was defeated the viceroy returned to the old policy of keeping Indian resguardos as subsistence plots for the Indians with only usufruct rights over the land. It was only the independence movement which set in motion the final dissolution of the Indian communities by ordering the resguardos to be divided among the commoners and to be held in fee-simple. (52)

Concrete data is available for two regions of Colombia, the savannah of Bogota in the central highlands of New Granada and the city of Popayan hinterland in south western Colombia. A brief analysis of both will permit us to illustrate some of the trends outlined above and give us a clue to other trends which have not yet become evident. In Bogota a generous concession of land grants, especially before 1585, brought about the accumulation of vast landed estates in the hands of single families through successive land grants and additional purchases. The estates of the encomendero Francisco Maldonado de Mendoza present an outstanding case. He and his family were granted several estancias before and after 1585 and inherited several more from his father-in-law; he owned at the end of the

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16th century not less than 25 estancias with a total area of c. 174 sq miles (or c. 111,200 acres). To legalise the titles through composicion he paid the relatively modest sum of 940 pesos. On the other side of the social scale, the lands of the Indians of the Savannah of Bogota had been severely reduced during the 16th century to around 10% of the total area of the savannah. Their situation deteriorated even further when they were concentrated in Indian reductions and allocated resguardos in the 1590's. As a result of this the Indian communities lost half of their land and were reduced to c. 126 sq miles (or c. 8,500 acres) or roughly 5% of the area of the savannah. At that time (1593) the tributary population of the area was 19,161 which indicates an average landholding of 4.2 acres per tributary or slightly more than the maximum fixed by the Audiencia. The lands thus spared were granted to the colonists from the 1590's to 1640. (53)

Land grants in the surroundings of the city of Popayan, which occurred between the 1570's and 1640, were necessarily generous. The lack of a dense Indian population and its frontier character limited the bulk of the production of the area to livestock raising, for which vast latifundia were necessary, until around 1700. The evaluation of the landed properties of Popayan during the composiciones of 1637 permit us to discern the structure of Spanish property in the area (see Table 15). Slightly more than a fifth of the proprietors (8) concentrated c. 61% of the land value in their hands while over a half of the more modest landowners were in control of property which was worth 11% of the total. A new land tax applied

Table 15: Value of Spanish Estates in Popayan Hinterland in 1637 (in pesos)(*)

Value	No of Estates	Total Value	%	Average Value
120-800	20	8,560	11.2	428
801-2,000	7	10,000	13.0	1,429
2,001-4,000	4	11,400	14.9	2,850
4,001 and more	8	46,600	60.9	5,825
Total	39	76,560	100.0	

(*) Source: Colmenares 1978: 241.

Table 16: Value of Spanish Estates in Popayan Hinterland in 1713 (in pesos) (*)

Value	No of Proprietors	Total Value	%	Average Value
40-200	21	2,440	4.8	116
200-500	13	4,980	9.8	383
501-1,000	7	5,240	10.4	749
1,001-2,000	5	8,500	16.8	1,700
2,001-4,000	6	18,260	36.1	3,043
4,001-6,000	1	4,540	9.0	
6,001 or more	1	6,600	13.0	
Total	54	50,560	100.0	

(*) Source: Colmenares 1979: 189.

in 1713 (see Table 16) permits us to discern the evolution of the Spanish agrarian structure in Popayan at the time. In the early 18th century the number of Spanish landowners had increased slightly due to purchases of small pieces of land from the big landowners but concentration of land among a few landowners was still much in evidence. Thus the top 8 landowners controlled 58% of the total value of land while the 34 more modest proprietors only controlled lands accounting for a value of 14.6% of the total. Data for the later part of the 18th century is too inconclusive to be able to discern the characteristics

of the agrarian structure of the Popayan hinterland. However, it seems that the trends operating in the 17th century, namely the retention of huge landed estates of high value by powerful families or institutions and at the same time the increase of land proprietors in the category of low value property, continued.

Unfortunately we know little about the Indian communities of Popayan in relation to land possession. Each community controlled in theory the area within a radius of 2.6 miles from its village as resguardos in the 17th century. The difficulties created for the colonists by the authorities in the appropriation of resguardo lands and the population decline after the allocation of resguardos (from 5,000 Indians in 1637 to c. 2500 in the 1660's) permit us to suppose that there was a relative self-sufficiency amongst the Indians in land resources. The continuation of repartimiento drafts until 1740 support this impression although by the end of the 18th century Indian vagabonds and Indian workers hired by the day were common. This process of dissolution of the Indian communities seems to have been associated with the tributary pressures of the state and encomenderos over them and also the retention by the haciendas of repartimiento Indians by force or through the concessions of lands in usufruct within the hacienda. (54)

d) Chile

The economy of colonial Chile differed from that of Mexico and Peru in several respects. Firstly, the aboriginal population was relatively scarce especially in the areas of effective

Spanish control (north and centre). Secondly, the Indian population south of the river Bio-Bio resisted Spanish invasion for almost the whole colonial period creating a source of economic and human losses for Chile and to some extent Peru. Finally the lack of continuous substantial mining activities, which could have created a solid market for Chile's agricultural products, impeded the effective colonisation of vast areas of the territory. These factors conditioned the evolution of the Chilean structure of production and brought about the positioning of the colony at the bottom of the hierarchy of economic dependence.

Up until c. 1580 gold mining predominated within Spanish economic activities and farming and ranching were only secondary trades which were needed to feed the Spanish population and provide the horses necessary for war. By the beginning of the 17th century this situation had changed substantially. The northern region was integrated into the Peruvian economy through the export of wine, hides and mules while the central region (the area bounded by the rivers Choapa and Maule) was beginning to export hides and cordovan leather to Lima. By that time, however, the Spanish settlements south of the river Bio-Bio had been wiped out by the warlike Mapuche Indians and with them the Spaniards had lost the profitable gold placers of southern Chile and about half of the encomienda Indians of the whole colony. From then on, Spaniards in Chile had to cope with a continuous war on the southern frontier, a lack of Indian labour power and scarcity of means of payment for their imports. Several factors permitted the colony to escape the economic mediocrity of the

early 17th century. These were a Peruvian military subsidy of around 100,000 pesos p.a. during the 17th and first half of the 18th centuries, the development of livestock production and the export of its by-products in the 17th century and the revival of mining in the second half of the 18th century. This economic expansion required the demographic recovery of the working population and regional specialisation. (55)

Livestock and agricultural production in Chile for the period 1680-1819 have been calculated by Carmagnani and is here presented in Table 17. It shows a constant expansion punctuated by minor decreases (less than 8%), except in the decade 1810-19 when independence wars disrupted the colonial economy. Two-thirds of the value of agricultural production (ranging from 63-75%) was concentrated in the central region (Santiago). The southern region of Concepcion produced another fourth of the total value (ranging from 18 to 31%) while the northern area of La Serena, with a limited amount of arable land, produced the rest (from 4 to 10%). Table 18 provides us with information about agricultural exports and, despite its incompleteness, clearly shows a trend towards productive specialisation in the three Chilean regions. Thus there is a clear tendency in the central and southern regions to switch from livestock to agricultural exports (viz wheat). This process was triggered by Peruvian demand from the late 1680's, and it affected central Chile first and then the southern region which was becoming effectively colonised by the 18th century. In the northern region agricultural exports decreased to virtually nothing by the beginning of the 19th

Table 17: Value of Agricultural Production in Chile, 1680-1819 (in pesos) (*) (Average per year)

Decades	Northern Region (La Serena)	%	Central Region (Santiago)	%	Southern Region (Concepcion)	%	Total
1680-9	13,680	6.2	139,570	62.8	68,820	31.0	222,070
1690-9	23,707	8.6	166,925	60.7	84,579	30.7	275,211
1700-9	29,986	10.1	197,072	66.2	70,540	23.7	297,589
1710-9	28,153	8.6	230,709	70.7	67,650	20.7	326,510
1720-9	31,395	7.0	335,247	75.0	80,381	18.0	447,023
1730-9	29,261	6.4	341,388	75.1	84,304	18.5	454,953
1740-9	39,288	9.2	298,679	70.0	88,846	20.8	426,813
1750-9	44,377	6.8	427,084	65.4	181,615	27.8	653,076
1760-9	41,409	6.0	461,086	66.6	189,530	27.4	692,025
1770-9	40,055	4.3	621,086	67.2	262,961	28.5	924,102
1780-9	33,543	3.9	551,441	64.5	270,669	31.6	855,653
1790-9	45,198	5.3	556,046	65.8	244,242	28.9	845,486
1800-9	84,296	6.0	885,292	63.5	425,376	30.5	1394,967
1810-9	80,766	8.3	623,877	63.9	271,357	27.8	976,002

(*) Source: Carmagnani 1973: 213, 235, 249. Based on the ecclesiastical tithe. Excludes the southern island of Chiloe and Cuyo, now in Argentinian territory.

century despite the increase of the value of its local production (Table 17). By that time mining had reached overwhelming importance in the La Serena region and mine centres represented an important market which was able to absorb virtually the whole agricultural product of the region and even imports from the central region. (56)

Table 17: Value of Agricultural Production in Chile. 1680-1819 (in pesos) (*) (Average per year)

Decades	Northern Region (La Serena)	%	Central Region (Santiago)	%	Southern Region (Concepcion)	%	Total
1680-9	13,680	6.2	139,570	62.8	68,820	31.0	222,070
1690-9	23,707	8.6	166,925	60.7	84,579	30.7	275,211
1700-9	29,986	10.1	197,072	66.2	70,540	23.7	297,589
1710-9	28,153	8.6	230,709	70.7	67,650	20.7	326,510
1720-9	31,395	7.0	335,247	75.0	80,381	18.0	447,023
1730-9	29,261	6.4	341,388	75.1	84,304	18.5	454,953
1740-9	39,288	9.2	298,679	70.0	88,846	20.8	426,813
1750-9	44,377	6.8	427,084	65.4	181,615	27.8	653,076
1760-9	41,409	6.0	461,086	66.6	189,530	27.4	692,025
1770-9	40,055	4.3	621,086	67.2	262,961	28.5	924,102
1780-9	33,543	3.9	551,441	64.5	270,669	31.6	855,653
1790-9	45,198	5.3	556,046	65.8	244,242	28.9	845,486
1800-9	84,296	6.0	885,292	63.5	425,376	30.5	1,394,967
1810-9	80,766	8.3	623,877	63.9	271,357	27.8	976,002

(*) Source: Carmagnani 1973: 213, 235, 249. Based on the ecclesiastical tithe. Excludes the southern island of Chiloe and Cuyo, now in Argentinian territory.

century despite the increase of the value of its local production (Table 17). By that time mining had reached overwhelming importance in the La Serena region and mine centres represented an important market which was able to absorb virtually the whole agricultural product of the region and even imports from the central region. (56)

Formation of the agrarian structure The general Spanish American policy of rewarding colonists with land grants as a way of settling the population and developing a European type of agriculture was in Chile more necessary than in other colonies. The poverty of the colonists, the lack of significant numbers of encomienda Indians, the constant state of war in the southern frontier, etc, produced a very generous policy of land grants which contrasts with the more restrictive ones of coastal Peru or central Mexico. In Chile land grants varied between 100 and 1,500 cuadras (772 to 5,790 acres) and although land grants for livestock raising purposes were initially issued without giving property rights, from 1583 this right was tacitly recognised. That year the governor, taking into consideration the concentration of lands by a few owners, limited the size of the grants to a maximum of 200 cuadras, but in the following decades the governors issued grants several times larger than this. This generosity, or what amounts to the same, the low value of the land, is also apparent if we consider the chronological span which the distribution of land grants covered. Despite the increasing interest of Spaniards in land at the end of the 16th century, the royal cedula of 1591, which commanded the sale of crown lands, was not enforced. On the contrary (free) land grants were issued more frequently around the city of Santiago at the turn of the century and the rest of Chile in the 17th century. Thus in the corregimiento of Maule, in the south of the Santiago region, 115 land grants were issued between 1600 and 1665 and another 59 during the rest of the 17th century. In the frontier region of Concepcion, the occupation of the land was even slower and most land grants

Table 18: Chilean exports in the 17th and 18th centuries by region (in pesos)(*)

Regions	Central (Santiago)				Northern (La Serena)				Southern (Concepcion)			
economic sector	live-stock	agri-culture	mining	total	live-stock	agri-culture	mining	total	live-stock	agri-culture	others(1)	total
year												
1660	74,877	8,162	0	83,039	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
%	90.2	9.8	0.0	100.0								
c. 1690(2)	150,386	124,686	4,270	133,060	935	3,602	2,128	6,665	41,242	0	625	41,867
%	53.7	44.7	1.6	100.0	14.0	54.1	31.9	100.0	98.6	0.0	1.4	100.0
c. 1750(3)	108,000	290,300	5,000	403,300		n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	17,430	11,594	900	29,924
%	26.7	72.1	1.2	100.0					58.5	38.5	3.1	100.0
1791	100,000	278,500	18,000	396,500	0	7,575	51,700	59,275	5,300	79,500	0	84,800
%	25.2	70.3	4.5	100.0	0.0	13.0	87.0	100.0	6.1	93.9	0.0	100.0
c. 1808(4)	184,219	254,872	24,424	463,515		1,475	129,887	131,362	8,381	83,371	8,108	99,870
%	39.8	54.9	5.3	100.0		1.2	98.8	100.0	8.4	83.5	8.1	100.0

(*) Source Carmagnani 1973: 33, 59, 77, 83, 102, 109.

(1) Includes mining, wood cutting and industry.

(2) 1693 for the central region, average 1692-1704 for the northern region, and year 1682-3 for the southern region.

(3) 1744 for Santiago, 1751 for Concepcion. Santiago's figures only include exports to Peru.

(4) 1809 for Santiago. Santiago's figures only include exports to Peru.

were issued after 1670. This process of free appropriation of land which was stopped in the areas of early colonisation by the total occupation of the available land, finally came to an end in 1709. Since then only newly founded towns were to receive free land grants, the rest of the land available was to be sold or subjected to composiciones according to the decree of 1591. (57)

The impact of the Peruvian demand on Chilean agriculture spurred the process of occupation and later concentration of lands by the Spaniards. This process occurred earlier in the areas closer to the main markets (Lima, Santiago) and spread slowly to the rest of the territory. In the central region the valley of Puangue attracted the interest of the Spaniards very early and it was totally occupied by 1621. The valley, some 500 sq miles, located on the road between Santiago and the main Chilean port Valparaiso, offered excellent access to the markets and there land increased its value more rapidly than anywhere else in the colony. For the rest of the Chilean territory the information on land grants and regions subiected to the tithe indicates a slow occupation of the land which continued after the years of independence, especially in the south. With respect to land distribution among the Spaniards a double distinction must be made. Firstly between those regions whose agricultural production was basically orientated to external markets (central and southern regions) and those orientated towards the internal market (northern region). Secondly, within the former, territories of relatively old must be distinguished from those of new settlement. In the northern region (see Table 19) the value of land in the hands of small proprietors was significantly higher

than in the central region (see Table 20). The difference in the proportion of the values of the property owned by the lower stratum of proprietors in both regions (22.9% in the northern region against only 9.7% in the centre), is even more remarkable if we consider the total population of both regions. Thus the ratio between proprietors and total population was 1 : 27 in the northern region while in the centre the ratio was 1 : 142. Certainly the internal demand generated by the mining activity and the high cost of labour power and land limited the expansion of latifundia and created favourable conditions for the persistence of independent small peasants. On the contrary in the central region small owners were a minority despite the fact that land was cheaper and arable land plentiful. The figures for 'inquilinos' or tenant farmers who paid rent at least partially in labour in the 1813 census confirm this imbalance in the structure of land distribution between the two regions at the time. The northern had 2,346, the central regions of old settlement 16,123 and those of recent settlement 1,159. In the latter, the properties of low value predominated and no property worth over 50,000 pesos occurred. However the low price of land in the area (22.5 pesos per cuadra on average) suggests an important concentration of land with averages of 35,200 and 1,100 cuadras in each category, sizes far superior to the averages in the other parts of central Chile and the north. (58)

No comprehensive figures on the agrarian structure of southern Chile during the colonial period are available to us. The agrarian census of 1833, however, shows a land distribution which is very similar to that of central Chile. This

Table 19: Distribution of Land among Spaniards according to its Value in Northern Chile in 1818 (in pesos) (*)

Value	No of Owners	%	Total Value	%	Average Value
Less than 1,000	1,399	87.1	249,787	22.9	178.5
1,000-2,999	115	7.1	181,496	16.6	1,578.2
3,000-9,999	77	4.8	394,566	36.1	5,124.2
10,000 or more	16	1.0	267,000	24.4	16,687.5
Total	1,607	100.0	1,092,850	100.0	23.568.4

Average value of one cuadra = 200 pesos.
Population in 1813 = 43,449.

(*) Source: Carmagnani 1973: 244.

Table 20: Distribution of Land among Spaniards according to its Value in Central Chile in 1818 (in pesos) (*)

	Areas of Old Settlement			Areas of New Settlement (1)			Areas of New Settlement (2)			All Areas		
Value	No of properties	Value	%	No of properties	Value	%	No of properties	Value	%	No of properties	Value	%
Less than 3,000	1,266	573,326	8.9	121	95,500	33.9	1,387	668,826	9.7			
3,000-9,999	162	832,827	12.9	30	136,000	48.3	192	968,826	14.5			
10,000-49,999	171	3,629,187	56.4	2	50,000	17.8	173	3,679,187	54.8			
50,000 or more	21	1,406,000	21.8	0	0	0.0	21	1,406,000	21.0			
Total	1,620	6,441,340	100.0	153	281,500	100.0	1,773	6,722,839	100.0			

Population in 1813 = 251,269 (excluding Santiago's hinterland).

(*) Source: Carmagnani 1963: 226.

(1) Average value of the cuadra 100 - 200 pesos.

(2) Average value of the cuadra 22.5 pesos.

shows low values of property in areas of recent settlement and higher values, although still lower than in the centre, in those of longer settlement. The process of concentration of land, together with the effect of Peruvian demand for agricultural products, is probably well represented by the case of the parish of Perquilauquen in the southern region during 1737-54 (Table 21). Although the data is not complete, the trends are apparent. Firstly the increase in the total amount of land owned by the colonists, secondly a decrease in the importance of the medium sized properties (100-999 cuadras) and an increase in the land owned by the small proprietors and the big landowners and, finally, a dramatic increase in the number of tenants. (59)

Table 21: Agrarian Structure in the Parish of Perquilauquen: 1734-54 (*)

Strata	1737				1754			
	No of owners	%	Acreage	%	No of owners	%	Acreage	%
Less than 100 cuadras	0	0.0	0	0.0	107	35.8	4,876	4.2
100-499	53	52.0	15,650	33.3	139	46.5	31,194	26.7
500-999	33	32.3	13,400	28.5	25	8.3	14,063	12.2
1,000 or more	16	15.7	18,000	38.2	28	9.4	65,700	56.7
Total	102	100.0	47,050	100.0	299	100.0	115,833	100.0
Tenants	35				227			

(*) Source: Carmagnani 1973: 254.

Indian land possessions in colonial Chile withered away due to the same causes which brought about the scarcity of Indian lands in Mexico and Peru, but the pace of this process was faster due to the lack of administrative control over the

colonists and the low density of the aboriginal population. Encomenderos were able to obtain Indian lands (as opposed to crown lands) through several mechanisms. These included obtaining land grants within the towns of their encomienda Indians, the purchase or 'inheritance' of such lands or simple encroachment and usufruct of Indian lands. This latter, which was even recognised by Chilean legislation from 1584-1620, permitted the encomendero total control over Indian production. Apart from these direct forms of appropriation of Indian lands by the encomenderos, other exactions by the encomenderos or the state brought about the weakening of the Indian communities and an erosion of their capacity to effectively protect their lands. One of the forms of appropriation was the continuation of payment of tribute in labour up until the 18th century which gave the encomendero the opportunity to uproot Indians from the communities and enserf them as yanaconas along with Indian slaves. This process seems to have gained momentum around 1700, as an effect of the wheat boom of the late 17th century and the resulting interest of the hacendados in additional land and labour power, when a series of Indian towns were moved to the haciendas of their encomenderos. Indian communities were also weakened by the escapes of commoners to avoid the payment of tribute. the renting out of community lands to poor whites and mestizos which increased miscegenation and, in the 1740's, the creation of Spanish towns within the limits of the Indian towns which meant the removal of the Indians to other places and/or losses of land. (60)

Unfortunately only partial or indirect quantitative data is available on the land situation of the Chilean Indians. This clearly indicates that the practices mentioned above

Table 22: Land allocations to the Indian villages of the valley of Puangue, 17th and 18th centuries (in cuadras)(*)

village	1604	1690	1775
Pico	200	nil	nil
Pomaire	320	196	196
Pichidegua	380	c.380 }	
Melipilla	400	c.400 }	. . . . .164 (*)
Huenchun	?	nil	
Total	1,300	c.970	360

(*) Source, Borde et al 1956:79-83, map 1. A cuadra is equivalent to c. 3.9 acres.In 1742 Pichidegua and Melipilla were moved to the town of 'El Alto' and allotted 164 cuadras.

were common and that the Indian population shrank severely despite the importation of Indians from the south of Chile, trans-Andean territories (now Argentina) and even Peru. In 1614 the northern and central regions had 48 Indian towns and 2,345 tributary Indians and elders, of these only 696 (or 29.7%) were living in the Indian towns at the time of the census while the rest worked on the estates of their encomenderos or had waged work outside the Indian towns. If we add to them some 1,000 yanaconas of working age (out of 2,162 of all ages) who were ex-prisoners of war or runaways from the Indian communities, the total number of landless Indians in the region would be a minimum of 1,000 (or 29.9%) and a maximum of 2,649 adult Indians (or 79.1%). The process of dispossession of the Indian communities can be illustrated by the case of the valley of Puangue, although considering its

favourable commercial location it might be an extreme case. The land situation of the 5 Indian towns existing in the area is summarised in Table 22. It should be noted that by 1604 several Indian land possessions had already passed to Spanish hands and that the area allocated to the Indians was a tiny fraction of the land allocated in the valley. Thus the grants of 21 (out of 31) Spanish grantees whose dimensions are known represented in 1604 over 10,400 cuadras, ranging from 24 to 1,500 cuadras per individual. The way in which the Indians lost at least part of their lands illustrates the pressures that the Indian communities were experiencing in central Chile. The villages of Huenchun and Pico ceased to exist by the mid 17th century. The Indians of both towns seem to have been removed to work as yanaconas with their encomenderos while the latter appropriated their lands. The town of Pomaire was reduced in 1679 to only 196 cuadras as the population had almost halved since 1604. Finally the Indians of Melipilla and Pichidegua were removed from their original lands in 1742 to provide lands for the newly founded Spanish town of San Jose de Logrono. By the end of the 18th century, the number of Indians in this new village, called 'El Alto', had shrunk to some 20 adults and they were renting out 48 cuadras. (61)

In this chapter we have discussed the formation of the agrarian structure in some areas of Spanish America. In the following chapter we will concentrate on similar geographical areas but will turn our attention to the economic performance of the haciendas and other agrarian enterprises. After that discussion we will summarise our findings in relation to agriculture as a whole and present our conclusions to both chapters.

Chapter 5: Agriculture II

In this chapter we will concentrate on the study of the institution which set the pace of commercialised agricultural production in most parts of Spanish America from the 17th century onwards, the hacienda. The hacienda's control of lands, labour and capital available for agriculture was by no means complete by the end of the colonial period, but the long term trend operated in that direction. Colonial haciendas do not represent per se the whole dynamics of commercial agricultural production but through the study of haciendas and their connections with other agricultural producers we can grasp the main characteristics of the whole colonial agrarian structure. This approach is virtually compulsory since haciendas have been submitted, unlike small farms and Indian communities, to detailed studies of their management, profits, labour systems etc. Additional information (agrarian and demographic censuses, data on agricultural prices, etc.) will illustrate the relationship hacienda-small farmers-Indian communities to give us a more comprehensive picture. The regional emphasis of this chapter is on Mexican and secondarily on Peruvian,Colombian and Chilean haciendas with few references outside these regions. This emphasis is inevitable, given the present state of the development of hacienda studies with emphasis precisely on these colonies. As noted above (Chapter 4, 2) this emphasis reflects, in the case of Mexico and Peru, the enormous demographic, economic and political importance of these colonies. Given the variety of regions and agricultural production which they included it might be argued that they were representative of colonial Spanish American agriculture as a whole.

We have divided this chapter in 7 major sections. We will start by defining the hacienda and other agrarian productive units and then we will consider hacienda labour, agricultural markets and prices, sources of capital, return from capital and hacienda turnover and stability. In the final section we will establish our conclusions.

a) Definition

Big landed estates in colonial Spanish America are referred to as estancias, haciendas and plantations. The differentiation between the first two was already present in the vocabulary of the period. Hacienda meant estate in the sense of property, fortune, capital and in relation to land, a rural property in which a certain amount of capital had been invested. Estancia, on the other hand, was the land without capital investment and usually dedicated to livestock grazing. The distinction between plantation and hacienda has been developed by Mintz and Wolf. They define plantation as agricultural properties organised to supply a big scale market which operates with abundant capital and is oriented mainly towards capital accumulation disregarding status considerations. On the contrary the hacienda has a small scale market, operates with little capital and the economic behaviour of the owner takes into consideration aspects of social prestige. Unfortunately this typology, based on 19th and 20th century cases, is difficult to test against our knowledge of colonial haciendas, but there are several indications that no clear cut distinctions can be made. We will consider, therefore, both categories as a continuum under the general name of hacienda which was the name used by the

colonisers.(i)

In relation to the difference between the hacienda and smaller units we will also adhere to the colonial use which included a mixture of acreage and value considerations. In general haciendas were larger and more valuable than ranchos and labores but in some cases ranchos and labores could exceed either the extent or the value of a small or inexpensive hacienda. This can be illustrated by the values and acreages of haciendas, ranchos and labores included in Table 1. Thus haciendas 1 and 2 had a size comparable or inferior to ranchos and labores 5, 6 and 7 but their values were higher. On the other hand haciendas 3 - 4 had a smaller or comparable value to ranchos and labores 5, 6 and 7 but their acreage was far bigger.

(i) For instance, in eighteenth century Mexico a large number of haciendas supplying large distant markets (Mexico City, Guadalajara and Guanajuato) were entailed, that is, a factor of production (land) was clearly linked to status considerations. The correlation between large markets and large hacienda capital is also questionable since merchant capital can provide the link between small or medium scale production and the large distant markets as in the case of 18th century Oaxacan cochineal, Guatemalan indigo, etc. (1) The distinction between estancia-hacienda is pointed out in Chevalier 1963:167 for Mexico and well developed in Burga 1976:106 for Peru. For the contrast hacienda-plantation see Wolf and Mintz in Florescano (ed) 1975:493, Keith 1971: 437 and Moerner 1973:185-6, Liher 1976:527-8.

(ii) The evidence for this paragraph comes from the generous sample of haciendas, labores and ranchos of Leon studied by Brading and in Taylor's study of the Valley of Oaxaca. For other regions of Mexico and Spanish America we have little information about acreage, values etc., of smaller agricultural units and therefore our definition remains necessarily vague in this respect. (2)

Table 1: Acreages and values of haciendas, ranchos and labores in colonial Mexico

	Haciendas	Acreage	Value (in pesos)
1	San Jose De Coapa (V of Mexico) 1780's	1,050	16,400
2	Xochimancas (Morelos) 1680's	c. 1,200	c. 190,000
3 - 4	Palma & Palote (Leon)	c. 9,000	9,750
	Labores and Ranchos		
5	Sardaneta (Leon) 1798	1,744	10,887
6	Patina (Leon) 1807	1,000 +	12,000
7	Cerrito (Leon) 1820	1,000+	5,800

1) Florescano (ed) 1975:234,239. 2) Berthes 1966:91, see also Appendix 3. 3 - 4) Brading 1978: 130-1. 5) Brading 1978:141. 6) Brading 1978: 163. 7) Brading 1978:170.

b) Labour

In Chapter 3 we analysed the main forms of forced labour practised in colonial Spanish America, slavery, encomiendas and repartimiento. It is not necessary to emphasise the importance slavery had in the development of certain agrarian enterprises in areas where Indian labour was scarce or its use restricted by the colonial authorities. However a word or two is necessary to specify the relationships between encomienda and repartimiento and the hacienda. Keith considers encomienda and hacienda as two successive institutions, which gave 'the upper class control over the supply of labour' mediated by a transitional period of wider spread of Indian forced labour or repartimiento. This holds true basically, for central Mexico and Peru where the beginnings of Spanish agriculture on a significant scale coincided with the abolition of personal services in the encomiendas in the

mid 16th century. However, where the abolition of personal service took place later than the beginning of Spanish interest in agricultural production there was an overlap of both institutions. As the tributary population of the encomiendas diminished in the 16th and 17th centuries and its escheat to the crown increased, the use of encomienda labour in agriculture lost importance while other sources of labour power became dominant. Thus forced labour of encomienda Indians was the main source of labour power in the Venezuelan agrarian enterprises up until the mid 17th century. Similarly in Colombia, the supersession of encomienda's personal service only started in the 1590's when the formation of latifundia was well under way.(3)

The repartimiento system was also an effective help to the emergent haciendas in the Indies and introduced a more rational distribution of Indian labour power among colonists. Its rotational and compulsive character however made it unworkable in the long run since farmers and miners retained the Indians beyond the stipulated period, and hacendados without enough Indian labour induced Indians from the communities to settle in their estates and avoid the repartimiento drafts altogether. The forms of transition from encomienda or repartimiento labour to labour controlled by the hacienda were varied and so were the mechanisms developed by the land owners to attract or retain their labourers. The latter can be classified into three main types: peonage, legal servitude and tenancy (or inquilinaje). Although these types overlapped in actual practice, the legal obligations of each category of workers were different and we will study them separately.

1) Peonage

In this section we will first define and review the development of the institution in Mexico and Spanish America and then we will establish the criteria to classify the different types of peonage. Finally we will study these types as they occurred in the Indies. The types of peonage discovered are temporary and permanent peons (according to the time spent on the hacienda by the worker) and debt, credit adscripted and free peonage according to the nature of the relation of production between the worker and the hacienda.

Peonage was in theory a form of free waged work by which land owners ensured the presence of a permanent or seasonal labour force in their enterprises. Central Mexico seems to have been the region which developed the system earliest. In the Valley of Mexico and Puebla there was a significant number of peons by the end of the 16th century and, by the time of the suppression of the repartimiento system in the region (1632), some towns in the Valley of Mexico had as much as three quarters of its working population hired by the haciendas. Thus royal legislation only sanctioned a phenomenon which had already developed in the economy, namely the obsolescence of the repartimiento system and the emergence, at least formally, of a free waged labour system. In northern Mexico the lack of large groups of sedentary Indians determined the occurrence of forms of wage labour very early (16th century) in agriculture and especially in mining. The high price of labour and the special conditions of the area (Indian warfare, availability of lands) also permitted the use of Indian slaves and semi-slaves as well as tenancy arrangements to induce Indians to settle in the hacienda. In southern

Mexico the slow development of the hacienda certainly kept down the absolute number of hacienda workers. Within the haciendas however peons seem to have been the main source of labour for the haciendas by the 18th century. That at least was the case in the Valley of Oaxaca and the more commercialised agricultural areas of Yucatan.(4)

Peonage spread to most of the Spanish American colonies during the colonial period but its importance does not seem to have been as great as in Mexico. Thus in Central America peonage was already in existence in the 1580's, but its expansion was severely limited by the continuation of the repartimiento, which was practised systematically until the 1670's and more sporadically up until the 19th century, and the use of tenant workers. Similarly in Colombia the persistence of the repartimiento system until the 1740's prevented the development of peonage as a significant institution. After that date the extent of peonage as permanent labour in the haciendas is uncertain since major haciendas had a high number of negro slaves and tenants.(iii) As for seasonal labour, the growth of the poor mestizo and white population created a favourable labour market for the haciendas. In northern and central Chile, the severe decrease in the Indian population and the growth of the poor white and mestizo sectors stimulated the expansion of peonage and tenancies (especially the latter) and the rapid decline of the encomienda system as a source of labour

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(iii) The Jesuit haciendas of Colombia and Quito had 1,774 black slaves and 3,500 'asituados' or tenants in 1767. Colmenares notes for Popayan in the 1740's a slow transition from coercive forms of labour (repartimiento and tribute in labour) to paternalistic forms of tenancy.(5)

power for the haciendas in the 18th century. By 1813 peons in agriculture and other activities were 34,293 or 33.4% of the working population in northern and central Chile and only second to tenants (35.5% of the working population) as a source of labour for the Chilean enterprises. Finally in Peru, peonage had been present at least since the 17th century but its extent during the period is unknown to us. The existence of an important number of legal serfs in the Peruvian sierra and high plateau and of black slaves in the coastal areas permits us to suppose that peons were not an important source of permanent labour for the haciendas. On the other hand, the presence of an important sector of landless peasants (see table 9, Chapter 4, above) by the second half of the 18th century suggests the existence of a vast floating Indian population which could be temporarily employed on the haciendas.(6)

Peonage in colonial Spanish America can be classified according to two main criteria: (a) the period of time involved in the 'contract' or agreement between the hacienda and the worker (i.e., temporary or permanent workers) and (b), the nature of the link between the hacienda and the peons (i.e. 'purely' voluntary workers, debt peonage etc.). We will examine the categories derived from these two criteria separately although they are linked both internally in the combinations which occurred (i.e., permanent debt peonage, temporary debt peonage etc.), and externally, since the occurrence of the categories of both criteria depended on the population growth, development of markets and land distribution in specific areas.

Temporary peons. The relationship between the haciendas in the Valley of Mexico and the surrounding Indian communities

around 1800 has been characterised by Tutino as symbiotic. He explains that the Indian communities of the area, although having a land base which provided them with a substantial part of their subsistence requirements, had to supplement their incomes with waged labour on the haciendas. On the other hand, the haciendas with abundant lands but a scarce resident population had to rely on the hiring of seasonal labour from the communities. Leaving aside the original appropriation of Indian lands by the Spaniards, the long term trend of absorption of the communities by the haciendas and the unequal exchange implicit in waged labour, the characterisation 'symbiotic' holds true for many haciendas and their nearby communities. These communities, faced by the insufficiency of community lands, found in temporary work on the haciendas a reasonable compromise between their need to retain a demographic base and a relative autonomy in their land resources and their need for cash for tribute payments or the purchase of additional food. The equilibrium described above was not always reached, let alone conserved, in all areas of colonial Spanish America. In some areas the abundance of Indian lands permitted the Indians to avoid peonage altogether, or to sell their labour power at a high price and/or force the hacendados to resort to legal or illegal means of coercion or inducement to obtain seasonal labour power from the communities. These means included occasional repartimiento drafts, advances of wages to prospective workers, the payment of bribes to priests, Indian officials or corregidores to persuade or coerce the Indians to work for the haciendas, etc. An alternative way for the haciendas to obtain labour power consisted in the purchase of African slaves or the settlement of service-tenants within the

haciendas. Obviously this situation implied the availability of capital or lands to the haciendas and, in the case of purchase of slaves, a market situation which permitted such an investment. At the other extreme of the continuum, communities with scarce land and/or a growing population created the ideal situation for the haciendas by depending to an increasing extent on the resources of the landed estates through temporary or permanent labour, tenancy, purchase of food and eventually the absorption of the community by the hacienda.(iv)

Permanent peons. The relation hacienda - community in relation to permanent labourers is somewhat different. In the early stages of the peonage system, which occurred at a time of Indian demographic recession, the incorporation of commoners to the haciendas as permanent labour meant the loss of tributaries able to perform repartimiento duties and was rigorously challenged by the Indian chieftains. The recovery of the Indian population in 18th century Mexico and Peru and the growth of Spanish and mestizo populations elsewhere made the contradiction disappear or become less conspicuous. Then the main source of conflict between the hacienda and the Indian community, or in general terms hacienda - small peasantry, became the control of the means of production (lands, water rights etc.). Labour, with less state regulation due to the

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(iv) The symbiotic type of relationship hacienda - community included, apart from Chalco, several other micro-regions in the Valley of Mexico, such as the Santa Lucia and San Jose de Coape haciendas. The situation of scarcity of labour and high wages for the temporary workers can be illustrated by the cases of the Valley of Oaxaca, coastal Peru and Morelos in the 18th and early 19th centuries as well as some frontier haciendas which hired labour from half 'domesticated' Indian tribes. This was the case for the Tarahumaras around Parral in northern Mexico from the late 17th century onwards and for some Mapuche Indians in southern Chile in the 18th century. Finally the dissolution of Indian communities and an abundant floating surplus Indian population were especially prevalent in the Mexican Bajio, Tlaxcala and Upper Peru. (7)

abolition of the repartimiento and the relaxation of community control, flowed from the communities to the Spanish haciendas, mines and towns or other communities which were well provided with lands. The growth of the rural population with insufficient land resources, on the other hand, seems to have changed the structure of hired labour within the haciendas. Katz and Liher's impression is that in Mexico (excepting peripheral areas) temporary workers were superior in numbers to resident peons by the 19th century. Several regional or local studies support this hypothesis.(v)

The nature of agricultural labour demands at the time, with increased needs during specific periods (harvest, shearing etc.), favoured a labour structure which consisted of a core of resident, reliable and skilled workers which

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(v) Studies on the Michoacan and Guadalajara regions indicate that this trend was apparent from the second half of the 18th century. Taylor's impression is that in the Valley of Oaxaca in the 18th century the temporary work of the Indians was more important than that of the resident peons. The same happened in some of the Jesuit haciendas of Puebla. In the hacienda San Jose de Coapa (Valley of Mexico) the number of temporary workers was far higher than the resident peons and according to Tutino this was the general situation in the Valley of Toluca and Mexico. In 1852 on the hacienda of Bocas (San Luis Potosi) at least 500 temporary workers were paid while the resident labour force did not exceed 400 peons. On the contrary, in the haciendas of the Sanchez Navarro family in Coahuila around 1800, around 50 temporary workers were employed annually compared to a resident labour force of c. 200 peons. In this case the scarcity of temporary labour had to be coped with by shifting personnel between different haciendas and jobs. Obviously a superior number of temporary workers employed in the hacienda does not necessarily mean that its participation in the total labour input of the hacienda was higher, but it does reflect its importance at crucial moments in the cycle of agricultural production (harvest, shearing, lambing etc.). Thus for instance, the haciendas of Santa Lugarda and La Noria employed in 1781 c. 153 permanent peons and 144 temporary workers, but the first group worked 41,310 man/days (87.7% of the total) against only 5,794 man/days (or 12.3% of total) worked by the temporary workers.(8)

could be supplemented by seasonal labour as required. This system lowered the total cost of labour since the haciendas avoided paying the cost of reproduction of the temporary labour force. Such costs included, in the case of permanent labour, sufficient wages and/or rations (usually maize) to meet the physiological and social needs of the peons and their families, all the year round. The preconditions of operation of this scheme were the availability of peons to be hired for short periods on the haciendas and the availability of the capital necessary to pay in cash for the peons. In other conditions slavery or tenancy become more rational alternatives for the haciendas.

The second criterion of classification (free versus coerced peonage) presents more problems for analysis, not only because of the paucity of pertinent data but also because of the different ways of interpreting those data available to modern students. We will concentrate on Mexico, where peonage appeared earlier and seems to have dominated the labour structure during the late colonial period, and for which the data available permits some relatively firm conclusions. Macera has demonstrated for Lower Peru that the practice of debt peonage existed, that is the advance of wages to the peons beyond their ability to repay in the short or medium term, thus ensuring their legal obligation to continue working on the estate, for both temporary and permanent workers. However his analysis does not permit us to estimate its importance within Peruvian agriculture or to establish comparisons between different regions in order to grasp the conditions which permitted its emergence and evolution. Similarly, data for Chile and Central America indicate that debt peonage was an important mechanism to

retain the labour force in the haciendas, but its extent and evolution is uncertain. For Peru and Chile students have suggested that hacendados succeeded in tying the labour force to the haciendas through legal serfdom in Peru and service-tenancies in Chile after a period of peonage in order to reduce the cost of labour. (9)

The difficulties created for haciendas by the repartimiento system and later its abolition in central Mexico in 1632 and in the rest of Mexico later on, resulted in the design and practice of a series of strategies to obtain and/or tie the labour force to the haciendas. Leaving aside the tenant system, they can all be described as ways of ensuring the supply of labour for the haciendas under at least the form of wage agreements or peonage. Within the peonage system several types can be discussed although the categories sometimes overlap and therefore no clear cut distinctions can be made. Below we will discuss successively debt, 'credit', adscripted and free peonage.

1) Debt peonage was the system by which employers induced prospective workers to accept an advance of wages which was big enough to ensure the continued work of the peon in the enterprise until he repaid his debt; this was usually for a long period of time. To be operative the system required that a) the amounts owed to the entrepreneur were substantial, the wage low or the expenses high enough to prevent the repayment of the debt in a short period, and b) there were mechanisms of coercion which ensured the retention of the peon until the debt was repaid. The first condition was fulfilled by illegal devices such as the manipulation of the accounts of the peons or the refusal to receive the

repayment and also by a social structure which demanded heavy expenditure by the peons. Among the latter were the payment of tribute by the Indian workers, the purchase of foods, clothes or luxury items at extortionate prices in the hacienda shop and especially the payment of religious fees which ensured a constant dependence of the peons on the wage advances made by the haciendas. The second condition was fulfilled by the internal security system of the hacienda (threat and administration of punishment, search for runaways etc.) and/or the local agents of the Spanish state. Debts were considered hereditary and sons, brothers and other kin were charged with the debt after the death of the debtor.(vi)

By 1600, with the repartimiento system still in operation, debt peonage had already spread significantly in Mexico, especially around Mexico City and Puebla. After the abolition of the repartimiento system in New Spain (1633), debt peonage developed rapidly to become, according to Borah, the main source of labour during the 17th and probably the early 18th century. By the end of the 18th century, however, debt peonage was being superseded in some Mexican regions by free peonage (see below); this was reflected in the attitutdes of the royal bureaucracy of the time. By 1600 a moderate policy of advances

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(vi) The characteristics outlined here constitute an ideal type of debt peonage which in different times and places was not always as extreme as defined here (see below). Indian tribute amounted to c. 5 pesos, the equivalent of over a month's wages (which were 3 to 4 pesos per month) of an unskilled peon. Religious fees were more of a burden for the peons. For instance in mid 18th century in the Valley of Mexico a wedding fee for Indians was c. 11.4 pesos, a burial for an adult Indian 5.4 pesos, etc. In the northern estate of the Sanchez Navarro these fees were slightly lower. (10)

to the Indian workers (to a maximum of 6 pesos) was accepted as a way of recruiting peons and local officials, with the tacit approval of the viceregal government, efficiently chased the runaway debtors and handed them to the haciendas as a matter of routine. Even viceroys in the 17th and early 18th centuries set legal precedents favourable to the institution by allowing the retention of Indians in the haciendas until the debt was repaid, irrespective of its amount. By the end of the 18th century the bureaucracy seems to have regarded debt peonage less favourably. In 1785, for instance, the viceroy commanded by law that no debt by peons to the haciendas superior to five pesos could be claimed by the estate owners and forbade incarceration of workers in the haciendas and physical punishment. This law did not mean an improvement for the peasants unless local officials were prepared to enforce it and/or the prevailing economic conditions had made the system obsolete. This was not the case for Coahuila in northern Mexico where the dominant labour system was debt peonage, in a form very close to the ideal type described above, until at least the mid 19th century. There an internal penal system, wide contacts with other haciendas and local officials to trace and return debtors, the transfer of debts to the children and debts several times higher than the meximum allowed were the rule. Similarly in the Valley of Oaxaca the haciendas depended on debt peonage for the provision of permanent workers. The debts of 475 peons sampled by Taylor for the 18th and early 19th centuries represented an average of around 35 pesos or 11 months' wages, although the range of debts was large and varied from one day's to several years' wages. The local

officials obliged the peons to repay debts in labour to the hacienda credited with the debt, even if workers recognised the debt and promised to repay it by working on another estate.[vii] Data for Michoacan suggests a similar situation. A sample of peons in five haciendas in the second half of the 18th century shows that 229 workers owed 7,082 pesos (or 31 pesos each on average), however on the same haciendas 88 workers were credited with an average of 12 pesos each. Finally in the area of Puebla-Tlaxcala local judges did not always respect the 1785 law and tended to force the peons to repay debts with labour even if they were higher than the maximum of 5 pesos. As in Michoacan debt peonage was only one of the mechanisms to retain labourers on the haciendas.(12)

2) 'Credit' peonage seems to have been another of the mechanisms used by the landowners to retain the workers on the haciendas. It simply consisted of the retention of wages by the hacendados in order to keep the workers on the estate. The evidence of this system is thin and therefore inconclusive in relation to its extent in colonial Mexico, but it was common enough to deserve our attention. In a study of the Jesuit haciendas in Mexico, Tovar notes that these estates had not only workers in debt to the hacienda but also that they owed

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(vii) This situation seems to have changed somehow during the government of Oaxaca's Intendant Mora y Peysal (1781-1808) who supported Indian claims and restricted debt peonage. After 1816 however royal bureaucrats reverted to a policy of full support for the haciendas and debt peonage. (11)

another set of workers important sums which the Jesuits invested in the haciendas. He also suggests that this credit of the peons operated as a means of retaining them. Ewald has confirmed the existence of large amounts of credits on the haciendas of the Jesuit College of Espiritu Santo in Puebla (in the case of some peons about 200 pesos or 5 or more years' wages were owed). However, she asserts that the non-existence of recorded complaints indicates that there was no forced retention of salaries. Nickel, however, has demonstrated that the Puebla-Tlaxcala haciendas, including the Jesuit ones, used credit (i.e. forced) peonage, among other methods, for both the retention of the workers and due to lack of capital to pay them. Morin suggests for Michoacan the use of credit peonage for the less essential workers while credit became available in the same hacienda to attract those who were more essential. Probably the rundown state of some haciendas made it virtually compulsory to retain wages in order not to enter into liquidation. This was the case for the hacienda of San Juan de Ulapa (north of the Valley of Mexico) in the late 1680's and early 1730's and the hacienda of Corralejo in the Bajio in 1707, and the general situation in Tlaxcala in the 18th century. In the latter case shortages of labour and the financial difficulties of the haciendas were associated with the emigration of Indians who were attracted by better salaries to the Valley of Mexico and the north. In this situation, a combination of measures to reduce the mobility of the labour force were enforced, debt peonage, 'credit' peonage and adscription.(13)

3) Adscripted peonage

Both Borah and Chevalier refer to a category of peons who were customarily (but illegally) considered to be attached to the land (adscripti ad glebam) in 17th century Mexico. These were peons, indebted or not, who sometimes were partially paid by the right to use a plot of land and whose adscription to the hacienda was merely legitimised by custom and the connivance of local officials. We have no indication of the size of the population considered to be adscripted or the development of the institution. Studies for 18th century Tlaxcala, however, show that, despite the illegality of the practice, adscription was strictly enforced by the local authorities. All the peons born in the hacienda (gananes) were to remain working there unless serious mistreatment was proved. They also tried to enlarge their labour force by arguing that temporary peons were in fact born in the hacienda and therefore could not leave it. Temporary peons with contracts for longer than a year were in special danger of being absorbed as gananes and had to register every year with the local judge to prove their status as a free member of an Indian community. No other evidence of enforcing an illegal adscription in 18th century Mexico is known to us. Perhaps the proximity of Tlaxcala to major areas of buoyant economic conditions (the Valley of Mexico, the Bajio, the mining north) and the development of links with the north through colonisation schemes created an especially (geographically) mobile peasantry which, in a situation of stagnation, it was only possible to retain by adscription. (14)

4) Free peonage was the labour system which operated mainly through economic compulsion and as such it presupposed the existence of a landless peasantry or peasants without enough resources to satisfy the subsistence, fiscal and social needs of the average peasant (food, tributes, religious fees etc). It also presupposed the availability of cash (or commodities accepted by the peons in lieu of cash) for the haciendas to pay the peons. Empirical evidence indicates that by the end of the 18th century free peonage was becoming the dominant form of labour in areas of profitable commercial agriculture and surplus population. Thus in the late 18th century Valley of Mexico and Toluca no extra economic coercion seems to have existed to retain the permanent or temporary peons in the haciendas. Most of the peons in the Valley of Mexico were not in debt to the haciendas and, of the remainder, the majority had debts which did not surpass the equivalent of three weeks' wages. Similarly debt peonage lost its importance during the 18th century in the Guadalajara hinterland. During the latter half of the 18th century, the majority of the peons resident on haciendas were not indebted and, for the rest, the average levels of indebtedness were equivalent to one or two months' wages. The Audiencia of Guadalajara forbade corporal punishment and incarceration for debts and their inheritance, and allowed the freedom of movement of indebted peons provided that they made arrangements to repay the debt. On the side of the haciendas no major efforts were made to recover debts since labour had become plentiful. Finally, partial data for other Mexican regions

indicates that free peonage predominated among the waged forms of labour in Chihuahua, San Luis and Queretaro in the late 18th century. In the first case labour seems to have been abundant. In the other two the scarcity of labour was compensated for by the effects of non-agricultural production (mining and industry) in these areas. This attracted migrant labour from the south and created a market which permitted the haciendas to pay higher wages to attract the labour force. (15)

5) Legal serfdom or Yanaconaje

Contrary to the situation in the rest of Spanish America, where serfdom was not legally recognised, in the Viceroyalty of Peru a prehispanic form of serfdom was adopted, and given legal status in the early colonial period. The origins of the yanacona system in pre-hispanic and colonial times are obscure. Under the Incas it was a labour system by which commoners uprooted from their community served for life in a particular kinship group. Although a hereditary status, it affected only one of the sons and does not seem to have been important numerically. After the conquest, Spaniards adopted the practice and used yanaconas as military auxiliaries against Indian rebellions, as personal servants and, increasingly, in agriculture. Up until the 1570's these Indians and agricultural entrepreneurs established informal arrangements by which the yanaconas worked for their Spanish masters receiving in exchange the usufruct of a plot of land, to which they were adscribed. In 1572, viceroy Toledo reviewed the conditions of

these workers but, contrary to earlier royal orders which stated the freedom of the Indians, decided to legalise and regulate the institution. Toledo confirmed the status of yanacona for those Indians already recognised as such and allocated Indians not linked to the community to Spanish entrepreneurs as yanaconas. But he forbade the future uprooting of new yanaconas from the existing communities. In relation to rights and duties, Toledo established that yanaconas should work five days a week for their masters and could not leave the estate. They should receive in exchange perpetual usufruct of a plot of land, a right which remained if the owner sold the hacienda or farm, payment of a tribute and religious fees, the loan of oxen and other instruments necessary for cultivation one day a week, etc. Despite the prohibition of recruiting new yanaconas the institution seems to have grown throughout the 17th century, especially in Upper Peru. The royal orders to ban all non-free Indian labour were not carried out during the first half of the 17th century and the Peruvian viceroys limited themselves to forbidding the recruitment of new yanaconas. At the beginning of the 18th century, a new royal order commanded the freedom of movement of the yanaconas (viz, the abolition of serfdom). The order was not enforced in Upper Peru where the system was fully entrenched in agricultural production. In Peru proper where the yanacona system was not so important it seems to have disappeared as a legal institution but it remained as an economic practice. Finally in 16th century Chile, Indians living on the Spanish estates and having different origins (slaves, yanaconas from Peru, encomienda Indians etc) were called yanaconas and

treated as such by the colonists. However, the regulations of the Viceroy of Peru in 1620 decreed that they were free to leave the haciendas and therefore not legal serfs. (16)

Data on yanacona population is almost totally absent for Lower Peru proper. We know that in the 1570's there were 1,188 and 514 yanaconas in the cities of Cuzco and Arequipa, that is around 20 and 5% respectively of the population of these cities in 1628. For Upper Peru quantitative data on yanaconas is available. The inspection of Judge Alfaro at the beginning of the 17th century established the existence of 25,000 yanaconas or probably some 10% of the total Indian population. By the end of the colonial period preoccupation with the financial state of the treasury produced a series of reports on the tributary population which have been preserved. According to these reports the yanaconas of Upper Peru numbered 73,816 or 17.3% of the total rural Indian population in the 1780's and 104,687 (or 24.1%) twenty years later (see Table 2). Apart from the growth of the yanacona population, Table 2 indicates a significant growth of the tenant sector and a decisive fall in the number of landless peasants, which clearly suggest a process of tying the floating labour force to the hacienda as yanaconas. This process was however not uniform. Studies for selected areas of the provinces of Larecaja and Chulumani, with a populaiton of 16,366 yanaconas or 22.5% of the yanaconas of Upper Peru in 1786, indicate a different pattern. In these areas the yanacona population decreased by about 20 to 25% during roughly the same period. These areas seem to have been affected during the period in question by an economic contraction which brought about the emigration of

a great number of yanaconas, either through their dismissal by the hacienda or more likely through their escape from it.

This leads us to consider the actual relations of production which linked the yanacona and the hacienda. According to Santamaria, in late 18th century Upper Peru the above characterisation of the yanacona as a legal serf was still valid, but he adds that haciendas dispossessed the yanaconas of the usufruct of lands after they reached the age of 50 years, until which time the haciendas paid their tributes to the crown. The replacement of the old yanaconas by young peasants left the former in a precarious situation and, not obliged to pay tributes, they usually felt free to leave the haciendas with their families. On the other hand, Klein's impression is that no real adscription to the land existed in late 18th century Upper Peru and that yanaconas were attracted to or gave up lands in the haciendas, which they cultivated as share croppers, by purely economic factors, that is the possibility of obtaining enough cash from that part of the harvest which they kept for themselves. Now Klein bases these observations on data from the recently colonised coca producing area of Chulumani. It is probable that the cash crop type of cultivation practised there and its dependence on the unstable market of the mining towns did not encourage the adscription of Indians to the haciendas. As for Lower Peru, researchers agree that the 18th century saw a slow process of enfeoffment of free peons to the land as yanaconas by substituting payments in cash or kind with the usufruct of a plot of land.

TABLE 2

Rural Indian Population in Upper Peru at the end of the Colonial Period*

	1785-7		1804-7	
Tributary Category	No	%	No	%
Landed peasant	151,978	35.6	164,472	37.8
Tenants	9,277	2.2	21,653	5.0
Landless peasants	184,078	43.1	130,013	29.9
Yanaconas	73,816	17.3	104,687	24.1
Uro Indians (Ethnic minority)	6,004	1.4	9,195	1.7
Other Indians **	1,965	0.4	6,544	1.5
Total	447,118	100.0	434,564	100.0

* Source: Santamaria 1977: 268

** Includes community Indians without land, mine workers, Indians attached to the church, etc.

In the hypotheses of Mellafe and Spalding this process would have become numerically significant with the economic contraction of the viceroyalty (mid-17th - mid-18th centuries) and was fully supported by the local bureaucracy. (17)

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6) Tenant Workers

As in the case of peonage and the yanacona system, data on this group of workers is scarce and its interpretation difficult. This derives from the fact that the renting of small plots of land was usually agreed by verbal contracts and only by inference can the real relations of production expressed in the tenancy agreement be determined. (18) We will first establish a theoretical appreciation of this category and go on to examine the concrete data and the trends of development of the institution in Spanish America.

Tenants can be classified into two or three groups according to the amount of rent paid. The first group was constituted by large scale tenants who rented whole haciendas, or a significant area of one or more haciendas, and used the labour of peons and/or sub-tenants for agricultural production. At the other end of the social scale there was a mass of modest tenants who had access only to a limited number of acres and who paid rent, either in cash, labour or kind or a combination of the three. Finally a third group was constituted by the downwardly mobile, prosperous small peasants whose scale of operation required hired labour. (19) Since large-scale and middle tenants did not participate directly in agricultural production, and at most assumed an administrative role in their haciendas or ranchos (farms inside or outside the limits of a hacienda) they do not concern us here. On the other hand, small tenants tended to provide, in one way or another, labour for the haciendas and in that respect they can be considered an integral part of the labour force of the haciendas.

Within this group of workers the tenant who paid his rent in money resembles the middle and upper strata of tenants and, indeed, the stratum of small proprietors. Like them they suffered the vicissitudes of agricultural production (droughts, low agricultural prices, etc) and the possibilities of upward social mobility or indebtedness. In colonial Spanish America this section tended to disappear through the commutation of money rent into at least partial labour rent or rent in kind (see below). Labour rent at least partially eliminated the risk involved in independent production by reducing the need for cash (necessary for the payment of money rent) and reducing dependency on the erratic market to a minimum. Finally, rent in kind also avoided the need for commodity production, but the peasants who paid it were more dependent on the size of the harvest in their private plots than those who paid rent in labour. A variant of rent in kind was a share cropping arrangement where the direct producer paid an agreed proportion of the harvest (usually a half) to the landowner as rent. Normally the landowner provided the seeds and sometimes the use of draft animals, so rent in this arrangement was mixed with interest on the capital advanced to the peasant.

We have already referred to tenant workers in dealing with other forms of hacienda labour in different regions of Spanish America. Unfortunately with the data available to us it is impossible to trace the origins of the institution or to assess its importance in most of these areas. Substantial studies on tenant workers have been done on central and northern colonial Chile which can give us a clue to understanding the development of the institution in the rest of Spanish America.

In Chile the institution appeared in the 17th century in the form of 'land loans' to poor Spaniards, mestizos or free negroids who had a kinship or friendship relation with the landowner. At this early stage the rent was symbolic or non-existent and the plots lent or rented out (the terms were interchangeable) were situated on the borders of the haciendas, the loan itself ensuring the right of the hacendado to its possession. Slowly some obligations, such as surveillance of the hacienda borders and attendance at the rodeos became part of the agreement. These obligations tended to increase in the second half of the 18th century and included, in some cases, the transport of merchandise to the urban markets and the provision of a peon, either for a specific purpose on the hacienda or permanently and, in general, an increase of the ground rent. This process was associated with the growth of the mestizo and poor white population during the 18th century and the parallel increase of wheat exports to Peru. During the decades after the mid-19th century a second boom of wheat exports (and, therefore, rising prices) gave rise to an even greater increase in pressure by the haciendas on the service tenants (called inquilinos from the late 18th century). This sector, which seems to have lost importance in agricultural production after independence, became in the second half of the 19th century, crucial for the haciendas when more labour was extracted from them.(viii) Well-off inquilinos were expected

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(viii) The number of inquilinos (service tenants) in central Chile increased from 17,282 in 1813 to 30,000 in 1865 (the estimate is Bauer's and includes what we have called the southern region from the Maule to the Bio-Bio rivers). However their participation in the total rural labour force fell from 38 plus to just 15.4%. The rural peon sector, on the contrary, grew from 18,457 peons (or less than 48%) to 125,000 (or 64.1% of the total number of rural workers). (20)

to provide two peons (either from the family household or hired) and poorer tenants had to provide virtually all the available male labour power within the family. In parallel to this, a new type of inquilino was recruited from among the peons and tenant families. They were given a garden plot of around one acre and if necessary a small salary. The increase of the importance of inquilinos for Chilean haciendas and their increasing exploitation seem to have been the result of the need to retain peons (increasingly attracted by the better wages in the mines, towns and public works) and the possibilities for the landowner to put pressure on a relatively well-off sector of the workers. (21)

Relevant data on other Spanish American colones are insufficient to reach any conclusions except for some regions of Mexico. By the end of the 17th century large haciendas leased outlying portions to small renters who were able to provide some services and, we are told by Chevalier, rapidly multiplied in the 18th century. The extent of this process in the different Mexican regions or in Mexico as a whole is not specified by Chevalier but data on some of them can be used to define this assertion. The Mexican Bajio fully fits this description. Tenant workers were in evidence in the region in the second half of the 17th century and they tended to increase rapidly during the 18th century. The work arrangements seem to have varied from estate to estate but a trend of general deterioration of the conditions of work seems to have occurred during the late 18th and 19th centuries as a result of the increase of population in the area and, later, the expropriation of the Indian communities. The <u>forms</u> of this deteri-

oration are not completely clear. In around the 1730's rent in labour was replaced in several haciendas by share cropping while, at the same time, other haciendas were commuting their tenants' rent from purely monetary arrangements to at least some labour rent. In still other haciendas a substantial increase in land rents (which usually meant the eviction of the tenants) and the obligation to work a few days per year on the hacienda for arrimados (relatives or friends living in the tenant plots) were enforced. By the end of the 18th century tenants controlled a good proportion if not most of the land of many haciendas in the Bajio, although the proportion of these who had labour obligations to the hacienda is not clear.(ix)

The importance of tenants in the Bajio region is shown in the following miscellaneous data. In four Bajio haciendas (Ibarra, La Griega, Puerto Nieto and Labor de Puerto Nieto) tenants formed 39.5% of the total working population (157 individuals). Six select haciendas of Penjamo had a total of 133 resident workers and more than four times as many tenants (607). In the first decades of the 19th century, three

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(ix) Bazant notes that in mid-19th century the hacienda 'Boces' (in San Luis de Potosi) the landowners or their representatives considered that 'all the inhabitants of the property (hacienda) were potential or real, permanent or occasional peons...and tried to use them according to the needs of agricultural work'. Obviously not all haciendas had the same conception of tenantry, but there is at least a kernel of truth in this conception, at least if we consider family groups rather than individuals. Thus, according to Tutino, on most of the Bajio estates the combination within the same family of renting land from and being paid by the hacienda predominated in the late 18th century. Similarly for the Chihuahua hacienda of 'Dolores', Benedict asserts that all tenants seem to have been related by blood or marriage to the permanent peons in the decades around 1800. (22)

haciendas of Leon received 18.4%, 11.7% and 69% of their gross income from tenants, this represented roughly the proportion of lands occupied by the tenants. Finally table 3 shows the proportion of hacienda production (or rather demesne production) in the total production of some districts according to the tithes paid by hacienda tenants and small proprietors. Two trends are apparent: firstly, the specialisation of demesne production in wheat (the Spanish grain par excellence) and tenant and small peasants production on Indian crops, and, secondly, the diminishing relative importance of demesne production, at least in the decades immediately after the mid-18th century. (23)

In the Guadalajara hinterland and Michoacan, tenants were also important by the end of the 18th century. In these regions, however, the development of the institution was slower and did not reach the proportions it did in the Bajio. In both regions, as in the Bajio, the demographic pressure increased the ground rent around 1790 making tenure more precarious and evictions more likely. By this time a tendency to commute money rent to labour rent or share cropping had developed. Unfortunately, the dynamics of this process and its quantative importance is unknown to us. Data for other regions of Mexico are even more fragmentary but provide us with important clues to understanding the relation between tenants and haciendas. The Jesuits of the College of Espiritu Santo of Puebla had virtually no tenants in the 1760's since they feared that the Indians might claim full possession of the land after a period of tenancy. In the huge hacienda of Santa Lucia, tenants were also unimportant numerically, but they were

Table 3: Agricultural Production in Some Bajio Districts in the Second Half of the 18th Century (in %)

District	Demesne		Tenants*	
	Wheat	Maize	Beans	Maize
(1) Penjamo 1779	85.2	10.4	-	n.d.
(2) Celaya 1767-72	94.0	90.0	90.0	n.d.
(2) Celaya 1782-3	87.0	91.0	81.0	n.d.
(2) Valle de Santiago 1765	80.0	42.0	34.0	n.d.
(2) Valle de Santiago 1793	66.0	20.0	11.0	n.d.
(3) Haciendas "Otates" and "Laborcita" 1752-6	n.d.	83.3	n.d.	16.7
(3) Haciendas "Otates" and "Laborcita" (Leon) 1762-7	n.d.	66.0	n.d.	34.0
(4) San Luis de la Paz 1803	n.d.	28.0	n.d.	n.d.

* Except in the haciendas of "Otates" and "Laborcita" we do not know the proportion produced by the tenants. Non-demesne production included, apart from tenants, small proprietors and Indian villages.

(1) Brading 1978: 27.
(2) Morin 1979: 272-3.
(3) Brading 1978: 73-4.
(4) Brading 1978: 22.

qualitatively important since a majority of them were Indian officials who tacitly agreed to induce the Indians of their communities to work in the haciendas in times of labour scarcity. Finally in the colonial Valley of Oaxaca, ground rent (although not a dominant form) was used to obtain labour by both Spanish and Indian landowners. In the first case, share cropping was the rule while Indian landowners (as

chieftains) used the pre-hispanic torrazgo institution which implied a kind of seigneurity with payments of rent in money and labour. (24)

c) Hacienda Markets and Agricultural Prices

The relation between haciendas and the market has been a subject of debate during recent decades. A traditional view portrays the hacienda as essentially 'self-sufficient, autarchic and independent of the market', while for others it was precisely a favourable market situation which permitted the birth and growth of the hacienda.(x) As Macera has pointed out, in the relation hacienda-market a clear differentiation must be made between the hacienda as a buyer and the hacienda as a seller of commodities in the market. With respect to the latter aspect, recent research has clearly demonstrated the hacienda's market orientation.(xi) We think we have sufficiently demonstrated this point in Chapter 4 above, where we showed that haciendas predominated around the main urban markets (Mexico City, Lima, Bogota, Guadalajara, etc) or close to the main routes of commercial traffic (the roads Santiago-Valparaiso in Chile, Lima-Potosi in the Cuzco area,

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(x) The traditional view is presented and criticised in Frank 1979: 78-84. The opposite view is sustained by Borah, Frank and Gongora. A more balanced view is maintained by Chevalier who indicates the occurrence of a general, but not absolute tendency towards self-sufficiency in seventeenth century Mexican haciendas. It is clear that he refers to the hacienda as a buyer of commodities, although he points out that at the time the fall in the silver output substantially reduced the regional markets. This point is made more clearly by Macera. (25)

(xi) A recent summary of these results and bibliography can be found in Liher 1976: 21-8.

Merida-Campeche in Yucatan etc). The other aspect (viz purchases of the hacienda in the market) is more complex and the view which asserts the self-sufficiency of the colonial hacienda in respect to its input contains at least a kernel of truth. As we shall see below the profitability of the haciendas varied according to the type of production practised, its location, access to capital and labour, etc. Not all haciendas were in a position to import or buy on the local market the necessary elements to ensure agricultural production and its realisation. In situations of low division of labour, inadequate transport systems and scarcity of means of payment, a relative self-sufficiency in the inputs of the hacienda was the only solution for continuous and profitable production. Thus most of the colonial haciendas cultivated grains and raised livestock irrespective of their main line of production. This provided the rations for the resident labourers, the animal power necessary for transport and production tasks and, eventually, extra income. In some cases, haciendas had small industries which provided them with coarse clothes for their workers, earthenware and glass containers for agricultural products and usually had among their permanent workers, blacksmiths, carpenters, potters, muleteers, etc.[xii] A trend

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(xii) The combination of grain and livestock production in colonial Spanish America was widely practised. Almost all the haciendas included in the bibliographical notes of this chapter shared this characteristic despite their main line of production. A recent paper by Taylor even defines the hacienda as rural properties to provide the local market with grains and livestock. The existence of livestock and grain production is, of course, no proof of a tendency to self-sufficiency. It is necessary to know the percentage of this production consumed internally. For instance, the hacienda 'Santa Lucia' had several ranchos of maize to provide the workers with their rations, although sometimes purchases of extra maize were necessary to feed them. On the other hand the hacienda of Otates was able to dispose of most of its maize production on the market. Our evidence for

towards productive specialisation and therefore more dependence on the market for supplies was however evident in haciendas of high profitability. In the early 17th century the Mexican Jesuits tried to make haciendas specialise in sugar production keeping other crops to a minimum. This occurred in at least two haciendas in and around Morelos (Jalmolonga and Xochimancas). The same is true for the secular sugar hacienda of Atlacomulco also in Morelos. All three depended on the market for livestock, grains and most supplies. Similarly, in the early 19th century, Cuban sugar mills replaced the Sunday work of the slaves on their plots by extra work on sugar production and imported the necessary foodstuffs for the labour force from overseas. Big livestock haciendas such as the Sanchez Navarro's in Coahuila and 'Las Vacas' and 'Fontezuela' on the River Plate relied on the market for their supplies in the late 18th century. In the two former cases, however, the haciendas became, through their shops, suppliers of commodities for their labourers and even for a whole region. (27)

Colonial haciendas incorporated commerce into their operations one way or another. Apart from cases where the owner of a hacienda was himself a merchant and commercialised its production and/or provided the hacienda and its peons with cloth, tools etc, most colonial haciendas had a shop or warehouse which sold the products of the estates such as maize, meat

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(xii) continued... industries in the haciendas comes mostly from Jesuit or big haciendas. Again this production was not always entirely for internal consumption and in some cases quite the opposite (ie industry was the main line of production). (26)

or coarse cloth, or commodities bought especially for the shop, such as textiles, tobacco, sugar and so on, to the workers. In either case, an important part of the hacienda's profits seem to have come from the estate's shop. The importance of the hacienda's shop varied widely in Spanish America. For some estates the resident peons constituted a captive market and they were virtually obliged to buy in order to recover wages owed to them or because of lack of credit anywhere else. Naturally the hacienda owner or administration took advantage of the situation by surcharging the commodities above the local market price. In other cases the estate shop was clearly a service rendered by the estate to their workers in order to attract labour to the haciendas. In these cases, probably no extra profit was made by the estate but certainly no losses either.(xiii) A second type of advantage provided by the hacienda shop was the reduction of cash payments to the workers to a minimum. The estate shop operated as virtual banks which credited the workers for their salaries in separate accounts and against which the workers could draw cash or commodities

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(xiii) Harris asserts that, 'The Sanchez Navarro commercial activities explain in large measure the family's success in building and operating the latifundio' in late 18th century Coahuila. Likewise the operation of a vast trade network by the Jesuits in several regions of Spanish America explains, to a large extent, the substantial profits obtained by their productive units and the expansion of the colleges. On a smaller scale laymen built up trade networks which commercialised their haciendas' products in Mexico City, Cuzco and so on. The 'service for the workers' type of hacienda shop can be illustrated by the hacienda Santa Lucia (Valley of Mexico), 'Ibarra' (Queretaro) and 'Dolores' in northern Chihuahua in the late 18th century. The 'exploitative' type of hacienda shop existed on several Michoacan haciendas where surcharges of 25 - 50% were the rule. The economic importance of Guadalajara hinterland and 'Dolores' provided the hacendados with between 4 and 7% of the total gross income of the haciendas, while 2 Michoacan shop haciendas produced 20 and 35% respectively of the net income of these haciendas in the 1770's. (28)

according to their bargaining power. This could mean retention of wages, payment in kind or cash and different levels of access to credit. Macera has calculated for eight haciendas of the Peruvian Sierra that less than 5% of the wages owed to the workers was paid in money in the years around 1770, the rest being paid in commodities, land rent, royal tributes, etc. For Mexico it seems that the major part of the salaries of the permanent workers was paid in kind, although the proportions varied from estate to estate and even within a single estate from year to year. Thus in the haciendas of Ozumba, Ojo de Agua and Loreto in Puebla payment for the permanent workers was made up of 22% in cash and the rest in commodities. In 1791 however the proportion of the payment made in cash had increased to 54.7%. The hacienda 'Cienaga de Mata' (northern Guadalajara) in 1777 paid exclusively in kind while the permanent workers of San Nicolas de Jongo (Michoacan) received 50% of their salaries in kind. Temporary workers both in Peru and Mexico seem to have been paid a larger proportion of their wages in cash, but again regional and chronological differences occurred. Van Young has noted a trend in the haciendas of the Guadalajara hinterland to increase the proportion of cash paid to the workers, a parallel decrease of the stocks of the hacienda shops and more availability of cash in the haciendas. Did this trend occur in other Spanish American regions? It seems quite possible for selected areas given, (a) the increase in silver production in Mexico and Peru in the late 18th century (see Chapter 6) which made the circulation of coin more possible, and (b) the expansion of the urban markets, the proletarianisation of small peasants and as a result the increase of commodity production

in the countryside. We will now deal with these two problems. (29)

The enormous increase in the amount of precious metals produced and coined in Mexico, Peru and Colombia and, to some extent, in Chile and Central America in the late 18th century (see Chapter 6, especially tables 3 and 6), should have created in theory a powerful expansion of the monetary economy of these colonies. However this effect was counterbalanced by the increasing export of coin to Spain, either directly from the producing colonies or by re-exports through other colonies (Chapter 6, table 1). Not having a complete series of legal precious metal exports, not to mention contraband, it is impossible to know the exact quantity of coin available in each colony at any one time. Contemporary estimates and complaints about the scarcity of coin however permit us to consider that the amount of coin avialable in the colonies was not substantially affected by the increase of coinage. Thus in Mexico, despite a coinage of over 350 million pesos in silver alone during the period 1771-91, the amount of money available in the colony was reported to have decreased from 36 to 31 million pesos in the same period. In Peru, of the just over 100 million pesos coined in 1761-74, only 265,853 pesos (or 0.3%) remained in the colony. A similar drainage of coin took place in Chile (where the amount of coin available seems to have increased) and Central America and Colombia. The effect of an increasing coinage on the forms of payment in the haciendas is further diminished if we consider that the former consisted of mostly high denomination coins only suited to large transactions and hardly accessible to rural workers. The minting of copper coins, which could have solved the problem of circulation in small

transactions, was consistently opposed by the big merchants. For their transactions with the European merchants they required coins of high denomination which were accepted internationally (i.e. silver or gold). The result of these practices for the colonial economy was dependence on a credit circuit which was controlled by the big merchant capitalists and centered in the colonial metropolis. It included smaller merchants, hacendados, hacienda workers and miners who were all linked in commercial networks. These networks were based on credit or delayed payments in kind or labour for commodities received in advance and cemented by loyalties or power and kinship relations. For the rural worker, the last link in this chain of credit, this meant at least the possibility of surcharges on the items purchased from the hacienda shops, indebtedness and willing or free permanent attachment to the hacienda. (30)

Hacienda markets (and therefore profits) seem to have been severely limited during the colonial period by the competition exerted by the small and medium size agricultural producers. In the rural areas, Indians or poor whites with arable land sufficient for subsistence needs and payments of tributes and tithe scarcely purchased from the haciendas, while in the urban markets this same sector depressed agricultural prices by selling below or just above the cost of production of the haciendas.(xiv)

(xiv) The evidence known to us in relation to this problem is scarce and limited mainly to 18th century Mexican regions. Furthermore it refers to the production of grain (that is a subsistence crop) for local or regional and not export markets. The relation hacienda-small producers in the market was complicated in the 2nd case by the intervention of usurer merchants who advanced money against the future harvest of small producers selling it later in the export market.

In central Mexico conditions for the formation of haciendas and their expansion existed from the mid-16th century up to the 1620's. These consisted of the continued rise of grain (and agriculture) prices due to the drop in the quantity of Indian production channeled to the market by the encomenderos and the demand created by the opening of silver mines. After that period grain prices stabilised for the rest of the 17th century as haciendas increased production, silver production decreased and regulatory measures in the town markets were enforced. (31) During the 18th century, haciendas in central Mexico suffered from the same problem, that is the lack of markets big enough to push up the prices of agricultural commodities and thus stimulate hacienda production and profits. The seminal work of Florescano in this field shows that the price of maize, the main Mexican agricultural product, remained at some 10 reales per fanega from the 1720's to the 1780's in Mexico City, although it was subject to seasonal and cyclical variations. Only in the three decades around 1800(1785-1814) was there a substantial increase in the price of maize which reached an average of 18 reales per fanega in the decade 1805-14. The imbalance between maize production and maize demand in Mexico City was coped with in several ways by the hacendados of the city's hinterland. Firstly, by taking advantage of the annual or seasonal price variations in the market and storing maize until that of the smaller producers was already bought, in this way they profited from the higher prices that the subsequent scarcity produced. Thus years of bad harvests which transformed the small producers into maize buyers were a blessing for the hacendados who were able to

dispose of their maize at a high price. The same process, but with less intensity, occurred during the months preceding the harvest when small producers stopped selling and eventually became maize buyers. Secondly, hacendados concentrated production by means of buying or encroaching on the land of the small producers and even eliminating some medium-size haciendas. Finally, especially towards the end of the 18th century, the hacendados evaded the regulations which compelled them to sell all the maize that they took into the city in the municipal market place (the alhondiga), thus avoiding the payment of the tax of ½ real per fanega and, at the same time, weakening the purchasing capacity of the municipal 'posito' (granary) which tried to regulate prices by buying, storing and releasing maize at critical times to equate supply and demand. The cumulative effects of these three factors, together with the impressive population increase in the last decades of the 18th century, which grew by 35% between 1790 and 1810, explain the rising trend of maize prices from the 1780's onwards. With an expanding market and fewer competitors the haciendas of the Mexico City hinterland were able to increase enormously the value of their production.(xv) At the same time, due to the increase in the number of landless peasants, the wages of the peons remained at the same level as before. (33)

The rise in the price of maize in Mexico City in the

(xv) The value of the tithe in the Archbishopric of Mexico City increased from an annual average of 413,263 pesos in the decade 1771-80 to 708,237 during the following decade and was equal to 729,719 in 1792. In the quinquennium 1806-10 the annual average had fallen to 510,081. (32)

last decades of the 18th century was not an isolated case. Agricultural prices in three other Mexican cities in northern Mexico (Zacatecas, Guadalajara and Leon) show the same trend; stagnant prices during the six or eight decades before the 1780's and a sustained rising trend thereafter. More interestingly the same trends that operated in Mexico City's hinterland with respect to the relation hacienda-small producers-market were also in force in the hinterlands of these urban centres. Both Guadalajara and Leon's haciendas had storage capacities which permitted them to wait for the months or years of high prices to sell, and in both areas the process of concentration of agricultural production was well under way. In Guadalajara, where Indian participation in the maize market represented consistently 12 or 13% of the total from the 1750's to the early 1780's, this participation had dropped to 1% or less by 1810. The situation was probably similar in Leon from the middle of the 18th century onwards. After a particularly bad harvest in 1749, which amounted to a seventh of the average of previous years, a significant number of small producers were forced to sell their lands to expanding haciendas in order to buy maize at inflated prices to avoid starvation. Municipal control of the maize price through its market and 'posito' varied in these three urban centres. In Zacatecas the scarce resources of the posito did not permit an effective regulating action and, in cases of massive starvation, it had to appeal to the good will of the local notables to obtain loans to buy maize and re-sell it at a nominal price. Similarly the posito of Leon had to borrow money from the church to buy and sell maize during the sub-

sistence crisis of the mid-1780's. Guadalajara's municipal council coped with the situation more energetically. From the 1760's the posito controlled the sale of the majority of the grain introduced into the city and in times of crisis seized stocks held by speculators, banned the export of grain from the area, etc. Even in the latter case the result of municipal control was the elimination of re-sellers and the reduction of the effects of famine rather than the elimination of the cyclical variation of prices which was the product of climatic conditions (droughts, frosts, etc) or the long-term trend of rising agricultural prices. Finally, population growth in the cities of Guadalajara and Zacatecas was spectacular during the second half of the 18th century. The former doubled its population between 1760 and 1770 and doubled it again in the following 50 years, while the latter doubled its population between 1750 and 1800.[xvi] (34)

The only study of the relation hacienda-small producers-market outside Mexico that we know of deals with the province of Cochabamba in Upper Peru. By the 1780's haciendas seem to have dominated access to land in the region as 73% of the Indian population lived on them. Land tenure systems within the haciendas however left plenty of room for independent and

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(xvi) The rate of population growth of the town of Leon cannot be ascertained with the available data although there are indications of a rapid growth between 1781 and 1810. In 1781 Leon had a population of 5,500 to 6,700 inhabitants which was well below the levels of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Zacatecas which had 112,926, 28,000 and 25,500 inhabitants in 1793 and which ranked first, fourth and fifth among Mexican urban centres at the time. Zacatecas, a mining centre, has not been considered with respect to concentration of grain production since it imported most of the grain it consumed from the Bajio. (35)

eventually marketable production in the form of tenancies, sub-tenancies and share cropping arrangements. As in the cases studied above this kept grain prices down and limited the profits realised by the hacendados through the sale of demesne production. Landowners fought back by storing grain to be released in the years of bad harvests and selling it in the upper lands which were most affected by droughts. These markets offered no competition from the small producers since hacendados controlled the mule-teams necessary for transport. Furthermore, hacendados, through their financial capacity, were able to acquire the farm of the ecclesiastical tithe and thus to collect roughly 10% of the entire grain production of the region and become a major grain seller. This did not mean very much in years of good harvests and low prices, however in years of scarcity this proved to be a major profitable speculation which rendered profits of around 50-60% in the early 1770's. Paradoxically, bids for the farm of the tithe reached their highest levels in the years when a bad harvest was expected and prices increased four or five times. Thus as a super-hacendado the tithe farmer, a hacendado himself, used the climatological disasters for his own profit, alienating a fraction of the harvest of the small producers without compensation and giving it back at usurious prices when the peasants' stock was depleted. (36)

The cases studied above and some indirect evidence indicate that one of the main determinants of the formation of prices of grain in colonial Spanish American markets in the short and medium term was the agricultural cycles.(xvii) The effects

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(xvii) This conclusion is also supported by the evidence provided by the study of grain and tuber prices and meteorological conditions in 18th century Potosi carried out by Tandater and Wachtel. (37)

of the annual agricultural cycles on the level of maize prices are quite clear for Mexican urban centres. Monthly maize prices in Mexico City, Guadalajara and Zacatecas and probably other urban cities,[xviii] indicate that during the months of the harvest, prices were relatively low and increased slowly to reach a peak just before the next harvest, (see table 4). This is of course a simplification since seasonal prices were affected by medium term trends, thus a bad harvest made prices during the harvest period remain high and, conversely, the prospects of a very good harvest made the prices lower well in advance of the harvest season. Also the practice of the landowners of releasing their maize from July to October slightly depressed prices during these months. Long term agricultural cycles are difficult to determine without long series of production, and even in that case the intervention of factors such as expansion of the area under cultivation, demographic change and the expansion of the market would distort the relation production-price which is the one which interests us. For shorter periods, however, it can be assumed that no major changes in relation to these factors occurred.[xix]

(xviii) Brading notes that in the towns of Silao and Leon summer prices were one or two reales higher than the annual average. Available bi-annual prices in the city of Oaxaca (years 1788, 1790, 1791 and 1794) indicate that prices in the second half of the year were higher, which could indicate a pattern similar to the one noted above. (38)

(xix) True, landowners could significantly reduce the area under cultivation in their haciendas, but that would reduce their income unless there was a monopolistic situation or an agreement between producers. Conversely producers could expand production by exploiting new lands, but that required capital, labour and lands which were not available in the short term. Demographic changes due to migration could affect the relation production/price, but it can be assumed that they are not connected with the cycles described above.

Figure 1 shows levels of maize production (as expressed in the tithe) and prices and their changes in the period 1749 to 1789 in Leon-Silao.

Table 4: Monthly Maize Prices in the Cities of Guadalajara and Zacatecas in the Late 18th Century (in reales per fanega)

	Zacatecas 1796-9 (1)	Guadalajara 1776 (2)	Mexico City 1762-80 (3)
January	15.3	c.6	11.4
February	17.4	c.7	11.5
March	19.1	c.8	11.7
April	22	c.8	12.4
May	23	c.9	12.8
June	24	c.11	13.1
July	19	c.15	12.8
August	21	c.13	12.4
September	21	c.13	12.3
October	22	c.12	12.6
November	18	c.6	12.2
December	16	c.6	11.0

(1) Garner 1972: 81. Average of the monthly means (i.e. lowest price plus highest price divided by 2).

(2) Van Young 1981: 4.

(3) Florescano 1969: 205-18. Average of the monthly prices for the 19 years considered.

As can be seen production varied enormously from year to year, as did prices although less violently. The obvious observation to be made is that there was a very close negative correlation between levels of production and prices. Thus, in two-thirds of the years under consideration prices and levels of production changed in opposite directions. More importantly, if production and prices are organised in cycles, that is disregarding minor variations, the correlation is almost perfect, each productive cycle being the mirror image of

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a price cycle.

Figure 1: Maize Prices and Maize Production in 18th Century Silao (in reales per fanega, and fanegas)*



——— Tithe or 10% of the maize production in fanegas
– – – – Prices in reales per fanega

* Source: Brading 1978: 180-3. See Appendix 1 for methods of calculation.

At the beginning of each cycle (i.e. 1749-50, 1754-5 etc) we find an extremely low level of production and high prices while at the mid-period of the cycle the opposite situation occurs.

Two connected problems arise from the analysis so far. Firstly, the representativity of the case Leon-Silao in relation to other Mexican areas, in other words, were maize prices and production so closely correlated in Mexico as a whole? And, if so, knowing that there was a rising trend in the price of maize in the three decades around 1800, does this mean that maize production lagged behind population growth during that period? The first question can be provisionally answered in the affirmative if we consider the information on prices and climatic conditions in several Mexican areas during the major agricultural crises of the last century under colonial rule in Mexico and the correlation between maize prices in those areas. The subsistence crises of 1749-50, 1785-6 and 1809-11 had as common causes prolonged periods of drought, sometimes aggravated by severe frosts which reduced the maize harvest to a minimum. Table 5 provides information on climatic conditions and increases in the maize prices in some Mexican areas during these crises.

This clearly suggests a marked dependence of maize prices on the level of production, the former increasing as a proportion from 67% to almost 400% in relation to normal levels. As can be seen in Appendix 1 the prices of maize in the crisis years are the highest recorded for Mexico City, Leon-Silao and, probably, other areas. The examination of the movement of these prices indicates a strong positive correlation between those of Mexico City and Leon-Silao and, more hypothetically, between these two and the other areas included. This correlation might indicate the beginnings of the formation of a capitalist national market, in the sense defined by Sereni, (xx)

(xx) See page 269

Table 5: Climatic Conditions and Changes in the Price of Maize during the Subsistence Crises of Late Colonial Mexico*

Region	1749-50		1785-6		1809-11	
	Climatic Conditions	Increase Over Normal Price (**)	Climatic Conditions	Increase Over Normal Price (**)	Climatic Conditions	Increase Over Normal Price (**)
Mexico as a whole			Drought			
Oaxaca			Severe and unseasonal frost	100-500%	Drought & frost	132%
Guadalajara				c. 135%		
Mexico City		67%		197%	Drought	71%
Leon	Drought	194%	Early frosts	390%	Drought (***)	

*Sources: Prices in Leon Silao, Mexico City and Oaxaca (1808-10) in Appendix 1. See also Hamnett 1971a: 61-4, 69-70; Van Young 1981: 94-8; Florescano 1969: 147, 179; Brading 1978: 193,189.

** For Mexico City and Silao-Leon and Oaxaca 1809-11, normal prices have been established by averaging the prices available for the 10 years previous to the crises. For Guadalajara and Oaxaca in 1785-6 we have no series of prices. In the first case we have compared the top price of 40 reales per fanega registered in April 1786 with the average prices of April, June and July of 1787 (17 reales per fanega). In the latter case we have considered not the prices in the city of Oaxaca but in the surrounding villages given in the reports of the local royal officials.

*** Conditions recorded for Guanajuato, but probably the same in Leon-Silao (Brading 1978: 194).

(xx) That is a market where most of the production of an economic space (or nation) is produced in a capitalist way and is sold in the market at its production cost, including the average capitalist rate of profit. See the important qualifications of Sanchez-Albornoz. (39)

or the effect of similar climatic conditions on the production levels of the regions considered. Without ruling out the effects of the incipient development and formation of a national capitalist market, especially in the Bajio and Mexico City hinterland, we are inclined to think that this correlation was mainly produced by similar agricultural cycles in the areas concerned. The information provided in Figure 1, Table 5 and the figures for production available for Chalco, the main maize supplier of the Mexico City market, support this. In 1741, 1759 and 1773 Chalco's annual production was below 146,000 fanegas of maize and annual average prices in Mexico City were relatively high (equal to or above 13 reales per fanega). In 1744, on the other hand, maize production was around 250,000 fanegas and the price of maize in Mexico City was amongst the lowest of the decade (10.5 reales per fanega). (40)

The answer to the second question is more complex. The impressive growth of the Mexican population during the decades prior to independence (36% between 1790 and 1810) does not need to be emphasised. However, this does not imply an imbalance in the supply and demand of maize per se or agricultural products in general, since new lands could have been brought into cultivation or areas of subsistence production could have become linked to the urban markets. For instance, the crisis of 1785-6 stimulated the planting of maize in Morelos for the Mexico City market. Guadalajara City drew part of its supply of maize during that crisis from coastal areas not previously linked to the city and by 1808 it had extended the area from which it purchased its maize beyond its traditional hinterland. It could be argued however that the increase

in the distances involved increased the average cost of transport and therefore the price of grain in the urban markets. Another factor to be taken into account to explain the rise of maize prices is agricultural and economic diversification. Expansion of crops other than maize displaced the latter to peripheral areas and probably pushed its price up via scarcity or an increase in transport costs. In Oaxaca for instance the boom in cochineal production in the second half of the 18th century made many Indian producers disregard maize production and buy it on the market, thus creating difficulties of supply and high prices, especially during agricultural crises. Similarly, the increase in silver production had probably the same effect since it required additional labour and animal power for which maize was necessary as fodder. Another factor in the rise of maize prices by the end of the colonial period was the process of expropriation of church funds by the crown during 1805-9, which meant the forced repayment of long term loans by indebted agriculturalists to the Spanish treasury. According to Florescano this made it impossible for many small and medium size producers to continue producing at the same level. Last, but not least, Mexican haciendas achieved during this period greater control, in some cases a monopoly of the markets through the elimination of small competitors and the increase of storage capacity which enabled them to release the grain in years of bad harvest. In this respect, information for Michoacan, Guadalajara and the Bajio indicates that towards the end of the 18th century haciendas substantially increased investments in granaries and storage facilities. (42)

Information about prices of staple food in other regions of colonial Spanish America is scarce but the data available suggests that some of the trends operating in Mexico were also present elsewhere in the Indies. Firstly, annual prices of the main staple foods varied widely from year to year in Cochabamba (maize), Potosi (grain and tubers) and Santiago de Chile (wheat, flour) (see Appendix 1). In the first two cases this was due to the agricultural cycle. Secondly, long-term trends of price increases in the main staple foods seem to have been associated with sustained or increasing mining production. Thus, the price of beef in the town of Popayan increased fivefold from the 1660's to the end of the 18th century, while the amount of gold registered in the town increased two fold between the first and the last decades of the 18th century. Likewise, the long term increase of the price of wheat flour in Chile could be associated with the two fold increase in mining production between the 1760's and 1820's.[xxi] For 17th century Mexico and late 17th and 18th century savannah of Bogota, Chevalier and Villamarin respectively have explained the decadence of the haciendas and therefore lower agricultural prices by the difficulties experienced by the mining sector in these regions. Thirdly

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(xxi) The decennial price of wheat flour in Santiago calculated by Carmagnani shows a steady rise from the 1760's to the 1820's. Chilean mining production registered and exported through Santiago became important in the mid-18th century and grew steadily for the rest of the period. On the other hand no direct association can be established between agricultural prices and mining output in 18th century Potosi. (43)

population increases occurred in the hinterlands of Santiago and Popayan during the periods of rising prices in these urban centres. However, without having figures for the population of the urban centres themselves this correlation remains hypothetical. Finally, export booms experienced by Chilean wheat in the late 17th and early 18th century, and Guatemalan indigo in the 1770's, created a temporary increase in foodstuff prices. In Santiago wheat flour prices increased from 19.5 reales per fanega in the 1680's to 29 reales per fanega in the 1720's and returned to normal levels (below 20 reales) in the middle decades of the 18th century. This was due to the expansion of wheat production after the first decade of the 18th century. Maize prices in Guatemala were reported to have increased nine times from 1750 to 1780 and cattle prices two fold during the same period. As in Oaxaca, agricultural producers neglected foodstuff production to concentrate on the more profitable indigo production, but during the 1780's the balance was restored through a gradual return of foodstuff production to a normal level. (44)

So far we have argued that the competition of small producers was a hindrance to the realisation of profits by the haciendas through the reduction of prices during the periods of good harvests. It is necessary to add that even a situation of high agricultural prices did not necessarily mean high profits for the haciendas, unless they were accompanied by control of the labour force through economic or extra-economic compulsion. In the hinterland of the city of Oaxaca where a substantial increase in the prices of foodstuffs occurred between 1785 and 1815, hacendados were not

able to take advantage of the situation. The retention of plentiful communal lands by the Indians put them in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the hacendados. State restrictions on the system of debt-peonage, forced trade and lack of collaboration on the part of the local bureaucrats in imposing forced labour on the Indian communities enhanced the Indians' favourable circumstances. This situation was reversed when the rebellion of 1810-15, which the Indians wholeheartedly supported, was over and the local bureaucrats realigned themselves with the interests of the hacendados. Then the armed forces of the state ensured a labour supply from the communities to the haciendas. Similarly in Morelos the high prices of 1786 did not fully benefit the haciendas, which were not able to hire additional workers to harvest the maize which had been planted especially for this eventuality. Indians concentrated on their own maize fields and hacendados had to request Indian compulsory labour from the authorities which the latter seem to have refused. (45)

The data presented above permit us to provisionally conclude that the formation of urban markets with sustained or rising agricultural prices, combined with a quasi-monopoly of the factors of agricultural production, that is, land, labour and capital, made the haciendas profitable and not merely viable. We have sufficiently dealt with the hacienda's control of land and labour and we turn now to consider its access to sources of capital.

d) Sources of Capital

The primitive forms of capital accumulation during the early colonisation of the Indies were linked to the spoils of war: looting, Indian slavery and Indian tribute and, in the long run, the rent produced by land grants. While the two former disappeared very early (by c. mid-16th century) and the product was spent in further conquests or in Spain, the two latter had a more lasting effect, settling colonisers in America and creating a demand for European agricultural products and the means of supplying them locally or regionally. By the mid-17th century, the Indian tribute appropriated by private individuals (encomenderos) had almost totally lost its importance as a source of capital and new concessions of land grants were limited to the frontier areas of the empire. Thus, from around 1600 hacienda owners had to rely on their own profits or income, loans secured through the mortgage of their lands or encroachment of Indian lands to expand their lands and/or production. (46)

Table 6 shows the main sources of credit for hacendados and other entrepreneurs in the 18th century in the Guadalajara region and Chile in 1639. Although we do not have figures for other areas and chronological periods, qualitative data indicate that church bodies (convents, nunneries, brotherhoods etc) were the main source of credit in the Indies during the 17th and 18th centuries. Since only loans and mortgages controlled by the church are sufficiently documented (the effects of these activities for the church are dealt with elsewhere, see Chapter 9) we will limit ourself at the moment to the impact of these activities on agriculture. It is necessary to point out that not all the money owed to the

church was the hacendados' debt, although the major part was secured by haciendas, and that it did not necessarily represent an investment in agriculture or even an initial transfer of money from the church to rural or urban entrepreneurs. This peculiar situation derived from the development of Catholic church institutions in Europe and America over a long period of time. During the colonial period the so-called capital of the church was composed, apart from direct investment in rural or urban property, by a) money loaned (depositos) to private individuals or corporations on a short-term basis but usually extended for decades and not necessarily secured by urban or rural property, b) mortgages (censos) taken by owners of rural or urban property against a long term loan, and c) mortgages imposed on property by individuals as a form of ceremonial expenditure (eg the dowry of a nun, the patronage of a hospital or church, etc). In this case the 'capital', a nominal sum of money, remained with the proprietor of the property and he or she paid in exchange an annuity of usually 5% of the principal of the censo. As can be seen only in the two latter cases was property necessarily involved and only in (a) and (b) was money transferred from the church to lay people or institutions. In no case however was it necessary to invest the principal of the loan or censo in the property given as a security. (47)

No general figures showing the degree of indebtedness of haciendas to the church are known to us, however, several hacienda studies for restricted areas and periods give us an impression of that indebtedness and, more importantly, reveal its economic consequences. Table 7 presents estimates of the proportion of the values of rural estates represented by the principals owed to the church in certain Mexican areas. Three

Table 6: Sources of Credit in 17th Century Chile and 18th Century Guadalajara *

	Chile (1)		Guadalajara (2)	
	1639 (%)	1721-30 (%)	1761-70 (%)	1801-10 (%)
Church	59.5	81.2	71.7	43.2
Secular Institutions	13.1	0.1	1.8	11.1
Merchants	27.4	9.2	15.6	12.8
Other Individuals	0.0	9.5	10.9	32.9
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total in Pesos	c. 903,993	640,994	1,006,059	953,837

* Sources: Gongora 1967: 71-96, especially 71-2 for Chile and Robinson (ed) 1979: 256-7 for Guadalajara.

(1) Accumulated borrowings and mortgages up until 1639. Of the c. 248,015 pesos owed to individuals only 48,015 pesos are documented, the rest are probably an inflated estimation and therefore the proportion of church loans would be higher. Excludes 781,731 pesos in credit sales by merchants.

(2) Borrowing and mortgages during each decade, excluding accumulated debts for previous periods.

comments are necessary to understand the limitations of the data assembled. Firstly, they cover different periods of time and therefore the percentages worked out might represent regional or chronological differences or both. In this respect the assertion of Brading that the increasing value of rural property in the Bajio at the end of the 18th century tended to minimise the importance of church loans while after the rebellion of 1810 this trend was reversed, is indicative of a changing situation favourable to agricultural entrepreneurs in the last decades of the 18th century.

Table 8: Church Loans and Censos to Landowners and Estimated Values in Some Areas of Mexico during the 18th Century (in pesos)

Geographical Area or Institution	1 No of Estates Included	2 Date	3 Estate Values (estimates)	4 Loans & Censos	5 % of Indebtedness (4/3 x 100)
1) Valley of Oaxaca	27	C 18	346,456	231,855	66.9
2) Tlaxcala	155	1712	1,769,637	748,735	42.3
3) Cholula (Puebla)	55	1790	788,442	550,504	69.8
4) Leon (The Bajio)	23	1777-1809	624,835	249,870	39.9
4) Silao (The Bajio)	13	1782-1823	341,687	145,870	42.6
5) Mexican Jesuit Estates	81	1750's	5,000,000 or 6,000,000	1,325,004	26.5 22.1

1) Taylor 1972: 142, 250.

2) Semo 197: 177 Includes independent farmers (ranchos).

3) Brading 1971: 218, included 17 independent farmers.

4) Brading 1978: 92-3.

5) Riley 1972: 246, 256-60. Rough estimates based on loans or censos in the 1750's and estimated values of the Jesuit rural properties between 1770 and 1803. This value could have been lower because of the increase of the price of land of the late 18th century or the deterioration of the estates after the Jesuit expulsion.

This impression is also supported by the case of the haciendas of the Valley of Oaxaca which increased their degree of indebtedness to the church during the first half of the 18th century but reversed that trend in the latter half by repayment of part of the principal borrowed. Secondly, Jesuit estates constitute a special case within colonial agricultural enterprises since their production, unlike that of the secular haciendas, was exempted from sale taxes and enjoyed an exemption

from, and later a reduction of, the tithe (1/3 of the standard 10%). Thus, their corporate character and the vast resources and capital accumulated through donations, together with privileges made it easier for them to repay their loans. Finally, considering the difficulties of the hacendados of the valley of Oaxaca and Cholula and the prosperity of the Bajio region during the 18th century, an estimation of the indebtedness of Mexican haciendas to the church of the order of 40-60% during the 18th century cannot be too wide of the mark. (48)

The dependence of landowners on church loans and censos elsewhere in the Indies is difficult to ascertain without a generous sample of hacienda values and data on their outstanding debts. Such samples are known for Lower Peru and Latacunga (Ecuador), but given the fact that they include only Jesuit haciendas confiscated by the crown in 1767, they cannot be considered representative of these geographical areas, let alone the rest of Spanish America. The 97 Jesuit haciendas of Peru were evaluated around 1770-2 at 5,729,790 pesos, while their total debt to church bodies and private individuals in 1767 was 539,466 pesos or 9.4% of the value of the haciendas. Taking into account that the sale price for the cases known was around a quarter lower than the evaluation figure, and allowing a margin for loans made by individuals, we can arrive at a rough estimate of 10% of indebtedness. This sound financial practice was probably impossible to follow by the average Peruvian hacendado since they did not enjoy the exemptions common to all Jesuit colleges in the Indies. Furthermore, Jesuit investments in Peru were mainly concentrated in sugar production (51.4%) and vineyards (34.1%) which were the most profitable agricultural enterprises at the end of the 18th

century. The ten or so haciendas of the Jesuit college of Latacunga were, on the contrary, livestock and grain estates. They were evaluated in 1767 at 145,342 pesos and were burdened with censos of 42,500 pesos or 29.2% of the total value. There is little that can be said about these figures since, apart from coming from the same (privileged) institution, they represent a special chronological period (c. 1767) which seems to have been far more favourable economically for the Jesuits than previous decades. Thus, the finances of the Jesuit colleges in Peru during the 17th century show an increase in the amount of indebtedness which rose from 665,155 pesos in 1635 to 1,264,043 in 1700, a trend which was subsequently reversed. Now the period before 1700 was marked by heavy purchases of lands by the Society which, in turn, meant heavy borrowing, repaid slowly after 1700 and more rapidly after 1750, a date which seems to mark a general recovery of the Peruvian economy after the slump which lasted from the 1680's to the first half of the 18th century. If we assume that the value of their lands in 1700 was equal to or below the value in 1767, then indebtedness would have been 22% or more. (49)

Apart from church loans and censos, agriculture received, at least in some Spanish American areas and periods, important direct or indirect investment from merchants and miners. The haciendas of northern Mexico were born in the late 16th century out of the necessity for mine owners to supply their mining camps with food for the workers, fodder and animal power. Although this subsidiary role of the hacienda as part of a mainly mining enterprise continued in many cases throughout the colonial period, haciendas became an investment in their own right for miners eager to establish a secure form of

income and eventually establish an entail on them. Equally Mexican merchants, as early as 1620, were joining the landed elite through purchase or foreclosures of haciendas. This was especially so in relation to sugar haciendas which they financed and seem to have expanded. After the law of free trade of 1778, which diminished the attraction of long distance trade by allowing more competition in that field, merchants increased their participation in agriculture by acquiring haciendas and investing, like miners, in irrigation works, granaries, turning scrub land into arable land etc. (50) We have little information about the participation of merchants and miners in agriculture in other Spanish American regions. It seems however that merchants invested, directly or indirectly, mainly in those agricultural sectors which ensured a high level of profitability. Thus merchants in early 17th century Guatemala invested in or financed sugar and indigo production only to withdraw during the slump of the mid-17th century. During the second half of the 18th century, the dynamism of the Atlantic trade provided a new group of Spanish merchants with the impetus to finance and participate directly in the production and export of indigo in Guatemala, a trade which reached a turnover of over 1,000,000 pesos per year. On the other hand, the merchants of late 18th century Buenos Aires invested little in ranching, a fact which probably reflected the buoyant situation of commerce in the Argentinian port. In 18th century Chile and Bogota merchants invested in agriculture but at the same time hacendados became merchants, a trend which seems to reflect a similar (low) profitability in both sectors. Finally, we have only found evidence of capital investment from agriculture in mining in the gold producing governorship of Popayan.

Miners in 18th century Peru, Chile and Central America were, on the contrary, financed by merchants and even hacendados. (51)

e) Return Upon Capital

The problems involved in estimating the rates of return upon capital spent in agriculture are manifold. Apart from the scarcity of data on Spanish colonial haciendas, the method of calculation is a problem in itself. Firstly, let us consider the problem of mortgages and loans imposed on the haciendas and the respective interest payments. Some researchers seem to include the payment of interest among the cost of operation of haciendas (expenditure) and then compare the net income (total income minus expenditure) with the total capital of the hacienda (including the borrowed capital). With this method borrowed capital appears twice in the accounts, first as interest and then as a producer of returns. As we shall see, payment of interest could reduce or eliminate the returns upon capital spent by the landowner, but to include it in the calculation of the profitability of the hacienda is a mistake. We have preferred to compare in Appendix 2 the annual net income of the haciendas against their values, which is the method used by most researchers. This method does not give an account of the returns of the hacendados but an account of the returns of the hacienda given its actual conditions of operation (markets, technology, labour systems etc). Thus, in the case of the hacienda San Juan Bautista (Appendix 2, case 2) a 2.6% return on the hacienda (1,554 pesos per annum) can be divided into a 5% return on the capital borrowed by the hacendado (2,715 pesos p.a.) and a negative return for the hacendado (-1,161 pesos p.a.). (52)

A second problem arises when we consider the length of time for which statistics are available for a single hacienda. This is particularly serious in the case of grain haciendas whose production oscillated violently from year to year. Thus, returns for a single year do not offer any guarantee that they are representative of a medium term trend. As a rule we have considered only haciendas whose net income is recorded for five or more consecutive years, in which case it is very likely that years of bad and good harvests balance each other out, so providing an average close to the medium term trend. A further problem appears in assessing the value of the haciendas. Here two alternatives are open to the researcher: to accept either the contemporary estimate of the value of the hacienda or its contemporary sale price. The former is in many ways a fiction since an important part of these evaluations was comprised of the 'value' of land which was originally acquired through free land grants. However, from the point of view of agricultural production this fiction becomes fact through the monopoly of land suitable for commodity production, and thus an entrepreneur wishing to become a hacendado had to pay a price for land as well as installations, livestock, slaves, etc. Using the second criterion (the contemporary sale price) we run the risk of getting into a circular situation. This is so because the sale price of haciendas, at least in 18th century Mexico, was determined by the rate of interest on ecclesiastical capital (5%) and the annual average net income of the hacienda, where the sale price was equal to twenty times the annual average net income, or anticipated rent (at the usual rate of interest) for the capital, which was

transferred through the sale. Provided that the new owner did not spend money improving the conditions of production of the hacienda, that the market situation remained the same and that the hacienda did not deteriorate through bad administration, physical or social catastrophes and so on, the return on capital would be, on average, close to 5%. (53) However, the new owner could substantially increase the net income of the hacienda by investing in the building of dams, granaries, equipment etc, or by buying additional livestock or land which could increase the productivity of the whole enterprise by a better use of the resources (labour force, combination of different activities, etc). Obviously if the landowner decided to sell the improved hacienda he or she would probably receive approximately the capitalised rent of the hacienda, according to the usual rate of interest, and the rate of return on capital for the new owner would be again circa 5% p.a. Unfortunately we do not have data which make possible the quantification of the profitability of these investments. There are indications, however, that the rate of return derived from these investments could have been significantly higher than the lending rate. This was tacitly recognised as early as the 1570's by the richest Mexican entrepreneur, Alonso de Villaseca. He asserted that the best investment was the purchase of 'half completed rural haciendas' of low price which, with additional improvements, would be transformed into valuable assets. This option was open only to entrepreneurs or institutions with enough capital or access to credit to undertake the necessary initial investment, and enough business sense to reinvest part of the profits in keeping up or improving the productive capacity of the haciendas.

The Jesuits of Spanish America followed Villaseca's dictum very closely. In Mexico, New Granada and Peru they acquired 'half done' haciendas and invested capital to make them really profitable. In central Mexico for instance the Jesuits bought lands piecemeal to create one of the best haciendas of the region: Santa Lucia. Over more than a 100 years (late 16th century to early 18th century) they bought lands for around 150,000 pesos and invested in improvements to create an enterprise which was to be evaluated at 1,151,694 pesos in 1776 and sold the same year for 660,140 pesos. (54) For 18th century Mexico, Brading has provided us with a generous sample of investments in agriculture from rich miners and merchants and even some relatively modest hacendados who had managed to render their newly acquired haciendas more productive, increase their values beyond the capital spent on them and expand production. The result of this policy was to have a very modest (or negative) net income in the year of investment, since investments and reinvestments were included in the expenditure, and an increased net income thereafter. On the contrary, the sale of assets (livestock, slaves, land, etc) by the hacendado or failure to do the necessary repairs resulted in an increase of the net income in the year in question but a diminishing net income thereafter. This was the case of many of the expropriated Jesuit haciendas during the period of royal management after 1767, where repairs or investments were hardly carried out at all. (55) (See Appendix 2)

The changes in the rate of return on haciendas and their value due to investment or lack of reinvestment can be illustrated by the case of the hacienda 'Dolores' (Chihuahua) during the period 1790-1820. The hacienda, excluding its livestock,

Table 8: Net Income, Inventory Gains and Rates of Return for the 'Dolores' Hacienda (Chihuahua) 1790-1820 (in pesos)*

	1790	1791-1795	1796-1800	1801-1805	1806-1810	1811-1815	1816-1820	1790-1820
Net Income	667	-1,484	7,106	-296	1,076	16,311	9,485	32,865
Inventory gains	461	4,111	5,942	10,654	6,589	8,626	-8,136	28,247
Adjusted gain	1,128	2,627	13,048	10,358	7,665	24,937	1,349	61,112
Livestock (head)	465	...	...	...	...	...	5,076	
Average Annual Rates of Return on a Capital Estimated at 37,000 pesos								
a) Considering only the net income	1.8%	-0.8%	3.8%	-0.16%	0.6%	8.8%	5.1%	2.9%
b) Considering the adjusted gain	3.0%	1.4%	7.1%	5.6%	4.1%	13.5%	0.7%	5.3%
Average Annual Rates of Return on the Sale Price 45,400 pesos								
a) Considering only the net income	...	...	...	...	...	...	7.2%	4.2%	2.3%
b) Considering the adjusted gain	...	...	...	...	...	...	11.0%	0.6%	4.3%

* Source: Benedict 1979: 408-9, 393.

was evaluated from 1771 until 1820 at 35,205 pesos. Table 8 presents the quinquennial net income, inventory gains or losses, the adjusted gain of the hacienda and the rates of return calculated for the period. It should be noted that the rate of return calculated on the net income is just over half of that calculated on the adjusted gain of the hacienda (2.9% and 5.3%). Big differences also appear in assessing the value of the hacienda depending on whether the sale price of 45,400 pesos or the evaluation of 35,205 pesos for the fixed assets is taken as the relevant figure. Since the growth of the assets (mainly

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livestock) was a product of natural repreduction it is clearly correct to use the latter figure plus some 1,860 pesos for the livestock listed in 1790 (4 pesos per head) which gives us a figure of 37,000 pesos. A final comment on the data is necessary. In all the five year periods the inventory grew, except in 1816-20 when the drought of 1817-20 killed 2,000 large animals in the hacienda, and the hacienda reached its ecological ceiling. This was probably reflected in the final sale price of the hacienda and certainly in its value. (56)

The example of the hacienda 'Dolores' and the previous discussion show the limitation of the data presented in Appendix 3 and its sources. There we have calculated the rate of return upon capital considering the average net income for a period of five years or more and the inventory value of the hacienda at a time close to it. Ideally the value assessment should coincide with the beginning of the period considered and the net income include the delayed profits (increase of unsold stock) and money or resources spent as investments (i.e. purchase of additional slaves, livestock, irrigation works, etc). Conversely the sale, depreciation or destruction of assets should be deducted from the net income. Unfortunately colonial accounts do not discriminate between investments and other expenditures and it is difficult to evaluate the loss of assets. However, in some cases (numbers 3, 27, 32) the information provided permits us to come very close to this ideal. We have already seen in detail, Case 3 (Dolores), that a return of 2.9% p.a. hides a higher return if we consider delayed profits on investments. In the case of 'Santa Lucia' the only value assessment available to us is from 1776. Applying this value

retrospectively to the 1750's it gives us returns of 3.0%, 3.4% and 4.4%. Considering that the Jesuits made improvements worth several thousand pesos during the mid-1760's, the return on capital for the years prior to 1767 would have increased by diminishing the total value of the hacienda and, for 1765-6, by inflating the expenditure with an investment barely used. Now if we consider the origins of the hacienda as a Jesuit enterprise in 1576 the returns are nothing less than impressive. In the year after the purchase net income was 1,500 pesos or 818% return, and during 1582-6, 4,638 pesos p.a. or 27.3% average return. Furthermore, the sheep flock had almost doubled by 1585 and therefore the value of the hacienda increased. Apart from this, and the donation of two estancias de ganado mayor (6.7 sq miles) no other improvements were carried out on the hacienda until 1586. The extraordinary performance of the estate seems to have been the effect of the rising prices of wool and meat and the administrative capacity of the Jesuits. (57)

The third case worth examining in some detail is 'Huara' (no 32) during the late 17th and 18th centuries. Here the inventory value of the hacienda has been calculated by Cushner for each separate year at market prices for each major component of the hacienda (land, equipment and slaves). We have assembled the data into periods according to sugar prices in Lima and Huara. These prices were very high before 1695 (c. 5 pesos per arroba), high but declining between 1795 and 1721 (3 - 3.5 pesos per arroba), extremely low during the 1750's (1 - 1.7 pesos per arroba) and low but increasing during the 1760's (1.7 - 2.8 pesos per arroba). These prices

are clearly shown in the rate of return during these periods, although net income was also affected by the level of production which seems to have increased steadily throughout the century. Production and income in 1757 and 1764 illustrate this radical change in returns. Although the production was almost the same in these two years (11,813 arrobas and 11,715.5 arrobas respectively) the total sugar value almost trebled (from 11,222 pesos to 32,803 pesos) dramatically increasing the rate of return.

Despite the limitations of the data presented in Appendix 2 it is possible to draw some conclusions. Firstly, it is clear that the return on capital of the haciendas varied according to the economic conjuncture of the region in which they were located. The cases of 'Santa Lucia' in the 1580's and of 'Huara' in the 18th century are good examples of the impact of prices on returns. A similar explanation can be given for the cases of sugar haciendas in Morelos in the late 17th and early 18th centuries since sugar prices in Morelos in the 1680's were over 50% higher than in the early 18th century. (58) Secondly, although the evidence is scarce, it is safe to assume that export prices had a similar effect. The high rate of return of the Cepi plantation (no 28) corresponds to a period of high prices of cacao in Caracas (an average of 18 - 20 pesos per fanega). The decrease of the cacao price (c. 5 - 8 pesos per fanega between 1653 and 1657) due to the competition of Ecuadorian cacao, must have reduced its return significantly through the decrease in net income if production remained at the same level, or through a necessary increase in the capital invested to ensure the same income through an increase of

production. Similarly return on capital in Guatemalan indigo haciendas must have been substantial during the boom years of the 1770's and 1780's. By 1804 the decline of the trade due to Bengali competition, European wars and plagues had allegedly reduced the return of the best plantations to 5%. (59) Finally, and more tentatively, comparisons between haciendas' returns can be made between geographical regions and agricultural sectors.

In Table 9 we have assembled the combined rates of return of 18th century Mexican and Peruvian haciendas together with other pertinent estimates. For Mexico the regional rates of return are compatible with the trends of agricultural development that we know of. The difficulties of the hacendados of the Valley of Oaxaca during the 18th century have been outlined above and it is not necessary to reiterate them. For Puebla the only index of agricultural activity known to us for the period is the value of the agricultural production as indicated by the tithe. During the period 1748-76 this value remained stable to start with, growing again after 1776, the year in which our information ceases for all but one of the haciendas considered. Obviously tithe value is a poor substitute for lists of prices which in combination with information on wages would give a more precise picture of the situation of the haciendas. However, the complaints of the hacendados about the emigration of Tlaxacla and Puebla workers to central Mexico and the Bajio and the imposition of adscriptive peonage on the haciendas, also points to a crisis in the hacienda system in that region at the time. The Guadalajara hinterland, central Mexico and the Bajio regions have been analysed above and they all show conditions favourable to long term hacienda

Table 9: Haciendas' Rates of Return in Selected Regions in Late 18th Century Spanish America *

Region/Agricultural Sector	According to Appendix 2	Cases Included (No)	Other Estimates
Mexico			6% (1)
Puebla and Oaxaca (1762-82, 1789-95)	2.2	2,5,6,7,8,9,10 (7)	-
Leon, Chucetaro & San Luis de Potosi (Different periods between 1753-1839)	4.2	13,14,21-4 (6)	-
Guadalajara hinterland (1767-82,1785-8)	5.8	18,19 (2)	4.8% (C18) (2)
Central Mexico (Valley of Mexico, Morelos) 1767-82, 1800-5	4.8	11,25-7 (4)	-
Northern Mexico (New Leon, Chihuahua, Durango) 1767-82, 1790-1820	4.7	3,12,15,16 (4)	-
Peru			
Sugar (1760-66)	7.8	32-34 (3)	7-10% ? (3)
Vineyards (1762-6)	13.5	35-36 (2)	7-10% (3)
Others (grain, livestock, 1762-6)	8.3	37-40 (2)	3-5% (3)
Chile			5% (4)

* Sources: Appendix 2 and notes below. Combined rates of return have been calculated by dividing the total sum of the averages of the haciendas considered by the total sum of their values.

(1) Brading 1971: 217, (2) Van Young 1981: 225, (3) Macera 1977: 4: 27, (4) Barros Arana quoted in Barbier 1980: 40.

profitability from some time in the second half of the 18th century. For the hinterland of Mexico City Florescano dates this definitive take off from 1779. Brading, for Leon, establishes roughly the same date (early 1780's) for a substantial rise in the price of grain, livestock and lands, although he suggests that there was agricultural prosperity before that date. Finally, in Guadalajara City meat prices increased and remained at a high level from 1780, although Van Young indicates that land values were on the increase and hacienda profits were already high in the 1760's.[xxii] As for Peru, the small number of haciendas considered has probably distorted the real returns for Peruvian haciendas as a whole. This is more likely in the grain and livestock sectors where the four haciendas included were located in the Cuzco and Huancavelica regions which were close to important mining centres. (60)

f) Hacienda Turnover

Having outlined the performance of agricultural enterprises in the Indies a quick overview of the individuals or corporations which controlled them is in order. The transfer of haciendas in a way other than through inheritance is not

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(xxii) The impression of prosperity for agricultural producers in Guadalajara and the Bajio is supported by the trends of the value of agricultural production as recorded in the tithe. In the diocese of Guadalajara this grew constantly from the late 1760's to 1805 with a decrease in the late 1780's and early 1790's. In the diocese of Michoacan, which included most of the Bajio and San Luis but not Queretaro, the trend is much the same. A constant increase from 1766 to 1807 with a small decrease in the mid-1790's. Obviously the value of this index as an indication of hacienda returns is very relative since it does not discriminate between hacienda and small producers or regions within the dioceses. (61)

necessarily an indication of lack of capital, mismanagement or difficulties in the agricultural sectors. Conversely the presence of many inheritors did not necessarily lead to the partition of haciendas, but as we will argue below, this tended to be the case in colonial Spanish America. The following discussion will hopefully illustrate the difficulties faced by the hacendado class in retaining their sources of economic power and prestige in a changing situation brought about by demographic, commercial and mining cycles.

The economic performance of the hacendados (ie their net annual income) depended on the value of the hacienda(s) owned, its rate of return upon capital, its indebtedness and, indirectly, the hacendado's source of credit. Leaving aside for the moment the latter we can establish an equation in which the net annual income of the hacendado (I) equals the rate of return upon capital (RK), minus the product of the percentage of the value of the hacienda represented by the loan/s (L) made to the hacendado and having as a security the hacienda and the rate of interest (In) paid on this loan, multiplied by the total value of the hacienda:

$$I = (\%RK - \%L \times In) \times K$$

In a fairly typical case in 18th century Mexico a hacienda with a value of 100,000 pesos, an RK of 4% and mortgages (L) of 40,000 would have a net income of 4,000 pesos per annum. Since the usual lending rate was 5% in colonial Mexico our typical hacendado would have to pay 2,000 pesos in interest and thus his/her net personal income would be reduced to 2,000 pesos per annum. Were the loans to the hacienda increased or its RK lowered I would become dangerously close to 0 or

even negative. In this case further indebtedness, sale of the hacienda or its forced auction were the only alternatives, unless profits from other enterprises could balance the books of this particular hacendado. In the latter case, however, the landowner could more rationally redeem the principal and receive the future net income of the hacienda without deductions.

Obviously prospective buyers with substantial capital preferred to acquire and hang on to haciendas with a high return while haciendas which produced low returns were likely to fall into the vicious circle of indebtedness, bankruptcy, sale-resale. This was fairly common, since heavily indebted haciendas were sold (or auctioned) for small sums of cash and the obligation of the new buyer to pay the interest on the principal borrowed. Unless the market situation changed or money was invested to improve the hacienda, the landowner would in all likelihood become bankrupt a few years later and the hacienda re-enter the market. The result of this situation was a trend towards the polarisation of the hacendado class into two different categories. On the one hand that formed by the owners of one or several highly valued and profitable haciendas(xxiii) usually with interests in other sectors (mining commerce, urban rentals etc), and on the other hand that formed by the owners of one or two haciendas of low

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(xxiii) Tutino asserts that 'Among the great landed families who could operate numerous estates...profits averaged from 6-9% of capital value...in the late 18th century.' This compares very favourably with the average rate of return in Mexico at the time. (62)

value and profitability and likely to leave the ranks of the hacendado class through bankruptcy. Investment from other sectors, changing market situations, laws of inheritance, good or bad business sense and luck within both categories of hacendados permitted a space for upward and downward social mobility. (63)

The correlation between stability of ownership and hacienda performance is substantiated by the few regional studies which present information about family or institutional retention of estates. In the 18th century in the Valley of Oaxaca the high rate of indebtedness of the hacendados to the church is itself an index of bad performance which confirms the difficulties of the hacendado class outlined above, and implies a quick hacienda turnover. In a (non-systematic) sample of 27 haciendas Taylor found that all the 20 haciendas 'mortgaged to over 80% of their value were sold on or before the death of the owner'. In Tancintaro (Michoacan), of the 17 major land holdings listed by E. Barret at least 10 of them were subjected to a rapid turnover, usually through foreclosure, during the late 17th and early 18th centuries because of the depressed conditions of the area (lack of labour force, disasters and epidemics). Among those which escaped that fate were the two estates of the Urrutia entail and the hacienda 'Sinagua' of the Jesuits.

In the relatively prosperous Valley of Puangue (Chile) of a total of c. 25 haciendas, 9 remained within the same family or institution for 100 or more years during the period 1680-1880 while a small group (3or4) suffered periods of continuous sales and foreclosures. For the Guadalajara

hinterland, Van Young has assembled data for a group of 35 major haciendas in the 18th century (1701-1805). On average, these haciendas were sold 4.28 times during the period or once every 22.2 years. Now this group of haciendas was more stable during the latter part of the century (1751-1815) when they were sold only 1.9 times on average or once every 35 years. This latter period coincided with the prosperity of agriculture in the region. Haciendas which changed hands six or more times during the century did so mostly because of financial problems and those which changed hands three or fewer times were estates entailed early during the century or very well managed estates.

Finally, for the thriving 18th century Mexican Bajio, the 40 haciendas accounted for by Brading seem to challenge the hypotheses of a positive correlation between stability and hacienda performance. During the 18th century (1712-1811) 3 haciendas remained within the same family for the whole period, 7 were sold only once, 13 twice, 10 haciendas 3 times and the rest 4 or 5 times, making an average of 2.3 sales for the period or a sale every 43 years. This compares favourably with the sample of haciendas of the Valley of Oaxaca and the Guadalajara hinterland but seems to fail to reach the high level of stability achieved in the valley of Puangue. The key to this anomaly seems to be the presence in the Bajio of a dynamic sector of miners and merchants who invested heavily in land. For instance, a powerful miner, the Count of Valenciana alone bought 9 of these haciendas in the 1780's. As we shall see in Chapter 6, the quick formation of capital in Mexico and especially in the Bajio due to its mining performance were unparalleled in Spanish America and permitted a

quicker renovation of the landowning elites. (64)

A further problem faced by the hacendado class was the breaking up of haciendas due to partition by the inheritors. According to Spanish law, at the death of either spouse, family estate was divided so as to return to the remaining spouse his/her share (usually a half) and to divide the rest among the legitimate children in equal parts. The testator was allowed however to will up to a third of his/her estate to a preferred child and up to a fifth to someone of his/her own choice. This did not lead to the partition or sale of haciendas when legitimate children were few and resources plentiful (several haciendas, urban estates, jewelry, etc) which could be divided without diminishing the productive capacity of the haciendas, but for hacendado families of more modest resources partition or sale of estates was a real threat. Hacendado families had at their disposal, however, many resources which assisted in avoiding this dispersion of fortunes. Religious vocations among children usually led to the renunciation of inheritance or the return of the assets inherited to the family when they died, marital alliances within or outside the hacendado class could enlarge the capital resources of the hacienda through substantial dowries, links with the church (i.e. a close relative in a nunnery or a monastery) could give easy access to credit, etc.[xxiv]

(xxiv) The analysis of family structure and other aspects of hacendado activities fall outside our scope. See however for examples of these phenomena: Serrera 1977:123,64,228-47 passim especially 11-27; Altman et al (eds) 1976:256-71 passim; Lavrin & Couturier 1979: 288-97. For examples of partition of haciendas through inheritance see Brading 1978:118-9, 129ff; Borde & Gongora 1956:83-7; Van Young 1981: 134-8.

A more direct way of avoiding the disintegration of family fortunes was the foundation of mayorazgos (entails) which were supposed to preserve almost half (7/15) of the wealth of the founder within one family line for ever. The wealth thus entailed (haciendas, slaves, urban estate, bureaucratic offices, etc) was transmitted undivided to the descendants of the founder according to specific rules of succession, usually the eldest son. In the Indies, the foundation of mayorazgos was subjected to little state control up until 1789. From that time newly created entails had to include assets able to provide the holder with an annual income of at least 4,000 pesos and therefore limited the institution to families in possession of a sizeable fortune. The limitations on the property rights of the holders of the entail were however substantial. Disentailment of property was very difficult to obtain and required the consent of the local Audiencia and the crown. The authorities also fixed the limits of indebtedness of the holders and, finally, leasing contracts could not exceed 9 years. The importance of the mayorazgo institution in the Indies was small compared with Spain and its development was slow. It has been estimated that in Spain, 30-50% of the soil remained entailed by the landed aristocracy during the 16th to 18th centuries, although this included seigneurial rights as well as property rights in the modern sense. For 18th century Mexico, Ladd has estimated the existing number of mayorazgos as c. 100, with a majority of them having relatively modest assets of between 30,000 and 100,000 pesos and only a handful reaching 500,000 pesos or more; the latter were mainly of 18th century creation. In Chile there were around 20 mayorazgos, all but one had been

founded in the 18th century and the majority of them were founded in the second half of that century. (65) As for entailed haciendas data is fragmentary but a rough idea can be obtained by looking at Table 10. The number of haciendas entailed in each area is small (under 15% of the total in all cases), but the importance of the haciendas at the time of their entailment seems to have been higher than that percentage suggests. Thus the entailed haciendas of the Valley of Oaxaca were highly profitable during the 17th century while the entailed haciendas of the Guadalajara hinterland were notable for their value or extent. In almost all the cases presented in Table 10 the laws of entail impeded the partition or alienation of the haciendas concerned until independence, but did not prevent the decay of a number of them due to depressed agricultural production or the failure to reinvest in them. (66)

Another source of relative stability in hacienda ownership was constituted by the rural property of the church and particularly of the Jesuits. This stability derived not from a legal prohibition to alienate its property, as in the case of entails, but from its corporate character and the accumulation of wealth through donations, dowries, financial and productive undertakings, etc. Church corporations were in general in a more secure position than the secular hacendados. Like the powerful landowners they were able to acquire and keep fine haciendas due to their vast financial resources. Unlike them, they were affected neither by the laws of inheritance nor by the restrictions imposed on entails. However, not all church institutions had vast wealth, acquired landed estates

Table 10: Entailed and Church Haciendas in Some Spanish American Regions in the 18th Century

	Total	Church*	Church/** Secular	Secular***	Entailed	Date of Entailment
(1) Valley of Oaxaca	57	8	10	33	6	5 between 1565-1625 the last in 1677
%	100.0	14.1	17.5	57.9	10.5	
(2) Leon & Rincon	40	-	2	38	0	
%	100.0		5	95	0	
(3) Guadalajara hinterland (sample)	35	2	7	21	5	4 of them during C 18
%	100.0	5.7	20.0	60.0	14.3	
(4) Tacintaro (1714)	17	1	-	14	2	Both in 1652
%	100.0	5.9		82.3	11.8	
(5) Valley of Puangue	23	1	1	18	3	1777 & after
%	100.0	4.4	4.4	78.2	13.0	

* Held by the church during the whole 18th century or a very long period (usually more than 50 years).

** Held by the church for a short number of years during the period.

*** Includes property held by individual priests.

(1) Taylor 1972: 124-5, 152-8, 174-191.
(2) Brading 116-7.
(3) Van Young 1981; 120-1, 170-1.
(4) E. Barret 1973: 89 and passim.
(5) Borde and Gongora 1956: Appendix 2.

or kept them for long periods. Thus the hacienda 'Hospital' (Morelos) of the Hospital Brothers of San Hipalito in Mexico City had constant financial deficits during the late 17th century and 18th century which ended up in the alienation of part of its lands to repay debts in 1789. On the other hand the

wealthy 18th century Mexico City nunneries preferred financial and urban ventures to hacienda ownership and, as Table 10 shows, retention of haciendas by church bodies was in many cases sporadic. For instance in the Valley of Oaxaca and the Guadalajara hinterland the church owned, at some time during the 18th century, over a quarter of the haciendas of each region but in both cases less than half of them were kept by the church for long periods. The key to this situation lies in the fact that a large proportion of the haciendas owned by the church for small periods were haciendas heavily mortgaged which the church had to foreclose and resell shortly afterwards in order to recover its principal. (67) The Jesuits of Spanish America on the contrary invested the major part of their vast wealth and had a record of remarkable stability and growth in their haciendas. Thus the Jesuit College of San Pablo (Lima) retained all the five haciendas owned in 1650 until the expulsion of the order in 1767 and in the interim added six estates of different importance to their assets. Similarly, the College of 'Espiritu Santo' of Puebla retained its five major haciendas from the first half of the 17th century until 1767, adding in the interim a number of satellite ranches and haciendas to their assets. That these were not isolated cases is shown by the activities of 20 of the 24 Jesuit institutions of Mexico. During 1670 to 1767 they sold 9 estates, purchased 41, accepted 13 donations and obtained a land grant. If we consider that by 1670 the Mexican Jesuits were already substantial landowners we can conclude that the Jesuits of Mexico and perhaps the rest of Spanish America retained most of the haciendas acquired in the 16th and 17th centuries up until 1767 and constantly

enlarged their assets.[xxv] (68)

g) Conclusions

The analysis of the agrarian structure of colonial Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Chile indicates that a continuous process of land appropriation and partial exploitation by the Spaniards occurred. The tempo of this occupation and its legalisation through grants and composiciones varied in the different regions and macro-regions according to the specific combination of three main interrelated factors. These were a) the density and character of the Indian population, b) the formation of markets for agricultural products and, linked to this, the profitability of the Spanish agrarian enterprises, and c) the presence of dense Spanish (or hispanised) population in the area.[xxvi]

The location of the initial Spanish settlements was, to a large extent, determined by the characteristics of the pre-hispanic societies in the Indies. The Spanish conquistadores and later the colonists settled in the politically and economically developed areas, which were at the same time the more

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(xxv) A long list of haciendas retained for over 100 years by the Jesuits in Colombia and Quito can be compiled comparing partial data on Jesuit purchases and expropriated haciendas in 1767 assembled by Colmenares (1969:617, 108-11, 114-7, 137-8). The same is true for the material assembled by Macera & Cushner on Peruvian Jesuits (Macera 1977, III:16-25, 33-43 passim; Cushner 1980: 36-53 passim). For other long lasting church property in colonial Spanish America see Burga 1976: 115-41; Florescano (ed) 1975: 447; Taylor 1972: 174-91 passim; Aranguiz 1967: 221-3; Borde and Gongora 1956: 60,223,228).

(xxvi) We follow here the analysis of Lockhart for Mexico (in Altman et al (eds) 1976: 3-6). See also Prem (1978: 229ff) and, for a different point of view, Taylor 1972: 65-71, 107-10.

rapidly conquered, and left those inhabited by warlike tribes or unsuitable for intensive agriculture as open frontiers. In these frontier areas (northern Mexico, western Colombia, southern Chile, etc) the process of occupation, legal appropriation and exploitation of land was slow due to the lack of Indians who could be submitted to the labour systems used by the Spaniards elsewhere and /or Indian attacks. In these frontier areas the lack of administrative control, the need for the Spanish state to stimulate the colonisation of the borders and the risks involved meant that the settlers were given access to generous land grants which resulted in the formation of latifundia which were not fully exploited. In the core areas on the other hand, the occupation, legal appropriation and exploitation of land by the Spaniards occurred at an early stage and progressed throughout the colonial period. This was in spite of the fact that Indian communities claimed possession of a substantial part of this land and that the state and the encomenderos, at least partially supported these claims in order to permit the physical reproduction of the communities and the production of a surplus, the tribute, on which they depended.

The dicotomy frontier/core areas is, however, insufficient to explain in full the process of occupation of lands by the Spaniards. Thus, in certain areas of high Indian population density, such as southern Mexico and sectors of Andean Peru, Indians retained most of the land at least until the late 18th century. Conversely, some areas which were originally of a frontier character, eg. areas of northern Mexico, became rapidly occupied and exploited by the Spaniards despite the

lack of aboriginal population and in the face of Indian attacks. The key to the explanation of these phenomena lies in the consideration of the formation of markets for Spanish agriculture, which to a large extent coincided with the centres where large numbers of Spaniards lived, and the trade routes between major colonial markets and the metropolis. These colonial markets were urban centres in which non productive activities, such as civil and ecclesiastical administration, commerce and so on and/or non-agrarian production (mining and industry), were concentrated and which generated in their hinterlands the stimulus for agrarian commodity production and for the expansion of the acreage under Spanish control. For the core areas the case of the hinterlands of Mexico City, Puebla, Lima, Potosi, Bogota, Santiago, etc., exemplify this trend. In frontier areas such as the Zacatecas hinterland and the Mexican Bajio the mineral wealth attracted Spanish miners, merchants, churchmen and Indian workers, creating the conditions for a thriving commercial agriculture. Once these trends were consolidated, of course, those regions ceased to be frontier areas.

In our analysis of the agrarian structure of colonial Spanish America we have found two main types of productive unit: the Indian communities and the big landed estate or hacienda. A brief summary and some conclusions as to the role played by each of them and the relations of production which characterised them is now in order.

The Indian communities were formed by relatively independent producers linked to kinship communities which had communal rights of possession of land and communal duties towards the Spanish state such as tributes and repartimiento obligations. The material basis on which the Indian community rested was the

possession of land, which permitted the physical reproduction of its members and the generation of a surplus extracted by the state in the form of tributes, repartimiento drafts, ecclesiastical levies and so forth. The community was subjected, apart from ideological and political factors and the land encroachment of the colonists, to two main pressures. On the one hand the need to maintain a balance between the community population and its land resources, an imbalance could be produced by either an increase in the former which was not compensated for by an increase in the latter, or a reduction of the land resources which in the long run produced a demographic decline through famines, forced emigration and so on. And on the other hand the exactions of the state, which could mean the sale of land to obtain the necessary cash to cover these demands, or the weakening of the labour force available in the community by the withdrawal of its members at crucial periods, such as harvest, or permanently.

During the 16th century all the Indian societies under Spanish dominion suffered a tremendous demographic decline. This created almost everywhere in the Indies the possibility, which the Spaniards were quick to grasp, to appropriate lands in the areas close to Spanish settlements without seriously affecting the Indian/land ratio in the communities. The recovery of the Indian population in Mexico and Peru by the late 18th century created an acute shortage of land resources in most of the communities close to important agrarian markets, and the surplus population was forced to join, temporarily or permanently, the labour force of the Spanish haciendas, other Spanish enterprises or rent lands from the haciendas or other Indian communities. On the other hand in central and northern

Chile and Colombia, where the Indian population decline continued beyond the 18th century Indian communities had land in excess of their subsistence needs and it was possible for them to rent out part of their patrimony to poor Spaniards and mestizos.

The pressures applied by the state and the colonists were many, but the most serious threats to the survival of the community and, indirectly, to their land resources derived from the tributary system and the repartimiento drafts for mining. A high rate of tribute, especially if paid in labour, and/or a repartimiento system including mining work resulted in the escape of large numbers of Indians from their communities to Spanish enterprises or other communities where, although landless, they were free of the repartimiento drafts and paid either a lower rate of tribute or none at all. The most seriously affected communities were obliged by the state to pay tributes for those Indians who had escaped and had no alternative but to sell community land, thus seriously diminishing the possibilities for a future demographic expansion under conditions of economic independence. A quick review of the data presented in the previous chapters[xxvii] indicates a correlation between the stability of the Indian communities and the nature of the Spanish exactions from them. The most favoured communities in the areas analysed were those of Mexico where tribute paid in labour was abolished in the mid 16th century and the mining repartimiento system had little or

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(xxvii) See Chapter 3, especially Tables 6 and 7, and Chapter 4, especially Tables 7 and 9.

no importance during the colonial period. There Indian communities began to recover demographically by the second half of the 17th century and, in the early 19th century, over 90% of Mexico's Indian population, and a higher proportion in areas of prehispanic Indian settlement, lived in their original communities. In Peru, although tribute paid in labour was eliminated by the late 1570's, mining repartimiento established in the 1570's remained as an important feature of the colonial system affecting a large proportion of the Indian population. There Indian demographic recovery only started in the late 18th century and, by that time, almost 40% of the Indians had been uprooted from their communities and worked permanently in Spanish enterprises or rented lands away from their original communities. The provinces most affected were precisely those where the mining draft was enforced. Unfortunately we do not have data discriminating between community and non-community Indians for northern and central Chile and Colombia, but the continuation of the Indian population decline beyond 1800 and the impressive growth of the mestizo and poor white sectors in those colonies suggest a more pronounced process of dissolution of the Indian community. This process was directly connected with the continuation of the payment of tribute in labour in Chile until the late 18th century and, in Colombia, with the mining repartimiento which was only abolished in 1729.

Unfortunately we lack detailed, comparative studies of the internal structure and economic resources of the Indian communities during the colonial period. The data available however indicate the existence of a process of social differentiation between different communities and of class formation

within the communities, based in both cases on differential access to land, livestock, commercial opportunities and so on. The process of social differentiation between Indian communities was somewhat arrested by the colonial state by several mechanisms. Firstly the crown imposed on the Indian communities different tribute rates according to their economic potential and in general tried to limit the community members to the level of mere subsistence. Secondly Spanish law limited Indian land possession to a minimal acreage per tributary which contrasted with the large grants conceded to Spanish individuals. Furthermore it limited the rights of the community over their lands to simple possession and they were therefore liable to reduction of their acreages according to the needs of the state. Only a few rich communities managed to acquire lands in fee-simple through composiciones or purchases, but even in these cases they were liable to expropriations. Finally funds accumulated by the community for periods of disasters and deposited in the community safes (cajas de comunidad) were systematically appropriated by the crown.(xxviii)

The most obvious case of class formation within the Indian communities was the one presented by the exploitation of the Peruvian forasteros by communities of originario Indians in the form of rents paid in labour kind or cash. However within the communities of originarios class differences also appeared. Both in Mexico and Peru Indian chieftains, nobles and officials appropriated community land and exploited the

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(xxviii) This economic degradation of the Indian communities to the level of mere subsistence was not complete since at least some communities had a number of resources at their disposal to reduce these pressures. One of these was the participation of their members in Indian sodalities which maintained economic resources available to their members in cases of disaster. These were immune to crown appropriation although not to ecclesiastical embezzlement or expropriation.

Indian commoners as tenants or unpaid workers. The colonial state, which needed to control the Indian population for tributary and repartimiento purposes, partially relied on the community chieftains and officials who were held responsible if these duties were not fulfilled. At the same time the crown granted those officials privileges such as exemption from tribute and repartimiento drafts, tolerated their abuses of authority and respected their individual wealth. (69)

The function and development of the colonial Spanish American hacienda was determined by a variety of factors. Among them the most significant ones were, a) the formation, expansion and contraction of the agrarian markets within each colony or the possibilities for export, which in the main determined the profitability of the haciendas and the stability or instability of the hacendado class, and b) the character and size of the Indian communities of each region, which to a large extent determined the forms of exploitation of labour used by the haciendas.

The initial stimulus for the production of agricultural items under the control of the Spaniards, as opposed to mere commercialisation of Indian production, arose with the need to find a substitute for food that was imported at a high price from Spain and was not produced by the Indians, such as wheat, livestock, sugar and so on. A second stimulus came about with the creation of mining centres in which a large number of non-agricultural producers with a substantial purchasing power lived, and where a supply of large numbers of draft animals and fodder was needed. In the markets thus provided the haciendas were in competition with smaller Spanish or mestizo

farmers and the Indian communities. In periods of high agricultural prices this presented no obstacle for the profitability of the hacienda and the income of the hacendados. In periods of low agricultural prices, however, the income of the hacendados was seriously hit, especially if they had high fixed costs (mortgages, a high labour bill and so on). To overcome this problem the hacendados used at least two strategies. One was the manipulation of the market by withholding their products from it during the years of good harvests and low prices and releasing them in the periods of scarcity. A second strategy was to reduce or eliminate the competition of the petty commodity producer by monopolising the productive factors: land labour and capital. Obviously the importance of these factors changed over time and from region to region. Initially land had little economic value and the use of the labour force through the encomienda, repartimiento and serfdom was the key productive factor which the hacendados strove to monopolise. Later on, as the population grew, land became, at least in the hinterlands of the big cities, the most important factor and landless peasants had to accept the terms offered by the hacendados to obtain their means of subsistence. As for capital, during the colonial period capital investment had little importance and to a large extent credit depended on the ownership of productive and well located land.

If the hacienda was externally, that is from the point of view of its sales, orientated towards the market to provide the landowners with the means to pay for a luxurious life style which was only available with large sums of money, internally, that is from the point of view of its purchases, the hacienda was orientated towards a natural economy. With

a few exceptions productive and non-productive items consumed in the hacienda were produced internally, such as draft animals, food for the workers and, in many cases, containers, coarse cloth for the workers, tools and so on, or directly commercialised by the hacendado through the hacienda shop. Labour itself became integrated into this natural circuit by legal adscription, serfdom, service tenantry, debt peonage and slavery. Only in some regions and periods did reliance on the market for the acquisition of productive items and payment of the workers in cash became important. Lack of liquid capital within the hacendado class, scarcity of coin and the interests of the merchant class, which depended for its profits on a network of credit relations, prevented the expansion of the money economy in the countryside and retarded the development of productive specialisation in the haciendas.

The size of the market and the degree of control of the haciendas over it locally or regionally and the variation of agricultural prices in other colonies and Europe largely determined the rates of return on capital of the colonial haciendas and the stability of the hacendado class. Sudden expansion of demand for tropical products such as sugar, indigo or cacao brought about enormous rates of return for short periods in the Indies. Competition from new producers within or outside the colonies and the internal rise in the price of foodstuffs brought the profitability down but, demand remaining high, the haciendas engaged in these areas of production could achieve a handsome return. The collapse of international prices, a factor which was beyond the control of the hacendados, could however diminish the profitability of the haciendas to negative levels. Internal markets had more stability but wide

fluctuations in agricultural prices also occurred. The establishment, growth or decay of mining and urban centres produced periods of increase or decline in agricultural prices. Seasonal and periodical 'crises' of overproduction also tended to diminish the profits of the haciendas, but in these cases the more powerful hacendados had at their disposal mechanisms of compensation which made these crises less serious.

The stability of the hacendado class was closely associated with the profitability of its haciendas and therefore indirectly with the market situation. Rich entrepreneurs (owners of large haciendas, miners, merchants, church bodies) acquired and held on to haciendas which provided high returns. As they were proprietors of several enterprises, these could be passed to their heirs at the death of the entrepreneur, without dividing or selling each particular enterprise. The property of corporate bodies or mayorazgos or entails provided a further stimulus to stability of ownership in these profitable haciendas. On the other hand unprofitable haciendas changed hands rapidly since they were already encumbered with mortgages and, unless the market situation changed favourably, this did not permit the owners the capital accumulation necessary to improve them in order to have at least a mediocre return. The owners of such haciendas were on the fringes of the hacendado class and their descendants usually joined the ranks of the large tenants, hacienda administrators, medium sized proprietors or the professions which were not connected with agriculture.

Colonial haciendas relied on a variety of labour systems ranging from slavery to waged labour passing through a series

of intermediate forms. The size and character of the Indian population determined to a large extent the development of these labour systems. Where the Indian population was scarce or non existent, the development of intensive agriculture required the importation of African slaves as in Cuba, Venezuela and coastal Peru, or if capital for the purchase of slaves was not available, it had to wait for a substantial increase in the stratum of mestizos or poor whites as in the case of central Chile. Livestock raising haciendas, however, were less dependent on demographic factors and they could be run with a handful of encomienda Indians, slaves or hired hands. The presence and survival of populous Indian communities submitted to the Spaniards, on the other hand, meant that there was an abundance of labour for the haciendas which was employed by them according to the capacity of the markets, the regulations imposed by the state and the capacity of the communities to retain their members and their land resources. Up until the early 17th century, the state forms of distribution of the Indian labour force among colonists (encomienda, tribute paid in labour and the repartimiento system) were of enormous importance for the operation of the haciendas. By that time haciendas had managed to acquire a stable and full time population, with only a weak connection or none at all to the Indian communities. Finally during the last decades of the colonial period, at least in the highly commercialised areas of central Mexico where there was a surplus Indian population, haciendas increasingly relied on temporary workers hired from the Indian communities.

The demographic factor does not exhaust the determination of the forms of labour used by the colonial haciendas. The

process of obtaining, retaining and exploiting the labour force in the haciendas was also connected to the market situation, the expansion of the monetary economy and the policies of the state and the practices of its agents. Within the permanent labour force of the haciendas we have discerned 5 or 6 forms of obtaining/retaining labourers. Their characteristics in terms of coercion and the type of payment received have been summarised in Table 11. The first three forms of hacienda labour listed (legal serfdom, adscripted peonage and debt peonage) required a system of extra-economic compulsion exerted by the hacienda itself and ensured by the officials of the state who, legally or illegally, enforced the retention of the workers on the haciendas. The main difference between these forms was the payment of the labour force which ranged from the mere usufruct of land under legal serfdom to, in theory, cash for debt and adscripted peonage. In the case of debt peonage their debt could be either an advantage or disadvantage for the worker depending on the labour market situation. An initial advance of wages for the workers could result from the inability of the hacendado to obtain workers by other means and this involved a risk for the hacendado depending on whether wages increased or decreased locally and the possibilities of the workers to repay the debt or escape. Several techniques were used by the hacienda owners, such as levying surcharges on the items sold in the hacienda shop, stimulating conspicuous expenditure, gaining the connivance of the local bureaucrats and so on, to diminish this risk to a minimum. The two other forms of permanent labour used in the haciendas (free peonage and service tenants) did not need

political coercion for their operation but differed in the type of payment the worker received.

The data presented in Chapter 5, section b, fragmentary as it is, at least suggests some trends in the development of the forms of permanent labour used by the haciendas. Firstly the coercive forms of labour tended to be retained in the areas of scarcity of labour and little development of the regional markets. That was the case of Oaxaca, Tlaxcala and most of Andean Peru. On the contrary, in areas close to important markets and well provided with labour, such as the Mexico City and Guadalajara hinterlands, the Bajio and coca producing areas of Upper Peru, these forms tended to become obsolete and were replaced by free peonage and tenancies. Secondly, the

Table 11: Main forms of permanent labour used by the colonial haciendas. (*)

Type	coercion	usufruct of land as the only form of payment.
Legal serfdom	+	+
Adscriptive peonage	+	-
Debt peonage	+	-
Free peonage	-	-
Service tenants	-	+

(*) + indicates the presence of the trait, - its absence.

situation of tenants, initially similar to independent proprietors, increasingly deteriorated under the double pressure of population growth and the impact of commodity production, e.g. 18th and 19th century Chile and the Mexican Bajio. Thirdly, there seems to be a cause and effect relation in

situations where there was a surplus in the supply of labour between the development of a monetary economy and free peonage, e.g. the cases of the Guadalajara and Mexico City hinterland and the Mexican Bajio. Finally the sample of regions and haciendas analysed indicates that de facto coercive forms of obtaining and retaining a permanent labour force predominated within the colonial Spanish American hacienda.