



This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s.

THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE ALGERIAN
REVOLUTION, 1956-1962: AN ANALYSIS OF A MAJOR
NEWSPAPER'S REPORTING OF EVENTS

by

Miloud Barkaoui

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Keele.

April 1988

To the memory of my father, Belkacem Barkaoui

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the response of *The New York Times* international edition to the Algerian revolution from 1956 to 1962. During the early years the paper took the French official view; however as the inevitability of independence became apparent, it began to take a more detached stance towards the Algerian-French conflict. Attention is also given to the ways in which other news publications responded to events in Algeria in order to establish some form of comparison.

Chapter I exposes the strengths and weaknesses of *The New York Times* as a leading newspaper. Chapter II briefly traces Algeria's relationship with France from occupation to the outbreak of the revolution, and analyses *The New York Times* earlier response to the Algerian experience up to 1956. Chapters III to VI provide a detailed thematic analysis of the way in which *The New York Times* reported and presented the Algerian revolution from 1956 to 1962, using other media and extra-media data. This is to establish a cross-check control of, and to expose what was missing from, its Algeria-related material. Chapter VII provides a statistical analysis of the manner in which *The New York Times* treated the Algerian revolution, using the "attention score" measurement system; and traces the evolution of the paper's stance towards the Algerian-French conflict throughout four major sub-periods within the overall period of research.

The thesis reveals that *The New York Times* coverage of Algeria between 1956 and 1962 was quantitatively plentiful, and that the level of interest in the subject was high. However, it shows that qualitatively the coverage was generally weak and that its greatest flaw was that of "omission". It concludes by outlining some basic guidelines which should control journalists in their reporting, in order to provide adequate coverage of world events.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe considerable gratitude to the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education for a generous grant which made this research possible.

I am indebted to my supervisor Professor David K. Adams for his active encouragement, constant critical stimulation and unfailing guidance throughout the preparation of this thesis. To him I also owe many thanks for his kindness, advice and humour throughout my stay in Keele.

I am obliged to all those who were willing to offer me help and advice: to Mr. R.W. Apple, the former *New York Times* Chief Correspondent in London; to a host of librarians in Algeria and England, especially the staff of the University of Keele Inter-Library Loan section; to the staff of the Department of American Studies; and to Mrs. Karen Harrison for her careful typing.

Not least, I wish to express my appreciation to my family and friends whose support and encouragement have been instrumental to the completion of this work.

April 1988

Miloud Barkaoui


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY	iii
MAP OF ALGERIA	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: REFLECTIONS ON <i>THE NEW YORK TIMES</i> , ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES	9
CHAPTER II: ALGERIA FROM POLITICAL AWAKENING TO REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM	24
CHAPTER III: TOWARDS FULL-FLEDGED REVOLUTION - "THE WORLD TAKES NOTICE"	61
CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND ALGERIA: SELF-DETERMINATION CONCEDED AS THE MILITARY OPTION FAILED	104
CHAPTER V: OVERTURES FOR A SETTLEMENT AND <i>COLON</i> INTRANSIGENCE - THE BARRICADES, THE PUTSCH AND O.A.S. TERRORISM	183
CHAPTER VI: THE HARD ROAD TO PEACE, ALGERIA'S ADVENT TO INDEPENDENCE AMIDST GROWING TENSION	252
CHAPTER VII: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF <i>THE NEW YORK TIMES</i> COVERAGE OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION, 1956-1962	277
CONCLUSION	324
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	335

ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY

- A.L.N. : *Armée de Libération Nationale*
- A.M.L. : *Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*
- C.C.E. : *Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution*
- colons* : European settlers or colonists in Algeria
- C.R.U.A. : *Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action*
- C.S.P. : *Comité du Salut Public* (Committee of Public Safety). This first appeared in France in 1793 during the First Republic as a means to preserve national security through centralized political authority. The notion appeared in Algeria in February 1956 and in May 1958 when committees, composed of army officers and *colon* activists, contributed to the downfall of the Fourth Republic. Similar committees tried in January 1960 to overthrow General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic.
- Dawla* : Arabic word for (Algerian) State
- fellagha* : Arabic word for highwaymen used by the French authorities in reference to the nationalist fighters.
- fidayine* : F.L.N. fighters in urban areas
- F.L.N. : *Front de Libération Nationale*
- interlocuteurs valables* : valid representatives (of the Algerian people)
- G.P.R.A. : *Gouvernement Provisoire de la Révolution Algérienne*
- Maghreb* : Arabic word for "the West" referring to the countries of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.
- M.N.A. : *Mouvement National Algérien*
- M.T.L.D. : *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*
- N.A.T.O. : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- O.A.S. : *Organisation de L'Armée Secrète*
- O.S. : *Organisation Secrète*
- P.C.A. : *Parti Communiste Algérien*
- P.P.A. : *Parti du Peuple Algérien*

- pieds noirs* : "black feet", name used in reference to the *colons*. One theory refers the origin of this term to the black polished shoes of the French troops; another theory refers it to the usually patronizing attitude of metropolitan French towards the *colons* whose feet, it was held, turned black because of excessive exposure to the African heat.
- ratissage*: : French word for "scraping" or "raking"; policy adopted by the French army against Algerian villages supporting the F.L.N.
- U.D.M.A. : *Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien*
- U.G.T.A. : *Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens*
- Ulemas* : Moslem Scholars
- U.N. : United Nations
- ultras* : diehard *colons* opposed to political changes in Algeria
- Wilaya* : One of the six provinces (or military commands) of the F.L.N. in Algeria.



INTRODUCTION

In 1962 Algeria regained its independence after 132 years of colonial rule and multifaceted resistance to French colonialism. Such resistance reached its zenith in 1954 when the Algerians declared an all-out military showdown with France, making their struggle for independence one of the most articulate symbols of post-1945 Third World aspirations for self-rule.

The thesis is primarily concerned with the response of one leading world newspaper to the events in Algeria between 1956 and 1962. The newspaper selected is *The New York Times* international edition. This edition, essentially based on the New York city late edition, is taken because, being aimed at the paper's European and international readership, it embodied the stance that the New York proprietors and editors wanted to project about the paper's response to the Algerian problem. Chapter I discusses the evolution of *The New York Times* and its position as a world-class newspaper. What happened in Algeria from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s represented another colonial crisis and a war of independence that cost the lives of more than one million people. It brought hardship to millions more, caused the downfall of six French governments and the collapse of the Fourth Republic, jeopardized Western security and the future of the N.A.T.O. alliance and added more fuel to Cold War rivalry. But, it was also a full-fledged revolution that transformed the realities in Algeria, in France and in Africa as a whole and added a significant new dimension to twentieth century "colonial wars". It promoted those same universal democratic principles for which Republican France itself has so often striven, and restored the Algerian State after more than a

century of colonial obscurity and a tragic abuse of military force by the imperial power.

Although the Algerian liberation movement, led by the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (F.L.N.), was officially declared in 1954, it was in 1956 that it became a popular revolution conducting a full-scale war. It was during this year that the F.L.N. geographically expanded its activities from its original base in eastern and central Algeria to the whole country. Its fighting ability was strengthened by a surge of popular support, an increase in the number of its recruits and by the acquisition of more effective arms, especially after the independence of Tunisia and Morocco which became both refuges and supply routes for *L'Armée de Libération Nationale* (A.L.N.). It was also the year in which the F.L.N. strengthened its claim as the only representative of the Algerian people, a role confirmed by the rallying of the old parties and nationalist factions *en masse* to its cause and their declaration of loyalty to it. The F.L.N. clearly defined its ideology, outlined its future objectives and set up its structural institutions during the Soummam Conference. It was also the year in which the French intensified their war effort by throwing half a million troops with the latest in military technology into Algeria; the excesses of the French army, including torture, became well-publicised facts in the war; N.A.T.O. involvement on France's side became obvious; and the internationalization of the conflict took a new turn. This crucial year in the conduct of the Algerian revolution is therefore taken as the main point of departure in this analysis.

But, in order to understand the events of 1956-1962, it is clearly necessary to look back into the earlier history of

Algerian-French relations. This is done in two ways. First, by a brief historical statement of the French encounter with Algeria before 1945. Second, by consideration of the increasing tensions in the relationship, as Algerian expectations at the end of the Second World War were undermined by the French effort to reimpose full colonial rule. The forms of post-War confrontation between France and the Algerian nationalists until 1954 and the early revolutionary activities from 1954 to 1956 form the subject of Chapter II.

Although the Algerian revolution in itself has been the subject of voluminous research, little effort - if any - has been made to examine its coverage in the news media. This study is, therefore, an attempt to investigate the way in which it was reported and presented by the world press, as represented by *The New York Times* measured against a selection of other daily and weekly publications. Chapters III to VI provide a thematic analysis of the conflict from 1956 to 1962. Chapter III addresses itself to the crucial years 1956 and 1957. Chapter IV deals with the period 1958-1959. Chapter V is devoted to the period 1960-1961. The final year of the revolution, 1962, forms the subject of Chapter VI. This analysis is quality-oriented; it has adopted the traditional historical approach based on cross-disciplinary knowledge. Yet, whilst promoting historicism, it introduces and utilizes some statistical and numerical methods in order to establish a quantitative model. It is concerned on the one hand with *what* the paper purveyed to its readers and *how* it purveyed it, and on the other hand with *what* it did *not* purvey but chose to omit. For the sake of thematic, analytical reliability, this analysis has not relied on samples based on regular intervals of time as other studies have done. Rather, it has examined all material in the paper's items that is directly related to Algeria: news reports,

editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor.

The major part of this thesis analyses the focal thematic points in *The New York Times* coverage of Algeria and its attitude towards the major themes. A "theme", here, can be defined as any statement, opinion, expression, assertion or implication on any subject related to the Algerian-French conflict which is repeated in subsequent issues. Some important questions to answer are whether the paper tried to investigate, interpret and analyse the subject as opposed to straightforward reporting of "hot news"; whether it presented facts with their historical, socio-economic and cultural contexts. Did *The New York Times* make the effort to go beyond current events to provide its readers with background information, and with the causes as well as the on-going nature and effects of the crisis?

Of major significance is the investigation of the accuracy of the information printed by *The New York Times* on the Algerian revolution. The thesis therefore addresses itself to the difficult question of facts. What really happened? What was reported and displayed in the paper? Because cross-disciplinary knowledge is of vital importance to this type of study, constant reference to established authoritative works and essential archival material is made throughout the thematic analysis. Meanwhile, a cross-check control of the paper's data on the subject has been established through an informal thematic comparison of its coverage with other selected news media, in the attempt to determine the extent to which the paper conformed to prevailing patterns of reportage and interpretation. Hence, *Time* magazine, *The Economist*, *The (London) Times*, *El Moudjahid* (the official organ of the F.L.N.) and *Le Monde* have been chosen for such cross-check control. Importance is also given to the official position of the United States

government and its attitude towards the conflict, and various alternative views are also examined as they found expression on Capitol Hill, and among trade unions and private organizations.

The thesis also examines the manner in which the paper displayed and presented its Algeria material. Both "frequency of occurrence" and "prominence of display" reflect the paper's position and attitude towards the subject. A front-page story, for example, bears more prominence than an inside story; an article with a four-column headline is more prominent than one with a two-column headline. Prominent presentation of particular items shows those aspects of the Algerian "problem" which were deemed to be most important. Such presentation or display, in addition to items count, help detect the paper's level of interest and fluctuation in attention in "peak" and "valley" terms.

To analyse the way in which *The New York Times* displayed and presented its Algeria material, the "attention score" system elaborated by Richard Budd stands as a useful approach.¹ Here, however, the slightly modified procedure based on a three-point scale, seems better suited to measure the degree of prominence of the news "play" than Budd's two-point scale. Hence, three points are assigned to any article with a headline covering horizontally four columns (or more) on the same page. Two points are assigned to any article which is two-columns (or more) wide, to articles covering three-fourths (or more) of the length of a complete column. Two points are also assigned to items printed on the front page, the editorial and opinion page or in the Sunday section "News of the Week in Review". One point is assigned to any item which does not meet any of the above-mentioned criteria.

All of *The New York Times* Algeria-related items are identified here as news reports, editorials, commentaries, letters to the editor or features. The news reports are classified according to their origin and source of information. Every item is classified according to its "valence": pro-French, pro-Algerian, neutral (or balanced). At the same time it is recognized that the issue of pro/con (favourable/unfavourable) is not yet totally resolved as the methodology for this type of research is not yet fully developed. An attempt is therefore also made to detect and examine the reporting errors or technical inaccuracies that are related either to the source, to the composition of the headline or to the material phraseology. Attention is also paid to the extent to which such errors are favourable or unfavourable to one side or the other. Chapter VII provides a statistical analysis of *The New York Times* coverage of the Algerian revolution using the "attention score" system of measurement.

It is widely accepted that the "information" each news medium purveys to its audience contributes to the overall shaping of the images that nations hold of each other. These images, which the media play an important part in forming, inevitably influence both the perception and attitudes of nations and, therefore, become an important variable in the field of international relations. What happened in Algeria during the period under study affected many different people, in different parts of the world in different ways. News of the Algerian-French conflict captured the attention of the news corps throughout the world. For many people, lay readers and experts alike, the print media served as the only source of information on the subject. *The New York Times* was one of the news sources relied upon for such information.

It has been selected for this study mainly because of its widely accepted reputation as the best, most prestigious and most influential newspaper in the United States. It was ranked first by an American panel, consisting mainly of leading international communications scholars, that was asked to name the top ten American "quality" papers.² It is widely read by top officials, academics and cultural figures. And it is regarded as an "international" newspaper with a multinational audience and a world-wide news interest, and as a model for "serious", "responsible" American journalism.

Notes

1. See Richard Budd, "Attention Score: A Device for Measuring a News 'Play'", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, No.2, 1964, pp.259-262.
2. See John C. Merrill, "U.S. Panel Names World's Ten Leading 'Quality' Dailies", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, 1964, pp.568-572.

CHAPTER I

REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW YORK TIMES, ITS STRENGTHS
AND WEAKNESSES

"... *The New York Times*... has always gone in for quantity rather than quality." [Dwight Macdonald, 1963]

"... My beefs about the *Times* are my beefs about the American press generally, but the *Times* could do something about it. And it does not..." [George Kennan]

The New York Times is widely regarded as one of the leading "prestige" newspapers in the United States and perhaps in the world. Prestige newspapers are those which hold an "influential" position either because of their in-depth news analysis or because of their extensive news coverage.¹ In the 1950s and 1960s *The New York Times* fell under the category of dailies which had acquired their elite or "prestige" image only through the extensiveness of their news material. As one American observer remarked, it had the "best coverage in extent", but for balanced, in-depth reporting the *Christian Science Monitor* or the *Baltimore Sun* might have been better.²

The slogan, "All The News That's Fit To Print", which first appeared in October 1896 and still figures on the front page of *The New York Times*, typifies its traditional claim of antipathy to sensationalization of the news and its pledge to print all that is "clear, dignified and trustworthy".³ Its publisher once defined the news that is *not* fit to print as "what's untrue".⁴ It has always sought to display itself as a serious-minded newspaper which prints all that is straight and unspectacular. In reality, however, it is

impossible for it to print "all" the news that is worth printing even without the fact that at least half its space is traditionally devoted to advertising. It is impossible for a single paper to cover all metropolitan news, let alone national and international affairs. In this context, the slogan "All The News That's Fit To Print" has been widely described as a "fraud".⁵

Yet, the founding of *The New York Times* in 1851 is seen as a turning point in the history of American journalism. It was launched as a serious newspaper for an educated audience in reaction to the growing "sensationalism" of the time, especially by newspapers like *The Sun*, *The Herald* and *The Tribune*.⁶ Its co-founders wanted to make it "the best and cheapest daily family newspaper" in the United States.⁷ In its first issue, the paper ran an editorial entitled "A Word About Us" in which the publisher defined its principles and direction:

"We do not mean to write as if we were in a passion, unless that shall really be the case; and we shall make it a point to get into a passion as rarely as possible. There are very few things in the world which is worth while to get angry about; and⁸ they are just the things that anger will not improve".

A few decades later it reiterated, perhaps more arrogantly, its claim of commitment to a morally "higher journalism", proclaiming itself as the champion of the serious-minded readers against the "jingoism" and "lavishness" of the yellow papers of the 1890s. Its article "New Journalism and Vice" of 3 March 1898, typified its campaign against sensational newspapers such as *The World* and *The Journal*. It quoted a critic who described the "fearful struggle" in which the American press had become engaged and which involved "two classes" of journalism: "On the one side stand the reputable papers which represent decency and truth, and on the other, is what calls

itself the new journalism, but which is in reality as old as sin itself".⁹

Similarly, this century, *The New York Times* has always pledged commitment to the principle of printing only what is serious and formal. It enhanced this pledge during the Great War when it was forced to cut its advertising lineage to cope with the ever increasing density and scope of news about an ever widening global crisis. "Don't spoil the paper for a few columns of advertising", its publisher had advised the editors. In 1918 the paper received a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of the War.¹⁰ The Great War represented a turning point in establishing the reputation of *The New York Times* as a newspaper that took responsibility to cover international news.

The New York Times has always sought to appeal to an elite audience, elite both in terms of "wealth" and "breadth of interest".¹¹ Reiterating the paper's claim of being representative of serious thoughtful journalism, the distinguished columnist James Reston once wrote:

"Our primary responsibility is not... to the commuter reading the paper on his way home from Westchester. Our primary responsibility is to the historian of fifty years from now".¹²

When it was first established, the paper pledged to be a newspaper "for the masses" to be sold at a popular price and with as diverse a news diet as possible.¹³ It soon, however, became identified with the commercial and investing middle classes.¹⁴ Because of its appeal to an "intelligent" and "wealthy" audience, representing only a fraction of the American population, it was accused of being a tool in the hands of the richest few, namely the trusts and Wall Street bankers.¹⁵ By the mid-1920s, it began to be seen by many as a "badge of

respectability" worn by people at different social and economic ladders; many read it simply because the elite did.¹⁶

Politically, too, by the late 19th century, *The New York Times*, had identified itself unequivocally with "Republican journalism" and with the Republican Party.¹⁷ However, as it sought to be viewed as a paper of record it shifted towards non-partisanship and political independence within the "liberal" tradition. It is, however, hard to validate its assertion of a liberal orientation, for its support of Democratic rather than Republican Presidential candidates does not, as has been suggested, necessarily sustain such a claim.¹⁸ On the contrary, it can be shown that the paper has, on many occasions, adopted a conservative stand on different issues, perhaps indeed more conservative than that of its readership.¹⁹ Yet, compared with other American newspapers, *The New York Times* looks relatively "liberal" because of its consistent criticism of the abuse of political power.

As part of the elite press, the paper is widely read by top officials in the United States. Though it may not influence decision making directly, it has usually occupied a significant position in the minds of policy makers. For officials and statesmen, it is both an important "purveyor of news" and a respected medium through which they can put their views, both to the public and to the different governmental institutions. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was once asked by a *New York Times* reporter: "Do you know anything we don't know?" "Of course not," he replied, "where do you think we get our information from?"²⁰ This may have been humorous, but *The New York Times* was and is widely rated as one of the most influential of the news media, through which American public opinion is informed about events.²¹

Through its national and international concerns it has sometimes played a significant role in the policy-making process of the United States. For example, not only did it influence public opinion towards the Cuban revolution at least in its early phases, it also, through its correspondent in Cuba Herbert Matthews, helped to form the attitudes of President Eisenhower, particularly towards the revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. It later came under fierce attacks for what was called "... the campaign of propaganda and misrepresentation which sold Fidel Castro to the people of the United States as a liberal and a democrat", and was accused of being one of the different forces in the United States which were working on behalf of the communists in Cuba.²² The State Department blamed the press in general, and *The New York Times* in particular, for helping Castro to power. In his testimony before the Senate, the American Ambassador to Cuba, Andrew Gardner, stated:

"Three front-page articles in the New York Times in early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro's world stature and world recognition...

After the Matthews articles... he [Castro] was able to get followers and funds in Cuba and in the United States. From that time on, money and soldiers of fortune abounded. Much of the American press began to picture Castro as a political Robin Hood".²³

With regard to the Vietnam War the news media, including *The New York Times*, are now, by the extent of their factual reporting, viewed as having had an important effect on both public and official opinion in the United States. With the acquisition of the highly important 4000 Pentagon Papers, *The New York Times* was able, in the words of one critic, "... to manipulate the history of the Vietnam War for withdrawal".²⁴

The New York Times has also influenced the conduct of domestic policy; its role in the disclosure of the Watergate scandal is a case

in point. Although it was beaten by the *Washington Post* in breaking perhaps "the century's biggest and best story", its coverage of the event was far more extensive than any other newspaper.²⁵ In 1973 it devoted three million words to the affair which it branded as "sinister", "subversive" and a reflection of an "authoritarian" ambition. Watergate stands as a perfect example of the press acting as a watchdog for the public interest and the ultimate critic of the government.²⁶ Its domestic political influence harks back to its earlier days where it played a prominent role amongst the "crusading" journals;²⁷ a classic example of this being its campaign against the Tweed Ring in 1870.²⁸

Together with a few other daily newspapers, like the *Washington Post*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *St. Louis Dispatch*, *The New York Times*, representing the prestige press in the United States, acts both as a guide and as an opinion leader to the less affluent American publications. It exerts particular impact on the smaller newspapers, for which it serves both as a major source of information and as an important "spring board" which sets the standard.²⁹ These newspapers often turn to its material as an alternative to the expensive services of the news agencies and wire services.³⁰

Statistically, *The New York Times* has traditionally led the field of foreign news coverage in the United States. According to a survey conducted by the International Press Institute in 1953, for example, it rated first in terms of the extent of foreign news reporting, with an average of 32 columns on foreign events a day, as opposed to only four columns for each of the other 105 American daily newspapers examined in the survey.³¹ In the 1960s it had a daily circulation of

700,000, a Sunday circulation of about one million and a half and a staff of 5,000 people. It also had forty full-time correspondents abroad compared with only ten for the *New York Herald Tribune* and twelve for its closest rival, the *Christian Science Monitor*. Its foreign news payroll was estimated at \$750,000 and the expenses of its foreign news services stood at an average of \$4,000,000 a year.³²

Today, *The New York Times* still statistically leads the field with about fifty full-time correspondents throughout the world. It has in recent years become self-reliant in terms of collection of foreign news. Of the million words or so it receives daily, it is claimed, only about 200,000 come from wire services and news agencies. The remaining 800,000 words come from its own correspondents.³³ Whilst three decades ago, except at time of crisis or revolution, the origins of "news" were often known beforehand - London, Paris, Rome and Moscow - today literally every region or spot in the world is a potential centre for big news. As a "collector of news", *The New York Times* has to a large extent been without rival in the United States.³⁴

Nevertheless, a "good" newspaper should not be judged according to statistics alone, such as the amount of its revenues or the number of its advertising lines or the yards of material it prints everyday, or by the multitude of its readership. Rather, it should be judged primarily according to the quality of its news reportage. Despite its quantitative supremacy, *The New York Times* coverage of foreign news has often been criticised for being qualitatively weak and for lacking "professional competence in the reporting and interpreting of events, especially outside the United States". Its news columns have been described as superficial, descriptive and intellectually mediocre.³⁵ It has even been suggested that the paper's editors and correspondents

are preoccupied only with what is dramatic and exciting: "Analytical coverage is no part of their training... If there is no 'crisis'... they feel there is nothing to report. The exceptions are provided by a few privileged correspondents who are allowed to roam further afield and to file 'background material'".³⁶ Many complain that its position amongst the leading newspapers in the world is overrated, arguing that although it has achieved pre-eminence in terms of the "quantity" of news reporting, its analytical interpretive standards badly need elevating. *The New York Times*, and the American press in general, have often been accused of failing to "explain the world to the people who live in it", by relying on superficial "hot" news at the expense of interpretation and analysis. However, it can also be argued that the reportorial element, namely the sheer weight of reporting and the repetition of factual information can be more effective in influencing public opinion than interpretation and analysis.³⁷ Yet, as the following chapters will demonstrate, the press's duty should not only be to describe events but also to give the "meaning" and "significance" of the news. Reporters, as Benjamin Demott has argued, should act as continuous analysts of events rather than as "firemen" to be requested only "on call" and then no longer required once the fire is over.

The New York Times does, to some extent, have an audience of national character. Yet, it can never claim to be a "national newspaper" in a European sense, especially after the failure of its West Coast edition two years after it had been launched in 1962, because it was unable to penetrate the highly competitive Western market and to compete with *The Los Angeles Times*.³⁸ It is not, in fact, easy for any American newspaper to be a national daily comparable to *The (London) Times* or *Le Monde*. This is due in part to

the local nature of advertising and in part to the subcontinental size of the country.³⁹ Like the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Christian Science Monitor* and *U.S.A. Today*, however, *The New York Times* has recently been moving towards becoming a national newspaper with regional editions printed in satellite plants across the country.

Nevertheless, it has not yet managed to put an end to the imbalance between its local, national and international news diets. It has indeed remained predominantly a New York daily.⁴⁰ "In traditional news value, national events rank above international, state events above national and local above state", wrote one observer, "so that if the municipal leaders happen to be involved in a scandal at the same time the French Parliament finally rejects EDC, then the latter is likely to be relegated to the inner recesses of a paper where fewer persons will read about it".⁴¹ This stems from the traditional interest of the American public in local, state and national news in that order, except at time of national scandal or of war when their interest shifts abroad.⁴²

News gathering is primarily a type of business and the success of any business depends on its revenue which is subject to economic factors like circulation, the scale of advertising and the daily expenses of its different services and personnel. As a "big business", *The New York Times* reached its zenith in the 1950s and 1960s, when it became statistically without rival in the United States, with a gross income of more than \$112 million.⁴³

Ironically, however, its spectacular growth over the last few decades resulted in some serious antithetical consequences as it was becoming managerially more complex. Its physical expansion generated an evident lack of coordination between the management of the daily

edition and that of the Sunday edition, and also between the editors of the day and those of the night.⁴⁴ Hence, several small "dukedom" emerged within its ranks, namely the news department, the Sunday department and the editorial page, each with its own personnel and "territory". This often resulted in antagonism between those "separate entities" and in extra-bureaucratic and managerial complications.⁴⁵ At the professional level, the paper fell victim to its own claimed "encyclopaedism" and, in the words of its managing editor, was growing "dull" and "stodgy" with "long sentences and countless dangling phrases".⁴⁶ Its news columns were generally devoid of background, analytical or interpretive material which would enable the reader to understand the complexity of events and their "whys" and "hows": "... if news is viewed as the flow of information relating to contemporary issues, on the basis of which political opinions take shape and decisions are made, then the 'whys' are an integral part of the news itself rather than something extra that needs to be justified as equally important or even more important".⁴⁷

The New York Times editorial columns in the 1950s and 1960s were also criticised for their "lack of vitality" and for being "boring", "unpersuasive" and "lacking in punch".⁴⁸ It became known as the "good gray *Times*" partly because of its editorials which lacked "bite" and partly because of its typography which looked dull and "old fashioned".⁴⁹ Editing was another area in which the paper seemed vulnerable to sharp criticism. It was often described as "chaotic" with just everything thrown in anywhere without evidence of clear professional consideration. The paper was particularly criticised for not being selective enough and was accused of "intellectual mediocracy" which, in the words of one observer, forced the reader to do "a lot of digging... to sort the facts out in the welter of *Times*

verbosity and to find out what they mean"; that is, do the work of the editors.⁵⁰ Its foreign coverage was especially singled out for criticism because, as already pointed out, it lacked essential background, analytical material despite its relative extensiveness.

In order to heal *The New York Times* divisions and splits to create one "coordinated newspaper" with firm authority at the centre and to improve its writing standards, the post of Executive Editor was established in the early 1960s and went to the former Managing Editor, Turner Catledge.⁵¹ Catledge, in an effort to bring all the separate entities of the paper and its personnel under his control, introduced the daily conferences with editors of the different departments.⁵² He gave more attention to the paper's "make up", typography, quality of reporting, editing, and also to the competition of the electronic media, especially Television. He also urged the editors to make the paper "more readable" by making it simpler and brighter, and instructed the reporters to make their news stories as simple and as brief as possible.⁵³

The growing powers of the Executive Editor resulted in a serious diminishing in the authority of the publisher over what was printed. In the 1950s, *The New York Times* publisher exercised considerable powers and exerted evident influence on the choice of subjects to be treated and even the way they were treated, at least with regard to local and national affairs. A classic example of this is the paper's support of General Eisenhower in the 1952 Presidential election. Because of the influence of the publisher, who was an enthusiastic supporter of the Republican candidate, *The New York Times* offered General Eisenhower unequivocal support from the start before the Democratic candidate was even known.⁵⁴ In recent years, however, the

publisher has had little "psychological" influence on its conduct, which stems largely from his choice of the Executive Editor and the other senior editors.⁵⁵

Despite constant attempts to introduce more analytical and interpretive material into its columns, *The New York Times* has always remained a news-oriented paper which "... has always gone in for quantity rather than quality".⁵⁶ It has always given absolute priority to "hot news" at the expense of the "hows" and "whys" of events. This has tended to produce superficial and purely descriptive news accounts, giving justification to the argument that a good newspaper should not be judged according to statistics or printing lineage, but rather according to the *quality* of its coverage. This thesis explores the manner in which *The New York Times* perceived and presented the Algerian revolution, and the extent to which its coverage was adequate in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

Notes

1. Ithiel de Sola Pool, *"The Prestige Papers": A Survey of Their Editorials*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952, p.1; Wilbur Schramm, ed., *One Day in the World's Press*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959, p.4.
2. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p.137.
3. Adolf S. Ochs quoted by John Tebbel, *The Compact History of the American Newspaper*, New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1963, p.195.
4. Quoted in Meyer Berger, *The Story of The New York Times, 1851-1951*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, p.20.
5. David S. Broder, *Behind the Front Page*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, p.14.
6. George Henry Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, New York, London: D. Appleton and Company, 1924, pp.284-5.
7. *The New York Times* was founded by Henry J. Raymond and two financiers from New York, George James and Edward B. Wesley.
8. *The New York Times*, 8 September 1851.
9. *The New York Times*, 3 March 1898.
10. "Remembrance of The Times: From the Papers of Garet Garrett", *The American Scholar*, Vol.36, Summer 1967, p.43.
11. R.W. Apple, the former *New York Times* chief London correspondent, personal interview, 17 April 1985.
12. James Reston quoted by Francis Williams, *The Right To Know*, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969.
13. Edwin Emery, *The Press and America*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1962, p.236.
14. Michael Shudson, *Discovering the News*, The New York Times Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 1978, p.119.
15. Meyer Berger, *The Story of The New York Times*, *op.cit.*, p.115.
16. Benjamin Stolberg, "The Man Behind The Times", *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol.138, December 1926, p.237.
17. Elmer Davis, *History of The New York Times, 1851-1921*, New York: *The New York Times*, 1921, p.33.
18. John Merrill, *The Elite Press - Great Newspapers of the World*, New York: Princeton Publishing Corporation, 1968, p.266.
19. Ben H. Badikian, "The Politics of American Newspapers", *Columbia Journalist Review*, March-April 1972, p.9.

20. Quoted in Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.*, p.210.
21. David Halberstam, *The Power That Be*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979; John Hohenberg, *A Crisis of the American Press*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
22. Herman H. Dinsmore, *All The News That Fits - A Crucial Analysis of The News and Editorial Contents of The New York Times*, New York, New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969, p.179.
23. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.*, p.44.
24. Russ Braley, *Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The New York Times*, Chicago: Regney Gateway, Inc., 1984, p.197.
25. Philip Nobile, "How The New York Times Became a Second Banana", *Esquire*, Vol.83, No.5, May 1975, p.86.
26. See Testimony of James Reston before Congress in 1973, *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, No.19, 1973, p.1123.
27. Francis Williams, *The Right to Know*, *op.cit.*, p.53.
28. *The New York Times* helped to uncover the financial scandals and the corruption of the municipal politicians under William Mary Tweed. On the paper's campaign against the Tweed Ring, see "The Secret Accounts: Proofs of Undoubted Frauds Brought to Light", *The New York Times*, 8 July 1971.
29. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.*, p.59; George Lichtheim, "All The News That's Fit to Print - Reflections on the New York Times", *Commentary*, Vol.40, No.2, September 1965, p.34.
30. Leo Bogart, *Press and Public: Who Reads What, When, Where and Why in American Newspapers*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1981.
31. International Press Institute, *The Flow of the News*, Zurich, 1953, p.22.
32. John Wilhelm, "The Economics of Foreign Coverage", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.X, No.2, 1956).
33. R.W. Apple, personal interview, 17 April 1985.
34. Dwight Macdonald, "The New York Times, Alas", *Esquire*, April 1963, p.55.
35. George Lichtheim, "'All That's Fit to Print' - Reflections on the New York Times", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, p.35.
36. *Ibid.*, p.33.
37. See Barnard Berelson, "Communication and Public Opinion", in Wilbur Schramm's *The Process and Effect of Mass Communication*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965, p.90; see also, R.W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, New York, London: D. Appleton Century Company Inc., 1937, p.368.

38. James E. Brinton, "Failure of the Western Edition of the New York Times", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, Spring 1964, pp.170-174.
39. John Merrill, *The Elite Press*, *op.cit.*, p.263.
40. John Tebbel, "National Newspapers", *Saturday Review*, 11 November 1961, pp.69-70; R.W. Apple, personal interview, 17 April 1985.
41. Pamela Cheathan, "Foreign News and the American Public", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.X, No.2, 1956, p.185.
42. Harry Schwartz, "Covering the Foreign News", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1970, p.741.
43. Jerome H. Walker, "Dryfoos Now Publisher, Oakes Editor of Times - Sulzberger Hands Over Reins to Son-in-Law; Mertz Retires, Editor and Publisher, 29 April 1961, p.23; also see supra, pp.6-7 for more examples of the paper's statistical supremacy.
44. Gaye Talese, "The Kingdoms, the Powers and the Glories of The New York Times", *Esquire*, November 1966, pp.180-181.
45. Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line*, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968, p.93.
46. Turner Catledge, *My Life and The Times*, *op.cit.*, p.194.
47. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.*, p.272.
48. John Tebbel, "Rating the American Newspaper, Part II", *Saturday Review*, 10 June 1961, p.54.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Dwight Macdonald, "The New York Times, Alas", *Esquire*, *op.cit.*, p.56.
51. Catledge had occupied the post of Managing Editor from 1951 to 1963. In 1963 he became Executive Editor, a post similar to that of Professional Editor in the European newspapers.
52. Turner Catledge, *My Life and The Times*, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971, p.514. These daily conferences are held every day between the Executive Editor and all the senior editors to discuss what news would be run the following day, and what space or prominence very item would be given. R. Apple, personal interview, 17 April 1985.
53. John C. Merrill, *The Elite Press*, *op.cit.*, p.272.
54. Harrison E. Salisbury, *Without Fear or Favor: The New York Times and Its Times*, New York: The New York Times Co., 1980, p.48.
55. Turner Catledge, *My Life and The Times*, *op.cit.*, p.210.
56. Dwight Macdonald, "The New York Times - Alas", *Esquire*, *op.cit.*, p.55.

CHAPTER II

ALGERIA FROM POLITICAL AWAKENING TO REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM

"As long as you keep Algiers, you will be constantly at war with Africa; sometimes this will seem to end; but these people will not hate you any the less; it will be a half-extinguished fire that will smoulder under the ash and which, at the first opportunity, will burst into a vast conflagration". [Baron Lacuée, 1831]

"After decades of struggle, the National Movement reached its final phase of fulfilment.... A group of responsible young people and dedicated nationalists gathering about it the majority of wholesale and resolute elements, has come to take the National Movement out of the impasse into which it has been forced... and to launch it into the true revolutionary struggle". [F.L.N. initial Proclamation, 1 November 1954]

France and Algeria to 1945

Before falling to French occupation in 1830, Algeria had for centuries been the target of naval expeditions by various maritime European powers. The Spanish dream of gaining a foothold along the North African coast had been fulfilled in the early sixteenth century when Spain was able to hold key positions stretching from Agadir to Tunis, including the western and central parts of the Algerian coast. It was in this context that the Barbarossa brothers, especially Arudj and Khair-el-Din, settled in Algeria and helped to organize local resistance to the Spanish presence. In 1516 Spain withdrew from all its Algerian acquisitions apart from Mers-el-Kebir and Oran in the west. The "State of the Algerians" was proclaimed and although it later came officially under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, the country remained, in the words of Charles-Andre Julien, "the mistress of its own destiny" as Ottoman sovereignty was purely nominal.¹

Because of the country's extremely long coast and its vulnerability from the sea, as proven by the Spanish invasion of 1505, and because of the Mediterranean's long tradition of piracy from ships of different nationalities, the founders of the Algerian state realized its dire need for a strong military base if it were to survive growing threats. After strengthening their defences, however, the Algerians expanded their influence in the area and imposed protection fees on all ships using the Mediterranean route.² This situation displeased the European powers which, at regular intervals throughout the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth, launched punitive expeditions against Algiers. As attempts by individual countries failed to bring results, alliances were formed in the hope of defeating Algeria. The last of such alliances was in 1815 when seven countries led by the United States attacked Algiers. Meanwhile, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and three years later at Aix-la-Chappelle, Algeria topped the agenda of European discussions.³

North Africa's relations with France go back as early as the thirteenth century when trade exchanges between them first began. Diplomatic relations with Algeria formally commenced in 1534 when the first French consul was sent to Algiers; he was also the first European consul to be assigned to Algeria.⁴ On many occasions both before and after its revolution of 1789 France benefitted from Algeria's military backing against its traditional enemies especially Spain and Prussia. Algeria was the first country to recognize the French Republic declared in 1793 and to offer full support at a time when it was facing diplomatic and commercial isolation in Europe. The Dey of Algiers provided the French with necessary food supplies and with cash loans to pay for purchases from Algeria which increased

sharply as a result of the drought and famine that had hit France.⁵ "It is in need that friends are known", wrote the Dey to the leaders of the French Republic. This close relationship continued and an estimated seventy treaties had been signed between Algeria and France before 1830.⁶

The other side of French dependence on Algerian imports was the growth of French indebtedness to Algerian creditors. As time went by, France's debts to Algeria swelled. Delays in repayment and lack of adequate explanations for such delays angered the Algerians. Anxious to find a settlement, Dey Hussein again raised the issue with the French consul on 27 April 1827 and demanded a plausible explanation. Outraged by Deval's response - "My Government will not reply, it is useless to write" - he ordered the consul to withdraw. After an altercation, the Dey struck Deval with his ostrich-feather fan. This incident was seen in Paris as an insult to the French empire and, thus, led to the French expedition to Algiers in 1827. But, as Metternich observed, it is not for a blow from a feather fan that one "spends 100,000,000 francs and risks 40,000 men". The real reason behind the expedition was France's dynastic dream of an overseas empire to rival its neighbours, one that went back to the fourteenth century.⁷ A further reason was the traditional search for outlets to internal problems through foreign adventures. Charles X, aware of the unpopularity and weakness of his regime, sought to divert his people's attention with the magic of *gloire* abroad.

Although the French entered Algiers in 1830, the conquest of the country as a whole was not completed until the early twentieth century. Almost every year since 1830 provides evidence of Algerian resistance to the French occupation. From 1830 to 1847, Emir

Abd-el-Kader hampered France's attempts to expand into the interior. In 1864, 1871 and 1916 fierce revolts broke out in different parts of Algeria. As one French deputy put it, "[n]ever before in history was there a colonization that required the support of 40,000 bayonets".⁸ But the French, having declared Algeria an integral part of metropolitan France in 1848, were determined to continue their campaign of "pacification" using ruthless and repressive methods.

Algerians were executed or imprisoned, their villages destroyed, their lands and patrimony expropriated, their cultural heritage and personal identity continuously attacked, and their human and political rights deliberately dashed. They had, since 1830, been compelled to live under a colonial system imposed upon them, which put Algerian values under continuous siege and denied them access to the possibilities of "evolution" they had long been promised.⁹ French settlers, on the other hand, were offered all types of support and encouragement. Convicts, political undesirables and victims of war and economic depressions were shipped off to Algeria and offered lands confiscated from the Algerians. Later waves of non-French immigrants, also coming from the least privileged strata of society and victims of European political and economic crises, crossed the Mediterranean to start a new life in Algeria, benefitting from all the rights and privileges guaranteed by their acquired French nationality. The Law of 26 June 1889 made every European immigrant automatically a French citizen.¹⁰

France's violation of its own pledge of 1830 to protect the Algerians, their property and their cultural heritage, continued unabated throughout its presence in Algeria. In simple terms, a Spanish, Italian or Maltese immigrant was able to enjoy human and

political rights in Algeria without having to concede anything; an Algerian had to renounce his language and religion. But, for the Algerian, Islam represented a fundamental part of his identity and heritage and a valid long-term social code. In 1932 Ben Baddis, leader of the Association of Ulemas, reacting to French claims of Algerian readiness for assimilation, declared: "Islam is our religion, Algeria is our country and Arabic is our language".¹¹ This later became the slogan of the nationalist movement in its struggle for independence. It was this repressive and discriminatory French policy that helped to keep Algerian nationalism alive, and it is in the light of this repression over more than a century of colonial rule that the Algerian revolution, which forms the context of this thesis, must be understood.

At the beginning of this century and especially during the inter-war period, Algerian resistance to the French occupation took the form of political activism. The Algerians began to believe that it was possible to influence French policies in Algeria from within, through political channels and the ballot box. The newly formed political parties led the field, demanding immediate action on the part of France to improve the socio-economic and political conditions of the Algerian population. Their demands, however, fell on deaf ears as the French authorities persisted in their repressive conduct, aligning themselves unequivocally with the *colons* and their interests.

Political life in Algeria between the two World Wars had been enlivened by the activities of emerging nationalist parties. Despite their antagonism, these parties helped to "educate" the Algerian population to understand fully their contemporary conditions and future prospects.¹² The worsened socio-economic situation because of

the war opened the way for the Algerians politically to lay the foundations for a more coherent and more effective nationalist movement. Despite mounting pressure by the Vichy regime on the key leaders,¹³ the Algerians - led by the Popular Party (P.P.A.) - waged a continuous campaign for self-determination. They declared their pro-Ally stance as inseparably linked with their right for self-determination. They, indeed, saw Algeria under French colonial rule as the victim of an unjustified occupation which did not differ much from that of the Nazis in Europe.¹⁴

After falling to German occupation, France resorted to a policy of promises towards its overseas colonies. These colonies were pledged to be granted the right to self-determination as soon as the War was over, provided that they stood on the side of France against Germany. The Algerians took such promises for granted as thousands of them were recruited to fight with the Allied forces on the European front.¹⁵ Promises of the "Liberation" of subject peoples were frequently made; the Atlantic Charter emphasized the right of all peoples to self-determination, and the United Nations Charter adopted at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 would stress the same right. These ideals and promises, however, were to be undermined by the attitudes of some colonial powers. France, in particular, sought to restore its colonial empire at any cost.

As the War drew to a conclusion France instructed its troops throughout the overseas dependencies to be prepared for potential "disturbances" in the colonies, sensing that the colonial peoples would inevitably ask for the fulfilment of its war-time promise of self-determination. The German forces eventually surrendered on 7 May 1945. On Victory Day, 8 May, hosts of people throughout the world

took to the streets to express their spontaneous delight at the Allied victory. Yet, freedom was regained only in Europe, as the War continued unabated on the Asian front and was ended only by the United States use of the atomic bombs against Japan.¹⁶

V-E Day and Its Aftermath in Algeria, Problems of Reporting

Convinced by the promises of the Atlantic Charter and those of the French during the War, scores of Algerians took to the streets to stress their demands for a "new deal".¹⁷ The nationalist leaders, who obtained authorisation to organize a march and lay a wreath in memory of the dead, believed that the sacrifices of the Algerians would have to bring a more democratic system to post-war Algeria.¹⁸

The marchers carried the Algerian flag alongside the flags of the Allied nations to demonstrate their attachment to the principle of self-rule.¹⁹ Ironically, however, on the day that victory for democracy was being hailed world-wide, repressive methods were being used elsewhere to quieten legitimate demands for the right to self-determination. Republican France, whose own legitimacy could be found in those war-time principles so frequently expressed, utilized authoritarian ways and means to quash aspirations for democracy. Whilst the Algerian troops, who had fought on the European front, were parading the streets of Paris under the warm cheers of the Parisian crowd, an estimated 45,000 of their compatriots - who were celebrating the same victory - were being killed in Setif, Kherata and Guelma.²⁰

During and immediately after World War Two, *The New York Times* had no resident correspondent in the whole of North Africa. This was perhaps inevitable in the context of the War, but it consequently

failed to report the events of V-E Day in Algeria on time and at first hand. Being heavily dependent on French official sources for information, its reports dwelled largely on the Government's line which it reproduced at face value. To minimise the effects of the killings on its image abroad, France tried to keep a low profile on the situation, blaming the uprising on the food shortage that had hit the country as a result of the War and the recent drought.²¹ These claims found much echo in *The New York Times* which filled its columns with heavy doses of French opinions. The quality of news reporting depends exclusively on the quality of the source and on the information available at the gathering end of the line. This is why newspapers and their correspondents are expected to diversify their sources of information and avoid relying on a single source, because the inevitable result of this is the distortion of the news. This point will be developed in much more detail at a later stage of this thesis.

The French press, not surprisingly, also gave absolute credence to the economic argument. *Le Monde* stated that the "action of the minority of agents provocateurs was facilitated by the grain shortage which was due to the bad harvest caused by the drought".²² Most of the Western press, at least immediately after those events, went along with the official contention. Only the *Christian Science Monitor* questioned the Government's argument and hinted that the uprising was politically motivated: "Despite the veil of censorship with which the French government has surrounded the recent riots in Algiers, it is manifest that these disturbances had a serious character".²³ This, one supposes, might have been of interest to *The New York Times* readers had they been told about it, but they were not.

Because of the evident lack of eyewitness accounts, the paper failed to go beyond routine reporting, which was exclusively dependent on second- and third-hand information, to let its readers know about the complexity of the situation and traditional French excesses in Algeria. The economic factor undoubtedly played a significant part in leading the Algerians into open protest against the colonial system;²⁴ but the major factor behind the uprising was their growing political awareness and their realization of the importance of the new circumstances provided by the Allied victory to which they had contributed. Evidence shows that their action represented a deliberate effort to show their demands for a "new deal" and to express renewed antipathy to the colonial regime imposed upon them since 1830.²⁵ France was now being assertively asked to put its war-time promises into practice.²⁶ The policy of systematic repression exercised by the *colons*, with the acquiescence of Paris, was a major reason behind the new nationalist bid for self-determination.²⁷

It was not until 24 May that *The New York Times* told its readers that "the problems in North Africa are political as well as economic". Yet, despite this little, timid divergence of opinion which did not touch the core issue of France's iron-fist response to the Algerian demonstrations, the paper continued its *entente cordiale* with the French Government. Failing to send a correspondent to Algeria, it persisted in playing the "news" without analysis or independent substantiation. Its reports, filled with factual errors and fallacies of judgement, gave the reader the impression that it was the Algerians who were to blame for the violence, and that the French army's ruthless reaction was justifiable: many French were killed and several French officials "were slain... by the rioters": It played down the

high casualty toll amongst the Algerians by simply relaying the official figure of 1,000 dead. In this, the paper's reporting did not differ much from that of *Le Monde* which had put all the blame on the Algerians asserting, with due exaggeration, that many French had been "massacred" and their homes and farms attacked.²⁸

The New York Times, steering closer to the rock of journalistic partisanship, sided with the official claim that a group of troublemakers incited by "German propaganda" was behind the nationalist action. It searched far afield for a possible foreign connection, reproducing at some length the argument that those events were part of a "fascist plot" to destabilise the French empire.²⁹ This idea was given force in the French press, which blamed "Hitlerite elements" for the uprising.³⁰

Every sign, however, points to the fact that the uprising had been incited from within Algeria and by provocations from the French police. It was the killing of the young demonstrator carrying the Algerian flag and the wounding of others that transformed the march into a riot which eventually turned into a popular uprising against the colonial system.³¹ *Colon*-organized vigilantes, on the other hand, embarked on a wave of killings and summary executions of Algerians.³² The police, the Army, the Navy, the air force and the Foreign Legion were all mobilised for large-scale operations of systematic pacification and *ratissage*.³³ "At the time of this campaign", the distinguished French historian, Charles-André Julien, later wrote, "the Foreign Legion troops burned, looted and killed at leisure".³⁴ The Cruiser *Duguay-Trouin* bombarded coastal villages; Douglas divebombers made as many as 300 sorties a day destroying at least forty villages.³⁵ The *colon* daily *L'Écho d'Alger* summed up the

general mood at the time through the slogan *c'est L'heure du gendarme*.

Those acts of repression, which continued unabated throughout the month of May, claimed the lives of an estimated 45,000 people; 6,000 more were arrested, ninety-nine of whom were to be sentenced to death. The French authorities succeeded, to a large extent, in concealing the truth about the police and army conduct in Algeria not only from world opinion but also from public opinion in France, which would later be shocked as the realities of the May killings unfolded.

Because of the news blackout and tight censorship imposed by the authorities on information from Algeria, *Le Figaro's* Pierre Dubard, who had witnessed the French *coup de force* response to the Algerian demonstrations, was able to dispatch his report to Paris only eight weeks after the killings. The report presented a serious challenge to the official argument. As a result, the French official sources were, in the words of Phillip Knightley, "completely discredited; the danger of accepting statements at face value was amply illustrated, and the manner in which each newspaper's political line had influenced its version of the Setif attack had been clearly shown".³⁶

Yet, the French press revealed the full scale of the May killings only as late as 1947. It was then that *Liberté* informed its readers that "thousands of innocent Algerians were murdered, villages destroyed and the hunt for the nationalists began", with the full acquiescence of Paris.³⁷ *L'Humanité*, arguing along a similar line, stressed the excessive "ferocity" with which the police and army had responded.³⁸ *Alger-Républicain* went back to the story in 1949, stating rather vigorously that "on 8 May 1945, 30,000 victims lost their lives to fascism and to the *colon* clan [who wanted]... to deprive the

Algerians of the fruits of victory to which they had contributed".³⁹

It was in June 1945 that *The New York Times*' readers learnt for the first time that "French ground and air forces killed or wounded more than 10,000 Arab rebels", when the paper picked up a story from the Rome edition of the American Army newspaper *Stars and Stripes*.⁴⁰ As J. Galtung and M.A. Ruge have argued, there are different ways of presenting an event, and particularly many ways of presenting "fights for independence".⁴¹ By using the term "rebels", for example, the paper gave the impression that the victims of the May killings had been armed, whilst evidence shows that they were civilians taking part in a peaceful march marking the end of the war. To them this was a legitimate way, falling within the democratic spirit traditionally preached by France, to make a bid for a new deal for the Algerian majority. *The New York Times*, timidly veering towards a detached stance, told its readers about "the most effective counter-measures" against the Algerians which had been taken by the French airmen, who "flew as many as 300 sorties in a single day with medium and heavy bombers obtained from the United States". To the paper, however, this tactic seemed justifiable "[b]ecause of the difficult terrain".⁴²

The paper did considerably better a year after V-E Day and its immediate aftermath in Algeria, when it reflected on the means adopted by the French authorities to stamp out nationalist protest. It seemed to have freed itself from the monopoly of the French information services, although its Algeria-related reporting was still coming only from Paris. Offering its appraisal of the situation in hindsight, it drove home the inescapable fact that "[t]he French used not only troops but gunboats in suppressing the uprising with the utmost severity".⁴³ It also conceded that the nationalist action had been

politically motivated and carefully planned, contrary to its previously held view that it had been spontaneous and mainly motivated by the economic difficulties facing the local population after the war. The concerted marches, the highly calculated timing of the nationalist rallies and the display for the first time of the Algerian flag evidenced the political nature of the May uprising. Meanwhile, its readers learnt about the French Government's attempts to conceal the truth about the police and army response to the nationalist protest: "... between 7,000 and 8,000 natives (the figures cannot yet be established) were slaughtered in the drastic reaction, including bombing and mass executions".⁴⁴

Despite such developments in the paper's perception of the crisis, the nationalist version was presented to its readers eighteen months after the uprising, taking the form of a letter published on 30 December 1946. Written by the Secretary of the Committee for Freedom of North Africa, Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Ahrass, it was given the title "North African 'Iron Curtain'". Dr. Aboul-Ahrass pointed to the "iron curtain" France had woven around its North African colonies to conceal the repressive conduct of its troops in Algeria which had resulted in "bloodshed, terror and revolt". This, he pointedly added, was played down if not completely ignored by the American media. With the aid of American bombers given the free French through Lend-Lease to help the fight against Germany, "40,000 Algerians were slain, 200,000 imprisoned and 3,000 native homes strafed and pillaged...". He concluded his letter by reminding readers of North Africa's contribution to the Allied victory: 65,000 North African soldiers "... laid down their lives and hopes that aspirations of men like Willkie and Roosevelt might become realities".

The aim of the French *coup de force* response to the Algerian demonstrations seemed to be twofold: to deal a decisive blow to the nationalist movement and its apparatus, and to establish a horrifying precedent that would possibly deter the local people from similar showdowns in the future. But, ironically enough, repression only helped to increase Algerian discontent and to radicalise nationalist attitudes towards Algeria's relationship with France;⁴⁵ moderates like Ferhat Abbas became "federalists" or "autonomists" and Algerian nationalism took a new turn.⁴⁶

The events of May 1945, in short, represented a decisive turning point in the evolution of Algerian nationalism. They had a significant impact on the attitude of young Algerians, especially members of the Seventh Regiment of Algerian tirailleurs who had fought with distinction on the European front during the War. They had just returned to eastern Algeria, when they learnt of the killings of Setif, Kherata and Guelma. Most of them henceforth became convinced of the necessity to pursue a military course of action. Some would eventually become prominent leaders in the Algerian revolution which was to be officially declared on 1 November 1954.⁴⁷ "Everyone of the 'new wave' of Algerian nationalists prominent in the National Liberation Front today", wrote Edward Behr in 1961, "traces his revolutionary determination back to May 1945... each of them felt after May 1945 that some form of armed uprising would sooner or later become necessary".⁴⁸ This was not perceived by the contemporary press, including *The New York Times*.

The Outbreak of the Algerian Revolution

After May 1945 the French authorities tightened their grip on Algeria in the hope of forcing the nationalists into submission and into accepting the *fait accompli colonial*. The nationalist movement came increasingly under siege: political parties were outlawed, their leaders were imprisoned and freedom of expression was restrained even further. Some modest reforms were offered to the Algerians under the Statute of 1947; but their implementation was, as previously, blocked by the *colons* and their strong lobby in the Government.⁴⁹ For the Algerians, "political revolution" had already got underway and nothing would satisfy them but national sovereignty. "No solution can be accepted by the Algerian people, if it does not imply an absolute guarantee of a return to our national sovereignty", declared Lamine Debaghine of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (M.T.L.D.).⁵⁰ The French Fourth Republic was now preoccupied with threats coming to it from its opponents within metropolitan France and also from the colonies, notably Indochina. Hence, when the Algerians decided to adopt "direct action", France was caught by total surprise and reacted in evident panic.⁵¹

In 1947 disenchanted Algerian nationalists founded the *Organisation Secrète* (O.S.), a paramilitary organization which sought direct military action. But, before it became effective it was uncovered by the French police and was totally dismantled in 1950. Some of its members were arrested, but most of them escaped either abroad or to the Algerian *maquis*. The French authorities and the *colons*, confident of the strength of the French presence in Algeria, seemed little concerned about these new developments. *L'Écho d'Alger's* comment on 21 April 1950 typified their over-confidence:

"The combined forces of justice and public order will continue unflinchingly until the destruction of every single germ of revolt in our Algerian soil". It was however from the ranks of the O.S. that the early leadership of the Algerian revolution came.⁵²

Some of those O.S. members, who had escaped arrest and remained in Algeria, turned to clandestine action under the M.T.L.D. Their objective was to lay the foundations for a more effective military front and to safeguard the M.T.L.D., which had become bogged down in *immobilisme* and routine and in needless personal feuds within its leadership.⁵³ The Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (C.R.U.A.), which was launched on 23 March 1954, embarked on a large-scale campaign to rally the Algerian rank and file behind one unified front, to heal the divisions that had manifestly occurred within the nationalist movement and to prepare for military action which was planned for 1 November 1954.⁵⁴ The C.R.U.A. soon became the *Front de Libération Nationale* (F.L.N.) which was to lead the revolution heralded by the synchronized attacks on French military installations on 1 November 1954. This particular date was chosen mainly for strategic reasons as most French soldiers would then be on leave because of the national holiday; this would provide the F.L.N. with more chances of success in its operations and especially to acquire arms from the installations targeted.⁵⁵

These F.L.N. attacks caught the French authorities totally unawares, despite earlier warnings by their intelligence services that military action by the Algerian nationalists was imminent. Such warnings, however, had not been taken seriously by Paris on the ground that Algeria had, unlike its neighbours, remained calm and untouched by nationalist "agitation".⁵⁶ When reports about the alarming scale of

the attacks flooded in, the authorities immediately branded the attackers as "cut-throat outlaws", reaffirming that Algeria would always remain French.⁵⁷

The New York Times, like most of the world press, was caught by surprise by the emergence of the F.L.N. and its first military operations. Still unrepresented in Algeria, it informed its readers through a dispatch from Paris which gave the event prominent front-page display under the headline:

TERRORIST BANDS
KILL 7 IN ALGERIA
FRENCH SEND AID.⁵⁸

In an editorial on the same day, also with the title of "Terror", it lost no opportunity to express sympathy for France which was "having hard luck in North Africa", as a result of nationalist "flames" spreading from Tunisia and Morocco to the hitherto calm Algeria. To this thought it was to come back a few days later in a "News of the Week in Review" comment, which voiced "surprise" at the outbreak of violence in Algeria, for long considered "an island of relative peace calm in an area otherwise inflamed by Moslem nationalism".⁵⁹

This surprise stemmed from a preconceived acceptance of the French assertion that Algeria was "French territory", and considered to be as much a part of France as Brittany or Normandy. The paper, whose articles were filled with heavy doses of French views did not cease telling its readers that Algeria was "constitutionally" an integral part of France.⁶⁰ As Robert Desmond wrote about half a century ago, news correspondents should verify all information they get from officials "lest they be made for propaganda".⁶¹ *The New York Times*, however, concealed from its readers the fact that Algeria had become "an integral part of France" only by a simple administrative

decree and without the consent of the Algerians. Nor were they told about Algeria's pre-1830 existence as an independent nation, referred to by French leaders as early as the seventeenth century as "*la République d'Alger*" or the Republic of Algiers, long before the term "Republic" became associated with France in 1793.⁶² Readers were also not told about France's earlier dependence on Algeria for assistance which had been deemed necessary for survival.⁶³ As Charles-André Julien has argued, most French, after an intensive process of indoctrination stretching from primary school to university, came to believe that Algeria was an integral part of France. Those same people would have protested vehemently if it had been declared that Alsace had become an integral part of Germany after 1870: "France is prisoner of myths it created itself, the most dangerous of which is 'Algeria is France'".⁶⁴ *Time* magazine, unlike *The New York Times*, touching on the question of how Algeria was now considered to be French, drove home the lesson but not until 30 May 1955 "... Frenchmen fondly imagine they have made [it] a part of metropolitan France by simple administrative fiat...".

The recent nationalist military action brought panic and confusion to French ranks and dealt a severe blow to the myth of *L'Algérie Française*. Unable to identify the men or the organization behind the attacks, the authorities immediately injected the rumour that foreign quarters were to blame. This rumour found much echo in the press, not least *The New York Times* which blamed the Egyptian government, the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists for these new developments in Algeria.⁶⁵ *The (London) Times* endorsed this claim more forcefully a year later: "... the terrorists were directed from Cairo by men who were direct agents of the Government...".⁶⁶ This is perhaps a typical example - if not a disturbing one - of press

willingness to indulge in speculation on complex matters based on the views of one of the belligerent sides in the absence of eye witness knowledge or independent substantiation. Every sign seems to point to the fact that the nationalist military action was planned and directed purely from within Algeria by disenchanted nationalists who had already fought for independence through political channels and turned to military action only when other means had failed to bring about the necessary reforms.

The National Liberation Front counted for its success primarily on the support of the local population and, from the start, insisted on the "Algerianness" of both its motives and direction.⁶⁷ Its initial "Proclamation" stressed that its main objective was to offer to "... all Algerian patriots of all walks of life and of all parties and political groups, which are *purely Algerian*, integration in the struggle for liberation regardless of any other consideration".⁶⁸ The term "front" was deliberately chosen to indicate that it did not represent one specific doctrine, political group or programme but an amalgamation of the different political tendencies.⁶⁹ The F.L.N. believed that with the backing of the Algerian population, victory would be attainable despite the limitation in its military capabilities. It was equally convinced that despite its affluent resources, the French army would never achieve military victory so long as it failed to conquer the minds of ordinary Algerians.⁷⁰ Aware of the vital importance of popular support for its cause, the F.L.N. directed its attention towards the masses to strengthen the ranks of *L'Armée de Libération Nationale*, which had launched the armed insurrection with no more than 3,000 under-equipped fighters. As the F.L.N.'s motives and objectives became clear, the local population - especially the inhabitants of the rural areas who represented 96

percent of the overall Algerian population - soon began to rally behind its cause.⁷¹

This fact was not perceived by *The New York Times* which was unequivocating:

ALGERIA MOSLEMS ALOOF IN REVOLT.

Its first correspondent in Algeria, Michael Clark, whose pro-French stance soon became manifestly evident in a series of articles from Algiers, echoing French statements in official handouts, ventured that the F.L.N. had not "... obtained the support or even acquiescence" of the Algerian population which had "... failed to respond...".⁷² He hastily concluded with an extravagant assertion that the majority of Algerians were "non-political" and that "nationalism is still something beyond their ken".⁷³ So the notion that Algeria was French and that most Algerians were happy with the *status quo* became an essential part of the context created by the reporter, established in his mind and possibly in the thoughts of the reader. Clark's subscription to the French Government's stand is perhaps more evident in his book *Algeria in Turmoil - A History of the Rebellion*,⁷⁴ which blames the country's problems on the nationalists whom it accuses of "extremism" and fanaticism. To many Anglo-American historians this book, the first major work on the Algerian-French conflict to be published in English, represented "a distinctly pro-French point of view".⁷⁵ His partiality was confirmed in a report by a team of French deputies visiting Algeria in June 1955 that emphasized the growing popular support for the F.L.N. and its cause.⁷⁶ The support and protection the nationalist fighters enjoyed among the 8,000,000 Algerians was pointedly stressed by *Time* magazine a few months later.⁷⁷

During the first few months of its existence *L'Armée de Libération Nationale*, because of its small size and rudimentary armament, was forced to rely on hit-and-run tactics and on acts of sabotage aimed at draining French resources. But, despite its limited resources and military capabilities, it managed to create a continuous feeling of insecurity and panic within French ranks.⁷⁸ By the time the first year of the revolution drew to a conclusion, its activities had reached most parts of Algeria, especially in the north where the bulk of the population lay. The fighting ability of the nationalist units was recognized by the French themselves. "They are naturally beautiful fighters", said one high-ranking Foreign Legion officer. "They are tougher than the Viet Minh Communists; they are the best marksmen I have ever fought against".⁷⁹ The first few months provided the F.L.N. with its toughest test, as it found itself involved in a continuous process of basic organization in order to lay down its vital political and military institutions.⁸⁰ It was not only necessary for it to unite all the Algerian political groups behind its cause and to attract large-scale popular support; it was also imperative to attract support from abroad.⁸¹ Yet, its earlier difficulties were partly eased by the fact that it did not find recruitment a problem. This was due to two main reasons: the anger which the French repressive measures provoked amongst the Algerian population, and the F.L.N.'s own success especially its ability to face the vastly superior French military machine.⁸²

As the effectiveness of the F.L.N. operations became evident, *The New York Times* - which had so far given its readers nothing beyond French claims that the situation was under control and that the country was now quiet everywhere - resorted to cautioning France against the "strong and well-organized... rebel army". Remarking that

the nationalist units were now in control of whole areas in the eastern districts of Algeria, it predicted that "more serious trouble" was in the offing.⁸³ *The (London) Times*, arguing along a similar line, had editorially pointed out that this sort of guerrilla warfare favoured the F.L.N. who held all the cards: "The initiative is theirs; they know the country and can count on the voluntary or enforced cooperation of most of the local inhabitants".⁸⁴ Against this background of surge in the F.L.N.'s popularity and appeal, the hitherto pro-integrationist Algerian politicians conceded that they had already been "left behind by recent events", and that they could never claim to be representatives of the Algerians unless an election was held to gauge public opinion.⁸⁵

The New York Times, which had demonstrated an ardent zeal in the cause of the French interests, maintained a merciless assault on the F.L.N. fighters during the first few months of the Algerian revolution. It branded them as "outlaws" and "fugitives from justice" whose aim was not a negotiated settlement but the "eviction of the French" and the "total destruction of everything European" in North Africa.⁸⁶ As Phillip Knightley has argued, the tone of the reporting of the war in Algeria was set by the French authorities who, through different forms of propaganda and political pressure, sought to portray the Algerian nationalist fighters as "evil" and "savage barbarians" to which innocent victims were handed over.⁸⁷ *The New York Times* and much of the press, because of the poor reporting from the scene, fell in with this deliberate deception. *The (London) Times*, doing no better, painted the F.L.N. fighters as "outlaws", "savage fanatics" and "criminals" responsible for a "wave of barbarism" in Algeria.⁸⁸ *The Economist*, on the other hand, was more cautious and more subtle in its appraisal of the F.L.N. Refusing to be

duped into those hasty, overloaded descriptions clothed with French stereotypes, it used straightforward terms such as "nationalists" or "dissident nationalists", "revolt" or "uprising";⁸⁹ none of the terminology the reader had become accustomed to in *The New York Times*.

The F.L.N. insisted from the start that it adopted violent means to further Algerian demands for independence only because no other option was available, especially after the failure of earlier attempts to bring about peaceful changes in the country.⁹⁰ Its violence was not being directed against individuals but against a system and a "retrogressive colonial regime".⁹¹ Pledging commitment to international laws on war, it left the way to negotiations with France always open. Its "Proclamation" of 1 November 1954 offered "an honourable platform of discussion with the French authorities provided that they recognize, to the people they still subjugate, the right of self-determination".⁹² Meanwhile, it insisted that its use of violence was only a response to the systematic repression used by the colonial authorities against the local population to bolster French domination in Algeria.⁹³ As Charles-André Julien remarked in 1955, the French had not kept their promises of reform in favour of the Algerian majority; there had always been a dichotomy between words and reality. The Algerians had in vain sought change through the ballot box; now they wanted to win change through revolutionary nationalism.⁹⁴

They complained of a systematic campaign of "structural violence" directed against them by the colonial authorities. This was aimed at preserving *colon* supremacy at all levels, socio-economic and political.⁹⁵ Up to one and a half million people out of a work force of three and a half million were, in 1954, either unemployed or underemployed.⁹⁶ Whilst all *colon* children benefitted from education,

only 18 percent of school-age Algerian children received primary schooling.⁹⁷ Illiteracy amongst Algerians ranged between 82 and 94 percent, whereas illiteracy amongst the *colons* almost did not exist.⁹⁸ And as *The Economist* noted on 1 October 1955, while individual income in France was estimated at 240,000 francs per annum, the average income of an Algerian family was only 30,000 francs (£30). All this might have been of interest to *The New York Times* readers had they been told about it, which they were not. Nor were they told about the campaign of "pacification" and "collective punishment", which included bombing of villages, arbitrary arrests and executions, and regroupment of the local populace in camps under constant military control, which was aimed at deterring Algerian civilians from assisting the F.L.N.⁹⁹ Perhaps it was all summed up by the French Minister of the Interior when he declared that "[r]epression will be pitiless".¹⁰⁰ The excesses of the French army in Algeria, including the use of torture, will be addressed in greater detail later on in this thesis.

The New York Times, which displayed passionate zeal in the cause of French military efforts to crush the F.L.N., was generous in its description of the French army's drive; the sequence of its headlines tells the story: "FRENCH MAP MAJOR DRIVE AGAINST REBELS IN ALGERIA;¹⁰¹ FRENCH PUSH HUNT FOR ALGERIAN FOE, CRUSHING OF REVOLT ASKED;¹⁰² FRENCH DRIVE ON REBELS;¹⁰³ FRENCH TAKE MORE ACTION to HALT ALGERIAN DISORDERS".¹⁰⁴ It relayed at length French claims that an early victory against the nationalist army was imminent, devoting considerable space to the French Government's inflated figures about alleged Algerian casualties on the battlefield.¹⁰⁵ And that was it, not a word about the French army's excesses and violations of international laws on war, especially on the treatment of prisoners of war, and nothing on the repressive measures and acts of "collective

punishment" and their heavy bearing on the civilian population. *The Economist*, by its weekly nature as synthesizer of news media information with the opportunity to write in more depth than the daily newspaper, pointedly stressed the French "... violent methods to repress the revolt", "... arbitrary police methods of handling suspected rebels" and "... mass reprisals and indiscriminate punishment of the innocent".¹⁰⁶

The French publications, which attempted to disclose the excessive conduct of the French troops in Algeria became subject to stringent measures whereby issues were seized and journalists imprisoned. Those newspapers, which refused to follow the Government's line, were attacked as unpatriotic and traitors to their country. They were branded as "disgraceful" by the French Premier in that they had so far lost sight of the French interest. *Le Monde's* distinguished correspondent, Georges Penchenier, revealed the indiscriminate reprisal raids carried out by the French army on villages, after coordinated attacks by the F.L.N. in August 1955. He spoke of old people, women and children executed by the French troops which he was accompanying: "The ditch outside the village [of Zef-Zef], along the Roman road, contained a thousand corpses. Here the hour of repression has sounded.... This has become a war of race and religion".¹⁰⁷ Earlier, *L'Humanité* had been seized and its correspondent Robert Lambotte expelled from Algeria because he had accused the French troops and Foreign Legion of carrying out indiscriminate killings amongst Algerians including women and children. "The forces of repression have gone mad", he had concluded.¹⁰⁸

The French authorities attempted to discredit any journalist reporting on those excesses, claiming that the women and children who had died recently had fought with the F.L.N. troops, and that all those killed had been "combatants". To Penchenier, this was utter deception. He again insisted that all the victims had been non-combatants who had been killed after the French-F.L.N. battle. He went on to describe, in detail, the Zef-Zef mayhem: "A dog tied to a post began to whine on seeing us. Some chickens picked quietly among the bodies. I do not recall seeing any adult males. I could distinguish several children of less than ten... a little girl, knees bent hand in hand... an old woman... three other women with babies in their arms. The coagulated blood was still red - it was a fresh slaughter".¹⁰⁹ The French Government finally bowed to solid eyewitness charges, conceding that its troops had carried out the massacres. "The Zef-Zef incident was an isolated case that will not recur, an unfortunate consequence of warfare", declared the Ministry of the Interior.¹¹⁰ To the Algerians, these excesses brought further confirmation that only military force could ever win them national independence; the F.L.N. was now firmly convinced of the need not only to put more pressure on France inside Algeria, but also to bring the Algerian cause to the attention of world opinion.

In addition to mobilizing all its resources inside Algeria, the F.L.N. was aware of the importance of diplomatic manoeuvring to bring pressure to bear on France. It was, from the start, eager to internationalize the Algerian problem and to make it "... a reality for the whole world with the backing of our natural allies".¹¹¹ It was towards the United Nations that its diplomatic activities were mainly directed. Its Bureau of Information in New York played a significant role in publicizing its case and in gaining more

sympathisers with its cause.¹¹² On the initiative of fourteen Afro-Asian nations, the General Assembly agreed to register the "Algerian question" on the agenda of its tenth session in October 1955. France, as expected, opposed this move on the ground that the war in Algeria was an internal French issue, basing its argument on Article 2 paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit matters to settlement under the present Charter".¹¹³

After failing to block registration of the Algerian item on the Assembly's agenda despite the support of its allies, especially the United States, France walked out in protest.

The American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, tried to justify the United States vote against the enclosure of the Algerian question into the General Assembly's discussion, by asserting that "[u]nlike Morocco and Tunisia, which are French protectorates, Algeria under French law is administratively an integral part of the French Republic...". He reiterated the French claim that Algeria fell beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations and that consideration of the Assembly would conflict with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of its Charter.¹¹⁴ The United States support for the French position had, since the outbreak of the Algerian war in 1954, been uniform. This support stemmed largely from its efforts to secure France's full cooperation in N.A.T.O. Hence, declared Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade: the United States should not endanger "the great N.A.T.O. organization that is the only organized strength of the free world against Soviet encroachment".¹¹⁵

The United States material and diplomatic support for France in Algeria angered many Congressmen. In a resolution to Congress, John McCormack of Massachusetts called on the American Government to "... administer its foreign policies and programs and exercise its influence through its membership in the United Nations and other international organizations", so as to support other nations in their effort to achieve self-government or independence which would enable them to assume an equal status among the free nations of the world.¹¹⁶ Harold Gross of Iowa declared that this resolution "... opposes colonial exploitation in all its forms and by every government. To support this claim and then provide funds for the support of French colonial exploitation in North Africa, for instance, will constitute the worst kind of double-talk".¹¹⁷ The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee concluded its discussion of the resolution by declaring that in essence, it was "... a reaffirmation of the principles of the Declaration of Independence", a document which was described by Abraham Lincoln as meaning "Liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope for the world, for all future time".¹¹⁸ These calls, however, did not have much echo in the White House.

The New York Times, like the American Administration, attacked the General Assembly for accepting to take up the Algerian question, which it regarded as an internal French issue beyond United Nations jurisdiction and which the Assembly had "no business interfering in".¹¹⁹ *The (London) Times*, following a similar line of argument, had asserted a few months earlier that the Assembly's discussion of Algeria would be "contrary to the mission of the United Nations".¹²⁰ *The New York Times* particularly attacked two of France's allies, Greece for voting against France and Iceland for abstaining, expressing regret that the result of the Assembly's vote was possible

simply because "two NATO countries failed to support France". This brought a sharp response from Iceland's permanent representative at the United Nations who, in a letter to the paper, ridiculed its claim that his country might have "violated the NATO pact". Remarking that it was through the right to self-determination that his country had gained its full independence in 1944, he reaffirmed Iceland's commitment to every people's right to self-determination. In response to the argument that the North Atlantic treaty "obligates every member to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area and to assist every other member in restoring and maintaining its security against an armed attack", he pointedly added: "NATO as a protector and bulwark for colonialism is completely alien to my people and entirely unacceptable".¹²¹

The New York Times, steering even closer to the rock of partisan journalism, criticised the United States, not because it did not support France, which it did, but, ironically enough, for not using conspiratorial tactics to influence the voting of other delegates, notably the Latin Americans. When the General Assembly, after dubious diplomatic manoeuvres by France and its allies, finally decided to delay considering the Algerian question, the paper lost no opportunity to rejoice and to reaffirm its pro-French stance: "The French had good cause for resentment and in fairness and common sense that cause should be removed.... The French argued, *with reason*, that Algeria was an internal affair and no business of the General Assembly's".¹²² The American Administration's rejoicement was equally ardent. Hailing the Assembly's decision to delay the discussion of Algeria, Henry Cabot Lodge claimed that this had moved the United Nations "out of a most difficult situation fraught with danger" and that "wise statesmen restored conditions necessary for full French participation in our

work".¹²³ To the F.L.N., however, the recent Assembly's decision was nothing but "surrender to the blackmail" of the French Government and its allies.¹²⁴ Its military efforts inside Algeria were, therefore, to be intensified to bring more pressure to bear on France.

Notes

1. See Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Shakhsiat el Jazair el Dawlia*, Vol.1, Constantine, Algeria: Daar el Baath, 1985, pp.58-62; see also Ray W. Irwin, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816*, The University of North Carolina Press (trans. Ismail Arabi, S.N.E.D., 1978), p.22; see also William Spencer, *Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs*, U.S.A.: Norman, 1976, p.165.
2. For more information on the Algerian navy and its activities, see H.D. de Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger sous la Dominations Turque*, p.129.
3. Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Inia wa Assala*, Constantine (Algeria): Daar el Baath, 1975, pp.288-292.
4. A. Dufour, *France-Pays Arabe*, Paris, 1975.
5. Lorna Hahn, *North Africa - Nationalism to Nationhood*, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960, p.134; Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, Penguin Books, 1961, p.13; Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Shakhsiat el Jazair el Dawlia*, *op.cit.*, p.19.
6. For more information on these treaties and the different forms of assistance provided by Algeria to France, see Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Shakhsiat el Jazair el Dawlia*, *op.cit.*, pp.56-194. See also Jamel Qannen, *Muahadat el Jazair maa Faransa, 1619-1830*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1987.
7. The German historian Dr. Turi Semjonow quoted in *ibid.*, p.21.
8. Quoted in René Valet, *L'Afrique du Nord: Devant le Parlement au XIXeme Siècle (1828-1838 - 1880-1881)*, Algiers, 129, p.135.
9. Colette and Francis Jeanson, *L'Algérie Hors-La-Loi*, Éditions du Seuil, 1955, p.87; Gerard Mansell, *Tragedy in Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p.32.
10. "Aux Origines Du Nationalisme Algérien", *Annales*, 4ème Année, Oct-Dec. 1949, No.4.
11. See *Najah* (Arabic Newspaper) 3 August 1932. Ben Baddis and the Association of the Ulemas - Moslem Scholars - played a leading role between the two World Wars, in reviving Algerian national conscience and in resisting French attempts to eradicate the Algerian identity and cultural heritage.
12. *El Joundi*, Number 28, June 1980, p.10.
13. Messali Hadj, for example, was sentenced to 16 years hard labour.
14. Ahmed Mahsas, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Algérie de la 1ere Guerre Mondiale a 1954*, Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1979, p.160.
15. *El Joundi*, *op.cit.*, p.10.
16. The two bombs caused 190,000 deaths, see *Le Monde*, 8 August 1987.

17. See Radouane A. Tabet, *Le 8 Mai 1945 en Algérie*, Algiers: Office des Publications, 1985, p.95.
18. *Révolution Africaine*, May 1982, p.20.
17. Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes - Où Le Temps des Certitudes*, Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1981, p.44.
20. See *El-Djeich* (French version) May 1971, No.96, p.6; Shaab, 7 May 1986; *L'Algérie-Actualité*, No.1073 (8-14 May 1986).
21. *The New York Times*, 15 May 1945.
22. *Le Monde*, 16 May 1945.
23. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 May 1945.
24. See André Noushi, *La Naissance du Nationalisme Algérien, 1914-1954*, Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1962, pp.97-124; Radouane A. Tabet, *Le 8 Mai 1945 en Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127.
25. See Jean-Claude Vatin, *L'Algérie: Politique, Histoire et Société*, Paris: Presses de La Fondation Nationale des sciences Politiques, 1983, p.277; Shaab, 7 May 1986.
26. Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.45.
27. Ahmed Mahsas, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.210.
28. *Le Monde*, 15 May 1945.
29. *The New York Times*, 24 May 1945; 2 June 1945; 12 July 1945.
30. *Alger-Républicain*, 11 May 1945; *L'Humanité*, 11 May 1945.
31. See Eugene Vallet, *Le Drame Algérien - La Vérité sur les Émeutes de Mai 1945*, Paris: Les Grandes Éditions Françaises, 1948.
32. Radouane A. Tabet, *Le 8 May 1945*, *op.cit.*, p.102.
33. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977, p.26.
34. Charles-André Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en Marche*, Paris: Julliard, 1972, p.304.
35. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.26; Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1960, p.54.
36. Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, London: André Deutsch Limited, 1975, p.359.
37. *Liberté*, 8 May 1947.
38. *L'Humanité*, 18-19 May 1947.
39. *Alger-Républicain*, 7 May 1949.

40. *The New York Times*, 1 June 1945.
41. J. Galting and M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1965, p.79.
42. *The New York Times*, 1 June 1945.
43. *The New York Times*, 29 April 1946.
44. *The New York Times*, 25 December 1946.
45. Ahmed Mahsas, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire*, *op.cit.*, pp.207-208.
46. Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.56.
47. See *El-Djeich* (French version) No.96, May 1971; Radouane A. Tabet, *Le 8 Mai 1945 en Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.135-136.
48. Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, pp.51-52.
49. The Statute called for the dissolution of mixed communes, abolition of separate administration in the Sahara, separation of state and religion and installation of French and Arabic as the official languages in Algeria.
50. Quoted in *Annales*, 20 August 1947, pp.45-65.
51. David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p.54.
52. William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968*, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp.60-61.
53. David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.55.
54. See Mohamed Boudiaf (one of the four original members of the C.R.U.A.), "La Préparation du 1er Novembre" in *El-Jarida*, No.15, November-December 1974; *Ou Va L'Algérie?*, Paris: Librairie d'Etoile, 1969, p.69; see also his interview in *Le Monde*, 2 November 1962; Rabah Bitat (one of the prominent figures in the Algerian revolution and the current President of the Algerian National Assembly), "Comment Nous Avons Préparé Le 1er Novembre 1954" in *L'Express*, 27 October 1979; Abdelhamid Mehri (former representative of the F.L.N. in the Middle east and currently responsible for information in the Party), "Ahdathun Mahadat Lifitihi Nufember 1954" (Events leading to 1 November 1954) in *El Açal*, No.22, October-November 1974.
55. See R. Bitat, "Comment Nous Avons Préparé Le 1er Novembre", in *L'Express*, 27 October 1979.
56. Yvès Courrière, *Les Fils de la Toussaint*, Paris: Fayard, 1968, pp.101-103.
57. Robert Aron, *Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, Fayard, 1962, p.317.
58. *The New York Times*, 2 November 1954.

59. "Trouble in North Africa", *The New York Times*, 7 November 1954.
60. *The New York Times*, 2 November 1954; 8 December 1954.
61. Robert C. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, *op.cit.*, p.45.
62. See, for example, texts of letters from Louis XIV to Dey Hadj Ahmed (dated 28 September 1695) cited in Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Shakhsiat el Jazair el Dawlia*, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p.73; to Dey Mustapha (dated 7 October 1705) cited in *ibid.*, pp.78-79; to Dey Hussein (dated 13 January 1706) cited in *ibid.*, p.81; to Dey Ali (dated 1 April 1711) cited in *ibid.*, pp.83-84; also letter from Louis XV to Dey Mohamed (dated 29 December 1721) in *ibid.*, pp.87-88; see also text of the treaty signed between Algeria and France on 16 January 1764, cited in *ibid.*, pp.91-92.
63. See *supra*, pp.26-26.
64. Charles-André Julien writing in *Demain*, 4 January 1956; also in his *Une Pensée Anti-Coloniale*, Paris: Sindbad, 1979, pp.159-160.
65. *The New York Times*, 4 November 1954.
66. *The (London) Times*, 30 November 1955.
67. Mohamed Tegua, *L'Algérie en Guerre*, Algiers: Offices de Publications Universitaire, 1976, p.297.
68. For text of the "Proclamation", see Document no.13 in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne* (compiled by Mohamed Harbi), Paris: Les Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1981, pp.101-103 (*emphasis added*); also in *El Moudjahid* (the official organ of the F.L.N.) No.4.
69. Lorna Hahn, *North Africa - Nationalism to Nationhood*, *op.cit.*, p.157.
70. See *El Moudjahid*, No.33, 8 December 1958; *El Moudjahid*, No.53-54, 1 November 1959.
71. See M. Tegua, *L'Algérie en Guerre*, *op.cit.*, pp.155-159.
72. *The New York Times*, 6 November 1954; 7 November 1954.
73. *The New York Times*, 19 November 1954.
74. Published in London by Thames and Hudson in 1960.
75. See, for example, David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.64.
76. See *The New York Times*, 30 June 1955.
77. *Time*, 26 December 1955.
78. See S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.94.
79. Quoted in *Time*, 26 December 1955.

80. Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, pp.92, 101.
81. See M'hamed Yazid, "Rapport sur L'Action Internationale du F.L.N." (July 1957) in *Les Archives de La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.172.
82. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.129.
83. *The New York Times*, 22, 23, 28 August 1955.
84. *The London Times*, 24 May 1955.
85. Dr. Ben Djelloul (pro-integrationist deputy) quoted in *The New York Times*, 29 September 1955.
86. *The New York Times*, 19 December 1954; 30 May, 2 September, 27 November, 1 December, 26 December 1955.
87. Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, *op.cit.*, pp.360-361.
88. *The (London) Times*, 2 November 1954; 2 June, 24 August 1955.
89. *The Economist*, 27 August, 1 October 1955.
90. M. Tegua, *L'Algérie en Guerre*, *op.cit.*, p.296.
91. P. Bourdieu, "Révolution dans la Révolution", in *Esprit*, January 1961, p.29.
92. See text of F.L.N. "Proclamation" in *Les Archives de La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.101-103.
93. *Résistance Algérienne*, No.33, 10-20 June 1957, p.3.
94. Charles-André Julien, *Pensée Anti-Coloniale*, *op.cit.*, pp.157-158.
95. See Jean Cohen, "Colonialisme et Racisme en Algérie", *Les Temps Modernes*, Paris: Imprimerie Chantenay, No.119 (November 1955), pp.580-581.
96. *El Moudjahid*, 4 July 1958; René Gendarme, *L'Economie de l'Algérie*, Paris: A Colin, 1959, pp.148-161.
97. *La Population en Algérie*, Paris: Documentation Française, 1957, Vol.III, pp.139-166.
98. Mouloud Kassem N. Belkacem, *Rudud Fial Awalia Dakhilan wa Kharijan a la Ghurati Nofumber*, Constantine (Algeria): Dar el Baath, 1984, p.177. For more information on the relationship between the Algerian population and the *colon* community, see F. Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, Paris: Maspéro, 1961; A. Memmi, *Portrait du Colonisé Précédé du Portrait de Colonisateur*, Paris: Buchet Chastel, 1957; P. Nora, *Les Français d'Algérie*, Paris: Julliard, 1961. On the disparity between the Algerians and the *colons*, see Robert Aron, *Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*; Michel Launay, *Paysans Algériens*, Paris, 1963; Pierre Bourdieu, *Travail et Travailleurs en Algérie*, Paris, 1963.
99. See P. Kessel and G. Pirelli, *Le Peuple Algérien et la Guerre, Lettres et Témoignages, 1954-1962*, Paris: Maspéro, 1962; J.J.

- Servanschreiber, *Lieutenant en Algérie*, Paris: Julliard, 1957.
100. Quoted in *Time*, 30 May 1955.
 101. *The New York Times*, 22 November 1954.
 102. *The New York Times*, 2 June 1955.
 103. *The New York Times*, 26 June 1955.
 104. *The New York Times*, 11 November 1955.
 105. See, for example, *The New York Times*, 26 June, 28 August and 22 November 1955.
 106. *The Economist*, 1 October 1955.
 107. Quoted in *L'Humanité*, 26 August 1955.
 108. *L'Humanité*, 23 August 1955.
 109. *Le Monde*, 30 August 1955.
 110. See Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, *op.cit.*, pp.362-363.
 111. See F.L.N. "Proclamation" of 1 November 1954 in *Les Archives de La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.103-104.
 112. Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, pp.422-423.
 113. See Mammeri Khalfa, *Les Nations-Unies Face à la Question Algérienne (1954-1962)*, Algiers: SNED, 1969, pp.41-55; see also Suzanne Bastidi, "La thèse Française est basée sur l'article 2, paragraph 7 de la Charte", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1959.
 114. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.849, "Question of Inscribing Algerian Item on Assembly Agenda", Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 3 October 1955, p.849; Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.854, "The United Nations After Years", Ambassador Lodge, 7 November 1955, p.740.
 115. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol.XXX, No.774, "The Middle East in New Perspective", Henry A. Byroade, 26 April 1954.
 116. *Congressional Record*, Vol.C1, Part 6, 84 Cong. 1 Sess., "The United States and Colonialism", John W. McCormack, 31 May 1955, p.7291.
 117. *Congressional Record*, Vol.C1, Part 7, 84 Cong. 1 Sess., "Opposition to Colonialism and Communist Imperialism", Harold Gross, p.9093.
 118. *Ibid.*, p.10503.
 119. Editorial: "ANTI-COLONIAL RAMPAGE", *The New York Times*, 5 October 1955; "DANGEROUS RIFTS", *The New York Times*, 9 October 1955.
 120. *The (London) Times*, 3 May 1955.

121. *The New York Times*, 2 November 1955.
122. *The New York Times*, 23 November 1955 (emphasis added).
123. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.859, "Decision of the General Assembly Concerning Algerian Question", Henry Cabot Lodge, 12 December 1955, p.992.
124. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 18 November 1955.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS FULL-FLEDGED REVOLUTION - "THE WORLD TAKES NOTICE"

"Men are so constituted that they are prone to support a cause which they believe to be assured of victory".
(H.A.L. Fisher)

"... the most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile - it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent.... The war in Algeria confronts the United States with the most critical diplomatic impasse since the crisis in Indochina..."
(Senator J.F. Kennedy, 1957).

The offensive launched by *L'Armée de Libération Nationale* on 20 August 1955, as already explained, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Algerian revolution which would, henceforth, become more effective.¹ At the end of 1955 and during the first few months of the following year, the nationalist units expanded their military activities to the Oran Department hitherto untouched by war. This period also saw the rise of the phenomenon of urban violence at a large scale.

Although the regular troops of the A.L.N. did not then exceed 20,000 men, their knowledge of the countryside, the growing popular support for their cause and the acquisition of more and better arms strengthened their resisting capabilities and enhanced their confidence in an eventual victory.² The independence of Tunisia and Morocco was another asset to the A.L.N. who could, therefore, use the neighbouring territories both as a refuge and as a supply route for the internal units.³ As the war was expanding geographically, the nationalist forces were gaining more control of the northern districts

notably in the east. Such growing waves of Algerian dissent added to the worries of the French authorities who would, consequently, multiply their efforts against what they called the "insurgents".⁴

The *Front de Libération Nationale* sought from the beginning to strengthen its political and military position by gaining the support of the up till now indifferent moderate nationalist groups. It was in this context that Tewfik el Madani and Ferhat Abbas, leaders of the Ulemas and the U.D.M.A. respectively, decided to abandon their moderate stand and join the F.L.N. and its cause in 1956. The Association of the Ulemas, Moslem Scholars, vigorously attacked the "atrocities and acts of barbarity" repeatedly committed by the colonial army under the pretext of suppressing the F.L.N.: no solutions to the problem would be possible without recognizing "the free existence of the Algerian nation, its distinctive personality, its national government and its sovereign legislative assembly", whilst at the same time preserving individual rights and interests.⁵ Members of the Algerian Communist Party also joined the F.L.N. but were integrated into the A.L.N. units only as individuals.⁶

All this further demonstrated the F.L.N.'s determination to unify the various nationalist groups under one front and its eagerness to resist any challenge to its proclaimed role as the only representative of the Algerian population. The wave of dissent, in effect, touched almost every political tendency including *Les Élus*, the pro-French deputies, who now expressed opposition to the policy of "integration" which they had, hitherto, staunchly supported. A direct result of these new developments was France's decision to formally dissolve the by now obsolete Algerian Assembly in April 1956.⁷

These rallies behind the F.L.N. strengthened its position as the only spokesman for the Algerians and substantiated its claim as the only force capable of uniting the various ideological tendencies behind the principle of national independence.⁸ It also made its first serious attempt to define its ideology, and set up its structural institutions during the Soummam Congress of 20 August 1956 which outlined the principles, methods and objectives of the Algerian revolution.⁹ This Congress stressed the F.L.N.'s leading role in the process of liberation. "At the political level, all the parties and groups (with the exception of Messali's M.N.A.)" wrote one of its prominent organizers, Abbane Ramdane, in an *El Moudjahid* editorial, "came to be integrated into the F.L.N. which has today become a unique political force in Algeria".¹⁰ The popularity of the F.L.N. expanded with remarkable speed at a time when the Algerian population as a whole was becoming, in one way or another, involved in the insurrection. By April 1956, it had become a mass movement.¹¹

The New York Times lost no opportunity to tell its readers about the large-scale resignations of Algerian local politicians which "symbolized new dissatisfaction with French policies in this rebel-torn area where nationalists are pressing for complete independence".¹² *The Economist*, arguing along a similar line, intimated that never had there been a more cogent demonstration of the "fiction" of proclaiming that all Algerians were assimilable to Frenchmen and that "*L'Algérie, c'est la France*".¹³

The New York Times seemed especially concerned with the change in the stance of *Les Élus*, who formed what came to be known as the "group of sixty-one" to protest against the dictum of "integration" which they had traditionally endorsed; the integrationist policy was no

longer acceptable to them because it failed to recognize "Algerian nationality". Remarking that the moderate nationalists now took the view that the situation had deteriorated so far that only the F.L.N. guerrillas could speak for the Algerian people, the paper quoted a hitherto pro-integrationist politician as saying that the Algerians no longer had any faith in the traditional parties which they regarded as tools of the colonial authorities: "We have been passed over. If the Government negotiates some sort of agreement with the rebels we can perhaps be useful again".¹⁴

The (London) Times, arguing in a similar fashion, intoned that Algerian political opinion had moved a long way in recent months; whereas a year earlier the intellectual Algerian would have been ready to accept integration of the type Jacques Soustelle appeared to be thinking of, now he had passed beyond that point and was "interested only in the recognition of Algerian nationality".¹⁵ *The Economist*, in a leading article headed "Algeria is African", stressed the same thought.¹⁶

As time went by, the statements of the former deputies of the Algerian Assembly grew more favourable to the F.L.N. and, therefore, more disappointing to the French. "Above all the Algerians want to attain dignity as men", declared one. "They want to win their political rights. Whatever the military resources of France, the war will go on as long as these rights have not been obtained".¹⁷ Reiterating the same argument a few months later, the former President of the Assembly, Abderrahmane Farès, told *Le Monde* that the F.L.N. which had been able "to muster behind it the Algerian people almost to a man", was now the last hope of the Algerian population.¹⁸

Algerian "Personality" Conceded; Self-Determination Still Denied:

Under growing pressure, the French Government formally accepted the distinctiveness of the Algerian personality. Hence, talks of a potential federal association between Algeria and France as an alternative to the now obsolete idea of "integration", became the main subject of the day-to-day conversation in French political circles. To the F.L.N., however, this alternative was not acceptable because it fell short of promising Algeria's right to self-determination.

To maintain its momentum and increase pressure on the colonial authorities, the F.L.N. needed not only the sympathy but also the active support of the local population. More efforts were made to draw Algerians of all walks of life - workers, peasants, students - into its cause. The trade union organization (U.G.T.A.) which it had created under its control came to play a vital role in leading strikes and in directing boycotts of the various institutions of the French Establishment.¹⁹ This need was highlighted in the final Declaration of the Soummam Congress which stressed the importance of civil dissent to enhance the military effort of *L'Armée de Libération Nationale*.²⁰

The Algerian population by and large responded favourably to this strategy despite France's multi-faceted campaign of dissuasion including a massive use of force.²¹ The French Government had long claimed that the F.L.N. enjoyed no support from the local people and that most Algerians were seeking French protection against the "rebels". Such claims found much echo in *The New York Times* which hastily asserted that villagers had given "evidence" of a wish "to rid themselves of the rebels and rebel exactions".²² *The Economist*, on the other hand, stressed the view that the nationalist movement was

firmly "entrenched" within the local population; its popularity with the ordinary Algerian and his active support for the actual fighters stemmed mainly from his belief that they were fighting to improve his lot.²³ This, one supposes, might have been of interest to the readers of *The New York Times* had they been told about it, which they were not.

Although the French Government had already conceded Algeria's independent personality, it was still clinging to the view that it was an integral part of metropolitan France and that its bonds with Paris were indissoluble. France's traditional insistence on this claim stemmed largely from the economic and strategic importance of Algeria which, in the words of *The New York Times*, served as a "gateway" to all French African territories and a "repository" of newly discovered oil riches.²⁴ This idea had been stressed by *The (London) Times* a few weeks earlier, arguing that because Algeria meant so much to France both "economically and emotionally" the search for a fresh political approach to Algeria was proving an "extremely painful process".²⁵

In its efforts to stamp out the Algerian revolution, France combined "reforms" with repression. The measures which were aimed at bringing about some change in favour of the local population and which came to be known as the *Loi Cadre*, or "outline law", promised the abolition of the structural political division between Algerians and *colons* by creating a single Electoral College, the provision of more opportunities to the Algerians to be employed in the official services, and the initiation of agrarian and industrial "reforms" aimed at improving their living conditions. "I guarantee you the fierce will of the Government", declared Premier Guy Mollet in his address to the local population, "to accord you justice and full

equality before the law".²⁶

To the Algerians, who as former Premier Mendès-France admitted had lost confidence in the promises of successive French governments, under whose orders election results were consistently rigged and the interests of the *colon* minority fanatically protected, those measures were no more than a drop in the ocean. To the F.L.N., they were merely "contemptible sops". The *Loi Cadre*, like other schemes before it especially the Statute of 1947, sought to keep French Algeria and "ignored Algeria's right to self-determination" despite the promises of cosmetic socio-political changes in favour of the local population.²⁷ The F.L.N. fighters were simply asked to lay down their arms and accept an outline law and an electoral regime imposed by France.²⁸ "For 125 years, we have served as guinea pigs for French schemes", declared Ferhat Abbas, "We still settle for nothing short of independence".²⁹

The New York Times, offering an appraisal in hindsight of the outline law, told its readers that despite its recognition of an "Algerian individuality" it was still deemed unacceptable to Algerians because it "failed to offer direct negotiations with the leaders of the rebellion". The plan, which was "good in theory" but unworkable in practice, was doomed to failure like a host of similar proposals before, because the 1,200,000 *pieds noirs* were "still not reconciled to loss of supremacy".³⁰ *The Economist* agreed but went further by pointing out that the new proposals were "equivocal" and France's record of promises in general was "poor". Whilst the plan recognized Algeria's different personality, it sought to maintain the dominance of the *colon* minority. Such contradictions, it cautioned, would only contribute to prolonging the war.³¹ To *The (London) Times* also, the

scheme was not enough to make the Algerians feel that "a real evolutionary road is offered to them as an alternative to rebellion".³²

The Fourth Republic Under Threat From *Colon* Extremism; Signs of Things to Come

The *colons*' constant fear of potential Algerian reprisals stemmed largely from their awareness of the injustices they had committed throughout the years against the local population. They became more and more sensitive to their dominant position which they saw under threat and, therefore, became more attached to the idea of mob violence. Even the most token proposals to improve the living conditions of the Algerian majority aroused suspicion and fear of being abandoned by France; they used every means possible to keep Paris under pressure in order to halt any move towards reform. Their emotional slogans, which were aimed at capturing the sympathy of the metropolitan French, typified their almost hysterical attitude: "*L'Algérie c'est la France*", "*De Dunkerque à Tamanrasset...*", "*La Méditerranée traverse la France comme la Seine traverse Paris*". Their frustration about the difficulty of preserving their privileged interests, combined with a feeling of inferiority towards the metropolitan French, led the *pieds noirs* to become the champions of "French Grandeur".³³ Mob disobedience became their principal weapon to make their voice heard by the Government.³⁴

Their hostile reaction to the appointment of General Catroux to succeed Jacques Soustelle as Minister Resident in Algeria culminated in turbulent riots during Mollet's Algeria visit on 6 February 1956. Catroux, who had been behind the Ordinance of 7 March 1944 - which had

promised a few changes in favour of the Algerians - and also involved in the negotiations that had led to Morocco's independence, was accused of being "too liberal". His appointment was seen as a recipe for the loss of *L'Algérie Française* and the collapse of French Africa.³⁵

Paris finally surrendered to extremist pressure and "the mob got what it wanted". Catroux's appointment was withdrawn and Robert Lacoste, the choice of the *colons*, was appointed instead.³⁶ Under Lacoste French troops jumped from 120,000 to 400,000. The needs of the army in Algeria, which was the largest France had ever sent abroad, were high both in equipment and in manpower; and caused serious strains to the French economy and treasury as France got most of its military goods from abroad.³⁷ The *piéd noir* paramilitary organizations, such as *Les Groupes Militaires de Protection Rurale* and *La Section Administrative Spécialisée*, which specialised in different techniques of repression against the local population, were given formal permission to operate freely: "'Psychological warfare' was now the order of the day".³⁸

The New York Times, in quite unprecedented fashion as far as its Algeria coverage was concerned, cried out against France's surrender to *colon* blackmail, attacking its failure to face up to the facts and the weakness of successive French governments to solve the country's crisis. Its editorial "MOB RULE IN ALGERIA" on 7 February 1956 drove home the lesson: the withdrawal of General Catroux's appointment was a clear illustration of France's political weakness. It was a serious development, because Algeria was France's most dangerous problem. The rioting of the *piéd noirs*, coming after months of severe guerrilla fighting was dramatic evidence that a strong hand was desperately

needed. "This is mob rule, which is shocking for one of the greatest powers in the world". In the light of what was to come this was almost prophetic. Nevertheless, despite this criticism which did not approach the fundamentals of French policy in Algeria, the paper continued to give general support to the French Government.

The events of 6 February 1956 established an encouraging precedent for the *colons*, set the pattern for future mob violence, heralded more governmental humiliations and represented a landmark in the history of the Algerian war.³⁹ The *pieds noirs* were taught that they could influence policy making in Paris through rioting. Such a lesson, as explained in the following chapter, would not be forgotten two years later during the Putsch of 13 May 1958 which would bring down the French Fourth Republic and bring General De Gaulle back to power.⁴⁰ Their belief was strengthened by the Government's appeasing efforts. "You have believed France was going to abandon you", Mollet told them. "I have understood your despair.... That is why I say to you serenely, that even if I suffered by them, the dolorous demonstrations of Monday have a healthy aspect. They were for a great many, the means of affirming their attachment to France and their anguish at being abandoned". "France will remain in Algeria", he declared. "The ties between the metropolitan country and Algeria are indissoluble".⁴¹

To the Algerians, as Edward Behr has pointed out, those events had shown that there were two scales of justice - one for the *colons* "who were allowed the utmost leeway and enjoyed the tacit approval of the police force", and one for the local population "on whom both police and army had no hesitation in opening fire".⁴² In this context, the paper cautioned that the Government's retreat under mob

violence would increase the reluctance of moderate Algerian leaders to enter into talks with Paris.⁴³ This retreat helped to destroy whatever trust some Algerians might still have held towards the French authorities and conversely strengthened the F.L.N.'s position. "After what we have seen", declared one "moderate" Algerian politician, "it is not expectable that we shall become more moderate ourselves. Fateful days are not far off".⁴⁴ Jacques Chevallier, the then Mayor of Algiers, reiterated the same view.⁴⁵

The New York Times, in a series of pointed anti-*colon* articles, blamed the extremists for wrecking any chance of a settlement along a federal line or on the basis of "independence within interdependence".⁴⁶ It even ventured that the Algerian nationalists might not have demanded independence "if any advance toward federation had begun earlier". The readers were pointedly told that the Algerians were still denied "the right to nationhood" because of the French Government's fear of *colon* vigilantism.⁴⁷ *Time* magazine drove home the same lesson a few months later, but revealed a new aspect of the problem - army complacency with the extremists: "Should Mollet show signs of giving in to Algerian demands for independence, much of the army might well support Algeria's reactionary French *colons* in open defiance of the government".⁴⁸

In addition to the aggression of the *pied noir* extremist organizations, the local population did not escape the systematic repressive measures of the army. Determined to put a rapid end to the war, the army adopted "collective punishment" as a means of bringing the people under control. Ironically, however, the collective punishment applied by the French in Algeria did not differ much from that applied by the Nazis in France during the Second World War and

which resulted in indiscriminate massacres like that of Oradour-sur-Glane.⁴⁹ The French army embarked on a campaign of arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate bombings of villages and the regroupment of the inhabitants of the areas, where the F.L.N. was thought to be in operation, in camps later described by the International Red Cross as "inhuman".⁵⁰ "Everybody, everywhere, is hiding something", became, in the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, the army's motto: "They must be *made to talk*".⁵¹ "You're going to talk! Everybody talks.... This is the Gestapo here! You know the Gestapo", one paratrooper cried at Henri Alleg after his arrest.⁵² Torture became normal practice. I shall consider this whole problem more directly at a later stage; at the moment it may be enough just to state it.

The French army's campaign of repression against the Algerian population reached its peak in 1957. According to F.L.N. figures as many as 6,000 people disappeared between January and April of that year.⁵³ "Psychological action" was used to scare the people into submission and, therefore, rally them more easily behind the idea of *L'Algérie Française*; and also to raise the morale of the French troops. It included a variety of techniques that ranged from propaganda through leaflets, films and banners - which all minimized the French army's losses and exaggerated those of the A.L.N. - to different forms of "brain washing".⁵⁴

The French army, haunted by the memory of its experience in Vietnam, claimed that it was not only fighting to protect civilians against "rebel terror", but also to protect Algeria against "communist subversion" and to defend the free world against international communism.⁵⁵ Repression reached a degree of brutality", wrote

Philippe Scherer, "rarely passed in the history of the French army... with fascist methods".⁵⁶ To General de Bollardière, who resigned from his command in the Atlas Mountains in protest against the use of torture, excessive repression lost France the claim to "moral values" which had always been associated with French civilization.⁵⁷ The repressive methods of the French drove the local population closer to the F.L.N. as noted by Germaine Tillion: "The people for long oppressed and denied their legitimate rights stood firmly behind the F.L.N., for independence and for reasons to live".⁵⁸ Alistair Horne has commented that any other power, which had used repression in war, realized that repression is a "double edged weapon", which would in the long run present the adversary with a valuable and more effective moral and emotional weapon.⁵⁹

The French attempts to quell the Algerian revolution by military force grabbed the headlines of the press in France and in the West. *The New York Times*, treating generously the Government's strategy to give "stern repression" priority over "reform", failed to expose the far-reaching consequences of this strategy and its heavy bearing on the civilian population. Lacoste's over-optimistic statements about the "last quarter of an hour" of the war continued to get into its columns at considerable length.⁶⁰ However, French strategy was to cause even *The New York Times*, a year later, to question the belief that the Algerian problem could be resolved by force: despite the dispatch of reinforcements to put French forces near the half million mark, action by the F.L.N. units in the countryside and in the cities continued to dominate the scene and frustrate Mollet's plans.⁶¹ But the paper's stance was not as clear as the stance taken by *The Economist* which vigorously scorned the French army's claim that the war was in its *dernier quart d'heure*. Although the Government was

given the special powers in Algeria for which it had asked, the Algerian revolution had passed the point where it could be destroyed either by special powers and reinforcements or by the F.L.N.'s tactical mistakes.⁶² The weekly, which was never openly unfriendly to the F.L.N., had earlier drawn attention to the peculiar character of guerrilla warfare and to the difficulty to face small hit-and-run units with big army contingents. Almost prophesying an F.L.N. victory, it had intoned that applied to Algeria, the experience of the recent guerrilla wars suggested that the French might not now be able to regain control: "If that is true, then France will sooner or later recognize Algerian independence".⁶³ The F.L.N. military actions reached an average of 2,624 per month in March 1956, as opposed to only 900 in October 1955.⁶⁴

Army Repression Amidst Surge of Popular Opinion Towards the F.L.N.

By 1956 control of French politics in Algeria had begun to slip away from the government in Paris and into the hands of the *colon* activists and their allies in the army and police, who were determined to protect *L'Algérie Française* at any cost. The central Government was no longer obeyed.⁶⁵ On 10 August 1956 a group of these activists, collaborating with some members of the police, planted a time-bomb in the rue Thebès of the highly populated Casbah region in Algiers which claimed the lives of many victims.⁶⁶ A few weeks later, the F.L.N. retaliated with its first bombs in Algiers where one of the most violent episodes of the Algerian war would take place.⁶⁷ This came to be known as the "Battle of Algiers".⁶⁸ But, it was in fact nothing close to a battle, simply because of the disproportionate nature of the confrontation: thousands of paratroopers, policemen and secret agents assisted by the *colon* activist groups were opposed to no more

than 200 *fidayene*, urban fighters, and five leaders.

To draw the attention of international public opinion to the Algerian cause, the F.L.N. organized an all-out strike, from 28 January to 4 February 1957, to coincide with the United Nations debate on the Algerian problem.⁶⁹ The strike gained a large following among the population of Algiers despite the French army's massive display and use of force. But, the strike provided the paratroopers, who were converted into "*soldats policiers*", with an opportunity and a cover to try to stifle the F.L.N. in Algiers and eliminate its leadership. Acting under the Special Powers Law of 16 March 1956, the *paras* embarked on a large-scale campaign of arrests, cruel interrogation and torture against the Algerian community in the city.⁷⁰

The New York Times correspondent, Tillman Durdin, watched the army's response to the strike at first hand and gave a detailed account of the tense mood now reigning in Algeria. Chronicling the rough tactics used by the French in an attempt to break the strike, his dispatch pointed out some clear cases of army excesses like the arrest of shopkeepers and the looting of their shops.⁷¹ His account, however, stopped short of informing the readers about the other more hideous excesses that were taking place in interrogation centres, and which were now common knowledge not only in Algeria but also in France and elsewhere.⁷² A fact which was not mentioned in the paper's general reportage of the strike and its aftermath was that the spontaneous popular response to the F.L.N. call was a clear demonstration of the support the F.L.N. was enjoying amongst the Algerians.

The *paras*, given absolute freedom of action under the Special Powers Law, continued their campaign of unwarranted arrests, interrogation and a large-scale practice of torture which resulted in the "disappearance" of hundreds of people like Larbi Ben M'hidi, Maurice Audin and Ali Boumendjel.⁷³ An estimated 3,994 Algerian detainees simply disappeared during this period.⁷⁴ It was through this ruthless campaign that the *paras*, the police and secret services scored a temporary victory over the F.L.N. in Algiers whereby France "won the battle but lost the war" as the following chapters will demonstrate. This wave of repression contributed to the awakening of people's conscience, in France and abroad, towards the war in Algeria and especially the conduct of the French army.⁷⁵ In Algeria, as already mentioned, it strengthened the F.L.N.'s position and enhanced its popularity among the Algerians.

Many Frenchmen of all walks of life protested against repression in Algeria, especially the practice of torture. General Paris de Bollardière had already shown his indignation by resigning from his post as Commander in the Algerian Atlas Mountains.⁷⁶ In a letter to *L'Express*, he spoke of "the frightful danger that would be for us to lose from sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate effectiveness, moral values that alone have up to now made for the greatness of our civilization..."⁷⁷ Represented by 357 prominent signatories, French intellectuals wrote to the French President deploring the army's conduct: "... for over a year, we have collected a great number of concurring statements, based on testimony of unquestionable validity, which affirms that these young soldiers have to participate, regardless of their desires, in actions which would arouse every human conscience.... We refer to the torture of prisoners... to the summary execution of innocent hostages, pillage

and the destruction of entire villages as measures of intimidation and reprisal".⁷⁸

Some individual French notables were quick to denounce the practice of torture by the French army. Jean-Paul Sartre pointed out that such "tortures bring no return, the Germans themselves ended by realizing in 1944; torture costs lives but does not save them".⁷⁹ Maurice Duverger branded it as "not only immoral but also stupid".⁸⁰ "Whatever its form and whatever its purpose", stated General Pierre Billotte, "it is unacceptable, inadmissible, condemnable...".⁸¹ "We, who fought against the racist monstrosity..." warned Pierre-Henri Simon, "are today conquered by Hitler, if our nation has adopted his ideas and methods".⁸² But, these protests did not have much impact on the army and its conduct; torture and other forms of excesses continued unabated after 1957. Although the Mollet government was forced to appoint a committee of inquiry into those charges, the committee was not given appropriate power and authority to conduct its investigation which got nowhere.⁸³ By 1956, most French had realized the extreme gravity of the Algerian situation for the future of France. But, as *France-Observateur* pointed out, French public opinion was still "uncertain", "hesitant" and sensitive to "chauvinistic propaganda" painting the war as a patriotic obligation.⁸⁴

The New York Times, addressing itself rather timidly to the question of French excesses in Algeria, failed to expose the heavy bearing the army tactics were having on the Algerian population. It, however, highlighted the repercussions reports of such excesses were having among the French who were reminded of the "German methods" of World War Two. "A nation with still memories of Nazi atrocities in concentration camps and in occupied France", its readers were told,

"has become troubled by reports that similar methods have been applied by Frenchmen against Algerians".⁸⁵ Though it relayed a host of criticisms by individual Frenchmen of the army's excessive conduct, including the use of torture against Algerian detainees, its reports were mainly weak and shallow. *Time* magazine, on the other hand, was more explicitly critical of the army's atrocities. In a pointed article headed "Against Torture", it revealed to its reader the ominous fact that the army, "reduced to waging a gloryless police action, is using cruel and cynical methods in totting up its weekly bag of rebels killed".⁸⁶

The New York Times addressed itself more directly to the problem of censorship facing journalists in Algeria. "Virtually all sources of information within Algeria are controlled by the French", Tom Brady wrote from Algiers. Visiting news correspondents and other foreign observers were, therefore, "suspicious of everything they see and hear".⁸⁷ A few months earlier the paper had told its readers that most of the news about the war against French rule in Algeria "reflects what the French authorities want to tell".⁸⁸ Foreign correspondents always had great difficulty in contacting Algerians for a second view: "... contact between a foreign correspondent and any Algerian is extremely limited".⁸⁹ I shall consider this whole problem of dependence on French official sources and its effects on the quality of the paper's Algeria coverage at length in Chapter VII. From France, C.L. Sulzberger reported on the growing fears of the Government's attempts to curb the press and limit its freedom. Fears were particularly voiced that the authorities were trying to silence those publications which contained material that displeased them.⁹⁰

Le Monde's issue of 6 January 1957 was seized in Algiers because it carried a story about the killing of a seven-year-old Algerian girl by the bullets of the French troops during one of their raids. The editor of *France-Observateur*, Claude Bourdet, was arrested and prosecuted in France because of an article in which he had attacked the army's conduct in Algeria: "A hundred thousand young Frenchmen are threatened with being thrown into the 'dirty war' of Algeria, to lose their best years there, perhaps to be injured, perhaps to be killed, for a cause few among these approve, in the kind of warfare which revolts most of them". Bourdet was charged of "undertaking to demoralize the army".⁹¹ Many writers had their homes ransacked by the police because of articles they had published criticizing France's Algeria policies, especially the army's conduct. Police also kept a close watch on many publications, especially *France-Observateur*, *L'Express*, *Témoignage Chrétien* and *Esprit*.⁹² Yet, the French Government generally avoided prosecuting newsmen because imprisoning reporters, editors or publishers was not as important as intimidating them into silence and self-censorship; attempts which *The Economist* described as "squeezing the press". The Government wanted to deliver a sharp message to the press proprietors that publishing articles on torture and other army excesses in Algeria would certainly result in seizure by the police and, thus, frighten away advertisers and drive the publication into bankruptcy.⁹³

The American free-lance writer Herb Greer and the film director Peter Throckmorton, were the first Western reporters to report the war in Algeria from the F.L.N. side during the winter of 1956-1957. They spent considerable time in A.L.N. camps, interviewing fighters, meeting victims of French bombings, recording action and photographing casualties of both sides. Their eyewitness accounts were later

broadcast on American Television and throughout the world "to the fury of the French authorities", as Greer later wrote, "who attempted to suppress our film in New York and to discredit our photographs and our articles".⁹⁴

To the F.L.N., "revolutionary war" was the only option left to the Algerians to resist French "political and military terror" and the army's attempts to "pacify the hearts and souls" of the local population through "systematic extermination".⁹⁵ Though it always resented violence, it believed that it was the only way for its survival". It's our only way of expressing ourselves", Yacef Saadi told Germaine Tillion.⁹⁶ The distinguished French writer, Jean-Paul Sartre, later gave credence to this view: "Our Army is scattered all over Algeria. We have the men, the money and the arms. The rebels have nothing but the confidence and support of a large part of the population. It is we, in spite of ourselves, who have imposed this type of war-terrorism in the towns and ambushes in the country. Within the disequilibrium in the forces, the F.L.N. has no other means of action. The ratio between our forces and theirs gives them no option but to attack us by surprise. Invisible, ungraspable, unexpected, they must strike and disappear, or be exterminated".⁹⁷

The New York Times, openly siding with the French official line and filling its columns with heavy doses of anti-F.L.N. opinions, struck hard at the Algerians' use of violence. It blamed the F.L.N. for the wave of violence that had been sweeping the country since 1954 and lost no opportunity to express its sympathy with the French forces which were engaged in a guerrilla war in which "no ground rules restrain the rebels".⁹⁸ The paper failed to go beyond routine reporting, which was heavily dependent on governmental sources, to let

its readers know about the F.L.N. and its motives at first hand through an eyewitness reporter. *The (London) Times*, also critical of the F.L.N., even praised what it called the French army's "humanity and courage".⁹⁹ One fact, still alluding most of the western press, was that the F.L.N.'s violence in Algiers, as already explained, had been provoked by the bombs of the *colon* activists collaborating with the secret services.¹⁰⁰ This inclination towards the French point of view and heavy reliance on official sources could perhaps be explained by referring to the generally accepted argument in journalistic circles, that the news media tend to devote more attention to those in power at the expense of those without power. It is also widely argued that there is an inherent western "loyalty-bias" which often affects the quality of coverage of non-Western news by the Western media. Relevant to this argument, which is considered more directly in Chapter VII, are the numerous theories of communication such as "elitism", "meaningfulness", "relevancy", "proximity", "underdog-colony and topdog-motherland", which suggest that there was an inherent bias towards France in *The New York Times* coverage of the Algerian-French conflict because of its loyalty to N.A.T.O. and to the interests of the United States.¹⁰¹

The waves of unwarranted arrests, interrogations and even executions would, in the words of one historian, only destroy any illusion of "a certain idea of France". Massu's ruthlessness would only kill Voltaire in the eyes of the Algerians including those Westernized intellectuals. The French Government was facing a real dilemma: it could not pursue a campaign of repression without risking to push the population closer to the F.L.N.; and it could not implement reforms in favour of the Algerians without being attacked by army and *colon* activists as a surrender to F.L.N. pressure.¹⁰²

The Algerian revolution became a true "mass movement" in mid-1956 when the National Liberation Front benefitted from a considerable erosion of opinion towards its cause. Several factors contributed to this, especially the independence of both Tunisia and Morocco, the execution of the two F.L.N. prisoners, Ferradj and Zabanah, and the retreat of the Government in front of extremist *colon* pressure and mob violence.¹⁰³ The F.L.N. improved its military effectiveness, scored its first diplomatic victory at the United Nations and, in the words of Germaine Tillion, became "too closely associated with the Algerian masses for any lasting detente to occur without its total agreement".¹⁰⁴

In addition to the half-a-million troops drafted into Algeria, as explained in detail in the following chapter, the French army used highly advanced military hardware mainly supplied to it by the United States through N.A.T.O. The A.L.N., on the other hand, did not have more than 100,000 men. Nonetheless, relying on hit-and-run tactics, its small units scored important victories on the battlefield which gave the official organ of the F.L.N., *El Moudjahid*, reason to boast that those small guerrilla units had not only managed to "put pressure on the formidable forces of French colonialism, but they now control all the national territory".¹⁰⁵ Monthly French losses in lives, as acknowledged by Minister Resident Robert Lacoste, had passed from 30 in November 1954 when the war had first started to 285 in January 1956.¹⁰⁶

The New York Times gave considerable attention to the growing strength of the F.L.N.-A.L.N., especially the "continuing ability of the rebel forces to maintain themselves in the field against more than 450,000 French soldiers".¹⁰⁷ Whilst intimating that the nationalist

forces had "had the upper hand almost everywhere", it had earlier openly sided with the Government's argument that the F.L.N. had no right to represent the Algerians and that there was still no "valid" interlocutor to negotiate a settlement with France.¹⁰⁸ It also hastily dismissed the Algerian demands for independence as "extremist".¹⁰⁹ In all this, the paper reflected the extremist French view that the F.L.N. had to be put aside to reach a settlement.

The Economist, arguing along a different line, observed that there seemed to be no way now, if there ever had been one, of setting the F.L.N. aside, intimating that the latter had "secured virtual recognition as the only 'worthwhile negotiating party'".¹¹⁰ This, one supposes, might have been of interest to the readers of *The New York Times* had they been told about it; but they were not, because of the paper's "sin of omission". *The Economist* also showed disagreement with it on the question of Algeria's future: "It is now impossible to envisage a future status for Algeria other than in some form of federalism or independence...". To this thought, the weekly was often to return.¹¹¹

The quality and direction of the news presented to the readers is essentially based on "what is available at the gathering end of the line". The correspondent on the spot has to diversify his sources of information especially on complicated matters like international conflicts and wars. Relying on one source of information inevitably leads to distortion of news. It is widely accepted in journalistic circles that the duty of the correspondent is "to tell the story of the people in the nation he is assigned, not merely the official acts of the government and the announcements of the press attachés".¹¹²

The Conflict and its Repercussions in the World

By 1956, Algeria had already become France's uncontested number one problem, causing mounting political, economic and financial strains. *The New York Times*, realizing the high stakes involved, intimated that the Algerian war was the "gravest" and "most burning" political and military problem not only of the French Fourth Republic but also of its allies.¹¹³ Columnist C.L. Sulzberger branded it as "the great cancer" that was slowly corroding France.¹¹⁴ Highlighting the distinctiveness of Algeria from any other post-war French problem, the paper pointedly stated editorially that it occupied a "unique position" in contemporary affairs, different from Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco, and far different from "the true colony" like French West or French Equatorial Africa.¹¹⁵

The paper predicted that France's economic difficulties would last as long as the financial requirements of the military campaign in Algeria continued.¹¹⁶ Those requirements, \$1,700,000 a day, and the Government's consequent resort to "special taxes" to meet them, brought the pressure of the Algerian reality into the home of the ordinary French, and "brought into play the long-standing and stubborn political cleavages in French society".¹¹⁷ People and politicians, as *The (London) Times* had earlier observed, were becoming more prone to accuse one another of betraying French interests, of creating "another Indochina", of failing one way or another to measure up to the challenge.¹¹⁸ *Time* magazine, following a similar line of argument, had gone even further arguing that the anguished question of Algeria - the possibility that it might become another Indochina closer to home - was "the one unknowable in all comfortable calculations about the future of parliamentary democracy in France".¹¹⁹ With hindsight, as

the following chapters will demonstrate, this was a sound observation.

Algeria was so important to France that it determined its attitude and policy towards the external world. The position of other countries towards the Algerian conflict became, in the editorial words of *The (London) Times*, "the touchstone" by which the sincerity of foreign governments was measured.¹²⁰ France's sharpened concern for its image and prestige in the world was far more closely linked with the challenge it was facing in Algeria, affecting its overseas generally, than with questions of European unity or Western relations with the Soviet Union.¹²¹

The conflict directly affected the N.A.T.O. alliance and even threatened its unity. Making Algeria its absolute priority, France sought effective assistance from its allies to stamp out the Algerian revolution. Up until August 1956, as many as ten French military divisions serving in Germany under N.A.T.O. out of a total of fourteen, had been transferred to Algeria, "to the detriment of the Atlantic shield in Europe",¹²² and despite the evident fear of the supreme allied Commander General Gruenther. "If the French problem became sort of permanent, we would have a reevaluation", he declared. "We are assuming that French divisions in Algeria are in Germany".¹²³

France got the moral, financial and military support it wanted from its allies especially the United States. American financial aid to France stood at 136 billion francs in 1956 and at 500 billion francs in 1957.¹²⁴ Reassuring the French authorities that the United States was solidly behind France's policies, the Eisenhower Administration viewed Algeria as a purely "internal French problem" and "not appropriate" for discussion by the United Nations. But,

because Algeria's defence was a N.A.T.O. responsibility, the problem was in the words of the American Ambassador to Paris, Douglas Dillon, "important for all the countries of the Atlantic alliance".¹²⁵ *The New York Times*, again showing its guardianship of Western interests and perhaps confirming the view explained earlier that there is an inherent bias in the reporting of non-Western news by the Western media, warmly hailed the American Government's support for France on Algeria.¹²⁶ Not by coincidence or mere timely mellowing did its editorial page intone: "Both our countries have the same ideals, the same system of democracy, the same philosophy of life in essential respects. We need each other. We stand or fall together". Arguing that American security rested upon its allies, it asserted that the United States had to stand on the side of France and its policies in Algeria, for any policy pursued by the American Government that did not take this into account was "bound to fail".¹²⁷

Although many Algerians were angered by the pro-French stance the United States Government had adopted since the beginning of the conflict, branding it as a betrayal of the traditional principle upon which the American Republic had been founded, the F.L.N. and its cause found a sympathetic ear among many American individuals and non-governmental organizations. Trade unionists, especially Irving Brown the then representative of AFL-CIO in Europe, openly supported Algeria's right to independence and repeatedly denounced the French military campaign, which was aided and financed by the N.A.T.O. alliance.¹²⁸ Because of this pro-Algerian stance, Irving Brown was declared *persona non grata* by the French authorities, denying him entrance into Algeria. It was against this background that the President of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, strongly reproached the Eisenhower Administration's policy towards Algeria: "We of the AFL-CIO

protest vigorously against even a single American helicopter or any other military equipment designated for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Defense of free Europe being used against the Algerian National Liberation forces. Instead, let our Government urge France to strengthen the cause of world peace and freedom by championing the establishment of a federation of democratic states of North Africa".¹²⁹

But, the most prominent American sympathetic voice for the Algerian cause was that of Senator John F. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United Nations Affairs. In his speech to the Senate on 2 July 1957, he vigorously attacked the failing policies of France in Algeria which favoured the *colon* minority, "stifled" educational opportunities for the Algerians, "jailed, exiled or executed their leaders, and outlawed their political parties and activities". Stressing that the most powerful force in the world was not the H-bomb but "man's eternal desire to be free and independent", he reproached the United States Government for supporting the French military campaign in Algeria. He described the Algerian problem as the "most critical diplomatic impasse confronting the United States since the crisis in Indochina", and went on to cite the reasons which made it an important issue for the United States:

"The war in Algeria, engaging more than 400,000 French soldiers, has stripped the continental forces of NATO to the bone. It has dimmed Western hopes for a European common market, and seriously compromised the liberalization reforms of OEEC, by causing France to impose new import restrictions under a wartime economy. It has repeatedly been appealed for discussion to the United Nations, where our equivocal remarks and opposition to its consideration have damaged our leadership and prestige in that body....

It has diluted the effective strength of the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East, and our foreign aid and information programs".¹³⁰

The New York Times, in a front-page story, lost no opportunity to remark that the Kennedy speech was "the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office".¹³¹ But, its editorial on the same day openly reproached the Senator's attack on the French Algeria policies as "at the very least risky" because of France's traditional "sensitivity" to, and "distrust" of, the true motives of the United States. It concluded by reiterating the official view of the State Department that Algeria was an internal complex French problem which should not be made an American affair.¹³² A few days later Senator Kennedy forcefully answered his critics:

"No amount of hopeful assertions that France will handle the problem alone, no amount of cautious warnings that these are matters best left unmentioned in public, and no amount of charges against the motives or methods of those of us seeking a peaceful solution can obscure the fact that the Algerians will someday be free. Then, to whom will they return - to the West, which has seemingly ignored their plea for independence; to the Americans, whom they may feel have rejected the issue as none of our affair while at the same time furnishing arms that help crush them; or to Moscow, to Cairo, to Peiping, the pretended champions of nationalism and independence".¹³³

Le Monde, unlike *The New York Times* interestingly enough, pointed to the fact that the Kennedy speech not only helped American public opinion to learn about the Algerian problem, but also pinpointed "much truth" and "opened the eyes of many Frenchmen" towards France's policy in Algeria.¹³⁴

Successive French governments, adopted the view that the Algerian revolution was directed, financed and equipped from abroad. "It would have foundered long before this", Foreign Minister Christian Pineau declared before the United Nations Political Committee, "had it not received help from certain countries which supply it with arms, money, directives and even bases of operations".¹³⁵ Droz and Lever have

commented that it is not surprising that the French authorities blamed the continuation of the war on foreign involvement, because any government which finds itself in serious trouble, traditionally denounces the "foreign hand" rather than faces immediate realities. The French Government's failure in this case was refusal to understand Algerian nationalism, its motives and its demands.¹³⁶ It was widely believed that the war would immediately cease if President Nasser of Egypt was overthrown. This was, in fact, the main reason behind France's participation in the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956. The French saw Suez simply as another theatre of the Algerian war.¹³⁷

The New York Times, asserting that many of the F.L.N. military strikes had been announced in advance from Cairo, gave its readers the tacit impression that without Egyptian support the Algerian revolution would collapse.¹³⁸ But, *The Economist*, addressing itself to this question a few months later, ridiculed the theory that Nasser's overthrow was the key to a French victory in Algeria: "The Algerian rebellion has deep enough local roots for Nasser's fate not necessarily to be decisive to its future".¹³⁹ This view was shared by many observers who pointedly argued that even if Nasser had been overthrown, the Algerian revolution would have kept the same momentum. Although he supported the Algerian nationalist movement, President Nasser had no influence over its organization or conduct.¹⁴⁰

The New York Times, searching farther afield for possible foreign involvement, gave credence to the French official view that the Soviet Union had penetrated the Algerian nationalist movement, asserting that the "liberation of the Algerians" was not so important to the Kremlin as was the "dissension" the war had caused in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance.¹⁴¹ Already in May 1956 the paper had indicated its

acceptance of the French view of the status of Algeria within the French Union by playing the familiar Cold War argument and by referring to the Soviet Union in the following way: "If Mr. Khrushchev is so concerned about the peoples struggling for national liberation he has a great opportunity to show that solicitude right at home. Why should not the Ukraine be independent, or Byelorussia, or Latvia, or Lithuania...? If Mr. Khrushchev wishes to be known as a liberator, why does he not give the peoples opportunity to decide freely whether they wish to be governed from Moscow or to govern themselves?"¹⁴²

The F.L.N. had since 1954 insisted upon its total independence from foreign influence. Welcoming any assistance from any country regardless of its ideological direction, it dismissed the French argument that it was dependent on Egypt as "vain slander".¹⁴³ As far as arms were concerned, the F.L.N. repeatedly denied its dependence on any particular country: "We have to buy them wherever we can get them, and they cost us dearly. Some come from the Middle East, but we buy them all over Europe as well, including France". In response to French allegations that the nationalist movement had been infiltrated by world communism, the F.L.N. reiterated its independence from communism both internal and external, accusing France of trying to denigrate Algerian nationalism, make Algeria a Cold War issue and, thus, win more support from its allies, and, possibly, even a direct American military intervention.¹⁴⁴ Interviewed on American Television in 1957, the F.L.N. representative in New York, M'hamed Yazid, was asked: "... it is said that the F.L.N. is communist and that the countries of the East provide it with a lot of arms, is it true?" He replied: "We are far from being communist, but when one makes a war, one needs arms. We prefer Western arms; if I find one who can give them to me, I don't see why I should refuse".¹⁴⁵

The F.L.N. had always sought to internationalize the conflict in order to attract outside assistance, and to exert more pressure on France to change its approach to the question of Algeria's future.¹⁴⁶ During the first three years of the revolution, the F.L.N. succeeded in making Algeria not perhaps an "international issue" in the full sense of the word, but an issue widely discussed at the international level.¹⁴⁷ Arab countries were showing growing concern; France was using every means to draw its allies into the war. The Algerians had repeatedly denounced the support France was getting from the N.A.T.O. alliance to continue its military campaign in Algeria.¹⁴⁸ The F.L.N. participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 made Algeria a primary concern of the Third World countries. At Brioni in Yugoslavia, a year later, the Algerians gained unequivocal support from the three leading figures of the non-aligned movement, Nehru, Nasser and Tito, who denounced the French policies and expressed sympathy for the Algerian people's demands for self-determination. And during the Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo in December 1957 the F.L.N. obtained a resolution condemning France's colonial conduct in Algeria.¹⁴⁹

The French attempts to stamp out the Algerian revolution themselves helped to internationalize the conflict. On 22 October 1956, for example, the French air force - with the approval of the Defence Minister and the Minister Resident in Algeria - highjacked the Moroccan plane which was carrying five F.L.N. officials from Rabat to Tunis where they were to attend a peace conference with the Tunisian Premier and the King of Morocco. The idea of the conference, interestingly enough, had formerly been encouraged by the French Government. This operation was largely condemned in different international circles as an illegal act of piracy committed in international space.¹⁵⁰ It seriously affected relations between

France and the newly independent states of Tunisia and Morocco which were to be drawn closer to the F.L.N., and posed a serious question in international law on navigation in international space.¹⁵¹ The highjacking, which further discredited the French word in Algerian eyes and thus jeopardized - at least temporarily - any chance of rapprochement between France and the Algerian nationalists, did nothing to "decapitate" the Algerian revolution as the French had hoped.¹⁵²

The New York Times gave its readers a rare eye-witness account of this incident through its correspondent Thomas C. Brady who had been on the same plane as the highjacked F.L.N. officials. A front-page report with a four-column headline cautioned against the possible consequences of such an act, especially in the long run. The high-jacking was seen as almost certain to produce "an open break" with Tunisia and Morocco. These two countries' anger was based on their belief that the French Government had sanctioned their approaches to the Algerian leaders to seek a ceasefire in Algeria and then seized the F.L.N. officials while they were, in effect, under Moroccan protection.¹⁵³ The paper, however, failed to address itself to the legal implications behind this act and the serious question it posed in international law, unlike *Time* magazine which would openly describe it as an unlawful "aerial kidnap".¹⁵⁴

The Economist went even farther in its criticism. Under the title "Algeria: Scoop or Blunder", it strongly urged the French Government to use the opportunity of the seizure of the five nationalist leaders to open up negotiations with the F.L.N. This would help find a solution to the Algerian problem and prevent "turning all North Africans - as opposed to Algerians only - into

people ready to buy guns and turn them on Frenchmen". Treating the captured men otherwise would be disastrous to France: they really represented Algerian opinion; unless they were treated as *interlocuteurs valables* - the valid spokesmen - whom the French Government said it wanted to meet, "there is no future for that government in French North Africa".¹⁵⁵

The Algerian Question as a U.N. Issue

It was at the United Nations that the Algerians really sought to internationalize the conflict. Backed by the Afro-Asian group, the F.L.N. tried to isolate France internationally especially in the U.N. General Assembly.¹⁵⁶ The Algerian question was gradually becoming a U.N. issue. It was placed on the General Assembly's Eleventh session in September 1956, and was discussed by the First Committee in February 1957 and during as many as seventeen meetings. A draft resolution put to the First Committee in February 1957 by eighteen Afro-Asian countries called upon France to recognize the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and to enter into negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. The resolution failed to get the required majority with a vote of 34 for, 33 against and 10 abstentions. A second draft resolution put forward by Japan, the Philippines and Thailand and which merely expressed the hope that France and the Algerians enter into negotiations to end the war, was passed by 37 votes to 27, with 13 abstentions.¹⁵⁷ France, boycotting the discussion, insisted that Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France: "To separate Algeria from France, would be to alter my country's boundaries", cried Christian Pineau.¹⁵⁸

The New York Times reaction to the United Nations' debate of the Algerian question was predictable. Reproaching the Afro-Asian countries for their attacks on France's policies in Algeria, it hailed Pineau's defence of the French position as "reasonable and impressive".¹⁵⁹ Its editorial on the same day vehemently attacked the General Assembly, accusing it of becoming "a forum for attack, for quarrels, for divisive tactics". It concluded by venturing that the Assembly could help the Algerians most by giving France enough time to implement its policies: "The French are making a fair offer on Algeria. They should be given every chance".¹⁶⁰

In this, the paper reflected the stance adopted by the American Government towards the question of the United Nations' role on Algeria. The United States firmly supported the French position and voted against all the proposed resolutions during the discussion of the issue by the First Committee in February 1957. Arguing that France was doing its best to reach a peaceful settlement, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States U.N. Ambassador, cautioned the other delegates: "We must, at the very least, do nothing here at the United Nations which will interfere with that evolution".¹⁶¹

The New York Times, hailing the American Government's stand on Algeria, called for more cooperation between the United States and France on this and other issues. Its editorial on 8 February 1957 typified its position:

"The United States has now backed France to the hilt on the Algerian question in the United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador Lodge's intervention on Wednesday gave the French everything they could desire. It was the right thing to do, and it should help a bit in the process of repairing the deteriorated relations between our two countries. From every angle - United Nations, Algerian, French and American - this was sound policy".

In this, the paper's position was not much different from that of *Le Monde* which, naturally, praised the United States for supporting the French thesis at the United Nations, and for expressing itself "with perfect clarity and with loyalty towards its ally, for which [French] public opinion will be grateful".¹⁶²

Despite this, *The New York Times* had earlier exposed the extensive "efforts of diplomacy and propaganda" which the French authorities had been busy making in order to influence international opinion. Such efforts were directed particularly at the United States, mainly because of its prominent position in the Western World and its influential role at the United Nations. Efforts were also made to influence the Afro-Asian countries because of their repeated attempts to indict France for its Algerian policies.¹⁶³ The French, however, failed to halt the growing wave of sympathy for the Algerian cause at the United Nations. The General Assembly's 12th session in December 1957 adopted an important resolution which expressed the hope that "*pourparlers* will be entered into" by both sides - Algerian and French - to find a solution to the conflict in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and promised to "take note of the offer of the good offices" made by Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁶⁴ This offer implicitly recognized the role of the F.L.N. as the only valid spokesman for the Algerian people and was, therefore, deemed unacceptable to France.

Notes

1. Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.96.
2. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982, p.125.
3. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.96.
4. Jacques Beaufort, "Lacoste Speaks Up", *The Mediterranean and Eurafrica*, I (1958), p.7.
5. See the Association of the Ulemas' "Manifesto" of 7 January 1956 in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.110.
6. See the P.C.A.'s communiqué of August 1956 in *ibid.*, p.97.
7. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, pp.96-97.
8. *Ibid.*, p.97.
9. For the text of the "Platform" of the Soummam Congress, see *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.164.
10. *El Moudjahid*, No.3, September 1956.
11. Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961, pp.10-11.
12. *The New York Times*, 5 January 1956.
13. *The Economist*, 21 January 1956.
14. *The New York Times*, 8, 9 February 1956.
15. *The (London) Times*, 14 January 1956.
16. *The Economist*, 21 January 1956.
17. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 13 May 1956.
18. *Le Monde*, 24 September 1956.
19. For more information on these organizations and their role in the nationalist movement see, for example, S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.101.
20. *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.166.
21. "La France Pursuit ses Crimes en Algérie", *El Moudjahid*, No.9, 20 August 1957.
22. *The New York Times*, 23 January 1956.
23. *The Economist*, 17 March 1956.
24. *The New York Times*, 31 March 1956.

25. *The (London) Times*, 2 January 1956.
26. For text of address, see *L'Année Politique 1956*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957, pp.503-504.
27. *Résistance Algérienne*, No.20, 1-20 February 1957.
28. J. and R. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.166.
29. Quoted in *Time*, 23 September 1957.
30. Editorial: "THE FRENCH CRISIS", *The New York Times*, 23 May 1957.
31. *The Economist*, 14 September 1957.
32. Editorial: "FAUTE DE MIEUX", *The (London) Times*, 16 September 1957.
33. The majority of the *colons* were of a non-French origin, they were mainly Spanish, Italian or Maltese underprivileged immigrants who became naturalized French after 1889: see Etienne Bruno, *Les Problemes Juridiques des Minorites Européennes du Maghreb*, *op.cit.*, p.32.
34. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.194.
35. On the events of 6 February 1956, see Yvès Courrière, *Le Temps des Leopards*, Paris: Fayard, 1969, pp.272-277.
36. Roger Quillot, *La SFIO et L'Exercice du Pouvoir 1944-1958*, Paris: Fayard, 1972, pp.555-559.
37. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1980, p.73; "Les Conséquences économiques et financières de la guerre d'Algérie", *Cahiers de la République*, No.12 (March-April 1958), pp.25-51.
38. D.C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.58.
39. Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.117.
40. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.89.
41. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 10 February 1956.
42. Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.90.
43. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1956.
44. Quoted in *Time*, 20 February 1956.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *The New York Times*, 9 April 1956.
47. *The New York Times*, 16 April 1956.
48. *Time*, 21 January 1957.

49. M. Tegua, *L'Algérie en Guerre, op.cit.*, p.325.
50. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria, op.cit.*, p.386; see also "La France Pursuit ses Crimes en Algerie", *El Moudjahid*, No.9, 20 August 1957.
51. See J.P. Sartre's "Introduction" to H. Alleg's *The Question, op.cit.*, p.29 [italics added].
52. Quoted in H. Alleg, *The Question, op.cit.*, p.58.
53. *El Moudjahid*, No.52, 15 October 1959.
54. "La Guerre Psychologique d'Après Les Revues Militaires Françaises", *Chronique Sociale de France* (2-3) 15 April 1959, pp.135-145.
55. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes, op.cit.*, p.198.
56. Quoted in M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie, op.cit.*, p.198.
57. Quoted in Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie, op.cit.*, p.140.
58. G. Tillion, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies, op.cit.*, p.21. Germaine Tillion was a leading French anthropologist with highly accredited views on Algeria.
59. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, op.cit.*, p.205.
60. *The New York Times*, 18 March 1956.
61. Comment: "North Africa Seethes", *The New York Times*, 2 February 1957.
62. "How Strong Are Algeria's Rebels?", *The Economist*, 17 March 1957.
63. *The Economist*, 17 March 1956.
64. Philippe Tripier, *Autopsie de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, 1972, p.79.
65. G. Tillion, *France and Algeria, op.cit.*, p.153.
66. Yvès Courrière, *Le Temps des Leopards*, Paris: Fayard, 1969, pp.379-383.
67. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie, op.cit.*, p.126.
68. For different views on the "Battle of Algiers" and its different phases, see: Yacef Saadi (the then Commander of the F.L.N. units in Algiers), *Souvenir de la Bataille d'Alger*, Paris: Julliard, 1962; G. Tillion, *France and Algeria, op.cit.*; Yvès Courrière, *Le Temps des Leopards, op.cit.*, pp.443-569; Jacques Massu, *La Vraie Bataille d'Alger*, Paris, 1971; Philippe Tripier, *Autopsie de la Guerre d'Algérie, op.cit.*; Mohamed Lebjaoui, *Bataille d'Alger ou bataille d'Algérie*, 1972; Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The F.L.N. in Algeria*, Stanford, 1978. See also Gillo Pontecorvo's half-documentary film "La Bataille d'Alger", 1965.

69. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.103.
70. Jacques Massu (the then Commander of the *paras*), *La Vraie Bataille d'Alger*, *op.cit.*, p.243; *El Moudjahid*, No.5, 5 August 1957, tome 1, pp.90-93. For text of the 16 March 1956 Special Powers Law, see *L'Année Politique*, 1956, *op.cit.*, pp.504-505.
71. *The New York Times*, 29 January 1957.
72. See, for example, "Le Dossier Jean Muller", in *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, No.38.
73. M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.331.
74. Y. Courrière, *Le Temps des Leopards*, *op.cit.*, p.517.
75. Alistair Horne, "The Impact of the Algerian National War of Liberation on the French Army" in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1985, p.175; J. Vilatoux, *La Répression et La Torture*, Paris: Ed. Ouvrières, 1975; P.H. Simon, *Contre la Torture*, Paris: Seuil, 1957; Martin Chauffier, *Guerre et Paix en Algérie*, Paris: Chroniques Sociales, 1958.
76. See accounts of General Paris de Bo 1lardière in his *Bataille d'Alger: bataille de L'homme*, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957.
77. *L'Express*, 25 March 1957.
78. Quoted in *Le Monde*, 22 March 1957.
79. J.P. Sartre's "Introduction" to H. Alleg's *La Question*, *op.cit.*
80. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 6 April 1957.
81. Quoted in A. Horne, "The Impact of the Algerian National War of Liberation on the French Army", in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.175.
82. Quoted in *Time*, 1 April 1957.
83. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.113.
84. *France-Observateur*, 31 January 1957.
85. *The New York Times*, 15 March 1957.
86. *Time*, 1 April 1957.
87. *The New York Times*, 10 June 1957.
88. *The New York Times*, 23 December 1956.
89. *The New York Times*, 26 February 1957.
90. *The New York Times*, 24 July 1957. C.L. Sulzberger was born in New York in 1912. He became a newspaperman after his graduation from Harvard in 1934, working for *Pittsburgh Press*, the United Press in Washington, the *London Evening Standard*, the United Press, and the North American Newspaper Alliance. He joined *The*

New York Times in 1939 as its Balkan Bureau Manager and was later its Chief Foreign Correspondent until October 1954 when he became a columnist based in Paris and writing under the column "Foreign Affairs" until 1978. He is the author of many books including *The Test: de Gaulle and Algeria* (1962), and the recipient of many journalistic awards.

91. "Qui demoralise L'armée?", *Temps Modernes*, No.123 (1956), p.1535.
92. Arlette Heymann, *Les Libertés Publiques et la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, 1972, pp.228-239.
93. *France-Observateur*, 3 May 1957.
94. Herb Greer, *A Scattering of Dust*, London: Hutchinson, 1962, p.146.
95. *Résistance Algérienne*, No.33, 10-20 June 1957, p.3.
96. Germaine Tillion, *France and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.36.
97. J.P. Sartre's "Introduction" to H. Alleg's *The Question*, *op.cit.*, p.28.
98. *The New York Times*, 17 March 1957.
99. *The (London) Times*, 22 April 1957.
100. See *supra*, p.74, see also Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.97.
101. See below, p.329.
102. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.223.
103. See *supra*, pp.68-70.
104. G. Tillion, *France and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.164.
105. *El Moudjahid*, No.3, September 1956, tome 1, p.42.
106. Quoted in *Time*, 19 March 1956.
107. *The New York Times*, 28 August 1956.
108. *The New York Times*, 4 January 1956.
109. *The New York Times*, 17 March 1956.
110. Leading article: "How Strong Are Algeria's Rebels?", *The Economist*, 17 March 1956.
111. Leading article: "Five Months for Algeria", *The Economist*, 21 April 1956.
112. See E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, pp.39-63. The problem of the influence sources of information have on the quality of news coverage is discussed more directly in Chapter VII, p.297.

113. *The New York Times*, 23 March 1956.
114. *The New York Times*, 12 December 1956.
115. *The New York Times*, 6 February 1957.
116. *The New York Times*, 21 April 1957.
117. Commentary: "Search in Paris", *The New York Times*, 13 October 1957.
118. *The (London) Times*, 28 May 1956.
119. *Time*, 19 March 1956.
120. *The (London) Times*, 30 March 1956.
121. *The New York Times*, 2 January 1956.
122. *The New York Times*, 19 March 1956.
123. Quoted in Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.136.
124. *El Moudjahid*, No.9, 20 August 1957.
125. Ambassador Dillon's statement in Department of State *Bulletin*, XXXIV, 880, Part 2 (2 April 1956).
126. See *supra* p.81; see also Chapter VII below for more explanation, p.329.
127. Editorial: "FRANCE AND THE U.S.", *The New York Times*, 26 February 1957.
128. "Le CISL et L'anticolonialism", *El Moudjahid*, No.8, 5 August 1957.
129. Quoted in Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.138.
130. "Imperialism - The Enemy of Freedom", John F. Kennedy, *Congressional Record*, Vol.CIII, Part 8, 85 Congress, 2 July 1957, pp.10783-10784.
131. *The New York Times*, 3 July 1957.
132. Editorial: "KENNEDY ON ALGERIA", *The New York Times*, 3 July 1957.
133. "Algeria", John F. Kennedy, *Congressional Record*, Vol.CIII, Part 8 (8 July 1957), pp.10966-10967.
134. *Le Monde*, 10 July 1957.
135. Quoted in *Time*, 9 December 1957.
136. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.103.
137. Jacques Soustelle, *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.20-22; Y. Courrière, *Le Temps des Leopards*, *op.cit.*, pp.403-406.

138. Commentary: "North Africa Seethes", *The New York Times*, 18 March 1956.
139. Leading article: "Algeria and Suez", *The Economist*, 3 November 1956.
140. André Beaufre, *The Suez Expedition 1956*, trans. Richard Barry, London, 1963, pp.144-148.
141. *The New York Times*, 29 December 1957.
142. Editorial: *The New York Times*, 21 May 1956.
143. F.L.N. Statement quoted in *The New York Times*, 16 April 1956.
144. An F.L.N. official quoted in *The New York Times*, 26 February 1957.
145. Quoted in Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, Paris: Fayard, 1970, pp.200-201.
146. Abdelmajid Belkharroubi, "Les Aspects internationaux de la Révolution Algérienne", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.44; Report by M'hamed Yazid, F.L.N. Representative in New York, on the diplomatic activities of the F.L.N. between 1954 and 1957, in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.174.
147. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.138.
148. "De L'Algérie à L'O.T.A.N.", *El Moudjahid*, No.13, 1 December 1957; "L.O.T.A.N. et Le Colonialisme Français", *El Moudjahid*, No.14, 15 December 1957.
149. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.114.
150. Mohamed Bedjaoui, *La Révolution Algérienne et le Droit*, Brussels: Editions de L'Association Internationale des Juristes Démocratiques, 1961, pp.161-174.
151. Charles-Henri Favrod, *La Révolution Algérienne*, Paris: Plon, 1959, pp.154-157.
152. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.146; William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968*, *op.cit.*, p.105.
153. *The New York Times*, 24, 25 October 1956.
154. *Time*, 5 November 1956.
155. *The Economist*, 27 October 1956.
156. On the role of the Afro-Asian group of the United Nations regarding Algeria, see S.B. Farajallah, *Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique dans le Cadre des Nations Unies*, *op.cit.*
157. *United Nations Year Book 1957*, New York, United Nations: Department of Public Information, 1958, pp.68-78.

158. Christian Pineau quoted in *The New York Times*, 6 February 1957.
159. *The New York Times*, 6 February 1957.
160. Editorial: "EUROPE AND AFRICA", *The New York Times*, 6 February 1957.
161. "Statement by Ambassador Lodge", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XXXVI, No.924 (March 1957), pp.421-422.
162. *Le Monde*, 8 February 1957.
163. *The New York Times*, 27 January 1957.
164. *United Nations Year Book, 1957, op.cit., p.72.*

CHAPTER IV

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND ALGERIA: SELF-DETERMINATION
CONCEDED AS THE MILITARY OPTION FAILED

"France is prisoner of mythes it created itself, the most dangerous of which is 'Algeria is France'". [Charles-André Julien, 1956].

"*L'Algérie Française* is a lamentable stupidity.... It is simply mad to believe that our forced domination has any future whatsoever". [General de Gaulle, 1958]

The first few months of 1958 were marked by a temporary drop in the military activities of *L'Armée de Libération Nationale*. This was due mainly to the partial success of the electrified barriers, erected on Algeria's eastern and western frontiers, in reducing the flow of arms to the nationalist units inside the country.¹ These units, nonetheless, now utilized relatively effective arms in comparison to the hunting rifles which had hitherto formed the bulk of their weaponry.² By the second half of 1958, the nationalist units based in the neighbouring countries had grown into a well-equipped frontier army that was to exacerbate the problem for France already presented by the internal units.³ This growth in number and in materiel brought with it changes and modifications in the structure and strategy of the A.L.N.⁴

The birth of what became known as the "external front" resulted in a shift of the centre of military tension from the interior to the Algerian-Tunisian border.⁵ This shift enabled the A.L.N. to exert new pressure on the French army, and generated morè tension between

Tunisia and France which helped to internationalize the Algerian problem, something that France had always sought to avoid.⁶ Such tension culminated in the French air raid on the Tunisian village of Sakiyet-Sidi-Yousef on 8 February 1958. This incident, as explained later, gave wider visibility to the Algerian problem in international circles, and greater awareness of its implications.⁷

Inside Algeria, the French army launched a gigantic military drive under the command of General Challe who masterminded the plan that was aimed at wiping out the strongholds of the A.L.N. in the areas under its control. "Plan Challe" involved mobilizing as many troops as possible, establishing military posts throughout the country, and regrouping or simply eliminating the inhabitants of what became known as the "forbidden zones".⁸ The partial success of this drive, thanks mainly to the early good results of the electrified barriers in controlling the movement of the nationalist units, and preventing supplies of arms through the frontiers encouraged French officials and generals to become optimistic that a military victory was now in sight if not just around the corner that would keep Algeria French.⁹

The New York Times treated generously French optimism about a foreseeable military victory. It reflected at some length the French army's military drive against the A.L.N. units and the joint success of the electrified barriers and "Plan Challe" in temporarily reducing the military activities of the A.L.N. inside Algeria. Its reports served to inflate French military gains, citing under prominent headlines the Government's exaggerated figures. Its issue of 5 March, for example, gave credence to official claims that Algerian losses during the first two months of 1958 stood at 8,500 dead. But its

reporter, D.W. Lawrence, was quick to put the record straight and question the Government's over-optimistic reports. In an extremely lengthy dispatch from Algiers which appeared under the double column headline:

France and Algeria Facing
Long and Costly Struggle

Early optimism in Paris is vanishing -
Neither side can deal knockout -
Rebels Growing Stronger Daily,

Lawrence stated that France faced a long, tough and expensive struggle in Algeria. There was no short or easy road to victory. Early French optimism had faded, and the many months-old contention of Robert Lacoste that the war had entered its "last quarter-hour", had now become a kind of "cruel joke in Algerian cafés".¹⁰

The Algerian revolution, during the period 1958-1959, experienced some serious difficulties and setbacks which were the direct result of these two factors: the electrified barriers and "Plan Challe". In addition to preventing arms getting through, the electrified barriers also deprived these internal units of vital regular contacts with their leaders in the neighbouring territories, especially in Tunisia. "Plan Challe" mobilized almost all the French army, equipped with the latest in military technology, in an all-out offensive against the Algerian forces throughout the country. It also deprived the National Liberation Army of the local population's support upon which every revolution thrives, by devising new repressive methods like the "regroupment camps".¹¹

The New York Times highlighted the significance, from the French point of view, of the Challe offensive, arguing that together with the systematic campaign of psychological warfare or "revolutionary war" as it was technically known, it represented the last card the French

generals in Algeria had to play, if they were to avoid another defeat similar to that in Indochina.¹² But, as its editorial "Offensive in Algeria" concluded on 26 July, despite this massive military drive that was costing France dearly, the French army would be in no position to crush the Algerian revolution: the guerrilla type of warfare the F.L.N. was conducting could not be stemmed even by "vastly superior forces".

The (London) Times also voiced doubts about whether the offensive would be enough to pacify the country, arguing that "the disquieting thought that it may be too late cannot be banished"; and that pacification, considered as a military problem alone, could take a matter of years.¹³ Yet, its treatment of the French military efforts was, on the whole, illuminating. Asserting that much efforts "deserve the highest praise", it hailed Challe's strategy and *Lignes Morice* for controlling the movement of the Algerian army units, cutting down the number of F.L.N. recruits and increasing the difficulties of what it hastily called "terrorists" in getting supplies of munitions and medicine.¹⁴

The thesis that a French military solution to the Algerian problem was out of the question, was accurately and firmly reflected by *The Economist* which stated that though the big French offensive had achieved some temporary success, it would not, in any sense, bring an end to the Algerian revolution. The weekly, foreseeing the unabated continuation of the war, was convinced that the F.L.N. was as strong as ever.¹⁵

The New York Times, now devoting more attention to eyewitness reporting, cast doubt on the French official contention that the

A.L.N. fighters had been weakened and demoralized as a result of the Challe offensive and the effects of the barriers. The paper took the unprecedented step - as far as its coverage was concerned - of sending a correspondent to the nationalist camps to spend time amidst the A.L.N. fighters and, thus, assess both their strength and weakness at first hand. Michael James was the first *New York Times* reporter to spend three days in an A.L.N. camp and examine the Algerian forces' organization, armament, training and morale.

It is worth noting that the paper's assessment of *L'Armée de Libération Nationale* had hitherto dwelled largely on the French Government's own accounts. Michael James' on-the-spot dispatches about the A.L.N.'s military strength and morale, represented the first serious challenge to the French official reports and showed that *The New York Times* was now taking an intense interest in the fighting ability of the Algerian forces. His thorough eye-witness accounts also represented the most comprehensive assessment yet printed by the paper. Praising his hosts' manners and hospitality, James informed his readers that those people were "hospitable to a fault". That was reported to be one of their best-equipped bases and they insisted on sharing what they had, which was little except for a plentiful supply of guns and ammunition.¹⁶ In another dispatch, he hailed their seriousness and impressive determination to win:

"In three days with rebel forces, this reporter has not heard a single spontaneous laugh. This is no reflection on morale, which would seem excellent, but an indication that the men are aware of the bitter job they have to do".¹⁷

Accompanied with pictures of the A.L.N. troops, Michael James depicted their training methods as "rapid and drastic" and their weapons stock as "a fantastic collection" of guns of various

nationalities and calibres. Referring to the guerrilla tactics followed by the Algerians, he observed that it was difficult to see just how, if the current situation were maintained, the French could win.¹⁸ Openly scorning the French claims of demoralization among the nationalist forces, he was under no illusion as to the A.L.N. strength. His stay indicated that if the French still believed in a sweeping military victory they were in for a big surprise: the A.L.N. was "obviously a well-organized and disciplined professional military organization", though there was not much spit and polish.¹⁹

The idea that the level of morale and discipline of the nationalist army was as high as ever was later confirmed by French prisoners after their release by the Algerians. Fifteen of these prisoners, as reported by *The New York Times* on 22 May 1959, portrayed the nationalist forces as of "high morale" and of "iron discipline"; they were also impressed by the dedication of the A.L.N. commanders to their cause and their strong determination to continue the struggle until "independence is won".

By March 1958, *The New York Times* had become convinced that the immense French military efforts would not in any way be enough to bring the war to an end, and that the attempt to cling to the myth of *L'Algérie Française* a little longer was impracticable. Ridiculing the French argument that the Algerians had been weakened, it vigorously stated that if the nationalist forces could persist on no greater scale than their current operations, they were capable of "bleeding France white".²⁰ The paper informed its readers that despite the gigantic French military efforts, the nationalist forces would still be strong enough to continue the war at a devastating scale. An editorial for 7 March commented that the French were setting up a bold

front, but at the very best they were making little or no headway in Algeria: the Algerian guerrilla units were as strong and numerous as ever and perhaps better armed. Although they were getting aid over the Moroccan and especially the Tunisian frontier, that aid did not make all the difference for "Even with the borders sealed, the Algerian rebellion would continue".

For *Time* magazine also the nationalist army was as strong as ever and still inflicting heavy losses on France despite the Government's claims that life in Algeria had returned to normalcy.²¹ It did not lack further opportunities to comment upon the evident growth of the Algerian revolution. Whether by voluntary allegiance or enforced support, the *Front de Libération Nationale* had grown steadily more powerful. After four years of continuous warfare, whole regions of the country had fallen into nationalist hands and were effectively ruled by F.L.N. mayors, tax collectors and administrative officers.²² Though the magazine recognized the fact that the numerical and material disparities between the nationalist forces and the French army were undoubtedly in France's favour, it emphasized that the Algerians had "relied heavily and successively on a moral weapon: the 20th century's prevailing anti-colonialism".²³

The Economist did not cease pressing the theme that France was fighting an unwinnable war. Whilst recognizing the differences in military capability, it openly cast doubt on official French optimism about the turn the war was taking; and vigorously flayed those who still believed that the F.L.N. could be crushed. It drew a parallel between Algeria and Indochina, where the Vietnamese guerrillas had won the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu despite France's theoretical military superiority.²⁴ It reminded its readers that the Algerian

revolution depended heavily for its success on the local population's support. Without such support the nationalist forces could not have been able to survive the massive Challe offensive and to tie down a much larger army than the French had ever used in Indochina.²⁵ *The Economist* praised the Algerians' strong determination to win despite all odds: "This was seen in the original forty years' struggle against the French occupation, and it has been seen again today".²⁶ Such realism was refreshing in the context of perceptions that were all too frequently pre-determined by emotional and rhetorical factors.

The London weekly provided an extended look into the rapid and steady growth of the Algerian revolution, intimating that the movement which began as a "sabotage by 500 to 1,000 men, armed mostly with shotguns" had now grown into a large-scale war with alarming results not only in Algeria but in France itself.²⁷ Earlier, in a leading article filled with scorn for the French official contention that a military victory over the F.L.N. was in sight, and headlined "Meet the Rebels", *The Economist* was in no illusion that the French were no closer to victory than during any of the previous last quarters of an hour proclaimed by the French Minister for Algeria, Robert Lacoste. Indeed, on a long-term view, it concluded, the Algerians had some undeniable advantages: an almost limitless supply of manpower from Algeria's predominantly youthful population; ready access to arms across Algeria's enormous frontiers; the support of the Afro-Asian bloc, including financial aid from the Arab world; the probability that world opinion was moving in their favour, especially after the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and, not least, the gradual financial exhaustion of France.²⁸

France's Growing Burden Because of the War

The situation in Algeria continued to determine and often shake the internal affairs of metropolitan France. The war drained French financial resources and caused political strains and power vacuums which threatened the future of the country's fundamental institutions. This threat to metropolitan France was the main reason behind the change in attitude in French public opinion. Aware of the increasing burden Algeria was putting on every aspect of their lives, as many as two-thirds of the French became, by the end of 1959, ready to accept negotiations with the F.L.N.²⁹

In January 1958, 27 percent of the French population still believed that Algeria should remain under French control. Those who did not believe in France's ability to keep Algeria French, saw their numbers increase from 25 percent in March 1957 to 51 percent in February 1959.³⁰ More and more people came to regard the war in Algeria as France's most serious problem: 68 percent by 1959. At the same time, a majority of the French became convinced that Algeria's independence was the only long-term solution to the endemic problems of both Algeria and France.³¹

The increase in *The New York Times'* coverage of the Franco-Algerian conflict reflected its growing awareness of the socio-economic and political effects of the war on France. The paper particularly focused on the financial burden Algeria was imposing on the *metropole* and highlighted the serious dilemma of the French Government. The dire need to keep up the flow of troops into Algeria to meet the increasing demands of an ever expanding war, had to be balanced against realization of the fact that this process was

draining France's treasury at a cost of not less than \$3,000,000 a day.³²

Between 1954 and 1958 as many as five French governments collapsed because of the war in Algeria. This gave rise to continued political anxiety, uncertainty and lawlessness. As *The New York Times* remarked on 17 January 1959, the war widened the political divisions and hardened the internal ideological conflicts which not only weakened France's governing power but also threatened to kill its democratic system altogether. A "News of the Week in Review" commentary piece, "France: Crisis No.19", exposed at length the political strains the war was causing. It had irreparably embittered feelings among the parties: the nationalist right, angered by the danger of the loss of another part of the old French empire, was increasingly violent in denouncing as "traitors" the advocates of negotiating with the F.L.N. Many moderates had been frightened into silence. The Socialists complained of the economic burdens of the war. And there was growing disrespect for the Government's authority in the military and among *colon* extremists.³³

Noting that the war had by 1958 become France's major preoccupation, *The New York Times*, again with a title of crisis, intimated that Algeria was at the heart of most of France's troubles, including its budgetary, labour, foreign exchange and inflationary difficulties. The political crisis culminated in the resignation of the Gaillard Government; this served as a prelude to the downfall of the Fourth Republic as a whole. The current crisis was evidently "much more serious than the normal squabbles over the internal affairs that made one French Government look much like another".³⁴ Unless an answer was found quickly, the war could wreck any effort to bring

internal peace and economic health to France.³⁵

The Sakiet Raid: More Internationalization of the Algerian Problem

The Algerian war also seriously affected France's international image and strained its relations with the external world, notably with its former North African colonies. The air raid of 8 February 1958, which the French claimed was aimed at F.L.N. bases on Tunisian soil, was in fact an indiscriminate act of "punishment" against what the French generals viewed as Tunisia's complacency in the war. Using American-made planes and bombs, the French bombed the Tunisian frontier village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, causing many casualties among civilians mostly among women and children.³⁶

The Sakiet raid had direct repercussions on Algeria. It enhanced the process of internationalizing the conflict, aggravated the strains within France's internal political structure and precipitated the crisis that led to the eventual collapse of the *Quatrième République*.³⁷ The raid was the work of some desperate officers in Algeria who had masterminded and implemented it apparently without the knowledge of the Paris Government. Yet, fearing the revolt of the Algiers generals, Premier Gaillard later publicly supported this ill-fated operation. History was, thus, repeating itself. As in February 1956, France seemed to be governed from Algiers and not Paris.

The Paris-based columnist C.L. Sulzberger observed that the generals of Algiers, who on many occasions had shown disagreement with governmental policies on Algeria, had once again shown signs of "getting out of hand".³⁸ This time however with catastrophic results,

for in the words of Yvès Courrière, "Algiers became the master of Paris".³⁹ Gaillard was as puzzled and confused as Mollet had been in February 1956.⁴⁰

The New York Times was aware of the direct impact of the Franco-Algerian conflict on the neighbouring states of Tunisia and Morocco. A "News of the Week in Review" piece "Algeria's Neighbors" informed its readers that both Tunisia and Morocco were not officially involved in the Algerian war against the French. But, their moral and material support for the Algerian National Liberation Front was causing anxiety and frustration among French officials; this was at the heart of the serious strains in their relations with France. And as long as the war continued French relations with Algeria's neighbours would be under considerable stress.⁴¹ A few weeks later, the paper specifically quoted Premier Bourguiba declaring his country's total support for the F.L.N. and its cause short of going to war: "Our position is like that of the United States with respect to the Allies in the first years of World War II. We are not one of the belligerents, but we are not neutral either. We will not help the French to close the border against our Algerian brothers".⁴²

The Sakiët incident and its aftermath continued to be given voluminous coverage by *The New York Times*. It reflected at length on the damage caused. Three days after the incident, for example, an illustrated page-three story was published under a prominent four column headline:

French Air Attack on Tunisian Village Leaves Death and Destruction.

It graphically showed the extent of the ferocity of the bombing which had reduced shops and classrooms to rubble. Another story the same day, emphasizing the heavy losses in human lives, was headlined:

TUNISIANS BURY
68 BOMB VICTIMS

14 Women and 14 Children
Among Them - Damage
to Village Found Heavy.

Well down in the story, a Tunisian observer was quoted as saying that somehow the French had "hit the targets that are supposed to be spared in civilized warfare: women, children, schools and Red Cross vehicles".

At first, in its detailed account of the raid, the paper blamed this "irreparable tragedy" on a few individuals suffering from the "trigger-happy madness" that often overtakes men with deadly weapons in their hands.⁴³ Soon, however, it voiced doubts about the actual mastermind of this raid. Reflecting that the bombing was a perfect example of Clemenceau's dictum that "war is too serious an affair to be trusted to generals", it underlined that this "brutal reprisal" in which so many innocent men, women and children had been killed or wounded had either been an uncontrolled, frigid military decision made in Algeria, or the "French Government and people have temporarily lost their judgement and their customary sense of civilization".⁴⁴

The (London) Times focused more on the international implications and highlighted its far-reaching significance, branding it as "a turning point both in North Africa and in France itself", comparable to the exile of the Sultan of Morocco in 1953 and the highjacking of the five Algerian leaders in 1956. This incident, like the other two, seemed to have been an "essentially political *coup*, which the government in Paris did not initiate but found itself unable to

disown". The paper concluded by cautioning the French Government that the initiative of a local army officer in Algeria was always liable to throw everything into disorder.⁴⁵

Time magazine also highlighted the serious threat the army generals in Algeria posed to metropolitan France. This idea was given force in pointed articles under such captions as "The Accused". The magazine went so far as to call the raid a "murderous blow" that had earned France worldwide obloquy; and frayed the government directive enabling local air force officers to bomb villages and kill civilians at will under the guise of "hot pursuit".⁴⁶

Casting about for a way to repair the damage done to Franco-Tunisian relations, *The New York Times* hoped that the French Government would distance itself from this "tragedy", and made the suggestive proposition that the government make amends in the obvious ways open to it: it might rebuke the offenders, compensate the wounded and bereaved and make it clear that France had not bombed Sakiet-Sidi-Yousef.⁴⁷ The paper took up the same theme again a few weeks later, urging France to apologize to Tunisia and offer to indemnify the victims and sufferers. It argued that France would seem a greater nation in the eyes of the world if its leaders expressed official apologies for the killing of innocent Tunisians and the destruction of purely civilian property, if they made a generous offer of indemnity: "Honorable amends do not mean weakness".⁴⁸

To its evident disappointment, however, that was not the course France chose to take. As a result, the paper launched fierce attacks on Premier Gaillard for his "unyielding and uncompromising"⁴⁹ support for "this idiotic act"⁵⁰ which resulted in the "killing of many

innocent Tunisian men, women and children".⁵¹ Noting that the raid and its aftermath had dealt a terrible blow to peace in the area, it stated that the French would be incredibly obtuse if they did not realize that the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef had been a grievous error which had made a settlement in North Africa much more difficult.⁵²

Time magazine, arguing along a similar line, ridiculed the French Government's argument that the Sakiet air raid was an act of "legitimate self-defense" and that in Gaillard's words, "the majority of the victims were soldiers of the Algerian F.L.N.". By the time Gaillard had spoken, dozens of foreign diplomats and journalists had visited Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and confirmed that a high percentage of the 209 casualties (79 dead, 130 wounded), inflicted by the French air force, had been women and children.⁵³ Earlier, and in response to French claims of Tunisian exaggeration, its article "With Bombs and Bullets" had stated that "[n]ewsmen stumbling through the rubble and counting the bodies laid out in long rows by the village cemetery, felt that the incident needed no exaggeration".⁵⁴

The New York Times, having long endorsed a local solution to the Algerian problem that would save France's pride, voiced its fear that the raid would damage France's thesis that Algeria was a purely French affair, by accelerating the process of internationalizing the conflict. This incident had hit public opinion everywhere in the world "with stunning impact", and was a major development in contemporary affairs: the United Nations, N.A.T.O., France, Tunisia, the Arab world and the United States were crucially involved.⁵⁵ *Le Monde* also endorsed the view that an almost certain consequence of the raid would be to enhance the internationalization of the "North African

question"; something that France had always tried to prevent.⁵⁶

The New York Times, which never failed to show its guardianship of Western interests, seized this "ill-conceived" raid⁵⁷ as a serious blow to the Western world as a whole, the result of which was that Algeria would be lost to France and North Africa to the West.⁵⁸ It had earlier warned that the West had, as a result, suffered a severe jolt and by the same token its enemies, and especially the Soviet Union, had gained a victory.⁵⁹ *The (London) Times* solemnly agreed, arguing that the danger of the Algerian war spreading through some new Sakiet incident was as real as the danger of the whole of North Africa being pushed into a bitter, active hostility towards the West.⁶⁰ Carrying this theme farther, *The New York Times* warned against the serious repercussions of the raid on N.A.T.O.'s defence and the security of the Western world, by turning all the North Africans against France and its allies which, as C.L. Sulzberger cautioned, would be a devastating blow to the West: N.A.T.O.'s eastern flank was already split wide open by the Greco-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus. "Now its southern anchor, from Casablanca to Bizerte, quivers with threats of new eruptions - which could only add to the torments of Algeria in between".⁶¹ This comment to a large extent typified the Western press.

Time magazine, on the other hand, put the Sakiet air raid in a wider historical perspective and examined the fundamental reasons that lay behind this short-sighted conduct. Goaded by the frustration of a war it could never win or end, it observed, France had lost its head and the result had been "a murderous display of the kind of ruthless brutality" that the West usually ascribed only to Communism. The raid and its devastating aftermath, was an inevitable consequence of

France's obsession with reconquest: "Among the retreating colonial powers, the French have clung longest to the savage techniques of imperialism's unhappy past".⁶² Highlighting Tunisia's anger at Western indecision and lukewarm reaction to the French raid, an article "Tough Talk" quoted at length Premier Bourguiba urging the West's two biggest powers to take a firm position against the Sakiet bombing. "The time has come for the United States and Britain to choose between colonialism and freedom. Since these two countries after the Sakiet bombing, requested us not to go before the U.N. Security Council, it is impossible for them not to take a stand in favor of the country which has been the victim of aggression and against the country which has been guilty of aggression".⁶³

The New York Times gave considerable attention to the impact the Sakiet incident might have had on American-Maghrebian relations, because of American involvement in the affair. Calling it a "tragedy" for the United States,⁶⁴ it urged the American Government to condemn the action, try to keep the friendship of both Tunisia and France and face the unhappy fact that the bombers the French had used, and even the bombs, had come from the United States.⁶⁵

In an official statement issued the day after the raid, the United States Administration declared that it was "profoundly disturbed" by the reports it had received of the Sakiet incident.⁶⁶ It, however, failed to take a clear and firm stance against the raid, despite the fact that many American officials, as reported in *The New York Times*, had privately expressed shock and embarrassment over the incident especially the use of American equipment to carry out the raid.⁶⁷ Yet, the American Government did what it could to dissuade Tunisia from taking the affair to the United Nations General Security

Council. It then, together with Great Britain, offered its "good offices" in an attempt to bring about a Franco-Tunisian *rapprochement* away from the United Nations.⁶⁸

This *rapprochement* was not, however, easy to bring about, as the mission of the good officers, Robert Murphy and Harold Beely, was limited only to the effect of the problem, Franco-Tunisian tension, and failed to address the central issue itself, the war in Algeria. Adopting the same argument, the Tunisian weekly *L'Action*, editorialized that the good offices undertaken without a clear definition of their object, had "little chance of achieving a result".⁶⁹ The Algerian National Liberation Front initially welcomed the demarche and voiced its hope that they would bring about negotiations with France and, thus, end the war.⁷⁰ It soon, however, expressed disappointment and vehemently attacked the Murphy-Beely mission because of its limited objectives.⁷¹

Successive French governments had promised French public opinion that the war in Algeria was in its "last quarter of an hour". But, each time such promises proved wrong by the intensification of the military activities of the A.L.N. France had each time responded by putting the blame for its lack of success in Algeria on "interfering foreign hands". At one stage it was President Nasser. At another it was international Communism. Now, Tunisia was to blame. "Without its incessant intervention", declared Defence Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas, "the operation in Algeria would already have ended".⁷²

In this context, *The New York Times* printed a letter in which its American writer drew a parallel between France's help for the Americans in the late eighteenth century and Tunisia's help for the

Algerians in 1958: France itself had set a traditional precedent for Tunisia by having allowed arms "to be smuggled out of France to us American rebels" and by having even signed an alliance treaty with the Americans in 1778. Soldiers and sailors were thereafter sent across the Atlantic "to encourage the American rebellion in the British Empire". As an encourager of rebels, therefore, France had a splendid record, and Tunisia still had a long way to go before it could be equalled.⁷³

To *The New York Times*, it was both natural and understandable that the Tunisians were ready to help their neighbours to achieve independence, even to the detriment of their relations with France at a time when they desperately needed French economic assistance. Indeed, one of the weapons France used against Tunisia was the abrupt halting of credits. Besides the elements of common origins, religion and culture which made the two peoples "almost indistinguishable", North Africa was a single political and economic entity, and progress in Tunisia and Morocco would not be possible or complete without the independence of Algeria as well. Because the real support for the Algerian nationalists and their cause stemmed largely from the Tunisian masses, "[i]t would be not only illogical but politically suicidal for ... [Premier Bourguiba] to turn his back on the Algerian National Liberation Front...".⁷⁴

The (London) Times also propounded the thesis that the source of the Franco-Tunisian crisis was the Algerian war which coloured and dominated almost everything in Tunisia. It was difficult to see how France's relations with the Tunisians, upon which depended to a great extent the attitude of France's allies towards Tunisia, could become normal and the French reap the rich dividend that was awaiting it

there, so long as the Algerian question remained unsettled. The paper attributed Tunisia's support for the Algerians mainly to a "natural sympathy" towards a neighbouring nation; but also asserted that, by helping the F.L.N., Tunisia was hoping to be able to "canalize and control the future shape of Algerian nationalism" and, thus, dissuade it from turning either to Cairo or to Moscow.⁷⁵

Premier Bourguiba repeatedly warned the Western powers that an almost inevitable consequence of the continuation of the war in Algeria and the Algerians' "despair of the West", would be a turn towards the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. If that happened, all North Africa would follow: Tunisia was for Algerian independence because "Tunisia's own independence is in the balance".⁷⁶ Because of this, the Tunisians enthusiastically supported the Algerian revolution and put increasing pressure on their government to follow suit. The editorial stance taken by *L'Action* towards the Algerian liberation movement typified Tunisian public opinion:

"The Algerian Army is already finding and will continue to find refuge and help on our soil. If need be, Tunisian volunteers will go to fight for liberty beside their Algerian comrades. We will aid the Algerians morally and materially with all the means at our disposal. We are linked by a common destiny and if the French seek to reconquer Tunisia - the better to crush the Algerian people - they will only confirm this destiny".

Under mounting Tunisian pressure, following the Sakiet raid, France agreed to withdraw its troops from Tunisia, with the exception of the Bezerte base which it was granted permission to keep. The agreement provoked a heated debate in French political circles, where most deputies in the National Assembly voiced their disapproval of the removal of French troops from Tunisia. Another political crisis developed precipitating the downfall of the Gaillard Government.

France came once again to face and agonising period of power vacuum which was later exploited by the *pied noir* extremists who, with the collaboration of the army generals of Algiers, orchestrated the military *coup* of 13 May 1958 to counter what they saw as the growing threats to *L'Algérie Française*.⁷⁸

The 13 May Coup and the Aggravation of France's Political Crisis

The *colon* activists seized on the execution of three French prisoners by the F.L.N., in retaliation for the execution of three Algerian prisoners by the French, as a pretext to show their anger at the Paris Government.⁷⁹ The F.L.N. decision to execute the prisoners was in accordance with its earlier warning to the French authorities against further executions of Algerian detainees: "The blade of the guillotine must stop. Let French opinion be warned. Beginning tomorrow each Algerian patriot to mount the scaffold signifies one French prisoner before the firing squad".⁸⁰

The extremist *pieds noirs* launched their demonstration in Algiers on 13 May; this later developed into a military insurrection against the French Government. The insurrection began with the occupation of the *Gouvernement Général* building and the formation of what became known as "Committees of Public Safety" throughout Algeria, and ended with the collapse of the Fourth Republic.⁸¹ Once again, as on 6 February 1956, activist influence in Algeria prevailed over metropolitan authority which eventually gave way to mob rule. France came, therefore, to resign itself to the harsh reality of being at the mercy of the Algiers generals. Extreme rightist activists played on the emotions of ordinary *pieds noirs* and instigated a mood of insurrection which was initially born out of a hysterical fear of

France's possible abandonment of "French Algeria".⁸² The army, believing that the advent of a military regime would consolidate its position in Algeria, lent its full support.⁸³ Concessions to the Algerians, which might lead to self-rule or autonomy, were firmly ruled out, and the long-cherished illusory policy of "integration" - championed by the former Governor General Jacques Soustelle - was given a new lease of life.

With the memory of its defeat in Indochina - which it blamed on the government's "weakness and indecision" - still fresh, the army seized the opportunity offered to it in Algeria to take revenge against the "treason" of the politicians.⁸⁵ It therefore immediately sided with the *colon* activists, forming a united front against Paris. It was this front which succeeded in bringing down the Fourth Republic and in bringing General de Gaulle back to power.⁸⁶

France's political crisis got abundant front-page and editorial coverage in *The New York Times*, which highlighted the seriousness of the political difficulties facing the Fourth Republic and their implications for the future of France. In an editorial "CRISIS" on 17 May 1958, the paper noted that the phrase "political crisis in France" had almost lost its meaning. But this time it seemed to be the real thing: "a decisive turning point in the history of the Fourth Republic". The current situation in France was portrayed as "extremely serious" and of "revolutionary" consequences which were symptomatic of a division between Frenchmen that still had not been healed. Fears were now growing that the military insurrection in Algeria might spread both to metropolitan France and to the other French colonies. Most of France's military strength was concentrated in Algeria and under the direct control of the insurgent generals; and even the

loyalty of the army contingents still at home had not been put to the test.⁸⁷

The same thesis was reflected, although less extensively or prominently, in other news media. *Time* magazine observed that "[t]he sands of time for the Fourth Republic's parliamentary regime seemed to be running out".⁸⁸ *The (London) Times* solemnly agreed and complained that the big question, which had always puzzled politicians and commentators alike, remained unanswered: was Algiers to be ruled from Paris or was Paris to be blackmailed from Algiers?⁸⁹ *The Economist* addressed itself to the main reason that lay behind the insurrection and concluded that it was the army's frustration and obsession with the idea of a military victory in Algeria: the Fourth Republic was a casualty of the Algerian war.⁹⁰ *Le Monde* attacked what it branded as the "madness of those ultras who believe that they could be able to defy France and with it the world without irreparably losing all that they pretend saving".⁹¹ Tunis's *Petit-Matin*, while deploring the *coup*, warned that the rowdy characters who had perpetuated the madness of 13 May were capable of much worse in future. Recent events had shown the world the true face of French colonialism.⁹²

The New York Times focused on what it saw as an inevitable consequence of the army insurrection: de Gaulle's bid for power. A Sulzberger column from Paris with the headline:

No Fishing Rods Upon the Rubicon: This Time
the Gaullist Power Bid in France Is For Real,

highlighted the General's popularity among the insurgents, who regarded him as the only man capable of solving the French crisis. It had long been evident that the Algerian storm would some day sweep northward. It was also clear that when it blew across France, its political epicentre would focus on General de Gaulle. This had

happened; the chances were now increasing that he might soon be brought back to power and again become responsible for France's fate.⁹³

As May wore on, *The New York Times* emphasized the need, not only for a more efficient political framework, but also for a stronger politician to make the system work. Its readers were told that France was on the verge of civil war and that the French people would have to make their choice between General de Gaulle and "inviting chaos".⁹⁴ The remedy to the country's crisis had to be both a structural and attitudinal revolution with a stronger man to implement new policies. An editorial full of support for de Gaulle's advent to power, intoned that the French malaise went much deeper than dissatisfaction with form and structure. The corrosion of French politics at home had been coupled with disastrous colonial policies and seemingly endless bloodletting in North Africa to create demand for a new approach to the country's problems and a new man to cope with them.⁹⁵

The paper stressed the theme that General de Gaulle was the only man available to France who could put the country on its feet again. But, it emphasized the difficult task awaiting him and the "fearful responsibility" he would have to carry if he were to succeed. This involved the necessity of making a solid settlement to the Algerian problem, the restoration of civilian authority over the army, the reconstruction of French unity and discipline and the establishment of a strong constitutional system acceptable to most Frenchmen.⁹⁶ This view was further expounded in the next day's editorial which closed on the note that de Gaulle would have to accomplish all those tasks, otherwise the "consequences could only be disastrous to France, to Algeria and to the entire N.A.T.O. structure". *The (London) Times*,

arguing along a similar line, warned against exaggerating his prestige: while most of the army, like the *colons*, looked on him as the only solution to the current stalemate they had made the mistake of overrating his popularity in France.⁹⁷ It agreed however that he would be responsible for the fate of the new republic whose success or failure would depend on his political skill and judgement.⁹⁸

The New York Times predicted that the most fearful danger de Gaulle would have to face was the growing strength of the very forces that had helped him to power. A Sulzberger column, questioning

Will There Be Shooting or Merely Shouting
At the Wake of France's Fourth Republic?

warned that the influence of the Rightist forces revolting in his name would increase and would eventually make it hard for the General to curtail the pressure of the army and the die-hard *colons*.⁹⁹ Highlighting his dilemma, the paper observed editorially that the task was a supremely difficult one for, although he had come to power through the process instigated by *colon*-army insurrection, his primary objective would have to be to curb those same forces and bring them firmly back under the control of Paris.¹⁰⁰

Similarly, *The (London) Times* cautioned that "the wild men of Algiers" were getting the upper hand again. It argued that most of those who had been behind the May military *coup*, showed their support for de Gaulle only out of convenience and not because of their "Gaullist" sympathies: "If he put an end to the revolt in Algeria, and to the Fourth Republic, they would be grateful to him. If he did not, they would have to try other means".¹⁰¹ In its editorial "THE RIVALS", a few weeks later, it intimated that the extremist *pieds noirs*, led by men like Soustelle and General Massu, had their "own deep convictions" other than those liberties which July 14 was

supposed to symbolize; they operated under the guise of the so-called "Committees of Public Safety".¹⁰²

The Economist and *Time* magazine also stressed the theme of the danger posed by the army and *colon* extremists. In a leading article "The Challenge from Algiers", *The Economist* made the suggestive proposition that exemplary measures might help to restore some discipline in the army. But that could be too dangerous for a badly weakened country for those measures could not be wholly safe as long as the Algerian war continued to keep the army "too big for its boots".¹⁰³ However, this was a risk worth taking because the cost of hesitation and weakness would be incalculable; leniency would encourage more insubordination. More concessions to the *pieds noirs* would substantiate their belief that they had the right and the power of veto on the composition and policy of the government. The authority of the government would be further undermined: "The seeds of rebellion can cross the Mediterranean". *Time* warned against those "die hards" who for the "weeks, perhaps months to come... would be restive and potentially dangerous".¹⁰⁴

The story of de Gaulle's return to power got abundant coverage under big headlines in *The New York Times* which reflected at some length the tense mood in both Algeria and France and the peculiar circumstances under which he was given the Premiership. The paper gave his election at the General Assembly a massive banner headline over all the eight columns of Page One accompanied with his picture:

DE GAULLE NAMED PREMIER in 329-224 VOTE
ASKS 6-MONTH DECREE RULE, LEFTISTS RIOT;
ALGIERS IS DISPLEASED BY CABINET CHOICES.¹⁰⁵

The same day it editorialized on the legal implications of the General's advent to power, arguing that this represented the "climax"

of France's grave crisis, it was not endorsed by all Frenchmen, but was, in fact, imposed on the nation and a reluctant Parliament by a military insurrection, centered in Algiers but reaching into France itself. This insurrection, which General de Gaulle refrained from repudiating, made him - under the circumstances created by France's governmental weakness - the only politician in the land who could save the country from the threat of civil war.¹⁰⁶ *Le Monde's* publisher and editor-in-chief similarly reflected the view held by many Frenchmen when he wrote that "...whatever reservations one could have about the present, and still more for the future, General de Gaulle would appear the lesser evil, the least poor risk".¹⁰⁷

The (London) Times stressed the "ominous" fact that the General's standard and prestige suddenly rose as a direct response to "one extreme and unrepresentative section of French opinion" - the military and *colon* insurgents.¹⁰⁸ Accepting the argument that he was probably the only man capable of putting an end to the country's crisis and perhaps close the breach between the insurgents and metropolitan France, it cautioned that as events mounted up, he would appear to come on the shoulders of men who had risen against the legal authority.¹⁰⁹ Putting the matter in a wider perspective, on the other hand, Rome's *Il Tempo* noted that France was on the verge of civil war, as it found itself in the midst of a serious institutional crisis brought on by exhaustion through its efforts to maintain its imperial pretensions contrary to the realities of the time.¹¹⁰

De Gaulle's Return to Power: What Plans Did He Have For Algeria?

After de Gaulle returned to power and the Fifth Republic got under way, the Algerian question remained to be determined. Most

observers were surprised to see, at least in the first few months, that he was following the same footsteps and implementing the same policies as his predecessors. His policy on Algeria was characterized both by ambiguity and by obsession with the myth of *L'Algérie Française*.¹¹¹ These characteristics were reflected in his statements and declarations: for example, he concluded his speech in Mostaganem in western Algeria in June 1958 with the phrase "*vive L'Algérie Française*".¹¹² France's persistent ambiguity on the future of Algeria was also reflected in his stance and attitude: whilst he carefully avoided using the operative word "integration", he made it clear that his intentions were to keep Algeria under French control. And whilst he was lecturing the world about the need for peace in Algeria, he intensified the French military campaign against the nationalist forces.¹¹³

For France, and General de Gaulle was no exception, Algeria was of vital importance for both "emotional" and "geopolitical" reasons. Keeping Algeria French was regarded as paramount to safeguarding the country's honour and the army's pride after the disintegration of the empire and its *grandeur*. Moreover, it was the military *coup* in Algeria that had given birth to the Fifth Republic after causing the downfall of the Fourth. Economically, the newly discovered oil riches in the Algerian Sahara promised to solve France's economic problems. Meanwhile, it was in Algeria that France, of all the N.A.T.O. countries, was fighting a "hot war" because of which, as C.L. Sulzberger remarked, "French nationalism is more aroused than the nationalism of any ally".¹¹⁴

De Gaulle and his new republic also failed to address themselves to the crucial question of how Algeria was to be governed and, apart

from the long-cherished myth of "French Algeria", what its relationship with France would be. *The New York Times* reflected this ambiguity which persisted at a time when both sides in Algeria, nationalists and army-*colons*, were still adamant in their attitudes: "The fighters of the National Liberation Front say that Algeria shall be independent and they say it rifle in hand. The extremist group of European settlers, or *colons*, as they were called, want an Algeria consisting of a group of departments governed as an integral part of France".¹¹⁵

Jacques Soustelle, whose illusory plans were rejuvenated under the new republic, again called for the integration of Algeria into France and insisted on one united country "from Dunkirk to Tamanrassat". De Gaulle more or less shared the same views. Though he deliberately avoided using the critical word "integration" he relaunched the same Soustelle integrationist doctrine, albeit under a new guise, pledging implementation of a policy that would produce "ten million Frenchmen" in Algeria with "the same rights and duties".¹¹⁶ Addressing an Algerian crowd during his visit to Mostaganem in July 1958, he declared: "All men who live here must be equal. We have begun to make them equal and I give you my word that they will be".¹¹⁷

Whilst during his African tour in the summer of 1958, he initiated a plan whereby France's African colonies south of the Sahara would be able to choose their own destiny through balloting, General de Gaulle ignored the choice of the Algerian people whose situation was "left... unclear and apparently unchanged".¹¹⁸ *The New York Times* informed its readers that while "black Africa" was offered a free choice to determine its future along the lines of a federal union with France or total independence, "no specific political future was held

out to Algeria" which was now "more isolated as a political problem than ever". Located between two independent states and former French protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco, and now bounded on its extreme southern borders by countries that could be independent if they wanted to, Algeria became the last major overseas area where France still resisted nationalist demands. Whilst the peoples of other colonies knew that a "no" vote would bring them independence, the Algerians knew only that a "yes" vote would mean, in de Gaulle's words, that they "want to behave like full-pledged Frenchman".¹¹⁹ The fact that they were left in the dark on what a "no" vote would mean to their future, confirmed the thesis that the old French undemocratic practices in Algeria were still as existent as ever, despite the shining rhetoric which coloured the first few months of the Fifth Republic.

In this context, *The Economist* wondered whether France, by turning to de Gaulle had willfully voted for war in Algeria, "for continued repression, for rejecting the Moslem community's aspirations to a proper part in directing its own affairs"; and whether France had truly voted for this in Algeria, while allowing the rest of French Africa, to choose its own destiny.¹²⁰ *The (London) Times* shared the same concern and highlighted the ambiguity of de Gaulle's draft constitution and the obscurity of his plan for the overseas colonies: even more obscure were the intentions for Algeria, which would vote in the referendum as a department of France. But as to whether it would subsequently be able to opt, like other overseas territories, for a change in status was not said.¹²¹ As many observers pointed out, de Gaulle was offering independence to people who had never expressed genuine desire for it, whilst withholding this offer from those who had. Ferhat Abbas had this in mind when he declared that de Gaulle

had already promised independence to the Africans, asking: "For what reason should the Algerian population be treated worse? We are not the enemies of France. We wish, on the contrary, to cooperate with the French on the basis of new relations when we have obtained independence".¹²²

During the referendum, French voters approved de Gaulle's constitution which left Algeria's future status unclear and totally undefined.¹²³ In Algeria, like all previous French elections there, dubious methods were widely utilized to influence the current voting process.¹²⁴ "Psychological action", using the latest in propaganda technique - films, radio broadcasts and leaflets, to name but few, was stepped up by the French army in order to influence the outcome of the Algerian vote.¹²⁵ Only the partisans of a "yes" vote, for example, had access to Algerian Radio during their electoral campaign. Those who advocated a "no" vote, like the Association of the Ulemas, were refused permission to use it. As Lorna Hahn had observed the French, with their army and police units numbering three-quarters-of-a-million men, employed every trick to influence the vote in the referendum, making the election as unrepresentative and undemocratic as any election previously held in Algeria. The right to freedom of expression was further violated when those metropolitan publications, which were critical of the army's voting tricks, were seized in Algiers.¹²⁶ Jacques Soustelle erroneously accused their correspondents of what he called "lies, violence, blackmail and terror".¹²⁷

The Algerian National Liberation Front voiced unequivocal opposition to the constitutional referendum because it provided no hope for an independent Algeria, for French elections in Algeria had

never been fair or free. "To boycott the referendum, is to say 'yes' to the Algerian state", the F.L.N. told the Algerians. "General de Gaulle and the 'Committees of Public Safety' have decided to make the Algerians vote within the framework of French Constitution", wrote the official nationalist organ, *El Moudjahid*. "The F.L.N. has already denounced this operation, stating that the [colon] factions of Algiers expected to use three million Algerian votes to assure their triumph in France".¹²⁸ The nationalists denounced the referendum as a new act of aggression against the Algerian people and responded by stepping up their military activities in Algeria and also by bringing the war to metropolitan France itself, in order to draw the attention of French public opinion to their struggle for national independence. This sparked a wave of violence which shook France badly and brought the war, with all its trauma, to the Frenchman's own backyard.

Emphasizing what it called the "terrible effectiveness and... remarkable display of coordination" with which the Algerians responded in France, *The New York Times* wondered whether the F.L.N. and the cause of the Algerian independence would gain or lose by such action. It concluded that in front of a consistent French refusal to accept the Algerians' right to independence through peaceful means, the nationalists were left with no other option but to use violence. This perhaps justified the commonly held view that men in the thick of a revolution may well be forgiven if they sacrifice fundamental principles to the needs of some difficult time:

"From the beginning, nearly four years ago, when the insurrection started in Algeria, the F.L.N. has demanded complete independence. The successive French Governments, the army and the French or European residents in Algeria will not willingly grant independence or abandon Algeria. This is the impasse. The F.L.N. therefore, can only reach its goal by a victory of conquest. Being a revolutionary movement, it uses the classic tactics of civil strife, sabotage and guerrilla warfare".¹²⁹

The paper quoted prominent F.L.N. leaders threatening to intensify their military efforts if the conflict with France remained unresolved; and cited an *El Moudjahid* editorial warning that unless the Algerian people was permitted to take the destiny of the country into its own hands, the Algerian war would "assume gigantic proportions".¹³⁰

The (London) Times also reflected nationalist opposition to de Gaulle's constitutional referendum, and the subsequent eruption of violence in metropolitan France itself, branding it as "a deliberately dramatic gesture" because of which "enough spectacular damage" had been done and communal suspicions and antagonisms would increase. Charging that the outbreak of this wave of urban violence in France was a result of the F.L.N.'s loss of influence after General de Gaulle's return to power, it asserted that this had forced the F.L.N. to step up its efforts to make up for the lost ground, and to remind the French and the Algerians that the "rebellion" and its leadership were still intact.¹³¹

In addition to its decision to bring the war to French soil, the F.L.N. decided to create the *Gouvernement Provisoire de La République Algérienne* (G.P.R.A.) on 19 September 1958 which was the first Algerian nationalist government since occupation in 1830.¹³² The date was intended to coincide with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly debate and also with the constitutional referendum. The creation of the G.P.R.A. was aimed at "legalizing" the status of the *Front de Libération Nationale*. "We must have an international personality", said a report of an F.L.N. Committee. "After this work in the dark, we need to go out to the daylight".¹³³ The G.P.R.A. was a significant step towards gaining more international recognition of

the Algerians' right to independence. Leaders of the Algerian revolution regarded its inauguration both as a "continuity" and as a "resurrection" of the pre-colonial state, the *Dawla*.¹³⁴ The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was proclaimed on 19 September 1958. Its Premier declared that "[t]his proclamation was made in the name of one people that has been struggling for four years for independence; it restores the Algerian State, which the vicissitudes of military conquest of 1830 had brutally and unjustly suppressed from the political map of North Africa".¹³⁵

The inauguration of the Provisional Government marked the beginning of a new phase in the Algerian revolution. After having consolidated its position militarily, the F.L.N. turned to more political and diplomatic action, using the G.P.R.A. as a means of diplomatic pressure and as a tool for possible negotiation with France. Ferhat Abbas had been deliberately chosen to preside over the G.P.R.A. because of his reputation in French political circles for his moderate stance and political experience. To the Algerians, these criteria were enough to reassure both French and world opinion of their good intentions.¹³⁶

No sooner had the G.P.R.A. been inaugurated than it launched an intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at putting General de Gaulle on the defensive. It declared its readiness to negotiate with the representatives of the French Government at any time, freed some French prisoners and temporarily stopped its military activities in France. It was in this context that de Gaulle recognized the "courage" of the Algerian fighters and offered his "peace of the brave" initiative, calling upon them to lay down their arms and send representatives to Paris to meet with French representatives. But

there appeared no common ground for talks. Whilst de Gaulle wanted ceasefire to be followed by legislative elections then by negotiations, the F.L.N. insisted on negotiations first, then ceasefire and then elections. The Algerian leaders reaffirmed their position that any settlement which stopped short of independence was out of the question and reiterated their determination to continue the struggle which, they believed, had by then reached a point of no return.¹³⁷

The New York Times was openly hostile to the formation of the G.P.R.A., asserting that this move would put "a great future handicap" on General de Gaulle and would hinder progress towards a peaceful settlement to the Algerian problem. Its editorial for 20 September, "The Algerian 'Government'", argued that the F.L.N. had chosen its moment "to strike very shrewdly - perhaps too shrewdly". "The setting up of the Provisional Government of the Algerian F.L.N. has taken a great gamble, and gamblers more often lose than win", it intoned. Dismissing what it called "the two extremes of independence and integration" as impractical solutions, it asserted that the ideas of autonomy, partial independence or a Commonwealth status had been possible future solutions.¹³⁸

The paper strongly criticized the F.L.N. for boycotting the November elections, charging that because of this stay-away policy the elections would not bring about "a badly needed settlement to France's Number One problem": the fact that only the advocates of "integration" stood as candidates in the coming elections dealt a terrible blow to de Gaulle's "ardent efforts" to find a solution to the conflict. It concluded by asserting that the fault was much more with the Algerian nationalists than with de Gaulle and his government: "The F.L.N. had a

splendid opportunity to win ground for themselves and put an end to the cruel conflict that has now lasted four years. They threw this chance away".¹³⁹

The (London) Times also reproached the F.L.N. for boycotting the elections and, thus, causing a major setback to de Gaulle's plan. In an editorial, "Disappointment from Algeria", it strongly criticized the "F.L.N.'s cold shoulder" towards the new proposals and praised General de Gaulle's "brave gesture" in calling for elections whilst the country was still ravaged by war: the F.L.N. boycott would mean the election of forty-six Algerian Deputies whose views would not be noticeably different from the twenty-one *colon* Deputies. This "prefabricated band of *colon* 'ultras'" would be the natural ally of the extreme right in the French Assembly, and would make it harder for General de Gaulle to carry out his plan for Algeria and might even influence the course of French politics as a whole.¹⁴⁰ *The Economist*, on the other hand, showed no unfriendly criticism of the F.L.N. decision to boycott the election, but its leading article "A Muffed Chance", in its 1 November issue, underlined the thesis that the representatives likely to be produced from those elections could not have the same authority and respect as those delegated by an election in which the F.L.N. had joined.

Like his predecessors, General de Gaulle sought to stem the Algerian revolution through socio-economic and political reforms in conjunction with the ever-increasing French military effort. He introduced, during his visit to eastern Algeria in October 1958, a plan which later came to be known as the "Constantine Plan", pledging to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Algerian population. It promised to bring salaries and wages in Algeria to similar level as

those in metropolitan France, to distribute 617,500 acres to Algerian peasants, to create chemical and metallurgical complexes in Algeria, to provide one million new houses, to create 400,000 new jobs and educational provisions for two-thirds of Algerian children of school age.¹⁴¹ The G.P.R.A. vehemently criticized the plan as another propaganda lure for world consumption. The socio-economic "reforms" put forward by General de Gaulle were devised mainly to protect the interests of the *pied noir* community and would hardly benefit the Algerian majority.¹⁴²

Whilst de Gaulle told the world about his socio-economic proposals, he strongly endorsed the intensification of French gigantic military campaign against the nationalist forces, in the hope of achieving a military solution to the conflict. The generals of Algiers believed that having a general at the top of the government would enable them to achieve victory over the F.L.N.-A.L.N. Under the command of General Challe the army, therefore, launched its biggest offensive ever, putting the nationalist units throughout the country under constant pressure.¹⁴³ Those units were also cut off from their political leadership outside Algeria and deprived of reinforcements of arms and ammunition.¹⁴⁴

In addition, electrified barriers along the frontiers were made more effective. "Regroupment camps" were set up in an attempt to isolate the nationalist forces from the local population. The "*quadrillage*" technique, which meant the division of Algeria into four major military zones, was replaced by "*La mobilité offensive*", which meant the use of mobile units that were more adapted to the conditions of guerrilla warfare throughout Algeria. The outcome of this offensive was devastating for the local population, as villages were

indiscriminately bombarded and, at times, strafed to the ground. F.L.N. losses were also high; the offensive succeeded in temporarily reducing the effectiveness of the nationalist forces inside the country.¹⁴⁵

Meanwhile, "counter-revolutionary warfare" or "psychological action" continued unabated under de Gaulle, mainly because of the growing strength of the army after the May insurrection.¹⁴⁶ This included arbitrary bombing of villages,¹⁴⁷ collective massacres of civilians,¹⁴⁸ brain-washing of suspects using the latest in the "art" of interrogation,¹⁴⁹ and the forced displacement and regroupment of up to two million people in camps under harsh conditions.¹⁵⁰ The ferocity of these methods had been summed up by the distinguished French soldier, Jean Muller, who had written shortly before he was killed in action in 1958:

"We are far from the pacification for which we had been called. We are dispirited to see to what point human nature could decline, and to see the French employing processes which stemmed from Nazi barbarism".¹⁵¹

These repressive methods, which the French army used at will against the civilian population, confirmed the Algerian people's total support for the F.L.N., without which the revolution would have been stamped out in its first few months. They also further demonstrated the frustration of the colonial regime and the isolation and unpopularity of the army of occupation.¹⁵²

With the publication of Henri Alleg's *La Question* in 1958, torture became a major issue in the Franco-Algerian conflict. Henri Alleg, the editor of *Alger Républicain*, was arrested and tortured by the paratroopers. In *La Question*, basically a manuscript smuggled out of prison, he described his experiences which made the book a best seller in France before it was banned, making it the first book to be

banned in France for political reasons since the eighteenth century. When *L'Express* simply mentioned the book it was immediately seized in Algeria and when, the following week, it printed an article on *La Question* by Jean-Paul Sartre, it was again seized in both Algeria and France. Likewise, *France-Observateur* was seized for publishing extracts from the book. *The (London) Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian* were the only publications that were able to publish extracts from the book and remain on sale, but their French audience was very limited.¹⁵³

Témoignage Chrétien, in particular, followed the story with interest; in 1959 it published two important articles on the practice of torture by the paratroopers in Algeria. The first article, which appeared on 10 April, made public a report sent by thirty-five priests, serving as reserve officers in Algeria, to their bishops in France telling them about methods being used by the army "which our consciences condemn - arbitrary arrests, torture, summary executions, and the killing of wounded on the battlefield". The second article, on 29 December, informed the French people about the special training camp, Joan of Arc camp, which was used to teach officers in the French army the different methods of torture; water torture and electric shock were said to be recommended by their instructors.¹⁵⁴

Algeria's Right to Self-Determination Recognized

The all-out French army offensive to some extent succeeded in reducing the military activities of the F.L.N. inside Algeria.¹⁵⁵ But, the F.L.N. managed to find ways to compensate for those losses, mainly by intensifying its external military and diplomatic efforts. In military terms, the Algerian forces based in neighbouring Tunisia

and Morocco, launched a big offensive across the eastern and western frontiers and through the electrified barriers. In diplomatic terms, the F.L.N. succeeded in gaining more publicity and sympathy for the Algerian cause throughout the world, as more and more countries declared their recognition of the G.P.R.A. and their open support for the Algerians' right to independence.¹⁵⁶

It was in this context that de Gaulle recognized Algeria's right to self-determination, offering the Algerian people a choice between "*La Session*", "*La Francisation*" or "*L'Association*".¹⁵⁷ As for the first option, "Secession", which was simply another French euphemism for independence, he warned of what he regarded as its potential frightful consequences which might lead to political chaos and an eventual communist takeover. The second, "Frenchification", meant the integration of Algeria into a France stretching "from Dunkirk to Tamanrassat". The third, "Association", was much preferred by General de Gaulle and meant Algeria's autonomy within the French union, with France to be in control of defence, economic planning and development, and foreign relations.¹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, and contrary to the true spirit of the self-determination principle, he insisted that the Algerian choice would have to be ratified by metropolitan French. In addition to the fact that France would have the power of veto over the Algerians' vote, their independent decision would be possible only with the passage of four years after "military pacification" was achieved.

The New York Times was full of praise for General de Gaulle's declaration on Algeria, giving it full play and prominent front-page coverage, which was lengthy but generally lacking in critical penetration. Its editorialists also wrote favourably of it, arguing

that he had gone further than any French Government leader ever had, and he had gone "in the right direction".¹⁵⁹ The next day's issue also presented a strong defence of General de Gaulle, asserting that no one but he could have "conceived a plan of this boldness": unlike other programmes, this "spelled out a democratic way by which Algerians might cease to be French".¹⁶⁰ Discussing the possible outcome of the proposed referendum, it predicted that since the choice would be done through balloting involving ten million Algerians and one million *pieds noirs*, Frenchification would not win.¹⁶¹

The (London) Times also had only praise for de Gaulle's plan as when on 17 September, under the caption "COURAGE AND LOGIC", it called it a "revolutionary step" whereby Algeria was for the first time explicitly offered self-determination on the same terms that it had already been offered other French colonies. The paper's own stance was unambiguous: although in theory the Algerians were offered three choices which ranged from integration to autonomy within the French Union to total independence, it was desirable that the Algerians, by their "good sense", would reject the two extreme choices and choose instead "a path of moderation and prosperity": association with France. It concluded by suggesting that it was not too late for a political solution to the Algerian problem.

The Economist and *Time* magazine echoed similar views. *The Economist* expressed its belief that what made General de Gaulle's plan a "liberal" one, was the fact that the Algerians were offered a chance to choose their own future: "What could be more liberal than to entrust the people of Algeria themselves with the destiny of their country?" Because they were promised a free choice in deciding "their own fate through universal suffrage", the long-cherished myth that

Algeria was bound to remain for ever an integral part of France had been destroyed.¹⁶² *Time* was quick to paint de Gaulle's words "I deem it necessary that recourse to self-determination be here and now proclaimed" as a "watershed in French history". It hailed him for coming out with such a programme: no other French leader had ever dared to offer the 9,000,000 Algerians what he was holding for them - "a free choice to decide their own future political status, even to secede peacefully from France if that was what they wanted".¹⁶³

The fact that General de Gaulle conceded Algeria's right to self-determination and vaguely accepted the possibility of an independent Algeria, completely destroyed the old myth of *Algérie Française*.¹⁶⁴ Yet, despite its liberal connotations, the offer was made subject to some conditions deemed unacceptable to the leaders of the Algerian revolution. As already explained, de Gaulle made a possible Algerian vote subject to French ratification giving France, therefore, the power of veto over the Algerians' choice. In case of a vote for independence, he intended to "reestablish and regroup" the partisans of "French Algeria" by partitioning the country - a possibility which the Algerians totally rejected. In addition, Algeria would choose its destiny only after four years of "military pacification". De Gaulle was, in short, advocating peace through war.¹⁶⁵

The G.P.R.A. welcomed de Gaulle's proposals on Algeria's right to self-determination, but complained that they were not democratic enough to make a settlement possible, and strongly rejected the "conditions" attached to them: a free and democratic choice could not take place whilst "an occupation army of more than half a million soldiers and almost the same number of gendarmes, policemen and

militiamen" were still present in the country, and whilst the same administrative apparatus, which had for long been condemned for its "electoral fraud", was still in existence.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, it declared its readiness to meet with representatives of the French Government to discuss the "conditions" and "guarantees" of self-determination and the way to apply it. It also named the five detained leaders - Ben Bella, Bitat, Ait Ahmed, Boudiaf and Khider - as its representatives in any possible *pourparlers*.¹⁶⁷

The New York Times referred, in passing, to the hard conditions de Gaulle had attached to his plan for Algeria, which were, from the Algerians' standpoint, not only contradictory with the principle of self-determination but a negation of it altogether. The hardest condition was the intended military pacification of the country which the French had always tried in vain to achieve: "If they are to do so now they will need some forbearance on the part of the rebels or they must make still greater military efforts".¹⁶⁸

The paper, on the other hand, criticized the G.P.R.A.'s response to de Gaulle's offer on the ground that the Algerians had, after all, been offered self-determination and that "... basically, was what they had fought for".¹⁷⁰ In another lengthy but shallow comment, "Rebel Reply", its readers were told that the Algerians' reply was "disappointing". The G.P.R.A. was particularly reproached for naming as negotiators with the French Government, the five leaders who had long been in French prisons and who could have had no recent contact with the Algerian forces.¹⁷¹ Urging the Algerians to "think again" and to be "more accommodating" to what it labelled de Gaulle's "statesmanlike proposal", the paper asserted that the Algerian leaders ought to recognize that they had a golden opportunity to achieve most

of their aims and to end the war which the world, including the Algerian people, wanted over.¹⁷²

The paper's general tone, however, was somewhat cordial with the stress on the need for a quick settlement to the conflict. It was for a time not without sympathy for the Algerians' stance, emphasizing their willingness to enter into *pourparlers* with the French Government about the application of the principle of self-determination: all things considered, it would not have been realistic to expect the Algerian leadership to go much further than it had done in meeting de Gaulle's challenge. The G.P.R.A. had already expressed a readiness to negotiate for an immediate peace and to enter into discussions on "the political and military conditions for a ceasefire and the conditions and guarantees of the application of self-determination".¹⁷³

Earlier, *The New York Times* had argued that despite the vagueness of some of the points of the self-determination offer and de Gaulle's insistence on keeping Algeria linked to France, Algeria's independence was inevitable, judging from other precedents in history: "No nationalist movement with deep roots - and the Algerian one has such roots - has ever stopped short of independence. If history is a guide, Algeria will be independent some day".¹⁷⁴ The Algerians had shown realistic moderation in their views and a readiness for negotiations with the French Government. What they still insisted on, understandably enough, was a guarantee that the proposed elections would be completely free and the voters' choice uncoerced. They were firmly opposed to some possible consequences of the coming referendum as stated in the de Gaulle plan, namely France's power of veto over the Algerian choice and the partition of the country if the vote were for complete independence. Despite what it saw as serious

uncertainties surrounding the recent moves, the paper was not without hope that those issues, given good will on both sides, would not be beyond "a solution by enlightened statesmanship".¹⁷⁵

The (London) Times, focusing on the conditions de Gaulle had attached to his offer, suggested three lines upon which his programme could be criticized. The first line, was that despite the offer of peace, no suggestion was made as to how the coming of peace was to be hastened. The second was the four-year period of time required between military pacification and elections, "... a long gap would mean a long uncertainty, during which passions might be excited instead of soothed..." The third, was the fact that the immediate consequence of an Algerian vote for independence would be partition.¹⁷⁶ It, on the other hand, criticized the Algerians' response to the offer, asserting that the F.L.N. leaders had little more to win by turning off "an honourable ceasefire". Calling for direct Franco-Algerian negotiations and noting that the stumbling block now lay in the terms of a ceasefire, it concluded that this could not be cleared by public exchanges alone.¹⁷⁷

The Economist drove home the lesson that de Gaulle, like his predecessors, was looking for a solution that would be short of independence, whilst ignoring the F.L.N. as a valid negotiator and spokesman for the Algerian people: the new plan, for all its "liberal" look and for all the General's power and prestige, would not provide the answer to the difficult problem which had "bedevilled France for five years". It defended the G.P.R.A.'s attitude towards the new plan and vehemently reproached the French press for presenting the Algerians' reply as "intransigent", noting - with some sarcasm - that those who had described it as such "must have expected a simple

surrender". The Algerians did, in fact, make concessions in response to the offer. The French having, in theory, admitted the right to "secession" the F.L.N. no longer made the recognition of Algeria's independence a condition that must be fulfilled before any negotiations. Moreover, the G.P.R.A entrusted its fate to the verdict of the people and described itself, in a vocabulary borrowed from wartime Gaullism, as the "keeper and guardian of the interests of the Algerian people", until the people was able to express itself freely. The weekly remarked that after having been put on the defensive by General de Gaulle's diplomatic offensive and because of its diplomatic skill, the G.P.R.A. had "recovered the initiative".¹⁷⁸ A few weeks later, it headed a leading article on the growing tension in France "Alarm Bells in Paris" in which it openly supported Ferhat Abbas's topical declaration that the five-year-old Algerian problem and its consequences, could not be settled by public statements. It also endorsed his observation that "one cannot be in favour of peace and at the same time against negotiations", referring to de Gaulle's refusal to negotiate with the G.P.R.A., to the hard conditions attached to the self-determination offer and also to the guarantees required.¹⁷⁹

Yet *The Economist*, whose reporting was more realistic and more detached than that of *The New York Times*, also held that both "the onus and balance of advantage" were on the Algerian side, in making the last concessions that would get the ceasefire talks underway. It argued that de Gaulle was the best man the Algerians could hope for to work out a settlement to the conflict; under mounting army pressure and *colon* threats his offer was the ultimate point he could reach: to expect France to offer more in public than de Gaulle had offered already, was to ask too much from an army which had not obtained the military victory it had long promised. The Algerians "ought to take

the plunge this time". If they did not, their refusal would be seized upon by the French *ultras* to claim that the F.L.N. could not risk a genuine test of its strength.¹⁸⁰ *Time* magazine was slightly more optimistic in its assessment of the recent diplomatic moves arguing, under the headline "Closer and Closer", that "hope" had eventually prevailed despite a "nightmare fear" because of the gap of opinion separating the two sides.¹⁸¹

Colon Diehards Angered by de Gaulle's New Proposals

De Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination aroused the anger and fury of the *pied noir ultras*,¹⁸² who accused him of betraying their interests by abandoning the long-cherished idea of *L'Algérie Française*, holding him responsible for what they called "this national catastrophe".¹⁸³ Branding him a master of duplicity and deceit intent on sellout from the very moment he came to power, they complained that they had been duped into helping him to power and were later betrayed.¹⁸⁴ In "the wild, unreal atmosphere of Algiers" immediately after the 13 May *coup*, the *colons* believed that de Gaulle would put an end to the Algerian revolution, restore French Algeria and introduce a kind of *colon* Golden Age in which "nationalist aspirations would be forgotten and their sympathizers banished into limbo".¹⁸⁴ They, out of frustration, devised countless slogans in the form of equations which reflected their almost hysterical desire to sustain their illusory interests in the country and to resist the forward evolution of history: "France is in Algeria = Algeria is French = Algeria is France = France is Algeria".¹⁸⁵

To the *colon* diehards and their sympathizers in France, the struggle to maintain French control over Algeria became a struggle to

safeguard the future of France itself. To some extremists, the "loss" of Algeria would even mean that France would not be worthy of existence at all.¹⁸⁶ The recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination widened the ever-increasing rupture between the Paris Government and the *colons*, and increased rightist fanaticism which became a major threat to de Gaulle and his republic. As E.S. Furniss argued, what would have been considered moderate in Algerian politics, would have been easily on the extreme right in metropolitan France.¹⁸⁷ The *ultras*, and their activist groups in Algeria, whose leanings were fascist,¹⁸⁸ were convinced that de Gaulle would have to be forced to abandon his recent offer of self-determination to the Algerians, even if that meant another insurrection similar to that which had brought him to power. He would, therefore, personally become the direct target of those diehards' vindictive attempts to preserve the outmoded colonial rule.¹⁸⁹ As Jean Daniel of *L'Express* warned, plots by factious groups would continue to represent a danger to the new republic unless firm action was taken: "The flux of the new *politique* plunges certain military circles in confusion and gives courage to the agitators".¹⁹⁰

The New York Times reflected, at some length, *piec noir* bitterness and anger at de Gaulle's self-determination proposals, and exposed the extent to which the diehards were causing a threat to him and his government: the *colons* would fight his policy to the bitter end and perhaps try to sabotage it afterward. They had vested interests and power to defend and they would be the greatest losers if the Algerians accepted his offer. Stating its faith in General de Gaulle and discussing the threat they represented, it remarked that such threat should not be exaggerated because those *ultras* were not as strong as they had been a year earlier.¹⁹¹

Taking vigorously the side of the Paris Government, the paper stated that the "militant minority" could no longer overthrow the republic; popular support, a strong parliamentary majority and a strong executive made opposition of this sort "not very effective". Passionately endorsing de Gaulle's ideas, it warned the *ultras* that their vindictive violence and plots might drive him to go further than he had in his recent offer for Algeria: his hand had been strengthened against right-wing military and *colon* extremists "... by the obvious approbation he has received from ordinary citizens".¹⁹²

The New York Times was not alone in exposing the anger of the *colon* diehards at de Gaulle's recent moves. *The (London) Times* highlighted the wide array of critics on the French right that was organized in many groups and movements and united only in fearing that his Algerian policy would destroy the hope of *Algérie Française* as they understood this mythical slogan.¹⁹³ *Apropos* the effects of the right-wing extremists who were determined to stymie de Gaulle's plan for Algerian self-determination, *Time* magazine commented that those extremists, unable to carry the day by parliamentary means, had coldly set out to create an atmosphere of civil war reminiscent of the May 1958 *coup* that had toppled the Fourth Republic.¹⁹⁴

Yet, *The (London) Times* was not without sympathy for the *pieds noirs*, regarding their anxiety and anger as "understandable", resulting from the "climate of violence and uncertainty" which had generated the recent *coup* whereby the Fourth Republic was brought down. It, however, blamed them for making the mistake of thinking that 13 May 1958 was "the first stage in a revolutionary process of which they could continue to direct the course and pace". The 1958 insurrection had succeeded, it argued, because French public opinion and army had

been in sympathy with the mood in Algeria, and also because a strong man had been ready to assume power and help France avert "chaos". Circumstances were now different: there was no figurehead in Paris for an anti-Gaullist insurrection. The army and public opinion were content that General de Gaulle should lead.¹⁹⁵

More Gains for the Algerian Cause Internationally

The Algerian National Liberation Front always wanted to internationalize the French-Algerian conflict, whilst the French tried every means to vindicate their claim that Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan France, and that the war was a strictly French domestic issue.¹⁹⁶ The Algerians sought assistance from world opinion, foreign governments, and international organizations and institutions.¹⁹⁷ They embarked therefore, on a big diplomatic campaign to win international sympathy, especially after the creation of the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* which brought with it a worldwide recognition of, and subsequent support for, the Algerian cause.¹⁹⁸ The G.P.R.A. came to rejuvenate the diplomatic role of the F.L.N. and give the struggle for independence a significant "international jurisdictional basis".¹⁹⁹

Algeria's neighbours provided most of the help to the Algerian revolution, playing host to tens of thousands of refugees and to an army which came since 1958 to launch a big offensive against the French across the frontiers. Tunisia, in particular, became almost directly involved in the war,²⁰⁰ as frictions with France culminated in the ill-fated French raid on the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and the subsequent designation of Anglo-American "good offices", in an attempt to find a settlement to the conflict between the two countries

outside the United Nations.²⁰¹

Not lacking the opportunity to highlight the scale of the tension that existed between France and Algeria's neighbours because of the war, *The New York Times* suggested three forms of the internationalization of the Algerian problem involving Tunisia. The first was the transfer of arms from other countries through the Tunisian border to the nationalist forces inside Algeria. Possible discussion of the mounting tension on the Algerian-Tunisian frontiers in international institutions, such as the United Nations or N.A.T.O., was another form of internationalization. A third was the fact that the Anglo-American "good officers" were "inexorably drawn into discussion of the frontier question", an issue arising from the Algerian war.²⁰²

Earlier, the paper had discussed a possible solution to the Algerian problem through a North African federation, the formation of which it considered "necessary" to end the war in Algeria. Its editorial for 7 March 1958, "NORTH AFRICAN UNION", had argued that the idea of such a federation, which would involve the independent states of Tunisia and Morocco and also an independent Algeria, was favoured by many leaders in both France and North Africa: "It [also] sounds good and looks good on the map. The history of our times has thrown these North African countries together for better or for worse. It would be better if they could somehow join up peacefully into a federation". To this thought, the paper was often to return.

The New York Times, however, erred in giving its readers the impression that Tunisian and Moroccan assistance to the F.L.N. was decisive. The Algerians in fact needed and welcomed assistance from

their neighbours, but such assistance was not of vital importance as to the course the Algerian revolution was taking or even to its intensity. Though the F.L.N. appreciated the help it was getting from abroad, it relied primarily on the response and contribution of the Algerian population, and on the resources available to it inside Algeria itself. The French had always claimed that had it not been for the help the F.L.N. was getting from Tunisia, the war would have long ended. Ridiculing this argument, *The Economist's* correspondent in Algeria observed that the Algerian revolution was not dependent on external factors: "A year ago, President Nasser was the culprit; now it is President Bourguiba. Help certainly comes from these quarters. But your correspondent found no evidence to support the view that Tunisian help is of decisive importance".²⁰³

In addition to the neighbouring countries, the Algerian cause found a sympathetic ear among the other independent African states. The Algerians regarded their struggle against French colonialism as a part and parcel of a wider struggle involving the Afro-Asian countries against colonialism in general: "The struggle of the Algerian people is not an isolated struggle nor is it unique in its kind; it is an episode of the universal struggle which raises the African and Asian peoples against European colonialism".²⁰⁴ Meeting in Accra in April 1958, the eight independent African states endorsed the Algerian cause and recognized the F.L.N. as the sole legitimate representative of, and spokesman for, the Algerian people, pledging moral and material support for the revolution. They also strongly urged France to end its military occupation of Algeria and enter into negotiations with the nationalist leadership.²⁰⁵

Reflecting the popularity of the Algerian cause among the African nations, *The New York Times* played the story of the Accra Conference under a prominent front-page headline:

8 AFRICAN LANDS
BACK ALGERIANS

Independent Bloc at Accra
to Recognize Insurgents
- Counsels Peace.

But it reproached the Conference for recognizing the F.L.N. as the legitimate spokesman for the Algerian people, painting this move as contrary to the United Nations Charter, to which those countries had pledged "unswerving loyalty". In fact, it veered back to its previous position and away from the course of impartiality, by attacking the F.L.N. and its conduct: "[I]t would seem to be contrary to the Charter to proclaim the ultra-militant National Liberation Front as the sole legitimate authority, and to pledge all 'practical' aid to it when it has no mandate from the Algerian people and is in fact fighting not only the French but also the more moderate Algerian elements which might constitute a majority".²⁰⁶ In making this point, the paper was merely echoing French claims of "F.L.N. unrepresentativeness" of the Algerian people.

The paper's stance provoked an angry reply from the F.L.N. representative in New York, Abdelkader Chanderli, who ridiculed its accusation that the F.L.N. had no mandate from the Algerians. He declared that the best mandate was the mass support of the population testified to by the success of the nationalist army in combating overwhelming French military forces in nearly four years. Confirmation of this fact could be seen in the reports of many correspondents including that of *The New York Times* in Algeria who had written as early as 9 June 1957: "There is only one significant

nationalist group in Algeria, the National Liberation Front". Chanderli's letter closed on the sensible note that the resolution adopted by the Accra Conference of the Independent States of Africa was aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the Algerian question if France agreed to negotiate a peaceful settlement then logically it had to negotiate with those with whom it was fighting.²⁰⁷

The Second Conference of the Independent States of Africa which was held in Monrovia in August 1959 also declared its support for the Algerian revolution, and pledged full support for the Algerian people in its struggle for independence. Moreover, it was the first time that the Algerian flag was hoisted in another country outside the Arab World and China. *The New York Times* highlighted the diplomatic significance of this event to the F.L.N. and to its cause under conspicuous headlines. Unlike its vigorous criticism of the 1958 Accra Conference and its positive stance towards the National Liberation Front, however, the paper showed much more understanding of the attitude of the independent states of Africa during their Monrovia Conference, and of their unequivocal support for Algeria's right to independence. Its editorial for 8 August 1959, "Monrovia and Algiers" admitted that it was "inevitable" that those countries should concentrate more on the situation in Algeria than on their own problems: "The political psychology of Africa in recent years has been such that nothing matters more than the self-respect and legal equality that came with independence".²⁰⁸

Le Monde also emphasized the diplomatic significance of the Algerians' gains in Monrovia, noting that the G.P.R.A. had achieved two successes during the Second Conference of the Independent States of Africa. One was of a political nature; its admission to the

Conference as a member with full rights and its recognition as part of the conclaves of the independent African states. The other was of symbolic nature and that was the approval of the Liberian Government that the Algerian emblem fluttered for a few days on the Parliament of Monrovia.²⁰⁹

The United States and the West Coming Under Algerian Criticism

The diplomatic offensive launched by the G.P.R.A. at the end of 1958 and the beginning of the new year, also included visits by Algerian delegations to different countries throughout the world; these visits attracted more support for the nationalist cause and consolidated the position of the G.P.R.A. internationally. China, in particular, provided substantial aid to the F.L.N. whose delegations visited it regularly on both official and unofficial missions. During a visit in December 1958, for example, a G.P.R.A. delegation was greeted with a warm welcome, treated as an official government delegation and received by both Mao-Tse-Tung and Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai. The Chinese authorities repeatedly pledged support for the Algerian revolution and for Algeria's right to independence.²¹⁰

The New York Times reported this Chinese-F.L.N. rapprochement with interest and under prominent headlines. Hence, the one which appeared on 22 May 1959:

RED CHINA TO ARM
ALGERIA REBELS

Insurgent Spokesman Says
Military Mission Made
Deal with Peiping.

It had earlier referred the Algerians' search for new allies to what it had viewed as the diminishing Egyptian support for the F.L.N., and also to the F.L.N.'s own reluctance to seek direct assistance from the

Soviet Union as a precaution against an alleged communist threat to its leading position inside Algeria. Its Paris-based columnist C.L. Sulzberger warned on 22 January 1959 that the F.L.N.'s decision to enlist the aid of China was only an "initial step" in the direction of moving closer towards the East: "if the Chinese are not able to provide enough assistance, the Algerian leaders will find themselves faced with a grim choice... [which might force them to seek] direct Soviet help".

It is worth reiterating that whilst it sought assistance from different countries and sources, the F.L.N. was always determined to preserve its freedom from the influence of foreign powers and to sustain its completely independent decision making. It made it clear from the start that it welcomed assistance from any source, be it Egypt, China, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union or any other country as long as there were no strings attached. It also reaffirmed its commitment to seeking the friendship of all nations, from both the East and the West without exceptions, as long as that friendship was genuine and not based solely on sheer convenience or opportunistic self-interest.

The G.P.R.A. vehemently denied Western allegations of communist inclinations in its recent moves, emphasizing that seeking communist assistance did not necessarily mean alignment with the communist world. In this context, its Minister of Information, M'hamed Yazid, reiterated Patrick Henry's words "give me freedom or give me death".²¹¹ On another occasion, he made it clear that the Algerians were looking towards the East because the alternative was not encouraging: "They are looking at China, which is celebrating the tenth anniversary of its revolution through the mobilization of the

masses. Perhaps those among us who advocated a western solution will be swept away one day".²¹²

Being engaged in a fierce war upon which the future of the country depended, the Algerian liberation movement could not afford being too selective or too choosy regarding its potential allies.²¹³ "We are not playing games", declared M'hamed Yazid on the eve of a visit by an F.L.N. delegation to China. "When we say we will take aid where we find it, we mean it".²¹⁴ The obligations of the war, in fact, left the Algerians with no other choice but to apply the simple rule of considering the enemies of France as their friends and those who were sustaining France, with both financial and military assistance, as their enemies.²¹⁵

The F.L.N. repeatedly denounced the mounting support France was getting from its allies who had thus become directly involved in the Algerian-French conflict, making it an international issue which seriously threatened world peace.²¹⁶ It particularly blamed the complicity of N.A.T.O. which was backing France to the hilt in its Algerian campaign, providing it with the military and diplomatic support needed to pursue the war,²¹⁷ and with the financial assistance required to protect its shaky economy.²¹⁸

The Algerians gave special attention to the stance the United States was taking towards their cause, because of its leading role in the Western world. Through its Bureau of Information in New York, the F.L.N. had since 1955 been trying to capture the attention of American public opinion and provide the American reader with an alternative version of what was happening in Algeria.²¹⁹ But it was only after the report of Senator John F. Kennedy to the Senate in July 1957, that

the Americans had really begun to discover the Algerian question.²²⁰ This was in itself a reflection upon the capability of the F.L.N. Bureau of Information and upon the nature and quality of the reporting in the American press.

The activities of the Bureau of Information, especially the contacts it established in New York, now began to attract more interest and, therefore, more sympathy for the Algerian cause in the United States. Some Congressmen were explicit in their criticism of the American Government for not helping the Algerian people to achieve its independence. Representative Adam C. Powell, for example, attacked his government's deliberate lack of anti-colonial activities because of its wish not to offend the N.A.T.O. colonial powers especially France. He called for a real change in the United States policy towards Africa as a whole.²²¹ Senator Wayne Morse reproached his government for allowing France to use the American weapons issued to it through N.A.T.O., against the Algerians.²²² A few months later, sixteen Democratic Congressmen highlighted the plight of the Algerian people because of the war which, they concluded, was a threat to world peace.²²³ Whilst expressing their support for Algeria's right to self-determination, the Congressmen urged the American Administration to put pressure on France to enter into real negotiations with the G.P.R.A.²²⁴

American academic opinion also became aware of, and more interested in, the Algerian-French conflict. In 1958 alone, as many as twenty-eight theses related to Algeria were submitted in different American institutions.²²⁵ Private relief agencies, like the Quaker organization "Friends Service Committee", warned against the serious threat the war posed to international peace and exposed the plight of

the Algerian refugees in the neighbouring countries.²²⁶ Private American individuals also became increasingly aware of the conflict and the significant role the United States Government could play in solving it. Hence, the following letter to *The New York Times* which is worth quoting at large:

"According to the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States is concerned about the integrity and independence of the States of the Middle East. Although final decisions about what happens in Algeria must rest with the Algerians and the French, we cannot as a people be spiritual isolationists. We have admired Franklin D. Roosevelt because he continued to speak up for Indian Independence. We are proud because the Philippines are free.

Why as a people are we not as specific and forthright in our sympathies today as we have been in the past? Certainly for Americans to voice opinions on such matters is not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

NATO will be stronger, not weaker, if Algeria is independent. We will be weaker, not stronger, if we give military materiel that is used against those seeking freedom....

Leaders in a country geographically separated from French territory are seeking first-class citizenship and political freedom in general... can those of us for whom freedom was won before we were born fail to favour the creation of a constantly expanding, voluntary association of free people, in the interest of world well-being and world peace? One would hope that France's disastrous experience²²⁷ in Indochina would cause her to ask the same question".

Yet, despite the sympathy of many American individuals and private groups for the Algerian cause and their condemnation of France's policy in Algeria, the United States Government persisted in adopting the same attitude which had first been put forward by Douglas Dillon at the beginning of the Algerian revolution. It still put faith in a unilateral French solution to the problem.²²⁸ Whilst almost totally ignoring the plight of the Algerian population, the United States Administration continued to provide France with all the financial and material help the war required. American Red Cross aid to the Algerian refugees was estimated at only three-quarters of a

million dollars, as opposed to the \$655 million the United States provided to France.²²⁹ In this context, the Algerians complained that the American Government was not interested in offering aid to the peoples who were in desperate need, but was ready to offer such aid, including the latest in military technology, to those who sought their extermination.²³⁰ Interviewed on American Radio in May 1958, Krim Belkacem, responding to a question about what the Algerians expected from the United States, had stated that they realized that the American Government had so far guaranteed four years of war in Algeria by a combination of military and financial support as well as absolute diplomatic backing at the United Nations. He had also voiced the hope that the Eisenhower Administration would listen and respond favourably to the pleas of the people of North Africa as expressed during the recent Tangiers Conference.²³¹

The United States was, however, only concerned about what it viewed as the threat posed by international communism in the area, especially Soviet attempts to gain influence in North Africa and the Middle East at the expense of the West.²³² Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had repeatedly declared that what the United States feared was that the war in Algeria might destroy the N.A.T.O. alliance in the same way the war in Indochina had destroyed the European Defence Community.²³³ The paradox was that during this period American rhetoric was as generous as ever in its support for self-determination. The United States was, in theory, always ready to support the demands of the Afro-Asian peoples for independence, reasserting its "efforts to help remind those nations that they have an alternative to Communist methods and Communist help in seeking to advance".²³⁴

The almost hysterical preoccupation of the United States with the threat international communism posed to the emerging nations did not, however, yield concrete, positive results for the future of those nations, and Algeria was no exception. Hence, the F.L.N. lost no opportunity to outline the fundamental dichotomies between the United States' idealistic rhetoric and its actual stance towards the issue of colonialism especially in Algeria. Whilst the United States offered its N.A.T.O. allies effective backing, including the "enormous weight" of its vote at the United Nations, it offered the subject nations no more than "the emptiness of its declarations of principle".²³⁵ M'hamed Yazid labelled the American attitude towards Algeria as "opposition to colonialism on Sunday".²³⁶

The New York Times now informed its readers of the Algerians' anger at, and condemnation of, the United States colossal support for France's military efforts in Algeria. It quoted Ferhat Abbas as saying that America's absolute backing of the French campaign against the Algerians would not only be "a cause of new difficulties" for France, but would also generate a "strong current of hostility" in the area towards the United States itself.²³⁷ The Algerian nationalist leaders were particularly offended by the fact that not only did the United States provide France with the most sophisticated military hardware, including the B.26 bomber, it also did its best to prevent other countries from giving arms to the Algerian forces.²³⁸

It was in this context that the F.L.N. reiterated its determination to provide the Algerian fighters with the arms they needed against the strong French military machine: "We will arm ourselves by every means available. This should not be mistaken for blackmail. Whether the United States helps France or not, we will

accept aid from any source as long as the war goes on".²³⁹ Earlier, it had made it clear that the Algerian people was in real need of true friends regardless of their ideological orientation.²⁴⁰ This was in direct response to the claims, made by the French and largely echoed in the West, that Algeria, and North Africa in general, were under the constant threat of communist infiltration. Noting that the United States' sole worry, with regard to Algeria, was to see Soviet weapons reaching the nationalist forces, the official organ of the F.L.N. wondered: "Is it with hunting rifles... that America would like the National Liberation Army to defend itself against the B.26 which it generously offers to those who have been encharged with its extermination?"²⁴¹ As *The New York Times* observed, the United States Government was now having a difficult task to maintain its full support for France, especially when more and more countries throughout the world were turning towards actively supporting Algeria's right to independence.²⁴²

The "Algerian Question" Again Before the U.N. General Assembly

The Algerians, especially after the creation of the G.P.R.A., maintained an intensive diplomatic campaign at the United Nations, aimed at convincing the international community of the necessity to impose a settlement to the Algerian problem through a referendum under U.N. supervision. During the 13th session of the General Assembly (September-December 1958), a resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian group called for "recognition of the right of the Algerian people to independence". It urged "negotiations between the two parties concerned", but was short of the two-thirds majority required for adoption by the Assembly. Once again France boycotted the discussions, still claiming that the Algerian conflict was a domestic

French issue and beyond U.N. jurisdiction. And once again its allies, the United States in particular, came to its rescue by voting against the proposed resolution.²⁴³ Even when this was converted into a weak resolution vaguely recognizing "the right of the Algerian people to decide for themselves their own destiny", carefully avoiding the use of the word "independence", the United States failed to offer its support and abstained. The resolution again fell short of the two-thirds majority needed, albeit this time by only one vote, 35 to 18.²⁴⁴ The United States' abstention was a significant development in favour of the Algerians that was deeply resented by the French Government. Yet, no change in the actual American policy towards Algeria could be appreciated by the Algerians unless, in the words of the G.P.R.A. Foreign Affairs Minister, "... no more American weapons and dollars are put at France's disposal to pursue its war of reconquest in Algeria".²⁴⁵ The flow of sophisticated American weapons to France would, in fact, continue unabated. The G.P.R.A. deplored the United States' position - abstention at the U.N. on the one hand and military backing of France on the other - as grossly hypocritical.²⁴⁶

During the 14th session of the General Assembly (September-December 1959), the Afro-Asian group proposed a resolution similar to the one they had proposed a year earlier. After "... noting with satisfaction that the two parties involved have accepted the right to self-determination as basis for the solution to the Algerian problem", the resolution urged the Assembly to recognize Algeria's right to self-determination, and called upon France to enter into negotiations with the G.P.R.A. to end the conflict.²⁴⁷ In its absence, France was again loyally defended by its allies who voted against the proposed resolution, despite the fact that this merely

reflected a demand which France had already technically conceded: Algeria's right to self-determination.²⁴⁸ In this context, the Algerian delegates to the U.N. Assembly denounced what they described as "manoeuvres and pressures by the Atlantic pact" and its opposition to any resolution on the Algerian question regardless of its content:

"These pressures and these manoeuvres only confirm to us the rightfulness of our position that no cease-fire in Algeria is possible without agreement between the two parties on the conditions and guarantees of the application of self-determination".²⁴⁹

The United States ambassador at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, argued that his country did not vote in favour of the resolution because it was not likely to hasten the achievement of a settlement, as it failed to take into account the most significant development on the Algerian question since it had been put before the General Assembly: "the forward-looking proposals of General de Gaulle". Yet, he asserted that the resolution embodied two principles which were "of fundamental importance in our history and tradition": the principle of self-determination and the principle of seeking solutions to serious problems through peaceful means.²⁵⁰ Earlier, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had declared that the United States hoped that no action would be taken by the General Assembly which might "prejudice the realization of a just and peaceful solution for Algeria such as is promised by General de Gaulle's far-reaching declaration with its provisions for self-determination by the Algerian people".²⁵¹ The American Government, mainly out of respect for French sensitivity, was still clinging to the view that the conflict would have to be discussed and solved outside the United Nations.

The Eisenhower Administration's policy towards Algeria again came under vehement attacks in Congress, notably from Senator John F.

Kennedy. He, a Presidential candidate for the 1960 elections, dismissed the argument that Algeria was an internal French problem and not a problem for international concern or a "proper subject for American foreign policy debates", as unrealistic. Emphasizing the far-reaching international ramifications of the Algerian problem, he warned that it might jeopardize, beyond repair, American and Western interests in North Africa: "It had endangered the continuation of some of our most strategic bases and threatened our geographical advantage over the communist orbit. It has affected our standing in the eyes of the free world, our leadership in the fight to keep the world free, our prestige and our security as well as our moral leadership in the fight against Soviet imperialism in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It has furnished powerful ammunitions to anti-Western propaganda throughout Asia and the Middle East, and will be the most troublesome item facing the October Conference in Accra of the free nations of Africa who hope... to seek common paths by which that great continent can remain aligned with the West".²⁵²

Like the American Government, *The New York Times* did not change its course, still did not want to believe that the conflict could be settled inside the United Nations, and again plunged to the aid of France. Once self-determination had been granted, it argued, the need for action by the United Nations - if there ever had been such a need - diminished. Commenting on the memorandum issued by the Afro-Asian group at the General Assembly, in which it stated that there had been no indication of improvement in the Algerian situation since the Assembly's 13th session in 1958, *The New York Times* asserted that that seemed to be true before September 16. But, "[o]n that date, there was an improvement in the Algerian situation when President de Gaulle issued his famous offer to the Algerians of three choices...

[integration, autonomy or independence]".²⁵³

The G.P.R.A. strongly criticized the argument that after de Gaulle's September 16 declaration a U.N. resolution on Algeria would not be helpful in promoting a speedy settlement to the conflict; it particularly focussed its criticism on the United States Government. Hence, M'hamed Yazid declared that the American ambassador to the U.N., Henry Cabot Lodge, seemed as if he were "acting as France's attorney" during its absence from the Assembly debate.²⁵⁴ The Algerians argued that the recent offer was aimed at international consumption, and was perfectly timed to coincide with the General Assembly debate to enable France once again to divert world attention from the Algerian situation. They welcomed self-determination but insisted that the "freedom of choice", essential to its implementation, had yet to be guaranteed by the French authorities. This argument was strongly endorsed by *The Economist*: "Self determination is splendid, but freedom of choice requires to be guaranteed; if the French refuse to discuss such guarantees, the United Nations should request them to do so or provide its own services".²⁵⁵

In its next issue, however, the London weekly hailed the mood now reigning at the United Nations as "Sweet Reason on Algeria": despite the differences of opinion still existing between the Afro-Asian group on the Algerian side and the Western group on the French side, a "flood tide of sweet reasonableness" had characterised the 14th session of the General Assembly; the arguments that still divided the two groups were about the "tactics" and not about the "goal". Recalling the wider gaps of opinion that had previously divided the two groups, it concluded that times had indeed changed. With the

right of the Algerians to self-determination already conceded, the choice was now between two options: either a United Nations resolution, or initiatives outside the U.N. Unlike *The New York Times*, which seemed to put almost absolute faith in General de Gaulle and his recent plan, *The Economist* deliberately avoided referring to any particular name or initiative, emphasized the need for cooperation and direct talks between the two parties concerned, and paid tribute to "men of good will" on both sides, thanks to whom "a solution in *Algeria now seems much nearer*".²⁵⁶

Despite its caution *The New York Times*, rounding up its discussion of the General Assembly's Algeria debate with a "News of the Week in Review" comment, implicitly reproached France for its intransigent attitude towards the idea of a U.N. solution to the conflict. France still claimed that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over what it considered a purely domestic French issue. Despite the welcome moderation of the recent draft resolution, which intentionally avoided using the word "independence", or referring to the G.P.R.A. by name so as to make it more accommodating to France, the French Government uncompromisingly dismissed it as "unacceptable". Highlighting the dire need for an early settlement to the conflict, its serious international repercussions and especially its heavy bearing on both sides, the comment closed on the note that the toll of the Algerian war averaged ninety-five lives and cost France at least \$3,000,000 a day over the five year period.²⁵⁷

Notes

1. *Lignes Morice* on the Algerian-Moroccan border and *Lignes Challe* on the Algerian-Tunisian border were both completed in 1959. See M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.459.
2. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.208.
3. *El Moudjahid*, the official organ of the F.L.N., put the figure of the nationalist troops in 1958 at 130,000 men: see *El Moudjahid*, No.31, 1 November 1958.
4. M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.448.
5. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.105.
6. *Ibid.*, p.110.
7. See below, pp.114-124.
8. M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.430.
9. See, for example, Maurice Cahlle, *Notre Révolte*, Paris: 1968, pp.52-53 and 146-148.
10. *The New York Times*, 8 March 1958.
11. "Les Camps de Regroupment", *El Moudjahid*, No.41, 10 May 1959.
12. *The New York Times*, 20 July 1958.
13. *The (London) Times*, 4 March 1958.
14. *The (London) Times*, 17 September 1958.
15. *The Economist*, 24 January 1958.
16. *The New York Times*, 16 July 1958.
17. *The New York Times*, 18 July 1958.
18. *The New York Times*, 16 July 1958.
19. *The New York Times*, 12 July 1958.
20. *The New York Times*, 8 March 1958.
21. *Time*, 17 February 1958.
22. *Time*, 13 October 1958.
23. *Time*, 5 October 1958.
24. *The Economist*, 22 February 1958.
25. *The Economist*, 1 March 1958.
26. *The Economist*, 6 September 1958.

27. *Ibid.*
28. *The Economist*, 22 February 1958.
29. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.217-218.
30. Harmut Elsenhans, *Echec d'une stratégie neo-coloniale: Économie politique spécificités, constances et étapes de la réaction Française a l'égard de la Révolution Algérienne*, in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.165.
31. Charles Robert Agéron, "L'évolution de l'opinion publique Française face a la Guerre d'Algérie", in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.161-169.
32. Editorial: "ALGERIAN DILEMMA", *The New York Times*, 21 February 1958. Between 500,000 and 800,000 French troops, many of them transferred from France's contingent in Germany, were already stationed in Algeria: see William R. Frye, "Algeria and the United Nations", *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, No.8 (1 January 1961), p.6.
33. *The New York Times*, 20 April 1958.
34. Editorial: "THE FRENCH CRISIS", *The New York Times*, 17 April 1958.
35. Editorial: "Algeria is the Key", *The New York Times*, 27 June 1958.
36. Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, p.221.
37. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.110.
38. C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test: De Gaulle and Algeria*, New York: Harcourt Brace & World Inc., 1962.
39. Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, p.222.
40. On the Mollet crisis, see *supra*, pp. 68-71.
41. *The New York Times*, 19 January 1958.
42. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 23 February 1958; *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
43. Editorial: "TUNISIAN MARKET DAY", *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
44. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
45. Editorial: "TUNISIAN INQUEST", *The (London) Times*, 18 February 1958.
46. *Time*, 24 February 1958.
47. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.

48. Editorial: "NEXT MOVE IN TUNISIA", *The New York Times*, 13 April 1958.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
51. *The New York Times*, 13 April 1958.
52. Editorial: "DANGER IN TUNISIA", 14 April 1958.
53. *Time*, 24 February 1958.
54. *Time*, 17 February 1958.
55. Editorial, "THE TUNISIAN INCIDENT", *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
56. *Le Monde*, 9 February 1958.
57. *The New York Times*, 15 March 1958.
58. Editorial: "NEXT MOVE IN TUNISIA", *The New York Times*, 13 April 1958.
59. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
60. *The (London) Times*, 6 March 1958.
61. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
62. *Time*, 17 February 1958.
63. *Time*, 24 March 1958.
64. Editorial: "TUNISIAN MARKET DAY", *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
65. *The New York Times*, 12 February 1958.
66. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, pp.249-250; also J. Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, pp.218-219.
69. *L'Action*, 24 February 1958.
70. F.L.N. spokesman quoted in *The New York Times*, 26 February 1958.
71. "L'Algérie et les bons offices Anglo-Américains", *El Moudjahid*, No.21, 1 April 1958; "Des bons offices a la Crise Française", *El Moudjahid*, No.22, 16 April 1958.
72. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
73. William Hard, "About the Record of France", *The New York Times*, 23 February 1958.

74. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1958.
75. *The (London) Times*, 19 February 1958.
76. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 7 and 8 February 1958.
77. *L'Action*, 23 February 1958.
78. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.110.
79. E. Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127; also J. Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.120.
80. *El Moudjahid* quoted in M. Clark, *Algeria in Turmoil*, *op.cit.* p.369.
81. E. Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127.
82. Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, p.271.
83. Philip M. Williams, "Death of the Fourth Republic: Murder or Suicide?", *Wars, Plots and Scandals in Postwar France*, Cambridge, 1970, pp.134-136; also Jean Ferniot, *De Gaulle et le 13 Mai*, 1965, pp.130-147.
84. On Soustelle's integrationist plans, see *supra*, pp.66-68; see also Jacques Soustelle, *Aimee et Souffrante Algerie*, *op.cit.*
85. E. Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.134.
86. On the build-up to the 13 May *coup* and its aftermath, see Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, pp.265-442; see also, Pascal Arrighi, *La Corse: Atout Décisif* (1958); Raymond Dronne, *La Révolution d'Alger* (1958); Alain de Serigny, *La Révolution de 13 Mai* (1958); Dominique Pado, *Le 13 Mai; Histoire Secrete d'une Révolution* (1958); Paul Gerin, *L'Algérie du 13 Mai* (1958); Merry and Serge Bromberger, *Les 13 Complots de 13 Mai* (1958); Albert-Paul Lentin, *L'Algerie des Colonels* (1958); Jacques Massu, *Le Torrent et la Digue* (1972); Raoul Salan, *Algérie Française*; Roger Tringuier, *Le Coup de 13 Mai* (1962); Jean-Raymond Tournoux, *Secrets d'Etat* (1960).
87. Editorial: "THE FRENCH REVOLT", *The New York Times*, 15 May 1958.
88. Editorial: "THE FRENCH REVOLT", *The New York Times*, 15 May 1958.
89. *The (London) Times*, 11 June 1958.
90. *The Economist*, 30 August 1958.
91. *Le Monde*, 15 May 1958.
92. *Petit-Matin* quoted in André Debatty, *Le 13 Mai et La Presse*, Paris: Armond Colin, 1960, pp.127-128.
93. *The New York Times*, 17 May 1958.
94. Editorial: "THE VERGE OF CIVIL WAR", *The New York Times*, 30 May 1958.

95. Editorial: "THE RELUCTANT REVOLUTION", *The New York Times*, 28 May 1958.,
96. Editorial: "SIX MONTHS TO GO", *The New York Times*, 3 June 1958.
97. *The (London) Times*, 22 May 1958.
98. Editorial: "GAULLIST FRANCE", *The (London) Times*, 30 September 1958.
99. *The New York Times*, 28 May 1958.
100. Editorial: "De Gaulle to Algeria", *The New York Times*, 4 June 1958.
101. *The (London) Times*, 11 June 1958.
102. *The (London) Times*, 14 July 1958.
103. *The Economist*, 17 May 1958.
104. *Time*, 16 June 1958.
105. *The New York Times*, 2 June 1958.
106. Editorial: "DE GAULLE IN POWER", *The New York Times*, 2 June 1958.
107. Quoted in J. Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, pp.132-133.
108. Editorial, "DE GAULLE'S ANSWER", *The (London) Times*, 16 May 1958.
109. Editorial: "WIDENING CRACKS", *The (London) Times*, 27 May 1958.
110. *Il Tempo*, quoted in André Debatty, *Le 13 Mai et la Presse*, *op.cit.*, p.118.
111. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.112.
112. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages: Avec le Renouveau (1954-1962)*, Paris: Plon, 1970, pp.15-17.
113. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.112.
114. C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test: de Gaulle and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.118.
115. *The New York Times*, 8 June 1958.
116. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 5 June 1958.
117. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 3 July 1958.
118. *The New York Times*, 30 August 1958.
119. *Ibid.*
120. Leading article: "The Gaullist Tide", *The Economist*, 4 October 1958.

121. Editorial: "THE GENERALS TOUR", *The (London) Times*, 19 August 1958.
122. Ferhat Abbas quoted in *Le Monde*, 15 October 1958.
123. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.197.
124. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.258.
125. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.195.
126. L. Hahn, *North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood*, *op.cit.*, p.236.
127. Quoted in Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.195.
128. "L'Opération referendum", *El Moudjahid*, No.29, 17 September 1958; for the official results of the Referendum of 28 September 1958 as given by the French Government, see *L'Année Politique, 1958*, *op.cit.*, pp.591-593.
129. Editorial: "Algerian Terrorism in France", *The New York Times*, 27 August 1958.
130. *The New York Times*, 29 August 1958.
131. Editorial: "SABOTAGE", *The (London) Times*, 27 August 1958.
132. The creation of the G.P.R.A. was decided on 9 September 1958 after a meeting of the "Committee of Coordination and Execution" in Cairo but was announced officially on 19 September 1958. For more information on this decision and the list of ministers and responsibilities see Document No.48, "Decision du Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution Relative a la Formation d'un Gouvernement - 9 Sept. 1958", in *Les Archives de la Revolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.225.
133. Document No.45, "Considerations Générales sur la Création d'un Gouvernement Algérien", annexed to the report of the Commission (Document No.44) September 1958, cited in *Les Archives*, *op.cit.*, p.214.
134. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.114; Hocine Ait Ahmed, *La Guerre et l'Après-Guerre*, Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1964, pp.27-28; Mohamed Badjaoui, *La Revolution Algérienne et le Droit*, *op.cit.*, p.20.
135. Quoted in *El Moudjahid*, No.30, 10 October 1958.
136. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.115.
137. *El Moudjahid*, No.30, 10 October 1958; also S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.117.
138. *The New York Times*, 20 September 1958.
139. Editorial: "The Algerian Election", *The New York Times*, 11 November 1958.

140. *The (London) Times*, 27 November 1959.
141. See Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages*, *op.cit.*, pp.48-51; see also *L'Année Politique*, 1958, *op.cit.*, pp.561-562.
142. *El Moudjahid*, No.49, 29 September 1959.
143. M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.418-420; Maurice Cahille, *Notre Révolte*, Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1968.
144. *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.231.
145. M. Tegua, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.426.
146. Mouton Claude, *La Contre-révolution*, Chire-en-Montreuil: Diffusion de la Presse Française, 1972.
147. "L'Aviation Française dans la Guerre d'Algérie", *El Moudjahid*, No.20, 15 March 1958.
148. *El Moudjahid*, No.41, 10 May 1959.
149. "Quatre Officiers Parlent" in *Témoignage Chrétien*, 16 December 1959; also *Le Monde*, 21 December 1959.
150. For more information on the conditions in those camps, see *El Moudjahid*, No.40, 24 April 1959 - Tome 2, p.245; see also "Les Camps de Regroupements", *El Moudjahid*, No.41, 10 May 1959.
151. Quoted in J.M. Darboise, M. Heynaud, J. Martel, *Officiers en Algérie*, Paris: Maspéro, 1960, p.34.
152. See *El Moudjahid*, No.33, 8 December 1958.
153. Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, *op.cit.*, p.364.
154. *Ibid.*, pp.364-365.
155. Droz and Lever, *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.216.
156. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, pp.122-123.
157. For text of this declaration, see *L'Année Politique 1959*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960, pp.629-631; see also *Le Monde*, 18 September 1959.
158. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages*, *op.cit.*, pp.117-122.
159. Editorial: "De Gaulle on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 18 September 1959.
160. Editorial: "More Thoughts on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 19 September 1959.
161. *The New York Times*, 26 October 1959.
162. *The Economist*, 19 September 1959.
163. *Time*, 28 September 1959.

164. E. Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.159.
165. See, for example, de Gaulle's message to the French army in Algeria on 28 October 1958: Text in *L'Année Politique, 1959*, *op.cit.*, p.631.
166. See F.L.N.'s declaration in *El Moudjahid*, No.51, 29 September 1959; see also Ferhat Abbas, *Autopsie d'une Guerre*, *op.cit.*, p.228.
167. For text of G.P.R.A.'s communiqué, see *El Moudjahid*, No.56, 27 November 1959.
168. *The New York Times*, 18 September 1959 .
169. *The New York Times*, 28 September 1959.
170. *Ibid.*
171. *The New York Times*, 22 November 1959.
172. Editorial: "The Algerian Reply", *The New York Times*, 23 November 1959.
173. *Ibid.*
174. Editorial: "More Thoughts on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 19 September 1959.
175. Editorial: "Forward Step on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 14 October 1959.
176. *The (London) Times*, 17 September 1959.
177. Editorial: "FIRST MOVES", *The (London) Times*, 23 November 1959.
178. *The Economist*, 3 October 1959.
179. *The Economist*, 24 October 1959.
180. *Ibid.*
181. *Time*, 26 October 1959.
182. Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, p.541.
183. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.206.
184. J. Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.135; Antoine Argoud, *La Décadence, L'Imposture et La Tragédie, de Gaulle et Moi*, 1974.
185. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.197.
186. André Figuéras, *L'Algérie Française*, *op.cit.*, p.47.
187. Edgard S. Furniss, Jr., *France, Troubled Ally: de Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960, p.434.

188. J. Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.121.
189. On this, see F. Carviglioli and J.M. Pontant, *La Grande Cible*, Paris: Mercure de France, 1972.
190. *L'Express*, 12 February 1959.
191. *The New York Times*, 22 October 1959.
192. *The New York Times*, 21 November 1959.
193. Editorial: "De Gaulle's Opponents", *The (London) Times*, 21 October 1959.
194. *Time*, 26 October 1959.
195. Editorial: "De Gaulle's Opponents", *op.cit.*
196. Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.171.
197. A. Belkherroubi, "Les Aspects internationaux", in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.44.
198. M. Bedjaoui, *La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.140.
199. Document No.50 in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.314.
200. Document No.91, "Proce-Verbaux de la Conférence Tripartite Nord-Africaine de Tunis [17-20 June 1958]", cited in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.414-426.
201. See *supra* pp.114-124.
202. *The New York Times*, 18 April 1958.
203. *The Economist*, 1 March 1958.
204. *El Moudjahid*, No.15, 1 January 1958.
205. Text of the resolution cited in *El Moudjahid*, No.34, 24 December 1958.
206. Editorial: "THE VOICE OF AFRICA", *The New York Times*, 23 April 1958.
207. Abdelkader Chanderli, "To Represent Algeria", *The New York Times*, 28 April 1958.
208. *Le Monde*, 11 August 1959.
209. *Le Monde*, 11 August 1959.
210. Document No.112, "Entretien Sino-Algérien à l'occasion du Séjour de la Délégation du G.P.R.A. En Chine Populaire (from 27 September to 10 October 1959)" in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.521-524.
211. Ferhat Ferhat, "American Policy Towards Algeria Between 1940 and 1962", Unpublished thesis, University of Keele, 1986, p.426.

212. "La Chine S'implante en Afrique du Nord", *Revue de Presse*, Vol.1959, No.18 (24 August 1959), p.5.
213. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.446.
214. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 6 May 1959.
215. "La Politique des Blocs et la Guerre d'Algérie", *El Moudjahid*, No.20, 15 March 1958.
216. "La Politique des Blocs et la Guerre d'Algérie", *El Moudjahid*, No.18, 15 February 1958.
217. "Les Responsabilités de L'Occident", *El Moudjahid*, No.18, 15 February 1958.
218. "Les Dollars et les Marks au Secours du Colonialisme Française en Algérie", *El Moudjahid*, No.16, 15 January 1958.
219. A.P. Lentin, "G.P.R.A.: Offensive Diplomatique", in *Historia Magazine*, No.283, 29 January 1973, pp.1973-1979.
220. For a discussion of Senator Kennedy's Algeria speech in 1957, see *supra* pp.87-88.
221. *Congressional Record*, Vol.CV, Part 4, 86 Cong., 1 Session, March 17, 1959-April 10, 1959, p.4993.
222. *Congressional Record*, Vol.CV, Part 4, 86 Cong., 1 Session, *op.cit.*, p.5241.
223. *Congressional Record*, Vol.CV, Part 12, 86 Cong., 1 Session, p.15026.
224. *Ibid.*
225. Yvès Courrière, *L'heure des Colonels*, *op.cit.*, p.495.
226. *The New York Times*, 14 December 1959.
227. Dorothy Norman, "Future Status of Algeria", *The New York Times*, 30 May 1958.
228. On Douglas Dillon's views, see *supra* p.86.
229. "Les U.S.A. Devant le Probleme Algérien", *El Moudjahid*, No.18, 15 February 1958.
230. *Ibid.*
231. Quoted in *El Moudjahid*, No.23, 29 May 1958.
232. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XXXVIII, No.988 (2 June 1958), pp.919-920.
233. Ferhat Ferhat, *American Policy Towards Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.414.
234. Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XL, No.1027 (2 March 1959), p.296.

235. "Les U.S.A. Devant le Probleme Algérien", *El Moudjahid*, No.18, 15 Februar 1958.
236. Quoted in *ibid*.
237. Ferhat Abbas, the G.P.R.A. Premier, quoted in *The New York Times*, 23 June 1958.
238. Abedlhafid Boussouf, the G.P.R.A.'s Minister of Communication, quoted in *The New York Times*, 21 May 1959.
239. Abdelhamid Mehri, the G.P.R.A.'s Minister of North African Affairs, quoted in *The New York Times*, 21 May 1959.
240. *El Moudjahid*, No.19, 28 February 1958.
241. "Les U.S.A. Devant le Probleme Algérien", *El Moudjahid*, No.18, 15 February 1958.
242. *The New York Times*, 18 September 1959.
243. Mameri Khalfa, *Les Nations Unis Face à "la Question Algérienne"*, *op.cit.*, pp.115-131.
244. For this U.N. vote and the countries voting for, against or abstaining, see *United Nations Yearbook, 1958*, New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1959, pp.79-82.
245. Lamine Deb baghine, interviewed on Tunis Radio in December 1958, quoted in *El Moudjahid*, No.34, 24 December 1958.
246. F. Ferhat, *American Policy Towards Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.427.
247. M. Khalfa, *Les Nations Unis Face à "la Question Algérienne"*, *op.cit.*, pp.115-131.
248. For more information on this vote and the countries voting for, against or abstaining, see *United Nation's Yearbook, 1959*, New York: United Nations: Office of Public Information, 1960, pp.51-56.
249. Quoted in *El Moudjahid*, No.57, 15 December 1959.
250. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLII, No.1073 (18 January 1960), p.100.
251. *Ibid*.
252. John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, ed. Allan Nevins, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961, p.95.
253. Editorial: "The Question of Algeria", *The New York Times*, 2 December 1959.
254. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 5 December 1959.
255. *The Economist*, 28 November 1959.
256. *The Economist*, 5 December 1959.

257. "Algeria in U.N.", *The New York Times*, 7 December 1959.

CHAPTER V

OVERTURES FOR A SETTLEMENT AND COLON INTRANSIGENCE -
THE BARRICADES, THE PUTSCH AND O.A.S. TERRORISM

"The present events in Algeria are ample demonstration - if there is further need for this - that the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic had every reason to call for these guarantees [when asking for pourparlers]. The French people can recognize the Algerian people's right to self-determination. But that does not settle the problem since the application of this right remains subordinate to the good will of the army of occupation and the 'ultras'". (G.P.R.A. Statement, January 1960).

"We want to halt the decadence of the West and the march of Communism. That is our duty, the real duty of the [French] army. That is why we must win the war in Algeria. Indo-China taught us to see the truth". (Colonel Antoine Argoud, November 1960).

"As soon as the state and the nation have chosen their path, military duty is marked out once and for all. Beyond its rules, there can be, there are only lost soldiers". (General de Gaulle, November 1961).

Alternately shifting from diplomatic flexibility to more military determination to continue the "struggle for complete independence", the Algerian Provisional Government declared on 19 January 1960 its complete commitment to making every effort to reach a peaceful settlement with France.¹ A year after its inauguration, the G.P.R.A. was attracting more attention from the international media and the different international institutions, diplomatic and other. *The New York Times*, for example, became increasingly interested in its structure and in the organization of its leadership, and also more aware of its pivotal role in the Algerian equation. The paper seemed particularly interested in, and to a large extent pleased with, the reshuffle in the G.P.R.A. which, it said, "enhanced rather than

reduced the possibility of peace talks". Yet, continuing to rely on French official sources and without independent substantiation it wrote favourably of the ministerial changes only because the reshuffle allegedly barred what it hastily labelled the "men of Cairo" and the "men of Peiping" from controlling the G.P.R.A.²

Meanwhile, as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber wrote in *L'Express*, conspirators were busy during this period preparing for a decisive attempt to take over authority in both Algeria and France: "... the factions of Algiers were organizing, preparing, with the complicity of local powers, their arsenals, and the army was progressively enthralled by the certitude of its political mission".³ Army-*colon* anger reached a boiling point. General Massu, the Algiers army commander, spelled out their grievances during an interview with Klaus Kempfski of Munich's *Suddeutscher Zeitung*, in which he vehemently attacked General de Gaulle's Algeria policy especially his recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination. As a result of such criticism, Massu was recalled to Paris and later removed from his duties and immediately replaced by General Crépin after what he called "*un entretien historique*" with General de Gaulle.⁴

The New York Times, along with much of the press, was aware of the by now familiar phenomenon of army-*piéd noir* extremism and the danger it posed not only to General de Gaulle but to the future of the Fifth Republic as a whole. The extremists now threatening de Gaulle were, ironically enough, the very ones who had been responsible for his advent to power after the 13 May 1958 *coup*. On the eve of what later became known as "barricades week", the paper ran a thorough editorial criticism of *colon* fanaticism, warning against a large-scale military conspiracy that could throw France into civil war.⁵ It

praised de Gaulle, quite excessively, for what it called his "statesmanlike ideas", "courage" and "extraordinary patience and tenacity"; but wondered whether the Algerian conflict - "the primary problem of France internally and externally" - had grown irretrievably beyond the capacity of even a General de Gaulle, with the extremist *colons* aggravating the situation.⁶

The (London) Times, arguing along a similar line, pointed to the alarming frustration of those "wild men" who believed that French Algeria could still be maintained, through total revolt against metropolitan authority.⁷ *The Economist* solemnly agreed and warned against the potential metamorphosis of the *colon*-army alignment against de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. The die-hard *colons* and the army officers complained that de Gaulle's offer of self-determination to Algeria had gone "too far" as a concession to the F.L.N.⁸ Remarking that the harsh criticisms of de Gaulle's Algeria policy recently voiced by Massu to the West German newspaper were widely shared by many "less exalted officers", *The Economist* reasoned that the possibility of successful Franco-Algerian negotiations would remain remote, as long as commanders-in-chief like General Challe were adamant that "whatever happens, the army will never leave Algeria".⁹ Meanwhile, the extremist *pieds noirs* and their sympathisers in the army were clearly waiting for a pretext to challenge de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic as they had successfully challenged the Fourth in 1958.¹⁰

The recall of General Massu to Paris provided them with such pretext: hundreds of rioters took to the streets and later barricaded themselves inside a perimeter of barricades in the centre of Algiers.¹¹ The real reason behind their action was undoubtedly de

Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination. Aware of the army's traditional complacency, the *colons* hoped that the paratroopers' refusal of a Paris order to clear the barricades would grow into an open revolt by the army against the Fifth Republic. This, it was hoped, would be substituted with a military regime in both Algeria and France, as the best guarantee of maintaining *L'Algérie Française*.¹²

The *piéd noir* and rightist press ran wild, attacking de Gaulle's decision to relieve Massu of his command and urging the *colons* to "take action". For example, under the prominent banner headline "General Massu is Relieved of his Duties", *L'Écho D'Alger* printed Alain de Serigny's highly provocative article which had originally appeared in *France-Soir* in its issue of 24-25 January, advocating insurrection against de Gaulle and the metropolis. The article warned the *piéd noirs* that their silence over the removal of Massu - the "symbol and companion of the liberation" and the "most representative of resistance to national disintegration" - would be regarded as "cowardice".¹³

The New York Times, in a long report by Thomas Brady which it ran under the headline:

EUROPEAN MOBS IN ALGIERS RISE
AGAINST DE GAULLE; 19 DIE IN RIOT;
ARMY DECLARES A STATE OF SIEGE

provided a detailed account of the *colon* insurrection, emphasising its multifarious implications. Yet, the significance of the report lay in the fact that it went beyond routine day-to-day reporting to provide background to the recent crisis. Chronicling the history and evolution of the 1,200,000 Algerian *piéd noirs*, Brady pointed out that most of them were descendants of the earlier settlers who had

come to Algeria in 1830. The Franco-Prussian war of 1871 forced many of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to emigrate to Algeria. Later, under-privileged immigrants of Spanish, Greek, Maltese and Italian origins also went to settle in Algeria. He touched on the evident economic disparity between the Algerian majority and the *colon* minority, which stemmed largely from the settlers' acquisition of the best land in the country from its legal owners by dubious ways and means.¹⁴ But, he failed to explore the deeper socio-economic factors that had provoked the crisis.

With increasing criticism of the *pied noir* dissidents and sharpened editorial attack on their fanaticism, *The New York Times* highlighted the gravity of the Algerian situation and warned against the danger of further disintegration: once again Algeria had turned into a testing ground for France and especially for General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. Yet, asserting that the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle was different from the Fourth Republic in which "leadership [had] disintegrated", it allowed itself to venture that "however disgruntled some army leaders may be, the army in Algiers remains loyal to Paris", and offered to forecast that the army would certainly not side with the *colon* extremists.¹⁵ With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the paper's remarks and prophecies were too overoptimistic. *The (London) Times*, following a similar line of argument, ridiculed the "logic" of the barricades seeing no outcome from their desperate tactics but further alienation from the *colons*: "disillusionment with the PRESIDENT is one thing; using the army to turn him out of office is another".¹⁶

The New York Times, whilst making de Gaulle's victory over the extremist *pieds noirs* dependent on the degree of support he could get

from the army, intoned that de Gaulle's "... firm stand will [eventually] carry the day". Reminding its readers of the already heavy cost of the war and the dangers it represented for the future of France, it intimated that it was advisable for both the Algerians and the French "... to come to terms, on which they are really not too far apart". A peaceful solution was possible despite the difficulties which still needed to be overcome: "Given good will on both sides it should not be beyond wise statesmanship to bridge these remaining differences".¹⁷

Columnist C.L. Sulzberger, casting about for the fundamental reasons behind France's malaise and the multiple schizophrenia that were tearing it apart, observed that the crisis was the result of the "tug between liberalism and reaction" and between "nineteenth-century dream and twentieth-century reality". Whilst the Fourth Republic was brought down "with a whisper" the Fifth - if it were to collapse as a result of mob rule from Algiers - would "go with a bang", the consequence of which would be nothing but chaos. In this, the columnist reflected de Gaulle's own warning that if he failed to curtail mob violence in Algiers, which was condoned and encouraged by the army, "the unity, prestige and fate of France would be compromised". Sulzberger, in fact, went farther to argue that in the event of such failure, the unity, prestige and fate not only of France but of the whole Western world, would be dealt a serious jolt.¹⁸

Against this background, de Gaulle asked the French Assembly to grant him power to rule by decree.¹⁹ The Assembly approved his request at a time when a poll showed that 75 percent of metropolitan French wanted the government to take a tougher line against the barricaders and their sympathizers in the army.²⁰

The New York Times criticism of the G.P.R.A. continued to inspire strong responses from the Algerian representative in New York, Abdelkader Chanderli. To its assertion that de Gaulle's offer of self-determination for all Algerians had not been sanctioned by the G.P.R.A., he replied - in a letter which the paper carried in its issue of 28 January 1960 - by observing that what the Algerians wanted were guarantees of free and fair application of self-determination which the French Government had so far failed to provide. On the contrary, only on 29 January de Gaulle reiterated the view that the army would be given complete control of the proposed referendum.²¹ The letter aptly pointed out that the paper's own recent reference to what it had called the "dangerous force" of the extremist army officers and the die-hard *pieds noirs* was in itself "a clear demonstration of the necessity of such guarantees for a free consultation".²²

Chanderli, in a similar letter to *The New York Herald Tribune*, criticized the American press for overplaying the alleged "terroristic nature" of the war the Algerians were conducting, whilst turning a blank eye on the more dangerous excesses being committed by the French army against civilians, including torture, indiscriminate shelling of villages and the regroupment of families in camps under constant military control.²³ A recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross had in fact revealed the alarming, often indescribable conditions to which people were subject in those camps. The camps had been set up in an attempt by the army to cut off the F.L.N. from the local population. Algerian leaders often complained that the Western media had failed to address itself to the plight of the two million people being confined to those camps. However, commenting on the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the C.B.S.

Correspondent in Paris drove home the lesson:

"Paris is suffering from a case of suppressed shame, shame about the revelations of tortures and inhuman conditions in Algerian internment camps, revealed two days ago in a report by the International Red Cross. This report and the shame it provoked have generally been suppressed, however, partly by Government pressure, partly by a curious self-censorship of the French press, which rarely prints unpleasant truths about Algeria".²⁴

In this context the G.P.R.A. reassured the French people that it wanted guarantees against the extremist *pieds noirs* and army officers, whose intransigence was to blame for the continuation of the war, and not against the average Frenchman: "The French people can recognize the Algerian people's right to self-determination. But that does not settle the problem since the application of this right remains subordinate to the good will of the army of occupation and the 'ultras'".²⁵ In April 1960 the G.P.R.A. decided to adhere to the Geneva Convention on war and called upon France to live up to them in its military campaign in Algeria. Involving more than half a million French troops and 130,000 A.L.N. fighters, the war had already claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, 100,000 Algerians were still in prison and interrogation centres, 300,000 refugees in Tunisia and Morocco and two million detainees in internment camps. The G.P.R.A. urged the international community to bring pressure to bear on France to abide by articles 3 and 4 of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners.

As Joan and Richard Brace have remarked, France violated in most flagrant ways some sections of article 3 which advised against: "a) Violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out

of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples". Article 4 was concerned with the way civilians were to be treated, but "[t]he practice of reprisals committed with the purpose of bombing-out villages en masse has become only common-place in the latter years of the [Algerian] war".²⁶ The Algerians of course invariably seized upon these violations and army excesses as strong evidence to justify their demands for guarantees before committing themselves to a cease-fire.

The conduct of the French army in Algeria and its alignment with the die-hard *colons* contributed greatly to France's malaise and the current crisis was no exception. As *The (London) Times* observed, the army, despite its claim of non-intervention, was in practice totally behind the barricaders. Although there was not yet a "crisis of the regime" in the same way this term had been used to describe the last days of the Fourth Republic, as there was no breakdown in the governmental machinery or collapse of the administrative apparatus, it was feared that otherwise the crisis was hardly less acute. Offering its appraisal of de Gaulle's showdown with the extremist *pieds noirs* and army officers, who had themselves been responsible for his return to power two years earlier, and the high stakes involved for France, the paper concluded that "[o]ne of them will have to prevail".²⁷

The New York Times, also continuing to stress the theme of crisis, held that what France was facing was a crisis of the whole Western world, arguing that there was no alternative to de Gaulle and his Algeria policies: either him and his plan, or there would be a calamity in France.²⁸ The news media often tend to personify the news in order to make it more interesting to the reader who generally wants

to know about fellow human beings.²⁹ News involving human beings attracts more readers especially when it is concerned with prominent world personalities; "'big names' make big news".³⁰ Concordant with this is also the idea of "elitism" which suggests that an "elite person" - the top leader of a nation or a well-known international organization - makes news and attracts more attention by the media to attract more readers.³¹ *The New York Times* made the news about the French crisis almost exclusively centred around the character of General de Gaulle. De Gaulle became, in its eyes, the central figure of the crisis; his future almost equal in significance to the future of France as a whole, and his personal difficulties equal in gravity to the crisis of the country at large. Day after day it hammered at *colon* disobedience. Day after day it expressed support for General de Gaulle: although he might have underestimated their threats and by the same token overestimated his personal authority, his recognition of Algeria's right to self-determination was "the wisest and bravest act of policy yet put forward".³²

The Economist drew attention to the fact that the crisis had not come as a surprise to those with fair knowledge about the Algerian situation, since the army-*colon* conspiracy and dissidence had always been manifestly visible. Its article "France Feels the Dead Hand", stated the lesson: General de Gaulle was primarily to blame for the crisis because of his failure to grab the opportunity offered to him immediately after his advent to power in 1958, to curtail the excessive powers of the army officers and to contain the wilder pretensions of the die-hard *pieds noirs*. The result of his failure was that the decline of the public power had come with "sickening rapidity". The article concluded by warning that if de Gaulle could not now exert his authority over the extremists, France would fall

victim to the "dead hand of military rule at home" and would certainly "be sucked down in the perpetuation of an impossible course in Algeria".³³

Following a similar line of argument, *The New York Times* intimated that failure to contain the *colon* dissidents and their active supporters in the army would almost certainly result in a civil war and would undermine France's international image and damage its position within N.A.T.O.: the weakening of France at home would increase doubts about the "wisdom of relying too heavily on the Paris Government as a key member of the alliance"; this would strengthen the Soviet position in the forthcoming East-West summit and with the emerging nations of the Third World. As for Algeria, France's failure to assert its authority over the army and *colon* extremists would drive the F.L.N. to "adopt a stiffer attitude towards negotiations with Paris".³⁴

The New York Times did not cease to scorn the army-*colon* alignment, pointing its editorial finger to the continuing grumblings within the French army, which it referred to as a hopeless sense of failure. To many French officers, the war in Algeria represented "the last in a series of humiliating campaigns that began with defeat in World War II and saw the French Army forced to abandon its position in the Middle East, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia". These ideas were given force in *Time* magazine which, underlining the gravity of the situation, went farther to deduce that the current army-*colon* outbreak - which had been "successfully provoked" by the Algerian leaders - was in the advantage of the Provisional Government: after the recent reshuffle in the G.P.R.A., which seemed to smooth the path towards Algerian-French pourparlers, the Algerians needed to know whether the

French army was loyal enough to Paris to impose on the extremist *pieds noirs* the free elections promised by de Gaulle.³⁵

Defeat of the Barricaders

After one week of anti-de Gaulle protest *colon* enthusiasm began to dwindle; their showdown with Paris finally collapsed with the surrender of the barricaders.³⁶ *The New York Times* reaction was predictable; it made a hero of General de Gaulle hailing his defeat of the barricaders as a victory not only for France but for the Western world as a whole: "Now that President de Gaulle and the forces of democracy and enlightenment in France have won the battle, we, too, can rejoice".³⁷ *The (London) Times*, also rejoicing at de Gaulle's victory, editorialized that the extremist *colons* and army officers now realized that "integration", as they understood it, could only be implemented at the cost of rebellion, a price France was not prepared to pay. It pointedly added, however, that danger still lay ahead especially as the army loyalty to Paris could still not be trusted.³⁸ This argument was carried further by C.L. Sulzberger in his "Foreign Affairs" column, remarking that the failure of the recent outbreaks did not by any means mean the end of the danger posed by the traditional army-*colon* alignment: all basic factors that had combined to produce the recent crisis still existed. If they could not be remedied there was bound to be more trouble. Further trouble could be averted only through an effective purge against "equivocators" and "Fascist-minded plotters" both in the army and in de Gaulle's own administration.³⁹ Sulzberger's comment was sustained by later events, for the plotters remained unchecked and, through de Gaulle's indecision, again had the opportunity to bring France to the brink of anarchy and chaos.

In this context, Ferhat Abbas addressed the *colon* community, asking for a joint effort to build a common country and to forget the nineteenth-century illusion of false privileges. He insisted that Algeria was the patrimony of all, and called for an "Algeria for the Algerians, for all the Algerians whatever be their origin". Stating that the independence of Algeria, like that of all the other ex-French colonies, was inevitable as it was written in the march of history, Abbas cautioned the *colons* that they could participate in the construction of a new country only by adhering honestly and sincerely to the principle of self-determination, for there is "... no army which can assure your future in the colonial framework". "Only the construction of an Algerian state can permit us to live together and guarantee the future of our children". He again reaffirmed the G.P.R.A.'s readiness to enter into talks with the French Government on the basis of the de Gaulle offer of self-determination, but insisted on sufficient guarantees for the free conduct of voting.⁴⁰

The New York Times reaction to the recent G.P.R.A. declaration was predictable. Claiming that it found it hard to "avoid a sense of disappointment", it put the blame on the Algerian leaders for what it saw as once again a missed opportunity for peace as had been the case immediately after de Gaulle's offer on 16 September the previous year. Taking vigorously the side of the French Government, an editorial asserted that "President de Gaulle needs help from the rebel leaders, but cannot accept terms made by them".⁴¹ *The Economist*, which was never openly hostile to the G.P.R.A. on the other hand, viewed the Algerian demands for guarantees with much more impartiality, portraying them as understandable and justifiable. It pointed out that the "G.P.R.A.'s present guarantees are its army and its organization", that it would be tactless to abandon them simply

because of General de Gaulle's rhetorical promises and "reputation for honesty", and that, in any case, many nationalist leaders questioned that reputation. The nationalists emphasized the General's plan to hold cantonal elections in Algeria without the participation of the G.P.R.A. as a fair justification of their mistrust and reservations. Unlike *The New York Times* which reproached the Algerians for not doing enough to hasten the process of peace talks, *The Economist* urged the French Government to make positive moves towards negotiations with the G.P.R.A., advising de Gaulle that time now seemed ripe and safe to make such moves in the wake of the collapse of the recent *pied noir* insurrection: "If he waits two or three months, the unlikely alliance of settlers and army could be renewed on fresh barricades".⁴²

Hopes of a quick settlement after the defeat of the barricaders were soon dashed during de Gaulle's visit to Algeria in March 1960. To appease the army and *colon* extremists, he openly retreated from the self-determination offer which he had promised a few months earlier. "There will be no Dienbienphu in Algeria...", he declared. "The Algerian problem will not be solved for a long time... Everything hinges on final victory of the French army".⁴³ This anticlimactic rhetoric provoked angry replies from the G.P.R.A. which accused de Gaulle of closing the door on negotiations and a peaceful settlement: "It is clear that the French Government is afraid of a popular verdict [in an Algerian referendum]. This is why the Government has voided self-determination of its substance and is seeking to revive the illusion of a military solution, [and] perpetuate colonialism..."⁴⁴ In this context, the Algerian leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the armed struggle for "Colonialism leaves us no other way out". Carrying this argument further, Ferhat Abbas stated that destroying colonialism in Algeria did not only mean emancipating a people, but

also enfranchising Africa and insuring the world's peace.⁴⁵

Time magazine, offering its appraisal of the pessimistic mood now reigning in Algeria as a result of de Gaulle's "somber message", reasonably remarked that this might have cheered some *colon* and army extremists but it pleased hardly anyone else. It vigorously attacked de Gaulle's recent statements, and woefully observed that the peace prospects that had opened following the barricades week now completely vanished.⁴⁶ *The New York Times* pressed the same theme two weeks later, stating that a settlement to the conflict seemed far away as the positions of both sides were now farther apart than ever. Unlike *Time*, however, it again blamed the Algerian leaders for not taking de Gaulle's offer of self-determination which it generously painted as a "fair one" despite the strings attached to it.⁴⁷ The paper clearly believed in a settlement along the lines drawn by General de Gaulle: an "independent" Algeria closely associated with France and N.A.T.O. The American Government shared the same views. Remarking that the recent difficulties had not enhanced the prospects of peace, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Francis O. Wilcox, asserted that the United States favoured direct negotiations between the two sides.⁴⁸ American support for France, however, continued unabated.

Searching farther afield for the international ramifications of the Algerian-French conflict, *The New York Times* lost no opportunity to underline its international scope especially its effects on the Western alliance.⁴⁹ Arguing along a similar line, *The Economist* predicted that more internationalization of the conflict was imminent as the chances of a negotiated settlement now seemed to have vanished, for the Algerian military leaders "must think in terms of military

aid" and the politicians "must look for international backing". It believed that the Algerians would have no problem gaining such backing. Whereas the Soviets might hesitate to offer open support, while they were still wooing France for other reasons, the Chinese "would not have such scruples".⁵⁰

Meanwhile, France continued to enjoy the unequivocal support of N.A.T.O. This continued to anger the Algerians who resented such backing for colonialism. In May 1960 Ferhat Abbas, in a telegram addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the N.A.T.O. countries meeting in Turkey, vehemently attacked the Organization for sustaining "French imperialism" in Algeria, urging each member state to dissociate itself from colonialism.⁵¹ The Algerians particularly singled out the United States' colossal military support for France without which, they believed, the French military campaign would have come to an immediate halt. The Algerian leaders were always anxious to trace and publicize the flow of American equipment and personnel to the French army in Algeria. A G.P.R.A. statement in May, for example, outlined the recent American military delivery of military assistance to France:

"American factories have just delivered a new shipment of helicopters to the French expeditionary force.

In addition, the United States has completed an initial delivery of bombers of the skyraider type to replace the B-26. And T-28A assault planes have been delivered and have gone into action.

American technicians in Algeria are responsible for ground maintenance and repair of these planes".⁵²

The statement concluded by stating that the United States total support for France's policies in Algeria would not allude the memory of the Algerian people. Two weeks earlier the G.P.R.A.'s representative at the United Nations had appealed to President Eisenhower to stop supplying France with the most advanced military hardware that would be used against Algerian civilians.⁵³

This and similar appeals did not fall on receptive ears as the United States' main preoccupation continued to be what it saw as the threat posed by international communism to Algeria and Africa. Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, urged the American Administration to back the efforts of the African peoples to achieve independence, before they turned to the Soviet Union for help, arguing that the continuation of the Algerian conflict, in particular, would facilitate the Soviet efforts to gain influence in the area.⁵⁴ But the American Government was not prepared to modify its pro-French stance, and continued to favour a purely French solution to the conflict.

The Algerian leaders, however, always insisted on a policy independent of both the East and the West.⁵⁵ They adopted a middle-of-the-road attitude in order to convince France's allies of their neutralist intentions so as to dissuade the West from continuing support for French colonial policies. Until the beginning of 1960, the G.P.R.A. had limited its relations with the Communist world to social and cultural cooperation, mainly to avert engulfing Algeria into Cold War rivalry. But when it became convinced that the West would not change its stance towards Algeria's demands for independence, the G.P.R.A. signed a significant agreement with China whereby the Chinese Government pledged technical, financial and military assistance. The Soviet Union, North Korea and North Vietnam later pledged similar assistance.⁵⁶ In this context, commenting on assertions in Western circles that the Algerian revolution had been penetrated by international communism as a result of the recent G.P.R.A. rapprochement with the East, Ferhat Abbas stated that the Algerians would not choose to be killed by Western arms rather than defend themselves with Eastern ones. He reiterated the view so

frequently expressed by the G.P.R.A. that the Algerian people would offer a hand of friendship to all peoples who supported the Algerian cause.⁵⁷

Western support for France was seen by the Algerians as a decisive factor that was prolonging the war and, therefore, prolonging the suffering of civilians. Such suffering, as already explained, took different shapes. According to *The Economist* people were, for example, forced into regroupment camps - 110 of them. They were cut off from their neighbours by double fences which were electrified, "lit by searchlight, targeted by artillery, with a 'prohibited area' between them thickly patrolled by armoured cars and tanks". People were under constant control and needed permits even to go to work. This is in addition to the physical suffering inflicted upon them by the police and paratroopers. As *The Economist* pointed out, hardly a family had not had one or more killed in the fighting or in the counter-actions arrested, imprisoned, deported and even tortured; lawyers had long lists of relatives who had disappeared and never been heard of again.⁵⁸ All this might have been of interest to *The New York Times* readers had they been told about it, which they were not. But, despite its use of such repressive methods, the French army failed to isolate the local population from the F.L.N.

De Gaulle's Talk of an "Algerian Algeria"

On 14 June, after the failure of other means, General de Gaulle made a significant overture towards peace talks with the G.P.R.A. and spoke for the first time of an "Algerian Algeria", as opposed to the previously dominant dogma of "French Algeria".⁵⁹ The G.P.R.A., in a communique which *The New York Times* printed verbatim, welcomed his

reaffirmation "in an explicit manner the right of the Algerian people to self-determination", reiterating its conviction that if the organization of the proposed referendum were "surrounded by all the indispensable guarantees of sincerity" the choice of the Algerian people would certainly be independence.⁶⁰

The reaction of the press to these new developments was mixed. *The (London) Times* at first got carried away by the glamorous picture General de Gaulle had drawn of Algeria and filled its reportage with heavy doses of French claims. It went even farther stating editorially that by any standards it was hard to see how he could have gone further.⁶¹ It soon, however, became aware of the complications that lay ahead, not least army-*colon* opposition to any possible progress towards a settlement. The paper praised both sides for showing "great political courage". The Algerians' decision to forthrightly accept the offer of direct talks could not have been an easy one to make: they were now after six years "used to the struggle", their confidence to achieve victory was running high and international solidarity with their cause had transcended all geographical boundaries. It went as far as painting these new developments as the beginning of a new chapter that would transform the international situation.⁶²

The Economist's reaction was more cautious, for false hopes had previously been aroused by similar offers and the French people, who were anxious to see an end to the war that was draining their resources, had by now become familiar with their "political version of the Finnish sauna" - they were submitted alternately to the warm rays of hope and the chilly impact of gloom. It particularly warned against potential outbreaks by extremist army officers and die-hard

pieds noirs, and reproached General de Gaulle for allowing them to recover and reform their ranks after the failure of their *coup* a few months earlier. Because of this, the French Government's position in negotiating a settlement with the Algerian leaders seemed less comfortable than in early February after the collapse of the *colon* insurrection, when the army-*colon* conspirators were in almost total disarray and despair.⁶³

The New York Times warmly welcomed the G.P.R.A.'s prompt response to the new proposals and its expressed readiness to send representatives to Paris to open up talks with the French Government. This attracted extensive coverage under prominent front-page headlines, and editorial relief was expressed that at long last direct talks were in the offing. Under the title "Hope for Algeria", it believed that "[a] ray of sunshine has broken through the dark clouds that hang over Algeria". Like *The Economist*, however, it cautioned that no easy solution could be expected because no formula of solution would be able to satisfy all sides especially the extremist *colons* and army officers. A solution was badly needed not only by Algeria and France but by the world at large, for "Algeria is one of those points where East and West, Africa and Europe, nationalism and colonialism clash head on".⁶⁴

The same theme was reiterated - also with a note of increased concern - in a long analytical piece in *The Economist* two days later. It reasoned that as the Algerian negotiators were on their way to Paris the difficult part began, and vigorously urged General de Gaulle to avert any complications that might hinder the process of talks; for if such talks broke down he would be the primary loser and his extremist opponents, Soustelle and Bidault, the only gainers.⁶⁵ This

view had been strongly articulated by Ferhat Abbas who had warned that if the "colonialists of Paris and ultras of Algiers" were not disarmed, they would not hesitate to try to sabotage the negotiations and perpetuate the war. He had also urged the Algerians to be "more than ever vigilant", arguing that under these circumstances the fact of beginning the negotiations did not yet mean peace.⁶⁶

In a "News Analysis" piece by Robert C. Doty from Paris, *The New York Times* highlighted the significance of the current Franco-Algerian talks and the "high stakes" involved, not only for France but for the Western world as a whole.⁶⁷ An Algerian settlement would help the Western powers to consolidate their position in Africa and Asia at a time when Cold War rivalry was at its peak. Such position had been badly shaken because of the considerable support France was getting from its allies regarding its Algeria policies. "I cannot think of any other factor that would do more to improve the whole Western position in Asia and Africa", declared a Western statesman, "than a peaceful settlement of the Algerian trouble". An Algerian settlement would especially help to strengthen the Western defences by allowing the cream of French combat strength now based in Algeria to consolidate N.A.T.O.'s European shield.⁶⁸

For France, Doty pointedly added, a settlement would allow the \$3,000,000,000 that was being spent every year to keep up with the military requirements in Algeria, to be diverted to some badly needed economic and social projects in France, and would help "heal current ills of French political life". A failure to reach a settlement would lead to a serious aggravation of those problems and in the event of a breakdown of the current talks, the Algerian leaders might be forced to move closer to the Communist world especially China. This would

heighten competition between the East and West to draw the emerging Afro-Asian countries to their side; consequently tempting France's allies to try to dissociate themselves from its policies on Algeria in order to "score points with the uncommitted nations". Making the suggestive remark that neither side would want to be seen to be responsible for the failure of negotiations once started, Doty forecast that both the French Government and the Algerian leaders would "go to great lengths of concession and conciliation in the peace talks". In retrospect, however, it is reasonable to argue that this was no more than wishful thinking, for the talks soon ended in deadlock.⁶⁹

Such deadlock was a direct result of the inflexibility of the attitude of the French delegation to the Melun preliminary talks, and its rejection of all the Algerian demands for guarantees of the freedom of the official G.P.R.A. delegation to speak and move without restrictions whilst negotiating in Paris.⁷⁰ The Algerian delegates wanted assurances that Ferhat Abbas and his delegation would be free to have access to the international media, contact the detained Algerian leaders and meet General de Gaulle. The French Government, however, was far from prepared to offer such guarantees, but sought to keep the G.P.R.A. negotiators virtually incommunicado.⁷¹

The G.P.R.A. reacted to the breakdown of the Melun talks by denouncing the French attempts to unilaterally set the conditions of the negotiations. The Algerian delegates to the official talks would be "deprived of every liberty and status of negotiators" if not treated as "political prisoners": this French attitude reflected the state of mind that in effect constituted a refusal to negotiate. Carrying this argument further, the G.P.R.A. insisted that a meeting

between the two delegations could be "fruitful" only when the conditions and details of such meeting were not imposed but were the result of an accord worked out by the two parties. It reaffirmed its readiness to send another delegation to Paris, if the elementary principle of bilateral accord on the conditions of talks were taken into consideration by the French Government.⁷²

The New York Times correspondent in Tunis, Thomas Brady, drew some comfort from the "conciliatory" tone of the G.P.R.A.'s communiqué, but averted criticism of the French Government's undiplomatic attitude.⁷³ Yet, its editorial "First Hurdle in Algeria" accepted the Algerian argument that the G.P.R.A. chief negotiator "was treated as a virtual prisoner" by the French who also wanted to "hold the definitive negotiations with Premier Ferhat Abbas under the same conditions". It concluded by cautioning that too much was at stake for France, as well as Algeria, to permit the talks to collapse before they hardly begun.⁷⁴ The United States Government, however, preferred complete silence on Algeria during and after the Melun talks. This angered some Congressmen like Senator Mansfield who criticized the State Department for not lending enough support to France which, he claimed, was doing all it could in a very difficult situation.⁷⁸

The Economist, unlike *The New York Times*, was explicit in its criticism of the way the French Government had approached the Melun talks. It was intellectual enough to reason that the French ultimatum to the Algerian negotiators would have made sense if the Algerian revolution had been in a desperate military position and had no other choice but to accept the terms the French had imposed. However, as the weekly rightly observed, all signs pointed to the contrary and to the fact that the Algerians "were not compelled; any more than were

the French, to accept any conditions whatever". The G.P.R.A. was praised for its "prompt and skillful" reply, especially for its readiness to send another delegation to Paris for talks under normal bilateral conditions. *The Economist* concluded by stating that if the French were not able to impose a solution by force of arms, they would not of course be able to have terms of negotiations of their own choosing, for "[w]hat is true of war is true of diplomacy".⁷⁶

Meanwhile, support for an independent Algeria was gaining momentum in France where more and more voices were being raised in protest against the continuation of the war and for an immediate resumption of talks with the G.P.R.A.⁷⁷ French public opinion, anxious to see a quick end to the war, rallied behind the slogan "peace in Algeria"; desertions from the French army multiplied while many young Frenchmen pursued their studies only to obtain a deferment.⁷⁸ Trade unions, students and youth organizations made 28 July a day of action for peace in Algeria. France was undergoing a "crisis of conscience" especially among the intellectual community, whose opposition to the war was growing into active support for the Algerian revolution as epitomized by the Jeanson trial.

Francis Jeanson, author of *L'Algérie Hors La Loi* (1955), was one of the most effective champions of the Algerian revolution in France. In 1957 he had set up an organized network of underground support for the F.L.N. in France, involving as many as three thousand volunteers.⁷⁹ Some of them were arrested on 24 February 1960 and went on trial on 5 September. On the day of their trial as many as 121 prominent intellectuals, writers and artists signed a declaration in support of the Jeanson group and in support of the right of Frenchmen to resist drafting in the Algerian war: "We respect and consider

justified", the declaration said, "the refusal to take arms against the Algerian people":

"We respect and deem justified the conduct of Frenchmen who consider it their duty to give aid and protection to the Algerians who are oppressed in the name of the French people. The cause of the Algerian people, which is contributing in a decisive way to the ruining⁸⁰ of the colonial system, is the cause of all free men".

In response, the French Government ordered the arrest of those thought to have been behind the declaration. The French press, fearing similar reprisals, generally ignored the declaration. When *Verité-Liberté*, *L'Express* and *France-Observateur* decided to publish it, they were immediately seized by the authorities. The premises of other publications like *Les Temps Modernes* and *Esprit* were repeatedly searched by the police. This, in fact, turned into a serious threat both to the liberty of the press and to the freedom of speech in France, giving some justification to the view that freedom of the press in the West "is only an illusion".⁸¹ Academics were dismissed from their teaching posts, actors banned from public radio, television and theatre, and civil servants suspended from their duties, as a result of a large-scale Government clamp down on the supporters of the declaration.⁸²

As *The (London) Times* observed, France was caught between two wars: a physical war that was being fought in Algeria and a psychological one that was being fought in France itself and both were crucial to its future.⁸³ Branding the Government's measures as "Draconian" and a "startling riposte", the paper argued that this could only dismay those friends of France who looked upon it as a nation among the leaders of the West. When this type of attrition against the intellectual community had been waged in some Communist countries, it was widely condemned in the West: "It must be condemned

with even more vehemence when it happens in what is supposed to be the free world".⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, on the other hand, preferred silence on this issue.

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle continued speechifying throughout France beating the drums of "grandeur", "strength" and "determination", promising that "peace is at our door".⁸⁵ He again ridiculed the United Nations claiming that there were no lessons France could learn from others. Whilst it was possible for him, as *The Economist* pointed out, to blame the breakdown of the Melun talks on a possible misunderstanding and therefore invite the Algerians for new talks, he misguidedly assumed all responsibility for the conduct of his envoys and, hence, for the collapse of the talks. To the Algerians, this was further confirmation of the French Government's intransigence.⁸⁶

The G.P.R.A. again accused the French authorities of putting an abrupt end to hopes that a peaceful settlement could be negotiated and approved by both sides. It reiterated its commitment to the principle of self-determination on the basis of a referendum to be supervised by the United Nations, guaranteeing the geographical and national unity of Algeria without the Sahara being amputated from the rest of the country.⁸⁷ The G.P.R.A. vehemently attacked the French Government's intention to grant the army full control of the supposed referendum and "to subordinate the free choice of a people to the 'good will' of an army of occupation".⁸⁸ Self-determination presupposes a free referendum declared Ferhat Abbas, and "this freedom would be illusory if the French Army controlled and organized the plebiscite by terrorizing the people".⁸⁹ The Algerian leaders had never been in a stronger position, for it was now clear that the war would be brought

to an end only with the consent of the G.P.R.A.; and despite the all-out Challe offensive, the A.L.N. maintained its military momentum and kept the French army under constant pressure.⁹⁰

Faced with a strong Algerian determination to achieve independence, a growing crisis at home, condemnation of French policies abroad and wider international support for the Algerian cause, General de Gaulle spoke for the first time of an "Algerian republic". De Gaulle offered the Algerians three options: Frenchification, autonomy in association with France or complete independence. *The New York Times*, now putting the full weight of its editorial commentary behind the offer of self-determination, intimated that "it manifestly makes no sense for Algeria, far better developed... [than any of the 15 newly independent African states] to be denied self-determination".⁹¹ Highlighting the mounting opposition to Algeria's right to self-determination amongst extremist *pieds noirs* and army officers, it made the suggestive proposition that with his recent pronouncements de Gaulle had "crossed the Rubicon" and turning back would be too dangerous.⁹² Meanwhile, the G.P.R.A. wanted to know whether the results of the proposed referendum would apply to Algeria as an entity or would each of the two communities, Algerian and *colon*, choose its own solution, thus leading to partition; and how proper supervision of the plebiscite would be guaranteed to avoid ballot rigging and interference by the army in the voting process.

Meanwhile the "appalling figures" of casualties and losses inflicted by the war on the Algerian population were emphasized by the Afro-Asian delegates to the United Nations General Assembly. In this context, *The New York Times* informed its readers that what the Algerians and their natural supporters were hoping for from the

Assembly's current debate on Algeria, was to secure a U.N. presence that would guarantee a free conduct of the plebiscite and prevent the French army from applying the coercive methods which had justified the traditional euphemism *élection à L'Algérienne*. Arguing that the General Assembly would not be able to bring in force to bear on France to change its policies *The New York Times*, still unable to conceal its inclination towards the French point of view, reiterated its support for the idea of a settlement outside the United Nations. It went even farther to call for the termination of the current General Assembly debate on Algeria in order to enable de Gaulle to carry out his "courageous proposal": any attempt by the United Nations would "undermine the French President's mission on which rests the hope for peace".⁹³

With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is reasonable to argue that the paper's claim was too shortsighted and its hailing of what it called General de Gaulle's "courageous proposal" was too naive and generous. The proposal, perfectly timed to coincide with the General Assembly's debate on the Algerian question, was partially aimed at yet again distracting the critical attention of the external world, at luring the Assembly into believing that a settlement was just around the corner and, therefore, buying France more time. Such "courageous proposal", as explained later, did nothing at least in the short run to bring about any change in the Algerian situation which would deteriorate to a more alarming scale.

Against this background General de Gaulle made another visit to Algeria in December 1960, amidst growing opposition to his policies among the extremist *colons* and army officers. *The New York Times* lost no opportunity to warn that both his own political fortunes and the

future of France were at stake, blaming this on what it called the "extremists on both sides".⁹⁴ To the Algerian nationalists this was an inexcusable insult: the paper quite unreasonably put the Algerians and the die-hard *colons* on the same footing and ignored the striking differences between the two sides in every aspect. Whilst, for example, the Algerians believed they were fighting for the "liberation" of their country from foreign occupation, the extremist *pieds noirs*, who most of them had been Petainists during the Second World War,⁹⁵ were conducting a campaign of violence aimed at preventing progress, and at preserving an anachronistic colonial system. During the de Gaulle visit, the extremist *colons*, supported by some army officers, held strikes and led demonstrations across Algiers in protest against the offer of self-determination and in support of *L'Algérie Française*. These led to sudden counter-demonstrations by the Algerian population with the shouts of "Vive L'Algérie independante", "Vive Le F.L.N." and "Abbas au pouvoir", which came to overshadow the *colon* protest.⁹⁶ The resort of the French army and police to indiscriminate reprisals against civilians typified France's hysteria and epitomized the boiling situation in Algeria.

The New York Times had to react to this turning point in the struggle. Perhaps confirming Galtung and Ruge's theory that the more negative the news the bigger the headlines and the more prominent the coverage,⁹⁷ the paper reported the December demonstrations and their aftermath at length under the front-page four-column headline:

61 DEAD IN ALGIERS RIOTS;
TROOPS FIRE ON MOSLEMS;
DE GAULLE REMAINS FIRM.

However, its usage of the term "riots" was rather inaccurate. Most evidence points to the fact that the nationalist demonstrations,

unlike those of the *colons*, were highly disciplined and intended to be peaceful. Describing with evident indignation how "censorship was clamped on press dispatches" from Algeria by the colonial authorities, the paper informed its readers that the instructions to the censors forbade any indication that the death toll might have been greater than the official figure, any reference to the display of the Algerian flag by the demonstrators, or any hint that the police and troops had opened fire on the crowd. The paper, whose reportage of the event was on the whole refreshing, concluded by revealing that any political commentary had been blocked by the censors to save France from worldwide embarrassment.⁹⁸

The events of December and their aftermath were carefully followed by the American State Department. Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 6 January 1961, Secretary Herter highlighted the serious nature of the Algerian situation and its international ramifications. "In Algeria, we have a continuing problem", he declared. "I say 'we' advisedly because it is a problem the impact of which has repercussions through the whole of Africa, through the whole of the Middle East into the Soviet bloc". In reference to the forthcoming referendum and recognizing the French army's unhealthy record of ballot rigging and voting frauds, he voiced his doubts whether the proposed plebiscite would be honest, free and fair.⁹⁸

The Economist went farther than *The New York Times* to emphasize the significance of the Algerian demonstrations which had been provoked by the *pieds noirs*: as the "great patient mass" of Algerians took to the streets waving their national flags and crying for an independent Algeria, the Algerian conflict entered a new phase.¹⁰⁰

Pursuing this theme in a leading article in the same issue entitled "Algeria's Cry", the London weekly intimated that the demonstrators, who had lost their lives under the brutality of the paratroopers, like the scores of thousands who had died in the field during the past six years of the conflict, had completely "destroyed the myth of *L'Algérie Française*. Without that myth, or some form of it, the French position in Algeria was untenable.

In the words of one French officer, those massive demonstrations represented "a psychological Dien-Bien-Phu" for France.¹⁰¹ For the G.P.R.A. this was a vote of confidence in its leadership and policies. The demonstrators' discipline and organization to a large extent epitomized the degree of maturity reached by the Algerian revolution. Medical committees were immediately set up on the spot to supervise and control the transfer of the wounded to improvised medical centres. Press committees were established by the demonstrators to respond to the questions of journalists who had come in large numbers from different parts of the world.¹⁰² The December events were, in short, of massive significance for Algeria and its political future. The myth of an Algeria led by the *colons* and an illusory third force was completely dashed and negotiations with the G.P.R.A. once again proved to be the only possible way out for France.¹⁰³ They represented a turning point in General de Gaulle's approach to Algeria for, while in Algiers, he had been able to measure the "impetuous power of the F.L.N." and the genuine desire of the Algerian population for independence. The nationalist demonstrations persuaded him of the necessity to talk more seriously and more profoundly with the G.P.R.A. as the only spokesman for the Algerians.¹⁰⁴

Time magazine, like *The New York Times*, gave considerable attention to the Algerian demonstrations but concentrated more on the brutality of the police and paratroopers who had reacted by "firing sub-machine guns from the hip". It reflected the French army's frustration and constant refusal to accept the reality that it was only a matter of time before Algeria regained independence, and quoted the colonel who had ordered the indiscriminate shootings: "My men have been fighting the rebels in the Aurès mountains. They are amazed to come against the very same rebel flag in the heart of Algiers". Impressed by the courage and determination of the demonstrators, it wondered how the police and army brutal response had not deterred the crowds and "still the green-and-white flags waved...". As a hope and a plan *L'Algérie Française* was dead, the magazine observed, and summed up the mood by quoting a typical cry from an Algerian woman shouting at a group of paratroopers: "Cowards! you were thrown out of Tunisia, you will be thrown out of Algeria. Here, all you can do is make war on women and children".¹⁰⁵

The Algiers demonstrations and their aftermath had immense echoes at the United Nations where the Algerian question was being discussed by the General Assembly for the sixth year running. Meanwhile, Ferhat Abbas sent messages to many world leaders - the U.N. General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, Nehru, Tito, Macmillan, Chou En Lai, Khrushchev as well as to the International Committee of the Red Cross - informing them of the high casualty toll among the Algerian demonstrators and asking for their intervention to stop the bloodshed: "We send you this appeal urging you to act so that this genocide against the Algerian people ceases immediately".¹⁰⁶

Addressing itself to the problem of colonialism, the General Assembly, after two weeks of heated debate in December 1960, adopted a significant resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian countries, which called for immediate steps to be taken towards a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The United States and many other Western powers failed to support the resolution, and so aroused the anger and indignation of the emerging nations. On 19 December the Assembly adopted a resolution by 63 votes to 8 with 27 abstentions, recognizing the responsibility of the United Nations to assist Algeria along the road to independence on the basis of territorial and national integrity.¹⁰⁷

The United States again abstained. The American delegates to the Assembly again argued that a settlement to the Algerian problem could best be achieved by direct negotiations between the two parties concerned outside the United Nations.¹⁰⁸ What made the United States abstain rather than vote against the resolution, as it had done previously, was that it realized that Algeria's independence was now only a matter of time and, thus, feared being identified with the colonial powers that voted against the resolution. The American Government believed that an outright opposition to the resolution would portray the Soviet Union, which voted for it, as the champion of Algeria's right to independence and thus, enhance the reputation of the communist world amongst the emerging nations in Africa and Asia. Yet, to the Algerians, the American abstention was not in any way more credible or more moderate than its outright support for France in previous U.N. sessions. The G.P.R.A. insisted that the United States again failed to back up the right of the Algerian people to independence, and also failed to live up to its traditional anti-colonialist rhetoric.

The Algerian cause was, however, championed by other delegates. For example, the Saudi delegate vehemently reproached the N.A.T.O. countries for their conspiracy with France in order to block any U.N. resolution on Algeria. The Soviet delegate attacked what he called the imperialists' exploitation of Algeria's natural riches, while ignoring the Algerians' inalienable rights of ownership of their natural resources, declaring that the Soviet Union saw the French talk of a referendum as a subterfuge to keep the United Nations from censoring France.¹⁰⁹ American support for France continued to spoil United States' relations with the newly independent African states. During the second All-African Conference, which had been held in Tunis in January 1960, American assistance of French colonial policies in Algeria had come under vehement attacks for having "serious prejudicial efforts on the African peoples". The Conference had declared that United States military, financial and diplomatic support for France was primarily to blame for the retarding of a settlement to the Algerian problem and urged the American Government to abandon its partisan attitude in order to safeguard Afro-American friendship and protect peace in Africa and in the world as a whole.¹¹⁰

The New York Times reaction to the United Nations handling of the Algerian question was predictable. Acting as the guardian of Western interests, it stoutly defended the stance taken by Western delegates on the General Assembly's resolution on the issue of colonialism. It blamed what it called the "sweeping form" on which the resolution had been drafted which might leave it open to serious misinterpretations and violations of the Charter. The paper was especially concerned with the future of the Western island possessions like Puerto Rico which would not be able to stand on their own feet. Using the traditional East-West rivalry to make a political argument, it

asserted that the West had been carrying out the principles adopted in the recent resolution long before the U.N. debate, by freeing many countries with a few hundred million people. It argued that it found it more urgent to apply those principles to what it called the "new colonial empires of Soviet Russia and Communist China, which have subjugated half of Europe and Asia".¹¹¹ By adopting this attitude, the paper was reducing everything to Cold War ideological confrontation. This perhaps confirmed the theory that an inherent "Western loyalty-bias" usually affects the coverage of non-Western news by the Western media, which will be addressed in much more detail later on in this thesis.

The New York Times lost no opportunity to reiterate its opposition to the United Nations discussion of the Algerian question. It tried hard to make an analogy between the Algerian situation and the Congo crisis and blamed the plight of that country on the "premature independence" it was given by Belgium, arguing that Algeria could suffer a similar fate.¹¹² In so doing it saw parallels where few existed. The Algerian problem and its circumstances were totally different from those of the Congo: what was happening in the Congo was the by-product of many intricate factors involving, amongst other things, the usual ideological rivalry between the East and the West, neo-colonialist expediency and internal struggle for political power. Whilst the paper persisted in expressing unequivocal confidence in General de Gaulle and his policies, the General continued to be vehemently criticized by many Frenchmen for not moving fast enough to end the Algerian-French conflict, because of his unwillingness to antagonize the extremist *pieds noirs* who still wanted a French Algeria. Among them was the former Premier Pierre Mendes-France, who argued that de Gaulle wanted to be the "man of everyone, of unanimity,

the man of those who are right and also of those who are wrong". This was what was retarding a solution to the conflict and preventing direct talks with the G.P.R.A., despite the fact that the sweeping majority of the French people wanted negotiations with the Algerian leadership and were convinced that France would never be able to control Algerian nationalism or prevent Algeria from eventually gaining independence.¹¹³ *The New York Times* pointed to the strength of such opinions whilst at the same time maintained its traditional pro-de Gaulle posture. It was the General's reluctance that enabled the extremist *colons* and their natural allies in the army to rebuild their strength and prepare for yet another showdown with Paris.

French Referendum on Algeria

The much publicized referendum on General de Gaulle's policies on Algeria finally took place in January 1961. In response to the question: "Do you approve the bill submitted to the French people by the President of the Republic both concerning the self-determination of the Algerian populations and the organization of public authority in Algeria before self determination?" 75.2 percent of the twenty million voters in France voted "yes" and 24.7 percent voted "no".¹¹⁴ In Algeria, however, 42 percent of the Algerian voters followed the G.P.R.A.'s instructions and boycotted the referendum, despite the French army's pressure.¹¹⁵ The Algerian leadership was opposed to the new French proposals because they failed to recognize the G.P.R.A. as the only spokesman for the Algerian people. The December demonstrations and the outcome of the referendum represented a significant victory for the F.L.N. and confirmed its popular appeal. The Algerian leaders advised the local population to boycott the provisional institutions and administrative apparatus that were to

come out of the referendum, warning against taking part in the new colonial scheme.¹¹⁶ In this context, *The Economist* accurately forecast that no Algerians would come forward to take part in a governing political body other than the G.P.R.A. Emphasizing the danger represented by the extremist *colons*, it vigorously warned that if peace were not negotiated within the next few months, chaos and violence would engulf the country.¹¹⁷ *The New York Times*, also stressing the theme of danger, had a few days earlier remarked that the chaos that might be brought about by the extremist *colons* would make the disorders Belgium was encountering in the Congo "seem like an amiable picnic".¹¹⁸

On 16 January the G.P.R.A. announced its readiness to begin negotiations with the French Government on conditions of a "free consultation of the Algerian people". This, unlike earlier votes, would have to be a free referendum to decide effectively the political future of Algeria.¹¹⁹ Under the title "Hope for Algeria", *The New York Times* warmly greeted the Algerian leaders' declaration, branding it as "the most conciliatory and reasonable pronouncement they ever made".¹²⁰ Ten days later, however, it again could not resist playing the French Government's own game by applying Cold War politics to Algeria, asserting that the ultimate success of the Franco-Algerian negotiations would largely depend on whether President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev could relax East-West tensions and, thus, discourage the Algerians from counting too much on Eastern aid.¹²¹ This view was later reiterated by *The (London) Times* which intoned that the Congo crisis had been an additional warning to both sides to prevent at all costs an extension of the Cold War to Algeria.¹²²

In his inaugural address on 20 January President Kennedy promised United States support for the aspirations of colonial peoples.¹²³ This was perhaps in direct reaction to Khrushchev's reiteration, two weeks earlier, of the Soviet Union's commitment to assist all "peoples fighting for liberation".¹²⁴ A few weeks later, Secretary of State Dean Rusk made a different reference to Algeria and expressed American sympathy for the Algerian people's demand for self-determination, promising to keep Algeria away from East-West rivalry.¹²⁵ Having by now realized that it was only a matter of time before Algeria became independent, *The New York Times* addressed itself to the question of how such independence would be arranged, and when. It emphasized the importance of direct Franco-Algerian talks and put its full editorial weight behind the forthcoming talks, arguing hopefully for their continuation without interruption.¹²⁶

The major points of difference between the G.P.R.A. and the French Government by mid-1961 were the future of the Sahara oil riches, the future position of the *colons* and the link between military arrangements for a ceasefire and the process of political talks.¹²⁷ Columnist C.L. Sulzberger, recognizing the difficulties which might arise particularly from France's demand for a lease at the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and joint control of the Saharan oil, pressed the suggestive view that the negotiations should be pursued to their ultimate point: "It is hard to imagine total failure". The risks would be too great for all sides - Algeria, France and the Western world.¹²⁸

The next Franco-Algerian talks were due to take place in Evian-sur-les-Bains in France. But to guarantee their freedom of movement and speech and access to the world media, the Algerian

delegation chose to reside in Switzerland close to the French border.¹²⁹ Yet, the French Government's intentions of negotiating with the M.N.A.¹³⁰ as an equal party with the G.P.R.A., provoked angry protests and led to the G.P.R.A.'s decision to withdraw from the talks before they had actually started.¹³¹ But it reiterated its willingness to open negotiations as soon as possible to achieve peace. The breakdown of the talks had not been unpredicted. Ferhat Abbas had warned that negotiations were not peace, and that the road was strewn with snares and obstacles: the "greed and stubbornness" of French imperialism could still make negotiations still-born.¹³² *The New York Times* was quick to express hope that the suspension of the Evian talks meant only a delay rather than a collapse of the process of direct negotiations.¹³³

This hope was however quickly dashed by General de Gaulle's tactless rhetoric, threatening that if the Algerians chose complete independence as a solution to the conflict he would cut off economic aid to Algeria, withdraw the *pied noir* community from Algeria and expel Algerians living in France. Commenting on "De Gaulle's Thunderbolt", *The New York Times* ventured so far towards criticizing de Gaulle as to declare that his recent statements had come "with the impact of an atomic bomb", reasoning that this attitude was dramatically opposed to the wishes of millions in both Algeria and France. It warned that this "impasse" could only benefit the extremist *colons* . Yet, despite this temporary criticism, the paper maintained its *entente cordiale* towards General de Gaulle and its support for his Algerian policies remained more or less uniform. It was quick to belittle the damaging impact of his recent statements on the prospects of peace, asserting that they should not be taken with too much literalism.¹³⁴ *The (London) Times* took a similar position,

arguing that there had to be more than enough in common between the aims of the G.P.R.A. and the French Government to make a start to negotiate possible even if that would mean more work by intermediaries "to oil the machinery".¹³⁵

The French Army in Mutiny

Still obsessed with the idea of a military victory over the F.L.N., the French generals in Algeria led a short-lived putsch against the French Government which collapsed on 25 April, four days after its announcement.¹³⁶ Once again army mutiny had brought France to the brink of anarchy. This mutiny, which was led by Generals Challe, Jouhaud, Zeller and Salan, gained the support of many frustrated career officers in Algeria and of the die-hard *pieds noirs*, who suddenly came to believe that a miracle might still take place and Algeria remain *Française*.¹³⁷

The New York Times reacted strongly, and vigorously took the side of General de Gaulle, describing the putsch as "an odious and stupid adventure" which came at a time when there was hope of an end to the Algerian crisis.¹³⁸ Its attacks grew bolder, stating that the mutiny was carried out by a tiny minority in Algeria at the very most one million *colons* and half a million troops, as opposed to the nine million people of Algeria and the forty-five million of France: "The leaders of this wretched mutiny must know that they cannot possibly succeed in Algeria without plunging their homeland into war and misery". Recalling that their goal was, as in 1958, the imposition of military rule in both Algeria and France, the paper drew comfort from the fact that the French people had abominated the mutiny. The strongest and most critical part of its far-reaching editorial was

reserved for the end, with the warning that the days of the first and second Napoleon, of Boulanger, even of Pétain, were over.¹³⁹ *The (London) Times*, arguing along a similar line, intimated that "the iron logic of events" was against the mutineers; it combined vehement attacks on the dissident generals and their *pied noir* supporters, with urgent calls for a settlement to the Algerian-French conflict.¹⁴⁰

On 22 April Ferhat Abbas appealed to the Algerian population to remain calm and united under the new circumstances, but at the same time "to organize in order to face up to provocations as you knew how during the historical days of last December and January".¹⁴¹ The population took his advice, stayed away from trouble during the period of the putsch, and did not interfere in the confrontation between French and French.¹⁴²

In another strongly-worded editorial, filled with hostility and scorn for the mutineers and headlined "The Treachery of Algiers", *The New York Times* pursued its attack on the leaders of the putsch, ridiculing their claim that their adventure was aimed at saving both Algeria and France from international communism. It warned that, if successful, their action would wreck Western unity, divide the French people and bring devastation to France: "Living in a far-outdated past, they have been inviting a civil war which they could never hope to win". The direct repercussions of the mutiny, were it successful, would threaten the survival of France as a free nation. Focusing on the international ramifications of the mutiny, it highlighted the potential effects those events might have on the position of France in the Western alliance: "This treason to the French Republic is treason to all of us".¹⁴³

In this context and amidst accusations that the United States Government and the C.I.A. had encouraged the putschist generals, President Kennedy reassured General de Gaulle of the United States' solidarity and support.¹⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary Bowles, without referring specifically to Algeria, reiterated the traditional American rhetoric of aid to the emerging nations of Africa and Asia to gain independence and also to protect their freedom against potential communist threats;¹⁴⁵ but the substance of the United States position remained military and technical aid to France.

Although there was strong evidence that the leaders of the putsch had actually planned an invasion of metropolitan France, they insisted that their only goal was "to save Algeria from the claws of rebellion and give back to France a pacified Algeria".¹⁴⁶ *The (London) Times*, ridiculing their claim as deliberate deceit, asked scornfully: "If the whole energies of France have, after seven years, been unable to crush the rebellion, is it conceivable that the French Army in Algeria - even if united, which it is not - would be able to do so quickly and on its own?"¹⁴⁷

Time magazine went farther to provide a historical account of the French army and its traditional obsession with victory: humiliated in World War II, defeated again at Dien-Bien-Phu, France's career soldiers were obsessed with proving that they could win a campaign in the field. It greeted the collapse of the mutiny with evident relief, and vigorously urged General de Gaulle to move as quickly as possible in his purge of the army dissidents, on the one hand, to convince the Algerian leaders that the French Government had enough authority to negotiate with them a settlement to the conflict and, on the other, to check the remnants of conspiracy within the army and amongst the

colons, so preventing them from recuperating their energy to prepare for another showdown.¹⁴⁸ *The Economist* also hailed de Gaulle's victory over the mutineers in the hope that this would open the way to direct talks with the G.P.R.A.: in this hour of triumph, the French President, armed with full powers granted him by Parliament, could act swiftly to reach a negotiated settlement in Algeria, while "the defeated champions of *L'Algérie Française* can offer no resistance".¹⁴⁹

Time magazine for 5 May, taking comfort in the fact that the mutineers had been defeated, branded the mutiny as the "last gasp of empire", arguing that the mutineers' cause and battle cry, *Algérie Française*, had been destroyed. The last obstacle before negotiations between the French Government and the G.P.R.A. was cleared. Such negotiations would indispensably end in Algeria's independence, and the mutiny only made things worse for the *colons*. The matter was one that France had been avoiding for years, and "it involved nothing less than the end of empire". The issue of *Time*, which struck hard at the mutineers, contained a strong warning that if the French in Algeria would encounter difficulties living in an independent Algeria, the four-day mutineers, and the *colons* who egged them on, would have their own important share of blame.

The Economist, arguing in a similar fashion, pinpointed the four "factors" or "factions" that were influencing events in Algeria. Remarking that three of these factions - the army, the administration, and the *pieds noirs* - were "helplessly and irreparably divided, indisciplined and vancorous", it saw that only the Algerians were in any way stable and their stability was born out of their trust in, and loyalty to, their political leaders. To its credit, *The Economist* never lost sight of the hardship of the Algerians and their economic

disparity with the *colon* community, which had traditionally been inflicted upon them by the colonial system. It hailed the Algerian population for remaining calm and for behaving "impeccably" under stress, but also cautioned that this might change if "provocation by French activists becomes unbearable": bearing in mind the numerous precedents in army-*colon* disobedience, it was clear that the forthcoming Evian negotiations would not be allowed to take their natural course, "without another explosion of some kind or another in Algiers".¹⁵⁰

The New York Times, on the other hand, was less cautious; it ventured to label the failure of the generals' mutiny as the kiss of death to all army dissidence and to *pied noir* activism. It asserted, though without much accuracy in hindsight, that the defeated generals and their *colon* allies would never be able to make more trouble, the road to peace was now cleared. Whilst it cleared General de Gaulle of any responsibility for the political *immobilisme* in the Algerian situation, it launched a new attack on the G.P.R.A., believing that France had done everything for peace and that there was no doubt that the Algerians were being offered self-determination in good faith and that all now depended on the "willingness and the ability of the rebel spokesmen to negotiate".¹⁵¹ And that was it. Not a word about the fact that the Algerian leaders had already accepted the principle of self-determination as the ideal basis for a settlement to the conflict, and that what they still insisted on were clarifications and guarantees that the proposed referendum would be free and fair. In retrospect, their insistence was justified.

The Evian Talks and Prospects for Peace

As the Franco-Algerian negotiations were about to reopen, France took a number of measures that were mainly designed to secure a favourable reaction internationally, particularly among public opinion. Hence, 6,000 Algerian political prisoners were freed, the five F.L.N. leaders imprisoned at L'Ile d'Aix were transferred to a more comfortable place at Chateau de Turquant and a month-long halt of offensive operations was unilaterally announced by the army.¹⁵² On 18 May a G.P.R.A. delegation led by Foreign Minister Krim Belkacem flew to Geneva. Two days later the delegation arrived at Evian for its first meeting with the French envoys.

In a "News of the Week in Review" comment, "Talks on Algeria", *The New York Times* greeted warmly and with evident relief the opening of direct negotiations after nearly seven years of warfare which "killed tens of thousands, forced the resettlement of hundreds of thousands and cost billions". Outlining the difficulties which still had to be overcome by the negotiators, namely the future status of the oil-rich Sahara and the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and the future economic links between France and Algeria, the writer held that the outlook for a settlement was moderately promising, largely because the alternatives to peace were grim.¹⁵³ Editorially, too, the paper recognized that the Algerians had already largely won what they had fought for, and virtually on their own terms, but lost no time in urging them to accept close links with France after independence, in the interest of arriving at peace with honour for both sides. The concern to protect French pride was, as explained elsewhere, one of the significant factors that, to a large extent, governed the attitude of both *The New York Times* and the American Government towards

Algeria; and this also reflected their concern to protect a perceived American interest best served by an Algeria closely tied to France and, thus, under N.A.T.O. influence. Echoing General de Gaulle's earlier threats, the editorial concluded with a highly partisan criticism of the G.P.R.A. and vigorously argued in favour of the French Government's proposals despite the fact that most Algerians found them both devious and dubious.¹⁵⁴

The major stumbling block in the negotiations was the future of the Sahara. The French delegation, under instructions from General de Gaulle, insisted that the Sahara should remain under French sovereignty but that Algeria would be associated in the exploitation of its natural resources. The Algerian delegation categorically rejected any attempt to partition the country, insisting on Algeria's territorial integrity as proclaimed on 1 November 1954. It also rejected any suggestion of preserving special privileges for the *colons* including the proposal of double nationality. Under Algerian citizenship, the Algerian delegates declared, all Algerians would be guaranteed their fundamental rights regardless of their origin. Those who preferred to maintain their French citizenship would be regarded as foreigners but would be guaranteed safety for themselves and for their property. On 13 June the French delegation broke off the Evian talks for an indefinite "period of reflection", despite the opposition of the Algerians who insisted that "only by pursuing the negotiations can we find a constructive solution to the problem and restore peace".¹⁵⁵

The New York Times reacted to the breakdown of the Evian talks in a predictable fashion. Failing to appreciate the Algerians' dedication to the process of direct negotiations and perhaps lacking

the editorial courage to reproach the French Government for having been responsible for the collapse of the talks, it at least implicitly condoned the French decision to break off the negotiations unilaterally, in a series of highly partisan editorials.¹⁵⁶ It put all the blame on the Algerian leaders who, it asserted, had "equivocated inexcusably", accusing them of creating an "impasse" in the country. By the same token, the paper openly supported the French argument: "President de Gaulle has amply demonstrated his eagerness to reach an agreement. Let the F.L.N. now do the same".¹⁵⁷

The Economist, whose analysis of the situation was more realistic, blamed General de Gaulle, not the G.P.R.A., for the failure of progress in the talks. It observed that the General had instructed his delegates "to ask too much at too high a price and given them too little to make concessions". The French sought to maintain control of the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir and a dual citizenship for the *colons* and refused to recognize Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara. Remarking that the French Government's tactics during the recent Evian talks were both ill-advised and counter-productive, it commented that if General de Gaulle really supposed that the nationalist leaders could concede all this, he was deceiving himself.¹⁵⁸ Yet, whilst *The (London) Times* had taken a rather pessimistic view as a result of the failure of the talks, intoning that the outlook for Algeria was now gloomy,¹⁵⁹ *The Economist* - although also concerned about this failure - took the more optimistic position that there might still be a positive outcome from the Evian negotiations and that the outlook was not wholly black.¹⁶⁰

The New York Times still failed to adopt a clear and straightforward position about Algeria's political future. Its views

seemed contradictory and on occasions marred by senseless speculation and editorial confusion. It showed tacit approval of the concept of a decolonized Algeria but was also favourable to the idea of continued French control of the Sahara and the establishment of a post-independence political structure based on ethnic origins.¹⁶¹ Both views were diametrically opposed to the positions adopted by the G.P.R.A. The paper made French Government's proposals appear more interesting than they deserved. Conversely, it portrayed the G.P.R.A. as less willing for a settlement and its efforts less worthwhile than they actually were. This attitude provoked a sharp response from the G.P.R.A.'s U.N. representative. In a letter to the editor, Abdelkader Chanderli dismissed partition, which had been tacitly approved by *The New York Times* as a possible solution to the conflict, as unthinkable: "Algeria including the Sahara is one. The people of Algeria are one. Each and every citizen, whatever his origin, shall be protected by a constitution guaranteeing his fundamental rights".¹⁶² Chanderli's response to the paper's questioning of the G.P.R.A.'s representativeness of the Algerian people was to refer to the results of the 5 July strike which had brought life in Algeria to a standstill, despite the uncurbed pressure applied by the 800,000 troops on the striking population.

Chanderli reproached *The New York Times* for attacking the Algerian negotiators simply because of their refusal to bargain away "two basic democratic principles". He defined these as self-determination that would have to apply to Algeria as one geographic entity including the Sahara, and self-determination that must apply to all Algerians as one nation regardless of their ethnic or cultural origins. The letter argued that the firm attitude taken by the Algerian delegates, which the French authorities and *The New*

York Times had branded as "stubbornness", stemmed largely from their desire to resist half-baked solutions that would in the long run generate more trouble and from their commitment to the fundamental principles behind their struggle which had to take precedence over the country's hunger for peace. Defending the G.P.R.A.'s position as "straightforward, logical and democratic", Chanderli reminded his readers that the Algerians had suffered one million casualties and more than two millions were still confined to regroupment camps. In the light of the evident lack of balance and impartiality in the paper's views on the breakdown of the Evian talks and on the question of Algeria's future, the G.P.R.A.'s U.N. representative found reason enough to call for "a full and complete reappraisal of *The Times*' Algerian policy".¹⁶³

The United States Government remained by and large silent on the Algerian position during and immediately after the Evian talks, but on 29 May, whilst not specifically referring to Algeria, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, had defended the Kennedy Administration's policy towards Africa and promised America's "unequivocal... dedication to freedom".¹⁶⁴ The American Government, wary of what it saw as the growing threat of international Communism and eager to avoid upsetting France, spoke only in mild terms about the Algerian situation, expressing its hope that that was only a suspension and not a complete collapse of the negotiating process.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, President Kennedy hinted at possible American intervention in Algeria in case of a Chinese or Soviet attempt to intervene directly in the Algerian-French conflict. Kennedy's victory at the 1960 Presidential elections had sparked the hopes of the Algerians because of the positive stance he had taken as Senator towards the Algerian problem. To their disappointment, however,

President Kennedy immediately abandoned this stance and turned his attention to the question of alleged Communist penetration of the Algerian revolution, arguing that "the Soviets had invested several billion dollars in military and economic aid to the developing countries... and more arms for the Algerian 'rebels'".¹⁶⁶

In response to General de Gaulle's threats of partition, the G.P.R.A. launched a worldwide campaign aimed at mobilizing international public opinion against the idea of fragmenting Algeria into fabricated geographical segments. It concentrated its diplomatic efforts particularly in Africa. In a memorandum to the independent African states, it warned Algeria's southern neighbours against any negotiations with France on the question of the Saharan boundaries. Numerous delegations were sent to different countries to inform them about the Sahara issue. July 5 was declared as a day of protest against partition and a general strike was called out throughout Algeria. Demonstrations broke out and the response of the French police was as usual brutal, resulting in many casualties.¹⁶⁶ "It is impossible to separate northern Algeria from the Sahara", stated an *E7 Moudjahid* editorial on 15 April: "French sovereignty over Algeria, radically called into question by the Revolution since 1 November 1954, should give way to the sovereignty of the Algerian people, within the administrative boundaries of Algeria of 1954, as described by the documents, maps and manuals".¹⁶⁷

As already mentioned, *The New York Times* had previously approved though only reluctantly, of the idea of partition as a possible solution to the Algerian conflict. But columnist C.L. Sulzberger, writing from Paris, vigorously argued against partition branding it as an "insane" measure that nobody wanted: "Partition would certainly

perpetuate and internationalize the Algerian war - everybody would lose as a result".¹⁶⁸ *The Economist*, following a similar line of argument, scorned partition as an unfulfilling short-term solution that would in the long run fuel the war.¹⁶⁹ *The (London) Times* made the analogy with Ireland, Palestine and Cyprus and dismissed partition as "quite impracticable" a solution.¹⁷⁰

The G.P.R.A.'s Reshuffle at the Top

The disappointing outcome of the recent Evian negotiations led the G.P.R.A. to adopt a tougher line, heralded by the replacement of the "liberal" Ferhat Abbas with the "radical" Benyoussef Ben Khedda.¹⁷¹ Ben Khedda immediately became a reportorial whirlwind in France and throughout the Western world, where he was portrayed as "tough" and "leftist" and even as "pro-Communist". Many saw his appointment as the signal of a more radical attitude, pointing to the G.P.R.A.'s first declaration under the new Premier in which it called for the "reinforcement of the activities of the National Liberation Army, the mobilization of the Algerian masses and the elevation of the standard of their struggle and discipline both socially and politically".¹⁷²

The New York Times reacted to the G.P.R.A.'s reshuffle by once again reflecting the views of the French Government and the French press. Its hostility to the new Premier was voiced under prominent front-page headlines like the one for 28 August:

Algerians Pick Anti-West Leftist
As Premier in Place of Abbas

Close Tie with Reds Seen
but Talks with France
Are Not Ruled Out.

This was accompanied by a picture of Ben Khedda. Labelling him as an "anti-Western... Left-wing extremist", it hastily asserted that the nationalists would now move much closer to the communist world, and forecast that they would be less supple in their bargaining than they had been. Almost without exception, the Western media focused on the alleged inclination of Ben Khedda towards China, basing their judgement solely on his earlier trips to China and on his admiration of China's successes. But, admiration does not necessarily presuppose alignment. As one Swiss expert on Algeria observed, the new Premier's admiration of China stemmed largely from that country's "success in organizing millions of people"; Africans badly needed organization and were impressed by the achievements of the Chinese in this respect.¹⁷³

Carrying its criticism further, *The New York Times* regarded Ben Khedda's appointment as the beginning of a "radically new phase" and that it would have grave repercussions on a France facing renewed "right-wing conspiracy" that was seriously threatening its stability.¹⁷⁴ *Time* magazine also cried against the reshuffle, asserting that the F.L.N. as a result "abruptly turned left" and that control of power would shift to the tough military leaders. Unlike *The New York Times*, however, it strongly reproached General de Gaulle for not having moved fast enough to reach a settlement with the more moderate Ferhat Abbas, arguing that the French would perhaps regret this considering what could be in store for them: "France's stiff-necked President Charles de Gaulle may find that he blundered badly in not having dealt with Abbas - while there was still time".¹⁷⁵

The Algerian Provisional Government and the new Premier repeatedly called upon France to abandon the idea of French sovereignty over the Sahara, leaving no doubt that the Algerians were

categorically opposed to the concept of partition regardless of its form. As France had already jettisoned the myth of *Algérie Française* it would be unrealistic to cling to the idea of maintaining colonialism in the Sahara. The question of the Sahara's future had been one of the biggest obstacles to agreement on Algerian independence and the sticking point in the last round of negotiations. Yet, by the autumn of 1961 de Gaulle had realized that his insistence on French sovereignty over the Sahara was not practical and would get France nowhere. Hence, during his press conference of 5 September, he officially recognized Algeria's sovereignty over the Sahara. "The realities are that there is not one Algerian, I know this, who does not believe that the Sahara should be part of Algeria". He argued that as long as the French interests in the Sahara were secured, France would not claim sovereignty over it.¹⁷⁶

The New York Times, shifting its position towards Algeria according to the shift in the French Government's policies, lost no opportunity to hail General de Gaulle's recognition of Algeria's sovereignty over the Sahara as "practical realism", arguing that this change in the French position would be enough as a concession to get Franco-Algerian negotiations going again. France's need for a settlement to the Algerian conflict had been made more urgent because of de Gaulle's "stern attitude on Russia". This required as much military strength as France could possibly acquire; all depended on the termination of the heavy French military involvement in Algeria where the cream of its armed forces were still tied up.¹⁷⁷ *Time* magazine, whilst welcoming the French decision to abandon the claim of sovereignty over the Sahara, openly reproached General de Gaulle for not having taken such a decision earlier, for this "would probably have produced an armistice long ago..."¹⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the United States continued to be wary of the growing influence of international communism in Africa. In an implicit reference to Algeria after his African tour at the end of 1961, Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams warned against the communist success in gaining influence amongst the nationalist movements and the new independent countries on the continent.¹⁷⁹ A few months earlier, President Kennedy had hinted at possible American intervention in Algeria if the Chinese or the Soviets did intervene. And in direct reference to Algeria on 31 October, Mennen Williams stated that the United States shared the same concern and conviction as the Africans regarding Algeria, arguing that his government was in favour of a democratic settlement to the conflict that would "fulfill the aspirations of the Algerian people". Yet, he again put absolute faith in the French Government and its policies.¹⁸⁰

In France itself the Algerian community was finding the stiff restrictions imposed by the police, such as the 8 o'clock curfew, increasingly unbearable. Many, as a result, took to the streets in large demonstrations. Police reaction was once again brutal and, as *The Economist* remarked, exceeded all imagination and "disgusted" even policemen themselves.¹⁸¹ Many news media like *The (London) Times* reported people being ferociously beaten up by the police and thrown into the river Seine where they drowned.¹⁸² *The New York Times*, however, surprisingly ignored reports of such disturbing incidents and spoke merely in general, vague terms about the situation which it described as "ominous" and "alarming".¹⁸³ It was later revealed that the French police had been infiltrated by fascist elements favourable to the O.A.S.¹⁸⁴

The O.A.S. Campaign of Violence

After the failure of all attempts to overthrow the French Government and establish a military regime through organized military putsches, and as Algeria's independence became only a matter of time, army-*colon* desperadoes resorted to a large-scale campaign of terrorism aimed at preserving *L'Algérie Française*.¹⁸⁵ The O.A.S. (*Organisation de L'Armée Secrète*) was, to many observers, only a sinister instrument of indiscriminate bombing, shooting and burning and far from being a "counter-revolutionary force" as it claimed.¹⁸⁶ It failed to become a political power in Algeria and in France, and remained essentially a police problem.¹⁸⁷ Its wave of violence resulted in an alarming deterioration of the economic situation in Algeria, especially when the promises of a speedy agricultural and industrial development in Algeria outlined in the "Constantine Plan" had not been fulfilled.¹⁸⁸ The O.A.S. succeeded only in increasing the alienation of the *colons* and in making life in an independent Algeria seem to them quite impossible.¹⁸⁹ As one observer remarked, many of their fears stemmed from a feeling of guilt towards the Algerian population; they could not believe that they would be generously treated in an independent Algeria nor imagine that their excesses since 1830 could be forgiven or forgotten.¹⁹⁰

This campaign of violence that was being conducted against civilians threatened to push the Algerian population beyond the control of the G.P.R.A. into perhaps irreconcilable retaliation. Algerians were, in the words of *The (London) Times*, either being killed by *colon* "thugs" or systematically tortured by the police and paratroopers.¹⁹¹ O.A.S. terrorism also spread to metropolitan France where police security began to break down and the police force itself

became a prime suspect.¹⁹² In this context, the G.P.R.A. issued a strong warning to the *pieds noirs* in Algeria, urging them to "refuse to be the unconscious tools once again of colonialist and fascist interests condemned by history".¹⁹³ Reiterating their belief that O.A.S. violence would not prevent Algeria from gaining independence, the Algerian leaders expressed concern that such violence could however irretrievably "compromise the future of the European community in Algeria".¹⁹⁴

The O.A.S. and its terrorist campaign provoked anger and condemnation in France. *France-Soir*, especially its editor Pierre Lazaraff, spoke bitterly of this organization's attempts to silence the French voices that were opposed to its conduct. Vehemently condemning the killing of civilians and senseless destruction of property, he urged the French Government to take effective counter-action. Because of this unequivocal stance, the paper itself fell victim to O.A.S. terrorism; its premises were seriously damaged by a bomb and its reporters and their homes were repeatedly attacked.¹⁹⁵ "What is the O.A.S. really concerned with?", wondered one *France-Soir* official. "It wants to prevent us from speaking the truth, from drawing attention to its atrocities as blackmailers, and murderers. The whole thing recalls the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany".¹⁹⁶

The phenomenon of O.A.S. violence drew scores of news correspondents and cameramen to Algiers. Fair reporting was, however, made virtually impossible as news men were being constantly intimidated and, in the case of some correspondents as explained in the following chapter, kidnapped and forced to leave. But reporting on Algeria had never been easy or free from intimidation before. As

already pointed out, the French Government had since 1954 tightened its grip on reporting from Algeria, vigorously warning correspondents against reporting the activities of the F.L.N. or interviewing its leaders. An Egyptian correspondent, for example, had been sentenced to death by a French Court in Oran on the charge of visiting an F.L.N. camp. He would have faced the gallows had he not been freed by an F.L.N. commando unit.¹⁹⁷

The O.A.S. violent conduct drew condonation and support only from people like the former Governor General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle. Soustelle's sympathetic stance vis-à-vis the question of *colon* terrorism came with no surprise to those with a fair knowledge of Algerian affairs. It was another confirmation of the complacency of the previous French authorities with the extremist *pieds noirs* and their interests, to the detriment of the Algerian majority. Such complacency was, in effect, one of the decisive factors that had brought about the Algerian revolution.¹⁹⁸

The Algerian Question Before the General Assembly for the Last Time

Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the General Assembly was to debate the Algerian-French conflict for the seventh time. But, as *The New York Times* predicted, it was clear that such debate would not be the hard-pitched battle that it had been in previous sessions, as a solution was now in the offing through bilateral Franco-Algerian talks.¹⁹⁹ A draft resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian group urged the immediate resumption of direct negotiations between the two parties concerned, and supported Algeria's right to territorial integrity and its sovereignty over the Sahara. This resolution was eventually adopted by the Political Committee by 61 votes to none with

34 abstentions, and was later adopted by the General Assembly by 62 votes to none with 38 abstentions. France, it should be recalled, had since 1955 been boycotting the United Nations debates. Whilst the United States abstained on this resolution during the voting of both the Political Committee and the General Assembly, the Soviet Union endorsed it on both occasions.²⁰⁰

Yet, as the independence of Algeria was now on the horizon, the United States became eager to gain the friendship of the Algerian leaders so as to prevent an independent Algeria from moving closer towards the East. The American Government had hitherto averted formal contacts with the F.L.N., for fear of offending the United States oldest ally, France. The first high-level meeting between an American official and F.L.N. representatives took place in Tunis on 17 October 1961 between G. Mennen Williams and two G.P.R.A. ministers, Saad Dahlab and M'hamed Yazid.²⁰¹ The United States' main preoccupation regarding Algeria continued to be its fear of growing communist influence in Africa. On 4 December 1961 the Director of U.S. Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Richard R. Brown, underlined the significance of American aid to the Algerian refugees in Tunisia, especially in the context of American efforts to contain communism.²⁰²

At the United Nations, the Algerian delegation headed by M'hamed Yazid had a formal meeting, the first of its kind, with the American delegation led by Adlai Stevenson. Reporting the meeting, *The New York Times* went as far as to brand it as "a political turning point" for the Algerian leaders, because of United States previous deliberate avoidance of direct contacts with the F.L.N.²⁰³ With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is clear that the meeting was not of any special significance for the Algerians and, therefore, did not warrant

such overenthusiasm. In Algerian eyes, on the contrary, the meeting was a demonstration of United States political opportunism; the State Department allowed formal contacts with the Algerian leaders only when it became clear that France had tacitly conceded defeat in Algeria and, thus, would not be offended by a gesture of this kind towards the Algerians.

By the autumn of 1961 the gulf between the G.P.R.A. and the French Government had substantially been narrowed. The stage was set for the renewal of direct negotiations and new prospects for a settlement were opened. General de Gaulle yielded ground on the future of the Sahara and gave up the idea of French control. Instead of a Franco-Algerian "association", he now talked of "France's cooperation offered to the new Algeria for its life and development...".²⁰⁴ The G.P.R.A. continued to insist on complete independence but spoke of "free cooperation" between Algeria and France, whilst reassuring the *colon* community that its "... security and legitimate rights would be guaranteed in an independent Algeria".²⁰⁵

As 1961 drew to a close, therefore, and despite continued O.A.S terrorism, optimism grew about the possibility of a quick settlement. For Algeria, this would mean the achievement of independence after 130 years of military occupation and after having paid a heavy price in human life. For France, a settlement would mean a positive transformation of the prospects of the Fifth Republic both domestically and internationally. Under these hopeful signs, *The New York Times* ended its 1961 Algeria coverage with a highly optimistic note, forecasting the end of the Algerian-French conflict during the course of the following year, despite all the uncertainties for 1962. The paper concluded that neither France nor Algeria could go on for

another whole year without an end to this "cruel drama".²⁰⁶ With hindsight, it is reasonable to argue that its predictions this time proved accurate, and its suggestive propositions were by and large intellectually astute.

Notes

1. For text of G.P.R.A.'s declaration, see *E1 Moudjahid*, No.61, 16 March 1960.
2. *The New York Times*, 21 January 1960.
3. *L'Express*, 4 February 1960.
4. Jacques Massu, *Le Torrent de La Digue*, Paris: Plon, 1972, p.310.
5. *The New York Times*, 23 January 1960.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *The (London) Times*, 23 January 1960.
8. "The Army Speaks", *The Economist*, 23 January 1970.
9. *Ibid.*
10. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.155.
11. Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem*, *op.cit.*, pp.166-168.
12. *Ibid.*, p.169.
13. Quoted in Richard and Joan Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.330.
14. *The New York Times*, 26 January 1960.
15. Editorial: "Algeria's Challenge to Paris", *The New York Times*, 26 January 1960.
16. Editorial: "FLARE UP", *The (London) Times*, 26 January 1960.
17. Editorial: "Storm Over Algeria", *The New York Times*, 27 January 1960.
18. *The New York Times*, 28 January 1960.
19. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.161.
20. C.R. Agéron, "L'Évolution de L'Opinion Publique Française", in *Le Retentissement de La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.161-169.
21. See text of de Gaulle's 25 January broadcast in Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.369.
22. A. Chanderli, "To Govern Algeria", *The New York Times*, 28 January 1960.
23. *The New York Herald Tribune*, 4 February 1960.
24. Quoted in Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.286.
25. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.370.

26. *Ibid.*
27. Editorial: "CRISIS FOR DE GAULLE", *The (London) Times*, 27 January 1960.
28. Editorial: "The Crisis of France", *The New York Times*, 29 January 1960.
29. Einard Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, pp.42-63.
30. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, *op.cit.*, p.55.
31. Oystein Sande, "The Perception of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, 1971, pp.221-237.
32. Editorial: "The Crisis of France", *The New York Times*, 29 January 1960.
33. "France Feels the Dead Hand", *The Economist*, 29 January 1960.
34. Comment: "France in Crisis", *The New York Times*, 1 February 1960.
35. "The Test for De Gaulle", *Time*, 1 February 1960.
36. Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.245-246.
37. Editorial: "Victory in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 3 February 1960.
38. "AFTER THE VICTORY", *The (London) Times*, 2 February 1960.
39. *The New York Times*, 4 February 1960.
40. Quoted in Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, pp.373-375.
41. "The Algerian Rebels", *The New York Times*, 19 January 1960.
42. "The Minds of Tunis", *The Economist*, 5 March 1960.
43. See *L'Express*, 10 March 1960; Bernard Tricot, *Les Sentiers de La Paix: Algeria, 1958-1962*, Paris, 1962, pp.141-142, 155-157.
44. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 16 March 1960.
45. Quoted in André Mandouze, *La Révolution Algérienne par Les Textes*, Paris, 1962, p.32.
46. "Back to the Fight", *Time*, 28 March 1960.
47. Editorial: "The Algerian Struggle", *The New York Times*, 15 April 1960.
48. Francis Wilcox, "The New Africa and the United Nations", Department of State *Bulletin*, 18 April 1960, p.592.
49. Editorial: "Tunisia and Algeria", *The New York Times*, 27 April 1960.

50. "The Tunis Barometer Falls", *The Economist*, 30 April 1960.
51. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 6 May 1960.
52. Quoted in *ibid.*
53. See *El Moudjahid*, No.78, 23 April 1960.
54. Ivan B. White, "Challenge of Our Times", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLII, 1095, 20 June 1960, pp.990-991.
55. Document No.56, "Questions et reponses lors d'une tournée de M. Lakhdar Ben Tobbal au Maroc", 4 March 1960 in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.295.
56. Document No.102, "Extraits d'un Rapport de Politique Generale sur les Pays Socialistes Dans Leurs Relations avec L'Algérie", 28 February 1961, in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.491.
57. Quoted in A. Mandouze, *La Révolution Algérienne Par Les Textes*, *op.cit.*, p.35.
58. *The Economist*, 28 May 1960.
59. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages*, *op.cit.*, pp.224-229.
60. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 22 June 1960.
61. "HARD BUT FINE", *The (London) Times*, 15 June 1960.
62. Editorial: "Acts of Courage", *The (London) Times*, 21 June 1960.
63. "The Algerian Seesaw", *The Economist*, 18 June 1960.
64. "Hope for Algeria", *The New York Times*, 23 June 1960.
65. "Algeria Armistice", *The Economist*, 25 June 1960.
66. Quoted in *The (London) Times*, 21 June 1960.
67. "News Analysis" is a column usually allocated to reporters to analyse, interpret and express opinions on events, which they were not allowed in the news reports.
68. "High Stakes", *The New York Times*, 1 July 1960.
69. *Ibid.*
70. Flory Maurice, "L'Échec de Melun", *Revue de L'Action Populaire*, No.41, Sept.-Oct. 1960, pp.948-958.
71. Edward Behr, *The Algeria Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.175.
72. For text of G.P.R.A. communiqué, see *The New York Times*, 6 July 1960.
73. *The New York Times*, 6 July 1960.

74. *Ibid.*
75. "The Congo and Policy Toward the New Africa", *Congressional Record*, Vol.CVI, Part 14, 86 Cong., 2 Sess., 29 August 1960, p.18126.
76. "Algerian Interlude", *The Economist*, 9 July 1960.
77. See M. Maschino, *Le Refus*, Paris: Maspéro, 1960 and *L'Engagement*, Paris: Maspéro, 1961; G. Arnaud, *Mon Procès*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960; N. Faverlière, *Le Désert de L'Aube*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960.
78. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, pp.137-138; Charles-Robert Ageron, *L'Opinion Française Devant La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*; Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.281.
79. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, pp.165-166.
80. For more information on this declaration and its signatories, see François Maspéro, ed., *Le Droit à L'insoumission: "Le Dossier des 121"*, Paris, 1961.
81. See "La Presse et la Radio diffusion en Europe Orientale", *La Documentation Française*, No.2735, p.4.
82. *L'Express*, 18 October 1960.
83. Editorial: "The Free World", *The (London) Times*, 30 September 1960.
84. *Ibid.*
85. Quoted in *Time*, 7 November 1960.
86. *The Economist*, 12 November 1960.
87. André Mandouze, *La Révolution Algérienne Par Les Textes*, *op.cit.*, p.34; Yvès Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, p.215.
88. A. Chanderli, quoted in Brace, *Ordeal in Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.369.
89. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 1 November 1960.
90. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.138.
91. "Referendum on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 17 November 1960.
92. Editorial: "Speed Up on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 25 November 1960.
93. Editorial: "The U.S. and Africa", *The New York Times*, 3 December 1960; "De Gaulle in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 10 December 1960.
94. *The New York Times*, 10 December 1960.
95. "The Algerian War - 1954-1962", Documentary, Channel 4 Television (G.B.), *op.cit.*

96. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.136; Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, pp.177-201.
97. Galtung and Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, pp.64-87.
98. *The New York Times*, 12 December 1960.
99. Quoted in F. Ferhat, "American Policy Towards Algeria", *op.cit.*, p.447.
100. "The Algerian Flood", *The Economist*, 17 December 1960.
101. Quoted in *Le Monde*, 5 October 1960.
102. Kader Kalache, "Manifestations de Décembre 1960", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.3.
103. Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.264.
104. A.P. Lentin, "Les Différentes Étapes de La Politique de De Gaulle de Juin 1958 a Juillet 1962", *Le Retentissement de La Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.225-230.
105. "Forced Pace", *Time*, 26 December 1960.
106. Quoted in Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, p.213.
107. Countries like Canada, Ireland, Denmark and Norway, which had previously abstained, now voted for the Algerian resolution, see Mammeri Khalfa, *Les Nations Unies Face à La Question Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.206.
108. "U.S. Explains Position on the Question of Algeria", Statement made by Francis O. Wilcox in Political and Security Committee on 15 December 1960, Department of State *Bulletin*, XLIV, 1124 (9 January 1960), pp.62-64.
109. Quoted in Victor Hal Cartwright, "Revolutionary Algeria and the United Nations: A Study in Agenda Politics", Dissertation, Maryland, 1974, pp.217-224.
110. *El Moudjahid*, No.53, 15 February 1960; Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, pp.42-43.
111. Editorial: "The U.N. and Colonialism", *The New York Times*, 17 December 1960.
112. Editorial: "A Way to Peace in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 26 December 1960.
113. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 30 December 1960.
114. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, pp.200-202.
115. For more information, see the eye-witness accounts of Commandant X, "L'Armée Française et L'Algérie en 1961", *La Nouvelle Critique*, No.134 (special edition), February 1962, pp.42-52.

116. Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie, op.cit.*, p.271.
117. "Ambiguous Algeria", *The Economist*, 14 January 1961.
118. *The New York Times*, 7 January 1961.
119. *El Moudjahid*, No.77, 29 January 1961.
120. Editorial: "Hope for Algeria", *The New York Times*, 18 January 1961.
121. Editorial: "Sparring Algeria", *The New York Times*, 28 January 1961.
122. Editorial: "Setting the Stage", *The (London) Times*, 23 February 1961.
123. "The Inaugural Address of President Kennedy", Department of State *Bulletin*, XLIV, 1128 (6 February 1961), p.175.
124. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, pp.302-303.
125. "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 6", Department of State *Bulletin*, XLIV, 1131 (22 February 1961), p.296.
126. Editorial: "The Algerian Negotiations", *The New York Times*, 21 February 1961.
127. Bernard Tricot, *Les Sentiers de la Paix: Algeria 1958-1962*, Paris, 1972, pp.289-230.
128. *The New York Times*, 22 March 1961.
129. Yvès Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir, op.cit.*, p.246.
130. The M.N.A. (*Mouvement National Algerien*) was an organization founded by Messali Hadj in 1955 to rival the F.L.N. but without much success.
131. See *El Moudjahid*, No.79, 15 April 1961.
132. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 23 March 1961.
133. Editorial: "Peace Snag in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 7 April 1961.
134. Editorial: "De Gaulle's Thunderbolt", *The New York Times*, 12 April 1961.
135. Editorial: "Blunt Alternatives", *The (London) Times*, 12 April 1961.
136. M. Challe, *Notre Révolte, op.cit.*, pp.190-194.
137. Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem, op.cit.*, p.182.
138. Editorial: "A General Stands His Ground", *The New York Times*, 24 April 1961.

139. *Ibid.*
140. Editorial: "FRANCE'S GRAVE HOUR", *The (London) Times*, 24 April 1961.
141. Quoted in Yvès Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, p.375.
142. *Ibid.*
143. *The New York Times*, 25 April 1961.
144. "President Sends Message of Support and Friendship to General de Gaulle", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLIV, 1141 (15 May 1961), p.709.
145. Charles Bowles, "Foreign Aid: The Great Decision of the Sixties", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLIV, 1142 (15 May 1961), p.703.
146. See *The (London) Times*, 25 April 1961; Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du Desespoir*, *op.cit.*, p.314.
147. Editorial: "OBJECTIVE PARIS", *The (London) Times*, 25 April 1961.
148. "The Third Revolt", *Time*, 28 April 1961.
149. "Charles land the Kingmakers", *The Economist*, 29 April 1961.
150. "Algerian Powder Barrel", *The Economist*, 6 May 1961.
151. Editorial: "Hope for Algeria", *The New York Times*, 10 May 1961.
152. "Trêve Unilatérale et négociations", *El Moudjahid*, No.80, 12 May 1961.
153. *The New York Times*, 22 May 1961.
154. "Truce in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 22 May 1960.
155. See Text of Krim Belkacem's press conference in *El Moudjahid*, No.82, 25 June 1961.
156. See, for example, "De Gaulle's Partition Threat", *The New York Times*, 29 June 1961.
157. Editorial: "Impasse in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 24 June 1961.
158. "French leave", *The Economist*, 17 June 1961.
159. Editorial: "BREAKDOWN AT EVIAN", *The (London) Times*, 15 June 1961.
160. "French Leave", *The Economist*, 17 June 1961.
161. Editorial: "The Crux of Algerian Issue", *The New York Times*, 7 July 1961.
162. A. Chanderli, "The Issues in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 15 July 1961.

163. *Ibid.*
164. G. Mennen Williams, "Africa: Challenge to American Trade Unions", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLV, No.1149 (3 July 1961), p.25.
165. *E1 Moudjahid*, No.82, 25 June 1961.
166. Quoted in Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (2nd ed.), London: Pan Books Ltd., 1966, p.255.
167. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.143.
168. C.L. Sulzberger, "De Gaulle's Trump Card", *The New York Times*, 1 July 1961.
169. "Backwards to Evian", *The Economist*, 1 July 1961.
170. Editorial: "SOLUTION OF DESPAIR", *The (London) Times*, 7 July 1961.
171. William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968*, *op.cit.*, pp.143-145.
172. See *E1 Moudjahid*, No.84, 29 August 1961.
173. Quoted in *The New York Times*, 30 August 1961.
174. Editorial: "New Phase in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 2 September 1961.
175. "New Team", *Time*, 8 September 1961.
176. See Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'Espoir: Le Renouveau*, *op.cit.*, pp.340-341; *Le Monde*, 7 September 1961; *Time*, 15 September 1961.
177. Editorial: "De Gaulle's Sahara Gesture", *The New York Times*, 8 September 1961.
178. "The Master's Voice", *Time*, 15 September 1961.
179. G. Mennen Williams, "Tasks and Opportunities in Africa", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLV, No.1169 (20 November 1961), p.862.
180. G. Mennen Williams, "The Three 'A's' of Africa; Algeria, Angola and Apartheid", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLV, No.1169 (27 November 1961), p.887.
181. "Race Against Violence", *The Economist*, 28 October 1961.
182. Editorial: "Next Step in Algeria", *The (London) Times*, 3 November 1961.
183. Editorial: "Stormy Times in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 21 October 1961.
184. Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.325.

185. For more information on O.A.S., see Yvès Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, pp.564-570; Gros Vitalis (former Police Chief of Algiers), *Le Temps de la Violence*, Paris: Presse de la Cité, 1971; B.M. Morland, *Histoire de l'Organisation de L'Armée Secrete*, Paris: Julliard, 1964; Pierre Sergent, *La Bataille*, Paris: La Table Ronde, 1968; J. Ferrandi, *600 Jours Avec Salan de L'O.A.S.*, Paris: Fayard, 1969.
186. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.182.
187. Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria*, London: Rupert Hart Davis, 1970, p.182.
188. Alex Nicol, *La Bataille de L'O.A.S.*, Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1962; Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, pp.271-276.
189. John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.182.
190. Quoted in Richard and Joan Brace, *Algerian Voices*, New York: D. Van Norstrand Company, Inc., 1965, p.10.
191. Editorial: "Shot-Gun Wedding in Algeria?", *The (London) Times*, 13 November 1961.
192. "With or Without", *Time*, 17 November 1961.
193. M'hamed Yazid quoted in P. Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.100.
194. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.218.
195. *The New York Times*, 7 December 1961.
196. Quoted in "Bomb v. the Press", *Time*, 15 December 1961.
197. See Harold Greer, *A Scattering of Dust*, *op.cit.*, p.38; Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, *op.cit.*, p.367.
198. See *supra*, pp.46-47.
199. *The New York Times*, 14 December 1961.
200. F. Ferhat, "American Policy Towards Algeria", *op.cit.*, p.497.
201. Charles-Henri Favrod, *Le F.L.N. et L'Algérie*, Paris: Plon, 1962, p.342.
202. Richard R. Brown, "Our People on the Move", Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol.XLVI, No.1177 (15 January 1962), pp.102-103.
203. *The New York Times*, 14 December 1961.
204. Quoted in John Talbott, *The War Without a Name*, *op.cit.*, p.219.
205. Krim Belkacem quoted in Yvès Courrière, *Les Feux du Desespoir*, *op.cit.*, p.468.
206. Editorial: "France's Balance Sheet", *The New York Times*, 30 December 1961.

CHAPTER VI

THE HARD ROAD TO PEACE, ALGERIA'S ADVENT TO
INDEPENDENCE AMIDST GROWING TENSION

"There are only two powers in the world... the sword and the spirit. In the long run, the sword is always defeated by the spirit..." (Napoleon Bonaparte)

"Liberty is the fruit of struggle". (Tawfiq El Madani, 1923)

"Today we see the end of a struggle which can be truly called the epic struggle and which will be remembered for very long in the annals not only of Algeria and Africa but in the world as a symbol of the people struggling for their freedom despite all sufferings". (Jawaharlal Nehru, July 1962)

As 1961 ended and the new year began, a settlement to the Franco-Algerian conflict seemed once again in the offing, despite the unabated continuation of the O.A.S.'s campaign of violence and destruction in a desperate attempt to keep the myth of *Algérie Française* alive. But, so many times previously hopes had been raised and then quickly dashed in the political labyrinth of the crisis. Yet, the reasons behind the urge to bring the conflict to an end as quickly as possible were becoming ever more pressing. Reflecting this atmosphere, and expressing irritation and amazement at the ruthlessness of the die-hard *colons*, *The New York Times* pointed its editorial finger at the paramount importance of a swift conclusion of an agreement between France and the G.P.R.A. before further tragedies ensued.¹

As the new year began, the extremist *pieds noirs* multiplied their efforts and intensified their "programme of murder and bomb outrages",

making Algerian civilians and passers-by their chief target.² In this, they hoped to provoke the Algerian population into retaliation that would bring the French army openly to their side, and thus wreck any chances of rapprochement between Paris and the nationalist leadership.³ Though the O.A.S. was to fail in its fundamental goals, it still posed a serious threat to metropolitan France. The question that was now being asked in different quarters was not whether the war would end in 1962, but whether Republican France would be able to survive the menace of the *colon* neo-fascist underground.⁴

Though in order to succeed, as *Time* magazine argued, Salan would have to defeat the powerful F.L.N. and bring down de Gaulle and his government - tasks that seemed beyond his powers - he could, even while failing, endanger France; mutiny might still drag the country into civil war. Carrying a front-cover picture of the O.A.S. leader under the caption "TERRORIST SALAN", *Time* defined the "philosophy" behind his organization as "a muddle of authoritarian, imperialist and populist ideas"; its propaganda as the sort often found in "flights from reality - orotund, florid, declamatory, and so ecstatic as to approach hysteria...".⁵

The New York Times, which never shrank from condemning the violence of the *colons*, also emphasized the danger that the O.A.S. posed. It branded their campaign as a desperate move with no legitimate ground, and highlighted the wider implications of *pied noir* intransigence: "Algeria is a land of great variety and beauty..." - it was not important, however, because of its size, its history, its resources or its wealth. It was important because its crisis tested the very nature of Western civilization. No longer was it possible to maintain the control of a country of ten million people by a minority of about one million. Yet, this was what the *colon* extremists were

fighting for. Not only did the conflict destroy the West's promises and ideals in the eyes of emerging nations and weaken its defences against the East, it "might even drag the world into a new war".⁶

The conflict had never had more serious repercussions on the political life of France.⁷ As C.L. Sulzberger remarked, not only was the country left in a serious psychotic condition it was also almost "schizoid, withdrawn from world reality" and as a nation "paranoically suspicious and sensitive".⁸ A few weeks later, carrying this theme further, *The New York Times* reflected the mood of confusion and uncertainty that was now reigning in France as a result of the terrorist campaign, which made the O.A.S. one of the "simulated hells on earth today". It, nevertheless, expressed confidence that France's central authority would eventually prevail: "We do not believe that a few thousand terrorists, some of them frankly fascist, can overthrow the Fifth Republic".⁹ But, France would have to reach a settlement with the G.P.R.A. to avoid further erosion of its stability. Arguing along this line, *The (London) Times*, which labelled the O.A.S. as a "conspiratorial sect" rather than a political organization, urged both the French and the Algerians to act swiftly and reach an accord: "Unless the final bargain is struck without delay the consequences could be disastrous for all".¹⁰

It was in this context that Franco-Algerian negotiations resumed in Rousses near the Swiss border. The two delegations, headed by Louis Joxe and Krim Belkacem, chose to meet in this remote village in complete secrecy from 11 to 19 February to escape the growing curiosity of world press.¹¹ After eight days of intensive discussion an *ad hoc* agreement on a set of points was reached.¹² But as a settlement to the conflict became imminent fears were growing that the

O.A.S. campaign of violence and wanton destruction might jeopardize any chances of future co-existence between the two communities in Algeria.¹³ Postmen, pharmacists, tram-workers, railwaymen, dockers, gas and electricity employees, doctors, educationalists, flower vendors, were cold-bloodedly murdered in an attempt to bring economic life to a standstill.¹⁴ Yet, although the die-hards might be able to destroy they would never be able to reverse the course of history.¹⁵

With the opening of the final Franco-Algerian negotiations at Evian-sur-les-Bains on 7 March, *The New York Times*, now throwing the full weight of its editorial criticism against the extremist *pieds noirs*, reproached the French Government for being too slow in its attempts to contain the O.A.S. It pressed for more positive action by the French army against the *colon* terrorists to eradicate the "shocking impunity" with which they were operating. The fact that Paris was not making a maximum effort to curtail such "savagery" and "gory deeds", could give the Algerians and world opinion reason enough to doubt France's ability to secure law and order during the period of transition between a ceasefire and independence. Either the French authorities were too weak to keep order, or they did not want to make the effort.¹⁶

Even newsmen did not escape the O.A.S.'s impunity. Italian journalists in particular, who were accused of being "too critical" of the extremist *colons*, became the chief target of ruthless gunmen. Giovanni Giovannini of Turin's *La Stampa* and Bruno Romani of Rome's *Il Messaggero* were kidnapped at gunpoint and their cameras were confiscated. The ten Italian journalists in Algeria were given twenty-four hours to leave, otherwise they would be shot. As a result of these events newsmen from different parts of the world protested to

the French Government about the lack of adequate protection. In response, the Government's Information Officer, Phillipe Mestre, tried to play down the abduction of the two Italian journalists as a "balloon incident". Nine of the ten Italian journalists immediately left for Rome where they attacked the laxity of the French authorities: "Chaos reigns in Algeria", wrote *Il Messaggero*. never before has freedom of the press received such a blow".¹⁷

A press photographer working for an American news agency, was asked whether he was a journalist and after replying yes, two armed men held him at gunpoint and a third slashed his face with a razor: "That's just a warning", they told him.¹⁸ Bombs were detonated at the homes of many newsmen such as the television commentator Michel Droit and Hubert Beuve-Mery the owner of *Le Monde*; a blind journalist was beaten to death and John Casserly of A.B.C. was given forty-eight hours to get out of Algeria.¹⁹

Reacting to the O.A.S.'s repeated warnings to newsmen, *The (London) Times*, in a leading article entitled "A Threat to Information", warned that those terrorists - to whom indiscriminate murder was a weapon and terror a policy - would have no scruples about murdering foreign journalists. As no honest, fair-minded reporter would contemplate depicting the O.A.S. in the illusive heroic role it sought, it was likely that Algeria would be deprived of outside observers unless they insisted on "their right and duty to go on observing and reporting". Holding the French Government directly responsible for the security of journalists, the paper combined its defence of freedom of the press with attacks on the extremist *pieds noirs*, abhorring their enmity to free reporting: "Such blackmail is worse even than the record of the Nazis and Fascists towards the

foreign press".²⁰

Ceasefire at Last

The Franco-Algerian negotiations in Evian-sur-les-Bains permitted the two sides to reach a final accord which, among other things, proclaimed 19 March as the date of the ceasefire.²¹ This was seen by many as an historic moment not only for Algeria and France but for the world at large.²² The news of the agreement was reported with evident interest throughout the world. Radio programmes were interrupted by the announcement and newspapers gave it voluminous coverage under exceptionally prominent headlines.²³

The New York Times greeted the agreement with enthusiasm, giving a detailed account under the front-page banner headline:

ALGERIA TRUCE SIGNED, EFFECTIVE TODAY
DE GAULLE ASKS FRANCE TO RATIFY ACCORD
SALAN APPEALS TO SECRET ARMY TO RESIST.

Writing favourably about the accord, the paper devoted pages three, four and five of its issue of 19 March entirely to the event, stressing the heavy losses the war had inflicted on both sides. The Algerian leadership was paid special tribute for its "composite character", and the A.L.N. fighters were praised for being "well disciplined and trained". The nationalist forces also won the praise of the French army commander in Algeria, General Ailleret, who paid tribute to their "courageous" endeavour. The next day's paper also devoted the whole of pages two and three to the Franco-Algerian accord.

After seven years, four months and eighteen days fighting had stopped; *The New York Times* searched far afield for the implications

behind the settlement. For the Algerians, the terms of the ceasefire agreement were a "triumph", ending the war that had cost hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars and heralding an independent republic.²⁴ Algeria was, in fact, destined to play a leading role in the *Maghreb*, Africa, the Arab world and the non-aligned movement.²⁵ For France and the West, the agreement meant that the "incubus" that had burdened them "bedevilling their policies and conscience" had now been banished.²⁶ For France, the ceasefire also meant not only the end of the Algerian war but also the end of the long process of liquidation of its colonial empire which had begun as early as 1946 with the outbreak of the war in Indochina.²⁷

"... the Algerian Revolution has triumphed and has attained the aims for which it fought", declared Ben Khedda.²⁸ The Evian Accords meant that the Algerians had fulfilled all the goals they had set for themselves at the Soummam Conference in 1956.²⁹ The G.P.R.A. whilst compromising on some secondary issues, was able to safeguard the key positions and fundamental principles of the Revolution.³⁰ The agreement also pointed to the disturbing fact that had it not been for de Gaulle's vain insistence on France's sovereignty over the Sahara, a similar arrangement could have been reached during the very first negotiations at Evian as early as May 1961, so possibly averting the O.A.S.'s campaign of violence and destruction.³¹

For *The Economist*, the enormous losses caused by the seven-and-a-half year war, and the serious international repercussions of the conflict, had, in this age of decolonization, made Algeria "the most conspicuous example of a settler minority clinging to its position by a policy of suppression". It was high time that the conflict was solved, but now that it seemed it had ended, the cheers

were muted. The reason for this was the O.A.S.'s desperate attempts to sabotage the Franco-Algerian agreement.

It was the French Government, especially General de Gaulle, that was to blame for giving the die-hard *colons* enough time to grow strong. Immediately after the collapse of the general's putsch in April 1961, de Gaulle could have concluded an agreement with the G.P.R.A. without serious opposition from the O.A.S. which was "barely hatched" and much weakened by the defeat of the mutineers. Instead, he had insisted in vain on retaining French sovereignty over the Sahara and, therefore, "wrecked the first Evian talks".³²

Ceasefire did not mean complete peace. To the Algerians, this period of transition from colonial rule to national independence was perhaps the most critical of the revolution.³³ The O.A.S., which was able to occupy the minds of the *colons*, intensified its attacks on civilians and on the economic infrastructure of the country. Even patients in hospitals did not escape its terrorism.³⁴ Sulzberger pointed out that it was seeking to reverse the course of history, but that this would not be possible even for these "Fascists" who leaned to the right of Franco.³⁵ The extremist *pieds noirs* and their terrorist underground, as *The New York Times* remarked, were "creatures of a past age" and their "madness" would eventually pass; Algeria was going to be independent and the die-hard *colons* were to be defeated.³⁶ By its savagery, the O.A.S. was demonstrating the "bankruptcy of its opposition". By their self-restraint in the face of such provocation, the Algerians were demonstrating a high level of political maturity and a capacity to govern the country.³⁷ A later analysis concluded that the Algerians maintained an extraordinary discipline and fortitude in the face of mounting provocation.³⁸ The nationalist

cadres, which *The Economist* at the time described as "an impressive group of mild-mannered young men", played a remarkable role in restraining the population from reacting to the O.A.S.'s "horrible provocation".³⁹

French Electorate Back the Evian Accords Amidst Large-Scale O.A.S. Violence

On 8 April French voters went to the polls; 90.7 percent of them voted yes for the peace agreement with the G.P.R.A.⁴⁰ The *New York Times*, in an editorial entitled "France Backs de Gaulle", considered the result of the referendum to be a "gain for the free world" and a serious setback for the *colon* extremists. It hoped that this would be enough to convince those extremists that their cause was a lost one and that continued murder for it would have to be stopped.⁴¹ Neither the overwhelming vote in support of the Evian Accords, however, nor the repeated assurance of the Algerian leaders that the rights of the *pieds noirs* would be guaranteed after independence, were enough to persuade the O.A.S. to bring its destructive campaign to an end.⁴² Yet, each day brought new evidence that this underground terrorist organization and its tactics were doomed.⁴³ The die-hards still did not realize that French dominance in Algeria had gone; this fact had still to be hammered into their nostalgic mind.⁴⁴

Pursuing its attacks on the O.A.S. and its "futile" and "vicious" campaign of "wanton destruction" from which Algeria was suffering to no purpose, *The New York Times* reminded its readers how this organization had come into being after the failure of the generals' putsch in April 1961.⁴⁵ Under the leadership of Generals Salan and Jouhaud "gathered a motley collection of thugs, neo-Fascists, romantic youths, deserters from the Foreign Legion...", whose aim was to block

the process of peace in Algeria and perpetuate colonial rule.⁴⁶ But, the O.A.S. was never able to achieve unity either in its leadership or in its methods. It consisted of civilian desperadoes whose aim was to save *L'Algérie Française*, and of disillusioned army officers intent on removing de Gaulle from power at whatever cost, using Algeria as a means as well as an end. In addition to the expected agony caused by the process of decolonization, the French army suffered the agony of not having won a war in twenty-three years of continued combat. This cruel fact pushed many officers into the hands of the O.A.S. which, in the absence of military victory against "foreign" opponents, seemed to "desire victory over France itself".⁴⁷

The O.A.S., suffering from a fundamental strategic disadvantage and representing a vastly outnumbered minority, was foredoomed.⁴⁸ As C.L. Sulzberger has remarked, its operational strategy seemed to be founded on a misapplication of the Vietminh doctrine of revolutionary warfare. In his manual Mao Tse-tung advised: "Mislead the enemy, make him negligent and then attack unexpectedly". Salan, on the other hand, was doing the opposite, misleading his own followers who themselves became negligent, capable only of carrying out random killings or bombings. The manual exhorted: "Attack, destroy and withdraw". The O.A.S., however, had nowhere to withdraw. Its members could try to withdraw to France to continue their campaign, but their cause was doomed. This handful of conspirators were seeking to halt the course of history, but history had already passed them by.⁴⁹

The O.A.S. was able to continue to operate only because the French Government and army were not making enough effort to quell its activities. If the French, as the G.P.R.A. insisted, had been willing to seize a few thousand known *colon* activists in Algiers and Oran,

this underground organization would have immediately collapsed. The French, however, wanted only to "decapitate" it by arresting a handful of its leaders.⁵⁰ This laxity only encouraged the O.A.S. to continue its campaign of violence and random destruction. So far, the Algerian leaders had managed to restrain the population from seeking retaliatory action. Yet, if the O.A.S. continued to pile up atrocities, a new storm would break, perhaps engulfing the country in total chaos.⁵¹

Following a similar line of argument, *The (London) Times* advised that the storm could be averted only if the French Government gave enough evidence that it was using all the measures at its disposal to crush *pied noir* terrorism. The sternest of actions would have to be taken to leave the extremists in no doubt that they were doing wrong, and thus put an end to the bloodshed that was "sickening world opinion", and jeopardizing the future of the *colon* community in Algeria. Indiscriminate destruction and killing on the scale practised by the O.A.S. desperadoes "must eventually defeat its own ends".⁵²

In this context, the G.P.R.A. again warned of retaliation against the unabated atrocities of the O.A.S., accusing the French army of laxity against those trigger-happy gunmen and of "brutality" towards Algerian civilians:⁵³ "We warn the French authorities one last time of the dangers of testing the patience of our fighters and our people so cruelly".⁵⁴

In this context, *The New York Times*, reflecting the view that the result of the forthcoming referendum would be the foregone conclusion of a vote for national independence, again hailed the Algerians for

their discipline and sense of responsibility. However, it also called upon them to show a few more months of "patience and fortitude".⁵⁵ A lot now depended on the ability of the new Algerian security forces to crush the *pied noir* underground, despite the failure of the French army to do so. This had to be done if the Algerian masses were to be persuaded of the need for continued patience and discipline during the critical period of transition.⁵⁶ But, many observers were of the opinion that the O.A.S. atrocities in themselves had strengthened the determination of the Algerian population. For example, popular armed patrols were set up to protect civilians; volunteers kept up the flow of food and medical supplies; women sewed the Algerian flag in preparation for Independence Day; improvised clinics were established to treat the wounded.⁵⁷ Such collective efforts only further evidenced the fact that what the Algerians had accomplished was not a rebellion, as the French claimed, but a large-scale revolution which had already brought about fundamental changes in the country.

Every sign now indicated that the die-hard *colons* had been defeated, albeit they could still be able randomly to kill civilians and destroy property. To *The New York Times* their acts were mad gestures by killers who knew they were doomed, or by French army officers, selling their lives for a cause and a doctrine that was both wrong and hopeless.⁵⁸ *The Economist* also argued that nothing could now prevent Algeria from becoming a republic or rob the National Liberation Front of the prize of national independence.⁵⁹ A private observer commented that "the French have lost all right to rule and have abused the privilege so profoundly that the force of human right is pushing them out".⁶⁰

The depth of the hopelessness of those "representatives of the European culture", as *The New York Times* ironically described them, was shown in two acts: one was the destruction of the main University Library in Algiers and the burning of at least half a million books; the other was the wrecking of the School of Medicine. This was "barbarism", concluded an editorial entitled "The Algerian Sickness", and those barbarians would have to be exterminated, driven into hiding or frightened into quietness; it could not be imagined that an "honorable peace" could ever be made with them.⁶¹ Their campaign of *terre brûlée*, which meant the total destruction of the economic and administrative infrastructure of the country, could only be described as "nihilistic madness of desperadoes run amuck".⁶²

But as it became clear that they had failed in their major goals, the *colon* extremists began to show a turnabout in their attitude in an attempt to strike some sort of deal with the Algerians. The latter, who had displayed "incredible forbearance" in the face of the savagery exhibited by the O.A.S., gave new evidence of their high sense of responsibility by agreeing to measures aimed at reconciliation between the two communities, including a general amnesty. Yet, there was always enough reason to question the true intentions of those desperadoes, who had shown "more kinship with Attila than with the noble French heritage", and to doubt that they would heed the directive to put an immediate end to their campaign of terror.⁶³

Algeria's revolution, as *The Economist* remarked, was socialist as well as nationalist and a socialist pattern of society was likely to be aimed at. Responding to worries about the future stance of Algeria towards France and the West, it prophesied that the election of a

national assembly that was to follow the forthcoming referendum would produce an Algerian government that would honour the Evian Accords and ensure Franco-Algerian cooperation.⁶⁴

A few weeks earlier, arguing along a similar line, *The (London) Times* had branded the Algerian leaders as "enigmas", partly in consequence of the experience they had acquired during the seven-and-a-half-year-war. It cautioned that they still would have to get to know each other and to function as a real team, and draw what it saw as a parallel with the problems faced by some European countries at the end of World War Two, as internal resistance leaders met the *émigré* leadership. Self-confidence and self-reliance were the two main factors behind the Algerians' victory. Though the F.L.N. had acquired help from different countries throughout the world, it had "achieved its unique success through its own resources of manpower, organization and morale". Hence, no country or ideological bloc could find that it had much political capital amongst the Algerians upon which it could draw. The Algerians, the paper predicted, would approach the business of government in the same pragmatic spirit that they had approached armed revolt.⁶⁵

Responding to the question: "Do you want Algeria to become an independent state cooperating with France under the terms defined by the declarations of 13 March 1962?", 5,975,581, comprising 99.72 percent of those who cast their votes on 1 July and 91.23 percent of the registered voters in Algeria, answered "yes", against only 16,537 who answered "no".⁶⁶ This vote formally brought to an end 132 years of French colonial rule. At long last, Algeria had achieved independence. This was officially recognized by General de Gaulle on 3 July.⁶⁷

"French Algeria died badly", wrote John Cavins: "The whole episode

constituted perhaps the most sordid and pathetic event in the long twilight of colonialism".⁶⁸

On Independence Day, jubilant Algerians took to the streets to celebrate victory after their long and costly struggle.⁶⁹ It was on 1 November 1954 that a group of relatively young men convinced, as *The New York Times* pointed out, that history was with them who had decided to follow in the footsteps of their ancestors and to challenge France's claim of sovereignty over Algeria. Immediately after the outbreak of the revolution, many observers thought their chances of shaking the vastly superior French military power were slim if not completely nonexistent. But after seven and a half years of revolutionary struggle, that combined armed revolt with the organization and mobilization of the people and a world-wide diplomatic campaign, the Algerians achieved the goal they had set out to achieve: national independence.⁷⁰

The New York Times reflected at length the tumultuous welcome with which the G.P.R.A. leaders were greeted by the inhabitants of Algiers after their return from Tunis. A prominently displayed front-page headline in the issue of 4 July read:

NATIONALIST LEADERS GET
WILD WELCOME IN ALGIERS
AS FREEDOM IS GRANTED.

This was accompanied with a picture of their triumphant ride through the capital. However, it cautioned against the discord that had recently occurred within the nationalist leadership. This had occurred partly because of the amnesty promised to the O.A.S. terrorists by the Transitional Executive Council, and partly because of the personal rivalry between some individuals within the leadership.⁷¹ Nevertheless, as *The New York Times* editorially pointed

out, all the leaders had the same goals for the new Algeria and all sought social revolution. Their differences were not ideological but lay in "the realms of pace and method".⁷² *The Economist* extended this argument: there was no quarrel over policy. Everybody was agreed about what would have to be done.⁷³

Remarking that Algeria was one of the most productive areas in the world, *The New York Times* called for close cooperation with France as the only country capable of providing the steady and effective aid that the new republic needed.⁷⁴ Its concern with Algeria's political and economic future stemmed largely from the growing preoccupation of the United States and the West with the country's ideological orientation after independence. The paper was one of many voices in the United States that called for effective American assistance to Algeria: "We cannot buy friends in such countries as Algeria. We can, however, make their people realize that our interest in their well-being is genuine".⁷⁵

Convinced by the inevitability of Algeria's independence, the American Government, as 1961 drew to a close, began to prepare policies anticipating an independent Algeria. For example, during a meeting with Saad Dahleb in December of that year, Bill Watman - an African Bureau officer at the State Department - expressed the United States' willingness to assist the new State. Commenting on the Dahleb-Watman meeting and admitting that his country had hitherto been handicapped by the Administration's "overriding concern for French sensitivities", Mennen Williams remarked that the recent American contacts with the Algerians represented "an advance in our effort to gain the confidence and friendship of Algeria's future leadership".⁷⁶

Birth of the Algerian Republic Amidst Growing Socio-Economic Problems

Algeria's achievement of independence took place at a time of exceptional tension. The *pieds noirs* were leaving the country *en masse*: 225,000 had already arrived in France by the end of June; and during the one week immediately following the referendum of 1 July alone, as many as 30,943 left Algeria.⁷⁷ The administrative apparatus of the country was on the verge of total disintegration and the economy was almost at a standstill.⁷⁸ Reflecting the country's mounting difficulties, a *New York Times* editorial entitled "Chaos in Algeria" underlined the gravity of the economic problems caused by the removal of essential technicians following the mass exodus of the *colons*; unemployment soared, production sharply decreased and capital resources declined. The task of building a strong and prosperous Algeria was made more difficult.⁷⁹ *Time* and *The Economist* had highlighted the serious problems faced by the new Algeria two weeks earlier.⁸⁰

This new Algeria was also, for a while, threatened by problems of a political nature as quarrels within the nationalist leadership sharpened. These were, however, soon eradicated by the impressive political maturity of the Algerian people who once again, lived up to their reputation as the "true heroes of the Revolution". Being aware of their responsibilities, and of the role they would have to play to preserve the freedom they had just won at a high price, they took to the streets to express their demands for the maintenance of national unity and for the election of a strong and regular government to face the gravity of the socio-economic situation.⁸¹ It was, in fact, the sacrifice of the people and their loyalty and complete backing of the F.L.N.-A.L.N. that had made victory possible.⁸² As already pointed

out, what took place in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, was not only a war of independence but a full-scale revolution of universal implications, to which success the people of all walks of life had contributed a great deal. Indeed, many Algerians considered their revolution as a fight for humanity at large.⁸³

The people's eagerness to get on with the job of laying the foundations of the new State was demonstrated by their massive turn-out at the polling stations on 20 September to elect the constituent National Assembly.⁸⁴ The first Government was formed on 29 September, marking the formal beginning of the political life of the Algerian Republic.⁸⁵ Hence, as *The New York Times* remarked, Algeria was now, for the first time in 132 years, ruled by its own regularly constituted Government and was enjoying an equal status among the free nations of the world.⁸⁶ The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria became on 8 October the 109th member of the United Nations, whose member states gave the Algerian delegation an enthusiastic welcome.⁸⁷

The sort of foreign policy that Algeria would choose to adopt was eagerly awaited by the international community, notably by the United States and the West. This was evidently reflected in *The New York Times'* editorial opinion which hailed the Algerian Government's declaration of a "neutralist and non-aligned" attitude in its future relations with the external world; and the reaffirmation of its commitment to the Evian agreement and, therefore, to cooperation with France.⁸⁸

Writing from Algiers in the "News of the Week in Review" section, Peter Braestrup - author of *Big Story...* - underlined the strategic importance of Algeria to both the East and the West: "Because of its

hard won revolution against French rule it is now the energetic virility symbol of Arab and African nationalism".⁸⁹ This view had been expressed a few months earlier by an English observer who, immediately after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement in March, noted that both politically and militarily the Algerians seemed equipped to give leadership to Africa and the Arab world.⁹⁰

Potentially the most powerful nation in the region, Algeria became the focus of attention of both the East and West; each side was anxious to see it kept free of the influence of the other. Meanwhile, the country's economic problems reached an alarming scale: schools closed because ninety-five percent of the teachers had left; two million people - half the entire workforce - were unemployed; only forty percent of the factories were still in operation; and industrial production was down by thirty percent.⁹¹ Algeria was in real need of international economic assistance to help meet its "unbelievable problem".⁹²

Commenting on those economic difficulties, Braestrup argued that the communist world was unlikely to be able to provide Algeria with the aid that France and the West could give with fewer strings attached.⁹³ This view was shared by both *The Economist* and *Time*. *The Economist* argued that Eastern assistance tended to be too irregular unless a country listed over and took the whole communist treatment; the Algerians would not under any circumstances accept to lose their freedom of choice.⁹⁴ Depicting the Algerians as "shrewd, pragmatic people", whose friendship for the West had survived the bitterness of the seven-and-a-half year war, *Time* asserted that they were aware of the economic aid that the United States could offer their country. Whatever the subject being discussed, Algerians often asked: "What is

reality?"⁹⁵

A few months earlier, addressing itself to the question of whether an independent Algeria would go communist, *Time* had reminded its readers that many things could have pushed the F.L.N. towards Communism. The French army had been trying to crush their revolution with American planes raining down American bombs on villages suspected of helping the nationalist units. Weapons captured by their fighters had American markings on them, including grenades, shells and wrecked helicopters. The only aid the Algerians received came from Arab or communist countries. Nevertheless, seven and a half years of fierce fighting and intensive diplomatic manoeuvring had made "sophisticated men of the F.L.N. political leaders..."; they were aware that the interest of their country lay in following a neutral line and in avoiding alignment with either ideological camp, without being internationally passive.⁹⁶

It was in this context that the Algerian Government reiterated its intention to remain neutral in the Cold War, to seek the "broadest possible cooperation" with other countries regardless of their political system and to avoid foreign dominance under any guise.⁹⁷ *The New York Times*, now concentrating on Algeria's future ideological orientation, was full of praise for the Government's reaffirmed commitment to the principles of balance and neutrality in its relations with both the United States and the Soviet union. The Algerians also sought balance in their domestic socio-economic strategy. This meant a deliberate policy to reconcile both the public and the private sectors, making Algerian socialism, as the paper editorially remarked with some relief, evidently distinctive from that of the Soviet Union.⁹⁸

Notes

1. *The New York Times*, 6 January 1962.
2. *The Economist*, 27 January 1962; see also P. Hennisart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.320.
3. See Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.510; see also C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test de Gaulle and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, pp.213-214.
4. See *L'Année Politique*, 1962, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, p.1.
5. *Time*, 19 January 1962.
6. Editorial: "Algeria's Dark Hours", *The New York Times*, 22 January 1962.
7. *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.1.
8. "Helping a Friend on the Verge", *The New York Times*, 10 January 1962.
9. Editorial: "Ordeal in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 5 February 1962.
10. Editorial: "Stubborn Race with Time", *The (London) Times*, 6 February 1962.
11. Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.327.
12. The points upon which the negotiators agreed in principle included the future of the oil riches and nuclear installations in the Sahara, the use of the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, the evacuation of French troops from Algeria, the future of the French community in an independent Algeria and economic cooperation between France and Algeria after independence. See *L'Année Politique*, 1962, "Les Accords d'Évian", *op.cit.*, pp.631-646; see also "The Franco-Algerian Settlement", *Survey of International Affairs*, 1962, London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp.438-461.
13. S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.148.
14. See Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, pp.516-517.
15. C.L. Sulzberger, "Can Revolutionary War Go Wrong", *The New York Times*, 3 March 1962.
16. See editorial: "Last Lap in Algeria", "Terror in Algiers", *The New York Times*, 7, 17 March 1962.
17. See Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.319.
18. Quoted in *The (London) Times*, 3 March 1962.
19. Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.319.

20. *The (London) Times*, 5 March 1962.
21. H. Claude, "Les Accords d'Évian", *Economic et Politique*, No.93, April 1962, pp.2-8; *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, pp.631-646.
22. "The Franco-Algerian Settlement", *Survey of International Affairs*, 1962, *op.cit.*, pp.438-461.
23. See *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.274.
24. Editorial: "The Algerian Terms", *The New York Times*, 20 March 1962.
25. "The Franco-Algerian Settlement", *Survey of International Affairs*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.444.
26. "The Algerian Terms", *The New York Times*, 20 March 1962.
27. "The Franco-Algerian Settlement", *Survey of International Affairs*, 1962, p.444.
28. Quoted in *Time*, 16 March 1962.
29. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, *op.cit.*, p.522.
30. Document No.58, "Contribution à l'histoire du F.L.N.", in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.312-321.
31. Albert-Paul Lentin, "Les différentes étapes de la Politique de de Gaulle de Juin 1958 à Juillet 1962", in *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, p.229.
32. Leading Article: "End of a Chapter", *The Economist*, 24 March 1962.
33. Document No.58, "Contribution à l'histoire du F.L.N.", in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.312-321.
34. On the O.A.S.'s terrorism, see Gros Vitalis (former police prefect of Algiers), *Le Temps de la Violence*, Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1971, pp.204-205; A.P. Lentin, *Le Dernier Quant d'heure*, *op.cit.*, pp.289-299; Paul Henissart, *Les Combattants du Crépuscule*, Paris: Grasset, 1970; Yves Courrière, *Les Feux du Désespoir*, *op.cit.*, pp.564-570; Alain Jacob, *D'Une Algérie à l'autre*, Paris, 1963; *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, pp.259-300.
35. C.L. Sulzberger, "Barbarians Were a Kind of Solution", *The New York Times*, 21 March 1962.
36. Editorial: "Birth of a Nation", *The New York Times*, 28 March 1962.
37. Editorial: "Murder in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 5 April 1962.
38. "The Franco-Algerian Settlement", *Survey of International Affairs*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.447.
39. "Battle for Paris", *The Economist*, 24 March 1962; "Algeria After the Ceasefire", *The Economist*, 7 April 1962.

40. Out of the 20.8 million of those who cast their votes, 17.9 million were for the agreement and 1.8 million were against it. See *Le Monde*, 14 April 1962; Droz and Lever, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p.336; *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.38.
41. *The New York Times*, 9 April 1962.
42. M. Harbi, *Le F.L.N.: Mériage et Réalité*, *op.cit.*, p.322.
43. P. Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.388.
44. C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test: de Gaulle and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.218.
45. Editorial: "Time Bomb in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 20 April 1962.
46. Comment: "Eyes on Algeria", *The New York Times*, 23 April 1962.
47. C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test: de Gaulle and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.210.
48. P. Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, pp.473-474.
49. C.L. Sulzberger, *The Test: de Gaulle and Algeria*, *op.cit.*, p.220.
50. *The New York Times*, 28 April 1962.
51. Editorial: "New Tensions in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 30 April 1962.
52. Editorial: "TIME FOR STERNNESS", *The (London) Times*, 4 May 1962.
53. *The New York Times*, 4 May 1962.
54. A.L.N. Communiqué cited in *Time*, 4 May 1962.
55. Editorial: "Madness in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 11 May 1962.
56. Comment: "Death in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 21 May 1962.
57. P. Henissart, *Wolves in the City*, *op.cit.*, p.405.
58. Editorial: "The Truce in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 7 June 1962.
59. "Whose Victory?", *The Economist*, 9 June 1962.
60. Jack Wilson, representative of the American Foundation of Algerian Children's Fund (a private organization founded by Professor Brace) quoted in Brace, *Algerian Voices*, *op.cit.*, p.206.
61. *The New York Times*, 9 June 1962.
62. Editorial: "'Scorched Earth' in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 16 June 1962.
63. Editorial: "Accord in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 18 June 1962.
64. Leading Article: "Which Algeria", *The Economist*, 30 June 1962.

65. *The (London) Times*, 24 April 1962.
66. See *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.84 and 310; see also S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.156.
67. See Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'Espoir*, Paris: Plon, 1970, p.137. Text of de Gaulle's declaration recognizing Algeria's independence, see *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.670.
68. John Cavins, "Algeria: The Last Ordeal", in *International Journal* (Toronto), Spring 1962.
69. See the vivid pictures that had been taken by the Swedish journalist Margareta Bohlin-Carlson and the eye-witness accounts of those who were observing or taking part in those celebrations in "En Direct De L'Indépendance", *Parcours Maghrébins*, No.9/9, June-July, 1987, pp.19-39.
70. *The New York Times*, 2 July 1962.
71. On this disagreement and the problems it created, see Mostefa Lacheraf, "Mésaventure de l'Algérie Indépendante et Triomphe de L'Unité", in *El Moudjahid*, 24 August 1962; see also *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, pp.300-328; see also *Le Monde*, 11 July; 4, 28 August 1962 and the chronology of Roger Letourneau in *Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord*, Paris: CNRS, 1962, pp.276-295.
72. *The New York Times*, 13 July 1962.
73. *The Economist*, 11 August 1972.
74. Editorial: "Darkness at Noon in Algeria", *The New York Times*, 6 July 1962.
75. Editorial: "American Aid to Algeria", *The New York Times*, 21 August 1962.
76. See F. Ferhat, "American Policy Towards Algeria", *op.cit.*, pp.498-499.
77. See *Le Monde* (daily) 5 and 12 July 1962; *Le Monde* (weekly), No.472, 3-9 January 1963.
78. See S. Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, *op.cit.*, p.156.
79. *The New York Times*, 27 August 1962.
80. *Time*, 10 August 1962; *The Economist*, 11 August 1962.
81. *The New York Times*, 1 September 1962.
82. Document No.58, "Contribution a l'histoire du F.L.N.", in *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, *op.cit.*, pp.312-321.
83. See Brace, *Algerian Voices*, *op.cit.*, p.222.
84. *The New York Times*, 21 September 1962.
85. *L'Année Politique*, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.327.

86. Editorial: "Algeria's New Government", *The New York Times*, 2 October 1962.
87. See *United Nations Year Book, 1962*, New York, United Nations: Office of Public Information, 1964, pp.150-151; see also *L'Année Politique, 1962, op.cit.*, pp.328-330.
88. Editorial: "Algeria's New Government", *The New York Times*, 2 October 1962.
89. *The New York Times*, 19 November 1962.
90. *The (London) Times*, 24 March 1962.
91. *Time*, 23 November 1962.
92. Ben Bella quoted in *Journal Officiel*, 4 December 1964.
93. *The New York Times*, 19 November 1962.
94. *The Economist*, 3 November 1962.
95. *Time*, 23 November 1962.
96. *Time*, 16 March 1962.
97. Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Khemisti, quoted in 26 November 1962; see also Front de Liberation Nationale, "Projet de Programme", *F.L.N. Documents*, Paris, 1962, pp.87-90.
98. "Algerian Balance", *The New York Times*, 4 December 1962.

CHAPTER VII

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES COVERAGE
OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION, 1956-1962

"Analysis of problems... is usually best carried out with statistical tools..." [Richard W. Budd, 1967].

This study, as demonstrated at length in the thematic analysis developed in Chapters II to VI, is quality oriented, using the traditional historical approach based on cross-disciplinary knowledge, media and extra-media data; it has explored what *The New York Times* said about Algeria, how it said it and what it did *not* say. Nevertheless, as this chapter will demonstrate, numerical methods have been utilized in order to establish a quantitative model aimed at examining statistically the paper's Algeria material and its display.¹

The New York Times carried 58 items on Algeria during the whole eight-year period 1945-1953. Its coverage, however, increased by 208.6 percent in quantitative terms in the two years preceding the period of substantive analysis in this thesis, 1956-1962. This was a direct result of the outbreak of the war and the serious turn the North African situation henceforth took. Its Algeria reportage in 1954 and 1955 was also thematically more diverse and its level of interest in the subject, measured by the three-point scale explained earlier, was much higher, with a total attention score of 246 points compared with only 70 points between 1945 and 1953.

In qualitative terms, however, the paper's coverage in 1954 and 1955 remained as weak as in the previous eight-year period. Deluded by French governmental sources, it helped to "black out" essential information about the Algerian problem and its various facets.² Most of its Algeria-related items seemed far away from the fundamental journalistic principle of "impartiality", as they unequivocally favoured the French Government point of view. Even in those scarce instances where it seemed to try to be impartial by providing both sides of each story, the choice of opinions and the way they were displayed - without direct distortion - were still favourable to the French authorities. Whereas, for example, it often quoted directly or at least paraphrased statements of French officials, it reported the statements of Algerian nationalists only indirectly.

Heavy dependence on "hot news" and the non-existence of in-depth analysis, combined with a general lack of understanding of the complexity of the post-War North African situation, resulted in hasty, superficial and often misleading coverage. *The New York Times* reporters and editors, failing to address themselves to the crux of the Algerian problem, added to the reader's confusion by relying on superficial, often over-simplistic second-hand reports. *The New York Times*, like all American newspapers, firmly adhered to the journalistic convention of complete separability of facts from opinion and interpretation; these were limited only to the editorial page, the Magazine or the Sunday section "News of the Week in Review". Only 23 items, comprising, 9.7 percent of the overall total Algeria material between 1945 and 1955 could be considered to belong to the analysis/interpretation category, including eleven editorials and twelve commentaries; but only a fraction of these can be regarded as really analytical or interpretive.

The New York Times Algeria coverage between 1945 and 1955 lacked the "breadth of analysis" and the "instinct for fact-finding" which is usually believed to constitute an essential part of the craft of journalism and, therefore, failed to provide the reader with the "whys" and "hows" of events. Without analysis and interpretation of news even sophisticated readers find it hard, if not impossible, to understand the multifarious conditions that circumscribe political situations. The paper tried to report the events in Algeria but failed adequately to address itself to the different causes and effects of the problem. Willy nilly, it helped the French authorities in their attempts to undermine the aspiration of a nation for the right to self-determination.

The paper was preoccupied mainly with what was "dramatic" and "novel". It focused on French "police" activities as the French Government attempted to stamp out the Algerian nationalist movement, and the lofty statements of French officials, to use its own slogan, became the "news fit to print". This almost obsessive focus on what was "dramatic" and "novel" resulted in considerable fluctuation in its Algerian coverage during the period. Over two years, 1948 and 1949, not a single Algerian story was deemed worthy of printing in its columns. This undermined one of the primary duties of a newspaper, which is to "make meanings out of events", by reducing the role of the journalist to one similar to that of a fireman to be requested only "on call" and then no longer required once the fire is over.³

The New York Times Algeria coverage between 1945 and 1955 was, therefore, generally weak, misleading and error-prone. The paper, widely regarded as the most prestigious daily publication in the United States, only partly lived up to its tradition as a "news

oriented" newspaper, and almost totally neglected essential background, analytical and interpretive information. Its reliance on French official sources made its reportage superficial, simplistic and largely dominated by subliminal, speculative and one-sided views. This thesis has explored the extent to which the newspaper, during the period 1956-1962, overcame its earlier limitations. The thematic analysis developed in Chapters II to VI is now given statistical expression by applying a modification of the "attention score" system. This chapter is divided into the four main sub-periods of the substantive thematic analysis.

Sub-Period I: 1956-1957

The New York Times Algeria-related coverage in 1956 and 1957 was centred around ten major thematic categories. These are classified here according to a three-point scale to determine their degree of "intensity". As explained earlier, a thematic category is given one point, two points or three points depending on its frequency number; that is, according to the number of times it has occurred in the paper's material in a given period. These categories are presented in Table 1 with their frequency number (or thematic trajectory) and their degree of intensity.

TABLE 1

Thematic Category	Frequency Number	Degree of Intensity
1. "Bad" character of the "rebels"	49	2
2. Algeria as an integral part of France	22	1
3. Foreign influence on F.L.N.	52	2
4. French attempts of socio-economic reforms to win popular support and isolate F.L.N.	97	3
5. Military situation: French efforts to end the war by force	160	3
6. Socio-economic and political repercussions of the war in France	78	2
7. The international implications of the Algerian-French conflict; France seeking N.A.T.O. assistance	47	2
8. The "Algerian Question" at the United Nations	36	2
9. F.L.N.'s growing political and military strength	89	3
10. <i>Colon</i> pressure and the French Government retreat.	23	1

Because this study is concerned with the manner in which *The New York Times* treated Algeria as well as the choice of themes, the attempt is made to examine the frequency of occurrence and prominence of display of the Algeria-related material. This helps to clarify the paper's attitude towards the subject. Measurement of the material

according to the "attention score" system has given the following results: out of a total of 489 items devoted to the subject during this sub-period (1956-1957), three items were assigned three points;⁴ 251 items were assigned two points; and 235 items were assigned one point. The total score of the attention given by the paper to Algeria in 1956 and 1957 was 746 points.⁵

The New York Times focused on four major thematic categories; the military situation, especially the French army's efforts to end the war by weakening the F.L.N.; the French Government's efforts to isolate the F.L.N. and win popular support through promises of socio-economic "reforms"; the growing military and political strength of the F.L.N.; and the heavy bearing of the war on France's political, economic and social life. The most "salient", or most frequently mentioned, categories are tabulated in Table 2 with their frequency number.

TABLE 2

Thematic category	Frequency Number
1. Military situation: French efforts to end the war by force.	160
2. French attempts of socio-economic "reforms" to win popular support and isolate F.L.N.	97
3. F.L.N.'s growing military and political strength	89
4. Socio-economic and political repercussions of the war in France.	78

The paper's degree of attention to the subject did not follow a steady pattern but was subject to conspicuous fluctuation. The level of interest in Algeria rose in the first five months of 1956 but fell sharply in the last seven months. This is evidenced by the 44 front-page stories, eleven editorials and four commentaries the paper devoted to the Algerian conflict between January and May, as opposed

to only 15 front-page stories, two editorials and two commentaries between June and December. It has already been observed that with the competition for space, other events than the preoccupation of the present thesis, can take over. In 1956, of course, the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez came to dominate the world press. However, despite this a similar degree of fluctuation affected its coverage in 1957. The degree of attention rose in the first six months with 31 front-page stories, eight editorials and nine commentaries, but fell sharply between July and September with only six front-page stories, two editorials and four commentaries. It then rose again between October and December with 15 front-page stories, six editorials and six commentaries. The degree of attention given by *The New York Times* to Algeria during this sub-period reached its highest point or "peak" in May 1956, with 14 front-page stories, one editorial and two commentaries, and also in June 1957 with nine front-page stories, three editorials and two commentaries. This fluctuation is presented in tabular form in Table 3:

TABLE 3

	Front-page stories	Editorials	Commentaries	Total attention score
January to May 1956	44	11	4	119 points
June to December 1956	15	2	2	39 points
January to June 1957	31	8	9	95 points
July to September 1957	6	2	4	24 points
October to December 1957	15	6	6	54 points

According to the "attention score" system relying as it does on a three-point scale to gauge the degree of attention associated with each item, editorials, front-page stories and commentaries are assigned two points. But, front-page stories with headlines covering more than half the number of columns on the same page are assigned three points.⁶ This study has detected three such stories in *The New York Times* Algeria-related coverage in 1956 and 1957. Each has therefore been assigned three points in the count of attention score table.

Despite its evident extensiveness, represented by the 489 items, the paper's Algeria coverage in 1956 and 1957 was predominantly favourable to the French point of view as demonstrated in Chapter III. In valence terms, therefore, 379 items, out of a total of 489, comprising 77.5 percent and with a total attention score of 552 points, were favourable to France. This is compared with only 110 balanced or neutral items comprising 22.5 percent of the total Algeria material and with a total attention score of 194 points. This perhaps confirms the view that by standards of professional competence in the reporting and interpreting of events, especially those outside the United States, *The New York Times* is denied the claim to "eminence" in American journalism, despite its statistical supremacy.⁷ It also corresponds with the view that: "All the News That's Fit to Print" is a "great slogan" but is also a "fraud"; no newspaper or network station has the space or the time to cover the actions and words of a single city like Washington let alone the world: "... the process of selecting what the reader reads involves not just objective facts but subjective judgments, personal values and, yes, prejudices".⁸

In addition to misrepresenting and misreporting events, *The New York Times*, whether deliberately or not, helped the French authorities to "black out" important news about different aspects within the overall area. The fact that most of its material was favourable to the French official view was a direct consequence of its heavy reliance on government sources for its raw information. This is especially true of the 175 news stories which had originated in France and the 141 stories which had originated in Algeria; these were overwhelmingly favourable to the Government's position. Up to 316 news stories out of a total of 418, comprising 75.5 percent of the total Algeria-related news reportorial material, were based on information from official sources. Concordant with this, is the fact that 66 items out of an overall total of 110 balanced or neutral items during this sub-period, had originated outside France and Algeria, mainly in Tunis, Rabat or at the United Nations or simply in the paper's own feature departments.

The fact that the paper depended on French governmental sources corresponds with the theory that news is elite centred both in terms of people and in terms of nations. As Johan Galtung and Mari H. Ruge have argued, in an elite-centred news communication system "ordinary people are not given the chance of representing themselves. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same should apply to nations".⁹ Such dependence also perhaps finds explanation in the fact that Europe has traditionally dominated the United States foreign news coverage. For example, 51 percent of all American foreign correspondents stationed abroad in 1975 were in Europe.¹⁰ It also corresponds with the theory that there is an inherent "Loyalty bias" which often affects the quality of the coverage of non-Western news by the Western media. This point will be developed in greater detail later on in this chapter.

The weakness of *The New York Times* Algeria coverage also stems from the fact that it relied heavily on "hot news" at the expense of analytical and interpretive material. Only 54 items, comprising 11 percent of the total Algeria-related material, can be considered to belong to the analysis/interpretation category; they included 29 editorials and 25 commentaries. Even these, arguably enough, were not analytical enough. This perhaps gives credence to the argument that the paper's editorial page was "unpersuasive" and lacked "vitality" and "punch". On the other hand, as many as 418 items, comprising 85.4 percent of all the Algeria material, fell under the "hot news", or straight news-reporting, category. Most of the reports, as already explained, originated in the information services of the French Government. The information conveyed by those services was generally relayed uncritically by the paper whose Algeria coverage, during this sub-period, was generally superficial and error-prone.¹²

Analytical coverage, it is argued, has never been part of the training of *The New York Times* correspondents: "If there is no 'crisis'..., they feel there is nothing to report". The paper's foreign coverage has even been described as generally "miserable", because of its lack of interpretive, analytical materials and its heavy dependence on "hot news". Its claim to "authority" in American journalism is often based on its "mastery of the factual material" or its possession of raw information.¹³ Editors of American newspapers including *The New York Times* traditionally objected to mixing news with opinion and insisted upon giving facts without context, arguing that the reporter's duty is to give the reader enough facts as simple and as clear as possible.¹⁴ Since the function of a newspaper is to "explain the world to the people who live in it", the theory of absolute separability of fact from opinion has been viewed by many

critics as "unreasonable". The newspaper's duty, as Benjamin Demott has argued, is not only to describe events but to measure their significance and their impact on the people. Hence, the newspaper should not only be an instrument which simply reacts to experience but should also "seek to act upon it, creating the central issues of the time in comprehensible language, aiming beyond accuracy at *meaning*". The newspaper should, in a nutshell, accept its obligation to "educate", and should not encourage the theory that "simple opinions are adequate opinions" whereby the reader may believe that whatever catchword he can invent will be enough to enable him to understand and interpret complicated matters, like wars and international crises.¹⁵

Concordant with the fact that *The New York Times* relied heavily on "hot news" at the expense of in-depth analysis and interpretation, is the argument that the Algeria-related events were generally presented to the reader devoid of their socio-economic, cultural and historical background. It is essential for the lay reader and the expert alike, one supposes, to perceive facts in their relevant contexts in order to understand their causes, consequences and implications. One of the shortcomings of the paper's reportage of the Algerian-French conflict was the tendency to overplay the consequences of events to the detriment of analysis of their causes and diverse contextual circumstances. In fact, not all the 51 items which have been classified herein under the analytical/interpretation category were analytical enough. Only seven of these, comprising a mere 1.4 percent of the total Algeria material, really attempted to analyse the conflict in all its aspects; only seven items were unclouded by the simplistic and highly subliminal views that largely dominated the paper's Algeria coverage in 1956 and 1957.¹⁶

A general rule in journalism is that the news should be presented to the reader in a manner that can be easily understood.

"Simplification" does not become a negative factor influencing news coverage if it is intended as "clarification", but, it becomes a negative factor that influences the quality of news coverage when it is intended as "making less complex". If a particular event has some sort of complexity and "what happened" is reported as less complex, "more simple" than it actually was, then simplification becomes a serious journalistic error.¹⁷

The (London) Times Algeria coverage, like that of *The New York Times*, was mostly simplistic and superficial. This was again partly the result of its almost exclusive reliance on French official sources for its news material: all the reports came from Paris; none came from Algeria, simply because the paper had no resident correspondent there. It was also partly a consequence of its heavy dependence on "hot news" at the expense of analytical, interpretive material. Although the paper devoted 22 editorials to the Algerian-French conflict during this sub-period, only three could be considered analytical or interpretive.¹⁸ The rest did not differ much from news stories as they were generally superficial and highly descriptive.¹⁹ The weeklies (*The Economist* and *Time*), on the other hand, because of their nature as synthesizers of, and commentators on, news media information, provided more analytical material and more background information to the Algerian problem than did the dailies, despite the fact that the news magazines are limited by space and frequency of publication.²⁰

The New York Times heavy reliance on French official sources, and the subsequent limitation of the amount of balanced or neutral Algeria news material, resulted in some serious reporting flaws and consequent

bias against the F.L.N. Therefore, whether deliberately or not, the posture of the newspaper was favourable to the French Government. Some of these flaws are related to sources of information which are technically known as "questionable"; others are related to the phraseology used and in this sub-period include three categories: "loaded words", "opportunistic reporting" and "pollyanna reporting".²¹

1. **Questionable sources of information:** These are the sources of news stories which are of "dubious validity and reliability". This study has detected that when the reporting was "inexact" in source of information it was often unfavourable to the F.L.N. and, by the same token, favourable to France. A story appearing on 30 July 1956 typified the paper's description of the military situation: "French forces killed sixty-six insurgents in week-end clashes in eastern Algeria, *reports reaching here said tonight*".²² A similar story read: "*Unofficial estimates today said the rebels had lost 15,000 men in the last two months. Only seventy French soldiers were reported killed in the same period*".²³ Also typifying the paper's reportage were phrases like "In view of diplomatic sources here...", "Observers here assumed..." which generally left the sources ambiguous and unidentified.²⁴ Moreover, some of the paper's sources of information were unreliable and of dubious validity because they had relied on accounts given by only one of the two belligerent sides, *viz* the French authorities: "Tonight's news bulletins from military headquarters have reported 132 rebels killed.. in the last twenty-four hours"; "French forces said today forty nationalist rebels had been killed in military operations in rebel-torn Algeria".²⁵

2. **Loaded Words:** This type of reporting error refers to words or phrases with "high overtones". Although such words or phrases

sometimes make reporting livelier and more appealing, their usage by *The New York Times* was, like the questionable sources of information explained earlier, favourable to the French position and, therefore, anti-F.L.N. Typical examples of this flaw are: "The rebels... had *preyed on civilians*"; "The rebel methods are *savage...*"; "... rebel... *vandalism and sabotage*".²⁶ Concordant with this, is the paper's general tone which was overwhelmingly favourable to France. Reporting on a French-A.L.N. military clash, for example, it carried the following dispatch: "French authorities say they *killed* 200 nationalist rebels over the week-end in Algeria. They reported that nineteen French soldiers had *lost their lives* in the operations".²⁷

3. **Opportunistic reporting:** This is defined as "news which is reported primarily for its timeliness rather than for its intrinsic news value". *The New York Times* sometimes used opportune news items to supplement certain subliminal views and pre-established ideas which were generally stereotypes of the French army's creation. To supplement the view of the viciousness of the F.L.N. fighters the paper reported at some length incidents where they were alleged to have killed civilians: "A French farm manager and his 23-year-old daughter were shot and killed in Birmandreis... by terrorists".²⁸ To support the idea of rivalry between the F.L.N. and other Algerian organizations the paper reported the arrest by the French of five men who belonged to Messali's M.N.A. for attempting to kill an F.L.N. leader, Krim Belkacem, under the conspicuous headline:

FRENCH JAIL FIVE REBELS

Seize Group Trying to Kill
Leader of Rival Band.²⁹

To supplement the claim that the F.L.N. was not enjoying the support of the local population and that most Algerians were distant from its cause, the paper opportunely reported: "Two native hamlets in the

Soummam Valley... put themselves under the protection of the French Army".³⁰ Another story had earlier read: "The rebels killed twenty-three Moslems at various places because of their sympathies for the French".³¹ And to supplement the claim that the French army was regaining control of the situation, it repeatedly highlighted F.L.N. losses through opportune news items. Typical samples of these include: "... sixty-five rebels had been killed and forty wounded in clash five miles west of Nedroma...";³² "Sixteen rebels, eleven of them in uniform, were killed by French paratroopers in an engagement near Honainie;"³³ "French forces killed sixty-six insurgents in week-end clashes in eastern Algeria..".³⁴ The paper, on the other hand, often minimized the French losses or ignored them altogether.

4. Pollyanna reporting: This refers to "news which is reported in its most cheerful light, news reported in terms of wishful thinking". For example, referring to what it called the French army's "successes" against the F.L.N., the paper commented in a pollyanna way that this would "lead to a modification of the rebel attitude", which to-date had still made recognition of Algeria's right to independence a prerequisite for any negotiations with the French Government.³⁵ This study, however, has not detected in this sub-period any instance of the other equally serious reporting errors such as "unwarranted headlines" and "climactic reporting" which developed later on.

Table 4 summarizes the manner in which *The New York Times* covered the Algerian-French conflict in 1956 and 1957.

TABLE 4

Origin of Algeria-related news stories	From France: 175; From Algeria: 141; Other: 102 Total: 418
Sources of news stories	French sources: 316; Non-French sources: 102; Total: 418
News stories as played in the paper	Inside pages: 307 stories; Page One: 111 stories; Total: 418
Nature of Algeria-related material	News stories: 418; Editorials: 29; Commentaries: 25; Letters to the editor: 17 Total: 489
Attention score of Algeria-related items	235 items: 1 point; 251 items: 2 points; 3 items: 3 points Total: 746 points
Valence of Algeria-related items	Pro-French: 379 items; Balanced or neutral: 110 items; Total: 489

Sub-Period II: 1958-1959

The New York Times Algeria-related material in 1958 and 1959 included thirteen major thematic categories which are tabulated below with their frequency number and their degree of intensity:

TABLE 5

Thematic Category	Frequency Number	Degree of Intensity
1. Economic and "psychological" importance of Algeria to France.	18	1
2. Military situation: the Challe offensive	68	2
3. French attempts of socio-economic "reforms" to win popular support and isolate F.L.N.	37	1
4. F.L.N.'s growing political and military strength	68	2
5. Heavy bearing of the war on both Algeria and France	76	2
6. International repercussions of the conflict; the impact of the war on neighbouring countries	109	3
7. France's enduring political crisis and the collapse of the Fourth Republic	77	2
8. De Gaulle's return to power and his attempts to keep Algeria tied to France.	152	3
9. Algerian reaction to de Gaulle's integrationist policies.	27	1
10. France's acceptance of Algeria's right to self-determination.	72	2
11. <i>Colon</i> -Army Opposition to de Gaulle's plan and threat of insurrection.	55	2
12. The West, the United States and the Algerian conflict.	65	2
13. The United Nations and the "Algerian Question".	29	1

Applying the "attention score" system³⁶ to measure the degree of prominence of the Algeria-related material and, thus, the level of the paper's interest in the subject, this study has detected that out of a total of 616 items devoted to Algeria, seven items were assigned three points,³⁷ 425 items were assigned two points and 184 items were assigned one point. The total score of the attention the paper gave

to Algeria in 1958 and 1959 was 1055 points.³⁸

The New York Times, in covering the Algerian-French conflict during this sub-period focused on four major themes: de Gaulle's return to power and his immediate policy on Algiers; the international repercussions of the conflict, notably its impact on the neighbouring countries; France's enduring political crisis resulting in the collapse of the Fourth Republic; and the heavy bearing of the war on both Algeria and France. These most salient themes are presented in Table 6 with their frequency number or thematic trajectory.

TABLE 6

Thematic Category	Frequency Number
1. De Gaulle's return to power and his attempts to keep Algeria tied to France.	152
2. International repercussions of the conflict; the impact of the war on the neighbouring countries.	109
3. France's enduring political crisis and the collapse of the Fourth Republic.	77
4. Heavy bearing of the war on both Algeria and France.	76

This study has detected considerable fluctuation in the degree of attention given by *The New York Times* to the subject during this sub-period. Such attention rose in the first six months of 1958 with as many as 118 front-page stories, 43 editorials and 15 "News of the Week in Review" commentaries. It, however, fell sharply between July and December with only 15 front-page stories, 13 editorials and seven commentaries. This fluctuation is perhaps partly determined by the fact that the first half of 1958 saw some important and highly "news worthy" events taking place in France itself, namely the 13 May *coup*, the downfall of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's return to power.³⁹ In the second half of the year, however, these events lost their novelty and therefore the paper's level of interest decreased. This

perhaps confirms a general criticism of *The New York Times*, and the press as a whole, that it only gives adequate attention to developments when they are new or "novel". This also corresponds with the theory that sensational happenings always make better "story". Conflict, hardcore news, controversy, crisis and disaster have always outplayed soft news in the media. The distinguished columnist James Reston once defined news as "a chronicle of conflict and change". In 1959, on the other hand, the paper's degree of attention to the subject followed a relatively steady pattern although without a very high cumulative score. This is evidenced by the 35 front-page stories, nine editorials and four commentaries devoted to the Algerian-French conflict between January and June, and the 35 front-page stories, nine editorials and eleven commentaries between July and December.

The New York Times level of interest in Algeria in 1958 and 1959 had reached its highest point or "peak" in May 1958, with 36 page-one stories, 16 editorials and three commentaries when the French political crisis reached its climax with the 13 May *coup* and also, to some extent, in June when the Fourth Republic finally collapsed and de Gaulle was brought back to power.⁴⁰ Its interest in the subject reached its lowest point or "valley" in April 1959 with only three page-one stories, one commentary and zero editorials. The paper's degree of attention to Algeria during this sub-period, measured by the number of front-page, editorial and commentary items is presented in Table 7.

TABLE 7

	Front-page stories	Editorials	Commentaries	Total attention score
January to June 1958	112	43	15	361 points
July to December 1958	15	13	9	70 points
January to June 1959	35	5	6	88 points
July to December 1959	35	10	13	110 points

1958 and 1959 also saw an evident rise in the amount of balanced Algeria material in the newspaper, in addition to the overall quantitative rise in the coverage. In statistical "valence" terms, 207 items out of a total of 616, comprising 33.6 percent of the Algeria-related material with a total attention score of 401 points, were neutral or balanced, compared with only 22.5 percent and a total attention score of 194 points in 1956 and 1957. On the other hand 296 items, comprising 48 percent of the total coverage and with a total attention score of 507 points, were favourable to the French Government. 113 items, comprising 18.3 percent of the overall coverage and with a total attention score of 147 points, were unfavourable to the *colon* extremists. As explained in Chapter III, after the French political crisis of 1958 and the 13 May *coup* which precipitated the downfall of the Fourth Republic, the paper began to take a firm and more explicit stance against the *colon* extremists and their allies within the army.

This increase in the amount of balanced or neutral material was a direct result of the decrease in *The New York Times* reliance on French official sources for information. In the profession of journalism correspondents are customarily expected to diversify their sources of

information and avoid relying on a single source. The quality and direction of the news finally presented to the reader is by and large "dependent on what is available at the gathering end of the line".⁴¹ In 1958 and 1959 *The New York Times* appeared to be more conscious of its public duty. Of the 484 news stories the paper devoted to Algeria during this sub-period, 192 stories, comprising 39.6 percent of the overall news reportage, came from independent sources, compared with only 24.4 percent in 1956 and 1957. 250 stories, comprising 51.6 percent of the total number of news stories as opposed to 75.5 percent in 1956 and 1957, still relied on French official sources. This study has detected that the paper increased its direct quotations of governmental sources and also its source references. This is an indication of its attempt to dissociate itself from both the source and the message as opposed to the previous two-year period which was dominated by paraphrasing and was, therefore, inevitably favourable to the French point of view. As L. Erwin Atwood has argued, "the communicator who is to relay the source's message may wish, consciously or not, to use these means to make it clear that the views expressed are not his own".⁴² It is interesting to note that 42 news stories, comprising 8.6 percent of the total Algeria news reportage as opposed to zero percentage in 1956 and 1957, came from Algerian sources. It is widely accepted that the duty of the foreign news correspondent is to "tell the story of the people in the nation to which he is assigned, not merely the official acts of the government and the announcements of the press attachés".⁴³

Congruent with the idea that *The New York Times* improved the quality of its Algeria coverage in 1958 and 1959, is the fact that it increased the amount of its analytical and interpretive material. Out of an overall total of 616 Algeria-related items, 114 items,

comprising 18.5 percent of the total coverage as opposed to only 11 percent in 1956 and 1957, fell under the analysis/interpretation category. They include 71 editorials and 61 commentaries. *The (London) Times* also quantitatively improved its Algeria-related analytical and interpretive material, evidenced by the 38 editorials it devoted to the subject during this sub-period compared with only 22 in 1956 and 1957. Once again, however, it was the weeklies, namely *The Economist* and *Time* - by their nature as synthesizers of news media information - which provided better analytical coverage and more background material to the Algerian-French conflict.⁴⁴

Although *The New York Times* diversified its sources of information and increased its usage of independent sources, its reportage in 1958 and 1959 was affected by a number of journalistic errors which were related to the source and are technically known as "questionable" sources of information; sources which are of "dubious validity and reliability".⁴⁵ As in 1956 and 1957, such errors were by and large unfavourable to the Algerian point of view and were, by the same token, pro-French. Typifying these errors are the following samples: "Experienced observers reported today that..."; "... it was learned today from unimpeachable diplomatic sources..."; "Unofficial reports said..."; "observers noted that...".⁴⁶

Table 8 shows in brief how *The New York Times* covered the Algerian-French conflict in 1958 and 1959.

TABLE 8

Origin of Algeria-related news stories	From France: 192; From other places excluding Algeria: 166; From Algeria: 126 Total: 484
Sources of news stories	French sources: 250; Independent sources: 192; Algerian sources: 42 Total: 484
News stories as played in the paper	Inside pages: 287 stories; Page One: 197 stories: Total: 484
Nature of Algeria-related material	New stories: 484; Editorials: 71; Commentaries: 43; Letters to the editor: 18 Total: 616
Attention score of Algeria-related items	184 items: 1 point; 425 items: 2 points; 7 items: 3 points Total: 1055
Valence of Algeria-related items	Pro-French Government: 296 items; Balanced or neutral: 207 items; Anti- <i>colon</i> : 113 items; Total: 616

Sub-Period III: 1960-1961

The New York Times Algeria material in 1960 and 1961 comprised ten major thematic categories which are classified in Table 9 with their frequency number, and with their degree of intensity measured on the three-point scale to denote their degree of intensity.⁴⁷

TABLE 9

Thematic Category	Frequency Number	Degree of Intensity
1. De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic under Army- <i>colon</i> threats	132	3
2. Growing Algerian popular support for the F.L.N.	58	2
3. De Gaulle's attempts to end the war through a solution short of independence and to keep Algeria tied to France.	69	2
4. France's aggravated socio-economic and political problems because of the continuation of the war.	110	3
5. The Challe offensive and the F.L.N.	44	1
6. French public opinion's growing opposition to the continuation of the war.	34	1
7. The French-Algerian conflict and the West: N.A.T.O. and the U.S.	49	1
8. Mounting international support for Algeria's right to independence.	46	1
9. The "Algerian Question" at the U.N.	33	1
10. Algerian-French negotiations and prospects for a settlement.	163	3

Applying the attention score system to denote the degree of prominence and frequency of occurrence of the Algeria-related material has given the following results: out of a total of 463 items devoted to the subject during this sub-period, six items were assigned three points,⁴⁸ 344 items were assigned two points and 113 items were assigned one point. The total score of the paper's attention to Algeria was 819 points.⁴⁹

The New York Times Algeria coverage in 1960 and 1961 focused on three major thematic categories: Algerian-French negotiations and the prospects for a settlement; threats of the army and *colon* extremists to de Gaulle and his republic; French aggravated internal crisis because of the continuation of the war. These most salient categories in the overall Algeria-related material during this sub-period are tabulated below according to their frequency number:

TABLE 10

Thematic category	Frequency Number
1. Algerian-French negotiations and prospects for a settlement.	163
2. De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic under Army- <i>colon</i> threats.	132
3. France's aggravated socio-economic and political problems because of the continuation of the war.	110

The paper's level of interest during this sub-period also fluctuated considerably. Its attention to Algeria went up substantially in the first two months of 1960, fell sharply between March and October, but rose again considerably in the last two months. It devoted as many as twelve editorials, 28 front-page stories and five commentaries to Algerian matters in January and February and a further twelve editorials, 39 front-page stories and five commentaries in November and December. In the intervening eight-month period it published only fifteen editorials, 35 front-page stories and eleven commentaries. In 1961, however, the paper's degree of attention to the French-Algerian conflict followed almost a steady pattern, with 14 editorials, 66 front-page stories and eight commentaries between January and June, and with eleven editorials, 64 front-page stories and three commentaries in the following six months.

The New York Times attention to Algeria in 1960 reached its highest points or "peaks" in January with fifteen front-page stories, seven editorials and two commentaries, and in December with 26 front-page stories, seven editorials and two commentaries. These peaks in the level of interest were a direct result of two major events which took place in Algeria: the serious disturbances caused by the *colons*, better known as "barricades week", in January; the Algerian nationalist demonstrations in December, and the iron-fist response by the police. These events attracted the most prominent headlines with a maximum three-point attention score and a considerable amount of front-page editorial and commentary material.⁵⁰

The paper's level of interest in Algeria in 1961 reached its "peak" in January, when the much publicized French referendum on Algeria was held, with fifteen front-page stories, three editorials and three commentaries. Its degree of attention to the subject, on the other hand, reached its lowest point or "valley" in September 1960 with zero page-one stories, one editorial and one commentary. *The New York Times* level of interest in Algeria in 1960 and 1961, measured by the number of front-page, editorial and commentary items, is tabulated below according to the three-point score system.

TABLE 11

	Front-page stories	Editorials	Commentaries	Total Attention Score
January to February 1960	28	12	5	92 points
March to October 1960	35	15	11	124 points
November to December 1960	39	12	3	110 points
January to June 1961	66	14	8	177 points
July to December 1961	64	11	5	160 points

1960 and 1961 saw a quantitative fall in *The New York Times* Algeria coverage by 24.8 percent compared with 1958 and 1959. More importantly, however, only 123 items comprising 26.5 percent of the overall Algeria material with a total attention score of just 311 points compared with 33.6 percent and a total attention score of 401 points in 1958 and 1959, were either neutral or balanced. On the other hand 244 items, comprising 52.6 percent of the total Algeria material with a total attention score of 346 points, were favourable to the French Government, compared with 48 percent and a total attention score of 507 points in 1958 and 1959.

The increase in the paper's Algeria balanced material in 1958 and 1959 had been partly the result of the changes that took place in France after the 13 May *coup*, the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the return of de Gaulle to power. With the change in French policy especially the acceptance of Algeria's right to self-determination, *The New York Times* adopted a more balanced stance: it hailed General de Gaulle for his new proposals; and became more receptive to the Algerian point of view and more detached from the traditional French

argument that Algeria was an integral part of France.⁵¹ But, the G.P.R.A.'s adoption of a cautious attitude towards the new proposals seemed to have angered the paper which put almost absolute faith in General de Gaulle and his policies, criticizing what it painted as the G.P.R.A.'s unwillingness to move fast enough towards a settlement. Hence, it veered back towards an evident pro-French and less balanced stance, as has statistically been illustrated in this section. It is noteworthy that the G.P.R.A.'s cautious attitude towards the proposals propounded by General de Gaulle stemmed largely from a desire to achieve a workable agreement and secure practical guarantees for a free implementation of the self-determination offer.⁵²

The paper's pro-French, anti-G.P.R.A. stance on the issue of Algeria's future perhaps confirms the view that the news often tends to "reinforce the *status quo* and to exaggerate the importance of individual action by big power leaders", like General de Gaulle, because of some inherent political and "identification" biases: France's importance to N.A.T.O. and to the United States self-interest. Indeed, as Sande has argued, the foreign news story in the American press seems to be "a reflection either of American interests or of American stereotypes".⁵³ This also corresponds with the theory that there is an inherent "loyalty bias" in the coverage of non-Western news by the Western media.⁵⁴ Yet, *The New York Times* took a sharper stance against the army-*colon* extremists: 96 items out of an overall total of 463 Algeria-related items, comprising 20.7 percent of the total Algeria coverage with a total attention score of 162 items, were unfavourable to the French army and the extremist *pieds noirs*. This was due to the campaign of violence and destruction conducted by the *colon* desperadoes and their allies in the army, in an attempt to hamper the process of negotiations and prevent Algeria's

independence.⁵⁵

The argument that *The New York Times* Algeria coverage in 1960 and 1961 was mostly favourable to the French Government is congruent with the fact that it relied heavily on French official sources for information. As many as 220 news stories, comprising 60.6 percent of the total Algeria-related news reportage compared with 51.6 percent in 1958 and 1959, came from French governmental sources. Only 80 news stories, comprising 22 percent of the total news reportage compared with 39.6 percent in 1958 and 1959, came from independent sources. This corresponds with the argument that the news is elite-centred with regard to people and also to nations. The views of those in power are always considered by the media as more "news worthy" than the views of the people without political power.⁵⁶ Yet, 63 news stories comprising 17.3 percent of the total news reportage, compared with only 8.6 percent in the previous sub-period, used Algerian sources. This increase was due mainly to the growing involvement of the G.P.R.A. in the news making process, at least from the paper's stand-point, by being directly involved in the diplomatic manoeuvres so widely reported during this sub-period.⁵⁷ Correspondents have always been encouraged to diversify their sources of information; the quality of news reportage depends on the quality of the source. The more access correspondents have to different sources of information the more accurately they can report events.⁵⁸ Foreign news correspondents have to report both the people and the governing power in the nation to which they are assigned: "... almost any people is likeable; but governments seldom are", wrote R.W. Desmond about half a century ago.⁵⁹

The Algeria-related analytical and interpretive material dropped by 15.7 percent compared with 1958-1959. It consisted of 96 items comprising 64 editorials and 32 commentaries. The paper still relied heavily on straightforward factual reporting at the expense of analytical, interpretive and background material. American newspaper editors, as already explained, have traditionally regarded the role of the newspaper as to "inform" by giving the reader "enough facts" as clearly and as straightforwardly as possible, and have, therefore, always insisted on the separability of facts from opinion. But, we saw at an earlier stage of this chapter that separability often tends to oversimplify the news by making events seem less complex than they really are. This often leads to distortion of truth.⁶⁰ Yet, straightforward news reports can be more effective in influencing public opinion than the interpretive items, especially if repeated regularly. An idea or suggestion can implant itself in the reader's mind and even become a "fact" in his eyes through "constant hammering, or gentle but repeated suggestion".⁶¹ To know the impact of *The New York Times* reporting of the Algerian-French conflict on American public opinion falls beyond the scope of this study, and can be discovered only through a survey of readers' opinion. But Bernard Berelson's argument that the reportorial content of the media can influence public opinion more than the interpretive content is very suggestive: "... events tend to solidify opinion changes produced by words, changes which otherwise would be shortlived; and the *fait accompli* event crystallizes opinion in favour of the event even though words had not been able to do so".⁶² News reportorial content, as already pointed out, formed by far the bulk of *The New York Times* Algeria coverage.

The (London) Times Algeria-related material dropped even more substantially than that of *The New York Times*. It fell by 39.4 percent, from 38 editorials (or leading articles) in 1958 and 1959 to only 23 in 1960 and 1961. The weeklies, on the other hand, by their nature as synthesizers of news media information, again provided better analytical, interpretive and background information on the Algerian-French conflict. This is especially true of *The Economist* and *Time*.⁶³

The increase in *The New York Times* usage of French governmental sources as evidenced earlier, and the subsequent decrease of its Algeria balanced or neutral content compared with 1958 and 1959, resulted in an evident rise in the number of reporting flaws which include "questionable sources of information", "loaded words" and "opportunistic reporting".⁶⁴ These flaws also include "climactic reporting" and "unwarranted headlines" which have not been detected in the previous sub-periods, and which are explained and illustrated below.⁶⁵

1. **Questionable sources of information:** Typical examples of these include phrases like: "Authoritative quarters... said", "... according to well-placed sources...", "Competent sources...[said]...".⁶⁶

2. **Loaded words:** As already pointed out, these words or phrases are generally used to make reporting, and writing in general, livelier and more appealing. But their usage by *The New York Times* in reference to Algeria was, like that of the questionable sources of information, unfavourable to the F.L.N. and to the Algerian point of view. After the failure of the first Evian talks in June 1961, for example, the paper put all the blame on the Algerian leaders

commenting editorially that the "... rebel National Liberation Front has *equivocated inexcusably*".⁶⁷ Another editorial had earlier accused them of creating an "*impasse* in Algeria".⁶⁸

3. **Opportunistic reporting:** After the *pied noir* disturbances in January 1960, for example, the paper used the G.P.R.A.'s reiteration of commitment to Algeria's right to *complete* independence as an opportune news item to supplement the view that the Algerian leaders were not doing enough to hasten the process of peace talks and that they were missing the opportunity to reach a settlement with the French Government. In the same context, to supplement the claim that General de Gaulle was doing everything for peace in Algeria, it asserted in an opportune manner that "President de Gaulle needs help from rebel leaders [against Army-*colon* extremists], but cannot accept terms made by them".⁶⁹ Referring to the idea of a possible Sino-Soviet support for the F.L.N., it made a highly opportunistic generalization making a settlement to the Algerian-French conflict totally dependent on the prospects of East-West relations: "... the ultimate success of [Algerian-French] negotiations... will largely depend on whether President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev can relax East-West... tensions".⁷⁰ And to supplement the view that the United States Government was actively involved in the search for a settlement to the Algerian problem, the paper used the marginal meetings of the American Ambassadors to Tunis and Paris with some Algerian and French officials to support the claim of "... efforts of the United States... to bring the two sides together...".⁷¹

4. **Climactic reporting:** This refers to the usage of news items which imply that a particular event is decisive in the Algerian-French conflict. *The New York Times* seemed preoccupied with the idea of a

possible rapprochement between the G.P.R.A. on the one hand, and China and the Soviet Union on the other, emphasizing the Chinese and Soviet promises of assistance to the Algerians. Hence, the replacement of Ferhat Abbas with Ben Khedda as Premier of the G.P.R.A. was reported by the paper as crucial and decisive in the conduct of the Algerian revolution and to the prospects of a settlement, simply because of Ben Khedda's alleged inclination towards communism. His appointment, it commented, marked a "... radically new phase in the long struggle in Algeria...".⁷²

5. **Unwarranted headlines:** These are headlines whose length does not draw justification from the story which follows. For example, reporting the appointment of Ben Khedda to the Premiership of the G.P.R.A., and echoing the highly speculative view about his inclination towards communist China, the paper ran the following unwarranted multi-column headline on 28 August 1961:

Algerians Pick Anti-West Leftist
As Premier in Place of Abbas

The only reporting flaw this study could not detect in *The New York Times* Algeria coverage in 1960 and 1961 was "Pollyanna reporting".⁷³

Table 12 below presents a brief summary of the way the paper reported and treated the Algerian-French conflict in 1960 and 1961.

TABLE 12

Origins of Algeria related news stories	From France: 166; From Algeria: 99; From Tunis: 63; Other: 35 Total: 363
Sources of news stories	French sources: 220; Independent sources: 80; Algerian sources: 63 Total: 363
News stories as played in the paper	Page One: 232 stories; Inside pages: 131 stories; Total: 363
Nature of Algeria-Related items	News stories: 363; Editorials: 64; Commentaries: 32; Letters to the Editor: 4 Total: 463
Attention score of Algeria-related items	113 items: 1 point; 344 items: 2 points; 6 items: 3 points Total: 819
Valence of Algeria-related items	Pro-French: 244 items; Balanced or neutral: 123 items; Anti- <i>colon</i> : 96 items Total: 463

Sub-Period IV: 1962

The New York Times Algeria content in 1962 embraced six major thematic categories which are tabulated below with their frequency number and their degree of intensity.

TABLE 13

Thematic Category	Frequency Number	Degree of Intensity
1. The O.A.S.'s continuing campaign of terrorism	118	3
2. The Algerian populations discipline and self-restraint in face of O.A.S. provocations	38	1
3. The international repercussions of the conflict	32	1
4. The long process of negotiations and the conclusion of a settlement.	45	1
5. Algeria's foreign policy immediately after independence, especially its stance towards the super powers.	51	2
6. The multi-faceted difficulties facing the new Algeria.	107	3

Measurement of the degree of prominence of the Algeria-related material according to the "attention score" system has given the following results: out of a total of 242 items devoted to Algeria during this sub-period, three were assigned three points,⁷⁴ 195 were assigned two points and 41 were assigned one point. The total attention score was 443 points.⁷⁵

The paper's Algeria coverage in 1962 focused on two major thematic categories: the continuation of the O.A.S.'s campaign of violence and destruction; and the different problems facing Algeria after independence. These two most salient or most frequently mentioned categories are presented in Table 14 according to their frequency number.

TABLE 14

Thematic Category	Frequency Number
1. The O.A.S.'s continuing campaign of violence.	118
2. The different problems facing the new Algeria	107

An evident degree of fluctuation, similar to that detected in previous sub-periods, characterized *The New York Times* level of interest in Algeria in 1962. The paper's degree of attention to the subject rose considerably during the first four months with a substantial amount of Algeria-related front-page, editorial and commentary material. This was due to the important events that dominated the Algerian scene, namely the final stages of the Evian talks and the conclusion of the long-awaited ceasefire agreement. The level of interest in Algeria evidently fell in May but rose sharply again in July before beginning to decrease until it reached its lowest point in November and December. The paper's degree of attention to the subject reached its highest point or "peak" in March with 17 front-page stories, including one eight-column banner headline, seven editorials and five commentaries; and also in July with 15 front-page stories, four editorials and three commentaries. This rise in the level of interest was due to two major events which took place during these two months: the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement between the G.P.R.A. and the French Government in March, and Algeria's formal independence in July.⁷⁶ The paper's degree of attention reached its lowest point or "valley" during the last two months which represented the denouement of the Algerian crisis when little was happening in terms of "news". *The New York Times* level of interest in Algeria in 1962, measured by the number of front-page, editorial and commentary items, is presented below in tabular form with the total attention score of each month according to the three-point scale explained

earlier.

TABLE 15

	Page One Stories	Editorials	Commentaries	Total Attention Score
January	13	3	2	36 points
February	10	6	3	38 points
March*	17	7	5	59 points
April*	11	5	2	37 points
May	8	2	3	26 points
June	11	6	3	40 points
July*	15	4	3	45 points
August	10	4	1	30 points
September	8	3	1	24 points
October	6	2	0	16 points
November	3	0	1	8 points
December	2	1	0	6 points

* The months of March, April and July contained the most prominent news items *The New York Times* devoted to Algeria in 1962, each with a three-point attention score. For a thematic analysis of what took place during each month, see *supra*, pp.255-262; 266-272.

The New York Times Algeria material went up by 16.3 percent in quantitative terms compared with 1961. The amount of its balanced or neutral material went up by 68 percent: 168 items comprising 69.4 percent of the total Algeria coverage in 1962 and with a total attention score of 308 points as opposed to only 48 percent and 159 points respectively in 1961. The pro-French Government material decreased by 79.7 percent with only 15 items and a total attention score of 27 points as opposed to 74 items and a total attention score of 125 points a year earlier. This was due mainly to the current Algerian-French rapprochement and the growing prospects of a peaceful settlement. As explained earlier, the news generally tends to reinforce the *status quo* due to political or ideological bias or to some identification factors.⁷⁷ It was in 1962 - the final year of the Algerian-French conflict - that *The New York Times* really left aside all the prejudices, stereotypes and wishful thinking that had hitherto

characterized its Algeria coverage and which were mainly borne out of sympathy for France as an ally of the United States.⁷⁸ And it began to accept the possibility of an independent Algeria perhaps totally detached from France and the West. The paper's anti-*colon* material went up by 47.5 percent with 59 items and a total attention score of 107 points compared with 40 items and 74 points in 1961. This was a reaction to the intensification of the terrorist campaign of the O.A.S. extremists which has been explained in detail and from different angles in Chapter VI.

Concordant with the argument that *The New York Times* considerably improved the quality of its Algerian coverage in 1962, is the fact that it increased the usage of independent sources at the expense of French official sources. 101 news reports out of a total of 178, comprising 56.7 percent of the total Algeria reportage in 1962, came from independent sources. This compared with 25 percent a year earlier. Only 21 stories, comprising 11.7 percent of the total news reportage as opposed to 72.6 percent in 1961, originated from French governmental sources. It has already been demonstrated that the nature of the source of information is crucially important to the quality of the news coverage: the quality and direction of the news the reader finally gets depends on what is available at the "gathering end of the line". The paper's usage of Algerian sources rose by 51.3 percent in 1962 to reach 56 items. This was partly the result of an intensification of diplomatic manoeuvring, and the subsequent increase in the number of public statements, proposals and counterproposals put forward by the Algerian leaders, which the paper had to report. But, the main reason behind the increase in usage of Algerian sources was Algeria's advent to independence and the consequent transfer of political power to the G.P.R.A. which, therefore, became the major

source of information in the country. This is perhaps another confirmation of the theory that the news media tend to regard the views of those in power as "more newsworthy" than the views of those without political power.

The New York Times Algeria-related analytical and interpretive content went up to 64 items, comprising 26.4 percent of the total Algeria coverage, as compared with 21.6 percent in 1961. Those items which could be considered analytical or interpretive comprise 43 editorials and 21 commentaries. It was in 1962 that *The New York Times* told its reader about the different dimensions of the Algerian conflict and its multifarious contextual circumstances, left behind prejudices and wishful thinking, and took an unequivocal stand on the questions of Algeria's future and *colon*-army intransigence.⁷⁹ Without rehearsing the functions and duties of newspapers, which have been discussed earlier, it is perhaps appropriate to note that a good newspaper should "speak the truth, adequately cover the interests of its greater community, take tough stands on issues that are of importance whether local, national or international".⁸⁰ A newspaper should not only aim at factual accuracy but also at *meaning*, by helping the readers to understand the complexity of the world in which they live.⁸¹ Calling for more reportorial commitment on the part of the news reporter by investigating the news, analysing and interpreting the raw information, Walter Lippmann once argued that it is only through the reporter that people understand their realities and reach "opinions about what their governors want them to consent to".⁸²

The (London) Times Algeria-related analytical and interpretive material, unlike that of *The New York Times*, fell by 38.4 percent

compared with 1961 with only eight editorials (or leading articles). *The Economist* and *Time*, on the other hand, maintained a high level of analytical, interpretive and background content on Algeria.⁸³

The evident decrease in *The New York Times* dependence on French official sources for information and the subsequent increase in the amount of balanced or neutral Algeria content resulted in a sharp drop in the number of reporting flaws. The only reporting errors detected in this sub-period were those which are technically known as "questionable sources of information". Most of these errors occurred during the first four months of 1962 at a time of intensive diplomatic manoeuvring, which resulted in the ceasefire agreement in March and the period of uncertainty which reigned in Algeria and France immediately after as a result of the O.A.S. campaign of *terre brulee*. Typifying such errors are the following samples: "A qualified source said here today..."; "Quarters close to the Government... said..."; "Informed sources said...".⁸⁴ This study has not, however, detected any instance of the more dangerous reporting flaws which are related either to the phraseology or to the headline of the types noted at some earlier stages of this chapter.⁸⁵

Table 16 shows in brief how *The New York Times* covered and treated the Algerian-French conflict in 1962.

TABLE 16

Origin of Algeria-related news stories	From Algeria: 111; From France: 34; From Tunis: 14; Other: 19 Total: 178
Sources of news stories	Independent sources: 101; Algerian sources: 56; French sources: 21 Total: 178
News stories as played in the paper	Page One: 114 stories; Inside pages: 64 stories; Total: 178
Nature of Algeria-related items	News stories: 178; Editorials: 43; Commentaries: 21; Total: 242
Attention score of Algeria-related items	44 items: 1 point; 195 items: 2 points; 3 items: 3 points; Total: 443
Valence of Algeria-related items	Balanced or neutral: 168 items; Anti- <i>colon</i> (O.A.S.): 59 items; Pro-French Government: 15 items; Total: 242

Notes

1. See *supra*, pp.3-6 for more detail on the method of research applied in this study.
2. Chapter III provides a thematic analysis of *The New York Times* coverage of Algeria between 1945 and 1955, using other media and extra-media data.
3. See Benjamin Demott, "Notes on the American Press", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, p.308.
4. These items are: "French Cordon Jewish Quarter of Algerian City to Quell Terrorism" (15 May 1956); "Seizure of Algerian Rebels Described by Correspondent on Their Plane" (24 October 1956); "Paris Right-Wingers Riot in Support of French Army in North Africa" (31 March 1957).
5. See Table No.4, p.292.
6. In 1956 and 1957 *The New York Times* Algeria coverage included three items with headlines of such length. In the attention score count tabulated above, therefore, each of these items has been assigned three points. See footnote No.4 above for a list of these items.
7. George Lichtheim, "All The News That's Fit to Print - Reflections on the New York Times", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, p.34.
8. David S. Broder, *Behind the Front Page*, *op.cit.*, p.14.
9. J. Galtung and M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, p.68.
10. John A. Lent, "Foreign News in American Media", *Journal of Communication* (Winter 1977), pp.46-51.
11. John Tebbel, "Rating the American Newspaper - Part II", *Saturday Review*, 10 June 1961, p.54.
12. Chapter III provides a thematic analysis of *The New York Times* reportage of the Algerian-French conflict in 1956 and 1957.
13. G. Lichtheim, "All The News That's Fit to Print", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, p.41.
14. Robert W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, *op.cit.*, p.8.
15. Benjamin Demott, "Notes on the American Press", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, pp.306-312.
16. These include two editorials: "DANGER IN ALGERIA" (11 February 1956), "THE ALGERIAN CONFLICT" (18 July 1957); and five commentaries: "Algeria Aflame" (13 May 1956), "North Africa Boils" (28 October 1956), "Algerian Dilemma" (1 December 1957), "Algeria and Morocco" (8 December 1957), "U.N. on Algeria" (15 December 1957).

17. Einar Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, p.45.
18. These were: "HIGH STAKES" (2 February 1956), "FRANCE'S DANGER" (2 March 1956), "THE TOUCHSTONE" (30 May 1956).
19. A thematic comparison of the coverage of the Algerian-French conflict by *The New York Times* and other publications including *The (London) Times* is provided in Chapter III.
20. See, for example, "War by Little Packets", *Time*, 12 March 1956; "Rights and Duties", *Time*, 19 March 1956; "Wasting War", *Time*, 23 April 1956; "The Reform That Failed", *Time*, 6 August 1956; "The Final Phase", *Time*, 21 January 1957; "Mobs and Morals", *Time*, 8 April 1956; "Miracle of the Sahara", *Time*, 5 August 1957. Of the 42 items *The Economist* devoted to Algeria in 1956 and 1957, 18 were leaders (editorials). These were the most analytical and interpretive of all its Algeria-related items providing socio-economic, cultural and historical background to the Algerian-French conflict. They included particularly "Algeria is African" (21 January 1956), "How Strong Are Algeria's Rebels" (17 March 1956); "Five Months for Algeria" (21 April 1956); "Algerian Crisis in Midstream" (9 June 1956); "Algeria: Scoop or Blunder" (27 October 1957); "Oil from the Sahara" (14 September 1957); "The Military Odds in Algeria" (23 December 1957).
21. For definitions of these reporting errors as used in this and succeeding paragraphs and a discussion of their impact on the quality of news coverage, see Martin Kriesberg, "Soviet Union in *The New York Times*", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *op.cit.*, pp.540-564.
22. Italics are added in all instances given here.
23. *The New York Times*, 22 April 1956.
24. *The New York Times*, 30 October 1956.,
25. *The New York Times*, 18 January 1957; 13 February 1957.
26. *The New York Times*, 3, 5, 9 March 1956; 6 December 1956; 29 April 1957.
27. *The New York Times*, 5 March 1957.
28. *The New York Times*, 25 December 1957.
29. *The New York Times*, 1 May 1956.
30. *The New York Times*, 3 March 1956.
31. *The New York Times*, 10 January 1956.
32. *The New York Times*, 8 April 1956.
33. *The New York Times*, 12 July 1956.
34. *The New York Times*, 30 July 1956.

35. *The New York Times*, 5 March 1956.
36. See *supra*, p.5 for an explanation of this system.
37. These items are: "French Attack on Tunisian Village Leaves Death and Destruction" (11 February 1958); "TUNISIA SEES ALGERIAN 'POISON' SPREADING" (16 February 1958); "CIVIL WAR PERIL RECEDES / IN FRANCE AND ALGERIA; JUNTA SUFFERS SETBACKS" (15 May 1958); "DE GAULLE TALKS BREAK DOWN / SOCIALISTS CONTINUE TO BAR HIM / LEFTISTS DEMONSTRATE IN PARIS" (29 May 1958); "DE GAULLE ACCEPTS CALL TO FORM CABINET / IF IT RECEIVED 'FULL POWERS' FOR REFORMS / SOCIALISTS AGREE TO CONSIDER HIS PROGRAM" (30 May 1958); "DE GAULLE NAMED PREMIER IN 329-224 VOTE / ASKS 6-MONTH DECREE RULE; LEFTISTS RIOT / ALGIERS IS DISPLEASED BY CABINET CHOICES" (2 June 1958); "DE GAULLE WINS REFORM POWER AFTER HE THREATENS TO RESIGN / BALKY ASSEMBLY YIELDS, 361-161" (3 June 1958).
38. See Table No.8, p.299.
39. Chapter IV provides a detailed thematic analysis of *The New York Times* Algeria coverage in 1958 and 1959 with reference to other news media.
40. See *supra* pp.124-131 for more detail on these events and the paper's response to them in comparison with other publications.
41. Einar Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, p.45.
42. L. Erwin Atwood, "The Effects of Incongruity Between Source and Message Credibility", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.43, 1966, pp.90-94.
43. E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, pp.39-63.
44. *The Economist* and *Time's* Algeria-related most analytical items in 1958 and 1959 were: "Glimpse of Eurafrica", *The Economist*, 25 January 1958; "With Bombs and Bullets", *Time*, 17 February 1958; "Meet the Rebels", *The Economist*, 22 February 1958; "The Accused", *Time*, 24 February 1958; "Tough Talk", *Time*, 24 March 1958; "The Challenge From Algiers", *The Economist*, 17 May 1958; "The General's Course", *The Economist*, 12 July 1958; "Algerian Anniversary", *The Economist*, 16 May 1959; "Plan For Algeria", *The Economist*, 19 September 1959; "The Watershed", *Time*, 28 September 1959; "The Gaullist Tide", *The Economist*, 4 October 1959; "Alarm Bells in Paris", *The Economist*, 24 October 1959; "Closer and Closer", *Time*, 26 October 1959.
45. See *supra* p.289.
46. *The New York Times*, 16 January 1958, 18 April 1958, 22 April 1959, 24 May 1959.
47. See *supra* p.5 for more information on this measurement system.
48. These prominently displayed items are: "EUROPEAN MOBS IN ALGIERS RISE / AGAINST DE GAULLE (26 January 1960); "DE GAULLE ORDERS RISING ENDED; / ARMY BIDS ALGIERS HOME GUARD / LEAVE INSURGENTS' BARRICADES (31 January 1960); "61 DEAD IN ALGIERS RIOTS; / TROOPS

FIRE ON MOSLEMS, / DE GAULLE REMAINS FIRMS", (12 December 1960); "U.N. VOTE, 63 TO 8, TO HELP / ALGERIA GAIN FREEDOM, BARS A REFERENDUM ROLE", (20 December 1960); "MUTINY IN ALGERIA ENDS; / CHALLE OFFERS TO YIELD; / REBEL FORCES WITHDRAW" (26 April 1961); 86 Slain and 150 Wounded in Algeria / As Moslems Mark 7th Year of Revolt", (9 November 1961).

49. See Table No.12, p.310.
50. Chapter V provides a thematic analysis of *The New York Times* coverage of Algeria in 1960 and 1961 with reference to other news media.
51. See Chapter IV for more detail.
52. See Chapter V for a detailed thematic explanation.
53. Ostein Sande, "The Perception of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.3-4, 1971, pp.221-237.
54. See E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *op.cit.*, pp.39-63.
55. See *supra*, pp.222-226; 237-239.
56. E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, pp.39-63.
57. See Chapter V for more detail.
58. D.S. Broder, *Behind the Front Page*, *op.cit.*, p.49.
58. R.W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, *op.cit.*, p.4.
60. See *supra*, p.288.
61. R.W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, *op.cit.*, p.368.
62. Bernard Berelson, "Communication and Public Opinion", in Wilbur Schramm's *The Process and Effect of Mass Communication*, *op.cit.*, p.90.
63. *The Economist* and *Time*'s most analytical and interpretive Algeria-related items in 1960 and 1961 included: "France Feels the Dead Hand", *The Economist*, 30 January 1960; "Longing for Stability" *Time*, 8 February 1960; "The Minds of Tunis", *The Economist*, 5 March 1960; "The Algerian Seesaw", *The Economist*, 18 June 1960; "The Algerian Armistice", *The Economist*, 24 June 1960; "The Algerian Flood", *The Economist*, 17 December 1960; "Forced Pace", *Time*, 26 December 1960; "Ambiguous Algeria", *The Economist*, 14 January 1961; "The Third Revolt", *Time*, 28 April 1961; "Algerian Powder Barrel", *The Economist*, 6 May 1961.
64. For definitions of these reporting errors, see *supra*, pp.289-291.
65. For more information on these types of reporting errors, see Martin Kriesberg's "Soviet News in *The New York Times*", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *op.cit.*, pp.540-564.

66. *The New York Times*, 1 November 1960; 13 January 1961; 19 December 1961.
67. *The New York Times*, 29 June 1961 (italics added).
68. *The New York Times*, 24 June 1961 (italics added).
69. Editorial: *The New York Times*, 19 February 1960.
70. Editorial: *The New York Times*, 28 January 1960.
71. Editorial: *The New York Times*, 7 April 1961.
72. Editorial: *The New York Times*, 2 September 1961; on Ben Khedda's appointment to the Premiership of the G.P.R.A. and the way it was reported by *The New York Times* and other news media, see *supra*, pp.
73. This type of reporting errors is explained and illustrated in *supra*, p.291.
74. These most prominently displayed items are: "ALGERIA TRUE SIGNED, EFFECTIVE TODAY; / DE GAULLE ASKS FRANCE TO RATIFY ACCORD; / SALAN APPEALS TO SECRET ARMY TO RESIST (Banner headline: 19 March 1962); "ALGERIA TRUE IS RATIFIED BY 90% OF VOTE IN FRANCE / IN SETBACK FOR RIGHTISTS", (9 April 1962); "NATIONALIST LEADERS GET WILD WELCOME IN ALGIERS / AS FREEDOM IS GRANTED", (4 July 1962).
75. See table No.16, p.317.
76. See Chapter VI for a detailed thematic analysis of *The New York Times* Algeria coverage in 1962 with reference to other news media.
77. See *supra*, p.304.
78. This is explained in detail in the thematic analyses (Chapters III, IV, V and VI).
79. See Chapter VI for more detail.
80. Hal Gulliver, editor of Atlanta Constitution, quoted in John C. Merrill and Harold A. Fisher, *The World's Great Dailies: Profits of 50 Newspapers*, New York: Hastings House, 1980, p.7.
81. John Tebbel, *The Compact History of the American Newspaper*, *op.cit.*, p.267.
82. Quoted in Benjamin Demott, "Notes on the American Press", *Commentary*, *op.cit.*, pp.306-312.
83. *The Economist* and *Time's* most analytical and interpretive items in 1962 were: "Without Alternatives", *Time*, 5 January 1962; "The Not So Secret Army", *Time*, 19 January 1962; "How to Make Peace", *The Economist*, 24 February 1962; "The Brothers", *Time*, 16 March 1962; "End of a Chapter", *The Economist*, 30 June 1962; "What Is Reality?", *Time*, 23 November 1962.
84. *The New York Times*, 10 February 1962; 28 April 1962; 1 November 1962.

85. See *supra*, pp.289-291; 307-309.

CONCLUSION

Historians have access to materials that are not available to contemporary commentators, and therefore the full story of past events has usually to wait for the passage of time. But the ways in which contemporaries report happenings are not thereby made valueless. Immediate reportings and perceptions sometimes tell a great deal about policy implications and the multifarious conditions that circumscribe events. The way in which international news is reported and presented plays an important role in shaping the picture of the world in people's minds, and in shaping the images nations hold of each other. Yet, the news media are often criticized for giving "a picture of the world" which differs from "what really happened". This has been particularly true of the different ways in which revolutions and wars of independence have been presented by various newspapers to their readers. This thesis has concerned itself with the way in which *The New York Times* reported and presented the Algerian revolution - what it said about it and how, and what it did *not* say - using other media and extra-media data to establish a cross-check control of its news coverage.

This analysis has revealed that, at least in quantitative terms, *The New York Times* Algeria coverage was commensurate with its widely acclaimed resources, as evidenced by the 1810 items it directly devoted to the Algerian-French conflict over the period 1956-1962. Although comparison with other world events falls beyond the scope of this study, the findings have shown that the paper's overall level of interest in Algeria was high; this is evidenced by the total attention

score of 3063 points over the period of research. This high level of interest stemmed largely from the fact that the subject was both culturally and politically "meaningful", "relevant" or "consonant" to the American reader, especially because of the French-American-N.A.T.O. connection. Since news is audience-oriented, the reader should not only be presented with the news that he can understand, but also with the news that catches his attention and interest. It is widely accepted that "the greater the possibilities of identification with the news, the greater will be the news flow".¹ A news medium is, above all, a commercial enterprise and, for it to survive in a highly competitive market, it has to continue to attract a sufficiently high audience and maintain its appeal to its constituency. *The New York Times'* high degree of attention to the Algerian-French conflict was due to the belief that the American reader was able to identify himself with it because of cultural (or politico-ideological) "proximity" with France, that embraced French involvement in N.A.T.O. and its relevance to United States interest and security.

But a "good" news coverage should not be judged according to statistics or printing lineage, but primarily according to its quality and depth. Although the paper's Algeria coverage was quantitatively plentiful it was qualitatively weak, generally superficial and lacking in depth. In most cases information on the causes, socio-cultural and economic contexts of events was either missing or rare and sporadic. Sole reliance on *The New York Times* would not have led to accurate understanding of the problem as the paper, with some notable exceptions, generally failed to go beyond routine reporting which was overwhelmingly based on French official sources, to the detriment of in-depth analytical, interpretive and background material.

The analysis suggests that the picture drawn by the paper about the Algerian revolution was heavily based on news stories about current incidents and events, whereas commentaries, analyses and background features played almost no role in shaping that picture. This was the main reason behind the fact that the degree of attention to Algeria tended to rise, and the Algeria-related items to be displayed with more prominence, at the beginning of a new development but tended to decrease sharply once the situation was no longer novel. Although the focus in the paper's attention varied from one sub-period to another, the military theme - namely reports of clashes, casualties and attacks - was displayed with significant prominence throughout most of the period of research.

Whilst this thesis has made no attempt to investigate the possible influence of *The New York Times* Algeria coverage on public opinion in the United States, it is worth reiterating that the reportorial element and the way it is presented to the reader is generally more influential than the interpretive content. The paper's predominant reliance on "hot news" stemmed from a traditional belief within American journalism that a newspaper's duty is to give the reader "facts" not opinions. Opinions were restricted to the editorial page, the Magazine or the Sunday section "News of the Week in Review". But, this study has shown that in addition to conveying and circulating factual information, a newspaper's duty should be to investigate the "hidden facts" and to "educate" the reader. Complicated matters like international conflicts and wars of independence need to be reported within their contexts to enable the reader to understand their meaning, and avoid simplification as a negative factor influencing the quality of news coverage; that is, when events are portrayed as "less complex" or "more simple" than they

really are.

The New York Times' heavy reliance on routine reporting, which was mainly based on information from French official sources, portrayed the Algerian-French conflict, especially in its early years, in an over-simplistic manner. It had at least until 1958 portrayed Algeria as an integral part of France and what was happening there as a "rebellion" or a "secession" similar to that of the South during the American Civil War. This negative simplification was not alleviated by the editorialists because, in the absence of an expert on Algerian-French affairs in the Editorial Department, the editorialists relied only on the information the news stories provided. Editorial topics were determined by the daily news reportage: the subjects of the 207 editorials *The New York Times* devoted to Algeria during the period 1956-1962 comprising 11.4 percent of the overall coverage were all inspired by the daily reports. Editorial policy can influence both the intensity and direction of the daily news reporting when, as Martin Kriesberg has suggested, "unwarranted headlines" and "questionable sources" of information of the types noted in Chapter VII, are used to back an editorial remark or argument. This study, however, has not detected any instance where the policy of the editorial page influenced or determined the paper's daily news reporting on Algeria. The editorials and the news reports were generally in harmony and no obvious contradiction has been detected. The analysis has shown that with some exceptions the editorials were by and large weak, consolidating the view that *The New York Times* editorial page traditionally lacked vitality and punch.

The paper's Algeria coverage, heavily reliant on French official sources, generally leaned towards the French point of view. It failed

to balance facts and supposition and draw the line between subliminal, predisposed views and what really happened. This has been established here by the use of other media and extra-media data. This thesis has shown that *The New York Times* was by and large preoccupied with what the French authorities said and did, confirming the theory that the news media tend to consider the views of those in power as more "news worthy" than the views of the "people without political powers". The quality of the news coverage depends on the quality of the sources, and the more diversified the sources of information the more accurate the news will be. The duty of the newspaper should therefore be to tell the entire story not merely the acts of those in power and their official statements.

In accordance with this analysis, the reader of *The New York Times*, throughout most of the period of research apart from the final year of the war where it took a detached stance, would have found that its news coverage was generally favourable to the French point of view. The paper's stance tended to change according to the change in French policy and attitude towards the problem. For example, it became receptive to Algeria's right to self-determination only after this had already been technically conceded by France in the aftermath of the 13 May *coup*, the downfall of the Fourth Republic and the return of General de Gaulle to power. It was only in 1962, when Algeria's independence became inevitable, that it finally set aside all the prejudices, stereotypes and wishful thinking which had by and large characterized its Algeria coverage. It began to adopt a balanced and detached stance, accepting the possibility of an Algeria totally independent of France. The paper's Algeria-related material had a negative effect on France's image only when it was associated with the *colon* extremists and their use of indiscriminate violence to prevent

Algeria from gaining independence. Conversely, its perception and presentation of the F.L.N. image was consistently unfavourable. In this context, analysis has detected that in all those instances when *The New York Times* Algeria-related coverage was "pollyanna", "climactic", "opportunistic", or affected by "loaded" words, "questionable" sources of information or "unwarranted headlines", the content tended to be unfavourable to the F.L.N. and favourable to the French Government. In thematic valence terms, the coverage of the Algerian-French conflict generally leaned towards France. It is divided into a pro-French anti-F.L.N. sub-period, 1956-1957; a much improved but still pro-French sub-period, 1958-1959; a pro-French Government but anti-Army-*colon* sub-period 1960-1961; anti-O.A.S., balanced sub-period, 1962.

The New York Times pro-French, anti-F.L.N. stance stemmed from its political (ideological) leaning towards France, particularly conditioned by its N.A.T.O. link with the United States. Like the American Government, it viewed the Algerian-French conflict mainly in accordance with the notion of American and Western interests, perhaps confirming the theory that there is an inherent "Western loyalty bias" in the reporting of non-Western news by the Western media. The paper made Algeria a top Cold-War issue and persistently cautioned against its possible effects on Western security, giving credence to France's almost hysterical warnings against an alleged Communist threat to the region and to the N.A.T.O. defence system, especially its southern shield. This corresponds with a remark once made by an African statesman that "... news coming out of Africa was often related to the already biased and prejudiced mind that keeps asking such questions as: 'is this pro-East or pro-West?' but nobody asked: 'is this pro-African?'"² The journalist should leave aside all prejudices and

wishful thinking and avoid letting his reports be dictated by his emotions. He should, in the words of R.W. Desmond, "analyse his own prejudices, ruthlessly, so that he could discount them and thus come nearer impartiality".³

Table 17 below presents a brief summary of the way in which *The New York Times* covered and presented the Algerian revolution during the period 1956-1962:

TABLE 17:

Origin of Algeria-related news stories	From France: 567	From Algeria: 477	Other: 399	Total 1443
Sources of news stories	French sources: 807; Algerian sources: 161		Independent sources: 475;	Total 1443
News stories as played in the paper	Inside pages: 789; Page One: 654		Total: 1443	
Nature of Algeria-related material	News stories: 1443; Editorials: 207; Commentaries: 121; Letters to editor: 39		Total: 1810	
Attention score of Algeria-related items	576 items: 1 point; 1215 items: 2 points; 19 items: 3 points		Total: 3063	
Valence of Algeria-related items	Pro-French: 934; Anti-colon: 268		Balanced or neutral: 608; Total: 1810	

Yet, using other media and extra-media data, this study has shown that the greatest flaw of *The New York Times* coverage of the Algerian revolution was that of "omission". It failed to investigate and expose the "hidden facts" and their historical, socio-economic and cultural contexts, and also failed accurately to reflect the reality of the war especially from the viewpoint of the people who were experiencing it. This stemmed partly from an evident lack of competence to investigate, analyse and interpret the truths that determined and circumscribed events. And partly, it was the result of

an inherent media preoccupation with the official versions of events, in accordance with the journalistic euphemism "big names make big news". This corresponds with the theory that the news is "elite-oriented" and that "the news media tend to reinforce the *status quo*" especially when national interest, even in its distant forms, is involved. It also confirms the theory that the news media tend to exaggerate the importance of statements and actions by big power leaders, at the expense of second opinions and independent substantiation which are essential for accuracy.

It is widely argued that daily newspapers have an "agenda setting" or "impression setting" influence on, and act as "leaders" to, the weekly publications. But, this analysis has not detected any significant influence, either in terms of themes, valence or intensity, by the daily newspaper on the news magazines. It has, on the contrary, shown that the weeklies, by their nature as synthesizers of, and often commentators on, news media information and despite their limitation by space and frequency of publication, provided qualitatively better coverage of the Algerian revolution. They presented the reader with more analytical background information on, and took a more detached stance towards, the Algerian-French conflict.

It is the editorial officers who set the values and determine the criteria according to which it is decided which news should be selected and in what way it should be presented. The quality and direction of a newspaper's coverage of a particular event, to a large extent, depends on the competence, perception and political views of those individuals who handle the news, from the correspondent on the scene to the top editorialist in New York. As Walter Lippmann wrote in *Public Opinion* in 1927, there is only "a small body of exact

knowledge" and almost no fixed standards of ability and training in the craft of news reporting; but a lot depends on the "journalist's own discretion", and on what Justice Holmes once labelled the correspondent's "inarticulate major premises" which inevitably colour his news dispatches. Yet, there are some general basic guidelines with which a journalist should always remind himself in order to achieve adequate news coverage and which are worth reiterating. He should -

1. remember that simple or immediate solutions for all national and international problems are not possible,
2. be level-headed and always keep in mind that prejudice and wishful thinking breed distortion of news; and yielding to personal temptations and emotions makes him a prey to the deliberate deception of those in the news and turns him into a sensationalist,
3. be "half diplomat, half detective" and make a good effort to report the people of the nation to which he is assigned as well as the governing power,
4. know that there is always a second opinion and another side to each story - "the best and worst give way under closer scrutiny"
5. make sure that the direct and practical always prevails over the generalized and abstract,
6. widen the scope of his knowledge especially by learning the language of the people on whom the reporting is done, and by having a clear idea about their history and culture,
7. double-check each story, report or statement and always ask: "Is it a fair reflection of the various opinions and views I have heard?" "Have I given all sides?"

The New York Times, despite its high reputation, failed to measure up fully to these criteria in its treatment of the Algerian crisis.

Notes

1. E. Ostgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, p.46.
2. Quoted in J. Galtung and M.H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, *op.cit.*, p.84.
3. R.W. Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, *op.cit.*, pp.44-45.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHYA. PRIMARY SOURCES**I: NEWS MEDIA**

1. *The New York Times*, 1945-1962
2. *The (London) Times*, 1954-1962
3. *Le Monde*, 1945-1962
4. *El Moudjahid*, official organ of the F.L.N., Nos. 1-91, 1956-1962, French edition.
5. *The Economist*, 1954-1962.
6. *Time Magazine*, 1954-1962.

II: INTERVIEWS

1. Mr. R.W. Apple, former *New York Times* Chief Correspondent in London, personal interview, 17 April 1985.
2. Mr. Godfrey Hodgson, journalist, writer and T.V. presenter, personal interview, 18 November 1986.

III: ALGERIAN DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

1. Front de Libération Nationale, *Les Archives de la Révolution Algérienne*, compiled by Mohamed Harbi, Paris: Éditions de Jeune Afrique, 1984.
2. Front de Libération Nationale, *Le Peuple Algérien et sa Révolution*, New York: Éditions Résistance Algérienne, 1956; the English version was published in 1957 under the title *The Algerian People and Their Revolution*.
3. Front de Libération Nationale, *El Moudjahid*, French edition, Nos.1-91, 3 bound volumes, 1956-1962, Yugoslavia: Beogradski Graficki Zavrod, 1962.
4. Front de Libération Nationale, "Projet de Programme", *F.L.N. Documents*, Paris, 1962.

IV: U.S. MATERIAL

1. *Department of State Bulletin*, 1954-1962.
2. *Congressional Record*, 1954-1962.

V: DOCUMENTARY FILMS

- "The Algerian War, 1954-1962", Channel Four Television Company Limited, Directed by Peter Batty, 1984.
- "La Bataille d'Alger", Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, 1965.

VI: PERIODICALS

1. *L'Année Politique*, 1954-1962, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
2. *United Nations Year Book*, 1954-1962, United Nations, New York: Department of Public Information.

VII: MEMOIRS AND DOCUMENTARY BOOKS

- Abbas, Ferhat, *Autopsie d'Une Guerre: L'Aurore*, Paris: Éditions Garniers Frères, 1980.
- Abbas, Ferhat, *Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie: La Nuit Coloniale*, Paris: Julliard, 1962, Vol.1.
- Ait Ahmed, Hocine, *La Guerre et L'Après-Guerre*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964.
- Alleg, Henri, *La Question*, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1958.
- Catledge, Turner, *My Life and The Times*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971.,
- Challe, Maurice, *Notre Révolte*, Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1968.
- De Bollardièrre, Paris, *Bataille d'Alger, Bataille de L'Homme*, Paris, 1972.
- De Gaulle, Charles, *Discours et Messages: Avec le Renouveau, 1954-1962*, Paris: Plon, 1970.
- De Gaulle, Charles, *Mémoires D'Espoir: Le Renouveau, 1954-1962*, Paris: Plon, 1972.
- Kaddache, Mahfoud, *Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien: Question Nationale et Politique, 1919-1951*, 2 vols., Algiers: S.N.E.D., 1980.
- Kessel, P., Pirelli, G., *Le Peuple Algérien et La Guerre, Lettres et Témoignages, 1954-1962*, Paris: Maspéro, 1962.
- Krock, Arthur, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line*, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968.
- Mandouze, André, ed., *La Révolution Algérienne Par Les Textes*, Paris, 1962.
- Massu, Jacques, *Le Torrent de La Digue*, Paris, 1972.
- Nait Belkacem, Mouloud K., *Shakhsiat el Jazair el Dawlia*, Constantine (Algeria): Daar el Baath, 1985.
- Qannen, Jamel, *Muahadat el Jazair Maa Faransa, 1619-1830*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1987.
- Saadi, Yacef, *Souvenir de la Bataille d'Alger*, Paris: Julliard, 1962.
- Sevan-Schreiber, J.J., *Lieutenant en Algérie*, Paris: Julliard, 1957.
- Soustelle, Jacques E., *Aimée et Souffrante Algérie*, Paris: Plon, 1956.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

1. BOOKS, ARTICLES, THESES

- Agéron, Charles Robert, "L'Évolution de L'Opinion Publique Française Face à La Guerre d'Algérie", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1985.
- Alwan, Mohamed, *Algeria Before the United Nations*, New York: Robert Speller and Sons Publishers Inc., 1959.
- American Scholar (The), "Remembrance of The Times - From the Papers of Garet Garrett", Vol.36, Summer 1967.
- Annales*, "Aus Origin du Nationalisme Algérien", 4ème Année, October-December 1949.
- Aron, Raymond, *La Tragédie Algérienne*, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957.
- Aron, Robert, *Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris: Fayard, 1962.
- Atwood, Erwin L., "The Effects of Incongruity Between Source and Message Credibility", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.43, 1966.
- Badikian, Ben H., "The Politics of American Newspapers", *Columbia Journalist Review*, March 1972.
- Bastidi, Suzanne, "La Thèse Française est basée sur L'Article 2, Paragraph 7 de la Charte", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1959.
- Beaufre, André, *The Suez Expedition 1956*, trans. Richard Barry, London, 1969.
- Beaufre, Jacques, "Lacoste Speaks Up", *The Mediterranean and Eurafrica*, 1958.
- Beaufre, Gal, "Le Temps de la Violence", *Historia Magazine*, No.101, 10 November, 1971.
- Bedjaoui, Mohamed, *La Révolution Algérienne et Le Droit*, Éditions de l'Association Internationale des Juristes Démocratiques, Brussels, 1961.
- Behr, Edward, *The Algerian Problem*, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961.
- Belkheroubi, Abdemajid, "Les Aspets Internationaux de la Révolution Algérienne", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1985.
- Berelson, Bernard, "Communication and Public Opinion", in Wilbur Schramm, *The Process and Effect of Mass Communication*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965.
- Berelson, Bernard and Janowitz, Moris (eds.), *Readers in Public Opinion and Communication* (second edition), London: Collier-Macmillan, 1966.
- Berger, Meyer, *The Story of the New York Times, 1851-1951*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951.

- Bitat, Rabah, "Comment Nous Avons Préparé le 1er Novembre 1954", *L'Express*, 2 October 1959.
- Bogart, Leo, *Press and Public: Who Reads What, When, Where, and Why in American Newspapers*, New Jersey: Lawrence Elbraum Associates Publishers, 1981.
- Boudiaf, Mohamed, "La Préparation du 1er Novembre", *El Jarida*, No.15, November-December 1974.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, "Révolution dans la Révolution", *Esprit*, January 1961.
- Brace, Joan and Richard M., *Ordeal in Algeria*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co. Ltd., 1960.
- Brace, Joan and Richard M., *Algerian Voices*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co. Ltd., 1965.
- Braley, Russ, *Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The New York Times*, Chicago: Regney Gateway, Inc., 1984.
- Brinton, James E., "Failure of the Western Edition of the New York Times", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, Spring 1964.
- Broder, David S., *Behind the Front Page*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
- Budd, Richard W., "Attention Score: A Device for Measuring a News 'Play'", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, No.2, 1964.
- Budd, Richard W., Thorp, Robert K. and Lewis, Donohew, *Content Analysis of Communications*, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967.
- Cahiers de la République*, "Les Conséquences Economiques de la Guerre d'Algérie", No.12, March-April 1958.
- Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, "Le Dossier Jean Muller", No.38.
- Cartwright, Hal Victor, "Revolutionary Algeria and the United Nations: A Study in Agenda Politics", Unpublished dissertation, University of Maryland, 1974.
- Chauffier, Martin, *Guerre et Paix en Algérie*, Paris: Chroniques Sociales, 1958.
- Cheathan, Pamela, "Foreign news and the American Public", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.X, No.2, 1956.
- Chikh, Slimane, *L'Algérie en Armes - Ou le Temps des Certitudes*, Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1981.
- Chronique Sociale de France*, "La Guerre Psychologique d'Après Les Revues Militaires Françaises", Vols.2-3, 15 April 1959.
- Clark, Michael, *Algeria in Turmoil - A History of the Rebellion*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1960
- Claude, H., "Les Accords d'Evian", *Économie et Politique*, No.93, April 1962.

- Cohen, Bernard C., *The Press and Foreign Policy*, New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Cohen, Jean, "Colonialisme et Racisme en Algérie", *Les Temps Modernes*, Paris: Imprimerie Chantenay, 1959.
- Commandant XXX, "L'Armée Française et L'Algérie en 1961", *La Nouvelle Critique*, No.134, February 1962 (special edition).
- Cooke, Gerald E., "News Media Perception and Projection of the Castro Rebellion, 1957-1958: Some Image Theme in Foreign Policy", Unpublished dissertation, University of Maryland, 1969.
- Courrière, Yvès, *Les Feux de Désespoir*, Paris: Fayard, 1971.
- Courrière, Yvès, *Les Fils de la Toussaint*, Paris: Fayard, 1968.
- Courrière, Yvès, *L'heure des Colonels*, Paris: Fayard, 1970.
- Courrière, Yvès, *Le Temps des Leopards*, Paris: Fayard, 1969.
- Darbois, J.M., Heynaud, M. and Marcel, J., *Officiers en Algérie*, Paris: Maspéro, 1960.
- Davis, Elmer, *History of The New York Times, 1851-1921*, New York: The New York Times Co., 1921.
- Debatty, André, *Le 13 Mai et la Presse*, Paris: Armond Colin, 1960.
- De Serigny, Alain, *La Révolution du 13 Mai*, Paris, 1958.
- Desmond, Robert W., *The Press and World Affairs*, London: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1937.
- De SoLa Pool, Ithiel, *"The Prestige Papers": A Survey of Their Editorials*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952.
- Dinsmore, Herman H., *All The News That Fits - A Crucial Analysis of the News and Editorial Contents of The New York Times*, New York, New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969.
- Documentation Française (La)*, "La Presse et la Radio diffusion en Europe Orientate", No.2735.
- Droz, Bernard and Lever, Evelyne, *La Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982.
- Elsenhans, Harmut, "Echec d'Une Stratégie Néocoloniale: Economie Politique Specificités, Constances et Étapes de la Réaction Française à L'Égard de la Révolution Algérienne", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1985.
- Emery, Edwin, *The Press and America*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Eshgui, Fleurin, "The New York Times' Image of Iran in Crisis: A Content Analysis", Unpublished dissertation, Columbia College, 1983.

- Fanon, Frantz, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, Paris: Maspéro, 1961.
- Frajallah, Boutros, S., *Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique dans Le Cadre des Nations Unies*, Geneva: Droz, 1963.
- Favrod, Charles-Henri, *La Révolution Algérienne*, Paris: Plon, 1959.
- Favrod, Charles-Henri, *Le F.L.N. et L'Algérie*, Paris: Plon, 1962.
- Ferhat, Farhat, "American Policy Towards Algeria Between 1940 and 1962", Unpublished thesis, University of Keele, 1986.
- Ferrandi, J., *600 Jours Avec Salan et L'O.A.S.*, Paris: Fayard, 1969.
- Firestone, Y., "The Doctrine of Intergration with France among the Europeans of Algeria, 1955-1960", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.1, 1971.
- Furniss, Edgar S. Jnr., *France, Troubled Ally: de Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.
- Gallagher, Charles, *The United States and North Africa*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Galtung, J. and Ruge M.H., "The Structure of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.1, 1965.
- Gendarme, René, *L'Économie de l'Algérie*, Paris: A. Colin, 1959.
- Gordon, D.C., *The Passing of French Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Greer, Herb, *A Scattering of Dust*, London: Hutchinson, 1962.
- Hahn, Lorna, *North Africa - Nationalism to Nationhood*, Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960.
- Halberstam, David, *The Power That Be*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Harbi, Mohamed, *Le F.L.N. Mirage et Réalité: Des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir 1945-1962*, Strombeck, Belgium: Imp. le Scorpion, 1980.
- Henissart, Paul, *Wolves in the City - The Death of French Algeria*, London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970.
- Heymann, Arlette, *Les Libertés Publiques et la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, 1972.
- Hohenberg, John, *A Crisis of the American Press*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Horne, Alistair, *A Savage War of Peace*, London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977 and 1987.
- Horne, Alistair, "The Impact of the Algerian National Liberation War on the French Army", *Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne*, Algiers: E.N.A.L., 1985.
- Husni, Samir, A., "A Content Analysis of Press Coverage of the 1975-1976 Lebanese Civil War by 'The New York Times' and 'The

- Times of London'", Unpublished dissertation, North Texas State University, 1980.
- Hutchinson, Marth C., *Revolutionary Terrorism: The F.L.N. in Algeria*, Stanford, 1978.
- International Press Institute, *The Flow of the News*, Zurich, 1953.
- Irwin, Ray W., *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers (1776-1816)*, The University of Carolina Press, 1937 (trans. Ismail Arabi, Algiers: S.N.E.D., 1978).
- Jeanson, Collette and Francis, *L'Algérie Hors-La-Loi*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1955.]
- Julien, Charles-André, *Une Pensée Anti-Coloniale*, Paris: Sindbad, 1979.
- Knightley, Phillip, *The First Casualty*, London: André Deutsch Limited, 1975.
- Kriesburg, Martin, "Soviet News in The New York Times", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.4, 1946.
- Lacheraf, Mostefa, *L'Algérie, Nation et Société*, Algiers: S.N.E.D., 1978.
- Lebjaoui, Mohamed, *Bataille d'Alger ou Bataille d'Algérie*, Paris, 1972.
- Legum, Colin, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.
- Lentin, Albert-Paul, *L'Algérie des Colonels*, Paris, 1958.
- Lichtheim, George "All the New That's Fit to Print - Reflections on The New York Times", *Commentary*, Vol.40, No.3, September 1965.
- Macdonald, Dwight, "The New York Times, Alas", *Esquire*, April 1963.
- Mahsas, Ahmed, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Algérie de la 1ère Guerre Mondiale a 1954*, Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1979.
- Mammeri, Khalfa, *Les Nations Unies Face à La Question Algérienne (1954-1962)*, Algiers: S.N.E.D., 1969.
- Mansell, Gerard, *Tragedy in Algeria*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Mehri, Abdelhamid, "Ahdathun Mahadat Lifatihi Nufember 1954", *EI Açała*, No.22, October-November 1974.
- Memmi, A., *Portrait du Colonisé Précédé du Portrait de Colonisateur*, Paris: Buchet Chastel, 1957.
- Merrill, John C., *The Elite Press - Great Newspapers of the World*, New York: Princeton Publishing Corporation, 1968.
- Merrill, John C., "U.S. Panel Names Ten Leading 'Quality' Dailies", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol.41, 1964.

- Merrill, John C. and Fisher, Harold A., *The World's Great Dailies: Profits of 50 Newspapers*, New York: Hastings House, 1980.
- Nait Belkacem, Mouloud K., *Inia wa Assala*, Constantine (Algeria): Dar el Baath, 1975.
- Nicole, Alex, *La Bataille de l'O.A.S.*, Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1962.
- Nobile, Philip, "How The New York Times Became a Second Banana", *Esquire*, Vol.83, No.5, May 1975.
- Nora, Pierre, *Les Français d'Algérie*, Paris: Julliard, 1961.
- Noureddine, Meziane, *Un Algérien Raconte*, Paris, 1962.
- Noushi, André, *La Naissance du Nationalisme Algérien, 1914-1954*, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962.
- O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962*, London, 1967.
- Ortiz, Joseph F., *Mes Combats*, Paris, 1964.
- Ostgaard, Einard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.2, 1965.
- Ouzegane, Amar, *Le Meilleur Combat*, Paris, 1962.
- Pabo, Dominique, *Le 13 Mai: Histoire Secrète d'Une Révolution*, Paris, 1958.
- Parcours Maghrebins*, "En Direct de L'Indépendance", Nos.9-10, June-July 1987.
- Payne, George H., *History of Journalism in the United States*, London: D. Appleton and Company, 1924.
- Quandt, William R., *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1962*, Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
- Quillot, Roger, *La SFIO et L'Exercice du Pouvoir, 1944-1958*, Paris: Fayard, 1972.
- Rosengren, Karl E., "International News: Methods, Data and Theory", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.2, 1974.
- Rouviere, Jacques, *Le Putsch d'Alger*, Paris, 1976.
- Roy, Jules, *The War in Algeria*, New York, 1961.
- Salisbury, Harrison E., *Without Fear or Favor: The New York Times and its Times*, New York: The New York Times Co., 1980.
- Sande, Ostein, "The Perception of Foreign News", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vols.3-4, 1971.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.
- Schramm, Wilbur, ed., *One Day in the World's Press*, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.

- Schwartz, Harry, "Covering the Foreign News", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1970.
- Shudson, Michael, *Discovering the News*, The New York Times Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1978.
- Simon, Pierre-Henri, *Contre La Torture*, Paris, 1957.
- Smith, Raymond F., "On the Structure of Foreign News: A Comparison of the New York Times and the Indian White Papers", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.1, 1969.
- Sorenson, Theodore C., *Kennedy*, (second edition), London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1966.
- Spencer, William, *Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs*, U.S.A.: Norman, 1976.
- Stolberg, Benjamin, "The Man Behind The Times", *Atlantic Monthly*, No.138, December 1926.
- Sulzberger, Cyrus L., *The Test: De Gaulle and Algeria*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1962.
- Talbott, John, "French Public Opinion and the Algerian War: A Research Note", *French Historical Studies*, No.9, Fall 1975.
- Talbott, John, *The War Without a Name*, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1980.
- Tebbel, John, "National Newspapers", *Saturday Review*, 11 February 1961.
- Tebbel, John, "Rating the American Newspaper, Part II", *Saturday Review*, 10 June 1961.
- Tebbel, John, *The Compact History of the American Newspaper*, New York: Hawthorn Books Inc., 1963.
- Teguia Mohamed, *L'Algérie en Guerre*, Algiers: Offices de Publication Universitaires, 1976.
- Témoignage Chrétien*, "Quatre Officiers Parlent", 16 December 1959.
- Tillion, Germaine, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961.
- Tricot, Bernard, *Les Sentiers de la Paix: Algeria, 1958-1962*, Paris, 1972.
- Trinquier, Roger, *Le Coup du 13 Mai*, Paris, 1962.
- Tripier, Phillipe, *Autopsie de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, 1972.
- Valet, René, *L'Afrique du Nord Devant le Parlement au XIXeme Siècle (1828-1838)-(1880-1881)*, Algiers, 1929.
- Vallet, Eugene, *Le Drame Algérien - La Verité sur les Émeutes de Mai 1945*, Paris: Les Grandes Éditions Françaises, 1948.

- Vatin, Jean-Claude, *L'Algérie: Politique, Histoire et Société*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1983.
- Vilatoux, J., *La Répression et la Torture*, Paris: Ed. Ouvrière, 1975.
- Vitalis, Gros, *Le Temps de la Violence*, Paris: Presse de la Cité, 1971.
- Walker, Jerome H., "Dryfoos New Publisher, Oakes Editor of Times - Sulzberger Hands Over Reins to Son-in-Law; Mertz Retires", *Editor and Publisher*, 29 April 1961.
- Wilhelm, John, "The Economics of Foreign Coverage", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.X, No.2, 1956.
- Williams, Francis, *The Right to Know*, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969.
- Williams, Philip M., *Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-War France*, Cambridge, 1970.

II: NEWS MEDIA AND PERIODICALS (used selectively)

1. *Alger Républicain*
2. *Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord*
3. *El Açala*
4. *Esh-Shāab (Le Peuple)*
5. *El-Djeich*
6. *Esprit*
7. *L'Express*
8. *Le Figaro*
9. *France-Observateur*
10. *L'Humanité*
11. *Le Monde Diplomatique*
12. *La Nef*
13. *La Nouvelle Critique*
14. *Les Temps Modernes*