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"RELATIONS BETWEEN BLACKS AND SEMINOLES AFTER REMOVAL"

by

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ABSTRACT

The basic aim of this thesis is to describe and assess relations between Blacks and Seminoles from removal to the end of the frontier.

After a brief Introduction recounting the history of Seminole-Black relations prior to removal and presenting the major themes contained in the text, Chapters One and Two describe the formation, development and ultimate demise of the alliance between the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles and the militant Blacks in the Indian Territory and Mexico.

Chapter Three explains why many of the Seminole Blacks in Mexico returned to Texas and joined the U.S. army, and explores the nature and extent of their involvement in the Texas Indian Wars. Chapter Four traces the efforts of these Blacks to return to the Seminole nation and developments leading up to the establishment of two independent Seminole Black communities on the Texas-Mexican frontier that have survived to the present day.

Chapters Five and Six compare Seminole slavery after removal with the systems operating within the other Civilized tribes and argue that, while the experiences of the other slaveholding tribes were essentially similar, that of the Seminoles was fundamentally different.

Chapter Seven describes the division of the tribe at the onset of the American Civil War and the experiences of the Seminoles and Blacks during the conflict. Chapter Eight traces the comparative success of Seminole reconstruction and the reasons behind it in arguing that the "peaceful co-existence" policy adopted by the Indians and Freedmen resulted in a golden age for the Seminole Blacks.

The Conclusion briefly relates the history of Seminole-Black relations in the Twentieth Century and summarizes the argument put forward in the text.

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"... Most of the descendants of the pioneers who fled from South Carolina and Georgia maintained their identity of character, living by themselves and maintaining the purity of the African race.... They settled in separate villages: and the Seminole Indians appeared generally to coincide with the Exiles in the propriety of each maintaining their distinctive character."

Joshua Giddings, *The Exiles of Florida*.

INTRODUCTION

In 1513, Juan Ponce de León landed near modern-day Jacksonville and planted the Spanish flag in Florida soil. The Spanish did not occupy Florida immediately, however, preferring to concentrate their efforts on richer prizes in Mexico and South America. As a result, it was not until Philip II established St. Augustine in 1565 that permanent Spanish settlement of the Florida peninsula began. The Spanish brought with them European diseases that ravaged the native population in the early 1600s. Beginning around 1680, moreover, the British colonists in the Carolinas sponsored Creek and Yamasee raids into Florida that made still further inroads into the native population by killing some of the Indians and enslaving others. The outcome was that, in 1708, the Spanish governor reported that 300 refugee Indians at St. Augustine were all that remained of the original inhabitants of Florida. During the course of the Eighteenth Century, however, the void would be filled by various immigrant bands that came to be known collectively as the Seminoles.

In the early Eighteenth Century, the Spanish invited some of the Lower Creeks to settle at Apalachee to create a buffer against the English. Other Indians were driven into Florida by the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War of 1739-1748. By 1750, Cowkeeper's band of Oconee, which had been driven south to the Lower Chattahoochee by the Yamasee War of 1715, had established the town of Cuscowilla on the Alachua Savannah. Around the same time, other bands of Creek extraction, including the Apalachicola and the Mikusuki, moved further south. A confederation of these Hitchiti-speaking bands began to emerge in the Alachua region. Cowkeeper and his band attained primacy, and the principal chiefs of the group until removal were descended from him

through the female line. After 1767, Muskogean speaking Upper Creeks began to move into Florida. The last of the important migrations took place after the Red Sticks had been defeated by Andrew Jackson at Horseshoe Bend in 1814. Their numbers more than doubled the Indian population in Florida and, from this point on, Muskogean became the dominant language within the confederation.¹

The term Seminole was first applied to the Alachua group during the 1770s. A Muskogean word, Seminole, roughly translated, means "runaway" or "wild". The term has great significance when one considers developments in the group's relations with Blacks. The Indians were runaways themselves, refugees from oppression, of whatever sort, exiles in a strange land. It seems only natural, therefore, that they would sympathize with the plight of Black runaways. Moreover, the constituent bands of the Seminole confederation tended to consist of recalcitrant traditionalists who were most fervent in their opposition to acculturative influences. In consequence, both the Spanish and the British tended to leave the Seminoles to their own devices and the group's native philosophy and institutions remained intact. The Seminoles' retention of native attitudes and practices would greatly facilitate the incorporation of large numbers of Blacks into their society and have an enormous bearing on the course of future relations between the two groups.

The economic, social and political arrangements operating within the Seminole confederation needed but few adjustments to include Blacks. The system was based on a loose organization of associated towns enjoying a great deal of local autonomy and displaying a large measure of cultural diversity. It was to achieve such independence that most of the bands had emigrated to Florida in the first place. The constituent members of the confederation were from diverse regions and spoke different languages. The rules of membership were, clearly, very flexible. Seminole native

philosophy stressed harmony, balance, and a cyclical mode of existence. The Indians were hunters and subsistence farmers. They were not concerned with profits or competition. A communal land system was operated and the town chief, or Micco, levied taxes from the residents in the form of small agricultural surpluses. William Bartram described the system operating among the Creeks in the 1770s. Each member of the town was permitted to enjoy the fruits of his labour but each deposited a quantity of corn in a large crib as "a tribute or revenue to the mico", the proceeds being retained for the public good.² Thus, the paying of tribute and deference, were long-established customs within Creek and Seminole society. This would have a great bearing on the form Black slavery would assume among the Seminoles.

The Seminoles held Indian slaves before they encountered Blacks. Slavery was associated with capture in warfare rather than an organized system of labour, however. Captives were generally seen as replacements for tribal members lost in warfare, and adoption was the usual outcome. Bartram observed some Yamasee slaves among the Seminoles in the early 1770s. The slaves dressed better than the chief they served, both men and women were permitted to marry Seminoles and their children were "free, and considered in every respect equal to themselves".³ Though adjustments would be made when Blacks replaced Indians as slaves of the Seminoles, the system would continue to adhere to native principles right up to the Civil War.

It seems likely that the Seminoles were first introduced to Blacks by the Spanish. Black slaves in the British colony of South Carolina quickly learned that Spanish Florida offered a refuge to runaways. Though they owned slaves, the Spanish adopted a more lenient approach to servitude, employing less rigorous slave codes and affording Blacks a far greater degree of freedom than the British. Blacks, therefore, gladly

exchanged masters by escaping south to Florida. The Spanish welcomed the new immigrants and encouraged runaways to flee to Augustine to become Catholics. At first, the former owners of runaways were reimbursed by the Spanish but, on 12 April 1731, the Council for the Indies in Madrid decided that from then on, British owners should receive neither payment nor the return of their slaves. In 1738, as war between Spain and Britain rapidly approached, the Governor of Florida increased his hospitality to the runaways of South Carolina. On 31 May, he reported that he had granted freedom to a number of Blacks who had fled to St. Augustine but had then been enslaved by the Spanish. In addition, the Governor issued a proclamation that, from that point on, every runaway who escaped to Florida would be set free.⁴ As a result, "Numbers of slaves did, from Time to Time, by Land and Water, desert to St. Augustine. And, the better to facilitate their escape, carried off their Masters' Horses, Boats etc. Some of them first committing Murder; and were accordingly received and declared free".⁵

On 16 February 1739, Governor Montiano set aside for these fugitive Blacks an armed garrison near St. Augustine called Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose which, in consequence, became the first known free Black settlement in North America. A priest was assigned to the settlement to give instruction in religion and the Spanish government supplied the Blacks with tools and food until they could harvest a crop. The Black settlement was considered both a provocation and a source of grave danger by the British colonists, standing, as it did, like a beacon to runaways. The Black participants in the famous Stono rebellion of September 1739, for example, were said to be headed for the Edisto River, whose mouth is directly north of St. Augustine. Although these fugitives were attacked and defeated some 10 miles south of Stono, South Carolina planters were considerably disturbed by the incident. England and Spain were officially

at war by that time and contemporaries felt that the insurrection had been directly instigated by Spanish agents. Evidence indeed suggests that slaves were informed of the free Black settlement in Florida by Black sergeants sent into the Carolinas by the Spanish to incite desertions from the plantations and, if possible, revolt.⁶

The Spanish not only incited insurrection and harboured runaways but also used the newly-freed Blacks to full advantage in resisting the British invasion of 1740 under General Oglethorpe. The Spanish realized that, faced with the alternative of freedom or a return to chattel slavery, nobody would oppose the British with more determination than the Blacks. Fort Mose, a strategic settlement and easily defended, was fortified with a battery of 4 cannon and its Black inhabitants were organized into a military company. Of the 965 troops in St. Augustine, 200 were 'Armed Negroes' said to be receiving the same pay and rations as regular Spanish soldiers and to have officers appointed from their own ranks. Montiano employed free Blacks extensively as scouts, and Blacks were reported killed and captured in actions outside St. Augustine. When the Spanish counter-attacked Georgia in June 1742, their forces included, "... A regiment of Negroes. The negro commanders were clothed in lace, bore the same rank as the white officers, and with equal freedom and familiarity walked and conversed with their commanders and chief".⁷

Thus, at the very time the Seminoles were establishing a separate political identity in Florida, Blacks were receiving extremely favourable treatment from the Spanish. The Spanish authorities welcomed runaways from the southern plantations, allowed them their freedom and asked for little in return save for their co-operation in repelling elements deemed hostile to both parties. The Seminoles could hardly help but be impressed by the treatment the Blacks received at the hands of the civilized and refined Spanish. They were allowed to live apart, own arms and property,

move around at will, choose their own leaders, organize into military companies under Black officers and, in general, control their own destinies. By the mid 1740s, a separate, armed settlement of free Blacks was situated just outside St. Augustine and it enjoyed the full support of the Spanish residents, the two being joined in a mutually beneficial alliance based primarily upon their joint opposition to British expansionism. The Seminoles' initial perception of the role played by former runaways in Spanish society would have a great bearing upon the development of their own relations with Blacks.

Blacks became associated with the Seminoles in the second half of the Eighteenth Century in one of four ways: as associated maroons, as captives from southern plantations, as runaways and as slaves purchased from whites or other Indians. Under the terms of the 1763 treaty of Paris, Florida was ceded by Spain to the British and Fort Mose was subsequently transferred to Cuba. Though many Blacks left Florida with the Spanish some stayed behind and established maroon communities approximate to the Seminoles. Their numbers were strengthened by the addition of more runaways from southern plantations as were those of the Seminoles. As allies of the British, the Seminoles also engaged in attacks on southern plantations and captured other Blacks. Southern whites were extremely concerned about these latest developments. This co-operation between the two minorities was the very embodiment of the planter's worst nightmare and ushered in a period of concerted efforts to divide the races. Petitions continually poured into Congress and the Executive Departments for the return of fugitive slaves thought to be residing in the Indian country. In order to placate the Georgians, the U.S. government concluded the treaties of New York (1790) and Colerain (1796) with the Creeks, the idea being to secure the return of runaways. Though both the U.S. and the Creeks considered the Seminoles to be part of the Creek confederacy,

the Seminoles themselves did not and repudiated both Creek authority in their internal affairs, in general, and with regard to runaways living among them, in particular.⁸

It was apparently during the last two decades of the Eighteenth Century, and probably after Spanish authority had been restored in Florida in 1783, that the Seminoles first adopted a system of Black slavery. Almost nothing definite is known about Seminole slavery during its formative years, detailed descriptions coming only much later. It seems safe to assume, however, that the early form it took was a mixture of native practices and the system practised by the Spanish, featuring both tribute and deference and separate and fully-functioning settlements of armed Blacks. Light was first thrown upon Seminole-Black relations during the East Florida annexation plot of 1812, when American settlers in Spanish East Florida revolted and attempted to annex the territory to the United States. The need to remove the Seminole and Black threat to southern slaveholding interests, however, would appear to have been at least as important a priority to the participants.

During the ensuing conflict, the Seminole-Black military alliance in Florida came into full view for the first time. When St. Augustine came under threat in April 1812, the Spanish asked the Seminoles and Blacks for help. The Georgia militia was mobilized as a precaution against Seminole attack but General Floyd was quick to add, "Should they take up the cudgels it will afford a desirable pretext for the Georgians to penetrate their country, and Breake up a Negroe Town: an important Evil growing under their patronage".⁹ While the Seminoles stood to lose their lands if the plot succeeded, the Blacks were in grave danger of losing their hard-won freedom by being returned to Southern plantations. Both, therefore, were quick to answer the Spanish appeal.

Blacks subsequently played a crucial role in helping to defeat the

expansionists and ensure that Florida remained in sympathetic Spanish hands. Black troops, swelled by reinforcements from Havana, formed a majority of the Spanish garrison at St. Augustine. A diversion in the patriot's rear by Seminoles and Blacks was responsible for reducing the number of Americans outside St. Augustine. Local Blacks, joined by runaways from other southern plantations, pestered the besieging force in conjunction with the Indians. Most important of all, the patriot supply lines were cut and the siege of St. Augustine finally raised by a force of Blacks and Indians under Black leadership. Finally, Major Daniel Newman's attempt to destroy the Alachua towns was thwarted by an Indian and Black force in which the bravest warriors were said to be those of the Black towns. In prolonging the action, the Blacks and Indians succeeded in causing a sufficient delay for the American Congress to demand a halt to the campaign in Florida.¹⁰ The campaigns brought two important factors to light. First of all, the Seminoles and Blacks were locked in a close military alliance that was clearly of mutual benefit. The allies were well co-ordinated, effective during campaigns, and constituted a formidable foe. Secondly, separate Black settlements had clearly been established within the Seminole confederation by 1812. The Blacks were armed and fought under their own leaders but they were responsive to the Seminoles and apparently enjoyed an excellent understanding with the Indians.

The southerners quickly determined upon further action to remove the Indian and Black menace. On 7 February 1813, a substantial force of volunteer and regular troops set out to destroy the Alachua towns, using Indian prisoners as guides. The Seminoles and Blacks, realizing that they were hopelessly outnumbered, fled into the swamp. The American force subsequently destroyed two of the towns, one being a substantial Black settlement near Bowlegs town. From the report of the American commander, it appears that the Black settlement was well-provisioned and prospering,

Tuesday, Febr. 11 was employed in destroying the Negro town shown us by the Prisoners. We burnt three hundred and eighty six houses; consumed and destroyed from fifteen hundred to two thousand bushels of corn; three hundred horses, and about four hundred cattle. Two hundred deerskins were found.¹¹

The actions of the southerners left a legacy of troubles. A large number of emigrant Alachua Indians and Blacks established new settlements on the Suwannee that were destined to play an important role in later developments. Of more immediate importance, however, many Black associates of the Seminoles were left seeking a more secure and permanent site for settlement. They also sought revenge.

In 1814, during the second Anglo-American war, the British troops were prepared to employ Black runaways against their former masters. The British planned to attack the U.S. from the Gulf coast and troops were landed in the mouth of the Apalachicola under the leadership of Colonel E. Nicholls. The Colonel was sent into the Mobile district where he printed proclamations offering Blacks free lands in the British West Indies at the end of the war and promising they would not be delivered to their former masters. Nicholls then proceeded to Pensacola where, late in July, he hoisted the British flag beside that of the Spanish.

With the infusion of the recalcitrant Red Stick immigrants after Horseshoe Bend, the Seminoles had become much more militant in their attitude to the U.S. The Red Sticks were still smarting from their recent defeat while the Seminoles and Blacks sought recompense for the destruction of the Alachua towns. Nicholls, in consequence, had little difficulty in rallying the Indians and Blacks behind his standard. Towards the end of 1814, he had armed and trained over 3000 Indians and 400 Blacks.¹² On 3 November 1814, Jackson forced the British to evacuate Fort Barrancas at Pensacola. The British sailed for the Apalachicola where they deposited their Indian and Black allies. Here, in Spanish territory, on the east bank, about 15 miles from the mouth of the Apalachicola and 60 miles

from the boundary of the U.S., Nicholls built a fort at Prospect Bluff and manned it with Blacks.

The British sailed home in the spring of 1815 after learning of the ratification of the treaty of Ghent. Most of their former Indian allies moved off to the east under their various chiefs leaving behind at the fort a considerable amount of arms and ammunition, something over 300 Blacks, around 20 Choctaws and 11 Seminoles to act as its garrison under a Black chief named Garcon.¹³ The fort was strategically located at one of the commanding sights along the river. It was situated upon a cliff with a swamp in the rear. This protected the fort from the approach of artillery by land. The parapet was said to be about 15 feet high and 18 feet thick and protected by 9 guns. The fort was as attractive a prospect to the plantation slave as the free Black settlement at Fort Mose had been and more runaways settled under its ramparts. Their numbers increased daily until, it was said, "Their cornfields extended nearly 50 miles up the river".¹⁴ South Carolina and Georgia planters were most disconcerted by the sight of their former slaves living comfortably and in complete freedom under the protection of a fort which clearly also endangered their own security. U.S. military and naval officers only awaited an excuse to put an end to the Black menace.

The Spanish Governor had confessed to Jackson his complete inability to suppress the danger. On 16 May 1816 Jackson ordered General E.P.Gaines to destroy the fort "and return the stolen Negroes to their rightful owners".¹⁵ Gaines accordingly built Fort Scott at the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers "in order to overawe the Negroes". To supply the post, 2 transports with ordnance and provisions, escorted by 2 gunboats, were dispatched from New Orleans. To reach Fort Scott, the fleet would have to pass beneath "the Negro Fort". The fleet entered the mouth of the Apalachicola on 10 July and received an express from Gaines that he

had sent word to Colonel Clinch, "To take his station near the fort, and if the fleet was fired on, raze the post to the ground".¹⁶ The fleet was not to enter the river until Clinch had taken up his position. The obvious intention was to provoke an attack from the Black fort that would justify its destruction.

The Blacks could hardly have been expected to allow men, arms and vessels, which would obviously be used against them, to pass by unmolested. On 17 July, a boat's crew in search of fresh water was ambushed by about 40 Blacks and Indians and all but one were killed or captured. That same day, Clinch had started down the river towards the Black fort. When he learned of the ambush he surrounded the fort and called on the garrison to surrender. The Blacks refused, Garcon hurling abuse at the U.S. forces. Furthermore, "The negroes had hoisted a red flag, and... the English jack was flying over it". On 27 July, the gunboats were ordered within range of the fort and shots were exchanged with the Blacks, "The contest was momentary. The fifth discharge (a hot shot) from gun vessel No.154... entered the magazine and blew up the fort".¹⁷ The U.S. forces rushed in, found 270 dead and took 64 prisoners, only 3 of whom were neither burned nor maimed. Garcon, the Black commander, and the Choctaw Chief were 2 of the 3 unharmed. They were turned over to the Americans' Creek allies for execution. The prisoners were cared for and taken as captives to Georgia where they were delivered to the descendants of their ancestors' owners.¹⁸

With the destruction of "the Negro Fort", the Black power base on the Appalachicola was broken. The fort's garrison had consisted almost entirely of Spanish Blacks from Pensacola, however. The American Blacks, fugitives from South Carolina and Georgia plantations, had mostly settled along the river and, upon hearing of Clinch's approach, had fled eastwards towards the Suwannee, where Bowlegs and his Indian and Black followers had

settled after being dislodged from the Alachua Savannah in 1813.

The Blacks built villages along the Suwannee which extended along the sea coast as far as Tampa, and re-organized. The Seminoles and Blacks then made almost immediate reprisals along the Georgia line in which whites were murdered and property fired. In February 1817, 600 Blacks were said to be in arms, drilling and parading to the beat of drums with officers of their own choosing, under strict military discipline, with their numbers bolstered daily by new recruits. They chose Nero, Bowlegs' chief slave, as their commander, swore vengeance for the destruction of the Black fort and sought an early engagement with the Americans. Throughout the summer of 1817, the Seminole Blacks and Indians were engaged in raiding and recruiting. In the autumn, two British adventurers, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister arrived at the Suwannee from the Bahamas. Ambrister stated that he had come to see the Blacks righted and took over drilling duties from Nero. The so-called First Seminole War eventually broke out when the Seminoles and Blacks allied in opposition to the slave hunting expeditions of white Americans.

Border skirmishes between the Seminoles and Blacks, on the one hand, and southern whites, on the other, continued into 1818 with the allies raiding plantations and carrying off property, particularly Black slaves. The main incentive for further U.S. military action was again furnished by southern planters anxious to destroy this threat to their slaveholding interests. Jackson replaced Gaines at Fort Scott with the prime objective of breaking up the free Black settlements which were luring slaves away from their masters, and returning runaways to their former owners. He almost immediately led his troops into Florida and advanced on the Suwannee. The Black villages were on the west bank of the river. The warriors sent their families and effects to the Indians on the east bank of the river and prepared to meet the enemy.

Bowlegs had lost no time in retreating into the swamp. While the remaining women, children and effects were being ferried across the river to safety, the Black warriors remained on the west bank to cover the retreat and were joined by a few Indians. At the ensuing battle, the Blacks were at every conceivable disadvantage. Dazzled by the sunset, outfired by the superior American rifles and outnumbered by three or four to one, the 200 to 300 Blacks covered the retreat for several precious minutes. Becoming overwhelmed, they realized it was time to make their own escape. Two Blacks were forced to surrender and a further 9 Blacks and 2 Indians were killed in the action but the rest swam to safety on the far eastern shore. The Blacks' resistance had fulfilled its primary purpose. The women and children had escaped into the swamp with their effects and the Blacks had suffered few losses and had only two prisoners taken. It is clear, moreover, that it was the Blacks who did most of the fighting in what is considered to be the main battle of the First Seminole War.

The Creeks later killed 3 Black warriors and captured 5 Black and 9 Indian women and children about 6 miles into the swamp. No further pursuit was attempted as the fugitives had broken up into small parties which could never be hunted down. Ambrister and Arbuthnot were summarily executed on 29 April. Before Jackson left the Suwannee, the Indian and Black villages were broken up, burned and sacked and their former residents driven far into the wilderness. "This Savage and Negro War", as Jackson later termed it, had come to an end.¹⁹ The American invasion had exposed the impossibility of Spain's resisting any serious demand by the United States for the annexation of Florida. On 19 February 1819, a treaty provided for its cession for a fee of \$5 million and the province was formally and finally transferred to the United States in July 1821.

The information arising out of the events leading up to the First

Seminole War, and including the campaign itself, provides the only substantial body of material available on the nature of Seminole-Black relations prior to the American cession. It becomes clear that the Indians and Blacks were joined in a close military alliance in opposition to American expansionism. In a very real sense, the two groups needed each other, the Seminoles to preserve their land and the Blacks their freedom. Thus, joint military ventures tended to be well organized and were usually successful. The Indians and Blacks fought in separate companies under their own leaders but seemed to enjoy a good understanding of what needed to be done, given the circumstances. The alliance appears to have been at its strongest when assailed from without and this would become a recurrent theme in the history of Seminole-Black relations. So too would the separation that was clearly inherent in their relationship at a very early stage. The constant references to "Negro towns" and the location of the Indian and Black villages on opposite sides of the Suwannee bear ample testimony to this. It would appear that when they were not under threat, the Indians and Blacks preferred to live apart and maintain a social distance. Once again, this would be a recurrent theme in their history.

The change of flags brought with it an increase in information on Seminole-Black relations as American travellers and government officials made a number of important observations on the two groups. By the early 1820s, Black slavery was firmly established among the Seminoles. Some of the Seminole slaves had been captured from southern plantations. Others had been purchased by Seminole chiefs who had observed that prestige was attached by whites to the ownership of slaves. The Indians, however, had little use for Black slaves. They were not interested in capitalist notions and hence the labour-saving potential of Blacks. Managing slaves was also considered beneath the dignity of the Seminole warrior. Thus, Black

slavery among the Seminoles took on new connotations, determined by three essential factors: first of all, the continuing need for a military alliance, secondly, the retention of native attitudes and practices, and thirdly the influence exerted on slaveholders by the Spanish system of servitude. The Blacks moved off to themselves, cleared the land, established settlements, and raised corn.

From the statements of a number of impartial observers of the 1820s and 1830s, a composite picture emerges of the status of Blacks within pre-removal Seminole society. First of all, the Seminoles apparently did not consider the system a clear-cut master-slave relationship. Their Blacks were under no supervision and frequently were under no obligation to their owner save for the donation of a small annual tribute. In 1822, William Hayne Simmons, in the first known description of the system operating among the Seminoles, stated that the Blacks, "... Never furnished the Indians with any surplus produce, for the purposes of trade; but barely made them sufficient provisions for necessary consumption".²⁰ The tribute appears to have been similar to the feudal tithe. In 1835, Seminole agent Wiley Thompson described the typical Black tribute, "... The slave supplies his owner annually, from the product of his little field, with corn in proportion to the amount of the crop; and in no instance that has come to my knowledge, exceeding ten bushels; the residue is considered the property of the slave".²¹ Major General George A. McCall also set a figure on the amount the slave donated. He thus described the Seminole Blacks, "They are chiefly runaway slaves from Georgia, who have put themselves under the protection of Micanopy, or some other chief, whom they call master; and to whom, for this consideration, they render a tribute of one-third of the produce of the land, and one-third of the horses, cattle and fowls they may raise. Otherwise they are free to go and come at pleasure".²² Historian Kenneth Porter coined a

neat phrase to describe the relationship when he referred to it as "primitive democratic feudalism". But General Edmund P. Gaines was the most precise in his summation, describing the Blacks as the Seminoles' "vassals and allies".²³

Secondly, the Blacks were allowed to live apart from the Seminoles and keep most of the products of their labour. Observers again agreed on this point. Simmons, for example, wrote, "The Negroes dwell in towns apart from the Indians, and they are the finest looking people I have ever seen".²⁴ Wiley Thompson, 13 years later, stated, "They live in villages separate, and, in many cases, remote from their owners, and enjoying equal liberty with their owners....".²⁵ Finally, in 1837, John Lee Williams observed, "The Seminole negroes, for the most part, live separately from their masters, and manage their stocks and crops as they please, giving such share of the produce to their masters as they like".²⁶ The Blacks, being better agriculturalists, apparently prospered under these favourable conditions, as witnessed by the amount of stock and produce found at the Black town at Alachua in 1813. Simmons reported that, like the Indians, the Blacks practised a system of communal agriculture, their fields being set apart from those of the Seminoles.²⁷ A number of the Blacks apparently became quite wealthy, Wiley Thompson stating, "Many of these slaves had stocks of horses, cows and hogs with which the Indian owner never assumes the right to intermeddle".²⁸ McCall completed the picture, "We found these negroes in possession of large fields of the finest land, producing large crops of corn, beans, melons, pumpkins, and other esculent vegetables.... I saw, while riding along the borders of the ponds, fine rice growing; and in the village large corn-cribs were filled, while the houses were larger and more comfortable than those of the Indians themselves".²⁹ The Blacks were not only permitted to own property but also guns for use in defence and for hunting purposes. They could also move around at will. There

can be little doubt that the Blacks were able to control most aspects of their daily lives.

The Blacks were clearly of great value to the Seminoles in both military and political terms. They were formidable and uncompromising warriors and would defend their freedom to the last. They were also familiar with the ways of whites and were useful in the formulation of military tactics and in negotiations. As Florida came under the American flag, the Blacks were used more and more as interpreters and intermediaries, an important role within Seminole society. By 1822, for example, Juan had emerged as a principal interpreter among the Seminoles, the Indians placing "the utmost confidence in him, when making use of his services, in their dealings with the whites".³⁰ As such, the Blacks attained powerful positions in the tribe.

An affection grew between the two groups that was reflected in the Seminoles' unwillingness to sell their Blacks to whites. Simmons observed in 1822, "Though hunger and want be stronger than even the *sacra funes auri*, the greatest pressure of these evils, never occasions them to impose onerous labours on the Negroes, or to dispose of them, though tempted by high offers, if the latter are unwilling to be sold".³¹ Again, this was widely accepted by observers, Thompson adding, "... An Indian would almost as soon sell his child as his slave, except when under the influence of intoxicating liquors. The almost affection of the Indian for his slave, the slave's fear of being placed in a worse condition, and the influence which the negroes have over the Indians, have all been made to subserve the views of the government".³² Woodburne Potter wrote in 1836, "... These Indians have always evinced great reluctance to parting with slaves: Indeed, the Indian loves his negro as much as one of his own children, and the sternest necessity alone would drive him to the parting... The negro is also much more provident and ambitious than his master, and the peculiar

localities of the country eminently facilitate him in furnishing the Indian with rum and tobacco, which gives him a controlling influence over the latter...".³³ Williams went still further, suggesting a year later, "There exists a law among the Seminoles, forbidding individuals from selling their negroes to white people; and any attempt to evade that law, has always raised great commotions among them".³⁴ It became clear during the post-removal period, in fact, that a number of other societal mechanisms acted to keep the Blacks associated with the Seminoles.

The Blacks lived in much the same way as the Seminoles. They lived in 'cabins' of palmetto planks lashed to upright posts and thatched with leaves. They also dressed like the Indians, on special occasions wearing moccasins, leggings, a girthed hunting shirt of bright colours, a turban composed of gaudy bandanas topped with plumes, and a series of brightly polished metal crescents hung around the neck.³⁵ The economic systems of the Black and Indian towns were similar, being based upon communal agriculture and hunting, the only real difference being that the Blacks were the more successful agriculturalists and seem to have owned more property than the Indians.

Yet though there were similarities between the two groups, the Blacks were not fully-functioning members of Seminole society. But few seem to have been included in Indian clans or towns, the mainstay of Seminole civilization. These two organizations determined most facets of a Seminole's existence, his relations, marital partners, political affiliation, leadership potential, rights of inheritance and social activities. To be excluded from these meant being considered an outsider. Some Blacks were adopted into clans, as had Indian slaves before them, but this appears to have only happened in exceptional cases. The Black towns featured prominently in Seminole society by 1812. It would thus seem that the Blacks as a whole were never incorporated into Indian towns and that

such adoption was restricted to members of a small elite group of Black leaders. Intermarriage between Indians and Blacks certainly took place but not to the extent that has been claimed by some historians. If an Indian male married a Black woman who was not a clan or town member, his offspring would be effectively born outside of Seminole society. Nor did adoption into clans and towns necessarily accompany intermarriage, particularly if the Black participant were female. Black male participants in intermarriages, however, seem to have been adopted into Indian clans and towns, the Black leader Abraham being a good example.³⁶ It would appear that, though they were close allies, particularly during times of strife, they preferred to remain socially separate whenever possible, settling apart, and maintaining their own economic and social arrangements. The Black towns fitted easily into the Seminole confederation but, with few exceptions, the Blacks were not considered Seminoles. This would become much more obvious after removal. Thus, the Seminoles had modified their native version of Indian slavery with elements of the Spanish system, the whole subject to military expediency, in order to accommodate the Blacks. The result was that the Seminole Black villages came to constitute maroon communities on the Florida frontier.

Though certain aspects of the Seminoles' and Blacks' lifestyles were similar, a great deal was very different. For a start, the Blacks spoke a creole language that was English-based while the Seminoles spoke either Hitchiti or Muskogean. Though a number of Blacks learned to communicate freely with the Seminoles and became important interpreters in the tribe, the first language spoken in the Black towns was different to that spoken in the Seminole towns. Secondly, Africanisms permeated Seminole Black culture as reflected in their language and naming-practices. Finally, many of the Blacks were Christian, having been converted either on southern plantations or by the Spanish. While their religion may have been a

strange mixture of elements including Africanisms, Baptism, Catholicism and nativism, it would certainly have been very different to traditional Seminole religion and ceremonials. White travellers and observers tended to stress the similarities between the Seminoles and Blacks and draw contrasts between their experience and that of the white south. In the process, they overlooked the differences between the Seminoles and Blacks except for mentioning the fact that they lived separate lives. In fact, whenever possible, the Indians and Blacks acted independently, their only concerted action coming in military campaigns, and even then they fought in separate units under their own leadership. One can well imagine that, despite their superficial similarities, the residents of Indian and Black towns pursued quite different lifestyles.

After the 1818 Battle of Suwannee, the Blacks and Indians were homeless and in motion. The two groups again formed separate settlements approximate to each other. In 1821, Captain John H. Bell produced a list of 35 Seminole towns which included 2 Black settlements and two associated with the Seminoles. The two Black settlements were Mulatto Girl's town, south of Cuscowilla lake and Bucker Woman's town, near Long Swamp, east of Big Hammock. The two associated Black settlements were "Payne's negro settlements in Alachua; these are slaves belonging to the Seminoles, in all about three hundred", and a village of Micanopy's Blacks near Pilaklikaha about 120 miles south of Alachua.³⁷ Thus, the Seminoles and Blacks again chose to settle apart and live in separate villages.

During the 1820s, relations between Blacks and Seminoles came under increasing strain. First of all, there may have been a feeling among some of the Indians that the Blacks had been responsible for the campaigns leading up to, and including, the First Seminole War. Without the presence of large numbers of runaways among the Seminoles, it seems unlikely that

Jackson would have invaded Florida. Secondly, some of the Seminoles agreed to return runaways to their owners in the U.S. Under the terms of the 18 September 1823 treaty of Moultrie Creek, the Seminoles agreed to prevent further runaways from entering their nation and to return those already living among them. Six of the most influential chiefs signed the unfavourable treaty because of bribes of annuity payments and promises that they would be allowed to remain on their extensive tracts of land, north of Tampa. One of the signatories was "Mulatto King", who had 30 men in his village on the Apalachicola.³⁸ Thirdly, following the annexation of Florida by the U.S., there was an increase in the activities of slave hunters and speculators in the area. Many whites tried to secure the return of their slaves while others sought to capture Blacks for sale and profit. At times it appeared that some of the Seminoles were in cahoots with the slave catchers and the fears of the Blacks were hardly assuaged by the signing of the Moultrie Creek treaty. Finally, under the treaty, the Seminoles agreed to remove from their fertile country in northern Florida to the interior country below Tampa. The prospective 5 million acre reservation was swampland, inundated, and impossible to cultivate. Many Seminoles and Blacks became semi-nomadic, surviving by stealing cattle from settlers in northern Florida. Others did not acknowledge the treaty and stayed where they were. Their proximity to white settlements facilitated the work of slave catchers and a number of Blacks were seized in this way. Thus, the 1820s were an unhappy period for the Seminoles and Blacks and served to weaken the alliance between the two groups. Though this would be revived as a matter of military necessity during the forthcoming Second Seminole War, U.S. military officials would eventually expose and exploit the weaknesses inherent in their relationship during the course of the conflict.

The Seminoles and Blacks were soon to become involved in a massive

conflict with the U.S. over their proposed removal to the Indian Territory. Under President Jackson's administration, the Indian Removal act was passed on 28 May 1830. Anxious to appease Florida settlers who complained of Indian and Black depredations and southern planters who were more concerned than ever over the loss of runaways, the administration sought an immediate removal treaty with the Seminoles. Already suffering considerable hardship from the devastating effects of the drought of 1831, the Seminoles seemed ready to listen to offers of a tract of their own, far away from white encroachment, in the west. Thus, the principal men of the tribe signed a provisional removal treaty on 9 May 1832 at Payne's Landing. The treaty stipulated that removal was conditional, pending tribal approval of a selected site. A Seminole delegation of 7 Indians was sent to explore the proposed area in the Indian Territory, accompanied by the leading Black interpreters Abraham and Cudjo. At Fort Gibson, the delegation signed an agreement on 28 March 1833 in the name of all the Seminoles, saying that they were satisfied with the land and willing to remove. The Seminoles on the Apalachicola also agreed to remove, under another treaty, but the bands further east repudiated the treaty of Fort Gibson.³⁹ The Seminoles were ordered to prepare to remove west within the three years provided by the treaty.

The Blacks were to play an important role in fostering and strengthening Seminole opposition to removal. Whites attempted to seize the Blacks among the Apalachicolas before they could be taken from Florida. The Seminoles also began to fear that if they removed to the west the Creeks would steal their Blacks. The Blacks, meanwhile, were afraid of being returned to their former owners or re-enslaved under the Creeks and exerted considerable influence on the Seminoles to oppose emigration. In January 1834, Thompson expressed his belief that one of the major causes of Seminole hostility to removal was, "The influence which it is said the negroes, the very

slaves in the nation, have over the Indians". Governor William P. Duval of Florida concurred, "The slaves belonging to the Indians have a controlling influence over their masters, and are utterly opposed to any change of residence". Finally, General R.K. Call reported to President Jackson in March 1835, "The negroes have a great influence among the Indians... and are violently opposed to leaving the country. If the Indians are permitted to convert them into specie, one great obstacle in the way of removal may be overcome".⁴⁰ There can be little doubt that the opposition of the Blacks was fundamental to Seminole opposition to removal.

When Seminole agent Thompson called the chiefs together on 21 October 1834, they challenged the validity of both the treaty of Payne's Landing and that of Fort Gibson, charging the government with trickery. Relations deteriorated rapidly during 1835. Agitation from white settlers to seize the Blacks associated with the Seminoles increased during the spring. Osceola was imprisoned by Thompson in an attempt to force him to agree to the terms stipulated in the treaty of Payne's Landing. Indian and Black depredations escalated, culminating in King Philip's raids on the St. John's River plantations on 26 and 27 December. The following day, 28 December 1835, the Second Seminole War officially began. At Fort King, Osceola had his revenge by murdering agent Thompson and 50 miles away, north of the Withlacoochee River, near the Great Wahoo Swamp, a relief column under Major Francis L. Dade was led into an ambush by a Black guide, Louis Pachecho, and annihilated by Seminoles and Blacks, the Blacks later mutilating the bodies of their victims.⁴¹

The Second Seminole War cost the U.S.. over \$20 million and the lives of 1500 members of the armed forces, in addition to those of white settlers and militiamen, before it was concluded in August 1842. It seems highly unlikely that Seminole resistance to removal would have been so widespread

and sustained, particularly during the first 3 years of the war, had it not been for Black involvement. General Thomas S. Jesup, assuming command of the U.S. forces in Florida in early December 1836, reported, "This, you may be assured is a negro and not an Indian war; and if it be not speedily put down, the south will feel the effects of it before the end of next season".⁴² The following spring he stated, "Throughout my operations I found the negroes the most active and determined warriors; and during the conference with the Indians chiefs I ascertained that they exercised an almost controlling influence over them".⁴³ Black participation in the Second Seminole War has been well covered by Porter.⁴⁴ Suffice it to say here that the Blacks assumed significant roles as warriors, spies, guides and subsequently as interpreters and intermediaries. They also took part in all the major campaigns of the war, the Withlacoochee campaign in March 1836, the battle of Wahoo Swamp in November 1836, John Caesar's raid outside St. Augustine in January 1837 and the battle of Lake Okeechobee in December 1837. The Blacks had more to lose than the Indians. While the Seminoles stood to lose their lands, the Blacks could expect re-enslavement, the loss of property and the break-up of their families. In consequence, they were certainly as firm in their resistance as the Seminoles. It is not exaggeration to state that the most expensive Indian war in the history of the U.S. was as much about Blacks as Seminoles.

As the war progressed, the allies were joined by refugees from Florida plantations and others captured by the Indians. Joshua Giddings estimated that fully 1400 Blacks were associated with the Seminoles in 1836.⁴⁵ While this appears to have been an exaggeration, nearly 500 were finally removed west with the Seminoles while others were either killed or returned to their former owners. The policy of removing Blacks to the west with the Seminoles was instigated by General Jesup as a matter

of military expediency to conclude the war as quickly as possible. The first move was made on 6 March 1837, at Camp Dade, when Jesup concluded a treaty with representatives of Principal Chief Micanopy and Alligator, including the subsequently famous Black interpreter John Cavallo, or as he was more commonly known, Gopher John. Under its terms, the Indians agreed to cease hostilities, go to Tampa on 10 April and board transports for the west. Hostages were surrendered for the performance of their promises. Through the bargaining of the Black leader, Abraham, important provisions were included concerning the Seminole Blacks,

Major General Jesup, in behalf of the United States agrees that the Seminoles and their allies who come in, and emigrate to the West, shall be secure in their lives and property; that their negroes, ⁴⁶ their bona fide property, shall accompany them to the West....

Thus, the Seminoles had been assured that their slaves would be allowed to accompany them to the Indian Territory, and would continue to live as their slaves after removal.

At first, Jesup intended to carry out his side of the agreement. On 26 March he reasoned, "The negroes rule the Indians and it is important that they should feel themselves secure; if they should become alarmed and hold out, the war will be renewed".⁴⁷ Legally, however, most of the Seminole Blacks were still the slaves of white planters. Under pressure from Florida slaveholders, he made the mistake of entering into an agreement with Coi Hadgo and other Seminole chiefs to surrender the Blacks taken during the war. The Blacks banded together against these aggressors and were supported by the young Indian militants. When several Florida planters arrived at the emigration camp to search for slaves, the Blacks and many Indians fled, while on 2 June, Osceola, Wild Cat and Gopher John seized and carried off the Seminole hostages given up under the terms of the truce.⁴⁸

The American commander immediately realized his mistake and re-introduced

the old 'Divide and Rule' policy to separate the races. This policy would eventually prove to be largely successful and would cause a rift between the Seminoles and Blacks that widened during the immediate post-removal period. In direct contradiction to his earlier treaty with the Seminoles, Jesup began to offer freedom to the Blacks if they would separate from the Indians and surrender. At first, he proposed to reverse Jackson's removal programme by allowing the Seminoles to remain in Florida,

The two races, the Negro and the Indian, are rapidly approximating; they are identified in interests and feelings.... Should the Indians remain in this territory, the negroes among them will form a rallying point for runaway negroes from adjacent states; and if they remove, the fastnesses of the country would be immediately occupied by negroes. I am very sure they could be confined to a small district near Florida Point and would accept peace and the small district referred to as the condition for the surrender of all runaway Negroes.⁴⁹

The question then remained of what to do with the Seminole Blacks.

Jesup did not propose to allow the dissemination among southern plantations of Blacks, trained in the use of arms and accustomed to freedom, who might foreseeably take the lead in slave insurrections. In September 1836, to prevent this occurrence, Jesup engaged the U.S. government in slave-trading ventures. For the benefit of "the public", Jesup purchased from the Creeks 90 captured Seminole Blacks to prevent their sale to unscrupulous Georgian slave dealers. This one action created many problems after removal as the original owners of these Blacks pressed claims for their property. As the Blacks were not to be allowed to remain among the Seminoles, could not be sold and were not to be returned to southern plantations, Jesup initially favoured their expulsion from the U.S., "It is highly important to the slaveholding states that these Negroes be sent out of the country, and I would strongly recommend that they be sent to one of our colonies in Africa".⁵⁰ Quickly realizing the impracticality of this suggestion, however, Jesup then proposed, once more, to send the Blacks to the Indian Territory with the Seminoles as

part of the removal programme. In the belief that the more militant Blacks would not surrender until they were assured of their freedom and that the Seminoles would hold out for as long as the Blacks, Jesup sought a new treaty in early 1838 that would solve both problems.

In early February 1838, from Fort Jupiter, Jesup appealed through Seminole Black emissaries to the Black chiefs August, July and Gopher John, "... To whom, and to their people, I promised freedom and protection on their separating from the Indians and surrendering". Jesup, at a stroke, had granted freedom to the Seminole Blacks, perhaps four fifths of whom were either runaways or their descendants and thus still legally slaves. Many of them, moreover, were slaves of the Seminoles. In view of Jesup's refusal to return them to southern plantations, "... It was stipulated that they should be sent to the West as part of the Seminole nation".⁵¹ Thus, Black emancipation and removal became the official policy of the United States army after January 1838.

To give his Black removal policy legal justification, Jesup resorted to the fiction that all the Seminole Blacks were legitimate Seminole property and all the Blacks who went to the emigration camps were dispatched to the west. With the onset of Jesup's Black removal policy, the Second Seminole War effectively came to an end for the Seminole Blacks. Most of those remaining in the field took the opportunity to sue for peace under Jesup's promise of freedom and removal. During the campaign of September 1837-March 1838, around 250 Blacks had either surrendered or been captured. Under the counsel of Abraham, Alligator surrendered with Gopher John and 88 of his band, including 27 Blacks.⁵² His capitulation led to the surrender of 360 more Indians and Blacks in April. Most of the slaves who had joined the Seminoles at the beginning of the war had either surrendered or been recaptured, but those who had managed to hold out until 1838 were deemed free by the U.S. government and were allowed

to board transports for the west alongside the Seminole Blacks of longer standing.

After 1838, Seminole Blacks, having attained such favourable terms for themselves, took on a new role as U.S. government agents who induced hostile Indians to surrender and remove west. Black guides, interpreters and negotiators such as Sandy Perryman, Negro John and Sampson, became indispensable in establishing contact with the remaining Seminole leaders.⁵³ Most important of all was Gopher John who returned to Florida from the Indian Territory and often played an important role in negotiating between the United States and recalcitrant Seminole chiefs. In 1842, General William Worth, the last of the American commanders in the Second Seminole War, estimated that there were only 301 Seminoles left in Florida. Realizing the futility of trying to force these resourceful Indians to remove west, Worth met their chiefs in council at Cedar Keys on 14 August and informed them that they would be allowed to remain in Florida on a swampland reservation deep in the southern section of the peninsula.⁵⁴ In the final analysis, Black removal had superceded Seminole removal on the list of American priorities.

Weaknesses had begun to appear in the alliance between the Seminoles and Blacks in the 1820s and these were exposed more fully during removal negotiations in the Second Seminole War. While the Seminoles and Blacks joined in fierce resistance to American expansionism, they had different reasons for doing so. The Seminoles wished to retain their land and slaves and maintain an identity separate from that of the Creeks. The Blacks, however, were fighting for their freedom. Jesup's removal policies eventually succeeded in dividing the races and drove a deep wedge between the Seminoles and Blacks that would remain for more than a decade after removal and result in some remarkable developments. The Indians had been assured that they would be secure in their slave property but the

Blacks surrendered at different times and under differing circumstances.⁵⁵ Hence, some were classified as slaves while others were deemed to be free. Problems arising out of the classification of these Blacks would be prevalent in the Indian Territory.

One factor emerges very clearly from the removal negotiations. The Blacks chose white promises of freedom and removal over further resistance and separated themselves from the Indians in order to secure that goal. No matter how mild the system of slavery practised by the Seminoles, freedom was clearly infinitely preferable. Later in the war, moreover, the Blacks aided the American removal programme by bringing in Indian recalcitrants. These developments led to the belief among many of the Seminoles that the Blacks had procured a good deal for themselves at the Indians' expense. The Blacks, meanwhile, treasured their new-won "freedom" and many of the more militant members of the group would be prepared later to go to extraordinary lengths to preserve their liberty. The issue of the Blacks' position in the Indian Territory would be complicated still further by conflicting claims to ownership by whites and other Indians, and the uncertain stance adopted by the U.S. in determining their status. The whole made for a host of complex problems that had a devastating effect on Seminole-Black relations after removal and were not fully resolved until emancipation finally decided the issue.

The basic aim of this thesis is to produce a detailed account of relations between Blacks and Seminoles from their joint removal to the Indian Territory to the end of the frontier. Two central arguments are contained in the text. First of all, the experience of the Seminoles, both before and after removal, was fundamentally different to that of the other Civilized tribes and this resulted in a different set of relations with Blacks. While all of the other slaveholding tribes adopted many facets of white civilization into their societies, the Seminoles were at best

indifferent and at worst openly hostile to acculturative influences. The Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws underwent changes in their societies that led to the rise of an intermarried white and mixed blood elite that fostered the incorporation of southern white institutions, including plantation slavery and harsh Black codes. The Seminoles, in contrast, experienced none of these changes. Nativism remained strong throughout the period and the tribe continued to consist of subsistence farmers under fullblood leadership. After removal, Black slavery among the Seminoles continued to comprise a mixture of native practices and elements adopted from the Spanish system. Though a progressive faction arose within the tribe after 1845, this could not, in any way, be compared to the mixed blood elites of the other Civilized tribes. Thus, the Seminoles never adopted institutionalized bondage. Slavery continued to be associated with tribute and deference rather than a codified system of labour. The Seminole Blacks remained the Indians' "vassals and allies" and continued to control most aspects of their daily lives. The success of Seminole reconstruction was largely attributable to the strength of nativism within the tribe. The Seminoles found they had few adjustments to make to incorporate the Freedmen into their society and grant them equal rights. The ensuing period constituted a veritable golden age for the Seminole Blacks and their experience stood in stark contrast to that of most Freedmen associated with the other, more acculturated, Civilized tribes.

Secondly, Seminole-Black relations throughout the period were dominated by the determination of the two groups to preserve their independence and individual identities. At certain critical times, such as during the Seminole Wars, the period prior to the Mexican migrations, and the Civil War, Seminoles and Blacks joined in close alliance for mutual benefit. Yet even here, the Indians and Blacks usually had different

motives and objectives. They also tended to act independently and unilaterally within the alliance, invariably living in separate camps and obeying their own leaders. The relationship between the Seminoles and Blacks was at its strongest, however, when the groups were threatened and their alliance stood up well to outside pressure. But whenever possible, the Seminoles and Blacks chose to separate, live apart, and maintain a social distance while pursuing their individual courses of action. Blacks were rarely accepted into Seminole clans or towns and there was only a low incidence of intermarriage between the two groups. The Black town became a virtually autonomous unit within Seminole society, having its own economic and social arrangements, and political leaders. A vital, clearly identifiable, and largely unique Seminole Black culture emerged within their settlements and this, at times, contrasted sharply with that of the Indians. The theme of Indian and Black separatism permeated every aspect of their relationship in each area of interaction. It is, without doubt, the most consistent feature in the history of Seminole-Black relations. To this day, separate settlements of Seminole Blacks have survived throughout the continent of North America. But while some of these have kept in contact with each other, most no longer maintain relations with the Seminoles.

In the belief that the history of Seminole-Black relations has suffered somewhat from being studied both in a fragmentary way and in isolation, an attempt has been made to take a broader scope of the subject and set it in a wider perspective. Only by drawing detailed comparisons with the other slaveholding tribes can a full appreciation of the differences in the Seminole-Black experience be gained and insights obtained into the reasons behind this. The Seminole Blacks have a colourful history. Included in their story are slave hunters, Comanches and Apaches, Mexican revolutionaries, Black army scouts, Indian wars,

famous outlaws, and Black cowboys, criminals and deputies. What emerges is an epic saga of slavery, exile and, ultimately, freedom; a struggle for independence, recognition and, at times, survival. Theirs is a success story. The existence today of thriving Seminole Black communities in Oklahoma, Texas and Mexico offer proud testament to the pioneers who forged them out of the wilderness, the descendants of the Florida maroons.

Footnotes

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CHAPTER 1

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE RECALCITRANT TRADITIONALIST
SEMINOLES AND THE MILITANT BLACKS IN THE
INDIAN TERRITORY, 1838-1849

The close association that had existed between the Seminoles and Blacks in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries had come under strong pressure in the years just prior to their removal from Florida from three main sources. First of all, following the accession of Florida from Spain by the U.S., there had been a growth in the activity of speculators in Seminole slave property. This had tended to weaken the links between the two groups and had led to the growth of mistrust among the Blacks. Secondly, the almost continuous separation of the Indians and Blacks following the treaty of Moultrie Creek had led to their gradual estrangement and left problems that were only temporarily assuaged by the necessity of a military alliance during the Second Seminole War. And finally, the U.S. military commanders in Florida had widened the breach by adopting a "Divide and Rule" policy during removal negotiations. While the Seminoles were assured that they would be secure in their "bona fide" slave property, many Blacks were persuaded to remove by the promise that they would be free men in the west. The policy drove a deep wedge between the Indians and Blacks and dramatically affected the course of relations between the two groups after removal.

Mutual suspicion and resentment came to mark relations between the Seminoles and Blacks during the immediate post removal period. Many Seminole slaveholders were unaware of the promises made to the Blacks while others chose to ignore them and all assumed the rights of ownership in the Indian Territory. This was deeply resented by most of the Blacks, many of whom actually possessed emancipation documents signed by U.S. generals. A number of Seminoles came to feel that they had been betrayed

by the Blacks, who seemed to have procured better terms for themselves at their expense. Some gave vent to their anger by attacking the lives, families and property of the leading Black interpreters. Many of the Blacks, meanwhile, felt not only that they had no further obligation to their former owners but also that the Indians were potential or actual adversaries. The more militant of them wished to move off to themselves and began to pursue a separate initiative towards that end.

It had been agreed in the 1832 treaty of Payne's Landing and the 1833 treaty of Fort Gibson that the Seminoles would settle among the Creeks in the west and become a constituent part of that tribe. In the latter treaty the Seminoles had been designated a tract of land lying between the Canadian and North Fork to the western extremities of Little River. When Opothleyohola and his Creek followers emigrated west in 1837, however, they settled in the eastern part of this tract near the confluence of the North Fork and Canadian. Fear of, and opposition to, Creek domination had been a major cause of Seminole resistance to removal. Indeed, the two tribes had been armed antagonists during the Second Seminole War. In the west, Principal Chief Micanopy and the more conciliatory Seminoles swallowed their pride and settled on their assigned lands in the Creek country, taking their Blacks with them. The recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles, or those who had held out the longest in Florida and were the most vehement in both their defence of the tribe's individual identity, culture and traditions and their opposition to change, however, adamantly refused to remove to the Creek country or become a constituent part of that tribe and settled instead in the Cherokee country around Fort Gibson.¹

There were two basic reasons for the recalcitrants' opposition to the Creeks. First of all, the Creeks threatened the very lifestyle of the Seminole traditionalists, and secondly they laid claims to their slave

property. The leadership of the progressive Lower Creeks was dominated by intermarried whites and their acculturated mixed blood offspring. Institutionalized slavery also existed among the wealthy, elite group of Lower Creek plantocrats. In the west, the Upper and Lower Creeks united under a general tribal council. Roly McIntosh, the wealthy and acculturated head of the Lower towns, also became the principal chief of the entire nation and his party came to dominate the Creek government. It was clear to the Seminole traditionalists that, if a union of the tribes came about, the more numerous Creeks, who were led by the progressive McIntosh party, would insist upon Seminole acculturation. The subjugation of Seminole interests and the loss of a separate tribal identity would thus become an inevitability.

Many of the Seminoles' slaves were also claimed by Creeks and the recalcitrants feared that, after the tribes united, many of their Blacks would be seized. Slaveholding among the Seminoles was traditionally associated with prestige and leadership and, following the upheaval of removal, the chiefs were more anxious than ever to strengthen their power base and protect themselves against a decline in status by retaining their Blacks within their parties. The fear that the Creeks would rob them of their slaves was the reason most often cited by the recalcitrants as the source of their opposition to unification with the larger tribe. The Seminole Blacks were also radically opposed to the proposed union of the two tribes. In contrast to the liberal form of slavery practised by the Seminoles, the Creeks had adopted institutionalized bondage, after the southern white model, with harsh Black codes. Under the Creeks, the Seminole Blacks could expect kidnap, sale or, at best, a harsher form of slavery.² Between 1841-1845, therefore, the Blacks forged an alliance with the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles which was based, primarily, on their joint opposition to unification with the Creeks.

Due to unmitigating circumstances, the recalcitrants temporarily capitulated and acceded to the Tripartite treaty of 1845, uniting the Seminoles with the Creeks. The treaty spelled disaster for the Seminole Blacks who now found themselves subject to harsh slave codes, the threat of being claimed by, or sold to, white and mixed blood speculators, and the incursions of kidnappers. In view of their apparent betrayal by the recalcitrants, the more militant Blacks adopted a separate initiative, seeking to establish their free status and secure their best interests independently. This led quickly to their separating themselves from both the Seminoles and their Black compatriots and seeking the protection of the army at Fort Gibson. The result was that these Black militants continued to reside on the military reservation for three and a half years while their status was being decided by government officials in Washington.

In the late 1840s, both the Seminoles and Blacks split into factions. While the majority of Seminoles continued to follow a basically conservative and conciliatory line, the recalcitrant traditionalists remained strong at one extreme while the progressives emerged as a powerful force at the other. The two parties held opposing views on the position of Blacks within the tribe. The recalcitrants quickly realised that the 1845 treaty had been a mistake and sought to make amends by disassociating themselves from the Creeks, if necessary by quitting the Indian Territory. They gathered behind the banner of the disaffected and ambitious Wild Cat, who stood in open opposition to unification. Wild Cat favoured the retention of slavery within the tribe but was opposed to institutionalized bondage on the Lower Creek model. He wished to keep the system the Seminoles had practised in Florida, with all its native connotations. As his opposition to the Creeks grew ever stronger following the Tripartite treaty, Wild Cat began to explore the possibility of creating a confederation of disaffected bands of Indians and Blacks under his leadership either in the

Indian Territory or on the Texas-Mexican frontier.

A progressive party also emerged within the tribe at this time. The progressives were more amenable to mixed blood and white overtures, and hence acculturative influences in general, than the rest of the tribe. They believed that the tribe's system of slavery should come more into line with that of the Creeks and that the Blacks should be subject to greater control. The philosophical and ideological differences dividing the recalcitrants and the progressives came to a head at the end of the decade and were one of the main reasons behind the emigration of Wild Cat and his supporters to Mexico.

The Seminole Blacks similarly split into factions after the Tripartite treaty. The more militant among them banded behind the powerful and influential Gopher John at Fort Gibson. These Blacks would not subject themselves to Creek codes, institutionalized slavery, or the possibility of sale. They had been promised their freedom and free they would be, no matter what the price. At Fort Gibson they stood in open defiance against the wishes of their Seminole owners. In contrast to this militant minority were the more conciliatory Blacks. While these were also opposed to slavery and unification with the Creeks, they were not prepared to go to extreme lengths to acquire their freedom. Preferring to live as slaves of the Seminoles to an uncertain future on the military reservation, these Blacks continued to reside approximate to the Indians and pay their small tributes to their owners. As with the Seminoles, these divisions would lead to a breach in the Black community at the end of the decade.

In 1849, two highly significant events took place which brought to a head the problems that had been building up since removal and greatly affected the future of Seminole-Black relations. First of all, the conciliatory Principal Chief, Micanopy, died at Fort Gibson leaving

behind two obvious claimants. As Micanopy's principal adviser, Wild Cat had harboured hopes of succeeding him but he was passed over in favour of the Chief's progressive nephew, Jim Jumper. Thereafter, the disillusioned Wild Cat set about establishing his frontier confederation outside the limits of the Indian Territory. And secondly, the U.S. eventually reneged on its earlier promises to the Seminole Blacks by restoring the militants based at Fort Gibson to the Indians as slaves. Though the Seminoles and Blacks agreed to live as they had formerly, in Florida, this was clearly unlikely to happen. Many of the Blacks had already been sold to whites and mixed bloods and these individuals were certain to pursue their claims. The progressive leadership also made it perfectly clear that it wished to exercise more control over the Black population. The militants, for their part, had become highly independent, refractory and somewhat arrogant and were totally indisposed to accept the authority of the Seminole progressives.

Thus, with the progressives in power and the tribe subject to the will of the Creeks, the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles and the militant Blacks were once again thrown into the same corner. Their alliance was subsequently re-established and the two groups eventually quit the Indian Territory for Mexico. They left behind them most of the Seminoles and the conservative Black majority and relations have been maintained between the two groups in the Indian Territory and Oklahoma to the present day. The alliance between the recalcitrants and the militants, however, was poorly founded and but a weak arrangement. The association can best be described as a marriage of convenience, based more on mutual need than identity of interest. The parties' reasons for entering into the alliance differed as did their hopes, dreams and expectations. Much of its initial strength was based on personality and it seemed unlikely to survive the strain of life on the Texas-Mexican

frontier.

The architects of the alliance, Wild Cat and Gopher John had become close comrades and allies in Florida. They had become acquainted at the Tampa Bay emigration camp after the capitulation at Fort Dade in 1837 and later they had co-operated in carrying off the hostages after the treaty had been violated by General Thomas S. Jesup. Their relationship had been strengthened by their joint capture, their subsequent imprisonment at, and escape from, Fort Marion in October and November 1837, and their dual command during the Battle of Okeechobee in December of that same year.³ After their removal to the Indian Territory, Wild Cat and Gopher John became the leaders of their respective parties, the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles and the militant Blacks, and forged the alliance that ultimately led to their joint emigration from the Seminole country. A comparative analysis of the careers of these two leaders in the Indian Territory helps to throw light upon the formation and development of the alliance and explain the weaknesses inherent within it. It is to such an analysis that this chapter is devoted.

Wild Cat was the true Seminole recalcitrant traditionalist. He had continued the struggle in Florida until March 1841 and was the last important chief to surrender in the Second Seminole War. When Wild Cat removed to the Indian Territory he refused to settle among the Creeks and remained as a squatter on Cherokee land for more than three years. His band landed in the west on 12 November 1841 and there were 197 names on the muster roll including Billy and Charles, two Black interpreters, and 5 slaves. The day after their arrival the weather turned cold and they refused to move any further. Wild Cat and his band made camp opposite the mouth of the Grand River, just below the garrison at Fort Gibson.⁴ As early as 28 November 1841, Wild Cat, using as his interpreter, "The celebrated Negro Abram", was complaining to Major Ethan A. Hitchcock.

Wild Cat "... Put in claims for property taken by the government for which they had never been paid. The chief said he had been promised kettles, axes, etc., but they had not come".⁵

By early 1842, almost 1,500 Seminoles, well over a third of the tribe, were encamped on Cherokee land around Fort Gibson under Wild Cat, Alligator and other chiefs. Through lack of building and farming equipment, they could not construct homes or cultivate the land and were destitute. They steadfastly refused to remove to their assigned lands, however.⁶ In his Annual Report for 1842, William Armstrong, the Superintendent of the Western Territory, noted the reasons for the Seminoles' reluctance to remove to the Creek country,

... There is danger of the Creeks oppressing the Seminoles whenever difficulty about the right of property arises, and unfortunately there are too many fruitful sources of disputed property, especially about Negroes. In many cases the Creeks claim Negroes which are in the possession of the Seminoles.... The question as to the right of these Negroes should be adjudged as early as possible, as it is one now calculated to produce and keep up a bad state of feeling.⁷

Unwilling to take any course but their own, the recalcitrants remained firm in their resolve not to locate amongst the Creeks, become subject to their control, or risk the loss of their Blacks.

During 1843, there were moves to adjust the problems between the Creeks and Seminoles. Thomas L. Judge, the Seminole sub-agent, had several interviews with Roly McIntosh and other Creek chiefs on the subject of disputed slave property. They gave assurances that the claims against the Seminole Blacks came from Creek individuals and not from the nation and promised to resort only to legal premises for their adjustment. Wild Cat and Alligator remained in the Cherokee nation but it was reported that some members of their bands were deserting them. Furthermore, Judge suggested that their portion of the annuity be stopped until they removed to their own country and gave satisfactory evidence that they intended to remain there.⁸ In his Annual Report for 1843, Armstrong recommended

departmental action to end the conflict,

The disputed question, in relation to Negro property between the Seminoles and Creeks has not yet been adjusted, and I recommend that immediate measures be taken to have these difficulties brought to a close, as otherwise, if they remain unsettled, they may, and probably will, lead to unpleasant collisions between the parties...⁹

Under the threat of defection of their band members, loss of the annuity, a firmer departmental line, and their continuing destitution, Wild Cat, Alligator, and their supporters in the Cherokee nation met the Creeks in council in October and agreed to remove if a parcel of land could be found for them on the North Fork. Judge guaranteed the Seminoles the security of their slave property if they removed as he firmly believed that they would never submit to Creek laws, especially those concerning the right of the Blacks to own property and carry weapons. In November, however, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. Hartley Crawford, recommended that a commission be appointed to meet with the Creeks and Seminoles to settle the dispute over the Blacks and the occupation of land, and that in the meantime there be no removal of those settled on the Cherokee lands. As 1843 ended, Wild Cat, Alligator and their supporters were still encamped in the vicinity of Fort Gibson, in defiance of Creek authority.¹⁰

Gopher John had been associated with Wild Cat and Alligator in Florida and from the time of his final removal to the west in 1842 to the treaty of 1845 he was closely allied to the Seminole recalcitrants who were residing on the Cherokee lands. John, who became the undisputed leader of the Seminole Black militants in the Indian Territory, at first hoped for a return to the earlier relationship that had existed between the Seminoles and Blacks in Florida. Seeing that Seminole opposition to the Creeks furthered the interests of the Blacks, he supported, encouraged, and followed the lead of Wild Cat during this period.

Gopher John had been the last Black chief to surrender in Florida. After his capitulation with Alligator in April 1838, he was shipped immediately to the west. John suggested that delegations of prominent chiefs

be sent from the Indian Territory to persuade the Seminoles still in the field to surrender, and he witnessed the return of his old ally Alligator and his brother-in-law Holatoochee to Florida. He succeeded in returning to Florida himself in 1839, became well-known as a guide and interpreter, and personally participated in bringing in 535 recalcitrants during the last two years of the war.¹¹

John finally removed from Florida in the summer of 1842. He left New Orleans on the steamboat "Swan", under the charge of Lieutenant E.R.S. Canby, on 22 July 1842, in a party of 102 Seminole captives. On 5 August, because of low water in the Arkansas River, they landed at La Fourche Bar, six miles below Little Rock. Emigration officials were anxious to remove new arrivals immediately to the Creek country south of the Arkansas to avoid adding to the numbers of those already settled on the Cherokee lands. Canby was unable to negotiate a draft to conduct the party further, however, and it was only through a loan of \$1,500 from Gopher John for the cost of transportation that the party could proceed. On 12 August, wagons and teams were secured and the party set out, finally arriving at the Creek council grounds on 6 September, where Canby delivered the emigrants to Creek agent John McKee. Gopher John made his home on the Deep Fork and helped to establish a separate Seminole Black community at that location. Upon the death of his Indian master, Charles Cavallo, in Florida, John had become the property of the Seminole chiefs under the tribe's system of guardianship and inheritance. In February 1843, for his service in providing funds for Canby's party, the chiefs in council declared John to be free.¹²

As a free Seminole Black, Gopher John was in great danger of being kidnapped by Creeks or whites and returned to slavery. Although he had made his home on the Deep Fork, he was not safe in the Creek country and consequently spent much of his time at Fort Gibson. Cherokee agent Pierce

M. Butler reported in April 1845, "During the residence of the Seminoles in the Cherokee Nation, John has been called on almost daily for the last two years... to interpret, and attend to their calls and wishes".

Although frequently the only interpreter at Fort Gibson, John was not hired officially, but Butler felt his services were so important that he ought to be paid.¹³ As the interpreter, intermediary, and adviser of Wild Cat and the recalcitrants at Fort Gibson, Gopher John was in a powerful position to advance the views of the Blacks and sustain the Seminoles in their opposition to the Creeks.

By early 1844 there had been no change in the situation of the Seminole recalcitrants. On 7 March, Butler reported that, "... One thousand souls, or one-third of the nation of the Seminoles proper, reside at present on this side of the river, on the Cherokee soil, headed too by a man of no ordinary talent, 'Wild-Cat'".¹⁴ They were paying a heavy price for their continuing opposition, however. Wild Cat thus described the miserable condition of his followers,

We have been conquered. Look at us! A distracted people, alone without a home, without annuities, destitute of provisions, and without a shelter for our women and children, strangers in a foreign land, dependent upon the mercy and tolerance of our red brethren the Cherokees; transplanted to a cold climate, naked, without game to hunt, or fields to plant, or huts to cover our poor little children; they are crying like wolves, hungry, cold, and destitute.¹⁵

Furthermore, in the spring of 1844, the Creeks instigated a kidnapping campaign to capture Seminole Blacks. In one such incident, the Creek Siah Hardridge stole Dembo, a slave of Sally Factor, a Creek woman who lived with the Seminoles. Wild Cat, representing Micanopy, tried to enlist the aid of the U.S. army at Fort Gibson in recovering Dembo. According to Wild Cat, the Seminoles were much enraged over the incident and feared an outbreak of hostilities with the Creeks if thieves such as Hardridge went unpunished after kidnapping ventures.¹⁶

Faced with the ever-increasing destitution of his supporters, the

failure of the Indian Office to come up with a solution to the Seminole-Creek conflict, the apparent indifference and apathy of Principal Chief Micanopy and those Seminoles who had already settled in the Creek country, and the failure of his own tactics to prevent the Creeks from kidnapping the Seminole Blacks, Wild Cat determined upon more decisive action. Spurred on by Gopher John, Wild Cat organized and financed a Seminole delegation to Washington in April 1844 to seek a solution to the difficulties. The delegation was headed by Wild Cat and the other leaders of the recalcitrants, Alligator, Tiger Tail and Tustenuggee, and accompanied by Gopher John, who acted as interpreter and doubtless represented the views of the Blacks to the Seminole delegates. Micanopy and other Seminole chiefs protested against Wild Cat's initiative, stating that the Seminoles were not bound by the actions of the delegation, which did not have their authority.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in the name of Micanopy, the delegation sought the fulfilment of treaty obligations and promises made in Florida by the U.S. commanders. In Washington, Wild Cat and Alligator thus explained the situation to General Jesup,

... On arriving at Fort Gibson... we were told... that a large portion of the country designed for us had been taken possession of by the Creeks, and believing if we settled among the Creeks (who were desiring we should do so and come under their laws) they being the strongest party, that they would take by force our Negro property from us, as many bad men among them were setting up unjust claims to many of our Blacks on which account we still remain in the Cherokee Nation.¹⁸

The threat of potential loss of slave property to the Creeks remained the major source of Seminole opposition to a union of the two tribes.

Wild Cat's Washington delegation came to represent the pinnacle of joint Seminole recalcitrant-Black militant interest and co-operation after removal, before the events of 1849. The relationship deteriorated rapidly upon the return of the delegation in July 1844. Gopher John had only been back at Fort Gibson a few days when,

... A Seminole, in the immediate vicinity of this Post, fired at him with a rifle, and killed the horse upon which he was

riding. His friends on the "Deep Fork" where he resides, have sent him word to remain here; that, if he goes home, he will certainly be killed.¹⁹

R.B. Mason, the Commander at Fort Gibson, believed the attack was a result of John's services as guide and interpreter to the U.S. troops during the latter stages of the Second Seminole War. Pierce Butler, however, reported that upon his return he had become, "... Obnoxious to many of the Seminoles, particularly his former owners who in consequence of some offensive language shot his horse under him and would have taken his life if not prevented".²⁰ Jesup, meanwhile, believed that the Seminoles were hostile to John and other leading Black interpreters because they were suspected of deceiving the Indians during negotiations and were held responsible for the failure of the U.S. government to fulfil its promises.²¹ The assessments of Mason, Butler and Jesup were all quite accurate, to a greater or lesser extent.

A number of Black interpreters and intermediaries had been previously attacked and killed by the Seminoles for their collusion with the U.S. forces in Florida.²² Moreover, in Washington, John had placed the interests and support of the Blacks firmly behind Wild Cat's recalcitrant banner. Flushed with a sense of his own power, upon his return, John had probably criticized his former owners - those chiefs who had at least tacitly compromised and settled amongst the Creeks. Finally, many Seminoles living in the Creek country suspected that John had represented only the interests of the Blacks at Washington. As the delegation went in the name of Principal Chief Micanopy, any agreements favourable to the Blacks which he had procured would be binding upon the whole tribe. Many Indians saw danger in the Seminole recalcitrant-Black militant alliance and the rise to prominence of the talented and diplomatic Gopher John. Certain Seminoles were prepared to resort to force to prevent any further advance of these developments.

The attempt on Gopher John's life meant that he could no longer safely reside among the Seminoles. Mason told John to remain at Fort Gibson where he and his family of three would be furnished with rations until further instructions were received from Washington. John had over 50 head of stock, a wagon, and other equipment on the Deep Fork. Mason was certain that this property would be lost as a result of John's being unable to return home to take care of it. On 2 August 1844, Secretary William Wilkins, acting upon the advice of Jesup, instructed General Arbuckle,

Let John remain under the protection of the garrison and furnish him and his family with rations + c. Let the proper chiefs be advised that they are held accountable for his property in the Indian Country and will be made responsible for any injury he or his family may receive from the Indians.²³

In late August, the Seminoles met in council and sent an apology, disapproving of the actions of this "one man", and showing willingness to pay for John's horse. No funds were available, however, and John was not reimbursed. Wild Cat was a signatory to the apology and, in all likelihood, advised Micanopy to adopt this course of action.²⁴ Although his home was on the Deep Fork, John had chosen to spend much of the period as an interpreter and intermediary at Fort Gibson, the focal point of Indian affairs in the Territory. In this position he was in close contact with Seminole affairs, kept abreast of change, and advanced the interests of the Blacks through his association with the recalcitrants. Following the attempt on his life, however, from July 1844 to January 1849, John was forced to live apart from the Indians and reside under the protection of the military at Fort Gibson. During and after 1845, here and at Washington, John would develop an independent and unilateral course of action for the militant Seminole Blacks.

Wild Cat and Alligator were also greeted by troubles upon their return to the Indian Territory. As they entered the Cherokee country

they found their people encamped on the prairies around Fort Gibson destitute and starving. The Arkansas and Grand Rivers had risen and driven them from their homes in the bottoms, not only destroying the crop in the ground but also sweeping off the corn they had stored in cribs. Many of their horses were also lost. 295 Indians and Blacks were completely destitute, "Subsisting on berries and what they could obtain by begging". Mason issued them with half rations for 18 days as a temporary relief but Armstrong was quick to realize that this latest catastrophe would leave Wild Cat's recalcitrants more amenable to a settlement with the Creeks if sufficient inducements were to be offered.²⁵

The U.S. commissioners entered into negotiations with the Creeks and Seminoles in the winter of 1844 to try to settle the difficulties between the two tribes. "The real bone of contention, the source of nearly all the bitter hostility, the controversy revolving round the Seminole Negroes..." dominated the debate.²⁶ Wild Cat, with other Seminole chiefs and headmen, submitted a memorial on 28 December 1844 which once more expressed the sincere hope that the Creeks would not interfere with their Blacks,

Whereas the Negro question has been productive of much excitement and unpleasant feeling between us and some of our Creek brothers in consequence of claims sett [sic] up for this species of property in our possession which claims we contend are neither lawful nor just; in order therefore that this subject may no longer be the means of annoyance, and keeping up this state of feeling, we wish our Brethren the Creeks will not permit any of their citizens to interfere with any of our Negro property; this description of property was put under our protection by the Government (at least much the largest number of Negroes with us are so under the above circumstance) and in no case can be taken out of our possession, without instructions from the Government to that effect.²⁷

During the negotiations, the recalcitrants had at first determined not to submit to Creek law on any terms, but they eventually capitulated. Wild Cat was a signatory to the Tripartite treaty of 4 January 1845 between the U.S. government, the Creeks and the Seminoles. The destitution of his

supporters and increased incentives were undoubtedly the deciding factors which persuaded Wild Cat to sign. The Seminole annuity was to be increased by \$2,000 per annum and, of vital immediate importance, the difference was to be paid in goods. The Seminoles would also receive \$1,000 worth of agricultural equipment per annum for the next five years. Finally, and as Armstrong later recalled, "what was of most consequence" in persuading the recalcitrants to relent,²⁸ the Seminoles were to be issued rations during their removal to the Creek country and subsisted for six months after emigration had been completed.

The preamble to the 1845 treaty reiterated that those Seminoles who had remained on the Cherokee lands were unwilling to submit to Creek law and rule and were apprehensive of being deprived of their property by the Creek authorities. The controversy surrounding the Seminole Blacks was summarily disposed of in Article 3,

It is mutually agreed by the Creeks and Seminoles, that all contested cases between the two tribes concerning the right of property, growing out of sales or transactions that may have occurred previous to the ratification of this treaty, shall be subject to the decision of the President of the United States.

The Seminoles were to settle either in a body or separately in any part of the Creek country; those who had not already done so were to remove there immediately. The Seminoles could make their own town regulations, subject, however, to the general control of the Creek council, in which they were to be represented. There was to be no distinction between the two tribes in any respect, except that neither could interfere with the pecuniary affairs of the other.²⁹ The union of the tribes was thus effected. During the spring of 1845, most of the Seminoles removed to the Creek country. They established 25 towns some miles distant from each other and made their fields on Creek bottom lands, the majority settling about eight miles north of Little River. By the fall the Seminoles were well established in the Creek country.³⁰

The treaty was a disaster for the Seminole recalcitrants and the Blacks. As Wild Cat had feared, the Seminoles were only able to maintain their social organization at the cost of their political identity. They had only minority representation in the Creek council and there would ensue a subsequent subjugation of Seminole interests to those of the more numerous tribe. Moreover, the Seminoles were not even secure in their property. There was no clause in the treaty which dealt with title to, or control of, the Blacks. Article 3 referred to contested cases between the tribes as a whole; Creek individuals could still press fraudulent claims to the Seminole Blacks. The conflict over the Blacks had been the main cause of Seminole opposition to the Creeks and would remain a major source of difficulty between the two tribes after 1845. The destitution of his supporters had forced Wild Cat to support the treaty, but he soon regretted his decision and remained firmly opposed to Creek authority. Deeply dissatisfied with his new home and situation in the Creek country, Wild Cat began to seek a viable and attractive Seminole alternative to union with the Creeks on unequal terms.

Gopher John had remained at Fort Gibson since July 1844. From about 15 October 1844 to 15 April 1845, he was often called upon to interpret and "frequently different bands would send for him a dozen times a day". He was particularly active from the signing of the treaty to the removal of the main body of Seminoles on 9 February 1845. For 60 days, from February until early April, John was engaged with his wagon and three yoke of oxen in helping to remove the Seminoles and their baggage from their camps near Fort Gibson to the Little River. His position among the Seminoles remained precarious, however. During the removal to the Creek country, there was a second attempt on his life and Judge believed that his assailants would try again.³¹ John was once more forced to take refuge at Fort Gibson; on 16 April 1845 Butler reported, "'Gopher John' - A

Seminole Black... is now living under the flag of the military....".³²

By mid April 1845, Gopher John faced a desperate situation. He could no longer live safely among his people in the Creek country, his former recalcitrant allies had capitulated, and a treaty had been signed which gave the Creeks dominance over the Seminoles. The effects of the treaty were likely to be disastrous for the Blacks. Free Blacks, such as Gopher John, could be re-enslaved under the Creeks or whites through questionable or fraudulent claims, or kidnapping. Slaves of the Seminoles faced similar dangers which could result in their subjection to a much harsher system of slavery. With the union of the tribes, the Seminole Blacks were subject to Creek slave laws. These laws, which were formulated as part of the Creek Constitution of 1825, affected free Blacks as well as slaves. Under the Creeks, the Seminole Blacks faced inequality before the law, legislation designed to prevent their intermarriage with Indians and, of great consequence, the confiscation of personal property. Furthermore, later additions to the Creek law forbade the Blacks to live in separate towns or bear arms.³³ Under Creek slave codes, which with every revision more closely resembled those of the southern states, the Seminole Blacks could expect loss of privilege and personal property and the breaking up of their families and townships.

Apparently sold out and deserted by Wild Cat and the recalcitrants, Gopher John determined upon an independent and unilateral Black initiative. John had completely lost faith in the Seminoles following the attempts on his life and the treaty of 1845 and in April he visited Washington with Mason, "With the view of obtaining permission of the Government to return and settle in Florida".³⁴ On 28 May, John once more applied for compensation for his loss of property the previous summer,

I hereby authorize and request Mr. Judge Seminole agent to pay to my wife Susan such sum of money as the Seminole council may allow to me from their annuities as compensation for a horse shot under me by one of their people in 1844.³⁵

The use of "their people" in John's application is indicative of the polarization of the Blacks and Seminoles that was taking place after the Tripartite treaty. Gopher John would spend the next year in Washington promoting the exclusive interests of the Seminole Blacks.

After the treaty of 1845, the Seminole Blacks removed to the Creek country and, in their customary fashion, established villages separate from the Indians. The Creeks then proceeded to present claims and assert jurisdiction over them. In Washington, meanwhile, Gopher John successfully solicited the aid of Quartermaster General Jesup. On 17 July 1845, Jesup visited Fort Gibson to direct the construction of new stone buildings. He sent word to the Blacks, many of whom were still claimed as slaves by the Seminoles, that they were free under the promises he had made to them in Florida and told them to meet him at Fort Gibson. The Blacks arrived after Jesup had returned to Washington, but he left behind a list of those he considered free. During the summer, a number of Seminole Blacks stopped working for the Indians and many of the men, some with their families, sought refuge under the protection of the military at Fort Gibson. In 1845 and 1846, some 60 or 70 Blacks were employed in the construction of the Old Commissary Building and other structures at the Fort which can still be seen today.³⁶

Gopher John continued to press the cause of the Blacks in Washington and on 8 April 1846 Jesup informed General Arbuckle, "The case of the Seminole Negroes is now before the President". Arbuckle was requested to prevent any interference with the Blacks at Fort Gibson until the President determined whether they were to remain in the Seminole country or be allowed to remove elsewhere. John had achieved as much as he could have hoped for in Washington. During his year there he had been responsible for Jesup's intervention, the protection of the Blacks by the military at Fort Gibson, and the referral of the case to the President. By April

1846, he was ready to return to the Indian Territory. Jesup wrote to Arbuckle, "John Cowayee has been so long here waiting a decision that he thinks it necessary to return to his family, leaving the business of himself and his people in my hands".³⁷ John recalled his previous return to the Indian Territory in July 1844 and tried to prevent a recurrence of those events. He had Jesup prepare a statement that, during his stay in Washington, he had not interfered in Indian Affairs but had concerned himself only with those of the Blacks. Further, that he had acted only in the capacity of interpreter to Wild Cat's delegation during his previous visit. John nevertheless found more problems awaiting him on his return; Wild Cat's brother had stolen a horse from his wife, Susan, during his absence. John dare not retrieve the animal as he feared for his life among the Seminoles. Moreover, the Indians began to kill his livestock on the Deep Fork. He instituted claims for his losses but they were never paid.³⁸ Gopher John and his militant Black supporters on the reserve were by now almost completely alienated from the main body of the Seminoles.

The Blacks at Fort Gibson remained under the protection of the military and awaited the decision of the President amidst Seminole slave claims and kidnapers' raids. They would not venture outside the fort for provisions, fearing attack or kidnap. Consequently, when their employment on construction projects terminated in late 1846, they had nothing and Colonel Gustavus Loomis, the Commander at Fort Gibson, was forced to issue rations to prevent their starvation. In the summer of 1847, the Creeks threatened to seize and re-enslave all the Blacks on the military reserve, thereby forcing the U.S. government to immediately make a decision in the case. As the threat of Creek aggression increased, and kidnapping ventures continued, more Seminole Blacks called at Fort Gibson for "free papers" and protection during the fall of 1847. Slave raids by Creeks and Seminoles on the Blacks at the reserve continued

during the spring and summer of 1848 but the latter remained firmly resolved to maintain their independence.³⁹

During these slavehunting campaigns, Gopher John again sought permission to remove the Seminole Blacks from the Indian Territory. In early December 1847, John and Toney Barnet, another leading militant Black, informed Loomis that they were satisfied they would never be allowed to enjoy their freedom among the Seminoles in the Creek country. The Seminole Blacks were, "Willing and desirous to emigrate to any place where they can be free and unmolested". Loomis suggested their transportation to Africa, "Where they can be free and this they desire: or to any place separate from the Indians".⁴⁰ The idea was seized upon by Arbuckle who recommended to Jones that measures be immediately adopted "for the removal of these unfortunate people from the vicinity of the Indian country... to Liberia". He suggested that they be transported to New Orleans, and from there to Africa. If it was considered inadvisable to remove them at public expense, the Colonization Society might be persuaded to take charge of them at New Orleans.⁴¹ The recommendations of Loomis and Arbuckle were not acted upon, however.

Loomis praised the Blacks at Fort Gibson. They attended Sunday School and during the summer of 1847 had raised large quantities of corn and rice.⁴² The Creeks held different views of the Blacks on the reserve, however. In April 1848, the Creek delegation in Washington wrote to Medill that the Seminole Blacks had become a "positive nuisance",

As things now exist they are apparently subject to no control, they violate the laws of the United States and the laws of the Creek Nation with perfect impunity. They are idle and worthless constantly engaged in bringing whisky into the nation stealing and rioting, and offering inducements to the slaves belonging to the various surrounding tribes of Indians to run away and when they are detected in crime, they at once take protection on the Government reservation where they are sustained by the commanding officer at the Post.

The Creeks demanded the "removal of these Negroes from their country" or

their placement "under the control of their laws".⁴³ Whether one accepts the opinion of Loomis or the Creeks, it is certain that the Seminole Blacks on the reserve lived apart from the Indians, followed independent courses of action, and increasingly viewed themselves as a separate and distinct social group.

On 10 June 1848, Gopher John sent a list of the complaints of the Seminole Blacks to Jesup,

We have great many enemies, great many who think only of doing us injuries - many who fabricate false claims and who for a few goods or a little whisky make false titles to our great annoyance....

... We are much annoyed, our people carried away, and our horses an object for many bad persons - so much so that we are now reduced to great poverty.

From his strategic position as interpreter to the Seminoles at Fort Gibson, John had heard that it was probable that the Blacks would be returned to their former masters. To cover himself against this eventuality he sought to establish his free status "on another title" by reverting to the 1843 decision of the Seminole council which had emancipated him. He anxiously requested Jesup to trace his emancipation papers of 1843. John's assumptions proved to be correct and his preparation well-timed. Before the end of the month the decision he had anticipated was handed down.⁴⁴

On 28 June 1848, Attorney General J.Y. Mason delivered his opinion deciding the fate of the Seminole Blacks. The legal principles were perfectly clear: regarded as persons, the slaves had no power to contract and therefore could not enter into any treaty or convention; regarded as property, when captured from an enemy in a land war they were to be treated as any other movable property, and not subject to the law of prize. Whether they were to be treated as prisoners-of-war or booty, their disposition was to be decided by the Executive Department of the government, under whose authority they were captured. Therefore, on consideration of public policy or for other reasons satisfactory to the Executive, the Blacks could

be restored and their antebellum status re-established. Mason was of the opinion that there was no precedent for the qualified freedom Jesup had promised the Seminole Blacks. The U.S. government had no right to incorporate freed Blacks with the Seminoles without their consent given by treaty. Hence, there was no authority for such a promise. Moreover, the opposition of the Creeks to such a settlement of free Blacks in their country showed the extreme impracticality of such an arrangement,

My opinion is, that the Military authorities should be instructed to restore the Negroes to the condition in which they were with the Seminoles, prior to the date of Major General Jesup's letter of the 8th of April 1846.

President Polk approved Mason's opinion on 8 July 1848.⁴⁵

The process of restoring the Blacks to their former condition was quickly set in motion. During the first week of August 1848, Arbuckle was instructed to deliver the Blacks to the Seminole chiefs who would then return them to their proper owners. Those who were not apparently the property of the Seminoles were to be reported to the department along with any claims made to them. The Post Commander at Fort Gibson was not to issue rations to the Blacks, except to prevent their starvation. Gopher John was still anxiously trying to establish his free status as American officials were apparently having problems tracing his emancipation papers. John therefore asked Wild Cat to make a statement that he had been granted his freedom by the Seminole chiefs, and Wild Cat complied on 21 August 1848.⁴⁶ Realizing that the Seminole Blacks could expect no further aid from the U.S. government, Gopher John established his base as a free agent and sought to renew his former close association with Wild Cat.

The removal of the Seminole Blacks on the military reserve to the Creek country was delayed for several months. A Creek raid on a Black settlement in September 1848 and the continuing plots of slave speculators persuaded Arbuckle to instruct the Commander at Fort Gibson to keep all the Blacks reported free on Jesup's list at the post. They were not to

be allowed to leave without permission. Moreover, other Blacks who were not on Jesup's list or residing on the reserve and not claimed by the Seminoles, whether free Blacks or runaways who had removed with the Indians and continued to reside among them, were to be brought in and kept under the protection of the military until the matter was decided. The Blacks at Fort Gibson had been badly affected by a drought during the summer which had severely reduced their harvest and by the late fall their provisions had run out and they were destitute. In mid November, the military had to issue rations to almost all of the Blacks on the reserve to prevent their starvation. The Seminole chiefs, in council, decided to receive the Blacks at Fort Gibson on 22 December. They would then be taken back to the Seminole settlements and there returned to their respective owners. Due to bad weather, however, the Blacks were not handed over to the Seminoles until 2 January 1849.⁴⁷

The decision of the Attorney General and their impending transference back to the Seminoles meant that the militant Blacks could expect no further help from the U.S. government. For over 3½ years they had lived apart from the Indians and their separation and different interests had resulted in an almost complete breakdown in relations. The Seminole Black militants had become refractory and independent and increasingly viewed themselves as a separate social group. They were to be transferred to a hostile environment and subjected to Creek aggression, sale, kidnap, and harsh slave codes with little hope of sympathy from the U.S. government or the Seminoles themselves. Forced to fend for themselves once again, the militant Blacks sought allies. Gopher John was quick to realize that the interests of the Blacks would best be served by a renewed alliance with the ambitious and increasingly disaffected Wild Cat and his recalcitrant traditionalist supporters.

Wild Cat was fiercely opposed to the Creeks' dominance of Seminole

affairs and had only grudgingly signed the Tripartite treaty of 1845 to put an end to the destitution of his followers. On removing to the Creek country, however, the Seminoles encountered more problems and their suffering was only temporarily alleviated. They were soon to experience more poverty, drought, starvation, and dependency upon agency officials. The Seminoles complained that the promises of the U.S. government "to give them a country in exchange better adapted to their habits of life" had not been carried out. The Creek country was almost destitute of game and much colder than Florida, hence their needs were greatly increased. Furthermore, they had removed too late in the season to plant sufficient corn for their needs. There was an unprecedented drought during the summer of 1845 and the Seminoles could only raise enough crops to feed themselves until November. Under the terms of the treaty, the Seminoles were to be subsisted from June 1845 to January 1846. This directive was carried out but, nevertheless, the Indians still used a great portion of their own crops in addition. The Seminoles were also to receive a \$13,000 payment for property abandoned in Florida. This sum, however, would hardly cover the purchase of their basic necessities and the debts they had been forced to contract.⁴⁸ It was clear to Wild Cat that, once the U.S. government stopped subsisting the Seminoles in January, it was going to be a long, hard, hungry winter for his people.

Apart from his disillusion with the country assigned to the Seminoles and his opposition to the Creeks, Wild Cat was extremely ambitious. During his visit to Washington in 1844, he had been greatly impressed by the power of the United States. He returned home flushed with his own importance and that of his people, who had successfully defied the might of the American forces for seven years.⁴⁹ The situation he faced on his return to the Indian Territory must have seemed that much worse in the light of this experience. Wild Cat hoped to succeed Micanopy as principal

chief of the Seminoles and in the meantime sought to establish himself as a force on the frontier.

In May 1845, Wild Cat attended the Grand Council on the Deep Fork as the "Counsellor and Organ" of Micanopy. The Council was attended by representatives of twelve tribes and Wild Cat came into close contact with several delegates from the Plains including Kickapoos, Quapaws and Caddos. Throughout the Council, the Seminole delegation was seated behind that of the Creeks "who assumed a position of overlords toward the Seminole tribe". It is probable that the proud Wild Cat was both insulted and humiliated by this display of Seminole subordination to the Creeks before the Council.⁵⁰ He determined that his future relations with the Plains tribes should be conducted on a more independent level.

An opportunity for Wild Cat to explore the southwest and develop his relationship with the Plains tribes was offered by the P.M. Butler-M.G. Lewis peace mission to the Comanches in the winter of 1845-46. Wild Cat joined the expedition on the Little River on 1 January 1846. The party crossed the Red River, explored the Brazos and Cow Creek areas meeting with Kickapoos, Caddos, Lipans and Tonkawas, and concluded a peace treaty with the Comanches. Along the way, Wild Cat entertained the party with stories of the broken promises of the U.S. government. The Seminoles had been assured that there would be plenty of game in the west but this had not proved to be the case and Wild Cat, in fact, saw his first buffalo during the course of the expedition. On Sunday, 22 February, the day before he had to return to the Indian Territory, Wild Cat attended a council of Lipans, Tonkawas, Creeks and Cherokees at the commissioners' tent and "addressed the meeting at considerable length" saying how "he was rejoiced in his heart to see his red brothers of the West and shake them with the hand of friendship".⁵¹ Wild Cat revelled in his new position of Seminole representative and diplomat. Even at this early stage it is likely that

he was considering trade links and a treaty of amity and mutual co-operation with the Plains tribes.

Upon his return to the Indian Territory, Wild Cat once more found his people in a state of destitution. The winter of 1845-46 was one of the most severe experienced in the west and caused much suffering. The Seminoles had insufficient provisions and their subsistence by the U.S. government had terminated in January. From then until May, when sub-agent Marcellus Duval procured corn for them on the credit of their annuity, many suffered terribly. During his recent expedition, Wild Cat had been impressed by the abundant wild game on the Plains and had proved himself an excellent hunter. Seeing his tribe's lack of provisions, Wild Cat became interested in possible trade with the Plains tribes of the southwest. With fellow recalcitrant leader Halleck Tustenuggee, who had accompanied the Washington delegation of 1844, Oktiarche and other Seminoles, Wild Cat organized an expedition and set out for the western prairies on an "exploring hunt". They were gone for about six weeks, during which time Wild Cat met with Kickapoos, Tonkawas, Lipans and Comanches in council. It was agreed that the parties should meet again on 1 September 1846 to negotiate further and establish trade links.⁵²

During the summer of 1846, after the exploring party had returned to the Little River, Wild Cat met with other Seminole leaders in council. He told them of his experiences with the southwestern tribes and of their eagerness to trade pelts and mules for goods that could be obtained from the Arkansas area. Wild Cat and other Seminole headmen, with a party of around 250, then set out to keep the appointment with the Plains tribes, intending to remain out for several months. Before leaving, Wild Cat's party secured credit at a frontier trading post and took along a considerable quantity of goods to trade with the Plains tribes for pelts and other items with which the Seminoles hoped to extinguish their debts.

This pilot expedition was to determine whether the Seminoles were to look to hunting and trade with the southwestern tribes for their future support. The hunt proved to be a failure, however, and the pelts did not realize the profits the Seminoles had hoped for.⁵³

During his three hunting, exploring and trading expeditions of 1846, Wild Cat had met the Comanches, Lipans, Kickapoos and Tonkawas in council and had become thoroughly familiar with the southwestern territory. Extremely ambitious and an indefatigable organizer, Wild Cat had, at first, sought treaties of trade and peace with the various tribes but increasingly entertained a scheme for creating a confederation, based on the Florida model, of Plains Indians, Seminoles, Blacks, and other disaffected splinter groups and refugees, under his leadership. He envisaged a large force of militant traditionalists, radical in their opposition to white acculturation and American expansionism, united by inter-tribal trade. The confederation would serve as a vehicle for protecting Seminole traditions and fulfilling Wild Cat's ambition to become an important figure on the frontier. The militant Seminole Blacks were, at this time, residing under the protection of the military at Fort Gibson but Wild Cat hoped to gain their support for his cause at a later date. Although he was thoroughly disillusioned with the Seminole experience in the West, Wild Cat still hoped to succeed Micanopy as principal chief and bring about his confederation in the Indian Territory, thus allowing the Seminoles to throw off the shackles of Creek domination. He had the alternative of emigrating with his supporters to the southwest to maintain a large force on the Mexican frontier if his hopes did not materialize. For the time being, however, Wild Cat chose to bide his time, keep his options open, and organize and promote his enterprise.

In May 1847, Wild Cat once again expressed his resentment of the treatment the Seminoles had received in the Indian Territory. He

complained to the Secretary of War that the assigned lands of the Seminoles in the west were not as good as those they had left behind in Florida. Furthermore, he sought to establish the intentions of the U.S. government regarding the Seminoles and the future prospects of the tribe in the Indian Territory in order to determine his best course of action.⁵⁴ In his annual report for 1847, Duval wrote of the considerable jealousy that existed between the Seminoles and the Creeks. The Seminoles still maintained that the Creeks were over-anxious to bring them absolutely and entirely under their control.⁵⁵

During the early part of 1848, Wild Cat was actively organizing his confederation. He was supported by a band of Kickapoos who had settled on the Canadian near the Seminole agency.⁵⁶ During January and February, Seminole and Kickapoo agents of Wild Cat and Alligator visited the Texas Indians promoting the scheme. They represented themselves as emissaries of the Creeks and invited the prairie tribes to join them in the Creek country. The Comanches were told that the whites were decidedly hostile and preparing for a campaign in their country, and that at every council they had lied to the Indians regarding their lands. Wild Cat's agents, moreover, "had used every exertion to induce the Wacos to emigrate to the Creek nation". They told the chiefs that whites on the Texas frontier would kill all the Indians and offered them better presents than they had received from the U.S. government at the late council if they would remove to the Indian Territory. Similar threats and inducements were offered to every band within the limits of the Texas agency and it was reported that the Tonkawas and the Kichai supported the project and had agreed to emigrate. The Texas Indians were thus kept in a state of constant fear and excitement.⁵⁷ Wild Cat planned to capitalize on this situation at a later date.

1849 was to witness the re-establishment of the alliance between

the supporters of Wild Cat and the militant Blacks under Gopher John. The two leaders had remained in contact during the period of the Black's residence on the military reserve. Gopher John had familiarized himself with the scheme for confederation and, in August 1848, Wild Cat had made a statement establishing his freedom. In early January 1849, two events took place which radically affected the history of Seminole-Black relations and set in motion the process that led ultimately to the emigration of the recalcitrants and the militant Blacks to Mexico.

On 2 January 1849, Micanopy died while awaiting the restoration of the Blacks to the Seminoles at Fort Gibson. Wild Cat had long cherished hopes of succeeding to the principal chieftainship but although he had served as the "Counsellor and Organ" of Micanopy and the Speaker of the Seminoles in the Indian Territory, the selection fell instead to Jim Jumper of the progressive, pro-Creek faction.⁵⁸ The selection of Jim Jumper was largely the result of pressure exerted by the pro-slavery sub-agent Marcellus Duval, who had a personal interest in the Seminole Blacks. As the progressive faction was now firmly in control of Seminole affairs, the thwarted and deeply dissatisfied Wild Cat became even more determined to resist all operation of the Creek laws, especially those which concerned the Blacks. Moreover, as he had failed to secure the principal chieftainship of his own tribe, he could scarcely expect the various Indian groups with whom he had consulted to unite under his leadership in the Creek country. Wild Cat, therefore, switched to his second option of establishing his confederation outside the Indian Territory on the Mexican frontier.⁵⁹

The very day that Micanopy died, the Blacks were handed over to the chiefs. The transference only took place after certain assurances had been given by the Seminoles, however. When information had first been received at Fort Gibson that the Blacks were to be restored to the Seminoles, the Commanding Officer had been directed to notify all persons concerned

that sales made previous to the transference would not be recognised. Notwithstanding, about one third of the Blacks affected by the decision were purchased by Creek, Cherokee and white speculators from Seminoles who frequently had no shadow of a claim. Some of the Seminole progressives, becoming increasingly influenced by the more acculturated Creeks and their white slaveholding neighbours, treated their slaves more and more as property and disposed of them for as little as a bottle of whisky. Moreover, a further one-third of the Blacks had been promised to William J. Duval, the brother of sub-agent Marcellus, for his services as attorney for the Seminoles in causing the Blacks to be restored to them. The Seminole Blacks had heard that two-thirds of their number had been disposed of to slaveholding Indians of other tribes and whites, and that they were to be distributed among the different claimants and "scattered" as soon as they removed from the military reserve. The Blacks had declared they would sooner die where they were than submit to such a fate, after being promised their freedom.⁶⁰

Arbuckle was apprehensive that many of the Blacks would make their escape and that others would oppose the transfer by force of arms. Lieutenant F.F. Flint, as assistant to the Post Commander, General W.G. Belknap, at Fort Gibson, was therefore instructed to reach an understanding with the Seminoles regarding the transfer of the Blacks,

When the Negroes were turned over to the Chiefs at Fort Gibson, it was with the express understanding that they would be permitted to live in 'towns', as they had formerly done, and that they should not be sold, or otherwise disposed of, to either white men or Indians, but be kept in the Seminole country.

The Chiefs were told that the Negroes would be turned over with this expectation, to which they assented; thereby virtually making a promise to the same effect. Had they not done so, the Blacks never would peaceably have returned to the nation.⁶¹

The chiefs gave the Blacks to understand that they would not be distributed among the various claimants but would remain with the Seminoles and be

treated kindly. The Blacks stated that they were perfectly satisfied to live with the Indians as they had done previously. Thus, on 2 January 1849, nearly 260 Blacks were turned over to the Seminoles as slaves at Fort Gibson in the presence of Duval. More than half of these were living on the reserve, the remainder mostly on the Deep Fork and Little River. There were also 14 free Blacks listed by the U.S. government, including Gopher John.⁶² Arbuckle stated that one third of all the Seminole Blacks had been living at Fort Gibson but he seems to have underestimated somewhat the total number of Blacks associated with the tribe at this time. It seems probable that the Black population numbered closer to the removal figure of 500 than the 400 Arbuckle suggested. On 3 January, Belknap reported,

No difficulty has arisen in the performance of this duty, either from the Indians, negroes or claimants, nor do I anticipate any.

As soon as the weather permits, I shall send the negroes to the Indian country.⁶³

The transfer went smoothly, but was bitterly resented by both the Indian and white speculators.

Owing to the severity of the winter, the Blacks did not remove from Fort Gibson to the Seminole country until the early spring of 1849. The Blacks were advised by the military to defend themselves against slave hunters during their removal but they determined to protect themselves against all speculators who came among them to execute claims. The progressive Seminole leadership pointed out a place about 15 miles from the agency where it directed the Blacks to locate. Upon reaching the Seminole country, however, the Black militants began to defy the authority of the Indians. Gopher John conducted his supporters to Wewoka Creek, about 30 miles from the agency, where they established an all-Black community some miles from the Indians. The Black settlement was named Wewoka, meaning "barking waters", after a small falls that broke over the rocks just north of the present-day city of the same name.

Moreover, the Blacks who had not removed to the reserve but had continued to reside among the Seminoles also defied the orders of Chief Jim Jumper. Most did not remove to their designated location but settled at Wewoka or remained on the Deep Fork. The chiefs deemed it advisable, however, not to interfere with the Blacks until it was decided who were the owners of the various families, in order to prevent trouble. But when the decisions had been taken, the Blacks were to be turned over to their respective owners.⁶⁴

The Seminole Blacks established their towns at a distance from those of the Indians and, fearing kidnap, armed themselves heavily for protection,

They retained their arms, and lived under no restraint whatever from their owners; in fact they seemed to be regarded by the Chiefs as common property, and the negroes considered themselves free, and merely under the guardianship of those Indians who claimed them as property in Florida before the emigration west.⁶⁵

The position of Gopher John in the Seminole country was still precarious and he sought to assure his own independence and mobility to act freely to advance his own interests and those of his people. On 8 April 1849, he was issued with a document by the military, "To pass and repass from the Seminole country, his place of residence to this post or to any other portion of the Indian Country where his necessary business might take him".⁶⁶ The Blacks had stated before their transfer that they were prepared to live with the Seminoles as they had previously, but events had taken place since removal which made such an occurrence unlikely at this juncture. The Seminoles were now subject to Creek law which had no provision for the qualified slavery they had formerly practised in Florida or its resulting social arrangements: independent and separate settlements of armed Blacks. Moreover, the progressive Seminole leadership sought to change the nature of the Indian-Black relationship and bring it more in line with the Lower Creek model. Many of the Blacks, meanwhile, had grown increasingly independent, insubordinate and militant

under Jesup's promises of freedom and their 3½ year separation from the Seminoles at Fort Gibson. By now, the militant Blacks were no longer prepared to offer the same deference to the Seminoles that they had in Florida and under no circumstances would they submit to Creek slave codes.

Difficulties arose between the Seminoles and the Black militants in June 1849. The Seminole chiefs sent two men to Wewoka to apprehend the Black horse-thief "Walking Joe". When the Indians tried to arrest Joe he drew a knife but they succeeded in disarming and capturing him. Before they could leave, however, all of the Black men in the town arrived armed with knives and pistols and, threatening the Indians, set Joe free. The Blacks then sent Cuffy to the chiefs with the message that, in order to avoid injury, the Seminoles were not to come to Wewoka to arrest anyone without first consulting the leaders of the Blacks. Asked to explain the incident, Gopher John blamed the "young and unmanageable negroes".⁶⁷ It was clear, however, that the Black militants were prepared to defend their liberty and settlements by force, if necessary.

In early July 1849, the Seminole chiefs in council decided the original owners of the Blacks before protection was offered, and the present owners whose right and title was derived from Seminole law. The progressive Seminole leaders and the Creek chiefs wished to comply with Creek law by disarming the Blacks, breaking up their townships, and distributing them to their respective owners throughout the country. The militant Blacks, however, well aware that a large percentage of their number had already been disposed of to white, Creek and Cherokee claimants, positively refused to be separated or allow their settlements to be broken up, and told the Indians that the military would support their action. They were described as "well-armed, rebellious and living chiefly in one town" and therefore able to offer powerful resistance to the Seminole

progressives and the Creeks should they attempt to enforce the law. The militants, moreover, utterly refused to recognize the right of their owners to dispose of them as they wished.⁶⁸

The Seminoles did not wish to confront the Blacks and sought the aid of their sub-agent, Marcellus Duval. Duval had a personal interest in witnessing the safe transference of the Blacks to their Seminole owners as about 90 of them had been promised to his brother. On 16 July 1849, Duval wrote to Arbuckle requesting that the military disarm the Blacks to facilitate their distribution,

The Negroes will most assuredly resist the Creeks in the execution of their laws, and unless assisted by the government, would also resist the Seminoles. They have already resisted the laws, and will, I believe, continue to oppose them, so long as they are allowed to remain armed.... It is absolutely necessary that these negroes should be disarmed.⁶⁹

The request of Duval was supported by the Superintendent for the Western Territory, John Drennen, but opposed by Arbuckle and his aide-de-camp, Flint. On 20 July, Drennen wrote to Arbuckle asking him to comply with Duval's request. Arbuckle, by this time, had learned of Duval's interest in the Blacks and was not prepared to support him. Flint replied to Drennen that it was inconvenient to send a force to the Black settlements owing to high waters and an outbreak of cholera among the troops at Fort Gibson. Furthermore, the General did not consider it necessary to send a military force at that time. He was prepared to send a "discreet officer", however, to accompany the agent in enquiring into the existing state of affairs and to prevail upon the Blacks to peacefully surrender their arms, but Duval declined the offer.⁷⁰

It became increasingly obvious during August 1849 that the military supported the cause of the Seminole Blacks. On 2 August, Flint wrote to Belknap expressing his belief that the principal object of disarming the Blacks was to better enable purchasers, speculators and other claimants to take possession of them.⁷¹ Later he wrote to Drennen, "... The promises to them have been violated on all sides, and the present

state of affairs is principally attributable to the Indians themselves".⁷² On 10 August, Duval made a second request for military aid to disarm the Blacks and, on the 14th, Arbuckle again declined. The cholera epidemic still raged at Fort Gibson incapacitating his troops, and furthermore, "It is believed that the Seminoles are sufficiently numerous to properly control their negroes, without the assistance of the military, and it is clearly their duty to keep them in subjection themselves".⁷³ On 18 August, however, Drennen once again threw his weight behind Duval's request. He had made the requisition for troops in good faith acting upon the written statement of a "highly respectable agent of the government". The Blacks would not resist U.S. troops in the performance of their duty but would certainly oppose the Seminoles and Creeks if they attempted to disarm them. The Indians might soon try to assert their authority and thus bring about serious difficulties. The course of action was perfectly clear to Drennen, "... I then conceive it to be the imperative duty of the government to protect the Indian and quell domestic strife".⁷⁴

The future seemed bleak for the Seminole Blacks. After Attorney General Mason's decision, and the militants' removal from Fort Gibson to the Seminole country, the army was powerless to offer them effective aid and could not for long maintain its policy of non-interference in the face of continued pressure from the Indian Office. The Seminole sub-agent had a personal interest in seeing the Blacks disarmed, scattered and reduced to slavery, and he was now supported by the powerful Superintendent of the Western Territory. Furthermore, they could expect no help from the progressive Seminole leadership which sought increasingly to reduce the Blacks to slavery on the Creek model. Finally, the Creeks threatened to enforce their laws regarding the Blacks themselves if the Seminoles could, or would, not. In view of the impending crisis, and in dire need of allies, the militant Blacks once more turned to Wild Cat

and the recalcitrants.

With the progressives firmly in control of Seminole affairs, Wild Cat determined to obstruct all operation of the Creek laws as they affected his tribe. The Blacks' situation became more desperate during the summer of 1849 and they looked increasingly to Wild Cat to champion their cause,

He [Wild Cat] was strongly influenced by Gopher John and others of the chief negroes, to resist any interference in reference to the condition of the negroes, and was urged by them to resist all influence of the Creeks over the Seminoles... the negro chiefs have exercised a controlling influence over the Seminoles, and have induced them to resist the government and laws of the Creek nation.⁷⁵

On 8 September, Wild Cat, Parsakee and George Cloud, together with about 15 warriors, called on Arbuckle. The delegation stated that the Seminoles had no complaints against the Blacks turned over to them at Fort Gibson and refuted Duval's charges that they were disorderly, rebellious and insubordinate. The Blacks had settled in three towns sufficiently convenient to the Seminoles and they wished them to retain their arms for hunting purposes to support their children, as they were very poor. Wild Cat further expressed the hope that the Blacks would be allowed to remain where they were without being disturbed in any way.

Although they claimed to have been sent by Chief Jumper, Wild Cat and his supporters undoubtedly acted on their own initiatives and in no way represented the views of the progressives. They stated that Jim Jumper, who himself owned no slaves, had promised one third of the Blacks to William J. Duval without even conferring with their owners or gaining their consent. Moreover, Duval's brother Marcellus, their sub-agent, had recently told them that one third of the Blacks was not sufficient remuneration and that, if they were not given up, the Seminoles' annuity would be withheld. The sub-agent had informed Roly McIntosh that, if the Creeks approved of disarming the Blacks, the Seminoles would assist

them, and Duval had arranged a council under the Creek Chief Jim Boy for 3 September near the Black settlements to achieve this objective. Wild Cat claimed that the Seminoles were totally opposed to any interference on the part of the Creeks, however, and had boycotted the council. Accepting Wild Cat's account as an accurate indication of Seminole feeling on the subject, Arbuckle deemed it advisable to delay military intervention until he received further instructions.⁷⁶ Wild Cat's initiative most clearly demonstrated the widening breach that was taking place within the tribe. Increasingly influenced by the militant Blacks, the recalcitrant traditionalists were in open opposition to the Duval-influenced policies of the progressives.

At the time of his visit to Arbuckle, Wild Cat was putting the final touches to his plan to remove from the Indian Territory and establish his confederation outside the limits of the United States, in Mexico. As early as 1843, an emissary of the Mexican government had visited the Creeks in the Indian Territory.⁷⁷ As a squatter in the Cherokee country, Wild Cat would have been particularly interested in his offers of land to such as would engage against Texas. During his exploring, hunting, trading, and diplomatic trips to the southern Plains Wild Cat became familiar with both the southwestern territory as far as the Rio Grande and Plains Indian relations with Mexico. In 1849, moreover, Creek agent James Logan reported that Wild Cat had acquired, and thus "owned", a Mexican boy who had been kidnapped by the Comanches.⁷⁸

Wild Cat was also doubtless aware of Mexican colonization schemes. On 27 November 1846, General Jose Mariano de Salas, temporarily in charge of the Mexican government, created the "Dirección de Colonización e Industria", stating in his decree that Mexico desperately needed immigrants to populate the vast expanses of the Republic. On 4 December 1846, a law was instigated to direct colonization in which provision was made for

the establishment of, "... Military colonies, composed of Mexicans or aliens, or both, along the coasts and frontiers as the government shall designate, especially to restrain the incursions of savages".⁷⁹ Little was achieved, however, until after the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which brought the Mexican War of 1846-48 to a close. Under the Eleventh Article of this treaty, the United States accepted responsibility for controlling the Indians who traditionally plundered the settlements of northern Mexico and who now resided on the American side of the new boundary.⁸⁰ However, due to an insufficient cavalry force on the Mexican frontier, which had proved to be the only effective counter to mounted Indian raiders, and a lack of co-operation between the Indian Office and the military, the United States proved itself completely incapable of coping with the Indian problem.⁸¹

On 19 July 1848, less than six months after the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Mexican Minister of War and Marine decreed that the new boundary required urgent attention, "... Both to preserve our territorial integrity and to defend the frontier states from the frequent and cruel incursions of the barbarians". The following day, President Herrera encapsulated the decree into a bill entitled "Military Colonies: A Project for Their Establishment on the Eastern and Western Frontiers of the Republic", which became the guideline for directing Mexican colonization. The bill included provisions for commercial and property rights, tax exemptions and the relaxation of passport regulations. The organization of the colonies was to be left largely to the discretion of the inhabitants, and if a settlement attained a population of 30,000 it could apply to the Mexican Congress for statehood. Among other liberal clauses contained in the bill were provisions for freedom of religion, civil marriage and trial by jury. Article 17 offered the most immediately attractive benefits,

Upon the establishment of a colony, the government will advance to the colonists a six-month's supply of provisions, to be charged to the public treasury, and tools, plows, oxen, horses, and whatever is needed to build houses for the colony.⁸²

This offer of the Mexican government particularly appealed to Wild Cat as a means of putting an end to the destitution of his supporters and establishing a solid base for his frontier confederation.

Wild Cat maintained his contacts with the Plains tribes and further promoted his project during 1849. On 6 March, he met with a band of Southern Comanches in council at the Seminole agency. The Comanches had especially sought the advice of Wild Cat whose reputation for intelligence and wisdom had, by this time, spread across the southwestern frontier. Wild Cat realized, however, that he was suspected of having improper relations with the Plains tribes and of cherishing schemes of confederation. He, therefore, diplomatically insisted that the Comanches admit publicly that he had done nothing to bring about their visit. Wild Cat advised the Comanches to make peace with the whites and settle down to raise corn and stock.⁸³ He was obviously playing his cards close to his chest and this advice was given largely to allay the suspicions of Duval. During this same period, Wild Cat was issued with a document by Duval, "To pass uninterrupted through the Texas Settlements on a hunting expedition and to visit General Worth".⁸⁴ Wild Cat doubtless used this privilege to put the final touches to his plans for a frontier confederation. A spark was all that was needed to put his scheme into action.

During the summer of 1849, some of the militant Blacks had again quitted the Seminole country for Fort Gibson, much to the dissatisfaction of the Creeks. There was undoubtedly collusion between these Seminole Blacks and free Blacks of the Creek and Cherokee nations who also resided in the vicinity. During October 1849, there were further kidnapping raids around the post.⁸⁵ For many and the most militant of the Seminole Blacks, the situation was becoming intolerable. The Creeks had earlier sought

the aid of the U.S. government to enforce their laws and reduce the Seminole Blacks to a position of subordination but, after Wild Cat had successfully persuaded Arbuckle to delay military intervention, they determined to take action independently. A Creek onslaught, which would spell disaster for the Seminole Blacks, appeared imminent. Working in close association with Wild Cat, the militant Blacks prepared to leave the Indian Territory for Mexico.

In early November, a Seminole delegation, headed by Duval and Halleck Tustenuggee, assembled at the North Fork with the intention of travelling to Florida to persuade Billy Bowlegs and the remaining Seminoles there to remove to the Indian Territory. Forseeing the new Creek initiative, Wild Cat sent a proposition to Duval which he wished to have communicated to the President. He proposed to remove his whole tribe to Mexico. It was the Seminoles' wish as they were tired of living among the Creeks and the country would suit them better. If the President favoured his enterprise, Wild Cat would persuade Bowlegs and the remaining Seminoles in Florida to remove to Mexico, whereas they would never willingly locate among the Creeks. Duval believed, however, that Wild Cat had secretly told members of the delegation to advise Bowlegs to remain in Florida until he could persuade the government to make a treaty by which they could remove with him to Mexico. The members referred to were, in all likelihood, Jim Bowlegs, Tom and Toney, three Blacks who accompanied the delegation as interpreters. Jim Bowlegs was a former slave and adviser of Billy Bowlegs in Florida and would likely exert great influence over the Indian chief. He had become a leading militant and would later head a second Seminole Black migration to Mexico in the summer of 1850.⁸⁶

Wild Cat was given the opportunity to put his plan into action when the Seminole delegation left North Fork town for Florida on 16 October

1849. Capitalizing on Duval's absence, Wild Cat mobilized his forces. He told the Seminole recalcitrants that everything was suited to their needs in Mexico and informed the Black militants that the Plains tribes had agreed to allow them to pass unharmed if they followed him. Thus, in late October, the allies, numbering about 200, left the Indian Territory for Mexico. The Indians and Blacks were represented in approximately equal numbers and included about 25 Seminole warriors and their families, chiefly of Wild Cat's band, a few dissatisfied traditionalist Creeks, 20 Seminole Black warriors and their families under Gopher John, and a number of Creek and Cherokee Blacks. It was believed that these Creek and Cherokee Blacks were to learn the route and then return to the Indian Territory to act as guides in running off other Blacks to join Wild Cat's confederation.⁸⁷ The Black exodus was thus described by a contemporary, Joshua Giddings,

Their arrangements were speedily made. Such property as they had was collected together, and packed for transportation. They owned a few Western ponies. Their blankets, which constituted their beds, and some few cooking utensils and agricultural implements, were placed upon their ponies, or carried by the females and children; while the warriors, carrying only their weapons and ammunition, marched, unencumbered even by any unnecessary article of clothing, prepared for battle at every step of their journey.⁸⁸

The Indians under Wild Cat led the way and the Blacks under Gopher John brought up the rear. Despairing of ever finding adjustment of their grievances in the Indian Territory, the two groups prepared to open another chapter of Seminole-Black relations on the Mexican frontier.

As they left the Indian Territory, the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles and the militant Blacks were joined in an unstable alliance based more on temporary mutual need than identity of interest. The emigrants were united in opposition to the Creeks and the Seminole progressives, but even this stemmed from different motives. Wild Cat was a proud traditionalist. He firmly believed that unification with the more numerous and acculturated Creeks would result in the subjugation

of his tribe's interests and a subsequent loss of the Seminoles' cultural heritage and identity. Moreover, Creek predominance over Seminole affairs could well lead to the loss of Wild Cat's Black property, either by fraudulent claims or a kidnapping campaign, and result in a relative decline in his status as a slaveholding Seminole chief. On numerous occasions during the 1840s, Wild Cat expressed this fear as the major source of his opposition to the Creeks. Wild Cat's opposition to the Seminole progressives was based on the belief that they would support unification with the Creeks and hence facilitate the process of acculturation within the tribe. But the leading recalcitrant was also smarting from the fact that he had been defeated in his attempt to secure the principal chieftainship by a progressive. The timing of his departure is highly significant. More than 4 years had elapsed since the signing of the Tripartite treaty but Jim Jumper had been in office less than a year. This strongly suggests that thwarted political ambition played at least as important a role as opposition to the Creeks in determining Wild Cat's emigration from the Indian Territory.

Gopher John was also opposed to the Creeks and the Seminole progressives, but for different reasons. Whereas Wild Cat was concerned with his interests in slave property, his status and his political future, Gopher John stood to lose his freedom and perhaps his life. Under the Creeks, Gopher John had experienced assassination attempts, the loss of his home, the destruction of his property and the break-up of his family. It is vital to an understanding of the motivation behind the militant Blacks' emigration to appreciate that many of those who left had experienced similar problems to Gopher John and were the ones most likely to lose their freedom, families or property to speculators, fraudulent claimants, thieves and kidnappers. This is true for John Kibbetts, Dembo and Hardy Factor, and most of the leading militants that left for Mexico.⁸⁹ The

Seminole progressives made it clear that they intended to conform to Creek standards by exerting more control over the Black population. The militants thus faced the prospect of living under harsh Black codes with the possibility of re-enslavement and sale. Their culture and traditions, indeed their very existence as a clearly identifiable social group, were in jeopardy. By 1849, Gopher John had to leave the Indian Territory to protect his life, liberty, loved ones and possessions. The immediacy and desperation of the Blacks' situation was far removed from that of their Indian allies. Whereas Wild Cat chose to seek a better life outside the Creek country, Gopher John was forced to.

The Blacks and Indians also had very different goals for their new community. The Blacks sought to live in peace, build their homes, raise their families, and work the land, free from disturbance. The Seminoles, however, sought the "Indian way of life", adventure, and power. Wild Cat would lead the confederation and the Indians were to assume positions of ultimate control. Following the ideal of restoring traditional Seminole social arrangements within the new community, Wild Cat expected the same deference from the Blacks as they had given in Florida. Here lay a source of future conflict. The confederation also offered Wild Cat the opportunity to fulfil his ambition of attaining a powerful position and increasing his own importance. He enjoyed constituting a threat to the frontier. His new power base would allow him to engage in the pursuits he most enjoyed, hunting and trading expeditions, and "politicizing" with the tribes of the southern Plains. By way of contrast, Gopher John wished to remove his Blacks from the centre of attention. During the 1840s, he had tried to remove them to Florida, Africa, or any place where they would be left to their own devices. John followed Wild Cat to Mexico not because of any spiritual wish to remain associated with the recalcitrants but because that country offered the best hope for his people

of a more insular, separate and independent lifestyle.

The emigrant groups did need each other, however. Gopher John and Wild Cat developed a close association in Florida and the Indian Territory and, after removal, worked together in opposition to the Creeks and the Seminole progressives for their mutual benefit. After the militants were returned to the Seminoles in 1849, they were desperately short of allies and in a hostile environment. Gopher John courted the support of the recalcitrants and Wild Cat became the undisputed champion of the Black cause among the Seminoles during the year. The Blacks realized how useful Wild Cat could be to them once they had left the Indian Territory. Wild Cat had a reputation which spread far and wide across the frontier and he was on good terms with many of the tribes of the southern Plains. Moreover, he was familiar with the southwestern trails and the Texas-Mexican border country. He could thus prove invaluable to the Blacks as a guide, military commander, strategist and diplomat. Furthermore, his Indian supporters were excellent trackers, hunters, and warriors and would give to the new community a firm foundation.

The Blacks were of even more potential use to the Indians, however, and Wild Cat greatly appreciated their value. The Blacks could play a vital role as agriculturists, interpreters, intermediaries and advisers. They were tried and trusted warriors and had proved in Florida that they would defend their freedom to the last. Moreover, Wild Cat wished to retain a large number of Black attendants to display his importance on the frontier. Finally, the emigrant Seminole Blacks would act as a lure to attract other Blacks and Indians to Mexico. Wild Cat hoped that his confederation would be supplemented by runaways from Texas plantations and the Indian Territory as it offered a haven of refuge for Blacks. He also intended to use the Blacks to attract other Indians by appealing to Seminole slaveholders to join their runaways in his confederation on the

Rio Grande. The Blacks were thus envisaged as valuable members of the new community, strengthening it both quantitatively and qualitatively and providing the necessary skills for its establishment, operation and survival.

There was a serious underlying conflict within the alliance as the emigrants left the Creek country. The post-removal experiences of the militant Blacks and the recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles had been very different. Prolonged periods of separation and the development of an independent militant Black initiative in the Indian Territory had put added strain on their relationship. They had little mutual interest and few joint objectives. The alliance relied heavily upon the charismatic and enigmatic Wild Cat, but even his strong personality was no substitute for a singularity of motivation or purpose. Once the militants and the recalcitrants had removed themselves from the proximity of their common enemies, the Creeks and the Seminole progressives, it remained to be seen if their alliance could be sustained in Mexico.

Footnotes

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9. A.R.C.I.A. 1843, Report 87, Armstrong to Crawford 30 September 1843, p.408.

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15. Arkansas Intelligencer, 30 March 1844.
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24. Mason to Jones 10 July 1844 and Judge to Boone 31 August 1844, ibid., M1973-44 and J1684-45; Jones to Arbuckle 3 August 1844, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 2; Statement of Boone, Fort Gibson, Indian Affairs, p.25.
25. A.R.C.I.A. 1844, Report 80, Judge to Armstrong 26 August 1844, p.476 and Report 75, Armstrong to Crawford 1 October 1844, p.458.
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27. Seminole Memorial 28 December 1844, M234-800, frame 626.
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29. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol.2, pp.407-409; National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T494, Documents Relating to the Negotiations of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Indian Tribes, 1801-1869, 10 rolls, Roll 4, Ratified Treaties 1838-1853, Ratified Treaty No.244, Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of 4 January 1845 with the Creek and Seminole Indians, frames 235-243.
30. A.R.C.I.A. 1845, Report 20, M. Duval to Crawford 30 September 1845, p.530.
31. Report of Butler, Cherokee Agency, 16 April 1845, Judge to Crawford 27 April 1845 and Butler to Crawford 25 July 1845, M234-800, B2452-45, J1684-45 and B2528-45; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.258; Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles, p.104.
32. Report of Butler, Cherokee Agency, 16 April 1845, M234-800, B2452-45.
33. Halliburton, Janet, "Black Slavery in the Creek Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 56, No.3, (Fall 1978), 298-314, pp.303-305; Waring, Antonio J. (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, University of Georgia Libraries Miscellaneous Publications No.1 (Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1960) pp.17-27.
34. Judge to Crawford 27 April 1845, M234-800, J1684-45.
35. Application of Gopher John through J.C. Casey, Washington, 28 May 1845, ibid., C2309-45.
36. Duval to Wm. Medill 24 March 1846, M234-801, Seminole Agency 1846-1855, D1059-46; Duval to J.K. Polk 21 December 1846, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frames 194-200; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.243; Foreman, Grant, Fort Gibson: A Brief History (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1936) p.31. Today a sign is posted outside the Old Commissary Building at the historic site of Fort Gibson which reads, "This Commissary Building was started by the U.S. Army in 1845 and many Seminole Negro Slaves were used in its

construction. It is the oldest stone Military Building within the state. It is the property of Oklahoma."

37. Jesup to Arbuckle 8 April 1846, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frame 92.
38. Wm. A. Gordon, Statement, 13 April 1846, G. Loomis to Duval 3 May 1846 and R.W. Kirkham to Jesup 20 August 1846, Fort Gibson, Indian Affairs, pp.17-18; Duval to Medill 2 June 1847 and Jesup to Medill 13 July 1848, M234-801, D38-47 and J96-48; Duval to Loomis 7 June 1847, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3; Loomis to Casey 11 June 1847, Fort Gibson, Letters Sent.
39. Loomis to F.F. Flint 29 October 1846, National Archives Record Group 393, Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 6, hereafter cited as Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, or Letters Sent; Loomis to Flint 20 July 1847, Fort Gibson, Indian Affairs, p.26; Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles, pp.112-114.
40. Loomis to Jesup 7 December 1847, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frames 31-33.
41. Arbuckle to Jones, 29 January 1848, ibid., frames 28-29.
42. Loomis to Jesup 7 December 1847, ibid., frames 31-33.
43. Benjamin Marshall, Tuckabatchee Micco, G.W. Stidham and George Scott to Medill 26 April 1848, ibid., frames 52-54.
44. Gopher John to Jesup 10 June 1848, M234-801, J102-48.
45. J.Y. Mason to President of the United States 28 June 1848, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frames 57-78, and particularly frames 71, 73, 74 and 77; Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1852 -) Vol.4, pp.720-729.
46. Gopher John to Jesup 10 June 1848, M234-801, J102-48; Jesup to B.L.E. Bonneville 28 July 1848, Medill to Gopher John 2 August 1848 and Statement of Co-ah-coo-chee 21 August 1848, Fort Gibson, Indian Affairs, pp.36-38; W.L. Marcy to Arbuckle 5 August 1848 and Medill to Duval 5 August 1848, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3.
47. Flint to W.S. Ketchum 21 August and 25 September 1848, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3; D.S. Miles to Flint 17 November 1848, Duval to Arbuckle 1st and 11 December 1848, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 7.
48. A.R.C.I.A. 1845, Report 15, Armstrong to Crawford 30 September 1845, pp.506-507 and Report 20, Duval to Crawford 30 September 1845, pp.529-531.
49. A.R.C.I.A. 1846, Report 15, Duval to Medill 5 September 1846, p.280.
50. Ibid., p.278; Arkansas Intelligencer, 24 May 1845; Cherokee Advocate, 22 May 1845; Foreman, Grant, Advancing the Frontier 1830-1860

(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1933) p.229.

51. Foreman, Grant (ed.), "The Journal of Elijah Hicks," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 13, No.1, (March 1935), 68-99, pp.71, 75, 80-81. See also, McReynolds, The Seminoles, pp.256-257.
52. A.R.C.I.A. 1846, Report 15, Duval to Medill 5 September 1846, p.279; Cherokee Advocate, 30 July 1846; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, pp.244-245.
53. A.R.C.I.A. 1846, Report 9, Armstrong to Medill 10 October 1846, p.266 and Report 15, Duval to Medill 5 September 1846, p.279; Arkansas Intelligencer, 3 October 1846; Cherokee Advocate, 30 July 1846; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, pp.245, 260-261 n.12.
54. Wild Cat to the Secretary of War 12 May 1847, M234-801, C82-47.
55. A.R.C.I.A. 1847, Report 20, Duval to Medill 30 September 1847, p.888.
56. A.R.C.I.A. 1846, Report 15, Duval to Medill 5 September 1846, pp.279-280.
57. A.R.C.I.A. 1848, Report 22c, R.S. Neighbors to Medill 2 March 1848, pp.576-586. See also, Richardson, Rupert N., The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement: A Century and a Half of Savage Resistance to the Advancing White Frontier (Glendale, California, A.H. Clark Company, 1933) pp.170-171 and n.317.
58. Both Wild Cat and Jim Jumper had good claims to the chieftainship as nephews of Micanopy. Wild Cat was the favourite son of King Philip, Chief of the St. John's River Seminoles, and a sister of Micanopy. Jim Jumper appears to have been the son of Jumper, of Second Seminole War fame, and another sister of Micanopy. Thanks largely to Duval, Jim Jumper was the one chosen to succeed his uncle. See, Foreman, Carolyn T., "The Jumper Family of the Seminole Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 34, No.3, (Fall 1956), 272-285, p.284; McReynolds, The Seminoles, pp.260-261 and Porter, Kenneth W., "Seminole in Mexico, 1850-1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 29, No.2, (Summer 1951), 153-158, p.154.
59. F.N. Page to D.E. Twiggs 18 November 1854, Indians - Creek and Seminole, 33 Congress, 2 Session, House Executive Doc. No.15, p.11, hereafter cited as Indians - Creek and Seminole.
60. Arbuckle to Jones 31 July 1848, Flint to J. Frennen 10 September 1849 and Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, ibid., pp.22, 29, 10; Miles to Flint 17 November 1848, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 7.
61. Arbuckle to Jones 31 July 1849, Indians - Creek and Seminole, p.22.
62. "List of Negroes handed over to the Seminole Chiefs at Fort Gibson, Cherokee Nation, 2 January 1849," W.G. Belknap to Arbuckle 3 January 1849 and Arbuckle to Jones 8 January 1849, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frames 143-154, 164, 140-141; Arbuckle to Jones 31 July 1849 and Flint to Drennen 13 August 1849, Indians - Creek and Seminole, pp.22, 26.

63. Belknap to Arbuckle 3 January 1849, M574, Roll 13, File 96, frame 164.
64. Duval to Belknap 7 June 1849, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3; Duval to Arbuckle 16 July 1849, Arbuckle to Jones 31 July 1849 and Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, Indians - Creek and Seminole, pp.19, 22, 10; "'I'm in the Wewoka Switch': Heard in the Oil Fields over the World," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 41, No.4, (Winter 1963), 455-458, p.457; Littlefield, Africans and Seminoles, pp.133-134.
65. Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, Indians - Creek and Seminole, p.11.
66. "Pass," 8 April 1849, Fort Gibson, Indian Affairs, p.45.
67. Duval to Belknap 7 June 1849, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3.
68. Duval to Arbuckle 16 July 1849, Drennen to Arbuckle 20 July 1849, Arbuckle to Jones 31 July and 14 August 1849, Indians - Creek and Seminole, pp.19-20, 20, 22, 25.
69. Duval to Arbuckle 16 July 1849, ibid., pp.19-20.
70. Drennen to Arbuckle 20 July 1849, Flint to Drennen 26 July 1849 and Arbuckle to Jones 31 July 1849, ibid., pp.20, 21, 22-23.
71. Flint to Belknap 2 August 1849, ibid., pp.23-24.
72. Flint to Drennen 13 August 1849, ibid., p.26.
73. Arbuckle to Jones 14 August 1849, ibid., p.25.
74. Drennen to Arbuckle 18 August 1849, ibid., p.27.
75. Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, ibid., p.11.
76. Flint to Drennen 10 September 1849, Flint to Colonel Raiford 10 September 1849, Arbuckle to Jones 14 September 1849, and Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, ibid., pp.28-29, 30, 31, 11.
77. Armstrong to Crawford 4 June 1843, M234-800, A1464-43.
78. Foreman, Advancing the Frontier, p.243.
79. De La Maza, Francisco F., Código de Colonización y terrenos baldíos de la República Mexicana 1451-1892 (Mexico, Oficina Tip. de la Secretaría de Fomento, Calle de San Andrés Núm.15, 1893) Número 120, Reglamento de 4 de Diciembre de 1846: para la Dirección de Colonización, pp.347-359 and especially Article 45, p.356. The quotation is my own translation.
80. U.S. Statutes at Large, 1789-1863 (Boston, 1852-1867) Article 11 of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Vol.9, pp.930-931.
81. Rippy, James F., "The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1848-1853," Hispanic American Historical Review, 2, (1919), 363-396, pp.376-379; Rippy, James

F., The United States and Mexico (New York, A.A. Knopf Inc., 1926) pp.68-70, 75-76.

82. De La Maza, Código de Colonización, Número 125, Decreto de 19 de Julio de 1848; y Reglamento expedido el dia 20 del mismo mes, para el establecimiento de colonias militares en la nueva linea divisoria con los Estados Unidos de América, pp.400-406. Again, the quotation is my own translation. See also, Beringer, Dieter G., "Mexican Attitudes towards Immigration 1821-1857" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972) pp.139-142; Faulk, Odie B., "Projected Mexican Military Colonies for the Borderlands, 1848," Journal of Arizona History, 9, No.1, (Spring 1968), 39-47 passim; Stout, Joseph A. Jr., The Liberators: Filibustering Expeditions into Mexico 1848-1862, and the last thrust of Manifest Destiny (Los Angeles, Westernlore Press, 1973) pp.27-29.
83. Foreman, Advancing the Frontier, pp.244-246, 248.
84. Duval to O. Brown 30 May 1850, M234-801, D392-50.
85. J. Lynde to Flint 12 October 1849, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 7; Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, Indians - Creek and Seminole, p.11.
86. Duval to Brown 5 November 1849, M234-289, Florida Superintendancy 1838-1850, D247-49; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.248; McReynolds, The Seminoles, p.266.
87. Duval to Brown 30 May 1850, M234-801, D392-50; Page to Twiggs 18 November 1854, Indians - Creek and Seminole, p.11; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.248; McReynolds, The Seminoles, p.266; San Antonio Western Texas, 6 June 1850; Woodhull, Frost, "The Seminole Indian Scouts on the Border," Frontier Times, 15, No.3, (December 1937), 118-127, Statement of Charlie Daniels, p.119.
88. Giddings, Joshua R., The Exiles of Florida (Columbus, Ohio, Follett, Foster and Co., 1858) p.333.
89. On the problems encountered during the 1840s by John Kibbetts and Dembo and Hardy Factor, three militants who subsequently became Seminole Black leaders in Mexico and Texas see, Dawson to Boone 10 April 1844, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 2; Belger to Loomis 3 April 1844 and Mason to Jones 5 March 1845, Fort Gibson, Letters Sent; Boone to Dawson 8 April 1844, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 5; Bliss to Dawson 13 May 1844, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Sent; J. Lynde to Flint 12 October 1849 and Belknap to Flint 31 October 1849, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 7; Statement of Tustenuggee Micco 9 December 1847, Logan to Loomis 6, 9, 11 and 15 December 1847 and Flint to Belknap 9 November 1849, Fort Gibson, Letters Received, Box 3.

CHAPTER 2

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SEMINOLES AND BLACKS
IN MEXICO, 1850-1861

The recalcitrant traditionalist Seminoles and the militant Blacks who had elected to quit the Creek country in the fall of 1849 were joined in Texas by a band of Southern Kickapoos. Beginning in 1850, these three groups were given land grants and other considerations by the Mexican government in exchange for their services in defending the frontier against the incursions of depredating bands of Indians. The large frontier confederation that Wild Cat had envisaged failed to materialise, however, and its population actually peaked in 1850. With the exception of some 300 Southern Kickapoos, most of whom remained with the confederation but a short time anyway, Wild Cat was never able to convince the Plains tribes that he represented their best interests or that they should accept him as their leader. Ironically, the military colony that Wild Cat established in Coahuila came to be under constant threat from those very hostiles he had hoped would support his cause.

The confederation was extremely attractive to Blacks, however, and many joined the colony during the course of the decade. Mexican Blacks, intermarried Indian-Blacks and their offspring, Texas runaways and free mulattoes from South Carolina all helped to swell the Seminole Black population. Within a few years, the Blacks heavily outnumbered the Seminoles at the colony and began to increase their landholdings accordingly. This served merely to add extra strain to the already tenuous alliance between the two groups.

In the early 1850s, the Seminole-Black military colony was attacked by slave hunters, Texas filibusters and depredating Indians. The pro-slavery Seminole sub-agent, Marcellus Duval, who had a vested interest

in the enterprise, hired noted slave catchers to return the Blacks to their owners in the Indian Territory. Texas slaveholders, moreover, aware that the colony threatened their propertied interests by offering a haven to runaways, sought to break up the settlement and recapture their Blacks. Other slave hunters based on the border became involved in schemes to capture the Seminole Blacks for profit and this led to several filibustering raids by Texans during the period. Hostile Indian bands also threatened to destroy the colony as it stood between them and their lucrative depredating excursions into the Mexican interior. The colony also offered the considerable prize of large numbers of saleable Blacks, in addition to other booty. As in Florida, the Seminole-Black alliance was never stronger than when it was being assailed from without and the colonists successfully withstood all of these attempts to break up their settlement. During more peaceful times, however, the alliance became more vulnerable as the differing interests and goals of the Indians and Blacks began to surface.

By the middle of the decade, serious cracks had begun to appear in the Seminole-Black alliance. Significantly, during negotiations with the immigrants, the Mexican government had treated the Seminoles and Blacks as separate groups, recognising the independence of the latter by giving them their own name and land. At the military colony, the Blacks, at first, had shown a willingness to conform to existing traditional Seminole economic and social arrangements by accepting a mild form of servitude and the overall sovereignty of the Indians. They offered their small tribute to the Seminoles and deferred to the authority of Wild Cat. Four major factors would subsequently come to work against this arrangement, however, and ultimately lead to the demise of the alliance.

First of all, as was their custom, the Blacks settled at a distance from the Seminoles and established a separate community. As in Florida,

the Blacks at the military colony were subject to few restraints. They raised crops and kept livestock, were armed, fought in separate companies under their own generals, had their own town chiefs, and maintained a culture which was very different to that of the Indians. This led to a gradual estrangement of the two groups and the growth of a separate Black initiative. Secondly, the Seminoles and Blacks had had different motives for removing to Mexico and once they were settled at the colony they sought different goals for their new community. While the Indians were hunters and warriors and happy to engage in lengthy expeditions in search of game or in opposition to the incursions of hostiles, the Blacks were agriculturalists who wished to stay at home and farm. Thirdly, the Blacks at the colony represented the most militant wing of the Seminole Blacks. In Mexico, their numbers were bolstered by hardened frontier maroons and Texas runaways who greatly strengthened their resolve to act independently and unilaterally. Finally, factional divisions within the Seminoles led to a decline in the strength of their leadership. The Blacks saw no further need for an association with the Indians and made it clear that they intended to control their own destiny.

The separate Seminole Black initiative took two forms. First of all, the Blacks undermined Seminole authority by refusing to engage in campaigns against hostile Indians and filibusters unless their interests were directly affected. And secondly, they objected to the overall sovereignty of the Seminoles and looked more and more to their own leaders. By 1856, the strength of Wild Cat's character and the respect of John Horse¹ for his close friend and long-time associate were all that held the Seminole-Black alliance intact.

With Wild Cat's death in 1857, the alliance quickly crumbled. Wild Cat's successor, Lion, demanded the same deference from the Blacks as his predecessor had received. The Blacks refused, however, and only took

orders from their own leaders. The Seminoles were piqued both by this and the Blacks' disobedience of the commands of Mexican officials to engage in campaigns against the hostiles. Moreover, the Indians became jealous of the Blacks' agricultural success, arguing, quite rightly, that the latter had come to possess more land, crops, livestock and improvements than themselves by staying behind at the colony instead of campaigning. A dispute broke out between the Seminoles, the Blacks and the Mexican authorities, ostensibly over cattle-stealing and water-rights. In actual fact, however, it represented the culmination of the process of separation that had been taking place between the Seminoles and Blacks at the colony. By the late 1850s, the two groups were completely alienated and the Seminole-Black alliance in Mexico was clearly a thing of the past. In the early 1860s, the ties linking the former allies were officially severed. The disillusioned Seminoles returned to the Indian Territory and the Blacks were left alone in Mexico - exiles in a strange land; maroons on a hostile frontier. It is to a discussion of these developments that this chapter is devoted.

The emigrant Seminoles and Blacks who left the Indian Territory in October 1849 crossed the Red River and made their way south through Texas along the route that subsequently became known as the "Wildcat Trail". The allies travelled slowly, hunting and fishing as they went. At streams rafts were made of logs tied together with ropes and the women, children and belongings were placed upon them. The young men then swam to the other side and pulled the raft across.² At the end of May 1850, the Seminole sub-agent Marcellus Duval reported that Wild Cat had located for the summer on Cow Bayou, which runs into the Brazos just south of the present-day city of Waco, to enable the Blacks to raise a crop.³ The emigrants had, in fact, proceeded further to the southwest. John Rollins, the Indian agent for Texas, reported later that he had met Wild

Cat and his party on the Llano. The Indians and Blacks had encamped there and planted small patches of corn which they intended harvesting before proceeding further.⁴

At their meeting, Wild Cat informed Rollins that he intended to visit Mexico and agree to campaign against the incursions of the wild tribes, provided that lands he approved of were offered in exchange. If he successfully negotiated an agreement with the Mexican authorities, Wild Cat would return to the Indian Territory next winter and remove all the Seminoles and Blacks across the Rio Grande.⁵ While his supporters raised a crop on the Llano, Wild Cat explored the region and visited the various Indian tribes in the area promoting his projected Mexican colony. It was reported on 22 May, for example, that Wild Cat was south of the Llano at Fredericksburg with a party of Seminoles.⁶ The excitement and intrigue surrounding Wild Cat's activities gave rise to many exaggerated reports. According to the San Antonio Western Texas, for example, there were 700 or 800 "Seminole, Lipan, Waco and Tankaway Indians" under the command of Wild Cat encamped on the Llano in June.⁷ Despite all his efforts with the Plains tribes, however, Wild Cat only succeeded in persuading a band of about 100 Southern Kickapoos to join his enterprise.⁸

In June 1850, Wild Cat travelled to Mexico to examine the possibility of locating there his confederation of Indians and Blacks. The Mexican officials were immediately receptive to his petition. The immigration of Indians and Blacks from the United States into northern Mexico, chiefly Coahuila, had precedents. In 1835, for example, a band of Texas Cherokees had asked permission to settle in Mexico, a move only frustrated by the Texas rebellion of the same year. Following the abolition of legal servitude in Mexico in 1829, it was recommended in 1831 that fugitive Blacks be placed on the frontier to protect the borderlands against Anglo-American filibusters. And in 1834, Mexican government agent

Almonte promised Benjamin Lundy, the northern abolitionist, that he could colonize ex-slaves in Tamaulipas. Moreover, Coahuila had experienced widespread depredations since the conclusion of the Mexican war. During the three month period following the bill establishing the military colonies in July 1847, 3 bands of Indians had ravaged several towns resulting in the expenditure of more than \$3,000 for their repulse. In 1849, 11 incursions by an estimated 800 marauding Indians had resulted in 22 persons killed, wounded and captured and several hundred horses stolen. Coahuila had spent over \$24,000 that year equipping troops for the contingency. Finally, during 1850, more than 600 Comanches, Mescaleros and Lipans attacked 36 times, killing 28, wounding 14 and capturing the same number. Financial shortages, poor planning and incessant delays hindered the founding of the colonies so that by 1850 only nine of the 18 colonies scheduled for the frontier had been even partially established. By the summer of 1850, the borderlands were on the verge of total collapse and the Mexican government was desperately seeking a population influx into the region.⁹

As the Mexican officials were so receptive to potential colonists, Wild Cat successfully negotiated a favourable agreement for his supporters. On 27 June 1850, Wild Cat, as Chief of the Seminoles and representative of the Blacks and Kickapoos, signed an agreement with the Inspector General of the Eastern Military Colonies, Antonio María Jáurequi in San Fernando de Rosas, present-day Zaragoza. The supporters of Wild Cat were assigned "16 sitios de ganado mayor", about 70,000 acres, half at the headwaters of the Rio San Rodrigo and half at the headwaters of the Rio San Antonio, some 50 miles southwest of present-day Ciudad Acuna. Wild Cat was named as chief of the combined tribes. The immigrants were to be considered Mexican citizens and must obey the laws and authorities of the republic. They were to help prevent further

incursions by raiding tribes such as the Comanches, Lipans and Mescaleros but maintain good relations with citizens of the United States. An important additional clause facilitated the initial attempt of the Seminoles and Blacks to restore within the colony the economic and social arrangements they had practised in Florida, "Although the Kickapoos, Seminoles, Mascogan Negroes,¹⁰ and other Indians who may come to Mexico must subject themselves to the laws of the country, it is not demanded of them to change their habits and customs". The immigrants were to be given tools to clear the land and build places to live, and a small food subsidy.¹¹ Having successfully concluded the agreement, Wild Cat returned to Texas to remove his followers to Mexico.

In early July 1850, probably due to the threat of slaving activities in the area, the Indians and Blacks hurriedly abandoned their crops on the Llano and set out for Mexico.¹² At Las Moras Springs, later the site of Fort Clark, the emigrants came across the encampment of a military train, under the command of Major John T. Sprague, which was bound for El Paso. The emigrants displayed a white flag and were allowed to enter the camp. A member of the train, Jesse Sumpter, later recalled seeing Wild Cat and "the noted negro, Gopher John" and estimated that, "In the crowd of Seminoles and negroes... were one hundred negroes making altogether something near two hundred in all". Wild Cat informed Sprague that his party wished to proceed to Eagle Pass and he was issued with a pass for the purpose.¹³ Cora Montgomery, a resident of Eagle Pass, described the arrival of the emigrants at the border,

Some reasonably well-mounted Indians circled round a dark nucleus of female riders, who seemed objects of special care. But the long straggling rear-guard was worth seeing. It threw Falstaff's ragged regiment altogether in the shade. Such an array of all manners and sizes of animals, mounted by all ages, sexes and sizes of negroes, piled up to a most bewildering height, on and among such a promiscuous assemblage of blankets, babies, cooking utensils, and savage traps, in general, never were or could be held together on horseback by any beings on earth but themselves and their red brothers.

Wild Cat later called on the Montgomery household. The Seminole leader was obviously revelling in his new position of power and the deference offered by his supporters, "He came in state to make his call on us, attended by his cousin and lieutenant, the Crazy Bear, and some other braves, and marshalled with all ceremony by his interpreter, Gopher John, a full-blooded negro".¹⁴

Eagle Pass was the border crossing most used by runaway slaves fleeing to Mexico. Slave catchers, dealers and kidnappers congregated there in search of fugitives and, consequently, the town became a hive of slaving activity. The emigrant Seminole Blacks therefore wished to cross over to Mexico as soon as possible. A few days after their arrival at Eagle Pass, the Captains of the three groups, Wild Cat of the Seminoles, "El Moreno" or "Coloured Man" John Horse of the "Mascogos", as the Seminole Blacks were called by the Mexicans, and Papicua of the Kickapoos, appeared before Colonel Juan Manuel Maldonado, sub-inspector of the Colonia Militar de Guerrero, a few miles south of Piedras Negras, to petition for their lands, tools and livestock. On 26 July, their petition was provisionally granted until confirmation was received from the Mexican central government. But on returning to Eagle Pass, Wild Cat was refused permission to proceed to Mexico by the Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan.¹⁵ Threatened by slave hunters, however, the Blacks and Indians stole over the Rio Grande at the dead of night. The dramatic crossing was later described by Mrs. Becky Simmons, a Seminole Black member of the party,

Now we was glad dat we done git away fo de American race people and we felt dat we could be safe if we can git across de ribber. Our men look round wit Wild Cat fur a place to ford de ribber. It was dark and about de middle of de night, so dat we had to be a hurrin' to git through wit crossin'. But dem hours look like a ten years, for we was so close to de American race people dat we wanted to git away across de ribber soon.

Soon, Wild Cat say dat he find a good place. We crossed first den de men crossed after us. Dere was a skiller made out uf three logs tied together, which we crossed on. Hit was a good ride, fur de men took long sticks to guide de traption across

de ribber. I neber would forgit dat time. Chulluns about to cry out cause dey is sleepy and de oluns scared dat dey is going to start aballin' out before we can git ober. Wild Cat he is fast and quick. He does things quick. De Mexicans did not know dat we wus dere eder. John Horse he told dem when we wus ready to tell de Mexicans dat we wus dare.¹⁶

The Crossing was made without discovery or injury and the Seminole Blacks found themselves on free Mexican soil.

Thus, in late July 1850, 309 Seminoles, Blacks and Kickapoos entered Mexico as immigrants. The Seminoles were temporarily settled at San Fernando de Rosas, now Zaragoza, Coahuila, the Blacks at El Moral, near Monclova Viejo about 25 miles above Piedras Negras, and the Kickapoos at Tuillo, near the Colonia Militar de Guerrero.¹⁷ The Mexican officials' initial perception of the immigrants gives an interesting insight into the nature of the relationship of the Seminoles and Blacks at the time of their entry into Mexico. The Mexicans gave the Blacks their own name, "Mascogos", and a tract of land at a distance from the Indians. From the start, the Blacks were perceived and treated as a separate social unit or "tribe", as independent of the Seminoles as were the Kickapoos.

The spring and summer of 1850 were troubled times for the Seminole Blacks left behind in the Indian Territory. The Florida delegation returned in April and Duval was asked by the Seminoles in council to recover the runaways. Duval's personal interest prompted him to request the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to issue orders for their arrest. He reasoned that if they were allowed to remain outside the United States their settlement would attract other "renegade Indians" and runaway slaves. Duval firmly believed, moreover, that "a large number" of Blacks from the Seminole and Creek nations intended to leave for Mexico in the fall.¹⁸

Following the departure of Gopher John, Jim Bowlegs had effectively assumed the leadership of the Seminole Blacks who had remained behind in the Indian Territory. Jim had acted as interpreter to the Florida delegation and had, in all likelihood, been instructed by Wild Cat and Gopher

John to influence his master Billy Bowlegs and his party to emigrate to Mexico. In April 1850, Billy Bowlegs wrote to the Seminole chiefs placing Jim in charge of his 50 slaves in the Indian Territory during his absence.¹⁹ Jim Bowlegs thus acquired considerable influence among the Seminole Blacks and was a natural successor to Gopher John. He was quick-witted and intelligent, had acquired property and a considerable personal following, and was the interpreter and adviser of a recalcitrant chief. In early June 1850, Creek slave hunters entered the Seminole country and took three Blacks, including Jim. The Blacks were rescued by General William G. Belknap but the Principal Chief of the Creeks, Roly McIntosh, protested against their being once more offered protection by the military. McIntosh informed Belknap that as Jim was a slave he was prohibited by Creek law from owning "arms and horses".²⁰ In reality, however, the Creeks were more anxious to remove this new threat to their authority. As had Gopher John earlier, Jim Bowlegs felt threatened and insecure, and his situation in the Indian Territory was becoming similarly intolerable.

Matters came to a head on 24 June 1850 when a party which included Creeks, Cherokees, and U.S. citizens arrived in the vicinity of Wewoka armed and equipped to take forcible possession of a number of Seminole Blacks claimed by them. When the Seminoles in the area learned that it was the intention of the party to attack Wewoka, many determined to assist the Blacks in defending themselves. Duval arrived the following day and prevented a clash by ordering the party to return to the Creek country north of the North Fork. The progressive Seminole chiefs later met the Creek leaders of the party in council where they agreed to admit the group and assist the Creeks in taking and delivering a number of Blacks. Approximately 180 Blacks were subsequently taken and held at the Seminole agency. Many were later retained to prevent their giving

information and support to those attempting to join Wild Cat in Mexico.²¹

Without doubt, the co-operation of the progressive Seminole chiefs in aiding the Creeks to seize the Blacks proved the last straw for Jim Bowlegs and his supporters. Immediately following the seizure, Jim forsook the protection offered by the military reserve to gather his followers for an attempt to join Wild Cat in Mexico.²² By early July 1850, about 180 Blacks under his command, "... Were en route for Texas, armed, and bidding defiance to any person or persons who should attempt to take them".²³ The Blacks split into parties of between 40 and 80 and made their way south across the Plains towards the Mexican border.²⁴

Shortly after he had effected the agreement with the Mexican officials and seen his supporters settled on their designated lands, Wild Cat returned to Texas. On 1 September 1850, he informed Texas Indian agent John Rollins that he was returning to the Indian Territory with the intention of removing all the Seminoles to Mexico.²⁵ During his sojourn through Texas, Wild Cat spread the word of the land grant in Mexico and the establishment of the military colony. The Seminole Black fugitives crossing the Plains doubtless heard of the grant and Wild Cat's journey through Texas to the Indian Territory and decided to await his return before entering Mexico.

While they were travelling through Texas, however, several of the Seminole Black bands were attacked by the Comanches, resulting in their capture, death and torture. At least one group of Blacks, that under the command of Jim Bowlegs himself, was captured by the Comanches with a view to selling them into slavery.²⁶ Another entire party of Blacks was put to death by the Comanches with the exception of two girls, who were tortured. The girls were seen with a Delaware trader by Captain Randolph B. Marcy, who thus described their horrendous experience,

They were taken to the camp where the most inhuman barbarities were perpetrated upon them. Among other fiendish atrocities, the savages scraped through their skin into the flesh, believing that beneath the cuticle the flesh was black like the color upon the exterior. They burned them with live coals to ascertain whether fire produced the same sensations of pain as with their own people, and tried various other experiments which were attended with most acute torture. The poor girls were shockingly scarred and mutilated when I saw them.

Upon inquiring of the Comanches the cause of their hostility to the Blacks, Marcy was told that it was because they were slaves to the whites and that they were sorry for them. Marcy realized, however, that the real motive was their fear that the Blacks would increase Wild Cat's force on the Rio Grande and interfere with their marauding operations along the Mexican border.²⁷ The enmity of the Comanches was not based on colour prejudice for they also indiscriminately killed Shawnees and Delawares suspected of intending to join Wild Cat.

Wild Cat finally arrived in the Seminole country on 18 September 1850, accompanied only by a woman and a young man. He expressed the wish to remove all of the Seminoles to Mexico and called a council for 27 September to discuss the prospect. The ensuing council proved most unsatisfactory to Wild Cat. He tried all means of persuasion to induce the Seminoles to follow him to Mexico. He told Seminole slaveholders that their runaways were residing in Mexico and that if they chose to emigrate with him they could again control them. He also stated that he had made arrangements for the Seminole annuity to be paid out on the Rio Grande. Duval, however, informed the chiefs that, as slavery had been abolished in Mexico, their Blacks were free and therefore no longer subject to their authority. He further informed them that Wild Cat's statements concerning the annuity were false and that, as their sub-agent, he was personally opposed to their removal. The Seminoles remained, for the most part, unimpressed by Wild Cat's enterprise.²⁸

In contrast, the Blacks were attracted by the Mexican colony and

Wild Cat's return caused great excitement among the Creeks who feared losing their slaves. On 23 September, Roly McIntosh reported to Belknap,

Now he come back with enticing news, and want to carry his people in that nation; and the negroes, he told them if they emigrate to that country, they will be all freed by the government. This is good news to the negroes. I am told some are prepared to go.²⁹

On 23rd and 30 September, the Creeks in council adopted measures to foil Wild Cat's plans and Duval feared a clash between the two opposing parties over the Blacks. Three hundred Creek warriors were sent into the Seminole country with instructions to prevent any Blacks from leaving the nation and to detain Wild Cat until the object of his mission could be ascertained. At Wewoka, the Creek party halted after learning that Wild Cat was in the Seminole country and that a number of Blacks were making preparations to leave, and returned home, without accomplishing anything.³⁰

Wild Cat was informed by Duval that McIntosh had ordered his arrest for conspiring to entice away the Blacks and create disorder in the nation, and had ordered out the Lower Creek lighthorse to take and convey him to the Arkansas district of the Creek nation. Wild Cat again expressed his hatred of the Lower Creeks. He told Duval that his supporters, "Tiwoconies, Caddoes, Kerchies and Comanches", were awaiting his return in Texas and would resist his enemies if he so ordered. He stated that he did not wish the whites or Upper Creeks to become involved but to leave it to him and the Lower Creeks "to settle according to Indian fashion". He could be found south of the Canadian, outside Creek and Seminole limits. Thus, in early October 1850, under the threat of arrest, Wild Cat left the Seminole country in the Indian Territory for the last time. He took with him only some 30 or 40 Seminole men and their families, numbering in all about 100, together with "a few negroes".³¹

The Lower Creek lighthorse pursued Wild Cat and his followers across the Canadian but near Camp Arbuckle they encountered a band of Comanches

who had captured Jim Bowlegs' party of Seminole Blacks as it was crossing the Plains to Mexico. The lighthorse paid the Comanches a ransom for delivering the Blacks and set off back to the Seminole country. The Blacks refused to return peaceably and attempted to escape their captors, resulting in a bloody encounter and casualties on both sides.³² That the prisoners fought valiantly but largely in vain was attested to by Doctor Rodney Glisan who remarked upon the number of wounded among the 60 captive Blacks of the party which passed by his camp on 23 October on its way to the Seminole country.³³ A few of the Blacks, however, escaped from their Creek captors and made their way to Mexico. One of these was the leader of the group, Jim Bowlegs, and his descendants still live in Nacimiento, Coahuila, and Brackettville, Texas.³⁴

On his return journey through Texas, the frustrated Wild Cat visited the Caddos and endeavoured to persuade them to emigrate with him to Mexico. Wild Cat stated that, as soon as he was settled across the Rio Grande, he intended to make war, not with the wild Indians but with the whites. Moreover, it was his intention to combine all of the wild tribes for the purpose and such as did not join him should be punished. Similar overtures were made to the Comanches and Wacos but none of these tribes was sufficiently impressed to support his enterprise. Wild Cat's only success was with the Southern Kickapoos. Despite the opposition of Chiefs Pecan and Pacanah, Wild Cat persuaded about 200 young warriors from the Canadian and Wild Horse Creek bands of the Southern Kickapoos to join him by promising them all the money and booty taken from the Comanches, and assuring them that they would be paid well by the Mexican government for their services.³⁵

Following his recruiting campaign, Wild Cat re-crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico. Despite the frustrations and failures of his trip, he had persuaded about 100 Seminoles, together with a few Blacks, and 200 Kickapoos

to join his enterprise. Moreover, the remaining 50-100 Blacks who had left the Indian Territory in July with Jim Bowlegs and escaped the ravages of the Comanches also reached the Mexican colony. Once settled in Mexico, Wild Cat's supporters came into contact with various groups of Blacks and Indians who, through settlement, military action, and intermarriage, became closely associated with the Seminole and Black communities.

The followers of Wild Cat and Gopher John had been preceded as immigrants by a group of over 20 Creek Blacks, mostly of the Wilson and Warrior families, and a family of Biloxi Indians. In all probability the Blacks had been former slaves of Pink Hawkins, a Creek who had moved to Texas in 1834 or 1836. The Blacks escaped from his plantation near Nacogdoches during the Mexican War and made their way across the Rio Grande.³⁶ They later became associated with the Creek Blacks of Wild Cat's party, were reinforced by further defections from the Indian Territory, and came to constitute a definite faction within the Black community. Kenneth W. Porter reported in 1946 that the Creek Blacks were "now inseparably intermixed with other elements",³⁷ but Ian F. Hancock, in recent and on-going field research among the Seminole Blacks at Brackettville, Texas, has discovered a clearly identifiable Creek Black element with a strong tradition of independence.³⁸ The immigrants also encountered a Biloxi family named Neco residing in Mexico. On 29 March 1839, a skirmish had taken place between the Texas Rangers and "a motley crowd of Mexicans, runaway negroes and Bilouxi Indians under General Cordova" at Mill Creek, Texas, after which the Mexican, Indian and Black survivors had fled to Mexico. Maria and her sister Laura Neco married Blacks and this small Biloxi remnant became interwoven into the Mascogan community.³⁹ The Blacks were also joined by the Shields brothers, a family of free mulatto settlers from South Carolina. At least two of the four brothers intermarried with the Seminole Blacks and their

descendants became closely identified with the group.⁴⁰

Wild Cat was thus surrounded by a motley group of supporters which included Seminole Indians; Kickapoos; Seminole, Creek and Cherokee Blacks; Creek Blacks already resident in Mexico; intermarried Biloxi; and free mulattoes. Mexican Indians, Blacks and natives, and Texas runaways would enhance the population of the group during the 1850s. By late 1850, however, the population of Wild Cat's colony peaked at about 200 Seminoles, more than 200 Blacks, and over 300 Kickapoos.

Prominent family names among the Mascogos were Factor, Payne, Bowlegs, Phillips, Perryman, Bruner, July and Fay. These names pointed to the background and history of the Blacks. The Factors were former slaves of Nelly and Sally Factor, descendants of the prominent Creek, Black Factor, who had settled in Florida and become associated with the Seminoles. The Paynes were former slaves of King Payne, Principal Chief of the Seminoles from ca.1784-1812. His brother Bowlegs, and the latter's descendants, Billy and Harriet, inherited many of Payne's Blacks and gave them their name. The Phillips were former slaves of Wild Cat's father, King Philip, Chief of the Saint John's River Seminoles. The Perryman and Bruner families were former slaves of prominent Creek families of the same name. Some of the Seminole Blacks took former Christian names as their surnames. The July family descended from a slave of that name who belonged to Nelly Factor. July had become a leading Black in Florida, been employed by the U.S. army as a guide during the Second Seminole War, and been killed by the Seminoles for his defection.⁴¹ The Fays were the descendants of a Black woman named Fy, a former slave of Cowkeeper, the Principal Chief of the Seminoles before King Payne.

Leading individuals in the early Black community were John Horse, John Kibbetts, Hardy Factor, Cuffy, Thomas Factor, Sampson July, Jim

Bowlegs and Kitty Johnson. Kenneth Porter has thus described John Horse, "A big, tall, fine-looking, 'ginger-colored' man, with a proud carriage and walk, renowned for his coolness and courage, his deadly accuracy with a rifle, and his tact and 'management', he shared with Wild Cat a fondness for fine clothes, ornaments, and whiskey...".⁴²

John Horse became the undisputed leader of the Seminole Blacks in Mexico and was referred to as "Captain of that tribe" by the Mexican authorities. John Kibbetts was his military second-in-command and Hardy Factor his counsellor. Cuffy was recognized as leader of the Seminole Blacks in John Horse's absence. John Horse's principal advisers were Thomas Factor and Sampson July, the uncle and brother respectively, of his wife, Susan, and Jim Bowlegs, his successor as leader of the militant Seminole Blacks in the Indian Territory after his departure. Kitty Johnson, as a young girl, was with the first party of emigrants which left the Indian Territory in 1849 and acted as nurse to Wild Cat's son, Billy, as they crossed Texas. Kitty grew up to be the leading Seminole Black woman in the Mexican community.⁴³

Shortly after Wild Cat had left the Indian Territory, Duval attempted to bring about the capture and recovery of the runaway Blacks by appealing to officials of Texas. On 20th and 21 October 1850, Duval wrote to Governor P.H. Bell asking his assistance in arresting the Blacks who had recently escaped from the Seminole country as they made their way through Texas to Mexico. The Indian owners were prepared to pay the legal reward for their apprehension and had authorized their sub-agent to offer \$50 per head for all the Blacks arrested and returned to them. Duval suggested that, as there were so many runaways and most were women and children, individual speculators, or a company of Rangers, would find it profitable to engage in their capture. He had instructed that this reward be advertised in hand bills and the Texas press. Furthermore, the apprehension

of the Blacks was of vital concern to Texas. Should they reach Mexico, the Blacks would aid Wild Cat's depredative expeditions. Duval then appealed to the fears of the slaveholding community,

These negroes themselves when located will form a formidable band—who will be able to secrete or protect all runaways from Texas or the Indian Country; and furnish guides to conduct, with the assistance of a few Indians, any others who can make their way to the Plains.

If the Blacks were apprehended, Duval should be immediately informed so that he could procure permission from their Indian owners to have them sold in Texas to save the trouble of having them sent back to the Indian Territory. Duval's personal interest in the Seminole Blacks was the basis for his concern. His brother William had died leaving him his claim to some "eighteen or twenty" Blacks who had run off with Wild Cat in the winter of 1849. Duval had heard that twelve of these were with Wild Cat on the Texas side of the Rio Grande and he would pay \$50 per head for their return. A list of their names would be sent with the bearer of the correspondence, his agent George Aird. As he was prevented by public duty from visiting Texas himself, Duval had instructed his agent to assist in any way he could to arrest the fugitive Blacks.⁴⁴

Duval had also directly requested General George Brooke, commanding the Department of Texas at San Antonio, to arrest any Seminole Blacks found by the military.⁴⁵ Bell believed the best interests of Texas would be served by complying with this request and, on 8 November, wrote to Brooke asking him to employ a competent force to pursue, and recover if possible, the fugitive Blacks.⁴⁶ The following day, Bell informed Duval that there appeared to be "considerable individual enterprise in this community for the recapture of the lost property".⁴⁷ On 12 November, however, Brooke replied to Bell's request and put a stop to any further speculation that the military would help to apprehend the Blacks. Wild Cat and his supporters had settled across the Rio Grande and had many

Blacks among them, but whether these were slaves of the Seminoles in Mexico or runaways from the Indian Territory was difficult to determine. No information had been provided by Duval regarding the names of the slaves, or their owners, and the right of ownership had not been determined. There was no proof that Wild Cat had carried off the slaves, or even advised them to leave their masters. Under the circumstances, the Blacks should be considered runaways and recaptured by their owners or speculators. To employ the military in such a venture would be unprecedented. Brooke therefore declined his support. He did, however, direct the Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan to detain all Blacks trying to pass into Mexico until their freedom or ownership was positively proved. Rollins was also to instruct the Comanches to prevent more Blacks from passing through their country. The Comanches were to be promised a considerable reward for each runaway apprehended and delivered at Fredericksburg, and warned that they could expect trouble if they failed to comply.⁴⁸ In effect, Brooke took preventative action after the main body of militant Seminole Blacks had already successfully entered Mexico. Official action by the U.S. military to return the fugitives to their former owners or claimants in the Indian Territory had thus been ruled out and Duval's designs, at least for the moment, thwarted.

During his absence in Texas and the Indian Territory, Wild Cat's Black and Indian warriors twice joined with Mexican troops to repel marauding Indian bands who crossed the border. Wild Cat's supporters fought well and the savages were defeated with losses. As a reward for their fidelity and bravery, their petition for land was granted by President Herrera on 16 October 1850, on condition that they stood by the obligations they entered into in the original agreement. On 18 November 1850, at Moral, Colonel Maldonado explained the terms of the grant which lay at the headwaters of the San Rodrigo and San Antonio

Rivers. The terms were accepted by the three Chiefs, Wild Cat, John Horse and Papicua, and they took the oath of fidelity the following day. They received gratuities from the Inspector, and were promised the lands they had solicited. On 4 February 1851, Wild Cat was appointed a colonel in the Mexican army and the Alcalde of the new colony. The Indians raised objections to their original grant and, on 3 March, were given lands near the military colonies of Monclova Viejo and Guerrero. The Seminoles settled at La Navaja and the Kickapoos at Guerrero. The Blacks remained at Moral, a short distance away from the Seminoles.⁴⁹

Wild Cat soon appeared to be similarly dissatisfied with the new Seminole land grant at La Navaja and restless for another move. Following Duval's correspondence, the War Department became concerned about Wild Cat's motives in removing to Mexico and sent out Colonels Cooper and Temple to investigate. On 22 March, Wild Cat had been ordered out with 100 Seminoles and Blacks and 70 Mexican colonists to counter Indian raiders entering Mexico by Francia.⁵⁰ Having completed his mission, he was interviewed by the U.S. officers at Eagle Pass on 27 March. Wild Cat stated that the Creeks had come upon his land, stolen his Blacks, and tried to involve him in difficulties. To avoid war, he had left the Indian Territory to search for a new home in Texas. Since he had left the Seminole country, the Creeks had stolen all the Blacks and other property which he had left behind. Wild Cat stated that he had not settled in Mexico, that he had no house but lived in a tent, and that he was only staying there with a part of his people to hunt until he could get a home. He denied that he was a permanent citizen of Mexico. He wished to exchange the Seminoles' tract of land in the Indian Territory for one in Texas, to which all of his tribe would later remove. Some of his people had been hunting in Texas but they had been forced to do so because of their starving condition. The officers advised him to return

to Mexico and remain there unless granted permission to return to the United States.⁵¹ Wild Cat went back across the Rio Grande to fulfil his obligations to the Mexican government but he was obviously still very unsettled and insecure, and in search of adventure and power.

Continued depredations by the hostile tribes led the Mexican frontier states to return to the traditional Spanish and Mexican scalp bounty in 1849-50. The Seminole Blacks could earn \$250 for a live hostile warrior, \$200 for his scalp, or \$150 for a live squaw or child under the age of 14. There were increased depredations during 1851 as Coahuila suffered 94 incursions by more than 3,000 Comanches and Lipans, resulting in 63 killed, 35 wounded, 11 captured and heavy livestock losses. Thus, on 13 June 1851, 113 Blacks, Seminoles and Kickapoos, together with 280 Mexican colonists, were ordered to commence a hunt for the depredating tribes following the Texas, Chihuahua and Durango borders of Coahuila to Laguna de Jaco and Laguna Tiahualila. The Seminoles were led by "Captains" Nokosimola and Manuel Flores, and the Blacks by "Captain" John Horse, both groups being under the general command of "Colonel Gato del Monte", or Wild Cat. The Blacks dressed after the Seminole fashion in turbans, shirts and leggings, with bracelets and bangles. They were heavily armed and were organized into their own companies, under Black leadership, as during the Seminole Wars in Florida. For 47 days the Seminole Blacks helped to comb the region. They saw action against the Comanches and Lipans, and recovered over 100 head of livestock. Colonel Juan José Galán, in command of the expedition, distributed the plunder taken among the Blacks, Seminoles and Kickapoos. On the return journey, however, the Kickapoos defected. A communique from the Sub-Inspector of the colonies, dated 14 July, reported that the Kickapoos had abandoned the expedition and crossed the border into Texas at Eagle Pass driving before them all the captured livestock, including that of the Seminoles

and Blacks. Moreover, it was believed that these Kickapoos had connived with Americans at Eagle Pass who were interested in kidnapping and enslaving the Seminole Blacks.

Upon the conclusion of the campaign, the "faithful Seminoles and Mascogos" received enthusiastic praise from the Mexicans for their patriotism, resolution and zeal. The expedition proved costly to Wild Cat's supporters, however. The Seminoles and Blacks had lost not only their captured livestock but also many former allies. Furthermore, the Kickapoo abandonment of the enterprise led to further defections. In the fall of 1851, the Southern Kickapoo Chiefs Pecan and Pacanah travelled to Mexico from their camps in the Indian Territory and successfully persuaded almost the entire Kickapoo faction to return with them to the United States. By the end of the year, Chief Papicua, nine men, seven women and four children were the only Kickapoo supporters of Wild Cat's enterprise remaining in Mexico. They lived near Morelos and engaged in agricultural pursuits.⁵²

Shortly after returning from the campaign, Wild Cat again called on Cora Montgomery at Eagle Pass. His ambition burned as fierce as ever. He now wished to become a U.S. soldier and agent and win renown and influence by quieting the refractory border tribes. In this way he hoped to become the foremost Indian leader. Wild Cat was attended by a servant and two interpreters. One of the interpreters was an Arab. He had been decoyed on board a Spanish trader and borne away to slavery in Cuba where he learned Spanish. He escaped to Florida and sought refuge among the Seminoles where he became an interpreter to the chiefs. The other interpreter was John Horse who was dressed after the Seminole fashion, in keeping with Wild Cat's attendants who all wore "turbans of bright-colored kerchiefs wreathed around their brows". Cora Montgomery seems to have totally misread John's character, describing him as, "Pliant

docile, heedless of race or nationality, and only intent to serve his chief", and, "In all his ways, true to the records of three thousand years of dependent servitude".⁵³ When one recalls the lengths to which John went, and the suffering and personal loss he endured throughout his life, to establish the freedom and independence of his people, the absurdity of these observations is easily recognized. John's languor can, perhaps, best be explained by the rigours of his recent expedition.

Of far greater danger to the Seminole Blacks in Mexico than the incursions of the hostile tribes were the schemes of Texas slave hunters. Mexico attracted large and rapidly increasing numbers of runaways which presented a serious problem for Texas slaveholders. Since 1850, the U.S. government had been negotiating for an extradition treaty which would include slaves, and even offered a reciprocal agreement to include peons, but the Mexican government would not consider such a stipulation. Moreover, the Mexican land grant to Wild Cat was heavily criticized in the Texas press as slave owners feared that their Blacks would flee from the plantations to join him. The Seminole-Black military colony in Mexico was an anathema to the slaveholding interests of Texas. In the past, several slaveholders had occasionally raised small armed parties and pursued runaways into Mexico without permission but, in late 1851, a more organized effort was made to break up the Seminole Black community, halt the flow of fugitives into Mexico, and bring about the recovery of runaways. On the assurance that he would enact a slave rendition law once in power, a large group of Texans supported the filibustering campaign of the revolutionary José María Jesús Carvajal, who hoped to separate the northern Mexican states into an independent republic to be called Sierra Madre. On 18 September 1851, Carvajal crossed the Rio Grande. He quickly took Camargo and advanced on Matamoros where he was joined by 300-400 discharged Texas Rangers under John S. "Rip" Ford. The

insurgents laid siege to the town for nine days but were then compelled to retire. Forty Seminoles and 20 Blacks under the general command of Wild Cat were sent to help resist the invaders and encountered the enemy at Cerralvo. At the ensuing battle, in late November, the Seminoles and Blacks fought bravely. Carvajal was heavily defeated and forced to retreat to Texas.⁵⁴

The Seminole Blacks were to experience a second threat to their freedom from Texas slave hunters in late 1851. Duval had failed to engage the support of the military and tried alternative strategy to recover the Blacks. In April 1851, the Seminoles in council had required Duval to proceed to San Antonio with a view to recovering their runaways.⁵⁵ Being unable to proceed to Texas himself because of his duties as sub-agent, Duval employed self-styled "Captain" Warren Adams, the famous runaway catcher, as agent of the Seminoles, and again asked Bell for assistance. As many runaways belonging to citizens of Texas had recently fled from the plantations and were in or around Eagle Pass, Bell complied. On 17 September 1851, the day before the Carvajal invasion, Bell issued an official request to "the citizens of the State of Texas" to aid Adams, in any way possible, in recovering and retaining the Seminole Blacks.⁵⁶ Adams, in effect, treated the document as a carte blanche to recover the Blacks in any way he could. He quickly gathered together a group of speculators to attack their settlements in Mexico while so many Seminole and Black warriors were engaged elsewhere in repelling Carvajal.

On 3 November 1851, Colonel Joseph Morris, the Commander at Fort Duncan, crossed over the Piedras Negras to advise the Mexican authorities that he had heard of the approach of a group of over 100 American adventurers from Béjar who intended to depredate on the frontier, and that Adams "the negro hunter" was at Leona with 17 men. On 10 November, Colonel Emilio Langberg, the Inspector of the Military Colonies, reported

that a special messenger had arrived from the Commander of Presidio Monclova Viejo with the news that the filibusters were across the Rio Grande from La Navaja with the intention of attacking and capturing the Seminole Blacks. The Mexican authorities immediately assembled 150 volunteers who marched to the Sauceda in the jurisdiction of Villa de Nava and repulsed the slave hunters. The Adams' party moved southwest from Nava, captured a family of Blacks living at Santa Rosa, and retreated to Texas.⁵⁷ The Seminole Blacks had again escaped unharmed.

Following the invasions of Carvajal and Adams, it became obvious to the Mexican government that the Seminole Blacks could not be allowed to remain so close to the U.S. border. The Black settlement would be surrounded by intrigue and speculation and would constitute a constant target for slave hunters and filibusters. Moreover, in view of American suspicions surrounding Wild Cat's colony, its proximity endangered the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Mexican-American relations. Finally, the Seminoles found the lands at La Navaja too dry for agriculture and requested to be relocated. Consequently, in late 1851, the Seminoles and Blacks were moved into the Mexican interior to the Santa Rosa Mountains, northwest of Músquiz, and promised a land grant in the Hacienda de Nacimiento, at the headwaters of the San Juan Sabinas River. The residents of Músquiz furnished the settlers with agricultural equipment and seed and, early in 1852, the Indians and Blacks moved up to Nacimiento and planted a crop.⁵⁸ These were the real beginnings of the Seminole Black settlement at Nacimiento, Coahuila, which is still in existence today.

Hostile Indians continued to devastate the interior of Mexico. Early in 1852, for example, the hostiles twice stole or killed livestock belonging to the Seminoles and Mascogos at Nacimiento. The Mexican officials again sought the assistance of the Indians and Blacks. In

January 1852, Langberg escorted "the well known Grover Jones", or Gopher John, Wild Cat and their party to Chihuahua City to confirm a permanent contract for scalping the hostiles. For reasons that remain unclear, however, Governor Cordero would not sign the contract and John and Wild Cat indignantly left the city declaring that there was not a single "gentleman" in the government. Several parties of Blacks under John Horse and Seminoles under Parsakee subsequently supported Langberg in a campaign against the Comanches which proceeded as far as the Laguna de Jaco in Chihuahua. During the expedition, the Blacks and Seminoles took many Comanche scalps. Between 6 January and 15 May, for example, 74 scalps and prisoners were presented for which the state of Chihuahua paid \$18,000. The Black campaigners returned to Nacimiento in June 1852 to find that those they had left behind had established a thriving community based on agriculture and hunting.⁵⁹

As the Seminoles and Blacks were pleased with their new location at Nacimiento, Wild Cat chose not to accompany Langberg's campaign but to travel instead to Mexico City, with the Kickapoo Chief Papicua, to confirm the grant. On 26 July 1852, a treaty was signed whereby the Mexican government awarded the Seminoles, Blacks, and Kickapoos four "sitios de ganado mayor", or approximately 26.5 square miles of land, in the Hacienda de Nacimiento, and an equal amount in Durango, which was never utilized, "In recompense for the good service they had begun to render in the war against the savages". In return, the Indians and Blacks were to settle in villages and be prepared to muster 200 warriors on request, although it appears unlikely that the immigrants could return so large a number. The lands were to be given in perpetuity provided the Seminoles, Blacks and Kickapoos obligated themselves to oppose the hostile tribes which committed depredations in Mexico. The treaty was evidenced by a bronze medal in relief on which was shown the

seal of Mexico, the peace-pipe of the Seminoles, and two clasped hands symbolizing peace and harmony. The agreement was confirmed by the Governor of Coahuila on 18 August and Wild Cat returned to Nacimiento in September.⁶⁰

The few remaining Kickapoos in Mexico were living at Morelos so the Nacimiento land grant was utilized exclusively by the Seminoles and Blacks. The Seminoles settled at the headwaters of the Sabinas and the Blacks, in their customary fashion, moved off to establish a separate settlement near the hill of Buenavista, about four miles from the Indians. Here they erected cabins, planted gardens and engaged in hunting, fishing and agricultural pursuits, raising corn and vegetables.⁶¹ Thus the Seminole Blacks once more lived apart from the Indians, tended to their own fields and herds, were armed and during campaigns organized into their own companies under Black officers. Yet although the Blacks were now legally free Mexican citizens, evidence suggests that there was an initial restoration within the colony of the former relationship they had shared with the Seminoles in Florida. Ahalakochee, who emigrated to Mexico with his grandfather, Wild Cat, in 1849, later recalled that the Blacks worked the land and carried out "the instructions of those whose bondsmen they were".⁶² Cora Montgomery thus described the arrangement,

Even the black slaves among them - and Wild Cat himself owns several - were 'accommodated' to the Mexican system of servitude under all the necessary legal forms, though a very old woman among them told me the only difference she ever found between being a slave and a peon, was in the harder way they had of grinding corn in Mexico, and that meat seemed scarcer.⁶³

The Seminoles were agriculturally inferior to the Blacks and continued to rely upon them for advice and aid. Moreover, as the Indians were as ignorant of Spanish as they were of English, several of the leading Blacks were once more employed as interpreters while others became counsellors and advisers. The early Seminole-Black experience at Nacimiento closely

resembled the relationship that had existed between the two groups in Florida prior to the 1823 treaty of Moultrie Creek.

The Seminole Blacks had been relocated well inside the Mexican interior but this served neither to allay the fears of U.S. officials nor to put a stop to the efforts of slave hunters. On 17 November 1852, Lieutenant Duff C. Green, commanding an escort party attached to the U.S. Boundary Survey Commission, came upon the settlers at Nacimiento. Green was stopped by Black sentries, posted to guard against hostile Indians and slave hunters, outside their settlement and he later noted the distance between the "Negroe Camp" and that of the Seminoles. Following an interview with Wild Cat, Green concluded that the colony was, "Very injurious to the slave interests of Texas, as runaways will always find a safe home".⁶⁴ Duval's agent in Texas, Warren Adams, had meanwhile failed to recover any of the Seminole Blacks and, as he had sent back no report, the Seminole sub-agent travelled to San Antonio in the fall of 1852 to confer with him and possibly make other arrangements "by which the owners might legally recover at least a portion of their losses". To enable Duval to make any transfers he thought advisable, the Seminole owners issued bills of sale for all the Blacks. Duval was unsuccessful in his mission, however, and started back to the Indian Territory but at Austin he received news of charges being made against him concerning his slaving activities. Duval was removed from his office as Seminole sub-agent before he could return to the Territory for having been too much absent from his post.⁶⁵ As Duval would no longer be able to use his official position to further his slaving interests, a great danger to the Seminole Blacks had been removed.

Adams at last enjoyed some success in late 1852 — albeit of a limited nature. John Horse was extremely unpopular with Texas settlers on the border and was regarded as an "impudent and troublesome negro" who

boasted of killing many whites in Florida. When John had called at Fort Duncan to claim a horse which had been taken up and sold he had been expelled, to the great delight of the local residents and border press. Then, while attending a fandango in Piedras Negras, he became involved in a brawl and was shot and wounded by a Texan. Adams rushed to the border, crossed over to Piedras Negras, and with the help of some professional slave hunters captured John and took him back to Eagle Pass, handcuffed. About two days later, Wild Cat crossed over from Mexico, prepared to pay a high price for the release of his counsellor, ally and friend, the acknowledged and trusted leader of his Black supporters. After long negotiations, Wild Cat agreed to pay Adams \$500 and deliver up other young Blacks for John 's release. That same day, Wild Cat crossed back to Mexico and returned with the \$500 in \$20 gold pieces. The gold pieces were stained with blood which the post surgeon at Fort Duncan, Doctor Cooper, announced was human. John Horse returned with Wild Cat to Mexico but the Seminole leader did not honour his contract to deliver the young Blacks. The symbolic blood stains had their effect on Adams who hurriedly quit the border country without tarrying further.⁶⁶

In return for their land grant, the Seminoles and Blacks were expected to engage in campaigns to remove the threat of hostile and depredating Indians from the Mexican frontier. They were to repel and pursue raiders, undertake regular and lengthy expeditions to seek out and destroy the enemy, and, in case of emergency, be prepared to be mustered into service by the state or federal authorities. The Indians and Blacks were to be compensated with "beasts, booty and pillage" and, in addition, were to be paid at the same rate as national troops when mustered into service. The warriors were occasionally furnished rations and their families supplied with money or food in their absence. Various bonuses of money and goods were also frequently promised.⁶⁷ Despite

these incentives, however, the Blacks became increasingly less interested in the prospect of military campaigns.

During 1853 and 1854, a development took place which would later prove decisive in separating the Blacks from the Indians. The Blacks had immediately taken better to the Hacienda de Nacimiento than the restless and unsettled Seminoles and had become heavily involved in agricultural and domestic pursuits. They were more concerned with sowing and harvesting crops, hunting and fishing locally, and taking care of their women and children than engaging in long, arduous and dangerous expeditions against the hostiles, leaving their settlement poorly defended. The Seminoles, on several occasions during 1853 and 1854, repelled Indian raiders and engaged in expeditions while the Blacks continued to work the land at Nacimiento. Only when their own interests were directly at stake, or they were mustered into service during times of emergency, did the Blacks wish to engage in campaigns. Early in 1853, for example, it was the Seminoles who undertook an expedition into the Laguna de Jaco with Mexican observers and received praise for their zeal and perseverance. Moreover, in August 1853, 13 Seminoles and seven residents of Músqviz repelled and pursued Indian raiders, killing three of five hostiles. Finally, in the spring of 1854, two parties of Seminoles, under Wild Cat and Coyote, again engaged in a campaign into Chihuahua against the Mescaleros and Comanches without Black support. At this stage, however, the Blacks still answered the call to arms when so ordered by the Mexican government. During August and September 1854, the Blacks, under John Horse or his second-in-command John Kibbetts, and the Seminoles, under Wild Cat, were three times mustered into service; twice to counter anticipated filibuster invasions and once to oppose hostile Indians.⁶⁸ It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that the two groups were developing different interests and priorities. Cracks were beginning to appear in the Seminole-Black alliance.

In 1854, the Seminoles and Blacks were accused of committing depredations in Texas. This came about partially in retaliation for the Texans' support for Carvajal and the humiliation of John Horse by Warren Adams with the resulting loss of \$500, and partially because the Seminoles and Blacks needed good horses to defend their settlements and fulfil their obligations to the Mexican government. In February, a herd of about 30 horses and mules belonging to residents of Eagle Pass was stolen by raiders from Mexico and driven across the border. Wild Cat's band was immediately implicated, "The Mexican who was employed in herding these animals... states that there was a negro with the Indians, which fact of itself, is enough to convict the Seminoles". Further evidence was presented by the discovery of a Seminole moccasin at the point where the raiders re-crossed the Rio Grande. One of the owners of the herd trailed Wild Cat's party to San Fernando where he requested the Alcalde to recover his livestock for him. Wild Cat was called before the authorities where he boasted of his deeds and declared that he could not return the animals as half belong to General Cordona, the Governor of Coahuila; he and the General being co-partners in the enterprise. The Alcalde appeared perfectly satisfied and the Seminoles and Blacks were allowed to retain their prize.⁶⁹

These accusations against Wild Cat focused attention on his settlement and supporters. A resident of Músqviz described the Blacks as "well armed and good fighters". He concluded that, in an emergency, an attack by 500 men on the Seminole settlement would be successfully resisted.⁷⁰ Colonel J. Plympton, summarizing the accusations against Wild Cat, gave an important contemporary description of the Seminole Black warriors,

The Seminole Indians have with them between 50 and 60 negroes, who are on terms of perfect equality with them, and entitled to as many privileges as though they were Indians. They are armed,

and almost invariably accompany them in their depredating excursions.

The Seminoles and Blacks would put two separate companies into the field, "One Company, composed entirely of Indians, is commanded by Wild Cat; the other, made up of negroes only [is]... under the command of a negro known as Gopher John". Plympton estimated that the total number of Blacks and Indians at Nacimiento, men, women and children, was 318, of which 183 were warriors. No official census of the Seminole-Black colony at Nacimiento was taken at this time but Plympton would appear to be guilty of miscalculating both the total population and its make-up. There were never as many as 130 Seminole warriors in Mexico and, after 1850, the Seminole population did not increase to any substantial extent. The number of Seminole warriors in 1854 was probably nearer to the "about 50" estimated by T.B. Holabird, perhaps totalling 60 or 65.⁷¹ Moreover, the Black population was growing and, by 1854, considerably outnumbered that of the Seminoles. Plympton's figures possibly refer only to those Black warriors frequently employed as it is probable that, if necessary, the Blacks could put at least 80 in the field. Furthermore, the Black population was evenly balanced as we know that there was a high percentage of women and children among the emigrants who left the Indian Territory in 1849-50. More than 200 Seminole Blacks were already resident in Mexico by late 1850 and their numbers were substantially increased in succeeding years by runaways from Texas. These runaways were a constant cause of concern to Texas slaveholders and were directly responsible for the next major event to affect the Seminole Blacks.

During 1852, Carvajal, Ford and Adams had made abortive attempts to break up the Seminole settlement in order to capture and retrieve Blacks. After 1852, Ford became the acknowledged leader of the movement to return fugitive slaves in Mexico to their Texas owners. During the mid 1850s, Texans became increasingly aware of property losses. Frederick Olmsted,

who was travelling in Mexico at this time, reported that at least 40 run-aways had passed through Piedras Negras in one three month period and that a great many more had crossed the Rio Grande further to the south.⁷² In June 1855, moreover, Ford estimated that there were approximately 4,000 fugitive Blacks in northern Mexico, at a value of more than \$3,200,000. Following these disclosures, slaveholders met in public meetings at San Antonio, Seguin, La Grange, Bastrop and Gonzales to formulate measures to restrain their Blacks. The editor of the Bastrop Advertiser claimed he knew of potential supporters of an enterprise to "pursue and capture our runaways even in the heart of Mexico". The Texas State Gazette, meanwhile, claimed that \$20,000 had already been gathered for such an expedition and that between 500 and 1,000 men were ready to leave.⁷³

Before resorting to force, however, the Texans first sought a peaceful solution to the problem of the runaways. On 25 August 1855, residents of San Antonio wrote to Langberg, "... Inquiring from him upon what conditions he would deliver up the negroes who had taken refuge in Mexico, how many could be recovered, how much would have to be paid for each delivered on the banks of the river, and the mode of payment". The communication ended, however, with a covert threat of unilateral action if agreement could not be reached.⁷⁴ Langberg gave a favourable reply, suggesting a reciprocal agreement for the rendition of runaways and Mexican peons, and relayed the request to General Santiago Vidaurri, the new revolutionary Governor of Nuevo León y Coahuila. Vidaurri crushed the hopes of the Texas slaveholders and any possibility of a peaceful solution, however, by vetoing Langberg's suggestion on 11 September, insisting that such an arrangement should be handled by the respective state governments, and not by private individuals. If the Americans chose "to invade our frontier with a view of recovering

their runaway negroes", Langberg was to use force to repel them.

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1855, Governor E.M. Pease of Texas authorized Ranger Captain J.H. Callahan to raise a mounted company to patrol and protect the frontier near San Antonio against Indian raids. The company was mustered into service on 20 July for three months during which time the interested slaveholders apparently approached Callahan and successfully secured his support for their mission. Callahan was joined by William R. Henry and the company gradually proceeded south until it engaged some of Wild Cat's Seminoles and Blacks about 30 miles from Bandera. By 29 September, Callahan's force was encamped four miles north of Eagle Pass prepared to cross over into Mexico to break up the Seminole settlement, capture the Blacks, and return the Texas runaways to their owners.⁷⁵

Under the pretext of pursuing Lipans and other depredating tribes, Callahan's expeditionary force, numbering 111 men divided into three companies, crossed the Rio Grande some three miles below Fort Duncan on the night of 1 October 1855. South of the river, plans were made for Callahan to draw off the Seminole and Black warriors, leaving the Black women and children at Nacimiento to be seized by Henry. The Seminoles and Blacks successfully ambushed and defeated Henry's party, however, prior to confronting Callahan. Callahan's party made for what they believed to be Wild Cat's headquarters at San Fernando. On 3 October, the Texans were led into an ambush of Mexican and Seminoles at Escondido Creek, some 22 miles into the Mexican interior. During the ensuing encounter, the Mexicans suffered four killed and three wounded, and the Americans four killed and seven wounded. Callahan was forced to retreat to Piedras Negras, which he took the following day. On 5 October, a force of about 700 Mexicans, Seminoles and Blacks which had been "detained awaiting ammunition", arrived outside the town. The Rio Grande was swollen and

Callahan could not withdraw to Texas so the Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan gave a demonstration of force to prevent the filibusters from being molested. Finally, on 6 October, Callahan's brief excursion ended when he fired the town and escaped across the river under the protection of the resulting smoke screen and the cover of the guns at Fort Duncan.⁷⁶ Callahan's hasty withdrawal may have been forced, however. There is an oral tradition among the Seminole Blacks at Nacimiento and Brackettville that their forbears chased the filibusters from Piedras Negras by shooting fire arrows into the houses and burning the town around them.⁷⁷

Much speculation has arisen over the motives behind the Callahan invasion. The filibusters claimed that their purpose was to pursue hostile Indians but the weight of evidence supports the contention that their main intention was to break up the Seminole Black settlement and return fugitive slaves to their Texan owners. It appears that Callahan was approached by San Antonio slaveholders with a view to this object during the summer of 1855. Ronnie C. Tyler has argued that Callahan's mission could hardly have been one of pursuit as he had determined to enter Mexico by 31 August, in anticipation of Vidaurri's negative response to the slaveholders' requests.⁷⁸ Also, the contemporaries Frederick Olmsted and Jesse Sumpter implicate Callahan in slave hunting activities. Olmsted wrote that Callahan's party was really on a reconnaissance to recover runaways,⁷⁹ and Sumpter was of the opinion that, "Callahan, being the owner of most of the Seminole Negroes [those Seminoles were all runaway slaves], determined to raise a party, go into Mexico and take them out by force".⁸⁰ From this, one may infer that Callahan had been promised a percentage of the Blacks he captured by the slaveholders.

Further contemporary evidence supports the view that Callahan's expedition was essentially a slave hunting enterprise. On 10 October 1855, General P.F. Smith wrote to the Adjutant General's Office that

he had received reports that a party was organizing to cross over to Mexico "and take negroes that had run away from Texas", and presumed the party alluded to was that of Callahan.⁸¹ The following day, Smith wrote to Governor Pease stating that he did not believe Callahan's company to be in,

... The hot pursuit of a party of Indians with their plunder.... This expedition, from facts which have come to my knowledge, is not of that character. I am advised that the burning of the town and the designs on the Seminole settlement have exasperated to the highest degree both that band of Indians and the Mexicans.... I have no doubt plans of revenge will be formed and executed on the peaceable inhabitants of our frontier.... We may look for an inroad from the Seminole to murder and scalp - not merely to steal.⁸²

Callahan himself, in a letter of 13 October to Pease, admitted some connection with the Texas slaveholders. He had met Colonel Bennett Riddells, a representative of the Bastrop slaveholders, at San Antonio. Riddells had previously crossed over to Mexico to confer with Vidaurri "for the recovery of runaway negroes" and had received assurances of success. Callahan was told he would experience no difficulty in crossing the Rio Grande and that Riddells would procure the necessary authority.⁸³ Furthermore, James Gadsden, the U.S. Minister to Mexico, in a letter dated 29 November 1855, aggressively answered Mexican complaints of the invasion and the burning of Piedras Negras, and recounted the reasons for the filibustering expedition. Among other grievances cited, Mexico had invited a lawless band of Seminoles to reside in their country whose Chief, Wild Cat, had co-operated in committing depredations on the Texas frontier. The Mexicans had also interfered with the institution of slavery by shielding and protecting runaways.⁸⁴ Finally, the Mexican Border Commissioners who later reviewed the affair were not impressed by Callahan's explanation,

The pretext was the pursuit of the tribe of Lipan Indians of whom the Texans complained.... It is probable, nevertheless,

that one of the incentives was the capture of fugitive slaves, a great number of which had taken refuge on the frontier of Coahuila.⁸⁵

The direction the invasion took in Mexico certainly suggests that the Americans intended to attack the Seminole Blacks at Nacimiento. The Blacks themselves believed that the invaders posed a direct threat to their community and still retain traditions of the time the filibusters came to "steal ouah chillun".⁸⁶ The Mascogos responded promptly and directly to the invasion, helping to defeat Henry and force Callahan to retreat to Texas.

Despite his humiliating defeat, Callahan remained actively involved in organizing a second, more extensive, foray into Mexico. Again under the pretext of pursuing and engaging hostile Lipan Indians, Callahan joined with other influential Texans in inviting the people of Texas to join in a campaign into the Mexican interior and request the U.S. government for arms. On 15 November 1855, the volunteers met, appointed a committee to receive contributions, and elected officers to lead the expedition. Mexican officials became aware of the threatened invasion and, under Langberg's orders, seven Blacks under John Kibbetts and a party of Seminoles under Wild Cat and Coyote were sent to Nava to oppose the American volunteers. Several other Blacks, however, refused to comply with Langberg's orders and, for the first time, openly defied the Mexican authorities. Some gave the excuse of the needs of farming for their non-attendance, while others did not wish to leave their families. It is probable, moreover, that the Blacks objected to serving under Langberg after he had so recently suggested that the Mexicans return runaways to Texas. Failure of more of the Mascogos to respond to Langberg's orders brought criticism from the State Gazette and, as a result of their non-co-operation, six Black families were threatened with expulsion. No action appears to have been taken, however. As it turned out, the Black

and Indian warriors were not needed as Callahan's projected second invasion failed to materialize. The circumstances surrounding the previous expedition were made public and the attitude assumed by the U.S. government put an end to any further attempts.⁸⁷ The independent and insubordinate attitude adopted by the Blacks in the face of the threatened invasion, however, would play a crucial role in determining their future relations with the Seminoles.

Despite this disobedience on the part of the Mascogos, the Mexican authorities at Santa Rosa gave a glowing report on the Seminoles and Blacks at the end of 1855. The military colonists had given no cause for complaint and were "industrious, warlike and desirous of education and religious instruction for their families".⁸⁸ In late 1855 and early 1856, Governor Vidaurri complied with their wishes and for their cultural improvement appointed the Seminoles and Blacks salaried instructors in agriculture, reading, writing and religion. A school for Seminole and Black children and a chapel were established by the spring of 1856. Moreover, an order of 1853 that the children be baptized began to be enforced. Seminole Black adults were also affected. From late 1856 onwards, John Horse is often referred to as "Capitán Juan de Dios Vidaurri (alias Caballo)". This was probably a result of his submitting to Catholic baptism and adopting the Blacks' instructor in religion and agriculture, Juan Nepomuceno Vidaurri, as his Godfather. Captain James Box, however, believed that John acquired his new name "on account of the confidence placed in him" by Governor Santiago Vidaurri.⁸⁹ Governor Vidaurri also provided the colonists with an armourer. Pedro Sains, a Black, was the first appointed but he was shortly afterwards murdered by an American employee and replaced. The Seminoles and Blacks continued to progress and impress the Mexican authorities. In early 1856, they were reported to be living in wooden houses, dedicated to agriculture, implacable

enemies of hostile and depredating tribes and making regular campaigns against these Indians.⁹⁰

Vidaurri instigated a series of campaigns in early 1856 to remove the threat of Lipan and Tonkawa depredations from Coahuila. On one such expedition, during March, 12 Blacks, 40 Seminoles and over 100 Mexicans scoured the country for ten days but returned without success.⁹¹ The disproportionate number of Black warriors to those of the Seminoles was typical of the developing pattern of the colonists' involvement in the campaigns against hostile Indians. Although they outnumbered the Seminoles, the Blacks put fewer warriors in the field and were increasingly disinclined to support such expeditions. This would later be cited by the Seminoles as a major grievance against the Blacks.

The first serious outbreak of dissension between the Mexican authorities, the Blacks and the Seminoles took place in April and May of 1856. It was charged that the recent runaways from Texas who had joined the Seminole Blacks were abandoning work and engaging in theft and other excesses. Vidaurri ordered their subordination to Wild Cat and instructed them to live honestly and industriously. The Blacks, however, "displayed that it was not convenient to them to subject themselves to Captain Cat, that they had always recognized Captain Horse as their superior, that in his absence they recognize Captain Cuffee...". Vidaurri clarified his position on 28 May,

Governor Vidaurri approves the election by the Mascogos Negroes ... of John Horse as captain of that tribe; but... imposes on them as Supreme Chief of the two tribes, Mascogos and Seminole, Captain Catamount, as being a man more competent, understanding, and energetic for managing the two tribes, among whom there has been from time to time some dissension, the Negroes being vicious and of bad customs and the Seminoles much more honorable men than the Negroes.⁹²

Vidaurri went on to stress the necessity of the Blacks' obeying John Horse and awarded him a cart, plough and oxen for subjecting his people

to Wild Cat. Wild Cat's leadership was not only challenged by the Blacks but also by the Seminoles themselves. Coyote and a group of supporters began to act independently and on 25 April Vidaurri was forced to order that, from that moment on, Coyote be recognized as second chief of the Seminoles, but only as subaltern to Wild Cat. During this period, Wild Cat was undergoing treatment at Monterrey for an illness. His enforced absence from the colony, together with his worsening drink problem, may have been the decisive factors in bringing about these latest developments.⁹³

The Blacks were beginning to assert themselves as a separate and recognizable social, economic and political group. The recent influx of runaways from Texas had swelled their population so that they were now more numerous than the Seminoles. Furthermore, these recent runaways had no tradition of respect for, or deference to, the Seminole chiefs, were not prepared to accept their authority, and acted insubordinately. The alliance between the two groups was rapidly deteriorating: the Blacks increasingly felt less need for an association with the Seminoles. As Wild Cat's grip on the leadership of the colony weakened, the Blacks took the opportunity to assert their independence. The Blacks had different interests, needs and priorities to the Seminoles and were now in a position to take control of their own destiny.

During the remainder of 1856, the Blacks continued their policy of non-co-operation with the Seminoles and Mexican officials in engaging in expeditions. From May to October, the Seminoles participated in campaigns, searching the country from San Vicente to the Big Bend for hostiles, killing Comanches, Kiowas and Tonkawas, and capturing horses and pillage, for which they received praise and gifts from the authorities at Músquiz. For the whole of this period, not one Black accompanied the Seminoles on any of their campaigns. The contrast in the attitude of

the two groups was most marked during late June and early July when the entire body of Seminole warriors engaged in an expedition, leaving their families without protection except for the Black warriors, who all remained behind at Nacimiento. Furthermore, when Vidaurri ordered 14 Blacks and 20 Seminoles to join his army in Monterrey in preparation for a rebellion against the central government in late October, the Blacks refused to obey, "Pretending they had no wish to fight in political wars". John Horse and four other Blacks, together with Coyote and a party of Seminoles, went to Monterrey to explain their position. The Secretary of War ordered that the Blacks be reprovved for disobeying the public authorities, but it was decided that, as they did not wish to become involved in the internal political dissensions of Mexico, they should be used instead against the hostile Indians. Once again, however, it was the Seminoles who took up the task. Coyote was ordered to seek out the enemy around Parras while John Horse returned home to Nacimiento.⁹⁴

In late 1856 and early 1857, the Seminoles and Blacks were hit by smallpox. The bands of Wild Cat and Coyote, recently returned from expeditions and encamped at Alto, near Músquiz, were the first victims. The disease thereafter spread quickly to Nacimiento. A programme of vaccination was set up in the Seminole and Black villages by Juan Long, a resident of Músquiz and cousin of Vidaurri, but in late January 1857 the terrified Indians fled into the hills in search of safety. By mid March, Long had the disease under control and the Indians returned to Nacimiento. It had taken a heavy toll from the Seminoles, however. 28 women and 25 men, including 19 warriors, had perished and among the victims were the Chiefs Wild Cat and Coyote. The Blacks suffered less than the Indians. The presiding physician believed that this was attributable to their healthier diet and stricter observance of curative methods. The Blacks' hereditary tolerance, however, better explains their greater

resistance to the disease.⁹⁵

The death of Wild Cat proved vital in further alienating the Blacks from the Seminoles. Although Wild Cat's leadership had been weakened and challenged during 1856, the Blacks had continued to tacitly accept his position of head chief of the combined tribes, with overall sovereignty. The strength of Wild Cat's personality and the respect he commanded had partially plastered over the cracks that had appeared in the alliance of the Blacks and Indians. He was succeeded as chief of the Seminoles by Lion, but the Blacks would not accept his overall leadership of the two groups. To the Seminole Blacks, the situation had changed.⁹⁶ As Joe Philips of the Seminole Black Scouts later recalled, "After Wild Cat dies, then John Horse took the command as chief".⁹⁷ From this point onwards, the Blacks looked exclusively to their own leaders and paid no further allegiance to the Seminole chiefs.

During 1857, an effort was made to remove the remaining Seminoles and Blacks in Florida to Mexico. Vidaurri was quick to appreciate the value of the Seminoles as a buffer against the depredating tribes. On 14 September 1857, he signed a contract with Edward Luis Bernard of Corpus Christi in which the latter would be paid for transporting 500 Seminole warriors and their families directly from Florida to Mexico. Vidaurri agreed to provide the immigrant Seminoles and Blacks with arable land providing they helped to defend Coahuila, especially against the incursions of hostile Indians. The scheme failed to materialize, however, as Bernard learned in New Orleans that he would not be allowed to enter into such a treaty with the Florida Seminoles.⁹⁸ This constituted the last effort to remove the remaining Indians and Blacks in Florida to Mexico.

The Seminole Blacks took part in only one brief campaign during 1857. In the spring, a band of Blacks under John Horse and one of

Seminoles under Juan Flores engaged in a retaliatory expedition against the hostiles which resulted in the capture of seven horses. In July, Long reported that the Seminoles were valuable opponents of the Lipans and Mescaleros. He began to pay them for scalps and advised Vidaurri to organize a company of Seminoles and Blacks to pursue the hostiles. It was once more the Seminoles alone, however, who engaged in three actions against the Lipans and one against the Comanches during July and August. Finally, in December, 30 Seminoles and 17 Mexicans engaged in a successful expedition against the Lipans and Tonkawas, after which complaints arose that the Blacks did not partake or co-operate.⁹⁹

1858 witnessed the climax of the dispute between the Blacks, the Seminoles, and the Mexican authorities. The conflict had deep roots and had continued to gather momentum since the first outbreak in April 1856, provoking intense feeling on all sides. The recent runaways among the Mascogos had been accused of abandoning work, theft and other excesses, and the Blacks as a whole of giving only grudging minority support to campaigns. The Blacks, for their part, had expressed the wish to be viewed as a separate and independent group with their own leaders. On 20 July 1857, the Seminole Chief, Felipe, had complained of abuses by the Blacks in the use of water for irrigation and, in December, complaints had arisen over their non-participation and non-co-operation in expeditions against the hostile tribes. Finally, in August 1858, the Seminole Head Chief, Lion, together with his second-in-command Nokosimola and Sub-Chief Manuel Flores, appeared before Vidaurri at Monterrey with a list of complaints against the Blacks. The Blacks owned more property and horses than the Indians because they remained behind at Nacimiento engaging in agricultural pursuits while the Seminoles supported the expeditions against the hostile Indians. Also, being superior in number, the Blacks used more water than they were entitled to. Finally, the

Seminoles wished to put an end to the Blacks' independence by requesting that they subject themselves to the care and command of the Indian chiefs, as they had under Wild Cat.

To add to the complaints against the Blacks, the Alcalde of Músqiz again charged that the Mascogos, or, more particularly, the recent runaways amongst them, did not respect private property and were accused of cattle-stealing. The Seminoles were unsettled and discontented and wished to remove to Mazatlan, but if either group went it should be the Blacks, who were not so helpful and were the target of Texas slave hunters. John Horse replied, somewhat unconvincingly, that the authorities of Músqiz did not provide the Blacks with proper assistance for their campaigns. Vidaurri warned the Blacks to respect property, avoid vice, devote themselves to labour and warfare against the hostile tribes, and separate themselves from the badly-behaved recent runaways. If, despite these warnings, the Blacks continued to cause trouble, the guilty among them would be sent to Monterrey and punished by being forced to labour on public works. Finally, Vidaurri ordered that, in future expeditions, the Seminoles and Blacks should be commanded by Mexicans and appointed a Mexican Justice of the Peace to regulate land and water rights between the two groups.¹⁰⁰

The continuing dispute clearly emphasized the conflicting interests of the Blacks and Seminoles. For most of their lives, the Blacks had been sources of contention in wars and slave controversies. They had been hounded by U.S. troops, white slave hunters and Creek kidnappers. In Mexico, they hoped to live in peace to build homes, raise families, and engage in agricultural pursuits. The Blacks looked for freedom, security, non-interference, and the facility to maintain an independent identity as a separate social group with its own culture and traditions. They were not interested in lengthy expeditions against hostile Indians

or filibusters unless they were directly affected. As farmers and stock-raisers they naturally objected to leaving their crops at inconvenient times to take part in expeditions and had in the past been given good reason to fear for the families they would leave unprotected. The Blacks were agriculturally superior to the Indians and, as their numbers grew, they cleared more land. As their acreage increased, so did their need for an increased supply of water. The Blacks acquired more property, crops and livestock and grew closer to the land than the Seminoles. The complaints of the latter were largely based on jealousy and insecurity.

The Seminoles, on the other hand, were hunters and warriors. They preferred to engage in lengthy hunting and military expeditions than work the land. At the height of their dispute with the Blacks, about half the Seminoles were permanently camped at Alto, "near the grog shops", awaiting the call to partake in campaigns.¹⁰¹ Indeed, Wild Cat's whole notion of the frontier confederation had been built around his ideal of adventure, power, and combat. At the time of their departure from the Indian Territory, the emigrant Seminoles and Blacks had been joined in an unstable alliance based almost exclusively on their joint opposition to their common enemies, the Creeks and the Seminole progressives, and the temporary need of the one for the other. In essence, the Blacks and Seminoles had had largely different reasons for leaving the Indian Territory, sought different goals for their new Mexican community, and once settled at Nacimiento, established different lifestyles. In Mexico, the Seminoles and Blacks found themselves once more exposed to frontier conditions and they initially attempted to restore their earlier Florida relationship. As in Florida, the alliance was at its strongest when assailed by external forces. Thus, for a time, the Seminoles and Blacks would unite to repel the enemy from without; the slave hunter, filibuster or hostile Indian. But their relationship was far weaker in Mexico than

it had been in Florida. The differing interests and lifestyles of the Indians and Blacks, and continuing trends towards Black independence and separatism, worked to undermine the alliance and led eventually to the final breakdown of relations in Mexico.

In March 1858, the Seminoles and Blacks combined once more on an expedition. On 2 March, the Mescaleros stole 30 horses belonging to the Blacks and six belonging to the Seminoles. Sufficiently incensed by their loss of property, the Blacks sent 20 warriors in company with an equal number of Seminoles in pursuit. On 18 March, they encountered their foes on the banks of the Rio Grande and routed them, killing two Mescaleros and recapturing their animals as well as 70 other horses, two mules and additional booty which the Mexican authorities allowed them to keep. With the exception of one other minor joint expedition in September 1858 which proved to be fruitless, this highly successful campaign marked the end of Seminole-Black military co-operation at Nacimiento.¹⁰²

During the fall of 1858, the Seminole Sub-Chiefs Long Tiger, Parsakee, and Young Coacoochee visited their kinsmen in the Indian Territory. They learned that, on 7 August 1856, the Seminoles had entered into a treaty with the Creeks and the United States which had led to the creation of a separate Seminole nation in the Indian Territory. The Seminoles had been given their own tract of land lying west of, and adjoining, the Creek country and, once they had removed there, the laws of the Creeks were no longer binding upon them. The Mexican Seminoles' main source of opposition to residing in the Indian Territory, the union with the Creeks, had thus been removed. The sub-chiefs returned to Mexico with the news, and an order from the Seminole chiefs to return the rest of the tribe to the new nation, in January 1859.¹⁰³ The idea appealed to the Seminoles in Mexico. The Indians had been experiencing hard times of late. In contrast to the Blacks, many of the Seminoles were poverty-

stricken and starving. Much of the Seminoles' enthusiasm for the Mexican colony had died with Wild Cat and many had taken to drink. Moreover, their dissatisfaction was compounded by the civil war then racking Mexico, constant disputes with the Blacks, and jealousy of their neighbours' success. Once the obstacle of the Creeks had been removed, the Seminoles in Mexico welcomed a return to the Indian Territory.

In fact, the wheels had been set in motion as early as August 1858 when it had been suggested to Charles Mix, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that, "All the Seminoles, men, women and children, who reside in Mexico, be allowed to return to the Seminole country, and be allowed to participate in all the annuities...".¹⁰⁴ The Commissioner had concurred and, on 13 September, the Secretary of the Interior had given the Mexican Seminoles permission to return to the United States. Finally, on 17 February 1859, 14 Seminole men, including the Chief of the tribe in Mexico, Lion, together with 37 women and children, set out for the new Seminole nation. The Mexican authorities regretted their loss on account of the good service the Seminoles had rendered against the hostile tribes. At Eagle Pass, the Seminoles were met by the agent of the United States, L. Star, and escorted through Texas to the Indian Territory. The Seminoles were starving and in need of government rations.¹⁰⁵ Their train was thus described by Zenas R. Bliss,

The party of Seminoles who passed through our camp were in an impoverished condition. Their horses were poor, and what little plunder they had was packed on mules and donkeys, and on top of the packs the squaws were perched with the children in their arms or tied to their backs. The men carried nothing but their arms, but the animals on which the squaws rode were very heavily packed, with all their household goods, in which pans and kettles seemed to predominate. They did not stop in our camp, but went through, looking poverty stricken, sullen and generally played out.¹⁰⁶

This pathetic spectacle offered sad testimony to the demise of the Seminole community at Nacimiento. It also served to emphasize how much more successful than the Seminoles the, by now relatively prosperous, Blacks had been in creating a new life for themselves in Mexico.

After Lion's band of emigrants had returned to the Indian Territory, there remained at Nacimiento about 100 Seminoles, together with the Blacks. The Blacks had no wish to return to the Territory. A separate Seminole nation meant little to them. Slavery still existed in the United States and among the Seminoles themselves, and the efforts of white slave hunters and Creek kidnappers would continue to pose a threat. Moreover, the Blacks were suited by Mexico at this time. They were free, relatively secure, and had become fairly prosperous farmers and stock-raisers. This was more than they could hope for if they returned to the Territory. The return of Lion's band weakened the Mexican colony, however, and ushered in a new phase of filibustering activity. In March 1859, it became known to General D.E. Twiggs that an expedition was being organized near San Antonio, "For the purpose of proceeding to Mexico to capture runaway negroes and then to sell them and divide the proceeds amongst the company..."¹⁰⁷ The Alcalde of Piedras Negras was warned that the filibusters intended to kidnap the Blacks at Nacimiento. The invasion did not materialize but its threat was sufficient to bring about the removal of the Seminole Blacks further into the Mexican interior.

On 23 March 1859, the state government of Nuevo León y Coahuila ordered that, since they were the principal object of filibustering invasions, the Blacks should be removed to the Laguna de Parras some 300 miles to the south in southwestern Coahuila, where they would be secure. Here they would be supplied with lands, water and other assistance, and in return the Blacks were to help repel the hostile Indians. The move would be in the best interests of all concerned, putting an end to slave traffic and the threat of invasion. The loss of their Seminole companions-in-arms, continuing speculation surrounding projected slave hunting and filibustering expeditions by Texans, and the hostility of some of their Mexican neighbours led to the Blacks' concurrence with

the scheme. The first group of over 80 Blacks, led by Felipe Sanchez, set out for Parras on 21 May 1859, transporting their possessions in carts. Most of the remaining Blacks removed during the summer leaving behind only a few of their number at Nacimiento. At Parras, the Blacks helped to defend the devastated area against the Apaches as members of the garrison.¹⁰⁸ It appears that the Blacks and Seminoles engaged in one last joint expedition after the Blacks had removed. Captain Box fell in with a company acting out of Parras, on an Indian scout, and noted,

They were on this occasion commanded by a stalwart negro, sometimes called Juan Caballo (John Horse) or more commonly Juan Vidaurri:... The Company... was composed of not soldiers only, but twenty Seminoles and eight negroes, the latter probably runaways.¹⁰⁹

It is interesting to note that the Blacks continued to put a disproportionate number of warriors into the field even after their removal. The Blacks at Parras now lived further away from the Seminoles than at any time since their relationship began in Florida. Further interaction between the two groups was subsequently minimised, and the alliance in Mexico drew to a close.

The Seminoles who remained behind at Nacimiento were becoming increasingly dissatisfied. With the return of Lion's band to the Indian Territory and the removal of the Blacks to Parras, the Seminole colony was severely weakened and fell prey to the raids of hostile Indians. There had been disputes between the Blacks and the Seminoles, and the Blacks and the Mexicans, but after the Blacks had removed, the Mexican authorities turned on the Seminoles, accusing them of disobeying orders. Furthermore, the Seminole community itself was racked by dissension surrounding a leadership dispute between Konip and Head Chief Nokosimala. It was becoming increasingly obvious that things could not carry on as they were. By March 1861, following invitations from their kinsmen in the Indian Territory, 22 of the remaining Seminoles had decided to leave

Mexico. The Hacienda de Nacimiento, meanwhile, changed hands and, in July, the new owner, Doña Guadalupe Echaiz, declared that the remaining Indians should be removed or have their holdings correspondingly reduced.¹¹⁰ This proved to be the final straw for the remaining Seminoles and they made ready to leave Mexico.

On 1 August 1861, the Seminole chiefs in the Indian Territory concluded a treaty with the Confederate commissioner Albert Pike that effectively signalled the beginning of the tribe's involvement in the Civil War. Principal Chief John Jumper sent emissaries to the Mexican Seminoles with orders to return to the Indian Territory and partake in the war effort. Consequently, on 25 August 1861, the remaining 100 Seminoles in Mexico set out for the Indian Territory. Confederate Captain Buck Barry furnished an escort and rations to the party en route to the Red River. Upon reaching the Indian Territory, some of the Mexican Seminoles appear to have answered Jumper's call to side with the Confederacy, thus ironically supporting the cause of that very progressive faction they had so vehemently opposed 12 years earlier. Others, however, fled north to Kansas with the recalcitrant traditionalist followers of Billy Bowlegs, and joined the Union army. The Seminoles left behind them in Mexico the main body of Blacks at Parras, together with a few more recent runaways at Nacimiento.¹¹¹

By this time, a large proportion of the total population of Seminole Blacks was living in Mexico. With the exception of but a few families, these Blacks would have no further contact with the Seminoles. From this point on, they were destined to create their own exclusive history, and maintain their unique cultural traditions, on the Texas-Mexican frontier.

Footnotes

1. In Mexico, Gopher John came to be known as John Horse. John had taken the surname of his former owner, Charles Cavallo, in Florida. The name "Horse" resulted from a translation of the similar-sounding Spanish word "Caballo". After 1856, John was frequently called "Capitán Juan de Dios Vidaurri", a mixture of his Mexican military title and his adopted confirmation name. During his residence in Mexico, Wild Cat, or Coacoochee, was, on different occasions, referred to as "Gato del Monte", "Capitán Gato", "Captain Catamount" and "Colonel Cat".
2. Daily Oklahoman, 23 January 1921. The emigrants' hejira was recounted here by Ahalakochee, who claimed to be Wild Cat's grandson. "Indian Pioneer Papers," 116 Volumes, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Vol.4, No. 6038, Louis Graham, pp.144-145 and Vol.46, No.12, 475, Wesley Tanyon, 22 December 1937, p.199, hereafter cited as "Indian-Pioneer Papers"; Webb, Walter P., The Texas Rangers; A Century of Frontier Defense (Boston, New York, Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1935) pp.133-136.
3. M. Duval to O. Brown 30 May 1850, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M234, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs 1824-1881, 962 rolls, Roll 801, Seminole Agency 1846-1855, D392-50. Microcopy M234 is hereafter cited as M234 followed by the roll number.
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5. Ibid.
6. Cherokee Advocate, 10 June 1850.
7. San Antonio Western Texas, 6 June 1850. See also, Fort Smith Herald, 20 July 1850.
8. Gibson, Arrell M., The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963) pp.179-181.
9. Faulk, Odie B., "Projected Mexican Colonies in the Borderlands, 1852," Journal of Arizona History, 10, No.2, (Summer 1969), 115-128, p.115; Report of the Committee of Investigation Sent in 1873 by the Mexican Government to the Frontier of Texas. Translated from the Official Edition made in Mexico (New York, Baker and Godwin Printers, 1875) pp.323-324; Rippey, James F., "The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1848-1853," Hispanic American Historical Review, 2, (1919), 363-396, p.386; Stout, Joseph A. Jr., The Liberators: Filibustering Expeditions into Mexico, 1848-1862, and the Last Thrust of Manifest Destiny (Los Angeles, Westernlore Press, 1973) pp.29-30; Tyler, Ronnie C., "Fugitive Slaves in Mexico," Journal of Negro History, 57, No.1, (January 1972), 1-12, pp.1-2.

10. From the very first treaty the emigrants made with the Mexican government, the Blacks were referred to as "Mascogos", or "Mascogan Negroes". "Mascogos" probably derives from "Muskogean", an Algonquian term referring to the language spoken by the Creeks and Seminoles and consequently, on occasion, their Black interpreters and associates. The Blacks first language, however, was "Afro-Seminole", an English-based creole with Gullah roots.
11. Antonio María Jáurequi, Inspector General of the Eastern Military Colonies, and Wild Cat, Chief of the Seminole Tribe, Agreement signed at Villa de San Fernando, Coahuila, 27 June 1850, Inspección de las Colonias de Oriente, Mexico City. Referred to and quoted in Latorre, Felipe A. and Dolores, L., The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Austin, London, Texas Pan American Series, University of Texas Press, 1976) pp.13-14. See also, Report of Committee of Investigation, p.408; Ritzenthaler, Robert E. and Peterson, Frederick A., The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Milwaukee, Milwaukee Public Museum Publications in Anthropology No.2, 1956. Reprinted, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1970) p.19.
12. Rollins to Bell 30 October 1850, Governors' Papers, P.H. Bell, Indian Affairs.
13. Sumpter, Jesse, "Life of Jesse Sumpter, the Oldest Citizen of Eagle Pass, Texas," 70 pp. typewritten manuscript, 1906, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin, p.2. See also, Cherokee Advocate, 3 September 1850.
14. Montgomery, Cora, Eagle Pass; Or, Life on the Border (New York, Putnam's Semi-monthly Library for Travellers and the Fireside, 1852) pp.73-74. Cora Montgomery was the pen-name of Jane Maria (McManus) Cazneau.
15. Cherokee Advocate, 3 September 1850; Informe de la Comisión Pesquisidora de la Frontera del Norte (Mexico City, Imprenta del Gobierno en Palacio, 1877) p.257; Memoria de la Secretaria de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina (Mexico, 1851) pp.17-18; Porter, Kenneth W., The Negro on the American Frontier (New York, New York Times, Arno Press, 1971) p.427; Report of Committee of Investigation, p.408.
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22. Duval to M. Arbuckle 29 July 1850 and Belknap to F.N. Page 6 August 1850, Second and Seventh Military Departments, Letters Received, Box 8.
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106. "Reminiscences of Zenas R. Bliss, Major General United States Army 1854-1876," 5 Volumes of typewritten manuscript copied from the original in the possession of Mrs. Alice B. Massey, Boerne, Texas, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin, Box 20441, Vol.2, pp.50-51. Bliss mistakenly stated that the meeting took place in the fall of 1858. The encounter must have taken place in March 1859, however.
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CHAPTER 3

THE SEMINOLE BLACK SCOUTS IN THE TEXAS INDIAN WARS

By 1860, the Seminole supporters of Wild Cat had returned to the Indian Territory and the militant Blacks were alone in Mexico, refugees from slavery, isolated exiles on a hostile frontier. The ensuing decade would prove to be a traumatic and problem-ridden period for these Seminole Black maroons. They were subjected to Indian depredations, internal revolution and foreign invasion. The group split into factions and became fragmentary and dislocated. The harsh climate and malignant disease merely compounded their troubles. Conflict, instability and destitution came to dominate their daily lives and threaten their very existence as a recognizable social group. The Blacks tired of having to continually struggle to survive and despaired of ever being allowed to settle peacefully in Mexico. By the end of the decade, many were beginning to seek alternatives.

In the late 1860s, three key developments took place which led to most of the Seminole Blacks returning to the U.S. First of all, American officials instigated a policy aimed at returning all of the various emigrant bands living on the Texas-Mexican frontier to their former homes with a view to removing all obstacles to the peaceful settlement of the area by whites. It was envisaged that the Seminole Blacks would be resettled in the Indian Territory among their kinsmen. Secondly, the Blacks learned that slavery had been abolished in the U.S. and received news of the thriving Freedman communities that were arising in the Seminole nation during reconstruction. Most became anxious to return to their former homes and make new lives for themselves under more favourable conditions. Finally, another smallpox epidemic, which quickly wreaked havoc upon the Kickapoo population and threatened to devastate the Black community, broke out at Naciminto. This proved to be the final straw.

After receiving promises from American government officials that they would soon be restored to their former homes in the Indian Territory, most of the Seminole Blacks in Mexico crossed over to the U.S. in the early 1870s. While the Blacks awaited the authorization to begin the journey northward, the able-bodied men were to be employed as scouts for the U.S. military acting out of the west Texas garrisons. In this way, it was envisaged that they could provide support for the remainder of the group. Thus began the remarkable career of the unit that came to be known as the "Seminole Negro Indian Scouts". As it turned out, the Blacks never did receive permission to commence their journey to the Indian Territory and the Scouts continued to function until 1914 when the unit was officially disbanded. But their most intense activity, interesting exploits and noteworthy feats took place during the 11 year period 1870-1881 in what has become known as the Texas Indian Wars, and it is to this subject that this chapter is devoted. As will clearly emerge, the Seminole Black Scouts would ultimately prove to be largely responsible for putting a stop to the depredating excursions of Indian bands based in Mexico, clearing west Texas of hostiles and facilitating white settlement of the area.

By 1861, the 350 Seminole Blacks in Mexico¹ were living at the Laguna de Parras in southwestern Coahuila. They were never allowed to settle peacefully at this location, however. For several years they helped to defend the devastated Laguna against Apache depredations,² and proved to be "very successful" as Indian fighters,³ but the constant raids continually disrupted their settlements. Moreover, the power struggle between the leader of the Mexican Reform, Benito Juárez, and the maverick "Caudillo del Nord", Santiago Vidaurri, Governor of Nuevo León y Coahuila, deeply affected the stability and security of the area.⁴ The French invasion and occupation of Coahuila under the Emperor Maximilian, however, proved to be by far the greatest source of disturbance to the Seminole Blacks.

French troops under Brigadier General Armand-Alexandre de Castagny entered Saltillo on 20 August 1864, and a few days later Parras was pacified and occupied by Colonel Aymard.⁵ Soon afterwards, the French burned El Burro, the hacienda at the Laguna where the Seminole Blacks had settled.⁶ The Blacks evidently split over whether they should actively oppose the French. John Horse remained at Parras with most of the group and joined the Mexican army. Indeed, his exploits were so successful that he was commissioned an officer and became known on the frontier as "El Coronel Juan Caballo". For his services against the French, he was rewarded with a gift from the Mexican government of a silver mounted saddle "with a gold plated horse's head for a pommel",⁷ which he used when riding his favourite white horse, "American".⁸ By 1865, however, the threat of filibustering raids from Texas had been removed and John Kibbetts and a large number of Seminole Blacks felt it safe to return to the more peaceful location of Nacimiento. Others chose to settle at Matamoros, and after slavery was abolished in the United States, Elijah Daniels and a group of Creek Blacks associated with the Mascogos returned to Texas.⁹

The Kibbetts' group returned to Nacimiento to find that the entire tribe of Southern Kickapoos, with a population of around 950 divided into four bands, had removed from Kansas and settled there.¹⁰ According to Chief No-ko-aht, when the Kickapoos arrived in the spring of 1865 they found "eight or ten families of Blacks" and some Northern whites who had taken refuge there during the Civil War. The Blacks had established thriving farms and paid the Mexican government their rent and taxes in produce and stock,

They raised cattle, sheep, and horses a good deal, and corn, pumpkins, and sugar [cane] and made sugar and raised sweet potatoes. It was in a little valley at the foot of the mountain where the Sobrinas River comes out.¹¹

These Black families, in all likelihood, became associated with the Kibbetts'

group after its return to Nacimiento.

The Seminole Blacks' title to land at Nacimiento was reaffirmed in 1867. On 13 October 1864, the Alcalde of Músquiz had reported that, five days earlier, Machemanet's band of Southern Kickapoos had asked permission to remain in that municipality until they could solicit a permanent place of residence from the President of the Republic. The request was granted and the entire tribe subsequently settled at Nacimiento during 1865. On 11 January 1866, the Alcalde received a decree from the Governor of Coahuila which stated that two "sitios de ganado mayor", or 8,676 acres, expropriated from the Sánchez Navarro estate and abandoned by the Seminoles and Mascogos in 1861, had been assigned to the Kickapoos and Pottawatomies by order of President Juárez. On 18 October 1866, the land was officially granted to the two tribes by the Governor of Coahuila and Presidential approval followed on 8 November. The Seminole Blacks feared that their claim to the Nacimiento grant, which derived from the 1852 agreement, had been overlooked and determined to re-establish and secure their title to the land. Once the French had evacuated Coahuila in late July 1866, John Horse turned his attention to gaining recognition from the Mexican government of the Blacks' right to hold land at the hacienda as this would furnish him the option of returning there, with his followers, from Parras. On 20 February 1867, therefore, John Horse, in conjunction with John Kibbetts, requested land at Nacimiento equal to that which the Kickapoos had received. Their petition was approved and later that year the Blacks received confirmation of the 1852 grant from President Juárez.¹²

The Seminole Blacks at Nacimiento subsequently established a community on their old land grant some five miles south of the Kickapoo villages¹³ but remained for the most part unsettled and discontented. The Blacks' and Kickapoos' title to the land had been confirmed on condition that they again help to defend the devastated area of northern Coahuila against

depredating bands of Indians.¹⁴ The Blacks' settlement was thus continually threatened by Indian raids while the men were once more expected to engage in lengthy expeditions against the hostiles. The land at the hacienda, meanwhile, failed to yield the expected returns.¹⁵ John Kibbetts later charged, moreover, that the Mexicans stole the Blacks' horses and robbed them,¹⁶ and John Horse was even forced to resort to leading a band of Lipans on raids into Texas to supplement their dwindling stock.¹⁷ It seemed that the Seminole Blacks would never be allowed to live normal, peaceful lives, or establish the thriving agrarian community of which they dreamed, in Mexico. As conflict, poverty, and destitution came to dominate their experience in the late 1860s, forcing them to live "in a state of semi-barbarism",¹⁸ they thought more and more of removing to a more settled environment.

By the late 1860s, American officials were suggesting that the Blacks return to the United States. In the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1868 and 1869, it was recommended that the Mexican Kickapoos at Nacimiento be returned to the U.S. to put a stop to their raids on settlements in Texas.¹⁹ Commissioner Ely S. Parker later intimated, however, that his recommendation was intended to include the Seminole Blacks who could be resettled "among their people from whom they separated".²⁰ Citizens of Texas were also prepared to take the initiative in putting a stop to the continuous raids by bands of American Indians who had taken refuge in Mexico. Popular meetings resulted in the appointment of an investigative committee which intended to bring the problem to the attention of the state and national governments. S.S. Brown was chosen by the committee to undertake a mission to Mexico to confer with tribal leaders and discover their disposition towards returning to the U.S. If they displayed a willingness to return Brown would act as a mediator between them and the Mexican and American governments to effect

the object.

On 15 June 1868, Brown obtained permission from Victoriano Cepada, Governor of Coahuila, to proceed to Músquiz and confer with the various chiefs. Brown then wrote to the Mayor of Músquiz, M. Menchaca y Longoria, stating that he hoped to meet "all tribal peoples formerly pertaining to the U.S. and now domiciled in Coahuila... with the view of their return to the territory of the U.S.". Menchaca was asked to notify the various tribes, "Kickapoos - Seminole, Potawatomie, Lipan, Delaware, Mescalero, Muscayus (Mascogos) and c", to send their head men to confer with him upon the subject of removal. Public meetings were subsequently held on 23rd and 26 July 1868 at the court house in Músquiz. Although these meetings failed to secure the removal of any tribes at this time,²¹ the Seminole Blacks began to seriously consider returning to the U.S. and were made aware that this would be welcomed. In the future, they would be more receptive to the overtures of American officials.

In 1869, another smallpox epidemic struck Nacimiento and decimated the Kickapoo population.²² The Seminole Blacks now wished more than ever to leave the hacienda. During the summer, John Kibbetts' son Bob was sent on an investigative mission to the Seminole nation in the Indian Territory. Major Zenas R. Bliss later reported that "the Indians there stated that they were anxious to have the Seminole negroes come over and join them".²³ In view of what later transpired, however, this hardly seems likely. In all probability, Bob would have been welcomed and invited to return to the nation by his kinfolk among the Seminole Freedmen. Kibbetts could not fail to be impressed by the separate and thriving Black communities that were arising in the Seminole nation during reconstruction and by the comparative case of the Freedmen's lot. Not only had slavery been abolished but also the Seminole Freedmen were treated equally before the law, allowed to organize politically, and granted equal

civil and economic rights. Kibbetts doubtless returned to Mexico with glowing reports of his findings and the Blacks at Nacimiento became determined, if at all possible, to return to the Seminole nation.

By 1870, as a result of a decade of continuous turmoil, the Seminole Blacks on the Texas-Mexican frontier had become divided, dislocated and fragmentary. John Horse and the main body of 150 Blacks were still living at Parras; John Kibbetts and 100 others were at Nacimiento; several families were at Matamoros,²⁴ and the Elijah Daniels' band was settled on the Nueces River in Uvalde County, Texas.²⁵ The disillusioned and poverty-stricken Blacks at Nacimiento were determined to return to the Indian Territory and the various other groups would soon follow their lead. In response to an invitation from the Commander of Fort Duncan, Colonel J.C. De Gress, to confer upon the subject, John Kibbetts crossed over to the post on 17 March 1870. Kibbetts requested permission for his group to remove to the Seminole nation and asked for subsistence and forage while in transit, adding that, though they were poor, his people were willing to work. Obviously influenced by the recommendations of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs in 1868 and 1869, De Gress gave Kibbetts rations and forage, and a document granting the Seminole Blacks permission to cross the Rio Grande and camp on the military reservation while their request was considered by the Department of Texas. On 25 March, the Department Commander approved the De Gress initiative and, though the offer was not taken up straight away, the process was set in motion which would lead eventually to the return to the U.S. of most of the Seminole Blacks living in Mexico.²⁶

John Kibbetts returned to Nacimiento to discuss the meeting with his people and make preparations for removal. Shortly afterwards, Captain F.W. Perry succeeded De Gress as Commander of Fort Duncan and was instructed to receive the group. On 15 May, Perry suggested that, as the Blacks were familiar with the river crossings utilized by the Kickapoos on their

depredating excursions into Texas, "they and their information might be made of some use" in helping to curtail these raids. The Blacks' proposed return to the U.S. was meanwhile officially approved and, on 21 May, Perry was instructed to effect the object and to encourage the immigrants to remain at Fort Duncan. Rations were to be issued to the group and were to consist of "18 oz Fresh Beef (whole Beef) or 12 oz Salt Meat. 18 oz Corn Meal, Hard Bread or Flour, each - 10 lbs Sugar, 5 lbs Coffee... to 100 rations... ($\frac{1}{2}$ this ration to children under 12 years of age)". By a post order, however, "Dressed Beef" instead of "Whole Beef" was issued to non-military personnel. Furthermore, following his suggestion to the Department, Perry was to ascertain if the Blacks would enlist in service against the Kickapoos and Lipans.²⁷

Captain Perry had expected the main body of the Blacks to remove to Texas by 15 May.²⁸ By mid June, however, they had still not arrived and Perry proceeded to Nacimientto to confer with John Kibbetts. The principle obstacle to their removal was the fear that they would have to pay revenue duties on their stock crossing the Rio Grande as they were not U.S. citizens. Perry, however, made an agreement with the Collector of Revenues at Eagle Pass until the matter could be acted upon by the Treasury Department. The Blacks expressed a wish to remove to the military reservation at Duncan and, if possible, return in due course to the Seminole nation. They requested rations and permission to hunt and work while at Duncan and expressed willingness to enlist as scouts if they received soldiers' regular pay. Perry added that he believed the Blacks were "well capable of performing the duties of Scouts".²⁹ Perry and Kibbetts finally arrived at an agreement that was usually referred to, later, by the Seminole Blacks as "the treaty". In essence, the Blacks' understanding of the agreement was that if they moved to Texas and the men enrolled as scouts in the military, the U.S. authorities would pay their removal expenses and provide

them with money, rations, land, stock and agricultural equipment until they could be returned to the Indian Territory.³⁰ If "the treaty" was ever put into writing, however, it failed to survive.³¹ Consequently, the authority under which it was entered into, and the details of its terms, would prove a source of constant contention in the future.

As the Seminole Blacks at Nacimiento prepared to remove to Texas, Perry's initiative received official approval. On 25 June, E.D. Townsend, the Adjutant General, reported that the Secretary of War had responded to Perry's suggestion that the services of the Blacks could be of use to the military by authorizing the employment of such as could be made useful as scouts, providing the number did not exceed the Department of Texas quota of 200.³² On 1 July, the Seminole Blacks were invited to cross over to Fort Duncan and, on the 4th, Kibbetts' group arrived at the post. Although John Horse and his party remained for the moment at Parras, moreover, it was their intention to remove to Texas in the very near future.³³

The Blacks were received at Fort Duncan by Major Zenas R. Bliss who had succeeded Perry as the Post Commander. During the course of several conversations with Kibbetts, Bliss was informed of the chief's wishes. Kibbetts hoped to return to the Seminole nation or be given land in Texas which he could cultivate without being molested, and sought permission to hunt and work in the vicinity. The Blacks wished to settle on Elm Creek, situated on the military reservation some five miles above the post, where there was good arable land. They were "willing and anxious" to be employed as scouts and requested only the same pay that the Tonkawa scouts received when actually employed in the field. Bliss was of the opinion that, though they knew nothing of Texas and could not act as guides to the water crossings used by the Kickapoos, the Blacks were good trailers, understood the habits of Indians perfectly, and "would make excellent scouts". He recommended that the 20 men in the group fit for scouting be

enlisted and that the Blacks be given "as much ground as they can cultivate at Elm Creek" and permission to both work in the vicinity of the post, and hunt within limits prescribed by himself.³⁴


The Department of Texas approved the recommendations of Bliss and authorized him to enlist 20 of the Seminole Blacks, or such number as was found fit for service, as scouts for six months. They were to receive the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers with the exception of John Kibbetts, who would receive the pay of sergeant. The Blacks were to be allowed to settle on the military reservation and cultivate the land, and the entire group would be under the control and protection of the military authorities at Fort Duncan.³⁵ They were subsequently "treated and controlled at this Post, exactly as camp followers".³⁶ As a result of the Departmental order, the Blacks went into camp on Elm Creek and, while the old men and those unfit for service sought work in the surrounding settlements to support their families, on 16 August 1870, Sergeant Kibbetts and ten privates were mustered into a new military unit that became known as the Seminole Negro Indian Scouts.³⁷

The enlisted scouts were furnished with rations, arms and ammunition. At first, they were expected to provide their own horses but later they came to rely heavily upon animals captured from Indians. They were not required to wear uniform but instead dressed in modified Indian fashion,³⁸ augmented by "some white man's duds".³⁹ Some even wore "buffalo-horn war-bonnets".⁴⁰ Sergeant John Kibbetts, who, when enrolling, also gave his former Seminole busk name of "Sittertastonacky", or Snake Warrior, assumed general command of the unit. Described by Bliss as "a very smart and reliable negro",⁴¹ Kibbetts was acknowledged as chief and obeyed implicitly by the Scouts. Aided by his son Bob,⁴² who was later promoted to corporal, he remained the leader of the Scouts until his death in 1878. He was succeeded by Elijah Daniels⁴³ and in time Bob was promoted to sergeant and assumed the

command. Although John Horse removed to Fort Duncan in late 1870 and remained in Texas for several years, he never served with the Scouts but instead "gave advice" to John Kibbetts.⁴⁴

Between 1870-1875, members of the other Seminole Black groups in Texas and Mexico were persuaded to remove to Fort Duncan by the offers of U.S. officials. The Matamoros' families and Elijah Daniels' band came in to Duncan in the summer and fall of 1871⁴⁵ and 18 of their men were recruited as scouts in the spring of 1872.⁴⁶ In response to promises that he would receive the same treatment as Kibbetts and have the duties on his property and stock paid, John Horse had crossed over to the military reservation in early December 1870 reporting that the rest of his group was on the road and would soon be arriving.⁴⁷ Some of his followers removed to Duncan in late 1872 and early 1873 and "a dozen or so" were recruited into the Scouts. Others crossed over later in the winter of 1873 and still others in 1874 and 1875. Again, several were enlisted⁴⁸ along with some Texas Freedmen, Mexican Blacks, and Mexicans who had either married Seminole Black women or otherwise become associated with the group.⁴⁹ Most of the Parras band, however, chose to return to Nacimiento during the 1870s instead of removing to Fort Duncan.⁵⁰

In early June 1872, Lieutenant Colonel W. Merritt, the Commanding Officer at Fort Clark, near Brackettville, Texas, requested permission to enlist up to ten Seminole Blacks as scouts at that post in the belief that "they would be very useful in this country against the Indians and other depredators".⁵¹ On 17 June, Major Henry C. Merriam, in command at Fort Duncan, recommended increasing the number of scouts at his post from 30 to 40 "in view of the necessity for mounted men on this border".⁵² The Commander of the Department of Texas felt that the number at Duncan was sufficient but, after corresponding with Merritt, authorized their enlistment with a view to removing 25 to Fort Clark for service at that



MAP 1: Seminole Black Settlements on the Texas-Mexican Frontier

Taken from Latorre, Felipe A. and Dolores L.,
The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Austin, London,
 Texas Pan American Series, University of Texas
 Press, 1976).

post. The Daniels' band expressed to Merriam a desire to remove to Clark as it was believed that they would be better able to support themselves at that location. Soon afterwards the Bruner family joined the band so that it could claim 17 enlisted scouts, including Chief Elijah Daniels; Jim and Jack Bruner; Charles and Jerry Daniel; Renty Grayson; Aaron, Caesar, Isaac and Titus Payne; John Ward; Ben Wilson Jr.; and Kelina, Toney, Coffey, Peter and James Wilson. It was felt, moreover, that there were other band members who were suitable for service that could be enlisted at Clark. The reduction in numbers at Duncan would be offset by more recruits from the Kibbetts' group and, later, from Mexico. The scouts among the Daniels' band insisted upon being accompanied by their families, and this was duly authorized. Consequently, in early August 1872, the entire party was removed to Fort Clark, by horse and wagon, under military escort.⁵³ The Daniels' band settled on Las Moras Creek, some three miles south of Fort Clark, below the post garden.⁵⁴

The Seminole Blacks possessed qualities that made them extremely useful to the U.S. military on the frontier and they were thus highly recruited as scouts. They understood and spoke both English and Spanish and were therefore able to respond quickly to commands and converse in "Mexican", the lingua franca of the region.⁵⁵ They had lived on the Texas-Mexican frontier for over 20 years and were thoroughly familiar with the border country and the various tribes who inhabited or frequented the area. Finally, they had been associated with the Seminoles for over a century and had lived approximate to various other tribes in Mexico and had thus come to know the ways of the Indian.⁵⁶ This knowledge was put to immediate use by the U.S. authorities. Between 1870-1872, John Kibbetts was employed as a mediator during negotiations between American military officials and the Mexican Kickapoos over the proposed return of that tribe to the U.S. Kibbetts subsequently displayed his intimate cognizance

of the customs and behaviour of the Kickapoos in sensing their hostility to the American proposal and probably saved the life of Major Bliss by advising him against visiting their camp.⁵⁷

The Blacks were extremely skilful trackers and were often able to pick up a trail many weeks old. On one occasion, on the Red River, a Seminole Black scout reported to his commanding officer that they were following a band of Kiowas which included one brave, five squaws, several children, six horses, and four lodges. Though he had not seen his quarry the scout further deduced from clues left on the trail that the band had provisions of corn and buffalo meat, the brave was sick, and one of the horses was half blind.⁵⁸ The Scouts were variously described as faithful and loyal to their commanding officers, excellent horsemen, fine marksmen, fearless fighters, and highly effective in hand-to-hand combat with Indians.⁵⁹ One epic duel ensued after scout Renty Grayson and an Indian trapped each other behind cedar trees near the Palo Duro Canyon in the Texas Panhandle. As the Indian had only a one-shot cap and ball rifle, Renty placed his campaign cap on the end of his ramrod and inched it out from the tree. The Indian shot the cap and jumped out from his cover whereupon Renty shot him down. Though wounded in three places, the Indian managed to engage the Black scout in a fierce hand-to-hand battle and it took half an hour of combat before Renty finally got the better of his "big and heavy" foe.⁶⁰

The Scouts also had great powers of endurance and were able to engage in many fatiguing campaigns without rest or food. At other times, they were able to get by on the barest minimum. Frederick E. Phelps, a contemporary officer, reported that they, "Could go longer on half rations than any body of men I have ever seen", and if there were no rations available, as was often the case, they were not averse to eating fried rattlesnake.⁶¹ The Seminole Black Scouts, moreover, had a highly developed

instinct for survival. This was most dramatically displayed during perhaps their greatest feat of endurance in early 1879. Thirty-nine scouts were included in an expedition charged with the pursuit of a band of Mescaleros who had absconded from their reservation at Fort Stanton, New Mexico. For a month, the U.S. troops chased the Indians across the desert in extremely cold weather but by 28 February, the 29th day of the expedition, they had been without water for several days and the terrain offered little hope of finding any. The animals were hardly able to move and the men fully expected to perish. At the height of their distress, First Sergeant David Bowlegs, displaying great skills, discovered a "sleeping spring". After working at it for an hour Bowlegs made the water flow so freely "that three animals, drinking could not lower it". The expedition was consequently saved from destruction and the spot was given the name "Salvation Springs". The scouts trailed the Mescaleros all the way to their reservation but the agent there refused to surrender them and they were forced to return to Texas empty-handed. After 80 days in the field, the scouts finally rode into Fort Clark, having covered 1,266 miles.⁶²

Praise was lavished upon the Scouts and their talents and exploits have been termed "uncanny",⁶³ "extraordinary",⁶⁴ and even "superhuman".⁶⁵ Their commanding officers led the acclaim. Major Bliss described them as "excellent hunters and trailers, and splendid fighters",⁶⁶ and Lieutenant John Lapham Bullis reported that they were "fine trailers and good marksmen and... very useful on this frontier".⁶⁷ The Seminole Black Scouts were described in 1876 as being "the terror to marauding Indians",⁶⁸ and a contemporary Black trooper of the 9th Cavalry later recounted that they came to be considered "the best body of scouts, trailers and Indian fighters ever engaged in the Government service along the border".⁶⁹ The Scouts proved to be so successful, faithful, and trustworthy that Colonel Loomis H. Langdon was led to declare in 1898 that they had fully

"justified the action of the Government in availing itself of their services".⁷⁰

The duties of the Scouts between 1870-1872 had mainly involved patrolling west Texas for Indian raiders, and they had not engaged in a serious skirmish during this period. By the summer of 1872, however, the Commanding Officer at Duncan reported that they had already proved to be "very faithful and efficient men as trailers, guides, and for patrols".⁷¹ On 6 March 1873, Lieutenant Bullis of the 24th Coloured Infantry, who had considerable experience of commanding Black troops,⁷² was put in command of the Seminole Black Scouts. Bullis' accession witnessed the beginning of a truly remarkable eight year period for the Scouts which has been described by William Katz as "unequaled in the military annals of the day".⁷³ Between March 1873 and June 1881, when Bullis relinquished the command,⁷⁴ they engaged in 26, usually lengthy expeditions, 12 of them major, and, though often heavily outnumbered by hostile Indians, had not a single man either killed or seriously wounded in action. Moreover, although they never numbered more than 50, the Seminole Black Scouts won an unprecedented four of the coveted Medals of Honour.⁷⁵ During this period, the Scouts took up arms against tribes of the southern Plains and border country, and proved once and for all that there was no mystical bond between the Seminole Blacks and American Indians. The Seminole Black Scouts, in fact, played a vital role in ridding west Texas of hostile tribes, and in so doing facilitated the peaceful settlement of the area by whites.

The Seminole Black Scouts engaged in their first major expedition against hostile Indians in May 1873 as part of Colonel Ranald Slidell Mackenzie's force that attacked the Mexican Kickapoos at Remolino. The Kickapoos had been attacked, on two occasions, by Texas militia during their removals from Kansas and the Indian Territory to Mexico in the 1860s.

Machemanet's band had been attacked by a mounted Confederate patrol while encamped upon the Little Concho, near San Angelo, in December 1862⁷⁶ and, on 8 January 1865, the Southern Kickapoos who had been fleeing to Mexico had received similar treatment from a force of 360 Texas militia and Confederate troops at Dove Creek. Although the Texans had been soundly defeated in this second engagement, the Kickapoos had lost 14 warriors⁷⁷ and had considered the attack a declaration of war. Once settled in Mexico, they had struck back at Texas with a continuous stream of depredating excursions.⁷⁸ The Kickapoos, moreover, had been quick to realize the economic advantages to be gained from their forays across the border and had come to rely increasingly upon Texas plunder for their livelihood. They had found a ready market for the stolen stock in Músqiz and other surrounding towns where the local merchants and politicians were often in cahoots with the raiders. Between 1865-1868, Mexican Kickapoos raiders had taken the lives of 62 Texas citizens and had wounded many others. The upper Rio Grande area had only one tenth of the livestock in 1872 that it had had in 1865 and its flourishing horse-raising industry had been completely wiped out. By 1873, total regional losses to the hostiles were estimated at 48 million dollars.⁷⁹

U.S. authorities realized that action had to be taken to control the forays of the Mexican Kickapoos. On 31 March 1873, Henry M. Atkinson and Thomas G. Williams were appointed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to effect the peaceful return of the Kickapoos to the U.S.⁸⁰ While the commissioners made their way to confer with Coahuilan officials, however, the Kickapoos continued to commit depredations in west Texas. In early April, 36 horses were taken from the Delorus ranch, some eight miles south of Fort Clark on the west side of Las Moras Creek, by a raiding party from Mexico. On the 13th, "15 Seminole Negro Indian Scouts under their best trailer" were sent to pick up the trail. Though the scouts could not

overtake the raiding party they discovered implicating evidence in the shape of "A small water keg painted and a rawhide lariat such as is used by the Kickapoos".⁸¹ A band of Kickapoo, Lipan and Mescalero raiders, moreover, subsequently committed a massacre at Howard's Wells in the Nueces Valley in which an officer of the 9th Coloured Cavalry was killed.⁸² In the light of these most recent hostilities, U.S. military officials determined to use more direct means to put an end to the Mexican Kickapoo menace.

Mackenzie's 4th Cavalry, considered to be the finest mounted regiment in the service, had been removed from Forts Richardson and Concho in March and April 1873 to meet the Kickapoo challenge.⁸³ In April, Mackenzie met with Secretary of War William Belknap and the Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, General Philip Sheridan, and received instructions, "To control and hold down the situation, and to do it in your own way... when you begin, let it be a campaign of annihilation, obliteration and destruction". Having thus been given a carte blanche to put an end to the raids, Mackenzie determined upon a surprise attack on the villages of the Mexican Kickapoos.⁸⁴

Preparations for the expedition began in April. The Seminole Black Scouts were foreseen as playing an important role as they had lived approximate to the Kickapoo villages in Mexico and were familiar with both the raiders and the area.⁸⁵ The Scouts warmed to their commission, seeing it as an opportunity to gain recompense for the "thirty head of horses" stolen from them earlier by the Kickapoos,⁸⁶ and contacted their kinsmen at Nacimiento. The Mascogos, disliked by the Kickapoos and concerned about their land rights at the hacienda, welcomed the chance to conspire against their "insolent" and "arrogant" neighbours and during the course of the next month furnished valuable information on the three villages of Kickapoos, Lipans and Mescaleros situated just north of Nacimiento and west of Remolino,

a Mexican town on the San Rodrigo River.⁸⁷ The preparations were completed by mid May and, at 11.00 p.m. on the 16th, the Seminole Black Scouts reported that they had learned from Nacimiento that the Kickapoo warriors had ridden off to the west that morning on a hunting expedition, leaving the villages unprotected.⁸⁸ Mackenzie realized that his chance to strike had arrived and his plan was immediately put into effect.

The order to march was quickly implemented and, at 1.00p.m. on 17 May, Mackenzie's force, including six companies of the 4th Cavalry, 17 officers and 360 enlisted men, and a detachment of 34 Seminole Black scouts, 18 from Clark and 16 from Duncan, under Bullis, set out for Mexico.⁸⁹ Robert G. Carter, who took part in the expedition, later recounted that behind Mackenzie, in the advance guard, rode, "... The Seminole negro enlisted scouts, with ebony faces, flat noses, and full lips, but the characteristic high cheek-bones of the Indian, their long, black crinkly hair plentifully powdered with alkali dust".⁹⁰ The column crossed the Rio Grande at sunset and rode the 63 miles to its destination during the night. By 6.00 a.m., Mackenzie's troops had moved into position to attack the three Indian villages on the south side of the San Rodrigo. Each of the villages averaged between 50 and 60 lodges, the largest being that of the Kickapoos which also happened to be first in the line of attack. The subsequent charge was a complete surprise. The Kickapoos scattered with troops in pursuit and within minutes their unprotected villages was in ruins.⁹¹

Mackenzie's men then turned their attention to the Lipan and Mescalero villages but their inhabitants had mostly escaped to the Santa Rose Mountains during the attack on the Kickapoos. Costilietos, the principal chief of the Lipans, however, was lassoed and captured by Renty Grayson as he was darting through the bushes.⁹² His daughter, Teresita, was also captured and brought back to Texas, and she later married Seminole

Black Scout James Perryman. Two children resulted from the marriage including a son, Warren, who would later serve as Deacon in the Seminole Black church in Brackettville and become a leading figure in the community. Teresita died in 1881 and was buried in the Seminole Negro Indian Scouts' graveyard at Fort Clark.⁹³

The destruction of the Indian villages at Remolino was completed. All the lodges and accoutrements were burned, 19 Indians were killed, 40 women and children were taken prisoner and 65 horses were captured, some still wearing Texas brands. Mackenzie, meanwhile, had just one man killed and two wounded during the action.⁹⁴ His force set off on the return journey at 1.00 p.m. choosing a more sparsely settled westerly route to avoid attack. The column could only move slowly due to the men being tired and hampered by the prisoners, and the scouts guarded the rear and flanks against ambush. On several occasions throughout the night, the scouts reported hostile groups in sight but the column remained free from attack and recrossed safely into Texas in the early morning of 19 May.⁹⁵ The scouts had taken part in an expedition that had covered more than 140 miles in 38 hours, much of the time in intense heat, without either sleep or food save for hard bread, and had been completely successful in accomplishing its goal. As Edward S. Wallace, a leading historian on the Mackenzie raid has remarked, "It was an extraordinary feat of arms".⁹⁶

The Seminole Black Scouts had played a major role in the expedition that effectively put an end to the Kickapoo menace in west Texas. In his official report of the action, Mackenzie called special attention to Bullis and his scouts, "Who behaved under the command of that gallant officer, very well",⁹⁷ and, on 20 June 1873, Bullis was promoted to first Lieutenant for his contribution to the expedition.⁹⁸ The prisoners that Mackenzie had taken were the incentive used by the American commissioners to persuade the Kickapoos in Mexico to return to the U.S. It was

made clear that the Kickapoos would only be reunited with their kinsmen if the tribe removed to the Indian Territory.⁹⁹ Continued activity by Mackenzie's troops along the border after the Remolino raid, moreover, doubtless influenced the Kickapoos to accept the commissioner's terms. The Seminole Black Scouts remained constantly in the field, camping first at San Pedro Springs and later at Elm Creek, and patrolled the north bank of the Rio Grande.¹⁰⁰ Following these and other, monetary, inducements, the first contingent of 317 Kickapoos left Músqiz on 28 August 1873 and arrived at Fort Sill, Indian Territory, in December.¹⁰¹ They would be joined later, in 1875, by a further 145 of their tribesmen.¹⁰²

Mackenzie's Remolino raid was thus directly responsible for the return to the U.S. of most of the Mexican Kickapoo population. Those who remained behind, moreover, had learned a harsh lesson. The expedition had demonstrated both the power of the U.S. army on the border and its willingness to disregard international boundaries in pursuing its quarry. Mexico could thus no longer be viewed as a haven for hostile Indians. Indeed, the Mexican government was sufficiently impressed by Mackenzie's raid to consent to negotiate a reciprocal treaty with the U.S. which would permit mutual pursuit and punishment of thieves and depredators across the border.¹⁰³ Following the Remolino expedition, Indian depredations in the upper Rio Grande region noticeably abated and "quiet and peace reigned for many a day".¹⁰⁴ Although small groups of partisan Mexican Kickapoos began anew their raids in 1876-1877, these were short-lived, and by 1880 the tribe had abandoned its war with Texas, given up plunder as a means of support, and returned to hunting and agriculture.¹⁰⁵

The Red River War of 1874 was the next major campaign to involve the Seminole Black Scouts. The southern Plains Indians had become increasingly disturbed by the rapid disappearance of the buffalo and the raids of renegades on their pony herds. Under the influence of cheap liquor, more

than 600 Southern Cheyenne, Comanche, and Kiowa warriors left their reservations in the Indian Territory with their families to join their kinsmen on the southern Plains in the hope of putting an end to their grievances and gaining recompense for lost lands and earlier defeats. On 27 June 1874, an attack by more than 200 Indians, under the Comanche Chief Quanah Parker, on a small party of buffalo hunters at their encampment at Adobe Walls on the South Canadian signalled the beginning of the Red River War. By mid summer Indian bands roamed the southern Plains attacking white settlements at every opportunity and U.S. military officials came to realize that a major campaign was needed to put a stop to these depredations and return the tribes to their reservations.¹⁰⁶

In late July, General Sheridan was authorized to marshal his forces into a three-pronged attack aimed at trapping the hostiles in the Texas Panhandle. As part of the manoeuvre, three columns were sent into the field by the Department of Texas. The largest and strongest of these, the Southern Column, was put under the command of Mackenzie. His force of 639 included eight companies of the 4th Cavalry, five of the 10th and 11th Infantry, and a scouting party which listed among its members 13 Seminole Blacks, 12 Tonkawas, and a few Lipans, under the command of Lieutenant William A. Thompson of the 4th Cavalry. On 22 August, the Southern Column left Fort Clark for Fort Concho with instructions to search along the headwaters of the Red River for the hostiles.¹⁰⁷ The Blacks and Indians would be employed extensively as "advance scouts and trailers" and were seen as "quite necessary to an expedition of this kind".¹⁰⁸

By September, the forces of General Nelson A. Miles, acting out of Fort Dodge, Kansas, had driven the main body of the hostiles onto the Staked Plains in the Texas Panhandle. The Indians took refuge in the Palo Duro Canyon, near present-day Amarillo, built villages, and settled in for the winter.¹⁰⁹ The Southern Column reached its supply camp at Fort Griffin

on 1 September and remained there for nearly three weeks. On the 19th, Mackenzie joined his forces and was informed by the Black scouts, who had been ranging far to the north, that they had discovered three Indian trails in the vicinity of the headwaters of the Pease River. Acting upon this information, Mackenzie started the column in that direction early in the morning of the 20th. Later in the day, a party of four scouts, who had been sent in advance to scour the area the previous evening, returned to camp stating that they had been attacked by 25 Comanches and, after a short exchange, had been forced to beat a hasty retreat.¹¹⁰ One of the four was Seminole Black scout Adam Payne, who was described by a contemporary as "a big black kinky headed negro, wearing horns".¹¹¹ For an individual act of gallantry during the exchange, Payne was later awarded a Medal of Honour and, in his commendation, Mackenzie, who was not noted for lavishing praise upon his men, stated that he had displayed "habitual courage" and "more cool daring than any scout I have ever known".¹¹²

The Seminole Black Scouts were soon to play a leading part in the Battle of the Palo Duro Canyon, the most dramatic, decisive and significant engagement in the Red River War. On 25 September, the scouts informed Mackenzie that they had discovered numerous Indian trails around the Tule Canyon, the biggest of which had been made by a large number of horses. On the 26th, the scouts came in to report that hostile Indians had gathered around the Southern Column in its encampment near the head of the Tule Canyon. Being thus forewarned, the expected attack by an estimated 250 warriors was easily repulsed.¹¹³ The following morning, Thompson and his men led a counter-attack that drove the Indians from the vicinity. During the charge, a Seminole Black scout distinguished himself by casually swinging from his saddle, taking aim, and shooting the horse of a fleeing Comanche as he attempted to escape up the side of an arroyo. The Comanche was killed soon after by a Tonkawa scout.¹¹⁴

Thompson's men, together with Company E, 4th Cavalry, pursued the Indians in an easterly direction for several hours but realized that they were being led away from the main body of hostiles and returned to camp. In the afternoon, the Southern Column set out in a northwesterly direction and, during the night, the scouts reported a large number of tepees on the floor of the nearby Palo Duro Canyon. Mackenzie's men then made their way in that direction with the intention of staging a surprise attack upon the Indian villages.

Mackenzie's troops arrived at the Palo Duro Canyon, just below its junction with the Blanca Cita Canyon, at daybreak on 28 September and peered over the rim. Deceived at first by the 700 foot vertical drop in the half-light, a Seminole Black scout exclaimed, "Lor' men, look at de sheep and de goats down dar".¹¹⁵ What they were seeing, in fact, were five well-equipped villages of Kiowas, Comanches and Southern Cheyennes which numbered over 100 tepees and stretched for some three miles along the canyon, along with a large horse herd which grazed nearby. The scouts soon discovered a narrow zig-zag path which led to the canyon floor and Thompson was ordered to take his men down and open the fight.

The descent took almost an hour and at the last moment the alarm was given. The frightened Indians fled from their lodges and ran for a pass at the west end of the canyon, in their haste leaving behind most of their property. The scouts led the charge and in the course of pursuit killed three warriors, the only Indians found dead in the field. Mackenzie's other troops, meanwhile, set fire to the Indians' property and by the early afternoon all of the lodges and tons of accoutrements had been destroyed. As the hostiles began to regroup and take up sniping positions among the rocks, Mackenzie led his troops back to the top of the canyon, driving before them the entire Indian horse herd. Only after the column had reached the safety of the supply train were the men allowed to rest and

eat after some 31 hours in the saddle and battle without sleep, and 48 hours without food. Upon returning to camp, Mackenzie discovered that his only casualty during the entire engagement had been one man wounded. The following day, the scouts were allowed to select the best of the Indians' horses for their own use and, after choosing 376, the other 1,048 were shot to prevent their recapture.¹¹⁶

The Battle of the Palo Duro Canyon was a complete success for the U.S. military and a crippling blow to the southern Plains tribes. Although their casualties were relatively small, the Indians were left without food, shelter, or clothing, and, of most importance, horses to replenish their supplies. Faced with a winter of sub-zero temperatures on the Plains, most of the hostiles drifted back to their reservations.¹¹⁷ A few bands still roamed the Panhandle after Palo Duro but Mackenzie's men remained in the field, and the Seminole Black scouts were prominent in tracking down many of these hostiles until 20 December 1874, when the Southern Column demobilized.¹¹⁸ With the exception of some minor activity in the eastern Texas Panhandle and the western Indian Territory by Miles' troops during early 1875,¹¹⁹ the war had effectively ended. Sheridan later reported, "The campaign was not only comprehensive, but was the most successful of any Indian campaign in this country since its settlement by the Whites, and much credit is due the officers and men engaged in it".¹²⁰ The Red River War marked the last major stand by the Kiowas, Comanches, and Southern Cheyennes against the inroads of whites onto their domain. The Seminole Black Scouts had played a major role in breaking the resistance of the hostiles, forcing their return to the reservations, and restoring peace to the white settlements on the southern Plains.

The Seminole Black Scouts both respected and had a deep affection for their commander, Lieutenant Bullis. Former scout Joseph Philips later recounted,

Lieutenant Bullis was the officer who stayed the longest with us. That fella suffer jest like we all did out in de woods. She was a good man. She was an injun-figher. She was tuff; she didn't care how a big a bunch dey was; She went into 'em every time; she look after his men; his men was on equality too; she didn't stand and dey go jonder, she would say 'come on, boys let's go get 'em.¹²¹

In 1875, three of the Scouts risked their lives to save Bullis from a party of hostile Indians. On 25 April, while on a routine scout in the Lower Pecos country, Bullis, Sergeant John Ward, Trumpeter Isaac Payne, and Private Pompey Factor struck a fresh trail of about 75 horses leading from the white settlements towards the Eagle's Nest crossing. The scouts following the trail for an hour and came upon 25 to 30 Comanches about to cross the Pecos with the stolen stock. Unobserved, Bullis and his men tied their horses, crept to within 75 yards of the Indians, and opened fire. They maintained the assault for three quarters of an hour, in the process killing three of the hostiles and wounding a fourth. Twice they managed to separate the raiders from the stolen horses but they were driven back on both occasions. Finally, however, the tide turned and the heavily outnumbered scouts were forced to beat a hasty retreat to avoid being cut off from their horses.

The three Black scouts were the first to reach their horses but, as they prepared to leave, Sergeant Ward glanced back and saw that Bullis had been separated from his mount and would soon be stranded among the hostiles, who were rapidly approaching. Ward shouted to his companions, "Boys, don't lets us leave him",¹²² and, wheeling his horse, dashed back towards Bullis through a hail of fire from the hostiles' Winchesters while Payne and Factor dismounted and provided covering fire. Undeterred by having "a ball shot through his carbine sling, and the stock to his carbine shattered", Ward reached Bullis, scooped him onto the back of his horse, and rode off beyond the covering fire. Payne and Factor then remounted and all four escaped from the exchange unharmed. The three Black scouts had displayed great courage, loyalty and speed of thought in

bringing about a remarkable rescue. As Bullis was quick to realize, his men had quite literally saved his hair. The three were subsequently commended¹²³ and, on 28 May 1875, each was awarded a Medal of Honour for his part in the action.¹²⁴

Between 1875-1877, the Seminole Black Scouts were employed extensively in Colonel William R. Shafter's expeditions into west Texas and Mexico and frequently worked with Black troops, or "Buffalo Soldiers" on detached service. During the spring of 1875, small bands of Comanches engaged in depredating raids on white settlements in west Texas and Shafter was ordered to plan a campaign to intercept these hostiles, search out and destroy their villages, and return them to their reservations. At Fort Concho, a lengthy and extensive campaign was organized. The expeditionary force which subsequently rode out onto the Staked Plains on 14 July under Shafter's command was supplied for four months and included six companies of the 10th Cavalry, two of the 24th Infantry, one of the 25th, and detachments of Seminole Black and Tonkawa scouts under Bullis and Lieutenant C.R. Ward. With the exception of the officers, the entire column consisted of Blacks and Indians and represented the largest body of men ever sent into the field in west Texas by the U.S. army.¹²⁵

On 18 October, Bullis, several Seminole Black scouts, and a small force of Black cavalymen discovered and charged an Indian encampment at Sabrinas. Though the Indians escaped, 25 of their horses and mules were captured and all of their supplies, "Consisting of 50 sacks of mesquite beans, three or four thousand pounds of buffalo meat, about 100 undressed buffalo hides, 100 good lodge poles, cooking utensils, etc.",¹²⁶ were destroyed. Typical of the hard-hitting surprise attack employed by the Seminole Black Scouts, this action constituted the harshest blow administered to the hostiles by Shafter's command. In late November, Shafter was ordered to terminate the expedition and return to Fort Duncan. The

entire campaign had resulted in the death of only one Indian and the capture of five others but two encampments and their supplies had been destroyed and 75 ponies and 11 good mules had been captured. More significantly, however, Shafter reported that "the Indians... were driven from the plains to Mexico" and, at the time his troops demobilized, there was not "an Indian east of the Pecos and south of the Red River".¹²⁷

During the spring and summer of 1876, the Lipans and Mexican Kickapoos resumed their raids into west Texas and the Seminole Black Scouts were kept in detached service with Shafter's command. In July, Shafter received orders to take a substantial force across the Rio Grande and attack a large Lipan village known to be in the vicinity of Saragossa, about 40 miles from Eagle Pass. Around the 20th, Shafter's command, consisting entirely of Black troops under white officers, with three companies of the 10th Cavalry, detachments of the 24th and 25th Infantry, and a party of Seminole Black scouts under Bullis, crossed over into Mexico. After the column had marched in a southwesterly direction for several days, Shafter became increasingly concerned that a Mexican force might cut off its return. To guard against this, and to save time, the main body went into camp while Shafter gave Bullis the overall command of 20 Seminole Black scouts and 20 Buffalo Soldiers of Company B, 10th Cavalry, under Lieutenant Evans, and instructed him to proceed to the hostiles' village and launch an attack, as planned.

Bullis' force set out in the late afternoon of 29 July and, after a brisk overnight march, located the Lipan village on the San Antonio River, about five miles from Saragossa. Although the village was large, numbering some 23 lodges, the U.S. troops went straight into the attack at daybreak. After the initial volley, Bullis' Black command became involved in a fierce hand-to-hand battle with the Lipans. As Charlie Daniels later explained, "We didn't had no time to load de gun, but jest turn de butt

of de gun and fight 'em".¹²⁸ The battle lasted for just 15 minutes as the Indians then fled from the field. Though heavily outnumbered, Bullis' men had killed 14 of the hostiles and captured four squaws as well as 96 horses and mules. Three of the Blacks, a trumpeter and two privates, had received flesh wounds from the Lipan lances but none was seriously injured. Once again, the surprise attack had been superbly executed and completely successful. After destroying the hostiles' village and trappings, Bullis' command rejoined the main body of troops and, on 31 July, Shafter and most of his column recrossed safely into Texas.¹²⁹ The Seminole Black Scouts received no respite, however, as they were immediately sent on yet another expedition into the Mexican interior in pursuit of Lipan raiders.¹³⁰

In 1877, the Seminole Black Scouts participated in three major campaigns against hostile Indians based in Mexico. In late June, while riding about 70 miles above the mouth of the Pecos River, Bullis and 37 scouts came upon the trail of a raiding party of some five Lipans, accompanied by three Comanches, which had been stealing stock in Gillespie County, and followed it to the Rio Grande. As the water was high, the scouts crossed over on "a raft of logs, tied with lariats",¹³¹ and henceforth that point on the river became known as "Bullis' Crossing".¹³² The following day, July 1st, the scouts continued the pursuit but by the afternoon 20 of their horses had broken down and 13 of the Blacks were forced to stay behind with them. Bullis and the remaining 24 scouts continued to follow the trail into the Sierra Pachona, despite seven of their number being forced to ride pack mules, and at daybreak on 2 July they came upon the stolen horseherd grazing on the hillside. Due to the braying of a mule, however, they were discovered by the Indians who took to the rocks and brush in a rough sierra. In an hour-long running fight, the scouts killed one and wounded three of the hostiles, forced others to abandon their trappings, and recaptured 23 of the 25 stolen horses without suffering a single casualty themselves. Bullis and his men safely recrossed the

Rio Grande by raft on 4 July having completed another extremely successful campaign.¹³³

In September, Bullis' command again crossed into Mexico on the trail of hostile Indians. On the 26th, three Seminole Black scouts reported that they had located the village of a band of Lipans, known to have recently engaged in raids into Texas, in the vicinity of Saragossa. That same day, detachments of Companies A and F, 8th Cavalry; C, 10th Cavalry; and the Seminole Black scouts, in all some 91 men, under the command of Bullis, crossed the Rio Grande. The column made its way in a southwesterly direction towards its destination and, at sunrise on the 29th, discovered the Lipan village on the Perdido Creek, near Saragossa. Bullis' command went into a charge and, after a running fight of four or five miles with the Indians, captured three squaws, a boy and a girl, 15 horses and two mules, and destroyed their entire village and supplies.¹³⁴ The tactics employed by Bullis and the scouts had once again paid dividends; the Lipans had suffered yet another defeat on their home territory.

In mid October, Bullis, 34 Seminole Black scouts, the Mexican guide José Tafoya, a surgeon, and Teresita, the Lipan wife of scout James Perryman, left Fort Clark on a supposedly routine expedition up the Rio Grande. On the 22nd, two Seminole Black scouts, who had been away on a mission for 40 days, reported to Bullis on the Pecos that a party of Indian raiders had returned to Mexico and were moving south towards the Sierra del Carmen in the Big Bend country. Bullis and his command crossed the Rio Grande on 28 October and followed the trail until 1 November when they came across the Mescalero village on the Texas side of the river. In the evening, however, the Indians discovered the scouts, ran off their horses and cattle herds to safety, recrossed the river, and succeeded in trapping the detachment in a deep canyon¹³⁵ on "a narrow ledge not more than ten or twelve feet wide, with a mountain towering above and the river

hundreds of feet below". Greatly outnumbered and surrounded by the enemy, and caught in a position which was almost impossible to defend, the Seminole Black Scouts faced their greatest crisis. For a time, they were "severely handled" and lost several animals and all their rations but, through Bullis' "skill and courage", they eventually fought their way out and made a wondrous escape into the open country without suffering a single casualty.¹³⁶ The Blacks believed that their safe deliverance from predicaments such as this came about through divine intervention and every night while on expedition they gave thanks for their good fortune in religious camp meetings which featured singing, praying, and bible readings.¹³⁷

Bullis returned to Texas shortly after this exchange and reported to Shafter. Captain S.B.M. Young, with detachments of Companies A and F, 8th Cavalry, and Lieutenant Beck with Company C, 10th Cavalry, were ordered to join forces with Bullis and the combined command returned to Mexico in mid-November. The Seminole Black scouts picked up their three week old trail, followed it back to the Big Bend Country, and arrived at the point where they had located the Mescalero village on 23 November. The column trailed the hostiles back into Mexico and, after a long pursuit, succeeded in surprising them in their village in the Sierra del Carmen. They killed two of the Indians, including the chief, Alsate, described by Bullis as "the most cunning Indian on all the frontier of Texas and Mexico",¹³⁸ wounded three others, and captured 17 horses, six mules and some arms, while only suffering one casualty themselves. Young's troops dispersed the hostiles and destroyed their village and this particular band of Mescalero raiders was left to face the harsh winter without shelter, supplies, or a leader.¹³⁹

The expeditions of 1875, 1876, and 1877 had their desired effect upon the hostile Indian bands based in Mexico as they became wary of attack and drastically reduced their raids into Texas. In June 1878, a detachment

of Seminole Black scouts accompanied Mackenzie on an expedition into Mexico to destroy a Lipan village near Músquiz, but, though they searched the entire area around Remolino, they did not discover any hostiles.¹⁴⁰ Mackenzie's raid spurred the Mexican government into making serious efforts to police its side of the border,¹⁴¹ however, and "in a few months robberies, raids and disorders largely ceased".¹⁴²

The Seminole Black Scouts had earlier gained experience of exploratory and associated pursuits. As well as being charged with sweeping the Staked Plains of hostiles, Shafter's 1875 expedition had been required to explore and chart the area, detailing its natural resources and water supplies, with a view to "its adaptability for cultivation and stock-raising".¹⁴³ The expedition had consequently produced the first accurate and reliable map of the Staked Plains, greatly increased the amount of information available on the area, and dispelled forever the myth that it was devoid of water. Its findings had been widely circulated and well received and had produced a large influx of ranchers, sheepmen and homesteaders into west Texas.¹⁴⁴

As the number of Indian raids began to decline in the late 1870s, the Scouts were employed more frequently in this type of work. From September to November 1878, Seminole Black scouts helped to improve communications in west Texas by working with Captain John L. Rodgers of the 2nd Artillery to build a road from the Pecos River to Fort Davis. Unfortunately, during this tour of duty, Charles July, "commonly called Cato", accidentally shot and killed himself.¹⁴⁵ In October 1879, Bullis, 13 Seminole Black scouts and two friendly Lipans were sent to discover the best route for a wagon road from the new crossing of the Pecos at Peña Blanca to Peña Negra, and estimate the length of time needed for its construction.¹⁴⁶ Bullis' men also escorted the parties of Judge Joseph Jones, which conducted surveys in west Texas, on several occasions¹⁴⁷ and, between January and April 1880,

they acted as guides to an expedition organized by a number of railroads to examine the mineral resources of Presidio County.¹⁴⁸ As explorers, road builders, surveyors, escorts and guides, the Seminole Black Scouts played an important part in the development of west Texas and helped facilitate the movement of white settlers into the area.

The Seminole Black Scouts' final Indian campaign followed what proved to be the last major Indian raid in Texas.¹⁴⁹ On 14 April 1881, a small band of Lipans crossed over into Texas and fell upon the McLauren ranch at the head of the Rio Frio, about seven miles above Leakey in Real County. The hostiles killed two of its inhabitants, Mrs. Kate McLauren and Allen Lease, a 15 year old boy who lived with the family, robbed it and other homes in the vicinity, and made their escape with a number of stolen horses.¹⁵⁰ The military authorities were subsequently notified of the raid and, on 26 April, Bullis, 34 Seminole Black scouts, and Teresita, rode out of Fort Clark with instructions from the Post Commander to "pursue and destroy, or capture" the hostiles.¹⁵¹

Despite the fact that they had wrapped their horses' hooves with rawhide to prevent their making tracks, the scouts struck the trail of the Lipan raiders on 27 April. In yet another remarkable feat, Bullis' men were able to follow the two week old trail over the rugged terrain surrounding Devil's River where the hostiles had killed 30 of the captured horses they had been unable to drive before them. On 1 May, the scouts followed the tracks across the Rio Grande, about 10 miles below the mouth of the Pecos, and pursued the raiding party high into the Sierra del Burro. Teresita was employed as a leading guide but along the way she "learned from something found on the trail that it was her people they were following", and tried to lead Bullis' men off the track. One of the scouts saw through her ploy, however, and kept the command on the right trail. At this, Teresita became violent and had to be tied to her horse.¹⁵² The scouts

continued the pursuit until 4.00 p.m. on 2 May when the hostiles were spotted in camp some two to three miles away. Bullis concealed his command until midnight when he took 27 scouts and crept off towards the Indian camp, leaving his other seven men behind with the belligerent Teresita and the horses. At daybreak, Bullis' force attacked and completely routed the surprised Lipans, who had not envisaged pursuit. Four warriors and one squaw were killed, a boy and a wounded squaw were taken prisoner, and the remaining 21 stolen horses were recaptured. The chief, San-Da-Ve, escaped from the field but was mortally wounded and died soon afterwards. Once again, the scouts had suffered no casualties during the exchange and they later recrossed safely into Texas.¹⁵³

News of the expedition "was hailed in Texas with wild joy".¹⁵⁴ Within a month, the west Texas frontier was deemed safe enough to allow Bullis to relinquish his command of the Scouts and, soon afterwards, he was transferred to Camp Supply, Indian Territory.¹⁵⁵ For the Seminole Black Scouts, the Indian wars were at an end. In the year following the final campaign, some 12 expeditions, covering 3,662 miles, were made from military posts in Texas, but none of these encountered a single hostile Indian.¹⁵⁶

Three important conclusions can be drawn from the experience of the militant Seminole Blacks during this period. First of all, these Blacks were prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to secure and retain their freedom. In 1849 and 1850, they had preferred to take on wild Indians, slave hunters and desperadoes on the Plains for the mere promise of freedom in a strange and dangerous land rather than face a life of slavery in the U.S. And again, rather than return to the Indian Territory with the Seminoles in the late 1850s they preferred to tackle Indian raiders, Mexican revolutionaries, French invaders and an unfavourable climate and terrain. Unlike their more conciliatory compatriots who chose to remain behind in the Indian Territory, accept the few demands placed upon them by their Seminole owners and risk the threat of sale or kidnap because

of the relative ease of their lot, the militant Blacks were resolute in their refusal to be slaves of any kind, no matter how mild the system of servitude.

Secondly, it was only after slavery was abolished in the U.S. and the Freedmen were granted equal rights in the Seminole nation that the militants contemplated returning to the Indian Territory. Even then they sought to resettle in the Freedman communities rather than among the Indians. The militants' decision was reached after they realized the benefits they would derive from living as Freedmen in the Seminole nation and not because they simply wished to renew their association with the Seminoles. Significantly, it was the Freedmen and not the Seminoles that invited the militants to return to the nation. By the time the matter was referred to the Indians for their decision, in fact, the tribal leadership was again in the hands of the progressives who subsequently adopted a policy of vehement opposition to the restoration of the Black emigrants. Clearly, while a kindred spirit still linked the Seminole Blacks who had remained behind in the Indian Territory with those who had removed to the Texas-Mexican frontier, no such feeling existed between the Seminole progressives and the Black militants.

Finally, the actions of the Seminole Blacks in Mexico and Texas clearly illustrate that they considered themselves a separate group and wished to act independently. The group effectively divorced itself from the Seminoles and showed no inclination whatsoever towards entering into an association with other Indian bands. The employment of the Scouts by U.S. military officials was essentially an extension of the old "Divide and Rule" policy. By enlisting the services of the Seminole Blacks against the Indian tribes of the region, they negated any possibility of a potentially troublesome alliance between the two minorities on the border. In fact, such collusion was never likely as the two came from such different back-

grounds and did not share a similar outlook. The exploits of the Scouts proved conclusively that the Seminole Blacks were concerned solely with promoting their best interests and did not wish to ally with the Indians of the Texas-Mexican frontier. The feeling was clearly mutual. Since the Seminole Blacks had left the Indian Territory they had been tortured, murdered and sold into slavery by Comanches while crossing the Plains and attacked constantly by Lipan and Mescalero raiders once they had settled in Mexico. The Blacks, in turn, had made agreements with the Mexican government to defend the area against Indian depredators in exchange for land, and had engaged in combat with the hostiles on numerous occasions. Once they had severed their connection with the Seminoles, the Blacks made no attempt to enter into an alliance with other, non-slaveholding, tribes in Mexico to take its place. Instead, they eventually removed to Texas and, in return for promises of money, food, land and equipment from the whites, joined the U.S. army and took up arms against the Indians of the border country and the southern Plains.

After 1870, the Seminole Black Scouts killed and maimed, and destroyed the property and villages of, Mexican Kickapoos, Lipans, Mescaleros, Southern Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches, and in the process played a major role in driving these bands from their homeland onto reservations or deep into the Mexican interior, thus pacifying west Texas and facilitating white settlement. By 1881, the scars ran so deep that it is impossible to imagine how a reconciliation between these tribes and the Seminole Blacks could ever have taken place. The case of the Mexican Kickapoos furnishes a good example. This tribe had become associated with the Seminole Blacks only because of its support for Wild Cat's projected frontier confederation. Once the Seminoles left Nacimiento, the Kickapoos and Blacks came to resent each other's presence at the hacienda. Feelings were running so high by 1873 that Mascogo informants and Seminole Black

scouts had led Mackenzie's troops to one of their villages at Remolino, resulting in the death of Indian braves, the incarceration of women and children, the destruction of their homes and property, and the forced removal of the majority of the tribe to reservations in the Indian Territory. Although the remainder of the Mexican Kickapoos continued to reside at Nacimiento, and today live only five miles away from the Mascogos' village, they never forgave the Seminole Blacks for their part in the affair and have harboured a grudge against them to this day.¹⁵⁷ The actions of the Seminole Blacks on the Texas-Mexican frontier after 1861 graphically illustrated that they preferred the promises of Mexicans and American whites to an alliance with the Indians of the region. Clearly, they felt that their interests would best be served by acting independently.

The Seminole Blacks' removal to Texas had been originally envisaged as merely the first stop on their journey to the Indian Territory. The employment of the Scouts, moreover, had been seen as merely a short-term measure designed to provide support for the group while in transit. But as the Scouts gave such excellent service to the army, the Blacks' removal to their former homes became a low priority to American officials. Not only had the threat of an alliance between the minorities on the frontier been removed but also the Blacks were proving to be remarkably efficient in combating hostile Indian bands. The Seminole Blacks subsequently became the subject of an inter-departmental wrangle within the U.S. government over who was responsible for their removal to Texas, and hence their welfare, and what was to be done with the group. The eventual outcome was the referral of the matter to the Seminole tribal authorities for their decision and the ultimate rejection of the Black militants by the progressive Indian leadership. A discussion of these events, and their outcome, will occupy the next chapter.

Footnotes

1. Mexican commissioners stated later that, by the end of 1861, the "Black Muscogees, at Parras" numbered "from 40 to 60 persons", Report of the Committee of Investigation Sent in 1873 by the Mexican Government to the Frontier of Texas. Translated from the Official Edition made in Mexico (New York, Baker and Godwin Printers, 1875) p.411. This presumably referred to warriors who could be put into the field as detailed calculations based upon contemporary reports and later developments have determined that around 350 Seminole Blacks must have been living in Mexico by this time. Significantly, the commissioners' figures coincide with the maximum number of Seminole Black scouts employed at any one time by the U.S. army after 1870.
2. Box, Captain Michael J., Captain James Box's Adventures and Explorations in New and Old Mexico (New York, J. Miller Publisher, 1869) pp.203-204; Foster, Laurence, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1935) Testimony of Joe Philips of the Indian Scouts, 1st July 1930, pp.44, 46; Porter, Kenneth W., "Davy Crockett and John Horse," American Literature, XV, (March 1943), 10-15, p.12; Porter, Kenneth W., The Negro on the American Frontier (New York, New York Times, Arno Press, 1971) pp.457, 459; Porter, Kenneth W., "Seminole Flight from Fort Marion," Florida Historical Quarterly, 22, No.1, (January 1944), 112-133, p.133 n.7.
3. Newcomb, James P., History of Secession Times in Texas and Journal of Travel from Texas Through Mexico to California (San Francisco, 1863) pp.14-15.
4. Scholes, Walter V., Mexican Politics During the Juárez Regime 1855-1872 (Columbia, Missouri, University of Missouri Studies, 1957) pp.8-9, 29, 89, 102-105; Sinkin, Richard N., The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building (Austin, Texas, University of Texas Institute of Latin-American Studies, 1979) pp.105-109. The Seminole Blacks later cited the revolution as being the main reason for their return to the U.S. See, Petition of Florida Seminole Negroes to President Grover Cleveland, n.d. but received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 9 February 1888, National Archives Record Group 75, Letters Received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 1881-1907, 3565-88, hereafter cited as R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, followed by the specific reference.
5. Dabbs, Jack A., The French Army in Mexico 1861-1867: A Study in Military Government (The Hague, Mouton and Company, 1963) p.99.
6. Porter, Kenneth W., "Farewell to John Horse: An Episode of Seminole Negro Folk History," Phylon, 8, No.3, (1947), 265-273, p.270, Biographical sketch of Rosa Fay.
7. "Reminiscences of Zenas R. Bliss, Major General United States Army, 1854-1876," 5 Volumes of typewritten manuscript copied from the original in the possession of Mrs. Alice B. Massey, Boerne, Texas, Box 2Q441, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin, Vol.5, p.107.

8. Porter, "Davy Crockett and John Horse," p.15; Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," p.268.
9. John Kiveth "Chief of the Seminole Negro Indians" to Brigadier General C.C. Augur 10 December 1873, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M619, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, Main Series, reproduced from Record Group 94, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s-1917, 828 rolls, Roll 800, frames 117-119. Rolls 799 and 800 contain File 488-1870, "Papers relating to the return of the Kickapoo and the Seminole (Negro) Indians from Mexico to the United States, 1870-1885". Roll 799 contains correspondence from 1870-1873 and Roll 800 that from 1873-1885. Microcopy M619 is hereafter cited as M619 followed by the roll and frame numbers; The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1870, hereafter cited as A.R.C.I.A. followed by the year, Report 123, Major Zenas R. Bliss to H. Clay Wood, Assistant Adjutant General in the Department of Texas (hereafter cited as A.A.G.D.T.) 14 July 1870, p.328; Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, 43 Congress, 1 Session, House Executive Document No.257 (Serial No.1615) Deposition No.545, John Kibbetts, p.22; "Ninth Census of the U.S., 1870, Population schedule, Uvalde County, Texas", Microfilm, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Centre, University of Texas at Austin; Latorre, Felipe A. and Dolores L., The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Austin, London, Texas Pan American Series, University of Texas Press, 1976) p.15.
10. A.R.C.I.A. 1869, Miscellaneous No.150, Edward Hatch to Ely S. Parker 9 August 1869, p.451; Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, Deposition No.545, p.22; Report of Committee of Investigation, p.411; Gibson, Arrell M., The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963) p.201; Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, pp.18-19; Ritzenthaler, Robert E. and Peterson, Frederick A., The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Milwaukee, Milwaukee Public Museum Publications in Anthropology No.2, 1956, Reprinted, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1970) p.19.
11. Root, George A. (ed.), "No-ko-aht's Talk: A Kickapoo Chief's Account of a Tribal Journey from Kansas to Mexico and Return in the Sixties," Kansas Historical Quarterly, 1, No.2, (February 1932), 153-159, p.156.
12. "General Guajardo's Notes", Documents No.61, 29 November 1866 and No.62, 20 February 1867, General Alberto Guajardo Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Yale at New Haven; Report of Committee of Investigation, pp.411-412; Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, pp.18, 123, 126. The Latorres cite a decree of 21 September 1938 by President Lazaro Cardenas which states that the Mascogos' ownership of land at the hacienda dated back to 1866. Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," p.265; Porter, Kenneth W., "Seminole in Mexico, 1850-1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 29, No.2, (Summer 1951), 153-168, p.164; Porter, Kenneth W., "Wild Cat's Death and Burial," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 21, No.1, (March 1943), 41-43, p.43. John Horse later claimed that he was in sole possession of the title to the Blacks' land grant at Nacimiento see, "Seminole Wild Cat Party," John Horse, "Colonel and Father of all the Seminole Indians, who rules all the Seminole Tribes," to Augur 10 December 1873, M619-800, frames 121-124.

13. Wallace, Ernest, Ranald S. Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier (Lubbock, Texas, West Texas Museum Association, Lund Press, Minneapolis, 1965) p.112 n.21.
14. Affairs of the Mexican Kickapoo Indians, 60 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Document No.215, 3 Vols., Volume 3, Appendix, p.1886. Though this source refers only to the Kickapoos, it is probable that the Blacks would have received title under the same terms. For statistics of Indian depredations in the area at this time see, Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, p.16.
15. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.46.
16. Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, Deposition No.545, p.22.
17. Ibid., Deposition No.554, Thomas A. Napkins, p.22; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.418. Porter doubts the validity of the charge that John Horse was leading raids into Texas but he certainly had sufficient motive, and the source appears sound.
18. Petition of Florida Seminole Negroes to President Cleveland, n.d., but received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 9 February 1888, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 3565-88.
19. A.R.C.I.A. 1868, Document H, N.G. Taylor to O.H. Browning 14 July 1868 and 23 November 1868, pp.87-88, 20; A.R.C.I.A. 1869, Miscellaneous No.150, Hatch to Parker 9 August 1869 and Parker to J.D. Cox 23 December 1869, pp.451, 8.
20. Parker to Secretary of the Interior 26 April 1870, M619-799, frames 592-595. Several pieces of correspondence relating to the return to the Seminole Blacks to the U.S. in the 1870's are included in more than one National Archives record group. The citations listed below refer to the most easily accessible source.
21. S.S. Brown to Victoria Cepada incorrectly dated 1 September 1868, Cepada and T. Serapio Frajosa to Brown 15 June 1868, Brown to M. Menchaca y Longoria, Mayor of Musqus [sic] 26 July 1868, Menchaca to Brown 30 July 1868 and Brown to Brevet Major General J.J. Reynolds 1 September 1868, in Winfrey, Dorman H. and Day, James M. (eds.), The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest 1825-1916, 5 Vols., Papers edited from the original manuscript copies in the Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas (Austin, Pemberton Press, 1966) Volume 4, 1860-1916, No.'s 186-188, pp.276-284.
22. Gibson, The Kickapoos, p.213.
23. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Bliss to Clay Wood 14 July 1870, pp.328-329. Laurence Foster states that a party of Blacks from Nacimientto had visited the Seminole nation earlier, in 1866, but does not cite his source. See, Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.46.
24. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Bliss to Clay Wood 14 July 1870, p.328; Depredations on the Frontiers of Texas, Deposition No.545, p.22.

25. "Ninth Census of the U.S., 1870. Population Schedule, Uvalde County, Texas."
26. Colonel J.C. De Gress to Clay Wood 17 March 1870, "By order of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J.C. De Gress," First Lieutenant E.A. Rigg, Post Adjutant Fort Duncan "to whom it may concern," 17 March 1870, Clay Wood to De Gress 25 March 1870 and Parker to Secretary of the Interior 26 April 1870, M619-799, frames 587-588, 585, 5, 592-595; "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians" and Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, Commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, Chicago, 29 January 1873, Endorsement on Department of the Interior Letter Received No.217-1872, National Archives Record Group 393, Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Division of the Missouri, E2547, Special File Box 15, Seminole Negro Indians, 1872-1876, hereafter cited as R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Report of Committee of Investigation, p.415.
27. Parker to Secretary of the Interior 26 April 1870, M619-799, frames 592-595; E.D. Townsend to Major General Reynolds 10 May 1870, M619-800, frame 766; Captain F.W. Perry to Clay Wood 15 May 1870, "By Command of Brevet Major General Reynolds," Clay Wood to Perry 21 May 1870 and Major Henry C. Merriam to the Commander at Fort Clark 5 August 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; William K. Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 21 February 1873, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M234, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, 962 rolls, Roll 805, Seminole Agency 1872-1876, I524-73 enc. Microcopy M234 is hereafter cited as M234 followed by the roll number and reference.
28. Perry to Clay Wood 15 May 1870 and 29 May 1870, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
29. Perry to Clay Wood 20 June 1870 and "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians," R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
30. John Kibbetts to A.A.G.D.T. 8 February 1874, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Petition of Florida Seminole Negroes to President Cleveland, n.d. but received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 9 February 1888, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 3565-88; Notes on the Seminole Blacks' return to the U.S. from Mexico in 1870 in the Warren Perryman Collection, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas, hereafter cited as Warren Perryman Collection ; Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," pp.44, 47; The Scouts, text by Keith Wheeler (Alexandria, Virginia, Time-Life Books, Old West Series, 1978) p.166; Woodhull, Frost, "The Seminole Indian Scouts on the Border," Frontier Times, 15, No.3, (December 1937), 118-127, Statement of Renty Grayson, Brackettville, Texas, 1927, pp.123-124.
31. William Warrior to Secretary of the Interior 20 February 1894, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 8296-94; D.M. Browning to Warrior 3 March 1894, National Archives Record Group 75, Bureau of Indian Affairs Letters Sent and Letter Books 1881-1907, Letter Book L.275, 26 February 1894-21 March 1894, p.370, hereafter cited as R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, followed by specific reference. Warrior claimed that John Kibbetts had possessed a copy of "the treaty" but that this was destroyed by fire after his death in 1878.
32. Townsend to the Commanding General, Department of Texas, 25 June 1870, M619-799, frames 574-575.

33. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Bliss to Clay Wood 14 July 1870, p.328; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.476.
34. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Bliss to Clay Wood 14 July 1870, pp.328-329.
35. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Clay Wood to Bliss 20 July 1870, p.329.
36. Merriam to Commander at Fort Clark 5 August 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
37. "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians," Muster Roll of Seminole Negro Indians as Scouts at Fort Duncan Texas from 16 August 1870 to 16 December 1870, War Department 15, 1207/1876; Bliss to Clay Wood 8 September 1870. Here Bliss reported that, by that time, 12 had enlisted. This corresponds with the number reported in March 1872 see, Muster Roll of Seminole Negro Indian Scouts enrolled by Major Bliss at Fort Duncan Texas 6 March 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 2, p.51 and Volume 5, p.106.
38. Katz, William L., The Black West (Garden City, New York, Doubleday Publishers, 1971) p.234; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.476-477.
39. McCright, Grady E., "John Bullis: Chief Scout," True West, October 1981, 12-19, p.16.
40. Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.477; Strong, Henry W., My Frontier Days and Indian Fights on the Plains of Texas (n.p. n.d., 122 pp., typewritten and illustrated, price \$1.50) p.53. A copy of this latter publication is housed in the Library Division of the Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma at Norman.
41. A.R.C.I.A. 1870, No.123, Bliss to Clay Wood 14 July 1870, p.328.
42. "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 5, pp.108-109.
43. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," Testimony of Joe Philips of the Indian Scouts, p.44.
44. Porter, Kenneth W., Communication to Herschel Boggs, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XLV, No.4, (April 1942), 373-374, p.373.
45. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," Statement of Renty Grayson, 1927, pp.123-124; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.476.
46. The number of Seminole Black Scouts rose from 12 to 30 between March and June 1872, see, Muster Roll of Seminole Negro Indian Scouts enrolled by Major Bliss at Fort Duncan, Texas 6 March 1872 and Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 17 June 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
47. Bliss to Clay Wood 20 July 1870, M619-799, frame 162; Bliss to Clay Wood 14 December 1870, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
48. Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.476-477, 482.

49. Bliss to Adjutant General Department of Texas 26 August 1884, M619-800, frames 720-725.
50. There is no evidence that the main body of John Horse's followers ever crossed over to Texas. Indeed, over 100 must have returned to Nacimiento during the 1870s to correlate with later population statistics. By 1875, there were still only 229 Seminole Blacks living on the military reservations of Forts Duncan and Clark and this number included the Kibbetts, Daniels, and Matamoros' groups, as well as intermarried and associated Texas Freedmen, Mexican Blacks, and Mexicans. Between 100-150 of the 350 reported in 1870, therefore, must have been living elsewhere. Moreover, by the time of Mackenzie's Remolino Raid in 1873, Seminole Blacks were known to have again settled at Nacimiento. By 1891, in fact, 123 male Mascogos were living at the hacienda and during the early 1900s the Seminole Black population at Nacimiento outnumbered that of the Texas group. The Nacimiento total included a small number of Seminole Blacks who returned to Mexico from the U.S. in the late 1870s and 1880s but the population of the Texas group showed no substantial drop, remaining fairly constant at around the figure reported in 1875. Although the Nacimiento population was bolstered by local Blacks and Mexicans who became associated with the group, its foundation must have been based upon the old stock of Seminole Blacks who returned from Parras.
51. Lieutenant Colonel W. Merritt to Acting A.A.G.D.T. 4 June 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
52. Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 17 June 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
53. "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians," Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 17 June 1872, Merriam to Commander at Fort Clark 18 July 1872, 1st Endorsement to latter, Merritt to Acting A.A.G.D.T. 23 July 1872, 2nd Endorsement, J.A. Augur to Commander at Fort Clark 25 July 1872, 3rd Endorsement, Merritt to Merriam 2 August 1872, Fort Duncan Special Orders No.96, 3 August 1872, Sections vii and viii, issued by H.F. Leggett, the Post Adjutant "By order of Major Merriam," Merriam to Merritt 5 August 1872, Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 5 August 1872 and Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie to Acting A.A.G.D.T., 23 April 1873, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
54. Parker, James, The Old Army: Memories 1872-1918 (Philadelphia, Dorrance and Co. Publishers, 1929) p.99; Reeve, Frank D. (ed.), "Frederick E. Phelps: A Soldier's Memoirs," New Mexico Historical Review, 25, No.3, (July 1950), 187-221, p.203.
55. Colonel William R. Shafter to Z. Chandler 28 December 1875, M234-805, S20-76; "A Negro Trooper of the Ninth Cavalry," Frontier Times, 4, No.7, (April 1927), 9-11, p.11; Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.50; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.477-478 and n.22; Reeve (ed.), "Frederick E. Phelps," pp.215-217.
56. Lieutenant John L. Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 28 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Brigadier General E.O.C. Ord to T.G. Williams 15 June 1876, M234-805, S448-76; Conger Jones, H., "Old Seminole Scouts still thrive on Border," Frontier Times, 11, No.8, (May 1934), 327-332, p.327; Raht, Carlisle G., The Romance of Davis Mountains and the Big Bend Country (Odessa, Texas, Edition Texana, The

- Rathbooks Co. Publishers, 1963; originally published in El Paso, 1919) pp.206-207; "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 2, p.51 and Volume 5, pp.111-117.
57. "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 5, pp.111-117.
 58. Boyd, Mrs. Orsemus B., Cavalry Life in Tent and Field (New York, Selwin Tait and Sons, 1894) pp.335-337.
 59. For contemporary descriptions of the Scouts' qualities and talents see, for example, Major A.P. Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 15 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Fenley, Florence, Old timers: Their Own Stories (Uvalde, Texas, The Hornby Press, 1939) David W. Barnhill, 185-191, p.187; James, Vinton L., Frontier and Pioneer Recollections of Early Days in San Antonio and West Texas (San Antonio, Artes Graficas Press, 1938) p.26; Parker, The Old Army, pp.99-100; "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 5, pp.126-127.
 60. "Black Watch of Texas," San Antonio Express, 16 November 1924; Conger Jones, "Old Seminole Scouts," p.331; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," Statement of Renty Grayson, pp.125-126.
 61. Reeve (ed.), "Frederick E. Phelps," pp.203, 214. See also, Anderson, LaVere, Saddles and Sabers: Black Men in the Old West (Champaign, Illinois, Garrard Publishing Co., 1975) p.115; The Scouts, p.166.
 62. Bulter, Grace L., "General Bullis: Friend of the Frontier," Frontier Times, 12, No.8 (May 1935), 358-363, p.360; Sweet, Alexander E. and Knox, J. Armo, On a Mexican Mustang, through Texas, from the Gulf to the Rio Grande (Hartford, Connecticut, S.S. Scranton and Co. Publishers, 1883) pp.520-521; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," Statement of Renty Grayson, pp.124-125.
 63. Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.489.
 64. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.48; The Scouts, p.166.
 65. "Brackettville and Old Fort Clark," Frontier Times, 12, No.8, (May 1935), 349-351, p.350.
 66. "Reminiscences of Zenas Bliss," Volume 2, p.51 and Volume 5, p.109.
 67. Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 28 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
 68. James, Frontier and Pioneer Recollections, p.80.
 69. "A Negro Trooper of the Ninth Cavalry," p.11.
 70. Quoted in, Foner, Jack D., Blacks and the Military in American History (New York and Washington, Praeger Publishers, 1974), p.53.
 71. Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 17 June 1872 and 5 August 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
 72. Heitman, Francis B., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army: From its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903, 2 Vols. (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1903)

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73. Katz, Black West, p.234.
74. Brigadier General C.C. Augur to Bullis 25 October 1882, Bullis Papers, No.36719H, p.14; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," p.120.
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119. Leckie, "Red River War," pp.94, 96; Wallace, Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier, p.165.
120. Quoted in Wallace, Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier, p.166.
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122. Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," Statement of Charlie Daniels, p.122.
123. Bullis to Lieutenant G.W. Smith 27 April 1875, quoted in Department of Texas General Orders No.10, J.H. Taylor A.A.G.D.T, 12 May 1875, Copy in Bullis Papers, 36719H, p.26. See also, Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," Statement of Charlie Daniels, p.122. For standard secondary accounts of this action see, Anderson, Saddles and Sabers, pp.120-122; Katz, Black West, pp.235-236; McCright, "John Bullis: Chief Scout," p.17; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.480-481; The Scouts, p.166.

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127. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Shafter to A.A.G.D.T. 4 January 1876, quoted in, Crimmins, Martin L. (ed.), "Shafter's Explorations in Western Texas, 1875," West Texas Historical Association Yearbook, IX, (October 1933) 83-96, p.95. See also, Haley, Fort Concho, pp. 235-238; Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, pp.147-148.
128. Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," statement of Charlie Daniels, p.122.
129. Gibson, The Kickapoos, p.268; Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, pp.149-151; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.484; Rodenbough, Theodore F. and Haskin, William L., The Army of the United States: Historical Sketches of Staff and Line with Portraits of Generals-in-Chief (New York, Maynard, Merrill and Company, 1896), p.295; Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis, pp.188-189; Wallace, Edward S., "General John Lapham Bullis: Thunderbolt of the Texas Frontier," Part 2, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LV, (July 1951), 77-85, p.82.
130. Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis, 8 January 1878, p.189.
131. Bullis to First Lieutenant Helenus Dodt 9 July 1877, Mexican Border Troubles, p.189.
132. Raht, Romance of Davis Mountains, p.205.
133. Shafter to Ord 7 July 1877 telegram, Bullis to Dodt 9 July 1877, First Endorsement to latter, Shafter 9 July 1877 and Major G.W. Schofield to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of Nueces, n.d., Mexican Border Troubles, pp.172, 189-190, 195; Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis, 8 January 1878, p.191.
134. Heitman, Historical Register, Volume 2, p.443; Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, p.154; Rodenbough and Haskin, Army of the United States, p.275; Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis 8 January 1878, pp.191-192. Bullis mistakenly reported that this action took place in late October 1877 and later contradicted his own testimony by recounting that he had taken part in the Sierra del Carmen campaign at that same time. See ibid., pp.194-195.

135. Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis, 8 January 1878, pp.194-195.
136. Reeve (ed.), "Frederick E. Phelps," pp.206-207.
137. Duval, Burr G., "Journal of a Prospecting Trip to West Texas in 1879: Notes of an exploring expedition organized by the Galveston, Houston and San Antonio Rail Road, the International and Great Northern Rail Road and the Texas and Pacific Rail Road for the purpose of examining the mineral resources East of the Rio Grande River in Presidio County, Texas," 116 pp. typewritten manuscript, p.39, in Duval, J.C. and Burr, G. Papers (1836-1937) Manuscript No.656, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin. Parts of this journal have been reproduced in, Woodford, Sam. (ed.), "The Burr G. Duval Diary," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXV, No.4, (April 1962), 487-511: see p.496.
138. Texas Border Troubles, Testimony of Bullis, 8 January 1878, p.195.
139. Heitman, Historical Register, p.443; Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, pp.154-155; "Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians in Texas," p.111; Reeve (ed.), "Frederick E. Phelps," pp.209-214.
140. Mackenzie to A.A.G.D.T. 23 June 1878, Report of Expedition into Mexico, in Wallace (ed.), Mackenzie's Official Correspondence, 1873-1879, pp.204-209 and notes 2 and 3.
141. Wallace, Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier, pp.176-182.
142. Parker, The Old Army, p.109.
143. Quoted in Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, p.143. For a detailed description of the scout see, Shafter to A.A.G.D.T. 4 January 1876, in Crimmins, (ed.), "Shafter's Exploration in Western Texas," pp.82-96.
144. Crimmins, "Mackenzie and Fort Concho," pp.29-30; Haley, Fort Concho, pp.232-238; Leckie, Buffalo Soldiers, pp.147-148.
145. Captain Jno. L. Rodgers, "Road Building on the Pecos River Texas, September, October, November 1878," in Fort Clark Records, Manuscript No.757, Box 2Q512, Volume of zeroxed correspondence and additional miscellaneous material relating to the period 1878-1881, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin, hereafter cited as Fort Clark Records, followed by specific reference.
146. Message from Bullis, presumably to Captain J. McNaught, Commanding the Expedition, received at Camp on the Pecos at 1:30 p.m. 14 October 1879, Bullis to H.A. Greene, from the Camp of the Seminole Black Scouts near the Mouth of the Pecos, 26 October 1879, entitled, "Report of a scout to Peña Blanco, and upon the selection of a route for a wagon road to Peña Negra" and First Endorsement to latter, McNaught, 1 November 1879, in Fort Clark Records, Box 2Q512.
147. Raht, Romance of Davis Mountains, p.207.
148. Duval, "Journal of a Prospecting Trip to West Texas in 1879," p.39 et.seq.

149. In October 1881, the Seminole Black Scouts had one other brush with Indian raiders in west Texas, but this encounter is not listed in Heitman's Historical Register as an engagement. On the 21st, it was reported that a detachment of Seminole Black scouts had run across a band of hostiles, "On the Rio Grande below the Rinconada near Antonia Cañon about 25 miles above Eagles Nest". The Indians escaped but the scouts were able to capture 13 head of stock, some of which was recognized as having been stolen from settlers at Independence Creek on the Pecos, Captain James F. Randlett, Commanding Camp at Mayer Spring, Texas, to Post Adjutant Fort Clark 21 October 1881, R.G 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 19982-81.
150. Stanley to Adjutant General 6 May 1890, in Bullis Papers, 36719H, p.13; Gray, Frank S., Pioneering in Southwest Texas: True Stories of Early Day Experiences in Edwards and Adjoining Counties, Edited by Hunter, Marvin J. (Austin, the Steck Co., 1949) p.241; "Last Indian Raid in Southwest Texas," taken from the San Antonio Light, 25 May 1924, Frontier Times, 4, No.11, (August 1927), 58-59, p.58.
151. Stanley to Adjutant General 6 May 1890. See also, Stanley to C.C. Augur 6 May 1881, in Bullis Papers, 36719H, pp.13, 24.
152. Sowell, Andrew J., Early Settlers and Indian Fighters of Southwest Texas (Austin, Ben C. Jones Co. Publishers, 1900) pp.516-517; Sowell, Andrew J., "Last Indian Raid in Frio Canyon," Frontier Times, 24, No.11, (August 1947), 500-503, p.502.
153. Major General Schofield to Adjutant General, telegram, 7 May 1881, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 7934-81; Sweitzer (no initial), Commanding at Fort Clark, to A.A.G.D.T. 6 May 1881, Stanley to C.C. Augur 6 May 1881, C.C. Augur to Adjutant General, Military Division of the Missouri, 27 September 1881 and Stanley to Adjutant General 6 May 1890, in Bullis Papers, 36719H, pp.25, 24, 23, 13; Bulter, "General Bullis," pp.360-361; "Last Indian Raid in Southwest Texas," p.59; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.489-490; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," Statement of Charlie Daniels, p.123. "For his perseverance, skill and good management of this successful expedition" and his earlier "gallant services in action against Indians, near Saragossa, Mexico, July 30, 1876", Bullis was breveted Major on 27 February 1890. See, Stanley to Adjutant General 6 May 1890, "Statement as to the military record of John L. Bullis" and C.C. Augur, Statement, 2 June 1890, in Bullis Papers, 36719H, p. 13 and Enclosure 1, pp.1, 3.
154. James, Frontier and Pioneer Recollections, p.26.
155. C.C. Augur to Bullis 25 October 1882, in Bullis Papers 36719H, p.14; Wallace, "Thunderbolt of the Texas Frontier," Part 2, p.85.
156. Rister, Southwestern Frontier, pp.268-269.
157. Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, p.221; Ritzenthaler and Peterson, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, p.25.

CHAPTER 4

THE SEMINOLE BLACKS ON THE TEXAS-MEXICAN FRONTIER,
1870-1914

In the early 1870s, most of the Seminole Blacks who had removed to Mexico with Wild Cat returned to the U.S. They had been led to believe that they would be restored to their former homes in the Indian Territory as soon as possible and had received assurances from American military officials to that effect. While awaiting clearance to begin the journey northward, the Blacks were settled in temporary camps on the military reservations of the west Texas garrisons and the able-bodied men were employed as scouts. Yet though the Blacks kept their part of the bargain, returning to Texas peacefully and giving excellent service to the army on the frontier, the U.S. failed to honour its promises and reneged on its obligations to the group. After 1870, the Seminole Blacks on the Texas-Mexican frontier went to great lengths to bring about their removal to the Indian Territory, but only a handful succeeded in actually making the journey.

During the 1870s and 1880s, the Seminole Blacks became the subjects of a fierce inter-departmental wrangle within the U.S. government, involving the Indian Bureau, the Interior and War Departments and the Office of the Adjutant General, over who had authorized their return to Texas and which was responsible for their upkeep and ultimate removal to the Indian Territory. Although all of these departments had favoured and played a part in effecting the return of the Seminole Blacks to the U.S., each denied responsibility once they were resident in Texas. The matter was clearly of low priority to government officials. Not only had the possibility of collusion between the Seminole Blacks and hostile frontier tribes been removed but also the Scouts were playing a vital role in ridding west Texas of depredating Indian bands. The Blacks' cause was strongly supported

throughout the period by military officials, who had reason to be grateful for the Scouts' services and were familiar with their plight, but their efforts proved fruitless. The earlier promises to the Seminole Blacks, as well as the wishes and needs of the group, were almost entirely forgotten as the buck was passed around the various government offices in Washington.

The experience of the Seminole Blacks on the Texas-Mexican frontier once again came to be dominated by frustration, insecurity, conflict and poverty. For many years they remained in an unsettled condition, only temporarily located on the military reservations, eagerly awaiting their removal to the Seminole nation. Government rations to the group as a whole were soon discontinued and, as work was scarce in so remote a location, the Blacks became dependent upon the wages of the Scouts and the few crops they were able to raise. Many became utterly destitute. Some took to stealing from neighbouring ranches and trouble broke out with the local white community. Exploited and oppressed, the Blacks again became factionalized and dislocated. The various bands separated in Texas and many Blacks, despairing of ever finding peace or prosperity in the U.S., returned once more to Mexico to rejoin their kinsmen at Nacimiento.

By 1880, it had become clear that the U.S. no longer had any intention of returning the Seminole Blacks to the Indian Territory. As Indian depredations on the frontier were rapidly declining, moreover, it seemed probable that the duties of the Scouts would be either reduced or disbanded altogether, spelling disaster for the group as a whole. Consequently, a number of the leading enlisted men pursued a separate initiative aimed at their removing independently to the Seminole nation. The group's removal was subsequently opposed by the progressive-dominated tribal council and the U.S. government concurred with its decision. Undaunted, a number of Blacks removed independently and without authorization to the Seminole nation and settled easily into the Freedman communities. Sub-

sequent petitions by the Seminole Blacks remaining in Texas proved fruitless and the group came to accept that its future lay not in the Indian Territory but on the Texas-Mexican frontier.

The Texas group remained as virtual squatters at Fort Clark until 1914 when the Scouts were disbanded and the Blacks ordered to leave the garrison. Thrown into an unfamiliar and unsympathetic white world without land, money or jobs, the Blacks nevertheless managed to establish a thriving settlement at nearby Brackettville. The Nacimiento group, meanwhile, again had to struggle to overcome hostile Indians, Mexican revolutionaries and harsh climatic conditions. The two settlements once more came to resemble maroon communities on the frontier. Strong relations have been maintained between the Texas and Nacimiento groups and efforts have been made to retain links with the Freedmen in the Indian Territory. With the failure of the plan to restore these Blacks to the Indian Territory in the 1870s and 1880s, however, substantial relations between them and the Seminoles came to an end at that time. Today, the Texas and Nacimiento groups remain in their remote communities on the U.S.-Mexican border and there is, at this time, no prospect of a re-establishment of their former association with the Seminoles.

The controversy over who had authorized the removal of the Seminole Blacks to Texas, and hence who was responsible for their upkeep and ultimate restoration to the Indian Territory, dated back to the time they first returned to the U.S. In April 1870, Ely S. Parker, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, recounted that in his Annual Report for 1869 he had recommended that the Seminole Blacks be returned to the Indian Territory, but hastily added that his department had not the means to effect the object. If the military would conduct them to the Seminole nation and arrange for their subsistence en route, however, the Indian Bureau would then assume responsibility and provide for their resettlement. An official

copy of Parker's report was furnished to the Commander of the Department of Texas by the Adjutant General on 10 May with the remark that the Secretary of War declined to give any orders under the circumstances. As a result, on 21 May, the Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan was instructed by the Department to effect the removal of the Seminole Blacks to Texas, encourage them to remain at his post, and issue them rations until he received further orders.¹

In early October, Secretary of War William K. Belknap applied to the Department of the Interior for means to pay the expenses of the John Horse party which was expected to remove to Texas shortly.² In reply, the Indian Bureau stated that it had at its disposal an appropriation of "\$25,000 made at the last session of Congress to enable the Secretary of the Interior to collect bands of Kickapoo or other Indians roving on the borders of Texas and Mexico and to relocate and subsist them in the Indian Territory", which would "cover the case in question".³ Belknap interpreted this statement as meaning that the Interior Department was prepared not only to bear the cost of removals but also to subsist the Seminole Blacks while they remained in Texas, as they were supposedly en route to the Indian Territory. Military officials in Texas subsequently continued to issue rations to the entire group on a regular basis from army supplies but the expenses were "borne on a separate abstract with a view to reimbursement by the Department of the Interior from the appropriation".⁴ In the mistaken belief that it would be repaid in full, the War Department continued to support this arrangement for over two years without complaint.⁵

In the summer of 1872, the Office of the Adjutant General issued General Order Number 54, which forbade the regular issue of army rations to Indians. The Chief Commissary of Subsistence in the Department of Texas was of the opinion that the order included the Seminole Blacks and, in early August, the matter was referred to the Commanding Officer at Fort

Duncan, Major Henry C. Merriam, for a report. In reply, Merriam recommended that the issue of rations to the group be continued. The Seminole Blacks had expected to be removed to the Indian Territory at any time and were poorly prepared to provide for themselves. If the rations were withdrawn, at least without considerable warning, they would be driven to support themselves by illegitimate means, or would return to Mexico where they could prove a menace to the frontier. In the light of Merriam's recommendation, supplies continued to be issued to the group while the subject was put before the Department of the Interior for its consideration.⁶

On 12 September, Belknap informed Acting Secretary of the Interior B.R. Cowen that the War Department had to discontinue issuing the Seminole Blacks with army supplies as the military derived no benefit from this expensive practice.⁷ He then referred back to "the arrangements" made with the Department of the Interior in 1870 and requested that the Indian Bureau be directed to assume its responsibilities and take up the burden of the Blacks' subsistence.⁸ The Bureau now had at its disposal over \$60,000 for collecting, relocating and subsisting bands of Indians, living on the Texas-Mexican frontier, in the Indian Territory. Cowen believed, however, that he had no authority to use these funds to subsist the Seminole Blacks while they remained at Forts Duncan and Clark. The group had by that time been living in Texas for over two years and could not possibly be considered as being en route to the Indian Territory. Instead, he authorized Commissioner of Indian Affairs F.A. Walker to ascertain if the Blacks were willing to return to the Indian Territory. If they were, "Immediate measures should be taken to accompany that result",⁹ and Walker added that once they had removed, "The appropriation... would be made available for relieving their present necessities".¹⁰ The Department of the Interior seemed set at last to effect the return of the Blacks to the Seminole nation.

In response to enquiries from the Indian Bureau, Merriam reported in late October that the Seminole Blacks were willing to make the journey to the Indian Territory and that this had been their intention in crossing over to Texas. Indeed, they had been waiting to remove for over two years and had more than once shown impatience at the delay. All that they needed were instructions, transportation and subsistence for the duration of the journey. On 15 November, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, the Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, endorsed the report with the recommendation that the Blacks be removed forthwith.¹¹

Upon receiving Merriam's report, however, Walker reconsidered the case and completely reversed his earlier recommendation that the funds at his disposal be made available to the Seminole Blacks if they chose to return to the Indian Territory. Walker could find no evidence that his department had authorized their removal from Mexico and was of the opinion that they should not have been removed at all. Under the circumstances, the Indian Bureau had no obligation whatsoever to the group. Moreover, in an obvious reference to the Seminole Blacks' colour, Walker stated that he did not believe the afore-mentioned funds had been appropriated "to defray the expenses of moving and subsisting these persons". Finally, in the mistaken supposition that it was intended to resettle the Blacks among the Creeks, Walker pronounced that they had failed to return to the Creek nation within the year specified by the 1866 treaty, therefore did not qualify for equal rights and privileges with native citizens, and should not be forced upon that tribe. In short, the Commissioner had refused both to subsist the group in Texas or allow it to remove to the Indian Territory. In his concluding remarks, Walker admitted that he did not know what could be done for the Seminole Blacks. He was adamant, however, that "they should not be turned over to this Bureau to be cared for".¹² Cowen concurred with Walker's assessment, forwarded his decision

to Belknap, and passed the case back to the War Department.¹³ As 1872 drew to a close, it began to seem unlikely that the Blacks' removal to the Seminole nation would ever be effected.

In January 1873, the matter was referred to Lieutenant General Sheridan for his consideration.¹⁴ After examining the facts of the case, Sheridan concluded that both the military and the Indian Bureau had been instrumental in bringing about the return of the Seminole Blacks to the U.S. and that both, therefore, had obligations to the group. He believed it would be "a very cruel thing to drive these negro Indians back into Mexico" and recommended that a permanent tract of land at Elm Creek be assigned to the group from the military reservation at Fort Duncan. The land, which could easily be spared, should be allotted to the heads of families so that they could establish farms. Sheridan expressed astonishment at the Indian Bureau's "pronounced and unequivocal denial of support" for the Blacks and requested that it reconsider its decision, if only as a favour to the military.¹⁵ Belknap referred Sheridan's report to Secretary of the Interior C. Delano, and used the opportunity to expound further upon the part played by the Commissioners of Indian Affairs in bringing into effect the Blacks' removal to Texas. On 5 March, Delano admitted that the rulings of the Indian Bureau had been contradictory and recommended that the case be investigated by the Assistant Attorney General,¹⁶ but his suggestion was never taken up. The question of what should be done with the Seminole Blacks remained unanswered and the subject once again fell into abeyance.

Frustrated by the endless machinations of government, the leaders of the Seminole Blacks began to give vent to their demands and grievances. On 28 June, shortly after the Remolino raid, Elijah Daniels, John Ward and James Bruner, the leading members of the Daniels' band at Fort Clark, filed a petition with Colonel Ranauld S. Mackenzie, then in command of the

post, for, "A Track of Land in the state of Arkansaw wher we can have a home for Life Time". The Blacks requested that some of their old men be first allowed to view the tract before starting out. If the land was deemed satisfactory they would require subsistence during the journey and arms and rations on arrival, "Until we can get a starte in making somithing". Once they were established, however, the Blacks would ask nothing more of the government than to be treated the same as Indians.¹⁷ Both Mackenzie and Sheridan supported their petition and recommended that they be removed to Fort Sill, in the Indian Territory. The Blacks should be settled on part of the land occupied by the Kiowas and Comanches at the post as they were industrious and would be more likely to establish farms, cultivate the land, and support themselves than the Indians. Some of the men could also be enlisted, if needed.¹⁸ Despite the strong support it received, however, the proposed removal of the Daniels' band to the Indian Territory never came about.

The Seminole Blacks were soon to come up against the greatest crisis they had faced since their return to Texas. In early December, the Department of Texas ordered that, except for regularly enlisted men, the Blacks should cease to be issued with rations after Christmas week. The women, children, old and infirm of the group had previously received rations even if they did not belong to families of enlisted scouts and had come to rely almost completely upon these issues for their subsistence. Beginning in 1874, the entire Seminole Black community would have to survive on the wages and rations of the Scouts and the small number of laundresses employed by the military,¹⁹ supplemented by whatever the women could earn in the neighbouring towns and the few crops they could raise around their makeshift settlements. Many faced the awful prospect of poverty, starvation and destitution.

Elijah Daniels was the undisputed chief of the band at Fort Clark

and John Kibbetts had been acknowledged as head of the Seminole Black Scouts since their first enlistment. After John Horse had removed to Texas, however, there had been some contention over who should be considered the overall leader of the group at Fort Duncan, and this may have been partly responsible for the transfer of Daniels and his supporters to Fort Clark. In early December, the 130 Seminole Blacks at Duncan held an election and voted Kibbetts headman over Horse by a majority of 17.²⁰ The aging but knowledgeable and experienced John Horse thereafter assumed a patriarchal role and was frequently consulted on important matters affecting the group. As the seriousness of the decision to terminate the rations of most of the Seminole Blacks was realized, both Kibbetts and Horse were sent to San Antonio to appeal their case before the Department Commander, Brigadier General C.C. Augur.

Kibbetts and Horse presented a long, varied list of requests and grievances to Augur. John Horse was in sole possession of the title to the Seminole Blacks' land grant at Nacimientos and was anxious to have it recorded and guaranteed in the U.S. In case he should die, Augur should consult with his son, Joe Coon, "Who can claim the land as our own". Horse further requested that his followers be reimbursed by the government for the losses they incurred in removing from Mexico, as had been promised, and hoped that Augur would see fit to provide him with "a little money for a Christmas gift".²¹ Kibbetts spoke at length on behalf of his men. He requested that the Scouts be permitted to keep their horses at the Blacks' camp at Elm Creek instead of at the picket line at Fort Duncan, some three miles distant. Their quota of forage for horses employed in military service, which had been reduced, should also be restored in full. Furthermore, scouts ordered out at night should not be sent alone but in pairs for mutual protection against Indian attacks. Finally, his men should not be required to work on menial tasks around the post, such

as wood-cutting, when not on expedition but should be used exclusively for scouting duty.²² Of most immediate and vital concern to the group as a whole, however, were the questions of removal and the stoppage of rations and it was to these matters that the two leaders devoted most of their petition.

Both Kibbetts and Horse requested that full rations be restored to all of the Seminole Blacks as there was little hope of their finding work in the neighbouring settlements and the wages and issues of the Scouts were insufficient to support them. They asked, moreover, that the men who had married into the group be permitted to enlist as scouts to bolster the total income of the community. As he was head of the Scouts and received a sergeant's pay, Kibbetts was not inclined personally to quit Fort Duncan but he expressed the sincere hope that all the Seminole Blacks who could not enlist would be allowed to remove.²³ John Horse and most of the group, meanwhile, were anxious to leave the military reservation and were prepared to move to Florida, the Indian Territory, or, as the leaders of the Daniels' band had requested earlier, Arkansas. Horse concluded by requesting that the President be petitioned on their behalf to provide the necessary land for a permanent home where they could live in peace, educate their children, and practise their religion.²⁴

In a few sentences, John Horse had expressed the key to the Seminole Blacks' way of thinking. The Blacks had viewed the old alliance with the Seminoles in Florida and Mexico primarily as a convenient arrangement designed to help secure their freedom and independence and retain their identity as a social group. Once slavery was abolished in the U.S. the need for such an alliance was obviously removed. From the late 1860s onwards, the Seminole Black maroons on the Texas-Mexican frontier expressed a wish to return to the Seminole nation, but this was spurred by the possibilities of land ownership and opportunity, not by the prospect of a re-establishment

of their former relationship with the Seminoles. After 1865, the Seminole nation was a desirable location for Blacks to live in, and the former emigrants were well aware of this. Essentially, they hoped to cash in on their links with the tribe to acquire land in the Freedman communities and other benefits and privileges in the nation. However, and it cannot be stressed too strongly, the Seminole Blacks were also prepared to take land in almost any other acceptable area, provided that they were allowed to stay together as a group. Thus, during the course of his lifetime, John Horse sought land for his people in Florida, the Indian Territory, Arkansas, Texas, Mexico, and even Africa. After 1870, U.S. officials concentrated on resettling the Blacks in the Seminole nation not because that was the only location they would consider but because it offered the only practical alternative, that was attractive to them, to their either remaining as squatters on the military reservations in Texas or returning to Mexico to constitute a threat to the border country. The close proximity of the Seminoles was no longer important to the Blacks and was certainly not a precondition for their acceptance of land. What the Seminole Blacks in Texas really wanted was a place of their own where they could lead their lives independently and peacefully. In the final analysis, they were only interested in reviving their association with the Seminoles as long as it offered the prospect of providing such a place.

Although he could see both the justice of their cause and the tragedy of their predicament, Brigadier General Augur could offer no hope to the two Seminole Black leaders. He informed them that the Indian Bureau had refused to help and the War Department could do nothing beyond enlisting the men who were fit for service. They replied by asking what was to become of the women, children, aged and sick who were not members of the families of enlisted scouts. To this, Augur later admitted, "I was unable to make any satisfactory answer".²⁵ Seeing that it was hopeless to pursue

the matter further at this time, Kibbetts and Horse returned to Duncan with the grim news that the Seminole Blacks faced a bleak New Year.

The order to terminate the rations of the majority of the Seminole Blacks was implemented on 10 January 1874. The 37 women and 48 children of the group at Duncan had continued to receive issues until then "under the orders heretofore in existence" but from that day on rations were furnished only to the enlisted scouts and laundresses.²⁶ On 8 February, Kibbetts complained that the government, in discontinuing the issues, had turned its back upon "the agreement" it had made with the Blacks in 1870 in which it had promised to, "Provide and furnish our families the Indian ration on condition that we the able-bodied men would serve the United States as enlisted Scouts". As Fort Duncan was so isolated, the women and children were unable to find work and consequently were starving. The Scouts were unable to bear the burden of supporting the entire Seminole Black community, and Kibbetts anxiously requested that their rations be restored in full.²⁷

Kibbetts' petition was strongly supported by both Lieutenant John L. Bullis and Augur. Bullis, in close touch with the situation at Duncan at this time, "earnestly recommended that something be done" to alleviate the suffering of the women and children.²⁸ Augur went further; if the government did not agree to either remove the Blacks to the Indian Territory or furnish them subsistence where they were, they would be driven, "in sheer desperation to prevent starving", to steal from the local white settlements. Retaliation by the whites would inevitably follow and the cost of restoring peace would far outweigh that of the supplies Kibbetts requested. Furthermore, Walker's earlier decision to disavow responsibility for the group had been hasty and ill-considered. The Blacks were encompassed not by the Creek but the Seminole treaty of 1866. This latter had no limitation as to when they could return to the Seminole nation and Augur

believed there could be "no doubt... as to their entire right to return there now". The Blacks' only requirements would be transportation, and subsistence during the journey and for a limited period after their arrival. Trying to be as accommodating as possible, Augur stated that, if it were decided to remove the group, he could spare a sufficient number of teamsters to effect the object during the summer.²⁹

After considering Kibbetts' petition and the recommendations of Bullis and Augur, the Acting Commissary General reported that a special appropriation would be required before the military could feed the Seminole Blacks legally. He believed that it would be far more appropriate for the Indian Bureau to supply them with rations. On 9 April, therefore, Belknap once again referred these proposals to the Secretary of the Interior with the request that the Indian Bureau be instructed to provide subsistence for the Blacks and make arrangements for their removal to the Indian Territory.³⁰

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Ed. P. Smith, decided that he required more information before being able to make a recommendation upon the proposals referred to him. As a result, on 31 July, special commissioners H.M. Atkinson and T.G. Williams, who were in the vicinity of Forts Duncan and Clark trying to bring about the removal of the remaining Mexican Kickapoos, were asked to furnish a report.³¹ In the meantime, the Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan had found it necessary to provide 10 destitute Seminole Blacks with subsistence to prevent their starvation. The 10 were issued with rations during June and July but it was decided that, as it had no authority to feed them, the military had to discontinue the practice at the end of August. The Commissary General and Belknap both recommended that the Indian Bureau assume the burden of their subsistence but, on 20 August, Acting Commissioner H.R. Clum replied that there were no funds at his disposal to defray the expense of feeding them while they remained in Texas. At the end of the month, therefore, and with winter just around the corner, these utterly dependent Seminole Blacks were once again abandoned

by the government.³²

On 16 November, Atkinson forwarded his report to Smith. The special commissioners concurred with Sheridan's earlier assessment that both the military and the Indian Bureau had been partially responsible for the return of the Seminole Blacks from Mexico. A number of the old men, women and children were "in a destitute condition" and, in view of this and their apparent "treaty right to the protection and care of the Government", Atkinson recommended that they be removed to a reservation in the Indian Territory and there subsisted until they could support themselves. The expense could be defrayed out of the funds Smith had at his disposal for collecting, subsisting and removing roving bands from the Texas-Mexican frontier. By 20 December, however, it had become clear that the Indian Bureau was disinclined to act upon this recommendation and Atkinson again wrote to Smith informing him that the condition of the Seminole Blacks had worsened considerably since his last report and many were now completely destitute. They were anxious to remove to the Indian Territory and Atkinson proposed that he and Williams be authorized to take them there.³³ Once again, however, no action was taken and the Seminole Blacks spent yet another winter, cold and hungry, on the military reservations.

From March to May 1875, censuses of the Seminole Blacks at Forts Duncan and Clark were taken under orders from Atkinson and the latest Commander of the Department of Texas, Brigadier General E.O.C. Ord. In early March, the Post Commanders were instructed by Atkinson to conduct surveys of the Blacks, "With the object of ascertaining their number, age, sex, condition (able-bodied + c. or not), and what were their wishes in regard to removal to the Indian Territory".³⁴ Lieutenant A.C. Markley consequently completed a census of the Kibbetts' group on 12 March and this, together with his report, was forward to Atkinson by Lieutenant Colonel William R. Shafter, the Commander of Fort Duncan, on the 14th.

Atkinson was also furnished later with the corresponding census details of the Daniels' band which Lieutenant Bullis had returned to the Post Adjutant, with a report, on 1 May.³⁵

After completing the survey at Fort Clark, a further report on the destitute condition of the Daniels' band was sent to Ord by the Post Commander, Major A.P. Morrow, on 3 May.³⁶ Earlier, on 28 April, Ord had felt it necessary to issue Department of Texas Special Order Number 80, without consulting his superiors. Section 3 provided that the Commanding Officer at Duncan would be permitted to issue rations to the Seminole Blacks at that post whenever this was deemed necessary "to prevent suffering among the helpless".³⁷ Upon receiving Morrow's communication, Ord decided that more precise information on the numbers and condition of the Blacks at both Duncan and Clark was needed before he could proceed further on the question of the issuing of rations. On 5 May, therefore, he also ordered the two Commanders to conduct surveys at their posts. Markley subsequently took another revised, updated, and probably more accurate census of the Kibbetts group on 9 May and this was forwarded to the Department Commander, with a report, by Shafter, the following day. On the 15th, Ord was also furnished with details of the census Bullis had earlier completed for Atkinson, together with a report from Morrow.³⁸ These censuses and accompanying reports provide the most detailed statistical information available on the two Seminole Black communities in Texas at that time.

The findings of Lieutenant Markley at Fort Duncan were the first to be presented to both Atkinson and Ord. His census of 9 May listed 107 Seminole Blacks living on Elm Creek. The group was divided into 25 family units headed by that of the Chief, John Kibbetts, with one scout, Henry Vaughn, and one old woman, Juana Washington, listed alone. Nineteen of the men were enlisted scouts and another two, Dan Johnson and Peter Bruno, were young and strong but had been rejected by the military as worthless.

These were deemed to be totally independent. Fifty-five women and children, moreover, were either self-supporting or members of the Scouts' families and required no assistance. Of the others, three men and four women were "old and helpless" and required continuous assistance. These included Cuffee Payne and his wife Betsy, Cyrus Bowlegs and his wife Mina, Calo Wilson and his wife Lucy, and Juana Washington. Furthermore, two men, four women and 11 children were reported as requiring occasional help. Included among this number were John Horse and his wife Susie, who had been described in the 12 March census as "decrepit" and "infirm" respectively. Markley's assessment that these 17 required only "some assistance" may have been, at least in part, misguided, as in March he had described six of them as being "destitute" and a seventh, Tina Killey, "decrepit". Scout George Washington had also been hospitalized following a gunshot wound and his wife Tina, and their six children, required temporary help. Thus, at the time of the second census, 31 out of 107, or nearly 30% of the Seminole Blacks at Fort Duncan, required some degree of assistance from the government.³⁹

Although there was widespread destitution among the Seminole Blacks at Duncan, they now showed a decided unwillingness to return to the Indian Territory. While conducting the March census, Markley asked each of the Blacks if he or she wished to remove and, with the exception of Kibbetts, who was uncertain, they all replied that they definitely did not. The very old and decrepit, who were among the most destitute and would seem to have had most to gain from the move, were the most adamant, answering that, as they had not long to live, they did not wish to make a fresh start but preferred to die in Texas. It seems probable that these old Blacks still harboured hopes that the government would provide for them, but, as Markley realized, realistically they had "but starvation or charity to look forward to".⁴⁰ Clearly, a mixture of lethargy and scepticism, induced by so long

a wait, had worked to undermine, at least temporarily, the resolve of the Kibbetts' group to remove to the Indian Territory.

In May, Shafter recommended that, except for the Scouts, rations should only be issued to the Blacks after an examination of each individual applicant and an assessment of the merits of each case as they could "all do something towards their own support". When rations had previously been issued to the entire group the scouts would not re-enlist after the expiration of their term of service but would "run about the country" for up to three months, only returning to military service when they were desperate for money. Now, with their families totally dependent upon them for support, they were anxious to be retained continuously in service and were proving more useful than ever before. Shafter held the opinion, therefore, that, except for the entirely helpless, and occasional assistance to the sick and women and children who had no man to provide for them, rations should not be issued to the unenlisted Blacks.⁴¹ Though Shafter thus recommended only limited assistance to certain members of the Seminole Black community, his suggestions would appear most humane and generous in the light of the action subsequently taken by the government in regard to this matter.

The census of the Daniels' band at Fort Clark was not as detailed as that completed at Fort Duncan, but it nevertheless contained the most important statistics of the community. Bullis listed 151 Seminole Blacks living on Las Moras Creek. The group included 29 scouts, seven unenlisted but able-bodied men, and 26 women who lived with them, who were deemed to be independent. Twenty-two others obviously needed assistance as 11 men and 11 women were described as "old and destitute". Also listed were 67 children, 55 aged under 12 and totally dependent, and 12 aged between 12 and 16, but, unfortunately, no statement as to their condition accompanied these figures.⁴² Around 33 to 40 per cent of the group's total population

probably needed some degree of assistance from the government, however, as it was reported that "about seven families", or "from 50 to 60 of the old men, women and children", were prepared to remove to the Indian Territory as they were unable to work and found themselves "almost in a state of destitution".⁴³

Since the stoppage of rations, the Blacks at Clark had been most dissatisfied. The means at their disposal could not match their needs and they had been driven to steal cattle from neighbouring ranches in order to survive. Bullis recommended that the old people and children be removed to the Indian Territory as the other members of the group would then feel more at ease in Texas. The government should purchase a reservation for those who were to remain behind where they could build farms as, after a little initial support, they would soon thrive. Morrow agreed that the destitute should be allowed to remove to the Indian Territory and concluded his 3 May report by adding that, should they not be, they ought once again to be issued the "Indian Ration".⁴⁴

In spite of the recommendation of Shafter, Bullis and Morrow, however, the destitute among the Seminole Blacks were neither removed nor granted assistance by the government. During the second week of May, they were dealt a crushing blow when, in consequence of a report from the Acting Commissary General that his department had no appropriation applicable to their subsistence, Belknap declined to approve Special Order 80, Section 3.⁴⁵ Upon receiving word of Belknap's decision, Ord wrote to the Adjutant General requesting that the Indian Bureau be asked to assume the responsibility for removing the "destitute and helpless" Seminole Blacks at Duncan to the Indian Territory. Arrangements for their transportation and subsistence en route could presumably be made by the Commissioner with the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments. Sheridan supported Ord's recommendation, and on 10 June it was referred to the Secretary of the Interior for his

consideration.⁴⁶

The plight of the Daniels' band was again described by Bullis in late May. The group was "in a very needy and destitute condition" and many complaints had been received from local ranchers of stock stolen by the Seminole Blacks to stave off starvation. Many of the younger Blacks had recently been set to return to Mexico because of these problems and had only just been prevented from doing so by the older members of the group. Stressing the important role the Scouts were playing on the frontier, Bullis inferred that action should be taken by the government to put an end to their grievances. In his endorsement of the report, Morrow recommended that he be granted authority to issue the Indian ration to the destitute Blacks as otherwise they would be left with the choice of "stealing or starving". Ord concurred, adding that the Scouts' families had no means of subsistence while the men were in the field and should be issued rations during those periods. The old and destitute, moreover, "should be fed or sent to reservations". Bullis' report and its accompanying recommendations were forwarded to the Adjutant General by Sheridan, "As a last hope that some action will be taken to meet the wants of a deserving people whose service has been and can still be made so valuable to the Government".⁴⁷

The matter was referred to the Commissary General who reported back that his department was unable to proffer assistance to the Blacks at Clark as it still had no appropriation applicable to their subsistence.⁴⁸ Consequently, Belknap wrote to Delano requesting him to instruct the Indian Bureau to make provision for the Daniels' band as the supplies of the War Department were exhausted.⁴⁹ On 23 June, Clum returned his decision on Ord's earlier recommendation regarding the Kibbetts' band at Duncan. As the Blacks had expressed unwillingness to remove to the Indian Territory and the Bureau had no funds at its disposal to subsist them while they remained in Texas, Clum believed his department was not in a position to

help in any way. Moreover, when he furnished Belknap with this report, Delano extended his decision to include the Daniels' band. Belknap replied by stating that, as it had no applicable appropriation at its disposal, his department could not be held responsible for their subsistence or "for any outbreak which may occur by reason of their not being fed".⁵⁰ Yet again, both the Interior and War Departments had refused to either remove or subsist the destitute Seminole Blacks, and had completely disavowed responsibility for their future welfare.

In early August, the latest Commander at Clark, Colonel Edward Hatch, reported that the Daniels' band had presented him with various requests. The Blacks asked to be either given land suitable for cultivation around the post, or be removed to Florida, so that they could become self-supporting. In Texas, all the workable land was already in the hands of large capitalists and beyond the means of poor people such as themselves. In Florida, however, they could rent good land and eventually purchase it from the fruits of their labour. Large areas of the state were still vacant and its beneficial climate and productive soil would assure their success.

Hatch believed that it would be both humane and economical to either give the Seminole Blacks land, or return them to Florida. Their removal would not be expensive and, if they were issued rations for a year while they became established, they would soon thrive and prove an asset to that state. They had experience of growing cotton, sugar, and corn, and, as the old men pointed out, if all else failed the Florida fisheries could provide them with a living. The Seminole Blacks were "entirely distinct from the Seminole Indians" and were like other Blacks except that they were "accustomed to arms", "brave and daring", and "superior to the Indians of this region in fighting qualities". If their requests were not granted, they would, in all probability, return to Mexico, furnish an asylum for both Black and white renegades, and engage in depredating excursions into

Texas.⁵¹ Ord concurred completely. The old and extremely young were "very destitute" and lived by stealing cattle and begging from relatives but if they were sent to south Florida, they would become "self-supporting and useful". Should they be allowed to return to Mexico, however, they would greatly enhance elements on the frontier hostile to the interest of Texas. These recommendations were approved by the Secretary of War in late August and were then referred through the Interior Department to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for his decision.⁵²

While the matter was being considered by the Indian Bureau, Charles W. Jones, U.S. Senator for Florida, wrote to Commissioner Smith protesting against the proposal to remove the Seminole Blacks to his state. The Blacks had lived too long on the uncivilized Mexican frontier and had developed bad habits. If they were resettled in Florida, their acknowledged skill in the use of arms and general mode of existence would render them "a very dangerous element in a community already containing too much inflammable material", and racial conflict and strife would be the likely result. Furthermore, the government had neither the right nor the authority to remove "paupers" from one state to another without the consent of the latter. The proposition did not include a provision for their subsistence after removal and they would, from that time on, be dependent upon the state government for support. The older members of the group, moreover, had earlier resided in the state as slaves, not citizens, and their children had been born in a foreign country. Florida, therefore, had no obligation to the Seminole Blacks and had a right to prevent their immigration from being implemented. Jones concluded by requesting that Smith decide against the recommendations of the War Department and make arrangements for the re-settlement of "these semi-barbarous people" in a more suitable location.⁵³

On 20 September, Smith returned a somewhat surprising decision upon

the recommendations referred to him. The decision was based upon the Commissioner's belief that there were at least three good reasons why the Seminole Blacks should be supported by the government. First of all, the government had a responsibility to them. The Blacks had been removed from Florida to the Indian Territory as part of the Seminole tribe but had been forced to take refuge in Mexico because of kidnappings and abduction. In that inhospitable country they had failed and many of the old and very young were now destitute and in great need of assistance. Secondly, if they were not given land they would become hostile and force an increase in expenditure for guarding the border country. Finally, the Seminole Blacks were familiar with agricultural practices and anxious to become self-supporting, and should most certainly be encouraged and assisted in this endeavour.⁵⁴

Clearly influenced by Senator Jones' objections to their resettlement in Florida, Smith recommended that the Seminole Blacks be returned to the Indian Territory. Article 2 of the Seminole treaty of 21 March 1866 stated, in part, that the Blacks associated with the tribe in the Indian Territory, "Their descendants, and such other of the same race as shall be permitted by said Nation to settle there, shall have and enjoy all the rights of native citizens".⁵⁵ Smith interpreted this clause as granting the Seminole Blacks in Texas "an equitable right" to reside in their former homeland. He therefore recommended that they be permanently relocated in the Seminole nation and that the Indian Bureau be authorized to submit an estimate for an appropriation of up to \$40,000 to defray the costs of removal and associated expenses. There could be "no question as to the humanity and economy" of the proposed action.⁵⁶ Smith's suggestions were approved by the Department of the Interior on 23 September and embodied, in a more official form, in "Legislation Recommended" by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in his Annual Report for 1875.⁵⁷ Events were moving rapidly. In

late December, Colonel Shafter even went so far as to put forward the name of his brother as a suitable candidate to collect the two Black bands and conduct their removal.⁵⁸ As the year drew to a close, it seemed that the government was prepared, at last, to take action to put an end to the frustration and problems the Seminole Blacks had experienced since their removal from Mexico.

Most of the Kibbetts' band was transferred to Fort Clark during the early part of 1876 in a move apparently envisaged as the first step in the removal of all of the Seminole Blacks to the Indian Territory. A few scouts were all that remained behind at Duncan and they completed the transfer a year later.⁵⁹ The Kibbetts' band settled adjacent to the camp of the Daniels' band on Las Moras Creek, and this was at first resented by the latter. On 7 March, Chief Elijah Daniels wrote to Mackenzie, then in command at Fort Sill, to request that his band be removed forthwith,

The tow Tribes is mixt and I have until the 2d of May to serve and I dont wornt to wate until that time if you can posbel take me before that time I wud be better satisfide.... And I have all the beast men. And I wash to have a good treaty.⁶⁰

Twice before, in July 1873 and March 1875, Mackenzie had suggested that Daniels and his supporters be removed to Fort Sill.⁶¹ Upon receiving this latest petition, however, he recommended that "a proper proportion of land in the Seminole Country in this Territory be assigned them". Their removal would be inexpensive and they would become self-supporting within a year.⁶² Once again, however, the authorities in Washington did not see fit to implement Mackenzie's proposals.

The Seminole Blacks had already encountered hostility from citizens of Texas,⁶³ and had made a dangerous enemy in the notorious outlaw John "King" Fisher. A favourite haunt of the scouts at Duncan was the "Old Blue Saloon" in nearby Eagle Pass. Around Christmas-time 1874, Corporal George Washington, the nephew of John Horse, got into an argument with Fisher at the bar over the payment of drinks. A gunfight ensued in which

Fisher received a scalp wound and Washington was shot in the stomach. Other Seminole Blacks may have been involved as Dan Johnson was noted as having a gunshot wound in March 1875. Washington died after suffering in hospital for several months but, although Fisher was indicted for his murder, he was cleared of the charge.⁶⁴ Never one to forget an injury, Fisher would many years later shoot a Seminole Black scout from his horse outside an Eagle Pass saloon after he had tried to strike the outlaw "King" with his quirt following another bar-room incident.⁶⁵

The acts of violence reached a climax in the spring of 1876. In late April, 35 citizens of Kinney County complained to the Secretary of War about the Seminole Blacks at Fort Clark. Few of their number were employed as scouts and the balance continually stole property from the local white settlers. The Commanding Officer at the post had no authority over the unenlisted Blacks and could therefore offer no assistance. There was also some contention over the land they were using at Las Moras. The Seminole Blacks may have tried to expand their agricultural production by moving outside the limits of the military reservation as the Texans claimed that they were located on private property and were causing damage both to it and the surrounding countryside.⁶⁶ Thus, the local whites had at first tried to gain redress for their grievances through peaceful means but by the third week of May no action by the government appeared to be forthcoming and they decided to take matters into their own hands.

On the evening of Friday 19 May, in a move clearly designed to "persuade" the Seminole Blacks to return to Mexico, two of the principal men in the community, John Horse and Titus Payne, were ambushed by hired members of the King Fisher gang as they were riding just south of the post hospital. Payne was shot and killed instantly. His body was dragged from the road and remained undiscovered until the Monday morning when he was found with his gun laid across his chest. John Horse was wounded in

four places and his mount, "American", was also badly hurt but, through great courage and skilful horsemanship, the old chief managed to make the Seminole Black camp and lived to tell the tale of his narrow escape from yet another attempt on his life.⁶⁷

Both the Seminole Blacks and local whites grew fearful after the attack. The Blacks became afraid to pass from their camp to the post or the nearby town of Brackettville, where some had found work, and both men and women took to carrying arms. The whites, in turn, became concerned by the threat of retaliation.⁶⁸ This situation led to renewed calls for the removal of the Seminole Blacks from Ord, Sheridan, and Colonel I. Irwin Gregg, the latest Commanding Officer at Fort Clark. Four main reasons why their removal should be speedily effected were put forward by the military officials. First of all, Gregg feared that "serious trouble" could result from the growing animosity between the Blacks and the local residents. Secondly, and of greatest importance to white interests, the Blacks might either choose or be forced to return to Mexico. Both Gregg and Ord feared that this could well result in their seeking revenge by engaging in depredating raids into Texas, which would prove far more expensive than removing them to the Indian Territory or Florida. Thirdly, the majority of the Blacks were either "old, feeble and diseased" or "young and helpless". Their condition was described by Gregg as "truly pitiable and daily growing worse" and Sheridan believed that "charity and humanity" demanded that the government make provision for them. Finally, Ord was of the opinion that positive good could ensue from their removal as, if their relocation were carefully planned, their "simple manners" and "religious tendency" would have a beneficial effect on neighbouring tribes such as the Sioux and the Apaches.⁶⁹ These recommendations were forwarded to Washington in early June in the main hope that the threat to white lives and property might at last spur the government into action.

Once again, the efforts of the military officials proved to be in vain. On 6 June, the latest Commissioner of Indian Affairs, J.Q. Smith, returned a decision against either removing or supporting the Seminole Blacks. Smith felt unable to support his predecessor's recommendation that an appropriation of up to \$40,000 be sought to relocate and subsist the group in the Indian Territory and had not submitted an estimate for the consideration of Congress. In fact, he found himself in full accord with the conclusions reached by Commissioner Walker in December 1872. The Indian Bureau had neither authorized the return of the Seminole Blacks to the U.S. nor benefitted from their move and therefore had no obligation to them. Moreover, these Blacks clearly had no "legal or equitable title" to any portion of a reservation, either in the Indian Territory or elsewhere. The Seminole and Creek treaties of 1866 had made provision only for the Blacks living in the nations at the time of their ratification and such others as were permitted to settle there by the tribal governments. The Seminole Blacks in Texas, therefore, were not entitled by treaty to land or rights equal to native citizens in either the Seminole or Creek nations. There was little likelihood that the tribal governments would consent to their relocation in the nations as they had been described as "fierce and lawless" and it would be both "illegal and unjust" for the government to force them upon the tribes. Furthermore, as the Blacks had previously been so independent, the government could hardly be expected to purchase for them a separate tract of land elsewhere in the Indian Territory and bear the expense of their removal there. Finally, the group included a number of former Texas runaways who had no history of Indian association and no more right to the consideration of the government than any other Freedmen. Smith concluded that the Indian Bureau was in no way responsible for the Seminole Blacks and that they had no claim to support from the government.⁷⁰

Smith's decision to revert to the policy of Commissioner Walker instead of supporting the initiative of his predecessor brought to an end four years of continuous and intense inter-departmental wrangling and sealed the fate of the Seminole Blacks. Evidence had been presented, propositions put forward and recommendations made. It seemed that little else remained to be said on the subject. Interest waned as time passed, and Smith's decision proved to be final. For a time, Ord continued to lobby on their behalf. In mid June, he wrote to special commissioner Williams and Congressman John Hancock requesting that an appropriation of \$20,000 be procured for their removal and on 6 July he repeated his recommendation that this be accomplished forthwith. Williams was in favour and reported that \$6,500 of a \$10,000 appropriation he had been ordered to administer for the "removal of roving bands of Indians from Mexico" remained, and could be used for the purpose. If the Secretary of the Interior gave him authorization, he would effect the object. Hancock, moreover, asked Smith to make a special recommendation on the subject so that it could be tagged on to the Indian Appropriation Bill then being debated in the Senate.⁷¹ Despite this considerable support, however, Ord's recommendations went unheeded, and no action was taken towards their implementation. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had made it clear that the group was not to be returned to the Indian Territory and could expect no further support from the government. In view of this decision, several individual parties of Seminole Blacks sought a better life than that offered on the military reservation by returning independently to Mexico and the Seminole nation in the late 1870s and early 1880s.

The Blacks had been greatly disturbed by the attack on Titus Payne and John Horse but the violence reached a new peak early in the morning of New Year's Day, 1877. Adam Payne, who had won a Medal of Honour for his part in the Red River War, had been discharged from the Scouts on

19 February 1875 at the end of his term of service.⁷² Instead of re-enlisting, he had taken to frequenting the border towns and was wanted in Brownsville for stabbing a Black soldier. Payne was attending a New Year's dance at the Seminole Black camp when, shortly after midnight, "A Sheriff blasted him from behind with a double-barrelled shotgun at such close range that his clothes were set on fire".⁷³ A small number of Blacks, including the influential Pompey Factor, another Medal of Honour winner, were so disgusted by this latest outrage that they crossed over into Mexico and rejoined their kinsmen at Nacimiento. John Horse is known to have returned to the hacienda shortly after the attempt upon his life and may also have moved at this time. The emigrant Seminole Blacks failed to fulfil the fears of U.S. military officials that they might join other bands on the frontier and engage in depredating raids into Texas, however. In Mexico, they once more had to defend their settlement and its environs against hostile Indians and again took up arms, this time under Colonel Pedro Avincular Valdez, known on the frontier as "Colonel Winker".⁷⁴

By the summer of 1880, it seemed probable that, in the light of declining Indian hostilities on the frontier, the duties of the Scouts would be curtailed and their numbers reduced. Several of the leading enlisted men were not prepared to face the uncertainty of life on the military reservation, or in Mexico, and hoped to secure a more stable future for their families by removing to the Seminole Freedman settlements in the Indian Territory. In June, First Sergeant David Bowlegs, Sergeants Sampson July and Bob Kibbetts, and Privates Isaac Payne and Pompey Perryman, asked Bullis to relay the message to Ord that they,

... As representatives of the Seminoles living on this frontier, desire to go to the Seminole reservation in the Indian Territory, —where they have relations living for the purpose of seeing the lands and finding out what rights and privileges they would be allowed should they move their families thereto.⁷⁵

Their proposal was supported by Bullis, Colonel D.S. Stanley the Commanding Officer at Fort Clark, and Ord. Stanley believed that their removal would lead them away from "the temptations of the Mexican Frontier" and Bullis was of the opinion that, once settled in the Seminole nation, they would "become industrious and make good citizens". Ord even offered to remove the Blacks if the Interior Department would resettle and supply them upon arrival in the Indian Territory. In reply, the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, E.J. Brooks, stated that, if they were transported there, his department would "find them suitable homes on the Seminole Reservation".⁷⁶ This initial favourable response by the government seemed to suggest that the Blacks' initiative would soon be rewarded.

During the summer of 1881, David Bowlegs, "the most influential of their number", visited the Seminole nation. Bowlegs liked what he saw of the thriving Black communities, was particularly impressed by the educational opportunities afforded the children of Seminole Freedmen, and took back to Texas a "favourable report" of his findings. Later, in an interview with Stanley, Bowlegs thus stated his reasons for wishing to remove,

If I had no one but myself and my wife I would rather soldier than do anything else I know of, but I have a large family growing up, and we are here where we own nothing, and can get no work. My children will grow up idle and become criminals on this frontier. I have been raised like an Indian, but want to go to my people and settle in a home, and teach my children to work, and most of my people are like me.⁷⁷

Many of the Blacks were excited by Bowlegs' account of life in the Seminole nation and eagerly awaited the call to remove there.

In the spring of 1882, having still not received permission to commence the journey, the Seminole Blacks determined to spur the government into action. Several of the Scouts, who were discharged in May, made preparations to remove instead of re-enlisting and in mid June Bowlegs, the leader of the would-be emigrants, reported that 57 Blacks were ready to leave. They had some transport of their own but asked for a further four army wagons

to enable them to make the journey.⁷⁸ Stanley suggested that he provide the wagons and that the party travel via either Fort McKavett or Concho so that the teams could be relieved. The Blacks would also need rations en route as they were "very poor and hardly able to provide for themselves".⁷⁹ Sheridan once again strongly supported these proposals and forwarded them to the Secretary of War for his consideration.⁸⁰ The matter had come to a head and decisions determining its outcome would soon be forthcoming.

The proposed removal of the Blacks to the Seminole nation was referred through the Indian Bureau to Union Agent John Q. Tufts for a report.⁸¹ On 18 July, Tufts wrote to John Jumper, principal chief of the Seminoles, asking for his opinion. A meeting of the Seminole council was called and Jumper delivered its verdict to Tufts on 2 August,

The Council are unanimously opposed to the coming of the said Bowlegs and party.... There is no foundation in fact for the assertion that the Seminoles here were willing for them to come among them to settle.

These Blacks had "voluntarily abandoned their Tribe" many years ago and had no just claim to the rights and benefits of citizenship under the 1866 treaty. Moreover, the group contained Blacks of "doubtful identity" and notorious outlaws who were deemed to be undesirable immigrants.⁸² In view of the Seminoles' emphatic refusal to receive the Bowlegs' party into the nation, Commissioner of Indian Affairs H. Price recommended that no action be taken to remove the group at that time.⁸³ In spite of the opposition of the Seminole and the Indian Bureau, however, Bowlegs, his wife Fanny and their nine children, removed independently to the Seminole nation in December.⁸⁴ The immigrants were received by relatives and settled so easily into the Freedman community that their presence in the nation was not detected by either the tribal or U.S. authorities for over a year.

In May 1883, it was reported that more of the Scouts wished to remove to the Seminole nation the following spring if their services were no longer

required by the military. Some were growing old and all wished to settle down and have homes of their own. They would require transportation to the Indian Territory and some assistance upon arrival until they could raise their first crop.⁸⁵ As it was not envisaged that the Scouts would be needed beyond the end of the fiscal year, the proposal was supported by Augur, in command of the Department of Texas, with the recommendation that arrangements be made to send them there at that time. As a result, Price instructed Tufts to ascertain if the Seminoles would be willing to receive the Blacks among them and furnish him with a full report and recommendations.⁸⁶

Tufts addressed the enquiry to Chief Jumper in early September and, on the 17th, again received a very definite negative reply. Jumper gave three main reasons why the Seminoles would not welcome the return of the group to the nation. In the first place, the majority of these Blacks had been Seminole slaves, had chosen freely to flee to Mexico, and had become citizens of that country. Moreover, they had removed before the signing of the 1856 and 1866 treaties, which had created separate Seminole reservations, and had therefore not been included in their provisions. Thus, these Black emigrants could not claim Seminole citizenship by either "blood, tribal organization or treaty" and had no right to land in the nation or other benefits deriving from tribal membership. In other words, and it should be made clear from the start, one of Jumper's principal objections to the would-be immigrants was that they were Black and former slaves of the Seminoles. Secondly, the Chief argued that there was not sufficient arable land in the "broken, poorly watered" Seminole nation for the population already living there and the established residents could not afford to make room for new immigrants. Finally, the Texas Seminole Blacks were portrayed as being "turbulent" and "lawless" and, if allowed to remove, would constitute a dangerous element in the

already troubled nation. Jumper put the Seminoles' case in a nutshell, "To sum it all up, they have no rights here, we have no room for them, and we protest against their being sent here as we have done before".⁸⁷ In the light of Jumper's reply, Tufts proposed that the Blacks be left in Texas where they could be more easily controlled. Consequently, on 18 October, Price repeated his earlier opinion that the group should not be removed to the Seminole nation and the Secretary of the Interior approved his recommendation the following day.⁸⁸

Once again, however, in spite of the opposition of the tribal authorities, the Union Agent, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, another party of 27 Blacks removed independently from Texas to the Seminole nation in October 1883.⁸⁹ When added to the Bowlegs' family, this made a total of 38 Seminole Blacks who had immigrated without permission in less than a year. These latest arrivals settled among their kinsmen in the Freedman community and immediately began to make improvements on the land. Their presence soon became known to Chief Jumper, however, and on 1 March 1884 he wrote an uncompromising letter to Tufts demanding that they be ejected forthwith as intruders.⁹⁰ This marked the beginning of a determined, year-long effort by the Seminole authorities to have the immigrant Blacks removed from the nation.

Upon receiving Jumper's communication, Tufts sent notice to the immigrants to either remove at once or state their case to him in person. In response, their leading men, accompanied by several Freedmen and Seminole leaders, travelled to Muskogee and appeared before him on 25 March. From their various testimonies it became clear that they felt they had a right to remain in the nation. David Bowlegs and his wife were both found to have been born slaves to an Indian in the Seminole country and to have left for Mexico in 1849. The members of the party

that had recently arrived had not taken part in the exodus of 1849-1850⁹¹ but had been forced by Seminoles to leave the reservation earlier and seem to have had a much stronger case for being allowed to return than the Bowlegs' family. They included Joseph Bagby (sometimes spelled Bagly), his "state-raised" wife, their 10 children, and two sons-in-law, Henry Coleman and "Thompson"; David Bowlegs' sister Dolly, her "state-raised" husband and their nine children; and Polly Marshall and her Creek Black husband, who had been sold by his Indian owner to a Texas white in 1847. Bagby, Dolly, and Polly had all been born in the Seminole country, were former slaves of Seminole Indians and had been sold into Texas in 1847 and 1848. Bagby and Polly, moreover, were children of Seminole Freedmen John Cudjo and Jacob Davis respectively and they considered they and their families had a just claim to rights in the nation as descendants of recognized citizens under Article 2 of the 1866 treaty.⁹² The Black immigrants clearly felt they had a strong case and seemed prepared to remain in the nation in defiance of the ruling of the Seminole authorities.

Being unsure of how to proceed, Tufts referred the facts to Price, requested instructions, and suggested that the immigrants be allowed to settle in the Oklahoma Territory. In the meantime, the Union Agent issued them with a permit to settle in the Seminole nation and raise a crop until the matter was decided.⁹³ Jumper immediately attacked the Tufts' initiative in a letter to Seminole delegate John F. Brown, who was in Washington. Brown was instructed to visit the Indian Bureau and put the views of the Seminoles before the Commissioner. In essence, Jumper wished to have stated that the immigrants had no right to return to the nation, were "not at all servicable [sic] as examples of industry" to recognized citizens, and should not have been allowed to remain while the matter was being settled.⁹⁴ Each side had made its position perfectly clear and it now remained for a decision to be made by the Secretary of the Interior.

Commissioner Price was of the opinion that the Bowlegs' family should be removed but the Bagby party should be allowed to stay. He could see no reason why Blacks who had left the reservation voluntarily years before the 1866 treaty should be included in its provisions. Furthermore, if they had no rights in the Seminole nation they had none in the Oklahoma Territory either, even if it were considered a suitable area for resettlement by Freedmen of the Indian Territory. The leaders of the Bagby party, on the other hand, had been sold and removed forcibly from the Seminole country and they, and their descendants, should be "by the terms of the Treaty, entitled to all the benefits thereby conferred" upon native citizens.⁹⁵ Secretary of the Interior H.M. Teller took issue with Price's assessment, and arrived at somewhat different conclusions. The 1866 treaty had not been designed to include Blacks who had removed from the Seminole country 18 years before it was signed, "whether their leaving was originally a voluntary act or a forcible removal", especially as they had not chosen to return until 17 years after the barrier to their so doing had been removed. The treaty clearly referred to Blacks "who were living among the Seminoles at the date of the treaty, and their descendants born after that date". All of the claimants, moreover, had resided for a number of years in Texas and it seemed probable that they had exercised the rights of American citizens there. As such, they had no claim to be considered under the Seminole treaty and could not be allowed to settle in the nation without the permission of the tribal authorities. If this were not forthcoming, the Blacks should be treated as intruders.⁹⁶ In the light of Jumper's protestations, this meant, in effect, that the immigrants would be ordered to leave. It was indeed unfortunate for these Blacks that the decision which effectively denied them the support of the government and anticipated their removal from the Seminole nation had been based largely upon the mistaken supposition that they had chosen not to return

earlier and had become U.S. citizens.

The verdict was relayed to Tufts with instructions on how to proceed by the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, E.L. Stevens, on 17 May,

Under this decision the parties referred to you are intruders and should be removed if the Seminoles are unwilling to allow them to remain.... They should be given a reasonable time in which to remove and to dispose of their improvements...⁹⁷

Consequently, Tufts sent notice to the immigrants to leave the nation and fixed a time for their removal. The Blacks completely ignored the order, however, and boldly remained where they were. Jumper protested to Tufts and was informed that he had again written to Washington, recommending that troops be sent into the nation to remove them.⁹⁸ If Tufts' letter was ever written, however, it was never received by the Indian Bureau and the immigrants were left undisturbed.

On 12 February 1885, as no action by the government appeared to be forthcoming, Brown wrote a letter of complaint to the Indian Bureau demanding that "steps be taken to effect their speedy removal".⁹⁹ As a result, Price issued Tufts the following instructions,

You will notify these parties that they must remove from the Seminole Nation, with their effects, within a reasonable time, say before the 1st of May, unless you have already fixed an earlier date, and take the necessary steps to secure such removal. You will report your action to this office.

It is believed that their removal can be effected by your police without the aid of the military.¹⁰⁰

Once again, however, Tufts failed to bring about the removal of the immigrant Blacks. No report was ever received by his superiors, and correspondence upon the subject discontinued. Tufts failure to act may have been prompted by the apparent impossibility of enforcing removal orders in the Indian Territory.¹⁰¹ Whatever the reason, the immigrants seem not to have been troubled further by either the tribal authorities or U.S. officials but allowed to settle peacefully into the Freedman community.

Although the immigrant Blacks continued to reside in the Seminole nation, they effectively removed themselves from the centre of attention. None of them was included in Seminole census records for the 1890s, which were compiled for annuity payments,¹⁰² or indeed in the Final Rolls of the Seminole nation drawn up for land allotment under the Dawes Commission.¹⁰³ This would suggest that these Blacks never became Seminole citizens or derived any direct benefits from their tribal association but lived on, and worked, the land of relatives. The immigrants did not disappear from view completely, however. On 16 May 1885, D.S. Stanley, by now a Brigadier General and in Command of the Department of Texas, reported that they had been "well received" in the Seminole nation and were still there.¹⁰⁴ And, in February 1888, the Seminole Blacks at Fort Clark, recounting their numbers, stated that there were "three families in the Indian Territory domiciled with the Seminole Nation", but unfortunately had no further information on them.¹⁰⁵ Interestingly enough, David Bowlegs' army discharge papers were filed with the Seminole County Clerk in October 1935 and are now housed in the Western History Collections of the University of Oklahoma at Norman.¹⁰⁶ Finally, and of most consequence as it confirms the strength of ties within the group as a whole, Kenneth Porter, after conducting a number of interviews with Seminole Blacks in Oklahoma, Texas and Mexico, reported in 1951 that the descendants of the immigrants in Seminole County still maintained visiting relations with the Brackettville and Nacimiento communities.¹⁰⁷

The Bowlegs affair was highly significant as it gave an indication of the state of Seminole-Black relations in the 1880s. The Black immigrants were indeed unfortunate in the timing of their return to the Seminole nation. Had they returned a few years earlier they would have found a more sympathetic leadership in the form of Principal Chief John Chupco and his conservative counsellors. Chupco had fought side-by-side with

Seminole Blacks both in Florida and during the Civil War and had actively promoted their incorporation into the tribe on an equal footing with the Indian members during reconstruction. Had Chupco still been chief, the petitions of the Black immigrants would probably have been received more favourably.

As it was, John Jumper and his progressive supporters were again in control of the tribal government. Though he was a fullblood, Jumper was an educated Christian, with white and mixed blood associates, who favoured rapid acculturation. During the antebellum period, he had acquired substantial holdings in slave property and had dealt widely in Blacks. In the Civil War, he had become a colonel in the Confederate army and led the Seminole Battalion against Union Blacks during military engagements in the Indian Territory. Defeated and exhausted, Jumper and his associates were anxious for peace during reconstruction and supported the status quo by not contesting the rights of Freedmen in the nation. The scars ran deep, however, and little love was lost between the Seminole progressives and the Blacks. Faced with a crisis situation in the 1880s, Jumper responded by giving vent to the strong racial consciousness of the progressives in opposing the immigration of Blacks into the nation, no matter how strong their claim to citizenship. The Seminole Freedman population was already increasing rapidly and Jumper's actions were undoubtedly motivated by the fear that the Indians would be swamped by the Blacks.

It was the Freedmen who wanted the Blacks to return to the nation. The immigrants were "well received" by their Black kinsmen, not the Seminoles. From the start, the progressive tribal leadership opposed their projected removal and, after it had been completed, insisted that they be ejected, by force if necessary. At first sight, several of Chief Jumper's arguments appear to have had a sound basis. First of all, the

Black immigrants did not have an indisputable right by treaty to enjoy the same benefits as Seminole citizens. Secondly, little was known of these people and the fear that they might constitute a threat to the peace of the nation seems understandable in the light of their having lived so long on the dangerous and lawless Texas-Mexican frontier. Thirdly, the shortage of land in the Seminole nation was a source of great concern to the tribe's leaders during reconstruction. Jumper, in fact, went so far as to purchase additional acreage for the Seminoles from the Creeks. Finally, the immigrants removed without receiving permission from either the tribal authorities or the U.S. government and this could have set a precedent for a flood of illegal intruders. On the surface, therefore, Jumper's opposition appears to have been justifiable yet, if one digs deeper, it can be seen that these Blacks had a strong claim to be allowed to remain in the nation and the Chief's out-of-hand denial of it appears to have been both unreasonable and discriminatory.

All of the 38 immigrants were either former Seminole slaves or members of their families. Some had fled to Mexico to escape servitude while others had been sold into bondage in Texas. Many were the direct descendants of recognized Seminole Freedman citizens and had kinsmen living in the nation. Moreover, a provision had been deliberately included in the 1866 treaty to allow the Seminoles to admit such persons.¹⁰⁸ The progressive leadership, therefore, made a definite decision not to exercise its discretionary powers in this case. Furthermore, a precedent had been set earlier for granting these people permission to return to the nation. The Indian followers of Wild Cat had also left voluntarily in 1849, had been exposed to lawless frontier conditions and had not been present when the 1856 treaty creating a separate Seminole reservation had been signed. Under Jumper's own reasoning, therefore, they had had no claim upon the tribe and had constituted a potential threat to the peace of the nation yet not only had they been allowed to return between 1859 and 1861 but

also they had been openly encouraged to do so. In short, a dual system was being operated by the Seminole progressives. What went for the Indians did not necessarily go for the Blacks.

This assertion is strengthened by the whole tone of Jumper's reaction to the immigrants. The Seminole Chief stressed that several of their number had been former slaves, labelled them as "persons of African descent and blood", and referred to them constantly as "these negroes".¹⁰⁹ His response was dominated by an uncompromising attitude and there was no hint of guilt, compassion, or a sense of responsibility in his statements. With the emphasis being placed so heavily upon the importance of "blood", one is left with the feeling that if the immigrants had been Seminole Indian rather than Black they would have been granted admission into the nation.

Apart from Chief Jumper, the Seminole tribal authorities were dominated at this time by an axis of former Confederate sympathizers headed by delegate John F. Brown. Though Brown's mother was a fullblood Seminole, his father was a Scottish physician and he had far more in common with the wealthy white and mixed blood elites among the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws than he had with Osceola, Wild Cat, or Billy Bowlegs. A progressive Southern sympathizer who had led Seminole opposition to the incorporation of the Freedmen into the tribe during the 1866 treaty negotiations, Brown would succeed Jumper as chief and dominate tribal affairs for the next 20 years. Brown wholeheartedly supported the Jumper line and, after his accession, adopted it as his own. The rights of the Freedmen were honoured but further efforts by the Texas Seminole Blacks to remove to the nation were strongly opposed. Clearly, racial tension and mutual suspicion continued to figure prominently in relations between Blacks and the Seminole progressives during the postbellum period.

Seminole reconstruction, as it affected the Blacks, was undoubtedly extremely successful. The Freedmen were incorporated into the tribe, granted rights and privileges equal to native citizens, and were left to their own devices and allowed to live in peace. The lot of a Seminole Freedman was infinitely superior to that of most Blacks associated with the other Civilized tribes at that time. Interestingly enough, the Black immigrants chose to return to the Seminole nation at a time when the Choctaw and Chickasaw Freedmen, in particular, were experiencing widespread discrimination, forced segregation, the threat of removal from the nations, and outright persecution. This alone confirms the assertion that the Seminole nation was seen by Blacks as a desirable place in which to live at that time.

Having said this, it must be stressed that it was the Freedman communities, and not those of the Indians, that attracted the Texas Blacks. The immigrants were not concerned with re-establishing relations with the Indians but with their Black compatriots. The Seminoles and Freedmen, in fact, for the most part, thought of themselves and acted as independent groups. They lived such separate lives that the tribal authorities remained unaware of the Bowlegs family's presence in the nation for over a year. Both were also fiercely loyal to their own kind. Thus, the Seminoles encouraged the return of Wild Cat's Indian supporters to the nation but opposed that of his Black followers 25 years later. The Freedmen, meanwhile, opened their arms to the Texas Seminole Blacks and the descendants of the immigrants were subsequently made welcome in the Brackettville and Nacimientto communities. Despite being separated by both time and distance, each Seminole Black community preserved a strong sense of constituting part of a clearly defined whole, and took pride in the group's history, culture and traditions. In May 1885, a military official astutely observed that the Texas Seminole Blacks had "no idea

of individual enterprise and responsibility" but regarded "their whole people as a unit".¹¹⁰ A Seminole Black identified first with his local community, then with the group as a whole. He never expressed the same allegiance to the Seminole tribe. Then, as now, while the Seminoles considered themselves to be Seminole and Indian, the Blacks associated with them thought of themselves not as Seminole, Indian, or Black, but Seminole Black.

While the Bowlegs affair was following its course, matters affecting the Seminole Blacks in Texas took a marked turn for the worse, resulting in renewed efforts to bring about their removal to the Indian Territory. In August 1884, military officials decided that the number of Seminole Black scouts should be cut from 40 to 6 at the end of the month.¹¹¹ Stanley, who was forced to issue the order, was appalled by his charge,

Thirty-four men - all with wives and children, - who have served as soldiers for the average of thirteen years; without any trades or property; and with habits essentially Indian, are thrown upon a community, itself poor, and hostile to these harmless vagabonds. ... How they are to live, or what is to become of them, I cannot imagine.¹¹²

The decision came as a devastating blow to the entire group as its 234 members had continued to rely almost completely upon the wages and rations of these men. Worst of all, they were given less than two weeks notice to find alternative means of subsistence in an area where work was scarce and the inhabitants hostile. The Seminole Blacks were completely unprepared to face this latest crisis, lacked even "the transportation to carry their families and effects to where they might hope to earn a living", and faced almost certain destitution.¹¹³

Local military officials, who were familiar with them, sympathized with the Blacks and again rallied to their support. Lieutenant Edward B. Ives, in command of the Scouts, asked that the order be modified to allow their gradual discharge, or that they be at least kept in service

until the end of September so that they could make some provision for themselves. If the military did not exercise restraint in this matter, the Blacks would become a burden to the public, either by stealing or begging.¹¹⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Zenas R. Bliss, once again in command at Fort Clark, supported Ives' assessment. The Seminole Blacks were "in an almost helpless condition, with many widows and orphans". Some feared that they would be ejected from the military reservation and asked permission to be allowed to remain until the spring when they would seek work in Texas, if not otherwise provided for. Some 30 others indicated a wish to remove either to the Seminole nation, or a separate reservation in the Indian Territory. Bliss believed that the government should pursue the latter course as almost all of the Blacks would remove if a reservation and transportation were provided. He recommended that the Scouts be kept in service for another month and that, during that time, a "suitable home" be procured for the group in the Indian Territory. These Blacks were not troublesome or dangerous but "better than the same class of their color now living in Texas", had served the army well as scouts and were "entitled to consideration".¹¹⁵ Both Stanley and the latest Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, Major General J.M. Schofield, agreed that the group should be resettled in the Indian Territory and the matter was passed on to the Interior Department by the Secretary of War for its consideration.¹¹⁶ No action was forthcoming, however, and the Blacks were left to suffer through another winter at Fort Clark.

During the spring of 1885, two of the Seminole Blacks' leading men, Sergeant Bob Kibbetts and ex-Sergeant Sampson July, decided to appeal their case directly to the Department Commander. The two presented a well-balanced combination. Kibbetts, by now, was in his mid 30s and recognized as head of the remaining scouts. Mature, intelligent, energetic and determined, he showed great potential and was the obvious choice to eventually

succeed to the chieftainship. July, in contrast, was aging, represented the views of the older generation of Seminole Blacks, and was "looked upon as the Patriarch of the tribe".¹¹⁷ The two leaders had also been prominent in previous efforts to secure the removal of the group to the Indian Territory. Kibbetts had made an investigative trip to the Seminole nation in 1869 while the Blacks were still in Mexico and he and July had been part of the Bowlegs' delegation that had sought permission to undertake a similar mission in June 1882. On 13 May 1885, Kibbetts and July visited Stanley at his headquarters after having made the journey to San Antonio "at their own expense".¹¹⁸ They "talked over their troubles and expressed their wishes" and found the Department Commander had a sympathetic ear. Stanley recommended that the Blacks "be cared for" and if the Seminole authorities objected to their resettlement in the nation, which they had "no good right to do", an alternative reservation should be procured for them elsewhere.¹¹⁹ Schofield again supported Stanley's suggestions, urgently requesting his superiors to carry them out.¹²⁰ Yet again, however, the Department of the Interior chose not to implement these recommendations, and still another year went by.

Undaunted, Kibbetts determined to go even higher. In March 1886, he travelled to Washington, alone, "at considerable personal expense",¹²¹ to lay the Seminole Blacks' case before top government officials. Kibbetts first visited the Bureau of Indian Affairs, requested that the Blacks be allowed to return to the Seminole nation under Article 2 of the 1866 treaty, and presented certain papers he had brought with him, including Sheridan's recommendations, to support his claim.¹²² He then appeared before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, headed by Chairman Henry L. Dawes, and "made a favorable impression... as a man of intelligence... capable of being of some service to his race". Taking the more direct approach, Kibbetts wanted to know if the Seminole Blacks

did not have a right to return to the nation under existing treaties. If not, he asked that homes be found for them in the Oklahoma Territory. Dawes forwarded these requests to the Secretary of the Interior so that a report could be furnished.¹²³ Through his enterprise, Kibbetts had gained the attention of high-ranking government officials and a Senate Committee and had set the wheels of the decision-making process in motion.

The Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs had written to Chief Jumper, asking if he would allow the Seminole Blacks to return to the nation, immediately after Kibbetts' initial visit to the Bureau. Although he realized that these Blacks were not directly encompassed by Article 2 of the 1866 treaty, the Acting Commissioner asserted that they were "a portion of the people whose rights were intended to be secured" by it. Moreover, if the Seminole authorities were to permit them to return, it would constitute "an Act of Justice as well as generosity towards a remnant of the people formerly held in slavery".¹²⁴ Jumper, however, chose not to reply to this communication,¹²⁵ and, as the consent of the tribal authorities was a prerequisite of any move to return the Blacks to the nation, his silence was as effective as a refusal in putting an end to the proposal. Furthermore, Commissioner J.C.D. Atkins concluded that, as these Blacks had been granted Mexican citizenship long ago, and were not resident in the U.S. at the time of the abolition of slavery, they were "in no sense freedmen" and had no right under existing laws and treaties to land in the Oklahoma country.¹²⁶ Dawes was informed by the Secretary of the Interior that new legislation would be required before the Blacks could be resettled in that area, but, as there were questions over their citizenship and former landholdings, none was proposed by the Senate Committee.¹²⁷ Kibbetts' long and expensive excursion¹²⁸ to Washington on behalf of his people thus proved fruitless, and it came to mark the last major attempt to resettle the entire Texas group in the Seminole nation.

The Seminole Blacks clearly had a deep respect for the elderly men of the community and appreciated their experience, knowledge and wisdom. John Horse, John Kibbetts and Elijah Daniels were all over 60 years of age when they dominated the leadership in the 1870s. John Horse and Sampson July, moreover, were later credited with having assumed a patriarchal role within the community. Indeed, it seems probable that, as in many other tribal societies, a council of elders met and either formally or informally advised the chief on important matters affecting the group. This contention is supported by the fact that, in early February 1888, eight of the group's leading old men drew up a petition addressed to President Grover Cleveland. The petitioners, with their approximate ages, included John Wilson, 80; Arder Facto (Hardy Factor), 84; Friday Bowleggs (Bowlegs), 60; Sam July, 60; Dick Johnson, 70; and Ben Wilson, 60. The signatures were headed by that of Dembo Factor, who was said to have been a warrior in the Dade massacre and a sub-chief at the Battle of Okeechobee during the Second Seminole War. Dembo was described as 86 years of age, "the oldest living of the tribe", and was "regarded as the Seminole Chief".¹²⁹ In all likelihood, the old Chief had reached a decision and acted upon it in concert with his principal advisers.

The petition displayed, for the first time, the pragmatic realization that the group as whole would never be allowed to return to the Seminole nation. In fact, the signatories reversed the usual tack by asking not to be sent there, because of the climate. Instead, they requested that a reservation be created for the group around Fort Clark. The tract should include the village they had built at Las Moras and, in addition, the well-watered land to the southwest should be purchased to bring the total area up to around 15,000 acres, "adapted for farming and grazing". Also sought were stock, seed, agricultural implements, and a sum of money to create and maintain a school. The petition was sent in the hope of

establishing "a well behaved, contented and prosperous community" and preserving the unity of the group. The Blacks were tired of wandering and sought a permanent home. Understandably, they considered their claim to be both just and worthy. They had, after all, been persuaded to return to the U.S. by the promise of land. And, though the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had earlier decided that a reservation could not be provided because they were not Indian, they retorted that "many" of their number had Seminole blood in their veins and that their claim had been "illogically and unjustly" questioned in view of their historic association with the tribe. Finally, the group contained many old people, orphans, and women with dependent children who were not members of the families of scouts, were incapable of labour, and in great need of assistance.¹³⁰ The authorities in Washington failed to grant these requests, however. The reservation never materialized and the Seminole Blacks continued to "squat" at Las Moras, on land that was not their own, for another 26 years.

During the 1890s, two individual requests to return to the Seminole nation by a Seminole Black man and a predominantly Seminole Indian woman again exposed the dual standards practised by the progressive leadership in dealing with such applications. The first came in 1894 when ex-scout¹³¹ William Warrior asked the Commander of Fort Clark, Major F.M. Hayes, to enquire of Chief Brown if the Seminoles would allow the Blacks based at the post to return to the nation. In his reply of 5 May, Brown stated that it had been decided earlier, in Washington, that these Blacks had no right to Seminole funds and lands. He went on to make the position perfectly clear, "The Seminole people do not want the 'Seminole Negro Indians' among the[m] at all and it is useless to think of being received by them".¹³² Brown's chieftainship saw no change in the established progressive policy of opposing the immigration of Seminole Blacks from Texas.

On the other hand, Brown's reaction to the second application, that of "Old Amy the Seminole Squaw", was altogether different. Amy was three-quarters Seminole Indian and just one-quarter Black, claimed to have been a first cousin of Osceola, spoke Muskogean, and had a Seminole name. She had left the Seminole country with Wild Cat and Gopher John in 1849 but had never crossed over into Mexico. At Eagle Pass, her husband had accepted employment with the U.S. army and had served as a guide, scout and trailer at Fort Duncan. He was killed in action two years later but Amy continued to live around the post and eventually moved to Fredericksburg. In 1898, she enquired of Chief Brown, through Marvin J. Hunter, if the Seminoles would accept her back into the tribe. Brown stated in reply that Amy was without doubt a member of the Seminole tribe. She was indeed a kinswoman of Osceola, her name had appeared in the tribal record for 1838, and she was remembered by survivors who had once known her. Furthermore, "A vast sum in the way of tribal annuities awaited her". If she could prove that she had not become a Mexican citizen, Brown "would send for her" and she would become "one of the wealthiest women in the Indian Territory". Unfortunately, Amy died in an accident before she could claim her inheritance.¹³³

Brown's contrasting responses in these two instances were consistent with the policy pursued by progressive Seminole leaders after 1859 and they clearly demonstrate the differing attitudes adopted towards Blacks and Indian applicants for re-admission into the nation. Just as Jumper had opposed the return of the Bowlegs and Bagby parties, so Brown opposed that of William Warrior, or any other Seminole Black in Texas or Mexico, 10 years later. And just as Wild Cat's Indian followers had been granted permission to return by the progressives, so was Amy, some 40 years later. In other words, while the claims of the Seminole Blacks were persistently rejected, if an applicant was wholly or predominantly Seminole

Indian, re-entry would not only be allowed, but encouraged and rewarded. Brown's verdict was patently discriminatory as Amy had no better claim to rights in the nation than many of the Seminole Blacks at Fort Clark. According to the Jumper line, as she had freely chosen to leave the Seminole country and had not been present at the time of the signing of the 1856 and 1866 treaties, her proposed return should have been opposed, as was that of David Bowlegs and Joseph Bagby. Several of the older Blacks at Clark, moreover, had participated in the Second Seminole War, appeared on emigration rolls, lived as free men in the Indian Territory, and had kinsmen living in the Seminole nation. The only significant difference between the claims of Amy and, for example, John Horse, was that hers was based on "blood". While she was three parts Seminole and enjoyed the support of the Indians, he was Seminole Black and did not. In short, the progressives' prime consideration in deciding whether or not to grant re-admission to former emigrants was not their history since leaving, or the justness of their claim, but their racial makeup.

Most of the Seminole Blacks in Texas had come to realize long before William Warrior's application for admission that they would never be allowed to return to the Seminole nation and had tried to establish a more settled lifestyle and community at Fort Clark. They built their homes in the shade of Oak and Pecan groves along the picturesque wooded banks of the cool, crystal clear Las Moras.¹³⁴ The dwellings they chose to construct were known as "Chink Houses". Developed by the group in Mexico, these structures were designed to accommodate a family and consisted of a double framework of wood packed with a mixture of clay, pebbles and pieces of rock, topped with a thatched roof. Sometimes they were plastered over, whitewashed and decorated with wood and often the kitchen was detached from the rest of the house. Although in their most basic form they deteriorated rapidly under heavy rain and needed frequent

repairs, these insulated houses were warm in the winter, cool in the summer and easily constructed, and offered an economical alternative to adobe, with which the Blacks were apparently unfamiliar.¹³⁵ The Seminole Blacks also built a church near their settlement based on the design of the historic First Church of Salem, Massachusetts.¹³⁶ Here they practised a unique religion which incorporated elements of African tribalism, Southern Baptism and Roman Catholicism and demonstrated most dramatically their diverse cultural background. A graveyard for the Scouts, which was built and maintained by the group, survives to this day and is listed as a tourist attraction of nearby Brackettville by the Texas Tourist Board.¹³⁷ Thus, once these Seminole Blacks had realized that their destiny lay in Texas, they had responded positively by establishing an individual and independent community in which they could pass on their history, practise their religion, speak their Afro-Seminole Creole language, maintain their naming-practices and, in general, preserve the group's unique cultural traditions.¹³⁸

Of the able-bodied unenlisted men, some found work as hands on local ranches,¹³⁹ others were small farmers,¹⁴⁰ and the remainder "lived in their accustomed Indian fashion" by hunting and fishing.¹⁴¹ The return of the scouts from expedition was anxiously awaited and, when they arrived at Fort Clark, the men would ride off to Brackettville to celebrate in the town's saloons.¹⁴² Most of the mundane tasks were left to the women who looked after the house, raised the children, and planted fruit and vegetable gardens.¹⁴³ Some few others found local work around Brackettville. The able-bodied remained severely handicapped, however, by the large number of young, old and helpless who were totally dependent upon them for support, and by the limitations of the small amount of land made available to them on the reservation. The Blacks were rarely able, therefore, to raise sufficient crops to match their needs and were constantly

poverty-stricken. The government, moreover, refused to help, even during the times of their greatest need. During the summer of 1899, for example, heavy rains caused the Las Moras to rise and flood the Blacks' settlement, leaving them "entirely destitute",¹⁴⁴ but the Commissioner of Indian Affairs decided that they were not eligible for relief, and none was furnished.¹⁴⁵ For the majority of the Seminole Blacks, life on the military reservation continued to be a grim struggle for survival.

The Scouts continued to bear the brunt of supporting the group. Though the Indian menace to west Texas had been effectively curtailed by 1881, and the frontier declared closed in 1890,¹⁴⁶ the unit was kept in part-time service on a reduced scale. During the 1890s and early 1900s, the Scouts were stationed at Forts Clark and Ringgold, the latter situated a mile from Rio Grande City in Starr County, Texas.¹⁴⁷ From here, they performed duties in the border country of a "more routine" nature than those they had come to expect, such as bringing to justice outlaws and horse-thieves.¹⁴⁸ By 1914, however, military officials decided that they had no further need for the services of the Seminole Black Scouts and, on 7 May, the 16 then enlisted were notified that they were to disband and leave the Fort Clark reservation, along with the rest of the group.¹⁴⁹

The order to quit the reservation was the ultimate expression of the shoddy and uncaring treatment the Seminole Blacks had received from the government since their return from Mexico. By 1914, the group living at Fort Clark had come to include 207 persons, of whom 113 were adults and 94 children, the whole divided into 52 families. In addition, six families, or 31 others, from Nacimiento were residing temporarily at the post.¹⁵⁰ As noted above, this figure included a great many who were incapable of supporting themselves, and most of the others were unskilled. Also, the group considered itself to be a complete social unit, had been treated as such in its dealings with the U.S. government since 1870, and could not

be expected to integrate easily into the local settlements. In other words, these Seminole Blacks were simply not prepared for life outside of Fort Clark. Furthermore, they had a considerable stake in the military reservation. They had lived there for over 40 years, made numerous improvements on the land and, at the time they received notice to remove, had some 225 acres under cultivation.¹⁵¹ Yet again, however, appeals on their behalf proved unsuccessful. It was decided that, as the Blacks would no longer include military personnel among their number, they could not remain at the post. Moreover, the Seminole Rolls had been closed on 4 March 1907 so they had no right to tribal funds or lands in the Indian Territory. The Secretary of the Interior thus summarized the position, as he saw it, "No allotments can be made to them as Seminoles and, of course, there is no provision of law for making allotments to them as Negroes".¹⁵² In these few words the government washed its hands of any responsibility for the group for the last time. There would be no further debate upon the subject.

Consequently, though the Seminole Blacks had been promised land if they would return to the U.S., fulfilled their part of the bargain by giving excellent service to the army, and proven to be mostly law-abiding and industrious people, they were evicted from their homes¹⁵³ and forced to face an uncertain future alone. This sizeable, largely unskilled, closely-knit community of poverty-stricken Indian Blacks settled in nearby Brackettville and, remarkably, not only overcame the suspicions and hostility of the local residents and survived in a town ill-equipped to bear the burden of their support, but also managed to preserve the unity of the group. The existence of a clearly identifiable, proud and active, group of Seminole Blacks in Brackettville today is due solely to the courage, industry and tenacity of these people who overcame the odds.¹⁵⁴ Because of the hostility expressed towards it by the tribal authorities

in the late Nineteenth Century, substantial relations between the Texas group and the Seminoles came to an end at that time. In contrast, however, its ties with the Seminole Black communities in Mexico and Oklahoma have been maintained and strengthened this century. As one might expect, in keeping with long-established traditions, the allegiances of the current generation of Brackettville Seminole Blacks lie not with the Seminole tribe but with their local group, and their people as a whole.

The Seminole Blacks who had resettled at Nacimiento were soon faced with a grave crisis. In 1879, the heirs of the original owners of the hacienda, the Sánchez Navarro family, sold it to an Englishman, John Willett,¹⁵⁵ but, "Would not guarantee to the purchaser the possession of the four sitios in possession of the Kickapoos and Muskogee Indians at Nacimiento, nor guarantee the water".¹⁵⁶ Although the land in question had ceased to be part of the Navarro estate when it had been granted to the settlers by the Mexican government in 1852, and the Kickapoos' and Mascogos' title to it had been reaffirmed by President Juárez in 1866 and 1867, Willett claimed that he could find no trace of any such title and considered the Indians and Blacks to be merely squatting upon his property. Consequently, in the same year as his purchase, Willett appealed to the Governor of Coahuila, Evaristo Madero, to remove the Blacks, but the Músqiz authorities refused to comply.¹⁵⁷ In December 1881, Willett's agent told the Blacks to leave the hacienda and, on 12 February 1882, Madero threw his support behind the initiative in issuing an administrative order demanding that both the Mascogos and the Kickapoos remove themselves forthwith. The leaders of the two groups, in response, drew up a protest to the order on 8 May and presented it to Madero in person. The strength of the Blacks' resolve to continue living at the hacienda was made clear in their statement that they would defend their land by force if necessary, "Uniting themselves with Indians from the Indian Nations of Arkansas and

Texas".¹⁵⁸ They hoped, however, to secure their title by more peaceful means, if at all possible.

The Seminole Blacks and Kickapoos decided to send a representative to put their views before the President of Mexico. John Horse was the obvious choice. He had been present when the land had first been granted to the immigrants by the Mexican government in 1852, recognized as the leader of the Mascogos in the 1850s and 1860s, and commissioned a colonel in the Mexican army. He was thus well known and respected in national circles. He was also an excellent diplomat and had successfully represented the interests of his people on numerous occasions in the past. Finally, since his return from Texas, he had remained active in the leadership and had made himself fully conversant with the facts of the case, on one occasion, in May 1881, appealing personally to Madero to protect the Blacks. Consequently, John Horse, possibly accompanied by one or two Black escorts, set out for Mexico City in August 1882. The outcome of his interview with the President is unknown, however, as John died before he could reveal the details of his mission. According to Porter, accounts vary as to the circumstances surrounding his death. Some say that he died in Mexico City of a sudden illness; others that he was murdered in a cantina on the return journey.¹⁵⁹ Certain it is, however, that the great man, who had narrowly escaped death on numerous previous occasions, had finally succumbed.

John Horse had been the dominant personality in Seminole Black affairs for half a century and his death marked the end of an era. His remarkable life had been one of epic proportions. He had been an interpreter, adviser and confidant of Seminole chiefs, an intermediary for the U.S. government, and a colonel in the Mexican army. He had served the Seminole Blacks as warrior, diplomat, chief and sage, and had represented their interests from Washington D.C. to Mexico City. He had taken up

arms against the U.S., the French, and hostile Indians. He had survived three wars and at least four attempts upon his life, and had escaped from the grasp of renowned slave hunters. A truly colourful frontier character, this Black chief dressed in Indian fashion and rode the Texas-Mexican border country on a white horse with blue eyes, sat upon a saddle embellished with gold. John's life had been one long struggle to find a permanent home for the Seminole Blacks where they could live in peace as free men, raise families, and establish an industrious and thriving community. This heroic quest would cause him to lead his people from Florida to the Indian Territory, Mexico, Texas, and back to Mexico in search of the promised land. It is only fitting that he should have died in pursuit of this goal.

Most significantly, John's lifetime had witnessed the changes that had taken place in Seminole-Black relations. When he was born, around 1812, a strong, mutually beneficial, primarily military and economic alliance had linked the Seminoles and Blacks in Florida. By the time of his death, some 70 years later, his followers were living in an isolated community in a foreign land, hundreds of miles from their former Indian allies. As a young man, John had seen the relationship come under intense pressure from two sources. First of all, the Indians' and Blacks' wish to preserve their individuality, identity and independence had led to their almost continuous separation and gradual estrangement. And secondly, the U.S. military had exploited these differences in adopting a "Divide and Rule" policy in removal negotiations during the Second Seminole War. This latter had given rise to mutual suspicion and distrust within the Indian and Black camps with the two groups determining to look out for themselves from that point on. Irrevocable damage was thus caused and the former allies were left to face a legacy of troubles after removal.

In the Indian Territory, John Horse had come across many of the problems

encountered by Seminole Blacks at that time. He had seen members of his family kidnapped by slavehunters and his life, home and property threatened by angry Seminoles. Although he had been a free Black , he had been a target for re-enslavement and assassination attempts and forced to live as a virtual prisoner at Fort Gibson for five years. Unwilling to live in slavery, no matter how mild the form of servitude, or under the yoke of Creek Black codes and a progressive Seminole leadership, John had managed to forge a tenuous alliance between his militant supporters and Wild Cat's recalcitrant traditionalists that had led to the two groups quitting the Indian Territory. In Mexico, however, John had seen the gradual deterioration of the alliance as the Seminoles had sought to exert their will over the increasingly independent and self-willed Blacks. He had been there when the Seminoles had ridden out of Nacimiento on the return journey to the Indian Territory, severing at a stroke the ties between the two groups. Since that time, the Seminole Blacks had lived by themselves in separate, maroon communities, and had pursued independent courses of action. There would be no re-establishment of relations with the Seminoles in John Horse's lifetime. During the 1870s, it emerged that these Blacks would not be allowed to return to the Seminole nation and, by the time of John's death, their historic association with the tribe had clearly become a thing of the past.

John Horse's mission to Mexico City had apparently been successful as the Presidency subsequently supported the cause of the Seminole Blacks. Between 1885-1891, President Porfirio Diaz, who had resumed office in 1884, protected the Mascogos against the persistent efforts of Governor José María Garza Galán of Coahuila to evict them from the hacienda. The result was the reaffirmation of the Blacks' and Kickapoos' title to four sitios at Nacimiento in 1892 when a plat of the area was drawn up by engineer Mijar y Haro and deposited in the Agrarian Department. Haro's plans gave

no specifications of the landholdings of each group, however, and a boundary dispute arose between them that has continued to the present day.¹⁶⁰

The dispute came about because the Kickapoos resented the fact that the more numerous Blacks took the majority of the land granted to the two groups at the hacienda.¹⁶¹ The extra land did not bring immediate benefits to the Seminole Blacks, however. Though it was reported in 1907 that the 300 Mascogos were the better farmers and planted the larger area, like the sharecroppers of the Deep South, they constantly ran into debt and were forced to sell their produce in advance, hence they were "always destitute". While the Kickapoos did not plant so large an acreage, they were at least able to keep what they raised for their own use. Moreover, the two groups leased out the water rights to Mexicans, and various others, who put nearly a thousand acres at Nacimiento under cultivation. The Blacks and Indians subsequently "loaned and spent the money and when this was gone had a pretty hard time". It was left to the Mexican government to expel the renters and insist that the colonists work the land themselves from then on.¹⁶² Though their landholdings had been secured, the Mascogos' troubles were, clearly, far from over.

The lives of the Seminole Blacks at Nacimiento were to be no easier than those of their kinsmen in Texas, faced, as they were, with jealous Kickapoo neighbours, an unsympathetic state government, frequent national revolutions, which devastated the country, and the never-ending problem of producing the crops necessary for survival in an area noted for its harsh climate and difficult terrain. Nevertheless, through perseverance and hard work, the Mexican group has survived intact to the present day. The Seminole Black village is now known as Nacimiento de los Negros and can be spotted on any Rand-McNally road map of Mexico, a few miles northwest of Músquiz, Coahuila, on Highway 53. The Nacimiento Blacks' associations with the Seminoles ceased long ago but they have maintained

close ties with the Brackettville group, and visiting relations with the Seminole Freedmen of Oklahoma, during the Twentieth Century. It is plain to see that the various communities of Seminole Blacks throughout continental North America are united in identifying with the group as a whole, feeling a strong sense of pride in its heritage, and sharing the firm intention to preserve and continue its unique cultural traditions.

By way of conclusion, three significant points should be emphasized. First of all, the Blacks living on the Texas-Mexican frontier were only interested in re-settling in the Seminole nation because of the benefits they would derive from such a move. They were familiar with the thriving Seminole Freedman communities and were anxious to receive land, economic opportunity, annuities, political representation, and education for their children. The U.S. government had originally agreed to pay their removal expenses and it was plain to see that the Seminole nation offered the best prospect for their future success. Of great importance, however, these Blacks were clearly not interested in re-establishing their association with the Seminoles for its own sake. Just as they had severed their connection with the Seminoles in the late 1850s because it appeared to be in their best interests, so they hoped to revive it in the 1870s for the same reason. But, if their removal to the Seminole nation were not approved, they were prepared to accept land in Arkansas, Texas, Florida, the Oklahoma Territory, or other parts of the Indian Territory. In short, these Blacks were not concerned with being associated with the Seminoles, they merely sought what was best for the group.

Secondly, the affair involving the illegal immigrants of the 1880s clearly points to the existence of a continuing racial tension between the Blacks and the Seminole progressives. The Black pilots sent to the Seminole nation were invited and entertained by the Freedmen and it was they who extended the offer to return. The restoration of the Blacks, in

fact, came to be vehemently opposed by the progressive tribal leadership. When the unauthorised immigrant parties removed independently to the nation, they settled in the Freedman communities. Here they were hidden by their kinsmen and their presence remained undetected by the tribal authorities for some considerable time. Once the progressives learned of their immigration, they embarked upon a vigorous campaign to effect their expulsion.

The incident highlights three important factors. First of all, the Freedman communities in the Seminole nation were so separate and isolated from those of the Indians that the latter were generally unaware of what went on there, even to the extent of not knowing of the presence therein of illegal immigrants from the border country. Secondly, having discovered and opposed the immigrants' presence in the nation, both the tribal authorities and the Union Indian agent appear to have been powerless to effect their removal from the almost autonomous Freedman settlements. Thirdly, while the progressives favoured the repatriation of Indian emigrants they were adamant in their opposition to that of Blacks. They had welcomed back the followers of Wild Cat but opposed the restoration of the Bowlegs immigrants. The Freedmen, meanwhile, welcomed their kinsmen into the nation, hid and supported them, and risked censure by both the tribal and U.S. authorities for their actions. Clearly, the ties that bound the Seminole Blacks in the Indian Territory with those in Texas and Mexico were far stronger than those linking the Freedmen with the Seminoles.

The final point that should be stressed is that when it had become clear that the U.S. had no intention of removing the Seminole Blacks to the Indian Territory, the Blacks again made no attempt whatsoever to establish an association with other Indian tribes based on the border. On the contrary, the Blacks continued to oppose the depredating excursions of hostile bands as both scouts in Texas and colonists in Mexico. The

Blacks again felt their interests would best be served by not entering into an alliance with the Indians of the border country. They clearly preferred the offers and promises of Mexican and U.S. officials to an offensive minority alliance on the frontier. Once again, the Blacks' sole motivation was to secure what they felt was best for the group and they demonstrated emphatically that they intended to act independently and unilaterally to achieve that end. It was the strength of their resolve to constitute a separate and viable community on the frontier that enabled the group to overcome the difficulties it was to face and survive intact to the present-day.

The Seminole Blacks who had remained behind in the Indian Territory after the exodus of 1849-1850, in general, fared better than their emigrant compatriots. Unlike the militants, these Blacks had been unwilling to seek freedom at any price but had preferred to accept the mild form of servitude practised by the Seminoles. For the most part, their decision proved a wise one. The Seminoles quickly put the traumas of the 1840s behind them and embarked upon a constructive and conciliatory decade. There was something of a reversion to the earlier Florida situation and both slaves and free Blacks came to enjoy, once more, a great deal of control over their daily lives. Yet the Blacks were still subject to kidnap and sale and remained a target for speculators. In the late 1850s, moreover, factional divisions, which threatened the future of Seminole-Black relations, reappeared among the Indians. The eventual outcome was the division of the tribe into Northern and Southern sympathisers during the Civil War, the recalcitrant traditionalists and Blacks supporting the Union and the progressives the Confederacy. The Civil War would ultimately prove to be the most important in the history of the Seminole Blacks as it had as a result their unconditional emancipation and acceptance into the tribe on an equal footing with the Indian

members.

Before going on to look at these developments, it is necessary at this stage to place post-removal Seminole slavery in the broader context of Indian slaveholding in the Indian Territory. Only then can one fully appreciate just how different the experience of the Seminole Blacks was from that of the majority of Blacks associated with the other slaveholding tribes, and how superior was their lot. Though considered to be a Civilized tribe and surrounded by progressive mixed blood Indians and southern whites, the Seminoles clung on tenaciously to their native ideology and customs, including their aboriginal form of slavery. The other slaveholding tribes, however, succumbed to both internal and external pressure to accept acculturative influences and adopted southern white notions and institutions, including Black codes, plantation and industrial slavery, and other manifestations of systematized bondage. A study of Black slavery among the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws with a view to drawing comparisons with the system practised by the Seminoles, is the subject of the next chapter.

Footnotes

1. Wm. W. Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 19 April 1870, Ely S. Parker to Secretary of the Interior 26 April 1870 and Major Henry C. Merriam to the Assistant Adjutant General in the Department of Texas (hereafter cited as A.A.G.D.T.) 12 August 1872, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M619, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General, Main Series, reproduced from Record Group 94, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s-1917, 828 rolls, Roll 799, frames 17, 592-595, 407-409. Rolls 799 and 800 contain File 488-1870, "Papers relating to the return of the Kickapoo and the Seminole (Negro) Indians from Mexico to the United States, 1870-1885". Roll 799 contains correspondence from 1870-1873 and Roll 800 that from 1873-1885. Microcopy M619 is hereafter cited as M619 followed by the roll and frame numbers; E.D. Townsend to Major General Reynolds 10 May 1870, M619-800, frame 766, "By Command of Brevet Major General Reynolds," H. Clay Wood to F.W. Perry 21 May 1870, National Archives Record Group 393, Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Division of the Missouri, E2547, Special File Box 15, Seminole Negro Indians, 1872-1876, hereafter cited as R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 21 February 1873, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M234, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, 962 rolls, Roll 805, Seminole Agency 1872-1876, I524-73 enc. Microcopy M234 is hereafter cited as M234 followed by the roll number and reference.
2. Belknap to George Boutwell 29 September 1870, Boutwell to Belknap 1 October 1870 and First Endorsement to latter, Townsend, 6 October 1870, M619-799, frames 57-58, 577-579.
3. H.R. Clum to W. Otto 3 October 1870 and see also Otto to Belknap 4 October 1870, M619-799, frames 53-54, 50-51.
4. Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 12 August 1872, M619-799, frames 407-409.
5. Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 12 September 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
6. Samuel J. Cushing to A.A.G.D.T. 5 August 1872, Endorsement to latter, A.A.G.D.T. 6 August 1872 and Merriam to A.A.G.D.T. 12 August 1872, M619-799, frames 405-409; "Brief of Papers relative to the subsistence and c. at Fort Duncan Texas of the Seminole Negro Indians from Mexico in anticipation of their removal by the Interior Dept. to a reservation", M619-800, frame 140.
7. It cost the U.S. Army \$540.39 to supply the Seminole Blacks at Fort Duncan with rations of fresh beef, flour, coffee, brown sugar and salt during August and September 1872, "Statement of the value of subsistence stores issued to the Seminole Negro Indians at Fort Duncan by Lt. J.M. Sturr 9th Cavalry in the Months of August and September 1872." Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence 14 January 1873, M619-799, frame 545.
8. Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 12 September 1872, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.

9. B.R. Cowen to F.A. Walker 25 September 1872, M234-805, I183-72; see also, Walker to Cowen 23 September 1872 and Cowen to Belknap 25 September 1872, M619-799, frames 452-458, 460-461.
10. Walker to Secretary of the Interior 27 September 1872 and see also Cowen to Belknap, Endorsement to above, 28 September 1872, M619-799, frames 446-447.
11. Merriam, Fourth Endorsement, 24 October 1872, to his letter of 12 August 1872 to A.A.G.D.T., M619-799, frame 443; Endorsement to latter, Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, 15 November 1872 in "Memoranda relative to Seminole Negro Indians," R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
12. Walker to Secretary of the Interior 16 December 1872, M619-799, frames 569-572.
13. Cowen to Belknap 26 December 1872, M619-799, frames 565-566.
14. Sheridan to C.C. Augur 10 January 1873 and C.C. Augur to Sheridan 14 January 1873, reference in "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians" and "Memoranda relative to Seminole Negro Indians," R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
15. Sheridan, Chicago, 29 January 1873, First Endorsement to Cowen to Belknap 26 December 1872, M619-799, frames 562-563.
16. Belknap to C. Delano 21 February 1873 and Delano to Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs 5 March 1873, M234-805, I524-73.
17. Petition of Elijah Daniel, 'Cife of the Simenoles negro Indians Scout,' John Ward and James Bruner, Fort Clark 28 June 1873, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
18. Col. Ranaid S. Mackenzie, Fort Clark, 10 July 1873, Endorsement to Petition of Elijah Daniel et.al. 28 June 1873, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Endorsement, Sheridan, 22 July 1873, M619-800, frame 110.
19. Major A.Z. Latimer to A.A.G.D.T. 22 December 1873 and "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians," reference to communication from the Department of Texas to Latimer 27 December 1873, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
20. John Kiveth "Chief of the Seminole Negro Indians," to C.C. Augur, San Antonio, Texas, 10 December 1873, M619-800, frames 117-119.
21. "Seminole Wild Cat Party," John Horse, "Colonel and Father of all the Seminole Indians, who rules all the Seminole tribes," to C.C. Augur, San Antonio, Texas, 10 December 1873, M619-800, frames 121-124.
22. Kiveth to C.C. Augur 10 December 1873, M619-800, frames 117-119.
23. Ibid.
24. Horse to C.C. Augur 10 December 1873, M619-800, frames 121-124.
25. C.C. Augur to Adjutant General 21 February 1874, M619-800, frames 101-106.

26. Latimer to A.A.G.D.T. 1 January 1874, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
27. John Kibbets to A.A.G.D.T. 8 February 1874, M619-800, frames 113-115.
28. Lt. John L. Bullis, Fort Duncan, 9 February 1874, First Endorsement to Kibbets to A.A.G.D.T. 8 February 1874, M619-800, frame 112.
29. C.C. Augur to Adjutant General 21 February 1874, M619-800, frames 101-106.
30. Acting Commissary General, Washington D.C., 11 March 1874, Fourth Endorsement to C.C. Augur to Adjutant General 21 February 1874 and Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 9 April 1874, M619-800, frames 100, 146-147.
31. Ed. P. Smith to Secretary of the Interior 31 July 1874 and Cowen to Belknap 15 August 1874, M619-800, frames 188, 185-186.
32. Colonel Jno. M. Bacon to Commanding Officer at Fort Duncan 1 July 1874, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Commanding Officer at Duncan to A.A.G.D.T. 13 July 1874, Fifth Endorsement to latter, Commissary General Subsistence, 29 July 1874, Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 7 August 1874, Clum to Secretary of the Interior 20 August 1874 and Cowen to Belknap 21 August 1874, M619-800, frames 179-180, 177, 182-183, 193, 191.
33. H.M. Atkinson to Smith 16 November 1874 and 29 December 1874, M234-805, A1085-74 and A26-75.
34. Lieutenant A.C. Markley to Post Adjutant, Fort Duncan, 12 March 1875, M234-805, A408-75.
35. Ibid., Col. Wm. R. Shafter to Atkinson 14 March 1875 and Bullis to Lieutenant George H. Smith 1 May 1875, M234-805, A408-75 and B791-75.
36. Major A.P. Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 3 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
37. Department of Texas Special Orders No.80, Section 3, 28 April 1875, issued, "By Command of Brigadier General Ord," M619-800, frame 262.
38. "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians," reference to Ord's directive of 5 May 1875 to the Commanding Officers at Forts Duncan and Clark to conduct detailed censuses of the Seminole Blacks at the posts, "List of Seminole Indian Negroes at Fort Duncan Texas, May 9, 1875," Compiled by Lieutenant Markley, Commanding the Detachment of Seminole Black Scouts at the post, Shafter to A.A.G.D.T. 10 May 1875 and Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 15 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
39. Markley to Post Adjutant, Fort Duncan, 12 March 1875, M234-805, A408-75; "List of Seminole Indian Negroes at Fort Duncan Texas, May 9, 1875" and Shafter to A.A.G.D.T. 10 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
40. Markley to Post Adjutant, Fort Duncan, 12 March 1875, M234-805, A408-75.
41. Shafter to A.A.G.D.T. 10 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.

42. Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 15 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; see also, Bullis to Smith 1 May 1875, M234-805, B791-75.
43. Bullis to Smith 1 May 1875, M234-805, B791-75; Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 3 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
44. Ibid. and Morrow to A.A.G.D.T. 15 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
45. Department of Texas Special Orders No.80, Section 3, 28 April 1875, Second Endorsement to latter, A. Beckwith, Assistant Commissary General Subsistence, 6 May 1875 and Townsend to Secretary of War 7 May 1875, M619-800, frames 262, 261; Townsend to Commanding General, Department of Texas, 12 May 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
46. Ord to Adjutant General 21 May 1875, First Endorsement to latter, Sheridan, 27 May 1875, Third Endorsement, Townsend, 2 June 1875. Ord's letter and its accompanying endorsements were forwarded by the Secretary of War's Chief Clerk to the Secretary of the Interior on 10 June 1875, M619-800, frames 267-268, 263-264, 272-273.
47. Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 28 May 1875, First Endorsement to latter, Morrow, 28 May 1875, Second Endorsement, Ord, 28 May 1875, and Third Endorsement, Sheridan, 4 June 1875, M619-800, frames 285-286, 281-283.
48. Commissary General Subsistence, 15 June 1875, Seventh Endorsement to Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 28 May 1875, M619-800, frame 284.
49. Belknap to Delano 19 June 1875, M619-800, frame 288.
50. Clum to Secretary of the Interior 23 June 1875, Delano to Belknap 25 June 1875 and Belknap to Secretary of the Interior 29 June 1875, M619-800, frames 293-295, 290-291, 297-299; "Memoranda relative to Seminole Negro Indians," reference to 9 July 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
51. Colonel Edward Hatch to A.A.G.D.T. 9 August 1875, M619-800, frames 305-308.
52. Ord, n.d., Endorsement to Hatch to A.A.G.D.T. 9 August 1875, M619-800, frame 300; Fourth Endorsement to latter, Townsend, 2 February 1876, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
53. Senator Chas. W. Jones to Smith 8 September 1875, M619-800, frames 326-330.
54. Smith to Secretary of the Interior 20 September 1875, M619-800, frames 319-324.
55. Kappler. Charles J. (comp.), Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, 3 Vols. (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2nd Edition, 1904) Volume 2, Treaty with the Seminole 21 March 1866, p.695.
56. Smith to Secretary of the Interior 20 September 1875, M619-800, frames 319-324.

57. Cowen to Secretary of War 23 September 1875, M619-800, frames 316-317. Copies of Cowen's communication were forwarded to Ord on 16 October 1875 and the Commanding Officers at Forts Duncan and Clark on 16 November 1875. See relevant references in "Brief of Papers in relation to the Seminole Negro Indians" and "Memoranda relative to Seminole Negro Indians," R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1875, hereafter cited as A.R.C.I.A. followed by the year, "Legislation Recommended," Smith to Secretary of the Interior 1 November 1875, p.30.
58. Shafter to Z. Chandler 28 December 1875, M234-805, S20-76.
59. Ord, "Report of Indian Scouts serving in the Department of Texas on January 31st 1877," 12 February 1877, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 6, No.925/77.
60. Elizy Daniel to "General" (R.S. Mackenzie, Commanding at Fort Sill, Indian Territory) 7 March 1876, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
61. Mackenzie, Commanding at Fort Clark, 10 July 1873, Endorsement to Petition of Elijah Daniel et.al. 28 June 1873 and Mackenzie to Adjutant General 28 March 1875, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
62. Mackenzie, Commanding at Fort Sill, 20 April 1876, First Endorsement to Elizy Daniel to "General" 7 March 1876, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
63. Callan, Austin, "The End of the 'Seminoles'," Frontier Times, 8, No.1, (October 1930), 9-11, passim.
64. Markley to Post Adjutant, Fort Duncan, 12 March 1875, M234-805, A408-75; "List of Seminole Indian Negroes at Fort Duncan Texas, May 9, 1875," R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15; Bonnet, W.A., "King Fisher, a Noted Character," Frontier Times, 3, No.10, (July 1926), 36-37, passim; Fisher, O. Clark and Dykes, J.C., King Fisher: His Life and Times (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1966) pp.45, 57; Porter, Kenneth W., The Negro on the American Frontier (New York, New York Times, Arno Press, 1971) p.485 and n.45.
65. "John Creaton; an Autobiography, 1856-1932," Unpublished Manuscript, 45 pp. typescript, p.33, in John Creaton Collection, Box 2Q490, Manuscripts Division, Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin. Creaton did not put a date upon this event but it must have taken place after 1881, while the author was in Eagle Pass, and before 11 March 1884, when King Fisher was shot down in San Antonio.
66. Petition of 35 citizens of Kinney County, Texas, to Secretary of War 24 April 1876 and Second Endorsement to latter, Ord, 6 July 1876, M619-800, frames 511-514.
67. Colonel I. Irwin Gregg to A.A.G.D.T. 23 May 1876, First Endorsement to latter, Ord, 27 May 1876, Gregg to A.A.G.D.T. 25 May 1876 and First Endorsement to latter, Ord, 29 May 1876, M619-800, frames 500-501, 505-507; Porter, Kenneth W., "Farewell to John Horse: An Episode of Seminole Negro Folk History," Phylon, 8, No.3, (1947), 265-273, pp.266, 268; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.486.

68. Gregg to A.A.G.D.T. 23 May 1876 and 25 May 1876, M619-800, frames 500-501, 505-506.
69. Gregg to A.A.G.D.T. 23 May 1876, First Endorsement to latter, Ord, 27 May 1876, Second Endorsement, Sheridan, 3 June 1876, Gregg to A.A.G.D.T. 25 May 1876 and First Endorsement to latter, Ord, 29 May 1876, and see also Gregg, 6 July 1876, First Endorsement to Petition of 35 citizens of Kinney County 24 April 1876 and Second Endorsement, Ord, 6 July 1876, M619-800, frames 500-502, 505-507, 513-514.
70. J.Q. Smith to Secretary of the Interior 6 June 1876, R.G. 393, S.F. Box 15.
71. Ord to T.G. Williams 15 June 1876, Williams to G. Schleicher 17 June 1876 and Jno. Hancock to J.Q. Smith 22 June 1876, M234-805, S448-76 and H472-76; Ord, 6 July 1876, Second Endorsement to Petition of 35 Citizens of Kinney County 24 April 1876, M619-800, frame 514.
72. Taylor, Joe F. (ed.), The Indian Campaign on the Staked Plains, 1874-1875. Military Correspondence extracted from War Department Adjutant General's Office, File 2815-1874 (Canyon, Texas, Panhandle-Plains Historical Society, 1962) p.227n.
73. Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.486.
74. Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," pp.266, 272 n.1; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, pp.486-487.
75. Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 14 June 1880, M619-800, frames 618-619.
76. Stanley, Commanding at Fort Clark, 15 June 1880, First Endorsement to Bullis to A.A.G.D.T. 14 June 1880, Second Endorsement, Ord, 22 June 1880 and E.J. Brooks to Secretary of the Interior 10 July 1880, M619-800, frames 615, 623-624.
77. Stanley to A.G.D.T. 19 May 1882, M619-800, frames 627-629.
78. Stanley to A.G.D.T 19 May and 19 June 1882, M619-800, frames 627-629, 639-640.
79. Stanley to A.G.D.T. 19 June 1882, and see also Stanley to Adjutant General, San Antonio, Telegram, 24 May 1882, First Endorsement to latter, C.C. Augur, Commanding the Department of Texas, 25 May 1882 and Second Endorsement, Sheridan, 1 June 1882, M619-800, frames 639-640, 631, 625-626.
80. Sheridan, 28 June 1882, Second Endorsement to Stanley to A.G.D.T. 19 June 1882, M619-800, frame 638.
81. Lincoln to Secretary of the Interior 8 June 1882, M619-800, frames 635-636.
82. John Jumper to John Q. Tufts 2 August 1882, M619-800, frames 651-652.

83. Tufts to H. Price 11 August 1882 and Price to Secretary of the Interior 9 September 1882, M619-800, frames 652, 647-649.
84. Tufts to Price 26 March 1884, National Archives Record Group 48, Records of the Department of the Interior, Indian Division, Special Files Box 48, Indian Territory Division, Choctaw Freedmen File, 6172-84, enclosed with H.M. Teller to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 2 May 1884, 8582-84, hereafter cited as R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, followed by specific reference.
85. Lieutenant F.H. French to A.G.D.T. 23 May 1883, M619-800, frames 656-657.
86. Secretary of War to Secretary of the Interior 20 June 1883, Second Endorsement to above, C.C. Augur, 14 August 1883 and Chief Clerk, War Department, to Secretary of the Interior 28 August 1883, M619-800, frames 667-668, 665, 730; Price to Tufts 6 September 1883, National Archives Record Group 75, Bureau of Indian Affairs Letters Sent and Letter Books 1881-1907, Letter Book 173, "Miscellaneous," p.665, hereafter cited as R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, followed by the specific reference.
87. Jumper to Tufts 17 September 1883, M619-800, frames 695-698 and see also Sheridan to Adjutant General 27 October 1883, *ibid.*, frames 703-704. Here Sheridan refuted the charge that he had described the Seminole Blacks as "a turbulent lawless band". The Lieutenant General stated that he had always considered them to be, on the contrary, "Law abiding, well disposed and worthy of consideration".
88. Tufts to Price 13 October 1883, Price to Secretary of the Interior 18 October 1883 and Teller to Secretary of War 19 October 1883, M619-800, frames 692-693, 686-690, 683-684.
89. Tufts to Price 26 March 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 6172-84, enclosed with 8582-84.
90. Jumper to Tufts 1 March 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 6172-84, Enclosure A, enclosed with 8582-84.
91. These Blacks subsequently became associated with the Texas-Mexican group but when, and under what circumstances, is unknown.
92. Tufts to Price 26 March 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 6172-84, enclosed with 8582-84.
93. Ibid.
94. Jumper to Jno. F. Brown 31 March 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 6781-84, Enclosure No.2, enclosed with 8582-84.
95. Price to Secretary of the Interior 25 April 1884, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B., L.B. "L" 124, p.494.
96. Teller to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 2 May 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 8582-84.

97. E.L. Stevens to Tufts 17 May 1884, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B., L.B. "L" 125, p.413.
98. Brown to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 12 February 1885, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 3139-85.
99. Ibid.
100. Price to Tufts 18 February 1885, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B., L.B. "L", containing correspondence sent out in February 1885, pp.133-135.
101. A.R.C.I.A. 1884, Report of Union Agency, Tufts to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 29 August 1884, p.99.
102. Listings of Joe Scippio and Caesar Bruner bands, Seminole Census Records 1890, pp.64-81, 90-97, in C. Guy Cutlip Collection, Box 4, Manuscripts, Manuscripts Division, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma at Norman; Ledger Book showing cash payments to Seminole Indians by bands, 1898, Seminole Volume 6, 125 pp., Listings for DosarBarkus and Caesar Bruner bands, pp.46-68, 81-90, and List of Headrights paid Seminole Indians by bands, J.F. Brown and Son, Headright 1901, Seminole Volume 7, 135 pp., listings for Dosar Barkus and Caesar Bruner bands, pp.47-69, 124-135, both volumes reproduced in SMN 1, Microfilm, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City.
103. U.S. Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, The Final Rolls of Citizens and Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes in Indian Territory; Prepared by the Commission and Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes, and approved by the Secretary of the Interior on or prior to March 4, 1907 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1907) Listings of Seminole Freedmen, pp.627-634.
104. Stanley, Commanding the Department of Texas, 16 May 1885, First Endorsement to Colonel C.H. Smith to A.G.D.T. 9 May 1885, M619-800, frames 786-788.
105. Petition of Florida Seminole Negroes to President Grover Cleveland, n.d. but received by Bureau of Indian Affairs 9 February 1888, National Archives Record Group 75, Letters Received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 1881-1907, 3565-88, hereafter cited as R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, followed by the specific reference.
106. Army Discharge Papers of David Bowlegs of the Seminole Negro Indian Scouts, 1873-1880, Epton (Hicks) Collection, Manuscripts Division, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma at Norman.
107. Porter, Kenneth W., "Seminole in Mexico, 1850-1861," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 29, No.2, (Summer 1951), 153-168, pp.167-168 and n.39. Porter cites as his source various interviews he conducted with Seminole Blacks in Nacimiento, Brackettville, and Noble town, Seminole County, Oklahoma, during 1942 and 1943.
108. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, Volume 2, Treaty with the Seminole 21 March 1866, p.695.

109. Jumper to Tufts 17 September 1883, M619-800, frames 695-698; Jumper to Tufts 1 March 1884 and Jumper to Brown 31 March 1884, R.G. 48, S.F. Box 48, 6172-84, Enclosure A, and 6781-84, Enclosure No.2, both enclosed with 8582-84.
110. Colonel C.H. Smith to A.G.D.T. 9 May 1885, M619-800, frames 790-791.
111. R. Williams to Lieutenant General Commanding the Army 7 August 1884, Williams to Adjutant General 7 August 1884, Williams to Commanding General, Division of the Missouri, 11 August 1884 and Department of Texas Special Orders No.104, Paragraph 3, 18 August 1884, issued by Thomas M. Vincent, A.A.G.D.T., under orders from Stanley, M619-800, frames 705-706, 709-710, 714, 741.
112. Stanley, 27 August 1884, First Endorsement to Lieutenant Colonel Zenas R. Bliss to A.G.D.T. 26 August 1884, M619-800, frames 715-77.
113. Lieutenant Edward B. Ives to A.G.D.T. 24 August 1884, M619-800, frames 727-728.
114. Ibid.
115. Bliss to A.G.D.T. 26 August 1884, M619-800, frames 720-725.
116. Stanley, 27 August 1884, First Endorsement to Bliss to A.G.D.T. 26 August 1884, Second Endorsement, Major General J.M. Schofield, Commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, 1 September 1884 and Secretary of War to Secretary of the Interior 19 September 1884, M619-800, frames 715-717, 783-785.
117. C.H. Smith to A.G.D.T. 9 May 1885, M619-800, frames 790-791.
118. Ibid.
119. Stanley, 16 May 1885, First Endorsement to C.H. Smith to A.G.D.T. 9 May 1885, M619-800, frames 786-788.
120. Schofield, 22 May 1885, Second Endorsement to C.H. Smith to A.G.D.T. 9 May 1885, M619-800, frames 793-794.
121. Sheridan to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 14 February 1887 and see also Lieutenant Colonel S.C. Kellogg to J.D.C. Atkins 25 March 1886, R.G. 75 L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 4313-87 and 8574-86.
122. Sergeant Bob Kibbit, Papers presented to Bureau of Indian Affairs, n.d. but handed back to him 17 March 1886, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 7024-86; Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to John Jumper 17 March 1886 and D.M. Browning to William Warrior 3 March 1894, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 146, pp. 8-9 and L.B. "L" 275, p.370.
123. Henry L. Dawes to Secretary of the Interior 20 March 1886, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 8066-86.
124. Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Jumper 17 March 1886, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 146, pp.8-9.

125. Atkins to Sheridan 3 March 1887, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 156, pp.457-458.
126. Atkins to Secretary of the Interior 22 March 1886, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 146, p.107.
127. L.Q.C. Lamar to Dawes 23 March 1886, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M606, Letters Sent by the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 1849-1903, 127 rolls, Roll 44, 8 February 1886-13 April 1886, pp.340-341; Atkins to Sheridan 3 March 1887, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 156, pp.457-458.
128. Kellogg to Atkins 25 March 1886 and Atkins to Kellogg 25 March 1886, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 8574-86.
129. Petition of Florida Seminole Negroes to President Cleveland, n.d. but received by B.I.A. 9 February 1888, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 3565-88.
130. Ibid.
131. William Warrior to Secretary of the Interior 5 March 1888, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 6884-88.
132. Brown to Major F.M. Hayes 5 May 1894, enclosed with Warrior to Hoke Smith, 15 May 1894, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 19400-94. For background to Warrior's application see, Warrior to Secretary of the Interior 20 February 1894, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 8296-94; and Browning to Warrior 3 March 1894, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 275, p.370.
133. Hunter, John W., "Old Army, the Seminole Squaw," Frontier Times, 3, No.8, (May 1926), 14-15, 48, passim.
134. For contemporary descriptions of Las Moras Creek and its environs see, Carter, Robert G., "A Raid into Mexico," Outing, 12, No.1, (April 1888), 1-9, p.1 and Reid, John C., "Reid's Tramp: A Ten Months' Trip Through Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California and Mexico in 1857," Frontier Times, 20, No.10, (July 1943), 197-208, pp.199-200.
135. Conger Jones, H., "Old Seminole Scouts still thrive on Border," Frontier Times, 11, No.8, (May 1934), 327-332, p.329; Foster, Laurence, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1935) p.48; Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," p.273 n.18.
136. "Black Watch of Texas," San Antonio Express, 16 November 1924.
137. Dickerson, W.E.S., "Seminole Indians," in Webb, Walter P. et.al., The Handbook of Texas, Volume 2 (Austin, Texas State Historical Society, 1952) p.592; Texas! Live the Legend (Publication of the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation Travel and Information Division, 11th and Brazos Streets, Austin, Texas 78701; distributed free of charge to travellers in the state by the Texas Tourist Bureau, 177 pp. 1982) p.21.

138. For a discussion of the religion, language, naming-practices and other unique cultural traditions of the Texas Seminole Blacks, see below, "Twentieth Century Relations and Conclusions".
139. Woodhull, Frost, "The Seminole Indian Scouts on the Border," Frontier Times, 15, No.3, (December 1937), 118-127, p.118.
140. Army Discharge Papers of Seminole Black Scout Joseph Philips for six month period of enlistment 11 October 1893-10 April 1894, Warren Perryman Collection, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas, hereafter cited as Warren Perryman Collection.
141. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.48.
142. Ibid. and James, Vinton L., Frontier and Pioneer Recollections of Early Days in San Antonio and West Texas (San Antonio, Artes Graficas Press, 1938) pp.79-80.
143. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.48.
144. Major Henry O.S. Heistand, Assistant Adjutant General, War Department, Correspondence left at the B.I.A. 10 July 1899, R.G. 75, L.R. B.I.A. 1881-1907, 32063-99.
145. Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Heistand 15 July 1899, R.G. 75, B.I.A. L.S. and L.B. 1881-1907, L.B. "L" 412, p.33.
146. Turner, Frederick J., "The significance of the Frontier in American History," Paper contained in, The Frontier in American History (New York, H. Holt and Co. Publishers, 1921) 1-39, p.1.
147. Army Discharge Papers of Joseph Philips, 1893-1909, in Warren Perryman Collection; "Descriptive Book for a Detachment of Seminole Indians, 1889-1893," National Archives Record Group 391, Records of the U.S. Army Mobile Units, 1821-1942, Indian Scouts; Muster Roll of Second Lieutenant E.H. Rubottom, Detachment Seminole Negro Indian Scouts, 31 October 1898 and Muster Roll of a Detachment of Seminole Negro Indian Scouts from 31 December 1910, reproduced in full in Greene, Robert E., Black Defenders of America 1775-1973 (Chicago, Johnson Pub. Co. Inc., 1974) p.387; Burg, Maclyn P., "Service on the Vanishing Frontier, 1887-1898," Military History of Texas and the Southwest, 13, No.3, (1976), 5-21, p.19.
148. Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.471.
149. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," p.48. It should be noted that the final order for the disbanding of the Seminole Black Scouts was issued two months later, on 10 July 1914.
150. Ibid.; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," p.120.
151. Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," p.127.
152. Quoted in Ibid., pp.126-127.

153. Foster, "Negro-Indian Relationships in the Southeast," pp.48-49; Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.491; Woodhull, "Scouts on the Border," p.127.
154. A good example of the Seminole Blacks' tenacity and ability to overcome adversity is furnished by the experience of Renty Grayson. After the Scouts were disbanded, they received pensions for their former services and again helped to support the rest of the group. Though Renty had been a leading member of the detachment, however, his service records could not be traced and he was forced, for a time, to live "from the post garbage cans". Renty was not one to give up easily, however, and he succeeded in enlisting the support of "several lawyers and army officers" in his fight for what was rightly his. The story has a happy ending. Renty had served as guide to the Fourth Cavalry's A Troop during the 1874 Battle of Palo Duro Canyon and his name was found on the payroll of that detachment. Consequently, he was awarded a pension of \$20.00 per month and received \$1,600 in back-pay, a sum sufficiently large to enable Renty to buy his own home and live in moderate comfort. See "Black Watch of Texas."
155. Latorre, Felipe A. and Dolores L., The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Austin, London, Texas Pan American Series, University of Texas Press, 1976) p.23; Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," p.265.
156. Affairs of the Mexico Kickapoo Indians, 60 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Doc. No.215, 3 Vols., Vol.3, Exhibit No.129 (Goode), "Notes regarding the Nacimientto lands held by the Federal Government of Mexico for the benefit of the Mexican Kickapoo and Muskogee Indians, numbering about 600," p.2202.
157. Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, pp.23-24.
158. Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," p.265, 272 n.2.
159. Ibid., pp.265-269, 273 n.5; Porter, Kenneth W., "Seminole Flight from Fort Marion," Florida Historical Quarterly, 22, No.1, (January 1944), 112-133, p.133 n.7; Porter, "Seminole in Mexico," p.164.
160. Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, pp.24, 123, 125; Porter, "Farewell to John Horse," pp.272-273, notes 3 and 5.
161. For a good discussion of the two groups' landholdings and ensuing disputes see, Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo Indians, pp.23-24 and 123-129.
162. Affairs of the Mexican Kickapoo Indians, Volume 3, No.129, pp.2201-2202. See also, Gibson, Arrell M., The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963) p.333. The Senate Document's figure of "300 Muskogees" ties in well with the 123 Seminole Black males reported to be living at the hacienda in 1891. See, Porter, Negro on the Frontier, p.444 n.65; and for a full citation of the source see, Porter, "Seminole in Mexico," p.163 n.27.

CHAPTER 5

BLACK SLAVERY AMONG THE CHEROKEES,
CREEKS, CHOCTAWS AND CHICKASAWS

The 1840s had witnessed a dramatic deterioration in relations between Seminoles and Blacks in the Indian Territory. The problems had stemmed from the removal policy of the U.S. government, unification with the Creeks in the west, and the growth of tribal factionalism. Matters had come to a head in 1849-1850 when Wild Cat's recalcitrant traditionalists had fled for Mexico following the accession to the principal chieftainship of the progressive Jim Jumper. The exodus split the Seminoles, reduced the Black population and threatened future relations between those who remained behind.

After the Mexican migrations, around 250 to 300 Blacks remained associated with the Seminoles in the Indian Territory. These Blacks faced a perilous and uncertain future. They had been restored to the Seminoles as slave property and could expect no further help from the U.S. military. They were subject to harsh Creek slave codes and, once again, could expect to become the objects of dubious or fraudulent slave claims and targets for slave hunters, speculators and kidnappers. Furthermore, the Seminole Black population had been reduced qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, by the Mexican migrations. All of the leading militants had fled the Indian Territory and those who remained behind were left without leaders and in disarray. The Blacks had also lost their strongest supporters among the Seminoles. Osceola had passed away in Florida, the conciliatory Micanopy had recently died at Fort Gibson and, most important of all, their closest ally and greatest hope, Wild Cat, had removed to Mexico. The leadership of the Seminoles was now firmly in the hands of the progressives and the Blacks could expect little sympathy from them after the events of the last five years. The Blacks had defied the authority of

the chiefs and deprived their owners of their labour and many slaveholders had lost large amounts of slave property to Wild Cat's colony. Though the Blacks had been turned over to the Seminoles with the understanding that they would be treated as they had been formerly, in Florida, some of the Indians had already demonstrated that they intended to exert more control over them. Finally, it appeared that, as the prestige and benefits deriving from slave ownership had been so seriously eroded by Black militancy since 1845, Seminoles might be more prepared than before to sell their slaves down the river. Many of the ties that had bound the Seminoles and Blacks in Florida had been severely weakened by removal and the events of the 1840s. Subject to an unsympathetic Seminole leadership and Creek slave codes, the Seminole Blacks seemingly faced a sea of troubles.

As it turned out, the Seminole Blacks fared far better in the 1850s than might have been expected. Though slaves were more likely to be sold out of the country than before, and slaves and free Blacks alike lived under the constant threat of being claimed, or kidnapped, by outsiders, there was no fundamental change in the lifestyle of the average Seminole Black. There were four basic reasons for this. First and foremost, the Seminoles continued to practise a primitive, aboriginal form of slavery. They had the lowest instance of white intermarriage and were the least acculturated of the slaveholding tribes. The tribe never developed a plantation economy or industries before the Civil War and consequently had no need for the cheap labour force provided by institutionalized slavery or the rigid controls thought necessary to preserve it. Seminole slavery continued to be associated with tribute and deference rather than with a codified system of labour. Slaves of the Seminoles continued to enjoy a great deal of personal liberty and mobility, and free Blacks lived among the Indians with few, or no, formal controls. Secondly, the Seminoles remained fiercely independent and totally refused to apply Creek slave

codes to their Blacks, allowing them to live apart and retain horses, arms and other property. Thirdly, Seminole slaveholders responded to the threat of further Black defections to Wild Cat's Mexican colony by imposing very few demands upon their slaves. Finally, the Seminole Blacks themselves adopted a more conciliatory approach and greatly aided their own cause. Seemingly wishing to put the traumas of the 1840s behind them, they embarked upon a decade of consolidation which proved to be remarkably successful.

Generally speaking, the lot of the Seminole Blacks in the 1850s was far superior to that of Blacks associated with the other slaveholding tribes. While Seminole Blacks were permitted to control most facets of their daily lives, Blacks associated with the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes were often subject to harsh slave codes and the whims of their owners. Most bondsmen associated with the Four tribes, moreover, were exploited by their owners for economic gain under a system of slavery that had come to contain many of the stereotypes associated with "The Peculiar Institution". In order to gain a clearer perspective on Seminole-Black relations in the 1850s and put Seminole slavery into the broader context of Indian slaveholding, it is necessary, first of all, to look in depth at how slavery developed among the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws. Only then can one fully appreciate both the differences between the experience of Seminole Blacks and Blacks associated with the other slaveholding tribes and the benefits Blacks derived from being associated with the Seminoles. It is to this subject that this chapter is devoted.

One is immediately struck by the similarities in the experiences of the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws and their differences from that of the Seminoles. Two key developments took place among the Four tribes in the first half of the Nineteenth Century which determined the

course of their relations with Blacks. First of all, the period saw the rise of wealthy white and mixed blood slaveholding elites who took over the economic, social and political leadership of the tribes and directed policy regarding Indian-Black relations. Secondly, this highly acculturated plantocrat class instigated the adoption into the tribes of almost all the elements of southern white civilization, including capitalist economies and institutionalized Black slavery, to the detriment of native customs. The Seminoles, in contrast, remained a nation of "uncivilized" subsistence farmers, under fullblood leadership, largely untouched by the alien culture. Consequently, they failed to develop either a profit-based economy or institutionalized slavery and were less concerned with the trappings of European and American civilization than their slaveholding Indian neighbours. In short, while many Cherokees, Creeks, Chocktaws and Chickasaws came to practise a system of slavery that was basically southern and white, Seminole slavery remained essentially Indian.

All of the Five Civilized tribes had kept Indian bondsmen in the aboriginal period¹ but their system of slavery had borne little or no resemblance to that of the Europeans. Indeed, the aboriginal societies, which had stressed harmony and balance and featured matriarchal systems, sexual divisions of labour, egalitarianism and subsistence economies, had seemed to be infertile areas for the growth of institutionalized slavery, with its associations of rugged capitalistic individualism, profit motives and material wealth. Indian slaves had usually been war captives and had been viewed as the spoils of victory rather than chattels. Lacking the desire to create profits and surpluses, the Indians had not felt the need for a large and permanent work force and had not developed a system of slave labour. Consequently, few demands had been placed upon the slave. The worst that Indian slaves could have expected was to work in the communal fields or pay an annual tribute, from the fruits of their labour, to the town chief. Indian slaves, moreover, had been easily and readily

assimilated into their captors' tribe. Usually, they would be adopted, in time, by a clan and incorporated into the tribe to counter military losses and increase the population. The slaves would thus become fully-functioning members of the tribes' societies, and native citizens would treat their children as equals.² Thus, it would be wrong to suggest that the tribes' adoption of African slavery was facilitated by their having a history of slaveholding. Only after fundamental and dramatic changes had taken place within the societies of the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws were these tribes able to incorporate institutionalized Black slavery. The only Civilized tribe not affected by these changes was the Seminole tribe, and it alone failed to develop such a system.

Blacks first became associated with the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws as captives, gifts, or fugitives. As they had no need for their labour, the Indians were unsure at first how to deal with them. Some lived as free Blacks while others were kept in a mild state of servitude, working in the collective town fields. The Indians noticed that prestige was attached by whites to the ownership of African slaves and slavery among them became identified with leadership and status, the Blacks offering tribute and deference to the chiefs. Due, primarily, to racial and cultural differences, however, the Blacks were not as easy to assimilate as Indian slaves³ and seem to have intermarried with the Indians and been adopted by clans only occasionally. They remained essentially outside of, and apart from, Indian society and this greatly facilitated the later development of institutionalized slavery within the tribes.

In the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries, the Four tribes submitted to intense external pressure to do away with many of their aboriginal concepts and practices and incorporate those of their white neighbours. This led to key economic, social and political changes that

would determine the course of their relations with Blacks. The first significant development in the process of acculturation was the tribes' involvement in the Indian slave trade. The southern tribes had early provided a ready market for European manufactured goods and they soon came to rely upon these products. Due to the acute labour shortage in the British colonies, Indian slaves became a very marketable commodity and the tribes concentrated on obtaining war captives for barter. In consequence, their perceptions of war and bondage changed dramatically. For the first time, hostilities were commenced for the sole purpose of capturing slaves. This marked the beginnings of capitalistic individualism within the tribes. Instead of belonging to the clan, town, or tribe as a whole, the captives became the property of the captor, who assumed the right to dispose of them as he wished. Fundamental native tenets such as the belief in subsistence economics, communalism and harmony and balance were thus undermined. The acquisition and sale of Indian slaves became an individual, competitive, profit-making venture that gave rise to an unequal distribution of wealth and an entrepreneurial elite within the various tribes. Most significantly, slaves came to be viewed more and more as property, and subject to the wishes of their owners.

It was a logical progression for the Four tribes to become involved in the trading of Blacks. White plantocrats put a far higher value on African than Indian slaves and there was always a heavy demand for Blacks in the Colonies and, later, the southern states. The sale of Blacks was, therefore, a far more lucrative enterprise than dealing in Indian captives and tribes turned increasingly to this pursuit during the course of the Eighteenth Century. Indians began to capture Blacks during frontier hostilities with whites and kidnap slaves from neighbouring plantations. They would then sell their plunder to white traders for European goods. This practice developed at different rates within the various tribes. By

the time of the American Revolution, for example, most Cherokees traded almost exclusively in Black slaves,⁴ but the Creeks, who were the most resistant of the Four tribes to acculturation, continued to kill Blacks along with whites in border warfare and only occasionally took them prisoner. Only after siding with the British did the Creeks become aware of the value set upon Blacks by their white neighbours and join the Cherokees, Choctaws and Chickasaws as participants in the frontier slave trade.⁵

The Four tribes not only captured and kidnapped Blacks to trade for European goods but also collaborated with whites in catching fugitive slaves and returning runaways living among them for financial rewards. The Indians and Blacks thus fell victim to the "Divide and Rule" policy of the British colonists. As William Willis has remarked, in order to protect their slave interests and prevent a combination of the two exploited races, "... Whites deliberately maintained social distance between Indians and Negroes and created antagonism between them".⁶ The British used a variety of devices to divide the races. Black soldiers, for example, were utilized against the Indians in border warfare while Indian warriors were employed in helping to crush slave revolts and rewarded for their efforts. Stemming from this policy, the Indians were paid for capturing Black fugitives from white plantations and returning runaways who had fled to their country.⁷ Individual Indians were employed by whites as slave-catchers and the Cherokees and Creeks acquired reputations for being particularly efficient in this pursuit. Most of the treaties entered into by the tribes, moreover, stipulated that they surrender fugitive slaves living among them and return all future runaways for an agreed price. As early as 1730, 7 Cherokee chiefs, visiting London to make a treaty with the British, agreed to return runaways for rewards.⁸ The Creeks were generally less co-operative than the Cherokees, Choctaws and Chickasaws in handing over Black fugitives but by the end of the Eighteenth Century even

they had succumbed to monetary inducements and joined the others in this pursuit. In fact, in the treaties of New York and Colerain, signed in 1790 and 1796 respectively, the Creeks agreed not only to return all runaways living among them but also to secure the return of all those living with the Seminoles.⁹

Through their involvement with the frontier slave trade, the Four tribes came into direct contact with white concepts and institutions. They learned the law of supply and demand and to perceive Blacks as a marketable commodity. They witnessed, first hand, institutionalized slavery at work and saw the financial rewards to be gained from the individual ownership of Black slave property. They appreciated the advantages of a large, permanent, unpaid, controlled labour force. And finally, they gained insights into the peculiar logic behind the capitalist ethic and could hardly help but be impressed by the apparent splendour of the civilization which had resulted from it. With nativism clearly in decline and so many obvious benefits to be derived from incorporating the essentials of white culture into their tribal societies, all that the progressives needed to commence such a programme was a rationale, and a catalyst.

The rationale for the Four tribes' incorporation of white institutions was provided by the Europeans and Americans. One of the more subtle features of the "Divide and Rule" policy was the instillation within the Indian consciousness of a sense of racial superiority to Blacks.¹⁰ Europeans stressed the similarities between Indians and themselves and their differences from Africans. Blacks were portrayed as members of an ignorant, subservient race while the Indians were encouraged to think of themselves as intellectually superior and having far more potential for advancement. After the American Revolution, the young Republic took advantage of the groundwork done by the Europeans when it embarked upon a policy of pacifying, christianizing and civilizing the Indians. In an attempt to

put a stop to border warfare, and the threat of their allying with either European powers or Blacks, the Americans sought to bring the Four tribes into the fold by promoting their incorporation of white institutions. After all, they argued, it was only natural that the former should adopt the successful formula of the latter.

The main exponents of the policy of civilizing the Indians were the Christian missionaries and Indian agents. Missionaries of various denominations were active amongst all the Four tribes before removal. They promoted Christianity and its accompanying moral code and denounced native religions and customs as savage and barbarous. The missionaries worked not only for the spiritual but also the physical well-being of the Indians, however, and placed emphasis on their social, economic and political improvement. They established among the Cherokees, Choctaws and Chickasaws a system of education which stressed practical, vocational training in areas such as farming, trading, book-keeping and law for men and cooking, sewing, spinning and knitting for women.¹¹ Indian agents, advisors and technicians were also sent to the tribes to help stimulate their adoption of agricultural and industrial pursuits. They were helped by developments such as the decline in Indian wars and depletion of game which altered traditional native perceptions of male and female roles in society and facilitated the tribes' switch from an economy centred around hunting to one based on agricultural and industrial production.

Finally, proponents of African slavery, including Indian agents, other government officials, southern planters and newspaper editors, gave forth on the benefits the Indians would derive from the institution. African slavery was portrayed as a civilizing agent which would stimulate agricultural and industrial enterprise and economic advancement. As Indians were racially superior to Blacks, they argued, their adoption of "The Peculiar Institution" would be a natural and mutually beneficial development. Living in a fragile

frontier environment where roles and status were not always clearly defined, many Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws were attracted to this rationale.¹² The dominant white culture on the frontier categorized people as master or slave according to race and many Indians began to accept that their subjugation of Blacks was a necessary prerequisite of their being accepted as equals by that culture. External pressures and the frontier situation had thus paved the way for the adoption of institutionalized African slavery by the Four tribes. This could not have happened, however, unless key changes had taken place within the tribes themselves. These internal developments must now be discussed.

The most dramatic internal development affecting relations between Blacks and Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws was the rise within the tribes of highly acculturated mixed blood elites who succeeded to positions of economic, social, cultural and political leadership, dominated the policy-making bodies, and actively promoted the adoption of white ideologies and institutions. During the Eighteenth Century, a number of European traders, public officials, military officers, travellers and adventurers settled among the Four tribes and took Indian wives. These intermarried whites were frequently adopted by the host tribe and their mixed blood offspring were born full-fledged tribal members, and hence entitled to all the rights and privileges of native citizenship, through the Indian system of matriarchal descent. The white immigrants carried their property and cultural traditions with them into the Indian country and were responsible for introducing institutionalized Black slavery into the tribes. Usually well-educated and enterprising, these whites opened plantations, amassed considerable fortunes and built up large holdings in slave property which they bequeathed to their descendants along with their conceptions of civilization.

Typical of these European immigrants were Lachlan McGillivray, James

Logan Colbert and John Pitchlynn, 3 Scots who settled among the Creeks, Chickasaws and Choctaws respectively during the Eighteenth Century and married Indian women. McGillivray settled among the Upper Creeks in the 1730s and came to own plantations, run by employing Black slave labour, on the Savannah River.¹³ Colbert, a trader among the Chickasaws, meanwhile, acquired 150 African slaves by 1782¹⁴ and Pitchlynn, who had settled among the Choctaws in the last quarter of the eighteenth century was reported, in 1832, to have an estate worth \$35,000, which included 50 Blacks, the largest number held at that time by a member of the tribe.¹⁵ The mixed blood offspring of these entrepreneurs inherited their fathers' property and were thus given an enormous advantage in the new competitive order that was emerging among the Indians. They put their economic supremacy and cultural background to full use and rose rapidly to become the acknowledged leaders of their tribes. Lachlan McGillivray's son, Alexander, became "King and Head Warrior of all the Nation"¹⁶ and exercised almost imperial control over the Creeks from 1783 until his death, ten years later. John Pitchlynn's son, Peter, meanwhile, would become a future principal chief of the Choctaws and James Colbert, through his several Chickasaw wives, gave rise to a veritable dynasty which came to dominate the affairs of that tribe for more than a century.

These are merely examples of a much larger trend. In actual fact, from the late Eighteenth Century onwards, the leadership of the Four tribes would be dominated by the great mixed blood families deriving from European intermarriages. Besides those mentioned above, prominent mixed blood family names included McIntosh, Marshall, Perryman, Grayson, Hawkins and Stidham among the Creeks; Ross, Vann, Adair, Downing, Drew and Boudinot among the Cherokees; and Folsom, Love, LeFlore, McCurtain, Burney, Harris and Jones among the Choctaws and Chickasaws. Although they constituted only a small percentage of the Indian populations, these mixed blood families

came to control the vast majority of the tribes' wealth and wield enormous political influence. Most pertinently, however, much of their wealth came to be based upon their ownership of Black slave property and throughout the antebellum period they would channel a great deal of their political energies into trying to protect this investment.

The rise of the mixed bloods to economic predominance became possible only after fundamental changes had taken place within the Four tribes. These included a growing acceptance of European economic principles and a corresponding decline in native practices inhibitive to individual enterprise. As noted above, frontier pressures and white influence had resulted in the tribes' partial acculturation. They had become increasingly receptive to the competitive capitalist ethic and had adopted a number of its tenets, including individual ownership of Black slaves and other property, and the acquisition of personal wealth. At the same time, many traditional native customs, which could have hindered or even prohibited the efforts of the mixed bloods, had gone into decline.

The mixed bloods were the direct beneficiaries of the decline of nativism in the Four tribes. All were changing to agriculturally-based economies and the lines denoting their traditional sexual division of labour were becoming blurred. Previously, the Indian woman had been responsible for growing crops while the man had engaged in military pursuits and the hunt. With the decline in frontier wars and depletion of game, however, Indian men became more involved in agricultural pursuits and the woman's role became less clearly defined. As she came to be no longer viewed as the sole provider of agricultural staples, there was a resultant decline in the prestige attached to the Indian woman. This development proved vital in facilitating the adoption of a Black slave labour force into the process of agricultural production when the need for additional workers arose.

Traditional native groupings had also been undermined. The matriarchal clan, the most basic and vital tribal subdivision, underwent a loss of influence and power in the face of accelerating acculturation and the declining prestige of Indian women. The town, meanwhile, centre of local social, economic and political activity, suffered from white civilization programmes such as that instigated by Benjamin Hawkins among the Creeks,¹⁷ which sought to break up these communities in favour of individual landholdings. As the clan and town went into decline, far more emphasis came to be placed on the individual and his economic achievements. Thus, the groundwork had been well prepared for the rise to power of an ambitious, elite class of acculturated entrepreneurs. The mixed bloods fitted the bill perfectly.

Ironically, the rise of the mixed bloods to economic predominance was aided more by the tribes' retention of a traditional native practice, communal landholding, than by any other single factor. The system naturally favoured the ambitious planter. All Indian land was owned by the tribe but each citizen was permitted to occupy as much as he wished for cultivation or pasture. Any tribal member could claim exclusive usage of unclaimed acreage as long as it was not within a certain short distance, usually a quarter mile, of any other person's land. Furthermore, there was no limit to the amount of acreage one could claim. If a planter became surrounded by other tribal members, he could simply expand elsewhere. Finally, though the tribe retained ultimate title, all improvements put upon the land became the exclusive personal property of the individual and could be sold or bequeathed at will.¹⁸ Thus, the native system of land tenure was perfectly suited to the acquisitive tendencies of the mixed blood entrepreneurs.

The period between the American Revolution and the removal of the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws to the trans-Mississippi

west witnessed the emergence within each of the tribes of a distinct mixed blood upper class. During this time, these descendants of intermarried and adopted whites used such advantages as inherited wealth, education and familiarity with, and receptivity to, white civilization to amass great personal fortunes. They took full advantage of both the tribes' partial acculturation and their retention of native landholding practices to build large farms, ranches and plantations and engage in diversified agricultural and industrial pursuits. As the need for a cheap, organized work force arose, they utilized systematized Black slave labour and their economic progress was aided enormously by their knowledge of agricultural techniques. The mixed bloods quickly came to produce surpluses and entered into the frontier white money economy by exporting cotton and other products and importing European manufactured goods and Black slaves. By the time of removal, they had come to own most of the tribes' wealth and slave property and effectively controlled their economies.

The mixed bloods measured their progress by European standards and sought to further emulate their mentors by acquiring all the trappings of white civilization. Thus, many came to live in southern white plantation-style homes while the more affluent built dwellings akin to the palatial homes of the wealthiest southern plantocrats with libraries, fine furnishings and gardens. They spoke English, dressed after European fashion, ate the whites' food and had their children educated in the east. They gave guests "southern hospitality" and their homes became social and cultural centres. Finally, they promoted tribal economic, social, political and cultural progress along clearly delineated white lines. By way of contrast, the majority of the tribes' members remained traditionalist and continued to live in simple log cabins, farm small patches of land, own few or no slaves, speak the native tongue, wear Indian dress and eat softky. By the 1830s, therefore, when the majority of the southern Indians removed to the

Indian Territory, the mixed bloods had come to constitute a distinct elite within each of the Four tribes. Indeed, in almost every aspect, they more closely resembled typical southern whites than traditional Native Americans.

Typical of the rising mixed blood entrepreneurs was Alexander McGillivray of the Creeks. The son of an intermarried white trader and a Creek woman, McGillivray could speak only English. He built on inherited wealth and came to own a number of plantations run by Black slaves under white overseers.¹⁹ He lived in the manner of the southern gentry of the period at his main plantation at Little Tallassee which was thus described by a white contemporary in 1776, "This plantation seemed beautiful to me. McGillivray had in his service about sixty Negroes, each of whom lived in a private cabin, which gave his place the appearance of a small village".²⁰ In 1791, it was reported that "more than fifty" of his Blacks worked at his various southern plantations while over 100 others were employed in the Spanish West Indies. Besides his slave property, he also owned "large stocks of horses, hogs, and horned cattle".²¹ Upon his death in February, 1793, William Panton reported that McGillivray died owning 60 Blacks, 300 cattle and a large stock of horses. Had he lived, Panton believed, he would have "added considerably to his stock of negroes".²² McGillivray's siblings were also substantial slaveholders. His elder sister, Sophia Durant, was reported as having 80 slaves in 1796 while his other sister, Mrs. Charles Weatherford, was said to have owned 30 Blacks in 1799.²³ Mixed blood slaveholding dynasties like the McGillivrays would emerge in all of the Four tribes before removal.

Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins reported that other mixed blood Upper Creeks were employing Black slave labour to advantage and climbing the economic ladder by the end of the Eighteenth Century. Peter McQueen, head warrior of Tal-e-see town, for example, was said to own "a valuable property in negroes and stock" and had begun "to know their value". Mr.

Cornells, the agent's assistant and interpreter, and a chief of the tribe, meanwhile, had "nine negroes under good government". By utilizing their labour, he had developed "a farm well fenced and cultivated with the plough" which produced cotton, oats and rye. Cornells also came to own a flock of sheep, a peach orchard and a large garden. Though the chief continued to wear Indian dress, the agent remarked that he always displayed "the manners of a well bred man".²⁴

Hawkins noted that the Lower Creeks tended to associate with frontier whites more than did the Upper Creeks. This factor was primarily responsible for a higher incidence of white intermarriage and a larger mixed blood population among the Lower Creeks. By the end of the Eighteenth Century, the Eufaula towns and their surrounding villages were fairly prosperous, the inhabitants owning cattle, horses and hogs and producing "plenty of corn and rice". A number of them were utilizing Black slaves and where they were, the agent emphasized, "there is more industry and better farms".²⁵ Leading mixed blood Lower Creek entrepreneurs included the cousins Benjamin and Lafayette Marshall. They engaged in trading, planting, farming and exporting and developed three extensive farms producing wheat, rice, oats and cotton by utilizing a large slave labour force. By the time of removal, the Marshalls had become two of the wealthiest members of the Creek tribe.²⁶

Without doubt, however, the most important mixed bloods to emerge among the Lower Creeks before removal were the members of the McIntosh family. William McIntosh, the head of the family during its rise to prominence in the early Nineteenth Century, used 74 Black slaves to operate two plantations, a grist mill and a cotton gin and came to own large herds of cattle, hogs, horses and sheep and many bushels of agricultural staples.²⁷ This Lower Creek chief resided in elegant style at his plantation home at Indian Springs, Georgia, "where he was served

by a retinue of negro slaves".²⁸ Other prominent mixed blood families became associated with the McIntoshes through marriage, economic and social ties and political affiliation and thus was created the McIntosh party which amassed great wealth and came to own large numbers of Blacks in the pre-removal period. The McIntosh party became extremely powerful and effectively dominated the leadership of the Creek tribe from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the outbreak of the Civil War.

Similar developments took place among the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes in the 50 years before removal. Mixed blood Choctaws and Chickasaws amassed great wealth by establishing industries, farms and plantations using Black slave labour in Mississippi and Alabama and a cotton culture emerged among the two tribes in the early Nineteenth Century. Chickasaw planters and farmers found ready markets for their surpluses in Mississippi and by 1830 they were selling beef, livestock, pork, cotton and corn and importing dry goods, sugar, coffee, and slaves. Significantly, agent John L. Allen estimated that Chickasaw cotton exports would reach 1,000 bales that year.²⁹ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Chickasaws became the wealthiest Indian tribe by the time of removal.³⁰ Prominent Choctaw and Chickasaw families benefitting from this economic boom included the LeFlores, Folsoms, Loves and Burneys who, again, emulated the lifestyle of the southern planter and assumed an aristocratic pose. But no single mixed blood family exerted more control over a tribal economy than the Colberts. The Colbert brothers built an economic empire based on commercial agriculture, industry and shipping and established a mercantile monopoly in the Chickasaw country which became popularly known as the "Colbert Combine". By 1830, the Colbert's domination of the Chickasaw economy was so complete that, as Arrell Gibson has observed, the nation "was in fact their commercial fief".³¹

The Cherokees were generally acknowledged by whites as being the

most civilized of the Five tribes. They had the highest incidence of white intermarriage and the largest mixed blood population, and were the most receptive to acculturation. Consequently, they came to acquire more Black slaves than any other Indian tribe before removal. The mixed bloods hastened to adopt white technology and by the 1790s they were utilizing modern equipment to produce cotton. By the turn of the century, large-scale southern-style plantations were in existence among the Cherokees in northern Georgia and many mixed bloods had become wealthy planters and traders owning large residences, substantial herds of livestock and many Black slaves.³² In 1802, a visitor to the tribe reported that, "Many of the Cherokees had large plantations worked by gangs of Negro slaves".³³ By 1826, mixed blood Cherokees were sending cotton to white markets via the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers and promoting the process of industrialization by utilizing looms, gins, spinning wheels and mills for domestic production.³⁴ As their demand for a larger work force increased with their growing involvement in the export trade and industrial pursuits, the mixed bloods greatly increased their slaveholdings in the few years prior to removal.

Major Ridge was one of the first mixed blood Cherokees to become a substantial plantation owner. By the early 1820s, he had established a large, diversified, plantation, called "The Chieftains", which was run by his 30 Black slaves. Here Ridge lived in an 8 room, 2 storey house with verandas, brick fireplaces, and glass windows set in walnut casings. The plantation featured a large orchard containing over 1,500 fruit trees, 300 acres of arable land divided into 8 fields, and a number of slave cabins for the Black labour force. Corn was the principal crop, but cotton, tobacco, wheat, oats, indigo and sweet and Irish potatoes were also grown while hogs and cattle were included in the livestock holdings. Major Ridge's son, John, also developed a thriving plantation, "Running Waters",

some 6 miles distant from that of his father. Notable features of the "Running Waters" plantation were a 2 storey house, an orchard of 600 fruit trees and 419 acres of arable land which was worked by the owner's 19 Black slaves.³⁵ The Ridges were, in many ways, typical of the rising class of mixed blood slaveholding aristocrats that emerged within Cherokee society before removal.

John Ross, principal chief of the Cherokees for nearly 40 years, was another wealthy slaveholder, merchant and planter. In the late 1820s, he lived in a large white house at his plantation near the headwaters of the Coosa. Ross came to own over 170 acres of arable land which was worked by 20 Black slaves under a white overseer and his improvements included a smokehouse, a blacksmiths' shop, warehouses, barns, stables, workhouses and slave quarters.³⁶ John's brother Lewis Ross, John Martin and Peter Hildebrand were other wealthy mixed blood Cherokee plantocrats who lived in elegant southern-style houses and had substantial slaveholdings. Lewis Ross, for example, owned about 20 Black slaves while John Martin was said to have owned around 100.³⁷

James, or "Rich Jim", Vann became one of the wealthiest Cherokees and owned the finest plantation house in the tribe before removal. As early as 1801, when the newly arrived Moravian missionaries began planting their first crops, Vann loaned them 6 teams and sufficient slaves to complete the task.³⁸ By the 1820s, he had established a large diversified plantation run by Black slaves under white overseers, owned large acreage and herds of livestock, and lived in a Georgian mansion.³⁹ A white observer noted that, in 1829, Vann was in possession of,

...A beautiful white house, and about six or seven hundred acres of the best land you ever saw, and Negroes enough to manage it and clear as much as he pleases; raised five thousand bushels of corn; and it would make you feel small to see his situation. Mr. Vann lives in a large elegant brick house, elegantly furnished.⁴⁰

Within a few years, James Vann's son Joseph had become the largest slaveholder in the Cherokee tribe by virtue of his owning a work force of 110 Blacks, most of whom he employed on his 800 acre plantation.⁴¹ By the time of removal, the estates of such wealthy mixed blood families as the Ridges, Rosses, and Vanns had become the envy of their white neighbours.

Census data compiled around the time the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws removed to the Indian Territory reveals that the mixed bloods had come to own the great majority of the tribes' slaves. The McIntosh party, which contained most of the mixed blood Lower Creek slaveholders, removed earlier than the rest of the tribe, arriving in the Indian Territory in early 1828. That a large percentage of the immigrant group was composed of Blacks is evidenced by an 1833 census which listed 1,948 Creeks, 498 slaves and 13 free Blacks.⁴² This ratio of 1 Black to every 4 Indians was the highest in the Four tribes at that time and graphically illustrates the substantial slaveholdings of the McIntoshes and their mixed blood associates. In 1832, a census was taken of the Creeks who had remained behind in the east. The figures show that the Lower Creeks, who were more acculturated and had a higher mixed blood population than the Upper Creeks, owned more Black slaves than their far more numerous compatriots. While the population of the Upper towns totalled 14,142 including 445 Blacks, that of the Lower towns was only 8,552, but included 457 Blacks. With the emigration of the McIntosh party, there were few substantial Creek slaveholders left in the east. Most owned less than 10 slaves and only 4 owned more than 25. Almost inevitably, these were mixed bloods; Paddy Carr, William Walker, Fanny Lovett and William McGill owning 35, 32, 30 and 25 Blacks respectively.⁴³ Clearly, an elite group of mixed blood Lower Creeks controlled most of the tribe's slave property at the time of removal.

It was a similar story with the Chickasaws and Choctaws. Throughout

the tribe as a whole, the Chickasaws had the highest ration of Blacks to Indians. The 1836-1837 removal rolls showed 4,914 Chickasaws and 1,156 slaves. Although they only constituted about a quarter of the tribe, the mixed bloods, together with the intermarried whites, owned most of the Blacks. Among the largest slaveholding families were the Colberts, Loves and Overtons. Several of the Colberts, for example, owned more than 20 slaves while one, Pittman Colbert, owned 150.⁴⁴ Among the Choctaws, the few fullbloods who owned slaves were generally chiefs. Pushmataha and Moshulatubbee, for example, were each in possession of 20 Blacks in 1825. By the time the Choctaws removed west in the late 1830s, however, there were only 8 fullblood slaveholders.⁴⁵ Again, most Blacks were owned by wealthy mixed bloods and intermarried whites, who constituted only a small proportion of the tribal population. There were only 512 Blacks among the entire Choctaw tribe in 1831 yet by 1840, shortly after removal, 293 slaves were owned by just 7 mixed bloods. These included Benjamin Love, Delia White, Simon Burney, Jackson Kemp, Susan Colbert, James Colbert and David Burney who owned 95, 51, 44, 30, 29, 26 and 18 Blacks respectively.⁴⁶ In the west, the Chickasaw and Choctaw mixed bloods would acquire more Black property and, consequently, an even greater percentage of the tribe's total slaveholdings.

Nowhere was the domination of the mixed bloods over slave ownership more prevalent than in the Cherokee tribe. In 1809, there were 583 Black slaves living among the Cherokees.⁴⁷ Clearly, the great majority were owned by the mixed bloods. The most recalcitrant traditionalist Cherokees lived in the Smokey Mountain region of North Carolina, near the Tennessee border. Significantly, this group had the highest percentage of fullbloods and the lowest slave population in all the tribe. In 1809, the North Carolina group totalled 3,648 and constituted almost 30% of the entire Cherokee population yet they owned just 5 slaves, or 0.85% of the total

held by the tribe.⁴⁸ During the next 16 years, the mixed bloods substantially increased their slaveholdings. By 1825, the Black population had risen by an unprecedented 119% to 1,277, while that of Cherokees by blood rose during the same period by only 9.2%, from 12,395 to 13,536.⁴⁹ In March 1826, John Ridge, in many ways the archetypal Cherokee mixed blood, observed that the tribe's slaves were "mostly held by half breeds and full blooded Indians of (distinguished) talents".⁵⁰ In actual fact, however, Blacks were rarely owned by fullbloods, even those of "distinguished talents". By the mid 1830s, almost 95% of the Eastern Cherokees' slave property was in the hands of the mixed bloods.

The 1835 census of the Eastern Cherokees⁵¹ has been the subject of some of the best quantitative analysis yet completed regarding the ethnic background of Indian slaveholders. Theda Perdue, Rudy Halliburton, Jr. and, in particular, Wm. F. McLoughlin and Walter H. Conser Jr. have all worked extensively with the census and presented arguments supported by solid statistics.⁵² The authors all arrive at the same conclusion: by 1835, a small elite group of wealthy, acculturated mixed blood white Cherokees had come to own the vast majority of the tribe's slave property in the east.

The 1835 census listed 16,542 Cherokees by blood, 201 intermarried whites, and 1,592 Black slaves. The Indian population can be subdivided into 12,463 fullbloods, 1,454 half blood white Cherokees, 1,492 quarter blood white Cherokees, 74 mixed Cherokee Blacks, 71 mixed Cherokee Catawbas and 56 mixed Cherokee Spanish. The tribe included 2,776 heads of family and 209 heads of slave owning families. Thus, only 7.53% of Cherokee families owned any Black slaves. Moreover, 168, or 80.38%, of the 209 slaveholders owned fewer than 10 slaves. Only 20 Eastern Cherokees owned 20 or more Blacks. but, of these, 5 prominent mixed bloods, Joseph Vann, George Waters, John Martin, Lewis Ross and James Daniel, owned 357,

or 22.42% of all the tribe's Blacks, between them. There were just 31 fullblood slaveholders who owned a total of 85 slaves. Though they added up to more than 75% of the total population, therefore, the fullbloods constituted only 14.8% of Cherokee slaveholders and owned a mere 5.34% of the tribe's Blacks. In contrast, while the mixed blood white Cherokees contributed just 17.81% to the total tribal population, they accounted for 85.2% of all Cherokee slaveholders and owned fully 94.66% of the tribe's slaves. Yet even these high figures somewhat underestimate the amount of slaves owned by the mixed bloods. The Treaty party, which contained a number of prominent mixed blood slaveholders and their Blacks, had already removed west, settling in the Indian Territory in 1829. If these emigrants had been included in the 1835 census, the proportion of slaves held by the mixed bloods would have been even higher.

McLoughlin and Conser's analysis⁵³ further sub-divides the Cherokee population into families and geographic locations and provides conclusive proof that the mixed blood slaveholders had evolved into an easily identifiable upper class within Cherokee society by the time of removal. The authors have computerized additional data relating to the census to increase the accuracy of their calculations and consequently their totals vary somewhat from the original manuscript. According to McLoughlin and Conser, there were, in fact, more fullbloods and less mixed bloods than were listed in the census and the Cherokee population in 1835 actually amounted to 16,533, including 12,776 fullbloods, 1,391 half blood white Cherokees, 1,469 quarter blood white Cherokees, and 897 with no indicated racial status. Basically, they argue that the small minority of mixed blood white Cherokees was far more likely to own Blacks than the full blood majority. These mixed blood slave owners were more educated, literate, acculturated and entrepreneurial than their fullblood compatriots and had developed into a wealthy elite group held together by ties of intermarriage

and similar ethnic backgrounds, cultural traditions and social and economic interests. Finally, slaveholding had a close positive correlation with economic, social and political advancement within Cherokee society and, by 1835, a small, closely-knit group of 42 mixed blood families had come to control the government and economy of the tribe.

The argument is supported by impressive statistics. The North Carolina Cherokees are presented as a model to illustrate the strong negative correlation between high concentrations of fullbloods and slaveholding. The story was much the same in 1835 as it had been in 1809. The group remained essentially recalcitrant traditionalist, having the highest concentration of fullbloods, 88.9%, the least white intermixture, and the lowest number of slaves in the tribe. Although their population of 3,599 accounted for 21.74% of the entire tribe, the North Carolina Cherokees owned just 32 slaves, or 1.99% of the tribal whole. There was a clear correlation between the percentage of white blood and the amount of slaveholding in the various Cherokee communities. Communities having a smaller percentage fullblood population were far more likely to own slaves than those with a higher fullblood percentage. The difference is marked even if the tribe is simply divided in half along "more or less fullblood" lines. Within the "more fullblood" communities, 2.4% of the families were slaveholders while just 0.2% owned 10 slaves or more. Within the "less fullblood" communities, however, 13.5% of the families were slaveholders while 3.1% owned 10 slaves or more. In short, a family living in a "less fullblood" community was 5 or 6 times more likely to own one slave or more, and 15 to 16 times more likely to own 10 slaves or more, than one living in a "more fullblood" community. Significantly, the margins begin to blur around the 71% median of fullblood concentration. If the most acculturated mixed blood communities were to be compared with the North Carolina group, the differences would be far greater still.

Similar results were obtained when Cherokee families were divided on the basis of ethnic background. Families were put into 3 categories: those containing all fullbloods, those with one fullblood member or more but not wholly fullblood, and those with no fullbloods. It was found that, while 7.4% of all Cherokee families were slaveholders, only 1% of the all fullblood families owned any slaves. 10.8% of the mixed fullblood families and 30.4% of the no fullblood families, however, were slaveholders. Clearly, while the all fullblood families had a strong negative correlation with slave ownership, the no fullblood families had a strong positive correlation with it. In both family and community, slave owning and white intermixture usually went hand-in-hand. Significantly, there were 7 times as many readers of English in the less than in the more fullblood areas. Finally, slaveholding was closely linked with the possession of industrial and agricultural skills, ownership of improvements, including nascent industries, large livestock holdings and high crop production. By 1835, the acculturated mixed blood Cherokee slaveholders were in control of the wealth of the nation.

In the final part of their analysis, McLoughlin and Conser key in on the 42 wealthiest Cherokee families, based upon ownership of 10 or more slaves, listed in the 1835 census. It was found that all the families were racially mixed and most had a very low percentage of fullbloods. The authors state that, of the 283 members of the 42 families, just 12, or 4.2%, were fullbloods while 256, or 90.45%, were mixed blood white Cherokees. They indicate further than 10% of all the intermarried whites in the tribe were included in this group and that 50% of the 42 families contained either a white man or woman. Here, unfortunately, they seem to have erred slightly in their calculations. Their figures suggest that 20 or 21 intermarried whites were members of the 42 families but 15 is the number that tallies with the number of fullblood and mixed blood

members they list earlier. If, in fact, 15 intermarried whites were included in the 42 families, the figure still constitutes 5.31% of all the group's members, or more than a full percentage point higher than that of the fullbloods whose entire population outnumbered theirs by more than 82 to 1. Indeed, the 42 families would have included as much as 7.4% of all the intermarried whites in the Cherokee tribe. The error, therefore, is merely one of degree. The 42 families clearly contained a high percentage of mixed bloods and whites and provide a perfect example of the close correlation between white intermixture and slaveholding.

The 42 mixed blood Cherokee families owned more slaves and livestock, cultivated more acreage and raised more corn and wheat, thereby obtaining more income, than any other tribal members. They owned 1,013 of 1,592 or almost two-thirds of all the slaves held by the tribe and possessed an inordinate share of wealth, skills and literacy. Furthermore, 25 or 30 of the 42, or just 1% of all Cherokee families, had accumulated the major share of the tribe's wealth and taken pains to retain it within their closely-knit community. In the early nineteenth century, as in the surrounding white settlements, the acquisition of agricultural and industrial skills, literacy and slave ownership led to increased wealth and upward mobility within Cherokee society. The mixed bloods had put their obvious advantages and talents to full use and had quickly climbed the economic ladder. By 1835, they had effectively created a 3-tiered class system within Cherokee society. While most of the tribe remained lower class subsistence farmers, the majority of the mixed bloods had assumed the position of an upwardly mobile bourgeoisie. A select minority of mixed blood slaveholding plantocrats, meanwhile, had ascended to the top of the pile and had come to constitute a very elitist and aristocratic upper class. Although the Cherokee experience furnished perhaps the most extreme example of mixed blood hegemony within the slaveholding tribes, it was by no means unique.

By the time of removal, slaveholding mixed bloods had also assumed the most prestigious upper and middle class positions within the societies of the Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws.

At the time of removal, many mixed bloods sold their improvements in the east and, with the proceeds, bought more slaves to take with them to the Indian Territory. Blacks were viewed as both easily transportable property and valuable assets as it was envisaged that they would prove vital in the process of taming the western wilds. Mixed bloods dominated the membership of the various tribal delegations during removal negotiations and were, consequently, more familiar with the course events were taking and better able to predict their outcome than their fullblood compatriots. Hence, they were able to make earlier preparations and better provisions for their new life in the west. Mixed bloods were among the first to arrive in the Indian Territory and they were able to quickly secure large tracts of the choicest land because of the tribes' communal land system. They tended to settle in areas suitable either for raising commercial agricultural products such as cotton, corn, cereals and livestock, or for constructing fledgeling extractive or manufacturing industries, and quickly set about re-establishing their wealthy estates in the west. The fullbloods, conversely, arriving later with few or no slaves, and uninterested in the capitalist ethic, tended to settle in remote wooded or mountainous areas, continue their native practices, plant small acreages, and live at subsistence level.

Blacks were to prove even more useful to the mixed bloods in the Indian Territory than they had in the east. They gave their owners an enormous advantage in re-establishing and strengthening their positions of economic supremacy within the tribes after removal. The mixed bloods quickly put their slaves to work clearing land, building houses and other improvements, splitting rails and making fences, ploughing fields, raising

crops, tending livestock, developing industries, constructing roads, clearing navigable channels in rivers and otherwise improving communications to facilitate the establishment of import-export economies. Slavery and its associated pursuits — plantation agriculture, corn production, cattle-raising and industrial enterprise — soon came to be extremely profitable. As they began to produce surpluses for export, the mixed bloods' demand for slaves to perpetuate and expand the system increased dramatically. The consequences of these developments were a far greater inequality in the distribution of wealth within the tribes than before removal and an even higher concentration of the tribes' Blacks in the hands of the mixed bloods.

The two decades prior to the Civil War witnessed the re-establishment in the Indian Territory of an economic and social class structure within the Four tribes, with the fullblood subsistence farmers at the bottom of the scale and a small group of wealthy, highly-acculturated, mixed blood aristocrats at the top. This upper class elite came to own most of the tribes' wealth and slave property. By the time of the Civil War, the highest concentrations of slaves in the Indian Territory were to be found along the Red, Arkansas, Verdigris, Grand and Canadian Rivers where the mixed bloods of the Four tribes had established their commercial, agricultural and industrial enterprises, while the lowest concentrations were in the hilly, woodland areas populated by the fullbloods. Only a small percentage of the tribes' members actually owned any slaves and the great majority of these were mixed bloods who had come to possess wealth and property far out of proportion to their numerical strength.

As had been the case in the east, there were conspicuous differences between the lifestyles of the mixed blood elites and the fullblood majorities in the Indian Territory. The mixed bloods generally lived in southern plantation-style frame houses, surrounded by improvements, on their large

holdings. The homes of the most wealthy, however, again were more akin to the white palatial mansions of the southern aristocracy. The mixed bloods dressed and ate like southern whites, spoke English, supported Christianity and sent their children to eastern schools and colleges. The fullbloods, in contrast, usually resided in rude log cabins on their largely unimproved small acreages in remote, isolated areas far removed from acculturative influences. They wore traditional dress, ate Indian food and spoke their native tongue. They continued to practise their native religion and customs and were generally opposed to, or not interested in Christianity, education or any other element of white culture. As wealth was unimportant, the fullbloods spurned the mixed bloods' preoccupation with large-scale profit-making enterprises and institutionalized slavery and owned few Blacks. Significantly, as we shall see in the next chapter, Seminole slaveholders were almost invariably fullblood Indian and more closely resembled the non-slaveholding fullbloods of the Four tribes than the mixed blood elites who owned most of the Blacks. In view of the fundamental differences in the Seminole experience, it is clear that the ethnic background of the majority of slave owners within a given tribe was the deciding factor in determining the nature of relations between that tribe and its Blacks.

Upon arriving in the Indian Territory, the Chickasaw and Choctaw mixed bloods settled mostly on the fertile bottom lands along the Red, Blue, Boggy and Washita Rivers. The area was ideally suited for growing cotton and many opened extensive plantations employing slave labour. They also engaged in cereal production, cattle-raising on a large scale and industrial pursuits and soon produced surpluses for export. Slaves were put to work improving communications. They built roads and constructed and manned ferries on the Red River and before long the products of Chickasaw and Choctaw mixed bloods were being sold in southern

markets. Commercial centres, dominated by entrepreneurial mixed bloods, arose in the two nations to cater to the ever-increasing demand for imported items. Through their enterprise, the mixed bloods prospered and some grew to be extremely wealthy, owning huge acreages and numerous slaves. The Red River region they settled, featuring, as it did, large cotton plantations owned by wealthy aristocrats and run by slave labour, developed into a microcosm of the Old South and even today the area is referred to by native Oklahomans as "Little Dixie".

Many of the wealthy Chickasaw mixed bloods had exchanged their holdings in the east for slave property at the time of removal and were, consequently, well-equipped to succeed in the Indian Territory.⁵⁴ They settled mainly around Fort Towson in the Choctaw district, along the Blue and Boggy rivers and in the region between the Washita and the mouth of Island Bayou on the Red River. The Loves, Colberts, Kemps, Overtons and Albersons set their slaves to work in large-scale agricultural operations and the area quickly became noted for its cotton plantations. Indeed, in 1856, at the organization of a separate Chickasaw nation, much of this country was included in Panola County; the name deriving from the Chickasaw word for cotton.⁵⁵ Besides cotton, the mixed bloods also grew wheat, oats, rye, corn, peas, potatoes and fruit orchards, raised cattle, horses and other livestock, built grist and lumber mills, cotton gins and spinning machines, and operated several salines. As early as 1843, certain individuals had as much as 500 acres of corn under cultivation.⁵⁶ Clearly, the mixed bloods took very little time to re-establish their economic hold over the Chickasaw nation in the west.

The Colbert family consolidated its hold over much of the tribe's wealth and slave property in the Indian Territory. After removal, it was noted that two of the Colberts, Pittman and Rodi, owned 245, or around 20%, of the 1,223 slaves held by the Chickasaws, between them.⁵⁷ Pittman

Colbert was unquestionably the most financially successful Chickasaw mixed blood. During removal, he had required 6 mules and a special wagon to carry his gold from Mississippi to the Indian Territory. By 1838, he had already established a plantation near Fort Towson on which he intended to cultivate over 300 acres of cotton. Within a few years, he was harvesting over 500 acres of cotton and large fields of corn annually by employing a workforce of 150 slaves under a white overseer. He also widened his interests to include a trading establishment in the Doaksville area. Another member of the family, Benjamin Franklin Colbert, came to operate the best-known ferry service across the Red River. Among his most regular customers were the crews of the Butterfield Overland Mail Company's stage coaches. "Colbert's ferry" was manned by several of his 26 slaves and his Blacks were also responsible for changing teams at his way-station and maintaining the service roads. The Colbert family set the standards by which other members of the Chickasaw mixed blood elite measured their achievements.

The Choctaw mixed bloods settled generally to the east of the Chickasaws, along the Red River, established farms, plantations and industries, and were soon producing surpluses for export. As early as 1836, it was estimated that 500 bales of cotton would be sent down the Red River and by 1837 2 gins were being operated in the Choctaw nation. The mixed bloods acquired more slaves during, and shortly after, removal and by 1839 the tribe had increased its 1831 total by more than 14%, to 600 Blacks. In the same year, individual Choctaws were said to own 3 flour mills, 188 looms and 220 spinning wheels. Shortly afterwards, lumber and grist mills, salines, and 10 cotton gins were in operation along the Red River. By 1847, the Choctaw mixed bloods were producing 1,000 bales of cotton for export annually as well as a surplus of corn.⁵⁸ Cattle-raising was also a vital concern of the Choctaw elite. In 1858, it was

noted of the wealthy that, "Their property was chiefly in cattle and negroes".⁵⁹ Although diversified farming was typical among the Five Civilized tribes, however, a high degree of specialization developed on the plantations along the Red River between removal and the Civil War. Cotton was king among the Chickasaw and Choctaw elite in the Indian Territory. So much so, in fact, that, by 1861, despite being raised by only a select minority, the crop had assumed an importance to the two tribes second only to corn.

Important commercial centres emerged at Eagletown, Doaksville, Skullyville, Boggy Depot, Tamaha, Perryville and Mayhew to deal with the increased volume of trade and cater to the demand of the Chickasaw and Choctaw aristocracy for imported items. Here leading mixed bloods operated business establishments, generally in partnership with licensed white traders from the southern states, while they continued to maintain plantations in the surrounding areas.⁶⁰ The biggest and most important of these centres was Doaksville, situated about a mile west of Fort Towson in present-day Choctaw County, which was described in 1844 as, "... A flourishing town, the largest in the Indian Country. It is surrounded by large cotton plantations, owned by Choctaws and Chickasaws, mostly half-breeds and worked by slaves".⁶¹

Two leading mixed blood slaveholders who lived near Doaksville were the Choctaw Chiefs Tandy Walker and Peter Pitchlynn. Walker was described as being nearly white "with no betrayal of Indian origin in speech or features", who was also married to a mixed blood. He lived in a large log house surrounded by stately oaks and out-buildings, including the executive office and slave quarters, and owned a 100 acre enclosed farm "under high cultivation" which was worked by his large slave labour force.⁶² According to the 1831 Choctaw census, Peter Pitchlynn had owned only 10 Blacks at that time. After removal, however, as his cotton interests grew, he greatly

increased his slaveholdings and the 1866 census revealed that 135 Choctaw Freedmen had belonged to him at one time, 32 of whom took the family name.⁶³ Walker and Pitchlynn provide a good example of the close correlation that existed in the Four tribes after removal between white intermixture, slaveholding, and political power.

The most financially successful member of any of the Four tribes to emerge in the Indian Territory during the antebellum period was the mixed blood Choctaw, Robert McDonald Jones.⁶⁴ Jones was born on 1 October 1808, the son of a white father and a mixed blood Choctaw-Scottish mother. He attended the Choctaw Academy at Kentucky, where he became a highly-regarded student, and graduated in 1830. Upon his graduation, he received \$1,800 of annuities which had accumulated while he was in school. The enterprising mixed blood used this sum as a financial springboard from which he built an astonishingly successful career in business and agriculture.

Jones was employed by the U.S. government during the Choctaw removals and first established a trading post at Pleasant Bluff on the Arkansas River above Fort Smith. In the late 1830s, he settled at Doaksville which became the centre of his financial empire. He came to own a number of commercial settlements, 4 large plantations in the Indian Territory, a sugar plantation in Louisiana and 2 steamboats on which he sent his products down the Red River from Kiamichi Landing to the gulf markets. He also owned a massive slave labour force to work his plantations and dealt widely in Blacks. At one time, he owned 500 Blacks and, though his number fell to 247 by 1860, he was still easily the largest individual slaveholder in the Indian Territory. By as early as 1849, he was raising 700 bales of cotton annually and his output continued to increase with his holdings; so much so, in fact, that for a single shipment of cotton sent to Liverpool in 1859 he earned \$80,000 in gold, which was an enormous

sum at that time. So successful did Jones become at making money that by the time of the Civil War he had amassed a personal fortune unsurpassed in the American southwest.

Jones' largest plantation, "Lake West", was situated in the southeastern part of present-day Bryan County and comprised some 4,000-5,000 acres. A second was at the mouth of the Clear Boggy River and a third at Shawneetown in McCurtain County. He wintered on his "Lake West" plantation in "The Mansion", a large, white, two-storey house with a piazza, lawn, garden, peach orchard and shade trees. But it was his summer residence which attracted most attention. On the site of the Old Providence Mission, just west of Fort Towson and about 3 miles southeast of present-day Hugo, Jones built the most elaborate antebellum dwelling in the Indian Territory. "Rose Hill", as it became known, was a huge mansion decorated with crystal chandeliers and fine European furnishings. It stood amidst a lawn of shrubs and flowers, the whole being bordered by a hedge of cedars, and featured a walk of marble slabs which led down to the nearby military road between Fort Towson and Fort Smith. A favourite pastime of Jones was to walk around his several estates hunting wild game with a heavy, custom-built Kentucky rifle which was carried by one of his stronger Blacks when not in use. Jones' wives included a mixed blood Colbert and a white Presbyterian mission teacher from New England. He was a charter member of the Doaksville Masonic Lodge and later led the Choctaw delegation to the Confederate Congress. He survived the Civil War and seems to have suffered little, financially, from its ravages.⁶⁵ He finally died in 1873 at the age of 65.

No single individual better exploited tribal resources for personal gain than Robert M. Jones. His was the most extreme example of the trend towards mixed blood affluence which was taking place throughout the Four tribes. His success story was the very embodiment of the hopes and dreams

of the mixed bloods and illustrated perfectly the promise of life offered to them by the Four nations. In consequence, his lifestyle and achievements became a model for their admiration - and emulation.

Among the Cherokees, the Old Settlers and the Treaty party, containing many slaveholding mixed bloods, were the first to arrive in the Indian Territory. They took large tracts of the most fertile land and were soon raising surpluses for export. The Ross party, composed mainly of full-bloods with few slaves, arrived later and generally took small pockets of land where they engaged in subsistence agriculture. The economic and social class differences between the slaveholding mixed blood elite and the fullblood majority actually increased after removal, due largely to their different responses to the increased opportunities offered by the new country for development. The large estates and stately homes of the Cherokee aristocracy re-emerged in the Indian Territory as did the smallholdings and log cabins of the fullbloods.⁶⁶ And while the dress, language, manners, education, religion and general lifestyle of the mixed bloods came to increasingly resemble those of the white southerners they wished to emulate,⁶⁷ those of the fullbloods remained native and traditional. In short, while the rich mixed bloods became ever more wealthy and acculturated, the poor fullbloods stayed essentially the same.

The Cherokee mixed bloods engaged in a variety of agricultural and industrial pursuits in the Indian Territory. Only the southern part of the Cherokee nation, along the Arkansas and Verdigris Rivers, was suitable for growing cotton and here many of the most wealthy and enterprising mixed bloods opened large plantations and raised the crop by using slave labour. Elsewhere, trading establishments, commercial cattle-raising and cereal production were their major concerns. Cherokee mixed bloods used their Blacks as cowboys and herders in large-scale ranching operations and cattle came to be the Indian Territory's most important

export.⁶⁸ Wheat and corn were also grown commercially and sold to the military garrisons or transported to southern markets down the Arkansas River on steamboats manned by Blacks. The mixed bloods also employed slave labour to operate cotton gins, tanneries, lumber and grist mills and mines.⁶⁹ Salt extraction was a major industry in the Cherokee country before the Civil War.⁷⁰ The most important salt-works was that owned by Lewis Ross near the old Chouteau trading post, at present-day Salina, on the Grand River. At one time, Ross owned over 200 slaves and was able to operate several shifts of 45 men at the works.⁷¹ He grew to be an extremely wealthy man on the proceeds of a lucrative export trade. By employing slave labour in such enterprises, the Cherokee mixed bloods widened still further the gap between themselves and the fullbloods and consolidated and strengthened their position at the top of the economic ladder.

Among the leading Cherokee mixed bloods in the Indian Territory were David Carter, Joseph Vann, and Lewis and John Ross. David Carter was described by the Fort Smith Herald in July 1849 as having "a fine plantation" two miles from Tahlequah, "black with darkies".⁷² Joseph Vann raised cotton and corn at his 600 acre plantation near Webbers' Falls. Included in his property were a handsome brick house, steamboats, racehorses and 300-400 Blacks. Vann came to be generally regarded as the wealthiest man and largest slaveholder in the Cherokee nation before his death in 1843⁷³ and his case is just one of many throughout the Four tribes pointing to the fact that the wealth of the mixed bloods was linked more to the ownership of slaves than to capital investment.

After removal, Lewis Ross grew to be an extremely successful merchant, industrialist and planter who owned large numbers of slaves and lived like a southern gentleman.⁷⁴ His brother, John, opened a 1,000 acre plantation at Park Hill, run by 40 slaves,⁷⁵ which grew to be largely self-sufficient. So successful were his operations that in 1844 his

personal wealth was estimated at half a million dollars. John Ross lived at "Rose Cottage", a brick mansion, finished in rosewood and mahogany, which could accommodate 40 guests. The furniture alone was worth \$10,000 and his table was graced with silver plate and imported China.⁷⁶ In the antebellum years, travellers, U.S. government officers and military officials from the surrounding states were entertained by Ross in great style and "Rose Cottage" acquired a reputation as one of the leading centres of social gatherings in the southwest.

The historic division within the Creek tribe between the Upper and Lower towns, which had been marked by geographical separation and ideological differences, became even more clearly defined after removal. The Upper and Lower Creeks settled as groups in different parts of their assigned country and were separated by 40 miles of prairie. The two groups held opposing world-views and practised different lifestyles. In theory, the overall government of the tribe was in the hands of an administration drawn from both factions but, in practice, the Upper and Lower Creeks tended to act independently and exercise a great deal of local autonomy.

As was customary, the mixed bloods were the first to arrive in the Indian Territory. The Lower Creek McIntosh party members settled on the choicest land, generally along both banks of the Arkansas and around the confluence of the Arkansas, Grand and Verdigris Rivers, near Fort Gibson. Here they opened up extensive farms, plantations, ranches and industrial operations worked by large numbers of slaves.⁷⁷ Cotton, tobacco and dry-field rice were raised, and cotton products, lumber and salt manufactured, but of far greater economic importance to the mixed bloods were commercial cattle-raising and corn production and surpluses of the latter two items were soon being exported out of the country. Slaves came to be in great demand among the Lower Creeks, as evidenced by their willingness to purchase captives from the Comanches⁷⁸ and their efforts to separate Blacks from

the Seminoles. The Lower Creek population contained a far greater percentage of mixed bloods and a higher ratio of Blacks to Indians than that of their Upper Creek compatriots. The wealthy progressives were similar to the mixed bloods of the other slaveholding tribes. They owned numerous slaves, operated large scale commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, emulated the lifestyle of southern aristocrats, and favoured advancement along white lines. To facilitate individual enterprise, they sponsored the relaxation of town controls and this led to an ever-increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth.⁷⁹ The result was an economic and social class system, headed by the slaveholding mixed bloods, which came to closely resemble that which had evolved within the Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.

Most of the large slaveholders in the tribe were Lower Creek mixed bloods, the great majority of whom belonged to the McIntosh party. Apart from the McIntosh family, the wealthiest of these was Benjamin Marshall.⁸⁰ The son of an Englishman, Marshall brought 19 slaves to the Indian Territory when he removed from Alabama in 1835. He established a flourishing plantation on the Verdigris River which grew to be one of the best known in the Creek nation. In 1845, his wealth was estimated at \$50,000 and two years later Creek agent Logan described him as "an educated half-breed of wealth and standing". Marshall greatly increased his slaveholdings after removal and in the late 1840s became extremely concerned by the proximity of the militant Seminole Blacks at Fort Gibson to his plantation. On 6 April 1848, therefore, he took the lead in complaining to Commissioner Medill that their presence on the military reserve was having "a most pernicious influence" on the Blacks in the region as well as upon "the lower and more ignorant class of Indians" and demanding either their return to the Seminoles or their removal from the Creek country. By 1860, Benjamin Marshall owned 76 Blacks and had become the largest slave-

holder in the Creek nation.

In contrast to their Lower Creek compatriots, the Upper Creeks were mostly traditionalist fullbloods. As they tended not to be interested in the capitalist ethic, they allowed their slaves far more liberty and independence than was usual among the Four tribes. Local government, town controls, communalism and nativism remained strong and the group's wealth was much more evenly distributed. Only the chiefs seem to have held an unequal share. Diversified farming on smallholdings was, essentially, the rule of thumb among the group as a whole. Significantly, the Seminoles far more closely resembled the Upper Creeks in ethnic background, outlook and lifestyle than any other group of slaveholders in the Indian Territory and these three factors were largely responsible for determining the course of their relations with Blacks.

Thus, the mixed bloods consolidated and strengthened their position of economic dominance within the Four tribes after removal. Wealth became increasingly maldistributed and class divisions widened still further. Fullblood subsistence farmers made up the lower classes while the middle classes were composed of mixed blood yeomen. At the top of the economic ladder was the small, elite group of aristocratic mixed bloods. A more fundamental division, based on differences in world-view and lifestyle, persisted between the fullbloods and the mixed bloods. While the fullbloods continued to stress native values and practices in the Indian Territory, the mixed bloods became ever more acculturated. They adopted the institutions, outlook and lifestyle of the southern white planters they wished to emulate and, as slavery became closely associated with profitability, they acquired more Blacks to secure an ever-increasing share of the tribes' total wealth.

By the outbreak of the Civil War, most of the slaves in the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes were in the hands of the few wealthy

mixed bloods who comprised the upper classes. According to the 1860 census,⁸¹ there were 45,297 citizens of the Four tribes living in the Indian Territory at that time. Of these, only 1,047, or 2.31% of the Indian population, owned any Blacks. 7,367 slaves were held in the Four tribes, an average of 7.03 per owner, and while 881, or 84.1% of the slaveholders had 10 or less Blacks, only 53, or 5.2%, possessed more than 20. The Creeks were somewhat exceptional. Due largely to the high concentration of fullbloods among the Upper towns, the tribe, as a whole, had a lower ratio of Blacks to Indians and a smaller percentage of slaveholders owning, on average, fewer slaves per capita than the Cherokees, Choctaws or Chickasaws. The figures for the Lower Creeks, taken alone, however, more closely resemble those of the other three tribes. While 261 Creek slaveholders owned just 1,532 slaves, 7 mixed bloods of the Lower towns, or just 2.68% of all owners, held 354 Blacks, or fully 23.10% of the tribal whole. The Lower Creek elite, in fact, more closely resembled the upper classes of the Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes than they did their fullblood compatriots. Clearly, the characteristics linking slaveholders of mixed blood crossed national boundaries and were common to the Four tribes.

Two important deductions concerning slaveholding in the Four tribes can be made from the information provided by the 1860 census. First of all, while the ratio of slaves to native citizens was fairly high at around 1:6, few Indians actually owned any Blacks. And secondly, slaves were not evenly distributed among native owners; a very small elite group owned a remarkably high percentage of the tribes' Blacks. As emphasized above, the great majority of slave owners, and almost all those with large holdings, were of mixed blood while veritable dynasties of aristocratic mixed blood slaveholders became prevalent throughout the Four tribes. Thus, the mixed bloods generally owned the Blacks, had most to do with

them and, as we will see, determined tribal policy regarding their behaviour. In view of the overwhelming evidence supporting the argument, one can only conclude that antebellum racial interaction within the Four tribes was not so much a story of relations between Indians and Blacks but of relations between a small minority of mixed bloods and their slaves.

Mixed blood slaveholders came to dominate not only the economic but also the political life of the Four tribes. As the clan system began to decline rapidly in the late Eighteenth Century, prestige and leadership came to be no longer associated with hereditary chieftainship but with successful accommodation of the new capitalist order. Consequently, the mixed bloods used their economic strength as a springboard to political power and quickly came to effectively control the governments of the Four tribes and direct their policies. So complete became their influence, and so ineffective the fullblood opposition, that in less than 40 years they brought to a successful conclusion an extremely ambitious programme aimed at securing their political positions, furthering the acculturative process within the tribes, and protecting their economic interests. By 1860, they had enacted what amounted to a full agenda of special interest legislation by establishing constitutional governments, overseeing the incorporation of many facets of white culture and writing and enforcing systems of law designed, mainly, to protect property. An integral and vital part of the latter were the Black codes created by the mixed bloods to control their slaves, protect institutionalized bondage, and conform with white notions of racial superiority.

The first step in the mixed blood slaveholders' assumption of power was their wresting control of the principal chieftainship from the hereditary clans. Alexander McGillivray, for example, became the effective ruler of the Creeks for 10 years in the late Eighteenth Century while the McIntosh family came to control the principal chieftainship of the Lower towns for

over 50 years in the Nineteenth, from 1808-1859. Pathkiller, the last hereditary Cherokee chief, meanwhile, was replaced by Charles Hicks, who has been described by one leading historian as, "a brilliant mixed blood".⁸² Upon his death in 1827, Hicks was replaced by John Ross, just one-eighth Cherokee and seven-eighths white, who remained chief until his death in 1866. The mixed bloods' grand design, however, was not to work solely through the chief but to change the political process to consolidate power in their own hands. They established constitutional governments, based on elective offices, realizing that they would constitute both the prime, and frequently sole, candidates, and the majority of voters in view of the fullbloods' disinterest in the democratic process. Again, the Cherokee experience furnishes a good example. The 1827 Cherokee Constitutional Convention was completely dominated by slaveholding mixed bloods who succeeded in writing most of their demands into the final document. Of the 12 signatories of the constitution listed on the 1835 census, 11 owned Blacks and their combined holdings added up to 22% of all the slaves in the nation.⁸³ In view of the extremely low percentage of slaveholders in the tribe at that time, these figures are even more remarkable. Clearly, the republican governments of the Four tribes were created and controlled during the antebellum period by slaveholding mixed bloods.

The Choctaws were the first Indian tribe to draw up a constitution, in 1826, and the Cherokees quickly followed suit in 1827. After removal, the Choctaws updated their laws and produced a new constitution, dated 3 June 1834, the first written in the Indian Territory. In 1838, the document was modified to include the Chickasaws, who had been incorporated into the tribe by the 1837 Treaty of Doaksville. The Chickasaws experimented in creating a constitutional government in the late 1840s and early 1850s and, after they were granted independence in 1855, established their own republic in August 1856. The Choctaws then revised their system and

came up with the Doaksville Constitution of January 1860. Following the Act of Union between the Old Settlers, the Treaty party and the Ross party, the Cherokees adopted a new constitution at Tahlequah on 6 September 1839. Like the Choctaws' Doaksville Constitution, this document remained the foundation of the tribe's government until Oklahoma was granted statehood in 1907. Because of factional divisions and a high percentage fullblood population, the Creeks lagged behind their more acculturated neighbours and only produced written constitutions in 1859 and 1860. Nevertheless, the mixed blood slaveholders of the Lower towns, who had effectively controlled the national councils since removal, succeeded, in the end, in reducing the power of the towns and establishing a centralized system of government.⁸⁴ Based on the system of government employed by the U.S., the constitutions of the Four tribes were essentially liberal, progressive documents which vividly illustrated the political maturity of the men who framed them.⁸⁵

The constitutional history of the Four tribes reflects the wish of the mixed bloods to create an ordered system of government conducive to the maintenance of their political and economic power. The antebellum period witnessed the successful completion of a programme aimed at centralizing the various tribal governments in their hands in order to shape the future of their societies as they saw fit and instigate and enforce codes of law designed to protect private property, in particular their interests in Black slaves.⁸⁶ In most important respects, the constitutions of the Four tribes were very similar. Each stressed the democratic process and most executive, legislative, judicial and local governmental offices became elective positions with limited periods of tenure. Various clauses dealt with suffrage requirements, eligibility for office and the amendment process and three-tiered national governmental structures, featuring the separation of powers and extensive networks of local government responsible to the central state, were established in

each of the tribes.

Above all, the constitutions were concerned with accountability, law enforcement and individual rights. Officers were to be either elected or made responsible to elected bodies such as the bicameral legislatures. All were subject to the will of the electorate, or, more precisely, the small minority of slaveholding mixed bloods who actually voted. Consequently, the mixed bloods came to dominate governmental positions and wield political power far out of proportion to their size. According to the 1835 Cherokee census, for example, the executive was composed of the two mixed bloods, John Ross and George Lowery, while 14 of the 16 members of the national committee, or senate, were of mixed descent. 12 of these, or fully 75% of the upper house, moreover, were only half-blood Cherokee, or less. The mixed bloods also accounted for 33% of the less influential lower house and monopolized judicial, administrative and cabinet posts.⁸⁷ Never again would the economic welfare of the upper classes of the Four tribes be subject to the whims of hereditary chiefs. Law enforcement was one of the mixed bloods' major concerns and elaborate judicial systems, featuring local county and circuit and national supreme courts, were created. Though bills of rights, confirming individuals' rights to freedom of speech and religion and trial by jury were written in, however, a dual system was operated for Indians and Blacks. All of the constitutions recognized the institution of slavery and asserted the inferior status of Blacks within the tribes.

The mixed bloods used their political power to push through a programme aimed at expanding the process of acculturation throughout the tribes. Progress was equated with the culture of successful southern planters and every effort was made to promote the adoption by the tribes of institutions fundamental to white civilization. If the tribes were to progress along the lines they laid down, they reasoned, their position in

the vanguard of the most acculturated would be secured. It was the mixed bloods' hope that, if their programme was successfully carried out, they would eventually be considered equal to the plantocrats they wished to emulate, and worthy of their political fellowship.

Christianity and education, sacred cows of the slaveholding mixed bloods, were encouraged to advance hand-in-hand through the tribes. The Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists were most active among the Four tribes during the antebellum period. Usually, they were invited by leading mixed bloods to establish mission stations and schools. Later, the tribes themselves took up much of the financial and administrative burden and established comprehensive systems of education, frequently in partnership with the missionaries. Offices such as superintendents of public education and boards of trustees were created to supervise the system, most of which came to be supported by tribal funds. Mission and neighbourhood schools grew up, as did seminaries and academies, and native graduates became teachers in a number of these establishments. Yet though it continued to grow throughout the period, the student population remained relatively low as interest in education was largely confined to the mixed blood minority.

Missionaries were invited into the Choctaw country in 1815 and they quickly laid the foundations for the tribe's heralded system of education. As early as 1830, it was reported that there were 11 schools in the Choctaw nation attended by 260 children. In addition, 250 adults had been taught to read their native language and 89 boys were enrolled at the Choctaw Academy in Kentucky. By 1836, 5 schools were being supported by the tribe itself. Increased emphasis was placed on education after removal and a great leap forward was taken in 1842. In November, the council passed an act creating a board of trustees and making provision for a comprehensive system of schools. By 1848, the Choctaws were sending graduates to eastern

colleges at public expense and supporting, with tribal funds, 9 boarding schools, including the famous Spencer and Armstrong Academies for boys and Wheelock and New Hope Seminaries for girls. Day schools, supported by public funds, were also established in local communities. Adults could attend both these neighbourhood schools and Sunday schools, which were initiated by missionaries but largely supported by council appropriations. All regularly-operating educational establishments were conducted in English. By 1860, 900 Choctaw children alone were enrolled in either neighbourhood or boarding schools, and the tribe had a comparatively high literacy level. Around 20-25% of the Choctaw nation had become Christian, but a far higher percentage of mixed bloods had embraced the religion. Significantly, sessions of the legislature came to be opened and closed with prayers.⁸⁸

The American Board of Commissioners opened 4 mission schools among the Chickasaws during their residence in Mississippi. After removal, though hampered for many years by being unable to act unilaterally or independently because of their union with the Choctaws, the Chickasaw mixed bloods successfully pushed through an ambitious education programme which involved the expenditure of much of the tribe's funds on schools. They created a system of local elementary and secondary schools in the Chickasaw district and by 1851 6 elementary neighbourhood schools were in operation. The first written law of the Chickasaws, dated 1844, provided for an appropriation to establish a tribal academy. The effort found fruition in 1851 with the opening of the Chickasaw Manual Labour School for Boys. Four other boarding schools, the Wapanucka Institute for Girls, the Bloomfield Academy for Girls, the Colbert Institute and the Burney Institute for Girls subsequently opened during the 1850s.⁸⁹ In view of their obvious handicaps, the Chickasaws had made remarkable advances in the field of education by the time of the Civil War.

The Moravians opened the first school among the Cherokees, at Springfield, Georgia, in 1801, and by 1826 eight mission schools, in part supported by the tribe itself, were in operation. Outstanding was the Brainerd Mission School, which ran from 1817-1839.⁹⁰ After removal, the mixed blood dominated council took steps to create a comprehensive system of education. The 1839 Constitution authorized the establishment of a national network of elementary schools and, in 1841, a free, compulsory, tax-supported education system, with provisions for eleven public schools, for all Cherokee citizens, was set up. Within 4 years, 900 pupils were enrolled at these institutions. Provisions were also made for higher education and, on 6th and 7th May 1851, male and female seminaries were opened near Tahlequah and Park Hill. An idea of the remarkable growth of Cherokee education can be gained from the fact that in just one year, between 1858-1859, the number of public schools rose by 42.85% from 21 to 30 while the number of enrolled students increased by 36.36%, from 1,100 to 1,500.⁹¹ So successful were the efforts of the mixed bloods that one historian has been led to suggest that, by 1860, "almost every Cherokee child had some formal education".⁹²

The Creeks, once again, lagged somewhat behind their more progressive neighbours in accepting such acculturative influences. By the end of 1832, the Methodists reported 200 members, the Presbyterians 81 and the Baptists 65, but the majority of these was composed by Blacks. Though the mixed bloods of the Lower towns tended to favour Christianity and education, they were opposed by the Upper Creek chiefs who saw in the missions a threat to their power and control, particularly over Blacks. Wishing to preserve stability and order, the Lower Creeks acceded to the demands of their compatriots and agreed to expel missionaries from the tribe in 1836. Congregations continued to meet unofficially, however, from that time until 1848, when the chiefs rescinded their formal opposition to Christianity.

In the latter year, the Methodists reported 592 members and the Baptists 550.⁹³ The Lower Creek mixed bloods were the strongest supporters of Christianity. Agent Garrett reported in 1858, "The Baptists appear to be the most numerous and successful, numbering among their converts some of the leading and most influential men of the nation".⁹⁴ Several of the leading mixed bloods, in fact, became Christian preachers. These included the Baptists James Perryman and Chilly and William F. McIntosh, the Presbyterians David Winslett and Joseph M. Perryman, and the Methodist Samuel Checote.

Creek education was hampered for many years by the tribe's post-removal opposition to missionaries. Nevertheless, the Presbyterians succeeded in opening the Kowetah Mission School in 1843, and this was later enlarged into the Kowetah Manual Labour School for boys and girls. Shortly after the removal of restrictions, in 1850, the Presbyterians opened a second boarding school at Tullahassee Mission and in the same year the Methodists opened the Asbury Manual Labour School. But 1856 witnessed the greatest step taken by the tribe itself to further its interests in education as the Creek council created a national system of 14 schools to be financed with funds accruing from the Tripartite treaty with the Seminoles and the U.S.⁹⁵ Though hampered for many years by the fullbloods, the Creek elite succeeded finally in getting the tribe's educational policy into line with that of the Cherokees, Choctaws and Chickasaws.

Besides Christianity and education, the mixed bloods fostered the adoption of many other pillars of white civilization. Under their sponsorship, the food, clothing, housing and language of the white south gained wide acceptance within the Four tribes. Agricultural, industrial and engineering techniques were copied, national museums erected and masonic lodges and improvement societies opened up. Strong emphasis was placed upon literacy in both English and native language. Due largely to the

advent of Sequoyah's syllabary, the Cherokees made the earliest advances. As early as 1822, Cherokees were reading and writing their own language and by 1830 more than half the adult men were reading native Cherokee.⁹⁶

Newspapers, published in English and the native language, soon followed. On 21 February 1828, the Cherokee Phoenix, the first of the Indian newspapers, made its debut under the editorship of the talented mixed blood Elias Boudinot. In its first 3 years, the paper published several Bible translations, hymn books, school books, and the laws of the nation. After removal, the national press was re-established and the Cherokee Phoenix replaced by the Cherokee Advocate. The Cherokee Advocate first appeared on 26 September 1844 and went on to become the most famous Indian newspaper ever published. Its editor was to be elected by the legislature and, fittingly enough, the first was William P. Ross, a mixed blood honours graduate of Princeton and the nephew of Chief John Ross. The Choctaws and Chickasaws followed the Cherokee lead. The first edition of the Choctaw Telegraph, founded by the mixed blood aristocrat David Folsom, came out on 6 June 1848 and was succeeded, 2 years later, by the Choctaw Intelligencer. The Chickasaw Intelligencer, meanwhile, made its debut in 1854 and the Chickasaw and Choctaw Herald went into circulation in 1857.⁹⁷ Interest in the written word continued to grow steadily throughout the period and many other publications, such as magazines, recreational literature, fiction, religious works and tribal political and legal documents came to be printed by the various presses.

Thus, the mixed bloods managed to incorporate many elements of white civilization into their societies. Contemporary observers tended to agree that, during the antebellum period, the tribes developed more advanced and civilized cultures than the neighbouring states. Yet most tribal members remained largely uninterested in, and unaffected by, the changes and the gap between the mixed blood slaveholders and the fullblood

majority grew ever wider.

Nowhere did the minority interests of the acculturated elite find better manifestation than in the tribes' acceptance of sophisticated legal systems. The mixed bloods' primary goal in wresting political power from the traditional ruling clans was to establish codes of law, in the belief that order was an essential prerequisite of sustained capitalistic economic growth. In this endeavour they proved to be extremely successful. Working through the newly-centralized governments, they put into effect written laws supported by local and national courts and enforcement agencies. These legal systems continued to be expanded and refined throughout the antebellum period and came to affect many aspects of individual and group behaviour. Many laws were concerned with property rights and these point to the interests and makeup of the group that framed them. Integral and vital to the system were the Black codes, based upon those in operation among the southern states, which were established in each of the Four tribes before the Civil War. As most Blacks associated with the tribes were slaves and most slave owners were of mixed blood, these codes can best be described as special interest legislation for the political and economic elite. The codes were to serve a dual purpose. They were designed to protect the mixed bloods' substantial interests in slave property, and gain the admiration and respect of southern white planters.

The Black codes adopted by the Four tribes were founded in the east but became much more severe after removal due, mainly, to the mixed bloods' need to create laws to better control their slave labour force on the new frontier. The codes affected both slaves and free Blacks. The right to own and control slave property was recognised and approved by the national governments, and a determined effort was made to institutionalize bondage and debase the position of Blacks within the tribal societies.

Blacks were considered unequal before the law and severe restrictions

were placed upon their political, economic, social and cultural activity. The law regarded slaves as property and protected the interests of the Indian owner rather than the Black as a person. Certain laws were applied exclusively to Blacks and they usually received harsher punishment than Indians for the same offence. Slaves were excluded from tribal citizenship, denied the vote, and prohibited from holding public office. They laboured under trade restrictions and their mobility was severely limited. They were not allowed to own livestock or arms and, eventually, their ownership of most types of property was prohibited. Slaves could neither cohabit nor intermarry with Indians or resident whites. They were not to be educated and could not even sing or gather in public places without supervision. The codes were designed to create a slave mentality. Through a programme of systematic deprivation, it was intended to establish a permanent, compliant, unpaid Black slave labour force. The status of Indians was raised, and their propertied interests secured, as Blacks were relegated to the bottom rung of the social ladder. Slaves were to be considered suitable only for taking orders and performing manual labour and it was hoped that they, too, would come to think of themselves in that light.

A small number of free Blacks were associated with the Four tribes. In general, their presence was a nuisance and an embarrassment to the mixed bloods and they were legislated and discriminated against. They held a somewhat anomalous position and tended to live on the fringe of Indian society. Though usually accepted as citizens, they could not hold office or positions of trust and were deprived of many benefits associated with tribal membership. As time went by, they became increasingly unequal before the law and were forbidden to own improvements, carry arms, marry Indians, learn to read or write, or conduct religious or public meetings. After removal, it was feared that free Blacks would

promote slaves' insubordination, aid insurrection, or act as models for their emulation. Consequently, a rash of legislation, aimed at disposing of the problem posed by the free Blacks once and for all, was passed by the tribes in the 1840s, 1850s and early 1860s. Severe restrictions were placed upon manumission by individual owners, abolitionists were to be expelled from the nations, and the national councils were forbidden to free slaves without their owners' consent. Eventually, free Blacks were either ordered from the nations, with confiscation of property and expulsion the penalty for noncompliance, or re-enslaved. These laws aimed at expanding the slave mentality into a Black mentality. Racial barriers were carefully delineated by law and Blacks came to have few rights or privileges, virtually no opportunity for any kind of advancement, and no means of entering Indian society.

Blacks were not regarded as equal before the law in any of the Four tribes. Under Chickasaw law, for instance, a Black was not allowed "his oath in any court of the nation" where the interests of any person other than another Black were being represented.⁹⁸ The codes typically featured clauses designed to protect Indians over Blacks and the propertied interests of the slave owner at the expense of impartiality. One of the first written laws of the Lower Creeks, for example, stated that if a Black were to kill an Indian he was to suffer death, but if an Indian were to kill a slave he was to pay the owner half the slave's value, or suffer death. Moreover, if a slave were to kill another slave he was to receive 100 lashes and his owner be compelled to pay the owner of the deceased half of the latter's value.⁹⁹ This law was broadened to encompass all of the Creeks in 1840¹⁰⁰ and similar codes were enacted by the other three tribes during the antebellum period. In 1842, the Cherokees took an apparent step forward by establishing a law imposing execution by hanging upon a citizen convicted of murdering a slave, but the effect was completely

nullified by the inclusion of a discretionary clause exempting from prosecution those who killed a bondsman either while administering "moderate correction" or when the slave was involved "in the act of resistance to his lawful owner or master".¹⁰¹

The codes also featured laws designed exclusively for Blacks and heavier punishments for Blacks than Indians for committing the same offence. Under Creek law, for instance, it was illegal for a Black to abuse an Indian citizen, but not vice versa.¹⁰² A Chickasaw slave, meanwhile, could receive 25 lashes for playing stickball on the Sabbath while an Indian citizen needed only to pay a \$5 fine for the same offence.¹⁰³

The Cherokees enacted a full agenda of legislation in this vein which typified developments taking place in all the Four tribes. In 1820, the Eastern Cherokees made it illegal for slaves to introduce liquor into the nation. Both owners and slaves were to be punished, but not to the same degree. While the owner could be fined \$15, the slave was to receive "15 cobs or paddles" from neighbourhood patrol companies which were to be organized to regulate the activities of Blacks. The Western Cherokees went still further. On 3 December 1833, they passed a law whereby slaves caught gambling, intoxicated, or abusing free persons were to receive 60 lashes from the lighthorsemen. After the unification of the tribe in the Indian Territory, the Cherokees consolidated, strengthened and extended these laws. One of the first laws passed under the Tahlequah Constitution concerned rape and mirrored southern white paranoia over the sexual potency of the Black male. Section 3 of the 19 September 1839 "Act for the Punishment of Criminal Offenses" stipulated that perpetrators of rape "on any female" were to receive 100 lashes, but any Black committing rape "against any free male, not of negro blood", would be hanged. Under legislation enacted a few weeks later, an Indian disrupting a church service would be fined between \$5 and \$20 while a Black convicted of the

same offence would receive 39 lashes, and the following year a law was passed whereby slaves, free Blacks or mulattoes "not of Cherokee blood" introducing or selling liquor were also to receive 39 lashes. But no single law better encapsulated the intention of the mixed bloods to create dual legal standards for Indians and Blacks within the Four tribes than that passed by the Cherokees on 20 October 1851. On that date, "stripes" were abolished as being "contrary to the spirit of civilization". Blacks, however, were excluded from its provisions.¹⁰⁴ In the eyes of the law, Blacks were clearly seen as being outside, or beneath, Indian civilization.

Under the constitutional governments of the Four tribes, slaves and free Blacks were systematically excluded from rights of citizenship, the vote, and office-holding. The Cherokee Constitutions of 1827 and 1839 limited tribal citizenship to descendants of "Cherokee men by all free women, except of the African race" and "the posterity of Cherokee women by all free men".¹⁰⁵ Thus, slaves, free Blacks, and descendants of Indian men by free Black women were denied citizenship and political privileges but, interestingly enough, the mixed bloods had felt the need to accede somewhat to the traditional matriarchal system by granting these rights to mulatto offspring of Cherokee women by free Black men. The Creeks later followed suit. On 8 May 1859, the general council decided that all free-born persons, except those of Black origin, previously acknowledged as members of the tribe, and children of Creek women by free Black men, when not more than half Black, were to be counted as citizens.¹⁰⁶ As so few unions took place between Indian women and free Black men, however, this was, in effect, but a small concession to traditionalism. The Choctaws and Chickasaws, meanwhile, excluded all Blacks and their descendants from the vote and denied them all the rights, privileges and immunities associated with citizenship.¹⁰⁷

When it came to office-holding the mixed blood legislators made no concessions. Article 3 of the Cherokee Constitutions of 1827 and 1839 stated in part that, "No person who is of Negro or Mulatto parentage, either by the father's or mother's side, shall be eligible to hold any office of profit, honor or trust, under this Government".¹⁰⁸ A similarly worded clause was included in both the Choctaw Constitution of 1834 and the Doaksville Constitution and, shortly after they had attained independence, the Chickasaws passed a law in November 1857 with identical provisions.¹⁰⁹ In this way, the mixed bloods sought to protect their interests by denying Blacks the rights of citizenship and excluding them from the political process.

The economic activity of Blacks was severely limited by the codes. Slaves laboured under trade restrictions designed to exert greater control over their actions, curtail crime and protect the slaveholder. In 1819, the Cherokees enacted legislation requiring the approval of the owner before bargains or contracts became binding and the following year the law was extended so that if a person traded with a slave without the owner's permission, and the property was found to be stolen, the purchasers would be liable to the owner for the value of the object. After removal, on 25 October 1850, a fine of \$25 was imposed on any person trading with a slave without the owner's permission. Half of the proceeds was to go to the owner and the other half to the nation.¹¹⁰ After their separation from the Choctaws, the Chickasaws copied many of their laws, including one passed in 1859 which required a permit from the owner before a trade could be made with a slave. Violators of the law were subject to fines or expulsion from the nation.¹¹¹ Creek slaveholders, meanwhile, were not obligated to honour either the trades or the debts of their slaves. Finally, in 1861, it was determined that no Creek slave could engage in mercantile business if the goods were his own. Guilty parties forfeited

the property which was to be sold to the highest bidder. Incentives were introduced to encourage enforcement. 75% of the proceeds were to go to the nation, but the other 25% was to be split between the informer and the lighthorsemen executing the law.¹¹²

Laws were also formulated to prevent slaves from accumulating property. In 1824, the Eastern Cherokees passed a law prohibiting slaves from owning livestock. The property was to be disposed of in 12 months or it would be confiscated "for the benefit of the Cherokee Nation". The Western Cherokees again went further. On 3 December 1833, it was declared illegal for slaves to own property of any description. They were given 6 months in which to dispose of the property or be subject to forfeiture to their owners. After tribal unification in the Indian Territory, the restrictions were limited, once again, to the ownership of livestock¹¹³ but this, nevertheless, effectively closed off the slave's main avenue for economic advancement. Under the 1834 Choctaw Constitution, slaves were prohibited from owning property of any kind except for "a good honest slave" and then only with a written pass from his owner.¹¹⁴ Chickasaw slaves were similarly barred from owning property of any sort. Violation would result in the confiscation and sale of the property and 39 stripes for the offender.¹¹⁵ Lower Creek slaves were not allowed to raise property of any kind in the east. If their masters did not take it away from them the lawmakers could and dispose of it as they pleased. The law went into effect for the whole tribe in the west but, after the 1845 union with the Seminoles, the Creeks specified the particular items they wished to restrict in order to better control the independent Seminole Blacks. The ownership of livestock was prohibited and the Creek lighthorse was to dispossess slaves of such property, which was then to be sold for the benefit of the nation.¹¹⁶ Thus, by restricting their slaves' economic advancement, it was the intention of the mixed bloods to keep their work

force financially depressed in order to foster greater compliance, subservience, dependence and loyalty. The avenue for obtaining emancipation through purchase was also closed.

Free Blacks also had economic restrictions applied to them. On 7 November 1840, the Cherokees prohibited free Blacks and mulattoes "not of Cherokee blood" from owning any improvements in the nation.¹¹⁷ Free Blacks in the Choctaw nation, meanwhile, were excluded from sharing in the annuity if "unconnected with Choctaw blood"¹¹⁸ and free Creek Blacks, if over the age of 12 and not recognized as citizens, were required to pay the nation \$3 per annum and taxed \$25 a head on cattle, horses and sheep and \$5 for each wagon, in the 1850s.¹¹⁹ Such legislation was designed to anchor free Blacks on the bottom rung of the economic ladder within the tribal societies. The purpose was to remove competition, undermine the figure of the free Black as a model for slaves' aspirations, and create an all-pervasive depressed Black consciousness.

All of the Four tribes enacted legislation during the antebellum period prohibiting miscegenation and intermarriage between Indians and Blacks. At the same time, laws were passed legalizing and condoning intermarriages between tribal members and white non-citizens.¹²⁰ The intention of the mixed blood legislators, therefore, was not simply to protect racial purity but to harden the colour line separating Indians and whites from Blacks by strengthening the association between Blacks and bondage and preventing their entry into tribal society through either intermarriage or mixed parentage. Blacks were to constitute a clearly recognizable racial group at the foot of, or outside, Indian society which could be easily legislated and discriminated against.

The Cherokees, at first, provided for the equal punishment of both the Indian and the Black participant in a mixed marriage and also included a fine for the slave owner for allowing such a union to take place. On

11 November 1824, the council enacted legislation whereby Indian, resident white or Black slave male offenders were to receive 59 lashes and their female partners 25. Owners permitting such unions were to be fined \$50. That this issue was a top priority with the mixed blood legislators is witnessed by the fact that the first law passed under the Tahlequah Constitution dealt with the matter. Not surprisingly, the old law was changed so that the punishment for a Black male offender was increased while that for the slave owner was dropped and the restrictions were henceforth to apply not only to slaves but also to free Blacks and certain mulattoes. Under the significantly titled 19 September 1839 "Act to Prevent Amalgamation with Colored Persons", intermarriage between "a free male or female citizen with any slave or person of colour not entitled to the rights of citizenship" was declared illegal. Offenders could receive up to 50 lashes but convicted Black males were to receive 100.¹²¹ Essentially, the only people having any Black blood who were to be allowed to marry Cherokees were the mulatto offspring of Indian women by free Black male citizens. As so few people of this racial makeup lived in the nation, however, the law, in effect, prohibited almost all Indian-Black unions.

The Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws followed suit. One of the first written laws of the Lower Creeks, put to paper in 1824, denied the right of inheritance to the offspring of Blacks and Indians; the child's property to be divided among his siblings. After removal, the laws against intermarriage were reinstated. Under the Creek code, if an Indian man took a Black woman for a wife both parties were to be whipped and the woman taken away and given to the Indian's nearest relative. If a Black man and Creek woman were proven to have had intercourse, they would receive 100 and 50 lashes respectively.¹²² Intermarriage between a Choctaw and a Black slave was prohibited by a law passed in the beginning of the tribe's

constitutional form of government. After removal, the legislature passed a number of laws prohibiting intermarriage between Indians and Blacks, including an interesting 1838 law prohibiting cohabitation between the two groups.¹²³ And after the tribe's separation from the Choctaws, the Chickasaws enacted similar legislation, forbidding such unions, in the late 1850s.¹²⁴ In these ways, the mixed bloods sought to close another major avenue through which Blacks could enter Indian society.

After removal, the mixed blood lawmakers made a concerted effort to protect and expand the institution of slavery within the Four tribes. A whole series of laws was passed to better control the Black slave labour force. Arms limitation was a top priority. Shortly after their arrival in the Indian Territory the Choctaws and Chickasaws forbade their slaves to own or carry arms of any sort. After 1857, a Chickasaw slave violating this law was to receive 39 stripes and have his weapons sold to the highest bidder for the benefit of the nation.¹²⁵ On 7 November 1840, the Cherokees prohibited their slaves from owning firearms but the following year the law was broadened so that henceforth no Black, whether slave or free, was to own weapons of any description. Owners permitting slaves to carry weapons were to be fined at least \$25 and Blacks breaking the law could receive up to 39 lashes from the patrol companies.¹²⁶ The Creeks, meanwhile forbade their slaves to own guns in the 1840s and 1850s but after 1 March 1861 no Black was allowed to carry any kind of weapon in the nation.¹²⁷ Clearly, these laws were developed to minimize the possibility of Black insubordination, insurrection or crime, by rendering the group defenceless and impotent.

Steps were taken to limit slaves' mobility. On 19 October 1841, the Cherokees set a precedent by authorizing the patrol companies to arrest and punish slaves found absent from their homes without a pass.¹²⁸ But between 1859 and 1861, the Creeks placed more restrictions on the movements

of their slave population than any of the other tribes. Slave owners were required to keep slaves "immediately around their improvements". Slaves were prohibited from hiring out to employers during their "free time" and those so doing were to be fined \$50 for each offence. No slave was to be permitted to travel more than 2 miles from his owner's premises at any time, or any distance at night, without a written pass from his owner. Slaves violating the law were to receive 25 lashes. Owners issuing passes, meanwhile, were to state the slave's destination, or be fined \$10. Finally, no Black was to be allowed to preach to an Indian congregation and slaves were only to be allowed to have religious worship if it were conducted within 2 miles of their owners' premises with some free person, not of Black descent, watching over them.¹²⁹ By 1861, the Creeks had come to view restrictions on mobility as a necessary requirement for greater control over their Blacks.

The tribes took a firm stance against runaways and those tampering with the slave property of others. All made provisions for imposing heavy punishment on both runaways and those harbouring them while offering rewards for captors of escapees. Creek Black runaways, for example, were to receive 100 stripes while those found harbouring them would be fined \$50, or also receive 100 lashes. Any person capturing a runaway, however, could collect \$25 from the Creek owner, or \$50 if the owner was a non-resident. Another Creek law, passed just prior to the Civil War, forbade persons to give passes to slaves they did not own. There were unusually harsh punishments for breaking this law. Offenders were to receive a \$100 fine and 100 lashes and inability to pay would result in an additional 100 lashes. Should the slave escape, the issuer of the pass would receive 100 lashes and be required to pay the owner the full value of the lost property. Failure to pay the due amount would result in death.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, in the Cherokee nation, the kidnapping of slaves remained one of the very

few capital offences in effect after 1846.¹³¹ Through the enactment of such harsh deterrents, the mixed bloods sought to better protect their investments in slave property.

To preserve intact the institution of slavery, legislation was enacted to curtail the activities of alleged and potential abolitionists. Missionaries and teachers were seen as posing the principal threat and abolitionism became closely associated with religion and education. Among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, it was forbidden to teach or preach to slaves, the Cherokees applied the law to all Blacks, and they and the Creeks declared the hiring of abolitionist educators unlawful.

The Choctaws passed a law in 1836 whereby missionaries in favour of "the principles and notions of the most fatal and destructive doctrine of abolitionism" were to be compelled to leave the nation and not allowed to return. The law was extended in 1838 so that a person "teaching slaves how to read and write or to sing in meeting houses or schools or in any open place, without consent of the owners, or allowing them to sit at the table with him" could be convicted of abolitionism and forceably expelled. In 1853, the council enacted new school laws. No slave or child of a slave was to be taught to read or write in any Choctaw school, and the authorities were to remove teachers known to be abolitionist or disseminating abolitionist doctrines. These laws, it should be remembered, also applied to the Chickasaws. Finally, the Chickasaws passed an act, approved by Governor Cyrus Harris on 27 November 1857, which provided for the removal from the nation of any person known to harbour abolitionist sentiments.¹³²

The Cherokees included free Blacks in the restricted category. A law was passed on 22 October 1841 whereby those teaching slaves or free Blacks not of Cherokee blood to read or write would be fined between \$100 and \$500. On 22 October 1848, the law was strengthened so that any

white non-citizen teaching any Black to read or write would be removed from the nation. Finally, in 1855, the Cherokees forbade the Superintendent of Schools to employ educators suspected of being abolitionist and the Creeks enacted similar provisions the following year.¹³³ The Four tribes thus acted to protect the institution of slavery by legislating against the abolitionist tendencies of religious and teachers. In so doing, they sought to further shape the Black mentality by instigating a programme designed to severely limit the potential of Blacks for intellectual growth and leave the group educationally, socially and culturally deprived.

Free Blacks came to be viewed as both an awkward nuisance and a positive threat to institutionalized slavery. Each of the tribes, at first, sought to limit the free Black population by placing restrictions upon manumission. In 1842, the Cherokees passed a law whereby persons emancipating slaves were to be held responsible for their conduct.¹³⁴ Before removal, the Lower Creeks had permitted manumission and recognized the emancipated Blacks as free persons. The law was changed in the Indian Territory, however, so that owners were prohibited from freeing slaves unless they were then taken out of the nation.¹³⁵ Under Choctaw law, slaves brought to the west at the time of removal were to remain slaves or, if manumitted by their owners, leave the nation. Chickasaw and Choctaw laws operating during the 1850s, moreover, stipulated that slaves could not be freed by individual owners without the consent of the councils, and even then the emancipated Blacks would have to leave the nations. The councils, in turn, were forbidden to emancipate slaves without the consent of the owners unless the slaves had rendered distinguished service, in which case the owners were to receive full compensation.¹³⁶ Thus, the initial moves were aimed at keeping the free Black populations small and static.

The Four tribes progressed from limiting the problem posed by free

Blacks to disposing of it completely. Each, in turn, enacted legislation aimed at expelling free Blacks from their nations, or subjecting them to re-enslavement. An early Cherokee law of 11 November 1824, for instance, stipulated that all free Blacks coming into the nation would be viewed as intruders and not allowed to remain without a permit.¹³⁷ The Cherokee authorities seem to have been of the opinion that "The Great Runaway" of 1842 was the result of contact between slaves living at Webber's Falls and alien free Blacks, or, more specifically, Seminole Blacks, residing in the area.¹³⁸ After the revolt had come to an end, the legislature passed an important law relating to the activities of free Blacks. Under the provisions of "An Act in regard to Free Negroes", free Blacks, except for the few manumitted by Cherokee citizens, were ordered to leave the nation by 1 January 1843, or as soon as possible thereafter. Any refusing to do so were to be reported to the authorities for expulsion. Also, if Cherokee manumitters were to leave the nation, or die, their free Black charges would be required to "give satisfactory security" to a circuit judge for their conduct. Those failing to do so would also be expelled from the nation. Finally, any free Black found "aiding, abetting or decoying any slave or slaves, to leave his or their owner" was to receive 100 lashes and be immediately removed from the nation.¹³⁹ As was frequently the case, the Cherokees set a precedent in enacting such legislation.

The Chickasaws and Creeks would follow the Cherokee lead with even more far-reaching legislation in the late 1850s and early 1860s. In 1859, the Chickasaws passed a law empowering county judges to order out of the nation the small number of free Blacks associated with the tribe. If any were to refuse to leave within 2 months of the order, they were to be sold at auction to the highest bidder for one year and then re-sold annually until they did leave.¹⁴⁰ That same year, the Cherokee council

passed a similar act requiring all free Blacks to leave the nation and only the veto of Principal Chief John Ross prevented it from becoming law.¹⁴¹ Free Creek Blacks had been permitted to stay in the nation during the 1840s and 1850s but had been subjected to per capita and property taxes. On 1 March 1861, however, the council enacted legislation whereby all free Blacks were required to dispose of their property and choose Creek masters within 10 days or be sold to the highest bidder for 12 months.¹⁴² The process of legally separating the races had thus been completed and the Black mentality clearly defined. By the time of the Civil War, the Four tribes forbade Blacks to enter their societies through intermarriage, mixed parentage, or manumission. The only slaves in the nations were Blacks, and all Blacks were to be slaves.

The Black codes had been designed with the dual purpose of protecting investments in slave property and impressing southern whites with the level of advancement in the tribes. Both goals were rather successfully achieved. By 1861, the tribes owned more Black slaves, and were able to exert more control over their movements and behaviour, than at any other time in their history. The mixed bloods were extremely proud of the system they had created. One historian has written, for example, that, "The Cherokees believed that slavery was their most important and cherished institution".¹⁴³ Southern whites were indeed impressed with their progress. Agent George Butler argued, in 1859, that institutionalized Black slavery had exercised an important civilizing influence on the Cherokees and was necessary for their continued advancement.¹⁴⁴ The idea was taken up by the Southern Literary Messenger that same year,

"... The advancement which those tribes have made in the arts of civilized life, corresponded almost exactly, in a ratio, with the extent to which they had adopted the 'peculiar institution.'... Civilization among the Indians was the result of their adoption of negro slavery".¹⁴⁵

Both the Messenger and agent Butler went on to suggest that Blacks be

purchased for the "wild tribes" in the hope that they would "acquire industrial habits" as the Civilized tribes had done. Many white plantocrats had come to consider the mixed blood slaveholders of the Four tribes, "Worthy of political fellowship, and several Southern newspaper editorials urged that this step be taken".¹⁴⁶

Recent debate has focused on comparisons between the slave systems operated by Indians and whites. For many years, it was the conventional wisdom that, although the Four tribes had adopted and practised institutionalized slavery, it was but a mild version of the system operating in the south. Indian owners were viewed as having been more lenient than their white counterparts towards their slaves, and Indian Blacks were believed to have worked under better conditions and received more humane treatment than their fellow bondsmen in the southern states. In a controversial book and two articles published in the mid 1970s,¹⁴⁷ however, the revisionist historian Rudy Halliburton Jr. challenged these ideas by putting forward his "microcosm thesis" which argued that Cherokee slavery closely resembled the system practised by southern whites in almost every way, and was nothing less than "The Peculiar Institution" writ small. But, as has been pointed out by several severely critical reviewers,¹⁴⁸ Halliburton's arguments are deeply flawed and his conclusions erroneous. Since then, Theda Perdue has produced an excellent study of the subject¹⁴⁹ which convincingly refutes the microcosm thesis and lends solid support to the more traditional view of Cherokee slavery.

Halliburton found little evidence to support the traditional view that Black slaves owned by Cherokees enjoyed easier lives than those owned by whites and believes the notion stemmed from propaganda circulated by pro-slavery southern Indian agents and missionaries anxious to placate their abolitionist-minded boards. "Full-bloods, half-breeds, near Whites and Whites... possessed slaves" but these groups should be considered as

one; "Cherokees all".¹⁵⁰ Cherokee Black codes followed the format of those of the southern states and severely infringed upon the rights of slaves, "As a result, slavery in the Cherokee Nation was little different from the surrounding slave holding areas with no increased freedoms under their Cherokee masters".¹⁵¹ The legislation regarding miscegenation demonstrated the real position of Blacks within the tribe. Cherokees viewed Blacks from the same perspective whites did and, "May have displayed the strongest color prejudice of all American Indians.... Some miscegenation did occur... but a Cherokee Negro was always regarded as a Negro".¹⁵²

Halliburton contends that Cherokee slavery was rigidly regimented and contained all the stereotypes of the white institution. The work performed by Cherokee slaves varied little from that done by slaves in the southern states and they "frequently reacted to their status by running away, exhibiting defiance, stealing and malingering". Cherokee masters, in turn, flogged, branded, raped and killed their slaves. "Cherokees never experienced the inner conflict between slaveowning and conscience" and there was "never any effective, organized or vocal abolitionist activity in the Nation". He concludes that, "Slavery in the Cherokee Nation was a microcosm of the 'peculiar institution' that existed in the Southern United States".¹⁵³

Unfortunately, Halliburton's arguments are frequently contradicted by his own evidence, his interpretation is one-dimensional and restrictive, and his conclusions mistaken. The author makes the basic error of not differentiating between the attitudes of the various groups within Cherokee society towards Blacks. He refers constantly to "the Cherokees", which is taken to include fullbloods, mixed bloods and intermarried white alike, and is of the opinion that the mixed bloods "were Cherokees in every respect".¹⁵⁴ But, clearly, the mixed bloods and fullbloods had opposing world-views which determined the course of their relations with Blacks. The mixed blood minority owned the vast majority of slaves in

the tribe, wrote the Black codes and stage-managed the development of institutionalized bondage. The fullblood majority clung to aboriginal beliefs and practices, were less interested in exploiting the Black population and consequently placed far fewer demands upon their slaves. Generally speaking, the slave of a mixed blood led a very different life to the slave of a fullblood. Consequently, it seems bizarre to consider the two groups "Cherokees all" and suggest that they shared the same attitudes towards Blacks.

Halliburton gives few indications of changes in Cherokee slavery over time or why it evolved the way it did. Aboriginal Cherokee slavery would not have developed into an institution if massive economic, social, political, cultural and demographic changes had not taken place within the tribe. It was only after the mixed bloods had amassed most of the slave property and assumed positions of political leadership that Black slavery became institutionalized. The slave codes were created by the mixed bloods to protect the economic system they had established. Furthermore, Halliburton tends to ignore the particular precedents that led to changes in the law, and in attitudes to Blacks. The Cherokee mixed bloods only felt the need to impose severe controls on the Black population after they were exposed to harsh frontier conditions in the Indian Territory. Most of the slave codes were written after removal and many of the harshest laws restricting the mobility and behaviour of Blacks were a direct result of one specific event, the Great Runaway of 1842. Not surprisingly, therefore, evidence suggests that Cherokee slaves were afforded far more privileges in the east than they were in the Indian Territory.

The mistaken assumption is also made that the Black codes were uniformly enforced in the Cherokee nation. Halliburton's argument is actually contradicted by his own evidence. Examples of harsh treatment of Blacks by Cherokee masters are cited, yet the 10 first-hand accounts

of slaves included as Appendix A in his book indicate a higher incidence of benevolent than cruel masters. Halliburton fails to produce quantitative or qualitative analyses to support his theory and is unable to differentiate between slaveholders who were more or less likely to enforce the codes. Again, he is hindered by his lack of appreciation of the importance of the owner's ethnic background and his one-dimensional view of a Cherokee national.

Halliburton argues further that intermarriage between Indians and Blacks was almost non-existent, the mixed blood offspring of such unions were always treated as Blacks, and the amount of labour imposed upon Cherokee bondsmen precluded any development of a slave community. Little evidence is provided to support these contentions, however. His comment that, "Miscegenation and intermarriage had been repugnant to the Indians from their earliest contact with Negroes",¹⁵⁵ appears to have little foundation in fact and is contradicted by the listing of mixed Cherokee-Blacks in the 1835 census. Though the Cherokees passed laws forbidding intermarriage between Indians and Blacks, there is no evidence that such unions were ever stamped out. Early Cherokee codes, moreover, clearly show that the offspring of Indian women by Black men at one time held more rights and privileges in the nation than other Blacks or mulattoes. Finally, as George A. Levesque has pointed out, the implication that there was no slave community among the Cherokee Blacks "flies in the face of far too much convincing evidence demonstrating the adaptive tendencies of those enslaved".¹⁵⁶ If Blacks on southern white plantations were able to develop a rich and distinct slave culture, it would seem unreasonable to assume that Cherokee Blacks could not do likewise. In short, Halliburton has produced a naïve and simplistic analysis that frequently displays complete disdain for the complexities inherent in the subject.

A far more thorough and mature analysis has since been produced by Theda Perdue.¹⁵⁷ In contrast to that of Halliburton, Perdue's study is well grounded in anthropological concepts and demographic realities. She has carefully traced both the changes in Cherokee society which permitted the incorporation of Black slavery and the evolution of the institution itself. Perdue has displayed a keen awareness of the importance of the relationship between racial background and slave ownership and has pointed out that the mixed blood minority owned most of the slaves and wrote all the Black codes. Also shown are differences between prescriptive law and actual practice, and variations in enforcement of the codes among owners of different ethnic backgrounds. Finally, Perdue is appreciative of the complexities involved in Indian-Black relations and has cut new ground by documenting some of the problems encountered by the mixed bloods in attempting to bring about the incorporation of the alien institution of Black slavery. She concludes that, generally speaking, the lives of the Cherokee Blacks were better than those of their counterparts in the southern states and notes the existence of a viable slave culture in the Cherokee nation.

Perdue carefully chronicles the changes taking place in Cherokee society which allowed the mixed bloods to assume power and largely determine the course of the tribe's relations with Blacks. The incorporation of institutionalized slavery was a gradual process and not devoid of problems. Before removal, there were relatively few laws governing the behaviour of masters and slaves and the Cherokee slave code stood in "stark contrast" to that of the white south. Noticeably lacking were laws dealing with insubordination and rebellion. Perdue believes that these discrepancies "can only be explained in terms of the enduring power of Cherokee cultural traditions". Slavery was conducted largely on an individual basis, the master was responsible for his slaves' actions,

and the national government only reluctantly intervened in the relationship between slave owner and bondsman. During the pre-removal period, "The Cherokee planter... attempted to imitate the plantation society of the White South. Yet he could not entirely escape his Indian heritage".¹⁵⁸

Contrary to Halliburton's belief, before removal, Cherokee masters at times felt uncomfortable with institutionalized slavery, displayed both pangs of conscience and limited support for emancipation and colonization, and tended to treat their slaves well. During the pre-removal period, the Cherokee Phoenix, a newspaper owned by a mixed blood slaveholder and produced for slaveholders, was opposed to the international slave trade and, for a brief period, a group of Cherokee masters permitted their slaves to belong to the "Wills Valley African Benevolent Society", an auxiliary of the "American Colonization Society" formed in 1817 to promote the repatriation of American Blacks to Africa.¹⁵⁹ As Perdue has stated, in the east, "Because traditional Cherokee culture acted as a leavening agent, Cherokee planters avoided much of the rigidity and cruelty displayed by the White slaveholding society".¹⁶⁰ Missionaries found Cherokee masters "very indulgent" and suggested their behaviour was worthy of "imitation by White people".¹⁶¹

After removal, the demands of frontier existence and the abandonment of traditional values by many slaveholders brought significant changes to Cherokee slavery, and it came to more closely resemble the southern system. Attitudes hardened, the slave codes became more severe and the institution became less flexible as owners came to expect more from their bondsmen. There were more cases of slave runaways, Black crime and harsh treatment by Cherokee masters. Nevertheless, Cherokee Blacks were able to maintain a viable slave culture as evidenced by reports of their one time attendance at religious, sporting and social functions, their preservation of family ties and naming practices, and their ownership of property. Perdue con-

cludes that the traditional view of Cherokee slavery is most accurate, "Although Cherokee planters required hard work from their bondsmen, they probably treated their slaves much better on the average than did their White counterparts" and "relative leniency on the part of masters seems to have been characteristic of Cherokee slavery both before and after removal".¹⁶²

These conclusions generally hold true when the scope of analysis is widened to include the Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws. It appears that the similarities between the slave systems employed by the Four tribes far outweigh the differences, and the differences appear to be of degree rather than kind. A number of general statements can be made regarding Black slavery among the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws. First of all, the adoption of systemized slavery came about gradually, and only after great changes had taken place within each of the tribes. The mixed blood minority came to own by far the greatest number of slaves, had most to gain from systemization and were responsible for writing the Black codes. At times, however, institutionalization was a painful process and masters found it difficult to go against traditional beliefs and practices by incorporating the alien system. During the pre-removal period, the tribes' slaveholders tended to compromise by allowing their Blacks considerable freedom. After removal, however, as the ever-more acculturated mixed bloods became exposed to harsher frontier conditions, their attitudes to Blacks hardened. The codes increased in severity and the institution became more regimented as capitalist pressures worked to place increased demands upon the slave labour force. Nevertheless, slave cultures continued to exist in each of the tribes and, as native traditions frequently put a damper on the worst excesses of institutionalized slavery, slaveholders tended to treat their bondsmen relatively well.

But what students of the subject would most like to know is just how

well Black slaves were treated by their Indian masters. Historians have spent a great deal of time making the inevitable comparisons between slavery as practised by the Four tribes and by southern whites. Most have adopted the more defensible, traditional approach that Indian slavery was less harsh, but many have been guilty of making sweeping generalizations and simplistic conclusions. Some others have taken the opposing view, that slavery among the Indians was as severe as among whites, but have tended to lose credibility by ignoring evidence which conflicts with, or contradicts, their theories. All too often, the reader is left unsure which "Indians" and which "whites" are being compared.

Precious little quantitative or qualitative analysis has been produced to compare the two systems, and what little has been produced has been limited in scope. Monroe Billington recently conducted a study in which he compared the narratives of 38 Blacks formerly held by members of the Four tribes in the Indian Territory with those of Blacks held in the same area by non-Indians. Of the 38 Indian-owned Blacks, 15 were held by Cherokees, 9 by Creeks, 8 by Choctaws and 3 by Chickasaws; the other 3 did not specify a tribe. By dividing the information furnished by the narratives into categories based on punishment, care and the Blacks' general attitudes to their owners, Billington concludes that, "Indian slaveholders apparently were no more or less lenient with their slaves than were White slaveholders".¹⁶³

Unfortunately, Billington's study is severely limited. While the idea of comparing slave systems operating in the Indian Territory was an excellent one, the methodology employed was sadly lacking. Billington says little about the "non-Indian" slaveholders used in the model and the very term, in itself, implies a negative approach which is confirmed by his conclusions. Worse still, all the Indian owners are lumped together in one category with no differentiation being made on the basis of tribe

or, more importantly, ethnic background. Billington's finding that, "... A higher proportion of Indian-owned slaves lived on plantations than did non-Indian-held slaves",¹⁶⁴ almost certainly means that most of the Indian Blacks used in the sample were slaves of mixed bloods, yet no effort is made to differentiate or draw comparisons between their experience and that of slaves owned by fullbloods. The author fails to appreciate that the differences between fullblood and mixed blood slaveholders are just as significant as the similarities between intermarried or predominantly white mixed blood and "non-Indian" slaveholders. Billington's study points to the need for a change of emphasis. At the present time, comparisons between Indian and white owners should take a back seat to comparisons between the various Indian owners themselves. Only after a greater understanding of inter and intra tribal differences and variations in slave ownership and the treatment of Blacks has been achieved will historians be able to draw accurate and useful comparisons between Indian slavery and "The Peculiar Institution".

It is as hard to generalize about how slaves were treated by citizens of the Four tribes as it is to generalize about their treatment by white southerners. While all the tribes had national governments, laws and police forces, enforcement of the slave codes was generally left to the individual owner. Given such latitude, tremendous differences emerged in the treatment afforded Blacks by the tribes' slaveholders. The Blacks themselves offer ample testimony to this in the pages of the "Indian Pioneer Papers"¹⁶⁵ and the "Ex-Slave Narratives".¹⁶⁶ Polly Colbert, a former slave of a mixed blood Choctaw family, for example, reported that her owners, "Sure was fine young folks and provided well for us... I never had much work to do", but Sarah Wilson, the former slave of an intermarried white of the Cherokee nation described her owner as "a devil on this earth" and went on, "The way he made the Negroes work so hard, old

Master must have been trying to get rich. When they wouldn't stand for a whipping he would sell them". The dichotomy was nowhere more vividly portrayed than in the narrative of Kiziah Love, a former slave of the mixed blood Chickasaw Frank Colbert. Kiziah thus described her owner, "Old Master Frank never worked us hard and we had plenty of good food to eat", but well remembered the terror she felt for his sadistic half-brother, Buck, who frequently physically abused his relatives' slaves and, on one occasion, went so far as to kill a Black nanny for not keeping his children quiet.¹⁶⁷ Clearly, much depended on the individual owner, his ethnic background and, to a lesser extent, his tribal affiliation.

The key differences between the slaveholders of the Four tribes and the way they treated their Blacks was admirably summarized by the informed Major Ethan Allen Hitchcock in 1844,

The full-blood Indian rarely works himself and but few of them make their slaves work. A slave among wild Indians is almost as free as his owner, who scarcely exercises the authority of a master, beyond requiring something like a tax paid in corn or other product of labor. Proceeding from this condition, more service is required from the slave until among the half-breeds and the Whites who have married natives, they become slaves indeed in all manner of work.¹⁶⁸

Over 90 years later, Hitchcock's perceptive observation was echoed in the words of New Thompson, a man with first-hand experience as a former Cherokee slave, "The only negroes who had to work hard were the ones who belonged to the half-breeds. As the Indian didn't do much work he didn't expect his slaves to do much work".¹⁶⁹

Categorizing slaveholders by ethnic background rather than tribal affiliation with a view to comparing their treatment of Blacks appears to be a most useful approach. The similarities between slaveholders of the same ethnic background crossed tribal boundaries. Generally speaking, the mixed blood slaveholders of the Four tribes had far more in common with each other than they did with the fullbloods of their own tribes. In each of the tribes, the mixed bloods wrote the codes and had most to

gain from their enforcement. Institutionalized slavery developed only among the mixed bloods and the codes were designed to protect their investments and further their capitalist ambitions. Though obviously there were great variations within each tribe and between the tribes, a mixed blood slaveholder was always far more likely to enforce the Black codes than a fullblood slaveholder.

During the pre-removal period, mixed blood owners were relatively lenient in their treatment of slaves. At various times, for example, Blacks were permitted to raise and own property, visit friends or relatives without accompaniment, and attend religious services, schools and social functions, such as dances and stick-ball games, with the Indians. Masters apparently showed no objection to their slaves receiving either religious or educational instruction and occasionally allowed them to travel long distances, without supervision, to attend church and school. A missionary reported in 1818 that Cherokee masters were willing to have their slaves instructed and were very indulgent in allowing them time to attend the meetings,¹⁷⁰ and there are many reports of Blacks and Indians attending the same religious services in which slaves often took the lead.¹⁷¹ Some slaves were even allowed to attend the same schools as the children of mixed blood owners. As late as 1832, the Ridge and Boudinot boys were attending school with two Cherokee slave boys, Peter and Sam.¹⁷²

After removal, however, the mixed bloods became less lenient in their treatment of Blacks. As they became more acculturated and capitalistic, they placed increased demands upon their slave labour force and were more apt to enforce the ever-more severe Black codes they were creating. Their slaves, in consequence, suffered a reduction in free time and loss of many former privileges. Not all mixed blood owners enforced all the codes all of the time. Betty Robertson, for instance, described how the slaves of Joseph Vann were permitted to, "Have singing and be baptized

if we want to.... But we couldn't learn to read or have a book".¹⁷³

Evidence suggests, however, that most mixed blood slaveholders enforced many of the codes at least some of the time.

There is no doubt that slavery among the mixed bloods of the Four tribes became more institutionalized after removal. Charles K. Whipple referred to the system of slavery being operated by the mixed blood Cherokees when he observed,

This institution was derived from the Whites. It has all the general characteristics of Negro slavery in the Southern portion of our union. In such a state of society as we find among these Indians, there must of necessity be some modifications of the system; but in all its essential features, it remains unchanged.¹⁷⁴

Attitudes towards Blacks continued to harden during the post-removal period and, by the time of the Civil War, the lives of mixed bloods' slaves were subject to more control and greater restrictions than ever before.

Slavery among the mixed bloods came to include many of the stereotypes associated with "The Peculiar Institution". Slaves were considered property. They were bought and sold on the auction block and families were often broken up. They were also willed to heirs, lent, borrowed, hired out and used as collateral for, or payment of, debts. But above all, Blacks were put to the task of furthering the capitalistic ambitions of their acquisitive owners. As in the south, Black men cleared the land, built and maintained improvements, and constructed communications. They worked as labourers on farms, ranches and plantations, or in extractive and manufacturing industries, where both the gang and task system were used extensively. Other slaves manned their masters' ferries and drove their coaches. Some Blacks were employed as carpenters, millers, blacksmiths or other skilled craftsmen and social divisions separated these artisans from the field hands, as on white plantations. Black women sometimes worked in the fields but usually they tended the gardens, made clothes, prepared food, and took care of the owner's house and family.

During the post-removal period, the slave dealer, the white overseer and the runaway became familiar figures in mixed blood culture. The "Black Mammy" figure emerged, older Blacks were called "Uncle" and "Aunt" and slaves were only referred to by their Christian names. Most slaves ate and dressed like their fellow bondsmen in the south and used English as their first language.

Work hours, conditions and punishment varied from plantation to plantation from excellent to comparable with the worst elements of slavery in the southern states. The Four tribes placed few restrictions on the extremes to which a master could go in correcting his slaves. While most slaveholders tended to exercise restraint, almost all the reported cases of cruelty to slaves can be attributed to owners of mixed blood. Even before removal, it was said that James Vann ruled his slaves with a rod of iron. On one occasion, he shot a slave for plotting against his life and, on another, burned a Black at the stake for robbing him.¹⁷⁵ Instances of cruel treatment seem to have increased after removal. A Cherokee slave, for example, was scarred for life after a beating from his owner, and a Creek slave later spoke of a whipping machine designed for thrashing bondsmen.¹⁷⁶ In a nutshell, slaves of mixed bloods were more likely to be treated badly by their owners than slaves of full-bloods because much more was demanded of them and they were subject to far stricter controls.

The Creeks are usually thought of as being somehow exceptional,¹⁷⁷ and evidence indeed suggests that Creek slaveholders, in general, treated their Blacks better than Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw owners. Much of the explanation for this lies in the fact that the tribe was divided into Upper and Lower towns and fullblood owners predominated among the former, yet even among the mixed blood Lower Creek slaveholders leniency seems to have prevailed. George Catlin noted that it was "no uncommon

thing to see a Creek with 20 or 30 slaves at work on his plantation",¹⁷⁸ but the Blacks do not seem to have been pushed as hard as they were on, say, Cherokee plantations. William Quesenbury thus described Lower Creek slavery in 1845,

I have been told that three of their Negroes can perform as much work as one of ours. Their Negroes have to support themselves with clothing and food. To do this they are allowed the Saturday of every week, and after their master's crop is laid by in July, from that time to September, or harvest time.¹⁷⁹

And Nellie Johnson, a former bondswoman of the mixed blood Lower Creek Roly McIntosh, described how the chief's slaves were given patches on which to grow food for themselves and weekends off to tend to them. She further observed,

... The old Chief never bothered the slaves about anything. Every slave can fix up his own cabin any way he wanted to, and pick out a good place with a spring if he can find one.... Old Chief just treat all the Negroes like they were just hired hands and I was a big girl before I knew very much about belonging to him.... He was gone off somewhere a lot of the time, too, and he just trusted the Negroes to look after his farms and stuff...¹⁸⁰

This suggests that Lower Creek slaveholders were a little less concerned with the profit motive and subject to more restraint from the tribe's strong and enduring cultural traditions when dealing with Blacks than their mixed blood Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw neighbours. Again, however, the differences were a matter of degree rather than kind.

Where the difference in kind lay was in the way the fullbloods utilized and treated their slaves. Because of their fundamentally different philosophical position and their lack of interest in the capitalist ethic, Black slavery among the fullbloods never assumed the same connotations that it did among the mixed bloods. It was associated with deference and tribute, and status and leadership — generally chieftainship — rather than with exploitable property and profit. Fullbloods placed few demands upon their Blacks, beyond the annual taxes attached to

aboriginal slavery. Indeed, some seem to have had hardly any use for their slaves at all. Slaves of fullbloods tended to enjoy a great deal of personal freedom and mobility. They were generally allowed to live apart from their owners, accumulate property and conduct their own lives with few restraints. Blacks were the acculturative medium through which fullblood slaveholders became familiar with the alien white culture. As such they gained respect and some assumed positions of importance as interpreters, advisers and intermediaries in transactions. Outstanding service would, on occasion, be rewarded with emancipation or the gift of an Indian spouse and some slaves were even treated as equals by their fullblood owners. Cudjo, a Black slave of Yonguska, chief of the recalcitrant traditionalist Qualla Cherokees, who escaped removal and remained behind in the Smokey Mountain region of North Carolina, encapsulated this attitude when he observed of his owner, "He never allowed himself to be called 'master', for he said Cudjo was his brother, and not his slave. He was a great friend o' mine, and when he died, I felt as I didn't care about living any longer myself...".¹⁸¹

Black slavery among the fullbloods seems to have been little affected by removal. Although Blacks may have become more of a convenience to the Indians, by helping to tame the virgin frontier, the relationship between a fullblood and his slave remained essentially the same. Albert D. Richardson was clearly referring to the fullbloods when he wrote of the Cherokees and Choctaws,

Slavery among them was farcical rather than tragical. The Negroes, far more intelligent than their masters, did much as they pleased, owning money, cattle and ponies; and as they made all purchases for the family, often feathering their own nests.¹⁸²

The fullbloods were unaffected by increasing capitalist pressures, stood to gain little from imposing more severe controls upon their slaves and consequently were much less likely than the mixed bloods to enforce the

Black codes. Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr. has noted that, among the Chickasaws, "Laxity in enforcing the slave code apparently coincided generally with the degree of Indian blood of the master," and among the Creeks, non-enforcement of the codes occurred mostly among the fullblood slaveholders of the more autonomous Upper towns.¹⁸³ The story was the same among the Cherokees. Wiley Britton, basing his observations on familiarity with the predominantly fullblood loyal or pro-Union faction of the tribe during the Civil War wrote,

While slavery had existed for some generations among the Cherokee people, it had never existed in that form which had characterized the institution in the Southern states. It was the concensus of opinion among the White troops who had been with the Indians nearly a year, that slavery of the Negroes among them had been only in name; that there was [sic] no outward signs of servitude in the Negroes towards the Indian master, as was always noticeable in Negroes who had belonged to White masters.

No one pretended that slavery among the Indians entailed hardships upon the Negroes compared to the hardships upon them by slavery among the Whites of the Southern states, and it would have been very difficult to impress a Negro with the idea that there was as great a distance socially between him and an Indian as there was between him and a White man.¹⁸⁴

Thus, the overwhelming weight of evidence supports the contention that, throughout the antebellum period, the fullbloods of the Four tribes practised a primitive and liberal form of slavery which was devoid of the stereotypes associated with the system operated by both southern whites and their mixed blood compatriots. One can only conclude that, where Indian slavery most closely resembled "The Peculiar Institution" it was not really Indian at all.

The differences in the philosophies of the fullbloods and the mixed bloods were reflected in their views on intermarriage with Blacks. Though there seems to have been a remarkably low incidence of Black intermarriage within the Four tribes, what little took place apparently involved fullbloods. Not limited by having to debase Blacks in order to rationalize institutionalized slavery and their position as slaveholders, and appear

civilized in the eyes of southern whites, the fullbloods attached far less stigma to unions with Blacks than the mixed bloods. Like white planters, the mixed bloods were paranoid about potential racial amalgamation. Again, they wrote the laws prohibiting Black intermarriage, were most likely to obey them, and had most to gain from seeing them enforced.

One of the earliest recorded instances of an Indian-Black union in the Four tribes involved Chief Shoe Boot of the Cherokees, who married the slave woman, Lucy. Lucy bore him two children and Shoe Boot petitioned the Council, which was dominated by mixed bloods, to permit their emancipation. The Council granted the request but warned Shoe Boot that such interracial marriages were not desirable.¹⁸⁵ Shortly afterwards, the first of the Cherokee laws prohibiting Indian-Black intermarriage was passed. Two years later, in 1826, John Ridge, a leading mixed blood, expressed his embarrassment that such unions took place, "There are a few instances of African mixture with Cherokee blood and wherever it is seen is considered in the light of misfortune and disgrace....".¹⁸⁶ The 1835 manuscript census listed only 74 mixed Cherokee-Blacks,¹⁸⁷ constituting just 0.45% of the population of Cherokees by blood, but all appear to have been offspring of fullbloods. Significantly, although they owned two thirds of all the tribe's slaves, the 42 wealthiest Cherokee families, studied by McLoughlin and Conser, contained no Black intermixture. As mixed bloods and intermarried whites comprised 95.76%, and fullbloods only 4.24%, of the families' members,¹⁸⁸ the evidence clearly points to a strong negative correlation between white blood and Black intermarriage.

It was a similar story among the Creeks. In 1824, the mixed blood Chilly McIntosh justified the first Lower Creek law to penalize intermarriage by stating that, "... It is a disgrace to our Nation for our people to marry a Negro".¹⁸⁹ Yet Annie H. Abel has written, "... The Creeks had no aversion whatsoever to race mixtures and intermarriage

between Negroes and Indians was rather common",¹⁹⁰ and her ideas have been strongly supported by other historians.¹⁹¹ Once more, closer definition is called for. Littlefield has argued convincingly that there was more racial prejudice among the Creeks than has been generally accepted, but that it was largely confined to the Lower towns during the post-removal period. He concludes that, "Amalgamation appears to have been more common among the Upper than the Lower Creeks".¹⁹² Again it would seem that Black intermarriage was more prevalent in predominantly fullblood communities.

Around 1859, it was commonly reported that the Choctaws had a "decided aversion" to Black intermixture.¹⁹³ This observation, however, probably referred solely to the mixed bloods, with whom contemporaries were far more familiar. Wyatt F. Jeltz, moreover, has suggested that among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, "There was little or no amalgamation of Indians and Negroes",¹⁹⁴ yet has provided no statistics to support this argument, and may again have mistaken prohibitive legislation for actuality. Of one thing we can be certain, of all the mixed bloods in the Four tribes those in the Chickasaw and Choctaw nations were the closest to southern whites and the most vehement in their support of institutionalized slavery and, later, the Confederacy. It would seem only logical to assume, therefore, that, as in the Cherokee and Creek nations, the mixed bloods would be far less likely to intermarry with Blacks than their fullblood compatriots.

Black slavery was at least partially responsible for causing a severe rift between the mixed bloods and the fullbloods which resulted in tribal factionalism, particularly within the Cherokee and Creek tribes. Though the mixed bloods' takeover of tribal affairs was generally smooth and efficient, some fullblood groups greatly resented the usurpation of native customs and, at times, rose in opposition to the accelerated

acculturative process which, of course, included institutionalized slavery. Among the Cherokees, early manifestations of fullblood opposition included the Ghost Dance Movement of 1811-1812 and White Path's Rebellion of 1826-1827, the latter counting some Blacks among its supporters.¹⁹⁵ By the time of removal, the mixed bloods had become associated with the Treaty party and the fullbloods with the National party. Although the tribe was supposedly unified in the Indian Territory, factionalism continued to be a problem. In the late 1850s, the mixed bloods became influenced by increasing pressure from secessionists and formed the Knights of the Golden Circle, later renamed the Southern Rights party, a secret organization pledged to preserve the institution of slavery and support the South. In response, the fullbloods revived the ancient Keetoowah, or Pin, Society which came to meet "among the mountains, connecting business with Ball-playing" and include abolitionism among its principles.¹⁹⁶

Developments were somewhat similar among the Creeks. The traditional rivalry between the Upper and Lower towns became heightened by escalating differences in their racial makeup and levels of acculturation. While the predominantly fullblood Upper Creeks continued to maintain native practices, the mixed blood Lower Creeks became increasingly receptive to southern white influences and institutions. Consequently, marked philosophical and cultural differences came to separate the two groups. Again, the problems were little assuaged by supposed tribal unification in the Indian Territory. The Upper Creeks resented the Lower Creeks' domination of national affairs and remained independent and isolate, while exercising a great deal of local autonomy. Relations between the Upper and Lower towns during the post-removal period tended to be marked by mutual suspicion, intense rivalry and frequent feuds.

These factional divisions would find full expression during the Civil War. While the Choctaw and Chickasaw mixed bloods fully supported

the Confederacy, the fullbloods of the two tribes tended to remain neutral in their remote fastnesses. The Cherokees and Creeks, however, were torn apart by the conflict. Generally speaking, the mixed bloods allied themselves with the Confederacy, while the fullbloods supported the Union. The Civil War, in fact, merely brought to a climax the factional struggles that had prevailed since the mixed bloods had effectively assumed power. The Treaty party, the Knights and the Lower Creeks supported the South; the National party, the Keetoowahs and the Upper Creeks, the North.

The decision of the mixed bloods to support the Confederacy was both logical and foreseeable. Their civilization and institutions were essentially southern and their best interests clearly lay with the more progressive Confederate states. The reasons behind the decision of fullblood slaveholders to support the Union were more complex. Certainly, they did not support the North in order to abolish Black slavery per se. Personalities, individual and group rivalries and jealousies, the contest for leadership, and the simple wish to take opposite sides to the mixed bloods all played important roles, but there was more to it than this. The fullbloods joined the Union not to support the ideals of the North but to oppose the southern white civilization the mixed bloods were incorporating into the tribes. A Confederate victory with mixed blood support would herald continued and accelerated acculturation but a Confederate defeat would hopefully lead to the demise of the mixed bloods and put a halt to the acculturative process. The Civil War thus highlighted an intrinsic irony in the philosophy and approach of the fullbloods: Black slavery was sanctioned as long as it remained primitive and aboriginal but would be opposed if it became institutionalized.

In contrast to the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws, the Seminoles failed to develop a plantation economy or industries before

the Civil War. They also had the lowest incidence of white intermarriage and were the least acculturated of any of the slaveholding tribes. Thus, as there were no mixed blood slaveowners, Seminole slavery never became institutionalized and, during the 1850s, Seminole slaveholders continued to practise the peculiarly liberal, aboriginal, form of Black slavery associated solely with the fullbloods of the Four tribes. Nevertheless, factionalism dogged the Seminoles as it had the Creeks and Cherokees, and the tribe was split by the Civil War. Ethnic background and institutionalized slavery were not the issues this time but personalities, rivalries, ambition and philosophical difference again played decisive roles. There were close parallels between the earlier Wild Cat-Jim Jumper contest and the struggle that developed in the late 1850s between Billy Bowlegs and John Jumper. Essentially, both involved a fight for the leadership between a recalcitrant traditionalist and a progressive for the right to chart the Seminoles' future. Once again, the traditionalists represented the best interests of the Seminole Blacks and most of them would eventually follow Bowlegs to Kansas in order to support the Union and oppose Jumper's more progressive Confederates. It is to these developments that we must next turn our attention.

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65. In the 1867 tribal census, Jones reported 9,450 acres under cultivation and his crops and livestock included 3,000 bales of cotton, 7,500 bushels of corn, 40 bushels of wheat, 50 horses, 60 mules, 2,500 cattle and 400 hogs, "Choctaw Census, 1867," Document 13559, Choctaw Files, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society.
66. Gregg, Josiah, Commerce of the Prairies (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1954; originally published in 2 volumes, New York, H.G. Langley Pub., 1844) p.400.
67. Society of Friends, Some Account of the Conduct of the Religious Society of Friends Towards the Indian Tribes in the Settlement of the Colonies of East and West Jersey and Pennsylvania; with a Brief Narrative of Their Labours for the Civilizing of the Indians from the Time of their Settlement in America to the Year 1843 (London, The Meeting for Sufferings' Aborigines' Committee, 1844) p.200.
68. Doran, Michael F., "Antebellum Cattle Herding in the Indian Territory," The Geographical Review, 66, (1976), 48-58 passim; Durham, Philip and Jones, Everett L., The Negro Cowboys (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1965) p.18.
69. For a good account of the enterprises of the mixed blood Cherokee slaveholders see, Perdue, Slavery and Cherokee Society, pp.96-105.
70. Foreman, History of Oklahoma, pp.54-58; Foreman, Grant, "Salt Works in Early Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 10, No.4, (December 1932), 474-500, pp.485-498.
71. Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma, Vol.1, p.298 n.5.
72. Fort Smith Herald, 18 July 1849.
73. Foreman, Carolyn T., "Early History of Webber's Falls," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 29, No.4, (Winter 1951), 444-483, p.460; Halliburton, Red Over Black, pp.72-73.
74. Hitchcock, Ethan A., Fifty Years in Camp and Field; Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, edited by W.A. Croffut (New York and London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, 1909) pp.139-140.
75. By 1860, John Ross' slaveholdings had increased to 50 Blacks. His brother, Lewis, meanwhile, had reduced his holdings to 57 Blacks, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M653, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, 1438 Rolls, Roll 54, Arkansas - Slave Schedules (Indian Territory) 1860, Cherokee Nation, hereafter cited as M653, Roll 54, followed by specific reference.
76. Eaton, John Ross, pp.164-165.
77. Littlefield, Africans and Creeks, p.111; Meserve, "The McIntoshes," pp.319-320, 323.
78. Foreman, Grant (ed. and annot.), A Traveller in Indian Territory; The Journal of Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Late Major-General in the United States Army (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, The Torch Press, 1930) p.28.

79. A.R.C.I.A. 1857, J.W. Denver to J. Thompson 30 November 1857, pp.6-8; Debo, Angie E., Tulsa: From Creek Town to Oil Capital (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1943) pp.23-25.
80. Information on Benjamin Marshall was derived from, Marshall et al to William Medill 6 April 1848, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M574, Special Files of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1807-1904, 85 rolls, Roll 13, "Seminoles Claims to certain Negroes, 1841-1849," Creek M216-48; M653, Roll 54, Creek Nation; Foreman, Carolyn T., "Marshalltown, Creek Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 32, No.1, (Spring 1954), 52-57, pp.52-53; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.190.
81. The following statistics are based on information found in, U.S. Department of the Interior, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1864) Book 1, p.xv, and, M653, Roll 54, Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.
82. Gibson, Arrell M., Oklahoma; A History of Five Centuries (Norman, Harlow Publishing Co., 1965) pp.113-114.
83. Perdue, Slavery and Cherokee Society, pp.55-57.
84. The various constitutions of the Four tribes can be found in a number of publications but, most conveniently for comparative purposes, they have been printed alongside each other in, Corden, Seth K. and Richards, W.B. (compilers), The Oklahoma Red Book, 2 Volumes (Oklahoma City, Democrat Printing Company, 1912) Vol.1, pp.201-237.
85. Such a man was the mixed blood Choctaw Allen Wright. Wright received an eastern education and graduated with a M.A. degree from Union Theological Seminary in New York City in 1855. Later, he became a mason, a Presbyterian minister, and the husband of an eastern white woman. He was elected to the Choctaw council in 1856 and played a large part in drafting the Doaksville Constitution. Subsequently, he served the Choctaws as a legislator and national treasurer. He was a signatory to the Confederate treaty and served in the Choctaw regiments during the Civil War, Meserve, John B., "Chief Allen Wright," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 19, No.4, (December 1941), 314-321, passim.
86. A good example of how the mixed bloods used the newly-created national governments and enforcement agencies to protect their minority slaveholding interests is provided by the action taken during the Cherokee slave revolt of 1842. On 17 November 1842, Captain John Drew was appointed by the mixed blood dominated council to take command of 100 men and "pursue, arrest and deliver" the runaways. The force was to be paid from the national treasury and an appropriation of \$500 was subsequently raised. See, Laws of the Cherokee Nation; Adopted by the Council at Various Periods, 2 Parts (Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation, Cherokee Advocate Office, 1852) Pt. 2, pp.62-63, 74.
87. McLoughlin and Conser, "Cherokees in Transition," p.698.
88. Debo, Choctaw Republic, pp.42-45, 60-65; Foreman, History of Oklahoma, p.35.

89. Gibson, The Chickasaws, pp.101 et seq., 204; "Review of Chickasaw Education Before the Civil War," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 34, No.4, (Winter 1956), 486-490, passim; Wright, Guide, p.91.
90. For a book-length history of this institution see, Walker, Robert S., Torchlights to the Cherokees: The Brainerd Mission (New York, Macmillan Co., 1931).
91. A.R.C.I.A. 1845, No.16, P.M. Butler to Armstrong n.d., pp.509-510; A.R.C.I.A. 1858, No.44, H.D. Reese to George Butler 11 September 1858, pp.142-143; A.R.C.I.A. 1859, No.54, Reese to Butler 30 August 1859, pp.177-178; Bass, Altha L. (Bierbower), Cherokee Messenger (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1936) p.300; Holland, Reid A., "Life in the Cherokee Nation, 1855-1860," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 49, No.3, (Fall 1971), 284-301, p.293; Knight, Oliver, "Cherokee Society under the Stress of Removal, 1820-1846," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 32, No.4, (Winter 1954), 414-428, p.416; Woodward, The Cherokees, p.252; Wright, Guide, pp.62, 67.
92. Holland, "Cherokee Nation," p.294.
93. Littlefield, Africans and Creeks, pp.116-120, 140 et seq.
94. A.R.C.I.A. 1858, No.45, W.H. Garrett to Elias Rector 14 September 1858, pp.145-146.
95. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Vol.2, pp.759-760 Articles 6-7; Wright, Guide, p.137.
96. Wardell, Morris L., A Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907 (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), p.4; Wright, Guide, p.67.
97. As usual, the Creeks were the last of the Four tribes to accept the alien institution and the nation's first newspaper, The Indian Journal, published at Muskogee, did not make its debut until 1877. Information on tribal newspapers was taken primarily from, Foreman, Carolyn T., Oklahoma Imprints 1835-1907; A History of Printing in Oklahoma before Statehood (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1936) pp.xiv-xvi, 76-85, 115, 130-133, 151-152, 179-185.
98. Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws (Tishomingo City, Chickasaw Nation, E.J. Johnson publisher, 1860) p.111.
99. "Code of Laws of the Creek Indians, 12 June 1818," National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy M271, Letters Received by the Office of the Secretary of War Relating to Indian Affairs, 1800-1823, 4 Rolls, Roll 2, Frame 771; Waring, Antonio J. (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, University of Georgia Libraries Miscellaneous Publications No.1 (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1960) p.17.
100. Debo, Road to Disappearance, pp.126-127; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, pp.213-214; Schoolcraft, Henry R., Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States; Collected and Prepared Under the Direction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs per act of Congress of March 3d, 1847, 6 Volumes (Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo Pubs., 1851-1857) Vol.1, p.277.

101. Quoted in, Davis, "Slavery in the Cherokee Nation," p.1067.
102. Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, pp.213-214.
103. Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, pp.125-126.
104. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.1, pp.24-25, 174; Pt.2, pp.17-18, 37, 44, 221-222.
105. Ibid., Pt.1, pp.242-243; Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation (St. Louis, R. and T.A. Ennis Pubs., 1875) p.11.
106. "Laws of the Creek Nation," in "Creek-Laws" Manuscript File, Grant Foreman Collection, Box 6, 83-229, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Law 111.
107. Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation (Doaksville, Choctaw Nation, 1852) p.21, hereafter cited as Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation; Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation: together with the Treaties of 1855, 1865 and 1866 (New York, Wm. P. Lyon and Son Printers and Pubs., 1869) p.19, hereafter cited as, Laws of the Choctaw Nation with Treaties; Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, pp.80-81, 111.
108. Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation, p.11; Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.1, pp.242-243.
109. Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.21; Laws of the Choctaw Nation with Treaties, p.19; Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, p.81.
110. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.1, pp.8-9, 25; Pt.2, p.212.
111. Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, pp.159-160.
112. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Law 48; second series, beg. p.14, Law 112; Waring (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, p.23.
113. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.1, pp.39, 174; Pt.2, p.44.
114. Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.20.
115. Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, p.39.
116. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Laws 73-74; Waring (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, p.21.
117. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, p.44.
118. Laws of the Choctaw Nation with Treaties, p.88.
119. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Laws 25-28.
120. Cf. for example, Cherokee laws of 28 September 1838, 10 November 1843 and 10 November 1846 legalizing intermarriage with whites, Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, pp.32-33, 92-94, 142.
121. Ibid., Pt.1, p.38; Pt.2, p.19.

122. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Laws 30-31; Littlefield, Africans and Creeks, pp.145-146; Waring (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, pp.20-21.
123. Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.20.
124. Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, p.96.
125. Ibid., pp.57-58; Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.20.
126. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, pp.53-54.
127. Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.215; "Laws of the Creek Nation," Law 116.
128. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, pp.53-54.
129. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Laws 112-115, 118-119; second series, Laws 110-111, 113-114.
130. Ibid., Laws 32-33, 37; second series, Laws 115-116.
131. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, p.139.
132. Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.20; Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, p.80; Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.83; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma, Volume 1, p.300 n.12.
133. Debo, Road to Disappearance, p.126; Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Pt.2, pp.55-56, 173-174; Littlefield, Daniel F. Jr., The Cherokee Freedmen: From Emancipation to American Citizenship (Westport, Connecticut and London, Greenwood Press, 1978), p.9.
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135. "Laws of the Creek Nation," Law 49; Sameth, Sigmund, "Creek Negroes: A Study of Race Relations" (M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1940) p.26; Waring (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, p.21.
136. Bonnifield, "Choctaw Nation," p.391; Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation, p.45; Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, pp.22-23; Jeltz, "Relations," pp.31-32.
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151. Halliburton, "Origins," p.496.
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153. Ibid., pp.x, 70-72, 140-144.
154. Halliburton, "Black Slave Control," p.26.
155. Halliburton, Red Over Black, p.36.
156. Levesque, "Review of Red Over Black," p.121.
157. See note 149, above.
158. Perdue, Slavery and Cherokee Society, pp.57-58.
159. Perdue, "African Colonization," pp.324-326; Perdue, "Plantation Slavery," pp.119-120.
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161. Quoted in, Perdue, "African Colonization," p.325.

162. Perdue, Slavery and Cherokee Society, p.98.
163. Billington, Monroe, "Black Slavery in Indian Territory: The Ex-Slave Narratives," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 60, No.1, (Spring 1982), 56-65, p.64.
164. Ibid., p.60.
165. "Indian Pioneer Papers," 116 Volumes, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society.
166. The "Ex-Slave Narratives" are housed in the Rare Book Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Recently, however, they have appeared in published form in, Rawick, George P. (ed.), The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography, 31 Volumes (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1972-1977). Volumes 7 and 12 contain the narratives of Blacks who were formerly slaves in the Indian Territory. A number of the most interesting of these have been reproduced in, Teall, Kaye M., Black History in Oklahoma: A Resource Book (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma City Public Schools—Title III, ESEA, 1971) pp.32-37.
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168. Foreman (ed.), Traveller in Indian Territory, p.187.
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170. Walker, Torchlights to the Cherokees, pp.86-87.
171. This was particularly true among the Creeks. See, for example, Foreman (ed.), Traveller in Indian Territory, p.110; Loomis, A.W., Scenes in the Indian Country (Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1859) p.110; McCoy, Isaac, History of Baptist Indian Missions (Washington, D.C., W.M. Morrison; New York, H. and S. Raynor, 1840) pp.453-454; Society of Friends, Some Account, pp.202-203.
172. Foreman, Carolyn T., "Miss Sophia Sawyer and her School," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 32, No.4, (Winter 1954), 395-413, pp.397-398.
173. Quoted in, Teall, Black History in Oklahoma, pp.36-37.
174. Whipple, Charles K., Relations of the American Board of Commissioners For Foreign Missions to Slavery (Boston, R.F. Wallcut Pub., 1861) pp.88-89. This has been reproduced in New York by the Negro Universities Press, 1969.
175. Gabriel, Elias Boudinot, p.25.
176. Rawick, American Slave, Vol.7, p.348; Vol.12, p.112.
177. One of the few historians not taking this approach is Janet Halliburton, who writes,
... The evidence seems to indicate that the Creeks were no less demanding of their slaves than were white masters.... Slavery among the Lower Creeks—those who usually used the plantation system—was almost exactly the same as the white plantation owner's system.
Halliburton, "Black Slavery in the Creek Nation," p.309.

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179. Quoted in, Foreman, Five Civilized Tribes, p.174.
180. Quoted in, Teall, Black History in Oklahoma, p.37.
181. Lanman, Charles, Adventures in the Wilds of the United States and British American Provinces, 2 Volumes (Philadelphia, J.W. Moore, 1856) Vol.1, pp.420-421.
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183. Littlefield, Chickasaw Freedmen, p.16; Littlefield, Africans and Creeks, pp.151, 154.
184. Britton, Wiley, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War (Kansas City, Franklin Hudson Pub. Co., 1922) pp.194-195.
185. Malone, Henry T., Cherokees of the Old South: A People in Transition (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1956) p.142.
186. Sturtevant (ed.), "John Ridge," p.81.
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189. Waring (ed.), Laws of the Creek Nation, pp.20-21.
190. Abel, Annie H., The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist: An Omitted Chapter in the Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy (Cleveland, Arthur H. Clark Co., 1915) p.23n.14.
191. See, for example, Debo, Road to Disappearance, p.116; Jeltz, "Relations," p.30; Porter, Kenneth W., The Negro on the Frontier (New York, New York Times, Arno Press, 1971) p.44.
192. Littlefield, Africans and Creeks, pp.88, 145.
193. Abel, Slaveholder and Secessionist, p.20n.
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195. McLoughlin, William G., "Cherokee Anti-Mission Sentiment, 1824-1828," Ethnohistory, 21, No.4, (Fall 1974) 361-370, passim, but especially pp.365-366.
196. E.H. Carruth to "Sir" 11 July 1861. See also, A.B. Greenwood to Elias Rector 4 June 1860 and Albert Pike to D.N. Cooley 17 February 1866, all quoted in, Abel, Slaveholder and Secessionist, pp.84-86n.122, 291-292, 134-140n.228 respectively. See also pertinent papers and correspondence on pp.47-48 and 293-294.