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An Imperial Frame of Mind

Imperialist and Racialist Attitudes
in the British Periodical Press 1851-1914

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I have been reading one of those prognostic articles on international politics which every now and then appear in the reviews. Why I should so waste my time it would be hard to say; I suppose the fascination of disgust and fear gets the better of me in a moment's idleness. The writer, who is horribly perspicacious and vigorous, demonstrates the certainty of a great European war, and regards it with the peculiar satisfaction excited by such things in a certain order of mind. His phrases about "dire calamity", and so on, mean nothing; the whole tenor of his writing proves that he represents, and consciously, one of the forces which go to bring war about; his part in the business is a fluent irresponsibility, which casts scorn on all who reluct at the "inevitable". Persistent prophecy is a familiar way of assuring the event.

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Study of Britain's periodical press from 1851 to 1914 reveals a widespread and continuous interest in imperial affairs. Expectations of economic reward from colonial ventures were accompanied by the desire to prevent foreign powers extending their territorial control; and outbursts of aggressive patriotism helped to justify "little wars" on the frontiers of Britain's own possessions. In addition a racial hierarchy was created to reinforce the position of the Anglo-Saxon as inherently supreme; while humanitarian motives were often expounded as rationalisations for Britain's assumption of the burden of empire.

Especially noticeable is the relationship of imperial attitudes to European and domestic concerns. Conflicts in China, India and Africa were represented as struggles between European nations, colonies being seen as diplomatic bargaining counters for civilised nations to play with. Imperial issues were also translated into domestic party political disputes, and lower races found ready comparison with the working class at home. Meanwhile the pressure from organised trade unions, militant feminism and Irish independence-seeking, coupled with threats from foreign competitiveness and increased military strength, especially on the part of Germany, gave empire the appearance of providing a solution to social and economic problems within Britain. As territory became exhausted, the focus of attention then shifted from the furthest-flung principalities back towards Europe, and tensions in the colonies gave way to those within Europe and Britain themselves.

It is impossible to estimate the influence of the periodical press upon governing decisions, despite the strong links between press and politicians; but it is clear that for the period in question both learned journal and self-helping, free-trading middle class were in the ascendancy. Hence this press represents the largely unchronicled views of an elite in its heyday, revealing an overwhelming and unmistakable imperial framework of reference, strongly motivated by Euro-, and Anglo-, centric considerations. The final resolution of these considerations, both domestic and imperial, was a war to end all wars. Such a resolution, however, also spelt the death-knell for both the unchallenged middle class and their learned press.

Abbreviations

ANG	<u>Army and Navy Gazette</u>
A-S R	<u>Anglo-Saxon Review</u>
ATYR	<u>All The Year Round</u>
BF	<u>British Friend</u>
BM	<u>Blackwood's Magazine</u>
Br QR	<u>British Quarterly Review</u>
BW	<u>British Workman</u>
BWwm	<u>British Workwoman</u>
C and A	<u>Cottager and Artisan</u>
CJ	<u>Chambers' Journal</u>
CM	<u>Cornhill Magazine</u>
CMI	<u>Church Missionary Intelligencer</u>
CR	<u>Contemporary Review</u>
Ecc R	<u>Ecclesiastical Review</u>
ECJ	<u>Eliza Cook's Journal</u>
Econ	<u>Economist</u>
Ec R	<u>Eclectic Review</u>
ER	<u>Edinburgh Review</u>
FH	<u>Family Herald</u>
FM	<u>Fraser's Magazine</u>
FR	<u>Fortnightly Review</u>
FV	<u>Friendly Visitor</u>
HM	<u>Harpers' Magazine</u>
HW	<u>Household Words</u>
ILN	<u>Illustrated London News</u>
LH	<u>Leisure Hour</u>
LL	<u>Labour Leader</u>
MM	<u>Macmillan's Magazine</u>
19C	<u>Nineteenth Century</u>
NLJ	<u>Navy League Journal</u>
NR	<u>National Review</u>
PMG	<u>Pall Mall Gazette</u>
QR	<u>Quarterly Review</u>
RM	<u>Reynolds' Miscellany</u>
SM	<u>Strand Magazine</u>
Spect	<u>Spectator</u>
SR	<u>Saturday Review</u>
St JG	<u>St James' Gazette</u>
TB	<u>True Briton</u>
VF	<u>Vanity Fair</u>
WG	<u>Westminster Gazette</u>
WR	<u>Westminster Review</u>

Part One - Introductory

The golden age of mid-Victorian Britain was ushered in through the glass-framed splendour of the Crystal Palace Exhibition to shine over an empire on which the sun never set. At the same time the golden age of the unashamed middle class was consolidated on the three pillars of knowledge, wealth and power - through the ending of the stamp tax on newspapers, through the repeal of restrictions on trade, and through the advancement of the Great Liberal Party, without as yet the disconcerting pressure of too many working class voters.¹ Free market forces predominated.

However, the failure of Chartism was not the end of the story for the proletariat, any more than free trade could forever exclude those without the initial opportunities and resources to compete in the world's markets. Increasingly the middle class hegemony became threatened by the rise of socialism and organised trades unions, while the wealth which had been used as concessions to buy off the skilled workers began inexorably to diminish.² As Britain failed to compete with her neighbours, she retreated into her colonies, often formally annexing others on the way, and the "new imperialism" has been seen as the product of this defensive economic approach.³ Meanwhile, the domestic pressures from below forced a reaction of aggressive, bellicose patriotism, which sought to subordinate social reform and class issues to more immediately unifying concerns of the "national interest". Jingoism, it will thus be argued, was a defensive diversion from internal affairs, proclaiming Britain's greatness loud and clear to all around, but masking uncertainties of equal proportions nearer to home.⁴

Finally, as territory became exhausted, and as the struggles of trades unions, women and the Irish approached climax, the imperial nations of Europe deployed themselves in a war to end all wars.⁵ This war, whether interpreted as a fresh division of colonies, or a solution to domestic problems,⁶ provides in hindsight a fitting conclusion to all the preceding years of frenzied arms-gathering and internecine denunciations. Whether a cause of subsequent social change, or more a cathartic catalyst without which the change could not have worked its way through the cautious constitution, the war saw the end of one world and the start of another.

The focus of attention for many recent imperial historians has been the circumstances of colonial territories themselves, study of the periphery being an undoubtedly healthy corrective to earlier purely Euro - or Anglo - centric approaches.⁷ However, to emphasise the actual colonial conditions, at the expense of the less-informed preconceptions of the governing officials who took the decisions, is to assume the knowledge of hindsight in the minds of our predecessors. It can also take little note of the reasons why individual businesses, explorers and missionaries invested their time and money abroad, and what they expected to gain. By studying the periodical press, on the other hand, it can be argued that we obtain a unique view of the expectations and preconceptions, and thus see how domestic motivations and uncertainties were the strongest characteristics of most imperial attitudes of the time. If Europe was pulled by the magnetism of the periphery, the periodical press suggests it was a Europe willing to be pulled.

Imperialism, however, even in this golden age, was never one single simple phenomenon. Chauvinism, insularity, jingoism, ethnocentrism, racism and racialism, all intermingled with the straightforward interest in the expansion of formal empire. Empire itself was not always clearly defined.

Annexations - often a case of pushing forward and flying a flag - were less real than the economic penetration to a deeper degree which existed in many informal colonies. At the same time, any empire governed by a handful of civil servants scattered throughout the globe was always something of a chimera. Yet the outspoken attitudes towards empire, in all its forms, were a characteristic of the periodical press to an extent that demands attention.

It was in the years of Victoria and Edward that the periodical press experienced its own golden age.⁸ 554 periodicals were listed in the Newspaper Press Directory in 1865,⁹ whilst between 100 and 170 new magazines appeared every decade from 1830 to 1880, the peak being with the 1860s and 70s.¹⁰ Most of these periodicals, moreover, were keen to be described as independent from party politics,¹¹ as freely expressing "any opinions adverse to the authorities",¹² or, in one case, "Liberal in its general tone; in Politics, Neutral".¹³ The periodicals wanted to establish themselves as the representatives of public opinion, and although there were some doubts expressed as to the financial realities of newspaper life,¹⁴ the general drift of journalist opinion was that the credibility of the press and the best interests of the country were furthered by the "natural position of complete independency".¹⁵ Furthermore, despite the new journalism, power was believed to rest firmly in the hands of the old "quality" papers.¹⁶

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Yet many of these views ignored the fact that the periodicals were, in essence, a record of the opinions of an educated elite involved in government, and of the assumptions on which that elite worked. Many journalists had been politicians, and many more regarded themselves as political animals with political functions, using newspapers as a way of exercising political influence and power.¹⁷ More than anything, that influence was achieved by periodicals gaining their writers access to the political elite whose decisions they intended to shape. As Kennedy-Jones put it:

"Instead of giving expression to the mandate of the people, it (the press) voices the cajolery of the various leaders" 18

Or, as a more recent writer declared,

"The humbug and hypocrisy of the press begin only when newspapers pretend to be "impartial" or "servants of the people". And this only becomes dangerous as well as laughable when the public is fool enough to believe it." 19

For the educated middle class, however, there was a need to believe it. As political and economic security was threatened there was still greater reliance on those organs of the press which reflected their concerns. The radicalism of earlier generations, before social and economic status had been achieved, found itself increasingly isolated from the mainstream of reformist emphasis. Anti-aristocratic bias turned into anti-trade union and anti-socialist bias. The internationalist perspective of the early radical press, with reports of working class struggles abroad, dissolved into nationalism and imperialism - the coverage of foreign affairs replacing symbols of class conflict with new affectual symbols of membership of a superior race and world power.²⁰ Indeed, the appearance of socialism in the 1880s did not make the intelligentsia independent, but rather made them move closer to the status quo, in order to defend the system against the threat of socialism. Hence the imperial context provided by the periodicals acted as a countervailing reassurance of stability, in a world of change.

The periodicals therefore contain a rich mine of information on the deepest thoughts and fears of the educated elite and show how it accommodated itself to the social system. The intelligentsia never developed a revolutionary ideology, though it often saw itself standing above the class struggle and outside the party system.²¹ Rather it was in the monthly and quarterly reviews, with their long, reflective, essay-length articles, that the newly economically independent professional middle class found its voice. An aristocracy of intellect replaced the aristocracy of birth, and with such contributors as Gladstone and Morley, sustained argument seemed an effective substitute for platform propaganda.

It was, moreover, little wonder that as much of the Liberal party establishment moved towards liberal imperialism, or even unionism, the periodical press should do likewise. The parallels between the press, the Liberal party, and the middle class itself were pronounced.²² It was almost as if there was a corporate failure of nerve in the face of imperial expansion and domestic demands for social reform - the contention here being that the two were inextricably connected. For by 1914 the educated classes' near monopoly of public opinion had been broken by the extension of the franchise, the growth of trades unions, the start of mass elementary education, and the consequent growth of new forms of popular journalism. New strident voices now claimed to represent public opinion - voices dangerous to the reviews and the serious political press. After the war the reputation of the press declined. The mass press and its mass readership did not correspond to the class press and its class readership - the Quarterly Review was not comparable with the Sunday Express. For the new readers were not politically motivated in the way that the old ones had been; and even the older "class" papers found that the political world had changed for the worse.²³

But for the era between Crystal Palace and Sarajevo, the periodical press represented the governing class opinions in a way unmatched before or since. Crudely speaking, the years from the fall of Chartism to the start of hostilities in 1914 were the years of the free-trading, self-helping middle class; after the mid-century gains wrested from the aristocracy through the fear of revolution, but before the rise of the enfranchised basically-educated proletariat of the twentieth century. And it was the periodical press which, in these years, so closely mirrored the developments of this thinking, governing society, the very assumptions on which it was founded, and the imperial parameters within which it operated.

Initially the periodical press was most obviously represented by the three major quarterlies - the Edinburgh Review, the Westminster Review, and the Quarterly Review itself.²⁴ All-powerful editors, employing hard-hitting anonymous review articles, well suited the new, educated middle class who were eager for cultural guidelines. Minor treatises in political theory, such as those of Bagehot, Morley and Maine, appealed to them more than the leading article in the daily newspapers.²⁵ However, these weighty quarterlies were increasingly eclipsed by the progressive monthly journals. Bagehot wrote scathingly of the Edinburgh Review's "essay-like review" which suited the "mass of sensible persons" who preferred their literature in "morsels, as they take sandwiches on a journey".²⁶ The arrogance and brutality of earlier days was felt to have been softened.²⁷

In the case of the Edinburgh Review itself, the death of Napier in 1847, the shift of editorial headquarters to London, and the end of Macaulay's writings in 1844, signalled a definite setting-in of gravity.²⁸ Less politics, fewer "causes", and more biography were hallmarks of its longest serving editor, Henry Reeve, who presided over its fortunes from 1855 until 1895. Reeve was also a leader writer for the Times, owing much to the patronage of Charles Greville,²⁹ and saw Whig principles as being the "true centre of gravity" of the Liberal party. A friend of de Tocqueville, he had even less sympathy for democracy, and the Edinburgh espoused Liberal Unionism after the Home Rule split.³⁰ Reeve was succeeded by Arthur Elliott, the second son of the Earl of Minto, and one of the first Liberal MPs to declare for unionism. As a passionate free trader who was also already a leading political writer under Reeve's editorship, Elliott provided the finishing touches of the transition from anti-radicalism to anti-socialism.³¹

The Quarterly Review went through a similar pattern of development, despite having started from a more overtly Tory standpoint. The age of Croker and Lockhart - whose domineering Toryism had characterised the earlier years of the journal - was over by the late 1860s, and Dr William Smith, the well-known lexicographer, became editor in 1867.³² His stay was also a long one, and he was not succeeded until 1894 when Rowland Prothero (later Lord Ernle) took over the reins. (He was then followed by his brother George, from 1899-1922.)³³ Increasingly, however, the full scope allowed to free-lance writers, and the lack of personal editorial imprint on the paper, meant that conservative politicians and intellectuals held sway. Salisbury wrote 33

articles for the Quarterly between 1860 and 1883,³⁴ while Louis Jennings wrote 23 articles in the years 1868-92. Orthodox economics were represented by four John Wilson contributions in the 1870s, and 12 Thomas Mackay pieces in the 1890s and 1900s.³⁵

Much of the writing treated radicalism as a foreign import, such as from France, and suggested that radical ideas would lead Britain along the same road of instability as her cross-channel neighbour.³⁶ Radicalism was seen to stem from envy, and to be held only by the "unnaturalised, un-English, alien section" of the middle class.³⁷ In short, it was a middle class product from that element of the middle class who had failed to be incorporated in the system. The importance, then, to the conservative journals was to stop intellectuals deserting their ranks; the battle being fought over radicalism because socialism was seen as merely a logical extension of radicalism. The conservatives thought that socialism could not gather strength without those intellectuals, and rooted their arguments in the earlier, mid-century framework of values.

However, if the conservative quarterlies moved to a position of entrenchment, the radical quarterly was not far behind. The Westminster Review, founded by the Philosophical Radicals,³⁸ and leaning heavily on contributions from J.S.Mill, moved apparently in two different directions at once. In 1886 it became a monthly journal, and abandoned its anonymity of authors, once more turning to social reform and issues such as the abolition of the land

monopoly and workers' co-operatives. But at the same time its style was firmly based in the old mid-century concerns, very much in J.S. Mill vein, and in no way reflecting the new socialist up-turn. (This was doubly ironic, given Mill's own later moves towards socialism.) In consequence, as the Westminster remained embedded in old, radical traditions, it found itself increasingly isolated from the main thrust of the new left. Its stance against the aristocracy became more and more irrelevant, and all that survived underneath the veneer was an attitude antipathetic to both trade unionism and socialism. As cumulative "little wars" wore down the reformers' resistance, the journals resembled more and more closely the newer moderate liberal monthlies, if not the conservative papers themselves.

In terms of circulation, estimates suggest that the Westminster averaged 4000 sales per edition between 1860 and 1870, while the Edinburgh was around 7000. The Quarterly, if its higher rates for advertisements are anything to go by, probably touched the 8000 figure.³⁹ All three were priced at 6 shillings, and were available through Mudies, as were the majority of the periodicals under consideration.

This then compares with the 3000 of the Fortnightly Review in 1865 (falling to 1400 in 1867 and rising to a steadier 2500 by 1873), the 4000 of the Contemporary Review in 1870, and the eventual peak of 10,000 by the Nineteenth Century towards the end of Victoria's reign.⁴⁰ If the circulations were not markedly different - and to estimate the overall readership is next to impossible - there is no doubt that the monthlies were in a general preponderance, even if only because of their variety and their appearance three times as often. Having said that, it is quite clear that subscribers adhered to quarterlies as well as monthlies, and therefore a large number of intellectual journals were being ingested by a relatively smaller group of readers. And, as Ellegard points out, while the quarterlies' circulation was fairly stable, that of the monthlies fluctuated with respect to whatever novel was being serialised therein.⁴¹

Chronologically speaking, the Fortnightly Review was the trend-setter amongst the second batch of learned periodicals. Based on two principles, the signed article and the independence from political party, it quickly acquired the reputation of a partisan review.⁴² Trollope's description of "freedom of speech combined with personal responsibility; let any man who has a thing to say, and knows how to say it, speak freely" was quickly owned by him to be "altogether impracticable".

"It was as though a gentleman should go into the House of Commons determined to serve no Party. Such gentlemen have gone into the House but they have not served their country very much. Liberalism, free-thinking and open enquiry will never object to appear in company with their opposites because they have the conceit to think they can quell those opposites; but the opposites will not appear in conjunction with liberalism, free-thinking and open enquiry. As a natural consequence, our new publication became an organ of liberalism, free-thinking and open enquiry which has asserted for itself a position in our periodical literature which is well understood and highly respected" 43

This was hardly surprising, given Lewes' editorship until 1866, followed by Morley until 1883.⁴⁴ In addition the paper boasted a large number of rationalist and Comtist contributions, combined with many articles on women and labour.⁴⁵ The initial financial difficulty was soon overcome by Morley's editorial skill, and the paper seemed well-established as the major voice of intellectual radicalism.

However, Morley's reign was a false dawn. Later editors - T.H.S.Escott until 1886, Frank Harris until 1894, and W.L.Courtney until 1917 - allowed the journal to resemble other liberal monthlies of the period. Under Harris, and the long-suffering sub-editor John Verschoyle, who had to do much of the real work, literature replaced current social issues; while Courtney

has been described as a "steadying influence" on the paper.⁴⁶ The most frequent contributors after 1894 were in fact opponents of socialism and reform, such as A.A.Baumann, J.A.R.Marriott, J.B.Crozier and W.S.Lilly. Thus once more the promise of a periodical evaporated under the pressure of events. Rather than risk espousal of the new forces in society, the journal resorted to a more non-political approach, which, unsurprisingly, gave dominance to the conservative writers' contributions. The "balance" which Trollope had declared impracticable forty years earlier had manifest itself in the same way - but from the opposite side.

Several imitators were prompted by the emergence of the Fortnightly. The Contemporary Review and the Nineteenth Century⁴⁷ both adopted the signed article, and it is in their pages that the reaction of liberal intellectuals to the twin threats of socialism and imperialism can be charted. The first two editors of the Contemporary were Henry Alford, Dean of Canterbury, and James Knowles, who were mainly concerned with religion and literature. But under the editorship of Percy Bunting (1882-1911), it became an organ of moderate social reform. Bunting was a prominent Methodist and Gladstonian

Liberal, one of the few Liberal intellectuals who did not break with Gladstone over home rule, and so the Contemporary became, unlike all the others, more rather than less sympathetic to social reform in the three decades before the First War. It must be said that it was social reform rather than the theoretical basis of socialism which was advanced, in such articles as those of Hobson and Massingham; and this earned the description of "semi-socialist liberalism" from W.T.Stead.⁴⁸

The Nineteenth Century started under James Knowles - as editor and proprietor - and its immediate success was continued by him until 1908.⁴⁹ Universally praised for his editorial skill and the business advantage to which he turned the signatories of the journals' articles, Knowles based the Nineteenth Century on the premises of the "Metaphysical Society". Indeed, many of this society's members became contributors, and Knowles was quick to see the commercial attraction of well-known academic and political people signing their names in his paper. He never allowed it to become a party organ - his only firm stance ever being on opposition to the Channel Tunnel - and although a moderate Unionist himself, he allowed articles on home rule, on working class conditions and on the trade unions. Hence Joseph Arch, George Potter, Hyndman, Kropotkin, Champion, John Burns, Keir Hardie and Webb were all contributors between 1880 and 1900.

The overall balance was, however, towards moderate liberalism. Gladstone contributed 53 articles, the Duke of Argyll 20, in the years 1877-1900. Liberal reformers such as Samuel Barnett and Frederic Harrison were easily matched by the Tory W.H.Mallock and T.E.Kebbel. The Nineteenth Century under Knowles was indeed a debating society in print, with big names displayed on the cover.⁵⁰ As in an Oxford debating society, intellectual dissent was tolerated, even encouraged, in the sure knowledge that the social homogeneity of the antagonists was not threatened.

The latest of the new monthlies was the National Review.⁵¹ Like most of its rivals, it claimed not to be a party organ; but Alfred Austin, its first editor, signed its first article with the pseudonym "Thomas Tantiy" (meaning "Tory"), and Salisbury and Balfour were at the launching dinner of the new journal.⁵² Austin acknowledged that conservatives had fallen behind in the realm of ideas, and he saw the National Review as a way to redress the balance. As he said in the first issue, conservatives should have "above all, no programme".⁵³ What was important was the reform of character, not social reform. In another early article Austin suggested that "the principal cause of social discontent is not so much the poverty of the poor as the extraordinary and ever-waxing splendour and ostentation of the rich."⁵⁴ For conservatives it was necessary to identify with the older aristocratic virtues, not with the party of capital. However, when Leo Maxse succeeded to the editor's chair in 1893, social issues were submerged under a concentration of foreign policy and the German threat. In a way the oldest virtue of all - diversion from home problems - solved the intellectual identity crisis at a stroke.

Although the monthly and quarterly learned journals are the primary consideration of this research, some recourse has been made to their weekly or daily counterparts. The Saturday Review, founded by the wealthy Peelite conservative Beresford Hope in 1855 with the aim of making it "the mouthpiece of the middle, moderate opinions of thoughtful and educated society", impinges on the periodical world, if only because its writers included Morley, Cotter Morrison, Leslie and Sir Fitzjames Stephen, Vernon Harcourt (later Sir William), Goldwin Smith and Henry Maine, not to mention Freeman's 700 articles and the contributions of J.R.Green.⁵⁵

Similarly, the three evening gazettes - Pall Mall, Westminster and St James' overlap with the periodical press by virtue of the common personnel. In the case of the Pall Mall, Morley was the editor from 1880 to 1883, when he was followed by Stead, who started the use of bold headings and cross heads, unlike the Times-dominated uniformity of tone. The staid establishment of journalism, where the Quarterly Review, for example, made cheques out for privacy not to names but to numbers, was shocked by Stead's campaign to protect girls and young women. The campaign changed the law and raised the Pall Mall's circulation by 50%; although proprietor Henry Yates Thompson cut Stead's salary as a consequence.⁵⁶ But out of all this came Stead's venture to start the Review of Reviews, a periodical which carried snippets of all the other periodicals, and which may have doubled the readership of (parts of) the original papers. Unsurprisingly, the backer for this was Newnes of Tit-bits fame and fortune, with C.A.Pearson as business manager; and 60,000 were sold on the first day of publication.⁵⁷ The appeal "To All English-Speaking Folk" touched a chord throughout the empire; although the review declined after Stead's death on the Titanic in 1912.

The main concern of this study is, however, the periodical rather than the newspaper.⁵⁸ It is the philosophy, the climate of opinion and framework of attitudes, which arguably tell us more about the educated elite of Victorian and Edwardian Britain than might be gleaned from the daily coverage of the news of events. Thus apart from the intellectual papers, it is worth considering the more light-hearted and amusing periodicals, where the built-in assumptions of an imperial nation did not have to be justified in such reasoned terms.

In this category we can include Frasers Magazine⁵⁹, started by William Maginn and named after the coincidental surnames of his friend (Hugh) and his publisher (James), whose longest serving editor was J.A.Froude (1860-74). Although this editorial weight would suggest a position higher up the intellectual ladder, the paper was less prestigious than either the old quarterlies or the new monthly rivals. Blackwood's Magazine⁶⁰ was in the same position, or possibly slightly higher in estimation, partly owing to its longer history. Both these two sold for 2 shillings and 6 pence, and their estimated 1860 circulations of 3000 and 10,000 declined to 6000 and 7000 respectively by 1870,⁶¹ Frasers finally going out of print in 1882.

One ready method of dividing journals is whether or not they carried serialisations of novels. Generally it was the higher quality papers which did not go in for this kind of attracting custom, while the others could almost be ranked according to which novels were chosen to adorn their pages. Macmillan's Magazine, at 1/- a copy, is a good example of the upper end of the serialising market, carrying the works of Hardy and James. Although edited by Morley 1883-5, it ceased to be political when he gave it up. A circulation of 20,000 in the early 1860s was levelling out at 8000 by 1870.⁶² The Cornhill Magazine was even more obviously slanted towards the literary side of society,⁶³ while papers such as Newnes' Strand Magazine were heavily influenced by the American examples of Harpers and Scribners.⁶⁴

Meanwhile there were a number of popular weekly papers which were by nature more periodical than topical. Again the distinctions are arbitrary, but it would surely be unrepresentative to write about Victorian periodicals without including Eliza Cook's Journal, Household Words and the subsequent All the Year Round, Chambers' Journal, Vanity Fair, Punch, the Illustrated London News, and Reynolds' Miscellany. These were the sort of papers which their proprietors may have thought would appeal to the masses, and which their editors may have thought would help to educate the working class out of the slums, but which were in practice often read by the masters rather than their servants. It would not be unfair to bracket them loosely with the Sunday papers which were coming into their own, except that papers such as Reynolds' Weekly Newspaper and Lloyds Weekly News were considerably more popular.⁶⁵ The reason for this, however, lay partly in the difference between "weekly" and "Sunday". As one description of the News of the World put it:

"the manner in which it is arranged adapts it for the perusal of a class of readers who, though respectable, may be supposed - through incessant occupation in the week - not to have had much opportunity before the Saturday evening for newspaper reading." 66

Yet in varying degrees - and varying often according to their radicalism - the lighter weekly and Sunday papers owed their popularity to the synthesis of the old non-political traditions of the chap-book and last dying speech and the political radicalism of the unstamped Chartist press.⁶⁷ At least one writer in 1904 still thought the weekly newspaper had the "widest influence on the lives of artisan Lancashire".⁶⁸ Moreover, although there was seemingly a world of difference between Eliza Cook's or Charles Dickens' home truths and the radical world of G.W.M.Reynolds, the development of the working class paper into big business narrowed the distinction considerably. Talking about radical issues has never been the same as espousal of those issues. In Raymond Williams' phrasing, Reynolds' epitomised the distinction between the "genuine arousal" of the true radical style and the commercial style of "apparent arousal as a cover for eventual if temporary satisfaction".⁶⁹ There is in hindsight a certain irony in the 1851 Press Directory description of Reynolds' Weekly as "Chartist but for its violent politics it might be characterised as a good family paper."⁷⁰

This does not mean that we should view such papers as Chambers' Journal or the earlier Knight's Penny Magazine⁷¹ as diversionary tactics to draw working class attention away from the unstamped press.⁷² The more reactionary end of the skilled worker market cannot be overlooked simply because radical periodicals are often more interesting to the social historian. Moreover, it is significant that this sort of journal did not appear conservative to contemporaries. Vanity Fair, for example, was described as "independent", with a "caustic though not ill-natured spirit"; while the Illustrated London News was "Liberal in its general tone, in Politics, Neutral".⁷³ Punch, in

the early part of the period, at any rate, was "Liberal, and it essays to promote Social Reforms by moral Satire and pungent Ridicule".⁷⁴ But then Dickens was himself regarded as a social reformer, and Household Words was abundant in attacks on "Red Tape" and bureaucratic civil service practice.⁷⁵

The louder noises of reform abated considerably with the passage of time, and it is important to see that the same journals still represented a particular moderate section of Victorian society. Of the four most prominent of these papers, Punch at 3d an issue sold over 40,000 per edition in 1870 (many through booksellers), the Illustrated London News at 5d sold 70,000 (after a stamped circulation figure of 130,000 in 1855), All The Year Round at 2d sold 50,000, and Chambers' Journal, at 1½d, sold 60,000.⁷⁶ It is also probable that the readership of these magazines, especially of the pictorial ones, was way above the calculated circulation figures. Whatever the seeming distance between these papers and their intellectual counterparts, it is impossible that there was no common readership between the two. Moreover, the general climate of opinion within the low-brow organs - where there was less pressure to rationalise a position - provided a strong reinforcement for the reasoned views of the high-brow. It is this climate of opinion, especially where subconsciously revealed, which is so telling to the historian of attitudes and expectations.

There were several other broad categories of periodical journal with a particular slant or overt purpose which renders them less directly useful to this study. Their very existence, however, is of interest, and they sometimes

add a sharper edge to a more general trend. The socialist press, for example, which blossomed between 1890 and the First World War, illustrates by contrast the defensive reaction of the liberal intellectual papers; while it is noticeable that the same years saw the growth of openly jingoist papers at the other end of the spectrum.⁷⁷ Yet in some ways the socialist press was operating under the same assumptions as the papers it criticised - most notably the assumption that the press was in the hands of the employing and propertied classes and that it could influence politics.⁷⁸ The main difference about socialist journals may be that they have been studied for their links with the socialist movement rather than as part of the periodical press.

As press, they were incredibly amateurish. Apart from the problems with unco-operative printers and unwilling advertisers, they expected to survive on politics alone.⁷⁹ As one advertising leaflet for Labour Leader declared: "There is no other paper like it. No Police News. No Football News. No Society News. But it is Full of News."

The major exception to this rule was Robert Blatchford's Clarion,⁸⁰ which sold in seaside resorts and did not confine itself to the detail of political theory.⁸¹ Its average circulation was over 50,000, and it often reached 75,000. On the other hand, Clarion was regarded as a renegade by many socialists, especially when they perceived Blatchford moving towards the right.⁸²

Amongst the other journals, Keir Hardie's Labour Leader held pride of place. Here again it is interesting to see the old assumption of independence from party - for Hardie tried to keep the paper separate from the I.L.P., conceding only after ten years of struggle.⁸³ Commonweal, under William Morris' editorship, suffered the insistence of the Socialist League being able to correct the staff;⁸⁴ and a variety of syndicalist periodicals thrived on bright, but short, careers.⁸⁵

If socialism flourished in a section of the later press, conversion of a religious nature existed in some force during the earlier years. The Congregational and Baptist British Quarterly Review, priced at six shillings, had a circulation of 2000 in the 1860s, and the monthly Eclectic Review, at 1/6, sold 1000.⁸⁶ Other titles included the Church Missionary Review, the British Friend, the longer-running Ecclesiastical Review, and the self-explanatory Church of England Temperance Magazine.⁸⁷ The latter's emphasis on female teetotal missionaries, such as Mrs Clara Lucas Balfour, and on domestic rescue work, as in Mary Howitt's "The Outcast Children's Cry",⁸⁸ was ridiculed by the Saturday Review as "The Puffery of Virtue".⁸⁹ Nonetheless, the existence of this religious press underlines some of the less outspoken opinions within the mainstream of middle class feeling, and it can not be ignored.

The same is true to a smaller degree with the specialised geographical, military and trading press. The Army and Navy Gazette⁹⁰ could on occasion express views which clarified the softer tones of the intellectual papers, and various other trading and military papers could set the philosophical articles on commerce and exploration into a more scientific perspective.⁹¹

But these were papers with specific appeal, and it is not clear how far they directly contributed to the broader groundswell of upper middle class assumption. What is, however, important, is the way their existence provided a background for the reflective articles of the more generally popular reviews. As such they impinge upon the relevant areas of this study.

Another category of journal is much harder to define. Papers with a low level of intellectual content, with a moralistic preaching of contentment with one's lot, and with an eager fascination with the evils of carnal pleasure - these were the more ordinary periodicals which combined watered-down ingredients of much of the specialised press and offered them up to a supposedly uncritical working class by way of "improvement". While distinct from the intellectual reviews on the one hand, these papers also strove to dissociate themselves from the "mischievous publications" and "moral poison of the Penny Press".⁹² Concern with working class bad habits prompted the Obscene Publications Act in 1857, and the perturbation about cheap periodicals was largely responsible for the growth of the purified press which ranged from Dickens' Household Words to Fanny Mayne's True Briton.⁹³

The relevance of this press to middle class opinion is less in the intended readership than in the aims of the proprietors and contributors. Fanny Mayne quickly declared that "Politics we have wholly eschewed", by which she meant radicalism. Periodicals such as The Christian's Bread Basket (1861-3) and Crumbs for the Lord's Little Ones (1853-7) were for distribution by "cottage visitors" - essentially superiors descending from an alien culture to impress its values upon the lower orders. They were writing about the working class, not respecting it nor stressing fellow feelings. Concern with the proletariat was not always concern for it.

Moreover, the emphasis on religion was firmly placed in the context of upholding the established order. God was part of the national heritage,

if not part of the British constitution itself.⁹⁴ Equally, the world was divided very crudely into Britons and the rest - Europe trembling at the name of "The English Yeoman"⁹⁵ - while Jews were to be kept out of parliament, as they represented a challenge to our Christian faith.⁹⁶ Religion, one way or another, aided the submerging of the individual in the moral British society.

Towards the end of the century, with the welcoming of the respectable working man, there developed further periodical inducements to working class acceptance of the status quo. T.B.Smithies' British Workman and Friend of the Sons of Toil (1855-1921), and its imitations (for example, the unconnected British Workwoman (1863-1913)) claimed a sizeable share of the market with themes of hard work and Bible study. In addition, the temperance campaigning of papers such as the Band of Hope Review and Sunday Scholar's Friend⁹⁸ complemented both themes admirably. The Cottager and Artisan was well described as promoting "the social welfare of readers on scripture principles".⁹⁹ As one article put it, "it is as much the duty of a man to give his master six days' work in exchange for the wages, as it is for him to keep the Sabbath."¹⁰⁰

Or, as another:

"A tidy, cleanly, well arranged house, exercises over its inmates not only a physical, but moral influence, and has a direct tendency to inspire self-respect, and to make the members of the family orderly, peaceable and considerate of the feelings and happiness of each other." 101

Temperance, sabbatarianism and philanthropy triumphed over upheaval or radical reform. The coarse working class was rejected, in favour of the respectable artisan who could be assimilated into fashionable society.

Although aimed at the men, it may well have been their masters, or indeed the masters' wives, who read many of this type of journal. Certainly the Family Herald, Leisure Hour, and Cassell's Family Magazine,¹⁰² which were a few degrees up the social ladder, reveal such expectations in their homilies. Thus working class interest is impossible to assess, but on the other hand it is not our prime concern. Similarly it is not the radical press, which has attracted more attention from posterity, which tells us what we want to know about the attitudes of the ruling class.¹⁰³ The importance of the low-brow purified press is that it shows the assumptions on which the middle class based their interpretations of the workers, and this acts as a relevant consideration beside the reasoned views of the intellectual monthlies and quarterlies.

The periodicals primarily under consideration were not newspapers, in that they did not carry "news". They could not be topical, and almost rejected topicality as a consequence. They were reviews, collections of articles from many different sources, and not extensively affected by the heavy hand of editorial control. For this reason, the research is not of a particularly marxist kind, and there is little concern with the financial considerations behind published articles, or journals. As Shattock has commented, the Victorian journals were not especially different, or distinct from one another, and the same writers appeared in each.¹⁰⁴ The quarterlies and monthlies were never tight little ships - the voices of Whigs or Tories or Radicals - but were rather groupings of essays by divers hands. Consequently our concern is with the general framework of assumptions across the spectrum of the periodicals. It is the views on which the governing decisions were based which is of relevance, irrespective of the question of direct influence.

The same stratum of society was involved in writing about government, and actually governing. In some cases the very personnel was identical.

Thus it is that the periodical press provides an excellent source of evidence for the opinions of the Victorian and Edwardian educated, ruling elite. As one recent writer has observed:

"Such papers were for men established in their station in society, or on their way to being so; men with morning coats and top hats - at least on Sundays. They were - these journals of the Victorian interlude whose shadow falls so far - heavily political, long-winded and restricted in interest: much more so in the nineties than they had been in the first exuberance of the new journalism of forty years previously, a great deal more so than the journalism of the eighteenth century. They almost entirely ignored the fact that even women could read and they were for the most part by now extremely dull. This quality of dullness had become indeed one of their virtues. It gave those who read them moral confidence." 105

However, the end of the century brought with it what G.M. Trevelyan condemned as the "white peril" of new journalism,¹⁰⁶ and the periodical journal no longer stood alone as the representative of public (i.e. educated) opinion. For a start, the last years of Victoria saw the spread of an albeit basic level of formal education, and the growth of a basic, Tit-bits style, press to capitalise on this. In the face of this, the established intellectual journals, rather than develop new designs which might be easier on the eye, or new forms of writing in less convoluted sentences, retreated still further into the essay-review. It was as if there was a conscious attempt to shun the new market by maintaining an intellectual elite who were prepared to read unbroken columns of deathless prose on page after page of unrelieved print.

At the same time, the extension of the franchise, and the accompanying rise in trade union and socialist activity, helped create a new political framework within which the periodical press could not hold its place. While external economic competition drove Britain into a defensive imperialism, backed up by jingoism inside the country, the forces of working class, Fenian and feminist discontent suggested an alternative altogether outside the

historical pattern of parliamentary debate. Trapped between imperialism and socialism the periodicals reacted by supporting the almost self-contradictory liberal imperialists, a group which failed to establish itself in the country and whose members were almost entirely subsumed by Tory policies, if not the party itself, by the time the First World War was over. It is not surprising that much of the learned press went the same way.

But in the years before the end of the century, many members of the educated elite believed that more influence could be exerted from the pages of the periodical press than from a seat in parliament.¹⁰⁷ Grey is reputed to have chosen the home rule side of the Liberal party less on the authority of Gladstone than by convictions derived from Morley's articles in the Pall Mall Gazette.¹⁰⁸ Journals close to the party establishments, such as the Nineteenth Century and the National Review, rarely spoke with sympathy for the parliamentary viewpoint. Indeed, there was an undisguised scorn for the compromise of party politics.

Even so, it is illusory to think that there was a "disinterested" or "balanced" stance. There was a clear defensiveness after the home rule split and the rise of socialist ideas, so that by the early twentieth century the anti-socialist views commanded as much space in liberal reviews as schemes for social reform. Though, as one commentator has shown,

"The Quarterly Review, Edinburgh Review and National Review went through no such change because they had never made any claims to stand apart from the existing economic and social system." 109

In some ways their consistency is more laudable than the failure of nerve which carried the liberal periodicals into the imperialist camp.

The reasons, however, have more to do with the changes in society which left all these papers stranded. The counterpoising of socialism and imperialism was outside the cosy liberal world of the mid-Victorian intellectual reviews, and their reaction was predictable. For the success of the reviews depended on a class of educated readers eager to be guided by a new aristocracy of intellect. In 1865 the Fortnightly Review and its followers contributed

to an educated class monopoly of public opinion. But the extension of the franchise, of trade union activity, of elementary education, and of the popular journalism of the 1890s challenged this monopoly. In the early twentieth century the essay-length article in the reviews still commanded the respect of educated middle class opinion; but by this time the periodical journal was only one voice among many claiming to shape public opinion. The balanced view of society, in these key years between Crystal Palace and the First World War, could not survive any emancipation of the working class - educationally, socially or politically - and the almost conscious attempt to build a centre party of liberal imperialism failed just because the periodical press would not include the working class in its vision and could not touch them with its traditional restricted appeal. The periodicals' reflection of literature, science and politics was only ever from one particular viewpoint - that of the middle class, newly-assimilated, governing elite.

Yet for the years we are considering, the periodicals ruled the roost, and provide an enormous source of material for the historian of attitudes. The question of influence is less important than the general overall assumptions. To follow one recent writer, "we are not interested in imperialism per se, nor even in anti-imperialism; only in what men understood by these terms."¹¹⁰ This understanding, this general frame of mind, these assumptions on which thinking society based its actions, are uniquely recorded by the periodicals of 1851-1914. This then is the value of these papers, and the validity of this research.

Part Two - Chronological

1851 was the year of the Great Exhibition in London, and Britain's manufactures were on show to reinforce her position as workshop of the world. Veritably she must have appeared to be "top nation".¹ Britain produced perhaps two thirds of the world's coal, perhaps half its iron, five sevenths of its small supply of steel, about half of such cotton cloth as was produced on a commercial scale, and 40% (in value) of its hardware.²

Yet already the seeds of decline were contained within mid-Victorian prosperity. Even in 1840 Britain possessed only about one third of the world's steam power, and by 1870 this figure was down to between a quarter and a fifth. At no time after 1850 was Britain able to feed herself, from her own agricultural products; and it was the increase in imported food-stuffs which played so great a part in the general economic depression after 1873. The ability of British shipping to import food was a very mixed blessing. Most important, Britain's export of men and machinery enabled her rivals to catch up with, and overtake her. She was left to escape from economic stagnation not by modernising her economy, but by exploiting the remaining possibilities of her traditional situation.³ She retreated to the first gains her shipping had given her - the colonies.

Consequently, during the 1850s and 1860s there was a change in the fundamental assumptions about empire. A growing consciousness of empire, a consciousness not needed before, when the empire was just accepted as running smoothly, became readily apparent in the pages of the periodical press. While colonies had previously appeared as millstones around British necks,⁴ and colonial desires for independence - among the white colonies, that is - had been treated favourably, the new attitudes towards empire suggested closer rather than looser relationships.⁵

Apart from anything else, Britain already had an empire well before the scramble for African territory. The formal empire in India never ceased to be vital to the British economy. Hence the division of the world into formal colonies and "spheres of influence" of the great powers was to be, for Britain, a step back. She exchanged the informal empire over most of the undeveloped world for the formal empire of a quarter of it, plus the old satellite economies.⁵

Similarly, much of Britain's imperial expansion in real economic terms took place before the steeplechase of the 1870s and 1880s. Between 1853 and 1880 Britain sent out 2,466,000 emigrants of whom an unknown but probably small proportion returned. At the same time Britain's export of capital was intricately connected with her export of people. By 1870 British capitalists had sunk £800,000,000 abroad, whereas in 1850 the total had been only £300,000,000.⁷ As L.H. Jenks notes, by 1877 "the export of a capital surplus was over. Her further investments were to come for a generation from the accruing profits of those which had already been made."⁸

So it was the period of the facade of Victorian prosperity which saw much of the colonising instincts of the British people at work. Asa Briggs has suggested five main influences which conditioned the national mood of the times,⁹ and they may equally well apply to a growing consciousness of empire. The direct influence of prosperity, the sense of national security, the belief in the superiority of English representative institutions, the feeling of a common moral code, and the belief in free discussion and inquiry - all contributed to the full imperial picture. Economic belief in the large material rewards to be gained from colonial ventures was assisted by the sense of national security which demanded that Britain protect her far-flung frontiers from the foe. English representative institutions were introduced into colonial spheres (especially the white settler lands) because of a

strong belief in the inherent good these institutions conveyed; and the strongest of these institutions was undoubtedly the Protestant Christian Church. A common moral code, based on hard work and self-help, combined with a belief in free discussion, was used to demonstrate to the rest of the world how only Britain was capable of safeguarding the basic freedoms of her subjects whilst at the same time encouraging their material well-being. Permeating all these aspects of imperial consciousness was the all too evident, though sometimes subconscious, reflection of domestic values. In all writings on imperial matters, the concern for the parallel circumstances at home was pronounced, if not paramount. The need to reassure the British public that the system worked in the colonies because it worked at home, and implicitly therefore that it did work at home, comes across starkly to a modern eye.

Imperialist historiography has largely assumed that economic imperialism, if it existed at all, came after 1870 rather than before.¹⁰ The evidence in the periodical press, however, of expectations of economic gains, dates back well before this, and is prominent with respect to Africa, India, China, and occasionally South America.¹¹ Security of empire and allied strategic questions were also important to the mid-Victorians. The North West frontier, especially during the Crimean War, posed many fears of Russian assault. Yet with regard to the security of India, it was also a matter of the security of the Indian cotton trade. Protection of the Lancashire - and British - economy was every bit as important as protection of territory.

Strategic questions were further reinforced by the boom in geographic and scientific exploration which took place in these years. In particular the 1860s saw vast areas of the dark continent opened to European eyes, and explorations were seen as preludes to trade and missionary work.¹² The latter was itself seen as opening the doors to the benefits of European civilisation, i.e. trade; and even missionary and allied religious journals themselves were happy to view their work in this light.¹³ As the Friend of India had put it in 1825, Christianity was needed

"to develop the vast resources of this rich country, to remove every obstacle to its occupying that elevated rank in the scale of nations, which it is so well able by nature to sustain." 14

The moral and humanitarian impulse behind imperialism was always liable to contradiction. The economic importance of native labour, and indeed of the persisting slave trade in Africa, was often difficult to reconcile with the treatment meted out to such labourers. The Act of Emancipation had at the same time taken much of the ground from beneath the philanthropists' feet, since it was possible for oppressive colonial employers to claim that their methods were not actually those of slavery, even if they were just as harsh in social and economic terms. The momentum from the anti-slavery agitation still continued, therefore, but in more uncertainty than hitherto. Attention had to be focussed on the Arabs' evil deeds, and on America, with careful avoidance of the likely consequences for Lancashire cotton. Meanwhile the Indian mutiny made it harder for any encouragement of philanthropic feelings towards the "lower races". Instead of leading to desires for decolonisation, such acts only increased Britain's moral obligation to improve and educate their inferiors. The stereotypes called up by the anti-slavery movements to win support for the negro were now used as caricatures to prove their inherent incapacity for further unassisted development. The Jamaican crisis of 1865 reinforced such views.

Chronologically, it was the Crimean War which first attracted imperial interest within this period. Apart from Russian expansion into Europe, which it was felt should be strongly resisted, Russian pressure on central Asia was seen as the real danger behind the Crimean War. Britain might be diverting her attention towards Constantinople at just the moment when Russia was planning to attack India. Any Russian advance in central Asia could be regarded as an advance on India. And, as with the Crimea, it was the fault of ignorant civilians at the head of the War Office that British forces were not holding their own.¹⁵ One magazine disparaged the Russian Bear still further. While Russia professed to encourage and protect the moves to civilise the central Asian hordes, her real object was, according to this journal, their total subjugation. But it was felt to be within the power of Britain to stop Russian progress, and to stop Russian appropriation of those sources of wealth and power in the east which had so materially contributed to raise Britain to her present high position among European nations.¹⁶ Security and prosperity were clearly linked.

As if this was not sufficient, there was even anxiety about Russian advances on the River Amoor in the far east.¹⁷ Russia, it seems, was everywhere. But at least this had aroused England from indifference -

"God grant that this opportunity, calculated to stimulate the purest patriotism and to satisfy the noblest ambition, may not be lost for England, and that she may find men capable of conducting her through the paths of justice and honour to that success on which depends the freedom or the slavery of mankind."

The domestic overtones, and the encouragement of energetic Englishmen, were evident in many journals.¹⁸ Bellicose expressions of manly pride abounded, including war poems such as the following:

"Heart of England, faltering never in the good time or the ill,
But thy great day's task of duty strong and patient to fulfil.....
Till He give us, when the giving shall not lift us up nor spoil,
All we sought, the ample guerdon of a nation's truth and toil" 19

The supposedly "better" journals were no exception in their feelings. Both Edinburgh and Westminster reviews urged army reform and hoped that the setbacks of the Crimean campaign would at least teach the army ministers a lesson; while the Quarterly Review praised Raglan for the example he left to other commanders, acting with spirit and suffering with resignation.²⁰ Meanwhile Household Words extolled the praises of the sick and convalescent who returned from the war still in high spirits. However, it observed one soldier writing to his mother:

""Don't let our Patrick, mother, go for a soldier; not that I mind for myself," he says, pointing to his shattered hand, " but one's enough." " 21

In general the Crimea acted as a spur to patriotic feeling within Britain, and especially towards reform of the army and the home defences. Additionally, the war was necessary to teach Russia a lesson, implicitly warning her off India.

The uprisings in India in 1857 were then the biggest affront to Victorian susceptibilities within this period. The idea that British customs and government might not be the most appealing to foreign peoples was too subversive to admit discussion. The further possibility that it might not be Russia who took India from the British, but rather the Indians themselves, undermined the entire concept of the Great Game, and cast severe doubt on the nature of "superior" and "inferior" peoples.

This largely explains the over-anxious assertions by the periodical press that the mutiny was confined solely to the native army. All ideas of a national revolution were speedily dismissed.²² The very word "mutiny" militated against any concept of a wider disaffection. Admittedly modern historiography is inclined to dismiss the theory of a national character to the uprising. While Savarkar insisted it was a national revolt, and Chaudhuri more recently has agreed with this view, Majumdar and Sen have regarded it as neither the first, nor a national, nor an independence ,

movement of any sort.²³ Western historians, unsurprisingly, are in accord with this latter view. Edwardes sees the mutiny as a meeting of two dying systems - the "country" power of British India and the traditional India obsessed with the past - and Hibbert agrees that the mutiny was the swan song of old India.²⁴ It was a conservative, tradition-loving section of Indian society which was reacting to the modernising zeal of British conquerors, and Princes and landowners felt threatened by the ruthless reforms of Dalhousie. The sepoys were torn to distraction between their loyalty and affection, and the belief that their religion and way of life were under attack.

Yet Hibbert admits that there was more to it than just the "mutiny" implied by the English term. Moreover, regardless of the actual level of national unrest involved, what is important is the eagerness with which the British periodical press dismissed any such possibility. Simultaneously, and directly giving the lie to these eager dismissals, the periodicals saw the need for radical re-thinking of Britain's government in India as a whole, and not just in the army. Whatever the previous mistakes,

"there will now be a real effort to secure the safety and ameliorate the condition of India, and, roused by a horrible catastrophe, we shall alike endeavour to do our duty to the natives and oblige them to do their duty to us."

India : "cannot for the future be to us a mere commercial mart, a provision for the cadets of our middle classes, a resource for superannuated generals or impoverished nobility, a thing of the city, of a clique, of a department; it must become an integral part of our Home Government, and the full power of national intelligence and opinion must be brought to bear upon its interests and resources."

More reassuringly, "Those who are intimately acquainted with the country are mostly of the opinion that the native civilians prefer our government, with all its shortcomings, to the stern and exacting sway of their own princes." 25

This mixture of alarm and complacency characterised virtually all the learned journals' approaches to the mutiny. Something needed to be done, but the basic precepts of British rule were still believed unshakeable. The Edinburgh Review, which noted in 1853 that the days of the Indian empire were numbered if the native soldiers became disaffected, still declared in 1858: "The instability of the British Empire in India is an idea so unfamiliar to the vast majority of our countrymen in the present generation, that if the events of the past year had not given to that expression a significance it never had before, the words would scarcely fall from the lips of an Englishman." 26

Some faith was placed in a providence which might have delivered this blow solely to inspire Britain to greater things. Such a providence would give Britain the chance to vindicate eternal justice and advance moral government.²⁷ The crisis in India might perhaps ensure a happier future to the half-civilised tribes surrounding her.²⁸ Putting down the mutiny might not only elevate Britain's military reputation, but also show her the task she had in front of her, and since nothing throughout the mutiny had threatened the loss of empire, there was much to show that Britain's hold over the Indian people was more than a mere physical grasp.²⁹

Furthermore, the commercial importance of India now assumed a moral banner. As the Eclectic Review suggested,

"We might, perhaps, (though this is very doubtful) have derived as much pecuniary benefit from India, had our relations with her been purely commercial; but our political supremacy was necessary, both for the moral discipline we ourselves have derived from the difficulties we have struggled with, and well-nigh mastered, and for the natives of India to receive from the West those new and powerful elements of moral life, by which they are being, morally, socially and religiously regenerated. Long may that supremacy be ours!" 30

Rather than suggesting a retreat from empire, the mutiny had inspired the press to closer links with colonies.³¹

At the same time, it is important to see how the Indian rebels were stigmatised with a violence unknown to civilised man. Partly the descriptions

of mutiny atrocities appealed to the interest in violence which undoubtedly still existed within the stability of mid-Victorian England.³² The casual rowdyism of election times was mingled with the vicarious thrill of reading about horror. This was doubly reinforced by the aspect of the glory of Englishmen and Englishwomen who were fighting for their lives against overwhelming odds.

Partly also the violence attributed to the Indians acted as proof of their lack of fitness for self-government. Any people who could behave in such a way were clearly in grave need of English tutelage and protection - from themselves apart from anything else. There was a further development to the argument in relation to domestic politics, for the radicals who urged a policy of "India for the Indians" were perceived as being grossly unaware of the Indians' true character. Attacks on native atrocities were equally attacks on domestic radicalism.³³ This period saw the beginnings of the view that self-criticism in Britain could cause discontent elsewhere in the empire - a view which recurred through the rest of Victoria's reign.³⁴

Generally, though, there were no depths to which the Indians had not sunk during the course of the mutiny. This country was in an "agony of horror at the atrocities which signalled the mutiny."³⁵ "Fiendish atrocities" had been perpetrated by the rebellious sepoys, said the British Friend.³⁶ Denying that missionaries had in any way caused the mutiny, the Church Missionary Intelligencer wrote of atrocities and horror, and especially bemoaned that the perpetrators were "our own native soldiers, whom we had trained and disciplined and armed."³⁷ This, ever the worst facet of imperialism, was still held to be the natives' fault.

The need for more religion and education was clearly felt. "Among the masses, it is ignorance, not knowledge, of the spirit of the gospel, which incites hostility to it." British endeavour was praised for its success in holding India, rather than the other way about.

"That a small island in the Atlantic, twelve or fourteen thousand miles distant from Hindustan, should, by a company of merchants, have conquered and held the vast continent of India, is a fact which can never be stated without exciting wonder and admiration."

Again the domestic side of affairs came in for emphasis. Despite the atrocities it seemed that even the miscreants at Delhi and Cawnpore had their semi-apologists in Britain, according to one journal. Were the contents of the Bottomless Pit let loose, the same parties would make it appear that the universe would not have had a Bottomless Pit but for the English.³⁸ The ^{religious} periodical press was not going to do Britain down, however. For it was:

"Because we were too English the great crisis arose; but it was only because we were English that, when it arose, it did not utterly overwhelm us." 39

The popular and learned journals could hardly be expected to be more moral than their religious counterparts. Chambers' Journal saw the need for British government, and capitalists as well, in India; owing to the "perfidy and incompetency of the natives of India".⁴⁰ Reynolds' Miscellany was littered with pictures of brave Englishwomen holding out sabres and pistols towards oncoming Indians; stressing both English courage and the treachery of such natives who could attack women.⁴¹ Household Words urged more missionaries in India, not fewer; especially as "Betrayers and Assassins are the pupils to be taught". Other apocryphal articles on India abounded, especially if they contained Indian viciousness. The Indian punishment of death by being shot from a cannon's mouth was morbidly noted.⁴² Fraser's

talked of the depths to which the natives had sunk by their unparalleled treacheries;⁴³ though describing them as "Plunderers" at heart might logically be held to invalidate the "sinking" they were supposed to have done. Most treacherous of all, it was noticed by Blackwoods now:

"The rebels have fought much better than was expected; they certainly never fought in any of our battles half so well or so stoutly as they are fighting now for themselves. This, though only natural, is still aggravating....." 44

But the fact that Britain had inevitably crushed the rising was further reason for ^{self-}congratulation:

"Our rank and file must be content to die, and have no names. Yet the country will know how to value their faith and service. The cause so blessed is not doomed to perish." 45

With all this coverage in Britain, it is interesting to read the popular novelist Annie S. Swan's history of the Women's Foreign Mission of the Church of Scotland.⁴⁶ In this she confessed:

"I have been struck by the lack of reference to the Mutiny in these old records".

Not trusting the evidence, or lack of it, in the missions' letters and magazines, she conventionally declared:

"It must have been a testing time for all missionaries and their helpers."

Yet her only examples were of a hostile reception for one missionary -

"several rude men who violently ordered us away with gross impropriety of language" -

and of one Rev. A.B. Campbell, who lost the attendance of some of his

"fine little Mahomedan girls" at his school, when the mutiny,

"with all its countless and unspeakable horrors, broke out.....
Ah! my dear brother, what obstacles obstruct the onward course of this glorious work!"

The distinct impression emerges that the mutiny had developed a life of its own in the British periodical press. The ability to criticise a government's lack of foresight, to castigate a savage race of natives, and to justify closer supervision of a land which was so important for the economy, created a journalistic bonanza for the press. But at the same time the romance of India vanished after the mutiny, and harsher racial attitudes appeared.⁴⁷ The consciousness of belonging to a conquering race

was doubly strengthened by the military actions necessary to quash the uprisings. Apart from a sense of heroic exile and missionary impulse, there was a deeper conviction that Britain should keep what she already had.

Whilst before 1857 India had been happily left to the East India Company, and a spirit of indifference had existed with regard to the colony, after 1857 Britain formally took over the functions of "John Company", and justified so doing. In a sense the mutiny prodded Britain to a dog-in-the-manger attitude to India. It was not that the rising and its suppression created a gulf between the British and the Indians, for the reforms of the 1830s and a changing administrative attitude had already alienated the rulers from the mass of the ruled. But it definitely crystallised and reinforced the division by increasing the distrust on both sides. There was much less enthusiastic orientalism after the mutiny, although articles on Indian customs and history persisted. Interest in Indian affairs as relevant to the practice of British government was also widespread. At the same time, without wishing to extend a comparison too far, Reform bills in Britain were failing in parliament after parliament.

The contemporary press continued to pay more attention to Indian affairs,⁴⁸ rather than any other imperial area, until the 1860s. Similarly, North America was more appealing to prospective settlers than the "dark continent". Meanwhile, the combination of the Crimea, the mutiny and Louis Napoleon's alleged plans to invade England, led to another outburst of defence scares. Again India, Europe and England were tied together by the thread of "security". Imperial and European concerns were linked closely to the age-old question of defence of the mother country.

As Macmillan's Magazine put it, in its first volume, there was a duty to render the "home of liberty" impregnable.⁴⁹ Most journals took great patriotic interest in the activities of the Volunteer movement, even seeing it as a force for bonding all Englishmen in a way which agitations for equality

could never do.⁵⁰ The desire to improve the navy, and again to improve the administration of it, was also prominent; and a combined Franco-Russian fleet was seen as the major threat.⁵¹ "The magnitude of our navy should then, as a necessity of national safety, be equal to the aggregate navies of the world", affirmed one periodical. Another asked what the naval question actually was, and decided it meant "Can Britain be, at sea, in these days, what she was in old days.....?"⁵² Harping back to an idealised past was common in times of crisis, and all the old Napoleonic war, Elizabethan, and even Arthurian, stories were trotted out for morale boosting.⁵³ The recent Indian experiences encouraged investigations into the sanitary conditions of the army,⁵⁴ while the colonies could sometimes be seen as able to create savings in the army by providing either money or men - in the case of well-established colonies such as Canada and the Cape, that is. Without such provision, and without more troops in India, a possible attack could be mounted on India by France, who might be about to occupy Egypt. So, asked one paper, "Is it worth while to go to war with France rather than let France occupy Egypt? We think that it is."⁵⁵ Thus were domestic, European and imperial matters inextricably entwined.

The militarist stance of the late 1850s and early 1860s was complemented by the growth of a more strident racialism over these two decades. An understandable ethnocentrism developed into a more harsh racialism, and the stereotype of the negro which had originated to assist the anti-slavery movements now persisted as a derogatory description of all lower races. The negro had always been believed to be a lower being than the Indian, but the term "nigger" was now transformed into a term of abuse and imported into India.⁵⁶ A hierarchy of "races" was beginning to be established, with

with Anglo-Saxon at the top and all the rest in descending order below. Teutons were above Latins; whites above browns, and browns above blacks. Within the latter two categories there were further subdivisions, on British values; so that hard-working or physically strong peoples were placed higher than indolent or weak nations. Darwin's Origin of Species, which had appeared in 1859, was quickly used to reinforce the "natural" extinction of the weaker races at the hands of the stronger. Meanwhile black slaves were clearly inferior races, as their ancestors had been the weaker tribes who were conquered.⁵⁷ Similarly the South American natives were doubly inferior, for they had been vanquished by the decadent Spaniards.

It is possible that the underlying weaknesses in the facade of mid-Victorian prosperity were beginning to make themselves felt, and that people were substituting Anglo-Saxon racial superiority for the diminishing returns of economic dominance. Alternatively, the new urban gentry might have found a convenient substitute for the blood relations of the traditional aristocracy in the common identity of the Anglo-Saxon race.⁵⁸ Equally it is possible that the threat of organised labour seemed to upset the old hierarchical relations within Britain, and the creation of a new hierarchy of races outside was a response to this feeling. However one views the 1860s, it is difficult not to agree with Lorimer that the educated classes' race assumptions were founded on their conception of themselves as civilised men in an uncivilised world, and as enlightened intelligentsia in a largely barbarian England. Pride of race satisfied self-esteem.⁵⁹

This it was which partly explains the ambivalence of the British press towards the American Civil War. On the one hand there was the view that the Birmingham working men should help the "Freed Refugees" from slavery in America, as when working people were in distress it was the duty of their

employers to keep them alive, and Britain had been the chief employer of "these people" when they had been slaves.⁶⁰ This in itself cast interesting sidelights on domestic politics. On the other hand, it was noted that the continuance of war caused bitter misery in Lancashire, and every Englishman must care more about his own countrymen than about Yankee or Negroes.⁶¹ Even so, Lancashire's distress should not be removed at the price of a great national sin. English power was that of moral power, and the South could not therefore be wished to win.⁶²

Yet another view held that, while sympathetic to the spirit of the north and abhorring the institutions of the south, the north should not have a better claim to enforce its policy on the south than the south had to taint the north with slavery.⁶³ All The Year Round used the course of the war for a number of articles reflecting negro stupidity; and also noted how river repairs in South Carolina were undertaken by whites, because "slaves are too valuable to be employed in such dangerous labour".⁶⁴ In common with several other journals, however, it started to investigate the possibilities of obtaining cotton from India, Egypt, Lebanon, and so on.⁶⁵ The sharpest opinion, most closely reflecting domestic fears, was that Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation would incite the slave to escape from his or her master.

"This implies throat cutting, and all the savage cruelties and brutal barbarities which the fierce passions of the degraded African are capable of perpetrating." 66

This editor added a reminder to the readership of the enormous difficulties for the southern states of dealing with an institution which they had not created and which Britain herself had assisted in forcing on them. Such attitudes were reinforced by the Saturday Review, which saw Lincoln trying to bring southerners back into the union through fear of having "their throats cut by their domestics"; and by the Spectator's fears of a "servile war",⁶⁷

though the latter thought the African temper placable enough to render violent rebellion unlikely.⁵⁹

The comparisons between the slaves and the British working class were becoming more apparent. Domestic political motivations behind the journalists thus explain much of their attitudes towards the conflict. The liberal Westminster Review faintly regretted the demise of anti-slavery feeling in England,⁶³ and the popular weeklies verged on revolutionary encouragement of the blacks. Lloyd's Weekly was mystified by black acquiescence and waited for them to rise up, and Reynolds' thought that if the blacks rose it would be justifiable homicide. The use of blacks in the army was largely objected to, but Reynolds' said that this was like the Volunteers not taking the Irish, or English working men.⁶⁹ The most direct comparison existed when it was suggested that blacks with education could safely be given the vote.⁷⁰ Parallels with reform in Britain were much more than coincidental.

Such parallels were then further delineated by the crisis in Jamaica in 1865. Bolt justifiably argues that the Jamaica revolt was important to most Victorians as a crisis for British liberalism. Historians have consistently written of the Governor Eyre affair rather than of the Paul Bogle or George Gordon controversy.⁷¹ However, when Bolt quotes the Contemporary Review's statement that only the "preponderance of an Anglo-Saxon element guarantees an inherent capacity for freedom",⁷² she herself is overstating the case to say that this was written about Jamaica. Jamaica was not mentioned anywhere near the above quotation, whatever was in the mind of the journalist concerned.

Modern historians may sometimes ascribe more significance to Jamaica than is warranted by contemporary interest. Not all journals dwelt on the issue in greater than passing detail. Moreover, the periodical press generally discussed the Jamaican revolt with more than one eye upon the domestic comparisons. At one end of the scale the Saturday Review even

complained that the irrepressible negro was interrupting the normal life of the English press, spoiling the Englishman's wine, and so on.⁷³

Blackwoods felt the controversy to be a malady which Americans would call "nigger on the brain". It attacked those who defended the Jamaican negro as more sacred than the European, and suggested that "in liberating the negroes by the sword, the North has itself become a slave." Blacks should not be allowed to lounge about great cities breeding a race of paupers.⁷⁴ Class and race were never far apart. A later sympathetic article showed the same condescension:

"Next to our roast beef and bitter beer, I believe we like our nigger - and he is as much a national institution as either of them" 75

The Quarterly Review (which thought Eyre's brutal repression to be a mistaken conscientiousness, though justified by knowledge of the negro character) drew the class-race analogy most strongly, and surely not unintentionally, in view of reform moves in Britain.

"Perhaps nothing in modern history so strongly illustrates the one-sidedness and imperfection of English legislation as the make-shift and hap-hazard looseness with which some 800,000 black semi-barbarians were at one bound - without commensurate training or preparation - admitted to the full civil rights of English citizens, and subjected to the ordinary routine of English administration." 76

Other journals also echoed the call for stronger government and more education. The spread of knowledge as a cure for insurrection was again a prominent domestic theme, with Hyde Park riots clearly in mind.⁷⁷

Some journals maintained a more balanced view. In the Spectator it was held that Eyre had let the deep-down masterful nature of the Anglo-Saxon get out of control, and that Britain had adopted one standard of justice for the blacks, and another for the whites. Another writer saw Gordon as a boy of good natural parts, while Eyre was weak and vain and unfit for responsibility. The terrible calamity might prove to have

been the "blackness before the dawn" of a happier day. It was widely considered insufficient to free slaves and then take no further interest in them. God had made all men, even the Africans, for advance. Britain ought not to let the negro ideal of life take its course; but rather should the negro be given the wants of civilised life. He was a child, and needed to be taught as such.⁷⁸ Again the reflection of views on the British working class is clear. The very language itself was virtually identical.

The same is true of those journals which opposed Eyre's action. The whole subject was referred back to European and British concerns, and domestic preoccupations shone obviously through the muddied waters of the incident itself. Thus the Fortnightly Review thought that if the Tories thought fit to pass their time in vindicating Mr Eyre and in identifying themselves with his ruthless acts, they were welcome to all the reputation it would bring them. Furthermore,

"there can be no excuse for the hanging of Mr George Gordon. He was a coloured man, but nearly white."

He even had an English wife. Eyre's actions had indeed "lowered the name of England before the world"; and the idea that England's fair name might be stained in the eyes of despotic continentals seemed to hurt most of all.⁷⁹

Reynolds' felt similarly. The Jamaican authorities:

"have exposed us even to the scorn and derision of the blood-stained minions of the murderous despots of continental Europe."

Moreover, this journal thought the English working class should learn from Jamaica, and compared the reprisals there with punishments inflicted on the Fenians in Ireland.⁸⁰

Only the Westminster Review gave any prominence to the idea that the reason for the decline of Jamaica's prosperity was the exhaustive system of agriculture which accompanied slavery, rather than the negro labourers who were part of that system. The journal showed how the negro race had not been violent until the recent deplorable incidents, and patronisingly

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showed how this people had exhibited remarkable obedience to law and order.⁸¹ Some other papers almost totally ignored the controversy, one merely featuring events in Eyre's earlier life as an explorer.⁸² Another wished that Eyre had remained an explorer.⁸³

Perhaps, as one recent historian has argued, as the African in the West Indies became less important economically, he became less of an issue of social and political debate in England. The Eyre controversy was just an exception. The former slave colonies, drained of wealth long before emancipation, drifted into economic insignificance, and England paid less heed to the problems of black humanity until the fresh assaults on Africa towards the end of the century.⁸⁴ Certainly the attitudes taken by the periodicals, even during the Jamaica crisis, reflected concern with domestic social and political problems rather than with inherent difficulties in the colony itself. As a crisis for liberalism it had a life in the press which the realities of the inter-racial circumstances in Jamaica would not otherwise have demanded. The connections between lower races and lower classes were transparently obvious, and the increasingly harsh attitudes to both were a symptom of the growing uncertainty of the times. Consciousness of an empire which would not function happily if left to run itself threatened the pillars of mid-Victorian dogma, especially those of laissez-faire trade; and the latter was itself beginning to run into the stumbling blocks of foreign tariffs and effective competition. Growing awareness of an empire meant growing awareness of an empire with problems, and problems similar to those experienced at home. The need to re-impose stability and order on a changing world caused harsher attitudes all round. The prosperous, educated, civilised mid-Victorian was becoming increasingly isolated.

There were several other aspects of the period 1851-70 which reinforced this consciousness of empire and the increasingly harsh attitudes which accompanied this. The increasing threat of Russia in central Asia, which was seen both as an extension of the eastern question and a renewed attack

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on India, received massive coverage in the periodical press.⁸⁵ Mostly the journals accepted that Russia was able and willing to invade India, and they urged the government to put their own house in order while there was still time. The relation to domestic efficiency, organisation and defence was always marked.

This itself was further strengthened by the growing power of Prussia within Europe. Already Prussian education and military systems were regarded with some degree of envy,⁸⁶ even though France was still supposed to be the major enemy. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 altered this traditional balance of power for good, and the period can be said to close in 1870 with this definite statement of German strength and French weakness. This was greatly to affect the imperial consequences of the following years, in the minds of the periodicals if nowhere else.

Meanwhile the geographical discoveries within Africa were beginning to be seen in terms of natural resources; and attempts to penetrate China, despite the anti-foreigner prejudice of that country, were smiled upon throughout the periodicals.⁸⁷ The importance of Chinese trade for India was stressed forcibly, and the ambivalence towards opium is explicable in that light.

But how far the transformation in imperial and racial attitudes was a response to the changes within Victorian England is most clearly seen in social and humanitarian, rather than economic, terms. India continued to be the most important aspect of imperial writings, and it was Indian education and constitutional government which reflected the views of the periodical press on their own domestic systems. Even apart from the vital economic importance of India, and the continuing overstatement of this in the press, it was the licentious ritual of the Hindoo religion and the basic

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incapacity of the Indian to govern himself which really captured the attention of the periodical writers.⁸⁸ In particular the relation of these subjects to their domestic counterparts is striking to the modern eye. As the Saturday Review made clear, it was only the Liberals who laboured under the mistaken idea that all men were alike, and entitled to be governed identically; and such views would lose India for Britain.⁸⁹ Similarly, Annie S. Swan's description of Indian women in 1819 as:

"living in gross darkness almost amounting to slavery. They were burden bearers, producers of children, instruments for man's use and pleasure, but in no sense regarded as sentient or even responsible human beings"

surely owes much to English women's circumstances, and reflects closely the British Quarterly Review's account of savage life, in which wife-whipping and barbaric "coming-out" ceremonies for young girls, involving thrashings on naked back and bosom, were graphically highlighted.⁹⁰ The obsession with sex and savagery mirrored domestic views of sexuality; and condemnation of almost all sexual practices on the part of savages reflects more than a little concern with propriety at home.⁹¹

A most telling example of British insularity received expression in a report by a Mr Young who inspected a Tonga school in 1853. The natives were able, he noted, to state "the distances of the principal English towns from London with tolerable correctness".⁹² The idea that London was the centre of the universe, and the exporting of sectarian religious controversies by missionaries of different denominations, stayed with the Victorians throughout this period. The extension into empire of social and political attitudes which were moulded in the changing environment of Victorian England only served to reinforce such attitudes, while the imperial situation was made to fit the facts of the domestic scene in which the attitudes originated. As the social and economic conditions of existence within Britain altered, in the face of organised labour and foreign competition, so the attitudes to empire altered with them. The replacement of lost stability internally, by a strict hierarchical framework of empire externally, characterised

much of the writings of the period. In no way were the writings a response to the demands of imperial rule, but rather were they formed as an answer for mid-Victorian man to the problems which beset him nearer to home.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 marked a turning point in European imperial history. With the advantage of hindsight, and with one eye on the First World War, it can also be seen as a milestone. To put it simply, Germany overtook France. For the first time in the nineteenth century, England's traditional enemy had been displaced from her position as chief rival. The perception of a second Napoleonic war, which had fuelled the periodical press in its invasion scares,¹ was superseded by the economic and military threat of a new, unified and dynamic power. More problematic still, Germany was of the same aggressive and successful Teuton racial stock as England herself. Admittedly Russia remained the Great Bear looming over the steppes of the Caucasus and the foothills of central Asia; but this was nothing new. Germany, on the other hand, threatened to upset the balance of power.

So while the 1850s and '60s had produced an increasing consciousness of empire, the 1870s and '80s were dedicated to the preservation of that empire in the face of suspected assaults upon it. Germany had risen both diplomatically and economically, and Britain and France, the old colonial powers, sought to preserve their empires against her. In addition, French attempts to make up for Alsace-Lorraine in the jungles of Africa threatened still further the informal empire Britain's traders had been building up for the previous fifty years. The alternative strength in empire which France was gathering could only impinge upon a Britain whose strength was her empire.

Germanophobic articles abounded in the periodical press.² It was all very well for Germany to have an empire, but not at British expense. And although America was also on the rise economically and politically, she did not fit into the old Eurocentric diplomatic pattern, and therefore did not matter so much. Besides, it was generally assumed that America was on Britain's side.³

The question of "sides" was itself to emerge within these decades.⁴ And not only was Britain's diplomatic isolation an increasing concern for contemporary opinion, but also her economic preponderance was clearly coming to an end. Already by 1875 nearly half the wheat consumed in Britain was imported from abroad. Britain was beginning to pay the penalty of industrial leadership, which was dependence for her food supplies on overseas producers.⁵ Then, as prices fell after the financial crisis of 1873, export values fell off rapidly, although imports remained high. For the twenty years up to 1874, Britain had exported an annual average surplus of about £15,000,000. She had done this in addition to reinvesting abroad almost all the earnings from existing foreign investments - some £50,000,000 a year by the mid 1870s. But in 1876 and 1877 Britain collected significant income from her foreign investments for home consumption. The tide of economic expansion had turned. Even the birth rate started to fall.

Meanwhile the era of the great depression, 1873-96, initiated what many historians have seen as the era of formal imperialism. Imperialism itself was not a new thing for Britain, but what was new was the end of the virtual British monopoly in the undeveloped world. Britain tried to preserve her areas of imperial influence through formally marking^{them} out against potential competitors; often ahead of any actual prospects of economic benefits and often with disappointing economic results. Rather than modernising her existing industries and facing her competitors head on, Britain retreated still further into the colonies; until eventually the number of colonies ran out.⁶

So preservation of existing trade and informal empire was what characterised these years for Britain. Strategically and economically she wished to maintain her position against the newly perceived threat of Germany, which inevitably left little room for humanitarian attitudes. The periodicals had no time to afford finer feelings for the native races,

they were too busy looking at Britain's rivals. Colonies were seen as pawns, and the Bismarckian view of imperial politics was readily adopted by the periodical press.⁷

Similarly, any possibility of the dissolution of the empire had to be stopped. Imperial federation might provide a practical middle way between colonial independence and rigid imperial dictatorship by Britain, but in no way should the drift to disintegration be tolerated. Indeed, any reduction in imperial liabilities was seen as numbering Britain's days as a great power;⁸ and Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech of 1872 actually specified not an expanding empire but the need to uphold and maintain it, and protect it from disintegration.⁹

As Platt has observed,¹⁰ the fact that Britain was so tied to free trade could in some degree have been responsible for pre-emptive annexations carried out through fear of foreign powers' tariffs. Robinson and Gallagher, and Fieldhouse, argue that the chronology of tariffs does not support this view;¹¹ but this may be missing the point of contemporary expectations. The pages of the periodical press were alive to the threat of foreign trade barriers,¹² and annexations were seen in the light of the preservation of the blessed system of free trade. The maintenance of a fair field and no favour - whether the threats to it were real or imagined - was pre-eminent. Britain's industrial economy had been built on her first wave of colonies, and so she fell back on colonies once other nations had industrialised and caught up with her. Thus stringent measures were taken for the protection of the traditional areas of trade, such as India, and for the places en route to India, such as South Africa and Egypt. Meanwhile increased formal concern was bestowed upon new areas, such as central Africa and the Pacific, so that no-one else, especially Germany, should take them instead.

Throughout her activities of the 1870s and '80s, Britain was going forward and formally expanding merely as a way of standing still and preserving what she already had. Expectations ran high, in terms of what Britain was getting and of what she was stopping others from getting. This also acted as a boost for sagging confidence. The imperatives behind her actions were diplomatic and strategic, in European terms, and economic and social, in domestic terms. Colonies themselves were of secondary importance to the Victorian imperialists, however much the actual circumstances on the periphery affected the course of events. Britain, and Europe, were dragged forward by the magnetism of the colonies, but they were more than willing to be dragged.

The immediate consequence of the Franco-Prussian war, in the periodical press, was a renewed outburst of articles on Britain's military strength.¹³ "For what follows the French war are we ready?" asked one. The internal aspect of Britain's strength was also emphasised. Britain's foes were not those who came to slay her, but those who told her she was already slain.¹⁴ The answer clearly lay with the Volunteers. Such a militia would render Britain safe from invasion by relying on

"that warlike spirit which we still persist in believing has not deserted the descendants of those who fought at Crecy, Blenheim, Waterloo, Inkerman and Delhi." 15

The common worry was well put in a prayer for statesmen of the calibre of Prussia's sixty years previously, accompanied by a warning that France's fate could easily overtake Britain:

"Our real danger lies in the careless ignorance which hides from us the dangers by which we are surrounded, and prevents us taking those measures by which alone they can be avoided.... More even than this, we want that the mass of the nation should rouse itself from the lethargy of security in which it is now slumbering; and, like true patriots, that we should prepare ourselves to make those sacrifices of time and money which alone can save the British empire from dismemberment, and these islands from the horror of invasion." 16

The links between imperial security and domestic invasion were clearly spelt out. So was the remedy, which was perceived specifically to lie within the field of domestic sacrifice of time and money. Belts had to be tightened, and sloth shaken off. The threat of lost colonies could be seen in another light, however. For Britain's difficulties included the need to provide relief for the troops in India. Only France had any similar problem, and Algeria was very small in comparison. One article even described a future Battle of Dorking, where the British forces had been depleted due to Indian and Canadian commitments. "We continued to retain possessions which we could not possibly defend."¹⁷ Although this hardly argued seriously for disengagement, it is instructive that there existed a perception of domestic threat from colonial over-commitment.

Colonies and mother country were inextricably linked over the question of defence, even though conclusions to be drawn from the links varied. More noticeable still is the general concern with the armed forces throughout the press. Although some journals were more bellicose than others, or merely gave more coverage, even liberal papers such as the Westminster Review bemoaned the dismal state of British military organisation.¹⁸ Punch added a cartoon of Britannia talking to Belgium. Entitled "Trust Me!" it prophetically showed England saying "Let us hope that they won't trouble you, dear friend. But if they do -- ".¹⁹

The defence theme continued to tick over during these years, with especial upsurges during the Russo-Turkish war of 1878 and the West African, Afghan, Egyptian and South African campaigns of the early 1880s. It was also defence of empire - whether strategic or economic - which explained the attitudes of the periodical journals to most of the colonial conflicts themselves. From the Mediterranean to the Cape, from Khartoum to Kabul, defence of India and the routes thereto were the paramount objectives.

In this way, the importance of a fortified harbour on the island of Crete was readily apparent to journalistic opinion. If ever the Bosphorus were opened to Russia, Crete would become a necessary link in the chain which secured British communications with the East.²⁰ Similarly Cyprus formed part of this same line of defence. As Hyam points out, only Cyprus seemed to combine the requisite characteristics of suitable location, size, population, defensibility, commercial prospects, with inoffensiveness (as a British possession) to other European powers. He suggests that Cyprus was **occupied** instead of Egypt, in order not to alienate France, and France came out of the deal, insofar as there was one, with Tunis, a much better proposition.²¹ Strangely, however, the periodicals were more interested in stressing all kinds of associated benefits to Cyprus other than the principal one. Cyprus was expected to recover her lost splendour under British protection, while caution was recommended for all who intended to embark on enterprises there.²² Punch noted:

"Among the disadvantages objected to Cyprus is its want of a natural harbour. This defect should be promptly remedied by the erection of a factitious harbour. Everything is possible to British enterprise and capital."

The piece ran on through joint-stock association, prospectus, subscriptions, work which would begin with the revival of commercial prosperity confidently anticipated as a result of the treaty of Berlin, and eventual absconding with the money by the promoters. Letters followed from "Happy Cyprus", often from one Jeremiah Diddler, who was surveying the field of enterprise.²³

Even in terms of defence there was often a strange kind of emphasis on strategic imperialism. Britain would keep Cyprus and nose as an imperial power, said one magazine, while the Russian threat would keep Britain watchful.²⁴ The Suez Canal produced similarly varied responses on the part of the periodicals. One told the story of a Canal bathe, and asked if the Canal would realise the hopes of the courageous men to whom its accomplishment was due; though

an improvement in Mediterranean commerce was also confidently expected. England's "half-sulky" efforts against the undertaking were . . . described, and the feeling was that England should wish it the best, as England would gain the most. English practical control of the Canal, on the grounds of using it the most, was also urged. The Fortnightly Review, however, carried the view that something which was really a European interest should be provided for by European concert.²⁵

Throughout these articles the element of strategic defence is markedly absent.²⁶ Instead there is clear evidence of defence of economic empire, and of expectations of increased trade for Britain through dominant control of the Canal. The Suez Canal was "a maritime highway valuable to the world at large, and to Great Britain in particular."²⁷ The idea that the interests of the world were best served if the interests of Britain were served was implicit in most economic attitudes at this time. Furthermore, there was a definite confusion of the general strategic value of areas with the specific economic advantages they conferred. The periodicals agreed with the essentially defensive imperialism on offer, but their rationalisations convey a sense of uncertainty as to the motives behind this imperialism.

The Mediterranean was not the only route to India. As defence of homeland expanded into defence of European approaches, so in its turn the latter expanded into the traditional areas of concern - central Asia and the Cape. The imagined threats to India, and therefore implicitly to Britain, were assisted by the habitual Victorian usage of small scale maps, making great distances into gentle paces at one blink of the eye.

Moreover, especially with South Africa, there was a two-fold problem. Not only were there white settlers, presumably under specific directions from their own mother countries, but also there were large numbers of

indigenous blacks, who appeared surprisingly reluctant to become civilised. Mirroring this dual difficulty, the periodicals were keen to uphold British treatment of the black natives against Boer mistreatment, and to blame the ill feeling caused by the Boers for any British-Zulu conflict. While terrible disasters were befalling Britain's usually victorious troops, it was felt that it was the treating of natives as slaves by the Boers which had made the latter obnoxious to the natives. British annexation of the Transvaal, on the other hand, would tend to civilise the African.²⁸

There was also condemnation of the savages, who had "dared to defy British power" -

"We knew of how little avail it is to urge prudential considerations on savages, who do not count the cost With the Zulu savage no arguments have force save those that are backed up by a pistol." 29

The war was not a "lust for aggression" or "imperialist tendencies", but merely following the old adage "si vis pacem, para bellum". The interesting aspect to a modern eye is the domestic angle which appears through the language of the periodicals. Civilisation and barbarism in close juxtaposition were incompatible, said one; surely not without some idea of the relationship between upper and lower classes at home. "The savage must accept civilisation or disappear before it."³⁰ Surprise was expressed at the courtesy of the Zulu chiefs, however. There was almost as much difference between the manners of upper and lower class Zulus as between ourselves, it was observed.³¹

Meanwhile there were objections to meddling in other people's affairs when Britain had enough to do for herself:

"The sooner we withdraw from a position that brings us into hostility with the natives whom we are supposed to be protecting the better for African peoples and English taxpayers."

Directly relating the matter to domestic politics, there was an appeal for a government with sufficient trust in the nation's strength not to be always seeking to remove possible enemies from its frontiers' neighbourhood. All in all, foreign affairs were distracting attention from domestic programmes.³²

Yet the "little war" against the Zulus was as nothing compared with the strategic, economic and constitutional problems with respect to the Boers. The European connection was clear in that the Boers were regarded as Dutch, rather than as the established settlers they in reality were; while the gold and diamonds to be found in the region underlined its economic desirability. Humanitarians and constitutionalists could only react against this background, and the values inherent to South Africa again confused the wider strategy of the route to the east.

Thus the "misguided " Boers, who were, incidentally, "arrant cowards", were failing to develop the natural resources of their country, as well as omitting to introduce a just and merciful policy towards the original owners. It was not the most pleasant of duties, but Britain was compelled by circumstances to annex the Transvaal.³³ The domestic political slant to the whole issue was also stressed. The situation was the fruit of the unhappy policy of the previous government, as well as of the unhappy timidity of the present government in reversing it.³⁴ Not only were the Boers described as "conservative partly to reinforce Britain's own liberal, democratic nature, but the South African village which regarded itself as the centre of the universe, rather than as a nook and corner of the world, was overtly castigated without ironic regard to Britain's own chauvinism.³⁵ After the conflict was over, Chambers' Journal even had a report from "One on the Spot" who observed the falling-off in Transvaal revenue since the British troops had left, and who averred that the Boers themselves, with very few exceptions, wished that the British were back again.³⁶ Any possibility that Britons might ever overstay their welcome was not to be tolerated. The final insult was to contrast the "morose and treacherous Boer" with the "manly dignity" evident in the Kafir.³⁷

This is not to deny that several articles saw the unjustifiable action by Britain in annexing the gold fields.³⁸ But the question was still seen in terms of the mistakes of one domestic political party as against the sensible policies of the other. In this, Gladstone was usually the *bête noire* for his "cowardice" and the disgrace of Majuba Hill. The radical party was thus to blame for the whole war.³⁹ Somehow the internal politics of Britain could be translated into the colonial problems of South Africa, and the attitudes generated by the former were adopted towards the latter. This was the real chauvinism of the periodical press.

It is then not surprising to find the same opinions delivered with respect to Afghanistan. As one reviewer said, "the government can neither make up their minds to fight nor to treat, to stand still or to go back." Determined to quit Afghanistan, they had lingered at the borders of Pishin. Determined to quash the rebellious Boers, they had granted all that the Boers had demanded.⁴⁰ Placing the blame as exactly as possible, it was noted:

"Something must be sacrificed to the Birmingham dislike of national growth and national glory, and that something shall be Candahar."

This relationship of external to internal need not obscure the very real changes in colonial policy occasioned by changes at Westminster. Without doubt the overtures made by Sher Ali to Lords Mayo and Northbrook could have prevented the second Afghan war if accepted, but the Liberal administration would not commit itself to a tangible treaty. In contrast, Disraeli's appointment of Lord Lytton ensured that Sher Ali's subsequent move towards Russia would be interpreted as a hostile gesture, rather than as the defensive reflex it was.⁴¹ In similar fashion, the disaffected Boers looked to the incoming Liberal government of 1880 to reverse the wrong of Conservative annexation carried out in 1877; and honoured the memory of Gladstone, who had initiated peace proceedings before Majuba, for years afterwards.⁴² None

of these genuine perceptions of difference in policy alter the original contention, however. The periodicals were almost unanimously setting out to prove that the domestic politicians were responsible for the colonial failures and successes, and were imposing the internal political tensions upon imperial events. Only in this way can the contradictory conclusions from similar premises be successfully explained.⁴³ The journals took their standpoint, based on domestic perceptions, and fitted the imperial findings into their own preconceived pattern. Even more than the journals, for they themselves were not the unified single-opinion publications one might expect, the contributors to these journals expressed their own feelings from an original preconsidered viewpoint. The extent to which the journals exerted influence was their choice of a particular contributor, whose opinions were likely to be known from their own domestic political position anyway.⁴⁴

The probabilities of a Russian advance on India through central Asia had therefore been bandied about from all political angles throughout the 1870s. Whether Russia wanted to invade, or could not help herself invading, or was able to invade in the first place, the periodicals faithfully reported her advances into Persia and Afghanistan, and argued in favour of or against retaliatory advances on the British part.⁴⁵ In particular the Edinburgh Review thought it madness if the current Anglo-Russian friendship was spoiled because of some imaginary danger in the heart of central Asia, and suggested that the peace of the world depended on the matter. The paper declared itself not a Russian apologist, but merely one who thought Russia had yielded to circumstances, rather than to aggressive expansion. Sir Arthur Hobhouse,

in the Fortnightly Review, said that Herat was not the key to India, and that Britain had no right to "protect" Afghanistan. Even Macmillans, advocating an English advance to the Oxus as any attempt to maintain Afghanistan as an independent "buffer" would be fruitless, thought that the meeting of England and Russia on the Oxus should still be friendly.⁴⁶ The hard liners were not impressed. Russia could not be trusted, and there was no hope for any policy which was based on keeping "in accord with Gladstone's speeches". However "irksome" the Afghans might find a temporary occupation of their country, it had saved them from the worse evils which Shere Ali's Russian leanings might have brought them.⁴⁷ After all, Britain had always repudiated any sinister designs of her own upon the territories of mid-Asian princes. "Our object was simply to help them against the common foe"⁴⁸ (my underlining)

Above all, and in contrast to the security of India argument, the Russophobes saw the grim hand of economic motive behind the Great Bear's advances. Fraser's generously declared :

"We are willing to believe that Russia may not now desire to absorb the whole commerce of the world, and that even did she possess the East, some slice might be left to other nations." 49

The Quarterly Review noted:

"But perhaps the most potent motive which actuates the non-military classes of Russians in desiring enlargement of empire in Asia, is a wish for commercial extension." 50

Even the conciliatory Edinburgh Review saw the inherent importance of trade. Every Englishman wanting central Asian tranquillity desired that "extensive Russian trade with Eastern Toorkistan might follow. Russian advances increased civilisation. They were not aggressive political moves, but a development of trade; and under the laws of free trade this could only benefit Britain, said the journal, noting in passing the petroleum discoveries near Baku."⁵¹

Once more the wider strategy had become confused with, or even subordinated to, the inherent economic motive. Also it is noteworthy how

the periodicals' descriptions of Russian motives for expansion could equally apply to Britain's own advances; although the papers themselves clearly did not see this irony. The third route to India which re-emerged in these years again confirmed all these themes. Just as South Africa was seen as a conflict with the Dutch, and as an economic advantage in its own right, and as a strategic route to the east, and just as central Asia was strategic and economic and a conflict with Russia, so then Egypt followed the same recipe, only with the old enemy of France to contend with. And again it was the domestic politicians who were to blame. Perceptions of colonies, viewed through perceptions of European conflicts, all came back to perceptions of internal politics.

Thus leading articles on Egypt were entitled "The Justification of Lord Beaconsfield's Policy" and "Was the Egyptian War Necessary?". The Conservatives, it was alleged, would have stood by the Khedive and backed him up, whilst Gladstone declared war on the national party. Even the Indian troops who helped in Egypt were only available thanks to Beaconsfield's earlier policy. Most significantly, when the sands had settled, these writers felt able to justify the protectorate on Salisbury's own grounds:

""we are now the predominant Power in Egypt..... why should we allow diplomacy to fritter away what the valour of our soldiers has won?""

England had to resign herself to the disagreeable necessity of a real protectorate of the country.⁵²

In contrast, there was a view that the Tory party had denounced the paralysis of the government, while the expedition to Egypt - conducted with consummate ability and crowned with success - had vindicated the government and defended the interests of empire. It was with pride that England could look at the good conferred on the Egyptians by English rule.⁵³ The Whigs and the Tories could both be satisfied by the actions of a "Radical" government, however tortuously they justified them. Only the supposedly "Radical" papers

might find themselves in difficulty. The Fortnightly Review upheld the feeling that it would not do to be dazzled by the marvellous military success of the campaign, and that Egypt should be for the Egyptians. But if England now left Egypt, civilisation would be retarded. The only justification for the occupation was to make the people prosperous, and even on selfish grounds this would be good, as it would make Egypt more secure. England must just make the best of it.⁵⁴ The Westminster did not even go so far as this. "Imperialism", it announced, "properly so called, is simply an attribute of empire." Men should not decry it for party purpose. "Haply England may soon have but to stretch forth her hands for the equity of Egypt's redemption." This was, however, before the war. Afterwards the paper inclined to the view that the Egyptian war "has altogether had a very marked effect in improving public opinion on this question of Imperial defence." In 1887 the Canal was held to be of considerable importance to Britain for military purposes, and assumption of a protectorate over the Canal was strongly urged. The first step towards this would be a permanent footing in lower Egypt. For if England remained in Egypt, she should count on having to fight France for it. If Egypt was worth this conflict, it was argued, she should take it now; if not, there should be an equally immediate withdrawal. The present middle course was wrong.⁵⁵

In all this, humanity was at a discount. When noting Baker's pure motives in his anti-slavery campaign, one paper regretted that he had given just the impulse to put Britain in the false position of being compelled to rule Egypt as well as keep it neutral. Another discussed railways, communication Suez and security, hoping Russia would not find some route to by-pass Suez;

and then piously pretended that these were not the real concerns:

"It is not the military occupation of Egypt that is in question, it is the regeneration of that unhappy country which is the task imposed on England by her own interests and by the interests of humanity." 56

This hardly squared with the subsequent assertions that France was to blame for anti-foreigner sentiment throughout North Africa, and that France's true policy should have been to act cordially with Britain.⁵⁷ European and security concerns left little room for real humanitarian sympathy, whatever the protestations of the benefits accruing from British rule. The real lie to the humanitarian impulse came in the Edinburgh Review:

"No-one in Europe doubts that this country has the power to accomplish a great work in Egypt, beneficial to the Egyptians, to British enterprise, and to the world. To fail for want of resolution in the performance of a task which Providence seems to have placed in our hands, and which may lead to far-reaching consequences in the present unsettled condition of Eastern politics, would expose this country to the scorn and derision of mankind." 58

What the neighbours thought was of supreme importance, whatever the inherent circumstances of the issue itself.

Apart from the direct question of the route to the east, which was implicit in all attitudes to central Asia, the Cape and the Canal, India produced two other major developments at this time. Firstly the Indian army had been employed in conflicts outside the sub-continent, notably Egypt, with apparently good effect; although the impressions left on the minds of the Indian soldiers might have had consequences for subsequent nationalism. Secondly, the 1875 census of India showed the total population to be over 190 million, nearly five times that of the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ The consciousness of such a huge number of people, ruled over by a handful of civil servants, must have played its part in the increasingly strong assertions of the need to preserve Britain's hold over the Indian empire. It was indeed argued that the empire of India was an empire which every man in Great Britain felt himself to be part emperor. Admit India to federation, and all that would be lost.⁶⁰

Similar fears about the government of India existed throughout the press. To train India to self government might benefit both countries, argued one writer, but to unite all India by railway and meanwhile incur the insolence

of race would produce calamity. British India was under British government, but it was observed that the true principles of independence had never yet become acclimatised as near home as Ireland.⁶¹ The essential need to discourage disunity in Ireland, and thus implicitly India, was clear. Although several articles described Indian missions, reasoning that India must surely have been committed to British care so as to receive the benefits of just laws and national liberty, others were increasingly concerned with economic matters, and the chilling prospect of India doing without Britain. The abolition of import duties on cotton was an advantage to India and to free trade, not a concession to Manchester, according to this standpoint. Similarly the article "A Pickle of Salt" reflected harsher attitudes to attempts to collect Bengal salt rather than accept the enforced import of salt from England.⁶² Lastly, and as with all the routes to India, the sub-continent itself was viewed in domestic political terms. The hill tribes could become tractable, said one journal, provided Britain avoided the appearance of desiring to annex them. Conservatives pursuing this policy were appealing to a stupid form of patriotism to win elections. Liberals, on the other hand, did not say empire was not worth preserving, but that there was no real danger to its security.⁶³ The distinctions were, however, increasingly blurred. Rather it was the conservative journals who gave the argument clarity. Neglect by the Liberal government was what the Quarterly Review believed to be doing much to estrange the colonies. "British rule is firmly seated in India; England has only one enemy to fear - herself."

While the three primary routes to India were being vigorously defended, albeit in varying ways, these years also saw interest in regions not immediately related. On closer inspection, however, the same principle of defensive preservation of informal empire can be seen to exist. The arguments within the periodicals were merely extended by one degree.

So it was the embarrassment perpetual to a great empire to become involved in little wars against unruly natives. When deliberate attack was made on British possessions, declared one review, Britain was obliged to vindicate her authority, not only in defence of a small colonial interest, but also for the great principles of civilisation, peace and freedom. Unhappily to a great country -

"no interests are small and no war is little. Whatever the game, and wherever it be played, the stakes of England are always large." 64

There was praise for British arms in the Ashantee wars of 1873-4, although there was some denunciation of the secret diplomacy of the war and a call for English people to have a greater share in their own management.⁶⁵ It was also noted that while the Ashantees were doubtful of civilisation, they were alive to the advantages of commerce. It should be the aim to obtain and retain trade, but war was blocking this. There was a similar approach a decade later. "The country can, of course, never afford more than a foothold for white traders", as a result of the prohibitive climate. But the advent of European influence would do more than anything to maintain peace and allow the natives of these vast rich and fertile districts to accumulate their produce and establish a profitable market for European wares.⁶⁶ Whatever the true economic potential of the region, it is noticeable how the contemporary commentators and men who actually took part in the processes of partitioning on the spot; such as Lugard, Goldie and Johnston, were unanimous in ascribing primacy to the economic motive.⁶⁷ The periodicals were not unusual therefore in this regard.

A more obvious extension of the principle of maintaining empire existed in the Sudan. Apart from a heroic story of epic proportions - "a chapter of history full of picturesque interest"⁶⁸ - the whole Gordon fiasco was easily transformed into another party political point-scoring session. When discussing the terms on which Gordon should remain in Khartoum, it was felt that the empire could not safely be ruled in accordance with the passing cries of whatever chanced to be the most boisterous section of the hour.⁶⁹

Conversely, anti-Gladstone tirades suggested that the Mahdi's massacres could bring some good in showing people the ugliest aspects of party politics. Gordon's death was "a disaster with the eyes of the world upon us, and which we cannot escape from by an ignominious convention, as we did from Majuba Hill". Again the standing Britain enjoyed in the eyes of her neighbours was of more importance than the fate of Gordon. Moreover, it was due to the imbecility of her rulers, according to this view, that England, at a time when she was without friends, had locked up her army in a struggle with African savages, when the army might be wanted elsewhere. Russian aggression could only be encouraged by English failure.⁷⁰ Even in the liberal Westminster Review there was a declared unconcern as to whether a Tory policy in Egypt would have been worse. The Liberal Government could not escape by pretending Gordon was wrong. They had failed to support him, and everyone knew what the result had been.⁷¹ The majority of the journals were on Gordon's side, regardless of how they had to twist their domestic political leanings to justify it.⁷² The majority were also in favour of maintaining the empire as they saw it, although for some this included the Sudan as well as Egypt, and for others Egypt was enough. The attitude of mind differed little throughout the journals. Condemnation, whether of Liberal or Tory, hardly gave much real consideration to the colonial circumstances themselves.

The same was certainly true of the Congo and the Berlin Conference of 1884. Domestic, or at least European, circumstances were far more pressing than those of the colonial territories in question. As foreign politicians were loyally guarding their interests in central Africa, it was held that Britain should do likewise.⁷³ The occasional defence of the Congo negro as not a poor, ignorant savage, did not greatly alter the predominant attitude of concern with the commercial and political "rights" of the European powers.

The Fortnightly Review thought "we are under an obligation to preserve our empire unimpaired". Writing of England, France and Portugal, with no mention of the indigenous population, the paper wanted the Congo left "free to the trade and enterprise of the whole world". It would soon become a most important highway of commerce,

"to the advantage of both the nations of consumers on its banks and the hard pressed toilers who earn their bread as producers in more civilised parts of the globe".

Elsewhere there were similar feelings of privilege at assisting in the religious, commercial, scientific and political competition opened up to Europe by the Congo. The question was not one of national rivalry, but civilisation against barbarism. The future of the Congo could only be fairly regulated by opening her waters on equal conditions and under reasonable regulations to the commerce of the world. While hoping that the Congo could be treated as a commercial rather than a political issue, there was some bemoaning the signal failure of the laudable attempt to secure the introduction of physical and political geography into the curriculum of the public schools. ⁷⁴

All in all, the existing trade of Britain in central Africa could best be guaranteed through a Congo treaty. The periodicals were not alone in this belief. Granville's reaction to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce had been to ask whether Britain should really "take possession of every navigable river all over the world, and every avenue of commerce, for fear somebody else should take possession of it?" Yet a few months later Granville himself was negotiating for equal opportunities for British trade in the Congo. As Platt says, Britain no more than any other trading nation could stand by while the markets of the world were closed to her trade. ⁷⁵ Whether or not they would have been closed is neither here nor there. The periodicals thought they would, and that was what counted.

Similarly, British interest in Bechuanaland followed German annexation of South West Africa. Anticipation of German interference in the Transvaal took over from fear of Dutch backing for the Boers; and Britain moved into

Bechuanaland as a wedge between the German hinterland and the Transvaal. German traders would otherwise have been in a position to prevent British control of arms supply to both Africans and Afrikaners. Still with an eye on India, and with added fear of French interest in Madagascar, statements such as Gladstone's on 9 December 1884 were not untypical -

"It seems that wherever there is a dark corner in South African politics there is a German spectre to be the tenant of it" 76

Unsurprisingly then, and especially after the occurrence of the Berlin Conference, one is brought back to the spectre haunting the whole of British periodical journals' outlook throughout these years. That Germany was not the specific fear in Egypt or central Asia hardly mattered. Her sheer unknown capacity was part and parcel of the apprehension. When she appeared in South Africa, central Africa, and one or two other more far-flung areas of the globe, the imagined threats seemed to be materialising. German technical education, navy, army, trade, and even political system, all seemed to come together at the crucial moment to produce success. And Germans were also Teutonic.

In this way the periodicals noted the way the Germans and Scandinavians were taking both the shadow and the reality of the British imperial estate. In developing Germany, Bismarck had "been followed by the best people on the globe's surface". To Dilke, German colonisation was, however, a sham; and German colonies obstructed civilisation in the same way as the Portuguese. German industry preferred to go to lands where liberty is enjoyed, such as under British or American protection. Or, as another put it, "Africa is large enough for the Teutonic and the Anglo-Saxon races". But the dement of envy was never far away. German naval power was described thus:

"the progress and condition of the naval power of foreign nations cannot be other than supremely interesting to a maritime people like ourselves"

Apart from the selfish feeling and fear, Britain needed to know how to improve her navy, to keep her pre-eminence.⁷⁷ Articles directly envious, uncertainly supercilious, or openly aggressive, teemed the pages of the periodicals.⁷⁸

The obvious ability of Germany to improve, economically and strategically, contrasted forcibly with Britain's own stagnation. Germany's internal cohesion added further reproach to a Britain riddled with industrial and political dissent.

Several other areas of the world achieved some prominence in the journals of the 1870s and 1880s. Often this was because such areas had only just been discovered, or else explored. Each new addition to the atlas soon became an addition to the stock of territories to be defended strategically or economically, and it is entirely in keeping with the periodicals' style that such "new" regions became well-established facets of the imperial repertoire.

As Harpers' said:

"Since the lamented Dr Livingstone set the fashion of exploring Africa, that benighted country has been so walked over and investigated and searched into by British travellers that there will hardly be a mountain, or river, or village left for the coming generation to discover, and as every traveller writes a book, the accumulated store of literature upon Africa has already assumed very respectable proportions." 79

Others were similarly captivated by the mighty geographical puzzle of the African rivers, and rather missed the tinge of mystery which was dispelled by their discovery.⁸⁰ Mostly, however, the journals let geography lead on to commerce. Great fortunes were expected from Uganda, and Sir Rutherford Alcock thought:

"Commerce has not had, since the discovery of the new world, so vast a field for profitable enterprise opened to it as Africa will soon present".

The remaining duty for the white man was to explore the land for produce and for the best ways of getting it to the coast.⁸¹ For it was not just self interest: "Commerce, however, quietly insinuates into barbarous populations the good which conquest endeavours to force upon them."⁸² Not only could exploration help to eradicate the slave trade, but there was an obvious duty to open up commercial routes for their own sake.

"That Africa might become a second America we cannot doubt".⁸³ In contrast, although the men on Arctic expeditions might dare anything for their flag, it was doubted that the Polar Sea would produce any more benefits.⁸⁴

Another area which it was felt would produce benefits was the Pacific. The importance of the Fiji Islands to Britain's colonial trade and to her position in the Pacific was heavily stressed, as was the anarchic nature of the South Sea Islanders which had impelled annexation.⁸⁵ Only later did the Westminster applaud the Pacific Islanders Protection Bill. Britons had often become worse than the savages in their hunt for gold, it said, but this Bill would restore trust in the honour of the white man, which is the first impulse of the weaker races. It would also fit them to develop the resources of the fertile lands which seemed destined by nature to add largely to the comforts and enjoyments of civilised man.⁸⁶ To this paper as well, the economic dividends and their expropriation remained in the long run unquestioned

The same was true throughout the Pacific and the far east. The harbours of North Borneo were highlighted from the point of view of their use to British commerce,⁸⁷ and Ceylon was seen as a tea and coffee exporter as well as a centre from which to despatch troops to any of Britain's great eastern possessions in time of need.⁸⁸ Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the lands of Samoa were intended primarily for Samoans and not European planters, it was felt sad to see how the natives had alienated their lands. There was no difficulty in seeing Britain accepting them, though.⁸⁹ Burmah was regarded as a great commercial asset - rubies were especially easy to come by there - and nothing short of conversion of Upper Burmah into a British province seemed capable of being thought out as a practicable scheme.⁹⁰

Continuing the theme of extended defence, there was some focussing on the island of Formosa. A Chinese-Japanese conflict over Formosa could not fail to have its effect on India, and "India touched means England alarmed. So even the little known island of Formosa may at any time be the cause of trouble here in the west."⁹¹ China itself was, of course, a prime consideration for Britain's economic empire. The fact, as Feldhouse points out, that where economic considerations predominated, economic forces did not necessarily lead to formal empire, is irrelevant. Economic partition, which Britain was to participate in and indeed promote, was quite sufficient.⁹² Moreover, the periodicals' encouragement of economic penetration was undoubted.⁹³ They only mirrored a certain amount of government assistance to British enterprise in China; as in helping Jardine Matheson to rise above its foreign rivals in the mid 1880s.⁹⁴ Preserving economic empire by economic means was just as important as any strategic defence or formal annexation.

One interesting sideline was provided by the French advances in Anam and Tonquin. Dismissing any jealousy or hostility, the Edinburgh Review declared: "England has no apprehension whatever from French success". What was worrying was the prospect of France failing to sustain the reputation of European superiority necessary to the maintenance of Asiatic peace. Implicitly Britain would never so fail.⁹⁵ The Westminster went further. "There is . . . reason to apprehend that the very measures which are being taken to favour French trade will tend rather to hinder commercial progress." Again there was no possibility of British action tending to hinder such commercial progress.⁹⁶ Both these journals were defending not only British empire but also British reputation of empire.

One other area with constant though rarely spectacular coverage was South America. Ranging from articles praising the wealth of Bolivia and Brazil - a subject "full of interest for Europe and America" - to those on Argentina, Peru and Chili - a land "full of natural beauties and mineral wealth", the papers were keen to stress the commercial possibilities involved.⁸⁷ As Hyam observes, although the Americans gradually moved in, by 1914 Britain still had four times the American level of investment in Brazil.⁸⁸ The element of British bowing down before American pressure in Latin America did not deter the periodicals' interest in the area; although the fact that America was still regarded as basically friendly may explain the lack of need to defend British interests more strongly.

This was not true of the majority of the earth's surface. As Fieldhouse notes, the whole world was Britain's field of investment.⁸⁹ It was protection of that investment which characterised most of the periodical journals' attitudes to empire. Attention moved in the 1870s and 1880s from the Mediterranean to the near east to the far east, the extension of the principle of preservation of empire explaining much of the opinions involved. Yet these opinions were impelled very clearly by European, and finally domestic, political and economic considerations. The imperial circumstances were made to fit the European and domestic facts, and the perception of empire depended on the perception of matters nearer home. Above all, the recognised economic depression and the military and commercial advance of Germany clouded the periodicals' approach to an informal empire which had served earlier needs when competition was either absent or perceived to be non-existent. Instead this period closed with an imperial agreement between England and Germany which used formal colonies as diplomatic pawns.

As the Victorian middle class dug its heels in against a pronounced recession, and attempted to preserve its share of the market against the threat of organised labour, and especially organised unskilled labour, so the periodicals dug in to preserve the empire built up over the previous half century. As Ireland boded to disintegrate the United Kingdom, so attitudes to Egypt, South Africa and, inevitably, India, were increasingly harsh in favour of maintenance of existing empire. Finally as Germany appeared to be increasing in strength still further beyond her conquest of France, the British periodicals responded with growing defence of both economic and strategic empire, which empire was stretched further and further in anticipation of the Teuton threat. Unsurprisingly, when the German drive towards colonies occurred, there were only those further and further flung outposts to be considered, and the prophetic gloom was self-fulfilling. The problems of empire were consequent on and secondary to the conflicts, real and imagined, within Europe itself.

The aggressive jingoism displayed by most of the national periodical press in the last decade of Victoria's reign owed much to the intensified feelings of being threatened. The threat of continuing economic stagnation, of the growing military and territorial strength of Germany, and of a rising and organised working class, now including unskilled as well as skilled labourers, forced attitudes to a fever pitch of sensationalist imperialism, often justified by reference to Darwinian precepts and ideas of survival of the fittest. Although these attitudes appeared to reflect a greater desire for a forward policy, expansion for its own sake, and for avenging Khartoum and Majuba, in fact they were an expression of the consciousness of decline.¹ The attempt to find solutions to Britain's problems by clutching frantically at imperial fantasies only masked the underlying pessimism. But the pessimism, and the accompanying militarism and strident racialism, was undoubtedly there.² In terms of the dynamism of the British economy, the horse had already bolted;³ and that the late Victorians could not bring it back again explains much of the outspoken imperialist attitudes which were trying to compensate for it.

However, it was not only that the late Victorians could not invigorate British industry. Admittedly they could not prevent the relative loss of supremacy consequent upon the industrialisation of other nations, but they could have adapted to the changes in circumstances. In particular they could have placed more emphasis on the role of science in technology, and on the technical and scientific education needed to sustain growth; as well as on the modernisation of equipment, on the extension of the factory system and the increase in the scale of economic enterprise (as indeed Marx had predicted for capitalism), and above all on the discovery that the largest potential

market lay in the rising incomes of the mass of working citizens in economically developed countries. None of these received the attention they deserved, despite the concern of the press with technical education, and the marked example of what was happening in Germany. Not even the depression of 1873-96 was great enough to frighten British industry into fundamental change.⁴

The reason for this was that the traditional methods of short-term profit-making were still sufficiently attractive to postpone the necessary modernisation of industry. To rely on colonies, formal and informal, and to rest on the laurels of her position as international money-lender, was much more convenient for Britain than to meet the growing competition head-on. The British economy retreated into trade and finance, built up historically over the previous century, and away from industry. Increasingly the areas of the globe into which her trade retreated became more remote, and the lengths to which Britain would go to protect this trade became disproportionately severe. The territorial acquisitions received more publicity than before, creating a misleading break in continuity; but the traditional outlook remained the same. This became true to such an extent that foreign investment was perceived as an alternative to domestic investment, and exceeded the net capital formation at home; which led advanced liberals such as J.A. Hobson to oppose imperialism on the grounds that the money could be better spent on social reform within Britain.⁵ The idea that foreign and domestic investments were exclusively separate and alternative permeated the whole of society.

But the outlook was still based in tradition. All that had happened was that defence of empire, economic and strategic, had been extended throughout the whole of the rest of the world. The perception that the limits had been reached - the Westminster Review thought that 1896 marked the turning point in Anglo-Saxon history, and that territorial expansion had ceased⁶ - and the consciousness of decline relative to other powers, notably Germany, with whom conflicts were bound to occur, did not alter the basic approach. Empire was there to be maintained, even if it needed a lot more shouting to do it. Or, as Marx wrote, the tendency of profits to fall could be temporarily checked by counteracting causes, one of which was the exploitation of underdeveloped countries by developed ones.⁷

This world wide extension of imperial craving did not, however, obscure the European motivations behind it. It was Germany's presence as a threat to the British empire which became most noticeable in accounts of colonial territories all over the globe, and it was Germany's diplomatic manoeuvres within Europe which caused most alarm in the articles of the periodical press. The questions of British isolation and imperial federation therefore took on added significance in this decade. Britain needed physical support from her colonies both in empire and, possibly, in Europe. This extended also to an old ex-colony, America, with whom links were advocated in many periodical articles.⁸ The annoyance of disputes such as those over Alaska and Venezuela was increased by the feeling of need for American aid in time of trouble. The end of isolation for Britain was near, even without the catalyst of the Anglo-Boer war. For the real force behind moves away from isolation was the German one. From Heligoland and Samoa to central Asia and China, Germany presented a real challenge; and it was not so much the Boers who were the enemy in South Africa as the European enemy perceived to be behind them.

If a world whose territory was fast disappearing was perceived as a drawing-board for the extension of European diplomatic bargaining, such a world was even more perceived as an outgrowth of domestic political and social forces. Whether imperialism in the 1890s was a diversion from social reform, or whether falling profits led the middle class to the twin panaceas of imperialism and socialism, the empire was never more firmly rooted in the domestic existence of Britain than at this time. The empire could unite the nation, and an imperialist working class could think of land upon which the sun never set, rather than of industrial unrest and social deprivation. The diplomatic isolation only reinforced the racial theories of those such as Pearson, and Anglo-Saxons were never more applauded than in the writings

of Haggard, Henley, Kipling and Conan Doyle. Succinctly linking race and class, one review pointed out that "England and the Anglo-Saxon communities succeed because they are the least socialistic countries in the world of civilisation."⁹ Similarly, there were a number of writers who saw opposition to the Anglo-Boer war as being connected to dangerous socialist ideas.¹⁰

The threat to empire was also perceived to be getting nearer to home. Ireland was compared to South Africa,¹¹ though one magazine cheerfully dismissed the London Irish as dearly loving to play at revolutionaries but not constituting a "White Peril".¹² Radicalism and home rule were intimately connected, and home rule and the disintegration of the empire were seen to be similarly tied together. This partly explains the extensive support for liberal imperialism provided by the periodicals. Not wishing to lose sight of their moderate nature, they were prepared to give credence to right thinking liberals such as Rosebery and Grey; but not wishing to face the consequences of loss of empire, they supported imperial unity to the hilt. This left them giving widespread coverage of liberal imperialist tenets, coverage in no way supported by the electorate. Perhaps the idea of a centre party, uniting the nation behind the banner of a liberal empire, was able to gain undue attention from refined intellectuals and journalists who were bored with the extremes of established parties. Certainly boredom contributed to some of the more sensational excesses of the 1890s, and political and economic stagnation needed sensations to divert attention from the real problems.

The importance of the 1890 Anglo-German agreement was clear to the collective mind of the periodical press. In the learned journals, if not in the real world, Germany had passed another definite milestone - that of wresting concessions from a weakly acquiescent Britain. To the Review of Reviews the agreement allowed Germany to possess an invaluable strip of territory and was a "melancholy monument erected over the grave of our lost opportunities". The Westminster Review similarly asked what Britain had got

in return. It felt that there was an immense amount of good to be gained by the drawing nearer of England and Germany, but that it was not being gained in the Salisbury manner - a little knuckling under and giving of presents. Punch carried this further in its cartoon "Given Away With A Pound Of Tea", where Grocer Salisbury gave up a "Heligoland" rabbit on a plate to a little German boy with a "Hinterland" packet already under his arm. Later in the year another cartoon struck the note of concomitant fear. "Our Turn Now" showed France and Portugal ("who know the value of Peace and Quiet") saying: "You give German somesing, - he go vay! You give us somesing, - ve go vay!!!"¹³ The statesmen might have felt that African concessions were more satisfactory than a war, and especially so now that Bismarck had fallen;¹⁴ but to the periodicals, of whatever persuasion, concessions were a sign of weakness. Though, as Langer points out with reference to the Anglo-German negotiations of 1898, Britain would not make concessions to Germany, because she was Britain's nearest rival; and this killed off the possibility of agreement.¹⁵ The statesmen were only a little way behind the journals.

The same was true of Africa as a whole. The periodicals urged annexations upon the politicians, and repeatedly declared that the partition of Africa was all but completed.¹⁶ The politicians duly obliged, and continued to work towards completion of the partition. The need to annex to prevent Germany increasing her territories was coupled with protestations of the new markets available to British commerce; though in reality it was France which was more likely to close its colonies' markets, and it was the prospect of markets which was greater than their realisation.¹⁷ The point was that British prestige could not be seen to be on the wane, especially by African savages who seemed singly inept at dying off in the way the Red Indians or the Australian aborigines had.¹⁸ At the same time there was a horror of

economic stagnation. Britain had to go forward and expand, and, as Goldie wrote in 1898, Africans had a duty to the world to exploit their resources effectively through trade. For that matter, so did the Boers.¹⁹

The large number of articles on Africa at this time reveals the complex interplay of strategic and economic concerns. Whereas the earlier bursts of African interest developed from geographic and economic expectations, and annexations were rationalised on strategic and humanitarian grounds, the present attitudes owed much to the perception of strategic threats from Germany, and were explained away on dubious economic returns. The few remaining unexploited areas were the bottom of the barrel. The journals frantically hoped that these territories would come good and arrest Britain's economic decline, but the phobia behind the articles was definitely German.

Traditions of German colonisation were explained, note being made of Emin Pasha's return to central Africa as a German official. Britain's general position in Africa was now more seriously challenged than at any time since Khartoum, it was alleged. The Fortnightly Review felt that the Tories had gone out of their way to jeopardise British interests in Madagascar by "making up" with Germany, while the Quarterly and Blackwood's both roundly denounced German colonisation as a "sham" and a refuge for destitutes. (Britain sent others as well, it was carefully added.)²⁰ The nuisance of Portugal in central Africa was also dwelt upon, particularly for failing to open the great waterways to general (i.e. British) commerce.²¹ But the tones used towards Portugal were derogatory rather than defensive. Similar tones occurred towards the French in Madagascar and the Italians in Abyssinia.²²

Economic expectations now played a secondary part, with railways - also of some strategic use - occupying much of the journals' optimism.²³ As one put it, African development should go in the spirit of philanthropy tempered by more or less remote prospects of dividends. In reality it was the philanthropy which was more or less remote in prospect. Although both Edinburgh and Westminster Reviews placed some emphasis on humanitarianism,²⁴ also suggesting that economic matters nearer home should not be neglected,²⁵ it was often the domestic side of philanthropy which was more important. As the Fortnightly said, the task of moulding the African empire kept up Britain's own energy, and indeed stimulated Britain's own arts and manufactures. Nineteenth Century saw the fulfilment of the task as Britain's duty, and her delight. All The Year Round turned on the so-called patriotism of people who would rather see their country beaten, and declared that if people were socialists and all men were equal, then the black man had no right to monopolise the territory of Africa.²⁶ Furthermore, according to the Review of Reviews, colonists "fresh from the battle with the wilderness, invigorated by breathing the uncontaminated air of the bush and the ocean" were needed to add strength to the government at home.²⁷ The domestic side of empire was rarely far out of consideration.

This domestic slant was particularly in evidence with regard to India and central Asia. More than ever were the detractors of imperialism accused of treachery and of stirring up dissent within colonies. Partly this was due to the increasing perception of the inherent weakness of British colonial rule. As the Spectator observed, there was no power whatever in the hands of those who governed India or Africa or Latin America to resist a general effort of the population to throw the whites out. The only course was "to rule, as completely and with as little repentance, as if we were angels appointed to that task."²⁸ Meanwhile the Quarterly Review applauded the

lack of exposure to party politics of the native states of India, and opposed the thrusting of advanced radicals' ideas on to the Indians. The Russian threat to central Asia, although still present, was regarded as secondary to keeping contentment within India.²⁹ For Britain would do well to have more confidence in her own power, which, so long as the people of India showed faith in it, was immense.³⁰ Moreover, the Indian dissent would not be without its use if it awakened the British conscience to a juster treatment of India and its people. Troubles from outside should not lead to ignoring dissent within India.³¹ Though there was always the question of Britain's good name to consider. The real aims were fulfilled if "we shall have conferred upon the Indians great and permanent benefits, and shall have left a good name for ourselves in history."³²

Moving to the frontiers, the need for stronger communications was seen to justify the advance to Chitral in 1895. After all, "no "affairs" in the world can be deemed "foreign" to the scattered but ubiquitous British empire."³³ It may be only with hindsight that one can detect a growing sense of rapport with Russia - as in articles advocating the lifting of petty restrictions on Russian expansion, and praising Russian railways as enabling people of both nations to see how human the other is.³⁴ What is more certain is the wider influence of Germany in world matters, as perceived in the question of an Asia Minor railway with possible German control. There was particular awareness of the need for a rearranged balance of power in the light of a German sphere of influence in Mesopotamia, though it was still a question of stopping Russia. "America and Germany are our natural allies", despite Germany's unreasoning commercial envy of Britain.³⁵ Whatever the

intrinsic merits of Britain's colonies, their relation to the diplomatic patterns within Europe was becoming rapidly more important.

The years 1895-98 reinforced this relationship still further. To the periodicals there was also the growing connection between imperial blunders and the particular party politicians involved. The triumphs of the Diamond Jubilee and the Colonial Conference had to be set against the fiascos of the Jameson Raid and Wei-hai-wei; whilst West Africa and Fashoda represented distinct crises even if successfully overcome. On a world scale there were also the Japanese victory over China, the American defeat of Spain, and the Peace Conference at the Hague, inspired by such varied worthies as W.T. Stead and the Tsar of Russia. Given the different outcomes of the events of these action-packed years, it is not surprising that the periodicals had some difficulty in maintaining consistent praise or criticism for either politicians or nations. A middle line involved, for example, censure of Jameson, ambivalence towards Rhodes - his great achievements balancing his clear involvement - and denial of Chamberlain's knowledge of the raid. The capitalists' attempts to gain a monopoly in South Africa had been frustrated, and the appointment of Milner would be a great conciliation to the Boers. Meanwhile both Chamberlain and Kruger should stand firm against British and Boer jingoism. Though it was chauvinism on the part of the Boers to think they could defeat British arms and reject the Crown.³⁶ Such a line allowed praise for the ruling British politicians by shifting the blame on to their hirelings, and disavowed jingoism while at the same time implying that the Boers were guilty of it. Thus even in fiasco could Britain appear untarnished.

A similar line was found by the Fortnightly Review for Britain's lease of Wei-hai-wei. Admittedly most journals avoided justifications of this action by failing to cover it at all, but the Fortnightly managed to defend Britain on the grounds that she had no interest in acquiring territory in the east. Wei-hai-wei should not, however, be returned to China, but rather

made into a Cyprus, that was to say, ignored.³⁷ Blackwoods on the other hand was quite outspoken. It knew well the view which Germany took of British rights in China, and noted that Germany acted on her view to Britain's detriment while Britain did not act. Wei-hai-wei was therefore not sufficient for the purpose Blackwoods had in mind. Moreover, with the completion of the Russian railways and the irritation of the Tsar at the failure of his peace proposals, how would a few British ships at Wei-hai-wei stop Russia?

"Wei-hai-wei can be turned into a paradise, a sanitarium, and a fortified harbour; but it cannot be held as a secondary naval base in time of war." 38

The threats now posed by both Germany and Russia had earlier been observed by the Quarterly Review. Its answer was, however, to open China's trade to all foreign powers, rather than to put China under the sway of any given state.³⁹

All these views ignored the real dilemmas at the heart of both Russian and German policy making.⁴⁰ Any idea that Russia might be torn between aggression and social reform, or between eastward and westward expansion, found little expression in the pages of the learned journals. In this they were little different to the ordinary dailies, and provincial papers, which were similarly keen to justify British action.⁴¹ What is significant is the effect of the Japanese victory over China for highlighting China's weakness in the face of other encroaching adversaries. Several articles had praised the "gallant little Japs", comparing their naval exploits to those of Nelson, and stressed the need for Anglo-Japanese friendship, the more so in the light of China's evident inability to keep other wolves from her door.⁴² At the same time, although not pressing for Japanese relinquishing of her gains, it was felt that Japan should not become too active abroad. The Japanese

should "concentrate their resources at home, and shun the treacherous lure of foreign territorial conquests." Apparently this could be said without irony. Moreover, China began to be compared with Turkey, clearly bringing the imperial field back into its European context.⁴³ The inherent importance of China itself was marginal when compared with its use as a European bargaining counter.

Meanwhile events were taking place in the Atlantic which relied heavily on the European context. The Spanish-American war fought over Cuba gave rise to considerations of humanitarian and racial feelings, as well as those of military and diplomatic. The two main strands of opinion concerned the obvious decadence of the Spanish, and the converse need for one great united Anglo-Saxon race to dominate the world. The strength of the ties of race and consanguinity could be clearly shown, by the conflict between a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon country. Moreover, the nation championing the cause of Cuba championed humanity and justice.⁴⁴ There was praise for the Americans and implicitly encouragement of greater links between England and her former colony.⁴⁵ One article observed how almost all the U.S. naval officers had British names, and another urged no lack of sympathy between the branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, lest the influence of the race suffer, perhaps permanently.⁴⁶ Harpers' Magazine, understandably, pointed out Anglo-Saxon affinities, and suggested that Egypt provided a clear example to America of how to govern semi-civilised peoples.⁴⁷ Even diplomatic difficulties, such as the Venezuela dispute, were played down; and solutions were regarded as "interesting and instructive lesson(s)" rather than unnecessary concessions.⁴⁸

On the other side, Spain was regarded as the most unspeakable of decadents. In particular she was guilty of letting the side down and showing non-Europeans her weakness.

"So clumsy is the handling of the Spanish army, so unsuited to this or any campaign. In a word it is a disgrace to a European power of the nineteenth century." 49

With reference to the Philippines,

"At last the Castilian, unchanged to the bitter end, has been cast out, and the American has taken his place." 50

Not that there were no domestic overtones either.

"The course of history may prove that it is only the Teutonic races - for Germany will feel her way to greater freedom - that are altogether fitted for popular government." 51

Race, internal stability, and imperial power were all inextricably connected. Attitudes to empire depended on, and were generated by, circumstances within Europe and within Britain. The decaying Latins, unfitted for popular government, were similarly unfitted to bear the white man's burden in the world as a whole.⁵² But the need to stress Anglo-Saxon supremacy belied the real uncertainties as to the durability of that supremacy. Increasing industrial unrest internally, and increasing awareness of the problems of maintaining an empire right across the globe, made it easier to ridicule the weak European neighbours than to look for solutions to the problems themselves.

The same attitude was taken in part towards the West African conflict with France. While insulting the native population with great frequency, especially for degeneracy and their apparent aversion to hard work, the periodicals had contempt for French achievements in West Africa, on the grounds that it was not being made to pay.⁵³ On the other hand, West Africa's economic value was itself in question. It was suspected that the commercial

potentiality of the region was limited in range, and that there was no field for European colonisation in Nigger territories. "There is a fascination about the internal lakes of Africa far out of proportion to their value in a commercial sense as waterways." Not that other powers would let France get away with taking all of North Africa. But, as the Fortnightly said,

"It would be an evil day if a disputed boundary in the valley of the Niger or a doubtful treaty with a savage chief should ever be permitted to embroil the peaceful relations of France and England. There is room for all in Africa." 54

In all this the emphasis on European concerns is clear. The intrinsic value of the region itself received far less attention; as indeed did the whole subject, when compared with other events of the time.⁵⁵ Chamberlain's views on the economic returns to be gained were not generally shared by the periodicals, therefore.

Partly this was due to the focussing of interest upon the simultaneous and more dramatic Sudan campaign. Apart from the whole question of Anglo-French relations, there were the matters of avenging Gordon's death and of helping the Italians in Abyssinia by distracting the natives.⁵⁶ Bound into many of the articles was also a continuing self-congratulation of British rule in Egypt, the benefits of which were held to justify non-interference by any other European power. And, as always, domestic radicals needed chastising for their opposition to empire, which was merely encouraging the pretensions of foreign powers and harming the subject peoples themselves. If the radicals came to power, France would want them to honour their pledges, and would want England to withdraw from Egypt, it was asserted. This would then be catastrophic, as Egypt needed seven more years of good English government to follow the previous seven. The rest of Europe, it was decided, was glad that Egypt was occupied by England, rather than France.⁵⁷

"We can no more withdraw from Egypt now than we can check the unceasing march of empire which is always onward, despite the Little Englanders, and is the accomplishment of the mysterious destinies of our race." 58

It was almost as if empire was inevitable, and there was nothing anyone could do about it even if they wanted to. There seemed to be no alternative. Fuller emphasis of the dangers of domestic subversion was given in another piece:

"Weakness and unbecoming shuffling in language only give undue prominence to the noise of our opponents, and inspire hesitation in the ranks of our friends." 59

The next logical step was to justify British rule in Egypt and conquest of the Sudan in European terms. Britain's selfless actions in carrying the Egyptian burden would earn the thanks of all Europe, and Englishmen could be proud of what had been done. England might not have wanted to go into Egypt, but she was not going to leave before the work had been done. Self-criticism could be squarely faced and countered:

"British capital will be available to open the basin of the Nile to trade possibilities unapproached by those which have sufficed to create the East African company. Thus alone can the ruin of the Sudan be retrieved; thus alone can Great Britain make some reparation for blunders which have brought discredit on her name!" 60

The British name was all important, the real needs of the subject people irrelevant. As an earlier narrative of the previous campaign disinterestedly observed, "thus ended a chapter of history full of picturesque interest". Lugard's suppression of the Uganda mutiny aroused the same detachment. Comparing the rising with the Sepoy revolt, Macmillan's Magazine noted the large number of Soudanese soldiers advancing to Khertoum, and found the causes of Ugandan disaffection "particularly interesting".⁶¹ It was not the indigenous population which was important so much as the threat to British security and prestige, and British prestige in the eyes of Europe at that.

Thus the culmination of the periodicals' attitudes was the raising of British repute by the denigration of the French. By the time of the Fashoda crisis this had reached such a point that a preventive war - to hit France hard and settle all disputes quickly while there was a chance of easy victory - was canvassed by several papers.⁶² On the other hand, the eventual victory for British statesmen created a larger feeling for reconciliation with France.⁶³ Provided the latter was seen to be weaker than Britain, the generous offer of friendship could be held out. There was, after all, no real threat from France.

That France was weaker was unquestioned. It was thought that she was temporarily out of her mind with respect to Egypt, and that the sooner she stopped pestering Britain, the sooner Britain could leave Egypt. France's aim was to keep Britain out of all possible markets for trade, but the French colonial party knew as much of colonial matters as the "African nigger" knew of European politics. Therefore the French occupation of Fashoda was held to mean little to France compared with what it meant to Britain. French colonisation was similarly criticised on the grounds that the French were only trying to promote the temporary political interests of their own country. It was suggested that France be given the Gambia - "which is worthless" - in exchange for the upper Nile. The tenure of French power in tropical Africa could never be other than ephemeral, so there was no reason for enmity between England and France there. Moreover, it may have been desirable to have French assent to a British protectorate, but Britain was well able to run the risk of offending France.⁶⁴ It all boiled down to the fact that France was still not the main fear. Fashoda was merely part of a great ousting scheme where "other nations" thought Britain could be squeezed to any extent.⁶⁵ The "other nations" - the Teutons of the Quarterly's article on popular government

and the evolution of France and Spain⁶⁵ - were the real concern, and the latins were mere decadent irritations.

The notable aspect of the periodicals' coverage of Fashoda and the whole Sudan campaign was the unanimous support given to the expansionist drive. It seems that by the end of the reconquest the papers had all submitted to the forward policy, regardless of their original attitudes to Egyptian occupation or the fall of Khartoum. The supposedly liberal Westminster Review carried scare stories of Arabs who lay down, feigning death, and shot upwards at the oncoming soldiers; and it justified Liberalism as being the true Imperialism, rather than the Little Englandism the Tories accused it of.⁶⁷ Such logistical contortions only masked the real surrender to the imperialist ideas. It seems that the Sudan campaign had worn down any possible resistance to imperial war, and prepared the way for the climactic conflict of the decade, and indeed of Victoria's reign - the Anglo-Boer war.

The significance of this contest was many sided. South Africa had to be safeguarded because of the route to India, and independent tendencies in any one colony could lead to the disintegration of the empire as a whole.⁶⁸ Economic interests dictated support for the British capitalists who had not the political rights in the Transvaal which justice and humanity demanded.⁶⁹ This was quickly nationalised into a general championing of the cause of freedom, and then included the question of defending the blacks against the cruel treatment of the Boers.⁷⁰ The struggle was indeed seen as a race quarrel, but the races involved were both white. The blacks existed merely as noises

off-stage, to be called up as another criticism of the Boers. For the Boers were variously: crafty, stubborn, cowardly, lying, and stupid, as well as cruel and backward. Accusations were made even of their failure to develop the resources of their country, a crime against progress which alone necessitated British intervention.⁷¹ The Boers themselves were not the full problem, however. They were seen to be the front-men for the Dutch and ~~the~~ Germans, both of whom were suspected of assisting the opposition to Britain. The European aspects of the war were always clear to the periodicals, and the war itself proved the final realisation that Britain's isolation was not all that splendid. An empire which needed to commit itself so strongly in any one area, and for so long, was hardly capable of defending its other interests at the same time. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was perceived as a definite consequence of the war, and the new balance of power within Europe motivated many of the reactions to the conflict.⁷² Finally the war represented the apotheosis of political fissure within Britain itself. Even without the "khaki Election" of 1900, the radicals were already castigated as the enemies of the freedom and humanity bestowed by empire. A vote for the Liberals was truly a vote for the Boers. To undermine the Little Englanders still further, the journals heavily emphasised the speeches of the liberal imperialists, such as Asquith and Grey. The wedge between liberty and treachery was driven in as firmly as possible.⁷³

This element was reinforced by the virtually undisputed bellicosity of the journals. Throughout the 1890s war was justified as an inevitable part of a Darwinian struggle for existence. Now Punch's "Juvenile Patriotism",

with a young lad on a rocking horse asking his mother about the infantry call-up, was echoed by the Illustrated London News' interest in reservists and volunteers who wanted to do their bit.⁷⁴ The many virtues of patriotism were stressed in the more learned journals too.⁷⁵ This did not, however, prevent widespread criticism of the organisation of the armed forces, and of the red tape and out-dated training and equipment which was wasting the courage of the ordinary soldier. Again the consciousness of decline, and of the dangers Britain might be exposed to in a "real" war, was manifest in the periodicals.⁷⁶ But the fact that the war was a good ~~step~~ was also evident. A surprising amount of detached drama-seeking can be found in the journals - "The public has nothing to complain of as regards lack of dramatic intensity in the progress of the war during the past week". As the Anglo-Saxon Review observed, "the political, commercial and industrial outlook in South Africa is at this moment of supreme interest...."⁷⁷

This is not to say that there was no opposition to the war. The Westminster Review carried many outspoken anti-war articles, decrying the insane policy of expansion for expansion's sake and urging Liberals to stand up and end the war. "A colossal empire without moral integrity is a name only." The government had not hesitated to make the country the "janissary of the Jews", and imperialism represented a crisis for democracy. Liberal imperialists were all very well in principle, but were very anti-liberal in practice; and Gladstone's foreign policy had been the practicable alternative to imperialism.⁷⁸ But the journal did not decry imperialism itself. British imperialism, the imperial connection described by J.S. Mill, added to moral

influence. It was only the baser kind of imperialism, founded on militarism, which was inimical to freedom.⁷⁹ Moreover, revealing the underlying fears, the question of British "honour" was repeatedly emphasised. The country could not come out of the war with honour, it was asserted, implying that the regard in which Britain was held by her neighbours was of greater moment than the results of the war for the Boers.⁸⁰ As for the blacks involved, who should say that the blacks in the Transvaal were not infinitely better off than poor Hodge in England? "Why destroy the independence of the Transvaal to give votes to a few blacks?"⁸¹ The domestic implications of such writings are clear, and the domestic motivations behind the attitudes allowed little scope for interest in the inherent problems of South Africa itself. One receives the impression that domestic party political point-scoring was more important than the real difficulties of the colonial circumstances.

The same was true of the Fortnightly Review. In August 1899 it carried the sentiment that the war party in Britain was likely to drive the Boers, who had been peaceful subjects for a hundred years, into the very disaffection it was necessary to avoid. Yet by the following year the journal carried views supporting Buller, noting the downfall of liberalism, and claiming that the Boers would have had no cause at all but for the false encouragement given by the weakness of former British governments. Liberals had reinforced Boer resistance, argued a later contribution. Moderate liberals should dissociate themselves from the radicals. The Contemporary Review agreed.

"No Liberal can possibly sympathize with the policy of the Boer GovernmentIt is too late when they have been opposing all their lives at home." 82

The importance of the domestic considerations was paramount, and the increasing pressure to support the war is readily apparent to the modern eye.

Domestic motivations received consistent expression in the other journals too. For when the war was going badly in the veldt, it was always possible to continue to wage it against the enemy at home.⁸³ The Quarterly Review saw "New Liberalism" as trying to deal a death blow to imperial federation by severing South Africa from the empire. Not content with Ireland, Liberals sought to attack the energy of Rhodes and his Chartered Company. But, said the Edinburgh Review, "Mr Gladstone, it will be observed, not less than Home Rule, is dead and buried." The Review wanted the whole world to recognise that Britain was not actuated by unjust or aggressive aims.

"We do not wish to rest our peaceful relations with the rest of Europe merely upon the fear of our power. Our statesmen have to see that our national character and good name are also held in respect."

Again the matter of what the neighbours thought affected the writer's conclusions more than the best solution to the problem itself. Domestic and European concerns were the highest priorities. As Blackwoods noticed, England's discomfiture was Germany's triumph. And, placing the blame squarely upon the radicals, Macmillan's asked the pro-Boers to realise the injustice of soft policy for the Boers. "Is the British tax-payer always to pay, the Boer always to reap the harvest?" Radicals might have agreed about the tax burdens, but the harvest the Boers were reaping was far from life-sustaining.⁸⁴

The importance of wider strategy can also be seen in the light of domestic fears. The defence of empire was an extension of defence of homeland, and British isolation apparent from the war encouraged feelings of alliance for immediate British protection as well as for safety of empire as a whole. Thus again can be explained the comparisons between the Anglo-Boer war and the American civil war, and indeed the American wars over Cuba and the Philippines.⁸⁵ The Pax Britannica had to be extended to include America, in case the threat to empire became a threat to Britain too. Moreover, the threat to South Africa represented a severe attack on the main pillar of the British imperial structure - India.

For: "From a defeat at Magersfontein or Colenso the nation can recover, but a crash at Quetta or at the mouth of the Khyber might bring down the Empire in India."

And that, to contemporaries, was critical. For when the bitterness of the South African war had passed, "which Great Britain is fighting really to maintain unchallenged her control of India and the east from the Cape of Good Hope", there would have to be a rearranged balance of power. America and Germany were then pinpointed as natural allies.⁸⁶ Such ideas were not so far from the minds of many politicians either.⁸⁷ Above all there was beginning to emerge the disquieting note of preparation for a real - that is European - war. There was a prevalent hope that the object lesson before Britain in the shape of the Boer conflict, would not be lost on her. Britain was urged to get rid of her obsolete ideas about the army; or the courage of her soldiers "may be again wasted on a yet greater and more disastrous field".⁸⁸ The "little wars" were just a prelude to the real thing.

In this context the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 provides the real ending to the Boer War, and to Victoria's reign; as well as giving the start to the drive towards the World War of 1914. The agreement did not receive massive coverage in the periodical press; but what was written there tended to confirm the earlier interest in Japan as a Europeanising nation, and in the need for Britain to have all the friends she could find, especially where security, and security of trade, might be of importance. Wei-hai-wei and the Boxer rising had made China a worry for Britain, as other powers had seemed more able to involve themselves in Chinese affairs than she could. Moreover, there was always the question of the security of India. In both cases Britain's commitment to any one area of the globe, as for example South Africa, meant that she could not directly safeguard her interests elsewhere. Japan, inculcated with traditional Protestant values of self-help and hard work, yellow though she might be, could provide the security required. Even her markets might prove better than the largely illusory possibilities of China. Japanese military strength was also not in question, after her victory over her neighbour. As Macmillan's put it, in an ode to

Japan, "We twain shall learn to prove
The world-wide dream of peace". 89

The proof of the pudding was, however, to be in the eating.

Throughout the years 1890-1902, British consciousness of decline had manifested itself in over-aggressive expansionist declarations, achieving fruition in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902. The realisation that an empire could not be kept running smoothly with a handful of civil servants,⁹⁰ and the discovery that the world was running out of territories which could extend British rule meant that Britain found herself clashing with other, and growing, nations. In particular this meant Germany. German expansion clashed with Britain throughout the globe, and it is a mark of the lengths to which Britain felt she must go to protect her empire that the clashes occurred often over the more trivial of imperial possessions.⁹¹ The perception was, however, that these areas were directly linked to the safety of the more important colonies, if not of empire as a whole. Moreover, Germany was suspected of aggression against Britain during the major conflicts, especially the Anglo-Boer war.⁹² Germans, it seems, were everywhere. The enormous number of small articles on German naval, military, educational, political and even social affairs testify more than anything to the German presence in the British mind.⁹³ The question of an all-Teuton Anglo-German alliance was also present in several articles, but the defensive nature of such an agreement - to stop Germany being an enemy rather than to have her for a friend - militated against

any strong convictions over the period of time.⁹⁴ The same was true of the Anglo-German negotiations themselves.⁹⁵ The idea was to keep Germany down, or use her against Russia (and vice versa); not to create a positive alliance. As Harpers wrote about German colonisation, the German colonist was a prosperous element in any community.

"But the obvious wisdom of preferring the unmilitary and amenable Congo state as an associate to the military, exacting and defiant German government need not be pointed out." 96

Specifically the German naval growth was regarded as the biggest danger to British security. Throughout the 1890s Britain's navy was described as inadequate to deal with combinations of foreign powers, and this was linked still more firmly with Britain's industry. Disappearance of the British navy from the seas was felt to mean paralysis of Britain's industrial activities. "The integrity of the British Empire can only be seriously menaced by a Power which can vanquish us at sea." Faith was noisily reaffirmed in Britain's navy and the "pluck" of her sailors.⁹⁷ For if Britain did not regain naval supremacy over her possible and probable enemies, she would have deserved the inevitable fate of all rich nations which failed to take adequate measures for their own defence.⁹⁸

The navy was, however, merely the largest of many factors governing Britain's imperial position. As such it was seen to be a direct product of Britain's internal strength, and the calibre of the sailors was intimately connected with the success of naval encounters. This led back to the need for inculcating the true values of manliness and patriotism, and for encouraging the volunteers, and other physical exercise, such as cycling. It also led back to an increased demand for internal unity, every bit as much as imperial unity. Without internal coherence and stability, it was impossible to maintain the facade of European domination, or the illusion of power over vast hordes of semi-civilised populations. Thus were the radicals in politics a particular enemy of their country. Not only did they apparently

advocate the disintegration of empire, but also their very divisive nature within society created a disintegration of its own. Similarly the radical pressures within industry were perceived as unreasonable in themselves, as well as contributing to Britain's industrial decline. The radical split, it was asserted, caused great pleasure among Britain's friends abroad.⁹⁹ Everyone liked to see the mighty fall, it was assumed, and Britain was all too conscious of the imminence of that fall. The domestic motivations behind European and imperial attitudes were clear. Without real concern for the colonial territories themselves, the periodicals used colonies as sticks with which to beat their own party political opponents, and as diversions from the internal problems which faced Britain. Defence of empire was held to necessitate internal unity, lest colonies attempt to shrug off the imperial yoke. Yet defence of empire was also a platform from which to achieve unity internally, proving the greatness of Britain and the weakness of her detractors. That this greatness needed to be proved shows the very real extent of the consciousness of Britain's decline.

"England, slumbering as she has been in a too confident security, still retains her ancient spirit, and will awaken to the defence of her institutions in the hour of peril, with the same energy and devotion that distinguished her career of old" (Fraser's Magazine February 1852)

"War is the father of things, and patient endurance is the mother. Our business is to maintain cordial relations between the states of the Empire and to improve them as occasion may offer, keeping, like the wise virgins, our lamps trimmed and our lights burning so that all things may be ready when the hour comes. "Tout vient à qui sait attendre." Yes, if one knows how to wait." (Quarterly Review January 1907)

After the Boer War the empire presented a paradox to the periodical press. It was undoubtedly vital to preserve the empire, but at the same time it was clearly too big. Yet somehow size boosted desirability. The larger Britain's share of the globe, the more necessary it was to secure it; for the more colonies Britain possessed, the more secure she would herself be.

The question facing the Edwardian decade was that of what to do to preserve this outstretched string of possessions. The first answer was to end Britain's diplomatic isolation. The Anglo-Boer war had shown that Britain could not be committed in more than one part of the globe at any given time, and partners were therefore needed to help her police her properties. The alliance with Japan led inexorably towards the ententes with France and Russia, and the isolation of Britain gave way to that of Germany.

The second possibility was economic. Tariff reform and imperial preference seemed to some to bind the colonies closer to Britain whilst depriving competitors of making their own inroads into British trade. This could also be accompanied by colonial military aid, and the whole bundle of imperial federation ideas. Colonial Conferences were held in 1887, 1894, 1897, 1902, 1907 and 1911; and even if formal federation never materialised, the informal links between the dominions were of great advantage when the war came.¹ Economically Britain continued her retreat away from industrial challenges of her rivals and into the unexploited colonies. The cotton industry escaped from Europe and North America into Asia and Africa, leaving its former markets to the exporters of British textile machinery. By 1913

Argentina and India alone brought more British iron and steel exports than the whole of Europe, Australia alone more than twice as much as the U.S.A.. Coal followed Britain's vast merchant fleet, and, like steel, tended to rely on the protection of the home market.

At the same time the whole economy was retreating from industry into trade and finance. Services made profits, but reinforced Britain's actual and future competitors. Britain's annual investments abroad had begun to exceed her net capital formation at home around 1870, and increasingly the two became alternatives. During the Edwardian years domestic investment fell while foreign investment rose almost uninterrupted. In the great boom of 1911-13, over twice as much was invested abroad as at home. British domestic capital was quite possibly inadequate for the sufficient modernisation of production, even had the will to modernise existed in the first place.²

The retreat was also a diversion from the internal economic problems. Industrial unrest, the need for new equipment, the importance of technical education - Cromer in 1903 saw the greatest national dangers to be "backwardness in education and unsound finance"³ - were all subsumed by the increasing colonial dependence. Arguably the championing of tariff reform by Chamberlain was also a diversion. Ailing electoral fortunes on the Conservatives' part were almost reinvigorated by a call which could overlook the domestic results of their years in power.⁴

This leads to the third solution to Britain's imperial problems, that of unity within Britain. Apart from the proliferating social Darwinian theories, and the Fabian doctrines of national efficiency,⁵ there was an increasing feeling within the periodicals that a united Britain was the best guarantee of a united empire and thus, of course, a peaceful world. Moreover, the stress on the need for a united empire was brought to bear on those dissenting voices within Britain on order to achieve that united mother country.⁶ Conscription began to gain support as never before, and the rising naval estimates were generally only criticised for not rising enough.⁷ Even liberal opposition was sometimes only

concerned to question the object of the estimates. "Yes" said the Westminster, "let England be watchful - in the proper direction. To imagine that Germany is bent upon a raid into this country is the height of absurdity." The article was headed "The New Naval Base And Russian Designs."⁸

The question was being begged, albeit unintentionally. Who was the empire to be safeguarded against? On one level it was Germany. The naval problem reached panic levels in 1909, ostensibly in reaction to Germany's building programme; and Anglo-French military conversations more than strengthened the letter of the entente.⁹ The threat of actual invasion of Britain focussed attention on the Low Countries, as it was essential to preserve a friendly power on the approaches to the North Sea and the Channel ports. The Belgian issue also silenced much of the opposition to a war policy. As J.L.Garvin wrote in the Pall Mall Gazette on the day that war was declared:

"We have to do our part in killing a creed of war. Then at last, after a rain of blood, there may be set the greater rainbow in the Heavens before the vision of the souls of men. And after Armageddon war, indeed, may be no more." 10

Yet on another level it was this erstwhile opposition to empire within Britain for which the greatest safeguards were needed. Socialist denunciation of capitalist plots to exploit the colonies went hand in hand with demands for industrial and political rights at home, and it was as much Britain herself as the empire which called forth demands for protection against unrest. Trade unions, the Irish, even - horror of horrors - women, were all vociferous in protest, and anything which could bring unity to bear on these disparate forces was to be welcomed with open arms.

Then again there was a broader level of protection. Increasingly the collective white European empire was perceived to be under threat from the coloured races of the world. The African blacks were not becoming extinct,

and if anything survived the climate better than the Europeans. The Chinese were providing their labour throughout the world, and the Japanese had defeated the Russians in war. It was also not difficult to see the Boers' drive to independence extending into other, non-white, colonies. Before long Europe as a whole would be on the retreat.¹¹

For in many ways the 1900s were similar to the 1850s. The Anglo-Boer war was a shock of the order of the Indian mutiny, both with their attendant parallels with the British working class. Moreover, interest had moved from the far east back to Turkey and the Balkans, and the old themes of conscription, invasion scares, and dividing up the sick man of Europe were happily resurrected only this time with Germany (and Turkey) as the enemy. Little colonial wars were giving way to the real European war, the thirst for which had not been assuaged by the Anglo-Boer trauma, and the whole spectrum was moved nearer to home, a home itself beset with violent unrest. The war, viewed in its longest perspective, was the inevitable consequence of Britain's world-wide supremacy, both economic and naval, during the mid-Victorian era; but when it came it was not a catastrophe wrecking a stable bourgeois world. Rather it was a respite from crisis, a diversion, perhaps even, as Hobsbawm observes, some sort of a solution.¹²

The period between the Anglo-Boer war and the World War commenced, as has been seen, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The consequences of this were observed by the Quarterly Review early in 1904. Although Russia and Japan were drifting to war, the review averred "it is pleasant to reflect that Great Britain was the first power to give full effect to the recognition of Japan". The Westminster approached the same conclusion from a different angle. The Japanese-Russian war was bound to come, it argued, but Britain was wrong to commit her future to the Japanese alliance. Meanwhile the Edinburgh Review pursued a middle line. Support for Japan would assist a strong China, which would in turn be India's most effective bulwark; and it

was thanks to the Anglo-Japanese agreement that the Russo-Japanese war had not dragged in the rest of Europe. But :

"No-one supposes that yellow troops will be poured into India to defend the Indian army and the British army from the forces of Russia." 13

There were still priorities, it seems.

There were also more obvious Eurocentric concerns. One reminiscence of the South African war said that that war taught Britain much, but that the present war was a maritime war with modern armoured fleets, "which relegates South Africa to the position of a side issue". Another article considered the destruction of the Russian armada from the point of view of the shipbuilder. Closest to home was a description of a Japanese agricultural college, stressing how education was the root of the Japanese victory. Gymnastics, military drill, and the "German system" were praised, while the Yellow Peril was seen to lie in the Japanese thoroughness and love of work.¹⁴

The balance of phobia between Russia and Germany was clearly shifting. (In contrast, the Anglo-French entente merited virtually no attention at all. France was obviously not worth the worry.) German involvement in colonial matters was growing year by year. As Darnton-Fraser wrote in 1909, "Russian impotence found its inevitable corollary in German aggression".¹⁵ In this way the periodicals detected the German hand at work in Asia, where the fruits of the Anglo-German agreement on China and the forthcoming connection of **the** Trans-Caspian, Trans-Siberian, and European railways were inextricably entwined.¹⁶ Balfour was blamed for a pro-German policy in "Koweyt" - domestic political criticism and Germanophobia mingling happily in the supposedly liberal Westminster Review.¹⁷ The German concession of the Bagdad

Railway was further apprehended, bringing the colonies firmly back into their European context.¹⁸

More general discussions explained the growth of German power over the preceding century. The aim of Germany, "it was confidently asserted, was to destroy the British empire and gain German naval supremacy. South Africa provided examples of Britain's endangered command at sea, and again the German peril was labelled. With completely unconscious irony it was hoped that Germany would find less rapid progress consonant with her security."¹⁹ No-one suggested that Britain should do the same. Instead it was noted, in an article entitled "The Waning Prestige of Germany", that "there are indications of an attempt to isolate Germany". England now sat once more at the head of European nations, and "the prestige which she lost in the Boer War she has regained".²⁰ Though the note of uncertain envy was never far away. German colonisation of Kiaotchau was shown to be more successful in its land use than British colonies, and the German army was described in the full power of its universal military service.²¹ On the other hand, Chambers' Journal was keen to dismiss the "new legend of Waterloo", that is, that Prussia saved England from defeat. In fact, the journal said, England saved Prussia.²² The bluster could only be justified by reference to Mahan - "the power to control Germany does not exist in Europe except in the British navy".²³

In contrast, Russia was becoming acceptable. Apart from articles on the role of the triple entente, there was a significant contribution before the Russian alliance which underlined the new set of circumstances. In the previous twenty years, it argued, the arena of combat had transferred to Asia and Africa, and every incident in Asia reacted upon the relations of governments

in Europe. Yet while the European governments quarrelled over partitions, some of the stronger natives had taken lessons in the art of war. Consequently it might be necessary to have a league of white races to impose peace on Asia. Russian demise in the Japanese war was detrimental to the peace on both continents, and Russia and England could not be manoeuvring against each other in Asia if they desired to act together in Europe.²⁴

For it was in Europe that the main conflict was envisaged. In particular, as the German threat to the Low Countries became more evident, Britain could fear for her own safety, not to mention that of her colonies. Although there was urged a diminution of mutual distrust between England and Germany, at the same time it was necessary to ensure that Belgium and Holland never served as base for any force hostile to Britain. Instead of nagging the Belgians over the Congo, they should feel that their interest lay on Britain's side and not on that of her rival.²⁵ Natives in the colonies were clearly of secondary value to their European overlords. The Contemporary Review concurred. Germany was slowly taking over the Netherlands, as well as south-western Russian provinces, and the price of any Anglo-German understanding would be the doubling of Germany's navy.²⁶ Blackwood's produced the logical reductio ad absurdum. Anglo-German friendship depended on mutual esteem, it said, so Britain should keep up her army and navy.²⁷ Such "friendship" dispensed with the need for enemies.

This warlike emphasis did not, however, preclude interest in more peaceful methods of defence. There were several articles on the Hague Peace Conference; though, the Edinburgh Review intimated, a peace conference forbidden to discuss arms expenditure hardly justified itself. W.T. Stead, in the Contemporary turned the argument along familiar party political lines. The sceptre of peace was England's no more, he wrote, lamenting the late Campbell-Bannerman.²⁸

Another defensive theme was that of imperial federation and, especially in these years, tariff reform. Here also domestic party politics intruded, with the rigidity of Liberal ministers against tariffs being held to have retarded colonies' ideas on inter-imperial trade. However, Chamberlain's theories of retaliatory duties and of reciprocal relations within the empire were regarded as impracticable by the same conservative journal.²⁹ They were similarly regarded, on more partisan grounds, by the liberal opposition.³⁰ The Edinburgh Review produced some ingenious arguments against tariffs, whilst applauding all colonial unities of any other description. In one article there was the suggestion that if Britain adopted protection, there was a risk of relying on the maxim "Trade follows the flag"; then if this did not prove true, would Britain turn her back on the flags?³¹ Other articles felt that Chamberlain was mistaken to revive the tariff question, and that preferential duties would lead to dearer food.³²

The motives behind his move were, however, felt to be more laudable. Favour was shown to the idea that each self-governing portion of empire should keep enough forces for its own needs, plus some for empire; giving independence to each self-governing unit, while the whole empire would gain by collective strength. And rather than imperial preference, it was suggested that there was a need to open fresh wheat fields to supply the increasing demands of the world's population.³³ Yet in general the whole tariff argument was confined to the more intellectual journals, economics always having a dismal visage. To the other papers, and in the long run to the alleged intellectuals as well, the simpler defence theme was often more interesting.³⁴

This theme was embellished with widespread jingoistic illustration. Moreover, it repeatedly gave rise to easy indictment of radicals within society, and allowed even liberal journals to defend a "humane" kind of imperialism without compromising their Gladstonian background. The domestic political implications were reinforced by the too oft-repeated denials of similarity between empire and mother country. One article, in dismissing home rule, declared :

"We have to get the best working system we can for the Empire and the kingdom. The facts and conditions are quite dissimilar in the two cases..."

It went on to ask what "Imperialism" meant. To Grey and Rosebery, apparently, it was not very different to what used to be called patriotism. But to the radicals it was a new name for the vulgar music-hall jingoism so rife a few years previously.³⁵ Thus were liberal imperialists supported in their "patriotism". Another compromise between liberalism and imperialism was worked out by Professor Kyllie in the pages of the Contemporary Review. Liberals, he felt, could support empire so long as they attached importance to education, justice and social reform. "The hope of Liberalism is the Empire at large".³⁶ To Blackwoods the middle way was clear. "Under Imperial Federation alone can the British race work out its glorious destiny."³⁷

To all these approaches there was a common ground - an advocacy of centre party politics - which tells us more about the concern for domestic unity than about the nature of imperial government.³⁸ The same feeling echoes throughout the whole defence theme. It was almost as if the intense jingoism of the "patriots" was only the other side of the coin on which trade union and female suffragist militancy were themselves so firmly stamped. Whether arguing for working class rights or duties, the tone was ever bellicose, and the empire was only there to provide illustration.

This extended right through from writings on conscription and boy scouts to those pseudo-scientific justifications of war. Darwinism was linked with empire, and the teaching of history was used to debate the need for war. As the Westminster Review declared, with apparent delight, "War is an inexhaustible subject".³⁹ It was not that all writers approved the sociological conclusions - one suggested that in war it was the young and fit who were killed while the weak and useless remained; thus contradicting the survival of the fittest.⁴⁰ But all journals devoted great space to militarist discussion, and their tones belied any apparent disavowals.

Thus schools were urged to devote more time to physical training, improving the material from which the army and navy were fed, while building up an all-round stronger and healthier race.⁴¹ Universal training was described as the "price of peace", and the boy scouts were praised as peace scouts. No-one who wanted to avoid war could do other than "Be Prepared".⁴² Moreover, since all other European nations considered the importance of national defence, Britain should too. It was a fool's paradise to believe that peace could be obtained by weakening the navy, the British empire's only defensive weapon.⁴³ While recruitment was seen as a "National Awakening", more significantly conscription was less desirable to a "free" nation. The real threat here, said one journal, was compulsory education and state aid for paupers, which killed individual effort and pauperised the people.⁴⁴ The domestic screw was turning hard.

In the same way there were lessons to be learnt, both historically and geographically related to Britain's domestic well-being. Apart from the repeated celebratory anniversaries of Trafalgar, the Peninsular campaign, and Waterloo,⁴⁵ and derisory comparisons with other foreign campaigns -

"IF it were not that the situation in the Tripolitaine is pregnant with lessons to those responsible for the military shortcomings of the British empire, the Turco-Italian war would practically have ceased to be of interest" ⁴⁶ -

the Boer War itself was directly connected to the future of Britain's army.

"The Boer War taught such a lesson that there is no profession now that works harder than does the profession of arms in Great Britain" 47

For if Britain did not get rid of obsolete ideas about the army, the courage of her soldiers "may be again wasted on a yet greater and more disastrous field".⁴⁸ The same domestic, Eurocentric viewpoint was true of Ireland. As Irish troubles multiplied, so did the comparisons with South Africa. Even more, home rule was given its internal political perspective - as either the "leading issue" in by-elections, or as exciting "no interest in the constituencies", depending on your point of view.⁴⁹

Two final pieces can be taken to illustrate the domestic motivation behind the imperial war. Francis Bam, writing on a Channel tunnel scheme, declared ironically:

"To ease the minds of the least rational of our population, harmless precautions against invasion through the tube can be taken, such as, amongst others, piling on the sides of the cutting at the mouth of the Tunnel masses of tangled barbed wire as big as houses, which could quickly be shoved down on to the rails below."

While Blackwoods virtually welcomed the onset of war in 1914 - there would be no more internal discussion now, it said, as all would unite against Germany. Indeed, if the war brought Britain national service, then the German warlords would not have acted in vain.⁵⁰ Although there had been, if anything, much less hostility and Germanophobia in the journals in the two years immediately before Sarajevo, there had been no let-up in this antipathy between "Jingoists" and "radicals". Again one wonders just whom the war was being fought against.

In the light of the domestic preoccupations, it may seem strange that much attention was lavished on missionary and humanitarian issues in these years. In one sense all of Europe was under threat from colonial unrest; there were repeated African risings between 1896 and 1907, for example.⁵² Again similarly to the 1850s, the perception that natives could throw off

the imperial yoke led to reappraisals of the forms of government, and the harsher racial views engendered were often disguised behind self-consciously philanthropic outbursts. Possibly also the completion of the partition of the world, undertaken for strategic or economic reasons, meant that there was now time to sit back and consider the interests of the subject peoples themselves. Porter has argued that the reactions against imperialism at this time sowed the seeds of lasting colonial doctrines such as indirect rule;⁵³ and it may be a mark of the considered unimportance of colonies per se that discussions about them could take a missionary rather than a Eurocentric direction, now that their initial usefulness was over.

Thus the Nineteenth Century felt that in practical terms imperial rule rested on the sanction of the population ruled - there was no ^{divine} right to rule, but rather to rule well.⁵⁴ In no way should humanitarian concerns in these years be seen as opposed to imperialism, however. It was merely a concern with the details of the imperial practice. Articles abounded on the West African drink problem⁵⁵ - not without thought of liquor nearer home - and others looked at the importance of Indian village life as a basis for organisation.⁵⁶ The relative benefits of religions as they actually affected the native populations were also discussed, with less of the preconceived Christian bias; though philanthropic feelings for native employment sometimes struck a note of discord with their British parallels.⁵⁷

Sir Harry Johnston wrote, for example:

"The noxious idea that the white man is always to be foreman and never labourer, that it 'lowers his prestige' in the eyes of the 'native' if he is seen working with his hands, is, together with whisky, sapping the foundations of the British Empire, and must be eradicated."

And although displaying blatant cultural relativism, the Contemporary allowed that the native responded to kindly treatment, and even more so to small responsibility.⁵³ There were always domestic comparisons below the surface.

More often, however, the periodicals preferred to pride themselves on Britain's achievements in humanitarianism. Egypt had prospered under British rule,⁵⁴ as had India and South Africa.⁵⁵ Though there were problems, notably in the Congo, where Belgium was urged to take the area over, as this would be better for European rule in Africa all round.⁵⁶ Punch carried a cartoon labelled "In The Rubber Coils - scene - The Congo "Free" State" with an African being throttled by the coils of a long snake with the head of King Leopold.⁵⁷ The fact that it was not Britain who was to blame was at once pleasing and disquieting. It was good to be able to blame others, but misrule by any European could rub off on natives elsewhere. The Westminster saw the issue very much in terms of government.

"As German and Portuguese Africa close in upon us, free trans-equatorial Africa most certainly will be, but another Canada or another United States according as we are wise or foolish."

It almost felt the impossibility of humanising the departmental machinery of European government, and declared: "The riddle of Africa is the problem for modern civilisation to solve." Ironically quoting Curzon - "You are there for the benefit of the people of the country" - it concluded that Europeans must learn to live in peace with other races, or they would face "the most destructive war that the foolishness of mankind and the arrogance of race have ever desolated the world with."⁵⁸

11

The links between race and war were reinforced by yet more "scientific" theories, as well as by the rise of the "Yellow Peril". Chambers¹ expounded on the survival of the fittest, though with some dismay at tribes dying out, and confidently predicted a colour war, "x years hence".⁶⁴ The Fortnightly stated the negro problem in America, noting how the Japanese used to be similarly denigrated. Port Arthur and Mukden, however, had put new colour on the Japanese skin and obscured the Mongolian features.⁶⁵ And the Westminster went further still. "Today in Europe, America and Australia, the white man is being burnt out like the filament of an electric lamp." "The latent possibilities of "Colonial John" are becoming a serious menace to the white race." It concluded without mincing words. "Stamp him out!"⁶⁶ With feelings like this, a good old fashioned European war might be held to restore the ailing prestige of the declining white man.

It is also not surprising that these views left little sympathy for the Chinese workers in the Rand mines. There was no wish to check the prosperity of one of Britain's best customers, it being claimed that the mines were not rich enough to pay the wages required by white men; while it was also felt that the Chinese were far from slaves in their working conditions.⁶⁷ The Westminster condemned the "yellow slavery" fairly enough, but it was more concerned with proving that the Anglo-Boer war had been a "Franchise war" and in condemning the capitalists. The domestic implications were extended by comparison with Irish emigrants.⁶⁸ It is clear that debating points were of more interest than the Chinese themselves. The other set of Coolie emigrants the Indians - received less attention. They were, after all, British subjects, and it was felt that the implicit trust with which they consigned themselves

to the white man's care gave ample proof of the government's unremitting zeal and intelligent understanding of the wants of this working section of India's toiling millions.⁶⁹ At root it was the British side of the philanthropic gestures which carried most weight. It was more blessed to give than to receive.

Partly this was because Britain was receiving less from the colonies anyway. Economic imperialism was not totally absent in these years - "with a generous and wise administration," said Chambers, "British East Africa is sure to attract capital as its resources become known; and in a few years we may hope to see a most prosperous colony."⁷⁰ Another periodical asserted that "the expansion of British exports is in a large measure contingent upon the investment of British capital abroad", and chronicled that investment.⁷¹ But for most of the periodicals the expectations of gains from colonies were lessened, the realisation of the possessions not living up to the prospects. In consequence, with the world already divided up, the only alternatives were to fall back on the humanitarian side of colonialism or to think in terms of a new partition of territory. Either option revealed the ultimate unimportance of the colonies themselves to the British mind, and demonstrated most forcibly the European, and eventually domestic, emphasis behind imperialist attitudes.

As much as anything, this could be seen from the standpoint of opposition. As Godard wrote in the Westminster,

"The crying need is, not increased production, but right production; not more material wealth, but the equitable distribution of wealth; not new markets, but new aims; not the acquisition of additional territory, but the civilising of what we have got; not the subjugation of the foreigner, but the subjugation of ourselves." 72

Imperialist or anti-imperialist, the cry was one of domestic unity, whether against black or yellow, German or Russian, Irish or trade unionist. The working class could be subjugated as the Indian had been, the Fenian as the Boer; while the rest of the world could be kept at bay by the Aliens Act,

passed in 1905. Everyone was an imperialist now; it was merely a question of how big you wanted your empire to be. And as time went on, the question was answered for itself. Europe was, and always had been, the real theatre of war. Space had run out in the rest of the world, and anyway it had never been so wonderful in the first place. What was needed was a way of regaining lost prestige, drawing together all the misdirected energies of the population, and diverting attention from the seemingly insoluble problems of a new world. The solution - strategic, social and economic - was the oldest one of them all.

Part Three - Theoretical

Chapter Six : The Security of Empire

Regardless of the weight attached to strategic considerations of individual imperial possessions, security of empire was perceived by the whole periodical press as directly related to security of Britain herself. Moreover, both Britain and her empire depended upon their mutual trade, and the security of this trade was paramount in any list of imperial objectives. One common factor linked commercial and military safety - the navy. Britain's naval supremacy in the world guaranteed both securities, and, as such, any growth in foreign navies was regarded as a threat to British trade and independence. As Harter says, the British navy was seen as a vital necessity, while other powers' navies were regarded as mere luxuries.¹

The importance of the navy also explains the emphasis on safeguarding the coastlines of imperial territories. As the fear of other nations' interference grew, the emphasis stretched to the hinterlands behind the coasts; in just the same way as the security of Britain had stretched to that of empire in the first place. The essential defensiveness to British naval policy lay behind the extension of concern with India to concern with the routes to India, especially Egypt and South Africa.² Eventually this developed into an interest in imperial federation as a way of spreading imperial responsibilities and of keeping colonies within a connected framework rather than letting them become independent of their mother protector. For, to continue the analogy, the mother who had raised these colonies was now feeling her own weakness, and needing their support in her old age. An imperial federation would not only keep the mutual trade flourishing in the face of foreign tariffs, but would also provide increased military force against the aggression which was felt to be approaching.

In the same way, running through the articles on colonial areas was an obvious decline in the French, and even Russian, threat, and an equally marked escalation of the German menace. More particularly, the British navy was felt to be pressurised by the rising German one, with the result that this European background to ostensibly imperial considerations was increasingly prominent.³ What was important was the imminent European conflict, though the distances around the globe to which Britain would resort to protect herself against this conflict were increasingly great. However, the world held only a finite number of properties for division between the powers, and the years before 1914 reveal a shift of concentration from the far east to the middle east, and finally to the Balkans and Europe itself. Time and distance were running out, and what the periodicals had regarded for decades as inevitable eventually came to pass.

The importance of the navy, in both creating and sustaining the empire, was never underestimated by the periodical press. As one journal noted:

"Our social progress, our international influence, our power " to help the right and heal the wild world's wrongs", our mission as the leaders and organisers of the backward and chaotic races that have come beneath our rule, and what is dearest to the hearts of Christian Englishmen, the opportunity to give to all the world the Gospel that has made us free; all these, and every other good we can desire ourselves or wish to share with men, depend upon our maritime supremacy." 4

Clearly Britain's navy was morally and strategically vital. As such, any rival fleet-building had to be regarded as intended for eventual aggression against Britain herself. Indeed, while British naval armaments were believed to tend to the promotion of peace - imposing an "awful responsibility on those who have to direct them", as Rosebery said - other powers' navies were regarded as merely furthering irrational animosity against Britain.⁵ Justice was in a minority in its questioning:

"But is the object of our bloated navy merely the defence of this island? Is it not rather the attempt of the British capitalist to obtain a monopoly in the future markets of the world at the expense of competitors?" 6

Yet the fact that "defence of this island" was the most often-sounded justification for naval expansion reveals the essentially defensive nature of this navalism. Not only was home defence used as an appealing cry to justify naval expansion, but also the disposition of the navy was such that it protected the vital trade and security routes without which Britain could have been cut off from her colonies. It was true that a general naval reduction might have been desirable in theory, but the first move had to be made by others, or so the argument ran.⁷ The basic retention of an, often imaginary, historical status quo was the real issue:

"What is the Naval Question?

It comprises all sorts of inquiries in one, and that one is really this: Can Great Britain be, at sea, in these days, what she was in old days.....?" 8

For "the integrity of the British empire can only be seriously menaced by a power which can vanquish us at sea," and :

"we should prepare ourselves to make those sacrifices, of time and money, which alone can save the British empire from dismemberment, and these islands from the horror of invasion." 9

Throughout these articles there existed a rampant fear of other powers' navies, coupled with an urging of all patriotic Britons to shake off their slumbering lethargy and prepare themselves for impending conflict. Another underlying fear was that the disappearance of Britain's navy from the seas could mean paralysis of her industrial activities. Thus the real danger of naval decline could lie in the commercial recessions which would inevitably follow. For Britain's wealth would then undoubtedly flow into the hands of her competitors.¹⁰ Without going too deeply into cause and effect, the periodicals displayed trade and security marching undeniably hand in hand.¹¹

Nowhere was this more obvious than with regard to India. The complacent idea of India as estate management writ large¹² was shattered during the 1850s, first with the sight of Russian mobilisation on the north west frontier in the Crimean war, and secondly with the mutiny of 1857. Suddenly a major trading

danger to colonial stability, conservatives were of the view that a strong forward policy was essential.¹⁶ In consequence the arguments were used partly to oppose domestic political opponents, and as such the inherent colonial circumstances were secondary to the domestic political diversions. However, even this analysis reveals contradictions, for the bellicose forward policy depended to some extent on the suggestion of British weakness, or at least insufficient strength; whilst the view of no outside danger implied adequate military resources, despite the fact that the liberals who opposed expansion tended often to be the keenest detractors of British military prowess. The point is that domestic political considerations and domestically adduced theories were superimposed over the colonial experiences themselves, and European and British politics were more important than the real issues of the north west frontier.

In this way, the Westminster Review urged that Britain avoided not only the desire to annex the hill tribes, but also the appearance of the desire to annex; and it berated the conservative appeal to a stupid form of patriotism at election time. The Edinburgh Review equally felt little need for alarm in 1808, as Russia was engaged elsewhere; and the article encouraged confidence in Britain's own power, which, so long as the people of India had faith in it, was immense. But it also suggested that a forward policy which secured a real and safe frontier was worth millions of pounds, which Britain should not shrink from imposing on the Indian taxpayer. For what substitute was there for such a policy? "It is too late to go back now." And the Quarterly Review consistently approved a strong policy against Russian aggression, on the grounds that it was a very real aggression which would stop at nothing.¹⁷

The Quarterly was also, unsurprisingly, the most ready of these three to extend defence of India into defence of the routes thereto. Stressing British interest in Java trade, and in the future of Borneo, the journal warned of the threat to Sarawak, as early as 1802, and suggested a British protectorate there as effective security against hostile designs.¹⁸ Repeating

the theme constantly over the years, a climax was reached in the article on "North West Frontier Policy" in 1900:

"South Africa and our supremacy there are not everything; there is a still more important factor to be considered, and that is the defence of the Indian empire.....From a defeat at Nagersfontein or Colenso the nation can recover, but a crash at Quetta or at the mouth of the Khyber might bring down the Empire in India." 19

Connections between India and points en route to it were never underplayed.

Essentially the theme was defensive. Paradoxical it may seem, but the extended line of protected territories existed primarily as a defence against foreign incursions into the trade routes with India, even though the extension of these lines of defence only increased the probability of "little wars" somewhere along them. Indeed, every year of Victoria's reign saw a conflict involving British arms somewhere in the world.

Easily the most persistent area of intrigue and conflict lay in central Asia. Whether Britain should push her own frontier further towards an advancing Russia, or whether she should attempt to create a buffer between the two super-powers, or indeed whether she should remain firmly behind the north west frontier and concentrate on good government within India, were options all canvassed by the periodicals at some time or other.²⁰ Much depended on one's view of Russia itself. In this context it is not remarkable that the British hawks ascribed aggression to the Russian ministers, whilst the more realistic views took more account of the practical difficulties involved in any Russian invasion plan for India. There was, however, little suggestion of the real tensions in Russian policy-making; once more it was largely a case of domestic political arguments being imposed upon the real circumstances.

Opposition to Russia could even be turned into a kind of purifying exercise for those who took part. There was a demand for ministers who would oppose Russian designs and stimulate the purest patriotism within the breasts of Englishmen;²¹ while British intentions in Persia and Afghanistan were rarely anything less than blamelessly virtuous, in contrast to the evil, scheming Russians.²² The occasional piece of self-criticism, over previous misconduct on Britain's part, usually ended up as justified in the long run, or as a lesson for the future, or even as a "blunder", which somehow overcame any stigma attached to the violation of treaties and so on.²³ Rarest of all were the deprecations of central Asia itself:

"whichever nation may be the nominal possessor of this and that mountainous tract on the distant north-west frontier of India, neither can effectively make any aggressive use of such a possession."

This was accompanied by an instruction to the writers in the daily press to form an adequate idea of the vast distances and arid wastes in central Asia.²⁴

But this was an exception. The normal line was to stress the importance of the region, and the crucial need to prevent Russian domination there. This again could be seen in party political terms, as was shown by the blame placed on the Liberals for the outbreak of the Afghan war. Was it any surprise, asked one periodical, that a policy which had for its object to keep "in accord with Gladstone's speeches" should result in trouble and war? And if there was ever a time when the duty of a high-toned opposition was to sink party differences in the general interests of the Empire, it was undoubtedly the present.²⁵

Although there was evidence of interest in the activities of the native rulers within central Asia, they were mainly regarded as wily and untrustworthy individuals reacting simply to the policies of successive European governments. Dignity and intelligence on the part of the princes was completely absent, and they were described more as puppets than free agents.²⁶ Again the concerns of politics and principles within Britain were paramount. The actual circumstances were very much at the other end of the telescope.

The same domestic political slant was truer still of one of the other routes to India, namely Egypt. This is not to say that the inherent circumstances of Egypt were neglected, especially after the occupation, but they were very definitely secondary in the wider issues. Thus the crisis of 1881-2 was reported in terms of Gladstone against Salisbury, and with regard to larger philosophical arguments of imperialism. Khartoum and the later reconquest of the Sudan were described even more emphatically along the lines of past and present political actions, with Gladstone seen as the man who caused Gordon's death and Salisbury the man who avenged it. Finally Fashoda represented the apogee of Anglo-French confrontations in Egypt, and the fruition of the (liberal imperialist) Grey's policy of 1895, when he declared that any foreign power's activity in the Nile Valley would be regarded as an "unfriendly act".

In all this the significance of Egypt in itself was limited. Only in its existence as a diplomatic pawn, as a stepping stone to India on a map covered in red paint, did it matter to the periodical press. Subsequently the journals' attitudes would come to include the benefits accruing to Egyptians from British rule, and would use such benefits as some kind of ex-post rationalisation for the occupation. But initially at least the periodicals were concerned with the relevance of Egypt as a bargaining counter between European nations and as a bulwark of the defence of India; always within the confines of British domestic party politics.

Thus the Fortnightly Review felt that France had had her chance and had failed to take it. England alone had overthrown the usurping power, and England alone had to reconstruct.²⁷ The Westminster Review agreed. The Canal was of crucial importance to Great Britain for military purposes, and so she should assume its protectorate.²⁸ Above all the reputation of the

government was more important than the colony itself. Among tirades against Gladstone and praise of Disraeli's Canal shares purchase, there was a strong line of praise for a government which had vindicated and defended the interests of empire; fudging over the fact that it was a government nominally pledged to oppose expansion.²⁹

Perhaps the highest authority for the occupation was that quoted by Punch. Headed "History Repeats Itself; or the Modern Oracle of Ammon", the cartoon showed John Bull as an explorer talking to an African chief. Background quotations from the Bible about Libyans and how all the Nile was Egypt were coupled with Gray's declaration on British spheres of influence covering the whole Nile waterway; and John Bull was shown saying "You see, Nilus, the Father of History and I are of the same way of thinking. So you're all right, my boy, while I'm here!"³⁰

Biblical ratification for annexation was, however, harder to find with reference to South Africa. Not only was the Cape regarded as vital as a strategic stopping point en route to India, not only were there perceptible threats to the hinterland from both Germany and, through the Boers, the Dutch, but also there were two native populations who had to be beaten into submission. Although it might be argued that the Boers and Zulus united would have formed a foe too strong for Britain, the hostility between the two was frequently a direct cause of British intervention. Hence the colonial power waged war on the Zulus to protect the Boers in 1879, but waged war on the Boers in part to protect the Zulus in 1882. Meanwhile, if central Asia and Egypt could rarely produce strong economic justifications for occupation, South Africa presented the twin glittering prizes of gold and diamonds. What had started as a naval base to defend India quickly turned into a sparkling gem in its own right.

Yet even these massive economic and strategic considerations could be subordinated beneath party politics. "The annexation of the Diamond Fields is perhaps the most discreditable incident in British Colonial history", said the Quarterly Review, in an apparently rare piece of national self-criticism. But, the review continued, the reason was that it was undertaken

during Mr Gladstone's ministry. Not to be left in a position of anti-expansionism, though, the journal then made clear the real justification for any presence in South Africa - that the Cape was the key to British India, especially were Suez to be closed.³¹ In 1883 the review returned to the attack, blaming the "radical party" for the war on account of radical denunciations of annexation before they came to power. This had led to the disgrace of Majuba Hill. Indeed the present course could imperil the Cape, India, and the very foundations of credit and character on which the empire stood. "Our friends no longer respect us," concluded the paper, placing the emphasis firmly back in its civilised European setting. A number of other articles compared central Asian and South African campaigns, with strong reference to Russia.³² Imperial strategy was always an outgrowth of European.

The onset of the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 further reinforced this emphasis. To whom would Delagoa Bay fall, asked one paper, anticipating the demise of Portugal.³³ The war itself was repeatedly portrayed as being between British and Dutch, rather than Boer,³⁴ with Germany the real power behind both. According to one source, the Germans regarded war against the Boers as an affront to the German nation; and it was pointed out that if Holland were to become German, then the Boers would be under German protection.³⁵

There was always a certain lack of urgency about most of the learned journals' descriptions of specific episodes - mostly because they were, after all, periodicals, and not newspapers. The outbreak of the Boer hostilities, the Fashoda episode, and indeed the Agadir crisis, all merited less attention than might have been thought. Yet within this somewhat distanced approach, the real European importance of colonial events could be stressed more forcibly.

Strategic concern with protecting India had moved back to protecting its approaches, and subsequently to protecting Britain herself within Europe.

As 1914 drew nearer, so Britain's gaze became more confined, and subject peoples took a very definite second place to the European masters who were perceived to lurk behind them.³⁵ Sir John Robinson, ex-Premier of Natal, summed it up in the Cornhill Magazine:

"as I write these words the most tremendous crisis that has yet menaced the country is impending, and a struggle fraught with incalculable issues to the Continent and the Empire seems inevitable." 37

At the same time as these areas of major concern were receiving widespread journalistic coverage, there were a number of other territories which were regarded as having strategic value. Whether as support for existing secure routes, or as fresh naval bases, or as bulwarks against expansionist rivals, these other lands attracted the interest of the periodicals with increasing intensity. They also bore witness most firmly to the use of geography and exploration to back up imperialist designs. Geographic articles in the 1860s and '70s were followed by annexation articles in the '80s. So the geographers, who, like Darwin, were essentially stockpilers of facts, found their efforts being put to more mercenary uses, a regular fate of scientists in all ages. The love of fact, and the need for them to be discovered by Englishmen, extended widely throughout contemporary opinion. The usage was another matter.³⁸

This was most true of central Africa. Waterways were charted in order to link up with Britain's maritime strength on the coastlines, thus profiting both commerce and security. The nation to push its explorers into any new region first was also the nation most likely to gain sway over the region first; or at least keep others out. And "England, as is her right and duty, stands foremost in these undertakings...." So were recounted the travels of

Baker, Livingstone, Speke and Grant,³⁹ and the importance of geography was raised high. Compared with this importance, the death of a few hundred barbarians, many of whom were cannibals, could be regarded as a small matter.⁴⁰ Moreover, virtually every other aspect of life could be included within the all embracing category of geography.

"That an island in the Indian Ocean, larger in extent than the United Kingdom, fertile in all tropical productions, peopled by an intelligent race, and not far removed from the great line of commercial traffic between Egypt and the East, should have remained for ages uninvaded by foreign conquest and unimproved by the progress of indigenous civilisation, is one of the most curious problems in geography." 41

The direct connection was best expressed in an 1894 article: "The geographical mysteries have been almost all solved, and the scramble for possession is nearly at an end."⁴² Macmillan's agreed. Geographers removed the perils and impediments too numerous for the merchant, capitalist or missionary. No step could be taken in progress "for the benefit alike of the African race and the rest of the world, until geographers have first prepared the way."⁴³ This is not to deny the unashamed excitement of such exploration. As Chambers' said:

"So long as the great African rivers had not been traced to their true sources, they formed a mighty geographical puzzle, on which the imagination could dwell at pleasure." 44

But the imagination could go further.

It was, however, the European angle which once more dominated strategic interests. As Farler said, in the Fortnightly Review,

"While I can sympathise with Germany in her desire to found a colonial empire, I must enter a protest against her planting herself on the ruins of British interests, or on ground already occupied by Britain." 45

Similar views on East Africa were included in articles on Stanley's expedition to Emin Pasha, and on the British protectorate of Uganda.⁴⁶ Heligoland attracted the same attention.⁴⁷ The European perspective was also reinforced

by the following statement in the Reviser of Reviews:

"In August Lord Salisbury completed the partition of Africa. The achievement is a notable one, and if so be that it secures a temporary abatement of the African fever, it will have been well worth doing." 48

Punch also held a Eurocentric view, with cartoons of French and Portuguese attempts to mimic the German success in wresting territorial concessions from John Bull.⁴⁹

The other strategic aspect to East Africa lay in its supposed proximity to Egypt. Hence the Canal led to Egypt, Sudan, and finally even Uganda and East Africa. It is true, as Fieldhouse points out, that the same gauge railway was constructed in Uganda as in the Sudan; not without military overtones.⁵⁰ Without denying the native troubles, nor the Germanophobia, augmented by Carl Peters' work in East Africa, there was always the question of the French presence in Africa as well. Even though the French were increasingly disregarded when compared with Germany, they did possess a large slice of Africa, whilst the history of their colonisation in Africa rivalled Britain's.

Nowhere was this more obvious than in West Africa. It was claimed that "there was more serious danger of a conflict over the Niger than ever arose over the Nile,"⁵¹ The two were certainly related, as the whole diplomatic proceedings leading to the Entente of 1904 were to show. Anglo-French accord rested on a whole general set of local arrangements.⁵² Yet in the case of West Africa it was the inherent economic advantages which led directly to the military clashes, rather than the extension of protection of routes to India. Some commentators were indeed not keen on civilising Africans by sending European or American gold-diggers among them and then protecting them in their enterprise. Though of course, the excitement of military success could always compensate for this:

"These trivial objections dismissed, we congratulate Captain Brackenbury on the position he enjoys as the narrator of these most interesting events." 53

The other strategic drawback was that of the topography - the civilisation of the races of central Africa was even held to be retarded by the absence of a seaport and highway into the interior.⁵⁴ On the other hand, no other European power could easily steal a march on Britain that way. As the Westminster explained, when noting the likely influence of France in the back-country during the West African wars, "the country, of course, can never afford more than a foothold for white traders."⁵⁵ Yet whatever foothold it provided, Britain would always be best suited to take it. For "unhappily" to a great country, "no interests are small and no war is little. Whatever the game and wherever it is played, the stakes of England are always large."⁵⁶ Strategy, like the sun, never set on the periodicals' eye view of empire.

Economic motivation was evident in two other areas of strategic concern. Possibly, however, the lack of threat to Britain's economic activity meant that security played a lesser part in the journals' regard for China and Latin America; or possibly the lack of novelty failed to attract them. It was not just that they were not near India; for they represented definite clashes with Russia and America in their own right. In the case of China, it was also the case that there was an intermittently hostile indigenous population, who had to be suppressed for their own good and for the good of civilisation, that is trade, at large.⁵⁷ But the general strategic tone was less panicked than in other areas, and even humanitarian grounds were not sought to defend strategic motives. After all, the Chinese did not consider their forms of torture cruel. "They behaved as barbarians behave to each other".

Where the question of security appeared, it was with the aim of defending an open door for trade, and foreign powers were berated for their attempts to restrict trade. Yet it was still with a European viewpoint that the struggle for control of China was considered. French, Russian and German designs were seen as reflecting a balance of power much nearer to home, and British prestige

in the eyes of her civilised neighbours was of greatest strategic importance, even with regard to British success in quelling Chinese insurrection.⁵⁹

Domestic party politics were absent, either from lack of any government activity, or from the relative lack of allegorical message to be derived from Chinese circumstances. Alternatively it could have been that the perceived threat to Britain's economic position in China captivated all political standpoints; unlike other areas where either threat or economic position was less certain.

Russia was clearly the main ogre. The Illustrated London News asked:

"Shall we be denied the privilege of having a diplomatic agent at Peking while Russia maintains one there?"

and Punch cartooned the Russian Bear: "in Chinese costume, only more like himself than ever, slyly chuckles as he crosses Manchuria. "Aha! They won't know me now! ""⁶⁰ In defending the occupation of Wei-hai-wei it was jokingly remarked: "As if there was the smallest probability of Russia ever leaving Port Arthur!", and the imminent completion of Russian railways and the Czar's likely irritation at the failure of peace proposals were also pointed out.⁶¹ Most significant was the comparison of China with Turkey. Urging Russia and Britain to act in accord, there was no wish for diplomatic arrangements to weaken Britain's sense of maintaining her power in China and elsewhere. European emphasis was reinforced by suggesting that the Russo-Japanese war was to protect the integrity of China, and that a railway was needed to connect India and China and to balance Russian and French lines. This would strengthen China, and a strong China would be India's most effective bulwark.⁶² Increasingly also Germany came into the reckoning, it being considered that Germany acted to Britain's detriment while Britain ignored her own rights. The implication was beginning to creep in that perhaps Anglo-Russian accord was more desirable than Anglo-German.⁶³

The whole debate was still however subject to the interests of trade. Whatever the European confrontation, it was felt that in the east England was faced by jealous and formidable rivals, who were rapidly learning from a study of English practice the secrets of administrative and commercial success. As an 1832 article had decided, interference in China should be limited to the "narrowest limits consistent with the due protection of our trade with a country containing, we are told, immense coal deposits, and full of undeveloped wealth". 64

Strategy and economics were confused in attitudes to the Pacific and far east. New Guinea was considered unattractive and undesirable, though with possible prospects. "New Guinea has been annexed mainly for political purposes. The interesting point is whether it is likely to be of commercial value in the future." Another view extended the interest in China to the island of Formosa, arguing that Chinese-Japanese conflict over Formosa could not fail to have effect on India, with consequent detriment to Britain herself. A similar extension of interest in 1902 took in the American conflict in the Philippines. For if an Asiatic population could make the problem of conquest difficult, it could have a profound effect on other Asians, such as the Boxers. The question of Anglo-Saxon prestige was again paramount.⁶⁵ Exploration was also encouraged in order to discourage others - for although Britain did not want the responsibility of annexing Polynesia, a caveat must be entered against any other power's annexations. At the same time, there was a clear link between exploration and economics:

"It is because we wish to open China, to see our import trade to China as flourishing as the export trade from China, that we urge an armed exploration of her seaboard and interior." 66

The other area of the globe where strategic interests appeared more tenuous than genuine was Latin America. In the main the periodicals observed the economic advantages of South American trade, but occasional references

reflected the fear of foreign incursions. Again the strategic concern was defensive, preventing other countries' advance rather than making any positive moves of one's own. Thus Spain was abused for any intentions in Chile, and America was warned off Nicaraguan and Venezuelan movements.⁶⁷

The Edinburgh Review made the important connection. Central America should be neutral, it said, dedicated to trade and transit. It also warned America away from any potential seizure, as America was a maritime rival with a policy of protection.⁶⁸

The argument that Britain's interests were world-wide, and therefore her defence necessitated world-wide security, explains much of the extension of strategic imperialism. The desire to prove that Britain's interests were world-wide was not entirely absent either. Yet the relation of far-flung territories to their European masters reveals the real domestic orientation to security of empire. In particular, the pre-emptive attitude of preventing other nations making gains underlines the defensive nature of the periodicals' approach.

One major aspect of imperialism with strategic overtones concerned the security of the white settler colonies. In this sphere it was fear of independence, or of diminishing support for the mother country which captured the journalists' imagination. As the colonies acquired enthusiasm for economic and political self-government, so Britain's periodicals clamoured for the strengthening of the links between Britain and her dependencies. Far from desiring overstretched military resources being used to protect these imperial possessions, the journals demanded that the colonies contribute themselves to imperial defence. Imperial federation was also variously supported, on the grounds that loose connections which recognised existing facts were better than total independence brought about by over-formal attempts at subjugation.

Informal association of the entire Anglo-Saxon race was expanded to take in the original settler colony as well. Hopes of an understanding with America were widely vaunted, despite the frequent snobbish and critical attitudes held towards American culture, and despite the occasional clashes over territorial disputes.⁶⁹ Harpers, though perhaps not representative on this issue, was not alone in spelling out Anglo-Saxon affinities. If there was not to be an Anglo-American alliance, the destiny of the two nations was certainly close together.⁷⁰ As Hyam notes, there grew to be a myth of a "special relationship" with America. The Anglo-Boer war was compared with the American civil war, and parallels were drawn with the American conquest of the Philippines. The British were always, like the north in the Civil War, fighting for free institutions, political democracy, and racial equality.⁷¹ It was as if there was indeed a widespread feeling that Britain must acquiesce in the "Americanisation of the World" (W.T. Stead). Britain was determined to solve her problems by admitting America as an equal partner in the Pax Britannia, and the myth of the "special relationship" made this easier to accept.

Next to America, in both senses, Canada formed an important part in strategic imperial thinking. For although much of the periodicals' attention to Canada was confined to the earlier years of imperialism, it was from these years that the very term "imperial federation" dates.⁷² Moreover, Canada occupied a twofold position in strategic discussions which lasted throughout the period. Firstly it was a block to American expansion itself, as well as being a check to French endeavours in North America. Secondly it presented a constitutional example for the rest of the empire, Gladstone using the British North American Act of 1867 as the basis for his Irish Home Rule plans, and liberals taking the same analogy for South Africa after the

Anglo-Boer war.⁷³ The contemporary vision was well put by the Westminster in 1885:

"The establishment of a great British power on the American continent has ceased to be the glorious vision of a remote future, and will soon be numbered among the most splendid achievements of the present generation" 74

By 1900 however, a Quarterly Review piece on Canada was taking a more defensive line: "One spirit in many forms must animate this empire if it is to hold together."⁷⁵ The example of Canada was clear, but could it be used successfully elsewhere?

In New Zealand, for example, there was also the problem of the indigenous population. This was a double snag, as there was much support within Britain for the manly Maoris. But whilst the savages inflicted "humiliating" repulses, there was never any doubt of the outcome. The natives had no more chance of ultimate success than the Fenians.⁷⁶ In Australia it was suggested that English blood should not be shed to keep the tie of dependence, but the settlers were warned of the pitfalls in independence. Comparison with America showed the good habits in Australian goldfields as against those in California - all proof of the beneficial government of Britain.⁷⁷ In South Africa it was not until after the Anglo-Boer war that any real level of settler self-government was mentionable to the majority of the press; and this was only due to a desire to avoid any future level of conflict similar to that which had so glaringly revealed Britain's military weakness. Even here there was a thought of nearer climes.:

"The history of this acute disease in South Africa is most instructive at the present juncture, as its course is so similar, except in point of duration, to the chronic disease from which Ireland is suffering." 78

Ireland itself represented the longest little war of them all. Strategic fears - Home Rule is Rome Rule - had existed long before the nineteenth century, but were none the less emphatic for that. Punch carried a poem called "Nationalist Neutrality" in 1870, in which the Oirish Republic hoped for a French victory against Germany - so that the Pope's influence would be increased.⁷⁹ Ireland provided both comparisons with other colonies (and colonies' inhabitants), and evidence of the Eurocentric motivation to strategic imperialism. As a back door to England it had to be made secure; and on that basis so did every other colonial possession. And if a population so near home, and so full of the benefits of English civilisation, was so consistently unruly, what hope was there for any other colonial population?

Time and again home rule appeared as the disintegration of empire. Goschen believed that without firmness towards the Irish evil-doers, "that every subject race, that India, that Europe would know that we are no longer able to cope with resistance."⁸⁰ It was this defensive reaction, this fear of what the neighbours might think, that lurked behind the whole espousal of imperial federation, and then tariff reform. When Chamberlain, as the principal exponent of both, perceived the waning confidence in the future of empire, he seized on notions which might bring the empire closer together and maintain it against the competition of rivals. In passing, he was also attempting to check the waning fortunes of the Conservative government, and bring it electoral success against its rivals.⁸¹

With or without support for federation, the periodicals were all aware of the fundamental problem. The Quarterly admitted that the empire was composed of unwilling nations, and the Review of Reviews thought that as communications made distances smaller, colonies were not protected. The Contemporary Review in 1870 felt: "At this moment we are drifting to the disintegration of our Empire", and Dicey in Nineteenth Century saw Britain's days as a great power numbered as soon as she started to reduce her imperial liabilities.⁸² The remedy was not so clear. Gladstone thought England's

power lay in her central strength, not in her extremities, Macmillan's argued that admitting, for example, India to federation was to lose the Englishman's empire over India, and the Contemporary placed faith in federation quickening the wealth of empire and promoting the general efficiency of legislation.⁸³ Yet in the long run it was the complacent Edinburgh Review which came nearest the mark. It suggested that Rosebery's support for federation was merely a new "notion", and that colonies were loyal to their sovereign. This was what gave England her superiority over a hundred nations with one law, one language, and a common ancestry, it argued.⁸⁴ In fact when war came, it was just that loyalty which made a reality of imperial unity, however defined.⁸⁵ At the same time, the Westminster attacked imperial federation from the totally opposite viewpoint. Colonies had been thought to add to England's national strength, but they increased the frontier line to be defended. The answer was not federation, therefore, but rather each colony bearing its own responsibility. "England has done her duty to the world in rearing her colonies whilst they were undeveloped, but they do not require leading strings for ever."⁸⁵

What is significant is the universal ^{un}certainty with regard to Britain's security, even though the solutions were far from unanimous. The need to look for solutions reveals the true concern, and this was evident as much in the diplomatic field within Europe as in the wider colonial sphere.

Thus splendid isolation became an increasingly unfashionable option. Especially after the Anglo-Boer war, the realisation that Britain could not be committed in two places at once led to a reappraisal of the pure Anglo-Saxon world domination. In addition there was the growing suspicion, mooted by Salisbury, that Britain had backed the wrong horse in the Crimean War. Russia lost her place as the bogeyman of Europe, and a movement which had started as an attempt to prevent British isolation ended as a clear-cut isolation of Germany.

Partly this was recognition of changed circumstances. In 1892 Salisbury learned that sea power alone was not enough to defend the Dardanelles. In 1896 Bulgaria was reconciled to Russia, strengthening Russian Dardanelle defences still further. Entente with Russia was being arrived at almost unintentionally, ~~in the knowledge~~ that Britain could not be the greatest navy and at the same time fight the greatest power on land. As Grey said in Twenty Five Years, policy was not a carefully worked out plan, but rather details which were settled first and from which a plan later emerged.⁸⁷

Yet the new direction in foreign policy had been inexorably taking shape over the course of several decades. Amidst the Russophobic articles and cartoons of the 1870s⁸⁸ there existed disquieting noises for the future.

Fraser's asked generally: "Who could suppose this joy to be but the prelude to gigantic wars? Yet that and that alone is most probably what this "Peace with Honour" means. Nor may we have so very long to wait."⁸⁹ The Edinburgh Review observed from an early stage, when commenting on the traditional adversary, France, "It cannot be too often repeated that the peace of Europe is threatened, if it be threatened, not by France, but by the changes Prussia has made in the distribution of power."⁹⁰ Punch in similar vein showed Britannia talking to Belgium. Labelled "Trust me!", the cartoon had England declaring "Let us hope that they won't trouble you, dear friend. But if they do — "⁹¹ And this was in 1870.

Empire was always secondary to Europe. The real war which was felt to be coming was marking out its battlefield, and the major powers were lining up to snatch the territory of the minor powers. Extended into the colonies, the imperialist nations were preparing to divide up the world along new frontiers as there were few new areas still remaining to be taken. Lenin's view of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, and the First World War as the clash of rival imperialisms,⁹² could easily have been based on the prognostications of the Victorian periodical press.

The European motivation continued and increased as the end of Victoria's reign drew nearer. Macmillan's drew portents from Siam, and saw the inevitable great war, when it would come, whelming all Europe. More significantly still, the writer asked if Britain's political condition was reparable. "The people of this island still have it in their hands to rescue this splendid empire".⁹³ Empire was traced back to Europe, and thence to Britain's own domestic problems. The direction of cause and effect was quite clear. Chamberlain, from a critical viewpoint, showed the same conclusion. "Jingoism to a large degree depends on the structure of society."⁹⁴

Meanwhile Russia was growing in respectability. Not only was this as a result of her defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905, nor because Anglo-Russian accord was a concomitant of the Anglo-French entente of 1904; although these were definite preconditions. The fact of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which ended Britain's splendid isolation, was also subsequent to the periodicals' shift of emphasis in the 1890s. Thus the Review of Reviews could declare in 1890: "We shall see the Anglo-Russian yet, despite all this pessimist fatalism." The Fortnightly recognised a threat to India in Russia's railways in Asia, but thought the increased travel by both Russians and English would show each how the other was human.⁹⁵ The real reason for the decline of Russophobia was not hard to find. As the Quarterly said, the clash of Britain and Germany at sea made Anglo-German accord unlikely, and pointed out a Russian-English understanding instead.⁹⁶ The German-inspired Bagdad railway only echoed this, bringing once more into the argument a threat to India.⁹⁷

Most forcibly of all, the discussion of the Netherlands brought strategy back into Europe and towards fear for Britain's own security. Not only had Germany shown herself a threat in the far east and the middle east, and a force in Turkish intrigue, but also she was well-placed to take hold of the Low Countries, and implicitly the English Channel. Blackwoods urged Belgium to step up her defences, and Dillon in the Contemporary Review

hameoned "The Germanisation of the Continent". With a mix of fear and envy:

"The work of cultured propagation which Germany is steadily carrying on in Europe and beyond the seas deserves the plaudits even of those whose one aim it is to defend England against Teutonic influence... Yet in spite of this peaceful penetration which is going on uninterruptedly without a protest from any Power, Germany is now increasing her army very considerably, and is preparing to add to the speed with which she is vying with us in the race for naval supremacy." 98

The argument had turned full circle, and the emphasis was back where it had always belonged - on the navy and the attendant safety of Britain in Europe.

For in the last resort the colonies were a diversion from Europe, and little wars were a diversion from the real war, that is the European one. It has been argued that the steeplechase for Africa and the partition of the world were consequences of the state of peace, and that European friendship was more important than a war over Africa.⁹⁹ Similarly the empire is held to have been equal to every contingency except that of fighting a world war.¹⁰⁰ Yet it may well be that the consequence of this sort of partition was world war, creating a new partition, and that the security against contingency was taken to just the lengths likely to induce war. When noting the contribution of Britain's colonies to the war, both in men and money, it is difficult not to see the escalation of world-wide defence as a partial cause of hostilities. Certainly the orientation of that escalation was towards defence of the mother country. In the long run colonies were no more than an elaborate safety barrier for Britain herself.¹⁰¹

In this way the two major strategic arguments came together. The first one, fear of native challenges to British rule and the attendant fear that other natives might detect British weakness, was sub^eservient to the second one, fear that British shortcomings might be seen by European eyes. Colonies had limited information as to other colonial activities, but European communications were well able to exploit British failures. Also, there is some truth in Hyam's suggestion that Europeans only acquired territory where native resistance was likely to be low.¹⁰² The colonies were not supposed to be a source of strategic anxiety in themselves. There was enough of that within Europe.

All of this was perceived within one further constraint - domestic politics inside Britain herself. Britain's reputation in the eyes of her neighbours was dependant on her perception of that reputation by her own population. Thus domestic unity and stability dominated imperial unity and security. Strategy could be used as political point-scoring, by the journals, blaming Gladstone or Salisbury as the case might be, and security could be explained in terms of (conservative) expansion or of (liberal) maintenance and contraction. To some extent this reflected economic arguments as well - economic gains from colonies as against increased expenditure in defending them. But overall there was a desire for a safe Britain, safe from herself, safe from her European neighbours, and safe from colonial unrest. And safety, like charity, begins at home.

Chapter Seven : The Economics of Empire

A Fair Field For British Enterprise and Capital

The periodical press did not exactly reflect the unofficial mind of empire, but neither did it entirely mimic the "official mind", to use the phrase employed by Gallagher and Robinson.¹ Questions of trade following the flag, and of imperial investment at the expense of the home market, were well aired in the periodicals. Both left and right used the economic argument as the basis for their opinions. To some, colonisation was of benefit to the whole world, commodities were produced under the most favourable conditions, and commerce conclusively followed the flag.² To others, trade did not increase in proportion to the area of empire, the majority of trade was always with foreign countries and not colonies, and "all the foreign markets in the world are not worth as much, even from the material point of view, as the home market furnished by a well-paid, prosperous working class."³ But both assumed that economic factors lay behind the drive to empire.

The same was true of other aspects of the economic argument. Financiers' influence was stated and denied, as in Leonard Woolf's "invisible wires" between board-room and statesmen, and in the complaint that Hobson was guilty of "palpable exaggeration" in ascribing undue influence to a clique of financiers.⁴ Whether cause, effect, or merely coincident, the financial element was never absent. The possibility that foreign tariffs could close markets to British trade was also dwelt upon, as was the "moral" issue of Britain's duty to expand.⁵ Another argument was that of colonisation, as distinct from annexation. Gladstone in 1855 had approved of white settler colonies for providing markets and employment. Here extensions of territory

could not, he had felt, be a legitimate object of ambition unless good use was made of that territory. Palmerston had echoed this in 1857 in resisting the burden of Egypt. "Let us try to improve all those countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon us the condemnation of all other civilised nations."⁶ This was quoted by Lord Cromer in 1879, when saying that the general aims of British policy were still the same. And Salisbury in 1885 only extended the line a little further in declaring: (to financiers)

"It is our business in all these new countries to make smooth the paths for British commerce, British enterprise, the application of British capital....You must enable it to get to the country where its work is to be done. You must open the path." ⁷

These points need, however, to be put in the context of the more recent historiography. Callaghan and Robinson concentrate on the security of existing colonies, and the continuity of imperial expansion before and after the so-called scramble for Africa. Africa was, after all, the bottom of the barrel.⁸ Their "imperialism of free trade" ideas are modified by Platt, who pinpoints the fact that:

"... the obsession with "security" and "fixation on safeguarding the routes to the East", which Robinson and Callaghan have rightly identified as recurrent features in the official attitude to British imperial expansion in Africa, applied almost as much to the safeguarding of the British position in world trade as they did to the physical maintenance of the empire." ⁹

Protection of India was still protection of Britain's economy. In addition, the continuity at an informal level was not reflected in the increasingly stringent measures Britain was prepared to take to defend her trade.¹⁰ The defensive nature of this imperialism should not, however, be overlooked. In keeping with Disraeli and Forster's utterances in the 1870s, Platt suggests that the outstanding feature of British foreign policy after 1870 was that it was perpetually on the defensive.¹¹ Hyam also echoes this. The concept

of living and dying empires, and the talk of Rome, were clearly linked with the down-turn in commerce during the great depression of 1873-96. Britain was passed in iron and steel manufacture by Germany and America in the 1880s and 1900s. German steel was sold in Britain itself, and there was a long-term retardation of Britain's economy even after the depression was over. The upward shift of 1904-14 was not based on new methods, and lasting solutions were never sought. Imperialism was a retreat into old ideas.¹²

More specifically, however, Fieldhouse has denied the economic theories of empire on the grounds of chronology. Tariff barriers and capital export came too late to explain the steeplechase, he suggests, and empire was created by a series of coincidental interactions on the colonial periphery.¹³ Hyam modifies this in one respect, in pointing to the concept of buying things abroad rather than of exporting surplus capital. But he also denies the theory of capitalist imperialism.¹⁴ Economic motivations are thus downplayed by reference to combinations of causes, of which economic reasons form a minority. Platt again offers an alternative approach. It was the commitment to free trade, he argues, which created the pressure to safeguard British trade. The scramble was the only alternative to tariffs. It was thus the fear of closed markets, and the expectations that colonies would offer great rewards, that galvanised Britain into imperial expansion.¹⁵

Yet it seems from the periodicals that much of this historiographical debate has missed the point. The real question in the learned journals' collective mind was the value of the informal empire, and of the "semi-colonies"¹⁶, rather than of formal annexations themselves. Political reasons - the official mind of Whitehall - ignore the genuine economic rivalries in, for instance, West Africa.¹⁷ To many, this economic, informal imperialism was the empire. If not already annexed, a territory soon would be, as far as many periodicals were concerned. The material reward was still canvassed, regardless of the formal position of the Union Jack.

It is in the same way that the very word "imperialism" is used today by many third world countries to mean oppression, capitalism, or simply power. The direct link with "empire" is regarded less strongly than the assumed penetration of foreign spy networks, of foreign multi-nationals, and of foreign "subversive" literature. Real penetration holds more command of territory than mere flag-waving, however noisy.

Moreover, in the case of Victorian and Edwardian England, expectations ran far ahead of reality. Like North Sea Oil, any remedy for British decline was clutched at by all frantic fingers. In encouraging business ventures in the colonies, politicians and periodicals were holding out desperate hopes for recovery. The real benefits were secondary to the aspirations. Thus the importance of the periodical press lay in their creation and reflection of an atmosphere of expected gain, a climate of future salvation through expansion, which had to be adhered to through thick and thin. Britain had to take colonies to stop others; for if there was a profit to be had, and the arguments relied on there being one, then it must not fall into foreign hands. Indeed, as the realisation of limited colonial wealth became more apparent, the press stuck more obstinately to their belief in economic justifications. Whether to uphold empire or to denigrate it, the assumption was that money was at the root.

Most of all, the periodicals reveal the domestic motivations behind imperialism. The weakness of British trade, especially within Europe and when compared with Britain's civilised competitors, and the threat of organised labour eroding British profit margins, were readily in evidence behind the journals' attitudes. In addition, the fixation with empire acted as a diversion from domestic problems; which explains the turn-of-century presentation of alternatives between home and overseas markets. If empire could deliver the goods, it could solve everyone's problems, reasoned the learned periodicals. The maintenance of profits was good for all. In this view, the press was echoing Marx's view of economic imperialism, in which profit has an absolute tendency to decline but is bolstered up by "counteracting causes".¹³ The search for new, unexploited markets was the last in a long list of counterbalancing activities, after which, to Marx's mind, capitalism

would have run out of answers.

What concerns us here is not the actual empire, but the periodicals' perception of empire. That perception, it is argued, was one of economic expectation, and an economic expectation which would solve the tangle of domestic problems. The question of cause and effect may be of less importance than the coincidence of opinion across the broad range of educated society. Government and periodicals were not two totally separate bodies, but neither were they identical. And economics, though fundamental, may not have been the only answer. The climate of opinion was nevertheless clear.

Most significantly, the periodicals' main economic emphasis was on Africa. Despite the subsequent failure to realise the lofty expectations, and despite the fact that Africa was really the last of all possible spheres of material reward, the journals homed in on the prospects there from a very early date. Possibly it was this very fact of being the final chance of release from economic stagnation which made the writers leap overboard in their descriptions of the dark continent. Africa just had to be full of resources. There was no alternative. And the more the periodicals catalogued their hopes, the more they convinced themselves they were right. Belief was all.

Nor did belief diminish over time. From 1851 onwards, the articles eulogised in tones which remained surprisingly similar for the whole of the period. Fraser's asked in 1851 what Africa would send to the Exhibition, and instanced Ethiopian leather, Tunisian fax, dates, olives and pistachio trees as possibilities. "There are African races," it decided, "who yield to no people in the construction of objects of local convenience and luxury." The magazine continued by bemoaning the Arab control of trade in the interior - for "here, it will be admitted, are the materials for a great trade." Already existing, though curiously small when compared with what it might be, African trade showed a quality commanding a ready market in Europe. The quantity was all that was lacking. Fraser's went on:

"Is there no way of making known to the natives of these interior states of Africa our peaceful desires to supply their wants in the greatest possible abundance, and to obtain a fair share of their custom for those commodities of ours which we can best supply? That in the friendly rivalry of nations, Great Britain would obtain, at least, a fair success, is proved by the fact,

that the British name is often falsely assumed, and British marks imitated, for the goods of other countries." 19

The importance of British involvement in Africa was implicit in all such articles, though often was cloaked in terms of "Europe", or of the "whole human race", lest the approach seem too self-centred. Thus it was noted that: "The aspect of Africa and its people to European eyes is wholly changed within one generation. The world at large knows Africa better: and Africa is the better for knowing the rest of the world".

The suppression of the slave trade in Africa was felt to have developed industry and commerce in as primitive a society as could be found in the world - and Britain's imports from Africa were listed, including West African palm oil, and 1250 bales of cotton cloth to one Manchester trader, Mr Clegg, in 1857. Moreover,

"there are whole classes of commodities in Africa which have scarcely been heard of yet Thus far, some natural wealth has been discovered wherever the natives are living."

The piece concluded that the whole human race would be better for the laying open of the new continent to civilisation, and the bringing up of whole races to their capacity for industry and general commercial intercourse.²⁰

The question of Africa's potential wealth was uppermost in many minds. In 1861 it was declared that the whole existing commerce of Africa did not exceed that of Hamburg. "And yet this continent abounds in natural wealth." Linking material benefit with the blessings of civilisation, it was further stated: "Africa may in one sense be defined as a continent of the future. At least seven eighths of the enormous area of one of the largest divisions of the globe have yet to acquire even the rudiments of true civilisation."

But the natives were traders by disposition. The demand for beads would develop into more rational and useful imports. With complete cultural insularity, natives were mocked because they had at first

"rejected the gold and silver ornaments that were offered them by their first visitors, but grasped eagerly at baubles which had no intrinsic worth. Children then, the natives of Africa are children still". 21

But the journal seemed confident that these children could be led to understand the "intrinsic worth" of "rational and useful" products.

By 1877, once geographers had removed "the perils and impediments too numerous for the merchant, capitalist or missionary", it was possible to say: "Commerce has not had, since the discovery of a new world, so vast a field for profitable enterprise opened to it as Africa will soon present."

Again it was England, as the leading maritime nation, who was especially expected to benefit.²² Some liberal writers still clung to the slavery question, one suggesting that:

"With the suppression of the slave trade a great future may be expected for Africa, if only a satisfactory method can be devised of developing her rich resources by means of the industry of her own healthy stalwart sons." 23

But there was no denial of the resources available. Indeed, the same journal three months later declared:

"That Africa might become a second America we cannot doubt".

Her rivers, minerals and climate were all superior and healthier than those of India, and England was urged by the paper to become "more alive to an obvious duty in this respect."²⁴

The atmosphere of expected gain continued well into the period of scramble. Practical proposals for getting at central Africa through Bechuanaland were put forward, and the commercial supremacy of Great Britain was held to be:

"not yet a thing of the past, and it need never be so unless British traders decline to adapt themselves to the changed conditions of commerce." 25

The only difference between this and the earlier attitudes was the increasing

emphasis on the role of British traders in opening up the tropical commerce. Expectations of the existence of resources were undiminished; but the means of obtaining them were seen to need some strengthening. Noting the attractions of Kilimanjaro - to both trader and sportsman - one article wished to overcome any differences of opinion as to East Africa's commercial potentiality by sending a number of merchant adventurers to see - an exploring expedition on purely commercial lines.

"There seems no reason why our great commercial people should leave exploration entirely to geographers, naturalists and missionaries." 26

By the 1890s this attitude had extended to support for the chartered companies, who were taking active steps to secure the goods. The transport difficulties in Mashonaland - with mineral wealth and agricultural prospects - would be overcome by the Company Railway, thus

"rendering easily accessible a new country, eminently suitable for British colonisation, and well calculated to relieve the pressure of our teeming population at home." 27

Two birds with one stone. Moreover, chartered companies were suggested to have done more in twenty years than had the government in two hundred. "In chartered companies alone is there hope for the development of British influence, commerce, and civilisation in Africa."²⁸ To some liberals there was therefore a true laissez-faire to the companies, leaving government free to get on with domestic administration. Though some criticism also crept in. To the Economist

for example, "Sovereign companies are probably the worst possible agencies for developing a new country. Instead of their object being to open up territory for settlement it is to close it. They want to make good dividends for themselves, not to see the ordinary emigrant flourishing." 29

The same paper later expressed concern that the British South African Company, with power but no responsibility, might provoke friction with European nations in Africa.³⁰

Yet even these criticisms did not deny the availability of wealth through imperial expansion. The question was rather that of who was to receive the dividends. Moreover, friction with European nations was of more concern than possible detriment to the indigenous population. Eurocentric, if not Anglocentric, motivations predominated.

An interesting feature of the later years is the specific analysis of defects in those areas already penetrated. While optimistic enthusiasm was lavished on unknown parts of the continent, well-known regions, often with clear economic links with Britain, came in for specific questioning. "One finds on the Niger little evidence of the marvellous wealth which is supposed to be locked up in Africa."³¹ West Africa "can never afford more than a foothold for white traders."³² However, the future was still expected to hold benefits. European influence would do more than anything to maintain peace and allow the natives of these "vast rich and fertile districts to accumulate produce and establish a profitable market for European wares."³³ "Under reasonable government this colony should develop large resources and be a valuable imperial possession."³⁴ And although the Ashantees might doubt a civilisation comprising rum, gunpowder, cheap newspapers and partisan politics, they were alive to the advantages of commerce.³⁵ Even if resources were not felt to have lived up to original expectations, therefore, the importance of a market for increasingly uncompetitive British goods was plain to see.

Meanwhile central and eastern Africa still attracted hopes out of all proportion to their real potential. It is no use arguing that economics were unimportant because there was a subsequent failure of development, any

more than arguing that economics were clearly important because of the following exploitation of resources.³⁶ The point is rather that contemporaries expected there to be material reward from colonial ventures. Thus Ceylon coffee planters were reported to be eyeing up Nyasaland, and British central Africa was thought likely to become the most successful coffee growing country in the world.³⁷ The Uganda Railway would similarly "not only open up a promising and fertile country, but its construction cannot fail to impart an impetus to the manufacturing industries of Great Britain."³⁸ Once opened, it was seen necessary for the railway to have something to carry. In this, "Mr Chamberlain with his usual acumen, hit the nail on the head...." and pointed to rubber and cotton. For:

"With a generous and wise administration, British East Africa is sure to attract capital as its resources become known, and in a few years we may hope to see a most prosperous colony." 39

The connection between good government and material gain was clear to these writers. As to cause and effect, at least one quarter hoped, rightly or wrongly, that Nileland would justify by its inherent prosperity the fond expectations of those who had urged the Imperial government to bring it within the British sphere of influence.⁴⁰ Even at the time it was perceived to be expectations which counted.

In the case of South Africa, there were actualities as well as aspirations. Again it is difficult to be sure whether periodicals were more concerned with the theoretical considerations of the extent of the available wealth, when their writings were dwelling more on the practical problems of Britain obtaining the wealth. Keen to urge annexation and government intervention in areas of limited resources, the journals seemed happier to leave real benefits to the hands of private enterprise. Thus it was even stated that Britain derived no direct advantage from her South African possessions, as these could never

compete with North America or Australia as fields of emigration and settlement. Rather they could only be made valuable by private enterprise.⁴¹ There were similar fears of complications marring the probable enrichment of the British colony; and a "hearty tone of encouragement" was wished to "those who are about to help themselves."⁴² The double meaning was unintentional.

If tropical Africa represented the extreme of expected material advantage without basis in fact, South Africa was the ultimate in white settler colony complication. In both, therefore, strong British government was seen as a prerequisite for safe economic development; though ideas varied as to the role of the private companies within that administration. On the other hand, in areas of direct economic interest which were lacking in other significance to European adventurers, British government was not so necessary. In China, for example, the periodicals' support for informal empire was clear. One trusted that British interference would be limited to the

"narrowest limits consistent with the due protection of our trade with a country containing, we are told, immense coal deposits, and full of undeveloped wealth."

And the National Review specified that:

"our national objects are simply those of commercial and peaceful intercourse." 43

Expectations still ran ahead of reality, but the emphasis was on keeping British involvement strictly within the economic sphere.

The economic importance was, however, well catalogued by the periodicals. Suggesting that the Chinese trade could be ten times as large, one showed how agricultural and mineral wealth were not fully utilised in China, how existing communications were defective, how there was still a large available opening for the extension of British trade in manufactured goods, and how the Chinese people were well-disposed and anxious to cultivate commercial relations with Europeans.⁴⁴ The need for telegraphic communication with China was repeatedly stressed as a means of increasing Britain's commerce there, for: "From the mighty empire of China we receive some of the most precious of our imports; to gain free commercial intercourse with that empire we have expended enormous sums of money and many valuable lives." 45

The vital part which China played in British commerce was testified by all.⁴⁵

But as time went on a tone of defensiveness also crept in. English manufactures were viewed as slowly awakening to the fact that their future prosperity was bound up with China; but China's power to manufacture her own cotton, rather than relying on British exports, was also noted.⁴⁷ By 1862 the advances of Japan had been recognised as such that Britain was accused of having ignored the actualities of Japan for the possibilities of China.⁴⁸ Now it was the Japanese industry and commerce which were regarded as of special importance to Britain; though the alliance of the same year obviously had more than a little to do with this.

Whether or not the far east promised more than it delivered, the attitudes revealed by the periodicals were heavily based in economic considerations. Not surprisingly, the same was true of the main jewel in Britain's colonial crown - India. Especially in the earlier half of the period, India's role in British revenue was stressed over and over again.⁴⁹ It was also important to the periodicals to emphasise the role of British capital and energy in stimulating the Indian wealth. India was seen as an obvious field for "the profitable employment of English capital." Furthermore:

"We consider it certain that the interests of the inhabitants of India can in no way be more effectually promoted than by the judicious application of British skill and money, under a government knowing how to rule all classes in a spirit of friendly confidence, without fear or favour..."⁵⁰

What was good for Britain would of course be good for India. Similar generalisations were adopted elsewhere. India, it was claimed, was a striking example

of the inevitable force of physical laws governing the progress and condition of mankind. The need was therefore clear for European capital and knowledge to employ the accumulation of Indian wealth.⁵¹

There were some doubts as to the moral nature of India's wealth, however. Opium could not be ignored in financial terms, but its desirability was another matter. Having said that, it is significant that several periodicals concentrated their attention on other aspects of the opium trade. Thus said one:

"We do not mean by this that the whole of the revenue from opium should be relinquished, or even materially reduced. On moral, if not on financial grounds, some restriction, in the shape of heavy export duty, must be placed upon a traffic that is contraband and mischievous in itself, and has been unduly fostered by political encouragement; but the monopoly is a needless, clumsy and most objectionable machinery, super-added to that which is otherwise evil." 52

It was the monopoly, with its threat to perfect free trade, which was almost worse than the opium. Another article put it more crudely still.

"Opium is an important source of revenue to the Government, but ~~of~~ we shall say nothing, as its production affords no field of speculation to Europeans." 53

Another area of doubt further underlines the Eurocentrism of the learned articles. This was the question of Indian import duties. Free trade principles suggested that there should be no duties on cotton goods imported into India— but the grim reality was that the Indian sub-continent was thus unable to compete with Manchester. The press reflected the conflict of ideas with their usual suphemisms. One observed the "grossest effrontery" in Manchester's efforts to secure a portion of Indian revenue for herself,⁵⁴ while another claimed that the abolition of import duties was an advantage to India and free trade rather than a concession to Manchester.⁵⁵ Yet another

sidetracked the debate into channels of chinchine cultivation in India, transplanted from Peru. Although England still relied mostly on the future cultivation of Indian cotton, it argued: "Peru (is) an important source of supply for Manchester."⁵⁵

In none of these writings was the economic basis irrelevant, however tangential and circumlocutory the arguments. It was not untypical for articles to point to: "the growth of our own dominions, stimulated by freedom of trade and by the progress of India in facilities of communication and the production of wealth."⁵⁷

Although the evidence of economic expectations may seem to have been laboured in the preceding paragraphs, it is necessary, given the general direction of the historiography, to show the extent of the periodicals' commitment to material aspirations. Whatever the motivations, or the effects, of the writings, and whatever the particular emphasis laid by individual writers and magazines, it is clear that economics played more than a passing role in imperial debate. Whether the hopes were real, or of influence on politicians and industrialists, is less important. The expectations were unambiguous.⁵⁸

Apart from expectations of British gain, there were a number of specific fears of foreign advance, and consequent tariff barriers. Again it is impossible to posit any effect of these fears upon decision-making processes, but it is undeniable that they existed within the pages of the press. It is also undeniable that they occupied the journalists' fascination in the latter half of the period under study, that is when Britain's strength was perceived to be on the wane. Such fears were, needless to say, reflective of the defensive nature of the later attitudes. As was singled out about the Berlin Conference,

foreign politicians were "guarding loyally their interests in Central Africa", and Britain must therefore do the same.⁵⁹

Again there were some convoluted rationalisations for opposition to foreign gain. One questioned Leopold's Association for its system of labour by contract, and for its private society nature; but the real point was that the Association had appointed France its legatee. This, it was felt, was a "possibly retrograde commercial policy". However, it was not that the struggle was claimed to be a national rivalry, but rather civilisation against barbarism; and the only solution was the opening of the Congo waters to all nations on equal terms.⁶⁰

Another article displayed similar contradictions. Writing on the French activity at Lake Chad, it declared that there was a fascination about Africa's lakes far out of proportion to their value as commercial waterways. French ambition, however, was seen to contemplate the whole of North Africa, and it was therefore not to be expected that the other powers would let France take undue predominance, however valueless the lakes.⁶¹

French progress in the east attracted similar criticism. Tonquin might appear to flourish, but French methods were unlikely to lead to progress, and moreover, "the area will be lost to British commerce, to Burmah, to India, to England, to Europe, and the world."⁶² "Commerce" meant British commerce, and "commercial progress" meant British progress. Even so, and regardless of French prospects,

"science will have cause to rejoice in the opening afforded to its inquiries in fields so long inaccessible, and with our own unrivalled advantages of position and superiority of means, as also of material interests at stake, we shall have but ourselves to blame if the rewards of enterprise be carried off by less-favoured competitors." 64

Meanwhile there was fear of Russian intervention in a newly-growing Tibetan market,⁶⁵ and Portugal was criticised for using Macao for a disguised slave trade.⁶⁶ In the latter case it was asserted that Portugal had only a limited claim to retain the colony, on such a basis, and support was promised for any Chinese attempt to regain the peninsula. The repeated belief that Britain alone was capable of colonisation, and that all other nations should keep well out of such ventures, extended from dismissing the Boers for not understanding gold-mining,⁶⁷ to castigating France and Germany for deliberate restriction of trade.⁶⁸ But at no time were economic motives, British or foreign, other than significant to the periodicals. And articles on foreign aims only shadow more clearly the British perspective. As an earlier piece put it:

"...perhaps the most potent motive which actuates the non-military classes of Russians in desiring enlargement of empire in Asia is a wish for commercial extension." 69

Were the non-military classes of Britons so different?

To some, however, the economic motive was covered by more altruistic rationalisations. The "duty" to expand, and the "moral" benefit of economic activity were themes with a certain attraction to uneasy apologists; while scientific and geographical ~~excuses~~ also provided less ulterior propaganda. Such arguments marked out the difference between selfish foreign expansion and pure-hearted British imperialism.

The conviction that an economic status quo was an abomination and that other countries had a duty to the world to open their resources to their neighbours' effective exploitation,⁷⁰ owed much to the late Victorian defensiveness and pessimism in the face of rivals' progress. China and Japan

in particular were urged to throw open their doors and stop selfishly concealing their wealth from the world, that is, from Britain.⁷¹ For:

"The Japanese undoubtedly have an exclusive right to the possession of their territory; but they must not abuse that right to the extent of debarring all other nations from a participation in its riches and virtues. The only secure title to property, whether it be in a hovel or an empire, is, that the exclusive possession of one is for the benefit of all." 72

There was also a prevalent assertion that European economic penetration was for the colony's own good. Queensland was seen to need native labour from the South Sea islands; therefore it was obvious that this labour force would be contented and well-treated there. For it was unthinkable that Europe would leave to anarchy a group of islands with a rapidly increasing trade.⁷³ Similarly railways in India would help agricultural conveyance, mitigate famine, foster the spirit of commercial enterprise, and lessen the fondness for military adventure which was formerly the chief source of national excitement. There would be a consequent arousing of the mind from lethargy, which would be more beneficial to the thoughts, feelings and habits of the people than any political changes of the previous 300 years.⁷⁴

In Africa too there was an expectation of native improvement through economic activity. Just as it was held to be the remaining duty of the white man to explore the land for produce and for the best ways of getting it to the coast, so it was felt that the Africans too were "not wholly destitute of the means of self-amelioration".⁷⁵ The emphasis on self-help is hardly surprising, and again reflects on domestic virtues.⁷⁶ Alternately there was the attitude of *quid pro quo*. The widening market for British manufactures was seen in the Sudan as no more than the fruit of Britain's "rescue work" in distant regions of the earth.⁷⁷ It would be

hard, however, to better the review of Livingstone's discoveries which said:

"Commerce, however, quietly insinuates into barbarous populations the good which conquest endeavours to force upon them." 78

Where philanthropy did not suffice for a justification, there were always strategic considerations to fall back on. The Canadian Pacific railway, for example, was seen as commercial advantage and political security rolled into one.⁷⁹ Britain's industrial activities were described as paralysed if Britain's navy were to disappear from the seas.⁸⁰ And it was claimed that the loss of integrity of China would threaten both British trade and the security of India.⁸¹ Security often meant security of trade.

But by far the biggest justification for economic involvement in the third world was emigration of Britain's "surplus population". Just as economists pinpointed surplus capital as a force behind financial expansion, so there was a social reformist line of argument about the starving millions at home who could more profitably be employed in the colonies. Hyam's theory of surplus energy⁸² - although related to individuals such as Lugard - bears some relevance here as well; at least in terms of the periodicals' perceptions of frustrated labourers desperate for the chance of honest hard work. Reading between the lines, however, it was more the desire for colonial resources to be fully exploited, and for an easing of social unrest at home, that appealed to the learned journalists.

Refuting the idea that colonies did not pay, one paper pointed to the scope for emigration - and "emigration of the class which would have upset the social order at home."⁸³ Alternately it could be related to more general economic principles. "Emigration has improved the material condition of all." For, in contrast to those such as Spain who merely undertook military conquests and made no attempt to settle true emigrants, Britain was a real coloniser. The problems of emigration could indeed only be solved by "the principle of

perfect free trade in labour".⁸⁴ The argument thus stretched to a global scale, as: "In discovering new lands fitted for human habitation we can hope to lessen the evils of an overcrowded world".⁸⁵ The insularity displayed in describing "new lands", as if they had sprung out of the sea without inhabitants of their own, is characteristic of these writings. The world was created for the benefit of Britain.

The stress placed on colonisation as more than mere national expansion extended throughout the period. For while some people may have believed that

"all that is required to found a prosperous colony is for the Home Government formally to annex some large portion of the earth's surface, to define its boundaries on the map, and to paint all within them of the appropriate national hue",

Britain's colonies' success lay in their absorption of the British surplus population. Moreover:

"The spread of Anglo-Saxon colonisation has been far less due to any great national desires or ambitions, than to material considerations which have determined the conduct and the lives of individuals." 86

It was still Britain's, rather than anyone else's, success. The same was felt about emigration as a tradition of the British race. For:

"The British Empire is the birthright and the natural inheritance of every Englishman within the compass of the British Isles.... The real prosperity of England turns upon her expansion abroad." 87

Simplistically speaking, as population increased the unemployed moved to the colonies, and the strength of the ties of kinship were held to constitute the best motive power of sound and healthy emigration.⁸⁸

However, while the intellectual monthlies and quarterlies generally favoured emigration on abstract principles of economics, some of the less learned papers cast doubts upon both the areas to be colonised and the sort

of colonists who were needed there. One should not claim to know all about Australia because of having been twice to North Shields in a coal brig; and it was only the best, according to this view, who would succeed in colonica. It was futile to send the worst, through pauper emigration schemes and so on.⁸⁹

A series of articles in 1858 also focussed on the type of emigrant needed. America and Canada were praised - either offering "a boundless field for the reception of an industrious and well-disposed class of emigrants" - and similarly the "right kind of emigrants" were wished on Australia - the children of gentlemen with large families and moderate incomes, who would not just "sit around" once they had arrived.⁹⁰ Unsuccessful attempts to settle Scottish salmon in the rivers of Van Diemen's Land were also noted.⁹¹ But overall the impression was that too many people were going to Australia than could possibly be successful.⁹² Masons and carpenters were in demand - "the colonies are still in a state in which the most robust in body make their way best" - but others were not. Thus:

"The indiscriminate flood of emigrants to Australia has borne a large proportion of clerks, and other classes of young men, ill-adapted for our rude condition of affairs, and great has been the disappointment and suffering accordingly. The headlong way in which 'genteel young men' have come out is quite astonishing... To unmarried young women, Australia scarcely affords the brilliant prospects some would have us suppose."

Others stressed the misery and hard work of emigration to New Zealand, urging settlers to marry before they went, as there were no wives to be had there; although the farming was good, Reynolds' Miscellany thoughtfully added. A piece of small correspondence, however, claimed that:

"A strong, active, hard-working young woman, if well conducted, can be sure of getting on in Melbourne. Apply for a free passage to the Emigration Commissioner, Park St, Westminster." ⁹³

In some territories there was another reason for doubting the need for the superfluous unskilled manual labour of Great Britain. This was the idea that blacks were by definition the working class of the colony, such as in South Africa.

"Not only is he (the white labourer) shut out from possible openings by race feelings - no white workman will work as mate with a black - but by stress of sheer competition." ⁹⁴

The distinction between white settler colonies and those with significant native populations was made more forcibly still with respect to South America. This whole region was seen to need Europeans, but articles warned the British labouring classes not to go there. Paraguay in particular was claimed to need foreign capital and labour to develop its vast resources; but it was doubted if it would ever become a favourite field for the emigration of Britain's surplus labour. ⁹⁵ West Africa was another area of assumed wealth which was also felt possible to provide no field for European colonisation. ⁹⁶ In contrast the established white colonies were constantly praised. Canada was "now one of the finest fields for colonisation" within the British dominions, ⁹⁷ and New Zealand was a fitting field for emigration by farmers suffering agricultural depression at home. ⁹⁸

It was not that emigration was wrong, therefore, but that there were areas of better advantage than others. Yet even with criticisms of emigration, the economic rationale was well in evidence. An article on population statistics felt that tropical countries would always be fatal to Europeans, but still saw the economic aspect of population movements. "The key to much of economic history is found in the progressive desires of mankind." ⁹⁹ Often the intellectual criticisms of emigration concerned its failure in

economic terms, rather than on any other grounds. One questioner asked how emigration could help unemployment, and pointed rather at the need to tax land values in order to break out of the monopoly barriers which fenced land in and fenced labour out.¹⁰⁰ Another asked if nothing could be done to:

"retain the most useful, nay indispensable, part of the community which now leaves our shores to seek happiness and prosperity, which rightly or wrongly, it conceives to be denied it here?"¹⁰¹

Far from encouraging the "right" sort of people to assist in colonial development there was now a fear of their departure harming Britain's home economy. One earlier piece also doubted the value of emigration as a panacea. Even if it did raise Britain's material condition, it would not end the discontent caused by rising expectations. The choice was for the government to employ people at home, or to send them for employment abroad.¹⁰² On all counts, emigration was part of the economics of empire. Movements of people were movements of units of production, and territorial expansion went hand in hand with both economic and population expansion.

This is not to say that there were not uncertainties as to the whole economic basis to imperialism. In the early part of the period, there was doubt as to the benefits of Californian gold, suggesting that despite short term gains,

"It will leave industry in all classes, and in none more than the manufacturing, exposed to the ruinous competition of foreigners."

and: "It will leave the British navy, and with it the British colonial empire and our national independence, gradually sinking from the competition, in shipping, of poorer states." ¹⁰³

The entire Eurocentric view of trade was also disputed, there being felt to be no divine right for all merchants to sell in every part of the world without hindrance:

"We have no right to insist that every one shall embrace European views of life under pain of revolution and civil war; and if it is really true that this is the price by which we are to buy a slight increase to our own trade, we must think wonderfully highly of money, if we are willing to take so great a responsibility for so small a consideration." 104

It is possible, however, that the issue of taking responsibility - and the consequent costs that this would involve - was part of the motivation behind this view. A similar early doubt concerned the specific economic advantages given by colonies, in this instance Abyssinia. "We do not want to import lions and butter, and nothing else seems to be particularly plentiful."¹⁰⁵ It was not then the material motive itself which was in question, but rather the means of putting it into practice.

Doubts in the first half of the era were rare, however, probably owing to the high level of expectations. From the late 1880s onwards the specific uncertainties increased in number. Cyprus' potential was seen to have been neglected,¹⁰⁶ and the ominously rapid development of Chinese iron and steel industries was felt to have adversely affected Britain's trade with both China and Japan.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile Africa, which "appears to be regarded just at present, by our countrymen, as an Eldorado, with a magnificent future before it", needed to be seen in the light of the "dreary realities of African life." The enormous difficulties in African schemes, and the uncertain and exaggerated benefits, were evidenced by the lack of progress by the East African Company.¹⁰⁸ As to the Anglo-German partition of the western Pacific,

"whether it may be the best for the natives themselves that their lands should be exploited for the profit of the European race is a question of ethics which we would rather not answer too plainly."

For some years, it was said, Britain's object should not be to extract profit. Rather her first duty should be to the native.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, the reluctance to "answer too plainly" said more about the periodicals' commitment than any open statement one way or the other.

The biggest economic doubts emerged during the Anglo-Boer war. The Fortnightly Review asked if England could last the century; suggesting that British trade would disappear unless there was a ~~marked~~ improvement in education, and an accompanying renaissance in national spirit.¹¹⁰ More strongly, the Westminster Review thought all European powers guilty of Rhodes' aphorism:

"We are not going to war for the amusement of royal families, as in the past, we mean practical business". 111

"We", it declared, was an international association of capitalists, and:

"Capitalism, by reason of its peculiar economy, can only exist so long as it is able to keep on opening up new markets for the disposal of its surplus products." 112

Yet this sort of questioning, as with J.A. Hobson's articles,¹¹³ in no way denied the existence of an economic aspect to imperialism. Often it opposed the methods, occasionally the very motive, but never did it doubt its being. Thus the Westminster Review itself could a few months later carry an article on "The Burden of Empire", characterising the growth of imperial expenditure as not just "special demands", but rather a "perennial drain". From this it could ask "Is this Imperial policy conducive to the interests of Great Britain?"¹¹⁴ But the issue was one of efficient budgeting, and the burden was financial. Criticism remained at the level of opportunity costing.

However, this leads on to the fundamental aspect of economic discussions, that is the domestic basis to the theories expressed on either side. The question was whether expansion was conducive to the interests of Great Britain, not to other Europeans, to the world, nor to the subject peoples involved. Constantly it was the Anglocentric perspective which underlined the attitudes in the periodicals. Moves for tariff reform and colonial preference grew out of the late-century doubts as to Britain's trade position within Europe, and indeed to the efficacy of Britain's long maintained adherence to free trade; just as moves for imperial expansion itself grew out of fears of declining returns on investment nearer home. Protectionist articles in

particular proliferated in the periodical press¹¹⁵ - rather like the present day clamouring for import controls - for the economic problem for laissez-faire liberals was that over-production was in fact solved by imperialism.¹¹⁶ Either they had to accept the solution, or think of a new one for themselves; and in the absence of the latter it was easier to argue over the sort of imperialism required than over imperialism itself.

Again it is significant that these views appeared more to the latter end of the period, with the increasing defensiveness of attitude towards empire. One of the earliest sirens of caution well illustrates the domestic and defensive considerations. Praising British commerce, it warned that Britain's proud position rested on an artificial foundation:

"We must defend by skill the position won by enterprise. We must show that successful trade does not enervate the race; that the increase of wealth does not only mean increased expenditure on useless luxury, but also increased comfort to all classes in the nation. And in an age of material prosperity, we must not neglect to preserve those constitutional bulwarks raised in far different times. Yet these also are worthy of preservation" 117

The Westminster Review, when comparing empires over time and space, also saw the phenomenal prosperity of the British empire as proof of the sound principles on which it was based. The domestic background to empire was obvious to both conservatives and liberals.¹¹⁸ An earlier piece elaborated still further on the ties of empire. Mrs Britannia, with her family of 46 children, had accumulated \$18 million in gold and \$20 million in cotton in one year, said the article; and the 46 children had shown they understood the productions of Birmingham, Sheffield, Low Moor and Wolverhampton as much as those of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Burton-on-Trent.¹¹⁹ But perhaps the best justification for close federation of colonial interests came in the following line: "Amalgamation is the order of the day, the approved process by which capitalists of all classes are doubling their profits and defying their competitors." 120

The approved process was as valid in territory as in finance.

Detailed discussions on tariff reform as a binding imperial force were, however, less unanimous. Everyone knew the problem, but the solution was far from certain. One writer described it in terms of free traders initially saying that no solid bonds of imperial preference were necessary, as empire was held together through sentiment; but now an understanding was necessary for each self-governing portion of empire to keep enough forces for its own needs, plus some for empire. This way, it was argued, each self-governing unit would have independence, but the whole empire would gain by its collective strength.¹²¹ Dangers were closely perceived in protection in toto, for reliance on trade following the flag meant a possibility of turning one's back on the flag if the trade was not forthcoming.¹²² On the other hand, the "rigidity of Liberal ministers" against tariffs meant they had given no advance to the colonies' ideas on inter-imperial trade.¹²³ This was despite the scale of British investments abroad - where "it may be said that the expansion of British exports is in a large measure contingent upon the investment of British capital abroad".¹²⁴ Even so, not all the papers were gratified by this large scale of expansion. As yet, Australia, New Zealand and Canada were not exhausted, and neither government nor company money in Africa would necessarily promise an appreciable return, according to one writer. The future of Africa was uncertain and remote, "while the vital interests of our trade and of our empire demand our attention much nearer home."¹²⁵

None of these views played down the economic importance of empire, though. It was still a question of getting the maximum out of that empire. Tariff reform was one answer, but there were others nearer to home, such as technical education. Several writers stressed this as an important

ingredient of German success, which would stand copying;¹²⁵ but one suggested that technical education supplementing shop training would not help British trade. Rather the "possession of a healthy, ideal life, both individual and national, will conserve that fibre and energy, which is the ultimate source of prestige and success."¹²⁷ Though when it came to health, there was an interesting double standard which said that sanitation rules for the Suez Canal should not be used to block British trade.¹²⁶ Similarly it was more than a joke, when cataloguing the great future of Mexico but noting that a capitalist would not go there when he might be shot if he stepped out of doors, to say that he needed only to go to Ireland.¹²⁹ It is true that Ireland may not have been the most profitable colony, but it was the oldest; and the failure of the capitalist there could be seen as the prelude of failure elsewhere.

For the expectations of material success were becoming increasingly desperate aspirations, rooted, subconsciously if not consciously, in the immediate and very real drawbacks at home. Tariff reform, imperial federation, and technical education were all clutched at to bolster up the fragile edifice of empire, as if the facade could somehow hide the underlying weaknesses of stagnant British trade. But no-one doubted that economics and empire were inextricably entwined.

Conclusions to be drawn from the mass of journalistic interest in economics must concern themselves with two main factors. Firstly, as far as the chronology goes, there was an enormous emphasis on material expectations throughout the period, and especially between 1851 and 1870, that is before the steep decline. The importance of this is not in the actual returns which were made on subsequent imperial investment, but in the clear pattern of

expectation on the part of the periodicals. The hope of material gain existed from an earlier date, for longer and in a stronger form, and without significant differentiation between areas of the globe, than any cursory reading of the substantial historiography on imperial affairs would suggest. That these expectant attitudes persevered gives weight to Robinson and Gallagher's thesis of "continuity" between 1850-70 and 1870-90; but it is important to see that the continuity was in attitudes towards economic, informal empire, and that this sort of empire was what the periodicals were interested in. Thus although there is marked evidence of strategic concerns between 1870 and 1890, fitting the "official mind" approach, these were often rationalisations of economic motive. It cannot be stressed too highly that protection of India was protection of Britain's strongest market. Then, after 1890, the prohibitive tone - that of stopping Germany in particular - crept in to the arguments. The realisation in some areas that economic profits were more illusory than real only led to an increased grasping for more territory, both to prevent others from taking it, and to try to persuade British readers themselves that there really was something to be gained after all. The louder the shouting, the more it hoped to convince.

The second factor relates to the geographical areas involved in the periodicals' predilections. Initially the key regions were the established white settler colonies, especially in terms of emigration and colonisation; but the focus quickly shifted to the more inaccessible territories of the third world. Through India and China, with their admitted historical trading considerations, attention moved on to Africa, South America and the islands of the Pacific. However remote, the periodicals investigated the possibilities in all earnestness; the motive being that anything, regardless of inutility, must not be allowed to fall under foreign control. There was no irony in the statement on Arctic expeditions that "men dare anything for their flag, but we doubt if the Polar Sea will produce any more benefits."¹³⁰ The point was that the limits of the unexplored world were being reached, and there were

few more territories to be penetrated. What was left was therefore scrutinized ever more eagerly, in the hope that it really would provide the solution that all had been waiting for.

In both time and space the periodicals' interest was widespread. But most of all the overrated expectations of gain reflect the underlying uncertainties about British trade and British prestige. In particular it was the British position within Europe, as mirrored on a scale of imperial possessions, and the position of the ruling industrial and political strata within Britain, as mirrored within Europe, which were at issue. The question of whether the learned journals' opinions influenced the politicians' formal outlook or the business community's investment programme is not proven, nor is it entirely relevant. Rather it is the climate of opinion exuded by the periodicals, a climate which extended across all the sections of educated journalism, which impresses the modern eye by its sheer force. And this atmosphere was one of uncertainty - uncertainty about the foundations of British power. Searching for solutions, or even just diversions, from the growing perceptions of British weakness, the periodicals all regarded empire - in its informal sense - as an economic consideration of the highest order. Other considerations were very definitely secondary to this. Increasingly also the journals concerned themselves with different methods of managing the empire - by tariff reform, philanthropic, or military means - but not with questioning the very basis of uncertainty which had caused reliance on that empire. In short, the economic importance of empire was so well-engrained as to defy question. To the periodicals, in contrast to Hyam's view, the theory of economic imperialism was never dead.

"To sustain worthily the burden of empire is the task manifestly appointed to Britain, and therefore to fulfil that task is her duty, as it should also be her delight"

H.F. Wyatt, *The Ethics of Empire, Nineteenth Century*,
April 1867

There really was no denying that empire was a burden. The questions were rather whether the burden was necessary, or desirable, and whether the extent to which it should be borne was measured by geographical size or strength of commitment. The load could be large, but evenly spread and to some degree self-supporting; or it could be small but heavy, depending upon the scope of responsibility envisaged. It also mattered whether the burden was considered in financial or moral terms. Arguments for and against both could be cross-referenced throughout the periodical journals without difficulty.

The key to the problem lies in the very concept of burden; for in an age where the denial of self in order to further the common good was held up as a high moral aim, a "burden" was in itself desirable, almost regardless of the usefulness of shouldering it. If discomfort, especially as experienced by missionaries, was a good thing to start with, then the reasons for that discomfort could on occasion fade into insignificance. If it was England's duty to bear and uplift the weight of the uncivilized world, then it was of necessity her delight. The good cause could justify the pain, but at times the existence of pain seemed to validate the cause.

It is this ambiguous nature of responsibility that makes humanitarianism both the biggest justification for imperialism and at the same time the biggest area of doubt. Regardless of whether or not the "task" had been "manifestly appointed" to Britain, or whether it was her duty to "fulfil that task", it was far from clear that empire was actually beneficial for the subject peoples. Missions which caused conflict instead of harmony, and capitalists who stole rather than developed, were not held to be evidence of humanitarian success. The burden, it seemed, could be falling on the defendant as well as the defender. Admittedly in straight financial terms

the empire was invariably seen as a good return on investment, whether this was wishful thinking or incipient socialist criticism, and only rarely was the burden questioned from this approach. But morally the issue was always more complex. Even the growth of trade could be used as a moral justification for territorial aggrandizement, and the physical protection of subject nations lent itself easily to a moral rationalisation of strategic defence plans. Similarly empire provided an excellent outlet for the surplus energies of Britain's domestic population - both rich and poor - and this was morally good for all concerned.

The point here, as elsewhere, is that the motivations and language used in all discussions on humanitarian imperialism were firmly based in Eurocentric, if not Anglocentric, considerations. What mattered was the economic, strategic, missionary or demographic well-being of the civilised European world, and the imperial moral questions were often merely a convenient disguise. Furthermore, where there was genuine concern for the plight of the untutored savage, the moral good resulting from mission work was invariably seen to accrue more to the donor than to the recipient. The salvation, secular or spiritual, of the Victorian gentleman seemed more important than the actual improvement of the wild masses, wherever they were. It was always more blessed to give (and to be seen to be giving) than to receive.

This does not necessarily deny on the part of individuals a very substantial and genuine desire to ameliorate the lot of Britain's poorer brethren. It is merely that the customary journalistic frames of reference were domestic rather than colonial. Even in opposition to militarism or economic exploitation, the periodicals' humanitarian outbursts were founded in thoughts of home. In the case of the missionary journals themselves there was also a vested interest in proclaiming disassociation from the undesirable effects of imperial ventures. The Church Missionary Intelligencer, for example, felt that as the Indian mutiny continued, it became clearer and clearer that the missionaries had not been responsible for the outbreak of violence. "Among the masses, it is ignorance, not knowledge, of the spirit

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of the gospel, which incites hostility to it."¹ Humanitarian *raison d'être*, at home as well as abroad, would disappear if accused of leading to war. Worse still, missionaries could not afford to be seen as likely to cause subversion and revolt by their actions.

India was the staple diet of all humanitarian writings. The fact that its millions of people were governed by a handful of Englishmen was not lost on the periodicals,² especially after the mutiny; and this increased the need for other means of preserving both peace and British rule. As Fraser's declared, there was much to show that Britain's hold over the Indian people was more than a mere physical grasp.³ Or, as the Illustrated London News

laid down: "Let England teach the true religion by her example to the world. To attempt to introduce it by the sword would not only lead to the inquiry among Pagans, and among some who call themselves Christians - Greeks and Roman Catholics, for instance, - whether Protestantism be the true religion - but would light the flame of the fiercest and most sanguinary war ever waged in the world; and would end, not in the conversion of Hindoos and Mahometans, but in our ignominious expulsion from regions which we should have proved ourselves unfit to govern and unworthy to possess." 4

Taken to its furthest, as by the Contemporary Review, humanitarianism was placed in direct opposition to militarism. How much better, it asked, would it have been to leave the conquered races to their own existence, "ruling by moral influence rather than reigning through the dread of European soldiery." A federation could be welded, which would gratefully recognise the paternal supremacy of a power paramount through its wisdom and goodness.⁵

None of this in any way denied the inherent virtue of British rule, nor attempted to view matters through Indian eyes themselves. In essence, humanitarian motives were being used to circumvent military shortcomings.

The goal was still the same.

Attacks on economic misuse of India were couched in the same vein.

The Quarterly Review, transparently more concerned at British indifference and apathy than the true interests of the Indians, stated:

"It cannot be to us a mere commercial mart, a provision for the cadets of our middle classes, a resource for superannuated generals or impoverished nobility, a thing of the city, of a clique, of a department; it must become an integral part of our home government, and the full power of national intelligence and opinion must be brought to bear upon its interests and resources."

There was another sting in the tail as well.

"We shall alike endeavour to do our duty to the natives and oblige them to do their duty to us." 6

The burden must, after all, be shared.

As the memories of the mutiny became longer, the tone of improvement for the benefit of India remained and predominated. Yet it was almost always described in terms of the good that Britain, as opposed to anyone else, had achieved. Rarely was India herself the main object of attention.

As one writer put it:

"It is only by extended education that we can hope to bring the people of India to a just appreciation of the efforts we make for their improvement." 7

It was for the benefit of India that it had been committed to British care; but so that Britain might impart the benefits of just laws, rational liberty, mental enlightenment, progressive civilisation, and, of course, Christianity.⁸ Only a few contributions suggested that India might prefer to be misgoverned in her own way than governed sensibly in Britain's.⁹ Usually the benefits of democracy were understood to be self-evident, and were held up in opposition to the savage systems of government they were to replace. And the provision of education would redound to Britain's good name for generations to come.¹⁰

The attitudes towards Africa were not, initially at least, quite so self-concerned. Remaining anti-slavery sentiments - as Bolt observes about the curiously long-lasting moralising language of the explorers¹¹ - and the lack of economic or strategic importance to many parts of the dark continent, meant that humanitarian feelings could survive relatively undisturbed.¹² However, even within this survival there existed a distinct sensation of expiation of guilt on the part of the Victorians. As Livingstone wrote in 1855, African peoples had suffered more than any other from white rapacity, and obligations were not wiped out by the payment of compensation to the slave-owners.¹³ The tendency to plunge into missionary activity as a way of overcoming this guilt was not absent from contemporary writings; though, as Curtin explains, humanitarian feelings as a whole diminished over time, and harsher use of racist stereotypes overtook the finer feelings.¹⁴

Chambers' Journal revealed the early balance of morals:

"The deadly climate of western Africa is at once its bane and its security. It paralyses the efforts of Saxon philanthropists to educate the negroes, and teach them the arts of civilised life; but it also prevents avaricious Englishmen from taking possession of the country, and enslaving the inhabitants on their own soil. Natives trained up in the British settlements on the coast and in Liberia, must be the educators of their own countrymen, carrying with them into the interior the letters and arts of civilised humanity." 15

The irony of the "Saxon" philanthropists was lost on the journal. Meanwhile

Blackwood's agreed with the general drift:

"It is necessary to remember that the first motive of the missionary is not the spread of trade, the increase of valuable produce, or the extension of the markets of the world. His primary object is the benefit of these same voiceless savages, for whom no-one else takes much regard." 16

On racial grounds the Edinburgh Review felt that England would be behaving immorally to abandon blacks to the possible oppression of whites, or whites to the dubious mercy of blacks, by allowing colonial independence.¹⁷ Indeed, opposition to slavery continued, in fits and starts, throughout the century.¹⁸ Only after annexations did the tone of self-righteous justification - of the benefits conferred by British civilisation - creep in to the discussion. It is significant how an 1884 article describing the success of missions, through moral influence alone, was headed "International Rivalries in Central Africa", and went on, without mention of the natives, to talk of leaving the Congo "free to the trade and enterprise of the whole world". As it made clear, "England is strongly represented on the Congo by its missionaries, traders, travellers....."¹⁹ One writer, however, thought little of Anglocentric ulterior motives. Writing on West Africa that "Africa is to France more or less what India is to us", he asserted that France was undoubtedly accomplishing great work for civilisation, which Britain had contempt for because France was not making it pay.²⁰ This sort of self-criticism was not widespread.

More typical were the articles on Egypt, where British rule was repeatedly shown to have endowed the natives with untold blessings of civilisation.²¹ For the first time since the Romans, order and prosperity ruled in the Nile Valley; and according to one journal, it was well known that nothing but the ever present fear that Britain might abandon Egypt prevented the peasant from testifying to his satisfaction with Pax Britannica.²² Other writings suggested that failure in achieving great work in Egypt would expose Britain to ridicule among her neighbours.²³ Scorn and derision were often more weighty considerations than either benefit or enterprise.

In South Africa it was not only the good of British rule which could be highlighted, but also the glaring deficiencies of Boer administration. The alleged maltreatment of blacks by the Boers was frequently picked out by the periodical press, constantly implying that British people were blameless in

comparison.²⁴ Boer patriotism, suggested the Quarterly Review, had required in reality a great deal of agitation to keep it warm, and reflected an express protest against the whole of Britain's mission and work in South Africa.²⁵

Blackwoods reacted similarly. The British aim was a South Africa "where black and white alike are to share the fruits of European wealth brought to enrich African soil." In advocating annexing the native territories the magazine claimed to speak in the interests of the natives as well as of Britain. For civilisation could only come, to the natives, it averred, by contact with European races.²⁶

The assertions that British domination was better for the blacks persistently dodged the question of how Britain actually treated these "lower races". It was only the comparison with the Boers that mattered. Thus it is not surprising to see outrageously exaggerated justifications of the treatment of Chinese immigrants to the Rand, albeit such a short time after a major war fought "on the native issue". The Chinese were far from slaves, it was said with confidence, and anyway Britain knew best.²⁷ Meanwhile many explicit references to blacks in South Africa hardly revealed the sort of caring attitudes which were declaimed from on high.²⁸

This is not to say that there were not articles opposed to British behaviour in South Africa. An earlier piece in the Quarterly accused the government of breaking its word to the Boers - "obligations contracted with a people like the Boers were not considered to be seriously binding" - and of selling guns to the Zulus, thus subsequently forcing the British people to furnish men and money to render harmless the miserable people whose special defenders Britain had liked to consider herself.²⁹ But the article still ended up with the same expectations of Boer cruelty to natives, and of the strategic importance of the Cape to British interests. Divide and rule was

regarded as a perfectly acceptable form of government, and votes for coloured people were rejected as dangerous with a non-white majority. (It was alright in New Zealand, as the Maoris were dwindling in numbers.) British rule was ultimately best, and most humane, for all.

There were several similar examples from the rest of the globe. It was England who was responsible for Christianising Samoan savages, rather than Germany, who was only concerned with firms and plantations.³⁰ England should boldly assume the sovereignty of the Fijis, to stop slavery; for that was the way to encourage civilisation and Christianity.³¹ The free circulation of missionaries and the healthful influences of Christianity were also believed capable of arresting the vice of opium in China, and English Christianity was seen as able to prevail with her rulers "over the short-sighted cravings of unscrupulous commerce."³² In Brazil it was even asserted that the natives were happier and better cared-for as slaves than free.³³ Any sadness at the vanishing of savage tribes was finally subordinated to realisation of the scientific laws of survival of the fittest.³⁴ Morals could not argue with science.

The very complex nature of the humanitarian debate did, however, allow for doubts as to efficacy. Not everyone was convinced that missions were of benefit to the earthly forms of those whose souls were being saved. Often this led to moral rationalisations of economic or strategic motivations, and almost always it was the domestic detriment which predominated, rather than the disadvantages for the subject peoples themselves. But the questioning of humanitarian methods, on humanitarian grounds, underlined a genuine concern with the workings of imperialism, even if imperialism itself was rarely seen to be the fundamental problem.

Thus it was suggested that missionaries were not necessarily doing good, as the ending of execution of adulterers had only increased native adultery, and other crimes.³⁵ Again it was a Eurocentric set of moral criteria which was being applied, and again the "tolerable" treatment given to the natives

by Englishmen was contrasted with the oppressive Portuguese administration. Frequently the African aversion to toil was blamed for the failure of British enterprise - missionary or trading - and the degeneracy of the native in contact with western methods was seen as an undesirable by-product.³⁶ Here too it was on a European scale of value judgments that vice and virtue were to be measured; hard work being above all a sine qua non of progress. A more problematic area was the militarist one. Physical strength was a domestically-praised priority; but there were several opinions that Britain had indulged in wholesale murder of Africans, and had indeed caused a number of the native conflicts.³⁷

Humanitarianism was thus posed in conflict with militarism, even though imperialism itself was usually accepted by both camps. It was only the perverted imperialism which was to blame.

This was certainly true of one criticism of Baker's expedition to stop slavery in the Nile Valley. Despite the noble motives, it was felt that Baker had given just the impulse to place Britain in the false position of being compelled to rule Egypt as well as hold it neutral. It may have been a "good work", but it was submitted that:

"it was not necessary for us to tackle (it) in the near future, and that there are worse evils even than slave-hunting, as witness the history of the redskins in America, or the Maoris in New Zealand." 38

Another wrongly-directed form of civilisation was described in the French occupation of Madagascar. Again there was the implication that British rule was better, but there were several more general criticisms as well.

"The white man's example has seldom been edifying. Fancy a steamer, having on board a mixed cargo of missionaries, Bibles and Mauritius rum - the most poisonous spirit ever distilled... the native does not yet see the duty of working steadily in order that the white man may make a big pile."

The article continued with concern that France might provoke a native return to heathenism. It was better never to develop resources than let the foreigner come in, take the good of the land, and fling the native the offal of his culture.

"That is a civilisation of which the world has seen too many instances. I hope the Malagasy have too much backbone to add one more to the number."³⁹

Al, though the majority of such attitudes related to the African continent, where possibly economic and strategic considerations were less immediate, other areas attracted some level of similar questioning. Mostly this was towards the earlier end of the period, rarely surfacing after the Jamaican and New Zealand conflicts in the mid 1860s. In the case of New Zealand there was substantial doubt as to the justification of Britain's policy of encroaching land purchase, and it was felt that systematic colonisation would have been more honest.⁴⁰ Over Jamaican troubles the feeling was that Britain had sacrificed anti-slavery principles to free trade principles when she had allowed slave-grown sugar from Cuba on to the market on the same terms as West Indian sugar. It was not sufficient to free the slaves; for naked inaction and animal enjoyment were not the purposes for which even the Africans were created. Britain it was asserted should by no means let the negro ideal of life take its course, and she should give the negro the wants of civilised life.⁴¹ The idea that there was any other form of improvement was inadmissible. Other articles critical of British behaviour in Jamaica reflected the standard fear of lowering Britain's name in front of the whole world,⁴² rather than desire to help the natives. This is not to mention all the articles which supported Governor Eyre.

Overall it is hard to escape the conclusion that British domestic frames of reference were at work throughout most apparently humanitarian writing. Moreover, moral feelings were at their most successful earlier in the century,

and when concerning areas with limited economic and strategic overtones; that is areas which could conceivably be regarded as less important. There were some calls for Christianity to close ranks in the face of threatening clouds of heathenism,⁴³ but generally it was more important to stress Britain's moral rectitude as against the failings of her competitors. Rarely was imperialism itself under attack.⁴⁴

This then explains the large number of economic and strategic motives which were rationalised by appeals to moral feeling. As even altruistic approaches failed to grapple with the central problem - the nature of imperialism itself - and contained themselves within the bounds of the workings and practices of expansion, so other factors behind the growth of empire could happily cloak their true designs in the all-embracing cloth of humanitarianism. Trade was thus a moral improvement for the uneducated savage, and security was a moral protection for the defenceless child.

In this way, the Quarterly Review described the philanthropic efforts of Mr Clegg, the Manchester mill-owner, who had sent several hundred gins to Abeakouta; where the natives quickly acquired the art of cleaning their own cotton, and were now ordering, and paying for, hydraulic presses to prepare the cotton for exportation. The slave trade, a gigantic moral wrong which had eaten like a cancer into guilty civilised countries, was being reversed by England (unlike decaying and decrepit Spain and Portugal). It could easily be seen how England's "commerce and moral ascendancy especially qualify her for redressing the injustice of centuries by raising the people of Africa from their present abject state, and giving them a just position in the world." 45

Missionaries and merchants were seen marching hand in hand,⁴⁶ and the modern notion of trading with a people without first having thrashed them was also discussed.⁴⁷ And it was decided that:

"Missionary zeal, trading enterprise, and love of sport, together with the native restlessness and spirit of adventure animating the Anglo-Saxon race, will soon bring us acquainted with the whole habitable surface of our globe....

"We ought to encourage the Africans," says Dr Livingstone, "to cultivate for our markets, as the most effectual means, next to the Gospel, of their elevation." 40

This was the only way to destroy the slave trade. As was said subsequently,

"With the suppression of the slave trade, a great future may be predicted for Africa, if only a satisfactory method can be devised of developing her rich resources by means of the industry of her own healthy stalwart sons." 40

It is indicative of the lack of clarity of the argument that the causal relationship could be reversed at will. The cultivation of markets would end the slave trade, and the ending of the slave trade would lead to the cultivation of markets. What was mainly at issue was the development of commerce; and moral justifications, however contradictory, were always put to good use.

Even after slavery had ceased to provide a widespread excuse for economic penetration, philanthropy continued to dominate the periodicals' rationalisations of commercial pursuits.⁵⁰ Uniting morality, tranquility, and prosperity, it was written that:

"So soon as confidence is restored by free communications with the interior of the country both by land and sea, the Eastern Sudan will be easily tranquillised. British capital will be available to open the basin of the Nile to trade possibilities unapproached by those which have sufficed to create the East African Company. Thus alone can the ruin of the Sudan be retrieved; thus only can Great Britain make some reparation for blunders which have brought discredit on her name." 51

Yet again it was the stain on the British reputation which hurt most of all.

In South Africa it was also possible to link moral overtones to Boer mismanagement of the economy, while supporting Britain's "wise policy for civilisation and the development of mineral resources".⁵² As the Anglo-Boer

war drew to a close - in itself a moral conclusion - one writer declared:

"Of no less moral importance is the progress which is being made in the direction of restoring the activity of the Rand." 53

The specific identification of finance with civilisation is not surprising, given the advances of the organisation of commerce and investment which had followed the technological revolution in industry at the start of the nineteenth century.⁵⁴ What it does illustrate, however, is the total commitment to a Eurocentric view of progress and development, which allowed no room for regional or cultural differences. Morality was measured on a scale of Samuel Smiles and Mrs Humphrey Ward - a scale which most of Victorian England did not adhere to itself.

The importance of economic activity for the moral regeneration of India was in many ways more vital than with regard to Africa, where commercial expectations generally ran ahead of reality. The crucial role India played in Britain's economy meant, however, that there was often a more undisguised approach. Opium was noted for its importance as revenue for the government, but one paper thought no more need be said, as its production afforded no field for speculation for Europeans. So much for morality.⁵⁵ Another paper eulogised on the benefits of railways to the Indians - including the rousing from lethargy that they were supposed to engender.⁵⁶ But the most telling pieces were those on European settlers in India. England's need for cotton led the journals to demand that settlers be granted the rights of enforcement of contract with the natives, and that they be protected from corrupt native judges, who were anti-Christian. It was not, however, that the settler wanted to oppress the native.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Indian emigration to the West Indies was described by one paper thus:

"Yet this humane and profitable consumption of the surplus labour of the East, an interchange so beneficial to both parties, is so little understood in many parts of England as to be looked upon as but a shade removed from slavery." 50

England, as ever, knew best what was good for her subjects. In effect even slavery was alright provided England was the slaver.

Other economic motives behind moral pronouncements included the reclamation of aborigines from piracy, the overthrowing of the "injurious" Dutch commercial system, the encouragement of civilising and educating the Malay native population in preference to total dependence on Chinese labour, and the fitting of Pacific islanders to develop the resources of their islands.⁵⁹ The seeming moral duty of the western world to develop the resources of the rest of the globe could also be seen in articles on China. One writer noted the influence of the west had tended to foster discontent.

"But I am convinced it would be for the benefit of the Chinese race and for the benefit of humanity if an end were put to the present corrupt, unprogressive system of government, and that can only be done by foreign intervention. China is a rich country, only wanting new life to develop it." 60

Or, as another put it, would England assist the Chinese empire in its hour of need, or leave it to filibusters, to "the detriment of our enormous trade and the prejudice of a promising future"?⁶¹ For "England has for years spent wealth, energy and precious lives in opening China to western influence and civilisation".⁶² Explicitly this effort on the part of England was more important than either its motivation or its effect. England had tried, and England deserved recompense. There was no moral alternative.⁶³

Humanitarian rationalisations also extended to strategic objectives. The navy was considered to exercise a beneficial influence over those it came in contact with,⁶⁴ and great naval armaments were believed to tend towards the promotion of peace. The more terrible the anticipation of war, the less likely its realisation.⁶⁵ It was also England's clear "duty" to defeat inferior peoples who challenged her, such as the Boers.⁶⁶ By the same token, it might not be pleasant, but it was definitely England's "duty" to annex the Transvaal.⁶⁷ Indeed, such annexation would undoubtedly improve all African civilisation.⁶⁸

The extension of clear strategic concern into humanitarian rationalisation might itself be held to display doubt about the moral rectitude of the strategic worry. If it were genuinely altruistic, there would be little need for elaborate justification. Subconscious recognition that it was not genuinely caring was at least partly responsible for the overstated humanity revealed by many of these moral assertions.⁶⁹ But the idea of a moral imposition upon England continued to back up strategic realities. England had apparently taken upon herself a burden "devolved upon us by no act of our own." Trade and education were now improving, and when the time came for Britain to retire from Egypt, she would have earned the thanks of all Europe.⁷⁰ Another aspect of the burden was that of redeeming the good name of Gordon. Appealing to finer feelings, it was suggested that Gordon could be avenged by carrying out the idea for which he sacrificed his life, in other words the "redemption" of Sudan. It was a "beseeching voice" from Khartoum which urged that Christianity should end the wrongs of heathendom.⁷¹ The possibility that the railroad which would bring civilisation would also bring military security was not mentioned. Moreover, the attack on morality implicit in savages'

attacks on British forces was unquestioned. "When a deliberate attack is made on British possession and forces, we are obliged to vindicate our authority, not only in defence of a small colonial interest, but also for the great principles of civilisation, peace and freedom."⁷² The last three were synonymous with British military power. Hints on the ulterior strategic motives behind apparent steps against slave-trading occasionally peeped through the camouflage. African colonies were seen to provide cheap black regiments to guard the West Indies, and the position of Britain at Zanzibar, Mombasa and Witu was shown to secure Britain an influence within her grasp, as well as enabling her to render the prosecution of the slave trade impossible on that coast.⁷³ But the ultimate unimportance of the slaves - freed or otherwise - was well illustrated in one article on Jamaica. Education must be more generally diffused, it said, and the principle of property must be inculcated. Furthermore, if the country were to revert to its ancestral barbarism, it was hoped that British people would not be taxed for the naval and military protection of the semi-savage community.⁷⁴ Domestic overtones were explicit.

Another way of illustrating Britain's altruism was through comparison with other powers' systems of government. The French occupation of the Mikong was blamed for the depravity of the Burma government, which was then seen to necessitate British occupation as the only alternative "capable of being even thought out as a practical scheme".⁷⁵ Similarly there was concern that France would fail to sustain the reputation of European superiority, in Annam and Tonquin, and would endanger the maintenance of Asiatic peace as a whole.⁷⁶ Nowhere in all this was there any evidence of true concern for the natives themselves. It was always the European peace in Asia which was at stake, not the peace between Asians. Detachment from the indigenous problems was well portrayed in a review of books on Persia:

"Persia possesses a twofold attraction for civilised Europe which may be described as historical and aesthetic on the one hand and political and practical on the other." 77

In this area too discontent amongst the natives was blamed entirely on the Russians, rather than on Britain or even the conflict between Russia and Britain. The importance of security in the east, especially in India itself, led to some outspoken assertions of moral behaviour:

"The more we can restrict and retire from European action, the stronger and more dignified will be our position, and the fitter and readier shall we be for the work which God has given us to do." 78

Though this was all bound up with pacifying the native, and particularly the contentment and obedience of the native army.⁷⁹

Yet the rationalisations of strategic and economic objectives as humane were themselves secondary to the domestic perspective within which they operated. Apart from the simple view that the connection between India and England was conferring benefits to both,⁸⁰ there were a number of themes relating to Indian domestic government which had clear consequences for Britain's own administration. Commenting on agrarian distress in India, one review suggested that where taxation could not be reduced, its redistribution was necessary. "No class can be granted immunity from the laws of natural decay and survival of the fittest. Were that practicable, all social improvement would be paralysed, and the financial ruin of India's peasantry would be only the prelude to the moral bankruptcy of the nation." 81

The same was not applied to British redistribution of wealth. Another journal showed an educational interest, revealing that in Bengal nearly half of the European children received no education. "We call on the English nation, and the Christian Church, to stop this disgraceful scandal to the British name."⁸² The fate of the non-European children, or of the working class children at home, was less important; and again one feels that "the scandal to the British name" was the most depressing feature of all.

A similar domestic motivation declared that "India is one great rack-rented Irish estate". While pennants still tilled the soil, and no policy

was spent to improve the condition of the people, no advance would be made. "O", it continued, "if in the next parliamentary game of puss in the corner, the experiment were tried, of choosing for the autocrat of one hundred and sixty millions, instead of a lord, or a lawyer, or a talker, a worker and a doer! O, how a Stephenson, or Peto, or Brassy, installed in Gannon Row, would civilise the Blacks and astonish the Browns!" 33

But one of the strongest pieces catalogued both the Anglocentric attitudes and the vital question of reform in one blow:

"It has been the greatest misfortune perhaps that has ever befallen India - the fact of its being alternately the subject of an acute feverish agitation on the one hand and a chronic torpid indifference on the other....

With India, as with everything else, reform, no less than charity, begins at home; and it is by cultivating in ourselves the spirit of unselfish patriotism that we shall best learn to meditate with genuine sympathy upon that great dependency which we have not seen perhaps with our eyes, nor shall see; but where, we know, are being daily wrought out, by our own countrymen, some of the greatest problems that affect the human race; that empire which is regarded not only by us, but by the whole civilised world, as the most signal proof of England's past, the severest test of her future greatness." 34

England's greatness was much more valued than India's well being, and the answer to reforming India lay in England herself. England's perception of India was the image in question, not the real India.

African examples produced the same implicit comparisons of home and colony. The permanence of black as the colour of South African labourer, and the problems once blacks became educated, were not without domestic class overtones.³⁵ An open statement in Macmillan's Magazine, that the personal wrongs inflicted on Langalibalele's tribe were comparatively uninteresting, besides the "larger imperial questions" of administration and justice, also reveals the remove at which British opinion operated.³⁶ Frequent references to imperialism as being used for "party purposes" - whether to praise the Conservative party for doing her duty, or for criticising detractors of empire for their lack of patriotism - again stress the relative insignificance of the inhabitants of that empire themselves.³⁷

Furthermore, there were several indications that the expending of surplus emotional energy on the part of the colonisers was a truer motive for philanthropy than any deprivation on the part of the colonised.⁸⁸ Urging perfect free trade in labour, one review claimed that emigration had improved the material condition of all.⁸⁹ There also existed the argument that the war was being fought in South Africa to ensure that territory remained available for Britain's surplus population "for which England has made enormous sacrifices". Pushing the idea to its limits, the Review of Reviews thought that the British Cabinet could well do with a dose of enthusiasm from its red faced empire builders. "The Colonists, fresh from the battle with the wilderness, invigorated by breathing the uncontaminated air of the bush and ocean, have much more of the rude daring of our ancestors than the more or less over-civilized products of the West-End club." 91

The surplus energy was being invested in the colonies, and bearing dividends for the mother country at home.

Most of all the native question was really only a debating issue within the cloistered confines of an articulate elite.⁹² Whether from left or right, the native was secondary to the domestic political opponent who could be lambasted for maltreatment of the native. In the same way, it was more usual to criticise other countries for their colonial inhumanity than to propound better dealings for England in her administrations. The Quarterly Review for one did not think much of a French suggestion to improve English popularity in the world, namely to abdicate her imperial mission.⁹³ There were even ideas voiced in the periodicals of Christianity helping English people to overcome continental socialism, and of the responsibility of governing diverse races saving Britain from parochialism.⁹⁴ To the Contemporary Review it was the indifference to religion in Britain which lowered missionary standards in India;⁹⁵ and other articles showed a belief in Christianity raising Britain;

rather than the races who she had allegedly gone to save.⁹⁶ The same attitudes coloured the missionary activity within Britain. The real plight of the deprived masses in the urban areas was almost always subordinate to the moral and journalistic advantages accruing to those who showed concern in the recesses of darkest England.⁹⁷

In political terms it is significant how there was virtually no attempt to challenge imperialism itself. Rather there was an agreed acceptance of the expansionist phenomenon, and a mere tinkering with the management of it. Instead of overthrowing the system, critics contented themselves with being humane administrators of it. One opinion was that Liberals should support empire, so long as they attached importance to education, justice and social reform. "The hope of Liberalism is the Empire at large."⁹⁸ There was also the element of diversion. Rather than face the problems of changing economic and social structures at home, it was more easily salving of the conscience to transport one's moral concern to the colonies, where in fact one could do nothing, because of the distance one was from the scene of the problem. But at least one could be seen to be trying. The telescopic philanthropy of Dickens' Mrs Jellyby, in Bleak House, well illustrates how Borrioboola-Sea was more important - as an abstract and far-flung idea - than the well-being of her more tangible and immediate dependants - the children living in chaos under her own roof.⁹⁹

Humanitarian attitudes were not all disingenuous, nor were they merely few and far between. Admittedly racialism seems to have prospered when humanitarianism declined; and it is possible that it was the old liberal journals, clinging on to traditional spheres of interest such as Indian constitutional principles, who prolonged discussion of apparently humane issues well beyond their natural life span. But this is not the point. What is important is that the motivation behind the attitudes was not humanitarian as much as economic or strategic, and that the moral benefit was seen to belong more to the giver than to the receiver. The domestic framework within which the periodicals set their articles was always paramount, whether consciously or unconsciously. Charity, in a sense, began, continued, and ended - at home.

"Our glorious Anglo-Saxon race
Shall ever fill earth's highest place;
The sun shall never more go down
On English temple, tower and town;
And, wander where a Briton will,
His Fatherland shall hold him still."

(From "Where Is A Briton's
Fatherland?", by Davano,
Review of Reviews, April 1881)

Throughout the Victorian and Edwardian periodical press there existed conscious, as well as unconscious, assumptions of the innate superiority of the English, the Teuton, and the white "races" of mankind. Imperial expansion increased the number of foreigners who were subservient to British rule, thus strengthening the feelings of political and military dominance; whilst evidence of savage and barbaric customs amongst the conquered led to augmented sentiments of moral superiority on the part of the conquerors. Discovery of new peoples also furthered the development of a stratification of opinion along "racial" lines. England came first, and other Teuton countries, such as Germany and America, followed. Latin countries, in increasingly obvious decadence, brought up the tail of the whites, after which came India, China, and other descendants of ancient civilisations. African tribes, often placed in order of merit according to their warlike capacity, were compared with the New Zealand Maoris; but Australian aborigines and North American Indians, although "quaint", were considered unimportant, since their contact with civilisation had brought them virtually to the point of extinction. In some ways natives of South America had succumbed to a double indignity, having been conquered by the more decadent Spanish; while the North American blacks had not yet overcome the disabilities of their slave past. It was, moreover, only the weakest of the African tribes which had submitted to slavery in the first place.¹

A full reading of the evidence shows how this hierarchical structure to the world's population, and the xenophobic ethnocentrism which accompanied it, reflected growing uncertainties within Britain. The organised power of labour and the decline of Britain's trading strength posed strong threats to the well-ordered social and political systems of Victoria's more prosperous years. Consequently, concern with finding new markets, and the unrealistic expectations of untold wealth from these markets, were coupled with a desire to re-impose a clear pattern and relationship, at once harmonious and hierarchical, upon a changing world. The precepts of Darwin were interpreted in such a way as to justify constant warfare in furtherance of imperial aims, at the same time as providing a theoretical basis for harsh social policies towards the lower orders at home.² "Survival of the fittest", originally intended to mean survival of those most fitted to their environment, quickly came to mean survival of those most physically fit,³ and assisted the growth of views of a strong imperial race with an imperial mission to civilise the world.

In the same way, Victorian preoccupations with the practical conduct of imperial affairs often owed more to the domestic implications. Discontent in India was seen in terms of the problems facing British constitutional principles, and the Jamaica revolt of 1865 was important to most Victorians as a crisis for British liberalism.⁴ From J.S. Mill through to Shaw and the Fabians, racial crises in the empire were signposts for domestic political formulation. Electoral reform and economic efficiency were the important subjects, to which imperial race-conflicts merely added supportive examples. As Porter shows, even radicals had little sympathy for the natives themselves. It was the domestic manifestations of imperialism, such as noisy jingoism and debates on military estimates, which infuriated them. Meanwhile the Sudanese

could be, to Labouchere, "unmitigated scoundrels", and the Ugandans "without exception the very laziest of that laziest race in the whole world, the African negro".⁵ British thought about race responded very weakly to new data, such as from African exploration, but far more strongly to changes in British thought itself. As Curtin says, "the image of Africa was far more European than African."⁶

The importance of the association between race and class also needs to be stressed. If the ethnocentrism of the 1850s and 1860s developed into a more strident racialism, and if all blacks came to be associated with the servile status of the British lower orders, it must also be seen how, as Lorimer suggests,⁷ this servile status had itself developed apace. The philanthropic paternalism towards the lower orders, as well as towards blacks, which had characterised the earlier years of Victoria's reign, was transformed into a more unfeeling antagonism by the end of the century, and attitudes towards race and class were inextricably bound together. One 1870 article provided a possible reason for this. Entitled "The Antagonism of Race and Colour; or White, Red, Black and Yellow in America", it suggested that in Europe there was no race antagonism, as all races were part of the Caucasian family, and the few non-Caucasians were treated with curiosity and not repugnance. But when the white man went to America or Australia, he assumed possession by the right, if not divinity, of his colour.⁸ Race, like class, did not matter until the ruling order needed to establish itself against the threat to its authority.

Economic reasons were other contributors to a harsher racialism. Just as the humanitarian outlook had declined and allowed feelings of racial hostility to grow, so too the setbacks in British competitiveness brought forth a newly charged xenophobia. The contradictory attitudes to the American civil war, for example, with all the overtones of comparison between

blacks and British workers, only reinforced the stereotype of the child-like barbarian who might slit his employer's throat.⁹ Economics were always more important. For, as the British Friend said, "the thread which the destinies of Anglo-Saxon races twine upon their distaff is made of cotton."¹⁰

It was not only the coherent reasonings of the intellectual journals which composed the late-nineteenth century strands of racialism. Literature, both high and low, added generously to the overall effect, as did the musical entertainments reliant upon minstrel stereotypes. The Illustrated London News reported a group of City bank clerks who had blackened their faces and provided a minstrel show for the inmates of Bethnal Green workhouse; though the Saturday Review by 1854 thought the shows "decadent" compared with the originals, which had aimed to show the "mingled simplicity and cunning of the negro".¹¹ The important point is that the stereotype derived from New World slavery, rather than/nineteenth century expansion. Although the attitudes themselves hardened, the image, as Curtin shows, was that of slave-trading West Africa well before Victoria.¹² The same was true of the most prevalent of all images - Uncle Tom - which found its way into all journalism, from joky to serious, secular to religious; and even into ceramic images as well. Punch called Disraeli a political Topsy, the Westminster Review described the book's popularity as due to the comic appeal of vulgar humour, and the Eclectic Review complimented Mrs Stowe on her realism of good and bad negroes.¹³ And the image stuck.

The most obvious use of the word "race" in the periodical press concerned non-whites. In this context the whole of the white population of the world was denoted by the "white race", and the remainder was subdivided into yellow, red, brown and black. Yet it is a mark of the lack of consistent definition that each of these colours could be further subdivided according to the whim of the author concerned. The vagueness of phrases such as "distinct variety of the human species", "common stock", or "descendants of a common ancestor",¹⁴ allowed "race" to be applied to anything from nation or people to tribe or family.

The usage was, therefore, far from precise. Confusions of race and colour were accentuated by the painstaking demarcations within the white communities, which served to reinforce the Anglo-Saxon distinction, in both senses of the word. It is significant how degrees of colour were used to establish degrees of progress towards the ideal, the swarthy Spaniard falling far behind the Aryan blonde. On the other hand, colour was, in its crudest form, the easiest way to distinguish those within Europe from those outside; and the question of the finer racial differentiations came later.

Partly therefore the growth of sub-divisions was a development over time. The continuing exploration within central Africa, slowly increasing the perception of differences between the various African tribes, led to the description of each in its own right.¹⁵ The more races there were, the more of a structure could be assumed from a racial hierarchy, and the more superior Britain's mountain-top position could become. The term "Africa" itself could be used to refer to uncivilised or unexplored areas of the dark continent, discovered areas bearing their own Europeanised names instead; which suggests that once fully penetrated by Europeans, territory ceased to be fully "African". At the same time, there were a number of terms which were used to cover all Africans, and which were on occasion transported to other areas of the globe.¹⁶

Thus "nigger" was a term of abuse for the negro in both Africa and America, but was imported into India later in the century. Previously the Indian had been considered of a higher order than the negro, owing to a supposedly harder-working nature.¹⁷ Similarly "Kafir", also spelt "Kaffir" and "Caffre", was used to denote all people of black skin, even though it was specifically related to Caffraria, a geographical portion of Southern

Africa. In fact the word derives from the Arabic, and was used by those first invaders of Africa to depict "Unbelievers", or people not of the true Islamic faith.¹⁸ Possibly this inexactitude of terminology further reinforced the division between Europeans and the rest, as it conveyed the impression that all non-whites were essentially the same, with interchangeable, generic names. Yet one can imagine the horror a Victorian Englishman might have felt at being mistaken for, say a Frenchman, despite the fact that all European explorers must have looked very much the same to the Africans concerned.

This dual attitude to non-whites, whereby they were at once generalised lesser beings and at the same time examples of varying levels of civilisation, was consistently echoed by Eurocentric, and frequently moralistic, value-judgements of their behavioural traits. Whether seeking to condemn or to excuse, the periodicals referred all characteristics back to a European, if not British, comparison; and this was as true of liberal as conservative journals. The Westminster Review noted the large number of races in Africa, commenting that the Kaffirs were "higher races" and not typically slaves. "The inferior negro races", however, "certainly possess no great amount of patriotism". Yet the most important point, to this article, was how the intensity of feeling in the United Kingdom over slavery showed "instructive evidence" of a vigorous growth of a sense of justice and benevolence in the British people.¹⁹ British criteria determined the order of superiority of African races, and British attitudes were more important than African realities.

In the same way, Fraser's highlighted the Kaffirs themselves. "Two Years in Natal" by "An English Lady", described birds, butterflies and Kaffirs in successive paragraphs. "The Kaffirs, in their free uncivilised state, are a most interesting people." Quick, intelligent, honest and truthful, large families lived happily together - a lesson to Christianity and civilisation. For "a Kaffir, when he is at home, is quite a gentleman".²⁰ The class angle intruded into Macmillan's as well. Zulu sentiments, wrote Frances Ellen Colenso, the bishop's daughter, were more akin to our own than usually credited, and there was almost as much difference between the manners of upper and lower classes amongst Zulus as amongst Britons themselves.²¹ The same journal was,

however, dismissive of savages' capacity. They were not likely to show any startling progress in our time, declared one article in 1892. Yet it noted that savage children went to school in the towns, while there were still those classes in England which discouraged school for working people.²² A further comparison studied America. Since the negro there had ceased to be just an agriculturist and had become an artisan he presented a menace to the white man - an unconscious parallel by the writer with the position of artisans nearer home. Meanwhile the Quarterly Review ridiculed the Africans who rejected:

"the gold and silver ornaments that were offered them by their first visitors, but grasped eagerly at baubles which had no intrinsic worth; children then, the natives of Africa are children still." 23

More than anything, the periodicals stressed the yardsticks of hard work and physical prowess.

"If the Kaffirs would work with even moderate application, the formation of a luxuriant garden of fruit, flowers and vegetables would be easily within the reach of any dweller on the soil." 24

Others agreed that the negroes lacked industry, but put it down to the tropical heat, and pointed at the races of southern Italy and Spain.²⁵

Implicitly northern European Anglo-Saxon races were not thus incapacitated. One questioning note sounded thus:

"Is it possible that the African native has been misunderstood and calumniated for generations, that he has been called lazy merely because his wants are easily satisfied, and savage and bloodthirsty merely because he has had the spirit of patriotism strongly infused with physical courage?" 26

Implicitly the article reveals priorities within Britain; underlining the values of civilisation and especially hard work. It must have been galling to a population nursed on Smiles' Self-Help to learn of lands where one did not have to work hard to satisfy one's wants.

Military strength was an attribute which fulfilled two functions simultaneously. Apart from acting as a comparison with British domestic characteristics, it also reinforced Britain's own original superiority. The stronger the subject peoples, the stronger Britain must have been to conquer them. The Zulus in particular were a "tall, athletic, handsome race, with a bold military carriage", while the lowest, most cowardly and most animal races were those to be found in the swamps. Zulus were also free from drunkenness (yet another domestic comparison), unlike some of the lower African races.²⁷

In some ways the most significant writings of all were those associated with women. It was not only the Victorian obsession with nudity which gave journalists the appearance of narrating in a way to please the women left behind.²⁸ The Illustrated London News pictured the women of Mazaro on the Zambezi carrying babies, and water, and commented:

"The arrangement of the dress, which has no shoulder-straps or girdle or other visible support, does seem rather puzzling to a male stranger from Europe; but the native ladies have their own contrivances for keeping all right, and they certainly do not require corsets or stays."²⁹

Wife-whipping and girl-thrashing were also catalogued, as was an African dance where the young girl exposed her chest and hurled herself at the writer's couch.³⁰ The fantasy element was rarely dismissed by pious platitudes to remember one's civilisation. Mary Kingsley, in "The Development of Dodos" in the National Review, explained a more reasoned comparison between women and blacks.

"A great woman, mentally or physically, will excel an indifferent man, but no woman ever equalled a really great man."

Thus inferior races would never equal superior ones.³¹ The Westminster

following the idealised J.S. Mill image of woman,³² felt, in contrast, that a negro vote had no force at all, mental, moral, or physical; unlike that of woman. The rights of ^{the} negro were, moreover, those rights conferred by the white population, "amongst whom" the negro dwelt.³³ Numerical minorities and majorities were less important than hierarchical positions in society. Irrespective of conclusions, the parallels between woman and black were clearly marked.

Repeatedly the non-white population of the world provided a back-cloth for enunciating the principles on which British civilised life was based; and the inherent importance of the colonial territory was secondary to this domestic implication.³⁴ The unconscious assumption of superiority was further used to defend colonization of Africa. The death of a few hundred barbarians, ever ready to fight and kill, and many of whom were cannibals, was regarded as a small matter beside the geographical importance of Stanley's discoveries.³⁵ "Africa is large enough for the Teutonic and the Anglo-Saxon races", observed one contemporary.³⁶ It was, after all, much better and happier for a slave to have a civilised and humane Englishman for a master than another barbaric African.³⁷ Such comments also allowed room for criticism of domestic opponents of imperialism. "Where would England be/^{today} if she had been in the past subject to the sort of attacks now levelled at Englishmen in Africa?" asked one. It was a questionable patriotism to want to see one's country beaten. Moreover, if everyone was socialist, and all men were equal, why should the black man have the right to monopolise the territory of Africa? For if England had not done what she had, "Pray, where shall she skedaddle to?"³⁸

Earlier articles reveal the same assumed superiority, and also the importance of keeping up the reputation of England amongst the barbarians. The Xosa Kaffirs were seen to be yielding to the teaching of civilisation, but the Zulus must "be struck down with an iron hand", as "the interests of the civilised world demand it". Civilisation and barbarism in close juxtaposition were incompatible - just as class relations at home represented the same potential conflict between hostile forces - "the savage must accept civilisation or disappear before it".³⁹ The idea that anyone could prefer some form of society other than British rule was intrinsically too subversive to admit of discussion. It was however noted that war often redounded to British disgrace, as the name of Englishman was reproached among the tribes. Another article argued:

"The sooner we withdraw from a position that brings us into hostility with the natives whom we are supposed to be protecting the better for African peoples and English tax payers."⁴⁰

The semblance of power was very important to an empire governing millions of savages with a handful of civil servants, whilst the demands of domestic tax-payers, eagerly expecting value for money, were consistently more appealing than the fate of their African protégés.

There were also a number of indications of the innate propensity for survival of white civilisation, as opposed to the certain extinction of the savage. Despite their skill in hunting, savages would soon be extinct, argued Chambers.⁴¹ The Quarterly reported in 1867 that slave trading and witchcraft lessened the numbers of negroes.

"We are unable to account for this; but whatever be the cause, we cannot affect to be sorry for the result. We feel too profoundly for the degradation of the negro, and the miseries he endures, and we have too little faith in the probability of his amelioration, to desire the continuance of his race."⁴²

Though as time passed a new attitude crept in.

"The native question is equally embarrassing, for the African races are numerous, and do not as yet show signs of dying out like the Red Man of America, and public opinion, when alive to the facts, will no longer countenance the old brutalities, by which the early colonists - sometimes acting in self-defence - cleared the land for their own possession." 43

But even this did not seem to criticise the "old brutalities" very harshly.

On the other hand, some assumptions of unquestioned superiority were tempered by obvious uncertainty. The climate of West Africa "paralyzes the efforts of Saxon philanthropists to educate the negroes, and teach them the arts of civilised life," said one writer.⁴⁴ For once God seemed to be on the side of barbarism. Another article displayed even greater cultural relativism. It described human heads being used as ornaments on African village gates and Borneo houses, and suggested that "the heads that grin outside our churches have, perhaps, the same origin".

"I should not like to answer for English people, any more than for any other people, not turning cannibals in a case where some overmastering superstition gave an edge to actual want." 45

There was similar uncertainty in a refutation of Livingstone:

"He tells us himself, that after living for a while among black people, you cease to be conscious that they are black; as by the same metamorphosis of feeling you cease to be conscious that ugly people are ugly."

The conclusion was that there was no evidence of the physique of the central Africans being superior to that of Britons. On the other hand, Britain could do well to learn how the Greeks and Romans civilised the races they colonised, while Britain herself ended up by exterminating them. The final tone was, however, definite. Despite Livingstone's praise for native industriousness,

"In everything which distinguishes man from man they are as inferior to the real Arab as the Chinese is to the Englishman ... Dr Livingstone must admit that the people which invariably succumb to another people are certainly their inferiors." 46

Yet the need to stress such inferiority belies a level of doubt. Some writers went further still, albeit in jocular vein. One asked when the first black had appeared in England, and even felt that "prejudice has dealt severely altogether with the black man". Another reported Canon Kingsley's dictum that all natives were rotting races, created to perish away before the white man; and said that it was lucky the Romans had not thought that of the Germans and Britons.⁴⁷ One of the most interesting reversals came in the British Friend:

"There must be something in the appearance of the white man frightfully repulsive to the unsophisticated natives of Africa".

Moreover, the assertion that white people did not eat black folks was a great assurance to the Africans.⁴⁸

The most damaging area of uncertainty was economic. Mortimer Durand, writing on South Africa, explained how the white immigrant soon learnt the one great lesson - that he must not do Kafir's work. Consequently he never learnt his business, his farm failed, and he let his land out to Kafirs; meaning that the white population never established itself on the land.

"It would almost seem as if a curse were upon the white man who tries to make his home in a country occupied by the black." ⁴⁹

The association between race and culture, between the Kafir and the Kafir's work, was never questioned. The white man was still regarded as "trying" to make his home there, despite Durand's pinpointing the areas where effort was really needed. But there was a chink in the white man's armour of omnipotence, and implicit doubts about the whole relationship of farmer to labourer.

The periodicals' normal attitude was that of condescension. Negro speech was constantly ridiculed - "'Who's dar" shrieked the negro, mad with horror...", "'Good ebening, white folks, good eb'ning'", "'Which way am she going to?'" and so on.⁵⁰ Punch particularly exploited this, as in

"Chamerobzow" (A Negro Melody):

"De niggers, when dey kick up row,
 No hang, no shoot, say Chamerobzow.
 Chamerobzow de friend ob nigger,
 In all de world dar arn't a bigger.
 Gollywolly, gorraworra, bow-wow-wow!
 De nigger lub him Chamerobzow.
 De buckra try, de buckra swing;
 Yoh! Chamerobzow, dat ar's de ting.
 De nigger am your man and brudder;
 You tell de debble take de udder.
 Gollywolly, gorraworra, bow-wow-wow!
 De nigger's friend ole Chamerobzow." 51

There also seemed to be humorous overtones to blacks in England. A picture of negroes and old white men was "not the Torture Chamber of the Inquisition, neither is it a Representation of the Alarming results of Negro Emancipation. It is merely the Turkish bath in Latherington Street, W." Similarly "Our Nigger Highwaymen" described sham niggers with banjos, infesting a street until they had levied some black mail from its inhabitants. Punch suggested it should be made penal to be seen with a blacked face.⁵²

Frequently the negro was described as "faithful", "amiable" and so on. "Sambo is naturally a jovial, good-natured, laughing fellow, especially if Dinah is there." With a Malthusian line of argument, blacks were considered to have the worst possible conditions to induce development, as all their wants were supplied in the neighbourhood.⁵³ It is hard not to suspect jealousy, or at least desire to banish any uncertainties about the justification of the Victorian work ethic. And the easiest way to accomplish this was to berate blacks for their lack of morality.- "they are still savages, and, like all South African natives, are utterly faithless and cowardly."⁵⁴ Alternately they could be pitied from a great height. "Of humanity fallen to abysmal depths of degradation, but still human, and therefore pathetic, problematical, heart-stirring."⁵⁵ Black superstitiousness was especially ridiculous. Lieut Hopkinson, reminiscencing in the Cornhill Magazine, told a story of a black who claimed to know his own daughter, even though he had left her before she was born, solely by her resemblance to him. This was

"extraordinary" to the lieutenant, blacks being "exactly like the rest of their fellows".⁵⁶ But most of all the black contentment could be used to defuse humanitarian concern. As Blackwood's showed, reviewing the works of Burton and Grant,

"all the niggers (we e) exceedingly jolly - singing, playing bells, horns, drums & co..... This seems rather odd as applied to the two women chained by the neck, but the African race is remarkable for its buoyancy of temperament, its indifference to physical suffering, or even to the approach of death." 57

The last attributes were supposedly doubly true of African women.

The ultimate unimportance of the African was implicit in another article, on the Congo question. Atrocities were described, and Belgian annexation approved, on the grounds that the latter would be better for European rule in Africa.⁵⁸ The natives themselves did not seem to matter. Similarly, South Africans were acquitted of inhumanity to natives. Only three bad cases had appeared in four years, and the murdered persons were only Bushmen. "They constitute the very lowest form of humanity. They are thieves by profession, ay, by nature."⁵⁹ The links with British domestic law and order were obvious. Reviewing Mary Kingsley's "Travels in West Africa", the Edinburgh Review agreed that the savage, like an animal, degenerated once tamed; and what was really needed was severe religious discipline.⁶⁰ The same could be said of the untamed lower orders in Britain's own cities.⁶¹ Further comparisons emerged from Bryce's writings on South Africa.⁶² Contempt for manual labour remained, despite the ending of slavery. For "it is the coloured population alone that provides the manual work", and although there was nothing to stop whites working, "black has always been the colour of the labourer, and black it will always remain". The idea of an immutable working class held strong domestic overtones, as did the fear of future problems for South Africa when

blacks received education. But for the moment

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"there is no friction between the races, the natives submissively accepting the inferior position assigned to them".

Again and again race and culture were confounded. Both racism - the stereotyping by race - and racialism - the regarding of races as inferior - flourished openly; and the criteria for all judgements were centred firmly in British civilised life. Thus, as Curtin observes,

"while most Britons assumed that African culture and African race were somehow interdependent, the accepted social theories still gave priority to man's moral, rather than his physical nature."

Despite biology, morality was paramount.⁶³ Darwin only bolstered up an existing belief in the survival of the morally fittest, as well as adding some justifications for the necessary extinction of the physically weakest. The theory of descent from monkeys placed the aborigines still further back along the evolutionary tree of progress. But it is the very fact that mid-Victorians felt the need for such hierarchies that tells us most about these attitudes.

The clearest instance of defence of the status quo came over the Jamaican crisis in 1865-6. It is significant enough that this episode received such attention from the British press, coming as it did at a time of profound uncertainty over the extension of British suffrage; but it is also significant that it has been so heavily considered by modern historians.⁶⁴ Partly this is because the controversy represented a fundamental division of social and political attitudes within Britain, and as such continues to occupy the interests of students of Mill and Carlyle, Kingsley and Dickens. But also the Jamaican affair came at a lowpoint of British interest in native affairs,⁶⁵ and stands out more clearly on the pages of the periodicals because of the very absence of alternative imperial events. Arguably the coverage was surprisingly slight, given the prominence of the thinkers involved on either side; and one is tempted to suspect anachronistic emphasis by later historians. Whatever the case, the fact remains that the

mid 1360s mark an interim period between the more demonstrative 1850s and 1870s, and Jamaica provided a more than useful background for arguments about domestic political reform.⁶⁶

These arguments had started well before 1865. In 1851 one journal had recorded that Jamaica had the example of Haiti to follow, and that Britain had no right to abandon blacks to the possible oppression of whites, nor whites to the dubious mercy of blacks.

"All the hopes which England has nourished of civilising and redeeming the African race must be abandoned, and all the sacrifices she has made so ungrudgingly for this high purpose will have been thrown away."

Moreover, and significantly, the journal noted that the emancipation of colonies would lead to tariffs being put up to raise money. Another article highlighted the commercial position of Jamaica, as well as the social one. It, however, held out hope for the emancipation of blacks from their heathen customs, quoting the example of Guiana.⁶⁷ The possibility that the sugar colonies were drained of wealth long before emancipation, thus losing their significance to European eyes,⁶⁸ is partially supported by the decreasing mention of West Indian economics, if not of the West Indies themselves, in the periodicals. Lessening interest in the African slave trade of these years was due to the same cause.

But this only increased the utility of discussions on black political rights, as the subject gave such a dispassionate silhouette of domestic reform and British lower orders. "Untrustworthy" negro servants in Jamaica compounded race and class, though "As Good As A White Man - And Better Too" told the story of a black servant helping a traveller escape from robbers on the way to Edinburgh.⁶⁹ "Black is Not Quite White" obviously sought a balanced opinion, but its conclusion is all the more revealing for that. It felt that sympathy for oppressed brethren, whose only crime was their colour, or wrath for their ungrateful turn upon their benefactors, were both exaggerated sentiments.

The negro, from a stock of slaves forced into decay, was naturally improvident and indolent, with perverted ideas of religion.

"Let us remember that the white man is far more responsible for his actions than the black man; but let us also remember that his position is a trying one, in having to hold his own, far away, against an overwhelming force of numbers." 70

There was no question but that the white man had to hold his position. Even journals which criticised Governor Eyre still used the basic assumption of white superiority - "there can be no excuse for the hanging of Mr George Gordon. He was a coloured man, but nearly white."⁷¹

Such papers as the Quarterly, on the other hand, made clear their opposition to the "hap-hazard looseness with which some 800,000 black semi-barbarians were at once bound - without commensurate training or preparation - admitted to the full civil rights of English citizens." Continuing the unmistakable parallel with domestic politics, the review asked what was to happen to Jamaica in the future, suggesting more stringent laws against offenders, more general education, and the inculcation of the principle of property. It chastised the Africans

"who are not animated by the same feelings of ambition and self-advancement which characterise Europeans - who are for the most part satisfied with a languid life of sensual torpor and the merest competency of subsistence."

If the country went back to its ancestral barbarism, British people had better not be taxed for the naval and military protection of this semi-savage community. The final alternative offered was for Basque and Portuguese settlers to unite with the more respectable Creoles. "They would not be English either in their habits or in their national and religious sympathies. This would certainly be a defect and an evil." But they would be hard-working, whatever their race.⁷² Nothing more definitely established a racial hierarchy than the placing of other Europeans between Britain and the blacks.

Comparisons with the domestic workforce were brought out further by writing on Brazil. Questioning their emancipation of slaves, it was alleged:

"There can be little doubt that the negroes are happier, better cared for, more industrious, and in every way better when slaves than when free; and the gift of freedom would in most cases be simple ruin to the individuals on whom it was conferred, who are for the most part quite unfit to receive it."

"Nevertheless", continued the piece, "I object to the institution, because I hold it to be degrading and debasing to the slave-owner" (my underlining).⁷³ The owner's morality was more important than the well-being of the owned. Similarly, with more than one eye on home, there was a report of the "ungraceful" gait of Patagonian women, who submitted to their husbands' exactions without murmur. Husbands "devote to complete repose all the time which is not occupied by the chase or in taming their horses", and women did all the transporting when changing residence.⁷⁴

Interest in some other intermediate races held the same domestic overtones. In the Bahamas the "conchs" or native whites oppressed the blacks in a manner "which is a disgrace to the British flag". Again the flag seems more revered than the relief from oppression.⁷⁵ The general view of the wild tribes of Vancouver was that such savage races were disappearing, "by a natural law, inexplicable but indisputably evident."⁷⁶ Yet the Contemporary felt:

"They are singularly interesting savages considerable notions of law and order very hospitable to strangers!"
 "On the whole, they are interesting people, not so degraded as African savages, not so frightfully miserable as the Esquimaux, not so brutal as the Australian aborigines."

The journal agreed that they were vanishing away, not due to the white man, but by natural decline, which there was nothing apparently to account for.⁷⁷

The most controversial races from the point of view of extinction were the indigenous inhabitants of Australia and New Zealand. Although the aborigines of Australia were disappearing rapidly, the Maoris of New Zealand had made a brave showing against British arms, and were sympathetically treated by several writers.⁷⁸ The end result was, however, unaltered. The Maoris would inevitably fade from the surface of the globe, regrettable though

this might be. Thus Wedderburn's article in the Fortnightly Review attached a "special and tragic interest" to "these Polynesians in all their branches", since "their annihilation, as a distinct race, appears to be inevitable within a very few years".⁷⁹ For:

"the fauna and flora of a small insulated land surface have in this case been brought into direct collision with those of the great northern province, evolved as the survivors of many competing types."

The passing of the Kanakas, inferior to the Chinaman in frugality and industry, would be regretted for their courtesy, courage, docility and generosity; while the Tasmanian black-fellow was pitied for being an irreclaimable savage, and for the mode of his extinction. But there was no room for them within the pale of civilisation. Continuing the Eurocentric criteria,

"It will not take long to write their epitaph, although in their keen love of sport and their invincible dislike of steady work they bear a certain resemblance to some of the most exalted and highly favoured classes of mankind."

An interesting use of the word "class". Further western criteria deplored the demise of the "polished Hawaiian" and the "chivalrous 'aori" as a real loss to humanity, since they had learnt thrift - an indispensable virtue for any surviving race. Moreover, white men had married some of the Maoris, and the resultant half-breeds were a "fine, vigorous race".

These attitudes were supported elsewhere, with descriptions of the New Zealander as the first savage who, after giving battle to civilised man and being beaten, "as the savage must ever be", had frankly offered to sit down beside the white man and enjoy the fruits of mutual civilisation. The only possible explanation was the temperate and healthy climate - the British race not spreading in the tropics, while aborigines failed to advance in temperate zones.⁸⁰ Domestic warnings were issued to ecclesiastical authorities who said the natives were right, since this might damage missionary enterprise. It was further declared that the 'aori return to church on the surrender of the Maori king was the "harbinger of the triumph of the Christian faith among a doomed and dying race".⁸¹ The most Eurocentric cultural comment came in a

fine description of the Maori creation myth:

"A barbarous allegory it is, with little or no coherence, still it contains dim shadows of truth. They have retained some memory of the first pair of human beings, and it is probable that some tradition of the Deluge may be concealed in the story of the anger of the storm giant." 82

The Bible, despite Darwin, was still a major yardstick when judging racial worthiness.

The Australian aborigines raised less of a problem. As Chambers said the day of the black fellows had gone, and gone forever. The Illustrated London News, despite bearing testimony to aboriginal intelligence, agreed.

"The natives of Australia are disappearing fast, through the ravages of intoxication and disease, combined with occasional warfare."

Drink was a very black mark. The Westminster Review firmly placed the discussion in its domestic context, the more significant for its critical standpoint. An article on how England had bamboozled ignorant aborigines for rubber and palm oil was entitled "What Should England Do To Be Saved?"; while the journal could only trust that the feeling of dark-skinned races as inferior would soon be stigmatised as "petty and parochial".⁸³ English feelings were more prized than the destiny of the ignorant aborigines.

Scaling the racial hierarchy, the yellow and light brown races of the east had a number of praiseworthy characteristics. The Chinese were thought to be the most industrious people in the world, and well-adapted for religion.⁸⁴ A piece of correspondence alleged that the Chinese were indeed descended from Noah after the ark, Chinese being the language of the whole antediluvian world.⁸⁵ It was as if Britain had a moral obligation to restore the Chinese to the civilisation of their ancestors. Only races with such a past were worth the effort, and only they could bring full credit on Britain for her achievement. Britain's lineage was fortified by fortifying that of another ancient civilisation.

However, the Oriental was still a lesser being. "The Siamese do not make good servants, for they are by nature intensely idle". Chinese pirates ran away under British fire, which "does certainly not say much for Chinese native courage". Punch satirised the pigtailed Chinaman who had dared to make war on Britain, including a cartoon of Palmerston holding him by the end of his long pigtail and raising a whip to him. "A Little Tea Party" showed Britannia asking: "A little more gunpowder, Mr China?", and Mr China replying "O-No-Tan-Ke-Hum". Most condescension was shown in a semi-excuse. The dreadful tortures employed by the Chinese, which caused national British indignation, were, it was asserted, not considered very cruel by the Chinese themselves. "They behaved as barbarians behave to each other". Finally there was the following dismissal, full of cultural chauvinism:

"A French philosopher has endeavoured to account for the small interest we used to take in Chinese affairs, by the fact that the population was so portentously ugly... Nobody could bear with the same equanimity of the destruction of a village of Circassians as of the engulfing by earthquake of half the city of Peking." 86

China's main crime, it transpires, was its secluding itself from the rest of the world, interrupting by its pride "the golden chain of commerce and humanity which ought to go round the globe." Race and trade were forged together.

Yet the reasons for eastern backwardness were a mystery. China's failure to progress was a puzzle to the student of evolution, and the influence of the west had, if anything, tended to foster discontent.⁸⁷ Nature moved in mysterious ways, after all:

"Nature seems to go by strangely definite stages of progression, and as in New Guinea we come to the first expression of the marsupials, the p~~u~~ched animals so eminently characteristic of Australia and New Zealand, so in the Negro-Malays Nature may have been trying her "prentise hand" on a new combination of atoms, something different from her Malayan sons and yet not quite like her negro offspring - a transition race in fact - to see what kind of creatures the new pattern would make." 88

Evolution helped explain a great deal, without conflicting with the idea of "Nature" as an all-embracing force. That mid-Victorian man was the final stage in the progression was equally catogoric.

-This applied similarly within Britain. In "Orientalism in European Industry", Macmillans described how steam and railways shook to their very vitals the constitutions of eastern races, and how great an influence exhibitions of Oriental manufactures had on British and French cultivated classes. But:

"On the workman of England, owing I fear to his lower intellectual organisation and development, they seem scarcely to have acted at all." 89

Only cultivated mid-Victorian man could claim to represent the true goal of progression.

Some Orientals were, however, more favoured than others. Japan was frequently, and increasingly, praised; again on Eurocentric grounds of hard work and physical prowess, though also on the desirability of Britain having her as an ally in the Pacific.⁹⁰ Tactical considerations bolstered up racial priorities. Admittedly there was still extensive condescension - "All who love children must love the Japanese, the most gracious, the most courteous, and the most smiling of all peoples..."⁹¹ But comparisons with other races showed the Japanese worth. The Formosan aborigines, fine specimens of humanity, and "harmless when not provoked", were thus no match for Japan. For "Japan is now civilised - she has railways, telegraphs, an army dressed up in European clothes, and, above all, a national debt. No wonder she felt aggrieved at the barbarism of the Formosans."⁹² Moreover, while the Japanese used to be regarded as not human,

"Liao Yang, Port Arthur and Mukden have put new colour on his skin and obscured the Mongolian character of his features." 93

One other eastern people possessed at least some of the hall-marks of civilisation. India had a long history, some writers even suggesting that she was the cradle of Aryan civilisation; which may have justified Britain's return to the sub-continent to recapture her roots. Indians were also fairer in skin than many savages, a sure guide to high position on the racial scale.⁹⁴

Moreover, they were one of Britain's earliest conquests, and had demonstrated many industrious abilities over the years; added to which the Indian army had been used in a variety of conflicts, even against other non-whites.⁹⁵ On the other hand, there was the 1857 mutiny, and undoubtedly attitudes towards the trustworthiness of the Indian altered dramatically as a result of this uprising.⁹⁶ As the Saturday Review suggested, the mutiny ended the romantic age of Anglo-Indian relations, and began a new era of caution and realism.

"The natives respect us, they acknowledge that we make them rich and prosperous, that we are very just and well meaning; but they cannot bear us. There is no mistake about this." ⁹⁷

However, the mutiny only reinforced the view of the Indian's cowardice. Like the Chinese, the Indian may have been hard-working, but was no paragon of bravery. Only the Anglo-Saxon, it seems, could be both. For it was the absence of national character which had let the Bengal people be conquered from the earliest times.⁹⁸ (There was no comparison with the waves of conquests of pre-Norman Britain). A numerous and wealthy population in India, "but feeble from the physical weakness of some races and the moral disunion of others," had rapidly yielded to the rude demands of European adventurers, and acknowledged their supremacy.⁹⁹

It was not that, at least before the mutiny, the Indian was not capable of advance. Exceptional developments of human nature were noted by Blackwoods amongst the races of India. India promised to continue for many generations subject to the ascendancy of the British race, "and it behoves us to fulfil our duty of benefiting people over whom we rule."¹⁰⁰ The Indian was always better than the negro - "our retention of India depends on combatting the fatal tendency of English adventurers to treat the Hindoo as the cotton planter treats the negro", and "of course there is little in common between the natives of India, with their ancient civilisation, and the uncivilised Kafir".¹⁰¹

Not that this said a great deal for the Kafir. But the course of the mutiny encouraged enormous swings at the Indian. "Betrayers and Assassins", "Class of Orientals who are 'Plunderers' at heart", and "an insolent and treacherous native army" were the sort of insults hurled at the rebels.¹⁰² Most of all, the periodicals were concerned with the depth the native had sunk by his unparalleled treacheries; as if to stress that the fall from grace was the real shock. One journal captured the full flavour of the disaster. Englishmen could thrash Asiatics, govern Asiatics justly, devote their life's energies to promoting the welfare of Asiatics; but when all was done Englishmen could not understand Asiatics.¹⁰³ Yet somehow the tone still blamed Asiatics for their incomprehensibility. As the Saturday Review affirmed, the Hindu character was one of the hardest on earth to understand.¹⁰⁴

The survival of concern with India well into the last quarter of the nineteenth century shows both the continuing dependence of Britain upon India and also the relationship of domestic Indian government to British constitutional principles. In some cases one also suspects that liberal journals persevered with interest in India as a traditional topic for liberal discussion.¹⁰⁵ Thus A.G. Leonard, writing in the Westminster Review in 1909, showed how the natives of India were capable of a high form of civilisation, but only if effected on natural lines, that is national education compatible with national ideals and customs. Urquhart agreed later that year. The regeneration of India relied on the educated classes, and the education system would continue to justify itself.¹⁰⁶ The connections with education and the educated classes within Britain were immediately obvious to the reviewer. Articles in the Fortnightly Review similarly added to the domestic comparison. Wilfred Scawen Blunt described the Indians' motto as "Reform", and urged that it not be turned into "Revolution". H.J.S. Cotton pushed a favourite analogy. The difficulties surrounding Englishmen in India were more considerable than those that had faced Ancient Rome. Yet he placed

hope in missionary and educational activity.¹⁰⁷ However, the feeling that the liberal journals still lacked real concern for the colonial circumstances themselves is hard to avoid. One piece on the Indian famine in 1901 observed that the destiny of a race was involved, possibly the destiny of an empire, but could find no more committed statement than:

"It will be interesting to glance at some of the questions involved in this momentous problem....." ¹⁰⁸

The irresponsibility of the media is not new.

If the liberal papers reduced the native to a domestic debating point, the more conservative organs exploited him as a club with which to beat the liberals. The Saturday Review was convinced that India should be governed with respect to English, and not Indian, ideas and officials; and said that only liberals had the mistaken idea that all men were alike, entitled to be governed identically - a clear overstatement of most liberal writings. Indians were further berated for their lack of backbone; though, as the Saturday Review itself noted, "if they had too much backbone, we should hardly be there to govern them."¹⁰⁹ One easy way of ensuring perpetual dependence was to discourage Indian advance, and the "educated native" was frequently pilloried.¹¹⁰ Again domestic considerations, particularly around the time of Forster's Education Act, were never far behind. The Quarterly Review highlighted this in an article on Gladstone and Disraeli. Peaceful evolution in India was better than radicals' advanced ideas being thrust on to the Indians. Hasty reforms, theoretically desirable, "are not always ^{practically} applicable to the races to which it is proposed that they should be applied."¹¹¹ It was not only races for whom this journal discouraged reforms. The same issue rejoiced in the Conservative election victory of that year.¹¹² At no time was the subservient race anywhere near as important as the internal political, social and economic circumstances of the mother country.¹¹³

This was especially true of the Anglo-Boer conflict of 1899-1902. The Boers gave massive doses of subject material for domestic consumption and comparison, while the tensions between Boer and black added confusing, and often contradictory, pieces of evidence to fuel the racial bonfires. Though white, the Boers were regarded as the lowest of all European settlers; partly no doubt to downgrade the successes of their spirited resistance. It was alright to praise brave subject peoples provided they did the decent thing and were defeated by superior British arms. In the Boers' case they were neither properly defeated nor willing to fight along traditional lines. Guerrilla warfare was just not cricket.

What is particularly noticeable is the common ground between all the journals, whether pro or anti war, or pro or anti Boer. The common assumption was of the unlettered Boer with his out-of-date habits, his stupidity, obstinacy and cowardice, his cruelty to animals - always unpardonable to the animal-loving Briton - and his mode of life which was "far more in touch with the seventeenth century than with the nineteenth". The detached approach to the "remarkable and interesting" Boers, who

"are just now objects of considerable interest to the British people, as, indeed, they promise to be for many a year to come", was just as condescending as anything directed towards non-whites.¹¹⁴ Whether attempting to justify or to denigrate, all papers used the stereotype of the Boer as the basis of their argument. The simple farmer was equally a commendable seeker of independence or a narrow-minded bigot who would submerge below the Uitlander gold-mining population of a different race and progressive ideas.¹¹⁵ Either way the Boer was unimportant to the more pressing problems within Britain; except for the light he might shed on those problems.

Thus European criteria were constantly used to describe the Boers; and subsequently such criteria were reinforced by the Boers' low score on these scales. Blackwoods in particular described the Boer idea of independence as being left to squat on his farm as his father squatted before him.

"The Boers are a cruel set, selfish and obstinate to a degree. Lying has been taught them as a useful accomplishment, and to overreach their neighbour by a lie is considered a trait that does honour to their genius. Honour, as understood amongst Europeans, is entirely absent from their natures."

As if this were not sufficiently damning,

"The Boer looks upon a Kafir as a creature just superior to his oxen." 116

The implication that the Briton regarded the Kafir any more valuably smacks of wishful thinking. Or possibly it was that the Briton looked upon the Boer as a creature just superior to a Kafir.

This question of racial priority between black and Boer occupied much of the press' attention. Partly Britain had to assert that she treated the blacks better than the Boers did in order to justify British rule in South Africa.¹¹⁷ Partly as well the fact that she had to assert this to such a degree casts strong doubt on its veracity. But partly there was a need to show that only Britain could rule successfully over a multi-racial country; and this assertion was aimed at those European neighbours who might see Anglo-Boer conflicts as a way of gaining territory for themselves. In this context the Boers were regarded as "Dutch", and Germany was then seen to be lurking behind Holland.¹¹⁸ As the Edinburgh Review had asked as early as 1851, when writing of the South African Dutch, Hottentots, Caffres and Negroes,

"Now with what show of decency or justice could England abandon to their own guidance and protection countries peopled by such various heterogeneous, and often hostile races?" 119

The Westminster later supported this, suggesting that Natal's mixture of distinct races was perhaps the only example on earth of a race of heathen barbarians living in peace with the whites, and with no diminution of coloured numbers.¹²⁰ Moreover, while the Boer looked on the black as inferior, delivered into his hands to be shot or enslaved, the Briton did not.¹²¹

The problem for liberal writers was whether to support the Boer in his independence, and ignore the black, or support the black and condone the domestic jingoism. The Guardian managed to find a viable line. Its main objection to Rhodes and the Uitlanders was their exploitation of native labour in the mines. Neither Boer farmer nor British capitalist behaved well to the natives, but the capitalist was more onerous by far than the farmer. The future commonwealth of South Africa should include the mass of native and coloured people as well. The Guardian also thought it would be a pity if Rhodesia rebelled because its whites wanted to enslave the blacks and the mother country would not let them.¹²²

The Guardian was, however, not typical. More typical was Herbert Paul's comment in the Contemporary Review.

"No Liberal can possibly sympathise with the policy of the Boer government.... It is too like what they have been opposing all their lives at home." 123

Moreover, British comments on the fate of the black were rarely enlightened. Blackwood's related the shooting of a black, merely on suspicion of murder, by Englishmen besieged in the Transvaal. "It afforded us a little excitement", and "had a wonderful effect on all classes".¹²⁴ The Westminster Review noted that in Cape Colony Malays and Kafirs could vote. "Such a result is strongly deprecated", it declared, as it would lead to "truckling to the black population" on the part of candidates - comments with clear significance for working class suffrage at home, and echoing J.S. Mill's views on manual labour majorities in the House of Commons. Furthermore, the paper recognised the genius of the Boer Government for ruling native races. All The Year Round added its

own domestic angle. Kaffre servants did all the laborious work of a household and made themselves generally useful. They would be good servants all round, but were spoiled by those settlers who at home would be servants themselves. Too much familiarity was decidedly not a good thing. Meanwhile the Fortnightly Review placed its support for one other principle of Boer rule over Kaffirs - "the infliction of the penalty of death for offences against white women. This is not a subject it is necessary to dilate on." 126

Finally Froude's South African travels revealed this gem to Chambers' Journal:

"To a white man, they say there is no danger while he has a black at his side, the latter being the better conductor. When one is struck, another must be immediately substituted." 127

So much for the development of the native.

For the real race question was that of Briton versus Boer. As one view held it, the South Africa problem consisted of the Race Question, the Railway Question (which was even more important), the Native Question, and the Imperial Factor.¹²⁸ Attitudes to blacks were merely part of the racial differences between Boer and Briton, and were completely subservient to the issue of control of South Africa.

In this way, "natives" were merely part of the problem between "races". Despite the fact that both Boer and African were to some extent native, British eyes saw the blacks as natives, and therefore lower in importance, while the Boers were front-men for other European imperialists. Hence race and nation were set in contradistinction to colour and nativeness. There were a few instances of disinterested concern for the African, but this was rare. Usually the native question was used merely as a debating weapon, both by left and right,¹²⁹ and attacks on the "plundering, piratical, murderous, gospel-spreading race", such as those made by Glarior¹³⁰ are less significant than signs of genuine doubt in the middle of articles

in favour of imperialism. The domestic emphasis to almost all the arguments is of most importance. As the Westminster argued, if India had no votes, "why destroy the independence of the Transvaal to give votes to a few blacks"? Especially when the black could be described:

"Torn from an African swamp, where he had devised a government method in every respect different from the representative system of the Anglo-Saxon race, he has been forceably (sic) inducted into a community in which he had no rights." 131

Getting nearer to home all the time, it was argued that while imperialists might say that the majority of British people favoured the Anglo-Boer war, "it is a travesty of liberal doctrine to say that the people are always right".¹³² In no way was the established hierarchy of races or classes to be upset by a crisis in British liberal and imperialist thought.

Moreover, the ultimate control of South Africa was never in any doubt to the majority of the press. "If two men ride on a horse, one of the two must ride behind," said the Quarterly, quoting a French proverb. In the end the strongest race must win, and that would be the Uitlanders.¹³³ Ignoring the differing backgrounds of the Uitlanders, the conflict was quickly reduced to European proportions, with English on one side and Dutch (with German backing) on the other. As the Anglo-Saxon Review suggested, "race hatred" in South Africa was not due to any vital differences between the Dutch and English, but to who was going to gain dominance.¹³⁴ For

"the end of the conflict is inevitable. Sooner or later the energy of the Englishman will win." 135

For South Africa require^d first of all that Britain should definitely assert her authority there; and this was the desire of Boer and Kaffir alike, ventured ~~ventured~~ one periodical.¹³⁶

There was, however, some uncertainty mixed in with the flood of unquestionable superiority. The white settlers in South Africa were perceived to be Dutch as well as British, and the Dutch had got there first. "War with a civilised race, well supplied with modern armament, and fighting for a national cause, cannot be entered upon without some misgivings."

The worst danger of all was to put loot before the eyes, and the scent of blood in the nostrils of the great tribes of half-awakened savages.¹³⁷ Such feelings of doubt were echoed after the war, when Britain should have been seen to be in full command, by an article on the deficiency of white women in the colony. This was regarded as a grave threat to anglicisation of the country.¹³⁸

With either doubts or definitives, the most telling aspect of the war was its reduction to domestic tensions within Britain. The right attacked the left for attacking British patriotism and democracy, and yet the right was doing exactly the same by these very attacks. Race questions, Boer and black, were inevitably secondary to the more important issues at home, and were used both to illuminate and reinforce the existing internal debating points. Gladstone was to blame for the whole business, claimed the Quarterly Review repetitively. Though "(It is not our wish to enter into any party discussions on this subject.)"¹³⁹ Soldiers were reported to have chanted "No more Gladstone for us".¹⁴⁰ As Blackwoods put it :

"On the part of the Boers it may well seem mere madness in a small backward people to engage in such an unequal contest. But it is not so extravagant when the incorrigible mutability of the British government is taken into account." 141

Punch in particular attacked pro-Boers - "Wobblers", "Monday morning quarter-backs" - and showed a naughty schoolboy Campbell Bannerman being ordered by Dr Bull to wipe off the mark on the map of the Transvaal.¹⁴² "Depreciations" further accused "certain members of the opposition" of aiding Kruger, and another article chastised an Irish MP for attacking the war effort. Under

Boer rule, rather than British, he would not have had the freedom to do that, it asserted with self-conscious smugness.¹⁴³ Few voices dissented from this tone.¹⁴⁴ British rule was the best in the world, and as such was clearly the best for Britain herself. Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the world verified her supremacy at home.

The importance of the Anglo-Saxon was firmly brought out with respect to other Caucasian peoples. Teutons were held to be superior to Latins, and Anglo-Saxons were superior within the Teutons. Origins were also important, and bravery in Viking and other Scandinavian myths was supposed to rub off on English descendants.¹⁴⁵ Looking to the future, the social imperialism of a perverted Darwinism, as used by Chamberlain, was used to justify the breeding of an imperial race - with a ready made colonial market for employment, and a tariff to provide the revenue to finance social reform.¹⁴⁶ Throughout these articles there developed an increasing need to allay the fear that Britain was losing her position of world domination. The number of commemorations of past British triumphs - Trafalgar or the golden age of Elizabeth, for example¹⁴⁷ - show the widespread nature of the feeling of unease.

The obsessive reports on growing German strength were only one facet of this unease. Attitudes to Germany were always a mixture of admiration and envy, sometimes tinged with nervous superciliousness.¹⁴⁸ All journals were concerned with the advances in German science and industry, and investigated the importance of technical education in Britain as a stimulant to British industry.¹⁴⁹ Germany was urged by one journal to be more friendly towards Britain, despite her unreasoning commercial envy; and another romanticised

that "Germany and England have special missions to fulfil, and they are not antagonistic."¹⁵⁰ For the "Teutons, including both Germans and Scandinavians, are unquestionably the predominant race in Europe", argued the National Review.¹⁵¹ There was nothing like identifying with obvious success.

The "natural ally" America received similar treatment, though muted. America was less of a threat, and by the same token less of a possible forceful ally. Moreover, there seemed less antagonism from over the Atlantic. Harpers pointed rather to Anglo-Saxon affinities, and highlighted the comparison between America's difficulties over the war with Spain and Britain's setbacks against the Boers.¹⁵² All The Year Round expressed another comparison.

Whilst England had improved the Indians under her rule, the American Indian was an impracticable subject, who "blocks the march of the world with his obstinate barbarism and his line of desolate reservations," and the American should not be expected to keep inviolate any covenants made in rash faith to preserve his wild neighbours from the intrusion of civilisation.¹⁵³ The unimportance of both sets of native, compared with their benefactors, was augmented by the display of greater ability on the part of Britain.

The Spanish-American war over Cuba was probably the most significant conflict in white racial terms. There was no doubt where the sympathies of the British press lay. It was noted how almost all American naval officers had "British" names, and it was suggested that:

"The course of history may prove that it is only the Teutonic races - for Germany will feel her way to greater freedom - that are altogether fitted for popular government."

Furthermore: "The Spaniards repeated the crime of Rome in destroying Carthage. They blotted out a nation; and they have paid the penalty in the decay of four centuries."

When America also relieved Spain of the Phillipines, it was rejoiced that:

"At last the Castilian, unchanged to the bitter end, has been cast out, and the American has taken his place." 154

The object lesson of the Cuban war was the deficiency of Spain:

"So clumsy is the handling of the Spanish army, so unsuited to this or any campaign. In a word it is a disgrace to a European power of the nineteenth century." 155

Such sentiments were forgotten by the time of the Anglo-Boer war. An earlier view in the Illustrated London News gave another domestic overtone. Castigating Spain for "repeated relapses on a national scale" in her government of Chile, the paper declared without irony:

"Her people are discontented, not to say disaffected. Did she seek to divert their attention from domestic misgovernment?" 156

No-one would ever have made such a suggestion about England. 157

Yet defensive thinking was still slightly evident during the Spanish-American war. Fear of disruption in Britain's food supply in time of war led to urging on an American alliance to stop any European combination against Britain. The strength of the ties of race and consanguinity, and the effect of heredity upon nations, were felt to be shown by this clash between Anglo-Saxon and Latin. 158 It is also significant that Kipling wrote "The White Man's Burden" as an exhortation to America to defeat Spain. 159

Although Spain was obviously in decay, other Latin countries also became increasingly enfeebled, in the eyes of the periodicals, as the century drew to a close. In particular, as Germany's star rose, that of France fell. One review suggested that France wanted colonial aggrandizement, but would not provide the abundance of citizens to assimilate her conquests. A Frenchman lived poorly because it was easier to save money than to make it; and he had no children for fear that they would die of starvation. (It is interesting how often some reference to the propagation of the race appears.) Indeed, the individual Frenchman kept France "back in the race", just as the individual Anglo-Saxon won the battle for his community. (The links between racial stock and a race against time were also important to a generation of Armageddon-expectant social-Darwinians.) This article concluded that:

"England and the Anglo-Saxon communities succeed because they are the least socialistic countries in the world of civilisation." 160

The relationship of social and racial thought is clear. Even English democracy could be used as continuing proof of Anglo-Saxon supremacy over foreign notions of socialism.

Another conflict of racial ideas criticised French penetration of Madagascar.

"Mankind are slow to learn that the acquisition of a wild uncultured territory, and the conquest of a sparse, barbarous people, are not desirable objects, and entirely fail to repay the sacrifices by which they are purchased." 161

Such a statement would hardly be applied to British advances. An article on Tasmania as a field for emigration showed that the "Greater Briton" who inhabited that small outpost of the empire had shown himself to be as amply endowed with the genius of colonisation as any other member of the race from which he had sprung. 162

Sometimes, however, it was necessary not to write the old enemy off. The only justification for increased military and naval expenditure was the strength and warlike intentions of possible foes. This was neatly captured by one rhyme which said that the days were long past when:

"Two Jolly Frenchmen and one Portugees,
One Jolly Englishman could lick them all three."

The writer then stressed the need for a large English navy. 163 That way the old adage was still repeated, but was used to further naval expansion. In the same manner, difficulties Britain got herself into always admitted her the chance of showing her genius for getting out of them. As was said of the Indian mutiny in 1857:

"Because we were too English the great crisis arose; but it was only because we were English that, when it arose, it did not utterly overwhelm us." 164

Yet this belied the uncertainty which ran behind much of the over-eager assertions of superiority. References to an "English-speaking race", which would overshadow the world in a peaceful and progressive spirit for the world's lasting good, were widespread, and the broken English spoken by foreign contributors to the Great Exhibition was ridiculed as harshly as any caricature of negro doggerel. The linguistic unity of English speaking peoples had to be preserved against those who spoke "bad English". 165 Again there might be an implication of lower class language lowering the imperial standards. Writing

about racial contrasts in fiction, the Edinburgh Review felt obliged to state: "There is nothing in the world so magnificent as the Anglo-Saxon race", and hoped the whole world would become Anglo-Saxon.¹⁶⁶ It meant Anglo-Saxon too, as opposed to Teuton. For, as the Westminster said, the Germans and Scandinavians were taking both the shadow and the reality of Britain's imperial estate. But "the British Empire is the birthright and the natural inheritance of every Englishman within the compass of the British Isles". Adding a clear domestic warning, "emigration is one of those means of expansion upon which "King Demos" is likely to form a wrong judgement." It was felt necessary to overcome both Europe and the working class therefore. For emigration had been "a most unvarying tradition of the British race", and the paper trusted the "instinct of the people". After all, "the real prosperity of England turns upon her expansion abroad".¹⁶⁷

Apart from the total, and presumably unconscious, confusion of English and British, the uncertainties behind Britain's stability both within Europe and within herself are self-evident to the modern eye. The necessity of expansion to prove Britain's greatness was coupled with a hidden desire to show that Britain could colonise and civilise the undeveloped world better than any of her rivals; and, incidentally, better than she could herself at home.

Occasionally uncertainty became overt. The Westminster Review, with a touch of wishful thinking typical of a paper masquerading as liberal, argued that 1896 was a turning point in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, and that the race had now appeased its land hunger.¹⁶⁸ Or was it just that the land had run out? The Fortnightly dismissed the idea that Britain was socially and morally the superior of all mankind; though noted that 'there was a happy interspace of virtue between the lowest class and the professional class in Britain.'¹⁶⁹ If race disappeared, there was always class to fall back on. But one surprisingly early apocalyptic poem swept all illusions devastatingly away:

"Under the solemn mango shade
 The White-skinned conquerors stood;
 The Saxon foot was planted down,
 The Saxon face wore a lordly frown,
 As they paused by the swirling flood..."

"Servile natives" come and warn the conquerors of a curse, which they ignore, and the tempest kills them all.¹⁷⁰

Although well in advance of events, the poem foreshadowed the general level of uncertainty felt at the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan. Russia was the one nation about which little was written in racial terms. Neither Teuton nor Latin, it did not fit many of the preconceptions, and its common Aryan ancestry was the only pinpoint of a reason for its strength. Possibly it was because Britain feared Russia most, and in so many vital areas of her empire, that Russia did not therefore need to be explained in racial definitions - such definitions could only be at variance with evolution and undercut Britain's own position as the culmination of racial progress. It was not until the defeat by Japan that race entered the discussion, firstly in Germanism versus Slavism - "Russian impotence found its inevitable corollary in German aggression"¹⁷¹ - and more importantly in the whole white versus yellow debate.¹⁷² If a coloured race could beat a white one, and a strong white one, then the whole white population was at risk (even though it was the Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-French alliances which had made such an outcome possible). It is in itself significant that "race" was only used as a sign of superiority or inferiority. Differentiation with equality was not possible.

This was especially true when race and class were confounded. The two races lending themselves most easily to this were the Jews and the Irish. With the former case, class could also cut both ways. Anti-war propagandists during the late 1890s wrote of Jewish financier conspiracies, and quoted John Burns' phrase "the janissary of the Jews" as an explanation of Britain's war against the South African republics.¹⁷³ On occasion this was reinforced by accusations of "German-Jewish" characteristics.¹⁷⁴ The aristocratic sneering at tradesmen was less evident than the assumption that "Jew" equalled "capitalist"; and the mindless hatred of Jews on this score learnt itself easily to later fascist writings.

On the other hand, the Jews were low-class immigrants, "strangers within our gates", whose quarters in London needed more stringent sanitation to be enforced on them, "in their own interests and those of their neighbours".¹⁷⁵ They were in addition "foreign undesirables" who, unlike other immigrants, had to bring their ghettos with them. The poorest English and Irishry could not compete with these Jews.¹⁷⁶

But then there was always a strong probability that the nearer the racial discussion got to home, the more of a domestic class stratum would be applied to it. It is equally no shock that a lower race could be identified by radicals with the capitalist section of society - their own *bête noire* - whilst the majority of the press compared them with the low life of the cities. Race could be read into as required. What is more significant is the relative absence of anti-semitism earlier in the century, when the comparisons were less relevant.¹⁷⁷ The literary indulgences of Eliot and Disraeli were also less dwelt upon by the press.¹⁷⁸

The best scapegoat was, however, closer still. The Irish provided (and provide) a fund of jokes for the press; much of which belied concern for their inability to be successfully subjugated, and revealed fear of the repercussions on the minds of the domestic working class. Ireland was, and is, a trial ground for attitudes closer to home; "Britain", then as now, rarely included Ireland. That is, except when concerning home rule. As Blackwood's said, "What is Nationality?", pointing at the "absurd" Irish demand for independence on the grounds that they were a separate and distinct race.¹⁷⁹ English nationality could hardly have met with such disdain. Yet the irony is that if they were not a separate race, the Irish faults must logically also have been British faults. "British" meant, however, the best of British.

Class comparisons existed best of all in relation to other races. The London Irish were described as dearly loving to play at revolutionaries, but as not forming a "White Peril" against the "Saxon tyranny".¹⁸⁰ India was urged to prevent the immigration of low-caste Englishmen, such as the reckless Irish and the lowland Scotchman; both of whom were "intolerable under the influence of cheap whisky".¹⁸¹ And from a liberal viewpoint, quoting Marx's expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil, the Irish were described as being forced to emigrate by land monopolies. Both in Ireland and South Africa it was the land question which was held to blame.¹⁸² Whichever way it was approached, Ireland represented an inferior race and class. As the English Review recorded in 1852, when reviewing Uncle Tom's Cabin, "how constantly we are reminded both of the good and evil traits in the Irish character by the language and deportment of these sable gentlemen and ladies." 183

One image reinforced another.¹⁸⁴

A final European racial note is worth mentioning, if only to show how far the stereotypes could sink in. "The Football Nations" encouraged manliness

and the promotion of physical and moral strength through football. French football was dismissed, as "it is towards Germany, however, that one looks with the greatest hope for the future of the game on the Continent." Cricket was not yet a national pastime in Germany, it was observed. Looking at Britain's own early development of football, it was suggested that environment dictated the form of sport, and was the source from which their "racial idea" derived its character. Ireland, moreover, owed her limited success at football to the fact that it was essentially Celtic - impetuosity and torrential courage were displayed, rather than reasoned and scientific tactics. Finally an old soldier gave his view that football was better than a battle.¹⁸⁵ In the battle for survival, even football could sort out the Teutons from the Latins, and the Saxons from the Celts.

The periodical press also revealed a number of explicit "scientific" theories on race. Initially, as Curtin says, humanitarianism was still the philosophy in office, despite the erosions by Darwin of the basic ideology. "The forms and meanings of African life were still investigated... in the light of the older tradition."¹⁸⁶ As time passed, however, the new pseudo-scientific racism ushered in harsher attitudes towards lower races. The growing doubts as to the previously-believed inevitable extinction of the black, and the growing fears of the "Yellow Peril", created more aggressive sentiments which closely paralleled the attitudes to the increasing organisation and strength of the domestic working class. A particular sign of this increased harshness lay in the way coolies - both Indian and Chinese - were treated in the press, a treatment hardly to compare favourably with the earlier diatribes against slavery. The parallels between coolies and workers at home were implicit to both advocates and detractors of the cheap labour system.

Thus one journal portrayed the "shadows falling over the magnificent fabric of western sovereignty in Asia." It regarded it as inconceivable that Europe should ever succumb to a black invasion, but the possibility of yellow races excluding Europe from the east was strong. Rather than the higher races declining, as Pearson had felt, it was the abnormal multiplication

of Asiatic populations under European rule which was so threatening.¹⁸⁷
 Another review, however, appreciated the possibility of higher races assimilating to the moral and mental depression of the lower,¹⁸⁸ and bemoaned the prospect of a "sensuous, genial, fibreless society". Frederic Harrison, in the Fortnightly Review, was less worried, expecting civilisation to overcome its dangers. He was even unconcerned if white men should be confined to the temperate zones. For "there is no "highest" race in any absolute sense".¹⁸⁹ Imperial sanitation could combat disease, after all, and Knox's pessimistic view of Europeans' capacity to acclimatise in foreign lands need not be dreaded.¹⁹⁰

Yet the setbacks to the Darwinian-style view of progress were immediately apparent. The whites were not succeeding naturally, and only the positive sciences of civilisation held out any hope for their surmounting their difficulties. Otherwise it could merely be observed that Dark intruded permanently into the domain of the Fair with more success than Fair into the domain of Dark - in the tropics "the blonde white is probably doomed to disappear off the face of the earth".¹⁹¹

"Men of the Saxon, Celtic and Teutonic races will not settle in countries unfit for the outdoor labour of white men; and though governed by Europeans, as colonies, they will never become the settlements of European races; and indeed, tropical countries appear to be fatal to the children of European parents." ¹⁹²

The idea of outdoor labour being associated with those of non-white skin was

inherent in all arguments about climate and population.¹⁹³ Greenwood's review of Pearson established the domestic overtones still further. Revealing the black race gaining education and wanting a share in employment and government it stated: "whenever that happens, the white race will either be absorbed or disappear."¹⁹⁴ The class analogy was blatant.

The expectation of a future colour war, which might overwhelm Europe itself, was often repeated in the press.¹⁹⁵ As the Edinburgh Review recorded, every incident with agitation in Asia reacted upon the relations of governments in Europe. When Europeans quarrelled over partitions, the stronger natives took lessons in war; and in fighting qualities the best African and Asiatic races were very little inferior to the European soldier. Possibly, it was suggested, there should be a league of white races to impose peace on Asia. For Russia's demise in the Russo-Japanese war was detrimental to peace in both continents.¹⁹⁶ Europe was always more important than the third world.

This was also reflected in the attitudes to coolies. Most periodicals denied that the Chinese labour in the Rand mines was slavery, as wages were higher than in China, and they put the need down to the black natives' laziness and hatred of the white man. The mines were not rich enough to pay the wages required by whites, and it was not wise for Britain to check the prosperity of one of her best customers.¹⁹⁷ So much for fighting the Boers on the "native question". The war over, however, the Westminster Review felt free to condemn the Chinese mine labour as "yellow slavery",¹⁹⁸ but merely used the issue as a stick with which to beat the capitalist mine-owners who had started the whole "franchise war". Domestic parallels were continued when the review accused the mine-owners of rooted objections against

employing anyone likely to ask for a voice in the government of the country. The Indian emigrants being used as coolie labour by Britain herself received less attention, although this was seen in one quarter as ample proof of Britain's clear understanding of the needs of India's toiling millions.¹⁹⁹

In general, despite the uncertainties, the white man was still supreme, and the Anglo-Saxon was still top race. Christ was, after all, a white man. Science only backed this up. As H.H. Johnston wrote: "Biology and sociology point to the superiority of the Caucasian and white races over the coloured races of the earth".²⁰⁰ That is not to say that there were not open questions asked. One writer believed that "Egoism, not less than altruism, bids us abjure the doctrine of racial supremacy."²⁰¹ Another went further still. Every race suffered from the bane of pernicious "nationality" - the "unquestioning racial prejudices of the ignorant, and the impious cant of ecclesiastics who countenance the murderous instincts of their kin".²⁰² Yet the argument was still a domestic one, and did not alter the previous existence of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. Moreover, such carping was sparsely spread out amongst the richer racialism of the majority of the periodicals.

Throughout the pages of this press there was reflected the feeling, conscious or unconscious, of British superiority over all other "races". This included use of the term "English" rather than "British" to convey the pure ethnic nature of this supremacy.²⁰³ Given an empire made up of many different nationalities, and an English people made up itself from Celt, Roman, Saxon and Norman origins, this use of a spurious racial expression sounds particularly out of place in the mouths of Unionist periodicals. Even in the non-Unionist papers the importance of England as the centre of the world's civilisation was self-evident, the paradox being that the empire needed to expand more and more to convey the impression of the purity of its mother country. Thus were nationalism and imperialism inextricably confused.²⁰⁴

The connection between internal and external affairs had been well put by the theorists. As Pearson said,

"If we leave the fertile, but unfit, one sixth to reproduce one half the next generation, our nation will soon cease to be a world power."

"The penalty to be paid for race predominance is the subjection of women." 204

In this setting it is not surprising how often women appear in writings about race.²⁰⁵ Blacks marrying white women were not only increasing chances of black survival, but also limiting opportunities for the propagation of the white race. Repression of female sexuality was only part of the general keeping of women in their place - and their place was to produce more healthy white Anglo-Saxons. In the same way class differences had to be eliminated, according to the theorists; for unless the working classes were strong, healthy, and well-trained, Britain could not succeed in the struggle for existence. A worthy stock must ensure that "humanity shall be represented by the fittest races."²⁰⁶ Quite whom humanity was to be represented to was never clear. Liberal imperialists, such as Rosebery, Haldane, Asquith and Grey also saw the need for a strong working class as the basis of an imperial race,²⁰⁷ and it is interesting to see how far the press espoused the liberal imperialist cause, despite its lack of impact on either party organisations or electorate.

For what is at issue is not whether logically argued racialist views were convincing to the general public, nor whether the working population of Britain accepted these racial assumptions without question. It is more important to see the attitudes of the upper and middle classes as far as they are reflected in these journals, and to estimate the effect on those, from Asquith and Grey to Balfour and Chamberlain, who found themselves in subsequent influential government positions. The ruling ideas of any epoch are the ideas of the ruling class,²⁰⁸ and there was a large area of agreed opinion between all elements of the late Victorian British press which could be said to constitute a ruling body of thought.

This body of thought then reveals a high level of xenophobia, masking very real domestic uncertainties in both social and economic spheres. As Shattock has noted,²⁰⁹ the periodicals were not really as distinctive as any editorial line might suggest, and almost all share an ethnocentrism verging on racialism, expressing an equation of non-whites with lower orders, and the further degradation of those lower orders. As non-whites became more familiar to the Victorians, through exploration and emigration (in both directions), and as they became stronger in their defence against imperialism,²¹⁰ so attitudes became harsher towards them. Familiarity bred contempt, but the possibility that Britain might be overthrown by lower races bred a skin-deep contempt masking fear. As the Spectator observed, there was no power whatsoever in the hands of those who governed India or Africa or Latin America to resist a general effort of the population to throw the white races out. The only course was "to rule, as completely and with as little repentance, as if we were angels appointed to that task."²¹¹ The chief function of the white clubs in colonies was to keep Britons from going native,²¹² for any such degradation would allow the white masks to slip.

The same was true of attitudes to lower classes. Philanthropic paternalism was polarised into class and race antagonism, and an investigation of the language of race in the British press suggests that it was employed with more than a little social domestic implication. What else can one make of an article on "The Coming Race and Moral Depravity" by a working woman - depicting the depraved offspring of the working class roaming the streets?²¹³ The apogee of xenophobia came in the years of the Anglo-Boer war, when Boers could be equated with radicals at home, and when imperialism could be presented as a diversion from and de-fusing of domestic social reform movements. The war also represented the last few years of Britain's diplomatic isolation, and nothing could be more indicative of the decline of the mid-Victorian Anglo-Saxon than the 1902 alliance with the "yellow race" of Japan.

Although Forster notes the Saturday Review use of the phrase "race of domestics", and Dickens wrote of "the Hands" of Coketown as

"a race who would have found more favour with some people, if Providence had seen fit to make them only hands, or, like the lower creatures of the seashore, only hands and stomachs" 214,

it is not necessary to labour the direct comparisons of class and race. Gissing did this adequately enough in Demos:

"People who have never known hardship often speak more cruelly than they think, and of course it always will be so long as the rich and the poor are two different races, as much apart as if there was an ocean between them". 215

Moreover, "the English working class has, on the whole, as little of that quality (chivalry) as any other people in an elementary stage of civilisation." 216

More significant, however, than the literary allusions, is the large body of implication, where ostensible racial discussions belied the domestic concerns of Victorian England. Threats to British stability - whether from socialism, labour, foreign trade or colonial revolt - increased the press' desire to emphasise Britain's greatness and security. England was placed at the top of a scale of races with all the other nations in descending order below. The superiority was such that Britain always knew better than her dependencies what was in their best interests - an idea which again lent itself easily to class terms. Concerns with other races were often no more than concerns with the workings of British constitutional government,²¹⁷ and many imperial incidents represented the crisis in liberalism which came to a head during the Anglo-Boer war. The missionary impulse was considered to be of as much benefit to the missionary as to the native, and the over-anxious assertions of the good accruing to the native from British rule reveal transparent doubt.

Quite possibly the harsher racialist views of the late Victorian years owed something to the sheer number of colonial territories. As the number of possessions increased, so did the probability of more racial conflicts. This paralleled the increase in domestic social conflicts, and perhaps acted as a diversion from them. The implications were, however, always clear. Ultimately the educated classes' race assumptions were founded on their conceptions of themselves as civilised men in an uncivilised world, and as an enlightened intelligentsia in a largely barbarian England.²¹⁸ The pride of race satisfied their own self-esteem. It also helped to justify their behaviour towards both lower orders and nations.

Chapter Ten : Jingoism-(i)-Formal and Informal Armies

A number of other themes running through the periodical press were related to imperialism and the war. The defence estimates were constantly linked with the safety of empire, and the Volunteer movement was avidly encouraged as a training-ground for the guardians of Britain's far-flung possessions. Despite the obvious "saturday night out with the lads" nature of the Volunteers,¹ the papers managed to see the movement as an important bulwark of Britain's imperial role, and repeatedly denied any licentious behaviour which occurred on Volunteer Camp weekends.² Foreign military preparations were also associated with British military, and hence imperial, levels of strength.

History and biology were introduced as further reinforcements. War was seen as scientifically inevitable, and as a natural stage of progress towards survival of the fittest.³ The doctrine that war was an inevitable stage of capitalism emerged not long after.⁴ Meanwhile parallels were drawn between Britain and her more illustrious predecessors - the Anglo-Saxons, the Vikings, the Greeks and the Romans. There were added emphases on the "Golden Age of Elizabeth", and on the successes of the Napoleonic wars.⁵ Even one of Thomas Hardy's Wessex Tales recalled a West country legend of Napoleon individually crossing the Channel to spy out the land for a possible invasion.⁶ The rose-tinted spectacles of the past drew a long shadow over the pessimism of the present.

Similarly the blustering patriotism and imperial bellicosity which attached itself to foreign conflicts belied an even larger degree of domestic disenchantment. Neither left nor right were really concerned with the inherent realities of colonial life, as can be seen from the intensity of debates over arms estimates when compared with any other topic of imperial discussion. As Porter says, to the radicals imperialism was a national psychology. It was the domestic manifestation of imperialism which infuriated them, and anti-imperialism was directed against jingoism at home.⁷ The converse was equally true. Support for the army, albeit imperial, was support for stability at home. Discipline, whether through the Volunteers or the late-century cycling clubs, was a guarantee against internal disorder.⁸ Or, as Dr Wansey Bayley later put it, a true conservative was for a lower beer tax, a Big Army, and control of venereal disease.⁹ Merry England was the aim, not a merry world.¹⁰

It is in this context that the early warnings of disaster must be set. Works such as Erskine Childers' Riddle of the Sands¹¹ reveal as much concern with the internal tensions of Britain as with the threat of the hypothetical German invaders. The predictive novels of the late nineteenth century were merely warning the public, over the heads of their political and military masters, of the dangerous conjunction of revolutionary technology and old political habits in a rapidly changing world. Germany fitted the bill of chief phantom ogre simply because she represented so exactly what Britain could be herself, whilst at the same time acting as a very real physical threat to British prestige and industry. Germans were of the same Teutonic stock as Britons, yet the British systems of education and armed forces lagged sadly behind. And it did not need spelling out that it was the Germanic Goths who had over-run the Roman Empire when its appointed time had come.

The biggest apparent paradox in the press lay in the simultaneous over-stated proclamations of present British strength and rising foreign power. If Britain were genuinely strong, there was no need to worry about

foreign threat. Alternately, if the foreign threats were real, there must be some doubt as to the true British strength. In fact, there was a need to point to weakness in order to force the revitalisation of the defences; but at the same time the illustrations from the past and the over-assertions of the present constituted strong denials that British potential was anything other than supreme. Moreover, the stress on British weakness in global terms added to the need for domestic unity. Dissenters had to toe the line, or else the prophecies of doom would be fulfilled. Jingoism was at once a distraction and a unifier.

This seems to be borne out by correlation with the years of imperial activity. Excessive patriotism could bolster up the aggressive acts of imperial expansion, but more usually it thrived in the absence of specific colonial events, tiding the appetite over until the next crisis arrived. Unity, and journalistic sales, were hardest to maintain in years without action. Eventually, however, the mood and the event fed from each other sufficiently to create a permanent high of excitement. In the days of sustained economic depression and political impotence such excitement was almost all there was to hang on to.

So it seems that the character of jingoism altered over the years. Initially there was a brash self-confidence, for which even the Crimea and the Indian mutiny only served as lessons for the future, or tests of British greatness.¹² As the leading paragraph of the Illustrated London News announced, after renewed peace in China:

"The star of England is once more in the ascendant. There was a time, not very remote, when it seemed to be obscured by the inexperience or the incapacity of our officials; by the lukewarmness of our Government in carrying on a struggle, on the success of which the people had set their hearts; and when the capture of the Malakoff by the French afforded a pretext to all who were jealous of or hostile to our influence in Europe, to assert that our power was on the wane, and that our glory had long since reached its culmination. But that day has passed.

Whatever may have been thought or desired a year ago, it is now patent to the world that Great Britain was never stronger or more influential than she is now; that the burden of war which pressed on other empires and states with intolerable severity was scarcely felt in this richer and more vigorous nation; and that any efforts however stupendous which the people and the Government may have made in past times to maintain the equilibrium of Europe and their own high position in the councils of the world would by no means

overtax their energies at the present time, but might be easily exceeded at the first sound of danger, or the first promptings of duty. To the British Government, Press and People, and to the knowledge that there were a fine army and a still finer navy in reserve to back their high pretensions, the result is entirely owing." 13

The following paragraphs elaborated this theme. Punch was also happy to encourage belief in Britain's war-time abilities, showing a General buckling up his belt, his bag packed with the word "India" on its side, and saying: "All right. I've been ready a long time." 14 There were doubts in some quarters - one article portrayed a convalescent soldier writing to his mother: "'Don't let our Patrick, mother, go for a soldier; not that I mind for myself," he says, pointing to his shattered hand, "but one's enough." 15 But for the most part the doubts were directed towards improving and strengthening the forces, not questioning the whole ethos of war. Household Words showed the efficiency of the French soldiers and officers in Algeria, the Westminster Review discussed Prussian policy, and the Illustrated London News warned of the war to come. 16 The criticism was of the management of the forces, not the forces themselves. Declaring the negligence of the Admiralty, and the imperative need for preparations against invasion, Fraser's Magazine recited the poem "For the penny-wise":

"We used to fight the French,
And beat them, says the story;
But now the cry "retrench"
Has a little docked our glory
We meant to beat the Kaffirs,
We had the best intentions;
But the Kaffirs knocked us over,
With the last inventions.
Poor little people, we,
And in the world belated!
Our musket as it seems,
Is superannuated.
Friends! The soldier still
Is worthy of his calling,
But who are they that want
A little over-hauling?" 17

The theme of the integrity of the common soldier was returned to time and again.

As usual there was one other area of doubt which had to be dismissed most forcibly of all. Domestic opponents, whether pacifist or simply frightened, had to be crushed out of existence. In "Peace and Patriotism", Blackwoods alleged that the Russian war was totally due to a pacific policy, and that the slaughter in the Crimea was due to the "people of peace" doing their best to keep up Britain's reproach of being a non-military nation.¹⁸ Punch countered cries of British defencelessness in India by suggesting the employment of women encased in whalebone and steel, with iron-hooped protection. Close-quarter combat would then be impossible, given their circumference. Such a scheme, it was declared, was no more absurd than the fears which had suggested it.¹⁹ Whatever the real needs of Britain in the colonies, the periodicals were united in their condemnation of dissenters at home.

The same was true of the invasion scare of 1859. The likelihood of Napoleon crossing the channel was secondary to the encouragement of home defence for its own sake. Napoleon was just a very convenient excuse. As the tortuous reasoning of the Westminster Review put it, the French might have no current intentions nor desire to attack Britain, but there were the greatest indications of their determination to be prepared for the conflict, should it occur.²⁰ Macmillan's Magazine underlined the domestic angle. "How much better is loyalty than jealousy for equality?" it asked, pleading the case that the Volunteers could create a close bond of union between Englishman and Englishman in a way that agitations and monster meetings never could.²¹

In one case an alternate conflict was even produced in order to keep the momentum going:

"It is true that no immediate peril threatens England, but there are many points on which it is impossible not to feel the greatest anxiety. The eternal eastern question is always assuming some new shape to perplex and frighten us." 22

Volunteering - the application of self-help to military rather than financial success - was too important to dwindle through lack of battles in which one could be involved.

There were some doubts about the desirability of war - there was regret that all civilised nations turned science towards the improvement of engines of war²³ and about English preparedness for that war -

"England is still as helpless in the event of a sudden call on her military resources as she ever was, and it is left to us to revert to a subject of which we begin to fear that the importance will not be admitted till some great national disaster has forced it on the convictions of all classes." 24

But the point was that these doubts could be used to spur on more war efforts. There was no time to lose, and the Volunteers must be given more parade movements and not just sham fighting. The state should reward the soldier, not just with money, for being a good citizen, and the Volunteer

"must be a patriot, ready not merely to be but to be trained as a soldier, though never ceasing to be a citizen.... Happy the country among whose youth such a spirit shall rule!" 25

Some disagreement existed about troops in the colonies, there being one argument for bringing the troops home where they were needed, another claiming that the real reason they were left in the colonies being that there would be moves to reduce their numbers, on economic grounds, if they were brought home.²⁶ The priorities were, however, clear. As one description of the Volunteers showed:

"England, as of old, girdled round by ocean-foam,
Now boasts a double breastwork guarding hearth and home." 27

After the seeming imminence of continental invasion, there appears to have been a lull in jingoist outbursts until the late 1870s. Whether this corresponds with the larger interest in real imperial expansion during these years is not certain, but it seems probable. The only exception again underlines the domestic, or at least European, aspect of jingoist concern, and the defensive nature of that concern. For this exception was the Franco-Prussian war.

Thus readers were warned that France's fate could overtake Britain, and it was asked "For what follows the French war are we ready?"²⁸ "The Battle Of Dorking" was widely reviewed, with encouragement given to stronger military organisation at home in order to counter any possible invasion.²⁹ Not that this suggested colonial withdrawal as such, but rather that invasion threatened empire as a whole. For:

"Providence has not ordained that trade will always come to us, just because we live in a foggy little island set in a boisterous sea!"³⁰

It was not only the straight military threat which made Germany so dangerous. Article after article revealed concern with improved German methods, educational and commercial as well as military, and the periodicals wanted Britain to improve accordingly. Indeed, "just at present England is very willing to learn from Germany."³¹ For if a French invasion scare could cause military advances in the late 1850s, a German invasion scare in the early 1870s necessitated reform throughout the British way of war. The shift in the European balance of power was more than cosmetic.

Interest in Europe, and expectation of a great European war, increased at the end of the decade. This was also the time of the introduction of the word "jingo" into the music-hall lyrics, following Disraeli's performance at the Congress of Berlin. It is ironic that the donation to the nation of

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"peace with honour" should have appeared so universally as a prelude to conflict. But that is exactly what happened.

"Who could suppose all this joy to be but the prelude to gigantic wars? Yet that and that alone is most probably what this 'Peace with Honour' means. Nor may we have so very long to wait." 32

The tone was almost one of wishful thinking. From Punch, with its cartoon of Disraeli leading Britannia to the cliff with "War" just over the edge ("On the Dizzy Brink"), to Nineteenth Century, with reasoned articles preparing for every conceivable emergency, the message was the same.³³ War was on the way.

"The whole civilised world, in both the eastern and the western hemispheres, is seething with excitement and pregnant with unpredicted possibilities of change." 34

One article went so far as to point out the importance of the spade in the Russo-Turkish war.³⁵

The feelings of proximity to war spilled over into renewed support for the Volunteers in the early 1880s. It also allowed room for dismissals of peace-mongers. One description of the Volunteers at Windsor allayed any "Peace Society" accusations of "vapouring and bravado" by asking:

"What is war when fought upon principles of liberty and upon principles of honour - what is it but the getting together of quiet and harmless people, with their swords in their hands, to keep the ambitious and the turbulent within bounds?" 36

Another justified Beaconsfield's use of army and militia reserves as being "not the last resource, but it is the first resource under our system."³⁷

Yet more articles demanded schemes of mobilisation, improved artillery and efficient (and economical!) naval administration.³⁸ The attitude, verbalised by one, was not to criticise the past, but to show where improvement was possible for the future. For England was different to other nations, having to look after colonies as well as home defence.³⁹ And, yet again, there was no time to lose.⁴⁰

Although Britain was still regarded as supreme, several assertions smacked of transparent unease. "With her children gathered about her, Britain may meet her enemy at the gate, and not be put to shame," said one, though simultaneously noting how the successful recruitment was due to "the actuality of want of employment and general depression".⁴¹ John Bull was alleged to keep his tremendous empire together "not by bayonets but by moral force"⁴² - surely flying in the face of all the evidence of Afghan, Zulu and Ashanti conflicts, not to mention Boer and Egyptian. Most of all an article in Chambers' entitled "Jingoism" argued directly against the prevailing wisdom. "Jingoism to a large degree depends on the structure of society", it declared. For jingoism needed a caste with warlike or idle proclivities, who could spend time getting their sons into the army - a sort of jingoist superstition. Encroachments on the land of "wretched tribes in South Africa" were a "gross error, wholly imputable to Jingoism". Furthermore:

"Let the great interests of the Empire, within its widely extended bounds, be by all means protected, as is justified by honour; but for any sake let us put a distinct stop to those petty wars of conquest in remote regions of the globe, waged for no rational purpose, which while costing us many valuable lives, help to keep alive the National Debt, and to form a serious drain on our resources. This can only be done by each in his sphere offering every discouragement to Jingoism." ⁴³

Again, however, it was the domestic aspect of jingoism which mattered to the writer. The fate of the "wretched tribes" themselves was totally submerged beneath the "honour" and "drain on our resources". Whether pro or anti expansion, the domestic repercussions always predominated. Jingoism was obnoxious to radicals because of their domestic challenge to liberal policy, and vice versa. Gladstone was caricatured by Funch for preferring even the cookery of Russia; yet the poem - "By A Jingo" - belied the overstated patriotism of many of Gladstone's opponents.⁴⁴ Jingoism was indubitably a domestic phenomenon.

It was also an essentially defensive reaction. With the onset of the 1890s, following Irish unrest, unskilled worker unionism, and German industrial and imperial expansion, the bluster born from uncertainty knew no boundaries. These were the years when real doubt was openly expressed, and when the over-eager statements of jingoistic fervour blossomed as the only way to debunk the doubt. Most of all, these were the years when Britain's internal political and industrial machinery was linked directly to her safety as an imperial power. England's real peril, said one journal, was that of her wealth going to her competitors. England might improve in naval and military terms, but her wealth depended on her agriculture, manufacture and commerce.⁴⁵ However, the disappearance of Britain's navy from the seas would mean paralysis of her industrial activities. Every squadron England maintained abroad was therefore part of a comprehensive scheme of imperial defence.⁴⁶ Frederick Greenwood warned of the inevitable war which would overwhelm all Europe, seeing a machinery of war in fire, sword, and finally "Red Spectre", as with the Paris Commune. He urged repair of Britain's political condition, as "the people of this island still have it in their hands to rescue their splendid empire."⁴⁷

Gradually it was being realised that modern warfare would extend its ramifications throughout the complicated framework of civilised society.

"It may be said that in these times war causes the whole nervous system and the life of a nation to vibrate; in any case, we are a long way removed from the little strifes which centred round given localities in the past."⁴⁸

No-one would any longer be safe. Moreover, there was still not sufficient preparation. Articles with such titles as "Can we hold our own?", "Our military unreadiness", and "England's Strength in Case of War"⁴⁹ chronicled English weakness; whilst others wishing to praise the fighting forces had to explain the huge difficulties to be overcome, such as bluejackets going

on lookout duty for fifteen hour stretches without food, and Volunteers who distinguished themselves in military reviews having to pay for their uniforms and weapons - "as usual!" according to Punch⁵⁰. Not that there was any question of the genuine patriotism of the populace. Military enthusiasm of a young soldier was a far better means of recruiting than the played out wiles of the professional recruiter, said one journal.⁵¹ There was, moreover, no doubt of the coming of war.

"What is happening at present in the Balkan peninsula and elsewhere is merely a light vibration of the air produced by the terrible storm gathering in the distance, which the lightning conductors at the disposal of our wretched diplomatists will soon be no longer able to avert."

And, as the Speaker said,

"It may not come in the spring, but the universal conviction that it must come sooner or later is just the state of feeling that renders it unavoidable." 52

Given the belief in inevitability, it is not surprising that opinion was so strongly in favour of increased armaments. In particular the navy received boundless encouragement. Mahan's works on sea-power, coupled with the rise of the German navy, alerted the leading journals to the decline of Britain's navy since the Crimean war. Only in 1895-6 did naval expenditure equal that of the army once again, and £13 million expenditure in 1888-9 doubled to £26.5 million in 1899-1900. The feeling that Britain's navy was a necessity, while other countries' navies were mere luxuries, explains Coschen's attitude that the naval estimates rose "not of provocation but of self-defence".⁵³ As Chambers' said in 1896, ten years previously a hostile coalition could have beaten England, and driven English commerce from the seas. This statement was accompanied by the age-old apology for increased arms - namely that while a general naval reduction was to be desired, the move must first be made by others, and not Britain.⁵⁴ It is noticeable how both journals and statesmen stopped talking about disarmament - a noble ideal which was impossible to attain.⁵⁵ Instead Mahan's view, "that nation will have the strongest arguments which has the strongest organised force", increasingly found favour with the press.⁵⁶ The great war was in prospect, despite the teaching of the navalists that the

infallible way of preventing war was by preparing for it. The vicious circle meant that the navalists made war more inevitable, which made the navalists' demands more extreme.

Nothing did more to strengthen the simultaneous self-praise and self-doubt than the series of conflicts culminating in the Anglo-Boer war. Whilst glorifying war, and praising British victory, the periodicals underwent severe logistical difficulties in reconciling the scale of these little wars with the immense effort expended by Britain in winning them. The best way out was (as we have already seen) to accuse the opposition of cheating, or not fighting fairly, and to argue that no other European army would have done half so well.⁵⁷ A large empire necessitated large responsibilities; and so the multitude of little wars only reflected the greatness of the empire. Moreover, the shortcomings could be used to attack opposing political parties for having caused the problem in the first place, or could be laid at the door of the faceless bureaucrats who sat at home while Tommy Atkins died in the field.⁵⁸ Never was the ordinary soldier anything other than a virtuous patriot who willingly served his Queen and country to the bitter end. As Punch wrote early in 1900, criticising the home government for inefficiency, "only the bravery of the British soldier saved the situation".⁵⁹

The necessity of improvement, and the fascination with conscription and new military technology, again reflect the widespread feeling that little wars, including the Boer struggle, were but a preamble to the "real" European war.⁶⁰ Moreover, there were positive virtues to military developments. Disease still killed more than arms did, and as arms improved the campaigns of the future were likely to be shorter.⁶¹ By the same token, the resolution at the Hague Peace Conference which tried to restrict British dum dum bullets was held "in no way" to "result in benefitting humanity".⁶² Concern with the threat of foreign torpedoes to British battleships was also expressed

in a way to encourage defensive improvements.⁶³ Yet the main attitude was still one of overstated confidence in the British spirit. With regard to British rifles, "their accuracy and finish are a proof that the British army is in possession of the finest in the world".⁶⁴ Even though conscription was believed by many to be inevitable if Britain were to maintain her army and navy on the same relative scale with other powers, the triumphs of South Africa were equal proof of the triumph of the voluntary principle in enlistment.⁶⁵ Furthermore, defence should be based on lines which would make the colonies and the mother country one as a home for men of the English race.⁶⁶ Just as "war has usually found Great Britain unprepared", so war drew closer all the members of the empire.⁶⁷ Among foreign powers the traditional allies were now fiercest rivals, and for honour and existence it was necessary to depend on Britain and her empire alone.⁶⁸

As if this were not enough, there were several pseudo-scientific theories advanced to account for the benefits of war. Dicey's style, in Nineteenth Century, was to paint peace as a weakness and an aberration; whilst the Reverend Peyton in the Contemporary Review justified war and suffering in battle from a theological viewpoint.⁶⁹ The Darwinian-like explanation of war as a glorious and inevitable mode of progress, sanctioned by nature, was also not without adherents.⁷⁰ War was even seen as a "tonic" for the individual 71

Presumably the individual writing such statements was rarely the individual actually fighting in the field. The Hague Conference prompted yet more armchair militarism, and one writer suggested that the people:

"will prefer to bear the burden of militarism rather than face industrial anarchy.... The next great war will infuse a tremendous vitality into our drooping industries." 72

There were, however, doubts about this. Firstly there was the question of shipyards building foreign warships. It kept the yards open, but at the same time it armed the enemy.⁷³ More seriously still, there were doubts about war itself. "What crimes are committed in the name of evolution!" cried the Westminster Review, in urging military and industrial peace.⁷⁴ The Fortnightly also preferred to link trade to education, rather than war. England would not last the century, in keeping her trade, without a renaissance in the national spirit.⁷⁵ Jingoism was, for once, unmilitaristic. The Liberal Magazine itself went further still against arms industries:

"It is quite impossible to justify the expenditure of vast sums of public money on the ground that it gives employment. The government cannot redeem their pledge to give "Better Times" in this way". 76

Finally the Westminster carried an article on "War and Trade". There was a common belief, it said, that war was good for trade. Yet few would maintain that the wholesale destruction of life and property could increase the wealth of a community. A war with one of Britain's best customers had to damage some trade. Most of all, it was claimed, the fact that war could in any way cause improvement in the industrial system revealed the existence of a terrible defect in the organisation of that industrial world.⁷⁷ As Macmillans had written in 1894, the fact that national sentiment and international animosity were both on the rise was due to the prevalent superstition that the infliction of losses on one country could somehow benefit another.⁷⁸

The connections between an external war and the internal organisation of society were implicit in all attitudes to imperial defence. Usually they reflected support for patriotic militarism, and a desire for domestic and imperial unity. Yet even when they occasionally raised doubts as above, the attitudes still considered the issues in terms of domestic considerations. It is not surprising, for example, that the Westminster saw nothing wrong with Irish Volunteers to defend their own country.⁷⁹ A liberal journal was likely to express a different attitude on Ireland - which was a party issue - to a conservative organ. Traditional concerns, with their traditional domestic overtones, consistently predominated. Another article suggested that the female jingo was worse than the male⁸⁰ - again a reinforcement of domestic stereotypes. The literary battle over jingoism was itself very definitely an internal struggle. The "deprecators of the nation" who opposed the implanting of reasonable patriotism in British youth⁸¹ were a bigger enemy than any Boer in the veldt; while the "policy of Grab-Jingo" was held by liberals to have poisoned the minds of young and old.⁸² To both sides the issues were domestic. As the Edinburgh Review put it, the General Election of 1900 meant that Salisbury was going to settle South Africa and to strengthen British military and naval defences throughout the world.⁸³ Anyone who held back from financial support for the war was, in Punch's phrase, A "Wobbler",⁸⁴ and it is significant that the anti-jingo "Vagrant" appeared less and less in Punch's pages as the war continued. The battle was waged as fiercely at home as abroad.

Partly the nature of journalism itself offers some explanation of this. As one history of Punch relates, "a war is a godsend to a humorous paper, simply because ordinary life becomes diversified."⁸⁵ It was not only humorous papers. The Illustrated London News related:

"The public has nothing to complain of as regards lack of dramatic intensity in the progress of the war",

and even the Westminster Review related happily "war is an inexhaustible subject!"⁸⁶

The very fact of so many articles on war is itself testimony to the prevailing journalistic sentiments. One cannot necessarily gauge public opinion from this, any more than today; but within the stratum of society which managed the empire and produced its periodical reading matter, it is clear that war was by the end of Victoria's reign an inordinately pressing concern.

The question is whether, after the Boer War, English opinion had indeed quenched its thirst for blood. Grey felt it had, as he wrote in a letter to President Roosevelt:

"Before the Boer War we were spoiling for a fight. We were ready to fight France about Siam, Germany about the Kruger telegram, and Russia about anything. Any government here, during the last ten years of last century, could have had war by lifting a finger. The people would have shouted for it. They had a craving for excitement, and a rush of blood to the head. Now this generation has had enough excitement, and has lost a little blood, and is sane and normal." 87

Whether Grey was right about what the people would have shouted for is not certain. Price's more recent view is that there was considerably less jingoism amongst the working population than was previously believed, and recruitment to the forces clearly correlated (and correlates) with mass unemployment.⁸⁸ This is not really the point here. Rather the question is whether there was any lessening of jingoist outbursts in the periodical press after the end of the Anglo-Boer war, or whether the learned journals saw the South African conflict as still a mere foretaste of bigger things to come.

In this light the answer is unequivocal. The number of jingoist articles, the concern with warfare in general, the commemorations of previous triumphs and the fear of foreign strength - all continued and increased throughout the periodicals.⁸⁹ In addition, the interest in domestic conflicts, Irish, industrial and feminist, blossomed as never before.⁹⁰ It is not necessary to go so far as suggesting a causal relationship between the warlike atmosphere

of the periodicals and the eventual outcome of war. What is important is the persisting view that the real war was one in Europe, between civilised nations, and not the little struggles of lower races; and further that the tensions within England were more important than anything else. The long fuse on both time and distance was burning itself out.

One must beware of historical hindsight, or seeing tensions merely in the knowledge that war was imminent. Certainly the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Boer war saw some diminution of overt patriotism, rather as if the excessive difficulties involved in triumph were an embarrassment to be quickly forgotten about. But the continuation of encouragement for militarism was undoubted. That war came in 1914 rather than 1910 or 1918 is neither here nor there. The train of bellicose writings was unbroken and expanding.

Thus fascination with mechanical developments,⁹¹ and with what other nations thought of British strength,⁹² were reinforced by support for domestic movements, such as the Boy Scouts. Dismissing their appearance as militaristic, one writer called them Peace Scouts. No nation who wanted to avoid war would do anything other than "Be Prepared", said the journal.⁹³ But the connections were there, all the same. Girls' clubs also attracted more attention after 1908, with the increasing insistence that children be brought up by mothers to become fit members of the empire.⁹⁴ Other groups, such as the Boys Brigade, the Church Lads Brigade, Incorporated Church Scout Patrols, army cadets, naval cadets and Jewish Lads Brigade all flourished at this time. Links with education may not have been typified by the Manchester teacher member of the First Volunteer Battalion whose room was used for caning 20-30 boys regularly every day at 4 p.m.⁹⁵ But discipline and militarism hung together very easily.

Other articles maintained the watchful regard of German progress, hoping, without intentional irony, that Germany might find less rapid progress consonant with her security. For the German aim was to gain naval supremacy, which was

not to be tolerated.⁹⁶ Moreover, as the continental nations had always considered national defence worthy of attention by all, Britain should do likewise. Haldane was thus praised for looking closely at the Volunteers.⁹⁷ As usual, the view of other nations as being second rate was tempered by the desire to imitate foreign characteristics. Britain was still best, but if all her neighbours were behaving in one particular way, she could do nothing other than copy them; which hardly reinforced the idea that Britain was omnipotent.

Consciousness of this decline had much to do with the repeated descriptions of Britain's former glory. The Napoleonic wars were the nearest and easiest to recall, and also bore greatest relevance to contemporaries. Chambers' refuted "The New Legend of Waterloo", that was that Prussia had saved England from defeat at Waterloo, when it was really the other way round.⁹⁸ Other journals carried histories of the Spanish campaign, Trafalgar, and even the Egyptian conflicts, in addition to the Waterloo reminiscences. It seemed that ninety years after Trafalgar Britain was just beginning to understand again the eternal principles of sea defence.⁹⁹ The Elizabethan age was praised still further, the increased time-scale adding to the cloudless Tudor skies, and the exploits of Drake and Hawkins demonstrating the true British maritime potential.¹⁰⁰ One writer in 1901 suggested that Britain could not go back to the England of Elizabeth; but still managed to praise a "sane and sober imperialism" which could be distinguished from "flag-waving and jingoism".¹⁰¹ The general view, however, was that "loyally and as gallantly as did those predecessors, our present race of sailors will repay our confidence."¹⁰² Or, as Macmillan's described Arctic enterprise:

"As long as our naval officers are trained in the school which has ripened such men as Robert McClure and Leopold McClintock, whose character is written on every page of their journals, we need never fear for the behaviour of the British navy." ¹⁰³

For the whole naval question was, to another journal, "Can Britain be, at sea, in these days, what she was in old days?"¹⁰⁴

The naval question extended still further to the nature of the English stock itself. All The Year Round traced back "our choral baast of "ruling the waves" to our bloodthirsty ancestors amongst the old Vikings", and the Fortnightly Review showed the Briton far from losing the manly virtues of his forefathers - pluck and energy - even in the darkest hour.¹⁰⁵ To the Quarterly Review the work of taking over the crumbling Turkish empire was:

"A work for England and Englishmen, for the successors of those who planted the British flag at Gibraltar, who unfurled it in Abyssinia, who have maintained it, the hereditary beacon of sound government, justice and prosperity to rulers and ruled alike, over India and half a world." 106

Meanwhile another article even ridiculed foreign insect-life:

"Better English flies and gnats, better American mosquitoes and gallinappers, than such a flying fiend as the Abyssinian seroot." 107

The English character reigned supreme, and its roots proved it.

The final historical comparison had no ancestral connection. The Greeks and Romans were compared in their empires with the British one, usually pinpointing the downfall of these previous imperialists.¹⁰⁸ The Westminster Review, however, suggested that in Athenian times no poet would have dared to invoke the god of war while staying in the security of his own home.¹⁰⁹ This attitude was rare, but the domestic and contemporary parallel was, after all, standard.

It is striking how cults of Hellenism, medievalism and primitive and folk cultures, including one of the free Anglo-Saxons before the Norman yoke, could all co-exist within the same limited section of Victorian society. Perhaps the real significance is that so many Englishmen of the period, living through the dislocations and social and political consequences of the industrial revolution, were prepared to look almost anywhere for inspiration, except to themselves and to their own practicable future. Thus in times of crisis it was easier to look back rather than forward, and to idealise the past as if to make the present go away.

In conclusion, the mounting jingoism of the Victorian and Edwardian years was firmly rooted in the here and now, although it appeared to concern the empire and the past. Always the jingoism related to the inadequacies and uncertainties of the present, which could be dissipated only by reference to former times and foreign climes. Home defence and imperial expansion co-existed in an age which felt it had to go forward and spread out in order to stand still and preserve what it already had. Meanwhile conservative papers accused liberals of lacking patriotism, and liberals claimed conservatives were fire-eaters. The bellicose policy applied internally to both sides. That blustering patriotism sought to extend the field of play is hardly surprising. Capitalists were exporting their capital, so jingoists transferred their jingoism to conflicts overseas or in the past. Hyam's theory of the export of surplus emotional energy is not dissimilar.¹¹⁰ But it is important to see that jingoism sprang from internal founts of energy.

For as the established hierarchy of the early Victorian years began to crumble under the pressure of an organised working class, a growing feminist movement, and a declining balance of trade, so the educated elite tried harder and harder to move away from where it was to where it would like to have been. Warnings of danger and foreign threats were used in a desperate attempt to augment the present military power; while lessons from the past repeatedly and in overstated fashion proved that the British potential for supremacy was well-established. But most of all the attitudes were turned against the modern domestic opponents. Both radical and imperialist saw the issues in terms of internal political tensions, and both were more interested to defeat the adversary at home than to establish British rule in the world for its own inherent goodness. Attitudes to domestic militarism were therefore concerned more with the domestic effects of this militarism than with its real value to the empire.

The question behind much of the jingoism was how far the here and now was in fact the ultimate end of progress. Victorian man in his supercilious self-assurance was convinced that he was the last stage in an evolutionary line of improvement, but as the years passed it became increasingly difficult to be so sure. The blustering increased in direct proportion to the uncertainty. In addition, although jingoism was a low emotion, it was happily espoused by many high-class papers. It was possibly less "the people" who were losing some assumed self-assurance than the rulers and writers who claimed to represent them. The war when it came was the last in a long line of diversions and distractions from the genuine problems within Britain, as such almost representing some form of solution.

Apart from its formal manifestations in armies and navies, there were many other aspects of jingoism which were much more emotional and irrational. Jingoism extended into all areas of society - from schooling and literature to philanthropy and feminism - and imperial language was employed in a variety of domestic topics. The phenomenon of exuberant and excessive patriotism has suggested to some writers a reflection of tensions within English society rather than any real focus of attention outside.¹ Disraeli's appeal to national over class issues, and the idea that jingoism was a reaction to Irish nationalism, lend support to this view. In particular, the build-up of domestic aggression before the First World War, among politics, industry, women and the Irish, shows how war - the ultimate expression of jingoist sentiment - could provide an outlet for all the pent-up frustrations within society.

It is therefore worth observing the imperialist slant to many apparently unrelated subjects. The cumulative effect of such articles reveals an imperial frame of mind, acting outside the obvious imperial events, but reinforcing them. This does not mean that there was necessarily a commitment to imperialist ideals, but rather that an imperialist setting was provided in which the domestic issues could be worked out. Again the need for order was paramount. An ordered system of commerce, in which Britain could maintain her domination of world trade, an ordered form of physical control, through which Britain could police the world,² an ordered pattern of education, to propagate the values on which the empire was founded, and an ordered population, so that the health and strength of the race could preserve it against all comers - all these were demanded in an attempt to impose stability upon a world which was rapidly changing. A healthy mind in a healthy body, was the prerequisite for a healthy Britain in a healthy empire.

Education was seen as crucial in this process, and many different aspects of educational theory were permeated by imperial thought. One historian has suggested that the creation of national loyalty was furthered by the spread of compulsory state education, and it is instructive to see school text books of the period with their maps marked in red.³ But the sector of education which was most dwelt upon was the technical. Following the rise of German industrial and military prowess, there was a growing realisation of the deficiencies of Britain's own education system with regard to producing scientists and industrialists. Cromer in 1903 thought the greatest national dangers "backwardness in education and unsound finance"; and technical education went through a boom period at the turn of the century. The periodicals, as was often the case, were well ahead on this subject. The Edinburgh Review in 1863 bemoaned the loss of Britain's place in the manufacturing and engineering industry of the world, as revealed by the previous year's Paris Exhibition. France, still the main enemy at this time, was seen to be thoroughly alive to the importance of scientific instruction, and Britain was urged to follow suit in order to continue as "first nation".⁴

However, there was another focus for educational discussion. This was the public school, the traditional and continuing opposite of state education, and yet the background from which Britain was expected to recruit her future leaders of empire. As one writer put it,

"they are the great seminaries of learning in this land,
and their welfare and progress concerns in the highest
degree the Empire itself."

In particular too much luxury in the public schools would not be helpful

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when confronted with the hardships of empire.⁵ Others observed the discipline of the public schools; but here too there were signs of a desire for science and "useful" subjects to creep in to a curriculum dominated by classics and rowing.⁶ The Westminster Review especially suggested that the upper class would oppose any substitution for the classics, since the classics were "safe and harmless".⁷ The main feeling, however, was that any average school prefect could manage to run an empire in the same way. The world was seen as the school writ large.⁸ Engendering unity through "house spirit", and fostering racial arrogance through the constant teaching of Anglo-Saxon supremacy, the public schools were playing a social and political role which rendered the question of science versus classics irrelevant.⁹

One particular aspect of this was the "amateur" approach. The all-round ability of a gifted amateur was seen to be more useful than the specific skills of a vocational training, and essential to this was a healthy love of games. Although Leslie Stephen argued that it was wrong for rowing to be as important as work,¹⁰ sport undoubtedly did play a large part in any gentleman's upbringing. As Blackwood's put it:

"In a commercial age, to hold dominion a nation must encourage manliness and such pastimes as promote physical and moral strength, discipline, the realisation and the sinking of self." 11

Football, it was argued, represented this above all, and the Victorian age was the golden age of football. The links between clubs, games and the sense of imperial togetherness were strong, and encouraged at all levels of society. Schooling and scouting led inevitably to volunteering. Although the enjoyment may have been derived from physical exercise and comradeship,¹² the inextricable connections with wider imperial purposes were always there, albeit at a subconscious level.

These connections spilled over into much of the periodicals' analysis of contemporary literature. Especially this was true of the years at the end of the century. When Macmillan's Magazine had hoped in 1882 that Palgrave's Visions of England would start a new species of patriotic poetry,¹³ the hope was soon to be answered. Macmillan's itself was able to carry several articles on the subject, among them a spate of Kipling's poems.¹⁴ One of these pieces made out a case for "The True Poet of Imperialism" - praising Tennyson for his patriotic fervour.¹⁵ Other journals also carried descriptions of Kipling, both of prose and verse, and debated whether he or his fellow poets had yet written the patriotic lyric.¹⁶ Henley's Lyra Heroica, Kipling's Barrack Room Ballads, and Newbolt's The Island Race were among those which competed for such a title, in the eyes of the periodicals, but there was a feeling that the writers' elementary education betrayed itself in the vulgarity of their writing. Henley and Kipling were ruled out of supreme status by at least one reviewer on these grounds.¹⁷ On the other hand, there was an opinion that this vulgarity could tell the more sophisticated reader something about the lower orders which was good to hear. "Kipling has revealed to us certain classes of our fellow creatures in their habit", said the Quarterly Review. His habitual abandoning of himself to patriotism was cheered by this journal as "good for the flabbiness and critical uncreativity of our generation".¹⁸

Even in the criticism of patriotic poetry there is much to be learnt of the prevailing climate of opinion. It was not the subject matter, nor the approach, which was objected to; but rather the tone, or the language. Would not poetry be just as effective in correct English as in slang and broken English, asked one writer. If Kipling wished for future fame, he should go to work seriously, and give his best, instead of just trying to please and interest people for the moment.¹⁹ Similarly, another critic of Lyra Heroica and Patriotic Songs thought that the "loftiest poets" did not indulge in this sort of thing.²⁰ As a review of Plain Tales From The Hills put it, the moral atmosphere was less wholesome than Moliere, being full of loud,

loose bluster. There were no delicate woman creations as in Meredith. The realism was, moreover, mimicry, and the dialects were not exact; while the degradation of language was considered too clever by half. But then again it was accepted that it was to Mr Kipling that English readers would owe it if India was at length brought near to them. The "fog of fighting" was as much in his eyes as in those of Helder.²¹ It is strange, if not taken up by the press, how so many supporters of physical, manly prowess were themselves less than physically fit.

Aside from poetry, the periodicals also dwelt upon the prose writings which lent themselves to imperial themes. R.L. Stevenson, with his "youthful and adventurous spirit", was believed to hold the heart and ear of a very great multitude. "He will shine after many days, we trust, and hold fresh generations captive with the spell of romance."²² Conan Doyle was another favoured example, while Trollope was praised for his essential English character and manners.²³ Meredith, with a "sort of distinguished unpopularity; but a sort of light and air compared with Eliot's melancholy", was further compared with Rider Haggard's blood and barbarians - though it was suggested that it might be better to put the latter's spears in a museum.²⁴ "Some Racial Contrasts in Fiction" described the American, Irish and French in fiction and concluded: "There is nothing in the world so magnificent as the Anglo-Saxon race";²⁵ while a more general view of the English artist encapsulated the benefit of an imperial heritage:

"He (the artist) has the history of this country to raise his ideas of action; the fresh life of the colonies to furnish him with variety; the annals of India to inspire him with romance." 26.

A final flourish to the latter was the inclusion of images of "England as it is under the Tories" and "England as it ought to be under the Liberals". However far the periodicals might wander, they always came back to home eventually.

Indeed the importance of England being forever England, both in time and space, was crucial for any belief in imperial unity. Hence:

"In her colonies, on board her navies, in her plantations, in her trade ships, England is ever England, and her pre-eminence synonymous with a more equal justice, a deeper reverence for law, a securer peace, a more widely diffused well-being, a firmer-based prosperity, than are sheltered by any other flag whatever, of the Old World or the New." 27

It was not just that England was the same, stable, ordered England as she had always and everywhere been, but that she was the only nation of which this was true. It was vital to establish that members of the English family were all right, by stressing how no-one else was. Thus could the identification of "them" and "us" be more effectively maintained. Thus could empire - and homeland - preserve its traditional unity.

This explains to some extent the fascination with hero-figures who carried the Anglo-Saxon banner against all comers, and with an idealised past when England was supposed to have reigned supreme. Articles on Gordon, Nelson, and Drake strengthened the chain of lasting achievement.²⁸ In the same way, attacks on foreigners reinforced the self-satisfied superiority of one's own nation. Foreign sailors were an "unsavoury lot", said one writer,²⁹ while an article on foreign opinions of Britain well illustrated the double standards of insularity:

"In the opinion of Thackeray, the reason why Americans and other intensely patriotic nations boast so loudly of their excellence is that they have occasional doubts and ugly qualms as to their physical, mental and moral superiority. A shaky faith, according to the great satirist, takes refuge in noise - in protesting over much."

And, without any trace of irony:

"The Briton, on the other hand, is oppressed by no manner of doubt. He does not care to compare his country with the rest of the world."

For what could others know of a really free country, when they could not "understand or appreciate the lofty supremacy of the children of Albion"?³⁰

This aspect of a "free country" was another critical part of the emotional composition. As was put by Chambers' Journal, Britons would never be slaves, for the Briton was a free agent, without conscription. However, and once more entering into domestic politics, compulsory education and state aid for paupers was seen as a threat to this freedom. State aid killed individual effort and pauperised the people.³¹ The link between international superiority and internal order was one of the strongest planks of the irrational jingoism. Britain was best because she was free, and Britain was free because she did not give concessions to her working class in the same way as her weaker rivals. This is not to say that there were no doubts in the press. The Fortnightly Review noted how Britons fancied themselves socially and morally the superiors of all mankind, when they were not. Jingoism was, it suggested, a self-righteous Liberal belief in British superiority coupled with a Conservative romantic vein in the British character. Yet even here the desirability of the existing ordered framework came through to save the day. For virtue was seen to be the happy interspace between the lowest class and the professional class - and so all was as it should be.³²

Virtue was also seen to be the motivating force behind the missionary work which went on within Britain. The imperial language used over church settlements, the comparisons of African and white slavery so ably exploited by W.T. Stead, and the sentiment that the working class poor of Britain's inner cities needing saving as much as the poor uncivilised inhabitants of the colonies, were all facets of a virtuous domestic imperialism. The imperial frame of mind in which such enterprises were undertaken, and described in the periodicals, is clear to see, and it is impossible to believe it was not conscious at the time. Thus Stead's campaign to protect young women - notably through his procuring and purchasing a young girl himself, his article

"The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon", and subsequent imprisonment - was a campaign against "white slavery" within Britain. The link between women and slavery was again an imperial one in a domestic setting, and Stead arguably ended the conspiracy of silence around the double standard of sexual behaviour for women and men of the lower classes and respectable men outside the home, and for respectable women and men within the home.³³ Gordon's scheme for "poor, friendless boys", to be cared for in the Gordon Boys Home, showed another blatant connection between home and empire;³⁴ as did a review of Dutch and German home colonies, which, whether or not suitable to Britain, were "an exercise in practical philanthropy".³⁵ Emigration was still, however, expected to fulfil the major role in alleviating hardship.

"That emigration alone can give them permanent relief the working men themselves will ultimately find out....
We cannot save the millions of Irish." 36

State colonisation was also expected to people the colonies from the parent stock. Without neglecting other schemes of improvement at home, it was more important not to neglect the splendid outlet afforded by the colonies for the employment of British capital, British energy and British enterprise.³⁷ Or, as Punch's cartoon had it:

"First Rough: "We're A goin' to be edjicated now, c'mpulsory, or else go to the treadmill."

Second Rough: "Ah! No vunder so many poor people's a emigratin' !" 38

But the real fear was that expressed in the writings on "outcast London", namely what to do with the poor. As one writer put it, they were everywhere. In particular there was a large group of women workers, who were thinking in silence today, like a blind Samson, but tomorrow they might grasp with their terrible might those strong columns on which Britain had built her prosperity and freedom. For "who knows what impulse may seize them when they feel their own power?"³⁹

Thus were the themes of workers, women and imperial prosperity bound up in one. The emotional tangle of compassion for the poor at the same time as protection of the imperial facade led to some highly hyperbolic reasonings. What is important to realise is that the domestic and the imperial were heavily intertwined, and that irrational imperialism took in areas of society so diverse as trade unionism, feminism, and the Irish - for all needed to be channelled in the same direction if the elaborate edifice of empire were to remain.

This is not to deny the very real forces of opposition to jingoism. Politically, industrially and socially there were critics of the patriotic bluster, but the question is rather one of the framework of ideas within which these critics operated. This framework can then be seen to extend throughout the range of intellectual opinion, and to enclose many seemingly opposed attitudes to empire. Moreover, the very tone of much anti-jingo material was every bit as aggressive as the "fire-eating" it decried. Basically, however, it was the acceptance of a broad set of principles, within closely set parameters of discussion, which characterised such a large proportion of the journalistic output. Acceptance then left the way clear for the drift to war.

In this way, Dilke in the Progressive Review observed: "I am not sure that we Radicals sufficiently attacked the policy of the Sudan and Matabele wars."⁴⁰ When it had been Grey who had made the Nile declaration, it was hard for Liberals to condemn Fashoda. As the Westminster Gazette revealed:

"For the moment the Boer ultimatum has salved uneasy consciences and rendered the discussion of alternative courses futile. Liberals, no more than Conservatives, need quarrel among themselves about what might have been. The momentary duty is to support the Government in making the inevitable expedition as prompt and effective as possible." 41

Or, as the Edinburgh Review had shown, Liberals were no longer sure whether to attack Salisbury for his jingoism or his weakness.⁴² The feeling of "there is no alternative" seemed to have dug so deeply into the journals that the arguments were no more than those of tinkering. Opinion had clarified substantially since Punch's 1830 cartoon of Hercules and Gladstone and Disraeli (in ancient garb) standing by the signposts "Peace and Prosperity" and "Peace and Empire", with Hercules uncertainly scratching his head.⁴³

There were, of course, a number of rhetorical outbursts against the new imperial outlook. "Our leaders have lost their heads, and delight in a revived "Imperial" England", wrote one, bemoaning the forgetting of home questions and seeing Parliament as an adjunct of this new Imperialism - "the baneful intoxication of this Imperial vanity." The same journal believed that while domestic programmes should not be invented merely to revive the country's interest in its own affairs, still that sounder interest would never be remembered while the nation chased shadows in Afghanistan and Zululand.⁴⁴ But it was more than anything the management of empire, and the seeking after a "proper" imperialism, which was at stake. It was not the question of empire itself. The difference between a pious hoping for peace and a coherent adoption of a strategy which might bring peace was not apparent to the press.

Nowhere was this truer than in the pages of the Westminster Review. It was the sort of empire which mattered - the liberal organ opposing the concept of a "Pirate Empire" and explaining that the liberal idea of empire was empire by home rule.⁴⁵ The rationalisation of party conflicts through imperial

arguments shows once more the domestic slant to the journalistic outpourings, well put in an article on "A South African Salmagundi", in which honour and a proud flag were brought to shame under a pseudo statesman - from Birmingham.⁴⁶ Another writer claimed to be more imperialist than Chamberlain, but considered a war not undertaken for self-defence as wholesale murder.⁴⁷ Gladstone's foreign policy, on the other hand, was a practicable alternative to imperialism.⁴⁸ One very involved argument distinguished sane and sober imperialism from flag-waving and jingoism. "Mr Rudyard Kipling was indeed justified of his readers", it condescendingly asserted, at the same time as noting the curious socialistic feature of modern imperialism, represented by G.B.Shaw. It saw imperialism as inevitable - the product of democracy and the tendency of big states to get bigger - and as "one result of the struggle for life among nations", and expected the burden of empire to lead to tax increases and universal military service. This baser kind of imperialism was inimical to freedom and based on militarism. But British imperialism was not like that, it stressed. Following J.S.Mill, the imperial connection could add to moral influence.⁴⁹

The sort of circuitous reasonⁿing above shows once more the careful confines within which the journals were working. Even opposition to jingoism could not break out of acceptance of an imperial system; it merely wanted it to work better. Porter has similarly chronicled the domestic turn of Labour M.P.s during the war - homing in on the exploitation of labour in South Africa as it related to England. The diversion from social reform, the diminution of opportunities for white emigre employment in South Africa, and the danger of conscription - these were the noticed facets of the war, rather than the imperial system itself.⁵⁰

The picture of working class observation of the Anglo-Boer war carries no very different weight. The effect on trade, and the element of recruitment consequent upon unemployment, predominated. As the Labour Chronicle reported in 1899, recruiting was low, due to the brisk condition of employment owing to the drawing away of reserves.⁵¹ Or, as Club Life explained through the words of one returned recruit,

"Since I have been back in England I have been asked a number of times why I left my native land.... I know it is the rule to expect all soldiers, volunteers, or servicemen to exclaim 'Why I want to fight for dear old England, my Motherland, against the foreign foe.'" Well, to tell you the truth those who go say nothing of the kind. What they are supposed to say is all a fake of the newspapers... What they did talk about was where the next bit of bacca was to come from, or the desire for beer, or when the war would be over, and a word or two about dear old Dad and the Ma at home. These bursts of heroic aspirations are all 'guiver' and I expect the best part of the men who went out at the time I did left England for the same reason i.e. the monotony of their surroundings. Here was I cooped up in a city warehouse a strong active fellow full of high spirits and a desire to see the world. What more to the taste could there be than a few months in a different land... I seized the opportunity at once... I did not care tuppence about the merits of the dispute, and the rubbish about 'fighting for the dear old flag' and our desire to kill Boers or anyone else, for the glory of old England.... it was to escape for a time the monotony of existence, and if other volunteers were only to speak the truth they would tell you the same thing." 52

It is not that this piece is either jingoist or anti-jingoist; it is more that the rational imperialism of the intellectuals was irrelevant to the real motives of recruits. But the irrational jingoism encouraged by an imperial frame of mind - by constant descriptions of Britain's empire and its glories - was well in evidence. Imperial adventure was always portrayed as more exciting than the drab life of the domestic working class.

There were one or two less serious aspects of trade and labour. All The Year Round dismissed the possibility that China would swarm Europe and Asia as being as likely as that domestic servants would in future be supplied by Chinese cooks (which some had already prophesied).⁵³ The Quarterly Review set up a contrast between romance and commerce, respecting the courage of a "Pioneer of Commerce" like Cooper who had penetrated interior China and tried to open up the Tibetan trade routes, but admiring still more the "amusement" that sent the heir to a great name through the severe winter of Hudson's Bay.⁵⁴ Of more concern are justifications of financial policy, such as Eliza Cook's

respect for "the commercial spirit" as a necessary part of the great system which regulated "the passage of our race from barbarism to true civilisation",⁵⁵ and Blackwood's Magazine's view that there was no unrest in the world's money markets in 1893 because financiers were sure there could be no fighting, British prestige being good enough to allay fears.⁵⁶

All these peripheral views add support to the overall picture of imperial thinking, and lend backing to the more logical articles on war and trade.

One such article in the Westminster Review declared:

"Extension of commerce is the enchanting catchword put forward in justification of an endless variety of political crimes, but it should be remembered that such extension becomes suicidal when the expense of it so enhances the cost of our produce as to decrease exportation opportunities and restrict the employment of home labour." 57

The point here is that the context of imperial activity was unquestioned, even though aspects of that activity may not have commanded support. It was not the empire which was to blame, but the possibility that it might make a loss.

One of the key areas for this imperial context was Ireland. The proximity of the oldest colony sharpened the perceptions, and it is arguable that jingoism was a reaction to Irish nationalism. Alternately it may be that jingoism and nationalism - Irish and English - were part and parcel of the same phenomenon. The same paradox as was observed with respect to the poor - compassion combined with the need for security - was well put for the Irish also:

"Ireland must be convinced that we are both strong and generous, and she will never be convinced of our generosity till she has had very keen and vivid evidence of our strength." 58

Similarly the Irish were denied fitness for self-government:

"The true principles of independence have never yet become acclimatised in Ireland; no country in the world is so little fit to be left to itself; and all wise and good men must combine to discourage any disuniting measure, as a calamity for both islands, and chiefly for the lesser and poorer one." 59

But comments such as these were hard to reconcile with objections to home rule based on an alleged desire for equal partnership within the United Kingdom.⁶⁰ If Ireland was so unfit as was declared, she could hardly assume equal partnership. Assurances that Britain was not contending for supremacy in Ireland seem less than frank, under the circumstances.

As with many other factors of imperialism, the liberal line of imperial federation was riddled with contradiction when it came to Ireland. Comparisons between Ireland and Lower Canada, or Ireland and France and Hungary,⁶¹ which were intended to support the connections between home rule and imperial federation,⁶² usually ended up justifying independence but arguing for dependence. It was difficult for writers of this persuasion to escape the unconscious insularity and automatic assumption of English superiority which necessarily relegated Ireland, and all other colonies, to subservient status. Working within the same framework of ideas as the straight imperialists, there was little chance of avoiding the view that England's destiny was what was at stake, and everything else was secondary to that. As one article expressed it, the British constitution was in its infancy. "A little island in a northern sea is not an empire that encircles and overshadows the world." The new constitution, however, was but the means for perfecting the great coming race of the world.⁶³ As has already been suggested,⁶⁴ the crisis for the British constitution was more important than the fate of the people who would have to suffer it. Any means of protecting the constitution was then justified on the grounds that it would ensure the future security of the (Anglo-Saxon) race - and that would be good for everyone.

There was one increasingly disquieting note to this well-ordered rhythm. Unlike industrial unrest, which was an inbuilt feature of capitalist production, or the Irish troubles, which were an understandable reaction to imperial rule, the women's movement upset the very hierarchies upon which Victorian propriety and prosperity were founded. Whether the militant suffragists were jingoist

or socialist, whether they were a female form of jingo or a feminine opponent of masculine aggression, they did not operate along conventional lines of protest - partly because there were no such conventional lines for women to protest along. The clear evidence that women started to practise birth control in the latter years of the nineteenth century suggests that women were withdrawing their labour in the only way they most effectively could.⁶⁵ Meanwhile window-breaking and meeting-disruption were used to express the most coherent demand of votes for women.

The periodicals tended to be dismissive of the women's movement, even if supposedly supporting the aim of suffrage. (The comparison with the attitudes to the Irish is apposite.) All The Year Round's account of the Amazons patronisingly suggested that:

"not only soldiering and sailing, but other manlike occupations, have been taken up by odd women now and then." ⁶⁶

The very phrase "odd women" carried a number of meanings, including Gissing's usage of describing the extra women surplus to male marriage requirements - that is odd in the sense of left over. More typical was the Edinburgh Review's assessment of women's education - that it was part of woman's very nature to desire being a mother⁶⁷ - and the Westminster Review's description of woman's capabilities - in hospitals, influencing soldiers, and so on.⁶⁸ Lady novelists were seen (not only by men) as the correlate of their position in society.⁶⁹

There was, however, an increasing tone of unease. Female suffrage in New Zealand was "not easily passed", one writer over-emphasised.⁷⁰ Moreover, the hero as warrior was seen to be fading from the feminine mind.⁷¹ And there was not just humour in the line that the female jingo was worse than the male.⁷² Yet the overall picture was one of exclusion of women's issues. There were few articles on women, even in their traditional roles; except for those on "Lady Travellers", which commanded a niche of their own. It was

as if women did not fit into the established hierarchy of Victorian man's society, and therefore there was nothing to write about them. If native women intruded into descriptions of colonial discovery, it was usually to demonstrate their deviance - especially sexually - from the pattern of Victorian womanhood left at home.⁷³ This then reinforced the correctness of the domestic arrangements.

But the events of the last years of the century shattered this complacency, even if they did not capture the ear of the press. Moreover, the combination of the Irish, the unions, and the women added up to a total of disruption which rivalled, or fuelled, the blustering patriotism blossoming in these years. Dangerfield has charted the tensions within these three sections of society in The Strange Death of Liberal England,⁷⁴ and the World War follows as naturally from his pages as from any diplomatic history. Whatever the causes of war, it seems undoubtedly likely that the climate of opinion within which these forces were brought to bear was as much responsible for an attitude of imminent cathartic catastrophe as any simple military explanation.

For the constant relation of imperial matters to the domestic circumstances within Britain suggests that the phenomenon of imperialism, and imperial warfare, sprang from internal sources of energy. The reflection of tensions within English society was notably advanced by Disraeli's appeal to national over class issues, for imperialism in the formal sense was set in a clear context of security at home. The very fact that the word "jingoism" sprang into popular usage after G.W.Hunt's 1878 music-hall song of the Russo-Turkish conflict illustrates this diversionary element to full extent. Jingoism - an outgrowth of domestic tension - was diverted explicitly towards an outside enemy, and implicitly towards those areas inside society which might be seen to represent that enemy. In psychological terms, the authoritarian upbringing of Victorian England firstly produced submission to the authority of the in-group, secondly aroused aggression to be displaced on to a carefully defined out-group, and thirdly, by these means, allowed the status-seekers to achieve their underlying goal, for the relativity of status depends on the existence of an underprivileged out-group, and how better to ensure this state of

underprivilege than by aggressive persecution?⁷⁵ Emotional and irrational jingoism was the other side of the coin of formal and theoretical imperialism, and its existence testifies strongly to the domestic basis of the supposedly rational imperialistic posturing.

Part Four - Concluding

It is impossible to deny widespread interest in imperialism amongst the periodical journals which were studied. Imperial defence, and the strategic importance of border territories, was highlighted in coverage of the Indian frontier, the West African hinterland, the Suez Canal, the Chinese harbours, and South Africa. An ulterior motive behind such strategic concerns was apparent in the articles on Indian cotton, Gold Coast coffee, Celestial ornaments, and diamonds and gold from the Rand. Imperial trade was overtly championed in all these cases. This led on to the narratives of imperial aggression, as in the Indian mutiny's suppression, and the Afghan wars, the Ashanti campaigns, the expeditions to the Sudan, the Wei-hai-wei incident and, to a lesser extent, the Boxers, as well as the Jameson raid and the subsequent Anglo-Boer war. Such aggression was rationalised as being necessary for the defence of existing British interests, in the same way as increased armed forces were considered essential for the preservation of peace. Moreover, it was often justified after the event on moral grounds; the burden of empire and the need for the spread of civilisation appearing as guiding factors.

More generally, imperialism was described, perhaps unconsciously, in terms of an extension of European diplomacy. The idea often presented itself of colonies as pawns and bargaining counters in a great diplomatic game. The way the powers seized small parts of China, and enforced concessionary zones upon the Celestials, was typical of this, as was the almost arbitrary division of Africa based on the collective poring over small scale maps in the stately apartments of Europe. Russian pretensions in Manchuria were regarded as a strong threat to British interests, and it is difficult to see the British seizure of Wei-hai -wei as other than a "cartographic consolation".¹ Similarly the "buffer" states between India and Russia existed more in the Whitehall-bound official mentality than as a tangible barrier akin to the real mountain ranges which kept the adversaries apart. Meanwhile German advances, particularly in East and Southern Africa,

and latterly in the near east, were also suspected, just as France was accused of trying to avenge Fashoda on the banks of the Yangtse.² Russia was the main villain, for most of the period, however. Particularly to the Quarterly Review, it was Russia who was ultimately to be feared from troubles on the Indian frontiers, and it was Russia who loomed over the "sick man of Europe" in the Balkans.³ The importance of Armenia, Crete and Bulgaria must be seen in this light. As the years passed, the Russian influence was replaced by the German threat. The interpretation was nonetheless the same. Colonial territories existed to be divided up in negotiations with other civilised nations, and their own inherent values were secondary to this Eurocentric approach.

If imperialism was seen as an outgrowth of European politics, it was even more distinctly visualised as an extension of British domestic politics. Gladstone against Disraeli, Morley against Salisbury and Chamberlain, and Campbell-Bannerman against Rosebery, Asquith and Grey were all translated by the press into Egypt, China and South Africa. This is not entirely surprising, for apart from the political backgrounds of the papers, politicians themselves used imperial matters as sticks with which they could beat their domestic adversaries. The social reform-imperialism debate was partly a parliamentary pretext.

What was more important was the way in which the press made the world seem smaller. Reports from every corner of an empire on which the sun never set, and encouragement for emigration to English speaking colonies in another hemisphere, maintained the self-assurance of a people accustomed to viewing the world with the aid of inaccurate and out-of-date gazetteers. The illusion of the global superiority of the small island to the north of the main European coastline could be maintained more easily thus.

So in searching for a coherent imperialist theory in the periodical press, it is essential to consider this internal, insular emphasis. If insularity and imperialism seem incompatible, no such problem exists with regard to jingoism. A "jingo" is a "supporter of bellicose policy" or a "blustering patriot",⁴ and the word achieved real popularity in the music halls after Disraeli's foreign policy of 1878, as we have seen. It had its

origins in seventeenth century conjurer's gibberish; and whether one views Disraeli or Harmsworth as the conjurer at the end of the nineteenth century, the gibberish is plain to see. Conservative journals accused Liberals of lacking patriotism, and Liberals claimed Conservatives were Jingoists and Fire-Eaters. The bellicose policy applied internally to both sides. "Jingo" was merely one more in a long list of party taunts, just as "Little Englander" and "pro-Boer" were for the other side. Indeed, even the anti-war movements became increasingly aggressive in relation to the war-mongers they were attacking. That blustering patriotism sought to extend the field of play is hardly surprising. Capitalists exported their capital, so jingoists exported their bellicosity to tensions overseas.⁵ But the aggression had its roots in the homeland.

As far as the periodical press was concerned, it was as if there was a failure of nerve in the face of the new journalism of Newnes and Harmsworth. As popular jingoism was encapsulated in the pages of the Daily Mail, so the periodicals' balanced stance moved towards the jingoist in attitude without at the same time abandoning the old-fashioned styles of presentation. With ideological onslaughts taking place at one end of a spectrum of opinion, "balance" shifted nearer to that end of the scale. This then destroyed the balance.

The failure of nerve did no more than reflect the crisis in the Liberal party itself. The succession of little wars, culminating in the Anglo-Boer war, split the Liberals at Westminster down the middle, even though signs of the fissure had been evident for some time.⁶ "Little Englanders" attempted to maintain a leaderless allegiance to Gladstonian principles, while liberal imperialists emerged as an elitist band around the wayward Rosebery. Conservatives were of course delighted at the opposition's disarray, and jingoism was in part a crowing of superiority by the Tory benches, eager themselves to find some point of unity.

For as the labour movement started to take away the social reforming ground beneath the Liberals' feet, and as the widening of franchise and elementary education threatened rather than strengthened the remains of the Great Liberal Party, so the Liberals found themselves in a dilemma - whether to become more radical still, or move to the right and stand away from the masses. It was the latter option which formed the real basis for liberal imperialism, but it was an option which could carve out very little space to call its own. In parliament it was used as an attempt to force a crisis in the Liberal party and to advance the personal careers of its exponents. The reasonable "business-sense" and "efficiency" talked about by liberal imperialists veiled their own total lack of any business sense. There was little contact with the masses, and speeches were aimed at the press rather than at the people, as if votes could be controlled through learned journals rather than liberal branches.⁷ (It is significant that the journals responded so well, as if they too wished to believe in their own influence. Unfortunately for them, they were the wrong medium at the wrong time.) Similarly there was little knowledge of South Africa, and liberal imperialists supported Milner as seemingly not (quite) supporting Chamberlain. They assumed Milner desired a peaceful solution in South Africa, when in fact he had deliberately precipitated the crisis.⁸ The fact that the Boers had issued the ultimatum enabled liberal imperialists to declare that war had been forced on Britain, despite the highly provocative nature of the British troops' arrival on the Transvaal border.

Although liberal imperialism was a limited option, it claimed disproportionate emphasis in the periodical press. In the same way imperialism was itself rooted in the context of the political and journalistic crises within late nineteenth century Britain. Scoring points off domestic political rivals, viewed much in the way of competing sports teams, had as much to do with jingoism as the inherent rights and wrongs of some far-off imperial conflict. In the face of the new journalism and the newly educated force of labour, coupled with the growing strength of Britain's continental rivals, the established periodicals clutched frantically at the jingo spirit to keep their own spirits up. Certainly they were "blustering". It was as if there

was a mental insecurity which needed to work up a hate against a common enemy (for example the Boers, or the Germans), in the same way as an economic insecurity clutched at imperial expansion in a desperate bid to stave off falling profits. Additionally the pride of race was used to assert the Anglo-Saxon merits at the expense of all others. But the excitement and titillation of imperialist adventures were merely generating an imperial attitude of mind within which the old domestic problems were still more important.

Despite the evidence revealed by the periodicals, and despite the recognition that the Victorian era was their golden age,⁹ historiography has largely ignored this press. The standard middle class intellectual reading fare - with its possible influence on government and industry - has been overlooked in favour of the radical propagandiser, or its counterpart, the jingoist daily. Yet arguably the periodical press charted the development of the British middle class,¹⁰ and conveyed the Victorian imperial frame of mind, more comprehensively than any other source.

In particular imperialist historiography has concentrated on the official Whitehall sources, and considered empire in terms of the formal annexations undertaken by a conscious government initiative. Alternately, there have been investigations of the colonial circumstances themselves, emphasising the combination or coincidences which contributed to interventions by European powers.¹¹ The two approaches are of course far from mutually exclusive, and both accept that imperialism can be defined by the running up of a flag. Whether attacking or defending empire as a whole, the basic assumption of formal colonies as the constituent parts of imperialism is not questioned. Even recent critics have rejected the whole of the old theories of economic imperialism on the grounds that formal annexations do not fit the theory.¹² Yet this is in danger of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

For the wide range of periodical articles reveal that imperialism was as much a general attitude of mind as a physical scientific definition. The expectation of material reward from colonial venture was widespread, regardless of the specific "cause" of any individual territorial acquisition. Admittedly the question of influence of the press is not proven; but this is not entirely the point. Chicken and egg type arguments are less useful than recognising how the climate of educated opinion was reinforced through the reading, and writing, in the intellectual journals of the time. Again the fact that these papers did not capture working class attention is less relevant to the present purpose. As working people acquired education and electoral rights, a new form of press developed, reaching out to the new reading public. Moreover, the influence of the periodicals can hardly be measured by the lack of success of the liberal imperialist faction. For while this tendency was presented in a way which could not attract the massive popular support, the attitudes of many of the leadership of the Liberal party were well in keeping with it. Thus, as an old Liberal Leaguer remarked to Halevy, the Liberal League did not vanish, but absorbed the Liberal Government. "That is why we went to war in 1914."¹³

It would of course be desirable to cover all forms of the press for this period. The provincial newspapers especially, including the weekly and evening editions, are in great need of analysis in order to complement the major national dailies. Regional views could provide an important corrective to London-centred studies. However, such an overall study would be enormous. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether it could amplify the already overwhelming picture of educated attitude derived from the monthlies and quarterlies.

For it is the existence of this overwhelming picture which, it is argued, makes the learned journal a category of important source material. That the picture shows a greater concern for trends near to home, even within contribution on subjects further afield, is not a very revolutionary finding. People are naturally more interested with what is going on on their doorstep. The

reasons behind this are, however, significant for any historian of imperial ideas and attitudes. Economic expansion, aggressive militarism, and ethnic chauvinism may all seem to have been trained on the territories of the third world; but the evidence of the periodical press is that they were displaced reflections of the circumstances at home. The act of flag-waving was essential in its own right, at times quite divorced from any foreign lands to which it was supposed to apply.

Thus the military was a metaphor for national destinies in general. National efficiency was a watchword for both empire and production (and re-production).¹⁴ Patriotism, stimulated by the challenge of the German industrial giant, was linked to perseverance, punctuality and diligence. Military organisation was a model for social structures, and the hierarchical principle is evident from clubs and schools right through to nations and races. The family, the nation; and the empire all worked from the same blueprint, all incidentally sharing the same false pedestal image of the mother figure in an age when women, especially working class women, were heavily exploited both in and out of the home. Britain was the mother country in the empire, and the mother of parliaments, while Victoria was the mother of the nation - a woman at the head of a governing system which was otherwise totally male. Similarly the mother in the standard family was praised for her virtues in rearing sons for the empire, yet was allowed no independent feelings - socially, sexually, economically or politically.¹⁵ It is ironic that when women started to challenge the confinement of their role, they adopted the aggression and violence of window-breaking and arson, and that they channelled their efforts into the war industries after the outbreak of hostilities. The military paramenters remained intact.

For the whole social fabric depended upon an authoritarian submission. Aggression did not need to be eradicated, therefore, but to be channelled against a distinct out-group, and thence against any perceptible group within society which seemed to be associated with that out-group.¹⁶ The concept of the enemy outside - Germany, the Boers, Russian anarchists or

the "yellow peril" - was used to strengthen unity within. But as it was rarely possible to attack this enemy - directly at any rate - it was necessary for there to be a group within society who could act as surrogate *bête noire*. This enabled the aggression to flow more constantly, as the group could be more **frequently** observed and attacked; and it also created a distinct, identifiable unity of all those doing the observing and attacking. The socialists were described as "un-English", the radicals as Boers in disguise, and the peace movement as Germanophile¹⁷ - all of which established an Englishness for those making the descriptions. It was hardly coincidental that this English nature should be capitalist, militarist and imperialist.

In short, the domestic motivations of the ruling class were transmogrified into empire. The displacement of economic shortcomings, philanthropic hypocrisy and racial uncertainties upon an imperial setting meant that the causes of Britain's problems need never be tackled. This is not to say that empire did not exist - although how far a handful of civil servants scattered across the face of the earth could be described as empire is questionable. It is not to say that annexations did not take place. But it is necessary to see that imperialism was a very broad phenomenon, taking in economic, social, military and racial aspects, and that these were all based firmly in the circumstances of the mother country. Foreign policy was more responsive to the internal dynamics of decision-making than to the external problems upon which it was supposed to centre.

As time passed, the focus shifted nearer and nearer to home. The exhaustion of new territory in remote corners of the globe carried with it the extinction of attempts to divert the domestic complications. Britain's new technology was overtaken by her European competitors in the middle years of the Victorian age, and instead of revitalising her industry at home, Britain sought to maintain the illusion of economic superiority by inflicting the benefits of free trade upon increasingly backward colonies. While the period 1851-70 was relatively dispassionate in imperial interest - the excitement of early 1850s discoveries being followed by a lull in which Jamaica stands out by way of almost anachronistic contrast - the following

decades reveal a sharp rise in expression. Informal empire worked well without challengers, but the Prussian victory over France in 1870 symbolised the new threat to Britain and to empire. Thus Britain entered defensively into imperial expansion, hoping with desperate wishfulness that the colonial ventures would produce the resources to keep Britain "top nation". By 1890 the world was largely divided up - in the eyes of the periodicals at least ¹⁸ - and the sight of Germany and Britain negotiating colonial trade-offs established the fact that territory was, to all intents and purposes, fully occupied.

Having stretched to the limit, the contestants now started their inexorable return to home. Battlefields in China and the far east gave way to subtle conflicts in the near east, and not so subtle conflicts on the trade routes to India, such as South Africa. The sick man went through his death bed agonies in Constantinople, and suddenly the scene was set for central Europe to become what it had always been in potential, the battleground of a war to end all wars. Collective European imperialism had extended itself throughout the world, only to find that the world did not have the answers; and in contracting itself back to size; collective imperialism became a collective war. The super-powers had put on their show in the colonies, but the real conflict, as it always had to be, was fought out at home.

This did not just mean within Europe as a whole. The long fuse leading to the war contained many smaller threads within Britain itself. Ireland commanded attention towards the end of this period with a force unrivalled until the present.¹⁹ The oldest colony, she was conveniently forgotten while Britain was able to cast her gaze over lands in five continents. But Ireland secured her position in a grisly limelight to remind the "united" kingdom that colonies, like everything else, began at home. As regards the home, we have already seen how women were also demanding attention for those "dependants" without whom the nation, let alone the empire, could not exist. Meanwhile the concessions granted to the industrial work-force in times of plenty were reaping their own reward as the recession deepened. Socialism has sometimes been seen as part of the response of middle class disaffection with falling profits,²⁰ but the spread of elementary education and the incipient

organisation of the unskilled workers spelt trouble for a society which was only prepared to assimilate the respectable working man. Not that the latter was behaving quietly either. The period leading up to 1914 was filled with industrial unrest throughout the established unions, in the face of legislation, or court decisions, which threatened to cripple the labour movement indefinitely.²¹ Lloyd George's attempt to keep the railwaymen at work by suggesting that strikes assisted the growth of the military strength of Germany,²² was not an eternal solution, despite the light it sheds on his pacifism and on imperial attitudes in general.

Yet to all these elements in society the war came as a solution as well as a diversion. Domestic motivations of the governing elite culminated in a war which could unite national interests over class, and the climate of opinion both lessened resistance to war and increased the expectation of its occurrence. At the same time, the movements from below needed something as catastrophic as war to upset the established hierarchy of power, in order to give them a chance of a brave new world. The aggression within all areas of society - even in the vociferosity of the peace campaigners - was channelled into the atmosphere of war, and most of the domestic critics joined in the war effort with all their energies.

When looking for change after the war, such as in female and working class suffrage, in the rise of the Labour party, or in an Irish "solution", it is therefore misleading to consider the war as having caused that change. The movements were already in existence, and the war merely cleared the way for developments which were all but achieved when an Archduke was assassinated in Sarajevo. What is impossible to estimate, but needs to be put forward on the basis of the evidence of the periodicals, is how far the war was caused by these very movements within society. If imperialism was, as has been argued, an outgrowth of domestic social and economic necessities, and if the war was fought at least in part as a clash of rival imperialisms with nowhere left to go, it becomes an important possibility that the domestic motivations and the climate of opinion engendered by them were in some way responsible for the war.

It is of course impossible to lay the tortuous diplomatic dealings of 1878-1914 at the feet of the psychological feelings of a society as a whole. What is harder to dismiss, however, is the fact that people were willing to fight in 1914, and that they went on fighting for four more years. It is also not irrelevant that they did this in several different countries at the same time; although it is way outside the scope of this survey to suggest why. All that can be said is that the climate of opinion did exist in one of those countries, amongst the educated upper middle class who wrote and read the periodical literature of the time, and who played a predominant part in the decision-making processes before the war. Whether the war postponed or accelerated the changes which were to lessen the preponderance of both this elite and their papers is neither here nor there. What is important is the perceptions of the elite in this period, and what can be learnt from them.

Above all it is this perception of empire, irrespective of what it was really like, which concerns us here. It is extremely doubtful that many of the Victorian and Edwardian middle class had the faintest idea of what life in most of the colonies was really like. (The exceptions might have been the white settler colonies, or perhaps India, where the whites were sufficiently numerous to maintain their own social life apart from the indigenous inhabitants.) Despite this probable lack of detailed knowledge, the learned journalists were happy to pontificate on the nature of empire, and the learned middle class readers were happy to receive their views.²³

It is then not surprising that these views were rooted in what their authors did know about, namely the social and economic circumstances of life in Britain. (At least, they knew about them insofar as they affected their own circumstances.) "Imperialism", a word first used in the 1840s, was a re-creation of the needs and aspirations of educated British society, placed in an imperial setting. The motive power behind this imperialism was European, and more specifically British, and the Europe which was dragged into territorial expansion by the magnetism of the periphery was a Europe not at all unwilling to be dragged.²⁴ To historians there is a ~~two~~fold interest - firstly the very existence of the imperial frame of mind, as

evidenced so strongly by the periodicals right across a spectrum of supposedly divergent political standpoints, and secondly the reasons for this particular frame of mind, which, it is argued, were based in the domestic circumstances of the Victorian and Edwardian gentleman.

Regardless of the definite motive for any individual territorial annexation, the periodical press helped to create an atmosphere in which empire seemed to provide the way out of Britain's difficulties. Economic challenge from her rivals, political threat from the unenfranchised, and social demands from women and the unemployed, could all be solved with the anticipated riches of the colonies. More subtly, this view of empire could provide the framework for domestic stability, by emphasising a hierarchy of races and the need for national unity against an indeterminate series of enemies. But it was the view of the elite. The Briton who was to be the leader of the world community was a male, white, Anglo-Saxon, wealthy, educated Briton. It was to establish his position within Britain that the imperial frame of mind was created. And it is the continuing tragedy of empire builders everywhere that the illusion has not yet been destroyed.

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Chapter One

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7. J.Gallagher and R.Robinson (with A.Denny), Africa and the Victorians (1963)
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8. F.Williams, Dangerous Estate (1959) p 101 calls the latter half of the 19th century the "age of the periodical", though hardly mentions it further.
9. Mitchell's Newspaper Press Directory 1865
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11. T.H.S.Escott, "Politics and the Press" FM xii (July 1875) pp 41-50
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12. N.P.D. 1851, p 123, description of the Naval and Military Gazette
13. N.P.D. 1851, description of the Illustrated London News
14. W.L.Watson, "The Press and Finance", BM clxiv (Nov 1898) pp 639-50
pointed out the financial conflict of interest.
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F.Hitchman, "The Newspaper Press" BM clxi (May 1897) pp 498-573
15. Greenwood, 19C, cit.
16. F.Greenwood, "The Newspaper Press", BM clxi (May 1897)
Also see G.Boyce et al, Newspaper History from the 17th Century to the Present Day (1978)
K.Jones, Fleet Street and Downing Street (1919)
R.L.Schults, Crusader in Babylon (1972) pp 204-11
17. Scott and Sir Henry Dalziel (Reynolds' Weekly owner) as Liberals, Astor and Davidson Dalziel as Unionists. Also Gavin, Spender, Gwynne, Morley, Gladstone, etc.
18. Boyce, op cit, p 29. Also Jones, op cit.
19. C.Cockburn, I Claud (Penguin 1967) p 121
20. Boyce, op cit, p 72. Also Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper 20 June 1897
21. J.Mason in Boyce, cit, ch 15

22. M.Palmer, The British Press and International News 1851-99, in Boyce, cit. Beatty Kingston, leading resident foreign correspondent of the Daily Telegraph agreed that the "demand for copious information" concerning "alien peoples" increased sharply 1860-90 (W.B.Kingston, A Journalist's Jottings (1890), ii, p 341.)
23. Boyce pp 223-4. Also H.G.Flack, "Fleet Street in the 1880s", in Journalism Quarterly, 1964 and R.G.Cox, The Reviews and Magazines, Pelican Guide to English Literature, vi, (1958).
24. ER founded in 1802 in a period of reaction, espousing Whiggish reform. Editors: Napier 1829-47, Empson - 52, George Cornwall Lewis - 55, Henry Reeve -95, A.R.D.Elliott - Published by Longman's, Green & Co, London. QR founded 1809 - antiquated Tory reputation, though the difference between QR and ER has been exaggerated. Editors: Lockhart -1853, Whitwell Elwin -60, W.Macpherson -67, William Smith -93, R.Prothero - 99, G.Prothero - Publisher John Murray, London. WR founded 1824 by the Philosophical Radicals. Editors: H.J.Slack Apr 1851, W.E.Hickson June-Oct 51, John Chapman, assisted by George Eliot, Jan52-54, Chapman -94, Hannah Hughes Chapman - Publishers: Chapman 1852-60, Manwaring -62, Trubner & Co -89, E.Arnold -92, Henry & Co -94, F.Warne & Co - (See especially W.E.Houghton (ed), The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, vol i (1967) vol ii (1972) and ER 196 (1902) p 315 for the "large majority of educated responsible men" reading the ER.)
25. Boyce, cit, p 282.
26. Bagehot, "The First Edinburgh Reviewers", MR 1885, called the ER so mellow that it might have been written by Privy councillors.
27. Williams, op cit, p 101.
28. J.Clive, "The Edinburgh Review, the Life and Death of a Periodical", in A.Briggs (ed), Essays in the History of Publishing 1724-1974 (1974) pp 113-41
29. Escott, "Mr Henry Reeve", in FR 64 (1893) p 703
30. H.Reeve, "Plain Whig Principles", ER 64 (1880) p 258
31. Boyce, op cit, p 289 - Elliott wrote 75 articles 1879-1912, though arguably it was not so much ER's ideas which had changed as events which had overtaken them - see Clive in Briggs, cit, p 140
32. Boyce, op cit, p 290; Houghton, op cit, vol 1 p 696.
33. See also "The Centenary of the Quarterly Review", QR 210 (1909) pp 731-84, and QR 211 (1909) pp 270-324
34. M.Pinto Duschinsky, The Political Thought of Lord Salisbury 1854-68 (1967) and P.Smith (ed) Lord Salisbury on Politics (Cambridge 1972)
35. Mason in Boyce, op cit, p 290
36. W.S.Lilly, "French and English Jacobinism", QR 168 (1889) pp 556-7
37. W.H.Mallock, "Mr John Morley and Progressive Radicalism", QR 168 (1889) p 274, noting Morley's writings on France in the 18th century. Mallock wrote 7 articles for QR and 9 for MR in the 1880s.
38. See especially J.S.Mill, Autobiography(1873), and Houghton op cit vol iii. The sale from Hickson to Chapman in 1852 meant a proprietor interested in profit as well as doctrine, and the end of links with Benthamism. WR was never able to pay its way - Harriet Martineau lent £500 in 1854, and many gratuitous articles and money came from backers who wished to see their own political views maintained. The paper declined in quality 1850-70, though; until the innovations of "India and the Colonies" and the divisions of reviews into "Science", "Belles Lettres", etc, which obtained good reviewers for these brief articles. See also Boyce, op cit, 287-8.
39. Ellegard, op cit; NPD 1851; and H.Sell, Dictionary of the World's Press and Advertisers' Reference Book (several)
40. Ellegard, op cit; Boyce, op cit; and J.W.R.Scott, The Life and Death of a Newspaper (1952)

41. Ellegard, op cit, p 7.
42. FR was founded in 1865, price 2/-. Started with £8000 under Cotter Morrison as proprietor, and helped by Trollope, Lewes and Chapman, it was bought out by Chapman and Hall at the end of 1866, with whom it stayed until closure. Begun as a fortnightly, it quickly became monthly, when Morley took over. To the FR, the question of forming national opinion should not have been in anonymous hands - hence the signed article (see Scott p 20).
Also see Houghton, vol ii, p 173; Scott pp 19-22; Boyce p 281, pp 284-5; E.M.Everett, The Party of Humanity (N.Carolina 1939). for FR up to 1874
J.Morley, "Valedictory" FR 32 (1882) pp 311-21
"The Fortnightly, A Retrospect", FR 69 (1901) pp 104-17
(The principle of independence of party had been anticipated by the shortlived Bentley's Quarterly Review (1859) and the earlier London Review (1829).)
43. Quoted in Scott, p 19
44. ibid. Also Houghton, etc. Morley was only 29 at the time.
45. 14 Harrison and 8 Beesly articles on the latter 1868-75.
46. See A.Waugh, A Hundred Years of Publishing (1930)
F.Harris, His Life and Adventures (1947 ed'n)
My Life and Loves (1964 ed'n)
Harris was eventually sacked for allowing an article from an avowed anarchist. The clash with Chapman produced the final rupture.
Also J.Courtney, The Making of an Editor (1930)
47. CR founded 1866, publisher Alexander Strahan added CR to his list of popular religious magazines - Good Words, Sunday Magazine, Argosy, etc.
Editors: Alford 1866-70, Knowles -77, Strahan -82, Bunting -
Publishers: Strahan -72, Henry S.King & Co -73, Strahan -76, King
June-Nov 76, Strahan -82, Isbister & Co -99, Columbus Co -
CR was designed as FR of the Established Church. Also there was a lifelong association of Herbert Spencer with CR. Controversy bloomed under Knowles' editorship, though the causes of the rupture with Knowles are not clear. 1877 Strahan sold his periodicals to Samuel Morley, Francis Peck and the nonconformist divine J.B.Paton, who together became Strahan & Co Ltd.
19C was founded 1877.
Published Henry S.King & Co Mar-Dec 1877, C.Kegan Paul & Co -81,
Kegan Paul Trench & Co -91, Sampson Low Marston & Co -1900
After 1900 it became the Nineteenth Century and After
See Houghton, Boyce, etc.
(Knowles was editor and proprietor of 19C 1877-Dec 1900, though H.H.Champion was assistant editor 1890/1 - 1892/3.)
48. Quoted by Mason in Boyce p 286.
49. Knowles therefore took the journal out of its named period into the 20th century. See also chs 9 and 10 of A.W.Brown, The Metaphysical Society (1947); F.Harrison, "The Nineteenth Century, A Retrospect", 19C (1918) pp 785-96; and J.E.C.Welldon et al, "James Knowles, A Tribute from his Friends", 19C(1908) pp 683-96.
50. Mason in Boyce, op cit, p 287.
51. NR was founded 1883. Editors and proprietors: Austin (until 1893) and Maxse. Publishers: Arnold and W.H.Allen (alternately).
52. T.E.Kebbel, "Lord Beaconsfield and other Tory Memories" (1907) p 242
53. NR, 1, p 26.
54. NR, 2, p 466, "Rich Man's Dwellings".
Similarly see Disraeli's earlier novels, such as Coningsby and Sybil for the clear view of older aristocratic virtue in opposition to capital and industrialisation.

55. J.W.R.Scott, op cit, p 16; Mason in Boyce, op cit, p 283.
M.Bevington, The Saturday Review 1855-68, (N.Y. 1941) p 16
Articles were unsigned, as their writers had other professions, and did not want journalists to become a separate class on their own. Editor J.D.Cook was a firm believer in the political supremacy of the upper and middle classes. John Bright called it the Saturday Reviler.
56. Scott pp 76-130; Williams pp 126-7.
Also Williams p 131 for Newnes and the Westminster Gazette.
Mitchell's 1870 described the Pall Mall Gazette as "liberal. This paper is exclusively addressed to the cultivated classes of society." It was an independent liberalism - neither the exclusiveness of the Whigs, nor the visionary ideas of the radicals.
57. Victorian Periodicals Review, summer 1979, J.O.Baylen, "W.T.Stead as Publisher and Editor of the Review of Reviews".
Also H.Simonis, The Street of Ink (London and New York 1917) p 287
H.Herd, The March of Journalism (1952) p 33
H.Friederichs, The Life of Sir George Newnes Bart (1911) pp 112-3
S.Nowell-Smith, The House of Cassell (1958) pp 178-80
and p 160 for Wemyss-Reid's rejection of R of Rs.
58. The division has to be arbitrary. Hence the Spectator and Economist have been largely ignored ("philosophical" and "more statistical than political" respectively, according to Mitchell's 1870).
59. FM founded 1847 (Maginn left BM to found FM).
Editors: J.W.Parker 1847-60, Froude -74, William Allingham -79,
John Tulloch -81, C.J.Longman -82.
Publishers and proprietors: J.W.Parker & Son -1860, Parker, Son & Bourn -63, Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green -65, Longmans, Green & Co -82.
60. BM founded 1817 (William Blackwood - High Tory - set out to do battle with the ER - Whig)
Editors: John Blackwood.1845-79, William Blackwood III -
Publisher and Proprietor: Wm Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh.
BM was especially fortunate in the fidelity of its contributors, offering low payment but a sense of good fellowship (A.Michie, T.E.Kebbal e.g.).
Though felt to be more staid with time, it was described by R of R June 91:
"With a rare consistency it has contrived to appear for over threescore years and ten as the spirited and defiant advocate of all those who are at least five years behind their time. Sometimes Blackwood is fifty years in the rear, but that is a detail of circumstance."
61. Ellegard, loc cit.
62. MM founded 1859, following discussions between Macmillan, Ludlow, Hughes, Kingsley and Masson.
Editors: D.Masson 1859-63, G.Grove -83, J.Morley -85, Mowbray Morris -
Publisher: Macmillan
The quality was higher than the Cornhill or Blackwood's, with a wide range of articles.
Also see Ellegard, and Scott p 61.
63. CM founded 1859, George Smith devising a magazine with general review and first class serialised fiction. It was anticipated by MM two months earlier, but had the drawing card of Thackeray as editor. Its high pay drew brilliant contributors.
Editors: Thackeray 1860-62, Greenwood, Lewes and Smith -64 (and without Lewes -68), E.D.Cook, Lewes and Smith -71, Leslie Stephen -82, James Payn -96, John St Ioe Strachey -97, R.J.Smith -
Publisher: Smith, Elder & Co.
Smith secured most of the contributors, though the competition of BM, MM and Temple Bar reduced Thackeray's 100,000 circulation to 20,000 by 1870. By 1882 the circulation was only 12,000, despite pleasant comments by the critics. Smith kept it on out of paternal affection, though it was losing money. (Ellegard's circulation figures: 1860 - 80,000; 1865-30,000; 1870 - 18,000).

64. Strand founded 1891.
See especially R.Pound, The Strand Magazine 1891-1950 (1966)
W.Churchill was paid £150 an article and £30 for photos (e.g. "An African Journey", 1903) - more than Kipling (£90 a short story) or W.W.Jacobs (£110). Newnes had an austere idea of a daily paper - so the profits from Strand and Tit-bits funded the liberal Westminster Gazette, which lost £10-15,000 p.a. for 16 years.
65. 1855 circulation of Lloyd's 100,000, Reynolds' 50,000. 1896 Lloyd's reached a million. See Williams p 101; M.Dalziel, Popular Fiction 100 Years Ago (1962); and V.Berridge, "Popular Sunday Papers and mid-Victorian Society" in Boyce, cit.
66. News of the World, published J.P.Bell, 20 Holywell St, Strand. Price 3d (before stamp repeal), and described as "Ultra Liberal" by Mitchell's 1851, p 124.
67. See Berridge, op cit; R.Altick, The English Common Reader (1957)
R.K.Webb, "The Victorian Reading Public" in Universities Quarterly 12 (57-3)
, The British Working Class Reader (1955)
An opposite view of popular press development and literacy is contained in H.J.Perkin, "The Origins of the Popular Press", History Today (1957) pp 425-35, and R.Roberts, The Classic Slum (1973) pp 129-30
68. John Leigh, "What do the Masses Read?", Economic Review (1904) p 175
G.A.Cranfield, The Press and Society (1978) p 165 - we learn far more from Eliza Cook's Journal and Reynolds' of the temper of the Victorian population.
69. R.Williams, "Radical/Respectable" in R.Boston (ed), The Press We Deserve (1970)
70. Mitchell's 1851, p 133.
• Reynolds' Weekly sold at 3d, then 1d and 2d after stamp repeal. Mitchell's described it in 1870 as "democratic", "contains much strong nervous writing".
71. 1832-45. See also Dalziel, op cit.
72. P.Hollis, The Pauper Press (1970) seems to suggest this view, while R.K.Webb, The British Working Class Reader, cit, is still a radical based study of literacy and social tension.
(P.R.Mountjoy, "The Working Class Press and Working Class Conservatism", in Boyce, op cit, catalogues much of this press.)
73. Mitchell's 1870. Vanity Fair was 6d and 7d, IIN was 5d and 6d.
See also C.Hibbert, The Illustrated London News (1977)
IIN was started 1842 by H.Ingram; its first issue sold 28,000. This rose to 130,000 with Crystal Palace in 1851.
74. Mitchell's 1851 p 128. 4d before stamp, 3d afterwards.
Punch was started under Mark Lemon in 1841, but its radicalism waned after 1843, Radicalism was no longer fashionable to the same extent. (A similar falling-off can be detected during the Anglo-Boer war 1899-1902.) See F.E.Huggett, Victorian England as Seen By Punch (1978)
R.G.G.Price, History of Punch (1957)
75. HW "Cheap Patriotism", June 9 1855; "The Thousand And One Humbugs - the story of Scarli Tapa and the Forty Thieves", Apr 28 1855, etc.
Also C.Hibbert, The Making of Charles Dickens (1967)
G.Orwell, "Charles Dickens", in Critical Essays (1946)
T.A.Jackson, Charles Dickens, the Progress of a Radical (1937)
76. Ellegard, loc cit. CJ and ATYR down from 80,000 in 1860. VF 5,000 in 1870. (Though Hibbert, op cit, p 13, estimated 300,000 circulation for IIN by 1863.)
77. Most notably Anglo-Saxon Review, 1899-1901, quarterly, edited Lady R.S.Churchill. Also The Ancestor (1902-5), Black and White Budget with a picture of Kruger on page one, Naval and Military Review (1900-), Army and Navy Chronicle (1900 - monthly at 6d), British Empire Review (1899-), Sapper (organ of the Royal Engineers, 1895-).
Also Empire Review and Journal of British Trade (1900)
British Trade Review and Foreign and Colonial Importer (1893)

78. D.Hopkin, "The Socialist Press in Britain 1890-1910" in Boyce, op cit. Bradford Forward 29 Oct 1904, and Keir Hardie in Labour Leader, 10 Nov 1894 p 5
R.McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-24 (Oxford 1974) p 234 - socialist press was advocated as the "necessary prophylaxis against infection from the capitalist press".
79. As LL, 11 Jan 96, New Age 12 Oct 99, LL 9 May 96, Workman's Times 10 Feb 1894. Liberty Jan 94 admitted to being an utter novice.
80. Clarion owned by nine registered shareholders headed by Blatchford. It had £10,000 nominal capital, and four of the major shareholders were Clarion staff.
81. See Clarion 11 June 1892.
82. See e.g. B.Simon, Education and the Labour Movement (1970)
83. K.O.Morgan, Keir Hardie, Radical and Socialist (1975) pp 137-42
84. Commonweal, Feb 1885 p 1. See also P.Henderson, William Morris (1973) pp 322 ff, pp 411-2, and E.P.Thompson, Romantic to Revolutionary (1976)
85. Socialist Standard - socialist party of Great Britain (Sept 1904); and the picture of syndicalist movement's periodicals in B.Holton, British Syndicalism 1900-14 (1976), W.Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 1900-21 (1969), S.Harrison, Poor Men's Guardians, a Survey of the Struggles for a Democratic Newspaper Press 1763-1973 (1974)
86. See Ellegard, loc cit, and Mitchell's 1851. (Ec Rev finished its 6th series in 1868)
87. CMR established 1849, quarterly at 6d, and ran till 1916. BF ran 1847-71, and CoETM from 1862-73. For the latter, see also G.W.Olsen "The Church of England Temperance Magazine 1862-73" in Victorian Periodicals Newsletter, June 1878 p 39.
88. Oct 1862, pp 21-2.
89. SR 16 Dec 1885.
90. Established 1860, price 6d weekly.
91. Similarly, The Navy League Journal, the Engineer, etc (see above, n 77)
92. e.g. True Briton, described in Englishwomen's Magazine Apr 1851 p 260. Also see Mountjoy in Boyce, op cit.
93. True Briton (1851-4). Also Dalziel, op cit. T.Frost, Forty Years' Recollections (1830) noted that Lloyd tested the acceptability of manuscript material submitted to him by asking his servants and machine boys to read it.
94. See TB ii (1852) p 132 e.g. See also P.Scott, "Victorian Religious Periodicals: Fragments that Remain" in D.Baker (ed), Studies in Church History (1973)
95. TB ii (1852) p 91 "a learned foreigner writes"
NS ii (1854) p 140 - accounts of foreign travel are full of outrage; and ibid p 24, poem in the same vein.
96. TB NS i (1853) p 589
97. Priced at 1d, BW had regular circulation of 100,000 by 1857, 200,000 by 1859.
98. Also Smithies', 1851-1902. See G.Stringer Rowe, T.Smithies, a memoir (1884)
H.J.Keefe, A Century in Print (1939) p 37 e.g.
99. Cottager and Artisan (as in Religious Tract Society, Annual Report 1864 p 2) Running as The Cottager in Town and Country 1861-4, and as C and A 1865-1919.
100. BW Aug 1862 - "Indolence Reproved". Similarly Friendly Visitor (originally published Rev Wm Carus Wilson 1820, new series 1854-62, 67-1912). FV Dec 67, "Trusting Christ", BWwm 43 (1867) p 341 "Richard Owen's Choice", FV June 69, BW Jan 72, Jan 73, Feb 68, C & A Feb 64, Jan 66 - all held similar articles.
101. BW July 1863, "Workingmen's hours". Also FV Feb 69 pp 24-6 (shameful for women to work outside the home). And BW 1855, 1866 pp 263-69, Jan 72, Oct 66, Sept 69, Dec 70, May 1901. C & A Mar 63, Mar 64. Band of Hope June 55 p 120 "What a Sailor Can Do". BWwm 1866, p 226, 264, 272 - "Asylum for Fatherless Children".

102. FH 13 May 1843 - 22 June 1940
IH - "a family journal of instruction and recreation" - 1852-1905
Cassell's Magazine 1867-74, Family Magazine -97, Cassell's Magazine -1912.
103. See also L.Shepard, The History of Street Literature (Newton Abbot 1973)
portraying an entertaining, scandalous, money-grabbing press, not
necessarily radical.
104. J.Shattock, in Research Society Victorian Periodicals, Sept 1977.
105. Williams, op cit, p 130.
106. G.M.Trevelyan in 19C, Dec 1901.
See also S.Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain (1981)
and S.L.Hughes, Platform and Parliament 1918 (1918)
107. Mountjoy in Boyce, op cit, p 293
108. Scott, op cit, p 61. (Also in G.M.Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (1937))
109. Mountjoy in Boyce, op cit, p 293.
110. B.Porter, Critics of Empire (1968) p 3

Chapter Two

1. W.C.Sellar and R.J.Yeatman, 1066 and all that (1932) coined the phrase. See also ER 94 (Oct 1851), "The Great Exhibition" - England had given the world the two philosophers to direct industrial science - Bacon and Newton.
2. Hobsbawm, op cit, p 134.
3. Also P.Deane, The First Industrial Revolution (1965)
D.S.Landes, Unbound Prometheus (1969)
3. Hobsbawm, op cit, p 149.
4. Though Disraeli's phrase (in his often misquoted 1866 letter) referred to Canada and not colonies in general. Also Hyam and Martin, cit.
5. Forster's statement that no-one any longer talked of shedding colonies and Disraeli's 1872 promotion of empire at the expense of social reform - see for example Semmel, op cit, and R.Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century (1976) p 17, p 48, etc.
6. Hobsbawm, op cit, p 150.
7. D.Thomson, op cit, p 164. Though of course most went to Europe and U.S.A.
8. L.H.Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (1961)
9. A.Briggs, Victorian People (1977 ed'n) pp 12-3
10. e.g. Robinson and Gallagher, cit, Fieldhouse, cit, Hyam, cit.
Also Robinson and Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" in Economic History Review (1953)
D.C.M.Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914 (1969)
"The Imperialism of Free Trade, Some Reservations"
Economic History Review (1968)
"Economic Factors in British Policy during the "New" Imperialism" ", Past and Present (1968)
11. e.g. ER 107 (Jan 58) "Prospects of the Indian Empire", and 108 (Oct 58) "The Slave Trade in 1858"; WR (Jan 58) "African Life"; QR (Oct 57) "India", (Apr 61) "Travels and Discoveries" - "this continent abounds in natural wealth"; FM (Jan 51) "Commerce with Africa"; BM (May 54) "Progress and Policy of Russia in Central Asia", (Aug 63) "Indian Prosperity"; CJ (Nov 62) "Telegraphic Communication with China"; ATYR (Sept 9, 65) "Our Colonies", etc, etc.
See also the fuller discussion below, chapter 7.
12. e.g. QR 110 (Apr 61) "Travels and Discoveries"; ER 112 (Oct 60) "Recent Geographic Researches", 126 (Oct 67) "The Christians of Madagascar"; BM (Apr 53) "The Missionary Explorer"; ATYR (Mar 24, 66) "du Chaillu"; etc.
13. CMI (1857 p 193) "The Niger Mission"; Br QR (Apr 58 p 510) "Commerce with India"; BF (1858 p 35) "Exploration of Africa"; Ec R (Feb 58) "Brazil and the Brazilians"; ect.
14. Quoted in E.D.Potts, British Baptist Missionaries in India 1793-1837 (1967) p 2.
15. WR 14 (Apr 56) "General Williams and the Fall of Kars"
BM 40 (May 56) "The Kars Blue Book"
16. BM 39 (Apr 54) "The Progress and Policy of Russia in Central Asia"
17. FM 42 (Jan 55) "The Latest Acquisition of Russia"
18. See the war articles in ER Jan 55, Wr Apr 55, Jan 56, FM Jan, July 55, BM Jan, Apr 55, CJ Oct 54, Jan, Feb, July, Sept 55, May, Sept 56, etc.
19. FM 43 (June 55), "June 1855"
20. ER 101 (Jan 1855) "Army Reform; WR 11 (Apr 55) "Our Army, Its Condition and its wants, 13 (Jan 56) "Military Education for Officers"
QR 100 (Jan 57) "Realities of war in the Crimea" (alleging that a timid government would neither support nor recall Raglan).
21. HW Mar 3 1855.
22. The mutiny articles in QR Oct 57, CJ Oct 24 57, ER Oct 57, Apr 58, WR Jan 58, BM Jan 58, FM Nov 57. Though also Sir H.Maxwell, Sixty Years A Queen (1897), p 96 - far more than mutiny - a race insurrection.

23. V.D.Savarkar, Indian War of Independence (1909)
B.S.Chaudhuri, Civil Rebellion in Indian Mutinies (Calcutta 1957)
R.C.Majumdar, Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857 (Calcutta 1963)
S.N.Sen, 1857 (Delhi 1958)
and see Hyam, op cit, p 70 - Clarendon and Greville's comments on British prestige in the eyes of others.
24. M.Edwardes, British India 1772-1947 (1967) pp 149-54
C.Hibbert, The Great Mutiny, India 1857 (1978) pp 391-2. And Hyam again.
25. QR 101 (Oct 57) "India"
Also note India's importance as a constitutional lesson for British democracy - as in Cobden's speech (16 Oct 57) quoted in Porter, cit, p 12: British could only rule India despotically, which would react badly on British democracy.
26. ER 97 (Jan 53) "The Indian Army"; 107 (Jan 58) "Prospects of the Indian Empire".
27. e.g. ER 106 (Oct 57) "India"
28. WR 17 (Oct 57) "Quedah, or Adventures in Malayan Waters"
29. QR 104 (Oct 58), vi, "Life and Opinions of Napier" and vii, review of Bright's speech on policy for India.
FM 47 (Aug 57) "The Indian Army"; and "The Indian Mutinies".
30. Ec R (May 58) "The Future Government of India".
31. BM 42 (Nov 57) "The Company's Raj", and 43 (Sept 58) "John Company's Farewell to John Bull" - did nostalgically regret the take-over of the East India Company; but apart from this the need for direct British government was put forward on all sides.
32. A.Briggs, Victorian People, cit, p 13
K.Chesney, The Victorian Underworld (1970)
33. e.g. WR 18 (Jan 58) "The English in India" - the "people of India" do not exist, except in the mind of Mr Bright.
And QR 104 (Oct 58), vii, review of Bright's speech.
Also Br QR (1857) p 505, "Epilogue on Affairs".
34. BM 43 (Dec 58) "Lord Clyde's Campaign in India 1857-8" noted that party debates did not circulate in India. They were only read by Anglo-Indians for amusement.
35. Ec R May 58 "The Future Government of India".
36. BF 1857 p 236.
37. CMI 1857 p 211.
38. CMI 1857 p 265 "The Rainbow in the Cloud, or Mercy Amidst Judgement", and p 275 "Duties of a Christian Government".
Br QR Oct 57, p 476, p 505.
Similarly SR held the opinion that only Liberals had the view of all men being alike, and that such beliefs would lose us India.
39. Br QR Jan 65, "The History of the Sepoy War"
40. CJ Nov 20 1858 "An Opening for British Enterprise".
41. RM Apr 10, 17 1858, and Feb 13, 1858 for the story "The Sepoys; or Highland Jessie, A Tale of the Present Indian Revolt" by M.J.Errym (illustrated)
42. HW Feb 27 1858, and Mar 27 1858. Also India articles in Jan 2, 9, 16, 23, 30, Feb 6, 13, etc.
43. FM 47 (Nov 57) "The Indian Mutinies"
44. BM 42 (Nov 57) "A Few Words from the Khyber"
45. WR 20 (Oct 58) "Indian Heroes"
46. A.S.Swan, Seed Time and Harvest (1937) pp 84-5
47. See also C.Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (1971) p 109, 157, 197 and D.A.Lorimer, Colour, Class and the Victorians (1978) p 161, 200
48. See the articles in ER Jan, Apr 63, Apr 64, Apr 70, Jan, July 73, Jan 75; QR Apr 63, July 66, Jan 71, Apr 75; WR Jan, July 62, Jan, Apr 63, July 65, July 68, Jan 69, July 70, Apr 72, Oct 74, Apr 75; etc
49. MM i (Nov 59) p 81, "The Rifle Corps Movement and National Defences"
50. MM 1860 ii p 394 "Volunteering Past and Present"; WR 23 (Oct 59) "Militia Forces" - "we should insure against danger in the soundest and cheapest office, by encouraging volunteer riflemen, and maintaining and improving our national militia"; FM 58 (1859) "National Defences"; RM Mar 24 1860, "Rifle Volunteers"; CJ Sept 10 1859 "Volunteer Artillery".

51. QR 105 (July 59) "The Invasion of England"; ER 110 (July 59) "The State of the Navy"; B^M 42 (June and Sept 59), "Fleets and Navies, 1 - France", " - 2 - England".
52. ATYR Aug 20 1859 (Household Words became All The Year Round in April 1859)
53. e.g. articles in ER (July 59) (Oct 61); B^M (Apr, Sept 60); ATYR (Dec 59) etc.
54. e.g. QR 105 (Jan 59), WR 22 (Jan 59)
55. FM Apr, June 61
56. Bolt, op cit, p 210
Also P.D.Curtin, The Image of Africa (1965) p vi and elsewhere - the image was formed before 1850, based on the slave trade with West Africa. And see below, ch 9.
57. C.Darwin, The Origin of Species (1859)
And ER 115 (Jan 62) "Sewell's Ordeal of Free Labour in the West Indies"
58. Lorimer, op cit, pp 108-13; Robinson and Gallagher, op cit, pp 2-3
59. ibid. Also see ch 9 below.
60. BF Mar 65 p 53
61. MM 7 (1862) p 419
62. MM 9 (1863) p 269. It was strange to MM how those who feared a strong commercial republic in the north never seemed to fear a powerful military republic in the south.
Also WR 25 (Jan 61) "American Slavery"; and B^M 45 (Dec 61) "Both Sides of the American War" - our devotion to the cause of human freedom stops us giving the south that moral encouragement often given to communities striving for independence.
63. ER 114 (Oct 61) "The American War"
64. ATYR Feb 16 1861, Nov 30 1861, Oct 18 1862, Dec 3 1864 ("A Black Affair", indexed "A Nigger Musician")
65. e.g. ATYR July 13 1861, Jan 4 1862; QR 110 (Apr 61); FR 118 (Oct 63)
66. FM 73 (Feb 63) "Negroes and Slavery in the US"
67. SR Jan 4 62, Oct 11 62; Spect Sept 21 61
68. WR 30 (Oct 62) "The Slave Power" (including review of J.E.Cairnes)
69. Lloyd's Sept 21 1862, Reynolds' Jan 18 1863, June 28 1863
70. e.g. SR Sept 30, Oct 20 1865. See also J.S.Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861)
71. Bolt, op cit, p 109
72. CR Aug 69, vol 11, p 230
73. SR Oct 66
74. B^M 49 (May 66) "The Negro and the Negrophilists"
75. B^M 51 (Feb 68) p 101
76. QR 120 (July 66), viii, "Papers Relating to Jamaica".
77. Thus PMG Nov 24 1865; ATYR Mar 3 66 - "Black is not Quite White"; CJ Aug 18 1866 "Life in the Mountains of Jamaica"; BF 1866 p 186 - W.Trall letter hoping to establish a mission in Jamaica, and 1867 p 44 - "Education in Jamaica"
78. Spect 1865-3, especially Mar 24 1866
Br QR Apr 66 "The Outbreak in Jamaica"; ER 115 (Jan 62) we are conscious of our superiority, but in W.Indies black and white must live together, and we must help them; FM 57 (Mar 66) "Public Affairs"
79. FR Feb 15 1866 (under "Public Affairs"), Dec 1 1865, Dec 15 1865, etc
80. RM Nov 26 1865, Aug 5 66, and again Nov 26 65.
Also Daily News Nov 18 1865 - all Britons are dishonoured by this.
81. WR 45 (July 67) "Jamaica"
82. MM 13 (Oct 65) "Eyre the South Australian Explorer" (xii p 501); MM 14 (May 66) p 55. Also see QR, CR, CJ's lack of coverage.
83. FR 5 (Aug 1 1866) "Discovery of the Albert Nyanza"
84. J.Walvin, The Black Presence (1971) p 31
85. e.g. QR Apr 66; B^M May 54, Feb 57; CJ Mar 25 65; FM Aug 57.
Also FR Sept 65, July 68, and Dec 1 1869 - "Masterly Inactivity" - for a slightly different view.
86. e.g. WR July 1860, Apr 61, etc. See below, chs 10 and 11.
87. ER 105 (Apr 57) "British Relations with China", 111 "Lord Elgin's Mission to China and Japan" (Jan 60); FM 46 (Feb 57) "The War with China", 64 (Mar 61) "Another Chapter on the Amoor"; and ER 102 (Oct 55) "The Political Disturbances in China". Again see below, ch 7.

88. e.g. Spect July 14 1866, Dec 11 1880; PMG Oct 1872; CR Jan-Apr 1866
p 123; SR July 8 1866, Aug 17 1867, Mar 28 1868, June 27 1868,
Mar 4 1871.
89. SR Mar 4 1871.
90. Swan, op cit, p 14; Br QR Apr 65.
91. Bolt p 134, etc
92. M.Jarrett-Kerr, Patterns of Christian Acceptance (1972) p 3

Chapter Three

1. e.g. MM 1 (1859) p 81. See also ch 1 n 49 onwards.
2. e.g. MM 24 (1871) p 339 "A Few Words for Bismarck" - "A word for Englishmen. Prussia is not our model State, except as a military one...."
Also MM 36 (1877) p 337, 37 (1877-8) p 406, 38 (1878) p 48; and FM Oct 71, May 74, July 75; ER July 76, Apr 85; WR Apr 86; FR Oct 83, Dec 84, Nov 89; ATYR Jan 89, etc.
3. e.g. FR 44 (Dec 85) "The Coming Contests of the World"; ER 169 (Jan 89) "Our Kin Beyond the Sea" - showed content that England gave birth to America and retained still their gratitude.
4. CR (Dec 70) 16 p 165 "Imperial Federalism"; 19C Sept 77 "Mr Gladstone and Our Empire", Sept 78 "Foreign Policy of Great Britain, Imperial or Economic", Aug 81 "The Revolutionary Party"; and FR Feb 70, Nov 77, Oct 78; FM Jan 70, Feb 73; ATYR Jan 74; WR July 70, Apr 76; ER Jan 70; QR Jan 70; etc.
5. Thomson, op cit, p 163, 165-6, etc. Also Jenks, Hobsbawm, op cit.
6. Hobsbawm p 131, and Robinson and Gallagher, Platt, Fieldhouse, cit.
7. See also the chapters in A.J.P.Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (1965), H.Brunschwig, French Colonialism 1871-1914 - Myths and Realities (1970) and H.A.Turner and Pogge von Strandemann, "The Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion", Past and Present (1969)
8. E.Dicey, "Mr Gladstone and Our Empire" in 19C Sept 1877; and also R.Lowe, "Foreign Dominions of the Crown" in FR Nov 77.
9. Disraeli 1872, quoted in Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics cit p 356. Also Forster 1875 "Who now talks of casting off the colonies? What more popular cry than the preservation of our colonial empire?"
10. Platt "Economic Factors" article, cit.
11. Robinson and Gallagher, cit, Fieldhouse, cit, and see below ch 7.
12. e.g. QR Jan 73, Jan 77, Jan 80, Oct 81, Apr 86; ER July 83; WR July 78.
13. e.g. MM 23 (Oct 70), 25 (71); FM n.s. 3 (Oct 71), 4 (May 72), 5 (Nov 72), 7 (Oct 73), 8 (June 74), 10 (Apr 75); BM 53 (May 71) 55 (Aug 75); ATYR Mar 16, Apr 20, 1878, Oct 5 72 - "The Army on its Legs", June 26, July 24, Aug 7 and Dec 4 - "Volunteering in Britain, France and Prussia" - 1875; QR 130 (Jan 71), 134 (Jan 73); Punch 1878 p 12 and p 207; FR 15 Feb, Mar 71.
14. MM 23 (Oct 70) "Are We Ready?" p 401; 25 (Oct 71) "England's Defence Against Herself" p 408.
15. FM n.s. 10 (Apr 75) "Recruiting and the Militia". Also FM n.s. 3 (Oct 71) "The English Statesman's Imperial Question" - "Our Volunteers, trained and organised as a sea-wehr, could keep the soil of England sacred again the world in arms."
16. QR 130 (Jan 71) "Defences of the UK"
17. ATYR Apr 20 1878 "British Mobilisation" - we need a scheme of mobilisation, let us hope we never have to put it to the test;
BM 53 (May 71) "The Battle of Dorking - Reminiscences of a Volunteer"
18. e.g. WR 61 (Apr 71) "Army Organisation"; FR 15 (Feb 71) "Our Defences - A National or a Standing Army". Though FR 15 (Mar 71) "Do Military Inventions Promote Peace?" unequivocally answered in the negative.
19. Punch 1870 vol 159 p 69. Though 1878 cartoon of "Ass In Lion's Skin" (vol 74 p 12), showing eponymous animal carrying "War Party" trumpet, and braying.
20. e.g. BM 55 (Apr 77) "Crete"
21. Hyam, op cit, p 251. Also Fieldhouse, op cit, Mediterranean chapter.
22. QR 147 (July 78), v, "History of Cyprus"; MM 48 (1878) p 325 "Cyprus" - need a survey of minerals etc for British capitalist in future moves. Though MM 50 (Sept 79) p 441 in "Cyprus - Is It Worth Keeping?" answered with a resounding "yes", and said British capital would take "its proper place as the fertilising agent of material prosperity".
23. Punch vol 75 p 45 (Aug 3 78) "Speculation on Cyprus" and p 81 "Happy Cyprus".
24. FM n.s. 17 (Sept 78) "peace With Honour".

25. CJ Apr 2 1870 "The Suez Canal"; MM 21 (69-70) "Suez Canal" p 82; FR 37 (Aug 82) "Great Britain and the Suez Canal", and also 30 (Jan 78) "An Inside View of Egypt" - glad that the Canal shares were not in French hands, as the French were not colonisers, but merely financiers, and not a good influence.
26. Though ER 143 (Jan 76) "Suez Canal" and 149 (Jan 79) "The Road To India" - at least the British government acted, instead of slumbering, though the Canal was to be secondary to the Euphrates railway, which was estimated to afford the only means of stemming Russian advances in Central Asia.
27. CJ Feb 19 76, review of Lesseps' History of the Suez Canal; and see also QR 140 (Oct 76) "Suez Canal"; ATYR Jan 8 76; FM n.s. 17 (May 78).
28. WR 92 (Apr 79) "Our South African Colonies"
29. BM 56 (Mar 79) "Exemplary punishment for the king who has dared to defy the British power, to break the peace of South Africa, and to drag his wretched vassals into a contest where they must necessarily be the losers...."
Similarly FR 145 (Apr 77) "Native Policy in South Africa" and 149 (Apr 79) "South Africa".
30. FM n.s. 16 (Feb 78) "The Kaffir War".
31. MM 43 (1880-1) "Royal Zulu Progress"
32. FR 31 (Mar 79) "Plain Story of the Zulu War", 35 (Mar 82) "How To Get Out of South African Difficulties", 32 (Oct 79) "South Africa Once More". Also South Africa articles in FR Dec 74, Feb 78, Apr, Sept 79, Nov 82; FM n.s. 20 (Feb 80) "The English Nation and the Zulu War" - the war was held to redound to national disgrace, and set missionaries back 50 years.
33. e.g. MM 36 (1877) p 70 "The Transvaal". Also BM July 78 "The South Africa Question", and BM July, Aug 81; though FR June 78, Apr 82, Dec 83, thought Britain's trade was safe in South Africa and no annexation was needed. Also WR July 78, Oct 81, July 82; ER Oct 71; QR Apr 83. And see WR Jan, Oct 82 - will the English taxpayer have to pay for South Africa? while QR Jan 77 "South Africa" - "discreditable" annexation.
34. e.g. MM 50 (1884) in "Review of the Month" - the Cape as a second Ireland.
35. MM 51 (1884-5) p 278 "Village Life in South Africa"
36. CJ Mar 22 1834 "The Transvaal Gold Fields"
37. ATYR Feb 26 1831 "Birthdays in Boerland" - possibility of much more friendly feeling between English and Kaffirs than between us and Boers.
38. QR 146 (Apr 79) "The South African Problem", FR 29 (June 78) "The Transvaal and the Zulu Country". Also QR 142 (Jan 77) "English Policy in South Africa"
39. e.g. QR 154 (Apr 83) "The Transvaal" - our friends no longer respect us. Also QR 157 (July 84) "England and her Second Colonial Empire", and QR 150 (Apr 81) "Ministerial Embarrassments"
40. QR 150 (Apr 81) "Ministerial Embarrassments"
41. L.Maxwell, My God - Maiwand (1979) pp 8-10, 21, 41.
42. A.Davey, The British Pro-Boers, pp 8-9, 15-30 (Capetown 1978)
43. Hence QR blamed Gladstone and the radicals for weakness, WR blamed Conservative aggression (though WR 91 (Jan 79) sympathised with the government and though liberal feelings "misplaced"), FR, specially in F.Harrison and R.Lowe articles (1880, 1878) condemned Tory vulgar imperialism; BM 57 (Oct 79) thought the Liberal opposition should sink their party differences.
44. See Boyce, op cit.

45. For British advance : ATYR Jan 18 1873; QR Apr 73, Apr 74, Apr 81; WR Jan 79 "Afghanistan", Jan 80 (in "India and Our Colonial Empire") and Jan 81 "Afghanistan"; FM Sept, Nov 73 "The Central Asian Question", and "British Policy in Persia and Central Asia" - what we omit to do, Russia does ostentatiously, and takes Khiva; MM 33 (75-6) "The Central Asian Question", 39 (78-9) p 369 "The Afghan Question", 44 (1881) p 53 in "Sir Donald Stewart's March From Kandahar to Kabul"; BM Jan, Oct 79, Nov 80; Punch 1878 vol 75, p 206, p 283, cartoon and poem "Pig-stickers beware!" with Lytton pig-sticking an Afghan boar, and Mother Britannia beating an Afghan boy.
Against British advance : ER Apr 70, July 73, Apr 74, July 75, Jan 86; FR Aug 75, Aug 76, Sept 80.
46. ER 142 (July 75) "England and Russia in the East" - Indian bazaars do not hum with excitement of Russian activity;
FR 34 (Sept 80) "Afghan Imbroglia"; MM 39 (78-9) pp 375-6 in "The Afghan Question"; also p 91 - "A Word For Shere Ali".
See also 19C Feb 1880 - Candahar is the most pleasant aspect of the Afghan situation (!).
47. BM 56 (Jan 79) "The Affghan War and its Authors"; also July, Oct 79, Aug, Nov 80.
48. FM 6 n.s. (Sept 73) "The Central Asian Question"
49. *ibid.* On Persia - "somebody must absorb that poor degraded country".
50. QR 138 (Apr 75), ix, "England and Russia in the East".
51. ER 139 (Apr 74) "The Russians in Central Asia", 153 (Oct 83) "Russian Railways in Asia" - "puerile notions" that England is right and Russia is wrong.
52. QR 153 (Oct 82) "Egypt", 154 (Jan 83). Also ATYR July 20 78 "Our Indian Army", and BM Oct 82, June 83 - Gladstone upsets Islam, we must stay to confer good.
53. ER 156 (Oct 82) "The Egyptian Rebellion". Also 153 (Apr 81), 171 (Jan 90), and 173 (Jan 91). British occupation did bring real benefits, though possibly not as great as Cromer imagined - see Hyam, *op cit*, p 255.
54. FR 38 and 39 (July, Nov, Dec 82, Jan, Mar, May 83).
Also FR 42 (Aug 84) "Our Obligations in Egypt" - "we English are too apt to rate too high our own capacity to govern, and to rate too low the capacity of a subject people."
And FR 51 (Nov 88) "Our Task in Egypt" - unless we can surrender Egypt to a more moral power than ourselves, we must stay there, or we will have done less good than not interfering at all.
Hyam, *op cit*, p 253 - British government expressed intention to leave Egypt 66 times between 1882 and 1922.
55. WR 92 (Apr 79) "The Imperial Policy of Great Britain - Egypt", 104 (Oct 82), 121 (Apr 87) "Egypt" - "Egypt is altogether a most perplexing country".
Also linkage with defence in MM 47 (82-3) - this war is not a continental one, after all.
56. FM n.s. 11 (Mar 75) "Some Political Aspects of Sir Samuel Baker's Expedition"; BM 55 (Oct 77) "The Khedive's Egypt and Our Route to India".
57. BM 68 (Aug, Sept 82)
58. ER 159 (Apr 84) "Egypt"
59. Sir H. Maxwell, *op cit*, p 144
60. MM 50 (84-5), E.A. Freeman "Imperial Federation" p 430
61. FM 10 (Oct 74), F.W. Newman "The Dangerous Glory of India"; 11 (Apr 75) "Some Remarks on Unions of Nations".
62. e.g. QR 138 (Apr 75), WR 89 (Jan 78), 90 (July 78) and ER 156 (July 82).
Also BM 86 (May 89) "A Pickel of Salt, A Tale of the Indian Monopoly".
63. WR 89 (Jan 78), 91 (Oct 78). And contrast QR 160 (Apr 86) on Baron Rubner.
64. ER 138 (Oct 73) "Gold Coast" - perhaps better to inflict one big blow than series of little wars.
65. BM 54 (July 74); ATYR Oct 11 1873; FM 9 (Jan 74).

66. WR 107 (Jan 83)
67. Hyam, op cit, p 278
68. ER 172 (July 90); also 164 (Oct 81) - Gordon's letters
69. MM 49 (1883-4) in the "Review of the Month"; and 52 (1885) p 237 - Sudan follies were in opposition to Gladstone's decisive leanings. FR agreed, 42, 43 (Mar, May, July, Oct 84).
70. BM Mar 84, Mar, Apr 85. QR Jan 85 - "Isolation of England" - the world profits from Gladstone being in power.
71. WR 115 (Oct 85) "Gordon's Journals". Also WR Apr 87, Britain should either take Egypt or leave it, no middle way.
72. ATYR Feb 2, 9, 1884 - "Chinese Gordon"; FR 47 (Jan 87) "Last Words With General Gordon"; and QR 158 (Apr 85) "General Gordon's Life and Letters".
73. QR 158 (Jan 85) "The Congo and the Berlin Conference".
74. BM 75 (Oct 85) "The Negroes of the Congo"; FR 41 (June 84) "England's Foreign Policy" (leading article); ER 160 (July 84) "The Future of the Congo"; WR 111 (July 84) "The Proposed Congo Treaty".
75. Platt, Finance etc, cit, p 261
76. Hyam pp 283-4
77. WR 117 (Apr 86) "The Economy of Emigration"; QR 163 (Apr 90), "Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain"; FR 42 (Sept 84) "The Germans in South Africa"; ER 144 (July 76) "The Growth of German Naval Power".
78. e.g. articles in QR Apr 78, Oct 88; ER Apr 73; WR July 90; MM 1877; FM Feb 77, May 74, July 75; and see note 2 above.
Also Punch 78 vol 75 p 143 - the Kaiser pushing down socialist Jack in a Box, and 1885, vol 89 p 103 - "The Irrepressible Tourist" - where will he go next?
79. HM 1880-1 p 794
80. CJ June 3, 10 1876 "A New World in Central Africa"
81. CJ June 3, 10 1876 (ibid); MM 36 (1877) p 85 ff "African Exploration and its results" - Alcock; and ER 147 (Jan 78) "Stanley's Discoveries".
82. CJ Sept 28 1872 "Livingstone's Discoveries".
83. ER 172 (Oct 90) "In Darkest Africa"; WR 85 (July 77) "The Cradle of the Blue Nile"
84. ER 145 (Jan 77) "Arctic Expeditions"
85. FM n.s. i (Nov 70) "Fiji Islands" - these islands would easily pay for the cost of their government; FR 136 (Oct 72) islanders have murdered Europeans.
86. WR July 75 "Pacific Islanders Protection Bill"
87. ER 156 (July 82) "North Borneo". Similarly ATYR Aug 11 1888 "Gems of the Eastern Seas" - "What this commerce will eventually be worth, one can hardly say, but the potentialities are not inconsiderable, were the natives weaned from their passion for bloodshed".
88. ATYR Aug 4 1888 "Ceylon Redivivus"
89. BM 84 (June 88) "Tonga and Samoa"
90. CJ Mar 12 87 "The Ruby Mines of Burmah"; BM Mar, Sept 86; QR Jan 86. Also Punch 1885 vol 89 p 215, cartoon of British subaltern kicking the Burmese Toad, with (French) Frog in the background. FR 31 (Apr 79) did not want to annex all of Burma (i.e. right up to China) on grounds of cost.
91. ATYR Feb 27 1875 "Formosa and the Japanese"
92. Fieldhouse, op cit, p 437; Platt Finance etc, cit, p 307
93. ER 133 (Jan 71) "Foreign Relations of China", 136 (Oct 72) "Corea"; WR 112 (July 84) "Corea". Though FR 16 (Sept 71) questioned British use of the opium trade, and doubted that wherever British commerce and influence abounded, benefits accrued.
Also ER 137 (Apr 73) "Trade Routes to Western China"; QR 132 (Apr 72) "Journeys in North China", highlighting agriculture and mineral wealth, defective existing communications, well-disposed people, and "that there is still a large available opening for the extension of British trade in manufacturing goods".
Also MM 26 (1872) "Japan"; FM n.s. 15 (Mar 77) "Foreign Relations of China"; FR 39 (June 83) "China and Foreign Powers".

94. Hyam, op cit, p 359
95. ER 166 (July 83) "The French in Anam and Tonquin"
96. WR 114 (Jan 85) "France and Cochin China"
97. FR 14 (Nov 70) "Bolivia and Brazil in the Amazon Valley"; HM 1890, 90-1 (vols 81, 82). Also ER 139 (Apr 74) "Hydraulics of Great Rivers"; CJ Oct 11 1873, warning possible emigrants against South America; FM 16 n.s. (July-Sept 77) "Mexico and Brazil, "River Plate", "Chile and Peru"; FR 54 (Sept 90) "Argentine Crisis".
98. Hyam p 171
99. Fieldhouse p 54

Chapter Four

1. Thomson, op cit, p 203. Similarly in A.J.Marder, British Naval Policy 1820-1905 (1940) p 13
2. Hyam, op cit, pp 92-4, 103
3. Hobsbawm, op cit, p 178
4. ibid pp 181-191
5. J.A.Hobson, Imperialism (1902)
See also ch 7 below, and Robinson and Gallagher on continuity.
Also Porter, op cit, for the whole question of imperialism as against social reform.
6. WR 155 (May 93) "Wanted - An Imperial Minimum". Also FR 78 (Dec 1902) "England After the War" - "With the peace of Pretoria it is a remarkable probability that England has fought her last war of conquest and touched the limit of her expansion". (Though this was after the war, admittedly.)
7. K.Marx, Capital, vol III pp 272-80
8. e.g. HM 98 (1898-9) p 385, FR June 96, WR Mar 97, QR July 98, MM 1898.
9. ER 187 (Jan 93) "The Success of the Anglo-Saxons". Also WR 130 (Oct 89) "Ireland and the Empire" - the new constitution is but the means for perfecting the great coming race of the world.
10. e.g. QR Apr 94, Oct 96; FR 1902 "The War and the Liberals" p 194; BM Nov 1900.
11. WR 169 (Jan 1902) "How Irelands Are Made"
12. BM July 1901
13. R of R July 1890 "Progress of the World"; WR 132 (Dec 91) "England and Germany"; Punch 1890 vol 98 p 307, vol 99 p 55.
14. D.R.Gillard, "Salisbury's African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890" in English History Review (1960). Also see English History Review 1965; and Hyam p 285.
15. W.L.Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1964 ed'n)
16. e.g. R of R Sept 1890 - "In August Lord Salisbury completed the partition of Africa". Also RofR Jan 91, ER Oct 90, Apr 94 - "The geographical mysteries have been almost all solved, and the scramble for possession is nearly at an end."
17. Langer. And note ATYR Jan 24 1891, Oct 29 1892, Britain has the best of the bargain, but it may be bad for all that.
18. e.g. ER 177 (Apr 93)... "the African races are numerous and do not as yet show any signs of dying out like the Red Men of America."
19. Hyam pp 103-5. The Times (Oct 15 1889, and Sept 23 1891) thought Britain could not afford to allow any section even of the Dark Continent to believe that our imperial prestige was on the wane, and withdrawal from Uganda would be a "fatal blow to all the civilising influences which we hope to exert upon Africa".
Also see below for discussion of the Boers.
20. MM 1890 p 113 "The Tradition of German Colonisation"; FR 92; QR Jan, Apr 89; BM June 98; R of R Nov 90 - it is intolerable that the English have to avenge the natives' killing of Germans, especially as it was the Germans who provoked it. Similarly BM 88 (May 90) "German Aims in East Africa" - the Germans at Zanzibar play the same game as the Russians in central Asia.
21. BM 88 (June 90) "The Portuguese and Makololand"
22. Punch 1890 p 30, 31; ER Oct 95; IIN 1895, Mar 14 supplement on Abyssinia: "every reason to suppose that the Italian Commander-in-Chief must have lacked some of the requisites which are necessary to make a successful General".
23. BM 98 (Feb 92) "Central African Trade", 103 (Dec 93) "The Rise of Our East African Empire"; CJ Feb 22 1896 "A West African Story", Feb 8 96 "The Uganda Railway"; plus CJ Oct 10 1896 "Coffee Planting in British Central Africa", Mar 5 1896; QR 193 (July 1901); ATYR Apr 29 1893; MM 91-2; FR 92, 93.

24. ER Oct 89 "East Africa" - at least ostensibly the salvation of Africa is the policy of Europe, 177 (Apr 93) "Mashonaland"; WR 129 (July 90) "In Darkest Affrica", 130 (Oct 90) "The Importance of Race".
25. ER 179 (Apr 94) "African Exploration"
26. FR Nov 90 "The Development of Tropical Africa under British Auspices"; 19C Apr 97; ATYR Apr 94.
27. R of R Apr 91. Also Hyam p 209, quoting Lecky 1893 - India maintaining the masculine qualities of our race.
28. Spect 5 Mar 1898. Also Hyam p 156 on white masks, and M.Howard, Continental Commitment (1971) - a few civil servants holding sway over vast numbers.
29. QR Jan 93, Oct 95, Oct 97; WR Jan 98; ER on the Russian threat - Jan 90, Oct 92, July 93, Apr 1902; but security of India dependent on good and prudent administration (Jan 95 "Lansdowne's Indian Government 1888-94")
30. ER 187 (Jan 93) - "Indian Frontier Policy"
31. WR 142 (Nov 94) "Discontent in India"; MM 59 p 291 (1888-9) "Home Rule For India".
32. MM 64 (1891) p 81 "Rise of British Dominion in India" - Sir Alfred Lyall. Also MM 70 (1894) p 100 "A Vision Of India" - great radical dream of India for the Indians.
33. BM 109, 110 (Apr, June, Sept, Dec 1895) "Our Indian Frontier", etc
34. WR 133 (Feb 92) in "China- A Far Eastern Question"; FR 72 (1899) "Russian Railway Policy in Asia" (p 914)
35. ER 189 (Apr 99) "Asia Minor"; CJ Apr 14 1900 "The Quest for India".
36. This line was taken by ER 189 (Apr 96) "Great Britain in South Africa" and 192 (July 97) "Public Opinion and South Africa". CJ expressly avoided discussion of the issues, and dwelt on the "remarkable and interesting" aspects of the Boers, June 20 1896 ("Who Are The Boers?"). QR 185 (July 97) cleared Chamberlain and praised Rhodes' courage.
37. FR 70 (1898) p 36 "Wei-hai-wei"
38. BM 122 (Apr, June 99) "A Year's Diplomacy in Peking" and "Wei-hai-wei". July's edition also carried an article on "The Downfall of Finland", as an object lesson in Russian aggression.
39. QR 186 (Apr 98) "Changes in the Unchanging East"; WR 152 (Mar 97) "The New Situation in China" noted the Russian threat and urged English action against it; while ER 188 (July 98) "British Policy in China" again scotched the idea of Russian aggression, but did not want to weaken Salisbury's hands.
40. Langer, loc cit. Also B.H.Sumner, "Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East", Proceedings of the British Academy (1940); Z.B.Steiner, "Great Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance", Journal of Modern History (1959)
41. I.Jackson, The Provincial Press and the Community (Manchester 1971), etc
42. BM 107, 108 (Dec 94, Feb 95). And: BM 118 (Apr, June 98); FR 63 (1895); ER 182, 183 (July 95, Jan 96)
43. ER 182 (July 95) "The Far East", 183 (Jan 96) "Political and Commercial Affairs in Asia". Similarly with regard to the Boxer Rising in 1900 - her interests, but in our own. Also "The Security of India" - QR 191 (Oct 1900). Though WR 165 (Nov 1900) "China - A Plea For Justice" noted Britain's selfish policy.
44. WR 157 (July 98). WR 156 (Mar 98) "Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine" preferred to see lands under good American government than under the restless tyranny of other powers.
45. e.g. FR 70 (1898), 77 (1902) - comparing America in the Phillipines with Britain in South Africa; R of R May, June 91; ER Jan 1900; QR July 98; and QR Oct 99 comparing U.S.Civil War with Anglo-Boer War; HM 98-9. Also Hyam p 204 and Bolt p 73.
46. QR 187 (July 98) "Cuba in War; FR 70 (1898) p 884 in "American Expansion and the Inheritance of the Race".
47. HM 1898 and 1899, p 385 and 631 respectively.

48. e.g. ER 191 (Jan 1900) "Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitration". Though Punch 1895, 109 p 302 had been harsher about Cleveland's attitude to Venezuela. And WR Feb 96 - Cleveland was well aware that the country could be extricated from his statements.
49. WR 153 (Sept 97) "The Object Lesson of the Cuban War"
50. QR 189 (July 99) "The Phillipines and Their Future". Also WR 153 (Oct 97) "Spain's Colonial Policy" - on Spanish odious rule; and BM 118 (Feb 98) "The Spanish Crisis" on Spanish decadence.
51. QR 188 (Jan 99) "The Evolution of France"
52. Kipling wrote "The White Man's Burden" as an exhortation to America to defeat Spain. See A.Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling (1977) p 204 and Lord Birkenhead, Rudyard Kipling (1978) p 191.
53. Especially BM 116 (Oct 97) "England and France in the Basin of the Niger" - the scramble for West Africa has gone on for about 20 years. The soil is fertile, but natives will not labour. Also MM 74, 75, 76, (1896, 96-7, 97); BM May 94 etc; CJ Feb 8 1896, Feb 22 1896; ER Oct 98 "European Powers in West Africa" - France converts her claims into military occupations.
54. CJ Aug 3 1895 "The Land of Palm Oil", Mar 5 1898; FR 68 (1897) p 917 "England and France in West Africa".
55. MM 80 (1899) p 105 "Interior of the Gold Coast" - thought that the Gold Coast rewarded the geographer, the anthropologist, or the scientific explorer. Though QR 192 (Apr 1901) "Relief of Kumassi" expected the colony to "develope large resources and be a valuable imperial possession". WR 159 (Apr 99) "Future of the Niger" saw a productive country inland, with palm oil, coffee and then rubber.
56. See WR 154 (Nov 97) "The Italians in Africa"; QR 187 (Oct 98) "England and Soudan". Also see G.W.Monger, The End of Isolation (1965) and A.J.P.Taylor, "The Upper Nile: Fashoda" in English History Review (1950).
57. FR 58 (1892) p 782 "Egypt 1882-92" by Sir W.T.Marriott M.P. Similarly FR 66 (1896) p 304, 499, 791, Major Arthur Griffiths' writings - "There is practically no limit to the benefits that would accrue to Egypt, if she were sure of peace and good government throughout her dominions".
58. FR 68 (1897) "After Khartoum" and "Khartoum in Sight".
59. BM 113 (Sept 96) "The Soudan Advance - What Next?"
60. QR 180 (Jan 95) "England in Egypt"; MM 70 (1894) p 464 "British Rights in Egypt". Also ER 171 (Jan 90) "The English in Egypt", 175 (Jan 92) "The Fate of the Soudan" - need for railway from the sea to Khartoum, and 184 (July 96) "Egypt".
61. ER 172 (July 90) "The Sudan Campaign"; MM 78 (1898) p 308 "The Story of the Uganda Mutiny". Also CM 1899, Sudan as a happy hunting ground for the tourist.
62. e.g. Sheffield Daily Telegraph Oct 21, VF Oct 6, StJG Nov 17, Econ Oct 15, Daily Graphic Oct 11. See Marder, op cit, pp 331-2, 336. Also H.W.Wilson in PMG June 6 1899.
63. Marder p 332. Also WR 157 (Dec 98) "How the Sudan Was Conquered" - if only French expeditions could tend to rapprochement.
64. R of R Aug, Sept 91. FR 69, 70 (1898) "Egypt" (p 681) and "The Fashoda Question" (pp 665-8 respectively). Also ER 173 (Jan 91) "French Occupation of Egypt", 188 (Oct 98) "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century"; QR 179 (July 94) "The French Sudan"; MM 79 (98-9) "An Egyptian Protectorate". Also Punch cartoon 1895 vol 108 p 170, supporting Grey's statement on the Nile Valley, and quoting the Bible on Libyans and the whole of the Nile Valley being Egypt. John Bull to African Chief...."So you're all right, my boy, while I'm here!"
65. BM 119 (Nov 98) "Our Fashoda Despatches"
66. QR 188 (Jan 99) "The Evolution of France". See above, n 51
67. WR 159 (Jan 99) "The Soudan". Also 161 (Dec 99) "Wassah Ullah" - the Egyptian cry. We would replace it with the cry "Progress". And 160 (May 99) "Liberalism and Empire".

68. CM Dec 99; QR Apr 1900 - "one spirit in many forms must animate this empire if it is to hold together"; ER Oct 1900 - war draws empire closer together, Oct 1901 - world-wide interests of British empire, Apr 1902 - our prestige in Abyssinia suffers; CJ Apr 14 1900 - Boer War defends India; FR May 1900, comparison with U.S., Oct 1900, prestige again, and 1902, the limit of British expansion.
69. ER July 97 - opposing capitalists, Oct 1901 - South Africa not a field for our surplus population; WR Nov 99 - we don't want a pirate empire, May 1901; IM 1900-1; BM May 96 - railway question rather than race; CJ July 19 1902 "The Coming Rush to South Africa" - don't be in too much of a hurry, but no finer field for development if you do go.
70. QR Oct 99; ER Jan 98 - the importance of black-white relations; WR June 96, Jan 97 - blacks should not vote, Mar 1900, Aug 1901; MM 1899, 1900 - compare with Lincoln in the U.S.A.; FR 1897 "Bechuanaland" etc.
71. A-S R Dec 99; ER Apr 96; WR Apr 96, Jan 97, Apr 1900; FR July 94, 1900 - 73 p 551, 74 p 177, 1901 - 75 p 147; BM Aug 96, July 99, Dec 99; CJ June 20 1896 "Who Are The Boers?", June 2 1900 "The Boers and Poor Whites", and Nov 22 1902 "South African Prejudices", etc.
72. Punch 1900 p 173; QR Oct 96, July 1902; ER Apr 96, Apr 1900; BM Mar 1900 CJ Dec 28 1895. Less so QR Oct 1902; ER July 95; MM 1894-5, 1901-2.
73. Punch 1900 p 101; QR Apr 94, Oct 96 - Gladstone was held to blame, though "it is not our wish to enter into any party discussions on the subject", Oct 99, Oct 1900; ER Apr 1900, Oct 1901; WR Feb 1900, Mar 1900, May 1900 (all anti-war), Dec 1901, Sept 1901 "Imperialism and the Coming Crisis For Democracy" - "capitalism, by reason of its peculiar economy, can only exist as long as it is able to keep on opening up new markets for the disposal of its surplus products", and "The Paradox of Liberal Imperialism" - war has shattered the great Liberal Party; MM 1899-1900 on Gladstone, 1901 on the taxpayer (twice); FR 1899 p 187 (anti-war), Aug 1900 (pro-war), 1902 p 194 - Dicey and every seat lost to the Unionists is a seat gained to the Boers; BM Nov 1900; MM 1900 p 17; HM 1899-1900 - Britain accused U.S. of unpreparedness for war, but now look at Britain.
74. Punch 1900 p 41; IIN 1899 p 608 etc, p 605: "Sweet and decorous it is to die for the Fatherland", "now as of old the legend endures; and the nation derives thence such comfort as it can in face of the records of the dead, the dying, and the dangerously wounded that come to us from the fields of victory in South Africa." SR Sept 3 1898, Feb 1 1896, 19C Feb 99 on the Jingo.
75. QR Oct 97, Oct 1900; FR 1899, p 958; BM Dec 1899 etc.
76. As HM 1900; QR Jan 1902, ER Jan 1900. Also F.Greenwood in Cosmopolis Nov 96, Aug 97; T.E.Kebbel "England At War" in 19C Mar 1898; S.Low, "Should Europe Disarm?" in 19C Oct 1898, and "Future of the Great Armies" in Sept 1899. Also E.Dicey "After the Present War", 19C Nov 99 - peace painted as weakness and aberration; Rev W.W.Peyton, "The Crucifixion and the War on the Creation", CR Oct 1900, Dec 1900 - justifying suffering in battle.
77. IIN 608 (1899); A-S R Dec 99; and CM 1899
78. e.g. WR Feb, Apr, May 1900, Sept, Dec 1901
79. WR Feb 1901, "Imperialism and Liberty". Other opposition went similarly. WG Oct 12 1899: "For the moment the Boer ultimatum has salved uneasy consciences and rendered the discussion of alternative courses futile. Liberals, no more than Conservatives, need quarrel among themselves about what might have been. The momentary duty is to support the government in making the inevitable expedition as prompt and effective as possible." See also Porter, op cit, p 103 on, and Davey, op cit, though little on periodicals. Also note the coverage given in Labour Leader, Justice, Reynolds' and Clarion.
80. WR Feb, May 1900, e.g. "The War and After", "For Honour! For Fatherland!"
81. WR Feb 1900, "The War and After", Aug 1901, "South Africa and Imperialism"

82. FR 72 (1899) "British and Dutch in South Africa" p 187; and 74 (Aug 1900) p 417 "Peace or War in South Africa"; 76 (1902) p 194 "The War and the Liberals". Also CR July 99, Oct 99 - "An English Radical must become a Jingo" and Jan 1900.
83. A.Davey, op cit, pp 8-9. D.Ayerst, The Guardian (1971) for accounts of the Manchester Courier staff laying siege to the Manchester Guardian and playing the Dead March in Saul around their offices.
84. QR 178 (Apr 94) "The British Navy"; ER 191 (Apr 1900) "Great Britain and South Africa"; MM 84 (1901) p 438 "Pro-Boer Idealism"; BM 125 (Mar 1900).
85. See n 45; especially also MM 1900 vol 82 p 294; FR 1900, 1902; and Hyam, op cit, p 204, Bolt, op cit, p 73.
- 86CJ Apr 14 1900 "The Quest For India"; QR 190 (Apr 1900) "North West Frontier Policy".
87. Hyam pp 202-5, Langer, etc. Also G.P.Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War (1927)
88. ER 191 (Jan 1900) "The War in South Africa"; QR 194 (Jan 1902 "War and Its Lessons".
89. QR 191 (Oct 1900) "The Chinese Crisis" and see n 43 above. Also QR 195 (Oct 1900) "The Commerce and Industry of Japan"; ER 178 (July 95) "The Far East" stressing the need for Anglo-Japanese friendship; MM 85 (1901-2) p 439 "Ode to Japan", though MM 71 (1894-5) p 69 "Our New Treaty With Japan" saw any Anglo-Japanese agreement as against international law, and against the judgment of all other Europeans. What the neighbours thought...
90. Howard, op cit, Hyam, op cit, p 156, etc.
91. ER 191 (Apr 1900 "Pacific"; WR 150 (Aug 96), "Samoa" - England Christianises, Germany only interested in firms; BM 125 (Dec 99) "Samoa" - in exchange for free hand, Germans give what was never theirs to give; CJ Apr 14 1900 "Baghdad Railway"; HM 1899-1900 "China and the Congo"; A-S R Dec 99 - Holland seen as part of Germany.
92. The Kruger telegram made some sense of this initially, but hardly afterwards. However, BM 125 (Mar 1900) showed feelings of German gains.
93. WR July 1902 "Empire as Made in Germany" - Kitchener copies Bismarck; FR Dec 96, we must go to school to Germany; ER Apr 94, Apr 95, Oct 97, Oct 99, Oct 1902; MM 91, 97; BM Jan 98, Mar 1900, Apr 1901; FR 96, 99 and 02; ATYR July 5 1890; CJ Feb 8 (German National Insurance) and Mar 1 1890.
94. CJ Apr 14 1900; QR Apr 1896, Oct 1899 - an Anglo-German agreement would be better than a Peace Conference; BM Mar 96.
95. Langer, Gooch and Temperley, op cit.
96. HM 1899-1900, p 577 "Germany's First Colony in China"
97. QR 174 (Apr 92) "Naval Warfare and National Defence"; CJ May 23 1896 "Our Naval Increase", Oct 11 1890 "How Our Blue Jackets are Fed"; FR 72 (1899) p 558 "The Darkest Hour For England"; ER 188 (July 98) "Naval Defence Past and Present" etc.
98. BM 105 (Mar 94) "The Navy and Its Duties".
99. BM 123 (Jan 99) "The Radical Split"

Chapter Five

1. Thomson, op cit, p 211.
2. Hobsbawm, op cit, pp 191-2
3. Quoted in Hyam pp 128-9. Similarly QR 197 (Oct 1903), reviewing Haldane "Education and Empire".
4. N.Blewett, The Peers, The Parties And The People - General Elections 1910 (1967) p 377
5. Semmel, op cit, and Porter, op cit.
6. See the articles on the Boer War in ch 3.
7. QR 200 (Jan 1905), 201 (Oct 1905), 203 (Oct 1906) - "The Price of Peace", universal training was held to be necessary to maintain British forces, and the only effective deterrent against invasion, 211 (Oct 1910); ER 214 (Oct 1911) "The Sovereignty of the Sea"; BM 128 (Oct 1901) "Recent Naval Progress" etc.
8. e.g. WR 175 (Apr 1903) "The New Naval Base and Russian Designs"
9. Thomson pp 214-5, Gooch and Temperley, Marder, op cit.
Also P.Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Armaments vol 1 (1936)
O.J.Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy 1890-1914 (1940)
C.F.Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain (1926)
E.L.Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (1935)
10. PMG Aug 4 1914. Also on Low Countries: WR 172 (1909) p 360 "The Peaceful Penetration of Germany in Belgium"; CR Jan 1911 p 114 "The Germanisation of the Continent"; BM 165 (Mar 1911) p 421 "The Strategical Position in the Low Countries"
11. As predicted ER 213 (Apr 1911) "The Conflict of Colour"
12. Thomson p 219, Hobsbawm p 193, Dangerfield p 185
13. QR 198, 199 (Apr, July 1904) "Russia and Japan", "Japanese Revolution"; WR 157 (Feb 1904) "Britain and the Far East Question", 158 (June 1904) "The Far East and the Near East" - white Czar with loans of yellow gold to defend white Aryan race against yellow Japanese; ER 199 (Apr 1904) "Conflict in the Far East", 202 (Oct 1905) "Battle of the Japan Sea". Also QR 201 (July 1905) - Russian alliance for Japan could mean risk.
14. QR 200 (Jan 1905) "The War in the Far East"; WR 160 (July 1905) pl "Destruction of the Russian Armada". This was later reinforced, regretfully, by CJ June 25 1910 "China's Awakening" - ominously rapid development of Chinese iron and steel industry meant that Japan, who used to import 90,000 tons of British pig-iron, now bought the Chinese article instead.
15. WR 172 (1909) pl "The Humiliation of Russia"
16. QR 197 (July 1903) "Asia in Transformation"
17. WR 160 (June 1903) "Koweyt"
18. Though ER 206 (Oct 1907) "The Baghdad Railway" - to see the significance of France in Sahara, England on Nile, Germany in Tigris, we need not to look through ideas of English, French, German, but European. "It is difficult to see thus why there is such opposition to the Baghdad Railway".
Also QR 207 (July 1908) "The German Peril"; CR Feb 1911 p 129
19. QR July 1908, Oct 1908; ER July 1910, Oct 1909; BM Oct 1911 p 455 "A Small German State" - Germany seen to be behind South Africa. We need a strong army and navy to maintain our esteem.
20. WR July and Aug 1906, p 66, p 173, "The Waning Prestige of Germany".
21. WR 170 (1908) p 17; CJ Feb 12 1910. Also WR Jan 1903, Germans seen as the important force behind the USA; and "Empire As Made In Germany"- WR July 1902.
22. CJ Nov 17 1906
23. ER Apr 1912 "Great Britain, Germany and Limited War"
24. QR Oct 1909, and ER July 1906 "Political Situation in Asia"
25. WR 174 (1910) p 133, 172 (1909) p 360. WR 168 (1907) p 39 ff - A.H.Weller in "Militarism" said that there was no danger of Germany invading colonies.

26. CR Jan 1911 p 114, 116, 118, etc - "The Price of an Anglo-German Understanding", "The Antennae of German Imperialism" - Germany's colonies in independent states.
Also Aug 1911 p 256 "Morocco", Feb p 243 "Persia".
27. BM Oct 1911 p 455; also Mar 1911 p 421. QR 205 (July 1907) suggested building a naval base on the east coast of the country to counter Germany.
28. ER 207 (Jan 1908) "The Second Hague Conference"; CR Feb 1911 p 218 "England's Lost Leadership of Peace". Also QR Jan 1908 "Hague Conference"
29. QR 205 (July 1907), 197 (Oct 1903). Also Jan 1907 on imperial unity and the colonial conference, and July 1907 on recognition of imperial conference as permanent institution, and change of name from colonial to imperial.
30. e.g. WR Jan 1904 "The Fantastic Fallacy of an Empire Builder", and Jan 1905 p 1 "Tariff Reform"
31. ER 196 (Oct 1902) "The Empire and the Colonies"
32. e.g. ER 198 (July 1903) "Mastery of the Pacific"; and Jan, Apr 1904 July, Oct 1903.
33. e.g. ER 208 (Apr 1909) "The Economics of Empire", 211 (Oct 1910) "Our Food Supply and Imperial Preference". But WR Jan 1914 pp 25-31 "Lessons From Colonial Expansion" - colonies have increased frontier line, not added to England's national strength. Answer not imperial federation, but that each colony should bear its own responsibility. And BM Apr 1911 p 576, "Reciprocity in Defence", colonies should contribute to their own defence, not rely on Britain; and QR Apr 1903, imperial telegraphs should link colonies.
34. Though this is not to deny CJ Oct 3 1908 - Tasmania as field for emigration - great benefits for all; and CJ Jan 30 1909 - dubious commercial benefit of Panama Canal; and QR July 1907 - British investment abroad was dependent on British capital invested abroad.
35. ER 195 (Jan 1902) "The Empire and the Kingdom"
36. CR Jan 1911 p 71 "Liberalism and Empire"
37. BM 192 p 431 "Imperialism in the Future" (1912)
38. Also Porter, op cit, chs 3 and 4 especially.
39. WR 159 (July 1902) "Darwinism and Empire, (Aug 1902) "The Teaching of History on War"
40. ER 209 (Jan 1909) "Evolution" - showed that evolution and biological principles were often used wrongly. Also WR Aug 1902 - "History on War" - "when the differences between men were less marked the survival of the physically fittest may have been the very best thing for the human race, but can we be certain that it applies with equal force today?"
41. ER 217 (Apr 1913) "The Demand for Compulsion"
42. QR 201 (Oct 1905) "The Price of Peace"; CJ Jan 22 1910 "Boy Scouts"
43. QR 204 (Apr 1907) "Mr Haldane and the Army", 203 (Oct 1906) "The Naval Situation"
44. CJ Oct 7 1911 "A National Awakening", Apr 13 1907 "Britons Never Will Be Slaves"
45. e.g. CJ Nov 14 1908 on the centenary of the fall of Baylen, Jan 19 1907 on the Greys at Waterloo, Sept 16 1905 - "that empire Britain has never lost, and may she ever, for the sake of freedom and the world, keep it secure in her hands."
46. BM 1912 p 126 "The Indian Mutiny - The Last Phase" for the lessons it teaches.
47. CJ June 6 1906, Nov 17 1906; also QR July 1906 - Boer war as a lesson for manoeuvres.
48. QR Jan 1902 (and see ch 4 n 88)
49. e.g. WR Jan 1914 p 1, p 110, and BM Jan 1913 p 115 "Events of the Month" and "Ireland and the Empire", respectively.
50. WR 167 (1907) p 361 "The Channel Tunnel"; BM Sept 1914 p 413 "The War"

51. Thomson, op cit, p 218
52. Hyam, op cit, p 96
53. Porter, op cit, p 1 and conclusion
54. R.F.Johnston in 19C July 1912
55. e.g. 19C Sept 1911 - Sir H.Johnston (and Oct 1908); June 1910 - Sir Leslie Probyn (and WG Nov 2 1912); and compare with Professor James Seth on drink regulation in Norway, CR Dec 1906.
56. e.g. 19C Nov 1909 - Sir A.T.Arundel. Also Cromer in QR Oct 1913 suggested that Indian peasants could take no more appreciable burdens in taxation.
57. Religion: ER Jan 1914 "The Aga Khan"; 19C Sept 1912 - Sir Bamfylde Fuller, and Jan 1912 - Swami Babu Bharati, Mar 1914 - F.H.Brown, and Aug 1914 - Sir A.Fraser. Also FR Aug 1905 - W.S.Lilly, though 19C Sept 1909 - Rev J.A.Shorrock, thought it necessary to rouse sense of Christian and imperial duty in the Church of England.
Labour: 19C Mar 1914 - E.D.Morel; CR Feb 1912 - Sir H.Seton Kerr, July 1906 - Sir A.E.Pease, Mar 1914 - W.Blane, Dec 1905 - W.Maitland.
58. 19C Oct 1908, and Pease in CR July 1906.
59. QR 199 (Oct 1904) "British Rule in Egypt"; ER 207 (Apr 1908) "Modern Egypt" - "we wish them good luck, and their glory is our own"; ER 205 (Jan 1907) too.
60. India: QR Apr 1906, ER Oct 1907, 19C Mar 1910, WR Aug 1902 (G.W.Steevens, though criticism of higher education in India), WR 1909 p 141, p 634, and vol 172 p 61 - education will improve the people.
Also CJ Aug 24 1907 - 50 years after the mutiny there is unrest in Bengal, we must learn our lesson.
- South Africa: ER July 1909, CJ Oct 20 1906 - British labour will put South Africa on its feet, the present system exploits native labour.
61. WR 168 (1907) p 241 "The Fundamental Cause of Congo Misrule"; QR Jan 1906 also.
62. Punch Nov 1906
63. WR Aug 1902 "The Moral of the Late War", and 1907, vol 167 p 380 "The Riddle of Africa"
64. CJ Oct 10 1903, July 29 1905
65. FR May 1907 - W.F.Bailey. Similarly WR June 1904 "The Far East and Near East".
66. WR 163 (1905) p 387; ER 213 (Apr 1911) - Putnam Weale - no danger of black invasion, but of yellow. CR Feb 1911, p 231 - Lyde - blonde white likely to disappear from the earth. WR 169 (1908) p 520 also; though 170 p 261 refuted this, saying that men were all of one blood. CJ Oct 5 1907 noted numbers of Chinese going to Australia.
67. QR 198 (Apr 1904) "Chinese Labour for South Africa"; CJ Oct 22 1904 "Chinese Labourers on the Rand Mines" - why does South Africa need this labour?
68. WR May, June 1904, 1905 p 580, 656, 699 - the "German Jew horde which controls the gold mines" etc. Also Porter ch 3, ch 4.
69. CJ Mar 11 1905. Though FR Mar 1914 - Saint Nihal Singh - policy of government to keep "free" and ex-indentured Indians out of South Africa, while no objection is made to those who are slaving in mines and plantations.
70. CJ May 14 1904; and e.g. May 30 1908, Oct 3 1908 (Tasmania), Jan 30 1909 (Panama), and June 25 1910 (China) etc.
71. QR 205 (July 1907) "British Investments Abroad" - $1\frac{1}{2}$ times 1897 levels.
72. WR Nov/Dec 1903 "Commercialism and Imperialism".

Chapter Six

1. Marder, op cit, p 13
2. See above, ch 3.
3. See above, chs 4 and 5.
4. London Quarterly Review, Jan 1896; similarly Spect Oct 24 1896, and Sir G.S. Clarke, "The Limitations of Naval Force" in 19C Aug 97.
5. Marder p 16, 17. Manchester Guardian Nov 11 1902, The Times June 14 1894; VF Oct 11 1894, and 19C Nov 93 - for irrational French hatred.
6. Justice July 23 1898
7. CJ May 23 1896.
8. ATYR Aug 20 1859.
9. QR 174 (Apr 92) "Naval Warfare and National Defence", 130 (Jan 71) "Defences of the United Kingdom". Similarly FM Feb 52 "State and Prospects of England"; ATYR Aug 1 1885 "The Auxiliary Navy"; MM 63 (1893) "The Great War".
ER 144 (July 76) watched the German navy "with interest" so that we could learn from it, and 153 (Jan 81) prided itself on British value for money in shipbuilding.
10. QR 174 (Apr 92), MM 58 (1888)
11. After all, the navy had set the empire up; and exploration of great rivers as commercial maritime outlets was a continuing theme (Hyam p 21, 23, etc)
12. Bentinck, quoted in Hyam p 20.
13. Hyam p 70. Also see Robinson and Gallagher on the routes to India.
14. IIN coverage in 1857 well illustrates this dual approach.
15. BM 43 (Nov 59) "The Future of India and her Army". Similarly MM 64 (1891) - the good name we earn for ourselves by government of India. QR 101 (Jan 57) "Realities of War in the Crimea" - little wars as a stain on the British name. Though QR 104 (Oct 58) - if putting down the mutiny had elevated Britain's military reputation, also let us hope it has shown her the task she has in front of her.
16. e.g. WR 91 (Oct 78), ER 187 (Jan 1898) etc.
17. WR 89 (Jan 78), ER 187 (Jan 98), QR 146 (Jan 79), e.g. Also QR 181 (Oct 95) "Public Opinion in India" - radicals' theories not applicable to races to which it is proposed they be applied.
18. QR 111 (Apr 62) "Indian Islands"
19. QR 170 (Apr 1900) "North West Frontier Policy"; see also ch 4 n 86. QR (Oct 74) "Provincial Turkey", for Turkey as the key to India.
20. e.g. a) BM May 54, Feb 57, July 79, Nov 80; MM 78-9; WR Jan 80; QR Oct 66, Apr 74.
b) FM Aug 57, Sept 73, Nov 73, Oct 75; BM Jan 54; MM 75, 80, 88; ER Jan 57, Apr 74, July 75, Jan 90; WR Apr 56, Jan 92; QR Apr 75. IIN 1857 p 310 - annexing Karrak in the Persian Gulf would give Britain control of the Gulf.
c) FR Sept 15 1865, Dec 1 1869, Mar. Sept 80; MM 73; ER Oct 80, Oct 83.
21. FM 25 (Jan 55) actually with respect to Russia on the Amoor, but during the Crimea conflict, and used to add to opprobrium arising from Crimea. (Need to find men to conduct England through paths of justice and honour, etc.)
22. e.g. FM n.s. 6 (1873), MM 32 (1875), ER 105 (Jan 57) QR 110 (Oct 61), 136 (Apr 74), 176 (Jan 93); FM 72 (1899).
23. e.g. FM n.s. 6 (Nov 73) "British Policy in Persia and Central Asia"
24. FM n.s. 10 (Oct 75) "Russia"
25. BM 57 (Jan, Oct 79). Also July 79 commended peace with honour and the new frontier. (Similarly QR 138 (Apr 75)).
26. ER 105 (Jan 57).
27. FR 38 (Nov 82) "The Reform of Egypt"

28. See ch 3 n 55. (WR Apr 87 - either take Egypt or leave it, no middle way). Also BM 70 (June 83) - if we went, there would be chaos, and France would step in. Similarly BM 77 (Apr 85) British failure in Khartoum would encourage Russian aggression. MM 46 (1882) and 50 (1884), FM 63 (June 61) and BM 55 (Oct 77) - Russia must not supersede Canal with new route to Persian Gulf (e.g. by railway). Better to fight France than let her occupy Egypt alone. Otherwise Britain needs more troops in India to meet possible attack from Egypt (!)
And see MM 98-9, FR 98 - desirable to have French assent to occupation, but we can live without it.
29. ER Oct 1882
30. Punch 1895 vol 108 p 170
31. QR 142 (Jan 77). Also BM 56 (Mar 79) similarly blamed Gladstone. CJ Apr 14 1900 - Britain fighting the war to retain India; FM 1377 - thought it an unpleasant but necessary duty to annex the Transvaal, as the natives had a stronger case against the Boers than vice versa. FR 1879 thought Britain had no right meddling in South Africa, while 1881 suggested we could not trust any government, as even Gladstone had sent troops, and in Dec 1883 FR declared that "No Cape Colonist is a Dutchman in that sense" - Rev D.P.Faure, a Cape Colonist.
32. QR 154 (Apr 83). Also BM Mar 79. FR 1880 - F.R.Statham - asked whether we were to regard Portugal as an African Russia. FM Aug 77 - peaceful annexation of Transvaal - those who were frightened by Russia in central Asia should consider how all empires are compelled by the exigencies of cases.
ER Apr 79 compared Britain in South Africa with France in Algeria.
33. CJ Dec 28 1895 "The Water Gate of the Transvaal".
34. CJ June 20 1896, QR Oct 1899, ER Apr 1896, BM Aug 96, Mar 1900.
35. QR 195 (July 1902)
36. And to the domestic politicians behind them - see the anti-Gladstone missives in QR Oct 96, July 97, Oct 99; and approval of liberal imperialists in July 1900. Also ER Apr 1900, BM Nov 1900, MM 1899-1900, FR 1891.
37. CM July-Dec 1899, p 348.
38. W.E.Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870 (Yale 1957) pp 222-3, e.g.
39. ER Oct 60, BM Oct 56, FR Aug 66 - "we easily retain our position as the leading nation in geographical discovery".
Also QR Apr 61, July 66, Apr 67, FR Aug 66.
40. ER 147 (Jan 78) "Stanley's Discoveries and the Future of Africa"
41. ER 126 (Oct 67) "The Christians of Madagascar".
42. ER 179 (Apr 94) "African Exploration". Also ECJ Nov 20 1852:
"Our officers in India are frequently employed in labours of a highly peaceful and civilising character, all tending to develop the resources of our great intertropical empire, and to make us better acquainted with its topography and its inhabitants."
43. MM 37 (1877-8) p 35. Similarly MM 80 (1899) p 105. Though BM 42 (Apr 58) - the primary object of the geographer is the benefit of the voiceless savages.
44. CJ June 10 1876.
45. FR Feb 1889 "England and Germany in East Africa".
46. FR Jan, July 1890, Aug 1892, R of R July 90.
47. R of R July 90, Aug 90. Similarly Punch 1890 p 307 (see above ch 4).
48. R of R Sept 90.
49. Punch 1890 vol 98 p 30, vol 99 p 55.
50. See Fieldhouse, op cit, chapter on tropical Africa.
51. BM Mar 99 "An Unwritten Chapter of History: The Struggle for Borgu".
52. See e.g. Gooch and Temperley, op cit, Taylor article, cit.
53. BM July 74, "Brackenbury's Narrative of the Ashanti War"; CJ June 11 1853 "African Kings at Home" - praised marvels and excitement of Africa in the same way.

54. BM July 89
55. WR Jan 83
56. ER Oct 73
57. e.g. FM Feb 57, QR Oct 62, IILN 57 p 31, 238, 306
58. FM Jan 61
59. e.g. FM Feb 57: imperatively necessary for the protection of British interests and still more British honour...
60. IILN 1857. Punch 1895 vol 109 p 206. Also 1895 p 211 - Russia asking if Japan should keep Sino-Japanese war gains, and John Bull saying yes.
61. BM June 99. See above ch 4 n 39.
62. ER Jan 96, Apr 1904. Though Oct 1900 - Russia naturally exists on the north China boundary, so we should not object.
Also FM Jan 55, Feb 57, Jan 61; QR Oct 62; FR 98.
Anglo-Japanese alliance was seen both to protect India and create a balance of power in Europe.
63. BM Apr 99 (and QR July 97)
64. ER Jan 96, QR Oct 62.
65. ATYR Nov 5 1887, Feb 27 1875; FR 1902 p 138. Also ATYR June 9 1883 - New Guinea annexation may have caused much map-searching.
BM Mar 96, Siam no longer has power to embroil two European powers - British and French.
66. QR July 77. BM May 60. Though on the Arctic exploration: - men dare anything for their flag, but we doubt if the Polar Sea will produce any more benefits - ER Jan 77.
67. MM 14 (1866), QR Jan 1901, WR Feb 96. Also WR Apr 70 for Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay as against Paraguay.
68. ER July 56. Security and economics also in QR July 63 - West Indies guarded by cheap black African regiments.
ER Jan 1900 talked of the audacity of the Venezuelan claim, but praised the settlement.
69. WR Jan 1903, May 98, FR May 91. Disputes as above (n 68) and ER July 56 etc. See also Monger, op cit.
70. HM 1898-9 p 385.
71. Hyam pp 202-5. Also Bolt p 73. And FR 1902 p 138, HM 1900 p 610 for America now laughing at British unpreparedness for Boer War.
QR July 99, Spencer Wilkinson, "The War in South Africa and the American Civil War", CR June 1900. (Also see ch 4 n 85).
72. First used in London Quarterly Review 1853. "Imperial Federation and America" in FM 1854, though FR thought it "impossible" in 1870.
73. Hyam p 33.
74. WR Apr 65. Also WR Jan 61. FM Feb 73 saw the British Isles as the centre of all colonies, self-governing or otherwise, working together for one great purpose - "Indisposed to aggression, and not jealous of the welfare of other states we might prevent wars."
ER Jan 65 showed another side, looking forward to independent British North America, it said: "Amalgamation is the order of the day, the approved process by which capitalists of all classes are doubling their profits and defying their competitors".
75. QR Apr 1900
76. MM 1869 p 417, 1865 p 168; FM Jan 61, Oct 64, etc.
77. ER Apr 65
78. WR Jan 1914. FM May 1896 pro South African Federation.
79. Punch 1870 vol 59 p 93. Also Hyam pp 86-7
80. Quoted Hyam p 94. R of R Dec 90 cartoon on Midlothian view of Home Rule.
81. Blewett, op cit; Hyam, op cit, p 112, 118, etc.
82. QR Apr 82, R of R July 91, CR Dec 70 (p 165); 19C Sept 77.

83. 19C Sept 78, MM 1884-5 p 430, CR Dec 70.
FM Jan 73 - G.Baden-Powell - saw English colonies as one state, and quoted Disraeli's self-government and military code as part of imperial consolidation. There was seen to be evidence of recruiting in colonies.
84. ER July 89
85. Thomson, op cit, p 217
86. WR Jan 1914, pp 25-31
87. Monger, Grey, op cit; and L.Penson, "The New Course in Foreign Policy", T.R.H.S. (1943) - details such as the 1895 "unfriendly act" declaration of Grey, and Britain not ganging up on Japan to take away her war gains. Also Balfour's statement that the maintenance of Constantinople's status quo was not the primary interest of this country.
88. BM Apr 77 - Crete as bulwark against Russia in the Bosphorus; QR Oct 74 - the division of Turkish territory and Turkey's relation to India.
FM Sept 73 "Cyprus"; and Punch 1878 pp 162-3, for cartoon of Bear and Lion on a mountain pass: "Which Goes Back?"
89. Also FM Sept 73
90. ER July 67
91. Punch 1870 p 69
92. V.I.Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1905)
93. MM 1893 p 414 (F.Greenwood)
94. CJ Apr 16 1881 - society needs a caste with a warlike or idle proclivity.
95. R of R Dec 90. FR 1899 p 914
96. QR July 97. Also BM Mar 96.
97. Although CJ Apr 14 1900 saw the Baghdad Railway as a check to Russian encroachment.
98. BM Mar 1911, CR Jan 1911 p 114
99. Hyam, op cit, p 285. Also Econ May 9 1891, concern that B.S.A.C. - power without responsibility - might provoke friction with the European nations in Africa.
Also Porter, op cit, p 42.
100. Hyam p 377.
101. And for her inhabitants. Wyndham said: "The empire must be defended, the empire must be united; the manhood of the empire must be safeguarded" (quoted in Hyam p 119)
102. Hyam p 107. (Though Italy in Abyssinia would not fit this rule.)

Chapter Seven

1. Robinson and Gallagher, cit, introduction.
2. e.g. WR 77 (Apr 76) "Our Colonial Empire" reviewing W.E.Forster address.
19C June 1877 - Sir Henry Birchenough - said foreign annexations even with tariff barriers did not injure trade.
3. Increased Armaments Protest Committee 1896 pamphlet; Lord Farrer in pacifist journal Concord Jan 98; and CR Dec 98.
Controversy flourished throughout the intellectual monthlies in 1899, following Hobson's writings in Aug 98. (See Porter, op cit, pp 193-9, and E.S.Beesly in Positivist Review, Feb 94)
4. L.S.Woolf, Economic Imperialism (1921), Porter, op cit, p 221.
Also ER 207 (Jan 1908), etc.
5. See below. Also Platt, cit, p 365. If we had not acted, argued J.Chamberlain in 1896, Africa would have been occupied by our commercial rivals.
6. Platt, cit, p 355.
7. Platt, cit, p 364.
8. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa cit, and "Imperialism" article cit.
9. Platt p 260.
10. Platt article on 'Imperialism of Free Trade', cit
11. Platt, Finance cit, p 356; and S.R.Stembridge, "Disraeli and the Millstones" in Journal of British Studies, v, (1965) 135-8.
12. Hyam, cit, pp 98-100. And Hobsbawm, as above, ch 2 and 3.
13. Fieldhouse, op cit, conclusion chapter.
14. Hyam p 28, and the initial argument in Hyam and Martin, cit.
15. Platt, "New Imperialism" article especially.
16. Lenin's phrase.
17. C.W.Newbury, "The Development of French Policy: The Lower and Upper Niger", in Journal of Modern History (1959), and Louis and Giffard(ed).
18. Marx, op cit, pp 272-80.
19. FM 21 (Jan 51) "Commerce With Africa"
20. ER 108 (Oct 58) "The Slave Trade in 1858".
Also Br QR Oct 57 p 332 ff, in "Travels in Central Africa" by H.Barth - no blind chance that has sent out these explorers. These countries are capable, under the simplest cultivation, of becoming great producing and exporting countries. "Is there not a wonderful future for Africa?"
CMI 1857 p 193 "The Niger Mission", by Rev S.Crowther:
"the annual exports from Western Africa at the present time cannot be less than 2,000,000 l; while there is every reason to believe that it will double, if it does not treble, or even quadruple itself in the next twenty years, if it be only protected until it has struck its roots in a little deeper in the soil of Africa." For we have only touched the coast - the interior is "far richer".
IIN Nov 7 1857 p 451 : "The enlightened mind of Dr Livingstone recognises the fact that commerce must first penetrate the African continent and conciliate the natives before Christianity can bestow its blessings on the natives."
21. QR Apr 61 "Travels and Discoveries". Also July 60 "State of the Kaffir Tribes", by Colenso - "favourable commerce".
MM 4 (1861) p 163 "The opening up of central Africa to commerce, Christianity and civilisation - such is the aim."
22. MM 37 (1877-8) p 85 "African Exploration and Its Results" - Sir R. Alcock. Livingstone, driven from Bechuana mission by the Boers in 1852, little dreamed that this was the first step to open the continent. As Livingstone said: "The Boers resolved to shut up the interior and I determined to open the country, and we shall see who have been the most successful - they or I".
23. WR Apr 77 "Slavery in Africa"
24. WR July 77 "The Cradle of the Blue Nile"
25. QR July 86 "New Markets for British Industry".

26. ATYR Apr 3 1886 "An African Arcadia". Also July 23 1892 "The Real Heart of Africa" - we can learn a lot from Tanganyika, physically, ethnologically and commercially the real heart of Africa. The further from the coast, the better the moral, social and political condition of the natives. Industry, mining and pottery abound.
27. ATYR Apr 29 1893 "Mashonaland"
28. FR Aug 89 "Downing Street Versus Chartered Companies in Africa" - Joseph Thomson. Replies by Florah Shaw, Sept 89 - "Dry Nursing the Colonies", and Nov 89, "British South Africa Company" - Britain should direct only British home affairs. If she tries British and imperial, she would fail at both. Chartered companies extend civilisation, therefore.
29. Econ May 9 1891. 'Similarly Investors' Review Mar, Apr 94, and Feb 96, accused British South Africa Company of swindling shareholders and of injustice to blacks.
30. Econ May 9 1891 pp 591-2. Also Jun 4 and Oct 8 1892, July 4 and 25 Apr 96, and Jan 4 96 - if amity in South Africa fails, it is due not to patriots but to men who are moved by hopes of percentages. Also New Age Jan 9 1896. And see Porter p 42.
31. ATYR Oct 29 1892 "Up The Niger". Uplands are unfit for European civilisation.
32. WR Jan 83 "West African Wars"
33. ibid
34. QR Apr 1901 "Relief of Kumassi"
35. FM Jan 74 "Ashanti War"
36. R.D.Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism (London and New York 1974) p 71.
37. CJ Oct 10 1896 "Coffee Planting in British Central Africa".
38. CJ Feb 8 1896 "The Uganda Railway". Similarly CJ June 26 1897 "Ugandan Protectorate" - "every likelihood of a good market for British products".
39. CJ May 14 1904 "The Prospects of British East Africa".
40. QR July 1901 "Negro Nileland and Uganda".
41. ER Apr 79 "South Africa"
42. ER Oct 71 "South Africa and her Diamond Fields". Also QR Jan, Apr 1901 "Settlement of South Africa" - state should finance industry, enterprise and immigration; and strong case for placing share of cost of war on the Transvaal taxpayers. State control of mines, minerals and means of communication meant an ownership which already conferred advantages on South Africa.
Similar views in Jan 1902 - the "moral" progress of the Rand.
43. QR Oct 62 "China" and NR Jan 1864 p 270 "Japan".
44. QR Apr 72 "Journeys to North China".
45. CJ Nov 1 1861 "Telegraphic Communication with China".
46. e.g. FM Feb 57 "The War With China" - "magnitude of our commercial relations with China"; Mar 61 - China's commerce was what English and Indian revenues depended on; ER Oct 55 "Political Disturbance in China" - opening China to foreign intercourse would lead to general advancement; and ER Apr 57 "British Relations With China" - the magnitude of commerce at stake.
47. MM 1871-2, p 218 "The Chinese Audience Question".
48. QR Oct 1902, MM 1872 p 493, and QR July 1902 "Things Japanese".
49. e.g. BM Aug 63; WR Apr 52, July 53, Apr 63, July 78; QR Apr 63, Jan 71; Br QR Apr 58; NR July 67; ER July 55, Oct 63; MM 60-1 p 417; FM Apr 52, Oct 62, etc.
50. QR Apr 63 "Progress and the Present State of British India".
51. MM Nov 60-Apr 61 p 412 "On the Development of India".
Also WR Apr 63 - lamentable want of British enterprise and manufactures to establish the growth of the cotton industry in India.
Br QR Apr 58 p 510 - "The Indian archipelago, is, then, distinctively the theatre of a great commercial future."

52. FM Oct 62 "The Opium Revenue of India"
53. QR Apr 63, and see above n 50.
54. BM Aug 63 "Indian Prosperity", with Manchester rich and India poor. We should not deprive Indian cotton weavers of their raw material. WR Oct 68, on China, felt we should hardly wish to shield Manchester shirtings from competition on equal terms with Shanghai cotton cloths in the internal markets.
55. WR July 78, in "India and Our Colonial Empire".
56. ER Oct 63 "Chinchona Cultivation in India"
57. ER July 55 "Indian Substitutes for Russian Produce"
58. See also WR July 75 "Pacific Islanders' Protection Bill" - we should fit the natives to develop the resources of these fertile lands, destined by nature to add to the comforts and enjoyments of civilised man; and WR Mar 1901 "Jamaica" - "there is no other colony in which labour and capital and English enterprise could find more profit (though compare this with attitudes in Apr 53 and July 67).
Also QR July 59 "Travels to West Pacific Isles" - the gain to commerce has been larger than expected, but will be more important still in the future; FM Sept 61 "Java" - could produce "almost unlimited wealth"; and CJ Sept 18 1897 "Chili" - "promising country" etc.
59. QR Jan 85, vi, "The Congo and the Berlin Conference". The same issue included "The Navy and the Empire" - our commerce can only be retained by altering our naval policy of steady decrease. Every effort is required to bring us up to that preponderance over France we formerly possessed.
Similarly R of R July 90 "Progress of the World" - the Anglo-German agreement over Heligoland was seen as a melancholy monument over the grave of our lost opportunities.
Earlier BM (Dec 69) had said that Britain must take over the Suez Canal or rivals would gain by it.
60. ER July 84 "The Future of the Congo"
61. CJ Mar 5 1898 "The French at Lake Chad". Similarly ER July 83 "The French in Anam and Tonquin" - "we enter upon this discussion with no feelings of jealousy or hostility to France."
"England has no apprehension whatever from French success" - but worries about France failing to sustain European superiority and reputation.
62. WR Jan 85 "France and Cochin China"
63. QR Oct 83 "The French Occupation of Tonquin"
64. ER Apr 73 "Trade Routes to Western China"
65. QR Apr 76 "Central Asia"
66. WR July 73 "Emigration and the Coolie Trade in China"
67. e.g. QR Oct 99 "British Supremacy in South Africa"
68. As above, and e.g. QR Oct 81, viii, "Trade" - foreign powers put tariffs on because they do not think that Britain will retaliate.
69. QR Apr 75 "England and Russia in the East" (see ch 3 n 50 above). Though ER July 93 - Russian-Siberian railway will only assist British trade in the North Pacific, and make Siberian resources available. Do not dread the Russian strength, therefore.
70. Hyam pp 103-6. Goldie wrote of the Africans' duty to exploit their resources effectively through trade, in 1898, and R.Churchill did similarly on the Boers in South Africa. (see also ch 4 n 19).
71. ER Apr 55, Oct 62 - our colony in Labuan has done some good, and opened the way to more; Oct 72 "Corea" - the legitimate development of European commerce and navigation in East Asia. Philanthropists will want Corean people, under adequate safeguards for their protection, brought into beneficial relations with the rest of mankind.
72. ER Oct 52 "Japan"
73. ER Oct 72 "Fiji Islands" - the same was said for North American penetration of Nicaragua, in contrast to Spanish involvement (ER Apr 52).
74. QR July 68 "Railways in India"; and anti-slave articles (e.g. QR Oct 72) saying trade improves when slavery is abolished.
75. ER Jan 78 "Stanley's Discoveries". Also MM 1891-2 p 110 "Experiences of an African Trader" - philanthropy tempered by dividends.

76. S.Smiles, Self-Help (1859)
77. MM 1900 p 272 "Rhodesia and Northwards"
78. CJ Sept 23 1872 "Livingstone's Discoveries". Also WR Jan 58 "African Life", quoting Livingstone: "We ought to encourage the Africans to cultivate for our markets, as the most effectual means, next to the Gospel, of their elevation."
79. QR Jan 87 "Canadian Pacific Railway".
80. QR Apr 92 "Naval Warfare and National Defence".
81. QR Oct 1900 "The Chinese Crisis"
82. Hyam p 135 - surplus emotional and sexual energy.
83. QR July 63 "The Empire"
84. WR July 74 "Emigration"
85. ER Oct 60 "Recent Geographical Researches" - again England stood foremost in these undertakings, along with Germany, whose mental and physical temperament alike fitted her people.
86. ER "The Future of South Africa" (James Bryce) Jan 1898.
Also ER Apr 51 "Shall We Retain Our Colonies" - asked the question why abandon them when colonial government is cheaper than the savings made through letting them go. Colonies were friendly trading communities.
87. WR Apr 86 "The Economics of Emigration" - emigration is one of those subjects on which 'King Demos' is likely to form a wrong judgement.
July 86 "Growth of Colonial England" - British South Africa had history, commerce and a suitable climate. The enormous trade value of the native races to the industrial population of the mother country was emphasised.
88. BM July 89 "Natural Emigration"
89. FM Aug 52 "Gold and Emigration"
90. CJ Apr 16 1853, and Jan 29.
91. CJ Jan 29 1853 "The Right Kind of Emigrants", and "Things Talked of in London".
92. CJ Apr 2 "A Voice on Emigration to Australia" by "A Colonist".
93. RM July 21 1860, Nov 27 1858, Jan 8 1859 "The Emigrant's Farewell to His Native Shores" (adapted for music:
"Yet the scenes of my boyhood shall ne'er be forgotten,
Oh! home of my fathers, old England, farewell."
And May 19 1860 "The Emigrant Ship" - result of hard times.
(July 21 1860 noted the lack of call for waiting on lady customers, or for banking)
94. ER Oct 1901 "Natives of South Africa" - native population too large for British working class emigration.
CJ July 19 1902 "The Coming Rush to South Africa" - did not suggest people be in too much of a hurry, though there was no finer field to go to.
CJ Oct 20 1906, however, asserted that British labour was the only thing to put South Africa back on its feet. The present caste system put the Kaffirs under exploitation.
95. CJ Oct 11 1873 "A Warning to Emigrants", Sept 8 1900 "Paraguay, the Transvaal of South America".
96. e.g. CJ Aug 3 1895 "The Land of Palm Oil" - the commercial potentiality of this region is limited in range. (See also n 31-2 above).
97. QR Jan 61 "Canada and the Arctic" - "France has never possessed the art of colonisation".
98. CJ Nov 22 79 (and WR Jan 60) - even Ceylon was seen as promising field for English enterprise - "we must see the Resplendent Isle as a possession and dwelling place, not a mere bivouac and shop".
99. ER Oct 1902 "Population"
100. WR July 1905 pp 574-5 (in "The Month"), and Oct 1906 p 375 "Shall We Tax Land?" (Lewis H Berens)
101. ER Oct 1892. Also MM 1883 p 127 "The Scramble For Wealth", by a London artisan - who can wonder that all indulge in this scramble?
102. WR Oct 52 "Our Colonial Empire" - colonisation comes of nature - thus the importance of commercial freedom and the hope for confederation of empire.
Though also see WR Oct 54 on Brooke - the answer not to pour emigrants in, but to develop the native resources.

103. BM Jan 51 "The Currency Extension Act of Nature". See also K.Marx and F.Engels, On Colonialism (1865) pp 222-3
104. FM Jan 64 "Japan"
105. CJ Sept 26 1868 "Plowden's Travels in Abyssinia"
106. ER Apr 91 "Cyprus" - "England alone has chosen to leave the work undone" - no roads and harbours in what should be an opening to Levantine trade and a naval stronghold.
107. e.g. CJ June 25 1910 "China's Awakening" - Japan used to import British pig iron, but now buys Chinese.
108. ER Apr 93 "Mashonaland"
109. ER Apr 1900 "Partition of the West Pacific"
110. FR 1901 p 20 "Will England Last the Century?"
111. WR Sept 1901 "Imperialism and the Coming Crisis for Democracy" (J.E.Ellam)
112. ibid. See also WR Nov-Dec 1903 "Commercialism and Imperialism" by Godard.
113. e.g. in CR Aug 98, Speaker 5 July 1902 letter, etc.
114. WR Feb 1904. Similarly QR Apr 79 on "The South African Problem" - we furnish men and money to render harmless the miserable people whose special defenders we had liked to consider ourselves.
115. e.g. Arnold-Forster in 19C Feb 96, Sir Frederick Young July 96, S.Low Aug 96, Sir Julius Vogel Mar 97; and Percy Hurd CR Aug 97. Though the Economist opposed an imperial customs union on Feb 1, Mar 28, June 6 and 13 1896.
116. Porter, op cit, p 46
117. QR Jan 73 "History of British Commerce 1783-1870" by Leone Levi.
118. WR Oct 98 "Aspects of Empire and Colonisation"
119. ATYR Sept 9 1865 "Our Colonies"
120. ER Jan 65 "British American Federation" - we look forward to the independence of British North America.
121. ER Apr 1909 "The Economics of Empire"
122. ER Oct 1902 "The Empire and the Colonies". Also Apr 1903 "Expansion and Expenditure" - the trade argument in favour of expansion is not altogether convincing. July 1903 "Back to Protection" - an increase in food prices without getting extra profits.
123. QR July 1907 "The Last Colonial Conference"
124. QR July 1907 "British Investments Abroad" - showed £1100 m in America, £470m to Africa, £440m Asia, £350m Australia, £201m Europe. These were 1½ times the 1897 levels, except for Europe and Australia, though market prices of the Transvaal shares had risen. Also Apr 1904 - there should be no interference in Chinese labour in South Africa (a good customer); and Oct 1904, showing the prosperity of Egypt since British rule.
125. ER Apr 94 "African Exploration"
126. e.g. articles in ER Apr 63, WR July 90, ER Nov 89, NR July 87, MM 77.
127. QR Oct 88 "Technical Education and Foreign Competition"
128. QR Oct 87 "Suez Canal and the Egyptian Question"
129. QR Apr 83 "Mexico" Also BM June 86 "Indian Arms" - "India is gradually ceasing to be a word of vague meaning in England." We have Indian draperies in fashionable English drawing rooms. CJ July 20 1889 "The Irish Gold Fields" - gold mining in antiquity, and still small quantities today.
130. ER Jan 77 "Arctic Expeditions". Though ER Apr 91 "Voyages to the South Pole in the Eighteenth Century and Early Nineteenth Century" : extraordinary if any other nation than Britain, occupying the Cape and New Zealand, relinquishes to any other nation the privilege of accomplishing within the antarctic regions whatever is able to be accomplished.
131. Hyam and Martin, op cit, p 1.

Chapter Eight

1. CMI 1857 p 265. See also MM 1863-4 p 288. (Though Curtin pp 325-8 shows how missionaries allowed the popular view in their widespread press, only putting the more sophisticated one in the papers of limited circulation.)
2. 19C Apr 1880 "Imperialism and Socialism" (F. Seebohm). Also Hyam p 156.
3. FM Aug 57 (and compare with Dec 52 - people are happy under British rule.) There was also suspicion that MPs had no idea how India was governed. And: "The country has been remarkably free from anything like internal disaffection".
4. ILN 1857 v 31 p 185. And ATYR Aug 15 1857, B' Nov, Dec 57, WR Jan, Oct 58; QR Jan 58 - fear of losing India. Also CJ Feb 11 1860: "Let us govern India by superior intelligence, honesty, virtue, morality, not by the mere force of heavier metal.... The account of the attack and capture of Lucknow is perhaps the most deeply interesting piece of writing in the book" (about W.H. Russell, My Diary in India 1858-9).
5. CR Oct 1867 p 172.
6. QR Oct 57
7. QR July 58. CJ Feb 8 1862 - slightly ironic - Indians need education to be fit for society, for example Mrs Parvenue's drawing room. ER July 82, natives are better off, but do not always know it. MM 1891 p81 - leave a good name for Britain in history; and WR Jan 82.
8. QR Apr 75. And ECJ Nov 20 1852 - to make us better acquainted with them; and ATYR Mar 27 1880 - what England has done for India. Also FM Sept 69; MM 63 p 332 (especially on public health).
9. NR 1864 (Jan) p 136. QR Oct 58 (Bright speech) was also anti-military enforcement of our system of government - but QR did not agree.
10. WR Jan 82 etc. Though WR Apr 58 - we must erect a High Court of Judgement as a barrier to the native states against the greedy encroachments of our bureaucracy.
11. Bolt p 110
12. Lorimer p 200, Curtin p 479.
13. Quoted in Hyam p 44
14. Curtin p vi
15. CJ June 11 1853 "African Kings At Home"; and ATYR July 23 1892 on Tanganyika. Also CJ Sept 6 1856 - some readers will speculate on the utility, apart from the religion, of attempting to introduce a new kind of civilisation amongst such a people.
16. BM Apr 58 "The Missionary Explorer"
17. ER Apr 51 "Shall We Retain Our Colonies?" and ER Oct 89 "at least ostensibly the salvation of Africa is the policy of Europe".
18. e.g. articles in ER Apr 75; WR Apr 75; BM Jan 65 - better an English master than a barbaric African; ER Oct 90 "Stanley"; Apr 93 "Mashonaland"; BM July 89 - blaming the Arabs.
19. FR June 1884 "International Rivalries in Central Africa"
20. BM Oct 97 "England and France in the Basin of the Niger"
21. e.g. FR May 84 "Europe's Stake in the Sudan" - let us go and govern them from principles of justice and sound morality. Also FR Aug 84 "Egypt" by R.T. Reid; ER Oct 81, Oct 82 - policing in Egypt needs no defence; ER Jan 90 - Englishmen may be proud of their achievement; WR Apr 87 - including "no amount of misrule seems to affect Egypt to her ruin"; and compare with MM 68 pp 87, 193, and 289 (on Abyssinia).
22. MM 1894 p 464
23. ER Apr 34
24. ER Apr 77, Apr 96
25. QR July 84
26. BM July 78. Similarly MM 1900 p 294, reflecting Lincoln and America.
27. CJ Oct 22 1904, Mar 11 1905. (Though WR May 1904 and throughout 1905 was highly critical.)

28. See ch 9 below; CJ Dec 19, 26 1896 "My Kaffir"; CJ Feb 23 1884 "The Kitchen Kaffir".
29. QR Apr 79. Also WR Apr 69 and e.g. FR July 97 against the Jameson Raid.
30. WR Aug 1896, Christianising was more important than the purchase of a few thousand acres of land at a low price from a half-savage chief.
31. MM 1872-3 p 370
32. CMT 1857 p 127; QR Oct 57
33. FM May 72
34. CJ Oct 10 1903
35. CJ July 29 1905 "African Notes"
36. e.g. BM Apr 88 - toil is in the interests of the taskmasters only. Also FR Apr 82 "Africa and the Empire" by Alfred Aylward - missionaries were wrong, for those we have civilised we have contaminated by our vices. We have no interest in Africa save a trading one.
37. e.g. J. Morley on Zulu War in FR Apr 79. At the very moment England is contemplated as trustee appointed by heavenly powers on behalf of the more backward races of the earth, we are massacring them by the thousand.
FM Jan 58 - wars were unjust; ER Oct 89; WR Feb 1900 - "bastard imperialism".
38. FM Mar 75
39. ATYR May 2 1885. Also Apr 28 1894 - better to be honest about the treasure-seeking motive, than to be a missionary who waxes fat.
40. BM June 65. Similarly J.E. Forst in MM 1865 p 168 - we cannot expect Maoris to relinquish their independence until they are subjugated. FR June 77 "Maoris and Kanakas" by D. Wedderburn - it must be admitted that missionaries have been too severe in their condemnation of native customs.
Also MM 1890-1, p 381, on "The Red Man And White" - the red Indian talks of the world to come as a land "where even white men cease to lie".
41. FM Mar 66. Also WR July 67, unprofitable estates following the exhaustive system of agriculture which goes with slavery.
42. e.g. FR Nov, Dec 1865; BF 1857-8 p 70 over China: "The atrocities perpetrated by the British authorities at Canton have excited but one feeling throughout the country - shame for the honour of the nation, and sympathy for the unhappy victims exposed to the ravages of shot and shell".
43. e.g. MM 1880 p 152 - praising Russian civilisation and urging Anglo-Russian friendship as an "alliance of Christianity".
44. WR asked in Jan 54 "What are the "blessings of civilisation" for the dark race but labour, care, drunkenness, disease and ultimate extinction?" (Significantly this was early in the period, and about the South Seas.)
45. QR Apr 61. (Though QR Oct 72 regretfully noted that British capital surreptitiously aided the maintenance of the East Africa slave trade and QR suggested the establishment of Christian negro settlements, as in West Africa.)
46. ER Jan 78; CJ Sept 23 1872 - commerce quietly insinuates into barbarous populations the good which conquest endeavours to force upon them.
47. FM Jan 51 (also Jan 58 on Livingstone)
48. WR Jan 58
49. WR Apr 77. Also BF 1858 p 35 - at length Africa can be fully explored and opened to civilisation and religion of Western Europe. Commerce can be expanded provided the slave trade is stopped. The welfare of the whole negro race is involved.
Also Hyam p 42, quoting Palmerston that economic interest would rise as the slave trade vanished, as negroes would develop legitimate commerce. See Jarrett-Kerr p 2, Potts p 2, Macdonald p 273.
50. ER July 84 urged the opening of waters of the Congo to the commerce of the world, to solve the problems of the area. MM 91-2 - philanthropy tempered by dividends; and FR Oct 84 - England teaches the blessings of peace and industry by the power of commerce.

51. ER Jan 92
52. WR Jan 82 - "The Boers are already setting about their own commercial ruin" - will English taxpayers again interfere to save them?
53. QR Jan 1902 "The War And Its Lessons"
54. Hobsbawm, etc.
55. QR Apr 63. Also CJ Nov 20 1858 - need British as capitalists and in government. ER Jan 58 too; though FM Apr 72 showed criticism of an economy based on opium.
56. QR July 68 - also helped agriculture, mitigated famine, fostered a spirit of commercial enterprise, and lessened the fondness for military adventure which was the former national enjoyment.
57. ATYR July 14 1861; FM May 58.
58. CJ June 23 1866
59. QR Apr 62 "Borneo and Sarawak"; ER July 82 - Chinese coolies were a necessity in the beginning, but the North Borneo Company will not reduce them to the slavery of Cuba, which is a disgrace to common humanity. The great harbours of North Borneo were very important, in view of our vast commerce.
Also WR July 75.
60. WR Feb 92. Also Oct 68 - we must win the confidence of the Chinese by showing we have their interests at heart, e.g. by introducing a neutral body of officials to collect and apportion revenue. We scarcely wish to shield Manchester shirtings from competition on equal terms with the Shanghai cotton cloths in the internal markets.
61. BM Jan 63
62. BM Feb 63
63. See also Hyam p 50 - improvement comes through commerce, and civilisation should be given to the rest of the world along British lines.
ILN 1857 p 451 - Livingstone's view of the need for commerce first, before Christianity can follow.
64. LQR Jan 96. Also Marder p 15, Spect Oct 24 1896, 19C Aug 97 (Clarke).
65. e.g. Marder p 16
66. e.g. BM Aug 96
67. e.g. MM 1877 p 70
68. WR Apr 79 "Our South African Colonies"
69. BM Oct 77 "The Khedive's Egypt and Our Route to India". Similarly QR Jan 83 "Was The Egyptian War Necessary?" - "we must resign ourselves to the disagreeable necessity of a real protectorate of the country, however much we may disagree with the fact and disguise it with a feigned name".
70. QR Jan 95 "England in Egypt", Milner.
71. QR Oct 96 (and the railroad would improve civilisation) and QR Apr 85.
72. ER Oct 73
73. QR July 63; ER Oct 90
74. QR July 66. Also ATYR Mar 3 1866 - the "trying" position of the white man in having to hold his own, far away, against an overwhelming force of numbers.
75. QR Jan 86
76. ER July 83
77. QR Jan 93 "Persia and the Persian Question"
78. FM June 65 "England's Future Attitude Towards Europe and Towards the World".
79. QR Jan 93 "Native States of India" - we must deepen the conviction that the maintenance of their government is as much within the design and care of British Indian administration as the preservation of the Queen's rule. Also BM Nov 60.
80. e.g. QR July 66 "The Value of India to England"

81. QR Apr 79 "Agrarian Distress and Discontent in India"
82. WR Jan 32 "India and Our Colonial Empire"
83. HW June 1855 "India Pickle" - an article from Household Words' reforming phase, opposing bureaucracy and the system of appointments to offices which needed, in HW's opinion, proper training and experience.
84. FM Oct 54 "India" by H.H.
85. e.g. Bryce in ER Jan 98 - contempt for manual labour, and hence it is the black which provides all the manual labour.
86. MM 1874-5 p 331
87. e.g. QR Oct 85, HW Apr 28 1894, WR Apr 79.
88. Hyam p 135, 141 - empire acquired in a fit of absence of wives.
89. WR July 74
90. Quoted in WR Nov. 99 (From H.M.Thompson, the jingoist)
91. R of R Apr 91
92. Porter p 65
93. QR Apr 92 "England Viewed Through French Spectacles"
94. 19C Apr 1880 (Seebohm); CR July-Dec 1885 p 572; 19C Jan-June 1884; Spect Oct 15 1864, July 30 1868, March 5 1898.
95. CR Jan-Apr 1886 pp 123-33. Also Bolt p 175.
96. e.g. Br QR Apr 65
97. See below ch 11
98. CR 1911 p 71 "Liberalism and Empire"
99. C.Dickens, Bleak House (1853)

Chapter Nine

1. For the idea of the hierarchy of races see Robinson and Gallagher pp 2-3, Hyam p 39, Bolt p 200. Curtin(ed), Imperialism (1971) p xv shows the view of superiority of the white man through power and knowledge, buttressing previous religious and xenophobic feelings. J.S.Mill, Representative Government, cit, ch 3, saw a "scale of civilisation" with the strong, striving, go-ahead British at the top, and the "self-helping and struggling Anglo-Saxons" Americans next, and the Germans (the right spirit of enterprise and the right religion) after that, finally followed by the Catholic Latins. Palmerston 1864: "The plain truth is that the Portuguese are of all nations in Europe the lowest on the moral scale". The Indians and Chinese were held to be skilful agriculturalists, unlike the non-settling red Indians; therefore the justification existed for killing the latter (see CR Jan-June 1901 p 401). And Occidentals were less civilised than Orientals because they were so much more hairy (see Jarrett-Kerr, op cit). ER Jan 1862 - West Indies blacks were seen as descendants of the inferior slave tribes.
2. See Semmel, Curtin(ed) p xv, Hyam p 39, etc.
3. The phrase was originally Spencer's anyway.
4. See above ch 2; Bolt and CR over the preponderance of the Anglo-Saxon element giving freedom.
5. Porter p 90.
6. Curtin p 479.
7. Lorimer p 191. Also Curtin (ed) p xv - arrogance rose steadily into the 20th century; and p vi - the age of humanitarianism ended around 1850, and 1850-80 marked the transition into full imperialism.
8. BM March 1870. Lorimer also suggests that the first few blacks in England were treated with curiosity, and that hostility built up with the growth of knowledge of their numbers. (BM article continued by discussing the problems of the Irish and negro servants in America.)
9. See SR Jan 4 1862, Oct 11 1862. And Lorimer pp 165-75.
10. HF 1858 p 172
11. ILN Feb 16 1867
12. Curtin p vi
13. Punch July-Dec 1852 p 179; WR July-Oct 1854 p 617; Ec R Dec 1852. Also Lorimer p 84; and ATYR June 10 1871 - coffee woman in European dress.
14. From the Cabinet Dictionary(1895)
15. ER Apr 75 - as the traveller in central Africa goes south, people are less nomadic and more inclined to regular rule. "Most remarkable". Also FM Apr 66, there were three classes of African tribe - Nigritian (near Niger), Nilotic (further south) and Hottentot (South and South West Africa). All came from Nubia, with progressive southerly emigrations.
16. ER Apr 93 - Hottentots quite different to Bechuanas, Kaffirs, Zulus and Basutos. Latter all belong to the Bantu family of mankind. Hottentot and Bushman were probably remote branches of the same stock originally. Hottentots were a "brave, cheerful, lazy and dirty race". Bechuanas "cheerful".
17. Bolt p 210
18. Imperial Dictionary (1902). Also Trollope in FR Feb 78 - Kafirs are really Gaikas and Galekas. Yet we call Basuto Kafirs etc. ER Apr 51 - South Africa has "Caffres, Hottentots and Negroes".
19. WR Apr 77 "Slavery in Africa"
20. FM Sept 75 "Two Years in Natal"
21. MM vol 43 (1880-1) "Royal Zulu Progress Over Bishopstowe" p 216

22. MM 1898-9 p 36 ff. Summing up: "Many savage races have a brain power equal to that of Europeans in childhood, but as a rule it ceases to develop about the age of puberty."
Though ATYR Sept 27 1879 felt "the most ridiculous specimen of mankind known to me is the educated negro".
Similarly mocking and patronising to the educated native were SR Sept 8 1866, Mar 20 1869; 19C Jan-June 84 p 559; Spect July 14 66. (FR July-Dec 84 p 445 did not disparage, however.) See also Bolt p 193, and note 114 below.
23. MM 1899-1900 p 449. OR Apr 61.
24. CJ Feb 2 78. Also CJ Apr 20 1901, May 4 1901 - "Hayti under negro rule" was "heading for barbarism", with only whites slowing it down. "Lazy negro".
25. Wesleyan Methodist Magazine Nov 66. And see Lorimer 125.
26. ATYR July 23 1892. And CJ Dec 19, 26, 1896 - J.A. Barry story "My Kaffir" - "Almost all Kaffirs are liars of a high degree", but the white goes on to find the diamond the dying Kaffir has told him about.
27. ILN 1857 p 626 (illustrated); FR Dec 88 - natural instinct of negro, child-like affection for officers. Anglo-Saxon loves manly sports, so do the bravest of the negro tribes.
BM May 91, Mar 79 - "With the Zulu savage no arguments have force save those that are backed up with a pistol."
Spect Nov 12 1898 - the Zulus, Masai and Matabele could be drafted into the British army with advantage.
CR Jan-June 1901, p 324 - many natives compare favourably with ourselves.
28. Bolt p 134. And BM Apr 90 on the Kafirs - "Their wives - for their plurality is on the Mormon principle - would be, on the contrary, displeasing ugly, with their repulsive busts, their coarse-oiled horse-hair locks, and their skewered ears and noses, were it not that this is almost redeemed by their dignity and the grace of their walk."
29. ILN 1878 pp 283-4 (Mar 30)
30. Br QR Apr 1865. RM May 18 1861.
31. NR Mar 96 p 71. Porter 152-3, 248.
Also Concord Apr 98 p 60 - that "unwomanly" woman Miss Kingsley.
32. J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Woman (1869). Contrasts existed in CJ May 4 1901, with West Indian women more hard working than men, who were lazy; and BM Feb 88, with African women in a story who were a "helpless, crushed and callous race, appearing to live merely for the sake of living, and just to satisfy the animal appetite for life." The use of the word "race" in this context seems to produce double castigation, crushing female Africans still further. (Compare this with attitudes to Victorian women at home, again.)
33. WR Oct 90.
34. See also e.g. BM Sept 51, FM Jan 53, Feb 63; ER July 65 on nudity; ATYR Mar 87 - "slavies" in Britain. CJ May 24 1884 had a Zulu romance, the course of true love runs smoother in Kafir land than in most civilised countries.
35. ER Jan 78
36. FR Sept 84
37. BM Jan 65
38. ATYR Apr 28 1894; Britain had the right of the strong hand, and the "native is a difficult man to live with, particularly to live in peace with."
39. FM Feb 78 "The Kaffir War"
40. FM Feb 80, Mar 82. Also RM Mar 30 1861. And FR Feb 78 - Trollope - we may congratulate ourselves on the civilisation we have brought the natives. We must endure this last little war without complaint.
41. CJ Feb 10 1894. Also BM Oct 97, Miss Kingsley thinks all races we encounter in Africa are moribund.

42. QR Apr 67. Though the climate seems to forbid the possibility of natives dying before the march of civilisation, "and if the negro were to vanish from the earth, we know not who from amongst the family of man would be likely or able to occupy his seat." That day is far distant, too.
WR Jan 83 - West African can never be more than a foothold for white traders. Also FR Mar 90 - "In the West Indies the negro has won, but there the climate was against the Europeans". Time and patience could now be spared to overcome the Kafir indolence - therefore the coolie system works.
43. ER Apr 93 "Mashonaland"
44. CJ June 11 1853
45. ATYR July 18 1885. Also June 10 1871: "Africa is not all sand and lions, nor do serpents and cannibals constitute the major part of the population....Patriotism apart... John Bull exchanges his beer and fog for the African sun and bananas."
46. CJ Sept 28 1872, though FM Apr 66 agreed with Livingstone: tribes were far from savage and inhospitable, and "are mild and inoffensive and friendly to strangers".
47. ATYR Mar 6 1875, July 12 1879. Also HW June 20 1857 - why is the negro black? It is not God's mark on Cain.
And ATYR July 19 1862 - the negro republic in Liberia is successful, proving the black capacity for self-government.
MM 1865 p 334 - Cairnes on negro suffrage - looking at the skull shape and judging political fitness from it.
48. BF 1866 p 58. Also MM 1865 p 426 - "an insult to the Maker who gave the black race its allotted place in the ranks of humanity to consider it as once at all points inferior".
BM Oct 85 - uncivilised African is not a poor ignorant savage, though there is an utter want of stability in his moral character.
ATYR Nov 2 1872 - "It is not often or sufficiently considered how closely allied, in their first principles, are the arts as practised by even the most barbarous races inhabiting this earth with those which are the pride of the most civilised nations."
49. BM Jan 1911 p 50 (vol 189)
50. ECJ 1852-3 Feb 19 (vol 8); RM June 7 1862.
ATYR Oct 18 1862 ran the story of "Blind Black Tom", who was "but one degree above an idiot".
51. Punch 1866 p 16
52. Punch 1866 p 26, 1870 p 241
53. ER July 54; CJ Dec 7 1907, 21 Aug 1905, and ATYR July 23 1892
54. CJ May 21 1853. Also ATYR Dec 7 1878 on the Kaffir - "Cruel and treacherous he is in war, brutal and lazy in peace". Similarly ATYR Nov 79 - "For mere brutality and roughness, the people of Afghanistan have no rivals in the world".
55. ER July 84; BM June 77 - "his inconsequence and fancifulness are those of the undeveloped human being, and are not stereotyped in his nature as in that of the ordinary Hindu".
56. CM July-Dec 99 p 47
57. BM Jan 65 "Nile Basins and Nile Explorers"
58. QR Jan 1906 "The Congo Question"
59. FR Dec 1883 "Pro Patria - The South African Problem". A similar lack of concern was shown in Punch's cartoon of a boy and girl watching a negro in swimming costume:
Mabel: In some countries those people kill and cook and eat each other, Jack!
Jack (who knows how lobsters are treated): I suppose they boil them first though! (Punch vol 79 (1880) p 131)
60. ER July 97 "Public Opinion and South Africa"
61. e.g. G.S.Jones, Outcast London (1971); H.Macleod, Class and Religion in the late Victorian City (1973); and K.S.Inglis, Churches and the Working classes in late Victorian England (1963).
Following W.Booth, In Darkest England and the Way Out (1890) and Mearns' Bitter Cry of Outcast London (1883)

62. ER Jan 1898. Also ER Oct 1901: South Africa will never be a field for the superfluous unskilled manual labour of Great Britain - the native population is too large. Shut out by race feeling, for no white man will work as a mate with a black, and by sheer competition.
63. Curtin p 244. Also p 364 - Darwin's blow to Christians allowed the earlier racism of Knox to stand more easily.
64. e.g. Bolt, Lorimer, Semmel etc.
65. Curtin p vi - 1865 was a low point in British interest in Africa. (Though exploration was still flourishing.)
66. Jamaica articles in Br QR Apr 66, QR July 66, (ER Jan 62 - "Sewell's Ordeal of Free Labour in the West Indies"), WR July 67; FM Mar 66; BM May 66; FR Dec 65; etc. See also ch 2 above, and sections in Bolt and Lorimer.
67. WR Apr 53 "British Philanthropy and Jamaican Distress"; ER Apr 51 "Shall We Retain Our Colonies?"
68. Walvin, loc cit.
69. CJ Aug 18 1866 "Life in the Mountains of Jamaica"; July 21 1866 "As Good As A White Man - And Better Too"
70. ATYR Mar 3 1866 "Black Is Not Quite White". Also July 19 1862 "The Negro Republic" - the negro's right to the free man's heritage of political liberty.
71. FR Dec 15 65 "Public Affairs"
72. QR July 66 "Papers Relating to Jamaica"
73. FM May 72, also showing the injustice of government confiscation of all slaves as being manifest even to the Spectator, "to whom, as the Pall Mall Gazette once observed, slavery is like a red rag, which deprives it of its usual good sense."
74. ATYR Aug 19 1871. Patagonians also reviewed by CJ 1871 - "Guinnard's Three Years' Slavery Among The Patagonians".
75. ATYR July 21 1888 - "There is much that is interesting and attractive about the coloured inhabitants of the Bahamas, and it is desirable that something should be done to relieve them from the grievous yoke of the truck system..."
76. CJ June 27 1868
77. CR Apr 68 p 611. CJ Aug 1893 also pointed to the colour blindness in North American Indians, as if to suggest a physiological reason for extinction.
78. e.g. FR June 77, BM Oct 51, etc. MM 65-6 p 168 - J.E.Gorst - Maoris did not start war, and the seizure of their Waikato lands was unjust. Also Cassell's Family Magazine 1892 p 100 on the Australian aborigine community - with beaten down women doing all the work.
79. FR June 77. BM Jan 68 - there are two distinct races in Polynesia, the eastern light copper-coloured, with fine physical and mental characteristics; while the western is quite black with negro traits. The Fiji natives are tall and muscular although black. Both sexes are naked to the waist, although the female bosom is now covered thanks to the missionaries. (Again the link between colour and women.) CJ Nov 13 1875 - the Pitcairn islanders are descended from the intermixture with the Bounty mutineers, and are "morally pure to a most unusual extent". (Though in fact Europeans were responsible for the introduction of venereal disease to the south seas - R and T Rienits, The Voyages of Captain Cook (1968) p 95.)
80. BM Oct 51. Also FM Jan 61: "The mere repulse of so many British soldiers by so few savages is humiliating, but it is not very extraordinary, and no doubt can exist as to the final issue of the contest."
81. FM Jan 61, Oct 65.

82. ATYR May 6 1876
83. WR Oct, June 1901. ILN 1857 p 71. CJ Nov 18 1893. And WR July 75 on Pacific Islanders' Protection Bill - our own countrymen are worse than savages in their hunt for gold. The Bill will restore trust in the honour of the white man, which is the first impulse of the weaker races. (Again honour is most important).
84. BF 1857-8 p 76 - a strong denial that the Chinese were a worthless race. WR 1908 p 520 - Asiatic races in colonies are industrious.
85. BF 1857-8 p 131.
86. HW Nov 21 1857; ATYR Feb 26 1887; Punch vol 32 p 184 (1857). Also vol 35 p 97 (1858). And FM Jan 61, BM Mar 60. Also FR Feb 1870 - H. Merivale - "Relations to China and Japan" - we must direct British industry, and keep within bounds the tendency towards overbearing and aggressive dealings with Oriental races. Britain would not be deficient in this.
87. WR Feb 1892 "China - A Far Eastern Question"
88. ATYR May 9 1868 "In the Indian Archipelago"
89. MM 1870 vol 21 p 551
90. See chs 4 and 5 above. BM Mar 60 - Japan is better than China, etc. Also FR Sept 76 - Dilke - the time will come when Japan is a useful ally to us in the North Pacific. ATYR Feb 27 1875 - trouble in Formosa might affect India.
91. FR Sept 76 "English Influence in Japan"
92. ATYR Feb 27 1875
93. FR May 1907 p 909
94. e.g. ER Jan 69, and Bolt p 131; and 190 on Greek, Italian, Assyrian and English art: "It is odd how persistently the supreme ideal of female beauty is fair". BM Jan 68 on fair and dark Polynesians, as above, n79. Also ATYR July 20 1873 - Indian troops being employed for an imperial war policy is not new, and quoting an 1802 account near Cairo - "the Indian army attracted much surprise and admiration. The Turks were astonished at the novel spectacle of men of colour being so well disciplined and trained."
95. Hyam p 206
96. Bolt p 157, 197; Hyam p 225, 232
97. SR Mar 28 1868, July 14 1877
98. ER Jan 69 - the arrogated superiority of Aryans had the effect of reducing aborigines to never-ending slavery. Spect Jan 29 1870, Hindu saw the "necessary unity of right and force" - a convenient justification of British rule and conquest.
99. FM Jan 51
100. BM Dec 56
101. FM Oct 60, BM Jan 1911 p 50
102. HW Feb 27 1858 "A Sermon For Sepoys"; FM Nov 57, Nov 58 also.
103. FM Dec 58 "India In A Mess"
104. SR Sept 8 1866
105. WR and FR for example, compared with OR and NR. This was despite the predominant move to the right of WR and FR - or was it because of it?
106. WR 1909 p 141 (vol 171), and p61 (vol 172)
107. FR Oct 84, Sept 78 "Prospects of Moral Progress in India" W.S. Blunt was a home ruler and writer, H.J.S. Cotton was Commissioner of Chittagong 1879-84.
108. WR Feb 1901 "The Indian Famine"
109. SR Aug 17 1867, Mar 28 1868, Mar 4 1871, and July 16 1877. Such views would lose India for Britain, it declared. Spect pride in the few Britons ruling many Indians, and the difficulty of understanding the Indian character. "Marvellous example" of government through "abstract principles" - Oct 22 1881. Also Bolt p 180 - there was a general unawareness of the paradox of the universal justice of British principles and the denial of a universal set of natural rights.

110. SR Sept 8 66, Mar 20 69; 19C Jan-June 84 p 559; Spect July 14 66.
111. QR Oct 95 "Rival Leaders and Party Legacies"
112. QR Oct 95 "Triumph of Conservatism"
113. Punch 1878 p 283 - cartoon of Mother Britannia beating an Afghan boy. Toy soldiers and a rifle lie on the ground. The Ameer has been treated as a "spoiled child".
114. CJ June 20 96, June 2 1900, Nov 22 1902; ER Apr 96 - The Boers have limited education and narrow views; MM 77 p 70 - "conservative" Boers, "arrant cowards", "misguided Boers", "No man sets a higher value on his personal safety than a Boer"; QR Oct 99 - the Boer does not understand gold mining; QR Oct 96 - "fanatics", "prejudiced"; ATYR Feb 22 69 - an apology, there are many bad characters in the Transvaal, but not all the population is bad; ATYR Oct 8 87 - Boers do not have spare beds, they sleep outside, the women are "bulbous" with "heavy, expressionless faces", the up-country Boer is neither pious nor patriotic, nor a bloodthirsty destroyer of native women, he is merely behind the times, with a hatred of innovation - he is an individual who, through circumstances, is cut off from civilisation; FR 1902 p 313 - the habitual laziness of the Boer; BM July 95 - "What do the dusky herd boys (Trek Boers) think as they follow their flocks? One might as well ask bird or beast for their thoughts."; WR Jan 97 - the Boer is an anachronism as a governing agent, ignorant and unprogressive, Apr 1900 - Boers come here to gain legal training, then go back and kill our soldiers - a "discreditable trait"; etc etc.
115. Thus WR June 1900 - Boer is not bad, especially in the country; ER Apr 96 - the Boer will lose (in Great Britain and South Africa).
116. BM Dec 81 "The Boers At Home, Jottings From The Transvaal"
117. MM 1877 p 70 - the Boers have a strong case against the natives, but the natives have a stronger case against the Boers. QR Oct 99, ATYR Jan 2 1869 also - slavery exists under the mild term of apprenticeship; searching for slaves is called hunting for black ivory.
118. e.g. QR July 1902 "Pan Germanism"
119. ER Apr 51 "Shall We Retain Our Colonies"; ER Apr 77 "Native Policy in South Africa" - should we protect the Boers from the natives or vice versa? MM 1877 - "The only thing that can excuse the annexation of lands belonging by nature and by right to savage races is the introduction of a just and merciful policy towards the original owners."
120. WR Apr 69 "South Africa"
121. WR Mar 1900 "The Problem in South Africa"
122. Guardian Apr 27 1901, Dec 27 1901. But WR was anti-black whenever pro-Boer, as in e.g. Aug 1901 "South Africa and Imperialism".
123. CR July 99. Also F.E.Garrett CR Oct 99 - "An English Radical must become a Jingo". Similarly in CR Jan 1900 - A.R.Carmen.
124. BM Aug 81 "Besieged in the Transvaal"
125. WR Jan 97 "The Two Sides of the South African Question". Also J.S.Mill, Representative Government cit, and WR Feb 1900.
126. ATYR June 10 1871. And FR 1902 p 301, WR 1905 p 656 - expressing the fear of blacks marrying white women.
127. CJ Mar 12 1883
128. EM May 96; also WR Aug 98 - the Jameson raid has intensified racial prejudices; QR Apr 1906 - the race question is still the most important; QR Oct 99 - the dominant factor behind the Boers is the antagonism between whites and blacks.
129. e.g. Porter p 65, 104
130. Clarion 4 Dec 97. Similarly IL Apr 4 1896. Other attacks in IL: July 17 1897, Oct 29 1898, June 17 1899 (Sudan), Mar 4 99 (Uganda), July 22 99 (Nigeria), Jan 18, Jan 25, Apr 4 (Gold Coast). Reynolds' June 14 1896.

131. FR May 1907 p 909 "The Negro Problem Stated" - William F. Bailey
132. WR Aug 1901 (and ch 4 n 81). Also Clarion Apr 9 93 "Stock Exchange Sharps and the Fat Men of Commerce"; and Apr 8 99 (Sudan) and Feb 26 93 (Nigeria).
133. QR Oct 99 "British Supremacy in South Africa"; ER Apr 96 "Great Britain in South Africa"; MM 1377 p 70 "The Transvaal"
134. L. Phillips, "Past and Future in South Africa", in A-S R 1899 p 191 - the Boers have lived near natives so long that they have acquired the native modes of thought. (The very existence of this journal is as interesting as anything it says.)
135. BM July 78 - In Natal Britain protects the natives, who multiply, and are fifteen times the number of whites. In the Free State the Boers drive the natives out. Our aim is a South Africa where "black and white alike are to share the fruits of European wealth brought to enrich African soil". Civilisation can only come to the natives by contact with European races, and native idleness must be stamped out.
136. BM Aug 96 "England's Duty in South Africa"
137. BM July, Aug, Nov 1899 "The South African War". Though this was accompanied (Nov) by: "This the Boers do not forget. Obstinate in all matters of feeling, they are obstinate in remembering they were first in the country"; also that there was no fear of the War Office not sending enough troops, and news of British victories over the Boers.
138. QR July 1902 "The Crying Need of South Africa"
139. QR Oct 96 "Boers and Uitlanders". Also Oct 1899 "British Supremacy in South Africa"
140. BM Apr 90 "The Transvaal and its Goldfields"
141. BM Aug 96 "England's Duty in South Africa"
142. Punch Jan 31 1901 p 81, Mar 7 1900 p 166, 1900 p 101
143. Punch Feb 21 1900 p 128, Dec 19 1900 p 449
144. CJ June 20 1896 did think it unfortunate that some people of British blood wanted to force war between the British and Dutch in South Africa. And FR 1902 p 194 - "Every seat lost to the Unionists is a seat gained to the Boers".
145. e.g. ATYR Feb 9 1895 - "those great northern peoples from whom our race is sprung, and whose blood and courage still run in our veins today." Also ATYR Nov 68 on the Vikings; FR Oct 70 on Aryan myths; ER Oct 61 on Njal. And for India as cradle of civilisation, see above n 94-5.
146. Semmel, op cit, chapter on social imperialism especially.
147. e.g. WR July 52 (Hawkins); ER Oct 67, Jan 68, July 68 (Wellington), Apr 75; MM 69; ATYR Dec 59; QR Jan 98 (Nelson); FR 1895 (King Arthur) etc.
148. What else can one make of Punch's comparison of German atrocities in the Franco-Prussian war with British misdeeds in the Boer conflict? (cartoon - "A Short Memory" - with Bismarck's ghost standing behind German pressmen, in vol 121 p 183, Sept 11 1901).
149. BM Mar 88; MM 1377; WR July 1890; QR Oct 88 - technical education was not held to be the whole answer to help trade.
150. CJ Apr 14 1900; QR Oct 99.
151. NR Apr 1864
152. MM 1898-9 p 385; 1900 p 610. WR Apr 86 - Bismarck was followed by "the best people on the globe's surface".
153. ATYR Mar 27 1880 "A National Contrast"
154. QR July 98, Jan 99, July 99 - articles on the war.
155. WR Sept 97 "The Object Lesson of the Cuban War"
156. IIN Dec 2 1865 p 525
157. Except Hobson. (And Shakespeare in Henry V!)
158. WR June 97, July 98. America was seen as part of Greater Britain (Dilke's work). See also Hyam p 52.

159. See ch 4 n 52 for Wilson and Lord Birkenhead.
160. ER Jan 98 "The Success of the Anglo-Saxons"
161. ER Oct 95 "Madagascar"
162. CJ Oct 3 1908. Also ATYR Jan 11 1890 on du Chaillu's work on the Vikings: "We have no cause to feel ashamed of the ancestry which he seeks to endow Englishmen".
163. CJ May 23 1896. Manchester Evening Mail Jan 5 1898 - "Why in the realm of labour alone do Englishmen continue to cherish the insular prejudice to the effect that an Englishman is superior to two Frenchmen?" (It was hardly in the realm of labour alone).
164. Br QR quoting Kaye's History of the Sepoy War, Jan 1865
165. WR May 1837. Similarly R of R June 1891 offered cheaper subscriptions to English speaking readers overseas, and Apr 91 poem asked "Where is a Briton's Fatherland?" (answering wherever one meets English speaking people).
RM Dec 27 1862, and FR Dec 85 - England as the leading Anglo-Saxon race, must stand before all those in whose veins English blood flows, before the whole English speaking race, as the unchallenged protector of the key to the Asiatic world - Egypt.
WR Mar 97 "Can The English Tongue Be Preserved?", i.e. against bad English. The linguistic unity of English-speaking peoples was paramount.
Lloyd's Weekly June 20 1897: "Looking back over the sixty years Her Majesty has occupied the throne she has seen the growth of this great empire, and the expansion of the colonies, the increase of prosperity and comfort of her people, and the strengthening of the ties that make for the federation of all the English speaking races united with us under the British flag."
166. ER July 1902 "Some Racial Contrasts in Fiction"
167. WR Apr 86 "The Economics of Emigration". Also BM Oct 56 - travel is almost purely an Anglo-Saxon characteristic. "The facts of history prove nothing more conclusively than this: a race either progresses or retrogrades..."
ER Apr 69 - how much the men of our lineage have done in colonising and civilising the globe.
168. WR May 1898 - though the same edition carried an article on the bond of empire and racial kinship. Also Feb 1900 - expansion for expansion's sake (in "The War And After").
169. FR Dec 1885 - H. Anstruther-White
170. ATYR June 26 1880 "Under the Mango"
171. WR 1909 p 1 ff, p 360 ff - Darnton Fraser's articles - we must encourage the Austrian Slav, who is still a child, against the German.
172. e.g. WR June 1904; ER July 1906, Apr 1911; QR July 1905 etc.
173. e.g. WR May 1900 "For Honour! For Fatherland!"
Speaker Nov 1899 - Hobson said that the Jews had cosmopolitan trade interests, which were not chiefly British.
LL Apr 23 98 on financiers, Clarion Mar 21 96 on the "parvenu Hebrew diamond thieves". Also see Porter p 103.
FM Jan 76 - Englishmen hide their heads in shame that their countrymen are mixed up in Turkish and Egyptian finances. "We sneer at the Jews, but we must grovel too."
174. WR 1905 pp 699-700 - the German Jew horde controls the gold mines. Reynolds' Apr 19, May 3 and 17, Aug 2 1896 - on the German Jews and "their pals". See also Hobson to Scott, Sept 2 1899, "German Jews who have been in England and figure as British subjects. Many of them are the veriest scum of Europe". Porter pp 201-2 - Jews had taken English names, so the full extent of the controversy was concealed.
175. CJ June 1 1895. Also WR Apr 63.
176. BM Feb 1901. See also C. Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939 (1978).

177. J.Vincent, reviewing Holmes, felt that anti-Catholicism took the place of anti-semitism (T.H.E.S. Nov 16 1979)
178. Such works as Hep Hep Hep, Daniel Deronda, Coningsby and Tancred.
179. BM 1912 p 155
180. BM July 1901, and ch 4 n 12 above - "in justice to them they often dismiss the topic of Saxon tyranny with good natured grins."
181. ER Apr 69, again confusing English and British.
182. WR June 1904 "Yellow Slavery and White"
183. English Review Oct 1852. Also Lorimer p 84.
184. Thus also Hyam p 258, Cromer to Lansdowne Feb 26 1904 - the Irishman beats the Egyptian hollow at lying.
Manchester Evening Mail, "We want peace and prosperity for Oireland, and begorrah we'll fight for it" (Mar 18, 1901). (Yet while ridiculing this attitude on the part of the Irish, this was exactly what was urged on Britain herself.)
185. BM Apr 1901 "The Football Nations"
186. Curtin p 387. Also Lorimer and Bolt.
187. ER Apr 1911, reviewing Putnam Weale's "The Conflict of Colour". Pearson also predicted Asiatic population growth.
Also WR 1905 p 656; 19C Apr 1904 "The Black Peril" - we drift in our native policy in South Africa; CR Aug 1911 - possibly the negroid races originally lived in South Italy, West France, and the western United Kingdom. If this was true, then the negroid is part of the progressive Caucasian. (Though notice which part...)
188. QR July 93 "Pearson's National Life and Character"- QR worried that "Universal military service seems inevitable. Military absolutism will be combined with industrial socialism in the communities of the future".
BM July 71 "The Coming Race" - the Vrilya. "A savage, captured and decently clad, shall fling off his clothes and return to old ways when the opportunity occurs. We must rather labour for definite and unmistakeable improvements".
189. FR July 93 "Evolution of Our Race". More advanced nations are elder brethren, and guide the backward nations till all nations will have one religion.
190. QR July 99 "Climate and Colonisation" - quoting Knox's Races of Man (1850). Though changes do occur: "In all countries where Europeans have settled, we find they have altered in temperament, ideas and bodily features." Also FR Jan 1894 p 74 "Professor Buechner's Origin of Mankind" - it is not to be wondered that uncivilised people, when they come into contact with civilisation, are ruined by it. Begging and stealing shows a low savage morality.
FM Sept 68 - medical science now permits the diseased to live, not following Wallace's law of natural selection (while conversely war destroys the youngest and the fittest).
CR 1870-1 pp 554-5 - Wallace on conservation of the native races shows the mental and moral state of some South American and Oriental tribes to be nearer perfection than we are. We are materially advanced, but we need morals. Can we not conserve the dwindling remnants of aborigines?
191. Lyle in CR Feb 1911 p 231
192. ER Oct 1892 "Population"
193. See above n 42. And CR 1870-1 p 554 ff - we have not met the negro on equal terms, but the Red Indian and the Australian have similar climates to us and we have won.
194. MM Mar 1893 p 391.

195. e.g. FR 1907 May p 913 - perhaps the negro will produce a leader to lift the people out of bondage through political movement or social war.
CJ July 29 1905 - "Some day, however, x years hence, there will be a colour war".
MM 1893 p 414 - Greenwood on the portents from Siam.
Also see comments on British decline, in BM Jan 74 - the Indian mutiny was the first sign of decline; BM July 71 on the Vrill-ya, race of the future.
And on white decline: WR June 1904 on the white Czar with yellow gold championing the white race versus the yellow; and QR July 1905 "Battle of the Sea of Japan".
Also FR May 1907 on the Japanese losing their Mongolian features after the battle of Mukden.
196. ER July 1906 "Political Situation in Asia"
197. e.g. CJ Oct 22 1904, QR Apr 1904 - saying that they were not in compounds, and quoting a bishop.
198. e.g. WR May, June 1904. Also compare with the Irish, driven out by land monopoly.
199. CJ Mar 11 1905.
200. In the introduction to A.J. Macdonald, Trade, Politics and Christianity in Africa and the East (1916) p xv, and conclusion p 270.
201. WR Mar 1904 "The Burden of Empire"
202. WR Apr 1891 "The Sentiment of Nationality"
203. See such contradictions as Dilke in ER Apr 69, with "Englishmen" including Scots and Irish, in his book Greater Britain
204. See also C.J.H. Hayes, Bases of a New National Imperialism (1941) and quoted in Fieldhouse (ed), The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism (1967) p 178, on the idea of national prestige.
205. Pearson, as quoted in Semmel, op cit. Also note Annie S. Swan, op cit, p 110 on Africa: "difficult to get the girls to comprehend what cleanliness meant". The girls were lazy, and: "As a race, - possibly owing to their strange methods of feeding - they are not virile".
Also e.g. WR 1905 p 656; FR 1902 p 301.
206. Pearson in Semmel, loc cit.
207. Simon, op cit, and H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists (Oxford 1973). (But Centre Parties have always attracted press interest).
208. Marx's phrase, in K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1848)
209. R.S.V.P. Sept 77 - periodicals as collections of essays by divers hands.
210. Hyam p 96, the number of African risings between 1896 and 1907.
211. Spect Mar 5 1898. See also ch 4 n 28 above.
212. Hyam p 156.
213. WR 1905 p 677 "The Coming Race and Moral Depravity".
214. Lorimer p 105. Dickens' Hard Times (1854) (Chapman and Hall 1878 p35) in ch x. Also p 137, "the God-like race... the community of Coketown Hands... as a class..."
215. Gissing, Demos (1908 ed'n) p 97
216. ibid p 149. And Disraeli Two Nations
217. India, Jamaica 1865-6, etc.
218. Lorimer p 161.

Chapter Ten

1. Price, op cit, p 220, men joined the Volunteers for the same reasons they had the Boy Scouts, physical exercise, comradeship, etc. The enthusiasts of the movement rationalised this into duty and patriotism. See also J.Laver, The Age Of Optimism (1966) ch 10.
2. e.g. MM 1860 pp 64-5; ATYR May 68; CJ July 60, etc.
Also Manchester Evening Mail May 20 1897, Volunteers had a "not altogether unnatural thirst" and Aug 8 1898, police were creating a case against them. Similarly Manchester Evening Chronicle Nov 22 1899.
3. e.g. Semmel, op cit; Marder, p 13 especially; SR Sept 3 1898; CR Feb 99 - H.F.Wyatt on "War As The Test Of National Value"; SR Feb 1 1896 "A Biological View of our Foreign Policy".
War was also seen as a tonic for the individual - as General Wolseley showed in "War And Civilisation", United Service Magazine March 1897, and "Is A Soldier's Life Worth Living?", FR May 89.
4. Lenin, op cit.
5. See below.
6. T.Hardy, A Tradition of Eighteen Hundred and Four (in Wessex Tales (Penguin 1976) p 37 ff).
7. Porter p 90.
8. Cyclist volunteers in Cheshire were saving the country from conscription, argued the Manchester Evening Mail, Apr 8 1901.
9. Quoted in Kinnear, The Fall of Lloyd George (1973) ch 3
10. Though, of course, a merry England would guarantee a merry world.
11. Childers (1900). Also I.F.Clark, The Pattern of Expectation (1980) for a history of futurology.
12. e.g. ILN July 1857 p 1: "The state of affairs in India may well excite the nation, but it will do more; it will excite its courage and wisdom."
13. ILN 1857 vol 30 p 31 (Sat Jan 17 ed'n)
14. Punch vol 33 p 35 (July 25 1857)
15. HW Mar 3 1855. Though poem Feb 3 1855:
"O you who rule the nation,
Take now the toil-worn hand,-
Brothers you are in sorrow
In duty to your land.
Learn but this noble lesson
Ere peace returns again,
And the life blood of Old England
Will not be shed in vain!"
16. HW Sept 29 1855; WR Jan 55; ILN Jan 17 1857.
Similarly HW June 9 57, change the top of the system, the Januses and Stumpingtons.
And ER Oct 51 - we may not have originated the idea of the Exhibition, but we provided the world with Locke and Bacon.
17. FM Feb 1852. NR Nov 64 on the Russian version of the Crimean War also blamed a "divided command" for degrading England in the eyes of Europe, and exalting the reputation of Russia.
18. BM Jan 55 "Peace and Patriotism"
19. Punch 1857 (July) p 79
20. WR Oct 1860 - France looking into iron plating ships too.
ATYR Mar 9 1861, amazed at French feats in Lebanon. How could these comparatively weaker men march better, though with greater loads, than our troops in India? Men work their way up - no buying of commissions - which was a sensible system, according to ATYR.
21. MM 1860 p 394.
Also WR Oct 59 - it behoves us, as a people loving freedom of action and independence, to be prepared to repel the invader without abstracting much manhood from productive labour.
"We should insure against danger in the soundest and cheapest office, by encouraging volunteer riflemen - maintaining and improving our national militia."

22. FM June 61. FM Apr 61 also feared money lost through forces, and urged colonies to pay for their own forces, or for those protecting them.
23. ER Apr 64 - though it went on to say that we must not make the error of flattering ourselves that we have already attained the unrivalled superiority over the rest of the world (though implying that Britain was going to attain it).
Also ER Jan 66: "Long may it advance, that the soldier may find his profession honoured by his countrymen in time of peace, and that in war the national courage which bore the Six Hundred to their death at Balaclava may be guided by the science from which their chiefs might have learnt how brave men's lives should be used."
24. FM May 68 "The Reorganisation of the Army"
25. MM 67-8 p 435; ATYR May 9 1868; CR Dec 69 p 559; FM Apr 65.
Also ER Jan 66 - honour the soldier, and ATYR Mar 65 - compare our forces with the French military.
26. FM May 68; BM Feb 69 "On Army Reorganisation"
27. MM 1864-5 p 495 "Song of the Volunteers"
28. QR Jan 71; MM Oct 70. Though ER Jan 71 said QR had indicted the Admiralty, but that improvements had been made, "which render the British navy at the present time fully able to perform any service that may be required of it." Also FM Aug 71.
29. e.g. BM May 71; QR Oct 71 etc.
FM Oct 71, Apr 75, placed faith in Volunteers, and the warlike spirit. WR Apr 71 and FR Feb 71 also bemoaned the dismal state of the British military organisation; ATYR Oct 5 1872 - the bad naval manoeuvres show the need for more proper ones.
30. QR Oct 71 "Army Administration and Government Policy"
31. FM Oct 71, also Apr 71 - army reform, May 71 - education in the navy, Aug 71 - future naval battles.
Also ER July 76 - on the growth of the German navy - "supremely interesting" to us as a maritime nation.
32. FM Sept 78. FM Feb 73 on Canada, claimed that Britain was a great unifier of the world, and indisposed to aggression.
33. Punch 1878, vol 74 p 19; 19C Sept 78 (Greg), and Apr 80 (Seebohm).
34. 19C Sept 78 (Greg). Also MM 1882-3 p 398.
35. Major W.F. Butler MM 1877-8 p 398 ("War Campaign and War Correspondent")
The writer also said that a European war would necessitate conscription. Though MM 1878 p 452 said compulsion was unfair, as someone with a cough got an unfair advantage in the race for life.
36. ATYR July 30 1881.
37. ATYR July 20 1878. Sim Aug 23 1879 "Aldershot Revisited" - "if one had our regular army composed of such men as the Volunteers I saw at Aldershot this summer, we should do well."
38. ATYR Apr 20 1878 on mobilisation, Mar 16 1878 on the Woolwich artillery, and ER Jan 81 "The Navies of the World"
39. ER Jan 81 "Army Reform"
40. ATYR Aug 1 1885 "The Auxiliary Navy" - we need the seafaring abilities of fishermen too.
41. ATYR May 23 1885
42. CJ Dec 15 1883; FM Feb 73 on Canada
43. CJ Apr 16 1881
44. Punch 1878 p 207
45. MM 83 p 179. Also WR Jan 1902 "England's Peril"
46. QR Apr 1892 "Naval Warfare and National Defence"
47. MM 1893 p 414 ff. FR also linked military and political affairs - "The Army and the Democracy", Mar 1886 - "We have three times lately barely escaped a great war", and "It is impossible to be secure of such good fortune in the future".
48. R of R July 1890.
49. FR June 1888; MM 1891-2 p 275; BM Aug 87. And WR May 95 "Our Defenceless Navy" - which needs protection from torpedo attacks.

50. CJ Oct 11 1890; Punch 1890 p 175. Also HM 1889-90 p331, by General Viscount Wolseley - "Armies to be efficient must not stand still, and ours, which is so very small, can least afford to do so."
51. WR Dec 1891 "Military Enthusiasm as a Means of Recruiting"
52. FR Feb 1887; Speaker Dec 30 1893. Also BM Nov 98; SR Feb 16 1895, Dec 24 1898, Mar 24 1900; VF Aug 30 1900; CR Dec 1894.
53. See e.g. Langer, loc cit, and chapter on New Navalism.
54. CJ May 23 1896.
55. H.W.Wilson "The Working of Arbitration", FR Dec 96; Spencer Wilkinson, "The Command of the Sea and British Policy", NR Feb 96. Also PMG Mar 19 95.
56. Marder p 23. Also PMG Mr 4 97; British Review Feb 6 97; NR Apr 98 - H.W.Wilson "Front Bench Invertebrates".
57. ch 4, on Anglo-Boer war especially.
58. e.g. BM Dec 1900 on the pro-Boers - they have just given us a tale of real if misapplied virility, of resistance to imagined enslavement, not unheroic and not without its pathos.
BM Oct 1900 - army reorganisation shows the need for military plan;
QR Jan 96 - the need to concentrate War Office power in a commander in chief; QR July 1902 - the need for effective men at the top;
QR Jan 1901 - again on army mismanagement.
59. Punch Feb 7 1900 (vol 118 p 65)
60. ER Oct 1901 "Party Politics and the War" - Britain has interests all over the world, so she must crush the South African commandoes. Violence of feeling against Britain among nations of Europe cannot be disregarded.
Also ER Jan 1900, QR Jan 1902, etc.
61. ER Oct 94 "Projectiles and Explosives in War"
62. BM Sept 99 "British Bullets and the Peace Conference"
63. From CJ Mar 30 1895, dismissing submerged boats as no danger, to WR May 97, with torpedo nets seen as worthless, and steel plate defence better.
64. CJ Sept 3 1898
65. CJ Nov 26 1898, pro conscription; and ER Apr 1901, no need for it.
66. WR June 98 "The Army Question"
67. ER Oct 1900 "South Africa"
68. ER Apr 97 "National Defence"
69. ch 4 n 76. 19C Nov 99; CR Oct, Dec 1900, etc. Porter p 39 also. Spect Sept 3 1898; SR Jan 21 1899; CR May 1900 "Churches at War" (J.Guinness Rogers); WR Sept 1900 "Clergy and War" (Nora Twycross).
70. See Marder p 18. Also SR Sept 3 1898; 19C Feb 99; and SR Feb 1 96.
71. e.g. General Wolseley, "War and Civilisation", United Service Magazine Mar 97; FR May 89 "Is A Soldier's Life Worth Living?"; 19C Oct 1898, "Should Europe Disarm?" (S.Low); 19C May 1899, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference" (S.Low); Navy League Journal Oct 98, "Can We Disarm?" (H.W.Wilson); and FR Aug 96, "The Human Animal in Battle".
72. J.McCabe and G.Darien, Can We Disarm? (1899 pamphlet). Similarly PMG Nov 26 1895; The Engineer Mar 15 1889, Jan 5 1894, Feb 7 1896, Apr 6 1900; Army and Navy Gazette Mar 23 1895; Navy League Journal July 95. PMG Jan 25 1895 and Jan 23 1896 linked commercialism and patriotism. Also see Marder pp 37-39.
73. 19C Apr 98 "British Ships in Foreign Navies" (A.Hurd). Though this was opposed by R of R Apr 15 1898; PMG July 4 1898; 19C Apr, May 1898 (Sir W.White).
74. WR Apr 1900 "War and Evolution". Also Oct 1901 "Universal Peace".
75. FR 1901 p 20.
76. Liberal Magazine June 96.
77. WR Jan 1901, which defect it is our duty to remedy, and it is within our power.
78. MM 1893-4 p 340.

79. WR May 1901. The edition also carried a working class and conscription article, rejecting the Germanisation of the British army.
80. WR Oct 1900 "The Development of the Jingo". (Also Kipling - the female of the species more deadly than the male.)
81. FR 1897 p 74 (Earl of Meath). Also Aug 1900 p 177 (J.H.Muirhead) - Anglo-Saxon patience and pluck gives her the edge over other nations.
82. WR June 1901 "The Policy of Grab-Jingo or Pro-Boer"
83. ER Oct 1900 "The General Election"
84. Punch Jan 31 1901 vol 120 p 81.
85. Price, op cit, p 132 (R.G.G.Price).
86. ILN 1899 p 608; WR Aug 1902.
87. G.M.Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Boston 1936) pp 132-3
88. Price, and C.Booth statistics of unemployment and recruiting during the war.
89. e.g. war and the forces: QR July 1902, July 1903, July 1904, Jan 1905, Oct 1905, July 1906, Oct 1906, Jan, Apr, July 1907, Oct 1910, etc; ER Oct 1903, Oct 1904, Oct 1905, Jan 1907, Jan 1908, Jan 1909, Apr 1911, Oct 1911 etc;
 commemorations: QR Jan 1905, Oct 1905, July 1906; ER Apr 1902; WR May 1903; CJ Jan 1907, Mar, Sept 1905, Nov 1906, Nov 1908 etc;
 foreign strength: QR July 1908; ER Oct 1902, July 1904, Oct 1909; CJ Feb 1910, Jan 1903.
90. See below, and Dangerfield, op cit.
91. QR July 1903, submarine will become an essential section of all naval powers.
92. MM 1902, French view of the army; FR 1902 p 613 - "Is Anglophobia in Germany less?"
93. CJ Jan 22 1910, on self-defence and defence of their country, and with praise for the Church army.
94. A.Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood", History Workshop Journal no 5 (May 1978); and J.Clarke and others (ed) Working Class Culture (1979) There were 22 Birmingham girls' clubs by 1911.
95. Manchester City News Jan 31 1914. Also R.S.Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys (1910); and M.Blanch, "Imperialism, Nationalism and Organised Youth" in J.Clarke (ed), cit, pp 105, 111.
96. ER Oct 1909 - we must protect the empire and be bigger than the next two powers; QR July 1908, "German Peril", July 1907 - the need for an east coast naval base.
97. QR Apr 1907 "Mr Haldane and the Army".
98. CJ Nov 17 1906. ECJ Mar 26 1853 gave an account of battlefield as a tourist sees it.
99. e.g. QR Jan 98 "Life of Nelson by Mahan", "unique genius".
100. WR July 52 "England's Forgotten Worthies", through to ER Apr 1902 "Waterloo", and CJ Jan 19 1907 "The Greys at Waterloo"; and QR Jan 1905 "The Tudors and the Navy".
101. WR Feb 1901 "Imperialism and Liberty"
102. FM Jan 65 "The Condition and Prospects of the Navy"
103. MM 1859-60 p 268 "Arctic Enterprise, Its Results Since 1815"
104. ATYR Aug 20 1859.
105. ATYR Nov 7 1868, and Jan 11 1890 - duChaillu's work on the Vikings - "we have no cause to feel ashamed of the ancestry he seeks to endow Englishmen". And FR 1899 p 958 (S.Low)
106. QR Oct 74; MM 1867-8 p 145 - on exploration - "there never shall be wanting men of such true English fibre to carry on the work - inshallah - if it shall please God".
107. ATYR Jan 4 1868.
108. e.g. WR Apr 1901; MM 1869; FR Mar 1866; etc
109. WR Mar 1900 "The Warrior Bard". Also Arnold's writings on Hebraism and Hellenism, Mill on the battle of Marathon, and see as well: R.Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece (Oxford 1980) especially p 332, the classics in the pockets of imperial adventurers and explorers, such as Rhodes, Cromer and Milner.
110. Hyam and Martin, op cit, with Lugard as the prime example.

Chapter Eleven

1. Dangerfield, Price, cit. Also G. Crossick (ed), The Lower Middle Class in Britain (1971); and D. Kynaston, King Labour (1976) - e.g. p 64 "grab and brag" Boer War, pp 122-3 Hyndman's belief in a military presence abroad (though Hyndman had little effect on the working class), p 106 quoting Gissing's The Nether World (1889) and the coconut shy - "the object was a wooden model of the treacherous Afghan or the base African", and p 151: "The Boer War itself was by no means the occasion for displays of mass jingoism as is often thought". (Though if there was no imperialism, there was no Bulgarian agitation either.)
FR 1902 p 194: "Every seat lost to the Unionists is a seat gained to the Boers".
2. QR July 1870, iii, "The Police in London", "a sober, vigilant and intelligent body of men, the like of which does not exist in any other European country". And Apr 97 e.g. on rising crime.
Also Blanch in Clarke (ed), op cit, p 107.
Though QR 171 (July 1890) p 150 - police rarely appeared as heroes in Penny Dreadfuls - "they are constantly shown as stupid, cowardly or ill-looking".
3. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital (1974) pp 94-7. Also Lorimer, op cit, p 209; R. Roberts, The Classic Slum (1971); and I. Zangwill, Children of the Ghetto (1957 ed'n).
On the other hand, see WR Apr 1904 on state education and militarism: "If it be true that when thieves fall out honest men come by their own, the converse is equally true, that when good people come to fighting over religion and education, instead of being content to worship and teach in his own way at his own expense, then the citadel of the national conscience is left unguarded, and is liable to be captured at any moment by the coarsest Jingoism."
4. ER Apr 1868 "Technical And Scientific Education". Also WR Apr 61 "Germany recognises science in universities", therefore we should do the same. MM 1867-8 p 447, 1869 p 177 - technical education is a national want.
5. ER Apr 1861 "Eton College"; WR Apr 61 also.
6. FM Oct 54; though FM July 54; BM July 95; on public schools and army competition examinations. See also FR Jan 1 1868 "Shall We Continue To Teach Latin And Greek?" (T. Fowler), and Aug 1 1868 "Technical Education".
7. WR July 64 "Public Schools in England"
8. Hyam p 162 e.g. Similarly QR Apr 78 "Naval Education", our present officers showing the virtue of the present system of juvenile entry, but we could still do with naval education. (Some tension is evident in this journal between education and tradition.)
9. R. Wilkinson, The Prefects (1968) especially.
10. FM Dec 1870 "Athletic Sports and University Studies" (L. Stephen). Also QR Oct 1909 "Sport and Decadence".
11. BM Apr 1901 "The Football Nations"
12. e.g. Price p 220. And Hyam's Schooling and Scouting section pp 129-34. Another imperial aspect of education was the Rhodes' Scholar - e.g. MM 1903 p 255 - it is better to tempt Englishmen to U.S.A. than vice versa.
13. MM 1882 p 424 "Patriotic Poetry"
14. e.g. "The Courting of Dinah Shadd", "The Ballad of the King's Mercy", "The Ballad of East and West", "The Ballad of the Last Suttee", "Without Benefit of Clergy" (MM 1889-90 p 361, p 68, p 123, p 193 and 1890 p 148). And 1893-9 - "The Madness of Mr Kipling" by an Admirer (p 131).
15. MM 1899 p 192
16. FR July-Dec 1893; QR Oct 1900
17. QR Oct 1900 "English Patriotic Poetry"
18. QR Oct 97 "Some Minor Poets", including Kipling's "The Seven Seas".
19. ER Jan 1898 - The Light That Failed has been over-rated.

20. ER July 1902 "War and Poetry"
21. QR July 1892 - Helder was the protagonist of The Light That Failed. Though WR Mar 1900 - "The Warrior Bard" - in Athenian times no poet would have dared to invoke the god of war while staying in the security of his own home.
22. WR June 98, QR Oct 91 (in "English Realism and Romance"), and Apr 95. Though ER July 95 - fame was owed to his contemporaries' personal liking for him, for there was no great novelty or profundity in his social philosophy.
23. QR July 1904, though Conan-Doyle was seen to know little about British system of titles. Also WR Jan 85 "English Character and Manners".
24. QR Oct 91 "English Realism and Romance"
25. ER July 1902. Also Oct 1902 "Three Race Heroines in Epic Story" - Helen of Troy, Sigurd, and the ancient Indian epics.
26. QR Jan 79 "England's Mission"
27. QR Apr 1884 in "The Malay Archipelago", including a review of "A Lady's Travels Round the World".
28. See ch 10 above, e.g. FR Apr 1885; ER Oct 86; MM 1891; FR 97; EM Aug 85; etc. See also Chevenix-Trench, "General Liability" phrase to describe Gordon, in his biography Charley Gordon.
FR Aug 1 1866 on Eyre - a pity he did not stick to geography, which he was good at.
QR Oct 91 "English Men of Action - Warwick the Kingmaker".
And CM Jan-June 96, p 258, "National Biography" (S.Lee):
"Pride in the achievement of one's ancestors is almost as widely distributed a characteristic of mankind as the power of speech. It is as strongly developed in barbarous as in civilised peoples", e.g. the Chinese. National biography must satisfy the commemorative instincts of all sections of a nation:- "Women will not, therefore, I regret to reflect, have much claim on the attention of the national biographer for a very long time to come."
29. ATYR Aug 19 1876 "Foreign Jack"
30. ATYR Nov 4 1876 "Hans in England"
31. CJ Apr 13 1907 "Britons Never Will Be Slaves". Alternatively WR Dec 99 "Wassah Ullah" - the Egyptian preacher cry; but in our land Progress and Universal Brotherhood will take its place as the cry.
32. H.Anstruther-White "Moral and Merry England" in FR July-Dec 85 p 775. Also see A.P.Thornton, For The File On Empire (1968) and Crossick (ed), cit.
33. PMG 6-12 July 1885. Scott, op cit, p 125 ff.
Also A.Robson, "The Significance of the Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon" in VPN June 1978, p 51 ff.
And P.Keating (ed), Into Unknown England 1866-1913 (1976), e.g. p 32 - "Would you like to come into a world where you've never set foot before, even though it's always existed underneath your nose?" asks a character in C.MacInnes' City Of Spades. A world of black immigrants, and of language of social exploration.
Also Punch vol 18 (1850) "Waiting at the Station", by Thackeray - "We had but to go a hundred yards off and see for ourselves, but we never did." (In response to Mayhew's Morning Chronicle articles.)
See also E.P.Thompson and E.Yeo (ed), The Unknown Mayhew (1971)
34. MM 1886 p 296.
35. ATYR June 18 1892.
36. FM Jan 1870 (Froude).
37. FR Mar 1888 "State Colonisation"
38. Punch Apr 2 1870 p 127 "Tyranny"
39. FR Nov 86 "Outcast London" (Rev G.S.Reaney). See also G.S.Jones, op cit, and G.Gissing, The Odd Women (1893).
Also ER Oct 92 - can nothing be done to retain the useful, nay indispensable part of our community which now leaves our shores, believing there to be better opportunities abroad?

40. Progressive Review Oct 96 p 60. Also Porter pp 57-60. The Liberals failed to define their position. W.Scawen Blunt diaries recorded: "The whole country, if one may judge from the press, has gone mad with the lust of fighting glory."
(But can one judge from the press?)
And CR July 99 (H.Paul) - no Liberal can sympathise with the Boer government; Oct 99 (Garrett) - an English Radical must become a Jingo.
41. WG Oct 12 1899. Reynolds' Feb 5 1899 called Campbell-Bannerman "The Jingo and Old Liberal Leader".
42. ER July 1898 "British Policy in China" - there is no alternative to the present government, so we should not weaken its hands.
FR Jan-June 1897 p 513; ER Apr 1900, Oct 1901 - on the liberal imperialists. Meanwhile QR Oct 85, Apr 81 and Oct 77, as well as Oct 1900 which attacked the Liberal electioneering which could "scuttle the empire".
43. Punch vol 78 (1880) p 139 "The Choice of Hercules"
44. FM Sept 73 "Peace With Honour", Oct 79 "The Cost of A Foreign Policy".
FM July 79: editor identifies with the Liberal party and the broad and generous creed which has enabled it to confer so many benefits on the empire. (WR Oct 84 - Kimberley has shown the Liberals the need to weld empire into a harmonious whole.)
FM Oct 1880 "The Peace At Any Price Party" (William Pollard, member of the Peace Society): "The nineteenth century was ushered in amidst war and bloodshed, producing inconceivable misery for thousands. Let us hope that it will close in amity, and that the "European concert" may grow into a federation of reason and righteousness guarding the peace of the world."
45. WR Nov 1899 "England and the Transvaal" (W.J.Corbet), May 1899 "Liberalism and the Empire", and Nov 1901 "A Pirate Empire".
46. WR June 1903 "A South African Salmagundi"
47. WR May 1901 "The World's True Heirs, or, True and False Imperialism" (F.A.White). Similarly Sept 1901 "The Consequences of The War".
48. Sept 1901. Similarly Oct, Dec 1901 - liberal imperialists are allright in principle, but in practice they become very anti-liberal.
49. WR Feb 1901 "Imperialism and Liberty". Also Mar 1900 - war shelves social reforms, which Salisbury dreads. And May 1901 "Where Are We Now?" - the extension of commerce is suicidal if it destroys export possibilities, and restricts home employment.
50. Porter pp 130-2. Reynolds' Nov 12 1899.
51. Labour Chronicle Dec 1899 (also Price, op cit, p 208 ff, and Professor Cunningham to the Royal Commission on Physical Deterioration - when trade is bad, recruiting rises.)
52. Club Life May 4 1901, quoted in Price p 231.
53. ATYR Oct 29 1881 "Kuldja"
54. QR Jan 1880 "The Romance of Modern Travel"
55. ECJ Dec 4 1852
56. BM Apr 1898 "The World's Unrest: Why Not the Money Markets?"
- 57 WR May 1901 "Where Are We Now?". Also Jan 1901 on "War And Trade" - how can war be good for trade when it destroys so much? And Nov 1903, "Commercialism and Imperialism" - the need for right production. (Also WR Aug 93 on "Industrial Warfare", and FR Aug 79 on trade unionism in India - encouraging it there.)
58. FR Jan 1 1868 "Ireland for the British" (J.C.Morison)
59. FM Apr 1875 "Some Remarks On Unions Of Nations". Also the Mexico comparison with Ireland - a capitalist shot if he goes out of doors (QR Apr 1833).
60. e.g. ER Apr 1888 - home rule would be a calamity. We are not contending for British ascendancy, but for the just and equal rights of Ireland as a member of the United Kingdom. (Yet to talk of "British" ascendancy was surely a contradiction in terms, in the context of Ireland.)
Also ER Jan 81 "England and Ireland".

61. e.g. WR May 1887; FR May 1880 - showing home rule in several countries.
62. WR Aug 1889 "Home Rule and Imperial Federation"
63. FR Oct 1889 "Ireland and the Empire"
64. See above ch 2, with respect to Jamaica especially.
65. A.J.P.Taylor, English History 1914-45 (Oxford 1965) p 165 - some indication exists of middle class abstinence from sexual intercourse. The whole sexual atmosphere of the 1890s may be of relevance. (There was routine circumcision in the upper classes in the 1890s (Hyam p 131), symbolic in anthropological terms.)
66. ATYR Dec 14 1874. Also Feb 6 1875 on "Snake Women" in history, literature, etc.
67. ER "Education of Women" July 1887. Also FR 1894 p 561 "Women and Labour" (K.Pearson).
68. WR Jan 57 "Capabilities and Disabilities of Women", Oct 65 "Capacities of Women".
69. WR July 52 "Lady Novelists", Oct 56 "Silly Novels By Lady Novelists" (George Eliot).
70. WR Dec 1894 "Female Suffrage in New Zealand".
71. WR July 1900 "Woman And War".
72. WR Oct 1900 "The Development of the Jingo".
73. See also Bolt and Iorimer; and CM 1896 p 258, and ch 9 above.
74. Dangerfield, op cit.
75. N.Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence (1976) p 260
 Also T.W.Adorno, E.Frenkl-Brunswik, D.J.Levinson and R.N.Sandford,
The Authoritarian Personality (New York 1950)
 C.Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (1972)
 Also QR 168 (1889) p 274 - "Mr John Morley and Progressive Radicalism"
 (W.H.Mallock) - saying that radicalism was derived only from envy, and
 held only by "the unnaturalised, un-English, alien section of it"
 (i.e. the middle class).
 And Boyce, cit, ch 15, radicalism was in part a middle class product
 from that section of the middle class failing to be incorporated into
 the system.

Chapter Twelve

1. Salisbury's phrase.
2. Marder's chapter on Fashoda. (The phrase is from the Manchester Evening Mail, Aug 16 1900).
3. e.g. QR, and to a lesser extent, BM, SR, NR.
4. Concise Oxford Dictionary
5. Hyam and the export of surplus emotional energy; see Hyam and Martin p 1 and elsewhere.
6. Grey's declaration of an "unfriendly act" if any foreign power went into the Nile Valley, 1895, was hardly a unanimous approach to foreign policy from the Liberal side. And the Home Rule split had only been ten years previous to this.
7. H.C.G. Matthew, op cit, p 287 ff.
8. ibid, p 172 ff, and T. Pakenham, The Boer War (1979), ch 1.
9. F. Williams, op cit, p 101.
10. As compared with E.P. Thompson and the making of the working class, perhaps the periodical press helped "make" the middle class.
11. Robinson and Gallagher, Fieldhouse, Platt - all investigate formal annexations in one way or another. Lenin's "semi-colonies" were not seen as relevant to this argument, and even Hobson still saw the subject administratively - as one of shifting wealth from the colonies to domestic reform movements.
12. Hyam and Martin question the old views, but still base their attack on economic imperialism on the equation of imperialism with formal annexation. Porter chronicles the contemporary critics, who used empire as a back-cloth for domestic discussions.
13. E. Halevy, quoted in Monger, op cit, ch 10.
14. Pearson, and Blanch in Clarke (ed), p 118.
15. Also A. Davin, cit, and Dangerfield's emphasis on women - there were no traditional avenues open to them, and therefore window-breaking was the only way out. But violence was itself traditional, in the violence of the system.
(For the view of women's traditional role, see e.g. the novels of Mrs Ellis - The Daughters of England, The Wives of England, etc.)
16. Dixon, op cit.
17. Clarke (ed), op cit, "the German-made canker" of socialism (taken from an Aston Unionist poster 1905).
18. R of R Sept 1890 "Progress of the World" - Salisbury has ended the partition of Africa; R.F. Betts (ed), The "Scramble" for Africa (New York 1966) p xi, p 3, quoting Emile Banning.
19. G.M. Young, op cit.
20. Poirier, op cit.
21. Such as Taff Vale and Osborne decisions.
22. e.g. Dangerfield.
23. Hobson had been to South Africa. Few other critics (or even supporters) of empire had been.
24. Fieldhouse's phrase.