Contesting piety: representations of Indonesian internet celebrities on Instagram

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Abstract

This thesis aims to ascertain how, through the social media platform Instagram, Muslim women internet celebrities represent themselves as public figures who can represent the *ummah*. Through their self-representation on social media, Muslim women internet celebrities create a "public Islam" and imagined piety community. This thesis' analysis focuses on the ways different interpretations of piety, *ummah*, and *hijrah* are represented by internet celebrities, and how said internet celebrities respond to their audiences, followers and peers on Instagram, as related to their political views. It explains how piety is constructed and achieved by individual celebrities and contested on Instagram. This research also explores how ideal Muslimah identity was imagined online vis-à-vis Indonesia's social and political situation during and after the mobilisation of Muslims through the Action to Defend Islam of 2 December 2016. The research not only expands our understanding of the way texts and knowledge are structured and produced by Muslim women through performativity and performance, but also finds that discourse about piety contains important assumptions that shape Muslim internet celebrities' imagination and construction of *ummah*. The concepts of *ummah* and piety were selected for this research as both are cornerstones of the construction of Islamic identity.

The Instagram posts and accounts of eight internet celebrities, namely, Dian Pelangi, Oki Setiana Dewi, Dewi Sandra, Zaskia Sungkar, Kartika Putri, Fenita (Jayanti) Arie, Ayudiah Bing Slamet, and Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari, were analysed in this thesis. It demonstrates how these eight internet celebrities have articulated their interpretation about piety (*sholehah*) and how the participatory culture of online communities enables them to respond to Muslim solidarity discourse. This research employed a multimodal analysis, combining semiotic visual investigation, comment interactions, use of specific language, and narrative exploration to understand the way texts and knowledge are structured and produced by Muslim women through performativity and performance. Using a Foucauldian analysis of discursive practices (Foucault, 1972; 2010), this research scrutinises how Muslim women's identities reflect and construct political and cultural discourse through language. Data for this study was collected through archival research. Thematic analysis was combined with visual analysis to examine text and images in relation to their representation of discursive practices.

This thesis argues that the concept of piety produced by internet celebrities is formed, maintained, and constructed in connection with the past. Participatory culture and personalised social media contribute to the construction of a sense of online community, both among internet celebrities as content creators and amongst the audiences/followers who use the digital environment's participatory functions. Internet celebrities' articulation of piety, *hijrah*, and bodily performativity is shown and contested through Muslim women's performativity through their hijab practices. Furthermore, the findings reveal how Muslim women online celebrities prominently depict neoliberalism—as it relates to postfeminism and women subjectivities—in their daily posts.

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Chapter 1

A. Introduction

This thesis explores how Indonesian Muslim internet celebrities navigate the relationship between religious piety and contemporary commercialisation on Instagram. This research contributes to an understanding the agency and practices of Muslimah Islamic identity in Indonesia and an examination of piety discourse and its contestation among Internet celebrities that mediatised by Instagram. Analysis focuses on the ways different interpretations of piety, *ummah*, and *hijrah*[1] are represented by internet celebrities, and how they respond to their followers and peers on Instagram, as related to internet celebrities' political views. It explains how piety is constructed, achieved and contested by individual celebrities on Instagram.

The research also explains how the ideal Muslimah[2] identity is imagined online vis-à-vis Indonesia's social and political situation during and after the mobilisation of Muslims through the Action Defend Islam on 2 December 2016 also known as "212 Movement". The massive demonstration took its numerical name "212" to mark it out in a form of political branding. A huge number of Muslim groups took to the streets pursuing the restraint of Jakarta Governor Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama on blasphemy charges. This anti-Ahok demostration included a series of rallies (2016-2017) and constituted the largest demonstration in the country's history.

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[1] *Hijrah* is Arabic language and means pilgrimage for the cause of Allah.
[2] Muslimah is a Muslim woman that embrace Islam as religion

One of the aims of this thesis is e to engage with the diversity of Muslim identities in circulation in the Indonesian public sphere. The different positions or identities that are presented by Internet celebrities will be contextualised more in the literature review. The subjects of this research were chosen due to their various social and political backgrounds. An online observation study was carried out in order to determine which Instagram profiles were the most popular, as well as to represent the diversity of Muslim women identities in circulation in the Indonesian public discourse. The Instagram accounts of Internet celebrities were also chosen based on their response to the Action to Defend Islam "212," presentation of *da'wa*[3] and *hijrah* activities, and how they established themselves not just as celebrities but also as political agents through daily live updates.

As the results, eight internet celebrities were chosen for this research, namely Oki Setiana Dewi who represents the *Salafi* movement Muslim groups in Indonesia; Zaskia Sungkar, and Dewi Sandra, who represent a movement that has promoted a pure and virtuous Muslim womanhood; Fenita Arie and Kartika Putri, who represent the *hijrah* movement since the 2016 Action to Defend Islam; and Tantri Syalindri and Ayudia Bing Slamet, who show internet celebrities' use of agency to contest the dominant stereotypes of Muslimah piety.

This research covers the period between September 2016 - December 2019, which incorporates the lead-up to and consequences of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. In this period, Jakarta's Muslim middle classes took part in

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[3] *Da'wa* is an Arabic word which means to invite someone. This term is often used to describe when Muslims share their faith with others and teach them more about Islam.

a campaign to challenge the incumbent governor Ahok; this movement has continued to affect Muslim political identity, providing a political and cultural situation that has promoted a pure and virtuous Muslim womanhood. The story of Ahok reveals a connection between Muslim solidarity and dissatisfaction with enduring socioeconomic circumstances. The origins of rising Islamic conservatism were inextricably linked to modernity's constant disappointment, including the fact that education has failed to provide young people with a more secure socio economic position. Many Indonesians are dissatisfied with other social groups (upper class, elite politicians), whom they believe have improperly gained economic and social access (Hadiz, 2019). Ahok's disputed urban redevelopment program (including mass evictions) exacerbated Indonesian culture's ubiquitous sense of precarious living. Ahok's Chinese and Christian identities reinforce racialisation as the rationale for the election's subsequent mobilization along religious lines of Muslim solidarity.

This chapter provides background information about the study, discussing the public practice of Islam since the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and its massive implications for the formation of Islamic identity in the Indonesian public sphere. Through social media platforms such as Instagram, celebrities have supported and circulated the belief that Muslims should only choose Muslim leaders, thereby attempting to shape collective Muslim identity. This discussion will be followed by reviewing Muslim internet celebrities' participation in the construction of discourses about Muslim women's piety. It will also include a

review of previous studies on Muslim identity on online media and highlight this study's specific contribution in examining the Indonesian context.

I lead this analysis by looking at previous studies on the use of online media such as blogs and Instagram in the context of Muslimah identity and gender performativity. I also highlight how Muslim women have a crucial role in identity formation and representation. In addition, I explore and examine the benefits and purposes of the preferred research methods, namely discourse analysis, especially on using a discursive approach and semiotic analysis, as linked through the multimodal method.

1. Background

The form of "public Islam" in Indonesia is connected to the rise of a new middle class after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998. Since that time, "public Islam" has been contested following the increased prominence of religious symbols in the Indonesian public sphere. Islam has become a foremost identity in the public sphere, and been used as a voice for political purposes. The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election[4] (Pilkada DKI) showed how public sentiment can be shaped by faith and racial elements and until 2019 this sentiment has been residual amongst Indonesian people. Both of these became

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[4] Ultimately, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, famously known as Ahok—the deputy governor of Jakarta (from 2012 to 2017) — in 2017 was accused of spreading hate speech against Islam and Islamic religious leaders based on a short video that had been edited by Buni Yani. Buni Yani, is the person indicted of intentionally uploading the video to discredit the governor. Buni Yani's intention was to increase support for Anies Baswedan, Ahok's competitor in the intensely fought Jakarta election in 2017.

important in the election, with political actors paying social media influencers to spread publicity, exposure and propaganda.

In the resulting public debates, many people expressed a view that Ahok's statements were critical of Sura Al-Maidah, verse five, in the Quran, which emphasises that Muslims should choose Muslim leaders over infidels (*kafir*, non-Muslims). Four public figures—Dian Pelangi (4.5 million followers), Oki Setiana Dewi (7.5 million followers), Zaskia Sungkar (13.4 million followers), and Dewi Sandra (5.5 million followers)—actively took part in these debates using the hashtag #muslimvotemuslim. The purpose of this hashtag was to support other Muslim candidates, who used Islamic religious symbols in their campaigns. During the gubernatorial election, a group of politicians cited religious reasons for rejecting leaders of Chinese heritage or Christian faith.[5]

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[5] Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, best known as Ahok, was elected deputy governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta for the 2012–2017 period. When the incumbent governor, Joko Widodo, was elected President of Indonesia in 2014, Ahok automatically became governor. In the 2017 gubernatorial election, for the 2017–2022 term, Ahok sought re-election, but was obstructed by the Gerindra Party that had supported him in a previous election. Things became complicated when Ahok supported Joko Widodo as President in the 2014 election, while the Chairman of Gerindra (Prabowo Subianto) emerged as Joko Widodo's main opponent. In the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo and Joko Widodo have opposed each other again. Ahok faced problems in 2016, after a short video that had been edited went viral. This video resulted in a hatred movement towards Ahok and demanded that he be tried and imprisoned. By late 2016, massive demonstrations on behalf of Muslims and Islamic religious leaders (*ulama*) happened, united under the 212 Movement. In the face of religious and racial issues, Ahok was defeated in the gubernatorial election, and he was later found guilty and sentenced to two years for blasphemy.

Muslim internet celebrities intervened to support this action. Using their popularity on social media, foremost Instagram, they tried to become voices of Islam and were used as such by politicians. Interestingly, the rejection of Ahok involved Islamization in the public sphere. Some internet celebrities, such as Fenita Arie (1.1 million followers) and Kartika Putri (8.4 million) followers, claimed that they were firmly veiled and doing *hijrah*, and by being involved in the Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam)[6], which positioned Ahok as an "opponent" of Muslims.

On the other hand, although they wore hijabs, some Muslim internet celebrities presented their nationalism in a different way and tended to promote multicultural values as part a characteristic of Indonesian society, such us Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari (1.4 million followers) and Ayudia Bing Slamet (1.5 million followers). My aim as a researcher is to examine the dynamics of the Muslim internet celebrities' representations of their identities. Since, identity is socially constructed—there is a process of being constructed—it is unstable, contextual, and linked to power relations in the subject's environment (Woodward, 1997, p. 20). Therefore, this research attempts to scrutinize how Muslim internet celebrities navigate their identities, political preferences as well as marketable components in their accounts.

In Indonesia, through the media environment, it can be seen how Muslimah internet celebrities realize a form of 'empowerment' through ICTs,

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[6] The Action to Defend Islam was a series of demonstrations held in Indonesia, especially in the city of Jakarta, in response to a statement by Ahok, that was deemed blasphemous, made during a working visit to the Seribu Archipelago.

that are used extensively, creatively, and productively by women (Lewis, 2013, pp. 2–3). For this reason, internet celebrities play a significant role in creating discourses about women's liberation. However, the political reality has triggered the emergence of a "new" (post-feminist) discourse of polite and religious women who are also able to be economically independent. In online media, piety is performed and articulated by social media, but social media is shaped by religious practice as well (Campbell 2013, p. 1; Engelke 2010, p. 371; Hirschkind, 2011, p. 91). On the other hand, internet celebrities construct their image transnationally along the lines of imagining a global community (Anderson, 2006, p. 46).

In line with my research, internet celebrities are subjects with an awareness of "how" and "why" they construct themselves. Especially in today's digital-savvy world, Muslim entrepreneurs have emerged, using their Muslim identity as part of personal branding to activate their position as celebrities to become religious influencers. This study begins by addressing the research question: "How do Indonesian Muslim internet celebrities navigate the relationship between religious piety and contemporary commercialization on Instagram?". More detailed explanations of the research questions will be discussing in the chapter Three.

2. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter One provides the background of the research. It delivers an overall introduction to the topic, identifies the research questions, discusses the emergence of public Islam

within the context of political contestation and outlines the thesis. I also explain the political background and historical context of Indonesia as a multicultural country, where the practice of Islamic law has long been debated. In this chapter, I explain that three important political groups (the Nationalist Party [PNI], the Masjumi Party, and the Communist Party of Indonesia [PKI]) have shaped the ideological tendencies of Indonesia and social and political competition in the nation. Furthermore, I also describe the social transformations and the practice of veiling in Indonesia as shaped by the contestation of these three important political groups. In this chapter, I also discuss piety, how it is understood in the Qur'an, and how piety is politicised in a global context. This chapter aims to explore the historical trajectory of piety in Indonesia within its specific social and political context.

Chapter Two sets up the theoretical basis through which I analyse Muslim womanhood on Instagram within the context of political, social, and cultural contestation. Since this thesis relies on gender performativity theory, this chapter explores how internet celebrities' practices (including veiling) are related to their social and political situations. The chapter also explains how social media constructs an imagined online community through the comments of celebrities and their followers.

Chapter Three, explains the methodology and details the research questions, reviews previous studies on the topic, evaluates the research methodology, reports on Instagram as a corpus, and explains the steps in the data analysis.

Chapter Four describes how internet celebrities model modesty and piety through Instagram. I demonstrate how Muslimah internet celebrities participate in politics, using particular online images and hashtags to present themselves as religious models, fashionable selves, and political influencers. Moreover, this chapter also investigates how internet celebrities portray piety and reflect religious discourse in society. In the last section of this chapter, I also analyse the collapse of internet celebrities' private lifestyles and religious practices by capitalising on their authenticity and intimacy.

Chapter Five addresses the different articulations of *hijrah* among internet celebrities. As Islamic identities have strengthened, the political and cultural situation has promoted a 'pure' and 'virtuous' Muslim womanhood. Some internet celebrities have shown conservative and puritan values on their Instagram accounts; others promote the *hijrah* movement owing to their political interests; and still others have challenged the *hijrah* trend among conservative internet celebrities. In this chapter, I explain the spectrum of *hijrah* articulation among internet celebrities to explain how the *hijrah* movement has been contested in the online community and received various responses from internet celebrities and their followers. I also make some important theoretical contributions by showing how the *hijrah* movement amongst internet celebrities relates to neoliberalism, postfeminism, and women's subjectivities, which has never been explored before (see McRobbie, 2004; Gill and Scharff, 2011).

Chapter Six examines how internet celebrities embody Muslim solidarity through their Instagram accounts. Some internet celebrities use their voice to resist and challenge alleged global conspiracies against Islam. This chapter also explores the contestation of Islamic religious authority and its contribution to the re-imagining and re-construction of a global Muslim *ummah*. By exploring celebrities' conservative understanding of *ummah* and piety, this chapter examines how internet celebrities describe their peers and their opponents to construct a transnational Islamic identity. This chapter will produce an important theorethical contribution on how piety is manifested by Internet celebrities, not only by being fashionable and modest, and not simply by wearing outwardly Islamic clothing, but also by sharing their inner reasons and speaking about global Muslim communities (Anderson, 1983; Mandaville, 2001).

The seventh chapter provides a critical brief overview and established of reflections on the dissertation research, as well as an exploration of a variety of recommendations for future research on Muslim women and social media. This chapter also assesses the study's limitations while reflecting on the overall experiences of conducting this research.

Overall, this research shows that discourses of piety and forms of public Islam in Indonesia are continuously changing and contested based on the contemporary political constellation. The veiling practices, imaginations of *ummah*, and *hijrah* definitions/practices represented by the eight internet celebrities provide an understanding of piety discourses and their contestation

among internet celebrities. Moreover, the comments from their followers and peers on Instagram provide insight into the tensions and disagreements amongst commentators regarding internet celebrities and their different articulations of Muslim identity.

In this part of the chapter, I will present a brief history of the socio-politics of the Indonesian state and how this history has evolved into a widely held conception of public Islam in Indonesia. Furthermore, this chapter will also explore how the contestation of piety discourses has an extensive history.

B. Background: Political and Social History of Indonesia

1. Establishment of the Indonesian State: Brief Historical Background

Various groups and elements contributed to Indonesia's struggle for independence against Dutch and Japanese colonisation, including not only the armed forces and nationalist groups, but also religious organisations. After Indonesian independence 17 August 1945, the Soekarno–Hatta[7] regime encouraged the formation of various political parties to perform "supremacy" in parliament (Hadiz and Teik, 2011, p. 464). Under the regime of Soekarno, Indonesia's first president (1945–1966), many parties were formed). The development of such a parliament was intended to ensure Indonesia's independence was acknowledged internationally.[8] Soekarno gave various

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[7] Soekarno and Hatta were the main leaders of the Indonesian battle for independence from the Dutch Empire. Soekarno was an important leader of Indonesia's nationalist action when the Dutch colonial era and Japanese armies colonize Indonesia.

[8] At the time, the Netherlands and its allies did not want to cooperate with Soekarno.

elements and mass organisations the opportunity to establish political parties in recognition of their contributions to Indonesia's independence. As a political leader, Soekarno had to provide the same space for all diverse political expressions.

As Hadiz and Teik state, "Indonesia's 1945–1949 war of independence ensured that the development of the post-colonial state would be a highly contested process within which different representatives of Islamic politics were involved" (2011, p. 470). This was also an effect of Soekarno successfully making populist nationalism, rather than religious values, the foundation of the Indonesian state. Remarkably, in the eradications, of the Communist Party and suspected members in the 1960s, Muslim groups helped the army carry out its violent operations (Schwarz, 1994, p. 171).

2. The Political History of Indonesia: Old Order (1945–1966) and New Order (1966–1998)

The diversity of values, culture, and political practices in Indonesia, thus, had to be arranged and united in a single system to form a national identity. As a nascent state, Indonesia needed a national philosophy, for which Soekarno

introduced the concept of Pancasila[9]. Introduced on June 1, 1945, Pancasila[10]

became the basic philosophy of the Indonesian state. Releasing the people from

exploitation, the spirit of Pancasila was not only about the independence of the

Indonesian people, but also the liberation of all nations from colonialism and

imperialism. Pancasila was an idea for unifying the nation of Indonesia, with

its main slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). Implicitly, it is an

idea of tolerance and social justice, necessary for uniting the diverse cultures,

religions, tribes, and language groups and strengthening the national identity

Indonesia presented to the world.

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[9] Etymologically, the term Pancasila is formed from two Old Javanese words initially derived from Sanskrit: *pañca* ("five") and *sīla* ("principles"). Thus, it consists of five philosophies and holds that they are interconnected:

> Belief in the One and Only God (in Indonesian, "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa"),
> Just and civilized humanity (in Indonesian, "Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab"),
> A unified Indonesia (in Indonesian, "Persatuan Indonesia"),
> Democracy, led by the wisdom of the representatives of the People (in Indonesian, "Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan Perwakilan")
> Social justice for all Indonesians (in Indonesian, "Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia").

Pancasila serves as Indonesia's national ideology, and is the primary reference for the norms and values embraced in various aspects of national life. Under the New Order regime, Pancasila was used to dispose of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and became the scourge of the Indonesian people. After political reform began in 1998, many Islamic organisations that had previously been silenced became popular, and questioned Pancasila's basis as political parties' guide towards values such as 'civilised humanity' and 'social justice for the people'. In many cases, especially during the New Order, the New Order regime sought to implement the aforementioned values, but they were eroded by the process of Islamification.

Indonesia's ideology is Pancasila, and the foundation of the state is UUD 1945.[11] The political history of Indonesia has been marked by the interactions of its many ethnicities, tribes, and religions. For the founders of Indonesia as a modern nation state, the central problem was finding unity in diversity; how could they accommodate a multicultural society into a unified state ideology? Soekarno sought to unite the nationalist movement, Islamic groups, and Marxist parties under one banner, NASAKOM (Anderson 1990, p. 29), and believed that Pancasila and NASAKOM offered a middle ground that could lay a strong foundation for Indonesia. Soekarno created the name to show his respect and commitment as the country's leader. NASAKOM – "Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis", meaning "Nationalism, Religion, Communism" – was a reflection of Soekarno's management and control of society.

The Communist Party of Indonesia campaigned against capitalism and supported popular ownership of production instruments and land. Representatives of the most significant Islamic groups, meanwhile, were from Masjumi Party and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The Nationalist Party of Indonesia

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[11] The Constitution of Indonesia (Indonesian: Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945, UUD '45) is the foundation for the government of Indonesia. Written when Indonesia was emerging from Japanese control following World War II and announcing its independence from its former colonial occupier, the Netherlands, the Constitution was abrogated by the Federal Constitution on December 27, 1949, replaced by the Provisional Constitution on August 17, 1950, and restored on July 5, 1959. Today, the Constitution is the supreme legal authority and requires the deference of all governmental actors. Since 1999, amendments to the Constitution have increased its size from 37 articles to 73 articles. This version of the 1945 Constitution has been annotated by the Department of Information, and the English translation is only provisional (http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7987).

(PNI), meanwhile, was founded by Soekarno, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and Boediarto on July 4, 1927, and conveyed the idea of a united nation.

Regarding *Masjumi,* this party always associated closely with Islamic group Darul Islam[12] rebellion in West Java region in 1948 (Pranowo, 1994, p.9). The Islamic group even demanded that Islamic law to be included as the basis of the state in Pancasila. This request was known as the "Jakarta Charter".[13] Soekarno rejected the request, and this caused much political upheaval at the time. It was at that time that early Islamic groups felt that the state did not support their ideology. In fact, "The Jakarta Charter" became a never-ending point in the struggle for Islamic law within the Indonesian state (Hefner 2000, p. 42; Feener, 2007, p. 141; Hasan 2011, pp. 75–76, Schwarz, 1994, pp. 168–171). Although the country's constitution mentions that Indonesia is based on "Belief in the Almighty God", Islam was still not the basis of the state; this situation was a source of dissatisfaction for Islamic groups.

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[12] "Masjumi, the abbreviated name for the Madjelis Sjoero Moeslimin Indonesia, was founded in 1943 to be an umbrella organisation for various Islamic groups serving the interest of wartime mobilisation of the Indonesian population under the Japanese occupation" (Feener, 2007, p. 140). Led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, DI/TII (Indonesian: Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, means Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia) and NII (Indonesian: Negara Islam Indonesia, means the Islamic State of Indonesia), struggling to establish Islamic Law as a state foundation, the movement recruited Muslim militants and was centred in West Java region. In 1958, certain Masyumi leaders had supported a rebellion action in West Sumatra; this action led Soekarno to drop the Party in 1960 (see Schwarz, 1994, p. 170).

[13] This was part of Masjumi's Islamist political agenda, drafted in June 1945. An important statement in this document was the inclusion of Islamic law as part of the Indonesian constitution. Masjumi felt entitled to propose its aspirations for its participation in the struggle for Indonesia's independence (see Feener, 2007, p. 141)

The Indonesian government even managed to limit the expression of Muslim identity in public space. According to Jefferies (2011, p. 228), "After independence in 1949, the Indonesian state actively discouraged the wearing of veils, as they were seen to represent a political and religious fanaticism that was viewed, both socially and politically, as antithetical to the idea that Indonesia was a pluralist, tolerant, and diverse community". The government made an intense and seemingly obvious argument. Although the people of Indonesia were mostly Muslim, in a real regard, the country consisted of various tribes, religions, values, and beliefs. For this reason, despite being the largest Muslim country in the world, there was no compelling reason why it should implement Sharia[14] as the foundation of the state (Hefner, 2000, p. 186).

3. Political History in Indonesia: New Order (1966–1998)

During the transition to Indonesia's new president in 1966, the country's second president, Soeharto based his legitimacy on the rumour that PKI (which was considered close to Sukarno's principles) had masterminded the deaths of military officers in 1965. This case, which became known as "*Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI*" (the betrayal of the G30S Movement and PKI), had been used as a 'master-narrative'[15] in communal narration and political discourse. "In [1966], President Sukarno was effectively ousted, Soeharto took his place, and the Indonesian Communist Party was officially banned" (Heryanto 2006, pp. 7–8).

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[14] Sharia means regulations basis on Islamic jurisprudence.
[15] The term 'master narrative' is adopted by Heryanto from James Clifford (1988, p. 86). It "functions as a canon, by which 'a potentially endless exegetical discourse can be generated", making memories and affecting the history and myths of society.

PKI was forcibly disbanded and party members (as well as persons suspected of involvement) were punished without any evidence or legal defence. At the same time, terror happened in silence and people recognised "religious labels" as important for their security (Pranowo, 1994, p. 13). Soeharto succeeded in using this situation to gain power and public trust by identifying the communist ideology as similar to atheist ideology, and communists as cruel people opposed to the *Pancasila*. The ideology of communism was banned by the state; Soeharto repressed communist parties; and gained public sympathy. This prohibition of communist activities and punishment of persons proven to be members made the issue of communism a deliberately created terror meant to control Indonesian politics. People who disagreed with the New Order[16] regime were labelled "communists", were unable to find proper jobs, were held as political prisoners, and were excluded from society.[17]

Even after Indonesia came under control of the Soeharto regime, Islam was not its dominant ideology; indeed, Islam continued to be suppressed by the state. With the Communist Party eliminated, only Muslim groups had the numbers and organisational strength to compete for power with the army: "The ban on Masjumi remained in force, and Soeharto's political organiser kept

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[16] The New Order (Indonesian: Orde Baru) is the name used by Soeharto for his regime, as the second Indonesian president. Soeharto chose this name to contrast with the "Old Order" of Soekarno regime (1945–1966).

[17] See also Geertz (1972, pp. 68–69). The threat of death was made towards persons who claimed to be "atheists". As such, it was important to "confess" membership in a particular religion and to show one's faith in public. Muslim youth groups also appeared to be actively hostile to atheists, either individually or as part of the army.

modernist Muslim leaders on a tight leash" (Schwarz, 1994, p. 171). Supporting "Javanism"[18] and secular nationalist values rather than Islamic identity was part of his strategy to suppress the potential power of Islamic groups (Kersten, 2014, p. 476; Hefner, 2000, p. 42). In the framework of Soeharto's power, three elements always appeared dominant: Men, Military, and Javanese (Schwarz, 1994, p. 280).

Soeharto knew that the strengthening of Islamic groups, would generate stiff political resistance for him. The strengthening of Islamic groups led to movements promoting an "Islamic state"—i.e. a state governed under Sharia— becoming stronger than before (i.e. under Soekarno). Even in the early days of his government, Soeharto banned the use of the hijab in public schools (Brenner, 1996, p. 676; Liddle, 1992, pp. 443-462). A change occurred in the late 1980s, when military support for Soeharto began to decline. The use of hijab was allowed in public schools as a symbol of the ruler's "acceptance" of the symbols of Islam. It also became the strategy for ensuring Islamic groups' support of Soeharto. The government embraced Islamic organisations, with the ultimate goal being to use Islam as a crucial part of addressing the ethical,

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[18] The largest ethnic group in Indonesia and the original inhabitants of Java, where Indonesia's biggest cities and capital Jakarta are located. The majority identify as converts to Islam, but many practice a *Kejawen* belief system that infuses elements of animism and Hindu-Buddhist culture. Soeharto himself was Javanese, practiced *Kejawen* teachings, and presenting them as the national identity of Indonesia. In the context of Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country in the world, Java has the largest population and is a place where Islamic beliefs have mixed with the spiritualism of the Javanese tradition (see Geertz 1960; Woodward 1989).

moral, and disciplinary concerns of society.[19] Similarly, *da'wa*[20] activities were part of the New Order's mass mobilisation in support of the development (Hefner 1993, pp. 13–14; Brenner 1996, p. 677). In this, the content of the *da'wa* Islam was always within the framework of preaching Islamic morality and personal piety (Pranowo, 1994, p. 8).

As emphasised by Hasan, "Despite Suharto's New Order's steadfast determination to marginalise potential sources of Islamic political power, Islam has begun to gain a spectacular presence in the public lives and debates of Indonesian Muslim society in the mid-1970s" (2009, p. 231). Many researchers believe that the rise of Islam in Indonesia is not only because of the internal situation, but also because of external influences from the Islamic revolution in Iran, which reopened debates over whether Indonesia should be an Islamic state (Bayat, 2007, pp. 71-84; Schwarz, 1994, p. 173).

4. Islamic Identity in the Reform Era (Started on May 1998)

After the fall of Soeharto May 1998, his Vice President BJ Habibie replaced him as the third President of Indonesia. Under the transitional government, Indonesia's political condition underwent significant change.

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[19] See the study by Hamayotsu (2002, pp. 354-356) comparing Islam and nation-building in Indonesia and Malaysia. After Indonesia's declaration of independence, its government's pressure on Islamic politics led to dissatisfaction among Islamic groups, who ultimately fought against the state constantly. On the contrary, in Malaysia Islam was made the official religion after independence, and the Malaysian government was more 'flexible' and 'pragmatic' as a guardian of Islamic idealism. As a result, Islamic groups in the country were more easily arranged and controlled.

Habibie revoked the requirement for Press Publication Business Licenses or SIUPP[21] (in Indonesian, *Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers*). The revocation of this regulation promoted a mushrooming of various mass media industries in Indonesia. In this era of euphoria for freedom of speech and public information disclosure, multiple identities previously suppressed by the New Order inevitably emerged, including Islamic identity.

The proselytization of Islamic morals and the promotion of private piety has grown stronger since the fall of the New Order. Islamic groups who had previously not enjoyed opportunities in Indonesian political contestation gained momentum after Soeharto's resignation on 21 May 1998. In this phase, Islamic groups could no longer be contained. The leniency and political change of the moment gave space for Islamic identity. After once being silenced by the rulers, Islam – through democratic freedoms – began to gain space in the public sphere. Religion experienced a process of "repoliticisation" and "deprivatisation" and played a particular role in directing the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and in intervening in public debates, and thus contributed to the growth of civil society (Casanova, 1994, p. 81).

Indonesia's transition from authoritarianism to democracy has provided enormous space for the expression of religious identity in the political area. Islam revived in democratic space through various political parties that used

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[21] In the New Order regime, media publishing businesses were required to get a permit from the Ministry of Information. This control was meant to ensure that the mass media would provide a positive framing that supported development, government policy, and minimise criticism of the state.

Islam as the basis and symbols of their politics (Qodir, 2011, p. 124). Moreover, as Qodir highlights, the emergence of these Islamic political parties in the power struggle was solely due to an opportunity for political power. Muslims saw an arena for a political power struggle, and therefore it was vital to gain their "voice". In 1999, after the first general election since the New Order's collapse, seven political parties were formed that used Islam in their names, ideological bases, and symbols. Brenner prefers "movements" instead of "revivalists" (1997, p. 679), as the revivalist were referring to the ever-prevailing ideology of Islam but under previous political orders (i.e. Soekarno and Soeharto), Islam had never prevailed as the ideology and law of the Indonesian state.

In the Reformation[22] era (started on May 21 1998), Islamism has more grasped power in political and social realms and freely its idea in society. The public controversy involves the notorious Islamic organization such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front or FPI) who coordinated massive demonstrations and vocalised blatantly from an Islamic point of view toward sensitive issues such as; targeting the LGBT community, attacking a non-Islamic leader, attacking groups it considers a religious minority including a Christian group that arranged to build churches, by promoting fear to their "opponents" based on 'sinful and immoral reason'. In Indonesia, the post-

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[22] Greater freedoms of political expression actually facilitated the development of more conservative forms of political Islam. As the result, the political freedoms allowed conservative Islamic actors to become dominant.

reform Islamic movement turned out to become more conservative (Bruinessen, 2013, pp. 57-59).

Furthermore, in the reformation-era, delivering freedom of expression, increasing economic stability and improvement of information technology that facilitated the opening of modern democracy also disseminates the trend of post-Islamism[23] in Muslim societies (Sinanovic, 2005, pp. 433-436; Bayat, 2013, p. 7; Hasan, 2013, pp. 177). Modern democracy has a propensity to embrace freedom of expression, which has resulted in a movement toward re-secularizing religion through media and popular culture. In the guise of religion, demonstrations of freedom of expression mobilize Islam as a source of legitimacy for consumerism, commercialism, and capitalism. In addition, this study will look at how the Reformation Era in Indonesia facilitates Post-Islamist contestation in the remaking of the Islamic public sphere in Indonesia.

The next stage of the chapter will further explore the intersection between freedom of political expression, and the effect of a strengthening of Islamic identity in the Reformation era into the formation of a discourse of piety in Indonesia.

C. The Discourse of Piety in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the preaching of Islamic morals and the promotion of private piety has increased since the collapse of the New Order regime - May 1998

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[23] Underlines the transformation of religious radicalism that proposes Muslims should practise their religious principles but at the same time still follow the track of modernity and globalisation in as a way of life in modern society.

(Hoesterey and Clark, 2012, p. 207, Arifianto, 2020, pp. 37–50). Understandings of piety have been informed by both internal and external social and political values, which are constantly evolving. In this section I will explore some of the conceptual challenges that women's involvement in Islamist movements poses to feminist theory in particular, and secular-liberal thought in general, through the definition of piety as involving specific gendered obligations for Muslimah. This section also aims to discuss the interaction between local and global piety discourses, with a particular focus on its historical development and its implications for Indonesian understandings of gender norms.

I start this section by referring to the Quran and its understanding of piety, then review several works on the politicization of piety in the global context. At the end of this section, I explore the historical route of piety in Indonesia. Overall, this section argues that (1) the meaning of piety has been hotly contested in the history of Islam, with this debate being informed significantly by the surrounding social and political context, and (2) contemporary Indonesian discourses of piety are inexorably linked with national power struggles, but should still be understood as part of global contestations.

1. The Meaning of Piety in the Qur'an

Piety is a main part of Islamic ritual and belief, appearing in English versions of the Qur'an as a translation of *taqwa*. According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (2003), *taqwa* and its derivatives appear 250 times in the Qur'an. As a required element of faith (Wadud 1999, p. 37), *taqwa* is understood as having several qualities: keeping trust (*amana*, see QS Al-Baqarah: 283),

faithfulness (*al-wafa*, QS Al-Imran: 76), patience (*al-sabr*, QS Al-'Imran: 186; QS Al-A'raf: 96; QS Yunus: 63–64; QS Az-Zumar: 10), and good living (Hasanat, QS At-Talaq: 3).

Taqwa comes from the Arabic word *muttaqun*, and refers to the act of placing a protective obstruction between oneself (the individual) and God's wrath. According to QS Al-Baqarah, Verse 177, in order to avoid the anger of God, a person must believe in God and obey all of his commands. Those are right, and those are *muttaqun*. In three examples of the most popular English translations of this verse, the word *taqwa* in this verse is translated as 'most righteousness' (Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 1987), 'righteous' (Muhammad MW Pickthall, 1977) and 'righteousness' (Mohammed H Shakir, 1999) (see http://al-quran.info/#home2-al-baqarah/).

A translation of QS Al-Baqarah, Verse 177, by Abdullah Yusuf Ali reads: "It is not righteousness that you turn your faces toward East or West; but it is most righteousness to believe in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the Book and the Messengers; to spend of your substance out of love for Him for your kin for orphans for the needy for the wayfarer for those who ask and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer and practice regular charity; to fulfil the contracts which you have made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering) and adversity and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth the Allah-fearing".

In the abovementioned verse, there is no link between righteousness and women's bodies[24] or awrah.[25] Rather, this verse explains how *taqwa* should be understood; it is necessary for maintaining vertical relations with God as well as for maintaining respectful relationships between members of society. By drawing on the concept of *taqwa*, Bravemann (1972, p. 13) has shown that, in classical Islamic literature, *taqwa* is defined definitions include 'godliness', 'devoutness', 'piety.' 'God-fearing', 'pious abstinence', and 'uprightness.' Moreover, Bravemann (1972) also explained that *taqwa* also has a social connotation with 'moral behavior' or 'reverential dutifulness'. Commonly referred to as the quality of being religious or worshipful, and sometimes translated as "Fear of God" (Izutsu, 1964, p. 56; Ohlander, 2005), *taqwa* has also been interpreted as 'moral excellence' (Maududi, 1983, p. 117).

Such a view is supported by Wadud (1999, p. 37), who writes that *taqwa* is understood as both action and attitude, a pious manner of behaviour that observes restraint and a 'consciousness of Allah.' In other words, action and attitudes are multidimensional terms that are explicated in the Qur'an and

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[24] The meaning of *awrah* in Islam varies from place to place and denomination to denomination, with the most extreme views (such as those embraced by the Taliban and Salafis) requiring women to cover up completely. In one misogynistic and sexist Islamic position, even the voice is regarded as *awrah*, meaning that women must never even speak to unapproved men. Women under the dominion of these sexist cults have no value other than conceiving and raising children while serving as household slaves.

[25] *Awrah* or *awrat* is a word used in Islam to denote the private parts of the human body that must be covered with clothing. Revealing the *awrah* is unlawful in Islam and is considered a sin. Etymologically, the term awrah originates from the root 'a-w-r, which means "defectiveness", "imperfection", "blemish", or "weakness." Nevertheless, the most popular English translation is "nakedness." The exact definition of *awrah* varies between schools of Islamic thought.

restructure all dimensions of human existence. Specific interpretations are then integrated into broader society, be it 'nation' or 'tribe', and framed as behaviour that shows one's reverence of God.

Similar discourse is found in Indonesian scholarship. In his book *Ensiklopedia Al-Qur'an: Kajian Kosakata* (Encyclopaedia of the Quran: A Vocabulary Study, 2008), the Arab-Indonesian professor of Quranic studies Quraish Shihab notes that the word *taqwa* is etymologically derived from the word *ittaqa-yattaqi*, which means 'guard against all that is harmful'. The word *taqwa* implies 'guarding against all sin by leaving everything that God Almighty prohibits and carrying out everything as he commands'. Expanding on the meaning of 'avoid', Shihab (2008) identifies piety as involving three levels of avoidance. First, avoiding *kufr* ("denial of the Truth", i.e. the articles of Islamic faith) by believing in God. Second, carrying out God's commands as long as possible and avoiding His prohibitions. Third, avoiding all activities that distract the mind from God. Quraish Shihab does not mention *taqwa* as being related to women's *awrah* (see also Quraish Shihab's discussion of *taqwa* on his daughter's official YouTube channel, Mata Najwa, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSRrnw4EHnk).

Such context is important. The Qur'an does not depict men and women as universal 'examples', but within the specific context of the Arabian Peninsula,[26] where it was revealed (Amin, 1969, p. 1). It offered divine solutions

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[26] The Arabian Peninsula is located in Southwest Asia. It extends from the northern deserts of Syria to the Gulf of Persia in the east, the Indian Ocean in the south, and the Red Sea to the west.

to various problems that occurred at that time, some fifteen centuries ago, as communicated through the mind of the Prophet. For instance, it is stated that "God is the Quran", because Arabic does not have a gender-neutral third-person pronoun, either singular or plural. Arabic society itself, however, is highly patriarchal (Wadud, 1999, p. 31; Watt 1982, p. 30; Brockelmen, 1944, p. 5), and as a consequence women are treated as objects of a social-moral system while men are given the authority to review and evaluate gender norms. Many interpretations of the Qur'an thus come from preachers with male-controlled backgrounds (Wadud, 1999, p. xxi; Shihab, 1996, pp. 293–297; 2004, pp. 288–290) and frame women as subservient. Nonetheless, Wadud (1999, pp. 32–33) shows that the Qur'an highlights female charms and thereby underscores the importance of respect (see also Shihab 2004, pp. 67–73; Rahman, 1980, p. 5; Khalaf-Allah, 1965, p. 185).

As Izutsu (2002, p.12) writes, the moral system explained in the specific language of the Qur'an does not by necessity represent good quality, but rather is part of a particular culture's linguistically defined worldview. Culture significantly affects the linguistic construction of reality, including ethnicity and religiosity. "Even when we are actually reading a text in the original, we tend almost unconsciously to read into it our concepts fostered by our mother tongue, and thus to transmute many, if not all, of its key terms obtainable in our native language" (2002, p. 4). Moreover, Izutsu (2002, p. 6) adds that "views of what is good and bad, or right and wrong differ from place to place and from time to time, and differ fundamentally, not as trivial details to be explained away

as degrees in the scale of a unitary cultural development, but as more basic cultural divergences having their roots deep down in the language habits of each individual community". The semantic structure of an ethical code is based on the empirical facts and social norms of a particular culture and society, and thus linguistic differences result in different cultures embracing different moral values.

The abovementioned studies provide valuable insight into the definition of *taqwa,* both within the context of personal relationships and within the context of religious practice. At the same time, however, they show that *taqwa* requires a complex and contextual interpretation. The concept of piety has been extensively debated, interpreted and contested throughout the history of Islam, with the surrounding social and political context playing a crucial role. With these considerations in mind, it's obvious to see how opinion leaders, male preachers, and a variety of social and cultural legacies influence the understanding of taqwa and piety. The preceding explanation will aid researchers in identifying contentious religious discourses in the public realm and online media arenas.

2. Interpretation of Piety in a Global Context

Performances of piety include self-control and bodily practices, both private and public. They include diet, attitudes, clothing, and bodily disciplines, all of which are ordered by local and global society (Tong and Turner, 2008, pp. 41–59). Such performances of piety have been prominent characteristics of Islamic religious movements and endeavours worldwide. Each Muslim state

has its own specific understanding of piety, reflecting its unique historical, political, social, and economic context. In today's Indonesia, Muslim identity is becoming increasingly prominent, particularly as Islam is being used to voice political aspirations in the public sphere.

Researchers have studied various features of piety (Mahmood, 2001; 2005; Bayat, 2007; Tong and Turner, 2008; Rinaldo, 2008, Barkin, 2014). Some have studied the intersection between Muslim women's acts of piety and digital platforms, including social media such as in Tumblr, Facebook, and Instagram (Campbell, 2005; Akou, 2010, pp. 331-346; Rocamora, 2009, pp. 407-424, Ahlbäck, 2012; Beta, 2014, pp. 377–389; Pennington, 2018; Baulch and Pramiyanti, 2018, pp. 1-15). As mediated religion is closely related to political discourses (Meyer and Moors, 2001), such studies offer an important means of understanding the formation of public space and nationalism.

New media then is relevant to discuss because provides an insight into national articulations of identity. In the digital era the modus of media consumption becomes more individual and segmented, on the other hand new sources of internet, not only rely on one national web source, but provide multi and global interfaces that contest various identities and ideologies. Therefore, in a network era, internet facilitated forums share, discuss, and represent an imaginary community. However, new media has also become a significant instrument for spreading hate speech, bullying, and disinformation, and as such education, digital literacy, and political awareness are important for all internet users (Lim, 2017).

The development of new technologies and internet networks has played a significant role in creating opportunities for transnational discourses about gender norms and Muslim women. New media, it turns out, has provided space for reinterpreting Islamic discourse, and this has transformed the positions of religious leaders vis-à-vis new media curators (Bunt, 2009, pp. 3-4). Users of new and social media have many opportunities to re-intellectualise Islamic discourse (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, p. 14; Hirschkind 2001, pp. 41–59), and this implies the fragmentation of religious authority. Religious knowledge is no longer derived solely from the teachings of religious scholars; it is also produced by the individuals/groups who manage and produce new content.

According to Deeb (2009, p. 114), there is a link between transnational discourses on gender and Islam in the practice of piety. Political and social contexts are critical aspects of the modern formation of piety, which is shaped by cultural, political, economic, and social factors. Deeb (2009, pp. 112–126) also explains that the gender roles of Muslim countries provide not only a mental differentiator between the West and Islam, but also a tangible boundary between the self (i.e. Muslims) and the Other (i.e. Western society). These gender roles may be manifested through women's articulations, positions, and embodiments, as well as the gendering of public spaces (Wadud, 1999). Scrutinising the gender norms in Muslim communities will enable us to learn how contemporary transnational discourses are engaged within said communities. To supplement this understanding, it is also necessary to recall that faith-based transnational mobilisation has emerged in recent years as

another important force in piety-making among all religions with a global reach (Silvestri, 2016).

With regard to the concept of "public sphere", there has emerged a discourse regarding a Muslim public with specific politics, Islamism, media, and technologies (Eickelman and Anderson 1999, pp. 14-15; Deeb 2005, p. 113; Meyer and Moors 2006, p. 56). This can be seen, for instance, in the treatment of the *hijab*, which is not only a manifestation of modesty within spatial relations and part of a religious practice (Siraj, 2011, p. 717) but also a symbol of Muslim resistance to western nations' control of the global order. By understanding gender roles in Muslim countries, we can recognise these countries' discourses regarding Islam and its teachings. In patriarchal Muslim countries, women are often positioned as the guardians of morals and values (Suryakusuma, 1991, pp. 40–50, Candraningrum, pp. 27-46).

As many Islamic groups and preachers have promoted conservative and radical Islamic discourses in response to the development of new economies and technologies, there have emerged new forms of authority and transnational Muslim solidarity (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, pp. 18–24; Mandaville, 2007, p. 107). At the same time, however, "a widening of the public sphere does not in itself produce more pluralistic – in the sense of being more tolerant or open-ended – knowledge" (Mandaville 2007, p. 104). Rather, many religious leaders who gain popularity through social media actually promote Islamic values that reject other beliefs, teaching exclusivity and preferring violent forms of dispute resolution. For instance, Indonesian Muslim women once

wore *kerudung*, head covers that were adopted shortly after the Islamization of Java (Ricklefs, 2007, p. 2). However, with the rise of neo-Salafist ideas on Indonesian campuses and mosques since the 1980s (Fealy and White, 2008, pp. 30–34; Brenner, 2011, p. 478), Arabic customs and new Islamic rituals were adopted and women began wearing veils, hijabs, and even *chador* as part of their practice of piety.

According to Mahmood (2005, p. 17), there is a strong relationship between the "words, concepts, and practices that constitute a particular discursive tradition that gives detailed reasoning of the discourse of piety". Discourse produces a means for understanding women and their relations. Multiple interpretations of *hijab*, for instance, have been embraced in different states and Muslim communities. Studies have shown, for example, that "modern Egyptian women" have returned to wearing the veil to prevent sexual abuse (El-Guindi 1981; Zuhur 1992, p. 83). Similarly, El-Guindi has shown that, in Middle Eastern societies, veiling has reproduced cultural codes that diverge from traditional concepts of "modesty, shame, and seclusion", and thus Muslims have various interpretations of the practice.

According to the Turkish scholar Gole (1996, pp. 20–22), there is a complex relationship between modernity, religion, and gender relations in Turkey. Understanding this relationship provides an important opportunity to advance understandings of veiling within the context of social and power relations "between Islam and the West, modernity and tradition, secularism and religion, men and women, and women themselves". Crucially, it is necessary

to understand the Turkish experience critically, as modern Turkey not only straddles Islamic and European cultures, but is also geographically divided between Europe and Asia, a fact that has influenced women's gender identity in the country.

According to Brenner (1996, p. 673), who conducted a study in Java, the decision to wear Islamic garments is part of a personal conversion, a means of embracing a new modernity. Particular forms of Islamic practice, as well as active community participation, are encouraged as a means of becoming modern. Veiling is offered as an alternative tradition, one that contrasts with Western models of modernity (see also Washburn, 2002, pp. 1–148). Furthermore, Muslim women's gender roles are constructed through the definition of piety itself. Piety is incorporated into everyday practices, such as dressing and eating, and thus these activities have transformed from secular ones to religious ones (Hartono 2018, p. 43).

Based on the above-mentioned studies, it may be surmised that veiling practices are closely related to public participation, and that public piety is perceived as associated with and is appraised based on women's contributions to the public good of the community. The cultivation of women's piety is also linked with the demonstration of modernity within a transnational and global context.

3.   Women's Piety in Indonesian Religious and Political Discourse

The piety discourses contested by post-Islamist women activists in Indonesia are not singular, but have a long and diverse history. According to a

study by Rinaldo (2013, pp. 62–191), the four largest Islamic women's organizations in Indonesia—Fatayat NU, Women's Solidarity, Rahima, and PKS Women—have their own interpretations of Muslim womanhood as well as concepts of gender equality, women's empowerment, domesticity, and public participation, as well as such issues as polygamy. This diversity leads to the contestation of particular discourses and practices in Indonesia's public sphere.

Indonesian piety discourse is inexorably related with the rise of neo-Salafist[27] teachings in the 1980s (Fealy and White, 2008, pp. 30–34; Brenner, 2011, p. 478). Following Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, Salafi teachings

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[27]Salafism is more of an ideology—and sometimes a movement—than a classification. The fundamental idea is that the first society ("Aslaaf") founded by the Prophet Muhammad himself was excellent, and as such imitating its qualities means "returning to the true essence of Islam." The scope of Aslaaf varies, but it is generally understood in the light of the hadiths as referring to the first three generations of Muslims. Salafis may have different understandings of aslaaf and its contemporary applicability. There is literalist Salafism, which emphasises the importance of literal understandings of early Islamic manuscripts and culture and replicating their practices. Conversely, progressive Salafism (*al-Salafia al-taqaddumiyya*), also known as neo-Salafism, understand early Islamic society through a modern lens and seek to return to the "true character of Islam" by replicating the thinking of *aslaaf* rather than its practices (for detailed discussion, see Wiktorowicz 2010, p.14)

penetrated Indonesia on a massive scale, spreading through campuses and mosques across the archipelago (Schwarz, 1994, p. 173; Izharuddin, 2015, p. 3). The Islamic Revolution provided significant momentum for challenging Western supremacy, and resulted in the institutionalisation of Islam in many Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia (Bruinessen 2004, pp. 131–132).

Indonesia's Islamic revival is also prominently related to the rise of *tarbiyah*[28] (see Jazani 2005, pp. 167–209; Daniel 2001, p. 175). More than a decade before the New Order collapsed in 1998, *tarbiyah* campaigners practiced "campus proselytisation"[29] through informal religious links and less detectable organisations. Activists translated *da'wah*[30] as the mission to return Muslims to a purer form of Islam, as practiced by Muhammad and the early Muslim community (Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2019). Casual religious networks began to emerge in the late 1980s, being used to subvert the political repression of Islam by the Soeharto regime, which tended to control formal

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[28] *Tarbiyah* is an Arabic word that refers to providing that which is necessary for human development (i.e. to nurture) (Uthaymeen, 1994, pp.82-83). *Tarbiyah* is closely related to *halaqah* (religious circles), which consist of multiple cadres under a religious instructor known as a *murrabi* (from the Arabic *rabba – yu rabbi – tarbiyah*, which means as "educating, caring, nurturing, and teaching with love") (Hussin, 2005, p.27)

[29] This word is often used to refer to Muslims' conveyance of information regarding Islamic beliefs and practices. It can be seen, for instance, in the title of Campus Da'wah Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, often abbreviated LDK), an inter-campus student organisation that proselytises Islam throughout Indonesia. Each campus has its own LDK branch, which can be modified and rebranded; alternative names include Islamic Student Activity Unit (Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa Islam), Islamic Spirituality (Kerohanian Islam), Forum for Islamic Studies (Forum Studi Islam), and Islamic Spiritual Body (Badan Kerohanian Islam) (see Azra 2000, pp. 35–45)

[30] *Da'wah* is an Arabic word that literally means "to make an invitation".

Islamic organisations. In the late 1980s, the *tarbiyah* movement began to move away from practical politics. This movement gained further momentum after the beginning of political reform in 1998.

By the end of the Soeharto regime, the campus *da'wah* movement had transformed into a broader *da'wah* movement, whose activists sought to integrate their ideology into their political contestations in the Reform Era. Through the Forum for Coordinating Campus Da'wah Institutes (FSLDK),[31] Campus Da'wah Institutes activists asserted their leadership, using the momentum of political reform to declare the establishment of the Indonesia Muslim Student Union (KAMMI)[32]. This organisation provided the embryo of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which was officially established on 20 April 1998 as the Justice Party (abbreviated PK).

According to Pipes (2000, pp. 87–93), at the end of the seventeenth century, European colonialism triggered the territorial and cultural defeat of Islamic societies. Islamic civilization was replaced by Western culture, knowledge, and economic-political philosophy. Muslim communities did not only face physical colonization, but also lost their control of global intellectual discourse (Davidson 1998, p. 3). This resulted in continuous religious

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[31] This forum aims to develop networks and channels between LDK activists.

[32] KAMMI emerged as an alternative means for Muslim students to promote Islamic living on university campuses. It traces its roots to the tenth Indonesian Forum for Campus Da'wah Forum (FS-LDK), which was held at the Muhammadiyah University of Malang (UMM) in March 1998. This event was attended by approximately 200 campus activists from 59 affiliated LDKs, representing 63 public and private universities. KAMMI was formally established on 29 March 1998 through the Malang Declaration.

sentiments, with the West and Christianity becoming perceived as the main enemies of Islamic civilisation. In this context, PKS promoted an 'active and comprehensive form of da'wah' (*al-dakwah al-harakiyah al-similar*) as a means of establishing a new and comprehensive Islamic civilisation (Muhtadi, 2008, p.158). Through its various activities, PKS has promoted a transnational Islamism[33] that involves humanitarian missions to Muslim countries such as Palestine, Syria, and Turkey as well as Muslim communities such as the Uighur and Rohingya. It has thus emphasised religious solidarity over the issues that are relatively closer to Indonesia's national and local interests.[34] These various activities have included Muslim women, who have tangibly contributed to various social movements opposing the repression of Muslims (including the veiling prohibition of the 1980's) and bolstered the idea of Islamic Revivalism (Jefferies, 2011, p. 228; Hefner, 2000, pp. 186–188).

The emergence of PKS and other Islamic political parties since the resignation of President Soeharto can be seen as evidence of how Islamic discourses have flourished in Indonesia and affected national politics.[35] Even

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[33] The rise of Pan-Islamic solidary in Indonesia has been used by Western media to justify the use of western perspectives to label Islamic movements as "radical". Since the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, which was carried out by the hard-line Islamist groups al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Islamism radicalism has become globalized, resulting in the West (particularly the United States) being suspicious of Islam.

[34] Since the beginning of political reform in 1998, many Indonesian Muslims have espoused negative views of the United States and Israel. These countries are often positioned as campaigning for secularism, democracy, and capitalism, all of which are understood as contrary to Islamic teachings. For detailed discussion, see; Saiful Mujani. (2005). "Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Indonesia", *Studia Islamika 12*(2).

[35] For a detailed account of the importance of Islamic parties in post-Soeharto

though such parties have not been able to gain a majority in Indonesia's five free and fair general elections (1999–2019), they have challenged efforts to reduce the commitment to political Islam and promote a secular state. As seen in Islamic-majority countries throughout Asia and Africa, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Nigeria, discourses have often framed Islam as ill-suited to the egalitarianism spirit of the democratic system. The tug-of-war between Islamic doctrines, external political dynamics, and transnational Muslim movements has significantly influenced the democratisation of Indonesia (Mandaville 2001, pp. 67–73; Fealy 2003, p. 161).

Unlike other Islamic Parties,[36] which trace their roots to 'local traditions' (see, for example, the National Awakening Party [PKB], United Development Party [PPP], Crescent Star Party [PBB]) or 'moderate Islam' (National Mandate Party [PAN]), PKS draws its ideological influences from the Middle East, particularly the values of the Muslim Brotherhood[37] (Bruinessen, 2002, pp.

Indonesia, see Amy McCreedy. (2003). "Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics", *Asia Program Special Report*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[36] As explained in the previous chapter, even before Indonesia's independence, the country had a long history with Muslim radical groups who wanted a sovereign state based on Islamic law. Muslim political movements in Indonesia have a clear genealogy, including the Darul Islam movement and the Masjumi Party, as well as links to transnational Islamic networks (see Bruisnen in Wessel 1996, p. 19–34; Hefner 2000, pp. 5–6).

[37] The Muslim Brotherhood is a missionary movement founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a schoolteacher working in the town of Ismailia, near the Suez Canal. He argued that an Islamic religious revival would enable the Muslim world to catch up to the West and shake off colonial rule. He had a vision of a universal Islamic system of rule that could be attained by promoting Islamic laws and morals and by engaging society through offering social services. Throughout its history, the Muslim Brotherhood has always adhered to an ideal of a society governed by Islamic laws and morals.

117–154; Muhtadi 2008, p. 6). Islamic parties that draw on 'local tradition' tend to hold a belief in cultural Islam, focusing on ways of enhancing spiritual life rather than to struggling through political practices. Such parties have agreed with the secular state-run, rather than Islamic, political system (Fealy 2003, p. 162; Liddle 2003, p. 6; Hefner 1993, p. 5). These parties acknowledge Pancasila as a political platform, one that enables Indonesia to exist as a secular state with a plural and multicultural society that nonetheless manifests fundamental Islamic principles such as respect for human rights, plurality, democracy, and gender equality (Bruinessen 2004, p. 119). This suggests that there is no particular notion of the state within the Islamic tradition, and that no single political party could declare itself the sole legal representation of Islamic aspirations.

In general, Salafi groups in Indonesia have been influenced by Wahhabism and contemporary Salafi movements from the Middle East. As such, they have a strong desire to emulate and refine ideal Islamic teachings, as practiced by their pious predecessors, the early generations of Muslims. Their main focus is to purify Islamic teachings, which they view as having been contaminated by local cultural practices (Wahyudi, 2007, pp. 45–56; Laffan, 2003, pp. 2–10; Barton and Fealy, 1996, pp. 120-135). It is not therefore surprising that Salafi groups associate outsiders with *bid'ah*,[38] because they consider these people as mistaken in their practice of Islam. In their everyday

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[38] The Arabic word *bid'ah* refers variously to "innovation", "novelty", "heretical doctrine", and "heresy". In Islamic studies, it most frequently refers to unorthodox approaches to Islam and its teachings.

lives, Salafists dress and act according to the traditions in place in the time of the Prophet Muhammad.

In order to live purely, Salafists turn to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (the *sahabah*), their successors (the *tabi'un*) and the successors of the successors (the *taba tabi'in*). Additionally, Salafists refer solely to the Qur'an and the Sunnah as sources of Islamic knowledge, ignoring all other hermeneutic teachings. Therefore, most Salafi men maintain beards and wear short trousers under long white robes, while women wear dark, loose clothes that do not expose the shape of their bodies as well as long veils. Commitment to such behaviour and dress is perceived as a means of adhering to the teachings of *al-wala wal bara*,[39] and enables them to easily distinguish their peers from outsiders (Hasan, 2006, pp. 198–201).

One of neo-Salafists main agendas in Indonesia is making sharia law a foundation of the Indonesian state. Its support for a "clean and caring" government, one that is free of corruption, practices good governance, and actualises economic prosperity has enabled PKS to enjoy significant achievements since the first free elections of the Reform Era.[40] When it first participated in Indonesian elections in 1999, PKS required a specific strategy, one that the party has adapted as new forms of political engagement based on religious contestation became possible in the early 2000s (Qodir, 2011, pp.

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[39] The concept of Al-Wala' wal Bara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) is commonly identified as "WB" in modern Salafism (see Ali, 2012, pp. 43-46).
[40] PKS received 1.4 per cent of the vote in 1999; 7.34 per cent in 2004, and 7.88 per cent in 2009. In 2014, its share of the vote decreased to 6.79 per cent, while in 2019 (the most recent election) it increased to 9.2 per cent (see Tempo Data, 2019).

120–124). To gain the support of Muslim voters, PKS has consistently presented itself as "piously Islamic in beliefs and practice than ever before in Indonesian history" (Liddle, 2003, p. 4). Such a situation has also occurred elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and affected both public and private spaces[41].

The purification of Islamic teachings has evolved gradually, influencing the practice of piety, etiquette, and even regional regulations. Neo-Salafi teachings have also increased religious extremism in urban Indonesian society (Boellstorff, 2004, p. 45; Sidel 2006, p. 78).[42] For instance, legislation against pornography and other sexualised imagery has become a "site of struggle" (see Kitley, 2008, pp. 88) between nationalist groups (shaped by liberal discourse) and conservative Islamic groups (influenced by neo-Salafi values). In 2008, this contestation ultimately produced the Pornography Law,[43] Indonesia's first legal product governing pornography and pornographic behaviour. Nationalist groups argued that pornography, defined as excessive exploitation of sexuality in magazines, books, films, etc. must be vigorously rejected; at the same time, however, they argued that it was not necessary to use moralistic laws to prevent and stop pornography.

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[41] see https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/political-islams-changing-face-in-south-east-asia).

[42] Some conservative Islamic groups have sought to re-establish the Jakarta Charter and implement Sharia law in Indonesia. Public morality has been argued intensively since at least 2005, when conservative Islamic groups endorsed efforts by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to legislate against pornography and 'pornographic behaviour' (*pornoaksi*, defined as public acts that exploits sex, vulgarity and/or erotica).

[43] Known as the Anti-Pornography and Porno-Action Law during drafting.

At the same time, political reform was reinvigorating the spread of political, social, and economic resources through the implementation of regional autonomy.[44] This, however, had the unexpected consequence of political contestation becoming dominated by familial dynasties and the passage of local regulations that benefit only specific political groups. Unquestionably, this has disadvantaged people at the grassroots (ordinary people who lack political and economic access). At the same time, it has facilitated the passage of misogynous local regulations that regulate women's bodies. In Aceh, for example, local Sharia regulations have been used to "politically abuse" women and their bodies. Areas that should be private have, through regulation, become public. Women's bodies have become arenas of political contestation, as local authorities regulate not only the shape and material of the clothing worn by women but also the places and occasions in which women's bodies are "acceptable" (National Committee for Women, 2010; Kloos, 2016, p. 528, Brenner 2011, pp. 480–481; Rijal 2005, p. 426; Wieringa 2015, p. 36).

Regional autonomy, one of the goals of the Reform era, has resulted in the appearance of various religious regulations that regulate private life. The most deprived in this situation are women and non-Muslim groups, who have

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[44] After more than 30 years under a centralised national government, Indonesia implemented a new policy of regional autonomy that took hold on 1 January 2001. According to Law No. 22 1999 on Local Government, central government authority in all areas of government (save security, defence, foreign policy, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and religious activities) has been devolved to local governments (for a detailed discussion, see Usman, 2002)

been controlled through local regulations that (for example) oblige female civil servants and schoolchildren to veil themselves. Other laws prohibit women from wearing tight clothing or travelling at night. This differs significantly from the situation during the New Order, when female civil servants faced hostility if they veiled themselves while working (Brenner, 1997, p. 676).

Another unusual situation is the emergence of religious leaders who offer and recite the Qur'an in the mass media to strengthen their positions as celebrities as well as businessmen (Fealy, 2008, pp. 25–26). On the national stage, religious leaders have significant influence through their opinions of popular media. In 2004, for instance, Abdullah Gymnastiar (better known as Aa Gym) delivered an impassioned speech before the House of Representatives to protest the release of a film titled *Buruan Cium Gue* (Kiss Me Now).[45] He argued this film promoted premarital sex and would thus erode the morality of the younger generation. Ultimately, this film was retitled *Satu Kecupan* (One Kiss).

Aa Gym rose to prominence through his *da'wa* programmes on Indonesian television. His approach to religion became known as *management qalbu* (the management of heart). He promoted the 'beauty of Islam', preaching the beauty of God and Islam's teachings to the public. He urged listeners to maintain the purity of their hearts by always knowing and remembering God. Aa Gym was prominent on national television during the month of Ramadan,

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[45] *Kiss Me Now* was also disapproved of because it was perceived as supporting women who are sexually active. Women are expected to passively obey the rules of Sharia law.

delivered speeches in front of state officials and even the president. Ultimately, he became a well-respected religious leader, whose moral judgements were commonly referenced. It was said that, in Indonesia, "film stars could only hope to enjoy the celebrity status of Aa Gym" (Watson, 2005, p. 776; Rudnyckyj, 2009, p. 192). This popularity gave him a prominent role in shaping the discourse of sexuality in Indonesia.

Returning to the campus *da'wah* movement, in the past decade it has been coloured by the Tarbiyah movement, as well as HTI[46] (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) and Salafism. Most campus activists began their proselytisation activities by serving as *rohis*[47] at their junior or senior high school mosques. Once in university, such students usually join the Campus Da'wah Institute directly, thereby becoming exposed to Tarbiyah, HTI, and Salafi teachings (Arrobi, 2019, p. 103). This situation is also directly linked to the *hijrah*[48] movement, which has dominated discourses about urban Muslim youths through such discussions as "Male Young Generations to Hijrah" *(Pemuda*

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[46] Hizbut Tahrir (HT), meaning "Party of Liberation", is an international Islamist movement with branches in more than 40 countries. Founded as a political party in Jerusalem in 1953 by Sheikh Taqi al-Din An-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar, HT aims to restore the Muslim world and free Muslims communities from the practices and systems of unbelievers by reviving the Islamic Caliphate (see Muhtadi, 2009, pp. 623–645; Osman, 2010, pp. 735–755).

[47] Rohani Islam (abbreviated as Rohis) is an organization to intensify and strengthen Islamic teachings. Rohis is also famously named the Mosque Family Council (DKM). Rohis is usually organisations in extracurricular forms at junior and senior high schools in Indonesia.

[48] As explained in the previous chapter *hijrah* means letters in Arabic indicating movement because of Allah to the better life.

Hijrah), "Married at a Young Age Movement" *(Gerakan Menikah Muda)*, or "Single fi Sabilillah" (single for the sake of Allah).

Salafi groups have been able to incorporate their *da'wa* content into the open market by presenting their teachings in fun, lively, and modern packages, even as their spirit remains the same. Technology and digital savviness enable post-Islamist articulation to become more easily understood and disseminated through the digital environment, with many Islamic preachers (including, for instance, Felix Siaw, Hanan Attaki, Khalid Basalamah, and Salim A Fillah), finding popularity on YouTube, Facebook and Instagram. Their social media accounts reach millions, and they have thousands of loyal followers. To summarise, the Indonesia context during my period of study is characterized by the role that religion, in particular Islam, plays in political decision-making and provides a brief outline of Indonesia's context.

Conclusion

Through global and local issues, we can understand how piety is contested within specific political, social, and economic circumstances. Likewise, the contestation of piety cannot be separated from the contexts and situations wherein neo-Salafi teachings developed. Three decades of experience have shown that there is a clear link between Islamic movements and democracy in Indonesia, with a range of diverse interests ultimately shaping discourse on piety as part of social values and norms. From contemporary media and technology, we can understand how Islamic politics has made religion, long deemed a personal matter, into part of

public practice, and how women's bodies have become the foremost sites of the struggle to blend and reconstruct the private and public spheres.

Chapter 2
Literature Review

A theoretical framework is a compilation of interrelated concepts that can help frame understanding of data or phenomena. To construct critical and rational assumptions, researchers need to formulate a theoretical framework (Gabriel, 2008, pp. 173–199). Theoretical frameworks can explain research problems (Richard, 2013), and therefore must cover a wide scope while simultaneously embracing specific theories that address particular conditions. In this research, I embrace a multi-disciplinary approach that has been important for media studies, cultural studies, and post-feminist theories. This section will help frame the dynamic transformation of complex veiling practices in Indonesia and understand them within Indonesia's social and political developments.

1. Veil as Political Expression

This section explores the dynamic transformation of the complex practice of veiling in Indonesia that is related to both the social and political Indonesian context. Various aspect of veiling practices in Indonesian society can be seen in multiple ways. In Indonesia, shifts in the meaning of the *hijab* (veil) have occurred owing to the influence of various complex situations and conditions (Wichelen, 2009, p. 76). The Islamic revival, which impacted the wearing of the veil by Muslim women in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia), was inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Izharuddin, 2015, p. 3). Given its impact on political and social life, even in the Soeharto Era of the mid-1980s,

Muslim women's wearing of the veil could be seen as a form of protest against state control of the expression of Islamic identity in the public sphere (Nadjib, 1991, p. xiii; Bodden, 2010, pp. 126–127).

A gradual symbolic change began after Soeharto's eldest daughter, Tutut, wore the veil when she performed the hajj pilgrimage in 1992. This circumstance can be interpreted as the "Cendana"[49] family's acceptance and negotiation of the values and ideologies of Islamic groups in Indonesia. After his return from the hajj, Soeharto appeared more amicable towards Islam. This moment became a significant marker of how the veil could be used as a symbol of political communication. A robust discourse of pious (*salehah*) women in Indonesia began to gain ground after the fall of the New Order and initiation of Reform in Indonesia, including its initiation of regional autonomy. Eva Burton (2006) explained how the collapse of the New Order Regime produced the strengthening of the religious system in public institutions, this firmed up the place of the Islamic religion as the main morality of public value, and has been affecting social and political conditions since.

There are two kinds of veil that have a strongly different meaning and causality related within the roots of Indonesian words and culture. Previously *kerudung* or *kudung* had a meaning of wearing a veil referring to any long and loose-fit material, or the sense that woman can leave their hair slightly visible. *Kerudung* was adopted as a related consequence of Islamic penetration of

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[49] Cendana is the name of the road where President Soeharto lived with his six children. The name "Cendana Family" was not intended to refer to the area of residence, but rather the power and strength of the family in Indonesian politics.

Arabic traders coming to Nusantara[50], the impact of infiltration was the adaptation of new Islamic principles or Arabic customs that had been happening since the end of the sixteenth century (see; Ricklefs, 2007, p. 2; Dewi, 2013, p. 113). Furthermore, around the sixteenth century *kerudung was* worn by upper-class women who were required to use the veil because they were noblewomen who were able to perform the haji (a pilgrim) and able to signify Islamic piety with the adoption of the *kerudung* (veil) as part of God's directives according to the Islamic faith (see; Andaya, 2000, p. 247). The term *kerudung* has been prevalent since the 1930s, and describes a type of veil that has been optional for most Indonesian women. An example from an early period of Aisyiyah women's clothing is posted on Muhammadiyah's online news and information channel (https://ibtimes.id/nyai-ahmad-dahlan-saja-pernah-tidak-pakai-hijab/, see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Photo of the women founders and administrators of Aisyiyah[51]

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[50]Nusantara is an Indonesian word for the Indonesian archipelago. It is originated from Old Javanese and literally means "archipelago".

[51] Aisyiyah is an Indonesian Islamic non-governmental organization focused on women's empowerment and philanthropic activity. Nyai Ahmad Dahlan founded

(the first Muslim women's organization in Indonesia underbound of Muhammadiyah) wearing headscarves, dressed in kebaya and batik cloth

In the 1980s, it was overtaken by another type of veil, known as *jilbab* as shown in figure 2.2 (Feillard, 1999, p. 10). Unlike traditional headscarves, or *kerudung*, which are worn loosely over the head, these new veils did not let a single hair show (see Wichelen, 2009, pp. 78–90). Conversely, the word *hijab* (common in English and Arabic, and thus reflecting a global perspective) tends to be used in popular culture to refer to high-fashion, especially among young urban Muslim women. The word *hijabers*, meanwhile, is commonly used to refer to individuals who wear a veil and who embrace a chic Muslim style (can be seen in figure 2.3 taken from https://dianrainbow.wordpress.com/). This style has also gained popularity with the establishment of the Hijabers Community (2010); its more than 5,000 members, spread across Indonesia's major cities in Indonesia, constantly organise Islamic recitals, charities, and fashion shows (see Rahmawati, 2016, p. 58).

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it on May 19, 1917, to help women gain access to education, health care, and social services.

Figure 2.2: Depicts a visual representation of a jilbab taken from Indonesia online media https://www.femina.co.id/profile/asma-nadia-manusia-itu-abu-abu.

Figure 2.3: A hijab model is displayed in this figure, which was collected from Indonesian Muslim fashion designer Dian Pelangi (Rainbow). This form of hijab was the most popular in early 2014, and it signaled the beginning of the word hijab's popularity among young Indonesian Muslim women.

The increasing popularity of hijab practice amongst Indonesian women through popular culture has inevitably placed the hijab as a measure of godliness. Wearing of the hijab has become an important outward sign of

Islamic religiosity for women. Moreover, hijab can be used in political campaigns, promoting greater sympathy through being pious (see; Candraningrum, 2013, pp. 27-46). The role of religion is supported by right-wing Islamic political organisations and activism, and (again) Indonesian secular democracy is becoming indistinguishable as Islamist groups gain more grip and prominence. Moreover, the contemporary choice of Muslim women to wear the veil is related to multifarious controls of social forces and institutional configurations which gradually present the veil as being prevalent to the cultivation between a moral-self and society's ethics (Brenner, 1996, pp. 673-679; Warbuton, 2006). Saba Mahmood (2005) explained, dressing in Hijab for women in Cairo, placed a fundamental setting to the construction of the pious self-related Islamist revivalist in the 1970's.

On the other hand, in contemporary Muslim societies the internet and other global communications provide broad interpretations and representations in global discourse, demonstrating how women with hijabs are depicted not only as religious but also as being modern, fashionable, and having self-governing agency (Rocamora, 2012; Tarlo 2010, pp. 160–163; Hedge, 2013, p. 34). From studies of the diverse veiling practices amongst Muslim women in the West, we cannot draw the generalisation that this solely constitutes a practice of consumerism and religious commodification. Rather, Muslim women are negotiating Islamic identity within the multicultural context of western countries. Muslims' representation through the fashion and lifestyles that appear in advertisements, e-commerce websites, television programmes, or

films (across hybrid media systems), provide essential evidence that religion and faith exist in transnational modernity. People are exposed to both secular and religious experiences, as well as diverse lifestyles and values, and this can result in the hybridisation of practises and religious knowledge (Silvestri, 2011).

I will present my findings within the context of various studies that position the veil as representing freedom and oppression, but I will avoid these polarising categories, instead taking the position that this particular way of dress is symbolic of a process of negotiation.

2. Reproduction or Resistance–Representation of Muslimah Internet celebrities

To understand about the representation of Muslimah internet celebrities I will be using the theory of representation from Stuart Hall (1997). Internet celebrities represent a specific ideology of Islam to their followers (readers of social media) through technical and symbolic codes. Using Instagram, internet celebrities have produced a set of language systems to represent what piety is. As such, internet celebrities can be seen as subjects wielding symbolic power, mobilising new discourses or even reproducing or resisting existing discourses. Within captions, images, short videos, colours, and background settings, internet celebrities symbolize something which is offered to members of society. They create and offer a set version of piety to the *umma*, thereby shaping its perceptions, which are also ideological.

Representation is the process of presenting or depicting something (Hall, 1997, p. 3). It involves meaningful communication in a social context

and is linked to power, ideology, and culture. Representation is an essential need for interaction; there is a process to understand each other. As such, representation is an essential foundation through which meaning is constructed and spread between members of a culture. Through language, meaning is created to represent the culture and conventions in society. Therefore, language, meaning, and culture influence each other. According to Hall (1997, p. xvii), "Language is one of the 'media' through which thoughts, ideas and feelings are represented in culture. Representation through language is therefore central to the process by which meaning is produced".

Hall (1997, p. 10) outlines three approaches to understand representation. First is the reflective approach, in which "language functions like a mirror, to reflect the true meaning as it already exists in the world". It means that language is imitating reality. Meaning is produced by humans through ideas, media, and experiences in society. It can be seen when social media content reflects the social situation, and it works mutually. Imitating reality as it happens is known as mimesis, an imitative representation of the real world in creative works (Hall, 1997, p. 11) such as art and literature. For example, in the Islamic arts, the formation of mimesis can be seen in the art of calligraphy, which is a representation of the Qur'an.

The second is the intentional approach, which Hall (1997, p. 11) defines as "Words [that] mean what the author intends they should mean". For instance, it can be seen when internet celebrities have the power to design, construct, and deliver a particular message to their followers as readers, but they still need to

modify the message (image, language, video) so it can be accepted by particular followers as communication targets. It is because, Hall (1997, p. 7) argues, the power is actually limited since "language is a social system through and through", meaning that the producer of a message needs to "negotiate" personal views when using words or images in the language system. Obviously, the language system "depends on shared linguistic conventions and shared codes" (Hall, 1997, p. 11). The use of language, thus, always refers to a social context that is lived in a particular situation and condition.

The last is the constructionist approach. Hall (1997, p. 11) explains, "Neither things in themselves nor the individual users of the language can fix meaning in language. Things don't mean: we construct meaning, using representational systems − concepts and signs". This explains how meaning is constructed based on current conventions, but improvements and adjustments are made to create a reality based on specific aims. For example, this can be seen in how internet celebrities use strategies when they post their representation as modern and pious Muslimah. Through the reproduction of images, sounds, short videos, and captions as part of the language system, internet celebrities construct their representation Indonesian identity as piety. As Hall (1997, p. 11) describes, "Representation is a practice, a kind of 'work', which uses material objects and effects".

Clearly, in the constructionist point of view, media not only has an essential position in the formation of identity but also has a significant role in the broader audiences' contestation of identities. Woodward (1997, p. 13)

argued that there is a relationship between identity and culture, which gives us meaning about with whom we belong and about how we maintain ourselves in particular contexts and situations. Moreover, Woodward (1997, p. 14) explains that "discourses and systems of representations construct places from which individuals can position themselves and from which they can speak". Socially constructed media give or offer subjects positions in ideology. In this position, the media works ideologically offering meanings that we negotiate with.

It might be suggested that all of our cultural practice has a meaning, and thus creates a discursive aspect. As explained by Foucault (1999, p. 25), discourse is about power relations, wherein language and practice produce knowledge. Internet celebrities on social media can be seen as a cultural phenomenon, as a medium to reflect a certain piety concept in the Indonesian Muslim community or *ummah*. Foucauldian discourse analysis examines not just the text as a single instance of language utilization but also the restrictions, regulations, partitions, and systems that govern certain bodies of knowledge. As a result, the discourse analysis in this study will look at the discursive practices of internet celebrities as more than just linguistic. For example, the concept of Muslim women's piety is always rooted in the historical situations in which it emerges.

Social media, thus, is the site of struggle, where the expression of piety is constructed and becomes discourse in the political, cultural and social background of Indonesia after 20 years of Reform. Moreover, internet celebrities can also be seen as cultural texts, constructing piety. As such, these

internet celebrities illustrate how the concept of piety in Indonesia is negotiated and sustained through discourse and representation. Social media, as a public arena, presents a set of signifiers that represent societal religious discourse. The Internet, as an information network, has certain technical properties that lend themselves to public sphere reflections, such as interactivity, openness, and equality (Rauchfleisch and Kovic, 2016).

According to Törnberg and Törnberg (2016, p. 132), "Social media is becoming an important source for the (re)production of discursive power in society, while simultaneously constituting a unique source for studying everyday discourses outside the scope of mass media". In the development of technology, new media has played a very significant role in the formation (and fragmentation) of religious authority (Bunt, 2003). Additionally, new media technologies encourage the transformation of religious identity, where in sharing information about religious ritual practices creates performative action (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, p. 5). Furthermore, social media has become a place of interaction and an important part of human life today.

Through Instagram, Internet celebrities have produced a specific language system and code to represent piety. Internet celebrities can thus be seen as subjects wielding symbolic power, mobilising new discourses, or reproducing or resisting existing discourses. Using specific captions, images, short videos, colours, and background settings, internet celebrities stand for something that they offer to members of society. They represent specific understandings of Islam, (re)presenting Islamic values to their followers (i.e.

readers of the social media) through technical codes. Internet celebrities' embedded-ness thus provides them with opportunities to become piety role models.

Rocamora (2011, p. 410) states that personal fashion blogs can serve as spaces of articulation for women. This new media also offers space for empowering women to build their images, as well as alternative spaces that can reconstruct feminine identity in mainstream discourse. However, in certain circumstances, there is a panoptic gaze, and women may feel themselves always being controlled and remarked upon by society. Through the internet, bloggers can construct their "identity performance" (Lister et al. 2009, pp. 268–269). Identity, as an "ongoing" process, is constructed with a specific purpose and strategy to have marketing impact. The specific performance within personal blogs is supported by fashionable sets of apparel, which simultaneously shapes performative quality. For instance, on Instagram, Indonesian Islamic fashion designers commonly use the hashtag #hotd (hijab of the day) in the performance of their fashion diaries. At the same time women have an element of liberation due to economic, independence and self definition, but, on the other hand, women are limited by political, religious norms and gender norms that emerged in patriarchal society like in Indonesia.

According to Foucault (1982, p. 778), identity is produced through discourse, and discourse is formed through power. Power normalises discourse, as it determines the subjects and objects of knowledge. In *Discipline and Punish* (1979), Foucault explains that docility is a result of disciplinary action.

Discipline differs from force or violence, as it means a way of controlling one's work and body. Judith Butler later developed this concept through her book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990), arguing that sex is not simply biological; it is a construction, created through norms, with regulatory practices that involve disciplining the body. This is supported through "feminine" practices of dieting, wearing make-up, all of which provide them with "a sense of mastery as well as a secure sense of identity" (Bartky, 1997, pp. 132–133).

Moreover, through using Foucauldian (1982) theory this research can employ an analysis of how Muslim Internet celebrities assist themselves in becoming self-transformed, self-directed, and self-managed in the face of others who bear witness to such self-transformation through technologies of the self, which are specific strategies constituted in concrete activities that are shown in the public arena. Internet celebrities employ methods and tactics derived from their knowledge acquisition and deployment as influencers and from knowledge manufactured by other cultural institutions that form and impact numerous discourses.

We cannot only see the practice of wearing the hijab as "a certain technology of power over the body" (Foucault 1979, p. 29) but must look beyond that. In the practices of Muslim internet celebrities, they deliberately make their own image Islamic, using the image of piety, in order to gain power and accumulate capital. Offering projects of identity and representation is what the public expects from such internet celebrities. This reality pushes

Muslim/Muslimah celebrities on social media to adopt appearances that represent moral values accepted in Islamic society or culture, i.e. the *ummah*. Furthermore, young Muslim women willingly wear the *hijab* as a means of disciplining themselves, of maintaining their religious piety that has been constructed by religious and political power in society.

3. Re-Imagining Ummah (Global–Local Entanglements)

This section will discuss the concept of imagined community by Anderson (2006), to understand how media works as a point of reference, used by people to imagine their collective identities. Mass media has been characterized as a viaduct of mass society (McQuail 1994, p. 95). A broad audience uses mass media as a reference to get information and knowledge that is seen as a reflection of society's norms. Mass media thus plays a significant role in the development of collective identities, i.e. individuals' sense of belonging to a group as part of their personal identities. In this, media also has a substantial role in constructing; "reality is mediated" (Couldry and Hepp, 2016). On the other hand, 'the media' generally continuously gives space to dominant identities, and thus media has the potential to construct imagined communities that contribute to public views of reality.

Castells (1997, p. 7) suggests that identity comes from many aspects of life, such as history, geography, biology, collective memories, and personal fantasies, as well as power apparatuses and religious exposure. As such, the media delivers a particular narrative of history that may be emblazoned in the collective consciousness. An exciting aspect of this practice is consideration of

which stories are selected and which are left out of these narratives. In this sense, a power relationship is involved in the construction of collective identities. As researchers, we need to scrutinize how identity is constructed, through what medium, by whom, and for what reason.

In his book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, which studies the roots of nationalism, Anderson (2006, p. 6) states that participation in the community is imagined. Members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, but in the minds of each exists an image of their relationship. Print media plays an important role in constructing the shared experiences of individual members of the nation and constantly continues. Media additionally support the idea that there is something collective that can be found among individuals. Without having met other community members, shared understandings and formations of national identity have been cultured in the daily lives of individuals. Through media representation, these imagined communities now become existent.

Nationalism also forms national identity. Anderson (2006, p. 34) explains that there are two main features of the nation bond. First is the physical aspect, including the political boundaries upon which the nation state was founded. Second is the immaterial aspect, including the shared experiences and sense of national identity that contribute to the roots of nationalism held by individuals. In this way the concept of a nation is built on an imagined political community; in former colonial states, this national identity was often created

and built to produce a distinction between coloniser and colonised. Furthermore, national identity is an expression of uniqueness, self, and otherness in each community. An "imagined community" can be understood as the formation of shared national identity amongst a nation and it is people, in which the people recognise themselves as a homogeneous society although having never met the other individuals.

Anderson explains (2006, p. 44-56) a nation as being an imagined political community, and imagined as both fundamentally limited and sovereign through a new mass media, the place where national identity is shared and represented. Scholars have debated the meaning of nation, which includes seeing the nation as a human population that strives for equality in the economic, legal, and political spheres for all of its members (Smith, 1991). The concept "nation" also refers to a set of shared characteristics (language, historical perceptions, etc.) that can and do change throughout time, a process that is entirely based on political expediency (Hobsbawn, 1992, Hroch, 1996).

The imagined community is constructed through the identification of people who live in particular states or nations. As such, nations and people identify themselves as part of the same community because they are part of one sovereign state, as shown on the political map. The concept of imagined community is formed, first, because it is a way of identifying the people who live in a particular state or nation. Second, because it has invisible borders, a nation, according to Anderson, is "is an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (2006).

Anderson (2006, p. 4) believes that nationalism is a cultural experience, not a set ideology of how society works. Nationalism and the concept of imagined community cannot be formed without media, which operates as a facilitator and contributes to the construction of identity within the nation and community. With the rise of capitalism, the media industry encourages society to honour their country. In this situation, as mentioned by McQuail (1994, pp. 81–82), mass media and society interact and influence each other, creating a sort of "interdependence". Moreover, Anderson (2006, p. 37) argues that, in the historical spread of nationalism, it was never original nor authentic. In the end, nationalism encouraged and generated action to defend and support the country.

In print capitalism, language is an essential part of national identity consciousness. Print capitalism forms the dialect of the language and national knowledge by adding new constancy, which helps shape the nation (Anderson 2006, pp. 45–46). Moreover, through print capitalism, language is used as power, because it gives space for the nation to become unique through communication. On this point, Anderson argues, language is mediated and a "basic morphology" sets the stage for the modern nation. The development of new media has turned out to significantly change the "imagined community" theory. As a result, Anderson (2006, p. 47) contends that the unification of print capitalism enables language to become a new universality, establishing the image of antiquity that is so important to the subjective feeling of the nation.

Benjamin's idea of mechanical reproduction (2007, pp. 218–219) influenced Anderson's view about the process of identity construction. In the

formation of an imagined community, mass production – especially of printed newspapers – is parallel with the development of industrial capitalism. The aura of cultural artefacts – the unique sensation of an object which cannot be reproduced (Benjamin 2007, p. 222) – can be ruined by mechanical reproduction, thereby creating consciousness. That this bereavement of aura by print capitalism can create a national consciousness is visible. In other words, nationalism is a cultural artefact of capitalism. Additionally, capitalism supports the deployment of nationalism, which is why Anderson (2006, p. 45) believes that there is no "authentic" nationalism.

Essentially, the concept of *ummah* might be regarded as a way for Muslims to find a home or a Nation identity that they are unable to find since they believe they are a minority, have become immigrants, and are tired of struggling on global inequality (Roy, 2003). Since the 1970s, new media provided venues for identity construction, including audio-video recording and satellite broadcasting, that have benefited transnational Muslim elites (Hirschkind 2001; Denoeux 2002; Lynch 2005). The rise of the digital environment – and, more recently, the widespread connection of mobile phones to the internet – has further supplemented this ever-changing media landscape (Saunders, 2008).

Furthermore, in the digital era, technology is assisting in the formation of the digital imagined communities. Online technology allows Muslims to engage actively with the ummah; the dynamics of such connection differ significantly from Muslims' passive relationships with religious elites (ulama)

(see Bunt, 2000). Social media offers a lot of potential for democracy in terms of articulating interests and regaining societal unity. But on the other hand, the development of internet networks and new media has contributed to crises of national identity, which have emerged because of an expansion of the construction of transnational and trans-local imagined communities that are considered better and more ideal than national identities (Mandaville, 2001, p. 101; Castells, 1997, pp. 38–43).

Within the framework of national and trans-national imagining, this study will understand how "piety" is produced and reproduced based on the political background, power, and Islamic discourse that has emerged in Indonesia in the 20 years since reform. Following Anderson's concept of imagined community, the imagined *ummah* as a "piety community" provides a role model for the piety concept. Now new media is being used in the Indonesian context as a form of reimagining and reinforcing national identity.

Members of the *ummah* need to imagine themselves as piety communities; how they are conceptualized, how they are characterized, how they look alike, and how they represent must be manifested. Social media, thus, becomes a "vessel" that gives space for imagined piety codes. The representation displayed by internet celebrities has allowed Muslimah to imagine how to become an ideal woman, based on the piety standards of Indonesian society. Moreover, because the *ummah* in Indonesia today may be imagined differently in different contexts, this research is exciting to investigate.

4. Social Media and Contestation

In this part of the chapter, I will be using Participatory Culture theory from Henry Jenkins (2016) and the theory of Public Sphere from Habermas (1992) to explain how the digital environment can act as a public sphere and is a prominent factor structuring democratic society. Audience research emerged to understand how audiences interpret media texts that are multidimensional and have complex structures and multiple meanings, and how people relate knowledge and experience to their interpretations (Livingstone, 2013, pp. 6–7). In addition, Hall (1997, pp. 15–18) identified the three positions of social placement in audiences' interpretations of mass media texts as the dominant reading, the negotiated reading, and the oppositional reading. With digital multimedia platforms, an audience not only becomes a receiver, but also a creator of a message. In this perspective, the audience shifts from 'audience' to 'users', and from 'consumers' to 'producers' (Lister et al., 2009, p. 10).

Therefore, the audience of new media is commonly known as media users. The audience is not homogeneous, but is segmented. Not everyone is persuaded by the same message; because of their diverse ages, educations, cultures, and experiences, users have different interests and different concerns. As users of new media, specific groups or segments use different strategic and communication channels to reach their objectives, and niche social networks. The digital environment has produced media lifestyle outcomes such us digital communities, selfies (self-photographs taken and then posted on social media), hashtags (#, attached to keywords so other users of social media can get

information from related areas), mentions (mentioning friends or other users), direct messages, followers (persons or groups who follow accounts), viewers (users who look at videos on social media), likes (actions to express agreement), online community, live streaming, and photo filters.

The goal of using hashtags to organize communication is to build numerous micro-communities of similar and opposing content, not just to make content discoverable or to merely add voice and context to a caption. But also, the dynamics of hashtags provide insight into the mechanisms by which specific social media sites can serve as vectors for the propagation of hate speech while also providing opportunities to counter it (Poole, Giraud, and de Quincey, 2020). Moreover, the practice of bricolage, in which users edit, correct, and modify pictures and creations, has become mainstream. As explained by Phillimore et al. (2016, p. 6), the practice of bricolage can be used to understand the practice of editing pictures and videos through social media applications.

Technologies used for knowledge/information distribution influence the message created. Digital media mediates a representation, reproduces a narration, and transmits more symbols and signs. The consequences of this situation can also influence the meaning. For instance, the development of religious messages on Instagram by internet celebrities cannot be separated from its tools and application that provide them with the ability to capture and edit media with filters and audio, or to make short videos. Digital media technology offers a hyper-real simulation of reality, combining the real and the

imaginary (Baudrillard, 1983; Eco, 1987). In this regard, the internet offers a means of standardising diverse ideals of authenticity, self-expression, and autonomy. Although concepts such as authenticity, self-expression, and autonomy are also *constructed* through the interactions of diverse social actors, wherein authenticity "is an integral part of the cultural production process" (Grazian, 2010, p. 192).

Additionally, online media has encouraged communities to work collaboratively and create further complex products together without any boundaries. As explained by Henry Jenkins (2016, p. 2), a participatory culture has emerged from the practice of creating and sharing content that promotes community engagement and support for values of diversity and democracy. Jenkins also describes how technology has shifted with the rise of networked individual, from command and control to collaboration and co-creation (2016, p. 183). In new media users' interactions with other users, there has been a significant shift from broadcast production to peer production, and this practice has resulted from the shift from mass production to customised segmentation. Nonetheless, it is obvious that capital power relations and commerce continue to dominate the political economy of digital media which limits the empowerment of individual producers). Online media can be used to challenge mainstream issues and provide a conduit for delivering alternative or counter-narratives that aren't always visible on the surface. Furthermore, counter-narratives in online media may aid in articulating a broad range of viewpoints

that the mainstream media typically overlooks (Dawes, 2017; Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015; Poole, Giraud, and de Quincey, 2020).

A political economy of media demonstrates the power that operates through the interconnections between politics, mediation, and economics. In the context of religious knowledge, the production and reproduction of religious content in mass media was initially controlled and presented based on mainstream values. Moreover, in the digital environment, religious knowledge can be produced by anyone with "alternative" views. Using technology people can get an answer instantly to a religious topic without meeting with a religion preacher, this indicates that technology supports religion towards a more dispersed, global outlook (Bunt, 2003, p. 120). As such, the authority of religious knowledge is increasingly being held by small segments.

This distribution of power provides the ability to express individual or group interpretations of religious opinions and beliefs. The digital environment is a space where social phenomena are "contested" in their display and discussion. In the imagination of the *ummah* the contestation is equally important because it has a specific meaning, with its own authenticity, self-expression, and autonomy, informing the continuity and transformation of community, to promote certain Islamic values. A digital environment, thus, is undoubtedly political. The virtual world exists not within a vacuum, but is full of contestation, existence, and power. The public sphere, originating from Habermas's thinking, is a space where there is freedom from intervention, and the people are free from external ties or influences, especially from the state

and the government (1992, pp. 28-30). Ideas in society are freely accepted (open power to access), discussed, and debated. Therefore, the public sphere is an essential mechanism in society. It can be said that the element of democracy develops in it.

Social media platforms, as part of the public sphere, have offered democratisation and facilitated individual subjectivities and self-presentation. Individual internet celebrities can represent themselves within a promotional culture wherein the self is integrated with capital rationalities. Moreover, the media environment also offers a more democratic space for people to engage with multiple viewpoints but it is limited by its commercial character. The media is fundamental to the workings of the public sphere. It is how the public can express their voice freely, give input to the government, change regulations, discuss public interest in a watchdog capacity in modern nations states. Distributing the news, and therefore the public agenda is how the media influences public opinion but also puts pressure on elite groups on various types of public issues in the current context.

With the emergence of new digital technologies anyone can be a producer and have a voice. The media environment can be seen as a public sphere that gives space for anyone to speak out, display ideas for debate and produce social change. The Public sphere has been seen as being limited to certain groups but online media platforms offer a place for a counter-public sphere. The Internet has facilitated radical, excluded, marginalized or non-elite actors to express their opinions, practices through economical virtual-counter

public spheres, protests or movements (see; Downey and Fenton, 2003, pp. 185-202). However, in the case of Indonesia, the celebrities mostly do not operate in the counter-public sphere but seek to endorse national values. This is evident through the online engagement of Muslim Internet celebrities' who have an opportunity to contribute to the process of the re-imagination and re-conceptualisation of the concept of global Muslim (the *Ummah*) by Muslim groups in Indonesia.

Despite the fact that new media can help to make the public sphere more diverse and inclusive, power and inequity still remain. Although there is competition, this does not imply that all players are on an equal footing or have the same resources. Inequalities are exacerbated by new media infrastructures as well as offline networks, infrastructures, and interactions. However, the paradox situation has also occurred where the virtual world is no longer a vacuum but is full of contestations of influence, existence and power. Digital technological competency, on the other hand, is inextricably linked to a person's access to information, knowledge, social relationships, and social identities. One example is Felix Siauw[52], a self-described "Islamic Inspirator" and "dawah advocate" in Indonesia. He claims that excellent ideas arouse him, and that he enjoys inspiring others by expressing those thoughts. Through a series of social

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[52] Felix Siauw is adamant about establishing an Islamic caliphate, as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) promotes. In its internal debates, HTI aggressively opposes democracy and nationalism, but outwardly supports Indonesia's nation-state and democratic system. Felix Siauw was a former marketing manager (Rizal, 2014; Rijal, 2011).

media activities, he discovers new audiences and new approaches as a da'wah promoter. Ensuring submitted messages 'go viral' is a key component of social media marketing (see Slama, 2017; Weng, 2018). Because of his mastery of technology, marketing abilities, and economic strength, Felix has established a positionin the public realm which enables him to find supporters, and campaign for his ideas.

Habermas aimed to explain the emergence of public space among the bourgeois society in the spirit of liberal capitalism in the 18th century. With the development of the concept of the nation-state, representative institutions, the economy, and the birth of the print media, the roots of the emergence of the public sphere began to develop in certain communities in Western Europe. In the history of Public Sphere, there are certain social groups that benefited on the basis of education, ownership classes (usually among men) which operated through various media such as journals, pamphlets, and newspapers and in certain environments such as bars, coffee houses and various clubs (1992, pp. 31-33). As mentioned by Fuchs, communication is absolutely an essential part of a domination-free society. However, because mass media was created by dominant groups under capitalism rationality, 'communication is not automatically progressive' (2016, pp. 177-193).

5. Media and Post-feminism

In this section I will use postfeminist theory to understand how in the popular media women are depicted as independent but are still subservient as an object of consumerism. Media and society have held that feminism is

considered achieved by producing independent women who have their own choices and freedom of expression, and are well-educated people capable of earning money. However, mainstream discourse also shows women as (still) endlessly searching for the perfect man to marry and bring meaning to their lives. They also still have to deal with such conservative values as body shape, healthy living, and fashionable and attractive performances, while simultaneously celebrating their independence with consumerism. McRobbie (2009, p. 130) states that "post-feminism is a kind of anti-feminism". Although media often shows women's empowerment, freedom of choice, and independence, behind that, women are still objects of consumerism.

Angela McRobbie's Post-Feminism and Popular Culture (2004, pp. 255–258) states that post-feminism is a cultural criticism of the feminism popularised by mass media such as television and advertising that locks women in double entanglement. In other words, traditional values such as getting married, having children, and looking attractive do not fade away when women have the awareness and ability to intentionally and deliberately decide their actions. Furthermore, through popular culture, media constructs a new dilemma as a consequence of feminism, namely the terror of loneliness combined with a discourse of self-care. This situation is used by capitalism as an opportunity to direct young women to consume to please and complete themselves.

Postfeminist criticism can be used to examine how capitalism creates a 'special occasion' for women to celebrate triumph by buying products. Industries address women through the frame of "women's independence" to sell

their products. Reynolds explains (2015, pp. 197–215) that there is "the fallacy of autonomy", wherein "autonomy or another characterisation best describes women's self-governance and freedom to choose under hetero-patriarchy is significant in understanding the gendered nature of modern and contemporary societies".

However, it is a fallacy when media depict women as having the autonomy to spend their money and celebrate their independence with material possessions. In the media, women are represented as individuals who need a variety of amusement and pleasure to maintain their self-image and escape their sense of loneliness. As such, "the body is presented simultaneously as women's source of power and as always already unruly and requiring constant monitoring, surveillance, discipline and remodelling (and consumer spending) in order to conform to ever narrower judgments of female attractiveness" (Gill, 2007, p. 155). According to Gill and Scraff (2011, p. 7) the independent, rational, self-regulating subject of neoliberalism, is equivalent to the active, freely chosen self-reinventing subject of postfeminism. This research will examine how the 'relations' work of the digital environment (e.g., the practice of sharing digital content, likes, comments) is represented in social media as part of the neoliberal paradigm's monetization of everything (e.g., privacy, intimacy, religiosity) (Cammaerts, 2011; Fuchs, 2014).

Media are a dominant social institution that works through representation to legitimise the current order of the world. It can be seen how media manage extensive codes of sexual and gender practice. Today, social

media are also involved in the way media legitimate ideas about how the world actually works and how it should work. Among Indonesian Muslimah, internet celebrities consistently frame the code of women's independence through travelling around the world, independently making their own money, and having a beautiful life by consuming things that show their piety. Moreover, each internet celebrity still needs to complete her life with a good husband to lead her personal religious activities and a baby to complete the integrity of the identity of being a perfect woman.

Moreover, Butler (1990, p. 2) argues that gender is performative, "reiterative and citational practices by which discourse produces the effects that it names". Gender is performance; it is not about who you are, but what you do at particular time. In others words, gender identity is performatively formed by the actual "expressions" that are said to be its consequences. Through frequent reiteration and media portrayal of actions, society had produced an idea of gender that is practice. It is obvious the cultural signs of gender are produced by a repetitive performance of femininity or masculinity. As Butler states (1990, pp. 45–50), "masculine and feminine roles are not biologically fixed but socially constructed". Butler's position is that not only is the self, the subject and gender effects of social and political practices and discourses but that the body is also historically constituted (Butler, 1990, p. 272). Therefore, there is no natural obligation to view bodies as ordered into distinct sexes. Every sense of givenness or facticity we may control about our bodies is about of historically practices and performances.

Butler's understanding of performativity was inspired by Foucault, who expressed the problem of the 'technology of the self' in "The Care of the Self" (1986) and "The Use of Pleasure" (1990). The technology of the self relates to how individuals, as subjects, give themselves standards and ethics to produce a specific figure expected by the social order. The industry creates the dogma that the more people consume, the more freedom they have. Freedom of choice is dependent on what we consume and what society expects from women. Instead of giving women freedom of expression, capitalism provides them with a new "cage". This theory will be used to understand Muslim women's practice as internet celebrities on Instagram as they use social networking sites to perform their identity, construct independent selfhood, and derive financial benefits as influencers, but also position themselves as individuals that still have to negotiate with the limitations of gender construction and religious doctrine in the Indonesian societal context.

6. Internet Celebrities and Neoliberalism in the Digital Era

Bearing in mind the neoliberal perspective, I will analyze the linkages between Instagram and internet celebrities as influencers in this section. This study also takes a media studies approach to examine how social media sites like Instagram promote the postfeminist notion that self-regulation is pleasurable by allowing users to identify such practices as joyful through captions and hashtags (Mahoney, 2020). Instagram users can display photographs of themselves, their lives, and interests by selecting,

reconstructing, explaining, and tagging images. As a result, users have created a controlled and stylized version of themselves (Archer, 2019).

In other words, Instagram provides users with the tools they need to make the image of themselves they want others to see. Because it focuses on visual beauty, Instagram has become the optimum medium for influencing others. As a result, those who become popular on Instagram are sometimes referred to as micro and Internet celebrities, and they might be classified as Influencers (Abidin, 2018). Instagram can be viewed in this light as a platform for neoliberal self-regulation. Users expose themselves to their followers through their postings, who can voice their opinions through likes, comments, and sharing. Moreover, influencers are also required to do emotional labour (Bridgen, 2011). Hochschild claims that (1983), controlling and regulating our emotions in order to develop a positive persona and interpersonal ties with customers is known as emotional labor.

An influencer is typically portrayed as a young female who is active, passionate about celebrities' culture, lives a fashionable lifestyle, and is hardworking. At this time, an Influencer is the personification of the combined strength of neoliberalism and postfeminism (Fitch and Third, 2010). As previously stated, Instagram's nature and structuring logic make it a perfect medium for users to chronicle and be recognized for exhibiting these neoliberal characteristics. Users can demonstrate their devotion to the "endless labor on the self" required for neoliberal subjectivity by publishing pictures of their fitness or beauty routine (Rosalind Gill 2017, p. 609). Internet celebrities are

not just marketing tools; they are also social connection assets with whom organizations can work to achieve their marketing goals. According to the neoliberal viewpoint, Instagram permitted a sequence of applications that has resulted in trending topics and widespread attention. The concept of neoliberal entrepreneurialism is encapsulated in this term (Fitch and Third, 2010).

A social media Influencer, also called a micro-influencer/micro-celebrity, is someone with a social media following larger than an ordinary person's but smaller than a celebrity's. Micro-celebrities build their popularity using such social media applications as Instagram and YouTube, using these to position themselves as part of an exclusive group of people (Marwick, 2014, p. 114). Online interactions are crucial for managing micro-celebrities' personal popularity and branding, and these are facilitated by such media as Instagram Live, synchronous replies, and comment responses. Ultimately, micro-celebrity status is obtained not through personal achievement, but self-promotion. Micro-celebrities are actors in an "attention industry", one that produces self-branding and personal commodification. Interestingly, "micro-celebrities" are often seen as ordinary people who have thousands or even millions of followers on social media, who bond with internet audiences through "admiration, association, aspiration, or recognition" (see; Kutthakaphan & Chokesamritpol, 2013).

The key difference between micro-celebrities and internet celebrities lies in their origins. Micro-celebrities display their 'unique' selves through products that can be understood in terms of their artistic values and broad merits. Internet celebrities, on the other hand, are essentially celebrities who

have achieved fame through traditional media such as television, radio, newspaper, magazine, and film, then expanded their activities onto social media to attract broader (and often younger) audiences (Abidin, 2018, p. 17). It is important to understand that micro-celebrities communicate directly with fans, unlike traditional celebrities (who only give a semblance of interaction).

Traditional celebrities did not rise to fame through their interactions with fans and audiences, and indeed many traditional celebrities are even detached from their audience, limiting their interactions with the media and the public. Conversely, internet celebrities emphasise a personal fame achieved through social media, actively creating visual content for their followers that they can exploit to improve their popularity. For this reason, internet celebrities employ different strategies to traditional celebrities. Internet celebrities do not need to be physically attractive, have a perfect personal appearance, or contribute to entertainment. According to Abidin (2018, pp. 19–26), everydayness, exclusivity, exceptionalism, and exoticism are all necessary to succeed in the "digital" world.

Everydayness refers to the quality or state of happening every day, or frequently. Micro-celebrities and internet celebrities need to maintain their presence in front of cameras, using practices of intimacy such as "outfits of the day" (more commonly identified as #OOTD on Instagram). They need to share their personal preferences, including fashion, food, beauty products, skin products, and leisure activities, all of which offer a means of maintaining a sense of community and sustaining relationships. A sense of everydayness, of

sensibility, is necessary for internet celebrities to promote personal branding. Moreover, daily updates enable internet celebrities to build a sense of familiarity through personal recommendations and product endorsement.

Exclusivity is another quality of internet celebrity that is necessary for audience exposure. It provokes audiences, shocks viewers to get their attention (Abidin, 2018, pp. 19-26). Exclusivity is limited to people with capital and wealth, and is therefore not available to everyone. Internet celebrities who expose their lives on social media need to show their private economic capital to prove their real-life status. High-class living is intended for people who want quality products without minding the cost; internet celebrities can use such a lifestyle to attract the attention of their followers, as social media audiences are self-selected groups of individuals who have centred themselves around certain interests, lifestyles, or influencers. An influencer is a popular person who continues to develop and promote civic practices in online environments as they discover new ways to participate, using recent communication technologies (Feenberg and Freisen, 2012; Dahlgren and Alvares, 2013).

Exceptionalism is another important characteristic for micro-celebrities and internet celebrities. It refers to the condition of being different from the norm, of having uncommon abilities or skills. These Internet celebrities' fame is founded on abilities that are rarely attained by others. Internet celebrities are eager to exhibit and expose their 'authentic' existence on Instagram. As a result, they must have the competence and ability to maintain a constant sense of uniqueness. In order to present a realistic everyday existence, they frequently

disclose their everyday language in accordance with the demotic language of their local place. The first time demotic language appeared on television was in a reality show (Turner, 2010). Because of the more intimate nature of social media, "demotic" language receives a level of attention that was before unpopular in traditional media (Abidin, 2018).

Exoticism, meanwhile, is driven predominantly by distance. In internet culture, audiences tend to perceive distant geography and culture as more unique, distinctive, and interesting to experience. The nuance of difference is a key factor in internet celebrity, as users can distinguish themselves from ordinary settings and backgrounds. This exotic nuance emphasises the "otherness" of different places, whose appearances and cultures differ from the masses. Cultural gaps between performers and audiences provide a level of exoticism that is worthy of attention (Abidin, 2018, p. 23). Democratisation has increased the appearance of participation, offering more space for people of colour, queer people, and people with disabilities, all of whom are restricted by the hierarchical traditional media system (Turner, 2010).

As content creators, internet celebrities provide designs, create posts, and share creative content that encourages user interaction. Such interaction enables audiences to provide feedback in the form of questions, compliments, criticism, and even hate speech. This engagement generates a sense of belonging and connectedness between readers and content creators, a perceived interpersonal relationship. Internet celebrities become influencers, individuals who have the power to affect others' consumption decisions because of their

authority, knowledge, position, or relationship with their audiences. Micro-celebrities and internet celebrities have "disrupted" the stardom process, which previously required individuals to produce artworks and compete for popular attention. Today, however, internet celebrities gain popularity by routinely presenting their domestic lives (at home, in the kitchen, in bed) to their audiences.

Additionally, in Indonesia, Muslim women influencers have presented themselves as religious persons, using such religious approaches to accumulate capital and gather followers, thereby using visual culture to promote their religious authority. Unlike traditional celebrities, who maintain distance from their fans and limit their interactions with fans, influencers establish two-way communications with their communities and engage intimately with them. Internet celebrities can be reached readily through social platforms, organisations, or institutions; at the same time, they can understand real communities' opinions and learn about various issues. In this research, I propose analysing how internet celebrities mix body performativity and participatory to contribute to political, social, and cultural contestation in Indonesia, especially since the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Conclusion

This section has demonstrated and reviewed the various literature that provides the foundation of this research. The first part explained how Muslim women have been subjected to contentious surveillance in relation to their religious identity such as veiled practices. However, the practice of gender formation of

Muslim women is understood to be socially constructed rather than naturally given and fixed. Traditional media and popular culture were also discussed as instruments that represent contradictory gender roles, where women's depiction has self autonomy but on the other hand has limitations based on societal norms and beliefs. In the media environment, Muslim women have the potential to reproduce and resist their gender performativity. Moreover, the participatory culture in media environment connected with the practice of producing and distributing content encourages community engagement in the development of convivial and a democratic civilization.

In new media users' communications, there has been a substantial change from transmission production to dialectic production, and this practice has occasioned since the shift from mass production to personalised segmentation. The internet has contributed to the formation of networked publics, with non-elite actors providing and practicing broader public discourses and debates. Networked publics have greater access to information, the ability to engage in public speech, and an enriched ability to undertake collective action. As explained by Benedict Anderson (1991), media and communication become political over the imagined community that they explicitly construct. Internet technology and infrastructure support how people imagine their identities, relationships, and connections with one another.

The geniality characteristic of internet technology has also facilitated internet celebrities to achieve a level of participatory culture with their followers through video, photos, caption post and comments as feedback. By maximising the use of social media, especially Instagram, the internet celebrities can present their

expression of identities as Muslim women, mothers, Islamic religious influencers and as part of an imagined *ummah*.

Furthermore, the goal of this thesis is to investigate how Muslim women who became Internet celebrities positioned themselves as entrepreneurs, as seen through the lens of gender construction, post-feminist theory, and neoliberalism perspectives.

Chapter 3
Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodology specific to the process of this research, and has been instrumental in addressing the research questions. Additionally, in order to outlined a research gap, the initial section in this chapter will examine previous research related to the representation of Indonesia Muslim women on digital media. Following that, there will be a section that explores the research questions, provides an explanation of the multimodal critical discourse method, a description of the data collection, and my approach to the data analysis used in this study.

1. **Studies of the representation of Indonesian Muslim women on digital media**

In this section I will explore previous studies that demonstrate how Muslim women use internet technology to extend their articulations on gender identity, religion, nation, and class. Furthermore, reading and understanding this research allows the researcher to develop a broad knowledge and effective research methods as a foundation for improving and facilitating theory development. Additionally, exploring previous studies can help to identify a research gap in the existing literature.

Previous research conducted by Nisa (2013) shows that online media facilitates Islamic groups' expression and maintenance of their identity vis-à-vis mainstream values in Indonesia. This research took place in 2007-2009 and focuses on the As-Salafiyyat mailing list, an online community for maintaining

these group from civil society. The internet practices of *cadari* (Muslim woman wearing *cadar*) women shows the performance of both private and public womanhood in that group. Interestingly, although group members are practically invisible in the offline public sphere, they reach a virtual public visibility through their online activities. Through sharing religious knowledge based on Salafi *manhaj*[53], the *cadari* use the mailing list to maintain collective solidarities over shared Salafi teaching such as; women should not go out frequently, and to protect individual belief *cadari* need to adopt a distance from mainstream Indonesian lifestyle. Virtual exposure in the online community helps them represent their subcultural capital, thus reorganising the values within the group. Nisa concludes that the virtual territory shelters *cadari* groups from the secular conditions that, at the time, had become mainstream in Indonesia. In this research, Nisa engages with the individualized internet use by *cadari* by seeing their use of the internet and interacting in the online community. This research demonstrates the sort of solidarity that can be created online in line with particular values that has relevance for my research.

Indonesian Muslim women in the digital environment have also been examined through a media and cultural studies perspective. One insightful study by Rahmawati (2016) reveals the complexity of modern middle-class women's use of online blogs to negotiate the articulation of modesty, modernity, motherhood, class and nation. Rahmawati uses individual interviews, focus

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[53]Is an Arabic word means method or way, famously use by Salafi in order to understand the way of life predecessors in Islam.

group discussions, and archival studies to understand how Indonesian Muslim fashion bloggers and women Muslim blog readers produce, consume, and articulate their womanhood. This research also illustrates the integration of modesty and modernity in neo-liberal feminine subjects where empowerment contributes to the articulation of gender identity amongst middle class Muslims. This research helped me to understand specific methodologies that can be applied to understand online audiences.

Young Muslim women's experience with veiling is also complex. In 2018, Emma Baulch and Alila Pramiyanti studied the emergence of Muslim micro-celebrities on Instagram. This study shows how veiled Indonesian women perform their class identities, but also perform dakwah (proselytisation) in a spirit of Muslim sisterhood. Instagram and its visual culture provides women with a platform to demonstrate their daily lives as consumers while simultaneously performing obeisance and sharing Islamic values. Their research employs online identity construction and interview analysis as a method to understand micro-celebrities' practices and performativity on Instagram. Analysing the camera angles, backgrounds, and contexts of *hijabers* images and language captions, this research shows how Muslim women in the *hijaber* community engage themselves in dynamic physical activity, travelling and acting as equal spouses in their marital lives. The main finding of this research is in showing how *hijabers* apply Instagram as a platform for presenting middle-classness, but also for Islam proselytization, which they consider as one of their main responsibilities as Muslims.

Another study of young Muslim women on Instagram, their religious influence, and the political subjectivity of Muslim womanhood was conducted by Beta (2019). Through ethnography for the internet as an approach, Beta combined participatory observations and archival studies to gathered online and offline data in her research. Beta illustrates that social media influencers represent commercial elements in their posts while simultaneously encouraging their followers to transform themselves and embrace conventional gender roles. Beta focuses on how social media influencers enthusiastically depict ideal Muslim womanhood: how Muslim women should appear, perform, and act in both the social and political arenas, particularly after the Action to Defend Islam in Jakarta (2016–2017). The last two studies from Baulch and Alila Pramiyanti (2018), and Beta (2019) provide an insight into how Muslim women not only perform their class identities, but also act *dakwah* (proselytisation) on social media.

Previous studies on Indonesian Muslim women in online media cultures focused on visual culture and why women read Muslim fashion blogs, but do not explore *their* contribution to shaping "public Islam" and "piety" on Instagram. With this research, I attempt to fill an important gap by using a critical approach, investigating how internet celebrities are using a particular post-feminist representation to conquer the commercial market with specific religious identities. Related to this, I will build my research with reference to theories such as post-feminism, social media, internet celebrities, media and Islam, and identity.

These theories can be tools to examine the research object, i.e. the identity and contestation of power behind the text. What is piety (shalehah)? Who constructs piety among the public? Why has that specific form of piety been chosen? Why not another? Power can determine discourse; the next step is to identify the subject and object of the knowledge. Who is the subject and what is the object of piety itself? From this fundamental research question more questions emerged, and produced expanded research questions. This research is significant, since by knowing the construction of Muslim women's identities as an icon of Islamic popular culture in modern-day Indonesia, we can trace the construction of contemporary Islamic identity in Indonesia.

2. Research Questions

This study aims to analyse how, through the social media platform Instagram, Indonesian Muslim women internet celebrities represent themselves as public figures who can represent the *Ummah* (Islamic people). Through self-representation, Muslimah celebrities use their social media accounts to create "public Islam". Furthermore, this research intends to understand through the representation of internet celebrities, the assumptions and construction of the "world" that they expose on Instagram. This is associated with a post-structuralist approach, which holds that culture, through text and language, makes sense of and constructs 'reality' in the world.

Specially, this research seeks to answer the following questions:

1. How do internet celebrities use their body performativity and their participation on the internet to contribute to the contestation of politics,

society, and culture in Indonesia, especially during and after the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta (Pilkada DKI)?

2. How is the concept of Muslim women's piety related to the *hijrah* movement being interpreted and presented by internet celebrities on Instagram?

3. How is the concept of Muslim women's piety related to the *hijrah* movement being interpreted and presented by internet celebrities on Instagram?

These research questions structure the arrangement of my thesis: each chapter is an answer to each of those questions. Chapter Four, will focus on research question number one (RQ1), to explore the political contestation represented by Muslim women online. Chapter Five, intends to answer research question number two (RQ2), in order to explore political nuances in the internet celebrities' interpretations of the concepts of piety and *hijrah* movement that are reflected in contemporary Muslim women's identity in Indonesia. Chapter Six, will address research question number three (RQ3), in what way are Muslim women Internet celebrities taking part in the formation and contestation of collective identities on the local, national and transnational level, which has been evident in the social media's representation.

While each chapter can be read separately, each chapter works to provision further chapters and complete the thesis as a whole. Despite these internet celebrities having similarities, their accounts also have diverse Islamic values. The hypotheses and assumptions in this study are related to these constructions of piety as part of internet celebrities forming and managing their 'public Islam' on Instagram. I will argue that this 'public Islam' is important to

their celebrity because Instagram offers them a sustained Islamic market to sell goods and services to followers. This study will address the issues and contexts related to these research questions. Data for this research was collected through online analysis and archival study. More specifically, the sections below will detail the purpose of this research. It will explain the multimodal critical discourse method, as well as the methods used for data collection and analysis.

3. Purpose of the Research

As mentioned previously, this thesis examines internet celebrities as cultural phenomena and as cultural texts. As part of the development of internet technology, digital savvy Muslim millennia's have been encouraged to articulate their culture and ideas through diverse media contexts. As part of communication, the media presents meanings and stereotypes through language (sentences, visual culture, sounds, music), thereby shaping the construction and expression of culture, politics, and social life (Bell & Garrett, 1998, pp. 3-4).

Social media platforms, though often acclaimed for their participatory and democratic environments, actually manufacture capital accumulation and offer pseudo-public spheres that reflect capitalist class relations and 'unlimited exploitation' (Fuchs, 2014, pp. 171–178). Social media is perceived to reflect societal trends and facilitates users' constructions of their self, and therefore has become a major source of data for governments, commercial organisations, and academics to analyse human culture and society. An examination of the construction of Muslim piety on social media could show the existence of Indonesian social values more widely.

This thesis focuses on the performativity of Muslimah internet celebrities that represent post-feminist ideas. These types of performativity are defined in terms of gender practice, reflecting the discourses of piety produced by society through politics and power. Moreover, this study also sees gender performativity as part of practicing gender, as part of the routines, thoughts, and actions that construct femininities and masculinities (Connell, 2002, p. 81; Martin, 2003, p. 352). Additionally, this research sees the practice of gender in contemporary Indonesia as being formed with "public Islam" being central to the reproduction of cultural and structural gender activities. The principal goal of this thesis is to analyse the gender performativity of Muslim internet celebrities and use a media and cultural studies perspective to understand the contributions of said performativity to the contestation of politics, society, and culture in Indonesia.

4. Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis

This section will discuss multimodal critical discourse analysis, a method used to understand the social discourses that exist and are exercised in symbolic practices and interactions. The corpus of this research consists of Instagram posts by several Muslim women internet celebrities. Although such posts look trivial, and are taken for granted as part of routine everyday activities, they are actually performative activities that reflect certain ideologies and power discourses. Foucault explained in his book *The Order of Things* (1994) that discourse is also associated with 'episteme', a systematic 'unconscious'. Discourses always refer to the dominant structures of meaning

in their specific social regimes, and this meaning cannot be separated from language. Meaning critically influences everything we do, and thus our social practices are never separated from the dimensions of discourse.

As a social praxis, discourse takes the form of symbolic interactions that can be expressed in speech, writing, pictures, diagrams, films, and music (Fairclough, 2010, p. 233; Bloor and Thomas, 2007, pp. 1–2). Language is not only used for communication; language, used to express culture and knowledge, is also an instrument of power (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 60). This implies a relationship between knowledge and power. As explained in Chapter One, this research combines critical discourse analysis with multimodal analysis to construct a holistic method for understanding how discourses are communicated using diverse semiotic resources and modes, and using different genres (Machin, 2013). To combine these diverse elements, a multimodal method is appropriate, one that not only examines how language represents certain ideologies and values but also understands how visual features and elements create meaning (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996). This research, thus, not only sees language as text, but also sees visual performances as reflecting certain meanings.

In a multimodal approach to visual analysis, digital cinematography and video recordings are analysed as modes of communication with language, gestures, and gazes that are central modes of representation and communication. Multimodality is fundamental to the theory and practice of social-linguistic traditions, and can explain social interactions using a range of

different modes of communication. As Goffman (1959) explained, social interactions are essentially people living their lives as actors performing on a stage. In this research, Instagram is the stage at the centre of internet celebrities' identity formation, through which they engage with the wider public while exhibiting commercial motives, popularity intention, political purpose, and religious commitment.

I will be using Foucault's concept of discourse, i.e. 'the production of knowledge through language', with meanings that 'shape and influence what we do'. In 'our conduct, therefore, all practices have a discursive aspect' (Hall, 1992, p. 291). This research recognises the Instagram posts of internet celebrities as social practices, which should be understood as discursive constructions. As such, their meaning is not bound to the internal structure of language; the external conditions of its expression, including the rules that govern a way of communication, also play a role (Foucault, 1972). This research focuses on how Internet celebrities produce narratives and stories about their religious lives, both in their public-domestic life and in their efforts to create political solidarity among Muslims. It focuses on the use of language as a sign system through which human beings communicate particular thoughts and knowledge.

As explained by Ayllon and Wlakerdine (2019, p. 114), Foucauldian discourse analysis not only focuses on the specific instance of language use, i.e. the text, but also scrutinises the controls, regulations, partitions, and systems of particular bodies of knowledge. Therefore, the discourse analysis in this

research will examine internet celebrities' discursive practices as more than purely linguistic. For instance, the idea of Muslim women's piety is always embedded within the historical contexts when and where it is invented. Particular understandings are used to construct subjects (i.e. Muslim women) via historical, political, moral, and socio-cultural values and contexts. Muslim women are positioned as representatives of their religion or as symbols of public morality.

Through the discursive practices of the human and social sciences, as well as other main discourses (such as social sciences, religion, government, medication, regulation and education) discourse defines, allows, and at the same time creates limitations and control (see Powers, 2007, pp. 18–34). These discursive practices enable those with power/knowledge to allow and limit certain social practices, thereby regulating people's behaviour. At the same time, these practices/discourses and the ideas they contain are accepted by what Foucault terms 'the Subjective self', thereby becoming embodied within individuals (who take part, and think of themselves in those terms). It is at this point that we adopt the subject positions that make our identities or selves.

In multimodal semiotics, these methods are seen as not as simply displaying particular meanings, but visual designs that can represent people, places, and things, both those visible and not visible in the text. In this method, social semiotics is also part of the modality concept, involving analysis of the signs and symbols encountered in everyday life (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006, pp. 160–163). The text dimension refers to how language is used by media

celebrities when producing texts to express ideas. Their words and phrases can be analysed as part of "power" when presenting ideas. When doing Foucauldian discourse analysis, this research will focus on power and politics, and will usually take a specific standpoint to challenge oppressive discourses. This research will also conduct a macro-level analysis, focusing particularly on how Muslim women are positioned.

Through multimodal analysis, I will investigate the visual choices, camera angles, and background configurations that constitute the photograph as well as their semiotic operations. The visual culture of identity is mediated through Instagram and generates a particular discourse. As explained by Zappavigna (2016, p. 273), because Instagram provides images and captions, its visual and written modalities can be understood through a number of semiotic approaches. By studying visual culture on Instagram, I will be able to find out how the subjective experience of internet celebrities' accounts can reveal the discourse of their identities as role models of piety in a digital environment.

In a media environment, the ruling class is not only the owner of capital; also possessing capital are the individuals who manage and create images, texts, and narratives to achieve particular goals. At the same time, digital technology has become a site of exploitation and social control, where digital labour is located (Fuchs, 2020; Selwyn, 2019, p. 37). According to Kress and Leeuwen (2006, p. 42), "in Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis, we ... also seek to 'denaturalise' representations on other modes of communication. We ... reveal

the kinds of ideas, absences and taken-for-granted assumptions in the images as well as the text that also serve the ends of revealing the kinds of power interests buried in them" (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 10). In this multimodal method, it can be seen how semiotic choices can be used by the producers of messages to highlight a particular identity while not revealing other identities. As such, as images are framed within specific discourses, they are also used to manipulate and conceal other discourses. As such, discourse and semiotics methods can reveal the inclusions and exclusions represented by media producers.

In the context of this research, the discursive and semiotic approach is used to explore the narratives represented in the Instagram posts of Internet celebrities. From their daily posts, it can be seen how Internet celebrities construct piety, crafting a narrative to tell general audiences about religious and national identities. Importantly, this study is not a linguistic one, and such does not focus exclusively on specific words or signs or deconstruct said words or signs in a very detailed way.

5. Data Collection

In content analysis, it is important to develop a sampling strategy, thereby defining the total range of content and choosing specific examples for an analysis based on specific issues, times, themes, or inferences (Deacon et al., 1999, pp. 121–122; Hansen et al., 1998, p. 104). As mentioned previously, the hypotheses and assumptions of this research focus on how internet celebrities articulate and represent diverse interpretations of piety, *ummah*, and

hijrah, and how they respond to their followers and peers on Instagram, as related to internet celebrities' political views. Therefore, this research focuses on visual texts and captions that are associated with Internet celebrities' representation of piety, *ummah*, and *hijrah*.

Moreover, to understand Internet celebrities' articulation of piety and different imaginations of *ummah* and *hijrah* interpretation, as represented in the interactions between audiences (commenters/followers) and internet celebrities, I also sampled audiences' reactions. On each of the Internet celebrities' posts, there were at least more than ten comments. In accordance with the purposes of this research, I focus on interactions that received more than twenty comments to represent a connected discussion about the social imagination of religious discourse in the comments column. Therefore, not all audience comments on internet celebrities' posts were chosen for analysis.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the data, all of the Internet celebrity accounts chosen for this research had consistent and accurate representations that related to the research questions (see Deacon, 2007; Bryman, 2001, p. 30). In my research, I will be analysing the Instagram accounts of eight internet celebrities: Dian Pelangi, with 4.8 million followers; Oki Setiana Dewi, with 7.9 million followers; Zaskia Sungkar, with 14.2 million followers; Dewi Sandra, with 5.4 million followers; Ayudia Bing Slamet, with 1.5 million followers; Fenita Arie, with 1.1 million followers; Kartika Putri, with 8.4 million followers; and Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari, with 1.4 million followers.

These accounts were selected first by looking at the number of followers, with a minimum threshold of one million followers. Internet celebrities can be categorised as influencers or public figures if their social media accounts have many followers, they actively maintain their closeness with their audience, and continue active interactions (see Marwick, 2013; Abidin, 2016). I focused primarily on celebrities who had already found fame in the mass media, and who subsequently their performance through social media activity (including Instagram). This was intended to ensure that all surveyed celebrities were prominent both on online social media and in offline media. Determining the qualifications of the research objects was necessary for me to ascertain their suitedness for the research (see Deacon et al., 1999, p. 133).

Through observations, I noted that the eight internet celebrities' accounts actively displayed daily performances that were closely related to the celebrities' own political stances, including 'vote only for Muslim leaders', 'engage in the 212 Action to Defend Islam', 'Pancasila is Indonesia's State Ideology', and their stance relative to multiculturalism and diversity in Indonesia. Not all internet celebrities explicitly displayed their political stances on their public social media pages; as such, the selection of these eight celebrities may be considered purposive sampling. Such an approach is commonly used in purposive sampling (Kyngäs, Elo, Pölkki, Kääriäinen, and Kanste, 2011), as it enables the research to gain appropriate data regarding the

informants, file, documents, or texts that are related with the research objectives and topic (Kyngäs, Elo, Pölkki, Kääriäinen, and Kanste, 2014).

Primary data for this research was collected from internet celebrities' posts between September 2016 and December 2019. Data were related to specific content (both visual and captions text), and within the context of specific events. One of the key events was the lead-up to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, during which the Muslim middle-class in Jakarta took part in a campaign to challenge the incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok). During these first stages, I focused on how piety is represented by internet celebrities, and searched for the hashtag #muslimvotemuslim to identify celebrities who used it in their posts. Afterwards, I scrutinised specific posts that related to internet celebrities' articulation and representation of their piety through body performativity, as well as such posts' contribution to their political stance. The resulting analysis is provided in Chapter Four.

Based on this data, I argue that well-known internet celebrities utilise a series of interconnected tropes—working hard, travelling around the world, living a religious life, spreading wise and inspiring quotes—in their social interactions to depict a restructured version of contested Muslim women's piety. These posts articulate a form of "natural" body performativity that obscures the commodification of religion, capital accumulation, and the notion of post-feminism. This kind of content will be examined more in sub-chapter four.

Furthermore, the 212 Action to Defend Islam also stimulated a piety movement. The massive rally included many celebrities, and it featured prominently in their Instagram posts. At the same time, many celebrities' posts began narrating the practice of *hijrah*. Such posts led me to examines *the hijrah* movement amongst internet celebrities. Using a multimodal analysis, Chapter Five investigates the wide range of Muslim women's identities—from conservative, moderate, to progressive—represented by internet celebrities, thereby demonstrating how internet celebrities have represented their dynamic interpretations of the *hijrah* movement that has recently become popular amongst Indonesian celebrities.

While observing internet celebrities' posts, I also took a look at some of the emerging trends. I saw specific content emerge after the 212 Action to Defend Islam was held, wherein several internet celebrities began making calls for global Muslim solidarity and action, which was seen simultaneously as an expression of piety and as an awakening of the Islamic *ummah* against those groups considered infidels (*kafir*). Therefore, in Chapter Six, I focus more on how the articulations of Muslim women's identities on Instagram contribute to different imaginations of the Muslim *ummah*. Posts discussed in this chapter include those related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Syria, Uyghur and Rohingya refugee crises, and the *qibla*[54] of Mecca–Medina in Saudi Arabia.

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[54] The direction in which Muslims pray.

Moreover, I also expand my analysis in the relations of how certain Internet celebrities imagined *ummah* and activated a collective imagination of nation in relation to Muslim womanhood. Internet celebrities' posts at specific times or during particular events are very important to explain the relations the between performativity of Muslim internet celebrities and their use of social media to contribute to the contestation of politics, society, and culture in Indonesia.

As mentioned previously, my research questions are best answered using multimodal discourse analysis. This method focuses on the socially and culturally placed construction of meaning, and can be useful to examine dominance, inequity, and ideology in social communication environments and texts. This study employs a Foucauldian discourse and semiotic approach. Multimodal analysis provides a set of identifications that seek to understand the specific kind of 'social relation between the producer, the viewer, and the object represented' (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006, p. 41).

Initially, direct observations of and interviews with internet celebrities were intended to be part of the data collection process. However, due to the limited time available and internet celebrities' busy schedules, this method was considered challenging. Furthermore, this research does not seek to confirm what internet celebrities do behind the text, but rather examine their interpretation of piety as articulated via their Instagram accounts. As such, interviews were ultimately deemed unnecessary.

Rather, as textual resources for context, I considered media interviews in which internet celebrities spoke about their creation of their Instagram accounts, careers, personal lives, and spiritual journeys. As mentioned by Bryman and Bell (2019, p. 300), "content analysis can permit the study of social groups that are difficult to access." Therefore, analysis of news publications, documents, and internet celebrities' Instagram posts can be used simultaneously to scrutinise and explain social structures such as the power relationships that create discourse. Media interviews, daily video blogs, and bibliographies offer effective sources for supplementary data, thereby enabling a comprehensive argument and analysis to be produced (Carmichael, 2008, pp. 391–392).

Further supplementary data were collected by using the strategic hashtags #muslimvotemuslim, #hijrah, #savepalestina #aksibelaIslam (Action to Defend Islam), #weareallmary, #kitasemuamaryam (we are Maryam), #suriahchildren, #suriahkita (we are Syria) to identify similarly themed images and texts posted between September 2016 and December 2019. This enabled me to identify the connections between celebrities' Instagram content and the content produced by others across Indonesia and around the world, thereby providing the social context and background for their discursive practices and semantic language.

6. Data Analysis: Analysing Multimodal Data

This section will explain the steps taken to answer the research questions using multimodal discourse analysis and a semiotic approach. Multimodal discourse analysis refers broadly to methods in which the study of

language is expanded to the research of other sources such as images (O'Halloran, 2011). This study is not conducting a linguistic analysis, but rather investigating the discursive practices and meanings that draw on particular representational frameworks from specific points in time.

Step one, before analysing the visual elements, captions, and follower comments of internet celebrities' Instagram posts, I provide a review of the relevant literature. The provides a broad analysis of internet celebrities and public Islam in Indonesia, which I will explore further through three different elements: historical context, visual culture, and Instagram comments from followers. Ultimately, this study seeks to contribute to the knowledge of Muslim popular culture, public Islam and internet celebrities, and their contribution to contemporary politics, culture, religion, and the configuration of public Islam in Indonesia.

Step two involved collecting and logging data during the three years of the research process. I selected more than eighty images (and related text) from each internet celebrity's account, and included followers' comments in my examination. Of the more than five hundred pictures selected, a total of eighty-four were analysed. Images were selected for analysis based on the research goals, as informed by the concepts and hypotheses of this study. Focus went to understanding the construction of piety and ideal Muslim womanhood, investigating calls for global Muslim solidarity, and examining the *hijrah* trend amongst internet celebrities.

Since this research has, from the beginning, sought to see how piety*,* *ummah,* and *hijrah* are articulate by Internet celebrities, these three keywords provided the dominant themes for analysis. Analysis of these themes is provided and expanded in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. Each chapter contains detailed sub-chapters that come from "identifying and describing both explicit and implicit ideas with the data" (Guest, McQueen, and Namey, 2012, p. 10). Data collected from the short videos, photos, and caption texts posted by internet celebrities on Instagram helped identify habitual acts from each internet celebrity account, as well as patterns of signs, gestures, and meanings.

All of these themes were chosen based on my observations, thereby providing specific data regarding the connection between text, context, and their relationship with other text that can articulate a sequent of events and patterns (Hansen et al., 1998, p. 134; Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 77). These patterns helped guide me towards an understanding of the content that was routinely produced by each internet celebrity. Furthermore, these patterns also helped me create categories of visual and textual analysis to understand more about the meaning and ideologies contained within the text. As explained by Jofee (2020, p. 210), specific patterns can underscore the thematic analyses that provide some of the best tools for qualitative investigation.

For this research, I do not take pictures or posts from related advertisements, but only the postings of internet celebrities to their public pages. As such, I only use de-anonymised text that belongs to the celebrities. Similarly, I do not examine all comments from internet celebrities' posts, but

choose only the comments that stimulated the most appreciation, discussion, and argument from followers, or those that conveyed prayers for the celebrities or indicated that commenters identified with them. This action is expected to provide a frame of the contestation of piety that occurs in the digital environment interaction.

For each internet celebrity, I have collected between three and five comments from followers. These are analysed as examples of responses to internet celebrities' content. These comments are kept anonymous to maintain privacy and identity; likewise, although all images and comments have been published on public pages, I will not reproduce or use them for wider purposes. This action values privacy, in line with studies on the ethics of social media data (see, Evans, Ginnis, and Bartlett, 2015, pp. 4-13). The text I select for analysis will only be used to write my PhD thesis and for related work in the academic world. I will not use it for other publications.

Visual analysis is used to analyse the visual data gathered from internet celebrities' accounts, which in this research are mostly photographic images, short videos, and event posters. For textual analysis, data were gathered from the captions present in internet celebrities posts' (usually accompanying visual posts) and from the comments from several followers/audiences. Both visual and text analysis are seen in terms of discourse, as representing discursive practices through the specific properties of visual coding and representation (see Deacon et al., 1999, p. 313).

Step three, after examining the internet celebrities' accounts, data were also collected by scrutinising media interviews in which internet celebrities discuss the creation of their Instagram accounts, careers, personal lives, and spiritual journeys. This research also consults internet celebrities' YouTube channels, news coverage in magazines or newspapers, and autobiographical books to explore each internet celebrity's personal branding and life story. Such media resource artefacts can help researchers understand how internet celebrities represent themselves in the public sphere through social media Instagram.

The hybrid media environment is the complex one of interdependent resources, specifically old and new media platforms with a dynamic and dialectical configuration that admits heterogeneous views, interests, and audience responses to global and local issues (Chadwick, 2013, pp. 121–124). Numerous online media platforms are available for networked actors to create creative content, disseminate news stories, and broadcast political views, all based on their personal values and interests, and invite comments or feedback from followers (see Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, pp. 739–768; Meraz, 2011, pp. 107–127).

Traditional news media has long had the power to define what main events are visibly broadcast to the public. However, on social media it is possible for networked publics to suggestively shape the ways in which news and issues remain discussed. This is part of the concept of 'networked framing', whereby non-elite actors can form public discourse and actions into a trending

topic (Poyhtari et al., 2019, pp. 1–22; Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013, pp. 138–166; Papacharissi, 2015, pp. 60–61). The rise of internet technology (especially the growth of social media, blogospheres, and alternative online media) has resulted in a significant shift in the distribution of news topics and perspectives amongst the public.

7. Conclusion, limitations, and subjectivity

Sandelowski (2004) mentions that qualitative research is expected to deliver and bring knowledge based on human experiences. Like other research, qualitative research has its limitations and challenges, whereby it is the researcher's responsibility to ensure precision and integrity (see Lorelli et al., 2017). This holds true for the current study as well; as discourse analysis relies on complex texts, this approach is limited to certain thematic analysis. As it only covers particular periods and social contexts, this research cannot produce generalisations.

In qualitative research, the researcher plays a vital role as an instrument for analysis, including formulating decisions regarding coding, theming, and placing the data in the context and suitable framework (Starks and Trinidad, 2007; Lorelli et al., 2017). Therefore, qualitative research can lead to subjectivity in analysis. This also happens when thematic analysis is considered in qualitative research, as such analysis conveys a researcher's individual interests related to the research data (Holloway and Todres, 2003). This can be problematic, as it is probably that other data and other themes are not covered, and thus neglected by analysis. For the thematic analysis in this thesis, I have

departed from my personal political stances, and this can shape my interpretation and investigation. For instance, I have focused on the topic of 'Muslim vote Muslim', but I have not investigated issues related to halal certification which has been widely criticized by the media and public as a source of corruption.

My identity as a Muslim woman who lives in urban areas and enjoys the privileges of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia also contributes to my subjectivity. This identity adheres to me and ultimately affects my focus on the Muslim middle class, rather than other ranges. Moreover, the tone of this research will shape the frame of critical analysis, showing my objection to the public debate on political identity in Indonesia. My research analysis will inevitably be coloured by my perspectives and understandings regarding one of the goals of political faith, primarily from Islamist groups with a narrow understanding of Islam that seeks to promote Sharia (Islamic law) through their political agenda.

All in all, I would like to highlight, even though there are some obstacles and limitations in this method and research, the phenomena that occur on internet celebrities' Instagram accounts signify cultural messages that are worthy of interpretation and important for exploration.

Chapter 4

Modelling Modesty and Piety Through Instagram

Between 1912 and 1930, well before Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, many organisations emerged that sought to enhance women's political participation and struggle against colonialism.[55] These organisations were predominantly religion-based and regional in their scope (Noerdin, 2005; Jayawardena, 1986). After Indonesia's independence, women's movements remained crucial in the fight against colonialism and the development of Indonesia as a nation. Soekarno, the nationalist leader, persuaded these organisations to support the nationalist movement against the Dutch by promising that the oppression of women would end with colonialism (Wieringa, 2002, pp. 40–45). Women in Indonesia, thus, became agents of nationalism, fighting to create a united and independent Republic of Indonesia.

Over more than five decades, Indonesia has become a considerably more Islamic nation. This has not only influenced national politics, but also how gender, social order, and intimacy are understood; it has thus significantly affected women's

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[55] See Suwondono et al. (1978, p. 102) and Blackburn (2004, p. 15). Women's associations founded between 1920 and 1930 can be divided into three categories; 1) associations that were women's branches of political parties or existing movements, such as Wanudiyo Utomo (of Sarekat Indonesia, which became Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia) and Aisyiyah (of Muhammadiyah), 2) associations of educated women who aimed to spread specific knowledge and understandings (Wanito Utomo, Wanita Mulia, Putri Budi Sejati, etc.), and 3) organisations for educated young women that were part of established youth associations (Taman Siswa Wanita, Putri Indonesia, Jong Java –Meisjeskring, etc.)

positions in Indonesian society. The new understandings of Islam oriented towards the Middle East has caused tensions brought about by globalisation and greater exposure to Western and Arabic values. In general, globalisation can be viewed as having transformed economies, politics, and societies around the world (Acker, 2004, p. 22). These understandings of Islam have focused on connections between individuals, a collectively that affects political concepts such as identity, freedom, and authority—particularly that of women (Blackburn, 2004, p. 84).

This chapter intends to explore whether the apparently trivial practice of social media use contributes to identity formation amongst women Muslim internet celebrities. Specifically, this chapter consists of four sections, and elaborates on the questions; how do internet celebrities use their body performativity and their participation on the internet to contribute to the contestation of politics, society, and culture in Indonesia, especially during and after the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta (Pilkada DKI). The first section explores how Muslim women Internet celebrities have used their body performativity and online engagement to demonstrate both their religious and faith politics, particularly during the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta (Pilkada DKI). It will also explore how Muslim women internet celebrities are taking part in political agency through their everyday posts. The second segment will investigate how conservative Muslim women's identities rose in the aftermath of Action Defend Islam (2017) and how this was represented on Instagram, particularly with regard to veils and religion expression as manifestations of piety.

The third part looks at some internet celebrities who used their Instagram account to define alternative ways for reconstructing piety through religious nationalism, diversity, and resistance to traditional feminine stereotypes in media. This third section will also provide an analysis how some Internet celebrities respond to the intensifications of Islamism and conservatism in Muslim women's identity politics in Indonesia, that are represented and contested in social media Instagram. The last section of this chapter will also answer the question on how internet celebrities are doing self-commodification in religious activities, through capitalization of content and addressing the audience to attract attention and publicity.

The study will demonstrate how internet celebrities' involvement in the digital media environment contributes to political, social, and cultural contestation in Indonesia. This chapter will use Judith Butler's theory of body performativity (1990) to see how gendered media practices and representations in postfeminist digital cultures formed in each internet celebrities' content. Performativity theory will also be used to analyse Muslim women's identity in Instagram linked to celebrity status that is constituted and produced with discursive acts of self-articulation (Butler, 1990; Barad, 2003). Additionally, I also use Foucault's (1988) theory of the technology of the self to illustrate how internet celebrities create their identity and character through piety discourses and how social media is a reworking of disciplinary power for the surveillance of Muslim women bodies. This disciplinary power is exercised through "panoptic" modes of control by society

which is represented by followers and commentators of internet celebrities (Foucault, 1988; Selwyn, 2019, p. 39).

1. **The Availability and Visibility of Piousness: Muslim Women's Political Agency**

Today, women participate in politics not only through demonstrations or women's organisations, but also through social media, a medium where visual culture is powerful. In Indonesia, even though young women have regularly participated in political movements, their significant socio-political effects are frequently concealed (Budianta, 2006, p. 916; Wieringa, 2002; Blackburn, 2004, p. 16). According to Lim (2017, pp. 411–428), social media was significantly used by the Action to Defend Islam (*Aksi Bela Islam*) movement against Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok), who was perceived as an "unbelieving" political leader (*pemimpin politik yang kafir*).

Virtual spaces facilitated young Muslim women's participation in this movement. As mentioned by Kavakci and Kraeplin (2016, p. 2) virtual spaces enabled Muslim women to produce representations of piety, faith, and fragmentation, and allowed their (re-)construction. This section intends to examine how internet celebrities have used their body performativity and internet participation to contribute to the contestation of politics, society, and culture in Indonesia, especially during and after Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election (Pilkada DKI). Moreover, this section explores how certain internet celebrities have expressed the political view, through religious messages, that Muslims may only elect Muslim leaders. This section will use Foucault's (1982)

"technologies of the self" theory to analyse how internet celebrities construct their identities as pious Muslim women and fashion religious messages to announce their political stances.

Dian Pelangi is a prominent digital influencer and has found success in the global Muslim fashion world. She is one of the Indonesian designers that broke with the Indonesian traditional limitations of Muslim fashion, to implement a more modern, fashionable and stylish design. Dian Pelangi has a large social media following, with 5.1 million Instagram followers — makes her a significant influencer to a broad demographic of her digital savvy followers, including on political and religious issues. During Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, Dian actively participated in the campaign activities of Muslim candidates: Agus Yudhoyono (with his running mate Sylviana Murni) in the first round and Anies Baswedan (with his running mate Sandiaga Uno) in the second round[56].

On her personal Instagram account Dian purposefully posted four pictures to support the Muslim candidate only.

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[56] Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election was held in two rounds. During the first round, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (one of the Muslim candidates) and his running mate Sylviana Murni were eliminated. During the second round, campaigning became more intense, as incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) was running against Muslim challenger Anies Baswedan. Although Ahok was an early favourite, he became involved in a blasphemy case that many believed was politically motivated.

Figure 4.1: Dian Pelangi with Sandiaga Uno (DKI Jakarta Vice Governor Candidate) in the 2017 promotion #MuslimVoteMuslim.
Posted 9 April 2017

The caption read: Today's highlight: intimate gathering with Sandiaga Uno. Alhamdulillah. Got this privilege to meet brother @sandiuno in person (with smile emoticon). So impressed by the way he shared his point of view, intelligently calm, charismatic yet funny! Thank you for sharing, and for enthusiasm to entrepreneurship with us brother Sandi, I feel more convinced! (to choose Sandi as Vice Governor). #OKOCE

Figure 4.2: Dian Pelangi with the Hijaber Community and Sandiaga Uno (deputy governor candidate), with hands held to signify his number on the ballot; it is accompanied by the hashtag #MuslimVoteMuslim.
Posted 18 April 2017

With caption reading: Bismillah for tomorrow committed to choose number 3 (smile emoticon) @hijaberscommunityofficial we support @aniesbaswedan @sandiagauno #OKEOCE

Figure 4.3: Dian Pelangi, put a photo selfie with her dad after voting for
DKI Jakarta Gubernational Election 2017 and promoting
#MuslimVoteMuslim
on her Instagram account.
Posted 15 February 2017

From the figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, it can be seen that Dian Pelangi—who has 5.1 million followers—voiced her preference for deputy gubernatorial candidate Sandiaga Uno, who emphasised his Islamic identity during the Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. On 9 April 2017, Dian posted an image of her standing beside deputy governor candidate Sandiaga Uno (see Figure 4.1). On 18 April 2017, Dian confirmed her support for the candidate by posting a picture of her, several members of the *hijaber* community, and the candidate (see Figure 4.2). A medium shot is particularly suitable when capturing 'dialogue' because it's cropped far enough away to include many people but cropped near enough to expose the connection between subjects (Thompson and Bowen, 2009, p. 16). These pictures have an important meaning regarding how Dian as a public figure is voicing her political views and has invited a large number of comments that

express appreciation of her stance. ''Agree with your decision as a Muslim Women'' is a typical statement following photos in which Dian is standing for the Vote Muslim candidate only, but some opposing comments also appear until after an interval of a few days Dian closes a comment column on her uploaded photos (see column section in figure 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4).

The opposing comments from some of the followers (that disagree with Dian's political stance) show how online spaces do facilitate encounters that generate alternative discourses. The pro-contra from commentators/followers created a strong sense of intimacy in the comments threads. For example, using the basis of religious argument – one of the supportive comments for Dian's stand comes from @account4.1: ''Muslim are required to follow what religious commands, if you disagree please go to the sea[57]''. Dian Pelangi thus used her popularity and influence to gain social and political attention (and thus votes). Dian Pelangi also promoted Muslim candidates using the hashtag #MuslimVoteMuslim. She therefore takes advantage of what Hine (2000, p. 70) identifies as the particular capacities or characteristics of the Internet as a communication medium to assert a certain political position.

Counter discourses came from several comments of commentators/followers, who accused Dian of being a racist and ruthless public figure because she was choosing her leader based on religious considerations

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[57] "Go to the sea", is sarcastic language that has a common usage by the millennial Indonesian generation for mocking others.

rather than individual reputation and character.[58] As explained by Zeynep (2013, pp. 848–870), influencers can measure public interest through social media engagement (shares, likes, and comments); at the same time, they can use their status to offer preferred perspectives and draw attention to writers, politicians, or other public figures. However, social media is also a site of contestation, where digital citizens can express disagreement with the ideas and messages conveyed by public figures.

Figure 4.4: Dian Pelangi posting a quote from Quranic Surah An-Nisa, Verse 59, citing the need for Muslims to vote for Muslim Leader in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Posted on 14 February 2017

The caption read: Believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are invested with authority; and then if you were to dispute among yourselves about anything refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you indeed believe in Allah and the Last

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[58] Sandi entered politics from the business sector, having been chosen as Anies Baswedan's running mate in Jakarta's 2017 gubernational candidate. During the campaign, he portrayed himself as a pious, polite, charismatic, and smart Muslim, thereby contrasting himself directly with Ahok (who was perceived as having a stern, assertive, straightforward personality). Many of Ahok's political opponents and detractors felt attacked by his policies. At the same time, Ahok did not receive the support of Islamic groups, who instead sought to impugn Ahok's electability on the basis of his double minority status (Chinese and Christian).

Day; that is better and more commendable in the end. Obey Allah the Messenger and Ulil Amri (leader/government/authority) as long as he holds to Quran and Prophet Sunna[59]. I be reminded by sister @ichahaditsya about this verse. Thank to Allah there is friend who reminded me. In the name of God friends hope we always remember to what and who we may return (smile emoticon) #MuslimVoteMuslim.

Looking at Figure 4.4 above, it can be seen that Dian intentionally posted verses from the Holy Qur'an to demonstrate her legitimacy. Photographing the Qur'an at an angle, popularly known as a bird's eye view (Thomson and Bowen, 2009, p. 102), Dian sought to capture the entire Qur'an while simultaneously highlighting a specific verse for audiences. This image can be analysed using semiotics to see how its messages are constructed to produce meaning, an approach that is especially important in fashion and political analysis (Branston and Stafford, 2010, p.10). These images of the Qur'an are rife with material symbolic meaning, with the pages coloured in pastels before being combined with white flower ornaments, photographed, and captioned to represent Dian's femininity. Dian, as seen in the image, chose a series of aesthetic and beautiful pages of the Quran to structure her unique identity. Dian Pelangi (Rainbow) is the name of Dian's brand, representing her style and label, and Dian appears to have expressed herself not only through the image but also through colour.

Moreover, Dian also provided a caption to highlight her knowledge of Islam, show her performance of religious rituals, and present her political

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[59]The traditional portion of Muslim law based on Muhammad's words or acts, accepted (together with the Koran) as authoritative by Muslims and followed particularly by Sunni Muslims.

choices as reflecting Islamic teachings. As such, through her Instagram account, Dian Pelangi presented herself as a legitimate interpreter of the Qur'an, giving authority to her view that Muslims must only vote for Muslims (as opposed to unbelievers, or *kafir*). Her support for a particular Muslim gubernatorial candidate can be seen as part of her political agency, which is demonstrated through her online expressions.

It is obvious, thus, that Dian presented herself as a pious woman, thereby claiming the agency to critically and publicly engage with religious texts. Through combining her identity as Muslim women, upper-class status and famous person, Dian has more agency to express her religiosity. In this way, Muslim women become religious authorities and have more say about what is good or bad in her community. In this context, Dian's body performance and gender performativity in social media becomes a site inscribed with contested understandings about what is an ideal Muslim, particularly for women.

Dian, one of the founders of the *Hijabers* Community,[60] has taken several pictures with the community to articulate and legitimise her political stance (see Figure 4.2). In these pictures, she actively used the group (see Rocamora, 2011, p. 411; Subijanto, 2012, p. 244) to (re)construct and express her pious identity,

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[60] The Hijabers Community is a group of veiled Muslim women who actively represent Islam as a lifestyle and source of happiness. Established in 2010 by the young fashion designers Dian Pelangi, Jenahara, Ria Miranda and Ghaida Tsuraya, the Hijabers Community began its activities using the online platform Blogspot (https://hijaberscommunity.blogspot.com/). In 2011, it migrated to Twitter and Instagram. To increase their popularity, the founders used their social media activities to become micro-celebrities (see Beta, 2014, pp. 377–389; Baulch and Pramiyanti, 2018, pp. 1–15).

attempting to influence her followers/commentators. In 2010, after helping

establish this community, Dian was able to use her popularity to attract members

and draw potential customers to her clothes brand (Beta, 2018, pp. 377-389). We

can thus concede that Dian used her Muslim identity as part of her agency in

order to influence others for political and commercial reasons.

Butler (1988) contends that a subject establishes their identity by

performing it. Dian's identity is defined by her stylized recurrence of specific

activities, as can be seen in figure 4.1, 4.2, 4.2, 4.4. Dian builds her identity in

these repetitive posts on topics she wants to identify with and how she

understands and recognizes it. She is not only portraying herself as a public

figure, but also as her father's daughter (see figure 4.3). Dian appears to confirm

through the photo that, while she and her father have different choices (Dian's

extended little finger refers to contestant number 1, and her father's extended

three fingers refers to contestant number 3), they are both constant in retaining

Muslim leaders by adding photo captions with the hashtags

#MuslimVoteMuslim.

The concept of piety as agency refers to Mahmood's (2005, p. 192)

argument that "piety can be a reference of an agency". Even though Islamic piety

is generally seen as opposed to the liberal ideals of feminist thought, these

internet celebrities attempt to show their identities as independent women

through their Instagram accounts. Moreover, according to Rinaldo (2014, p.

825), Islam can be a resource for women's agency, and religion and feminism

can interconnect in "unpredicted and unexpected ways". Individual agency is

thus not only about progressive action; it may also be regressive. As seen in Dian Instagram's posts, she deliberately used her popularity and recognition to deliver a narrow political perspective, one that identified Muslim leadership as better than an unbeliever *(kafir)*.

During the Action to Defend Islam (popularly known as the 212 Movement), another internet celebrity who deliberately showed her political stance in her everyday posts was Dewi Sandra, who promoted the movement by posting short videos with the hashtag #212. This hashtag was popular amongst Indonesian Muslims, who used it to signify the '212 Action' (referring to 2 December 2016, when the first demonstration was held). Between December 2016 and the 2017 election, internet celebrities and others Instagram users who supported the movement specifically used hashtags such us #MuslimVoteMuslim #AksiBelaIslam212, and #212 to express their political views. These hashtags offered powerful tools for promotion, organisation, and connection, as well as useful media for facilitating users' discovery, participation, and contribution to the conversation (Sharma, 2013; Loza, 2014).

Dewi Sandra also exhibited agency in her virtual construction of social piety, identity, and Islam. Various celebrities used their social media accounts to attract and impress followers, as seen in one of Dewi's posts on the day of the Action to Defend Islam. Even though Dewi did not physically participate in the '212 Action', she continuously posted specific visuals and captions that supported it. Not only did Dewi use modest clothes and veils to represent her religious piety, but she also highlighted the importance of Muslims using their

morality and their religion to guide their political views. Moreover, from Dewi's posts, it can be seen that the proliferation of Islamic symbols by internet celebrities is achieved not only by publicising fashionable clothing, but also by participation in political activities such as the Action to Defend Islam.

Figure 4.5: Dewi's post of her husband and friend
when joining a massive march
Action Defend Islam placed in The National Monument
(Indonesian Monumen Nasional, abbreviated Monas).
Posted on 2 December 2016

With a caption that reads: Happy Friday prayer for My Imam, My friends, My brothers, My sister.

Figure 4.6: A short video about the 212 Action Defend Islam Movement posted by Dewi Sandra to support the anti-Ahok mobilisation.
Posted on 2 December 2016
This post includes the caption: "Just one word to describe this beauty; only Allah is able to unite all of us #212". Under this caption, many people commented that they were proud to support Dewi Sandra, a Muslim artist with the piety and morality to defend Islam rather than support Ahok. This can be seen in the following two comments, @account 4.2: "Allahu Akbar (God is Great). Islam is beautiful, as is Dewi Sandra, who is gorgeous. Thank God. God willing, there are still artists who don't support Ahok". @account 4.3: "Subhanallah (Praise be to God). I am always amazed and cry when I see pictures or videos of these actions. Alhamdulillah, and God willing, I will never lose my pride as a Muslim."

On the day of the Action to Defend Islam, 2 December 2016, several internet celebrities also posted similar photographs and expressed their support for the Action to Defend Islam. As can be seen in the picture below (see figure 4.7) Zaskia Sungkar is another internet celebrity that expressed her support for this massive demonstration that took place on the Monas and Jakarta's streets on Friday to protest against the governor of Jakarta, a Christian and the first ethnic Chinese in the position, over accusations that he insulted the Quran.

Figure 4.7: Zaskia Sungkar posted an image of the massive congregation that depicts thousands of hardline Muslims who came to Monas and did Friday prayer together as part of the Action Defend Islam agenda.
Posted 2 December 2016

Zaskia used the description "God is greatest, God is greatest, happy ❤ Friday prayer for my brothers and sisters", to show her support for the march through sharing and reposting images. The first '212 Action' demonstration was held on a Friday. Muslims believe Friday is more favorable than any other day of the week because on that day Muslims gather together to pray in congregation. At that '212 Action' period thousands of Muslims came to Monas to share Friday together, wearing white robes as a dress code, the high camera angle exposing the size of the congregation (see figure 4.7).

To some extent, Islamic identity can produce privilege. A growing number of internet and micro-celebrities also have Muslim lifestyle businesses, and thus maximise their influence through social media to sell various products such as Muslim clothing, hijabs, hajj travel packages, television programs and films. All of these efforts involve Muslims' solidarity as a single community (*ummah*). Social media interactions, thus, provide an opportunity to examine

how online expressions of religion have enabled religious communities to grow, supported by young Muslim internet celebrities in the popular culture and entertainment industries. As can be seen in the figure 4.8 Zakia Sungkar posted a picture with numerous Indonesian Islamic Preachers that support Action Defend Islam Movement on her Instagram account.

Figure 4.8: A number of Indonesian public figures during Islamic teaching and preaching in Musawarah Recitation taking a photo with Felix Siaw and Abdul Somad, a controversial Indonesian Islamic Preacher.
Posted on 3 June 2018

Figure 4.9: Zaskia Sungkar placed three pictures in one post when she was involved in Islamic teaching and preaching in Musawarah Recitation (Kajian Musawarah) activities.
Posted on 13 November 2018

Another time Zaskia also posted a series of pictures when she was involved in another Musawarah Recitation (Kajian Musawarah) activity. The caption read "No matter how many steps we have walked away from God; it only takes one step to return to Him @hijrahfest @kajianmusawarah. Who is the most turning my heart, please make my heart stand on to Your religion". In these pictures Zaskia highlights her activities in this Islamic teaching gathering (see figure 4.9). On the same page, one of Zaskia's followers, placed a comment in response to Zaskia's pictures, "This is one of the picture and caption from @Zaskiasungkar15 which is very memorable, when I was deciding to *Hijrah*. I think this caption made me understand that God is all good, that no matter how far we don't care about His orders, it only takes one step to return to Him". From this statement it can be seen how young people are drawn by the spiritual journey of influential people like "celebrities *Hijrah*[61]". Through continuous media engagement, Zaskia has became one of these inspirational celebrities.

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[61] The trend amongst Indonesian celebrities that promotes a "born-again" journey. This trend hit the urban middle class, promoted by celebrities and "social-media

Figure 4.10: A post by Oki Setiana Dewi asserting her commitment to supporting a Muslim leader in the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Posted on 5 April 2017

Inarguably, the growing influence of Conservative Islam has resulted from "smart *dakwah*[62]" (proselytisation), through which celebrity *ustadz*[63] use their star power and digital marketing skills to reach out to technology-savvy millennials (see Sebastian and Nubowo, 2019, pp. 1–22). Artists have become popular *ustadz* and *ustadzah* as the concept of *hijrah* has become increasingly intertwined with entertainment media, Islamic lifestyles, and Muslim consumer culture. These celebrity *ustadz* and *ustadzah* have engaged with the bounds of Indonesian moralities, realities, and popularities, reflecting the increasing dominance of Islam in the Indonesian market (Fealy, 2008, pp. 29–30). Oki Setiana Dewi, another internet celebrity, also actively campaigned for a

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preachers" that tend to become intolerant not only towards other religions but also towards Muslims from different communities.

[62] Call or invitation, including the proliferation of the Islamic religion.

[63] The word *ustadz* is Persian. It usually refers to a well-regarded male teacher; female teachers are known as *ustadzah*. In Indonesia, the terms *ustadz* and *ustadzah* refer to persons with religious knowledge who spread Islamic teachings among the faithful (Nisa, 2018, see p. 79).

Muslim governor; she likewise established herself as a Muslim woman who adhered to Qur'anic teachings, as seen in the caption reading (see figure 4.10); "In the name of God (number three emoticon) Ustadz Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Ory Vitrio, Oki Setiana Dewi, Mrs Adhyaksa Dault, Mommy Neno Warisman. I am Muslimah, I believe in the Qur'an. This is my stand. I choose a Muslim leader. #MuslimvoteMuslim post photo by @oryvitrio".

The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial campaign was used by several internet celebrities to confirm their representations as ideal Muslimah by presenting the interpretations and judgments of specific *ustadz* who rejected the Christian governor Ahok. In the above-cited declaration of herself as a Muslim, Oki Setiana Dewi deliberately referred to the Islamic preacher Ustadz Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin (a leader of the 212 Movement), her husband namely Ory, Mrs Adhyaksa Dault (wife of the former Minister of Youth and Sports of United Indonesia) and Neno Warisman (a former singer and actress who has become active in the religious, social, and educational fields, as well as in political campaigns such as the #2019GantiPresiden movement[64]) as a means of reaffirming her identity. With a medium shot Oki posted her political choices to vote for candidate number 3 (see figure 4.10) which is Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno as Muslim leader in DKI Jakarta Gubernational Election 2017.

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[64]The hashtag #2019GantiPresiden (#2019ChangePresident) and resulting movement was initiated by Mardani Ali Sera, a politician with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This movement urged people to not vote for incumbent Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in the 2019 General Election. Members of this movement claimed that Jokowi (and his ministers) had exploited various racial issues, fake news, and hate speech during his first term.

Using the hashtag #MuslimVoteMuslim Oki depicted a caption from Al-Quran as part of her consideration to choose a Muslim leader. In the group shots Oki also demonstrates her legitimacy and power by engaging with elites (an Islamic preacher and political actor) as part of the discourse that Oki's wants to contribute.

According to Althusser (2014, p. 190), ideology constructs the subject-position and recruits the individual who occupies that position. In reality, social media are part of an arena where public understandings of Islam are created. Through social media, internet celebrities have in turn reinforced Islamic discourse and shaped gender relations in Indonesian society. Young, Muslim, digitally savvy women internet celebrities have created online personas, becoming role models as religious, cultural, and political media personalities with millions of 'followers' who consume their social media posts. Butler's (1988) performativity theory helps explain individual desire on social media. Instagram allows online celebrities to build their brands by repeating digital actions like posting, like, and commenting. The posts of online celebrities, in particular, are calculated attempts to build their identities. The rise of internet and micro-celebrities has also affected the fashion sense of middle-class Muslims in Indonesia, creating the view that hijab fashion is more dynamic, cheerful, and undeniably chic.

Mundane activities such as posting and reposting are part of online activism. Through such digital technologies, individuals feel that they can make changes, participate in movements, and take action, even when not

accompanied by offline activities. The practice of sharing, distributing issue, discussion and commenting in social media are examples of "*craftivism*: a practice of using crafts for political activism" (Nikunen, 2019, p. 130). The purpose of these actions are not only about creative creation, but also constructing an online imagination in order to increase an online political community.

The online political community on social media enlarge practices of political participations, with intimacy, care and influence, in ways to gaining collective interest. As explained by Lim (2015, p. 118) the imaginaries of social movements allow collectives of people to become involved in digital environments "that provide sites for the contestation of power (and counter-power) and are themselves part of the contests over access, control and representation." Foucault (1988, p. 67) also concludes that 'power is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere'; it is thus neither an agency nor a structure. This indicates that power is part of a 'regime of truth' that penetrates society, which is in continuous fluidity and negotiation.

Moreover, Foucault's term 'power/knowledge' can be used to understand how internet celebrities use their power to establish forms of "knowledge, scientific understanding, and truth" through their popularity on social media. Religious experiences are mediated by the social media activities of internet celebrities deemed to have religious knowledge, as well as through their activities in online religious communities. The subject can be present through the control of others, making the subject dependent; conversely, the

subject can have thoughts and self-knowledge that cannot be readily separated from social discourse (Foucault, 1982, p. 208).

These Internet celebrities' decisions to support only Muslim leaders confirms the importance of conservative Muslims in Indonesia's popular culture today. Furthermore, from the comments of internet celebrities' followers who support their actions, it can be seen that celebrities' ideologies tend to be supported by their social media followers as part of their engagement with this media. As explained by Fuchs (2020, pp. 145-147), "In the internet's communication environment, audiences are not just consumers of information, but producers and active audiences, who produce content, data, and social relations. They are *produsers* (producers and users) and *prosumers* (producers and consumers)". Audiences like, share and comment, their engagement in this media involves production, circulation and consumption of content at the same time. This type of participatory culture is often referenced to highlight resistant politics and practices. However, examining this online discursive engagement shows that the social media communication environment practices of these internet celebrities are used in order to broaden the dominant discourses.

This section analyses how social media is used as a tool to help people develop a sense of self in relation to their political agency through discursive practice. When internet celebrities transform their subjectivities through self-transformation techniques, these subjectivities are no longer defined solely as a constitutive construct of power. Rather, self-expression technologies such as everyday fashion, trivial diaries, and political posts are used to remake

celebrities' identities and give them agency (O'Regan, 2009, p. 176). Therefore, the Instagram activities posted by Internet celebrities serve as technologies of the self, through which are celebrities are subjectified by fans/followers to present certain personas and create an imagined online community with a certain self-identity (Foucault, 1978).

2. The Rising Tide of Conservative Muslim Women's Identity Politics in Indonesia

The Action to Defend Islam movement has actively used hate speech, aimed at the West, China (and the Chinese by extension), and Christianity. Such sentiments have been fuelled continuously by commercial products[65] that use Islam and Islamic identity for resisting the Joko Widodo government. Among its accusations is that the forbidden Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) has re-emerged, backed by China, and threatens the continued existence of Islam as an ideology, identity, and community in Indonesia. Many Indonesian Muslims viewed Ahok (an ally of Jokowi) as representing the "triumph" of Chinese Indonesians, who are viewed as fierce social and economic "opponents" of Indonesia's Muslims. Additionally, the radical Islamic Defenders Front[66] has coordinated public demonstrations

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[65] The Action to Defend Islam inspired people who participated in the march to establish the 212 Sharia Cooperative (KS212). This cooperative is considered to be the means of economically empowering Muslims within a liberal, secular, and capitalist state and market. It has established the "212 Mart", which sells products produced by Muslims. As of June 2019, the cooperative claims to operate 230 stores throughout Indonesia. See; https://koperasisyariah212.id/syari-roti-roti-milik-umat/.

[66] FPI advocates a kind of influential intolerance, which has regrettably enjoyed periodic implicit formal support even as minorities are attacked and their sites of

involving more than a hundred thousand people. The rise of post-Islam has further been marked by the mushrooming of Islamic civil organisations and Islamic study groups, as well as the strengthening of conservative Islam (Hasan, 2009; 2013).

Since 2010, Instagram has become one of most popular online platforms for sharing photographs and videos (Abidin, 2018, p. 33; Goor, 2012, pp. 3–4). It has thus provided a public sphere though which piety can be constructed through vigorous and endless discourse. As a public space, social media has provided a means of circulating codes of modernity as well as particular significations and practices. Internet celebrities have shared particular significations and religiosity practices as forms of representation. As mentioned by Hall (1997, p. 43), representation involves meaningful communication within specific social contexts; it is thereby linked to power, ideology, and culture.

Representation is essential for interaction; it is a process for understanding others, a fundamental means of constructing and disseminating meaning. Through language, meaning is created to represent the culture and conventions of society. Language, meaning, and culture therefore influence each other. According to Hall (1997, p. xvii), "language is one of the 'media' through which thoughts, ideas, and feelings are represented in culture. Representation through language is therefore central to the process by which

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worship are demolished (see Qodir, 2009, p. 56; Wilson in Fealy and White, 2008, p. 202).

meaning is produced". Media, likewise, is also a site of struggle, a medium wherein all identities are contested. The growing conservative Muslim Identity on Instagram has also driven the rise of Islamism in popular culture. The emergence of the Action to Defend Islam coincided with the widespread adoption of the hijab as a symbol of religious adherence and the emergence of "Islamic recitation" groups. In this section, I will explore the representation of conservative Muslim women's identities on Instagram, particularly as related to the matter of veiling and worship as expressions of piety. Again, I am going to use Foucault's concept that "technologies are forms of practical reason to realised simultaneously as material and discursive practice" and that "power is exercised over oneself as technologies of the self" (in Ayllon and Walkerdine, 2008, p. 116).

After Action to Defend Islam happened in 2016, Islamic recitation emerges amongst celebrities in Indonesia. The most famous Islamic recitation group, Musawarah Recitation (Kajian Musawarah) was initiated by several Indonesian male artists.[67] Recitations, broadcast on YouTube, are creative in their content and always presents popular preachers.[68] Artists involved have included Dimas Seto, Arie Untung, Dude Herlino, Tengku Wisnu, and

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[67]Arie Untung, a singer, has used his social media accounts to fight against liberalism since 2012. In 2017, as part of the 212 Movement, he also opposed the election of Ahok and campaigned for the Muslim candidate Anies Baswedan; in this, he was supported by Internet celebrities such as Dian Pelangi, Dewi Sandra, and Oki Setiana Dewi.

[68] Recitation activities are regularly posted on the Kajian Musawarah YouTube channel. As of September 2019, this channel has 88,198 subscribers (see https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPRaiX9XPfzTjJiIW9yYzjA)

Irwansyah. In 2018, Musawarah Recitation created the *Hijrah* Festival, a marathon show of Islamic *dakwah* (proselytisation) that has included controversial speakers,[69] *muhasabah* (retrospection), Muslim clothing bazaars, halal product exhibitions, and religious conversion (*mualaf*). The *Hijrah* Festival, as with concerts and expositions, charges admission and carries out extensive promotion activities using YouTube (see, for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6paY-p-apBs) and Instagram (@hijrahfest).

Figure 4.11: Kartika Putri posted a group photo session with several internet celebrities that involving Musawarah Recitation (Kajian Musawarah). Posted 25 October 2018

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[69] These include Felix Siaw and Abdul Somad. As of September 2019, Siaw has more than 4 million followers on Instagram, 3 million followers on Twitter, and 400,000 subscribers on YouTube. Affiliated with HTI (Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia), he actively uses online recitations to campaign for an Islamic state and encourage the creation of a transnational caliphate. He has also opposed Pancasila, the establishing principles of the Indonesian nation-state (see https://www.newmandala.org/piety-politics-popularity-felix-siauw/). Similarly, the controversial speaker Abdul Somad has supported Musawarah Recitation and endorsed Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 Presidential Election. In August 2019, Somad caused religious tension after a video of him calling the Christian cross "a sign of the devil" during an Islamic lecture went viral on social media (see https://www.newmandala.org/abdul-somad-ustadz-jaman-now/).

"Musawarah Recitation" did not only involve male artists (this will be explored more in chapter 6), but also various female celebrities. Furthermore, there was a surge in internet celebrities' use of fashionable hijab on social media and identification of themselves doing *hijrah*. These accounts promoted more conservative Islamic thinking, one that played on symbols of obeisance and control of the female body. The above picture (see figure 4.11) is taken from the account of actress Kartika Putri (@kartikaputriworld), who declared the beginning of her *hijrah* in early 2018. This picture was given the following caption:

> "May peace be upon you, as God has willed us to be happy and always meet friends who prioritise heaven and always strive to be better. Continuously... this togetherness will always make us consistent, as Allah gives His blessings and reminds us and invites us to always do good things, amen. May Allah always make it easier for us to learn, also for me, who is very lacking in knowledge, and hopefully all of us will always get better over time. In the name of Allah, may we be best friends to get to heaven together, amen. Pious Muslimah never bore of studying Islam, especially sisters @dhiniaminarti @fenitarie @shireensungkar @ramita_nasution and everything @fitrop @chafrederica @zaskiasungkar15 @dierabachir @ichasoebandono @herfisa @dewisandra @ratu_anandita @vebbypalwinta @irnalaperleofficial @awanisaw @mayrariarty @victoria_makeupatelier @vivithalib @hepidavid @dierabachir."

On their respective accounts, the internet celebrities Dewi Sandra, Zaskia Sungkar and Kartika Putri posted similar pictures about their activities in Musawarah Recitation. These images were full of material signifiers, depicting the celebrities wearing pastel-white veils and clothing to indicate their femininity. Additionally, their white backdrops also signified that these celebrities were depicting themselves as religious Muslim women who have

sense of purity, cleanliness, and piety. Such colour coding, in conjunction with the context of the picture (including caption), is part of sign-making, through which meanings are understood (Kress and Leeuwen, 1996, p. 5). These internet celebrities identified themselves as blessed by being united with other pious women through their Islamic activities; Dewi Sandra even used the caption "Sister 'til Jannah", as seen below:

Figure 4.12: A post by Dewi Sandra showing Muslim women engaged in Musawarah Recitations. Posted on 20 October 2018

With a caption that reads: "When taking this photo, we were directed by sisters who made the atmosphere full of love (joy). This is a result of our pose with the concept of sister @fitrop, with the password "Sisters till Jannah", click click click (sound of camera). I love each and every one of these ladies. If all of you are gathering in heaven and I'm not there, please look for me".

From the figure (see 4.12) above, religious piety is interpreted as part of one's association with people following the same path. All are seen as seeking God, as worshipping Him, as covering their hair and wearing Islamic clothes in order to enter heaven. Dewi actively and consciously combined English ("sister") and Arabic ("Jannah") to represent modernity while simultaneously showing her piety. Dewi Sandra, who has more than five

million Instagram followers, has the ability to depict beauty standards, gender construction, and spiritual discourses. Foucault's concept can be seen in internet celebrities' accounts, where technology is used to establish their positions not only as public figures but also as owners of religious authority.

As Foucault (1998, p. 63) states, power is distributed and omnipresent. Discourse is a way of thinking, made up of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and practices used to build a system of behavior and speech that can develop formations and lead to a regime of truth. It is not only about material power or ideological manipulation; it can simply be about systematic, seemingly insignificant activities. By publishing specific concerns or actions, internet celebrities establish themselves in front of their online followers. As a result, it is vital to respond to any emerging concerns in the online world. Internet celebrities ensure that their online presence is acknowledged by their fans/followers daily through regular updates.

Figure 4.13: A post on Zaskia Sungkar's Instagram account identifying her as a member of the female hijab squad in @kajianmusawarah.
Posted on 31 October 2018

Zaskia Sungkar also put a beautiful caption beside the picture. She explained how fortunate she was to have famous young women as her friends, and that they continually encouraged her to do good and act piously. Using hashtags, she called them the "hijab squad", as seen:

"Longing ❤ longing for those who have clean hearts and always think positively, and those who give me a peaceful feeling ❤. They send a WhatsApp (message) inviting me to attend an (Islamic) recitation or send articles that make my heart peaceful, and send me a (messages of) praise or (Islamic) quotations when I am away. Hopefully, I can be like them, amen @kajianmusawarah #hijabsquad. Your friend is the one who calls the name of God in front of you, and calls your name to God behind of you" Wardrobe: @irnalaperleofficial".

In her caption, Zaskia Sungkar also mentioned the account @irnalaperleofficial, thereby promoting a fashion brand that endorses these celebrities. Such endorsements have commonly been used by internet celebrities, correlating with their religious journeys (*hijrah*) and depiction of their transformation.

In Indonesia's social discourse, being a good woman means covering one's body. This has been particularly true in the context of the *hijrah* trend, wherein women have faced pressure to prevent men from seeing their bodies, often through the idiom "the veil is to protect women's human dignity". On their social media accounts, internet celebrities not only show their activities during Islamic recitations, but also regularly post pictures and captions related to their proselytisation, their moral supervision, and the importance of positive habits such as veiling, wearing Muslim apparel, and making pious friends. The relationship between capital and religion it is very visible here; veiling, clothing, and friendships are all simultaneously powerful forms of capital and

prominent religious practices. As mentioned by Robinson (1983) the concept of racial capitalism has relations with inequality, including racial identity, ethnicity and gender. For embodied capitalism to survive, it must exploit discrimination of human value, and promotes certain value through social structures developing from capitalism.

The pictures show how Instagram accounts are primarily used as a tool to manage the self — the embodied and physical self, a means to tell self stories of religious experiences and express self-agency while undergoing self-transformation. This type of "personal narrative" addressed to real and imaginary others (van Dijck, 2007) is written with oneself and an audience in mind. Women dress up to practice their discipline, their body mastery, their sense of security, and their feminine identities. Women feel that they need to follow God's advice, to cover their body parts, to follow social norms by doing good deeds and avoiding sin. Control of the mind is seen as producing bodily discipline. The wearing of the hijab is "panoptical", in that it is simultaneously omnipresent and diffuse (Bartky 1990, p. 147; Foucault 1979, p. 29), and thus exceedingly powerful. Moreover, Rocamora (2011, p. 422)—also drawing on Foucault's concepts—has shown how personal blogs like Instagram accounts can be understood as technologies of surveillance, with people not only being able to govern and manage their own personae, but also control of their bodily appearances through filters, colours, and shapes.

Following the act of defending Islam in 2017, the reality surrounding the expression of piety, Muslim women, and social media have been

strengthening the term of piety, which refers to Middle Eastern-style Muslim dress. Since then, an increasing number of Indonesians have worn clothing that is more associated with Arab culture (and thus Islam) than traditional Indonesian or Western clothing. The movement involved not only one demonstration—the titular "212" demonstration, held on 2 December 2016— but a series of demonstrations,[70] intense mobilisations that became increasingly opposed to President Joko Widodo and his government. On the other hand, this demonstration presents a tangible vision and action concerning Muslim solidarity and *ummah* imagination. A claimed one million people gathered in Jakarta, demanding that the government arrest Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok) for blasphemy. Participants wore white hijabs, robes, caps, and turbans, all of which are associated with the Islamic fashion codes of the Arab Peninsula (Bruinessen, 2018, p. 2).

Since then, the social imagination of religious discourse can be seen in how the public sphere contests images and bodies, producing public visibility, conscious meaning and problem solving (see; Gole, 2002, p. 176). According to Nicholas Mirzoeff (2002, pp. 134–140), analysis of visual representation can explain how images are systems of meaning and parts of the socialisation process in the social imagination. One can understand who gets to produce

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[70] The Action to Defend Islam refers to a series of episodes involving the controversial organisation Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). Demonstrations were first held on 14 October 2016, then again on 4 November 2016, 2 December 2016, 11 February 2017, 21 February 2017, 31 March 2017, and on 5 May 2017. These demonstrations ultimately resulted in Ahok's loss in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Additionally, on 9 May 2017, Ahok was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for blasphemy by the North Jakarta District Court.

images, who gets to consume them, and who can do both as part of processes of contestation.

Within the framework of national and trans-national imagining, "piety" is produced and reproduced based on the political backgrounds, powers, and Islamic discourses that have emerged in Indonesia in the twenty years since political reform began in 1998. As modern public spheres, social media has helped establish the social image of Muslims and Islam, and reflect modern codes of social discourse. This is seen below, in a post from @kartikaputriworld:

Figure 4.14: A post by Kartika Putri; this selfie shows her wearing a niqab, and is accompanied by a narrative of her "critical" experience after being asked by airport officials to open it.
Posted on 13 March 2018

With caption reads: "May Allah bless you with safety and prosperity. My experience today is precious to me, and maybe to all of us. So today I got *syar'i* (clothes) and niqab for an endorsement. After taking the photos, I still wore the niqab because it made me feel comfortable and safe; after all, I was in a hurry going to the airport. When I arrived at the airport, I was still wearing my niqab, because it was convenient. But, sadly and pathetically, my luggage was checked randomly; I even had to pass the censor check (for your information, I always carry a small, empty suitcase for books). Then I asked the officers, "why is my bag being chosen for checking, even

though there is no problem with my suitcase?". Then I asked, "is it because I use a veil?" (I was still trying to be calm), and they said, "yes, it's random". Then I opened my suitcase, but (the officers) were not nice. And it did not stop there; on the second inspection, the same thing happened, and even my body was inspected (by female officers), even though there was no problem with the body scan. Again and again, they checked my suitcase, and they asked me for my boarding pass, even though it had been checked before. Oh my God… why must I be "intimidated" for wearing this niqab? What's wrong with Muslim women wearing the niqab? In the name of Allah, I was wearing a niqab, and I felt more comfortable (not being the centre of attention for men), and I felt safer wearing it. But why, here, (in Indonesia), in a majority Muslim society, can't Muslim women who wear the niqab be fairly accepted. Now I feel challenged to wear the niqab in other public places, to find out the reactions of others. Remember, we Muslim women who wear the niqab also have hearts and feelings, so please treat us properly, without intimidation. I am still shocked and sad. I understand the SOP (standard operating procedures), and this is not my first time at the airport, but clearly, there is a difference (when I am not wearing a niqab). I am telling my experiences in the hope that (officers' treatment of women wearing the niqab) will be better in the future. If not us, who will fight for equal rights, without racial and religious discrimination #readwithgoodandtrue."

Through selfies—defined as photographs taken of one's self, typically using a smartphone or webcam, and uploaded to social media (Oxford Words Blog 2019)—celebrities gain status by sharing their passions with followers (Marwick, 2015). In this context, Kartika Putri's post intensely presented the *niqab* and sharia clothing as signifying piety. This is emphasised in her statement: "What's wrong with Muslim women wearing the niqab? In the name of Allah, I was wearing a *niqab*, and I felt more comfortable (not being the centre of attention for men), and I felt safer wearing it." These words reflect the thoughts, ideas, and feelings attributed to *awrah* (the private parts) and Islam as a way of life. According to her post, Kartika believed that her *awrah*

included not only her hair, hands, breasts, and genitals, but her entire body. Likewise, she rejected being labelled a potential terrorist suspect because she wore a *niqab*. She identified herself as experiencing discrimination, citing her experiences with the airport officials.

At the same time, however, Kartika Putri was endorsing a specific brand of *niqab* through her Instagram account, combining consumer culture with religion while also explaining her travelling[71] (in the airport, a public space) without a *mahram*[72], which shows Muslim women's freedom to work and move in the public. Nonetheless, by arguing that women who wear the *niqab* experience discrimination in Indonesia, she was using it to seek the sympathy and empathy of her followers. Internet celebrities seek to the gain sympathy and attention of the public through their everyday posts. Through direct online marketing and social media advertising, celebrities gain attention not from provable talent, but specific techniques that draw the attention of the public (Abidin, 2018, p. 3).

The Islamic culture industry, which will be addressed further in this part, involves a "series of images, behaviors, knowledge, and commodities (that) are marketed specifically to Muslim women," (Gökarksel and McLarney, 2010, p. 2). This market is always connected with politics, society, and culture.

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[71] Culturally, Muslim women in the Persian Gulf who wear the *niqab* must always be accompanied by her *mahram* when travelling outside the home.

[72] A *mahram* is an unmarriable kin, one with whom marriage or sexual intercourse is prohibited in Islam. These may include blood relatives (parents, siblings), relatives by marriage (parents-in-law and siblings-in-law), or "milk relatives" (persons who were nursed by the same woman). Only a *mahram* may legally escort a woman while travelling outside the home.

It not only enhances Islam's ability to face the challenge of the global free market, but also creates new forms of Islamic practices. Such a market orientation has become an integral part of religious practices (Rudnyckyj, 2009, p. 195), with Muslim women being placed not only as consumers, but also as commodities (Goffman, 1979, p. 15; Roberts 1998, p. 818). The identities of Muslim women, thus, are ultimately defined through market negotiations. Continued redefinitions of identity are influenced by the images, narratives, and knowledge created by market discourses.

Since the Soeharto era, women wearing the *niqab* have often been associated with terrorism in Indonesia.[73] Historically, in the mid-1980s, Indonesia experienced complex interactions between puritan Islamic concepts, socialism, and nationalism within the context of the state ideology of Pancasila. This included a wave of violent confrontations, as well as a suicide bombing in the name of *jihad*;[74] specific efforts were made to establish an Islamic state and sharia way of life[75] (see; Bruinesssen, 2002, pp. 117–154).

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[73] The wearing of *niqab* by young women is widely considered a sign of a conservative Islamic understanding. In fact, in late 2018, after an increasing number of students at the State Islamic University in Yogyakarta began wearing the *niqab*, the rector at the university prohibited students from wearing the *niqab* on campus (see https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-43298214)

[74] During the 1977 elections, the Suharto government cracked down on Muslim "extremist" groups such as the Jihad Commandos (Komando Jihad), as they were considered treasonous. Such movements were blamed on Darul Islam, which had fought for Islamic politics and an Islamic state (see Quinton, 2010, pp. 21–35)

[75] These include black clothes and niqabs for Muslim women. In international discourse, burqas and niqabs are no longer seen as matters of religion, but rather within the context of security and sexism (see https://www.bustle.com/articles/124682-the-countries-banning-burqas-out-of-fears-of-terrorism-are-more-numerous-than-youd-think)

Figure 4.15: A post by Oki Setiana Dewi showing her joy at meeting two women who wear the niqab in their everyday lives and inviting discussion amongst her followers.
These two women inspired her novel *Light on Light* (2012).
Posted on 30 August 2017

In the Muslim popular culture of internet celebrities and their followers, *niqabs* have positive connotations. This can be seen in other internet celebrities' posts. See, for example, the above-mentioned post by Oki Setiana Dewi, which was captioned: "Sister Taqi dan Sister Khairil, these were the people I discussed in my novel *Light on Light* (Mizan, 2012). Wish success for both of you in your studies at Ummul Qura University, Mecca. Thank God we have met again". In the above caption, Oki Setiana Dewi expresses her joy and pride after meeting and taking photographs with two women who were attending school at Umm Quran[76] in Saudi Arabia. Since she first rose to fame in 2009, she has become iconic as a Muslim artist who covers herself devoutly.[77] This

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[76] A large institution of higher education in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Many Indonesians view studying at Umm Quran as prestigious, as they regard Saudi Arabia as the source of Islam and as having a direct relationship with the Prophets of Islam.

[77] Oki Setiana Dewi became famous after playing Anna Althafunnisa, the main character in the film *Ketika Cinta Bertasbih* ('When Love Glorifies'); watched by some 3 million people, this film was Indonesia's biggest box office success of 2009. Shortly before being cast in the film, Oki Setiana Dewi had begun wearing the hijab. She felt that her *hijrah* journey had created various opportunities for her in the entertainment industry. Oki Setiana Dewi has used her experiences with *hijrah* to

post received various comments from followers, including discussion of whether Islamic law requires women to wear the *niqab* or simply recommends it, like comments read; @account 4.4: Friends in Heaven, later. @account 4.5: "*Niqab* is sunnah; hijab is an obligation. Sunnah can be completed or not; there is no sin. But when it is an obligation, you need to do it; if you don't, it is sinful". @account 4.6: "If you want to be respected, Sisters, you must also respect people who do not wear the hijab. If you cannot accept (people who do not wear the hijab), do not complain, and please do not curse others".

According to Campbell (2005, p. 2), "Spiritualising the Internet means the Internet is seen as a technology or space that is suitable for religious engagement, … allowing users to include Internet-based activities in the rhythm of their spiritual lives". As such, the internet has created a broad space for the interaction of values, moral judgments, and religious discourses about women's bodies. Piety is not mediated only by rituals and religious practices, but also through online media; Oki Setiana Dewi thus exposed her spiritual life as part of her practice of piety (Engelke 2010, p. 371; Hirschkind, 2011, p. 91). Interestingly, since the Action to Defend Islam movement, many products have been marketed with various Islamic attributes and branded with the numbers "212".

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speak at Qur'anic recitals throughout Indonesia. One, published on YouTube channel "Cinta Quran TV" on 26 July 2019, has been seen more than 50,000 times (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11P8JrJC2WU).

Figure 4.16: A post by Oki Setiana Dewi; this poster, for the film *212: The Power of Love*, was inspired by the Action to Defend Islam.
Posted on 18 January 2018

Figure 4.17: Oki Setiana Dewi promoting the film *212: The Power of Love*.
Posted on 28 March 2018

Oki Setiana Dewi also used Instagram to promote a film about the Action to Defend Islam, on which she had served as executive producer. Titled *212: The Power of Love*, this film was claimed to be based on the spiritual experiences of Muslims who participated in the Action to Defend Islam. In a long caption that identified all of the actors and actresses involved in the picture, Oki Setiana Dewi identified herself as a *dai'yah* (female preacher), motivator, and executive producer. She also used hashtags such us;

#filmindonesia #212themovie #filmislami #aksibelaislam #212 #thepoweroflove and #islam, which linked posts about the film with posts about the same topic. Having 10.5 million followers, and applying various labels to herself, Oki Setiana Dewi identified herself as a "religious influencer"; the boundary between sacred religious interests and commercial interests was thus blurred.

This confirms how political movements in Indonesia, using the skills of internet celebrities, have become embedded in the Islamic market. Additionally, it shows the blurred boundary between followers' positions as part of the *ummah* and as consumers. Oki Setiana Dewi's posts highlight how Islamic industries are created through online media. Using various features of social media, she created an Islamic subjectivity as a Muslim woman who displayed her piety through her Islamic products. As explained by Gökarıksel and McLarney (2010, p. 7), "the fashioning of Islamic subjectivities, where certain commodities, such as the fashionable veils, has multiple performativity effects on the body".

Such posts by Kartika Putri and Oki Setiana Dewi show the acceptance of conservative Islam in Indonesia (covering all of body parts except the eyes). As mentioned by Sebastian and Nubowo (2019, p. 16), conservative Islam's growing influence in Indonesian society is not accidental; rather, it is the result of creative and continuous digital marketing by conservative individuals and groups. Free-flowing networking platforms such as social media, through the open dissemination of global interactions, make it easy for aggregated local

and global discourses to produce diverse mosaics of interest, interpretations, and adaptations (Lim, 2012, pp. 128–129). Additionally, global fibre-optic systems have provided a vehicle for transforming local issues into global ones (and vice versa). In this context, we can understand how Instagram offers a medium for global connections and for the configuration of the *ummah* as a global Muslim community.

Since the 1970s, Indonesia has seen the development of various strands of critical religious thought. In contemporary Indonesia, there is an intense movement to "purify" Islamic thought, to remove the influences of religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism (Bruinessen, 2013, p. 80); this has only intensified following the charges of blasphemy against Jakarta's former governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. The rise of Islamic populism[78] has also been evident in Indonesian popular culture, where Islamic narratives and films (popularly known as *film islami*)[79] have gained popularity since 2008. At the

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[78] As a result of the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia, Oki Setiana Dewi's reputation as a "genuine" Muslim has grown and she has established herself as a celebrity *ustdazah* (woman preacher) who actively testifies about her *hijrah*, preaches on national television, and raises funds to build mosques. In 2016, public doubt about her religious knowledge emerged, as she never formally studied religion, and much debate occurred. Oki Setiana Dewi's responses to these doubts were broadcast on national television (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQHtsvvnQ0E, it will be explored more in chapter 6).

[79] The term *film islami* refers to a genre of films that proliferate Islam through audio-visual means. It is commonly regarded as having begun with *Ayat-ayat Cinta* (Verses of Love), which was released in 2008 and seen by more than four million viewers; it thus reached broader audiences than many contemporary Hollywood films (see Hakim, 2010, pp. 101–128). *Film islami* also represent the tensions between the capitalist and moral aspects of Indonesia's current Islamisation (Heryanto, 2014, p. 48; Heeren, 2012, p. 115). Films in this genre are mostly

same time, the number of Islamic groups and organisations has mushroomed; these have used audio-visual media as tools for their religious proliferation and self-representation (Heeren, 2012, p. 160; Heryanto, 2014, pp. 44-70). The Action to Defend Islam movement, similarly, has continued to offer a public "stage" for radical activists and conservative preachers who reject Indonesia's promotion of tolerance and diversity. The very notion of piety has become contested, creating a tug-of-war between various political interests that is reflected in popular culture.

This section demonstrates how discursive practices of self-piety were constructed in the accounts of internet celebrities. Its analysis of the Instagram accounts of internet celebrities shows these celebrities' use of social media to support conservative Islam. It recognises that Instagram is used as a technology of self-expression, through which specific ideologies are displayed to control individuals and regulate/facilitate their behaviour (Foucault 1988, p. 18).

3. Body Politics of Muslim Women: Between Modesty, Resistance and Negotiation

Resistance and negotiation with conservative Islam is also mentioned in several internet celebrities' posts that attempt to provide more diverse identity constructions in social media. This section provides an analysis of how some Internet celebrities' body performances demonstrate how social media could offer young Muslim women alternative spaces that allow them to build images

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adapted from best-selling novels with Islamic themes; this includes the aforementioned *Ketika Cinta Bertasbih*.

and reconstruct piety. Women's body politics were a popular issue in the 1970's as part of second-wave feminism, which originally encouraged women's ownership over their bodies (Rich, 1976). Body politics (Foucault, 1978) is used in this section to explain how internet celebrities organize their bodies in response to political issues and gender discourse in Indonesia.

Some Instagram Internet celebrities use their accounts for more than just acquiring fame; they also use them to practice typical modesty, resistance, and to negotiate stereotypical feminine ideals prevalent in mainstream media. One young Muslim woman who has differed significantly from other internet celebrities is Ayu Diah Bing Slamet. Using a signature black-and-white tone, her account regularly presents an "Indonesian Islam",[80] one that appears more "lenient" than "strict". It can be seen in the picture below:

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[80] Over the last decade, Indonesia has experienced extensive debates regarding the meaning and substance of being Muslim in Indonesia. The roots of this debate are derived from disagreement over whether Muslims should embrace similar cultural and religious practices as in Saudi Arabia. Some Indonesians, including the Salafi, emphasise the importance of promoting a pure belief in the oneness of God. Tensions have focused on the command to maintain strict religious exegesis as well as moral sincerity (see Hefner, 2018, pp. 246–255). Other Muslim organisations have offered an "Indonesian" or "Archipelago" Islam (commonly known as *Islam Nusantara*), following a notion of indigenous Islam introduced by former Nahdlatul Ulama leader (and fourth President of Indonesia) Abdurrahman Wahid. The indigenisation of Islam has been seen as a means of constructing an Indonesian Islamic identity and resisting transnational Islam, which has been deemed ill-suited to Indonesian culture (see; Baso, 2019, pp. 18–46; https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/islam-nusantara-a-local-islam-with-global-ambitions/).

Figure 4.18: A post from Ayu Diah Bing Slamet, showing her and her husband wearing the head coverings of Indonesia's Minangkabau ethnic group; it is captioned "My Minang +1 ❤️".
Posted on 28 July 2018

Figure 4.19: A representation of Indonesian Muslim Identity. With headscarf, Ayu Diah Bing Slamet is also wearing a Minangkabau head covering and posts several of her friends (without the veil) who are wearing same traditional attire when they do bridesmaid duty.
Posted on 22 July 2018

Figures 4.18 and 4.19 above show Ayu's pride as an Indonesian woman of Minangkabau[81] heritage. See, for instance, the caption: Bainai night @askyfebrianti We do love Minang attire ❤️ @jacquelinakamil @aruntilarasw @cantikafelder @adicamb @lejueeley @karinalalujan. #minang #padang #bukittinggi #tanahdatar #southsumatera #indonesia #instagood #instaphoto #traditonalattire #malambainai.

In Figures 4.18 and 4.19, Ayu can be seen wearing traditional Minangkabau clothing. Both pictures show her wearing traditional attire (*baju tokah*) and headwear (*suntiang*). Ayu included several hashtags—#minang #padang #bukittinggi #tanahdatar #southsumatera #indonesia #instagood #instaphoto #traditonalattire #malambainai—to draw attention to her rhetoric.

Figure 4.20: A post by Ayu Diah Bing Slamet, showing her child against the backdrop of Indonesian maps; it is given the hashtags #Indonesia #Pancasila #majemuk (plural) #bhinekatunggalika (unity in diversity).
Posted on 9 March 2017

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[81] Also famously called the Minang, they are an ethnic group indigenous to West Sumatra. In the Minang tradition, *bainai* is a sort of "bachelorette party", a celebration commemorating one's last night as a single woman.

As an Indonesian Muslim woman, Ayu appears very proud of her identity. Through her Instagram account, she continuously asserts the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Indonesian nation. As seen in the figure above, she posted a photograph of her child against the backdrop of a map of Indonesia. This image is captioned: "My Indonesian kid. Honest, worthwhile, and nationalist 😊 #theelementaryschoolkid #indonesia #pancasila #plural #unityindiversity". In her social self-branding, Ayu has presented herself as a happy wife with a happy "young" family. Through her YouTube channel #temantapimenikah (Friends but Married), she shares videos of herself, her husband, and her child (as will be explored more in Chapter 6), as well as her activities (cooking, singing, watching concerts, and travelling). As of September 2019, Ayu's channel has 615,000 subscribers.

Even though Ayu does not make any specific statements about resisting the conservative Islamic movement, her posts nonetheless use specific hashtags to ensure that her ideas and opinions can be instantly expressed to the public. The identities produced by internet celebrities, thus, cannot be reduced to the simple binary of celebrities versus fans; rather, they can be seen as constructing and producing particular points of view (see Bamberg, 1994). Ayu presents a different Islamic discourse, one that—unlike the Action to Defend Islam movement—articulates support for a plural Indonesia.

Additionally, in 2017 Ayu showed her concern for Unity in Diversity (the national motto), pluralism, and tolerance in Indonesia by participating in the music video for the song "Suaraku" (My Voice, November 2017). Sung by

the trio GAC (Gamaliel, Audrey, and Cantika), this song highlights the importance of voicing one's opinion, even when it differs from that of the majority (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUO6nkbKn-Y). The beginning of the video depicts several internet influencers, including Ayu, arguing that people must be able to articulate their thoughts without any fear. It includes the dialogue: "It saddens me that, nowadays, I see many individuals are afraid to be themselves, afraid to be different, afraid to express their truest thoughts. And I have one wish: that one day, when my children grow up, they won't be afraid of using their voices to speak the truth".

Although Ayu does not explicitly indicate her disagreement with the Action to Defend Islam, her position can be implied through her self-representation on social media, particularly her voice of support for continued tolerance. Furthermore, Ayu rarely shares pictures or captions that depict her spiritual activities. As seen in Figure 22, Ayu expressed her desire to reconnect with Ramadan next year through Arabic calligraphy posts, but her graphics and captions were more akin to ordinary Muslim than religious influencers.

Figure 4.21: To connect her commentary on Ramadan,
Ayudiac posted an Arabic calligraphy post.
Posted on 14 June 2018

A humanist Muslim identity, one that is softer rather than critical, also appears in the posts of Tantri Syalindri. The vocalist of the Indonesian rock band Kotak, she has a significant number of fans as well as numerous Instagram followers. However, like Ayu Diah Bing Slamet, Tantri often conveys religious messages—without being condescending. Tantri acts more naturally and casually when delivering spiritual messages to her followers throughout entertaining and amusing pictures, as seen in the pictures below:

Figure 4.22: Tantri posts a dance posture, while on the stage and writes an amusing caption to remind her followers to fulfil their zakat obligations according to religious guidance.
Posted on 10 October 2018

This image is accompanied by the caption: "Luckily, I can put my hidden talent on stage: the talent to dance without rules. Good morning friends. Let's work. Remember, 2.5% of your rights belong to the people who need it. Don't forget, gang". Through everyday language, Tantri delivers religious messages that appear different from those of other internet celebrities. For instance, Tantri choose to use a word "gang" to mention her followers. As English dictionary explained (Collins, 2016) "gang" have a meaning a group

of people, specifically young people who go around in circle in a certain community or neighbourhood.

In this sense Tantri refers to her fans and followers as a friend using a word that is associated with egalitarian relations. Using an everyday language or regular language is one of the hallmarks of internet celebrity, this practice aims for an effect that is "less constructed, less filtered, more spontaneous, and more real, thus fostering feelings of reliability and authenticity" (Abidin, 2018, pp. 92-93). The engagement of audience in the creation of celebrity content can be through 'demotic language', as seen in reality TV shows, that have pioneered the way to deliver this (Turner, 2010, 2014).

These religious messages are accompanied by images that depict Tantri wearing clothing that, while not exaggerating the curves of her body, nonetheless evidences them; similarly, she is wearing a fashionable veil that is tied behind her neck. Such a style has a significant meaning in the current contestation of Muslim identity in Indonesia. Tantri's hijab style, that does not extend the veil to the chest, is a verification that Tantri is not a part of conservative Islam. Indonesia conservative dress tends to consist of loose clothing, long veils and natural colours like white, black and brown. Tantri's hijab style becomes a symbol of individual expression through a fashion statement. As previously explained, Muslim conservatism has increased in recent years, with the appearance of the veil being used as a measure of piety.

Furthermore, in Indonesia it is unusual to see the musicians (particularly vocalists) in rock bands wearing a hijab. Seeing a rocker such as

Tantri, thus, indicates that there have been intense changes in how Indonesian society perceives Muslim womanhood. Tantri is not the first Indonesian women singer to have worn a veil while performing on national television. Long before then, however, in the 1980s a nine-member band of modern *qasidah* singers gained prominence. Members of this group, known as Nasida Ria, wore "Indonesian veils"[82] and sang about the morality and principled behaviour of virtuous Muslims. Mixing *gambus*,[83] Arabic words, and *dangdut*-style drum beats (thereby drawing from one of Indonesia's most popular music genres), Nasida Ria rose to prominence while incorporating a spirit of *da'wa* (proselytisation) into their performances (Latifah, 2011, pp. 352-367).

Importantly, both of the aforementioned internet celebrities (Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Syalindri) have consistently worn edgy[84] and tomboyish clothing rather than performing conventional femininity (i.e. long skirts and pastel colours), as seen in their Instagram accounts. Loose dresses, unattached baggy pants, long-sleeved tunics and long veils are more commonly associated

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[82] A simple veil known as *kerudung* or *kudung* referred to any long and loose-fit material, or the sense that woman can leave their hair slightly visible (see chapter 3). In the last decade the "Indonesian veil" form has changed with various colors and models, including wearing a veil that is tied behind the neck and does not extend the veil into the chest.

[83] A musical instrument derived from the classical Arabian *'ud,* it resembles the Yemeni *qanbus*.

[84] This style is all about combining clothing with accessories (shoe, bags, jewellery) in an unconventional and different manner (see https://medium.com/@QeturahHQ/whats-your-fashion-style-conservative-or-edgy-f6958d758671).

with *hijab syar'i*[85] in Indonesia. There is thus a significant distinction between ideal and not ideal Muslim women, creating a hierarchy of religious piety within Indonesian society. As Islam is no longer denigrated, as it was during the Soeharto era, Muslim women have had greater means of expressing their religiosity in the public arena. Muslim piety has become more "familiar" among the Indonesian middle-classes (see Wichelen, 2009, pp. 76-79; Hartono, 2018, p. 43).

This situation has also influenced the fashion industry in Indonesia, where pious practices have become more noticeable in consumer practices, products, and services. As explained by Rinaldo, Indonesians "…. are producing a new kind of middle-class habitus that distinguishes women by class and approach to religion" (2008, p. 29). This is reflected in Tantri's explanation that she feels comfortable with the styles and fashion trends in Indonesia today, where she can dress fashionably as a Muslim woman without wearing the long skirts worn by many other Muslim women.

As Tantri stated in a nationally broadcast interview: "I don't need to feel worried about wearing a fashionable hijab on stage, because there are many fashion products that are already stylish. I don't have to wear long dresses when I perform as a rocker, because hijab style now is more stylish in Indonesia than before". (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjMcSF5N6ik). Although many patterns indicate a rise in conservative Islamic attitudes among

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[85] The word *syar'i* is the adjectival form of the word *sharia,* or Islamic law. *Hijab syar'i*, thus, is attire that follows the guidelines of *sharia* law (see Hartono, 2018, pp. 39–52).

Indonesia's middle class, Tantri's represents a contradicting identity. As can be seen in how Tantri presents her body through wearing the veil with such (moderate) style indicating how she is practising body resisting, imagining her body politics in the midst of an Islamic patriarchy society as is Indonesia.

Figure 4.23: A post by Tantri, depicting her as wearing a hijab, loose pants, and black sneakers, while freely jumping on stage
with other members of Kotak.
Posted 29 October 2018

Figure 4.24: A black-and-white photograph of Tantri, singing on stage while wearing a veil in front of an enormous audience.
Posted 3 July 2018

The caption reads: "The reason I still sing, until today, is because I can make other people happy through the blessing that Allah has given me. That is my voice".

Along with the strengthening of Islam in social and political life in Indonesia, Muslim women have experienced increased pressure. Conservative Islamic group believe that women must not sing in public, as this will result in *fitna*[86] (temptation), and because a woman's voice is part of her *awrah*[87]. In a caption that accompanies Figure 4.24, Tantri offers an implicit explanation for her decision to continue singing even after veiling herself: she believes that her voice is one of God's blessings.

Figure 4.25: A post by Tantri, including a video clip to promote freedom of expression and encourage young people to participate in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election.
Posted 11 April 2018

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[86] The word is frequently used to describe things that must be avoided to be defeated.
[87] The *awrah* refers to the parts of the body that must be covered.

In the political arena, Tantri and her band Kotak have often campaigned to promote free speech, as well as to stop body shaming, hate speech, disinformation (hoax), and bullying on social media. Collaborating with Najwa Shihab, a famous talk show host, Tantri and her band produced a musical and lyrical project that invited listeners to peacefully and respectfully articulate their aspirations while participating in Indonesia's 2018 presidential election. Tantri, in conjunction with Kotak, thus undertook a music project to promote a better political situation and more civil discourse.

As seen in Figure 4.25, Tantri posted a clip with her band Kotak, espousing the importance of freedom of political and social expression while encouraging young people to participate in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Set against a black background, this video clip serves as a signifier to deliver strong messages about power, strength, authority, and aggression, emphasising the importance of encouraging young people to express their aspirations. The post also conveys the message that people have power and that every individual voice matters, as represented by Tantri's t-shirt, "The People Have Power." Moreover, her musical activities have been intimately related to social issues such as nationalism, freedom of opinion, tolerance, and open-mindedness. The full video clip can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVuoVateQP4.

According to Novak and Khazraee (2014), images—especially digital images—have significant social and political power, and can encourage political movements through their documentation of protests and violence

(David, 2009; Shaw, 2013). As mentioned by Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 965), agency is the expertise through which individuals intentionally decide, encourage, and structure their actions to achieve a specific outcome. Personal agency is also about individuals' ability to improve through social means and personal experiences. This reflects a study by Harju and Huovinen (2015, pp. 1602–1625), who found that plus-size women fashion bloggers use their experiences as consumers to resist the stereotypical feminine ideals found in the media. Moreover, according to Rinaldo (2014, p. 829), pious critical agency includes not only women's reflections on religious texts, but also their critical reinterpretations of their political activism.

Pious critical agency recognises a new public engagement, one of politicised conversations about the importance of religious texts in which conservative interpretations are often contested and challenged. In Indonesia, studies of Muslim women's agency have become prominent as political reform has occurred and Islamist actors have claimed increased authority (Rinaldo, 2014, p. 825). Moreover, the rise of Islamic populism has resulted in increasingly conservative understandings of religious doctrine, including with regards to gender and women's public involvement (Brenner, 2011, p. 675; Bruisnessen, 2013, pp. 3–4; Van Doorn-Harder, 2006, p. 67, Beta, 2019, pp. 1–20).

The body performances of Tantri Syalindri and Ayu Diah Bing Slamet provide evidence of how social media can provide young Muslim women with spaces of articulation that enable them to create images, as well as alternative

spaces for reconstructing piety (Rocamora, 2011, p. 410). Although there are limitations, social media does allow some freedom of expression, as seen from some internet celebrities' posts. Tantri and Ayu Diah use body politics to expose their political aspirations and stimulate debate on their Instagram accounts. By situating affective body politics in the context of social media, this section examines how technology and the digital environment play crucial roles in the formation, maintenance, and contestation of affective body politics (Papacharissi, 2016).

4. Capitalizing Intimacy and Authenticity: New Religious Forms of Internet Celebrity on Instagram

This sub-section examines the representation of Indonesian Muslim women on social media, arguing that it increasingly exposes the collapse of private lifestyles and religious practices. By studying Instagram, as an online medium, it examines the concepts of privacy and intimacy within the context of analysing Muslim women as internet celebrities. Internet celebrities offer new forms of religiosity and lived religious practices in online media, encouraging specific interpretations of Islam. This sub-chapter thus aims to show how internet celebrities portray themselves as devout and righteous, how they represent ideal Muslim women, create their public, and form 'public Islam' by capitalizing on their intimacy.

In this section, I will focus my analysis on two internet celebrities; Zaskia Sungkar and Fenita Arie. Both provide a pattern of representation that can be seen more generally. This section also suggests that new forms of online

religion have embraced self-commodification in relation to representations of belief and piety. I suggest that religiosity is constructed through discourse, language, and representation, and this shows how religion—as part of private life—has become a public concern. Islam is often viewed as a more public religion, as it is often embedded into state and social practices; this goes hand-in-hand with the greater visibility and structural embeddedness of Islam in Indonesia since 1998. In the imagining of Indonesia as a religious and contemporary society, social media can be considered spatial, interactive, and political. Through a study of visual culture on Instagram, we can identify internet celebrities' discursive construction of their identities as role models of piety.

Many social media posts used for self-branding provide individual stories with complex gendered identities, be they mommy bloggers (2009, pp. 729–747), motherhoods and consumptions (O'Donohoe et al., 2013, pp. 120–296), transgender vloggers (Raun, 2017, pp. 99–113), and fashion bloggers (Duffy & Hund, 2015, pp. 1–11; Beta, 2014, pp. 377–389; Harju & Huovinen, 2015, pp. 1602–1625; Rocamora, 2012, pp. 92–106). This indicates that gender is fundamentally complex, involving the intersection between mediated knowledge, fashion, self-identity, social class, religion; these aspects of the 'collective culture' of womanhood all saturate contemporary culture.

In her 1988 essay "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution", Judith Butler explained that individuals create their identities by performing them. It is the stylised repetition of specific actions that defines this identity. Butler's

concept of performativity is a useful one for social media analysis. Instagram enables internet celebrities to create identities by stylising the repetition of digital actions such as posts, likes, and comments. These posts, thus, are deliberate attempts to construct identity.

Internet celebrities have become prominent as new media environments have grown. Social media, evolving from new media, offers space for people to represent themselves. Internet celebrity is defined as an innovative form of online performance, one that utilises such technologies as videos, blogs, and social networks to increase popularity (Senft, 2013, p. 115). Internet celebrities represent themselves as "ordinary people" on social media, and this requires them to expose their everyday activities and practices to capture a specific niche market. Performing the self is part of celebrity culture, one that is strongly correlated with collective imagination and recognised as the act of self-performativity (Marwick, 2013, p. 117). Fame is not always achieved through performance (e.g. film stars, news broadcasters, athletes, musicians), but also through heredity (e.g. royalty) and access to political leadership (e.g. presidents, prime ministers, etc.).

As mentioned in the literature review, internet celebrities manage their popularity through personal commodification. As such, authenticity and intimacy are strategic elements of their strategy to reach followers (Marwick, 2015, p. 333). Not only do internet celebrities portray themselves as "ordinary people" as part of authenticity and genuineness, but they also articulate themselves through this everydayness. Internet celebrities need not use world-

famous attractions as the backgrounds of their photo shoots (even though some do); they can emphasise the authenticity of their personalities through their private relations and spatial backgrounds.

As shown in the figures below, the Internet celebrity couple Zaskia Sungkar and Irwansyah present themselves as loving wife and husband. In both figures, it can be seen that they present themselves as intimate when travelling around the world. Against the backgrounds of San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge and a beautiful town in Greece, they embrace each other. The captions further underscore the intimate quality of their relationship.

Figure 4.26: Zaskia Sungkar and her husband showing their intimacy as part of their 7th Anniversary, with the background of the Golden Gate Bridge
Posted on 15 January 2017

Figure 4.27: Zaskia Sungkar with her husband Irwansyah taking a wefie against the beautiful scenery on Greece.
Posted on 6 March 2017

These posts are accompanied by the captions: Happy anniversary to my husband, my best friend, my working partner, my spouse, my leader. May Allah always protect your steps, thank you for six years, three months of marriage + three months of being friends + three months for being my boyfriend. Thank you for a fantastic seven years. There is no perfect human being, either me or you, but I am always grateful that God has brought us together and given our lives colour. Hopefully, we will always and forever be thankful and together until in heaven. Love you ❤️

The picture, dominated by the beautiful landscape, confirms the happiness of the couple through its intimacy and through their smiling faces. As explained by Jerslev (2016, p. 5240), the "attention-creating performance of a private authentic self is one of the most valuable commodities in social media celebrification". In their everyday posts, internet celebrities need to expose their private lives, their personal experiences, and their daily journeys as part of their self-commodification. This enables them to garner attention, as "intimacy becomes a new currency" in digital media environments (Raun, 2018, pp. 99–113).

Wefies—selfies involving more than one person—are similar to self-portraits, a well-established genre in visual culture. Self-portraits differ somewhat from most portraits—"few self-portraits aim for the excruciating realism of the identity card; instead, the photographic self-portrait ranges from a literal reflection of the photographer's appearance to the creation of intricate narratives" (Marien, 2006, p. 20). This can be seen in figure 4.26, where the modestly dressed bodies of Zaskia Sungkar and Irwansyah are surrounded by the recognizably rugged landscape of San Francisco and its iconic bridge. Becoming international travellers and posting photographs to social media

reflect internet and micro-celebrities' tendencies to discursively construct their middle-class identities and consumer power, as doing so "requires respectable financial means and in turn accretes as cultural capital: an ability to be accepted as global cosmopolitan" (Beta, 2014, p. 385).

Figure 4.28: Zaskia holding Irwansyah's hand in a first-class aeroplane cabin while doing her minor pilgrimage (*umroh*).
Posted on 22 February 2018

> The caption reads; I rarely write words from the heart. Usually I feel disinclined, especially for social media posts. Frequently, I write captions that only use black heart emojis. That is enough. This is the routine of Irwansyah @irwansyah_15 ❤️ before we go to sleep, in the car, in the airplane, until we are tired, then he releases my hand. We are far from perfect, but because of love and routine, doing everything together, we are always strong together and need each other. Hopefully we can continue like this until we are wrinkled [and old], and into the hereafter. Far from worry, grudges, we must become people who are forgiving and avoid the temptations of Satan, amen. Oh Allah, hear me, hear my prayer, my invocation. Hopefully, we will continue to be *istiqomah* and therefore, hopefully, I can become a pious wife, amen #typingwithcrying.

Similar dynamics are produced through other glossy, sympathetically composed images. Internet celebrities present comfortable identities as middle-class people who can not only travel to western countries, but also make luxurious pilgrimages to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Using

Instagram's ability to share their location, internet celebrities form cultural platforms that allow them to assert their status and existence. Interestingly, these images also reflect the intimacy of husband and wife, wherein they hold hands while seated in a first-class airplane cabin—a setting well-beyond the reach of any ordinary Indonesian. As stated by Marwick (2015, p. 139), micro-celebrities display an attraction for "the tropes and symbols of traditional celebrity culture, such as glamourous self-portraits, designer goods and luxury cars". Interestingly, in Indonesia, pilgrimage has also become recognized as an achievement in middle-class society since the 1990s, when Soeharto performed his religious pilgrimage and began adopting Islamic symbols (Hasan, 2000, p. 77). Instagram provides a framework and design that allows users to present their self-images as a part of their self-identity. Instagram, which is similar to daily journals such as blogs, is a rich environment for self-expression and self-representation since people may transmit their mobility to a prospective worldwide audience by posting specific performances that confirm their travel style (Germann-Molz's, 2006; O'Regan, 2009).

Zaskia Sungkar began wearing the hijab in 2012, a year after she married Irwansyah. In an interview with the YouTube channel Cinta Quran TV (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9JSf2HCDzs, published on 21 January 2019), Zaskia Sungkar explained that she had chosen to wear the hijab because she wanted to break away from her previous circle of friends, whom she considered to practice depravity. Zaskia Sungkar also stated that had chosen to wear the veil to kerb the bad behaviours of her youth. Zaskia Sungkar

had become famous from a young age, starring in televised soap operas, singing duets with her sister Shireen Sungkar, and serving as a television presenter. Two years after Zaskia adopted the hijab, she decided to develop a Muslim fashion line using the brand @kiabyzaskiasungkar (it will be explored more in chapter 6). In 2017, Zaskia founded another company—Jannah Corporation (@jannahcorp) with her husband in order to facilitate *hajj* and *umrah* pilgrimages; she has also sold "sweet cakes" throughout Indonesia.

Figure 4.29: A post by Zaskia Sungkar promoting the *umroh* services of her company @jannahtravel, as well as pilgrimage packages;
the post mentions various Indonesian celebrities, including @teukuwisnu, @dimasseto_1, @marioirwinsyah, and @dude2harlino.
Posted on 2 May 2018

Presenting religion as a way of life is an important element of such couples' activities. This can be seen, for example, in Zaskia Sungkar's frequent mentions of God and religion in her posts, including in phrases such as "together until heaven", "pious wife" and "Oh Allah, hear me, hear my prayer, my invocation". All of these phrases also reflect the gender relations in her

marriage; her husband is always regarded as her *imam* (leader) in domestic life. This therefore implies that, no matter how successful a woman is in her career and public life, she still needs a man as her husband, as the head of her family, and as her guide in religious life. Duffy and Hund (2015, pp. 3–7) argue that micro-celebrity culture represents dominant gender norms through the construction of femininity using a visual grammar. As a young Muslim woman, Zaskia presents herself as not only fashionable, but as a pious wife who supports her husband, prays for him, and—most importantly—shows it to the public.

Figure 4.30: Zaskia Sungkar posting her traveller diary in Korea as brand ambassador for Wardah cosmetics, while wearing an autumn outfit.
Posted on 7 November 2016

The above picture also shows how hijabs empower Muslim women to create simultaneously modern and religious identities (Lewis 2015; Moors 2013; Tarlo 2013). Micro-celebrities create a middle-class consumer culture, with female subjectivities being given a pleasing format, including "outfits of

the day' or "OOTDs" (Abidin, 2016, p. 33). They present themselves as beautiful woman with successful married lives who spend time travelling around the world. Figure 4.30 above is taken from the account of Zaskia Sungkar and shows her as enjoying a vacation to Korea, funded by Wardah Cosmetics, using the hashtags #zaskiasungkarxwardah #wardahtravelinstyle to present her travels as halal and Islamic. For example, by wearing a hijab, attractive scarf, brown coat, and comfortable boots, Zaskia Sungkar presents herself as different to most young Muslim women in Indonesia, having both economic capital (being able to use branded clothes and bags, to travel around the world) and social capital (being a famous social media influencer). This is also contextual; as a result of the *Hallyu Wave* that has spread worldwide over the past twenty years,[88] many Indonesian teenagers want to visit Korea.

In her feed—her gallery/album of images—Zaskia Sungkar presents herself as attractive and classy. She understands that, by posting pictures of herself against the background of Korea in autumn, she will beautify feeds and increase the number of likes and views her account receives. Additionally, by using the hashtags #zaskiasungkarxwardah and #wardahtravelinstyle, she allows Instagram users to connect with others and find images using common terms. Notably, Zaskia—as a young Muslim internet celebrity—presents

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[88] The Korean wave, known as *Hallyu*, has swept across almost all countries in Asia. It operates through image rather than force or violence, an intangible form of soft power (see Syamsuddin, 2012, pp. 2-10). One variation of the Korean wave is popular music from South Korea, which combines dynamic music, easy listening, and energetic dancing.

herself as a main player in the consumer economy, which she also does through

her social media-based business (Nisa, 2018, pp. 68–71).

Figure 4.31: A post by Fenita Arie, showing her activities with her husband
Arie Untung while filming a *musawarah* recitation activity.
Posted 28 May 2019

> The caption reads: "You. My leader. At the beginning I met You. I always pray that YOU are always be a good leader for Me. Who patiently guides me. The one who is loyal to me, who patiently teaches me. Who always provides a shoulder on which I can cry. Alhamdulillah, thank you God. I have met this person. I love him because of You, oh Allah. Please, may we stay together in this world and in your heaven, Lord. #masyaallahtabarakallah #hijrahfest. Ode to my lovely @ariekuntung after @hijrahfest by @marenrart.

Similar pictures and tones are also evident in the account of Fenita Arie,

a celebrity who attributes her *hijrah* to the support and guidance of her husband

Arie Untung. This Muslim couple present their intimacy on Instagram and

frequently discuss their husband–wife relationship, especially their religious activities, on their YouTube channel Cerita Untungs (Untung's Stories, see the links https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JdlAwiglV9c). Figure 4.31 offers a short video, shared to Cerita Untung, in which Arie Untung is shown caressing and holding Fenita Arie, who is crying as she reflects on their shared *hijrah* (Fenita Arie's *hijrah* story will be explained more in Chapter 6).

In another video, Fenita exposes an emotional moment she experienced during the Ramadan Hijrah Festival[89] (held 24–26 May 2019 at the Jakarta Convention Centre). This video, which has more than 1.4 million views as of September 2019, not only presents the couple as hugging each other, but also shows Fenita admiring her husband as her guide. This is emphasised through an emotive caption, one that has been received positively by her followers (see, for example, @account 4.7: "oh God, I am touched"; @account 4.8: "Oh Lord, I am crying"; @account 4.9: "What God has willed").

Figure 4.32: A post by Fenita Arie, showing her intimacy with her husband Arie Untung while filming a *musawarah* recitation activity.
Posted 30 July 2018

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[89] This three-day *hijrah* festival included seventeen Islamic preachers who spoke on a stage, using a professional sound system and large screen similar to those used in concerts (see the official YouTube channel of the Hijrah Festival, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0S4vIfnWjVI).

Together with authenticity and intimacy, internet celebrities also use other strategies. They maintain fan bases, construct consumable personae, and show affiliation with other celebrity practitioners. As Marwick states: "while mainstream celebrities are expected to protect their privacy, micro-celebrities cannot or they'll lose this attention" (Boyd & Marwick 2013, p. 143). What does "attention" mean to Muslimah internet celebrities? The answer is about how their present religious practice in their daily social media posts. As authenticity and intimacy are inseparable in Indonesian society, it is necessary for Internet celebrities to engage in a strategy to form a relationship between the digital creator and their audiences, therefore they need to expose their personal life and forgo their privacy to the camera.

Figure 4.33: A post by Fenita Arie and her husband Arie Untung, showing them during a Qur'anic recitation activity while simultaneously endorsing a brand of prayer rugs.
Posted 25 August 2019

This photograph is accompanied by the following caption: "Alhamdulillah, I have a husband who always reminds me to remember our Creator (God). In the middle of our busy days at the office, I need to manage all of my activities. When the time comes to give a 'report', it must be a priority, because this 'report' makes us able to communicate, be grateful for His favours and also ask for prayers. So, when we had to renovate the office, one place needed

special attention: our mosque. This mosque is the site of our 'reports' (prayers), and thus it should be as comfortable as possible. Even though the mosque is not 100% complete yet, at least we have a prayer carpet from @bandarkarpet, which is convenient. Hopefully, more and more many people can prostrate (pray) on this carpet and bring more blessings to our lives. Amen 🙏 #famcompany #prayerrug #mosque".

This picture received positive comments, such us; @account 4.10: "Good woman for a good man"; @account 4.11: "Masya Allah ❤"; @account 4.12: "Masya Allah ❤️" @account 4.13: "Masya Allah…Tabarakallah". Most comments employed the terms *Masya'Allah* and *Tabarakallah*, which can be translated respectively as "God has willed" and "Allah be praised". Rather than criticising Fenita's post for using Qur'anic recitations to advertise a brand of prayer rug, her followers responded by praying for her, considering her and her husband to be role models. Instagram has spread interest in celebrity. It has urged people to publicise themselves, to ensure equal access to self-representation, but also to promote self-commodification—including the commodification of intimacy. As stated by O'Donohoe et al. (2013, pp. 34–37), everyday life practices related to consumer culture help shape cultural discussions regarding the domestic practices, cultures, and identities that are embedded within consumer culture.

On their account, Zaskia Sungkar and Fenita Arie actively present themselves as successful Muslimah fashion designers, using young women's body images to gain economic power and create authenticity. Problematically, however, such digital expressions often highlight normative feminine

discourses and practices, including those within consumer marketplaces (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 64). Additionally, as found by Baulch and Pramiyanti, the discourses of independent Muslimah and empowered Muslim wives are part of an important feminist agenda; this is also evidenced in the *Hijabers Community* (2018, pp. 8–9). Overall, however, Indonesian women are still bound by the traditional view that women are responsible for the household while men are responsible for supporting the family. Economic, social, cultural and political structures also position women as lower than men, while patriarchal political structures and a lack of financial resources make women rely heavily on men when making political decisions (Soetjipto, 2014, p. 12). As such, no matter her success, a wife must remain subordinate to her husband. This is reinforced by religious teachings.

In several of the above posts and captions, husbands are shown as playing an important role in the internet celebrities' spiritual journey. The piety discourse and constructions of Muslim women are presented as inseparable from their husbands, who are shown as family leaders with positive influence and inspiration. Given this background, it can be understood how Fenita Arie and Arie Untung have used their agency as a pious celebrity couple in their self-branding and creation of authenticity. Self-branding (also known as personal branding) requires individuals to continuously shape a unique public image to increase their commercial and/or cultural capital (Khamis et al., 2017, p. 191). The posts of Internet celebrities can be interpreted as a body of discourse or as the "rules, divisions, and systems of a specific body of

knowledge" (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine, 2008, p. 99). Using multimodal discourse analysis, body performativity (Foucault, 1988; Butler, 1990), and celebrity culture theory (Marwick, 2017), this section analysed how Internet celebrities performatively and discursively construct their identities on Instagram, identifying themselves not only as heteronormative ideal women but also as pious role models.

Conclusion

The potential for a radical and populist Islam has remained strong in Indonesia. Having become involved in mainstream politics, Islamist populists are well-positioned to take advantage of social, political and economic conditions to gain power, particularly inter-ethnic tensions and the sense that Muslims are marginalised in a country where they are the majority. A wave of Middle East-based movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood (which has become incorporated in a political party, the Prosperous Justice Party), Hisbut Tahrir, and various Salafi groups, have successfully engaged young people—including women. This movement has generated concern about Indonesia becoming Arabised[90] following the fall of the Soeharto regime (Bruinessen, 2018, p. 2; Muhtadi, 2008, p. 6). Simultaneously, the findings of text and discourse analysis explain current Muslim

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[90] Since the fall of Soeharto, there has been a significant shift in everyday practices of Islam. Islamic consumption, behaviour, and dress patterns have become increasingly oriented towards the Arabian Peninsula. The Muslim middle class has contributed significantly to this shift in Indonesian religious life. The most populous Muslim-majority country in the world, Indonesia contributes the largest number of hajj pilgrims (around 200,000 pilgrims). Many Indonesians also undergo *umrah* (non-mandatory lesser pilgrimages to Mecca that may be performed at any time of the year) as a sign of piety (see Abdurrahman, 2000, pp. 45–55).

bodies and Muslim fashion on social media, demonstrating how religion and faith have become part of transnational modernity (Hegde, 2013; Tarlo, 2010, pp. 209–225).

The piety of Indonesian women cannot be studied in a vacuum; it must be understood within the context of post-Reform political identity. This is reflected in internet celebrities' posts, which exist within broader political, social, and cultural contexts. As such, one must not only investigate the actual impact of women's piety on gender norms in society, but also the role of internet celebrities' portrayals and contestations of Islamic identity on social media. Reflecting post-feminist sensibilities, it celebrates individual choice, independence, and self-expression within the consumer marketplace (Gill, 2007, p. 154; McRobbie, 2004, pp. 255–258).

As explained by Foucault (1988, p. 18), the technology of the self—part of subjectivity—changes based on an individuals' role in the society. In order to take on new roles, individuals must constitute themselves differently based on their social context. As Butler explains, through her idea of body roles, the subject and gender are part of political practices in certain historically constituted discourses (Butler, 1990, p. 272). Through their Instagram accounts, internet celebrities can not only represent themselves, but also articulate their political stands, their identities as ideal Muslim women, obedient wives, and also stylish religious influencers.

This chapter highlights the tensions in Indonesian Muslim women's online representation. The several internet celebrities show that they have the agency to

represent themselves as strong, modern women, independent-selves but contradictory support conservative norms. Moreover, their agency is individualistic, and thus does not challenge the structural constraints of society. However, this chapter has shown that this resistance is still restricted by religious, social, and commercial norms. Women's agency has increased as freedom of expression has been facilitated by social media, but there are still limitations. As seen in section one, several internet celebrities—Dian Pelangi, Oki Setiana Dewi, Dewi Sandra, and Zaskia Sungkar— actively campaign for a Muslim governor, and endorse a fundamentalist Islamic preacher to emphasise their political stance. As internet celebrities with more than a million followers, their use social media is providing space for Muslim women to utilize their agency.

Through social media, the visibility of new piety and Islamic morality are manifested through internet celebrities posts that articulate their views about political factions, gender performativity, and Muslim identity. Section one has also shown how internet celebrities contest the formation of identity in digital environments, especially during times of political, social, and cultural contestation (as in December 2016 – December 2019). Young women became agents of political contestation, using online images to present themselves as religious role models, fashionable selves, and political influencers. Moreover, some internet celebrities have not only used their Instagram accounts for *da'wa*, but also capitalised on intimacy to engage audiences.

Moreover, in section two there are internet celebrities—Dewi Sandra, Zaskia Sungkar, Kartika Putri and Oki Setiana Dewi that continually demonstrated

the conservative concept of piety. By representing Muslim woman hood with Islamic dress, make-up, and Islamic recitation, they are producing bodily discipline, with Instagram as technologies of surveillance. These kind of posts shows the engagement of religious matter with neoliberal practices, that demonstrates Muslim women's self-actualization and achievement. Instagram as a technology of the self is used by Internet celebrities as a channel to voice support for their preferred identities for the purpose of gender conformity or political interests.

On the other hand, in part three of this chapter provide result analysis, there is different representation that is demonstrated by internet celebrities—Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Tantri Syalindri which contested and challenged conservative interpretations, using their Instagram account to articulate alternative spaces for reconstructing piety through religious nationalism, broad-mindedness, and to resist the stereotypical feminine ideals in media.

Section four shows how internet celebrities—Zaskia Sungkar and Fenita Arie portray with their private life with their husband who decided on a *hijrah* movement. In daily posts, they present self-commodification in relation to representations of religious activities. Internet celebrities respond to audiences that expect transparency, openness, and authenticity, and are required to directly interact or connect with these audiences to maintain their status (Marwick, 2013, p. 158; Senft, 2008, p. 116). As part of celebrities' intimacy and brand image, religion must thus be managed. Although, as Elizabeth Bucar (2016, p. 84) has claimed, some Muslim women produce circumstantial norms and moral epistemologies that are fundamental to the making of pious subjectivity, others continue to devalue their

aesthetic power. Instagram presents a glossy image, a 'soft' form of proselytisation and consumerism. Additionally, the broader commodification of Islam has enabled people to use online communication channels to preach outside of places of worship as seen in the internet celebrity's posts.

Within the particular context of Muslim women internet celebrities, religious expression is used as a means of attracting followers' attention. Therefore, authenticity and intimacy are crucial elements of internet celebrity. Social media is often suggested as linking the public and private spheres by placing intimacy within an arena where it can be portrayed and displayed (Miguel, 2016, pp. 1–10). Furthermore, as social media connects celebrities with audiences, it is an effective means of attracting audience feedback and attention through a choreographed self-commodification (Lasén, 2015, p. 76). For instance, through selfies on social media, celebrities display and construct a meaning of everydayness in a manner that blurs the public and private spaces. To conclude, this chapter shows how Muslim women represent and contest political agency, piety, body politics, ideal Muslim women, faithful wives, and fashionable religious influencers as discursive practice.

Chapter 5

Manufacturing Piousness on Instagram: *Hijrah* Movement and the Articulation of Muslim Women's Subjectivity

After the "212 Action" was held on 2 December 2016, a wave of *hijrah* spread among Indonesia's Muslim celebrities. Due to the strengthening of Islamic identity in the Indonesian public sphere, and due to rising Islamic conservatism, this *hijrah* wave had far reaching consequences. As the meaning of the *hijrah* became more complicated, particular views emerged that positioned Arabic customs as the most authentic Islamic codes and symbols. This *hijrah* movement was also influenced by transnational Islamist organizations, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, as well as by Islamist political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party. These organisations have played a central role in disseminating Islamic populism and gathering public support for the contestation of power and resources based on a shared religion-political identity (Hadiz, 2018, pp. 566–583, Lanti et al., 2019).

Displays of religiosity and piety have become increasingly prominent in Indonesian society. As Islam has become increasingly politicised, many political figures have associated themselves with conservative Muslim organisations that support sharia law. This political and cultural situation has promoted a 'pure' and virtuous Muslim womanhood, as seen in several internet celebrities' urging of women followers to "go back to the mosque", to be "together with the congregation", and to "cover all parts of their bodies except the eyes". On the other hand, some celebrities present their spiritual journey as closer to religious nationalism, highlighting how the merging of nationalist and religious identities is

displayed, discussed, and commented upon on social media. Furthermore, the internet is also used by internet-celebrities in their *da'wa* activities, in which they place themselves as influencers with sufficient religious knowledge to become role models even if they lack a background in religious education. The practice of veiling is also used by Muslim women to perform their subjectivity while simultaneously depicting a dualism that endorses the dichotomy between "the self" and "the other" in efforts to validate and naturalise certain systematised forms of power and exploitation that they experience as Muslim women (see Said, 1978; Samiei, 2010).

This representation contributes to an understanding of how Muslim women try to construct and present themselves in diverse ways, and underscore that Muslim women are not monolithic. Further, it aims to facilitate an understanding of how hybrid identities change depending on how an agent is socially positioned in specific political/cultural contexts, including on social media. As Barker explained, identities and the existence of a "true self" are socially constructed (1999, p. 169). Cultural identities are not permanent, but processes and modes of subjectivity, that intersect with gender, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality, etc. Barker (1999) also mentions how (television) media demonstrates the fragmentary and contradictory hybrid identities that translate into social relations and everyday practices.

This chapter seeks to understand how Muslim women's piety and *hijrah* are interpreted and presented by internet-celebrities on Instagram and how they make sense of these concepts and are portrayed in line with the intersection of their diverse identities. As explained by Campbell (2010, p. 7) and Barendregt (2012, p.

214), the intersection between Islam and technologies can be understood through a dualistic approach. First, researchers can explore digital media technologies' formation and how they are used to assemble Islamic practices and cultures. This approach focuses on how certain digital media platforms, such as virtual recitation group and prayer applications (aplikasi pengingat sholat), can facilitate religious events. Second, researchers can examine how digital media (particularly social media) is engaged by individuals or groups in their attempts to express their understandings of religion, including their representations and meaning making.

This chapter employs the second approach, investigating the means through which the *hijrah* wave is represented and articulated by internet celebrities on Instagram. This chapter will illustrate internet-celebrities' dynamic interpretation of the *hijrah* wave through multimodal analysis, exploring a broad spectrum of Muslim women's identity, from conservative, moderate, to progressive. On the basis of this evidence, it once again can be seen how social media can be part of political participation and mediatisation.

In all of its sections, this chapter will use Gill's postfeminist theory (2007), which explains how contemporary media culture articulates women as having the autonomy to make their own decisions and to empower themselves, while simultaneously restricting women to consumerism and the commodification of difference. Moreover, Gill and Scharff (2011) also explain that neoliberalism is strongly related to post-feminism and women's subjectivities, and that practices of consumerism and femininity are interconnected with women's ability to choose, to reconstruct their subjectivity through independence, and to empower themselves by

representing themselves on Instagram. This chapter also draws on McRobbie (2004, pp. 255–258), who explains that post-feminism frequently promotes progressive feminist goals but at the same time implements certain forms of subjection.

1. The New Self: The Journey of *Hijrah* and Self-Entrepreneurs

In the past three years, many YouTube channels have promoted *hijrah* activities and supported Islamic living. Indeed, internet celebrities have navigated the social media landscape successfully by expanding their activities to perform regularly and produce visual content. Many internet celebrities built upon their popularity as television stars, created a Facebook page, changed to Instagram accounts, and increased their popularity through YouTube. Additionally, they have become what are commonly called "vloggers" (video bloggers), sharing their daily lives and religious activities with their audiences. This can be easily seen through internet celebrities' interviews, wherein they explain their reasons for self-transformation—what is popularly known in Indonesia today as *hijrah*.

Celebrities are normally identified as people who find popularity through the mass media (television, radio, and print media) in such fields as entertainment, sports, and politics. Internet celebrities, meanwhile, are produced by themselves—usually using social media—and their status is afforded by others (Marwick, 2013, p. 115). They must be continuously present in the eyes of their followers. Indonesian internet celebrities' decision to not only wear the veil, but to cover themselves from head to toe, implies a range of aesthetic values related to moral authority, consumption, and selfhood (Bucar,

2017, p. 90). These internet celebrities are expected to reveal personal information (Marwick, 2013, p. 117), as seen in several internets-celebrities' narration of their *hijrah*, to effectively draw public attention.

In this section, I will examine how internet celebrities represent their transformation from Islamic moderates to puritans. This section's definition of puritan conservative values borrows from Bruisneen (2011, 2013), who understands it as involving individuals or organisations oriented by religious and moralistic factors to intervene in public affairs. This is seen, for instance, in the labelling of products as *halal* and *haram* (licit and illicit), in the use of specific financial systems (banking and insurance), as well as in the selection of political leaders that protect the perceived interests of Muslims (the *ummah*) rather than promote inclusive national interests. This term will support an examination of how internet celebrities articulate their Islamic values and act as role models of Muslim womanhood and piety. These celebrities also use self-branding to promote their personal transformation through consumerism.

In this section, I will discuss the theoretical aspects regarding the relationship of social media as a critical reflection of culture that is produced and consumed by internet celebrities and their audiences. It will show how internet celebrities use mass-mediated cultural forms to position themselves not merely as objects and recipients, but as agents and actors, through cultural consumption and political practice approaches (see; Breckendridge, 1995, pp. 4–6).

This is apparent in Zaskia Sungkar's Instagram account, where she began posting photographs that she identified as more "polite" (i.e. depicting her with longer dresses and hijabs than previously) both in her regular posts and in her endorsement activities. As a member of a *hijrah* artist group (Musawarah Recitation), Zaskia captions her photographs to show her gratitude to God. On their social media accounts, Zaskia and Irwansyah present themselves as happy couple who support each other. Their use of Instagram not only allows them to promote themselves as entertainers, but also to establish themselves as young Muslims who embody Islamic living. With 18.7 million followers as of September 2019, Zaskia Sungkar has become the brand ambassador for Muslim Cosmetics and the online marketplace brand; she has also given various endorsements and created a line of Muslim clothing (@kiabyzaskiasungkar). This can be seen in figure 5.1 below:

Figure 5.1: Zaskia Sungkar endorsing *Khimar* and inviting
positive comments from her readers and followers.
Posted 23 December 2018

With a caption that reads: There are those who cry and don't want to
go home (with a love emoticon); Masya Allah mami Kia loves Adam
Khimar: @aauf_store skirt: @kiabysazkiasungkar

Following her post, Zaskia's received much support from her followers' in

comments as seen below:

@account 5.1: Masyaallah you are so beautiful sister
@zaskiasungkar15 (with love emoticon)

@account 5.2: Masya Allah, may Allah gives His honour to women
who *hijrah* in His path

@account 5.3: Masya Allah beautiful like Arabic women

@account 5.4: An angel of heaven Masyaallah (love emoticon, angel
emotion)

@account 5.5: Masha Allah (love emoticon purple) Happy to see it.
Irwansyah is lucky to have a wife like this. Makes feel happy (with
three emoticon love) May you are having a succeeds
@zaskiasungkar15

@account 5.6: Masya Allah, I pray for you to use Khimar immediately (love emoticons red) so you're pretty face just for your Irwan (husband)

The visual offers a useful site for a semiotic approach that can understand how non-linguistic communication can also deliver social discourses and meaning (Machin, 2009, pp. 181–190). In the above figure, Zaskia shared a photograph of herself in front of a background of green leaves. She is wearing a loose dress and a long veil covering her face, leaving only a latticework panel in front of her eyes. In her caption, Zaskia mentions her nephew, Adam, and called herself Mami (meaning Mama). In the picture, Zaskia is wearing a product and promotes *khimar*[91] and the long skirt that comes from her fashion brand. This picture, which is typical of internet celebrities' endorsements, may appear effortless, but actually offers certain products (Abidin, 2018, p. 94).

Interestingly, the use of the term *khimar* to refer to head coverings has become widespread amongst people who have undertaken the *hijrah*, as the use of Arabic-language words is seen as presenting a stronger sense of piety than the use of Indonesian-language words. Many historians have identified the Arabian Peninsula as the "home of Islam" because the religion originated in Mecca and Medina in the early 7th century CE (Pickthall, 1997). As such, the clothes, culture and language of the region—particularly Saudi Arabia—have become embedded in the minds of the Indonesian people as part of their

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[91] The meaning of the Arabic word *khimar* is "head covering".

religious identity. The word *Arabisasi* ('Arabisation') has been used specifically to describe the growing popularity of veils, hijabs, *khimar*, and modern mosques, as well as the mushrooming of Islamic education institutions, exclusive Muslim housing complexes, and the persecution of religious minorities, referencing how Saudi Arabian values have transformed Indonesian society.

Moreover, Figure 5.1 can be seen as a promotion of *hijab syar'i*, a style of hijab that has become increasingly common in Indonesia over the past ten years. Positive comments equate Zaskia to an Arabic woman, as mentioned in @account 5.3. Another comment came from @account 5.5, which expressed that Irwansyah (Zaskia's husband) should be happy because he has a pious wife. Such comments provide clear evidence that constructions of purity and virtue have been positively received and reinforced in online spaces. Furthermore, such responses promote the discourse that a wife is her husband's "jewellery". The dialectic communication in Zaskia's post can be seen as part of the blending of Islamic principles and Indonesian culture, wherein a Muslim woman may be famous and strong, but is (still) subordinate and complementary to her husband.

Figure 5.2: Zaskia's first post, when she began wearing loose clothing and longer hijabs with the intention of improving the quality of her spirituality. Posted 28 March 2018

In early 2018 (see Figure 5.2), Zaskia Sungkar asserted that she had undergone *hijrah*, not by donning the hijab (which she had begun in 2012), but by totally transforming her appearance and adopting loose clothing and longer hijabs. She first presented her new style on her Instagram account on 28 March 2018 in a post captioned: "Only by remembering Allah will our hearts feel peace (love emoticon)". Many comments appeared to support her *hijrah*, particularly her choice of outfit. One comment from Account 5.7 reads: "Love you more sister Kia. Now your hijab covers your chest. May Allah always gives His blessing to you".

In the past ten years, the previous tendency—particularly prominent during the Soeharto regime—for women wearing long veils to be frequently labelled radicals and identified with fanatic Islamic values (see Jefferies, 2011) has been nearly reversed. There is an emerging discourse of piety amongst Indonesian Muslims, who believe that Muslims' clothing should follow sharia law (popularly known as 'Sharia clothing') and thus cover the entire body (save for the face, hands, and feet) without compromising style. In recent years,

however, it has not been enough for clothing to cover the body from the neck to the ankles, and to include a separate head covering; Muslim women experience social pressure if they are not veiled, as they are made to feel as if their religious piety and devotion are somehow lacking (van Doorn-Harder 2006, p. 143). Muslim women are increasingly expected to wear a chador/niqab and to cover their faces (showing only their eyes), and failure to do so can result in ostracism.

Many mosque communities (*komunitas masjid*) have also appeared to promote the *hijrah* movement amongst millennials, and these use social media to maintain relations with young and tech-savvy Muslims (Lengauer, 2018, pp. 5–23). The rise of Muslim internet celebrities as social media influencers has also significantly increased the prominence of Islamic living (Beta, 2019, pp. 1–20). Internet celebrities' posts and comments create a social discourse, showing how social media is used as a means of *da'wa* and constructing pious and virtuous Muslim womanhood through audience feedback. These online communities are, as Jenkins explained, "preparing the way for a more meaningful public culture" (2008, p. 239). Audience feedback is part of this public culture, which offers users a place to express, engage, create, and share. However, this common public culture is further complicated by its being the site of piety contestation.

Instagram interactions activate the public's in-between connection and invites audiences to imagine affective relationships formed through social media storytelling and public figures' personas. This strong bond may result in

the emergence and development of specific feelings and emotions; as explained by Papacharissi (2006, p. 21), social media can strengthen affective public sentiment. These feelings and emotions can be expressed in an online community through a variety of actions made possible by social media architecture. On Instagram, users can express their feelings and emotions by clicking the like button, commenting, reposting, and sharing content.

Figure 5.2 shows a wide-angle view of Zaskia in a room, which appears to be in a building/apartment. This image creates the impression of distance, that viewers are distant observers of Zaskia's new style of hijab. It focuses audiences' attention on Zaskia's clothing, her branded bag, long black *khimar* and loose dress. Zaskia performed her *hijrah* by conducting various recitations and wearing Islamic clothing; according to her confession, the idea of *hijrah* came from her husband, as she mentioned on her YouTube channel Cinta Quran (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9JSf2HCDzs, published 21 January 2019). Interestingly, Zaskia and her husband routinely share their religious activities and travelling experiences on their Instagram and YouTube accounts (the Sungkar Family Channel, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnaD-UVn884) as part of their proselytization activities. As explained previously, the 212 Movement of 2016–2017 promoted an "Islamic awakening" and *hijrah*. Zaskia and her husband were among the first to take part in this movement.[92]

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[92] Irwansyah also participated in the Action to Defend Islam, which held a reunion event in December 2018 (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VHUmA4dB1h8)

Following a similar pattern to Zaskia Sungkar is another internet celebrity, Dewi Sandra. Studying her Instagram posts shows how she has transformed her appearance. After many years as a famous model and singer, in 2012 she decided to wear a hijab and begin her self-transformation. After her *hijrah*, she decided to stop singing because she believed that the world of entertainment contained more negative things than positive, as she explained on her *da'wa* channel on YouTube (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BtXh98aH5_4, published 26 October 2019). Online testimonies from internet celebrities such as Dewi Sandra about their decision to *hijrah* are common on YouTube, and the theme has become increasingly prominent in the last three years.[93]

In one such video, posted to the YouTube channel "Quran Indonesia Project" (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RCqGxcw1C8, published 21 August 2018), Dewi Sandra detailed her experiences reading the Qur'an—particularly Surah Al-Azab, verse 59—and reuniting herself with God. Excerpts are quoted below:

> "God, whom I have cheated on. God, whom I have hurt. God, whom I have lied to… the most critical thing I have done is reading that verse (in the Qur'an) and reflect on myself. Did I still have the opportunity? Umm… would I still be recognised and be protected? God still knows me. God still protects me. Where else would I find

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[93] After wearing the *hijab* and declaring her *hijrah*, Dewi was a guest star on numerous YouTube channels:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BtXh98aH5_4,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PSVtev7ynA4,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otMrUlPGk2s,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpfb0-hC15w.

a God like that? Immediately I fell in love with God. Beautifully, he invited me to return to His religion."

Dewi has also actively used her Instagram account to show her faith and become a 'religious influencer'. Like most Muslim internet celebrities, after changing her looks in 2012, she deleted all pictures on her Instagram account that showed her not wearing a veil. Furthermore, she began transforming her Instagram content and posting beautiful images with thoughtful captions. In the image below (Figure 5.3), Dewi Sandra shows herself holding the Qur'an. This image is accompanied by the caption: "The more you read the Qur'an, the more you fall in love with the author (God) love emoticon. Who reads the Al-Kahfi verse on Friday will get the light". This black-and-white image shows Dewi embracing the Qur'an, symbolically showing her intimacy with God. She not only presents an attractive religious image, but also encourages her followers to read Surah Al-Kahfi on Friday (a holy day in Islam) to receive Allah's blessings. This image, combined with its insightful caption, provides an imaginary setting of ideal Muslim womanhood; a Muslim woman is one who uses the Qur'an for serenity, sensibility, and piety.

Figure 5.3: Dewi Sandra's hands holding a Qur'an, accompanied by a caption urging people to read the Qur'an.
Posted 26 October 2018

Noticeably, the growing influence of the internet has resulted in "smart *dakwah*" (proselytisation) from the 'palm of the hand'. Internet celebrities use their space to create power and becomes digital marketers and religious influencers at the same time. Personal marketing requires self-branding, and since there is a 'privatised audience' in today's consumer-centric space of media surplus, autonomy and ingenuity are required (Brody, 2001, p. 20). When internet celebrities transform their appearances (through *hijrah*), they not only perform "self-(re)branding", but also change themselves into "ordinary people" and present a sense of everydayness. This is because "internet celebrity is a product of performance and perception" (see Abidin, 2018, p. 19). In this sense, micro-celebrities are common people that became famous/influential through online media. On the other hand, internet celebrities are individuals who were previously well known in the mass media but required social media to convey an intimate image to their audiences and present a sense of 'everydayness'.

Figure 5.4: Dewi Sandra explaining her decision to *hijrah* and change her
looks, including when she goes to the beach
or exercises in the swimming pool.
Posted 27 April 2018

In the image above (Figure 5.4), Dewi Sandra's ideal of dress etiquette is conveyed. She endorses Muslim swimwear, represents her personal self-(re)branding as a pious woman who wears only long clothes when in public areas. Dewi is seen wearing a swimsuit that is famously known as the "burkini", which is designed to encourage women to feel both comfortable and stylish when participating in sports. In the above image, Dewi shows herself in the pool, with her modestly dressed body surrounded by a background of water. It is captioned as follows:

"Before wearing a hijab, swimming was totally me. I have always been a water baby, loved going to beach and pool… please don't ask what I wore. After *hijrah*, I didn't know what to wear, but finally the moment of truth… looking for a proper swimsuit is not easy. Found the model, but the colour made me stress. The model was too tight, so sad because I felt like Spiderman. That's what I used to call my suits. Lastly, I found it through Instagram. I found @polite_swim and I bought it! Beautiful colour, from the head-dress, tops and pants, all designed for Muslimah like us that love to play in the water. Especially this. Thank God, it is a present and a new model. Love love love, just wanted to share with all of you swimmers. Happy Friday blessings. Before preparing for (Friday) prayer, first 25 laps…"

This caption explains that Dewi chose her swimsuit model because she wanted to maintain her *hijrah* and remain as polite as possible, even when exercising (which is not related to religious activities). Through this image, Dewi Sandra displays her individual choice, presenting a religious persona but also supporting consumer culture through her caption. This image represents the substance of the postfeminist notion (McRobbie, 2004, pp. 255–258; Thompson and Donaghue, 2014, p. 40; Roberts, 1998, p. 28). Muslim women often successfully perform independent actions, but at the same time support consumerism as part of *hijrah* transformation. This shows how women internet celebrities utilise their bodies, capabilities, and intimate power relations (Abidin, 2018, pp. 15–16). In their endorsements, celebrities rely on positive images and characters to promote products and services; they also emphasize their personality to add value to their brands (Marwick, 2015). During endorsement, internet celebrities use social media as a means of transforming their followers and online communities into constituencies and consumers. This kind of message has been strongly articulated on internet celebrities

Instagram pages. Continuously internet celebrities demonstrate their empowerment enabling self-transformation and materializing their piety through consumerism.

The 2016 Action to Defend Islam, 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, and 2019 Indonesian presidential election all created momentum for increasing the prominence of Muslim conservatisms (Lanti et al., 2019, p. 10). A wave of *hijrah* has spread amongst Indonesia's Muslim youth, and gained significant inroads where it influences them the most—on social media. This *hijrah* movement has gained traction in part because of internet celebrities' use of Instagram to gain acceptance, to promote a modern Islamic way of life, to present women dressed fashionably in long veils side-by-side with men riding skateboards,[94] and to share memes quoting Quranic verses. Some of these public figures have included prominent musicians and film actors. This includes, for instance, Fenita Jayanti; popularly known as Fenita Arie, taking her husband's name, she was already famous as a model and infotainment presenter when she decided to begin her *hijrah*.

On her Instagram account, Fenita continuously promotes the *hijrah* movement, this relates to the idea of *da'wa* (see figure 5.7, 5.8, 5.9), Fenita Arie frequently invites many people to follow her example and her directions. The media landscape can provide political participation in the age of

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[94] Hanan Attaki, one famous preacher, has used social media extensively through his network *Pemuda Hijrah* (Lanti et al., 2019, p. 10). He has promoted *hijrah* widely amongst millennials, and as of November 2020 his Instagram account has more than eight million followers.

mediatisation (Dahlgren & Alvares, 2013). Notably, Fenita Arie and Arie Untung explicitly linked their *hijrah* to the Ahok case and Action Defend Islam series (2016) *(see Kumparan* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5aSBiMXPPIU)*,* in that interview Fenita states that one of her reasons to take *hijrah* was because it triggered a desire to defend Islam:

> In the previous case (of Ahok), Arie was excited to show his position in public, show his stand. I expressed my objections, telling him not to show his view about certain political matters. It is better [I said] if we keep our opinions to ourselves. No need to tell other people. Because we are working in entertainment, and because politics is such a sensitive matter. We still need the attention of the public because we work in this industry. Especially because Muslims were said to have "short fuses" (i.e. be easily angered), and given many offensive names. Finally, at one point, Arie was bullied on social media for expressing his political views. When he was defending Islam, there was a comment addressed to him, like this: "please take care and see to your own wife, who still wears sexy clothes and likes to talk about other people". At the time, the bully mentioned my social media accounts as well. I felt bad for being a wife who did not support her husband, because at that time I still did not wear the hijab and I worked as an infotainment presenter. I was also thinking, "My husband is not bad. He is very pious in his daily life. He always prays, five times a day". It is not like other people said about him. That was when I decided I should follow him, become a better person, and do the Hijrah.

After she decided to use a veil (her first post with a veil was on 5th January 2018), Fenita increasingly changed her style, as in her post below;

Figure 5.7: Fenita Arie's post after she shared her decision to take *hijrah*.
Posted 24 February 2018

The caption reads: Praise to Allah, today is done, thank you for all, we shared a lot about *hijrah*. The point for some events that I attend today is we are Muslimah let's proud with our hijab, because of the goodness its should be start, so we can feel happiness and a blessing from Allah, amen #hijrahisgood #proudwearinghijab #fashion #muslimfashion Make-up by @yayihanoum Wardrobe by @umaprivee

Through a long shot image, with an indoor background Fenita wears red clothes promoting *hijrah* and for Muslims to wear a hijab on her Instagram account. In her caption she also added an explanation that she joined an event that gives her an opportunity to share her story on *hijrah*. After she decided to *hijrah* Fenita shared her activities to promote the *hijrah* movement more often, this accompanies an endorsement of a Muslim fashion product of her own. This kind of promotional image is regularly presented in her posts, even when she is doing *umrah* (a religious activity), a year after her *hijrah*, as this picture shows;

Figure 5.8: Fenita Arie promoting a religious *umrah* outfit
in front of Al-Masjid An-Nabawi in Mecca.
Posted on 25 February 2019

With the caption: Ltru Umrah Series. Well, for those of you who are looking for clothes to go on *umrah*, @ltruofficial also provides *umrah* equipment: socks, hand stockings, dresses, and veils. Check it out in the nearest store, or go directly to our Instagram account

Figure 5.8 shows how Fenita Arie, while performing her *umrah* simultaneously promoted her brand of clothing. After deciding to undertake *hijrah*, Fenita—as with most other Muslim internet celebrities—Fenita developed her own brand of Muslim clothes brand, namely @fez_official. In this context, she used her personal piety as part of her brand image, winning sympathy and empathy by using religion. Other research has identified the prominence of religion in consumer behaviour (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Mokhlis, 2006). Moreover, in the current era of surplus, marketing personnel speak prominently of the "attention economy" on online media (Brody, 2001, p. 20). Therefore, the story behind internet celebrities' self-

transformation journey is valued as an interactive experience, one shared together with religious commodities.

Internet celebrities frequently share personal stories about "working hard to achieve success, gain popularity, and be regarded as a great role model, portraying themselves as ordinary people whose journeys are highlighted and crafted into moralising stories of meritocracy" (McRobbie, 2009; Littler, 2018). Internet celebrities who have undergone *hijrah* commonly use self-entrepreneurship to validate their self-transformation. The new self that is portrayed by internet celebrities combines women's empowerment with neoliberal subjectivities (Gill, 2007), defining successful Muslim women as fashionable, financially independent, fabulous, and famous, but also responsible conveyers of goodness and piety.

Figure 5.9: A repost by Fenita (Jayanti) Arie promoting her stories of *hijrah* with her husband Arie Untung.
Posted on 23 May 2018

Fenita reposted a post by @kumparancom with the following caption:

Repost by Kumparancom: Arie Untung and Fenita Arie are one celebrity couple that has already done *hijrah*. Not long ago, Fenita started wearing the hijab, while Arie has already shown his *hijrah* process to the public. Led by *Ustadz* Erick Yusuf, @ariekuntung and @fenitaarie tell the story of their inner passions and challenges during their *hijrah*. Check out the full story at kum.pr/HijrahCelebrity or click the link in the bio.

#nowkumparan #hijrahselebriti #islam #muslim #hijrah #ramadhan #ramadhan2018 #marhabanyaramadhan #arieuntung #fenitaarie #celebrity #indonesia

Figure 5.10: Many of positive comments from Instagram followers regarding the testimonies of this couple.
Posted on 23 May 2018

Responding to Fenita Arie's post, many followers commented that this couple were an inspiration for people who wanted to improve themselves;

@account 5.8: You are my celebrity role models, Brother @ariekuntung and Sister @fenitaarie. Hope that both of you remain *istiqomah* 🙏

@account 5.9: It's inspiring. *Netizens* (internet citizens) have to watch this. Thank you for sharing, Brother @ariekuntung and Sister @fenitaarie. Hopefully, both of you will have a *sakinah* (peaceful, restful, honourable, and happy), *mawaddah* (be honest, faithful, and pious)*, warrahmah* (forgiving, graceful, merciful, compassionate, and fortunate) family 🙏

@account 5.10: Just watched the video yesterday. Made me cry, [to see] how Allah gives the best compassion to His *ummah*. The

blessings of Allah be upon this couple; hopefully, they will live forever in heaven, Amen.

@account 5.11: Already watched the program on the Kumparan channel. It is amazing how God touched the hearts of Arie's family, especially Sister Fenita, giving them a different perspective. It really inspired me to do *hijrah*.

As a couple who recently decided to undertake *hijrah*, Fenita and Arie Untung received much appreciation and support from their followers. Some comments even identified them as role models for the *hijrah* movement. Internet celebrities' fashion blogs, as with fashion blogs in general, have intentionally been used to influence mass audiences and to expand and share both cultural and symbolic capital (McQuarrie et al., 2013, pp. 136–158; Hearn and Schoenhoff, 2016, p. 194; Gormley, 2016). Cultural capital refers to the compilation of symbolic capital, such as tastes, skills, styles, reputations, and material possessions (Bourdieu, 1986). This cultural and symbolic capital forms the foundation of social life, and determines individuals' position within society.

Social capital provides individuals with access to resources, and enables them to mobilize their resources to facilitate action. According to Bourdieu (1986, p. 122), social capital includes "a capital of social connections, honorability, and respectability". In the context of the *hijrah* movement, internet celebrities have deliberately used social media to influence their audience. As evidenced in Fenita Arie's posts, she has accumulated and utilized social capital to foster her self-branding, commodification, and capitalization

(Fuchs, 2017, p. 36). This situation can be linked to populist Islamic discourse, political identities, social network technologies, and commodification. As stated by Bunt (2009, pp. 131–134), social media has obscured the boundary between Muslims' political and non-political expressions even as it has facilitated a new knowledge and proselytizing economy that combines resources with various religious statements. At the same time, the architecture of social media encourages users to circulate, copy-paste, and recreate content, thereby shaping feelings and emotions (Papacharissi, 2016, p. 116).

2. The Tension Between *Hijrah* Discourse and Religious Nationalism

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the contestation of piety has become prominent in the Indonesian public sphere. In today's Indonesia, piety has become an everyday discourse, and been used to mobilise political interests. The power of right-wing politics in Indonesia is parallel to that common in the West; it largely pro-capitalist, pre-electoral, but concurrently conservative and often exclusionary, especially when dealing with minorities (see Hadiz, 2018, pp. 468–569). This is not, however, universal; some internet celebrities have taken other paths and shown resistance.

This section will explore how some internet celebrities represent themselves as religious and nationalist Muslims by conveying moderate and progressive Islamic values through their daily posts. Religious nationalism, as part of the concept of Pancasila—the symbolic soul of the state—is represented through the values of tolerance, equality, and pluralism, all of which contradict

the positions and interpretations of Islamist groups that have sought to transform Indonesia's national ideology. Since the dawn of the Reform Era (1998), all Indonesians have enjoyed greater freedom of speech and freedom of organisation than possible previously. Islamists, particularly those who promote the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, have used this freedom to "Islamicise Pancasila"[95] (Bourchier, 2019, p. 727, Munabari, 2017, p. 248). Moreover, internet celebrities' definition of a moderate and progressive Islam incorporates concepts of human rights, gender equality, and religious pluralism; such celebrities see religion as more flexible, and support the inclusion (rather than exclusion) of minorities (see Safi, 2003).

In the onslaught of messages and representations of internet celebrities who follow a strict approach to *hijrah*, some internet celebrities have taken a more moderate-progressive approach (albeit one more extravagant than most ordinary people). Such representativeness is exemplified by the internet celebrity Ayu Diah Bing Slamet (account name: @ayudiac). In the following two images, Ayu expresses her Muslimah identity while engaging in outdoor sport activities in Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Flores, Indonesia. Both images

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[95] The "Islamisation of Pancasila" is understood as replacing the tolerance, equality, and pluralism taught by the national ideology with fundamentalist Islam. The words 'Islamisation' (*Islamisasi*) and 'Islamicise' refer to the processes through which Islam is framed as a political system, and through which its proponents seek to establish an Islamic state (Bruinessen, 2011, p. 7). Under the dominant understanding of Pancasila, Islamic teachings and rituals are regarded as private matters, and the Indonesian State must not take sides with any religion; such an understanding is challenged by Islamist groups (Prawiranegara, 184, pp. 74–83; Bourchier, 2019, pp. 713–733).

focus on Ayu's activities rather than her face. In Figure 5.13, Ayu is shown drinking from a bottle of water, sitting near a parked bicycle, wearing a Gucci sling bag. She is framed by a background of autumn leaves. In the caption, she writes that she felt happy after playing squash, even while travelling. Wearing a sporty hijab, Ayu allows her body shape to remain visible; in this, she contrasts with other internet celebrities, who avoid showing tight clothes on social media because they are not considered to be pious. As explained in the previous sub-chapter, loose clothing is considered better, because it reflects women's obedience to the order to cover their *awrah*.

Ayu identifies "Squash City" using Instagram's location feature. This provides important background, showing her enthusiasm for doing sports, and at the same time exhibiting her internationality and capital. Internet celebrities should have "exclusivity" as part of their celebration of their unordinary lives, and as such the locations of their images are part of their displays of sumptuous lifestyles and lavish experiences (Abidin, 2018, p. 20). Through this image, she not only provides a representation of an active and energetic Muslim woman, but also delivers a message about middle class consumer culture and extraordinary lifestyles, that is strongly related to post-feminism and women's subjectivities (Gill and Scharff, 2011).

Figure 5.13: Ayu Diah drinking from a bottle of water, seated near a parked bicycle, after playing squash while travelling to Amsterdam.
Posted 11 November 2018

Figure 5.14: Ayu Diah standing on the deck of a deluxe ship while travelling in Labuan Bajo, Flores.
Posted 29 August 2019

Figure 5.15: Ayu Diah snorkelling in Labuan Bajo, Flores.
Posted 28 August 2019

Figure 5.15 also shows Ayu while snorkelling in Flores, a beautiful island in Indonesia. As with figure 5.13, in this (5.15) image, the shape of her body is clearly seen under her formfitting gear. Unlike other Muslim internet celebrities who have undertaken *hijrah*, Ayu does not seem too worried about her body shape when doing sports. Accompanying this image, Ayu provided the caption: "this evening, amongst the turtles and coral reefs; the view was so much better than in the photo. The coral reefs are beautiful". Ayu posted a wide angle shot, incorporating the beauty of the sea into her travelling story. As with Figure 5.13, the image lets the subject fill the frame while emphasising the scenery.

As a Muslim internet celebrity, Ayu always synchronises the content of her Instagram account with the content of her YouTube channel. For instance, the travels represented in Figure 5.13 can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbUyha9fp-U and the snorkelling represented in Figure 6.14 and 6.15 can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYOIy_BfhBM. Such cross-media marketing strategies are intended to integrate messages into audiences' minds; rather than use and operate a single social media channel, internet celebrities use a combination of Instagram and YouTube to expand their audiences, interactions, and feedback. In the digital age, social media is a stage, and internet celebrities' body performativity is a central space for performing their everyday lives, gaining wider attention, reaping commercial benefits, and

accumulating influence (Goffman, 1959; Butler, 1990). However, unlike most artists, Ayu often presents a nationalist Islam rather than a conservative Islam.

In her posts, Ayu often articulates her position as an Indonesian citizen who is Muslim. As explained by Busse (2019, pp. 1–21) the fusion of religion and nationalism reflects an alignment of goals; religious nationalism puts the interests of the nation first, seeking a political recognition and sovereignty that is supported by religion. As seen in her other posts (see Figure 5.16), Ayu also shows concern for the issues and problems that have become increasingly widespread in Indonesia (such as corruption). As a public figure who has many followers, her actions have enriched the public culture of Indonesia. In this, she is one of few Indonesian celebrities who shows concern for public issues such as corruption, national unity and integrity.

Figure 5.16: Ayudia shows her stand about anti corruption movement.
Posted 9 November 2017

This post is captioned: "I hope we can always have a long life, impassion the spirit of anti-corruption even at the lowest level so that Indonesia can be much better. If money is not corrupted, maybe we can have fun playing in the park with our babies, taking fast trains; many things would be easier. But, never mind (don't be pessimistic)

… the problem is, if not us, who else will be concerned with this? Thank you for inviting our family. Sekala has become the youngest person invited to KPK's office. We will help as much as we can, as citizens, so that corruption can be eradicated through our work. In the name of Allah.

As seen in Figure 5.16, Ayu's post is accompanied by a long caption. The card depicted in its photograph has more text: "Hi. My name is Ayudia. Corruption, in my opinion, is an extraordinary crime. My way to avoid corruption is to realize that money and property are not taken with us when we die". From this post, Ayu emphasises her stance that young people must care about social issues, support the enforcement of social justice, and fight corruption. She said that her little family (she called it the "Belo Family") was pleased to have been invited to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to campaign against corruption, and even mentioned how happy she was when her son Sekala became the youngest person to ever be invited to KPK's offices. Furthermore, by including the caption "Bismillah (meaning 'in the name of Allah)", she also represented her hybrid identity not only as a mother, but also as an Indonesian citizen and a Muslim woman who is participating in and concerned about public culture.

Ayudia is one Indonesian artist who decided to embrace the internet as a new space after getting married and leaving television in 2017. At the same time, she decided to change her appearance (she began wearing the veil). Through her vlogs, Ayudia has built an image of her and her husband Ditto as a young (Muslim) couple who travel around the world with their (small) family. Ayudia and Ditto were best friends before marriage, and now have one child

(Sekala, a toddler). They share the same passion for creative activities such as photography, writing, music, and filmmaking, using these to produce a series called "Teman Tapi Menikah" (Friends but Married).

Through her vlog, Ayudia has deliberately created a brand of an equal, happy, and positive young family. She and her husband believe that, by starting a family, they have found meaningful synergy in their careers. Their principle is not to work *for* the family, but to work *with* the family. Ayu even explained that the reason she vlogs about her everyday life is to earn money, thereby enabling her to have a normal life as a mother and wife (who cares for her child by herself); this can be seen at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Njx0GWjGTbg.

Figure 5.17: Ayudia cuddling and kissing her baby, she has kept her image
without wearing a veil online.
Posted 14 October 2016

Interestingly, even she is a Muslim, Ayudia does not often use Islamic branding as part of her marketing strategies. Additionally, in an interview with the Indonesian online media Kumparan (at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b5EZNJ20DeMsuch published on 28 May 2017), she explained her transformative journey. Even on social media, she rarely expresses her views about God, writing instead that religion is a personal matter. She mentioned this in an interview:

> "I wear the veil because I feel comfortable. I treat the veil as a security blanket, something that protects me from the temptations and evils of the entertainment industry. After I began wearing the veil, there were actually no significant changes in my life. I just wanted to be seen as a normal human, as me, as Ayu, without any label. Moreover, I even refused to delete my photos from the past, when I did not wear the hijab, because that was part of my life".

In representing herself as an Indonesian Muslim woman on social media, Ayudia Bing Slamet described her veil as a personal defence mechanism, one that protects her from the outside world. Interestingly, rather than present herself as a *shalehah* individual, she openly refused to be a role model of piety. As stated in the interview:

> "Let my relationship with God be special. I don't even want to share quotes like "I Love Allah" on my social media account, because my relationship (with God) is private. Other people shouldn't know my path with God".

Ayu's position reflects the findings of Hefner (2007, pp. 389–420). Studying young middle-class Javanese Muslim women in Yogyakarta, Hefner found that veiling practices are neither continuations of tradition nor antimodernist reactions; instead, they are complicated and sometimes enigmatic efforts through which young Muslim women assert themselves in public spaces. The practice of veiling cannot be reduced to a mere expression of piety; it also includes contestation, negotiation, consumption, and the

strengthening of Muslim women's identity in the public sphere. It can be understood that social media networks facilitate the public in interacting with others, responding to social situations, and even taking part in the shaping of public culture. As explained by Cayton (2008), "public culture includes a set of shared values and communicative symbols with which most of us will emphasize."

This definition can be useful to see how internet celebrities use social media in their communication practices to show their viewpoints, concerns, and actions, not only religious but also political. Hariman (2016) explained that public culture is used to identify a particularly modern form of collective identity, one that is dynamic, mixed, mediated, and varied. As mentioned by Ayu, she understands the practice of veiling differently; she understands it as a form of comfort, but not explicitly as a form of visual piety. She has even deliberately refused to delete photographs that she posted before wearing the veil (see Figure 5.16). However, she has faced a backlash from some followers for such choices. This distinguishes her from internet celebrities who are part of the *hijrah* movement, who highlight the importance of messaging religiosity on social media after their transformations.

Another internet celebrity that has kept her photos without the veil on social media is Tantri Syalindri. Take, for example, a post by Tantri Syalindri dated 17 July 2016. It depicts the internet celebrity as a new mom, sitting on a red bench, holding her baby; she is not veiled in this photograph. As of

September 2019—a year after Tantri Syalindri decided to begin wearing the

*hija*b—she has kept the photograph online.

Figure 5.18: A post by Tantri Syalindri showing her with her baby; it is
accompanied by a touching caption wishing
for the child to achieve all of her goals.
Posted 17 July 2016

Similarly, in an interview with Net TV (reposted to YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Azl-kYf2pnE on 16 June 2018), Tantri Syalindri refused to use the word *hijrah* to describe her spiritual transformation. When asked "What does *hijrah* mean to you?", she answered:

> *"Hijrah* is very heavy for me, because I am now in the process (of changing), and I really enjoy doing it slowly. I do not want to change 100%. I am not that type of person. Maybe now it's more suitable to say that Tantri is in the process. It sounds more comfortable to my ears. But *hijrah…* hmmm…. maybe some people would think so, and it is not wrong, but for me, the word *hijrah* is too heavy. I choose the word "in the process"".

Furthermore, different articulations of Muslim women's identities on Instagram have contributed to different imaginations of a contemporary Muslim *ummah* in Indonesia. This is evidenced in Tantri Syalindri's Instagram

account, @tantrisyalindri. She is not only an internet celebrity; she is also the vocalist of a famous band, a wife, and a mother.

Figure 5.19: Tantri Syalindri performing on stage. She is lifting one foot while singing; in her right hand is an Indonesian flag that has been fastened to the microphone boom pole.
Posted 1 June 2018

Figure 5.20: Continuity image when Tantri Syalindri lifting one foot to have warming up on back stage and next picture when she performing on stage.
Posted 12 July 2018

Tantri Syalindri decided to begin wearing the veil in 2018, as she officially posted on her Instagram account on 21 March 2018. Nonetheless, she continued to present herself as a rock star, one who is free to express herself on stage despite wearing the hijab. Moreover, she regularly presents her

nationalism on stage and tends to promote multicultural values as characterising Indonesian society. To her 1.9 million followers, Tantri Syalindri has consistently shown her pride as an Indonesian Muslim woman. Take, for example, the following caption:

> "Indonesia has 1,360 tribes, 17,504 islands. 726 traditional languages, and various religions and faiths. Even though our population is 250 million, how can we unite? We CAN, all because Indonesia has Pancasila (quote by) Mahfud MD #happybirthdayPancasila #TheUnitaryStateoftheRepublicofIndonesia"

Quoting Mahfud MD,[96] an Indonesian politician and lecturer, Tantri Syalindri showed her love for Indonesia as well as its various ethnicities, islands, and local languages. The people quoted by internet celebrities can also be understood as part of their representation. Many internet celebrities tend to quote conservative or even extreme Islamic preachers; others, such as Tantri Syalindri cite more moderate views in their contributions to Indonesia's contemporary social and political dynamics. Tantri Syalindri has even posted support for moderate-progressive Islamic preachers, as seen below;

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[96] In 2018, Mahfud was a judge with the Constitutional Court of Indonesia. Well known as a progressive judge, Mahfud was regarded as having made progressive decisions and purging the Court of corruption. He often commented on issues concerning human rights in Indonesia. In mid-2012, Mahfud caused controversy when he commented that people could only be punished for being atheists or communists if they acted in a way that went against Indonesia's national ideology, Pancasila (see https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/17/mahfud-reaffirms-support-atheists.html).

Figure 5.21: A post by Tantri Syalindri; in it, she is standing together with Ardan (her husband), Quraish Shihab, and Najwa Shihab, Posted on 3 December 2018

The above photograph shows Tantri Syalindri sitting with her husband Ardan, Quraish Shihab (a famous Islamic preacher and scholar) and Najwa Shihab (a television journalist). It is accompanied by a caption explaining that the photograph was taken shortly after Tantri Syalindri recorded an appearance on the programme *Shihab & Shihab*.[97] In the above post, Tantri Syalindri showed her "preference" for moderate and progressive Islamic narratives.

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[97] *Shihab & Shihab* presents discussions of Islam and religion. It is hosted by Najwa Shihab, a television journalist who is famous for the attention she gives to corruption and injustice in Indonesia, together with her father Quraish Shihab, a professor of Islam and the Qur'anic sciences who served as Minister of Religious Affairs in the VII Development Cabinet (1998). Owing to his support for Joko Widodo in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, Quraish Shihab faced accusations that he was Shia rather than Sunni. *Shihab & Shihab* is broadcast by Narasi TV, a YouTube Channel that regularly discusses contemporary developments and interpretations (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGpuyFiC74k).

Unlike internet celebrities who display their *hijrah*, through their *kaffah* and *sharia* lifestyles, she has taken another direction. See the following caption:

> "As a loyal viewer of *Shihab & Shihab*, I am very honoured to be able to directly ask *Abi* (an Arabic word meaning father, referring to Quraish Shihab) about something that has worried me. Thank you, Sister Nana @najwashihab, for inviting me to come to the Narasi TV studio and relieve my thirst. Want to know about what? Please watch *Shihab & Shihab*, please. I'll tell you later, on air".

Interestingly, Tantri Syalindri's decision to study Islam under Quraish Shihab received many comments (Figure 5.22):

Figure 5.22: Various responses to Tantri Syalindri's post.
Posted on 3 December 2018

@account 5.12: Ms Tantri has correctly chosen *Abi* Quraish Shihab. As a priest, his preaching gives all peace, tranquillity. It all makes sense. Hopefully, you will not join the other artists who suddenly undergo *hijrah* and feel themselves to be the most correct, like Arie Untung and his friends (other artists)

@account 5.13: 👍 good sister

@account 5.14: You are right in choosing who to ask. Please maintain your *istiqomah* (follow the straight and proper route, permitting no deviation). Don't allow the whispers and temptations of other artists with millions of followers to affect you, Sister Tantri, and make you uncomfortable. Be careful; today, the truth is often obscured. Keep studying with the right Islamic preachers, those who are *sanad* (who have the proper expertise). Like Professor Quraish Shihab, Gus Mus, Kyai Maimun, Habib Lutfi, the Islamic scholars in Lirboyo, Jombang (moderate popular Islamic preachers) who are truly *zuhud* (bringing people close to Allah). Please, make friends with kind and intelligent people like Ms Najwa

@account 5.15: try to follow @ariekuntung

@account 5.16: *Abi* Quraish Shihab has always been a source of pride. In elementary school, my father always invited me to watch him, if *Abi* Quraish was on television. Miss you, my father.

@account 5.17: good Ms Tantri 👍

This post drew interesting comments; two comments mentioned Arie Untung, who became a leader of artists' *hijrah* in Indonesia and thus symbolised the movement. Take, for example, the comment from the account @account 5.12; it deliberately juxtaposes Tantri Syalindri's understanding of Islam with Arie Untung's presentation of Islam as strict, stiff, and more authentic than other religions. From the comments on these posts, it can be seen how contestations of piety are also discussed by online communities. Tantri Syalindri's followers even challenged the *hijrah* trend among internet celebrities, specifically mentioning Arie Untung as an icon of the conservative *hijrah* movement.

Such a situation can be interpreted simultaneously as a political response and as a practice of affective body politics on social media. Followers and commentators express their emotions and feelings through current body political movements and activism (Papacharissi, 2016; Hynnä, Lehto, Paasonen, 2019). Although the followers of these celebrities never meet each other—or the internet celebrities involved—, online media provide them with an important means of forming an imagined community (Anderson, 1991).

Through mundane and trivial ordinary posts, Tantri Syalindri identifies with her audience's religious lives, constructing closeness with an imagined community while simultaneously providing audiences with religious information. At the same time, she shows her political preferences (her choice of tolerant and progressive Islamic preachers, rather than conservative ones). In this sense, it can be seen that her post does not operate in a social vacuum, but instead represents her political interests, participation, and contesting voice. Tantri Syalindri's posts show how civic interaction is part of discursive practice. Purposeful or not, these posts construct her collective sense of belonging and her community's shared knowledge, values, and groups (see Dahlgren & Alvares, 2013, p. 57).

On her appearance on *Shihab & Shihab* show, Tantri also asked how Islamic law regards women's singing activities; this provided a counterpoint to the conservative Islamic argument that women should be prohibited from singing in public. On the Quraish Shihab answer he said; "There is no prohibition against exercising music; even the Prophet (Muhammad SAW)

once invited two singers in his home. And basically, woman's voice is not included *awrah*". Tantri Syalindri's decision to study under Quraish Shihab presents particular political and religious views. Contestations of Islamic identity are seen in her account, particularly in the Islamic discourse she presents to the public.

The representation of Muslim internet celebrities as submissive, calm, and beautiful are not common in the posts of Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Tantri Syalindri. Rather, most of these Muslim internet celebrities depict themselves as engaged in dynamic physical activity as celebrities, travellers, and mothers. In other words, these internet celebrities represent themselves as capable of working and traveling actively while still taking care of their children (i.e. being 'Mumpreneurs'). Referring to Littler (2018, pp. 183-186), mumpreneurs employ meritocratic ways of addressing obstructions. They manage their time and space flexibly to balance gender, work, and childcare in order to achieve self-realisation. A 'meritocracy' is defined as 'a social system which enables people to achieve success proportionate to their expertise and abilities, as opposed to one in which social class or wealth is the predominant part' (see; Allen, 2011, pp. 367–382). At the same time, however, the mumpreneur concept is a double-edged sword. In neoliberal subjectivities, women are seen as becoming empowered, independent, and successful as facilitated by digital technology, which helps women work from home while taking care of their families (Schraff, 2014); at the same time, this discourse is offered as a

superficially meritocratic solution wherein women need to balance between productivity, reproductive labour, and their domestic burdens (Littler, 2018).

Tantri Syalindri and Ayudia Bing Slamet are internet celebrities' that use their online account as space for agency. Not only to resist, but also to challenge the dominant stereotype of Muslimah piety that pervades on Instagram, fashion blogs, and online media. Papacharissi (2002, p. 644) stated that internet celebrities control their self-image through their social media accounts. When a Muslim women's body is the field where identity is presented, it is noticeable that hijab is not the only site of power and ideology but also a performance sequence (Butler, 2006, 2004, 1990). Both Tantri and Ayu present a hybrid identity as internet celebrities, Muslim women, and Indonesian citizens. Their online posts on Instagram show the fusion of their religious and national identities, which are presented as coexisting and even as reinforcing each other. Additionally, both can be seen as acting not only as everyday religious influencers, but also as representatives of religious nationalism.

3. Internet Celebrities as Religious Influencer: Between *Da'wa* and Populism

This section will focus on the several Indonesian internet celebrities, Oki Setiana Dewi, Fenita Arie and Kartika Putri that may be considered popular *da'wa*. One of a prominent celebrity who has promoted the *hijrah* movement on her Instagram account and YouTube channel is Oki Setiana Dewi who rose to popularity through the Islamic Film *When Love Glorifies God* (*Ketika Cinta*

Bertasbih) in 2009. Since then, she has consistently presented herself as a religious preacher. In her activities, Oki Setiana Dewi often conveys Salafi[98] values, which are close to puritan-conservative Islamic. Interestingly, through her social media and visual culture, Oki Setiana Dewi—like other internet celebrities—brings Islam into her everyday life and personal experience, thereby creating approachability and immediacy (Fealy, 2008).

For internet celebrities and famous preachers, online media serve to democratise 'Islamic knowledge by breaking the monopoly of the *ulama* (preachers) in accessing and interpreting the main religious sources' (Qur'an and hadiths), as well as the major works of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence and fatwa) (Bruinessen, 2010, p. 22). At the same time, online media can erode the essence of quality of knowledge and promote viral populism. As mentioned by Weng (2018, p.62), "a popular preacher needs to equip himself or herself with communication skills and media strategies". Islamic preaching in Indonesia does not only convey religious knowledge, but also integrates social media as part of Islamic practise and discourse. It cannot be denied that celebrity preachers on social media present a beautiful visual culture, attractive video content, and strong storylines to target media-savvy audiences, even when they

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[98] *Salafi* teachings are directly connected with the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. Over the last 20 years, Salafi teachings have grown out of Indonesia's increasingly closer connections with transnational Muslim politics and its dynamics. Salafi madrasas and teachings mushroomed in Indonesia as freedom of expression became increasingly guaranteed after the collapse of Soeharto's New Order Regime in May 1998. The principal value of this teaching is to follow the *salaf al-salih*, which means to submit to the literal word of the Qur'an and the *sunna*, and that this submission will determine whether or not one can be called Muslim (see Noorhaidi, 2008, pp. 247–274).

lack qualified religious knowledge and education. However, as more conservative interpretations of Islam have spread through social media, and as popular figures have echoed this doctrine, such strict interpretations of Islam have received the attention of broader Indonesian society.

Oki Setiana Dewi is one internet celebrity who has used "smart *dakwah*" (proselytisation), branding herself as a celebrity *ustadzah*[99]. On her Instagram posts, she always uses her activities to teach certain understandings of Islam, conduct *da'wa* sessions, and offer Islamic motivation lessons to everyone interested in *hijrah*. Oki actively promotes her *da'wa* schedule and programmes throughout Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, even Europe. As she stated on a national *hijrah* programme, *Hijrah TransTV* (also published on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrYtswfnHXo, published 17 July 2018), before deciding to don the veil in 2005, Oki had performed on several television films but had yet to become popular. She ultimately chose to undertake *hijrah* when her mother's illness burdened her with significant financial issues, believing that wearing the hijab and performing *hijrah* would attract God's help.

After she decided to don the veil, in 2009 she was cast as Anna Althafunnisa, a beautiful and pious Muslim woman in the series *Ketika Cinta Bertasbih* ('When Love Glorifies'). Afterwards, Oki was cast in various

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[99] As mentioned in the previous chapter, the word *ustadz* is Persian. It usually refers to a well-regarded male teacher; female teachers are known as *ustadzah*. In Indonesia, the terms *ustadz* and *ustadzah* refer to persons with religious knowledge who spread Islamic teachings among the faithful (Nisa, 2018, see p. 79).

commercial advertisements, television shows, and became an Islamic preacher on national television. In 2016, the public began doubting her capacity as an Islamic preacher as she had never formally studied religion, and much debate followed. Oki Setiana Dewi's responses to these doubts were broadcast on national television: she admitted that, although she lacked a formal Islamic education, her passion to teach and dream of building an Islamic nursery school motivated her to actively and informally study Islam (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQHtsvvnQ0E, published 4 May 2016). In an interview, she mentioned:

> "From elementary school until university, I never formally studied Islam. But when I was in university, I was active in the *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (Campus Da'wah Institute) and engaged in providing Quran recitation lessons for poor moms in Depok (near Jakarta). But after my mom was sick, I became really interested in studying Islamic thought. After I graduated from university, I spend several months studying at the *Rumah Quran* (House of Quran), University of Indonesia, and memorising the Quran. I also studied at Ummul Qura University, Mecca. I felt stupid, and so I needed to study more. Formal education and informal education are just as important. I realise that I love children and teaching, so I decided to do a master's degree in nursery education, so that—if, someday, I have the chance to open a school, particularly a nursery that uses Quranic memorisation as a technique—my education would enable it. Hopefully, the school will open this year."

Afterwards, Oki became more famous as a religious influencer, often positioning herself as exhibiting ideal characteristics and regularly providing *da'wa* messages through her commercial activities, spiritual commitments, and political engagements. As part of her *da'wa* activities, Oki also manages another Instagram account @okisetianadewiofficial (with 65,800 followers)

and YouTube channel Oki Setiana Dewi (with 1 million followers) per April 2020.

Figure 5.23: Oki promoting her programme "Indahnya Ramadan" (The Beauty of Ramadan), during which she gave *da'wa*.
Posted 21 May 2018

Furthermore, observations show that the images shared through the @okisetianadewi Instagram account frequently show Oki standing/sitting in front of a forum, holding a microphone and being positioned higher than her audience. As seen in the image below, Oki is framed from behind, shown standing in front of her audience. This high angle and framing also shows Oki as wielding power.

Figure 5.24: Oki while lecturing about Islam.
Posted 7 December 2019

Figure 5.25: A poster depicting Oki Setiana Dewi as an ustadzah at the Hijrah Festival 2018; in the caption, she invites her followers to attend her session. Posted 19 May 2019

Figure 5.25 shows Oki as an Islamic preacher at the first hijrah lifestyle event in Jakarta, namely the *Hijrah Festival*. Managed like a music festival, this three-day programme introduced Islamic preachers who had become famous through viral visual-content on social media. Most of the Islamic preachers who attended the *Hijrah Festival* taught conservative and *salafi* Islam, offering a rigid understanding of Islam that challenged Indonesia's multicultural and diverse society. The *hijrah* festival also promoted an Islamic economy, offering a bazaar of Muslim products and halal food while providing a special place to remove tattoos. One special session also offered testimonies about individuals' experiences converting to Islam, which received the broad support of visitors.

The use of social media to spread Islam can be understood as part of the struggle for power and influence, as well as how online media users respond to their circumstances. The growth of social media in contemporary Indonesia has resulted in the rise of celebrity preachers, often entertainers without any

solid background in Islamic education (Millie, 2012, p. 123; Muzakki, 2008, p. 208). Social media, thus, has become a site where digital-savvy individuals lacking a formal religious education can shape the mediation of religious knowledge. Through online media, celebrity preachers—*ustadz* and *ustadzah*—gain power, authority, and legitimacy simply from their online popularity (i.e. number of followers). In the images above, Oki's posts present her as an *ustadzah* who can motivate and inspire people to attain an idealised self. At the same time, however, Oki also does commercial endorsements that promote products while their narratives and contextualisations blur the boundary between advertisement, testimony, and authentic content.

In Figure 5.26, Oki Setiana Dewi shows her modest hijab, thereby endorsing her hijab as part of her representation. Accompanying this image is a caption announcing that she would preach at a mosque in Semarang (the capital of Central Java). Figure 5.27 also shows how Oki Setiana Dewi combined the Qur'an with a mention of her brand, @imsyarixosd. All of these images offer evidence of how she has legitimised her position as an Islamic preacher. These images illustrate how Oki Setiana Dewi has used her social activities not only to legitimise her knowledge and power while simultaneously attracting people and teaching them about spiritual substance, but also to support consumer culture. Internet celebrities are self-employed content creators, many of whom work as paid brand promoters (Ferrucci & Vos, 2017). In their daily posts, content creators not only depict themselves as fashionable persons and stylish beauty bloggers, but also create closeness with an online

imagined community and provide audiences with knowledgeable advice, continuously promoting consumerism (Wright, 2017). In the digital environment, commercial intimacy is core to audience engagement (Senft, 2008). Commercial intimacy refers to the means through which internet celebrities build their textual and visual narratives to accumulate a massive follower base based on their personal lives and lifestyles (Abidin, 2015). In Indonesia, religious life has frequently become the main content and value for presenting a consistent personal brand, as seen in the account of Oki Setiana Dewi.

Figure 5.26: Oki Setiana Dewi publicising her *da'wa* while simultaneously endorsing her hijab brand @merajutkisah. Posted 6 August 2019

As this caption reads: How are you, faithful? May we always stand steady in devotion to God, to you my friends. This evening, God willing, I will give a lecture at Uwais Al Qorni, Mijen, Semarang. See you my friends! Hijab by: @merajutkasih

Figure 5.27: A post by Oki Setiana Dewi showing her doing *da'wa* in front of forum, quoting the Quran and promoting her
clothing brand @imsyarixod in the caption.
Posted 16 October 2018

The caption reads: Surah Al-Insyirah verse 7. So when you have finished with one thing, then do another thing seriously. Dress and hijab by: @imsyarioxd foto by: @bundasusie

Figure 5.28: Kartika Putri asserting her decision to undertake *hijrah* and urging her readers to follow the same path.
Posted 25 February 2018

However, as Arabic customs have been embraced as the most authentic Islamic codes and symbols, women have adopted not only the hijab but also *shariah* rules. At this point, Instagram has become a space where piety is contested through visual appearance. This can be seen in Kartika Putri's Instagram account (Figure 5.28), when she declared her *hijrah* and invited her followers to follow the same path. This post was captioned as follows:

> "……I repeatedly did self-introspection. *Insya Allah* (God willing), I will always be reminded to be close to Allah. Shame on me if I do not obey his commands. I just want to share (my experiences) with all Muslim women. Let's not be foolish, or you will regret it like I did. Let's do a *hijrah* movement and let's brings ourselves to heaven, not hell.   #followhijrahkartikaputri #nowtomorrownotcertainlywestillalive #togethertohijrah

As mentioned by Tarlo (2007, p. 151), "the hijab allows space for individual interpretation and there are many different styles and nuances to hijab wearing". As seen in Kartika's post, she deliberately showed her beautiful

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face after her self-transformation. As stated by Lasén (2015, pp. 61–68), since the adoption of camera phones, selfies have provided everyone with an appropriate means of self-portraiture. Selfies have also become a significant means of achieving celebrity status and creating fame (Marwick, 2015, pp. 137–160). Through an extreme close-up of her veiled face, which fills the entire frame of the photograph, Kartika reframes herself and draws the audiences' eyes to her beautifully veiled face. From her post, it can also be noted that, since her *hijrah,* Kartika has begun actively giving advice regarding morality and Muslim piety. In the picture above, it can also be seen how Kartika's still conforms with gloal and local ideals of beauty and femininity. Drawing on both global models of Islam but also global models (western) ideals of beauty that had already taken hold in Indonesia–Kartika's continues to wear make up and wearing a veil as well.

Using the hashtag #followhijrahkartikaputri, Kartika emphasises the urgency of self-transformation, encouraging Muslim women to transform themselves into religious influencers on social media. As part of her (re)branding, Kartika has presented herself as a public figure who inspires and motivates others. She also conducts interpellations (see McRobbie, 2004), thereby calling women into being, producing other Muslim women (followers) as subjects, and helping women achieve religious transformation. In this post, Kartika presents her personal (religious) choice of wearing a veil and asks people to delete earlier photographs (in which she appears without a veil). This gains new prominence within the context of self-surveillance, self-monitoring,

and self-discipline in a postfeminist media culture (Gill, 2007). Postfeminist media culture emphasises how the media attempts to monitor women's bodies, often through insulting comments and evaluations that focus on female celebrities' performance (including hair, wardrobe, and attitude). As McRobbie (2004) explains, "In postfeminist media culture, [it] is constructed as a window to the individual's interior life."

In this media culture, women's bodies are positioned as needing reinvention or transformation, which can be realised by following the advice of lifestyle experts, hairstylists, designers, and even celebrity religious influencers. As can be seen above, internet celebrities use *hijrah* not only to articulate their private journey, but also create a "rhetoric of authenticity" through their visual styles (Botterill, 2007, pp. 105–125). Authenticity is needed to maintain identity (individuality) while constructing meaning for audiences (Frank, 1997, p. 133). While seen as part of the counterculture themes of self-autonomy and autonomous choice, identity is also a project, part of the problem and process of 'being' (Woodward, 2010, p. 10). For that reason, it is not only required or derived, but negotiated, associated, imagined, and opposed (Hall, 1991, p. 225). The Instagram accounts of internet celebrities can be understood as centrally concerned with encouraging the maintenance of individual identity, manufacturing piety, and constructing Muslim identity.

Figure 5.29: Kartika requesting that people delete all images of her not wearing a hijab, as she had decided to undergo *hijrah*.
Posted 10 February 2018

This caption reads: "My heart trembled when I was told that, when I sleep, eat, study, work, and even pray and study, the angels will record all of my sins. I asked why all the sins still come to me also, even though I do good things. But the angels told me that so many photos of me show my *awrah*, are seen by men who are not my *mahram*. Every man can look at my photographs; that is why the angels kept recording my sins. And these sins will remain even after I pass away. So I am begging, from the bottom of my heart, to help me by deleting all photos of me that not wearing the hijab as obligated for Muslims. May Allah return your kindness.

According to the researcher's personal observations, after declaring her *hijrah*, Kartika reached 11.7 million Instagram followers; this was twice as many as before she began wearing the hijab. By exposing private matters such as religious transformations, internet celebrities optimise their accounts to increase their number of followers, to receive likes, and to invite positive comments that benefit them. As such, it can be seen that emergence of social media culture has been inexorably linked with digital labour, participation, but also commodification (Fuchs, 2014, pp. 60–61).

Another celebrity who broadcasted her self-transformation and decided to use her Instagram account for *da'wa* and self-rebranding activities is Fenita Arie. In the early 2000s, Fenita and her husband Arie Untung happily announced their commitment to transforming themselves through the *hijrah* movement. On her Instagram account, Fenita continuously promotes *hijrah* movement, this relates to the idea of *da'wa*, Fenita Arie frequently invites many people to follow her example and her directions. Notably, Fenita Arie and Arie Untung explicitly linked their *hijrah* to the Ahok case (2016) *(see Kumparan* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5aSBiMXPPIU)*, in that interview Fenita said that one of her reasons to *hijrah* was triggered by a desire to defend Islam:

> In the previous case (of Ahok), Arie was excited to show his position in public, show his stand. I expressed my objections, telling him not to show his view about certain political matters. It is better [I said] if we keep our opinions to ourselves. No need to tell other people. Because we are working in entertainment, and because politics is such a sensitive matter. We still need the attention of the public because we work in this industry. Especially because Muslims were said to have "short fuses" (i.e. be easily angered), and given many offensive names. Finally, at one point, Arie was bullied on social media for expressing his political views. When he was defending Islam, there was a comment addressed to him, like this: "please take care and see to your own wife, who still wears sexy clothes and likes to talk about other people". At the time, the bully mentioned my social media accounts as well. I felt bad for being a wife who did not support her husband, because at that time I still did not wear the hijab and I worked as an infotainment presenter. I was also thinking, "My husband is not bad. He is very pious in his daily life. He always prays, five times a day". It is not like other people said about him. That was when I decided I should follow him, become a better person, and do the Hijrah.

Arie Untung with her wife, Fenita Arie, found public attention because of their *hijrah* stories. Both are important members of the "Musawarah

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Recitation" group, which strongly supports Islam as a way of life. Together with artists Dimas Seto and Teuku Wisnu, they were also founding members of the *Hijrah Festival*, this festival is managed by the event company of Arie Untung[100].

Figure 5.30: A post by Fenita Arie during the Hijrah Festival that shows the quotation:
"Hijrah is with the congregation. (It's better together), don't be alone".
Posted on 23 December 2018

> *Hijrah* is with a congregation. It's better together; don't be alone. Because they are the ones who will be looking for us if we are not in His heaven (Jannah). Let's look for pious friends, so that we can also remind each other to keep *Istiqomah*. Don't say that *Istiqomah* is difficult; we must keep trying #masyaallahtabarakallah #brotherandsistertillheaven #friendship #hijabsquad #hijrahsquad

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[100] see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkCIGfDrQQc when Fenita and Arie Untung made content about the Hijrah Festival official office under their company.

As seen in the figure above, Fenita Arie posted a picture of herself at the *Hijrah Festival* together with many other people. The *Hijrah Festival* is a three-day programme that includes sermons from well-known preachers, communal prayers, and a bazaar; entry costs US$5. 66/person. According to organizers, some 12,000 tickets were sold for the November 2018 Hijrah Festival (see https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/02/21/hijrah-movement-and-millennials-ahead-of-2019-election.html). With her picture, Fenita included a caption that the *hijrah* movement needed to reach as many people as possible. This movement has shaped the construction of piety and the political, cultural and social discourses in Indonesia, becoming an inspiration for new digital-savvy generations of Muslims.

Figure 5.31: Fenita Arie posted a picture of Ustadz Abdul Somad,
the image came from her activities in Hijrah Festival.
Posted 11 November 2018

In the image above Fenita Arie posts a picture with a low angle position. Taking a picture from a low angle, also know as a 'worm's-eye view', makes subjects appear higher than normal. This picture apparently has been taken by Fenita from the audience position, looking and listening to Abdul Somad who was lecturing, at the *hijrah* Festival event. This makes him seem, authoritative and more dominant. In this sense, Fenita also shows her respect for the Ustadz Abdul Somad (UAS) and positions herself as a learner who takes a lesson from UAS preaching. Moreover, Fenita also added a caption that reads; "Masyaallah (as God willing) with our teacher (in Islam) at @hijrahfest #rapatkanshaff #hijrahfest2018". This visual and narrative sign simultaneously tells us something about 'the world' (ideational meaning), positions us in relation to someone or something (interpersonal meaning) and produces a structured text (textual meaning) that reflects Fenita's impression of UAS (see Halliday, 1978).

The contentiousness of the Jakarta gubernational election was driven in part by preachers such as Abdul Somad, Adi Hidayat, Salim Fillah, Felix Siaw, and Hannan Attaki, all of whom supported the *Hijrah* Festival and more religious lifestyles. Most were opposed to Indonesia's incumbent president, Joko Widodo, (2014–2024), and many were controversial. For example, Felix Siaw—as a member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an organization banned by the government in 2018—had supported the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. Siaw has also campaigned, directly and indirectly, to link Islam with HTI's ideology and to offer it as a means of addressing the

marginalisation of Muslims and the socio-economic injustices they experience in Indonesia and around the world (Weng, 2018, p. 74). Another preacher, Adi Hidayat, graduated from Kuliyya Da'wa Islamiyyah in Libya and tends to promote strict and intolerant interpretations in his sermons. The *hijrah* movement, thus, underscores the political ideologies and contestations behind the everyday practice of religion.

Many scholars have discussed how the internet, including social media, has driven the fragmentation of Islamic authority (Eickelman & Anderson 2003, pp. 1–18; Hoesterey 2016, pp. 34–35; Hosen 2008, pp. 159–173). At the same time, internet celebrities use their account to perform their self-transformation in the name of *da'wa* actions. However, the *hijrah* movement prioritises the sense of taking care of *Ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Muslim fellows) and maintaining the faith. Embracing this attitude, many internet celebrities have used social media not only to proclaim their *hijrah*, but also to urge others to make the same decision. Internet celebrities' posts frequently present Islamic ideals and frame veils as representing proper etiquette. They blur the line between public and private, piety and populism.

4. Self-Empowerment: Women Muslimpreneurs and The Ambiguity of Self

This section will analyse Dian Pelangi, an internet celebrity who has used her self- representations to highlight specific articulations of her empowerment and self-entrepreneurship. Her identity as an empowered Muslim woman reflects the neoliberal subjectivity that understands women as

having economic, cultural, and social capital that complement each other. She has used Muslim women's empowerment simultaneously to promote women's autonomy while simultaneously presenting ambiguity in the dualist ideology that juxtaposes the "West" with "Islam". Employing the theory of Orientalism (Said, 1978) and the notion of women's subjectivities (Gill & Scharff, 2011), this section will analyse the practices of post-femininity that are interconnected with self-orientalism and women's autonomy.

Dian Pelangi is one internet celebrity who pronounced her *hijrah* to the public. However, unlike other celebrities, who transformed themselves after the "212 Action to Defend Islam" in 2016, Dian claimed to have experienced internal struggles long before she received attention as a famous designer and celebrity. As explained in her autobiography (2014) *Brain, Beauty, Belief, – A Guide for Being a Smart, Beautiful, and Good Muslimah* (2014), Dian had a 'rebellious' phase as a teenager when she wanted to remove her hijab because few of her classmates at vocational school wore the hijab (2014, pp. 30–31). In this book, Dian also explained she had worn the hijab since childhood (while attending a *pesantren*, an Islamic boarding school), and that as an adult (particularly after becoming a celebrity) she has never wanted to remove it.

On the other hand, Dian Pelangi may be seen as a prominent representative of the emerging Islamic culture industry (Waninger, 2015, p. 2), one wherein Islamic images, practice, knowledge, and commodities have intersected with Indonesian politics. As a Muslim fashion designer, Dian Pelangi has crafted an identity as a Muslim millennial who looks modern,

works hard, is wealthy, pious, and combines her popularity with her business and *da'wa* activities. As explained previously, in Chapter 4, Dian took an active part in the Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam 212). Although this was presented as an expression of Muslim solidarity, it became political, urging the resignation and imprisonment of Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok).

Figure 5.32: A post by Dian Pelangi showing her wearing white; the caption offers words of wisdom and is given the hashtag #212.
Posted 2 December 2016

In Figure 5.32 above, Dian Pelangi shows her political position by presenting herself wearing white Muslim clothing. It is accompanied by the caption; "Oh my Lord who can change hearts, please lock my heart on your religion #212". In the Indonesian internet sphere, the hashtag #212 is used to signify the Action to Defend Islam, as this number refers to 2 December 2016—the date the demonstration occurred. This rally was sponsored by Islamist opponents to Ahok, the ethnic Chinese Christian who served as governor of Indonesia's Muslim-majority capital. When Jakarta Governor Joko "Jokowi" Widodo was elected president in 2014, Ahok—as his deputy—

automatically became governor for the remaining three years of his term. Although Dian employed a soft campaign to promote the 212 movement, her posts nonetheless expressed her belief that Indonesia's leaders should be Muslim. The white clothing worn by Dewi also refers to the clothing worn at the Action to Defend Islam rally, which was intended to link this gathering to those in the fields of *Arafah* in Mecca and *Mahshar* (the place where Muslims believe they will resurrect and meet together on judgment day).

Dian Pelangi has had several achievements in the Indonesian Muslim sphere, having become one of the founders of the *Hijabers* Community in 2011 and been internationally recognised as a Muslim fashion designer, a businesswoman, micro-celebrity, and icon of 'Islamic' products. She has gained significant popularity since 2010, when Dian and her team initiated her personal branding through blog.dianpelangi.com. In 2012, she began relying more on Instagram to reach broader audiences using visual culture instruments. Dian also became popular amongst young digital-savvy Muslim women in Indonesia through the iconic hashtag #hijaboftheday.

Figure 5.33: Dian Pelangi holding a tumbler displaying the name of a dairy product, with the Eiffel Tower, Paris, as her backdrop.
Posted 10 January 2017

The caption reads: Woke up and wishin' I was still on my holiday (smile emoticon). Yet so excited to be back to my studio (with love emoticon) Lovin' the iconic tumblr of @hilo_soleha that always brighten up my day! (Love emoticon). Have a great day #sahabatsoleha (love emoticon) (camera emoticon) picture by: @luluelhasbu

On her Instagram account, Dian Pelangi shares her travels, which reflect her international career and achievements. In Figure 5.33, Dian Pelangi can be seen through a medium angle that can be used in cinematography to show two images at the same time. In this image, Dian is shown against the backdrop of the Eiffel Tower, a famous and remarkable icon of France. Through this image, Dian uses the iconic setting of France as a locus of global fashion that most people would love to visit. A semiotic analysis of this picture shows that the image not only presents her (beautiful) veiled face, but also identifies herself as an empowered Muslimah who can travel internationally without a *mahram*[101] accompanying her. Furthermore, Dian uses her transnational mobility to serve as the brand ambassador of Muslim products.

In Dian Pelangi's Instagram account, it can be seen how she treats her account as a digital magazine, one that is beautifully arranged, with rainbow shades that reflect her cheerful, feminine, and explorative personality. Instagram and other social media may offer a new space for industrialised

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[101] *Mahram* is an Arabic term derived from '*haraam*' which literally refers to something which is sacred or prohibited. In the terminology of Islamic Fiqh, Muslim women should be accompanying with a person at all times on the basis of kinship, or marriage relationship with men.

celebrity manufacturing wherein femininity and consumerism are performed (Duffy, 2015; McRobbie, 1997; Hou, 2019). Social media has facilitated the spread of self-branding and self-celebrification practices, which are replete with exclusivity (Gamson, 2011; Turner, 2010). Through her regular posts, Dian Pelangi regularly depicts herself as a fashion and beauty content creator while simultaneously endorsing a 'feminised consumption of branded goods' (Duffy, 2015), thereby positioning herself as one of Indonesia's most powerful influencers.

Figure 5.34: Dian Pelangi sharing that she was recognised with the Forbes 30 Under 30 Asia – 2018 Award for Two Categories (Celebrity and The Arts). Posted 28 March 2018

With caption reads: 10 years of an amazing journey. When I look back to the beginning of my career in this industry, never have I thought that I will get this far, to this point, Forbes 30 under 30 Asia - 2018, for TWO categories; Celebrity and The Arts. The young Dian, wanted only to express her idea, to introduce modest fashion to the world and to make her parents and family proud. Alhamdulillah all the hard work has been paid. This recognition is not merely an achievement for me, but also a responsibility and a reminder, to keep going, to inspire, to be down to earth, and to encourage you, you and you, that "You Can". Thank you @forbes @forbesasia. It Can. Although the hands and knees has trembled. Although the teeth have crunched and rasped. Although the heartbeats and the eyes has fireflies. You can. Graduates of Islamic boarding school and fashion design vocational schools who do not have anything behind the name, but you can do this. You definitely can do more. 💪

Another post (Figure 5.34) depicts Dian Pelangi as a successful entrepreneur and fashion designer, one who was recognised by Forbes in 2018 as an inspirational celebrity and artist. She posted a series of beautiful images of herself, accompanied by captions that identify her as a graduate of an Islamic boarding school and a fashion school (unpopular amongst young Indonesians). Furthermore, these captions appear to emphasise her identity as an inspirational young Muslim woman who appreciates religion but is not old-fashioned. Through such posts, Dian Pelangi shows her exceptionalism and identifies herself as an influencer who combines economic, cultural, and social capital to highlight her expertise and exceptional skills (Abidin, 2018, p. 28). By combining these images and captions, Dian Pelangi showcases her abilities as a Muslim fashion designer who enjoys social mobility, capital control, and social inclusivity.

Gill (2007, pp. 147–166) explains that cultural media forms often depict women contradictorily, simultaneously offering empowerment while celebrating consumerism as part of success. By highlighting her recognition as part of *Forbes'* "30 under 30 Asia", Dian Pelangi presents herself as a successful woman with international recognition. Moreover, this image also presents Dian Pelangi as part of a neoliberalism logic, using upward mobility and representing an entrepreneurial spirit. Freeman (2007) explains that the dialectics between reputation, respectability, and class in an entrepreneurial world have implications for neoliberalism's cultural meaning. Of particular note, *Forbes* is an American business magazine that deploys a list and rankings of a public figure's reputation.

However, Gill (2017) also identified a link between neoliberalism and gender relations. In one of her captions Dian Pelangi writes: "The young Dian wanted only to express her ideas, to introduce a modest fashion to the world, and to make her parents and family proud." This can be understood as implying that Dian Pelangi, as an individual, made significant effort while also facing outside pressure, constraint, and influence in her journey to become a successful fashion designer. In her caption, Dian Pelangi also highlighted her support for other women: "This recognition is not merely an achievement for me, but also a responsibility and a reminder, to keep going, to inspire, to be down to earth, and to encourage you, you, and you, [to say] that 'You Can'. Thank you @forbes @forbesasia. It Can. Although hands and knees tremble. Although teeth crunch and rasp. Although heartbeats and eyes flutter. You

can". This caption identifies Dian Pelangi as having autonomy and passion, as being a self-regulating subject capable of competing and participating in the challenging world. Dian Pelangi practices self-management and self-discipline, as identified in postfeminist and neoliberal ideals (see Gill, 2017, p. 2017; McRobbie, 2004, pp. 255–264).

Figure 5.35: Dian Pelangi presenting herself wearing a *chador,*
accompanied by words of wisdom.
Posted 14 June 2018

This image is accompanied by the caption: Every pious has a past, and every sinner has a future, God willing #WelcomingEid #Repentance

In her images and captions, Dian Pelangi often combines modern and progressive representations with conservative ones. Although in some pictures she looks modern and travels internationally, she also offers a conservative representation of piety. This can be seen in Figure 6.35, where Dian presents herself wearing a chador and embracing the exoticism of Arabic culture. This image and its accompanying caption employs orientalism (Said, 1978, pp. 2–

3) to depict women as exotic creatures, different and inferior beings who are sites of sin and fitnah and thus must be controlled. As an empowered Muslim woman, Dian Pelangi has the ability to control and influence others; this power makes it possible for her to maintain discourse. Instead of placing herself as a challenging and robust subject, Dian Pelangi positions herself as an object of self-orientalism. The subjects' creation and the objects of individual knowledge are in intimate contact (Foucault, 1966).

As seen in the figure above, the self-orientalism discourse highlights the link between the body and political power (Butler, 1990). It is implied that Muslim women's discursive body practices have a set of rules; even though women have autonomy in their lives, they remain subjects that must be protected, covered, and controlled through the chador. This Muslim woman's discourse, can be identified as a consequence of women's modern urban spaces and their use of global communication networks. As Indonesian Muslims have negotiated between religious practices and secular consumerism, they have sought to validate their personal piety in the public sphere, as seen in Figure 5.35. Such representation has created an ambiguous space for Muslim women, wherein they practice agency while simultaneously being controlled. As can be seen, internet celebrities tend to construct identities as international travellers and independent Muslimah on Instagram, but still remain faithful to Arabic cultural perspectives.

Conclusion

Many internet celebrities have chosen to remove photographs of themselves from before they began wearing the hijab, as they believe that the continued presentation of their *awrah* in these past photographs would result in sustained immorality—a legacy of sin. Such a concept has become increasingly common in Indonesia over the past few years. Detailed observation of four internet celebrities—Dewi Sandra, Kartika Putri, Fenita Arie, and Zaskia Sungkar—shows that, after deciding to undertake *hijrah*, they deleted earlier photographs showing their unveiled bodies. Another two internet celebrities, Oki Setiana Dewi and Dian Pelangi, began wearing the hijab before they created their Instagram accounts and the *hijrah* trend grew in Indonesia. Only two of the studied internet celebrities, Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Tantri Syalindri, have kept photographs of their unveiled bodies on social media. Accidental and/or internet celebrity requires controversy and intentional self-branding to achieve temporary virality on social media (Abidin, 2017, p. 14). However, in Indonesia, religious publication is important for articulating self-identity. This can also be seen in the positive response to internet celebrities, i.e. in followers' appreciation.

Based on this examination of the Instagram accounts of internet celebrities, it can be concluded that online media platforms enable internet celebrities (as networked actors) to create creative content, spread media narratives, and disseminate political ideas congruent with their personal ideals and values while encouraging comments or feedback from followers. Their interactions with audiences demonstrate how affective politics unite their networks, thereby

highlighting how emotions and affective politics—be they consistent with or contrary to an individual's biases—can produce greater media engagement thus reinforcing this communicative cycle (Parsons, 2010; Papacharissi, 2010).

Women's bodies, as part of their individual subjectivity, embody social and political values through cultural means. Women employ their subjectivity to gain recognition as pious women, ideal wives, and good mothers. Cultural interpellations transform women into being, produce them as subjects (Butler, 1990, 1993). This can be used to understand how Muslim women internet celebrities represent their body autonomy, discipline, and self-regulation within the confines of society's discursive practices (Foucault, 1990). As seen in internet celebrities' accounts, the *hijrah* journey is always related to the discourse of the new-self, one that urges women to turn to consumerism and the commercial world for religious, feminine, and domestic direction. Islamic labels and products are often found in celebrities' post, further emphasising their self-transformation. After completing their self-transformation, internet celebrities actively promote many commodities associated with religion, including outfits that are deemed Islamic. Instagram accounts are primarily used to manage the embodied and physical self by telling self-stories about religious experiences and expressing self-agency while undergoing self-transformation (Foucault, 1988).

Instagram has attracted younger users, particularly millennials (Arnold Street Media, 2016), who are attracted to visual culture and its ability to offer "products in an original way" (Clasen, 2015). At the same time, to build authentic brands and social interactions, internet celebrities need to share their personal

stories to create a community with strong fans and customers; as such, Instagram has become the most popular social media platform for social interaction (Voorveld et al., 2018, pp. 38–54).

YouTube, on the other hand, is used for vlogging and documenting everyday life, with such videos being used as part of a marketing strategy to present internet celebrities' everyday lives and activities (Gamson, 2011, pp. 1061–1069). Through Instagram posts, as complemented by YouTube videos, internet celebrities do not only promote products, but also provide narratives and contexts that blur the boundaries between advertisement, testimony, and authentic content. Internet celebrities build their reputations on their everyday posts, massively promoting products and services. They are influencers, with engaged followers who pay close consideration to their views; therefore, the line between editorial content and sponsored is blurred, as influencers' tastes cannot be easily separated from the content they are paid to endorse (Abidin, 2018; Nisa, 2018; Dekavalla, 2019).

Moreover, Khamis et al. (2017, pp. 191–208) also explain that brand trademarks (consistency, characteristics, and values) must be maintained in cross-media strategies through such activities as "liking", "sharing", and "commenting". These strategies offer a space for interaction and self-branding, through which public attention can be drawn. As Page argues, there is "particular emphasis on the construction of identity as a product to be consumed by others, and on interaction which treats the audience as an aggregated fan base to be developed and maintained in order to achieve social or economic benefit" (2012, p. 182). This situation can be understood as part of *prosumer* activities, where, to some extent, there is blurring

between production and consumption activities (Ritzer, 2009; Fuchs, 2014). Social media involves an attention economy, one that engages with the neoliberal reasoning of competition and individualism because content creators seek to "accumulates likes, followers, friends or check-ins" as part of their self-branding reputation (Fuchs, 2014, p. 36). Audience attention is a commodity for industrialised celebrity manufacturing, wherein attention is a new form of currency (Garcıa-Rapp, 2017; Fuchs, 2020).

Muslim women's subjectivity also has a contested relationship with the meaning of one's "true self"[102]. Instagram celebrities attempt to manufacture piety, an as part of hybrid identity realised as a result of their *hijrah* journey. As the section above explained, *hijrah* is not a monolithic concept, but rather, one that varies based upon its articulation of "the true self". As the *hijrah* trend has got stronger in Indonesia, especially since the Action to Defend Islam, women's bodies have increasingly been discussed and labelled within piety discourses. Internet celebrities have used dynamic Islamic self-(re)branding on social media to reconfigure the political subjectivity of Muslim womanhood, creating the view that women's bodies should be covered as a sign of their devotion to God and the quality of their piety. On the other hand, however, some internet celebrities also challenge

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[102] The true-self can be understood in terms of how individuals prepare for such performances (see Goffman, 1959), which includes how Muslim women present themselves in public lives. When it comes to wearing a veil, Muslim women have many reasons and motivations. It could be for personal reasons, like their family's upbringing in Islamic beliefs. However, wealth, spiritual experience, individualism, and self-actualization are all factors that can impact veiling practices (Hefner, 2000; White, 2002; Jones, 2007).

the collective definition of *hijrah*, presenting a different representation—a religious nationalist ideology. Understanding internet celebrities' identity performances, as well as the intersection of their performances with digital initiatives, consumerism, democratisation, religious nationalism, and Islamisation, facilitates the understanding of image-making activities and contestations in Indonesia.

Moreover, some key features of Muslim internet celebrity are the use of online visual sermons as part of *da'wa*, with eye-catching images and captions written in casual language that can influence others' religious practices. This reality provides evidence that Muslim internet celebrities, as influencers, cultivate themselves not only as brands but also market products through their images of piety. Such activities represent young Muslim women's involvement in religious, political, and business activities in their online representation. According to Boubkeur and Roy, a 'post-Islamist society' is characterised by 'the growth of a younger post-Islamist generation which has used online media and social networking, not to articulate about an Islamic state, but to join global discourses on freedom and pluralist societies' (2012, p. 13). This reflects a study by Muller (2013, pp. 261–284), who found that Islamic markets and post-Islamism reinforce each other, and that Islam becomes 'post-Islamic' in its competition over popular culture. It follows that political ideology transforms itself into a life philosophy of systematised personal piety; through online media, personal piety is facilitated by secular methods. Also important is the self-orientalism represented by internet celebrities, who present a dualism but also sometimes a fusion between 'West and Islam', as a consequence of globalisation, online media, and social networking.

Anderson (1991) explains how media and communication become politicised because of the imagined community that they explicitly construct. People's perceptions of their identities, relationships, and connections to one another are aided by Internet technology and infrastructure. Social media, as part of the networked era's participatory culture, has enabled Muslims to engage in global discourse and take action based on their personal experiences (Jenkins, 2016). The architecture of social media platforms such as Instagram (including visual filters, short video clips, photo sharing and tagging, hashtags) ease networked publics creation of online communities, including those that supported (or, alternatively, resisted) the Islamic discourses that flourished after the "212 Action to Defend Islam" in 2016.

Chapter 6

Imagining an *Ummah*: Internet Celebrities and Muslim Solidarity

This chapter investigates how internet celebrities represent Muslim solidarity through their Instagram accounts. The term solidarity refers to "standing in unity with others and showing support in the struggle for justice" (Nikunen, 2019, p. 15). The solidarity can also suggest feeling and action between individuals or groups with the same concern, that incites social movement, therefore collective activity is growing not only because of the idea of participation but also emotional solidarity (Jones, 1995, p. 16). Internet celebrities manifest piety not only by being fashionable and modest, and not only through overtly Islamic styling, but also by presenting their inner motivations and speaking about global Muslim communities. Several internet celebrities have become voices of conservative ideas, and through their posts, they have developed a transnational resistance identity that challenges an alleged global conspiracy against Islam. This evidences that the *ummah* is imagined as a revolutionary group of the faithful seeking to re-establish Global Political Islam[103] (Mandaville, 2001).

In Indonesian, the term *ummah*—an Arabic loan word—is generally used to refer to Muslim communities in both local and global contexts. It is commonly used by clerics during religious gatherings to refer to their congregations as well as

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[103] According to Mandaville, the interaction between political Islam, nationalism, state, society, and globalization adds to Islam's complexity. He also thinks that Islam's political position has become more complex and delicate in recent years as a result of globalization.

global Islam. It is not only a faith that unites Muslims into one community, but also an emotion that enables Muslims to engage with others in other parts of the world. At the same time, however, the term *ummah* is sometimes invoked for political reasons. *Ummah* sometimes invokes idealized versions of Islamic history, advocating for the 'reconstitution' of the caliphate, a state that politically unites all Muslims in a single entity, a 'new' Islamic system (dar al-Islam). Others see Pan-Islamic solidarity in cosmopolitan terms, forming a community of individual Muslims connected via transnational rather than intergovernmental organizations (see Hashmi, 2009).

By exploring the conservative understanding of *ummah* and piety, this chapter will discuss how internet celebrities interact with their peers and their rivals to construct a transnational Islamic identity. Overall, this chapter will borrow Anderson's concept of imagined community and his argument that the (print) media industry plays an important role in elaborating the concept of nation as an imagined political community. The concept will be used to understand the discursive practices evident in internet celebrities' posts and the comments of their followers (1983, p. 46).

This research uses social media Instagram as its corpus, with the concept of an imagined community being used to understand the nexus between Global in the imagined Muslim *ummah* then perceived global conspiracy against it, and a link between national consciousness and religious solidarities. Through internet celebrities' posts and political discourses, social media has brought into being mass publics who are connected by identity, religious solidarity, and imagined

community. Further facilitating this, the digital age has precipitated the rise of a new type of community: an online community that emphasises connections and networks (see Anderson, 1992, pp. 7–8; Gole, 1997; Lim, 2012; boyd, 2011; Erol, 2011).

Moreover, this chapter will also apply participatory culture theory to understand how social connections are created within the digital environment, as well as how followers/commentators respond to the social media content of internet celebrities. Muslim solidarity also consists of the performance of self-action, wherein images, audio-visual media, and caption texts are produced and consumed as part of a participatory culture that advances the articulation of self and sharing in an online community (Jenkins, 2016). Audiences have responded through various comments that support Muslim solidarity; this can also be seen as part of participatory culture, even though social media activism it can be categorized as a "lazy" form of activism (Morozov, 2009). As part of the digital environment, social media provides users an opportunity to establish more interactive, collaborative, and egalitarian relations (Castells, 1996, p. 388; Slevin, 2000). Moreover, in the digital era, the development of online communities has contributed significantly to the emergence of new practices of citizenship that raise new challenges and opportunities as technology reconfigures publicness (Hermes, 2006; boyd & Baym, 2012).

Social media, being a mediated public, enables content creators and audiences to interact with each other. Social media, as part of a networked public involving new social dynamics, offers people space to actively discover their

collective identity and ascribe it to themselves and others (see Said, 1978). Additionally, to recognise subsequent developments and trends, this analysis also refers to video materials from September 2016 to December 2018, as well as several pictures and videos posted in 2019 that demonstrate the representation of specific issues by internet celebrities. To deepen its analysis of the Muslim solidarity activities performed by certain internet celebrities, this section also includes several pictures from YouTube that are related to the 2017 Action to Defend Palestine. A descriptive analysis of celebrities' posts, as well as comments from their followers, supports this textual analysis, thereby making a more comprehensive multimodal analysis possible.

1. **The Representation of Global Muslim Solidarity**

This subsection investigates how some internet celebrities taking part in the Muslim solidarity discourse have produced discourse of nationalism and Muslim identity in the global Muslim public sphere. This section will explore how internet celebrities portray themselves as pious Muslim women who are members of a global Islam. This part will use Anderson's conceptual framework to explain how media is used to create an imagined community (1991, p. 7), expanding the concept to include not only political communities, but also racial, regional, and religious communities, such as a universal *ummah* (Lim, 2012, p. 137). Furthermore, this section also investigates how internet celebrities contribute to the construction of political issues. In the discursive context, internet celebrities are taking part in producing and representing these self

stories. The term "self" refers to the Muslim community, which is against the imagination of the stronger West, which must be battled and called "others."

Oki Setiana Dewi (OSD) is the most noticeable of the Internet celebrities who actively uses Instagram extensively for *da'wa* and establishing global Muslim solidarity as an object of living a noble Islamic life. Based on empirical observation, the findings indicate that Oki Setiana Dewi posted an average of 5–6 times a day in the specific time of period. As such, she is the most active of the eight internet celebrities analysed in this study. She was particularly active after the first 'Action to Defend Islam' in 2016, using this momentum to promote a global Muslim solidarity movement in Indonesia on Instagram. In her posts, Oki Setiana Dewi continued to contest established (in Indonesia) notions of piety with reference to a global Muslim solidarity discourse. Through observation, it is noticeable that she posted more regularly about global Muslim solidarity over time; she posted on the topic 101 times in 2017 and 119 times in 2018.

Oki Setiana Dewi makes the connection between Indonesia and global causes in several ways. As can be seen in figure 6.1 below, this is evident through the use of Palestine and Indonesian colours and identities to symbolically depict the struggle against a colonialist (Israeli) power. This video, posted in celebration of Indonesia's independence edition, shows Oki Setiana Dewi wearing a black hijab and confidently delivering a speech from a *minbar* (mosque pulpit, where imams generally stand when delivering sermons); although her audience is not clear, it appears that she is speaking to a prayer

recitation group. However, at the same time Oki Setiana Dewi asserts the need for global solidarity through the text 'Towards #ActiontoDefendPalestine, Indonesian independence is incomplete without Palestinian independence' (*Menuju #AksiBelaPalestina. Kemerdekaan Indonesia tidak lengkap tanpa kemerdekaan Palestina*).

This combination of nationalist identity and global solidarity demonstrates an example of the fusion of national and global identities for political reasons. Furthermore, in the last scene a dark colour is used to conclude the short video, emphasising the idea that Palestine is being colonised and remains in a precarious situation because of ongoing conflict. By identifying Muslim actors and Islamic countries as standing together with Indonesia, she articulated a message of Muslim solidarity and created an imagined identity that included Indonesia, Palestine, Egypt, and Arabic countries. Using a hashtag resembling that of the #ActiontoDefendIslam, her campaign appears to connect Islamic consciousness with national consciousness as a sign of an authentic Indonesian Muslim identity. Hashtags also have the purpose of accumulating discussions/chat/talk and producing thematic areas to discuss (Bruns & Burgess, 2011).

Hashtags are also proficient to promotion knowledge and understanding about particular topics as in the illustration of hashtag engagement (see Yang, 2016). Muslim women are constructed as conducting jihad not only through financial donations and verbal support, but also through digital posts promoting global Islamic solidarity. In social media sharing photos in a certain theme is

part of attachment and closeness (Van Dijck, 2008, pp. 57-76), because the activity provides bonding and group interaction that has endowing effect (Tiidenberg, 2014, p.40). Sharing photos is also part of empowerment and agency, where through selfies everyone can show their engagement with an online community in a specific event through the hashtag (see Deller & Tilton, 2015; Hampton, 2015). Using hashtags on Instagram is also a significant way to elevate awareness, because it helps them to be found by other users, especially non-followers.

Figure 6.1: Excerpts from a short video showing Oki Setiana Dewi delivering a speech in favour of Palestinian solidarity, as well as several responses to her post.
Posted on 16 December 2017

In her speech, Oki Setiana Dewi tells her audience that Indonesia owes much to Palestine. She even mentions that Soekarno, who had proclaimed Indonesia's independence and served as its first president, had seven decades

ago previously declared that Palestinians and Indonesians were brothers. As the video presenting Oki's speech displays:

> "During Indonesia's independence, the proclaimer Soekarno stated, "Never forget history, how Sheikh Muhammad Amin Al-Husaini, the Great Mufti (Leader) of Palestine, expressed his support for Indonesia's independence in September 1944 on Arabic radio in Berlin; the Egyptian and Palestinian people also provided their support. They lobbied, urged Arab countries to support Indonesia's independence. Even Muhammad Ali Taher, the most prosperous Palestinian entrepreneur, gave all of his money to Bank Arabia and said; "I do not need proof of my donation. Please, accept all of my assets so Indonesia can become free". How, now, can we not defend you, Palestine? Our independence (Indonesia) is incomplete without Palestinian independence".

Most of the comments posted in response to Oki Setiana Dewi's video were positive, using the name of God to support her stance. As follows; @account 6.1: "Masyaallah (what Allah wants), I got goose bumps, Sister. Allahuakbar (Allah is great)"; @account 6.2: "Subhanallah (Allah is perfect)"; @account 6.3: "Masyaallah (what Allah wants), Allahuakbar (Allah is great)". Additionally, Oki Setiana Dewi's speech provided a short historical narrative, arguing that Indonesia had only become independent through the support of Egypt and Palestine, and through lobbying other Arabic countries to the encouragement of Indonesian freedom at that time. Oki Setiana Dewi also mentioned Sheikh Muhammad Amin Al-Husaini, a Palestinian cleric, *mujahideen*,[104] and mufti who was interested and concerned for Muslims and

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[104] In Islamic countries, persons who fight or act as soldiers—especially against non-Muslim forces—are called *mujahideen*. In Indonesia, Salafi Jihadi groups have encouraged Muslims to become *mujahideen* and fight as jihadis. Similarly, in the global Muslim solidarity discourse, people who fight for Palestinian freedom are also considered *mujahideen*.

Muslim communities around the world—including in Indonesia. Through her speech, Oki Setiana Dewi emphasised that, although Sheikh Muhammad Amin Al-Husaini had been fighting against British imperialism and Zionists[105] who wanted to control the city of Al-Quds, Palestine (also known as Jerusalem), he continued to support Indonesia's independence.

By referencing Soekarno and Sheikh Muhammad Amin Al-Husaini, Oki Setiana Dewi created a specific communicative event involving a number of social actors within a specific setting. From contextual features, it can be seen that she sought to construct a discourse that underscored the long-standing closeness and friendship between Indonesians and Palestinians, something that endures even today. Furthermore, through her communication with her followers, she attempts to develop a new imagined community from the dynamic intersection of global and local identities. As Mandaville (2001, p. 170) states, internet technology has allowed Muslims to reimagine their community as an *ummah* even when they feel disregarded in many Western societies.

Not only that, it should be recognised how Instagram comments work as feedback, and internet celebrities use them to maintain relationships with their active followers. Moreover, comments enable varying levels of public engagement, thereby creating a sense of community in online spaces. One implication of the digital environment is the possibility that 'every participant

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[105] Zionism is a popular term in Indonesia, which can be attributed in part to Indonesians' solidarity with the Palestinian people.

in a communicative act has an imagined audience' (see Jenkins 2016, p. 2). Moreover, because digital technology can facilitate online communities in their efforts to collaboratively erase boundaries, audiences can become cohesive because they share certain imaginations regarding identities such as language, religion, and political choice.

As explained by Jenkins (2016), participatory culture can promote specific issues that encourage community engagement and support for certain values, including global Muslim solidarity. Social media has helped Muslims engage in global discourse and take action based on their life experiences (Burgess, Green, Jenkins, and Hartley, 2009). At the same time, however, participatory culture is also problematic (Fuchs, 2014, pp. 60–61), as content creators—e.g. internet celebrities—and their audiences do not occupy an equal position. Content producers are dominant in making commercial and profit-oriented messages, reaping material benefits and popularity from the activities of their followers. Participatory culture, thus, also involves the exploitation of audiences as digital labour.

Specifically, thus, it seems that the audiences and followers of Muslim internet celebrities—as in Figure 6.1 example above—take indications from the social media environment to imagine the *ummah*. By invoking the name of God (Allah), the imagined audience exists using the 'same text, same stylistic and linguistic choices' (Scheidt, 2006, p. 245). As explained by Fairclough (2003, pp. 124–127), discourse operates as part of a projective imaginary, with feelings, beliefs, and social mores that represent diverse aspects that are located

in the text and social practices. Commentators articulate their feelings as sharing an identity with other commentators, thereby enabling them to act and feel as if they know each other and feel united as one community and religion.

Moreover, Fairclough argues that social practice plays a significant role in articulating and reproducing identities in discourse (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, p. 38). However, since internet celebrities share their values, political stances, and opinions with their audiences, it can be understood how internet celebrities' activities frame audiences not as mere fans or followers, but rather as "political allies, supporters, political opponents, even as mediators to broader publics such as journalist; and attention is treated, at least insofar as the issue is addressed explicitly, as an instrumental resource that is sought for the cause rather than solely for the sake of attention on the person" (Marwick & boyd, 2011, p. 14).

Moreover, as internet celebrities must maintain their popularity, they often use macro and micro-narratives to draw fans' attention and stimulate interactions. As mentioned by Page (2012), social media can be deliberated as a promising space aimed at digital storytelling. It can be used to communicate an idea, a message, action, or further information in a sequence identified as a narrative. Social media facilitates the sharing of emotions and sentiments regarding current issues, as well as the creation of a visual narrative through such techniques as photography, filming, recording, and editing. Related to this, social media can also be seen as a creative industry with interconnected

roles and functions used not only by amateurs but also professionals (Burgess, 2007).

Social media narratives are multimodal, combining different modes (images and texts). They are not driven only by natural practices, but also necessitate skilled content creation (Venditi, et al., 2017, pp. 273–282). Social media is a key instrument for identity construction, and it is used by internet celebrities to facilitate the dissemination of information and recontextualisation of this information with macro narratives. In this sense, global narratives and macro narratives imply the possibility of summarising broader discourses (see Djik, 1976, pp. 547–568). In this context, macro discourse involves the construction of the nation, the construction of the global *ummah*, and the definition of both in the minds of the Indonesian people. As mentioned in Chapter Three, in Indonesian society, disagreements and conflicts between Israel and Arabic countries are consistently associated with the Israel–Palestine problem. Furthermore, the conflict is always depicted and seen as "fundamentally religious rather than political or territorial" (Lim, 2012, p. 133). This has an impact on all activities related to Israel, which is labelled as immoral, a land of unbelievers (*kafir*); conversely, everything related to Palestine is represented as positive and Islamic by the Indonesian people.

In the context of Muslim solidarity, Oki Setiana Dewi has linked "Palestine narratives" with the construction of Indonesian Muslimhood. As mentioned by Lim (2012, p. 137), internet technology mediates the discussion of global issues that are recontextualised vis-à-vis national and local situations,

and these are continuously contested with micro-narratives that are derived from complex everyday life practices. In other words, internet celebrities use global topics to connect with their fans and followers using local languages and natural narratives, thereby portraying themselves as credible representatives of the interests of ordinary people.

Online connections position online communities as fan bases, and communication technologies are the dominant tools through which Internet celebrities "maintain authentic relationships" (Marwick, 2013, p. 119). In the above post, by referencing two prominent and respected leaders in her speech, Oki constructed an imagined community in which Indonesia and Palestine exist side by side. Moreover, she identified 'Egypt' and 'Arabic radio' as having promoted Indonesian independence, thereby reasserting the significance of Islamic solidarity and transnational Muslim identity in Indonesia. She thus sought to play an important role in creating an online community, using social media to present various stories and images that could help audiences empathise with the suffering, sadness, and oppression of others. As explained by Nikunen (2019, pp. 15–16), solidarity action media also presents stories that benefit specific parties at the expense of others. As such, the media plays a vital role in shaping conflict and expressing suffering to broader audiences (Franks, 2013, p. 3; Tester, 2001).

However, on her short video post, Oki includes the watermark *Saling Sapa TV* as well as that organisation's Instagram and YouTube accounts. This context suggesting that Oki Setiana Dewi's post (see figure 6.1) and activities

were affiliated with these accounts. The application of this watermark is intended to inform people of the owner of the videos and promote the brand name to audiences. A comprehensive exploration shows that *Saling Sapa TV* was established by "Action Defend Islam 212" alumni as a means of spreading media that opposed Joko Widodo in Indonesia's April 2019 presidential election.[106] *Saling Sapa TV* presents not only Islamic sermons delivered by Islamic preachers, but also videos that argue that the Joko Widodo government[107] has promoted political policies that are detrimental to the interests of Indonesian Muslims.

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[106] In the 2019 Presidential Election campaign, Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin identified with the religious nationalist narrative and Pancasila, while their opponents Prabowo Subianto and Sandiago Uno identified as conservative Muslims backed by pro-sharia groups. During Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, Sandiaga Uno had run as the deputy to gubernatorial candidate Anies Baswedan.

[107] The presidential election campaign of 2014, which culminated in the election of Joko Widodo as president, provided numerous examples of strong nationalism re-emerging at the core of Indonesian politics (see Aspinall, 2015). But, the political constellation of Indonesia was altered in 2017 as a result of the increasing penetration of Islam, which was followed by the occurrence of the Action to Defend Islam. Indeed, Joko Widodo and Ahok are political allies. Ahok was appointed as Joko Widodo's deputy governor in Jakarta for the period 2012-2017 by election, and in 2014, Joko Widodo decided to run for President of Indonesia, which he won. Since 2017 then, hard-line Islamists have targeted Jokowi personally, accusing him of pushing liberal secularism and rumors that he is a closet Christian. Therefore, Joko Widodo chose Ma'aruf Amin as his vice president in the 2019 presidential election to appeal to Muslim voters. Ma'ruf is regarded as one of the country's most powerful Muslim figures. In 2015-2020, he serves as the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). Indonesia's primary ecclesiastical authority, the MUI, is made up of Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Having first posted content on 18 April 2017 (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7YCGiXK8Zw), *Saling Sapa TV* has produced videos that depict Islamic recitations by prominent clerics (all 212 Alumni) and Indonesian public figures who have undergone *hijrah*. This YouTube channel has also offered a platform for discussion; during its live streams, participants are able to converse with each other as a perceived *ummah*.

At the same time, Oki Setiana Dewi's post clearly displays the logo of the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI, GNPF-MUI), an organisation that had aggressively campaigned against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and steered the 'Action to Defend Islam'. The YouTube channel *Saling Sapa TV* also broadcast the 'Action to Defend Palestine', which was held on 17 December 2017. A screen capture of the YouTube video is presented in Figure 6.2 below:

Figure 6.2: Screen capture picture from a YouTube video showing the 'Action to Defend Palestine' (17 December 2017); this agenda was promoted by Oki Setiana Dewi through Instagram posts on
9, 11, 12, 15, and 6 December 2017.
Live streamed on 16 December 2017

Figure 6.2 shows Habib Rizieq Shihab,[108] a leader of the Islamic Defenders' Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) giving a speech from what he claimed to be Mecca. Claiming to represent the phenomenal strength of political Islam, he was an initiator of the 'Action to Defend Islam' and consistently demanded that Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) be arrested and tried for blasphemy. During the Action to Defend Palestine, FPI again sought to promote a particular Islamic identity and piety by challenging the Joko Widodo government. By using the same figure and agenda as the 'Action to Defend Islam', the 'Action to Defend Palestine' provided a point of unity for protesters and presented itself as an important chapter in the "awakening of Islam"[109] in Indonesia.

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[108] Habib Rizieq Shihab is a leader of FPI that had a central role in supporting Prabowo's coalition and election campaign in 2019. Through the Ahok blasphemy case in the 2017 Jakarta generational election, FPI have had success through provocation, hate speech campaigns and mobilizing people in supporting Action Defend Islam. Since 2017 Habib Rizieq stayed in Mecca after Jakarta Police allegedly identified him as witness in the case of smartphone chats containing pornography, on the FPI sites it is believed the case has been used to discredit Rizieq's position as an Ulema (Islamic cleric).

[109] The Indonesian Council of Ulamas[109] (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), Indonesia's official clerical body, had formally issued a fatwa urging the government to prosecute Ahok for insulting the Quran. It also urged Islamist groups to remain calm during the judicial process, but this request was largely ignored; rather than remain calm, Islamist groups—particularly smaller, more radical ones such as FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which together formed GNPF-MUI—held a series of protests ('peace actions') demanding Ahok's imprisonment. During these protests, demonstrators held congregational recitations and prayers at the National Monument in Jakarta.

Figure 6.3: A Saling Sapa TV stream from its YouTube channel. Covering Prabowo Subianto's electoral campaign, it shows members of clergy (*ulama*) who supported the candidate.
Live streamed on 6 April 2019

Figure 6.4: Another scene from the Saling Sapa TV stream, depicting Prabowo Subianto and Sandiago Uno during their campaign activities in Jakarta; participants wore white hijabs, robes, caps, and turbans, all of which drew on the Islamic fashion codes of the Arab Peninsula to affirm a genuine Islamic value.
Live streamed on 6 April 2019

Interestingly, the YouTube channel Saling Sapa TV live streamed a campaign rally held by Prabowo Subianto—Joko Widodo's opponent in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election—on 6 April 2019. Both the GNPF-MUI and Saling Sapa TV logos can be seen on the video (see Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4). The short video posted by Oki Setiana Dewi was linked to the audience of those backing Prabowo Subianto's campaign (April 2019), the 'Action to

Defend Islam' (2016), and 'Action to Defend Palestine' (2017–2018). Moreover, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 shows how the colour white and Islamic fashion codes were used during the presidential campaign, reflecting Islamic identity politics (i.e. an attempt to accommodate broader Islamic groups in Indonesian politics) and the rejection of the Joko Widodo government's perceived lack of Islamic credentials and support for communism and Chinese economic hegemony.

By using an Islamic identity to actively mobilise religious sentiment, Prabowo Subianto and his supporters actively promoted a sectarian campaign, using congregational recitations and prayers similar to that done by the Action to Defend Islam at the National Monument. However, Prabowo Subianto's sectarian campaign polarised voters and created friction between Muslim, Nationalist, and Secular groups that could create instability in Indonesian society. As explained in Chapter 1, these three groups have historically been trapped in a never-ending struggle for political power.

Through one-minute long videos posted to Instagram, internet celebrities were able to present the Indonesian nation as deviating from Islam (in recent history). Internet celebrities and political-religious influencers such as Oki Setiana Dewi were thus involved in the cultural production of knowledge, attempting to construct understandings of Indonesia and Islam that were mutually compatible. Demonstrations and political engagement were presented, disguised as popular culture and religion, and Muslim internet celebrities used Instagram to spread more extensive understandings of media,

religion, and culture as part of ongoing continuous social change. As represented in the short video post by Oki Setiana Dewi (see figure 6.5), this can be seen through the visual communication where components including; fonts, colours and composition work to communicate ideas and political stances; Oki uses a multimodal form of communication to transform her solidarity activities.

Figure 6.5: Oki promoting donations for Syrian Global Muslim solidarity.
Posted on 8 March 2018

Oki has also produced and circulated short videos that urge Indonesian Muslims to stand in solidarity with the Muslims of Ghouta, Syria (Figure 6.5). This can be seen in the background of a short video depicting a speech by the

internet celebrity. Presenting pictures of destroyed homes, schools, and public facilities in Ghouta, the post is accompanied by the hashtag #saveGhouta (#selamatkanGhouta), which implicitly urges Indonesian Muslims to take a stand against the United States and Zionism. The post also includes a link to the Instagram account of Quick Response and Action (Aksi Cepat Tanggap, ACT), an Islamic philanthropical organisation affiliated with PKS[110] that has actively promoted global Muslim solidarity. Her choice of hashtags, thus, supports her efforts to create a global *ummah*.

> May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be with you. I, Oki Setiana Dewi, invite all of you to make donations to our friends, our brothers and sisters in Ghouta who are being tested by Allah (Glory to Him) with various kinds of sorrow. Therefore, please give your best gifts to Aksi Cepat Tanggap at the account listed below. God willing, [we can] help our brothers in Ghouta. Stop Syrian suffering. Save Ghouta!

As mentioned previously, the glorification of Islam through *da'wah* has become a competition in Indonesia, one contested by multiple Muslim groups seeking to implement Qur'anic teachings and arguing that establishing cooperation with Muslims is preferred over collaboration with unbelievers (*orang kafir*). Additionally, using Surah al-Maidah, Verse 51, and al-Baqarah, Verse 120, some religious leaders (*ulama*) have invoked the Quran to warn

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[110] As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is associated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an irenic organisation that rejects democracy because it is perceived as part of the liberal ideology and opposite to Islamic values. These two groups, which stem from the Tarbiyah movement, have become important organisations in Indonesia (see Woodward, 2010, p. 175).

Muslims against having Jewish or Christian leaders.[111] Religious contestation has frequently taken place amongst Indonesia's current political and cultural entities.

Moreover, through textual analysis it can also be noticed that the typefaces used for the short videos in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.5 resemble each other greatly. The hashtags #AksiBelaPalestina and #SelamatkanGhouta both use a sharp, heavy, and solid font. Semiotically, this typeface conveys the impression of strong ideas, commitment, and urgency. As such, the *ummah* narrative highlighted presents Muslims' struggles as the struggles of a financially marginalised, powerless and pious majority. Modern-day Muslims' religious practices have been influenced by various digital platforms and social media features, as evidenced particularly clearly in religious sermons, fatwas,

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[111] Historically, Indonesian has experienced deep sequential Christianisation (*kristenisasi*) involving the preaching of Christianity to Muslims—particularly during the colonial era, when Christian missionaries' interests coincided with those of the ruling regime, and during the New Order regime. After the violent actions of 1965–66, since the Soeharto regime blamed the Communist Party for killing six generals in 1965 (strengthening this impression through official textbooks), the government has held that those who do not belong to one officially recognised religion (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism) were atheist communists who consequently had to be to be murdered. This resulted in many people swiftly converting from traditional/local religions to Christians (which was perceived as more tolerant than Islam, and easier to access than other religions) (see Wierenga & Katjasungkana, 2018, pp. 38–45). That caused many Muslim leaders to worry that, as during the colonial era, Islam's political strength would be undermined. The forced depoliticisation of Islam and deislamisation in the early New Order regime also invited strong reactions among contemporary Muslim leaders (see Bruinessen, 2004, pp. 1–4).

and establishment of virtual communities. Consequently, new media culture has had a fundamental impact on global Muslim awareness.

As explained by Eickleman and Piscatori (1996), internet technology—including social media—has certainly facilitated the spread of information regarding trans-local and global issues, both religious matters such as *da'wa* as well as matters of performance, construction, and significance (Aguirre & Davies, 2015). The internet has become a tool for proselytisation since the mid-1990s, when Muslims began using online media to seek alternative views and information about religion from multiple references (Campbell, 2010, p. 31). Social media has become an effective means of spreading multiple ideologies, through the duality of structure and agency. Internet celebrities have used technology to create creative content regarding Muslim solidarity that is produced, distributed, and consumed based on human agency (including power, ideology, and knowledge) (Fuchs, 2014, p. 37).

As cited by Campbell (2010, pp. 42–43), the media supplies religious information, and is a source of narratives, signs, and myths. Internet celebrities, through the content of their social media accounts, also present themselves as pious individuals who are primary sources of symbols and myths. For instance, Oki Setiana Dewi has a powerful 'voice' in online communities; she presents global Muslim solidarity to her 10.8 million followers (as of April 2019) and presents herself as a significant source of religious knowledge for Muslims around the Muslim world and as a pillar of a global political community.

By highlighting the importance of the Indonesian government and society in responding to the needs of Muslims around the world and in dealing with oppression, Oki has become a prominent community leader, promoting not only the use of the hijab as a form of religious piety, but also as an expression of Muslim solidarity. Internet celebrities can now be perceived as authorities on what it means to be religious, replacing traditional institutions as sources of meanings and explanations. It is noticeable that, owing in part to these cultural practices (i.e. the consumption of new media), religion has simultaneously become individualised and globalised (Campbell, 2010, p. 43). Internet celebrities' use of media technologies to form religious messages contributes to this.

Unlike other internet celebrities, Tantri Syalindri has not proclaimed herself as a pious role model. On her Instagram account, she rarely shows specific activities that expose and perform her religiosity. Nevertheless, when the Al-Aqsa[112] attack[113] occurred in 2017, she went online to express her feelings. She presented a plain white visual, and added her voice with the short sentence 'Pray for Al-Aqsa' and the caption 'Innalillahi wainnailaihi roji'un #savealaqsa'. Tantri's expression of her condolences for the Al-Aqsa attack

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[112] Referring to the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The name Baytul-Maqdis traditionally refers to the historical site; however, it is sometimes used as a synonym for the mosque.
[113] One of Islam's three holiest sites, Al-Aqsa Mosque has long been a symbol of Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule. The origins of the conflict may be traced back to the late 1800s, when national movements such as Zionism and Arab nationalism arose.

offers a religious standpoint, as reflected through the use of such specific words as 'Innalillahi wainnailaihi roji'un'—a Qur'anic verse that translates to "We belong to Allah and to Allah we shall return".

With this white background, combined with a typewriter font, Tantri's post looks modest but powerfully articulates her solidarity with the victims of the attack. Noticeably, rather than showing resentment towards Western countries—including Israel—Tantri emphasises human solidarity. She articulates the tragedy in Palestine as a humanitarian event, rather than connecting it with Palestine and Islam in 'one solid setting'. This differs from Oki's post, which frames Zionism and Western countries as united in humanitarian crimes against Muslims. Interestingly, although Tantri does not specifically link the Palestinian tragedy with Israeli atrocities, her followers' comments express a loathing for Israel and full support for Palestine. For instance, two commentators encouraged Tantri to organise a humanity concert to support the victims of the bombings and used the word Palestine as a hashtag; one commentator explicitly criticised the nation of Israel. One comment read, for instance, "yes, please make humanity concert to help all the victims #savepalestina @savealaqsa".

The comments above present Muslim global solidarity. Palestine is part of 'us', united with Muslims in Indonesia. The victims are one and the same as the 'self'. Referring to the concept of post-colonialism (Said, 1993, p. 218), the self refers to what we think about what we are. It shapes identities through agreement, disagreement, and negotiation between colonised and coloniser.

Our self regulates our understandings, and our performance is based on our self-image and our interactions with others. Commentators recognise themselves as having the same identity as Muslim Palestinians who are suffering, restrained, and powerless.

On the other hand, the 'self' is often juxtaposed with the 'other', using a process of *othering* to create mainstream and marginal identities (Hall, 1996, p. 5). This is related to how groups with disparate political power bargain with each other. In the example here, comments are used for this *othering* process, labelling Israel and Israelis as unbelievers (*kafir)*, Jews, and colonisers. Nevertheless, even as most commentators position themselves as the *self* (as being more civilised and religious), and thus as superior even to Western superpowers (which are, as majority-Christian nations, also societies of unbelievers), they imply a dialectic in which commentators identify themselves as marginalised, powerless, displaced minorities within a broader global context.

Moreover, the above text also emphasises the importance of religious sentiments in *othering* processes. As mentioned by Hadiz (2018, p. 570), Islamic populism[114] has flourished in Indonesia among the more "middle class, educated and cosmopolitan people". In this situation, the narratives of past and

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[114] The rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia has coincided with the rise of radical Islamic organisations that have supported anti-Chinese sentiment, promoted Sharia law, and infiltrated mainstream moderate Muslim organisations, political parties, and educational institutions. Islamic populism is more than an ideological narrative; it is also a discursive instrument, a stylistic approach, and a strategic logic for promoting a comprehensively Islamic way of life (see Mudde, 2004; Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017).

continued victimisation and discrimination contribute significantly to the construction of a middle-class Muslims in Indonesia, including their definitions and imaginations of themselves and others. Additionally, this narrative builds on the marginalisation of the *ummah* throughout the colonial era and under the New Order[115] regime, when the social agents of Islamic politics were regularly targeted for state repression (Hadiz, 2018, pp. 571–572). Several Muslim groups believe that the western system is one factor that has caused uncertainty and injustice in Indonesian politics, and seek alternative economic and political systems to replace disappointing political institutions.

The media constructs audiences as subjects, using discursive practices to construct identities through the portrayed intersection of class, gender, race, and religion. At the same time, subjects' and citizens' identities are multi-layered and complex, and as such they must be analysed intersectionally and understood as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 47). The politics of belonging, thus, do not merely involve having a particular nationality or citizenship, but a sense of embracing a specific affiliation and sense of entitlement (Squire, 2009; Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 46). Moreover, digital citizens can easily articulate their identities, referring to particular collectivities in social media. The rise of the digital age has brought about a

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[115] As mentioned in Chapter Three, under Soeharto's authoritarian New Order regime, Muslims were oppressed by a state that promoted secular nationalist values as a means of suppressing the potential power of Islamic groups (Kersten, 2014, p. 476; Hefner, 2000, p. 42).

new concept of digital citizenship, as an effect of its implementation in almost every part of everyday life (see Boyd, 2011).

In social discourse, every identity commits inclusion and exclusion by defining the values and meaning of the colonising culture against the colonised in attempting to capture an imagined nation. Using otherness and self, the identity involves the binary relation between belonging and alienation; the imagination of Global Muslim communities is constructed through online interactions and produces collective and individual identities. These conceptions and performances of individual and collective identity show how colonial power is dismantled and transformed through modes of identification relating to how people experience life in their communities (see Hughes, 2011, p. 1). Within the specific Indonesian social context, several Muslim groups[116] have become suspicious of western countries and their values—such as capitalism, democracy, and liberalism—because they are considered foreign yet used by the Indonesian system.[117] The conservative Muslim groups often showed their contestation to the Indonesian government through marching in demonstrations in Jakarta capital city.

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[116] These groups, including; Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), rejects the Indonesian state and propagates the establishment of a Khilafah (caliphate) in Indonesia as part of the larger Khilafah in the Muslim world; *the Salafi* movement – espouses and teach a purist form of *Wahabi Islam;* and Front Pembela Islam (FPI – Islamic Defender Front) which is the main organiser behind the Action Defend Islam 2016-2017 (see Lanti, et al., 2019, pp. 8-10).

[117] Values of capitalism, liberalism, and secularism—often associated with Western countries—have been considered to represent Pancasila's failure to unite people and provide them with a sense of certainty and justice.

Figure 6.6: Tantri Shows her sympathy for Al-Aqsa
as part of Global Muslim Solidarity.
Posted on 24 July 2017

Figure 6.7: Tantri's followers show they support for Al-Aqsa
through Tantri's Instagram post.
Posted on 24 July 2017

Visual culture has become a significant resource for exhibiting and creating online identities, through everyday photos, created and curated media, and employs a range of social media tools such as Instagram and Instastories[118] posts. As can be seen in Figure 6.6, from the sample of Tantri's Syalindri posts over two years, Tantri only posts one picture and caption about Global Muslim

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[118] An application on Instagram that shows stories as something that curates a number of moments together. The feature facilitates the combination of various photos and videos together in a "slideshow format," or short video.

solidarity. Among internet celebrities, Tantri very rarely presents herself as a Muslim role model or even posts about Islamic wisdom in her account. During 2016-2018, only in 24 July 2017, when the Al-Aqsa calamity came out as an International issue, Tantri's showed her sympathy through a modest visual and short caption on her post.

The Muslim global solidarity "fever" also hit internet celebrities who had just made a decision to do a *hijrah*. One of them was Dewi Sandra, who also actively promoted and posted Global Muslim solidarity in her everyday posts. Based on observation of Dewi Sandra's Instagram account over a period of two years (2017-2018), Dewi's posts 29 pictures and caption about Global Muslim solidarity. In that period Dewi actively presents herself as a Muslim role model not only to promote the Muslim solidarity movement but also political engagement with the Gubernurnatorial election Jakarta 2017.

As the visual below (see figure 6.8) shows, Dewi Sandra reposts a one-minute video from @felixsiaw account. In the short video Felix Siaw voices his opposition to Western countries and Joko Widodo's government, and positions Western countries values against Islam. Later Dewi Sandra placed a caption on the video defining and identifying the enemies of Muslim Communities, as follows:

> Uyghur, another Palestine, another Rohingnya, another Syria. When the mainstream media hides the truth and the politicians and people of power suddenly become dumb and turn completely silent. Human beings being tortured because of their ethnicity, their faith, their belief. Tell me who is being terrorized and who are the true terrorists?

> #AllahKnowsEverything

#xinjiang #uyghur #doa #praytogether
Motion by @myodauz
Voice by @felixsiauw
Second video; I could not bear to post the faces of these children.
Third slide picture by @tanam.pohon

Short video 1;

Short video 2;

Picture 3:

Figure 6.8: Dewi Sandra posted two short videos and one picture on her
Instagram account on campaigns for global Muslim solidarity.
Posted on 21 December 2018

In one day, Dewi Sandra posted two short videos and one picture, as above. The first video presented a sermon by Felix Siauw. The second video (taken from an anonymous source) depicted the repression of Syrian children; finally, the photograph campaigns for pan-Muslim solidarity against Muslim Uyghurs' abuse in China. In this last photograph, Dewi Sandra reposted from @tanam.pohon, a self-labelled 'alternative media', with more than six thousand followers, that has regularly challenged the policies of the Joko Widodo government through its posts. In the caption, Dewi identified Uyghurs, Palestinian, Rohingyas, and Syrians as a singular victimised in-group, contrasting them with the "mainstream media [that] hides the truth and the politicians and people of power [who] suddenly become dumb and turn completely silent". The dichotomy in how authors and content creators emphasise information that distinguishes between a positive *us* and negative *them* creates in-groups and out-groups (see van Djik, 1998, p. 267).

In her caption Dewi Sandra strongly criticised groups who have power but do not have compassion and humanity because of the differences in "ethnicity, their faith, their belief". Dewi then explicitly declares that politicians, media, Western countries including the (recent) Indonesian government are part of the same groups that are steadily identified as antagonists. This analysis can be observed through Dewi Sandra's preference to re-share content from Felix Siaw (see figure 6.8 – video one) whose famous campaign is to establish the formation of a caliphate, as a member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), that attempts to influence Muslims to support Islam as a way of life and political ideology.

Dewi Sandra also shares another short video that shows a child sobbing and pleading for her father to be released as a prisoner of war, but the source is not cited. When tracked from social media, it appears that the second short video became famous during 2017 when Syria was at the centre of International news. A search of the platform using the hashtags #suriahchildren #suriahkita (we are Syria), as can be seen in the picture below, shows stories about the Syrian War that showed the crying, sadness and oppression that happened to Syrian children, are easy to find through Instagram.

Figure 6.9: Pictures evident through and Instagram search when using
hashtags #suriahchildren #suriahkita (we are Syria).
Searching on 12 January 2020

Furthermore, the video above (see Figure 6.8) represents Dewi Sandra's
'self-consciousness' as a Muslim.. The media, through language, plays an
important role in portraying group identities, such as nation or society, and
proposes who is included inside or outside of these imagined collectives
(Bullock and Jaffri, 2000). Meanwhile, the constructed out as 'others' are often
stereotyped, censured, demonised rather than ennoble (Morey and Yaqin,
2011). Interestingly, this short video appears to have been uploaded in close
coincidence with a post by Zaskia Sungkar, another internet celebrity who
joined the formal campaign for Muslim Global solidarity and took Felix Siaw
as her role model.

dan dunia menyaksikan Islam yang selama ini dituduh radikal tidak lebih adalah KORBAN

#SAVEUYGHUR

RE-EDUCATION CAMPS

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ Repost By ust @felixsiauw Sampai Persatuan Itu Tiba

Berbeda itu bukan berarti bermusuhan, itu yang dipraktekkan Muslim Xinjiang yang berbeda kultur, agama, dan fisik dengan kebanyakan penduduk Cina lainnya

Bertahun-tahun lamanya tidak ada konflik di Xinjiang, mereka hanya

136,284 views
DECEMBER 22, 2018

Add a comment...   Post

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zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ Repost By ust @felixsiauw Sampai Persatuan Itu Tiba

Berbeda itu bukan berarti bermusuhan, itu yang dipraktekkan Muslim Xinjiang yang berbeda kultur, agama, dan fisik dengan kebanyakan penduduk Cina lainnya

Bertahun-tahun lamanya tidak ada konflik di Xinjiang, mereka hanya

136,284 views

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

konflik di Xinjiang, mereka hanya melakukan aktivitas sebagaimana kita dan ibadah seperti Muslim lain di dunia pada umumnya

Itulah bukti, bahwa Islam itu di manapun mendamaikan, di tempat lain selain di Xinjiang pun begitu, seperti di Indonesia yang disatukan karena Islam

Hanya, mereka yang tak suka dengan Islam, untuk kepentingan mereka, lalu memberi label negatif seolah Muslim itu

136,284 views

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zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

sesadis sebrutal apapun siksaan pada Muslim

Sekarang dunia menyaksikan, Muslim yang dituduh radikal dan teroris, dimana-mana hanya jadi korban, ingat AS - Iraq, Israel - Palestina, Cina - Uyghur

Penganjur toleransi, anti-rasialis, aktivis kemanusiaan, masih banyak yang bungkam. Apakah karena ini korbannya

136,284 views

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

adalah Muslim? Yang dianggap radikal?

Sedihnya, saat ini tak ada yang bisa kita buat selain berdoa dan memberikan edukasi agar ummat sadar bahwa kita Muslim itu satu kesatuan

Juga berdoa, agar satu saat nanti, ada negara yang berani mengerahkan kekuatan untuk menyelesaikan penindasan pada kaum Muslim, saat Muslim bersatu, insyaAllah

136,284 views

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

memberi label negatif seolah Muslim itu jahat, radikal, teroris, makar

Secara tidak langsung, Islam dituduh menjadi penyebab radikalisme. Karenanya de-radikalisasi harus dijalankan, yang ujung-ujungnya adalah de-Islamisasi

Maka tindakan jahat, bengis, brutal, diperlakukan pada mereka atas nama pre-emptive action, kamp konsentrasi, kampanye anti-halal, seperti pada

136,284 views

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zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

pre-emptive action, kamp konsentrasi, kampanye anti-halal, seperti pada Uyghur di Xinjiang

Nyawa dan jiwa, disiksa dan didera, semua disebabkan oleh tuduhan. Padahal yang mereka lakukan sama saja seperti kita, shalat, puasa, dakwah

Itulah kesamaan pola komunis dan kapitalis dalam menekan Islam. Tuduh dulu radikal dan teroris, lalu lakukan

136,284 views

zaskiasungkar15 ✓ • Following

#Islambukanteroris #agamadamai #xinjiang #uyghur #china #felixsiauw #radikalisromantis #saveuyghur

Motion by @myodauz, silakan share, mudah-mudahan jadi kebaikan bagi kita (via #appskottage.com #IGSaver @AppKottage)

57w

136,284 views

Figure 6.10: Zaskia Sungkar repost from Felix Siauw's (a preacher who supported the establishment of a caliphate) Instagram account that campaigned for Global Muslim solidarity.
Posted on 22 December 2018

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Zaskia Sungkar shared this kind of video through her account without any editing from the original source of Felix Siaw's Instagram account. As internet celebrities that decided to *hijrah*, Zaskia currently take part in a Global Muslim solidarity campaign. One of her activities, noticeable from ASPAC Media[119], can be seen on this YouTube account with link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FQt95NJ1Crw. On that link, it is evident that since 2015 Zaskia Sungkar and her husband Irwansyah have actively taken part in solidarity action for Palestine. Slightly different to Dewi Sandra's repost, Zaskia Sungkar prefers to repost part of a short video and caption from @felixsiaw account. As demonstrated in the caption below;

> Repost by *ustadz* (preacher) @felixsiauw Until Unity Has Arrived: Being different does not mean that it is hostile, it is practised by Xinjiang Muslims who are culturally, religiously and physically different from most other Chinese residents. For years there is no conflict in Xinjiang, they (Muslim Uyghur) only perform activities as we do and worship like other mostly Muslims in the world. That is evidence, that Islam is bringing a peaceful in everywhere, in other places besides Xinjiang as well, like in Indonesia which is united because of Islam. Only those who do not like Islam, for their interests, then they give a negative label as if Muslims are evil, radical, terrorist, and treason. Indirectly, Islam is accused of being a cause of radicalism. Therefore, de-radicalization must be carried out, which in the end is de-Islamization. The violent, brutal acts are treated on behalf of them (Islam) in the name of pre-emptive action, concentration camps, anti-halal campaigns, like in the Uyghur's in Xinjiang. Physically and mentally, (Uyghur people) tortured and flogged, all of that created by accusations. Although what they do is the same as us (Muslim in Indonesia) such us; praying, fasting,

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[119] ASPAC is Asia Pacific Community for Palestine or commonly abbreviated AsPac for Palestine is a consortium of non-governmental organizations (NGOs / NGOs) in the Asia Pacific that synergizes with institutions and individuals who have concern for the Palestinian struggle to regain its sovereignty and independence, against 'Zionist Israel'. The complete profile and activities of these organization can be seen in the https://www.aspacpalestine.com/profil/.

preaching. That is the similarity of the communist and capitalist patterns in suppressing Islam. Firstly, accusing (Muslim) as radicals and terrorists, then do whatever cruelty to torture Muslims. Now the world is watching, Muslims accused of being radical and terrorist, everywhere are just victims, remember US - Iraq, Israel - Palestine, China – Uyghur. Many advocates of tolerance, anti-racism, humanitarian activists, are silent. Is this why the victims are Muslims? Which is considered radical? Sadly, at present, there is nothing we can do but pray and provide education so that the ummah realize that we Muslims are a unity. Also, we can pray, that one day, there will be a country that is brave enough to mobilize its power to solve the oppression of Muslims, when Muslims unite, God willing.

#Islamisnotterrorist #peacefulreligion #xinjiang #uyghur #china #felixsiauw #radicalromantics #saveuyghur
Motion by @myodauz, please share, hopefully, it will be good for us (via # appskottage.com #IGSaver @AppKottage)

The contestation between Muslim identity and Western values is represented in the Felix Siaw caption that is reposted by Zaskia Sungkar. Online preachers such us Felix Siaw use social media to spread their ideology to broader audiences. In the caption above, it can be seen that Felix Siaw has juxtaposed the United States with Iraq, Israel with Palestine, and China with the Uyghur population; all are labelled unbeliever countries (*negara kafir*) that have subjugated Islamic countries/people. This strategy is designed to create a sense of drama and invite attention, solidarity, and sympathy from online Muslim communities, by constructing perceived enemies. Furthermore, by categorising the United States, Israel and China in one group, Felix Siauw implicitly labels them as atheist, non-Muslim, and Communist lands, homogenising them as enemies and rivals of Islam. At the same time, Iraq, Palestine, and Uyghur were homogenised as neglected, victims, and oppressed peoples.

The memory of 1965–66, which has become known as "Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI" (the betrayal of the G30S Movement and PKI), has been used as a 'master-narrative' in the communal narration and political discourse regarding the origins of religious contestation (see Chapter Three), especially given the significant role of labelling Communists as unbelievers or atheists since 1965.[120] This is supplemented by a narrative common amongst Indonesian Muslims—and not only the radical/Wahabi/Salafi ones—that perceive an international conspiracy and anti-Muslim agenda that unites the enemies of Islam, including Zionists, Christian missionaries, neo-liberal politicians, and their diverse local collaborators, in a mission to defeat or weaken Islam in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2004, p. 1). These 'master narratives' still exist today, and are contested in political and social discourses in Indonesia. Even during the 2019 Presidential Election, anti-communist paranoia was used by one of the candidates to spread hatred and fear amongst Indonesian voters.

Observation of posts by Zaskia Sungkar shows that, over a two-year period, Zaskia posted five pictures and captions about Global Muslim

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[120] This conflict was waged mainly along moral and religious lines. Much of the conflict was oriented towards the Institute for the People's Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, often abbreviated Lekra), a productive literary and social movement associated with the Indonesian Communist Party. Founded in 1950, Lekra urged artists, writers, and teachers to follow the doctrine of socialist realism (see Yuliantri, 2012, pp. 16–20). Lekra's performances often presented the "evil hadji" as the most selfish and exploitative character in the *wayang, ketoprak*, or *ludruk* (a popular form of authentic Javanese performance). Moral religious contestation also involved performances, with a socialist ideology, that urged poor peasants to demand their fair share of land and crops from landlords labelled "*hadji*" (Muslims who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca); this hurt religious groups deeply (Wieringa & Nursyahbani, 2018, pp. 30–43).

solidarity. She also presented herself as a Muslim role model supporting the Muslim solidarity movement, identifying herself simultaneously as a public figure and as *shalehah* (a pious Muslim woman). Not only that, a short video (see Figure 5.8 and 5.10) shows how the glorification of Muslim solidarity has stimulated the formation of personal and collective modes of being and belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Using visual persuasion, the short video depicts a character (a Muslim Uyghur) to mobilise the aesthetics of persuasion and circulating a caliphate ideology amongst Muslim communities online. The new media offer an arena of identity contestation, a means of challenging Pancasila as Indonesia's state ideology. Dewi Sandra and Zaskia Sungkar, as young Muslim talent, use their role to amplify their *da'wa* as part of their religious activity.

2. Activated Muslim Sisterhood and Nationalism as Part of Solidarity

This section seeks to examine how internet celebrities have activated and illustrated their gender identity to depict the important role of global Muslim sisterhood in online media, across lines of difference and privilege. This section will examine how, through online activism, the relationship between feminism and nationalism can be used to activate the imaginations of the *ummah* and create Muslim solidarity. Borrowing from Butler (1990), who explains how self, subject, and gender affect the formation of social and political practices, this analysis will also examine how internet celebrities portray historical practices and perform femininity as part of their solidarity discourses. Moreover, this section also borrows from Anderson (1991) to show how media

platforms and social networks can intentionally be used to spread awareness about sisterhood. Internet celebrities depict their gender identities as important parts of their nationalism, within specific historical and geographical contexts.

In this section, I will focus my analysis on Oki Setiana Dewi, who has represented Muslim sisterhood in a transnational Islamic frame. I also analyse Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari, who purport to represent nationalist values through their collective imagination of the nation. Muslim women's importance in defending Islam is highlighted through social media. In Figure 6.11, for example, Oki Setiana Dewi employs a particular approach to gender construction by using the women of Baitul-Maqdis[121] as an example of feminine strength. The hashtags #kitasemuaMaryam, #weallareMaryam, and #savealaqso assert a Muslim sisterhood—a gendered solidarity—as well as *ukhuwwat wathaniyah*.[122] In Figure 6.11, gender constructs are carefully employed; although the Muslim woman appears timid and deferential (her eyes are closed, and she is looking down), she still raises her clenched fist in resistance. Around her wrist is a bracelet or band that resembles that Palestinian flag, further intensifying the image's message. Finally, Maryam—the Arabic name for 'Mary'[123]—provides social legitimation for an Islamic femininity.

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[122] Togetherness and unity, rooted in a shared belief system.

[123] According to the Qur'an, Maryam was virgin when she gave birth to Isa (known in the Bible as Jesus). According to Surah Maryam 19, verse 20, Maryam was shocked when an angel informed her that she would bear a son, saying "How can I have a boy while no man has touched me and I have not been unchaste?" (see https://quran.com/19/20)

With a caption that activates Muslim sisterhood sentiment, Oki tries to romanticise the story and characterization of Mary;

> We are all Maryam is a movement of empathy and support for the struggle of women of Al Quds. Initiated by UKED Turkey, this movement with the support of the global community will be released from 1/28 - 8/3/2019. Modern Baytul-Maqdis women have experienced similar suffering as same as the mother of Mary US. Siti Maryam experienced a lot from pressure and suffering and expulsion from the Jews. Like Al-Quds women today. So she (Mary) was made for a symbol in this movement. Currently on the same earth. Palestinian women are victims, only because they follow the principles that they believed. Join for participation and coordination. Let's support the hashtags #weareallmary #kitasemuamaryam #weareallmaryam #savealAqso

Figure 6.11: A post by Oki Setiana Dewi promoting Muslim solidarity through the hashtag 'We are all Maryam'.
Posted on 1 February 2019

Oki's post invites 11,783 likes and more than thirty-five comments. On her caption Oki's also encourages her readers and followers to spread the campaign, inviting people to participate *(bergabung untuk partisipasi dan berkordinasi, mari kita ramaikan* hashtag #weareallmary #kitasemuamaryam #WeAreAllMaryam #SaveAlAqso)* and use the hashtags #weareallmary #kitasemuamaryam #WeAreAllMaryam #SaveAlAqso to attract attention to this action in social media. This kind of invitation, Oki claimed to be part of

religiously activities that inspire piety or good deed (*amal shalih*). These encouragements are inscribed in almost all the captions that Oki has written about Global Muslim Solidarity. Encouraging readers and followers to spread the content and ideas published by Oki shows how religious figures engage the internet as a medium of proliferation to produce Islamic sentiment according to their perspectives.

Moreover, the picture above produces an imaginary in the representation of Maryam. Maryam is portrayed as an imaginary icon of Muslim communities, the Mother of the Prophet Isa who lived in Al-Quds and experienced tremendous suffering because she defended her homeland and the values she believed in[124]. From the http://www.ukead.org/eng/d/78/al-quds-today- website address can be discovered that UKEAD Turkey (The International Union of Al-Quds Culture Education and Research) is an organisation that is concerned with a cultural movement, with a focus on the issue of Palestine and al-Quds. Using the picture above Oki relates her campaign #WeAreAllMary movement to UKEAD Turkey[125], in Indonesia she has strong engagement with International Islamic organization.

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[124] Explanation from dr. Ali Abu Shafia as Director of External Relations UKEAD. The activity of UKEAD can be seen at http://www.ukead.org/eng/d/78/al-quds-today-.

[125] According to Hadiz (2016), since the beginning of 2000s Islamic populism was strongly evident in Turkey represented by Erdoğan's with The Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), a conservative political party in Turkey. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's regime, "religion has become a new or re-born element of the new Turkey and has been transforming many areas such as: the media, the Kurdish issue, implementation of the rule of law, foreign policy and gender issues" (see Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019, p.1).

Oki Setiana Dewi has sought to activate sisterhood and solidarity through pictures of Maryam, a pious character wearing a long veil, and the hashtag #WeAreAllMary (in Indonesian, #KitaSemuaMaryam). The followers of @okisetianadewi feel connected with internet celebrities and other followers in an imagined community characterized by the hashtags #weareallmaryam and #WeAreAllMary, as seen in Figure 6.11 above. These messages of Muslim solidarity remain evident today, as women have asserted crucial agency in creating their postfeminist identities. As can be seen through online media, the idea of transnational Islam can be derived and shaped by imaginations of gender identity and sisterhood (as represented by internet celebrities). At the same time, however, activated sisterhood frames Muslim women as valuable beings who must be protected but also controlled.

Referring to the website https://fsldk.id/we-are-all-maryam/, it can be seen that the hashtag campaign #WeAreAllMaryam has used the experiences of women in Al-Quds (Jerusalem) to invite the global community to stand against injustice. Initiated by the Al-Quds Cultural Institute (UKEAD) in Turkey,[126] it has received support from thirty countries, including Malaysia,

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[126] Turkey's history and political situation are similar to Indonesia's, in that religion and the state are intertwined and that state elites desire to 'control', 'eliminate', and 'use' religion to promote unity amongst citizens. In addition, Islamic values have been used for political and social mobilisation to contest and restructure a nationalist and secular nation-state. Furthermore, both countries are home to a growing urban middle class (mostly Muslim) that is still struggling to achieve betterment. The *ummah* is equated with the 'common people', a concept integral to all populist imaginings that juxtapose the morally good (but subordinate and vulnerable) with the powerful, greedy, and insatiable political elite (see Hadiz, 2016; Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019).

Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan, and Indonesia. From the website, it is also noticeable that this campaign was continuous through various media from January 28 to March 8, 2019. Following Mecca and Medina, Al-Aqsa Mosque—located on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem—is the third holiest site in Islam. According to Islamic belief, the Prophet Muhammad had been transported from Mecca to Al-Aqsa during his Night Journey, and then on to heaven. Muslims also believe that the first *qibla*[127] was oriented towards this site, until Allah directed Muhammad to turn towards Mecca. The 'Action to Defend Palestine' was also framed as part of *Jihad*; although the caption did not explicitly mention the word *jihad,* the struggle of Palestinian women is clear in the image, caption, and hashtag. For instance, following the hashtag #weareallmary on Instagram, one can find pictures such as those below:

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
[127] The Qibla (Arabic: قِبْلَة, "Direction", also transliterated as Qiblah, Qibleh, Kiblah, Kıble or Kibla), is the direction that Muslims should face during their prostrations (*salah*).

Figure 6.12: Pictures that appeared through an Instagram search when
applying the hashtag #weareallmary and #kitasemuamaryam.
Searching on 10 December 2019

Figure 6.13: A poster and caption posted by Oki Setiana Dewi urging women
to join an Islamic recitation (*pengajian*) titled
"Palestine: Love to the first Qibla" (Cinta pada kiblat pertama).
Posted on 22 August 2019

In Figure 6.12, the link between the hashtag #weareallmary and

women's support for Palestine is evident. In 2019, posts by Oki Setiana Dewi

continued to construct an imagined community, one united not only by an awareness of nation but also a notion of global Muslim solidarity. She did not target her *da'wa* at Muslims in general, but specifically at Muslim women. In Figure 6.13, the colour pink is used to highlight femininity as an important part of Indonesian–Palestinian solidarity. With the images of the speakers displayed across from each other, in front of pictures of the Indonesian and Palestinian flags (respectively), the two Muslim countries are implicitly understood as equal, as having a solid relationship, and as helping each other. Additionally, the poster not only identifies Oki Setiana Dewi as an Indonesian artist, writer, and motivator, but legitimizes Dr Ola Taleb as a Palestinian native. It is clear, thus, that women are key actors in the *da'wa* movement, and that global Muslim solidarity is not monopolised by male preachers and male activists.

From Figure 6.13, women are presented as key actors in the emergence and re-imagination of Islamic piety through internet communities. Piety requires action, and one potential action marketed to Indonesian Muslims is attending Islamic recitations[128] at a mosque—such as the Jakarta Bintaro Jaya Great Mosque mentioned in the above post. These posts not only mix Indonesian and Arabic, but also English; this can be seen for example in the

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[128] Since 2010, *pengajian* (Islamic recitation group) have become popular events among Muslim communities in big cities in Indonesia. One of the important groups popularising the concept of popular recitation was the *Hijabers Community,* which has gathered thousands of young Muslim woman across diverse cities in Indonesia and holds regular events such as fashion shows, beauty workshops, religious motivation seminars, and *pengajian*—all combined with chic fashion (see Rahmawati, 2016, p.58).

sentences "Free khusus *Akhwat"* (Free special for *akhwat*, an Arabic word for women or can be a sister) and "Ladies Day Sit & Sip" (*sip* being an Indonesian colloquialism for 'good'). By using Arabic and English words, this poster implicitly presents itself and the action to defend Palestine as transnationally oriented, as Arabic and English are the languages of global Islam. This sentence argues that Muslim women must manifest their faith and piety by standing in solidarity.

Also evident in this post by Oki (see Figure 6.13) is the importance of using English to assert piety, as in the sentence "A woman's beauty isn't in her features, the shade of her skin, or her possessions. True beauty in her heart, her *iman* (faith) and her *taqwa*" (piety). By using English, this poster ironically depicts English as part of globalised discourses even as it purports to criticise the West. This captures the practice of ambiguity (see Bhabha, 1995), which occurs when Oki's is trying to campaign against Western values, but at the same time, she also uses English words to facilitate her action. Within the context of global Muslim solidarity, this poster also contributes to the process of reconstructing and re-imagining ideal feminine piety. As explained by Butler (1990), gender is a performative act constructed by reiterated acting. Gender performativity involves society's production of signs and signifiers regarding women's bodies and gender identities. Through her posts on Instagram, Oki Setiana Dewi creates signs and signifiers of what Muslim women should look like (i.e. wearing a hijab and a long dress like her). She also underscores the importance of Muslim women defending Al-Aqsa as part of their piety.

Cultural institutions and media representation—religion, education, family, and media—help individuals articulate a sense of identity and define their moral values (Dobson, 2015, p. –118).

As seen in the posts of internet celebrities, the solidarity campaign focuses not only on religious solidarity itself, but also on how Muslim women's subjectivity constructs their womanhood through their responsibility to care for others. Additionally, the poster also highlights women's agency; being a smart and successful Muslim woman must involve globalisation and take part in global discourses (such as Muslim solidarity). As explained by McRobbie (2007, p. 722), post-feminism underscores that women's autonomy is constructed by success, as achieved through ambition, determination, and hard work. Individual responsibility enables women to achieve body autonomy, economic independence, and self-confidence when performing self-subjectivity (see McRobbie, 2004, p. 6).

Interestingly, after the Action to Defend Islam, many recitations appeared as part of awakening Islam. Islamic studies were held in many mosques, and Indonesian democratic systems were used to advance the interests of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and its Salafi ideology. The conservative turn in Indonesian politics has been marked by the proliferation of worship activities driven by anti-government Islamic groups, which claim a basis in Islamic awakening and solidarity. Many mosques have become centres of halal commerce, trading and selling Islamic products to glorify Muslim solidarity; such a tendency is also evident in Oki Setiana Dewi's Instagram

posts. Such activities highlight the reality that a growing number of Indonesian Muslims have embraced more conservative interpretations of Islam and promoted the public implementation of Sharia law. Mosques, thus, have become more than places to improve religiosity; they are also loci for economic practice and political consolidation.[129]

As mentioned in chapter three, the Tarbiyah movement is affiliated with the Islamist political party PKS and is inspired by Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Salafism is a movement/ideology whose most prevalent faction is identified by nonviolent/passive Islamic puritanism when other kinds of Salafism embrace political and jihadi, but these appear in much more modest numbers (Karagiannis 2009, pp. 72-103; Karagiannis & McCauley 2006, p. 328). Salafists members usually avoid using television, music, and interaction between different sexes. The Islamic recitation then promotes the *hijrah* movement. The movements typically include young people who have a little-to-no prior religious background and quickly become religious experts, often shifting out of their stylish clothes for long, dark, loose clothing for women,

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[129] Through the Morning Congregational Prayers Movement (*Gerakan Subuh Berjamaah*), a discourse on public morality to 'Action Defend Islam' was constructed to teach and promote a 'Public Islam' that emphasises Muslim leadership and Islamic piety through a *jihad* against blasphemy, the intimidation of potential communists, and the implementation of Sharia law. It has sought to create 'solidarity among Muslims' in several ways, including: emphasising the role of Muslim figures in national history, particularly the 'Jakarta Charter' that sought to implement Sharia law in Indonesia in the early days of independence; spreading information on the oppression of Muslims in Indonesia and around the world; spreading discourses regarding foreign threats; and cultivating anti-Chinese sentiment. These are perpetuated through sermons during recitations (*pengajian*), morning prayers, and Friday prayers, all of which are done in the mosque (see Bourchier, 2019, pp. 713–733).

and ankle-length pants and a long beard for men, in the length of just several months. In the Indonesian public sphere, veiling has become part of 'political Islam', part of a binary distinction between "Western values" and the "Islamic way of life". Stereotypical representations can be seen, for instance, in the use of veiling as a powerful symbol of 'piety'. It has often been used vis-à-vis the nation-state's ideology (*Pancasila*) and conceptualization of Indonesian civilisation.

Figure 6.14: *Jakarta Murojaah* (Jakarta Memorises the Qur'an),
a poster inviting audiences to celebrate Indonesian
independence using an Islamic approach.
Posted on 3 August 2019

Oki Setiana Dewi has also consistently posted about her love for the Indonesian nation state, which has been articulated through more contextual

interpretations—first and foremost Indonesian independence, as mentioned in a post from 3 August 2019 (i.e. during the month of Indonesian independence) that promoted her *da'wa* activity titled Jakarta Murojaah – Merdeka Bersama Al-quran (Jakarta Memorizes the Qu'ran – Freedom through the Qur'an). Using the red and white of the Indonesian flag, as well as images of Istiqlal Mosque (the largest mosque in Indonesia) and the National Monument[130] as its background, this poster implies that Islamic values are important parts of Indonesian nation identity. Using the colours of the Indonesian flag, this poster identifies itself as celebrating Indonesian independence.

Figure 6.14 presents pictures of celebrities who have undertaken *hijrah*, including Dini Aminarti and Alyssa Subandono, as taking part with this agenda. Also included in the activity was Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Vice Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly for the 2014–2019 term; a member of PKS[131], he was also a prominent figure in the 'Action to Defend Islam'. As such, through her post, Oki Setiana Dewi constructed an Islamic identity by legitimizing Islamic values as integral parts of the Indonesian nation. It also supports the preservation of traditional imagined communities,

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[130] The National Monument (Monumen Nasional), colloquially known as Monas, includes in its holdings the flag first flown when Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945. A 137-metre-tall obelisk, the monument is topped by a 14.5-metre bronze flame covered in 32 kilograms of gold leaf. A symbol of Jakarta, the National Monument stands amongst Indonesia's most important government buildings, including the Presidential Palace, the Cabinet Office, and the office of Jakarta's governor.

[131] Indonesia's Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) – the strongest and successful Islamic parties in Indonesia. This party has for many years gained inspiration from Turkey's AKP's successes, which won the general election for the three times respectively with assuredly (see Hadiz, 2016).

wherein Muslims are both citizens of a nation state as well as part of a global *ummah*.

Oki Setiana Dewi's caption also encourages Muslim women to express and represent themselves as religious, limitless, and emancipated, willing to fight for their religion. As stated by Gill (2008), post-feminism has a contradictory problematic: women are encouraged to attain empowerment (to resist, make their own political expressions, make choices), but at the same time global Muslim solidarity movements do this by perpetuating stereotypical representations. For instance, long veils and loose dresses (see Figures 6.13 and 6.14) have generally been called *hijab syar'i*, and popularly identified as following the instructions of Allah in the Qur'an. Through online media, technology produces interconnectedness between neoliberalism and postfeminist (Gill and Scharff, 2011), wherein "the autonomous, calculating, self-regulating subject of neoliberalism bears a strong resemblance to the active, freely choosing, self-reinventing subject of postfeminist".

3. Religious Solidarity in the frame of Religious Nationalism

This section explores solidarity in the frame of religious nationalism. Religious nationalism, or the blending of religious and national identities and aspirations, is becoming a more prominent feature of nationalism (see Grzymala-Busse, 2019, pp.1-21). Religious and national identities coexist and even enhance one other, rather than secular nationalism which simply displaces religious identities and allegiances (see Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Such religious nationalism becomes a significant factor in bolstering widespread religiosity

and attitudes, emphasizing the importance of religious nationalism, as can be seen in this section's analysis.

There are two distinct discourses demonstrated in this part: Pan-Muslim solidarity (*ummah*) and nationalist solidarity. Pan-Islamism is an ideology that advocates for Muslim people's global unification based on their shared Islamic identity, which is promoted by transnational Islamist organizations. Pan-Islamism is performed by conservative Muslim groups to call for the 'reconstitution' of the caliphate, a state that politically unites all Muslims in a single entity (see Hashmi, 2009). Religious nationalism, on the other hand, comprises of more than just a fusion of identities; religion is used as a basis for creating national pride when nationalism seeks political legitimacy and sovereignty for the country (Grzymala-Busse, 2019, pp.1-21).

In practices of craftivism, social media have provided new visibility and scope for various issues that also connect with multi-layered identity and senses of belonging (Nikunen 2019, pp. 130–132; Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 60). Social solidarity can intersect with gender, class, ethnicity, and religion. Expressions of solidarity in the frame of nationality can be used by internet celebrities to articulate their political standpoints. Some internet celebrities utilise important sites of alternative visions and voices, activating different issues to communicate and contest in internet spaces. Religious nationalism is an important issue to communicate, even though it is not popularly articulated amongst internet celebrities. As mentioned by Grzymala-Busse (2019, pp. 1–21), religious nationalism is powerful, as it shapes legitimate citizenship,

presents the nation, and privileges political actors in seeking electoral support. Applying the concept of imagined community offered by Anderson (1992), in this section I will analyse how religious solidarity is articulated by two internet celebrities—Ayu Diah Bing Slamet and Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari—to understand their imagination and sense of belonging as Indonesian Muslim women.

A different articulation of nationalism and solidarity is presented by Ayu Diah Bing Slamet, who has offered her voice in support for the national ideology of Pancasila.[132] As mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, transnational Islamist groups have had far more access to Indonesia's public spheres and politics since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Prominent leaders of Islamic groups[133] have established a counter-discourse that challenges the majority's understanding of indigenous Indonesian Islam (Hefner, 2003) and promoted the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. As also explained previously, several internet celebrities have expressed support for such clerics. Ayu has taken a different political stance, with a particular understanding of nationalism, endorsing Pancasila as Indonesia's ideology as the basis of the nation's commitments and policies.

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[132] Pancasila remains the symbolic soul of the Indonesian state, one that promotes a message of tolerance, equality, and pluralism. Transnational Islamist groups have seen Pancasila as one of the main impediments to the struggle for a more Islamic state (see Bourchier, 2019: pp. 713–733).

[133] Take, for example, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a prominent cleric who was associated with the Islamic radical group Jemaah Islamiyah. Ba'asyir was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for his involvement in series of terror attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings, and his association with militant training camps in Aceh.

Figure 6.15: Ayu Diah Bing Slamet shows her Nationalism and her support
for Unity and Diversity in Indonesia
Posted 1 June 2017

The caption reads: When it seems that everyone is tired, there is still
hope to carve something good (self-reminder). Thank you, our
heroes, for fighting for diversity, which enables us to sleep
peacefully today. #Pancasilaweek #IamIndonesia #IamPancasila.

In her post (see Figure 6.15), Ayu Diah Bing Slamet presents the
sentence "*Saya Indonesia, Saya Pancasila*" (I am Indonesia, I am Pancasila[134])
in a simple font on a white background that resembles crumpled paper, Ayu
Diah Bing Slamet stresses her continued support for Indonesian unity and
diversity, the oneness for which the country's heroes had fought so hard.
Simultaneously, she implicitly expresses her anxiety regarding recent

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[134] In the middle of the strengthening of identity and hate politics, as well as the
erosion of unity and diversity in the face of the blasphemy charges against Ahok,
the Joko Widodo government sponsored 'Pancasila Week'. Taking place from 29
May to 4 June 2017, this event was held to commemorate the anniversary of the
ideology's formulation. Many people, including celebrities, participated in this
event, and showed their activism through social media. The sentence "I am
Indonesia; I am Pancasila" was widely shared on social media, not only as a means
of asserting nationalism, but also as a political stance in support of the Joko Widodo
government and in opposition to the Islamic movements that rejects democracy and
Pancasila.

developments in Indonesia. She imagines a pan-Indonesian solidarity, one inexorably rooted in the national ideology of *Pancasila*. Ayu does not emphasise her Muslim identity when talking about solidarity and nationalism; instead, she presents herself as an ordinary citizen, one who recognises *Pancasila* as the foundation of the Indonesian nation. It is significant, internet celebrities use sufficient online sociality to influence people to step towards their identities as political agents.

Another internet celebrity who has promoted interfaith solidarity through her social media account is Tantri Syalindiri Ichlasari. This can be seen, for instance, in an Instagram post (see Figure 6.16) through which she voiced her solidarity with the victims of a terrorist attack on three churches in Indonesia's second-largest city: Surabaya, East Java. This tragedy was perpetrated by one family,[135] which had ties to the Islamic State, belonged to Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD, an Indonesian IS-inspired network), and may have spent time with jihadists in Syria. This bombing drew many responses. Many condemned it as a cruel act. However, many Muslims in Indonesia saw this tragedy as an attempt to discredit Muslims.

In their everyday narratives, many Indonesian Muslims have framed the ethnic Chinese and Christians as their rivals and enemies. As such, terrorist bombings in Indonesia have often been framed as part of a Western conspiracy

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[135]   For   coverage   of   the   Surabaya   bomb   attacks,   see; https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/second-family-stages-suicide-bomb-attack-indonesia, http://www.csw.org.uk/2018/05/14/news/3966/article.htm.

against Islam.[136] Economic disparity, as well as competition in everyday experiences, significantly influence how stereotypes are formed in human consciousness, as well as how specific identities shape prejudices and biases (Berger and Luckmann, 1991, p. 39). For many Muslims in Indonesia, the prejudices they face as Muslims (especially after the Surabaya bombings) was part of a reality that was closer than a distant 'western conspiracy against Islam' (see Lim, 2012, pp. 127-140).

Importantly, however, Muslims often receive special privileges in Indonesia because of their majority position; state activities and regulations always benefit the majority. As such, Islamic populism has become deep-rooted not because of an ideological narrative, but because of how its operational logic directs the logics of society. As mentioned by Hadiz (2016), Islamic populism (as with all populist discourses, styles, and socio-cultural appeals) has been shaped by certain historical and sociological processes that claim roots in majority values. This can be seen in various posts by internet celebrities (such as Oki Setiana Dewi's posts about Global Muslim solidarity), who argue that Muslims have been obstructed and subjugated (despite being in the majority), and thus must support transnational Muslim solidarity (*ummah*).

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[136] The strengthening of Islamic politics in Indonesia is also related to the increased sympathy for individuals who use Islam to justify their radicalism and attacks. There was, for instance, much speculation regarding who was responsible for the Bali bombings, which killed more than 180 people in 2002. Some Indonesian Muslim have blamed the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), claiming that it conducted the bombings as part of conspiracy against Islam and as a means of convincing Indonesia to join a possible war against Iraq (see Hassan, 2007: 1033–1056; Smith, 2005: 33–44).

Figure 6.16: A post in which Tantri Syalindiri Ichlasari
shared her sadness over the Surabaya church attacks.
Posted on 14 May 2018

The caption reads: This is an alarm for us. Let's stand united, abandon our conceit, and stop our claims as to who is right. Please, don't fight; don't argue with each other. You must care about the environment, your neighbours. Please be aware. Let's fight terrorists together, no matter who they are. This is a great crime. Support their eradication, down to the roots #notafraidofterrorists #surabayabrave #wearenotafraid #againstterrorists #prayforsurabaya #prayforIndonesia.

Similar to Ayu Diah Bing Slamet, Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari has presented a pro-nationalist attitude in her posts. As seen in the picture above (Figure 6.16), in her caption Tantri campaigned for social solidarity, one based not in a shared religious identity, but rather one that crosses boundaries. In her post, she urged an immediate response to the terrorism in Surabaya and highlighted the importance of retaining unity in diversity as Indonesia deals with its problems. As seen in Figure 6.16, Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari presented her caption in conjunction with a photograph depicting her on-stage, gripping a microphone with her left hand and an Indonesian flag (attached to a long stick) with her right.

In her caption, Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari presents the bombings in Surabaya as stemming from individual egotism. She also drew attention to the need for unity through a series of pictures and captions that emphasise nationalism as a means of tackling terrorism in Indonesia. When the majority of Indonesians view Islam as better than all other religions, it is inevitable that Muslims' perceptions of tragedies will be influenced by their majority position and the inherent advantages. Such views are expressed even in followers' comments; take, for instance: "My Islam, it does not teach to kill outside of war. Terrorists have no religion. They only use the veil (*cadar*) to hide their identity. Don't associate terrorists with Islam. Islam is beautiful and peaceful."

Through her message, Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari emphasises the need for public awareness as a means of handling the Surabaya bomb. She also links terrorism with selfishness, lack of mutual understanding, and sense of

superiority. In her caption, she supports an understanding of difference as an essential part of Indonesia's multicultural society. She sought not to exclude but rather to minimise marginalisation based on difference; in this context, Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari understands Christians as the same as other Indonesian citizens, and thus as enjoying the same rights to life. This message runs contrary to that of Oki Setiana Dewi, who promotes a pan-Muslim solidarity against Zionist Israel and its Christian supporters through discourses of exclusion and imagination. These are manifested through similar means, even as they have significant differences in their values and sensibilities (Nikunen, 2018, pp. 10–22).

Moreover, as explained by Nikunen (2019, pp. 65–66), the collective imagination of the nation is rooted in the specific values and moral dimensions of the community. The ideas expressed by individuals within the community, as well as individuals' relations with others, are directly correlated with their imagination of nation and place. Significantly, media representations play an essential role in the production of these imaginaries (Orgad, 2012, p. 45). Similarly, the growing interest in solidarity amongst Muslim women is partly rooted in ongoing social changes. At the same time, however, it is important to recognise that not all internet celebrities rely on their religious identities to voice solidarity; some prefer not to emphasise their privilege as they advance specific social interests, including nationalism.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained how different articulations of Muslim women's identities on Instagram have contributed to the different imaginations of *ummah* in contemporary Muslim communities in Indonesia. Through several internet celebrities' posts, the importance of social networking websites such as Instagram in re-imagining Islamic authority, Muslim sisterhood, and Islamic solidarity (i.e. in *ummah*) has been articulated loudly. It can also be understood how internet celebrities, through everyday activities that may appear trivial, have also contributed to the imagination of the ideal form of Muslim womanhood through their gender identity and femininity. The key findings illustrate how several internet celebrities use Instagram as a means of Islamic populism. While others use their Instagram accounts to share their support for nationalist action based on Indonesia's multicultural society, as seen in Tantri Syalindri Ichlasari and Ayu Diah Bing Slamet posts.

The internet has facilitated the development of new forms of religious interpretation outside the hierarchies of conventional and mainstream religious authority (Bunt, 2009, pp. 132–134). Digital and social media provide Muslims with significant networking tools, with which they can connect with and influence their peers, as well as access local and global perspectives. Such social media websites have been used by transnational and political Islamic movements such as Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi Jihadi (Taufiqurrahman, 2014; Solahudin, 2011). Social media also offers forms of solidarity and reciprocity supported in the articulate collective experience of marginalisation, counter-public-fostering, and contributing

to forming an active audience (Seto, 2017). However, in internet celebrities' posts it can be seen how solidarity campaigns actively using 'polymedia' events to stimulate social media engagement. Through different social media platforms, solidarity campaigns can accumulate, discuss, and debate information, using multiple sources to generate various expressions of solidarity, even if banal and mundane (see Nikunen, 2019, pp. 114–115.

Also discussed in Chapter Six is the rise of the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which has grown out of the *tarbiyah* and campus *da'wa* movements since 1998 as a means of purifying religion. Through its various activities, PKS has shown the influence of transnational Islamic ideologies—especially Muslim brotherhood (Bruinessen, 2002, pp. 117–154; Muhtadi, 2008, p. 6). During the 'Action to Defend Islam', PKS—as a supporter of Prabowo Subianto[137]—played a significant role in mobilising the masses through social media, exploiting its connections with university campuses, Islamic boarding schools, Islamic recitation communities, and mosques (see Lim 2017, p. 420).

The 'Action to Defend Islam' further reinforced political Islam. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's case reflects not only Muslims' expression of solidarity, but also their attempt to assert religious morality. Also known as the '212 Movement', the 'Action to Defend Islam' has continued to influence Indonesian politics; during Indonesia's April 2019 presidential election, for example, both candidates adapted their politics to accommodate Islamic concerns. Muslims were encouraged to

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[137] Prabowo Subianto was one of Indonesia's presidential candidates in 2014 and in 2019. Cultivating an image as a pious leader to Muslim voters was part of his strategy to be elected president (April, 2019).

express their social, economic, and political views and preferences, including through the internet (as seen in internet celebrities' posts). Furthermore, through political events, the Muslim solidarity campaign echoed louder and rapturously, advocating the discourse of Islamic awakening. It is also noticeable that Arabic cultural symbols are often used as if they are Islamic symbols to highlight internet celebrities' piety.

With reference to the gubernatorial campaign of Anies Baswedan and his running mate Sandiaga Uno,[138] several internet celebrities articulated and celebrated their Islamic identities in the public sphere, including through campaigns promoting congregational prayers (*shalat berjamaah*), communal Qur'anic recitations, Islamic studies under the clerics involved in the 'Action to Defend Islam', and *hijrah* movements. In detail, the linking of socio-economic differences and piety has created a 'market of morality', wherein Islamic symbols are consumed and reproduced as a means of opposing the Joko Widodo government. This strengthens not only the politics of Muslim identity, but also Muslim solidarity.

Islam is presented as a religion of the people, the community, and the media; at the same time, Oki Setiana Dewi's posts also mediate Islam. Social media, thus, offers a significant tool through which internet citizens can connect with others and strengthen local and global perspectives, as clearly seen in Oki's use of her Islamic identity to highlight her nationalist identity. Other internet celebrities represent

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[138] The main competition to incumbent governor Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama and his running mate Djarot Saiful Hidayat in Jakarta's 2017 gubernational election. Anies was allied with Prabowo Subianto, the leader of the Gerindra Party, who ran against Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election.

Muslim solidarity not only as part of *da'wa,* but also echoes a post-colonial mind set that constructs a message of self and other. The construction of imagination internet celebrities such as Dewi Sandra and Zaskia Sungkar highlights how Muslims are imagined as collectively being oppressed by Western nations. Moreover, the imagination of the urgency of Islamic awakening is continually echoed by the emphasis of communism as an ever-present spectre, that requires constant vigilance to prevent.

Internet celebrities' everyday posts in the name of *da'wa* are also meaningful as sites of political struggle. Internet celebrities cannot be seen simply as individuals, but must be recognised as agents actively promoting a specific Islamic ideology through their Instagram accounts. Noticeably, discourses about Palestine have been used by Indonesian Muslims to challenge the expression and forms of Israeli colonialisation (as supported by the United States government). This is always associated with Zionist–Christian (Western) ideologies, and presented as part of a global conspiracy against Islam (Lukens-Bull & Woodward, 2009).

Together, these results provide important insights into the global Muslim solidarity movement, which reaches beyond nation, state, and society. As cited by Huntington (1996), due to industrialisation, modernisation, and social change, people are increasingly separated from longstanding local identities, including national ones. Religion has successfully filled this gap, providing a foundation for cross-border identity construction and engagement that shape global civilisation. As mentioned previously, the expansion of internet and new media has contributed to the construction of transnational and trans-local imagined communities, as

evidenced in the global Muslim solidarity movement (Mandaville, 2001: p. 101; Castells, 1997: pp. 38–43).

Chapter 7
Conclusions, Limitations, and Reflections of the Study

This chapter provides a summary of the findings that have been discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In the first section, each question will receive a focused and concise discussion. During the second section, the limitations and difficulties of this research will be explained, as will recommendations for potential future research. In the last section, I will offer my personal contemplation about this research and how my own identity as a Muslim woman has given me insight into other Muslim women as subjects of this research.

7.1 Conclusion

In my thesis, I established the nexus between Indonesian Muslim women's identity, post-feminism, social media, and politics. Muslim women internet celebrities' representations on their Instagram accounts are constructed around piety and society's gender norms in Indonesia. Through their Instagram-mediated public performances, including their mundane and everyday posts, Muslim women's identities and values are contested and produced by internet celebrities. In the context of Indonesia, Muslim women have demonstrated political agency in the public practice of Islam online since the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and its massive implications for the formation of Islamic identity in the Indonesian public sphere. In internet celebrities' practices of cultural production, thus, it is vitally important to understand their articulation

of this piety in terms of both the political context and the postfeminist condition.

This thesis' analysis shows how internet celebrities' represent themselves, framed within the context of narrow regulations, neoliberalism, and the disciplining of female bodies and feminine gender identities within a political context that is increasingly religiously conservative. Generally, this condition reflects the political ideologies and dominant discourses in late-modern societies that give neoliberalism, patriarchy, and heterosexual normativity a central position in global society. Moreover, the political ideologies in Indonesia are also influenced by dominant gender discourses that place woman as a supplementing component to her husband and family. Additionally, after the fall of Soeharto and resulting Reformation Era 1998 in Indonesia, which stimulated the rise of Islamic political parties, Islamic religious movement and Islam has become a foremost identity in the public sphere. Women in Indonesia have been further subject to the boundries produced within this context.

Data for this study was collected through archival research. Thematic analysis was combined with visual analysis to examine the text in relation to the representation of images and discursive practices. After gathering more than five hundred pictures from eight internet celebrities, of which eighty-three were selected for analysis, this study sought to interpret and make sense of qualitative data. Through a multimodal analysis (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006), which involved semiotic visual exploration, comment interactions, language

investigation, and narrative analysis, this project gained an understanding of the way texts and knowledge are structured and produced by Muslim women in Indonesia through performativity and performance. This research's analysis of discursive practices (Foucault, 1972; 2010) has enabled it to scrutinise how Muslim women's identities reflect and echo political and cultural discourse in Indonesia through language, as will be elucidated below.

7.1. RQ1: How do internet celebrities use their body performativity and their participation on the internet to contribute to the contestation of politics, society, and culture in Indonesia, especially during and after the 2017 gubernatorial election in Jakarta?

The 212 Action to Defend Islam involved many celebrities in demonstrations that, though seen as a manifestation of Muslim solidarity, had a political slant. **Chapter 4** dealt specifically with the link between Muslim women and political contestation. To obtain a detailed response, I divided the analysis into four sections. **Section 4.1** observed how some internet celebrities actively urged Muslims to choose only Muslim leaders. These internet celebrities used religious symbols and activities as they proclaimed their political stance. The construction of piety, being politically contested, indicates how individual celebrities in Indonesia construct their self-identity based on Islamic moral values that are not only associated with, but encourage political contestation. Internet celebrities utilise piety as agency (Mahmood, 2005), exposing their religious activities in relation to their political participation. Through discursive practice analysis, the constitutive limits, ambiguities, and

contradictions of postfeminist discourse and representation became clear (McRobbie, 2004, Hall, 1997).

In this sample, Muslim women are positioned as economically empowered, able to freely choose their career, or agents who liberally articulate their political stance, but simultaneously echo conservative Islamic ideas (Gill, 2007). In this context, social media has not only been utilised for self-promotion, but also to demonstrate complex understandings of piety, ideal Muslim identity, and religious interpretations amongst internet celebrities and in their political stances. Muslim internet celebrities are political agents whose subjectivity is interlinked with and conditioned by their countries' historical, political, and economic backgrounds. As part of the discourse of body roles, Muslim women constitute themselves through regulations and gender performativity (Foucault, 1988; Butler, 1990). Noticeably, as Islamic identities have strengthened in Indonesia since the beginning of political reform, an increasing number of role models have emerged and asserted their desire to become 'better people' through religion; in other words, internet celebrities' subjectivity has been produced by their political contexts.

Section 4.2 explored how Muslim women internet celebrities have contested efforts to purify religion by opposing a pluralist and multicultural Indonesian state. The manifestation of piety through veiling practices intensified after the 212 Action to Defend Islam, and the availability and visibility of hijabs increased amongst internet celebrities. Some internet celebrities not only celebrated veiling practices, but deliberately supported the

wearing of *niqabs* as the ultimate manifestation of Muslim women's faith. The analysis found that, *niqabs* have become increasingly acceptable in the Indonesian public sphere over the past decade (Bruinesssen, 2002). This shows how some internet celebrities have supported a puritan and a sharia way of life. Moreover, several internet celebrities used the 212 Action to Defend Islam as a commodity in film, showing that political Islam and religious commodification have both intensified tremendously as a consequence of Islamisation.

Nevertheless, **Section 4.3** discovered a different political stance has been articulated by other Muslim women internet celebrities, who have represented a notion of nationalism that challenges conservative ideals. By continuing to representing Indonesia as a multicultural and pluralist society, these internet celebrities have contested moderate Islam in their everyday posts, using these posts as part of an important discourse against the recent turn to faith politics in Indonesia (Sebastian and Nubowo, 2019). Of the eight internet celebrities studied, only two have intensely represented themselves as Indonesian women who are Muslim, rather than highlighting their identities as Muslim women. By establishing Muslim women's agency, this section postulated Instagram as a political arena, one that reflects how the dynamics of religious expression have been constructed, represented, and contested.

Section 4.4 explored how internet celebrities capitalise on their authenticity and intimacy in their posts (Abidin, 2018). This section showed how narratives about the perfect relationship between husband and wife are

established through enjoying and consuming lavish products. Moreover, some Internet celebrities also present Muslim women's piety and its manifestation in their domestic and married life. By presenting themselves as travelling internationally and consuming luxury goods, while remaining pious and religious, internet celebrities have presented their Muslim identities as empowering rather than restricting them (Gill, 2007). From this section, it can be seen that internet celebrities' quality is created not only through their economic and cultural capital, but also their religious capital. The practice of self-advertising also involves internet celebrities' use of religious activity for social status, endorsement, and branding. Muslim women are presented as ideal wives, who complement their husbands by becoming perfect and ideal women. Their husbands, meanwhile, are depicted as determinants, as leaders in family and religious life.

7.2. RQ2: How is the concept of Muslim women's piety, as related to the *hijrah* movement, being interpreted and presented by internet celebrities on Instagram?

In the **Chapter 5** asked how Internet celebrities embody and contest the meaning of *hijrah* through their Instagram accounts. It does this by analysing internet celebrities' interpretations of the concepts of piety and *hijrah* movement and examining whether the political nuances portrayed on the internet lead to a more convivial or polarised construction of contemporary Muslim women's identity in Indonesia. To answer this question, chapter five is divided into four sections.

Section **5.1** emphasised how internet celebrities portray their *hijrah* journey as a complete spiritual change from moderate Islam to puritanism. Internet celebrities are not mere documenters of piety and the *hijrah* movement, but content creators who construct and fashion their meaning. This section found that the 212 Action to Defend Islam drew celebrities to politicisation of religion along with an Islamic lifestyle. Furthermore, it showed that the expression of Muslim solidarity turned political through conservative demands for *hijrah* that simultaneously promoted commodification in a post-feminist media culture.

As seen in this section, internet celebrities apply the concept of neoliberal-capitalism (McRobbie, 2004) in their daily practices. Because of the rise of religious influencers, as well as the mediation of internet celebrities, religion has become more involved and multifaceted. Internet celebrities have acted as content creators, and through their self-entrepreneurship and product endorsement they have simultaneously created, provided inspiration and religious authority. This section also provides findings on how the hybridisation of the media environment has also contributed to an increased blurring of content configuration, between factual testimony, commercial advertisements or fictional stories (Papacharissi, 2015; Einstein, 2016; Sumiala et al., 2018; Valaskivi et al., 2021). Additionally, the analysis also found that audiences' responses seemed to support internet celebrities' personal transformations and adoption of a more conservative form of piety.

Section 5.2 discussed internet celebrities who represent and challenge the stereotypes of Muslimah piety. Through their gender performativity (Butler, 1990), some internet celebrities have used different articulations to perform their *hijrah* stories, highlighting not conservative ideas but national ones that incorporate their Muslim womanhood. Religious nationalism is emphasised by these internet celebrities through the values of Pancasila, rather than purely Islamic ones. Furthermore, this section also showed that some internet celebrities present a moderate-progressive attitude rather than a conservative one. Through their hijab practices, internet celebrities' articulation of piety, *hijrah*, and body performativity shows remarkable diversity in Muslim women's performativity (Butler, 2009). This section also explored how different articulations of women's identity have invited different imaginations of *ummah*, as represented in the interactions between audiences (commenters/followers) and internet celebrities (Bunt, 2009). In audiences' participatory culture (Jenkins, 2008), there are reactions from Internet celebrities' followers to conservative Islam and the perceived global conspiracy against Islam.

Section 5.3 analysed how the self-transformation of internet celebrities, as manifested through the *hijrah* trend, has enabled Muslim women to transform themselves into religious influencers through Instagram. This section explored how internet celebrities have actively shown their *da'wa* activities and events. By applying a post-feminist media culture perspective (McRobbie, 2004), this section also revealed how internet celebrities—through

their Instagram posts—provide information about being good Muslim women. As a social media platform, Instagram has provided a space for self-monitoring, self-surveillance, and self-discipline, all in the name of evaluating and correcting Muslim women's bodies.

This section showed how internet celebrities actively give instructions and advice regarding the maintenance of a Muslimah identity. Additionally, this section also discussed how the 212 Action to Defend Islam affected the *hijrah* wave, and strongly influenced some celebrities to express their piety in the name of Muslim solidarity. However, this section also revealed that several celebrities contested the representational framework described. For example, in their implicit support for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which is an organisation that promotes an Islamic state and supports the overt politicisation of religion, and thus in 2017 has been banned by the Indonesian government for its perceived anti-Pancasila ideology. As depicted in the analysis Internet celebrities produce and fashion content to articulate their ideas and political stance but there there is a national politics behind it.

Section 5.4 analysed how internet celebrities perform their independence through capital and self-entrepreneurship (Gill, 2007). Through luxurious posts in everyday activities, internet celebrities perform in accordance with celebrity culture. They routinely represent Western countries as beautiful places, the perfect places to become international designers or otherwise find success. At the same time, internet celebrities also present ambiguity, representing Muslim women and their hijabs and niqabs as exotic

persons. This ambiguity reveals that, even though Muslim women have independence, they remain and present as controlled subjects. Moreover, this section also showed how internet celebrities practice self-orientalism (Said, 1978) by proclaiming Muslim women as inferior and using Arabic cultural perspectives to reinforce this kind of idea.

Overall, based on research findings, the discussion highlights how participatory culture (Jenkins, 2008) has facilitated Internet celebrities as content creators and influencers to present their religious interpretation as ways of constructing imagined piety. Participatory culture in the digital environment has also facilitated commentators and followers of Internet celebrities to respond to various issues presented in the Internet celebrities accounts. Moreover, the hybrid media environment provides the space for Internet celebrities commentators and followers to articulate their responses through online interactions. Through a multiplicity of visual genres and interfaces, Instagram is a simultaneous part of the hybrid media environment because it provides a remediation of issues, through text, image, audio, and video, and can thus be defined as a form of hypermediacy (see Bolter & Grusin, 1999: 15; Chadwick, 2013, p. 25). Overall, the findings of the study provide insight into Muslim women's discursive practices on the existence of wearing the hijab in Instagram as an online public space, as well as depicting diverse Muslim subjectivity experiences and performances. Furthermore, Internet celebrities have an essential role in expressing, echoing, and upholding particular political

viewpoints in the midst of Indonesia's political contestation of identity through their daily performativity, which appears to be taken for granted.

7.3. RQ3: How have the different articulations of Muslim women's identities on Instagram contributed to the different imaginations of Muslim *ummah* in contemporary Muslim communities in Indonesia?

Chapter 6 focused specifically on the formation and contestation of collective identities on the local, national and transnational stage, which has also been informed by the media's depiction of certain ideologies, values, and interests (Bunt, 2009). After the 212 Action to Defend Islam in 2016–2017, there were intense efforts to create an Action to Defend Palestine. This chapter explored how the *ummah* is imagined in the global Muslim solidarity discourse. To provide specific and comprehensive analysis, this chapter was divided into three sections.

Section 6.1 explored the practices of internet celebrities when crafting stories about Muslim identity and nationalism, as mediated by social media (i.e. Instagram). An imagined community (Anderson, 1983), a global *ummah*, has been created through the narration of self and other (Said, 1978). Furthermore, this section also analysed how, through Instagram, an online community has been created through comments, likes, and reposts on internet celebrities' posts, thereby representing the notion of participatory culture (Jenkins, 2008). These activities have presented new ways of constructing an imagined community through social media: an online forum for establishing a political community can be realised by performing and presenting a religious

middle-class lifestyle and consumer culture (Nikunen, 2019). Some internet celebrities have also actively echoed conservative Islamic preachers (through their Instagram content) when portraying group identities, thereby creating a collective image of the in- and out-group (Bullock and Jaffri, 2000) as a means of challenging Pancasila as Indonesia's state ideology.

Section 6.2 discovered how internet celebrities have activated a collective imagination of nation in relation to Muslim womanhood. This section explored how the tension between global and local has been continuously discussed and contested in online spaces, and how Muslim women have become agents who actively participate in these actions (Mandaville, 2001). By promoting solidarity amongst Muslim women, internet celebrities have actively called for women to become involved in global issues. Through posts about femininity, Muslim solidarity has actively used Muslim womanhood as an important means of raising awareness about sisterhood in Islam. Additionally, the analysis showed how the concepts of sisterhood and *ummah* in Islam are very important in the construction of Islamic identity. At the same time, to some extent internet celebrities also present ambiguity. On one hand, Western values are imagined as always immoral and dishonest powers (Lim, 2012). On the other hand, internet celebrities also utilise Instagram and neoliberal logic to gain the sympathy and empathy of their followers (Gill and Scharff, 2011). The development of the dynamic interactions between global and local Muslim identities are portrayed and contested by internet celebrities through their everyday posts.

Section 6.3 offered an analysis of how some internet celebrities participated in the Muslim solidarity issue by using religious nationalism (Busse, 2019) as a background. This section showed how religious nationalism is highlighted and gives value to social solidarity campaigns. At this level, some internet celebrities have emphasised the multicultural Indonesian national identity over their Islamic identity, supporting a different direction to express solidarity that reaches beyond a shared faith, culture, race, or ethnicity. Moreover, this representation contradicts the discourse of Muslim religious solidarity, which is much more popular amongst internet celebrities. The analysis also shows that the resistance to and contestation of conservative Islam has created a different imagination about the global Muslim *ummah* (Bunt, 2009). This representation is equated with the concept of Indonesian citizenship, which upholds Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state.

The next section will discuss the limitations of this study, as well as suggestions for future research.

7.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

Because social media has become the prominent communication technology, it is urgent to examine the relationship between its contemporary usage and collective identity formation. Muslim women internet celebrities reflect intersections of religion and neoliberal practices, demonstrating Muslim women's self-actualization and achievement. As a self-expression technology, Instagram is used by Internet celebrities as a channel to express support for their preferred identities, whether for gender constructs or political interests.

Instagram also facilitates Internet celebrities to participate in global-local interactions, particularly those involving public/political Islam. Since research on internet celebrities, identity politics, piety contestation, and participatory culture is limited, this research felt challenging. In this, the historical contexts and political settings that I have elaborated in the literature review have provided important guidance for the methodology of my research.

Originally, direct observation was to have been part of the data collection method; but because of limited time and internet celebrities' busy schedules, direct observation of and interviews with internet celebrities was deemed problematic. Therefore, this research gathered data from other sources (i.e. internet celebrities YouTube channels, media websites, existing literature) to gain further insights into the motivations behind the celebrities' content creation. As mentioned by Chadwick (2013, pp. 121-124), the hybrid media environment has transformed media formats. The complexity of this meant it was necessary to access other platforms.

The applied textual analysis also has its limitations; such research cannot perform generalizations, but mainly implement an extensive and complicated investigation of selective times and social contexts. Specifically, if the study takes another sample from another period, it can further expand the analysis. Although this research has been broad, it is important to consider other methodological possibilities for studying this topic. It is crucial, therefore, for future research internet celebrities and Instagram to not only focus on visual representation, but also on internet celebrities' content creation

process. Such research could also involve direct observation of how audiences/followers use and utilise social media and respond to its content.

7.3 Closing Remarks and Reflections

In conclusion, my research has taken as its object Indonesian Muslim women internet celebrities and the mechanisms through which they use Instagram to mediate, perform, and contest piety. As explained by Anderson (1983), the print media has historically had an important position in constructing the idea of nation-state as an "imagined community". Similarly, social media (Instagram) has proven significant in constructing "imagined piety", with public Islam and Islamic values becoming prominent in Indonesian nation-building. In reality, it is necessary to recognise that the concept of piety produced by internet celebrities is formed, maintained, and constructed in connection with the past. The identity (of a nation-state) is created through a "never-completed process of becoming, a process of shifting identifications" (Hall, 1992). Moreover, there is more space in digital technology for Muslim women to expand their visibility and performatively expose their personal lives.

Participatory culture and personalised social media have contributed to the construction of the sense of online community, both among internet celebrities as content creators and amongst the audiences/followers who use the digital environment's participatory functions. As explained by Lim (2015, p. 118), social movements' imaginaries allow collectives of people to become involved in online activism and digital environments to contest issues of

access, control, and representation. At the same time, however, such movements have been critiqued, as they are often not accompanied by offline activities (Nikunen, 2019). My research hasn't engaged with the full body of work on online activism because I wanted to concentrate on the way texts are created by Muslim women through performativity, but also the discursive construction of piety and the underlying assumptions that form Muslim internet celebrities' imagination and construction of *ummah.*

This research is essentially coming from my individual interest within a political context. It is quite challenging for me, as a Muslim woman from a middle-class economic and social background who also luxuriates in the celebrity culture present on my social media, to critically engage with my research objects. I also have my political stance, including my perspective on faith politics. I disagree with explicit faith politics, because this kind of campaigning is changing Indonesian political identity, and has resulted in the decline of human rights and democracy. Moreover, this type of faith politics also contests Pancasila as a constitutional ideology and turns Islamic politics into a new kind of nationalism, endangering Indonesia's religious tolerance and diversity.

My personal perspective inevitably influenced my data analysis. I have demonstrated how internet celebrities utilise the digital environment as an arena to represent their individual agency. At the same time, the intersection between post-feminist notions and neo-liberal feminine subjectivities are also important elements that can be seen in seemingly mundane and trivial aspects

of everyday life. Overall, my research findings are significant in terms of how Muslim women are discussed and debated in a non-western context, as well as female subjects, both of which are marginalized in academic debates. I believe that this thesis will open up further discussion and further research, which will promote studies of digital literacy and internet celebrities, particularly in relation to faith identities.

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