Policing football in Sweden

A Participant Action Research project conducted with the football community

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Acknowledgments

This thesis examines the policing of football crowds in Sweden. It was funded by the Enable Sweden Project in conjunction with Keele University. The huge investment in this thesis made by the Enable Project was only possible due to the backing of Gålöstiftelsen[1] to whom I will be eternally grateful.

This thesis has been conducted as part of a broader programme of work run by the Enable Project. The project was created in 2014 by Filip Lundberg of Djurgården IF Fotbollsförening in collaboration with Clifford Stott of Keele University (then of the University of Leeds) and Jonas Havelund from the University of Southern Denmark. Special thanks should go to Clifford and Jonas for their help and support - especially in the early stages of my research.

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Special thanks should be reserved for my Mum and Dad who have supported me tremendously throughout the entire duration of my research. I promise to remove all the

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timeline diagrams, thematic maps, annotated transcripts and theoretical plans from the walls and windows of your conservatory upon completion!

There are also a number of other people who need thanking for their help over the last few years. Unfortunately, it would take me another thesis worth of words to truly do justice to their efforts, so I will not try here. I will be in touch with them in the not too distant future to thank them personally.

However, I would like to mention the one person who I cannot ever speak to again: Brent McEwan. Rest in peace sir.

> I heard you die twice, once when they bury you in the grave
> And the second time is the last time that somebody mentions your name

Academic Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the editors for inviting me to write that chapter for them. This has allowed me the opportunity to speak to a policing and academic audience around the world.

Abstract

This PhD thesis was written as part of a programme of research conducted by the Enable Project into the policing of domestic football events in Sweden. Between 2014 and 2016 Enable had conducted a series of Participant Action Research based observations; Enable had then made a series of recommendations for the Swedish Police to implement in order to reduce the potentiality for conflict with and between supporter groups. This thesis was then designed to monitor and analyse the impact of the three main changes. Specifically, that 2016 report had suggested that the police focus on three key issues. Firstly, they needed to place a greater emphasis on facilitation. Secondly, they should address the inconsistencies in the national approach to crowd management. And finally, it was concluded that the police would benefit from separating the spotter and dialogue roles. Three data collection methods were employed. The first of which involved four large scale observations conducted in 2017. This involved teams of around 15 people observing a football match day operation to create a triangulated consensual account of the day's events. This data was thematically analysed and used to create thematic maps. The second method included four online qualitative surveys to run alongside those observations. In total 1433 responses were received and then analysed using a content analysis approach. The third method was an interview study done with 20 police officers and 11 football supporters conducted over the course of the 2018 season. This data was used to perform a multi-perspective thematic analysis. Analysis of all the data collected in this thesis showed that a greater police emphasis on facilitation was linked to a reduced potentiality for conflict and thus greatly enhanced their ability to manage the crowd. It was thus concluded that, by placing an equal emphasis on facilitating the lawful intentions of the crowd as they do on controlling the unlawful intentions of it, the police can overcome the 'legacy of illegitimacy' which inhibits their ability to manage crowds without the use of excessive force.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter One: Introduction

This introduction aims to accomplish three objectives in a short space. First, I will give a brief historical description of the Enable Sweden Project which originally commissioned my research. I will then elaborate on the early investigative work of the Enable Sweden Project in order to contextualise the research which I have undertaken. Finally, I will discuss how this thesis will be organised with specific reference to the aims of the thesis and an overview of the data collected.

1.1 Enable Sweden

On the 30th of March 2014 Djurgårdens IF (DIF) played their first game of the 2014 Allsvenskan football season away at Helsingborgs IF[2]. As is custom for the supporters of DIF, a large number travelled from Stockholm to attend their first away fixture. Sadly, one supporter never returned home. After a conflict within the city before the game, the supporter was initially thought only injured. However, after the game began, reports started to circulate that the supporter had unfortunately passed away. The outraged Djurgården supporters invaded the pitch and proceeded to chant "Mordare! Mordare!" (Murderers!) at both the home supporters and the authorities. With a score line of 1–1, the match was officially abandoned after 42 minutes and a crisis period began for Swedish football.

It was within this context of crisis that Enable was created. Very serious political debates occurred in the wake of this tragic event, with some even suggesting that away supporters should be banned all together from attending matches in order to avoid any repeat incidents. Yet anyone who follows Swedish football can tell you that the atmosphere created in the stadiums is one of the highlights of the game in Sweden. In the late 2000s Irish broadcaster

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[2] The Allsvenskan (All-Swedish) is the top tier of the Swedish football league system.

Setanta Sports ranked Hammarby's Söderstadion as the eleventh-noisiest in the world, beating renowned stadiums such as Barcelona's Nou Camp and Milan's San Siro. Stuart Fuller's (2016) book about football around Europe emphasises this fact in his chapter on Sweden when he declares that "[a]ny Football Tourist will tell you that Swedish football is the best in the world" when it comes to the atmosphere (ibid., kindle version Chapter 8). To lose such a key element of the game would evidently have had a very negative impact on Swedish football as a whole. Such a draconian approach would also have raised some very pertinent questions about Sweden's observance of the European Human Rights Convention; not to mention been incongruent with the philosophy of Sweden's police force who are seen as world leading in their commitment to democratic policing (HMIC, 2009).

Sensing the need for a more reasonable solution, Filip Lundberg of Djurgården IF contacted Professor Clifford Stott, an English academic expert in policing and managing football crowds, and Jonas Havelund, a Danish academic who had previously worked with Professor Stott to implement a more dialogue-based approach to policing football in Denmark. Together they initiated a Participant Action Research (PAR) project aimed at bringing together stakeholders to enable an evidence-based solution to the crowd management issues presented by Swedish football. PAR is not a method per se, but a research framework that incorporates stakeholders in the data gathering process with the specific aim of informing and influencing practice (Elliot, 1991; McNiff & Whitehead, 2005; Munn- Giddings & Winter, 2013). In the wake of the tragic death and the resulting crisis period, it was evident that Enable needed "an approach to research that could be specifically applied to solving social problems" (Masuda, 2016, p.3). Or as Kurt Lewin (1946, p.35) stated in the seminal paper on Action Research, research that produced nothing but books would not suffice. As such, Enable was founded with the specific goal in mind that the research it created could be used directly to influence policy or practice.

The project formally began with an observational study of IFK Gothenburg v Djurgårdens IF in September 2014. After the initial observation in which the applicability of such a research approach was demonstrated, the Project began Phase One which ran a series of observations throughout the 2015 Allsvenskan season[3]. The first phase was used to demonstrate the viability of the approach and when additional funding from the Gålöstiftelsen was secured in 2016 the project began Phase Two. This was designed to be a major initiative built around five distinct work programmes.

Phase Two's five work programmes were planned to run concurrently up until the end of 2020. The work programmes (WP) were: 1) Project Management, 2) Supporter Culture, 3) Policing, 4) Partnership and Sustainability and finally 5) Dissemination. My PhD research was to be conducted as part of WP3 which was already ongoing in the summer of 2016 when I joined the project. As such, there was already a well-defined and operationalised research approach in place which I was tasked to continue, with some of my own enhancements, and then analyse. The early stages of WP3 had conducted an assessment of policing, and the project had already recommended several changes in practice that the police should initiate to reduce conflict between the supporters and the police. This thesis was therefore originally intended to focus on how those changes impacted supporter behaviour. It was thus hoped that my research would help the project to transition its main research focus from the police, who had been extensively prioritised up till then, into supporter culture (WP2), while also contributing significantly to WP5, the dissemination of knowledge [4].

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[3] Partly funded by Länsstyrelsen Stockholm / County Administrative Board of Stockholm
[4] The Enable Project separated into Enable Sweden and Enable UK in early 2018 and this phase approach has now been discontinued. However, Enable Sweden was still simply referred to as Enable during my field research, therefore I use the terms Enable or the Enable Project throughout the rest of the thesis as none of this work is related to Enable UK, nor was Enable Sweden a term commonly used until 2019.

1.2 The PAR Cycle

Having briefly discussed the origins of the Enable Project and my own research, this section will outline the nature of the PAR cycle as I have interpreted it (PAR will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). It will then fill in the picture of where exactly the project was when I joined by positioning the previous work of Enable into said PAR cycle precisely. Finally, it will seek to elaborate on how my work fits into that cycle and what it is aimed at achieving specifically.

1.2.1 The PAR Approach

The PAR approach originated with the work of Kurt Lewin (1946). However, Lewin's desire for his approach not to be seen as an exact technocratic prescriptivist methodology, meant that he never precisely articulated a step-by-step process for his proposed action reflection cycle. It should thus be seen as more of a template for adaptation to the specific context the circumstances require. The figure below is a diagram of how it has been applied in this specific context. My model draws heavily from the interpretation model of Elliot (1991, p. 71) yet also combines the theoretical work of Kindon, Pain and Kesby (2007, p. 15) to appropriately represent the way Enable had enacted Lewin's guide.

Figure 1- A Revised Version of Lewin's Model of Action Research Based on That Created by Elliott (1991, p. 71)

1.2.2 The 2016 Enable Report

At the commencement of my research in October 2016, Enable was in the middle of a PAR cycle. Stott et al.(2016) had published a report two months prior which gave a very detailed picture of exactly where the project was in terms of the PAR cycle at that point in time. It describes a process of reconnaissance through a series of observations conducted between September 2014 and May 2016[5].

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[5] In 2014: IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, September. In 2015: AIK v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Djurgården IF, April; IFK Göteborg v IF Elfsborg, June; Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, August; IFK Göteborg v Hammarby IF, September; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, October. In 2016: Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, April; AIK v IFK Göteborg, April; Helsingborg IF v Malmö FF, May, IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, May.

This report was then used to articulate not just the findings, but also a series of recommended actions based on the post event analysis conducted by the Enable team with participants in a workshop[6]. Stott et al.'s (2016) report was very detailed and nuanced therefore it is difficult to retain the complexities of that argument while summarising it here. For this reason, I include two points of reference: The first is to the full report which can be found via the Enable Sweden wesbite[7]; The second is to a summary of that report which can be found in Appendix A.

The summary was originally produced by myself for the police after a meeting between Enable and the Police Chiefs in Stockholm on the 19th of December 2016. This was then translated into Swedish by Anders Almgren (the Former IFK Gothenburg SLO[8]) who joined the Enable Project on the 1st of January 2017. It was requested by the police so that a shortened Swedish language version of the full 49 page English language report could be disseminated across the force which would not require such a huge investment in time to read.

However, there were three main issues highlighted. Firstly, that there was considerable variability in the strategies and tactics used for policing supporters in different areas of the country. This did not sit neatly within the framework of a single national police force and was a source of misunderstanding which often led to conflict between supporters and police.

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[6] That same workshop format was followed during my research and the exact protocol will be further elaborated upon in Chapter Five.

[7] The full report can also be downloaded here:
http://findresearcher.sdu.dk/portal/files/121776201/Stott_et_al._ENABLE_2016_Policing_Football_in_Sweden.pdf

[8] "Under Article 35 of UEFA's Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, clubs across Europe are required to appoint a Supporter Liaison Officer (SLO) to ensure a proper and constructive discourse with their fans. The outcome of this in Sweden is the development of a coordinated programme of investment and education by Swedish Elite Football and the major Swedish clubs, in a particular form of SLO oriented toward conflict de-escalation. The SLOs work to establish good links of communication between supporter organisations and the clubs. The SLOs often act as a primary contact point to the police particularly with regard to negotiating gathering points and routes for fan 'marches'." (Stott et al., 2016, p.13).

There was thus a requirement to address these regional variabilities especially with regards to supporter engagement. The next two points sit within this national variance and relate specifically to the Conflict Reducing Principles (CRP) which underpin the Special Police Tactic (SPT) for policing crowds in Sweden. There are four Conflict Reducing Principles. They are Education/Knowledge, Facilitation, Communication and Differentiation. These principles were originally proposed by Reicher et al. (2004) and were based on research conducted over the previous twenty years by researchers and theorists working in the Social Identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) (this research and the principles will be discussed throughout Chapter Three). The report pointed out that even though references were often made during the observations to the facilitation of positive supporter culture, there was very little police action observed that attempted to facilitate. In fact, most of the police action observed was coercive in nature. As such, facilitation needed to receive more focus during the planning stage and the match event. The third main issue was related to police-supporter communication. It was noted that Supporter Police units who were tasked with both prosecution and liaison duties were not able to provide as rich an information flow as the units who specialised predominantly in liaison duties. The separation of roles was only enacted in Stockholm where Supporter Police focused on prosecution and a separate police unit, known as the Evenemangs, concentrated almost entirely on liaison with supporters. This liaison role enabled the Evenemangs to communicate well with supporters during events and therefore allowed those Evenemangs Officers to help facilitate the legitimate goals of the supporters while also providing an enhanced flow of information about supporter intentions back into the operation. The report concludes by suggesting that a national implementation of the Evenemangs concept could therefore aid the police in attempting to resolve these three core issues (Stott et al., 2016).

The Enable 2016 Report should be seen as the first part of the PAR cycle as shown in Figure 2 overleaf.

ENABLE PAR CYCLE ONE

Identify Initial Problem Area

Observations 2014- 2016

Enable Report (2016)

Facilitation should be emphasised

Inconsistencies in national approach should be addressed

Spotter and Dialogue role should be seperated

Implement Actions

Monitor Implementation and Effects

Analysis Stage (explain any failure to implement, and effects)

Feedback to Participants　　　**Identify Problem Areas**

Cycle repeats

Figure 2- Enable PAR Cycle One at the Commencement of my Research in October 2016

This second diagram illustrates how the Enable Project was at the stage of having made recommendations for the police to implement. As such, the Enable Project was at the time of my engagement in need of an impartial academic to come in and spearhead the next stages of research. The focus of this thesis was therefore to be on the monitoring and analysis stage, with a particular emphasis on the effects that these action steps had on the supporter community. The thesis would then be used to feedback to the participants so that a new PAR cycle may begin again from a more informed position.

1.3 Monitoring and Analysis

This final section of the introduction will give an overview of the aims of the thesis and the methods I have employed within it. I will then give a short overview of how the subsequent chapters will be organised to achieve this.

1.3.1 Aims of the thesis

It is important to note that while aspects of my research work originated from the funded Enable project, this PhD thesis is separate to that project and has its own explicit statement of aims. The Enable Project seeks to mitigate conflict within the context of Swedish football and incorporates Lewin's Action Reflection Cycle (1946) to do so. My work is designed to facilitate that overarching goal. The main aim of this thesis is therefore to undertake the monitoring and analysis stages of the PAR cycle of the Enable Project (Stott et al., 2016; Elliot, 1991). In order to achieve this aim I will employ the theoretical framework of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000). As will be illustrated in the literature review (Chapters Two and Three), the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) is that which is not only the most apt for understanding football crowd behaviour, but also the current dominant psychological model of the crowd. However, as that chapter will also point out there is a lack of ESIM based research outside of the UK football crowd context. Yet, when one considers that ESIM and the Conflict Reducing Principles (CRP) derived from it were adopted by the Swedish Police in around 2007 and underpin the Special Police Tactic (SPT) for managing crowd events in Sweden (Adang, 2012), it seems pertinent and timely to conduct ESIM based research in Sweden.

The aims of the thesis should therefore be seen thus:

1. To observe and critically analyse how the recommendations produced in the 2016 Enable report have been implemented.

2. To understand what effect the implementation of these recommendations has had on intergroup dynamics.

3. To comprehend why some recommendations have not been implemented.

4. To explore ESIM as a framework to understand intergroup dynamics.

5. To extract recommendations and lessons learned for Sweden and the wider football policing community.

These aims will be achieved by proceeding with the monitoring and analysis stages of the PAR cycle of the Enable Project (Stott et al., 2016) in three key studies as follows:

1. Observations and Thematic Maps
   - To monitor implementation in situ and critically analyse.
   - In order to do this, four observations were conducted in April 2017. This involved large teams of around 15 people made up of highly experienced crowd management professionals (such as police officers or club security managers), supporter representatives and academics (including myself) observing a football match day operation and then reconvening in a 3 hour workshop the next day to create a triangulated consensual account of the day's events (Denzin, 1989).

2. Multi Perspective Thematic Analysis of Interviews
   - To follow up observations and understand gaps, barriers, and successful implementation from police and supporter perspectives.
   - In order to do this, I conducted 11 interviews with supporters and 20 interviews with police officers over the course of the 2018 Allsvenskan.

3. A Quantified Thematic Analysis of Supporter Surveys

- To understand how a police focus on facilitation affects crowd members during an event and how widespread perceptions are.

- In order to do this, I constructed a voluntary, online, qualitative survey which could sit alongside the 2017 observations. In this way, supporters could directly give us insight into their perspective of the matches observed (if they so wished) and we could include anyone who wished to have their voice heard (as long as they had compatible technology). In total 1433 responses were received over the course of the four observations.[9]

In order to conduct this research I also needed to speak Swedish. I therefore embarked upon a series of intensive Swedish language courses at Folkuniversitetet; first in Gothenburg during 2017 and then in Malmö and Lund during 2018. These courses, as well as extensive self-study, helped me reach a stage where I could understand CEFR B2[10] level written Swedish with little need for a dictionary (I can still be derailed by some accents however).

1.3.2 Organisation of the Thesis

As the Enable project seeks to mitigate conflict in and around Swedish football, there was a requirement that this thesis should help inform police policy at a national level in Sweden. I have therefore adopted the 'compromise model' of thesis organisation, recommended by Dunleavy (2015, p. 60), in which readers are introduced to the original work much earlier than they would be in a traditionally organised thesis that might have numerous literature review chapters. Adopting this construction thus allows the reader to access my research

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[9] All research was carried out under strict ethical guidelines stipulated by Keele University. Please see Appendix B for Keele University Ethics Review Panel permission documents.

[10] The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (**CEFR**) is an international standard for describing language ability. It describes language ability on a six-point scale, from A1 for beginners, through A2, B1, B2 and C1 up to C2 for those who have mastered a language with native level proficiency (Cambridge, 2020).

findings and analysis in a more timely fashion, and garner a better appreciation of how the findings presented here could inform future police practices.

Chapter Two begins the thesis with a general crowd psychology literature review. This is followed by a second literature review chapter which will focus on police psychological understandings of crowds and demonstrate how ESIM can help us to interpret the behaviour of those crowds. Chapter Four will subsequently address the methodological approach employed throughout the duration of my research. The thesis will then move on to the 'core' section in which my empirical data is presented and analysed with Chapters Five through to Seven.

Chapter Five will draw on analyses of four sets of observational data, each of which corresponds to a specific fixture from 2017. The analysis focuses on the behaviours of football fans, the strategies of crowd policing chosen for the fixtures, and the implications for the 'classical' theories of the crowd and the ESIM. In turn, Chapter Six will analyse data from both the police and supporter interviews conducted in 2018. This chapter compares and contrasts the perceptions of football crowds and the police to contribute to fundamental theories of human behaviour and identity, including the Social Identity Theory and the Self Categorisation Theory. Chapter Seven will go on to present the supporter survey data to illustrate the supporter perspective in regard to the 2017 observations and give further evidence to the benefits of a facilitation focused approach.

The thesis will draw to a close with a final chapter that summarises the main findings and then discusses the implications and the limitations of this work, before suggesting an area of research which the next PAR cycle might focus upon. By trying to give an overview of both the police and supporter perspectives and showing how they fit together the core element of this thesis is inspired by Elcheroth and Reicher's notion that, when writing for stakeholders,

change "may be best achieved by altering our knowledge of others' thoughts and intentions rather than trying to change our internal beliefs" (2017, p. vi-vii).

Chapter Two: Introducing Crowd Psychology and Intergroup Relations

The purpose of this initial literature review chapter is to introduce the key areas of crowd psychology and intergroup relations, which are, in turn, linked to the Social Identity Theory and its extensions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The conceptual framework of the thesis focuses on ESIM and the practical implications of intergroup relations. To define and critique the core concepts discussed in ESIM, this chapter refers to the core areas of crowd psychology, and models of intergroup legitimacy and contact.

2.1 Introducing the Areas of Crowd Psychology

According to Laursen (2019), football crowds can be investigated along four core areas, namely collective action, empowerment, crowd behaviour and rituals. The following section, therefore, focuses on these dimensions by referring to fundamental theories of crowd psychology.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there has been a persistent debate about the degree to which individual psychology and crowd psychology are similar (Borch, 2012). According to Freud, the difference between individual and crowd domains in psychology is overplayed, because individual psychology always approaches persons in a social setting and deals with how they interact with other individuals (Freud, 1940). In other words, collective phenomena incorporate a variety of behaviours at an individual level. On the other hand, Freud's analysis of crowd psychology was published under the title 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego' (Freud, 1940), which collides the categories of group psychology and crowd psychology. Scholars such as Reicher and Ramachandran (2012) argued that a psychological group consists of individuals sharing the same social principle or characteristic, while crowds are usually heterogeneous and may include participants that do not necessarily

share significant characteristics (e.g., behavioural traits) with others. In the context of the thesis, crowds of football fans may include several distinct psychological groups such as 'Ultras'[11].

The archetypal classical argument that crowd psychology is distinct from individual psychology can be found in the works of Gustav Le Bon (1960 – originally published in 1895), one of the earliest theorists of crowd behaviour. Le Bon (1960) argued that individual identity is lost in the crowd when members acquire anonymity. In these conditions, individuals cease to obey their normal values and are not capable of judging objectively, which arouses emotion-driven and spontaneous behaviours (Le Bon, 1960) Ideas and examples of behaviour from the surrounding social community become especially contagious, and therefore make the crowd difficult to control. Le Bon's theoretical explanation of crowd behaviour was somewhat accepted within psychology and can be seen mirrored in the works of scholars pre-eminent within the field of social psychology such as Philip Zimbardo (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks & Jaffe 1971), the architect of The Stanford prison experiment. That experiment implied that group behaviours were shaped by contextual situations (e.g., instructions given by persons of authority) instead of individual personality traits. Authors such as Le Texier (2019), however, acknowledged that the experiment conditions failed to address threats to validity and reliability, most notably the participants' want to behave in a manner requested by the researchers.

The prevalence of Le Bon's theory of the crowd is in no doubt due to a certain extent to its use by certain politicians in the 1920s and the 1930s, who were in correspondence with Le Bon

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[11] "One of the most visible ways of expression of the ultra's 'identity' is their use of coordinated chanting, large visual displays, banners and pyrotechnics inside and outside of stadiums. Moreover, Ultras are often central to organising, 'stewarding' and leading large fan marches to and from stadiums and have a complex relationship to violent confrontation. For example, Malmö FF has an independent supporter group called the Supras Malmö, formed in 2003 from a coalition of independent supporters and Ultras. It would be inaccurate to assume that this group actively pursues violent confrontations with opposition fans. However, at times the different Ultras within and between clubs can be openly hostile to one another and do on occasion become involved in confrontational situations" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 13).

and used his theories to help them manipulate crowds in their rise to power (Kershaw 2000). Le Bon's (1960) statement that crowds act irrationally was rarely questioned until the latter part of the twentieth century when scholars, such as Turner and Killian (1987), Waddington, Jones and Critcher (1989), and McPhail (1991), began to argue that personal identity is replaced by emergent social norms in the crowd, instead of a complete identity loss. As such, individuals do not renounce their normal beliefs and values but rather adopt higher-level values attributed to the whole group. The concept of social identity has become a dominant explanation as to why social groups are unique and distinctive from each other (Waddington et al., 1989; Greene, 1999). In the context of public order policing, "it is not simply that social identity shapes the values and standards on which we act, it also determines, amongst other things, who can influence us and how, the nature of our goals and priorities, how we view others and interpret their behaviour, and, more specifically, the conditions under which we enter into conflict with others" (Reicher, Stott, Cronin & Adang, 2004, p.560).

Prior to evaluating the role of social identity in crowd psychology and considering intergroup relations, this section of the literature review will touch upon the essential aspects of crowd theory, including collective actions, protest and empowerment, crowd behaviour in the conditions of emergency, and crowd celebration. As noted by Hogg and Tindale (2008), the phenomenology of crowd behaviour and participation is an extremely under-explored research area, which goes beyond the rational-irrational behaviour argument (Reicher et al., 2004) and distinctions between individual and group psychology (Freud, 1940). Additionally, the content and quality of processes in crowd psychology depend on the crowd type. Cerrah (2018) differentiated between aggressive, escapist, acquisitive, and expressive crowds. Football crowds' behaviour may vary from expressive to aggressive, thus involving diverse manifestations of collective actions aimed at emotional expression or even destruction. Therefore, the choice of crowd policing and control strategies should be predicated by the crowd's current behaviour and radicalism, and not based on stereotypical preconceived notions about that crowd and its 'group mind' (Le Bon, 1960). The discussion of key areas of

25

crowd psychology will, therefore, outline key theoretical areas and concepts that could be leveraged to explain the behaviours of crowds of football fans.

2.1.1. Collective Action and Social Change

The middle of the twentieth century was marked by the emergence of two alternative perspectives on social change. According to the first body of research (Podgórecki, Alexander, & Shields, 1996), interventions aimed at the change of behaviour norms and individual motives are needed to achieve social change. This understanding of social change gave rise to social engineering (ibid.). The second perspective suggests that specific determinants of collective action stimulate social change (Prentice & Paluck, 2020). Such popular movements as #MeToo and Black Lives Matter are a good illustration of the second view, implying that a large-scale social transformation is impossible without collective efforts of many individuals, as opposed to fragmentary and artificial interventions made by the few (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2019). This thesis is consistent with the second understanding of social change, because the interest area and target population (i.e., policing of the football community in Sweden) comply with the three criteria defining collective action, namely involvement of social groups experiencing a common emotion, shared interests inside the group, and common actions aimed at the satisfaction of this interest (Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio & McCarthy, 2004). Collective action is broadly defined as "actions taken by members of a group to further their common interest" (Bogdanor, 1987, p.113).

It was highlighted earlier in this section that collective identity dominates in the crowd (Turner & Killian, 1987). Similarly, it is valid to argue that collective identity serves as a starting point of group membership identification and further leads to collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A three-component model was developed by Cameron (2004) to explain the process of collective identification. Specifically, Cameron singled out such components as cognitive centrality, ingroup affect, and ingroup ties. The cognitive centrality

component deals with the frequency of associating oneself with a specific group and the degree to which this social identity is important for an individual. Ingroup affect stands for the potential feelings one can experience with respect to a social community. Finally, ingroup ties imply the sense of belongingness and perceived similarity to other group members (Cameron, 1999). Cameron (2004) admitted that the combinations in which these constructs of social identity influence social change are not sufficiently examined. However, it can be assumed that high cognitive centrality and low ingroup affect, when individuals act rationally with moderate emotional motivation, lead to collective action. Alternatively, undeveloped ingroup ties and negative ingroup affect are more likely to arouse social mobility, which is an individual intention to break associations with a social group, and make collective action less probable (Rowley, Sellers, Chavous & Smith, 1998).

Continuing the path of collective action determinants to stimulate social change (Prentice & Paluck, 2020), it is essential to consider how these determinants are classified in extant literature. Giguere and Lalonde (2010) differentiated between affective and strategic determinants of collective action in light of Cameron's (2004) multi-dimensional view on collective identity. Affective determinants imply that an emotional stimulus is created for individuals to participate in collective action (e.g., fear of negative consequences, anger, inspiration, etc.). In turn, strategic determinants stem from cognitive stimuli, which make individuals expect that collective action would be able to improve the surrounding conditions (Giguere & Lalonde, 2010). When strategic determinants are involved, individuals should realise the instrumental value of specific steps and tactics, thus choosing adequate scenarios for collective action. Interestingly, Giguere and Lalonde (2010) emphasised the role of self-control in combination with strategic determinants. This means that individuals should possess the ability of systematically performing their planned actions. The relevance of self-control is higher with respect to strategic determinants than to affective factors, because the latter involve impulse behaviours (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004).

Academic research into collective action remains challenging. For example, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) concluded that there is a measurement issue with collective action, because it involves a large number of participants, fails to offer clear operationalisation steps, and has a dynamic nature. These researchers attempted to develop a conceptual framework of collective action, but it managed to include only generic stages, such as structure, conduct and performance. Meinzen-Dick et al.'s (2004) framework (see Figure 3 below), is consistent with the line of argument in this literature review, since it reflects the input of determinants to collective action and its expected outcome in the form of social change (Prentice & Paluck, 2020). The inclusion of standalone interventions is not envisaged by this model.

Figure 3 - A Conceptual Framework of Collective Action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004, p.203

Continuing the debate between the conflicting perspectives on crowd behaviours, Drury and Reicher (2000) criticised the intention of previous researchers in the field (e.g., Le Bon, 1960) to approach crowd behaviour as irrational, spontaneous, and destructive. Alternatively, crowd action does not only bear a meaningful message but also creates new meanings. In addition to external social changes resulting from collective actions, participants of the crowd also transform their self-identities. For instance, even passive participants of mass strikes gradually adopt a more critical perspective on the authorities and acquire clearer class collective identities (McIlroy, 2012). Drury and Reicher (2000) went far beyond social change as a result of collective action and introduced the concept of psychological change, incorporating group polarisation mechanisms, stereotype change, conformity, facilitation of

minority influence, persuasion, and attitude change. This thesis argues that it is hardly possible to count on a large-scale social change without psychological changes at an individual level. Interestingly, the research pursued by Zaal et al. (2012) demonstrated that there is also a reverse connection between collective action and social change. The results obtained by these scholars showed that individuals who perceive a high probability of social change due to their actions prove to be more committed to collective action at the implementation stage (Zaal et al., 2012).

2.1.2. Political Protest and Empowerment

Referencing the concept of protest and empowerment in the context of football crowds, Brechbühl, Dimech and Seiler (2020) noted that protesting the actions of 'illegitimate' police forces created the sense of empowerment among football fans, necessitating an analysis of these two concepts. Specifically, Drury et al. (2005) arrived at the conclusion that collective action may lead to empowerment by means of collective self-objectification (CSO). Although the phenomenology of empowerment is complex, CSO contributes by actualising the social identity of crowd participants, making them resistant to the power of strong groups. In other words, CSO creates shared norms, which can be expressed via collective actions, and the empowerment effect is achieved due to the sense of belonging, shared problems, unity, and support (Drury et al., 2005). Drury et al.'s (2005) assumptions about empowerment were tested on the population of 37 political activists, which is a relatively small sample that does not allow for making meaningful generalisations and limits the applicability area of these observations. On the other hand, it is challenging for qualitative analysis to attract large respondent numbers due to substantial time needed to interview each participant (Slone, 2009). Drury et al. (2005) relied on a mixed approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative analysis.

CSO is said to take its origin in crowd behaviour theory and the Elaborated Social Identity Model (the ESIM and its development will be the main topic of Chapter Four) (Drury & Reicher, 2000). This perspective on CSO suggests that social identities are not mere cognitive sets but can, instead, be measured and observed in collective behaviours in crowds or homogenous groups. Hence, collective empowerment can only occur in the conditions of intergroup dynamics (Stott & Reicher, 1998). Drury et al. (2005) determined at least four essential features of CSO. First, the change of identities only takes place after the change of a surrounding context. For example, political protest or radicalisation occur when individuals place themselves in a new social context, where they act as antagonists with respect to the mainstream position. Second, novelty is typical to CSO, "as an explanation for empowerment, it refers to the actions of groups in resistance who challenge the status quo, rather than those of dominant groups whose actions serve to reproduce the status quo" (Drury et al., 2005, p.311). Third, only collective action, which is perceived as legitimate by the group members, is able to create the empowerment effect. Fourth, the endurance of empowerment depends on the period these new relations and new identities may last themselves (Drury et al., 2005).

Simon and Klandermans (2001) limited the phenomenon of psychological empowerment to the function of politicised group identity. These scholars developed a mixed model of psychological and social factors standing behind mobilisation. Politicised group identity stems from the involvement of individuals in a collective dispute, understanding of challenges shared within the community, and antagonistic attributions (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Nonetheless, Drury et al.'s (2005) understanding of empowerment through collective action is broader than Simon and Klandermans' (2001) politicised mobilisation, as CSO-based empowerment is deeply rooted in the ESIM and better recognises contextual factors surrounding political antagonism, as well as legitimacy criteria.

Overall, the phenomenon of empowerment is defined as "a social-psychological state of confidence in one's ability to challenge existing relations of domination" (Drury & Reicher,

2005, p.35). In extant empirical research, it was typical to approach empowerment through the notion of efficacy (Fox-Cardamone, Hinkle & Hogue, 2000; Fiske, 1987). These researchers also viewed empowerment as an essential step before collective action, which is manifested through protests, social movements, and demonstrations in political life. However, social movement researchers went further and argued that empowerment is an enduring phenomenon, which does not only precede collective action but also evolves in the process. Specifically, conflicts and collective discussions contribute to the identification of boundaries inside and outside the group, which in turn leads to a better formulated politicised collective identity (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Nonetheless, empowerment still remains one of the least studied phenomena in crowd psychology (Landmann & Rohmann, 2020).

Collective action in the form of peaceful protests was investigated by Batel and Castro (2015) in their empirical research. These scholars examined the movement of local residents in Lisbon neighbourhoods, which resisted the change of the neighbourhood convent. Applying a socio-constructionist view to this protest campaign, Batel and Castro (2015) reported that the social identity of the protesters was not built evenly and symmetrically. For instance, certain representatives of the social group were isolated and could not receive regular updates about the movement. For this reason, Batel and Castro (2015) selected Social Representations Theory (SRT) to explain how third parties might contribute to a better link between collective action and social change.

The following tested assumptions about the SRT were found useful for crowd dynamics during political protests. First, the SRT has a dialogical orientation, meaning that direct and indirect communication takes place between protesters. Second, social representation achieves consent through communication and discourse. Third, social representations range from emancipated to hegemonic, thus varying in terms of their universality and scope (Batel & Castro, 2015). The contribution of Batel and Castro (2015) to the discussion of collective

action may be recognised in identifying an additional source of empowerment for political protests. The involvement of third parties (especially powerful ones and belonging to the authorities) serves as an inspiration for protesters and facilitates social change. However, it should be acknowledged that the link between the involvement of third parties and empowerment can be moderated by the group type. According to Cerrah (2018), aggressive groups rarely achieve consent relying on their internal resource, and the involvement of third parties may decrease the protesting potential, making social change less probable. Alternatively, the transformational power of acquisitive or escapist groups is more dependent on communication and social representation (Cerrah, 2018). Further research should be undertaken to discover the sources of empowerment for football communities and examine social representation mechanisms among political protesters.

2.1.3. Crowd Behaviour During Disasters and Emergencies

According to Veld and de Gelder (2015), dynamic crowds (including crowds of football fans) may experience significant negative emotions when faced with situations threatening the well-being of their representatives such as applications of excessive police force. However, Veld and de Gelder (ibid) also acknowledged that there was a lack of explanations of how panic and fear spread throughout dynamic crowds, necessitating a brief discussion of how these two concepts are discussed in fundamental works on crowd psychology.

As noted by Cocking, Drury and Reicher (2009), the concept of panic is frequently introduced when crowd behaviour is studied in emergency situations. Popular definitions of panic mention such factors as excessive fear, lack of cooperative behaviours, and selfish actions aimed at personal security (Mawson, 2005). This 'panic model' of crowd behaviour during disasters and emergencies offers an external observer orientation and claims that individuals act instinctively when they seek to escape from danger. Thus, crowd members should not be viewed as thinking agents but rather as inanimate objects when mass panic

takes place (Sime, 1995). An important implication of the panic model is that physical factors (e.g., the size and positioning of emergency exits for evacuation) should dominate in security engineering over psychological factors, because individuals are not able to demonstrate rational and adaptive behaviours.

On the other hand, Cocking et al. (2009) argued that the role of panic is exaggerated by those observers who do not act as crowd members. For example, typical panic was registered only in 0.8% of cases during the 9/11 attack in the US according to the empirical study by Blake, Galea, Westang and Dixon (2004). Other scholars confirmed that during fire emergency and evacuation, people tend to leave buildings through the same exits they entered it, even if closer and more convenient exits are available on their way (Donald & Canter, 1990). This observation proves that panic does not completely substitute rational behaviours, as individuals prefer using evacuation exits that they know and have used before to manage uncertainty during disasters. The intention to avoid a mistake under an emergency situation can be classified as rational behaviour (Cocking et al., 2009).

This literature review approaches the Social Attachment Model as an alternative to panic to explain crowd behaviour during situations that threaten the well-being of people in a crowd (e.g., arrests or excessive force exhibited by riot control police). According to this model, individuals are inclined towards demonstrating affiliative behaviours when they face external threats from the surrounding environment (Cornwell, 2003). In other words, crowd members seek to cooperate with familiar people (e.g., family members, relatives, friends, etc.) and move to familiar places. Family ties become stronger under the pressure of emergency, and mutual efforts contribute to the sense of security (Feinberg & Johnson, 2001), which is radically different from selfish actions implied by the panic model of crowd behaviour (Sime, 1995). Numerous observations during World War II demonstrate that the deepest emotional experience and grief were associated with the loss of attachment figures

and separation from close relatives rather than with personal insecurity stemming from air raids on London (Mawson, 2005).

One of the key advantages of the Social Attachment Model is that it offers theoretical reasoning to cooperative actions during disasters. Indeed, the panic model cannot explain why individuals become even more concentrated and demonstrate self-control under stress, especially when they are responsible for attachment figures (e.g., children, parents, etc.) (Varghese & Thampi, 2021). On the downside, the Social Attachment Model fails to explain why emotional and social attachment can quickly evolve between complete strangers (Mawson, 2005). The proportion in which cooperative actions supported by social bonds and spontaneous panic-stricken actions reveal themselves under emergency should be further investigated with a special emphasis on football communities.

According to Drury, Novelli and Stott (2013), the scholarly attempt to contrast between panic and social attachment theories is deeply rooted in the argument whether the crowd possesses vulnerability or resilience characteristics. The vulnerability perspective along with the mass panic allowance assumes that crowd behaviour is predominantly dysfunctional and serves as an illustration of social pathology. From this standpoint, uncontrolled emotions, screaming, and fear are instances of irrational behaviour (Johnson, 1988). Conversely, the resilience perspective suggests that the crowd obtains necessary psychological and social resources to survive in a threatening environment (Hernandez, 2002). The collective capacity of the crowd should not be underestimated, but the real degree to which crowd behaviours can be coordinated and adapted to external challenges is also determined by social norms adopted by crowd members and specific social identities (Drury et al., 2013). Similarly, Cerrah's (2018) classification of crowds may be useful to assume that expressive and escapist crowds would be prone to demonstrate panic, whereas acquisitive crowds are more likely to display rational decision-making.

A number of theoretical challenges were outlined by Haghani and Sarvi (2017) for modelling crowd behaviour during emergencies. First, human behaviour is said to be complex and involve many variations, especially in the conditions of uncertainty. Hence, even crowds with homogenous composition may display varying behaviour patterns in similar circumstances. Second, the applicability of generic models remains questionable, because behavioural phenomena take place in rich context. For example, crowd behaviour can differ according to the type of danger in an emergency situation (e.g., fire, natural disasters, terror attacks, etc.) (Haghani & Sarvi, 2017). Finally, the method of experimentation is not always suitable for modelling and predicting crowd reactions, because it is costly and technologically challenging to simulate emergency situations. Thus, it is problematic for researchers to directly observe crowd behaviour during emergencies. When participants and eyewitnesses are interviewed with a time lag, their perceptions and self-analysis may be significantly distorted (Shiwakoti, Sarvi, Rose & Burd, 2011).

2.1.4. Crowd Celebration and Rituals

In football crowds, rituals and celebrations (e.g., chants) are seen as crucial means of reinforcing the sense of belonging to the crowd, highlighting why an investigation of these two concepts is relevant to the thesis (Newson, 2019). It has already been pointed out earlier that Le Bon's (1960) theory of the crowd is the subject of numerous criticisms. Despite this however, Tutenges (2015) still utilised Le Bon's (1960) assumptions about crowd behaviour to examine crowd dynamics during celebration and emotional flow. Interestingly, the crowd involves individuals in celebration even if they were not going to celebrate an event alone. This occurs due to the shared activity and destabilisation effect, which was described by Le Bon (1960). Furthermore, Tutenges (2015) emphasised that leaders manipulate the crowd, thus giving a direction for approval and attitudes. This means that crowds do not spontaneously celebrate random events or achievements but rather have a collective filter for appropriate occasions for celebration. Finally, the classical crowd theory manifests that

crowds are always intellectually and morally inferior to its separate members. For this reason, celebration and rituals in the crowd should have a simple form and a symbolic meaning; otherwise, they will cease to be practical for collective action (Tutenges, 2015).

Durkheim's (2001) understanding of crowd dynamics is rather complementary to Le Bon's (1960) theory than conflicting to it. Crowd participants are said to demonstrate "violent gestures, shouts, even howls [and] deafening noises of all sorts" (Durkheim, 2001, p.163) because the future and the past are not essential for the crowd. In other words, crowd members enjoy the present moment and are eager to display emotional expression, which does not immediately convert into social change and political reforms (Prentice & Paluck, 2020). Hence, from the viewpoint of classical crowd theorists, social change cannot be presented as a direct effect of collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Durkheim (2001) was convinced that crowds do not have a predetermined purpose but worship collective excitement, which can be achieved only in a physical proximity to each other. In this sense, Durkheim's (2001) position is in line with Canetti (1984), who argued that crowds gather in order to overcome the limits individuals face on their own.

With a special emphasis on sport communities, a ritual can be defined as "an established procedure for a religious or other rite, which encompasses a prescribed formal or customary ceremonial act" (Cheska, 1979, p.57). Examining sport sociology and crowd behaviour, Cheska (1979) identified at least five unalienable characteristics of a ritual. First, ritual events or actions are repetitive, and collective memory stores them for a prolonged time period. Second, rituals should be practiced regularly to remain in collective memory. Third, rituals are marked by a high emotionality level, often involve personalisation, and evade from rational control (Cheska, 1979). This characteristic also implies that rituals offer a high energy requirement to all participants, and the avoidance to take part in ritual celebration is usually associated with breaking ties with the crowd. Fourth, ritual actions involve drama, and the quality of performance is determined by role playing and mimicry. Fifth, ritual

actions in the crowd bear a symbolic meaning, and, therefore, should be perceived metaphorically by internal and external observers (Cheska, 1979). The contribution of Cheska (1979) to the body of literature on crowd behaviour may be seen in outlining firm criteria of rituals, as these are often confused with non-symbolic, standalone, and rational actions, which cannot be recognised as rituals (Hatuka & Kallus, 2008).

Interestingly, Turner (1976) noted that rituals were used more widely and intensively before the Industrial Revolution and served for the demonstration of power and communication between clans, families, tribes, and other social circles. Rituals in the post-industrial relations are gradually losing their collective meaning, and individualism does not allow for applying them as universally as before in different spheres of life. Therefore, rituals have now become a part of leisure activities, including sports, art, and games (Collins, 2004). Cheska (1979) agreed that the main functions of rituals are communication and demonstration of power. A critical success factor for ritual actions in the crowd is that crowd members should understand the same cultural code. On the other hand, established and widely practiced rituals go beyond the cultural code and are comprehensible for everyone (e.g., Mexican wave in the stadium) (Tutenges, 2015).

2.2 Theory of Intergroup Relations

While the representatives of football crowds do not necessarily share values outside of their interest in football, their preferences toward certain football teams or players may be considered an example of a belief superseding ethnic, racial or similar characteristics (Newson, 2019). Relating this discussion to fundamental works on the topic of intergroup relations, academic research into intergroup relations has been central to the understanding of politically motivated behaviours and international agenda over the last five decades. One of the key areas under investigation was political cohesion, or the degree to which representatives from different ethnic, racial, religious, and occupational groups can share the

same political views (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960). Cruel experiments on ethnic groups (e.g., Jews, Gypsies, etc.) in Nazi Germany stimulated scholarly interest towards such phenomena as intergroup conflict, ingroup solidarity, and mechanisms of spreading and overcoming prejudices (Allport, 1954). The growth of national independence movements after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe gave rise to the study of intergroup relations in terms of political technology and social psychology (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Finally, the status of disadvantaged groups in diverse national conflicts was perceived as a result of imbalanced intergroup relations, and academic attempts were aimed at examining recovery strategies.

Hence, the existing research body of intergroup relations is extensive and contains multiple layers. This section of the literature review seeks to discuss the main theories of intergroup relations, paying special attention to the aspects of intergroup legitimacy, intergroup contact, and intergroup helping. According to their definition, intergroup relations "refer to the way in which people who belong to social groups or categories perceive, think about, feel about, and act towards and interact with people in other groups" (Hogg, 2013, p.533). The section will, therefore, outline key theoretical concepts explaining how the participant of football crowds view legitimacy and contact with other representatives of these heterogeneous groups.

Huddy (2004) differentiated between several theoretical perspectives on intergroup relations. Specifically, Social Identity Theory (SIT is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.1) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) assumes that people assign favourable evaluations to the groups that they identify with as a means of improving or maintaining their-self-esteem. As a result, classification into groups inherently produces group favouring behaviours. Internal loyalties and external antipathies are a natural extension of SIT when intergroup relations are under investigation (Huddy, 2004). Alternatively, the system justification theory suggests that individuals act in favour of maintaining the status quo; as a result, making intergroup

conflicts more or less intense compared to the status quo may be seen as undesirable. When disadvantaged groups are involved, they are not eager to openly demonstrate conflicting views or their ingroup bias. Representatives of disadvantaged groups usually maintain a neutral status internalising their beliefs, even if this position challenges group interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The third perspective outlined by Huddy (2004) is Social Dominance Theory, which promotes a more balanced view on intergroup conflicts. This theory states that ideological hegemony is kept in reasonable boundaries by means of social hierarchy in order to avoid the protesting activities of disadvantaged groups. In this sense, direct discrimination is not acceptable, as it may lead to revolutions, revolts, and rebellion among the oppressed groups. On the other hand, Social Dominance Theory does not conceal the fact that powerful groups intend to acquire even more power and dominance. For this purpose, a scale of intergroup inequality was developed by Social Dominance Theory (Huddy, 2004).

In turn, the Normative Theory of intergroup relations is widely used in sociology research, but it is still often presented as something implicit behind crowd behaviour. The contribution of Pettigrew (1991) is recognised in attracting theorists' and practitioners' attention to the role Normative Theory plays in establishing the norms of group behaviour. The theory proclaims that intergroup interaction and interpersonal communication in groups rely on shared expectations about how these processes should run (Pettigrew, 1991). Hence, even informal norms that have never been written down or systematised determine intergroup dynamics, taboos, and discrimination patterns. For example, the interaction of black and white Americans over the last century has been shaped by the changing racial norm, which also varied from state to state in the US. The compliance with the common norm was stimulated by both society and institutions, as a system of reward and punishment has always been used to guide intergroup relations (Liverpool, 2020).

At the same time, Normative Theory is associated with multiple weaknesses, including circular reasoning and the lack of comparative evidence to support it. The circular reasoning

problem suggests that it is hardly possible to establish whether genuine norms have led to specific patterns in intergroup relations, or the nature of intergroup relations has created durable social norms (Bohman, 2004). As shown by Le Texier's (2019) critique of the Stanford prison experiment, participants in crowd experiments may consciously or unconsciously behave in a manner that is seen as desirable to the researchers, threatening the validity and reliability of such studies. Second, normative structures are always context-specific, and it is hard to prove empirically that a certain cause-and-effect relationship is commonly established, as the same environmental conditions will not be repeated in another normative setting (Weaver & Trevino, 1994). According to Pettigrew (1991), the application of Normative Theory to intergroup relations may be challenging due to the fact that empirical researchers do not take into account how a certain norm has been developing. Social norms are rarely finite and are in the process of constant development; therefore, the extent to which they may influence intergroup relations is always dynamic (Pettigrew, 1991).

Given that Intergroup Relations Theory often deals with the concepts of an intergroup conflict and disadvantaged groups' position, Taylor and McKirnan (1984) developed a five-stage model of intergroup relations, which explains the nature of dominant-subordinate bonds. The model is especially beneficial to the understanding of how disadvantaged categories have reacted to social inequality during the process of historical development. As categorised by Taylor and McKirnan (1984), the first stage denotes strictly stratified relationships between groups, which are typical to feudal and paternalistic societies. The dominant-subordinate relations are polarised and rigorously followed during this stage. The second stage is marked by industrialisation and the emergence of individualistic ideology. Hence, this period accepts the possibility of social mobility, because ingroup characteristics are not perceived as default and 'set in stone' but, rather, acquired (e.g., skills, competencies, experiences, etc.). Nevertheless, this stage continues offering significant limitations to disadvantaged groups, because ascribed characteristics (e.g., gender, age, race, etc.) are strongly associated with a social status (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984).

The third stage of Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) model involves a higher degree of social mobility than the second stage. Here, selected representatives of disadvantaged groups are allowed to alter their initial status and transit to advantaged groups. Interestingly, Taylor and McKirnan (1984) differentiated between two major strategies of such a transit. First, members of disadvantaged groups acquire completely new characteristics, and their association with the old group vanishes. Second, when it is impossible to change ascribed characteristics (e.g., skin colour, gender, etc.), representatives of disadvantaged groups do not lose their original identity but still adopt a sufficient number of new characteristics to qualify as advantaged members (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). The fourth stage, consciousness raising, depends on the efforts of those disadvantaged group members who were not permitted to upgrade their status and enter an advantaged group. They gradually acquire an understanding that the status of their disadvantaged group is determined by the collective opinion. Hence, if all disadvantaged group members agree to promote their status, their group has a chance to become an advantaged one. One of the weaknesses of Taylor and McKirnan's (1984) theory is that the fourth stage does not determine any time boundaries and mechanisms of becoming an advantaged group through consciousness raising (Ellemers, 1993). The fifth stage stands for competitive relationships between groups, which are no longer classified as disadvantaged or advantaged. Groups' quality characteristics and involvement in collective action become dominant in recognising their status (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). A graphical representation of the five-stage model of intergroup relations is available in Appendix C.

2.2.1. Models of Intergroup Legitimacy

As argued by Weber, Mummendey and Waldzus (2002), the overall quality of intergroup relations is, to a considerable degree, determined by perceived legitimacy of the group member's status (both advantaged and disadvantaged). Verkuyten and Reijerse (2008)

added that legitimacy "refers to the extent to which the status structure is accepted" by the representatives of a particular group (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008, p.107). Researchers inspired by Social Identity Theory tend to agree that situations in which the ingroup status is perceived as illegitimately disadvantaged provoke intergroup opposition and frequent conflicts (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is legitimacy perceptions of low-status groups that either create internal pressures and motivate group members to achieve a higher status or make them submissive and satisfied with the current social score. An illegitimately low status is also responsible for the growth of ingroup bias, higher emotional attachment to other group members, display of anger, and more aggressive intergroup behaviours. The outcomes of academic research relying on Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) are similar to those underpinned by SIT. RDT theorists argue that an unfairly low appraisal of the group status potentially leads to deprivation experiences and social change intentions (Crosby, 1976).

However, it would be wrong to claim that low perceived legitimacy only affects disadvantaged groups. When advantaged social communities start recognising their high status as unfair, pro-socialist revolutionary aspirations and movements arise among upper-class representatives (Weber et al., 2002). They start acting as advocates of the poor and weak, changing their attitudes to same-class individuals to negative. The empirical study pursued by Finchilescu and DeLaRey (1991) demonstrated that white South Africans who recognised their advantageous position compared to the black countrymen as illegitimate were inclined towards demonstrating empathy, positive attitudes, and support with respect to the disadvantaged group. Therefore, both unfair disadvantages and unfair advantages are embraced by the concept of perceived legitimacy in intergroup relations (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

Weber et al. (2002) further attempted to examine mechanisms standing behind the legitimacy evaluation process in groups. The researchers arrived at the conclusion that status perceptions rely on prototypicality, which is a category for normative comparison and a

standard for status confirmation. The prototypicality concept is said to take its origin in Self Categorisation Theory (Weber et al., 2002). All group members search for prototypes of the normative inclusive standard among surrounding individuals, and, if matching characteristics are discovered, the status is evaluated positively, Conversely, a mismatch between the normative criteria and actual characteristics ends in a negative status evaluation (Weber et al., 2002). An essential weakness associated with Weber et al.'s (2002) research is that prototypicality is problematic to measure objectively and identify any strict compliance criteria for ingroup and outgroup comparisons. As suggested by the Ingroup Projection Model, members of advantaged groups are more inclined to perceive internal characteristics as prototypical than generalise external group attributes (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). This approach to prototypicality contributes to higher group integrity, while it may be challenging for non-members to recognise typical group attributes, thus making prototypicality a highly subjective category (Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007).

In their empirically tested model, Halabi and Nadler (2017) systematised the effects of low and high perceived legitimacy in status relations. It may be observed from the scheme below that when the relationships between groups are marked by low legitimacy, high-status groups seek to establish their authority and find additional arguments in the favour of their dominant position. In response, low-status groups try to challenge advantaged communities' power and existing hierarchy of relations (Halabi & Nadler, 2017). Alternatively, a high-legitimacy status does not require such a proactive position from both groups, because the established relationships are perceived as relatively fair and stable. Highlighting the relevance of these arguments to this literature review, Halabi & Nadler (2017) implied that relationships between groups in heterogeneous crowds of football fans may depend on the perceived legitimacy of high-status groups. On the downside, Halabi and Nadler's (2017) framework lacks contextualisation and fails to reflect any input factors and conditions influencing the amount of perceived legitimacy (Halabi, Dovidio & Nadler, 2016).

Inter-Group Status Relations

Low Perceived Legitimacy and Stability of
Status Relations

High Perceived Legitimacy and Stability of
Status Relations

High-Status Group	**Low-Status Group**	**High-Status Group**	**Low-Status Group**
High motivation to reassert power and diffuse threat to social dominance	High motivation to challenge existing hierarchy	Medium to low motivation to assert power	Dependency on the high-status group is relatively non-threatening to social identity
Increased effort to provide dependence-oriented help to low status outgroup	*No help seeking from high-status outgroup *Unwillingness to receive assumptive help from high-status outgroup *Greater willingness to seek and receive autonomy-oriented help	High level of giving dependency-oriented help to low-status outgroup	*High level of seeking dependency-oriented help from high-status outgroup *Willingness to receive dependency-oriented help from high-status outgroup

Figure 4 - Intergroup Relations and Levels of Perceived Legitimacy (Halabi & Nadler, 2017, p.207)

The investigation pursued by Halabi and Nadler (2017) did not consider any emotional effects of low and high perceived intergroup legitimacy, whereas Miron, Branscombe and Schmitt (2006) adopted Emotion Theory to study the emotional consequences of intergroup wrongdoing. Specifically, the researchers analysed two samples of male participants (52 and 73 respondents) to see how these individuals perceived gender inequality in their community. Miron et al. (2006) concluded that low legitimacy of gender inequality perceived by the male

44

respondents resulted in collective guilt and distress. Collective guilt "has been theorised as most likely to occur when people self-categorise at the group level and perceive their ingroup as being responsible for illegitimately benefiting from the outgroup's disadvantage" (Miron et al., 2006, p.163). At the same time, the relationship between an illegitimate intergroup status and collective guilt of the advantaged became weaker when individuals were involved in manipulations with their status explanation. For example, those male respondents who attempted to rationalise the existing equality by their sexist beliefs and other ideologies implying gender discrimination did not experience collective guilt, even if their legitimacy perceptions were low (Miron et al., 2006). The discussed research was limited to the only criterion of inequality, which served as a basis for legitimacy evaluation, which is why the observations of Miron et al. (2006) cannot be generalised to other settings and low-high status relations.

Figure 5 - Perceived Legitimacy and Collective Guilt (Miron et al., 2006, p.169)

2.2.2. Models of Intergroup Contact

Intergroup contact, which is more widely known in crowd psychology literature as the contact hypothesis, suggests that an effective and regular contact between representatives of

various groups is able to improve intergroup relations, decrease the level of intergroup bias, and eliminate potential conflicts (DeLamater & Ward, 2013). The contact hypothesis was originally formulated by Allport (1958), who argued that "to be maximally effective, contact and acquaintance programmes should lead to a sense of equality in social status, should occur in ordinary purposeful pursuits, avoid artificiality, and if possible enjoy the sanction of the community in which they occur" (Allport, 1958, p.454). Interestingly, the author of the contact hypothesis identified several prerequisite conditions for intergroup contact to be successful. First, the contact situation should be marked by an equal status of all participants. Second, the participants should be aimed at intergroup cooperation. Third, the aims of intergroup contact should be clearly determined before the contact takes place. Fourth, there should be legal and institutional support of intergroup contact in the form of favourable legislation and social stimuli (Allport, 1958).

After its development in the 1950s, the contact hypothesis was subjected to rigorous empirical tests in the body of intergroup relations literature. For example, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) ran a meta-analysis, incorporating over 200 academic studies and 90,000 participants. The researchers observed a clear tendency towards connecting diverse intergroup contact strategies and the elimination of intergroup bias. The extant empirical research reviewed by Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) also confirmed that intergroup contact was effective in terms of reducing stereotypes and prejudice against disadvantaged groups. Moreover, the four critical success factors of intergroup contact singled out by Allport (1958) were found to be relevant to intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). A larger sample of 515 studies over the 1949-2000 period was covered by the same meta-researchers several years later (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), and the prerequisite conditions of intergroup contact, as well as positive changes in intergroup dynamics, were again confirmed.

One of the major problems with Allport's (1958) contact hypothesis is that the critical success factors surrounding intergroup contact are difficult to meet in real-life conditions. Although

contact participants are supposed to have common goals and intergroup cooperation (Allport, 1958), representatives of advantaged and disadvantaged groups often have to contact each other because of existing conflicts or pressures (e.g., lack of resources, need to respond to existing threats, emotional exhaustion, etc.). In these conditions, intergroup contact is initiated on a conflicting basis, and Allport's (1958) requirements are not satisfied from the very beginning. For these challenging situations, Stephan and Stephan (2000) developed the Integrated Threat Model, which identifies the key sources of anxiety associated with future intergroup contact. These sources include realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes. A realistic threat stems from the anticipated risk to lose political power or the source of well-being, while symbolic threats touch upon the levels of convictions, beliefs, and values (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Intergroup anxiety is created by such negative emotions as embarrassment or rejection that might be experienced during a personal contact. Finally, stereotyping is a result of generalising negative characteristics possessed by a single group representative to all group members. The Integrated Threat Model contributes to the understanding that when the acceptable level of anxiety is exceeded, the phenomenon of intergroup avoidance may be observed (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

The academic achievement of Kawakami et al. (2000) may be recognised in identifying a wider variety of conditions potentially contributing to successful intergroup contact. Specifically, these scholars discussed the category of mediating mechanisms, which facilitate the intensity and effectiveness of intergroup contact. First, functional relations should be established between group members (Kawakami et al., 2000). This assumption originally appeared in the works of Sherif et al. (1961), who emphasised the limitations of interdependent and competitive groups. This type of relationship is characterised by a win-lose situation, because the failures of one group would be beneficial to the other. Hence, intergroup relations need to become truly cooperative, thus converting mutual actions into a win-win situation, which would be equally beneficial to both parties (Sherif et al., 1961).

Additionally, Kawakami et al. (2000) highlighted the role of cognitive factors as facilitating mechanisms for intergroup contact. Group members should be open to learning new information, as it allows for decreasing the levels of uncertainty and anxiety at preparatory stages. There is a negative correlation between new knowledge acquisition and stereotyping (Kawakami et al., 2000).

An integrated model of intergroup contact was assembled by Dovidio, Gaertner and Kawakami (2003). These researchers managed to match such theoretical layers as prerequisite conditions of successful intergroup contact (Allport, 1958), mediating mechanisms (Sherif et al., 1961; Kawakami et al., 2000), and generalisation, which is a summary of benefits spread to the entire group if intergroup contact is preferred to interpersonal contact (Dovidio et al., 2003). This model is graphically presented below.

Figure 6 - Integrated Model of Intergroup Contact (Dovidio et al., 2003, p.14)

Dovidio et al.'s (2003) model contributes to the understanding of the intergroup contact process, since the consecutive stages are disclosed by it. Nonetheless, this framework still remains a purely synthetic one, as no measures of favourable factors were established, and other parameters of intergroup contact (e.g., duration, intensity, frequency, performance indicators, etc.) were not identified by Dovidio et al. (2003). Similarly to Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) and Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), the authors of the model conducted a meta-review of previous academic studies instead of running empirical tests dedicated to the problem of intergroup contact. Further research should be undertaken in the area of ranking and prioritising the prerequisite conditions for intergroup contact, because the feasibility of simultaneously meeting all the requirements is questionable (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

2.2.3. Intergroup Helping Models

As shown by Laursen (2019), behaviours in crowds of football fans may not necessarily be aggressive or antagonistic; the representatives of crowds may help others within or outside their preferred groups. To analyse such behaviours, the study refers to a comprehensive classification of helping that addresses both individual and group levels which was developed by Thomas, Amiot, Louis and Goddard (2017). These researchers applied Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012) to examine how individuals were motivated to grant favours to each other. Thus, helping may source from self-determined motivation, which involves autonomous actions and stronger reliance on personal values, and from non-self-determined persuasions, which are associated with control and obligation (Thomas et al., 2017). Extant empirical research demonstrates that individuals with self-determined motivation are frequently involved in activism, emergency helping, and donation. Autonomous helping is highly representative of individual convictions and values (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Alternatively, 'obligatory helping', which does not rely on self-determined motives, is rather representative of the need to comply with existing social norms or satisfy relationships. According to Amiot, Sansfacon and Louis (2013), extrinsically motivated helping is not a

negative phenomenon, as it may familiarise individuals with helping experiences, and they would be willing to make an autonomous helping decision in the future.

At a collective level, individual helping motives are not always applicable to understand the driving force behind the helping intention. Thomas et al. (2017) argued that Social Identity Theory is much more relevant than Self-Determination Theory to comprehend the mechanism of intergroup helping. Any membership in social groups implies that individuals would perceive themselves from the standpoint of conventions attributed to these groups. Therefore, helping, attitudes, values, and emotions would be shaped by social identities instead of personal identities (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Thomas et al. (2017) and Hogg and Smith (2007) recognised the identity-affirming function of intergroup helping, which reveals itself in the intention of group members to feel pride and content with other social community members or even with themselves. Simultaneously, non-self-determined motives can be present in intergroup helping when group members seek to reject existing stereotypes or undertake protective actions against external threats (Hogg & Smith, 2007). Power asymmetries can also be reinforced by means of intergroup helping based on non-self-determined persuasions (Thomas et al., 2017).

As noted before by intergroup legitimacy theorists (Halabi & Nadler, 2017), the behaviour of low-status and high-status groups with low perceived legitimacy would be different from those of groups with high perceived legitimacy. Similarly, the quality of intergroup helping will vary in both cases. When the status relations are not perceived as fair, advantaged groups will seek to provide help that would worsen the disadvantaged groups' dependence and establish their own power to a higher degree (Nadler & Halabi, 2006). In the same situation, low-status groups would be interested to receive help that would strengthen their status-quo. It is more likely that the help of advantaged groups will be perceived as condescension or indulgence and will be rejected. When the status relations are perceived as fair, advantaged groups will be aimed at dependency-oriented assistance, and disadvantaged groups would

agree to receive this type of help (Nadler & Halabi, 2006). Overall, intergroup helping is deemed to be threatening experience because low-status groups become increasingly dependent on high-status groups' resources, expertise, and social capital. In these conditions, autonomy is lost, and receivers become sensitive to the goodwill of the giver (Schneider, Major, Luhtanen & Crocker, 1996).

Interestingly, the empirical study pursued by Reysen, Katzarska-Miller and Gibson (2013) identified intergroup helping as a natural consequence of world knowledge, global awareness, and normative environment. The researchers attempted to explain the meaning of global citizenship, which incorporates such attributes as intergroup empathy, social justice, awareness of diversity, responsible action, and environmental sustainability, in addition to intergroup helping (Reysen et al., 2013). These findings are consistent with the observations of Kawakami et al. (2000), who confirmed that knowledge, as well as cognitive processes, has a positive effect on intergroup dynamics. Nonetheless, Reysen et al. (2013) failed to differentiate between low-status and high-status roles of global citizens, which might determine the content of intergroup help. In accordance with Nadler and Halabi (2006) and Halabi and Nadler (2017), the willingness to render and accept intergroup help is, to a considerable degree, determined by the status and perceived legitimacy of groups, which was not included in the scope of Reysen et al.'s (2013) investigation. However, an essential strength of this study is that Reysen et al. (2013) contrasted between intergroup helping and intergroup empathy, which are frequently confused in the body of literature. Empathy does not involve a proactive position and is displayed at an emotional level (Laurence, Schmid & Hewstone, 2018).

2.3. Introduction to the Social Identity Approach (SIA)

2.3.1. Social Identity Theory

The contrasting characteristics of personal identity and social identity were outlined by Tajfel and Turner (1979). These two types of identity serve as a good explanation of behaviour in interpersonal situations and intergroup situations respectively. The latter are marked by category-based processes and should be approached by researchers bearing in mind that group membership is a key determinant of social identity (Oakes & Turner, 1980). In other words, social identity is knowledge which is cultivated by individuals that they belong to a certain social group. The self-categorisation process, which is an unalienable part of SIT, allows group members to label themselves as representatives of a specific community. In turn, social comparison, which occurs in the ingroup and outgroup dimensions, is another essential component of SIT (Mastro, 2003). "The consequence of self-categorisation is an accentuation of the perceived similarities between the self and other ingroup members, and an accentuation of the perceived differences between the self and outgroup members... The consequence of the social comparison process is the selective application of the accentuation effect, primarily to those dimensions that will result in self-enhancing outcomes for the self" (Stets & Burke, 2000, p.225).

SIT offers a number of self-enhancing strategies, which include individual mobility, social competition, and social creativity. The choice of a specific strategy at an individual level is in turn determined by the group boundaries, status of the group, legitimacy perceptions, and how stable this group has been over a time period (Hogg, 2013). The individual mobility strategy suggests that, in open groups, individuals may prioritise their own goals to group objectives and start disassociating themselves from the group. The social competition strategy is responsible for the phenomenon of ingroup favouritism, when group members wish to achieve positive distinction from non-members. This scenario, outlined by SIT, is

said to contribute to the level of social competition, especially if advantaged groups are difficult to join. When the social competition strategy is selected by individuals, status relations are not considered as firm (Stets & Burke, 2000). Finally, the social creativity strategy is implemented in stable status relations, but when the access to advantaged groups is still limited. Creative behaviours are seen predominantly in finding new comparison criteria and sources of differentiation by low-status group members. This strategy allows disadvantaged community members to gradually upgrade their status by changing the principles of the self-categorisation and social comparison processes (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

Buglione (2012) applied these self-enhancing strategies to the context of non-traditional studies and experiential learning. It may be observed from the table below that personal development revealed itself as a natural outcome of the social mobility strategy. Social competition led to community development, while social creativity resulted in the acquisition of new leadership competencies (Buglione, 2012). It is valid to argue that the outcomes observed by Buglione (2012) would vary from industry to industry; however, there is still a connection between the pursuit of own goals and personal development. The relationship between social competition and community development seems justified in light of Stets and Burke's (2000) and Hogg's (2013) theoretical statements.

Table 1 - Self-enhancing Strategies of Social Identity Theory (Buglione, 2012, p.3)

Identity Development Construct	Identity development Conflicts and Responses	Relationship to Service-Learning
Social Mobility	The focus of the strategy is related to personal versus social identity development	Service-Learning offers personal development outcomes
Social Competition	Actions are taken to improve Outgroup membership	Community development efforts address issues of power through organizing
Social Creativity	Analysis of Outgroup strengths identifies similarities and differences among/between group members	Service-Learning reflection enables individuals to challenge and change beliefs, and raise consciousness. Service offers opportunities for intergroup exchange, group cohesion and leadership development

The main achievements of SIT were thoroughly classified by Brown (2000). This researcher acknowledged that SIT is highly beneficial in terms of explaining the phenomenon of intergroup bias. Specifically, the social competition strategy accounts for the origins of favouritism (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), which is a classical manifestation of bias. Biased evaluation of outgroup members relies on the intention to achieve positive distinction and win in this social comparison. On the other hand, favouritism is supported by the need to see prototypicality in one's own characteristics and identity (Weber et al., 2002). The second advantage of SIT mentioned by Brown (2000) is that it allows for explaining possible reactions to status inequality. The researcher emphasised that "an important contribution of SIT has been to reveal not only how the discontent fuelled by relative deprivation is affected by social identity processes, but also how collective protest itself can sometimes be better predicted by group identification than by relative deprivation" (Brown, 2000, p.749). Third, an essential contribution of SIT is that the theory enriched the understanding of stereotyping in crowd psychology. It now goes beyond the assumption that stereotypes are harmful distortions, and intergroup relations should better be aimed at valuing heterogeneity (Brown, 2000; Mastro, 2003).

2.3.2. Self Categorisation Theory

It was highlighted in the previous subsection of the literature review that self-categorisation is an important process involved in SIT (Stets & Burke, 2000). However, it is essential to differentiate between self-categorisation as a part of SIT and standalone Self Categorisation Theory (Trepte & Loy, 2017). The latter was originally developed by Turner (1999) and posits that individual behaviour is either driven by social identity or by personal identity, depending on the perceived significance of a practical situation. The two identities can be salient, but there is still dynamic switching between them (Turner, 1999). Alternatively, Social Identity Theory does not present social identity and personal identity as mutually excluding realities, but they rather create a continuum and complement each other (Trepte & Loy, 2017). Distinct to the SIT, the Self Categorisation Theory focuses on the general self-concept while the SIT analysed intergroup conflicts.

In addition to the self-categorisation process, which is shared by SIT and Self Categorisation Theory, the latter includes two other processes, which should be given particular attention in this section (Trepte & Loy, 2017). The salience stage implies that individuals face a number of situational cues on a daily basis, which either arouse their group aspirations or remind of individual priorities. Salience is a psychological process, which allows individuals to judge about the perceived importance of each cue (Oakes, 1987). However, this does not mean that only rational decision-making occurs at the salience stage, as emotional reasoning is also possible to select the most dominant motive (Rowley et al., 1998). Depersonalisation takes place at the end of the self-categorisation flow and implies that social identities and perceptions about them become depersonalised (i.e., lose connection with an individual). Due to this stage, individual behaviour is transformed in collective behaviour, thus making individuals adjust to group-level needs, values, and interests (Trepte & Loy, 2017). According to Hornsey (2008), depersonalisation is not observed in situations when the individual domain is selected by team members, and they decide to follow personal priorities. Self

Categorisation Theory lacks such stages as social comparison, positive distinctiveness, and self-esteem, which are usually attributed to SIT (Turner, 1999).

2.3.3. Extension and Development of the SIA into ESIM

The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) was developed in order to rationalise change in normative behaviour during mass events (Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000). According to the model, behavioural and psychological change in the crowd is predicted by collective empowerment and new social positioning, because the boundaries of groups are newly defined, and individuals express expectations about potential status change (Drury & Reicher, 2005). The growth of these expectations is also stimulated by the possibility to project status and identities in the outgroup direction, offering another wave of empowerment and emotional stimulation. The adaptability and suitability of ESIM for explaining the escalation of conflict and how the form of conflict and behaviour changes over time was demonstrated in a recent paper by Stott et al. (2018). The scholars used this framework to analyse the riots which occurred in London in the summer of 2011. Using a wealth of data sources, including interview data obtained in the immediate aftermath of the riots by Tim Newburn and colleagues at LSE, Stott et al. (2018) were able to demonstrate how the normative change from directly targeting the police to other objects during protest actions demonstrated how the variation of intergroup power had changed. In effect, the researchers were able to show how and why the riots transformed from being initially anti-police in nature to take on more of an anti-capitalist dynamic as they continued beyond the first day.

The ESIM will be the main focus of the Chapter Three, however it is important to introduce it here so that we might understand the basic premise in order to critique it within the wider SIA. Drury and Reicher (1999) identified a number of essential characteristics of ESIM. First, ESIM simultaneously approaches power attributed to the group as a condition and a product

of collective action. Second, empowerment inside the group is enhanced by how non-members treat group insiders. Third, the degree to which group members perceive their externally-oriented actions as legitimate influences the desire to challenge disadvantaged groups (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Fourth, Drury and Reicher (1999) noticed that power is effectively distributed from high-status group members to low-status members in case intergroup influence is needed. In these conditions, even those individuals who did not consider themselves to be powerful enough start challenging members of external disadvantaged groups. Fifth, it is collective identity that determines the extent to which former low-status group members would demonstrate discriminative attitudes or actions with respect to disadvantaged outgroup (Drury & Reicher, 1999). These valuable observations were collected by Drury and Reicher (1999) on the basis of qualitative analysis, including 29 interviews with protesters. On the other hand, it can be critically noted that the sample of 29 participants is not sufficient for large-scale generalisations of ESIM applicability (Slone, 2009).

2.3.4. Weaknesses and Limitations of the Model

According to SIT, similar groups would seek to find ways of differentiation and distinction from each other (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, as argued by Brown (2000), this assumption was not confirmed in practice, since there is empirical evidence confirming that similar groups do not demonstrate a high level of intergroup bias and are attracted by each other. Another limitation of SIT is that the framework lacks a predictive power to simulate crowd behaviour and forecast the development of intergroup relations. The model was originally constructed using a retrospective approach, where the relationship outcomes were used as a starting point to determine the prerequisite conditions (Dovidio et al., 2003). The mediating mechanisms were added at a later stage to expand the functional value of the model (Brown, 2000).

Finally, the self-esteem hypothesis, which is viewed in combination with SIT, is not systematically supported by empirical evidence. The self-esteem hypothesis relies on the SIT assumption that individuals usually develop positive identities (Stets & Burke, 2000). A reasonable implication of this is that intergroup dominance, discrimination, and conflicts have a potential to increase self-esteem, while this was not proven by all empirical studies (Brown, 2000). In turn, Drury and Reicher (1999) asserted that ESIM is an increasingly synthetic model to explain power shifts in intergroup relations. In extant empirical research, ESIM has been applied to generally theorise the start and generalisation of conflicts in the crowd (Stott et al., 2018). Taking into consideration that ESIM is heavily focused on the empowerment effect (Drury & Reicher, 2005), this stage of social identity flow raises significant measurement problems. Neither quantitative nor qualitative research is able to uncover the 'black box' of the empowerment path and how encouragement impulses are transmitted between group members (Slone, 2009; Trepte & Loy, 2017).

Conclusion

It can be concluded at the end of this chapter that the differentiation between personal identity and social identity has been central to the body of literature (Waddington et al., 1989; McPhail, 1991). Every time collective identities are discussed in crowd psychology and intergroup relations, the SIT underpinning becomes dominant due to its clear self-categorisation mechanism, social comparisons with ingroup and outgroup members, and self-enhancing strategies (including individual mobility, social competition, and social creativity) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Drury & Reicher, 1999). ESIM has contributed to the theoretical and practical understanding of intergroup conflict, although it remains problematic to study the distribution of power relations with the help of the elaborated model (Brown, 2000; Trepte & Loy, 2017). Legitimacy perceptions are recognised as a powerful condition behind the quality of intergroup contact, intergroup helping, and threats faced by group members (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008; Weber et al., 2002).

Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated more clearly in the next chapter, the SIA and ESIM in particular are the most viable theoretical frameworks currently available for analysing police citizen interactions and relations within the context of football policing.

Chapter Three: Police Psychology Literature Review [12]

This chapter explores the relationships between crowd theory, police psychology and the policing and dynamics of crowds. The chapter begins by providing an overview of research on police understandings of the crowd and their relationship to public order policing in Section 3.1. It will highlight how a body of nineteenth century crowd theory still often informs and dominates the contemporary police understanding of crowds, a psychology which in turn drives repressive forms of 'crowd control' designed to deal with 'troublemakers' and the 'mindless mob'. In so doing it will aim to show the importance of police psychology for driving particular forms of social action. The chapter then moves on to provide an overview of the social identity approach in Section 3.2, now the dominant psychological model of crowd action. I will then highlight some of the core theoretical concepts and ideas underpinning this psychological theory of crowd action to demonstrate its explanatory power in Section 3.3. It will be argued that according to this approach, collective action in a crowd, rather than being 'mindless', actually reflects a socially determined identity that can be shaped and reshaped by interactions with the police. The next two sections (3.4 and 3.5) will then consider a programme of research focused upon the application of this theoretical approach to football. These sections demonstrate how when used to reshape police psychology and practice, police use of the social identity perspective drives a highly effective 'crowd management' approach. The chapter draws to a close with a discussion about the challenge of change in Section 3.6, and then concludes by highlighting in Section 3.7 why research conducted from a social identity perspective in Sweden is so important.

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[12] Large parts of this chapter were adapted for inclusion in Williams, N., & Stott, C. (2022). The role of psychological science in public order policing. In P. B. Marques & M. Paulino (Eds.), Police Psychology: New Trends in Forensic Psychological Science (pp. 149–171). Academic Press.

3.1 Classical Perspectives and Reactionary Policing

The seminal modern works on public order policing were arguably Peter (Tank) Waddington's Strong Arm of the Law (Waddington, 1991) and his subsequent work Liberty and Order (Waddington, 1994). The latter is first and foremost a rich and detailed first-hand account and analysis of an impressive and ground-breaking ethnography with the London Metropolitan Police 'Public Order Unit'. It draws out the now familiar idea that the central motivation driving police decision-making in the public order context is a rather banal form of pragmatism revolving around the dynamics of what is referred to as 'on the job' and 'in the job' trouble. On the job trouble is conceptualised as the 'public disorder' or confrontation that officers may have to routinely confront in the course of their duty, whereas in the job trouble described the potential political ramifications of disorder for commanders and the force as a whole. Liberty and Order sets out a number of case study examples to illustrate and substantiate this central thesis. These examples point toward the centrality of police psychology in their actions towards crowds. For example, Waddington points out that officers often perceived disorder as "more or less uncontrollable", which in turn "placed police commanders in a position of some helplessness and explains why they invested so much in trying to exert extensive control over the event" (Waddington, 1994, p. 160).

Waddington's (1991, 1994) ideas about the centrality of police psychology in public order policing were further developed by Stott and Reicher (1998a), who conducted a qualitative analysis of a series of interviews with 26 Public Order trained police officers from the UK. The study aimed to address three specific questions:

1. What were the general theories of crowd action articulated by police officers?
2. How do crowd contexts affect the practicalities of policing?
3. How do these police theories and practicalities articulate with each other and affect the ways in which crowds are policed?

Stott and Reicher (1998a) identified three consistent themes evident in the way officers talked about crowds and their role in policing them. First, while officers described crowd composition as generally heterogeneous, they consistently characterised this in terms of two social categories, an anti-social and a violent minority, which could exploit the potential mindlessness of the otherwise peaceful majority. It was evident that this psychological perspective mirrored dominant 'classical' theories of the crowd. On the one hand, the minority group's behaviour was described in terms of a 'convergence' of those with pre-existing motivations to create disruption and disorder (c.f. Allport, 1924). On the other hand, the majority were described as ordinary people who became pathological as a result of the anonymity assumed to be inherent from being within a crowd. Essentially, as a consequence of their anonymity and 'submergence' within the crowd, the majority are open to the disease-like spread of pernicious ideas and behaviours through 'contagion' (c.f. Le Bon, 1895/1960; Zimbardo, 1969). As one police commander put it when describing his experience of policing a major riot in Central London: "the fever of the day, the throwing and everything else, they get locked together and think 'oh we are part of this'. Something disengages in their brain. I am not a medical man or an expert in crowd behaviour, but something goes, and they become part of the crowd" (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, p. 517).

Second, as a consequence of these assumed mechanisms, all crowds, despite their heterogeneity of composition, were described as potentially conflictual, and the crowd homogeneously dangerous. The final theme, and in line with Waddington's proposition, were the practicalities of policing that flowed from officers' psychological perspectives. To begin with, if crowds are potentially dangerous and volatile, then it was understood that strict control of them was necessary, and if minor incidents of conflict developed it should be quelled via the rapid and relatively undifferentiated use of force. Moreover, if a crowd is homogeneously dangerous, then the decision to treat the crowd as a single entity is a logical one. Given this perspective, officers inevitably saw the cause of crowd conflict as a result of

factors inherent to the crowd itself. In effect, there was no reason for them to reflexively consider the role that police tactics might play in the production and escalation of conflict.

Adding further evidence, Drury, Stott and Farsides (2003) conducted a quantitative questionnaire survey of 80 public order trained British police officers. As with the previous study, the data supported the idea that officers saw the composition of crowds as mixed but composed of a violent minority, and a 'mindless' majority. While this data suggested that officers did not overtly endorse the view of the crowd as a homogeneous threat, it did confirm that they advocated the quick assertion of control against the crowd as a whole in order to prevent any potential conflict from escalating. Moreover, crowd policing methods were not considered to contribute to the escalation of conflict.

Given these two studies were conducted exclusively with British officers, it is arguable that these forms of police psychology are only evident within a UK context. However, Prati and Pietrantoni (2009) translated the survey and distributed it to Italian police officers trained in policing public order. In addition to further validating and exploring the generalisability of the earlier studies, their survey data also allowed them to assess the effect that experience of crowd policing had on officers' psychological perspectives of the crowd. The study supported the idea that police officers perceive crowds as populated by a dangerous minority capable of exploiting a relatively mindless majority. For that reason, these police officers saw a need to rely heavily on coercion in order to control the volatility of the crowd. Interestingly, Prati and Pietrantoni also demonstrated that officers with more experience of policing crowds were more likely to view the crowd from this 'classical perspective' than their less experienced counterparts.

Arguably, this attitude within and across the police is evidence of what Prati and Pietrantoni (2009) referred to as a common-sense understanding. Yet, as such, it begs a common-sense question. As Milgram and Toch (1969) pointed out, if processes of anonymity lead to irrationality among crowd members and the uncritical spread of ideas and behaviours, then

why do police officers not also become influenced by these same psychological processes? This important and far-reaching question reflects the broader limitations of these classical theoretical perspectives on the crowd: their lack of explanatory power. In other words, despite evidence that they are dominant in the psychological perspectives of police officers involved in policing crowds, it has been increasingly recognised that such theories are themselves incapable of explaining the behaviour of crowds (Reicher, 1982). Indeed, it must be recognised that these classical theories have been largely rejected by the academic community some time ago (Barrows, 1981; Nye, 1975). They were developed at the end of the 19th Century at a time when the emerging industrial capitalist social order was increasingly threatened by revolutions 'from below', manifest most clearly in the form of the crowd. At that time, the crowd was becoming a salient social, political and intellectual concern, particularly for the elite middle classes keen to protect their new-found wealth and opportunity. As such, these classical theories were initially developed as a means through which a technology of social control could be developed and thus it could be argued that where they predominate, they do so not because they explain, but because they exculpate the authorities and legitimise coercive forms of social control (Stott & Drury, 2017).

Perhaps more importantly, these forms of police psychology are problematic because they drive forms of police action that produce unnecessary confrontation. For example, during a major demonstration in London against a new form of taxation, Stott and Drury (2000) chronicle how a peaceful demonstration developed into major rioting involving thousands of people in active confrontation against the police. Analysis of the dynamics through which that riot came about showed that police intervention using relatively indiscriminate coercive force had played a critical role. Moreover, this research also highlighted that the decision to intervene in this way was partly a function of the police commander's interpretation of the situation in terms of classical theory. Witnessing minor incidents of confrontation, he had assumed that as a function of contagion processes this would spread to the crowd as a whole. As a consequence, he took a decision to intervene against the crowd, but in so doing

inadvertently created forms of police action which escalated the very conflict they were seeking to avoid. In other words, police psychology acted as a form of self-fulfilling prophecy (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b).

3.2 The Social Identity Approach

In the late 20th Century, a new way of understanding the psychology of crowds began to emerge. The Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (SIM; Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987) was developed to address the limitations of classical theory (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924) and build an explanation of the ideological form and normative limits of collective action during the 1980 St Paul's Riots in Bristol. The data collected by Reicher showed that there were clear behavioural patterns evident in the actions of the rioters, and that far from being mindless and random, the rioters acted in a co-ordinated fashion, only attacking property which symbolised outside wealth and societal oppression, while the "police were the only [human] targets of collective attack" (Reicher, 1987, p.192). Reicher concluded that these targets were seen by rioters as the physical embodiment of an ongoing unjust, oppressive and racist social system (1984, 1987). The study was the first to identify how the actions of the crowd were based on a clearly defined, shared common social identity. Thus, Reicher (1996a, p. 328) contended that "people do not lose their identity in the crowd but rather shift from acting in terms of personal identity to acting in terms of the relevant social identity. Correspondingly, people do not lose control over their behaviour in the crowd, but rather control shifts to those values and understandings by which this identity is defined".

Despite this important advance in theoretical understanding, the SIM was not able to explain changes in the normative behaviour of the crowd, particularly the important transition from peaceful norms into a riot. As such, an analysis of a peaceful student protest, which turned

violent in London in 1990 (Reicher, 1996b), laid the foundation for the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM). At an empirical level, the study highlighted how a peaceful demonstration against the abolition of student grants escalated into a major riot as a direct outcome of aggressive and indiscriminate police interventions against the crowd. At a theoretical level, the study demonstrated the importance of intergroup interaction in reshaping the form and content of the crowd's social identity, enabling confrontational collective action in the crowd. Moreover, the transition into collective conflict was not due to pathological mechanisms inherent in the crowd, but resulted from the dynamics of the intergroup interactions over time. Key to these dynamics was a disparity in what both the police and the students viewed as (il)legitimate action on behalf of the outgroup.

Reicher's (1996b) analysis demonstrated that the conflict between the police and the student protesters flowed from an asymmetry of what did and what did not constitute legitimate social action (Drury & Reicher 2009). The students had assembled and marched with the belief that they had the democratic right to cross Westminster Bridge and be heard by their MPs outside the Houses of Parliament (although the organised march route did not include crossing Westminster Bridge). Thus, when the police attempted to stop them from crossing the bridge, they perceived such police action as an illegitimate attempt to deny them their democratic right. In contrast the police had blocked the bridge as they did not want to allow any 'disruption' of parliament. Furthermore, for the police the crossing of the bridge by protesters represented a deviation from the originally proposed route of the march that was indicative of further deviant intentions. Both sides essentially saw their position as being pro-democratic and thus legitimate. The students attempting to protect their right to be heard, and the police attempting to protect the democratic process within the houses of parliament from being disrupted. Reicher (1996b) points out that "over time the confrontation between police and demonstrators became more aggressive" (ibid., p.121) as each group continued to attempt to maintain their position. Therefore rather than an immediate outbreak of collective conflict due to the pathological nature of one group or the other, it was argued that the

ingroup perception that an outgroup had violated 'our' model of what is right, and therefore legitimate, had created the conditions for and the escalation of intergroup conflict. Consequently, it was for this reason that when the police attempted to use force against the crowd "only [violent] actions seen as 'defensive' rather than 'offensive' generalised through the crowd" (ibid., p. 132). Central to this argument was the concept of 'legitimacy'. Legitimacy is not a fixed or static concept/ attribute of an individual or group. Rather, it is a subjective assessment which emerges from social relations and revolves around what is seen as just or right dependent upon each individual context.

By analysing the conflict in its context, Reicher was able to demonstrate that police action and their psychological perspective, while intended to prevent violence, was actually implicated in its cause. Thus, in order to explain the developmental changes of crowd action it is important to recognise crowd events "are typically intergroup encounters and therefore the position of any one party must be understood in relation to the ongoing intergroup dynamic" (Drury & Reicher, 1999, p. 383).

The SIM is effectively an application and development of Self Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987). SCT is a theory of the self and proposes that people have a variety of social identities, which enable them to make sense of and orientate meaningfully toward the group level social context within which they may find themselves. For example, in societies organised and structured in terms of racial categories, people often utilise those ethnic categories to define themselves and act toward others. Like SCT, the ESIM, and the SIM, view "social categories as context-dependent social judgements, based upon a social actor's background ideology and motivations, and ... are dynamic in both form and content" (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schrieber, 2007, p. 76; cf; Reicher, 2001; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Once salient in the self-system, SCT proposes that people conform to the defining dimensions of that social category and see others who do so as common ingroup members. This social identity or self-categorisation is actively constructed at the

psychological level from background beliefs that flow into a set of comparative judgements within each specific social context. Given this intimate relationship between social identity and the social context, when that context changes, so too does the form (who is considered a common ingroup member) and content (what is considered as normative for the ingroup) of the social identity, enabling collective action.

Accordingly, a specific self-categorisation becomes salient in the self-system as a result of the 'meta contrast ratio' (MCR) defined as:

> the ratio of the average difference perceived between members of the category and the other stimuli (the mean inter-category difference) over the average difference perceived between members within the category (the mean intra-category difference) and provides a simple quantitative measure of the degree to which any subset of stimuli will tend to be cognised as a single unit, entity, or group (i.e., perceptually categorised) (Turner, et al., 1987, p. 47).

In this way, the MCR explains how the social context plays a direct role not just in self-definition, but also in social influence processes underpinning the emergent normative dimensions of collective action. Given this inter-relationship, as the social context changes (e.g. through police coercive intervention during a crowd event) then what it means to be a category member, the behaviours that are normative for that category and who is influential or prototypical also change. Put slightly differently, outgroups – such as the police - have the power to act toward a crowd in ways that impact directly upon the social identity dynamics driving collective action in that crowd. Thus, through its focus on the intergroup dynamics of crowd events, ESIM adopts what can be referred to as a 'process' model of identity; collective action in a crowd is not merely an outcome of cognitive processes, but also "dependent upon the nature of power relations in the inter-group context" (Stott & Drury, 2000, p. 266; cf. Reicher, 1987, 1996a; Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b).

[T]he ESIM can be summarised as follows: people's sense of their social position (social identity) changes to the extent that, in acting on their identity (participating in a crowd event), they are repositioned as a consequence of the understandings and reactions of an outgroup (treated as oppositional by the police). This repositioning leads both to a new identity and new forms of inter and intragroup action (intergroup hostility, variations in 'prejudice' and conflict) (Stott, Drury & Reicher, 2011, p. 297)

Across a programme of research surrounding a series of crowd events involving England fans at Italia 90 (Stott & Reicher, 1998b), anti-poll tax demonstrators (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000) and anti-road campaigners (Drury & Reicher, 2000) a similar pattern of intergroup interaction and psychological change was identified. The pattern can be summarised as follows:

1. At time one, a physical crowd is constituted by smaller, relatively heterogeneous psychological groups united by an identity defined in terms of relatively peaceful objectives and norms.
2. The same crowd is perceived as a homogenous threat by the authorities (police) who have the power to act on the basis of this understanding leading them to exercise force in a relatively undifferentiated manner.
3. This action against the crowd by the authorities at time 1 is perceived as unwarranted and indiscriminate by sections of the crowd.
4. As a result of the shifting intergroup context (i.e. police action), the social identity enabling collective action in the crowd at time 2 also changes along two important dimensions.
5. Conflict toward the police comes to be seen as legitimate by crowd participants (e.g. a reassertion of rights) and those engaging in conflict against the outgroup are seen as common ingroup members.

6. The boundaries of identity shift to be more inclusive and the psychological unity creates empowerment enabling crowd members to act against the police.

Taken together, this research helps identify a series of issues that highlight the role of police psychology in the dynamics of crowds. On the one hand, police psychological perspectives are often informed by outdated classical theories of the crowd. This in turn feeds forms of police action, which are essentially counterproductive and dangerous in that they appear to play an important role in the production of collective violence. Scientific research on crowd psychology has begun to show how and why this is the case. Thus, we now move on to explore how the social identity based research on crowds has begun to reshape police psychological perspectives and behaviours towards crowds and the apparent benefits that accrue from this.

3.3 ESIM and Football Crowds

A significant component of the early empirical and theoretical development of ESIM was made possible through a series of studies of what is often referred to as football 'hooliganism'. Early academic theories of crowd violence at football, suggested that collective conflict in this context was the result of the convergence of the 'rough working class'. Dunning, Murphy and Williams (1988) proposed that there were sections of society relatively untouched by the 'civilising processes' through which the working classes had gradually adopted non-violent middle class norms and values during the twentieth century (cf. Elias & Jephcott, 1978). They asserted that 'hooliganism' was the result of young men from this rough working class converging onto the football terraces of their towns and cities to exercise a form of violent territorialism against similar groups from other towns and cities, visiting to support their teams. While Dunning et al.'s (1988; cf Dunning, 1994) work on football crowd conflict explains 'violent' crowd behaviours in terms of class structure and socialisation practices, this 'hooligan' model essentially shares Allport's (1924) 'classical' perspective that

violence is a result of the convergence of those already predisposed toward violent confrontation (in this case through prior socialisation processes).

From this viewpoint the very presence of these fans poses a 'risk' to the 'public order' (Stott, West & Radburn, 2018). Accordingly, preventing football crowd disorder is a matter of identifying 'hooligans' and stopping them from converging onto the football terraces. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the policing approach, which predominates in football, relies heavily upon the surveillance, categorisation and coercive control of so called 'risk' fans (Stott & Pearson 2006, 2007, Hopkins 2014, Hopkins & Hamilton-Smith 2014, James & Pearson 2015). However, the official UK and European police definition of a 'risk' fan is somewhat problematic: A "person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event" (Council of Europe, 2010, p.21). It could be argued, that far from providing a nuanced way of identifying fans that are inclined toward the production of disorder, this definition is so broad it could be applied to anyone who goes to, or even watches, a football event. Moreover, it begs the question of what circumstances are likely to provoke or undermine any individual tendencies that may or may not be present.

Any understanding of collective conflict in terms of the 'hooligan' crowd member's disposition also has several explanatory limitations. First, it cannot account for the specificities of a given incident: when it is likely to occur, if and how it spreads to involve others or the form it takes. Second, it is unable to explain the complete absence of violence when so called 'hooligans' or 'risk fans' are present or why it is that collective violence in the football context develops when those involved are not known to the police as hooligans or risk fans (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001; Stott & Pearson, 2007).

Stott and Reicher's (1998b) study of football crowd conflict on the island of Sardinia during the 1990 Italian World Cup Finals (Italia90) demonstrated how ESIM could help advance

theoretical understanding beyond the 'hooligan' account. With English club sides still banned from European competition due to the Heysel stadium disaster[13], the Italian authorities mobilised upwards of seven thousand Italian police to keep the notorious English 'hooligans' in check. While serious rioting did develop during England's residency on the island, Stott and Reicher argue that the dynamics and form of these riots could not be understood merely in terms of the pre-existing violent dispositions of English 'hooligans' (c.f. Williams, Dunning, & Murphy, 1989). They assert that the rioting was better understood as the outcome of specific patterns of intergroup interactions between fans and police over time. England fans understanding themselves to be behaving legitimately – by gathering together, drinking and celebrating their identity as supporters - were systematically confronted by other groups, locals and police, in ways that the England fans understood as illegitimate and indiscriminate attacks on the category as a whole. Subsequently, as a direct result of these intergroup interactions, fans were drawn into conflict with the police (despite initially eschewing violence).

It was also evident that prior to the tournament the police and significant components of the local population held and expressed the view that the majority of English fans travelling to the island were hooligans. As a result, large numbers of England fans experienced heavy handed indiscriminate policing and hostility from locals over a period of days prior to England's second match of the tournament against the Netherlands. This in turn created a social context in which England fans felt police actions were illegitimate and as a consequence that it would be legitimate to confront police given the opportunity. Just prior to this match, around six thousand England supporters began to march en masse toward the stadium. Fearing disorder, the Italian police attempted to block the route of the march using their batons to disperse the crowd. However, given England fans were gathered together and

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[13] On May 29th 1985, 39 people were killed and approximately 600 were injured before the 1985 European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus. The majority of those who sadly lost their lives were Italian. Subsequently, 14 Liverpool supporters were convicted of manslaughter and all English clubs were banned from European competitions for 5 years.

felt they had a legitimate right to march to the stadium peacefully, they felt empowered and that it was legitimate to confront the police, forcing them to retreat. In the context of this riot, it was only police targets that were subjected to collective attack. Thus, the study suggested that collective conflict at football should not be viewed merely as a result of relatively fixed identities emerging from the macro-social context (i.e. the rough working class). Rather that more powerful explanatory models of conflict require an analysis of the intergroup interactions between crowd participants and those who police them during the crowd events. Moreover, the study once again highlighted the importance of police psychology, by demonstrating how the police perspective of football crowds led them to police the crowd as inherently violent and thus collective violence emerged as "a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Stott & Reicher, 1998b, p. 374).

Further evidence of the importance of these social psychological dynamics came when both England and Scotland qualified for the 1998 World Cup in France (France 98) (Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). The tournament provided a unique opportunity to extend the ESIM understanding of football crowd behaviour by comparing the two supporter groups. Whilst there are many differences in English and Scottish football culture, the domestic football leagues in both countries have problems of group conflict, yet the supporters of the Scottish national team no longer have the same reputation as those of the English team, despite sharing a very similar supporter demographic (Giulianotti, 1991, 1994).

England were drawn to play their opening match of France 98 against Tunisia in the southern city of Marseilles (Stott et al., 2001). As the tournament began, large numbers of England fans started to gather in the Old Port area of the city. During these early stages there appear to have been hostile interactions between some England fans and locals of North African descent, most likely initiated by racist provocations and insults from a relatively small contingent of England fans. However, as other England fans continued to arrive in significant numbers throughout the first few days of the tournament, local youths began

'unprovoked' attacks on England fans across the Old Port area (perhaps as a result of the earlier provocations). During these confrontations the police did little if anything to intervene or if they did, they launched attacks against England fans. In this context, England fans found themselves faced with a lack of protection from the police or as a target of what they experienced as unjustified police aggression. Consequently, collective violence began to emerge.

As was observed at Italia 90, the research highlighted a pattern in which the identity underpinning the emergence of collective violence was embedded in an intergroup context defined in terms of opposition to illegitimate outgroup actions. This context of 'common fate' for England fans appears to have empowered those prepared to confront aggressive outgroups, and rendered them as prototypical, and hence influential, ingroup members (Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). Contrastingly, Scottish fans had been praised for their behaviour at the UEFA European Football Championships in Sweden in 1992 (c.f. Giulianotti, 1994), and were now famous for their creation of a boisterous but non-violent 'carnival' atmosphere surrounding football games (c.f Giulianotti, 1991). With their now positive reputation preceding them, police and locals were apparently much more welcoming. However, it was also evident that the heavy drinking and boisterous behavioural norms of the Scots were not dissimilar to the collective behaviour among England fans. Yet while those behaviours were interpreted by police as 'hooliganism' in the England context they were interpreted as benign in the other. The Scottish fans' experiences of being allowed to collectively express their identity without provoking a hostile response from locals or police led to a perception of intergroup legitimacy, which was paralleled by displays of a strong 'self-regulation' culture. In effect, in this context of intergroup legitimacy the Scottish supporters started 'self-policing'. It was apparent that this form of norm enforcement was, at least in part, in order to maintain the positive reputation of their own group. Indeed, violence in this context was still seen as legitimate, but only toward those other Scottish supporters who had transgressed ingroup norms. As one Scottish supporter described:

"The guy with the Tunisian top got the ball and . . . the Scottish guy stuck his fuckin'
head on him . . . Next thing there was about twenty, thirty guys with kilts on bootin'
fuck out of the Scottish guy . . . nobody wanted to know him, just thought he was a
complete wank [Conversation Scotland supporter, 16 June 1998, Bordeaux] " (Stott et
al., 2001, p. 372)

However, it should be caveated that when Scotland fans did experience contexts of
intergroup illegitimacy (such as when a perceived hostile group of England fans were
present), they too displayed evidence of similar shifts toward seeing conflict as both
appropriate and normative for their category as a whole. The study therefore provided
evidence as to how perceptions of outgroup legitimacy could make non-conflictual people
within the crowd more influential in a potentially volatile situation, subsequently
disempowering those who actively sought conflict, and vice versa in situations of perceived
outgroup illegitimacy. Thus, it became evident that the ESIM could "account not only for the
presence, but also the absence, of collective 'disorder'" (ibid., p. 359).

3.4 Euro 2000: High and Low Profile Policing

Having developed a theory and evidence-based approach to understanding collective violence
in this context, the research work moved on to try to use this knowledge to inform and
address police psychology and action. This 'action research' oriented approach was in part
made possible by a structured observational analysis of crowd behaviour conducted during
the UEFA European Football Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2000 (Euro
2000) (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001), which offered an opportunity to compare the effect of
contrasting policing styles upon supporters as they moved between cities. The study
identified two different styles of policing employed across the eight different host cities.

According to the observational data collected, they suggested that a 'friendly but firm' or 'low-profile' policing approach was used in five cities, while a more 'high-profile' style was recorded in the other three. The study defined the contrast between the two styles in terms of the relative distance between supporters and the police, the visibility of police riot uniforms and the levels of verbal interaction with supporters. In high-profile cities, police tended to maintain greater distance from the supporters, appeared more often and in greater numbers, were dressed in riot gear and demonstrated lower levels of friendly informal interactions with crowds; whereas, in low profile cities the patterns were reversed.

Adang and Cuvelier's quantitative structured observational data showed that for matches categorised by the authorities as 'low risk', high-profile cities tended to be characterised by three times as many visible police officers deployed onto the streets than in the low-profile cities (an average of 30 officers per 100 fans versus 10 officers per 100 fans respectively). In high-profile cities, riot police were also more visible (one out of five samples versus one out of ten samples) as were police riot vehicles (62% versus 42% of samples). For matches judged by the authorities to pose an increased risk these ratios roughly trebled such that in high-profile cities the average number of officers increased to 90 per 100 fans present, but only to 30 per 100 in the low-profile cities (ibid., p. 62). Perhaps most interestingly, their study was also able to detect a clear relationship between the different styles of policing and the number of 'violent' incidents; for fixtures categorised as high risk there was no detectable difference between observed levels of disorder and the police profile. In other words, in high risk scenarios, trebling the visible presence of police officers had no measurable impact upon the levels of disorder. However, the study also observed that the highest levels of disorder occurred surrounding fixtures classified as low risk by the authorities but where high profile policing had been deployed. Thus, in low risk scenarios low profile policing was not only associated with better outcomes, high profile policing was either less effective or actually exacerbated problems.

These findings provide clear empirical support for the benefit of a 'low-profile' policing approach. It is interesting to note that all of the low-profile cities were located in the Netherlands. Whereas the high-profile cities were mostly in Belgium. When these two different policing styles are contrasted with the arrest figures for England fans during the tournament, there is also a radical difference: only 6 were arrested in the Netherlands compared with 965 in Belgium (Stott & Pearson, 2007, p. 146)

Further research (Stott, 2003) suggested these stark differences were again linked to police psychological perspectives in that the Belgian police had expected England fans to be either potential hooligans or very likely to engage in disorder, thus they had policed them in a relatively uniform manner, treating all supporters as potentially dangerous and volatile and confronting fans for merely engaging in otherwise peaceful normative expressions of their football fan identity.

Stott (2003) conducted a questionnaire survey of Belgian Gendarmerie officers that was used to explore their psychology toward England fans as a social category. The survey data suggested that the majority of the supporters attending the championships were not thought to pose any major level of threat to public order. Nonetheless, the survey identified that the fan groups of Turkey, Germany and England were all perceived to pose significantly higher levels of threat than the fans of any other nations attending the tournament. Moreover, fixtures involving England were seen by the officers to pose the highest likelihood of disorder. The survey also suggested that these Gendarmerie expected that in the context of the tournament, around two thirds of England fans would ultimately become involved in violent disorder at some point and that roughly one in two of them were expected to be hooligans actively seeking to incite it. Perhaps it is unsurprising then that there was particularly clear consensus among these officers that there was going to be disorder surrounding the match between England and Germany when they played each other in the city of Charleroi.

Moreover, when asked to describe England fans, the police consensus was that they were volatile, dangerous and aggressive whilst over one third of England fans were expected to become violent when consuming alcohol. When gathering in large boisterous groups, they were considered likely to pose a significantly higher threat to public order and be seen as significantly more intimidating to the general public than the supporters of other teams. Any boisterous activity involving England fans was seen as significant evidence of the presence of hooligans, more so than if those groups were German or Romanian, for example. When asked about the cause of disorder with England supporters, provocation by German supporters and organised hooligan conspiracies were seen as relevant causal factors. However, the mere presence of English hooligans and heavy alcohol consumption were given the strongest mean likelihood ratings. There was also agreement that boisterous groups of England fans required strict forms of policing, with early forceful intervention essential. The article concludes by also arguing that with over 8,000 officers deployed in Belgium alone, one of the primary influences on the social context into which England fans arrived was the Gendarmerie.

The fact that the questionnaires were distributed after the events does limit the extent to which we can view officers' responses as a genuine representation of their previously held expectations. Some responses could have been influenced by events and may be more representative of post event justifications or what Waddington calls 'post-riot ideology' (1991, p. 234). But nonetheless, this study does add further support for the idea that police psychology had implications because it led them to interpret otherwise peaceful supporters as potentially problematic and to police them accordingly.

3.5 Euro 2004 -Changing Police Psychology of the Crowd

Reicher, Stott, Cronin and Adang (2004) postulate that the success of the 'low profile' strategy was down to a number of factors that can be summarised as a set of principles, based

on all the research discussed so far. Reicher et. al, (2004) advocated a new approach to policing crowds, which reconceptualised the idea as one of crowd management rather than crowd control. The new approach consisted of four Conflict Reducing Principals (CRP):

- Education[14]

Officers should learn about the social identities present within the crowd and be aware of their sensitivities and behavioural norms

- Facilitation

The policing of crowds must be orientated towards facilitating the legitimate intentions of those present

- Communication

Officers must communicate with crowd participants throughout the event

- Differentiation

If police intervention does become necessary, then it must be correctly targeted at those causing trouble and not the whole crowd (ibid.)

These principles raise important questions about how such theoretical strategic intentions can be effectively implemented at a tactical level by police practitioners. Hoggett and Stott (2012) argue that the most compelling example of their successful implementation can be found in the policing operation for fans attending the UEFA European Football Championships in Portugal in 2004 (Euro 2004). Consistent with Adang and Stott (2004), the Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP) decided to innovate and develop a low-profile policing model based on the then current scientific ESIM research and theory. Instead of policing in a manner influenced by the 'hooligan' model that was characteristic of previous tournaments, the PSP embraced a theory led approach in which a model of dynamic risk assessment was

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[14] In Sweden Education is referred to as Knowledge, but the principle of learning about and understanding the social identities within the crowd is the same.

coupled with a Graded Tactical Approach (Reicher et al., 2004, Stott & Pearson 2007, Stott et al., 2007, 2008).

The graded model of tactical intervention consists initially of officers in normal uniform focused on facilitation and communication. This enables the police to establish and maintain a proportionate police presence, which reflects the current behaviour of the members of the crowd. It also allows for officers to make ongoing dynamic risk assessments, monitoring for and gathering information on the presence or absence of any threats to public order posed by individuals or small groups. Such tactics allow for the early identification of emerging tensions, which, if necessary, can be dealt with by larger squads of police. This also increases the likelihood that if police use of force is necessary, it will be differentiated and proportionate whilst also fostering a sense of police legitimacy within the crowd. The key feature of the Graded Tactical Approach is that it is always proportionate to the behaviour of the crowd, and further numbers of police or the use of police riot equipment are only deployed as a reaction to escalatory behaviour on the part of crowd members (Stott & Pearson, 2007).

In order to evaluate the success of this theory led approach, both qualitative (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schrieber, 2007) and quantitative (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schrieber, 2008) data were gathered during the tournament. Using an ethnographic semi-structured observational framework, Stott et al. (2007) constructed a consensual account of police deployment and the subsequent behavioural norms of England fans during match days in areas under the jurisdiction of the PSP. This was then contrasted to data collected in Albufeira, an area under the jurisdiction of Portugal's second police force, the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), which had jurisdiction over Portugal's rural areas and smaller towns. In contrast to the PSP, the GNR approach relied on the use of 'high profile' police deployments similar to that seen in Belgium in Euro 2000. These observational accounts were then supplemented by phenomenological analysis of fan data collected from England

supporters, which was used to explore the evolving content of their social identity and its relationship to the surrounding social contexts.

Three key incidents were observed by the research team in areas under the jurisdiction of the PSP, which highlighted the success of their approach in avoiding collective disorder. In all three incidents it was evident that some fans began to instigate conflict. However, rather than leading to more widespread 'disorder', these attempts were undermined; in the first two cases by England fans who effectively 'self-policed', and in the third by a 'proportionate' and specifically targeted police intervention. The study highlights how the ESIM-informed tactics employed by the PSP helped them to avoid the undifferentiated use of force against large crowds, which earlier studies had pinpointed as being pivotal in initiating and escalating crowd conflict. Stott et al. argue that within those "cities a form of England fan identity was apparent that was defined in terms of 'non-violent' football fandom, similarity with fans of other nations and positive social relations with the police" (Stott et al., 2007, p. 91). They go on to suggest that it was this context of legitimate intergroup relations, created and facilitated by the low-profile approach, that meant attempts by confrontational groups to influence the wider England fan base toward conflict failed. To put it simply, those fans attempting to create confrontation and violence were disempowered by a widespread perception of legitimate policing. Speaking to the success of the policing approach, in areas under the PSP's jurisdiction there were no major incidents of collective conflict. As one England fan described it:

> "All the fans were policed very well, it was obvious they had done their homework, were not out to cause rather to deter trouble, unlike certain other forces, Belgium and Slovakia, to name but two. They had learnt from the way that the Dutch [Police] worked so well in [Euro] 2000 and should be commended … if only we could experience it wherever we went in Europe." (Post-tournament email survey, RH) (Stott et al., 2007, p. 87)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, where collective conflict did emerge, it did so in areas controlled by the GNR. Despite not hosting an England match, two 'riots' involving England fans occurred in the coastal resort of Albufeira, in the southern Algarve region of Portugal. The events were characterised by an escalation of conflict against the GNR, with initially peaceful fans being drawn into the concurrent escalation of relatively undifferentiated coercive police intervention. In contrast to the match cities, the shared social identity evident among England fans in Albufeira was defined in terms of the inappropriateness or illegitimacy of police action (Stott et al., 2007, p. 91).

In addition, Stott et al. (2008) conducted a quantitative analysis of policing at Euro 2004. Consistent with the approach used by Adang and Cuvelier (2001) at Euro 2000, a programme of structured observations was undertaken in order to assess the overall pattern of policing and the effect on supporters across all of the tournament venues. This was supplemented by a survey-based study of England fans' perceptions of policing prior to and after the tournament. The study showed that across all observed fixtures around 56% of samples saw a visible police presence during crowd events. Of those samples, there was an average of 5.5 officers per 100 fans. The pattern differed for matches considered normal risk as opposed to increased risk, with an average of 4.5 officers and 6.9 officers per 100 fans respectively. In all the samples collected none observed police officers in full riot gear. This reflected the genuinely low visibility of riot police across the entire tournament. Most interestingly, across a total of 1896 observational samples taken (997 samples from seven normal risk matches and 899 samples from seven increased risk matches) only 0.4 % samples record an incident of disorder, all of which were rated as small by the observers. This statistic is highly significant when compared to the 10% rate of disorder recorded in the 664 samples taken at Euro 2000. Stott et al. (2008) also demonstrate interesting psychological transformations among fans. In particular, when England fans travelled to the tournament, they perceived a lack of similarity between fans and the police. However, after experiencing

legitimate policing during of the tournament, when measured again, these fans now saw themselves as more similar to the police. In other words, their experience of a Graded Tactical Approach based on the Conflict Reducing Principles transformed what had previously been a hostile and polarised relationship between fans and police into one where fans began to identify with the police somewhat.

3.6 The Challenge of Change

This chapter has so far demonstrated how police psychology of the crowd is often (mis)informed by classical theory, which can result in a fundamental misunderstanding of crowd behaviour, and thus lead to poor police decision making and action towards crowds that are counter-productive. Indeed, such perspectives are not just wrong, they are dangerous because they can act as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. However, through an extended programme of Action Research Stott et al. (2007, 2008) have demonstrated how the psychological perspectives of the police can be transformed when informed about the importance of intergroup and social identity dynamics. With this perspective and knowledge in place, the PSP in Portugal developed a highly sophisticated and successful policing approach, both at the strategic and tactical level. Research at that tournament allows us to understand that it was effective because it was capable of managing crowd dynamics in ways that avoided the mistakes of the past and enabled the tournament to pass off without any incidents of widespread rioting, except in those areas controlled by the GNR whose psychological perspectives and actions had not been informed by ESIM theory. The success of the Euro 2004 tournament in terms of the absence of collective 'disorder' amongst fans in the major urban areas is now widely acknowledged in policy circles throughout Europe (Stott & Pearson, 2007).

Evidence of this important relationship between police psychology and crowd dynamics is also evident in the policing of football fans in the UK. In 2002, Cardiff City Football Club

(CCFC) had the highest number of arrests and football banning orders of any club in England and Wales (Stott, Hoggett & Pearson, 2012, p. 385), and the longstanding reputation of their fans for collective violence meant they were seen as highly problematic for the authorities. Nonetheless, following two serious incidents of disorder with hundreds of CCFC fans, in May 2001 and January 2002 respectively, South Wales Police (SWP) came to understand that their then current model was according to a Chief Superintendent in the force "a real failure in policing" (Stott et. al, 2012, p. 387). As a result, SWP decided to develop a multi-stakeholder initiative designed to try to address the underlying problems. Working with CCFC, the fans and the local authorities, a series of reforms were initiated. Shortly after these changes began to be implemented, Stott, Hogget and Pearson (2012) began a longitudinal three-year ethnographic study of the policing and collective action of CCFC fans between 2005 and 2008. Their analysis suggests that one of the most important changes was a move by the police away from a reliance on a deterrence model toward one which focused more on dialogue and facilitation. As one club official put it: "[Previously] There was no contact, no dialogue, there was nothing. Then they [the police] stopped that. They started talking to fans and … the [police] would interact with the fans, go to the fans meetings, the fans then thought 'we know why they [the police] are here now they are not here to beat us up, there [sic] not here to bludgeon us, there [sic] here for a reason', and the fans reacted accordingly" (Stott et. al, 2012, p. 387)

Thus, as we have seen elsewhere, changes in police understanding led to changes in police action over time. In this case, these reforms began to impact upon the intergroup context, which led to increasing levels of shared perceived police legitimacy among fans. Stott et. al, (2012) argue that this in turn appears to have fed into changes in the intragroup dynamics among a previously 'radicalised' community of football fans, empowering a culture of 'self-regulation' and disempowering so called 'hooligans'. The dramatic changes in normative fan behaviour meant that within two seasons, major incidents of 'disorder' had all but

84

disappeared when Cardiff played at their home stadium, which allowed the police to reduce the cost of policing games by approximately fifty percent. As one police commander put it:

> This time four years ago, we'd have been policing this game with what, 6–8 PSUs[15] and here we are doing it with three tomorrow. It [the dialogue approach] is a win win, the club are saving money because they are not paying for the same number of officers at games and we're saving, with the overall wider community of South Wales also benefiting as there's less officers being subtracted from their communities to police the football. What I can't understand is why my colleagues around the country are perhaps not taking the same view (SWP, C. Supt, 01) (ibid., p. 388).

As the statement above points out, despite a growing body of work, the UK police appear to have resisted attempts to update their own doctrines on public order policing. In other words, even in light of the knowledge made available to the police, practices simply remained the same. For example, in 2009 the national training for police public order commanders in the UK was using classical theory to (mis)inform trainees about the underlying dynamics of crowds. It was not until a member of the public was killed as a result of police use of force during the dispersal of a protest in Central London that year that this situation changed. Subsequently, a national inquiry into the policing of the G20 grew into a national review of public order policing (HMIC, 2009). Drawing upon the research discussed above, one of the core recommendations of that report was that classical theory should be rejected and ESIM theory should form the conceptual basis for public order policing in the UK. A second recommendation was that the police should advance their capacity for communication and dialogue during crowd events. As a result, new units of officers called Police Liaison Teams (PLTs) were developed. These units were designed to promote dialogue with those in the crowd and rapidly began producing positive outcomes that have seen them spread across the

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[15] A PSU is a Police Support Unit. The number of officers in a PSU is 25. They are equipped with 'riot gear' (protective clothing, helmets, batons) and are used in public order policing operations in the UK.

UK in terms of the policing of protest. It has been argued that PLTs at protest events "allowed for an improved capacity for proactive public order management, encouraged 'self-regulation' in the crowd, and avoided the unnecessary police use of force at moments of tension" (Gorringe, Stott & Rosie, 2012, p. 111).

The use of modern psychological understandings of the crowd to underpin public order policing tactics has been highly successful in helping police forces around Europe to avoid widespread conflict at football. However, a conservatism toward reform in the police is evident. Hoggett and West (2018) note growing recognition that the way in which football in the UK is policed needs to change in line with those changes witnessed toward protests. However, despite the evidence of the success of PLTs in reducing intergroup tensions at protests (Gorringe et. al, 2012) there is still a significant resistance to the adoption of PLTs within the policing of football in the UK (Hoggett & West, 2018; Stott, West & Radburn, 2018). During field work on the use of PLTs at football among the few forces willing to innovate in this direction, Stott, West and Radburn (2018) noted that officers "openly expressed their view that PLT did not have a place in policing football" (ibid., p. 12). Whilst other research projects have noted that such an approach is deemed by the police as too "pink and fluffy" (Stott, 2016a) to be effective at football. However, the irony of this should be emphasised. A lot of the ESIM research which has informed the creation of PLTs, was conducted at football crowd events, so to question the appropriateness of their use in football seems illogical.

It is widely understood that most police practices are shaped by local customs, opinions, theories, and subjective impressions, and that on the whole the police have not shown an enthusiasm for evidence-based reform (cf. Sherman, 1998). Hoggett and Stott (2012) suggest that it is not the actual nature nor the availability of evidence that acts as a barrier to public order policing reform. Instead, it is the nature of the police organisation itself combined with an often apparent inability of academia to find a successful way to work together with the

police. Canter (2008) highlighted this issue with regards to police and academic co-operation, suggesting that both parties perceive themselves as the one-eyed king in the kingdom of the blind. In order to counter this problem, Hoggett and Stott (2012) suggest that *"policing itself needs to generate the capacity for knowledge development"* (ibid., p 180) by working with social scientists in a framework of knowledge co-production whereby trust and communication are improved. This idea was reinforced by the work of Kalyal (2019) in Canada on resistance to evidence-based practice (EBP) in the Canadian police. After conducting an in-depth interview study with executive level police officers and members of police research organisations, she concluded by emphasising the importance of "maintaining effective communication within and outside the organisation ... [in order to] reduce misconceptions that prevent EBP from taking root in police organisations" (Kalyal, 2019, p.12). When one considers these issues, it reinforces the notion of Elcheroth and Reicher (2017) that moving forward we as academics need to work in a way "that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries" (ibid. p. xv), so that we might avoid repeating the same mistakes of academics in the past who could not find a way to work with the police in a successful manner.

3.7 Policing Football in Sweden

One of the most progressive police forces in the world when it comes to evidence-based change to public order practices is in Sweden. The above mentioned UK report into the policing of the G20, *Adapting to Protest* (HMIC, 2009), makes several references to Sweden and the police use of dialogue, concluding that "[w]hile confrontation between protestors and police has not been completely eliminated in Sweden, the level of confrontation and disorder is markedly less than at comparable events in other countries" (ibid., p. 77). However, the changes which led to the Swedish police taking a more communication based approach have taken a similar trajectory to that described in the UK. In June 2001, between 25,000 and

50,000 people[16] demonstrated in the city of Gothenburg against a meeting of the European Union Summit and the visit of the then United States President George Bush Jr. The events that transpired led to three days of 'riots' between the 14th and 17th (Wahlström, 2011, p. 23). The policing response (which included a mass arrest of 459 people, three demonstrators being injured by police gun fire and around 150 people being hospitalised) was characterised by a subsequent national inquiry as 'a serious failure of policing' (SOU, 2002; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2012). Independent academic research carried out in the aftermath of Gothenburg (Granström, 2002) highlighted that the dynamics of escalation seen over the three days were consistent with the theoretical model described by Reicher and colleagues, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter (cf. Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000). Furthermore, Adang (2012) points out that the conclusions of the Gothenburg Committee were "eerily similar" (ibid., p. 2) to those made by the HMIC after the G20 riots in the UK 8 years later, in particular with regard to the police's ability to communicate with and facilitate crowds in order to de-escalate conflict. The results of these initial inquiries were, however, strongly rejected by elements within the police. It was not until a subsequent 2004 report stated that the police were in need of a nationally coherent "mobile concept where the legality, the flexibility of the police operation, conflict solving and the safety of the single policeman is in focus" (Taktikutveckingsprojektet, 2004, p.3 as quoted in Wahlström, 2011, p. 24) that the National Police Board decided to adopt a new concept known as the Special Police Tactic (SPT). Key to the new concept was a different type of training programme, which began in spring 2005 and concluded in spring 2007 when the SPT was fully operationalised (Adang, 2012, p. 1-2). The SPT is thus a combination of two elements (Adang, 2012; Polishögskolan, 2005). Firstly, it comprises of the mobile operations concept, which moves away from the static use of large numbers of officers in phalanxes and big formations of armoured vehicles to a more mobile strategy which places greater emphasis on:

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[16] The estimate of 50,000 is according to the police (SOU, 2012, p. 122), however, Holgersson and Knutsson (2012, p. 3) suggest the number was closer to 25,000.

[S]ecured vehicles, strong enough to withstand attacks from protesters, such as

bombardments with paving stones. Each vehicle carries a group of uniformed officers.

The officers protected inside can rest and swiftly be moved where they are needed.

They can also get protection by standing behind the vans and be ready to intervene.

An important task for the vehicles is to function as devices to physically funnel, stop,

round-up or disperse demonstrators. (Holgersson & Knutsson 2012 p.8)

This is itself based upon the Danish Mobile Concept. Born out of similar circumstances in the

aftermath of a 1993 riot in the Nørrebro neighbourhood of Copenhagen, the Danish Mobile

Concept replaced the more static large scale approach previously employed by the Danish

Police, which Danish officers themselves described as "consistently primitive" (Wahlström,

2011, p.18). The Mobile Concept was used with considerable success when Copenhagen

hosted the 2002 EU summit and saw virtually no violent police-protestor confrontations

(Petersen, 2016; Wahlström, 2011). The second element of the SPT is the use of the ESIM

based Conflict Reducing Principles (Reicher et al., 2004; 2007). According to the police,

these principles underpin their entire approach to crowds, in particular helping them to

communicate and engage in a two-way dialogue so that they might reduce the risk of conflict

rather than trying to assert control over the crowd through the use of force (Polisen, 2019a).

However, it should be noted that although the SPT is defined by Adang (2012) as comprising

these two elements, Adang also points out that it was after the implementation of the mobile

concept in 2007 that the police began to look at developing their psychological approach to

crowds (ibid., p. 3). This in itself, suggests that there is still a reticence towards change when

it comes to psychological perceptions of the crowd.

One of the key developments within the SPT that has helped them to achieve this

communication-oriented approach with regards to policing protests is the formation of a new

unit known as the Dialogue Police. Although often maligned by colleagues, the Dialogue

Police with their non-coercive approach are seen as providing a good route for

communication between protesters and the police. This enhances the police's ability to facilitate crowds, which can pre-emptively de-escalate the situations that pose the most risk when policing and improve the information flow from the crowd into the police hierarchy (if their superiors are willing to listen to them) (Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011; Stott, 2009; Stott, Scothern & Gorringe, 2013; Stott et al., 2016). These Dialogue Police Units were mentioned extensively in the HMIC Report (2009) as a model of good practice and were somewhat of a blueprint for the UK Police's PLTs (Gorringe et al., 2012).

The use of the SPT with regards to policing protests has been fairly well documented and researched (cf. Wahlström, 2011, Holgersson, 2010; Holgersson & Knutsson, 2011; Adang, 2012). Yet despite the policing of football also being within the SPT's remit, and football matches taking place far more regularly than protests, the use of the SPT at football in Sweden is relatively understudied. In 2008, a report from the Swedish Council of Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 2008) pointed out the need for more research on the policing of football supporters. It went on to highlight that the SPT's application to policing protests and demonstration had shown some success in mitigating conflict between police and protesters, yet it was not adjudged to have even been implemented satisfactorily with regards to sports let alone showing any signs of success in mitigating the issues seen around sports in Sweden (ibid., p. 50).

Adang's (2012) paper on the development of the SPT states that some of the observational data used was gathered at football matches, however, his concluding remarks only mention football once when he states that it "is also of central importance to further develop the knowledge of football fans, demonstrators, and protest movements. Without this knowledge it is difficult to reach an effective strategy which avoids conflicts and respects human rights" (ibid., p. 9). This almost total absence of research conducted into the policing of football and sports events in general in Sweden has not gone unnoticed (cf. Green, 2006, 2009;

Radmann, 2013, 2015), yet it had remained somewhat of a literature gap until the Enable Project was created in late 2014 (Stott et al., 2016; Stott, Havelund & Williams, 2018).

Conclusions

In this chapter I have set out to demonstrate that when it comes to crowds, police psychology matters. As evidenced throughout, when a classical psychological perspective underpins the policing or reactive control of crowds, then the violence that police fear and seek to prevent can ironically become a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, when the police inform their psychology and practice to proactively manage crowds from a social identity perspective this can help to undermine such conflictual dynamics. It is important to stress however, that this approach is not a panacea. What ESIM based policing approaches can achieve is a reduction in the probability of disorder escalating, enabling the police to act quickly to problem solve and de-escalate conflictual situations before they can become widespread. This corresponds with the plethora of other potential benefits that can flow from this ESIM led approach, such as reduced policing costs, the ability to use the officers not drafted into public order to help police their local communities, or the long-term increased perceptions of police legitimacy within the community.

This chapter has also highlighted some rather obvious research gaps. Firstly, there is the evident absence of research on the use of the SPT at football. Secondly, from a more empirical and theoretical perspective, there is the absence of ESIM research with crowds who are not made up of mainly UK nationals. The majority of the research discussed was conducted within the UK or with UK nationals at football tournaments in mainland Europe. When we consider that the Swedish SPT is underpinned by the ESIM based Conflict Reducing Principles, it becomes pertinent to conduct research into their application and effectiveness in that context. This also makes salient the final literature gap, that no research has been conducted with a national police force that has adopted a policing approach

underpinned by ESIM with regards to the policing of a domestic football league. So far, the work of those in the ESIM school has been to try and convince police forces to move away from a focus upon coercion and to move towards a facilitation and dialogue focused approach to policing football, and while certain forces within the UK are willing to innovate (Hoggett & West, 2018) they are the exception rather than the rule. In Sweden, they do have a national police force that at least claims to approach football in this manner, the opportunity to research it should therefore be grasped with both hands. The following chapters therefore set out to validate the ESIM and to see to what extent it applies in this context.

Chapter Four: Methodology

> The field researcher is a methodological pragmatist. He sees any method of inquiry as a system of strategies and operations designed – at any time – for getting answers to certain questions about events which interest him (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973, p. 7)

The nature of the situation around Swedish football in 2014 was extremely tense after the death of a supporter. It therefore required a two-pronged response which focused on both the "parallel processes of research and transformation" (Stott et al., 2016, p. 15). As such, this was a situation which "made the project ideally suited to a methodology referred to as Participant Action Research (PAR)" (ibid). PAR, or simply Action Research as it is often referred to, "is a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes" (Reason & Bradbury, 2006, p.1). In essence, it is a methodology in which both researchers and participants attempt to co-create "practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people" (ibid). The emphasis in this type of methodology is on research 'with' the community, not 'on' the community (Heron & Reason, 2006).

This chapter will consist of six sections. The first will take a look at the origins of Participant Action Research in order to elaborate upon the philosophy which underpins the approach. The second section will address why a PAR methodology was particularly suited to the situation around Swedish football in 2014. The chapter will then look at the limitations of a PAR approach and illustrate how the research approach has been designed to countenance them. The question of paradigm will be addressed subsequently, in order to show how my own constructivist research is positioned within the more critical theory position of the project. The penultimate section of the chapter will then engage in a discussion of how quality can be ensured within PAR research, before a final section will give a precis of the analytical approach I have adopted throughout this thesis.

For the reader's convenience, the practical aspects of the designed methodology, including data collection instruments, data collection processes, and data analysis procedures, are explained and discussed in the subsequent chapters. Specifically, the process of analysing behavioural observations of football crowds and police officers is presented in Chapter Five. In turn, the multi-perspective thematic analysis of individual perceptions is explained in detail in Chapter Six. Finally, the benefits of facilitation are quantified in Chapter Seven.

4.1 The Origins of PAR

The origins of the PAR approach can be traced back to two points in history in which real world application of theory was needed. In the first case to Kurt Lewin, in order to defend democracy, and in the second to Paulo Freire, who tried to extend the boundaries of who was able to participate within democracy.

Enable's methodology, and subsequently my methodology, has been heavily influenced by the seminal work of Kurt Lewin (1946). Lewin's methodology was created in response to real world situations of intergroup conflict. A Prussian (modern day Poland) Jewish pre-war refugee from Nazi Germany, Lewin had been frustrated by the limitations of positivistic research methods for understanding complex human problems (Minkler, 2000; Masuda, 2017). Lewin also opined that the very nature of the controlled experiment was profoundly 'unscientific' (Billig, 2019, p.155) as it created a study of behaviour in situations that were artificial and abstracted from everyday life. It was Lewin's contention that "the 'statistical procedure' leads to the exaggeration of small differences between group scores and to concealment of variations in the ways experimental participants behave" (Billig, 2019, p. 165; cf. Billig 2013), and thus did little to illuminate real life behaviour outside of the laboratory. Instead he believed that social psychologists should study specific real life examples as they unfolded over time (Lewin, 1936).

Although Lewin (1946) did acknowledge that the forms of knowledge created by positivist methods could provide the powerful groups in society with a better understanding of the disempowered groups, he argued that they provided the powerful with no means to understand how they themselves contributed to the situation (ibid.; cf. Mckernan, 1991; Nofke, 1997) [17]. Such a decontextualised examination of one group was problematic as "[i]ntergroup relations is a two-way affair" (Lewin, 1946, p. 44) which in Lewin's eyes meant "that to improve relations between groups both of the interacting groups have to be studied" (ibid).

Lewin's approach was also based on his fear that the positivistic stance of many social scientists was coming to be seen as a 'technocracy' which created 'laws' that would tell practitioners exactly "what to do and what not to do" (ibid., p. 44). For Lewin, this kind of system was fundamentally flawed as:

> These laws do *not* tell *what* conditions exist locally, at a given place at a given time. In other words, the laws don't do the job of diagnosis which has to be done locally. Neither do laws prescribe the strategy for change. (ibid., p. 44 - emphasis in original)

Instead, he saw democratic participatory processes as the key to social learning and created a theory of Action Research based around four steps to be conducted with the community in question: planning, fact finding, execution and reflection (ibid). As such, Action Research is a spiral like process in which data is collected to determine goals, actions (or interventions) are then taken to attempt to achieve those goals, followed by an assessment period in which the results of these actions are reflected upon (Bargal, 2008, p.19). This reflection is not just a reflection on the results achieved, but also a critical reflection in which practitioners reflect

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[17] Cf. Meyer (1981) for a prime example of this with the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, a study started in 1932 and ran until 1972 in which around 400 African American men with syphilis were studied but not treated for the disease.

upon their own position, the questions they have asked, and the beliefs and assumptions which they themselves bring into the research process (Rowell, et al., 2015, p. 255). This has come to be seen as the action-reflection cycle, in which the reflection stage forms part of the planning stage of the next cycle.

It is in this desire to develop interventions in which Lewin's Action Research approach differs most from the more traditional positivistic approaches. Positivist social scientists would not typically be seeking to enact interventions as their belief is that such interventions would be contrary to the scientific process (Bargal, 2019, p. 18). However, Lewin's experiences during the end of the Weimar Republic and his flight from Germany left him with both a deep sensitivity to social issues and the desire to use his resources as a social scientist to do something about them (Rogers, 1994). Lewin's theories about the action reflection cycle were formed after his departure from Germany in 1933. As Chaiklin (2013) points out, Lewin's initial research career in Berlin between 1921 and 1933 was not concerned with experiments into social intervention at all. Yet after arriving in America, Lewin's beliefs appear to have undergone quite a radical transformation (Lewin, 1936; cf. Billig, 2019). During the Second World War, Lewin worked with the American government from at least as early as 1942 until 1945, and although there is some question about the extent of his relationship and research with them (queries remain about whether or not it extended beyond simply looking at social problems such as the changing of dietary habits) (Chaiklin, 2013, p. 133; McKernan, 1991; Lewin, 1943); what is evident, is that Lewin believed firmly in the principles of democracy. When the second world war started he quickly came to the realisation that:

> The desperate struggle in which we are involved has made it clear to an increasing
> number of people how vital socio-psychological problems are, and how imperative it
> is to approach them in a much more radical and earnestly scientific way. (Lewin,
> 1943, p. 113)

Thus, it was in a context in which Lewin experienced the erosion of democracy in Germany first hand, that he developed an approach to research which would help to defend democracy by employing the very principles of it. He was not alone in this desire to apply a more democratic approach to research. McKernan (1991) contextualises Lewin's (1946) Action Research, and the growing popularity of it, within the wider more inclusive post war climate in the western world. This post war era gave rise to a number of intellectuals who abandoned the positivistic textbook approaches. A fine example of this is the work of Ferdinand Zweig, whose book *Labour, Life and Poverty* (1948) details his *radical* new approach in which he "tried a new and unorthodox technique" (ibid., p. 1) that basically meant he spoke with and engaged with participants "on an absolutely equal footing... and never posed as somebody superior to them, or [as] a judge of their actions" (ibid., p.1-2).

However as McNiff (2013) points out, the enthusiasm for Action Research was at its zenith just after Corey published *Action Research to Improve School Practices* in 1953, and slowly declined to the point that academic discussion of it in the western world revolved more around its absence than its use; as exemplified by Sanford's 1970 article in *The Journal of Social Sciences* entitled 'Whatever happened to action research?' (McNiff, 2013, p. 57-58; Sanford, 1970).

The decreasing popularity of Action Research in the west is sometimes attributed to the increasing focus on positivistic scientific methodologies that reflected a growing interest in the space race, or as McNiff (2013) describes it "a post-Sputnik Research, Development and Diffusion Mode" (ibid., p. 57). While the prominence of the space race may have led to an increasing preference for the detached experimental positivist approach to research, the association of Participant Action Research with Paulo Freire was perhaps also part of its decreasing overt popularity. Born in Brazil in 1921, Friere's middle class family were hit hard by the 1930s and the Great Depression (Freire, 1996). These experiences are often apparent in Freire's PAR approach as described in his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970). The

work is thoroughly Anti-Colonialist/Capitalist and Marxist in its outlook. As well as drawing on the work of intellectuals like Marx, he also found inspiration in the works of revolutionary leaders such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara. Names synonymous with armed insurrection and communism. The anti-colonial nature of his approach stressed the need for the oppressed populations to play a major role in their 'liberation' through education. It should be noted however, that even though Freire admired the work of Mao and Che, nowhere in his writings did he ever advocate for violence (Lloyd, 1972, p. 19). Much like Lewin's (1946) approach, Freire's was transformative, pedagogical and collaborative. However, while Lewin's approach revolved more around the participation of community leaders, Freire's was more inclined towards the inclusion of the whole community. Freire (1973) believed that a fundamental flaw in education was that it was colonial in nature. By colonial he meant that students were simply told what to think and what to know and therefore remained passive and accepting of the status quo. For Freire a 'praxis' of reflection and action was key to the conscientisation of the learner. The awakening of perception would proceed to action, which in turn would provide the basis for new perceptions, new reflections and new actions (Lloyd, 1972, p.5). Freire emphasised the need for teachers to also learn 'from' their students, so that the teacher might be better positioned to facilitate the learning. A philosophy which almost mirrors Reicher et al.'s Conflict Reducing Principles (2004) that require the police to gain a better understanding of the groups they police in order to facilitate their legitimate aims. Freire first tested his theories on a large scale in 1962, when his approach was used to teach 300 adult sugarcane farmers to read in just 45 days (Freire, 1973, p. 50-55; Freire & Macedo, 2005). At that time, literacy was required in order to vote and as such this work had radical transformative potential for the future of Brazilian democracy. However, his emancipatory and consciousness raising philosophy was viewed as so dangerous by the right wing military government which took power in 1964, that Freire spent a large portion of his life in exile as a consequence (Kirylo, 2011).

Around this time there was a proliferation of PAR in areas of the developing world, notably in India, Africa and South America (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007). Even though many in Western Europe and North America also drew inspiration from his work, they "have tended to tone down this revolutionary impetus" (Masuda, 2017, p. 3). Indeed, when we consider that many researchers receive government funding, it seems self-evident why research strategies so strongly associated with Marxist thought would decline in western capitalist nations. Some even omit his contribution altogether. For example, Jean McNiff (2013), whose Action Research textbook was originally printed in 1988 and is now in its third edition, does not even mention Freire except for a brief reference in a case study towards the end of her book. However, this does not mean that she shies away from "the emancipatory impulses of action research" (McNiff, 2013, p. 63; cf. Carr & Kemmis, 2005).

Freire can be seen as the originator of what is now referred to as the Southern School of PAR, while Lewin is generally considered the originator of the Northern School (Fals Borda, 2006; Masuda, 2017). The reader will have noted the addition of the word 'Participant' to Action Research as Freire was introduced to the discussion. This was deliberate, as it was Freire's model which radically expanded the boundaries of inclusivity in this type of research. Although the underlying principles of action and reflection are the same, the addition of 'Participant' reflects what some deem as a signal of "political commitment, collaborative processes and participatory worldview" (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007, p.11; Reason & Bradbury, 2006). There are also differences in approach based more around how conservative the changes sought as a result of the research are (Masuda, 2017; Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007), however both schools were created out of a desire for change and employ the philosophy that we must "investigate reality in order to transform it" (Fals Borda, 2006, p. 353). Therefore, despite these differences, I will use the terms Action Research and Participant Action Research interchangeably for the rest of the thesis.

4. 2 Why was PAR the correct research approach for Enable?

No methods are intrinsically better than others, but some are more suited to particular problems or situations. The context in which Enable was created was one which needed evidence based change. Enable's raison d'être was not just to provide an evidence base, but it was also created to influence practice with regards to the safe management of crowds at Swedish football. Therefore, it seems that a PAR approach following in the footsteps of Lewin and Freire is the optimal choice for such a project. As such, Enable's adoption of PAR followed a 'logic of appropriateness' (Greener, 2011, p.1). This is not to say that more traditional positivistic approaches cannot be helpful to understanding crowds. For example, there are documented incidences of using virtual reality simulations to help explore crowd behaviour under different experimental conditions. Such studies can give us a greater understanding of how people may react in different crowd scenarios (Drury et al., 2009; Helbing et al., 2015). However, there are financial and logistical restraints with such methods. When it comes to using techniques such as crowd modelling in football stadiums specifically, this approach "can be expected to take roughly one year… [and] typically costs hundreds of thousands of US dollars [per stadium]" (Glenesk, Strang & Disley, 2018, p.12). Thus, when one considers that Enable's main source of funding was from a charitable foundation, it quickly becomes apparent that the use of PAR is also a more responsible economical choice.

As highlighted in the previous section, the PAR methodology's primary difference from a more positivist methodology is in the desire to enact transformations. Key to such research-based transformations is the legitimacy and the comprehensibility of the knowledge upon which it is based (Lewin, 1946). The PAR framework prioritises collaboration with stakeholders, so that researchers can co-create knowledge with the community. It is the contention of PAR researchers that the exclusion of practitioners from the knowledge creation process is one of the fundamental reasons that traditional research based knowledge

is often dismissed by practitioners (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007). However, as Ernie Stringer (2008) points out, participant buy-in and active participation can be key to developing feelings of ownership of and confidence in research. Thus, through their involvement with the research process, participants come to regard this knowledge as legitimate (Dustman, Kohan & Stringer, 2014) and the likelihood of this research-based knowledge being incorporated into professional practice increases.

The inclusion of the community in data collection and analysis is the main way in which PAR differs from a more traditional ethnographic approach. As Margaret Eisenhart (2019) points out, both PAR and Ethnography have similar trajectories and have become somewhat entangled in educational research over the last 50 years (ibid., p.1). PAR "draws on key ethnographic methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews, and takes a multi-method approach" (Tacchi, 2015, p.220). So much so in fact, that some scholars have coined the term Ethnographic Action Research (ibid.; Bath, 2009; Tacchi, Slater, & Hearn, 2003) to reflect how the observation and analysis stages of a PAR project often use methods which would usually be employed in "[a]n ethnographic approach to researching projects" (Tacchi, Slater & Hearn, 2003, p. 9). However, it could be argued that while ethnographic methods lend legitimacy to a PAR project, PAR itself offers a more democratic stance towards research that is action orientated (Eisenhart, 2019). Such a stance allows for the raising of critical awareness amongst all participants within a project and the opportunity for perceptions (both a participant's own and others') to be challenged and reflected upon during the analytical stages (Balakrishnan & Claiborne, 2017).

Essentially, a PAR approach is like a 'team ethnography' (Erickson, Stull, & Stull, 1997). This allows for a much more comprehensive account of an event and enables participants to help develop the data, producing an analysis which is seen as more legitimate in the eyes of those who have the power to act upon it to continue Lewin's Action Reflection Cycle (1946). The data being produced in such a way not only produces a more authentic participatory voice

(Reason, 2006; Reason & Bradbury, 2006), but also then allows this authenticity to flow into the analysis stage and thus further legitimises the research in the eyes of third party readers (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007).

In addition to legitimising the knowledge created, such an approach also makes this knowledge more comprehensible. PAR has always been seen as having a "tremendous pedagogical effect" (Lewin, 1946, p. 42). PAR's ability to act as a powerful tool for learning was especially important in the type of climate apparent in Sweden in 2014. I must admit that I struggled with some of the theoretical aspects of the social psychological processes within crowds before I started to work in the field. Despite having spent hundreds of hours reading and writing about these issues, it was my involvement in Dr James Hoggett and Chief Superintendent Owen West's PAR fieldwork in early 2017 (an investigation into the use of specialist dialogue units at football in the UK) that really illuminated quite how group identities can form and behavioural norms can change during an event (Hoggett & West, 2018).

Even though PAR faded out of use in the western world from the 1970s onwards as a research strategy (Sanford, 1970), its validity as a tool for learning has never been in question; as McNiff states in the third edition of *Action Research: Principles and Practice* (2013):

> In 1988, when the book was first published, action research was still struggling for legitimacy. This remained the case until about the late 1990s. Many people still positioned action research as a powerful tool for learning, especially professional learning, but would not accept it as a method for knowledge creation and theory generation. (ibid., p. 1)

In addition to PAR's ability to make knowledge more legitimate and comprehensible, there is also an added dividend with regards to transformation. Through their participation in the

research process and the analysis stages, stakeholders experienced the creation of the knowledge garnered from the research enquiry. They then had the ability to start to base practice upon an enhanced understanding gained from that participation. Put in more theoretical terms, their shared social experience during the research led to a shared sense of social reasoning and improved the tacit knowledge of participants (Hervik, 1994). Thus, the inclusion of practitioners meant that the knowledge uptake within our stakeholder organisations could begin much earlier than it would with traditional research based projects that are dependent upon the delivery of a finished report.

The collaborative approach to research and the creation of knowledge was also key to the initial development of the policing model which is now employed in Sweden. Reicher et al.'s Conflict Reducing Principles (2004) were in part inspired by the research documented in Adang and Cuvelier (2001)'s study of policing during Euro 2000 (specifically the 'low profile' policing approach adopted in the Netherlands). The low profile approach was a radically new way of approaching football policing at the time. However, it is not surprising that a new way of handling 'the problem' of football supporters originated in the Netherlands, when one looks at the history of the Dutch approach to football in general. Numerous football authors cite the location of the Netherlands at the centre of Europe as being key to their industrial revolution and then make parallels with their football revolution in the 1970s (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009; Cox, 2019). Dutch total football (like their industrial revolution) is widely regarded as having come about because of the knowledge sharing that took place there, particularly in Amsterdam, between all the different football philosophies of the surrounding European nations. Dutch total football, and by implication the great Milan and Barcelona teams of the nineties, are the product of an international network of knowledge sharing[18]. That same Dutch approach to knowledge sharing was at the heart of the development of what Adang and Cuvelier (2001) termed the low profile approach. The phrase "international police

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[18] One might even argue that the modern tactical innovations of 'gegenpress' and 'tiki taka' also have their roots in Amsterdam in the 1970s- however that is an argument that I will save for a future research project into tactical innovations in football.

co-operation" is mentioned 56 times[19] in their 101 page document. Knowledge sharing was evidently an important part of the development of the CRP and by implication should be key to the further development and refinement of the principles in the different localities in which they are implemented.

The PAR approach adopted by Enable was chosen due to its ability to both conduct research and facilitate change. By including participants in the PAR research, Enable seeks to make the knowledge co-created with the community more comprehensible and more trustworthy in the eyes of our stakeholders; and thus more likely to be able to influence stakeholder practices within the context of Swedish football.

4.3 Limitations of PAR

While the previously cited quote from McNiff (2013) describes the pedagogical benefits of a PAR approach; It also highlighted how PAR has struggled for legitimacy, particularly as "a method for knowledge creation and theory generation" (ibid., p. 1) in the past. This section will seek to elaborate on the (perceived) limitations of PAR and how Enable has sought to rectify them.

The inclusive nature of action research might be determined by some as problematic. PAR places the researcher inside the area or problem which is the focus of study (Rowell et al., 2015). This invokes questions of objectivity and subjectivity. However, at the same time such a criticism is perhaps not congruent with the nature of this research. PAR is not simply about understanding social life (Lewin, 1946). It is about transforming it for the better (Fals Borda, 2006). As such, PAR researchers do not claim to be 'neutral', instead they recognise their positionality and critically reflect upon it in the research process (Rowell et al., 2015, p. 255).

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[19] The phrase "international co-operation" is also mentioned 9 times

They propound neither objectivism nor subjectivism, but instead view subjectivity and objectivity as being "in constant dialectical relationship" (Freire, 1970, p. 50). My own data analysis methods were therefore configured with the need for critical reflection in mind and can be seen in Section 4.6.

A similar critique can also be made of the participants. By doing research 'with' the community, the community also become researchers to some extent. There is thus a danger that "[p]articipation can have a shadow side in that human persons in primary association can band together in defense [sic] of their version of reality and refuse to countenance alternatives" (Reason, 2006, p. 194). As such, a form of compliance might emerge, which places constraints on our ability to conduct a deep analysis of the data we collect. However, the inclusive nature of PAR also means that knowledge is co-created and therefore is negotiated and dialectic in nature. Thus, by making sure that all elements of the community are represented it is possible to avoid the dominance of one particular voice or one group of voices.

This was taken a step further by the Enable Project. The general protocol for Enable's knowledge co-creation was that each observation team would be made up of police officers, safety and security professionals, football club staff, supporter representatives and academics. Half of the participants would usually be drawn from the local area of the observation (such as host club, host police force and local supporter scene) and the other half would come from across Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Having half the observation team made up of non-local participants thus provided some alternative voices and helped to countenance such "errors of consensus collusion" (ibid.) which might happen if the research process became dominated by a particular group.

The third issue, and perhaps one of the most difficult problems to overcome, is that PAR is time consuming. One of the first stages of a PAR project is to "[e]stablish relationships and

common agenda between all Stakeholders" (Kindon, Pain & Kesby 2007, p. 15) before the concepts of "research design, ethics, power relations, knowledge construction process, representation and accountability" (ibid.) can be reflected upon. The establishment of relationships within a given context is necessary before the action stages of a PAR approach can be embarked upon. The relationships developed in a PAR project will influence the research strategies available. One cannot even embark upon a PAR project if one cannot gain the trust and co-operation of those participants in the first place. This "formation of communicative space" (Kemmis, 2001, p. 100) is a form of action in itself which can take longer than imagined and often seems "to get in the way of directly addressing practical problems" (Reason, 2006, p. 194). However, whilst some might view this as a limitation, through the collaborative process of PAR research, groups which might previously have been distrustful of each other could begin to rebuild the trust between themselves. A meta-analysis by Lemmer and Wagner (2015) demonstrated that intergroup contact interventions have been shown to be a valuable tool for reducing prejudice and increasing understanding between majority and minority groups. From this perspective we might argue that PAR's ability to create communicative spaces is actually a major benefit rather than a limitation.

Once relationships have been established, the PAR researchers must then embark on a first stage of data gathering in order to identify issues that need to be addressed. In this methodology the PAR researcher "start[s] not, as in traditional academic research, from an interesting theoretical question, but from what concerns us in practice" (Reason, 2006 p.188). As Joanne Rappaport points out in her book on Fals Borda and the origins of PAR, entitled *Cowards Don't Make History* (2020), such an approach can be seen as controversial and unconventional within academia. Although this is not particularly problematic for the community a PAR researcher works with, it can often prove an insurmountable obstacle within the PAR researcher's academic establishment.

Fortunately, when I came to work with the Enable Project in 2016, these initial research stages had been completed and it had been fairly successful in developing the relationships necessary for a very inclusive PAR approach. The first formalised collaborative relationship was with Swedish Elite Football (SEF), who became an official partner organisation of Enable on the 22nd of December 2015. Those relationships continued to develop after the commencement of my research. For example, on the 16th of January 2017 Enable was invited to a meeting with the then Minister for Sport and Health, Gabriel Wikström, so that we might present the project's research, experiences, and direction of future travel. While two days later the Swedish Football Association (SvFF) officially endorsed Enable and became the fourth working partner alongside Swedish Elite Football (SEF), the Swedish Police and the Swedish Football Supporters' Union (SFSU). Thanks should go directly to Filip Lundberg, Clifford Stott and Jonas Havelund for this, as it was their hard work prior to my involvement that created these relationships and gave me the chance to work in what was really a world leading and exemplary model of PAR.

In a nutshell, there are admittedly potential limitations to a PAR methodology. However, by seeking to maintain critical reflection throughout, and by including all stakeholders in the research process Enable has sought to counter these potential limitations. Furthermore, I would also counter that some of these limitations should be seen as a benefit when one considers the potential for reduced intergroup antagonism which can result from the creation of communicative space.

4.4 Research Paradigm

> Questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105)

This section of the chapter will address the topic of research paradigm. By clearly articulating the philosophical standpoint which underpins both the project as a whole and my thesis in particular, this section foregrounds not just the actual methods employed in the collection of data and the analysis of it, but the very type of knowledge which I want to produce from the process.

Guba and Lincoln (ibid) assert that there are four main paradigm positions from which research can be conducted , specifically "positivism, post positivism, critical theory and related ideological positions, and constructivism" (ibid., p.105). The goal of a PAR project is always to facilitate change and thus would at first glance fall into what Guba and Lincoln (1994) classify as "Critical Theory and Related Ideological Positions" (ibid., p. 110). However, as Merriam and Tisdell (2106) point out, the philosophical perspectives towards research can often intersect. Guba and Lincoln's (1994) work acknowledges this when they suggest that their typology should be seen as a set of 'ideal types' rather than a precise and neat delineation. The long term goal of Enable is to facilitate change. However, the democratic philosophy of PAR means that those changes should be created with the practitioners. A purely Critical Theory position could hinder that as:

> While critical theorists say what ought to be done to right wrongs, they do not show how it can be done or what needs to be done to realise the potentialities of their theories to turn them into living realities... Furthermore, they tend to believe it sufficient to critique other people but not to critique themselves which leaves them open to challenges of contradictory behaviour (McNiff, 2013, p. 50)

In other words, those who take the critical position and 'agitate' for change can themselves become one of the blockages of that change. Furthermore, as the literature review demonstrated consistently, widespread conflict at football is not due to the inherent

pathological or biological traits of crowd members, but results from widespread perceptions of illegitimate outgroup actions. If the key to understanding conflict, and thus de-escalating it, is through comprehending the multiple perceptions of reality and how they interact then we need a paradigm which is capable of doing that. Therefore, I will adopt a more constructivist position, with the aim to bring a clearer understanding of the situation and "to distill a consensus construction that is more informed and sophisticated than any of the predecessor constructions" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). Change can then be initiated based on a "rational understanding about possible alternatives or on clear foresight about what the effects of different social actions would be" (Lewin, 1946, p. 128).

The critical and constructivist paradigmatic positions share a number of similarities, and as such are far from being incompatible. They both see the ontological status of knowledge as being inseparable from the people who produce it; the investigator and the investigated are interactively linked in the process of conducting research and both make value judgements. Therefore the two paradigms have transactional and subjectivist epistemologies. While they also both employ dialectical methodologies. A constructivist based framework is however both wide-ranging and eclectic (Schwandt, 1998, p. 242). Therefore too narrow a definition is oxymoronic and would go "against the assumptions and values that constructivism embodies" (Bisman & Highfield, 2012, p. 6; cf. Potter 1996). Yet for the sake of clarity let me state that I adopt a mainly constructivist position in which:

> Realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals and even across cultures), and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions. (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 110-111)

This position differs slightly from the more radical Critical Theory paradigm which puts more emphasis on the direct confrontation of power and attempts to challenge power relations (ibid). Yet the constructivist based approach:

> While not necessarily setting out to be a critical catalyst for change, [by] illuminating these manifold realities [it] may provide multiple solutions rather than singular, one-size-fits-all answers (Bisman & Highfield, 2012, p. 6)

This is not to say that a purely constructivist approach is without its drawbacks within a PAR framework. The constructivist position tends to see people as objects of study, making statements both about the actions of those people and the intentions behind them (McNiff, 2013). In doing so the researcher essentially speaks on behalf of other people. When the researcher brings that position to the long-term PAR framework there is a danger that "they systematically rule people out of the decision-making process" (McNiff, 2013, p. 49) when moving forwards. In order to counteract the potential for my work to be seen as speaking for participants I have tried to present my analysis of the interviews and surveys in a way that maximises the voice of those participants. For that reason, I have tried to use quotes and responses from the participants as much as possible in order to let both the data and therefore the participants speak for themselves.

At the same time these critical implications for PAR of a constructivist position can actually be beneficial when applied to some of the intermediary stages of the PAR cycle. Participants in the context of Swedish football have numerous other duties and obligations. The police for example have numerous other societal responsibilities with which they must contend on a daily basis. They do not necessarily have the time to be active in all of the data collection or data analysis stages. Thus, it is not always practical to undertake "*deep* PAR in which the researched have participated equally throughout the research process, from conception of the research question, through data collection, data analysis, dissemination and implementation"

(Stuttaford & Coe, 2007, p. 188). Therefore a more constructivist based position is the most ethical when it comes to analysing the data that our participants have helped to create in this thesis. This way a multi voice reconstruction of the situation (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 112) can then feed back into the participatory and democratic decision making process as the project moves forward with its more critical transformative agenda.

4.5 Quality in Constructivist PAR Research

Opinions about what constitutes quality in research vary depending on the epistemological and ontological positions held by researcher and reader alike. Unfortunately there is a tendency for some academics to view only positivistic research as being 'worthy'. This is often because of a predilection to judge all work by the values held by the positivistic paradigms. Take for example the literature review conducted by Strang, Baker, Pollard and Hoffman (2018) on the subject of violent behaviour at football which was prepared for Qatar University so as to inform the country's preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The review states that they "rated only a handful of studies as being very high quality and these were mostly quantitative studies that employed rigorous statistical methods" (ibid., p. 3). Such a stance views internal validity, external validity, replicability/ reliability and objectivity as "the conventional benchmarks of "rigor"" (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 114). However, judging work conducted according to the idea that there are multiple interpretations of reality, by the criteria of those paradigms which search for knowledge of the one true reality is always going to be problematic. Ergo, when judging the quality of research it is important to use "a systematic method whose assumptions are congruent with the way one conceptualises the subject matter" (Reicher & Taylor, 2005, p. 549)

It thus follows that constructivist research should be judged by the constructivist benchmarks of quality. From such a position, rigour becomes less about detached objectivity (Wittgenstein, 1968), and more about the trustworthiness and the authenticity of the

research (Lincoln & Guba, 1986, p. 73). Lincoln and Guba (ibid, cf. Guba 1981) propose that the term 'rigour' should actually be reserved for the positivistic criteria of quality and that instead quality in 'naturalistic' research (critical theory and constructivist paradigms) can be ensured through two sets of criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1986, p. 76; cf Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The first set parallels the essence of positivistic rigour with:

> the *trustworthiness* criteria of credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paralleling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling objectivity) (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 114)

Although, in defining quality in research it extends the criteria to include notions not usually considered by positivists:

> the *authenticity* criteria of fairness, ontological authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), educative authenticity (leads to improved understanding of constructions of others) catalytic authenticity (stimulates action) and tactical authenticity (empowers action) (ibid.)

There is one final characteristic which should be the mark of quality in participant action research: Transparency.

> Quality in action research will rest internally on our ability to see the choices we are making and understand their consequences; and externally on whether we articulate our standpoint and the choices we have made transparently to a wider public. (Reason, 2006, p. 190)

Transparency in research can help to ensure the trustworthiness of it. Not just for myself during data analysis, but also in the eyes of the reader.-Perhaps more importantly, a

transparent approach can lay the foundation for catalytic authenticity. A research approach which emphasises democratic participation should by implication be open and transparent about how that research is conducted. If the research processes employed are not made explicit, how can all the stakeholders be expected to take part in the reflection/planning process for future PAR cycles? If they don't know exactly how the recommendations and suggestions made at the end of this PAR cycle were arrived at how can they even trust them? One cannot be expected to make an informed decision without all the available information.

As I believe I have demonstrated, the benchmarks for assessing this thesis should be whether it is trustworthy, authentic and transparent. However, before I move on to discuss the analytical approach, there is one final indicator of quality which I would like to highlight. That is when the methodology is acknowledged by others working in the same field. In the case of the Enable PAR methodology, not only is it becoming widely acknowledged around Europe, but it is also being recommended as the methodology that should be adopted in countries which have experienced significant issues with football crowd violence, such as in Italy:

> Rather than criminalizing all football fans, it would be more fruitful to ensure that all stakeholders collaborate constructively in the management and control of stadiums to improve the fan experience. This approach is promoted in the UK by ENABLE, a participatory action research project started in Sweden, which aims to gather evidence and to analyse, identify and develop good practices in the management of crowds at football matches (Testa, 2018, p. 80)

Whilst it has already become the modus operandi adopted by Dr Alain Brechbühl of the University of Bern which has moved to create Enable Switzerland (Brechbühl, 2018). This in itself should be considered an indicator of quality in research when other well-respected academics around Europe acknowledge the appropriateness of such an approach. Especially

when it is those who do not necessarily agree with all the tenets of the ESIM based interpretation of football crowd violence (cf. Testa & Armstrong 2008, 2010; Testa 2010). This widespread acknowledgment and adoption of the Enable methodology is a hallmark of quality; and even though I have worked to refine it, this research format was pioneered by Clifford Stott in Sweden and credit should ultimately be given to him for his unique concept.

4.6 Analytic Approach

There was both a set of guiding analytic principles applied throughout the data analysis, and also a defined step by step process applied methodically to each data set. This section will therefore be twofold. First, I will outline the analytic principles adopted in order to maintain the constant dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. The second half will then focus on my rationale for the use of Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2012, 2020) throughout the thesis and how this approach evolved into more of a Content Analysis approach for one study (Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019).

4.6.1 Analytic Guidelines

- Know yourself, be explicit about your positionality (experiences, biases, preconceptions)
- Know your question
- Seek creative abundance. Don't be afraid of consulting with others and looking for alternate interpretations and understandings
- Be flexible
- Exhaust the data
- Look for anomalies. Search for examples which disprove your developing conceptions

- Seek critical feedback. A solo analyst is a great danger not only to themself but also to others!
- Share explicit details with team members and audience

    (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 142-3)

These were the principles applied to every step of the analytic method and should be considered the overarching guidelines of my constructivist analytic approach. They are based in the main on Miller and Crabtree's (1999) advice for researchers, however, they were also influenced by social scientists like Loïc Wacquant (2004) and Alice Goffman (2015), whose constructivist accounts of working with hard-to-reach communities I found particularly illuminating in the way they gave voice both to their subject and their participants. Most notable amongst these inspirations was Cousin Eli's ethnographic study of Jelly's Place in Chicago (Anderson, 1979). Anderson's work exemplifies how important it is to seek critical feedback from colleagues and to share explicit examples with them throughout.

> About a year and a half into the study, when I began working with Howard Becker, I gave him an account of my work up to that point, including my discovery of the three groups—the "respectables," the "nonrespectables," and the "near-respectables." Howie required more clarification of those terms. And he asked me a critical question, "But, Eli, what do they call themselves?" (Anderson, 2003, p. 230)

The above quote illustrates why reflecting together with colleagues is so important for the authentic development of themes, categories and conceptualisations[20]. Furthermore, Anderson's work displays a level of humility which I personally admire. He never shies away from the fact that his analysis was aided by his colleagues, classmates, and comrades and I have tried to follow his fine example.

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[20] The need to seek critical feedback becomes even more important when one is working with a PAR project in another country and using data which is not written in one's own native tongue.

4.6.2 Analytic Method

The analytical method employed throughout this thesis was Thematic Analysis (TA) using Braun and Clarke's guidelines (2006, 2012, 2020)[21]. Much in the same way that the PAR research approach was chosen according to the logic of appropriateness, the choice of TA was initially a pragmatic one. There was both a logistical and theoretical rationale for the use of TA, both will be discussed in turn in this section.

Logistical Appropriateness

TA is relatively suited to the novice researcher and the expert alike. I was fairly inexperienced in data analysis six years ago when I embarked upon this project, however the nature of the Enable set up meant I had a plethora of data within the first eight months of commencing research. I therefore needed to get to grips with it before the sheer volume became overwhelming. TA is particularly well suited "for those early in a qualitative research career" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 9) and thus allowed me to start analysis without delay. In addition to this it is theoretically flexible and not tied to one particular paradigm position, so it is pragmatically suited to a project which flows between the constructivist and the critical.

Furthermore, TA is not a prescriptivist set of rules one must follow with strict adherence at all points; but a descriptivist guide to analysing data that is situated, reflexive and adaptable to the context in which the researcher is working. Or as Braun, Clarke and Hayfield (2019) themselves say, it is not a complete package holiday but rather a compass for navigating one's

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[21] Braun and Clarke (2020) now conceptualise TA as having different approaches which they cluster into 'coding reliability', 'codebook' and 'reflexive' variations. Yet, as they themselves point out (Braun and Clarke, 2020 p. 6) they failed to acknowledge this when they first articulated the TA approach. As my analysis was well under way before they made explicit their reconceptualisations, I have maintained the use of the phrase TA.

own adventure. Therefore, it is particularly compatible with a situated and reflexive PAR framework. The descriptivist nature of TA also lends itself to the 'quantitising' (Sandelowski, Voils & Knafl, 2009) of qualitative data. In other words, TA coding "can be used as a way of converting qualitative information into quantitative data" (Boyatsiz, 1998 p. 4-5) which when looking at the perceptions held within groups can allow us to see how widespread those perceptions are[22].

Additionally, the procedure outlined for Braun and Clarke's (2006, 2009) TA is helpful for researchers aiming to maintain the dialectic relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. As such, it is a data analysis method which can help to ensure quality within a PAR methodology. For example, with regards to my own application of the phased process outlined by Braun and Clarke (ibid.), during *Phase Four* presentations of the themes and the coded data would be prepared by myself for analysis meetings with the other Enable team members. This phase of the analysis was aimed at the verification of themes within the data set; and as recommended by Braun and Clarke (ibid), it employed Patton's (1990) principles of *internal homogeneity* and *external heterogeneity* to ensure that themes were internally coherent and externally discreet. While the preliminary themes had been identified by myself, these meetings were a group discussion in which we would reflect critically upon my interpretation of the data, the raw data itself and how my own positionality and biases might have affected these interpretations. Consequently, by adopting this phased thematic analysis approach I was able to ensure that the data analysis was done in a trustworthy, authentic and transparent way.

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[22] This will be further discussed in the Method section of Chapter Seven.

Theoretical Appropriateness

While the pragmatic choice of TA for logistical reasons is clear, its pragmatic choice for theoretical reasons was the driving rationale behind its adoption for the entire thesis. TA has been used previously as a vehicle for understanding in a constructivist approach which allows researchers to go past the dominant pathological classification given to certain lifestyles and behaviours by outgroup members; it is therefore perfectly suited for a thesis which aims to gain clarity of the more nuanced meanings and understandings given to the lifestyle and behaviours by ingroup members (Taylor & Ussher, 2001[23]). This is perhaps the most salient reason for the use of TA: Its applicability to inductively identify and understand the experiences, meanings and realities of participants (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 9; Ahrens & Chapman 2006).

It is no doubt for this reason why it has proved so popular with other Social Identity Theorists who wish to conduct theoretically guided analyses of their data sets (Stevenson, McNamara & Muldoon, 2014, p.457). In fact, use of TA is especially common in ESIM analyses (Stott et al., 2007; cf. Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b, Drury & Reicher, 1999; Radburn et al., 2022). Stott et al. (2007) argue that such an "analytical technique is based upon the assumption that fans' descriptions of events are indicative of their representations" (p. 81) and therefore provides explanatory power (cf. Stott and Drury, 2001: 252). Given what we learned in the second literature review chapter about how conflict arises, primarily that conflict flows from an asymmetry of perceptions about what does and what does not constitute legitimate social action (Reicher, 1996b; Drury & Reicher 2009), using an approach to data analysis which "is extremely flexible and thus facilitate[s]... a focus on experiential aspects of participants' accounts at the explicit (semantic) level" (O'Donnell et al., 2016, p. 65) seems logically appropriate. A prime example

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[23] Technically Taylor and Ussher (2001) refer to their paradigm position as 'constructionist' however, this term is significantly similar to Guba and Lincoln's (1994) term 'constructivist' therefore I have used them interchangeably.

of that flexibility would be the use of Braun and Clarke's (2006, 2009) TA to inform a Multi Perspective Thematic Analysis (Kassavou et al., 2015) which can then help us to focus in on those asymmetries (Vogl et al., 2018; Levitt et al., 2018).

In a nutshell, the use of Thematic Analysis was due to its ability to highlight contrasting perspectives. When using a theoretical framework like ESIM which highlights that conflicts arise due to an asymmetry in perceptions of legitimacy (Reicher, 1996b; Drury & Reicher, 2000) and that the different perceptions held of outgroup behaviour are key to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict at crowd events (Stott & Drury, 2000), an analytical strategy which can be used to identify the multiple perspectives of similarities and dissimilarities in how police officers and football supporters perceived each other's behaviours and crowd psychology[24] is theoretically appropriate.

With that being stated, the co-constructionist nature of this thesis brought some changes to the research methodology that were not initially planned, giving a certain twist to how the data analysis procedure was undertaken. Specifically, the data analysis method for the supporter surveys, which are described and explained in detail in Chapter Seven, incorporates certain principles and elements of content analysis. Although both content and thematic analysis methods are often used interchangeably in the literature, they nevertheless have some important differences and nuances (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For example, Vaismoradi and Snelgrove (2019) argued that while thematic analysis was purely qualitative, content analysis could be employed to process qualitative and quantitative data alike.

Content analysis implies some quantification of data and enables researchers to count instances of codes rather than just searching for themes by collating initial codes from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This quantitative touch allows for getting a better

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[24] This will be discussed further in the Method section of Chapter Six.

understanding of the contextual use of the content or words to explore their usage. As noted by Vaismoradi and Snelgrove (2019), a content analysis continues beyond the mere frequency counts and focuses on the process of content interpretation. In addition, content analysis often involves defining codes not only during but also before data analysis, which are derived from theory or relevant empirical findings by previous researchers in the field.

Giving explicit examples to others is a key aspect of the data analysis procedure in both content and thematic analyses. Shifting towards content analysis while maintaining a thematic approach was a great way of maintaining shareholder involvement, co-creating knowledge, and gaining an extended understanding of how football events are managed by the police and what challenges both police officers and football supporters face during football events in Sweden. This approach was particularly useful to ensure stakeholder feedback and engagement throughout the analysis and writing-up stages.

Coding is an important part of both content analysis and thematic analysis and it was done in conjunction with both groups of stakeholders, namely police officers and football supporters. It is important to note that the analysis process started as thematic analysis and evolved to the point where it incorporated some elements of content analysis. This shift can be explained by my willingness to make sure the analysis findings are not merely academic but also provide practical value on a decision-making and policy level. At some point, I realised that a pure thematic analysis would not be seen as highly useful by Swedish police officers or other power-holding stakeholders who tend to rely on more quantitative data when it comes to decision-making. Therefore, in order to make the data more accessible from a policy-maker's point of view, I moved away from a purist qualitative approach. We started with a qualitative thematic analysis approach but it was quantified later on to a certain degree to make the study practically and academically useful.

The shift towards content analysis also indicates that this study focuses on multiple data types. The following table summarises all the data collected in the course of this study, as well as the data analysis methods employed.

Table 2 – Data Collected and Analysis Methods Used

Data Type	Data Collected	Data Collection Instruments	Analysis Methods
Primary qualitative	Behavioural data	4 multi-stage observations	Thematic maps
Primary qualitative	Individual perceptions and attitudes as psychological constructs of meaning	Qualitative interviews with 20 police officers and 11 football supporters	Multi-perspective thematic analysis
Primary quantitative/qualitative	Football supporters' overall perceptions of the event and its management	4 online surveys of football supporters	Multi-phase thematic/ content analysis

Conclusions

The approach adopted by Enable, Participant Action Research, is a way of doing research and transforming a situation. PAR is "radical and earnestly scientific way" (Lewin, 1943, p. 113) of approaching research, borne out of Kurt Lewin's (1946) desire to defend democracy and Paulo Freire's (1970) desire to extend the boundaries of who may participate in it. The approach emphasises conducting research 'with' those involved in a situation or problem

rather than conducting research 'on' them (Heron & Reason, 2006). Such an approach offers both benefits to the knowledge created and to those participants who become involved in the project. This is achieved primarily by legitimising the knowledge created in the eyes of practitioners, which in turn means it is more likely to influence perceptions and therefore impact upon real world practice. There are limitations to the PAR methodology, as there are with all approaches, however these limitations have been highlighted and addressed. With regards to this thesis I have adopted a constructivist position within the long-term critical PAR framework. This position has been adopted so that numerous possible routes to change can be identified and decided upon by all stakeholders in a democratic process.

Chapter Five: An Analysis of Thematic Maps Based on Behavioural Observations of Police Forces and Football Crowds

This chapter analyses four sets of observational data, each of which corresponds to a specific fixture. The analysis focuses on the behaviours of football fans, the strategies of crowd policing chosen for the fixtures, and the implications for the 'classical' theories of the crowd and the ESIM. The analysis follows a chronological perspective and demonstrates how the actions of police forces provoked reactions from football crowds.

Specifically, the analysis procedure creates thematic maps for each individual set of observations, which are, subsequently, combined into one integrated map. According to Cormack et al. (2018) and Smith (2015), thematic maps are suitable for analysing large sets of qualitative data. Thematic maps allow for detecting and linking several patterns in the participants' observed behaviours, allowing for the creation of visual representations of the key meanings arising from qualitative descriptions (Cormack et al., 2018; Smith, 2015).

Briefly summarising the key outcomes of Chapter Five, the study acknowledges a lack of significant disorder in the observed football matches. However, this success is only defined from the short-term perspective. There is an inconsistency in how the police approach crowd management; in many cases, the actions of police forces are far removed from the recommendations made by Enable in the 2016 report. In the long-term perspective, this lack of consistency and the failure to fully apply the CRP could result in the creation of pro-confrontational social identities among the representatives of football crowds. There are few pieces of evidence suggesting that the police forces are aware of the long-term results of their actions, questioning whether the current approach to crowd policing in Sweden is sustainable. Following an in-depth critique of the methodology employed in this chapter in Section 5.1., each of the above arguments is discussed in detail in section 5.2., when the behavioural data is

briefly presented, and in section 5.3, when it is analysed. Section 5.4. provides a more detailed summary of the results and the theoretical contribution made throughout the chapter.

5.1. Research Method

5.1.1. Sampling

As shown in the below table, the observational data included four separate sets.

Table 3 - A Summary of the Observational Data Sets

Set Number	Set Fixture and Venue	Date
1	IFK Gothenburg vs. Malmö FF (IFK vs. MFF) at the Nya Ullevi Stadium, Gothenburg	Sunday, April 1st 2017
2	BK Häcken vs. Djurgårdens IF (BKH vs. DIF) at the Bravida Arena, Gothenburg	Sunday, April 9th 2017
3	IF Elsborg vs. AIK Stockholm (IFE vs. AIK) at the Borås Arena, Borås	Monday, 10th April, 2017
4	Malmö FF vs. Djurgårdens IF (MFF vs. DIF) at the Swedbank Stadion, Malmö	Monday, 24th April 2017

All fixtures were to be played in Region West (the area around Gothenburg and Borås) and Region South (the area around Helsingborg and Malmö), areas that Enable had not focused on as much as Stockholm previously. As such, they would provide an opportunity to assess how the goal of standardising the national approach was progressing. Further justifying the choice of the above fixtures, all four of the matches have been defined as high-risk events by the local police forces; this decision was primarily driven by historical data suggesting that the supporters of the involved teams could engage in confrontations. On the one hand, the observation sample includes four key events that had a high probability of disorder occurring,

allowing the observation team to identify and record police and supporter behaviours in such situations. On the other hand, the assignment of the high-risk status to certain football matches may, in some cases, lack a formal rationale (Havelund et al., 2014; Laursen, 2017). As described by Havelund et al. (2014) and Laursen (2017), police forces typically lack valid knowledge of supporter culture and behaviours. The findings implied that certain matches could be assigned with a high-risk status without a clear justification.

The observation team was composed of several stakeholders from different backgrounds (e.g., academic researchers -myself included- and the representatives of the Supporter Liaison Officer community); the observation groups were integrated into football crowds and the responding police forces. As a result, the study follows the approach of overt participant observations. Participant observations allow for accessing the 'backstage cultures' of the analysed target populations, positively contributing to the saturation of the attained qualitative data (Kawulich, 2005; Platt, 1983). However, there also exists the risk of observation teams excessively relying on informants that are similar to the observers in terms of their perceptions of events or their demographic and cultural characteristics (Platt, 1983; Kawulich, 2005). To address this issue, three-hour workshops were conducted following each of the four football matches to jointly triangulate the accounts of different observers and eliminate observer bias.

As all four fixtures were chosen before the data collection process, the project followed the event sampling strategy (Zeren & Makosky, 1986). In the case of this study, event sampling was primarily informed by how the police perceived the risk of disorder occurring at certain fixtures. According to Zeren and Makosky (1986), event sampling allows for capturing valuable social processes occurring at significant events, justifying the usage of this strategy in the present project. Tschan et al. (2005) also strongly implied that event observations constituted a valid approach when measuring the different constituents of the social identities of the targeted populations, including their emotions and responses to external occurrences. The credibility of data attained through event sampling, however, depends on the criteria used for

fixture selection (Zeren & Makosky, 1986). As argued previously, there are no guarantees that the assignment of risk ratings to certain matches reflects the probability of disorder occurring at these events (Havelund et al., 2014; Laursen, 2017). Nonetheless, as the study is interested in social identities at specific pre-determined points in time, event sampling constitutes the only valid alternative, particularly when compared to time sampling or instantaneous sampling.

5.1.2. Data Collection and Procedure

As shown in Table 2, a total of four sets of observational data are included in the study. Similarly to this project, Stott et al. (2018) and Hoggett and Stott (2010) used observations to analyse behaviours and social identities in the context of football crowds and responses to their actions. As shown by these analyses, observations constitute a valid means of sourcing data for making conclusions about social identities regardless of the nationality of the participants and the specific fixtures chosen by the observational teams (Stott et al., 2018; Hoggett and Stott, 2010). Observations, however, lack any inherent means for ensuring their credibility. Yager (2013) attempted to solve this issue by creating a quantitative method of assigning 'weights' to observations, which were effective when analysing time-series data. Nonetheless, there do not exist any specific criteria that could be used to assign numeric 'weights' to observations of football crowds and police forces (Stott et al., 2018). The study, therefore, does not implement the approach of Yager (2013).

As described by Stott et al. (2018), the observations carried out during the Enable project followed a multi-stage approach, defined below.

- Pre-event preparations. This stage involved the procurement of preliminary data about the chosen fixtures, most notably historical information about the behaviours of police forces and football supporters at similar events. The stage was concluded with the creation of observation teams, each including approximately 15 people.

- Event. Each observation team was provided with a pre-event briefing by Clifford Stott, Jonas Havelund, and, in the case of Observation 4, the police officer serving as the point of contact in Region South. To ensure that the observations fully captured the operational footprint, each team was encouraged to disperse geographically and temporally at the discretion of the observers. These decisions were also informed by digital communications between the representatives of each team covering a particular fixture.

- Post-event. Each fixture was followed by a workshop conducted by Clifford Stott. In the majority of cases, the observation teams attending these workshops were joined by the representatives of all participant groups, including police officers and the representatives of supporter organisations.

On the one hand, the above procedure facilitates data triangulation by allowing the observation teams to freely discuss their perceptions of social identities, the behaviours of football supporters and the responses made by police forces (Stott et al., 2018). On the other hand, it may be challenging to report the results of such a multi-stage observation procedure within the format of a single report. As argued by Denzin and Lincoln (2011), using the subjective 'I' is becoming increasingly common among analyses of observations, as each member of the observation team may have a subjective voice. As detailed in the following section, the study uses thematic maps to reconcile the different subjective voices and provide a comprehensive view of how social identities were formed and changed during the various fixtures.

All research was carried out under strict ethical guidelines stipulated by Keele University[25].

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[25] Please see Appendix B for Keele University Ethics Review Panel permission documents.

5.1.3. Data Analysis

There is a lack of other empirical projects that have applied thematic maps to evaluate ESIM in the context of football crowds. This study acknowledges that the use of thematic maps deviates from the methodology of Stott, Havelund and Williams (2018), which relied on an in-text thematic analysis of observations conducted during the Enable project. Nonetheless, the present thesis also includes an analysis of interview data attained both from football supporters and the representatives of the police force. As shown in Chapter Six, this information is primarily interpreted via the means of a multi-perspective thematic analysis (Vogl et al., 2018; Levitt et al., 2018). As a result, there is a need for the analysis of the observational data to produce findings in a format consistent with the interpretation of the interview data. Thematic maps attain this objective by providing visual representations of participants' perspectives and social processes involved in the formation of social identities during the analysed fixtures. Appendix D provides a combined thematic map for all four observations and fixtures. The core themes are listed per fixture as well as per social process (e.g., 'Facilitation' or 'Risk management'). Justifying such a structure, other social studies relying on thematic maps similarly linked smaller 'codes' to larger 'themes', which, in turn, were encompassed by higher-order semantic units (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Waite et al., 2018).

While both Cormack et al. (2018) and Smith (2015) have demonstrated the suitability of thematic maps for analysing large sets of qualitative data, it should be noted that there are few formal guidelines or rules for creating accurate thematic maps representative of the observation data (Stehman & Czaplewski, 1998). As a result, the credibility of thematic maps depends entirely on the researcher, with few criteria for verifying whether the results reflect the underlying social processes (Stehman & Czaplewski, 1998). Therefore, in order to ensure credibility, steps were taken during the analysis stage which will be discussed in the next two paragraphs.

The post-event briefing conducted by Clifford Stott strongly encouraged the representatives of the observation teams and the members of the observed populations to provide their own accounts of the fixtures and their social identities (Denzin, 1989). Furthermore, all representatives of the observation teams were also asked to produce written summaries of their field notes and consult with myself in case they wanted to add more data. Additionally, these post event workshops were written up as reports which were then sent out to all participants, a form of member checking, for verification and validation of the information contained within each report (Doyle, 2007; Klinger, 2005). As a result, the final thematic maps combine several subjective accounts simultaneously, allowing for eliciting valid meanings and assigning them to the experiences of the participants and the observers (Stott & Drury, 2000).

The use of thematic maps alone to analyse large data sets lacks the means for ensuring inter-rater reliability as thematic maps involve a visual component (which is based on the researcher's subjective representations of the data). Therefore, it may be challenging to attain reliable and valid feedback. However, the reliability of in-text thematic analyses can be improved by sharing the thematic codebook with the participants or other academic researchers in the same field to attain additional feedback (Belotto, 2018). Thus, codebooks were developed and shared with Enable team colleagues during the earlier stages of the Thematic Analysis process (Roberts, Dowell & Nie, 2019) and Thematic Maps were only refined once those phases had been completed.

Following the recommendations of Braun and Clarke (2006) and Braun and Clarke (2012), the data analysis procedure follows the below stages.

Table 4 - The Key Stages in the Data Analysis Process

Stage	Description
Preliminary stage	Occurs during the post-match workshops in which the representatives of the observation teams are encouraged to create collaborative and triangulated descriptions of the attained data.
Stage one	Contemporaneous note-taking performed by the researcher and Jonas Havelund during the post-match workshops including transcribing the audio recordings of the workshops and creating event timelines[26].
Stage two	Using Nvivo to assign initial codes to the workshop transcripts and the notes created by the researcher and Jonas Havelund.
Stage three	Integrating the initial codes into higher-order themes.
Stage four	Refining the themes with reference to the principles of internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity. Presenting the themes and the coded data during the meetings with other representatives of the Enable project through in-person and digital discussions.
Stage five	Rereading all data, the assignment of codes to initial thematic maps and editing the created thematic maps.
Stage six	Writing a report outlining the findings arising from the attained data.

The term 'internal homogeneity' means ensuring that all codes within a specific theme have a joint semantic component linking them together (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In turn, 'external heterogeneity' focuses on making each theme semantically distinct (Byrne, 2021). Both of these criteria are met by initially developing codes and themes using Nvivo and allowing the representatives of the Enable project to provide feedback following stages two and three.

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[26] Please see Appendix E for an example of the timelines.

5.2. Brief Presentation of the Behavioural Data

This section briefly describes the observation data attained during the chosen fixtures. The information is provided separately for each set of observations[27]. A synthesis and an in-depth analysis of the observation data are given in Section 5.3.

5.2.1. Observation 1

For Observation 1 at the pre-match planning stage, ticket allocations, perceived fixture risk, and pre-match communication constituted the key themes arising from the observational data. The pre-match stage focuses on the police routing the supporters to the stadium and the calm and relaxed atmosphere during the supporter march. During the match stage, the 'TIFO'[28] display and overcrowding constitute the key areas of investigation. The post-match encapsulates the effectiveness of police engagement strategies resulting in crowd segregation and a lack of critical incidents.

Pre-Match Planning

The chosen fixture (IFK vs. MFF) is typically denoted as the 'mesta mästarmötet', meaning the 'clash of champions', owing to both teams' high level of sports performance and their previous achievements. In 2016, prior to the match between the same teams, a small incendiary device was thrown from the grandstands at an MFF substitute (Tobias Sana) during their warmup. This incident was later used as a rationale for the football authorities to enforce the decision that IFK had forfeited the match due to the unsportsmanlike behaviours of their supporters.

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[27] A fuller account of these Observations can be found in Appendix F
[28] "Inside stadiums fan groups would often initiate impressive and coordinated displays or Tifos, which usually involve the use of large banners, paper 'confetti' and pyrotechnics, both Smoke and Bengal flares, despite the fact that the use of pyrotechnics inside stadiums is against the law in Sweden." (Stott et al., 2016, p. 37)

Owing to its 'clash of champions' status, more than 30,000 tickets had been sold a week before the match, meaning that the Nya Ullevi stadium was close to full capacity. As the event involved a large number of away supporters (the estimated number equalled 5,000 individuals), the Event Police[29] chose to escort these supporters to the local train station following a 15-minute hold-back period. Despite this, the police expected the event to be safe; as a result, the initial operational plan only required the presence of the Event Police and the Supporter Police[30] at the supporter gathering places.

Nevertheless, the fixture was assigned by the police to the 'high risk' category of events involving crowd management. Justifying this decision, the Nya Ullevi stadium lacks the means of segregating the home and away supporters. Furthermore, the match attracted a larger number of spectators compared to other events of the same size. The supporters of both teams also assigned a high degree of significance to the fixture, meaning that the police expected the supporters to display and experience intense emotions. To follow the Conflict Reducing Principles, the police established preliminary communications with the supporters. This process was facilitated by the existence of effective relationships between the Supporter Police in Malmö and the key representatives of the Malmö supporter community.

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[29] "Event officers were designed specifically to enhance the Graded Tactical Approach by empowering proactive communication led supporter engagement. The approach was informed by the Danish 'Event Police' concept (Havelund, Ilum, Jensen, Nielsen, Rasmussen & Stott, 2010). As with DELTA units, the officers populating the Event units had good levels of cohesion and were effective at managing stressful situations since they had a history of working together in high risk environments. They were configured in much the same way as DELTAs but were given a different style of uniform and briefed to provide a more active role in engaging with fans, proactively using communication and oriented toward facilitation and dialogue rather than use of force." (Stott et al. 2016 p. 12).

[30] Supporter Police units consist of a few police officers who specialise in working with the local supporter subculture. "in the Western and Southern Regions officers in these units deploy wearing police uniform and tabards, with the words Supporter Police clearly displayed. Individual officers within these units combine within a single role the functions of criminal intelligence, surveillance, coercion, liaison and prosecution (e.g. gathering evidence, providing testimonies in court trials, pursuing stadium bans, etc.)" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 12).

Pre-Match and Match

No significant incidents occurred during the pre-match stage. While the supporters used flares and smoke bombs, such measures required no interventions from the police. The police forces present at the pre-match stage also engaged in conversations with the supporters, leading to some supporters experiencing surprise at the police choosing to remain friendly with the representatives of the crowd. Nonetheless, as some entrances at the Nya Ullevi stadium were not operational, to facilitate the segregation of home and away supporters, there existed a non-insignificant risk of overcrowding. At least one child was at risk of receiving injuries or traumas after being separated from their father; however, the crowd recognised such risks, and no supporters were injured at the pre-match stage. While 'TIFO' displays consisting of large banners and pyrotechnics are forbidden in Sweden, the home supporters were still able to establish such a display following their migration to stadium area E.

Post-Match

Following the conclusion of the match, the supporters agreed to take the pre-agreed route to the train station. A portion of the Malmö supporters exited the stadium in close proximity to a bar populated with the IFK supporters, which resulted in verbal confrontations between the two groups. The Event Police, however, reacted quickly and effectively without relying on unnecessary shows of force, preventing a critical incident. Several high-risk supporters were observed engaging in friendly conversations with the Malmö Supporter Police and the local Event Police. No other notable incidents occurred at this stage.

5.2.2. Observation 2

For Observation 2, the planning stage encapsulates a lack of prior tensions between the supporters of BKH and DIF, as well as the impacts of the recent Islamic State attack on the

crowd management strategies employed by the local police force[31]. The pre-match stage highlights that, despite the lack of segregation, no critical incidents occurred when home and away supporters were mixed at the stadium ingress. During the match, body searches created large queues, which, in turn, created additional tension. Despite this, the crowd displayed signs of effective self-regulation. No incidents occurred during the post-match stage, owing to a high level of engagement displayed by the Event Police.

Pre-Match Planning

Two days prior to the match, the 2017 Stockholm truck attack occurred. Following this tragic incident, the response of the police forces was praised by the media, the government, and the general population, which, subsequently influenced supporters' attitudes toward the police forces managing the fixture. There existed little tension between the supporters of the two teams competing in the fixture (BKH and DIF). However, owing to the recent events, the police forces still mandated certain safety-related practices, such as body searches of all supporters arriving at the Bravida Arena. Similarly to Observation 1, the Supporter Police and the Event Police constituted the two key departments assigned with the task of managing supporters' behaviours.

Pre-Match and Match

Pre-match, the representatives of the Supporter Police unit arrived at the bar, which had previously been designated as the meeting spot for the home supporters. While away

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[31] On the 7th of April, Sweden suffered a tragedy. Rakhmat Akilov, a 39-year-old asylum seeker from Uzbekistan, stole a delivery van as its driver was dropping off goods in central Stockholm. In the name of the Islamic State – he killed five and injured fourteen people when he ploughed the van into them on one of Stockholm's busiest shopping streets. The police response in this critical time could easily fill an entire book on its own, however, it will have to suffice here to say that the response was swift and decisive. Within hours the city was in lockdown and Akilov was in custody. The police were heavily praised by politicians, the media and society at large. Pictures of police vehicles covered in flowers adorned the front pages of most major newspapers the next day.

supporters came in close proximity to this location, they were ultimately rerouted by the Event Police. Certain representatives of the Evenemangs Police, subsequently, entered the location in which the away supporters were grouped, deciding that standing outside could be perceived as suspicious. Both home and away supporters openly exhibited their positive attitudes toward the police and commended their prior work in managing the consequences of the Stockholm truck attack.

While certain representatives of away supporters exhibited friendly behaviours toward home supporters, one Djurgården supporter walked through a petrol station with a lit Bengal flare. This was stopped however by a Djurgården Supporter Liaison Officer. When both sets of supporters entered the stadium, there existed no separation between the home and away supporters. Despite this, no incidents occurred when these two crowds interacted. Initially, the stadium staff conducted rigorous body searches of all individuals entering the stadium. As the queues grew, however, the searches became more lenient. The match opened with a minute of silence honouring the victims of the prior attacks.

Post-Match

The majority of the DIF supporters were able to board the designated buses and immediately leave the venue. The remainder departed to the Wieselgrensplatsen tram station escorted by the Event and Evenemangs officers. While certain behaviours of the crowd (e.g., jumping and singing) disrupted the personal spaces of other tram travellers, no critical incidents occurred during the post-match stage.

5.2.3. Observation 3

In the case of this fixture, the pre-match planning stage was characterised by how the media and the supporters perceived the same match last year, as well as the last time when AIK played

at the Borås Arena. There also existed a lack of detailed information about supporters' planned actions (e.g., marches), strongly challenging the decision-making within the local police force. Nonetheless, no significant incidents occurred during the pre-match and match stages despite the difficulties in the processing of supporters at the stadium ingress. The post-match stage is defined primarily through the lens of positive interactions between the local police and both home and away supporters.

Pre-Match Planning

Prior to the match, the local media expected the event to cause a significant amount of disorder and disruption. Contributing to this perspective, the previous time that AIK had played at the Borås arena, the resulting fixture was described as 'the chaos match' by the local media outlets. A week prior to the observed fixture, the police force chose to arrest several supporters of Gais after their usage of pyrotechnics during the Gais vs. Norrby game. However, several stakeholders (including the media and the representatives of supporter groups) argued that the police exerted excessive force in the resulting confrontation. As a result, several AIK supporters had announced that they would be wearing special bracelets at the AIK vs. Elfsborg match with "#slåinte" ("#don't hit") written on them. The supporters also did not disclose any specific plans for the fixture, making effective decision-making on the part of the police highly challenging.

Pre-Match and Match

Pre-match, home supporter groups refused to conduct a formal march to the stadium. Instead, several groups of supporters left their pre-match place of gathering and arrived at the venue on their own. To manage the away supporters, the Event Police and the Evenemangs primarily relied on their own small contingent of communication focused units with some mounted police units positioned outside the bar. The supporters displayed no anxiety when faced with

mounted units, and some of the supporters pro-actively engaged with the police, asking to take photos with their horses. Despite the presence of the Firman Boys (a dedicated hooligan group for AIK[32]), the away supporters displayed positive attitudes toward the presence of the Evenemangs and the observers from the Enable project. No critical incidents occurred during the away supporters' march to the stadium. While the ingress of away supporters into the stadium was quick and efficient, there were long queues at other entrances, as the event staff conducted thorough body searches of select individuals. According to the representatives of the observer team, the decision-making of the event staff was primarily guided by whether the arriving fans looked high-risk or low-risk.

Post-Match

While Delta Units[33] were present at the post-match stage, they were positioned to not be visible to the away supporters (the officers were still visible to the home fans). The AIK supporters used the already prepared buses to leave the venue. Interestingly, one of the AIK supporters chose to disengage from the group by shaking the hand of one of the representatives of the Delta Unit. The supporter also attempted to swap shirts with the police officer; however, this proposal was met with a refusal. Furthermore, an additional van of away supporters overtly thanked the Evenemangs for their handling of the fixture. This was caused by the Evenemangs helping these supporters before the match after their vehicle had broken down on the way to

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[32] In Sweden there are sub groups within the supporter scene who self-identify as 'hooligans'. These groups "focus less on visual and auditory displays and more on actively seeking either pre-arranged or spontaneous confrontations with other hooligan groups. Hooligan groups in Sweden are highly organised. They operate informal 'League tables' of some measure of their power, organisation and fighting prowess and, to determine their position in these 'tables', regularly organise pre-arranged confrontations in remote areas some distance away from stadiums in terms of location and time. Also hooligan groups in Sweden have collaborative affiliations to those attached to clubs in Denmark and other parts of Europe." (Stott et al. 2016 p. 13)

[33] The Special Police Tactic "is designed to achieve flexible situational adaptation through mobility via the use of small squads of [DELTA] officers moving in lightly armoured vehicles with clear chains of command. These units are trained in the use of high level force, utilise protective equipment (body armour, helmets, shields, batons, etc.) and are prepared to work in extremely dangerous and stressful situations such as riots. In the Swedish context these squads are commonly referred to by their radio call sign DELTA" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 7).

the venue. Explaining their rationale for helping the fans, one Evenemangs officer stated that their job was to highlight that the police did not aim to criminalise football crowds.

5.2.4. Observation 4

At the pre-match planning stage, the fixture was primarily characterised by a history of past incidents and violence between the supporters of different Stockholm-based teams and the fans of MFF. While the match was characterised as high-risk by the police, the crowd management strategy still prioritised following the communications-based approach reinforcing positive perceptions of the police forces. However, several actions of the police at the pre-match stage (e.g., using police vans) partially contrasted with the designated strategy. Two incidents occurred during the match at the supporter segregation lines; both were quickly managed either by the police or the supporters themselves.

Pre-Match Planning

The MFF vs. DIF fixture has typically been the cause of several incidents before the 2017 match. For instance, in 2015, away supporters aimed to patronise a local pizzeria frequented by the home supporters with an implicit objective of antagonising the supporters of MFF. Furthermore, fixtures involving teams from Malmö and Stockholm have produced several clashes between their respective supporters in the past, raising tensions prior to the 2017 match. Pre-match, both home and away supporters organised formal gatherings from which the fans were scheduled to arrive at the venue. Because of the history of the fixture, the police assigned a high-risk label to the match. While the main strategy of the police forces was still

communication-oriented, the approach also incorporated the deployment of undercover Romeo Units[34] to provide real-time information about the high-risk supporters of MFF.

Pre-Match and Match

The arrival of home supporters following the fan gathering event proceeded as planned without any additional incidents. The police officers chose to keep their distance from the fans and face away from the fan gathering places in an attempt to avoid antagonising the supporters. Nonetheless, several police vans were deployed to monitor the situation at the pre-match stage. The Supporter Police did not send any requests for such vehicles; no altercations or incidents had occurred that would merit such a decision. The Supporter Police frequently requested the vans to leave, as their presence could aggravate the home supporters. However, these requests were ultimately not met.

While several of the away supporters were lost during the bus transportation stage, their eventual arrival at the venue occurred without any clashes with the home supporters. When several supporters were unable to receive seats on the provided buses, the police gave advice on which taxi companies would be able to quickly and safely deliver the supporters to the stadium. Following the start of the match, the observer team counted at least 20 police vehicles parked in the vicinity of the venue. Such a large number of vehicles could be considered a 'show of force'; this approach was inconsistent with the pre-match plans to focus on facilitation and graded police deployment. During the match, two incidents occurred following the second MFF goal and repeated cross-line segregations. The first of these incidents was quickly managed by the Evenemangs officers in coordination with away club staff. During the second incident, however, the away supporters themselves refrained from antagonising home fans following verbal reprimands from their friends.

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[34] The Romeo police are plain clothed officers who work in small teams. Their main role within the SPT is to make tactical, quick arrests without attracting too much attention and to provide covert intelligence.

Post-Match

During the post-match phase, several of the home fans were curious about the large presence of the police force but did not consider the actions of the police officers to be excessive or antagonising. However, when the away supporters were leaving the stadium, several officers started to record the crowd to attain the video evidence of fans' behaviours. This approach was largely seen as provocative by the away fans; the officers also did not react to supporters' verbal communications. Nonetheless, this event did not result in any significant incidents.

Summary

Summarising the descriptions provided in Section 4.3., incidents could have occurred at each of the four analysed fixtures due to the history of supporter behaviours at prior fixtures or excessive police presence. While there were some inconsistencies between the behaviours of the police forces (e.g., the usage of police vans in the MFF vs. DIF match) and the CRP, the officers avoided any significant clashes between the home and away supporters at each event. Overt examples of the police helping fans were met with strong positive reactions from the representatives of the home and away crowds.

5.3. Analysing the Collected Data

This section elaborates significantly on the brief presentations of the observation data presented previously and outlines the key theoretical contributions of the study. The section is structured according to the thematic map for all observations listed in Appendix D. The map includes six core themes, four of which correspond to each individual fixture, while another two focus on facilitation and risk management. The final sub-section summarises the results of the analysis procedure and synthesises the findings across all four observations.

5.3.1. MFF vs. IFK (Observation 1)

Four sub-themes are linked to Observation 1, namely the work of the Event Police, the facilitation approach, potential conflicts, and retention at the local level.

The Work of the Event Police

At the pre-match stage, the Event Police primarily focused on establishing peaceful communications with the supporters. During the home supporter march, the representatives of the police force were seen engaging in informal dialogue with the fans. Nonetheless, the arrival of the dedicated IFK hooligan group ('The Wisemen') at the away supporter train station meant that the police chose to separate these high-risk supporters from the remainder of the away crowd. From this perspective, the police did not necessarily follow the paradigm of reactionary policing described by Drury and Reicher (1999) and Stott and Drury (2000). Specifically, no undifferentiated applications of police force had occurred during the fixture. However, the separation of the hooligan group and the remainder of the away supporters demonstrated that the police believed that the crowd was susceptible to the spread of 'risky' ideas, similarly to what was defined by Stott and Reicher (1998a).

Highlighting the theoretical contribution of the study, it could be argued that the classical 'common sense' theories of crowd policing lack explanatory power, not only when analysing the behaviours of crowds but also when applied to the behaviours of the police officers themselves (Milgram & Toch, 1969). Partially transitioning away from the 'common sense' approach, the police could avoid the applications of undifferentiated force while still holding the belief that violent minorities could 'infect' peaceful majorities with risky ideas. Post-match, when several IFK supporters began to verbally antagonise the MFF fans, the Event Police chose not to engage in any physical confrontations and, instead, used communications to defuse the situation. Subsequently, high-risk IFK fans were seen engaging in friendly conversations with

the local Event Police following the fixture. Consistent with the ESIM, the findings suggest that avoiding the imposition of confrontational social identities could be beneficial to managing crowds.

The Facilitation Approach

Throughout the fixture, the police demonstrated a notable commitment to following the facilitation approach. Nonetheless, supporter compliance played a similarly significant role in the avoidance of critical incidents throughout the fixture. In general, the ESIM has focused on explaining instances of non-compliance by highlighting the shift from individual to social identities as a result of outgroup reactions (Stott et al., 2011). Contributing to ESIM, the study suggests that crowd compliance follows a similar mechanism (Stott et al., 2001). If the heterogeneous crowd is not overtly perceived by the police as oppositional and hostile, there should exist few barriers to the attainment of supporter compliance. This was particularly signified post-match by the friendly conversations between the police officers and known high-risk supporters of IFK. While the police still followed an outdated approach to categorising fans into low- and high-risk categories, the lack of unwarranted conflict meant that no confrontational social identities were established throughout the fixture (Stott & Pearson 2006, 2007, Hopkins 2014).

The results also strongly suggest that the divide between low- and high-risk fans lacks a theoretical and practical rationale. As stated in the literature review, the current definitions of high-risk fans could, in theory, be applied to a majority of football fans (Council of Europe, 2010). Further supporting the criticisms levied by Stott and Reicher (1998b) and Stott et al. (2011), one of the possible post-match confrontations between the fans of IFF and MFF started without the overt presence of any high-risk supporters. The arrival of 'high-risk' supporters, therefore, does not guarantee that an incident will occur; the absence of these fans also does not mean that supporter interactions will always be peaceful. The ESIM, nonetheless, implies

that supporters' awareness of the divide between high- and low-risk fans could in itself be the driver of the formation of confrontational social identities (Stott and Reicher, 1998a). However, as demonstrated by the peaceful conversations between the police and the IFK supporters post-match, this is not necessarily the case.

The Potential Conflicts

The first fixture is characterised by two post-match potential conflicts arising from the following events.

1. The arrival of the MFF fans to a location in close proximity to a bar populated by the IFK supporters.

2. An incidental meeting between the MFF and IFK ultra-groups[35] after leaving the stadium.

In both cases, the police were able to quickly and non-confrontationally prevent the conflicts before they threatened public well-being. In partial contrast to the core tenets of the ESIM, it could be argued that both conflicts occurred without a direct imposition of any social identities arising from the actions of the police forces (Stott & Reicher, 1998a). On the other hand, it could also be suggested that, in both of the above cases, the supporters perceived the actions of the opposing group as illegitimate. For instance, in the first confrontation, the MFF supporters did not intend to disturb the post-match activities of the IFK fans; their arrival at the away supporter-populated bar was accidental. Despite this, the away supporters could have perceived their arrival as an illegitimate threat, resulting in an escalation of the conflict.

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[35] "One of the most visible ways of expression of the ultra's 'identity' is their use of coordinated chanting, large visual displays, banners and pyrotechnics inside and outside of stadiums. Moreover, Ultras are often central to organising, 'stewarding' and leading large fan marches to and from stadiums and have a complex relationship to violent confrontation. For example, Malmö FF has an independent supporter group called the Supras Malmö, formed in 2003 from a coalition of independent supporters and Ultras. It would be inaccurate to assume that this group actively pursues violent confrontations with opposition fans. However, at times the different Ultras within and between clubs can be openly hostile to one another and do on occasion become involved in confrontational situations" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 13).

Consistent with the ESIM, the construct of legitimacy applies not only to supporter-police interactions but also to the engagements between the home and away supporters (Stott et al., 2001). Contributing to the ESIM, the study demonstrates that even accidental threats to expressing one's identity may provoke a strong response from the representatives of football crowds. To avoid critical incidents, the avoidance of excessive police force usage should be complemented by minimising such risks to crowds' legitimacy.

Retention at the Local Level

The ESIM focuses exclusively on the formation of social identities and engagement in collective action as the outcome of continued illegitimacy and prolonged conflict between crowds and police forces (Stott & Reicher, 1998b). However, despite both of these factors being applicable to football supporters in Sweden and the 'clash of champions' in particular, the police forces chose to retain the facilitation approach, which, subsequently, resulted in the avoidance of any major incidents throughout the fixture. The ESIM does not necessarily acknowledge situations in which the individual representatives of the crowd may transition away from the imposed social identities (Stott & Reicher, 1998a). As the police had avoided the application of excessive force during the event, several supporters chose to overcome the history of perceived illegitimacy and engaged in friendly conversations and interactions with the officers. The ESIM, therefore, needs to include new provisions on how and when exactly the representatives of crowds may choose to overlook past illegitimacy.

Summarily, Observation 1 strongly implies that football supporters may choose to overlook histories of illegitimacy and display friendly attitudes toward police officers. It could be that the lack of immediate unwarranted applications of force could produce a strong positive effect on supporter compliance and avoid the formation of pro-confrontational social identities. Observation 1 also demonstrates that legitimacy constitutes a central concept for evaluating not only the actions of the police but also the responses of other crowds. The mechanics of

intergroup conflict defined by the ESIM, therefore, could apply to interactions between home and away supporters (Stott et al., 2001).

5.3.2. BKH vs. DIF (Observation 2)

As shown in the Appendix D, Observation 2 is assigned with three key themes, namely the work of the event police, the increased focus on security, and the behaviours of the stakeholders following the 2017 Stockholm terrorist attacks.

The Work of the Event Police

During previous matches between IFK (who play in the same city as BKH) and DIF, the police had observed several violent conflicts between the supporters of those teams occurring in the city of Gothenburg. Despite this, the Event Police avoided the application of excessive force and chose to comply with the CRP. Similarly to Observation 1, this decision allowed the police to establish friendly communications with the representatives of both home and away supporter groups. Consistent with the ESIM, the results suggest that if no undue imposition is made on the rights of the football supporters, there will be few incentives for the formation of confrontational social identities (Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). Football fans may also be willing to overlook the past legacy of perceived illegitimacy when faced with peaceful means of policing. Expanding on the key principles of the ESIM, the present study highlights that social identities constitute temporary constructs that can be discarded based on the behaviours of police officers.

The avoidance of excessive applications of force could have also resulted in incentivising self-regulation among the representatives of both home and away crowds. For example, when a group of DIF supporters boarded a tram to the venue, two police officers chose to accompany this group. While the behaviours of the supporters were partially confrontational and included

making loud noises and banging on the roof of the tram, the lack of a forceful response from the police meant that engagement in such actions gradually diminished. In the early works of Stott and Drury (2000) and Stott and Reicher (1998b), the ESIM was primarily applied to cases in which undifferentiated police actions caused the emergence of pro-confrontation social identities. The current research project, on the other hand, supports later work on the ESIM (Stott et al., 2007, 2008) which suggests that the avoidance of undifferentiated responses could result in the formation of non-confrontational identities, with a strong focus on self-regulation. The findings strongly imply that continued and consistent adherence to the CRP could reduce the probability of anti-police social identities forming within crowds.

The Increased Focus on Security

Following the 2017 Stockholm attacks, the police strategy incorporated a greater focus on public security. For instance, at the pre-match stage, more rigorous than normal body searches were conducted at the venue entrances. On the one hand, such actions could have been perceived as undifferentiated and excessive by the representatives of the crowds. According to the processes outlined by Drury and Reicher (2000) and Stott and Reicher (1998b), if the crowd is perceived as a homogenous threat by the authorities, the formation of pro-confrontational social identities will be considered a legitimate response. However, no critical incidents occurred during the body searches, and both home and away supporters were willing to comply with the newly established rules. The results, therefore, demonstrate that contextual factors could strongly influence the establishment of social identities and, in some cases, may disrupt the formation of pro-confrontational social identities. In the discussed fixture, the 2017 Stockholm Terror Attack and the resulting positive perceptions of the local police forces acted as two examples of such factors.

The increased focus on security could also be linked back to the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy. According to Drury and Reicher (2000) and Stott and Reicher (1998b),

illegitimacy acts as one of the key drivers influencing the creation of pro-confrontation social identities and incentivising engagement in collective action. Furthermore, a continued legacy of illegitimacy may also influence participation in collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). Nonetheless, a shift in the definitions of legitimacy and illegitimacy that occurs as a result of outside events (e.g., terrorist attacks) may also incentivise the representatives of crowds to overlook the legacy of illegitimacy and display compliance with undifferentiated police action. It is impossible to make accurate predictions of crowd behaviours and responses based purely on the basic tenets of the ESIM. Instead, such analyses have to consider how exactly legitimacy and illegitimacy are defined within a specific point in time.

Interestingly, the individual representatives of football crowds were observed praising the police for their effective work in mitigating the consequences of the 2017 attacks. These actions further contributed to the interpretation that contextual factors may strongly influence whether police responses to crowd behaviours are seen as legitimate or illegitimate. Two alternative interpretations could be proposed to link the findings of the study to the ESIM. Specifically, it could be argued that police legitimacy could aid in the formation of anti-confrontational social identities, positively contributing to supporter compliance with the employed crowd management strategies. Alternatively, it could be stated that police legitimacy prevents the creation of pro-confrontational identities and, subsequently, facilitates the expression of supporters' individual identities (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Notably, the ESIM does not clarify precisely how crowds can form social identities that encourage compliance with police actions (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b).

The Behaviours of the Stakeholders Following the 2017 Attacks

The findings of the study strongly contradict the perspective that the imposition of low- or high-risk labels on fans constitutes an effective strategy for crowd management. According to

Allport (1924), violence occurs as a result of joint efforts of the stakeholders who are predisposed toward confrontation, owing to their sociocultural characteristics (e.g., growing up in impoverished areas). From this perspective, the behaviours of crowds could be accurately predicted based exclusively on the presence of 'hooligans' or high-risk supporters. As demonstrated by the observed fixture, this is not the case. Expressing solidarity with the citizens of Stockholm and the victims of the 2017 attacks, the supporters displayed compliance with the newly established security measures (e.g., extensive body searches). In addition, both home and away supporters expressed praise toward the Event Police and frequently engaged in friendly conversations with the officers. The presence of high-risk fans and their interaction with crowds do not necessarily provoke violence or contribute to the creation of confrontational social identities.

The study acknowledges that individual actions could still pose a high risk to public health and well-being. Pre-match, one of the DIF supporters was observed traversing an open petrol station while holding a lit flare. This supporter was quickly stopped, and the flare was confiscated by a Supporter Liaison Officer. However, it remained unclear whether this individual was one of the high-risk supporters of the DIF group. It was also questionable whether the fan hoped to engage in confrontation with the police or the home supporters. In contrast to the 'classical' perspective on crowd policing, the emergence of risks threatening public safety is not necessarily linked to an individual's predisposition toward violence (Allport, 1924). The incident had occurred in close proximity to the venue; however, no other supporters chose to engage in collective action. Crowds, therefore, are not inherently predisposed toward the spread of confrontational ideas, as was implied by Allport (1924) and Le Bon (1960). The results question whether the assignment of fans into low-risk and high-risk categories can effectively mitigate the emergence of threats to safety and order.

Further contributing to the above interpretation of the observation data, home and away supporters exhibited high levels of mutual respect. For example, when a large group of the DIF

supporters exited the tram station near the venue, they were placed in close proximity to several individual supporters of the BKH. Instead of displaying animosity, one of the DIF fans greeted a young BKH supporter and provided reassurance that the DIF crowd had peaceful intentions. The classification of fans into low- and high-risk groups, arguably, reduces the probability of such positive incidents occurring at various fixtures (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). As argued by the core tenets of the ESIM, undue and undifferentiated confrontations between the police and the supporters could enforce social identities and bar fans from expressing their individual behavioural preferences. In the above example, the positive interaction between the BKH and DIF supporters was only possible owing to the police not interfering with the observed conversation.

Data from Observation 2 highlights that there are few theoretical or practical justifications for the imposition of low- or high-risk labels. When allowed to express their individual identities, both home and away supporters could exhibit high levels of mutual respect. Furthermore, regardless of their sociocultural background, the representatives of heterogenous crowds could express compliance with police actions and solidarity with the individual police officers. The data implies that fans are not inherently predisposed toward violence; additionally, the crowd does not constitute an entity that could be 'infected' by the spread of pro-confrontational ideas from the 'hooligans' (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). The 'classical' theories of the crowd, therefore, fail to represent the behaviours and identities of contemporary football fans. The usage of these theories as justifications for forceful policing may be ineffective in preventing fan-police confrontations.

5.3.3. IFE vs. AIK (Observation 3)

Appendix D shows that the analysis of Observation 3 focuses on four key themes, specifically history-based policing, the work of the Event Police, media amplification pre-match, and the excessive deployment of the police forces.

Media Amplification Pre-Match

The brief descriptions of the observation data stated that a prior match between the IFE and the AIK had been denoted as 'the chaos match'. Further contributing to pre-match amplification, the local police had been critiqued for their excessive applications of force when managing the crowds at the Norby vs. Gais match one week before the AIK vs. IFE fixture. The media amplification and the past actions of the police resulted in the representatives of the AIK supporters openly condemning police violence, as well as the decision of the Firman Boys (the AIK 'hooligan' group) to attend the match. Neither of these decisions was openly confrontational toward the police. However, the pre-match stage was still partially consistent with the ESIM (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). Due to the legacy of illegitimacy, the AIK supporters were incentivised to engage in collective action and planned to wear the '#donthit' bracelets. This message implied that, at the pre-match stage, the fans had already expected the police to display excessive force.

The findings also raise the question of whether the establishment of this preliminary social identity was caused entirely by police actions during the Norby vs. Gais match or by the media amplification of the resulting scandal. As stated by Stott et al. (2001) and Giulianotti (1994), reputation may substantially contribute to how legitimacy and illegitimacy are defined by football supporters and the local stakeholders. With the reputation of the police threatened by the Norby vs. Gais controversy, the AIK fans and the general public could have assigned a greater level of legitimacy to open anti-police sentiment. Contributing to the existing body of knowledge on the ESIM, the research project highlights that media communications could play a significant role in defining legitimacy and illegitimacy. However, as the study did not gather any primary data directly from the AIK supporters who have visited the fixture, it remains unclear whether the above interpretation is consistent with how these stakeholders justified their decision-making.

History-Based Policing

The police originally based their response strategy on the CRP, meaning that communications and relationship buildings were considered the key means of managing the home and away crowds. Nonetheless, the establishment of an effective response strategy was challenged by a lack of any formal plans disclosed by the home and away supporters. Lacking knowledge about the supporters' plans, the decision-making of the police forces was inconsistent throughout the match. Specifically, the presence of a large number of police vehicles strongly contrasted with the attempts of the Event Police to follow a dialogue-based approach to crowd management. The 'classical' theories of the crowd strongly implied that deviancy from reactionary policing was a rare occurrence in crowd policing scenarios (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). However, the present study suggests that there may exist a divide in how the different police units manage crowds' behaviours at the same fixture. It is, therefore, possible for certain officers and decision-makers to subscribe to the 'classical' theories of the crowd while their colleagues act in agreement with the CRP.

Such contrasting perceptions of the crowd raise the issue of how exactly the discrepancies between the actions of the police forces affect the formation of social identities. According to the ESIM, the undifferentiated deployment of a large number of police vehicles could be seen as unwarranted and excessive, contributing to the creation of pro-confrontation social identities and engagement in related collective action (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Turner et al., 1987). However, throughout the pre-match stage and during the fixture, several AIK supporters were seen engaging in friendly conversations with the representatives of the Event Police. Furthermore, no collective action was taken against the presence of the police vehicles. Contributing to the findings of Stott et al. (2011), the current project argues that, when faced with undifferentiated deployments of police forces, football fans may reject pro-confrontational social identities and, instead, choose to conform to their individual identities.

This unexpected result is driven by the fact that fans are able to distinguish between the individual police units and do not treat the police as one homogenous group.

The study strongly supports the critique of the term 'hooligan', which was provided by Stott and Pearson (2006) and Hopkins (2014). As shown previously, it is impossible to predict the behaviours of fans based purely on their predisposition toward violence (which, in itself, is based on arbitrary criteria, such as fans' sociocultural backgrounds). The occurrence of violent incidents also does not depend on supporter behaviours at the pre-match stage. Specifically, fans' lack of organised marches to the stadium could be seen as a direct response to the Norby vs. Gais controversy and a refusal to comply with the traditional strategies of policing at high-risk fixtures. Despite this, the fans were compliant with the actions of the Delta Unit escorts and did not engage in any confrontational collective action at the match and post-match stages. The categorisation of supporters into low- and high-risk groups, therefore, may lack any practical and theoretical rationale.

Excessive Deployment of Police Forces

The brief descriptions of the observation data suggested that the excessive deployment of police vans throughout the fixture was unnecessary and, in some cases, inconsistent with the application of the graded approach to police deployment. Consistent with the ESIM, such an approach to crowd policing could be detrimental to the quality of the long-term relationships between the police forces and the supporters (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Turner et al., 1987). Specifically, the application of undifferentiated force may contribute to the legacy of perceived illegitimacy and, subsequently, facilitate the establishment of pro-confrontation social identities at future fixtures. However, the ESIM does not fully explain why such social identities were not formed during the IFE vs. AIK fixture despite the prior Norby vs. Gais scandal and the use of excessive force during similar fixtures in the past. It could be that the

actions of the Event Police and Evenemangs (e.g., helping several supporters to travel to the venue) were crucial in preventing engagement in violent collective action.

The Work of the Event Police and Evenemangs

Throughout the fixture, the Event Police and the Evenemangs Units displayed a willingness to conform to the CRP and dialogue-based engagement with both home and away supporters. For instance, the Event Police allowed fans to choose how they wanted to arrive at the venue in the absence of any pre-agreed marches. In one case, when the supporters' chosen transport experienced a mechanical malfunction, the Evenemangs Police organised the arrival of a mechanic to help the affected fans. Post-match, these supporters openly thanked these specific officers. Consistent with the findings of Stott et al. (2011) and Drury and Reicher (2000), openly allowing supporters to express their individual identities prevented the formation of pro-confrontation social identities and reduced the probability of critical incidents occurring in police-supporter interactions. Analogously to Stott et al. (2011), the study demonstrates that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not static concepts. Legacies of illegitimacy may be partially discarded when meaningful normative and behavioural change is exhibited among the police forces. Despite the status of the previous fixture as 'the chaos match', no disorder occurred at the 2017 fixture owing in no small part to the work of the Event Police and the Evenemangs.

The findings of the study argue against the efficacy of history-based policing. The excessive deployment of the Delta Units throughout the fixture strongly contrasted with the proposed graded tactical approach and did not help to diminish fans' perceptions of police illegitimacy arising from the Norby vs. Gais incident the week prior. Despite this, no critical incidents occurred before, during, or after the match, with the fans, in general, being compliant with police requests. The analysis attributed this outcome to the actions of the Event Police and Evenemangs. It could be that, despite the existence of the legacies of illegitimacy, fans' behaviours and identities are based primarily on the immediate police behaviours and actions.

Fans also do not consider all police officers as belonging to a single 'illegitimate' crowd and are willing to express their gratitude for officers' help.

5.3.4. MFF vs. DIF (Observation 4)

The thematic map provided in Appendix D distinguishes between six key themes applicable to this fixture, namely the Evenemangs-style approach chosen by the Supporter Police, the work of the Event Police, the excessive deployment of police forces, the management of confrontations, and planning based on previous fixtures.

Planning Based on Previous Fixtures

The descriptions of the observation data suggested that the history of provocation and confrontation at prior MFF vs. DIF fixtures could be the cause of confrontations between the home and away supporters, requiring direct interventions by the police forces. Based on these events, the policing strategy was based primarily on ensuring public safety and avoiding any critical incidents in the interactions between the home and away fans. Originally, the Delta Units were only planned to be used in situations with elevated risk, demonstrating consistency with the CRP. However, the rapid and intensive deployment of police vehicles during the pre-match stage and throughout the fixture was highly inconsistent and lacked a practical justification. Similarly to what was stated by Adang and Cuvelier (2001), the use of high-profile policing was primarily based on historical data about the occurrence of violent incidents at similar fixtures in the past. Adang and Cuvelier (2001) also acknowledged that high-profile policing did not guarantee the elimination of risks to public safety; low-profile policing typically was associated with beneficial outcomes, such as the avoidance of confrontations between the police and the supporters.

Contributing to the findings of Adang and Cuvelier (2001), the study shows that high-profile policing can be detrimental to the outcomes of crowd management plans and activities. The significant deployment of police vans throughout the fixture was met with continuous requests from the Supporter Police to avoid further excessive shows of force. These requests were ultimately left unfulfilled, highlighting that there may exist division between on-the-ground officers following high-profile and low-profile approaches to policing, respectively. The works of Adang and Cuvelier (2001) or Stott (2003) presented the police as a relatively homogenous group that committed either to high-profile or low-profile policing. Observation 4, nonetheless, shows that different police units may follow different approaches to crowd management and, in some cases, disagree about their aims and methods. Despite the excessive deployment of police vans, the fixture was not characterised by any substantial confrontations between the supporters and the police. It could be that fans can acknowledge that individual police officers or units disagree with the use of high-profile policing.

Excessive Use of Police

Continuing the analysis of police deployment throughout Observation 4, the deployment of police vans had increased significantly by the kick-off time. This show of force strongly contrasted with the earlier decision to rely on graded police deployment and focus on facilitation instead of forceful policing. According to the ESIM, such actions could be seen as inciting intergroup conflict and imposing a pro-confrontational social identity upon the heterogeneous crowds (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000). However, no significant confrontations between the police and the supporters occurred throughout the fixture. While several groups of the MFF supporters chose to linger at the venue following the end of the match, they were curious about the increased police presence and quickly left following the recommendations of the Malmö Supporter Police. This example suggests that fans could reject the imposition of social identities even when encountering overt shows of excessive and, arguably, unnecessary force.

The Management of Confrontations

During the match, the two notable confrontations between the home and away supporters were quickly and effectively mitigated by the Supporter Liaisons Officers, the teams' security managers and the supporters themselves. Specifically, the first incident (which had arisen as a result of repeated cross-segregation line hostilities) was managed through the use of dialogue and hand gestures. The second incident was primarily managed via self-regulation on the part of the away supporters. However, its consequences were quickly mitigated by the Malmö Event Manager and the stewards, who effectively distanced the away supporters from the segregation line without the use of excessive force. Consistent with Adang and Cuvelier (2001), the study shows that the use of a low-profile approach to crowd management provides substantial benefits by allowing for the deescalation of conflicts. By primarily relying on dialogue, the Supporter Liaison Officers and the security managers avoided the imposition of pro-confrontational social identities onto the away supporters.

The Evenemangs-Style Approach of the Supporter Police

Throughout the fixture, the Supporter Police have exhibited an Evenemangs-style approach to crowd management and the management of critical incidents. Prior to the match, the Supporter Police engaged in extensive dialogue with the supporters and provided specific guidelines on what constituted acceptable behaviours. For instance, the Supporter Police clarified that the use of loud 'bangers' was prohibited during the supporter march; the fans fully complied with this regulation. In some cases, the police also allowed fans to avoid punishment for committing certain offences, such as public urination. The observation data strongly suggests that the categorisation of fans into high- and low-risk supporters lacks a practical justification (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott et al., 2001). Despite the presence of high-risk supporters, the fans adhered to the recommendations of the Supporter Police and quickly

adjusted their behaviours when additional requests were made by other stakeholders, such as the teams' Security Managers. Avoiding the creation of pro-confrontational social identities may, therefore, be essential to the successful policing of large-scale fixtures.

The Work of the Event and Evenemangs Police

The observation data also indicates that the work of the Event and Evenemangs Police was crucial for avoiding direct confrontations between the supporters and the police officers. For example, after the match, these two units of officers were able to quickly deescalate the deployment of the nearby Delta Officers and ensure the peaceful gathering of the 'Tifo' materials by the away supporters. In addition the Evenemangs Police had also been instrumental in resolving a critical incident pre-match, during which one bus of DIF supporters could not be located by other officers. Contributing to the ESIM, it could be argued that the work of the Event and Evenemangs Police positively contributed to fans being free to express their own individual identities (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). The avoidance of confrontation, therefore, depends on the following factors:

- Avoiding the imposition of the 'hooligan' label on the representatives of heterogeneous crowds.

- Providing valid opportunities for expressing one's individual identities (e.g., helping supporters or not inflicting punishment over minor offences).

Summarily, data from Observation 4 showcases that history-based policing produces few practical benefits. The excessive deployment of the police vans was justified by the 'scandal match' status attached to a previous MFF vs. DIF fixture and disorder before the Malmö vs Hammarby (a popular Stockholm based team) in late 2016. However, during the 2017 match, this show of force was unnecessary and could have contributed to the continuation of the legacies of illegitimacy. The evidence also highlights that communication-based approaches to crowd management may be effective in alleviating emerging conflicts. Self-regulation through

the expression of fans' individual identities could also discourage confrontations. Consistent with the previous observations, Observation 4 also indicates that the 'hooligan' label lacks predictive power.

5.3.5. Risk Management

The broad theme of risk management focuses on non-facilitation responses to crowd behaviours. The theme primarily includes nodes describing cases in which police behaviours either lacked a practical rationale or did not fully attain their planned outcomes.

Lack of Intelligence

Throughout the IFE vs. AIK fixture (Observation 3), the police have exhibited a lack of valid knowledge about the behaviours of the supporters. Despite the previous Norby vs. Gais scandal, the police have relied on excessive deployments of the Delta Police, which contrasted with the proposed graded approach to crowd management. These actions were in part justified by the police because of the presence of the well-known hooligan group which follows AIK - the Firman Boys. Nonetheless, the above discussion attributed a lack of significant confrontations at the event to the work of the Evenemangs and Event Police and the dialogue-based communications between the police and the supporters. Consistent with the above analysis, the categorisation of fans into 'hooligans' and 'non-hooligans' does not necessarily produce practical benefits (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). Instead, the establishment of dialogue-based strategies of crowd policing may be effective even during high-risk matches characterised by prior intergroup hostilities.

Policing History

Observation 3 and Observation 4 also demonstrate that the prior history of policing at past fixtures is a major source of intelligence used by the police to justify the deployment of certain units or the commitment to shows of force. While Stott et al.'s (2016) previous Enable Report did point out how risk should be seen in the context of previous fixtures' incidents influencing supporter behaviour. There was almost a complete dependence on the historical record for current fixtures' risk analysis. However, the study strongly questions the effectiveness of the police relying solely on histories in informing future policing. For instance, during Observation 3, the deployment of the Delta Police was in contrast to the growing perceived illegitimacy of police responses highlighted by the Norby vs. Gais controversy. As such, it could be argued that an over reliance on policing histories to develop new policing strategies, could contribute to the establishment of long-term illegitimacy and the imposition of pro-confrontational social identities (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott et al., 2001). However, the absence of any significant police-supporter confrontations at these fixtures also suggests that fans are able to overcome illegitimacy and engage in dialogue with the police regardless of the prior history of intergroup conflict.

Accountability

In observations 3, and 4, the police have demonstrated a lack of accountability over the unnecessary displays of force and actions that could be seen as provocative by the supporters. For example, during the MFF vs. DIF fixture, the police failed to acknowledge that the deployment of police vans was a source of tension at the event instead of acting as a mechanism for preventing critical incidents. When video officers attempted to record the crowd exiting the stadium, there were no accountability systems present encouraging the police to avoid such unnecessary confrontations. In the latter case, the lack of accountability was a source of temporary tension between the police and the away supporters. Contributing to the ESIM, the

study shows that the lack of immediate and long-term accountability could be a source of perceived illegitimacy, contributing to the emergence of momentary intergroup conflicts (Stott et al., 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998b).

Largely Ignored Terrorist Threat

This node focuses on Observation 2 and the efforts of the police to improve the security of the fixture following the 2017 Stockholm attack. While additional security measures, most notably body searches, were implemented at the venue entrances, the effectiveness of these practices remained questionable. Specifically, one of the representatives of the observation team was able to bring an unsearched bag with them to the stadium. After an additional gate was opened 20 minutes before kick-off, no body searchers were conducted at this entrance. Despite this, the actions of the police during the fixture were openly praised by both home and away supporters. The findings suggest that the increased legitimacy of police responses may encourage the representatives of heterogeneous crowds to overlook the inefficiencies in police behaviours and facilitate positive dialogue between the police and the supporters (Stott & Reicher, 1998b).

The theme of risk management suggests that the police frequently rely on inaccurate or outdated data about fans' behaviours when making decisions related to officer deployment or the implementation of the different policing strategies (e.g., the graded tactical approach). For the police, the presence of 'hooligan' groups automatically justified relying on excessive shows of force even when there was little evidence that the 'hooligans' were planning provocations or confrontations. Such ineffective deployments of limited police resources also contributed to the continuation of the legacies of illegitimacy, threatening the long-term relationships between the police and the supporters.

5.3.6. Facilitation

Appendix D demonstrates that the theme of facilitation directly opposes the theme of risk management in terms of contents and its spatial position in the thematic map. Facilitation encompasses the Evenemangs, communications with fans, fan hosting areas, and the deployment of the Event Police.

The Evenemangs

The actions of Evenemangs and the Supporter Liaisons Officers strongly imply that providing fans with opportunities for expressing their individual identities could reduce the occurrences of violent incidents at high-risk fixtures. For instance, the provision of medical and mechanical aid to the supporters has been highly effective at eliciting positive responses from the representatives of heterogeneous crowds in Observation 2. Expanding the ESIM, the findings suggest that dialogue-based facilitation and overt examples of intergroup help also inform new intergroup actions (Stott et al., 2011). Originally, the ESIM focused on intergroup conflict and identity repositioning as a result of perceived illegitimacy (Stott et al., 2011). The present study, on the other hand, demonstrates that intergroup action may also be positive depending on outgroup reactions.

Communication with Fans

The observation data strongly supports the claim that communications and dialogue-based outgroup actions reduce the chances of critical incidents occurring at football fixtures. Similarly, communications with fans could be effective in managing arising conflicts, allowing the supporters to express their individual identities and engage in self-regulation. During the MFF vs. DIF match, communications were successfully used by the Supporter Liaison Officers and the security personnel to deescalate an emerging conflict between the home and away

supporters. The findings strongly imply that crowds are not susceptible to being 'infected' by violent ideas distributed by pro-confrontational minorities, in contrast to what is stated by the 'classical' theories of the crowd (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). Both of the incidents that occurred during the MFF vs. DIF fixture were localised close to the segregation line, with the crowd in general not engaging in conflict despite several confrontations and provocations on both sides.

Fan Hosting Areas

In observations 1 and 4, dedicated fan hosting areas have also contributed to the elimination of risks and the lack of critical incidents at both of these fixtures. For example, during the MFF vs. DIF fixture, the fan hosting event was successfully used to reduce the chances of home supporters engaging in confrontations with the away supporters. This evidence suggests that there exist non-confrontational alternatives to the traditional means of crowd policing. As implied by Giulianotti (1994), allowing fans to express their individual identities could be a prerequisite for the elimination of perceived illegitimacy and conflicts between the supporters and the police. Giulianotti (1994), however, primarily focused on media amplification and fans' international reputations. Complementing the findings of Giulianotti (1994), the study argues that respect toward fans' individual identities could strongly contribute to the betterment of police-supporter relationships and address significant risks to public safety.

The Concept of the Event Police

All four observations provided data suggesting that the deployment of the Event Police positively contributed to managing emerging conflicts and reducing the probability of critical incidents occurring at the fixtures. However, the study critiques the practical considerations guiding the deployment of the Event Police. Specifically, apart from Observation 1, the Event Police have only been used to communicate with the away supporters; no deployments of the

Event Police were made to communicate with the home fans. Furthermore, Observation 3 shows that the requests made by the Event Police (e.g., asking to avoid the excessive usage of police vans) are not always honoured by the local commanders and other decision-makers. Despite the successful applications of the Event Police, the evidence suggests that the 'classical' theories of the crowd still strongly influence policing strategies and approaches in Sweden (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). As a result, there exist few opportunities for the Event Police to establish positive long-term relationships with the supporters.

In general, the theme of facilitation highlights that communications and the freedom to express supporters' individual identities both contribute toward the mitigation of emerging conflicts and the emergence of new critical incidents. The findings also imply that, in opposition to the 'classical' theories of the crowd, football fans are not 'infected' by violent ideas and events. The emergence of conflicts at football fixtures depends on intergroup action and contextual factors (e.g., media amplification) instead of fans' sociocultural backgrounds. While the work of the Event Police and the Evenemangs constitute an example of how facilitation-based approaches can be applied in practice, the deployment of the Event Police is irregular and inconsistent.

5.4. Summary of the Contribution and Conclusions

5.4.1. Contributions to the 'Classical' Theories of the Crowd and 'Hooliganism'

The findings of the study strongly critiqued the main postulates of the 'classical' theories of the crowd. According to Le Bon (1960) and Allport (1924), the anonymity provided by crowds makes the individual representatives of different groups susceptible to the spread of pro-confrontational ideas. No examples of such a process were observed throughout all four

observations. Furthermore, in cases in which the supporters were given the freedom to express their individual identities, they were able to self-regulate any emerging incidents and, in several examples, expressed open gratitude toward the police forces. As a result of the 'spread' of confrontational ideas, the 'classical' theories of the crowd suggest that all crowds are inherently predisposed to violence. Despite the high-risk status of the fixtures and prior histories of violent behaviours, all four of the observed fixtures were managed without any substantial incidents. The study attributed this outcome to the work of the Event Police, the Evenemangs and the Malmö Supporter Police, who were able to manage several emergent confrontations through dialogue. Even if there exists a history of violence between the groups of home and away supporters, there are no guarantees that excessive usage of police forces would be necessary to avoid future incidents. The 'classical' theories of the crowd, therefore, lack predictive and explanatory power.

Of particular note in the discussion of the 'classical' theories of the crowd is Observation 3, in which the prior Norby vs. Gais controversy encouraged fans to plan to wear special bracelets opposing police violence. According to the 'classical' theories, these bracelets could be seen as a pro-confrontational idea inciting non-compliance with police demands (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). Nonetheless, in the wake of the Stockholm attack the bracelets were not worn. The representatives of crowds, therefore, can follow their individual identities when given the opportunity and do not necessarily conform to the actions prescribed by their immediate peers. The study also questions the theoretical and practical validity of the concept of 'ideas of contagion' central to the 'classical' theories of the crowd (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). Throughout all four observations, incidents were confined to several small groups of supporters (or, in the case of Observation 2, to individual supporters) and did not implicate other representatives of the same crowds.

Consistent with the above critiques of the 'classical' theories of the crowd, the study also questioned the value of the construct of 'hooliganism' and the division of fans into high- and

low-risk supporters. Such theoretical and practical perspectives assume that there exist sociocultural factors (e.g., growing up in impoverished areas) that determine an individual's propensity toward violence in crowds (Dunning et al., 1998; Allport, 1924). Nonetheless, in observations 1 and 2, several 'high-risk' supporters engaged in friendly conversations with the police officers and displayed no intent for engaging in confrontational behaviours. Furthermore, the incidents that had occurred throughout all four observations were not necessarily linked to the presence of 'high-risk' fans. On the one hand, the observation data could be described as anecdotal evidence that does not necessarily prove that sociocultural factors do not predict one's propensity toward violence. On the other hand, as shown by the Norby vs. Gais scandal, excessive applications of police force with the aim of segregating and punishing 'hooligans' may risk contributing to the long-term legacy of illegitimacy and increase the risk of violent incidents occurring at future fixtures. From this perspective, adherence to the 'classical' theories of the crowd lacks both theoretical and practical rationale.

5.4.2. Contributions to the ESIM

The findings of the study were highly consistent with the ESIM (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott et al., 2011). In cases in which the police avoided the use of excessive force, supporter crowds exhibited few (if any) confrontational behaviours. Despite fans' awareness of their segregation into low-risk and high-risk groups, the supporters were willing to engage in friendly conversation with the police officers, this was particularly noticeable in all observations. Contributing to the ESIM, the study implies that fans could reject the imposed social identities and, instead, conform to their individual values and behavioural preferences. This process can occur even in situations in which there exist excessive deployments of police forces, most notably observed in fixtures 3 and 4. Alternatively, it could be argued that, similarly to pro-confrontation social identities, supporters could also establish anti-confrontation social identities and display compliance with the police requests and the security measures established by the responses. This interpretation applied to Observation 2, in which the prior

2017 Stockholm attacks had incentivised crowds to comply with rigorous body searches upon the stadium entrances.

The concept of anti-confrontational social identities has so far not been articulated to the same extent as confrontational social identities have been by the ESIM (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b; Stott et al. 2001, 2007, 2008) and constitutes a valid direction for future research. Observation 2 suggests that such identities may arise as a response to force-majeure events and contextual factors. The emergence of anti-confrontation identities may also depend on the historical and immediate perceptions of police forces. During Observation 2, the police officers were perceived as public heroes who had aided in addressing the immediate consequences of the 2017 attacks. It is unclear if there exist any other sets of circumstances in which fans could conform to pro-police identities and comply with strict security demands.

Data from observations 3 and 4 partially contrasted with the ESIM, in that even in cases in which the police relied on excessive shows of undifferentiated force, the fans did not form any pro-confrontational identities and did not engage in related collective actions (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Contributing to this unexpected outcome, the Event Police and Malmö Supporter Police were seen disputing the presence of police vans during the pre-match stage of Observation 4. This distinction between the behaviours of the Event Police and the drivers of the police vans could have improved collective perceptions of the Event Police. In both observations 3 and 4, the representatives of the Event Police were seen helping the supporters, either at the pre-match or the post-match stages, further explaining the above results. The findings strongly imply that football fans may not impose any specific identities on the representatives of the police forces and may not perceive all police officers as belonging to the same homogenous group. There exists a significant divide between the police officers who still rely on the 'classical' theories of the crowd and the supporters who acknowledge that police officers may express their individual identities.

Expanding the current body of knowledge on legitimacy and illegitimacy, the observations highlighted that media amplification could strongly influence how both of these concepts are defined by football fans. Specifically, in Observation 3, the prior controversies threatening the reputation of the police forces had incentivised the AIK supporters to openly critique police violence through the use of special bracelets. According to the ESIM and the study of Giulianotti (1994), media amplification of prior controversies and fans' reputations could affect the establishment of pro-confrontational social identities. However, no substantial conflicts between the police and the supporters emerged during the IFE vs. AIK fixture. In cases in which the Event Police offered help to the away supporters, such gestures were met with praise and gratitude.

Highly consistent with the findings of Stott et al. (2001), Stott and Pearson (2006) and Giulianotti (1994), media amplification could play a significant role in determining legitimacy and illegitimacy. Specifically, the media reporting on the Norby vs. Gais controversy significantly increased the visibility of the results of excessive policing to the general public, arguably providing football fans with new opportunities for expressing the newly established social identities. Disagreeing with Stott et al. (2001) and Giulianotti (1994), however, there were no significant supporter-police confrontations before, during, or after the fixture. It could be that media amplification of past controversies may motivate fans to avoid conflict with the police as a means of improving their intergroup legitimacy. As a result of the majority of fans not engaging in any confrontational or provocative actions targeting the police, the significant deployment of the Delta Police throughout the fixture was unnecessary and further contributed to the legacy of perceived illegitimacy. Media amplification, therefore, may distort the long-term intergroup dynamics and provide fans with an additional means of boosting their legitimacy.

The study has also critiqued the inconsistent deployment of the Event Police throughout the observations and noted that there existed cases in which the Event Police disagreed with

excessive shows of force and unnecessary reliance on police vans. Even in these scenarios (most notably, Observation 4), fans were able to reject pro-confrontational social identities and, instead, engaged in dialogue with the police officers. After the IFE vs. AIK fixture, several supporters openly praised the work of the Event Police, despite the fact that the match had seen an excessive deployment of the Delta officers before the kick-off period. While the police may follow the 'classical' theories of the crowd, fans themselves are able to distinguish between the individual identities and actions of the different units and officers (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). Transitioning away from the 'classical' theories of the crowd should, therefore, facilitate the creation of positive long-term relationships between the police and the different supporter groups.

5.4.3. Conclusions in Relation to the Enable Project

Despite the significant risks posed by all four fixtures, no critical incidents of violence occurred before, during or after the analysed matches. The study attributed this outcome to fans' self-regulation, the supporters expressing their own individual identities (instead of conforming to pro-confrontational social identities), and the work of the more facilitation focused police units (Event Police, Stockholm Evenemangs and Malmö Supporter Police). Specifically, the actions of the Event and Evenemangs Police, such as openly offering help to the away supporters, were met with praise and friendly engagement from the fans. However, not all recommendations that had originally been proposed by the Enable project have been implemented by the police decision-makers managing the fixtures (Stott et al., 2018).

Specifically, in all observations apart from Observation 1, the Event Police were only deployed to manage the away supporters. On the one hand, this decision could have been justified by the need to effectively use the limited police resources (e.g., manpower) and closely manage the high-risk supporter groups. On the other hand, the work of the Event Police produced strong immediate benefits, such as the emergence of immediate positive relationships between

the officers and the supporters. Consistent with the original recommendations made by the Enable project, a consistent national approach to the deployment of the Event Police could extend these benefits across a wide variety of supporter groups and the individual representatives of football crowds (Stott et al., 2018).

Additionally, there was no evidence suggesting that the deployment of the police forces followed the recommendation of separating the dialogue and the spotter roles in Region West for the home supporters (Stott et al., 2018). Instead, in the majority of cases, the Supporter Police were tasked with fulfilling both of these responsibilities by identifying the possible antecedents of accidents such as interactions between the home and the away supporters and immediately responding to these events by engaging in dialogue with the fans. The failure to separate the two roles meant that the Event Police and other facilitation-focused stakeholders, most notably the Supporter Liaisons officers, on occasion lacked the resources to quickly and efficiently respond to the emerging incidents. Following the original recommendations of the Enable project constitutes a valid solution for addressing this issue and ensuring the consistent application of dialogue-based facilitation.

Chapter Six: A Multi-Perspective Thematic Analysis of Joint Perceptions of the Police and Football Crowds

This chapter of the thesis follows the recommendations of Vogl et al. (2018) and Levitt et al. (2018) by using a multi-perspective thematic analysis method to establish similarities and dissimilarities in how the police perceived football crowds in Sweden and vice versa. The structure of the chapter begins with a brief discussion of the means of data collection and analysis used to elicit key semantic patterns representative of the participants' perceptions. This is followed by a multi-perspective analysis of the core concepts and themes emerging from the attained primary qualitative data. This section of the chapter compares and contrasts the perceptions of football crowds and the police to contribute to fundamental theories of human behaviour and identity, including the social identity theory and the self-categorisation theory. Finally, the concluding sub-section summarises the key findings and discusses the implications of the analysis.

Briefly summarising the discussion presented below, this chapter demonstrates that ESIM could be applied not only to crowds of football supporters but also to police officers. Both present day and fundamental studies on the topic of football riots and other collective action have, in general tended to focus on the process of identity repositioning amongst non-police groups (Stott et al., 2001; Stott et al., 2018; Reicher, 1996b). Nonetheless, the findings indicate that identity repositioning may also occur among authority groups such as the police, particularly if police officers assign strict criteria of legitimacy and illegitimacy to certain means of policing (e.g., if establishing a dialogue with football supporters is seen as an 'illegitimate' practice). The chapter also focuses on how outdated classical theories of the crowd apply to both football supporters and police officers. In contrast to other literature on this topic (Stott & Drury, 2017; Stott et al., 2011), this analysis suggests that both supporters and officers

adhere to outdated classical theories of the crowd which in turn informs the categorising of other parties in 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' terms groups.

6.1 Research Methodology

6.1.1. Sampling

To recruit police officers, I relied on the non-probability snowballing sampling strategy (Burgess, 1984; Goodman, 1961; Sedgewick, 2013; Etikan, Alkassim, & Abubakar, 2016). Whilst this approach might lack in generalisability, as snowball samples are not necessarily representative of the characteristics of the target population (e.g., the police forces managing football crowds in Sweden) (Geddes et al., 2018), the use of non-probability snowball sampling "does not prevent analytical generalizations from being developed, by discussing the consistency of a given theoretical framework with observed data" (Audemard, 2020, p. 35).

The researcher originally contacted the police officers who had participated as liaisons during the 2017 Enable Project. In Region South, the liaisons sent emails to prospective candidates, which were, subsequently, followed by formal invitations to participate in the study sent by the researcher[36]. In Region West, the liaison was tasked with creating a list of prospective interviewees who would be available to participate in subsequent face-to-face interviews. Following the researcher's arrival in Gothenburg in June, the initial list was expanded. According to Ronkainen and Wiltshire (2021), qualitative research in the context of sports psychology needs to account for the complexity of context (e.g., participants' characteristics) to be considered valid. To address this requirement, the study relied on the following sample inclusion criteria when recruiting police officers.

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[36] Please see Appendices G and H for a copy of the Consent Form and Information Sheet which was sent out at this stage.

Table 5 - Sample Inclusion Criteria (Police Officers)

Area	Criterion
Job experience	At least five years of experience in policing in general.
Experience in managing football crowds	At least three years of regularly policing football crowds.
Role as a police officer	Priority on officers who performed specialist roles in crowd policing (e.g., Event Police).

In total, 20 police officers were recruited using the above strategies and criteria.

Similarly to the outlined approach, the non-probability snowball sampling strategy was used to recruit participants among the Swedish football supporters. When visiting the matches of Malmö FF in Sweden and Turkey, the researcher personally met with other football supporters who had originally been part of the observations conducted in 2017. The researcher personally provided these candidates with an informal invitation to participate in the study, as well as a request to inform their peers of the planned qualitative interviews. Additionally, similar informal invitations were distributed by the Malmö Supporterhuset and MFF Support (the official supporter club). The above strategy threatened the confirmability of the findings, as the researcher did not distance themself from the participants and was a part of the same social groups and organisations supporting Malmö FF (Johnson & Rasulova, 2017; DeVaney et al., 2018). Nonetheless, Johnson and Rasulova (2017, 268) argued that "confirmability is achieved when the interpretation of data is neutral". As shown in Section 6.1.3., the study relies on the framework of multi-perspective thematic analysis to address threats to confirmability. The following table summarises the inclusion criteria for the participants recruited among regular football supporters.

Table 6 - Sample Inclusion Criteria (Football Supporters)

Area	Criterion
Regularity of match attendance	Attending at least twenty matches per football season within the past three years.
Participants' self-identification	Self-identifying as a current 'active supporter' of Malmö FF.

The final research sample of football supporters included 11 individuals.

6.1.2. Data Collection and Procedure

The present study relies on qualitative interviews with police officers and football supporters. As stated by Smith and Sparkes (2016, p. 108), interviews are "an effective way for people to describe their experiences in rich and detailed ways" in the context of research on sports and behaviours related to sports (Killick & Griffiths, 2021). Nonetheless, it has been argued that interviews gather language data which, in itself, is not representative of any deeply rooted psychological constructs or meanings (Smith & Sparkes, 2016). As a result, interview data needs to be paired with compatible thematic analysis frameworks to be considered representative of psychological concepts. The multi-perspective thematic analysis framework addressing the above issue is defined in Section 6.1.3.

To gather data from police officers, 20 face-to-face interviews were conducted with the recruited representatives of the sample. Preliminary interview schedules were distributed among the Enable Project liaisons and, subsequently, modified in accordance with their feedback[37]. During the process of data collection, one police officer had to cease their

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[37] Please see Appendices I and J for a copy of the Interview Questions for Police and Supporters.

participation due to their involvement in an urgent police case; this interviewee was substituted by a volunteer among other police officers who fit the inclusion criteria.

The interviews were conducted in officers' offices, their patrol vehicles, and unoccupied rooms at the regional police stations. Interviews were recorded on the researchers' smartphone; the participants were aware of this procedure. The interview data was, subsequently, transcribed manually with minimal editing. For example, the transcripts clarify the usage of certain Swedish terms and constructs (e.g., 'graderat' is explained as the Graded Tactical Approach used by the Swedish police). A similar procedure was followed when gathering data from the 11 recruited football supporters. Nonetheless, some participants experienced discomfort with discussing sensitive topics (e.g., violent behaviours of football supporters) in specific areas, including bars, supporter clubs, or cafes. In such cases, the researcher offered alternate locations for the face-to-face interviews, such as countryside cafes or late-night takeaway restaurants.

Partially replicating the research instruments of Drury et al. (2003) and Stott and Reicher (1998), the interview questions were grouped into distinct sections. For police officers, these sections included questions about the participants' career history, the Special Police Tactics (SPT), the role of the interviewee within the SPT, the equipment and tactics used for crowd control, perceptions of football crowds, and the general perceptions of football supporters. For the football supporters, the questions focused on their personal history as a supporter, supporter groups and identity, past interactions with police forces, match attendance history, and the participants' future plans as a supporter. Justifying the above approach, Smith and Sparkes (2016) implied that grouping interview questions in semantically distinct categories allowed participants to focus on one specific concept or construct at a time, improving the degree to which qualitative data was rich with information.

All research was carried out under strict ethical guidelines stipulated by Keele University[38].

6.1.3. Data Analysis

The study uses the multi-perspective thematic analysis method, similar to that which was outlined by Vogl et al. (2018) and Levitt et al. (2018), to identify similarities and dissimilarities in how police officers and football supporters perceived each other's behaviours and crowd psychology. As argued by Vaismoradi and Snelgrove (2019) and Belotto (2018), compared to other means of analysing qualitative data (e.g., automatic content analysis), thematic analysis is interpretative and analytical. Justifying its usage, this approach involves eliciting deeply rooted meanings based on semantic themes instead of "easy-achieved categorisations" (Vaismoradi & Snelgrove, 2019, 4). Thematic analysis, nonetheless, lacks any effective means of addressing threats to inter-rater reliability, such as researcher bias (Brough, 2018). As a result, scholars with a socio-cultural background different to the author of the thesis (e.g., scholars who have not visited football matches themselves) may have produced different themes and different thematic structure based on the qualitative data attained from police officers and football supporters in Sweden.

Meeting the qualitative reporting standards defined by Levitt et al. (2018), the following figure outlines the thematic structure of the attained multi-perspective thematic analysis framework. Following the recommendations of Vogl et al. (2018) and Kassavou et al. (2015), the structure is separated into three levels, namely comparisons on an individual unit level, comparisons on a relational unit level (within the populations of police officers and football supporters), and comparisons between relational units (between the populations of police officers and football supporters).

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[38] Please see Appendix B for Keele University Ethics Review Panel permission documents.

Data analysis followed the below procedure:

1. Relistening to the interview transcripts with Jonas Havelund.

2. Inputting the transcripts into Nvivo and forming an initial list of ideas significant to each participants' experiences (codes).

3. Collating the codes for each individual unit into themes.

4. Deleting themes that did not form a coherent pattern.

5. Assigning themes to individual units of analysis (e.g., phrases) at the relational unit level (see Figure 8).

6. Conducting a thematic comparison between relational units.

Figure 7 - The Multi-Perspective Thematic Analysis Framework

The comparison of relational units involves three core themes, each of which is separated into two sub-themes. As acknowledged above, such a structure of multi-perspective thematic analysis does not guarantee inter-rater reliability; nonetheless, Muldoon et al. (2019) noted that "calculations of inter-rater reliability have been shown to be unsuited and of little value"

to qualitative studies based on a theoretical position. The reliance of the study on a transparent coding scheme defined above should at least partially address the outlined limitation.

The results of the thematic analysis are presented similarly to the works of Stevenson et al. (2019) and Muldoon et al. (2019). Each theme is supported by an excerpt from the interview transcripts, followed by defining the theme, explaining convergences and dissimilarities in different accounts, and linkages to fundamental theories of crowd psychology.

6.1. Football Supporters' and Police Officers' Mutual Perceptions of Social Norms and Groups

This theme focuses on how police officers construe crowd behaviours, choose their rationale for responding to these behaviours, and how supporters react to such decisions.

Football supporters' reactions to police presence and possible separation into minorities and majorities

"I believe a small group of the supporters are not there for the football. They just want some kind of colour to fight them...They're not there for the game. They're in a fight" (Interviewee 6-Police Officer)

Police construed football crowds as dichotomous entities that could be, in general, separated into minorities and majorities. In this case, the term 'majority' referred to heterogeneous groups of supporters, the behaviours of which remained within the confines of the law and did not usually require significant interventions.

0002: A big crowd is coming, and in this one maybe like 90% is normal people. But, then you have to spot out the 10% that's not.

0006: I'm a big football supporter and I want that the good football supporters are like are able to go [to] a good football game. So it's very important to differentiate. And you have to see they are good people. They just want to look at football. There are bad people, [but] you can't take everyone and say football supporters is like assholes because it's very, very small.

The term 'minority' denoted football supporters who used football matches as a platform to engage in violent or other illegal behaviours. Policing 'minority' groups required forceful intervention, such as making arrests. According to the police, supporters from both groups reacted to how the police officers chose to manage 'minorities' and 'majorities'. If police officers remained civil in their interactions with the 'majority', 'minorities' lacked an explicit rationale for engaging in violent behaviours (e.g., assaulting police officers). Alternatively, 'minorities' reacted with violence to instances in which, in their opinion, the police used excessive force when dealing with 'majorities', and vice versa.

When discussing the rationale for such a classification, the interviewed police officers argued that the representatives of 'minority' groups engaged in antisocial behaviours owing to their individual characteristics (e.g., a lack of emotional intelligence or a lack of control over tensions experienced during football matches). As a result, the representatives of 'minority' groups presented a constant threat to public well-being, which had to be addressed by police officers.

0006: I believe a small group of the supporters are not there for the football. They just want some kind of colour to fight them - in my way to look at it - just my way. Like every gang, they want the colour and fight for it. They don't know anything about football. They don't care. You know if they are making trouble for the football club is

that they don't care. And they are not. No I don't like them. They're like criminals at football game or every, yeah it can be ice hockey or something like that. But football is a big problem! They're not there for the game. They're in a fight.

The participants omitted that such perceptions of crowds could contribute to identity repositioning among this minority of football supporters. According to the ESIM, identity repositioning occurred when the members of heterogeneous crowds expressed solidarity with groups that were seen as illegitimately oppressed by the police (Stott et al., 2018). Instead of protecting 'majorities', the actions of police officers, therefore, could have facilitated the creation of collective identities uniting different football supporters and increasing the probability of collective action. Although some interviewees were aware of this phenomenon, none of the officers discussed possible alternatives to their current perceptions of crowds. Still, the data analysis demonstrated that the police officers who participated in this study viewed the minority as being distinctly different from the majority and, hence, football supporters.

0002: I would say that a hooligan is not a real supporter, because they're so wrong. So that's not a supporter, that's just an idiot. The way they behave. Of course now I'm talking about the extreme ones that are there to fight and that's luckily not so many, normally.

The interviews with football supporters strongly supported the above interpretation by highlighting that these participants rejected the rigid 'majority-minority' classification imposed on crowds by police officers. Although the football supporters did not overtly reference the dichotomy between 'minorities' and 'majorities', these participants commented that "they [the police] have no research about what a supporter is" (Interviewee 16- Football Supporter). The football supporters, therefore, implicitly disagreed with any types of classifications of football crowds that could be construed by the police. Other interviewees referenced the fact that there existed a significant amount of camaraderie not only between the

supporters of the same team but also between the entirety of the football crowd attending a particular match at a time when police behaviour was seen as overtly illegitimate. Such statements similarly disagreed with how the police divided crowds into 'majorities' and 'minorities'. For football supporters, although they do see different sets of supporter groups as distinctly different (eg. hooligans, ultras, tifo groups etc) the static dichotomy between a good majority and a bad minority did not exist; subsequently, police responses that were based on the 'minority-majority' classification (e.g., only arresting 'minorities') were perceived as illegitimate. As a result, football supporters reacted negatively to overt police presence. The interviewed police officers failed to acknowledge such reactions to their perceptions of football crowds.

To highlight the contribution of these findings to theory, the analysis refers back to the classical theories of the crowd outlined by Allport (1924) and Le Bon (1960). Allport (1924), in particular, specifically referenced the dichotomy between 'minorities' and 'majorities', leading the police to believe that 'minorities' were inherently confrontational. The literature review argued that such an approach lacked explanatory power (cf. Reicher, 1984). Despite the fact that the classical theories of the crowd could be considered outdated, the interviewed police officers employed this approach to categorising football supporters into two distinct groups; this classification was rejected by football supporters themselves. Reicher's (1984, 1996b) Social Identity Model explained that the representatives of crowds did not lose control of their behaviours but, instead, shifted to crowd-specific norms and values. Nonetheless, this theory did not fully evaluate how exactly police officers' adherence to outdated theories of the crowd could provoke the process of identity repositioning among both the police and the heterogeneous crowds of football supporters.

The study validated previous work which had addressed this fundamental theoretical gap (cf. Stott et al., 2001) by implying that the conflict between how police officers and football supporters perceived crowds was a contributing factor to determining crowd behaviours. If

police officers acted in accordance with outdated theories of the crowd and specifically targeted what they perceived as 'minority' groups, previously peaceful football supporters could be motivated to express solidarity with other members of the crowd and express overt resistance to police forces as a means of protecting 'minority' groups. Football supporters' rejection of outdated classifications of crowds, therefore, could have been a motivator for turning to violent behaviours. Supporting Reicher's (1996b) perspective, police actions designed to minimise violence could, instead, serve as a cause for the escalation of crowd behaviours.

The results were highly consistent with the ESIM, in that police actions and perceptions of crowds significantly contributed to the process of identity repositioning (Stott & Drury 2017; Stott et al., 2001). In some cases, football supporters were willing to reject their identities as supporters of a particular football team; instead, supporters were motivated to express solidarity with supporters of the opposing team. The ESIM, nonetheless, suggested that identity repositioning occurred as a result of immediate or enduring outgroup conflicts. The findings here and subsequently, complemented this argument by highlighting that identity repositioning was also facilitated by mutual outgroup perceptions. If police categorised football crowds into dichotomous groups, such as 'minorities' and 'majorities', the crowds could respond by forming group identities deliberately conflicting with such categorisations. For example, football supporters that had previously not expressed any negative sentiment toward the police may have engaged in antisocial or violent behaviours. Contributing to the ESIM, the thesis validates the idea that identity repositioning is at least partially dependent on the degree to which crowds are knowledgeable of how responders categorise heterogeneous crowds into homogenous groups.

When explaining the rationale for why authorities followed outdated classical theories of the crowd, Stott and Drury (2017) suggested that such reasoning was inherently political and represented an implied conflict between the ruling elites and the crowd. The findings only partially supported this theory. On the one hand, the interviewed police officers implied that

establishing a dialogue with certain football supporters was futile; only reactionary and forceful policing was effective in minimising risks to public safety. On the other hand, the participants did not necessarily consider themselves as enforcers for or the representatives of the ruling elite but rather saw themselves as the guardians of democracy. Instead, their adoption of the classical theories of the crowd was motivated by a lack of knowledge of football supporters' characteristics, interests, and behaviours. The thesis suggests that the continued usage of the outdated theories of the crowd may not be inherently political. Instead, such theories could be considered as the 'default' option to which responders may resort when lacking knowledge of crowd motivations and behaviours.

Dissimilarities in the Perceptions of the Conflict Reducing Principles (CRP)

"Without them [the Malmö Supporter Police] I think it would be horrible…I think they do more than any other police. Just in Malmö I think they have been such a huge help" (Interviewee 21 – Football Supporter)

The disagreements between the police and football supporters also extended to how these two groups of participants perceived the implementation and the effectiveness of the CRP. The interviewed football supporters exhibited strong positive perceptions of the representatives of the Malmö Supporter Police (a unit which at the time of interview operated in line with the CRP).

> 0016: I think the groups have a very good contact with them and I think it's very good to have a great contact with the supporter police.
> **Interviewer: Why?**
> 0016: If they need help or something – they are always there!

According to the participants, these officers were frequently successful in deescalating conflicts not only between the police and football supporters but also "even with their own colleagues" (Interviewee 21 – Football Supporter).

> 0021: Without [the police] I think it would be horrible. I would not like that. I think they do more than any other police. Just in Malmö I think they have been such a huge help. I don't think it works as well in different cities. But in Malmö I think they're very important.

The supporter interviewees linked such positive outcomes to two factors, namely the fact that the Supporter Police were recognisable and trustworthy, and the high degree of knowledge possessed by the Supporter Police about football supporters, their preferences, and behaviours. However, football supporters did not extend such positive perceptions to regular police officers. In fact, the supporter interviewees rarely acknowledged that the Supporter Police and other officers were employed by the same public institution and were tasked to fulfil similar roles.

According to the supporter participants, attitudes toward the CRP and the use of CRP when policing crowds determined whether police officers were trustworthy, worthy of supporters' respect, and legitimate. If an officer was willing to consistently follow the CRP by engaging in regular dialogue with the supporters, those supporters were willing to display respectful behaviours when communicating with such police workers. In contrast, the officers who ignored the CRP were seen as inherently illegitimate and oppressive. The interviewees did not discuss instances in which perceptions of the CRP and police officers, in general, were influenced by other factors, such as class conflicts.

> 0023: The two supporter police who works very closely- they know how people are- but if you ask 98% of them they will probably see you like a criminal who just makes

chaos and stuff like that. Cos they don't know what you do in life or your background or stuff like that - they just care about one thing. They're just very pumped up like the third hooligan firm. Not everyone, but the majority of them.

In contrast, regular police officers were described as exhibiting negative perceptions of the implementation of the CRP. Interviewee 14 (Police Officer), for example, noted that the CRP was considered "almost a swear word" amongst their colleagues.

> 0014: Among the normal Delta I don't think they discuss it too much. To mention the Conflict Reducing Principles is almost a swear word. So if I would come to a normal Delta and say 'Hello, today we will work specifically with our Conflict Reducing Principles', they would say 'Ah come on! Give me a break!'!

Other police officers noted disagreement amongst their colleagues with the aims of the CRP; according to one participant, it was considered "very strange to make something easier for a crowd" (Interviewee 8 – Police Officer). Police officers, therefore, perceived the CRP as an ineffective public relations strategy that failed to address the threat posed by football supporters in 'yellow' or 'red' situations[39]. Few of the interviewed police officers commented on how positively the CRP were perceived by football supporters. For the most part, the participants failed to recognise that football supporters acknowledged that the Supporter Police were successful in deescalating conflict. More than half of the Police interviewees either refused or were unable to recite the CRP from memory, further illustrating the low degree of significance assigned to this framework by the regular police officers.

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[39] The SPT categorises crowd situations into three types using a traffic light style of categorisation. Green being a peaceful situation, yellow/amber being a situation in which trouble appears to be afoot and red for when there is a riot.

The study refers back to the ESIM to illustrate the theoretical contributions of the study. The CRP aims to avoid collective action by preventing the undifferentiated oppression of groups within crowds and minimising the probability of identity repositioning (Stott & Drury 2017; Stott et al., 2001). The ESIM based process of identity repositioning, however, only defines the behaviours of the representatives of crowds who would otherwise not engage in antisocial and violent behaviours. Such a point of view acknowledges, but does not seek to emphasise, that there may exist representatives of the crowd for whom the intensity of the class conflict means that police presence in itself is seen as inherently illegitimate, creating a significant risk to public well-being (Stott et al., 2018). On the one hand, the study demonstrates that, consistent with the ESIM, going beyond the 'hooligan' perspective can be highly beneficial to managing collective action in the context of football crowds. If football supporters feel that police officers are knowledgeable and respectful of supporters' characteristics and behaviours, the crowds of football supporters will be less likely to resort to violent collective action.

On the other hand, the findings indicated that the ESIM should be extended to accurately reflect the perceptions of police officers and the rationale for the choice of certain means of crowd policing (e.g., making arrests) (Stott et al., 2018). In 'yellow' and 'red' situations, police officers considered that conducting peaceful negotiations with football crowds was risky; as a result, the implementation of the CRP was seen as ineffective in such cases. Subsequently, some police officers were reluctant to implement the CRP which were congruent with the core postulates of the ESIM. The ESIM suggests that collective action strongly depends on authorities' behaviours; however, this claim omits that police actions themselves are not necessarily driven by the decisions of individual police officers and commanders. The above interview excerpts characterised the widespread negative perceptions of the CRP and liaison-based interventions among the Swedish police. There existed a system of social identities in which conformity to the CRP was perceived as "strange" or illegitimate. The thesis, therefore, implies that such social identities became salient in 'yellow' or 'red' situations among police officers.

To elaborate, the thesis raised the question of whether the term 'identity repositioning' could refer not only to crowds but also police. When discussing instances of other officers following the CRP and engaging in dialogue with football supporters, the interviewed police officers argued that such behaviours strongly deviated from the definition of legitimacy accepted within the police force. Rejection of the CRP was perceived as an acceptable behaviour within the police force.

> 0009: Yeah um maybe sometimes like supporters who like make crimes and so on maybe we could be a little bit more what do you call it in English 'grund sätta' [setting ground rules/ laying down the law]?
>
> **Interviewer: A little bit stricter with them maybe?**
>
> 0009: Yeah maybe, sometimes to also show the other that this behaviour is correct and that behaviour is not ok...

While acceptance of these principles was referred to almost as a corruption of the traditional police role and values. The findings implied that police officers could adjust their social identities based on their colleagues' expectations and the general sense of solidarity with other groups. Nonetheless, such a process was not explicitly discussed in any of the interviews with the Swedish police.

Highlighting the limitations of the ESIM, the thesis also demonstrates a parallel in how the police perceived crowds and how football supporters perceived police officers. Previously, the analysis of findings stated that police officers adopted outdated theories of crowd behaviour of Allport (1924) and Le Bon (1960) by categorising heterogeneous crowds into rigid 'minority' and 'majority' groups. However, football supporters followed a similar approach by assigning police officers into mutually exclusive groups. Regular police workers were frequently

perceived as illegitimate and oppressive, while police officers who followed the CRP were seen as legitimate facilitators of dialogue between the police and the crowd.

> 0022: You can have those different police. Some police can have - its people that you can have a dialogue with and some police can be those ones who just wave their batons

The ESIM did not clarify how exactly identity repositioning occurred if both crowds and police tended to categorise others into dichotomous groups (Stott & Drury 2017; Stott et al., 2001). The thesis addresses this theoretical gap by suggesting that such categorisations facilitate identity repositioning among football supporters. When encountering police officers who could have belonged to the 'illegitimate' group, football supporters exhibited high degrees of camaraderie and solidarity with other representatives of the crowd. Identity repositioning, therefore, depends not only on reactions to responders' actions but also on deeply rooted perceptions of responders.

Continuing the discussion started by Stott et al. (2018), the thesis expands on the definition of risk typically facing officers when policing crowds of football supporters. In their original work, Stott et al. (2018) noted that the concept of risk should have encompassed not only the presence of 'high risk' football supporters but also reputational damage and the loss of public trust as a result of excessive use of force when policing. However, such findings omitted that police officers' perceptions of risk went beyond the presence of 'high risk' individuals; instead, these workers construed risk as the degree to which the continued escalation of crowds' antisocial behaviours could threaten public well-being. According to these interviewees, only policing 'high risk' supporters could be ineffective in 'yellow' or 'red' situations. When evaluating liaison-based means of policing, the participants implied that crowds could engage in violent and antisocial behaviours in the absence of forceful policing. Risk, therefore, could

be defined as a perception of the police force as weak and ineffective, which officers feared enabled violent supporters to escalate antisocial behaviours in a crowd.

6.2. Perceptions of Police Legitimacy and Illegitimacy

This theme encapsulates patterns in how police officers and football supporters construe police legitimacy and illegitimacy.

Ingroup perceptions of legitimacy and illegitimacy vs. outgroup perceptions

"The third person, not the hooligans, the major crowd - normal crowd is going to come to the stadium and watch the game and leave and live happily ever after. You know - without a disturbance from the hooligans…we are going to be the fence that separates them" (Interviewee 2 – Police Officer)

As shown in the above quote, the police consider their presence at football matches and subsequent efforts to manage violent crowd behaviours as inherently legitimate. According to the police interviewees, crowd policing fulfils the function of protecting "normal" football supporters from the representatives of the 'minority' groups.

> 0002: you know a supporter is just a normal guy or girl, woman watching and likes, enjoying, and following their team. And then you have those hooligan kind of guys that I really don't get.

In turn, such perceptions mean that legitimacy is measured as the degree to which 'minorities' are able to influence the behaviours of 'majorities'. However, legitimate policing of 'minorities' did not necessarily involve using force; the interviewees, instead, focused on establishing initial

communications, gathering intelligence, offering help to 'majority' groups, and establishing surveillance over the high-risk football supporters.

> 0001: It's seeking out the troublemakers and sticking close to them. And early on starting the communication, at least from our side. Try to get a dialogue going and try to get our message out. And also of course intelligence gathering is very important. Try to get a feel for what their agenda is.

Assigning inherent legitimacy to police action also meant that any deviation from such a cognitive paradigm was seen as "friend corruption. That you become friends with the security guys in the clubs" (Interviewee 30). Legitimacy, therefore, was construed not only as a justification of police action but also as a function of assigning oneself to a narrowly-defined group of public workers. The interviewed police officers failed to acknowledge that football supporters differed in their perceptions of legitimacy, leading to significant differences in how police officers and football supporters perceived the use of police force and the general strategies of policing (e.g., establishing surveillance).

In contrast, football supporters assigned legitimacy on the basis of trust, mutual respect, and length of service in the Supporter Police role. Interviewee 26 (Football Supporter) also noted that "the Supporter Police in Malmö have trust from the club...the only thing they lack is trust from the rest of the police!", highlighting that football supporters were aware of the concept of 'friend corruption' that was referenced by the interviewed police officers. Football supporters avoided assigning inherent legitimacy to police officers and crowd policing; instead, legitimacy was earned through displaying support of legal club activities and supporting the interests of supporters over the interests of other police officers. Illegitimacy, subsequently, was construed as a long-term legacy of excessive use of force by police officers and the perceived rejection of the CRP by regular police officers. Owing to past incidents of excessive use of force, the CRP

and other means of improving police legitimacy were seen as a public relations exercises that did not necessarily improve relations between the police and supporters.

> 0021: And they were really aggressive. And they didn't really read the situation well because there was a lot of young girls and children and regular supporters who have never been in a situation like that and they just went berserk. A girl went to the ground she was pushed with the neck grip from behind…

When defining the ESIM, Stott et al. (2011) noted that the repositioning of social identities and new forms of collective action occurred as responses to observed police actions. In turn, histories of illegitimate or oppressive responder actions created an enduring outgroup conflict which, subsequently, also contributed to the process of identity repositioning. (Stott et al., 2018). Supporting this point of view, the repositioning of social identities among the supporter interviewees frequently occurred gradually as a result of exposure to police actions that were not necessarily observed by the specific representatives of crowds.

> 0020: People who go to a lot of games and they talk to each other and exchange their experiences from the police and they have their own experiences as well. If that's your only time you encounter the police or have anything to do with them you get a picture of what they are like.

In other word, the sharing of information about cases of excessive use of police force facilitated the process of identity repositioning among other members of heterogeneous crowds. For example, some interviewees reported hearing that football supporters exposed to excessive uses of police force exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.

The ESIM implied that the participants of outgroup conflicts experienced identity repositioning as a result of such enduring outgroup conflicts (Stott et al., 2011; Stott et al.,

2018). Nonetheless, the theory omitted any definitions of how exactly the representatives of crowds may construe such histories of oppression. The thesis addresses said research gap by referring to the concept of the legacy of illegitimacy. The term 'legacy of illegitimacy' refers to long-term enduring outgroup conflict in which accounts of police brutality and excessive uses of force are extrapolated to the entirety of the police force (apart from the Malmö Supporter Police and similar units). While football supporters were aware of how police officers defined legitimacy, these participants noted that real-life crowd policing failed to ensure the safety of the representatives of the crowd and the fairness of outgroup relationships. As a result, football supporters felt justified in rejecting the definition of legitimacy followed by the police. Enduring outgroup conflicts were based on mutual rejections of how each group defined legitimacy, which, subsequently, facilitated identity repositioning. The thesis therefore suggests that eliminating legacies of illegitimacy may be a valid solution for reducing the effects of enduring conflicts on collective action. However, neither of the interviewed groups expressed a desire to accept each other's definitions of legitimacy.

Consistent with the ESIM, football supporters experienced a gradual repositioning of social identity, in that their trust toward the police decreased, while their solidarity with other football supporters (and the probability of engaging in collective action) improved.

> 0015: The trust for the police here around our supporters now is really, really low now...and they ruin for all the good police officers!

The thesis acknowledges that Williams et al. (1989) defined a similar case in which long-term intergroup interactions motivated identity repositioning. Nonetheless, so far, the discussion has focused on how football supporters reacted to the legacy of illegitimacy associated with the police force. The interviews with the police officers, however, implied that this term was also applicable to football supporters. When discussing their rationale for applying force during crowd policing, the participants alluded to previous 'yellow' or 'red' situations in which football

192

supporters significantly threatened public well-being. In turn, such events contributed to police officers' perceptions of supporters' unwillingness to conform to the established behavioural standards, reinforcing the officers' attitudes toward their own legitimacy and illegitimacy. The thesis, therefore, suggests that legacies of illegitimacy are construed by both groups participating in enduring outgroup conflicts.

To summarise the above arguments, the repositioning of social identities occurs not only as a result of direct exposure to police actions but also from indirect exposure to the legacy of illegitimacy, contributing to the studies of Stott et al. (2011) and Stott et al. (2018). The above findings also critique the current approach to defining 'risk' supporters in the UK and Europe, as outlined by Hopkins (2014) and James and Pearson (2015). According to this definition, 'risk' supporters exhibit a high propensity to engage in illegal or antisocial collective behaviours in connection to football events. From this perspective, the gradual identity repositioning experienced by the participants of the study may place the majority of the representatives of football supporter clubs into the 'risk' supporters category (Hopkins, 2014; James & Pearson, 2015). The above definition fails to acknowledge that the increase in the probability of a supporter engaging in illegal or antisocial collective behaviours may be caused by the legacy of illegitimacy associated with the excessive use of force by the police. The strict distinction between 'risk' and 'non-risk' supporters omits the gradual process of identity repositioning outlined above.

The effects of legitimacy and illegitimacy on crowd behaviours and perceptions of the police

"...they [the police] will probably see you like a criminal who just makes chaos and stuff like that. Cos they don't know what you do in life or your background or stuff like that - they just care about one thing" (Interviewee 23 – Football Supporter)

The interviewed football supporters strongly implied that police behaviours which were perceived as illegitimate gradually contributed to a loss of trust in the police and experiencing feelings of resentment toward the police officers.

> 0024A: You hear stories of the police taking people out into the woods and beating them almost to death. That's why nobody in our neighborhood trusts those fuckers.

According to the participants, the majority of the police forces tasked with crowd policing failed to use appropriate means of crowd policing (e.g., establishing dialogue and conducting negotiations).

> 0021: She was pushed into the asphalt and there was a guy running away from the situation with his back turned to the police and he was hit so it was a lot of different situations within the chaos.

The interviewees established a strict typology of police officers. On the one hand, there existed 'legitimate' officers, who wanted to resolve conflicts without escalating to the use of violent methods. On the other hand, other officers "just waved their batons" (Interviewee 22 – Football Supporter). Football supporters failed to recognise that such a rigid categorisation did not necessarily reflect police motivations and the justifications for using violent vs. non-violent means of crowd policing. Despite this, the interviewees were willing to self-regulate in cases in which 'legitimate' police officers were unfairly critiqued by other football supporters. Interviewee 15 (Football Supporter), for instance, reported that "they [other supporters] posted shit about our Supporter Police … I had a discussion with them about that".

The above findings raised the question of whether self-regulation could be construed as a form of collective action resulting from identity repositioning. In the above example, other supporters' unfair critiques of the Supporter Police unit were seen as threatening ingroup

legitimacy, provoking self-regulation among the football supporters. Other supporter interviewees similarly implied that even radical groups of supporters were willing to self-police when faced with cases in which police officers were willing to engage in dialogue and leverage liaison-based means of policing. The ESIM primarily focuses on individuals engaging in antisocial collective action as a result of illegitimate oppression from responders (Stott et al., 2011; Stott et al., 2018). The thesis, nevertheless, provides support for one of the less well developed elements of ESIM which suggests that collective action can also take a pro-social form through self-policing (cf. Stott et al. 2001; Stott et al. 2018). If police officers declined to implement intrusive or forceful policing strategies and, instead, treated supporters with respect, the affected groups of supporters were willing to overlook the legacy of illegitimacy.

Continuing the theme of categorising police workers into 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' individuals, the interviewed police officers strongly implied that the Malmö Supporter Police and other officers who followed the CRP were ineffective.

> 0008: A lot of officers thought that this is just words. That the knowledge that was undercover. And this thing that we should make it easier for them? Strange! Very strange to make something easier for a crowd!

When asked about the rationale for such perceptions, Interviewee 14 (Police Officer) argued that the presence of forceful policing was necessary for 'yellow' or 'red' situations, in which engaging in liaison-based means of policing was considered impossible. Similarly to football supporters, police officers categorised their colleagues into 'effective' and 'ineffective' groups. In contrast to football supporters, however, dialogue-based means of crowd policing were seen as ineffective, while applications of force were construed as justified means of responding to threats to public well-being.

The interviewees implied that the Supporter Police and other 'ineffective' officers failed to acknowledge the significance of the threat posed by 'minority' football supporters to public security. The participants did not overtly reference the concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy when discussing 'effective' and 'ineffective' police officers. However, as shown above, some interviewees mentioned the concept of 'friend corruption' when discussing cases in which their colleagues actively tried to establish a dialogue with football supporters or exhibited similar interests. Similarly to football supporters, therefore, the conflict between perceived legitimacy and illegitimacy informed how the interviewed police workers categorised other police officers. The interviewed police officers, nonetheless, failed to acknowledge that there existed such a similarity between how police workers and football supporters perceived the efficacy and legitimacy of crowd policing.

The findings of the thesis are highly consistent with the work of Williams et al. (1989), who argued that football supporters assigned either legitimacy or illegitimacy to intra- and intergroup behaviours. As a result, only the police officers who exhibited conformity to or respect of the social values of football supporters were perceived as legitimate. Nonetheless, Williams et al. (1989) failed to extend their findings to police officers. As shown above, police officers assigned a similar categorisation to define their colleagues by using the concepts of effectiveness and ineffectiveness, which were implicitly linked to legitimacy and illegitimacy. Although early work touches upon the subject (Stott and Reicher, 1998b; Stott et al., 2001), the ESIM has so far not fully explained how such considerations may influence identity repositioning in football crowds (Stott et al., 2011; Stott et al., 2018). The study demonstrates that exposure to the 'legitimate-illegitimate' typology could facilitate identity repositioning among football supporters. By following a rigid system of legitimate and illegitimate values, football supporters can determine which collective identity (and, subsequently, collective action) would be perceived as 'legitimate' by other representatives of crowds. For example, demonstrating overt resistance to 'illegitimate' police officers could be a means of exhibiting 'legitimate' collective behaviours and actions.

The ESIM also does not clarify how exactly identity repositioning occurs when both groups (the police and football supporters) follow similar systems of categorising action into 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). The thesis implies that the failure of the Swedish police officers to distance themselves from the rigid categorisation of 'effective' and 'ineffective' strategies of crowd policing may contribute to identity repositioning among the representatives of football crowds. Assigning the concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy to certain police actions, such as establishing a dialogue with crowds of football supporters, could have increased the degree to which the police officers were willing to engage in excessive shows of force, subsequently motivating identity repositioning among the football supporters. Alternatively, the police officers may have experienced identity repositioning themselves by following strategies of crowd policing that were seen as effective and legitimate by their colleagues. The findings of the thesis, therefore, suggest that the ESIM applies not only to football supporters but also to the police. The ESIM requires a revision to elucidate which specific factors could trigger identity repositioning among the representatives of police forces.

Both groups of participants imposing strict dichotomous categories on each other's behaviours has been a consistent theme throughout the sub-sections. In the literature review (Chapter Three), it was stated that outdated theories of the crowd were, in general, adopted by responders by categorising in-crowd groups into 'majorities' and 'minorities' (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). However, the findings implied that such a point of view was also adopted by football supporters who unambiguously classified police officers into legitimate and illegitimate groups. Such a classification, in turn, implied that resistance to police illegitimacy was justified, facilitating the process of identity repositioning and motivating collective action. Motivated by their previous experiences during 'yellow' and 'red' situations, the interviewed police officers were similarly unwilling to discard the 'minority-majority' dual classifications. Contributing to the ESIM, the thesis states that continued identity repositioning as a result of

enduring conflicts occurs within both groups and is facilitated by the adoption of strict dual systems of classifying each other's behaviours.

6.3. The Outcomes of Police Actions

This theme focuses on how exactly the use of forceful approaches to crowd policing contributed to collective action among football supporters. The theme also focuses on supporters' self-regulation and their awareness of identity repositioning as a result of police actions.

Perceived justification of police actions and excessive use of force

"…the other supporters don't want to be with them, when the police officers are in the vicinity. And that works a lot. They can't plan if they meet, they know we can be there and put their things away or search or whatever" (Interviewee 3 – Police Officer)

As shown above, the interviewed police officers referenced the short-term effectiveness of their preferred means of policing 'minority' supporters when justifying their choice of current and future strategies of crowd policing. Interviewee 3 (Police Officer) specifically referred to the 'German surveillance' method, in which police officers established visible surveillance over high-risk supporters. The police were unwilling to acknowledge that such overt means of preliminary policing could incentivise antisocial or illegal behaviours among the targeted football supporters. Nonetheless, the police interviewees admitted that, in some cases, inconsistencies in the chain of command significantly disrupted communications between the police and football supporters. More than one police interviewee described a case in which the police had established specific agreements with football supporters in the areas of police behaviours, crowd collective action and crowd policing strategies. Following the arrival of a new commander, however, police officers were mandated to follow new orders, which were

incongruent with the previously negotiated approaches to crowd policing. The police officers admitted that such a change lacked rationale and was unfair to football supporters.

In contrast to the police officers, the interviewed football supporters argued that there was no reasonable justification for how the police used force when managing crowds. Avoiding the dichotomy between 'minority' and 'majority' supporters, the supporter interviewees focused on cases in which the police used excessive force against low-risk football supporters, including women, and teenagers. According to Interviewee 21 (Football Supporter), officers could "go berserk" when policing crowds, with little to no rationale for excessive uses of force. Similarly, Interviewee 28 (Football Supporter) provided an account of events in which "we [football supporters] were very upset - all of us! Crying people! Angry people! And then we kind of turned around and the police stood there and just laughed". The interviewees strongly implied that the police either lacked knowledge of football supporters' behaviours and interests or, in some cases, acted maliciously and outside of the CRP. As a result of such perceptions of police officers, the representatives of football supporter clubs were motivated to adopt confrontational social identities.

The ESIM argued that, in crowds, football supporters may shift to confrontational social identities when exposed to excessive uses of police force (Stott et al., 2011; Stott et al., 2018). This theory, however, fails to acknowledge the long term effects of pre-match means of policing, such as the 'German surveillance' method. The interviewees with football supporters strongly implied that such approaches superimposed social identities on high-risk supporters. If a football supporter felt that the police considered them to be a high-risk target willing to engage in antisocial, violent, and illegal behaviours, the probability of this supporter engaging in such collective actions in the crowd increased. Contributing to the formulation of the ESIM given by Stott et al. (2011) and Stott et al. (2018), the thesis demonstrates that the target identities of the identity repositioning process may not necessarily form in congruence with collective crowd behaviours. Instead, such identities may be construed to conform to how the

police perceive one's risk to threaten public security. Supporters' rejection of the 'minority-majority' classification of crowds, therefore, increases the intensity of enduring conflict and increases the probability of subsequent identity repositioning within a crowd.

On the one hand, the findings of the study were partially consistent with how Reicher (1996b) approached the creation of social identities in the context of crowd policing. According to Reicher (1996a, 1996b), the continued conflict between how different groups perceived legitimacy drove the gradual escalation of outgroup relationships between crowds and the police. In my sample of Swedish Police Officers, the police assigned inherent legitimacy to their actions and shows of force; the football supporters perceived such strategies of crowd policing as intrusive, violent, and malicious. The findings, therefore, implied that continued use of excessive force by the police was a key cause of outgroup violence. On the other hand, the arguments of Reicher (1996b) failed to acknowledge that participants of intergroup conflicts could admit partial illegitimacy while still escalating conflicts. The interviewed police officers, for example, admitted that uncertainties in their chain of command resulted in a failure to follow the previously negotiated crowd policing arrangements. In this case, illegitimacy was assigned not to high-risk supporters but, instead, to police commanders. Complementing the work of Reicher (1996a, 1996b), the thesis raises the question of why exactly participants may choose to escalate outgroup conflicts, even when acknowledging ingroup illegitimacy.

Addressing this knowledge gap, the thesis argues that outgroup illegitimacy may be a stronger driver of collective and individual action compared to ingroup illegitimacy (Reicher, 1996a; Reicher, 1996b). Although the police officers acknowledged that their chain of command lacked a consistent approach to decision-making, the participants were still unwilling to revise their perceptions of outgroup legitimacy and illegitimacy. Exposure to cases of ingroup illegitimacy did not provoke the process of identity repositioning among the representatives of the sample. On the other hand, knowledge of outgroup illegitimacy, such as new cases of

supporters engaging in antisocial behaviours, contributed to officers' justification for the use of forceful and intrusive means of policing.

Awareness of radicalisation as a result of policing

"We have some problems with the police at that time and then it was like a statement. Cos they did fuck up us very much and then ok you are one in the lead now we should get one-one...we fuck you back" (Interviewee 22 – Football Supporter)

The interviewed football supporters strongly implied that radicalisation was a direct consequence of encounters with excessive uses of police force or encounters with accounts of such events. Certain football supporters, therefore, followed an eye for an eye system, in which excessive use of police force had to be met with visible antisocial behaviours (e.g., lighting flares in the grandstands during football matches).

> 0022: We had a statement at the stand. And then it was one person who had a police outfit and did one flare.

The supporter interviewees argued that it was their responsibility to respond to police behaviours that were seen as illegitimate; Interviewee 22 (Football Supporter), for example, noted that "we can't just let them do what they want". The supporters acknowledged that such radicalisation incurred consequences in the form of the increased intensity of police responses to collective action. The participants, nonetheless, omitted any discussions of whether radicalisation as a response to police action was seen as universally legitimate among all football supporters. Furthermore, the interviews included no references to whether the representatives of football supporter clubs were motivated to engage in self-regulating behaviours when encountering radicalised behaviours. The interviewees engaged in self-regulation only when their actions threatened the representatives of the Malmö Supporter

Police unit and other officers who followed the CRP. Such an omission implied that football supporters were either unwilling or unable to extend legitimacy beyond their own group.

In turn, the police officers acknowledged that radicalisation was an undesirable outcome that had to be avoided. Interviewee 31 (Police Officer), for instance, admitted that

> 0031: If they want to go another way than they're supposed to, we can facilitate them. If it's not going to go close to another team['s supporters]. Or sometimes it's a bar that doesn't give out more than light beer[40], then we went round and looked for another bar that they can be in [which serves strong beer] and we help them. So we help them and sometimes they hate us and so on, so we have to make it easier for them to love us.

Other interviewees (e.g., Interviewee 3 – Police Officer) similarly argued that forceful policing provoked similarly aggressive responses from supporters. Nonetheless, there were no other acknowledgements that antisocial individual or collective action could be taken to make statements about police brutality. When discussing high-risk supporters and other representatives of 'minority' groups in crowds, the police participants noted that they did not understand why exactly such supporters chose to transit their heightened emotions experienced when watching football into violent and antisocial behaviours. According to Interviewee 1 (Police Officer), "I can get a lot of tired of them [high-risk supporters] specifically, because there's a lot of childish behaviour and they are very... Do you say self-righteous?". The interviewed police officers, therefore, assigned radicalisation to individual characteristics of the representatives of 'minority' groups, such as a perceived lack of emotional intelligence.

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[40] [maximum alcohol content of 3.5%]

Referring the above findings to the ESIM, this theory similarly implied that continued radicalisation was a consequence of direct or indirect exposure to police brutality and excessive uses of force (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). The ESIM, nonetheless, focused on collective action in which the collective identities of the representatives of heterogeneous crowds became salient as a response to outside factors and existing outgroup conflicts. The interviewed football supporters, in contrast, discussed cases in which only certain individuals exhibited signs of radicalisation with no immediate collective action following antisocial behaviours. The participants were willing to provide implicit approval of the 'eye for an eye' system; however, the supporters did not exhibit a strong motivation to engage in violent or antisocial collective action after being exposed to radicalised supporters. The findings contribute to the ESIM by showing that the gradual process of identity repositioning may not necessarily result in engaging in collective action. Instead, radicalisation as a result of identity repositioning may manifest in individual actions with no subsequent collective actions. This process is motivated by perceptions of implicit approval in which radicalisation and antisocial behaviour are seen as justified by other representatives of heterogeneous crowds without any explicit agreements.

In his reviews of police action and crowd behaviours, Reicher (1996a, 1996b) suggested that police action originally designed to reduce violence in crowds could, instead, become the cause of subsequent collective action. On the one hand, the analysis supported these results by showing that police violence and cases of excessive use of force motivated the establishment of an 'eye for an eye' system promoting the radicalisation of football supporters. On the other hand, the interviewed police officers argued that supporters from 'minority' groups were predisposed toward radicalisation and exhibiting antisocial and violent behaviours. The police participants attributed such a pattern to a perceived lack of emotional intelligence and other individual characteristics. In opposition to Reicher (1996a, 1996b), the analsysis raises the question of the degree to which forceful crowd policing contributes to long term radicalisation and subsequent acts of violence. Football supporters were unwilling to support radicalised

supporters through collective action, suggesting that radicalisation is at least partially dependent on individual characteristics and perceptions of the police.

In addition, the findings in this chapter raise the question of whether the term 'radicalisation' is also applicable to police officers. Exposed to a legacy of continued outgroup conflict, police officers were highly resistant to change in the form of the CRP. As highlighted previously, the interviewees also considered forceful policing to be the only effective means of responding to continued threats to public security and well-being. Such perceptions manifested in a rigid structure of social identities, in which police officers who were willing to establish a dialogue with football supporters were seen as 'corrupted' or 'illegitimate'. The interviewed police officers did not explicitly state that forceful policing was a part of an 'eye for an eye' strategy designed to respond to prior cases of supporters engaging in violent or antisocial behaviours. Nonetheless, officers' continued partial adherence to the outdated classical theories of the crowd and the continued usage of forceful policing were driven by a legacy of perceived crowd illegitimacy. As a result, continued outgroup conflict could have enforced social identities that were supportive of forceful policing and resistant toward the CRP.

Chapter Summary and Conclusions

The multi-perspective thematic analysis focused on three key themes, namely officers' and supporters' mutual perceptions of social identities and norms, perceptions of police legitimacy and illegitimacy, and the outcomes of police actions.

When discussing the perceptions of police actions and crowd behaviours, there existed significant differences in how football supporters and police officers perceived crowds. The interviewed police officers partially relied on outdated theories of the crowd originally outlined by Allport (1924) and Le Bon (1960). Specifically, these participants categorised heterogeneous crowds into the representatives of 'majorities' and 'minorities'. The former group was not

predisposed to antisocial behaviours and violence and, therefore, had to be protected through police action. The latter group, in contrast, posed a significant risk to public well-being and, subsequently, had to be monitored and forcefully restrained.

In contrast to police officers, football supporters did not categorise their peers into 'majority' and 'minority' groups. When discussing how the police categorised crowds, the participants argued that police officers lacked knowledge of football supporters' behaviours and habits. The results implied that football supporters considered the rigid 'majority-minority' classification to be invalid and outdated (Allport, 1924). As a result, if police officers openly followed the 'majority-minority' paradigm (e.g., by segregating high-risk supporters from others), their actions were perceived as intrusive and illegitimate, potentially escalating conflict between supporters and the police. From this perspective, the study strongly supported the ESIM by highlighting that identity repositioning could occur when supporters encountered 'illegitimate' means of policing (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994).

On the other hand, football supporters were willing to exhibit similarly dichotomous perceptions of police officers when discussing the implementation of the CRP. The representatives of the Malmö Supporter Police unit were, in general, perceived as 'legitimate' officers, who attempted to establish a dialogue with supporters and demonstrated high degrees of knowledge about supporters' behaviours and the football culture. In contrast, other police officers, particularly the representatives of the Romeo and Delta units, were frequently seen as inherently 'illegitimate'. Football supporters argued that police officers had to acquire supporters' respect, which could only be done by consistently displaying 'legitimate' behaviours. Interestingly, police officers adopted a similarly dichotomous classification of other officers. The interviewees exhibited negative perceptions of police workers who expressed open agreement with the CRP and, in some cases, referred to such instances as 'friend corruption'.

Based on the above findings, this chapter critiqued the ESIM, as this approach attributed high levels of responsibility for antisocial behaviours in a crowd to police behaviours (Stott & Drury 2017; Stott et al., 2001). The study, however, implied that identity repositioning in a crowd was based not only on police action but also on the established perceptions of authority groups. The findings highlighted that football supporters followed a rigid classification of police officers into 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' groups based on the perceived implementation of the CRP. The police officers, however, reported that applications of force were frequently necessary when policing crowds in 'yellow' or 'red' scenarios. According to the interview transcripts, participants from either of the two groups were unaware that dichotomous classifications of each other's actions could have contributed to the intensity of the outgroup conflict.

To explain the above findings, the chapter construed the term 'legacy of illegitimacy'. Consistent with the ESIM, the legacy of illegitimacy defined first-hand experiences or second-hand accounts of excessive use of force and similar manifestations of continued outgroup conflict which motivated identity repositioning in crowds (Williams et al., 1989; Stott & Drury, 2017). The analysis, nevertheless, also applied this term to how responders perceived football crowds. The police officers construed illegitimacy as supporters' failure to conform to behavioural and legal norms. The previous experiences of police officers in 'red' or 'yellow' situations meant that forceful means of crowd policing were seen as inherently legitimate when encountering future cases of antisocial behaviours in a crowd. In some cases, police officers felt justified in applying force without a formal rationale as a preventative measure. Similarly to football supporters, police officers based their actions on a legacy of illegitimacy; however, their definition of legitimacy strongly differed from how this concept was perceived by football supporters.

Contributing to the ESIM, the analysis demonstrated that identity repositioning may not necessarily occur in crowds or conform to specific collective action (e.g., engaging in post-

match antisocial behaviours). Football supporters were exposed to illegitimacy outside of their participation in crowds in the form of preventative policing, such as the 'German surveillance' method. In turn, the participants strongly implied that such policing strategies superimposed social identities that increased the probability of a supporter directly opposing the police through violence. According to the interviewed police officers, the majority of the preventative means of policing were overt and visible to their targets. Consequently, football supporters were aware of the fact that they were considered 'high risk' by the police forces. As a result of the identity repositioning process, such knowledge contributed to supporter radicalisation. Referring to the concept of self-regulation, the study also demonstrated that collective action was not necessarily negative. Identity repositioning provoked by police actions seen as legitimate could motivate radicalised supporters to overlook the legacy of illegitimacy.

The study, subsequently, raised the question of whether the process of identity repositioning could also occur among police officers. The participants imposed a strict classification of their colleagues' actions. Engaging in dialogue with the crowd or wanting to conduct negotiations with the representatives of 'minority' groups were seen as illegitimate behaviours. The analysis questioned whether police officers exposed to the continued outgroup conflict were motivated to reposition their identities to conform to how their colleagues defined legitimacy and illegitimacy. As a result of this process, officers who could have been motivated to act in accordance with the CRP would have resorted to forceful means of crowd policing (e.g., beatings and arrests). Nonetheless, none of the participants explicitly mentioned such cases.

The continued outgroup conflict between the police officers and football supporters meant that some football supporters exhibited signs of greater radicalisation. The participants discussed cases in which overt acts of defiance of police regulations (e.g., lighting flares on the grandstands) were seen as legitimate means of opposing an oppressive crowd policing regime. On the one hand, these results were consistent with the ESIM, according to which enduring conflict provoked identity repositioning (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). On the other

hand, such acts did not necessarily provoke collective action, contradicting the ESIM. The participants noted that, in many cases, acts of overt resistance toward the police were individual and were only implicitly approved by the crowd. Identity repositioning, therefore, does not guarantee that an individual is willing to engage in collective action against the police. The results question whether the concept of identity repositioning has predictive power when evaluating the future behaviours of the representatives of heterogeneous crowds.

The chapter also raised the question of whether the term 'radicalisation' was applicable to police officers. Similarly to football supporters, police officers were exposed to a legacy of illegitimacy (e.g., football supporters not obeying police orders). Some police officers also attributed supporters' propensity to engage in antisocial behaviours to individual characteristics, such as a lack of emotional intelligence and self-control. As a result, police officers were willing to engage in excessive shows of force or were motivated to rely on the 'German surveillance' method and other means of intrusive preventative policing. Among the interviewed police officers, therefore, the legacy of illegitimacy elicited new justifications for the use of forceful policing. In some cases, police officers were willing to acknowledge that the effectiveness of their strategies of crowd control was diminished due to the inconsistencies in the police power structure. Nonetheless, the participants did not feel the need to change their general approach to policing and were willing to continue to act based on their current perceptions of crowds and the legacy of illegitimacy.

However, it should be acknowledged that only conducting a single round of interviews with each participant limited the attained qualitative data to a cross-sectional perspective; therefore the study fails to investigate longitudinal changes in how the police and football supporters perceive crowd behaviours and psychology. For example, when encountering new cases of police brutality, football supporters may be incentivised to engage in violent behaviours, driven by their new attitudes toward the failure of the police to use justified levels of force.

The following bullet points outline the key arguments and contributions presented in this chapter.

- Demonstrating that the process of identity repositioning may occur not only among supporters but also among police.

- Establishing that identity repositioning may not necessarily lead to engaging in collective action.

- Suggesting that identity repositioning may occur outside of crowds and could be caused as a result of the police superimposing the 'high risk' supporter identity over certain individuals.

- Defining the legacy of illegitimacy as a continued driver of outgroup conflicts and identity repositioning among both supporters and the police.

- Illustrating that both supporters and police officers superimposed dichotomous categorisations of each other, resulting in opposing perceptions of legitimacy and illegitimacy.

- Implying that radicalisation may occur not only among football supporters but also the police officers as a result of exposure to the legacy of illegitimacy.

Chapter Seven: Quantifying the Benefit of Facilitation

> Those who had been to Hillsborough for the big occasions were able to guess whereabouts in the ground the tragedy had occurred. But then, nobody who runs the game has ever been interested in the forebodings of fans (Hornby, 1992, p.217)

When this doctoral study was begun one of the main mandates was that this thesis should help Enable to transition its research approach from being very police-centric to encompassing the supporter perspective. This was to be with a particular focal point on how the recommended Participant Action Research based changes affected the supporter community. In order to do that, four separate online surveys were created that ran in parallel to the observations chronicled in Chapter Five.

As the previous chapters pointed out, only the recommendation of increasing the police focus on facilitation had been partially implemented. The recommendations of addressing the inconsistencies in national approach and separating the spotter and dialogue roles had not been effected. The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the effect of facilitation upon the supporters. The pioneering ESIM studies (Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001) demonstrated their arguments by providing a behavioural account of 'what happened' supported by an analysis of 'how' crowd participants perceived these specific episodes in a qualitative manner. This was the original intention for the supporter survey data collected, however the large amount of data submitted by the supporters has allowed an opportunity to do this in a unique quantitative manner. By codifying all the responses in a quantitative content analysis and then linking it to the timelines created in the observational analysis, the supporters' perceptions of the events in positive or negative terms at different times throughout the observation can be explored. Reicher and colleagues (ibid) have always argued that the outbreak of widespread violence in

crowd events was due to widespread perceptions of illegitimacy. Therefore, by introducing a quantitative element here it can be demonstrated just how widespread these perceptions are. By doing this the aim is to explore how a focus on facilitation creates the context in which supporters self-police and potential conflict is avoided.

After a discussion of method, the chapter will be divided into three sections. It will begin with a brief discussion about the number of survey participants in general and what can be inferred from the response rate alone. The second section will then look at supporter perspectives in a facilitation focused context. Arguably the greatest example of police implemented facilitation for both home and away supporters was during Observation One (IFK vs MFF) [41] and this section will therefore focus exclusively upon the data set from that observation. After an initial analysis of perceptions of the event as a whole, the data from the two supporter groups will be looked at separately, firstly with regards to the pre-match stage of the event and then specifically with regards to their perceptions of the police. Separating the data of the different supporter groups at this stage is done for strategic reasons. First, it will allow for an examination of perceptions to be tied to the previous observational data. The observational data showed that the policing of Observation One prioritised the segregation of supporters, therefore the supporters' data should also be segregated for its analysis. This will allow the timelines [42] created during the observational data analysis to be used to relate the perceptual data to the behavioural data. Secondly, even though both supporter sets were policed with a facilitation focused approach, by separating the data like this we can see if this approach is perceived in the same way and begin to consider whether this approach can help the police to overcome the legacy of illegitimacy highlighted in the previous chapter that often exists in the relationship between home supporters and local police forces. In order to elaborate on this argument, the third section of the chapter will then focus on supporter perspectives in a context in which the police approach was more focused on control. This

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[41] Please see Appendix F for a full account of the observational data from Observation One.
[42] Please see Appendix D for the Observation One Timeline.

section will therefore concentrate on home supporters' perceptions of the police in Observation Four (MFF vs DIF). This will not only allow for an examination of how supporters see the police when the police prioritise control, but it will also allow perceptions to be compared and contrasted for the same supporter group in two quite different contexts.

7.1 Method

This method section details a novel way of looking at survey data in relation to an ESIM based study of a crowd event. It is designed to look at and explore the temporal nature of crowds and crowd behaviour. As this method is novel it is explained and discussed in more extensive detail than the previous two empirical chapters, which used existing methodologies, in order to ensure transparency (Reason, 2006).

7.1.1 Sampling

Separate Swedish language surveys were created and hosted online to accompany all of the observations conducted. The surveys were released online either on the day of, or the day after, an event. They were promoted via the official Enable social media accounts. All relevant participants and stakeholders were asked to repost or share links to the survey website. The links and social media posts asked anyone who had attended the event to participate.

7.1.2 Data Collection

When one thinks in terms of football then the most voluminous stakeholder group is evidently the supporters. They are perhaps the most important stakeholder group - if it wasn't for the desire of supporters to watch football then none of the other stakeholders

would be there. This was the first attempt by the project to access supporters and therefore it was appropriate to have a short survey which could be accessed by anyone who wished to take part. The survey was designed to look "beyond the obvious taken-for-granted reality" (Waller et. al, 2016, p. 4) and therefore avoided asking overly specific questions which might limit the potential responses submitted. The aim was not to test hypothesis, but to allow respondents to talk about any subject or issue that **they** deemed relevant.

Survey Questions

1. Please enter your age:

2. Please enter your gender:

3. Please tell us which football team(s) you support:

4. Please tell us how many games you usually attend (both home and away) in a season:

5. Please tell us your views on the management of the match between _____ and _____ on _____ at _____:

6. If you have not done so already, can you describe a specific incident which you feel exemplifies good management from the game between _____ and _____ on _____ at _____. Please feel free to write about more than one incident:

7. If you have not done so already, can you describe a specific incident which you feel exemplifies bad management from the game between _____ and _____ on _____ at _____. Please feel free to write about more than one incident:

8. Is there anything else that you think we should know about the management of supporters at football?[43].

The survey purposely asked supporters to relate experiences and perceptions about the 'management/handling' of the match so that they might highlight any issue at all. By purposefully using the Swedish word 'hantering' (management/handling) rather than words or phrases such as 'policing', 'security', or 'control procedures', the survey was meant to serve as a *tabula rasa* type of data collection method which would not narrow the focus of respondents or limit potential responses (Burgess, 1984). The survey was also discussed with members of the Swedish Football Supporters Union (SFSU), who reviewed the survey and gave feedback on its construction and wording. The proactive contribution of the SFSU here gave an interesting piece of insight into supporter culture too. In the main, the feedback from the SFSU was positive, except on one main point; that the word 'fan' should not be used and that it should instead be replaced with 'supporter', as the word 'fan' was seen as too commercial and perhaps antagonistic to how many supporters view their identity[44].

The use of an online survey was also pragmatic. The survey instrument offers supporters a way of engaging with research on their own terms if **they** wish to. A qualitative survey allows them to say as much or as little as they want to say, and they can re-read their answers before they submit them. In addition to this, online surveys can reach a far wider audience than in person surveys conducted on the day of the event (Evans & Mathur, 2005, 2018).

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[43] Please see Appendix K for the full Survey format in Swedish.
[44] This was a surprise to me as I had regularly described myself as a fan prior to this. However, in retrospect my understanding of the word 'fan' had been influenced by my experience of living in Istanbul where my friends and I would often describe a dedicated supporter in Turkish as a 'fanatik'. As such, I had previously conceptualised a 'fan' as a type of fanatical follower of football. Whereas the SFSU members suggested the word had more consumer and capitalist connotations when used in Swedish.

All surveys were conducted in accordance with guidance and permission from Keele University Ethics Panel[45].

7.1.3 Translation Issues

After feedback from the SFSU, the survey was translated by Enable colleague Anders Almgren (a native speaker of Swedish) and, after a final consultation with the SFSU, was released online in Swedish.

The majority of the responses were submitted in Swedish. As I was enrolled in Swedish language courses, the surveys were primarily analysed by myself. These understandings were regularly checked, corroborated and/or corrected by both Anders Almgren and Jonas Havelund during the stages of analysis detailed below.

All survey responses used in the thesis are given first in the original Swedish with my own English translation immediately afterwards. All translations were proofread by Enable colleagues Anders Almgren and Jonas Havelund (however any dubious translations are ultimately my fault). Use of both the original Swedish and an English translation was made in order to respect the supporters' voice (Reason, 2006; Reason & Bradbury, 2006).

7.1.4 Data Set

Below is a table containing data on the number of survey responses received in comparison with the total match attendance.

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[45] Please see Appendix B for Keele University Ethics Review Panel permission documents.

Table 7 - Number of Supporter Responses to Each Observation's Survey

Observation	Match Attendance	Survey Responses	Percentage of Attendance	Qualitative Responses	
1	32,129	710	2.21%	375	(1.17%)
2	5541	157	2.83%	83	(1.5%)
3	9335	195	2.09%	78	(0.86%)
4	19,074	371	1.95%[46]	166	(0.87%)
Total		1433		702	

There is a caveat to these numbers, however. Around half of the survey responses received contained only the participants' demographic data and no qualitative data about their perceptions of the event. During the preliminary analysis, I noticed a higher frequency of these incomplete responses at certain times. In order to understand this phenomenon, the submission times of all the surveys were analysed. There was a profound trend in completion across all four matches. The incomplete responses were more common in the first few hours after the survey was made accessible online. As such, a possible reason for this incompletion could have been down to the volume of supporters trying to access the survey at the same time. Increased attempts to access a website can dramatically slow down or prevent all access to a site, whilst research by Google has shown that 53% of mobile users abandon websites which take longer than three seconds to load (Kirkpatrick, 2016). However, the reasons for incompletion aside, it is possible that the incomplete survey participants may have done the survey again at a later point. Therefore, in the interest of maintaining quality, all the incomplete survey transcripts were removed from the analysis and only the 702 surveys which contained qualitative responses were retained.

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[46] Both supporter groups had already been asked to fill in surveys in the previous weeks.

7.1.5 Data Analysis

Initial survey transcript analysis was based on the Thematic Analysis process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006, 2012, 2020). Analysis of the surveys took place concurrently with the analysis of the observational data described in Chapter Five. However, as this data set was almost entirely[47] made up of Swedish language responses, it was a slower process that began to be guided by the more advanced observational data analysis. In addition to this, as the abundance of data became apparent, I used Content Analysis methods to adapt the phases in order to quantitise the analysis. Although not a commonly used technique, the descriptivist nature of Thematic Analysis does lend itself to the 'quantitising' (Sandelowski, Voils & Knafl, 2009) of qualitative data and Content Analysis coding "can be used as a way of converting qualitative information into quantitative data" (Boyatsiz, 1998 ps. 4-5). This shift from a purely Thematic Analysis approach to a more Content Analysis based approach, can be explained by my willingness to make sure the analytical findings are not merely academic but also provide practical value on a decision-making and policy level. However, this has already been discussed in detail in Section 4.6.2 of Chapter Four so will not be repeated here.

Before continuing, the issue of agency should be addressed. I was very much moved by Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke's (2006, 2012, 2020) argument against using phrases that remove human agency from research. They take issue with the way that researchers often posit the idea that 'themes emerge from the data' as if by magic, whereas in reality it is a process of hard work that enables a human researcher to identify themes. As the following analysis section articulates a process developed by myself I intend to use the first person as per Braun and Clarke's (ibid) convictions.

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[47] Notable responses such as "all cops are bastards/1312" or "no pyro no party" were occasionally submitted in English.

Phase One

The first phase of familiarisation with the data took place as surveys were submitted. I was attending Swedish lessons most mornings, and would generally preview the survey transcripts received during that day after doing my Swedish homework in the evenings. In this way, they served both as a dataset and as a Swedish language learning resource. Any novel grammatical constructs or particularly vibrant use of language would be noted down and added to my Swedish language notebook. With the number of surveys from some observations being particularly voluminous not all could be read on the day of submission, but were always read within the first week of their initial submission. There was no written coding at this point, although subjects which were of particular interest were reported during video conferencing with Enable team members during the weekly Enable operations meeting.

One month after each survey had first been made available to supporters, submissions were closed. Response rates usually slowed to a trickle after the first week, however they were left open for a further three weeks to allow for those who might not be so active on social media to have a chance to partake. Once closed, the completed data set was transferred into an Nvivo project. All responses were read again at this stage, and while no written coding took place, Nvivo and data visualisation software was used to create visual representations of the most commonly used vocabulary in the responses for each question of each survey. This was not an analysis tool per se but more a language learning resource used to make sure I was acquainted with the most commonly used terms before I analysed the data set from each question of each match's survey. Each qualitative question of each survey received the same treatment prior to the coding.

Phase Two

Initial coding of the data was done in a trial run. Twenty percent of each observation's data set was coded semantically in order to test the viability of the approach. The rationale for such an approach was twofold, firstly I was still a novice coder and secondly I was only at an A1/A2 CEFR Swedish level at the time. Therefore, I coded responses purely semantically. In other words, I asked myself: 'What is it they are talking about here and are they describing it positively or negatively?". Again, like the initial phases of the observational data analysis process this was data driven.

Once the viability of the procedure had been assessed in conjunction with Clifford Stott, Sammyh Khan and Jonas Havelund, all data was then subjected to the same process.

Phase Three

This phase involved the creation of themes. It also became apparent that such a huge and detailed response from supporters was going to allow me to evolve my analytical approach and add a Content Analysis element to the process[48]. Initial codes revolved mainly around stages of the event, like the ingress, or the more conceptual issues such as policing. When compared with the timeline created during the analysis of the observational data it became apparent it would enable me to show how widespread positive and negative perceptions of each stage were and how perceptions of issues such as policing changed throughout the event.

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[48] Please see Chapter Four Section 4.6.2 for further discussion of this evolution.

Once the decision was made that the survey data would be used in combination with the observational data, the subsequent phases were then essentially phases four, five, and six from the analysis procedure detailed in Chapter Five.

7.2 Survey Data Response Analysis

This short section will discuss the response rate received for the survey study in order to demonstrate how it speaks to the desire of supporters to be part of the conversation about how Swedish football is managed.

The response rate alone gives some useful insights into Swedish football supporter culture. It is widely understood that survey response rates have been steadily declining in most of the industrialised world over the last several decades (de Leeuw and de Heer, 2002; Sinclair, O'Toole, Malawaraarachchi & Leder, 2012; Spaeth, 1992). In addition to this, football supporters are a heavily stigmatised group (Pearson, 2012; cf. Goffman, 1963) and as such are a hard to reach population (Waller et al., 2016, p. 71). When one considers this it would be expected that supporters would give below average response rates. However, if we take a closer look at the demographic data from the 375 completed transcripts received for Observation One; 136 were submitted by MFF supporters, 236 from IFK supporters and 3 from supporters of other teams.

Figure 8 - Survey Participants

The proportion of MFF supporters demonstrates the dedicated nature of the supporters who attend away matches. 136 from an official ticket allocation of 3000 is 4.53%. Although, as our observations noted there were visible numbers of away supporters in the home areas, therefore if we calculate the percentage from the highest estimated away attendance of 5,000 MFF supporters, we still have 2.72% of the total away support. The actual percentage is probably somewhere in between those two figures, but if we take even the lowest of 2.72%, this is still distinctly higher than the 2.2% response rate which Sinclair, O'Toole, Malawaraarachchi and Leder (2012) concluded was the average response rate to generic internet surveys when comparing response rates for different methods of survey format. Thus, the response rate should be seen as a profound statement from Swedish football supporters that they want to be part of the solution and not just considered as a problem.

7.3 Analysis of Observation One Responses

Excellent examples of police facilitation were seen across all the observations, however, the police emphasis on facilitating both home and away supporters was most salient in Observation One. As such, the analytical focus of this section has been guided by the observational data. I will seek to transform the abundant number of qualitative responses submitted for Observation One into a quantitative analysis. This will allow the perceptions of the supporters to be understood not just in relation to the different elements or stages of the event but also to see how widely these perceptions were held.

7.3.1 Overall Perceptions of the Event

All survey transcripts were coded according to the overall perception of the event. Contents were coded into 4 different categories. The first was for positive only experiences. The second was designated positive and negative for those responses that gave mixed answers. The third was for the responses which described a purely negative experience. Whilst the final category was termed neutral for those answers which simply stated facts and gave little to no indication as to whether the responder saw them as either positive or negative.

Figure 9 - Pie Chart Showing How All Respondents Experienced the Event in Observation One

The chart above demonstrates that 179 (47.3%) respondents viewed the event in overwhelmingly positive terms. This was the largest coding category. 113 (32.8%) respondents described the event in both positive and negative terms. However, this category can be divided up into two subcategories. Firstly, those respondents who described a majority positive experience with some negative caveats. 94 respondents were thus categorised. As opposed to 19 respondents who described majority negative experiences with positive caveats. 73 respondents (19.47%) were coded in the third category which viewed the event in overwhelmingly negative terms. Finally, 10 respondents submitted answers that were characterised as neutral.

Relevant quotes from the participants are provided to support the quantified analysis outcomes. For example, to illustrate the positive perceptions of the respondents, one of them stated that

> *Exemplariskt arrangerat för oss bortasupportrar. Allt från marsch från Liseberg,*
> *serveringsområde vid Ullevi och bemötande från personal och ordningsmakt var*

helt klanderfritt. **(Exemplary arrangement for us away supporters. Everything from the march from Liseberg, the away supporter zone at the Ullevi and the treatment from the personel and the security was completely faultless)** MFF35M[49]

As previously noted, the respondents who provided mostly positive responses accounted for the second largest category. According to one of the participants who belong to this group, their experience was:

> *Mestadels bra men insläppet och utsläppet sköttes väldigt dåligt. Stor kritik där.* **(Mostly good but the ingress and egress was run really badly. Strong criticism there.)** MFF22M

By contrast, one of the respondents who described majority negative experiences with positive caveats noted that:

> *Blev dirigerad till annan ingång. Men lugnt, inget bråk. Samtidigt oroligt med så många på allt för liten yta.* **(Was directed to another entrance. But calm, no violence. At the same time worrying with so many in such a small area)** MFF31M

Overwhelmingly negative perceptions were held by 73 respondents, some of whom noted that:

> *Dåligt insläpp, tog en massa tid.* **(Poor entry, took a lot of time.)** MFF30M

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[49] MFF35M refers to the supporter's demographic data: MFF (team supported) 35 (age) M (self-defined gender)

Ifk svek KB och gjorde så vi inte kunde samlas **(Ifk betrayed KB and did so we could not gather)** IFK50M

Insläppet bedrövligt!! Att det skall vara samma varje gång är otroligt. Långa köer där de till sist tvingades öppna grindarna och släppa in alla utan biljettkoll och visitering. **(Woeful ingress!! That it should be the same every time is incredible. Long queues where they were eventually forced to open the gates and let everyone in without a ticket check and visitation.)** IFK36M

7.3.2 Supporter Perceptions during the Event

As the previous section exemplified, many of the overall perceptions about the handling of the event in general hinged upon the perceptions of certain elements or substages of the event. In order to understand this further, every specific perception, issue or element detailed was coded semantically and also categorised as either a negative or a positive reflection on that issue. In total 285 respondents chronicled 773 examples of negative experiences during the event, whilst slightly fewer, 265 respondents, gave 610 examples of positive experiences during the event.

Figure 10 – Respondents' Positive and Negative Perceptions of the Event

The semantic codes generated could also be further subdivided into three distinct categories. The larger category was that of comments which referred to different stages of the event, such as the ingress (239 comments of which 187 were negative and 54 were positive) or the marches (35 comments of which 33 were positive and 2 negative). The second category is that of general themes discussed in relation to the event, such as the policing and security in general (73 comments of which 71 were positive and 2 were negative).

Supporter perceptions	Examples		
	Stages of the event	**General themes**	**General themes/stages of the event**
Positive experiences	87	71	11
Negative experiences	189	2	0

Whilst the third was a combination of the above mentioned categories, the general themes discussed in relation to the substages of the event, such as the policing of the marches (11 comments of which all were positive).

7.3.3 Summary

Quantitative analysis showed that just under half of Observation One's survey respondents described the event in positive only terms, with around a quarter describing the event as positive with negative caveats. In addition to codings of positive and negative, analysis of the transcripts showed that responses which detailed specific experiences could be categorised as describing either stages of the event, themes from the event or a combination of both. As such, the breadth of the data for Observation One allows for an examination of supporter perceptions of phases of the event itself and for an analysis of perceptions of the police in this facilitation focused context. The subsequent sections will therefore address these topics.

7.4 Supporter Perceptions of the Pre-match Phase in Observation One

I will now present an analysis of the supporter perceptions during the pre-match phase of Observation One up until the ingress into the stadium. The reason for such an analysis is again guided by the observational data. It was during the observational analysis that the planning phase and the pre-match phase were highlighted as being very focused on facilitation. The argument has also been made during the literature review that such a focus will increase perceptions of legitimacy and thus increase the crowd's ability to self-regulate. Therefore, it will be the aim of this section to relate the perceptual to the behavioural and demonstrate evidence of such a link. In addition to this, it should also be noted that this was the first IFK match at the stadium for several years. Thus, while there are some very valuable responses from the match phase and post-match phase data when considering how to manage moving stadiums again, there are few generalisable conclusions that can help inform the policing of other football games in Sweden.

The segregation of supporters had been a key feature of the police plan in Observation One, therefore the survey responses have also been segregated so that the perceptions of both the IFK Supporters and the MFF Supporters can be analysed accordingly in the next sections.

7.4.1 IFK Supporters

For the IFK supporters, the first and the second main events described were the supporter march and the ingress, respectively. The respondents' perceptions of these two events are presented by means of the following chart.

Figure 11 – IFK Supporters' Perceptions

The respondents perceived the ingress much more positively as compared to the march. Specifically, only 14 respondents viewed the supporter march in overwhelmingly positive terms while the ingress was positively viewed by 42 of the individuals who participated in the online survey. At the same time, the overall negative attitudes towards the ingress prevailed, as the chart above shows. Specifically, the ingress was described negatively by 83 home supporters. The large proportion of positive comments were from supporters who had heeded IFK's advice to arrive early and avoided the queues, or from supporters commending the smiling welcoming attitudes of the staff at the entrance.

> *Mycket bra. Lugnt. Mycket folk och köer men det visste jag innan och personalen löste det bra. Bra info från ifk i tid om att man skulle vara ute i god tid. När jag kom till arenan löpte inpasseringen på bra det gick smidigt* **(Very good. Calm. Lots of people and queues but I knew that before and the staff did well. Good info from ifk pre-event that you would should arrive in good time. When I arrived at the arena the ingress was good and things went smoothly)** IFK45M

The negative comments about the ingress revolved around queues, overcrowding and ticketing issues.

> *Insläppet till Kommandobryggan stort minus. Tog väldigt lång tid och många som inte hann in till matchstart. Insläppet på nedre ståplats var till fel sektion och folk fick hoppa över stängslet för att komma till rätta.* **(Entrance to Kommandobryggan a big minus. Took a very long time and many who did not get in to the match start. The entrance for the lower standing section was to the wrong section and people had to jump over the fence to get to the correct place.)** IFK23M

> *Insläpp fungerade uselt. Långa köer till PQR medan det till ABC var tomt. Folk med biljett till A 2 blev nekade att använda ABC spärren då det står PQR på biljetten. Konstigt när man ska sitta på A2. På läktaren stod massa folk på våra sittplatse*. **(The ingress was wretched. Long queues to PQR while those to ABC were empty. People with a ticket to A 2 were refused to use the ABC lock when it says PQR on the ticket. Strange when sitting on the A2. There were a lot of people on our seats.)** IFK44M

7.4.2 MFF Supporters

The following chart demonstrates MFF supporters' perceptions of and attitudes towards three main categories found in the data they provided, namely the march, the ingress, and travel/accommodation.

Figure 12: MFF Supporters' Perceptions

According to the findings, the ingress was perceived by the participants more negatively as compared to the remaining two events. Below, I support the quantitative analysis outcomes by providing the reader with qualitative excerpts from the survey.

The responses which detailed events up until their arrival at Liseberg station were seen as largely positive, with 12 respondents describing positive train experiences.

> *Polisen gick med i tåget och var väldigt trevlig och social mot alla supportrar.* **(The police went with the train and were very nice and social towards all supporters)** MFF46F

> *Vi kom med supportertåget och vägen till Ullevi var bra.* **(We came with the support train and the road to Ullevi was good.)** MFF52F

Supporters who travelled by other means were also highly positive about the accommodation for them.

Mycket nöjd med hur saker o ting utfördes i Göteborg. Bra med pakeringar för folk som kört upp. Men även polisen gjorde de bra vad jag såg. Eftersom vi Malmö supportrar va rätt många så är det ibland polisen spårar och gör ingripande som blir risk för allmänheten men inget sådan såg jag. För mig var allt bra faktiskt även när marschen kom till Ullevi gick det fort med att komma in på området. **(Very pleased with how things and things were done in Gothenburg. Good with parking for people who have driven up. But even the police did well what I saw. Since we Malmö supporters are quite many, it is sometimes the police track and make intervention that becomes a risk to the public, but nothing like that I saw. For me, everything was good in fact even when the march came to Ullevi it was quick to enter the area.)** MFF22M

There were however two negative experiences detailed that related to this travel stage.

På vägen mot tåget såg vi inga poliser som utlovat men vi kände oss skapligt säkra ändå för vi var sena så vi gick med barnfamiljer. **(On the way with the train we did not see any police officers as promised but we felt reasonably safe anyway because we were late so we went with families with children.)** MFF40M

Kommer inte på något speciellt. Ganksa dåligt skyltat eller förklarat hur man kommer till olika ställen. Vi gick från göteborg C till Liseberg station vilket tog ca 25 min eftersom vi fick fel info om vilken spårvagn vi skulle ta. Samma när vi skulle tbx, då fick vi fråga runt tills vi hittade de andra som skulle dit **(Can't think of anything special. Really bad signposted or explained how to get to different places. We went from Gothenburg C to Liseberg station which took about 25 mins because we got the wrong info about which tram we**

should take. Same when we were going back, then we had to ask around until we found the others who were going there) MFF17M

It should be noted that these negative remarks relate more to the lack of a police presence and the lack of help for away supporters to find their rendezvous point.

The Supporter March was seen in a similar manner with 19 respondents describing it positively.

*Bra organiserat mellan liseberg-ullevi, allt var lugnt och trevligt.***(Well organized between liseberg-ullevi, everything was calm and nice.)** MFF27F

There was one negative comment made about the march. However, rather than it being a critical point about the organisers or the police, it complimented them while criticising other supporters.

Mycket bra bemötande av polis o övriga arrangörer. Blev lotsade till tågstationen av poliser längs vägen. Tycker det är synd att det behövs då många poliser. Tycker att MFF supportar skräpade ner mycket på vägen mellan Liseberg o Ullevi. **(Very good treatment from police and other organizers. Was guided to the train station by police along the way. It is a pity that many police officers are needed. I think that MFF's supporters left a lot of rubbish on the road between Liseberg and Ullevi.)** MFF54F

Interestingly, there were also 4 very positive comments about the MFF Supporter March from IFK supporters.

Att fansen från MFF gick från stationen i Liseberg. Kanonbra! **(That the fans of MFF went from the station in Liseberg. Really great!)** IFK26M

The home supporters evidently saw the arrangements that kept away supporters out of their own territory as positive.

The first event which is described in overwhelmingly negative terms is the ingress. 104 supporters described the ingress in negative terms while only 10 saw it in a positive light. There were a number of negative issues in particular about the ingress which were discussed such as the queue, overcrowding at the entrance, and ticketing issues. Numerous supporters also pointed out how events like this are where the *risk* in football lies from their point of view.

Långsamt insläpp, risk för att någon blir klämd. Hade nog varit bra med "fållor" en bit ut från insläppet så blir inte risken för nertrampade barn lika stor. **(Slow entry, risk of being crushed. Had probably been good with "enclosures" a bit away from the entrance, then the risk of trampled children will not be as great.)** MFF46M

Whilst some explicitly stated that such situations are likely to lead to violent incidents.

Här hade man kunnat köra fler köer för snabbare insläpp som minskar risken för stök. **(Had there been more queues could have for a faster ingress it would reduce the risk of disorder)** MFF35M

However, as the observational data in Chapter Five illustrated, the crowd remained compliant and there was no violence. The survey responses give a strong indication as to why that was.

Insläppet var katastrof, räddades endast av mffsupportrars goda humör. Trångt,

för få personer i insläppet, kunde blivit farligt! **(The ingress was a disaster,**

saved only by the good mood of the MFF supporters. Crowded, too few

people in the entrance, could become dangerous!) MFF55F

7.4.3 Summary

The supporters' perceptions during the pre-match phase were highly positive, and show

evidence that in this context supporters who do make negative comments are actually making

them about their fellow supporters. This suggests that in the case of a well facilitated march

the police have created a context in which supporters start to self-regulate. The arrival at the

ingress is seen in highly negative terms, and as one respondent points out this is the type of

situation in which conflict becomes likely. However, as some other respondents illustrated

the positive atmosphere created by the facilitation approach 'saved' the situation and

supporters 'urged' each other to remain calm. In other words, the data suggests that when the

conditions for conflict arose it was avoided due to self-regulation within the group by certain

individuals who were empowered by the context created through a police focus on

facilitation.

The three responses from supporters who categorised themselves as supporting neither team

were not included in this stage of the analysis, but it should be highlighted that if SEF's

overall ambition of increasing attendance numbers at Swedish football is to be achieved this

third category may become an area that needs to be planned for by the authorities.

7.5 Perceptions of Policing and Security During Observation One

This section will focus on the theme of policing and security during Observation One. Again, the response from both sets of supporters will be dealt with in turn. The results of the analysis are presented as follows.

Figure 13 – Positive and Negative Comments Provided by Both IFK Supporters and MFF Supporters About Policing and Security

The subject was described in overwhelmingly positive terms across the event and by both supporter groups. IFK supporters made 67 positive comments and 9 negative on the subject. Whilst the MFF supporters made 66 positive comments as opposed to only 7 negative ones. First, the perceptions of the police in general during the event will be discussed and this will then be followed by an analysis of the perceptions of the policing at different stages of the event.

236

7.5.1 IFK Supporters' General Perceptions

IFK supporters made 34 positive comments and no negative comments about the general behaviour of the police.

> *Polisen hade en återhållsam och lugn inställning mot oss hemmasupportrar.* **(The police had a restrained and calm attitude towards us home supporters.)** IFK33M

> *Polisen var relativt osynlig vilket var bra.* **(The police were relatively invisible which was good.)** IFK34M

> *Positivt att polisen höll avstånd. Skapade lugn.* (**Positive that the police kept their distance. Created calm.**) IFK37M

As the above comments demonstrate, the positive perceptions of the policing described are consistent with the Graded Tactical Approach, whilst these responses often link it directly to creating a calm atmosphere. The police use of dialogue was also highly commended.

> *Viktigt med dialog mellan supportar, klubben och polis. Bra idag, kan bli ännu bättre!* **(Important with dialogue between supporters, the club and police. Good today, can be even better!)** Male 29 years IFK Supporter

7.5.2 Timeline of IFK Supporter Perceptions

Figure 14 - IFK Supporter Perceptions of the Police Presented Chronologically Through the Event (Obvs 1)

IFK supporters described all the events up until the arrival at the stadium as overwhelmingly positive, with the behaviour of officers being notably commended at the march and the ingress.

> *Bra innan match med polis som inte stressade upp i marsch osv. Uppenbarligen skötte de arbetet eftersom det inte blev konfrontation.* **(Good before a match with police who did not stress up in march etc. Obviously, they were doing the work because there was no confrontation.)** IFK31M

There were negative comments made about the policing and security. However, the majority of these negative comments were about the lack of personnel in the stands or the failure to stop other supporters from bringing in pyrotechnic devices.

> *Bra visitering av vakter, trevliga vakter och poliser. Lagom många av poliser och vakter. Den enda missen är att bengaler kommer in. Jag får sitta och andas i min halsduk för jag tål inte röken från bengalerna. Så mer visitering av klackarna tack.* Female **(Good inspection of guards, nice guards and police. Quite a lot of cops and guards. The only problem is that Bengals come in. I had to sit and breathe through my scarf because I can't stand the smoke from the Bengals. So more visitation of the active sections please.)** IFK52M

The most negative comment made by IFK supporters about the police during the event illustrates a valuable point about the Conflict Reducing Principles.

> *Enda dåliga från matchen jag kommer ihåg just nu var när en polis kom fram och kommenterade vår svartklädda klädsel (som vi har för att försvåra identifiering vid bränningar) efter matchen och nämnde att den såg väldigt dyster ut. Sådant bygger upp aggressioner mot polisen hos folk väldigt snabbt.* **(The only bad thing from the match I remember right now was when a police officer came forward and commented on our black-clad attire (which we have to avoid being identified whilst burning flares) after the match and mentioned that it looked very funereal. This is how aggression against the police builds up people very quickly.)** IFK20M

The officer referred to probably did not mean to upset these supporters. It sounds like this was an attempt to engage supporters in dialogue, and reflects the police desire to use communication to build bridges with the supporter community. However, the officer lacked

the knowledge of ultra culture necessary to engage with the supporters that are part of these types of subgroups and the action actually had the reverse effect. This survey response illustrates the need for specialist officers who have an in depth knowledge of supporter culture when attempting to engage with particular groups within the supporter community.

7.5.3 MFF Supporters' General Perceptions

Similar to the IFK Supporters, 37 MFF Supporters made comments referencing the police or security in a positive way throughout the day.

> *Mycket bra bemötande från publikvärdar och polis.* **(Very good treatment from stewards and police.)** MFF29M

However, this can be contrasted with only 2 negative comments made about the general demeanour. In this case both comments specifically used words which would usually be interpreted as Stewards or Security Guards.

> *Otrevliga ordningsvakter* **(Unpleasant guards)** MFF32M

7.5.4 Timeline of MFF Supporter Perceptions

Figure 15 - MFF Supporter Perceptions of the Police Presented Chronologically Through the Event (Obvs 1)

The policing up until the arrival at the stadium was all seen as positive. The predominant themes across all these phased based remarks were about the police communication and use of discretion.

> *När vi skulle gå från Liseberg till Ullevi gick allt helt perfekt! Man kunde fråga polisen saker och dom svara artigt!* **(When we should go from Liseberg to Ullevi everything went completely perfect! One could ask the police things and they respond politely)** MFF21M

Whilst some also commented about how it was somewhat different to their expectations.

Blev direkt förvånad över polisens agerande vid marschen (Malmös). De brukar ha ett väldigt hotfullt sätt att bete sig mot supportrar. Denna gången var det leenden, skämt och dialog. Mycket bra! Dessutom ett öppet brev från polisen till alla supportrar med information, där man höll god ton genom hela brevet. (**Was immediately surprised by the police's behavior at the march (Malmös). They usually have a very hateful way of behaving towards supporters. This time it was smiles, jokes and dialogue. Very good! In addition, an open letter from the police to all supporters with information, where they kept good tone throughout the letter.**) MFF17M

Figure 16 - The Letter Sent by Gothenburg Police to the Malmö Supporters

The majority of the negative comments about policing and security were all related to the match stage and the post-match stage. However, whilst most of the positive responses in our timeline commend both the police and the security together, these two stages' responses make distinctions. Firstly, there were those that criticised the stewards inside the stadium.

> *Dålig koll från publikvärdar då man inte fick sin köpta plats på övre etage. Ingen koll på fördelningen av folk mellan sektionerna.* **(Poor checking from stewards then people do not find their seats on the upper floor. No control over the distribution of people between the sections.)** MFF34M

Whilst the second set of negative comments refer directly to the police and all revolve around the lack of the 'agreed' hold back.

> *Det mesta var bra utom att man inte fick ta med öl in på arenan samt att polisen ej eskorterade supportrar enligt överenskommelsen..* **(Most things were good except that you were not allowed to bring beer into the arena and that the police did not escort supporters according to the agreement ..)** MFF17M

Rather than criticising police action here, the supporters were critical of the fact that the police had agreed a course of action which they had not followed. In essence, this criticism is of the police failure to behave in the pre-agreed manner and protect the supporters. Yet despite this, the majority of comments about the policing after the match were positive.

> *bra guidning från Göteborgspolisen hela vägen till Göteborg c* **(good guidance from the Gothenburg Police all the way to Gothenburg c)** MFF26M

Whilst some even excused the police failure to implement the pre-agreed plan due to the manner in which the officers on the ground reacted to the situation.

*Att när vi omdirigerades, efter matchen, pga en kommunikationsmiss inom polisen -
att det gjordes respektfullt och ursäktande istället för med, som det brukar vara,
med piska och hot* **(That when we were redirected, after the match, due to a
communication failure within the police - that it was done respectfully
and apologetically instead of with, as it usually is, with whip and threats)**
MFF36M

Even when the police did have to act in order to arrest a supporter, this action was seen as
legitimate and the incident was included in the responses when asked for examples of good
event management.

*Incident när Malmöit försökte stjäla halsduk från gbg-supporter efter matchen. Jag
försökte lugna ner honom men polis kom relativt omgående och tog hand om honom
på ett lugnt sätt. Inte alls den upplevelsen jag är van vid då polisen allt som oftast
överreagerar och använder väldigt mycket våld mot fotbollssupportrar* **(Incident
when Malmö supporter tried to steal scarf from gbg supporters after the
match. I tried to calm him down but the police came relatively quickly and
took care of him in a calm way. Not at all the experience I am used to
when the police often overreact and use a lot of violence against football
supporters)** MFF25M

It is also important to highlight that this response describes the supporter's own attempts to
self-police his fellow ingroup member.

7.5.4 Summary

Positive perceptions of the police were directly linked to descriptions of police action that is consistent with the CRP. These assertions from supporters themselves exemplify how such policing is strongly correlated with positive perceptions of the police and group self-regulation, thus demonstrating why the police should be focusing more on facilitation. However, in order to strengthen this argument it is necessary to analyse supporter perceptions in a context which lacked police implemented facilitation.

7.6 MFF Supporter Perceptions of Policing and Security in Observation Four

This final section will seek to analyse the home supporters' police perceptions in Observation Four. The observational descriptions and analysis in Chapter Five showed that there was relatively little facilitation from the police for the home supporters in both Observations Three[50] and Four. Both sets of supporters' police perceptions were analysed. However, in Observation Four we have the same supporter group that had previously described the police in overwhelmingly positive terms when policed according to the CRP. Therefore, this section will focus only on them as it allows for a comparison with the police perceptions seen in Observation One's dataset.

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[50] Please see Appendix F for a behavioural account of Observation Three.

7.6.1 Perceptions of the Police

Of the 166 supporters who completed the survey for Observation Four 148 categorised themselves as MFF Supporters[51]. 34 of those supporters made negative comments about the policing while 18 supporters made positive comments. Of the 34 negative comments made about policing, 27 of those supporters made negative comments that were related directly to the events of the match. There were also 16 supporters who made comments related to the policing of football in Sweden in general. 9 of which had already made negative comments about that match specifically, whilst the remaining 7 voiced negative comments about policing but made no reference to the policing of the match specifically.

This should be contrasted to the 102 home supporters that made negative comments about logistical issues in and around the stadium such as the queues, the kiosks or the toilet facilities. Although not directly related to policing this does add to the principle of knowledge and once again reiterates the supporters' desire to be facilitated during an event.

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[51] The other responses were submitted by 17 DIF supporters and 1 OIS supporter (a Superettan team in Gothenburg)

Figure 17 – Supporters' Perceptions of the Police

It is somewhat surprising that there are 18 positive comments about the police. In Observation One MFF Supporters had made 37 positive comments but this appeared to be correlated to the facilitation focused CRP based policing. Therefore, one would expect that in the context of relatively little police facilitation in Observation Four, there would be relatively few positive comments about the police.

7.6.2 Positive Perceptions of the Police in Observation Four

With an unexpected number of positive comments about the police it seems very important to understand what was considered positive about the policing. This segment will thus unpack those positive perceptions.

Evenemangs

The largest share of positive comments about the police during the event revolved around the handling of the situation at the segregation line during the match. Eight supporters all commended the work of the police.

> *Blev lite småbråk vid bortasektionen (där man såg någon djurgårdare kasta något).*
> *Kan ha blivit provocerad av någon från hemmasektionen dock osäkert då jag bara*
> *såg när kaoset började. Vakter/polis va snabbt på plats för att sära och lugna ner*
> *grupperingarna. Bra jobbat. Var en annan situation där en man (något berusad)*
> *började skrika och ha sig, dock ok så länge han inte skapar bråk. Fanns alltid vakter*
> *på plats nära honom som hade koll (som även pratade med honom då och då).*
> *Tumme upp för jobbet.* **(There was a little incident at the away section**
> **(where you saw some DIF supporter throw something). May have been**
> **provoked by someone from the home section though unsure as I only saw**
> **when the chaos started. Guards / police were quickly in place to secure**
> **and calm down the groupings. Well done. Was another situation where a**
> **man (slightly drunk) started screaming and having his own, though ok as**
> **long as he did not cause trouble. There were always guards on site near**
> **him who had a check (who also talked to him occasionally). Thumbs up**
> **for the job.)** MFF31M

The speed, low profile and dialogue based response of the officers in combination with the other stakeholders (eg: DIF SLO, Security Guards) was highly commended. We should bear in mind though that, just as the observational data and analysis highlighted, this de-escalation was performed by the two Stockholm Evenemangs Officers. The Officers who travel around the country with the three clubs from Stockholm and whose modus operandi is based upon the CRP.

It should also be noted that one supporter who commented on the handling of this segregation line incident had not even noticed the Evenemangs Officer's involvement.

> *Bortsektionen upplevdes stökig vid 1-0 målet och där kom då fler matchvärdar och något som såg ut som Djurgårdenpersonal och hjälpte till med ordningen utan att förstärka. Det resulterade att inga mer stökiga incidenter. Hade polisen agerat hade situationen blivit svårare. Bra beslut!* **(The away section felt messy at the 1-0 goal and there came more match hosts and something that looked like Djurgården staff and helped with the order without reinforcing. This resulted in no more messy incidents. Had the police acted, the situation would have been more difficult. Good decision)** MFF31M

The fact that this supporter did not recognise that there was police involvement speaks to the modus operandi of the Evenemangs Officers who, in collaboration with other stakeholders, can work to de-escalate situations without the need to use large numbers of officers and thus help maintain the graded approach.

Low Profile Policing

The ability to use the graded approach was the next most common positive comment made about the policing operation at Observation Four. Eight supporters made positive comments

on this subject. Three of which commended the total absence of the police for them personally.

> *Jag märkte inte av varken polis eller personal under matchen, vilket väl får ses som en bra sak eftersom jag var där för att se på fotboll. Jag gick in, gick till min plats, såg på matchen och gick ut.* **(I did not notice either police or staff during the match, which may well be a good thing because I was there to watch football. I went in, went to my seat, watched the match and walked out.)** MFF36M

Whilst the other five comments were related to the low profile presence or calm manner from their perspective.

> *Polisen höll sig undan gångbanor och inga polishästar hade skitit ner gräset så man kunde gå även där.* **(Police stayed away from walkways and no police horses had shat on the grass so you could walk there too.)** MFF30M

Prosecution

Two supporters commended the police attempts to prosecute supporters who use pyrotechnics.

> *Bra att polisen filmar bengalbrännarna, så att man kan stänga av dem. Läste att några var påverkade, en stor säkerhetsrisk för övriga supportrar.* **(Good that the police are filming the flare burners, so you can turn them off. Read that some were affected, a major security risk for other supporters.)** MFF55F

Two supporters made comments which could be seen as reflecting positively on high profile policing and highlighted the link between large police numbers and a feeling of safety.

> *Noterade att det var många poliser utanför efter evenemangets slut vilket även det bidrar till att skapa en viss trygghet (även om det i grunden är trist att det behövs).* **(Noted that there were many policemen outside after the end of the event which also helps to create some security (although it is basically sad that it is needed).)** MFF41M

Summary

Rather than just view all 18 positive comments about the police as positive endorsements of a high profile approach, it is perhaps better to say that actually 13 of these comments were endorsements of CRP consistent police action and that support for the high profile approach is not widespread. It is also interesting to reflect on how it was the work of the two Evenemangs Officers with the away supporters that garnered the most positive comments about policing during the event from the home supporters. If we consider police legitimacy as being key to encouraging crowds to self-regulate, then surely deploying one or two more of this type of officer could present a wise investment for the police.

7.6.3 Negative Perceptions of the Police During Observation Four

Having unpacked the positive perceptions of the police, it now becomes important to understand what supporters considered to be negative about the policing approach. This segment will undertake such an endeavour.

Bearing remarkable consistency with ESIM theory, when the police were spoken about in negative terms it was mostly for not using a CRP based approach. Of the 27 supporters who made negative comments about the policing approach during the match, all 27 of those made comments that criticised the police for using high profile deterrence based tactics.

There was one supporter who criticised the police for not taking a tougher approach with the DIF supporters. In response to question 7 (asking for examples of poor crowd management during the event) he stated:

> *Just vad ordningsvakter/polis INTE gjorde vid DIF-supportrarna.* **(Just what the security guards/ police DID NOT do with the DIF supporters.)** MFF22M

However, the same respondent was also very critical of the control focused approach to the home supporters.

> *Förstår inte det enorma fokuset på MFF klacken från ordningsvakter samt polis. Det är aldrig stökigt på vår läktare.* **(Don't understand the huge focus on MFF active sections from police guards and police. It's never messy on our stands.)** MFF22M

Therefore, I think it would be safer to conclude that the supporter is actually frustrated that there is an apparent inconsistency between the police approach to home and away supporters. Thus, this criticism of the police for not using more repression with away supporters is borne out of a perceived unfairness and not an actual desire for more repression.

Aside from the previously discussed comments, all other negative comments made about the police action during the event can all be categorized as relating to high profile deterrence

based policing. This can further be subdivided into comments about over aggressive policing, and the over deployment/ wasting of police resources. Each subcategory will now be discussed in turn. While these two categories have been clarified in this analysis, supporters often linked the one with the other and therefore they should be considered inextricably linked.

Aggressive Policing

The largest of these subcategories was that of over aggressive policing. 16 supporters commented upon this issue. It is also interesting to note that while all other categories contain responses from a wide range of age groups, this category's responses came from a predominantly younger demographic. The respondents' ages in this category were: 16, 17, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23, 23, 25, 29, 30, and 31.

Those supporters who described aggressive policing pointed out how it was perceived as disproportionate.

> *Hotfull stämning då polisen förföljer supportrar som är påväg till matchen. Inget bråk mellan supportrar igår, ändå väljer polisen att gripa folk. Polisen spottar supportrar i rakt i ansiktet när de gör så här och visar att man inte alls vill samarbeta.* **(Hateful atmosphere as the police follow supporters who are on their way to the match. No trouble between supporters yesterday, yet the police choose to arrest people. Police spit supporters straight in the face when they do this and show that they do not want to co-operate at all.)** MFF19M

The subject of the arrests was particularly poignant.

Polisen var väldigt hungriga dock. Grep folk till höger och vänster. **(The police were very hungry though. Arrest people right and left.)** MFF22M

As our observations showed, the only arrests of home supporters were for the use of pyrotechnics. Such focus on pyrotechnic repression was also perceived as illegitimate.

Polisens häxjakt på Bengalbrännande. **(The police's witch-hunt for those who burn flares.)** MFF25M

The use of overt surveillance as a method of deterrence for pyro was also considered a very negative aspect of the policing operation.

Att polisen bevakar läktaren i hopp om att identitera folk, stör mig. Jag tycker pyrotekniken är stämningshöjande. **(The police are guarding the stands in hopes of identifying people, disturbing me. I think pyrotechnics are mood-enhancing.)** MFF18M

Apart from as a very visual symbol of control it is hard to understand what addition this tactic of filming supporters makes. The Malmö Stadion has an extensive state of the art camera system. As such, it provides a far more complete visual record of supporter actions than an officer with a hand held video camera ever could. So it is hard to argue that these recordings are giving the police extra evidence or information.

This subject was often linked to police over deployment and the wasting of police resources.

> *Polisen filmade läktaren och jagar supras som vanligt, istället för att lösa riktiga brott.* **(Police filmed the stands and chasing supras as usual, instead of solving real crimes.)** MFF23M

> *Polisen borde inte ha minst fyra personer som filmar ståplats genom hela evenemanget om dem har sådan resursbrist som dem påstår.* **(Police should not have at least four people filming pitches throughout the event if they have such a shortage of resources as they claim.)** MFF19M

While the focus on controlling pyrotechnics was linked to the over deployment and wasting of police resources, when supporters made more extensive comments about the over deployment it was linked to an increase in police-supporter tensions.

> *Jag har inga personliga negativa erfarenheter från det här evenemanget. Dock har jag hört från vänner som satt på södra sidan av stadion att det va lite obehagligt att det var väldigt många (Sex stycken piketbussar) poliser som stod och hängde utanför. Det är bra med en polisiär närvaro under de här matcherna men det finns andra sätt för polisen att hantera situationen.* **(I have no personal negative experiences from this event. However, I have heard from friends who were sitting on the south side of the stadium that it was a bit uncomfortable that there were very many (Six riot vans) police officers placed outside. A police presence is good during these matches, but there are other ways for the police to handle the situation.)** MFF32M

> *Alldeles för mycket poliser som bara stod och kollade. Skapar otrygg känsla med så många poliser tycker jag. Är rädd att dom ska gå in på läktaren och skapa oreda.*

Vill inte riskera att folk skräms bort från svenska läktare genom polisens agerande och att det känns otryggt. **(Clearly too many police officers who were just watching. Creates an unsafe feeling with so many cops I think. Are afraid that they will go into the stands and create disorder. Don't want to risk people being scared away from Swedish stands by the police 's actions and feeling safe.)** MFF23F

Policing during Observation Four was perceived negatively for two reasons. It was perceived as over aggressive and as an over deployment. These two perceptions were not mutually exclusive but rather are a reflection of each other, it is also clear that such perceptions create a sense of police illegitimacy as the police are seen to be wasting resources and escalating tensions through such deployments.

7.6.4 General Perceptions of Police at Football in Sweden

16 supporters made negative comments about the policing of football in Sweden in general. These general negative comments were largely similar to those already discussed in the previous section.

Jag vill understryka at även om jag förstår att det är viktigt och nödvändigt med en stor polisiär närvaro under dessa högriskmatcher så kan deras närvaro också uppfattas som provocerande och läskig. Det är enligt min mening mycket bättre om polisen syns i mindre grupper och sedan finns nära till hands OM (och endast om) det skulle behövas. Jag tror att det kan bli så att när polisen förväntar sig att det ska uppstå negativa situationer så kan de ibland vara de som skapar de negativa situationerna. **(I want to emphasize that although I understand that it is important and necessary to have a large police presence during these high risk matches but their presence can also be perceived as provocative**

256

and scary. In my opinion, it is much better if the police are visible in smaller groups and then there is close at hand IF (and only if) it would be needed. I think it may be that when the police expect negative situations to occur, they can sometimes be the ones who create the negative situations.) MFF32M

However, in addition, there was one other salient issue mentioned; The desire to not be treated as criminals.

Se inte oss som kriminella. Vi är där för att vi älskar vårt lag. 0,1% är ute efter bråk... **(Do not see us as criminals. We are there because we love our team. 0.1% are looking for violence...)** MFF22M

Behandla oss som Supporter och inte kriminella. **(Treat us as Supporters and not as criminals.)** MFF36M

It would seem that, for the Malmö Supporters at least, the control focused policing strategy used in Region South is creating a long term perceptual context of police illegitimacy in which supporters feel they are treated as criminals. As such, this strategy is doing the opposite of building relations with the supporter community; which was actually one of the stated goals for the police in Region South during the 2017 season.

7.6.5 Summary

The analysis of home supporter police perceptions during Observation Four demonstrates that positive perceptions of the police correlate with descriptions of policing methods that are CRP consistent. The negative perceptions of the police all correlate with descriptions of policing methods that are not CRP consistent.

The perception that the police are behaving in an over aggressive way and over deploying is also creating a medial and distal context in which supporters perceive themselves as being treated like criminals.

Conclusions

This chapter had one main goal; To demonstrate how a focus on facilitation can affect the perceptions of those within the crowd. The analysis explored how the policing approaches detailed and analysed in the preceding chapters affected supporter perceptions during the observations in their own words. It has been demonstrated that not only did a focus on facilitation enhance perceptions of police legitimacy, but it also encouraged an atmosphere of self-regulation amongst the supporters when the conditions for conflict did arise. Conversely, when the police focused more on control centric tactics the opposite appeared true in terms of perceptions of police legitimacy.

The data presented in this chapter suggests that a focus on facilitation can help the police to avoid the vulnerabilities highlighted in the previous chapters. Conversely, it also demonstrated how supporters perceived the police to be acting somewhat illegitimately in a context lacking in police facilitation. The final section suggested how the proximal perceptions created in this context translated into distal negative perceptions of the police from the supporter perspective. The data here seems to support the notion from the previous chapter that over aggressive policing and over deployment of officers is a contributary factor in creating distal vulnerabilities for the police.

The quantity of the responses allowed me to attempt to relate the perceptual to the behavioural in a quantitative format. However, this approach was reflexive and only enacted when the huge quantity of data became apparent. The response rate was unexpected and

originally it was planned that the survey data would simply provide a section to the analysis of the observations chapter, and not a complete chapter of its own. Due to this, there were some limitations to the design of the survey. If a future PAR cycle includes a survey instrument then the design of that survey must ensure it can accommodate such large numbers.

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Key Contributions

This final chapter of the thesis will wrap up the academic work presented here in relation to the aims highlighted in Chapter One. They were as follows:

1. To observe and critically analyse how the recommendations produced in the 2016 Enable report had been implemented.
2. To understand what effect the implementation of these recommendations had had on intergroup dynamics.
3. To comprehend why some recommendations had not been implemented.
4. To explore ESIM as a framework to understand intergroup dynamics.
5. To extract recommendations and lessons learned for Sweden and the wider football policing community.

In order to draw out how these aims have been achieved, this chapter will be divided into five segments. I will begin by summarising the key findings of the three empirical studies in Section 8.1. This summary focuses on the insights attained through the analysis of three sets of data, namely observation data (Chapter Five), interview data (Chapter Six), and survey data (Chapter Seven). As such, this first section is designed primarily to observe and critically analyse how the Enable 2016 recommendations had been implemented (Aim One). However, it also draws out points which discuss both the effect of this implementation (Aim Two) and why some recommendations had not been implemented (Aim Three). Both Aims Two and Three are then explored further in the following Section (8.2), which will present an integrated view of the main results of this empirical project. This section outlines the main contributions made by the findings to the ESIM and the 'classical' theories of the crowd, and provides a synthesis of how exactly the results of the study support and challenge the existing

theories of the crowd and crowd management. In other words, this second segment explores ESIM as a framework for understanding group dynamics (Aim 4) by first showing how my work challenges the 'classical' theories of the crowd and then validates and critiques ESIM. In addition, this section uses a theoretical lens to understand and explain both the effects of the recommendations (Aim Two) and why there was not a total implementation of them (Aim Three). The third section (8.3) will then review the main theoretical and practical implications arising from the results of this thesis in order to extract recommendations and lessons learned for Sweden and the wider football policing community (Aim Five). This analysis is related to how the findings of the study could inform future works on the subject of social identities. Briefly, this section also outlines how the study could inform new approaches to crowd policing. The penultimate section (8.4) provides a reflective statement and acknowledges the limitations of the study. This part also discusses what could have been done differently. Finally the thesis will be concluded with the key messages of the thesis and some personal reflections in section 8.5.

8.1. Summary of the Findings

As shown in Chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis was to proceed with the monitoring and analysis stages of the PAR cycle of the Enable Project (Stott et al., 2016). According to Elliot (1991), the monitoring and analysis stages were tasked with observing the implementation of a particular intervention (in this case, the recommendations made in the 2016 Enable report) and explaining its effects while acknowledging any failures in the implementation process. The study, therefore, aimed to observe and critically analyse how the recommendations produced in the 2016 Enable report had been implemented and what effect their implementation had had on intergroup dynamics. To achieve this overarching aim, the thesis primarily relied on the ESIM as its theoretical framework, acknowledging the lack of ESIM-based research outside of the context of football crowds in the UK (Stott and Reicher, 1998a; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). This overarching aim was broken down into five sub aims. The first

of those aims will be addressed in this section. Primarily, this section seeks to observe and critically analyse how the recommendations produced in the 2016 Enable report have been implemented (Aim One). However, at points throughout this section the next two aims will also be touched upon when this critical analysis enables us to understand the effects of those recommendations (Aim Two) and comprehend the lack of implementation (Aim Three). This section will be composed of two parts. The first will talk about how I approached these aims with reference to the individual studies and what was learned from each one, and the second part will discuss the data and analysis from all three studies to show how it fits together to allow us to properly monitor and analyse the Enable 2016 PAR recommendations.

8.1.1 Key Studies

In order to achieve the aims of the thesis I conducted three key studies. Each will now be briefly summarised in order to explicitly demonstrate how these studies mapped onto those aims and what those studies told us.

Chapter 5

This chapter drew on data from four large scale observations conducted in April 2017. This involved the use of large teams of around 15 observers (made up of highly experienced crowd experts- including myself) observing a football match day operation and then reconvening in a 3 hour workshop the next day to create a triangulated consensual account of the day's events. This study was done to monitor implementation in situ and critically analyse. This observational data was then thematically analysed and translated into thematic maps. It showed that there was an overarching police desire to focus on crowd control on the day of the event which was often achieved at the expense of creating long term positive relationships with the community that they policed. On the other hand, when the police focus was on facilitation the police reaped numerous benefits in terms of crowd compliance and

increasingly good police-supporter interactions. Unfortunately, it showed that the focus on facilitation (Recommendation One) was only partially implemented and the other two recommendations (addressing the inconsistencies in the national approach and separating the spotter and dialogue role) were not.

Chapter Six

This chapter used data from 11 interviews with supporters and 20 interviews with police officers conducted over the course of the 2018 Allsvenskan. It was designed to follow up observations and understand gaps, barriers, and successful implementation from police and supporter perspectives. This data was then thematically analysed using a multi-perspective approach. It demonstrated that both supporters and police tended to categorise the other group in terms of a minority and a majority. Although while police saw the majority of supporters in positive terms, the supporters saw the majority of officers in negative terms. It was the behaviour of members of the outgroup that created a 'legacy of illegitimacy' which then was an obstacle to implementing the other recommendations made in the Enable 2016 Report. Most police officers tended to think in the short term; Predominantly, about crowd control on the day of an event and did not pay attention to the legacy effect of these control methods. They also tended to see other officers who attempted more crowd management focused approaches as contravening police identity norms and being guilty of 'friend corruption'.

Chapter Seven

This final empirical chapter used data from 702 qualitative responses contained in 1433 online supporter surveys conducted alongside the 2017 observations mentioned in Chapter Five. This chapter was aimed at exploring in depth the effect of a police focus on facilitation from a supporter perspective. Here I employed a previously unused method in ESIM based

studies to quantify the qualitative data and explore how widespread perceptions were and how they could change throughout an event. This chapter demonstrated the temporal nature of crowd perceptions and showed a link between police facilitation and positive perceptions within the crowd. Respondents then directly linked the positive atmosphere created by a facilitation approach to the crowd's ability to self-regulate when the conditions for conflict did arise. On the other hand, it also provided further evidence that crowd control techniques employed by the police reinforced the legacy of illegitimacy.

8.1.2 Monitoring and Analysis

The thesis demonstrated that the implementation of the recommendations made in the 2016 Enable report has so far been inconsistent. Specifically, that report had focused on the following issues.

1. A lack of emphasis on facilitation.
2. Strong inconsistencies in the national approach to crowd management.
3. The separation of the spotter and dialogue roles.

As shown throughout Chapters Five to Seven, the Swedish police have implemented approaches indicative of a greater emphasis on facilitation. For instance, the Event Police and the Evenemangs Officers were observed establishing a dialogue with supporters or, in several cases, offering advice and other help to the representatives of football crowds. A prime case being in Observation Two, when these officers facilitated both medical and mechanical aid for supporters which enabled them to attend the match (Chapter 5 Section 5.3.3 and Appendix F). However, the deployment of the Event Police did not necessarily reflect any substantial changes in how police officers viewed football crowds and facilitation. As shown in Chapter Six, police officers could still conform to the 'classical' theories of the crowd, in which crowds are separated into 'peaceful' majorities and 'violent' minorities (Chapter 6 Section 6.2.1.) (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). From this perspective, the types of

facilitation prescribed in the 2016 Enable report (e.g., establishing long-term relationships with supporters) lacked a theoretical and practical rationale. If the main objective of the police officers is to physically separate the representatives of the 'majority' groups from 'violent' minorities, there is no reason for these stakeholders to engage in dialogue or emphasise facilitation.

Furthermore, the observations demonstrated that the methods deployed by the more facilitation focused units (Event Police, Malmö Supporter Police and the Stockholm Evenemangs) could be in disagreement with how other police units may choose to respond to emerging risks and incidents. As an illustration, in Observation 4, both the Event Police and the Malmö Supporter Police frequently requested the removal of police vehicles, as their presence could be seen as an unjustified deployment of excessive force. Nonetheless, in disagreement with the graded tactical approach, these requests were not satisfied by commanders and other decision-makers (Chapter 5 Section 5.3.4 and Appendix F). Contributing to the 2016 Enable report, the study showed that the lack of unity in how police officers perceived crowds challenged the implementation of the recommendations originally made by the Enable project (Stott et al., 2016). The actions of the Event Police, the Malmö Supporter Police and the Stockholm Evenemangs implied that these officers were aware that excessive deployments of force and other responses that could have been perceived as illegitimate by the supporters could drive the establishment of confrontational social identities. However, this opinion was not shared by several other officers interviewed during this research project. Fans' responses to 'illegitimate' police responses were in line with the ESIM by contributing to the establishment of a legacy of illegitimacy and diminishing trust between the police and the supporters (Stott & Pearson, 2006; Stott & Drury, 2000), as emphasised by the following interview extract:

> Interviewee 28 (Football Supporter): We [my partner and I] had a long discussion about this cos his children are 9 and 11 and the important thing for us - even though

we don't really like the police not in football nor in political life - I have very little trust in the police. Like I've seen so many things happening where the police didn't have to be so violent. But anyway, so we talked about this. Like how are we going to tell the children cos we really want them - like if they're one day in a situation we want them to be able to trust the police and actually call the police and that for them… [silence]

Interviewer: So, this transfers outside of the football?

Interviewee 28: Yeah, so this goes everywhere. So, they were like 'Oh so did the police do this [severely injure participant's partner]?' 'Yeah!', cos we didn't want to lie them either cos the police did actually do this to him. But then we said there is also good police, so you don't have to be afraid.

Interviewer: Who are the good police?

0028: Honestly, I don't really know.

Therefore, the lack of emphasis on facilitation could threaten the establishment of stable and mutually respectful relationships between supporters and the Swedish police inside and outside of football events.

The findings suggested that there was a lack of consistent strategies and approaches to crowd management at the national level. While the police chose to implement the graded tactical approach to manage all four fixtures discussed in Chapter Five, the exact crowd management measures employed by the local police at each match differed. For example, officers attempted to record fans' behaviours on video during the post-match stage in Observation 4; this tactic was not employed when managing other fixtures (Chapter 5 Section 5.3.4 and Appendix F). The lack of national consistency meant that it was difficult for fans to form accurate expectations of police behaviours, further contributing to the continued reinforcement of the legacy of illegitimacy (Stott & Pearson, 2006; Stott & Drury, 2000). The police, in turn, only exhibited a limited degree of awareness of how inconsistent decision-making at the local level could challenge police-supporter relationships. As a result, several of

the interviewed police officers expressed a desire to continue to implement intrusive or coercive means of policing (e.g., the 'German surveillance' method- Chapter Six Section 6.2.3.), even when there were few immediate risks to public safety and well-being.

The study acknowledges that inconsistencies in the national approach to crowd management could be explained by the fact that police approaches to each individual fixture depended on contextual factors. For instance, the implementation of additional security measures at the stadium entrances in Observation 2 was caused by the recent Islamic State attack in Stockholm (Chapter 5 Section 5.3.2 and Appendix F). Additionally, the police used historical data about fans' behaviours (such as the intensity of the rivalries between the fans of certain teams) to inform the deployment of forces (Chapter 5 Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and Appendix F). Nonetheless, the findings questioned whether this information was a valid indicator of crowd behaviours and the risks posed by fans to the safety and well-being of the general public. Consistent with the ESIM, the use of historical data to inform police approaches to crowd management could intensify intergroup conflicts between heterogeneous football crowds and the police (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Giulianotti, 1994). Explaining this result, the interviewed fans were aware that the information used by the police to predict supporters' behaviours was inaccurate. Or as one supporter put it "they [the police] have no research about what a supporter is" (Interviewee 16- Football Supporter - Chapter Six Section 6.2.1.). Consequently, the police could be perceived as an illegitimate group, the actions of which prevent fans from expressing their individual identities.

Further acknowledging the issues with how crowd management is approached in Sweden, there was no separation between the spotter and dialogue roles in Regions West or South, despite this recommendation being explicitly made in the 2016 Enable Report (Stott et al., 2016). Specifically, in all four observations, the Event Police fulfilled a variety of functions, including communicating with fans, addressing supporters' requests, and attempting to reduce the intensity of the conflict between fans and other police officers. As a result, the

interviewed fans tended to group police officers into two relatively homogenous groups; 'legitimate' officers (including the Event Police and the Malmö Supporter Police) and 'illegitimate' officers such as the Delta Police. Such a separation, arguably, prevented the establishment of positive long-term relationships between fans and the police units that the supporters did not assign to the 'legitimate' group. A clear separation of the spotter and dialogue roles may disincentivise the establishment of such inaccurate perceptions of police officers and improve the degree to which facilitation is applied in crowd management in Sweden.

8.2. Implications for Theory

This section seeks to relate the work undertaken in this thesis to theory. More specifically it will explore ESIM as a framework to understand intergroup dynamics (Aim Four). In order to do that it is divided into two sections. The first will analyse the contributions of my work to the 'classical' theories of the crowd. The second will then use ESIM as a theoretical frame to understand the work presented in the previous chapters. By doing this, I intend to validate and critique ESIM, while also using the theoretical perspective discussed here to further understand the effects of (Aim Two), and obstacles to (Aim Three), implementation.

8.2.1. Contributions to the 'Classical' Theories of the Crowd

As shown in the literature review (Chapters Two and Three), the 'classical' theories of the crowd separated heterogeneous groups into 'peaceful' majorities and 'violent' minorities (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). In turn, the proximity of minorities and majorities may mean that 'peaceful' groups could become susceptible to the spread of pro-confrontational ideas. From the 'classical' perspective, the main task of the police is to physically separate the representatives of majority groups from 'violent' minorities. This study strongly challenged

that idea. Throughout all four observations, there were isolated incidents of the away supporters engaging in confrontations with the police or with the home supporters. However, these incidents were successfully managed through dialogue, either by the representatives of the crowds, the more facilitation focused Police units (Event Police/ Malmö Supporter Police/ Stockholm Evenemangs), or the stadium security staff. The 'classical' theories of the crowd implied that crowds could become 'infected' by the spread of 'violent' ideas; this claim was also supported by several of the interviewed police officers (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). This thesis therefore suggests that such a point of view lacks a practical justification.

The 'classical' theorists of the crowd also failed to comment on whether fans were aware of how the police separated crowds into majorities and minorities (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). Contributing to this theoretical gap, this study demonstrates that fans are highly knowledgeable about such perceptions of football crowds. According to the interviewed supporters, the 'classical' point of view is outdated and discriminatory. Fans are also aware of how the 'classical' theories of the crowd guide how the police approach crowd management. Specifically, the participants do not consider themselves predisposed to violence and perceive excessive deployments of police forces as unsafe. Further expanding the critique of the minority-majority distinction, many of the interviewed police officers do not acknowledge that following the 'classical' theories of the crowd could contribute to the legacies of perceived illegitimacy and the establishment of pro-confrontational social identities among supporters.

Additionally, highlighting the unique contributions made by the study, the thesis suggests that football fans similarly divide other crowds, including police officers, into majority and minority groups (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). In this case, the Malmö Supporter Police and the Event Police are frequently included in the 'legitimate' minority category while the Delta Units and the Romeo (surveillance) Officers are assigned to the 'illegitimate' majority group. The traces of the 'classical' theories of the crowd may, therefore, be found not only in how

police officers treat crowds but also in how supporters treat police officers. Following such a rigid classification of crowds into 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' groups could reinforce stereotypes about police officers and threaten the stability of supporter-police relations. Another noticeable division into majorities and minorities occurs when police officers describe their colleagues who explicitly follow the CRP and establish dialogue with supporters. From their police perspective, such behaviours are inherently 'illegitimate'. The 'classical' theories of the crowd have traditionally been applied to analyse how police officers justified their approaches to crowd management (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). This study, on the other hand, suggests that these theories could at least partially inform how fans perceive police officers and how officers treat their colleagues.

The thesis also strongly critiques the concept of hooliganism and how this term may influence crowd management. According to classical theories, 'Hooliganism' arises as a result of sociocultural conflicts; the application of this concept to crowd management therefore means that there are valid reasons for classifying fans into low- and high-risk groups (Dunning et al., 1998; Allport, 1924). The findings of this study indicate that 'high-risk' fans feel antagonised by the police employing excessive deployments of force or coercive methods of surveillance, leading to the establishment of pro-confrontational social identities (Stott et al., 2011; Stott et al., 2018). Additionally, supporters from groups classified as 'high-risk' do not necessarily exhibit an inherent predisposition toward violence. In several cases, the away supporters were willing to recognise and praise the help given to them by the certain Police Units. Consistent with the ESIM, the thesis argues that the formal division of fans into low- and high-risk groups may reinforce long-term conflicts between the police and the representatives of heterogeneous football crowds.

8.2.2. Contributions to the ESIM

According to the ESIM, the continued usage of 'illegitimate' means of policing could contribute to the establishment of pro-confrontational social identities and the reinforcement of continued conflicts between crowds and responders (Stott et al., 2001; Giulianotti, 1994). The thesis expands on this claim by highlighting that the process of identity repositioning could be gradual and occur outside of any immediate confrontations between supporters and the police. By being exposed to the 'legacy of illegitimacy' (e.g., rumours about the police using intrusive surveillance methods), supporters could gradually begin to conform to social identities that construe actions against the police as legitimate. Furthermore, the ESIM does not fully acknowledge that the establishment of pro-confrontational social identities may not necessarily lead to violent conflicts between fans and police officers (Drury et al., 2003; Stott & Drury, 2017). While the interviewed fans perceived the police as a largely 'illegitimate' force, this was not seen as an incentive for taking violent collective action. Instead, as shown by the intention for supporters to wear the '#slåinte' bracelets in Observation 3, collective action may be taken to gain legitimacy and influence how the supporters are perceived by the general public.

Conflict between supporters and the police, therefore, might not take violent forms and could, instead, focus on shifting the existing perceptions of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of these two groups. While Stott et al. (2001) and Giulianotti (1994) referenced reputation as a possible driver of legitimacy and illegitimacy, the authors did not fully consider how fans could engage in collective action to boost their perceived legitimacy. The analysis undertaken in this thesis also implied that while continued outgroup conflicts legitimise actions taken against the police, such actions are not necessarily collective. Both the interview and observational data includes examples of confrontations between the police and supporters which was limited to small groups or individual action. While other representatives of football crowds perceive such confrontations as legitimate, they are unwilling to engage in

collective action to fully express their social identities. The study shows that the process of identity repositioning only partially accounts for when and how crowds could engage in violent collective action.

The ESIM also focused exclusively on the process of identity repositioning among the representatives of football crowds (Stott et al., 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2000). However, there are several examples of social identities being established among the police. The interviewed police officers suggest that fans' resistance to coercive or forceful policing was 'illegitimate'; this creates an outgroup conflict in which police officers feel justified in their continuous application of the 'German surveillance' method and similar techniques. In turn, this process creates a system in which any deviations from forceful or coercive policing (such as engaging in dialogue with the supporters) are seen as illegitimate. Similarly to how Stott and Reicher (1998a, 1998b) defined the social identities of football fans, the social identities of police officers provided psychological unity and empowerment. In such an environment, the expression of officers' individual identities could be grounds for one's exclusion from the list of 'legitimate' police officers. Nonetheless, it remains unexplored whether social identities in this context could drive engagement in violent collective action.

The ESIM also does not always distinguish between home and away supporters (Stott et al., 2001; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Instead, the model applies terms such as social identities and identity repositioning to large heterogeneous crowds without considering their affiliation. The thesis addresses this theoretical gap by illustrating that outgroup treatments of home and away supporters may strongly influence fans' perceptions of legitimacy and illegitimacy. As an illustration, if the police are less strict when managing home supporters compared to the away supporters (or vice versa), one group may feel more justified in continuing and reinforcing the intensity of their outgroup conflicts. As shown by the interview data, the social identities of fans are shaped not only by their immediate exposure to 'illegitimate' police action but also by their awareness of other fans' experiences with forceful or coercive

policing. Fans may receive such information from other supporters affiliated with their preferred teams; there exist few incentives or opportunities for fans to learn about how the supporters of opposing teams are treated by the police. In summary, how the police treat the fans of opposing teams could provide fans with a benchmark against which they could compare the perceived legitimacy and illegitimacy of their own interactions with law enforcement.

Additionally, the establishment of social identities and identity repositioning processes are driven primarily by fans and how other supporters of their preferred teams are treated by the police. The findings highlight that conceptualising all fans as members of the same heterogeneous crowd regardless of their affiliation may be myopic (Stott et al., 2001; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Instead, the ESIM has to make a distinction between different types of crowd, such as in this case home and away supporters. The thesis acknowledges that the validity of this contribution to the ESIM is limited by the inconsistencies in the deployment of police forces. In all four observations, the Event Police were primarily focused only on managing the away supporters. It is unclear how exactly identity repositioning could change if the Event Police are also deployed to facilitate dialogue with the home supporters. The failure to separate the spotter and dialogue roles also means that the Police may be slow to react to emerging conflicts and incidents.

8.3. Key Lessons Learned

This section will address Aim Five specifically; What were the lessons learned for Sweden and the wider football policing community? It will review the main theoretical and practical implications arising from the results of this thesis both for the subject of social identities and for policing.

Throughout the chapters analysing the primary data, the study repeatedly critiques the concept of 'hooliganism' and the officers' reliance on the 'classical' theories of the crowd (Dunning et al., 1988; Dunning, 1994). The thesis acknowledges that the division of crowds into 'majorities' and 'minorities' may have grounds in historical data, suggesting that 'hooligan' groups present a significant threat to public safety and well-being. However, the study also provides several examples in which emerging conflicts between the home and the away supporters were managed through dialogue instead of coercive policing. The findings strongly imply that, even if 'minorities' exist within football crowds, the representatives of these groups are not inherently predisposed toward the continuation and reinforcement of violent outgroup conflicts. Instead, continued outgroup conflicts arise from the establishment and adoption of pro-confrontational social identities, which are construed as responses to intrusive, coercive, or reactionary policing (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b).

According to the interviewed officers, the use of intrusive or coercive policing has previously been successful in preventing critical incidents and ensuring the security of 'majority' groups. Nonetheless, if the assumption that 'hooligans' are violent by nature is not met, the application of these methods lacks a theoretical rationale (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). The thesis highlights that the representatives of crowds could manage emerging conflicts on their own; additionally, heterogeneous crowds are not susceptible to the spread of 'violent' ideas, as was implied by Le Bon (1960) and Allport (1924). From this perspective, the term 'hooligan' is an outdated concept that cannot be used to inform effective facilitation-based approaches to crowd management. In turn, the applications of police force (most notably, low- and high-profile policing) which use the concept of 'hooliganism' as their justification are similarly outdated (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). Long-term, such approaches challenge the establishment of positive relationships between supporters and police officers. Illustrating this point, fans exposed to the use of the 'German surveillance' method tend to view the majority of police officers as 'illegitimate', with rare exceptions in the form of the more facilitation focused officers (e.g., Event Police).

274

Nevertheless, the study also suggests that the full-scale adoption of the recommendations made in the 2016 Enable report is currently impossible in Sweden (Stott et al., 2016). The following obstacles limit the degree to which these recommendations could be implemented.

- The existence of long-term legacies of illegitimacy informing the relationships between supporters and the police.
- Supporters' categorisation of police officers into 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' groups.
- The use of outdated historical data about fans' behaviours in the application of the graded tactical approach across Sweden.
- The deployments of the Event Police exclusively to manage the crowds of the away supporters.
- Police officers' tendency to perceive dialogue-based approaches to crowd management (and, subsequently, the colleagues who follow these approaches) as 'illegitimate'.
- Media amplification of the conflicts between supporters and the police.

However, all of these obstacles can all be framed as learning points if we flip them around. So, while this thesis highlights them as problems, they are building blocks for any future work in this field, both in an applied setting and in a theoretical setting. For example, if one were designing training with the police then the fact that there is a history with supporters must not be ignored. That is one of the primary issues which prevents the implementation of a facilitation focused approach. Thus, police training going forwards needs to take that history into account and reframe it not as a negative, but as a learning point. Another key learning point which should underpin future police training is how legitimacy is defined by football supporters and what police actions create an enhanced perception of police legitimacy. If police strategy was focused on achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the crowd rather than on controlling the crowd it would enable them to achieve power through the

crowd rather than power over. In other words, it is important that the police recognise and bear in mind the fact that coercive tactics have "the unfortunate long term consequence of undermining the intrinsic motivations that also encourage law abiding behaviour, with the result that people's behaviour must be increasingly motivated by costly deterrence mechanisms if constant levels of compliance are to be maintained." (Fagan & Tyler, 2004, p. 4).

In practice, the above challenges mean that the Swedish police act on inaccurate or outdated information, leading to the reinforcement of the legacies of illegitimacy. Furthermore, the interviewed police officers do not exhibit a strong desire to change their perceptions of football crowds; these stakeholders chose to adhere to their interpretations of the 'classical' theories of the crowd (Le Bon, 1960; Allport, 1924). As a result, introducing meaningful changes to crowd policing in Sweden would, first and foremost, require systematising valid research into supporters' behaviours and rationale for engaging in confrontational action. While some of the interviewed police officers displayed a limited awareness of the process of identity repositioning, the participants were not fully knowledgeable about the fundamentals of contemporary crowd psychology. From this perspective, the provision of additional training interventions to police officers (focusing on the ESIM, identity repositioning, and the existing legacies of illegitimacy) could facilitate the implementation of the recommendations made by the Enable project.

There was an interesting question that this thesis when read in its entirety invokes.
Why do the police perceptions of the majority (that their behaviour can be influenced by the police) exemplify an understanding of modern crowd psychology, but the perceptions of the minority (that their behaviour is not influenced by the police) are the same as the classical understandings? The viewpoint that the minority have a static identity which is not affected by intergroup dynamics seems to reflect the theoretical perspective of Reicher's (1984, 1987) Social Identity Model (SIM). The SIM showed that crowd action was not random or

meaningless, but had a clear socially patterned form that reflected the social identity of those within the crowd. However, the SIM could not fully account for the dynamic changes in crowd behaviour from peaceful to conflictual forms (Stott, Hutchison & Drury, 2001). In this way the SIM somewhat perpetuated the classical notions of Le Bon (1960) or Allport (1924), that elements within the crowd or that certain crowds were inherently pathological and violent. As such, the police perceptions exemplified in this thesis suggest that incorporating modern psychological perspectives into police training have led to the police becoming better informed about crowd psychology, but that perhaps the training methods used are not adequate for fully training officers in the nuances of crowd psychology with regards to how intergroup dynamics can escalate or de-escalate. The SIM (upon which ESIM was built) had essentially extended Self Categorisation Theory (SCT) which also acknowledged these contradictions:

> The model of the self proposed SCT is by no means static, fixed, global, reified. The opposite is the case: a fundamental idea is the rejection of self- categories as 'absolutes': the self is dynamic, relational, comparative, fluid, context-specific and variable. Self-categorisations are part of the process of relating to the social world, not 'things'. (Turner, 1988, p. 114)

However, as numerous contemporaries pointed out in the late 1980s "the tendency to overlook the flexibility of social perception and the possibility of change over time may be traced, in part, to a reliance on the positivist- empiricist language and methodology" (Condor, 1989, p. 24). In other words, the architects of SCT knew that identity was not static, but they couldn't demonstrate how change in identity happened because of their methodological approach. It was Reicher's adoption of an observational approach that helped to exemplify SCT outside of the laboratory (Reicher, 1984), and his subsequent development of this research strategy (along with Stott and Drury) which then led to ESIM's demonstration of how behavioural change happens (Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b;

Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000). The fact that the police understanding of crowds which the majority of officers articulated reflects the SIM more than the ESIM is interesting theoretically, because it suggests that there could be a similar issue with regards to police training. Therefore, I would argue that there is a body of work to be done which first determines how adequately police training communicates these theories and then secondly to see if it can be improved. I believe that this is the most pertinent lesson learned for Sweden and the wider football policing community and the next port of call for research.

Although the ESIM originally focused on outgroup conflicts between the representatives of crowds and responders, the thesis also distinguishes between home and away supporters (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Stott & Reicher, 1998b). It was shown that fans frequently defined legitimacy and illegitimacy by how other groups were treated by the police. For instance, outgroup conflicts were reinforced if the police applied more force or coercion to away supporters in comparison to home supporters, and vice versa. The elimination of such inconsistencies may decrease the intensity of outgroup conflicts and contribute to the mitigation of the legacies of illegitimacy. As an illustration, the Event Police may be deployed in equal measure to communicate with both home and away supporters. The establishment of new policies or practical guidelines on crowd management should provide local decision-makers with valid and reliable evidence allowing for the equal treatment of the different supporter groups. However, the study does not fully establish which specific provisions and recommendations could be included in such documents. It also remains unclear whether police officers would be willing to change their current approaches to managing home and away supporters.

Consistent with Giulianotti's (1994) argument, reputation and the media constitute a significant influence on the process of identity repositioning. In some cases (e.g., the Norby vs- Gais scandal), media amplification allows fans to give reputational legitimacy to their continued conflicts with the police. Media amplification also strengthens the legacies of

illegitimacy by exposing fans to other supporters' experiences with coercive or intrusive policing. Notably, media representation cannot be directly controlled by the Swedish police, particularly in the case of social media platforms, on which supporters can quickly share information about police illegitimacy. Nonetheless, the creation and implementation of new strategies for how the Swedish police interact with mass-media outlets and social media may still reduce the intensity of outgroup conflicts. For example, the police may choose to openly acknowledge and praise cases in which crowds self-manage emerging incidents. Such discourse could be effective in improving the perceived reputation of home and away supporters and mitigating the negative influence of long-term legacies of illegitimacy.

At this point it is also important to think about the wider implications for policing (and policing research) around the world. Over my years of research, the Swedish police officers that I knew well often discussed with me the possibility of exporting the Swedish policing model to other countries. This is something that the Swedish Police have actually pursued with their involvement in training the Ukrainian Police in 2017. There was also an invitation from some French academics and Paris St. Germain supporters that I had met over the course of my work to set up an Enable style project in Paris. However, the Swedish police and the Enable Project have been set up in what is arguably an ultra-democratic country. Both the Swedish supporters and the Swedish police often made reference to living in that democracy when discussing their own position and role within society. I would argue that the main lesson learned here, primarily that a police focus on facilitation helps prevent conflict, is a conclusion that is heavily tied to the ultra-democratic nature of Sweden. I would therefore argue that the nature of government and policing must first be analysed in a country in order to ascertain whether this lesson might be applicable to that country. It is questionable whether this lesson would help police forces that are constructed or founded on different principles. For example, while this lesson may aid the British police who were founded upon the premise that they are of the people and for the people, the French police (who's raison d'être is to protect the state) would perhaps need to reconceptualise their whole approach to

policing and what policing is before this lesson might bear fruit for them. The key issue being that in Sweden, facilitation focused policing improves the citizen's perception of police legitimacy. However, in states where democracy is differently conceptualised then the perception of legitimacy for police may well be different. I would therefore argue that conducting similar studies into what constitutes legitimacy would be an optimal initial step when looking to deescalate conflict in other contexts.

This was particularly poignant in the Chapter Five. When using the somewhat novel approach of a multi-perspective thematic analysis I was able to draw out the tensions between police and supporters to demonstrate the asymmetries in legitimacy perceptions which Reicher (1996b) originally highlighted as being the key to change in a group's normative behaviour. This is a relatively unused approach when looking at policing football crowds and conflict, and it has demonstrated that it helps us highlight the conflicting perceptions from which actual conflicts arise. It should be pointed out that this approach to understanding (and therefore deescalating) conflict could be beneficial outside of football, and outside of Sweden in general.

8.4. Reflective Statement

This section includes a reflective statement summarising the key limitations of the project and the evaluation of the researcher's experiences with addressing these issues. The analysis also briefly discusses what could have been done differently to avoid the main shortcomings of the study. In each sub-theme, the discussion follows Kolb's (1984) reflective cycle model, as this approach allows for linking specific experiences to abstract conceptualisations and active experimentation.

Hypothesis Disconfirmation

According to Elcheroth and Reicher (2017), as well as Billig (2013), testing claims depends not only on the provision of the evidence that supports them but also on establishing whether opposite claims are untenable. The thesis strongly argues in favour of the facilitation approach to policing football crowds, by providing data highlighting that coercive or forceful crowd management reinforces outgroup conflicts and contributes to legacies of illegitimacy. However, the study does not pursue the 'devil's advocate' approach and does not fully assess whether coercive policing can, in at least some cases, be beneficial to public safety and well-being. Linking this limitation to specific experiences, this thesis was closely linked to the Enable project and the 2016 Enable report. As shown in the introduction, the thesis was situated within a specific PAR cycle, meaning that I had to quickly gather and interpret data to facilitate the completion of this cycle and aid in advancing the Enable project to the next stage.

As a result, I have only conducted one round of interviews with each participant; the survey data was similarly cross-sectional. This issue is notable, given that the establishment and implementation of the CRP in Sweden is a relatively recent development; neither the police nor fans have had the time to fully formulate their outgroup conflicts and their perceptions of legitimacy and illegitimacy in light of the 2016 Enable report (Stott et al., 2016). Subsequently, the study does not fully disprove that forceful policing is ineffective, particularly in high-risk conditions. In future studies conducted either within or outside the scope of the Enable project, more comprehensive longitudinal approaches conducting two or more rounds of the data collection process and ensuring that data are repeatedly sourced from the same participants would be beneficial.

Police Training

The study demonstrated that, despite the implementation of the CRP, the police still divided heterogeneous crowds into relatively homogeneous minority and majority groups, which was highly consistent with the 'classical' theories of the crowd (Allport, 1924; Le Bon, 1960). Nonetheless, several of the interviewed officers acknowledged that, in some cases, the actions of the police could change the behaviours of the representatives of the 'majority' groups. Therefore, there existed at least a limited awareness of the ESIM and its key principles among the representatives of the research sample. This finding raised the question of how exactly police officers reconciled their knowledge of the ESIM with the 'classical' theories of the crowd. This question has not been fully investigated in the current study and further research needs to be conducted to understand how the fundamental postulates of the ESIM and the 'classical' theories of the crowd could manifest in outgroup relationships.

In my opinion, the possibility of interviewing other academic researchers or crowd psychologists to elicit deeper insight into how and why the 'classical' theories of the crowd continue to be widely applied by police officers is a tangible option.

Generalisability

Previously, the reflective statement acknowledged that there existed time constraints arising from the fact that the study had to be conducted within the limits of a single PAR cycle of the Enable project. As a result, it was challenging to source data that would represent the behaviours of fans and the police across the larger context of Sweden. Further limiting generalisability, it was shown that there existed significant context-specific factors that determined the applications of the graded tactical approach and supporters' reactions to crowd policing. As an illustration, in Observation 2, fans were willing to openly praise and thank police officers for their work in protecting public safety and well-being. During this

fixture, the supporters were also willing to comply with intrusive means of policing, such as extensive body searches. In both of these examples, the supporters' behaviours were caused by the recent acts of terrorism in Stockholm. While the data analysis procedure was fully guided by workshops and expert reviews of codebooks and thematic maps, I acknowledge that the findings may not necessarily reflect how identity repositioning may occur in other regions or at other times.

I would also argue that generalisability was limited by fans' perceptions of their preferred teams. For instance, Malmö only has one team playing in the top football leagues in Sweden. This example contrasts with the cases of Stockholm and Gothenburg; both of these cities are represented by multiple teams in the Swedish top football leagues. I have only become aware of this threat to generalisability when conducting the qualitative interviews, at which point it was impossible to fundamentally change the design of the study. In my opinion, the thesis should have included a discussion of how the structure of football competitions may influence outgroup conflicts, legitimacy, and illegitimacy. To avoid such limitations in future academic practice, I am planning to familiarise myself with how generalisability in mixed methods studies is conceptualised by other contemporary scholars.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to monitor and analyse an already in process PAR cycle. The theoretical model used was that of the Elaborated Social Identity Model. Thus, the thesis also aimed to validate that model while analysing to what extent it was applicable.

The thesis has shown that when the recommendations made during the initial stages of the PAR cycle were implemented by the police, both they and the supporters reaped numerous benefits. More specifically, it was shown that when the police did implement a greater focus on facilitating supporters' legitimate aims it not only help to avoid any widespread conflicts,

but it also helped to mitigate the 'legacy of illegitimacy' created by previous police use of force. This is important because it shows that ultimately crowds do not need to be controlled as per the classic theories would suggest, but rather they need to be managed as per modern academic ESIM analyses have shown.

There was a point during Observation Two when one supporter approached a police officer after the game and asked to swap shirts with them. This was a very salient moment which demonstrated how effective a facilitation focused approach is when managing a fixture dubbed the 'chaos match' in the previous season. When I finished my field work at the end of October 2018, I attended a game at Brøndby IF. To mark this occasion, my friend gave me a match worn shirt from the Danish Cup Final of the previous season. It now hangs in a frame in pride of place in my study and probably will for a long time. Such gestures are not made lightly, and in my opinion the police in Borås should take this supporter's offer of his shirt as the ultimate commendation. I would argue that this gesture demonstrates exactly why the Swedish police were correct to adopt the CRP back in 2007 and why their persistence in trying to implement them is the correct course of action if they wish to continue policing in a democratic manner.

Using the data and analysis contained in these chapters allowed me to validate the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000) by demonstrating how identity is not only shaped by context but reshaped through the intergroup interactions within that context which then in turn redefines said context. Put simply, action reflects identity and identity is always context specific; the actions of one group can change the context and thus change the identity and the actions of another group. As such, context is not an externally pre-defined entity, but something which is created through interaction and is constantly redefined by it (Drury & Reicher, 2000).

Finally, while my analysis of the police during this thesis can often be critical, at no point would I say that these criticisms reflect any malevolence on the part of the police. I really cannot stress this enough. How they behaved towards both myself and the Enable Project over the last few years was incredibly positive. The police did not need to open themselves up and accommodate this research in the way that they did, especially when one considers the potential for reputational damage and that the police had come under heavy political and media criticism in the last few years for their handling of other crowd related issues (cf. Norman, 2019). Having spent a lot of time working with and observing police forces from around Europe during my research (my football research has taken me to Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK), I doubt police forces in other countries would have been so keen to open themselves up to a research project such as Enable. The very manner of the police's co-operation with the project speaks to their desire to do the very best job they can. It is my hope that the evidence provided in this thesis can enable them and other police forces around the world to move forward in a more positive fashion and continue to contribute to society in a positive manner.

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Appendices

Appendix A: ENABLE 2016 Report Summary

The full report can be downloaded here:

http://findresearcher.sdu.dk/portal/files/121776201/Stott_et_al._ENABLE_2016_Policing_Football_in_Sweden.pdf

I have summarised it in this appendix document.

ENABLE Methodology

The Methodology employed by ENABLE has been that of Participant Action Research (PAR). This primarily observational approach has involved teams of highly experienced academic researchers and safety and security practitioners working together to provide an in depth and detailed case analysis of twelve safety and security operations (Lewin, 1946; Drury & Stott, 2001; Pearson, 2014; Stott, West & Radburn, 2016) These included the following fixtures. In 2014: IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, September. In 2015: AIK v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Djurgården IF, April; IFK Göteborg v IF Elfsborg, June; Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, August; IFK Göteborg v Hammarby IF, September; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, October. In 2016: Djurgårdens IF v Hammarby IF, March; Hammarby IF v Helsingborg IF, April; AIK v IFK Göteborg, April; Helsingborg IF v Malmö FF, May, IFK Göteborg v Djurgårdens IF, May.

ENABLE's Key Observations about the policing of football in Sweden in 2016:

- It is important to recognise that the policing of crowds in Sweden should conform to a nationally coordinated model referred to as the Special Police Tactic (SPT). The SPT was set up in the wake of the Gothenburg Riots of 2001 and was a new conceptualisation of how to police crowds which was underpinned by the ESIM. However, ENABLE's research has identified that there needs to be a clearer focus on the ongoing evolution and use of the SPT within football. While there is a strategic commitment to the use of the SPT in football among senior commanders across the country the approach is not being effectively delivered in a coordinated manner at a national level.

- There is considerable variability and complexity in tactics for achieving engagement with football fans in different areas of the country, which does not sit neatly within a framework of a single, simple and coherent national framework. When present, 'Dialogue Police' units which work predominantly to facilitate and communicate with crowd members, added to police capacity to deliver a graded tactical capability by enhancing information flow and the dynamic risk assessment. The inclusion of Evenemangs police, a specialist Dialogue Unit in Stockholm which focusses on football fans, from the early stages of an operation often helped to promote perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants in ways that empowered conflict reduction through crowd 'self-regulation'.

- While a specialised 'dialogue unit' exists in the form of the Evenemangs Police, such a unit exists in a developed manner only in Stockholm and not elsewhere. Since dialogue is a fundamental tactic of the SPT this represents a breakdown of the nationally co-ordinated approach. Correspondingly, there are consistent and systematic problems in terms of the delivery of low levels of proactive verbal engagement with fans from police

staff. There are also sometimes negative non-verbal communications. While there is an obvious capability to rapidly escalate police tactical profile toward 'high end' coercive styles of policing, there was a less obvious capability to proactively de-escalate through communication and engagement.

- Supporter Liaison Officers, fans employed by the club to act as a communication conduit between the fan base and other stake holders, (SLO) ensure a proper and constructive discourse between football stakeholders (police, clubs, SEF etc.) and the fans. They can often act as a primary contact point for the police, particularly regarding negotiating gathering points and routes for fan marches. This point of contact and informal route of communication to and from fans (including those considered as 'risk') greatly improves the police's and fans' ability to de-escalate conflict.

- ENABLE's research suggests that the consistent deployment of Dialogue Police, across both high and low risk events, improves their personal skills and non-coercive function in order to enable them to operate with high levels of discretion. The outcome is improved capability for communication between police and supporters that enhances both planning and pre- event negotiation processes.

Key Recommendations made by ENABLE in 2016:

- There is little need to further develop police capacity to deliver the coercive capabilities of the SPT in the policing of football. There was considerable evidence that these aspects can be delivered with effectiveness and dynamism. There is however a need to address the SPT approach to supporter engagement in order to enhance and develop the graded tactical approach.

- The EVENT (Dialogue) police concept is in the early stages of its development but our observations do suggest that these units add to police capability to deliver a graded tactical capability. However, the current lack of clarity concerning the tactic is undermining its legitimacy and capacity. The specialist engagement skills provided by Dialogue Units can develop over time with regular deployment but would benefit from a clear and coherent concept, competency profile and training framework. Importantly, ENABLE suggested that EVENT policing needs to be seen as an evolution of the SPT as a whole, and therefore part of an evolving national concept for policing crowds of all types.

- There is a requirement to address the regional variability in supporter engagement and to co-ordinate this capability under a single national strategic and tactical approach. As such, there is a need for the nationally co-ordinated development of adequately resourced Football Dialogue Police units similar in form and function to the Evenemangs Police in Stockholm.

- Dialogue policing needs to be an evolution of the SPT and therefore part of an evolving national concept for policing crowds of all types and supported with a corresponding training package. The specialist engagement skills provided by Dialogue Police can develop over time with regular deployment but would benefit from a clear and coherent concept, competency profile and training framework.

- Uniformed 'supporter police' which combine the 'spotter' and 'liaison' role appear to be related with weaker information flow. This is not, however, due to poor professional practice, but rather due to a structural and organisational issue. There should be a formal separation of 'spotting' and 'dialogue' functions among Dedicated Football Officers in regions outside of Stockholm.

Appendix B Ethics Review Panel Permission Documents

Ref: ERP398

10th February 2017

Professor Clifford Stott
School of Psychology
Keele University

Dear Clifford,

Re: Enabling an Evidence Based Approach to Safety and Security in Swedish Football

Thank you for submitting your revised application for review.

I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel. The following documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows:

Document(s)	Version Number	Date
Low Risk Observation Protocol	1.3	23-09-2016
Verbal Informed Consent Protocol	1.1	10-02-2011
Data Protection, anonymization and sharing research data	1.7	23-06-2015
Enable Research Information Sheet	N/A	N/A

If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, **1st December 2017**, or there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an 'application to amend study' form to the ERP administrator at research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating **ERP3** in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating **ERP3** in the subject line of the e-mail.

Yours sincerely

pp C H Bannerman

Dr Helen Price
Vice Chair – Ethical Review Panel

CC   RI Manager

Ref: ERP3110

21st June 2017

Neil Williams
School of Psychology
Keele University

Dear Neil,

Re: The policing of football in Sweden: understanding the social psychology of conflict reduction

Thank you for submitting your revised application for review. I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel.

The following documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows:

Document(s)	Version Number	Date
Online Survey English Version	None	15 June 2017
Online Survey Swedish Version	None	15 June 2017

Just one minor point, the tweet suggests that you want feedback on the game itself rather than on the policing of the game. The Panel recommend that you make this clearer. Please send any amended documentation to the ERP administrator at research.governance@keele.ac.uk

If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, **30th November 2019**, or there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an 'application to amend study' form to the ERP administrator at research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating **ERP3** in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on research.governance@keele.ac.uk, stating **ERP3** in the subject line of the e-mail.

Yours sincerely

PP C H Bennerman

Dr Helen Price
Vice Chair – Ethical Review Panel

CC   RI Manager
        Supervisor

16/03/2018

Keele
U N I V E R S I T Y

Dear Neil

PI: Neil Williams
Title: The policing of football in Sweden: understanding the social psychology of conflict reduction
Ref: ERF3129

Thank you for submitting your application for review. The proposal was reviewed by the Panel Chair. I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel.

If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, or there are any amendments to your study you must submit an 'application to amend study' form to the ERP administrator at research.governance@keele.ac.uk.   This form is available via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/

If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me, in writing, via the ERP administrator, at research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating **ERP3129** in the subject line of the e-mail.

Yours sincerely
PP.

Dr Valerie Ball
Chair – Ethical Review Panel

Appendix C: Five-Stage Model of Intergroup Relations

Stage 1

Clearly stratified intergroup relations

Disadvantaged group ← Stratification based on ascribed characteristics → Advantaged group

Stage 2

Individualistic ideology

Disadvantaged group ← Stratification based on achievement → Advantaged group

Stage 3

Individual social mobility

Disadvantaged group → Selected disadvantaged group members attempt to pass into advantaged group → Advantaged group

Stage 4

Consciousness raising

Disadvantaged group → Those who successfully 'pass' conform in extreme to advantaged group → Advantaged group

Those who fail to 'pass' return to their original group to initiate collective action

Stage 5

Disadvantaged group → Collective action ← Advantaged group

(Taylor & McKirnan, 1984, p.293)

324

Appendix D: Candidate Thematic Map off All Observations

2017 Observations

facilitation
- Better information flow
- Legitimacy
- Police care about supporters
- Better intelligence upon which to base risk assessment
- Better relationships
- Waiting till all supported have gone
- Medical aid
- Mechanical aid
- Supporter who wont usually engage
- Large numbers of police might actually increase the risk?
- Evenemangs
- SLOs
- Risk assessment
- Needs reassessing
- Fanzone
- March
- Liseberg
- Bought patience
- Event police worked well
- FACILITATION APPROACH
  - Compliance from Supporters
  - Emphasis on pre match planning
  - Involved supporters
- MFF vs IFK
  - Potential conflicts
  - Tobias sana
  - Old stadium
  - Stadium move
  - AMF
  - Retained at local level

facilitation (right branch)
- If the police are determined not to roll out evenemangs concept- at least acknowledge how the long term relationships helped all sorts of issues
- Long term relationships impossible
- Due to limited resources Event police only for away fans (except 1st match)
- Communication with fans
- Event police
- Fan hosting areas
- 45-50 year old man at Boras
- Seems impossible to stop it
- All four matches used it
- Why not extend it to pyro?
  - More dangerous- petrol station incident
  - Criminalising it purely drives it underground
  - Tabooness would be lost
  - masking
  - Tensions rose when video evidence gatherers went to record DIF pyro holder at malmo
  - Tension that arose in supporter community was after attempted pyro arrests Norby Gais
  - flare
  - "Chaos match" was also based on last years pyro related fires

DIF VS BKH
- Event police worked well
- Crowd on or near road
- long queue along the sidewalk of Hjalmar Brantingsgatan
- Decision to increase search regime
- Expense of safety
- Focus on security
- Andy Hollinson walks into AIK end at Elfsborg unquestioned
- Excellent work from evenemangs
- Solidarity between teams
- Post terror
- Positive perceptions of police
- Risk supporter unusual engagement with police and praise
- cancel

ELF vs AIK
- Supporter police evenemangs style approach
- Event police worked well
- Despite commitment to graded policing
- Policed on history rather than intelligence
- Event police worked well
- Media amplification pre match
- Excessive use of police
- Chaos match
- Newspaper- we are stronger now
- Over deployment
- Mixed signals about graded approach
- Previous week's incident
- Hit here bracelets
- Firman boys bus
- Entrance
- Redesigned
- LG took knowledge from workshop into planning
- Potential conflict with ultras
- SLO and security manager sorted quickly
- Reinforces point that less resources with more specialised skills are more effective
- Problems in suburbs not attended
- Rise in tension
- Fan walk not march
- Previous poor relations with police
- Lack of proper intelligence

DIF vs MFF
- Event police worked well
- Helicopter????
- empowerment
- Excessive use of police
- Police driving on cycle lane- 3rd party impact
- Mixed signals about graded approach

Risk management
- Lack of intelligence
- Policing history
- Accountability
- Largely ignored terrorist threat
- Base plan on previous Sunday fixtures
- Confrontations that did occur were managed by SLOs, Security Manager and Evenemangs
- Monday
- Two incidents
- Second one self policed from DIF
- MFF security manager and stewards worked well here
- "Ultras back" - DELTA geared up to move in- Evenemangs explained it was just about tifo
- Event police falling over each other
- Fear about 3rd bus
- Intelligence came via evenemangs
- Search cursory at most on more than one occasion
- gun
- If they dont search well in order to avoid pyro related conflicts?
- Amount of police drives up tensions in 3rd parties and supporters
- Over policing
- Autonomy of deltas in green state goes against the idea of graded policing
- Little ability to de-escalate resources

Appendix E: Timeline of Observation One

Pre Match Disussions
- SEF Invite Police to Meeting
- Part of IFK Hierarcy and Fans not on board
- Fans Forum setup
- Local District, Greater Gothenburg or Special Event???
- Logistics of different stadium facilitate Segregation
- FanZone
- Liseberg
- Parking

Pre Match Planning

MFF / IFK / Police

- 4/5000 expected in total
- 3000 Official Ticket Allocation
- Pre Match Communication
- Special Train organised to Liseberg
- Special Dispensation organised for Liseberg
- Fan March organised from Liseberg
- Announced on 28th March via 'Ultras Malmo' Facebook
- Special Train for post match organised
- Fan Communication and Facilitation

- Pre Match Communication
- Fan Communication and Facilitation
- Discussion about March between Fans and Police
- Fans Announce Fan March on 20th March (Facebook)
- High Risk
  - History
  - Important Match
  - Different Stadium = Different Routine
- Greater Gothenburg Level
  - Goal - "experienced as safe to go to football in Gothenburg"
  - USED ESIM PRINCIPALS TO DO THIS
  - In line with Broader National Strategy
  - Third Person Aspect
  - City Centre Disturbances Prioritised
  - Would only use Event and Supporter Polis to achieve facilitation
  - Letter to Malmo Fans
  - Use good links between Supporter Polis in Malmo and Fans
  - Hold Back and Escort to Train post match

Pre Match

MFF / Police / IFK

- Non train supporters also came here
- Gathered at Liseberg
- Proactive and welcoming
- March
- Negative MFF Graffitti on route
- Some cars went into march
- Flares and Flags
- Positive Atmosphere
- Potential Critical Incident
- Ingress
- Massive Queues
- No exit route for wrong ticketed fans etc
- Strict search regime
- Fan Zone

- Only Event and Supporter Polis
  - Liseberg
  - Only 30 mins before march
  - Complete lack of traffic plan

- Gathered at Gotaplatsen
  - Calm and Relaxed
  - Lots of people
- Avenyn 10am
- 11am Planned Start
- SLO and Supporters decided to wait for late group
- Supras Arrived late and Marched to the March
  - Assertion of Dominance?
  - Refusal to conform
- Walked with March and Stood on Avenyn
- March
- Some cars went into march- no traffic plan
- Smoke Bombs, flares and Bangers Used
  - Best March in Years
  - SFSU
  - Self regulation
- Stopped at Traffic Lights
- Discussion with Police at junction to Heden about route
- Continued on pre agreed route
- Arrival at stadium
- No emergency exit
- Ingress
- Lack of Stewarding/ Direction
- Overcrowding
- One observer had to help a child out of the crowd before being crushed
- Queues
- Strict Search Regime
- Chaotic
- LM Entrance
- Poor Searching
- Club received many emailed complaints about this

Match
- MFF Fans grouped near Segregation line
- MFF own steward not seen
- Smoke negative effect of surrounding crowd
- TIFO Display
- Safety Risk

- Lack of Stewarding/ Direction/ Extreme Overcrowding
- Announcement forbidding TIFO
- Second Announcement saying Pyro would take place
- Started on time
- Stewards and Guards not at segregation line for 20 minutes
- Aggro at Seg Line first few minutes (LM)
- Dealt with by Supporter Polis
- Gaurds arrived
- Match proceeds with no further incidents
- Logistical issues like queues and access to toilets are noted

- Locked Gate in 1 section
- Large section migrated to another section before match
- Migration to fulfil TIFO area
- Potential Critical Incident
- Large TIFO Display
- Safety Risk
- Many fans entered after Kick Off

Post Match
- Most MFF Ultras leave by bus
- Communication Error leads to lack of Hold Back
- No police escort to station
- Potential flashpoint en route extinguished by smiling EVENT Polis
- EVENT Polis react to mark way

- Most fans leave

- MFF Ultras late leaving stadium
- Heading to station
- IFK Ultras delayed leaving stadium to collect TIFO
- Head to nearest tram stop
- Chance meeting between Ultra groups who had stayed back to collect their TIFO
- Ultras begin to mask and move towards MFF Ultras
- Two Police Horses command Ordningsvakt to help them block road
- Event passes off without fans actually coming into contact
- DELTA Units then escort MFF Ultras to station

- **Station**
  - Station is segregated with locked doors and police tape
  - Large Police presence
  - EVENT Polis and Supporter Polis
  - Excellent engagement for close to an hour
  - IFK known risk fans at station
  - Positive engagement with known risk
  - No incidents

Appendix F: Observations 1, 2, 3 & 4 Full Report

Observation 1

Fixture: IFK Gothenburg (IFK) vs Malmö FF (MFF)
Venue: Nya Ullevi Stadium, Gothenburg
Date: Saturday 1st April 2017
Kick Off: 13:00[52]
Attendance: 32,129

Background

The match between IFK Gothenburg and Malmö FF was the first match of the 2017 Allsvenkan season; contested by teams from the two largest cities outside of Stockholm, it is known locally as the mesta mästarmötet (the clash of champions) due to the illustrious record of both teams.

The match we observed had drawn much attention as the last fixture in Gothenburg between the two teams on the 27th of April 2016 had been abandoned and dubbed 'skandalen matchar' (the scandal match) after an incident in which a banger (a small incendiary device) was thrown from the stands at nearby MFF substitute Tobias Sana while he warmed up. Formerly a popular player for IFK, Tobias Sana responded by throwing a corner flag into the stands. The players all left the field and the match was then abandoned. IFK was later adjudged by the football authorities to have forfeited the match with 0-3 score line.

Planning Stage

The match was scheduled to be played at the Nya Ullevi stadium, situated approximately 500m from the Gamla Ullevi stadium in which IFK usually plays its home matches. The initial proposition to move the fixture to the larger stadium came from the football league, Svensk Elitfotboll (SEF), and was part of their broader strategy to enhance the profile, reputation and financial power of Swedish football.

The majority of supporters and some significant elements within the IFK Gothenburg administration were not keen on the idea at first. There were two dominant reasons for this opposition described in our workshop. Firstly, from the supporters' perspective, moving into a larger and less atmospheric stadium with the sole purpose of maximising profits is not necessarily seen as a valid reason to move. It is seen by many as a symptom of "modern football", or the growing influence of neoliberal business models in football. In order to understand supporters' opinions and wishes, a forum for home supporters and club staff was set up in early December. This was accompanied by the creation of social media pages that supporters could use to contact the club day and night.

The second major issue with moving to a different stadium was logistical, which was more of an apparent issue for club staff than supporters. Moving into another stadium is a major challenge as all the normal routines are cancelled. One example being the transfer of all the season ticket holders from one stadium to another. In addition to these in-house logistical issues, there are also those which involve the external stakeholder collaboration - such as the club-police planning processes. For every match, the organising club must put in an

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[52] Times given in 24 hour/ Military time format Central European Time (CET).

application to the police with a projected idea of supporter numbers that will attend and a proposed plan for how to manage that event. These plans are more of a formality when always working in the same stadium. However, moving stadiums means these plans must be drawn up from scratch, increasing the heavy workload for the club and the other stakeholders. However, after initial talks with the supporters had gone well, the Gothenburg police were notified of the plans at a meeting in January. There were numerous meetings held over the course of these negotiations between the club and the police to discuss all elements of the operation; a prime example would be the evacuation plan which is not only worked on by both the police and the club in a collaborative way, but also the other stakeholders and experts such as the fire department, medical services, and the city council.

One of the major priorities of both the football clubs and the police in Sweden is the segregation of home and away supporters. However, with the stadium having been built for the 1958 World Cup, the Nya Ullevi[53] was not designed with such policies in mind.

A structural renovation in the 1990s means the stadium is considered structurally sound and can accommodate 75,000 people for concerts. However, it is seen as far from optimum for football matches and supporter behaviour in the 21st century. Despite these concerns about internal segregation, the use of the stadium did offer several logistical advantages for segregating supporters prior to kick off. The stadium's location meant that the away supporters travelling by special train could be disembarked at Liseberg (approximately 950m from the away section entrance), the penultimate station before Gothenburg Central (approximately 1300m from the away section entrance). An away supporter march could then be organised by supporters and facilitated by the police along a route which would not intersect with that of the home supporters. In addition, the stadium infrastructure itself enabled the organisers to create a fenced supporter hosting area outside of the away entrance in the south-east corner of the stadium. Whilst a large car park adjacent to this area offered the opportunity to park all away supporter vehicles in a controlled area close by with easy access.

The Nya Ullevi stadium has a total unsegregated match capacity of 43,000. However, due to the security arrangements and other sterile zones[54], the capacity for this game was 35,000. The long-term communication strategy implemented by the home club in December had led to the creation of an unfenced fan hosting area at the home section entrances with numerous child friendly activities and amenities. It appeared to have won over a large section of the supporters as around a week before the match more than 30,000 tickets had already been sold, and the stadium was ultimately expected to be close to capacity.

Home supporters

As is normative for football supporters in Scandinavia, key groups amongst the home supporters announced on the 20th of March via social media that they would arrange a supporter march to the stadium from Götaplatsen on Kungsportsavenyen ("Avenyn"). The march was scheduled to commence at 11:00 and would follow the normal march route used by home supporters. However, a couple of days prior to the match it became apparent that this route was now blocked due to construction work. The police explained that to the supporters and asked them to choose another route.

Away supporters

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[53] It was in this stadium that Pelé scored his first international goal to knock Wales out of the 1958 World Cup.
[54] For example, one area remained unoccupied adjacent to the warm-up area for the substitutes in order to avoid a repeat of the Tobias Sana incident.

The away section had an allocation of 3000 tickets, this had quickly sold out and it was estimated that there could potentially be an additional 2000 away supporters with tickets in other areas. The official supporter club, MFF Support, organised a special train together with the railway company to bring supporters directly from Malmö to Gothenburg. The special train also sold out its 920 person capacity very quickly and was planned to depart Malmö at 08:05 arriving at Liseberg station at 10:30. The platform at Liseberg Station is not capacious enough to accommodate such trains however, so for the supporters to alight here special dispensation from the Trafikverket (Traffic Authority) and the police was necessary.

A march was organised from Liseberg with MFF Support (the official supporter club) inviting all those traveling by other means to congregate at the station and join the march toward the stadium. The supporters were also informed on MFF Support's website that there would be a fenced hosting area with food and a bar at the away entrance.[55] The route for the march had been discussed between supporters, police and MFF and was communicated via social media to all away supporters. A group called Ultras Malmö[56] with more than 11,000 followers published the route on social media on the 28th March.

After the match the special train would depart from Central Station Platform Three at 16:10. The supporters were informed that there would not be an overt show of force from Delta Units[57], but that there would be a 15 minute hold back after the match and that they would then be escorted by the Event Police[58] to the station.

Police Strategy

The overall police goal of the day was that the event would be perceived as safe. The police operation would work to create a safe event not just for supporters but also for the general non-match going public (called 'the third party' in official documents). The operational plan stated that as long as no risk occurred, the only police due to be present at the fan gathering places should be the Event Police and the Supporter Police[59]. Segregation of supporters and the maintenance of it was a priority for the police.

[55] http://mffsupport.com/nyheter/uppdaterad-och-slutgiltig-info-inforgoteborg/ accessed 27.03.2017
[56] "One of the most visible ways of expression of the ultra's 'identity' is their use of coordinated chanting, large visual displays, banners and pyrotechnics inside and outside of stadiums. Moreover, Ultras are often central to organising, 'stewarding' and leading large fan marches to and from stadiums and have a complex relationship to violent confrontation. For example, Malmö FF has an independent supporter group called the Supras Malmö, formed in 2003 from a coalition of independent supporters and Ultras. It would be inaccurate to assume that this group actively pursues violent confrontations with opposition fans. However, at times the different Ultras within and between clubs can be openly hostile to one another and do on occasion become involved in confrontational situations" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 13).
[57] The Special Police Tactic "is designed to achieve flexible situational adaptation through mobility via the use of small squads of [DELTA] officers moving in lightly armoured vehicles with clear chains of command. These units are trained in the use of high level force, utilise protective equipment (body armour, helmets, shields, batons, etc.) and are prepared to work in extremely dangerous and stressful situations such as riots. In the Swedish context these squads are commonly referred to by their radio call sign DELTA" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 7).
[58] "Event officers were designed specifically to enhance the Graded Tactical Approach by empowering proactive communication led supporter engagement. The approach was informed by the Danish 'Event Police' concept (Havelund, Ilum, Jensen, Nielsen, Rasmussen & Stott, 2010). As with DELTA units, the officers populating the Event units had good levels of cohesion and were effective at managing stressful situations since they had a history of working together in high risk environments. They were configured in much the same way as DELTAs but were given a different style of uniform and briefed to provide a more active role in engaging with fans, proactively using communication and oriented toward facilitation and dialogue rather than use of force." (Stott et al. 2016 p. 12).
[59] Supporter Police units consist of a few police officers who specialise in working with the local supporter subculture. "in the Western and Southern Regions officers in these units deploy wearing police uniform and tabards, with the words Supporter Police clearly displayed. Individual officers

The match was categorised by the police as high risk. This was based on several factors. Firstly, moving to the larger arena meant changes in security routines and a larger number of spectators than usual, which could lead to unforeseen risks. Secondly, the match was perceived as an important match by supporters for both teams and emotions were expected to be high. Additionally, this fixture had historically been marred with incidents. However, despite the high-risk classification the handling of the match was not escalated to the 'regional level' as would usually be expected for high risk matches. The match was instead handled at the 'area level', which in this case meant that control of the operation was kept by the Police in the area of Greater Gothenburg[60].

The police strategy was in line with the National Strategy and was based upon the Conflict Reducing Principles: communication, facilitation, differentiation and knowledge. The principles were described as being key to the police's long-term strategy for promoting self-policing amongst supporters. The main activity in the build-up to the match was to communicate and collaborate with all the other key stakeholders (both sets of supporters, both clubs, the local council and Police Region South). The police in Gothenburg in our workshop also highlighted the good working relationship between the Supporter Police in Malmö, the SLO from Malmö and the key individuals from the Malmö supporter community as being critical to achieving this goal. In the weeks leading up to the match, Gothenburg Police also prepared a welcome letter to the away supporters which was published on MFF's club website. On the match day itself the police aimed to set limits and communicate at gathering places, whilst also having resources available to prevent attacks or other symbolic displays of aggression/aggro which can escalate into conflict (Marsh, 1978) in the arena or its vicinity. Football related disorder would take precedence over other disturbances in the city as the police also wanted to prioritise reducing the impact of football on third parties.

Match Day - Pre-match Phase

Home supporters

Home supporters gathered at Avenyn as planned. As the announced time for the march to start approached, Götaplatsen was filled with people. The atmosphere was calm and relaxed. Event Police and Supporter Police were the only police present as planned, walking among the supporters and engaging in dialogue in a friendly manner. At 11:00 the supporters seemed eager to start the march, however as one of the ultra-groups had not yet arrived the march was delayed. Shortly afterwards the missing ultra-group arrived in full voice, and supporters set off approximately 10 minutes later than planned. As the march started Bengal flares and smoke bombs were used. A few bangers were thrown as well. After each detonation a chorus of amusement followed. The event had what our observers described as a 'carnival atmosphere' (cf. Pearson, 2012). A couple of cars driven by elderly people were caught in the march. However, the crowd very slowly parted to allow the cars to pass through the march. Police officers walked amongst the crowd as the march progressed often chatting jovially with supporters. Shortly after the march had begun one of our observers stopped in order to take a photo of 'the smoky carnival'. Fumbling off his gloves, an officer next to him very quickly offered to hold his coffee cup so that he might use two hands to take the photo.

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within these units combine within a single role the functions of criminal intelligence, surveillance, coercion, liaison and prosecution (e.g. gathering evidence, providing testimonies in court trials, pursuing stadium bans, etc.)" (Stott et al. 2016 p. 12).

[60] In Gothenburg a match can be handled at either local, area or regional level.

Figure 18 - Photo Taken During Home Supporter March (Obvs 1)

As the photo was being taken our observers noted several surprised looks from surrounding supporters. When those supporters where later asked why they had looked so astonished they replied that they were very unused to such a friendly approach from the police.

> "The police are usually ****s, but that guy was ok!" (Anonymous IFK Supporter)

The march soon stopped as supporters reached a red light. Whilst the vociferous singing and many pyrotechnics continued, the supporters waited patiently for the lights to turn. Next to this junction was the construction site that had led to the route being changed. As supporters waited for a green light, they serenaded the construction workers in a jovial manner and implored them to work faster. Once the light turned green the supporters then began to march again along the recently agreed route.

The march continued in such a manner until it had almost reached the stadium and then stopped again. This time however it was stopped in order to orchestrate a large vociferous entrance of all the supporters at once. The march had become somewhat spread out over the last two kilometres and the supporters at the head of the march wanted to recreate the energy experienced at the start in Gotaplatsen. The IFK supporters and club staff who were present during our workshop called the march the best and most organised in years.

Away supporters

A large number of away supporters who had travelled by other means congregated at Liseberg Station prior to the arrival of the special train. Despite this growing number of away supporters our observers noted that there was a distinct absence of police until approximately thirty minutes before the train's expected arrival time. When a police presence did materialise, it was made up of Event Police and the Malmö Supporter Police. It should also be noted however, that there was no overt but distant show of force from Delta Units. Those police present were solely focused on the supporters and engaged in a fairly proactive and purposeful manner. One specific example being when two Event Officers noticed a bus arriving and crossed the whole crowd to greet and welcome supporters individually as they stepped off the bus. Our observers noted this approach as key for setting the tone for the rest of the event.

Shortly before the arrival of the special train there were also some unexpected (but not unwelcome) guests. The incident involved a small group of home supporters that are part of the IFK affiliated hooligan group 'The Wisemen'[61], who arrived into the city via the same train station. Once again, the police in the vicinity approached in a welcoming manner and quickly worked to avoid any interactions which might have resulted from the coming together of this risk group with those away supporters already assembled. The home supporters informed the police that they had arrived in what would be their usual match day routine and soon left in a taxi with no trouble between the supporter groups.

The crowd around Liseberg Station soon swelled beyond the available pavement space and spilled onto the surrounding streets. As no traffic plan had been put in place this had quite a profound impact on the passing traffic. Numerous cars had taken this route, only to have to turn around. Later on, as the crowd grew, some cars even became stuck within the crowd. It was estimated that this crowd was well over 1500 and could have been up to 2000 supporters. Once the march began some cars even became stranded in its midst surrounded by marching fans carrying flags and ignited flares. Whilst this incident passed without consequence, there are some very real safety issues involved here: Bengal flares burn at extremely high temperatures and cars contain highly flammable substances. The smallest accident could well result in mass injury or fatalities; In one car, the driver was an elderly gentleman who became somewhat unnerved as his vehicle was engulfed by the crowd. One of our observation team, a member of the Swedish Police, used his position within the march to talk to the driver reassuring him that the march would pass quickly, that the driver should remain where he was and allow the crowd to flow around him.

Similar to the home supporter march, the away supporters used flares, flags and co-ordinated chanting or singing to mark their presence in Gothenburg. However, the main difference was that throughout the route the away supporters were greeted by hostile graffiti with abusive messages to the Malmö supporters. This did not seem to be much of an issue for the away supporters, but was probably not seen as desirable for those third parties who reside in the defaced buildings.

The march arrived at the fenced fan hosting area without any major issues. However, the entrance to the stadium was far too small for such a large crowd and very quickly the

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[61] In Sweden there are sub groups within the supporter scene who self-identify as 'hooligans'. These groups "focus less on visual and auditory displays and more on actively seeking either pre-arranged or spontaneous confrontations with other hooligan groups. Hooligan groups in Sweden are highly organised. They operate informal 'League tables' of some measure of their power, organisation and fighting prowess and, to determine their position in these 'tables', regularly organise pre-arranged confrontations in remote areas some distance away from stadiums in terms of location and time. Also hooligan groups in Sweden have collaborative affiliations to those attached to clubs in Denmark and other parts of Europe." (Stott et al. 2016 p. 13)

atmosphere amongst the supporters turned from festive to quiet dismay. In spite of this evident mood killing turn of events the supporters were compliant and waited patiently.

Match Phase

Despite huge crowds still being outside at kick off time the match started as scheduled. As part of the strategy to keep supporters segregated with the creation of the Away Supporter Zone (ASZ), some entrances were not in operation. This led to significant issues with the ingress for one half of the stadium. Being the only entrance on the entire north-west side of the stadium for home supporters meant that 13,000 people needed to come through a two-metre gap in the temporary fencing that had been constructed outside the LM entrance. There were no stewards outside of that area and many of the thousands of supporters thought that there was more than one entrance and walked around the crowd, only to find their mistake. This then led to a chaotic situation with supporters pushing from all directions to try and make it inside before kick-off. Such was the heaving of the crowd that one child was caught on the wrong side of the railings and separated from his father. It was the conclusions of our observers that this child could easily have been crushed and severely injured had some of the crowd not recognised this and forcefully held others back. The stewards within the fenced area had very little option to help ease this congestion and simply worked to move people through as quickly as possible. The congestion could have been a contributory factor to the poor search regime which was at best a cursory pat and on occasions non-existent at all. There was also a distinct lack of stewards and security guards inside the stadium during the first twenty minutes of the match, especially on the segregation line which was presumed to have been related to their presence being needed at the entrance.

All other entrances were set up to take around 3,000 supporters each. These entrances had much stricter search regimes than the one previously described. However, even here there were virtually no stewards or security guards to direct people to their seats. Combined with the lack of labelling for seats or rows, many fans were left wandering around the stadium until well after kick-off whilst some simply chose to stand on stairways. Throughout the entire match phase the concourses and vomitories were extremely congested, with few stewards and no medical stewards visible. Our observers also noted that several fans in the more active supporter sections were seen straddling the handrail at the edge of the upper tier. Had any of those supporters lost control, the fall to the lower tier would have caused significant injury not only to them but also to those below them.

Whilst the obvious lack of communication between stadium staff and supporters delayed the ingress, there was also an evident lack of communication between the club and the stadium staff themselves which had a dramatic impact upon this issue. Just before kick-off, a mass migration of home supporters took place over the barriers from Area F to E. Both areas should have been crowded, but the latter was completely free of spectators. The cause of this was a locked gate on the concourse close to the GH entrance. Even though the mistake was realised well before kick-off, the key had apparently been misplaced and the gate could not be opened before the start of the match. Coordinated by IFK club staff, the migration occurred approximately 10 minutes before kick-off. This unoccupied area was integral to the home supporters' Tifo[62] display.

Post-match phase

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[62] "Inside stadiums fan groups would often initiate impressive and coordinated displays or Tifos, which usually involve the use of large banners, paper 'confetti' and pyrotechnics, both Smoke and Bengal flares, despite the fact that the use of pyrotechnics inside stadiums is against the law in Sweden." (Stott et al., 2016, p. 37)

Despite the proposed 15 minute holdback of MFF supporters, the gate for the away section was opened immediately after full time. Instead of a large march with a large police escort to the central train station, the flow of supporters was more like a trickle as MFF supporters made their own way to the station. Yet it should be noted that those supporters still took the pre-agreed route. Upon recognising that no hold back had taken place, the Event Police reacted quickly to facilitate the new situation. Although spread thinly they positioned themselves at key points along the route to direct the growing flow of MFF supporters with smiles and large positive paralinguistic gestures. There was a potential flashpoint here when the first Malmö supporters exited a park close to a bar populated by IFK supporters. The IFK supporters started shouting and moving towards the Malmö supporters, but the Event Police dealt with the situation in a calm manner. By the time two of our observers who had heard the shouting from 50 metres or so away had arrived, the situation had dissipated and the IFK supporters were returning to their seats, while the two Event Officers returned to their original spot at the park entrance and continued to direct the MFF supporters.

A second flashpoint occurred between some of the ultra-groups. Whilst the majority of the MFF ultra-groups left by bus, one group did almost come into conflict with members of an IFK ultra-group. At around 15.30 a group of IFK ultras were leaving the stadium with their Tifo materials and heading to a local tram stop. As they crossed the canal next to the stadium, they saw the MFF group. Very quickly they started to mask up and advance. However, at the same time two mounted police on the bridge were able to co-ordinate with a group of security guards outside of the stadium and assembled to block the two groups from each other and no blows were exchanged. This group of Malmö supporters were then escorted by Delta units to the train station and the IFK supporters returned to the tram stop. No further incidents were noted during this journey, apart from the odd minor verbal exchange between the same MFF ultras and their newly acquired Delta escort.

In the train station the Event police worked with a lot of enthusiasm, massive amounts of supporter engagement and very positive body language. They could be overheard thanking the supporters for coming and wishing them a pleasant journey back to Malmö. Despite the presence of a couple of known IFK risk supporters at an adjacent bus stop, no further incidents occurred. These known risk supporters were later seen engaging in jovial conversation and laughing with the Malmö Supporter Police and the local Event Police.

Observation 2

Fixture: BK Häcken (BKH) vs Djurgårdens IF (DIF)
Venue: Bravida Arena, Gothenburg
Date: Sunday 9th April 2017
Kick Off: 17:30
Attendance: 5541

Background

Two days before this fixture, on the 7th of April, Sweden suffered a tragedy. Rakhmat Akilov, a 39-year-old asylum seeker from Uzbekistan, stole a delivery van as its driver was dropping off goods in central Stockholm. In the name of the Islamic State – he killed five and injured fourteen people when he ploughed the van into them on one of Stockholm's busiest shopping streets. The police response in this critical time could easily fill an entire book on its own, however, it will have to suffice here to say that the response was swift and decisive. Within hours the city was in lockdown and Akilov was in custody. The police were heavily praised by politicians, the media and society at large. Pictures of police vehicles covered in flowers adorned the front pages of most major newspapers the next day.

With regards to the football and supporter background this was perhaps the fixture with the least amount of tension in the build-up to the match. As has been discussed already in the introduction chapter, DIF always tend to take a large group of supporters to their first away game of the season, and it had been during that event in 2014 that the unfortunate circumstances which led to the creation of the Enable Project unfolded. There was no history of animosity between the supporter groups of BKH or DIF though and none were expected. BK Häcken do not have a hooligan group and are often referred to as the least problematic of teams in Gothenburg when it comes to policing. There are often tensions, however, between DIF and IFK (Håcken's city rivals). Previous seasons had seen violent incidents in and around the city centre between these supporters.

Planning Phase

Home Supporters

The official supporter club for the home supporters, Getingarna, had announced on their website, that the sportsbar Whoopsi Daisy would be their meeting place. The expectation was that around 60-100 supporters would meet there. No march had been announced.

Away Supporters

The match was the first away match of the Allsvenskan season for Djurgården IF. A large travelling contingent was expected. The official supporter club, Järnkaminerna, had arranged a special train to bring 500 supporters that morning. The train sold out within about ten minutes, and was scheduled to arrive at 15:35 at Gothenburg central station. In addition to this it was expected that three busses with away supporters would arrive at a similar time. Järnkaminerna had announced that they would meet at Göteborgs Wok Backaplan near the tram station Hjalmar Brantingsplatsen within walking distance from the stadium. The local transport company had arranged extra trams to bring the train passengers from the central station to the meeting place. A total of around 2000 away supporters were expected at the match in a stadium with a capacity of 6000 spectators. No arranged march was expected, however it was largely anticipated that most supporters would walk to the stadium at the same time.

Police

The overall goal for the police was that the event would be perceived as a safe event for the general public and for the spectators. The police wanted to contribute to a welcoming atmosphere and avoid potential conflicts. There were no expected confrontations between supporters but there were speculations about IFK Gothenburg supporters trying to attack Djurgården supporters in the city centre. The primary intervention throughout the day would be the Supporter Police and the Event Police. Event Police were also to take the lead if away supporters chose to walk to the stadium. Their roles were to seek dialogue with the different supporter groups. The police strategy also emphasised the Conflict Reducing Principles.

Additional Information

All of the above plans were in place before the terrorist attack in Stockholm. In light of this event, SEF issued a decree that searching and visitations should be conducted much more thoroughly. The club responded by announcing at the security meeting on the day of the match that they would do a thorough visitation at all entrances.

Pre-match Phase

Home supporters

Home supporters gathered at Whoopsi Daisy. The sports bar has a basement which was reserved for members of the official supporters' club. Observers and others who went downstairs were kindly asked by a host about their membership and thereafter told that it was a members-only event. Upstairs was a mix of Häcken and Djurgården supporters. A Supporter Police Officer was present here and spent most of his time engaging in dialogue with supporters both inside and outside the bar. Our observers noted that the officer in question always seemed to have a smile on his face even when some distance away from the supporters. This had a positive and somewhat disarming effect on supporters whenever he did engage with them, be they home or away supporters. In addition to this, a couple of plain clothes police officers also patrolled the area. Event Police were also close by but the majority of the engagement was handled by the uniformed Supporter Police Officer. At around 16:45 a group of about 75 Häcken supporters were escorted to the stadium. During their short walk towards the stadium, they sang and despite groups of Djurgården supporters on the opposite side of the street there was no sign of aggression from either side.

At the stadium the majority of home supporters had to ingress through entrances behind the home section goal (often referred to as the 'short side' in Sweden). As away supporters had also obtained tickets in the home section long side, the lines were a mix of supporters. Despite this evident lack of segregation, no incidents between rival supporters were observed. However, few opened entrances and the order for a thorough visitation meant long queues that snaked around and up the side of the busy dual carriageway prior to kick off.

Away supporters

As mentioned, three busses with away supporters were expected to arrive in Gothenburg during the afternoon. Upon arrival in Gothenburg, the driver of one DIF coach phoned the Stockholm Evenemangs Police present in order to ask for assistance in getting to the designated away supporter venue. The driver informed the officer that 2 busses were on their way to that location. However, there was a third bus with known risk supporters among the passengers whose whereabouts was unknown. After several phone calls Gothenburg Police managed to reach the driver who informed them that the bus in question was headed for a restaurant on Gothenburg's Avenyn where the away supporters had made a reservation.

This was seen as problematic by the police for two reasons. First, there were major roadworks on Avenyn at the time, which meant that the bus would probably not be able to drive straight up to the restaurant, and therefore would have required the away supporters to walk quite some way. Also, Avenyn is considered the 'sacred territory' of the IFK Gothenburg supporters. With IFK playing away at Sirius that day and not expected to take such a large number of supporters, it was a worry that many IFK supporters would be present to watch the game in bars. In light of such knowledge the Bronze Commanders made contact with the bus and advised the bus driver not to go there. Instead, the bus drove to Göteborgs Wok at Backaplan. However, the restaurant nor the area appealed to a large contingent of the away supporters and so at around 15:30 some supporters began to migrate towards a Chinese restaurant near the stadium and in close proximity to the Whoopsy Daisy. The Event Police who had been stationed close by organised themselves quickly to direct the away supporters in the most direct route and prevent them from walking immediately past the front of the Whoopsy Daisy. Supporters complied with these directions from the Event Police, who worked in an instructive and friendly manner.

As the group had migrated so did one of the Stockholm Evenemangs Unit. He stood outside the new location advising supporters of local shops and engaging in general conversation with supporters who had come outside to smoke. One gentleman who was part of DIF's hooligan group was also in the vicinity, whilst he was not engaging directly with the Evenemangs Officer he did send the odd quip in the officer's direction and the officer

returned some friendly banter. After a moment or two, the supporter came over and addressed the officer directly.

> "Hey, but the police did a really fucking good job on Friday! Thanks for that!" and shook the officer's hand.

This was not an isolated incident either. The same officer took some of our observation team into the restaurant to introduce them to key members of the supporter group. Our observers where initially reticent, but the officer explained that it was fine for them to go in and introduce themselves. It was the officer's opinion that actually there was more danger for them to be seen hanging around outside all the time as supporters might think them undercover police. Or even worse- journalists. Upon entering and being introduced, virtually all supporters immediately switched to speaking in word perfect English and some also invited our observers to drink with them. Despite this restaurant being populated by what the police would categorise as the type of supporters posing the highest risk to public order, and the group of supporters who self-identify as hooligans, our observation team said that the atmosphere and response of the supporters was nothing but polite and welcoming.

The only point when there appeared to be any hostility was when the officer attempted to introduce our observers to a group who were in a special smoking room. As the door was opened, one very large middle-aged gentleman addressed the officer by name and told him to close the door. The officer responded in a polite fashion but the supporter approached him wagging his finger. One of our observers present at this point was a native English speaker with no Swedish language skills and said from reading the body language alone it appeared somewhat intimidating. However, as the supporter approached the door with cigarette in mouth, he pointed at a sign that said 'Please keep this door closed' and smiled gleefully at the officer. Quite amused that he had been able to catch a policeman breaking the rules, he then asked the officer to either come in or go out, but the door should be closed so that the smoke did not affect others.

Soon afterwards as our observers and the officer were leaving the restaurant, a younger man was called over to the smoking room and then dispatched to come outside and talk with us. The young man told our observation team that the gentlemen in the smoking room were 'too old school' to talk to the police, but they had said if the police wanted to have dialogue with their group it could be done through him.

The special train scheduled to arrive at 15:35 was now expected at 16:30. Despite this, from around 15.25 till 15.45 virtually all the doors of the station building itself were locked. Even though there was a large police presence in and around the station, our observers noted that the reason for the closure was never communicated to other station users either via tannoy or by any officers that they observed. It should be noted that this had a considerable impact upon the third parties which the National Strategy aimed to reduce. On any normal weekend it would have caused a little bit of concern for the public, but just two days after a terrorist attack in the capital it could well have caused greater concern.

An hour later, the delayed supporters were guided onto three specially organised trams and transported directly to the stadium. The supporters organised themselves so that those taking care of Tifo materials would travel on the first tram, and the rest would follow on the next two. A team of our observers got on the second tram and witnessed two Event Police officers also try to board. They were initially pushed back by Djurgården supporters, but they got back on the tram in a non-confrontational manner and proceeded to talk with the supporters during the journey. Initially some supporters began to bang on the roof and jump up and down whilst singing, but these officers did not interfere and within a minute or two the supporters themselves began to self-regulate and stopped the banging and jumping.

The supporters from the special train arrived at the away entrance at the same time as those from the nearby restaurant. After a significant delay to their train journey, the special trams had then arrived at the wrong tram stop[63]. This meant that the delayed away supporters had to walk up the dual carriageway past the home supporters' entrances to reach their entrance.

Figure 19 - DIF Supporters Walk on the Dual Carriageway After Disembarking From the Wrong Tram Stop

During this arrival phase our observers noted two extremely different examples of supporter behaviour that dominated a significant part of the workshop discussion the next day.
On one side of the stadium during this walk from the tram stop a Djurgården supporter realised the sense of trepidation felt by a young home supporter due to sudden appearance of this mass group of away supporters. He broke away from his friends to approach the young Häcken supporter and his father. He then greeted them, telling them not to worry and that they had nothing to fear from him and his fellow supporters.

However, at almost the exact same time, on the other side of the stadium a Djurgården supporter was walking through a petrol station with a lit Bengal flare above his head. Fortunately, a Djurgården SLO was on hand and quickly went over and took the flare away without any incident. Later on, we had reports of a supporter who had injured his own hand and foot after dropping a flare. This turned out to be the same man from the petrol station incident. It was unclear whether these injuries were sustained with that same flare or at an earlier or later point. What is clear however, is that had a flare been dropped in the vicinity of the petrol station the results could have been catastrophic.

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[63] The name of the tram station at which the special trams disembarked is "Rambergsvallen", which is the same name as that of the old stadium (closed in 2014) situated on the same site as the Bravida Arena (opened in 2015). However, it is at the opposite end of the stadium from the current away section.

Match Phase

Figure 20 - DIF Supporters Gathered Outside the Away Entrance

Body searches at all entrances were conducted in a manner that was less and less rigorous as kick off approached. The queues turned to a throng on all sides. The terror alert post Stockholm had seen stewards instructed to conduct more rigorous searches, and this had been observed in the initial stages of the ingress. However, the stewards conducting these searches were soon trapped in the middle of a large crowd with little recourse to take action against people caught with illicit items and no facilities to search bags. One of our observers even entered with a large bag which went unsearched. Around 20 minutes before kick-off, an extra gate at the home end was opened in order to allow more people to enter before the match started. There was no searching at this gate at all. As kick off drew near, tensions amongst those still outside were palpable. The Security Manager of BK Häcken thus decided to postpone kick off by 5-10 minutes. Staff from clubs and police did what they could to inform and calm the waiting supporters.

Despite the evidently chaotic and stressful conditions the majority of supporters were orderly. There was clear evidence of self-regulation within the crowd. A prime example being when those carrying the Tifo supplies were allowed to bypass the queue and enter straight

into the stadium. Those already queueing parted in spite their own frustrations at not having entered yet.

Figure 21 - DIF Message of Solidarity

The match began with a minute's silence for the Stockholm attack the Friday before. Djurgården supporters also unveiled a banner in honour of the victims and had one flare to represent the sentiment of the banner:

<div align="center">

"STOCKHOLM IN OUR HEARTS
WE LIGHT A CANDLE FOR THOSE AFFECTED"

</div>

The match passed without incident, the only other notable point being a Tifo display by DIF supporters at the start of the second half. This was presumably the Tifo they had prepared for before the game, but had postponed so that the Stockholm victims could be remembered and to respect the minute silence. Smoke from this Tifo delayed the kick-off of the second half by a few minutes.

Post-match Phase

The DIF supporter buses were parked immediately outside the away end. Supporters were able to board quickly and these busses promptly left. The rest of the away supporters walked to Wieselgrensplatsen tram station to travel to the main station together with some of the Event officers. Once again, their use of friendly body language to direct people and constant verbal communication were employed to high effect.

The supporters with the tifo material were the last main group of supporters to leave the stadium as they had been collecting their flags and banners. They were led to the tram stop by the two Stockholm Evenemangs Police officers that accompany them to all matches. On the tram, there were many members of the public and as the supporters got on they began to sing and jump. Very quickly, after a short word from one Evenemangs police officer to a prominent supporter, the whole group slowly began to stop jumping but continued to sing.

As the atmosphere started to calm, the same Evenemangs officer moved to speak to an elderly couple who were sitting on the tram and looked a little shocked. Gripping the handrails either side of their seat he used his body to form a physical barrier between them and the bouncing supporters as he faced inwards and addressed the couple. After asking them about their day and the weather he then explained to them that the supporters would be disembarking at the central station. After around five minutes with the couple looking visibly relaxed the officer moved away. On finishing the conversation with the couple, he then thanked the surrounding supporters for their consideration.

At the same time the second Evenemangs Officer moved between the smaller groups of away supporters up and down the carriage. Whilst smiles did not accompany all of these interactions, there was always an evident show of mutual respect.

This high level of engagement continued at the train station. Working mainly in pairs, the Event Police circulated the station area talking to supporters and public alike. As had been evident all day, this approach resulted in a lot of positive interactions between the police and the citizenry in the station. With departure time drawing near, many handshakes were exchanged as supporters boarded their train.

At the close of the operation, some of our observers spoke at length with the Event Police about their role that day. Most were incredibly positive about the role and the value of it to the broader police strategy. However, one or two officers did express an element of dissatisfaction. Not with the role itself, but with their own ability to perform it. Despite having wanted to do this role for some time before being assigned to it, they hoped they would not have to do it again. This sentiment was aptly summarized by one officer when he concluded that:

> "It is much easier just to sit in a bus or stand there and look tough than it is to constantly try and talk to the supporters."

Observation 3

Efter kaosmatchen – nu storsatsar polisen: "Vi är starkare den här gången"
(After the chaos match - now the police are betting: "We are stronger this time")[64]

Headline from the Borås Tidning 6th April 2017 quoting Borås Police Chief (Borås Newspaper) (online edition 10th April 2017)

Fixture: IF Elfsborg (IFE) vs AIK Stockholm (AIK)
Venue: Borås Arena, Borås
Date: Monday 10th April 2017
Kick Off: 19:00
Attendance: 9335

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[64] This is a literal translation of the text. However, in English a translation which captures the essence of the headline more effectively would be 'After the Chaos Match- now the police are hedging their bets/covering all eventualities: "We are stronger this time" '

Background to Match

The fixture between IF Elfsborg and AIK was the first home match in the season for IF Elfsborg and the first away match for AIK. The organisers expected between 800-1200 AIK supporters to travel from Stockholm. The build-up to this match in the local media had started days in advance with much disorder anticipated after the last time AIK played in Borås – a match referred to by journalists as "the chaos match". The same fixture in the previous season had been disrupted due to heavy smoke hazards and a fire in the away section after accidents with flares and smoke bombs. Six people were injured during that event.

An incident one week earlier on the opening weekend of the season after local team Norrby played Gais (Gothenburg's second most popularly supported team) had further inflamed the situation. The police had attempted to arrest Gais supporters as they were leaving the away section for pyrotechnic use. The ensuing confrontation led to heavy criticism for the police, not just from Gais supporters but from the wider supporter community. It is not for this section to analyse that police-supporter confrontation or to pass judgement. It is mentioned here simply because the incident was largely viewed to have been disproportionate and unnecessarily violent, which many in print and social media described as a reflection of police incompetence.

As a direct consequence of this incident, a group of AIK supporters had announced that they would be handing out bracelets against police violence with the text "#slåinte" meaning "#don't hit". There were also a lot of rumours and speculation about how some supporters would prepare to meet forceful policing, should that occur. AIK's hooligan group, the Firman Boys, who had not originally planned to attend the match organised their own bus during the final week before the game. This was rumoured to be related to the Gais incident and the ensuing media coverage. However, both social and print media were awash with such stories that week.[65]

Planning Phase

Home Supporters

Home supporters had planned a gathering at their usual meeting place of Lilla Bränneriet. The SLO expected around 150 supporters to congregate at the pub. There was no confirmed information about any planned march.

Away Supporters

Five busses with away supporters were expected to arrive in Borås prior to the game. On AIK's website it had been announced that the away supporters could meet at Brasseriet in Allégatan. There had been an arranged cash-back on beer with 2 SEK per beer sold going to the AIK-Tifo Fund. The match also marked the 15 year anniversary of Ultras Nord, but there were no planned special events or activities. The expectance on game day was that away supporters would go to the stadium in smaller groups rather than in a large march.

Police Strategy

The lack of definitive information on a home supporter march, and the absence of information for an away supporter march was cause for concern amongst those planning the

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[65] All of the events described here took place prior to the 7th of April terrorist attack in Stockholm.

police operation. If there are no pre-agreed march times or routes the police cannot precisely calculate how many units will be needed or what type of units will be needed at different stages of the operation. There is also often a general feeling amongst officers that no news is bad news.

The overall police strategy on the day was firstly to safeguard human life and health. The avoidance of disorder and limiting the impact of the event on third parties was to be prioritised. The police also wanted an emphasis on the making the "right arrests". The tactics were reliant on the Conflict Reducing Principles with the aim that football should be perceived as a safe event and that the centre of Borås should be seen as a welcoming and safe area. The police wanted to use a graded policing approach and be able to facilitate supporters while still being dynamic, flexible, proactive and most importantly -in control. At risk level "Green" all police officers should use "communicative and relationship building methods".

Pre-match Phase

Home supporters

Earlier observations had given some of the Enable team the opportunity to meet and work with Elfsborg supporters previously, thus when some of our observers arrived at the home supporters bar those Elfsborg supporters were particularly amenable to talking to our observers. After a round of greetings the subject of conversation slowly came to the present event. One of our observers asked them how they would get to the stadium if there was no march. There was a pause and wry smile before the reply came:

> "There is no march, but there will probably be a walk"

A contentious history with the police meant that no supporter wanted to officially take any role as the coordinator of a march. The Elfsborg SLO expected that many supporters might simultaneously, but independently of course, decide to leave Lilla Bränneriet around 60-75 minutes before kick-off. It was also expected that those supporters might all follow the same route.

The primary deployment around the home supporters' pub was the local Supporter Police. They described their approach as a being a Neighbourhood policing approach, with a focus on disrupting the cycle in which the younger supporters can be drawn into criminality. This seemed somewhat at odds with the march/ walk issue, however it became apparent that there was a fairly good relationship between them and the supporters. Some supporters suggested that the issues were more with those at a higher level.

There were also a couple of Delta Officers in close proximity, however they stood several metres away and spent most of their time facing away from the pub. There were large numbers of Delta Units in the surrounding streets. Their presence was especially overt on the central square outside the city courthouse. Here the Delta Units were joined by mounted officers. Our observers noted many members of the public talking amongst themselves about what was going on and why there was such a sheer presence of police in what was described as 'anxious tones'. Some were overheard asking police officers what was going on and why there were such large numbers of them. However, some were overheard equating their presence with the incidents in Stockholm and quickly departed the area.

Despite the large overt police presence between the home and away supporter pubs, our observers noted a couple of groups of teenage home supporters walking past the away pub repeatedly. However, our observers did not note any attempt by police to engage with these groups.

As had been predicted by the Elfsborg SLO, home supporters did not organise an official march to the stadium. Instead, they all decided spontaneously to walk to the arena at around the same time. Just as one small group stood up to leave, another group would follow suit. When the Elfsborg 'walk' started the Delta Units employed their mobile concept. Moving quickly to junctions, blocking roads and then jumping back into vehicles and moving forward to the next junction. This created a mobile segregation of supporters – a mobile fence. This had been identified in the pre-match briefing as a potential flashpoint. However, the Deltas worked well to keep the two sets of supporters segregated even though the Elfsborg 'walk' passed very close by the AIK supporters pub.

Away supporters

The AIK supporters' pub was policed predominantly by the Event Police and Evenemangs. Some mounted officers also patrolled the street upon which the away supporters bar was situated. The officers kept up high levels of proactive engagement all day, and at no point did it appear like the away supporters were anything but welcome. This feeling was reflected in the supporters' attitude to the police, who after some time also started to initiate conversations with the police on their own volition. The Event Police Bronze Commander very much led through example. Setting the tone not only for supporters but also for his unit in how they should act in this context. Even when not in the away supporter bar he could be seen engaged in very active and dedicated leadership of the unit, using radio from some distance whilst briefing officers from other units and on occasion also members of our observation team.

Figure 22 - AIK Supporters Thanking an Event Police Officer for the Hospitality Shown to Them[66]

The police decision to deploy horses was made in order to present a friendly face to supporters. This decision was often reassessed throughout the operation. Had supporters

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[66] And for offering to place the supporter's empty bottle in a bin.

shown anxiety towards them, the horses would have been withdrawn. However, this proved unnecessary and in this context the positive supporter-police relations were clearly illustrated by the interactions between supporters and the mounted units. Several AIK supporters asked for photos with the horses and then hung their scarves over the horses while posing.

Many supporters who had come outside to smoke, lingered long after and continued chatting with officers in the vicinity. One group of our observers were also invited into the bar to have a drink with the supporters after a brief introduction from an Evenemangs Officer. Several supporters who were part of the risk group the Firman Boys joined the table of our observers and discussed English football at length. After our group of observers left, the Evenemangs Officer told us the supporters had continued to ask questions about the project and some of the key members of that risk group had even suggested they would be happy to be interviewed by Professor Stott.

However, at the same time vans full of Delta Units could be seen driving back and forth in front of the pub, for no apparent reason other than making the police presence more obvious. These Delta Unit vans often parked up on the surrounding streets within view of the away supporters. It was difficult to see what the goal of this was, apart from simply reminding the away supporters of the police's strength and capability.

The necessity of these units is totally understandable for the supporter 'walk' or march, and the excellent job the Deltas did in creating the dynamic mobile segregation reflected the evident experience and skill of these units. However, their large visibility around the town centre seemed to be somewhat at odds with the graded tactical approach. The communication between different police units worked well during the whole walk/march period, with intelligence from the Supporter Police and Deltas filtering through to the Event police at the AIK pub (and vice versa) helping them to make sure that the two groups would not meet on the way. The Event Police made a point of not organising a march or a walk for the AIK supporters, instead allowing them to organise themselves. They did however, offer advice on topics such as choosing an appropriate departure time which wouldn't clash with the home supporters.

The AIK supporters' march was led by the 'normal supporters' as the ultras who would usually lead had instead taken busses. Only three flares were used during the AIK march, one of which was ignited by a 45-50 year old gentleman. Just as the Elfsborg supporter 'walk' before it, the AIK supporter march was characterised by good interaction with police all the way to the stadium.

Match Phase

The away supporter ingress into the stadium was extremely well organised and quick, with a good searching regime. The away entrance had been the site of problems in the past and it had been redesigned to try and avoid such hostile interactions. The design had also been influenced heavily by the previous two Enable observations. In order to avoid such disorderly crowds gathering at a small gap in a fence and forcing their way in from all sides, the entrance had additional fencing that created the type of queueing facility that one might see before a passport or security check in an airport. Queues were fast flowing in these conditions and supporters entered quickly. The entrance setup also included exits for supporters who were turned away. The body search area was screened from being visible from outside, but enabled several supporters to be searched at the same time within sight of each other, so that supporters remained reassured that they were not being isolated. This also created a better working environment for those doing the body search, which is said to be the rationale for the screening; body searching can be a stressful assignment, especially in front of large groups of supporters waiting to enter the stadium. Three supporters were arrested, two for

possession of pyrotechnics and one for drunkenness during the search regime, but this went largely unnoticed by the majority of supporters due to the screening.

The quick ingress into the stadium might have been aided by two noticeable events which happened outside of the entrance. Firstly, one of the AIK coach drivers emptied the coach's latrine on the pavement directly next to the away entrance causing a fairly horrendous smell. Secondly, as supporters disembarked the AIK SLO and the Security Manager were already at the entrance. When a large group of supporters with their Tifo equipment got off the bus and started to become agitated that they were not going to be able to get their equipment into the stadium in plenty of time, the pair moved quickly to facilitate a speedy entrance and helped them to bypass the long walk up and down the fenced queuing area. Supporters who were not carrying Tifo materials then joined the normal queue with everyone else.

It was during this time at the away entrance that a female supporter recognised one of our colleagues as being part of the Enable Project. Despite him being affiliated with a rival Stockholm club she came over and hugged him, thanking him profusely for initiating the Enable Survey (the analysis of which will be discussed in Chapter Seven).

The ingress at the other sections did not appear to be as smooth. The searching regime for the long sides of the stadium seemed to be selective at best. Some members of the observation team brought in large backpacks which were never checked, others received a cursory pat on the pockets, whilst one who could be classified as looking more like the stereotypical 'risk' supporter was searched quite thoroughly. There was no screened searching regime at the home supporter section behind the goal. This was based on the fact that at no home game during the previous season had the Elfsborg supporters used pyro. They had only used it at away fixtures when their own club would not be fined for its use. Since the body searching is generally perceived as an attempt to stop pyro and screening thus can be perceived as an escalation of these attempts, the club and the police had decided not to send this kind of signal in a situation where order had generally been good.

Stewards were positioned both inside and outside the ground to offer assistance and help direct people. Yet at the same time there seemed to be an excess of stewards who had no defined job role, this was most acute during the game when large groups of stewards could be seen congregating in the access points from the vomitories to the concourse, but no stewards were attending the emergency exits inside the concourse.

In the away end, 8 security guards had positioned themselves within close proximity to one side, whilst another 6 were positioned very closely on the other side. These security guards were wearing the new uniforms which look similar to the Delta Police in full riot gear, and spent the majority of the match staring at the away supporters in a manner that could not be described as friendly or welcoming. They were not under police order at the time and had positioned themselves there according to their own command structure. Their positioning looked like a tactical deployment aimed at ensuring segregation, however it seemed somewhat redundant when one noticed that a large numbers of AIK supporters had obtained tickets in the corner of the adjacent stand and were mixed in together with the Elfsborg supporters and completely unsegregated.

The half time briefing in the stadium included all Bronze Commanders and above, except for the Event Police Bronze Commander. This may have been due to the fact that the Event Police had been deployed into the away section concourse at half time and were thus "on duty" at that time. However, with several officers from that unit having displayed significant levels of competence in the role prior to the match the Bronze commander could have probably excused himself in order to attend the briefing. Although not openly stated in the workshop, there were clear indications that the role of the Event Police was undervalued by those in control of the operation.

During the second half, one of our observers who had remained outside the away end noted that with around 20 minutes of the match left the stewards at the away entrance simply disappeared and the observer was able to walk into the away end unchallenged and join the away supporters.

Post-match Phase

By the end of the match the away section entrance had been cleared of the fencing that had provided the queuing and searching areas. It had been replaced by most of the AIK supporter busses. 4 of the 6 busses were now parked inside the permanent fenced area of the away entrance, whilst the remaining two were parked immediately outside the gates. There was a large police presence around this end of the stadium with Delta Units, but they remained mainly in busses and around the corner, slightly out of sight from the away supporters, but visible to home supporters leaving past this end of the stadium.

Shortly after the game finished two groups of security guards formed lines between the coaches parked outside the gates and the fencing. These security guards used a positive and friendly body language to direct home supporters in the other direction, but did not stop pairs of supporters who insisted on coming through. The home supporters from behind the goal were guided away from the stadium by police and security guards who used the design of the stadium area to maintain their policy of segregation.

The main visible police presence at the away end entrance was the Event Police, who kept up the same levels of engagement seen throughout the whole day. Numerous AIK supporters who had travelled with their own transport, filtered out of the gates and left in a very peaceful manner. Quite interestingly at this point our observers noted one away supporter who turned back and ran up to some of the regular Delta Officers with his hand outstretched. After a round of hand-shakes he took off his shirt and tried to swap it with one of them in much the same way players swap shirts after a hard fought match. Unfortunately the officers had to decline this offer but did consent to having a picture taken with the gentleman.

Figure 23 - A Supporter Thanks the Police Once More Before he and his Friend Depart

The Evenemangs Unit was also present at the away entrance as the supporters left and remained there, laughing and joking with the supporters until the very last supporter had left. Even after the Delta and Event Police had left the Evenemangs remained, still making sure that every single one of their supporters had left and had their transport home organised. Just as they themselves were about to leave, a van pulled up with a group of supporters who thanked the Evenemangs profusely for their help. After the van left the officer explained that the supporters' transport had broken down on their way to the match. They had phoned the Evenemangs, who had in turn contacted local police who could draw on local knowledge to help to organise a mechanic and get them back on the road so that they could attend the match.

Observation 4

Fixture: Malmö FF vs Djurgårdens IF
Venue: Swedbank Stadion, Malmö
Date: Monday 24th April 2017
Kick Off: 19:00
Attendance: 19,074

Background to the fixture

This match would take place as the fourth fixture of the 2017 Allsvenskan league schedule for both teams. After the 1-1 draw with IFK, Malmö had won their previous two fixtures and were now sitting first in the table. However, Djugården had made a slower start to the season, only registering one win and were mid table in seventh position.

The tie had been wrought with controversy in previous seasons. In the 2015 season there had been some minor disturbances around a pizzeria frequented by home supporters. Located approximately 900 metres away from the stadium, incidents had occurred as the away supporter march had passed by. In the following 2016 season, away supporters had then patronised the same restaurant earlier on during the match day. A situation which would no doubt have been seen as deliberately provocative by home supporters. However, through the use of dialogue the police had been able to persuade the away supporters to move to an area closer to the away entrance and avoided any issues. On both occasions there had been attempts by smaller groups of home fans to confront the away supporters before and after the matches.

The fixture had also seen significant disturbances within the stadium in recent years. The most notable being an incident in 2011 when the match had been abandoned in the eleventh minute after 6 pyrotechnic devices were thrown onto the pitch.

There is a lot of animosity between Malmö supporters and supporters from all the teams in Stockholm. On one recent visit to the capital, MFF supporters had been attacked on 3 different occasions on the same day. Each time by supporters of a different Stockholm team. The history of disturbances is long and could easily fill a chapter on its own so the narrative should move on before it becomes bogged down. However, one final point just to explain the immediate context of this match. The last visit of a Stockholm team, Hammarby IF, to Malmö had taken place on the 6th of November 2016 (just over 5 months before our observation). On that occasion a bus load of away supporters had disappeared en route only to then materialise in the middle of the Möllevången neighbourhood, a popular meeting place for MFF supporters before matches. Widespread violence occurred. One officer suffered a broken arm. Television, newspaper and social media were filled with stories, eye witness reports, videos and photos of the incident for some time afterwards.

Planning phase

Home Supporters

Malmö FF arranged a pre-match event with food and live music for supporters from 17:00 at the Supportertorget at the stadium. This is a large covered space inside the arena, behind the north terrace where most of the active supporters stand. The area includes a fenced space in

which a bar is placed, serving alcohol and food (only 18+ years may enter). There are also permanent spaces were MFF supporters can sell souvenirs or away travels; on this occasion a new supporter jacket would be released with the profits used to support future Tifo arrangements.

However, the police also expected many supporters to meet in the area around Möllevångstorget at their usual gathering places and begin walking to the stadium around an hour before kick-off. There was no organised march for the ultras, but it was expected they would all walk together as per usual.

Away Supporters

The away supporters organised a gathering at Lilla Torget in the city centre at Victors, a bar in the old city area often frequented by away supporters. The pub was reserved from 15:00. Two busses were scheduled to leave Stockholm at 08:00 and arrive in Malmö at Lillatorget at 15:00. Via the club's website and social media, DIF had informed the supporters that three SLO's, the Head of Security, one member of the security team and two Evenemangs Officers would also be present in Malmö. In addition to this, the club included information about the presence of the ENABLE observation teams.

Police Strategy

The police had categorised the match as high risk. However, this did not change the overall strategy for 2017 in Region South. The police's main goals were to create a feeling of safety and security around all sports events, and, to preserve and maintain order so that events could go ahead without any major inconveniences to those attending or the general public. In order to do this the police wanted to use a communication-based approach that supported positive supporter culture whilst simultaneously enhancing the perception that the police were both a professional and positive element in society.

The Event Police (more commonly referred to as Delta 85/D85 in Region South) would be the primary intervention for away supporters in the Graded Tactical Approach. The D85's primary function was to facilitate supporters in a predictable way and to consistently act in a de-escalating and non-confrontational manner before, during and after the game. They should be able to set limits but still be perceived as acting in a legitimate manner by the supporters. Being close to the supporters, they would also be the ones who would make the call for reinforcements if needed. Just as the D85 would be the primary intervention for away supporters, the Malmö Supporter Police would be the primary intervention at Möllevångstorget for the home supporters. The Delta Units deployed for the match were only to be used in situations with elevated risk. The undercover Romeo Units[67] would also be deployed during the operation to provide early surveillance of the "main target risk supporters inside [the] MFF environment"[68].

Match Day - Pre-match Phase

Home supporters

The 'fanhosting event' was well attended. According to the club, an estimated number of three thousand supporters took part in the pre-event at the stadium. This event was part of a broader strategy aimed not only at enhancing cohesion amongst supporters, but also to

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[67] The Romeo police are plain clothed officers who work in small teams. Their main role within the SPT is to make tactical, quick arrests without attracting too much attention and to provide covert intelligence.

[68] This was the exact phrasing used by the Officer who kindly came to our Enable Pre-Match Meeting to brief all of the Observation Team.

enhance safety and security. Measures had been taken to enable supporters who did not have tickets to the standing terrace to be able to access the concert area. They could then pass through a second body search and make their way to other sections. The atmosphere was relaxed and positive.

Many home supporters not participating in the concert, gathered in pubs and cafes around Möllevångstorget from 16:00 onwards. The two Malmö Supporter Police arrived at 17:00. They parked outside the pub frequented by the MFF ultras and alighted their vehicle. Their engagement strategy was measured and low key. They did not enter the bar but stood a few feet away from the doorway greeting supporters as they passed and engaging with those outside smoking. Their body language was relaxed and they generally faced away from the windows of the bar in a manner that suggested their primary concern was the safety and protection of the supporters and not the prosecution of them. This approach was very much in line with the Graded Tactical Approach as it had been explained in our morning briefing.

On the other hand, from this point onwards our observers noted numerous police vans driving around the square at regular intervals. The presence of these police vans did not seem to reflect any behaviour occurring in the square nor was their presence a request from the Supporter Police who were supposed to be the primary intervention. The presence of these vans sent somewhat mixed signals to supporters around the area. The Supporter Police were observed entering into heated discussion with some of the vans who stopped outside the pub with the ultras, apparently asking them to leave the area as their presence would aggravate the supporters. Yet as soon as one van would leave, another van would appear.

In addition to this, these vans also added significantly to the congestion of traffic in the area during rush hour. This square is a popular commercial and residential hub in the city. From 17:00 onwards it is also a busy thoroughfare for commuters. A large part of this traffic passes through on bicycle as this area contains some of the largest and longest cycle lanes in the city. However, as vehicular traffic built up, the police vans started to drive on the cycle paths in order to bypass that traffic. This caused considerable disruption to the third-party citizens who were trying to navigate these bustling bicycle-only designated thoroughfares.

The majority of Malmö supporters walked together to the stadium at around 18:00. This larger flow of supporters also contained a significant number of the known Malmö risk supporters. They were escorted by the Supporter Police on foot and followed by Delta Police in vans, while a helicopter flew overhead. The Supporter Police kept up their interaction with the supporters en route and helped reaffirm boundaries of acceptable behaviour. For example, when asked why the Deltas were following the group, they told the supporters that as long bangers were not used then the Delta Police would remain in the vans and remained there simply as a precaution in case DIF supporters would appear. No bangers were used. When the march passed through the large park near the stadium, there was a lot of public urination. Although technically an offence, the police used their discretion well at this point. However again this was done in a limit setting manner. One supporter who did not go far enough away from the road was reprimanded by the Supporter Police, and told to at least do it behind a tree and out of view. The supporter apologised and then did so. The number of vans increased as the march progressed, starting originally with two vans and ending up with nine vans by the end, with the plainclothes Romeo Units and Motorbike Officers there also.

Away supporters

The away supporters rendezvous in Lillatorget at 15:00 was to be policed primarily by D85 officers. Due to the intermittent heavy rain and transport logistics only a handful of away supporters had arrived at the bar by this time. Some of the officers engaged with away supporters in a positive manner. One table in the bar had three of our observation team sat at it, they were also greeted warmly by one officer. It was unclear at the time whether this

officer knew they were observers or supporters, but it should be noted that all others in the bar received this same level of warm reception. One observer pointed out that such a welcome did leave him smiling, and he noticed a similar reaction from supporters at surrounding tables. Due to the lack of supporters at this time however, the full complement of D85 officers was considered disproportionate and the D85 commander quickly redeployed several officers to do a casual patrol of the area so as not to overcrowd the venue. One coach load of supporters did arrive at approximately 15:30 with around 70 away supporters but this was as high as the number of away supporters in the square got that afternoon, with the other busses preferring to go straight to the stadium because of the heavy rain. During that peak occupancy, the D85 commander tried to have no more than nine officers in and around the bar at any time. The reason for this was twofold. Firstly, the low number of supporters, and secondly, the D85 Bronze Commander through his and his team's engagement with the supporters had been able to perform a dynamic risk assessment and concluded that those present posed little risk.

On previous occasions in Malmö there had been trouble with unknown busses of supporters from Stockholm appearing without warning in areas considered to be the home supporters' territory. Due to this history, when a DIF bus could not be located it was clearly considered an issue. The police were aware that a third bus was expected but had no information as to its whereabouts. With help from the Stockholm Evenemangs Police they found out the number of the bus driver who informed them that he thought the supporters would go straight to the stadium. This topic caused some consternation during our workshop. When the police had phoned the coach driver they had said that the DIF SLO had informed them that the supporters wanted to go directly to the stadium. This was not actually the case.

The D85 unit in Lillatorget wanted to convince the away supporters not to have a march, and encouraged them to take the bus to the ground. This would benefit the supporters as it would stop them from having to march the 4.1 km to the stadium in the rain while also benefitting the police by reducing the number of potential flashpoints along the march route. At around 16:20, it became clear that the majority of supporters preferred to go to the stadium by coach. However, this then presented a logistical problem. The number of supporters exceeded the number of unoccupied seats on the one bus that was available to them. The D85 were then key in helping those remaining supporters to organise taxis by offering advice on which companies had the largest taxis and lowest fares.

Match Phase

A large part of the police plan had been about having contingency resources for the away supporters' march. However, once D85 had facilitated transport to the stadium there was a clear indication that many of the police units were now surplus to requirements.

As the kick-off time drew nearer, the police presence outside both MFF and DIF entrances rose quite dramatically. At one point, our observers counted four police vans and two cars in close proximity to the home entrance. At the away section entrance it would not be an exaggeration to say there was an uncountable number of vehicles, due to the design of that section of the stadium (screens designed to block opposing supporters from each others' view) and other police vehicles blocking the view, only parts of some vehicles could be seen, but it was estimated that around 20 vehicles were parked in the vicinity. Dozens of police officers were also seen gathered in groups around the barriers that created a sterile zone between home and away entrances. This deployment effectively appeared to be a show of force, however it severely undermined the earlier attempts by the D85 to create the perception of a graded police deployment.

Figure 24 - The View From the Concourse on the South Side of the Stadium (Obvs 4)[69]

Despite the prohibition of pyrotechnics being a major focus for the event, the search regime for the home supporters was non-existent on the long sides and purely symbolic at the Supportertorget entrance, with a cursory pat at the most. One of the Swedish Police officers who was part of our observation team managed to bring in their sidearm despite supposedly being searched. Another member of the team also brought in a large backpack which was not searched. The search regime at the away end was more vigorous than the home stands, but seeing as pyro was used in the away section during the match, it was clearly not as effective as had been hoped for. Just outside of the away ingress there was an incident in which one supporter got off the bus and promptly lit up a flare in front of 16 police officers. He was immediately arrested.

The Malmö supporters had organised an incredibly elaborate Tifo display for this match. This included a large pictural representation of a scarf with the words 'HEJA DI BLÅE' (Come On The Blue Ones) written in the local Scanian dialect, and thousands of smaller scarf sized representations of a similar image with two wooden poles on either end so that supporters could hold them high above their heads.

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[69] It shows 10 police vans and 1 unmarked police van. Described as a 'police party' by one of our workshop participants.

Figure 25 - Malmö Supporters Tifo (Obvs 4)

Much of this display was hastily cleared away afterwards. A couple of supporters, in collaboration with safety personnel made sure all unwanted flammable materials were put into large bins and removed so as not to be a fire risk during the match. This was deliberately done in case there would be pyrotechnics used later on. This is clear evidence that the supporters who do organise and use these devices take the safety issues associated with their use very seriously.

Figure 26 - MFF Supporters and Club Staff Work Together to Clear any Fire Hazards (Obvs 4)

Our observers noted that later on in the match, pyrotechnics were only used at the front of the stand and then handed to fire marshals afterwards to be disposed of safely. Below is a picture of their use just after Malmö had scored an equalising goal. It should be noted how supporters actively lowered their flags whilst the pyrotechnics burned. Supporters that our observation team spoke to also informed us that it was commonplace for all flags and such materials to be covered with flame retardant chemicals as a precautionary measure.

Figure 27 - MFF Supporters Use Pyrotechnics to Celebrate a Goal (Obvs 4)

There were two incidents of disorder within the stadium during the match. Both occurred around the segregation lines on either side of the away section. The first came after the second Malmö goal. While celebrating the goal some supporters were also gesturing provocatively at the away supporters. This antagonism had the effect of bringing supporters who had previously been quite centrally located in the away section towards the segregation netting. As these segregation line interactions continued it drew more people towards the netting in what appeared to be a rapidly escalating situation. The DIF SLOs and the DIF Security Manager, who had already been in positions close by, were able to move to the nucleus of the problem in a non-confrontational manner before the escalations became physical. Moments later the two Evenemangs officers, who had also been positioned close by but out of sight on the concourse, arrived into the area of the developing conflict. Working together they calmed these irate supporters using mainly verbal communication and hand gestures. The situation dissipated almost as quickly as it had begun and after just a few minutes most of the DIF supporters returned to their original positions. During this de-escalation the Evenemangs Officers were able to learn that the flashpoint had been caused by a series of cross segregation line hostilities. This information was then communicated with the security guards who asked the home supporters accused of instigating the altercation to move further away from the segregation line. A line of security guards then positioned themselves in this newly enlarged sterile area. No further altercations took place on that side of the away section.

The second incident occurred on the opposite side of the away section just after full-time. Away supporters made angry gestures and shouted insults across the segregation netting. It was unclear to whom exactly these gestures were aimed though as this section was predominantly a family section filled with young children. Because this side of the away

section had been very quiet throughout the match the DIF SLOs and the Evenemangs were still occupying positions in the vicinity of the previous altercation. This meant that the same type of de-escalation seen earlier did not happen. As the away supporters continued to hurl insults at the family section, some teenagers and young men in their early twenties started to gravitate towards this area from other parts of the home section. The insults were soon returned. The general topic of the exchanges mainly revolved around the pros and cons of Malmö's historic links with Denmark. However, at one point an away supporter jumped up onto the netting as if making ready to rush across the net covered seats that formed the segregation line. His friends all looked to be following suit, however at this critical juncture a young female supporter next to him quickly pulled him back down and verbally reprimanded him. This had an effect on the surrounding cohort who then followed the young lady's lead and instead of mounting the net stayed put or even took a step back.

The Malmö Event Manager, who had been positioned pitch side on the half way line and had observed these interactions was quickly over at the corner flag and in front of the segregation line. He directed stewards via radio and with his hands to usher the home supporters away from the segregation line. The Malmö stewards then worked systematically and politely to ask supporters to leave. This appeared to have a somewhat sedative effect on the away supporters whose vociferous comments about the Danish patronage of Malmö supporters became less audible as the home crowd filed out.

Figure 28 - MFF Players Thank Supporters for Their Contribution (Obvs 4)

Emotions were also high at the home end terrace. However, it must be said that this was expressed in a much more positive way. The team came over to thank the supporters for their exuberant singing throughout the match. They stayed there for some time. It was evident that the team value these positive contributions that the supporters make to creating such an ambience. The singing continued at full voice whilst the players applauded the supporters.

Post-match Phase

Just before the end of the match, four plain clothes police officers (Romeos) had positioned themselves outside the home section ready to arrest those suspected of pyro use. They quietly

arrested two supporters without incident. Apart from this the egress at the home end was without any other noticeable incident.

Some home supporters were seen hanging around at the away end. The Malmö Supporter Police were also around this location though and after short conversations with any group that seemed to be lingering a little bit too long, these groups (who were mostly composed of teenagers) continued their journeys home. During our workshop, the Malmö Supporter Police reported that most supporters had been drawn there by curiosity about the incredibly large police presence rather than any desire to cause trouble. Outside of the stadium there was again a huge number of officers at the away end after the match. This included around 13-15 visible vehicles and approximately 50-60 Delta Officers.

As the away supporters were leaving the stadium a pair of video evidence officers came to the edge of the area and started to video record the crowd. This had an inflammatory effect on supporters who then started to shout at these officers. The officers simply grinned back at the supporters, further antagonising them. These officers had been sent there to try to document the supporter who had held a flare during a Djurgården goal celebration. Yet unlike the Romeo's differentiated actions at the home end, this deployment was undifferentiated and somewhat provocative.

The majority of away supporters filtered out of the stadium, looking fairly frustrated after going from a 2:1 lead to losing 3:2. However, they were described as frustrated but not looking for confrontation by the Evenemangs present. The majority had already made their way directly to their busses when one Djurgården supporter shouted "Ultras, back, ultras, back!". This had two immediate effects. The first being that a large number of ultras ran back from the busses towards the stadium exit. The second being that the police responded by gearing up a group of Delta Officers and moving towards the outer gate of the segregation area should they be needed. Fortunately, one of the Evenemangs Officers was able to communicate to the D85 that this was a precautionary measure and that the ultras were simply calling back their friends in order to protect the Tifo materials while they were being loaded into a car.

Appendix G: Interview Consent Form

Interview Informed Consent Form (Version 2.0 February 3rd 2018)
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

1.	I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated _____.	☐
2.	I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation.	☐
3.	I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.	☐
4.	I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn.	☐
5.	The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (anonymisation of data) to me.	☐
6.	I consent for this interview to be audio recorded.	☐
7.	The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been explained to me.	☐
8.	I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified in this form.	☐

Participant:

Name of Participant   Signature   Date

Researcher:

Name of Researcher   Signature   Date

Appendix H: Interview Information Sheet

ENABLE Interview Information Sheet   **Version 2.0**   **5.3.2018**

Personalised Code Number: _ _ _ _   **Date:** __ __ __

- **What is ENABLE?** ENABLE is designed to contribute directly to the evidence based transformation of stakeholder practice with respect to safety and security in Swedish football. A primary focus of this research is the decision-making and actions of police, safety and security personnel and the impact their actions have on fan behaviour, safety and security. It is being conducted in partnership with the Swedish Football Supporters Union (SFSU), the Swedish FA (SFA), Swedish Elite Football (SEF) and the Swedish Police.

- **What is ENABLE doing here?** ENABLE adopts a knowledge co-production framework possible through collective participation from relevant stakeholders. This interview / focus group is being used as part of a series of interviews/ focus groups that will be conducted in order to understand the views of all stakeholders in Swedish football and how the current situation impacts upon them.

- **Will your participation in the project will remain confidential?** If you agree to take part, your name will not be recorded and the information will not be disclosed to other parties. Your responses to the questions will be used for the purpose of the ENABLE Project only. You can be assured that if you take part in the project you will remain anonymous.

- **What are the advantages of taking part?** You may find the project interesting and enjoy answering questions about your experience of Swedish football matches. Once the study is finished it could provide information about how to move forward with strategies to end football related crowd violence.

- **Are there any disadvantages of taking part?** It could be that you are not comfortable talking about your experience of Swedish football matches.

- **Do you have to take part in the study?** No, your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. You are not obliged to take part, you have been approached as a stakeholder in Swedish football with a view that you might be interested in taking part, this does not mean you have to.

- **How do I opt out?** If you do not wish to take part you do not have to give a reason, and you will not be contacted again. Similarly, if you do agree to participate you are free to withdraw at any time during the project if you change our mind.

- **What happens now?** If you are interested in taking part in the study you are asked to read the Informed Consent Form and prepare any questions you might have about it or the study in general. If you decide you would rather not participate in this study you need not reply to this correspondence. Simply ignore this letter and no further contact will be made.

- **How can you withdraw from the study at a later point?** Apart from the Informed Consent Form, your name will not be recorded anywhere. All of your data will be stored under the code at the top of this sheet. If at any point in the future you wish to withdraw that data from the study, please contact us with that code and all related data will be destroyed.

  Researcher: Neil Simon Williams

  Postgraduate Researcher, Keele University

  Supervisor: Professor Clifford Stott (c.stott@keele.ac.uk)

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If you experience problems with the research team you may also contact:

Research Integrity Team
Directorate of Research
Innovation and Engagement IC2 Building
Keele University
ST5 5NE
Email: research.governance@keele.ac.uk
Tel: 0044 1782 733371

Appendix I: Police Interview Questions

Preamble, introduce the participant to the general themes of the research and try to make them feel relaxed.
Sign the information sheets and consent form.
I will be recording this (anonymity and confidentiality guarantees).

Let's begin:

<u>Personal history: early motivations and understanding of the organisation</u>

Id like to start off by just talking about your personal journey into the police?
When did you decide you wanted to join the police?
What was it that attracted you to the job?
What was it about the police that you found attractive?
What role do you think the police play in society?

Where and when did you join?
What was your training like?
What were the key things you learnt about being a police officer during your training?

How long have you been in the police?
Where are you based?
What is your daily police role?
What do you like / dislike about your 'day job'?

Supplementary questions:
Did you have any mentors when you were a younger officer? If so who were they, were they good / bad mentors? What was it about them that you found good / bad?
I am learning Swedish and I watch a lot of Swedish tv dramas. Wallander, Jordskott, The Bridge etc. They often use the phrase 'Bra Polis'- what does that mean to you?
What do you think about the way police are represented in these dramas? Do you think it's an accurate reflection of the role? What's different if anything between the drama and reality?

<u>SPT</u>

So, let's move on to your role with the SPT
(If they haven't already mentioned public order)

How and when did you get involved the SPT (Delta, EVENT, other)? (If interviewing someone involved in PO policing but not within SPT then supplement)
What role(s) have you played within the tactic?
Why did you want to get involved in the SPT / roles?

Tell me about the training you go through when preparing to be [role(s)]?
What are the key lessons you learnt through that training about being an SPT officer?

How involved are you in the planning and what is your role in it?
How much can you change it if you don't agree with it?
Are there some overarching regulations which guide your plans?

What do you think about the dialogue police?
How are they similar / different?
Why do you think about them in that way?
Did you ever think about joining the dialogue Police?

Why / Why not?

What do you think about the EVENT police?
How are they similar / different?
Why do you think about them in that way?
Did you ever think about joining the EVENT Police?
Why / Why not?

Tactics and equipment   -scrap???

Can you tell me a little bit about your equipment that you carry and uniform you wear?
What is that equipment and what is it for?
Can you give me an example of that?
Do you think that your equipment is effective? Why / Why not?

Can you tell me a little about the tactics you use in your role?
What are the key tactical interventions you use? Examples could be arrest, dispersal,
containment, working together as a unit, baton, gun.
What do you think about distance weaponry (gas, water cannon)? Why do you think that?
What do you think about animals (horses and dogs). Why do you think that?

Core SPT principles

Now I'd like to explore some of the key ideas and principles around which the SPT is
organised to get some understandings of what these mean to you.

Have you heard of the Conflict Reducing Principles?
Can you tell me what they are?
Knowledge, Facilitation, Communication & Differentiation (explore each one if possible)
For each ask:
What does that mean to you?
Can you give me an example of when you have seen the principal used?
How do you see this principal guiding what you do?

Once explored each then ask:
Do you feel they work well as a set of guiding principles? Why / Why not?

Are you happy with how your officers apply these principals?
Do you feel they all understand them and use them effectively?
Is it important to you for everyone to have a thorough understanding of them?

The SPT talks about signal state- can you tell me about that?
The SPT talks a lot about the counterpart, can you tell me about that?
How does the counterpart affect your role and what you do in it?

One of these is an important one that comes up several times in our research so I'd like to
explore this in more detail.

Communication
Is communication important? Why / Why not? What does the expression 'communication
mean to you'?
Do you communicate a lot when you are deployed in your role? Why / Why not?
Do you ever get sick of trying to communicate and be nice to people?
Do others you work with feel / act the same way?

Do your commanders complain about a lack of communication?

Tell me about the communication between you and the other gold commanders in this region?
What about those in other regions?
Do you ever feel the differences between regions cause problems?

Tell me about the different units within the SPT that you have available for football policing?

What do you think about the dialogue police?
What do you think about their role? Why do you think that?
Do you think the role is valuable?
What do you think about the way they operate?
Do you seem them as different?
Do you trust them?

Policing Football Scrap?

I'd like to turn now to a specific interest in our research, football crowds [Wherever possible when try addressing these question ask the participant about examples]

In your role do you often get deployed for police football fixtures?
How / why did you get into policing football? (Not a matter of choice but deployment)

Is policing these types of events different to policing other types of crowd? (let them impose the categorical distinctions – e.g. protest, ice hockey, celebrations, etc.)
How / Why are these the same / different?

What is your role when policing football?
What are your key priorities?
What is it like for you in these kinds of situations?
Can you think of examples that characterise what policing is like for you?

Do you enjoy that role? Why / Why not?
What is it about it that you like / dislike?

Tell me about your colleagues?
How do you work with your colleagues on match days?
Is working together as a unit important in these situations?

What kinds of things are a priority for you when policing football? Why?
How do you evaluate risk when you are working at football?
What does risk mean to you?

Have you ever had to use your baton?
Can you describe a situation where that happened?
What role did your unit play in that situation?
What went through your mind in that situation?

What are your commanders like?
Is there a good / bad commander?
       What is good / bad about him / her?

What do your commanders tell you about your primary goals on a match day?

How is that communicated to you?

What do you think about the Evenemangs / Supporter / ROMEO police?
What do you think about their role? Why do you think that?
Do you think the role is valuable?
What do you think about the way they operate?
Do you seem them as different?
Do you trust them?

What is it like for you on match days?
What is it like when you police football crowds? How do you feel? Wat concerns do you have in that kind of situation?

What is important to you about working as a unit?
What are your key priorities?
If there a feeling of us and them on match days? [Who is the counterpart?]
Do you distinguish between yourselves and other police (supporter police, Evenemangs, DELTA, ROMEO)?
Why? In what way? (Explore each)

Do you see differences between you and the other police deployed at these events?
Do you think the other officers in your unit feel the same?
Can you give me an example of that?
What kind of problems do you experience with your collegues?

Supporters

How do you see supporters in general?
Can you tell me about some positive/negative experiences with supporters?
Are there specific kinds of supporters that present you with difficulty when you are working?
Tell more about who they are and why?
What are the causes of problems in football?
What do you think about the way football is policied?

In your role do you need to communicate with supporters?
Why / why not?

Taking into account all of the times you have been deployed in football- what do you think goes well?
What do you think goes badly?

Can you give me a specific example of when that happened?
Tell me about a typical match day in your role?

When you are with your colleagues and you deploy into an event- what are the things going through your mind?

If you are in a situation where violence develops- what is your biggest worry?

Future

We have talked a lot about your past career and where you are now, let's turn to look at the future.
How do you see your own future career direction in the police?
Would you like to stay in public order?

Would you like to be a commander? /stay in the unit?
What is it about being in the SPT that like?

Do you think football crowds are managed effectively?
How would you manage football crowds differently?

You are the experienced officer in the room. I'm not.
Can tell us about how you see the best direction of travel for managing football crowds in the long term?

Appendix J: Supporter Interview Questions

Preamble, introduce the participant to the general themes of the research and try to make them feel relaxed.
Sign the information sheets and consent form.
I will be recording this (anonymity and confidentiality guarantees).

Let's begin:

<u>Personal history: early motivations and understanding of the supporterdom</u>

May I ask you how old you are?

Id like to start off by just talking about your personal journey into being a supporter?
When did you first become interested in football?
What was it that attracted you to your team?
What was it about the stadium that interested you?
What role does football play in society?

Have you been a part of any formal or informal supporter groups?
Where and when did you join?
Was it easy to become a part of these groups?
Were there any particular new behaviours that you had to develop to become part of the group?

How long have you been a supporter/ part of those groups?
Where do you live?
What is your daily job like?
What do you like / dislike about your 'day job'?

Supplementary questions:
Did you have any mentors when you were a younger supporter? If so who were they, were they good / bad mentors? What was it about them that you found good / bad?

I am learning Swedish and I watch a lot of Swedish tv dramas. Wallander, Jordskott, The Bridge etc. They often use the phrase 'Bra Polis'- what does that mean to you?

What do you think about the way police are represented in these dramas? Do you think it's an accurate reflection of the role? What's different if anything between the drama and reality?

<u>Supporter Groups</u>

So, let's move on to your role within the supporter groups you are part of?

Can you tell me about your first experience with the group?

What role(s) have you played within the group?
Why did you want to get involved in these roles?

Does membership of this group affect your day to day life or is it just on a match day?
What are the key lessons you learnt about being a member of the group in the early stages?

What are the other prominent groups within your team's supporter culture?
What do you think about the _____?
How are they similar / different?

Why do you think about them in that way?
Did you ever think about joining that group?
Why / Why not?

Dress

I have often heard talk of supporters having a kind of uniform. Do you think that is an accurate description?

Can you tell me a little bit about the clothes/ uniform you wear?
Is there a reason you wear it?
Can you give me an example of that?
Do you think that it is effective? Why / Why not?
How do you think you are perceived when dressed like this?

Are flags/ banners/ pyro important to your group?

We conducted a survey after the MFF match at Gothenburg last year on the opening day of the season, and a couple of supporters mentioned the phrase "no pyro no party". What does that mean to you?

Can you tell me about the different types of pyro?

Interactions with the Police

Do you have a lot of interaction with the Police?

Are there different types of police that you come into contact with?
Do you come into contact with them outside of match days?

Is there a difference in the way these units interact with you? How do you feel when that happens?
Does everyone in your group interact with the police or are there just some people? Why is that?

Do you feel that there is enough communication between you and the police?

How do you feel when you see a large group of police? Does it change depending on the place?
What about home and away? Is it sometimes a relief to see a large number of police when you visit _____ for example?

Does it change depending on their dress?

What do you think about the EVENT police?
How are they similar / different?
Why do you think about them in that way?

What do you think about the Evenemangs/ supporter police? (it will be interesting to see if the MFF supporters know about the Evenemangs)
What do you think about their role? Why do you think that?
Do you think the role is valuable?
What do you think about the way they operate?
Do you seem them as different?

369

Do you trust them?

Have/would you ever consider joining the police?
What about after the terrorist attack in Stockholm?
In the enable surveys last year I saw a lot of "hata snutten"? What does that mean to you?

Football Match Days

How many football fixtures have you been to this season? What about last season? How long have you been doing this?

What is it like to be a part of the crowd?

Home vs Away matches: How / Why are these the same / different?

What are your goals on a match day?
Tell me about a typical match day? Home vs Away

Tell me about your fellow group members?
Is it important that you stay together on match days?
What is it about these situations that makes it important?

Have you ever been involved in violence on a match day? Outside of a match day?
Can you describe a situation where that happened?
What went through your mind in that situation?

If there a feeling of us and them on match days?

How does your group decide on their actions on a match day?
Do you ever co-ordinate with other supporter groups from your team?

Do you have a lot of interactions with supporter groups from other teams?
Are there positive/ negative interactions?
Can you tell me about some positive/negative experiences with supporters/ police?

What is going through your mind in those situations?

Are there specific kinds of supporters that present you with difficulty when you are at a match?
Tell more about who they are and why?
If you are in a situation where violence develops- what is your biggest worry?

What do you think are the causes of problems in football?
What do you think about the way football is policed?

How do you see "flagpole" supporters in general? Similar or different to you?

Future

We have talked a lot about your past and where you are now, let's turn to look at the future.
How do you see your own future within the supporter environment?
Would you like to stay in this group?
Would you like to be a leader?

What is it about being in the group that like the most?

Do you think football crowds are managed effectively?
How would you manage football crowds differently?

Can tell us about how you see the best direction of travel for managing football crowds in the long term?

Appendix K: Swedish Version Supporter Survey

Sida 1.

Introduktion

Du är inbjuden att delta i forsknings projektet ENABLE.

Denna enkät ger dig möjligheten att uttrycka din åsikt och upplevelse av hur fotbollsevenemang hanteras av klubbarna och polisen. Vi är särskilt intresserade av fotbollsfans upplevelser och erfarenheter av hanteringen av matchen mellan _____ och _____ som spelades den _____ på _____.

Forskningsprojektets primära syfte har varit att utarbeta en plan för att kunna analysera, identifiera, och utveckla bra praxis för att hantera folksamlingar vid Svensk Elitfotbolls matcher.

Genom att delta i denna studie hjälper du till att förstärka svenska fotbollsfans röst i debatten och utvecklingen av hur fotbollsmatcher ska hanteras i framtiden.

Klicka på ”nästa” för att fortsätta.

Sida 2.

Samtycke

Jag förstår att mitt deltagande är frivilligt och att jag när som helst utan att ge orsak, och utan negativa följder, kan dra tillbaka mitt deltagande. Dessutom kan jag avstå att svara på specifika frågor i enkäten.

Om jag väljer att dra tillbaka mitt deltagande från studien innan 1 juli 2019 kommer all data som kan associeras till mig att förstöras.

Jag ger min tillåtelse att andra forskare inom projektet får tillgång till mina svar efter att de anonymiserats. Jag förstår att mitt namn inte kommer att kunna kopplas till forskningsmaterialet, och jag kommer inte att kunna bli identifierad eller identifierbar i rapporten eller andra rapporter baserade på denna forskning.

Jag förstår att mina svar kommer att hållas konfidentiella.

Jag godkänner att den **anonymiserade data** som samlas genom mina svar får användas i framtida forskning.

Jag har läst och förstår ovanstående text och jag: *Obligatoriskt fält
0 önskar delta i studien
0 avstår deltagande i studien

Sida 3.

Bakgrundsinformation

1.Ålder:

2. Kön:

3. Vilket/vilka fotbollslag stöder du? _____

4. Hur många matcher (hemma och borta) går du på varje säsong? _____

Sida 4.

Dessa frågor avser Din upplevelse av hanteringen av matchen mellan _____ och _____ den _____ på _____.

5. Med egna ord, kan du beskriva din upplevelse av hanteringen av matchen mellan _____ och _____ den _____ på _____:

6. Om du inte redan gjort det, kan du beskriva en specifik händelse som du tycker exemplifierar bra hantering från matchen mellan _____ och _____ den _____ på _____:

Exemplifiera gärna med fler händelser om du vill.

7. Om du inte redan gjort det, kan du beskriva en specifik händelse som du tycker exemplifierar dålig hantering från matchen mellan _____ och _____ den _____ på _____:

Exemplifiera gärna med fler händelser om du vill.

Sida 5.

8. Finns det något ytterligare som du anser att vi behöver veta/något du anser viktigt angående hantering av fans vid fotbollsevenemang?

Sida 6.

Tack för ditt deltagande! Ditt deltagande hjälper oss att förstå hur alla involverade parter inom svensk fotboll kan skapa en säkrare fotbollsmiljö.

Ditt id.nummer för denna studie är _ _ _ _. Vid kontakt framtida kontakt med ENABLE gällande ditt deltagande, såsom avbryta deltagande, var vänlig ange detta id.nummer.

Email n.s.williams@keele.ac.uk vi frågor eller för att avbryta ditt deltagande.

Tack för ditt stöd och din hjälp!

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