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TELEVISION AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ:

ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO THE EFFECT OF TELEVISION ON

TWO IRAQI VILLAGES

by

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Abstract

This study tries to examine the contribution of television broadcasting to development in Iraq. In most Third World countries (including Iraq), expectations and hopes that the use of the mass media might accelerate or aid development programmes and processes have been entertained for the past thirty years.

This study has been divided into ten chapters. first chapter is an introduction. The second chapter is a review of the main theoretical approaches to communication and development goals; the contribution of television to development and a brief comparison between two other developing countries. Chapter three characterizes the main features of population trends in Iraq in so far as they relate to the extent of popular participation in the development process. Chapter four discusses agriculture, oil and industry and their basic material development. Chapter five examines the infrastructure of development: education, health, and popular organizations. Chapters four and five reveal the development structure in order to link it with communication in the following chapters. Chapter six, discusses communication policy in Iraq with the emphasis on television policy to reveal the contributory role of television to development. Chapter seven, discusses the development of Iraqi television, its administrative system and budget; the instrumental

capacity of television. Chapter eight, examines the role of the Iraqi government in popularizing television and establishing television services. Available television sets in rural areas made it possible to conduct field studies. Chapter nine reveals the efforts of television programmes in two villages in Iraq. Chapter ten concludes the study with results.

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Chapter One

Introduction

Television in the Third World is a new phenomenon, which spread throughout the developing countries in the second half of the 1950's and just after, and only a decade before most developed countries.

Television is one of the most important inventions of this century because the effect of television programmes is undeniable, from New York to Tokyo, and from Stockholm to the Marsh Arabs. (i.e. all round the world).

Also, in the 1950's, developing countries started socioeconomic programmes to raise living standards and to accelarate
their economic growth towards the same levels as the
developed countries. Later, development became a major concern
of all developing countries. Governments and international
agencies employed a variety of resources and methods to
achieve development. In very recent years, some countries
have tended to use television as an instrument for enhancing
development. One such country is Iraq. This thesis examines
the contribution of television to development in Iraq.

In the process of carrying out my research, I met with two sets of people:

1. Those officials considered 'the leaders' of the village,

such as party officials, the headmaster, health officials, agricultural authorities, and officials of the general federation of Iraqi women and other popular organizations.

The conditions for selecting the "ideal" informants were delineated: role in community, knowledge, willingness, communicability, and impartiality. (1)

2. The second set of people were the peasants from the village.

I collected information about the village on the following bases:

- 1. Population.
- 2. Data on agriculture, education and living standards;
- 3. The direct impact of the National development plan upon the village.
- 4. How far the village resembles or is representative of other villages in the area and how their population compares with the population in other villages;
- 5. Number of television sets in the village according to families.

The Iraqi broadcasting communication plan identified and contributed to eight areas of social development. These areas were the subject of interviews and observations as follows:

Marc-Adelard Tremblay, The key informant technique: A non-ethnography application, 1982, in, Field Research: Source book Field Manual, (ed.) by Robert G. Burgess, George Allen and Unwin, London, p.100.

- 1. Education
- 2. Health
- 3. Relationship of individual to the state
- 4. Old practices and customs
- 5. Women's position
- 6. Agriculture
- 7. Political consciousness
- 8. Participation (i.e. voluntary work)

Research on the subject of communication

Iraqi and overseas scholars have produced a number of studies on Iraqi villages, but no study has been done on the effect or the contribution of the mass media at village level, or even on development in Iraq. There are few theses about villages in Iraq. Amongst them is a Ph.D. study about Marsh village dwellers, presented at the London School of Economics in 1955. This thesis focuses on the social and economic system in a Southern Iraqi village and discusses the tribes, social stratification and the kinship system. The rest of the theses were similar in their concerns to the above thesis.

Moreover, the contribution of television to development is quite a new subject. Previous communication studies in Iraq concentrated mainly upon the history of Iraqi journalism, and a very few were devoted to current problems and situations.

In short, there is no study in Iraq concerned with broadcasting or its contributions to development in Iraq, On the other hand, there are four social anthropological theses on Iraqi villages. One of these was written in the early 1950's. two in the 1960's, and the other in the early 1970's. None of these theses provided the requisite information for my own project. They focused on ecology, the social structure and on social systems.

According to my inquiries, it would seem that television penetrated rural areas only after 1976. The microwave networks made it possible to provide the whole of Iraq with television transmission in July 1976, and mass television installation subsequently began.

Some observations concerning the impact of radio on rural Iraq had been made previously. It is an interesting subject for review, showing, as it does, the historical background and impact of broadcasting on the villages.

In 1958, one Iraqi writer claimed that he questioned 400 students in the Marshes in Southern Iraq, and concluded that most of the students stated that they had never seen a car or heard a radio in their lives. (1) In contrast, a foreign researcher in 1958 estimated that there was at least one radio in 70 per cent of villages. There were two radios in the village chosen by the researcher for her field-work: one in the house of the school master and the other in the house of a clergyman. The researcher stated,

^{1.} Abdul Karim Alwan, 1958, Of Feudal Tragics, Al-Mutunabi Press, Baghdad (in Arabic) p.74.

"More important than numbers, is the effectiveness with which the radio has distributed new ... concepts". (1)

The same researcher believed that the most important tool for development in rural Iraq was the radio. (2) In 1958, another foreign researcher observed that villagers were able, from time to time, to listen to the radio, which was not only a link to the external world, but also a symbol of prestige and status in the village. (3) However, no researcher mentioned television in Iraqi villages until the mid 1970's, partly, because there was a lack of research in this field, and because television had not significantly reached rural Iraq before 1976.

Hence, the director of the Department of Internal Information in Thi-Qar province, affiliated to the Ministry of Information, stated that his department's activities were concentrated upon the more isolated villages which were not yet provided with electricity. The department presented films, distributed books, leaflets and posters. (4) It must be remembered that television can only present information and ideas to people who own television sets in those

^{1.} Phebe Ann Marr, The Iraqi Village- Prospect for Change, Middle East Forum, November, 1959, Vol. XXXV, No.9.pp.23-24.

^{2.} Ibid., p.23.

^{3.} Malcolm N. Quint, The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village, The Middle East Journal, Vol.12, No.4, Fall 1958, p.372.

^{4.} Interview with Internal Information Director in Thi-Qar Province on 16.11.1981.

villages provided with electricity. Televized information is considerable, and this demonstrates the importance of television transmission and government hopes to reach the village population of Iraq.

In addition to this, one Iraqi writer has stated that some people in a Southern Iraqi village told him after viewing televized love scenes, (films, plays etc.) modern dancing shows, "We just discovered that we were living like foxes". (1) Which, broadly speaking, meant that they felt they were living in the backwoods, remote from modern life.

Lastly, some interesting observations were made by an Iraqi researcher when conducting his research in the North of Iraq. He noticed television sets in some peasant houses in a village not provided with electricity. Naturally, these sets did not work. The peasants told the researcher that provincial officials had promised to provide their village with electricity in a few months time. So, the peasants purchased television sets and were waiting for electricity to be provided. (2)

In sum, there is a great need for more research in the field of media and development, and this informs my attempt to research in this area. My purpose is twofold: first, to remedy the lack of such research in the field of

^{1.} Slaman, A.A. 1980, Rural Society in Iraq, Ministry of Culture and Information, Baghdad, (in Arabic), p.229.

^{2.} Al-Jawhar, M.N., The Role of Public Relationship in Development, A Field Work Study of the Employment of Public Relationship for Some Aspects of Development in Iraq, 1981, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished) (in Arabic), Cairo University, Public Relations Department, p.227.

television and development (not only in Iraq, but also in Third World countries), and secondly, to check the extent to which television contributes to development, and accelerates this process.

The problem of research:

The first problem facing the researcher in most developing countries, as far as I know, and in Iraq in particular, is the scarcity of research done in the field of the mass media. It goes without saying, that there were some attempts to explore, or to reveal some dimensions of the impact of the mass media, or its contribution to development. These difficulties face all Arab countries. Published information about television in Iraq is not worth mentioning. Even information about the history of television in Iraq is not available, so I turned to newspapers and magazines published during the early days of television transmission in Iraq. Neither is there a specialized library for communication studies (I include in this, the main library of the Iraqi broadcasting establishment). A very little information about Iraqi broadcasting has been published in foreign languages. (1) Secondly, I have acquired materials by using interviews with and questionnaires for officials responsible for running television departments,

^{1.} For instance, Hadid, Z.A., who did an M.A. thesis on "Mass Communication and Social Change in Iraq: Changing the attitudes of Women" at Durham University in 1980, depended on foreign information about the history of Iraqi broadcasting, which is not accurate.

or preparing television programmes. Among these officials were: the Director General of the Iraqi Broadcasting
Establishment. I saw other personnel who participated in making decisions for Iraqi broadcasting, and the directors of government departments responsible for preparing television programmes concerning social and economic development.

Thirdly, I searched the Iraqi broadcasting archives. The problem with this method is twofold: firstly, it takes time because the archives are uncatalogued; secondly, many documents are regarded as classified information, so a good relationship with the relevant officials is necessary for permission to release it. In any case, most officials show no interest in cataloguing documents unrelated to their daily activities. It is my belief that this attitude will weaken long term planning.

In fact, data relating to these matters in developed Western countries can be easily obtained. In contrast, it is very difficult to obtain such information in Third World and similar countries, including Iraq.

Problems encountered in the fieldwork:

Some research problems at village level may be classified as follows: The distance between the place of study (England) and the place where the fieldwork was carried out (Iraq), a researcher has to include in his considerations a flexible plan, because it is often difficult to communicate with a

supervisor over such distances. I have translated my questions into standard Arabic which is different in some particulars to spoken Arabic. As a result, there was a need to explain some questions to the interviewees. lot of time was wasted because the country folk were not in a hurry to answer questions and they liked to talk about all kinds of things. In fact, I asked some rural people if the questions were comprehensible, and I took into consideration their comments about language. necessary to change my plan from oral interviewing to interviewing by means of written questions. Rural people mostly distrust strangers with casette recorders and cameras. They tend to believe that any such a person is a secret policeman or an official trying to collect information about their properties and their private lives. Some people would not allow me any of their time if I insisted on doing oral interviews. Some would not answer my questions, or if they did, would have told lies. On the other hand, some people were quite willing to discuss their personal or village problems, assuming that the researcher might mediate with the government or the provincial authorities on their I wrote a set of questions which depended heavily on a previous plan approved by my supervisor. I repeatedly told most of the people I interviewed the purpose of my research, emphasizing that I did not want to know their

names or to trace any personal information. Interviewing women in an Iraqi village has not been an easy job at all in the past, but now, with party organizations acting as intermediaries, it has become possible. When I tried to interview women in the village I found that village customs made it impossible to ask each women 40 questions. So, I dropped those questions which men could answer adequately (i.e. per capita income). Seven questions were chosen for In fact, the men of the village were aware of my questions to the women. Students in intermediate and secondary schools were very helpful in enabling me to meet and interview the women of their families. I believe that all the students were members of the ABSP organizations. One final problem has been transport to and from the city and the acquisition of a room in provincial hotels is a very real difficulty. Most of the above problems might be solved if a person respected by the local population were to introduce the researcher to the villagers.

The questionnaire items were discussed with the following:

- 1. Dr.Hadi Al-Heeti, a lecturer in the communication department, University of Baghdad.
- 2. Dr.Abdul-Satar Ez-Al-Deen, a lecturer in the nationalist and socialist studies department. University of Baghdad.
- 3. The Ba'th party leader in Elchebiesh district.

- 4. The Ba'th party leader in Elentesar village.
- 5. Mr. Galib Al-Nasrallah, M.P. for Thi-Qar province.

 Some of the questionnaire's items were reshaped in simpler language. So that they could be fully understood by the villagers, but keeping the original meaning.

Chapter Two

Communication and Development: The Contribution of Television to Development

The following chapter aims to demonstrate the role of mass communication, particularly television in National development. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section, discusses the concept of development and the relationship between communication and development. The second section argues the relations and contribution of television programmes to development. And the third section investigates the experience of Egypt and India in the sphere of communication of development. The literature on media development is extensive, but there are few studies on television and development.

As a matter of fact, a little research and literature has been done on the area of television and development in the Third World countries. So, the literature of communication of development could be used to clarify the role and approach of television's contribution to the development effort.

Section One

Communication and Development

In the last thirty years, a great deal of research on communication and development has been done. Most of this research was produced in Western countries, especially in the U.S.A., namely in the area of innovation. The central themes in the area of diffusion of innovation is as follows; (1) the central concern in development is increasing productivity, secondly, the spread of cultural patterns and material benefits from the developed (Western) to the underdeveloped countries could achieve development, thirdly, within each developing country a similar diffusion occurs from the modern (urban) to the traditional (rural) areas and sectors.

However, at present a lot of thought is being given to the subject of communication and development by the Third World countries by individuals, government departments and international organization agencies (i.e. UNESCO).

To start with, the relations of communication to development must be defined and careful thought given to the role of broadcasting in development.

Havens, A.E. Methodological Issues in the Study of Development, <u>Sociologia Ruralis</u>, Vol. X11, No.3/4, 1972, p.220.

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Development and Government:

The definition of development, is in reality a controversial one. Many authors have mixed up concepts such as "development", "modernization", "growth", "urbanization", and "Westernization". The term "development" is likely to be used by individuals and officials and seems a comprehensive one.

It is interesting to borrow the representative concept put forward in the 1970's:

"A Widely participatory process of social change in a society, intended to bring about both social and material advancement (including greater equality, freedom, and other valued qualities) for the majority of the people through their gaining greater control over their environment". (1)

In fact, development aimed to transform the socio-economic structure of society from the conditions of underdevelopment.

Practically, scholars and leaders of developing countries refer to development as:(2)

- 1. Economic transformation, in the direction of aid and rapid increases in the national product. Also, the orientation of manufacturing to enable the country to direct its own future growth.
- 2. Social transformation, in the direction of a more equal distribution of income and broad popular access to social improvement in the fields of education, health services, housing, recreational facilities and participation in political decision-making.

^{1.} Rogers, E.M., Communication and Development, the Passing of the Dominant Paradigm, Communication Research, Vol. 3. No. 2. p. 225.

^{2.}Portes, A., On the Sociology of National Development, Theories and issues, American Journal of Sociology, July, 1976. Vol. 82.No. 1. p. 56.

3. Cultural transformation, in the direction of reaffirmation of national identity and traditions. Centralized government in the Third World tends to accelerate economic growth and social distribution. State resources are employed to achieve growth. However, the operational problem in the sociology of development is how to advise government in their development policies and plans.

Practically, governments are dependent on their policies which are based on the interests of political leaders, their supporters, the civil service and other pressure groups. So, government is not interested in listening to advice which contradicts their development policies. (1) However, the term "first World" is used

in the usual sense, to designate capitalist countries, which include, the U.S.A., United Kingdom, Japan and Western European countries, the "second World" refers to the socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland etc., and finally, "Third World", refers to the poor, non-industrialised countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also, the term "developed countries" refers to the wealthy, industrialised, technologically advanced, militarily powerful, politically stable, nations. (2)

^{1.} R.Jayaraman, Some theoretical considerations in the study of social development in the Third World, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol.X111, No.3/4, 1973, p.240.

^{2.} Tony Belton, et.al., 1981, Introductory Sociology, The Macmillan Press, London, p.159.

On the other hand "developing countries" are those countries at different stages of "underdevelopment".

The following table illustrates the gap between developing and developed countries in the sense of per capita income and consumption of energy:

Table 2.1
Economic Development by Continent

	Average Per (U.S.		Consumption of energy (KWh) per capita
	1970	1976	1971
Latin America	550	1,100	832
Africa	190	420	343
North America	4,200	7,020	8,080
Western Europe	2,240	4,840	3,996
Asia		1,770	527

Source: Tony Bilton (et al), 1981, <u>Introductory</u>
Sociology, The Macmillan Press Ltd., Table3.1,
p.160.

Theories of Development:

I think it is important to distinguish the contrast between two types of theory which dominate the literature of the sociology of development, in order to show how these two approaches yield different accounts of the media.

The main sociological approaches towards development
may be roughly divided into one of two categories of theories:

modernization and radical approaches.

The Modernization Approach:

Is the product of Western countries, it argues that the obstacles to development are to be overcome through exposure to Western ideas and institutions.

In his study, Frank⁽¹⁾ offered a critical examination for the sociology of development, which is largely produced in the United States. Frank examines the theoretical modes and trends previously classified by Manning Nash. These include: ⁽²⁾

The Index Approach, was used as a comparative criterion between the characters and components of developed countries which made ideal abstractions typifying the socio-economic features of developing countries.

Secondly, the acculturation view of the process of development implied that the West or the Atlantic developed countries diffused knowledge, values, skills, technology, organizations and capital to developing countries, encouraging imitation of their societies, cultures and personnel. Lastly, there is the approach concerned with analysis of development

^{1.} Andre Gunder Frank, Sociology of Development and Development of Sociology, 1971, Pluto Press.

^{2.} Ibid. pp.2-3.

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process, as it occurs, in developing countries.

In conclusion, Frank stated that there were large similarities in the major approaches; similarities of empirical inaccuracy, theoretical inedequacy, and effectiveness of policy. There were also ideological and analytical resemblances.

Many scholars are followers of Frank's classification of the sociology of development. They called the above approaches "the modernization theory of development".

In sum, the modernization theory - puts forward the idea that less developed societies can become more developed or "modern" by being exposed to the values and norms of developed countries.

Rostow, for instance, in his book "The stages of Economic Growth" argued for the introduction and diffusion of Western economic, social and political institutions in the developing countries as a necessary condition for growth. (1)

The following figure illustrates the major modernization approaches of the study of development. Also, there were some critics of modernization theory, who argued that the modernization approach emphasized that the values of modern Western society were the result rather than the cause of

^{1.} Tony Bilton, et al., Introductory Sociology, 1981, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, p.162. In his book, W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 1971, second edition, Cambridge University Press, classified Iraq as follows: "The take-offs of China and India have begun, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia and other states are likely to be less than a decade behind - or at least not much more, given the acute pressures to modernize now operating on and within their societies". p.126.

Figure 2.1

Major Approaches to the Study of Development

Major Assumptions Types of Approaches Frequent Concepts to the study of development Equilibrium Α. Individuals suffer Modernization, Models deprivations that learning curves, are contextually internalization, determined; deprivation behaviour can be attitudes, values, changed at any time, rationality, adult development will socialization, occur through new intra-generational learning experiences.change. В. Psychodynamic Early childhood Personality, backsocialization wardness, childhood largely predeterexperience, status withdrawal, intermines future behaviour which generational change, modernization. may impede innovativeness, cleavage between individual behaviour and current social environment, development occurs through new socialization patterns.

C. Diffusionist

Simplistic dualism; societal cleavage based on degree of use of modern technology; development occurs through new capital and technological inputs.

Diffusion curves, rates of change for ecological units, lagging sectors, productivity, technological growth, modernization

Source: A.E. Havens, Methodological issues in the study of development, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol.X11, No.3/4 1972, Extract from table 2. p.256.

Western industrialization. (1) Furthermore, the crude statistical measures of growth in developing countries, do not say much about the character of this growth. (2)

In short, the modernization approach suggests that developing countries should imitate the rich countries. The historical relations between what are now called developed and developing countries provided an explanation for the underdevelopment of the Third World, rather than blaming developing countries for their underdevelopment, as a result of preserving traditional values. (3)

The radical approach: the second set of approaches were based on criticism of modernization approaches, and were established on the basis that Third World countries' underdevelopment was a socio-economic condition created by processes which accompanied the growth of North Atlantic countries over a period of more than a hundred years. (4)

The radical approaches concentrate on attacking the notion of "diffusion". They rename diffusion "mechanisms of dependency" or "imperialism" and show that its effect on Third World countries were the opposite of what modernization

^{1.} Jayaraman, R., Some Theoretical Consideration in the study of social development in the Third World, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol.X111, No.3/4. 1973. pp.237-254.

^{2.} Bilton, T., (et.al), Introductory Sociology, op.cit,p.261.

^{3.} Frank, A.G. The Development of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review, September 1966, Vol.18, No.4. pp.18-20.

^{4.} Bilton, T., (et.al), Introductory Sociology, op.cit, p.162.

approaches supposed. (1)

Crucial factors in promoting the emergence of the capitalist economy in Europe: private property, the commercialisation of agriculture and wage labour, all of which gradually allowed a greater accumulation of surplus through more productive work rather than, as in feudalism, through simply more work. (2)

wealth, accompanied by military and political domination made it possible for development to flourish in Europe.

National development models: Nontheless, the Third World countries are currently in need of a series of national development models, made by themselves and, based on knowledge through understanding of national needs, moving at whatever pace is feasible and directed toward the country's perception of its own goals. (3)

In recent years, state intervention has become the major means of shaping most Third World countries' policies, as well as, the main tool for applying development practices.

It seems to me that many factors coordinate in shaping such a development model. The first of these is the ideology of the government and its relationships with the major world

^{1.} Fitzgerald, Frank, T., Sociology of Development, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.11, No.1, 1981, p.8.

Bilton, T., op.cit., p.163.
 Wilbur Schram, Mass Media and National Development, 1979
 International Commission for the study of Communication Problems, UNESCO, paper No.42, p.6.

powers. Second, is the capacity of resources, revenues, and the size of population, to carry out development projects. Third, the level of achieved social and economic improvement and how far the government wishes to go in its development process. So it is true to say that the improvement of living standards for all people in such countries, is achieved by building up efficient structures in the social and economic sectors.

Broadly speaking, during the 1960's and 1970's several factors played a role in destroying the credibility of the modernization theories of development. The oil crises during and after 1973 produced many wealthy developing nations. Iraq was an example of a developing country which depended on its own perspectives to create its own course of development. Also, the rise of China made it possible for developing countries to become developed without following dominant modernization theories evolved in the West.

It should be born in mind that there were and are, great differences among individual developing countries. Each is of a different stage of development and therefore each will need different policies. (1) Moreover, the pragmatic question is that the governments are shaping the kinds of structural changes that take place. (2)

Lucian W.Pye (ed.) 1963, <u>Communication and Political</u> <u>Development</u>, <u>Princeton</u>, <u>New Jersey</u>, <u>Princeton University</u> <u>Press</u>, <u>p.229</u>.

Norman Long, 1977, An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development, Tavistock Publications, London, p.5.

In sum, the chief concern of several Third World countries has been how to develop their societies, along lines of development appropriate to their abilities and policies, in the sense that each developing country has limited resources to spend on development projects and programmes, so it is necessary that these, resources are spent in accordance with the ideology of the state.

Communication and development:

Many areas of media development have not yet been dealt with. In one of his early studies, Rogers pointed out that "Westerners" state of knowledge about mass media exposure and modernization in underdeveloped societies was relatively underdeveloped. Meanwhile "Existing theoretical models are not much help". (1) However, there are two main broad theoretical approaches which have dominated research on the area of communication and development; firstly, the conservative theoretical approach, which underlies, most, social change theories, and secondly, the radical approach based on criticism of this so-called conservative approach.

Pragmatically speaking, there can be no doubt that the application of development theory in Third World countries shows that most governments responsible for applying development policies, did so idiosyncratically, according to their abilities and policies. On the

Everett M. Rogers, 1965, Mass Media Exposure and Modernization among Colombian Peasants, <u>Public</u> <u>Opinion Quarterly</u>, Vol.XXIX, No.4. pp.614-625.

theoretical level, there is fundamental agreement between the dominant theories of development that the core of development is to change the traditional and agrarian societies into modern and industrialized societies. difference between theories is based on the ways of transformation. Theories of communication development proceeded from development theories. I borrow Golding's classification for the dominant paradigm (conservative approach) of communication development theories because it is comprehensive. The prevalent approaches were: (1) First there is the index approach, which is originally an economic one, affirms that definite indices such as the percentage of the population in non-primary sectors of production, Gross national product (GNP) per capita, the numbers of radios, televisions, newspapers, students and beds in hospitals etc., are used as simple unitary indicators for development. International organizations (e.g. UNESCO) used this approach for measuring the relationship between media and development. So, the correlations between development and media consumption figures, show associations between media and development data, and actually shows the results of the development The level of development shows the influence of its media (i.e. media is the result of development).

^{1.} Peter Golding, 1974, Media Role in National Development, Critique of a Theoretical Orthodoxy, <u>Journal of Communication</u>, vol.24, No.3. pp.39-53.

The second, are the theories of differentiation, or the psychological approach which assume that developed countries have gained the technological tools which have enabled them to develop, whilst underdeveloped countries have had less opportunity to acquire this technology.

Thus development may occur when technology is introduced to underdeveloped countries. Traditional values and ways of thinking tend to be considered a barrier to development. The role of the media may find its metier in promoting values appropriate to modernity, and so promoting the ability of the individual to project himself into the role of another "empathy".

The third kind of theory was the diffusion of innovation put forward by Everett Rogers, which assumes the backwardness of the Third World peasant societies. The influence of the following among peasant society are great: Mutual distrust in interpersonal relations, limited perceived good, hostility towards governmental authority, fatalism, lack of innovation, limited aspirations, low empathy. (1)

The mass media may play its role in development by introducing new ideas and images which accompany innovations.

^{1.} Everett M. Rogers, 1969, Modernization among Peasants, the Impact of Communication, Holt, Rinhart and Winston Inc., New York, pp.26-38.

All such communication development theories emerged from development and social change theories. (1) However, the theory of classical conditions of communication process into development, put forward by Schramm, is still valid: (2) this says that the populace should have information about national development. The aim of this is to raise people's aspirations for themselves and their country. Secondly, it stated that people should have an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and that the necessary skills must be taught. Pragmatically speaking, however, it is reasonable to suggest that the effect of media on development may usefully be thought of in terms of the following question:

"What media in what society at what stage of development have what effect on what aspects of the nation". (3)

So, one may say that the role of the media in development

^{1.} For more details about the literature on communication of development see: 1. Everett M.Rogers, Communication and Development, The passing of the dominant paradigm, Communication Research, Vol.3. No.2. April 1976. pp. 213-240. 2.Peter Golding, Media Role in National Development, Critique of a theoretical orthodoxy, Journal of Communication, Vol.24 No.3, Summer 1974, pp. 39-53. 3. Herman Felstehausen, Conceptual limits of development communication theory, Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. X111, No.1, 1973, pp. 39-54. 4. Wilbur Schramm, Mass media and National Development, 1979, International commission for the study of communication problems, Paper No.42. UNESCO, Mimeographed, N.D. 5. Frederick W. Frey, Communication and Development, in, Handbook of Communication, Edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool, et al., Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago. pp. 237-461.

^{2.} W.Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, UNESCO, p.125.

^{3.} Sydney W. Head, <u>Broadcasting in Africa</u>, A Continental Survey of Radio and Television, 1974, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, p.335.

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is dependent on the level of improvement of socio-economic sectors and that:

"mass media development is interdependent with achievements in many aspects of the "way of life" in a country" (1)

A classic view of the link between media and development stated that the communication system is both an index and agent of change in a total social system. (2) However, a more recent view stated that the mass media has been both cause and effect. (3)

In 1972, UNESCO's advisory panel on communication research, policy and planning recommended the creation of national communication policy councils, as well as national communication policies, (4) and this International Organization was a great help to developing countries in establishing their own communication systems and policies. So, it becomes clear, that developing countries shaped their communication policies, in a pragmatic way, according to their stage of development and ideology.

^{1.} George H.Axinn and Nancy W.Axinn, Communication among the Nsuka 1gbo: a folk village society, <u>Journalism Quarterly</u>, 1969. p.230.

^{2.} Daniel Lerner, Communication system and social system, 1960, in "Mass Communication", (ed. by) W.Schramm, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, p.133.

^{3.} Luis Ramiro Belteran, (a quotation), 1974, Rural development and social communication Relationships and strategies, in "Communication Strategies for Rural Development", New York State College of Agriculture and life science, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, pp. 11-27.

^{4.} Marco Antonio Rodrigues Dias, John A.R. Lee, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Osmo A.Wiio, National Communication Councils, Principles and Experiences, UNESCO, Paris, 1979, p.32.

Modernization theories have been little used or used in adapted form by developing countries. In my opinion, the role of mass communication, in development is one of a number of socio-economic factors. All socio-economic sectors react together to achieve development. Communication can never play its role in isolation. Communication is not a miracle worker and cannot change an underdeveloped or developing country into an advanced one, though undoubtedly, communication plays a large part in such a country's system. In most developing countries the communication sector is a crucial part of the system. So, it is worth studying each developing country's communication system and its development to reveal their dynamics and relationship between communication and development.

Section Two

Television in the Third World and its Role in Development

The Introduction of Television:

The introduction of television to most developing countries was not made in order to service development. Later, after the introduction of television, broadcasting was called upon to serve the aims of socio-economic and political development. According to Katz, the various reasons for introducing television were: as a symbol of nationhood, as part of national celebration, to transmit sporting events, as a soporific for the people, to reflect the image of leadership, as a result of foreign broadcasting proposals, as a result of educational proposals by UNESCO, or to meet cosmopolitan demands. (1)

In spite of this, there is much evidence in favour of the notion that television is a crucial factor in the political and socio-economic conditions of a developing country. Egypt used their television entertainment programmes to extend their influence throughout the Arab world. (2) Television was introduced into Cyprus by the

^{1.} Elihu Katz and George Wedell, (and others), 1978, Broadcasting in the Third World, Promise and Performance, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, p.14.

^{2.} Timothy Green, Egypt, in Broadcasting in Africa, (ed.by) Sydney W. Head, op.cit, p.25.

British to help keep the people off the streets and as a "tranquilizer". (1) It was also noted that the U.S.A. provided Egypt with television when the U.S.S.R. built the high dam on the Nile. The U.S.A. also installed television in Damascus when Egypt was in union with Syria. (2) One should add to that as a matter of interest that after several years of television, Egypt cut off its close relations with the U.S.S.R. and Syria demolished its union with Egypt

The introduction of television to developing countries created a number of problems. One of these was the lack of skilled personnel to run it. These countries suffered from scarcity of skilled personnel and resources, which forced them to establish firm relations with Western countries, in the sense of importing programmes and so on.

Television in the context of the development programme:

In recent years, two kinds of Broadcasting have dominated the developing countries, these were public interest broadcasting (i.e. Governmental), and commercial broadcasting. Broadcasting which involves the development process is categorized as public interest broadcasting.

^{1.} Elihu Katz and George Weddel, <u>Broadcasting in the Third World</u>, op.cit, p.ll.

^{2.} Timothy Green, Egypt, op.cit.p.24.

Whilst commercial broadcasting serves the advertizer's interests, in general. Therefore, I am going to concentrate on television broadcasting as a function of development and as a contributory factor to change in developing countries and in Iraq in particular.

Generally speaking, both television and radio provide links with government for a geographically dispersed population. Some researchers prefer using radio rather than television for development, because it is cheaper and can be used in areas not provided with electricity. One author noticed that most information from the outside world was brought to rural villagers by radio, and those who received information tended to pass it on to others. (1) Television is capable of making information, more available than other mass media, but in most poor countries, television is still unavailable. In such conditions radio seems a more appropriate tool for development, and where television is used in rural areas, then, it could be an effective medium for enhancing development. In spite of this, some researchers on the impact of television concluded that little is firmly understood about the social or individual effects of television. (2)

Douglas A. Boyd, <u>Egyptian Radio: Tool of Political and National Development</u>, <u>Journalism Monographs</u>, No. 48. <u>February</u>, 1977, p. 28.

G.Goodhardt, A.S.C. Ehrenberg, and M.A.Collins, 1975, <u>Television audience: Patterns of Viewing</u>, Saxon House <u>Studies</u>, G.B. p.135.

Moreover, it has been noticed that for more than twenty-five years, people have been immersed in a medium never before experienced on this earth. (1)

In the Third World, two hopes were held for broad-casting, firstly, that broadcasting should contribute to the process of integration, and secondly, that it should contribute to socio-economic development. (2)

Thus, the link between broadcasting and development has become more explicit. (3) Therefore, the effect of broadcasting in the field of development was dependent on two factors, one is that the amount of attention given to development problems by the mass media, and the other is the extent to which development efforts are linked with agents of change. (4) Consequently, broadcasting is the favourite medium for most Third World countries as a channel for their policies.

Theoretically and practically, broadcasting in most

Michael Novak, 1975, Television Shapes the Soul, in "Television as Social Force: New Approach to television Criticism", Edited by Douglas Cater, Praeger Publication, p.9.

^{2.} Elihu Katz, 1977, Cultural Continuity and Change. The Role of Mass Media, in "Communication Policy for National Development", (ed.by) Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh and Marcel L. Vidale, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.p. 109.

^{3.} Katz E., (et.al), <u>Broadcasting in the Third World</u>, op.cit. p.26.

^{4.} Ibid, pp.184-85.

Third World countries is the medium of state policies, hence the need to study each country individually to reveal the extent of broadcasting's contribution to development. All evidence, indicates that, cinema attendance, theatre going, and the reading of newspapers and books are all at a low level compared with television viewing and radio listening.

Television as a medium of education, information, and entertainment is transmitted to the population. The ideology is implicit in programmes, and undoubtedly, affects the population in the long term, instead of making any sudden achievements in political, social and economic sectors.

The Influence of Western Programmes:

Nevertheless, the diffusion of innovation theory is still the dominant one in several developing countries, in spite of contrary slogans in the so-called revolutionary and progressive countries. In fact, a new form of diffusion of innovation has influenced the television programmes of most Third World countries. Western countries' (especially the U.S.A.) Television programmes became cheaper than ever. Table 2.2 shows the purchase price of American programmes and films in a number of developed and developing countries. The new technology attracted developing countries. Meanwhile, television equipment and television sets remain expensive,

TABLE 2.2

Prices charged for U.S.A. television series and for the televizing of feature films 1976

in \$

Country	Price range half hour episode	Price range feature film
Canada Bermuda Brazil Chile Haiti West Germany Italy Portugal United Kingdom Iraq Syria Algeria Nigeria Japan	1,500 - 2,000 150 - 200	8,500 - 12,000 90 - 150 5,000 - 10,000 350 - 400 75 - 100 24,000 - 32,000 10,000 - 12,000 500 - 600 25,000 - 70,000 200 - 250 90 - 120 No sales 80 - 100 20,000 - 60,000
oupan	3,000	20,000 - 00,000

Source: Jeremy Tunstall, The Media are American, 1977, Constable, London. Table 17. pp.301-303

which simply means that television sets may only be available for the rich and the middle class, who tend to be, the most powerful people in developing countries. Naturally, the majority of people who are poor, cannot purchase television sets. Therefore, the impact of television and its benefits will be lavished on a minority of people, not the majority.

From the experience of Iraq, the possession of television sets in rural areas, indicates the status and prestige of television set owners. Thereafter, it seems, that television stations tried to reflect the ways of life and thinking of urban population, which is to a great extent, an imitation of Western style.

The gap between rural and urban areas in Third World countries may be affected by the influence of television programmes, reshaping the rural population according to urban modes of living and thinking, giving them standards of education which enable them to participate more effectively in the development process. It is generally understood that in the case of government intervention the ideology of this sort of government gains influence through broadcasting. In spite of this, one of the early recommendations to be made by American propagandists, to the Middle East, was not to limit their attention to the upper class in whose hands the economic and political

power, but to direct it to all social classes in the Middle East. (1) Moreover, another early study of broad-casting to Arab World listeners suggested that broadcasting can maintain and increase interest in the achievement of the West in science, in the art of government, and social welfare, and lessen their political suspicions in matters of policy. (2) It could be argued that these kind of recommendations were developed and used by television programmers.

A typical Western diffusion was shaped in the light of the following kind of recommendation.

"... societies quickly forget the foreign origins of elements of their culture.

After a couple of generations the imported elements become part of the sacred cultural heritage which traditionalists seek to protect". (3)

So, it should be borne in mind that a vast television industry has grown up and around the needs and wishes of sponsors. (4) Thus, one may say that television

^{1.} Seth Arsenian, 1948, Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East, Middle East Journal, Vol.11. Part 4. p.429.

^{2.} Nevill Barbour, 1951, Broadcasting to the Arab World, Middle East Journal, p.69.

^{3.} Ithiel de Sola Pool, 1977, The Changing flow of Television, Journal of Communication, Vol.27. No.2. pp.139-149.
4. Joseph Turow, 1980, Television sponsorship forms and

^{4.} Joseph Turow, 1980, Television sponsorship forms and programme subject matter, Journal of Broadcasting, Vol.24. Part 3, p.381.

programmes are a cultural product whose influence goes beyond simple consumption. (1)

Nonetheless, several authors agree that the content of imported television programmes is often alien to the imagery and values of the importing country, which indicates a gap that might be unbridgeable. (2) Generally, it was recognized that the influence of Western television was not limited to imported programmes, but also involved the spread of imitating a Western style of local programming. Commercials promoting foreign products are another form of influence. (3)

Objections to television:

No doubt, opposition to the introduction of television by several traditionalist, nationalist and religious groups in some developing countries may be grounded on the thesis that television would change society in favour of Western concepts. (4)

Rita Cruise O'Brien, 1977, Professionalism in Broadcasting in Developing Countries, <u>Journal of Communication</u>, vol.27. No.2. p.150.

^{2.} Katz, E., and George Weddle, (et.al) Broadcasting in the Third World, op.cit, pp.155-157.

^{3.} Godwin C.Chu and Alfian, Programming for Development in Indonesia, 1980, Journal of Communication, Vol.30, No.4. p.56.

^{4.}Douglas A.Boyd, 1980, Saudi Arabian Broadcasting: Radio and television in a wealthy Islamic state, Middle East Review, Vol.12. Part 4, p.23.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, some scenes would be considered unacceptable for showing on television, examples of this might be: (1)

- 1. Scenes which arouse sexual excitement.
- 2. Women who appear indecently dressed, appear in dance scenes, or in scenes which show overt acts of love.
 - 3. Women who appear in athletic games or sports.
- 4. Alcoholic drinks or any thing connected with drinking.
- 5. Derogatory references to any of the "Heavenly Religions".
- 6. Treatment of other countries with satire or contempt.
- 7. References to Zionism.
- 8. Material meant to expose monarchy.
- 9. All immoral scenes.
- 10. References to betting or gambling.
- 11. Excessive violence.

Egypt was the most radical of the Arab countries during
Nasser's time, but when the new regime took control of
Egypt in 1971, the country became more liberal having an
open economic policy, connected with the U.S.A. Broadcasting
goals were set which were supposed to serve national
development interests in accordance with the ideology of
new regime. An Egyptian researcher conducted an analysis

^{1.} Boyd, Douglas Arrington, An Historical and Descriptive Analysis of the Evolution and Development of Saudi Arabia Television: 1963-1972, Ph.D. thesis, (unpublished), 1971, University of Minnesota, pp.241-242.

of their content and found that entertainment was built around the individual and not on the collectivity (family, nation), around self-gratification rather than service to higher values. However, it was concluded that the programmes only dealt with middle class problems, middle-class language is the one which predominates. Whilst workers and peasants had only fifteen minutes of programme time in a week. (1)

In addition, Belltrans, (2) cited a table of programme contents for programmes produced in Western countries (especially in the U.S.A.) and exported to developing countries. Their goals were obviously contrary to the socio-economic goals of developing countries. They preached individualism: in order to enjoy life, it is implied that the individual needed to gain a good social and economic position. Important aims in life were to have money, prestige, beauty, health and fun. Money was to be obtained by any means, including violence, cheating and stealing. Beauty, and health were to be gained by consuming products. Diversion was to be found in luxury, alcohol, fancy clothes,

Abd al Basit Abd al-Mu'ti, 1980, Egyptian broadcasting: Content analysis, <u>Jerusalem Quarterly</u>, Part 17, p.114.

^{2.} Luis Ramiro Belltrans S., television etchings in the minds of Latin Americans: Conservatism, Materialism, and Conformism, 1978, Gazette (Deventer), Vol. 24. p. 69.

fine cigarettes, and beautiful women. Finally, scientists are supposed to be insane, they live removed from reality and do not know how to enjoy life. According to Beltrans, the programmes which tend to structure the images and attitudes mentioned above can be found in adventures (crime, Western, spies, etc.,) and even in humorous programmes. (1)

Having said all this, one should also remember that

"... No broadcasting system, particularly one in the Middle East, can be meaningfully studied outside its physical and cultural context. (2)

Access to television:

Nevertheless, in practical terms, television ownership is not an indicator of true audience size or access to television. Access to television in Europe and the U.S.A. is of a different kind, to that in many developing countries, especially in the East. In Europe, people watch television privately, mainly in their own homes, but in the East, for example, access to television is by public means (in addition some private access).

l. Ibid. p.68.

^{2.} Douglas A. Boyd, Egyptian Radio: Tool of Political and National Development, op.cit. p.l.

In other words, the number of nuclear families possessing television in developed countries may bear a fairly direct correlation to overall possession of television sets and numbers of viewers. In developing countries, extended families, and possibly, their relatives and neighbors watch television together in private places, although a lot of people watch television in public places. So, the criterion of television possession is not a very accurate indicator of access to programmes.

The distribution of television transmitters throughout the world is shown in Table 2.3. Developing countries had 8,100 in 1965, going up to 31,250 in 1977 whilst developing countries had 450 in 1965, reaching 1,650 in The poorest continent, in terms of number of 1977. transmitters was Africa. It had 100 in 1965, going up to 250 in 1977. It was followed by Latin America, which had 250 in 1965, and 650 in 1977, whilst Europe had 3,550 in 1965 and 16,000 by 1977. The number of television receivers and receivers per 1,000 inhabitants is shown in Table 2.4. The world total of receivers was 181 millions in 1965, and 419 millions in 1977. Africa had 0.6 million in 1965, and 4.7 millions by 1977, which amounts to 1.9 per thousand in 1965 and 11 in 1977. In Latin America, there were 8 million receivers in 1965 going up to 31 millions in 1977, or 32 per thousand of population in 1965 and 90 per thousand in 1977. In Asia, there 19.3 million receivers in 1965, reaching 44.6 millions in 1977.

TABLE 2.3

Number of television transmitters Worldwide

Continents, Major Areas and Groups of Countries	Number of Regular Television Transmitters				
	1965	1970	1975	1977	
World total (1)	8,550	17,700	29,000	32,900	
Africa America Asia Europe Oceania U.S.S.R. Developed Countries Developing Countries (1)	100 3,070 1,100 3,550 80 650 8,100 450	140 4,130 3,780 7,900 230 1,340 16,900 800	230 5,000 6,700 14,900 370 1,800 27,580 1,420	250 5,070 9,000 16,300 440 1,840 31,250 1,650	
Africa (excluding Arab states)	55	70	120	130	
Northern America Latin America Asia (excluding Arab countries) (1)	2,820 250 1,070	3,850 460 3,730	4,360 640 6,630	4,420 650 8,930	
Arab states	75	120	180	190	

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1980, Paris, p.913.

⁽¹⁾ Not including China, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam.

Television sets per 1,000 inhabitants were 18 in 1965 and 30 in 1977. Europe had 59 million receivers in 1965, and 126 by 1977, per 1,000 inhabitants, this represented 132 in 1965 and 264 in 1977. The U.S.A. had 84 million receivers in 1965, reaching 176 in 1977. For every 1,000 inhabitants, the total was 182 in 1965 and 301 in 1977. The total number for developed countries was 170 million in 1965 reaching 368 in 1977. number per 1,000 inhabitants was 166, going up to 322 in 1977. Meanwhile, in developing countries, the number of receivers was 11 in 1965 reaching 51 in 1977. Per 1,000 inhabitants, this represented 7.3 in 1965, reaching 24 in 1977. The great differences between the numbers in both sort of countries is quite clear. Viewing the matter from a political standpoint, it must be admitted that governments around the world are controlling broadcasting or that broadcasting is under their supervision. Herein, broadcasting is the reflection of governments' policies and ideologies.

TABLE 2.4

Number of Television Receivers and Receivers per 1,000
Inhabitants

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	No.of televison receivers Total: millions		Per I	Per 1,000		inhabitant		
	1965	1970	1975	1977	1965	1970	1975	1977
World total (1) Africa America Asia (1) Europe Oceania U.S.S.R Developed Countries Developing Countries (1) Africa (excluding Arab	181 0.6 84 19.3 59 2.4 16 170 11	109 27 90 3.5 35	160 37.2 114 5.5 55	419 4.7 176 44.6 126 5.9 62 368 51 2.1	72 1.9 182 18 132 137 69 166 7.3 0.4	214 22 196 200 144 227	285 27	128 11 301 30 264 268 238 322 24 6.5
States) Northern America	76	92	133	145	355	407	562	604
Latin America Asia (excluding Arab	18.8	17 26	27 35.7	31 42	32 18	60 22	83 27	90 29
States) (1) Arab States	0.9	1.9	3.4	5.2	8.4	15	24	36

1. Not including China, The democratic people's Republic of Korea and The Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam.

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1980, p.914. UNESCO,

Section Three

Television in India and Egypt:
A Comparison

The experiences of developing countries in the field of media development affords this study a further opportunity to compare the evidence concerning the contribution of television to development. Egypt and India were chosen as examples. The justifications for the choice of these two countries was that both are developing countries; Egypt is the pioneer Arab state in the field of communication and development. socio-economic policy in many respects, is similar to Iraqi policies. India may be regarded as the Third World pioneer. It has considerable experience in the sphere of communication development. Both countries tried to become more developed, partly by means of broadcasting (this feature is also characteristic of Iraq). Both countries were ruled by British administrations, and for the most part their systems showed similar characteristics to the British system. Similarly in Iraq, British companies built the television system and most technical personnel were trained in Britain.

The main distinction between these countries were the population sizes. India had a population size about eighteen times that of Egypt and more than fifty times that of Iraq.

Population distribution is different in India from that of Egypt. The demographic implications are, partly, that access to television sets also varies. It is worth noting here, that the features of Egyptian television programming policy bore a number of similarities to Iraqi television programming policy. Furthermore, Iraqi television was provided with Egyptian television programmes on a large scale, during the 1960's and the early 1970's. During the second half of the 1970's the relations between Iraq and Egypt became weaker than ever, especially after the establishment of relations between Egypt and Israel. This affected the number of Egyptian programmes shown on Iraqi television. Meanwhile, the programme exchange between Iraq and India was nil. Although Iraqi television occasionally showed some Indian films with sub titles and songs.

Seemingly, the main reason for this was the difference in language.

Many other developing countries have recently become interested in applying television and radio

programmes to the promotion of development processes. (1)

There is general agreement that Egyptian broadcasting was the most active and influential system in the Arab World.

During Nasser's era, Egyptian radio broadcasting had a lot of influence on nationalist Arabs. But some foreign observers of Egyptian radio grossly exaggerated the effect of its broadcasting:

"After the revolution (in Iraq) which brought Abdul Karim Kassim to power, an envelope arrived at Saides (the director of the voice of the Arab - the Egyptian radio) office. It contained a piece of bone and a note. "In appreciation for what you did in helping to make the revolution a success" the anonymous note read, "I send you a piece of the finger of the traitor Nuri as-said". (2)

^{1.} Significantly, Indonesia was among those using such methods. The Indonesian satellite transmits education and public information programmes to the rural population of Indonesia by using the satellite, the whole of Indonesia came under a single policy and modern communication They set three policy goals for television system. which are familiar to many other developing countries: firstly, the promotion of national unity and integration, secondly, the promotion of national development, and lastly the promotion of political stability. Although Although the Indonesian satellite has succeeded in sending the development message to rural areas, many programmes are still influenced by the U.S.A. and this is a common problem facing developing countries. For more details see, Godwin C.Chu and Alfian, programming for development in Indonesia, <u>Journal of Communication</u>, Vol.30, No.4. 1980.pp.50-57.

William S.Ellis, Nasser's other voice, <u>Harper's</u> Magazine, Vol.222. No.1333, June 1961, p.56.

Egypt invested more sources in the establishment and programming of its broadcasting system than any other developing countries. (1) Consequently, the media in Egypt were used to "create an awareness" of the needs and goals of socio-economic and political development. (2) However, the Arab countries, including Egypt, established their broadcasting media, when under European colonial The British and French administrations placed influence. the media under government control from the beginning. (3) Broadcasting became a government institution after independence. Egyptian broadcasting goals may be summarised as follows: encouraging the arts, fostering social solidarity, spreading culture to the population, discussing social problems and generating moral values, spreading the renaissance of the Arab heritage, and entertainment. $^{(4)}$ It is agreed, however, that in Egypt, and in the Middle East in general, broadcasting has had strong political overtones. (5) Until the early 1970's, Egyptian broadcasts were not of immediate political relevance.

1. Douglas A.Boyd, Egyptian Radio: Tool for Political and National Development, op.cit. p.l.

W.Leonard Lee, Television programming in the sixties: A content analysis of Egyptian and Lebanese Television, 1980, in "Case Studies of Mass Media in the Third World," Studies in Third World societies, No.10, Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, p.173.

^{3.} William R.Rugh, 1979, The Arab Press, Croom Helm, London, p.114.

^{4.} Abd al Basit Abd al-Mu'ti, Egyptian Broadcasting: Content Analysis, op.cit. p.110.

^{5.} J.Tunstall, 1977, The Media Are American, Columbia University Press, New York, p.242.

They were mainly imported from the U.S.A. and they broadcast these alongside political material which was often hostile to the U.S.A. (1) Undoubtedly, the problem of mixing such differently orientated materials is the risk of creating contradiction in the orientation of However, broadcasting did carry out government policies, and when government changed its policies, broadcasting made parallel changes. In spite of this, Egypt tended to be the centre of television programme production and talent in the Arab World. Since the beginning of the open policy of the 1970's, Egyptian television production concentrated on entertainment programmes acceptable to other Arab countries. Development programmes became insignificant, (2) from the late 1970's onwards. In his studies of six villages in rural Egypt, El-Menoufi finds that, the peasants were strongly attracted by the Koran recitations and religious talks, and they displayed a minimal interest in sports and cultural The author stated that on the whole, the programmes. rural programmes did not attract the villagers. (3)

^{1.} William A.Rugh, The Arab Press, op.cit.p.122.

Al-Muti, A. Egyptian Broadcasting: Content Analysis, op.cit. p.114.

^{3.} Kamal El-Menoufi, Occupational Status and Mass Media in Rural Egypt, <u>International Journal of</u> <u>Middle East Studies</u>, Vol.13.part 3. August.1981. pp.263-264.

It could be said that there were similarities
between Egyptian and Iraqi broadcasting television
policies up to the start of the 1970's. Both used
the Arabic language. Egyptian slang is familiar in
Iraq. So, the responses to the programmes were
familiar. The Arab nationalist movement was very strong
in both countries and dominated government policies.
Cultural and social values were similar in both countries.
Table 2.5 shows the programme export revenue from 1973-1978.

The sales of Egyptian television programmes to Iraq from 1973-1978 were (in U.S. dollars); 61,472-75,375-116,216-119-550-225,302 and 211,948 respectively. (1)

The total cost of Egyptian programmes purchased by the Arab countries from 1973-1978 was 20,636,412 (U.S. dollars). Out of this Iraq spent 809,863 dollars. (2)

The number of television sets in Egypt was 1,300,000 (including 10,000 colour sets). Egypt's population was 40,000,000. The number of television sets per thousand inhabitants was 32.5 in 1980. (3)

However, Table 2.6 shows the number of receivers in use per inhabitants in Egypt and India.

We notice from Table 2.6 that vast growth occurred during the years 1965-1977 in the number of receivers.

^{1.} Dajani, K,F., Ibid, p.193.

^{2.} Ibid., p.194.

^{3.} World radio Television Handbook, 1980, A Billboard Publication, 34th Annual edition, p.393.

TABLE 2.5

Dollar revenue from the export of Egyptian television programmes from 1973 - 1978

Year	To all Countries	To Arab Countries	% To Arab Countries
1973 1974 1975 1976	2,160,374 2,348,988 2,736,872 2,927,520	2,154,803 2,342,230 2,724,888	99.74 99.71 99.55
1977 1978	4,804,940 5,698,460	2,916,586 4,804,940 5,692,975	.99.63 100.0 99.9

Source: Karen Filon Dajani, Egypt's Role as a Major Media Producer, Supplier and Distributor to the Arab World: An Historical-Descriptive Study, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished), 1979, Temple University, Table 9. p.181.

TABLE 2.6
Television Broadcasting: Number of Receivers and Receivers per 1,000 in Egypt and India

	Number of red	ceivers (in 1,000)
Year	Egypt	India
1965 1970 1976 1977	323 529 - 1,000	•,8 25 479 627
Year	Receivers per	1,000 inhabitants
1965 1970 1976 1977	11 16 - 26	0.0 0.1 0.8 1.0

Source: Extracted from Table 10.4 <u>UNESCO Statistical</u> Year-Book 1980, p.1228.

Although the ratio per 1,000 inhabitants was still low compared with developed countries' level.

It was reported that the number of television sets in India in 1980 was 680,000. (1)

In fact, set numbers in India seem very poor according to population size, village dispersion and low living standards. In this case television would seem not to be the most appropriate tool for development, but the Indian authorities made it possible to use television in the service of development, namely in agriculture. It was observed that since the early days of transmission the famous Indian programme about agriculture "Krishi Darshan" "Agricultural View" on Delhi television, Indian authorities took the initiative in popularising this programme among farmers. The Krishi Darshan programme was begun on a regular basis in 1967. 80 villages had television sets installed by the government. sets were kept at the extension training centre with a man to operate them regularly. (2) This procedure was the basis for establishing teleclubs, which solved, to a great extent, the problem of possessing television sets privately.

l. ibid, p.

^{2.} Nagendra P. Singh, Dynamics of Change among the Villagers of Krishi Darshan Programme on Television, Society and Culture, Vol.4. Part 2. 1973. p.15.

To overcome the problem of scattered villages, India used a satellite to transmit rural programmes. Krishi Darshan was announced in advance to farmers. The habit of watching programmes regularly was developed in time. From 1971 the programme was televised three days a week. The satellite instructional television Experiment (SITE) system, is a multidimensional, multi-agency, one-year learning experiment on how to run a national television system for development. SITE deals with the great cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of India and services numerous user agencies in health, in family planning, in agriculture, and in primary education. In 1975, about 2,400 villages from six different states became part of the national television network and the SITE programme. (1)

In addition, agricultural information is spread through extension service personnel equipped with posters and pamphlets, radio All India, broadcasts a weekly (government made) programme for farm audiences. Some documentaries cover 560,000 dispersed villages. (2)

India's economic structure is based on a mixed economy with a measure of planning in a liberal, pluralistic

Prakash M.Shingi and Bella Mody, The communication effects gap, A Field experiment on television and agricultural ignorance in India, Communication Research, Vol.3. No.2. April 1976. p.189.
 ibid, pp.188-189.

society. (1) Thus, communication was considered as a mobilization mechanism in India and government made an increasing contribution to media development. (2)

Previously, we have seen that television policy and practices stem from government policy. So, it can be said, in this regard, that there is no ready-made television policy for development. The experience of individual developing countries may provide some indicators for the pragmatic character of television policy.

^{1.} B.G. Verghese, A Philosophy for Development Communication:

The View from India, International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, Paper No.44, UNESCO, Mimeographed, N.D.

^{2.} S.C. Dube, Development Change and Communication in India, In "Communication and Change - The Last Ten Years - and the Next, (ed. by) Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner, An East-West Centre book, 1978, The University of Hawaii Press, p.106.

Chapter Three

Population Structure and Trends in Iraq

Population data index many of the basic characteristics of a country, the size of population, the dynamics of population growth, fertility and mortality rates, age and sex, the distribution of economically active population, the per capita incomce, educational status, in particular, the extent of illiteracy, all of these factors constitute the changes in the economic and social structure of the country. For the purpose of this study it is important to look at the population structure of Iraq and its characteristics; the distribution of population, the size and number of villages makes it possible to analyse how television has an impact on remote areas and populations, as well as the more densely populated centres. The distribution of the economically active population reflects the manpower capacity which contributes to socio-economic development, while per capita income gives an indicator of consumer purchasing power (i.e. television) and improving living standards. Lastly, the literate population are more able to understand what is going on than the illiterate population, and they are more able to run the development projects, especially those needing some skills.

In this chapter, I shall discuss population structure, the economically active population and illiteracy in Iraq.

It should be kept in mind that most statistics concerning Iraq is an official data. 58

Section One

The Population Structure of Iraq

Since the second world war, four population censuses have been carried out, in 1947, 1957, 1965 and 1977. The total population of Iraq increased from 4,816,185 in 1947, to 12,000,497 in 1977, representing a total growth of 40.13 per cent. The most important reason for population increase is the high birth rate and the decrease in deaths. Available estimates show that fertility mid 1965 in Iraq is as follows: (1)

Crude birth rate - 49.5
General reproduction rate - 3.48

The estimation of crude birth rates in these years is as follows

Period	Crude birth rate
1970 - 75	49.0
1975 - 80	47.0

A common feature of developing countries is their high level of fertility. The birth-rate in developing countries is still higher than 30 live births per 1,000 inhabitants per year more than four births per woman during her production life. (2)

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Population Growth and Development in Iraq, (Revised), 1974, Mimeographed, p.4.

Geoffrey Hurd (and others), Human Societies- An Introduction to Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, London, p.68.

The figures for mortality for Iraq are as follows:

Period	Crude death rates
1965 - 1970	16.4
1970 - 1975	14.5
1975 - 1980	12.6

Developing countries have the highest infant mortality rates; in Pakistan and India the infant mortality rate is over 200, whilst in Sweden it is as low as 18. (1) Nevertheless, the following figure shows the demographic characteristics of societies at different levels of economic and social development. In Iraq, life expectation from birth in 1952 is estimated at 40.4 years, and at 48.6 years in 1965. (2) This rose from 56.5 in 1968, to 62.2 in 1977. (3)

However, the rate of population growth was 3.2 per cent annually up to 1980. Table 3.1 shows the total population growth from 1947 until 1977, divided by provinces (Muhafadhas). As Table I shows, the population increase in Baghdad is due to high migration from other cities and rural areas. The main reasons for immigration were the unbalanced living

^{1.} ibid, p.63.

The Ministry of Planning, Population Growth and 2.

Development in Iraq, op.cit,p.5.
Ministry of Culture and Information, Revolution and 3. Development in Iraq, op.cit, p.30.

Figure No.1

Demographic characteristics of societies at different levels of economic and social development

Level of social and economic development

Major demographic characteristics

Examples

Societies with low national income. High percentage of labour force in agriculture, low levels of urbanization.

High birth-rates. High death-rates. High infant mortality-rates. Contemporary Low expectations of life at birth. Low rate of natural increase. tage of children. Low percentage of old people. Low percentage of persons 15-64.

All societies before 1700. modernizing societies. (e.g. India, Egypt, High percen- Tropical Africa, most of Latin America and Asia before 1950)

Societies undergoing the early stages of industrialization. National income per capita increasing. Percentage of labour force in agriculture declining. Rising levels of urbanization. High birth-rates at Britain, 1780-1880 U.S.A., 1870-1910 first, gradual decline West Europe, 1830in later stages. Declining death-rates. 1900, U.S.S.R. Rising expectation of 1910-1940. Japan life at birth. Very 1920-50. high rate of natural increase at first, gradual decline as birthrates fall in later stages. Very high percentage of children at first, declining later.

Societies with high national income per capita, low percentage of labour force in agriculture. High levels of urbanization. Low birth-rates. Low death-rates, low infant mortality-rates. U.S.A., U.S.S.R., High expectation of life Japan, Australia, at birth, low rate of natural increase, low percentage of children. High percentage of old people. High percentage of persons 15-64.

Contemporary Britain, W.Europe, New Zealand, Canada.

Geoffery Hurd (and others) Human Societies, Routledge Source: and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, Figure 5.1., p.61.

TABLE 3.1

Population of Iraq according to Provinces for the years 1947, 1957, 1965 and 1977

	1947 Censu	s	1957 Ce:	nsus	1965 Ce	nsus	1977 Cen	sus
Province	Number	O _O	Number	8	Number	%	Number	96
Nineveh Salah Al-Deen		12.4	755,447	11.9	888,601 -	11.0	1,105,671 363,819	9.2 3.0
Ta'meem Diala	286,005 272,413	5.9 5.6	388,839 329,836	6.1 5.2	473,626 397,363	5.9 4.9	495,425 587,754	4.1 4.8
Baghdad Anbar	817,205 192,983	17.0 4.0	1,313,012 253,023	20.7 4.0	2,045,375 307,012	25.3 3.7	3,189,700 466,059	26.5 3.8
Babylon Kerbla	261,206 274,264	5.4 5.7	354,779 217,375	5.6 3.4	448,168 339,854	5.5 4.2	592,016 269,822	4.9 2.2
Najaf Qadisiya	<u>-</u> 378,118	- 7.8	<u>.</u> 520 , 470	8.2	<u>-</u> 543 , 228	- 6.7	389,680 423,006	3.2 3.5
Muthanna Thi-Qar	371,867	7.7	458,848	7.3	498,850	6.2	215,634 622,979	1.7 5.1
Wasit Maysan	224,938 307,021	4.7 6.4	295,899 329,840	4.7 5.2	334,331 345,467	4.1 4.3	415,140 372,575	3.4 3.1
Basrah	368,799	7.7	503,330	7.9	669,479	8.3	1,008,626	8.4
D'hok Arbil	239,776	5.0	273,383	4.3	356,293	4.4	350,575 541,456	2.9 4.5
Sulaimaniya	226,400	4.7	304,895	4.8	399,768	4.9	690 , 557	5.7
Total	4,816,185	100,0	6,339,960 ⁽¹) 100 , 0	8,097,230 ⁽²	100,0	12,000,497	100,0

- (1) This number includes Iraqis abroad, which is 0.7 per cent or 40,984 people.
- (2) The same as in number one; Iraqis abroad numbered 49,815 or 0.6 per cent.

Sources: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1969, Baghdad, p.61, and, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978, Baghdad, p.26.

standards between rural and urban areas, lower agricultural productivity which led to lower per capita income amongst peasants and lack of health and education services, as we shall see in the section on agriculture. However, the same table shows that the rate of population growth in each province indicates that massive growth occurred in three main provinces: Baghdad, Nineveh and Basrah. On the other hand, the largest migrations were from the two provinces of Maysan and Thi-Qar.

Rural and Urban population:

The size of Iraq's rural population is shown in table 3.2. The population of Iraq is divided as follows: 36.29 per cent is located in rural regions, whilst 63.71 per cent is located in urban areas. But, if we omit the three big cities in Iraq (Baghdad, Nineveh and Basrah) we find that the percentage of rural-to-urban population in Iraq is 50.77 per cent to 49.23 per cent.

In fact, the definition of "rural" used, since 1947, for the purpose of censuses, and official data is specified as areas which are outside the boundaries of municipalities. Meanwhile, the areas inhabited by 1,000 people or more, with municipalities are officially defined as urban areas. It is necessary to accept this definition because all the official population data concerning Iraq has been calculated

TABLE 3.2

Distribution of Rural and Urban Population, 1977

Province	Rural Population	Urban Population	Total
Nineveh Ta'meem Diala Baghdad Anbar Babylon Kerbla Qadisiya Muthanna Thi-Qar Wasit Maysan Basrah D'hok Arbil Sulaimaniya Najaf	506,859 147,988 345,700 269,628 210,405 303,834 99,612 227,387 127,823 375,576 231,468 206,793 208,173 143,171 253,392 364,955 125,647	598,812 347,437 242,054 920,072 255,654 288,182 170,210 195,619 87,814 247,403 183,672 165,782 800,453 107,404 288,064 325,602 264,033	1,105,671 495,425 587,754 3,189,700 466,059 592,016 269,822 423,006 215,637 622,979 415,140 372,575 1,008,626 250,575 541,456 690,557 389,680
Salah Al-Deem	206,032	157 , 787	363,819

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978, Baghdad, p.26.

on this basis.

Villages in Iraq:

The data available from 1973 demonstrates that the number of villages in Iraq was 9,782 and that their population was 4,016,677 (as shown in table 3.3). that period, there were 4,559 villages with a population of less than 250 inhabitants per village, representing 46.6 per cent of the total number of Iraqi villages. The total population in these villages is 684,385, representing 17per cent of the total population. These numbers reveal the smallness of about half the villages in Iraq (i.e. about 150 people per village). There are 3,038 villages with 251 -500 inhabitants per village. The total population of these is 1,080,610, representing 26.9 per cent of the total population. Lastly, there are 2,185 villages with populations of over 500 inhabitants. The total population of this group is 2,251,682, and its percentage is 22.3 of the total population. Most Iraqi villages are isolated to some extent both from each other, and from direct government administration. Thus, from the government's point of view, they need an effective instrument to encourage and maintain contact with new processes of social and economic change. These changes,

TABLE 3.3

Iraqi Villages and their Population, 1973

The Unit of Population	No. of villages	Population	as percentage of total village population in Iraq	as percentage of rural population
1 - 250 251 - 500 501 - 750 551 -1,000 1,001 -1,250 1,251 -1,500 1,501 -1,750 1,751,-2.000 more than 2,000	4,559 3,038 1,080 469 211 143 73 64 145	684,385 1,080,610 666,962 408,790 236,008 197,214 120,498 118,777 503,433	46.6 31.1 11 4.8 2.1 1.5 0.8 0.7 1.4	17 27 16.6 10.2 5.9 4.9 3.0 2.9 12.5
Total	9,782	4,016,677	100.0	100.0

Source: N. Yacub, Statistics of Villages, Rural Population and Co-operatives in Iraq, 1977, Mimeographed (in Arabic), p.3.

particularly those associated with the media, such as television, are having a great effect on the people's way of life.

Section Two

The Economically Active Population

Iraq is generally considered to be a youthful population: in 1965, 47.9 per cent of the total population was under the age of 15 years, and 5.3 per cent was over the age of 65. In 1977, the age group under 15 years was 48.8 per cent and 4.2 per cent (including unknown group) was over 65 years. economically active population in the age group 15-65 was 46.8 per cent of the total population in 1965. According to the 1977 census, the economically active population between the ages of 15-65 was 2,725,069 and its percentage to the total economically active population is 86.95, whilst its proportion of the total Iraqi population is 22.71 as shown in Table 3.4. Data available from the 1977 census shows that the size of the employed population engaged in services (including community, social and personal services) was 942,688 while 758,265 were engaged in agriculture (including agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing). Table 3.5, shows, as well, the number of the active population in agriculture was in decline. This is probably because of the migration from rural areas to the urban areas and the growing importance of state jobs within the labour force. decline in the agricultural labour force reveals, apparently,

TABLE 3.4 The Population Age Structure of Iraq, 1965 and 1977

	1965		1977	
Age	Total	8	Total	િ
less than one year 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 +85 unknown	283,012 1,313,548 1,282,975 995,599 651,166 559,898 493,385 475,720 450,016 316,817 280,560 227,990 197,477 141,268 189,742 61,599 72.099 33,937 56,236 14,186	16.3 15.8 12.3 8.0 6.9 6.1 5.9 5.6 3.9 3.5 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.3 0.8 0.9 0.4	501,772 1,780,956 2,044,959 1,539,959 1,010,261 1,116,367 810,939 604,084 495,150 379,037 418,225 321,123 244,378 221,427 155,301 124,643 96,469 42,497 58,145 34,796	4.2 14.8 17.0 12.8 8.4 9.3 6.8 5.0 4.1 3.2 3.5 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3
Total	8,097,230	100.0	12,000,497	100.0

Sources: Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organisation, General Population Census of 1965, 1973, Baghdad, pp.242-243, and Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organisation, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978, Baghdad, p.27.

TABLE 3.5

Distribution of Economically Active Urban and Rural Population by Sex and Field of Economic Activity - 1977 (Age 15 - 65)

	Urban		Rui	Rural	
Sector	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Electricity, Water and Gas Construction Trade Transport Financing Services Unknown	84,603 24,843 182,595 19,668 196,931 167,672 133,081 21,391 666,281 28,463	23,183 1,345 34,197 926 4,105 13,693 4,696 5,008 82,070 6,018	403,052 8,981 34,629 2,324 91,657 16,015 35,909 3,781 191,446 12,172		758,265 35,801 261,531 22,936 293,440 198,633 173,925 30,231 942,688 50,903
Total employed	1,525,528	175,241	799,966	267,618	2,768,353
Population Unemployed	26,506	9,130	19,748	612	55 , 996
Labour force	1,552,034	184,371	819,714	268,230	2,824,349

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Baghdad, pp.36-45

that Iraq has become more urbanized.

In addition, it may reflect the relations between the peasant, the land, and its productivity. The smallest sector, in the sense of employed population in rural Iraq is the electricity, water and gas sector.

2,324 males and 18 females were engaged in the above sector. This means that 0.08 per cent of total employed was devoted to serving large areas and population categories in rural areas in the fields of electricity, water and gas, which is an important factor in the achievement of rural development and social change.

However, the percentage of total labour force to total population in Iraq is 22.60, but the total population between the age 15-65 is 5,620,991, which represents 46.84 per cent of the total Iraqi population (the working age is 15-65). So, the labour force is 48.25 percent of the total population. The reason behind the apparent decline in the active population is the large number of Armed forces members and students who are not accounted for by these figures. It can be demonstrated from Table five, that women in Iraq are a small proportion of the economically active population. In 1977, the number of women employed in rural areas was 267,618 and in urban areas it was 175,241 or 16.0 per cent of the total population employed. The ratio of employed women to total population is 3.61 per cent.

It is interesting to note that the number of women employed in rural areas was greater than the number of women employed in urban areas; the proportion of women to men employed in the rural areas was 33.45 per cent, while the figure was 11.49 per cent in urban The classification of employment figures is areas. compiled according to the following categories: civilians engaged by government bodies and the private sector; the Armed forces, and unpaid family workers. This excludes, housewives, students not economically active, children below the working age and retired persons. In rural areas, the whole peasant family works together in agriculture. This makes the percentage of rural women's employment higher than that of urban women. (1)

According to the official figures following the 1976 national development plan, the labour force in Iraq was fully employed. The effect of industrialization on the labour force was generally recognized in the main cities but in the post-revolutionary period, almost half of all industrial projects were concentrated in Baghdad. The spread of industrial projects in provincial areas

^{1.} Ministry of Planning, Social and Educational Dept., 1974, The Contribution of Women to Economic Activity in Iraq, (Arabic), Mimeographed, p.4.

increased the number of industrial workers in the rural areas and adjacent urban areas. So, the impact of industrialization on the rural population has been considerable.

Per Capita Income

It goes without saying that, in an important sense, economic development may be defined operationally as being associated with social change, in which new ideas and practices are introduced into the social system, in order to produce higher capita income and improve standards of living. This study focusses on, the increase in per capita income which facilitated the purchase of television sets than previously. The rise in the average per capita income was a result of state policy for raising the standard of living, with the emphasis on lower income groups and on reconstructing the nature of consumer spending in a manner which would ensure the highest social returns. (1)

The average cash income for industrial workers increased from I.D. 250 in 1968 to I.D. 834 in 1979, which was equivalent to an increase of 234 per cent. The monthly consumer expenditure per worker increased by 290 per cent in the period 1972-1978, which afforded them

^{1.} Ministry of Culture and Information, Revolution and Development in Iraq, op.cit. p.36.

an opportunity to develop their economic, social and educational standards. Overall, the national income has been increased by an annual rate of growth of 27.7 per cent, measured by current prices in the period 1969-1979. The share of the individual in the national income increased by 23.5 per cent per annum, measured by current prices during the same period. In 1969, the average per capita income was I.D. 92.3 rising to I.D.763.8 per capita in 1979 as shown in the following table. (1)

TABLE 3.6

The Development of Average per capita Share in National Income (Current Prices)

	1969	1979		<pre>% Average annual growth</pre>
National income I.D. Millions	850	9,792	8,942	27.7
Average per capita	92.3	763.8	671.5	23.5

^{1.} Ibid., p.40.

Section Three

Illiteracy in Iraq

Literacy and development:

UNESCO describe the literate as those "... who can, with understanding, both read and write a short simple statement on his everyday life". (1)

Between the totally illiterate and the literate, there is a large number of the semi-illiterate. The number is approximately one in ten of the adult population. The semi-illiterate are those who can read but cannot write, or those who can both read and write but can hardly understand what they read and can hardly write anything besides their signatures. (2) Cipolla pointed out that in an advanced industrial society a person with less than ten or twelve years of schooling is functionally illiterate. (3) However, more and more education became the dominant tool for social stability and hegemony ...

^{1.} Harvey J. Graff, The Literacy Myth - Literacy and Social Structure in the Nineteenth-Century City, 1979, Academic Press, New York, p.3.

^{2.} Carlo M.Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the West, 1969, Penguin Books, p.ll.

^{3.} ibid, p.104.

and instruction was used to teach and inculcate the principles of social and economic behaviour in a changing and modernizing society, and literacy became a crucial vehicle for that process. (1) So, literacy aids industrialization, especially at a time when modes of production were rapidly changing with the introduction of new machinery. The literate are more adaptable to new circumstances and receptive to new ideas. So, when England began to industrialize in about 1750, large numbers of the population were literate. (2)

Collins pointed out that correlations of education and levels of economic development for a nation show that the higher the level of economic development of a country, the higher the proportion of its population at all educational levels.

The main contribution of education to economic productivity, seems to occur at the level of the transition to mass literacy. (3) This explains the significance of compulsory education in developed countries, and in some developing countries. In contrast, the overproduction of educated personnel in countries whose economic

Harvey J.Graff, The Literacy Myth, op.cit, p.26.
 Carlo M.Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the West, op.cit, pp.87-102.

^{3.}Randall Collins, Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification, American Sociological Review, 1971, Vol.36. pp.1005-1006,

development cannot absorb them, may become antieconomic. (1) Also, it was observed that the better employees are not generally more productive, but in some cases are actually productive. (2) These observations are based on evidence concerning the contribution of education to individual productivity. Comparing the productivity of better educated employees with less educated employees, seems to me, more relevant to advanced countries than developing countries, whose vast populations are often still illiterate. following table shows the amount of illiteracy in the World. In the Arab countries (Iraq is one), Africa and Latin America the percentages of male illiteracy were 30.8, 48.0 and 24.8 respectively. The percentages for women were 57.3, 72.8 and 31.3 respectively. Whilst in North America, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe, the percentages for men were 0.5, 0.5, 0.5 and 1.2, respectively and for women 0.5, 0.5, 0.5 and 3.1 respectively. The percentages of illiterates in the developed World were 1.2 for men and for women 2.3, whilst in developing countries, the percentage of

l. ibid, p.1006.

^{2.} ibid, p.1006.

TABLE 3.7

Illiteracy in the World in 1980, for the ages (15+) excluding the Arabs in the age group 15-45

Area	Male %	Female %	Total %	Illiterates in millions
Arab Countries Africa Latin America North America Soviet Union Western Europe Eastern Europe Developed World Underdeveloped World	30.8 48.0 24.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.2	57.3 72.8 31.3 0.5 0.5 3.1 2.3	44.1 60.6 28.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.8	28,080 155,762 44,280 0.948 1,015 0,611 1,845 15,944
				•

Source: Dr.M.H.Al-Rawi, The International day for the eradication of illiteracy and the Arab strategy for the eradication of illiteracy, Al-Thawra, (Newspaper), Baghdad, 8.9.1980. p.3.

illiterate men was 37.2 and for women, 58.3.

The above numbers reveal the enormous educational gap between developed countries and the developing countries.

Arguably, illiteracy is one of the main problems facing developing countries. Development programmes may require training in reading, writing, arithmetic and general knowledge (i.e. these steps would prepare people to participate more efficiently in economic and social development). The national campaign for compulsory eradication of illiteracy defines an illiterate as any citizen over 15 years and below 45 years of age who can neither read nor write, and whose cultural standards would not enable him or her to practice his citizenship rights and assume his or her obligations by participating in decision-making and carrying out public duties. is relevant to the Arab literacy and Adult Education Organization policy which aims at emancipation throughout the Arab world by means of alphabetical and cultural literacy, by raising people to such an educational and cultural level that it enables them to master the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic to a degree that qualifies them to continue their education and training, and to participate in the development of their community. (1)

^{1.} Musari Al-Rawi, (ARLO Director), Toward an Arab Strategy of Adult Education for Development, Mimeographed, N.D. pp.4-5.

Historical Background

It is interesting to review the background to the illiteracy problem in Iraq, as a means to understanding the effect of illiteracy among Iraqis. The new state of Iraq was established in 1921, it had previously suffered from a long period of colonization by the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire, almost no schools were founded, until the early 20th century, and most people were So, the first attempt to eradicate illiteracy illiterate. in Iraq dated from 1921. At that time, and in following years (until the 1950's) illiteracy eradication campaigns depended on voluntary efforts and initiatives by individuals or charity organizations (i.e. local societies such as womens groups or educational groups), as well as the ministry of education. But these exertions did not keep pace with the high number of illiterates. The main reason was the inability of the education system to absorb all children of school age. It was reported that the percentage of illiterates registered in 1957 was 81.71 per cent, ranging from 91.51 per cent in rural areas to 63.3 per cent in urban centres, and from 91.6 per cent among women to 72.4 per cent among men. (1)

There are celebrated sayings of the prophet Mohammed "seek knowledge even in China" and "Seek knowledge from birth to death". Originally, by China, the prophet meant

^{1 .} Alya Sousa, The National Comprehensive Campaign for the Eradication of Illiteracy and Prospect for Development and Social Change, 1981, Mimeographed, p.2.

the impossible. These sayings were widely used in Iraq as slogans, with many other catch-phrases, to persuade illiterates to attend illiteracy eradication centres. In the early 1960's, an Iraqi researcher suggested that public places, especially mosques could be used as centres for educating people by television if permission were granted by the religious bodies. This seemed particularly suitable because mosques were crowded only on Fridays, and this has always been an official holiday for schools. (1) This suggestion was made due to the problem created by a lack of space and facilities. In recent years, the huge oil revenue made it possible to approach these problems by allocating government-owned buildings (i.e. schools) or buildings owned by popular organizations for the purpose of eradicating illiteracy. However, the sum of voluntary and charitable efforts to eradicate illiteracy appear insignificant because of the high percentage of illiteracy in the country as a whole.

Government and Illiteracy:

After the 1968 revolution, the issue of combating illiteracy was considered one of the revolutions main objectives. The ABSP had reiterated that illiteracy was not an educational, social, or economic problem, but a central political issue of far-reaching implication. (2)

^{1 .} Jaafer Haj Ali Abbas, Some Aspects of American Elementary and Secondary Instructional Television: Their implications to Education in Iraq. M.A. Thesis, (unpublished) 1961. State University of Iowa.p.98.

^{2 .} Alya Sousa, op.cit. p.3.

The Ba'th Party's ideological commitment towards stamping out illiteracy was issued by the Ba'th Sixth National Conference in 1963, which said that education is important to enable people to understand public affairs, the broad outlines of political issues, and socialist construction. (1) After the 1968 revolution, it affirmed that the "Elimination of Illiteracy is one of the basic conditions for achieving a radical change in the social situation in the direction of progress." (2) The political report of ABSP stated that the illiteracy of vast sectors of the population, especially in rural areas, "is one of the most formidable obstacles to the political, economic and social progress of our country". (3)

The 1971 national action charter emphasized that the spread of education should be linked with development and the requirements of revolutionary objectives. (4)

The eradication of illiteracy law had been issued in 1971, and was followed by free education in which the state took

^{1.} Christopher J. Lucas, Arab Illiteracy and the Mass Literacy Campaign in Iraq, Comparative Education Review, Feb. 1981, p.78.

^{2.} The Labour Charter, Baghdad.

^{3.} The Political Report, op.cit. p.116

^{4.} The National Action Charter, Article 9.

financial responsibility for at all educational levels, starting from kindergarten and going up to university (i.e. no private educational institutions). Several measures were taken to encourage illiterates to enrol at illiteracy eradication centres. Among these measures were the making of literacy a condition for employment and promotion in government departments. (1) Although there was an increase in literacy centres and the number of illiterates enrolled in 1972-73, these efforts did not lead to the eradication of illiteracy or its reduction, for two reasons: firstly, the absence of any legislation obliging illiterates to join literacy centres, and secondly, the absence of any legislation obliging 6-year olds to join primary schools. (2) Therefore, nonattendance contributed to the continuing high level of illiteracy. The political report of the ABSP in 1974, pointed out that "the struggle to wipe-out illiteracy at the earliest possible time is one of the most important domains of our struggle. Upon its success depends many vital political, economic and social issues. The ABSP has the responsibility of leading the revolutionary transformation". (3) The political report also stated

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Alya Sousa, op.cit, p.4.
The supreme council for compulsory literacy, Revolutionary 2. Steps toward literacy in Iraq, N.D. Mimeographed, Baghdad, p.3.

^{3.} Political Report, op.cit.pp116-117.

that ... eradication of illiteracy requires a comprehensive national campaign, marked by a limited and pre-defined period of time, to be led by the party, and with the participation of popular organization, the Armed forces and the competent state institutions, and for which, all the nation's political energy should be employed. With the provision of the necessary material and scientific capacities would be provided. In 1978, the comprehensive national campaign for compulsory literacy legislation was promulgated, making the eradication of illiteracy a national aim. The mass media was employed to serve the campaign. (1) The advantage of television among other mass media comes from the fact that people can see and hear programmes easily even when they cannot read. One may say therefore, that the television audience was educated into visual literacy, even where it was illiterate in the conventional sense. Nevertheless, priority in enrollment was given to the following sectors:

- A. Workers in the socialist, mixed and private sectors.
- B. The Armed forces.
- C. The Internal security forces.
- D. Urban area inhabitants.
- E. Rural area inhabitants.

^{1.} Ibid., pp. 116-117.

Study programmes were of 14 months duration, divided into two seven month stages: namely the Base stage and the integral stage. On completing these two stages, learners are eligible to join "popular schools" as 4th Grade students. They could also pursue their study further after finishing the two stages. Nevertheless, according to the 1977 census, 53.0 per cent of Iraq's population were illiterate. 36.05 per cent of the total were males and 70.68 per cent were females. urban Iraq 25.94 per cent of males were illiterate and 58.01 per cent of females; while in rural Irag 56.01 per cent of males were illiterate and 93.11 per cent of females. Table 3.8 shows that the ratio of illiterates compared to the population in the 15 - 45 age group decreased from 86.1 per cent in 1957 to 67.9 in 1965, and reached 55 per cent in 1973. The ratio of illiterate females compared to the population in the same age-group, decreased from 90.1 per cent in 1957 to 78.1 per cent in 1965, and reached 70.2 per cent in 1973. So, the largest number of illiterates in Iraq was in the female group as shown in table 3.9.

However, a period of three years was set as the deadline for completely wiping out illiteracy. According to Law No.92 of the year 1978, all Iraqis, irrespective of their

TABLE 3.8

Illiterates: number and percentage (15-44 age group) compared with the same age group of the total population, 1957 - 1973

Age group	Sex	1957	1965	1973
Population	Male	1,174,836	1,515,072	2,001,542
15 - 44	Female	1,293,726	1,502,369	1,963,643
age group	Total	2,468,562	3,017,441	3,965,185
Illiterates	Male	1,011,824	1,028,804	1,102,146
15 - 44	Female	1,212,101	1,326,642	1,565,210
age group	Total	2,223,925	2,355,446	2,667,356
Percentage of illiterates to population 15 - 44 age group	Male	86.1	67.9	55.0
	Female	93.7	88.3	79.7
	Total	90.1	78.1	70.2

Source: Iraq, Ministry of planning, Educational Planning
Department, Evaluation and follow-up the Comprehensive
National campaign for the Compulsory Eradication of
Illiteracy, September 1980, Baghdad (Arabic),
Table No.1. p.3.

TABLE 3.9

The Capacity of Illiteracy in Iraq according to Sex, Province and Rural-Urban, 1977

Urban				Rural	
Province	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
Baghdad Salah Al-deen Nineveh D'hok Arbil Al-Sulaimaniya Al-Tameem Diala Al-Anbar Wasit Babylon	103,491	275,062	18,577	43,043	440,173
	6,808	19,630	16,400	53,934	78,772
	23,917	64,010	35,529	83,661	207,117
	13,280	13,264	17,376	23,952	67,872
	24,412	37,770	30,020	46,237	138,439
	21.762	40,471	49,444	57,367	169,044
	25,239	37,912	12,080	26,182	101,413
	8,792	27,358	20,469	57,057	113,676
	10,273	29,108	13,629	34,703	87,713
	7,584	20,392	17,633	40,714	86,323
	10,496	32,372	19,521	50,215	112,604
Kerbela Al-Najaf	7,702	18,394	6,662 7,730	17,327 21,026	50,085 69,460
Al-Qadisiya	7,418	21,506	17,261	39,370	85,555
Al-Muthanna	3,165	9,204	9,872	22,814	45,055
Thi-Qar	8,151	31,205	23,563	65,061	127,980
Maysan	6,552	17,379	18,810	34,059	76,800
Basrah	28,492	82,312	14,259	29,486	154,549

sex, within the 15-45 age group, had to attend illiteracy eradication centres (if they were illiterates), otherwise the person was liable for a fine or imprisonment. more, popular schools were set up to receive those who completed the "complementary stage". Data given to the writer by the higher council for the comprehensive national campaign for the compulsory eradication of illiteracy shows that the number of illiterates between the ages of 15-45 is 2,212,630, or 50.11 per cent of the same age group. Table 3.10 shows the number and percentage of illiterates attending eradication illiteracy centres in 1979. Many literacy centres were established throughout Iraq and they were supplied with all the necessary equipment. The number of these centres was 26,729 in 1980, compared with 255 centres in 1968. Baghdad television broadcast a lesson every night, at the various literacy levels throughout Iraq. Those who missed their day's lesson in the schools could follow it on television. Meanwhile, Baghdad television encouraged the illiteracy eradication campaign by showing programmes, plays and films. of these programmes were prepared by television staff, others by popular organizations and government information departments. The educational system is centralised in Iraq. The communication plan for the eradication of illiteracy campaign aimed to garauntee regular attendance of literacy

TABLE 3.10

Number and percentage of illiterates attending literacy centres on 1.3.1979

Province	No.of enrolled at 1.3.79		Percen	Percentage of en		
	urban	rural	Male	Female	Total	
Baghdad Salah Al Deen Nineveh D'hok Arbil Al-Ta'meem Diala Al-Anbar Wasit Babylon Kerbela Al-Najaf Al-Qadisiya Al-Muthanna Thi-Qar Maysan	269,884 20,111 84,796 13,538 36,988 34,294 38,917 27,326 27,816 44,149 15,938 33,304 27,541 11,879 35,305 20,055	56,233 23,839 92,082 21,530 42,870 21,012 56,018 25,134 58,050 49,421 16,282 19,265 50,240 18,167 29,863 24,329	82.1 78.2 81.1 60.7 64.2 62.4 88.7 54.5 95.2 97.5 64.4 80.1 77.3 45.0 63.7 81.2	70.9 46.4 87.1 44.1 53.4 49.9 81.7 61.7 100.0 77.8 64.3 74.1 96.4 75.5 46.6 46.2	74.1 55.8 84.9 51.6 57.6 54.5 83.5 99.4 83.1 64.3 75.6 90.9 66.6 50.9	
Basrah Al-Sulaimaniya	64.162 39,546	25,976 33,487	74.4 52.0	52.1 36.5	58.3 43.2	

centres, and encouraged people who worked in illiteracy eradication centres to work harder and to support illiterates However, some authors doubt in the educational process. Blaug, (1) the benefits of literacy campaign. for instance, believes that, literacy cources are usually too short within the campaign to have much effect on attitudes, and that, most, literacy campaigns succeed only in informing not in raising the literacy level. However, the Iraqi campaign was supported by a coordinated effort on the part of the government communications departments: the "political orientation" department of the Army was involved, as well as the provincial communications departments. established role for broadcasting was to produce and show a weekly programme containing material on the process of illiteracy eradication such as plays that concentrated on solving illiteracy eradication campaign problems. It is important to notice that developmental, cultural and political programmes were adjusted to meet campaign guidelines. Also, television showed posters and titles carried slogans inbetween programmes.

E.T.V. benefited from cartoons showing campaign slogans. It also created a weekly programme for training teachers.

^{1.} Mark Blaug, Education and the employment problem in developing countries, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1973, p.55-56.

In general, broadcasting programmes, especially popular organizations programmes (i.e. Women, Workers, Students, Peasants, etc.,) included figures concerning their members joining illiteracy eradication centres. However, it was recognized that several other communications activities should accompany the campaign, such as space allocated in newspapers and magazines, mass meetings, and the organization of "communication caravans" to the desert and remote areas to explain the purpose of the campaign and to encourage the local population to attend education centres. Large numbers of slogans displayed in streets and public places reminded people of the campaign. These slogans include: educating women is educating the whole family; educating people means demolishing backwardness, eradication of illiteracy is the departure point for achieving comprehensive national development

CHAPTER FOUR

The Material Foundation of Development: Agriculture, Oil and Industry

Section One

The Agricultural Sector

The significance of the agricultural sector is that it is considered, by the Iraqi government, as supporting the policy which requires the creation of new economic resources to reduce dependence on oil as a revenue for development and to raise national income. Such socio-economic problems stem from the system of land-ownership in Iraq. The aim of this section is to reveal the relations between rural population (i.e. villagers) and the ownership system, and how this system has had an effect upon social and economic development in rural Iraq.

estimated at about 48,000,000 dounms, (1) but the total area of exploited arable land is 23,000,000 dounms. Only 10,400,000 dounms are left fallow for the next year, and 1,400,000 dounms are cultivated as orchards and grazing land. (2) The primitive method of agriculture in Iraq is to cultivate half of the land and leave the other half fallow for next year, this method called (near and near), or "two field' system, or 'up and down' in England. The land owner and peasant believes that

^{1.} One dounm = 0.62 Acre.

J.Hashem, H.Umar and A.Al-Manufi, Evaluation of Economic Development in Iraq, 1950-1970, Vol.2. 1970, (In Arabic) Baghdad, pp.3-4

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this is the way to restore the land's fertility.

The cultivatable land in Iraq may be divided into two areas:

- The rain-fed land, the land that depends on rainfall for irrigation, most of this land is located in the north of Iraq
- 2. The irrigated land which depends on river water for irrigation.

The above way of irrigation is practised in the central and southern areas of Iraq. The number of areas which are irrigated by means of irrigation in Iraq is as follows; area irrigated by rainfall 11,000,000 dounms; area irrigated by flow 7,000,000 dounms; area irrigated by water pumps 4,600,000 dounms, area irrigated by water-wheel 200,000 dounms and area irrigated by other means 200,000 dounms. (1) The total irrigated land is 23,000,000 dounms. Table 4.1 shows that only 14,925,062 dounms were under crops in 1969 in the whole of Iraq. The above number may decrease when rainfall or irrigation flow decreases. The main features of the agriculture sector, centre around two related characteristics, "firstly the low economic surplus produced, and secondly the inadequate distribution of this surplus among the various social classes in rural Iraq". (2) However, it is important to discuss the effect of land tenure upon the socioeconomic conditions of rural Iraq:

^{1.} Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Economy of Iraq, 1977, (Printed by FARESO) Spain, p. 43

^{2.} Nabil Y.Alnawwab, State Intervention in the Development of Social Welfare in Iraq during the period 1958-1968, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Keele University, 1979, p.85.

Land Utilization by Areas in 1969 (in Dounms)

TABLE 4.1

Crop	Area under crops in North North	Area under crops in Central	Area under crops in South
Winter crops	7,400,071	4,216,855	1,615,070
Summer crops	218,525	298,445	404,945
Winter vegetables	24,534	117,334	21,774
Summer vegetables	80,211	464,032	62,366
Total	7,724,241	5,096,666	2,104,155

Source: S.A. Al-Khazraji, 1972, The Road to Agricultural Revolution, Al-Numan Press, (Arabic), p.27.

Since over 70 per cent of the population is employed in agriculture or allied industries, land tenure is the human problem Par excellence in Iraq. In one way or another it lies behind most, if not all, of the Social, economic and Political problems of the country. (1)

The Land Tenure

In the Ottoman period, the land belonged to the state, but each tribe occupied an area which it settled in and used for cultivation. This land was called the tribal dirah. However, the tribesmen owned the land communally as partners not as mere labourers; the head of the tribe (Shaikh)was given a percentage of the production in return for which he gave certain social, economic and political services to the tribe.

The chief characteristic of this kind of cultivation can be identified as a kind of self-sufficient economy where each local community produced most of the essential goods. This resulted from isolation, lack of agricultural facilities, knowledge and the absence of physical and economic security in these regions. (2)

As a result of the development of communications which connected various Iraqi cities to each other and the huge rewards for agricultural exports, the economy of rural areas was changed from self-sufficiency to a commercial economy. The change of crops included wheat,

^{1.} Fahim I.Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957, Atlantic Books, Stevens & Son.Ltd., 1958, London, p.80.

^{2.} AZEEZ, M.M. Geographical Aspects of Rural Migration
From Amara Province, Iraq, 1955-1964, Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Durham University, 1968, p.41.

barley, paddy and cotton. These crops involve changes in the shift from subsistence farming to the growth of cash crops.

In 1917 Iraq was occupied by British troops.

The immediate British concern seems to have been the security of imperial communications to the Far East, as well as their cultural and commercial interests in Iraq. Between 1919 and 1921, tribal revolts removed large parts of the country from the control of the central government. These local revolts, required a political and administrative formula other than direct military occupation. (1) From 1920 to 1932 Iraq was under British mandate. The British made no serious attempts to solve the land problem during this period, because these reforms would have risked their control over Iraq. On the other hand, it explains, why the British were dependent on the feudal system, (2) as we shall see later. Furthermore, the British revived the

^{1.} Mark Heller "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958". Armed Forces and Society, 1976, Vol.4. pl, pp. 77-96.

^{1976,} Vol.4. pl, pp.77-96.

2. Fuad Baali, Relations of the people to the land in Southern Iraq, University of Florida Press, Florida, 1966, p.13.

power of the Shaikhs by:

- 1. "The process of tribal disintegration was reversed. The progress of villages toward independence from surrounding tribes was so far as possible arrested, the commingling of different tribes forbidden, and the escape of peasant tribesmen from the Shaikh's land prevented.
- 2. The paramount tribal chief became responsible for the administrative of the law among his tribesmen.
- 3. The dignity of the position of the tribal chief was enhanced by their "election" to parliament. They had not been privileged in the Ottoman period". (1)

However, a tribe may be defined as follows: a group of people constituting one social unit who assume collective responsibility towards the community, each having the same style of thinking and the same attitude towards the values and the customs of the community. (2) They are organized much like clans under recognized chiefs and may have internal familial or political divisions, whilst still having a fraternal type of relationship amongst themselves.

The Shaikhs landowner were predominate and most

^{1.} Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 1978, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp.94-95, And for more details see the same source, pp.53-162.

And for more details see the same source, pp.53-162.

2. Abduljabbar Araim, 1963, Communities, Class System and Castein Iraq, University of Baghdad, p.7.

influential power in the parliament and upon state administration. Table 4.2 shows the representation of Shaikhs in Parliament before the revolution of 1958. In 1921, when a new state of Iraq was formed, it found that most of the land registry records had been destroyed or lost after the end of the Ottoman period. In 1932, the Government passed the Land Settlement Law which established four forms of tenure:

- Mulk. Land held in absolute private ownership.
 This form of tenure was of an urban nature.
- 2. <u>Matruka</u>. Land reserved for public purposes in actual practice considered as state land.
- 3. <u>Waqf</u>. religious trust land usually designated for both private and public benefit.
- 4. Miri. or State land, which was of three kinds,
 Miri sirf, absolute state land, Miri tapu, Where
 titles in the name of individual owners and where
 the state's rights were reduced to a minimum.
 The owner was free to sell, mortgage and lease the
 land. Miri Lazma, the holder of such land could
 not sell it or pass it over to a third person
 without a permission from the land title settlement
 office.

The miri tapu and miri Lazma were the most prevalent form of tenure in rural Iraq. Table 4.3 shows the classification of land tenure before 1958.

TABLE 4.2

Representation of Shaikhs and Aghas in Parliament in Selected Years.

	No.of Shaikhs or Agha deputies	Total no. of deputies	90
The Turkish (Parliament) of 1914	l ^a	34 ^b	2.9
The British-sponsored constituent assembly			
of 1924	34	99	34.3
1925	17	88	19.3
1928	13	88	14.8
1930	14	88	15.9
1933	18	88	20.5
1937	21	111	18.9
1943	3 7	116	31.9
1947	45	135	33.3
1948	46	135	34.1
1953	49	135	36.3
1954 (June)	49	135	36.3
1954 (September)	51	135	37.8
1958	52	145	35.9

- (a) This deputy came from a family of Shaikhly origin, but was not himself a Shaikh.
- (b) This was the number merely of Iraqis and not of all Ottoman deputies.

Source: Hanna Patatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 1978, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p.113. Table No.6.1.

TABLE 4.3
Classification of Land Tenure, 1958

Form of Tenure	Area in Dounms	% of total
Miri Tapu Miri Lazma Miri Sirf Land held by lease Miri Land with Unsettled title Waqf Lands Mulk	12,481,588 10,587,676 4,684,537 3,703,939 439,074 207,989	38.82 32.92 14.51 11.51 1.37 0.80
Total	32.154,813	100.00

Source: J.Hashem, H.Umar and A.Al-Manufi, Evaluation of Economic Development in Iraq, 1950-1970, op.cit. p.26. Table 9.

Most of the land belonged to the state by law, but for all practical purposes was privately owned by a small minority of holders, the tribal Shaikhs and town merchants. Table 4.4 shows the size of land holdings before the revolution of 1958. Eighty-six per cent of land holders owned about 11 per cent of cultivated holdings. Their holdings were of a size which varied between less than one dounm and less than 100 dounms, while 2 per cent of the land holders controlled about 68 per cent of the total area. By comparing the size of Iraq's rural populalation, which numbered 3,854,966 in 1957 with the number of holdings at 168,364, we find that only 4.37 per cent of the total rural population owned land. This resulted from the legal settlement of 1933. In fact, many of the peasants were apprehensive that registration of title to land might mean more taxes and/or military services, or omnipotent money-lenders. Moreover, the tribesmen were

TABLE 4.4

Size, Number and Area in: Dounms of Cultivated Holdings in Iraq, 1958 - 1959

Size	Number	Percent	Area	Percent	t Average
Less than 1.0	22,801	13.5	8,524	à	0.4
1.0 - 3.9	35,157	20.9	64,531		1.8
4.0 -19.9	45,539	27.1	429,910	1.8	9.4
20.0 -39.9	18,891	11.2	527,474	2.3	27.9
40.0 -59.9	10.802	6.4	521,806	2.2	48.3
60.0 -99.9	11,612	6.9	894,707	3.8	77.1
100.0 -199.9	11,464	6.8	1,575,881	6.8	137.5
200.0 -399.9	5.459	3.2	1,479,198	6.3	271.0
400.0 -599.9	1,693	1.0	812,922	3.5	480.2
600.0 -999.9	1,510	0.9	1,156,735	5.0	766.0
1,000.0 -1,999.9	1 ,395	0.8	2,012,643	8.6	1,442.8
2,000.0 -3,999.9	1,066	0.6	2,999,040	12.9	2,813.4
4,000.0 -9,999.9	682	0.4	4,078,593	17.5	5,980.3
10,000.0 -19,999.9	181	0.1	2,457,408	10.5	13,576.8
20,000.0 -49,999.0	70	а	2,096,872	9.0	29,955.3
50.000.0 -99,999.9	19	а	1,334,102		70,215.9
100,000.0 and over	5	a	876,913	3.8	175,382.6
All holdings	168,346	100.0	23,327,259		

(a) less than 0.1 per cent.

Source: Fuad Baali, Relation of the people to the Land in Southern Iraq, University of Florida Press, Gainesville, Florida, 1966. p.29. Table 5.

not fully informed about the law, thus their Shaikhs found an opportunity to register the land in their own names. The shaikhs gained a legal title to the land and the original owners became their tenants. (1) The peasants who were powerless and ingnorant lost their land and became tenants or share-croppers. Meanwhile, the Shaikhs became more powerful and wealthy and they were considered legal owners of the land. Thus land was expropriated by the Shaikhs who exercised control over everything within their lands, even the personal life of the peasants. his position as a share-cropper, the peasant had a low income. An Iraqi writer estimated the income of a peasant family to be ten to twelve dinars per year in southern (Dinar=Pound), by law, the peasant should have received 40 per cent of the crop, but the Shaikh took his share for providing irrigation, seed and land, therefore, the peasant received about one third only. In 1948, Doreen Warriner compiled this table of crop distribution in southern Iraq. (3)

^{1.} Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, 1962, Oxford University Press, London, p.136 and F.I. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957, op.cit, p.83.

^{2.} Jawad, H., The Social Structure of Iraq, 1945, New

Publisher Press, Baghdad, (Arabic), p.21.
Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, 3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, London, p.114.

	Per Cent
Government	10
Principal tenant (Shaikh)	7.5
Sircal (Shaikh agent)	2.5
Landowner	40.
Peasant	40.
	100.0

Thus, this system forced the peasant to borrow from money-lenders or the landowner himself at high rates of interest to pay back the landowner what he had received in advance before starting his work (e.g. wheat, barley, money) and the peasants found themselves increasingly in debt to the landowners. (1) The average charge on loans in rural Iraq varied between 30 per cent to 60 per cent. (2) Warriner believed that the high level of rents was the main cause of rural poverty in Iraq. (3) The feudal system, (with the limited ability to reinvest in agriculture, the concern for immediate return, the resistance to innovations, the wasteful methods of cultivation, the general impoverishment of land, $^{(4)}$ and the flight of peasants from rural

Warriner, D., Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, op.cit. p.115, and Azeez, M.M. Geographical 1. Aspects of Rural Migration from Amara Province, Iraq, 1955-1964, op.cit. pp.65-66.

Abdul-Razzak Al-Hilali, Problems of Agricultural Credit in Iraq, 1957, Al-Najah Press, Baghdad, (Arabic), 2. pp.90-97.

^{3.} Warriner, D., Land Reform and Development in the Middle

East, op.cit. p.137.
Hanna Patatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary 4. Movements of Iraq, op.cit. p.152.

to urban areas) led the pre revolution 1958 government to make certain attempts at land reform. These included such things as improving the condition of landless peasants by increasing their share of the crops and by resettlement projects upon state land (miri sirf) involving independent small-holders and raising agricultural production. (1) However, these attempts did not resolve the miserable living conditions of the peasant.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Iraq, The John Hopkins Press, 1952, pp.13-17.

The Agrarian Reform Law and the Evolution of the Agricultural Sector

"And at the door of the peasant's hut the dog of the Shaikh is barking: "where is my Right,"

M.S. Bahr-il-ULum. (1)

On 30th.September 1958, the government passed the Agrarian reform law: the aims of this law are, firstly, to free the peasants from semi-serfdom under the feudal system, or to put an end to feudalism in both its sense as an outdated mode of production and as a political The second aim is to improve the socio-economic status of peasants by raising their living standard and the third aim is, to raise the level of agricultural production. The main points of the law are as follows. Firstly, it establishes a limit on the size of agricultural land holdings by sequesterating what is over 2,000 dounms of rain fed land or 1,000 dounms of irrigated land. The state has taken over ownership of the sequesterd land and compensation has been paid to the previous Secondly, as regards distribution of land to owners. the peasants, the peasants getting land were to pay for their holding over a period of twenty years. the reform law preserved the system of shareholding in landowner's areas with some amendments in the division

^{1 .} Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, op.cit. p.144. It is a poem showing to whom the fruits of the peasant's labour was going: to the Shaikh and his followers and even the Shaikh's dog wanted a share.

of produce as follows:

	By flowing water	By artificial means	By rainfall
Land	10%	10%	10%
Water (irrigated)	10%	20%	-
Peasant's labour	50%	40%	50%
and seeds			
Ploughing	7.5%	7.5%	12.5%
Harvesting	10%	10%	10%
Administration	10%	10%	10%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Finally, the law defined the minimum of agricultural workers and established agricultural cooperatives. (1)

In fact, the peasants, were exposed to a long period of oppression including poverty, disease and ignorance, seeing "progress in terms of land distribution, schools for his children, free medical facilities close by his home and, above all, an increased income" (2) The unstable political situation in Iraq after the revolution of 1958, the conflict within the patriotic parties themselves and with revolutionary government on the other hand, (3) left

^{1.} For more details about agrarian reform law see: Zaki Hairi, "The Agrarian reform law in the Republic of Iraq", World Marxist Review, 1959, Vol.2., pp.55-60, and, Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian reform in Iraq, Croom Helm, London, 1978, pp.108-151.

^{2.} Malcolm N.Quint, The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village, The Middle East Journal, 1958, Vol.12, No.4. p.371.

^{3.} Some authors believe that the conflict had religious or sectarian origins, see, Abbas Kelidar, "Iraq: The search for stability," 1979, Middle East Review, Vol.11, part 4, pp.27-32, in fact, one can find the roots of this opinion in most western points of view about the East, especially about Iraq.

out rural Iraq with its previous miserable conditions; thus, the agrarian reform failed to achieve its goals. The reasons might be listed as follows: the delay in the distribution of the sequestered land among peasants, (only 4.5 per cent of the land was distributed to the 9 per cent of peasants during the four and a half years after the passing of the agrarian reform law). On the other hand, the state in 1966 had seized only 12,604,000 dounms or 48.3 per cent of the total lands (26,104,694 dounms) subject to redistribution. 51.7 per cent of the total lands were still within the holdings of the feudal landowners, who were maintaining the same state of affairs which prevailed before the revolution of 1958. (1) agrarian reform accomplished its political goal of removing the landlords. But there has hardly been any progress towards social and economic goals. (2) Since the revolution of 1968, the most radical progress in agrarian reform has been achieved. In 1969, compensation for landowners and their right to choose the land they kept under the 1958 agrarian reform law was abolished.

^{1.} Fuad Baali, "Agrarian reform in Iraq: Some Socio-Economic Aspects", 1969, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 74-75.

Sociology, Vol.28. No.1, pp.74-75.

2. John L. Simmons, "Agricultural Development in Iraq: Planning and Management Failures," The Middle East Journal, 1965, Vol.19, No.2., p.131.

The land was distributed freely to the peasants. 1970, the law No.117 of agrarian reform was issued, reducing maximum land holdings which became small and medium holdings. The Iraqi government desired to expand three forms of agricultural development: state farms, collective farms and cooperatives; the emphasis placed on it was to make agriculture the dominant and most developed sector. Meanwhile, the spread of socialist culture among the peasantry was to be vigorously promoted. (1) On state farms, the land belongs to the state which controls production and marketing, and peasants are employed as wage earners. On collective farms, the land belongs to the collective and peasants share the product on the basis of their participation in cultivation. In cooperatives, the land belongs to the cooperative: the peasants who participate in cultivation receive payment, each according to his contributing work. (2) Table 4.5 shows the number of farmers cooperatives and area of regional activity. The distribution of land to the landless peasants in 1978 is shown in Table 4.6. Meanwhile, the size of state

2. Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968. 1978, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., pp.120-121.

^{1.} The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, The Political Report of the Eigth Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in Iraq, January 1974, 1979, Ithaca Press, London, p.81.

TABLE 4.5

Number of Farmers Cooperatives and Area of Activity Region as in 31.12.1978.

Details	Number	Members	Area (000)dounms
Local cooperative	1,935	331,973	37,619
associations (1)	•	,	- , , - 2 -
Joint cooperative	245	1,721	-
associations		•	
Collective cooperative farms	79	7,569	718
Specialized cooperative			
association			
Husbandry	1	235	
Bee Breeding	2	145	
Fishing and Fish Breeding	14	3,217	
Animal Breeding	35	5,820	
Marketing	4	(2)	
Number of cooperative farmers			
of all associations		348,959	

- (1) Including associations specialized in horticulture.
- (2) Members thereof are included in the local cooperative.

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning - Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Baghdad. p.83.

TABLE 4.6

Total area of Distribution and Number of Beneficiaries from the Beginning of Land Reform Law up to 31.12.1978 by Provinces.

Province	Total Area of distributed land	Grand total of beneficiaries
Nineveh Salah Al-Deen Ta'meem Diala Baghdad Anbar Babylon Kerbela Najaf Qadisya Muthanna Thi-Qar Wasit Maysan Basrah D'hok Arbil Sulaimaniya	1,961,196 252,853 664,624 276,712 260,209 67,163 343,560 29,614 13,665 275,440 119,349 584,390 266,695 460,599 27,338 337,540 876,834 801,105	27,048 6,294 11,397 7,662 10,196 3,527 13,407 1,862 3,805 10,515 3,919 26,667 8,861 29,208 1,795 16,515 21,998 38,299
Total	7,618,886	242,975

Note: Areas mentioned above included the announced decisions only.

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Baghdad. p.81.

farms is about 905,000 dounms, collective farms are 700,000 dounms and cooperatives about 23,000,000 dounms. These farms represent 78 per cent of total agricultural land in Iraq. (1)

The annual income of a rural family with an agricultural income from the period 1960-1975 ranged from 135 to 560 dinars as follows: (2)

Social services to the rural population expanded in 1969-1970. Table 4.7 shows some social services in regions with agricultural cooperatives in 1974. It is interesting to note that there were 131 television sets in agricultural cooperatives, which means that every television programme could be seen by 500 peasants, at least, in the cooperative area. There are no recent data available on the number of television sets in cooperatives but the number of television sets in rural Iraq has increased, especially when the government were distributing television sets free for all village families in some areas in rural Iraq, as we shall see in later chapters.

There is no doubt that the socio-economic conditions of peasants have been improving in rural Iraq, but it is

 Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq, 1978, Croom Helm, London, p.181.

^{1.} Azzat Ibraheem, The Basics and Principles of Agricultural Policy in Iraq, 1979, Al-Mua'sa'sa Al-Iraqia la-Dea'ia wa Al-Teb'ah, Baghdad, (In Arabic) pp.22-23.

TABLE 4.7

Social Services at Regions of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1974

Provinces	Centres of rural industrie	Illiteracy combat s centres	Rural theatrical companies	Cinema projectors	Social centres	Athletic teams	Television sets	Village libraries
D'hok	_ 9	10 71	-	-	5	2	1	5 29
Nineveh	15	/ <u>1</u>	1	<u> </u>	29	о 7	13	
al-Sulaimaniya Arbil	13	63	1	1	6	7	٥ 	6
	7	33	7. T	1	12	/	10	12
Kirkuk	/		1	1	14	8	15	14
Diala	8	23	Ţ.	7	/	/	9	7
Al.Anbar	9	27	1	1	/	/	5	/
Baghdad	4	34	1	1	8	11	3	8
Wasit	11	79	1	1	5	11	6	5
Babylon	5	124	1	1	10	11	6	10
Kerbela	15	38	1	1	10	10	8	10
Al-Qadisiya	3	41	1	1	10	7	7	10
Al-Muthanna	-	57	1	1	0	8	4	10
Maysan	6	82	ī	1	1	7	12	11
Thi-Qar	4	48	1	ī	13	5	8	13
Basrah	_	25	ī	ī	5	6	12	5
Main agricultum projects	cal -	-	-	1	72	41	6	72
Total	103	756	15	16	234	161	131	234

Source: Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p.212
Table No.20.

significant to take into account the analysis of the Ba'th Party who have ruled Iraq since 1968 and led the process of development.

"Despite the radical reform laws, reducing the limits of ownership and thus providing extra land for distribution to poor peasants, there are still many peasants who own no land and are compelled to hire out their labor to small and medium landowners, or to migrate to the towns in search for employment. The natural increase in population, has taken the form of nuclear families, and the growth of mechanization of farming will raise their numbers still further. (The party viewpoint is that urbanization requires these conditions). More and more peasants will have to sell their labour to landowners or move to towns. As a result, exploitation in rural areas will increase, promoting a new sort of class conflict, while at the same time unemployment worsens. Moreover, the break up of large land holdings, though in itself progressive and democratic, reduces productivity and harms the general development of agriculture." (1)

Thus, the solution can be found in the establishment of state farms, collectives and cooperatives to take the lead in agricultural production over the method of small farmers. On the other hand, progress in rural Iraq depends chiefly on the level of participation of the peasants themselves in development, because they are the human factor in the process. The question now is how can this participation be increased. I believe this can come about in two ways. Firstly, by increasing social

The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, op.cit. pp.84-85

and economic facilities, such as health centres, schools, more credit facilities for peasants, homes with water and electricity, and the establishment of new entertainment facilities; secondly, by changing the old culture, which depended on tribal norms and values and, the old mode of production; and mass media can change the old culture and the old mode of production, as we shall see in later chapters.

Section Two

- The Oil Industry and Its Revenues -

"Iraq is the exception, there, not a dinar has disapeared from public view" (1) - The Economist -

There were two powers dominated socio-economic sectors before the revolution of 1968. Firstly, feudalism, which influenced the agricultural sector, while the second power was the foreign monopoly of oil companies.

Generally speaking, Iraqi political and social consciousness was against feudalism and the oil companies. Both of these were particularly associated with British colonization, in the Iraqi mind.

The economic and social development of modern Iraq can be connected to the development of the oil industry and its revenue to the budget of the Iraqi government, since the begining of the 1950's. The aim of this section is to discuss the relationship between the development of the oil industry in Iraq and the magnitude of its oil revenue within the broader picture of economic and social development.

At the turn of the century, the conflict between foreign business interests for the control of Iraqi oil had started. With the outbreak of the first world war,

^{1.} The Economist, Oil and Social Change in the Middle East, Vol.CLXXVI, No.5836, July 2.1955. p.3.

the situation of foreign powers in the area was changed. Iraq was colonized by the British and figured actively in British strategic calculation. (1) The French and the Americans ousted Ottoman and German interests in Iraqi oil. In 1925, the oil concession was granted to the Turkish Petroleum company, which was later renamed the Iraqi Petroleum company (I.P.C.)

Oil in commercial quantities was struck for the first time during the Turkish Petroleum company concession in 1927, with the completion of the company's pipeline; the first million tons of oil being produced in 1934. Two other concessions were signed in 1932 and 1938 with 'mousel petroleum company' and the Bassrah Petroleum company. The same interests owned the three oil companies as follows:

	Per cent
Royal Dutch Shell Co. (British and Dutch) British Petroleum Co., (British) Compagnie Francaise de Petrols (French) Near East Development Co. (American) C.S. Gulbenkian (Armenian)	23.75 23.75 23.75 23.75 5.00
Total	100.00

The oil companies were run as a British organization and most of its Western staff were British. (2) Whilst most of its workers were Iraqis. Oil company concessions lasting for seventy five years covered the whole of Iraq, with the exception of a small area which was under the

^{1.} Ali N.M.Al-Khuwaiter, The Oil Industry in Iraq and its Contribution to the Economic Development 1968-1978, An M.A. thesis (unpublished), 1980.University of Keele, p.15.

^{2.} David H. Finnie, Business in Basra and the Oil Industry, 1956, Middle East Economic Papers, p.40.

concession of the Khanaqin Oil Company. (1)

The impact of oil revenue upon economic and social development in Iraq, in the twenty-four years following the discovery and production of oil was very small. The oil companies only paid the Iraqi government from 1927-1950 37.65 million Iraqi Dinars (I.D.) Table 4.8 shows the development of oil revenue during the period from 1927-1950.

In 1934 the total government revenue was 5.02 I.D. millions. The oil revenue in the same year was 1.02 I.D. millions or 20.3 per cent of total government revenue. In 1937, oil revenue constituted 10.5 per cent of total government revenue. In 1941 the oil revenue share was 14.3 per cent, whilst in 1945 the contribution of oil revenue to total government revenue reached 11.5 per cent and 15.8 per cent in 1950.

From the earliest days of oil concession, Iraqi public opinion (2) had been against foreign oil companies. (3)

^{1.} The concession of Khanaqin oil company (British) covers only the 'transferred territories'. Its production was small.

Public opinion, in this respect, means the announced sentiments of political parties carried by its members and supporters, the mass media, especially the opposition individuals interested in public matters and other social, economical and political organizations who reflect the opinions and sentiments of their members or the general public.

^{3.} R.D. Melaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin and Abraham R.Wanger, Foreign Policy-Making in the Middle East, 1977, Praeger Publishers, New York, p.148.

TABLE 4.8

Total Government Revenue, Government Oil Revenue, and Oil Revenue as per cent of total Government Revenue in Millions of Iraqi Dinars.

1927 - 1950

Year	Total government revenue	Oil revenue	per cent
1927-1933		.64 ^a	
1934	5.02	1.02	20.3
1935	5.36	.59	11.0
1936	6.03	.60	9.9
1937	6.94	.73	10.5
1938	7.84	1.98	25.2
1939	9.21	2.02	21.9
1940	9.72	1.58	16.2
1941	10.16	1.46	14.3
1942	13.83	1.56	11.3
1943	18.10	1.88	10.4
1944	18.89	2.22	11.7
1945	20.22	2.32	11.5
1946	25.10	2.33	9.3
1947	26.02	2.35	9.0
1948	26.72	2.01	7.5
1949	28.63	3.24	11.3
1950	33.49	5.28	15.8

a. Annual average for 1927-33 inclusive.

Source: Fahim I.Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957, Op.Cit., p.31.

On the other hand, oil production in Iraq was sensitive to international political tensions: for example, during World War II a good number of the producing wells of the (Kirkuk) and (Ain Zala) areas were destroyed by the British military command in Iraq in anticipation of a possible southward advance by German forces. (1) In 1948, the Haifa pipeline was idle as a result of the Arab - Israeli war. Similarly, during the Suez canal crisis in 1956 and the Arab - Israeli war in 1967, some pipelines were destroyed. In all these cases, Iraqi revenues were decreased.

The government established the Development Board in 1950, and allocated to it all the oil revenue. In 1952, the oil revenue was divided between development board and government budget (70/30 per cent) until 1959, when the division was altered to 50/50 per cent.

Government and oil revenue:

The Iraqi oil industry's significance lay chiefly in its contribution to the government's budget. In 1952, Iraqi government shared the profits with oil companies on a fifty-fifty basis. Subsequently, its royalties increased with increasing oil output. The government has been dependent on oil revenue since that time. In

^{1.} Qubain, F., The Reconstruction of Iraq, op.cit. p.137.

1952, its receipts from oil formed 53.8 per cent of government revenue. In 1959 the figure was 96.8 per cent, and in 1970 64.8 per cent. Government receipts from oil rose from 40.1 million I.D. to 79.8 million I.D. in 1958 and to 186.1 million I.D. in 1970. 4.9 shows the quantity of oil revenue received by the Iraqi government between 1951 and 1970. However, the oil companies considered to be the largest industries in Iraq, could only make a minimal contribution to total employment in the country, because the oil industry is characterised by a high capital/labour ratio. The total labour force in this industry was estimated to be 14,000 workers in 1956 and 16,000 (or one per cent of the total labour force) in 1960. This number decreased to 10,800 by 1967. (1) However, oil workers enjoyed social services and a living standard much better than other sectors workers.

The influence of government were slightly recognised among oil companies. The oil companies were unilaterally carrying out legal operations, research, exploration on a monopolistic basis, independent of any kind of government control or supervision. (2)

^{1.} Al-Khuwaiter, A.N.M. The Oil Industry in Iraq and its Contribution to the Economic Development 1968-1978, op.cit., p.23.

Dewan Berindranath, 1979, Iraq, The Land of Arab Resurgence, A Press Asia Publication, New Delhi.p.116.

TABLE 4.9

Oil Revenue Compared to Total Government Revenue

1951 - 1970

Year	Total government revenue	Oil revenue	per cent
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967	44.9 74.4 82.9 97.8 125.9 113.8 97.6 137.2 89.7 103.6 120.7 114.7 126.8 146.0 179.1 158.6 210.4 220.4	13.9 40.1 58.3 64.3 73.7 68.8 48.8 79.8 86.8 95.0 95.0 95.0 116.0 126.1 133.9 140.7 128.9 170.0	39.9 53.8 70.3 69.2 58.5 60.4 50.0 58.2 96.8 91.7 82.8 91.5 86.4 74.8 88.7 61.3 77.1
1969 1970	250.6 287.0	172.9 186.1	69.1 64.8

Sources: Ferhang Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-1965, 1972, Frank Cass, London, Table 1.6.p.11. and Michael E. Brown, The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.10. No.1. 1979, Table No.3, p.114.

Thus, the influence of the oil industry upon economic and social development was small in direct means, except in its contribution to the Iraqi government's budget; in the pre-revolutionary period of 1958, the development board stressed the construction of large irrigation projects, giving some attention to improving socio-economic conditions.

Development Board policy might be criticized as follows: despite the importance of long-range projects, it could not alter the underdeveloped, semi-feudal social system to a progressive modern one within the basic conditions. Illiteracy, inadequate health conditions, lack of educational facilities (1) and the development board failed to establish an adequate public relations programme to inform and guide the population. (2)

It is important for our purpose study to stress the following point: most of Iraqi people, in pre-revolution era, were distrustful of the government and its socioeconomic development projects. The reason is political, and that explains why the popular participation in

^{1.} Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 1973, Jerusalem, pp.32-33.

^{2.} Qubain, F., The Reconstruction of Iraq, op.cit., p.37.

development has not occurred.

Nationalization of oil:

Nevertheless, extensive negotiations between the Iraqi government and the oil companies opened in 1959. Iraqi demands were for free natural gas, relinquishment by the IPC of the greater part of its non-exploited concession area, revision of the profit-sharing arrangements and 20 per cent of the equity of the IPC to go to the government. After three years of negotiation, the Iraqigovernment promulgated Law No.80, which expropriated without compensation about 99.5 per cent of the IPC concession, confining the company to the areas in which it was actually producing. (1) Law No.80 was the most extreme action that had been taken in the Middle East against the oil companies since the Iranian nationalization of the consortium in 1951. (2)

In 1964, the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) was established to engage, inside and outside Iraq, in the various phases of the petroleum industry. In 1967, the INOC was being allocated, by government, most of Iraq's territory for exploration. In 1969 an agreement was

l. Peter Mansfield, (ed.)., 1973, The Middle East, A

Political and Economic Survey, Fourth edition, Oxford University Press, London, p.334. Edith and E.F.Penrose, 1978, Iraq; International Relations and National Development, Ernest Benn, 2. Boulder, West View Press, London, P.384.

concluded with the Soviet Union for the national exploitation of oil. The work in INOC fields was developed and the national oil exploitation have been successing. At the end of 1971, the Iraqi government invited the oil companies to enter into negotiation which it made clear would be decisive. (1) Iraqi demands can be summarised as follows: (2)

- 1. Twenty per cent participation in IPC assets.
- 2. An IPC-Iraqi production level agreement providing for a minimum production increase per year.
- 3. Effective Iraqi participation on the IPC's board of directors.
- 4. IPC recognition of law 80's validity.
- 5. A payment of I.D. 81.4 million for back royalties the IPC owed the government.

At the same time, oil production was substantially reduced, with the intention that the development plan should be halted and the government deprived of a major part of its hard currency reserves. (3) During that period, the government and the Iraqi people, and their

l. The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, op.cit, p.54.

Michael E.Brown, The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, 1979, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.10, No.1. p.111. The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, 2.

^{3.} op.cit, pp.54-55.

organizations were mobilised to fight the monopolies. (1)

The Role of the Media:

An important instrument used at that time, to mobilise the people was television amongst other Iraqi Iraqi television played a leading role by mass media. stressing programmes on the oil battle between the government and the oil companies. Iraqi television has long been, the best instrument to be used by Iraqi leaders to declare and announce their decisions and Interestingly, it was noted in 1941, that statements. Baghdad bazaars, was backed by the local press and wireless which were anti-British. (2) This was due to the popular concept of the oil companies as benefiting the British, rather than the Iraqi people, and as chiefly responsible for Iraq's backwardness and lack of independence. Nevertheless, the days between March and June of 1972 witnessed the greatest mobilization of the mass media against foreign oil companies. The party leadership was at the forefront of the campaign with slogans designed to discredit the oil companies.

l. ibid, p.55.

Lady Drower, Marsh People of South Iraq, Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, 1947, p.83.

"follow-up committee" which had overall responsibility for negotiations worded the slogans, and directed other media activities, to recruit the people's support. (1) Also, from March to the day that oil was nationalized, newspapers published the minutes of the negotiations between the government and the oil companies. Television and radio broadcast these minutes. Moreover, broadcasting prepared several programmes to explain the latest developments, and to call upon the people to do their duty as citizens, fighting for their independence. The struggle with the oil companies showed that the political parties and popular organizations could mobilize support against the oil companies via mass meetings. Slogans and posters were all over Baghdad's streets, and shown on television between programmes. Some of these slogans were: No retreat but forward, Dignity and national sovereignty are more precious than today's loaf, one front, one line of struggle. (2) These slogans became the popular songs and chants of the people. (3) television showed; economic and political programmes on oil issues, songs, slogans, plays, and discussions all

^{1.} Adil Hussein, 1981, The Eternal Fire, 1972 Iraqi Oil Nationalization in Perspective, Third World Centre, London, p.137.

^{2.} Ibid, p.137.

^{3.} Saddam Hussein, 1973, On Oil Nationalization in Iraq, Ath-Thawra House, Baghdad, p.43.

aimed to mobilize the population against the oil companies and to aid the government.

Oil for Iraq:

However, on 1st.June 1972, IPC was nationalized. The government controlled over 65 per cent of the oil producing sector with 99.75 per cent of oil-producing land. Immediately after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the Iraqi government used oil as a weapon against American, Dutch and Gulbenkian interests for their support of Israel: they nationalized their shares. In 1975, Iraq nationalized the remaining shares of the British and French. Thus, Iraqi economic freedom became an undeniable reality. (1) However, nationalization of the IPC was feasible because of: (2)

- 1. The establishment of the INOC as an alternative source of revenue for the Iraqi government.
- 2. The increased technical expertise of the INOC staff, enabling it to run the IPC fields upon nationalization.
- 3. A guaranteed market for both (Rumaila) and nationalised crude oil.

The days which followed the October war of 1973, brought

^{1.} ibid, p.60.

^{2.} Michael E. Brown, The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, op.cit. p.123.

the highest increase in oil prices. One writer on oil said of those days that "they changed the world". (1)

In fact, it gives Iraq extra power to accelerate its socio-economic development. Iraq income from oil exports increased from 575,0 million U.S. dollars in 1972, to 8,500 million U.S. dollars in 1976, and to 25,981 million U.S. dollars in 1980. Table 4.10 shows the increase of Iraqi oil revenue. The total investment alloted to the two National development plans, the first between 1970-1975, the second between 1976-1980, was 18,201.6 million I.D. and the amounts invested for all the annual plans and programmes projected before the revolution and for a period of 18 years was 1,896 million I.D. (2)

Since the revolution of 1968, Iraq has been working to make radical changes in its economic structure, to transform its one-sided economy relying on the oil export as the principal source of finance to a diversified economy with a balanced industrial and agricultural base by a policy of linking oil revenue and production to development needs creating new permanent economic

Michael Field, 1975, A Hundred Million Dollars a Day, Sidgwick and Jackson, London, p.13.

^{2.} The Observer, London, July 20.1980.p.14.

source. (1)

Hence, oil is used as a catalytic agent for socioeconomic development.

TABLE 4.10

Iraq's Revenue from oil, 1971 - 1980

Year	Million	(U.S.	Dollars)
1971		840	
1972 1973	ו	575 ,843	
1974		,700	
1975		500	
1976	8 ,	,500	
1977	9 ,	,631	
1978	10	,200	
1979	21,	,291	
1980	25	,981	

Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, <u>Annual Statistical Bulletin</u>
1981, Vienna, Exerted from Table 135,
p.222.

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Man: The Object of Revolution, 1978, Beirut, p. 39.

Section Three

Industrial Sector in Iraq

In recent years industrial policy in Iraq, has taken into consideration the need to increase agricultural production and improve conditions in rural The objective of the Iraqi government is to coordinate industrial development with agricultural development. The 1976 - 1980 five-year plan (The National Development Plan) in the industrial sector aimed at creating an economic surplus to enable the industrial sector, especially in manufacturing industries, to finance the investments of the development plan. It also aimed at meeting the needs of agricultural development - the need for tools, machines and fertilizers, and at providing irrigation and drainage projects with required industrial materials. Industries were developed to process raw materials and agricultural products, and to participate in the diversification of production and the export structure, with a view to achieving a balanced development between industry and agriculture, so that development would contribute to the transformation and technical improvement of the agricultural sector. This would ensure the increased productivity of land and labour and would provide industry with the required raw materials. It would meet the increased demand in the local market for goods manufactured for production and consumption, and move towards replacing imported goods with home-produced commodities. Finally, the

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resulting change in the economic structure should absorb the surplus of labour. (1)

However, it is interesting to trace the development of the manufacturing sector in Iraq, and to reveal the impact of this sector upon development.

Iraq has traditionally been an agricultural country for a long time. The manufacturing sector was small and confined mainly to cottage industries. These ancient crafts were the basic industry until the mid 19th. century, when the first modern factory was established for repairing steam ships. Since that time, Iraq has come into contact with Western countries and with Western economic forces.

After World War I, a number of small industrial establishments emerged such as textiles, cigarettes, alcoholic drinks, soap, confectionary and flour. Moreover, some factories for constructional materials were established. (2) The authors of "Evaluation of economic growth in Iraq, 1950 - 1970," believe that the new industries in Iraq were set up to supply the prerequisites for foreign occupation and to build government offices and foreign military installations. (3)

Government and Industry:

In 1946, the government established the Industrial Bank, which encouraged the private sector. Industrial

Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Man: The Object of Revolution, op.cit, p.52. and The Observer, Revolution and Development In Iraq, 20.July.1980.p.15.
 For more details see, Kathleen M.Langley, The Industrialization

^{2.} For more details see, Kathleen M.Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, 1967. Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series.

3. J.Hashim, H.Omar and A.Al-Manufi, Evaluation of Economic Growth in Iraq, 1950-1970. Op.cit.

growth occurred as the oil revenue increased, the government played its role in two ways, with a large government share in the ownership of industry; and in their high contribution to public investment in industry.

However, the relationship between the government and industry until the 1958 revolution was as follows: firstly, that government action was administrative only, whilst industry was indirectly subsidized by means of selective tax relief; secondly that the government began to participate in industry (although indirectly) through the medium of the Industrial Bank. Thirdly, the government, through the Development Board, directly established a number of plants. (2) government also encouraged growth of the private sector. It achieved this, firstly by means of protectionist measures, using tariffs and quotas to reduce foreign competition. Secondly, it introduced exemptions of all kinds designed to encourage private investment in industry. Finally, it initiated controls over the allocation of private investment in industry. (3)

It would not be exaggerating to say that the private sector became more dominant in the domestic market.

The private sector controlled the food industries and building materials, which meant that it controlled the

Zeki Fattah, Development and Structural Change in the Iraqi Economy and Manufacturing Industry: 1960-1970, World Development, 1979, vol.7.part 8-9.p.813

^{2.} Langley, K.M. The Industrialization of Iraq, op.cit.p.273.
3. Dr.Ferhang Jalal, The Role of Government in the

Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-1965, Frank Cass, 1972, London, p.102.

daily needs of the population. Furthermore, the diffusion of western methods of thinking and production within Iraq, may have been intended by the West to bring Iraq into line with Western capitalist thinking. In 1964, the government tried to reduce private sector influence by nationalizing 30 large industries including Banks and Insurance companies. However, the industrial trends of pre 1958 continued until 1968. These trends were; the continued prevalence of small scale industrial establishments; the bias in favour of Baghdad as the main beneficiary of the industrial sector, in terms of location of establishments, employment, wages and the generation of capital. Also, the persistence of consumer goods industries. (1)

After 1968, the industrialization process completed industrial projects already started but which had been left unfinished for many years. It expanded existing factories and their capacity, introduced new industries, ensured the Ba'th party's control and direction of the industrial sector, ensured and expanded the participation of the working class in the field of production and in solving labour problems, and encouraged private investment in small and medium projects and set up mixed projects. (2)

Alnawwab, N.Y. State Intervention in the Development of Social Welfare in Iraq During the Period 1958-1968, Op.cit.p.145.

The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects, 1979, Ithaca Press, London. p.84.

There were three major kinds of industrial organization involved in this development.

- The socialist sector owned and run by the state: most of the Iraqi large-scale establishments were included in the socialist sector.
- 2. The private sector owned and run by individuals.
- 3. The mixed sector owned and run by the state and individuals.

However, the government was dependent on the socialist sector to lead development in Iraq. The contribution of the socialist sector to the G.N.P. increased from 24.5. per cent in 1968 to 82 per cent in 1979 and the proportion of investment in the sector also increased from 35 per cent to 75 per cent in the same period.

Table 4.11 shows that the number of large-scale industrial establishments increased by 30.85 per cent from 1,264 in 1970 to 1,654 establishments in 1978. The number of their employees increased to 39.70 per cent, and their wages by 79.33 per cent. The social and economic gap between urban and rural Iraq is manifested in the concentration of industry in Baghdad and the other two major urban centres, Nineveh and Basrah. Baghdad encompassed 60.76 per cent of large-scale establishments in 1970, sharing with Nineveh and Basrah 77.69 per cent of total large-scale industry in Iraq. In 1978 Baghdad encompassed 57.01 per cent of total large-scale establishments, while its percentage with Nineveh and Basrah was 72.85. The three urban centres

^{1.} The Observer, Revolution and Development in Iraq, op.cit., p.14.

TABLE 4.11

Number of Industrial Establishments, Employees and Wages, 1973 - 1977

Year	Sector	No.of establishments	No.of Employees	Wages paid (million I.D.)
1973	Socialist	185	79.1	28.85
	Private	1090	41.6	11.03
	Total	1275	120.7	39.88
1974	Socialist	198	86.16	39.90
	Private	1043	37.80	12.42
	Total	1241	123.96	52.32
1975	Socialist	204	93.6	45.07
	Private	1145	41.0	16.06
	Total	1349	143.6	61.13
1976	Socialist	225	99.5	55.88
	Private	1245	43.2	20.15
	Total	1479	142.7	76.03
1977	Socialist	266	105.7	71.22
	Private	1282	44.4	25.23
	Total	1548	150.1	96.45

Note: Private sector includes mixed sector.

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Op.Cit., p.91. Table 4/1.

possessed 67.23 per cent of employees from such establishments, whilst Baghdad had 52.73 per cent, by 1978. The number in 1970 was 77.29 per cent. These numbers reveal the growth of large-scale establishments outside the three main urban centres. At that time, the percentage of small-scale industrial establishments outside the three urban centres was 37.22 per cent. In 1969, the three major urban centres shared 52.41 per cent of total small-scale establishments. By 1977, Baghdad's share of small-scale industrial establishments had decreased to 36.57 per cent of the total, and the three urban centres' shares increased to 54.30 per cent of the total.

Television may play an important role by increasing the workers skills through the educational and functional programmes.

Chapter Five

The Social Infrastructure: Education, Health and Popular Organizations.

This chapter aims to demonstrate the important role played by the infrastructure in the development of political and social consciousness and in educating the people to be motivated and to participate actively in the development process. Amongst infrastructural trends, there are three which stand out as the most important in creating motivation, these are: education, health, and party organizations.

In the Third World, the illiteracy ratio is very high, health is generally poor, and membership of popular organizations is low, which suggests that poor participation in development processes is one of the main barriers to development. Other social services may affect development, but on a smaller scale (i.e. charitable institutions). The rural population needs education and health services, both to improve their living standards, and to persuade them to organize their own activities. So, the trends in education, health and popular organizations are geared to the needs of the rural population.

It is a vital factor in the process is communication which can motivate people to develop their education,

to improve their attitude towards health and health practices. Finally, it is a channel for party and popular organization, for developing awareness and public participation in development programmes.

Section One

Education

My concern in this section is to discuss education in Iraq and its relation to development, in the sense of providing development centres and projects with skilled and trained personnel. In all sectors, the shortage of technical skills and basic training skills constitutes a major obstacle to Iraq's transformation into a developed country.

In this section I am not going to discuss educational television or television as an education (this will be discussed in later chapters).

Education and Ideology:

The ideological basis of Iraqi education is rooted in the constitution of the ruling Ba'th party. According to the Ba'th party constitution, educational policy aims to create a new Arab generation, believing in the unity of the Arab world, scientific thinking and freed from superstition and reactionary traditions. The Ba'th party's educational goals which appeared in its constitution are as follows: (1)

Article 44: That all intellectual, economic, political, architectural, and artistic manifestations of life to be stamped with a national Arab character which will restore the nation's links with its glorious past and urge it forward to a future still more glorious and exemplary.

Article 45: Education is one of the exclusive functions of the state. Foreign and private

^{1.} Tareq, Y. Ismael, The Arab Left, 1976, Syracuse University Press, pp.136-37.

educational institutions will therefore be abolished.

Article 46: Education in all its stages will be free to all citizens. In its primary and secondary stages it will be compulsory.

Article 47: Vocational schools with the most up-to-date equipment will be established and training in them will be free.

Article 48: The teaching profession as well as all that pertains to education will be confined to Arab citizens, except for higher education.

The party's ideological guidelines, which were adopted by its sixth national conference in 1963, has re-emphasized the constitution's guidelines.

Since the party has ruled Iraq it has tried to put these ideological guidelines into practice. It has been said that the revolution of 1968 was to bring about total and radical change in educational policies, structure, curricula and practices. So, the concept of literacy became more than numeracy and the ability to read and write. Literacy was to be related to the new Ba'th party principles.

The main features of Iraqi educational policy may be defined as follows:

- 1. Expansion of education rights in accordance with the principle of equal opportunties for all.
- 2. Establishing the foundations of a new educational system in harmony with national and socialist aims.
- 3. Reducing the gap between male and female education.

- 4. Adopting Arab and Islamic heritage and civilisation.
- 5. Developing and expanding vocational education.

The educational needs of Iraq may be summarized as follows: Syllabuses of all educational levels should be inspired by the principles of the party in accordance with the political, economic, social and cultural objectives to be achieved in Iraq and in the Arab countries. The party political report stated:

"We must concentrate urgently on the different levels and branches of science and technology which will give us the experts needed for the country's growth and for its entry into the age of technical and economic development". (1)

Education and Development:

The national plan for the years 1976 - 80 defined the Iraq's needs:

- Generalization of primary education and completion of compulsory education during the years covered by the national development plans.
- Expansion of vocational education and the preparation of technicians and intermediary cadres in harmony with development requirements and promotion of development in the Arab countries together with the development of educational programmes to cope with world technological progress.
- 3. Expansion of graduate and post-graduate studies with due concentration on scientific and technical specialisation, preparation of University Cadres towards raising the efficiency of University education, and at the same time effecting a balance with post-graduates within the development prospective to meet the Arab homeland's requirements. (2)

^{1.} The Political Report, op.cit, p.172

^{2.} Ministry of Information, The Economy of Iraq, op.cit.p.136.

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Nontheless, in Arab countries and in Iraq, education has tended to improve the quality of life in general. Also, educational activities have tended to undermine the traditional value system and weaken inefficient out-of-date social and economic practices. People become more politically and socially conscious by means of education, and better motivated to participate in the process of social and economic development. (1)

Clearly, education has helped to change traditional values and behaviour in favour of values connected with science and technology. Nevertheless, it is worth starting with a definition of education. Williamson stated that education was a process of learning which enabled people to understand the habits of thought and social values which are influential in society. Education is not a uniform experience. What is experienced as education varies according to dominant principles of social classification, age, sex, religion, nationality and occupation - which operate in different societies at different points in time. (2) However, for the purpose of this study, education may be regarded as any process of learning to read and write which is functional to industrial modes of production. Verne demonstrated that European industrialists knew that

^{1.} Mohamed Rabie, The Future of Education in the Arab World, in, Michael C. Hudson, (ed), The Arab-Critical Issues, 1979, Georgetown University, p.19.

^{2.} Bill Williamson, Education, Social Structure and Development, 1979, The Macmillan Press, London, pp.25-6.

technological training for immigrant workers means, basically, training in the technology of reading, which integrates immigrants into the organization of industrial space, and, consequently, makes for greater acceptance of its norms. (1) Generally speaking, the role which education plays in bringing about economic and social development is a complex one. In developed countries, the arguments are concentrated on the relations between education and earning money and employment. The better educated workers earn more, because of the knowledge they have acquired in schools. (2) Furthermore, Williamson, stressed that educational level is an important determinant of income and life chances. This is a general relationship which exists in all societies and the correlation between education and earnings is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. (3) The above point of view seems true to some extent, because most people try to improve their live conditions by acquiring well paid

E.Verne, Literacy and Industrialization - The dispossession of speech, in, Harvey J. Graff (ed.) Literacy and Social Development in the West: A Reader, 1981, Cambridge University Press, p.295.

^{2.} Mark Blaug, Education and the Employment Problem in Developing Countries, 1973, International Labour Office, Geneva, p.28.

^{3.} Bill Williamson, Education, Social Structure and Development, op.cit, p.23.

jobs or work. But, it should be kept in mind, that, in some developing countries, particularly in Iraq, the labour market is not free. The government controls almost all public sector jobs and work, and in most cases it is impossible for workers to change their work or to shift to the private sector. The government stabilizes the labour market, develops its workers skills and considers educational qualifications as a means of gaining promotion. So, it is quite true that the question of education is crucial to development in two senses; firstly, education makes for better citizens, and, secondly, education is needed as an input in the developing of the industrial sector to provide trained personnel and scientific "know-how". (1) nutshell, the education in devloping countries relates to the country's model of development as used by the ruling group to manage and direct economic and social change, and development programmes. All countries must face the facts of limited resources and competing priorities. (2) The developed Western countries have produced a great deal of unemployment in recent years. In a society,

^{1.} Baidya Nath Varma, The Sociology and Politics of Development: A Theoretical Study, 1980, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p.111.

^{2.} Bill Williamson, Education, Social Structure and Development, op.cit. p.29-33.

where unemployment and underdevelopment are endemic, it is hard to see the importance of linking education to jobs or labour policies. (1) Many researchers, point to this result. It goes without saying, that education may enable people to cope with cultural advances. It is interesting to notice that the governments of most developing countries have adopted education as an instrument for effecting national development. The Nigerian policy, for example, include: (2)

- The instilling of a national consciousness and national unity.
- 2. The inculcation of the right values and attitudes for the survival of the individual and Nigerian society.
- 3. The training of the mind in the understanding of the world around; and
- 4. The acquisition of appropriate skills and abilities both mental and physical as equipment for the individual to live in and contribute to the development of his society.

Educated people and development:

The answer to the dominant problem of repetitive methods in teaching in Iraq as expressed by the vice

^{1.} E. Verne, Literacy and Industrialization, op.cit, p.297.

^{2.} Aderemi Olutola, Education and Nation-building The Case of National Youth Service Corps in Nigeria, Compare, Vol.9, No.2, 1979, p.183.

president of Iraq was:

"We do not want the pupil to memorize matters related to the party and state in a parrot-like way." (1)

On the other hand, policy decision-making presents pupils with a new role, which in practice, propels human resources, especially the new generation, into the grasp of the party.

"So that parental conservatism does not dominate their homes, we must make the child radiate in it, so that backwardness is driven out ... the young son remains in our hands, and we have to transform him into an effective radiation centre within the family." (2)

The party aims to shape pupils' thinking according to its principles. The people who are outside the party, should be "encircled" through their children.

"Teach the student and pupil to object to his parents when hearing them talking of state secrets and to warn them that this is wrong. Teach the student to criticise their fathers and mothers, in a respectful way, when hearing them talking about the secrets of their party organization. You should put in every corner a son of the revolution, a trustworthy eye and a sound mind that receives his directives from the responsible centres of the revolution and sets out to apply them. Teach him to protest, respectfully, against either of his parents when seeing him dissipate state property, telling him that it is dearer than his own private property." (3)

^{1.} Saddam Hussein, 1977, <u>Democracy: Source of Power</u> for the Individual and <u>Society</u>, <u>Ministry of</u> Information (Iraq), <u>Documentary series No.62</u>, pp.5-6.

^{2.} ibid, pp.11-12.3. ibid, pp.15-16.

In recent years, most developing countries have achieved political independence, but they remain dependent upon the developed countries for, their educational needs. Text books, for instance, are mostly translations of those prepared in the West, with slight amendments to fit local needs. Teachers especially in higher education, are often the products of the West's higher education system, and even examinations are tailored to Western needs. (1)

The above features were the same in pre-revolutionary Iraq (pre 1968) and even in the years following the revolution, up to 1974, when the political report of the Ba'th party laid down the guidelines for changing education in accordance with party ideology and social needs.

Development of education in Iraq:

The development of education in Iraq shows, historically, the limitation of this sector in preparing a skilled and educated population. It is true to say that the development of educational systems within Third World countries was part of the colonial process. (2)

2. Ibid., p.183.

^{1.} Philip Robinson, Perspectives on the Sociology of Education - An Introduction, 1981, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p.183.

Historically, during the Ottoman era, Iraq had, few primary and secondary schools. Education was used by rulers as an instrument for preparing officials for government service. Thus, the literacy proportion did not exceed one and half per cent of total population. (1)

After the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman troops were withdrawn from Iraq, schools closed down, and most of them destroyed. Most of the Turkish teachers withdrew with the Ottoman tr∞ps, with the result that educational activity ceased throughout Iraq, with the exception of Mousil (Nineveh) province, in the north. (2) The British military authorities had several reasons for not wishing to re-open the schools, Among them was the priority of preserving stability in the country, but when the British army attempted to reorganize the state administration, they found a shortage of local officials and employees to run the various governmental departments. In addition, the British responded to the people's demand for the re-opening of schools. As a result, a few schools were opened. (3)

^{1.} Yousif Izzidien, Modern Iraqi Poetry- Social Political Influences, 1971, The Cultural Press, Cairo, p.216.

^{2.} Abdul-Razzak Al-Hilali, 1976, History of Education in Iraq during the British occupation in 1914-1921, Al-Ma'arif Press, Baghdad, (in Arabic), p.18.

^{3.} ibid. pp.38-40, the same conclusion in P.Robinson, Perspectives on the Sociology of Education, op.cit. p.183.

However, the development of the education system during the period of the monarchy was slow. The number of state college students increased from 99 in 1921/22 to 1,218 in 1940/41 and 8,568 in 1958/59. The number of state secondary school students also increased from 229 to 13,969 and 73,911 in the same period. (1) The above numbers show that, if the development of the country needs more educated people. This limited number was not adequate to run all the developmental projects successfully, because most people were illiterate and they came from agricultural areas, so, they have great difficulty in dealing with technology or even with any organized work.

Nevertheless, until a few years ago, the two methods of education which dominated rural Iraq were: firstly, the official schools, and secondly, the traditional Arabic Mullahs (religious), in which small groups of boys (or girls) under the direction of a Mullah, memorized religious principles and lessons in a repetitive style. (2) In sum, some improvements were

^{1.} Hana Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 1978, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p.34.

Victor Clark, 1951, Compulsory Education in Iraq, UNESCO, Paris, p.15.

made during the monarchical period in the education sector, especially following the establishment of the development board.

In the early 1950's a first attempt was made to differentiate between urban and rural education. (1) During the early years of republican rule, the main characteristics of the new education policy were based on the Arabic heritage of civilization and culture. (2) The main barriers can be summarised as follows: the consideration of children as a labour force for their parents, and the long distance of most small villages from schools that were usually located in the larger villages. (3) After the 1968 revolution, Iraq applied the principle of free education for all on a large scale, right through the system from Kindergarten up to university, with equal opportunities for all. Gradually, all private schools and institutions of private education came under government control. should be borne in mind that there was a strong relationship between increased oil revenue and the development of the education sector, in the sense of the

Abdul A. Al-Rubaiy, The failure of political integration in Iraq: The education of Kurdish minority, <u>INTELLECT</u>, 1974, Vol.112, Part 2357, p.443.

^{2.} ibid, p.444.

George L. Harris, 1958, <u>Iraq</u>, its people, its society, its culture, Harf Press, New Haven, p.279.

number of schools and those enrolled in them. So, the development of the education sector can be reviewed in the context of two National development plans. One of the indicators for the growing importance of education was the increase in educational expenditure and its proportion to total expenditure. The following table shows expenditure in the education sector during the first national development plan 1970-1975.

TABLE 5.1

Volume of educational expenditure for 1970-75 and its proportion to general expenditure (in I.D. million)

Year	Volume	Proportion to general expenditure
1970-71	57,9	17.4%
1971-72	66	19.9%
1972-73	74.4	21.5%
1973-74	78.6	20.8%
1974-75	119,7	18.2%

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Information, 1977, The economy of Iraq, Development and Perspectives 1958-1976-1980, FARESO: Spain, Exerted from table No.12. p.132.

Table 5.1 shows a big jump from 1973/74 to 1974/75 according to the official sources, this was due to the implementation of the free education law, which enabled everyone to join schools without any financial outlay

(i.e. the government supplied pupils with free books, pencils, etc.,) The second national development plan framed the dimension of education as follows: (1) firstly, generalization of primary education and achievement of compulsory education during the years 1976-80. Secondly, diffusion of vocational education and the preparation and training of technicians and intermediary cadres, in conjunction with development requirements, and lastly, the expansion of graduate and post graduate studies. Allocations for the education sector went up to I.D. 726 millions in the 1976-80 plan, effectively a rise of 831 per cent. (2)

Kindergarten: Kindergarten curricula were built on party guidelines which aimed to alert children to the values and principles of ABSP. (3) Kindergarten growth may be demonstrated as follows: the number of kindergarten attendants rose from 13,462 in 1970-71 to 67,265 in 1978-79, an average annual growth rate of 25.59 per cent. The number of kindergartens rose from 124 in 1970-71 to 333 in 1978-1979, an annual growth rate of 13.55 per cent.

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Economy of Iraq, Development and Perspectives, 1958-1976-1980, op. cit. p.136.

Ministry of Culture and Information, Revolution and Development in Iraq, op.cit. p.104.
 Al-Bazzaz, H. (ed.), 1978, Education Under the Wing

^{3.} Al-Bazzaz, H. (ed.), 1978, Education Under the Wing of the Revolution, Ministry of Education, Baghdad, p.79.

Table 5.2 shows the growth rate of the kindergarten.

Primary Education: The increased number of pupils enrolled in primary schools after the 1968 revolution was as follows: In 1968/69 the total number was 1,017,050 which rose to 2,459,870 in 1978/79. The average growth was 92.6 per cent. The annual growth rate was 9.26 per cent. It is interesting to note that the increase in the rate for girls was higher than for boys. Nontheless, the relationship between women and development as related to education stems from the expansion in the educational and scholastic process achieved by the provision of equal chances for men and women as well as to state intervention. It should be borne in mind that for a long time, Iraqi women were deprived of education. number of girl pupils in elementary schools was only 462 in 1921. This figure reached 1,058,695 in 1979, i.e. 2,292 times more than in 1921. The number of primary schools reached 5,137 in 1968/69 and 10,560 in 1978/79. Table 5.3 shows the growth of primary schools during the years 1968-1979.

Secondary Schools: The number of students was increased, largely during the years 1968-79. This number rose from 285,703 in 1968/69 to 781,766 in 1978/79, with a total growth rate of 107.5 per cent and an annual

TABLE 5.2

Number of Kindergartens and Children Enrolled

1970/71 - 1978/79

Year	No. of Kindergartens	No.of Children
1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79	124 134 134 149 202 240 276 306 333	762 614 665 867 1,397 1,886 2,291 2,603 2,862
13.07.3	555	2,002

Source: Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Table 11/1. p.235.

TABLE 5.3

Number of Schools and Pupils at the first level,

1968-69 - 1978-79

Year	No.of Schools	Boys	Girls	Total
1968-69	5,137	718,461	298,589	1,017,050
1969-70	5,176	736,177	304,793	1,040,970
1970-71	5,616	780,356	318,524	1,098,880
1971-72	6,006	851,430	344,100	1,195,530
1972-73	6,269	916,620	381,136	1,297,756
1973-74	6,731	983,994	424,935	1,408,929
1974-75	6,194	1,030,547	493,408	1,523,955
1975-76	7,664	1,176,208	588,884	1,765,092
1976-77	8,156	1,259,962	687,220	1,947,182
1977-78	8,387	1,289,347	763,369	2,052,716
1978-79	10,560	1,401,175	1,058,695	2,459,870

Sources: Al-Bazaz, H., Education Under the Wing of the Revolution, Ministry of Education, Baghdad, Table No.10, pp.112-113 and, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract Of Statistics 1978, Baghdad, Table No.11/3, p.237

rate of 10.75 per cent. The rapid growth in secondary school enrollement occurred after 1974/75, when educational policy enforced equal distribution of education services between urban and rural areas, free education and the transformation of private education into state controlled establishments. Table 5.4 shows the growth of secondary schools from 921 in 1970-71 to 1,579 in 1978/79. A total growth of 56.3 and annual growth rate of 7.03 per cent.

<u>Vocational Education</u>: Vocational education in Iraq includes the following studies: technical, industrial, agricultural and home economics. Vocational education is greatly encouraged by the government. It believes that vocational education prepares skilled persons to participate in development programmes and projects. The number of students in vocational education was 10,143 in 1971-1972 rising to 48,186 in 1978/79, at total growth of 177.4 per cent and annual growth rate of 25.3 per cent. The number of vocational schools was 52 in 1971/72 rising to 109 in 1978/79 (total growth was 78.9 and the annual growth rate was 11.3 per cent). The number of teaching staff rose from 1,100 to 3,273 in the same years. Table 5.5 shows the details of various studies in vocational education for the period 1971/72 - 1978/79.

<u>Higher Education</u>: Higher education was provided by state universities. The first school of higher education

Number of Schools and Students at the Secondary level for the years 1968-69 / 1978-79

Year	No.of schools	Boys	Girls	Total
1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78	921 995 1,033 1,064 1,099 1,221 1,320 1,384 1,579	215,126 213,981 215,645 223,416 250,083 274,356 325,884 356,789 392,772 457,270 550,023	70,577 86,060 88,595 92,156 103,020 114,268 131,879 142,325 165,349 196,600 231,743	285,703 300,041 304,240 315,572 353,103 388,624 457,763 499,114 558,121 653,870 781,766
10,000	1,575	330,023	231/143	, 01, 100

Sources: Al-Bazaz, H., Education under the Wing of the Revolution, Op.Cit. Tables 31, 32, pp.207-208, and, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Baghdad, Table 11/7. p.241

Number of Vocational Schools and Students During the years 1971/72 - 1978/79

			Number of S	tudents		
Year	No.of Schools	Agricultural	Technical	Commercial	Home Arts (1) Total
1971/72	52	3,185	3,153	2,506	1,299	10,143
1972/73	62	3,119	3,321	3,656	1,330	11,426
1973/74	64	3,531	5,264	5,187	1,657	15,639
1974/75	71	4,112	8,059	7,782	1,072	21,029
1975/76	75	4,689	9,697	8,479	433	23,298
1976/77	82	5,390	13,768	9,207	-	28,365
1977/78	92	5,784	19,460	9,944	-	35,188
1978/79	109	7,896	27,854	12,436	-	48,186

(1) Home Arts schools were abolished since 1974/75.

Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization,
Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1978, Baghdad, Exerted from Table No.11/10.
p.246

was established in Baghdad in 1908, with an enrollement of 65 students. Between the first and second World Wars, three more colleges were established. The growth of higher education began in the 1950's. One of its main objectives after 1968 has been to create participation in the development of and the efficiency of manpower specialization.

Summing up, the number of students at all stages of education was 3,752,250 for the year 1979/80, in comparison with the number for 1967/68, when it was 1,321,419. The increase was 184 per cent. Table 5.6 shows the percentage increases in these numbers for the period 1967/68 and 1979/80.

The government has largely achieved these goals on the way of revolutionizing education. Text books were rewritten in accordance with the guidelines of the party, responding to the demands of society and large numbers of teachers, belonging to the party, have been trained to teach at all educational levels. (2)

^{1.} K.I. Adham, <u>Higher Education in Iraq, its Evolution</u>, <u>Objectives and Trends</u>, <u>Ministry of Higher Education</u> and Scientific Research, Bureau of Planning, Baghdad, Mimeographed, March 1972, pp.4-5.

^{2.} The Central Report of the Nineth Regional Conference of the Ba'th Party, June 1982, Baghdad, Al-Thawra, (Newspaper) 29.1.1983. p.8.

TABLE 5.6

The Percentage Increase in the Number of Students at the Various Stages of Education 1967/68-1979/80

Educational level	Increased	percentage
Kindergartens	353%	
Primary Education	163%	
Secondary Education	253%	
Vocational Education	429%	
Teacher Training	52%	
University Education	174%	
Graduate Education (1)	595%	
Graduate Engineers (2)	416%	
Graduate Doctors (3)	120%	
Technical Institutes' Graduates (4)	1,529%	

- (1)For 1972
- (2) The increase in 1979 on the 1968 figures (3) The increase in 1979, compared to 1968 (4) The increase in 1979, compared to 1968

Source: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1980, Revolution and Development in Iraq, op.cit., p.108

Section Two

Health

In this section, I shall discuss the relationship between health and development. The starting point is that healthy people are more effective as participants in the development process. I shall discuss the existence of health services in Iraq, particularly in rural areas. I shall also discuss the channels which carry health information, which aims to make people more aware of health issues, to change their attitudes toward modern medicine, and encourage acceptance of new and healthier habits. Finally I shall discuss the relationship of the mass media to the health sector in Iraq.

Health and Development:

The importance of improved public health in the development process of most developing countries can be discussed in terms of the effect of disease upon the efficiency of people to work actively, since ill-health is one of the main causes of low productivity. Disease is usually, connected with poverty and ignorance, both of which were a common feature of rural Iraq for many years. In the 1950's, the incidence of endemic disease was very high. One writer estimated that 95 per cent of villagershad at least one endemic disease; 80 per cent

had at least two; 60 per cent had at least three. (1)

Meanwhile, another writer pointed out that the average

peasant was a living pathological exhibit, because he

was probably a victim of such diseases. (2) However,

it was agreed that the direct reasons for the magnitude

of disease in Iraq are the hot and dry climate in most

areas, inadequate drainage and the lack of sanitation

in general, have caused a serious increase in the

incidence of malaria, bilharizia and hookworm. (3) Further
more, impure water caused a lot of health problems.

Significantly, most endemic disease in Iraq is of social and economic origin. Standards of living were very low. Poverty was rife, education poor, and there was a general lack of sanitation facilities. The health services were concentrated in Baghdad. Five out of every eight doctors in Iraq were in Baghdad. There was a lack of doctors in rural areas. Iraqi doctors preferred working in Baghdad or in the big cities for such reasons

^{1.} Malcom N.Quint, The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village, Middle East Journal, Vol.12, No.4, Fall 1958, p.370.

A.Michael Critchley, The Health of the Industrial Worker in Iraq, British Journal of Industrial Medicine. Vol.12, 1955, p. 73.

^{3.} Hassan Kadhum Al-Bassam, An Evaluation of the Rural Development Programmes of Iraq, 1959, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished) Cornell University, pp.115-116.

^{4.} N.Al-Hani, Our Generation and Missguidance, Al-Neda'Al-Ejtemai, Baghdad, Vol.2. No.1, March 1953, p.13.

as the inadequate social life in rural areas. When Quint was doing his case-study, a southern Iraqi village, stated that the nearest doctor was in the main provincial city, about eight hours distant from the village, by the usual means of transportation. The cost of the trip to the city alone was more than many of the villagers could possibly afford, quite apart from the cost of treatment and medicines. To people who can afford meat or chicken only once or twice a year, a doctor was a luxury. (1)

In recent years, large capital investment in the health centres in rural areas, and the condition that doctors should serve three years in rural areas before practising in urban areas all factors which have improved, to some extent, the health of the peasants.

"The objectives of health care policy in Iraq are to raise the standard of health care services available to all citizens, in general; to increase the availability of health care services in rural areas, in particular, and to increase the availability of free-of-charge services available to the poor." (2)

Between 1968 and 1977, the number of hospitals and the ratio of hospital beds to population increased from

^{1.} Quint, N., The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village, op.cit., p.370.

J.S. Ismail, Social Policy in Iraq, <u>Iraq Today</u>, Vol.5, No.105, 1980, p.13.

1:537 in 1968 to 1:506 in 1977. The ratio of doctors to population has changed from one doctor to 4,200 of the population in 1968, to one doctor per 2,600 of the population in 1978. (1) Table 5.7 shows, the 1978 figures for health units, medical personnel and paramedics in Iraq.

It is true that in developed countries many deaths are unknown and which cannot yet be prevented or cured. In developing countries many deaths are due to diseases which can be controlled by medical science. (2)

It was observed that, developing countries suffer a double disadvantage in the field of health. They have a greater mortality and morbidity, and their medical care service is more inadequate than that of developed countries. (3)

Health services in Iraqi rural areas were even less adequate than in urban areas. In 1972, for example, the

^{1.} J.S. Ismail, Social Policy in Iraq, op.cit., p.13.

^{2.} Geoffery Hurd, (et.al), Human Societies- An Introduction to Sociology, op.cit, p.64.

Ronald Frankenberg and Joyce Lecson, The Sociology of Health Dilemmas in the Post colonial World: Intermediate technology and medical care in Zambia, Zaire, and China, in, Emanuel de Kadt and Gavin Williams (ed.) "Sociology and Development" 1974, Tavistock Publications, p.255.

TABLE 5.7

Number of Health Units, and Number of Medical Personnel and Paramedicals in 31.12.1978

Health unit	No.of health units	Doctors	Dentists	Pharmacists	Paramedicals
Hospitals	200	2,794	241	421	8,325
Other health institutions	1,686	1,071	396	235	6,701
Private	-	322	57	538	
Public clinics	129	507	77	45	603
Evening clinics	551	772	263	178	2,698

Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Department of Social Statistics, Health Services for the year 1978, Main indicators, TablesNos. 2, 3, 4, 5, pp.6.7.8.9.

The number of people working in Public and Evening clinics is included in the number of people working in other health institutions. 1 doctor for 2,953. 1 dentist for 17,861. 1 pharmacist for 10,469.

scarcity of transportation and the deficiency in health education were to weaken the capacity of the health services in rural areas. (1) Table 5.8 shows the total numbers of health institutions in Iraq by type and province for the year 1978.

It reveals that 13 per cent of all health institutions were located in Baghdad, 9.4 per cent in Nineveh and 8.7 per cent in Basrah, and 68.9 per cent of health institutions were divided between 15 provinces. 47.4 per cent of health institutions were branch health centres, 0.7 per cent of health institutions were ophthalmic treatment centres, 1.3 per cent were T.B. centres and 0.9 per cent were for endemic disease.

Media and health education:

An effective instrument for improving health education in rural areas has been the television health education programmes. Recent rapid development of television programmes has created increased social awareness of health matters. Changing attitudes towards modern health methods and educating people to apply the principles of hygiene is the link between mass communication and development in the health sector. The first attempt to spread sanitation information was made in schools in the

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Educational and Social Department, Analysis of Existing Health Services in Rural Iraq and Requirement for Such Services until 1980, Mimeographed in Arabic, 1974, p.9.

TABLE 5.8

Number of Health Institutions by type and Province: 1978

Province	Dispensary	health	Branch health centre	clinic	Maternity & child care		mobile	River mobile dispensary	health	clínic	Endemic diseases	T.B. Centre	Ophthalmic treatment	Others	Total
Nineveh	20	25	74	4	6	2	16	_	1	_	1	1	1	7	158
Salah Al-Dee	en 4	12	45	1	3	_	7	1	1	_	1	1	-	_	76
Ta'meem	23	7	42	2	2	1	10	_	1	1	1	1	1	3	95
Diala	4	16	74	2	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	104
Baghdad	4 4	13	39	34	16	17	17	1	_	7	1	3	_	37	219
Anbar	11	15	78	2	· 4	_	9	_	_	1	-	2	-	_	122
Babylon	7	15	47	1	1	1	6	_	1	1	1	1	-	4	86
Kerbela	7	5	18	.1	2	1	5	_	1	1	1	1	1	_	44
Najaf	4	6	29	2	2	2	8	_	2		1	1	1	_	58
Qadisiya	11	8	33	2	5	1	9	_	1	1	1	1	-	3	76
Muthanna	7	6	7	1	1	1	4	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	3.3
Thi-Qar	9	12	54	2	1	1	I	10	3	1	-	1	-	_	95
Wasit	2	7	28	1	1	1	13	-	•••	1	-	1	-	1	56
Maysan	2	6	27	4	1	1	8	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	57
Basrah	33	7	48	5	2	_	9	7	3	2	1	1	1	2	121
D'hok	3	9	21	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	2	42
Arbil	14	18	50	1	1	1	7	_	1	1	1	1	1	-	97
Sulaimaniya	21	21	85	2	10	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	3	147
Total '	226	208	799	67	61	33	120	21	20	20	15	21	11	64	1,686

Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Department of Social Statistics, 1979, Statistics of Other Health Institutions for 1978, No.G/9/5, Table No.2, p.7 (In Arabic)

twenties, on a modest scale. Hygiene became a regular curriculum subject but living standards remained unchanged. Health education, especially among the rural population had little effect. During the 1930's the medicine and hygiene section was established within the Ministry of Education. (1) More than twenty years ago, one scholar pointed out that the principles of simple modern hygiene were almost unknown to the rural population. (2) In reality, some diseases remained hidden, such as various women's diseases. A lot of people considered these shameful and a threat to their social status.

In any case, large numbers of mainly illiterate

Iraqi women, and semi-illiterates still believed in

"Divine will" and the "evil eye" as causes of illness,
as did large numbers of men. So, to change attitudes

towards new medical treatment two things were necessary:
firstly, to educate people within schools (through students
and school health services, health education might reach
most families up and down the country. Students mostly
provided their parents with the new health services).

^{1.} John Iannuzzi, <u>Iraq, 1920-1958: The Development of the Social Infrastructure of an Emerging Country, 1965, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished), The Catholic University of America, p.104.</u>

^{2.} Hassan Kadhum Al-Bassam, An Evaluation of the Rural Development Programmes of Iraq, op.cit. p.115.

and secondly, to use the mass media to raise consciousness and drive out superstition. It should be kept in
mind that such created consciousness must accompany
improved health services.

"Traditionalism and fatalism were begining to decline in the rural areas as a result of recent increases in rural education and the penetration of new ideas through the news-paper and radio. The peasants began to question old opinions and customs and to realize that their difficulties were not predetermined and inescapable." (1)

A special section within the Ministry of Health deals with television, radio and newspaper health-campaigns. It aims to awaken public consciousness to change public attitudes and to create general awareness of health. The main sources of health information for rural areas are twofold: firstly, via rural health extension, which is a Ministry of Health department and health campaigns. Secondly, this is achieved via broadcasting and other media channels, directed by the Ministry of Health, the Iraqi broadcasting establishment, and other government bodies. Rural health extension was devoted to spreading health education amongst the rural population in order to motivate people to change unhealthy practices and out-dated attitudes towards medicine. Table 5.9 shows the attitudes of an Iraqi village towards folk and modern medicine. The rural health extension teams' coordinate

John Iannuzzi, <u>Iraq, 1921-1958</u>: The <u>Development of the Social Infrastructure of an Emerging Country</u>, op.cit. p.107.

TABLE 5.9

Attitudes of an Iraqi Village Towards Folk and Modern Medicine

	No.	8
Families believing in modern medicine only	152	76.5
Families believing in folk medicine only	24	13
Families believing in modern and folk medicine	20	10.5
Total	196	100.0

Source: A.A. Salman, 1980, <u>Rural Society in Iraq</u>, Ministry of Culture and Information, Al-Rashid Publishing House, Baghdad, Table No.5, p.105.

and cooperate with popular organizations and government departments in rural areas. (1)

In an interview with a health official, he stated that, health films had been shown to villagers with the cooperation of the general federation of Iraqi women and peasants' societies. Usually health films were shown in illiteracy eradication classes in remote villages. films were of foreign origin; others were Iraqi-made. According to the observations of the health official personnel, people preferred the Iraqi films, because the language and environment in Iraqi films were familiar. (2)

Many health campaigns were launched each year. example was the anti-T.B. campaign in public parks and places to inform people about T.B. its cures, and how to avoid its dangers. The participants in this campaign accounted for thousands. (3)

On the first day Radio Baghdad transmitted in 1936, a health lecture was amongst the few programmes broadcast, and since that time regular programmes, and lectures have been broadcast. Amongst health programmes presented by Baghdad radio was the "Rural Health programme".

^{1.} A.H. Al-Khafaji, Health Services in Rural Iraq, 1975, Ministry of Health, Directorate of Rural Health Services, Mimeographed, (in Arabic), p.6. An interview done on 28.12.1981 in Baghdad.

^{2.}

A.T.A. Al-fukaki, 1979, T.B. eradication in Iraq during the years 1969-1978, General establishment for health security and rural health, Baghdad, pp.24-25.

I shall discuss health programmes and health guidance on Baghdad television at a later stage.

Section Three

Popular Organization: Participation

"The secret of being successful in constructing the new society ... is the love of order which has its serious effect on the implementation of the programmes based on the ideology used for building (the Iraqi) society".

Saddam Hussein

In this section, I shall discuss the popular organizations in Iraq which have strong connections with the ABSP up and down the country. The importance of these organizations probably stem from their mediating role between Party (or State) and population. popular organizations are centralized organizations in Their headquarters are in Baghdad, but most organizations have branches in the other Iraqi cities and villages. Each popular organization seeks a population with whom it identifies as being within its area of interest (i.e. the general federation of Iraqi women seeks to organize women). People in Iraq who are not ABSP members or symphathizers may join popular organizations. The functions of popular organizations related to my study, may be summarized as follows: they are instruments of the party (or state) which apply ABSP and government policies by communication with the public in two ways. Firstly, it does this by means of personal contact via

Party cells. Secondly, most of the popular organizations have television programmes which present its policies, activities and practices. I shall discuss the television programmes of popular organizations in later chapters.

State and Party:

The relationship between the ABSP and the State became clear in 1974. The party guided and steered the state authorities and bodies. So, the state which is considered the most effective tool for achieving socio-economic transformation in Iraq has its policies directed by the ABSP. Overall, state bodies have effected their practices and activities in accordance with party programmes and principles. Hence, the popular organizations form part of the party organization itself. In practice, popular organizations operate up and down the country between party and people. On the one hand, popular organizations are transmitters of party policy among the various categories with which it is concerned. On the other hand, it informs the party leadership about public opinion and problems (i.e. feed back), which occasionally leads to improvements in their member's living and working conditions. Stress was placed on the role of popular organizations in the development process. ABSP became responsible for spreading its values in society and eradicating attitudes which it

regarded as undesirable. (1) Among the new values and practices to which the party paid special attention was the national sentiment (a necessary concept with respect to collective work done voluntarily). Voluntary work was a concept which the party strived hard to apply. It aimed, thereby, to create participation, so, popular organizations launched massive voluntary campaigns, mainly devoted to agricultural projects or to services, to bring immediate benefits to the people, (2) such as building houses for peasants, agricultural stores, schools, popular clinics and so on. In addition, labourers established agricultural stations, and taught peasants to run agricultural machines. Students, also participated by educating illiterate peasants. So, voluntary work was a leap forward in the mobilization of the people to participate in development work. The national development plan for the years 1970-75 laid emphasis upon public participation, to achieve developmental goals. (3)

Furthermore, the national charter stated that the

The 1968 Revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects,

The Political Report of the Eighth Congress of the

ABSP in Iraq, January 1974, op.cit., p.119.

^{2 .} Ibid., p.118.

^{3.} M.M. Al-Khayro, The Applied Social Development in Iraq, Social and Criminal Research Bulletin, Vol.2 No.1. 1973, Baghdad, p.91.

state authority should fully encourage peasant societies, worker unions, student and women's organizations, and other popular organizations to play an active role in accelerating socio-economic and cultural transformation. The national charter, also stated that popular organizations had been offered the opportunity to spread participation consciousness throughout the entire population. (1) The embryonic media was a party tool for popular enlightenment and information and acted as a purveyor of the new values and practices and helped to build up a solid relationship between people and government, in spite of the anticipated mistakes "... the practice of criticism is new in official institutions and in the people's relationship with the government." (2)

Apart from broadcasting information to the people, there were two other main institutions in Iraq providing people with education and information, in the popular sense. Firstly, there were government institutions, and secondly, popular organizations. The main government institutions, which deal with the people were, the

^{1.} The National Charter Action, Chapter One, Para.4, Ministry of Information, Documentary Series No.16 Baghdad, 1971.

^{2 .} Saddam Hussein, <u>Iraq - Revolution in the Service of Humanity</u>, op.cit, p.27.

peasant cultural organization, which was affiliated to the ministry of agriculture and agrarian reform. This institution was a state body, which aimed to promote consciousness amongst peasants, geared towards increasing production and raising living standards, training peasant leaders and furnishing them with party principles. organization provided various social activities and communication services in rural areas. The second government department involved is the workers cultural organization, which is subject to the ministry of labour and social affairs, has similar tasks to those of the peasants cultural organization, but its concern is with the workers. The other government departments are:

The Rural Cultural Centres:

These centres were established in the early 1970's. The functions of these centres was to enlighten peasants in accordance with party ideology and practices, (1) to change old practices and to develop solidarity and cooperation within villages, to expand cultural, social and political consciousness through personal contact and mass meetings, to establish new practices stemming from party principles, to tighten the link between peasants and state, to develop women's participation in development

Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Peasants Cultural Organization, 1979, Guidelines work for rural 1. Cultural Centres and Agricultural Extension, Baghdad, (In Arabic). p.19.

projects, and to organise social and leisure activities in rural areas. Part of table 5.10 shows the number of rural cultural centres in 1978, according to provinces.

The Rural Women's Guidance Centres:

These centres aimed to inform rural women in various ways, on the advantages of participation in development processes and to raising her living standards. Table 5.10 shows the number of centres in 1978 in the whole of rural Iraq. These centres were run and directed by 816 women cadres.

The Fellowship Centres for Rural Youth:

These centres were established in 1969 with assistance from the FAO to introduce a new agricultural information service, in order to raise the living standards of villagers; to persuade them to adopt collective and cooperative methods; to prepare the younger generation for participation in rural development, and to spread literacy amongst villagers. Table 5.11 shows the number of fellowship centres for rural youth in 1978.

The primary object of each popular organization is to orientate workers, peasants, youth, students, and women into the new ideological guidelines of the ABSP and its practices. Party and popular organization members are numerous.

According to an ABSP leader in Diala province. More than 90 per cent of all students, peasants and workers in villages

TABLE 5.10

Number of Rural Cultural Centres and Rural Women's Guidance Centres According to Province

Province	No.of Rural Cultural Centres, 1978	No.of Rural Women's Guidance centres 31.12.77.
Baghdad	10	12
Salah Al-Deen	6	11
Nineveh	15	8
D'hok	15	7
Arbil	28	2 4
Al-Sulaimaniya	a 10	21
Al-Ta'meem	11	7
Diala	14	11
Al-Anbar	13	5
Wasit	21	32
Babylon	19	13
Kerbela	10	11
Al-Najaf	12	9
Al - Qadisiya	17	12
Al-Muthanna	9	17
Thi-Qar	28	14
Maysan	13	18
Basrah	10	11
Total	261	361 ⁽¹⁾

(1) This number included 83 rural women's guidance centres in agricultural states and 35 centres in village industrial centres.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,
Peasant Cultural Organization, 1979, Guidance
Work for Rural Cultural Centres and Agricultural
Extension Festivals, P.30. and Ministry of
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Peasant Cultural
Organizations, Guidelines and Work Plans for
Rural Family Planning Development Department,
Baghdad, 1978, p.18.

TABLE 5.11

Number of Fellowship Centres for Rural Youth, 1978

Province	No.of	Centres
Baghdad SalahAl-Deen Nineveh D'hok Arbil Al-Sulaimaniya Al-Ta'meem Diala Al-Anbar Wasit Babylon Kerbala Al-Najaf Al-Qadisiya Al-Muthanna Thi-Qar Maysan Basrah		5 15 15 7 12 20 13 17 11 16 18 10 11 15 13 20 16
Total	2	59

have joined party organizations. (1)

The popular organizations, mostly, cooperate with each other to achieve certain aims. For instance, during the days of the national campaign for the eradication of illiteracy, popular organizations cooperated to play a major part in the campaign. They used their television and radio programmes to encourage the campaign. peasants, workers, students, youth broadcasting programmes, mainly led the campaign to persuade illiterates (within these organizations in particular, and other illiterate viewers and listeners in general), to attend illiteracy eradication centres, and follow up its programmes. organizations also used mass meetings for the same purpose. They also used published information leaflets and organized classrooms for their illiterate members. However, general policy for popular organizations was made by the "central occupational bureau", which was a higher committee of the ABSP leadership. This bureau made decisions about all popular organization policies and their major activities. Popular organizations at rural level can be divided up as follows:

1. The National Union of IraqiStudents:

The N.U.I.S. officially represents all Iraqi students at home and even abroad. Amongst the N.U.I.S. activities

^{1.} Al-Thawra (The ABSP Official Newspaper), A sample of Ba'thists lives in villages, No.4126, 3.9.1981, (Baghdad)

are: improved social and educational conditions for student, representation of students on government educational bodies (this enables the N.U.I.S. to participate in the decision-making process) and participation in the execution of social and economic development programmes such as the building of schools, clinics, irrigation works and even road works. More importantly, the N.U.I.S. played a leading role in the national campaign to eradicate illiteracy from Iraq. The N.U.I.S. have a branch in all Iraq educational institutions from primary school up to universities.

2. The General Federation of Iraqi Women:

This federation is an establishment characterized by the principles of social democracy representing all Iraqi women. (1) The federation aimed to prepare and mobilize Iraqi women to achieve cultural progress and to participate with other public sectors, in rendering public services, popular action, civil defence and taking part in economic, social and cultural development projects. (2) To achieve its goals, the federation took great care to

^{1.} Iraqi Official Gazette, No. 12, Law No.139, Article 2, para (b), 1972.

^{2.} Ibid, Article 3.

ensure cooperation with government establishments concerned with women, family, motherhood and childhood. It encouraged women to join these establishments and participate in their activities to develop the methods of cooperation, collective work and democratic practices. They held seminars and debates, gave lectures, showed films and used other information media, such as television and radio programmes to enlighten the population and direct its concern towards wiping out old practices and thinking based on attitudes of female inferiority. They aimed to develop rural women's participation by spreading cultural, social and economic awareness amongst them, and persuading them to get involved in the development processes. In most Iraqi cities and villages, there are federation branches.

3. The Peasants cooperative Societies:

Aims to achieve the following objectives:

Propagation and deepening of ABSP dogma; extending social and cultural services to the peasants and contributing towards the implementation of state plans for collective and individual land exploitation. (1)

4. The General Federation of Iraqi Youth:

This federation was established in 1972. Its objectives have been defined as the preparation and mobilization of

^{1 .} Iraqi Official Gazette, No. 2579, Law No. 43, 28.3.1977.

youth to carry out activities, designed to raise the standards of Iraqi youth at the educational, ethical, National Arab and human levels. They are concerned to protect national unity by arousing awareness amongst Iraqi youth. For the purpose of this study, developmental demands are included amongst the objectives to be achieved by the youth federation. (1) This federation have centres and organizations in almost all Iraqi cities and villages.

5. Other Popular Organizations:

Many popular organizations are concentrated in urban areas. So, I do not propose to review, for instance, the general federation of labour unions, the teacher's union, and the unions of various other occupations which have no branches at village level, but simply to say that they have a huge number of members and a variety of activities.

There are several political objectives, which I do not mention, because they are not related to this study.

Chapter Six

Communication policy in Iraq: with special reference to broadcasting

Section One

Communication Policy in Iraq

It is generally agreed that the function of the mass media in development is to inform, educate and mobilize the population. Such thinking on the communication of development is linked to the belief that the role of mass media is to solve social problems (e.g. ignorance of health practices).

It is interesting to contrast the (image) of the media in developing societies with the image of the media in developed societies.

It could be argued that the media in the Western countries, may promote ill health. The ways of promoting ill health are as follows: by advertising products which affect the health (i.e. cigarettes, drugs); and by the neglect of publicising information which demonstrates the health risks connected to certain products. (1) According to Howitt's (2) classification, three models recur in mass communication literature. They are:

^{1.} Howitt, Dennis, 1982, Mass Media and Social Problems, International series of experimental social psychology, Pergamon Press, Oxford, p.157.

^{2.} Ibid, pp. 7-16.

- (1) The effects model (sometimes known as the "hypodermic" approach or the stimulus-response approach) which concentrates on the direct influence that the mass communication has on the audience as a whole. The idea is that the mass communication inject into the audience a dose of persuasive communication which has a fairly uniform effect on the audience. The assumption is that persuasive communication in the mass media operates directly on the audience.
- (2) The uses and gratification models. Underlying the uses and gratification models is the idea of function. To ask "For what purpose do people use the mass communication?" is as illuminating a question as, "What effects do the mass communication have on the audience?" (i.e. Basically the audience is asked what they get out of a particular programme).
- (3) The cultural Ratification model. The basic principle of the cultural ratification model is that the communication, along with many other social institutions, act as agencies of the political control of society. That is, the mass communication are so allied to the power structure of society that it is inevitable that they serve to support and maintain power structures and dominant ideologies. The mass communication, in particular, present a world view to members of society which regenerates continually and pervasively the ideological structures that are required for the maintenance of the existing power structure.

Communication policy and practices in Iraq seem nearer to the cultural Ratification model.

A Ba'th government slogan in Iraq is "Man is the object of the revolution". So, it should be born in mind that mass communication may play its part in development in two respects: first, the mass media do so in the economic sector, by demonstrating development in various areas and creating awareness of the development process by linking its results to the wealth and development of the country. Secondly, it challenges old values and practices in society, and spreads Party values and new practices. Thus, television is an instrument for demonstrating the values of development to a mass audience. The principles of Iraq's communication policy are enshrined in extensive legislation. They are also re-iterated and elaborated through statements by the government and the party leadership.

Communication policy in Iraq: Background:

It is of some interest to look briefly at the background of communication policy in Iraq during the period of the monarchy up to July 1958.

The government tightly controlled the mass media and made them a tool for expressing its interests. The government possessed its own media departments such as radio and television broadcasting and some allied newspapers, and controlled private sector publicity by means of censorship

"Baghdadi criminal law" which included several measures that enabled the government to keep its hold on the mass media. (1) The government had the right at any time to stop publication of newspapers during any political crisis. The government also pressured the newspapers through official advertisement. In Iraq, unlike other countries, the government provided approximately three quarters of all advertizing in the newspapers. (2) Officials used these advertisements to influence newspapers, to aid government, or to avoid criticism.

However, no private news agencies operated in Iraq before the second World War, though in Baghdad Arab News Agency was initially distributed free of charge. This agency had a special relationship with the British government. (3)

A British diplomat observed that public opinion in Iraq was very influential in politics before 1958. His point is only a slight exaggeration:

^{1.} A.A.Al-Bustani, Journalism Freedom in Iraq, The women division of Beut Al-Auma society publication, Baghdad, (Arabic), 1951. p.3.

^{2.} S.Zaku, The Historical Relationship Between Government and Journalism in Iraq, 1969, Republic House Press, Baghdad, (Arabic) pp.5-6.

^{3.} J.O. Boyd-Barrett, The World-Wide News Agencies: Develment, Organization, Competition, Markets and Production, Ph.D. thesis, 1976, Open University, pp.286-287.

"In Iraq ... British policy quite deliberately neglected the opinion of educated Iraqis ... it was opinion easily discoverable by anyone prepared to listen to the ordinary people - who made the revolution in Iraq in July, 1958." (1)

In sum, between 1869-1958, a period of some political instability, the press (and other media) had been beset by cenorship, suppression, and licensing. It is interesting to note that the British authorities, during the revolt of 1920 in Iraq, not only suppressed the rising nationalist papers, but also exiled their founders to deserted villages. (2)

Mass communication policy in Iraq after the 1958 revolution may be characterized as follows; the ex leader General Quasim, stated in 1959:

"I regard the newspapers and magazines as clubs, institutions and schools for the education of the people ... I do not want the people to be isolated from the policy of the country." (3)

The pre-1968 situation left its marks on the organization of the media. The common task of press and broadcasting is to support the republic and inform public opinion inside and outside Iraq about the achievements of the Government in various sectors. The Iraqi Minister of Guidance in 1959 pointed out that:

"Our social aim is twofold, namely, to destroy the old society with one hand and to build a new society with the other." (4)

4. B.B.C. ME/84/A/12-14.

^{1.} CARACTACUS, Revolution in Iraq - An Essay in Comparative Public Opinion, 1959, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, p.7.

^{2.} Ghazi Asmail Al-Gailani, 1971, Iraq's Journalism and Political Conflict 1956-1963, Ph.D.thesis (unpublished), The University of Iowa, pp.17-18.

^{3.} B.B.C. Daily Series, No. 781, 14th. February, 1959. Appendix G.

The Minister said of the plans of the Ministry of Guidance:

"We have many plans to increase the role of this Ministry, which is responsible for intellectual and social guidance and for educating the people by means of publications, radio, films and theatre. We intend to make this Ministry's machinery capable for carrying out large-scale planning. We hope to study the question of establishing a news agency, improving publications, publishing picture magazines, making educational films, and forming popular groups, which will tour the provinces and villages to educate and entertain citizens. We intend to bring radio and television to every corner of the country, because 80 per cent of our people are illiterate and ignorant. The task of this Ministry ... is to educate and guide the people and channel their creative potentialities into a field of production in order to build a prosperous society."

The year after the 1958 revolution, the Military Governor-General issued a statement to newspaper and magazine owners, (it includes broadcasting), decided the following: (2)

- 1. To ban the publication of any report or article which tends to:
- (a) Incite disturbance of the country's internal and external security and set people against the regime.
- (b) Encourage the committing of crimes.
- (c) Exhort to disobedience or non-observance of regulations,

l. Ibid.

B.B.C. Daily Series, Part IV/ME/121/A/1.

or to resistance to any legal measure or procedure.

- (d) Engender malice and grudges or spread dissension among the citizens. This excludes criticism based on sound and cogent scientific grounds.
- (e) Desecrate and deride religions.
- (f) Violate the sanctity of ethics and defame the reputation of individuals.
- (g) Influence magistrates or judges in cases heard or considered by them, or influence the prosecution, lawyers or examining magistrates and commissions in such cases, or influence public opinion in favour of a particular side.
- 2. To ban the publication of:
- (a) false news and the photostats of forged documents falsely attributed to others, with an eye to influencing the course of justice.
- (b) Any controversy or opinion on cases being heard by courts before the verdict is delivered.
- (c) Any article or report offending the Government and the official and semi-official bodies in regard to the performance of their duties.
- (d) Movements of the armed forces or anything relating to the formations, weapons, and equipment of these forces, unless special authorisation has been obtained from the competent authorities.
- 3. The above message is addressed to all proprietors of

newspapers and magazines. Contraveners will be liable to penalties set forth in Article 15 of the Martial Law ord-inance, which provides for three years of imprisonment or a fine of 150 dinars, in conjunction with the penalties provided in the aforesaid Press law.

Thus, the Baghdad press became more rigidly controlled than it ever was in the days of Monarchy. (1)

Between 1963-1968, a great deal of control was also exerted by the government over the press. The government expects the support of the press in working towards its goals. It obtains it in three ways: (2)

First, the party of government owns the largest daily newspaper, and the government itself owns the second largest. Secondly, the government furnishes a large percentage of news through the Iraqi news agency.

Thirdly, press laws promulgated on June 24, 1964, provide for censorship of the press when it offends government foreign policy by criticizing religion or by publishing obscenity.

In fact, governments in Iraq were interested in mass media as a means of neutralizing any political opposition

The Economist, The Iraqi Tragedy, April 4, 1959, p.47.
 William R. Lindley, The Press of Baghdad and Iraq as seen by an outsider, Journalism Quarterly, Summer 1965, Vol.XXXII, pp.451-2.

through controlling information sources, and to persuade the population that they were working for the public interest. Before 1968, the ABSP underground press aimed to mobilize the population for the revolution.

Communication policy after the 1968 revolution:

After the revolution of 1968, new tasks were found for the mass media (which was controlled by the party) to stabilize the new regime and help in building a new state apparatus. (1) It was observed that, before 1974, Iraqi communication policy practices were characterized by the following features: the emphasis was given to demonstrate the image of party and Party leadership, as hardworkers for their country. This was done because, it was realized that the population had previously distrusted the government and its mass media messages.

The party slogan in the years following the revolution was: "The whole truth for the people". In addition, the party sought to create and develop the people's participation in the development process.

Decisions on communication were made by the ABSP national communication bureau. This bureau was headed by

^{1.} Nuri Al-Marsumi, Journalism and its relations with the state departments, Al-Thawra, (Newspaper), Baghdad, 17.11.1974.

a member of the ABSP National Committee. Among its members were the Minister of Information and a number of other ministries. They laid down the guidelines for the conduct of the mass media.

In the case of broadcasting, the director general was responsible for applying these decisions and guidelines. However, the director general did make decisions about programme contents. Although, in some infrequent cases, the Minister of Information, or the national communication bureau might make decisions about the suitability of the contents of some programmes. (1) So, the national communication bureau is the senior committee for Iraq's communication system. The main functions of this bureau are to spread party ideology, principles, policies and everyday matters throughout the population, using all the necessary media channels. (2)

Communication policy in Iraq may be discussed on three levels: firstly, communication development aims and goals; secondly, communication manpower and skills (i.e. administrative), and thirdly, communication technology. In later

^{1.} An interview with the television director in Baghdad on 4.1.1980.

^{2.} Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, The Internal Constitution, 1971.

chapters, I shall discuss the last two trends in the Iraqi broadcasting system. In the discussion immediately following, I shall concentrate on the communication development trend.

The main feature of the Iraqi communication system is its centralization, which is linked to state intervention. In researching the reasons behind centralization one finds that the Ba'th Party emphasis is on building up new values and practices. So, from a Party standpoint, the centralization of communication is necessary for the spreading of its own ideas, and to guide and mobilize the population under a one party perspective, It was pointed out that communication policy should stem from party ideology and everyday practices, so that party and state goals were served. Meanwhile, the guidance of the leadership is a central indicator for communication departments and apparatus. (1) Hence the party leadership in Iraq was aware of the importance of the role of communication. The seventh congress of the Arab Ba'th socialist Party in Iraq held a few months after the 1968 revolution, recommended the necessity of developing the people's consciousness, and for reshaping national culture in accordance with party ideology. They also stressed the importance of spreading new cultural concepts by scientific methods, and preparing a comprehensive

^{1.} Saheb Husien, 1978, Communication and anti-communication, Ministry of Culture and Arts, The little encyclopeadia No.17, Baghdad, (in Arabic), pp.11-19.

campaign for the eradication of illiteracy. (1) The tenth National congress of the party, held in 1970, mentioned the necessity for achieving a social, cultural and communications revolution to improve the Arab standard of living. (2)

The turning point in Iraqi communications policy came in 1974, when the political report of the Eighth Regional conference of the ABSP was announced, and adopted as a programme and workguide by all authorities. (3) The political report stated that: The intention was to keep the information media fully and accurately informed of every detail of the party's plan, and to afford them all the resources needed for their effective performance. In recent years especially, the leadership has worked hard to this end, directly supervising the many media organs and providing them with the means to develop their intellectual, human and technical resources, in the hope that they would come to form a creative vanguard of change,

Abdul Cani Abdul-Gaffur, Communication, Culture and National Development, 1974, Ministry of Information, Information series No.56, Baghdad, (in Arabic), pp.96-97.
 Ibid, p.97.

Ibid, p.97.Waqai Al-Iraqiya (Iraqi official Gazette), Law No.142 of 1974, No.2405 of 13.10.1974.

constantly making known the policies and ideals of the revolution. (1)

Nevertheless, the political report admitted that less has been achieved than the party required. The political report pointed out that unhealthy phenomena shown in the years before 1974 " ... bureaucracy, lack of revolutionary zeal and initiative, must be totally eradicated". (2) So, the communications sector was to become a pioneer sector. The political report made this clear, when it pointed to the following:

"The next phase must see the creation of a genuinely revolutionary information and cultural service, which expresses the aims of the revolution with precision and fidelity, and is creative and inspirational to the population and to intellectuals, not only in Iraq, but throughout the Arab homeland." (3)

In addition, an early document published in the first years of the revolution stated, "Revolution should have its own information and cultural values to express its ideology, situations, aspirations and ambitions." (4) So, communication could help policy makers, namely the revolutionary command council, to make political, social and economic

Political report, op.cit., p.112.

^{2.} Ibid., pp.170-171.

^{3.} Ibid., p.171.

^{4.} The National Act Charter, 1971, Ministry of Information, Documentary Series No.16, Baghdad (in Arabic), pp.48-49.

decisions in the interests of development. On the other hand, the chairman of the national communication bureau pointed out that broadcasting is considered the most important apparatus in the state, " ... All state apparatus indirectly inform the population about their activities and achievements. Communications apparatus, especially television and radio, informs the population directly and convinces them that state achievements are in their interests and in accordance with party aims." (1) In short, communication is a vital part of the Iraqi political, social and economic system. It cannot be separated from any of these.

In a directed system, aiming to apply state and party ideology, the communications function does not just transmit information to the population, but guides its activities to support socialist transformation under the new system. However, one important communications function in development is to create a popular censorship to criticize any mistakes and shortcomings which accompany the development process. Neglect of mistakes makes the communication of development less effective. (2) The Minister of Information pointed out in 1979 that social change means basically building up "the new man". (In Ba'thist ideology "the new man" was an

^{1.} Radio and television magazine, Communication apparatus

and current phase, No. 60, July 1, 1972, pp.7-9. Kheder, A., 1977, National Development and Arab 2. Cooperation, Al-Thawra publications, Baghdad, (in Arabic), pp. 124-125.

individual who believed in Ba'thist ideology and supported their principle of revolution.) Communications, then, connect social change with party ideology and practices. (1) In sum, the central goals which the Ba'th party work to achieve via mass communication are as follows:

- 1. To disseminate Ba'th party ideology and its philosophy of building a society in accordance with the aims of a party of Unity, Freedom and socialism.
- 2. Make known the Revolution's achievements, and their importance for the people and as a result of party goals.
- 3. Establish and encourage national integration.
- 4. Inculcate Ba'th ideology in Iraqi youth and children.
- 5. Defeat reactionary, sectarian and tribal ideas and values.
- 6. Defeat any practice or ideas contrary to the revolution and the aims of party.

The Minister of Information stated that:

"We are not going to leave any part of our society unreached by party and state ideology and revolutionary practice, we intend to educate and mobilize the people. By these means, we hope to provide an opportunity to integrate all parts of our society. We recognize that some of our people not reached by television transmission are more backward compared with others who were reached earlier by television transmission." (2)

Saad Qasim Hamudi, 1979, The role of communication in social change, Al-Jumhuryia, (Newspaper), No.3648, July 25th, (Baghdad)

Jasim, L.N., (The Minister of Information), Communication and War, Freedom House of Printing, 1981, Baghdad, (Arabic), p.4-6.

However, some people who work in the communication departments still believe that their duty is just to endorse and
praise what is done by the state departments and say things
which satisfy officials. (1)

The central report of the Ninth regional conference of the Ba'th party, stated that the communication sector is the sector most directly related to the life of the people and party and state programmes and policies. This sector still clashes daily with cultural forms, beliefs, and intellectual trends contrary to party and state ideology. On the other hand, the communications sector is an important instrument for popular mobilization towards party goals and to spread culture. (2)

^{1.} Al-Thakafa (editorial), Communication between naivete and scientific revolutionary principles, No.4, April 1980, (Arabic), p.6.

^{2.} Al-Thawra, (Newspaper), 29. January 1983, p.7.

Section Two

Iraqi Television Broadcasting Policy

In Iraq, the major aims of national development are to bridge the gap between rural and urban areas, in the sense of improving socio-economic living standards and to promote urban modes of life. Television may play its role, in this respect, by promoting new values and practices which enhance the national development process, such as the rejection of tribalism, and so on.

It is a fact that most of Iraq's population distrusted official speeches. They frequently used to hear speeches from the officials of previous governments full of promises to achieve improvements in socio-economic conditions, but they got almost nothing. So, instead, people now look for real achievements that improve their standard of living. For decades, the population of Iraq were promised improvements by the government, but little was done. So, having suffered considerable oppression during the Ottoman era and during the early part of this century, the people distrusted a mass media, owned or controlled by government, tending to regard it as an organ of false propaganda.

After a year of Iraqi radio broadcasting, an Iraqi author pointed out in 1937, that the government had produced a great deal of propaganda for its intended activities without

any real achievements. Thus, government propaganda was injurious to government aims, and actually became anti government propaganda. (1)

Iraqi Broadcasting before 1968:

Before the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, the state leadership were very sensitive to radio broadcasting. They kept broadcasting under their direct supervision. (2) The prime minister gave regular instructions to the broadcasting authorities, mainly concerning political policy. (3) Broadcasting in Iraq has always been considered a most important political tool.

The "people's court" in Iraq sentanced the director general of Iraqi broadcasting to 15 years imprisonment for broadcasting programmes considered as anti the National interests. The people's court stated that "Broadcasting is a part of state policy", (4) and the director of Iraqi radio stated that, "the director general should apply government policy in all programmes". (5) It is interesting to note that, the people's court convicted some broadcasting

^{1.} Abdul-Razak Shebib, 1937, The Public Opinion, Al-Furat Press, Baghdad, (In Arabic), p.88.

Iraq, Ministry of Defence, People's Court Minutes, 1959, The fifth case, Vol. 2, The Government Press, Baghdad, p.678.

^{3.} Ibid., p.635.

^{4.} Ibid., p.719.

^{5.} Iraq, Ministry of Defence, The People's Court Minutes, Vol. 3, 1959, Baghdad, p.932.

programmers for their preparation of some programmes on development, such as "Iraq in transition", "Joining forces", "Iraq on the move", "Iraq feature" and "Question and Answer", which was prepared under the direction of the U.S.A. cultural centre in Baghdad. The public prosecutor described these programmes as false information which gave the illusion that Iraq was an Edenic paradise. (1)

There was a cultural and artistic cooperation agreement between Iraq and the U.S.A. The U.S.A. was to give technical aid to Iraqi broadcasting. (2) In 1956, an agreement between "Iraqi broadcasting and the propaganda Department" and the U.S.A. cultural centre was made to allow the broadcasting of some programmes for Baghdad radio. (3) The programmes had a propagandist aim in favour of the U.S.A. (4)

The ex director general of Irag broadcasting in 1959, defined the broadcasting policy as follows: (5)

> "Since the broadcasting station represents the broad political line of the nationalist Government in this historic phase, thereby laying strong foundations for our new Iraq, we hereby announce that it is not committed to the adoption of any

^{1.} Ibid., p.734.

^{2.} Ibid., p.842.

^{3.} Ibid., p.739.

Iraq, Ministry of Defence, The people's court minutes, Fifth case, vol, two, 1959, Government Press, Baghdad 4. (Arabic), p.720. B.B.C. Daily series, ME/106/A/1.

^{5.}

ideological tendency assumed by any political or partisan group. We declare that the broad-casting station is devoted to the rendering of service to the whole people. It reflects every echo of rationalism and culture, and of the social and artistic activities harmonising with the trend of this historic phase of our present national movement under the leadership of His Excellency the loyal leader, Abd al-Karim Qasim.

The idea that the broadcasting station represents an overriding ideological inclination which commits it to support a certain group and exclude another is baseless as far as facts are concerned. No indication of it could ever be adduced. The broadcasting station derives its policy from the wise views which have been, and are, expressed by the saviour leader in his historic speeches, which reflect the revolutionary accomplishments of this historic phase of our national struggle.

We urge the sons of the people and loyal elements to offer constructive and objective criticism. We also urge them to co-operate and work to realise the unity of the national ranks, without involving the broadcasting station in the ideological differences pertaining to ideologies which it respects, but to which at the same time it is not committed to adhere. The broadcasting station also declares that it agrees with all political inclinations as regards the main points of our national struggle. This station declares its co-operation with those who have good intentions, namely those who understand the historic facts of this national phase, under the leadership of the faithful leader.

The broadcasting station declares once again that it will co-operate with every loyal group of the people to preserve the gains of the immortal 14th July and to keep its flag flying for ever."

In fact, television assumed importance in Iraq, immediately after the 14 July 1958, revolution. (1) So, it is clear that Iraqi government paid broadcasting a good deal of attention before the 1968 revolution and the present government continues to do so. In short, radio and television

^{1.} Douglas A. Boyd, 1982, Broadcasting in the Arab World, A Survey of Radio and Television in the Middle East, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, p.111.

were tightly controlled by government. (1) In addition, television in Iraq is amongst the most important of the mass media. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that television is the main social activity in Iraq. (2) Iraqi broadcasting after the 1968 revolution:

It would be correct to say that in the past, the guesthouses, in most Iraqi villages, were the main public meeting places. Nowadays, with the penetration of television, the people, mostly, prefer to meet each other in house having a television set, or to stay at home with their own television sets. In spite of this the possession of television sets does not mean that the owner actually watches programmes. In contrast, those who do not possess television sets tend to watch programmes whenever television sets are available. It is interesting to note the relationship between social status and television ownership and access.

In rural areas, a person's social prestige, might be gauged by his family's position, income and education. In recent years, with the advent of television in rural areas, a person may gain prestige by possessing and or/following television programmes which give him or her information and enable him or her to discuss it within his society. Another factor which encourages the population to follow television programmes, is the party's increased need for educated and informed members and sympathizers. In a political sense,

^{1.} William A.Rugh, Arab media and politics during the October war, The Middle East Journal,

^{2.} A personal interview with the director general of the Iraqi broadcasting on 25.1.1981.

broadcasting was a prime target for the revolutionaries, who took control of it and used it in the service of the aims of the revolution. (1)

Also, it was noticed that any break in broadcasting transmission made the population fearful. (2)

In spite of this drawback, the party and state leadership has concentrated on broadcasting to deal with the population. The Minister of Information is customarily a director general of broadcasting. The director general of Iraqi broadcasting is directly responsible for television programme contents. This explains how broadcasting became the vital link between government/or the party leadership and the people, and how television became the best channel for the leadership to announce their decisions and make statements. (3) At the level of programming, Iraqi television was confused by its partial dependence on certain imported programmes, as the ex-director general put it:

"We buy the U.S.A.'s series, West Germany's music and songs programmes, the Soviet Union's cartoon films, France's youth programmes and the Netherlands' entertainment".

^{1.} Jalil Kamal Al-Deen, Observations among Arab broadcasting, Al-Thawra, (Newspaper) No.1713, 15.3.1979. Aziz Al-Said Jasim, Nationalization and this era,

^{2.} Al-Thawra, (Newspaper), No.1261, 29.9.1972.

See for example, Al-Jumhuria, (Newspaper), No.4253, 3. a speech by the Iraqi president on 24.April 1981.

A speech delivered by the director general of broad-4. casting to the first seminar of informational regional Arab centre of population studies, held in Baghdad between 20-25 November 1974, (Mimeographed in Arabic).

So, to avoid the impact of multicultural confusion diffused throughout the programmes, Iraqi broadcasting tried to make plans and regulations for controlling programmes, with the aim of avoiding such contradictions with government and party ideology and policies. Western programmes shown on Iraqi television included films, action and adventure programmes, series entertainment, variety and some documentary films.

The differences between television in the West and Iraq may be roughly summarized as follows, firstly, the technical and production side of things are different. Of course, television is a Western invention, having a complex technology, so, the technical standards in Iraq and in developing countries in general are not very advanced. So, Iraq, lags behind the West in this respect. Secondly, programme content differs. Generaly speaking, Western television programmes may discuss and show almost anything, whilst in Iraq, (and in other developing countries), programme content is tightly censored in order not to contradict state goals and principles. Lastly, artistic quality is of a higher standard in the West, because it is the result of several processes and factors. So, artistic quality in Iraqi television (and that of other developing countries) is modest, which explains why developing countries, in general, tend to produce simple programmes (i.e. talks, documentary programmes, etc.).

Before 1974, broadcasting authority planners used to build up their programming plans on the implications of the national development plans. Then it would ask for contributions from other government authorities responsible for applying the national development plan to broadcasting. After researching the Iraqi broadcasting minutes, I have concluded that television was concentrated on short term plans and aimed to provide television with daily programmes, and there is no central plan included goals to be achieved. In a minute dated 28.12.1970, television was placed under the control of the director general. The minute did not say who made the decision. However, the concern of the television committee was to approve a number of programmes (e.g. local plays, songs) and to prepare some of these programmes for special days, (e.g. the National day, Army day). So, there was no real communications policy before 1974. The main aims of broadcasting were to avoid any opposition to party and government in programming. The television programming authorities only discussed programme items, figure by figure (i.e. to cut programme time or to replace programmes). difficult to say, that there was a noticeable contribution to development or to social change, in the sense of policy. in reality the development process for changing Iraqi socio-

economic conditions is not significant in the early years

of the 1968 revolution. The state's main task was to seek to build up a sort of stability After the national-ization of oil in 1972, and the government's adoption of the so called, "explosive development plan", and the creation of numerous socio-economic projects, communications policy became clearer. Later, following the political report of 1974, broadcasting adopted new strategies and programming to apply its directives. So, the official objectives of Iraqi broadcasting were as follows. (1)

- 1. Spreading the progressive national awakening amongst the people.
- 2. Encouraging humanitarian, social and moral values.
- 3. Reviving the literary and scientific Arab heritage.
- 4. Spreading knowledge and culture amongst the population.
- 5. Issuing educational programmes laid down by the state.
- 6. Harnessing all technical capacities guiding and investing them in the service of society.
- 7. Acquainting citizens with humanitarian civilization.
- 8. Providing "innocent" entertainment at a high artistic level.

Technological improvements in broadcasting were fostered by the state, which also paid attention to developing a skilled broadcasting labour force. All of this was done to promote radio and television and to encourage them in

^{1.} The Waqai Al-Iraqiya (<u>Iraqi Gazette</u>) No. 1849 of 8.3.1970. Article 3, Law No.42 of 1970.

the performance of their job, in accordance with broadcasting planning and state aspirations. (1) The Iraqi broadcasting communications programme for development is framed in the following terms:

- 1. To explain development concepts and aims, in order to connect these with the development process.
- 2. To explain the particular experience of the development of Iraq which stems from the whole independence policy.
- 3. To present development projects and compare them with the prerevolutionary projects.
- 4. To inform the population about investment schemes in various sectors.
- 5. To inform the population about achieving development programmes.

The central principles of Iraqi programming for development were as follows: firstly, the "explosive development plan" is crucial to building up Iraq in accordance with the party and its political report. Secondly, development is not an external factor in the life of the people, but it is a part of their lives. Thirdly, the relations of development to party aims and ideology are crucial. Lastly, the role of the people is important in supporting development programmes.

^{1.} The aims of the national development plan for developing radio and television. (An Iraqi broadcasting document) Mimeographed in Arabic, undated.

To sum up many of the aims of broadcasting seem to be rather idealistic. There were a lot of difficulties and problems in applying the development plan, so, broadcasting aimed to identify the following obstacles to national development:

- The shortage of skilled personnel.
- 2. The shortage of raw material.
- 3. Transportation problems.
- 4. Housing and electricity problems.
- 5. Problems related to the people themselves, such as undisciplined consumerism, waste in various public services, and the negative aspects of state departments.

In short, the main aims of broadcasting policy for national development for the years 1976-1980, emerged as follows:

- 1. The areas of development and politics: to promote socioeconomic achievements and conduct of such programmes through:
- A. Filming new projects.
- B. Reports.
- C. Debating.
- D. Reviews.
- E. Live transmission.
- F. Government development programmes.

All the above figures linked development with the so-called socialist transformation in Iraq. In other words, broadcasting was to convince the population of the benefits of socioeconomic achievements:

- A. Social Welfare
- B. Social, economic, cultural and political development.
- C. To assert the dominant role of labour.
- D. To build up the Iraqi economy according to nationalist and socialist principles.
- E. The contribution of development to party policy.
- 2. The area of culture and education:

Broadcasting policy in this area aims to concentrate on party education and cultural concepts. The following methods were the instruments of the above purpose:

- A. Plays and programmes which explain party ideas in direct and indirect ways.
- B. To present a strong challenge to the bourgeoisie's right-wing reactionary ideas and cultures.

In contrast to previous practices, broadcasting policy emphasized nationalist culture through:

- 1. The Arab heritage as civilized values from the past was to be a light for the Arab nation in the present and future.
- 2. Cultural development in harmony with party principles.
- 3. To protect new generations from anti revolutionary ideas and practices.
- 4. To pay attention to poems, stories, theatre and cinema as new revolutionary values.
- 3. The area of entertainment: One of the main objects of Iraqi broadcasting policy and one of the most difficult was

to achieve a balance between political and socio-economic development goals and the entertainment content of programmes. One of Iraq's main problems is its geographical situation between a number of different countries which transmit a good deal of entertainment programmes to lure Iraqi viewers and listeners. So, broadcasting policy in this area aims to:

- 1. Increase local entertainment programmes.
- 2. Increase the number of local songs and the amount of folk music in programmes.
- 4. The area of children's television; broadcasting policy emphasizes that ABSP ideas should be presented to children in a direct way, whether in songs, quizes or any other kind of programme. The planners believe that the best way to reach children and affect them, is directly.

The drawbacks of Baghdad television may be summarised as follows:

- 1. The scarcity of script writers and the scarcity of studios, which affects workers' productivity.
- 2. The scarcity of technical staff and staff who are not fully skilled.
- 3. None existence of specific regulations to evaluate work and workers.

- 4. Lack of coordination between song production for radio and television.
- 5. Non-employment of regulations concerning television production.
- 6. Inadequate space.
- 7. Censors who are unable to give a definite judgement.
- 8. Some television departments ignore the daily followup comments to their programmes.

In sum, television policy for development takes place in two ways; directly, through developmental programmes, and indirectly, through entertainment programmes, and so on, which urge people to support development or, at least, not act against development policy and practices.

In fact, it is very difficult to make good quality programmes to aid development aims. This is especially true of entertainment programmes. These sorts of programmes are generally difficult to produce in developing countries, owing to limitation on finance, skilled personnel, etc. So, most of these are imported rather than tailored to development needs in Iraq. However, for someone who has never used electricity, pure water or anything electrical in his life, television is of immense help in discovering a wide range of things about the outside world. One must bear in mind that television may play a negative role in relation to development if programmes are not carefully chosen and may create barriers to development.

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Section Three

British Broadcasting: Its Relations With Government

Compared With Iraqi Broadcasting

It is particularly interesting to look at the relations of British broadcasting with government, because Iraqi broadcasting was installed and based upon the British system of transmission, also, the Iraqi broadcasting technicians were trained in Britain. Furthermore, British educational, economical and political influences were very strong among Iraqis at the start of broadcasting transmission during the period of the monarchy. Moreover, the reputation of the British Broadcasting Corporation in Arab countries as the best station from the early days of its broadcasting in Arabic to the Middle East in the late 1930's. An Arab official declared that the B.B.C. had accustomed them to truth and honesty in their broadcasting of news, (1) and even in those days, the influence and reputation of the B.B.C. was still recognizable in most Arab countries, is largely true to say that in Arab countries, the B.B.C. service is widely respected. Some programmes, such as "Trade and Industry" are heard by many top people. (2)

^{1.} The Listener, The Arabic broadcast, 12. January 1938, Vol. X1X, No. 470, p. 66.

^{2.} Bernard Bumpus, Broadcasting and Audience Research in the Middle East, Bulletin of British Society for Middle East Studies, 1979, Vol.6, Part 1, p.19.

Historically, as well, the B.B.C. had its influence on the audience in Iraq. For example, in May 1941, D.Stephenson, the man responsible for the B.B.C. news bulletins in Arabic, was rung up in the middle of the night, at the request of the British Ambassador in Baghdad, to arrange a special broadcast to Iraq on the revolution of 1941. (1)

It goes without saying that broadcasting had become the main source of information and entertainment for most of the world's population.

The importance to Western countries of broadcasting in a political sense, is of considerable significance, for instance, a politician could reach most of his electorate during an election campaign much easier than by means of personal meetings. (2)

In reality, broadcasting became the instrument which most reflected popular images, impressions and ideas, so, it was widely used by the rulers of Third World countries to establish their interests, whilst in Western countries, air-time was divided between the main political parties.

(e.g. in Britain, they give five minutes, to the Conservative party and the same to the Labour party to broadcast their statements).

^{1.} Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, The War of Words, 1970, Oxford University Press, p.521.

Michael Starks, Government Review Broadcasting 1974-81 Outcome and Expectations, <u>The Political Quarterly</u>, Vol. 52, No.4, October-December 1981, p.468.

However, the British broadcasting system is well known as the most stable and dynamic in the Western world. (1) The characteristics of British broadcasting may be related to the British pattern of development. (2) Of course, in more politically structured and stable countries, broadcasting tends to be more dynamic than in other less stable In Iraq, for example, broadcasting suffered during the pre 1968 revolution from instability within its administration and in policy terms. Thus, stability in broadcasting, is one of the main differences between the British and Iraqi systems.

British broadcasting and government:

Historically, broadcasting in Britain had the name, wireless telephony, which was thought of as a new kind of telephone, sending messages, and it took time for the establishment of broadcasting services. (3) Apparently an Act of 1904 meant that the Post Office had to license all transmitters/receivers. However, in 1926, the British Broadcasting Service was created by Royal Charter, after two major public inquiries into the technical and social problems of broadcasting management. The Royal Charter,

^{1.} Anthony Smith, 1974, British Broadcasting, David and

Charles, Newton Abbot, p.14.
Williams, Raymond, 1974, Television-Technology and Cultural Form, Fontana/Collins, p.33. 2.

^{3.} Coase, R.H., 1950, British Broadcasting - A Study in Monopoly, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Longmans, Green and Co., London, p.3.

casting and post office authorities, came to provide the basis of broadcasting regulations in the United Kingdom. (1)
Therefore, in the United Kingdom, broadcasting had been regulated by the Post Office and the Home Office, with certain powers over commercial broadcasting. Broadcasting is a licenced state concession of the government and depends for its continued existence on periodic renewal. (2)

The powers of the British government over the broadcasting authorities may be divided up under the following headings: (3)

- Control over the use of frequencies and other technical matters.
- 2. The appointment and dismissal of member of the broadcasting authorities;
- 3. Programmes;
- 4. Financial matters;
- 5. Annual reports of the broadcasting authorities.

^{1.} Caroline Heller, 1978, <u>Broadcasting and Accountability</u>, Television Monograph No.7, British Film Institute, London, p.8.

^{2.} Anthony Smith, 1976, The Shadow in the Cave, Quartet Books, London, p.206.

^{3.} Home Office, <u>Broadcasting</u>, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by command of Her Majesty, July, 1978, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, p.33.

Although, there was nothing to stop any government from simply walking into the building and taking over control of programme-making. (1) Without licence from the Minister and the Post Office no programmes could be transmitted. This was justified on the grounds of frequency regulation. The limited number of frequencies available for broadcasting led government to control their use, because it was thought desirable that the available frequencies should be shared, internationally, between users, i.e. navigation, the armed forces, police, fire, broadcasting etc., and between nations. So, the British government has the job of deciding the order of priority of licensing for frequencies use. (2)

The British government has used the licence sanction to control broadcasting.

In Iraq, also, the government has the right to control frequencies, even among its departments and agencies. All broadcasting is directly supervised by government officials.

The second source of British government influence on broadcasting relates to the rights of appointment and dismissal of members of the broadcasting authorities. These absolute powers seem rather extreme, but, in reality, they are never exercised and successive governments have worked

^{1.} Anthony Smith, The Shadow in the Cave, op.cit., p.207.

Nicholas Graham, <u>Structures of Television</u>, 1978, Television Monograph No.1, British Film Institute, London, p.17.

hard to stress the independence of both the B.B.C. and the I.B.A. in matters of programme content and the day-to-day management of their affairs. Moreover, the Post Office is not responsible for broadcasting in the sense that other Ministers are responsible for their departments. (1) In Iraq, the director-general is appointed by the President of the Republic, as are the governers, who can be dismissed at any time. Politically, the job of director general in Iraq is a sensitive one. Each government that has come to power, by a coup or revolution, has consistently dismissed the director general immediately, or imprisoned him. However, by law, the Minister of Information is responsible for the Iraqi Broadcasting Establishment, although it has a formal independence.

The Programmes:

The power of government over broadcasting programmes can be viewed through government acceptance of the Annan Committee's recommendations, which are as follows; to prescribe broadcasting time; to require the broadcasting of announcements in association with the functions of a Minister of the Crown; to require the broadcasting of any other matter in an emergency; to veto any particular broadcast or class of broadcast; and to prevent the making of exclusive arrangements for the broadcasting of sporting or

^{1.} Ibid., p.18.

other events of National interest. (1) The government's power of veto implies a potential threat to the independence of the broadcasting authorities, though the power of veto is little used. (2)

In Iraq, the absolute power of the director general over programmes made, ensures that they adhere to government and party ideology and policies.

The British government's influence over broadcasting extends to financial matters, including the following: the power to prescribe the broadcaster receiving licence fees; to require the B.B.C. and I.B.A. to provide forecasts of their budgets, including expenditure and income and so on, which enables the government to exercise some general control in the national interest over budgeting in broadcasting, but not to intervene in the day-to-day management of broadcasting. As for the B.B.C. about 90 per cent of the corporation's revenue comes from the licence fee. The rest comes from grant aid for its external services and in the form of profits from the sale of B.B.C publications and programmes. (3) In fact, the B.B.C. has never been financed by a licence fee. The money raised from licence fees goes

^{1.} Home Office, Broadcasting, op.cit, p.35.

^{2.} Ibid., p.36.

^{3.} Ibid., p.47.

into the general pool, whilst the B.B.C. is financed by money voted by Parliament from the treasury out of general tax revenue. (1) Apart from licence fees, which are not charged in Iraq, the government is the sole finance of broadcasting.

Finally, the broadcasting authorities prepare annual reports for presentation to parliament. The Home Secretary has the power to require the B.B.C. and I.B.A. to provide certain information in their reports. The main areas covered in the report are; the quantity and nature of complaints received during the year about programmes from the public and any action subsequently taken; the conduct of public surveys during the year and the number and nature of the occasions on which broadcasting material was prepared by the broadcasting authorities as staff, broadcast by their respective services. (2) In Iraq, there has been no such practice except during 1976.

Independent Television:

The Independent Broadcasting Authority (I.B.A.) is appointed by the Home Secretary to provide independent television and independent local radio (I.L.R.) services in the United Kingdom. The I.B.A. has four functions:

^{1.} Nicholas Graham, Structure of Television, op.cit, p.18.

^{2.} Home Secretary, Broadcasting, op.cit, p.37.

to select and appoint the broadcasting companies; to supervise programme planning; to control advertising and transmission of services.

The I.B.A. selects and appoints the programme I.T.V. and I.L.R. programmes are provided by separate companies. These companies gain their revenue from the sale of advertising time in their own transmission area and pay the I.B.A. a rental to cover its costs in administering the system and operating its national network of transmission. In addition, the I.T.V. companies pay a levy to the exchequer. These companies are not benefited by license fees, which are B.B.C. only. The I.B.A. aims to ensure that the output of I.T.V. is of high quality and provides a proper balance, but the creative content of the programmes is the business of the individual programme companies. Each company consults the I.B.A. about their plans and before deciding on programme content. The I.B.A. may require them to make alterations before these are approved for transmission. These conditions help to safeguard high standards; accuracy in news reportage, impartiality in matters of controversy, and the maintenance of these.

Advertisements are also governed by the I.B.A.Act, so, advertisers are not allowed to sponsor programmes. An absolute distinction must be made between programmes and advertisements. Advertisement time is limited to six minutes per hour, averaged across the day's programming, usually

with a maximum of seven minutes in any "clock-hour" (e.g. 6-7p.m, 7-8p.m). Finally, the I.B.A. transmits the programmes. The I.B.A. plans, builds, owns and operates all the transmitters, allocating them to various programme companies, to carry their programmes. In sum, the I.B.A. carrys out all technical operations. (1)

The great income of I.T.V. companies enables them to produce and provide better programmes for their audiences. The big companies (such as those based in London, Midland, Lancashire and Yorkshire) sell programmes to smaller companies, who cannot produce expensive programmes. The small regional I.T.V. companies mainly produce programmes of local interest, which are shown during off-peak viewing hours. (2)

In Iraq, there is no independent broadcasting system. So, related matters, such as cost of production, regional interests for advertisers and commercial relations between companies, do not enter the question.

Programme obligations:

The main obligations of broadcasting in Britain, so far as the B.B.C and the I.B.A. are concerned are almost the same. (3) According to the B.B.C. and I.B.A. laws,

^{1.} IBA, <u>Television and Radio</u>, 1981, London, For more details see pp.5-8.

Winston Fletcher, Britain's National Media Pattern, in, "Media Sociology", (ed.) by Jeremy Tunstall, 1970, Constable, London, p.88.

^{3.} For more details, see, Home Office, <u>Broadcasting</u>, op.cit, especially Chapter 10.

each authority has to broadcast information, education and entertainment of a high general standard. particular, their quality must be high and their content must preserve a proper balance covering a wide range of subject matter. Programmes should not include anything which offends against public decency or is likely to encourage or provoke to crime, or lead to disorder or be offensive to public feeling. The broadcasting authority must ensure that impartiality is preserved in news programmes and programmes dealing with matters of public policy, and in the treatment of controversial subjects generally. B.B.C. and the I.B.A. must not include any expression of the corporation's opinions on current affairs or on matters of public policy. Each Authority must ensure that proper proportion of programmes are of British origin and British performance and each Authority should exclude programmes which might be unsuitable for children and young persons from the earlier part of the evening. In practice, these sort of programmes are shown after 8p.m. Each authority has editorial responsibility for the content of its programmes. In Iraq, these obligations are more strictly fulfilled, and the broadcasting authority usually exercises censorship on programmes and intervenes in the matter of programme content, especially news concerning the party, matters of state and government opinion.

Chapter Seven

The Development and Structure of Iraqi Television

The aim of this chapter is to discuss and reveal the development of Iraqi television; its administrative system and budget.

The development of Iraqi broadcasting shows the importance of this instrument as a medium of communication and as a technological tool used by the government to influence the population.

Certain technical improvements have been made in Iraq during recent years: new television stations have been built and transmission now covers most of the population. Centralization is the main characteristic of Iraq's broadcasting administration. The reason behind this is the need for organization and control of programmes to avoid any contradiction of government and Ba'th policies, and to serve government, party political, social and economic goals.

Section One

The development of Iraqi television:

The Iraqi government has paid great attention to the mass media as a means of reaching the population, and has paid particular attention to broadcasting. reasons behind this are several. Firstly, the number of radio and television owners greatly increased during the years following the revolution of 1968, especially after the oil crises of 1973 and the increasing of revenues. Secondly, more people listened to the radio, and watched television than read newspapers or visited the cinema and theatres. It was reported that there were 2.3 newspapers per 100 persons in Iraq and there is one cinema seat per 194 persons approximately. (1) Furthermore, there are no statistics available about theatre audiences. Thirdly, from the point of view of the government, the relative isolation of remote villages and cities, increases the importance of broadcasting. Finally, there are a large number of illiterates in Iraq. Such people cannot, of course, read newspapers, so they make use of broadcasting as their source of information. Although it is possible that some of

^{1.} Ministry of Information, Information series No.68.
Annual book, Cultural survey for the year 1975,
Baghdad (in Arabic), 1976, p.19 and pp.157-161.

those who can read talk to those who cannot about the content of papers, for the most part, the large number of illiterates who have relations with the Ba'th Party get information through Party channels.

Nevertheless, television in Iraq is controlled by government, through laws and administration. The private sector has no role in television: it does not own any part of television or television programmes. Iraqi television was tightly controlled by the political leadership, during the period of the monarchy and the republican regime. It is no coincidence that Iraqi television was officially inaugurated by the King, and the first programme or feature on television was a speech by the King himself on his birthday. (1) Since that time Iraqi television has been under the supervision of the political leadership. It is of some interest to trace the development of Iraqi television, and to reveal the importance of this instrument in the social, economic and political life of Iraq.

^{1.} The Iraqi leadership had been interested in broad-casting, for a long time, see, for example, Gerald De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad 1921-1958, 1961, Hutchinson of London, London, P.104, in which the author pointed out to King Ghazi, in 1936, that "The King's interest in Radio took an extravagant turn. He acquired a private radio broadcasting station on which he spoke himself and put out programmes ..."

Television in Baghdad:

The first opportunity for the population of Baghdad to watch television occurred on 13.10.1954, when a British fair introduced a small television station to Iraq and transmitted programmes inside the fair. (1) The company which introduced television to Iraq was Pye. They did so in order to promote the sales of receivers. (2) In 1955, Iraqi television equipment was removed to the Iraqi broadcasting building in which it was allocated a small studio, of about 150 metres square. The experiment, began at that time, lasted until the popular inauguration of television on 2.5.1956, when Baghdad television went on the air regularly for the first time.

In fact, the number of 500 to 600 television sets was given as being in use in 1956. (3) Most of the television receivers were owned by families, and there were some sets on view in public places. Television programmes, at that time, included children's features, songs and music, drama, and newscasts. (4)

F.J. Maaroof, Baghdad the Prime City of Iraq, 1976, Unpublished M.A. thesis (in Arabic), University of Baghdad, p.337.

^{2.} Elihu Katz and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World, Promise and Performance, 1977, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, p.97.

^{3.} Sam Pope Brewer, T.V. magic carpet reaches Baghdad,

The New York Times, September 2. 1956, p.7. George L. Harris, 1958, Iraq its People, its Society, 4. its Culture, HARF Press, New Haven, p.140.

In the inauguration ceremony, the former general director of Iraqi broadcasting pointed out that the social and cultural infrastructure of Iraq was poor and that the aims of broadcasting should be to help educational, cultural and social institutions. The general director added that: "We shall present, to all of the population sectors the cultural and entertainment programmes that they wish to watch." (1)

This speech might be considered the first example of an explicit television policy in Iraq, as well as the first indication of planning and development of the same.

The political opposition pointed out that the creation of television in Iraq was to direct people's attention away from the economic, social and political problems. From the evidence of personal discussion with several politicians and broadcasters about the role of Iraqi broadcasting in the monarchist regime before 1958 and the minutes of post-revolutionary people's court, support the view that the monarchist regime used television for entertainment purposes. The people's court stated that some development programmes were produced in the U.S.A. cultural centre, but their aims were to deceive people by giving them false impressions about development.

^{1.} Al-hurya, (Newspaper), Baghdad, No. 576, 4.5.1956. p.3.

So, it would seem that during the monarchy, the regime used television to divert popular attention from its own failings.

It was reported that Iraqis were largely unaware of the progress being made in development projects, or of their importance for the country as a whole. 1956-57 the Development Board increased its information activities about development schemes. (1) As a matter of fact, Iraqi television was dependent on the imported programmes of all kinds except for a few documentaries, televized meetings, speeches, news presentation and live school activities and plays. Thus, television was used for entertainment purposes partly because of the problems of production (including shortage of skilled people and finance). In fact, most films, plays, variety shows and most entertainment programmes were of foreign or Arab It is worth noting here, that an American reporter described the appearance of television in Baghdad as follows:

"The city of the caliphs has jumped with enthusiasm onto the magic carpet of television". (2)

George L. Harris, <u>Iraq</u>, <u>Its People</u>, <u>Its Society</u>, <u>Its Culture</u>, op.cit. pp.135-136.

^{2.} Sam Pope Brewer, T.V. Magic Carpet Reaching Baghdad, op.cit. p.7.

Although he remarked that many other basic improvements were more necessary than television.

However, broadcasting had a transmission range of only 25 kilometers; the height of the transmitting mast being 50 feet. In 1970 it was replaced by a 500 foot mast, while the new one, which became operational on 17 July 1976 is 1,000 feet high. (1) This means that the range of transmission and the size of population covered by transmission became wider.

The total sales of the British company's television sets was only 120 sets until Iragi television went on the air officially. (2) In 1956, the government imported 1,048 television sets. In 1957 the number of receivers increased to 3,305. In 1958 this figure increased to 5,480, finally reaching 13,862 in 1959. (3) Figure 7.1 shows the increase in numbers of television receivers between 1960 and 1970.

Television in Iraq:


Baghdad television was the first television station in the Middle East, its transmission confined to Baghdad

^{1.} Radio and television Magazine, 20 Years of Iraqi Television, (a supplement) May 2.1976, Baghdad,

^{2.}

No. 187, pp. 22-25.
Al-hurya (Newspaper), No.567, Baghdad, 4.5.1956.p.3.
Zaki Al-Jaber, A Study of Iraqi Family Response to 3. Baghdad Television Programmes, 1969, Arts College Magazine, University of Baghdad, Vol. 12, p. 286.

Figure 7.1.



Sources: Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization,
Transport and Communications Statistics between 1960-1969
Mimeographed (in Arapic), 1970, Table No.168.p.198
and Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical
Organization. Transport and Communications Statistics
of 1971, Mimmegraphed (in Arabic) Table No.92. p.94.

city and its suburbs. This was so until November 1967 when Kirkuk television station began transmitting to the North East of the country. On 26.2.1968, Mousl television station was established; its area of transmission was the North and North West of Iraq. On 2.1.1969, Basrah television station began transmitting over an area covering the South and the nearby border areas of Iran and Kuwait. On 17.10.1974, Missan television station was established to cover the South East, and finally, Muthana television station opened on 7.4.1975, to cover the South West of Irag. During the 1970's there were marked improvements made at provincial television stations. These provincial television stations played an important role in the provinces. It is interesting to note the following description of an Iraqi underdeveloped province. It clearly shows the importance of television in the life of the population: The Al-muthana population is early awaiting television transmission. AlMuthana city is without a park or public garden. (This is of some importance in Iraq owing to the hot weather). is no central library. There is one old cinema which There are no suitable coffeehouses shows poor films. (often existing coffeehouses would be seedy, run-down places, in a poor state of repair). No swimming pools and no theatres. (1) The situation is much the same in

^{1.} Al-Shaher, S.A., What About Al-Muthana Television?, TAREEQ Al-SHA'B, (Newspaper), No.252. 19.7.1974, Baghdad, p.8.

the majority of Iraqi cities. Thus, television transmission exploited a potential gap in Iraqi daily social life, especially in rural areas. So, the constitution of the Iraqi television audience may be expressed in the following categories: age group, occupational group, male/female, position in the labour force, (including students), and so on.

It is largely males who go home in the afternoons, because of the climate, and spend the evenings in coffeehouses or clubs. Both coffeehouses and clubs are provided with television sets, so viewing is public. Women and children tend to stay at home and watch television. Unlike English women, Iraqi women tend to stay at home, especially in the evenings and do not go to pubs or to other places of entertainment. So, television may become the only channel of entertainment for women inside the house.

It is generally agreed that television is a major social resource for most Iraqis. Table 7.1 shows an estimation of the total area and population covered by television transmission. Theoretically, the following figure shows that before 1974, Iraqi television depended on the following sources to build its schedules and ascertain audience preferences: (1)

^{1.} Personal interview with the Planning Director in Iraqi broadcasting establishment, December 1980.

TABLE 7.1

The percentage estimation of areas and population covered by television transmission

Television station	Total Areas (in Km2)	Population
Baghdad	42.80	48.75
Kirkuk	10.69	12.85
Mousl	11.60	11.10
Basrah	4.11	7.10
Missan	7.39	8.91
Muthana	19.01	5.78

Source: Ibrahim Al-Daquqi, The Scopes of Influence of Television Programmes in Rural Development, Afaq Arabiya, Baghdad, Vol,11, July 1976.

- 1. Letters,
- 2. Phone calls,
- 3. Viewers' requests.
- 4. Direct contact with people.


Obviously, the above methods may be considered unscientific, whilst surveys and interviews give the planner a more accurate picture. The following two figures, 7.2 and 7.3 show the programme schedule for channel one, 1976 and the programme schedule for channel two, 1978.

The total area covered by television transmission is about 95 per cent of Iraq and about 96 per cent of the Iraqi population, but in practical terms, these figures considered by the range of television owners and the existence of electricity. Recently, the entire country has been covered by a microwave network. The following map, shows the areas covered by transmission.

However, Iraq television includes two central channels, firstly, Channel 9, which transmits daily from 6.p.m. until midnight, except on Mondays and Fridays, when it transmits from 4.p.m. on Monday until midnight; and from 9.a.m. to 2.p.m., then from 4.p.m. until midnight on Friday. Channel 7 transmits from 6.15p.m. until 10.p.m.

Map 7.1

Areas in Iraq covered by Television Transmission



Programme Schedule for Channel One From 1-7-1976 (For three months)

	4p.m.	, 6	- '	5-15	6-5	5 7-15	т	8-	8-30	9-		1	<u> 0</u>		
SAT.			cartoon	Sciences Magazine		Women's Magazine	Variety - Health films		Behind the a	Your Homela Someth	and		variety		
SUN			cartoon	Children's Magazine		Meeting Variety	Foreign series		Our oil	With viewer	rs		Arabic Play		
MON.,	Football Match	Quran	Sinbad (series)	Hobbies		Student - Youth	Variety	-	Arab series	variety cultural programme	varieties		Arabic series		Sign Off
TUES.			cartoon	Children's programme	sion Diary	Agricultura Revolution Industrial Revolution	Variety	(Both Channels)		Week	varieties	(Both Channels	Iraqi local play		News -
WED.		Sign On	cartoon	Our beautiful words	Televisi	Health Education	Variety - Sport films	News (Bo	Variety	Scienc for al	1	News (Bo	Ara o and		Brief
THURS			cartoon	Numbers		Interior Magazine - Traffic Prog.	Variety		From our national heritage Arab folklore	Arabic series			Foreign film		
FRI.	Arabic film		silent	Watch together		Workers	Variety		Camera was there Variety	Quizze	≥s		Iraqi/ Arabic play		
Frida	y 9.15a.			9.50		0~30 11-	11-10			12-			=	1-30	
Morni	Ouran readin	i	cartoc	n children prog.	's va	ariety Ten minut (news	songs	Fore; serie		gs Sport films	Two songs	m	ews and ain week ews	religious period	ign off

Programme Schedule for Baghdad Television Channel Two - 1-1-78 (For three months)

	6p.m.	6-15	6 - 30	7-30	8-30	8.30		<u> </u>	10	
SAT.				.fic		Songs (Poems)	Scientific hobbies	With International music		
SUN.	channels)			scientific films		Eastern music	The World in a week (in English)	Ballet		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
MON	(Both ch			Arabic grammar series)		Development and future	Foreign songs	Foreign series		al graph graph traditions are strain a value of the strain and strain a value of the str
TUES.	us period	ស	lessons	scientific films	channe 1s)	1. Civiliza 2. Meeting cultural personal 3. Book of	with a .ity	Foreign variety	, h	0
WED.	Religious	Activities		sci. fil	(Both cha	Iraqi local series	Poem and poet	Foreign variety	in English	off.
THURS.	Quran =	School A	Educational	from history	News (I	Music (films)	International folklore	Foreign series	News i	Sign o
FRI.	Football Ma	 atch: Iraq:	i/Arab	4 4		English lessons	Foreign serie	es		

when it completes its programmes with the English news broadcast.

Table 7.2 shows the Iraqi television channels within its

transmission range.

On the eighth anniversaryof the revolution in 17.7.1976, another development occurred in Iraqi television. The first colour programmes went on the air with a speech by the president. Iraqi television used the French system SECAM. Iraqi television was also connected with Atlantic and Indian satellite via the reception station in Dujail. It also joined up with Kuwait and Syria by a Microwave network. These connections have given Iraq, a means of receiving and transmitting television news daily from and to the world.

Iraqi television suffered for a long time from foreign ready—
made programmes, and within the first month of operating, the
editor—in—chief of the now defunct "The Cinema" magazine wrote

"It would be better to call the new television — Baghdad television
machine — not — Baghdad television station", (1) because most of
the new television performances were to show foreign ready—made
programmes. The demand for new domestic programmes led the Iraqi
Television authority to produce more local programmes such as local
plays, documentaries and entertainment. It can be said that during
the years following the revolution of 1968, there were a large
number of changes in Iraqi television. However, there is no definite

^{1.} The Cinema, May 1956, No.36, Baghdad, (in Arabic) p.3.

TABLE 7.2

IraqiTelevision Channels by Kilowatt transmission range

Province	C	hannel	K.W.	Radius total covered areas (in Kilometeres)
Baghdad	9	(The first central channel)	12.5	100-120
	7	(the second central channel)	10	100
Basrah	9	the first	12.5	100-120
	12	the second	10	100
Mosul	9	the first	12.5	100-120
	7	the second	10	100
Kirkuk	6	the Kurdish channel	12.5	100-120
	8	the first	10	100
	10	the second	10	100
Missan	5	the first	12.5	100-120
	11	the second	10	100
Al-muthana	6	the first	12.5	100-120
	8	the second	10	100

evidence to indicate that these changes were a result of a deliberate act of government policy although a government announcement encouraging broadcasting on development, stressed the role of broadcasting as an important means of reaching the people. The number of television stations was increased from three stations to six.

Possession of radio and television sets:

The number of receivers was increased sharply. main reason for these changes was the role of the government in popularizing television sets, but I shall come back to this in the next chapter. As for radios, it was reported (1) that the number possessed by families in Iraq in 1977 was 1,050,245. 755,356 out of the total number were in urban areas, which amounted to 71,9 per cent, whilst in rural areas there were 294,889 radios (28.1 per cent). The number of families who possessed radios was 55.94 per cent of all families in Iraq. In other words, 62.56 per cent of the total families in urban areas and 44.86 per cent of the total families in rural areas owned radios. The number of family members who possessed radios was 61.23 per cent of all family members in the country. The percentage of family members in urban areas was 67.04 of those in rural areas. The number of radios possessed

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Planning, The Central Organization of Statistics, 1978, The Number of Radios and Television Sets Possessed by Families, for the year 1977, (classified report in Arabic) Baghdad.

by families in Baghdad was 339,227. This figure was 94,411 in Basrah, 89,933 in Nineveh and 44,713 in Thi-Qar, which is 32.30, 8.99, 8.56, and 4.26 per cent respectively. In sum, the number of families who possessed radios was 956,385. 93 per cent of these families possessed one radio. 5.2 per cent possessed two radios, whilst 1.8 per cent possessed three radios or more.

The number of television sets possessed by families in Iraq for the year 1977 was 622,715. 594,245 were in urban areas, which represented 95.43 per cent of total television sets. 28,470 television sets were in rural areas. This percentage was 4.57 of all television sets in Iraq.

The number of families who possessed one television set or more was 34.96 per cent of all Iraqi families: 53.23 per cent of all urban families and 4.42 per cent of all rural families. The percentage of families/population who possessed one television set or more was 39.67 per cent of families/population in Iraq. 59.51 per cent of families/population lived in urban areas and 5.95 per cent of families/population lived in rural areas.

The number of television sets possessed by families was divided up as follows: 287,948 in Baghdad, 61,448 in Basrah; 52,262 in Nineveh. The percentages were 46.24, 9.87, and 8.44 respectively. Table 7.3 shows the number

TABLE 7.3

Number of families possessing television sets according to Provinces, 1977

Province	No.of families possessing one T.V. set	No.of families possessing two T.V. sets	No.of families possessing three T.V. sets or more	Urban	Rural	Total
Nineveh	49,697	1,210	142	48,035	3,014	51,049
Salah Al-Deen	9,242	88	5	8,521		9,335
Al-Tameem	28,122	444	39	27,239		28,605
Diala	24,239	254	13	18,471		24,506
Baghdad	252,432	15,097	1,686	265,817		269,215
Al-Anbar	11,495	118	. 8	10,644	•	11,621
Babylon	25 , 861	245	13	22,714		26,119
Kerbela	13,222	152	6	12,119	•	13,380
Najaf	16,813	125	8	15,769		16,946
Al-Qadisiya	13,189	113	13	12,336	•	13,315
Al-Muthanna	6,440	83	8	6,096		6,531
Thi-Qar	12,126	60	5	11,532		12,191
Wasit	12,021	91	4	11,277	839	12,116
Maysan	10,189	153	4	10,136	210	10,346
Basrah	57 , 047	1,932	170	56,090	3,059	59,149
D'hok	3,266	23	1	3,154	136	3,290
Arbil	14,890	127	11	14,641	387	15,028
Al-Sulaimaniya	14,915	61	5	14,866	115	14,981
Total	575,206	20,376	2,141	569,457	28,266	597,723

of families who possessed television sets was 597,723.

96.2 per cent of families owned one television set; 3.4

per cent owned two television sets, and 0.4 per cent

possessed three television sets, or more.

The above figures show that in 1977, the number of families who possessed radios was more than the number of families who possessed television sets. It should be borne in mind, that from 1976 television transmission spread all over the country and electricity was supplied to several areas in rural Iraq, which increased the number of television sets there.

A large number of programmes were produced locally; the number of imported programmes decreased and, finally, the most important development occurred - full government control of programme content was achieved.

The new programmes followed the principles of the Ba'th Party ideology, thus giving full expression to their social and economic policy. In other words, television programmes were used as instruments for social and economic development in Iraq.

Non-Iraqi television stations:

Some television stations still transmit programmes to Iraq from abroad. So, one may say that the conditions of television production is this vulnerability to foreign transmission. Iran, for instance, has ten television

stations and television transposers reaching areas in Middle and Southern Iraq. Iraqi officials classified these station's programmes as anti-Iraqi. Some Arab television stations transmit to Southern Iraq: Qatar, for example, started transmitting on channel 9, which is the same as Basrah's television channel. The voices and pictures of the two stations interfered with each other. (2)

In fact, most of these station's programmes created obvious ideological contradictions with Iraqi television programmes which were constructed to serve the socioeconomic and political aims of the Iraqi government and Ba'th Party. For examples, before the Iran revolution in 1979, items from Iranian television stations were:

Cartoons: these films are biased towards Arab children, showing that the Arab character is murderous, destructive and barbaric.

Films: Iran's television stations show films banned in Iraq, such as Karate, sex films and racist items (i.e. cowboy films which discriminate against Red Indians), pictures including the star of David, which is a Zionist

Ihsan W. Al-Sammari, The Reactionary Media's Indicators in the Arab Gulf, <u>The Arab Gulf Magazine</u>, No.2, 1975, (Arabic) p.47.

^{2.} Ibid., pp.48-49.

symbol.

Striptease: is nearly a daily feature. Iranian television shows striptease scenes from night clubs. These sorts of scenes are unusual in Iraqi life. It would seem that these programmes are aimed at Iraqi youth. Political Correspondent: the Iranian correspondents insult Iraqi leadership.

Racist war: Iranian propaganda focuses on the Persian race as the best and strongest.

Furthermore, Iran practically occupied the oddnumber channels of Iraqi television (7-11), it succeeded
in using channel 7, which is inbetween channel 8 from
Kuwait and channel 9 from Iraq. So, any one wanting to
choose a channel, had to watch an Iranian television
station.

The revolutionary face of Iraq is the main reason for Iranian broadcasting in the area.

People usually watch non-Iraqi television programmes in private. It is understood that Iranian programmes, especially, are prohibited in public places (i.e.coffee-houses and clubs) although no proclamation has been made about it.

The similarity of dialect and life styles between the population of Basrah and that of Kuwait result in Basrah viewers watching Kuwaiti or another Arab station's

programmes. Basrah province has an important strategic location. Transmissions from a number of countries can reach Basrah (i.e. Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia).

A survey done by the Iraqi broadcasting establishment on the viewing of non-Iraqi television stations in Basrah province, (1) showed that 88.4 per cent of interviewees watched non-Iraqi television stations. (The number of interviewees was 619 from a variety of different categories). The interviewees stated that they watched Basrah television as well as non-Iraqi channels. 3.7 per cent stated that they just watched non-Iraqi stations.

The preference for viewing programmes from Kuwaiti television in Basrah was as follows:

The programme	Viewing	percentage
Science and life Animal World Kuwaiti songs People's life Round table With the family Local plays		20.6 18.5 10.5 7.7 6.3 6.3

The peasants preferred Kuwaiti songs. They tended to ignore the "Science and life" programme, preferring "Animal World". Kuwaiti stations usually transmit new Arab series and new films, while Basrah station usually

^{1.} Mimeographed, Undated, (in Arabic).

repeats old Arab series and films. So, some people prefer Kuwaiti television.

Table 7.4 shows television stations in the Arab Gulf near Southern Iraq.

TABLE 7.4
Television stations in the Arab Gulf

Station	Channel	Transmission (in Kilowatt)
Abu Dubi	5	5
Kuwait	6	5
Saudi Arabia	6	10
Abadan (Iran)	7	20
Kuwait	8	20
Iran	9	10
Qatar	9	10
Basrah	9	10
Kuwait	10	10
Iran	11	20

Source: Ihsan W. Al-Sammari, Ibid., p.48.

Section Two

Iraqi Broadcasting Administration Structure

The Iraqi broadcasting reflects the existing ideologies and policies of government and the Ba'th party, which previously had been accused of lacking coherent objectives and goals. A major characteristic of the broadcasting establishment is its very high degree of Centralization, with a director general of broadcasting controlling and supervising the most minute details both of programmes and expenditure. All programmes, their administration and budgets have to be approved by the director general.

In formal terms, Iraqi television and the Iraqi broadcasting establishment are independent of government. In practice, the government exercises a great deal of control.

Administration before 1968:

It is useful to trace the administration system of Iraqi broadcasting to show how much attention the Iraqi government pays to administration, and how this is used to build up programmes to serve socio-economic goals. In 1959, the law of the "Ministry of Guidance" promulgated, two articles (3 and 7) which laid down that radio and television are a general directorate, under the control of the guidance ministry. The director general is responsible for managing radio and television, and is

himself subject to the minister's supervision. director general controls three departments, radio, television and engineering and technical. In 1964, a new culture and guidance ministry system replaced the previous one, but did not affect the general directorate of radio and television, which was still subordinate to the new ministry. The reasons for ineffective broadcasting administration before 1968 can be summarized as follows: shortage of money to create and import good programmes, government emphasis on broadcasting as a propaganda instrument, which the people disliked and distrusted. Before 1968, television departments were divided up as follows: films, decor and props, producing, announcers, cinema photography, and commercial advertizing. (1)

Administration after 1968:

After the revolution of 1968, the new government paid more attention to Iraqi broadcasting. In 1970, Iraqi broadcasting and television establishment was founded by statute No.42. (2) The brief for the new establishment was to reorganize radio and television to conform to the

^{1.} Al-Kin'ni, N.M., <u>Introduction to Communication</u>, 1968, Ministry of Culture and Information, series No.1. Baghdad, (Arabic), p.46.

Iraq, Official Gazette, No.1849, 8.3.1970.

party principle of scientific method, to spread the Iraqi revolution's voice over the world. (1) The new system of administration is defined as a "public interest" (2) organization subject to the Ministry of Culture and Information.

An administrative board, is at the head of the broadcasting administration. It includes the minister of culture and information as president, and the director general of broadcasting as the vice-president. members were: the directors of the television, radio, engineering and technical, administration and personal records, accounting and legal departments. The administration board also included representatives from the following ministries; culture and information, the director general of the Iraqi news agency and the public relations representative of the revolutionary command council. Later in 1972, the administrative board was altered as follows: the president is the minister of information or his representative, the director general is the vice-president, representatives from, the ministry

^{1.} For more details, see the following issues of Official Gazette, Law No.127 for the year 1970, No.1891 on 22.6.1970, Law No.117 for the year 1971, No.2029 on 9.8.1971, Law No.72 for the year 1972, No.2152 on 14.6.1972 and system No.5. for the year 1972, No.2089 on 24.1.1972 (in Arabic)

^{2.} A "public interest" organization is one which operates for the benefit of the public, rather than, serving the private sector or individual interests.

of defence, ministry of foreign affairs, Revolutionary command council, director general of the Iraqi news agency, the artists union, the planning director for Iraqi broadcasting and the general federation of workers unions. The reorganization of the administrative board personnel shows that most of the broadcasting directors were dismissed from the board without any given justification. However, looking at the titles of those officials dismissed, one may deduce that the board retained top officials and dismissed more junior ones.

In practice, the new president was the director general himself. This reflects the centralization of broadcasting administrative bodies, the director general can apply government policy. The task of the administrative board (see mass communications policy chapter) is one of internal administrative decision-making and does not contribute to media decision-making, which is a matter of national policy. In this way, the director general, became responsible for applied media and broadcasting policy in his establishment. However, I do not wish to discuss the whole of the broadcasting administration's functions. I am concerned, rather, with the structure of television administration, and its interaction with media policy. The director general directly supervises the Baghdad television department, which includes eleven sections:

- 1. The administration section, which is concerned with matters of television administration.
- 2. The coordinating section, whose functions are to prepare programme schedules and supervise provincial television stations and programme supply.
- 3. The executive and follow-up section, which supervises Baghdad television's programmes.
- 4. The children's programmes section, which prepares and presents all children's programmes.
- 5. The development programmes section, which supervises and produces programmes on social and economic development, and aids government and organization developmental programmes.
- 6. The decor and props section, which constructs sets, provides props and organizes studio timetables.
- 7. The films and serials section, which takes care of films and serials which belong to the broadcasting establishment, or which are on hire.
- 8. The drama section, which produces and directs plays, serials and series, except singing and musical ones, and deals with dramatists.
- 9. The cultural programmes section, which prepares all cultural programmes (literature and arts).
- 10. The entertainments section, which produces series, operas and musical programmes. It also supervises the celebrations on feast days and national days.

- 11. The youth and sport sections, which prepares and presents sports programmes.
- Figure 7.4 shows the Iraqi broadcasting administration structure.

It might be said that the relations between the director general and television departments are the closest relations inside the establishment, in terms of supervision.

All those people I have been able to interview described television as a "sensitive instrument". The government pays a great deal of attention to television.

Most people watch television every day. All major government decisions are first announced on television (i.e. government depends on television to reach the population.)

It is common knowledge in Iraq, that if anything is wrong or the political situation is uneasy, one can guess as much from the programme schedule (i.e. if television shows patriotic songs, that usually means that something is to be announced later).

The director general himself censors most programmes such as drama, and even the news. Programmes have to be accepted by the director general before they can be shown on television. The director general used an internal transmission in his office to approve programme items.

In practice, the director general is the director of Iraqi

Figure 7.4

Iraqi broadcasting structure

	Director General				
Administration and methods Dept.,					
		Director general's secretary			
Engineering and Technical affairs Dept	- •				
		Administration and personal records dept.			
Security dept.					
		Baghdad radio			
Voice of people's radio		News dept.			
Overseas and domestic dept.					
domestro dept.		Broadcasting training dept.			
Baghdad television	<u> </u>				
Dublic moleticus dest		Planning dept.			
Public relations dept.		Accounting dept.			
Kurdish radio					
		Legal dept.			
Linguistics dept.					
		Equipment and stores dept.			
Services Unit	-				
Musical and singing		Cinema production			
Musical and singing production unit		Basrah television			
Al Ta'meem television		Nineveh television			
Misan television		Al-Muthana television			
		1			

television despite the fact that there is a television director. The director general regularly receives guidance from the president and leadership about television programmes. (i.e. observations and comments on programmes. Occasionally they have ordered a programme off the air and the showing of another programme). In most cases (researcher was told by officials in the Iraqi broadcasting establishment), officials obey the leadership and only in very few cases do they ignore their comments and orders for replacing certain programmes. Significantly, the president of the communication bureau is himself the president of the country. So, broadcasting officials feel secure, despite this sort of intervention. This reveals the reasons for the director general's supervision of television programmes. Nevertheless, the television director supervises television sections and coordinates them. The section director's function is to supervise his section's work, in detail. In most cases, he needs approval of his decisions about programmes content and accounting matters, from the television director or the director general. This form of centralization is looked on as a built-in safequard against inaccuracy in television programmes, as well as encouraging adherence to government policy amongst television personnel. supervision of programmes, the director general is not a kind of dictator. (He does not have absolute decision-making power). His and his staff's contribution to the Ba'th party

are an aid to, cooperation and coordination between broadcasting bodies. Centralization might be seen as an
excellent way of reorganizing broadcasting to serve government and party policy. The strength of the director
general's grip on the broadcasting administration is a
reflection of the strength of the government's and the
party's hold over all media institutions.

It is interesting to note that in each of the five provinces of Iraq there is a provincial director of the television station who is, in reality, the agent of the Iraqi broadcasting establishment subject to the director general in Baghdad. These stations show ready-made programmes from Baghdad, except a few local programmes and local news.

The broadcasting staff:

One of the main purposes of changing the old administrative structure of Iraqi broadcasting in the first years of the revolution was to reform the administration in accordance with party principles. These developments took place at the technical levels, such as increased numbers of studios and modernization of equipment, but until 1974 most information and cultural organizations (including broadcasting) still lacked Ba'th Party ideology and Bathist cadres. (1)

^{1.} The political report of the Eighth congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist party in Iraq, January 1974,
The 1968 revolution in Iraq, Experience and Prospects,
Ithaca Press, London, 1979, p.112

The political report stated for the following years (1975-1979) that

"... great attention must be paid to forming cadres on a sound basis and to promoting democratic practices and initiative in this domain. Those who work in it must be judged by objective criteria, and then given every latitude. Bureacratic customs and artificial expansion of the workforce must be rejected. As many artists, intellectuals, writers and journalists as possible must be recruited to the cause of the revolution so that they will play their full part in it. Finally, we must attract skills from other Arab countries into all branches of this sector". (1)

The statistics on broadcasting staff are shown in Table 7.5. The total number of broadcasting staff is 2754. The number of officials is 1594 and the number of workers is 1160. Table 7.6 shows the distribution of officials on the broadcasting departments.

TABLE 7.5

Distribution of broadcasting labour force according to sex, 1979

	Male	Female
Officials	1254	340
Workers	1056	104
Total	2310	444

The Political report ..., ibid. p.171.

TABLE 7.6

Distribution of broadcasting staff according to sex, 1979

Department	No.of Male	No.of Female	Total	Percentage to the total No.
Director				
General Secretary	11	6	17	1.07
Baghdad television	196	76	272	17.06
Administration and	_	_	•	2 7 2
Methods	1	1	2	0.13
Accounting	48	14	62	3.89
Broadcasting	-	•	0	0 56
Training	7	2	9	0.56
Planning	13	14	27	1.69
Services Unit	6	-	6	0.38
Administration and	26	4	30	1.88
Personal records	26 25	6	31	1.94
Kurdish radio	25 68	32	100	6.73
Baghdad radio Security	9	J 2 	9	0.75
Overseas and Domestic	38	17	55	3.45
Public relations	6	6	12	0.75
Musical and singing	U	O	12	0.75
Unit	25	-	25	1.75
Al-Muthana television		4	26	1.63
Missan television	11	2	13	0.82
Basrah television	77	19	96	6.02
Legal	8	_	8	0.50
Linguistics	7	_	7	0.44
News	72	20	92	5.77
Althawra transmission				
Station	47	_	47	2.95
Voice of the people's				
radio	51	31	82	5.14
Al-hurya transmission				
station	29	-	29	1.82
Cinema production uni-	t 53	17	70	4.39
Engineering and				
technical affairs	184	27	211	13.24
Al Ta'meem television	67	15	82	5.14
Nineveh television	49	14	63	3.95
Babel transmission				
station	23	_	23	1.44
Equipment and stores	75	13	88	5.52
Total	1254	340	1594	100.00

Source: Iraqi broadcasting establishment, Labour force guide, Mimeographed (in Arabic), 1979

Section Three:

Television Budget

Following the revolution of 1968, rapid progress has been made in several important directions. The sharp increase in oil revenue made it possible to spend resources on improving socio-economic conditions.

Broadcasting's share of the National budget increased sharply during 1968-1980 to improve standards of operation and production. The broadcasting system is a part of the system of government so most spending on broadcasting is met by government sources. The Iraqi broadcasting budget is drawn from the following sources: (1)

- 1. The annual governmental grant decided upon by the Minister of finance, provided that it is not less than two million Dinars per year.
- 2. The fees from services rendered by the organization, such as, commercials, programmes, parties, bulletins and publications.
- 3. Donations and contributions.

Government and television budget:

For the most part, the broadcasting budget is dependent on government support; most of its revenue comes from the Ministry of finance.

^{1. &}lt;u>Iraqi Gazette</u>, No.1849, 8.3.1970, op.cit. Article 4.

Commercial and services revenues for the Iraqi
broadcasting establishment is small, because the establishment does not consider the gathering of revenues to
be a prime aim. The main sources for these sorts of
revenues are television advertizing, hire of instant
oral translation equipment, in the meetings and
conferences of other government departments; the development and printing of films for other government departments.

(1)
Also, some programmes and drama are sold to other states
on the Arab Peninsula

Commercial advertising revenue comes from the public sector or mixed sector. The private sector is not allowed to transmit advertisments. Advertising accounted for just 0.74 per cent of the total income in 1975. Furthermore, advertisment prices in Iraq are very cheap, for instance, one second of television time costs the advertiser 500 Iraqi fils (about 65 pence) (2) However, since 1975, there has been no private sector advertising on Iraqi television. The accounting director explained, (3) that the director general's justification was that there was no further need for private revenue. In fact, the real reason for this is the announcement of the new broadcasting guidelines which

^{1.} Ahmed, K.A., The Unified Accounting System: Its Adaptation for Application to the Iraqi Broadcasting Establishment, 1979, M.A. thesis, (unpublished) Baghdad University (Arabic), pp.92-93.

^{2.} The National House for publication, distribution and advertisement, Prices Guide, Baghdad (in Arabic), N.D.

^{3.} Personal interview with accounting director of Iraqi Broadcasting establishment on January 15th.1981.

derived their principles from the Ba'th party political report.

It seems to me that the concept of the commercial in Iraqi broadcasting is not similar to the Western concept of it, in terms of profit. Iraqi broadcasting tends to promote public and mixed sector's goods and activities and discourages the private sector. Economically, it is important to let the public and mixed sectors dominate the market, if socialist transformation is to be accomplished, in accordance with the government's policies. The private sector tends to serve individual interests, and resist practical domination by the public and mixed sectors. Because of this, the television authorities prohibited private sector advertisement in order to avoid any contradiction with government policy. However, the banning of private sector advertisements was also, partially, a political event.

The broadcasting budget has been in deficit every year, because its expenditure exceeds its income. The Iraqi presidential and Ba'th Party/information bureau makes good the loss. The Iraqi broadcasting Account Director stated that presidential and party leadership made it possible to finance broadcasting when their account became overdrawn. However, Table 7.7 shows the growth of broadcasting budget

from 1972 until 1978 and the increase of approved budget and the revision of budget.

Table 7.7 shows the growth of the budget from 1972, the time of the separation of the broadcasting budget from that of the information ministry. The decline in the broadcasting budget in 1975 was due to integration and separation of the Iraqi cinema and theatre from the Iraqi broadcasting establishment. (The integration of Iraqi Cinema and Theatre with Iraqi broadcasting establishment was due to deliberate integration policy). (1)

However, it seems that the controlling of budget can give the government a possibility of exerting further control and interference in programmes content.

All broadcasting equipment imported from abroad is exempted from tax, but, unlike the British Broadcasting Corporation, Iraqi television receives no licence fees. (2) Viewers are not charged for broadcasting services. television reception has helped to popularize television sets.

^{1.}

Iraqi Gazette, Law No.72, 14.6.1972, No.2152.
There were radio licence fees following the establishment 2. of radio broadcasting in 1936, but because of licence evasion, the government abolished this tax in the late 1940's.

TABLE 7.7

The growth of the Iraqi broadcasting budget during the years 1972-1978

Year	approved budget	Modified budget	Percentage
1972 1973	2,475,000 3,830,000	2,486,200 4,310,000	73
1974	6,148,100	6,148,100	51
1975	4,611,070	5,226,120	- 15
1976	5,850,000	6,100,000	16
1977	6,600,000	6,500,000	6
1978	7,570,000	7,770,000	15

Source: The table supplied to the researcher by the accounting director at the broadcasting establishment.

The budget:

The fiscal year begins on the first of January and ends on 31 December. The administration Board presents a broadcasting budget proposal to the Minister of information for legislation, which is appended to the National budget. (1) The Finance Ministry appraises the broadcasting budget. Finance ministry officials scan the budget's items of operational and programming expenditure, frequently making cuts in the budget. Control of the broadcasting budget is a matter of contention between Iraqi broadcasting and the finance ministry. Whilst the budget is financed by the government, the conflict between broadcasting and the

^{1. &}lt;u>Iraqi Gazette</u>, No.1849, 8.3.1970, op.cit. Article 11.

finance ministry will continue. The contrast between the Iraqi broadcasting budgets for 1968 and 1979, shows a considerable increase in spending.

In practice, Iraqi broadcasting is able for the most part, to overcome the financial problems, because it deals with the leadership, which gives it considerable support. However, the support of the leadership does not alter the relationship between broadcasting and the Finance ministry.

Normally, with the expansion of broadcasting services and production, the broadcasting budget would run short of money before the end of the fiscal year. For example, in 1975, the fund for propgrammes staff wages was 548,750 I.D. In 1976, although, remarkable progress had been made in local programmes production and in importing foreign programmes, the budget for the fiscal year was 300,000 I.D. This amount was spent within the first five months. To alleviate such cash shortages the budgeting authorities transferred money between budget divisions, this transference affected other broadcasting divisions, and created problems in fulfilling the needs of other departments within broadcasting,

Fig. 7.5

The budget of Iraqi broadcasting for the fiscal year 1968

Figures	Approved budget	Real expen	diture
	I.D.	I.D.	Fils
Salaries, Allowances and wages 1. Civil servant's salaries 2. Employees' salaries 3. Temporary employees' salaries 4. Foreign employees' salaries 5. Civil servants' allowances 6. Employees' allowances 7. Inflation allowances for C. 8. Inflation allowances for employees 9. Inflation allowances for foreign employees	87,500 86,200 11,000 2,700 42,000 29,000	100,219 88,454 7,622 2,124 32,903 24,183 41,665 36,903 0,298	154 203 974 700 487 304 080 979
Tota	1 337,170	334,375	781
Travelling allowances Transport allowances Furniture Publishing Stationery Telephone, Telegram and postage Rents Clothes Light repairs Books Miscellaneous expenditure Legal expenditure Civil servants' insurance Water and electricity Vehicle repair	7,800 1,400 0,300 0,200 2,250 0,050 0,500 85,000 12,000	8,550 0,113 1,523 2,484 1,241 1,932 4,834 1,348 0,49 0,173 0,842 0,035 0,273 76,364 10,735	405 650 865 408 084 135 550 850 - 632 430 938 001 345 652
Tota	1 132,750	110,502	945

Other expenditure	I.D.	I.D.	Fils
Propaganda expenditure Freelance programming fees Equipment and materials Cinema films	3,000 140,000 100,000 65,000	0,791 156,923 28,893 25,492	160 190 855 469
Decoration and theatre materials Tapes for television	6,000 56,000	6,010 8,015	9 24 868
The cost of cultural agreement with the United Arab Republic Iraqi share in broadcasting	60,000	-	-
conference in Geneva Purchase of vehicles	0,300 10,000	0,203 7,184	722 -
Radio and television magazine expenditure	3,000	2,583	331
Total	443,800	236,098	519
Total expenditure	913,720	680,977	245

Source: Provided to the writer, by the Iraqi broadcasting accounts department.

Figure 7.6. Broadcasting Budget in 31.10.1979 for the fiscal year 1979

	101 0110	IIDOUI JOUR			
Administration expenditure	Approved	Modified	A	pproved	Modified
	budget	budget	b	udget	budget
	(1)				
	M Th. H	M Th. H	M		M Th. H
l.Civil servants' salaries	1 064	1 064	11. Public Relations expenditure	25 1	25 1
2.Labourers wages	700	750	12.Civil defence expenditure	18	18
3. Foreign employees			13. Miscellaneous expenditure		
salaries and wages	120	120	14. Subscription to training semina		3
4.Inflation allowances	650	650	15.Printing expenditure	18 750	18 750
5.Family allowances for			16.Stationery	40	40
labourers	124	124	17.Clothes	15	15
6.Contribution to state retir			18.Light repairs	10	10
ment fund	170	170	19.Petrol	30	30
7.Contribution to social secu	rity		20.Bank charges	1 500	1 500
and retirement of workers'			21.Storage and maintenance		
establishment .	90	140	expenditure	10	10
8.Allowances for civil servan	ts 575	5 7 5	22.Water and electricity	225	225
<pre>9.Allowances for labourers</pre>	300	300	23. Scholarships and grants for br		_
10.Rewards for encouraging			casting training institute	3	3
broadcasting employees	5	5	24.Taxation	40	40
Total	3 798	3 898	Total	610,500	610,500
Administrative expenditure:			Other expenditure:		
l.Travelling expenditure and			1.Propaganda expenditure	35	35
allowances	45	45	2.Freelance programming fees	768	1 018
2.Delegates expenditure and	45	43	3.Blank films	150	150
allowances	40	40	4.Materials for developing		
3.Exchange expenditure	1	1	and printing	13	13
4. Subscriptions to newspapers		7	5.Cinema films for television	200	200
and magazines	13	13	6.live transmission by satellite	179 050	254 050
5.Postage and Telex	5	5	7.Microwave nets expenditure	297 400	372 400
6.Telephone and Telegrams	15	15	8.Cinema production for television	n 50	50
7.Rents for buildings and	10	13	9.Decoration	90	90
premises	30	30	10. Tapes for television	100	100
8.Insurance for personnel	30	30	11.Records and radio tapes	20	20
responsibility	1	1	12.Cost of agreements with other		
9.Insurance	20	20	countries	30	30
10.Legal expenditure	250	250	13.Subscription to broadcasting	14	14
to redat exbenditure	250	250	14. Cultural agreement costs. unfor	1S 3	3
			14. Cultural agreement costs.	٠,	•

Figure 7.6 continued.

	3	M-2161-2
	Approved budget	Modified budget
	M Th. H	M Th. H
15. The Iraqi share in the		
broadcasting conference i		1
Geneva 16.The importation of	1	1
British encyclopaedias	50	50
Total	2,000,450	2,400,450
Maintenance:		
1.Repair and maintenance of		
vehicles	40	40
2, Repair of technical	00	0.0
equipment 3.Repair and maintenance of	80	80
furniture	7	7
Total	127	127
		
Capital expenditure:		
1.Building construction	15	15
2.Purchase of buildings and real estate	•	6
Total	6 21	21
Equipment:		
1. Purchase of equipment and spares.	550	650
2. Purchase of tools for broad		050
casting equipment	50	50
3. Purchase of air condition	ing 35	35
4.Purchase of air cooling	_	_
equipment Total	5 640	<u>5</u> 740
	640	740
<u>Vehicles</u> :		
1. Purchase of buses, pick-u		
and estate cars	50	50
2.Purchase of motor cycles	,450	,450
Total	50,450	50,450

	Approved budget	Modified budget
Purchase of furniture Books and references	M Th. H 5 2 17	M Th. H 5 2 17
Total	7 17	7 17
Total expenditure	7,254,417	7,904,417

()) M=Million, Th.=Thousand, H=Hundred.

Source: Provided to the writer, by the Iraqi Broadcasting Accounts Department.

such as equipment and films. (1)

Broadcasting wages were very low until 1974, when oil revenues rose dramatically and expenditure was increased. The broadcasting authority also improved broadcasters' wages. The reasons for this improvement were to provide incentives to workers to raise the standard of programmes and broadcasting in general. Of course, it is time to say that staff do not improve standards just because they are given a pay rise. Poor wages did not motivate broadcasting staff to do their best. (i.e. television paid the preparer of a television programme between 5-15 I.D. for a programme lasting between 25-35 minutes. The presenter was paid 25 I.D. an hour and an interviewer was paid 5 I.D.) (2) Table 7.8 shows the percentage of wages paid to programme contributers (Freelance) and salary allocations during the years 1970-1980.

Although the budget has increased, wages and salaries still account for the lion's share of the budget. What does this increase mean? Simply, it means that the level of expenditure on programmes and salaries remains low. (i.e. the cost per hour of producing a series or a film was approximately 8,000 I.D. in 1977) (3)

^{1.} Iraqi broadcasting establishment, The Evolution Indicators, 1975-1976, Mimeographed, (in Arabic), N.D., p.140.

^{2.} These figures are derived from a classified report.

^{3.} A memorandum from the director of the cinema production unit of Baghdad Television, (Arabic)

TABLE 7.8

The percentage of wages paid to programme contributors, and officials and employees salaries in the whole broadcasting budget for the years 1970-1980

Year	Wages	Salaries
1970	14.16	35.41
1971	13.94	32.63
1972	17.65	38.53
1973	15.73	39.53
1974	9.87	40.99
1975	6.90	41.13
1976	5.05	53.66
1977	9.66	52.53
1978	9.67	52.70
1979	10.59	52.35
1980	12.71	43.28

Sources:

Iraq, Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of budget, The Budget Law for the year 1971, 1971, pp.351-353, the budget law for the year 1972, 1972, pp.384-386, the budget law for the year 1970, 1970, pp.380-384, the budget law for the year 1973, 1973, pp.416, 420, the budget law for the year 1974, 1974, pp.656-660, the budget law for the year 1975, 1975, pp.712-715, the budget law for the year 1976, 1976, pp.793-795, the budget law for the year 1976, 1976, pp.793-795, the budget law for the year 1977, 1977, pp.909-911, the budget law for the year 1978, 1978, pp 803-806, the budget law for the year 1978, 1978, pp 903-806, the budget law for the year 1979, 1979, pp.846-849, all of these laws published by Government press respectively, for 1980, the numbers supplied by the accounting department.

One effective measure to improve the standard of programmes might be to pay more for programmes, and to improve the salaries of writers and adapters further. However, improvements of this kind during the years following 1973 have been achieved in terms of increased expenditure on salaries and wages. Table 7.9 shows the increase of programme wages during the years 1968-1980. Meanwhile, television programmes departments make their proposals for their annual budgets by estimating the wages and rewards for contributors to programmes. Other costs, such as operational costs and salaries do not appear in the programming department's proposals. 7.10 shows the budget estimate for the development programmes department for the year 1979. The main expenditure figures are estimated on the basis of adaptation, preparation, presentation, translation and prizes for competitions and other contributions. For instance, the allocations for the following programmes are:

- 1. "Camera Was There": preparing and presentation.
- 2. "Camera Was There" (in Kurdish): Translation and presentation.
- Quiz: presentation, contribution and prizes.

TABLE 7.9

The growth of "freelance" wages during the years

1968-1980

Year	Total Budget in I.D.	Freelance wages in I.D.
1968	913,720	140,000
1970	1,412,000	200,000
1971	1,685,500	235,000
1972	2,631,200	448,700
1973	3,496,500	550,000
1974	6,736,600	665,000
1975	5,052,450	548,750
1976	5,945,000	300,000
1977	6,728,000	650,000
1978	7,938,000	768,000
1979	7,254,417	768,000
1980	11,405,000	1,450,000

These figures relate to the temporary employment of such people as writers, presenters and actors. This figure includes some full time employees who are also earning a salary.

Sources: Iraq, Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Budget, The Budget lows for the years, 1968-1980.

TABLE 7.10

Budget estimation of development programmes department from 1.1.1979 until 31.12.1979.

Programme	No.of programmes	Total I.D.
Television reports Quiz	52 52	3,640 7,280
Camera was there	138	2,070
Oil is ours	52	1,560
Camera was there (in Kurdish)	52	780
Television reports (in Kurdish)	52	1,040
Women (Asyrian)	52	780
Women (Turkmen)	52	780
Oil is ours (in Kurdish)	52	780
Development and future Face to Face	52 52	5 , 200 520
Documentaries Urgent production budget	8	2,400 15,000
Total		41,830

Source: The table supplied to the researcher by the development programmes department director at the broadcasting establishment.

Chapter Eight

Government and Television Development Programmes

Section One: The Role of the Iraqi Government in Popularizing Television and Establishing Television Services

The main purposes of popularizing television in Iraq are to spread government and Ba'th party policies, to bridge the gap between rural and urban areas and to create a National consciousness.

There were two prerequisites necessary before television could be popularized: firstly, the electrification of the country, and secondly, the provision of television sets.

What matters here is the way in which, 1. the electrification of the whole country, especially rural areas, meant that television transmission could reach the population throughout the whole country, and 2. the way in which television services could serve the government's socio-economic policy.

With the introduction of television and other improvements in socio-economic conditions, development could be achieved gradually. It is important to realize that Iraqi rural areas before 1958 had no electricity at all. (1)

^{1.} F.I. Qubain, 1958, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957, op.cit, p.189.

Electricity was all consumed within the cities, especially in the major cities. During the years 1958-1968, 250 villages were electrified. This amounted to 2.5% of Iraqi villages. Following the revolution of 1968, increasing the electricity supply became an important task. There was a government programme for the gradual electrification of rural areas. During the years 1970-1974, 1500 villages were provided with electricity. The percentage of Iraqi villages electrified in this way was 15.2%.

In 1974 the Development Board ordered the ministry of industry to provide electricity to the following: villages with a population of more than 500 inhabitants, cooperative peasant villages, border villages, tourist villages and villages of archaeological importance. (1)

The proportion of the rural population receiving electricity has increased to 50% of the total and this was estimated to have increased to 70% by 1980. In this way, the government provided electricity to more than two million people, who were able to use electricity

^{1.} The general Directorate of small projects and rural electrification, 1977, Report on Electrification of Rural Areas, Mimeographed, (In Arabic), pp.1-15.

for the first time in their lives. (1) Table 8.1 shows the number of villages and the number of people who received electricity before 1976.

The government also provided some collectives with television sets and electric generators, so that they could watch television easily, in spite of the lack of electricity in their areas. The final means of supplying electricity was provided by the Armed forces: the Army supplied free electricity to those villages which were situated near to their camps, using mobile electric power stations. (2) This phenomenon reveals that the government has been using different methods for providing rural areas with electricity as part of its programme of socio-economic development. In recent years, the heaping of small holdings spread from the cities and the government provided these projects with electricity, though the use of electricity for agricultural improvements was limited

Also, there are no reliable records of the number of television receivers in Iraq before 1977. Some of

^{1.} Iraq, Ministry of Planning, 1978, Man: The Object of Revolution, op.cit. p.103.

^{2.} An interview with Mr. H.Al-Dabbag, the Ministry of Planning's Delegate, who researched the socio-economic conditions in rural areas.

TABLE 8.1
Villages Provided With Electricity

	Villages provided with electricity from municipalities before 1.4.1975.		Villages provided with electricity until 1.10.1976.	
Provinces	No.of villages	population	No.of villages	Popul- ation
D'hok	27	10,000	47	17,400
Nineveh	54	21,000	82	35,640
Arbil	98	38,000	142	56,960
Sulaimaniya	56	22,000	107	40,480
Ta'meem	44	18,000	70	27,833
Diala	191	76,000	213	84,800
Baghdad	141	60,000	183	79,080
Anbar	106	42,000	151	64,160
Wasit	51	19,000	59	22,200
Babylon	261	99,000	286	109,000
Kerbela	124	49,000	151	59,200
Qadisiya	212	82,000	257	98,440
Thi-Qar	55	21,000	80	28,760
Maysan	16	7,000	37	11,440
Muthanna	20	7 , 900	21	8,300
Basrah	73	28,100	153	57 , 548
Najaf	_	-	-	-
Salah Al Deen	-		-	_

Source: The General Directorate of Small Projects and Rural Electrification, Report on Electrification of rural Areas, 1977, Mimeographed (in Arabic) p.16.

these figures are estimates. Owing to a lack of statistics and information on public viewing (in coffee-houses, clubs and Youth centres, etc.,) the following table is an estimate of these figures:

Year	No.of receivers in use (1000)	No.of receivers in use per 1000 inhabitants
1965	171	21
1970	350	37
1975	410	37
1976	425	37

Source: UNESCO, 1978, Statistical Yearbook 1977, Paris, Table 16.2, p.1017

My general point here, is that the impact of television has to be assessed in terms of the different social situations in which it is viewed.

In order to popularize television, the Iraqi government supplied television sets in two ways: firstly, from government-owned factories, and secondly via the Iraqi Trading Company, which is government owned, and deals particularly with importation. In this way, the cost of providing television sets was borne by presidential or Ba'th party headquarters. All television sets were given free.

Free distribution of television sets:

Between 1971 and 1978 a number of rapid changes occured in production line manufacture within the electronics manufacturing company, which is also a Ministry of Industry subsidiary. Government used this company's production to popularize television. The electronics

manufacturing company produced 100,000 television sets Production has increased since that time. Government and the Ba'th Party organization supervised the distribution of television sets to the population. A few months later, when colour television went on the air in 1976, the Ba'th Party leadership decided that all coffee houses in Iraq, must be supplied with a television set, so the Baghdad division of the Ba'th Party leadership distributed television sets free to all coffee houses in Baghdad. Other divisions of the Party in the provinces followed Baghdad's example, and distributed television sets to all coffee-houses. An example of the way in which this policy operated is offered by the following incident: the president of Iraq offered free television sets to the Missan Province coffee-houses, where the people were unable to buy their own colour television sets. enabled the people of Missan to watch television free of charge in the coffee houses. (2) Table 8.2 shows the number of coffee-houses in a selection of major Iraqi city centres.

^{1.} Funoon (Arts), 1979, 1980's witness a big achievement in Electronic Industry, No.34, Baghdad, p.27.

^{2.} Missan: Ten Years, 1978, Dar Al-Kuttub, Institute for printing and publishing, University of Mousel, (in Arabic), pp.15-16.

TABLE 8.2

The Number of Coffeehouses in a Selection of Iraq City
Centres in 1975

City	No. of Coffeehouses
Baghdad	1,864
Mousel	318
Basrah	216
Kirkuk	267
Najif	250

Source: F.J. Maroof, <u>Baghdad the Prime City</u>, op.cit., extracted from Table 54. p.188.

The importance of providing coffee-houses with television sets might be inferred from the important role of coffee-houses in Iraqi social life. Undoubtedly, most of the Iraqi male population spends some time each day in coffee-houses. There they meet for conversation and relaxation. In some coffee-houses the proprietors offer free newspapers, as well as a small library.

In fact, the provision of television sets to coffeehouses is a necessary experiment, because it reaches a wide
range of the male population, and creates the motivation
for discussing the content of television programmes and
understanding government policy. It is thought that this
might create greater participation in the political process,
and contribute to raising consciousness, and thus aid
change. Also, all public organisations and Union clubs

are provided with television sets.

There are no statistics concerning viewers' reactions, partly because of the oral traditions of Iraqi culture: large numbers of adult and adolescent males may be observed spending part of every day in coffee-houses, public centres, or clubs watching television, chatting generally, about current events, and this includes commenting on television programmes.

So one may conclude that most meeting places in Iraq, are provided with television sets, and that most of the places mentioned above, were provided with television sets by the government.

In 1978, the government began mass distribution of television sets. It allocated 32,000 television sets to village families, (One television set per household) in the North of Iraq and 1,691 in Southern Iraq (to two villages in the Marshes). Some village families in the West and the East of Iraq have also received free television sets. In the meantime, the government provided these villages with schools, health centres, illiteracy eradication centres, pure water and electricity, and increased the availability of work to the population.

According to the Iraqi news agency, the distribution of television sets was to improve the underdeveloped living

standards of the peasantry and to create new socioeconomic conditions for those people who lived in remote
villages. The Iraqi News Agency stated that the presentation of television sets which accompanied the other
facilities would change existing conditions in rural
Iraq, because television is a direct and active instrument
in the education and culture of the population. (1)

The policy of distributing free television sets to villagers on such a scale might be considered a novel policy.

In the final analysis, government intervention seems necessary at this stage of development, because most sectors were underdeveloped and living standards were very low. In the case of Iraq, only the government has the power to direct social change. Television is one of its instruments for socio-economic development.

Educational Television:

The other measure taken by the government to popularize television was its establishment of Educational Television (E.T.V.). E.T.V. in Iraq has been employed to bring about the following aims: (2)

^{1.} Iraqi News Agency, 1979, Report, June 27th, (In Arabic)

^{2.} Iraq, Ministry of Education, A Report on the Directorate of Educational Television, Mimeographed, N.D. p.3.

- 1. Provide training for teachers in using modern technological media in teaching, through the acquisition of new teaching experiences, skills and methods.
- 2. Enabling teachers to relate modern scientific development to the curriculum.
- 3. Assisting students towards self-reliance in the educational process, and planting in them the spirit of research, scientific thinking and skills.
- 4. Making television available to serve learning and development plans.
- 5. Serving school and University education, training teachers, educating adults and eliminating illiteracy.

The Ministry of Education distributed 50 television sets to primary schools in Baghdad in November 1971, during the period of experimental transmission on channel 8. In 1975, the number of television sets in schools reached 500 (1) Subsequently a lot of schools outside Baghdad began using E.T.V.

In July 1971 the E.T.V. station was opened officially under the supervision of the Education ministry. The new station prepared Educational programmes for transmission on four days a week. Since then E.T.V. has expanded to cover most Baghdad schools. Table 8.3 shows the number of programme hours transmitting between 30.2.1968 and 30.6.1972.

Abdul Ruhman, A. and M.S. Al-hayani, E.T.V. in Iraq, 1976, Ministry of Education, E.T.V. Department, Mimeographed, (in Arabic), p.9.

TABLE 8.3.

Programme	Total	Transmission(in	Hours)
Educational lessons Cultural encyclopedia Schools television Eradication illiteracy	lessons	453 157 47 180	

Source: Special report on E.T.V., 1973, Baghdad, Mimeographed (in Arabic)

In 1972, Iraqi television established the second channel (channel 7) to transmit Educational programmes. The reasons for this development may be identified as follows: a wide range of students will receive educational programmes in order to develop their knowledge and to pass their examinations, secondly, to create motivation for illiterates to overcome their reading, writing and numeracy difficulties. However, channel 7 became a national channel in 1976, and was received in all areas of Iraq. Finally, the most important step in popularizing television was the localization of production and preparation of programmes.

Non Iraqi programmes:

Undoubtedly, a large number of the population were illiterate and their culture was very different from that shown in ready-made foreign programmes. In this instance, Iraq's problem is similar to other Third World countries. The government regarded dependence on foreign programmes

as a loss of national characteristics and a cultural invasion. Also, many people prefer watching local and Arab programmes owing to the difficulties presented in trying to read subtitles, and problems in understanding foreign languages and cultures.

In spite of financial and technological limitations, Iraqi television was criticized from its earliest days of transmission for its dependence on foreign ready-made programmes. The Iraqi media authority became aware of "a cultural invasion". The problem of foreign ready-made programmes has been solved gradually. The government has attempted to protect the National culture and population from "cultural invasion" by paying more attention to creating and producing their own programmes, which reflected government ideology and policy. Writers and producers under the influence of government and supervised by the party, tried to shape local programmes. The result was a decrease in multiculture diffusion from foreign countries, and an increase in home-produced programmes. This proved a practical means of popularizing television in Iraq. Foreign and Arab programmes were and are subjected to tight censorship. The censors reject programmes which contradict government and party ideology or policy. reality, it is very difficult to decide, whether or not

entertainment, for example, includes implicit or explicit contraventions of Broadcasting censorship regulations. It is thought that most foreign and Arab programmes do include such contraventions. However, the need for entertainment programmes forces the censorship, and television authorities to accept some foreign and Arab programmes. In a personal interview with the ex-director of Iraqi television, he pointed out that the television authority "make the best of a bad job". (1) The lack of locally produced entertainment programmes is the sole reason for this compromise.

I shall analyse the distribution of types of programmes transmitted in the next section to see how much local programmes account for within the total of programmes shown on Iraqi television.

Viewers and Viewing:

An Iraqi broadcasting establishment comments concerning television viewers, (2) stated that the preferred siesta time in hot season was between 10 and 12p.m. It was thought that civil servants were almost all asleep after

^{1.} Interview with Mr. S. Mahdi, in 1978.

Mimeographed (undated) in Arabic, and personal interviews in the Iraqi Broadcasting during 1980-1981.

12 midnight. Peasants preferred going to sleep before 10p.m.. During the cold season, most viewers were asleep before 11p.m. The older peasants and female peasants preferred going to sleep before 9p.m. The main conclusion to be drawn from television research are as follows:

Possession of Television sets:

Occupation is the main indicator for the possession of a television set. A higher percentage of those possessing television sets were found to fall into the following categories:

- 1. Civil servants
- 2. Students
- 3. Housewives.
- 4. Workers
- 5. Peasants.

There are two possible reasons for this ownership pattern:

- 1. Economic, i.e. low income, or/
- 2. Limited electricity supply to rural areas.

Viewing Hours:

The Iraqi broadcasting made two findings:

- Most viewers do not set aside an exact time for watching programmes.
- 2. Peak hours are between 8 10p.m.

Regularity of Viewing:

The following indicators have been recognized:

1. Most people who have been questioned, watched television

every day, which meant that their viewing was regular and they followed television programmes daily.

- 2. A high percentage of television viewers are, civil servants, students and workers.
- 3. As for the educational level of viewers, it was discovered that people who had secondary school education or a university degree, watched television more than others, and tended to watch television programmes daily.
- 4. Females watch more television programmes than males. The lowest level of television viewing occurred among peasants (they may have no television sets).

The reasons for irregular television viewing:

The main reason for irregular viewing or non-viewing tended to be lack of access to a television set in the home. It was recognized that so far as peasants were concerned, the popular organizations could play a vital role in overcoming this obstacle by providing television sets in their buildings, so they were able to aid the development process by offering communal viewing (a tele club), rather than individual watching. In fact most popular organizations offered television sets in their buildings. As we have seen, the government also offered television sets to a large number of peasants.

The Motivation to Watch Television Programmes:

The results in this respect were: the percentage of people who liked watching specific programmes was, mostly, higher than the percentage of people who had no desire to watch particular programmes, which seems to indicate that television can affect viewers. The preferred programmes were as follows:

- Sports week.
- 2. Science for all.
- 3. Art zoom.
- 4. News.
- 5. Cinema and people.
- 6. Series and Arabic films.

Illiterates showed a preference for entertainment and information programmes, such as sports week, series and Arabic films, Iraqi plays and news. Meanwhile, people who had secondary school certificates and upwards, showed a taste for additional programmes, such as, Cinema and people, Science for all, as well as the above mentioned programmes.

Favourite items for night viewing:

Viewers preferred watching Arabic items more than items in foreign languages whatever these items were: series, films or songs.

Films, series and plays were the preferred items for evening viewing. Songs, interviews and football matches

were less favoured. However, illiterates preferred Iraqi plays and Arabic films and series. Those holding educational certificates (secondary schools and upwards) preferred foreign films and series. Females, in general like Arabic series, plays and films more than males. According to occupational level, peasants and workers preferred Iraqi and Arabic television programmes, whilst civil servants and students preferred foreign films and series (beside Iraqi and Arabic programmes). So, it is particularly important in scheduling programmes, to take into accounts, sleeping time in Winter and summer.

For peasant programmes, the best transmission time is between the opening of transmission and 10p.m. It is also important to increase the number of Iraqi and Arab series and plays, because most viewers enjoy this sort of programmes, and to give special consideration to the quality of Iraqi series and plays. Finally, it is important to avoid contradictions between the ideology of Western films and series (and even Arabic commercials, films, and series) and the ideology of the Iraqi government and its policy of socio-economic transformation.

In 1975, 1 the Iraqi broadcasting establishment urged the state department who made programmes on development to develop these in accordance with the political Report

Official letter number 478, dated 7.1.1975, from the Iraqi broadcasting establishment to the state departments concerned with development programmes.

of the Ba'th party. The Iraqi broadcasting establishment stated that these departments should take into consideration how the programmes should be shown, when, and to whom. The content of prgrammes should be connected with the revolution's movements. The length of programme should vary between 5 - 20 minutes. The establishment asked the state departments to:

- 1. to supply three copies of the script at least three days before the programme date, which for the purpose of editing and censorship, in accordance with development policy and goals.
- 2. to supply departmental publications to be used in the programme.
- 3. to designate a presenter of a high linguistic competence, who knew how to present the programme.

Section Two:

The Role of Governmental Authorities in Televising Their Own Development Programmes

The Iraqi governmental authorities which televise development programmes might be divided into two divisions; firstly, the Iraqi television departments, and secondly, the information and media authorities in Iraqi ministries and public organizations.

The distinguishing feature of the Development programme department is that it is totally concerned with socioeconomic development programmes. This Department produces and prepares such programmes and coordinates with other government authorities in televising its own programmes.

The rest of the television departments transmit their own programmes, which, also, relate to socio-economic development, directly or indirectly, because all programmes are organized under the same regulation, and serve the same policy.

The relationship between development programme department (D.P.D.) with the rest of Iraqi broadcasting departments is organized administratively by the television director and director general, and with regard to the programme policy it is controlled by the planning committee and the regulations of the Iraqi broadcasting's media plan. Although the influence of the director general on the D.P.D.

is obvious, the director of D.P.D. has to some extent to make his own decisions in the daily work matters and media follow-up. But with respect the media policy decision making, the planning committee, must approve the programme policy. (1) It would seem that part of the decision-making process concerning programmes takes place within the D.P.D. which is controlled by the television director or director general. Decision-making in the D.P.D. frequently takes an advisory form, which then requires approval of the director general (i.e. decision-making in Iraqi broadcasting is subject to centralization). The administrative body of D.P.D. is as follows:

- 1. Producing section. 2. Cameramen section. 3. Montage
- 4. Archive section. 5. Linguistic supervision (editing and correction) 6. Local programmes section. 7. Sound and lighting. 8. Administrative section.

The staff of D.P.D. in 1979 was made up as follows: Five producers, ten producers' assistants, seventeen cameramen, eight cameramen's assistants, five montage, three archivists, one linguistic supervisor, and film teams of reporters and writers working with D.P.D. as freelance writers, the number of them is unlimited.

Meanwhile, governmental authorites and popular organizations wishing to make programmes, provide the cash

^{1.} An interview with D.P.D. director on 30.8.1979.

for the making of these, whilst Iraqi broadcasting provides the money to cover production costs. The D.P.D produce two kinds of programmes; firstly, television reports or documentary such as 'Camera was There', follow-up programmes on governmental and organizational activities related to socio-economic development. Examples of these programmes concern such matters as the oil training centre and the glass factory in Anbar, and secondly, documentaries, such as "The Seventh Bridge". This particular film explained the importance of "Bab Al-Muadam Bridge", its part in national development and background information on Baghdad's bridges. Other local programmes produced by D.P.D. are as follows:

- 1. Women's Magazine (in Turkmen)
- 2. Women's Magazine (in Asyrian)
- 3. Student (in Kurdish)
- 4. Industrial Revolution (in Kurdish)
- 5. Agricultural revolution (in Kurdish)

All the above programmes were translated from Arabic and presented on Kirkuk television. These programmes are broadly similar to the Arabic programmes produced by the D.P.D.

However, the director general of Iraqi broadcasting pointed out that the measure of the development plan's success is related to the extent it succeeds in changing society. (1)

Iraqi broadcasting establishment, Baghdad television,
 D.P.D., Minute No.4. 1976, Mimeographed (in Arabic) p.2.

Such is the role of television development programmes encouraging social change. In late 1975, the D.P.D. tried to supervise and organize the governmental authorities programmes. Conflict arose between the D.P.D and other governmental authorities due to the fact that non-D.P.D. programmes were of an inadequate level of competance. Each government authority plans and decides the content and product of its own programmes without having adequate broadcasting experience. However, Table 8.4. shows the regular development programmes in 1.7.1976.

TABLE 8.4.

	The programme	Transmission time	The authority behind the programme
1.	Health education	Weekly	Ministry of Health
2.	Women Magazine	Weekly	General federation of Iraqi women
3.	The Agriculture Revolution	Fortnightly	Ministry of Agriculture
4.	The Industrial Revolution	Fortnightly	Ministry of Industry
5.	The Student Magazine	Fortnightly	National Union of Iraqi Students
6.	The Workers programme	Fortnightly	General Union of Iraqi workers
7.	Youth Magazine	Fortnightly	General Union of Iraqi Youth
8.	Interior Magazine	Fortnightly	Ministry of Interior
9.	Public Safety	Weekly	Traffic Department

In personal interviews with government authorities responsible for preparing and presenting development programmes, the following facts were revealed: (1)

1. Some development programmes were initiated before 1968.

These were individually prepared. But, the link between those programmes and later comprehensive development policy was little recognized. In the 1970's, ministries and organizations prepared their own programmes which promoted their activities. After the political party report of the eighth Ba'th conference in 1974, all government authority programmes became subject to its guidelines.

- 2. Staff working in government departments devising television programmes, prepare departmental news items, news of the department activities and edit reports.
- 3. Decisions on government television programmes are taken by the Minister himself. In the case of radio programmes, the director of the communications department makes the decision. This reflects the greater importance of television programmes over radio programmes in the government authorities' decision-making process.
- 4. Cooperation between communications departments and the D.P.D. is focussed on producing and directing programmes.

^{1.} Interviews done in Baghdad with governmental communication authorities during January 1981.

The D.P.D. helps government authorities and organizations by providing equipment and cameramen for the making of such reports. In the case of the Industry ministry, its communications department supplies the D.P.D. with ministry news, whilst the latter provides the rest of the programme. Other government departments prepare their own programmes without outside help. The final decisions before producing and presenting programmes are taken by the Iraqi broadcasting authorities. It examines government programmes and may approve or reject any or all items in their proposals. (1) The aim of broadcasting control is to bring development programmes into line with government and party policy.

Development programme content:

A content analysis of development programmes in the period studied reveals the following facts about each programme in relation to socio-economic development:

1. Health Education:

Items included in the programme are practical films, interviews with specialists concerning illness prevention and how illness occurs, visiting health institutions in rural and urban areas to show the health sector's achievements during the revolutionary period.

A significant role is played by this programme during

^{1.} A personal interview with the director general of Iraqi broadcasting on 25.1.1981.

epidemics, to educate and explain to people all matters related to disease. This programme is prepared and presented by the Health ministry.

In fact, the propaganda element of development programmes concentrates on government achievements in an attempt to bring these achievements closer to viewers who may have an ingrained belief that past Iraqi governments promised much and did little in these areas. This is something which the health programme has in common with other development programmes.

2. Agricultural Revolution:

According to SAIED, (1)

"In theory, extension work extends agricultural information to the farmers, but in reality very little of this has been accomplished. Extension workers are, for the most part, stationed in the ministry of agriculture in Baghdad and are very seldom found even visiting the farming communities. Lack of funds, of transportation, and other factors keep them within the cities".

So, the importance of agricultural revolution programmes comes from the widespread of television in rural areas. However, the programme shows agricultural activities in the country, gives farming advice to peasants, shows films

^{1.} SAIED, Kadhum Ibrahim, Agricultural mechanization in Iraq with reference to dates, wheat, and barley, 1971, Ph.D.thesis (unpublished) Michigan State University, p.151.

and slides to promote improved agricultural methods.

Also, the programme discusses problems which have accumulated from the past and explains government policy for a new agricultural era. The programme presents information concerning new kinds of social and economic relationships in rural areas.

3. Industrial Revolution:

The programme shows the growth in industrial projects and covers industrial development in the country, giving special attention to major projects achieved or under way since 1968. The department of information in the ministry of Industry prepares industrial news and ministry news. The Department of Development in Iraqi television prepares the remainder of the programme, such as filming of projects and industrial establishments and interviews within industrial establishments.

4. Student's programmes:

The programme shows the activities of the National Union of Iraqi Students and its branches inside and outside the country. Furthermore, the programme includes meetings with students to publicize their educational problems, and give them an opportunity to show off their talents.

These items arise out of films, documentaries and studio meetings. In the final analysis, this programme's function is chiefly political and vocational.

5. Youth:

As well as showing news and films about youth organizations throughout the World, the programmes try to keep a balance between entertainment and ideological orientation. They show items on talented teenagers, films about the General Union of Iraqi Youth, and encourage young people to join their Union. They also cover the activities of Youth centres throughout the country.

6. Women:

Presents the General Federation of Iraqi Women's news, activities, explanations of the role of women in development and presents new ways of improving women's position in Iraqi society.

7. Workers:

The programme concentrates on the news and activities of the General Union of Workers and its achievements.

The programme discusses workers' problems, answering their questions and shows off creative workers. The main programme features are news, films and meetings.

8. Interior:

The programme shows the activities of the Ministry of the Interior and the provincial government and their services to the people. The programme attempts to build closer relations between the people and government.

9. Oil Programme:

This programme is prepared by the Ministry of Oil's Department of Information. The programme reflects the government's oil policy, such as industrialization of oil, integration of oil policy with the national economy and staff training. The programme shows films and news about Arab and International organizations for oil and gives general information concerning oil. Moreover, the programme shows new oil projects in the country and meeting with people working on these.

10. Television documentaries:

These documentaries are prepared and produced by
the development department of Iraqi television. They are
concerned with achievements and socio-economic transformation
within the country as a whole, and sometimes show individual
development programmes.
Comments:

The main comment to be made concerning government authorities programmes is that the Development programmes department is the sole mediator between governmental authorities in matters of television programming. Secondly, most governmental authorities staff are not specialists in television programming, so, the Development programmes department was created to supply this lack.

Hence the profound influence of the D.P.D. upon the preparation and presentation of programmes on development.

They took over responsibility (for programme making) from those governmental authoritie's, popular organizations etc., who did not have the capacities, skills, or facilities to make their own. In this way, their influence over development programmes has become dominant and decisive.

Development programmes on television can be critisized on the following basis: In scheduling development programmes, one finds some programmes with no direct or close relation to development, such as traffic are included. Meanwhile, some programmes directly related to development are produced by other television departments, (not by development programmes department). Such as "the Development and Future", prepared by the Cultural Department. Another characteristic of development programmes including a great deal of propaganda for the government departments, more than is really necessary to get across the socio-economic implications of development. This propaganda may give an exaggerated role to a department or a minister or a top official for the achievement of, or work done towards the achievement of socio-economic development.

In fact, it is very difficult to avoid this sort of propaganda sometimes, mainly because of the official relations between the bosses (Minister, general director etc.)

and the programme makers. This propaganda could, however, be controlled by the development programmes department. Thirdly, previously noted, several development programmes are prepared and presented by other governmental authorities, who have little or no experience in television programming. So, the main weaknesses in such programmes, are that some items present numbers and scientific language, which are not easy for viewers to understand.

In short, the programmers need to know how to reach their targets, using language viewers can understand.

Various government authorities took on responsibility for the presentation of programmes (e.g. agriculture, industry). It was recognised that some presenters were not suitable to present television programmes because they did not speak Standard Arabic, or that their scripts were of a poor standard. Some presenters read directly from the script, as if presenting a radio programme, and this also, is unacceptable - sometimes, long meetings between officials have been televized, which viewers described as "boring".

Section Three

The Screening of Development Programmes on Iraqi Television

Development programmes are shown during peak viewing hours in the evening (between 7-9 p.m.) In order to maximise their influence on the population.

Iraqi television patterns its broadcasting in quarterly schedules, based on the guidelines of the broadcasting plan and Ba'th policy.

The main problem presented by research into the classification of development programmes as distinct from other programmes is solved by understanding local programmes (cultural, religious, entertainment programmes, etc.,) as serving the same policy and that most local programmes are related to socio-economic development in one way or another.

Table 8.5 shows the changes which occurred in programming in 1975, and the early applications of the political report and Iraqi broadcasting communication plan. Information programmes were extended from 184 minutes to 488 minutes per week, (the percentage increase was 37.7%). The percentage of cultural programmes increased to 76.3. The percentage of entertainment programmes decreased 13.7 per cent in 1976.

TABLE 8.5

The average weekly transmission in the second half of 1975 and the first half of 1976 (in minutes)

Programme type	1975	1976
Information Culture Entertainment Sciences Programmes for	184 743 824 30	488 974 711 45
special viewers Advertisements	651 157	833 118
Total	2,589	3,169

TABLE 8.6

Programme transmission during July - December 1976
on Channel 9

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total Transmission (in minutes)
News Political Culture Development Entertainment Documentaries Series Religious Children Songs and music Serial Films Short films Sport(outside broadcast) Sport films Intervals Plays	7,030 2,163 2,056 3,916 5,081 384 2,140 2,646 6,005 5,209 1,335	769 2,386 184 7,369 2,558 7,072	5,127 2,323 3,974 821 3,062 316	7,030 2,163 2,056 3,916 5,081 384 2,909 5,032 11,316 12,578 6,216 11,046 821 3,062 316 5,870 105
Total	43,835	20,443	15,623	79,901

The percentage of science programmes increased to 66.7%. While programmes for designated audiences (e.g. worker's programmes, women's programmes), increased by 78.2%. Finally, the percentage of advertisement in 1975 was 13.3%. Table 8.6 shows the figures for the second half of 1976, which divided programmes into the following categories: local, Arab, foreign programmes. The percentages of these to the total were 58.88%, 25.56% and 19.56% respectively. The following types of programmes have been produced or reproduced by Iraqi programmers: news, political programmes, culture, development, entertainment (variety shows), documentaries, and musical interludes or slogan presentation.

Arab programmes include series, religious programmes, children's programmes, songs and music, plays, serials and films.

Foreign programmes include: children's programmes, serials, films, short films, sport (outside broadcasting), and sports films. In 1976, foreign programmes were the only source of short films, sport (outside broadcasting) and sports films. The percentage of programmes accounted for by the above figures was 5.26% while the rest remains of foreign programmes account for 14.30% of all light entertainment on television.

The number of local Iraqi programmes in the same

category was 9.19%, whilst Arab programmes accounted for 12.28%. Table 8.6 also shows that the orientation programmes related to socio-economic development were made by Iraqi programmers.

The second year of the National development plan (1977) was affected by Iraqi television programming as shown in Table 8.7. Foreign programmes were decreased to 18.67 per cent whilst local programmes' output was increased to 56.16 per cent. Programmes purely concerned with development accounted for 5.31 per cent of the total. In the meantime, all other local programmes presented the ideology and policies of the government and the Ba'th party indirectly. This point, in particular, reveals the difference between Iraqi television and British television. Iraqi television is prevented from showing programmes which criticize or contradict the government or party policy or ideology. However, the split between foreign and Arab programmes has remained the same during all national development plan years. Both foreign and Arab programmes are shown, largely outside peak viewing hours. For ordinary and rural viewers, foreign programmes tend to present language difficulties. In 1977, foreign programmes provided a large proportion of those shown. For example, the percentage of foreign children's programmes was 6.93%

TABLE 8.7

Programme transmission during 1977, On Channel 9

110914	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total Transmissior (in minutes)
News	15,991			15,991 4,792
Political	4, 792			7,003
Cultural	7,003			9,600
Developmental	9,600 11,378	1,685	92	13,155
Entertainment Documentaries	2,638	1,003	32	2,638
Series	3,560	1,560		5,120
Plays	1,023	1,140		2,163
Religious	4,383	5,388		9,771
Children	12,385	819	12,546	25,750
School Activitie		··· -	•	664
Songs and Music	9,870	15,814	12	25,696
Serials	2.710	4,223	5 , 851	12,784
Films		14,880	6 , 870	21,750
Short films			4,871	4,871
Sports films			400	400
Sport (outside	2,460		3,140	5 , 600
broadcast)				12 260
Intervals	13,268		500	13,268
Total	101,725	45,509	33 , 782	181,016

(chiefly cartoons). Table 8.8 shows that this split was repeated in 1978. The increase in local programmes occurred in 1979. Table 8.9 shows that 59.6 per cent was the total output of local programmes whilst foreign programmes represented just 16.1 per cent of the total. The greatest increase in local programmes occurred in 1980. Table 8.10 shows that at this time 62.3 per cent of programmes were local and 13.6 per cent of programmes were foreign. Although the goal of Iraqi broadcasting was to localize its programmes, the need for entertainment programmes remained.

To resolve this problem. Iraqi television diversified and continued to diversify its sources of foreign programmes.

The other channel on Iraqi television (7), presents more local programmes than channel 9, for instance, tables 8.11 and 8.12 for the years 1977 and 1978, show that local programmes account for 66.11 per cent and 69.9 per cent of all programmes, and foreign programmes accounted for 17.75 and 25.7, respectively, while Arab programmes formed 16.14 and 4.4 of the total. A possible reason for this might be that Channel 7 was planned as an educational channel. Tables 8.13 and 8.14 show total programmes on Channel 7 for the years 1979 and 1980.

TABLE 8.8

Programme transmission during 1978, On Channel 9

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total Transmission (in minutes)
News Political Culture Developmental Entertainment Documentaries Series Plays Religious Children School Activitie Songs and Music Serial Films Short films Sport films Sport foutside broadcast) Current affairs School lessons Youth and sport Intervals	16,932 8,270 10,525 7,780 8,820 2,190 2,818 487 5,396 9,606 9,606 9,606 2,650 375 384 323 11,614	1,450 119 1,348 979 4,463 456 11,357 9,354 10,357	434 61 11,298 11 5,934 5,372 4,342 51 3,274	16,932 8,270 10,525 7,780 10,704 2,370 4,166 1,466 9,859 21,360 90 18,646 16,547 15,729 4,342 51 5,924 375 384 3,888 11,614
Total	96,897	39,883	34,242	171,022

TABLE 8.9

Programme transmission during 1979, On Channel 9

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes tranmsission (in minutes)	Total Transmission (in minutes)
News Political Cultural Developmental Entertainment Documentaries Series Plays Religious Children School activiti Songs and music Serial Films Short films Sport films Sport (outside broadcast) Current affairs School lessons Youth and sport Intervals	2,426 2,426 1,258 5,591	1,990 53 550 3,271 4,276 416 - 7,112 16,707 6,888	89 261 9,479 (1) - 4 5,980 5,682 3,161 115 3,107	17,069 15,109 10,285 6,800 9,862 704 4,856 3,895 9,989 20,927 12,896 25,161 12,823 3,161 115 5,533 1,258 5,591 162 8,404
Total	104,223	41,268	27,878	174,600

^{1.} Co-Arab produced transmission = 1231 minutes.

TABLE 8.10

Programme transmission during January - August 1980, On Channel 9

	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total transmission (in minutes)
News Political Cultural Developmental Entertainment Documentaries Series Plays Religious Children School activitic Songs and music Serial Films Short films Sport films Sport foutside broadcast) Current affairs School lessons Youth and sport Intervals	3,991 3,971 86 1,888 385 946	513 215 2,319 3,741 655 4,251 10,521 3,768	492 5,353 ⁽¹⁾ 4,151 3,926 850 516 1,341	13,749 11,972 7,302 6,616 6,731 779 1,882 2,713 7,862 14,800 31 8,242 18,643 7,780 850 516 3,229 385 946 295 5,679
Total	75,316	25,983	16,629	121,002

^{1.} Co-Arab produced transmission = 3079 minutes.

Programme transmission during 1977, On Channel 7

TABLE 8.11

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total transmission (in minutes)
News Political	14,588 1,377	46	284	14,588 1,707
Cultural	14,571			14,571
Developmental	1,053			1,053
Entertainment	1,075	149	100	1,324
Documentaries	261	40	73	374
Series	333	210		543
Religious	2,383	2,354		4,737
School activiti	ies 4 , 209			4,209
Songs and music	5,335	9,496	2,182	17,013
Serial	1,514	3,303	3 , 307	8,124
Films		354	537	891
Short films			8,241	8,241
Sport films			1,360	1,360
Sport (outside				
broadcast	6,039		1,454	7,493
School lessons	7,033			7,033
Current affairs				460
Intervals	5,139			5,139
Total	65,320	15,952	17,538	98,810
	•	•		

Programme transmission during 1978, On Channel 7

TABLE 8.12

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total transmission (in minutes)
News Political Cultural Developmental	16,502 2,583 8,192 776	128	344	16,502 3,055 8,192 776
Entertainment Documentaries Series Religious School activit	1,034 413 956 3,819 ies 5,410	75 44 28 1,353	3,309 320	4,418 777 984 5,172 5,410
Songs and musi Serial Films Short films	• _	1,832 564	3,646 3,684 1,646 6,476 1,308	7,685 5,654 1,646 6,476 1,308
Sport films Sport (outside broadcast) School lessons Current affair	4,146 10,959		2,173	6,319 10,959 584
Educational Children Plays Intervals	2,187 1,412 248 5,677	250	2,301	2,187 3,963 248 5,677
Total	68,511	4,274	25,207	97,992

TABLE 8.13

Programme transmission during 1979, On Channel 7

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total transmission (in minutes)
News	15,205	- 50	602	15,205
Political	1,108 5,077	279	602	1,989 5,077
Cultural Entertainment	376	62	4,929	5,367
Developmental	1,773	16	8	1,773 219
Documentaries	165	46	_	
Series	-	•		402
Plays	402	7 467		5,009
Religious	3,542	1,467	1,179	3,145
Children	1,966		1,17	4,207
School activit		1 (7)	1,262	5,324
Songs and musi-		1,671	2,623	7,191
Serial	660	3,908	3,987	3,987
Films			7,900	7.900
Short films			1,003	1,003
Sport films			1,003	1,000
Sport (outside		2 424	1,565	10,231
broadcast)	6,232	2,434	1,505	1,276
Current affair	•			13,833
School lessons	•			1,439
Educational Intervals	1,439 5,139			5,139
THICET NOTE	2,137			•
Total	64,048	9,867	25,058	98,973

TABLE 8.14

Programme transmission during January - August 1980,
On Channel 7

Programme	Home Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Arab Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Foreign Produced Programmes transmission (in minutes)	Total transmission (in minutes)
News	10,184			10,184
Political	2,898	52	171	3,121
Cultural	3,889			3,889
Entertainment	556	185	2,568	3,309
Developmental	1,451			1,451
Documentaries	228	107	28	363
Plays	151			151
Religious	2,132	1,195		3,327
Children	346	170	892	1,853(1)
School activiti				2,707
Songs and music	•	1,880	328	4,035
Serial	551	3,683	2,143	6,377
Films		90	2,444	2,534
Short films	5,191			5,191
Sport films	545			545
Sport (outside	1 072	200	7 427	9,698
<pre>broadcast) Current affairs</pre>	1,973	298	7,427 50	9 , 696
School lessons			50	6,939
Educational	6 , 939 650			650
Youth and sport				15
Intervals	3,845			3,845
COT V (LTD	5,045			3,0.3
Total	46,078	7,660	16,051	70,234

^{1.} Co-Arab Produced transmission = 445 minutes.

CHAPTER NINE

Television and Two Villages; A Case Study

The village in Iraq: A historical perspective:

Rural Iraq was a tribal society both in its economy and social organization, based on egalitarianism. The village tribes were largely out of government control. Gradually, in the late nineteenth century, under the influence of westernization (i.e. introduction of technology, establishment of new communication systems with the outside world) led to changes in the relations between tribal leaders and their tribesmen. The leader became the landowner and tribesmen became the peasants. However, one of the objects of the 1958 revolution was to release peasants from feudal exploitation (see agriculture section for more details).

After the 1968 revolution, the ruling Ba'th party acted to achieve a socialist transformation in rural areas (and in Iraq as a whole), by the political mobilization of the peasantry. The party tried to create institutions and organizations which in the long run, would become the dominant, and eventually, the sole power in rural areas.

The party believed that social and political affiliations should be shifted from the tribe to the party and its ideology. Thereafter they concentrated on eradicating tribal values and practices which they considered an obstacle to development.

Most of the rural population had Bedouin origins. (1)
So, their practices stemmed from their tribal background.
Some of their practices may be summarised as follows: (2)

1. Contempt for manual work. The Bedouins spent most of their time travelling, looking for water and food for their animals.

- 2. Contempt for arable farming and market gardening.
- 3. Contempt for livestock farming.

It was observed that village life in Iraq has been collective rather than individualistic in nature. (3)

Until recent years, many villagers considered the government as alien, corrupt, predatory, and repressive. (4)
Gulick's description of patrilineal segmentary kinship structure in the Middle East is typical of Iraq villagers.
He stated that important and binding kinship ties are not

 Al-Helali, A., Tribal Values and its Impact on Rural Economy, Al-Turath Al-Sha'bi (Folklore Monthly magazine), No's. 9-10, Vol.1, May, June 1964, (Arabic), p.16.

^{1.} Fernea, Robert Alan, <u>Irrigation and social organization among the ElShabana - A group of tribal cultivators in Southern Iraq</u>, 1959, Ph.D. thesis (unpublished), The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, p.45.

Jack S.McCrary and M.Sa'eed, The Social Characteristics of the Population of Iraq, 1968, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, p.109.

^{4.} John Gulick, Village and City: Cultural Continuities in Twentieth Century Middle Eastern Cultures, In, Ira M.Lapidus, (ed.), Middle Eastern Cities, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angèles, 1969, p.123.

limited to the members of individual households. Ideally, brothers are expected to support each other throughout life. There are stronger expectations of this sort among cousins and other relatives (especially patrilineal ones) than there are in the West. Although these expectations are complicated by a number of seriously conflicting emotions, they can have considerable force. (1)

However, the influence of the towns has radiated into surrounding rural areas and the isolation of the village is breaking down. (2) In sum, several factors have helped to shift villagers towards modern horizons. The visits of villagers to towns, moving to gain education, looking for jobs. The impact of government projects in rural areas, and later the penetration of radio and, later, television, which may become the fastest means of linking rural and urban areas.

^{1.} Ibid, p.124.

Harries, G.L., <u>Iraq its people</u>, its culture, its society, op.cit., p.305.

The Two Villages:

Saddam Hussien Village

Why were these two particular villages chosen? I chose Saddam Hussien (S.H.) village for a number of different reasons. Firstly, all houses in the village were provided with free television sets by the government. Secondly, the village was isolated in the Marshes, the nearest city being about seven kilometres distance by boat. Thirdly, most people remained illiterate even after the 1968 revolution. There were no schools, no health centres and no means of government administration in the village. So, television became a "window" on the external world, combined with a school for children, a centre for the eradication of illiteracy, a mobile health centre and a resource for many branches of party and popular organizations.

I heard of this village for the first time after starting my study at Keele university, when I received some Iraqi newspapers and magazines.

Saddam Hussien village is situated on the Marshes in Southern Iraq. The only way to reach this village was by boat. Administratively, the village was affiliated to Al-Chebaysh district. All the houses in the village were reed huts built on patches of dried reed. The village did have one mixed primary school. The rate of illiteracy in the early 1970's was 100 per cent. In 1980, about 100

people remained illiterate. The direct impact of the National development plan upon the village is nil, though there were some indirect benefits. The people depended for their living on fishing, and some of them were reedgatherers. There was no agriculture in the area because of continual flooding. The population of Saddam Hussien was estimated at about 800 inhabitants. Electricity was provided by a small generator, which usually worked from 4p.m. until midnight, or a little less, (this nearly corresponds to the time of television transmission). It is thought that the government arranged the type and times of electrification to allow people to watch television and use light in the evenings. In reviewing the literature which has been written about the Marshe people, one finds great differences between the life of the Marshe people before the 1970's and in recent years. Nevertheless, many aspects of life remain unchanged. It is my belief that Saddam Hussien village is representative of other villages in the area.

The main features of life in the marshes are:

1. That the people depend on the following activities for their income: reed-gathering and delivery of reeds to the Basrah paper factory. This factory's production is dependent on the Marshes for 85 per cent of its reeds.

- 2. Fishing and bird hunting: the output is marketed in Baghdad and the central provinces. The average family income from fishing is about 300-400 I.D. per year.
- 3. Hand-made local products depends on reed-gathering, a number of cottage industries use these to make carpets, baskets and other similar artifacts.
- 4. Large number of buffaloes are bred in the marshes, which provide a range of dairy products; milk, cream, butter and cheese.
- 5. Small field crops are grown in the area, such as rice and vegetables, for local needs.

Until the late 1970's, the main road connecting El-Chebaysh with the provincial centre was cut off by floods many times a year. This led to food shortages and the isolation of the area. In 1979, the government spent 12 million I.D. to build a new road to El-Chebaysh. However, the main link between Saddam Hussien village and the outside is to El-Chebaysh district centre. At this point some data about the centre might be useful. (1)

In 1976-77 there were two primary schools for boys, one for girls and 14 mixed schools (in the whole El-Chebyash district). There were 863 girls in various classes and 2,327 boys. Male teachers numbered 62 whilst female teachers numbered 13. In 1976, there was one hospital

^{1.} The data was provided to the researcher personally by the Ministry of Planning in Baghdad.

and eight health institutions, including two doctors, one dentist, and 31 paramedicals. The number of El-Chebaysh population centre was 25,121. So, there was one hospital-bed to 1,396 persons, one doctor to 12,561 and one dentist for the centre's population. However, the number of doctors and dentists was increased after 1977. Before 1977, Saddam Hussien people used to go to El-Chebaysh if they were ill.

Elentesar village:

Elentesar village is situated near Baghdad, about 18 kilometres distant. Administratively, it is subject to the Al-Rashidyah district. Elentesar is similar to most Iraqi villages in its socio-economic system and practices. The houses in the village were built of mud, but the more recent roofs were built from breeze-blocks or bricks. Elentesar was characterized by a high level of illiteracy. When the eradication of illiteracy campaign was started in 1978, 18 males and 46 females joined the eradication of illiteracy centres. In 1980, everyone up to the age of 45 joined eradication of illiteracy centres or schools. Elderly people remained the only category who were illiterate.

People earned their living from agriculture and related work. Two modern buildings were put up in the village: a new primary school and a health centre.

The last of these is located in a huge caravan, which originally belonged to the Arab organization for the eradication of illiteracy and adult education. (This organization attempted a pilot project for the eradication of illiteracy in Elentesar village, but it later gave up). Pure water was provided to the villagers by a small water strainer, run by a local worker. There was no paved road to the village linking it with other villages, or to the main road. There was no regular public transport to the village. Going by the above features, one might classify Elentesar as an isolated village. The population of Elentesar was estimated at about 800 inhabitants. Interviewees stated that all householders had television Unlike Saddam Hussien village, people in Elentesar sets. village purchased their own television sets. Electricity was provided to the village, so there was no problem in receiving television transmissions.

In recent decades, there has been a major change in Al-Rashidyah's economic system - a shift from a subsistence economy, designed to fulfill local needs, to a cash economy, with its emphasis on products like cotton, vegetables, and fruits (that bring in more money and, consequently, more profit). (1)

In neighbouring villages around Elentesar, the people

^{1.} Ayad Al-Qazzaz, review books, American Anthropologist, Vol.76, No.2. June 1974, pp.74-76.

belong to the same tribe as the majority of Elentesar villagers and all share the same agricultural practices. A researcher concluded that there is a great similarity between Al-Rashidyah (and Elentesar as a part of it) and other villages' political and socio-economic systems. (1) The Media and Village Life:

Rural areas in Iraq are exposed to the following mass media; electronic (i.e. television and radio), printed; (i.e. newspapers, books, etc.); and by personal contact, with civil servants, officials, teachers, agricultural staff etc.; or by visiting cities, or visits to and from their relations living in urban areas.

The Iraqi mass media whose work is directed towards rural areas are:

- 1. Television: channels one and two.
- 2. Radio Baghdad.
- 3. The "Voice of the People" radio.
- 4. Daily and weekly newspapers and magazines.

All the above, include programme slots and newspaper space specially allocated for rural areas. Also the more general programmes and news items may be of interest to the rural population as well.

The following case study will reveal the relationships between the villagers and television in some detail.

Alaiddin J. Al-Bayati, <u>Al-Rashidayh-Social and Anthropological Study</u>, 1977, <u>Baghdad</u>, Al-Numan Press, (Arabic) p.9.

However, a brief discussion of televisions relations to village life would seem to be useful.

As mentioned previously, the Iraqi government and the Ba'th party have a policy of distributing free television sets to villagers, especially in remote areas. The official viewpoint of the distribution of television stated that television would help to bridge the gap between urban and rural areas.

In addition to the distribution of television sets, the government established modern villages for many people who used to live under primitive conditions in widely dispersed settlements, which has meant that they could not be provided with various amenities (i.e. pure water, electricity, health centres, etc.). The modern villages were provided with one television set per householder. In addition to the other amenities mentioned. The distribution of television sets in some remote areas, may take other forms. For example, government provided popular organization. centres, coffeehouses and agricultural cooperative centres with television sets. A part of the results of the following case study will deal with recognized effects of television programmes on village life.

Characteristics of Villagers:

The main characteristics of rural populations, in terms of the village unit, is its similarity in customs,

behaviour, habits, and production practices (i.e. the homogeneous socio-economic system).

In Iraq, most villagers, in such areas belong to the same tribe or clan. In general, there is a kinship between village people. In the past, there was usually a respected person in the village who was regarded as a leader and who gave judgments on most matters concerning the villager's lives. Also, in past years, feudal, religious and family leaders took a dominant role in rural life. Nowadays (i.e. since the Ba'th Party established its control in the 1970's), these powers came into the hands of the party, party organizations, and Party leaders in most areas of rural Iraq. These powers covered most political, social Most male and economic aspects of rural activities. villagers seem to have some sort of relationship with party organizations. So, the influence of the party upon villagers is direct. By and large, most people in the age groups between 15-40 have relations with the party. More than 50 per cent of people aged between 40-50 years also have some connection with the party. Few people over 50 years of age actually join the party. This point reveals the power of the party to orientate village socio-economic systems. Furthermore, all villagers receive the same information and are able to discuss it together. The party transmits, internally, via its cells, its opinion on

current affairs and a variety of other matters.) 9.1 shows the total number of people with whom I spoke in "Elentesar" and "Saddam Hussien" villages, comprising 90 males and 70 females. The total population of the two villages was approximately 1600, (800 inhabitants in each village). The number of interviewees represented 10 per cent of the total population. As for age distribution, 16.9 per cent of interviewees in both villages were males aged between 15 and 20. 4.4 per cent were in the age group 20-30, 9.4 per cent were aged 30-40, 15.6 per cent were aged 40-50, and 10 per cent were aged between 50 and 60. Female age groups for both villages were as follows: 11.2 per cent were aged 15-20, 14.4 per cent were aged 20-30, 14.4 per cent were aged 30-40 and 3.7 per cent were between 40 and 50 years of age. The number of females in the 20-30 age group was higher than the number of males in the same age group. It was recognized that there were very few females aged over 40 years; this was the lowest figure for any age group. Whilst the highest figure was for the male age group between 15-20 years. The random (1) interview demonstrated that most intervieweees were in youthful age

^{1.} The object of any sampling procedure is to secure a sample which will reproduce the characteristics of the population. See: John Madge, The Tool of Social Science, Longman, 1953, London, pp.207-8, The random sample was defined by Paul Bellaby and John Whittaker as follows: a sample in which any particular number of the population under study is just as likely to be chosen as any other member, a seminar at Keele University, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, (The Role of Statistics in Sociology/Anthropology), Mimeographed, 1.3.1979

TABLE 9.1.

Age distribution for interviewees of Elentesar and Saddam Hussien villages according to sex.

Distrib in year		No.of peo Elentesar Male	ple Saddam Hussien Male	Total	Percentage
15-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60		16 4 7 15 8	11 3 8 10 8	27 7 15 25 16	16.9 4.4 9.4 15.6 10.0
15-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60		Female 7 9 10 9	Female 11 14 13 2	18 23 23 6	11.2 14.4 14.4 3.7
	Total	80	80	160	100.0

groups of 15-40. This accounted for 70.7 per cent of all interviewees. Also, Table 9.1 indicates the small number of males in the age group 20-30. The reason for the decline in this number is due to the fact that most village people were working or studying somewhere outside the village, and some of them were doing national service in the armed forces.

In sum, the age groups of both male and female interviewees for both villages are as follows: 28.13 per cent were up to 20 years old, 18.75 per cent between 20-30, 23.75 per cent were 30-40, 19.37 per cent were 40-50, and 10 per cent were between 50-60.

Per Capita income:

The average monthly income per householder for Saddam Hussien village was 117 I.D., and 114 I.D. for householders in Elentesar village. Per capita income for the two villages seems too high, comparing it with official statistics which stated that per capita income for the Iraqi population was 63.65 I.D. in 1979. (1)

In general, the above income levels enabled people to purchase television sets and other modern facilities, although there was free distribution of television sets by the government to Saddam Hussien village. In personal discussions, many village people recognized that, "some

^{1.} Ministry of Culture and Information, Revolution and Development in Iraq, op.cit., p.40.

young men and women have been immensely influenced by television, that they have attempted to imitate what they have seen on television; for example, they sometimes try to provide themselves with flashy clothes and urban food". These young people used some kinds of equipment which they had never used before, (domestic appliances, such as: gas cookers, refrigerators, deep freezers, etc.), and these changes led people to change some of their old daily habits. The changes occurred because of the influence of television programmes. However, the increased per capita income in the last few years allowed some people to enjoy modern products for the first time. Among these products were television programmes.

Villages and education:

The educational level of villagers was as follows:
The number of females possessing the education certificate was nil. The reason for this was the segregation of women in the past, and poor educational facilities. Males also suffered from low levels of education. The questionnaire included questions about literacy and I elicited further information about illiteracy from the area education authority. Generally speaking, poor conditions in rural areas included poor educational facilities. Table 9.2 shows that 69.4 per cent of total interviewees were illiterate. 28.1 per cent had primary school certificates.

TABLE 9.2. Educational level by certificate

Kind of certificate	Elentesar	Saddam Hussien	Total	8
None (Illiterate) Primary school	59 1 7	52 28	111 45	69.4 28.1
Intermediate school	-	_	-	
Secondary school	-	_	_	
Other than secondary S.	-	4	4	2.5

Whilst 2.5 per cent had certificates above secondary school level. The last category included some village officials, while the educated people of both villages left their villages to work outside it or complete their studies in the main cities. Others were doing military service. In contrast, some people not having an educational certificate had spent some time in school.

To sum up, the level of education by certificate was low, in both villages. This educational level would seem to be similar to the levels of most other Iraqi villages.

Viewing:

Viewers were asked where the television was positioned in their houses. The purpose of this question was to find out whether the visitors also watched television or not (visiting is the most frequent of social life practices in rural Iraq). It was also important to know if viewers' families watched television or not. The answers suggested

that families watched television programmes as well as their visitors. On the other hand, all respondents pointed out that they possessed their own television sets. So, normally, there was no problem in getting access to a television.

Viewing time according to male age groups is shown in Table 9.3. I did not ask women about their viewing time because they spend most of their time at home. So, one supposes that they watch television for longer than the men. Secondly, it would have been considered unacceptable for a stranger to ask the women the large numbers of questions necessary to my study.

In Elentesar village the television-viewing population under 40 years old is as shown in Table 9.3; 3.7 per cent watched for one hour, 11.1 per cent for two hours, 40.8 per cent watched for three hours and 44.4 per cent for more than four hours. Whilst for people aged over 40 years television viewing was as follows: 4.3 per cent watched for one hour, 43.5 per cent for two hours, 26.1 per cent for three hours and 26.1 per cent for more than four hours. Table 9.3 also, shows that 85.2 per cent of the population under 40 years old watched television for more than three hours per day, which gives an indication of the high potential influence of television on this group.

In Saddam Hussien village, people under 40 years old spend the following time watching television: 23.8 per cent watched two hours. 42.9 per cent for three hours and 33.3

TABLE 9.3

Viewing time according to age (Males) and village
Figures as percentage

		Elentesar	Village
Viewing time		less than 40 years old	More than 40 years old
One hour Two hours Three hours Four hours More than four hour	rs	3.7 11.1 40.8 44.4	4.3 43.5 26.1 26.1
	Total	100.0	100.0
		Saddam Hus	sien Village
One hour Two hours Three hours Four hours More than four hour	s	23.8 42.9 33.3	21.1 52.5 21.1 5.3
	Total	100.0	100.0

per cent for four hours or more. People over 40 years spent this time as follows: 21.1 per cent watched for one hour, 52.5 per cent for two hours, 21.2 per cent for three hours and 5.3 per cent for four hours. People under 40 years watched television for longer than people over 40 years old because it introduced a variety of information and new perspectives into their closed societies.

Preferred programmes:

People of the two villages according to their age and sex favoured the following programmes (measured by frequencies as shown in Table 9.4). Men in the age group between 15-40 preferred the following programmes: local plays, news, health, sports, current affairs, sciences, entertainment, Arab plays and Arab-produced and foriegn films, children's programmes and cartoons, agriculture, education and development programmes. Men in the age group 40-60 preferred the following programmes: News, current affairs, entertainment, health, local plays, sciences, agriculture, development and education. Whilst women's programme preferences were as follows: local plays, current affairs, news, health, sports, sciences, entertainment, Arab plays and films, education, development and agriculture. Table 9.4 suggests that in the age groups 15-40, the first preference was local plays, which would seem to indicate that they liked watching things which reflect their daily lives.

TABLE 9.4

Favourite programmes according to age, sex, by frequencies (1)

Programme	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60	Women
News Local plays Current affairs Health Arab plays and films Sports Science Children and cartoon Entertainment Education	2	1	3
	1	5	1
	5	2	2
	3	4	4
	8	-	8
	4	6	5
	6	-	6
	9	3	7
	7	9	9
Agriculture	10	7	11
Development	12	8	10

 The following programmes were also chosen, folk songs, cultural films, religion, folk poet, but the numbers for these were too low to affect the table. I personally observed the popularity of local plays and series, and discussed this with the director general of Iraqi broadcasting. I asked him, why Iraqi broadcasting did not increase the number of this sort of programme to aid the achievement of developmental and broadcasting aims. The reply stated that skill shortages were the main obstacle. (1)

Women, also, regarded local plays as their first preference whilst men in the age group 40-60 years made local plays their fifth choice. This last category regarded local plays as "childish" and not suitable for their age and the hard lives they had led.

News came as the first preference for men in the age group 40-60 years, while it came in the second place for men in the 15-40 age group and in third place for women. Broadly speaking, Iraqi people, including villagers, are interested in news and political questions, partly, because they have some relationship with political parties and partly because they are accustomed to discussing political matters with each other.

It is difficult to distinguish between news and current affairs programmes on Iraqi television. However, current affairs includes commentary and reports on one or

^{1.} Personal interview with Mr. Hamid Saaid, On 11.12,1981.

two subjects, whilst news includes several items and events of the day. Nevertheless, men in the 40-60 age group and women, made current affairs their second preference whilst it came in fifth place for men in the age group 15-40. This might be explained by the fact that men in the age groups 15-40 receive a lot of information through their relations with party organizations, and they are accustomed to following up several sources of information. Men in the age groups 15-40 put health programmes in third place, whilst men in the age groups 40-60, and women, put it in fourth place.

Villagers respected the truth of health information.

The long-term shortage of health facilities in rural areas, in the past, led people to depend on self-help methods of health care.

Other development programmes, including education and agriculture received low levels of preference. In fact, most Iraqi programmes, include several items concerning socio-economic development and ideas reflecting development goals.

In Elentesar and Saddam Hussien villages, viewers stated that they watch television in their own homes, because they possessed their own television sets, unlike many villagers in other areas, who still watch television

in the coffeehouses or in the cooperative societies. Women and children, usually stay at home more than men, so they may watch television in the house, if they possess a television set. Otherwise, they may watch television at a neighbour's house or a relative's.

Illiterates and television:

For illiterates, there were questions about watching illiteracy eradication programmes in previous years. Table 9.5 shows that 7.4 per cent of men in the age group 15-40 in Elentesar village and 60.9 per cent of men in the age group 40-60 watched these programmes. Whilst in Saddam Hussien village 23.8 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 52.6 per cent of the age group 40-60 years watched them.

TABLE 9.5

The percentage of illiterates viewing illiteracy eradication programmes in previous years.

Village	Age groups 15-40 years	Age groups 40 - 60 years
Elentesar	7.4	60.9
Saddam Hussien	23.8	52.6

In fact, people recently started watching television programmes and somehow this viewing accompanied the establishment of the eradication of illiteracy centres. The question was developed to check whether or not television programmes for illiterates were the basis of

their education or whether it was due to the illiteracy eradication centres. Table 9.6 shows that 3.7 per cent of men in the age groups 15-40 stated that television programmes were helpful, as did 13.0 per cent of men in the age group 40-60. 39.1 per cent stated that television programmes partly helped them to educate themselves.

TABLE 9.6

The percentage of people considering literacy programmes of importance

Village	Age group	15-40	Age group	40-60
	Helpful	Partly	Helpful	Partly
Elentesar	3.7	-	13.0	39.1
Saddam Hussien	14.3	4.8	5.3	31.6

In Saddam Hussien village 14.3 per cent of men in the age groups 15-40 stated that television programmes were helpful and 4.8 per cent stated they were partly helpful.

Whilst 5.3 per cent of men in the age group 40-60 from the same village pointed out that it was helpful, 31.6 per cent stated it was partly helpful. Given these figures, it is, I believe, very difficult, at this early stage of education, to distinguish between the television factor and the schools factors in the education of illiterates (i.e. the helpfulness of television programmes is obvious, but to measure it would require a different study from this one).

The television authorities encouraged the National

campaign for the eradication of illiteracy by placing lessons and programmes for illiterates between 8.30-9.0p.m. every evening on both channels. So, many viewers watching television at a fixed time, followed literacy programmes.

Health programmes

Table 9.7 shows the percentage viewing of health education programmes. In Elentesar village 6.3 per cent of men aged 15-40 years, watched health programmes. 69.6 per cent aged 40-60 years watched the same programmes. In Saddam Hussien village 100 per cent of all men watched health programmes. It is believed that Saddam Hussien villagers suffered badly over a long period of time from not having any sort of health services. Because the village is more isolated than Elentesar village, its people tried to become self-reliant in the matter of health problems.

TABLE 9.7
Percentage viewing health programmes

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	96.3	69.6
Saddam Hussien	100.0	100.0

On the other hand, Elentesar villagers could go to the capital (just 18 kilometres) or to Al-Rashidyah district before their village got its own health centre.

In general, interviewees agreed that watching health prgorammes was useful. Table 9.8 shows that in Elentesar village 70.4 per cent believed it was very important, 25.9

TABLE 9.8

The usefulness of television health programmes as seen by villagers, by percentage

Village	Age gravery import-	not	not	Age gr very import- ant	not	not
Elentesar Saddam Hussien	70.4 61.9	25.9 38.1		26.1 10.5	69.6 89.5	

per cent stated it was not very important and 3.7 per cent said it was not important at all. The percentages of the age group 40-60 answering the previous question were; 26.1, 69.6 and 4.3 respectively. In Saddam Hussien village 61.9 per cent believed it was very important and 38.1 per cent believed it was not very important, whilst in the age groups 40-60,10.5 per cent stated that it was very important and 89.5 per cent said that it was not very important.

Interviewees who believed that the health education programmes were very important, depended on programmes for much of their health information. While interviewees who stated that television health programmes were not very important, either had some health information or found some television health programme information was too complicated for them (i.e. operations, laboratories ...) and some interviewees did not understand medical expressions.

People frequently believed in folk medicine in the past because it was the only available means of alleviating disease. But, over the last 15 years, some improvements were made in the health services in rural areas. So, it was important for the purposes of this study to know whether

previous attitudes towards folk medicine were still strong or whether people had started to believe in modern health services. Table 9.9 shows that 40.7 per cent of Elentesar men in the age group 15-40 stated that their attitudes had changed towards medicine and 100 per cent of the age groups 40-60 stated likewise. In Saddam Hussien village 38.1 per cent of the age group 15-40 pointed out that their attitudes had changed and 100 per cent of the age group 40-60 stated likewise. In fact, all interviewees made it clear that they believed in the new medicine. This percentage was less in the 15-40 age group in both villages, due to the fact that several interviewees had no old attitudes towards medicine anyway, because of their youth.

TABLE 9.9

The acceptance of the idea that television had changed attitudes towards medicine

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	40.7	100.0
Saddam Hussien	38.1	100.0

The percentage of acceptance that television had affected people and guided them into new attitudes towards medicine. In Elentesar village, 13.7 per cent of the 15-40 age group agreed that television had had a great

effect upon them for having a new attitude towards medicine and 13.0 per cent of the age group 40-60 stated the same. In Saddam Hussien village, 4.5 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 5.3 per cent of the age group 40-60 have agreed that television programmes information has helped to change their attitudes towards medicine.

Another question asked to further check villagers' attitudes towards medicine was where they were taken when they were ill. Three possibilities were chosen for questioning: firstly, the doctor; secondly, a religious place, and thirdly, being left to "God's care" or, in other words, doing nothing. Table 9.10 shows that 4.7 per cent of men in the age group 15-40 in Saddam Hussien village stated that the patient could be left to "God's care". The remainder said that they would take the patient to a doctor.

As a matter of interest, health officials complained of the huge number of people visiting health centres each day, without being genuinely ill. Health officials stated that villagers liked coming to the health centres and receiving treatment. Free health services and free medicines made it possible, to improve villagers' health considerably. Of interviewees who stated that they took their patient to a doctor in the case of illness (see Table 9.11), 14.8 per cent of Elentesar men in the age group 15-40 years

TABLE 9.10
Where do you take the patient who is ill?

Village and age group	Doctor	Religious Place	Doing Nothing
Elentesar Age group 15-40 Age group 40-60	100.0	<u>-</u>	-
Saddam Hussien Age group 15-40 Age group 40-60	95.3 100.0	-	4.7

TABLE 9.11

The percentage of those stating that television persuasion encouraged them to **g**o to a doctor

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	14.8	47.8
Saddam Hussien	14.3	10.5

stated that television programmes had persuaded them to go to a doctor and 47.8 per cent of the age group 40-60 said the same. In Saddam Hussien village 14.3 per cent of men in the age group 15-40 and 10.5 per cent of the age group 40-60 agreed that television programmes persuaded them to do so. Several factors encouraged other villagers to take their patients to a doctor, among them, the spread of education, health campaigns, and the existence of health centres around the villages.

The revenge custom:

The revenge custom prevalent in rural areas for many years has also been influenced by the spread of television. The flow of television programmes into rural areas combined with party education against the revenge custom made some progress towards the eradication of this custom. Iraqi television presented several programmes, plays and films (drawn up on broadcasting plan lines) to this end. So, the usefulness of television programmes in changing villagers' attitudes about the revenge custom, is, broadly speaking, as follows: Table 9.12 shows that 74.1 per cent of Elentesar men in the age group 15-40 and 39.1 per cent of men aged 40-60 were agreed that they no longer believed in the revenge custom. 76.2 per cent of the Saddam Hussien age group 40-60 also agreed. After discussing the revenge custom with villagers, and according to the researcher information, it

is believed that the ratio of interviewees who reject the idea of revenge is far-reaching. Many people were influenced by their political or social status. Other interviewees, however, agreed that they still believed in revenge.

TABLE 9.12

Do television programmes affect old customs, by percentage

Village	Agen group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	74.1	39.1 47.4
Saddam Hussien	76.2	4/.4

Summing up, social change occurred slowly in rural areas under the influence of the mass media and other factors. In this sense, one may say, that television programmes can accelerate socio-economic change.

Television and agriculture:

In past years, most peasants in several areas in rural Iraq, especially in the South did not grow vegetables. They regarded it as a "shameful" job. Thus, it seems that most peasants, who were of Bedouin origin, had a weak relation to the land. For them, the most respected crops were wheat and barley. However, 25.9 per cent of Elentesar men aged 40-60 years stated that television programmes had

persuaded them to grow new crops. In Saddam Hussien village there is no cultivation because of continuing flooding in the Marshes. In fact, under market demand and the spread of new ideas and practices, most peasants started growing vegetables. The following list shows the new agricultural products which have been cultivated in Elentesar village; aubergines, peppers, tomatoes, green peas, radishes, water melons, cucumbers and cotton.

In sum, television programmes may persuade peasants to grow new crops to improve their standard of living, and thus, indirectly, contributed to national development goals in the sense of increasing production. It is difficult to say that television programmes were the sole means of persuading peasants to increase production although a high percentage of peasants said that television had been an important influence in the making of their decisions. per cent of the age group 15-40 years and 100 per cent of the age group 40-60 of Elentesar village stating so. 9.13 shows the percentage of villagers who believed that television programmes persuaded peasants to increase their production. 44.4 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 73.9 per cent of the age group 40-60 from Elentesar village and 9.5 per cent of the group aged 15-40 and 47.4 per cent of the age group 40-60 from Saddam Hussien village agreed that television programmes influenced them to increase production.

TABLE 9.13

Percentage of villagers who believed that television programmes persuaded people to increase productivity

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	44.4	73 . 9
Saddam Hussien	9.5 (1)	47 . 4

1. Increasing of productivity in Saddam Hussien village is about fishing and reed-gathering and other local production.

It should be kept in mind that increasing production in Saddam Hussien village was in the field of fishing, reed-gathering and other local products.

One important point recognized through discussion with peasants was that several government authorities had helped peasants to increase their production. So, with government help and the encouragement of the mass media, peasants worked hard to achieve increased production and create spiritual motives to participate in the development process.

Those using television programmes on agriculture in Elentesar village which the villagers adapted to their own methods of cultivation represented 40.7 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 26.1 per cent of the age group 40-60. Nevertheless, agricultural innovations were made such as

the establishment of cooperative societies and farms. The state tried to spread cooperative societies and farms to create new socio-economic relations in rural areas.

7.4 per cent of the age groups 15-40 and the 13 per cent of the age groups 40-60 were persuaded by television programmes to join cooperatives. The reason for this low percentage, might be put down to party intervention and its role in organizing peasants to join cooperatives.

Television and Women:

Women's programmes and several television programmes emphasized the equality of men and women, as well as party literature, which all aimed to educate people towards its acceptance. An indirect question was asked based on a celebrated old Arabic saying which stated that women care less about religion than men. Men in both villages agreed that they should be equal to women in rights and duties. The percentage of those accepting the notion of equality is shown in Table 9.14. In Elentesar village the percentage was 40.7 of men aged 15-40 and 26.1 per cent aged 40-60. In Saddam Hussien village 95.2 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 36.8 per cent of those aged 40-60 believed like-Another question was asked concerning the effect of television programmes on encouraging the idea of equality. Answers were as follows, according to the means of information/ guidance: the party had the greatest influence, followed

TABLE 9.14

Acceptance of the idea of equality between men and women, by percentage

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	40.7	26.1
Saddam Hussien	95.2	36.8

by television programmes, and education (schools).

To investigate further women's position in rural areas, two questions were asked about the enrolment of girls in schools, as an index of the belief in women's equality. Table 9.15 shows that in Elentesar village 40.7 per cent of men aged 15-40 and 87 per cent of men aged 40-60 and 66.6 per cent from Saddam Hussien village aged 15-40 and 84.2 per cent of the age group 40-60 had female relatives in schools. Nevertheless, when investigating the importance of television in persuading rural males to allow their females to enrol in schools, the following results were obtained: Table 9.16 shows that in Elentesar village 11.1 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 17.4 per cent of the age group 40-60, and of Saddam Hussien village males, 57.1 per cent of the age group 15-40 agreed that television was the sole factor. In fact, some respondents there had no female relatives in of school age.

TABLE 9.15
Enrolment of girl relatives in schools

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	40.7	87.0
Saddam Hussien	66.6	84.2

TABLE 9.16

Those answering 'Yes' to the previous Table: Have television programmes influenced you in allowing to accept girls to enrol in schools, by percentage

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	11.1	17.4
Saddam Hussien	57.1	-

The main factor influencing enrolment seems to have been the compulsory education law, which obliged parents to send their sons and daughters to schools. The impact of television amongst women in the villages under investigation was as follows: in both villages for all age groups, 100 per cent agreed that television had has some impact on village women. Table 9.17 shows areas of influence. The age group between 15-40 years in both villages were agreed that television's first significant impact was on general cleanliness, and secondly, on education. In Elentesar village, other areas so influenced were; child rearing, cooking, home care, clothes, and new practices

(i.e. immitating urban women's style of speaking).

In Saddam Hussien village the areas of influence were; clothes, child rearing, cooking, home care, and new practices.

Men aged 40-60 in both villages were agreed that cleanliness was the practice most affected by television. In Elentesar village men believed that the following areas were affected by television programmes: education, home care, clothes, child rearing, cooking and new practices, whilst in Saddam Hussien village these were: education, clothes, cooking, home care, child rearing and new practices. From the women's point of view, the women of Elentesar village believed that television influenced women in the following areas (according to frequencies): education, cleanliness, home care, cooking, child rearing, clothes, and new practices, whilst the women of Saddam Hussien village placed these in the following order: cleanliness, education, home care, clothes, cooking, child rearing, and new practices. Nevertheless, the two main subjects influenced by the impact of television on women were education and health.

One noticed through observation and discussion that villagers believed that women had learned from television and imitated several things seen on television. Recently,

TABLE 9.17

How television programmes affect women, according to answers, by frequencies

Subject	Age group Elentesar		Age group Elentesar		Women Elentesar	S.H.
Cleanliness	1	1	1	1	2	1
Clothes	6	3	4	3	б	4
Cooking	4	7	6	4	4	5
Education	2	2	2	2	1	2
Child rearing	3	4	5	6	5	6
Home care	5	5	3	5	3	3
New practices	7	6	7	7	5	6

women have gathered a lot of information about their country and the external world, which has not happened previously. Villagers were so concerned about conditions of hygiene, that several notices were put up about changing habits of hygiene. Women were regarded as the most backward sector in rural areas, so the effect of television on them was clearly recognized.

Television and Politics:

Sources of political information and news were provided mainly, via four channels: Radio, Television, Newspapers, and the people themselves (or party organizations). Table 9.18 shows which people depended on the above four media. Of those in the Elentesar age group 15-40, 22.6 per cent

TABLE 9.18
Political information and resources

Type of Source	Age group Elentesar		Age group Elentesar	
Radio	22.6	33.3	30.4	15.8
Television	70.4	52.4	56.5	63.2
Newspaper	7.4	14.3	8.7	_
People	_	_	4.4	21.0

listened to the radio, 70.4 per cent watched television and 7.4 per cent read newspapers, while 33.3 per cent of Saddam Hussien villagers got their information from the radio, 52.4 per cent from television and 14.3 per cent from newspapers. In the age group 15-40, individuals got their information as follows: in Elentesar, 30.4 per cent from the radio, 56.5 per cent from television, 8.7 per cent from newspapers and 4.4 per cent from the people. In Saddam Hussien 15.8 per cent listened to the radio, 63.2 per cent watched television and 21 per cent got information from the people. Table 9.19 reveals that television has the highest percentage for providing people with political information, followed by radio, newspapers, and the people. It should be kept in mind that people usually used more than one source to get information. Villagers pointed out that television was the main source for political information

due to the length of viewing time, and was their favourite source. The party came last on the list of sources, due to the availability of electronic and printed media which provided information faster than mouth to mouth methods and personal contact. Table 9.19 shows the extent of belief that Iraqi television encouraged political awareness in people which enabled them to understand and analyse political questions. 96.3 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40, 78.3 per cent of the age group 40-60 years, 71.4 per cent of the Saddam Hussien village age group 15-40 and 94.7 per cent of the age group 40-60 agreed that television information was very important in putting them "in the picture" about their country and the external world.

Table 9.20 shows the relationship between the people and the government. 96.3 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40 and 100 per cent of the age group 40-60 stated that they had strong relations with government and they felt very close to the leadership of the country. 95.2 per cent of the age group 15-40 and 94.7 per cent of the age group 40-60 in Saddam Hussien village felt the same. This table reveals that villagers gave up their old negative relations with government and built up new relations to cooperate in development goals.

TABLE 9.19

Capacity of television information in providing political awareness

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	96.3	78.3
Saddam Hussien	71.4	94.7

TABLE 9.20

Relations of village population with government after television transmission improved

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60
Elentesar	96.3	100.0
Saddam Hussien	95.2	94.7

TABLE 9.21

The role of television in persuading villagers to participate in voluntary works

Source	Age group 15-40		Age group	40-60	
Party	75.0	77.8	75.0	100.0	
Television	12.5	16.7	10.0	_	
School	8.3	8.3	15.0	-	
Army	4.2	_	-	-	

Television and participation:

The creation of participation was reported as the most important aim of development. 88.9 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40, 87 per cent from 40-60, and 85.7 per cent of the Saddam Hussien village age group 15-40 and 63.2 per cent of the age group 40-60 reported that they participated in voluntary popular works. Table 9.21 reveals the role of television in persuading villagers to participate in voluntary works. In encouraging these attitudes, television came in second place after the party. 7.5 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40, 77.8 per cent of Saddam Hussien from the same age group, 75 per cent of the Elentesar age group 40-60 and 100 per cent from Saddam Hussien in the same category, agreed that the party had persuaded them to participate in voluntary work. 12.5 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40 and 16.7 per cent from this age group in Saddam Hussien; for the same age group in Elentesar, the percentage was also 12.5, and 10 in the 40-60 age group. These agreed that television was the main factor in their participation, whilst I think that school and military service accounts for the remainder. Party organizations and state intervention mechanisms are centralized so voluntary work became more organized and fruitful. In this respect, television, by its

daily coverage of voluntary work up and down the country, created an awareness of this contribution to development. Iraqi television showed at least one of the popular organizations' programmes daily, such as items on students, women, workers, and so on. At village level, table 9.22 shows that 88.9 per cent of the Elentesar age group 15-40, 82.6 per cent of the age group 40-60, 95.3 per cent in Saddam Hussien's 15-40 age group and 78.9 per cent of the age group 40-60 stated that popular organization's programmes were interesting and useful. 76.6 per cent of Elentesar women and 75 per cent of Saddam Hussien women stated the same.

TABLE 9.22

Consideration that popular organization programmes are interesting for villagers

Village	Age group 15-40	Age group 40-60	Women
Elentesar	88.9	82.6	76.6
Saddam Hussien	95.3	78.9	75.0

In fact, these sort or programmes, provide a wide range of information about occupations and personal rights and duties.

Villagers and developed countries:

However, development programmes show several items concerning developed countries, such as agriculture and health programmes: items from France, for example, dealing

with modern methods of agriculture and French hygiene. I suggested several examples to interviewees: villagers of all age groups including women were fully agreed that they hoped Iraq might develop along lines similar to those in developed countries. Iraqi television shows programmes from several countries, so, the questions were geared to finding out if there was a general impact made by such programmes, or whether any particular country appealed more than others. Table 9.23 shows the countries chosen by villagers to which they would like Iraq to be similar. All age groups including women, except Saddam Hussien women, chose France as their first preference. It is believed that France was chosen because of her friendly relations with Iraq, and French technological assistance. So, the reasons were primarily political ones. The Soviet Union came in second place, chosen for similar reasons as France. It is believed that men's preferences were shaped through their military service during which they trained with Soviet weapons. The U.S.A. came third mainly because of its technological reputation, seen through American programmes. The U.K. came in fourth place, because of traditional relations between the U.K. and Iraq. On the other hand, Iraqis were influenced by British goods and industries. Moreover, Iraqis believed firmly in Britain's medical reputation. China came in

Countries chosen by villagers hoping that Iraq might become like these, according to frequencies (1)

TABLE 9.23

Country		sar Age group 40-60	Women	Age group	m Hussien Age group 40 - 60	Women
France	1	1	1	1	1	2
U.S.S.R.	2	2	2	2	2	1
U.S.A.	3	3	3	3	3	3
U.K.	4	5	5	4	4	4
China	5	4	4	-	_	-

 The following countries were mentioned in the answers; Europe (in general), West Germany, Yugoslavia, Italy, Japan, Romania, Bulgaria, Australia. fifth place. It was chosen largely on the reputation of her people as hard workers. In fact, villagers treat all South Asians as Chinese. Europe tends to be mentioned in general terms. So, it is hard to say there is a definite influence from any one country upon villagers. Villagers agreed that developed countries are examples for development which they would like Iraq to emulate. Villagers would not wish, however, to imitate these countries' political regimes.

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

Two major points need to be made about the situation of television in Iraq. First, development policy and broad-casting in Iraq are completely controlled and directed by the government. Secondly, broadcasting has been used by the government as an instrument for development.

Iraqi broadcasting had its "communication plan" for the years 1976-80. These were the same years covered by the political Report of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, as well as the National Development plan. The communication plan depended heavily upon the guidelines laid down in the Political Report, as did the National Development plan.

The policy goals of television in the sphere of development are as follows: the promotion of the two main trends
of National Development, firstly, the socialist transformation, and secondly, cultural and social transformation.

The problem of research may be identified as follows: to what extent (if at all) has Iraqi broadcasting achieved its goals in educating the rural population, changing old values and ways of thinking to those which the government and the party believe will serve development aims. I have tried to test the goals of the communication plan at village level in rural Iraq by carrying out interviews and making

observations in two villages.

The aim of this study was to examine television broadcasting in a developing country. Iraqi television was chosen because it is considered to be the major medium by both government and the population.

This study focuses on the contribution of Iraqi television to development in accordance with controlled government policy.

Iraqi broadcasting autonomy is insured by legal safeguards, but in practice, government exercises a crucial
influence on broadcasting. The influence of government on
broadcasting is exerted via the power of appointment and
dismissal to broadcasting posts, and control of the broadcasting budget which is always in deficit. The financial
requirements of broadcasting have proved a further means
of controlling broadcasting. Iraqi television is a government department, operated by civil servants. The power of
civil servants is decisive. They represent government and
apply its policies in programme making and screening.

According to Page:

"In a very important sense, a television system is what it broadcasts. Policies, technical resources and organization, all exist primarily for one purpose: to produce and transmit specific programmes." (1)

^{1.} Page, Donald Calvin, A Comparative Analysis of Television in Egypt and Jordan: Programming and Broadcasting System, 1977, Ph.D. thesis, (unpublished), The University of Michigan, p.1.

Television, basically, is a Western invention. The pre conditions for success in the West already existed. There was a ready-made audience for the new medium. It is true, to some extent, that,

"There are many empirical variants of the relationship between media as a source and people as receivers which produce different kinds of audience and many questions in the study of audience which have arisen from this diversity". (1)

The Iraqi television, may, stress on the diversity of audience in the production and screening of development programmes (i.e. Women, workers, peasants, students, etc...). In the final analysis, the diversity linked with such categories, to motivate and reunion them to participate in development process and to aid government policy.

Westerners already possessed the habit of access to mass media. People were able to purchase television sets; and electricity was supplied to all inhabited areas.

In contrast, most developing countries, installed television stations for different reasons, without having the Western capacity to operate stations and produce programmes. The majority of developing countries have tried to use television in the service of national interests, among which has been the serving of development aims.

Nontheless, Iraqi television programmes (and other developing countries' programmes) compare poorly

^{1.} Denis McQuail, 1983, Mass Communication Theory, Sage Publications, London, p.149.

with that of Western ones (i.e. British or American programmes), due to the shortage of skills and finance.

In Iraq, however, the government tends to reach the bulk of the population through television, so, it has provided television sets free to many popular organizations and societies, all coffeehouses and a large number of villages, even in remote areas. Government supplied electricity to rural areas and linked areas by tranmission over microwave networks.

Television used in Iraq, to inform people about government policy on development.

The 1976-80 National Development plan included a number of socio-economic projects. Basically, the aim of development is to raise the standard of living. Hence, knowing the structure of the population and the size of the economically active population is necessary in order to gauge the human factor in the development process and the size of the illiteracy problem (as a barrier to development). Also, it was necessary to know the per capita income in Iraq, for two purposes: to guage the real standard of living, and to check the popular capacity to purchase television sets (in several developing countries, a large number of the population are unable to afford television sets).

The study spelled out two major areas of development: social development, through education, health care instruction, popular organization, and economic development, which focuses on agriculture, oil and manufacturing. The study discusses, in detail development trends in Iraq and the role and relation of television to each sector. Development programmes shown on Iraqi television represent all sectors of development, and all of these emphasize government policy in the sector concerned. Development programme makers tend to cover aspects of development achievements in their own sectors. The propagandstic tone of development programmes, mainly refers to the fact that development programme-makers, as civil servants, belong to government departments, and so tend not to broadcast anything controversial. They are committed to applying their department's policies.

Television also plays a major role in disseminating information and creating support for government policy in development.

Television is tightly controlled. The central communication plan for development for 1976-80 indicated the general outlines for development programmes and a general policy for broadcasting. This is considered by all television-making departments as their guide to programme content. It was recognized that certain programmes could

not be used in the service of development, especially foreign programmes (e.g. entertainment, films) and these were difficult to replace by local production. Television concentrates heavily on political orientation towards the Ba'th party, so giving added support to government.

Of course, rural areas in most Third World countries, and in Iraq, are characterized by their isolation from urban areas and by their backwardness. Developing countries create problems in bringing services to rural areas, in changing practices and anti-development values. It was believed that broadcasting is an active instrument for the enhancement of change in rural areas by acting as a channel for new values and practices. Broadcasting tries to persuade peasants to develop their modes of production, using new methods and tools, and to improve living conditions (health, education, etc.). Also, broadcasting provides women with information and encourages health habits in daily life, and the improvement of family conditions.

Three of the pre conditions for reaching rural areas with television have been gradually created since 1976. Firstly, television transmission reached the whole country by microwave networks. Secondly, television sets were distributed free by the government and privately purchased. Lastly, electricity was provided on a large scale to rural areas. This made it possible, to receive television programmes.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the introduction of television to rural areas in Iraq created a "revolution" in the sense of radically changing life. The rural people were exposed to a great deal of information and gained a new outlook on life (it is very important to note that rural people tend more to believe in what they see, rather than what they hear). In rural areas, television became a component of daily life. The effect of television was marked in those villages, which, for the first time, were able to watch television programmes.

The access of villagers to television was accompanied by government intervention aimed at achieving improvements in education, health, agriculture and local administration. The Ba'th party also stimulated villagers to become involved with one or more of its organizations. Large numbers of villagers became involved with the party. In this way, the rural population were orientated towards Ba'th ideology and became ready to support government policies.

The rural people, began to accumulate information and ideas about a whole range of things. So, the importance of television development programmes stems from the fact that the people could be oriented towards development information and ideas provided by television. As already mentioned, most television programmes were devoted to explaining and supporting government policy. At this stage

in the development process, Iraqi television has had tremendous potential success in rural areas, and it will be some time before villagers begin to demand alternative programmes.

Appendix

The Questionnaire

This questionnaire is to be used for scientific purposes only. Its details are confidential.

- 1. Age?
- 2. Per Capita income (monthly)?
- 3. Educational level (by certificate):
 A.-None B-Primary C-Intermediate D-Secondary
 E-Above secondary
- 4. Sex:
 A-Male B-Female
- 5. Place of residence: village
- 6. Have you got a television set in your house?
 A. Yes B. No.
- 7. In which room is the television set in your house?
- 8. How long do you spend watching television per day:
 A- One hour B- Two hours C- Three hours D- Four hours
 E- More than four hours?
- 9. Where do you watch television, at: A-Home B-Peasant society office C-Coffeehouse D-Home, Peasant society and coffeehouse.
- 10. What is your favourite programme?
- 11. (To previous illiterates) Did you watch illiteracy
 eradication programmes in previous years:
 A-Yes B-No
- 12. Were illiteracy eradication programmes the basis of your education, or did they just help you, to some extent, to educate yourself?
- 13. Do you watch Health education programmes?
 A-Yes B-No

- 14. If the answer is yes: Do you think this programme
 is useful to develop your health education?
 A-To a large extent B-To some extent C-None
- 15. Has your attitude towards medicine changed these days?
 A-Yes B-No
- 16. To those who answered yes: Do you think there is a role for television in changing opinions, and if so, how?
- 17. If your child, or one of your relatives is ill, do you
 take him to:
 A-Doctor B-Religious man C-Shrine D-Leave him to
 God's protection.
- 18. To those who answered to a Doctor Did television programmes persuade you to go to a doctor?
 A-Yes B-No
- 19. Television shows a lot of programmes about revenge -Do you think these programmes were useful in changing opinion about these customs:
 A-Yes B-No
- 20. To peasant: You didn't used to grow certain crops. Did television programmes persuade you to grow new ones that you had never grown before?

A-Yes B-No

- 21. To those who answered yes: What kinds of crops?
- 22. Has your agricultural production increased nowadays, compared with previous years.

A-Yes B-No

23. Did television programmes persuade you to increase your production?

A-Yes B-No

- 24. Television programmes emphasize equality between men and women. But there is a saying which goes that women are imperfect in mind and religion. Do you accept that you are equal to women in rights and duties?

 A-Yes B-No
- 25. To those who answered yes: Did television programmes affect you, or was it another factor. What was it?

26. Have you got a daughter or sister of school age and is she now at school?

A-Yes B-No

- 27. To those who answered yes: Have television programmes persuaded you to accept her being at school, because of their emphasis upon science and education values?

 A-Yes B-No
- 28. Do you think that television programmes affect the women in your village?
 A-Yes B-No
- 29. If the answer is yes: What sort of impact?
- 30. Agricultural television programmes broadcast information about agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and information about agriculture in general. Do you use this information in your farming.

A-Yes B-No

- 31. In rural areas, new relationships dominate peasant cooperative societies, collective farms and state farms. Is there a role for television programmes to persuade you to get involved with these new methods A-Yes B-No
- 32. Which media sources gives you more political information (as news).

A-Radio B-Television C-Newspapers D-People

- 33. Do you think that information given by Iraqi television is enough to inform you about current affairs in Iraq.

 A-Yes B-No
- 34. After villages got television sets. Citizens used to watch a lot of news. Does this keep you in touch with political events and current affairs and the leadership in Iraq.

A-Yes B-No

35. Did you participate in voluntary work at any time?
A-Yes B-No

- 36. To those who answered yes: Did television programmes persuade you to participate and if so, how?
- 37. Every day television shows programmes about popular organizations, such as students, women, workers. Do you think these programmes are interesting to you as a rural person?

A-Yes B-No

38. Development programmes on television (such as Agricultural and Health programmes) show films about similar sectors in foreign developed countries. Would you like your country and society to be like those of the developed countries shown in the films

A-Yes B-No

- 39. If the answer is yes: like which country would you like Iraq to be?
- 40. If the answer is no, why?

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