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The European states system and Ottoman-Russian relations, 1815- 1856

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the way that the European states system operated and affected the Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856. The 1815 Settlements established a new system of international relations in Europe. Russia played the greatest role in foiling the Napoleonic bid for hegemony. The most distinguishing characteristic of this new system was that its structure made cooperation effective within the framework of the institution of Concert of Europe. In this respect the four victorious great powers, i.e. Russia, England, Prussia and Austria, did not exclude the defeated power, France, and they took on the governance of international affairs.

The new system was built on the political and territorial balance. To this end, the restriction of France and moderation of Russia was necessary. Both countries had some revisionist objectives. Consequently, Near East became the centre stage of the international politics after 1815. Ottoman Empire did not take part in the 1815 Settlements. Therefore, Ottoman-Russian relations were to continue on a bilateral base.

Russia's strategic goal to secure her south-east frontiers clashed with her responsibility for maintaining the provisions of 1815 Settlements in Central Europe since any change in Near East would affect the territorial and political balance in Central Europe, too.

Under these circumstances, Russia faced a dilemma in her relations with the Ottoman Empire. Russia was very advantageous owing to her enormous power and her treaty rights regarding the Ottoman Empire which had acquired since 1774.

Ottoman-Russian relations developed around three main events during 1815-1856: the revolt of Greeks (1821-29), the rebellion of Viceroy of Egypt (1833 and 1839) and the Holy Place Issue (1852-1854). In all those events Russia was successfully restrained against the Ottoman Empire by the structure of the new system.

The thesis draws a number of conclusions. The underlying economic structure of the new state system almost remained the same during the 1815-1856 period. The thesis concludes that the course of Ottoman-Russian relations was increasingly determined by the elements of relationship structure. In particular, the foreign policy objectives of France played the significant role in shaping the Ottoman-Russian relations during 1815-1856.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents for their love and support throughout my life. It is also dedicated to Zehra, Begüm and Buşra for their patience and understanding during my absence for this study.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS/ ABBREVIATIONS

BOA HH	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Hattı Hûmayun (Prime ministry Office Ottoman Archives)
CMA	Communication with Mehmed Ali
CRAL	Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Levant
CRRP	Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches
EP	Eastern Papers
et al.	*et alii* – (and others)
loc. cit.	*loco citato* – (in the place cited)
op. cit.	*opus citatum est* – (work cited)
PRAG	Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece
TNA	The National Archive (Public Record Office)
VPR	Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii (Russian Foreign Policy)

Introduction

The entry of the Russian Tsar, Alexander I, into Paris in 1814 effectively brought to an end two decades of turmoil in Central Europe resulting from France's attempt at hegemony under the leadership of Napoleon.

In the aftermath of their victory, Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia laid down the parameters for a new states system in several treaties, creating a complex mechanism of balance of power politics and cooperation among them. The defeated France was not punished, but was rather accommodated into the mechanism; thus, the task of governing international politics and maintaining general peace was entrusted to the oligopoly of the five great powers of Britain, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia, known as the 'Concert of Europe' in the history of the European States System.

The map of Europe was redrawn by the victorious powers in 1814–1815: France was reduced to her pre-1790 territories; Russia obtained two-thirds of Poland, the rest of which was divided between Prussia and Austria. Prussia, wedged between France and Russia, was compensated with some territories of Saxony in return for her losses in Poland, and her territories were extended into the Rhineland; while Austria [or the Habsburg Empire] gained some territories in the north of the Italian peninsula. Most importantly, a federation made up of the various German states was founded in Central Europe, and independent Holland was established.

The political setting of Europe was also restructured. France was restricted and encircled by the independent states, while the influence of Austria was extended and consolidated over the Italian peninsula. Both of

the Germanic powers, Austria and Prussia, became kind of power brokers in the administration of the German Federation.

Russia came out of the Napoleonic wars [1793–1815] as the most dominant of the continental powers. Not only had she managed to stop Napoleon's *'Grande Armee'*, which had advanced as far as Moscow, but continued to wage war against France until Napoleon's final surrender. The Russian army in the battlefield and the Tsar at the table were the major determinants in the establishment and organisation of the coalitions in their defeat of Napoleon's attempts at hegemony, even after the latter's expulsion from Russian soil.

Russia's military supremacy and strong political posture made her the major player in the post-Napoleon Settlements too. She strengthened her presence in Central Europe by keeping two-thirds of Poland. This meant that Berlin and Vienna, two important capitals in Europe, were just 100 miles away from Russian territory, well within striking distance of the Russian army. This dominant position enabled Russia to become a significant actor in European affairs, and thus she was able to play an active role in the course of the political events of the post-Napoleonic era.

The disproportional Russian military might and political influence made counter-balancing Russia an urgent issue for the other victorious states in the new European States System after 1815, along with keeping France under control. The problem of the disproportional power of Russia was not only its effect on the balance of power in Central Europe, but also the high level of influence she had secured in the Near East, where the Ottoman Empire was situated.

Russia had been expanding for 100 years in the Balkans and north Black Sea to the account of the Ottoman Empire, whose territories were of

great strategic importance not only for the balance of power in the Near East, but also Europe. In the words of one historian, her territories were so vast and strategic 'that European balance of power would have been upset if the empire had been appropriated by any one of the powers'.[1] Therefore, her disintegration or appropriation could have been a serious source of destabilisation in the Near East and would disrupt the balance of power in Europe.

By the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was firmly settled in the north Black Sea and had started threatening the Ottoman capital city of Istanbul and the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, which were the last obstacles in the way of her aspirations in the Mediterranean. Russia had been at war with the Ottoman Empire at the time of Napoleon's assault on Russia in 1812, and the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) had been hastily concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia at the demand of the latter when the French were looming on the horizon. Under that treaty, Russia gained control of the Bessarabia region, bringing her territories adjacent to the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. This territorial gain raised concerns in Austria, as the Principalities had been all that stood between her and Russia. Even the Principalities were not unaffected by the strong influence of Russia, as Russia's treaty rights over the Principalities, which gave her pre-approval rights in the appointments and dismissals of the rulers by the Sultan, were already pitting Austria against Russia.

Another power that was concerned on the policies and objectives of Russia in the Near East was Britain. By this time, Britain had become the most industrialised power and had extensive colonial possessions and dependencies that stretched from the Atlantic to India. As an island, her

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[1] L. S STAVRIANOS, *The Balkans Since 1453 (*London: Hurst&Company. 2000), p. 215

political and economic interests deterred her from pursuing any territorial gain in continental Europe, maintaining as a priority the strategic sea and land routes under her control for the free, safe and secure trade and transportation among her colonies. In this respect, halting Russian expansion in the Near East, and ensuring the stability and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, became Britain's primary goals, making her not only the defender of the status quo in Central Europe but also in the Near East after 1815.

For the reasons summarised above it was no surprise when Austria and Britain raised the issue of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, proposing her inclusion under the general guarantee of the multilateral arrangements of the Congress. The Ottoman Empire had not joined the third coalition of Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia against Napoleon, and so did not attend the Congress. Britain and Austria failed in their efforts, in part due to the unwillingness of the Ottoman Empire to become subject to international agreements which could have caused the interference of the signatory powers, specifically in her relations with her autonomous dependencies, namely the Principalities and Serbia. More importantly, Russia raised strong objections to the proposal on the grounds that she was in dispute with the Ottoman Empire over the implementation of the bilateral Treaty of Bucharest (1812), and so was against any agreement in this regard until such disputes had been settled.

It seemed that Russia did not want the Near East to become subject to multilateral arrangements. She was implicitly regarded the Near East as her neighbour, and so did not want any other great power to become involved in the region.

Russia's prominent position and pressure from other overriding matters did not leave much room for the other participants to resist and

overrule Russia's objections to discussion of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Vienna; supported by the unwillingness of the Ottoman Empire to join the Congress of Vienna.

The Ottoman Empire, by 1815, was overwhelmed by enormous domestic problems. While the Sultan still commanded huge territories in the Balkans, his sovereignty over some of them was questionable. For example, Serbia and the Principalities, which were autonomous entities, were practically under the influence and control of Russia rather than their suzerain in Istanbul; while other non-Muslim subjects were under the ideological influence of the French revolutionaries and the Russian pan-Slavic and Orthodox influences. The Slav and Orthodox subjects fixed their eyes on Russia and considered the Tsar as their protector, rather than their sovereign in Istanbul.

Under those circumstances, the Ottoman Empire was looking for a way to stop its rapid decline, as both the ruling elite and the general public were living with the trauma of falling from a great power status into a lamentable condition. This situation made it difficult for all levels of society to unite around a single reform programme. The government's priority in its foreign policies was to maintain peace for as long as possible in order to win enough time to focus on domestic issues, however the Empire lacked sufficient power to deter any of its neighbours, namely Russia, from breaking the peace that it very much needed. It was already apparent from the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty* (1776) that the Ottoman Empire could not stand alone against Russia, and its decline became more rapid and its situation further deteriorated against Russia as a result of the successive defeats between 1774 and 1812. The territorial gains by Russia around the Black Sea after those battles put the Ottoman capital of Istanbul under a permanent Russian military threat.

The situation of the Muslim provinces and subjects was not very encouraging either, where emergent notables were holding the economic and political reins of power and were challenging the will of the Sultan to assert his authority over their fiefs. In desperation, the Sultan had to consent to a formal written contract – a *Sened-i Ittifak* (Convention of Unity) – in 1809 to recognise their privileges in return for their support of his domestic reforms. The only ray of light in that bleak picture of 1815 was the arrival of a strong and reform minded leader, Sultan Mahmut II, who had a clear-cut vision about what needed to be done for the survival of the Empire.

Although there had been no meaningful change in Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1774–1815 period, there was a huge shuffle in the international states system of which both states were a part before and after the Napoleonic Wars, the consequences of which would materialise in 1856 in Paris.

In a meeting reminiscent of the 1814 Congress of Vienna, the same great powers were again sitting around the table in 1856, but this time in Paris. The difference was not only the venue of the Congress but also the position of Russia. The Congress, which brought a formal end to the Crimean War (1854–1856), saw discussions of how to restrict Russia and keep it restrained within the European States System. In systemic terms, it brought about a restructuring of the European States System while keeping the core characteristic of balance of power through multi-polarity. As a part of the restructuring, the Ottoman Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of Europe, which gave it and its citizens' equal status in terms of legal affairs in the public law of Europe. More importantly, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the signatory great powers. How can this be explained, given that all of the major actors were the same as in 1814?

The aim of this thesis is to explain the most notable differences in Ottoman-Russian relations and the positions of the great powers of Russia and France between 1815 and 1856 by analysing the operation of the structure of the international states system that prevailed in the 1815–1856 period.

Focus will be on the events that most significantly affected Ottoman-Russian relations in 1815–1856, being: the Greek Rebellion (1821–1830), the Rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, (1833 and 1839), the Holy Places Dispute in Jerusalem (1852–1854) and the subsequent Crimean War (1854–1856).

The narration of these events and their effects on Ottoman-Russian relations will be told in three distinct but related perspectives: The breakout of those events and how the Ottoman government handled them; the reaction and interference of Russia in those events; and the involvement of the other great powers.

The thesis will be organised in five chapters. The general aim of Chapter I is to present the methodological framework of the thesis and to provide a very short historical overview of Ottoman-Russian relations until 1815, opening with an explanation of the aim and scope of the Research Question. This will be followed by an explanation of the significance and originality of the study and a Literature Review, before ending with the Conceptual, Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks.

The Second Chapter will analyse in detail the structure of the European States System that prevailed in 1815–1856 in accordance with the Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks. On the basis of this analysis, some hypotheses will be proposed regarding the operation of the structure of the European States System and its likely effects on Ottoman-Russian relations.

With the conclusion of the Second Chapter, the first leg of the research will have been completed. The following three chapters will focus on analyses of Ottoman-Russian relations around the events of the Greek Rebellion, the Rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, the Holy Places Dispute and the subsequent Crimean War.

The Third Chapter will explain the role of the European States System in connection with the Concert of Europe in Ottoman-Russian relations, revolving around the Greek issue of 1821–1829. In this respect, the start and spread of the Greek revolt, its links with Russia, the involvement of Russia, and her restraint in the first phase of the revolt will be narrated and analysed. Then, the events leading to the shift in Britain's position, her approach to Russia, their agreements on how to deal with the Greek question, and the repercussions of that consensus over the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia will be explained. Lastly, the chapter will focus on how Russia's war objectives with the Ottoman Empire were limited, and how she had to agree to the formation of the new Greek state under the tutelage of the Concert of Europe instead of letting her become a satellite state of Russia, despite her enormous losses in both human and economic terms as a result of the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War.

The Fourth Chapter will explain the scope of Ottoman-Russian relations after 1830, with a focus on the shift in Russian foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire aimed at bringing it under her tutelage rather than destroying her through coercive means. To this end, an explanation will be made of how Russia dispatched her navy and army to the aid of the Ottoman Sultan when the army of Mehmed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, threatened Istanbul; and then how the bilateral defence Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi between the two states was agreed. The reaction of the other great powers to the predominance that Russia gained through her unconditional and bold support to the Sultan, and their efforts, specifically those of Britain and

France, to reduce the Russian prominence and advantage in Near East will form the main body of the Fourth Chapter.

The Fifth Chapter will analyse Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1841–1856 period, and will explain how Russian prominence in the Near East was terminated and replaced by the Concert of Europe. Put differently, it will be about how the Near East came to be included under the collective guarantee of the European States System. To this end, the chapter will specifically focus on the new search of France for areas of influence and her initiatives in Near East after Napoleon III had taken the reins of the state within the new international environment following the revolutionary waves of 1848. France's overtures to ally with Britain against the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia and to end her isolation in Europe will be discussed. The issue of the Hungarian refugees and of the Holy Places and their effects on Ottoman-Russian relations will be analysed in the light of the new quests of France. The chapter will also touch specifically on how Russia interpreted the French actions and steps in the Near East. In this respect, the Menshikov mission, the Russian occupation of the Principalities, the start of the Crimean War, the diplomatic initiatives, and finally the arrangements of the Congress of Paris will be narrated.

Chapter I

RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

This chapter begins with an explanation of the main Research Question posed by the thesis, the main elements of which will be outlined through a description of its aim, nature and scope. A further explanation will be made in the section addressing the 'Justification/Significance of the Study' and the 'Literature Review', which will clarify how this research differs from previous studies into Ottoman-Russian relations, and how it contributes to the body of literature on the subject.

The methodology section will begin with a presentation of the 'Conceptual Framework' of the study, in which the essential concepts of the research question associated with the inherent variables will be set out. This will contribute further to the understanding of the aim and scope of the research question of this study.

Following on from this, an outline of the 'Theoretical Framework' will be presented, in which the relevant theoretical approaches that will guide the research will be explained. This will include a clarification of the theories, or combinations of theories, that will be employed when attempting to establish the nature and scope of the relationship between the dependent, the independent and the intervening variables of the research.

The chapter will close with a presentation of the 'Analytical Framework' through which the scheme of the research will be defined, and an explanation of how the relationship between the variables in the structure of the 1815 European States System and Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period will be analysed. To this end, an

operational definition of the variables of the research question will be provided.

1. Research Question: Aim, Nature and Limitations of the Research

The main research question involves understanding and explaining of the underlying structural nature of Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period by focusing on the operation of the current European States System of which they were a part. To this end, particular attention will be paid to the roles and functions of the institution of the Concert of Europe as a distinctive element in the European States System. The research question will be further clarified through an explanation of the aim, nature and scope of the study.

The key objective of the presented study is to examine in detail the position of the Ottoman and Russian Empires within the European States System[1] in the 1815–1856 period and to find out how it affected their relations in that period.

Within the limits of the main question and key objective, the answers to following secondary questions will constitute the essence of the study: What was the distinctiveness of the European States System in the 1815–1856 period? How was its structure composed? How did it operate and affect the course of the key events which took place between Ottoman Empire and Russia in the 1815–1856 period?

It is important to note that the presented work will not be a wholly narrative-based[2] historical study, as it will also draw upon some

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[1] The expressions 'the 1815 States System', 'the 1815 European States System', 'the 1815 International System', 'the post- Napoleonic States System' and 'the System' will be used interchangeably throughout this research, however all refer essentially to the same phase in the European States System that came into existence after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

[2] Stone defines 'narrative' as 'the organisation of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots', L. Stone, '*The past and the present revisited* ', (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 74.

conceptual premises related to the system and theories in international relations. To elaborate further, the research will narrate the sequence of events and human interactions in the specified time period, with the assumption that non-human forces also played a role in shaping Ottoman-Russian relations.

Accordingly, the research will combine narrative-based and theory-based explanations,[3] in other words, a synthesis of impersonal and socially constructed elements, with the intention being to explain a certain period in the history of Ottoman-Russian relations.

The research question contains three main inter-related variables. These variables, and their levels of analysis, are as follows:

The independent variable is the 'Structure of the 1815 European States System' that functioned at the system level, meaning that while its effects were systemic in nature, they could be observed at the unit level. The dependent variable, on the other hand, is 'Ottoman-Russian relations'.

Another systemic variable in the research question is the 'Concert of Europe', which displays both independent and intervening characteristics in its effect on the dependent variable of Ottoman-Russian relations. When the Concert of Europe functions as a 'structural modifier'[4], that is, acting as if it was structure, to affect the dependent variable, it becomes an independent variable. The collective tutelage of the five great powers and its working principles and norms can be defined as

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[3] For the methodological differences between theory-based and narrative based explanations, see J. Levy, 'Too Important to Leave to the Other, History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations', *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27–31.

[4] According to Snyder, structural modifiers are a class of systemic factors having system-wide influences. They modify the effects of the more basic structural elements on the interaction process but they are not interaction itself. He gives norms and institutions as an example of structural modifiers. H.G. Snyder, 'Process Variables in Neo-Realist Theory', *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no.3, 1996, pp. 168-171.

examples of the structural modifier characteristic of the Concert of Europe. However, when the Concert of Europe functioned to alleviate the anarchic conditions in international politics in the 1815 European States System, and paved the way for security cooperation instead of competition, for example, by not allowing the process of security dilemma,[5] to occur, it became an intervening variable.

There is already a considerable amount of literature on this subject, but in order to remain within the parameters of a PhD thesis this research will be subject to the following limitations:

- The main body of the research will be an analysis of the political/military and economic interactions and processes[6] in the 1815 European States System. Also touched upon will be the economic capabilities of the unit states in the System, in that they influenced to some extent the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period.
- The impacts of cultural/societal interactions fall generally outside of the scope of the study, except in cases when they affected significantly Ottoman-Russian relations.
- From a geographical point of view, the research will be also limited to the processes and interactions involving Europe; with the relations and policies of the great powers concerning, for example, America, Central Asia and Africa only taken into consideration in exceptional cases were they had an effect on Europe-wide politics.
- Finally, the main focus of the research will be on the interactions and processes that took place among the great

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[5] On the definition of security dilemma, see 'G. Evans and J. Newnham '*The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*', (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 494-495.

[6] Interaction is the actual communication between states or some physical actions. Process is naturally occurring or designed sequence of operations or events, possibly taking up time, space, expertise or other resources. Snyder (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 170.

powers[7] rather than those of the unit states of the second order in the 1815 European States System. As may be understood from an analysis of the working of its structure in the following chapter, it was their military and economic capabilities that were the main determining factors in the emergence of the structural (impersonal and personal) forces of the 1815 European States System.

2. Justification of the Study

The justification for this research lies in its explanation of the distinctness of the 1815–1856 period in the international politics of the European States System.

The 1815 Settlements[8] brought an end to France's aspirations to establish hegemony after her defeat by the Quadruple Coalition of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia and introduced a new pattern of international relations. This new pattern restored some of the characteristics of the system that had been in effect before the French revolution in 1789, but also introduced some new elements into international politics. This will be referred to hereon in as the '1815 European States System' in order to distinguish it from the previous and later phases of the System[9]

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[7] According to Levy, great powers are the states which possess a high level of military and economic capability, making it invulnerable to military threats apart from those of the other great powers and their interests and objectives are continental or global rather than regional or local. He also argues that it is the great powers that determine the structure, major processes and the general evolution of the states systems, J. S. Levy, '*War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975*', (Lexington: Kentucky University Press , 1983), pp. 8 and 16-19.

[8] The 1815 Settlements comprises the Treaty of Chaumont (March 9, 1814), the First Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814), the Conventions of the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Second Treaty of Paris and the Holy Alliance (15 September, 1815), the Quadruple Alliance (20 November, 1815) and the Protocol of Conference and Declaration of the Five Cabinets (15 November, 1818) at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. For text of those treaties, see E. Hertslet, '*Map of Europe by Treaty; showing the Various and Territorial Changes which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814*', (London: Butterworths and Harrison, 1875).

[9] The detailed distinguishing characteristics of the 1815 European States System will be covered in the second chapter.

The most distinguishing characteristic the 1815 European States System was the introduction of a new institution: the Concert of Europe. This allowed Great Britain, Russia, France, Austria and Prussia to collectively exercise tutelage over the states of the second and the third orders, and was for the first time a collective/shared hegemony in the history of European States System. It also served to alleviate the anarchic conditions of the structure of the 1815 European States System, and as such facilitated cooperation in security issues.

Ottoman-Russian relations took on a completely new form under the new structure that bore little resemblance to the relationship during pre-1815 and pre-1789 European States Systems.

Russia was a key actor in the construction of the 1815 Settlements and subsequently she became the guardian of the new international order in Central Europe against the French revisionist aspirations and against the destabilising revolutionary movements between 1815–1856. Therefore, she was one of the most effective members of the oligopoly of five great powers which taken the responsibility of governance of international politics.

In contrast, the Ottoman Empire was at her weakest, and had become subject to the tutelage of the oligopoly of the great powers under the Concert of Europe, retaining only minor influence in international politics in the 1815 European States System. The Ottoman Empire's lack of influence was demonstrated by her lack of participation at the Congress of Vienna, during which the post-Napoleon order was forged.[10]

Despite her weakness, the existence and stability of the Ottoman Empire was a key factor in the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, given her strategic territories in the Balkans and the Middle East and in this regard she could not be categorised alongside the states of the second

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[10] A. Cevdet Paşa, *Tarihi-i Cevdet*, (Istanbul: Uçdal Neşriyat, 1984), 5.Cilt, p. 2579.

order. In this context, the Ottoman Empire played a stabilising role in the Balkans and Middle East that was similar to that played by the Hapsburg Empire (Austria) in Central Europe. Both regions contained many different and intertwined ethnic and/or religious nations, all of which were under the influence of nationalist and liberal ideologies. This situation of being of the upper body over the conglomeration of different ethnic and religious groups in Balkans and Middle East made the Ottoman Empire's existence unavoidable for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlement. The uncertainty of what kind of political establishment would replace the Ottoman Empire, or who would take possession of the Ottoman territories in case of her downfall, was a serious concern for the great powers after 1815. It was certain that these territories would give their owner a key advantage at the expense of the other great powers so that none of them would consent to their redistribution without war.

Under those circumstances specified out above, the Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856 constituted a very unique phenomenon for the analysis of the operation of the 1815 European States System and for the identification of its structural imperatives. So the question of whether the Ottoman-Russian relations would follow the same pattern as that seen in the second part of the 18th century, or not became the most significant challenge for the 1815 European States System. If it did not, what was the role of the structure of the 1815 European States System in that or to what extent did they affect Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856?

These questions necessitate presenting a very brief summary of the background of Ottoman-Russian relations until 1815. Particular focus will be on two political/military events that occurred in the second half of the 18th century, as their effects continued to shape Ottoman-Russian bilateral relations after 1815. These events were the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca following the1768–1774 Ottoman-Russian War and "the Greek Project" in the last decades of the 18th century.

The roots of Ottoman-Russian relations date back to the 14th century, however the Ottoman Empire and Russia only came into direct contact in the mid- to late-17th century when Russia's place in the European States System became more firmly established.[11] Up until that time, the Ottoman Empire's involvement with Russia had been through her vassal, the Crimean Khanate.[12] As the 17th century gave way to the 18th century, Russia's power and influence developed so that the relations between the two states began to take on greater significance and reach level similar in importance to that of Britain, France and the Hapsburg Empire (Austria).[13]

Russia's foreign policy strategies in the 18th century had their roots in the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725).[14] At the core, they envisaged the extension of Russian sovereignty towards the Baltics and the Black Sea, and this would remain as the basis of the Russian foreign policy until the French Revolution and the subsequent French bid for the domination in Europe. The main challengers to Russia in the execution of its strategy had been Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Peter the Great had successfully dealt with the Swedish challenge and had devised a novel and rather satisfactorily solution to the Polish problem; however he failed to resolve satisfactorily the expansion into the Black Sea, and consequently to reduce the Ottoman Empire to the level of a weak or vassal state.[15] His Black Sea strategy would only be realised by his successors in the last quarter of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, when

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[11] For a detailed account of the early Ottoman-Russian relations, see A. N. Kurat, '*Türkiye ve Rusya*', (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990).

[12] Ibid, p. 35

[13] Halil Inalcık, '*Turkey and Europe in History*', (Istanbul: Eren Press, 2006,), p. 123.

[14] E.V. Ansimov, 'Imperial Heritage of Peter the Great', in H. Ragsdale.- V. N. Ponomarev, (eds), *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 21-35

[15]*Ibid*, p.31-35

Russia was able to remove at last the Ottoman Empire from its list of the potentially aggressive states.

Russian goals for expansion with regard to the Ottoman Empire, specifically, her aspirations towards the Black Sea, were facilitated by her alliance with the Hapsburgs, who regarded Russia as their key ally against the Ottoman Empire – their main rival in the Balkans and Central Europe. Moreover, Russia's constant struggle against Poland and Sweden, which were also hostile to the Hapsburgs, further consolidated the Austro-Russian alliance. France was supporting Poland and Sweden due to their pressure on the Hapsburgs in the north, meaning that Russia was also a hostile country to France.

Under those conditions, the Ottoman Empire, regarding Russia as a threat in her north-west, had to choose to ally with France, Poland and Sweden. But, the alliance with Poland and Sweden and the vacillation of France did not provide the Ottoman Empire with enough support in her confrontations with the more powerful Austro-Russian alliance in the Balkans in the first half of the 18th century.

The second half of the 18th century witnessed a further isolation of the Ottoman Empire against the Austro-Russian alliance as result of a shift in alliances in the European States System.[16] The shift itself, which has come to be known as the Diplomatic Revolution, took place in 1756 and involved the establishment of two opposing blocks: Anglo-Prussian on one side, and Franco-Austrian on the other. The establishment of the new alliances in the European States System, formalised by the 1756 Treaty of Versailles, meant that Russia became an ally of France, and was thus in a better position to move against a weakened and further isolated Ottoman Empire.[17] In this way, the Ottoman Empire lost the support of France,

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[16] F. Israel, *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967*, (Chelsea House Publishers, 1967, New York,), p. 264.

[17] *Ibid*, p. 264-265.

which had been her ally in the European States System since the 16th century. The first opportunity for Russia to take advantage of the new alliance came in 1768 when the Ottoman Empire initiated military action against Russia in an attempt to stop her turning Poland into a vassal state, which the Ottoman Empire viewed as threat the regional balance of power in her north west.[18]

The 1768–1874 Ottoman-Russian War ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, which had struggled to engage in the six-year campaign without the assistance of any other great power, either direct or indirect.[19] Russia had already secured the neutrality of Austria, France and Britain through the reshuffling of the alliances as specified out above. Another key factor in Russia's victory was the presence of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean for the first time in history, having sailed from the Baltic Sea with the logistic and personnel support of the British navy.[20] This was the beginning of Russia's naval ambition in the region for the future, and heralded the roots of the rivalry between the maritime powers of Britain, France and Russia in the decades to come.

The end of the conflict was marked with the conclusion of the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca*,[21] which was the most notable agreement related to Ottoman-Russian relations and the European States System prior to 1815. Renowned Balkan historian L. S. Stavrianos explained the significance of the Treaty for the future of Ottoman-Russian relations, "… all the treaties executed by Turkey and Russia during the following half

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[18] O. Sander, '*Siyasi Tarih, Ilkçaglardan 1918'e*', (Ankara: Imge, 1989), p. 360.

[19] *Ibid*, p. 361

[20] M.S. Anderson, 'Great Britain and the Russian Fleet, 1769–1770', *The Slavonic Review*, vol. 31, no. 76, 1952), pp. 148-163.

[21] For the text of the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*, see Israel (1967), *op. cit*., pp. 913-929

century [1774–1829] were but commentaries on the *Kucuk Kainarji* [*Küçük Kaynarca*] text".[22]

In line with the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire had to accept the independence of the Crimean Khanate, which Russia would annex shortly after.[23] It also gave Russia some rights with regard to the administration of the Principalities, which had been autonomous states in the Ottoman Empire since the 15th century. However, the most controversial arrangements were the two articles that gave Russia the right to build a church in Istanbul, and to represent the interests of the church and its congregation in front of the Ottoman authorities.[24] Russia would later argue that those articles not only gave her the right to make representations for that specific church and its clergy, but also to protect and intervene on behalf of the Orthodox sect and subjects of the Ottoman Empire,[25] which was rightly perceived as a clear violation of Ottoman sovereignty over three-quarters of her non-Muslim subjects, and would be the source of many future conflicts.

The Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* not only brought significant consequences to bilateral Ottoman-Russian relations, but also to international politics in Europe. Specifically, two states of the European States System, Britain and Austria, were going to be most affected by this new situation in Near East.

Firstly, Russia's access to the Black Sea was firmly secured, and her harbours on the north coast of the Black Sea became important Russian naval bases. This meant that the Bosporus, which cuts through Istanbul,

[22] L.S. Stavrianos, '*The Balkans since 1453*' (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), p. 191

[23] M. S Anderson 'The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-4' *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 37, No. 88, 1958, pp. 17-41

[24] R. Davison, 'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered' *Slavic Review* Vol. 35, No. 3, 1976, p. 463

[25] For the various approaches to this issue by some scholars, see, *ibid*, p. 468

the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, and the adjoining Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, were the next targets in case of an Ottoman-Russian military conflict. Those straits were the last obstacles in front of Russia's access to the Mediterranean. This situation would be a major concern for Britain, whose great power status was basically dependent on her maritime power in the European States System.[26] For this reason, the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* became the milestone for Britain to revise her alignment with Russia.

Secondly, Russia's influence drastically increased over the Orthodox and/or Slavic nations in the Balkans after the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*. As the strongest independent Orthodox and Slavic state, she became an attraction point for the Orthodox and/or Slavs living under the sovereignty of the non-Orthodox states in the Balkans, namely under the Ottoman and Habsburg (Austrian) Empires. This was enough for Austria to be concerned. Moreover, the rights granted to Russia over the administration of the Principalities by the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* would mean Russia's political penetration into the Balkans which was to open Austria's south to the Russian pressure too in addition to that in her east.

However, in the beginning, Austria did not consider the rise of Russian influence in the Balkans as a threat, and so did not question her alliance with Russia against the Ottoman Empire. It seemed that she considered the benefit of the alliance with Russia to be much more than a mere alignment, if not an alliance, with the Ottoman Empire. What was the attraction of the Russian alliance that dissuaded Austria from objecting to the rise of Russian influence in the Balkans? The answer was a secret partition agreement of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and Austria that would later be known as 'the Greek Project'.

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[26] Duke of Argyll, '*Our Responsibilities for Turkey, Facts and Memories of Forty Years'*, (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street Press, 1896), pp. 3-4.

The so-called Greek Project was the most second remarkable event of the last half of the 18th century in the Ottoman-Russian relations after the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca*. In addition to its importance in the partition of the Ottoman territories, the Greek Project also proved to be of significance in three other key areas. Firstly, it served to nullify the opposition of Austria to Russia's expansion in the Black Sea and her annexation of Crimea in 1783; secondly, as has already been noted, it prevented further objections from Austria over the rise of Russian influence in the Balkans; and finally, and possibly of greater significance to future relations in the region, it served to inspire the future rulers of Russia to develop similar partition schemes across the Ottoman Empire.

The 'Greek Project' had been developed originally by Catherine II and her close aides, and envisioned the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and Istanbul, to be replaced by a Greek kingdom that would include Istanbul. The Project also foresaw the establishment of the Dacia Kingdom in the Principalities and the division of the remaining Balkan, Black Sea and Caucasus territories between Russia and Austria.[27] The Project was developed and formulated by way of a secret correspondence between Catherine II and the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph rather than through a formal treaty, being best described as a secret treaty in the form of an exchange of letters between the two powers in 1781.[28]

As a consequence of the newly developed alignments, Russia was able to annex the independent Crimean territories in 1783 without resistance from the other great powers. This, in the words of Anderson, '... was the most important territorial change in Europe during the two

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[27] For an excellent analysis of the Greek Project based on the Russian and Austrian archives, see Hugh Ragsdale, 'Evaluating Traditions of the Russian Aggression: Catherine II and The Greek Project,' *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 66, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 91–117

[28] I. D. Madariaga, 'The Secret Austro-Russian Treaty of 1781', *The Slavonic and East European Review,* vol. 38, no. 90, 1959, pp. 114 and 129-132

decades which separated the first and second partitions of Poland'.[29] Without the support of any great power, all the Ottoman Empire could do in its weakened state was watch while Russia made its *fait accompli*.[30]

By the beginning of the 1800s, Russia had achieved all that had been envisioned by Peter the Great.[31] Poland and Sweden had been reduced to the level of vassal or ineffective states, and the Ottoman Empire, although not reduced to such a level, had been removed from the list of first-level states in the European State System. In addition, the Black Sea had been transformed from a vital Ottoman asset into a Russian-dominated sea, protected by the Russian naval arsenals at *Sebastopol, Kherson* and *Nikolaev* on its northern shores. The Ottoman position had thus become more precarious due to the geographical location of her capital city, Istanbul, and the threat of a seaborne attack. This was the state of affairs between the Ottoman Empire and Russia when the 1815 Settlements were forged out in the Congress of Vienna.

In conclusion, the domestic weakness of the Ottoman Empire was not the only cause of this dramatic shift in power in Ottoman-Russian relations, as the structure of the European States System in the latter half of the 18th century effectively excluded the Ottoman Empire from allying with larger powers against Russia and the Austro-Russian alliance.

Obviously, Ottoman-Russian relations could not remain unaffected by the structural transformation of the European States System following the 1815 Settlements

After 1815, the main challenge for Ottoman-Russian relations, and in connection, the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System,

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[29] Anderson (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 19

[30] Anderson (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 39

[31] For the foreign policy objectives of Peter the Great and its influences on his successors, see Ansimov (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 25

was whether Russia would pursue the same line of revisionist policies in regard to the Ottoman Empire as she had been doing when assuming the role of guardian of the status quo in Central Europe in the 1815 European States System. Moreover, would Russia act in concert with the other great powers for the maintenance of 1815 Settlements? If not, how would the structure of the 1815 European States System work to restrain Russia in its pursuance of her relations with the Ottoman Empire? While answering each of the above questions, some regular patterns of behaviours among the great powers in regard will be identified in the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. It was a relationship that had consequences for the wider political map of Europe that are still evident in global politics today, and as such is a significant research question for this study.

3. Literature Review and Originality of Study

In order to address the key issues and questions raised in this thesis, it is first necessary to make a review of previous literature related to the subject. In this way, the originality of the presented thesis, and how it will add to furthering the understanding of this complex and interesting topic, will be clarified.

The international order in the post-Napoleonic era and 19th century Ottoman-Russian relations have attracted the attention of a great number of scholars and researchers, and as a result there is a considerable body of academic literature pertaining to the period. The previous studies may be categorised in accordance with the issues covered by the variables of the research question. To this end, first, the research question and the main argument of the thesis will be reiterated, and then the issues covered in previous literature will be outlined.

The aim of the presented research is to examine how the development of the 1815 European States System, which was established by the 1815 Settlements, affected the relationship between the Ottoman

Empire and Russia between 1815 and 1856. This being the case, the core argument of the presented work is that Ottoman-Russian relations in this period should not be examined independently of the European States System, but rather should be analysed taking into account the dynamics and politics of the great powers that emerged out of the 1815 Settlements.

The research question and the main argument of the thesis have opened two broad issues for discussion. The first covers the establishment of the 1815 European States System and its working throughout the 1815–1856 period; while the second covers the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in that same period. Previous scholarly works will be grouped on this basis, after which a critical review will be made of each, defining the contribution of each group to the understanding of the two issues.

The various facets of the foundation and operation of the 1815 European States System have been covered by many scholars and researchers,[32] examining specifically the French bid for hegemony and the resistance of the other great powers. In this context, the emergence of a new pattern in international relations and the Concert of Europe has been analysed focusing on the failures of the great powers up until 1812, and then the establishment and success of the Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia against Napoleonic France. These studies can be of much value when assessing the changes that occurred

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[32] Some of these studies in that respect are I. Clark '*Hierarchy of States, Reform and Resistance in the International Order*', (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); P. Kennedy '*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*' (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); F.R Bridge and R. Bullen ' *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-191*', (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2005); K. J. Holsti, '*Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); M.S Anderson, '*The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914*' (London, Longman, 1985); V. E. Gulick '*Europe's Classical Balance of Power: a case history of the theory and practice of one of the great concepts of European statecraft*' (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); A. Sked (ed), '*Europe's Balance of Power*' (New York: Barnesln & Noble Books 1979); W.R. Thompson, '*On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics,* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); B. Buzan and R.Little '*International Systems in World History*' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); C. Holbraad, '*The Concert of Europe: a Study in German and British International Theory*, 1815-1914' (London: Longman, 1970); H. Nicolson '*The Congress of Vienna*' (London: Constable and Co. Ltd, 1946)

in international relations as a result of the foundation of the 1815 European States System, and how the era after 1815 differed from the previous century. As such, these studies have been immensely useful in the analysis of the structural features that drove competition and/or cooperation among the great powers. These monographs and articles are mandatory background reading when making a structural analysis of the foreign policies of the unit states in the 1815 European States System.

The most important scholarly works are those of H. Kissinger and F. Hinsley.

Kissinger's *'A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822'* (1957) explains how the peacemakers in the 1815 Settlements tried to reconcile the legitimate security needs of the great powers with the maintenance of the post-Napoleon order. In this respect it is a very useful study, pointing out the significance of the structural arrangements for lasting stability. It clearly argues that the success of the 1815 Settlements was based on the contentment of Russia and the accommodation of France in the new international system alongside the existing powers of Austria and Britain.

Hinsley's *'Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States'* (1980) focuses on the development of the modern European States System from the 16th century to the 20th century, which in this respect is much more comprehensive than Kissinger's work. Hinsley concluded that two different but interrelated aspects of the European States System developed: Europe became, on the one hand, a kind of political community operating under specific rules and principles, while on the other hand remaining as a collection of separate states that cooperated on the basis of the political/military and economic interactions and processes. The significance of his conclusion for this research is that it presents a framework for the analysis of the roles and places of the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the European States System.

The specific issue of Ottoman-Russian relations in the 19th century has also been covered at length in many scholarly works, which can be divided into two categories according to their genre.

The first category comprises monographs relating the diplomatic history of the 19th century.[33] These works focus mainly on the interactions and processes of the unit states in the 1815 European States System rather than on its underlying systemic and structural characteristics. They provide a detailed analysis of how the great powers dealt with each other, and explain the alignments and alliances that took place among them. However, particular focus is on the relations of the great powers rather than the Ottoman Empire, and so they can be considered as more general in their outlook regarding the Ottoman-Russian relations, which are covered only briefly and in very general terms.

The most significant contributions to this category are those by P. Schroeder and A. J. P. Taylor.

Schroeder's comprehensive study, *'The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848'*, (1990) presents a clear understanding of the new dimensions of the post-Napoleonic settlement, showing how international politics was transformed from crude balance of power politics into a

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[33] Some prominent examples of this genre can be listed as follows: A. R. Marriot *'The Eastern Question, A Study in European Diplomacy*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917) I. H. Uzuncarsili and E.Z. Karal, *'Osmanli Tarihi'*, 9 Cilt, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); F. Armaoglu, *'19 uncu Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi'* (Ankara, Is Ban. Yay. 1989); O. Sander*,'Siyasi Tarih, Baslangictan 1918'e'*(Ankara, Imge, 1989); R. Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih'*(İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1985); A.N. Kurat *'Türkiye ve Rusya (XVIII. Yüzyıl Sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri) 1789-1919'* (Ankara, T. T. K., 2011); A. N. Kurat *'Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917'ye Kadar'*(Ankara, T.T.K. 2010); M. S. Anderson *'The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations'* (London: Macmillan, 1966); B. Jelavich *'Russia's Balkan entanglements, 1806–1914'* (USA, Cambridge University Press, 1991); L. S. Stavrianos *'The Balkans since 1453'* (London: Hurst, 2000); C. Webster, *'The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841'*(London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951); ' *'The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822'*, (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1931); J.V. Puryear, *'International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, 1834–1853,'* (USA: Archon Books, 1969) and '*France and the Levant'*(USA, Archon Books, 1969); W.E. Mosse *'The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855-1871'*, (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1963) V.H. Aksan *'Ottoman Wars; An Empire Besieged, 1700–1870'* (Harlow: Longman/Pearson, 2007)

managed balance of power relations. Regarding the Ottoman Empire before 1848, he describes at length how the Greek revolt (1820–1829) and the rebellion of the governor of Egypt (1833–1839) were intervened in and settled, by the great powers in line with the new understanding in international relations.

Taylor's work, *'The Struggle for Mastery in Europe in 1848–1914'*, (1954) starts where Schroeder left off. In contrast to Schroeder's approach, Taylor argues that there was no substantial difference between pre-1815 and post-1848 international politics in Europe, and that balance of power politics prevailed for the entire duration of the 19th century, as the title of his book suggests. He provides a detailed account of the military and political interactions and processes among the great powers between 1848 and 1914, detailing also Ottoman-Russian relations.

In addition to the general political history studies of the 19th century, there are a large number of works covering particular periods or specific issues in Ottoman-Russian relations. By drawing mainly on primary sources, they contribute significantly to the understanding of the big picture in international politics in the Near East at the time.

'The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations' (1966) by M.S. Anderson is an authoritative work dealing with the specific subject of international politics around the Ottoman Empire. Recounting the great powers' policies concerning the Near East, it begins with the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* in 1774 and culminates in 1923. Another subject-specific work in this genre is Jelavich's *'Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914'* (1991) which is a very useful study of how Russia used her Orthodox and/Slavic connections with the Balkan nations under the Ottoman Empire in her efforts to extend influence into the southern sphere of Eurasia and the Mediterranean. V. Aksan's *'Ottoman Wars; An Empire Besieged, 1700–1870'* (2007) looks at how the

Ottoman Empire resisted the military pressure of Russia and Austria from the 18th century until the end of the Crimean System in 1870.

V. Puryear's *'International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834–1853';* (1969) and *'France and the Levant from the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah'* (1968) thoroughly investigate the economic motives behind the British and French policies towards the Near East, relying primarily on English and French archives.

Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire and her policies concerning the Near East in 19th century are clearly a subject of great interest to Russian scholars. In this respect, *'Vostochniya Voproc Vo Vneshneiye Politike Rossiya, Konets XVIII- Nachalo XX v'* (1978) is a concise and compact book by a group academics, V. A. Georgiev, N. S Kinyapina, M.T. Panchenkova and B .I Sheremet, about the 'Eastern Question', viewed from the Russian perspective. It can be considered as the Russian equivalent of Anderson's *'The Eastern Question, 1774–1923'*, examining at length Russian foreign policy and its implementation in regards to the Ottoman Empire, relying on Russian primary and secondary sources.

The starting point of Russian-Ottoman relations in the 1815 European States System, being the rebellion of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, is covered in detail in G. L. Arsh's *'Eteristskoii Dvenzhenie v Russii'* and A. M. Stanislavoskaya's *'Rossia i Gretsiya'* (1970). These publications go on to analyse Russia's interest and links with the Greek organisation *'Phelika Heteria'*, which stared the Greek rebellion in 1821–1830. Both studies are very good examples of background readings of the Russian-Greek relations before the establishment of an independent Greece in 1831.

'*Turtsiia i Adrianopolskii Mir 1829g*' (1975) by V. S. Sheremet examines the Ottoman-Russian relations in the context of the Greek rebellion, with particular emphasis on the 1828–1829 war and the Treaty of Adrianople. The main conclusion Sheremet draws is that the Treaty of Adrianople was a milestone for Ottoman-Russian relations in the first half of the 19th century. With the signing of the Treaty, Ottoman-Russian relations were based on Ottoman subservience following the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833, which had long been Russia's aim.

A. Georgiev's '*Vneshniyaya Politika Russii na Blizhnem Vostoke v Kontse 30- Nachale 40x Godov XIX v*' (1975) continues to narrate Russian policies in the Near East, starting where Sheremet's study left off. The book narrates the shift in Russian policy to preserve the existence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, and examines how Russia dealt with the rebellion of the ruler of Egypt against the Ottoman Sultan and the signing of the bilateral defence Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833, followed by the second rebellion of the Egyptian governor and Russia's subsequent cooperation with Britain. Finally, it details the replacement of the bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* by the multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841. He argues that Russia's agreement to replace the bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* with the multilateral Convention of the Straits was a key characteristic of Russian policy in the Near East, and claims that by giving its consent, Russia lost her monopoly in the regulation of affairs in the Near East, which became the subject of the multilateral politics of the great powers.

Relating to the Crimean War, which ended the 1815 European States System and was a remarkable event in Ottoman-Russian relations, two important books are worthy of mention. A.M. Zayonchkovskiy's '*Vostochnaya Voyna 1853-1856 gg. v Svazi s Sovremennoy ey Politicheskoy Obstonovkoy, Prilojeniya*' (1908-1913) and E.B Tarle's '*Kirimskaya Voina*' (1950) present a detailed account of the events leading up to the Crimean

War and the war itself. Both studies are based on a large collection of Russian documents.

Ottoman-Russian relations and the great power politics of the 19th century have attracted the attention of many Ottoman historians as well. A. Cevdet Paşa's '*Tarih-i Cevdet*'[34], M. Nuri Paşa's '*Netayicul Vukuat*'[35], A. F. Türkgeldi's '*Mesaili Mühimmeyi Siyasiye*'[36] and M. Celaleddin Paşa's '*Miratul Hakikat*'[37] are the most well-known among them. These historians were high level courtiers in the last half of the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore their works partly reflect the views of the establishment. Nevertheless, these books have become standard sources of reference for later historians in the Turkish Republican era. Regarding the Turkish studies written after 1923, the most comprehensive record of Ottoman History is '*Osmanli Tarihi*' by I.H. Uzuncarsili and E.Z. Karal. This is a detailed chronological account of all external and internal events of the period under examination in this study. In addition, '*19 uncu Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi*' by F. Armaoglu, '*Siyasi Tarih*' by O. Sander and '*Siyasi Tarih*' by R. Ucarol are three important academic works that touch upon Ottoman-Russian relations, alongside other developments in international relations in 19th century Europe. H. Inalcik's studies are also worth mentioning here for their contribution to the understanding of the role of the Ottoman Empire in the European States System from the 15th century onwards, although his studies are not specifically about 19th century Ottoman history.

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[34] A. Cevdet Paşa, '*Tarihi-I Cevdet*', (Istanbul: Uçdal Neşriyat, 1984).

[35] M. Nuri Paşa: '*Netayic Ül-Vukuat Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi , I-II*', haz. N. Çagatay (Ankara, TTK, 2002)

[36] A.F. Turkgeldi, '*Mesail-i Muhimme-i Siyasiyye*' (Ankara: TTK, 1987)

[37] M. Celaleddin Pasa, '*Mirat-i Hakikat*' (Istanbul: Kervan, 1979)

Finally, the memoirs of leading statesmen in the 1815–1856 era, such as F. Metternich,[38] D. Talleyrand,[39] and F. Guizot[40] constitute the second category of works relating to Ottoman-Russian relations.

These studies, in English, Turkish and Russian, have made meaningful and substantial contributions to the understanding of the way in which the 1815 European States System was founded and operated, and the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in the first half of the 19th century. That said, the subject cannot be considered closed as there still remain some unexplained issues and gaps in the understanding of the era.

Firstly, the general and diplomatic history studies address the Ottoman-Russian relations only to a limited degree, while the subject-specific studies do not pay sufficient attention to the systemic differences between the pre- and post-1815 Ottoman-Russian relations in terms of the structural constraints. That said, both groups of studies serve as the basis for the further elaboration of the key international political events and developments of the time.

Secondly, most of the studies dealing with Ottoman-Russian relations are narrative-based explanations rather than analyses that draw upon theoretical assumptions, and so do not clearly identify the underlying structural causes of some of the consistent patterns in Ottoman-Russian relations between 1815 and 1856. In this regard, the operation of the 1815 European States System in those relations has not been sufficiently addressed.

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[38] *Memories of Prince Metternich'* in 5 vols., ed. by R. Metternich and tran. by A. Napier, (London: R. Bentley and Son, 1879)

[39] *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand* in 5 vols., trans. by A. Hall, (London: Griffith Farran and Co. Ltd. 1891)

[40] F. Guizot '*Memoirs to Illustrate the History of my Time'* in 5 vols., (London, R. Bentley, 1861)

Thirdly, there is a need to use some other exploratory tools in addition to the balance of power concept for a better understanding of the Ottoman-Russian relations. Obviously, the balance of power can explain most of the behaviours and tendencies of the unit states in the 1815 European States System, however focusing solely on this issue results in some omissions from the big picture since it does not explain sufficiently the differences between the pre- and post-1815 eras, or between the 18th and 19th centuries. Accordingly, the specific role and function of the Concert of Europe in international European politics in 1815–1856, and its subsequent effects on the course of Ottoman-Russian relations in that era, have been generally overlooked.

This research aims to fill these gaps by taking 1815 as the start point of the new phase in the history of the European States System, herein referred to as the '1815 European States System'. On this basis the structure of the 1815 European States System will be analysed to identify its structural characteristics through some theoretical approaches, after which an attempt will be made to find consistent patterns in the operation of the 1815 European States System and its effects on Ottoman-Russian relations based on the findings of the structural analysis.

4. **Conceptual Framework**

Before proceeding onto the theoretical and analytical tools used in the analysis of the relationship between the variables of the 'Research Question', the key concepts of the 'Research Question' will be explained so as to justify the use of these particular theories and analytical models. The key concept is the 'European States System'; however, it is necessary to speak a little about the general characteristics of international systems before going into the particulars of the European States System.

International System

Despite its significance and frequent use, there is no universally accepted definition of an international system.[41] According to Little this is partly the result of the different methodological ways the 'system' concept has been dealt with in the international relations discipline.[42]

When there exists a collection of at least two unit states among which political/military and economic interactions take place, and consequently a kind of dependency is formed among them, we can begin to speak of an international system.[43] Interactions among the unit states must be sustained on a regular basis and over a substantial period of time.[44]

The significance of the international system concept comes from its contribution to the understanding of the constraining forces on the states that make up that system. The sources of the constraining forces on unit states in a systemic relationship can be defined as structure, process and interaction,[45] which are impersonal in nature, and affect the behaviours of unit states. Besides this, there may be other personal or socially

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[41] B. Buzan and R. Little, '*International Systems in World History, Remaking the Study of International Relations*', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 90

[42] For the different systemic approaches in international relations, see R. Little, 'Three approaches to the international system: some ontological and epistemological considerations', *British Journal of International Studies* vol. 3, 1977, pp. 269–285 and R. Little 'A systems approach' in *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*, Trevor Taylor (ed), (New York: Longman Group, , 1978), pp. 183–204 and David Yost, 'New Perspectives on Historical States-Systems', *World Politics*, vol. 43, 1979, p. 51

[43] For example, Tilly defines the term 'international system' as follows: 'States form a system to the extent that they interact with each other regularly and to the degree that their interaction affects the behaviour of each state'. C. Tilly, '*Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990*', (USA: Blackwell Press, , 1992), p. 162

[44] Buzan and Little (1999), *op. cit*, p. 96

[45] *Ibid.*, 77-89

constructed elements, such as common rules and principles that affect the behaviours of the unit states of a given international system.[46]

The structure of an international system indicates how the unit states in the system stand in relation to each other as a consequence of the distribution of military and economic capabilities power among them. However, its effects over the unit states can be felt through processes such as fighting, arms races, security dilemma, political recognition, alliances and alignments, and trade agreements. As for processes, they suggest how those unit states work or interact with each other.[47] Processes are also very important for understanding the effects of structures, and as has been noted above, structural effects transmit into the behaviours of states through processes.[48] Nye uses the metaphor of a poker game to describe the linkages between structure and processes in an international system.[49] The structure is how the cards are distributed among the players, while the process is about the rules of the game and how the players use the cards they are dealt.

From these explanations, it can be deduced that processes are systemic in nature in the operation of an international system, in that they affect behaviour, while not being part of the structure but they require a viable structure to take place.

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[46] Owing to the impersonal forces of the systemic forces of structure and process, structuralists argue that the focus of the analyst in international relations should be on the underlying features of the system rather than the actors, namely, the states. In this regard, 'They [structuralists] are sceptical of the influence of organisations making much impact outside the structural constraints. They are even more sceptical of the influence of individuals'. M. Nicholson ' *A Concise Theory of International Relations*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 102

[47] J. Nye, '*Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*', (Pearson Longman, New York, 2006), p. 37 and Buzan and Little (1999), *op. cit*. pp. 79, 84–85 and 216

[48] G. Snyder, 'Process Variables in Neorealist Theory', in *Realism: Restatement and Renewal*, ed. B. Frankel, (Cass, 1997), p. 168 and for the detailed explanation of process and process types, see also Buzan and Little (1999), *op. cit*., pp. 79, 217–227 and 301–329

[49]Nye (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 38

It is important to note that a structure among three impersonal sources of the systemic forces is the most static one that makes it much more durable. In other words, changes in structure take place at a slower rate than they do in processes.[50] All of these characteristics make structure much more important in the analysis of the effects of international systems on its unit states.

Another concept that is closely associated with the concept of structure is that of structural modifiers. Snyder defines these as: 'System wide influences that are structural in their inherent nature but not potent enough internationally to warrant that description. They modify the effects of the more basic structural elements on the interaction process, but they are not interaction itself'.[51] Military technologies, norms and institutions can be put forward as examples of structural modifiers.[52]

European States System

The 'European States System' is, in short, an international system made up of independent states interacting on the basis of the Treaty of Westphalia.[53] It covers geographically the Western hemisphere of the Eurasian landmass since its inception in the 15th century.

Since the 15th century,[54] the European States System has evolved in two distinct but interrelated directions.[55] The first evolution has been the expansion of political/military and economic interactions and processes to

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[50] Buzan and Little (1999), *loc. cit.*, and Nye (2006), *loc. cit.*

[51] Snyder (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 169

[52] *Ibid*, pp. 169–171

[53] For the text of the Treaty of Westphalia, see Israel (1967), *op. cit.*, pp. 7-49.

[54] Tilly argues that 'historical starting points are always illusory, because in a continuous historical process some earlier element always links to any supposed beginning'. Therefore, starting the European States System from 15th century becomes a common approach, since the roots of its basic characteristics and institutions date back that period. Tilly (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 164; J. Levy, *op. cit.* p. 24

[55] M. Wight, '*Systems of States*', H. Bull (ed) (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 125–128

cover the Balkans, Near East [Ottoman Empire], Caucasus Region, Russia and North Africa[56] based on the sovereignty of the unit states and multi-polarity based on a balance of power.[57] The great settlements of Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1714) and Vienna (1815) were some of the key events determining the specific scope of the European States System.

The second evolution of the European States System entailed its development as a political community, which paved the way for the birth of common norms, rules, public law, diplomatic relations and institutions.[58] Buzan sees the birth of the European community 'as a historical response to the existence of [a European States] system'[59] covering the Near and Middle East, North Africa and Russia, in which the norms, values and institutions of the European International Society spread.[60]

These two simultaneous developments were closely interrelated, meaning that both have to be taken into consideration when analysing the effects of the European States System. Both effects were systemic in nature but had different motivations, with the first arising out of impersonal forces [interactions, processes and structure] on the unit states, and the second out of consciously formulated rules and institutions.

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[56] Wight, *ibid*, pp. 110–128, for a detailed account of the political and economic development of the European States System, see Buzan and Little (1999), *op. cit*, pp. 241–275 and Tilly (1992), *op. cit*., pp. 163–191

[57] For a detailed theoretical analysis of the concept of balance of power, see R. Little, '*The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Moreover, see, A. Watson (1997) '*The Evolution of International Society, A Comparative Analysis*', (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 104–105

[58] Wight (1977), *ob. cit*., pp. 33–39 and 125–128

[59] B. Buzan '*People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*', (Michigan: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 167

[60] *Ibid.*

5. Theoretical Framework

This section will discuss theoretical approaches in an attempt to determine the relations between the variables of the research question. To summarise the variables of the research question, the structure of the 1815 European States System is an independent variable; the Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period are a dependent variable; and the Concert of Europe is both an independent and intervening variable.

The first theoretical approach to be followed in the analysis is the system approach,[61] which will make it possible to reduce the complexity and confusion displayed by the amalgam of interactions. In this way, the cause-effect relationship in the behaviours of the Ottoman Empire and Russia and between the other great powers in the 1815 European States System may be accurately determined.

The second main theoretical approach used in the analysis is the neo-realist or structural realist perspective, which is compatible with the system approach. The neo-realist approach, although with some modifications, will allow the contributions of the institutional and security regime theories to be accommodated, leading to a better understanding of the operation of international systems while maintaining the core assumptions of the realist tradition.[62]

As a systemic theory, Neo-realism treats the internal attributes of actors as non-determining and non-explanatory in the behaviours of states.[63] However, when examining the short- and mid-term operations of international systems like the 1815 European States System, some of the

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[61] On the use of system theory in international relations, see Little (1978), *op. cit.,* pp. 183-2

[62] R.O. Keohane (ed) 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in *'Neo-Realism and Its Critics'*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 163-175

[63] Keohane (1986), *ibid,* p.169

unit state attributes, collective norms and principles became important for the analysis of systemic imperatives. Rather than adopting the rigid stance that Neo-Realism proposes, additional socially constructed elements, such as common international norms, principles, processes and structural modifiers will be included in the portfolio of systemic components as explanatory variables that rely on the contribution of other perspectives as the Neo-Liberal (institutional) approach. The practical results of this broad and modified approach will allow functional differentiations, or in more concrete terms, the international division of labour among states in the 1815 European States System to be taken into consideration. Also, it will facilitate an understanding of the ordering principle of the 1815 European States System, lying somewhere between anarchy and hierarchy, given the existence and operation of the Concert of Europe after 1815 in European international politics.

6. Analytical Framework

This section will very briefly touch on the steps followed in the research and specify how the theoretical approach will be employed.

As a first step, the structure of the 1815 European States System will be analysed using the analytical model developed by R.J.B. Jones, which offers the analytical advantage of providing an 'intermediate level' of analysis between the system and unit levels in accordance with the theoretical approach applied in this thesis.[64] Through this 'intermediate level' of analysis, focus can sway somewhere between the all-inclusive unit level and the neo-realist's highly parsimonious system level.

With the analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States System, it will be possible to come up with some hypotheses about its working and impact on Ottoman-Russian relations. In the final step the bilateral interactions and processes among the Ottoman Empire and

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[64] R.J.B. Jones, Concepts and Models of Change in International Relations', in *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension*, ed. B. Buzan and R.J.B. Jones, (Frances Pinter, London, 1981), p.16-20

Russia and the other great powers in the 1815–1856 period will be analysed to test the hypothesis.

Conclusion

The following chapters contain an analysis of the working and effects of a new phase in the history of the European States System in terms of the bilateral relations of two of its peripheral states: the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

These two states were unique at the time with regard to their positions and relations within the European States System: The Ottoman Empire had been a state of the first order within the System since the 14th century, while remaining outside of its institutional arrangements; while in contrast, Russia was a latecomer to the first order states of the European States System owing to her aggrandising policies against the neighbouring states of Poland, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire.

When the post-Napoleon order was forged in 1815, the Ottoman Empire was at the nadir of its power, although her stability remained of great importance for the maintenance of the peace that the 1815 Settlements had brought. In her weakened state, she concentrated all her energy on consolidating state authority in the provinces and organising her army and state machinations to achieve her primary aim of maintaining the international status quo to the greatest extent possible.

In contrast, Russia, one of the main pillars of the 1815 Settlement, was at the peak of her military power, and was faced with the dilemma of how to deal with the weak Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman territories were all that stood in the way of Russia's access to the Mediterranean, where, as a maritime power, she would be able to create a safe and secure frontier on her southern frontier to match the one in the west that had resulted from the 1815 Settlements. She could continue her pre-1815

aggrandisement policies with regard to the Ottoman Empire and to the other great powers, however this could potentially expose her to a hostile coalition of the other great powers and would result in the disruption of the peace and order brought by the 1815 Settlements. As an alternative, she could agree to maintain the status quo in the Near East, which would likely fall under the sphere of influence of one of the maritime powers of the 1815 European States System, being Great Britain and France.

As a result, there was great ambiguity in the level of Ottoman-Russian relations as the new phase of the European States System started to unfold. Could Russia continue to expand further to the south-west at the expense of the other great powers and remove the last obstacle in its way to the Mediterranean to achieve a secure and stable south-west frontier? How could an inward-oriented Ottoman Empire stand against such a militarily and politically powerful Russia?

The answers to these questions may be found in the operation of the current European States System. A new relationship pattern emerged as a result of the Chaumont, First and Second Paris, and Congress of Vienna Treaties during 1814 and 1815 after the defeat of the Napoleonic France, referred to collectively as the 1815 Settlements. The most distinguishing aspect of this new system was the inception of the Concert of Europe, by which the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements was entrusted to the concerted actions of the great powers.

So, would Russia be restrained, or would she be permitted to follow her policies for expansion under the new structure of the European States System? And to what extent would she be restrained or allowed to continue? The most essential part of the answer to those questions will be addressed in a thorough analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States System, which will be the subject of the following four chapters of this study. The choice of theoretical and analytical tools will be of key significance in answering these questions. A systemic approach and a

modified version of Neo-realist or Structural realism are considered to be the most suitable theoretical tools in this regard, since they will allow the identification of the systemic forces at play in the 1815 European States System regarding the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

The research will be carried out in two broad steps. The first step will entail a detailed analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States System in Chapter II; while the second step will be an analysis of the interactions and processes among the Ottoman Empire and Russia and the other great powers, focusing on the key events of the 1815-1856 period, and based on the outcomes of the first step. The second step will be covered in the third, fourth and fifth chapters.

CHAPTER 2

**ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM
1815–1854**

Introduction

This chapter will present an analysis of the structure of the
European States System that prevailed from 1815–1856, with the overall
aim being to provide an understanding of the external environment of
Ottoman-Russian relations in that period. To this end, the structure of the
European States System[1] and the way it worked during that period will be
explained, which will lead to some hypotheses on the effects of the
European States System on Ottoman-Russian relations from 1815–1856,
which will be covered in the following chapters.

To this end, answers will be sought to the following questions: First
of all, (1) how did the new relationship patterns come about; and more
particularly, what events instigated the change, and on what pillars were
they grounded? Did the new pattern of relationships amount to a
completely new international states system; and, if so, what new elements
distinguished it from the previous system; (2) following the 1815
Settlements and the formation of a new relationship pattern, what was the
structure of the new states system? Put differently, what how was the
power distributed among the great powers, and how were they[2] positioned
in respect of their relationships? To this end, what was the ordering

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[1] I will sometimes use the term 'the Structure' (with the definite article and a capitalised 'S') in place of the
phrase 'the structure of the 1815 European States System'.

[2] As to the significance of great powers in the operation of states systems, Levy argues that it was the great
powers that determined the structure, major processes and the general evolution of the states system, and
therefore their actions are of primary interest for an analyses of the operation of the states systems. J. S.
Levy, 'War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975', (Lexington: Kentucky University Press,
1983), p. 8; Likewise, Waltz says that the 'structures [of international states systems] are defined not by all of
the actors that flourish within them, but by the major ones' K. Waltz, 'Theory of International Politics',
(New York: Random House, New York), p. 93.

principle of the structure and did any hierarchy exist? (3) Were there any functional differences among the unit states of the new states system that emerged from the nature of the ordering principle? If so, what were those functional differences? And, finally, (4) how can the changes that took place in the relationship pattern in 1815–1856 be categorised?

The first step in the analysis of the structure will be to split it into two parts, in accordance with the model presented in the Analytical and Theoretical Frameworks in the previous chapter: **Capability Structure** and **Relationship Structure**. This division is purely analytical and is necessary as each requires the use of different methodological tools.

The analysis of the Capability Structure will draw upon some economic and military data related to the great powers and will present a comparison of their standings within the system so as to reveal the underlying forces that determined or constrained the great powers in their application of foreign policies. This will facilitate an assessment of whether the great powers' foreign policy objectives were consistent with their economic and military capacities. In concrete terms, it will reveal whether their economic performances were able to support their foreign policy objectives in the 1815–1856 period.

The analysis of the Relationship Structure will include explanations of the following elements: (1) The ordering principle that defined the nature of the relationships among the unit states under the new states system that resulted from the 1815 Settlements;[3] while the analysis of the ordering principle will include an examination of the Concert of Europe, which was the defining body in international politics from 1815 onwards; (2) the modal tendencies of the great powers in their foreign policies in the 1815–1856 period; and, finally, (3) the outcomes of the interplay between the ordering principle of the structure and the modal tendencies of the

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[3] For a definition of ordering principle and its role in the determination of the nature of structures of international states system, see *ibid*, pp. 81–99.

great powers. In this context, the diverging approaches of the great powers will be analysed.

The chapter will conclude with some hypotheses about the operation and effects of the structure on Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1854 period.

To reiterate, through an analysis of the relationship and capability structure of the new international states system, the environment and the systemic forces that either determined or constrained the Ottoman Empire and Russia in their bilateral relations will be defined. At the centre of the analysis will be the interactions and policies of the great powers, since their interests and capabilities extended beyond their immediate neighbours; and more so than any other states, they shaped and responded to the structure of the international states system of which they were a part.[4]

A. Foundation of the 1815 European States System

The new pattern of international relationships came into existence after the defeat of Napoleonic France and the successful dissolution of the so-called 'Napoleonic Empire'[5] by the third coalition of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1815.[6] However, the foundation process of the states system as 'a political community'[7] with specific norms was not

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[4] B. F. Braumoeller, 'Systemic Politics and the Origin of Great Power Conflict', *American Political Science Review'*, Vol. 102, No. 1, 2007, p. 77.

[5] For details of the political setting of the Napoleonic Empire, see A. Watson, '*The Evolution of International Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis'* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 232–234 and Paul Schroeder, '*The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 371–395

[6] For a detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars and their political implications on the European States System before 1815, see P. Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* pp. 100–441.

[7] I. L. Claude, Jr. '*Swords into Plowshares, the Problems and Process of International Organization'*, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 26. Regarding the role of cultural and political questions and norms in the course of the European States System, see M. Wight, '*Systems of States'*, ed. H. Bull, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp. 33–45. More general theoretical information about the analytical division of political, military, economic and societal sectors in the analysis of international systems can be found in B.

completed until France had been fully admitted into the ranks of the 'great powers club'[8] in 1818, which was to assume the task of the governance of international relations. The following international agreements formed the pillars of the new states system: The Treaty of Chaumont (March 9, 1814), the First Treaty of Paris (May 30, 1814), the Conventions of the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Second Treaty of Paris and the Holy Alliance (15 September, 1815), the Quadruple Alliance (20 November, 1815) and the Protocol of Conference and Declaration of the Five Cabinets (15 November, 1818) at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.[9] For clarity, these will be referred to collectively in future references as the 1815 Settlements.

Having outlined the birth of the new international relationship pattern, an assessment will now be made as to whether the new patterns in international relations could be described as a new international states system. According to Stanley Hoffman, if a positive answer is given one of the following questions, the existence of a new international states system can be assumed: Firstly, what were the system's basic units? For example, were they states, or supranational institutions for global governance? Secondly, what were the predominant foreign policy goals that these units sought with respect to one another, such as territorial conquest, material gain through trade etc.? Thirdly, what level of power was each member able to impose over each other members as a result of the military and economic capabilities of each state?[10] Based on this theoretical framework, can the relationship pattern between the states in Europe

Buzan and R. Little, '*International Systems in World History, Remaking the Study if International Relations'*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 72–77.

[8] Levy lists four criteria for a great power: 1. It possesses a high level of military capability, making it invulnerable to military threats from non-powers, and needs fear only other great powers. 2. Its interests and objectives are continental or global rather than regional or local. 3. It defends its interests more aggressively, including the frequent threat or use of military force, and finally, 4. It is recognised by the formal criteria of an international conference, congress, organisation or treaty, or is granted privileges such as veto power or permanent membership. For more detailed explanation, see Levy (1983), *op. cit*., pp.16-19

[9] For the English texts of some of these treaties, see M. Hurst, (ed) '*Key Treaties for the Great Powers 1814-1914',* vol.1, (London: David& Charles Ltd. 1972,), pp.1-147

[10] S. Hoffman, 'International Systems and International Law', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 215

after 1815 be defined as a new states system? And if not, what was it exactly?

When the characteristics of the different unit states and the way they interacted with each other are taken into account, the new pattern of international relations after 1815 cannot be perceived as a new international states system. Still, the main units engaging in international relations were the independent sovereign states. The conditions under which interstate relations took place were anarchic, and states still interacted with each other according to the principles established in Westphalia in 1648.[11] Lastly, and most importantly, the balance of power and its subsequent outcome of multi-polarity was still the determining principle in the foreign policies of all the major states, as had been the case since the 15th century. From this it can be understood that the 1815 Settlements brought nothing new to those areas, but what they did do was introduce a significant new element that distinguished the new pattern of international relationships from their 'predecessors',[12] being the oligopolistic governance of international relations under the 'Concert of Europe'. The commonalities between the previous system and the Concert of Europe institution prevent the new patterns in international relations from being referred to as a completely new states system, as they were rather a new phase in the course of the European States System. In future references, this will be referred to as the '1815 European States System',[13] which denotes at the same time both the continuity and exclusivity.

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[11] For the legal and political contribution of the Peace of Westphalia in the development of European States System, see Leo Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948', *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 42, no.1, 1948. For an opposing view, see A. Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth' *International Organization,* vol. 55, no. 2, 2001

[12] For details of the previous phases of the European States System, see Watson (1997), *ob. cit.*, pp.182–237, C. Tilly, 'Coercion, Capital and, European States, AD 990–1990', (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 1992), pp. 163–191, and F. H. Hinsley, '*Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States'*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), pp. 153–185

[13] I will sometimes, depending on flowing of the text, use 'the System' with the definite article and a capitalised 'S' letter interchangeably with 'The 1815 European States System'.

As a 'geographical category', the borders of the 1815 European States System and the characteristics of its unit states remained the same as they had been between the 1713 Utrecht Settlements and the start of the French bid for hegemony after 1789. In this context, the Near East (Balkans, Asia Minor, North Mediterranean, Caucasus and Persia), North and South America and Japan all fell within the borders of the 1815 European States System.[14]

Multi-polarity in the balance of power had been a characteristic of the European States System since the 1648 Westphalia Agreements; however the imperatives or requirements for multi-polarity in the 1815 European States System were different from those of the previous era. These specific imperatives or requirements, and the way that the 1815 Settlements attempted to meet them require further analysis, since they were the operational indicators of the balance of power in the 1815 European States System.

(i) *Fixing and then Preservation the Territorial and Political Balance/Equilibrium among the Great Powers*

In the 1793–1812 period, France had, to a great extent, altered the political and territorial map of Europe following her victories under the leadership of Napoleon.[15] The so-called 'French Continental System' saw a re-design of the political and territorial map of Central Europe, with France at the centre.[16] The peacemakers at the Vienna Congress in 1814, as a priority task, attempted to undo this political and territorial setting and replace it with a new one, with the intention being to reset the

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[14] F. S. Northedge, '*The International Political System*', (Faber and Faber, 1976), pp. 73–76. For a very useful discussion of the cultural and chronological borders, as well as the geographical borders of the international states system, see Weight (1977), *op. cit.*, pp. 33–45 and 111–152

[15] Watson (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 238; for a detailed account of the Napoleonic Wars and their political consequences, see Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.*, p. 371–383

[16] Watson (1997), *op .cit.*, p. 232

balance of power in Europe among the five great powers (including France).

In this regard, firstly, the dynastic regimes that had been replaced or removed by Napoleon were restored in France, Spain, Naples, the Netherlands, Tuscany and Sardinia,[17] after which, a number of 'intermediary states'[18] were established in central Europe and around France. The most remarkable among these was the confederation of 39 German states in Central Europe and independent Holland to the north-east of France.[19] A second issue was the territorial re-arrangement. To this end, France's borders were pushed back into their 1792 limits; Russia got most of Poland in Central Europe and retained Finland in the Baltics and Bessarabia to the north-west of the Black Sea; Prussia obtained the Rhineland in the west and part of Poland in the east, becoming a bulwark for France and Russia in both directions; and Austria gained Salzburg, the Adriatic coasts, and Lombardy, Venetia and Galicia,[20] extending Austria's influence further south over the remaining Italian states. Moreover, both of the Germanic powers were given some rights and privileges in the administrative affairs of the German Confederation, which was to serve as a stabilising factor between Austria and Prussia and between France and the two Germanic states.

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[17] C. K. Webster, '*The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*', (London: Bell & Sons Ltd, 1945), pp.36-37; 44-45 and 122-128.

[18] For the conceptual definition of 'intermediary states' and their functions in the 1815 European States System, see P. Schroeder, 'The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure', *World Politics*, vol. 39, no. 1 1986, pp. 12 and 17-25.

[19] For details of the reconstruction of the German Confederation and Italy and the Netherlands, see Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.*, pp. 561–570 and Webster (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 44–45 and 115–135.

[20] An excellent and concise account of the territorial settlement and its impacts on the number of subjects is provided by E. Gulick, '*Europe's Classical Balance of Power, A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft*', (Cornell University Pres, 1967)

(ii)   *Keeping a restricted but effective France*

France had attempted to achieve hegemony in Europe, and was stopped only after great human and material cost. However France was deemed necessary, as Metternich pointed out, for achieving the greatest possible political equilibrium between the four victorious powers[21] and so could not be sacrificed. The intention was to reduce her power and to apply restrictions that would prevent her from becoming a threat,[22] but at the same time she would not be a *'quantite negligeable'* in the affairs of the 1815 European States System.[23]

Consequently, France's territory was downsized to the pre-1792, and later pre-1790, levels and was encircled by the independent buffer states, as described in the preceding sub-section.[24] As to her political and military restrictions, the four victorious powers of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia pledged to join forces against France if she attempted to disrupt the order. This was the most powerful means of restraint of France, forcing her to remain within the limits of the 1815 Settlements.[25] The isolation of France was further increased through the Holy Alliance Agreement of the eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia after France's second attempt to dominate Europe under Napoleon was foiled in Waterloo in 1815.[26]

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[21] F. R. Metternich, (1879) 'Memories of Prince Metternich' in 5 vols. ed. by R. Metternich, tran., by A. Napier,(London: R. Bentley and Son, 1879), I, p. 249

[22] N. Rich, 'Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914', (McGraw-Hill, Inc.,1992), pp. 32–35

[23] Munster to the Prince Regent, 5 May, 1814, Political Sketches, p. 162, quoted by Webster (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 46

[24] Gulick (1964), *op. cit.*, pp. 175–176

[25] The Allies agreed in the first and second Articles of the Second Treaty of Paris to maintain it (the Treaty) by force if necessary, and to continue the commitment even after the end of the occupation according to Article five. For the text of the said Treaty, see, E. Hertslet, 'The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various and Territorial Changes which have taken place since the General Peace of 1814', (London: Butterworths and Harrison, 1875), pp. 372-411

[26] Over the nature of the sanction of the Holy Alliance on France, see Gulick,(1967), *op. cit.*, pp. 285–287

(iii)   *Moderation of Russia*

The entry of Russia into the European States System, in the words of Hinsley, was 'the greatest event, after the discovery of America, in the history of modern times … [Russia] had complicated the political relations of the states [of the European States System], multiplied wars and threatened the balance of power and the law nations …'.[27] Russia's flanking position and the size of her impenetrable territories, stretching from Poland to the Black Sea, and from Central Asia to the Arctic, made her very distinct from any of the other great powers in the European States System.[28] It was Russia that played the decisive role in the defeat of Napoleon, despite being the most recent arrival into the European States System. If not restrained, Russia could have used her great advantages to secure a lasting dominant position in Central Europe after 1815,[29] potentially taking over the position formerly held by France.[30]

The moderation of Russia was mainly achieved by the way the Polish issue was settled[31] – by keeping France as an effective state, but with her 1790 borders, in the European States System, and finally by the creation of the Holy Alliance.[32] All of these steps were enough to convince Russia to act with moderation in Central Europe, but not in the Near East, which

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[27] Hinsley (1967), *op. cit.*, p. 191

[28] Paul Kennedy, '*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*', (New York: Wintage Books, 1987), p.154

[29] M.S. Anderson, '*The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919*' (UK: Longman Group, 1993), pp. 183–185. According to Paul Hayes, Castelreagh knew that a very strong Russia would make it impossible to achieve equilibrium. P. Hayes '*The Nineteenth Century 1814-1880*', (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1975), p. 6

[30] Hayes, *ibid*, p. 3

[31] I. Clark '*Hierarchy of States, Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 82

[32] According to Kissinger, the Holy Alliance of the Eastern Monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia obliged them to act in unison, in effect giving Austria a theoretical veto over the activities of her smothering Russian ally. Henry Kissinger, '*Diplomacy*', (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 83; Schroeder also is of the opinion that the Holy Alliance functioned as an instrument for the blocking of Russia's extremities. Paul Schroeder, 'Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. 82, no. 1, 1983, pp. 7–9

was also important for the general balance of power after 1815. The unchecked expansion of Russia's land frontiers in the Near East could have resulted in her dominance of three continents,[33] which was a fact that was understood by Metternich more than any other contemporary statesmen in Europe. He argued that the Ottoman territories were vital for the equilibrium of Europe, and for this reason he and British Foreign Minister Castlereagh attempted to bring the Ottoman Empire under the guarantee of the 1815 Settlements. To this end, they tried to convince Russia to drop some of her claims so as to facilitate the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the Vienna Congress;[34] however the Ottoman Empire's lack of response to these efforts meant that Metternich's plan could not be realised. This was partly due to the consequences of Napoleon's escape from Elbe, and so the uncertainty of the Russian attitude in the Near East would continue to be a source of concern for Britain and Austria, and for the stability of the 1815 European States System.

Having explained the specific imperatives/requirements or preconditions for the balance of power and multi-polarity, what follows is a detailed analysis of the structure of the 1815 European States System. For a detailed examination of its composition (nature) and operation, the System will be split into two interrelated parts, as each part requires different analytical tools for analysis. The analysis of the 'capability structure' will allow an understanding of the distribution of economic and military capabilities among the great powers within the System ; while the second part, the 'relationship structure,' illustrates how the great powers stood in relation to each other within the System in terms of their foreign policy objectives and policies. The capability structure is comparatively

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[33] J. V. Puryear, '*International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East a Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant, 1834-1853*', (New York: Archon Books, 1969), p. 6

[34] H. Nicolson, '*The Congress of Vienna*' (London: Constable and Co. Ltd, 1946), p. 245

static and undergoes only slow change, since changes in the distribution of economic and military capabilities require much more time.

B. Capability Structure of 1815 European States System

An analysis of the capability structure of any given international states system entails a division and comparison of the economic and military capabilities of its unit states, allowing the relative economic and military power of any unit to be identified.[35] Within this framework, the analysis will draw upon three types of data related to the economic capability of the five great powers between 1800–1860, extending 15 years beyond either end of the period of this research (1815 and 1856). The aim here is to ascertain whether there was a striking change in the balance of power among the five states of the 1815 European States System over the 60-year period.

First, a comparison will be made of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) levels, per capita GDPs, Per Capita Levels of Industrialisation and Total Industrial Potentials of the five great powers, followed by the numbers of army personnel in each country for the 1815–1860 period.

In 1830, Russia had the largest share of GDP out of the five great powers within the System, accounting for 25 percent of the total, followed by France with 21 percent; Great Britain with 19 percent; and the German Federation (including Prussia) and Austria, both with 17 percent. (**Table 1**) In this case, the total GDP of the two flanking states of the 1815 European States System, Russia and Britain, had a combined GDP that almost equalled the total of the other three.

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[35] Nye uses the metaphor of a poker game for the description and distinction of the structure and process. The structure of a poker game is in the distribution of power, that is, how many chips the players have and how many high cards they are dealt. The process is how the game is played and the types of interactions among the players. J. Nye, 'Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History', (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006), p. 38

Table 1: Volume of Total Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices[36]

(in 1960 US dollars and prices)

	1830	*1860*
Britain	8,245	16,072
Russia	10,550	14,400
France	8,582	13,326
Austria	7,210	9,996
Germany	7,235	12,771

However, the situation of per capita GDPs was much different owing to Russia's immense population. As **Table 2** illustrates, Russia ranked last in the five countries, with Britain leading by a huge margin in this respect, while the remaining three had almost the same level of per capita GDP, but all were well ahead of Russia. This situation undermined the military capacity of Russia in the long term, since investments would be low, and would be reflected in the per-capita Level of Industrialisation and Total Industrial Potential of the great powers between 1830 and 1860 (**Table 3 and 4.)**

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[36] Adopted from P. Bairoch, 'Europe's Gross National Product: 1800-1975, *Journal of European Economic History*', vol. 5, no. 2, 1976, p. 303-331

Table 2: Volume of per-Capita Gross Domestic Product by Country[37]

(in 1960 US dollars and prices)

	1830	*1860*
England	346	558
Russia	170	178
France	264	365
Austria	250	288
Germany	245	354

Tables 3 and 4: Per-Capita Levels of Industrialisation and Total Industrial Potential[38]

(Relative to UK in 1900=100)

	1830	*1860*
England	25(17.5)	64(45)
Russia	6(10.3)	8(15.8)
France	9(9.5)	20(17.9)
Austria	7(5.8)	11(9.5)
Germany	8(6.5)	15(11.1)

The comparison of GDP levels in **Table 1** shows that the rate of economic growth, which was an important indicator of the economic and military capacity of states in the long term, was not promising for Russia or Austria. While Britain's GDP grew by 52 percent between 1830 and 1860, Russia's rise was only 20 percent, well below the German

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[37] Adopted from P. Bairoch (1976), op. cit., p. 286

[38] Adopted from P. Bairoch, 'International Industrialisation Levels from 1750 to 1980', J*ournal of European Economic History*', vol. 11, no 1-2, 1982, p. 292-294

Federation (including Prussia), with 43 percent, and France, with 38 percent in the same period. The relative economic decline of Russia and Austria in contrast to the economic rise of England and Prussia can be seen also in a study by A. Maddison, though based on a different method of calculation.[39]

The comparison of the military strength of the five great powers will be based only on the number of the land army personnel, since none of the great powers possessed significant naval forces, meaning that the determining military might was still land armies.

In this respect, Russia ranked highest in terms of the number of military personnel (**Table 5)**, and Russia's superiority in this respect had not changed by 1860. However, the relative economic and industrial backwardness of Russia prevented the Russian army from becoming the decisive military force its number would suggest at first sight.

	1816	1830	1860
United Kingdom	255,000	140,000	347,000
France	132,000	259,000	608,000
Russia	800,000	826,000	862,000
Prussia/Germany	130,000	130,000	201,000
Habsburg Empire	220,000	273,000	306,000

Table.5 Military Personnel of Great Powers[40]

On the basis of these figures, the following arguments can be put forward about the Capability Structure of the 1815 European States System. Firstly, there were no substantial differences in the GDP levels of

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[39] A. Maddison, '*Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992*, (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995)

[40] Kennedy (1988), *op. cit,* p.197

the five great powers during the 1815–1856 period, and so none of the great powers were able to exercise hegemonic dominance in the System, either militarily or financially. Considering the positions of the flanking powers, Russia's army seemed very impressive in terms of numbers, but was held back by its economic incapacity. On the other hand, Britain was financially and industrially very strong, but lacked a land army that was powerful enough to exercise a determining role in continental affairs. Secondly, the trends in GDP growth rates and the levels of industrialisation pointed to a steady structural shift in economic and industrial strength from Russia and Austria to England and Prussia, while France succeed in keeping her relative economic strength. Thirdly, the capability structure of the System supported multi-polarity, which became the main characteristic of the 1815 European States System.[41]

This multi-polarity in the System, in effect, a power stalemate, made clear the significance of the 'relationship structure' in the determination of the course of international relations in the 1815–1856 period. From another perspective, the equal division of power among the great powers forced them to be flexible in forging alliances and ententes to balance any future potential challengers, since none of them alone was capable of stopping such attempts.[42] Therefore, it may be argued that the elements of the 'relationship structure' were much more visible than those of the 'capability structure' in the attitude and behaviours of the great powers in the 1815–1856 period.

C. **Relationship Structure of the 1815 European States System**

The fulfilment of the specific requirements addressed above was necessary for the foundation of the 1815 European States System, but

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[41]R. Langhorne, 'Establishing International Organizations: The Concert and the League' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, p. 5 and Y. Gortzak, 'How Great Powers Rule: Coercion and Positive Inducements in International Order Enforcement', *Security Studies*, v. 14, no. 4, 2005, p. 679

[42] Wight (1977), op. cit., pp. 104–105

was not sufficient to sustain it. Therefore, the question of how it was to be maintained still remained to be addressed by the victorious powers in 1815, whether by way of cooperation, or by the crude means of balance-of-power politics, or a combination of both. This may be understood through an analysis of the 'relationship structure' of the 1815 European States System.

As previously stated, 'Relationship Structure' refers to the positions of unit states in relation to each other in a given international states system, and an analysis of relationship structures, which are in fact a function of capability structures, will provide some insights into why alliances occur among certain states.

The analysis of the relationship structure of an international states system entails a detailed examination of the 'ordering principle' and 'modal tendencies' of its unit states in their foreign policies, and the 'outcomes' of the interplay of the ordering principles and modal tendencies.[43]

The following specific questions will be addressed in this section: Firstly, what was the ordering principle of the unit states in the 1815 European States System? And in that context, what were the roles and functions of the Concert of Europe as the leading constitutive element in the ordering principle of the Structure? Secondly, what were the differences in the foreign policy objectives of the great powers in that period? Thirdly, what were the 'outcomes'? In simple terms, which issues resulted in divergences, and which brought about alliances or ententes among the great powers of the 1815 European States System?

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[43]Barry Jones, 'Concepts and Models of Change in International Relations', *in Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension,* ed. B. Buzan and R.J.B. Jones, (London: Frances Pinter, 1981),
p. 16

1. Ordering Principle in 1815 European States System

The ordering principle of the structure of an international system indicates how the unit states are organised within that system – in simple terms, whether the unit states are anarchically or hierarchically organised. The ordering principle of the structure of the 1815 States System was basically anarchic as a result of an almost equal division of military and economic capabilities among the great powers. In other words, there was no predominant or hegemonic power that was able to oversee and regulate the interactions and processes among its unit states. This non-existence of a predominant state in the 1815 European States System meant that it was no different to the previous phases of the European States System.

However, the anarchical state of the Structure was different for the unit states in the second and third ranks of the 1815 European States System, namely for the medium-sized and smaller states. The directors of the five great powers could regulate their relations under the Concert of Europe when they deemed it necessary, meaning that sometimes the five great powers could turn the anarchical scope conditions for the medium-sized and smaller states into a hierarchical one through cooperation within the Concert of Europe. Due to the existence of the Concert of Europe institution it may be argued that the ordering principle of the structure of the 1815 European States System stood at a central point between the anarchical and hierarchical extremes of the ordering principle spectrum.[44]

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[44] On international cooperation and its impacts over the anarchical scope conditions in international politics, see K.A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies' *World Politics* Vol.38, No.1, 1985 and B. Buzan, J. C. Barry and R. Little '*The Logic of Anarchy: Neo-Realism to Structural Realism*', (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)

The institution[45] of the 'Concert of Europe'[46] allowed the five great powers to assume responsibility in governing international politics in the 1815 European States System rather than leaving it to its own ends, as had been the case in the previous phases of the European States System.[47] The most remarkable mention of the idea of the Concert of Europe was made in a letter from British Prime Minister William Pitt to Russian Tsar Alexander I on 19 January, 1805 summarising the aims and functions of the Concert of Europe, and voicing his concerns regarding the insufficiency of the balance of power in politics to maintain peace and stability:

> 'This Salutary Work [the proposed work of England for the allies against Napoleon] is still imperfect, if the Restoration of Peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving Solidity and Permanence to the System which shall thus have been established … It [the new international order] should re-establish a general and comprehensive system of Public Law in Europe, provide, as far as possible, for repressing future attempts to disturb the general Tranquillity, and above all, for restraining any projects of Aggrandizement and Ambition similar to those which have produced all the Calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution'.[48]

The date of the demise of the institution of the Concert of Europe is not as clear as its date of establishment. While some argued that it ended with the Crimean War, which was the first war among the great powers after 1815, some historians claim that some of its principles remained in

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[45] Keohane refers to institutions as 'sets of practices and expectations', R. Keohane, '*After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*', (Princeton: 1984), p. 246

[46] Miller defines 'concert' as 'an international institution or a security regime for a high level of diplomatic collaboration among all the great powers of the day', B. Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts', *Review of International Studies* vol. 20, 1994, pp. 328–329 and for the English and German understanding of the role and functions of the Concert of Europe, C. Holbraad, 'The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815–1914', (London: Longman, 1970)

[47] Richard Elrod, 'The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System', *World Politics*, vol. 28, 1976, pp. 159–174

[48] H. Temperly and L. M. Penson, '*Foundation of British Foreign Policy, From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)' or Documents, Old And New,* (Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Pres, 1938), p. 18

effect until 1914 or even 1938,[49] depending on how the actual role and functions of the Concert of Europe are defined. The different standpoints may be understood by answering the following questions. How did the Concert of Europe work? What were its mechanisms, principles and norms? How did it function? How did it co-exist with the balance-of-power politics? In this regard, whether its principles and norms replaced those of balance-of-power politics, or whether they worked together will be analysed.

a. Mechanisms, Principles and Norms of the Concert of Europe

Krasner describes 'principles' as beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude, and 'norm' as the standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.[50] Principles and norms, to a great extent, describe the character of a given regime and establish the procedures through which rules and policies are observed in that [security] regime. Principles and norms are also structural modifiers,[51] operating like a structure in affecting the behaviour and actions of states within an international system. The principles and norms of the Concert of Europe, in this regard, were the socially constructed elements rather than the principles and norms of the balance of power politics. They affected the operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System, and consequently its Ottoman-Russian relations too. With the help of 'these socially constructed elements', the Concert of Europe, as a security regime, saved the 1815 States System from some of the consequences of the pure

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[49] Langhorne cited some views arguing that the last applications of the Concert of Europe took place in 1914, while Clark gave the example of the Munich Conference in 1938 as the example of the Concert of Europe. Richard Langhorne, 'Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 12, 1986, p. 313 and Clark (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 78

[50] S. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, p. 186

[51] H.G. Snyder, 'Process Variables in Neo-Realist Theory', *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 168-171

anarchical conditions and security dilemma processes. But what exactly were these principles and norms?

There were two main principles of the Concert of Europe:

(1) the five great powers, had 'common responsibility for maintaining the Vienna Settlement, and for monitoring, managing, and sanctioning any deviations from it'[52] in the 1815 European States System. This principle emerged out of the experiences of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleonic France had been defeated only by the third coalition of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and after the defeat of France, the mission of that coalition became, in the words of Kaunitz, the Hapsburg statesman, to preserve 'public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of possessions, and the faith of treaties'.[53] The great powers became aware that peace and stability could only be maintained in the face of challenges to the multi-polarity through cooperation.

(2) the preservation of the dynastic regimes, which entailed an outlawing of revolutions and revolutionary movements and their underlying ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism and constitutionalism. European statesmen, by 1815, believed that revolutions constituted the gravest threat to political and social order in the states, and consequently, to the continuation of the 1815 Settlements. They explained that the public support and rallying behind Napoleon had been based on the attraction of revolution and revolutionary ideas. Taking the economic and military capacity of France into account, it can be seen that the statesmen were right in their assessments of the power of revolutionary movements.

The mechanisms that made possible or facilitated cooperation among the five great powers were consultations, conferences and

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[52] Hinsley (1967), *op. cit.,* p.53

[53] René Albrecht-Carrié, (ed) '*The Concert of Europe*', (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 25

congresses, for which the legal basis was the 6th article of the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. The said article reads:

'... to facilitate and secure the execution of the present treaty to consolidate the connections which at present moment so closely unite the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the high contracting parties have agreed to renew their meetings at fixed periods ... for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests and ... for the maintenance of the peace of Europe'.

Under this article, seven congresses and 17 conferences were convened between 1815 and 1885 to discuss concerted actions over issues that were systemic in nature.[54]

These meetings provided transparency and were a platform for the exchange of information, making coercive bargaining easier among the great powers.[55] Similarly, they prevented misconceptions and an accumulation of problems, and moreover, increased the likelihood of agreement in the event of disputes that could otherwise have escalated into conflict.

There had to be also some norms adhered to by the great powers when following these principles, which in the 1815 European States System were as follows:
- No change should be made unilaterally.
- No change should be to the significant disadvantage of any power in particular, or to the balance of power in general.
- Change can come only through consent; unilateral behaviour without consultation and implied or explicit consent is evidence of aggressive intent.

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[54] Hinsley (1967), *op. cit.*, p. 214

[55] D. Lindley, 'The Concert of Europe, Transparency and Crisis Management' prepared for Delivery at the American Political Science Association Conference Boston, MA, 2002, p.1

- Consent means consensus, but votes are not to be taken.[56]

With the help of these norms, the 'collective outcomes of conferences and congresses were regarded as the "the law of Europe", thus creating new benchmarks against which to measure foreign policy claims and actions of individual states',[57] and 'this gave rise to moral and legal obligations that limited the unilateral pursuit of selfish interests'.[58] In this way, as we shall shortly see, the institution of the Concert of Europe contributed to the working of the structure of the 1815 European States System and differed from the means of balance of power politics.[59]

Having covered the mechanisms, principles and norms, the following section will analyse how the Concert of Europe functioned and how it co-existed with balance of power politics in the 1815 European States System?

b. Concert of Europe and its Double Functions

The peacemakers of 1815 were faced with two major problems: (1) How to establish equilibrium between the great powers, and (2) how to maintain it, and ensure peace and stability.

The first of these was mainly settled at the Congress of Vienna, as explained in the 'Foundation of the 1815 European States System' section of this chapter;[60] while the second issue, how to maintain the peace and

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[56] Hinsley (1967), *op. cit.* p.53 quoted by K. J. Holsti, '*Peace and war: armed conflicts and international order 1648–1989,*' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 42

[58] K. Booth and N. J. Wheeler, ' *The Security Dilemma Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics'*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 110

[59] Clark (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 86

[60] See pp. 47-55

stability[61] brought about by the 1815 Settlements, was much more complex, since it involved the future.

There were three obstacles to the sustainability of the 1815 Settlements in the future, two of which have been explained in the 'Foundation of the 1815 European States System' section, being how to ensure the restriction of France and to moderate Russia, specifically in the Near East. The third challenge came not from any single state, but from the masses across Europe. The rapid industrialisation processes in Europe had brought thousands of people from rural areas into the big cities;[62] and under conditions of severe poverty, the influence of revolutionary nationalist views and the successes of the French Revolution, these uprooted masses became a serious destabilising force among the domestic regimes in Europe.[63] With the consequences of the French Revolution in mind, the statesmen of 1815 were well aware that the impacts of revolutions were unlikely to remain within the borders of the state of origin, but could easily attract the different ethnic and religious nations living under the multi-national empires, such as Austria (Hapsburgs), Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Italy, and could well become a systemic problem.

In this respect, the spirit and attraction of revolution had been one of the factors behind Napoleon's successes,[64] and the force and effects of nationalism can clearly be seen when looking at the economic and military

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[61] K. Deutsch and J. D. Singer defines 'stability' as 'the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics: that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its member continue to survive; and that large scale war does not occur'; Deutsch and Singer, 'Multi-polar Power Systems and International Stability' in J. N. Rosenau, ed., '*International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*', (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 315-317

[62] M. Lyons, '*Post-Revolutionary Europe, 1815-1856*', (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 161-174

[63] *Ibid*, pp. 56-75

[64] Langhorne, (1986), *op. cit*., pp. 315–316 and 321

capabilities of France, which were no greater than those of the other great powers.[65]

The solution that the statesmen of the victorious great powers developed to cope with these three main challenges was 'to concert their actions' under the Concert of Europe.

How could the Concert of Europe contribute to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements? How did it co-exist with the balance of power politics in the structure of the 1815 European States System?

The Concert of Europe contributed to peace and stability in two ways. Firstly, it facilitated cooperation among the five great powers by alleviating the anarchical conditions. In this way, self-restraint on the side of the great powers became possible through a joining of forces in promoting common policies throughout the international system as a whole.[66] Secondly, it would enable the great powers to exercise collective hegemony over the states of the second and third ranks in the 1815 European States System. This tutelage served for the maintenance of the status quo in two ways. First, it enabled the great powers to prevent the medium-sized and smaller states from manipulating rivalries between the great powers for their own aims; and second, the great powers could act as peace brokers for the conflicts among the medium-sized and smaller states. These two factors, and the role of balance of power politics, will be elaborated with the help of some tables.

(1) The Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, having first been established by the Treaty of Chaumont (1814) against France, remained in effect even after France was admitted into the ranks

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[65] In order to see the less and more equal economic capabilities between France and the other great powers and compare their figures, see the tables 1, 2, 3 and 4., pp. 56 and 57

[66] H. Bull, '*The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*', (New York, 1979), p. 225

of the Concert of Europe in 1818[67] and was the most effective instrument of the balance of power politics. [68] Another example of balance-of-power politics involved Russia. It was the strength of an alliance of the great powers against Russia, as was the case in the Polish-Saxony crisis in 1814 during the Vienna Congress, that forced Russia into a moderate position at that time, and similar action against Russia remained as a possibility. On such grounds, it can be argued that the restriction of France and the moderation of Russia were the outcomes of the successful operation of the balance-of-power politics between 1815 and 1856. The cause-effect relationship between the 1815 Settlements, which were in fact the formalisation of those two requirements for the balance of power cited above, and the peace and stability[69] after 1815 can be understood from **Table 6**.

Table 6[70] Operation of balance of power politics in the structure of the 1815 European States System

a

Balance of Power Politics ⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⟶ **Peace and Stability**

-Quadruple Alliance (Restriction of France)

-Moderation of Russia

The first function of the Concert of Europe came into play here, mitigating the balance-of-power politics conditions so that the five great powers could cooperate in achieving collective peace and stability. In this case, the function of the Concert of Europe was to pave the way for the

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[67] Gulick (1967), *op. cit*, pp. 287–291 and over the continuation of the pledges of the four great powers against France, see H. Kissinger, 'A World Restored, Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22', (London 1957), p. 225

[68] Gulick lists the means of balance of power politics in the European States System as 'vigilance', 'alliance', 'intervention', 'holding the balance', 'mobility of action', 'reciprocal compensation', 'preservation of components', 'coalition' and 'war', Gulick, *ibid.,* pp. 52–91; for the means of alliance and war, respectively, *ibid*., p. 58–62 and 89–91 and I. L. Claude, Jr., *op. cit*., p. 26

[69] According to Kissinger, '…the success of peace is stability.' Kissinger (1957), op. cit., p. 138

[70] In the preparation of this and the following tables in this sub-section, I have benefited from the explanations in S. D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables' *International Organizations*, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982

politics of cooperation. The contribution of the Concert of Europe to peace and stability by mitigating the security concerns of the great powers and facilitating cooperation among them resulted in the situation illustrated in **Table 7.** As can be understood, the politics of cooperation under the Concert of Europe did not wholly replace balance-of-power politics, as the intention was only to alleviate them.[71] Therefore, the great powers behaved in ways that sharply diverged from normal 'power politics'.[72] In other words, they acted with self-restraint, which also contributed the avoidance of war among the states. In this context, the Concert of Europe could be described as a kind of security regime that provided a 'peacekeeping' mission.[73] To this end, it enabled them to follow path '**b**', while also observing the alternative path '**a**' for the same ends, as illustrated in **Table 7**.[74] Therefore, it can be said that the Concert of Europe played the role of an intervening variable, facilitating a process towards the same ends that balance of power politics intended to achieve.[75]

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[71] Clark (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 92

[72] R. Jervis, 'Security Regimes', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, International Regimes (Spring 1982), p. 362–365

[73] Rich (1992), *op. cit.,* p. 31

[74] Clark also argues that 'the Concert of Europe was something more than balance of power system'. Clark (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 83

[75] On how the Concert of Europe operated to mitigate the process of security dilemma and pave the way for great power cooperation and self-restraint, see, R. Jervis, 'From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation', *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1985; and Krasner (1982), *op. cit*, p. 191–192

Table 7: Operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System when the Concert of Europe functioned as an intervening variable

BoP Politics   **b** →   Concert of Europe   **b** →   Peace and Stability

Principles, norms and mechanisms

(1815 Settlements)

a

(2) The second function of the Concert of Europe was to guard and govern the international politics of the 1815 European States System. The five great powers considered themselves entitled to develop collectively any necessary measures, and then to impose them onto the other member states of the 1815 European States System if deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace and stability,[76] which may be described as the use of a collective/shared hegemony by the five great powers.[77] The concerted actions of the collective hegemony prohibited any of the great powers from acting alone to gain extra advantages at the expense of the rest. In this capacity, the Concert of Europe functioned as an independent variable, as shown in **Table 8**. Here, in addition to the balance of power politics, path **a,** and the Concert of Europe's intervening function, path **b**, was path **c**, in which the Concert of Europe functioned independently to secure peace and stability to reach the same ends as path **a** and **b**. This was achieved by exercising tutelage over the states in the second and third ranks in the 1815 European States System (**Table 8**). The tutelage of the Concert of Europe, overseeing and managing the interactions and processes among the states of the second and third ranks, would also contribute to peace and stability (path **d**), which can be referred to as the 'peace-making' function of the Concert of Europe.

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[76] Clark (1980), *op. cit.,* p. 79

[77] Watson (1997), *ob.cit*, p . 240

As Miller has indicated, a major distinction should be made between a *concert,* which includes all the great powers in the international system, and an *alliance* of several great powers that are in balance with one another.[78] Accordingly, **b+c+d** were concerted actions, while the actions **a** constituted balance of power politics within the 1815 European States System.

Table 8: Operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System when the Concert of Europe functioned both as an intervening variable in its peace-keeping capacity and as an independent variable in it its peace-making capacity.

a: Balance-of-power politics exercised for the fulfilment of the two special imperatives/requirements for peace and stability in the 1815 European States System)

b: balance of power politics modified and alleviated by the Concert of Great Powers. The norms and principles of the Concert of Europe were functioning as intervening variables for peace and stability.

b+c+d: Operation of the principles and norms of the Concert of Europe. Here the principles and norms of the Concert of Europe were functioning as an independent variable for the peace and stability, meaning the collective use of hegemony by the five great powers. [79]

To summarise, these were the basic roles and functions of the Concert of Europe in the operation of the structure of the 1815 European States System, being the tutelage of the great powers over the smaller

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[78] B. Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts' *Review of International Studies,* vol. 20, no. 4, 1994, pp. 328–329

[79] The principles and norms 'established agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy', and legitimatised the order that the Concert of Europe had attempted to bring about. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, '*The Security Dilemma, Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*', (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 109

states, and at the same time, the means of preserving peace in Europe by preventing wars between the great powers themselves.[80] In short, the Concert was '*of* the powers, and *between* the powers'.[81]

Having explained the ordering principle of the Structure, the following section will address the main foreign policy objectives of the great powers, which were under the constraining effects of that mixed order principle of the structure of the 1815 European States System. To what extent were the foreign policy actions and objectives of the great powers consistent with the structural imperatives the 1815 European States System? This may be understood from an analysis of the structural characteristics and modal tendencies of the great powers in 1815–1856.

2. Structural Characteristics and Modal Tendencies of the Great Powers of the 1815 European States System

The previous section contained an analysis of the ordering principle, which was systemic in nature; while the following section will take the form of an analysis of some of the unit characteristics of the great powers in the 1815 European States System. These unit characteristics were part of the system level, in as much as they made a difference in the relationships of the great powers.[82][83] A comparison will be made of the 'modal tendencies' and the underlying structural characteristics of the great powers in the 1815 European States System in order to provide an understanding of how they differed. [84]

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[80] Clark (1980), *op. cit*, p. 79

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] On how unit characteristics become systemic in nature in international systems and affect their operations, see B. Buzan (1983), *op. cit*., pp. 153–181

[83] Like a map, the closer one stands to it, the more detailed the surface becomes. When the time span is shorter, the modal tendencies of states within the international system appear to be more systemic.

[84] Watson (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 240–241

Modal tendencies, according to Jones, are the '**objectives**' and '**practices**' or '**characteristic behaviours** pursued and adopted by the great powers'.[85] From a methodological standpoint, modal tendencies are useful in explaining some of the processes of the alliances, ententes, wars, embargoes, times of peace etc.[86] Unlike the capability structure, which saw little change between 1815 and 1856,[87] the modal tendencies of the great powers become much more significant in the explanations of the processes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and also among the great powers themselves.[88]

Britain and Russia survived as the main pillars of the structure of the 1815 States System following the Napoleonic Wars, partly due to their exclusive flanking positions.[89] Not only did they successfully resist the military power of France, but also, in the words of Dehio, 'they had all resisted the wave of revolution and asserted their distinctive identities',[90] both before and after 1815, and as a result, they became much more independent in pursuing their interests in the post-1815 era. Paradoxically, this situation of relative independence at opposite geographical locations and with differing structural characteristics

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[85] Jones (1981), *loc. cit.*

[86] Mark Bloch argues that systemic explanations can illuminate the origins of particular conflicts or alliances, but the causes need to be sought primarily at the unit level. March Bloch, 'The Historian's Craft' (Manchester, 1954), pp. 29–35, quoted by H.M. Scott, 'Paul W. Schroeder's International System: the View from Vienna' *The International History Review*, vol.16, no.4. 1994, p. 667

[87] See, Table 1, 2, 3 and 4 in pp.56-57

[88] Nye (2006), op. cit., p. 36. Structural Characteristics and Modal Tendencies also reflect the effects of the social and economic forces in the political behaviours of states. In this sense, according to Gaddis, it was Karl Marx who first called attention to the phenomenon. J. L. Gaddis, 'The Long Peace, Elements of Stability in the Post-war International System', *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1986, pp. 114–115

[89] E. Kraehe, 'A Bipolar Balance of Power', *American Historical Review*, June 1992, AHR Forum, pp. 707–708

[90] L. Dehio '*The Precarious Balance The Politics of Power in Europe 1494-1495*', (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963)

compelled Britain to engage too little in European affairs, while Russia was to be involved too much.[91]

England had been a staunch defender of the balance of power and multi-polarity in the European States Systems since the 15th century, and this was reflected in Great Britain's foreign policy. Being an island and a maritime power, Britain harboured no territorial ambition in Europe, concentrating rather on her colonial possessions. Her avoidance of territories in continental Europe made her the most likely ally in the European States System for those fighting against the hegemonic bidders; however her absolute adherence to multi-polarity in continental Europe compelled her to steer clear of long-term commitments to any state in the System.

Unlike the other great powers in the 1815 European States System, Britain was a parliamentary monarchy, and so did not regard the shifts and changes in the domestic regimes caused by the popular movements as a threat to the stability of the 1815 European States System.

In addition to multi-polarity, another factor determining her foreign policies was her position as the most industrialised and developed country in Europe since the second half of the 18th century. [92] Between 1760 and 1830, Britain was responsible for around 'two-thirds of Europe's industrial growth of output', and its share of world manufacturing production leaped from 1.9 to 9.5 percent; increasing further to 19.9 percent over the next 30 years as a result of industrial expansion.[93] This success was based upon the free and safe state of international trade and her colonial possessions, and for this reason the preservation of maritime supremacy

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[91] C. J. Bartlett, '*Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814-1914*', (Palgrave, Macmillan Publishing, 1996), p. 14; Clark (1980), *op. cit*., p. 87

[92] Kennedy (1984), *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155

[93] P. Bairoch, 'International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980', *Journal of European Economic History*, vol. 11, no. 1-2, 1982, p. 291-292

and the control of the maritime trade routes to her colonies became her primary objectives in the 1815 European States System. These objectives became much more vital after the arrival of steam power into land and maritime transport technologies.

All of these factors explain why England became such a staunch defender of the status quo[94] that existed under the 1815 Settlements, which were in essence the promotion of equilibrium and multi-polarity in the European States System. To this end, she regarded the Holy Alliance of the Eastern Monarchies to a certain extent as the threat to multi-polarity in Europe, so that dividing it became one of her main foreign policy objectives after 1822.[95] Unlike Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, and Alexander I, the Russian Tsar, British statesmen at the time had little to fear from the liberal and constitutional movements abroad, and hoped in fact to make competitive gains from the condition of international flux.[96]

The modal tendencies of Great Britain in the 1815 European States System can be summarised as: **(1)** the preservation of the balance of power; **(2)** the avoidance of long term alliance commitments in order to remain flexible for a better realisation of the balance of power;[97] and **(3)** the maintenance of her maritime supremacy and the safety and security of the sea and land routes to her colonies.

Britain's naval and economic power was not sufficient to ensure alone the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, as had been observed in

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[94] Status quo power seeks security not power. Therefore, the principle objective of status quo power is to preserve the existing international order. On the other hand, 'the principal objective of revisionist power is to overturn the existing international order' and recast it to her advantage. K. E. Boulding, *Stable Peace*, (University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 28

[95] Hayes (1975), *op. cit,* p. 27

[96] M. Walker (ed.) *Metternich's Europe*, (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 11

[97] Kissinger (1994), *op. cit*., pp. 89 and 95

the Napoleonic wars; and so the role of the other flanking power, Russia, became significant in the preservation of the status quo.[98]

Russia was the largest continental great power in the 1815 European States System. With an immense land army and enormous territories in Asia, Russia was a formidable nation. She was situated at the other end of Europe, and what was more, she had the advantages being a neighbour to both Central Europe and the Balkans, which Britain was not. These characteristics allowed Russia to make up for Britain's shortfalls in ensuring the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements,[99] which the other two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, could not fulfil, as had been clearly illustrated during the Napoleonic wars.

Russia, like Britain, was also a staunch defender of the 1815 Settlements, but for different reasons. The 1815 Settlements provided great security for Russia at her western extreme, which was an unknown situation in Russian history, and was able to deploy its troops to within 100 kilometres of the capitals of both Austria and Prussia after gaining two-thirds of Poland with the settlements. Russia became a key player in European affairs, in spite of her peripheral position, as a consequence of the structural dependency of Austria and Prussia. In a bid to consolidate that status quo, Russia initiated the establishment of the Holy Alliance of the Eastern Monarchies in 1815, through which she was able to secure permanent involvement in the affairs of Central Europe and check any development that may constitute a threat to the status quo. For example, Russia would be very willing to intervene in the suppression of nationalist/liberal revolutionary movements at source by considering them as European [systemic] matters, rather than treating them as domestic issues; and this willingness won her the title of 'the Guardian of the Order' (of the 1815 Settlements) in Europe between 1815 and 1856.

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[98] Bartlett (1996), *op. cit*, p.12

[99] Watson (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 243

However, in the Near East, Russia was implementing revisionist policies that were in sharp contrast to her attitude in the west.[100] There are two plausible explanations for this apparent contradiction, the first of which was related to Russia's unique geographical location. Russia had no secure frontiers in the Near East to match those in the west after 1815, meaning that Russia's security concerns were both defensive and offensive in the 1815 European States System. Since the Ottoman Empire was not a threat, and an overland invasion was unlikely as long as Russia maintained its alliance with Austria and Prussia,[101] the only sources of insecurity for Russia were the naval powers of the maritime states. From a defensive angle, her main concern was that the Ottoman Empire may fall under the control of the great maritime powers. The dissatisfaction and historical grievances of the coastal people of the Caucasus region and the Ottoman Empire towards Russia could have been a lever in the establishment of such an influence of a maritime power,[102] and such a situation would mean also the control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, and partly the Black Sea, which were strategic not only for her security, but also for her flourishing southern economy.[103] For this reason, Russia adopted a policy with regard to the Straits and the Black Sea, in the words of Jelavich, '... to establish a system that would ensure that the British and French fleets would be excluded from the Black Sea, either by an agreement with the Ottoman Empire, an international treaty, or possession of the Bosporus'.[104]

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[100] E. Sarkisyanz, 'Russian Imperialism Reconsidered' in *'Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution'*, edt. Taras Hunczak, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974), p. 63; Nicholson (1946), *op. cit*., p. 245; Watson (1997), *op. cit*, p. 239

[101] B. Jelavich,*'Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, 1806–1914', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 28

[102] G. H. Bolsover 'Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey' *The Slavonic and East European Review,* vol. 27, no. 68, 1948, p. 279

[103] T. Stoianovich, 'Russian Domination in the Balkans', *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution*, edt. T. Hunczak, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press., 1974), pp. 215–230

[104] Jelavich (1991), *loc. cit.*

From an offensive angle, Russia could become a maritime power if she secured an outlet in the Mediterranean. Since such a possibility was impossible in Central Europe, the Ottoman territories in the Balkans or the Straits remained the only alternatives.

The second driver of the Russian revisionist scheme in the Near East was a result of the nature of her bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. Russia had acquired some significant treaty rights in the administration of the autonomous principalities and Serbia in the Balkans. More importantly, she had consolidated her position in the eyes of the Orthodox and/or Slav subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who began to see Russia rather than their sovereign state, the Ottoman Empire, as the guardian of their existences and freedoms.[105] All of these issues put her in a unique and advantageous position in terms of her relationship with the Ottoman Empire, which was something she did not want to concede. Apart from her bilateral advantages, France was also restricted; Austria and Prussia were structurally dependent on Russian support; and the Ottoman Empire was going through her weakest period.

However, Russia's economic capacity and industrial base would not allow her to pursue a policy of guardianship of the status quo in Europe and a revisionist policy in the Near East at the same time. The Russian economy was largely based on agriculture, so the overall GNP and industrialisation level never looked impressive.[106] It was, as Kennedy pointed out, far less likely to lead to surplus wealth and develop a decisive military strike power in the 1815 European States System.[107]

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[105]Sarkizyanz (1974), *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[106] Bairoch,(1976) *op. cit.*, p. 282

[107] Kennedy (1987), *op. cit*, p. 152

In the light of these explanations, the modal tendencies of Russia can be summarised as follows: **(1)** Strict maintenance of the status quo brought about by the 1815 Settlements in Central Europe to the greatest extent possible; and **(2)** a continuation of the flexible revisionist policies in its relationship with the Ottoman Empire without endangering her position in the Quadruple Alliance and inducing a hostile coalition of the great powers.

As touched upon in the preceding section, France was kept undivided and an effective member of the 1815 European States System, despite being the root cause of the upheavals of the last 20 years, however she remained restricted and isolated. To reiterate, Prussia's borders were extended into the Rhineland, Austria was strengthened in Northern Italy and British influence was expanded in the Iberian Peninsula. Additionally, the Holy Alliance was founded among Russia, Austria and Prussia. All of these measures and precautionary steps were not groundless. In the words of Kennedy, 'France's national income was much larger, and capital was more readily available; its population was far bigger than Prussia's and more homogenous than the Hapsburg Empire. It could more easily afford a large army and could pay for a considerable navy as well'.[108]

The primary aim of these arrangements was not to punish France, but rather to keep her in check while she remained an unavoidable part of the multi-polar structure of the 1815 European States System. However, the perception of both the general public and the government in France was that the coalition of the victorious powers, which had been originally established to bring down the Napoleonic Empire, had been transformed into a perpetual league to keep France restricted. For this reason, overthrowing the 1815 Settlements became the primary objective of her foreign policies after 1815. As Bullen pointed out, 'an attack on the [1815] treaty was a necessary credential for patriotism' in French domestic

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[108] Kennedy (1988), *op. cit*, p. 214

politics.[109] The scope of France's revisionist policies ranged from the recovery of France, to the territorial revision of the 1815 settlements.[110]

Being aware of the fact that the 1815 Settlements were to be the basis of the foreign policy objectives of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, France also concentrated on finding new areas for expansion and influence, and the North Mediterranean and Egypt were the most likely candidates. This new search by France inevitably brought the Ottoman Empire into focus, since these areas were under the formal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.[111] The close engagement of France in the Levant region would have consequences in Ottoman-Russian relations, and in the cooperation of Britain and Russia in the Near East.

In summary, the modal tendencies of France after 1815 were as follows: **(1)** Revision of the 1815 Settlements by all possible means, including support of liberal and revolutionary movements in order to get rid of the restrictions and isolation imposed upon it; and **(2)** a search for new political and economic areas for influence in order to increase its political and economic significance in the 1815 European States System.

The other two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, were squeezed between a staunch defender of the status quo (Russia) and a complete revisionist state (France) after 1815, playing a significant role in contributing to peace as stabilising and/or absorbing agents of the effects coming from both sides in the 1815 European States System. They blocked the effects of the nationalist movements in Italy and the confederation of German states, and thereby protected the stability of

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[109] R. Bullen, France and Europe, 1815-1848: the Problems of Defeat and Recovery, p. 123, in A. Sked, (ed) *Europe's Balance of Power*, (New York: Barnes&Noble Books 1979)

[110] Ibid, p. 125

[111] For an extensive research into the involvement of France in the North Mediterranean and Ottoman Empire, see J. V. Puryear, '*France and the Levant from Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah*' (USA: Archon Books, 1968)

Central Europe, which was the backbone of the 1815 Settlements. Likewise, while serving as an effective buffer zone for Russia, blocking the infiltration of nationalist views, they were also serving as a barrier in the way of Russia, preventing her from penetrating into Central Europe.[112]

The challenges that Austria had to tackle were much harder than those of Prussia in the 1815 European States System. Geographically, Austria sprawled across Europe from the Northern Italian plain to Galicia, and from Central Europe to the Balkans. Thus, Austria had to undertake a *'five-sided checkmate'*[113] mission in the 1815 European States System[114] that included checking Russian penetrations into Galicia and the Balkans; French revisionist schemes in Central Europe and Italy; and Prussia's ambitions over the Germanic states. In sharp contrast to Prussia, Austria was a multi-national empire. Although Germanic, she was populated by twice as many Slavs of one sort or another (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) than Germans, in addition to 5 million Hungarians, 5 million Italians and 2 million Romanians,'[115] and had to maintain this complex multi-national structure against the impacts of nationalist views and movements.

With such demographic and geographical characteristics, Austria was the *'central fulcrum'* in the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, and 'None of the other great powers – even when engaged in hostilities with Hapsburgs – knew what to put in its place'.[116] In this context, Austria and the Ottoman Empire can be said to have had similar functions within the 1815 European States System.

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[112] Kennedy (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 163

[113] Kennedy (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 209

[114] Bartlett (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 6

[115] Kennedy (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 164–165; D. Lieven, *'Empire, The Russian Empire and its Rivals'*, (London: John Murray Ltd, 2000), pp. 170–175

[116] Kennedy (1987), *op. cit*, p. 166

Another specific challenge for Austria worthy of mention here that was also important to Ottoman-Russian relations was the steady rise of Russian control and influence in the Balkans.[117] As noted in the first chapter, Russia's advance in the Balkans and in the Black Sea region became possible with help of Austrian support. However, by 1815 Russia's plans and ambitions over the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans had begun to endanger the security of Austria in two ways. Russia became the de facto ruler of the Principalities and Serbia, which were under the formal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire,[118] meaning that Russia would be adjacent to Austria's southern territories. Moreover, the Russian policy to promote Slav and Orthodox bonds and solidarity among the Slavic and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire was to affect also Austria's Orthodox and Slav subjects.[119]

The greatest burden on Austria was her relative economic backwardness and military inadequacies, which were not consistent with the task she faced in keeping Central Europe free from the revolutionary and nationalist movements and from the French revisionism and Russian ambitions, both in Central Europe and in the Balkans. Austria ranked last among the five great powers in the *'Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output'* and *'Per Capita Levels of Industrialisation'* with its shares of 3.2 and 3.2; and 7 and 8 percent respectively in 1800 and 1830.[120] 'The empire as whole fell behind Britain, France and Russia in terms of per capita industrialisation, iron and steel production, steam power capacities, and so on'.[121] Obviously, the situation of the army reflected

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[117]Bartlett (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 17

[118] Bartlett (1996), *op. cit.*, p. 12

[119] For the development of Slavic nationalism in the Balkans and Russia's involvement in its development, see Stoianovich (1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 230-235

[120] Bairoch (1982), *op. cit.*, p. 291-292

[121] Kennedy(1987), *op. cit.*, p.165 (original emphasis)

these figures. The heavy public debt and hugely depreciated currency compelled the government to keep military spending to a minimum, resulting in Austria becoming militarily dependent on Russia.[122]

The strategy applied by Chancellor Metternich was, firstly, to define Austria's problems according to systemic parameters so as to attract the involvement of the other states in sharing the burden of the solution.[123] His formula, in the words of Sked, was '... what was good for the (Hapsburg) Empire was good for the rest of Europe'.[124] Secondly, if concerted action by the great powers was not possible or feasible, then she would attempt to enter into various alliances and ententes.[125] For example, she retained her alliance with the conservative Eastern monarchies against French resurgence and nationalist revolutions;[126] however she also had to check Russian influence by working with Great Britain, Prussia and the Ottoman Empire. [127]

In summary, Austria's modal tendencies were: **(1)** The preservation of the 1815 Settlements; **(2)** keeping Central Europe free from Russian influence, while relying on her political and military help; **(3)** the eradication of all the revolutionary nationalist and liberal movements; and finally, **(4)** blocking the physical and influential expansion of Russia in the Balkans.

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[122] G.E. Rothenberg, '*The Army of Francis Joseph'*, (Indiana: West Lafayette, 1976), p. 9, cited by Kennedy, *ibid.,* 167 and A. Sked, '*The Metternich System, 1815-48*, (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1979), pp. 105-107

[123] Walker (1968), *op. cit,* p. 9

[124] Sked (1979), *op. cit*, p. 114, in Sked (1979), *op. cit.*

[125] Sked (1979), op. cit., pp. 98–99

[126] Kennedy (1984), *op. cit* p. 163; Kissinger (1994), op. cit., p. 85

[127] Henry Kissinger (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 85. The following words of Metternich summarised the role of Austria in the operation of the 1815 European States System: 'Austria considers everything with reference to the *substance*. Russia wants above all the *form*; Britain wants the substance without *form* … It will be our task to combine the *impossibilities* of Britain with the *modes* of Russia', quoted by Kissinger (1994), *op. cit.,* pp. 87–88 (original emphasis)

The other great power lying between Russia and France was Prussia, which was supposed to be the guardian of the Rhineland against France in the 1815 Settlements. Her other roles in the 1815 European States System have been touched upon in the discussion of Austria's modal tendencies, however Prussia's function of containing France was much more acute than that of Russia, as the French moves towards the Rhineland in the 1830 [Belgian] and 1840 [Egypt] crises indicated.

On the other hand, Prussia, as the alternative Germanic great power to Austria, was competing for dominance over the Germanic states, however Prussia did not succumb to the nationalists regarding the situation of the German Confederation. Being aware of the precarious balance of the 1815 European States System, Prussia always preferred to act in line with Austria in her foreign policies; however this did not preclude her overall goal of achieving a union of the German states under her leadership.

The modal tendencies of Prussia in the 1815 European States System can be summarised as: **(1)** The preservation of the 1815 Settlements in line with Austria's preferences, and **(2)** the integration of the German states through the consolidation of economic and political relations.

After this explanation of the modal tendencies of the great powers, the following section will focus on the outcomes of the interplay of these modal tendencies.

3. Outcomes of the Mixed Ordering Principle and Modal Tendencies of the Great Powers for the Operation of the 1815 European System and their Likely Effects on the Ottoman-Russian Relations in 1815-1856

This section will deal with the outcomes of the interplay of the mixed ordering principle and modal tendencies of the great powers of the 1815 European States System. These outcomes were the functional differentiations of the unit states, the categories of changes and the diverging issues among the great powers.

a) Functional Differentiations among Unit States in 1815 European States System

The first 'outcome' to be addressed is the functional differentiations[128] among the unit states of the 1815 European States System resulting from the Concert of Europe, which brought a hierarchy to the order. If the pure anarchical conditions had prevailed in the 1815 European States System, the unit states had to be functionally the same in consequence of the self-help mechanism, as argued by Waltz.[129] The oligarchic principles and norms of the Concert of Europe intervened and changed the normal operation of the anarchical structure of the ordering principle. This situation of intervention, consequently, led to the emergence of some functional differences within the 1815 European States System that were to affect the course of Ottoman-Russian relations.

The privileged role and governing function of the unit states of the great powers have already been discussed in depth, and so shall only be covered in brief here. After this, the roles and functions of the unit states of the second and third order will be discussed.

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[128] By functional differentiations, I mean the various direct or indirect roles that states play in the operation of the structure of a given system.

[129] Waltz (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 116

The first functional differentiation in the 1815 European States System was between the members of the oligopoly of the five great powers and the medium-sized and smaller states.[130]

The second differentiation emerged in the roles and functions of the states of the second order, which Schroeder referred to as intermediary within the 1815 European States System.[131] According to him, they became specialised in certain functions that were essential for the smooth operation of the Structure and for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. He argues that the German Federation served the purpose of preventing war over the territories of the Germanic states between Austria and Prussia; the Ottoman Empire blocked any hegemony of any of the great powers over the Straits; Denmark and Sweden guarded the exit to the Baltic Sea etc. These states indirectly contributed to maintaining the balance of power, as the relative cost of their partition or annexation by the great powers would have been too high.[132] This meant that it was better from the perspectives of the great powers, particularly regarding their neighbours, to let them prevail. [133]

b) Categories of Changes in the 1815 European States System

The second element to be analysed in the 'Outcome' component of the Relationship Structure are the categories of changes in the 1815 European States System. These emerged as a result of the way the 1815

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[130] Holbraad (1968), *op. cit.,* p. 1

[131] P. Schroeder. 'Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 125-129 and 'The 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure', *World Politics*, vol. 39, no. 1, 1986, pp. 12 and 17–25

[132] Ibid.

[133] For the analysis of the interrelation between history and international relations disciplines, see T. Smith, '*History and International Relations'*, (Routledge, London, 1999)

European State System had been founded and were in line with its ordering principle [the Concert of Europe]. A definition of these changes will help clarify the cause-effect relationships between the variables of the research question.

The changes concerning the 1815 European States System may be categorised under two headings, being: 'significant changes' and 'non-significant changes'.[134]

Significant changes comprise changes in the elements of the Capability and Relationship Structures, which have been thoroughly analysed in the preceding sections, and are categorised as 'structural changes'. On the other hand, non-significant changes in the 1815 European States System were related to the non-systemic unit level changes; for example, changes in the characteristics of the unit states, state regimes or of the head of states etc., and as such may be classified as non-structural changes.

For the purpose of this thesis, the 'significant [structural] changes' will be further divided into two categories: 'structural changes with transformational implications' (SC with TI) and 'structural changes without transformational implications' (SC without TI) according to their implications in the operation of the 1815 European States System.

SC with TI were changes in the specific imperatives/requirements of the 1815 European States System that ensured multi-polarity, or prevented any hegemonic ambitions of the revisionist states. In simple words, SC with TI transformed the structure, and consequently the 1815 European States System. On the other hand, changes involving the principles and norms and the decision-making procedures of the Concert of Europe in its security regime and modal tendencies, and in the divergent issues of the great powers, were structural changes, but they did

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[134] Jones (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 17-19

not have the capacity to transform the structure of the 1815 European States System. For this reason they are considered to be SC without TI.

All of the changes conceptualised in the preceding paragraphs were 'changes within the system'. In other words, they were not 'system changes', which denotes a complete new system with a new structure, and with its own constitutive and definitive elements.

c) Divergent Issues among the Great Powers in the 1815 European States System

(1) The first issue of divergence among the great powers after 1815 was in how to deal with the revolutionary movements that were drawing on nationalist/liberal and constitutionalist ideologies.[135]

In fact, there was consensus among the great powers about the danger that revolutions posed to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements; but when it came to under what conditions they constituted threat, disagreements surfaced.

When the political disturbances in Naples, Sicily and Spain turned into demands for constitutional reforms and similar rights, Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, suggested the development of a 'doctrine of intervention on a European scale to prevent changes in the system of government of any state'.[136] He was of the opinion that the 1815 Settlements established the legal and rational base for such an initiation. Russia and Prussia shared the view of Metternich that the directory of the great powers [Concert of Europe] could intervene in the domestic affairs of states if their regimes were under the threat of revolution. However, Great Britain and France opposed such a scheme, but for different reasons.

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[135]Langhorne (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 6; Clark (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 88

[136] Walker (1968), *op. cit*, p.10

Britain argued that 'none of these three [Chaumont, First and Second Paris Treaties] treaties contain any express guarantee, general or special, by which their observance to be enforced …',[137] claiming that the mission of the Quadruple Alliance was to create 'a union for the re-conquest and liberation of a great proportion of the continent of Europe from the military dominion of France … It never was however intended as a union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states'.[138] Making a broader interpretation of the treaty articles, it asserted that Britain 'can not and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution',[139] and that she could only act collectively 'when the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, [in which case] she can interfere with effect …'.[140]

Leaving the legal dimension of the dispute aside, the main concern of Britain and France was that Russia was gradually taking on a general policing role in central Europe, using the elimination of revolutionary threats as an excuse. Such an approach could bring total control of Central Europe into Russian hands, considering the relative insufficiency of the military capacity of Austria. Aside from this, Britain was not against the intervention by a neighbouring great power to assist a dynastic regime in its fight against the revolutionary movements on behalf of the Concert, which was clear from her lack of protest during Austria's intervention in Naples in 1820 and France's intervention in Spain in 1821. What Britain was against was the intervention by Russia in those places, since none of her interests were threatened by the revolutionary developments there. In fact Austria was also against a Russian presence in Central Europe, but

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[137] The memorandum on the Treaties of 1814 and 1815 (May 30, 1814, June 9, 1815 and November 20, 1815 Memorandum on the Treaties of 1814 and 1815, Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1818 in Harold Temperly and Lillian M. Penson, '*Foundations of British Foreign Policy, from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or Documents, Old and New',* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 40–41

[138] *Ibid*, p. 54

[139] State Paper of 5 May 1820 in *ibid*, pp. 62–63

[140] *Ibid*, p. 62

her weakness and structural dependency on Russia prevented her from taking the hard line followed by Britain.[141]

(2) The second significant issue of divergence among the great powers in the 1815 European States System was about how to deal with the Ottoman Empire. In the words of Metternich, the Ottoman Empire was 'one of most essential counterweights in the general equilibrium of Europe'.[142]

As touched upon in the analysis of the modal tendencies of Russia in the previous section, Russia had revisionist goals in regard to the Ottoman Empire, with the overall aim being to secure a safe frontier to her south-east to match the one in the west. This would be possible by reducing the Ottoman Empire to the level of a vassal state, like Poland, so as not to induce a hostile great power coalition against her. For this reason, Russia was not very receptive to the proposal put forward at the Congress of Vienna in 1814 that the Ottoman Empire should be included in the European guarantee.[143]

Accordingly, Russia put a two-pronged policy strategy into effect: The partition of the Ottoman Empire in agreement with the other great powers; and supporting the establishment of the satellite kin states in the Ottoman territories by promoting Orthodox and Slav nationalism and solidarity among the Slavic and Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.

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[141] Walker (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 11

[142] Bartlett(1996), *op. cit.*, p. 12

[143]Langhorne (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 7

Partition Proposals for the Ottoman territories in agreement with Great Britain and Austria

The Russian policy of partition of the Ottoman territories was not new, actually dating back to the reign of Catherine II in the 18th century. It was again revived after the 1830s, however there was a great difference between the motivations. The main motivation behind the partition schemes of the 18th century had been the aggrandisement and subjugation of a powerful rival; while in the 19th century the intention was to achieve a pre-agreement out of concern of exclusion or confrontation by the other great powers over the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

In his first attempt to get Austria on board in 1833, the Russian Tsar proposed 'to recreate a Greek empire' in place of the Ottoman Empire 'if the Turkish empire destroys itself through its own incapacity'. At the same time, he tried to alleviate the concerns in Austria that he was in favour of maintaining the Ottoman Empire.[144] In his second attempt in 1843, the Tsar went one step further, offering 'everything between this river [Danube] and the Adriatic' to Austria in its partition proposal.[145] In 1844, amid concerns in Austria over a Greek Empire in Istanbul, the Tsar excluded the possibility of reconstituting a Greek Empire and proposed giving Istanbul to Austria as well.[146] However, Austria did not consider the proposals as genuine. According to the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 'the Tsar was anxious to find some means for acting when the time seemed ripe, which would leave him free to declare that he was acting for a friendly and allied power and not for Russia ... when the deed had been done and the time came for discussing ... he would put forward the idea of setting up a state united to Russia by interests, principles, and

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[144] WSA, Berichte aus Russland. Ficquelmont a` Metternich, 13/25 fev./ 33, no: 234 A. cited by Bolsover 'Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey' *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 27, No. 68, 1948, p. 117, fn. 7

[145] WSA, Berichte aus Russland. Ficquelmont a` Metternich, 4 oct./ 43, sec. Vienne, cited by Bolsover (1948), *ibid.* p. 127, fn. 32

[146] Bolsover (1948), *ibid.* pp. 131 and 133–134

religion, governed by a Russian prince, and a better guardian of the Straits for Russia than Turkey could be'. [147]

Russia did not limit its attempts at persuasion to Austria. Being aware that the second great power with interests at stake in the Near East was Britain, and that without her consent Russia could not realise any serious territorial re-arrangement in the Near East, in 1844, the same year in which the Tsar had approached Austria for the second time, he raised the issue of a pre-agreement over the partition of the Ottoman territories with Britain during a state visit to the country. However, Britain did not share the same pessimism of the Tsar regarding the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire. The caution of the British government led the Tsar to believe that Britain would not object to his plans when the conditions were right. As the events on the eve of the Crimean War were to prove, Britain did not see eye-to-eye with Russia, being wary of her intentions. While the focus of Russia was on the need for a pre-agreement of what to do after the Ottoman collapse, Britain's pre-occupation was with how the Ottoman Empire could be maintained so as to avert a clash of interests in the Near East. As Stockmar said in his memoirs, Britain was not at all responsive to the Tsar's tentative efforts in 1844 to express his views about the possible shape of the new order in case of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.[148] Likewise, Britain's reaction was no different in 1853 when Nicholas I made his famous remark about ' the sick man of Europe', referring to the Ottoman Empire.[149]

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[147] Bolsover (1948), *ibid*., p.135; WSA, Russland, Varia. Colloredo a` Metternich, I / 13 avril/45, cited by Bolsover (1948), *ibid*., p. 135

[148] Baron Stockmar, *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar*, (London, 1872), vol. II, pp. 107–109, cited by Bolsover (1948), *ibid.*, p. 132 and fn. 39

[149] The remark was made to the British Ambassador, urging Britain to designate a scheme for the post-Ottoman era. The response of the English government was that 'the object of H.M government is the preservation of peace; and they desire to uphold the Turkish empire … and believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan … in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove all cause of alarm respecting its dissolution*'*. P.R.O., F.O. 65/420, Clarendon to Seymour, 23 March/53, No.23, Sec&Conf., quoted by Bolsover (1948), *ibid*., p. 140

Support of the Establishment of Kin Satellite States in the Balkan Ottoman Territories

The second track of the revisionist policy of Russia in the Near East was the establishment of satellite states in the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, which were populated by Slavic and/or Orthodox subjects.[150] This second-track policy served as an alternative and was complementary to the partition policies should the partition scheme not work, and entailed promoting and supporting the Slavic and/or Orthodox nationalist movements among the Ottoman subjects in the Balkans.

By following such a policy, Russia was able remain behind the scenes and avoid the open reaction of the other great powers, as would otherwise have been the case. The rights and privileges that Russia had gained from bilateral treaties[151] since 1774 over the administration of Serbia and the Principalities established a legal and convenient environment for her to follow such policy. Also, the establishment of small Slavic and/or Orthodox states in the Ottoman territories could have been a central ground between the conflicting goals of the great powers in the region.

Implications of Russian Revisionist Policies for the Ottoman Empire in the 1815 European States System

Russia's revisionist policies would bring about changes in the territorial and political balances of the 1815 European States System, although Russia was careful not to raise the suspicions of the other great powers, which were not comfortable with the Russian promise of restraint, bearing in mind the aggrandisements of Russia in the second half of the 18th century. In their eyes, as Puryear pointed out, the unchecked expansion of the Russian frontiers in the Near East could have resulted in

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[150] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.*, pp.30-31

[151] The main treaties in this respect were Kucuk Kaynarca (1774), Yassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812), see F.L. Israel, '*Major Peace Treaties of Modern History*, *1648-1967*', (New York: Chelsea House Pub., 1967)

its dominance of three continents.[152] Obviously, the other great powers differed in their specific concerns of the Russian revisionist policies in the Near East, apart from in their general concern regarding the balance of power, with Great Britain and Austria in particular concerned about Russian policies with regard to the Ottoman Empire.

From a political/military perspective, Russian access to the Mediterranean over Ottoman territories would aid her in becoming a sea power, and would upset the balance between the maritime and continental powers in the 1815 European States System. Apart from this general effect, a powerful Russian navy presence in the Mediterranean would put the maritime supremacy of Britain at risk. The roots of the British concern in this respect dated back to the last quarter of the 18th century, when a Russian naval build-up in the Baltics became visible.[153] The reaction of Pitt, the British Premier during the Orchakov crisis, provides testament to the British concerns regarding the maritime aspirations of Russia.[154]

Secondly, the Ottoman territories spanned the land and sea routes to India, which was 'the jewel of the [British] Empire'.[155] The loss of that jewel would be intolerable for Britain after losing North America, and in this regard the Ottoman territories were the advance defences of India, and so needed to be protected from Russian influence.

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[152] Puryear (1969), *loc. cit.*, p. 6

[153] Lord Melbourne said of the Russian Baltic fleet 'Such an armament as never existed in the world before … It is impossible to consider the country [Britain] safe while this force is so near'. C.W. Crawley, 'Anglo-Russian relations 1815- 1840' *Cambridge Historical Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1929, p.48

[154] For the British concern over the Russian push into the Black Sea during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792, see P. C. Webb 'Sea Power in the Ochakov Affair of 1791', *The International History Review,* Vol. 2, no. 1, 1980, pp.13-33

[155] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.,* p. 4

Maintaining the Ottoman Empire was deemed a worthy cause by Britain, in that it served for the economic interests of the expanding British industry and commerce. The rise in industrial production between 1760 and 1830[156] was pushing Britain to pursue a free trade policy and to find new markets. Bailey argues that Italy, France, Russia and Austria were all less significant than the Ottoman Empire in the two decades after 1830.[157] For example, in contrast with the high-tariff handicaps and mercantile competition of Russia,[158] the Ottoman Empire was much more liberal, and therefore valuable to British commercial interests. These interests had led inevitably to a close political relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire after 1835,[159] the first outcome of which was the signature of the 1837 Free Trade Agreement between the two states.

The second state to be affected by the Russian revisionist policies in Near East was Austria.[160] In contrast to Britain, Austria was a neighbour of Russia, and had both Slav and Orthodox subjects. The Ottoman territories in the Balkans were serving as the buffer zone between Austria and Russia, meaning that the impacts of the Russian promotion of Slavic and Orthodox nationalist programmes and the establishment of Slavic and/or Orthodox satellite states would be much more direct and immediate on Austria than on Britain. Russia was already within 100 kilometres of Vienna after taking control of Poland, and so any Russian advance in the Balkans would amount to her encirclement. However, Austria's weakness and structural dependency on Russia prevented her from taking as rigid a stance as Britain in 1815–1856.

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[156] Bairoch, (1982) *op. cit*, p. 291

[157] Frank E. Bailey, 'The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-1850', *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1940, pp. 458 and 466

[158] Puryear (1968) *op. cit,* p.1

[159] Palmerston to Nourri, Oct. 23, 1835, F.O. 195/122, The National Archive (Herinafter TNA, the new name of the Public Record Office)

[160] Kissinger (1994), *op. cit*., p. 94

From an economic point of view, the Danube River, through the Black Sea, was the second largest maritime outlet for Austria after the Adriatic Sea.[161] Accordingly, the mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea and its surrounding areas was of great importance for Austrian trade with the Ottoman Empire and the Levant region, and so any type of unilateral control of those areas by Russia would be against Austria's economic and commercial interests.

As for France and Prussia, none of their specific interests came under the direct and immediate impact of the Russian revisionism for the Near East, in contrast to those of England and Austria. Their concern was much more related to their impacts on the general balance of power of the 1815 European States System. France's special situation, however, placed her in direct opposition with Russia in the Near East. As previously stated, France was herself a revisionist state after 1815, but her revisionism rather involved Central Europe, where Russia paradoxically was in favour of the strict preservation of the status quo. Therefore, the Near East emerged as the only area where France could challenge Russia for the realisation of France's revisionist objectives in Central Europe.

D. Hypothesis and Arguments

Out of the analyses of the Structure, which has revealed the nature of the ordering principle, the modal tendencies and structural characteristics of the great powers, the outcomes of the interplay of the impacts of the Concert of Europe, and the modal tendencies and structural characteristics of the five great powers, the followings hypotheses are proposed regarding the operation and effects of the Structure on Ottoman-Russian relations in 1815–1856

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[161] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p.7

H1. For the successful maintenance of the 1815 Settlements, the Ottoman Empire had to be independent and free of any dependencies or alliance commitments to any great power. Any substantial deviation from that principle by a great power would invite balance-of-power politics against that great power by the remaining great powers.

The 1815 Settlements brought about a territorial and political equilibrium among the great powers, while also meeting their security needs. This was a very precarious balance-of-power arrangement. Schroeder argues that one reason for the relative success of the 1815 Settlements was its establishment of intermediary bodies,[162] which contributed to the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System through their functions as a buffer between the great powers. Each specialised in one specific area, meaning that their removal would cause significant systemic turbulence. In this respect, the function of the Ottoman Empire, for example, was as a buffer zone between Russia and Austria in the Balkans; and as the controller of the Straits she was able to block the further expansion of Russian power into the Mediterranean, as well as the expansion of the other maritime powers into the Black Sea.

On the basis of this argument, any changes or shifts in the intermediary position of the Ottoman Empire in the 1815 European States System would result in the launch of balance-of-power politics as illustrated in figure 2, without cancelling the operation of the Concert of Europe.

H2. The Concert of Europe affected Ottoman-Russian relations both in its intervening (peacekeeping) and independent (peacemaking) variable capacities in 1815–1854, as indicated in figure 3, so long as

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[162] For the concept and role of the 'intermediary bodies' in the international relations, see, P. Schroeder, 'the 19th Century International System: Changes in Structure', World Politics, 39, (1986), pp. 12 and 17–25.

Russia remained within the limits of the foundation principles/requirements of the 1815 Settlement.

The foundation of the 1815 European States System was built on three pillars, being territorial and political equilibrium among the great powers; the restriction of France; and the moderation of Russia. Any attempt to change them involved balance-of-power politics rather than the Concert of Europe, as any change in those pillars would result in a structural change with the transformational implications in the 1815 European States System, as has been explained in the 'Outcomes' section.[163]

H3. The key state in the determination of the course of the Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815 European States System was France.

The Capability Structure of the System almost remained the same throughout the 1815–1856 period, although the economic and military capabilities of Russia and Austria were in gradual decline. However, the shift in the balance of power was not so substantial as to cause any abrupt political shift in the Relationship Structure; and this situation in the Capability Structure led the elements of the Relationship Structure to become the determining factors in shaping Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period.

When the Relationship Structure took centre stage, it was France's policies and behaviours that would affect the course and shape of Ottoman-Russian relations in 1815–1856.

Of the five powers in the System, only three of them, Britain, Austria and Prussia, were in favour of the status quo. France and Russia were both revisionist powers although their goals differed. An alliance of the status quo powers would be ineffective against the Russian revisionist

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goals in the Near East due to the strategic weaknesses of Austria and Prussia, which were squeezed between the two revisionist powers of France and Russia. This situation was a great obstacle in front of Britain, which was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East. In this case, her alliance with France, as the two leading maritime powers, would be much more effective in preventing the revisionist goals of Russia in the Near East, and thus affecting Ottoman-Russian relations.

Conclusion

The French bid for hegemony in the European States System and the resistance by the alliance of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia in the 1792–1815 period led to the emergence of a new international system in 1815. The victorious powers decomposed the 'French Continental System' and replaced it with a new pattern of international relationships, realised through a set of international agreements that are referred to as the 1815 Settlements.

The new international system, or new pattern of international relationships, was not a completely new system, since it retained the essential characteristics of the European States System as a 'political community', formulated by the Westphalia Agreements and in effect since 1648, taking the form of a multi-polar structure based on independent sovereign states. Geographically, the borders of the new international system were no different from those under the previous system, however there were some new elements in its 'political community' aspect, which justify it being referred to as a new phase in the history of the European States System.

These new elements can be classified under two headings: The founding and governing/maintaining elements.

The founding elements of the new phase were: (1) The political and territorial equilibrium between the great powers, (2) the restriction of France, and (3) the moderation of Russia. These were the specific imperatives or founding conditions of the new international system. In other words, they were consequences of the division of the military and economic capabilities of the great powers in the 1792–1815 period.

The maintaining element of the new relationship pattern was the undertaking of the governance of international politics by the great powers through combined policies and actions. In this context, the Concert of Europe had been the most significant development in the history of the European States System since the 15th century, creating a hierarchical system within the new phase of the European States System.

Due to the new founding and governing/maintaining elements in the structure of the new phase of the international system, in addition to the essential principles of the Westphalia, this will be referred to as the '1815 European States System' in future references.

An analysis of this relationship structure reveals that the ordering principle of the System was much broader and more complex than the Waltzian conception of 'anarchy' suggested[164] owing to the institution of the Concert of Europe. It was broader because the principles and norms of the Concert of Europe, as structural modifiers, shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the unit states in the 1815 European States System too. The existence of the Concert of Europe was a kind of hierarchical element within the general anarchical conditions of international relations after 1815, since it led to the division of the 'manager' and 'managed' among the unit states in broad terms.

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[164] This is not to argue that Waltz's conception of structure is false or flawed, since his conception is parsimonious and aims to explain the structure of the general nature, which he made very clear.

The 'manager' was the directorship of the five great powers, while the 'managed' were the states of the second order. In this way, the Concert of Europe enabled the great powers of the 1815 European States System to employ a collective/shared hegemony over the rest of the member states, and thus maintain peace and order after 1815. The division of the economic and military capabilities of the great powers also compelled them to act together, since none of them had the necessary capacity to take on the task of the 1815 Settlement alone. To that end, the Concert of Europe was also a body facilitating cooperation between the great powers in ensuring security and preventing conflicts among them; and if not possible, then at least preventing escalation into all-out war. In this capacity, the Concert of Europe served to block the mechanical or predatory balance of power politics of the pre-1815 Settlements and to curb and regulate the intentions of the revisionist states of France and Russia.

The consequences of the deviation from the pure anarchical conditions in international relations led to some functional differences among the member states of the 1815 European States System. The major differentiation was between the members of the directorship, being the great powers, and the other unit states. The states of the secondary rank differed in their intermediary functions in the maintaining of the 1815 Settlements – they were separating buffer zones and occupied strategic locations for the balance of power or territorial/political equilibrium among the great powers. The function of the Ottoman Empire, for example, was as a buffer zone between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and as the controller of the Straits, blocked the further expansion of Russian power to the Mediterranean and the further expansion of other maritime powers into the Black Sea.

All of this meant that Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 would be shaped by a new phenomenon in international relations, in addition to the anarchical conditions.

In addition, the division of economic and military capabilities under the 1815 European States System would not allow the predominance of any of great powers. Although there were differences in their economic and military capacities, none held enough power to produce a significant shift in the political structure, and rather supported multi-polarity in the 1815 European States System in the mid- and short-term. This situation signified the importance of the relationship structure of the 1815 European States System in Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period.

This meant that it was the modal tendencies of the great powers that played the leading role in dictating the course of international politics. Despite an agreement among the great powers to use collective hegemony, there were substantial differences in the modal tendencies of their foreign policies. These differences constituted an important part of the relationship structure of the 1815 European States System since they formed the basis of any alliances and alignments between the great powers. Like the ordering principle, they affected the course and nature of the interactions and processes among the great powers in the short- and mid-term; and in that context, have been valuable in providing insight into the processes concerning Ottoman-Russian relations.

Great Britain, Austria and Prussia were in favour of maintaining the status quo in Central Europe and the Near East; while France was understandably a revisionist state since she had been reduced and restricted. Russia's position was somewhat different, in that she was following policies promoting the strict preservation of the status quo achieved through the 1815 Settlements in Central Europe. On the other side, Russia had flexible revisionist targets in the Near East, namely for the Ottoman Empire, whose territories were of great significance in sustaining of the political and territorial equilibrium of the 1815 Settlements.

These modal tendencies led to various alliances or alignments. Russia was adamant in its fight against all revolutionary movements, irrespective of the source, since they were considered to threaten the status quo in Central Europe. In this context, Russia aligned with Austria and Prussia under the Holy Alliance; while Britain and France seemed to constitute an opposing block against the intervention and suppression of the liberal and constitutionalist movements. However Austria and Britain were in favour of maintaining the status quo, namely the 1815 European States System, in the Near East, and so were aligned in their opposition to Russia in her revisionist aims concerning the Ottoman Empire. In this case, the key states in Britain's stance with regard to Ottoman-Russian relations were France, and to a lesser degree, Austria. That said, France's primary objective was revision in Central Europe of the 1815 Settlements, and therefore would support either path, being the status quo or revision in the Near East, depending on the realisation of her aims in Central Europe. Put differently, France could support Russia or Britain in the Near East, depending on their policies in Central Europe.

To conclude, the capability structure of the 1815 European States System on the whole remained unchanged in that no great power was able to dominate in the international relations of the member states, although it clearly indicated a power shift from Russia and Austria to Britain and Prussia (the German Confederation). This situation of constant multi-polarity in the capability structure was the basis of the constraint in the relationship structure and bilateral relations in the 1815 European States System. In this context, the existence of the Concert of Europe as the ordering principle; the functional differentiations of the unit states; and lastly, the alliances between Russia, Austria and Prussia (Holy Alliance), and between Britain and France (Cordial Entente) and the consensus between Britain and Austria for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire were the factors that determined and/or constrained the processes among

the unit states, including those located between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the 1815–1856 period.[165]

Within this structural framework of the 1815 European States System, the Ottoman-Russian relations that developed around three key events, being the Greek Rebellion and the establishment of Greece in 1822–1830; the Rebellion of the Governor of Egypt and the settlement of the Egypt issue in 1832–1842; and the Holy Places Dispute and the Crimean War in 1852–1856, will be analysed. The processes among the great powers and between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in those periods will be the core focus of the following chapter, since they served as the conveyor belts of the effects of the structure of the existing international states system.

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[165] Nye gives the example of a poker game when describing the distinction between structure and process. The structure of a poker game is in the distribution of power, that is, how many chips the players have and how many high cards they are dealt. The process is how the game is played and the types of interactions among the players (How are the rules created and understood? Do they obey the rules? If players cheat, are they likely to be caught). Nye argues that the process of an international system is determined by three elements: (1) structure; (2) the cultural and institutional context in which states can cooperate; and (3) modal tendencies of states. Nye, *op. cit.,* p. 38

CHAPTER 3

ASCENDANCY OF RUSSIA IN THE NEAR-EAST: THE GREEK REBELLION IN 1820–1828 AND THE OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR OF 1828–1829

Introduction

The previous chapter concluded that the capability structure of the 1815 European States System did not change to any great extent in the 1815-1856 period. Therefore the elements of the relationship structure have to be to a great extent referred for the explanation of the operation and effects of the structure of the 1815 European States System in this period.[1] To recall, these elements were the institution of Concert of Europe, the modal tendencies and structural characteristics of the great powers and the outcomes of the interplay of the mixed ordering principle of the 1815 European States System such as the functional differentiations.

In the relationship structure, Russia faced a dilemma regarding the preservation of the status quo in the 1815 European States System that had resulted from the 1815 Settlements. Russia desired to preserve the status quo in Europe, but was keen to discuss the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire; an act that Britain, Austria and France all considered would disrupt the balance of power and upset the status quo. For reasons of security and strategy Russia did not give up entirely her revisionist policies concerning the Ottoman Empire, but rather adopted a flexible approach that could be tailored to the requirements of the conditions.

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[1] According to Little, 'the complexity and confusion displayed by the amalgam of interactions, there are a set of structures which describe the international system and explain the behaviour of the individual states'. R. Little, 'Three Approaches to the International System: Some Ontological and Epistemological Considerations', *British Journal of International Studies*, vol. 3, 1977, p. 189

At the top of Russia's security agenda, as a great power[2], was her desire to consolidate her south-western frontiers against any seaborne threats from the Black Sea through the Straits and the Mediterranean. While the weak Ottoman Empire itself did not pose a threat, the great powers with strong navies, namely Britain and France, could in theory sail through the Straits and use the Ottoman territories adjacent to the Black Sea as a launch pad for an attack; and Russia's very close historical relations with the Ottoman Empire did not preclude such possibility. Her recent increasing dependency on the Straits for the economy of southern Russia, specifically for the export of grain and the other agricultural products to Europe and the Levant region, was one of the factors in that strategic consideration.[3] All these were her short term defensive security considerations. However, Russia was also fostering some offensive security objectives as well concerning the Straits. These objectives were connected with her power projection of achieving sea power capacity.

However, it was the structural constraints of the 1815 European States System that stood in Russia's way in this regard. The moderation of Russia, that is, the abandonment of her revisionist aims in the Near East, was one of the structural requirements of the 1815 European States System; and any insistence on revisionism in the Near East could result in her coming head-to-head with Great Britain and Austria. As Temperley highlighted, the defence of Istanbul for Britain, specifically the Straits, was of high strategic importance, as her interests to preserve her monopoly of

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[2] René Albrecht-Carrié explains the great power status of the 19th century international politics as follows: *'A power has such a rank when acknowledged by others to have it. The fact of a power belonging in that category makes it what has been called a power with general interests, meaning by this one automatically a voice in all affairs'* René Albrecht-Carrié, *'A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 21–22

[3] On the developing economy of southern Russia and the increase in Odessa grain exports, see L. Siegelbaum, 'The Odessa Grain Trade: A Case Study in Urban Growth and Development in Tsarist Russia', *Journal of European Economic History*, vol. 9, 1980.

being dominant sea power in the 1815 European States System and to safeguard the sea and land route to India.[4]

As to Austria, she could not tolerate being encircled by Russia from the south-east in the Balkans following Russia's penetration into Central Europe after annexing two-thirds of Poland under the 1815 Settlements.

For this reason, Russia changed her policy of aggrandisement and annexation of the pre-Napoleonic Wars towards the Ottoman Empire so as to be able to realise her objectives in the Near East. She adopted a flexible policy of two tracks:[5] (1) The annexation and/or partition of the Ottoman territories between the Danube River and Istanbul and the Aegean Sea with the other great powers, specifically in agreement with England and Austria; or (2) the establishment of satellite Slavic and/or Orthodox states in those territories in the belief that they would be dependent upon Russia. These two policies were alternatives to each other, but both were complementary to Russia's strategic goals in the Near East.

The second track policies seemed much more feasible under the structural constraints of the 1815 European States System. The first of these were the treaty rights that Russia had obtained regarding the administration of Serbia and the Principalities and the rights of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which had come at the end of the several wars and the concluding treaties.[6] The treaty rights secured her involvement with the Principalities (Moldavia and Walachia) and Serbia, undermining the authority of the suzerain Ottoman Sultan, and

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[4] H. Temperely, 'British Policy Towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey 1830–1914', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, vol. 4, no: 2, 1933, p. 156

[5] B. Jelavich, ' *Russia's Balkan Entanglement, 1806-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.27-30 and B. Jelavich, '*A Century Russian Foreign Policy 1814–1914*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company), pp. 56-58

[6] These treaties were 'Kucuk Kaynarca (1774), Yassy (1794) and Bucharest (1812).

thus consolidated her position.[7] Likewise, her constant intervention in issues concerning the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire reinforced her position as the protector of the Orthodox subjects, who constituted 65 percent[8] of the population of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Secondly, in the event of satellite independent states being established, it was assumed that they would have to seek the protection of Russia for their security as the biggest and neighbouring Slavic and Orthodox kin power in the region. This policy had been tested and successfully implemented by Russia in the case of Serbia in 1806–1816.[9]

When the Greek revolt broke out in 1820 the Ottoman Empire was preoccupied with ensuring the authority of the central government over the powerful local governors as a part of her state reform, and so her military and economic conditions prevented her from following any specific goals in her foreign policies, aside from retaining her territories. Her survival was in this regard dependent upon the Anglo-Russian strategic rivalry and the Austrian quest for stability, as would be her fundamental principle for the remainder of the 19th century.[10]

Prior to the Greek insurgence, which had succeeded due to great diplomatic efforts and military intervention, Central Europe had been shaken by revolutions in Naples, Sardinia and Spain, all of which were crushed. It was the structure of the 1815 European States System that was the defining factor in the success of the Greek revolt.

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[7] F. Armaoglu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (1789–1914), (Ankara: Alkım Yayınevi, 2007), p. 157

[8] E. Akarli, *Ottoman Population in Europe in the 19th Century; its Territorial, Racial and Religious Composition*, Unpublished Master Thesis in Madison Unv, Wisconsin, cited by K. Karpat, *Osmanlidan Gunumuze Etnik Yapilanma ve Gocler*, trns by B. Tirnakci, (Istanbul: Timas, 2010)

[9] E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi (1789-1856)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), p. 58

[10] S.Hanioglu, *A Brief History of The Late Ottoman Empire*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008)
p. 4

The intention in this chapter is to seek answers to the central question of how the structure of the 1815 European States System worked and affected the Ottoman-Russian relations in 1821-1830 which developed around the Greek revolt.

To begin with, the issues which distinguished the Greek revolt from the other revolts taking place in Europe and the Ottoman Empire will be identified. To this end, firstly, an overview of the place and functions of the Greek subjects in the Ottoman state and society will be presented, followed by an analysis of how they became influential in Russia and in the Russian court. The second part of the chapter will look at how the Greek revolt started, and an assessment will be made of how, and to what extent, the Russian authorities were involved. The next section will look at how Russia tried to turn the Greek revolt into a Russian issue, and consequently a systemic or a European one, in order to involve the other great powers under the auspices of the Concert of Europe. This will be followed by a review of the reactions of the other great powers to Russia's involvement in the Greek revolt, specifically those of Austria and Great Britain. Finally, an explanation will be made of the chain of events surrounding the Greek issue that led to the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829 and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. To conclude the chapter, an analysis will be made of the new international state of affairs after the Ottoman-Russian War and the Treaty of Adrianople within the context of the 1815 European States System.

1. Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and Russia

The status and roles of the Greek subjects in the economic and political life of the Ottoman Empire and Russia by the 1800s were very much different from those of the other Orthodox and/or Slavic nations under the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, a thorough analysis of these differences would provide a good indication of why the course of the Greek insurrection took a different path in terms of the Ottoman and Russian

behaviours and reactions, and subsequently of the involvement of the great powers.

a. Greek subjects in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire organised her non-Muslim subjects according to their religions,[11] which was to be known as the '*millet* system'.[12][13] Under this system, the Greeks in 1454, Armenians in 1461 and Jews at the end of the 15th century after their expulsion from Spain, were formally organised as 'millets' within the Ottoman Empire.[14] According to Ottoman law, 'millets' had the right to self-administration in civil and religious matters among their religious co-patriots; and in this way the non-Muslim communities managed to retain and carry forward their identities under the Ottoman Empire. When it came to their relations with the state, their religious functionaries, both in the localities and in the capital, were also representing their communities in the state organs, and the religious leaders were bestowed with official powers and titles within the state organisation.[15]

The Orthodox millet covered all of the Orthodox subjects of the different ethnic nations of the Ottoman Empire; however the Patriarchs, who were the highest religious and state figures in the Orthodox millet, were elected from the Greek community. This situation inevitably gave

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[11] For a detailed study of the legal status of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, see G. Bozkurt, *Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Gayri Muslim Azinliklarin Hukuki Statusu*, (Ankara: TTK, 1989)

[12] 'Millet' was the name of the status and privileges given to non-Muslim subjects, denoting the religious groups that had substantial autonomy in the handling of civil and religious affairs and were represented by their religious institutions in the state organizations. See *ibid.*, p. 9

[13] For a detailed explanation of the millet system and the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Balkan nations, see K. Karpat, 'Ottoman Relations with the Balkan Nations after 1683', *Balkanistica in Occasional Papers in Southeast European Studies I*, ed. Kenneth E. Naylor, (Virginia: The American Association for South Slavic Studies, 1974)

[14] K.Karpat, *Balkanlar'da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk* (trans. R. Boztemur), (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004), pp. 72–73

[15] *Ibid*, p. 99

some advantages to the Greeks over the other Orthodox subjects in the religious and administrative affairs of the state.[16]

Two other developments enhanced even further the role of the Greeks in the political life of the Empire, in addition to their privileged status in the Orthodox Church. First, the influence of the Slavs or the Muslims of Slavic origin in the Ottoman court decreased after they 'discredited themselves by supporting the Hapsburg armies whenever they crossed the Danube',[17] and their places were filled by Greeks.[18] Second, the Ottoman court needed to consolidate her control over the Principalities as a bulwark against the expansion of Russia from the beginning of the 18th century. Until that time, the rulers of the Principalities had been selected from among the local rulers by the Ottoman sultans, but from 1711 onward the rulers of the principalities were appointed from among the Greek notables, which continued until the Greek revolt in 1821.[19]

The result of these two developments was an increase in the visibility and employment of Greek subjects in the Ottoman court,[20] and in this way the Greek subjects, in the words of Arnold Toynbee, gradually became 'the senior partner in the Ottoman firm'[21] and the Ottoman Empire became the 'Tourkokratia'[22] from the Greek perspective.

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[16] *Ibid*, pp. 100–103 and Armaoglu (2007), op. cit., p. 167

[17] L. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000) p. 270

[18] J. V. Hammer-Purgstall,'*XVIII. Asirda Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Devlet Teskilati ve Babiali*', (Istanbul: I.U.H.F.D., 1941, Cilt VII) pp. 564–568 cited by Bozkurt (1989), *op. cit*., p. 156

[19] Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit.,* p. 271 and Karpat (2004), *op. cit*., pp. 88–89

[20] For example, the first Chief Interpreter of the Porte (the abbreviation for the Ottoman Government coming from the Grand Porte, denoting the highest authority to be sought refuge) which was in practice the undersecretary of foreign affairs was Panayiotakis Nikousis and his protégé, Alexander Mavrokardatos was the negotiator of the 1699 Karlowitz Treaty, Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit.,* p. 271 and Karpat (2004), *op. cit*, pp. 100–101

[21] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, (London: 1935), II, p. 225 cited by Stavrianos (2000), *loc. cit.*

[22] C. Issawi, 'Introduction' in *Ottoman Greeks in Age of Nationalism, Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteen Century*, D. Condicas and C. Issawi, (edts), (New Jersey: the Darwin Press, 1999), p.1

Socially, the Greek subjects were the most numerous among the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, living mainly in the coastal cities and in the capital city of Istanbul, in contrast to the other Orthodox subjects of the Empire.[23] In Istanbul, the Greek notables and clergy settled around the district of *Phanar*[24] where the Patriarchy was situated, and in time the merchant and clergy families came to be known as '*Phanariots*' in reference to the name of the district.

The situation was similar in the economic domain. Their positions on either side of the Aegean Sea and the scarcity of natural resources on the Greek mainland led them to engage in commerce and shipping.[25] With the decline of the role of Venice in the economy of the Eastern Mediterranean, partly due to the rise of the Atlantic economy, Greek traders in the Ottoman Empire took their places and soon become the main traders between the Levant and major European ports.[26]

These combined domestic political, economic and social privileges and advantages, which were unique among the other *millets,* facilitated the emergence of a secular Greek power centre in the capital city of the Ottoman Empire alongside the religious and official power of the Patriarchy.

From the second half of the 18th century, another factor that was international rather than domestic in nature reinforced the political and economic development of the Greek subjects, being the rise of Russian power in the Black Sea. The impacts of that development on the Ottoman

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[23] *Ibid*, p. 2

[24]*Fener*, originaly Greek and spelled phanar, means 'Light House' in Turkish. The district, where the Patriarchy was situated, was named after *Fener* as a light house had been erected there.

[25] Issawi (1999), *op. cit.*, p. 2

[26] Stavrianos (2000), *loc. cit.*

Greeks and on how Russia utilised the Greek factor in her foreign policy objectives concerning the Ottoman Empire will be covered in the next section.

b. Greeks and Russia

Although the religious and cultural bonds between the Greeks and Russia dated back as far as the Byzantium period, the political and economic ties between two nations started only after the second half of the 18th century, with the 1868–1774 Ottoman-Russian War being the milestone in these relations.[27] During the war, Russia had sent a fleet via the Baltic Sea to the East Mediterranean with the technical help of Britain[28] and landed a number of troops in the Peloponnesus in 1769 where the goal was to trigger a local revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The ensuing uprising was easily suppressed by the Ottoman military, but the event remained as an example in the minds of the Greek nationalists for similar actions in the future.[29]The interests of Russia in the Greeks did not end with the culmination of the war, as two different but interrelated developments further increased the interactions between Russia and the Greeks as a consequence of the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca*.[30]

When Russia became a coastal state of the Black Sea and obtained rights for its trade ships to pass through the Straits, Greek ships and their crews, sailing under the Russian flag, carried out the majority of sea transportation between the Russian Black Sea ports and those of major

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[27] A. M. Stanislavskaya, *Rossiya i Gretsiya v Kontse 18 Nachale 19 Veka, Politika Rossiy v Iyonceskoy Respublika, 1798–1807*, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1976), pp. 9-10

[28] On the details of British technical assistance, see M.S Anderson, (1952), 'Great Britain and the Russian Fleet, 1769-70', *The Slavonic and East European Review,* vol. 31, no. 76, 1952

[29] D. Woodward, *The Russians at Sea*, (London: William Kimber, 1965), p. 91

[30] For a concise summary of the consequences of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on the development of the economic and political Russian-Greeks relations, see V. A Georgiev, N. S. Kinyapina, M.T. Panchenkova and B. I. Sheremet, *Vostochniy Vopros Vo Vneshney Politike Rossiy', Konets 18-Nachalo 20 v*, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1978)

European cities.[31] As a consequence, the port cities of Odessa, Marseille and Trieste became home to significant Greek trade colonies.[32]

The second development was political. Greeks were the most suitable instrument for Russia's attainment of its goals in geographical and religious terms, and so became the central focus of Russia's foreign policies when she settled on the Black Sea's northern shores.[33] With the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty, Russia took on the role of protector of the Orthodox Church and its followers as an important part of her foreign policy concerning the Near East. She based her claims on the 7th and 14th articles of the Treaty,[34] which were never accepted by the Ottoman Empire or the great powers to the extent that Russia argued and interpreted those articles. For the consolidation of her argument and the securing of influence over the Orthodox world, Russia had to cultivate close relations with the Greeks because of their leading role in the Patriarchy.

Russia needed the Greeks not only for their role in the Orthodox Church, but also for the strategic position of their mainland in the Mediterranean, which could enable Russia to realise her goals concerning the Straits and the Mediterranean. The most concrete step taken by Russia associated with Greeks in this regard was the so called *Greek Project* in the last quarter of the 18th century. The Greek Project, which is covered in depth in Chapter I, targeted the partition of the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and Austria, and the revival of the Byzantium (Greek) Empire in Istanbul. [35]

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[31] G. A. Arsh, *Yeteristskoy Dvijeniye v Rossii, Osvoboditelnaya Barba Grecheskovo Naroda b Nachale 19 b i Russko-Grecheskiye Sivazi,* (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970), pp. 30-31

[32] *Ibid*, pp. 36–37

[33]Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* pp. 35–38

[34] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* p. 37

[35] Stanislavskaya (1976), *op. cit.,*, p. 10

As a result of the economic interactions and political efforts, Russia became an attractive destination for the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Many talented Greeks sought opportunities in trade and education in Russia, and gradually became the most influential Orthodox non-Russian figures. Two such Greek subjects were Count John Capodistrias, (1776–1831), a native of Corfu, who entered Russian service and rose to the position of foreign minister and was a close confidant of the Tsar.[36] He led the pro-Greek circles in Russia and was an ardent supporter of the Russian military intervention in the Greek insurrection during 1810–1822. The other was Alexander Ipsilantis, who was from a well-known *Phanariote* family in Istanbul and became a major general in the Russian army and aide-de-camp of Tsar Alexander I.[37] He would go on to lead the small army of the rebels who started the revolt in the Principalities in 1821.[38]

The foundation of *Philike Hetairia* (Society of Friends), which would organise the Greek revolt in Russia, was not unusual under those circumstances.[39] As has been earlier noted, the port city of Odessa had become a thriving centre for Greek traders and merchants by the 19th century. *Philike Hetairia* was set up by two Greek and one Bulgarian merchant in 1814,[40] who chose the name to disguise its true aim, which was to plan the Greek insurgency.[41] The chair of the organisation was first offered to Capodistratis, who declined the position, and so the leadership

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[36] For detailed information about the political career and works of Capodistrias in Corfu and Russia, see C. W. Crawley, 'John Capodistrias and the Greeks before 1821', *Cambridge Historical Journal,* vol. 13, no. 2, 1957

[37] Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit.*, p. 282

[38] Başbakanlık Osmanli Arşivi Hattı Humayun Defteri (BOA HH hereinafter), No. 47772

[39] For a detailed account of the foundation and activities of Philike Hetairia in Russia, see G. A. Arsh, *Yeteristskoy Dvijeniye v Rossii, Osvoboditelnaya Barba Grecheskovo Naroda b Nachale 19 b i Russko-Grecheskiye Sivazi*, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970)

[40] For a detailed analysis of the early members of the Philike Hetairia and the composition and geoographical distribution of its members, see Crewley (1957), op. cit., p. 174–182

[41] Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit.,* p. 282

went to Alexander Ipsilanti.[42] The *Philike Hetairia* was organised in all major settlements of the Ottoman Empire under the pretence of providing education and charity to the Greek subjects. A number of Russian officials were actively involved in the activities of the *Philike Hetairia* and provided an adequate environment for it to carry out its activities, such as collecting money and assembling men and arms for the revolt.[43]

Having summarised the economic, political and social conditions of the Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire outside the Greek mainland and in Russia, a specific analysis about the conditions of the Greeks living in the peninsula of Mora will be made, where the insurgency achieved its goals.

c. Greeks in Mora

The political and economic levels of development of the Greeks living on the mainland of the Mora Peninsula were in sharp contrast with those living in the coastal and capital cities of the Ottoman Empire, who were not as politically or economically advanced as those in Istanbul or Russia. In the words of Schroeder, 'they were mostly peasants and were too ignorant and downtrodden and too riddled with factions'.[44] The social and economic imbalances on the peninsula made it ripe for insurgency. According to Karpat, while 40,000 Turks possessed 3 million acres of agricultural lands on the peninsula, the 360,000 Greeks held only 1–1.5 million acres.[45] The oppressive methods of the Albanian creditors over the Greek peasants were another factor driving discontent among the Greeks

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[42] Arsh (1970), *op. cit.* p. 245

[43] R.N.R. Florescu, 'Lord Strangford and the Problem of the Danubian Principalities, 1821–1824', Slavonic and East European review, vol. 39, 1961, pp. 473–474. Jelavich also gives the name of the local governors of Odessa and Bessaribia among those Russian officials who were actively involved with Philike Hetairia. Jelavich (1991), *op. cit*, p. 52

[44] P. W. Schroeder *'The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848'*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p.615

[45] Karpat (2004), *op. cit.,* p. 106

of Mora.[46] [47] These appalling conditions provided the necessary human base for the nationalist programs formulated by the progressed elite, as was the case in most of the nationalist movements of the 19th century.

2. Start of the Greek Revolt and the First Phase of Great Powers Diplomacy: 1821–1824

The analysis in the preceding section underlined the two reasons why the Greek insurgency took a different course to previous uprisings, although it was not the first non-Muslim insurgency against the Ottoman rulers.[48] First of all, the level of economic and political development and the status of the Greek subjects in the Ottoman Empire were different from those of the other non-Muslim nations in the Empire. Secondly, the Greeks were very influential in Russia as result of their increased commercial and societal interactions during the last four or five decades; and finally, the Greek insurgency was internationalised, meaning that the great powers were also involved. There were three reasons which helped internationalise the Greek insurgency, being the Russian diplomatic initiatives; the strategic location of the Greek mainland for the 1815 European States System; and the sentimental and material supports of the European public. These issues will be covered as part of the analysis of the development of the insurgency and the great power diplomacy from 1821 onwards.

a. Ottoman Empire on the Eve of the Greek Rebellion

On the eve the Greek riot, the Ottoman Empire was being shaken by internal clashes. Everybody understood the need for reform in both the state and the army, but the content and scope of the reforms was still the subject of a power struggle. Reform-minded Sultan *Selim* III was

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[46] *Ibid.*

[47] For the educational and political activities of the Greeks before 1821, see C. W. Crawley (1957)' op. cit., pp. 162–182

[48] It was the Serbians that had first rebelled against the Ottoman rule. See L. Meriage, 'The First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question' *Slavic Review,* vol. 37, no. 3, 1978

dethroned in 1808 and killed later by his successor Sultan *Mustafa* IV, who would later share the same fate, but this time at the hands of the pro-reform forces. The capital would witness the power struggle between pro- and anti-reformers for the entire period of Sultan *Mahmud*'s rule (1809–1839).

The reforms resumed under Sultan *Mahmud* after a long interval following the overthrow of reform-minded *Selim* III in 1808, and his priority was to consolidate the central government and to reform the army.[49] The consolidation of the central government was achieved by removing much of the authority from the local notables in the provinces.[50] In this regard, his struggle against the local ruler of Mora, *Tepedelenli Ali*, who was holding the Greeks under a firm grip, paradoxically facilitated the success of the Greek rebels.[51] The clash between the Sultan and *Tepedelenli Ali* prevented any close scrutiny or control of the rebels of the latter, and more importantly, diverted the Ottoman army away from the rebellion, thus allowing the rebels to take control of the whole of Mora in 1821 without any state intervention.[52]

b. State of Affairs in the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Europe Prior to the Greek Insurgency

The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was not far from tension before the Greek insurgency, as the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 had been hastily accepted by Russia due to the approach of Napoleon's Grand Army.[53] Russia pledged to return all of the territories in the Balkans and Caucasus, except for Bessarabia, while the Ottoman

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[49]Karal (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 90

[50] *Ibid*, pp. 154-155

[51] M. Nuri Paşa, *Netayuc-ül Vukuat, Kurumalari ve Örgütleriyle Osmanli Tarihi*, Sadeleştiren, Neşet Çağatay, (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu 1992, p. 248

[52] *Ibid*., pp. 251–252

[53] A. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe 1789–1825*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1947), p. 407

Empire was to settle the Serbian issue by giving her autonomy and recognising some of the rights of the autonomous Principalities. However, the Serbian leaders were not content with what they had been given under the Treaty, and so the problem remained unresolved.[54]

As long as Russia remained at war with France, the unresolved Serbian question was not a cause for concern for the Ottoman Empire; however a more controversial issue was the return of the territories in the Caucasus. Russia did not interpret its promise as covering some of the territories in the Caucasus, which were of great importance for the control of the Black Sea's eastern coastline.[55] G. A. Stroganov, the new Russian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, arrived in Istanbul in 1816 to secure the full implementation of the Bucharest Treaty according to the Russian terms.[56] It was clear with the appointment of Stroganov that Russia was committed to gaining in 1816 what she could not get in Bucharest in 1812 after she had quashed the Napoleonic threat.[57]

An Ottoman-Russian war was the last thing that the great powers could afford so soon after the devastations of the Napoleonic Wars and the 1815 Settlements. The outcomes of such a war were hard to predict for the future of the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently for the territorial and political equilibrium in Europe the 1815 Settlements had brought about. In particular, Austria and Great Britain would lose out in case of such a war, since France had already been restricted; and for this reason,

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[54]Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* pp. 18–24

[55]M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923 A Study in International Relations, Macmillan*, (New York, 1966), p. 59–60

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 59–60

[57] In the words of Kissinger, Stragonov was a diplomat of the old Russian school, which considered Russia to be the heir to the Byzantine Empire, and Constantinople the natural goal of Russian Policy. H. A. Kissinger, *A World Restored Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1857), p. 291. Speaking on the general tendency of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire, Crawley argued that 'The Russians used the treaties to put forward much wider and vaguer pretentions, which they hoped that Europe would take for granted'. C.W. Crawley, '*The Question of Greek Independence, A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821–1833*', (The Unv. Press, Cambridge, 1930), p. 2

Castelreagh, the British Foreign Minister, instructed the British ambassador in Istanbul to advise the Ottoman government to conduct her negotiations with Russia so as to avoid any excuse for war, and to be more solicitous so as to secure a clear and early settlement with Russia.[58]

At the same time, the revolutionary movements in Spain, Portugal, Naples and Piedmont threatened to undermine the dynastic regimes that were considered to be the base of the political stability of the 1815 European States System, and the great powers were preoccupied with tackling those movements through congresses and conferences. This has been labelled consequently as the Congresses and Conferences System era due to the efforts exerted to find a collective solution to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlement, in which Russia played a leading role. News of the Greek insurgency broke while the Tsar was at one such congress in Laibach in 1821.

c. Start of Greek Insurgency and Russian Initial Reactions

The Greek insurgency started when the head of *Philike Heteria*, Alexander Ypsilanti, crossed the Prut River into Moldavia with a small band of irregulars on 4 March, 1821[59]. He was relying on the support of the locals and more importantly of Russia, and proclaimed to the locals that the mighty empire would defend their rights.[60] However, that mighty empire did not come to help because, in the words of Jelavich, his 'was the wrong rebellion at the wrong time in the wrong place'.[61]

It was indeed the wrong time to expect the backing of Russia. Tsar Alexander I and the emperors of Austria and Prussia, as the Holy Alliance,

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[58] Castlereagh to Liston, Nov. 20, 1815, F.O. 78/84 Public Record Office (PRO hereafter) and Castlereagh to Frere, Jan. 29, 1816: F.O. 78/ 85 PRO

[59] Georgiev *et al.*(1978), *op. cit.,* p. 79

[60] R. Clogg, (ed.) '*The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821* (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 201–203

[61] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* , p.52

had already agreed to refuse any changes in the domestic regimes brought about by the revolutionary movements in the Conference of Troppau in 1820 when they met to deal with the revolutions in Spain, Portugal and Nepal. More importantly, in the event that the changes endangered neighbouring countries, they would attempt to bring the offending country back into line 'first by friendly pressure, and secondly by coercive force',[62] principles that they would reaffirm in Laibach in May 1821. Under these circumstances, the reaction of Alexander I was not unexpected. He condemned the action of Ypsilanti with the following words, 'He could not count on any aid, nor even on any mark interest on our part, as long as he misguided his compatriots and led them to inevitable misfortune'.[63]

The place that the head of the *Philike Hetaerae* chose for the revolt, strangely enough, was not the Greek mainland but the Danube Principalities, which in hindsight was the wrong choice. The locals saw their rulers of Greek origin to be responsible for the misrule, if that was indeed the case,[64] and so the invitation from Ypsilanti to take part in the insurgency did not attract the masses he had hoped. Once the local Romanian rebel leader Tudor Vladimirescu had decided to act on his own, the revolt of Ypsilanti was doomed to failure.[65] The Ottoman forces entered the Principalities and suppressed the revolt without difficulty, while Ypsilanti fled to Austria where he remained imprisoned until 1827.

The Greek revolt did not end with the suppression of the Ypsilanti irregulars in Moldavia, as it would spread to the Mora Peninsula and the

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[62] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1947), *op. cit.*, p. 382

[63] Nesselrode circular dispatch, Laibach, March 18/30, 1821, Vneshniaia Politika Rossii XIX i nachale XX veka: Dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva Inostrannykh del. Vols I-XIV, Izdatelstvo nauka, Moscow, 1960–1965, (referred as VPR hereinafter), Vol. XII, p. 70–71

[64] For example, Ypsilanti himself was the son of one of the Hospodars of Moldavia before 1806. Karal (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 112

[65] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit*, p. 54

surrounding islands by early April of the same year.[66] The rebels 'massacred every Turk on whom they could lay their hands'[67] in Mora, and by the summer of 1822, the Greek rebels had taken control of the north of the Isthmus of Corinth, Missolonghi, Athens and Thebes.[68] The subsequent measures taken by the Ottoman government, the Russian reactions and the involvement of the great powers will be the focus of the next section.

d. Development of the Revolt in Mora and the Counter-Measures of the Ottoman Government

While the actions of Ypsilanti were considered to be a plot staged by Russia, the revolt in Mora changed the whole attitude and reaction of the Ottoman government[69] who dispatched the army and the navy to supress the revolt. The army had already been preoccupied with the rebellious Ali Pasha in Ionia before being diverted to the harsher geographical conditions of the Mora Peninsula, which made it difficult to restore order. Moreover, the rebels in Mora were receiving strong support from the inhabitants and the church, in contrast to the situation in the Principalities.

As previously touched upon, the Greeks had been heavily engaged in maritime trade and shipping between the Levant, Europe and Russia, and it was the same ships that were then armed and used against the Ottoman Navy to prevent any effective operations from the sea against the rebels. The converted ships were able to effectively disrupt supply lines to the Ottoman cities and Istanbul, leading the Ottoman authorities to stop

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[66] For a detailed account of the operation of the Hetariatist in Mora, the role of the priests in the insurgency, and the spread of the insurgency to islands, the fall of Athens and Missolonghi and the massacre of Muslims, see G. Finlay, '*History of the Greek Revolution*', (London : in two volumes, William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), pp. 171–224

[67] C.Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, (London: G.Bell and Sons, 1947), p. 353

[68] Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit.*, p. 2

[69] Georgiev *et al.*(1978),op. cit., p. 78

and search all Russian cargo ships passing through Straits under the suspicion that they were being operated by the Greeks under the Russian flag to carry supplies to the rebels.[70] The longer the revolt lasted, the more coercive means were put into practice.

As again specified out in the previous section, the Greeks were living not only on the Greek mainland, but also in Istanbul and Asia Minor. News of the atrocities committed by the rebels against the local Muslims and the disruption of supply lines to Istanbul resulted in great public uproar against the Greeks living in Istanbul and in the other parts of the Empire.

In the meantime, the Ottoman government was beginning to understand the scope of the events and the activities of *Philikia Hetaerae*, as well as the involvement of the Greek priests and other leading notables. A harsh wave of measures and punishments against the priests and leading Greeks ensued. Most of those found to be involved in the activities of *Philikia Hetaerae* were executed, the most notable event being the execution of the Patriarch Gregory V, even though he had issued an encyclical condemning the rebellion.[71]

Russia's reaction to the execution of the Patriarch and other leading bishops in the major cities and the confiscation of cargoes from Russian ships sailing through the Straits was swift, considering them as the final blow to Russia's self-appointed mission as protector of the Orthodox faith and her great power status. The war party, which had been already in motion in St. Petersburg to quash disputes arising from the implementation of the Treaty of Bucharest (1912), took this as an opportunity 'for an attack on Turkey [the Ottoman Empire]'.[72]

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[70] Anderson (1966), *op.cit*, p. 60

[71] Stavrianos (2000), *op. cit*, p. 284

[72] A.G Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times*, (London: John Parker and sons, 1859), p. 454

e. Internationalisation of Greek Insurgency

After the outbreak of the rebellion, Russia's Tsar warned the Ottoman Empire to act with restraint[73] He did not hide its sympathy for the rebels, hailing them as 'the victims of events', and stating that they would find in the Russian missions 'the assistance always owed to misfortune and even more natural yet when this misfortune falls upon a nation which is united to us by the sacred ties of a common faith'.[74] The Russian Embassy staff in Istanbul had already 'openly but not officially favoured the Greek cause',[75] however the execution of the Patriarch and the other leading bishops and the confiscation of Russian cargoes had hardened Russian attitudes.

Stroganov, the Russian ambassador, delivered a strongly-worded letter of protest to the Ottoman government on 28 June[76] demanding they halt the violence against the Greeks, terminate their occupation of the Principalities, and cease the stop and search of Russian cargo ships sailing through the Straits in pursuance of the Ottoman-Russian treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774) and Yassy (1782).[77] The Porte replied that the Patriarch and the other bishops had been justly condemned and executed according to law for their involvement in a conspiracy against their lawful sovereign and the Ottoman Empire would follow her bilateral commitments after she restored the order in the Principalities and Mora (Greek Mainland).[78]   However, Russia was not satisfied with this reply, and on 18 July, 1821 *Stragonov* delivered an ultimatum, but this time on the order from his capital, condemning the hanging of the Patriarch and

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[73] Georgiev *et al*(1978), *op. cit.,* p. 80

[74] Alexander I to Stragonov, Laibach, March 31/April 12, 1821,VPR, *op. cit.* Vol. XII, p. 93–94

[75]Crawley (1930), *op. cit.* p. 2

[76] Georgiev *et al.* (1978), op. cit. p. 80

[77] V. I. Sheremet, *Turtsiya i Andrianopolskiy mir 1829 g*. (Moskva, Nauyk, 1975), p. 11

[78]*Ibid,* p. 11 and also Finlay (1861), *op. cit*, p. 238; Crawley (1930), *op. cit.,* pp. 17–18

the leading Greeks in the strongest terms, and asserting Russia's role as representative of the Christendom. The Ottoman government was strongly requested to (1) restore the destroyed Greek churches; (2) provide a guarantee of protection of the Ottoman Christians; and finally (3) the return to the status quo in the Principalities within eight days [79] When he did not receive a reply in time, according to his calculations, he broke off diplomatic relations and left Istanbul for Russia in August.[80]

With the breaking of diplomatic ties, Ottoman-Russian relations took a different path in their approach to the Greek insurgency within the 1815 European States System that was to a great extent shaped by the mediation of the great powers in the absence of direct contacts between the two states.

f. Restraint of Russia in 1821–1826

Despite her firm stance in Istanbul, Russia was following a conciliatory policy in the European courts, being aware of the strategic importance of the Mora Peninsula and its surrounding islands in the power structure of the 1815 European States System. The islands could not be overlooked by either the continental or maritime great powers; however it was Great Britain and Austria that played the leading role rather than France and Prussia.

For Britain there had been permanent anxiety about Russia's designs on the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean since Pitt's time.[81] In this regard, her interest was not only commercial, but also naval. 'In the Black Sea lay the Russian Navy, formidable in itself; dangerous if joined to that of any maritime power [France] in the Mediterranean other

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[79] The Russian ultimatum is in A.F. V. Prokesh-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen,* (Vienna: 1867), III. Volume, p. 95

[80] Georgiev *et. al*,(1978), *op. cit*, p. 80

[81]Duke of Argyll '*Our Responsibilities for Turkey, Facts and Memories of Forty Years*', (London: John Murray, 1896), pp. 3-4

than Britain.[82] Therefore, an Ottoman-Russian war over the Greeks would be tantamount to the realisation of the Russian goals in the Mediterranean from the British perspective.

Austria, on the other hand, was very much concerned about Russia's self-assumed role of protector of the Orthodox and/or Slavs in the Balkans, since the Austrian Empire had many Orthodox and Slavic subjects. The Russian decision to provide for the protection of the Greeks meant that Greece would be the next state to fall under Russian influence after Serbia and the Principalities. This was unacceptable for Austria under the 1815 European States System, unlike in the last quarter of the 18th century with regard to the Principalities, and in the first decade of the 19th century with regard to Serbia. Moreover, supporting Russia would mean backing the Greek rebels, which would consequently mean the reversal of the agreements reached in Troppau to block the revolutionary movements in Naples, Spain and Portugal by the three conservative monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia.[83]

The attitudes of the British and Austrian ambassadors in Istanbul toward the actions of Ambassador *Stragonov* were an indication of the policies of both powers towards the Greek issue in 1821–1826. This concerted policy was based on the separation of the Russian Treaty rights, Russian concerns about the well-being of the Orthodox Greeks and the unjust actions of the Ottoman authorities. This line of policy was also an indication that the remaining members of the Concert of Europe would not recognise the Russian claims within the Treaty regarding the protection of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The following section will address how Russia, Great Britain and Austria implemented their policies regarding the Greek issue in 1821–1826.

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[82] H. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827, England, The Neo-Holy Alliance, and The New World*, (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd, 1925), p. 320

[83] Metternich held the view that the Greek Revolution was 'entirely the work of Russian agents', Gordon to Canning , 120/55 F.O. The National Archive (hereinafter TNA)

Russia did not appear to want to break away from her allies in the Quadruple Coalition because of the Greeks, which meant that she would continue to uphold the 1815 Settlements and try to seek a solution to the Greek question within the limits of the 1815 European States System.[84] In this case, the Ottoman Empire would play the key role in the settlement of the Greek issue, since neither Great Britain nor Austria desired any dramatic change in the status quo that existed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia; and more importantly, Russia herself had a strong desire to remain within the 1815 Settlements.

After breaking her relations with the Ottoman Empire, Russia concentrated her efforts to reassure the great powers of her desire to adhere to her commitments in the 1815 Settlements, pledging not to act alone in the Greek issue.[85] Even before the break up, the Tsar told the British ambassador that he believed that Paris liberals were responsible for the disturbances in Spain, Italy, Spain and the Near East, claiming that the objective of those in the Principalities was to distract 'the attention of Russia from the affairs of the rest of Europe'.[86] A similar attitude was reiterated in the dispatch sent to the European courts on 4 July from Russia[87], expressing that Russia 'will never act either on the basis of its exclusive interests or without cooperating with the powers with which the transactions which constitute the guarantee of general peace unite it'. On the other side, the dispatch also inquired what the partners would think should Russia act to restore peace and strengthen the equilibrium of Europe.[88] In other words, she was expecting the same role

[84] Sheremet (1994), *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13

[85] *Ibid*, p. 13

[86] From Bagot, June, 20, 1821, F.O. Russia, 127 cited by Webster (1947), *op. cit.,* p. 359

[87] Georgiev *et al*,(1978), *op. cit*, p. 80

[88] Nesselrode to Golovkin, St. Petersburg, June 22/July 4, 1821, in Prokesh-Osten, *op. cit*., pp. 101–104

to be recognised for her in the Near East within the Concert of Europe as it was for Austria in Italy and France in Spain.

The members of the Concert of Europe declined the Russian offer to act on their behalf in the Near East, as the implications of such a move by Russia would be very different from those of Austria in Italy, and France in Spain. While in Italy and Spain the intention had been to restore the authority of the legitimate rulers against the revolutionaries, the aim of Russia was just the opposite, being to protect the rebels against their legitimate sovereign. Secondly, the interventions of neither France nor Austria would result in a shift in the balance of power in the 1815 European States System, unlike the involvement of Russia in the Near East.[89]

However, both Britain and Austria voiced their opposition to the Russian demand to act on behalf the Concert, reminding her of the principles of the 1815 Settlements. In this context, Castlereagh, the English Foreign Minister, in a direct appeal to Alexander I, underlined that 'the Greek insurrection was the same as those in the West, and was the work of the same organised spirit of the same international power which was revealing itself in places where the governing power was enfeebled'.[90] Therefore, he expected that a 'Russia which can adhere to its peculiar habit of action would nevertheless remain unalterably true to the fundamental obligations of the alliance and the present European States System'.[91]

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[89] According to Clayton, 'By 1821, however, containment of Russia was considered [by Britain] a major need. The loss of Greece might not in itself seriously weaken Turkey; but Russian intervention on the Greek side almost certainly would', G.D. Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, (London, TBS, 1975), p. 43

[90] Kissinger (1957), *op. cit.,* p. 294

[91]*Ibid.*

Austria followed Britain in her refusal to grant Russia the assent she sought for collective action, or indeed individual action by Russia on behalf the alliance, in the Near East.

The similar attitude of Britain and Austria towards Russia with regard to the Greek revolt paved the way for further cooperation between Castlereagh and Metternich. This was the exact wish of Metternich, who was aware that the most effective way to strengthen Austria's hand in restraining Russia was through cooperation between Austria and Britain, even though the two states' perceptions of how Russia could be restrained were different. An opportunity to forge a definite and precise understanding between Britain and Austria with regard to Russia's position in the Near East emerged when the British King visited Hanover, accompanied by Castlereagh.

The most significant result of the meeting between Castlereagh and Metternich was an agreement to implement policies that would keep Russia within the parameters of the 1815 Settlements.[92] The two states pledged to prevent Russian recourse to coercive means, including war, to settle the Greek issue, being aware that the Tsar, who was the ultimate decision-maker in foreign policy issues, was under heavy pressure from the powerful pro-Greek and pro-war lobby. Although Castlereagh and Metternich differed in their ideas of how to relieve the pressure on the Tsar; their approaches were targeting the same end; that is, to restrain Russia in the Greek issue. Castlereagh was much bolder than Metternich. In his letter to the Tsar he asserted that the Greek crisis had the potential to disrupt 'not only the stability of the present European Situation but the moral character and harmony of the alliance'.[93] Targeting the pro-Greek lobby around the Tsar, he reminded that 'it is impossible not to feel the appeal; and if a statesman were permitted to regulate his conduct by the

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[92]Temperley (1925), *op. cit.,* p. 323

[93] To Bagot Oct 28, 1821, F.O. Continent 47, Londonerry to the Tsar, Oct. 28, 1821, F.O. Russia 126, cited by Webster (1947), *op. cit.,* p. 379

counsels of his heart instead of the dictates of his understanding, I see really no limits to the impulse…'.[94] On the basis of those views, he refused to discuss the Russian inquiries regarding the possible consequences of a Russian attempt to settle the Greek issue.[95]

As for Austria, Metternich was most careful in his response to Russia in recognition of the precarious domestic situation of the Tsar explained in the last paragraph. His response was not limited to the rejection of Russia's demands, in that it also included some proposals for the handling of the Greek issue and the establishment of a base for the collective action of the great powers in the future. To that end, he formulated Russia's grievances that had arisen from the Greek revolts and the conduct of the Ottoman Empire to quell them in the following ways:[96] (1) Restoration of the protection of the Ottoman Christians; (2) maintenance of a distinction in the treatment of the guilty and the innocent in the Greek rebellion; and (3) withdrawal of the Ottoman army from the Principalities and restoration of the previous administrative system. Metternich then suggested that Russia should distinguish her violated treaty rights from her grievances about the misconduct of the Ottoman government in the suppression of the revolt.[97] With regard to those covered by bilateral treaties, Russia maintained the right to deal with them unilaterally; but for those not covered by the bilateral treaties, they should not be dealt with unilaterally by Russia. Since the issues that resulted from the Greek revolt were apparently not stipulated by bilateral treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, they were of interest also to the other great powers. In other words, they were European issues,

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[94] Kissinger (1857), *op. cit*., pp. 376–377

[95] Webster (1947), *op.cit.*, p. 375

[96] Webster (1947), *op.cit.,*pp. 379–380

[97] 'Remarks on Nesselrode's Letter to Lord Strangford' in *Memories of Prince Metternich* Vol.1-5, (London: Spoottisewoode and Co 1879) Vol. 4, pp. 67-75

and so should be dealt with through the concerted actions of the great powers.

In this way, Metternich was attempting to invalidate the Russian argument that it had to intervene in the Greek issue on the basis of its special status with regard to the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Metternich was indicating that Russia could get the help of the great powers for its legitimate rights, so long as it gave up its self-appointed role of protector of the eastern Christians. It should be noted that the offered help did not include a military option, but rather put pressure on the Ottoman Empire from Britain and Austria to ensure the legitimate rights of Russia, such as in the evacuation of the principalities and the commercial rights for the passage of Russian cargo ships through the Straits.

In contrast to the categorical refusal of Britain, Austria was more flexible in its reply to Russia's request to intervene in the Greek issue on behalf of the alliance. In the end, Austria was indirectly saying no to Russia on the ground that her grievances against the Ottoman Empire did not originate from her treaties with the Ottoman Empire

The refusal of Britain and Austria to endorse or cooperate in the issue persuaded the already-reluctant Tsar not to go ahead with an intervention into Greek affairs. The first step to that end was his decision to accept Austria's offer during a meeting in Vienna.

The Tsar chose to send Tatishchev as his special envoy to the meeting in Vienna rather than Stragonov, who was the former ambassador in Istanbul and a hardliner in St. Petersburg, going against the advice of the Foreign Ministry.[98] This choice could be considered as another signal

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[98] Jelavich (1991), op. cit., p. 62

that Russia was ready to align her policies towards the Greek issue with those of Austria and Britain.

The negotiations between Austria and Russia started in Vienna in March 1822. Although there were no changes in the Russian demands,[99] the negotiations bought Metternich time in which to forge an agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, or at least keep Russia within the limits of the alliance. At the end of the negotiations, Metternich agreed to some concessions, that Austria would break ties with the Ottoman Empire in the event of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia resulting from Ottoman attitudes to the treaty rights of Russia. This concession was not without conditions, as it depended on Britain also breaking its ties with the Ottoman Empire in the event of such a war. Metternich knew that Britain would never make such a move, and so he was not actually committing to anything substantial.[100]

The second mission of Tatishchev to Vienna in May 1822 continued on the basis and limits of the agreements achieved during the first mission.[101]

The Ottoman government, from the outset until the end of the Greek issue, objected strongly to any mediation by any great power in the settlement of the problem, on the grounds that it was a domestic issue;[102] but on the other hand, she was very conciliatory in the settlement of the disputes regarding the implementation of her bilateral treaties with Russia. The main difficulty in the settlement of those disputes was the open Russian support for the rebels and the complicities of the Russian officials. Nevertheless, as a result of the efforts of the British ambassador

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[99] On the summary of those demands, see, Anderson (1966), *op. cit.*, p. 81

[100] Webster (1947), *op. cit,* p. 393

[101] Instruction of Alexander to Tatishchev, May 14/26, 1822, VPR, *op. cit.*, p. 507–510

[102] BOA HH No. 51283.

in Istanbul some progress was made in meeting the Russian demands with regard to the affairs of the Principalities.[103]

When the great powers, with the exception of Britain, convened in November in Verona, their positions regarding the Greek issue had already been determined, with the separation of the implementation of the Russian treaty rights and the Greek issue being the basis of their agreement. Accordingly, the participants were mainly preoccupied with the Spanish issue, with the Greek issue being dealt with in only one day, as Russia reiterated its already well-known demands while strongly denying complicity in the rebellion.[104] Austria, Prussia and France insisted Russia resume diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, for which Tatishchev listed three conditions: 'The complete evacuation of the Principalities by the Ottoman Empire; the Pacification of Greece by a series of acts showing that the Ottoman Government respects the Orthodox religion under the protection of Russia; and finally, a repeal of the measures that hindered commerce and free navigation in the Black Sea'.[105]

Progress regarding the treaty rights of Russia in Istanbul, which have already been dealt with above, facilitated the job of the Tsar in endorsing the Metternich formulation, and Russia resumed its diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire at the level of attaché in 1824.[106] So ended the first phase in the internationalisation of the great powers' involvement in the Greek issue. The Russian decision not to act unilaterally, but rather according to the concerted policies of the great powers set out by Austria, would last until April 1826 when Britain

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[103] For details of the efforts of the British ambassador in the evacuation of the Ottoman army from the Principalities in Florescu (1961), *op. cit.,* pp. 472–488

[104] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit*, p. 65;

[105] Russian Declaration at the Congress of Verona, November 9, 1822, in Prokesch-Osten (1867), *op. cit.*, p. 440

[106] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 84

changed her policy, and agreed with Russia over the settlement of the Greek issue. From April 1826, when the Petersburg Convention was signed, to the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in April 1828, Russia would again act under the concerted policies of the great powers, but this time framed and led by Britain instead of Austria.

As a result, the restraint of Russia in the Greek issue was the marking factor in the international domain from 1821–1828; however developments between 1824–1826, both in the Ottoman's handling of the Greek revolt and in the handling of the great power diplomacy, prevented any breakthrough in the settlement of the problem. These interim developments are covered in the following section.

3. Interim Great Power Diplomacy in the Greek Issue: 1824–1826

A key event in the 1824–1826 period was the first indications that Great Britain would soften on Castlereagh's rigid stance against Russia on the Greek issue. This was also a sign of Britain's new overall policy against the Congress System, which was the convention among the great powers for the overseeing and regulating of international politics within the 1815 European States System.

After the Congress of Verona in 1822, relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia saw a slight improvement as a result of positive steps taken by the Ottoman Empire with regard to the Principalities and commerce.[107] This resulted in the Tsar appointing Minciacky to head an economic mission in Istanbul,[108] and by the end of 1824, 'tranquillity had been restored to the Principalities and the bulk of the Turkish occupation force had been withdrawn'.[109] This cleared the way

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[107] For the steps concerning the Principalities, see Florescu (1961), op. cit., pp. 479–483

[108] Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 14

[109] Florescu (1961), *op. cit.,* p. 487

for Russia to send a new ambassador, Ribeaupierre, to Istanbul, which meant a full restoration of diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire; however the departure of the new ambassador was postponed.[110]

Russia, the main protagonist in the Greek issue from the European States System, did not stop its efforts to settle the issue after the 1822 Verona Congress, preparing a memo in March 1824 for the pacification of the Greek issue.[111] Her plan envisioned three autonomous Greek principalities under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire with a status similar to that of the Principalities under the guarantee of the allied courts. If the belligerents chose not to agree to the terms, the allies would take coercive measures.[112] Russia's motivation in preparing such proposal was obvious; it was not happy with the demand for independence from the Greek rebels, as a Greek state, in contrast to the Principalities, would not be adjacent to Russia. Moreover, Russia did not possess the naval capacity in the Mediterranean to be able exercise influence over such a state, meaning that an independent Greece would more likely fall under the influence of a maritime power, namely, Britain. An autonomous Greece, like Serbia, would be much more preferable for Russia than an independent Greece, since she would be predisposed to Russia if she was formally placed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

On the basis of that plan, Russia invited the great powers to St. Petersburg to negotiate the Greek situation,[113] however before the meeting the Russian plan for the pacification of Greece was leaked in a French newspaper. This was a big disappointment for the Greek nationalists, since the proposal did not envision independence and union for Greece,

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[110] Jelavich (1991, *op. cit.,* p. 72

[111] Memo to the Austrian, British, Prussian and French governments on the pacification of Greece, January 9/21, 1824, VPR, *op. cit.,* pp. 308–314; Georgiev *et al*(1978) *op. cit.,* pp. 82-83

[112] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* p. 70 and Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.,* pp. 14-15

[113] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* p.638

but was regarded rather as 'the *Hospidarisation* of Greece', echoing the status of the Principalities. For this reason, the Greeks turned to Great Britain for protection,[114] heralding a new internationalisation process within the Greek issue in which Britain would take the lead.

Austria and France received the Russian proposals with some concern. The establishment of three autonomous Greek states was considered to be an extension of Russian influence into Greece, as had already been the case for the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and Serbia in the Balkans. With the addition of three new divisions in Greece, a total of six 'meagre and divided Balkan Principalities would revolve as satellites round the Russian sun'.[115] Moreover, they were concerned that the Russian proposal would bring the strong refusal of the Porte, and that subsequently coercive measures and finally war would be unavoidable.[116] However, they did not oppose Russia outright, and took part in the opening session of the St. Petersburg conference in June 1824. The meeting could not produce any concrete decisions with regard to the Greek issue[117] as, according to Schroeder, the participants lacked clear instructions from their governments. For this reason, Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, suspended the first meeting.[118]

As for Great Britain, Canning, the new Foreign Minister, announced that Britain would not agree to a proposal unless it was accepted by the Greeks, and announced some conditions for Britain's participation in the second St. Petersburg conference, scheduled for March 1825.[119] These

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[114] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* pp. 70

[115] Temperley(1925), *op. cit.,* p. 330

[116] Schroeder (1994) *op. cit.,* p. 639 and S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Strafford Canning,* 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1888), p. 348

[117] Anderson (1966), *op. cit.,* p. 82; Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* p. 83

[118] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 639

[119] Temperely (1925), *op. cit.,* p. 88.

included the full restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and a renunciation of the use of force by the warring parties. In fact, Britain had already begun the process of designing a new policy regarding the Greek issue in line with her overall policy to divide the Holy Alliance, and so could be seen to be deliberately isolating herself.

In Britain's first attempt to that end, Canning sent his cousin, Strafford Canning, to St. Petersburg as the newly appointed ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, with an offer 'to have Britain mediate between Russia and the Ottoman Empire separately from Austria and France',[120] which was tabled before the second opening of the St. Petersburg Conference in February 1825. Lane-Pool argued that his preliminary discussions with the Tsar and Nesselrode had cleared the way for the much later agreement, the Protocol of 4 April, 1826, between Britain and Russia in the settlement of the Greek issue.[121] Moreover, Britain recognised the Greek rebels as belligerents[122] in March 1823, and did not interfere when their representatives raised a loan in London.

The second St. Petersburg conference between the great continental powers again failed to bring an end to the problem.[123] Although the participants adopted a protocol in April 1825 offering mediation between the Ottoman Empire and Greeks, given the attitude of the two parties, the effects of the protocol on the settlement of the issue would be very much limited.[124] It seemed that none of the great powers wanted Russia to reinforce her position in the Near East, and Russia was understandably disappointed. Nesselrode wrote to the Russian representatives on 18

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[120] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* pp. 640- 642

[121] Lane-Poole (1888), *op. cit.,* p. 370

[122] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 175

[123] Anderson (1966), *op. cit.,* p. 82

[124] Georgiev *et al*(1978), *op. cit.,* pp. 82-83

August claiming that there was little point in continuing the negotiations regarding the Greek issue with Austria, Prussia and France.[125]

This was not a declaration of the end of Russian endeavours in the Near East, but was rather an admission of the impracticability of the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia in the region. This was the first occasion in the 1815 European States System, as Taylor pointed out, that the Holy Alliance could function in Central Europe, but was unacceptable for Russia when it came to the Near East. Russia's position as a flanking power in the 1815 European States System meant that she could act independently of the continental powers. An alternative opportunity was already looming on the horizon in the shape of the increasing interest of Britain in the Greek issue and Canning's desire to reduce Britain's involvement in continental affairs. In this respect, informal consultations took place between Canning and the Russian ambassador in London, and at the end of 1825 the Russian ambassador informed St. Petersburg that Britain was shifting to the side of Russia.[126] This can be considered as the end of the first phase and the start of the second phase in the internationalisation of the Greek issue.

4. Development of the Greek Revolt and the Second Phase of the Great Powers Diplomacy: 1826–1828

Despite the time gained through the international restraint of Russia, things did not go well for the Ottoman Empire in the field. Her military commanders were unsuccessful in suppressing the rebellion and bringing stability back to the Mora Peninsula. This was partly due to internal political clashes among the senior officials, and partly due to the lack of sufficiently disciplined, equipped and trained troops.[127] As

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[125] A.V. Fadeev, *Rossiya i vostochnyi krisiz 20-x godov XIX veka*, (Moskva, 1958), p. 96

[126] *Ibid*, p. 137,

[127] Karal (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 115

explained earlier in the chapter, the diversion of the Tepedelenli Ali Pasha's rebellion in Ionia was one of the reasons behind the failure of the Ottoman forces to quell the Greek revolt, however his elimination in November 1822 did not bring any sweeping success for the Ottoman forces, contrary to the expectations in Istanbul.[128]

By 1825, the Ottoman forces and Greek rebels had reached a military stalemate. The 'Liberated Peloponnesus was unable to carry the revolution further, but the Turks likewise were unable to re-conquer the Peloponnesus'.[129]

This stalemate was broken when Sultan Mahmud commissioned the governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali, and his son Ibrahim to quell the revolt, with the promise of the governorships of Girit (Kiriti) and Mora in return for their services.[130] The Egyptian army under Mehmed Ali had already proven its abilities against the rebellious factions in Egypt and Arabia. According to Armaoglu, it was Metternich who recommended Mehmed Ali for the task.[131]

Ibrahim landed in Mora in February 1825 with a well-equipped army and started pushing from the south-west of Mora while another Ottoman army advanced from the north-west. They quickly re-captured territory from the Greek rebels, and finally stormed their stronghold in Missolonghi in 1826.[132] Athens followed in June 1827, after which, in the words of Stavrianos, 'The revolution appeared to be doomed, the situation changed overnight with the intervention of the European powers'.[133]

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[128] Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 4

[129] Stavriaonus (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 285–286

[130] Karal (2007), *loc. cit.*

[131] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 173

[132] M. Nuri Paş a (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 253;

[133] Stavrionus (2000), *op. cit.*, p. 286

So what happened in the internationalisation of the Greek issue to bring about the collective intervention of the great powers? This question may be answered by outlining the international developments from 1823 onwards.

a. The Shift in Britain's Position and the Britain-Russia Accord over the Greek Issue: From Mediation to Intervention

The general international situation by 1823 had changed from the preceding 1820–1822 period in two specific areas. Firstly, the congress system, which facilitated the regulation and governance of international politics under the directorship of the great powers through formal and regular conferences and congresses, ended in 1822; and secondly, the reluctance of Britain to take part in the continental affairs of the 1815 European States System was strengthened with the arrival of George Canning to the office of the Foreign Ministry after the death of Castlereagh in 1822. A third but no less significant factor was the disappointment of Russia in her efforts to reach a concerted but effective conclusion to the Greek problem.

Initial contacts regarding the settlement of the problem started between Britain and Russia at the end of 1825.[134] Using the pretext of the death of Alexander I and the coronation of the new Tsar, Nicholas I, Canning sent Wellington to St. Petersburg on a special mission at the beginning of 1826 to find a common position between Britain and Russia regarding the settlement of the Greek issue.

What factors brought about such a shift on the side of Britain? Before going into the outcomes of the Wellington mission, these considerations will be briefly touched upon.

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[134] For a detailed account of these contacts, see Temperley (1825), *op. cit.,* pp. 344–351

Firstly, Britain had always desired to destroy the Holy Alliance, considering it as a barrier to international competitiveness from which she stood to benefit a great deal.[135] The disappointment of Russia in its allies of the Holly Alliance with regard to the Greek issue presented a good opportunity for Britain to achieve that aim, and the appeal of the provisional Greek government to Britain for protection against the military advance of the Egyptian forces strengthened Britain's hand in that regard.

Secondly, Britain came to the conclusion that Russia could no longer be prevented from going war with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Canning recognised that 'it might be desirable to take some vigorous step to prevent Russia from going to war with Turkey'.[136] That 'vigorous step', according to Canning, could take the form of a separate entente with Russia as the best way of resolving the Greek conflict, while averting individual action by Russia, and would comply well enough with his idea of 'every nation for itself'.[137] It should be noted that that Canning's policy was the least plausible one.

Thirdly, Britain was becoming more and more concerned with the rising influence of Russia over the Greeks as a consequence of Russia's actions in the preparation of the revolt to its continued claim as the protector of Orthodox Christians. Being a maritime power, Britain would not be comfortable with a Russian satellite state in the middle of the Mediterranean.[138] Besides, the acute failure of the Ottoman army in

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[135] F. R. Bridge & R. Bullen, *The Great Powers and The European States System 1814–1914*, (London: Pearson Longman, 2005), p. 75

[136] Temperely (1825), *op. cit.*, p. 91-95

[137] Bridge and Bullen (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 75

[138] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 173

suppressing the revolt had increased Britain's anxiety over the likely birth of a Greek state under Russian protection.[139]

Finally, a strong Egyptian presence on the Mora Peninsula with the backing of continental Egypt would not consistent with British political and economic interests and projections; and therefore an autonomous Greek entity under the Ottoman Empire was much more in line with its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.[140]

From the Russian perspective, a Russian-British accord could nullify the resistance of the continental powers to Russia's plans in the Near East.[141] Russia desired at the very least the neutrality of Britain in the event of a Russo-Ottoman war, and such an accord would provide just that.[142]

The outcome of the Anglo-Russian negotiations was the Protocol of 4 April between Britain and Russia, signed in St. Petersburg in 1826, and was a milestone and remarkable shift in the great power diplomacy of the 1815 European States System.[143]

Both states agreed that Britain should offer to mediate between the Porte and the Greeks with the objective of turning Greece into an autonomous vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.[144] More significantly, the Protocol provided for possible intervention by the two powers, 'jointly or separately' if necessary. The drawing up of the borders of that

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[139] Canning wrote to the British ambassador in Istanbul that 'to suppose that Greece can ever be brought back to what she was in relation to the Porte is vain'. F.O. Turkey, 78/133; Barbara Jelavich, '*A Century of Russian Foreign Policy', 1814–1914*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott Com., 1964), pp. 58 and 67–68

[140] *Ibid,* pp. 68- 74

[141] Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.,* p. 5

[142] Georgiev *et al*(1978), *op. cit.,* p. 84

[143] Clayton (1975), *op. cit.,* p. 50

[144] Anderson (1966), *op. cit.,* p. 65 and Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.,* pp. 18-19

'autonomous Greek state' would be decided later. Finally, the protocol invited the other great powers to join Britain and Russia for the realisation of its arrangements.

Was the Protocol the end of the British policy to defend the existence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which had been the case since the era of Pitt the Younger in 1793? Clayton argues that although Britain wanted some degree of freedom for the Greeks, it was not to be at the expense of the unity of the Ottoman Empire.[145] Given the efforts of the new ambassador, Stratford Canning, in Istanbul, it seemed that Britain believed the Ottoman government would prefer the British carrot and the Russian stick policy rather than a change of policy for the defence of Ottoman integrity. However, as events would later demonstrate, it was to be a daring and complex carrot and stick policy.

As to Russia, she had succeeded in removing the Austrian and Prussian obstacles that stood in the way of her achieving her goals in the context of the settlement of the Greek issue and in pulling Britain to its side.[146] To what extent Russia could use that advantageous position to realise all her goals in the Near East would depend on the attitude of the Ottoman Empire towards the British efforts to strike a deal between the Porte and the Greeks. The first signals indicated that it was Russia not Britain that would benefit most from the new situation under the Anglo-Russian accord. In this regard, the new Tsar, Nicolas II, had taken the first step even before the signing of the Protocol by delivering an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire about the fulfilment of the Treaty of Bucharest.[147]

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[145] Clayton (1975), *op. cit.,* p. 52

[146] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* p. 84

[147] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.,* pp. 176–177

b. Russian Ultimatum and the *Ackermann* Convention

The ultimatum contained the following points: (1) The return of the Principalities to pre-1822 Greek revolt conditions; (2) the observation of the administrative concessions with regard to Serbia; and finally (3) the dispatch of a fully authorised delegation to the Russian city of *Ackermann* on the Black Sea coast to negotiate the remaining disputes in the implementation of the Bucharest Treaty. If this were not done within six weeks, war would ensue. There was no mention of the Greek issue in the ultimatum.

The last thing that the Ottoman Empire could afford was a war with Russia, since she had just disbanded the Janissary army (1826) and was in the middle of organising a new military force.[148] Consequently, she accepted the terms and sent her delegation to Ackermann, and the negotiations were concluded with the signature of the *Ackermann* Convention on 7 October, 1826. The Ottoman Empire had no choice other than to accept all the Russian conditions,[149] and Russia, thus, managed to make the Porte concede to all the points that she could not do in the hastily concluded Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 just a month before Napoleon advanced upon Russia.

The Ottoman Empire agreed to the following points: The rulers of the Principalities would be selected by the respective local assemblies for seven years with the joint assent of the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and could not be dismissed unilaterally by the Ottoman Empire; the autonomy of Serbia would be reinstated and the Ottoman army would have no troops stationed in Serbia aside from in three designated castles; and finally, Russian traders would be allowed to trade freely in all Ottoman seas and ports, and would be allowed to sail unhindered in the Straits and Black Sea.

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[148] A.Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 10 Cilt, (Istanbul, Uçdal Neş.,1984), C. 6, p. 2974

[149] BOA, HH, 51536

With the arrangements of the *Ackermann* Convention the already weak links between the Principalities and Serbia and the Ottoman Empire were further weakened. On the other side, Russia further consolidated her position over the Principalities and Serbia, thus changing the balance of power in the Balkans and in the 1815 European States System. As a consequence, by the end of 1826 Russia had become unquestionably the leading state in the Near East; had secured the support of Britain in the Greek issue; and had succeeded in having all her bilateral demands accepted by the Ottoman Empire.

As for the Protocol, the British policy of mediation backed by the threat of the Russian stick did not work. The Ottoman Empire categorically rejected the proposals of the 4 April Protocol for the pacification of Greece when the protocol was officially delivered in April 1827, on the grounds that it was a domestic matter in which nobody had the right to intervene.[150] The Empire did not budge an inch from the position that had been put to the British ambassador in 1824. I will take it here because it was a good example of the complaints of a state of the second order in the 1815 European States System against the self-proclaimed right of governance of international politics by the great powers: 'it [the pressure of the great powers] is not to be endured … that the Christian Powers of Europe should, without any right but which their collective strength gives them, prepare and proclaim to the world a scheme for the dismemberment of an [Ottoman] empire which has uniformly endeavoured to be at peace with them and to avoid giving the smallest cause of offence. In what treaty is it specified that the Sovereigns of Europe are to assemble, and quietly to carve out the Turkish dominions at their pleasure, because the Christian subjects of his highness choose to rebel against him'.[151] In fact, the Ottoman Empire was facing the dilemma of being a multi-national empire in an age of nationalism in the context of the Greek issue, as explained by *Pertev*

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[150] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 179 and Sheremet (1975), *op. cit.,* p. 19

[151] In Lane-Poole (1888), *op. cit.,* p. 397(emphasis is mine)

Effendi *Reis-ul Kuttab* (Foreign Minister): 'If the secession of the Greeks were agreed without war, it [the event of secession] would establish an example for other nationalities. Therefore, if we choose to agree to its cessation after we have used all available means to stop it, then our enemies would not be in a position to easily come up with such demands in the future in the case of similar events'.[152]

Austria and Prussia rejected the invitation to sign the 4 April Protocol,[153] while France reacted positively, seeing an opportunity to break the isolation imposed upon her during the 1815 Settlements. Moreover, she saw in the protocol a potentially open the path for future Anglo-French or Russo-French alliances.[154] However, France requested that the Protocol be turned into a treaty;[155] and as the resistance of the Porte necessitated the coercive arrangements of the Protocol being put into effect, the allies decided to do just that, signing the Treaty of London on 7 July, 1827.

c. London Treaty and the Annihilation of the Ottoman Fleet in *Navarino*

By signing the Treaty of London,[156] which was drawn up based on the April 4 Protocol, Great Britain, Russia and France pledged to engage in combined efforts to bring armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks and to establish an autonomous Greece under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The signatories also agreed not to seek any territorial extensions, exclusive influence or commercial advantage. Up to this point, the essence of the Treaty had been the same as that of the 4

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[152] Karal (2007), *op. cit.,* p. 102

[153]Metternich to Esterhazy, June 8, 1826, in Metternich (1879), *op. cit.,* pp. 317-325

[154] Bridge and Bullen (2005), *op. cit.,* p. 76

[155] Anderson (1966), *op. cit.,* p. 85 and F.O. Dudley to Grenville, 1 June, 27/361 France, cited by Temperley(1925), *op. cit.,* p. 96

[156] For the text of the Treaty see, E. Hertslett, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, (London: Butterwoths and Harrison, 1875), vol. I, pp. 769-775

April Protocol, however the most significant arrangements were in its secret articles: 'If, within a month, the Porte does not accept the armistice or if the Greeks refuse to execute it' the signatory states would exert all means necessary to obtain the immediate effects of the armistice 'without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between them'.[157] The second secret arrangement was related to the establishment of consular and commercial relations between the signatory states and the provisional Greek government.[158]

By signing the Treaty of London, Russia accepted not to act on her own, which would have been possible under the terms of the Protocol. Through coercive means, the allies considered the sea blockade of the Ottoman and Egyptian supplies and reinforcements from Egypt and the Ottoman mainland ports to Mora. As long as the British navy constituted the main bulk of maritime force, the political and military control of events in the region would seemingly have been in the hands of the British.[159]

The Ottoman government officially received the London Treaty on 16 August.[160] However, the government declared that she would not allow any interference between her and her subjects in the Greek issue.[161] Consequently, the allies, Britain, Russia and France, sent a joint naval force to the East Mediterranean at the beginning of September to block Ottoman supplies, deciding that the joint navy should operate under the

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[157] *Ibid*, p. 772-774

[158] On the details of the collective initiatives concerning the implementation of the Treaty of London that the Ambassadors of England, Russia and France made in Istanbul, see the Annexes A, B, C,D, E and F to the Protocol of 12th July 1827, Part B, p. 178-186, Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece (PRAG hereafter)

[159] However, Metternich disagreed that England can control Russia in Near East in that way. He predicted that '..Russia would be master of the situation...' Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to Gentz, from June 28 to September 13, 1828, in Metternich, *op. cit.,* p. 439-440

[160] Joint Report of Dragomans of France, Great Britain and Russia, August 16, 1827, Annex B to the Protocol 1, p.116, Part B, PRAG

[161] BOA HH, 51283 and Joint Reports of Dragomans of France, Great Britain and Russia, August 30 and 31, September 9 and 11, 1827, Annex A and C to the Protocol 4, Annex to the Protocol 7 and Annex to the Protocol 8 respectively, p.123-126; 137-139 and 141-143, Part B, PRAG

instruction of their embassies in Istanbul. To this end, the three ambassadors in Istanbul agreed to instruct the navies to apply blockade measures against the belligerents in Mora, namely, to the Ottoman forces under Ibrahim and the Greek rebel forces.[162]

Meantime, Metternich took the initiative when the Ottoman government had accepted his advice to find a middle way acceptable to both sides, but his initiative remained unfinished because of the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in *Navarino* Bay.[163] The *Navarino* event happened as follows. Upon the arrival of the allied navy in *Navarino* Bay, where the Ottoman and Egyptian navies were anchored, Admiral Codrington, the commander of the British navy, convinced Ibrahim to suspend hostilities.[164] Both sides agreed to wait until Ibrahim received instruction from Istanbul. [165] However a dispute among the crews of the opposing navies led to the total annihilation of the Ottoman-Egyptian navy by the allied forces on 20 November, 1827.[166]

The destruction of the Ottoman fleet took everybody by surprise; and who instigated the opening of hostilities would be a subject of debate among statesmen and scholars for a long time.[167] Some pointed at individual mistakes, and Stratford Canning argued in his memoirs that it was 'the fiery and enterprising spirit' of Codrington that had been the main reason.[168] In this regard, he confessed that if he had received the

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[162] Protocol 5, Conference of September 4, 1827, p. 127-128, Part B, PRAG

[163] Metternich to Ottenfels, October 3, 1827 and Mettemich to Ottenfels, October 17, 1827 in Metternich, *op. cit.,* pp. 401-411

[164] Admiral Codrington to Stafford Canning, September 24, 1827, p.159, Part B, PRAG

[165] Admiral De Rigny to Guilleminot, September, 26, 1827, Annex B to Protocol 10 p. 64-168, Part B, PRAG

[166] Admiral Codrington to Stratford Canning, October 20, 1827, p. 65, Part B, PRAG

[167] According to Sheremet it was the Russian captains, L.P Geydon and M. P. Lazarev, who wanted the entry of the allied joint fleet into Navarino bay where the Ottoman fleet were lying anchored. Sheremet (1975), *op.cit.*, p. 20

[168] Lane-Poole (1888), *op. cit.,* p 449

slightest intimation of the admiral's attitude, he would have avoided use of the term 'cannon-shot' in his instructions.[169] Schroeder had an opposing view, laying the blame to a great extent on the political decision makers in London and their failure to define the political objectives and give clear-cut instructions.[170] Metternich commented that 'the [*Navarino*] event of October 20 begins a new era for Europe' and 'the Ottoman empire ceased for the moment to belong itself.'[171]

Understandably, the reaction of the Ottoman Empire was severe, demanding both an apology and reparation from the allies responsible for the attack on the navy of a state that was at peace with them.[172] The allies refused to accept responsibility for the attack, claiming that it was the Ottoman navy that had initiated the hostilities.[173] In the meantime, the Ottoman government tried to drive a wedge between Britain and her allies, relying on the deep distrust between Britain and Russia, and offering to Britain a new and close alliance if she pulled out of the London Treaty.[174] In this context, the Porte proposed that the Greeks should have a mild governor appointed by the Sultan and that their grievances be remedied; but they must first submit, and the powers must abandon the Treaty.[175] This proposal was rejected by the allies' ambassadors because it was 'too shadowy to promise the slightest advantage'.[176] Upon the categorical refusal of the Porte to enter into negotiation with the Allies on the base of

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 653

[171] Metternich to Apponyi, November 1827, in Metternich, *op. cit.,* p. 418

[172] Report of the Interpreters of France, Great Britain and Russia, November 9, 1827, Annex A to the Protocol 21, p.191, Part B, PRAG

[173] Joint Note to the Reis Effendi by the Representatives of the Three Courts [Britain, Russia and France], November 10, 1827, p. 192-193, Part B, PRAG

[174] Dragoman Report of 18 November in Lane-Poole (1888), *op. cit.,* p. 454

[175] A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, '*Russia and Europe*', 1825–1878, (The George Wahr Publishing Company, Michigan, 1954), p. 23

[176] Lane-Poole (1888), *op. cit.,* p.455

the Treaty of London, the ambassadors of the allies made a collective decision to leave Istanbul.[177]

With the departure of the British, Russian and French ambassadors, Ottoman-Russian relations entered a new phase. Until that time, their relations had revolved around the Greek revolt and Russia's part in the alliance of the three powers; however in the aftermath of the *Navarino* Bay event the key point of focus became strictly Ottoman-Russian relations.

5. **Declaration of War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia**

Despite of the indifferent attitude of the Ottoman Empire to the allies regarding the *Navarino* event, the Ottoman ruling elite always considered Russia to be the main protagonist of the hostilities and thought, quite wrongly, that the Russian demands had been met by the *Ackermann* Convention and that a likely Ottoman-Russian war had been avoided.[178] It was this belief that led them to agree to the Russian ultimatum and the unfair arrangements of the *Ackermann* Convention.

Greece was a lost cause for the Ottoman Empire, as now the most pressing problem was whether to continue to adhere to her policy regarding the Greeks or to give in to the demands of the allies. She chose the first alternative, as she believed that submission on the Greek issue would be conceived as acceptance of Russia's revisionist policies and would set an example among the other Orthodox subjects, who constituted the bulk of her non-Muslim population. Worse still, if the Greeks in Mora were given autonomy, there was no guarantee that the Greeks in Asia Minor and the Balkans, which were also home to a large Muslim population, would not demand the same rights.

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[177] Protocol of Confrence held at Sublime Porte on 24th November, 1827, p. 209-220 and Protocol 33-Conference of the 1st December, 1827, p. 224, Part B, PRAG

[178] A. Cevdet Pasa (1984), *op. cit.,* p. 2998

To that end, Sultan *Mahmud,* summoned the Council of War to decide on a course of action. Public unrest was already at a peak as a result of the abolition of the Janissary army and the introduction of new reforms, and the situation was exacerbated by the destruction of the Ottoman navy and their failure to suppress the Greek revolt. Any concessions in the Greek issue after the eight-year struggle and the exhaustion of the Empire's resources after the acceptance of the Ackermann Convention could invoke widespread civil unrest.[179] The Ottoman Empire, it seemed, had no other choice but to go to war. In the Imperial rescript of 18 December, the Sultan announced the abrogation of the Ackerman Treaty and the closing of the Straits to all foreign ships, and issued a call to arms to all Muslims to resist the Russians and Greeks.[180]

Among the allies, Britain was the only state that was indecisive on which path to follow. Canning had died in August 1827, just before the Battle of *Navarino,* and the King had 'deeply lamented' the destruction of the Ottoman Navy, describing it as an 'untoward event'. Wellington, who replaced Canning, asserted that the Ottoman Empire was an ancient ally of Britain and that the changes in Eastern Europe 'rendered its existence as an independent and powerful state, necessary for the well-being of this country'.[181] On the other hand, Britain was paralysed between the two revisionist states of Russia and France without the effective alliance and support of Austria which had been isolated by the Treaty of London.[182]

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[179] However there were some that opposed to the war with Russia on the ground that the Ottoman Empire was isolated and could not fight alone against Russia. Note (*layiha*) submitted by Izzet Molla, in Vakanuvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi, Tarih Vakfi, Y.Kredi yay. 1999, Istanbul, vol. 1, p. 281-289,

[180] Jelavich notes that 'the statetments [in the rescript] were in fact basically correct', Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* p. 83; Georgiev *et al*(1978), *op. cit.,*p. 87

[181] Quoted by Temperely(1925), *op. cit.,* p. 99

[182] Bridge & Bullen (2005), *op. cit.,* p. 78

Under these circumstances, Wellington decided that the only effective way of reining in Russia was to limit its war objectives, rather than confronting her under the prevailing situation.

As for France, she was also wavering between Russia and Britain; and suggested that in order to prevent the war there should be a European sanction against the Russian occupation of the Principalities and a British-French occupation of Mora;[183] however both Britain and Austria opposed the proposal. Austria's objection was based on the belief that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia would amount to a strategic threat to her own sovereignty.[184] This was an indication that it would be France rather than Britain that would be the leading power during the Ottoman-Russian War in the pacification of Mora.

In contrast to Britain and France, Russia knew what she would do and she was much firmer than Britain in her actions as Metternich had predicted after the signing of the Treaty of London in 1827.[185] The international situation seemed very convenient for Russia, being reminiscent of the conditions before the 1768–1774 Ottoman-Russian War. Britain was caught up between her London Treaty commitments and her interest in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, while Austria was isolated and disabled. Moreover, the revival of France's revisionist intention regarding Greek affairs was putting further constraints on Austria and Prussia.[186] The Ottoman Empire was violating her treaty obligations in regard to Russia, and so Russia requested support from its allies in taking coercive steps against the Ottoman Empire on 26 February, citing the violation of the *Ackerman* Convention. 'If support was denied, it would absolve itself from the treaty restrictions and would act

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[183] Temperely (1925), *op. cit.,* p. 99

[184] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 654

[185]Fn. 159

[186]Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* p. 90

according to its own interests'.[187] Later, fearing the reaction of Britain and a hostile coalition of the great powers, Russia quickly withdrew its demand for support, and declared war on the Ottoman Empire at the end of April 1828.

6. Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829 and the Treaty of Adrianople

The Ottoman-Russian War was the first to involve a great power since the 1815 Settlements, and so it was certain that it would bring some significant structural changes to the 1815 European States System. What was important from the angle of the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements was whether or not these significant structural changes would have transformational implications for the 1815 European States System.

Being aware of the significance of the impacts of her war against the Ottoman Empire on the 1815 Settlements and the maintenance of the status quo in the west, Russia stated that her intention was not to overthrow the Ottoman Empire and that she 'was far from indulging in sentiments of hatred against the Ottoman Power', listing her objectives as: the observance and efficacy of bilateral treaties; the security of the liberty of commercial navigation in the Straits and the Black Sea; the acceptance of the London Treaty with regard to the Greek issue; and finally, the payment of indemnity to Russia by the Ottoman Empire.[188] She attempted to assuage the fears of her allies concerning the Greek issue, declaring that they 'will find her [Russia] always ready to act in concert with them in the execution of the Treaty of London … and to make any changes in their [the articles of the London Treaty] nature and effects,' and it was not Russia's intention to seek any territorial gain or additional privileges. That said, she was very careful to avoid mention of the rights of the Balkan Orthodox Christians, which would have caused alarm in Austria and

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[187] Schroeder (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 654

[188] For the English text of the Russian war declaration of 26 April, 1828, see Hertslett, *op. cit.,* p. 777–784, and the Ottoman declaration of June, 1828 in answer to the Russian declaration, see *op. cit.,* p. 787–797

Britain. This, however, did not mean that she gave up her claims as the protector of the Orthodox Christians, as her inner communications quite clearly demonstrated.[189]

Russia's declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire put her in a very awkward position with her allies in regards to the settlement of the Greek issue, as she had been one of the signatories of the London Treaty that pledged neutrality in the issue of the belligerents, that is, the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks, in Mora. With the declaration of war, Russia abandoned her neutral position, which would potentially endanger the application of coercive measures for the settlement of the Greek problem. Britain and France were against any war with the Ottoman Empire over the Greek issue, but if they left the problem unresolved the settlement of the problem would have been left in the hands of Russia, which was already at war with the Ottoman Empire. This would lead to the establishment of a Russian satellite state, which the allies had been trying very hard to resist since 1821.

The problem was settled with the signing of the 15 July Protocol by the allies, under which 'Russia agreed to relinquish her belligerent character in the Mediterranean, there acting as a neutral along with Britain and France and continuing her hostility towards the Ottoman Empire at all other points'.[190] In this way the relationship founded by the Treaty of London between the three allies regarding the Greek issue was maintained. This suited Britain as well, in that the upholding of the London Treaty would provide a restraining hand over Russia.[191]

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[189] Russia employed a different language in the despatch addressed to Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, stressing the stipulations concerning 'the Christian people that these same treaties place under the protection of His Imperial Majesty; Nesselrode to Lieven, St. Petersburg, Feb. 14–26, 1828 in Prokesh-Osten, op. cit., pp. 169–176

[190] V. J. Puryear, '*France and Levant, from the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah'*, (USA:Archon Books, 1968), p. 56

[191] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1954), *op. cit.,* p. 24

Another protocol, signed on July 19, between the three allies, authorised France to land troops on Mora on behalf of Britain and Russia to execute the stipulations of the London Treaty.[192] A joint memo informed the Ottoman Empire that 'the landing of allied forces on the Greek peninsula is not operated in hostile views towards him'.[193] According to the 19 July protocol the French troops would leave Mora as soon as the Egyptian forces evacuated. In the meantime, an agreement was made between Codrington, the commander of the British Navy, and *Mehmed Ali*, the Governor of Egypt, on 9 August regarding the evacuation of Egyptian forces from Mora, who would be escorted to Alexandria by British and French ships.[194]

After the signing of the protocols, Russia was given a free hand in her war against the Ottoman Empire, without fear of obstruction from her allies. The war took place on two fronts, the Balkans and the Caucasus. The Ottoman Empire had been in the progress of putting together a new army after the Janissary Army had been disbanded in 1826, while a significant part of its navy had been destroyed at *Navarino*. What made the Ottoman's plight worse was that some local notables and a significant proportion of Ottoman subjects were reluctant to contribute to the army in reaction to the disbanding of the Janissaries and the introduction of new reforms.[195] As a result, Sultan *Mahmud* had to maintain a considerable military presence also in the capital.[196]

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[192] Georgiev *et al*, (1978) *op. cit.,* p. 89

[193] The 19th July Protocol of Conference, 1828, Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece, 1826–1832, p. 91

[194] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.,* p. 57

[195] V.H. Aksan '*Kuşatılmış Bir İmparatorluk Osmanlı Harpleri 1700-1870*, (trans. G.Ç. Guven) (Istanbul: T.İş B., 2010), p. 359

[196] Ibid, p. 360; V. Moltke '*The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829; During the Campaigns of the Danube,the Sieges of Brailow,Varna, Silistria, Shumla and the Passage of the Balkan by Marshal Diebitch,'*(London: John Murray, 1854) p. 12

The Russian army was also not without its problems, although it was in a much better state than its opponent.[197] The war lasted almost two years, from 1828 to 1829, and was not the swift Russian victory that was widely expected.

There was stalemate on the Balkan front in the campaign of 1828, despite some slight advances of the Russians in the east;[198] however, the situation changed drastically towards to the end of the 1829 campaign, both in the Balkans and on the eastern front. A small part of the Russian army ended up in Edirne after passing the Balkan Mountains, which was the second capital city of the Ottoman Empire and was only 100 miles away from Istanbul.

This sweeping victory in the Balkans left some weaknesses that could have spelt disaster for the Russians. *Diebitch*, the commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, with an army of 20,000[199] in Adrianople 'was still facing the reserve army 30,000 strong in Constantinople [Istanbul], whereas portions of Bulgaria were still occupied by a force of 30,000 Albanians and the fortresses on the Danube ... were still in Turkish hands'.[200] To the east, Russia made some considerable advances, reaching as far as Erzurum, which became a bridgehead for further advances into the Basra Gulf along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

The Sultan, after a two-year war against a great power without any ally following an exhaustive decade-long war against the rebels on Mora, did not want to push his luck any further. He asked for an armistice via

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[197]Moltke (1854), *op. cit.,* pp. 21–28

[198] Aksan says that the Otoman Empire sent most of its strength to the Balkan front, which was close to the capital city, meaning that the eastern front was kept relatively weak. Aksan (2010), *op. cit.,* p. 360

[199] According to Moltke, the Russians arrived in Adrionople in such a weak a state that they could affect nothing more through the force of arms, the evidence being that the number of troops in Adrianople that could be commissioned was only around 5,000 after deducting the many injured, Moltke (1854), *op. cit.,* pp. 442 and 450

[200] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1954), *op. cit.,* p. 44; Moltke (1854), *op. cit.,* pp. 437–438

the Prussian King, and Russia accepted[201]. Russia did not want to raise concerns among the other great powers at that time, and was also reluctant to risk operating her army so far from its supply centres and being squeezed between the Ottoman troops in Bulgaria and Istanbul.

The Treaty of Adrianople following the armistice was concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1829,[202] and included the following agreements:

- Russia was to keep the small islands in the Western Black Sea, which were strategically useful for the control of the Danube River delta. The rest of the captured territories were to be returned to the Ottoman Empire. The Pruth River would again form the border between two states in the west; while in the east a small strip of the Black Sea coast, and the towns of Poti, Anapa and Ahiska were to be kept by Russia. In this way, Russia cut off the Ottoman connections with the rebellious Muslim Circassians to Russians in the Caucasus.
- Ottoman military fortifications would be demolished in the Principalities, and no Ottoman troops would be stationed there. The rulers of the Principalities were from then on to be selected according to the previous agreements, but now for a lifetime.
- The Ottoman Empire was to recognise the Treaty of London, thus accepting the agreements of the great powers under the Concert of Europe regarding the settlement of the Greek issue, which was to end with the establishment of an independent Greek state. Both states reconfirmed the administrative concessions given previously to the Principality of Serbia.
- The free passage of Russian ships in the Black Sea, the Straits and all Ottoman ports in the Levant was secured. The Porte pledged not

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[201] BOA, HH, No. 42727 and 43725

[202] BOA, HH, No. 43144

to interfere with Russian trade in those places and to protect Russian traders against any violence.

- Finally, the Ottoman Empire had to pay a war indemnity to Russia.

As can be seen, Russia made only moderate territorial gains under the Treaty of Adrianople, meaning that the territorial balance within the 1815 European States System was not disrupted. However, when it came to the political equilibrium, her influence rose tremendously over the Ottoman Empire,[203] who committed to providing 'prompt and full satisfaction' to the Russian representative in the event of infractions of any of the Russian treaty rights. More importantly, Russia was recognised as having the right 'in advance … to consider such an infraction as a hostile act; and to launch immediate reprisals against the Ottoman Empire'.[204] Given the self-proclaimed rights of Russia regarding the guardianship of the Orthodox Christians and her treaty rights relating to the administration of the Principalities and Serbia, the scope and nature of Russia's upper hand in the Ottoman-Russian relations can be easily conceived. The breadth of Russia's gains from the Treaty can be even better understood from the fact that the majority of the Ottoman population in the Balkans were Orthodox or Slavs, including the Bulgarians, Serbians, Montenegrins, etc. With the new arrangements of the Treaty of Adrianople, the loose suzerain power of the Ottoman Empire over the Principalities and Serbia was further weakened so that they became virtual extensions of Russia in the Balkans.

With the signing of the Treaty of Edirne, the Greek problem of the great powers was settled. The triple alliance agreed that Greece would be a

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[203]Metternich described this new state of affairs in Near East as fallows 'Nothing in this [Ottoman-Russian relations] affair has had any precedent in the history of diplomacy ;everything in its consequences may bring about new combinations…The Ottoman Empire is shaken to its foundations. The State condemned to owe its existence to what the mass of the public pleases to call moderation on the part of the conqueror has ceased to be counted amongst the number of independent States' Metternich to Esterhazy, Sept. 21, 1829, in Metternich(1879), *op. cit.,* pp. 627-628

[204]J. L. Donne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917, Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), p. 122

monarchy, and that the new monarch would not be from any of the dynasties of Britain, France of Russia so as to ensure its impartiality. However, this impartiality would not work, since the external dimension, from its inception to its independence phases, was a decisive element in the birth of the new state, as later events would manifest in the coming years.

Conclusion

As argued in the previous chapter, the capability structure of the 1815 European States System, which was based on the distribution of economic and military capabilities, remained unchanged in the 1815–1856 period. Therefore, for a structural analysis of the Ottoman-Russian relations from 1820–1830, which revolved around the Greek insurgency, one has to take into account the interplay of elements within the Relationship Structure, being the ordering principle, the modal tendencies of the great powers, and the outcomes, such as the functional differences and the types of structural changes.[205]

These processes require a viable structure if they are to succeed, and the effects of the structure in a given international states system can be understood through an analysis of the processes taking place among its unit states.[206] Consequently, processes can be said to be closely linked with the modal tendencies of the states in their foreign policies.

On the basis of this methodological framework, an analysis has been made of these processes to determine the workings and effects of the

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[205] According to Stein, when structural factors serve to constrain, they are causally incomplete; they act as necessary, but not as sufficient, conditions. Decision-making explanations fill the explanatory gap left by the indeterminacy of structural factors. A. Stein, 'Constraints and Determinants: Structure, Purpose, and Process in the Analysis of Foreign Policy' in *Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International Politics: Crossing Boundaries*, ed. H. Starr, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 195. Within this methodological framework, the elements within the Relationship Structure, together with the human choice characteristics, take centre stage when the Capability Structure elements remained unchanged.

[206] J. S. Nye, '*Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 2006), p. 38

structure of the 1815 European States System on Ottoman-Russian relations and on the other great powers regarding the Greek issue between 1821 and 1830.

It is argued that Russia faced a dilemma when attempting to secure her south-western frontier through the obtaining of concessions in the Straits, while at the same time preserving the status quo in the West after 1815. Therefore, Russia pursued a two-tracked policy in her relations with the Ottoman Empire, being the partitioning of the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, and supporting the Orthodox and/or Slavic nations under the Ottoman Empire 'to destabilise the frontier and facilitate the Russian advance'.[207] Her rights under the bilateral treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774), Yassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812) facilitated her efforts in regards to the Orthodox nations of the Ottoman Empire, and allowed her to exercise influence on the Principalities and Serbia. However Russia also tried to extend her influence over all the remaining Orthodox subjects of the Empire, including those living outside the Principalities and Serbia, by citing Articles 7 and 17 of the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca*, assigning her as the protector of the Orthodox faith in the Ottoman Empire. This policy brought 65 percent of the total population of the Ottoman Empire in her Balkan territories under the control of Russia.[208]

The Greek revolt in 1821 provided Russia with the first opportunity to test her arguments regarding her protector status of the Ottoman Orthodoxies and realise her strategic goals in the Near East under the 1815 European States System. The Greek subjects, who were Orthodox but not Slavs, were very influential both in the official circles and the economy of the southern part of Russia, which was an important factor in Russia's interest in the Greek revolt.

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[207] Donne (1997), *op. cit*, p.120

[208] For a breakdown of the Ottoman Population in her Balkan Territories in the 1820s, see Engin Akarli's 'Ottoman Population in the 19th Century, its Territorial, Racial and religious Composition', Unpublished Master Thesis, Wisconsin University, Madison, 1970, cited by Karpat (2010) *op. cit* p. 177

It is hereby suggested that Ottoman-Russian relations should be analysed in two distinct stages, respectively 1821–1826 and 1826–1830, in terms of the operation and effects of the structure of the 1815 European States System. In both stages, the founding/governing principles constrained Russia, compelling her to remain moderate in the 1815 European States System throughout the whole Greek affair. Put differently, Russia did not openly challenge the founding principles of the 1815 European States System so as to remain within the limits of the principles of the Concert of Europe.

The first stage of the Greek revolt in 1821–1826 overlapped with changes in the decision-making procedures of the Concert of Europe. The era of the Congress System, which was marked by regular congresses and conferences to deal with the revolutionary movements in various locations, ended in 1823; a noteworthy consequence of which was a drop in Austria's leading role in the decision-making bodies in the Concert of Europe. However, the effectiveness and lead role of Austria still prevailed during the first stages of the Greek revolt.

In the first stage of the Greek revolt, an Anglo-Austrian accord led the great powers to convince Russia not to act on her own, but to remain within the limits of the concerted European policy with regard to the Greek issue. Since Russia was not challenging the founding principles of the 1815 European States System it became possible for her to address her demands and concerns over both her treaty rights and the Greek issue. In this context, the great powers under the leadership of Austria compelled Russia to separate her treaty rights from the common European right so as to maintain the peace and order that had been disrupted by the Greek Rebellion. This meant that Russia had the right to ask for the implementation of her treaty rights, and to this end, also to apply coercive measures, including war, if the Ottoman Empire failed to comply with her treaty obligations. However, intervention in the Greek issue in the name of

maintaining general peace and order in Europe was outside of her treaty rights, and therefore necessitated a collective response, while also pressing the Ottoman Empire to address the Russian grievances about her treaty rights.

This was the essence of the approach of the great powers when Russia asked for their endorsement for her unilateral intervention, which lasted until 1826. When the great powers, including Russia, convened in Verona, they agreed that the revolutionary movements in Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Ottoman Empire were the main threat to peace and order in Europe, and that they had to be dealt with through concerted action by the great powers. Austria and France had been allowed to eliminate the revolutions in Naples, Sicily and Spain on behalf of the Concert of Europe, the same permission was not given Russia. The reason for such a discriminatory approach was that the interventions of Austria in Italy and France in Spain would not have resulted in a structural change with transformational implications for the 1815 European States System. Additionally, the Russia desire seemed to be intervention for the sake of the revolutionaries rather than to restore the order of the dynastic regime, which was a result of her affiliation with the Greek cause.

While Russia was prevented from taking unilateral action, she succeeded in getting her treaty rights accepted by the other great powers. Consequently, Russia was acting alone when she issued an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire to stop violating her treaty rights and sent a delegation to *Ackermann* to ensure the implementation of the disputed articles of the previous treaties. In this way, the *Ackermann* Treaty (1825) brought to Russia exactly what she sought in terms of her treaty rights.

In the second stage, 1826–1830, the Greek issue was marked by changes in the operation of the Concert of Europe, with a breakdown of the Austrian-British accord and the establishment of an Anglo-Russian alliance. Despite this shift, the principle of the maintenance of political

and territorial equilibrium in the Concert of Europe prevailed. This shift in the decision-making procedure of the Concert of Europe was in fact a structural change without transformational implications, since it did not question the founding principles of the 1815 European States System. The change also meant the end of the effectiveness of Austria, which was a staunch defender of the status quo not only in Central Europe, but also in the Near East within the operation of the Concert of Europe.

Another noteworthy characteristic of this second stage was its accommodation of the possibility of coercive measures against the belligerents, unlike in the first stage. In technical terms, the peace-making function of the Concert of Europe was going to replace the peace-keeping function of the first stage. To this end, the great powers, with the exception of Austria and Prussia, formulated coercive measures through the Petersburg Protocol (1826) and the Treaty of London (1827) under the auspices of the Concert of Europe. However, the subsequent refusal of the allies' proposal regarding the settlement of the Greek issue by the Ottoman Empire; the death of the British Premier who had been the architect of the Anglo-Russian accord; the controversial annihilation of the Ottoman Navy at *Navarino*; the hesitations in France and Britain in deciding upon the next step after *Navarino*; and finally, the strong reaction of the Ottoman government all led to the outbreak of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1828.

The war lasted two years and ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire; and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople (1829) paved the way for the establishment of an independent Greece and the ascendancy of Russia in the Near East.

All the efforts by the great powers under the Concert of Europe had aimed at preventing an Ottoman-Russian war so as not to allow the disruption of the equilibrium in the 1815 European States System. To that end, they limited the war objectives of Russia, and Russia's subsequent

territorial gains were very modest, despite her tremendous human and material losses. Moreover, the great powers ensured that the sovereign of the independent Greece should not be appointed from the members of the royal families of Britain, Russia or France so as to avoid any outside influence on the new state. Moreover, it was the Concert of Europe that was going to be the guarantor of Greece's independence rather than Russia; meaning that the new Greek state, which owed its independence to Russia's two-year war against the Ottoman Empire and its tremendous human and economic costs, would not be a satellite state of Russia in the Mediterranean.

Despite all the limitations imposed on Russia, she did manage to gain ascendancy in her bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire, which did not bode well for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. Russia had managed to consolidate her position for the realisation of her long-term strategic objectives in the Near East having retained the controversial right of protection over the Ottoman Orthodox population, and more importantly, she had demonstrated that she was prepared to go to war to maintain her guardianship of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was a very significant development both for the Ottoman Empire and for the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, as 65 percent of her subjects in the Balkans were Orthodox Christians. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire's power over the rulers of the Principalities and Serbia was substantially diminished and the Tsar and his representatives became the de facto sovereigns in those places.

All of these changes were the significant steps on the way for a structural change with transformational implications for the 1815 European States System. Russia's new-found influence over the Ottoman Empire was to the detriment of all the other great powers. As will be explained in the next chapter, this advantage would compel her to adjust

her policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire for some time to come while keeping her strategic goal unchanged.

CHAPTER 4

FROM WEAKNESS TO DEPENDENCY OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE ON RUSSIA: REBELLION OF *MEHMED ALİ*, THE 1833 TREATY OF *HUNKAR ISKELESI*

Introduction

It was not the rights of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, nor the disputes arising from the implementation of the bilateral treaties that shaped Ottoman-Russian relations in 1831–1841, but the rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt, *Mehmed Ali.*

The rebellious state of affairs that focused around *Mehmed Ali* would last almost 10 years, with a temporary settlement in 1833 and a final settlement in 1840. During that period, his Egyptian armies won several victories against the imperial armies of the Ottoman Empire and twice, in 1833 and 1839, came close to occupying Istanbul and bringing down the Ottoman government.

On both occasions, *Mehmed Ali* was stopped by the diplomacy and military might of the great powers. The intervention of the great powers came as no surprise, since the structural implications of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would be too great to bear for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements.[1] To this end, it was Russia that came to the rescue of the Ottoman government when *Mehmed Ali* threatened the capital city in 1833, and would continue to play a determining role in the final settlement of the issue in 1840 in line with her new policy to keep a weak Ottoman Empire.

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[1] P. W. Schroeder, *'The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848'*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994,) p.726

It was argued in the third chapter that the influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire witnessed a steep escalation after the 1828–1829 war and the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople. For this reason, Russia followed policies that would keep the Ottoman Empire weak since that would suit her interests under the power parameters of the 1815 European States System.

Mehmed Ali led two rebellions, the first in 1831, which he initiated; and the second, which started as a consequence of the Ottoman military operation in 1839 to bring him under control. The first rebellion ended with a temporary settlement in 1833; however the international consequences of the first rebellion were unprecedented in the 1815 European States System. When a plea for help from Sultan *Mahmud* was declined by Britain he had to seek the help of Russia, which dispatched troops and warships to Istanbul to protect the Ottoman capital from the possible advances of the rebellious Egyptian army. After the temporary settlement of the rebellion, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a bilateral defence treaty, known as the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833.

The Ottoman Empire virtually became the protectorate of Russia with the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*.[2] This was to be the peak of Russia's predominance over the Ottoman Empire, and the ensuing situation was tantamount to a complete reversal of the balance of power in the Near East for the 1815 European States System when the Treaty was interpreted in its strictest terms. Obviously, this situation was a cause for alarm for the other great powers and led them to take some extraordinary measures in the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, Russia chose not to strictly interpret the articles of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* when a similar situation arose in 1839, choosing rather not to act unilaterally, but rather in concert, thus giving up the

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[2] J. A. S. Grenville, '*Europe Reshaped, 1848-1878*', (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 168

bilateral rights granted to her in the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* and consenting to the Convention of the Straits in 1841.

From the Ottoman Empire perspective, the signing of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* indicated that the Ottoman Empire was not going to absolutely rely on the support of the western great powers, specifically that of England and France, in her relations with Russia. This adjustment of the policy was the consequence of the policies of both great powers in the Greek rebellions before and after *Mehmed Ali*'s rebellion in 1833.

This chapter will present an analysis of the interactions and processes that took place between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and also among the great powers, in the context of the rebellion of *Mehmed Ali*, with the conclusions based upon the relationship structure of the 1815 European States System. To recall, the capability structure of the 1815 European States System had remained virtually unchanged between 1815 and 1854, and the effects of the structure in that period could only be perceived in the processes taking place among the unit states. This necessarily takes the elements of the Relationship Structure to the very centre of the analysis.

Using this methodological approach, how Russia's dominance happened in 1833 and the subsequent reactions of the great powers will be explained; and why and how Russia stepped back from its ascendancy over the Ottoman Empire, bringing the Ottoman-Russian relationship back in its pre-1833 level.

The following sections will analyse why and how the two rebellions erupted and how they became internationalised. To that end, firstly the domestic situation will be examined to establish the root causes of the rebellions, followed by *Mehmed Ali*'s reforms in Egypt and how they were received in the Ottoman Empire.

This will be followed by an analysis of the international situation, including the change in policy in Russia after the Treaty of Adrianople and the recommendations of the Kochubey Committee over the handling of Ottoman-Russian relations. The international developments, that is, the 1830 revolution in France and its impacts on the Russian-French relations, will then be addressed, along with the initiatives of the new monarchy of France in Egypt and their use of *Mehmed Ali* as leverage in raising France's status in the Levant.

1. International Situation and the Ottoman Empire by 1830

The great powers, after the end of the Ottoman-Russian war in 1829, were preoccupied with the establishment of the Greek state, for which choosing the new dynasty and defining the borders were the key items on the agenda. The new independent Greece was eventually placed under the rule of a member of the Bavarian dynasty, and its borders were drawn between the gulfs of Volos and Arta in 1832.[3] In this way the neutrality of the new state was secured. The influence of Russia over Greece as a powerful kin Orthodox state was blocked given that she was not adjacent to Greece and was not a maritime power in the Mediterranean, thus ensuring the equilibrium of the 1815 European States System.

Further disruptions to the international order at the time came in the form of revolutions in France (1830), Poland (1830) and Belgium (1833)[4] and, most notably, the uprising in France led to a change of dynasty, with the Bourbon dynasty being replaced by the Orleans dynasty. All of these revolutions played a part in the revival of the Holy Alliance in 1834, which

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[3] C.W. Crawley 'The Question of Greek Independence, A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833 (London, Cambridge University Press. 1930), pp.208-209

[4] For a concise account those revolutions and their impacts, see M. Lyons, *Post-Revolutionary Europe, 1815-1856*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

had been damaged by the Anglo-Russian accord over the Greek issue in 1826.[5]

Within the scope of this thesis, the most remarkable developments in 30's and 40's of the 19th Century were the changes in policies of Britain and Russia concerning the Near East.

The 1829 Treaty of Adrianople between Ottoman Empire and Russia was a breaking point for Britain to reverse her conciliatory policy which had been forged during the alliance against Napoleon. However, it took some time for this policy to take effect. The signing of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* became the starting point of this new assertive policy against Russia and conciliatory policy toward France.[6]

The second remarkable development for the Ottoman-Russian relations in this era was the shift in Russian policy regarding the Ottoman Empire. The implications of that shift for Ottoman-Russian relations between 1830 and 1841 were more significant than any other issue.

a. New Policy of Russia after the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople

Before the signing the Treaty of Adrianople, the Tsar set a Committee lead by Kochubey 'to deliberate on the political complications which the events of the present war [the 1828–1829 war] might bring about in the Ottoman Empire and of which the result might be its collapse in Europe'.[7] The Committee, after much discussion, came up with three likely scenarios with regard to the future of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences for Russia.

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[5] B.H. Summer, '*Survey of Russian History'*, (London: Duckworth, 1947), p. 408

[6] V. A Georgiev, N. S. Kinyapina, M.T. Panchenkova and B. I. Sheremet, *Vostochniy Vopros Vo Vneshney Politike Rossiy', Konets 18-Nachalo 20 v*, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1978), p. 96.

5 R. J. Kerner, 'Russia's New Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adrianople'; including the text of the Protocol of 16 September, 1829, *Cambridge Historical Review*, vol. 3, no. 5, 1937, p. 280

These scenarios were: (1) acquisition, or (2) partitioning of the Ottoman Empire among the great powers, or (3) division of her territories into independent states.

The Committee noted that acquisition would cause a general war among the great powers; while both partition and division were not without their own difficulties. Firstly, both would entail the expulsion of the Muslim population into Asia Minor, which would lead to a Turkish revival and put Russia's possessions in the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus territories at risk. Secondly, neither alternative would preclude the involvement of the other great powers. 'Thanks to their geographic positions; [the other great powers] could make more advantageous acquisitions at the expense of the Porte than could Russia. Austria could acquire Serbia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Albania, and likewise subjugate Montenegro; while Britain and France could seize the islands of Greece, Candia and Egypt. Under such circumstances the Russian flag would be called on to face dangerous enemies in southern Europe instead of indifferent Turks'.[8]

The Committee concluded that the Russian policy had to be 'not at all new acquisition, nor the expansion of [Russia's] frontiers, but far more their security and the development of Russia's action in the midst of neighbouring peoples',[9] and that Russia 'could most easily attain that [security and development of its actions] by prolonging the existence of the Ottoman Empire *under certain conditions*'.[10] However, if the Ottoman Empire collapsed 'by the force of circumstances' without the intervention of Russia, the decision of the Committee was that Russia should militarily occupy the Straits until such time as an international congress could

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[8] The Report of the Committee (emphasis mine)in *ibid*, 283

[9] *Loc. cit.*

[10] *Ibid*, p. 283 (emphasis mine)

decide upon the fate of the region in line with the true interests of Russia.[11]

The Committee did not specify what the 'certain conditions' were, but they could be understood from the *Nesselrode* memorandum[12] presented to the Committee for its deliberation. The said memorandum stated, 'We [Russia] have always considered that the maintenance of that empire was more useful than detrimental to the true interests of Russia, that any order of things which might be substituted there would not balance for us the advantage of having for a neighbour a weak state, always menaced by the spirit of revolt which agitates its vassals, reduced by a successful war to submit to the law of the conqueror'.

This recommendation of the *Kochubey* Committee was endorsed by Tsar Nicholas I and was forwarded to *Diebetisch* , the general commander of the Russian army in the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War, to be used as the basis of the peace negotiations with the Ottoman delegation in Adrianople. But the peace terms had been already agreed upon which were compatible with the essence of the Committee's conclusions. However, the recommendations of the Committee, that is, the maintenance of a *'weak Ottoman Empire',* and in case of its collapse, the occupation of the Straits region until a settlement could be found among the great powers, were going to form the basis of Russia's policy between 1829 and 1854 with regard to the Ottoman Empire.[13]

To sum up, Russia realised that she could not decide upon the future of the Ottoman Empire alone under the existing structural imperatives of the 1815 European States System.[14] She had already

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[11] *Ibid,* pp.285-286

[12] Georgiev *et. al*, (1978), op. cit., pp. 92-94

[13] *Ibid*, 92-93 and 96

[14] H. N. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian Approachment with Britain 1836-1844* (London: University of California Press, 1976), p. 29-30

established predominance over the Ottoman Empire, and maintaining that status quo would be much more beneficial to her than having to face challenges from the great powers. In short, she preferred the certainty of the present than uncertainty in the future regardless of the potential greater gains.

b. Domestic Situation of the Ottoman Empire

After suffering defeat in the 1828–1829 war the Ottoman ruling elites gave up all hope of a reversal of the Russian power against the Ottoman Empire.[15] Until the time of the war Istanbul had been vulnerable only to a Russian seaborne threat over the Black Sea, but after the 1828–1829 war Istanbul also became vulnerable to a Russian overland threat through the Balkans. Secondly, Russia was able to consolidate her self-appointed role as the protector of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as the autonomies of the Principalities and Serbia had been so strengthened that their dependencies on the Sultan were reduced to the payment of an annual tribute. It should be noted that the great bulk of the people in the Empire's remaining Balkan territories, such as Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were Orthodox and/or Slavs. This situation compelled the Ottoman government to re-consider her relations with Russia since the support of the western great powers against Russia was not absolute any more as the events indicated in the Greek rebellion.

As explained in the previous chapters, Sultan *Mahmud* had launched very ambitious reform programs,[16] the most remarkable of which was to centralise the administration and re-organise the army, and to this end he managed to bring many of the local notables in the Balkans and Asia

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[15]V.I. Sheremet, *Turtsiya i Adrianopolskiy Mir 1829, g,* (Moskva: Nauyk, 1975), p. 186

[16] On these reforms, M.S. Hanioglu, *A Brief History of The Late Ottoman Empire*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) and I.Ortayli, *Imparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (Istanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2006)

Minor under his authority.[17] The Sultan was also aware of the ambitions and long-term plans of *Mehmed Ali*,[18] however the Greek rebellion and the following Russian war allowed *Mehmed Ali* to survive the Sultan's centralisation efforts. Surprisingly, the Sultan had to ask for *Mehmed Ali*'s assistance to suppress the Greek revolt, and in return he was offered the governorship of Mora, which was inconsistent with his reform programme.

c. Egypt under *Mehmed Ali*

Mehmed Ali, who was of Albanian origin, was born in *Kavala*[19] in 1769 and joined the Ottoman army there at the age of 17. His unit, in which he was the second in command, was sent to Egypt to fight against the invading French army under Napoleon in 1798. He would go on to become the commander of the *Kavala* units and would remain in Egypt after the French withdrawal.

How did he become that powerful? The answer partly lies in the consequences of the French invasion of Egypt in 1795. One of the most concrete outcomes of the French invasion for Egypt and the ensuing war was the loss of the majority of its local notables, *Mamluks*, who were the main pillars of both state and society and were an obstacle in the way of effective central government in Egypt.[20] Their departure left a vacuum in the political spectrum in Egypt, which was filled by *Mehmed Ali*.[21] His formal recognition as the Viceroy of Egypt came in 1805 after he agreed to restore order in the Arabian Peninsula where the holy cities of Islam were located, which had been disrupted by the Wahhabi sect. His success in

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[17] Prominent notables and their places included, for example, Pasvanoglu of Vidin, Tuzcuoglu of Trabzon, Dagdevirenoglu of Edirne and Karaosmanoglu of Aydın, see S. J. Shaw, and E.K. Shaw, '*History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*' 2 Volumes, (Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol II, pp. 14- 42

[18] S. Altundag, *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı Mısır Meselesi 1831-*1841(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1945), pp. 31–33

[19] Kavala was a city in the Ottoman Empire territories in the Balkans in the North of the modern Greece

[20] *Ibid*, p. 24

[21] *Ibid*, p. 24-26

eradicating the *Vehhabi* sect boosted his reputation among Muslims; but his reputation in the eyes of the Ottoman government grew following his defeat of the British army in 1807 and his liberation of the occupied Alexandria, after which the coastal areas were also placed under his jurisdiction.[22]

After being appointed as the Viceroy of Egypt, *Mehmed Ali* intensified the modernisation efforts in the country. Egypt was in a much better situation domestically and internationally than the Ottoman Empire, and so *Mehmed Ali* was much more successful in implementing economic and military reforms than the Sultan. The Ottoman Empire had been at war with Russia from 1806 until 1812, after which she had to suppress the Greek insurrection, throughout which *Mehmed Ali* continued to carry out his reform programmes. As to the other great powers, France and the coalition of Russia, Great Britain and Austria were fiercely engaged in wars for dominance in Europe.

By the 1820s *Mehmed Ali* had succeeded in everything that Sultan *Mahmud* II was still trying to achieve: he had centralised the administration and made the economy more efficient through the construction of irrigation systems and canals for transport, opening new areas for agriculture and creating state monopolies.[23] As result of these measures, Egypt's annual revenues increased from 8 million Francs in 1805 to 50 million Francs in 1821.[24] Moreover, he founded a new army based on conscription and built a navy with the help of French experts. According to one Turkish historian, the discipline of collective working

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[22] M. Kamil Pasa, '*Tarih-i Siyasi-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*, 3 cilt, (Istanbul, 1911),, c. II, p. 108

[23] *For a detailed account of the economic development of Egypt by 1830's see, C. Keyder, Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey,(ed.* by A. Oncu, C. Keyder and S. E. Ibrahim*),* (American University in Cairo Press, 1994)

[24] K. Fahmy, *All The Pasha's Men Mehmet Ali,his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*, (New York: The American University in Cairo Press1997), p.10

that the Nile River had brought to the Egyptian people was an essential element in *Mehmed Ali*'s success.

It should be noted that all these successes paradoxically sowed the seeds of conflict, since they required more resources to sustain than Egypt could provide for *Mehmed Ali*'s grand projects and his army. The adjacent Syrian territories under various Governorships were rich in both human and material resources, for recruits and industry so that the ambitious *Mehmed Ali* would set his eye on Syria.[25] The question was how to convince the Sultan for such a concession, given his determination to restrict the power of the provincial governors. Opportunity for *Mehmed Ali* would come not from Syria but from somewhere completely different, and under completely different circumstances: the Mora Peninsula, which was under the control of Greek rebels. The governorship of Mora offered *Mehmed Ali* the resources he needed, but only on the condition that he rid the territory of Greek rebels.[26]

As *Mehmed Ali* was in possession of a well-trained and well-equipped army and navy, it came as no surprise when the Sultan asked for his military assistance in the suppression of the Greek insurrection in Mora in 1825; and as anticipated, the new Egyptian army would quickly prove its merits on the battlefields of Mora.

d. Great Powers and Egypt

The successes of *Mehmed Ali* and his relations with the Sultan could not go unnoticed by the great powers of the 1815 European States System, given the strategic location of Egypt as a bridge between the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Black Sea and Asia Minor. *Mehmed Ali* was well aware of the significance of international support for the realisation of his aims and the converging and diverging interests of the

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[25] Georgiev *et al*,(1978), *op. cit,* p. 98

[26] A. Cevdet Pasa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, (sadelestiren Dundar Gunday) 8 Cilt, (Istanbul, Ucdal nesriyat, 1984), cilt V, p. 106-107

great powers over the whole region. Britain and France had consuls in Egypt who were following closely the developments in Egypt at close quarters. France was the most active of the great power in terms of relations with *Mehmed Ali* prior to 1831. France's historical relations with the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century, Napoleon's recent military campaign in Egypt, France's role in the Catholic Church in Palestine, and the commercial dependence of the Marseilles region on trade in the Levant all contributed to her close relationship with *Mehmed Ali*.[27] As underlined in Chapter II, the overall objective of France was to rid herself of the isolation imposed by the 1815 Settlements, and the Levant region and North Africa, specifically Egypt, could be instrumental in its bids against Russia and Britain.[28] According to Puryear, the French policy of strengthening Egypt within well-defined limits began in 1824,[29] and to this end, many French military and technical experts played important roles in the restructuring of the Egyptian state and its army and in the construction of a number of public facilities. All of these led a contemporary French statesman to regard *Mehmed Ali* as a lieutenant of France in the region.[30]

The new policies of Britain and Russia towards the Ottoman Empire were also instrumental in the bid of France to Egypt to turn it a French protectorate. Britain always considered the Ottoman Empire necessary for the balance of power against Russia in the region; but the influential position that Russia had gained over the Ottoman Empire after 1829 led Britain to intensify its efforts to strengthen the Ottoman Empire through reforms. As indicated above, Russia sided with Britain in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire to some extent, thus France's contribution in the

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[27] H. Inalcik, *Turkey and Europe in History* (Istanbul: Eren Press, 2006), p. 7

[28] J. V. Puryear, *France and the Levant from Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah* (USA: Archon Books. 1968) p. 117

[29] *Ibid,* p. 43–53

[30] On Coehorn Memorendom see, *ibid,* p. 117

maintenance of the Ottoman Empire would no longer be so precious in the eyes of the Ottoman ruling elite, and for this reason France chose to side with *Mehmed Ali* rather than the Ottoman Empire.

France's close relations with *Mehmed Ali* cooled after France decided to join the alliance of Britain and Russia for the settlement of the Greek issue since *Mehmed Ali*'s forces had been in fierce struggle against the Greek rebels in Mora. However, after the evacuation of Mora in 1828, France re-approached *Mehmed Ali* who was concerned about the Sultan's reaction to the withdrawal of his forces from Mora without consent.[31]

2. First Revolt of *Mehmed Ali* and its International Implications

The intervention of the great powers in the Greek issue and the following independence of Greece invalidated the promise given by the Sultan to *Mehmed Ali*. Upon that, *Mehmed Ali* again requested the governorship of Syria in return for his services during the Greek insurrection, however his request was turned down and the post was offered to Girit.[32]

The main reason behind the Sultan's decision to decline *Mehmed Ali*'s request was that his position and power were not consistent with the centralisation policy of the Sultan, but this was not the only reason. *Mehmed Ali* had declined the Sultan's request for troops during the war with Russia, and moreover, he had not consulted with the Ottoman government before agreeing to evacuate Mora with the allies of the London Treaty.[33]

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[31] M. Kutluoglu, '*The Egyptian Question : The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Pasa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reaction of The Sublime Portre (1831-1841)* (Istanbul: Eren Yayincilik, 1998), p. 48–50

[32] Kamil Pasa (1911), *op. cit*., C.III, p. 121

[33] M. Nuri Pasa, '*Netayuc ul-Vukuat, Kurumalari ve Orgutleriyle Osmanli Tarihi*, 4 Cilt, (Sadelestiren, Neset Cagatay), (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), p. 251

Self-confident in his power, and in full awareness of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of its devastating war with Russia, *Mehmed Ali* considered that this was the most appropriate time to act against his master, planning to take advantage of the discontent of the people regarding the Sultan's reforms, whose dignity had already been ruined after defeat at the hands of Russia. He started making preparations for a military advance on Syria to take by force what had been refused by the Sultan. A delegation from Istanbul was sent to negotiate with *Mehmed Ali* in a final attempt to stop his march on Syria, however the negotiations were unsuccessful.

Why was *Mehmed Ali* so interested in Syria? As previously mentioned, he needed human and material resources for economic development and to maintain a strong army in Egypt. For example, *Mehmed Ali* faced a shortage of timber for the construction of merchant vessels, as well as fuel, coal, copper and iron, and Syria could provide all of these resources.[34] More importantly, from a strategic point of view, Syria could serve as an excellent barrier against any Ottoman advance southwards in the future due to its high mountain ranges, narrow passes and deep valleys.[35]

a. Start of the Rebellion: *Ibrahim*'s Military Campaign in Syria and Asia Minor

By 1831, *Mehmed Ali* had fallen out with Abdullah Pasha, the governor of Acre, over some of his actions, including Abdullah's refusal to return the 6,000 Egyptians who had fled to several districts under the Acre governorship to escape conscription and other duties.[36] Moreover, Abdullah had been levying exactions on the Egyptian merchants, and had not repaid the debts to Egypt that he had incurred during the internal

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[34] Altundag, *op. cit.,* p. 36

[35] Kutluoglu, *op. cit.,* p. 32

[36] Kamil Pasa (1911), *op. cit.,* c. III, p. 122

disturbances of the 1820s.[37] The Ottoman government urged the two parties to resolve their disagreements peacefully and specifically warned *Mehmed Ali* not to act on his own, stating that the Ottoman government would take the necessary steps for the settlement of the dispute.[38]

Committed to his designs on Syria, *Mehmed Ali* ignored the warnings of the central government,[39] and dispatched an Egyptian army numbering 35-40,000 troops under the command of his son *Ibrahim* in October 1831. The internal feud among the local rulers and the discontent of the people in their administration blocked any successful resistance to *Ibrahim*'s army, and the cities of Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus quickly surrendered without resistance. As we will see later, the reaction of the people to the reforms of Sultan *Mahmud*, in particular the abolition of the Janissary Army, facilitated the easy advance of *Ibrahim* into Syria and Asia Minor. *Ibrahim* laid siege to Acre in November, 1832.[40]

The fall of Acre opened a route to Asia Minor for *Ibrahim*, whose successes raised his prestige in the eyes of Syrians and allowed him to take quick control of Damascus and Aleppo in July 1832.[41] The last clash in Syria between *Ibrahim* and the Ottoman army before *Ibrahim*'s thrust into Asia Minor took place in Antioch, and ended with victory for *Ibrahim* on July 29. With that victory, *Ibrahim* took control of the Taurus passes leading to Central Anatolia.

Although all those initial clashes and developments were an indication of the severity of the threat, the Sultan was far from ready to

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[37]Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi, Hatti Humayun Defterleri, (cited as BOA HH hereafter), No: 20037

[38] Kamil Pasa (1911), *op. cit.,* c. III, p. 123, and BOA HH, No: 20037

[39] Barker to Malcolm June 1, 1831, FO 78/202, The National Archive (cited as TNA)

[40] Kutluoglu, *op. cit.,* pp. 69-70

[41] For how those places fell under Ibrahim's control and the initial clashes between the Ottoman imperial army and Ibrahim's army see, BOA HH No. 20209, 19719, 20148, 20285, 19889, 20148

compromise; and so the two sides began preparing for the next and final confrontation, in which both the Ottoman Empire and Sultan *Mahmud* would be relying on some sort of the external support.

Before proceeding to the confrontation between *Ibrahim* and the Ottoman army under the command of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Reşid in *Konya* in December of 1832, mention will be made of the diplomatic and military support that the Ottoman government sought from the great powers.

b. Seeking British Naval Assistance against *Mehmed Ali*'s Military Movements

Sultan *Mahmud*'s first choice for external support was obviously Britain, given the British attitude toward the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and her naval capacity. The existing close relationship between France and Egypt made France unreliable in the eyes of Ottoman officials, and an offer of mediation by France during *Ibrahim*'s Syrian campaign between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali* had already been turned down.[42]

As the Ottoman navy had not yet recovered from the devastating impacts of the Navarino battle, what they needed was British naval assistance in their bid for the subjugation of *Mehmed Ali* to complement the overland mission of the Ottoman army against *Ibrahim*'s forces.[43] A significant proportion of the British navy was already present in the Mediterranean and the Ottoman government believed it could cut off the supply lines to the Egyptian army if Britain agreed. They were ready to pay Britain's expenses for carrying out such a mission, which was illustrative of the Ottoman military chiefs' confidence in their military

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[42] S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 1831, FO 78/211 and 212, PRO

[43] BOA HH, No.20339

strength and their underestimation of *Ibrahim*'s army before the final confrontation in *Konya.*

To this end, the first step was taken by the Ottoman government when Stafford Canning, the British ambassador, was in Istanbul to obtain the consent of the Sultan for the Concert decision relating to the borders of the newly-established Greek state. Direct proposals for an Ottoman-British alliance were made by both the Sultan and the Foreign Minister and, while the British ambassador made no commitment, he did promise to convey the request to his government.[44] According to the Turkish archives, Canning urged the Ottoman officials to demand help from the British.[45]

However, the Ottoman government did not think Canning wielded enough influence, and so decided to send a special envoy, Namık Pasha, to Britain with a request for naval assistance from the Sultan,[46] as had been previously expressed to Canning.[47]

Namık Pasha called in on Vienna and Paris on his way to London. In Vienna he had an audience with Metternich, who told him that the Ottoman government should seek a compromise over Syria with *Mehmed Ali* if it was not confident in the strength of its army so as to avoid further grave consequences. Moreover, he suggested that the Ottoman

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[44] C. Webster (1951) '*The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841 Britain, The Liberal Movement and The Eastern Question*, vols.1-2, (London, G.Bell & Sons Ltd 1951), p. 279

[45] BOA HH, No 20339 and 20341 and S. Canning reported the meeting follows: 'whatever pledge was implied in that language [in the meeting with Reis Effendi] I amply redeemed by submitting to my chief the expediency of sending a small squadron to keep watch over the ambitious movements of *Mehmed Ali*'. S. Canning, *The Eastern Question*, (London: John Murray, 1888), p. 208. It seems that he was responding to the claim by the French Chargé d'Affairs, Varenne, that Canning's words were misinterpreted or poorly translated which probably led to the conviction that more substantial aid might be available from Britain. AE Turquie, 264, cited by Puryear (1968), p. 163

[46] BOA HH, No. 20341

[47] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.,* p. 88. The Ottoman Chargé d'Affairs in Vienna, Mavriojeni, who was in London dealing with another matter, also raised the issue of naval assistance from Britain in his negotiations.

government should not request the active mediation of Britain, but rather a strong political opposition to the actions of *Mehmed Ali* and not to let the ships operating under the Egyptian flag in the Mediterranean.[48] It seemed that Metternich did not share the confidence of the Ottoman officials in the capability of the Ottoman army, and was afraid that an active British presence in the Near East could lead to reaction from Russia, which could potentially complicate the matter further. However, he instructed the Habsburg representative in London to assist *Namık Pasha* in his mission in London.[49]

Namık Pasha's next stop was Paris. As related earlier, the offer of mediation by the French government had already been declined, and therefore the visit did not bring about any change in the French attitude. He arrived in London on 17 November in 1832.

In Britain, *Namık Pasha* was very well received by Palmerston and the King,[50] and Palmerston was in favour of granting assistance to the Ottoman government.[51] He wrote to Granville that 'the general interest of all Europe except Russia [was] to uphold the Sultan's power against [*Mehmed Ali*] *Pasha*',[52] however there was hesitation and division among the cabinet members over the Near East, blocking a definite decision on the matter. Also, the issues of Belgium, Spain and Portugal and the upcoming general election would further prevent any breakthrough in the issue. On 27 January, 1833 the British cabinet decided to decline the request of the Ottoman government for naval assistance, but proposed the mediation of British government between the Ottoman government and *Mehmed Ali*. Palmerston was to label Britain's position on this issue in the

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[48] E. Molden, *Die Orientpolitik des Fürsten Metternich 1829-1833*, (Wien: Hölselzs Verlag. 1913) p. 41

[49] *Ibid,* p. 41

[50] Altindag (1945), *op. cit.,*p. 88-89

[51] Webster (1951), *op. cit.,* p. 281

[52] Palmerston to Granville, 6 Nov., 1832: Borland Papers cited by Webster (1951), *op. cit.,* p. 282

first month of 1833 as 'the tremendous blunder'[53] and 'the great mistake'.[54] Despite being declined by the British government, *Namık Pasha* stayed in London until the middle of March of 1833 to try and change the British position regarding the issue.[55]

While *Namık Pasha* was in London negotiating British assistance, *Ibrahim* inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ottoman army near *Konya* and took the Grand Vizier prisoner. With this victory, the last obstacle between *Ibrahim* and Istanbul had been removed, leading Austria and France also to seek an alliance with Britain in an effort to settle the matter.

c. Efforts of Austria and France to Bring Britain on Board

Austria had already offered assistance to the Ottoman delegation in London, but after the defeat of the Ottoman army in *Konya* Metternich suggested that British, French and Russian ships should act together to guard Istanbul from the Sea of Marmara.[56]

The second state seeking British cooperation was France. French Premier Broglie suggested that France and Britain should guarantee the Sultan's throne on the condition that he did not admit Russian ships, and at the same time allow both powers to mediate between the Sultan and his vassal. If *Mehmed Ali* could not be convinced, then they would coerce him with naval sanctions.[57] Neither proposal could pass through the British cabinet even though Metternich's envisioned concerted action on the

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[53] To Lamb, 22 May, 1838: Memorandum in reply to Lord Holland, cited by Webster (1951), *op. cit.,* p. 283

[54] 8 March, 1840: Borland Papers, cited by Webster (1951), *op. cit.,* p. 284

[55] For the letters that Namik Pasha wrote about his meetings and his views about the results of those meetings see, Altındag (1945), *op. cit.,* pp. 90-100

[56] Lamb to Palmerston January, 17, 1833., F.O. 7/ 240 TNA

[57] Granville to Palmerston, 21, 25 Jan., 1833: F.O. France, 463 quoted by Webster, ibid., p. 292 and C.M.D. Talleyrand, *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand Vol.1-5* (trans.by.A. Hall.) (London: Griffith Farran and Co. Ltd. 1891), vol. V, p. 493

matter;[58] and the division of the great powers in the 1815 European States System between the Eastern monarchies and the liberal Western powers and their mutual commitments in each block had, by 1833, effectively blocked any advance among the great powers regarding the Egypt issue.[59]

d. Dispatch of the Ottoman Delegation to Egypt, and Russian and French Mediations

The defeat of the Grand Vizier's army in *Konya* in December must have totally altered the expectations of the Ottoman government. The refusal of Britain and the strong favouritism of France toward *Mehmed Ali* paved the way for Russia to provide an alternative to the Ottoman government, as Stafford Canning had anticipated.[60] The Sultan had already inquired through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires *Butenev* in the summer of 1832 what Russia could do for the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against the rebellious vassal.[61] At the end of November 1832, *Nesselrode*, the Foreign Minister of Russia, informed *Butenev* that Russia was able to send a fleet at very short notice upon the request of the Sultan.[62] Later, Russia sent special envoy General *Murayev* to Istanbul to assure the Sultan of the resoluteness of the Tsar regarding the well-being of the Ottoman Empire, and to that end, he was ready to provide military assistance if the Sultan asked. *Murayev* arrived in Istanbul on the same day as the military defeat in *Konya* and held meetings with Foreign Minister *Reis* Effendi and with the Chief Commander of the Army *Serasker,* both of whom expressed their gratitude to the Tsar's offer, but declined his offer of military aid.[63] *Murayev* continued his mission by

[58]Lamb to Palmerston, February 7., 1833: F.O.. 7/ 240 TNA

[59] M.S. Anderson '*The Eastern Question 1774-1923,* (New York: Macmillan St. Martin's Press1966), p. 98

[60] S. Canning (1881), *op. cit.,* pp. 213–214

[61] Anderson (1966), *op. cit.,* p. 98

[62] Webster (1951), *op. cit.,* p. 284

[63] F. S. Rodkey, '*The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations Of England, France, And Russia, 1832-1841* (Urbana, The University Of Illinois, 1923), p. 17

setting out for Egypt to convey the message of the Tsar to *Mehmed Ali* that the Tsar was a friend of the Sultan, and that he would not allow *Mehmed Ali* to destabilise the Ottoman Empire.[64] Obviously, the Tsar's concern was that he would lose his recent gains over the Ottoman Empire as a result of *Mehmed Ali*'s victories.

In the meantime, the Ottoman government decided to enter into direct negotiations with *Mehmed Ali*,[65] and to that end the Ottoman sent a delegation in response to a request from *Mehmed Ali* at the end of November. This decision to negotiate with *Mehmed Ali* was the last step before the acceptance of the Russian offer, in which French efforts also played an important role. *Halil Rıfat Pasha* and *Reşid Bey* were selected as the special envoys of the Sultan to be sent to Egypt.

The decision of the Ottoman government to enter into negotiations was the determining factor in *Mehmed Ali*'s decision to stop *Ibrahim* from going any further after the battle of *Konya*, being aware that marching his army into Istanbul would result in international intervention, and consequently his objective of gaining Syria would fail. Recent developments had all been in his favour, and his meetings with *Murayev* had demonstrated to him that Russia was not concerned whether Syria came under his rule or not, as Russia's primary focus was on Istanbul and the Balkans.[66] On the other side, France was already on his side and would not take part in any international efforts to expel him from Syria. As a result, the Sultan finally consented to enter negotiations with *Mehmed Ali*, whose best course of action was to wait and force the Sultan to concede. For this reason he refused *Ibrahim*'s request to continue

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□ Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97, 100–101

[65] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 172

[66] For details of the Murayev meetings and the report he forwarded to the Ottoman government, BOA, HH, No 20119,

marching, asking him to stop in *Kutahya*.[67] *Ibrahim*'s departure from *Konya* on 20 January rang alarm bells in the Ottoman government, who requested Russian military help in defending Istanbul,[68] but first an explanation will be made of the final attempts of the Ottoman government and the French to reach a settlement before the Russian military was summoned.

The Turkish delegation was instructed to offer *Mehmed Ali* the city of Acre and the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus and Tripoli, in addition to the governorship of Egypt, Jidda and Crete. If *Mehmed Ali* asked also for Damascus and Aleppo, *Halil Pasha* was not to consent, but was to await instruction from Istanbul.[69] Obviously there was a big gap between what was being offered by the Ottoman government and what *Mehmed Ali* demanded.

Varannes, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul, wrote three letters with the knowledge of the Ottoman government to *Mehmed Ali*, *Ibrahim* and *Suleyman*, dated 8 January, to be delivered by the Ottoman delegation.[70] *Halil Pasha* took the letter to *Mehmed Ali* in which *Varannes* underlined their willingness to reach an agreement, and his sincere hope that the 'deplorable debate which agitated the empire and attracted the attention of Europe' would be terminated.[71] In the letter addressed to *Ibrahim*, *Varannes* informed him of the dispatch of a delegation with full powers to meet his father, requesting he halt his advance and wait for the outcome of the negotiations. He also added his assurances that Turkish

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[67] For the text of Ibrahim's letters, dated 28 December, 1832 and 3 February, 1833, to proceed forward, see, Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78, 103–104

[68] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 186

[69] BOA HH, no 20364

[70] AE Turquie, 265 cited by Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 181

[71] *Ibid.*

forces would remain inactive as long as *Ibrahim* stayed put.[72] *Ibrahim* replied to Varennes' letter on 17 January, informing him that his army would proceed until his father instructed him otherwise,[73] and also informed the Ottoman government about his intentions on Bursa – a coastal city by the Marmara Sea that was less than one day from Istanbul. This news brought panic to the Ottoman government, which made preparations to request the already-granted Russian assistance. The news from Egypt from the Turkish delegation was not encouraging, as *Mehmed Ali* was demanding all of Syria, as well as the districts of Adana, İçel and Alanya in Asia Minor, and said that if his demands were not met he would instruct his army to march on Istanbul.[74]

Ottoman officials considered seriously the offer of Russian assistance, and informed the Russian representative of their intentions. The French and English representatives again intervened to stop that happening; however their efforts did not change the attitude of the Ottoman government to summon the Russian fleet, as *Ibrahim*'s army was only a two-week march from Istanbul, and his movements were suspicious.

e. Summoning of Russian Military Assistance for the Defence of the Capital against the Rebellious Egyptian Forces

The Sultan finally made an official request for the intervention of the Russian fleet on 2 February.[75] The first part of the Russian fleet anchored in the Bosporus on 20 February, and a small army unit landed in the Asiatic shores of Bosporus in April. This event can be said to have signified the failure of the Concert of Europe, and was a milestone in the great power politics of the 1815 European States System for the period of

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[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 186

[74] BOA HH, No: 20382,

[75] For the text of the official request, see Altındag (1945), *op. cit.,* p. 121

1833–184. The aloofness and hesitation of the British, and the French favouritism towards Egypt were the major factors in that failure. An analysis of the long-term implications of the Russian military arrival on the Bosporus for the 1815 European States System will be covered in the following section, after an explanation of the short-term consequences of the *Mehmed Ali* issue.

The deployment of Russian troops and ships in Istanbul forced Britain to reconsider the seriousness of the issue for the Ottoman Empire, but their immediate efforts concentrated on the departure of Russian forces as soon as possible. To this end, the arrival of new ambassadors of France and Britain in Istanbul were hastened, while Britain and Austria sent special envoys to Egypt to speed up the settlement of the Egypt problem. Without a settlement, they were aware that the Sultan could not be asked to request the withdrawal of the Russian military units from Istanbul, and in this respect, as had previously been the case, the French efforts were of great significance.

f. French Efforts for the Settlement of the Egypt Problem

Roussin, the new French ambassador in Istanbul, arrived in Istanbul two days before the Russian fleet arrived in the Bosporus. As soon as he took office in Istanbul he assumed a very active role in the Egypt issue, not as a mediator, but as a dealer disposed to forging a settlement between the parties on the basis of granting Syria to *Mehmed Ali.*[76] His immediate request to cancel the summoning of the Russian fleet received no response from the Ottoman government, and so his next act was to try to persuade the Ottoman government to ask for a Russian withdrawal if he could make *Mehmed Ali* accept the terms that had been offered to him by Halil Pasha.[77] He signed a convention with the Ottoman government on 21 February, one day after the arrival of the Russian

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[76] For the details of his instruction see, Puryear (1968), op. cit., pp. 190–192

[77] According to Altındag, the places to be placed under *Mehmed Ali* by the terms set between Roussin and the Ottoman governments were less than those of Halil Pasa, see, Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 123

military, which contained a pledge to take coercive measures against *Mehmed Ali* if he refused the terms,[78] justifying his actions thus, 'What consideration can balance the immense fact of a Russian squadron anchored under the walls of Constantinople'.[79] The conditions of the Convention were approved by Britain too, since they limited the possessions of *Mehmed Ali* to Syria, which had been her overall objective.[80]

In accordance with that convention, *Roussin* sent letters to *Mehmed Ali* and *Ibrahim*. In his letter to *Mehmed Ali*, he stated that the Ottoman government were rightly suspicious of the movements and intentions of *Ibrahim*, and had, in consequence, requested Russian help. He added that this event had disrupted the peace in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, and that *Mehmed Ali* would be held responsible for the consequences. In order to avoid this responsibility, he advised that *Mehmed Ali* on behalf of France accept the Acre, Jerusalem, Tripoli and Nablus governorships, and advised him of the convention signed between the Ottoman government and France, underlining that France would stand behind its signature.[81]

However, the warning given by *Roussin* to *Mehmed Ali* was not supported by his government, and Broglie, the French Premier, told *Roussin* that France would not support the use of force against Egypt, and that the precise delimitation of Syria was of secondary importance to France.[82] For this reason, the French initiatives ended without success. *Mehmed Ali*'s reaction was swift, with a reply to *Roussin* on 8 March stating that the acceptance of such terms would mean his political death,

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[78] J. Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, (London: Smith Elder&Co, 1912), p. 159

[79] AE Turquie, 265 cited by Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 191

[80] H.L. Bulwer, *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, 1-2 Volumes, (London: R. Bentley, 1870), vol. II, p. 145

[81] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p 123

[82] AE Turquie, 265 cited by Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 193

and that he would prefer real death to political death.[83] At the same time, he informed the Turkish delegate in Egypt that he fully authorised *Ibrahim* to conduct negotiations, and that unless his [*Mehmed Ali*'s] terms were not meet, *Ibrahim* would continue his advance.[84] On that, *Resid* returned to Istanbul with the demands of *Mehmed Ali,* and *Halil Pasha* remained in Egypt.

g. The Temporary Settlement of the Egypt Issue: the *Kutahya* Settlement

The Ottoman government was in a position in which it could either accept *Mehmed Ali*'s terms or reject them, relying on the military assistance of Russia, however the latter option would have very serious domestic and international implications. The reaction of the public towards the Sultan and Russia could not be thoroughly predicted,[85] and so the Ottoman Council decided to send the newly returned *Resid* to meet *Ibrahim* in *Kutahya,* accompanied by French Chargé d'Affaires Varanne. This time the Ottoman government was prepared to hand over the whole of Syria, but not the districts of Alaiyye, Silifke and Adana in Asia Minor, which were the key passes between Syria and Asia Minor, and were also rich in timber resources.

Finally, a compromise was reached between *Resid* and *Ibrahim* on 9 April, although the question of Adana was not decided upon[86] until 14 May. According to the settlement, which was not a convention in nature but rather was a grant that would be subject to renewal every year, *Mehmed Ali* would gain the governorship of all of Syria, besides his

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[83] For the text of *Mehmed Ali*'s letter see, Altındag(1945), *op. cit.*, p. 125; Hall (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 159

[84] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p 126 and Mandeville to Palmerston, March 26, 27, 1833 cited by Hall (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 159

[85] Hall (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 157

[86] The agreement between Ibrahim and Reşid was that Ibrahim would send a special envoy to Istanbul to ask the governorship of Adana province. Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 144

existing governorships of Egypt and Jeddah.[87] As for Adana, he gained the right to collect taxes there, but would not be able to militarise it. This agreement was secured by the *ferman* (decree) of 5 May that was delivered to *Mehmed Ali* and *Ibrahim* respectively on 7 and 14 May. The pressure being applied by the newly-appointed special envoys to Egypt by Britain, France and Austria did much to persuade *Mehmed Ali* to agree to the deal.[88] However, the delay between 8 April and 14 May brought a further reinforcement of the Russian military on the Bosporus, which raised the suspicions of Britain and France.

h. Attempts to Balance Russia in the Near East and the British and French Fleets in Dardanelles

The continuing reinforcement of the Russian troops in Istanbul was being followed with great concern by the other great powers. Apart from the diplomatic efforts in Istanbul to speed up the withdrawal of the Russian forces, Britain and France also resorted to military means to put pressure on Russia by sending fleets to the Mediterranean. The British fleet was instructed on 10 May to sail to Alexandria and wait there until the peace was concluded,[89] after which it sailed to *Besika* Bay just outside of the Dardanelles, where it anchored on 22 June, and was soon to be joined by the French fleet.[90] The collective aim was to demonstrate to Russia that they would not remain silent as long as Russian troops remained in Istanbul, with the intention being to force Russia to withdraw as soon as the terms of peace had been fulfilled by *Ibrahim*. On 26 May, France suggested that both powers should jointly instruct their ambassadors in Istanbul to order their respective fleets to pass the

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[87] For the text of the fermans (decrees) granting those cities to *Mehmed Ali* and Ibrahim and their letter of obedience, see Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, pp. 132–135

[88] On the efforts of Britain and France, see, Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, pp. 199–207

[89] F.O. 195 T 109, cited by Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 205

[90] Reports by Lander, F.O. 195 Dardanelles 95, cited by Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 207

Dardanelles and wait in the Sea of Marmara should a strong indication arise that Russia was preparing to seize the Dardanelles.[91]

Palmerston hesitated in his response to the French suggestion, preferring to wait for a report from the newly arrived British ambassador, Ponsonby, in Istanbul.[92] Ponsonby's report did not raise alarms regarding Russia's activities and intentions in Istanbul. The Russian special envoy, who had been sent to Istanbul by the Tsar to compensate for the shortcomings of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in the face of the French Ambassador's actions, assured Ponsonby that the Russian military would return home as soon as *Ibrahim*'s army crossed the Taurus Mountains.[93] Ponsonby also considered that any attempt by Britain and France to pass the Dardanelles would result in the Russian troops remaining in the Bosporus, forcing the restraint of both countries from an approach through the Dardanelles.[94]

i. Withdrawal of the Russian Military and the Peak of Russian Dominance in the Near East: Defence Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi between the Ottoman Empire and Russia

Russia was monitoring closely French activities in Istanbul and fleet movements in the Mediterranean. In this respect, *Butenev*, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Istanbul, declared in April that the withdrawal of the Russian troops was dependent upon the complete withdrawal of *Ibrahim*'s army from Asia Minor.[95] This declaration made sense for the Ottoman Empire, since France and Britain had increased their pressure on *Mehmed*

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[91] Broglie to Talleyrand, May 26th , 1833, p. 119 in '*Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand*,' (trns. by A. Hall), (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1892, London), Vol. 5, p. 119

[92] Talleyrand to Broglie, May 29th, 1833, in '*Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand', op. cit.*, pp. 120-121

[93] Talleyrand to Broglie, June, 11th, 1833, in '*Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand', op. cit.*, pp. 126-127 and Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 100

[94] Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 7, 1833, F.O. 146/ 143, TNA

[95] Mandeville to Palmerston, April 11, 1833, F.O. 78/222, TNA

Ali after the difficulties encountered over the status of Adana between the Porte and *Mehmed Ali.*

When the situation in Istanbul was entering into a precarious stage on the eve of the complete withdrawal of the Egyptian forces, the Tsar decided to send A. *Orlov,* who was very well-known among Ottoman officials as one of the signatories of the 1829 Adrianople Treaty, to Istanbul as his special envoy.[96]

Orlov's primary mission was to convince the Ottoman government that it could rely to a great degree on Russia's support, both now and in the future.[97] By proving the sincerity of Russia regarding the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, Orlov was able to nullify the French influence, and also to close the door on collective European action in the Near East.[98]

It seemed that Russia still considered the Near East as its exclusive area of influence, and wanted to keep it within the domain of the bilateral relations between itself and the Ottoman Empire. Given the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the advantages to Russia as a result of such bilateral relations in the Near East were obvious.[99]

The Russian desire to keep the Near East in the bilateral domain was consolidated by the Ottoman request to sign a bilateral defence treaty. According to *Altındag, Ahmet Fevzi Pasha* told *Butenev* in April that the existing entente between the two powers should be raised to the status of

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[96] As Hall pointed out, 'his appointment was due to the Tsar's desire to be represented at Constantinople by someone who could be depended upon resolutely to oppose Admiral Roussin [the French Ambassador]' Hall (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 162

[97] *Ibid.*, Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, pp. 147–148

[98] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, pp. 148 and Georgiev *et al*(1978), *op. cit.*, p. 101

[99] Georgiev *et all* (1978) *op. cit.*, p. 101

a definite treaty (*par un traité definitive*).[100] *Orlov* left Istanbul together with the Russian troops on 9 and 10 June after the Russian officer received news of the complete withdrawal of the Egyptian army on 6 June.[101] The days between the Egyptian and Russian withdrawals saw the most remarkable international consequence of the rebellion of *Mehmed Ali* for the 1815 European States System. A defence treaty was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia that was known as the 'Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi'*. This came as no big surprise, as there had been rumours about it weeks before the withdrawal of the Russian units.[102] It was the Sultan who first suggested the treaty during an audience accorded to *Orlov* shortly after his arrival.[103] As Temperely highlighted, the Sultan suspected France of helping *Ibrahim,* and resented Britain's refusal to grant naval aid.[104]

The Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* contained six public articles and one secret article, and was signed for a period of eight years with an option to extend it for a further eight years.[105] The treaty stipulated that both states would assist each other militarily upon the request of either party in case of an attack by a third party; however the crucial point was how would a state like the Ottoman Empire, which had been unable to cope with a rebellious governor, go to the aid of Russia in the event of Russia coming under attack? The answer lay in the secret article of the treaty, which allowed for the closure of the Straits to war vessels of any nations at war with Russia, although it was unclear whether the passage of Russian

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[100] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 150

[101] Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 153

[102] Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 22, 1833, F.O. 78/ 224, PRO

[103] H. Temperley, *England and the Near East The Crimea,* (London: Longmans Green and Co. 1936), p. 70

[104] Tempereley, ibid., p. 70. Altındag also claims that Sultan Mahmud learned that France had once considered the replacement of the Ottoman dynasty with a new dynasty, probably led by *Mehmed Ali*, which would be very open to French influence. Altındag (1945), *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[105] For the text of Treaty, see E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, (London: Butterworths and Harrison, 1875), pp. 925-927

vessels would be allowed or not. Russia's immediate gain from this was security against any naval threat from the Black Sea via the Straits. In the long term, the treaty would enable Russia to enter the Straits for defensive purposes in case of any threat to Istanbul, which was not beyond the realms of possibility given Russia's past activities.[106]

As for the reactions of the other great powers to the Treaty, Britain and France instructed their representatives in Istanbul to advise the Ottoman government not to ratify the Treaty.[107] Accordingly, France and Great Britain were resolved to act as the circumstances might appear to require 'equally as if the treaty above-mentioned were not in existence'.[108] Put in simple terms, they said that they would be free to act as they saw fit if the Russia sent military forces to Istanbul. A copy of this note was sent also to the Russian government.[109]

Russia responded to the British and French declaration using the same tone.[110] *Nesselrode*, the Russian Foreign Minister, contended that the Treaty was purely defensive, being aimed only at the preservation of the Ottoman Empire; and that Russia was determined to faithfully carry out its contracted obligations [towards the Ottoman Empire] 'as though the declaration contained in the French and British notes did not exist'.[111] Palmerston reiterated Britain's displeasure at the Treaty; however, the British Chargé d'Affaires in St. Petersburg ended the discussion about the true nature of Treaty by stating that his government 'was resolved not be

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[106] Talleyrand, the French Ambassador in London, commented that the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi, which was stated to be purely defensive treaty, can very easily become an offensive one, see Talleyrand to Broglie, August 2nd May 29th, 1833, in '*Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand', op. cit.*, p.140

[107] Georgiev et al (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 102

[108] F.O. Turkey, 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 27, 1833, F.O. 78/221, TNA and Talleyrand to Broglie, September 19th, 1833, in '*Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand', op. cit.*, p.177

[109] For the British declaration, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, p. 928

[110] Georgiev *et al* (1978) *op. cit.*, p. 102

[111] Bligh to Palmerston, October 24, 1833, F.O. 65/208, TNA

drawn into a controversy upon a question in which it differed so widely from the [Russian] imperial cabinet'.[112]

In fact, the most worrying aspect for Britain regarding the new alliance was the preponderance that Russia had acquired in its relations with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the controversial issue of the Straits. Assurances from the Ottoman Empire and Russia that the closure of the Straits would, in principle, apply to all warships did not help reduce the concerns of Britain and France. The responses of Britain and France will be covered in the following section, after an explanation of how Russia addressed the concerns of her allies in the Holy Alliance, namely Austria and Prussia. As long as the Holy Alliance continued undisrupted, Russia had little to worry about from Britain and France. To that end, Russia called a meeting of the rulers of the three Eastern monarchies on the pretext of becoming better acquainted with the new King of Austria, Franchis.

j. Revival of the Holy Alliance: Munchengratz Agreement between Russia, Austria and Prussia over the Near East

The 1830 Revolution in France and the close relations between Britain and the new dynasty in France convinced the Tsar to share Russia's dominant position with her conservative Eastern brethren. To this end, Russia took the initiative to eliminate the concerns raised by her alliance with the Ottoman Empire and remove doubts about her future intentions among her allies in the Holy Alliance. The result was the signing of the *Munchengratz* Agreement between Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1834, through which Russia was attempting to stop her Eastern allies from joining forces with Britain and France. This resulted in a revival of the Holy Alliance, which had been damaged by the Anglo-Russian-French alliance in the settlement of the Greek issue in 1826–1830.

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[112] Bligh to Palmerston, October 24, 1833, F.O. 65/208, TNA

The Munchengratz Agreement was a type of road map to be followed by the Eastern monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia regarding the issue of the Ottoman Empire. The three powers pledged to cooperate in protecting the existing regime in the Ottoman Empire against any threat. Also, in a secret article, they agreed to prevent any further expansion of *Mehmed Ali*'s authority in the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, and to cooperate should the Ottoman dynasty be overthrown. With that agreement Austria and Prussia forced a compromise from Russia regarding the Ottoman Empire in the event of its collapse – that Russia would not act alone in such a situation, while Austria and Prussia, in return, would remain within the Holy Alliance and not form a block together with France and Britain against Russia.

To conclude, the first rebellion of *Mehmed Ali* had ended with a further increase of Russian dominance over the Ottoman Empire, which by 1833 was not only weak and vulnerable to Russian influence, but also, to some degree, dependent on Russia, partly as a result of the failure of the Concert of Europe. The process to include the Ottoman Empire in the general settlement had started at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, although her existence and stability was vital for the maintenance of peace. This setback further deteriorated after the Ottoman Empire was left at the mercy of Russia in 1828; and the same failure of the Concert of Europe was apparent when the Ottoman Empire, following the devastating war with Russia, was left unsupported against the rebellious governor of Egypt. On both occasions, Russia took advantage of the opportunity to establish her predominance in the Near East; however this situation was affecting the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, which would only be remedied when *Mehmed Ali* again made moves to march on Istanbul in 1839. As will be seen in the second part of this chapter, the predominant position of Russia would be only checked following a profound change in British policies, as the other flanking and relatively structurally independent power in the 1815 European States System. The substantial rise of the British economic interests in 30's and

40's in Near East was the most determining factor in the establishment of the new policies that England would pursue in Near East against Russia.[113]

3. Second March of *Mehmed Ali* on Istanbul in 1839 and the Replacement of the Bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* with the Multilateral Straits Convention in 1841

The *Kutahya* Settlement failed to bring any enduring solution that would be to the satisfaction of either party. Sultan *Mahmud* would continue to reform his empire and regard the administration of *Mehmed Ali* in Egypt and Syria as the biggest obstacle in the way of the restructuring of the state organisation.[114] *Mehmed Ali*'s army was still a threat, even though it had retreated to beyond Adana, and Syria was an important part of the Ottoman Empire, having the population and natural resources that the state badly needed to expand the central government's services.

Despite attracting the initial support of the local people in Syria during the clashes, the implementation of steep taxes and the introduction of conscription by *Mehmed Ali* resulted in unrest among the people, who for centuries had been used to relatively autonomous administration under the Sultans.[115] *Mehmed Ali* found that Syrians were not as submissive as Egyptians, and in some cases he had to resort to military means, resulting in a number of revolts in Syria during the 1834–1839 period.[116]

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[113] Frank Bailey, The Economics of British Foreign Policy, 1825-1850,*The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1940, pp. 449-450 and Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 97

[114] M.Nuri Pasa (1992), *op. cit.*, p. 274

[115] Rodkey (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 44 and over some details of the tax regime and administrative measures prevalent in Syria before 1834, see Kutluoglu (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115

[116] For example, the first revolt broke out at the outset of his administration in Syria in 1834, see, Kutluoglu (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 115

Mehmed Ali was not very comfortable, despite his successes both in the field and around the negotiation tables.[117] He could not militarise Adana and its surrounding region, and therefore continued to feel the pressure of the Ottoman army standing right next door. Secondly, his holdings were subject to renewal every year, meaning that the security of his home and family were not guaranteed as he headed into old age. For this reason he sought hereditary rights for himself and his family over his holdings in both Egypt and Syria.

a. Great Powers and the Near East, 1833–1839

Britain underwent a complete change in policy concerning the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1833, leaving behind her hesitant and defensive attitude for a much more resolute and assertive one to curb Russian dominance in the Near East.[118] As underlined in the previous section, the increasing of the British economic interests in Near East played important role in that shift. To this end, she began collaborating with the new monarchy of France on a new set of agreements known as the *'entente cordiale'*[119]. On the other side, Russia had managed to revive the Holy Alliance block through the *Munchengratz* Agreement, meaning that international alignments by the end of 1833 were almost identical to those forged in 1815 that remained until the Anglo-Russian accord of 1826.

Although Britain and France were aligned against the dominant position of Russia in the Near East, their stand on *Mehmed Ali*'s policies and his sovereignty over Syria was completely different.

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[117]Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838, No. 5, p.45, Communication with *Mehmed Ali*, 1838, printed by T.R. Harrison, London (referred as CMA hereinafter)

[118] Frank. E. Bailey, *'British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement, A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations'*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p.40

[119] The rapprochement between England and France did not result in an alliance owing to the deep differences between two countries over the 1815 Settlements. Therefore, the *'Entente Cordiale'* remained rather as an alignment. For the debate between Talleyrand, who was in favor of an alliance, and Broglie, who considered it not possible, see Broglie to Talleyrand, December 16th, 1833, p. 187-195; Talleyrand to Broglie, December 24th, 1833, p. 195-197; Broglie to Talleyrand, December 30th, 1833, p. 197-198 and Talleyrand to Broglie, January 3rd ,1834, p.188-199 in *'Memoirs of the Prince Talleyrand', ibid.*.

Britain did not consider the transfer of Syria to *Mehmed Ali* as consistent with its modal tendencies,[120] being against anything that undermined the authority and reforms of Sultan *Mahmud*. Secondly, Britain was concerned about *Mehmed Ali*'s policies for expansion. His influence and control over the region of Mesopotamia, which neighboured Syria, could put at risk Britain's land and sea routes to India through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Persian Gulf. The invention of steam power and its use for maritime and rail transport also brought the potential to connect Asia Minor via the Mediterranean, along the Tigris and Euphrates and into the Persian Gulf.[121] As early as March 1834, Palmerston was voicing his concerns: '[*Mehmed Ali*'s] real design is to establish an Arabian Kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself, but as it would be necessary imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be'.[122]

On the other hand, France was quite content with the balance between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali* brought about by the *Kutahya* Settlement. Unlike Britain, France 'looked upon him [*Mehmed Ali*] as, in a sense, a protégé, who was continuing the glories of Bonaparte's short but brilliant Egyptian regime'.[123] In line with its aspirations to expand into North Africa and the Mediterranean basin, France sought to consolidate its influence on Egypt, which had become very significant for its possession of Algiers. France's recent arguments with *Mehmed Ali* through its ambassador in Istanbul, which had ended abruptly with the

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[120] For the details of the British modal tendencies within the 1815 European States System, see p.75

[121] For the details of that project, see Rotkey (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 39

[122] Palmerston to Temple, March 21, 1833, in Bulwer, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 145

[123] J. Marriot, 'The Near East and France, 1829–1847' in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919,* ed. Ward and Gooch, (Cambridge, 1923)

disapproval of Paris, were not based on her objection to placing Syria under the control of *Mehmed Ali*, but on the fear that it would increase Russia's grip on the Ottoman Empire.[124]

Regardless of their deep division over the future of *Mehmed Ali*, the termination of Russian dominance in the Near East was the overriding objective for Britain and France; however this could only be achieved through an annulment of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*. The Quadruple Treaty of 1834 among France, Britain, Spain and Portugal that ended the clash over the Carlist question in Spain facilitated the pursuit of a policy to curb the influence of Russia in the Near East. To that end, as a practical means, the two powers, and Britain in particular, carried out a 'watchful waiting' policy in the Mediterranean through their fleets.[125] Moreover, Britain supported the reform movements of the Sultan and tried to strengthen its commercial ties with the Ottoman Empire. The 1838 Treaty of Free Commerce between the Ottoman Empire and Britain is worthy of mention here for its impacts on Egypt and for its political support of Britain for the Ottoman Empire.[126]

Despite all the differences among the great powers in their pursued objectives between 1833 and 1839, they all had one thing in common: to prevent the start of hostilities between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali*.[127] During this period, for example, the Ottoman government sought to cross into Syria utilising the opportunities that the revolts against *Mehmed Ali*

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[124] Rodkey (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 36–37

[125] Puryear (1969) '*International Economics and Diplomacy in Near East', 1834–1853*, (Archon Books: USA, 1969), p. 15

[126] On the economic and political impacts of the 1838 Treaty of Free Commerce over the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, see S.M. Kutukoglu, *Osmanli-Ingiliz Munasebetleri*, 2 Cilt, (Ankara: 1978). Moreover, Bailey (1940), *op. cit.*, pp.480-481, and Rodkey (1923), *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68

[127] Palmerston to Campbell, February 6, 1838, No.1, p. 3 and Same to Same, No. 4, p. 4, Communications with *Mehmed Ali*, 1838, printed by T.R. Harrison in London (referred as CMA hereinafter)

in Nablus, Jerusalem, Damascus and Acre offered.[128] However Russia warned the Ottoman government that Russia could not assist in this endeavour, as the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* was a purely a defence treaty that could not be invoked if the Ottoman Empire was the aggressor.[129] Russia was aware that the re-appearance of the Russian navy in the Bosporus would provoke the arrival of the British and French fleets into the Sea of Marmara, and so the last thing that Russia wanted was an Ottoman-Egypt clash. Russia, as Gorionov pointed out, was not in favour of war, realising that the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* furnished a constant danger to the peace of Russia in Europe and tried to prevent the circumstances to call it into operation,[130] and a similar stance was taken by the British and French ambassadors in 1834.[131]

International and domestic restraints would hold the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali* only for five years, until June 1839, when the need to address domestic issues far outweighed the international efforts to restrain them. In May 1838, *Mehmed Ali* told British Consul Cambell that he was resolved to be independent,[132] and by April 1839 the armies of both sides were facing each other across the Euphrates and the outbreak of war was imminent.

b. Second Rebellion of *Mehmed Ali* in 1839

The battle that ended the five years of peace between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali* took place in *Nizib* on 24 June. The Sultan would never hear of the crushing defeat of his army, as he died a few days before the news of his loss reached Istanbul. Worse was yet to come, as the Ottoman navy,

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[128] On the details of the revolts and the Ottoman military intervention preparations see, Kutluoglu (1998), *op. cit.*, pp. 114–116

[129] Ponsonby to Palmerston, August 20, 1834, F.O. 78/238, TNA and, Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.*, p.104

[130] S. Goryanof, *Rus Arsiv Belgelerine Gore Bogazlar ve Sark Meselesi* (translated by Macar Iskender and Ali Resad and prepared by A. Ahmetbeyoglu and I. Keskin), (Istanbul: Otuken, 2006), p. 85

[131] Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 25, 1834 F.O. 78/237, TNA

[132] Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838, No 5, p. 4-5, CMA

having set out on a mission to blockade Egypt, was surrendered to the rebels by its commander amid the power struggles among the high officials of the Ottoman Empire upon the death of Sultan *Mahmud*.[133] In the words of Guizot, 'within three weeks, Turkey had lost her Sultan, her army and her fleet'.[134] It seemed that her days were really numbered.

Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government had only one remaining path open to them – negotiating terms for peace with *Mehmed Ali*. The new Sultan sent an envoy with an imperial pardon to *Mehmed Ali*, also offering him the hereditary governorship of Egypt, on the condition that he return Syria and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.[135]

The Sultan's offer and international mediation was not enough to persuade *Mehmed Ali* to yield after his second victory. He informed the General Consuls of the great powers that he had no intention of keeping the Ottoman fleet, and would return it as soon as his hereditary rights for the all places he now held were assured, and the Grand Vizier, *Husrev*, who was his sworn enemy, was removed from the office.[136]

The Ottoman envoy returned to Istanbul bearing a letter to *Husrev Pasha* from *Mehmed Ali* containing the same demands he had expressed to the consuls. As a last desperate measure, the Ottoman government decided to send Minister of Justice *Saib* Effendi to meet with *Mehmed Ali* for fresh talks, contemplating offering him the lifelong governorship of Syria, in addition to the hereditary governorship of Egypt.[137] However, that intended mission did not take place, as it was superseded by a collective

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[133] Karal (2007), *op. cit.*, pp. 197-202

[134] F. Guizot, *Memoirs to Illustrate the History of my Time* Vol.1-5, (London:Richard Bentley, 1861) vol. 4, p. 342

[135] BOA HH, No 4822

[136]Minute of Interview of the Councils, inclosure 4 in No 260, p. 341-342, Part I, Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Levant (referred as CRAL hereinafter)

[137] Hosrew (Husrev) to *Mehmed Ali*, inclosure 6 in No 260, p. 343-344 Part I, CRAL

decision among the great powers that would change the whole course of the Egypt affair.

c. Intervention of Great Powers under the Concert of Europe

The representatives of the great powers in Istanbul delivered a collective note to the Ottoman government on 27 July requesting they suspend all negotiations with *Mehmed Ali.* The collective note offered that the Ottoman government should suspend all negotiations with *Mehmed Ali* and inform him that the affair is now in the hands of the five powers.[138]

The collective note from the five powers came into existence out of a collective desire to avoid the consequences of invoking the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi.* Russia was also in agreement, being aware that the re-appearance of the Russian navy in Istanbul would result in the French and British navies entering the Dardanelles. As had been the case in the *Nizib* War, none of the great powers wanted the situation to deteriorate, but the division between the Anglo-French and Holy Alliance blocks made it impossible to reach a solution that would be acceptable to all.

d. Start of Disagreements between France and Britain over Course of Action on *Mehmed Ali*

As time advanced, disagreements started emerging between Britain and France over how to deal with *Mehmed Ali*, the first of which was related to the return of the Ottoman navy. Britain, naturally, was very sensitive to changes in the balance of power among the naval forces in the Mediterranean, and was in favour of taking a very hard line. In that respect, Palmerston ordered the British fleet in the Mediterranean to use force if necessary and to work together with the French admiral there, whom he hoped would receive a similar order from Paris.[139] This wasn't to

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[138] Palmerston to Ponsonby, August 21,1839, No. 237, p. 311 Part I, CRAL

[139] Palmerston to Admiralty, August 5, 1839, No. 186, p.239, Part I CRAL

be, as on 6 August, the French government decided to reject Palmerston's proposal to take coercive measures against the Egyptian forces.[140]

The second disagreement regarding the settlement of the Egypt issue was much more significant in terms of its long-term implications. As touched upon earlier, France was in favour of formalising the status quo by forcing the Ottoman government to include Syria in the hereditary rights of *Mehmed Ali*, who in return should cede Adana and Crete back to the central administration. This policy was totally inconsistent with the British policy for reasons as have been expressed in the preceding paragraphs.

The stalemate among the great powers would be broken by a Russian policy shift in August 1839. Russia had been aware of the importance of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* Treaty for the structural balance of the 1815 European States System, which was due to come to an end within two years, although there was a possibility for renewal for another eight years. The security that the Treaty was to provide could be gained by dividing the maritime powers, namely France and Britain; while on the other side, the other continental powers of Austria and Prussia posed no maritime threat, and were even structurally dependent on Russia. Based on this, Russia decided to find ways to cooperate with Britain regarding the Egypt issue rather than going it alone. From another perspective, Russia could be seen to be returning 'the favour' that Britain gave in 1826 by leaving Austria to approach Russia for the settlement of the Greek issue, however now it was France that was going to be isolated through the cooperation of the flanking powers of the 1815 European States System.

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[140] Puryear (1968), *op. cit.*, p. 157

e. Second Anglo-Russian Accord for the Settlement of Egypt Issue and the Isolation of France

To discuss matters with the British government, *Nesselrode,* the Russian Foreign Minister, sent Baron *Brunnov* on a special mission to London on 15 September, 1839,[141] where he raised the following points:[142] Russia is ready to consider the closing of both Straits to all warships in times of peace and war. In this respect, his government would consider not renewing the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*; but in return the maritime powers should agree not to dispatch their fleets into the Sea of Marmara should the Russian fleet show up in the Bosporus, which in turn would be at the disposal of the allies to guard Istanbul against *Ibrahim*'s army. Finally, the maritime powers should abandon any idea of concluding a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Palmerston immediately informed French Ambassador *Sebastian* about the Russian proposal. When Sebastian conveyed the proposal to his government, he did so underlining Palmerston's positive assessment of the Russian approach. His assessment was, in fact, heralding under which priorities the matter would be settled, which would be to the advantage of Britain and Russia rather than France. He wrote that the British Foreign Ministry 'was regarding the abolition of the Treaty as ample success', and added that the proposed unilateral action of Russia in Istanbul in case of *Ibrahim*'s advance 'seems to Palmerston to be the action of the five courts and abdication of the exclusive protectorate of Russia'.[143]

The reaction and disappointment of France was not unexpected. Marshal *Solt,* the French Premier, informed his ambassador that the government would not change its policy to leave the hereditary rule of Syria to *Mehmed Ali,* would not to apply coercive measures against him,

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[141] Palmerston to Clanricarde, August 27, 1839, No. 291 p. 375, Part I CRAL

[142] Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 25, 1839, No. 352, p. 438-442, Part I CRAL

[143] Guizot (1861), *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 552-553

and would pass through the Dardanelles should the Russian navy make an appearance in Istanbul. He summarised the French stance thus: 'we will keep our ground'.[144]

The British reply to the Russian proposal arrived on October, 1, and the British Cabinet gave its conditional approval to the scheme. If Russia's military intervention became necessary for the protection of Istanbul, it should take action with the cooperation of the British navy. Palmerston suggested that the cooperation should take place in such a way that the fleets of the two powers should not be brought into contact with each other.[145] This should be done, he suggested, by placing one Strait under the control of one power, while the other Strait would be controlled by the other. Put differently, Britain proposed to Russia what France had so far threatened, that if Russia sent her fleet to Bosporus under the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*, then France would pass into the Dardanelles.

Brunnov expressed that he was not in a position to approve the proposal and would have to relay it to his government. The first leg of the *Brunnov* mission ended with a positive attitude and conditional approval by the British government. *Brunnov* then left London for his original post in Stuttgart.[146]

f. *Brunnov*'s Second Mission to London and the Completion of the Second Anglo-Russian Accord for the Near East: Signing of the London Treaty of 15 July, 1841

The Foreign Minister of Russia, *Nesselrode*, wrote in October 1839 that 'the Tsar received *Brunnov*'s reports with real satisfaction'.[147] Thus,

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[144] The Duc to Dalmatia (Soult) to Sebastian, September 26, 1839, inclosure in No.324, p.408-409 Part I CRAL

[145] Brunnov to Nesselrode, September 26, 1839, No. 342, p. 442-446, Part I CRAL

[146] Rodkey (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 129

[147] ibid.

he instructed *Brunnov* to return to London to conclude a convention on the basis of the British conditions.[148] This attitude of Russia allowed Palmerston to both settle the Egypt question and conclude the issue of the Straits. The price of terminating the Anglo-French entente, which had started with the Quadruple Treaty of 1835, would be worth paying for Britain, since she would achieve the two primary objectives that had been her policy since 1833.

Palmerston wrote to Granville on December 9, 1839 that: "The Russian government agrees to our proposal about the Dardanelles … This will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side with us and Russia – and France if she stand aloof – will be left to herself".[149]

Brunnov, the Russian envoy, submitted the Russian proposals to the British government in January 1840. The proposal contained a provision that *Mehmed Ali* should receive Egypt and the Acre fortress part of Syria in hereditary possession, and return the rest of the territories to the jurisdiction of the Porte; and if he declined, the allies should apply coercive measures. These would include Russia sending its fleet into the Bosporus and landing troops to defend Istanbul on behalf of the Concert if *Ibrahim* advanced into Istanbul. The other allies, namely Britain and France, may pass the Dardanelles and anchor between Gallipoli and Mudanya Bay in the Sea of Marmara. Finally, once the *Mehmed Ali*'s suppression had been achieved, the Ottoman Government would implement her ancient right to close both Straits to all warships in times of peace and war.[150]

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[148] Clanricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839; No. 401, p. 505-506 Part I CRAL

[149] Palmerston to Granvill, Dec. 6, 1839, Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 305–307

[150] Measures suggested by Brunnow for the Settlement of Turco-Egyptian question , Jan. 1840, p. 531-533. Part I CRAL

These proposals were consistent with the proposal of the Ottoman government for the settlement of the Egypt issue, which was to grant *Mehmed Ali* the hereditary possession of Egypt, and in return he would restore the Ottoman fleet and evacuate all the other areas. However the problem was not with the Ottoman Empire, but with France, which was against reducing *Mehmed Ali*'s power. Austria and Prussia, as the continental powers, also did not wish France to remain isolated and tried to reconcile the French demands with those of Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire.[151] To this end, Metternich took action to bring France into the concert of the four powers. Previously, Neumann, the Austrian Ambassador, had suggested that the life-long governorship of Syria could be left to *Mehmed Ali* in order to win French approval for a collective compromise, however his suggestion failed to win over France, which argued that any agreement should be acceptable to both the Ottoman government and *Mehmed Ali*, and that *Mehmed Ali* would not find the conditions acceptable.[152] This time, Neumann, acting under the instruction of Metternich, on 5 May suggested that Syria could be divided into two parts, and the part covering Acre and its surroundings could be retained by *Mehmed Ali*, but before he received a reply on 15 May he amended his proposal, this time suggesting leaving all of Syria to *Mehmed Ali* for the duration of his life.

However, France declined to step back from its previous position. The new French Premier, *Thiers*, declared that 'France could not suggest the proposals to *Mehmed Ali*, he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be sound and well-founded'.[153]

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[151] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 110

[152] Guizot (1861), *op. cit.*,V, pp. 81–82

[153] Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, cited by Hall (1912), *op. cit.*, pp. 267–268

While the negotiations among the five great powers were going on in London, the pressure of the pro-*Mehmed Ali* faction in Istanbul increased for a direct settlement between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali*. It seemed that France was hopeful of a satisfactory result, and was expecting news of a settlement anytime. The removal from office of *Husrev*, the Grand Vizier, and *Mehmed Ali*'s decision to send an envoy to restore the Ottoman fleet raised the hopes of France to this end.

Finally, the determination of France to take Syria out of the control of *Mehmed Ali* and the developments in Istanbul convinced Palmerston and the representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia to agree to a settlement. The Convention of London was signed without France on 15 July, 1840, with the Ottoman representative also appending his signature. The isolation of France meant also the end of the Anglo-French entente over the Near East, having been based on France's strong favouritism towards *Mehmed Ali*.

The London Treaty stipulated that *Mehmed Ali* would be granted the hereditary rule of Egypt and the rule of some regions of Syria for life if he accepted the proposal within 10 days; however if he failed to accept the proposal he would be forced to give up Syria and would risk losing everything. France did not sign the London Treaty due to its humiliation at not being invited by Britain and Russia to take part in drawing it up. Being aware of the opposition of France and counting on the friction among the great powers, *Mehmed Ali* refused the first proposal, resulting in the Sultan making a formal declaration that *Mehmed Ali* had lost all of the rights and concessions given to him previously with regard to the administration of Egypt.

After *Mehmed Ali* had refused the proposal, an Ottoman expeditionary force, reinforced by some European military experts, landed in Lebanon, while a joint navy of the allied great powers blockaded the Syrian cost. After a while, the Ottoman army captured *Akka*, and a local

riot was organised in Syria against the forces of *Mehmed Ali*. Meanwhile, Russia said that it would not object to the dispatch of a joint fleet to Istanbul to defend Istanbul if necessary, which was obviously aimed at France. Realising that he was going to become further isolated, *Mehmed Ali* consented to the hereditary rule of Egypt, bringing to an end the second rebellion of *Mehmed Ali*; however the problem of the 1834 Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* for Britain still remained to be settled.

With the settlement of the Egypt problem, the allies turned to the delicate but strategically important issue of the status of the Straits. The Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* had been signed for eight years and still had two more years to run. Russia, for the sake of an alliance with Britain and to widen further the gap between Britain and France, had tacitly accepted the re-signing of the Treaty, having become well-aware over the last couple of years that the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* would not be as effective as Russia had previously anticipated. This would facilitate the signing of the 1841 Straits Convention, which formally recognised the old principle of the Ottoman Empire – that the Straits would be closed to warships during times of both war and peace. With the signing of the Convention, Britain managed to make all sides accept that the regulation of the passage in the Straits could not be subject to any bilateral, but only multilateral arrangements, which had been the main aim of Britain since the signing of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833.

Conclusion

It was concluded in the second chapter that the capability structure of the 1815 European States System remained mostly unchanged between 1815 and 1856. Therefore, it has been postulated that the structural effects of the 1815 European States System over the Ottoman-Russian relations of this period can be understood and explained from the

processes and interactions taking place between the Ottoman Empire and Russia and the other great powers. [154]

Within this methodological framework, the workings and effects of the structure of the 1815 European States System are attempted to be understood through an analysis of the processes between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and among the other great powers at the time of the rebellion of the governor of Egypt in 1833–1841.

It was argued in the previous chapter that the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 was a milestone for Russia, in that she was thus able to increase and consolidate her influence over the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it is suggested that the increase of Russian influence in Istanbul brought about structural changes with transformational implications in the 1815 European States System.

This advantageous situation induced Russia to reconsider her policy concerning the Ottoman Empire, with her new policy being to keep 'a weak Ottoman Empire' on her southern borders. The reason behind such a shift was that Russia could not predict either the nature or scope of the prospective settlement in case of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; and the existence of a weak Ottoman Empire was at that time her best means of preventing the infiltration of any great power into her southern wing.

Unexpectedly, the influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire turned into predominance as result of the Russian military support of the Sultan against the rebellious governor of Egypt and the signing of the bilateral defence Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833. This was due to the fact that it was only Russia among the great powers that responded to the

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[154] For the relation between the structure of an international system and the processes of its unit states see, Joseph S. Nye, '*Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*', (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006), p. 38

Sultan's request for military support in the face of the advance of *Ibrahim*'s army towards Istanbul.

The crucial gain for Russia that the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* afforded was that she could ensure the Straits were closed to states with which she was at war, so long as the Ottoman Empire remained neutral; and more than that explicit gain, Russia was also able to reinforce her bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. This legal instrument that had been defensive in nature could be effectively used to turn the Ottoman Empire into a mere vassal state under Russia's revisionist modal tendency towards the Ottoman Empire, and her past attitudes and disposition to interfere in the Sultan's domestic affairs.

By 1833, it was only France that was resolute in her attempts to prevent the summoning of the Russian fleet by the Sultan. After its arrival in Istanbul, it was France rather than Britain, whose aid had been sought before requesting Russian support, which actively tried to send the Russian fleet back. The motivation behind the French efforts, apart from general concerns related to the balance of power, was that she did not want lose the advantages to Russia that she had acquired in the Mediterranean over Egypt.

As argued in the second chapter, the primary objective of France after 1815 was to rid herself of the restrictions imposed by the 1815 Settlements. In this respect, she tried to find new areas for influence, and Egypt, and the ambitions of its governor, *Mehmed Ali*, suited very well France's interests. Egypt's significance was doubled for France as a result of her occupation of Algiers in 1830, and the French ruling elite considered *Mehmed Ali* as a French protégé due to his extensive employment of French experts. In the eyes of many French people, *Mehmed Ali*'s modernisation efforts in Egypt were in fact following on from the mission that Napoleon had left uncompleted in 1797. This strong affiliation of France with Egypt explains why the Ottoman Empire sought

Russian rather than French aid against *Mehmed Ali* after Britain declined. However, as a result of the unilateral action of Russia upon the request of the Sultan, the two revisionist states in the 1815 European States System came head-to-head in the Near East. This can be described as the second failure of the Concert of Europe after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1828–1829, in which it was again Russia that benefited at the expense of the other great powers in the Near East, putting the maintenance of the 1815 European States System further at risk.

It was the Sultan's concession that saved the further deterioration of the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System in 1833. The *Kutahya* Settlement between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali* ended the first rebellion of the latter and brought the Russian military into the Bosporus. *Mehmed Ali* gained more than his initial demand of Syria, extending his area of governance to Adana in Asia Minor.

After the departure of the Russian military, the first reaction to the disrupted balance of power in the Near East from the maritime powers of Britain and France was their declaration that they would not recognise the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi. Secondly, they made it clear that their fleets in the Mediterranean would pass through the Dardanelles if the Russian navy showed up in the Bosporus in the implementation of the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi.

The close understanding between Luis Philippe's France and Britain, known as the *Cordiale Entente,* also contributed the cooperation of the two maritime powers against Russia's predominance in the Near East. In reaction, Russia attempted to revive the Holy Alliance The result was the signing of the *Münchengratz* Agreements in 1835 among Russia, Austria and Prussia, who pledged to preserve the Ottoman dynasty against any threat; and in case of its collapse, they would act together so as not to permit an Egyptian expansion of power into the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. This was a sign that Russia was still a

proponent of cooperation with regard to the Ottoman Empire under the confines of the Concert of Europe.

Other than on the point of the elimination of Russian predominance over the Ottoman Empire, there was no common ground between Britain and France. While Britain did not accept the rule of *Mehmed Ali* over Syria, which was located between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean, and thus covered much of her overland and maritime routes to Central Asia and India, France was in favour of consolidating *Mehmed Ali*'s power base, in a way contemplating it as her extension in the Near East.

The stalemate between the *Cordiale Entente* and the Holy Alliance lasted until *Mehmed Ali*'s army defeated the Sultan's army in Nizib in 1839 for the second time, and opened up the way to Istanbul. Unlike in 1833, the great powers acted in concert at the beginning of the second crisis, which meant that the revisionist powers could act with restraint. In other words, Russia would act in moderation and France would act in restriction which was the foundation principles of the 1815 European States System.

The initial agreement to act in concert for the settlement of the issue did not last longer due to France's unwillingness to restrict *Mehmed Ali*, and this led to the second Anglo-Russian accord in the Near East in the 1815 European States System. In the beginning, Russia had acted with restraint by not acting alone in accordance with the defence Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi; and this moderate approach would continue with her consent to replace the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* with a multilateral convention.

The unwillingness of Russia to renew the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* and to take Syria out from under the control of *Mehmed Ali* was enough to convince Britain to give up the *Cordial Entente* with France for concerted European action. As a result, France could not oppose the concerted

actions against *Mehmed Ali,* and remained isolated by the four great powers. This time, the Concert of Europe re-emerged in the form of the Quadruple Alliance against France, however, France would soon join the four great powers when the bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* was replaced with the multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841, which renewed the right of the Ottoman Empire to close the Straits to military vessels on a permanent basis. As to *Mehmed Ali,* France had to accept the offer made by the four great powers that left him the hereditary rule of Egypt and the life-long rule of a small part of Syria.

The Concert of Europe functioned as a peace-making body in the Egypt issue, and was an example of the collective use of hegemony over the states of the second order in the 1815 European States System, ensuring peace by restricting France and moderating Russia. By agreeing to act in concert, Russia was exercising self-restraint, while France, which had declined to cooperate, was forced to act in moderation.

With the Convention of the Straits, Russia gave up all of the advantages she had gained under the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi; but managed to secure her Black Sea shores from maritime threats from Britain and France by accepting the closure of the Straits. What Russia had to accept was the loss of the predominance she had gained by being allowed to dispatch her fleet to the Bosporus with the signing of the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* in 1833. Put differently, Russia returned to her pre-1833 position in her relations with the Ottoman Empire, meaning that she still held great influence over the weakened Ottoman Empire. It would take another decade for Russia to be stripped of the advantages that had resulted from her bilateral treaty rights, and the removal of the constant Russian naval threat to Istanbul from the Black Sea. This issue will be dealt with in the following and final chapter of the thesis.

CHAPTER 5

EXTENSION OF THE 1815 SETTLEMENTS TO THE NEAR EAST, OR THE END OF RUSSIAN PREDOMINANCE OVER THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE CONGRESS OF PARIS

Introduction

The two previous chapters have argued that the interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in the 1815–1841 period led to an increase of Russian influence over the Ottoman Empire and a level of structural dependency of the Ottoman Empire on Russia. This was in part a result of the omission of the Ottoman Empire from the 1815 Settlements; and also partly a consequence of the structural changes with transformational implications resulting from the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian war and the subsequent Treaty of *Edirne* (Adrianople), and then by the defence Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* (1833). Although this structural dependency was decreased somewhat with the replacement of the bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* by the multilateral Straits Convention of 1841, still Russia retained great influence over the Ottoman Empire as a result of her bilateral treaty rights and claims prior to 1815 regarding the administration of the Principalities and Serbia and the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. When those rights and claims were bolstered by Russia's superior military power, and specifically by keeping the Ottoman capital in check through the presence of her naval bases in the Black Sea, the extent of Russia's influence over the Ottoman Empire can be accurately understood. Russia's past behaviour during the Greek issue (1820–1830) offers a good indication of how Russia was able to interpret those treaty rights in accordance with her modal tendencies.

This situation was obviously not compatible with the foundation principles of the 1815 European States System. Therefore, the main question for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System in 1841-1854 was how Russia would use her influential position in the Near

East – whether she would act in moderation and exercise restraint, or try to realise her goals at the expense of the other four great powers.

This final chapter will contain an analysis of how Ottoman-Russian relations were shaped in the 1841–1856 period. In more precise terms, the chapter will explain how Russia was militarily and politically restricted in the Near East, and how the 1815 Settlements were somewhat extended to cover the Ottoman Empire, which they had failed to do in 1815.

Within this overall framework, the first step will be to analyse Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1841–1848 period and the Russian attempts to strike a pre-agreement with Austria and Great Britain about the future of the Ottoman Empire. Then, the political implications of the 1848 revolutions of the 1815 European States System will be briefly discussed; followed by an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian refugee crisis after the 1848 Revolutions and its effect on Ottoman-Russian relations. The second part of the Chapter will be devoted to the Holy Places issue and the Crimean War and its concluding Treaty of Paris.

1. Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1841–1852

The period between 1841 and 1848 was very tranquil in Ottoman-Russian relations, with no remarkable development taking place between the two states. Despite that tranquillity, the Tsar continued in his efforts to strike an agreement between Russia and Britain on a course of action should the Ottoman Empire collapse, for whatever reason. Russia's initiatives in that respect, and Britain's position, were as follows:

a. *Russia's Efforts for a prior Agreement over the Future of the Ottoman Empire with Britain*

With the signing of the London Straits Convention of 1841, Russia implicitly accepted that she could not rely on her bilateral treaty rights with the Ottoman Empire, which became somewhat the subject of the

collective hegemony of the oligopoly of the great powers under the Concert of Europe.[1] However, this did not mean that Russia gave up her privileged position and revisionist objectives. In this respect, the Tsar's ceaseless efforts to reach a prior agreement with Britain in 1844 and 1853 over the future of the Ottoman Empire or the post-Ottoman order in the Near East are worthy of mention. On both occasions Russia's argument was that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was so near that both powers had to agree on a course of action after its disintegration. The Tsar's attempt to reach an Anglo-Russian understanding over the Ottoman Empire in 1844, which will be covered in the following section, can be considered as an example of Russia's 'managed revisionism' in the Near East.

While visiting Britain in 1844, the Tsar raised the issue of a prior agreement over the future of the Ottoman Empire with Aberdeen, the then Foreign Minister. It seemed that the Tsar still held the view that Ottoman Empire was a 'corpse', despite all of the reforms that had been undertaken since 1839.[2] He suggested that the two powers should consult over the steps to be taken in order to avoid a general war among the great powers should the Ottoman Empire disintegrate; however the British government believed that any such scheme would speed up her demise, although not doubting the sincerity of the Tsar regarding the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the government was inclined to interpret his overtures as being based on concerns about the preservation of the order brought about by the 1815 Settlements rather than for any form of aggrandisement.[3]

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[1] For a detailed account of the process of the Russian retreat and its disadvantageous implications for Russia, see V. A Georgiev, N. S. Kinyapina, M.T. Panchenkova and B. I. Sheremet, *Vostochniy Vopros Vo Vneshney Politike Rossiy', Konets 18-Nachalo 20 v*, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1978), p.118-120

[2] The Tsar told Austrian Ambassador Ficquelment in 1833 that he wanted to help the Ottoman Empire, but as it was already a corpse, he would be unable to give it life again. Bolsover, 'Nicholas I and the Partition of Turkey' *Slavonic Review, vol. 27, no: 68*, 1948, p.

[3] J. S. Curtiss, '*Russia's Crimean War*', (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), p. 30 and Georgiev *et al*,(1978), *op. cit.,* pp. 123-124

In a subsequent visit by Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode, both states agreed on the need to preserve the Ottoman Empire for as long as possible; but concurred that 'her collapse was highly likely and that two powers must then confer to decide on a course of action that would remove the danger of a general war'.[4] However, this understanding did not result in a treaty, as each state had different priorities and objectives. While Britain thought that the agreement should consolidate the views and policies of both states with the aim being to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and allow it to stand on its own two feet, Russia believed the agreement should provide a base for cooperation in the post-Ottoman era. Put differently, there was no change in the policies of either power regarding the Near East. Britain would not step back from her policy of maintaining the status quo, and Russia still held on to her revisionist objectives. In this case, an Anglo-Russian agreement on the issue would likely be impossible, as the events leading up to the Crimean War would illustrate.[5]

The second attempt of Tsar Nicholas I to come to a prior agreement with Britain over the future of the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1853, and is popularly known as the 'Seymour Conversations'.[6] This issue will be covered in an analysis of the antagonism between France and Russia over the Holy Places issue; however first an assessment will be made of the most important event in the lead up to the Crimean War and its implications on the 1815 European States System: the 1848 Revolutions.

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[4] Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.,* p.30

[5] S. M. Goryainov, "The secret agreement of 1844 between Russia and England," *Russian Review* (Liverpool), vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 97-115 and vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 76-91, 1912

[6] For a detailed account and concise evaluations of those conversations see G.B. Henderson, Historical Revision, The Seymour Conversations, 1853, '*The Journal of Historical Association*, vol. 18, no. 71, 1933

b. ***1848 Revolutions and the 1815 European States System.***

The 1848 revolutions were a highly significant event that brought systemic changes to the workings of the 1815 European States System and in the domestic regimes of all the great powers, aside from those of Britain and Russia.

The wave of 1848 revolutions started in January 1848 in Palermo and spread to the rest of Italy and France in February, before sweeping over central Europe. The social and economic causes and consequences of those revolutions fall outside the scope of this thesis, and so will not be covered here; however the resulting changes to the political map will be covered in depth. Increasing nationalism was one of the primary causes of the revolutions. Politically, they brought about significant changes in the domestic regimes of France, Austria and Prussia. The consequence of those revolutions and the accompanying social upheavals was the replacement of the ruling elites, who had lived through the Napoleonic wars and were to some extent involved in the forging of the 1815 Settlements, with a new generation of rulers in the governments of all the continental great powers in central Europe. Not even Metternich, who had been involved in the 1815 Settlements and their execution, could escape the effects of the regime changes. This change in the political decision-making bodies of those states was a sign that the restrictive and cautionary effects of the Napoleonic Wars in the processes of foreign policy-making of those states were starting to erode.

It was in France that the most remarkable domestic regime change occurred. France had become a republic with the overthrow the Orleans dynasty, which had replaced the Bourbons in 1830. Napoleon III, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, was elected as the president of the second French Republic under the new constitution that was promulgated after the 1848 Revolutions, but he masterfully succeeded in abolishing the constitution and became the Emperor of France in 1852.

With the 1848 Revolutions, one of the principles of the Concert of Europe, which was to prevent revolutionary movements and preserve the European dynasties, ceased to function, meaning that the nationalist movements would no longer come face-to-face with system-wide coercive measures and resulted in the emergence of a much more suitable environment for the destabilisation of multinational Empires.

As for Ottoman-Russian relations, an immediate effect of the 1848 Revolutions was the crisis of Hungarian-Polish refugees between the two states. After the Hungarian rebellion was suppressed by the Russian army in 1848–1849, around 3,000 Hungarian and Polish refugees fled to the Ottoman territories, among which were many notable political and military figures.[7] The most famous of these were *Kussuth*, the Hungarian insurrection leader, and *Zamoysky*, the Polish General.

Russia and Austria demanded the repatriation of the refugees on the grounds of articles in the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, and the 1774 Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca* between Russia and the Ottoman Empire; however the Ottoman government argued that those treaties did not commit the Ottoman government to the return of political refugees, and declined their demands on the 30 August, 1849. Instead, she settled them in places far from the Austrian and Russian frontiers in accordance with the common practice of the time in international relations for political fugitives.[8]

Russia and Austria reacted. The Tsar sent a special envoy to Istanbul, who on September 4, together with the Austrian Ambassador in Istanbul, requested the return of the refugees on the grounds that they

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[7] For the detailed account of the issue of the Hungarian and Polish refugees in the Ottoman Empire, see B. Nazır, *Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler Osmanlı'ya Sığınanlar,* (Istanbul, Yeditepe Yayınevi 2006)

[8] S. Parakash Sinha, 'Asylum and International Law, the Hague', 1971, cited by D. M. Goldfrank, '*The Origins of the Crimean War*', (UK, Longman Group, 1994), pp. 68–69

were criminals; and threatened to break off diplomatic relations if their demands were not met. The Ottoman government refused to comply, and Austria and Russia suspended diplomatic relations on 17 September, although their ambassadors remained in Istanbul.[9]

This suspension of relations and the threat of war alarmed Stratford Canning, the British ambassador in Istanbul, who wrote to London and to William Parker, the British admiral in Malta, requesting part of the British naval fleet sail to the Dardanelles as a precautionary measure. In his despatch to London, he gave a full account of the matter, including Austria and Russia's threats to break off relations, and stated that he had so far supported the Ottoman government, in agreement with the French ambassador. He added that he hoped 'Her Majesty's Government will sympathise with the Sultan and be earnestly disposed to rescue him, if possible, in some way or other from the necessities of his present position.'[10]

Palmerston, the British foreign minister, had already made up his mind on a course of action even before Canning's dispatch arrived. He wrote in a dispatch to the British ambassador in Paris on 29 September that the only way to avert the crisis between the Ottoman Empire and Russia-Austria would be to make Austria and Russia understand that the Ottoman government had friends who would back and defend her in times of need. To that end, he asked the ambassador in Paris to ask the French be ready to deploy squadrons in the Mediterranean and to take up position in the Dardanelles, ready to sail to Istanbul if invited by Sultan.[11]

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[9] H. Temperley , *England and the Near East The Crimea,* (London: Longman Greens Co, 1936), p. 262

[10] F.O. 78/778, from Stratford Canning, No: 279, September, 16, 1849, cited by Temperley (1936), *op. cit.,* pp. 262–263

[11] Palmerston to Normanby, September, 29, 1849, in Evelyn Ashley, *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple Viscount Palmerston* , two volumes, (London, 1879), vol. II, p. 107–108

Upon receiving the requests from Canning and the Ottoman government, Palmerston immediately told Russian Ambassador F. *Ivanovich Brunnov* on 2 October that Britain would support the Ottoman Empire against any threat.[12] On the same day he obtained the Cabinet's approval to enter into communications with the government of France in parallel with the views he had expressed to Canning in Paris in his 29 September dispatch, and communicated his actions to Canning in Istanbul.[13] British policy regarding the issue was finalised on 7 October, and Canning was instructed accordingly.[14] Palmerston stated that Britain would not hesitate to comply with a request of support from the Ottoman government, and reminded the five powers of their solemn declaration in 1841 to respect the inviolability of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that he believed the French government would be also ready to grant support if sought by the Ottoman government.

France did not want to pass up the opportunity to forge an alignment with Britain, and made similar promises. To that end, the French fleet was also instructed to join the British fleet in the Dardanelles.

In the meantime, the Ottoman government sent a special envoy, *Fuad* Effendi, on a secret mission with a letter in reply to the Tsar. He held several meetings with *Nesselrode* in the second week of October, and a deal was struck to relocate the refugees as far away from the borders as possible.[15] On the other hand, Austria had already decided to separate her diplomatic activities from those of Russia.[16] This parting facilitated to bring an end to the crisis.

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[12] The Memorandum, October, 2, 1849, in Ashley, *ibid.,* pp. 108–109

[13] Palmerston to S.Canning and to Normanby, October, 2 , 1849; in Ashley, *ibid.* pp. 110–113

[14] F.O. 195/325, Palmerston to S. Canning, No. 241 of 7 October, 1849, cited by Temperley (1936), *op. cit.,* p.264

[15] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 70

[16] Ibid., p. 69

The resoluteness of Britain and her leading role in obtaining French support were decisive factors in the reaching of a result, however the development of the crisis and the reactions of Britain and France were a clear signal to Russia that if she did not act with moderation in the Near East, an Anglo-French alliance would be the most likely outcome within the 1815 European States System.

2. The Events Preceding the Crimean War

The events that led up to the Crimean War started with a dispute of symbolic importance over some rights and privileges concerning the use and repair of a number of sites of religious importance for Orthodox and Catholic (the Latin) Christians in Jerusalem. The actions of the involved parties, which turned it from a purely civil matter into the greatest international crisis of the time, offers a good illustration of how far states in the 19th century could use seemingly minor issues to engage in power politics, and how delicate the territorial and political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System truly was.

There were a number of significant events from the start of the dispute over the Holy Places in May 1850 until the outbreak of war in 1854 between the alliance of Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. These events, in chronological order, were the dispute of the Holy Places between the Orthodox and Latin Churches under the patronage, respectively, of Russia and France; the forced entry to the Straits of the French warship on the pretext of carrying the newly appointed French ambassador to Istanbul; the Tsar's attempt to form an Anglo-Russian alliance; the *Menshikov* Mission to Istanbul; and the occupation of the Principalities by Russia.

a. *Question of Holy Places and Russian-French Rivalry in the Near East*

Jerusalem has occupied a special place in the minds of the followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam since time immemorial, irrespective of the sovereignty of the city.

Being aware of the religious significance of the place for all Christian denominations, the Ottoman authorities opened the sanctuaries to all sects, but to varying degrees. There had been no problem in this regard until the beginning of the 19th century, as most of the followers of the Orthodox or Eastern Church were Ottoman subjects, and so had an inherent right to perform services there, while the non-Ottoman Catholics were also given some rights in this regard. In any case, the last word in regulating access lay solely with the political authority, and order in the use of the sanctuaries had been maintained until the 19th century.

The first half of the 19th century witnessed the steady ascendancy of Orthodox influence in Jerusalem, in parallel with the rise of Russian power in international politics. On the other side, the influence of the Latin Church decreased as a consequence of a rise in the domestic influence of secular forces in France after the 1789 revolution[17] and the international restriction of France in the 1815 European States System. The steady growth of the Orthodox Church brought great disappointment and discontent among the Latin community in Jerusalem, and consequently in the Catholic Church.[18]

The first seeds were sown of the 1852 dispute over Holy Places when the Greeks were given the right to rebuild the Church of the Saviour (Holy

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[17] Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 281

[18] The British Consul in Jerusalem reported in 1850 that 'the Latin community had long been dissatisfied with the inefficiency of French protection … but especially within the last few years'. See *ibid*, p. 286

Sepulchre) in 1808 after it had been destroyed by fire.[19] That event ignited a bitter feud between the two sects, as the Orthodox Church replaced the Latin symbols and inscriptions with Orthodox ones during the repair. The Catholic clergy mounted a bitter campaign, asking for their historical rights to be recognised and for the church to be restored in that respect. When its cupola was due for repair, the Catholic Church claimed that it was their right to carry out the repair, and turned to France to mediate in their dealings with the Ottoman authorities.

The second incident related to the 1852 dispute of Holy Places occurred in 1847. During a service held by the Orthodoxies in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, a star of religious importance for Catholics was lost, and naturally, the Catholic community blamed the Orthodox clergy.

France's Demand to Invoke the 1740 Capitulations and the Start of the Holy Places Issue

The complaints from the Catholic Church and their application for state mediation coincided with the desire of Luis Napoleon to have the support of the Church in his domestic politics and to continue the assertive role of France in the Near East. As indicated in previous chapters, successive French governments, as part of their revisionist efforts, had applied policies aimed at playing a more assertive role in the Near East since 1815.

The starting point of the internationalisation of the Holy Places' issue occurred when the French ambassador in Istanbul communicated a request from Napoleon III to the Ottoman government in May 1852 for the return to the Catholic Church of nine Holy Places, on the grounds that

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[19] Report prepared by the Ottoman Government over the emergence and development of the Holy Places in A. F. Turkgeldi, *Mesail-i Muhimme-i Siyasiyye*, (referred as MMS hereafter), vol. I, (prep by B.S. Baykal, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), pp.229-235

they had been assigned to the church by the 1740 capitulations.[20] The request had been endorsed also by representatives of other Catholic countries, including Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sicily and Tuscany.[21] At the same time, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem made a formal request for permission to repair the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre.[22]

Assessing the sensitivity and international implications of the issue, the Ottoman government acted with great caution, taking almost a whole year to deliver its reply to the French Embassy, which it did on 30 December, 1850.[23] The Ottoman government informed the French Embassy of its intention to set up a mixed commission with members from all of the involved parties to make a study of the dispute, since the complexity of entangled historical rights, privileges etc. was making it very difficult for them to reach a fair and quick decision.

France was not satisfied with the Government's decision to defer the issue to a commission, and made a much more serious inquiry on 23 February, 1851 asking 'whether the Porte considers itself still bound to her by the Capitulations of 1740 … and if not, the Porte will understand that the result can only be a serious prejudice to its relations with France'.[24] France's argument was based on the principle that none of the unilateral arrangements, such as the *fermans* (imperial decrees) and concessions giving rights to the Orthodox clergy with regard to the use of the sanctuaries, could invalidate such bilateral arrangements as the 1740 Capitulations between the Ottoman Empire and France. However France

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[20] B. S. Baykal, Makamati-i Mubareke Meselesi ve Babiali,*(Belleten, C. XXIII F. 16, 1949)*, p. 245 and S. Canning to Palmerston, May, 20, 1850, , No. 1, p. 1, Part I, Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek churches in Turkey (referred as CRRP hereafter),

[21] E. Z. Karal, *Osmanli Tarihi*, (Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), p. 226; and S. Canning to Palmerston, June, 5, 1850, CRRP, Part I, No. 3, p. 2

[22] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 79

[23] Aali to Aupick, inclosure in No. 9, December 30, 1850, p. 10, Part I, CRRP

[24] Aupick to Ali, inclosure in No. 12, February 23, 1850, p. 13-14, Part I, CRRP

later moderated its position, consenting to the establishment of the mixed commission after appreciating the complexity of the matter.[25] The French representative, *M. de Lavalette,* proposed a settlement that envisioned the joint use of three of the nine places under the sole possession of the Orthodox Church,[26] as the remaining other six places were already in common use.

Following this French proposal, the Ottoman government, considering a resolution to allow all of the holy places of the Christian faith in Jerusalem to be opened for use by all, informally inquired whether France would consent to sharing the sacred places, other than the nine currently disputed sites under the sole use of the Catholic Church. De Lavelette turned down the proposal, saying that no such demand had been made by the Orthodox community for the use of the sacred places possessed by the Catholic Church.

Intervention of Russia on behalf of the Orthodox Church

The Orthodox community in Jerusalem was aware of the French request in Istanbul, and so it did not take long for Russia to intervene. Russia was content with the existing situation, in which the Orthodoxies had an advantage, and so did not want the balance to change in favour of the Catholics. To this end, Russia was adamant that there should be no change to the status quo.[27] Apart from her efforts in Istanbul in the Ottoman court, Russia also tried to dissuade France from pursuing the matter any further, since it would also disturb further the situation among the Christians in the Levant.[28]

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[25] S. Canning to Palmerston, May,19, 1851, No. 15, p. 16, Part I, CRRP

[26] S. Canning to Palmerston, September, 17, 1851, No. 17, p. 18, Part I, CRRP and Same to Same, November, 4, 1851, No. 20, p. 19-20, Part I, CRRP

[27] Nesselrode to Titov, 21 January, 1851, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Russii fond Posol'stvo v Konstantinople 213, quoted by Goldfrank, ibid, p. 80–81

[28] Kiselev to Nesselrode, 28 April, 1851, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Russii fond Posol'stvo v Konstantinople 213, quoted by Goldfrank, ibid, p. 81

When all efforts failed to dissuade the French and to prevent the Ottoman government from processing the French request, Russia decided to become actively involved in the matter. Russian Ambassador M. D. Titov had an audience with the Sultan and conveyed a message and two letters of the Tsar. Nicholas I stated in his letters, which were addressed to the Sultan in person, that there should be no 'unjust concessions regarding the religious establishments that have been possessed since time immemorial by the Greek Church and visited by annually by my subjects by virtue of the treaties that fortunately exist between our countries'.[29] In this way Russia was stating that it would not allow any change to take place regarding the possessions of the sanctuaries in dispute, that is, a change in the status quo that currently favoured the Orthodox Church.[30]

Upon the reaction of Russia, the Ottoman government proposed the common use of all of the places in dispute. In this way it was trying to meet the demands of both states, while asking considerable concessions from the French side. However, the proposal was rejected by both sides,[31] and, moreover, the rivalry between the two countries reached the level of threats to break off relations with the Ottoman Empire unless their demands were met.[32]

The works of the Commission were superseded by the diplomatic disputes; however the Commission had already reached a deadlock in the discussion related to the validity of some of the documents presented by

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[29] The Letter of Nicolas I to Sultan Abdulmecid in MMS, Turkgeldi, ibid, pp. 236-237

[30] S. Canning to Palmerston, September, 17, 1851, No. 17, p 18, Part I, CRRP

[31] S. Canning to Palmerston, November, 4, 1851, No. 20, p.19-20, Part I, CRRP

[32] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.* p. 3

the Orthodox members, who subsequently decided not to participate any further.[33]

Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government decided to replace the mixed commission with the new one, comprising only leading Muslim experts and scholars, to examine the rights and privileges of the two sides under the existing treaties and *fermans* (imperial decrees).[34]

Findings of the New Commission and Disagreements over its Conclusions

The new commission concluded its assessments towards the end of the year after a meticulous study of all the relevant documents and claims. Its first conclusion was that the 1740 Capitulations between France and Ottoman Empire did not supersede the previous unilateral *fermans* that had granted certain rights and privileges to the Orthodox Church in regard to the use of the Holy Places. Secondly, Russia, in contrast to the position of France, had no right to act on behalf of the Jerusalem Orthodox Church for the Holy Places, whose rights only came from the *fermans* issued by previous Sultans.[35]

On the basis of these two main principles, the Commission submitted its report and recommendations to the Ottoman government, which approved the conclusions and recommendations with slight modifications.[36]

In accordance with the Commission report, the Ottoman government prepared a note addressed to France and issued a *ferman* to

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[33] Goldfrank (1979), *op. cit.,* p. 82

[34] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 3

[35]The Report prepared by the Ottoman Government over the emergence and development of the Holy Places in Turkgeldi, *op. cit.,*pp. 229-235

[36] Protocol of the Council of Ministers over the Issue of the Holy Places, in, Turkgeldi, *op. cit.,* pp.239-253

the Jerusalem Orthodox Church for the settlement of the Holy Places dispute. The French note gave the Catholics two keys to the north and south doors of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, and a key to the Grotto of the Nativity. The Latin priests and the Ottoman subjects of the Catholic religion were to be admitted to the Tomb of the Blessed Mary to perform their services on the condition that they make no alterations, either in the administration or in the existing state of the monument.[37] As for the repair of the dome of the Church of Saviour, the works were to be carried out by the Ottoman government in consultation with representatives of all parties.[38]

On the other hand, the *ferman* to the Orthodox Church, which was issued later than the French note, underlined that the new arrangements would not permit any alteration to the existing state of the sanctuaries or their contents. The government also decided that there was no need to read the *ferman* out but only to register, advising that it be kept and produced only in case of emergency.[39]

Contrary to the expectations of the government, the dispute did not end with these decisions, as the stipulations contained within the 'French Note' contradicted the *ferman* issued to the Orthodox Church. While with the 'French Note' the Ottoman government intended to maintain her treaty obligations with France and with the other Catholic powers, on the other hand, she tried to preserve the existing states of affairs of the Orthodox Church with the *ferman*. In simple terms, she to an extent tried to satisfy both sides by giving and taking to and from each side.[40]

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[37] Aali to Lavalette enclosure in No. 37, February 9, 1852, pp. 37-38, Part I, CRRP

[38] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 4

[39] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* pp. 5-6

[40] Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, November 20, 1852, No. 51, pp. 47-49, Part I, CRRP

It seemed that the government had tried to meet the demands of both sides, that is, the restoration of the rights of the Catholics and the preservation of the status quo for the Orthodox; however the way the note and *ferman* were formulated fell short of achieving that goal, and so the dispute did not end there. The persistent interventions and threats of the French and Russian representatives prevented the Ottoman government from reaching a precise and final decision in the dispute.[41]

The Ottoman government, in October 1852, sent its commissioner to execute the decision. The Commissioner read out the order of the Sultan in the presence of the consuls of Russia, France and Austria, permitting the Catholics to celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. When he was asked to read out also the *ferman,* he replied that he did not have it in his possession, and that his instruction did not cover the promulgation of the *ferman,* upon which the Russian consul walked out of the ceremony. [42] This was only a partial execution of the decision, and it was not until December that its execution could be completed. On 22 December the Latin Patriarch deposited the Silver Star with great ceremony in the sanctuary in Bethlehem, and two keys to the sanctuary were handed over to the Catholic clergy. In the words of the British Consul,' the Greeks (Orthodox) felt this severely and were highly indignant'.[43]

b. *Arrival of the French Warship in the Bosporus*

France did not hesitate in using threatening language in her relations with the Ottoman Empire in the context of the Holy Places issue. Her representative in Istanbul on one occasion mentioned the need to dispatch the French fleet to the Dardanelles to force the Ottoman government to adhere to her commitments after she abolished the mixed

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[41] Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, December 4, 1852, No. 53, pp. 49-50, Part I, CRRP

[42] Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, October 27, 1852, No. 49, pp. 44-46, Part I, CRRP

[43] Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury, October 27, 1852, No. 49, pp. 44-46, Part I, CRRP

commission.[44] When the Ottoman Empire issued the *ferman,* which contained phrases that were out of accord with the French note of 9 February, France protested harshly, and even accused the Ottoman government of yielding to Russian threats.

Naval intervention became possible when *Lavalette* returned to Istanbul as ambassador. The French government sent its new steam-powered warship *Charlemagne* to Istanbul on the pretext of carrying the ambassador. Although permission for passage in the Dardanelles was given on the spot by a special decree of the Sultan, Russia and Britain protested that the event was in explicit violation of the 1841 Straits Convention.[45] In response, the Ottoman and French governments confirmed that such acts would not be allowed to happen, however the French naval show did not end there. On two separate occasions, France made a show of strength to the Ottoman provincial administrators in Tripoli and Epirus when her requests were not met by the local rulers,[46] which compelled Russia to adopt a harsh stance against the Ottoman Empire. Before relating the Russian reactions, first, the consequences of the demands of both states in the context of the Holy Places issues will be addressed.

c. Differences in the Consequences of the Demands of France and Russia over the Holy Places Issue

There was a huge difference in the implications of the French and Russian demands concerning the Holy Places issue for the Ottoman Empire. France's demands were very clear, under the 1740 Capitulations in that they were limited to the Catholic clergy's spiritual and religious functions and the ecclesiastical establishments, and had nothing to do with the Catholic subjects of the Sultan. Russia's position, on the other

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[44] Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, December 4, 1852, No. 53, pp. 49-50, Part I, CRRP

[45] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *op. cit.,* p. 132

[46] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 94

hand, was very different, since she was citing Article VII of the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774) and her own wide interpretation of its contents in her demands.[47] Therefore, her argument was based around not only the Orthodox Church and its ecclesiastical establishments, but also the protection of the 12 million Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.[48] In fact, Article VII merely committed the Ottoman government to protect the Christian religion and its churches,[49] and had nothing to do with the Holy Places issue, as both sides were Christian. This situation raised the suspicions of Britain and Austria against Russia since her arguments threatened to undermine the loyalty of the majority of the Sultan's non-Muslim subjects and shifted their sovereignty to the Tsar.[50]

d. Menshikov Mission to Istanbul and Seymour Conversations in St. Petersburg – Preparing the Ground for War

The Ottoman government's decision regarding the Holy Places was taken by the Orthodox Church and Russia as a breach of the promise to maintain the status quo given to Russia by the Sultan. They considered it the work of a pro-French clique lead by Foreign Minister *K. Fuad.*[51] The conclusion had wounded *Nicholas I* too deeply for him to accept defeat.[52] In fact, as Goldfrank pointed out, the Ottoman government did not concede to all the demands of the French government but had actually tried to strike a balance between the demands of the two sides. [53]

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[47] Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, December 5, 1852, No. 54, pp. 50-51, Part I, CRRP

[48] Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, December 5, 1852, No. 54, pp. 50-51, Part I, CRRP

[49] Temperely, p. 295–296 and for an excellent assessment of the article 7 and 14 of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca and their misinterpretation by the number of scholars, see Roderic Davision (1976) 'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered, *Slavic Review* Vol. 35, No.3.

[50] Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 296

[51] Georgiev *et al* (1978), *loc. cit*

[52] Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 301

[53] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 79

For Russia, the issue went way beyond the possession of some keys and places of worship, as their concern was based on the change to the status quo that had prevailed since the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War and the concluding Treaty of Adrianople in the Near East. As touched upon in the previous chapters, the policy of Russia with regard to Ottoman Empire shifted from bold revisionism to managed or controlled revisionism after 1829, with the main intention being to preserve the weak Ottoman Empire, so long as it remained under the influence of Russia. The French attempt to revoke the 1740 Capitulations was interpreted as a challenge to Russia in the Near East, however France was the last power that Russia could bear to see increase her influence in the Near East. France was pursuing a policy for the revision of the 1815 Settlements, and had been the traditional ally of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until the beginning of the 19th century. Therefore, the French challenge could have been tolerated in Egypt, for example in 1839, but not in Istanbul in 1852, specifically a challenge from Napoleon III.

In the eyes of the Russian statesmen, the Ottoman Empire gave in to the French demands under the threat of French reprisals, and very recently, Austria, likewise, had succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Empire to accept her demands in the Montenegrin crisis.[54] Similarly, if this was the way to handle affairs with the Ottoman Empire, Russia had to prove her political weight in the Near East. It had to take coercive action and force the Ottoman government to make good on the broken promises made to the Tsar, and to restore the status quo for the Orthodox Church. To this end, Nicolas I decided not to send any further personal communications to the Sultan, since his letter had not produced anything different but to send extraordinary envoy to Istanbul. Moreover, he decided to mobilise two army corps in the Balkans and speed up the

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[54] Curtiss, ibid, p. 87

preparations of her Black Sea fleet to demonstrate his seriousness over the issue.[55]

However, the Tsar was aware of the international implications of any military action against Ottoman Empire without the consent or agreement of Britain, at the very least, and so *Nicholas I* decided also to attempt to revive the 1844 agreement with Britain. In the meantime, the new British government, under the premiership of Lord Aberdeen, who had taken part in forging the 1844 agreement, raised the hopes of *Nicholas I* to ally with Britain in the Near East against France in 1853 as it had over the Greek and Egyptian issues in 1826 and 1839.

The Tsar's initiative to look for cooperation with Britain in the Near East resulted in meetings between the Tsar and British Ambassador Hamilton Seymour in St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1853. The 'Seymour Conversations' failed to reach their objectives, serving rather to raise the suspicions of Britain over the Tsar's intentions for the Ottoman Empire, and would become a milestone in Anglo-Russian relations regarding the Near East and pave the way for Anglo-French Alliance in Near East.

The first meeting, although brief, is the most referenced, taking place on 9 January, 1853 over dinner. The Tsar, after remarking on the new Aberdeen government, said: 'The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces; the fall will be a great misfortune. It is very important that Britain and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised'. Then he continued, 'we have a sick man on our hands, it will, I tell you

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[55] Seymour to Russell, January, 13, 1853, No. 92, p. 79, Part I, CRRP

frankly, be a great misfortune, if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made'.[56]

Following this short but striking conversation, the Tsar met Seymour again on 14 January and elaborated his views. He assured Seymour that Russia was not on any territorial quest and that he considered the Ottoman Empire to be a good neighbour as it was not aggressive. However, he said, she had fallen into decay and could die very soon; and while nobody wanted that to happen, if it did, she would not be able to rise again. He therefore suggested that it would be wise to make plans for a course of action beforehand rather than face 'the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of European war if it should occur unexpectedly and before some ulterior system has been sketched'.[57]

The British statesmen, in the beginning, were not alarmed by Tsar's views, considering them to be the same as those expressed by him in 1844,[58] however the Tsar revealed that he had more in mind when he approached Seymour at a ball and asked for the reply of the British government to his offer. On learning that the British government did not consider that Ottoman Empire to be at the end of her life, and consequently was not in favour of a scheme that could stir up trouble, his reaction was, 'I repeat to you that the sick man is dying.'[59]

The last of the series of meetings was on 21 February, when *Nicholas I* set out some details of his 'gentlemen's agreement'. He explained that his intention was to demonstrate that Britain and Russia had a common interest in providing ready access to the Black Sea and the

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[56] Seymour to Russell, January 22, 1853, No. 1, pp. 1-3, Part V, Eastern Papers (hereafter cited as EP),

[57] Seymour to Russell, January 22, 1853, No. 2, pp. 3-6 Part V, EP

[58] J.V. Puryear, 'New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1931, p. 230

[59] Seymour to Russell, February 21, 1853, No. 5, pp. 8-9, Part V, EP

Mediterranean. When Seymour raised the position of Austria during the meeting, the Tsar said, 'When I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well, what suits the one suits other; our interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identical' [60] Seymour regarded these words as the understanding having been struck between Austria and Russia regarding the Ottoman Empire. Then *Nicholas* elaborated some details of his proposal for the setting of the post-Ottoman order: 'The Principalities and Serbia would remain under Russian protection, as they have since the beginning of the 19th century; Bulgaria can be an independent state; Britain should occupy Egypt,' and added that if Britain wants that he would not object to Candia (Crete) as well.[61] As for the status of Istanbul, Seymour wrote, 'He especially employed precise terms with respect to commercial policy to be observed at Constantinople when no longer held by the Turks', but with regard to its political status, he wrote that 'his Majesty is intentionally inexplicit as to its temporary occupation'.[62]

On the following day, *Nesselrode* sent a verbal note to Seymour to soften the position of the Tsar, asserting that the Tsar was not proposing the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, but was rather ensuring that each side avoid acting at cross-purposes.[63]

The meetings between *Nicholas I* and Seymour would determine the British position with regard to Russia for the next two decades. Rather than gaining an ally, the Tsar made the British government suspicious of his intentions in the Near East. His efforts to come to an understanding, or, in his terms, 'a gentlemen's agreement' in 1853 for what he had already proposed in 1844 about a course of action in the event of the

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[60]Seymour to Russell, February 22, 1853, No. 6, pp. 9-12, Part V, EP

[61] Seymour to Russell, February 22, 1853, No. 6, pp. 9-12, Part V, EP

[62] Ibid.

[63]Zayonchkovskiy, *Vostochnaya Voyna v Svyazi s Sovremennoy ey Politicheskoy Obstanovkoy*, 4 volumes, (St. Petersburg, 1908–1913), Prilozheniye, p. 362

collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a significant role in the shift of Britain to the side of France. Seymour concluded from his meetings with the Tsar that Russia had already made up her mind and had come to an agreement with Austria about the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, and was trying to win Britain over to complete the isolation of France.[64]

Menshikov Mission

The choice of *A. S. Menshikov* as the special envoy to send to Istanbul indicated the importance of the mission for *Nicholas I*, being one of the most influential dignitaries in the Russian imperial court and also personal friend of the Tsar.[65] However, he had been the former general governor of Finland so that he lacked the necessary experience and knowledge about the Near Eastern affairs.[66]

His instruction contained three main goals:[67] Firstly, he was to secure a new *ferman* from the Sultan confirming the Orthodox privileges as they had existed in February 1852. In that respect, the repair of the cupola of the Church of the Nativity was to be carried out under the control of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. Secondly, a new convention or *sened* (unilateral commitment by the Ottoman government) was to be obtained from the Sultan granting and guaranteeing all of the rights and privileges to the Orthodox subjects of Sultan for the future. This would acknowledge Russia's right to protect the Orthodox subjects and would have the force of a treaty. To that end, *Menshikov* was given a draft of seven articles.[68] Thirdly, the religious influence of France had to

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[64] Seymour to Russell, March 22, 1853, No. 7, pp.12-13, Part V, EP

[65] A. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe 1825-1878*, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: George Wahr Pub. Comp., 1954), p. 140

[66] Tarle says that Menshikov wrote to his Austrian General friend that he hoped the Istanbul mission would be his last active job and he never understood why they were conducting negotiations with Muslims about an issue concerning the churches. E.V. Tarle, *Kirimskaya Voyna*, 2 Volumes, (Moscow, 1944), p. 157

[67] Zayonchkovskiy (1908-1913), Pril., I, *op. cit.,* p. 374

[68] Ibid., pp. 376–377

be checked in Near East. Actually, this instruction, although specifying religious influence, hinted at the overall influence of France given that the number of Catholic subjects of the Sultan were very limited To curb the influence of France, *Menshikov* would offer to sign a secret defensive and limited alliance with the Ottoman Empire if she hesitated in signing a convention with Russia about the rights and privileges to her Orthodox subjects because of fear of France.

Moreover, the instruction stated that he should refuse to deal with Foreign Minister *Fuad,* who had convinced the Sultan to break his pledge to the Tsar and was the driving force behind the pro-French faction.

As Goldfrank pointed out, *Menshikov*'s portfolio of instructions prepared him mentally and operationally not for negotiations, but for diktat.[69] His journey to Istanbul, with an accompanying delegation, was also consistent with his instructions, starting with a visit to the 5th Corps, which had already been ordered to mobilise,[70] after which he called in on Sebastopol where the Black Sea fleet was anchored, where a great military display was held by the navy in his honour. He finally arrived in Istanbul aboard a warship.[71] His delegation included the son of *Nesselrode*, Vice Admiral *Kornilov*, the Chief of the Black Sea Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Corps. All of these details can be considered as a response to the French naval show of force during the negotiations of the Holy Places issue the previous year, and a challenge to Russian influence in the Near East.[72]

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[69] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p .133

[70] Seymour to Russell, February 10, 1853, No. 92, p. 79, Part I, CRRP

[71] Rose to Russell, March 7, 1853, No. 104, p. 86, Part I, CRRP

[72] B. Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 118–119 and A. J. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1954), pp. 49–51

The menacing aspects of the *Menshikov* mission did not end with his arrival in Istanbul, but went on unabated for the duration of his stay in Istanbul, as we see shortly. The first of them was to refuse to see the Foreign Minister *Fuad Pasha*, which was unusual in the diplomatic practices so that the British and French representatives were alarmed.[73] After visiting the Grand Vizier (equivalent to the post of Prime Minister in the Ottoman Empire), he deliberately bypassed the office of Foreign Minister *Fuad Pasha* in the adjoining room of the Grand Vizier,[74] an act that was in clear violation of established diplomatic traditions and practices. This snub to *Fuad* was due to his perceived impartiality during the negotiations for the Holy Places issue. Upon that intended explicit insult, the Foreign Minister resigned and was replaced by *Rifat Pasha.*[75]

It seemed that the Ottoman government had made up its mind to act with patience and restraint, and this would be a key characteristic of the Ottoman stance for the duration of the *Menshikov* mission.[76] The goal was not to give any pretext to Russia or lose the support of the European public, which had been very favourable to the Ottoman Empire due to her firm stance against Russia in the issue of the Hungarian refugees in 1849.

The same mood of restraint did not prevail in the British and French Embassies, where the harsh and unusual behaviours of *Menshikov* at the outset of his mission had rung alarm bells. Accordingly, they asked their governments to dispatch their respective fleets to Istanbul.[77] British Chargé d'Affaires Hugh Rose asked Admiral W. D. Dundas to dispatch the Mediterranean squadron to Istanbul, who declined the request but informed the Admiralty. France, on the other hand, sent her fleet, not to

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[73] Rose to Russell, March 7, 1853, No. 105, pp. 87-88, Part I, CRRP

[74] Rose to Russell, March 3, 1853, No. 102, p. 85 Part I, CRRP

[75] Rose to Russell, March 7, 1853, No. 110, p. 91, Part I, CRRP

[76] Karal (2007), *op. cit.*, pp. 228-230

[77] Rose to Russell, March 3, 1853, No. 102, p. 85 Part I, CRRP
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Istanbul, but to Salamis Bay in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British government endorsed Dundas' decision not to act, as Aberdeen still believed that the French menaces towards the Ottoman Empire the previous year had given Russia a pretext for its actions, besides which he tended not to see eye-to-eye with France.[78] The refusal to send the squadron by the British government seemed to increase the resoluteness of Nicholas I in his bid towards the Ottoman Empire. However the British government, rather than sending its navy, decided to send Stafford Canning back to Istanbul to take up the post he had left six months earlier. Canning's orders were to put pressure on France to settle the unseemly dispute of the Holy Places, and his presence would prove to be much more effective in the *Menshikov* negotiations than the presence of the fleet. He was instructed 'to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war and to persuade the powers interested to look to an amicable termination of existing disputes.' Moreover, he was authorised to ask for the Mediterranean fleet to be held in readiness, but the final order for its deployment would be in the hands of the government.[79]

In the meantime, *Menshikov* had presented a *note verbale* to the Ottoman government on 16 March. In his note, he was accusing the Ottoman government of breaking its promises regarding the preservation of the status quo in the use of the Holy Places, and asking it to remedy the damages that had been incurred. To that end, Russia was requesting an arrangement be made that covered not only the Orthodox clergy and church, but also all of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman State, citing that she 'can no longer be confined to barren and unsatisfactory promises which may be broken at a future period.' To this end, *Menshikov* submitted a draft *sened* on 22 March that included guarantees of the religious welfare of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[80]

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[78] Aberdeen to Clarendon, 21 March, 1853, cited by Temperely (1936), *op. cit.*, p. 312

[79] Clarendon to Stafford, February 25, 1853, No. 94, pp. 80-82 Part I, CRRP

[80] Note Verbal addressed by Prince Menshikov to the Ottoman Minister for Affairs, March 16, 1853, No. 160, pp. 147-150, Part I, CRRP

The preamble of the draft explicitly referred to the 1774 *Kucuk Kaynarca* Treaty, stating as its intention 'to better explain and make precise the terms and the meaning of articles VII, VIII, XIV and XVI of the treaty concluded in the year 1774 at *Kucuk Kaynarca* and confirmed by subsequent treaties and that of Adrianople' for the constant protection of the Christian religion in the Ottoman Empire and all its churches.[81] Moreover, it suggested life tenure for the Orthodox patriarchs, which would make them practically independent, with no responsibility to the Ottoman state, even in their civil duties.

Those proposals in the form of convention or *sened*, bilaterally committing the Ottoman Empire to Russia, would have very serious consequences for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman state, and consequently for the future of the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, as the demands covered not only the Orthodox Church and its clergy, but also the Orthodox lay-subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The text of the note and draft emphasised coverage of 'the Orthodox religion' as well as for 'its clergy and benefices' in the Empire. Even if the demand for protection had been restricted to the clergy, it would still have serious consequences for the integrity and independence of Ottoman Empire, given that the Orthodox clergy were responsible for carrying out civil duties related to the 12 million Orthodox subjects of the Sultan under the unique *'Millet System'*.[82] As pointed out earlier, the French demands under the 1740 Capitulations covered only the protection of her own Catholic nationals and the Latin monks, and had nothing to do with the Catholic lay-subjects of the Sultan. As such, Russia's demands

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[81] Draft of the convention presented by Menshikov to the Ottoman Minister for Affairs, in Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit*., pp. 254-257 and Project of Secret Treaty proposed to the Porte by Prince Menshikov, enclosured in No. 153, pp. 135-138, Part I, CRRP

[82] For a detailed definition of the Millet System and about the legal status of none Muslims in the Ottoman Empire see, G. Bozkurt, *Alman-İngiliz Belgelerinin ve Siyasi Gelişmelerin Işığı Altında Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandışlarının Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914),* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996)

would definitely place Russia over France in respect of influence in the Near East, and would amount to a serious disruption in the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System.

The first round of negotiations in Istanbul between the new Foreign Minister *Rifat* and *Menshikov* lasted for 12 days.[83] *Rifat* succeeded in convincing *Menshikov* during their negotiations to separate the issue of the Holy Places from the issue of the convention or *sened* guaranteeing the future of the religious welfare of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman state.[84] As a result, with the mediation of British ambassador, it did not to take long for a settlement to be reached on the Holy Places to which the Catholics also agreed. The last objections of Russia regarding the proposal, communicated on 19 April, were addressed, and the Ottoman government promulgated on 5 May two *fermans* bringing to an end the two-and-a-half year issue of the Holy Places.[85]

After successfully concluding the Holy Places issue, Menshikov reopened the last and most significant and controversial part of his mission: to obtain a *sened* or convention agreeing that Russia had a right to protect the Orthodox religion and its followers under Ottoman sovereignty. To that end, he sent a new note on 5 May to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The note was in fact an ultimatum, giving the Ottoman government five days to reply, and threatening to leave with the embassy staff in the event of non-compliance.[86] He also enclosed a new draft *sened* (written promise) or convention that was almost identical to that of 22 March, apart from a few modifications, making no mention of the Treaty of

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[83] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1954), *op. cit.*,p. 142

[84] Kudus ziyaretgahlari meselesi hakkinda Prens Menchikov ile muzakereye memur olan Hariciye Naziri Rifat Pasa tarafindan netayic-i muzakerati havi makami sadarete takdim olunan tezkire sureti, in Turkgeldi (1987) *op. cit.*, pp. 257-264.

[85] Stratford Canning to Clarendon, May 3, 1853, No. 180, pp. 170-174, Part I, CRRP

[86] Baykal (1949), *op. cit.,* p. 256

Kucuk Kaynarca or the patriarchs' life tenure.[87]   The first article of the draft stated that no change should be made in the rights and privileges of the Orthodox churches that they had enjoyed until that time and the Ottoman Empire was to assure these forever on the basis of the strict status quo.[88] No change should be made in the rights, privileges, and immunities that the churches, the pious institutions and the Orthodox clergy had enjoyed or were in their possession *ab antique* in the states of the Ottoman Sublime Porte, which is pleased to assure these to them forever on the basis of the *strict status quo* existing today. Additionally, the second article granted automatically to 'the Ottoman Orthodox cult' any rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman government in the past or in the future to the other Christian cults by means of treaties, conventions or particular dispositions'. [89]

However, *Menshikov*'s negotiating position was not as strong as it had been during the first round concerning the Holy Places dispute, as he now seemed to be requesting something that was beyond the religious rights and privileges of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was aimed explicitly at establishing the Russian ascendancy and political predominance in the Near East over the 12 million Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Even British Premier Lord Aberdeen, who was favourable to Russia, said that *Menshikov*'s demands were 'certainly unreasonable',[90] and both the English and French ambassadors advised the Ottoman government to resist. On 7 May, the British ambassador suggested that Rifat promise 'to redress any grievances fairly made out on behalf of the Greek Church and to confirm and to carry into effect all the established rights and privileges already secured by imperial favours to the Christian religion'; while the French ambassador informed the

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[87] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 151

[88] Note from Menshikov to Rifat, May 5, 1853, enclosed in No. 179, pp. 165-167, Part I, CRRP

[89] *Ibid*

[90] Temperly (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 321

Ottoman government that concession to the Russian demand for the *sened* would be in breach of the 1740 capitulations, and so had to be resisted.[91] Both declined to give the Sultan a blank cheque regarding naval aid. But later Stratford Canning hinted that he would deploy the fleet if Istanbul was under imminent threat.[92] All of these overtures from the ambassadors of the maritime powers consolidated the stance of the Ottoman government for the refusal of the Russian ultimatum.

The Ottoman government responded to the ultimatum of 5 May with a conciliatory note on 10 May stating that 'the Sublime Porte is entirely disposed to observe scrupulously the religious immunities which all the subjects of the Sublime Porte enjoy … even though the intentions of the Russian government may be friendly, but should a government make with another government a *sened* on such a delicate question … it is evident to all in general that it is not only entirely contrary to the rights of governments, but that it destroys the foundation of sovereign independence'.[93] The Ottoman government, as expected, was following a very strict and clear-cut policy during all negotiations to reject any commitment to a third state about the rights and privileges of her Orthodox subjects. It rightly argued that such a commitment to a third state in the guise of a *sened* or convention would mean a violation of her sovereign rights and the transfer of her sovereignty over some 12 million Orthodox citizens to Russia.[94]

Menshikov, on receiving the reply, did not immediately pack up and leave, but rather extended the ultimatum to 14 May with the hope of obtaining a *sened* with a different guarantee.[95] However he was not going

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[91] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* pp. 153–154

[92] Stratford Canning to Clarendon, May 10, 1853, No. 203, pp. 213-214, Part I, CRRP

[93] Rifat to Menshikov, May 10, 1853, enclosure 2 in No. 193, pp. 196-197, Part I, CRRP

[94] Baykal (1949), *op. cit.,* p.244

[95] Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,* p. 154

to wait in silence, and ordered his ship to prepare for embarkation. Being aware of the nature of the incoming reply, he sought the mediation of *Resid Pasha*, who had been the Grand Vizier and the brains behind the 1839 *Tanzimat* (Reordering) Edict to reform the Ottoman state organisation, to use his influence over the Sultan for a compromise and for an audience.[96] While the council of ministers was waiting to receive him,[97] he went directly to the Palace and complained to the Sultan about the government, adding that if *Resid* had been foreign minister, a peaceful solution would already have been found. Most importantly, he stated that the Sultan had two choices: either the Ottoman Empire would be reduced to the level of Greece, Belgium or Switzerland, becoming legally obliged by treaty to accept intervention by several great powers, or enter into bilateral relations with Russia.[98]

Sultan *Abdulmecid*, as a last option, reshuffled his cabinet and appointed *Resid* as foreign minister.[99] *Resid* requested from *Menshikov* a further two-day extension to the ultimatum to allow him to make a thorough study of the matter. *Menchikov* consented to three days and delayed his departure, but declared that relations had officially been broken. The British ambassador prepared a brief memorandum for his meeting with *Resid,* which expanded upon *Rifat'*s note of 10 May but reduced the guarantee to a solemn communication, instead of a *sened*, of the new *fermans* to all five great powers instead of only Russia.[100] This became the alternative proposal of the Ottoman government to the Russian proposal draft *sened* of 5 May, and would guide her negotiations for the next five months.

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[96] Baykal (1949), *op. cit.,* p.257

[97] *Ibid.*

[98] Menshikov to Nesselrode, 16 May, CPPR, pp. 323–324, note 490, cited by Goldfrank (1994), *op. cit.,*pp. 155–156

[99] Baykal (1949), *loc. cit.*

[100] Stratford Canning to Clarendon, May 14, 1853, No. 205, pp. 214-215, Part I, CRRP

The Ottoman Grand Council on 17 May authorised *Resid* to offer *Menshikov* an official note containing the Sultan's reaffirmation of the rights of the Ottoman Orthodox subjects, and a *sened* covering the Russian churches and hospices in Jerusalem.[101] The note offered almost the same privileges and guarantees for the Orthodox citizens as had been given by successive Ottoman governments as required by their state and society understandings without any outside intervention, and it did not mention Russia at all. This was exactly the opposite of what the *Menshikov* mission had hoped to achieve, and so *Menshikov* rejected the proposal.

Meanwhile, the representatives of Britain, France, Austria and Prussia in Istanbul attempted to mediate between *Menshikov* and the Ottoman government by obtaining some concessions from the Russian delegation. To that end, the Austrian and French Ambassadors, on behalf of the four powers, met with *Menshikov* on 20 May, but to no avail.[102]

Seeing the resoluteness of the Ottoman government regarding its right of sovereignty over its 12 million Orthodox subjects, no matter who was in charge of the foreign office, *Menshikov* informed them that he would consent to a statement from the Ottoman government rather than a *sened*. To that end, he drafted the text of a statement on 20 May and sent it to *Resid* for approval.[103] The new draft statement, in the words of Jelavich, 'softened the form but not the basic content of the *Menshikov* mission'.[104] It did not offer anything new but changed the wording of the previous notes submitted to the Porte.

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[101] The Unofficial Note sent by Reshid to Menshikov, in Turkgeldi, pp. 293-294

[102] Stratford Canning to Clarendon, May 20, 1853, No. 209, pp. 218-219, Part I, CRRP

[103] Draft of Note proposed by Menshikov to be addressed to him by Porte, enclosure in No 210, pp. 221-222, Part I, CRRP

[104] Jelavich (1991), *op. cit.,* ,p. 123

It was obvious from their attitude over the past three months that the Ottoman government would not accept such a dangerous bilateral pledge to Russia concerning the future of their Orthodox subjects. *Menshikov,* in a private letter to *Nesselrode,* specified how the draft statement would assure Russian influence over the Orthodox Church.[105]

On the following day, 21 May, *Menshikov* left Istanbul, reminding the Ottoman government of the consequences of any act that might invalidate the other rights, privileges and immunities of the Orthodox Church.[106]

e. Occupation of the Principalities, the Vienna Note for Settlement and Russia's Violent Interpretation of the Vienna Note

After the *Menshikov*'s departure, Russian Foreign Minister *Nesselrode* sent a note to *Resid* on 31 May informing him that Russian armies would occupy the Principalities as a 'material guarantee' of the full acceptance of *Menshikov*'s final proposal.[107] He gave the Ottoman government a week to reply to the note, which had arrived in Istanbul on 9 June.[108]

Before the arrival of *Nesselrode*'s note, two important developments took place. Firstly, the British Cabinet took the decision to send the British fleet to *Besika* Bay just outside the Dardanelles, and France agreed to support it with a French squadron;[109] and, secondly, the Ottoman Empire promulgated two *fermans* granting some rights to her Orthodox

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[105] Zayonchkovskiy, Pril , I, *op. cit.,* no. 124

[106] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* pp. 20-21

[107] Nesselrode to Reshid, 31 May, 1853, EP, I, pp. 245–246

[108] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 22

[109] Clarendon to Stratford Canning, July 28, 1853, No. 370, pp. 399-400, Part I, CRRP

subjects and confirming all of the previous privileges of the Orthodox Church.[110] With that, the Ottoman Empire was sending a message that she was not against any improvement in the state of affairs of her Orthodox subjects, but was against associating it to a foreign power, namely Russia.

As for the *Nesselrode*'s note of 31 May, the Ottoman government sent a polite refusal to the Russian legation in Istanbul, who were the last remaining representatives of Russia left in Istanbul.[111]

On July 7, news of the Russian occupation of the Principalities arrived in Istanbul and was met with mild reaction from the Ottoman government, who refused to accept it as a *casus belli.*[112] Russia, likewise, took a softer tone regarding her occupation rather than a hostile attitude, stating that her move did not mean war and that it was just a temporary measure to ensure a satisfactory answer to the Emperor's just demands.[113] In line with that attitude, the Russian troops in the principalities took up defensive rather than offensive positions in the Ottoman territories.[114]

On 14 July, the Ottoman government formally protested the Russian occupation,[115] underlining that Russia's demands for the protection of the Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire were needless, as two recent *fermans* from the Sultan had conceded every legitimate

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[110] Imperial Ferman sent by Resid to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople enclosure in No. 323, pp. 338-339, Part I, CRRP

[111] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* pp. 22-23 and the text of the Ottoman Reply to the Nesselrode's Note, in *ibid.* pp. 299-301

[112] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* pp. 233-234 and Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 341

[113] Russian Manifesto, inclosure in No 316, p. 323, Part I, CRRP

[114] Circular Dispatch from Nesselrode to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts, July 2, 1853, No. 329, p. 342, Part I, CRRP

[115] Protest of the Porte against the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, enclosure in No. 368, pp. 396-398, Part I, CRRP

right; and claiming that the Ottoman Empire could not contract 'exclusive obligations' to any power. Lastly, the government stated that the occupation of the Principalities was in violation of the 1841 Straits Convention, and appealed to the signatory powers since the Convention had guaranteed the territorial integrity and independency of the Ottoman Empire.[116]

The reaction of the great powers to the occupation was mixed. Britain did not regard the occupation as grounds for Turkey to declare war. In this respect, the British Foreign Minister said that the British fleet would not enter the Dardanelles unless there was an imminent threat to Istanbul. Britain also considered that Russia was in breach of its promise in the 1844 Agreement, which stated that two states would not unilaterally act against the Ottoman Empire without consultation with each other.[117] Likewise, Austria was critical, but asked the Ottoman government not to turn the situation into a *casus belli*.[118] France's reaction was the most critical, announcing that the Ottoman government was justified in regarding the occupation as an act of war, and said that if the Ottoman government opened the Straits to French and British warships it would not be in violation of the 1842 Straits Convention.[119] In that respect, France shared the same view as the Ottoman Empire.

The defence of Russia to those criticisms, in general, was that her temporary occupation of the Principalities was partly in response to the presence of the allied squadrons in Turkish waters.[120]

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[116] Note from the Porte to the four representatives, July 14, 1853, No 12, p. 5, Part II, CRRP

[117] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.,*p. 237

[118] Westmorland to Clarendon, June 11, 1853, No. 259, pp. 271-272, Part I, CRRP ,

[119] Circular Dispatch of Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Ministers abroad, July 15, 1853, No. 345, pp. 362-364, Part I, CRRP

[120] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1954), *op. cit.,* p. 149

On the basis of the mild reactions and conciliatory attitudes of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and Austria, and even France, and the restrictive tone of Russia, it seemed that none of the great powers would object to a concerted European action to settle the problem. To that end, three major initiatives were put forward, but only one of them, known as the Vienna Note, would be realised.[121] The overall aim of all of the initiatives was to satisfy Russia without weakening the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan over his Orthodox subjects.

Austria would take a leading role in resolving the dispute, having remained in the background since the beginning of the Holy Places.[122] The Vienna Note was the final attempt to come up with a concerted European action to ensure peace, and was finalised by Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph and his Foreign Minister *Karl Ferdinand von Buol*, based on the previous work of the representatives of Britain, Austria, Prussia and France.

The note was a composite document that was essentially based on the previous works of Clarendon and *Bourqueney*, the British and French ambassadors in Vienna, and included a promise from the Sultan that he would 'remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* and Adrianople concerning the protection of the Christian religion' and would 'preserve fully the spiritual privileges of the Orthodox Church to enjoy full equality with other rites'. The note also contained a reaffirmation of the recent settlement of the Holy Places dispute, with a promise to make no changes without the prior understanding of the governments of France and Russia, and granting the right to Russia to build a church and hospice in Jerusalem. [123]

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[121] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,*p. 25

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 24

[123] Clarendon to Stratford, August 2, 1853, No. 31, pp. 23-24, Part II, CRRP

Nicholas I approved the note on the condition there would be no changes made to it. However the Ottoman government accepted it only with some modifications.[124] The Porte noted that the phrase of 'if at all times Emperors of Russia have testified to their solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan has never refused to consecrate them anew by solemn acts' offered and implied a pretext for Russian intervention in the future. The Porte also objected to the reference to the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca,* arguing that the Treaty was not a source of religious privileges, and that the religious privileges of the Orthodox Church had been recognised and maintained without any outside participation since the time of *Mehmed the Conquer* (1451–1481). She further wanted a guarantee from the powers that there would be no future interference in or occupation of, the Principalities.[125]

Nesselrode reacted immediately to the modifications. He sent a despatch to Vienna stating that Russia would not accept any changes to the note and would thus withdraw its own acceptance, since the proposed modifications invalidated the letter and spirit of the Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca.*[126]

It seemed that the Ottoman Empire had destroyed the last chance for peace by seeking to modify some of the passages that had been designed to satisfy Russia's demands. This caused much irritation throughout Europe; however the negative mood against the Ottoman government would abruptly shift in the direction of Russia when a German newspaper leaked an analysis made by the Russian Foreign Ministry for the Tsar about the proposed modifications.[127]

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[124] The modifications proposed by the Porte to the Vienna Note in Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 311

[125] Ibid.

[126] Seymour to Clarendon, September 8, 1853, No. 90, p. 97, Part II, CRRP

[127] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.,* p. 27

In that analysis, *Nesselrode* informed the Tsar that the Vienna Note had recognised the rights of Russia to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[128] Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, declared that Russia had made an 'unexpected' or 'violent interpretation' of the Vienna Note, and thus Britain would longer be advising the Ottoman Empire to sign it.[129]

In the meantime, there was an uprising in Istanbul provoked by the pro-war circles against the government and the belief that it was conducting pro-Russian policies. Alarmed by the news, France informed the Ottoman government of her intention to dispatch her fleet to protect the lives and properties of the French citizens in Istanbul. Likewise Britain sent an order to Stratford Canning to call up the fleet to Istanbul for the same purpose; however Stratford Canning waited until 21 October to give the order. Only two steamers from each power were summoned.[130] Needless to say this move meant more than only the protection of civilians, as the Russian 'violent interpretation' had rendered a further step inevitable.[131]

Russia's last action before the start of hostilities was an attempt to revive the Holy Alliance. The words of *Nicholas I* to the French ambassador summarised the significance of the Holy Alliance for Russia in the Near East: 'The four of you [France, Britain, Austria and Prussia] could dictate to me; but that will never happen. I can count on Vienna and Berlin.'[132] However as developments would prove, it was a mistake for Russia to rely

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[128] Armaoglu (1997), *op. cit.* p. 238, Taylor (1956), *op. cit.,* p. 36

[129] Lobanov-Rostovsky (1854), *op. cit.,* p. 151

[130] Stratford to Clarendon, September 15, 1853, No. 114, p. 121, Part II, CRRP

[131] H.W. Temperely, 'Stratford de Redcliffe and the Origins of the Crimean War', *English Historical Review* April 1934, p. 275

[132] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.,* p. 54

the Holy Alliance to that extent; as Taylor put it 'once the eastern question was raised, the Holy Alliance was a ghost, no more'.[133] Nevertheless, Austria had to be won over by Russia owing to her strategic location in the Balkans should war break out with the Ottoman Empire and her maritime power allies in the Balkans.

The military manoeuvres in *Olmutz* offered the opportunity for a summit between Austrian Emperor *Francis Josef* and *Nicholas I* on 23 September. *Nicholas* was very conciliatory in his approach to the problems with the Ottoman Empire,[134] and spoke of evacuating the Principalities as soon as his terms were accepted. However, he stood firm on the maintenance of the Treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774) and Adrianople (1829), and on the preservation of the status quo relating to the different religious groups in the Ottoman Empire. It seemed that Russia was seeking for an entente with Austria in case of war against the maritime powers of Britain and France. For this reason Russia was flexible regarding the Principalities, which were the main concern of Austria.

A new proposal for the settlement of the problem came out of the meetings in *Olmutz* through the initiatives of *Boul*, the Austrian Foreign Minister, who drew up a draft collective note for the four powers of Austria, Britain, France and Prussia to mediate between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.[135] The *Boul* Project, as it would later be known, was based on the Vienna Note, but aimed at an authoritative interpretation of the Vienna Note which all parties, including Russia, would attach to it.[136] The intention was to address the concerns of the Ottoman Empire that Russia would interpret any bilateral commitment over the treatment of the

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[133] Ibid.

[134] Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.,* pp. 176–177

[135] Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* p. 355

[136] Westmorland to Clarendon, September 28, 1853, No. 122, p. 129-130, and Draft of Note enclosure in No. 126, pp. 133-134, Part II, CRRP

Orthodox religion as a pretext for intervention in domestic issues. Moreover, it aimed to alleviate the British reaction to the violent interpretation of the Vienna Note by the Russian Foreign Minister.

France was content with the note, and the French Ambassador in London told Clarendon that France was willing to put its signature to it if the British government concurred. Clarendon was reluctant on the grounds that the draft note would not provide any real security to the Ottoman Empire and would not neutralise the analysis of Count *Nesselrode*, which had disclosed the views of Russia and justified the fears of the Ottoman government.[137] Clarendon's attitude led France to follow suit in withdrawing her support for the Vienna Note,[138] and thus the efforts to reach a solution through concerted European action in the form of the Vienna Note and the *Buol* Project ended without success.

This reserved stance of Clarendon against Russia was endorsed by the British Cabinet during its meeting on 8 October, during which the Cabinet made a number of other important decisions. First, it decided that the Tsar's assurances in the *Buol* project were not convincing, as the Emperor might in the future 'assert a protectorate over the Greek Church and over 12 million of subjects of the Porte'. Second, it sent a pre-emptory order to the British ambassador in Istanbul to call the British fleet to Istanbul.[139]

There were two major reasons for such a dramatic change of tack by the British government, despite the fact that British Premier, Aberdeen, and Foreign Minister, Clarendon, were unwilling to go into war with Russia over the Ottoman Empire.

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[137] Clarendon to Seymour, October 6, 1853, No. 128, pp. 137-138, Part II, CRRP

[138] Clarendon to Cowley, October 7, 1853, No. 130, pp. 140-141, Part II, CRRP

[139] Temperely (1936), *op. cit.,* pp. 356–357

Firstly, Britain noticed that she could not expect the Ottoman Empire to show restraint any longer, as her territories had been under occupation since June. The Sultan had already convened his Great Council to decide upon what course the state should follow.[140] The Council decided unanimously to declare war against Russia if she did not evacuate the Principalities, and the Sultan ratified the decision of the Council on 29 September, after which the Ottoman commander on the Danube front gave an ultimatum to his Russian counterpart to evacuate the Principalities within two weeks.[141] Under these circumstances, if Britain endorsed the draft note by *Buol,* which did not bring any substantial change and was unlikely to be accepted by the Ottoman government, then the Ottoman Empire would have to stand alone against Russia, as it had in the Greek affair in 1828. The British government wanted to avoid such an eventuality.[142] Secondly, the British government was under pressure from its public, which was severely criticising the government as being pro-Russian.

Upon the passing of the deadline for the Russian evacuation of the Principalities, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia on 4 October, clashes between the Ottoman and Russian forces began on the Danube front in the last week of October, and Russia formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 2 November.[143]

On 8 October, *Resid* sent a formal request for the British and French fleets to enter the Dardanelles. The British and French ambassadors summoned their fleets on 20 October, and they entered the

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[140] Stratford to Clarendon, September 26, 1853, No. 123, p. 130, Part II, CRRP

[141] Stratford to Clarendon, October 4, 1853, No. 149, pp. 153-154, Part II, CRRP

[142] P. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 78–81

[143] Russian War Manifesto, enclosure, in No 226, pp. 228-229 Part II, CRRP

Dardanelles on 22 October.[144] Their entrance was not in violation of the 1841 Straits Convention, since it only forbade the passage of warships when the Ottoman Empire was at peace. However, Britain and France were still were not formally at war with Russia.

3. Failure of Last Minute Efforts and the Declaration of War on Russia by France and Britain

Despite the declaration of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the representatives of the four powers of Britain, France, Austria and Prussia did not halt efforts to find a formula that would satisfy both sides; and the winter season facilitated further diplomatic efforts since actual fighting had not started.

Their attempts focused on developing a base for the start of negotiations between the two sides, and to that end they drew up a protocol in Vienna on 5 December, 1853 calling for the Tsar to not infringe on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and not seek new rights over her Orthodox subjects beyond those rights established by the treaties of Kucuk Kaynarca and Adrianople. For her part, the Ottoman Empire decided that she was ready to recognise all of her commitments under the existing treaties as long as her sovereign rights were maintained.[145] The four powers decided to send a joint communication to the Ottoman Empire requesting confirmation of under the conditions under which she would be willing to negotiate,[146] to which the Ottoman government replied at the end of December, stating that her conditions remained

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[144] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit*. p. 29

[145] Protocol of Conference of the four representatives held in Vienna, December 5, 1853, enclosure in No 315, Part II, CRRP

[146] Note addressed by the Vienna Conference to Reshid, December 5, 1853, enclosure 1 in No 315, Part II, CRRP

unchanged,[147] and requested the participation of the other great powers in the negotiations if they were to be held. If Russia accepted the conditions as the starting point of negotiations, the Ottoman Empire would send a plenipotentiary to negotiate peace directly in a neutral place, with direct representation by other great powers.[148]

Russia was highly critical of these conditions, although Austria tried hard to convince Russia to accept them.[149] Russia adhered to her view that the problem should be negotiated on a bilateral basis, and was against the participation of the other powers in the negotiation.[150] This position was not feasible, given that Britain and France had already dispatched their fleets to Istanbul. As there was no concession from the Russian side, the envoys of the four powers decided that it was impossible to achieve a common base for the start of negotiations between the sides.[151]

Despite the failure of the conferences of the four powers to strike a base for negotiations to preserve the peace between the Ottoman Empire-Britain-France block and Russia, Vienna remained the hub of all diplomatic initiatives and meetings during the war, as Austria and Prussia were both strategic territories, the control of which could affect the course of the war. Therefore, while the war was going on in the field in Crimea, the eyes of the warring sides were on the Austrian government, and all sides sought to win their support.

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[147] For those conditions, see Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.* pp. 23-24

[148] Westmorland to Clarendon, January 13, 1854, No. 403, pp. 368-369, Part II, CRRP

[149] Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.* p. 214

[150] Nesselrode to Meyendorff, 13 January, 1854, AVP, f. Kants., D. No 164, cited by Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.* p. 225 and Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.* p. 33

[151] For the details of the Russian proposals, see Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.* pp. 223–225

While the diplomatic efforts of the four powers were continuing in Vienna between September 1853 and March 1854, two important events took place in the field. On 30 November, 1853 the Ottoman fleet in *Sinop* Harbour in the Black Sea was totally destroyed by the Russian navy.[152] By attacking the fleet, which was anchored in the harbour, it seemed that Russia had abandoned its previous defensive position to go on the offensive. This meant that the whole Black Sea and the coasts of the Ottoman Empire, from Varna in the west to Batumi in the east, including Istanbul, were now vulnerable to attack from the Russian navy. Moreover, it was a blow to Ottoman morale and a challenge to Britain and France, whose fleets were anchored in Istanbul. The British admiral of the fleet in Istanbul had previously sent word to the Russian admiral in Sebastopol that if the Russian fleet should leave port to attack the Ottoman Empire, he had orders to protect the Ottoman Empire. He added that he hoped the Russian admiral would make no move to endanger the peace between Britain and Russia.[153]

Britain and France could not allow Russia to neutralise the offensive capacity of the allied navy, so they decided to act to protect the Ottoman warships and Ottoman coasts in the Black Sea. They sent their fleets to the Black Sea with a notification to the Russian admiral that all Russian warships found at sea would be requested to return to a Russian port or face destruction.[154] *Nesselrode* asked whether the Russian ships and shores would also be protected by the allied navy while protecting the Ottoman coasts against Russia.[155] Upon receipt of a negative response, the Russian ambassadors left London and Paris in the first week of February 1854.[156]

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[152]Tarle (1944), *op. cit.* pp. 317–323

[153] Clarendon to Stratford, October 8, 1853, p. 143, Part II, CRRP

[154] Tempereley (1936), *op. cit.* pp. 376–378

[155] Nesserode to Brunnow and Kiselev, January,16, 1854, No. 1, pp. 1-2, Part III, CRRP,

[156] Clarendon to Seymour, February, 7, 1854, No. 6, p. 7, Part III, CRRP

The departure of the Russian ambassadors did not result in an immediate declaration of war, since efforts to find a solution in Vienna were continuing, although the likelihood of a negotiated settlement was becoming less and less under the pressure of the developments at the fronts. When the conference of the four powers in Vienna failed to convince Russia to concede to the Ottoman conditions, which all had endorsed, Britain and France agreed to deliver an ultimatum to Russia to evacuate the Principalities and to confine her disagreements with the Ottoman Empire to purely diplomatic terms. This ultimatum was also endorsed by the Austrian government, and in the event of a negative answer or continued silence, they would declare war.[157] *Nesselrode* promptly replied that 'the Emperor does not judge it proper to give any reply to the letter of Clarendon',[158] to which the response was a declaration of war from France on 27 March, and from Britain on 28 March and a military alliance of France and England.[159]

a. *Austria-Prussia Alliance and the Evacuation of the Principalities by Russia*

As noted previously, the role of the two continental powers, Austria and Prussia, would determine the course of the conflict between the 'flanking powers'. The Black Sea was blockaded by the allied fleets, and so Russia's only alternative for a military drive was overland, crossing the Danube through the middle of the Balkans, so long as she could secure her rear from the military threat of Austria. Thus, Austrian support, or at least her ambivalent neutrality, was a prerequisite for a Russian overland operation against the Ottoman Empire. As for the Anglo-French block, allying with Austria would tremendously facilitate their

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[157] Clarendon to Nesselrode, 27 February, 1854, Zayonchkovskiy, Pril II, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–222

[158] Consul Michele to Clarendon, March, 19, 1854, EP, VII, pp. 82–84

[159] Convention between Her Majesty and the Emperor of the French relative to military aid to be given to Turkey, signed at London, April 10, 1854, EP

mission. For this reason both sides put great effort into winning the support of Austria.

Russia seemed, at the beginning, to be in a more advantageous position in this regard, given her ties to the Holy Alliance, however this perception seemed to be illusory as time passed. Both states, but specifically Austria, were concerned about Russia's intentions and her likely efforts in the Balkans to destroy the Ottoman Empire.[160] Russia tried to ease those concerns, or at least to alleviate, them well before the outbreak of the actual war.

As have been noted, the first serious attempt by Russia in this regard was made during the summit of the three sovereigns of Russia, Austria and Prussia in *Olmutz* in September 1853; however both German Kings declined to offer to support Russia in the event of war between Russia and the Anglo-French bloc.

Franz Joseph, the Emperor of Austria, expressed to the Tsar that Austria's biggest concern was the destabilisation of the Balkans as a result of the insurrection of the Slavs and/or Orthodox subjects in Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Principalities, which would be a likely consequence of the weakening of the authority of the Sultan. He refrained from offering any military support if war should come, claiming that the only promise he could make was neutrality, but said that he would not hesitate to act if Austria's interests were affected.[161] Prussia, on the other hand, did not want to upset France and Britain, and so did not leave a door open for any military help, and, like Austria, promised nothing more than neutrality if circumstances allowed.[162]

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[160]Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.* pp. 24-25

[161] T. Schiemann 'Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. 4 Volumes, (Berlin, 1908), Vol. IV, pp. 300–301

[162]*Ibid*, p. 310

The second attempt by Russia to find allies took place after the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire but before the declaration of war by France and Britain in February 1854. The Tsar sent *A. F .Orlov* on a mission to Vienna and Berlin[163] to, at minimum; obtain assurances of neutrality if they do not ally with Russia when the Russian army crossed the Danube to advance on Istanbul through Bulgaria. When *Orlov* met Franz Joseph he said that Russia could no longer take a defensive position across the Danube, and that if Austria remained neutral, her interests would be protected, and guaranteed that Russia would not make any settlement in the Ottoman territories without a preliminary agreement with Vienna. However the Emperor expressed his doubts about whether Russia and Austria would be able to control the Slavs in the Ottoman territories, and thus would be able to impose any settlement over them to the interest of Austria when they rose.[164] In their second meeting he obtained only the promise that Austria would take the position of armed neutrality if Russia provided a formal guarantee regarding the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and an agreement to return the border populations to the conditions that they enjoyed under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. *Orlov*'s offer to share the Russian protectorate over Serbia at the mouth of the Danube did not change the attitude of Austria.[165]

After the declaration of war on Russia by Britain and France, Buol presented a proposal to the Emperor about the likely course that Austria could follow. He stated that Russia could rekindle a revolutionary blaze that extended from Bulgaria to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and for this reason Austria

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[163] For the detailed account of the Orlov mission in Vienna, see Tarle (1944), *op. cit.*, pp. 442-469

[164] Orlov to Nesselrode, 3 February, 1854, No. 1, AVP, f. Kants., D. No. 160, cited by Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 219

[165] Orlov to Nesselrode, 3 February, 1854, No. 2, AVP, f. Kants., D. No. 160, cited by Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 221

had to focus on blocking Russia in the Balkans. The Anglo-French alliance could not defeat Russia without the help of Austria, and therefore if Russia chose not to withdraw from the Principalities and give up the plan of Slav insurrection in the Balkans, Austria would have to join the Anglo-French alliance. For that, Austria had to secure the following conditions: the allies were to make a decisive attack on the Principalities so that Austria would not bear the brunt of Russia's anger. Then, the allies must promise to make no conquests and induce the Ottoman Empire to give Austria the protectorate of the Principalities instead of Russia. Finally, none of the allies should make a separate peace with Russia.[166]

However, the Emperor could not approve the plan because of some harsh but reasonable objections from the other circles. The objections were two-fold: firstly, the Austrian army could not stand against Russia alone, and so an alliance should first be secured with Prussia before aligning with the allies; and, secondly, Austria could not risk all-out war with Russia. Britain and France were more revolutionary than Russia, and Austria would always need Russia's protection against the power of France. If Russia lost, Poland would rise again and Austria would have to deal with unrest in the east, which could cause her to lose Italy in the west.[167]

As Austria was trying to clarify her stance, a conference of the four powers of Austria, Britain, France and Prussia was held in Vienna on 9 April at the request of Britain and France to address the concerns of Austria and to establish a common base among the four states. The four powers agreed that the existence of the Ottoman Empire was unseparable part of the general equilibrium of Europe, and decided to deliberate upon the best means of achieving this equilibrium. In this regard, they agreed upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the evacuation of the

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[166] Buol's Proposal of 21 March, 1854, HHSA XL, 48, cited by Curtiss (1979), *op. cit*., p. 254

[167] Schroeder (1972), *op. cit*., pp. 160–161

principalities, and the consolidation of the civil and religious rights of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the four governments pledged not to enter into any agreement with Russia or any other power that went against those principles without having deliberated them in common discussion.[168]

The agreements at the conference of 9 April paved the way for the Austro-Prussian offensive and the defensive alliance of 20 April. They pledged to protect each other's territories, and to that end, both states were obliged to mobilise part of their forces. Austria was also authorised to call for the evacuation of the Principalities, which would be strongly backed by Prussia; and if that call was rejected, action would be taken under the provisions of the alliance agreement. On the other hand, it was agreed that no mutual offensive movement would be taken unless Russia incorporated the Principalities or attacked or passed through the Balkans.[169] Through this alliance, both the Germanic powers were able to urge the Anglo-French alliance to moderate its actions against Russia. At the same time, they tried to force Russia back from the Principalities and preserve stability in the Balkans as much as possible. This was the optimum position for the continental powers, which were squeezed between the flanking powers under the conditions of the 1815 European States System.

On the basis of her alliance with Prussia, Austria forwarded its requests to Russia in the form of an ultimatum on 3 June, 1854. Through those requests, she urged the Tsar to bring an end to the crisis, which had caused substantial damages to the Austrian economy due to the prolonged occupation of the Principalities. The Austrian Emperor fervently wanted to see an end to Russian military operations to the south of the Danube, and to obtain a date from the Tsar when he would put an end to

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[168] Protocol of the Conference in Vienna, April, 9, p. 2, Part VIII, EP

[169] Text of the Austro-Prussian Alliance, April 1854, Part X, EP

his occupation of the Principalities.[170] Furthermore, Austria proposed to Russia that it subscribe to the principles of the 9 April Protocol for the settlement of the crisis.

In response to Austria's ultimatum, Russia sent *A. Gorchakov* to Vienna to take up the post of ambassador at the end of June, with orders to explain the Russian position with regard to the Protocol of 9 April, and to clear the way the way for an agreement.

Gorchakov informed the Emperor that it was not Russia's intention to hold on to the Principalities indefinitely, and that she was ready to evacuate if provided with suitable guarantees. Russia had been in support of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire since 1829, and was ready to respect its sovereignty as long as it was respected by the other powers. Finally, Russia claimed that it would not object to common European guarantees for the rights and privileges of the Ottoman Christians.[171] It seemed that Russia was moving into a more moderate position after the protocol of 9 April. Austria immediately conveyed these messages to London and Paris, promising her clear support.[172]

In early August 1854, France and Britain established their conditions in response to the Austrian-Prussian inquiry following the Russian overtures, as follows: firstly, the Russian protectorate of the Principalities was to be replaced by a European guarantee; secondly, navigation of the Danube was to be 'freed'; thirdly, the Straits Convention of 1841 was to be revised 'in the interests of the Balance of Power in Europe'; fourthly, Russia was to abandon its claim as protector of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and instead the five great powers were to obtain from the Ottoman government a promise of the

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[170] Zayonchkovskiy, Pril , II, *op. cit.*, pp. 339–341, 348–351

[171] Nesselrode to Gorchakov, 29 June, 1854, AVP, f. Kants., D. No. 164

[172] Gorchakov to Nesselrode, 12 July, 1854, AVP, f. Kants., D. No. 161

security of the Christians; and, finally, the British and French Cabinets reserved the right to make additional demands later in the war.[173]

Since the first, second and fourth points had already been negotiated, and Russia could be somewhat brought into line, the third condition, to revise the 1841 Convention of the Straits in the interest of the balance of power in Europe, was going to be the sole war objective of the allies. The allies regarded the naval presence of Russia in the Black Sea as a threat to the balance of power in Europe, and so wanted it to be curbed. In that way, they considered the influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire would be reversed, which was something that was also sought by Austria.[174] Russia, not surprisingly, was unyielding on that point, and consequently rejected the proposal.[175]

In the meantime, Russia was already considering the evacuation of the Principalities and to adopting a watchful position in the west, which was the only way to stop Austria joining the Anglo-French bloc. If the occupation of the Principalities ended, Austria could not risk going to war with Russia, as it would put her in opposition with Prussia.[176] Russia completed the withdrawal from the Principalities at the end of August, and after a while, Austria, in agreement with the Ottoman government, occupied the Principalities and declared the Principalities closed to the bloc powers.[177] Thus, the Balkans issue was dropped from the agenda of the allies, allowing them to focus on the Russian Black Sea coasts in a bid to realise the third condition.

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[173] Taylor (1956), *op. cit*., pp. 65–66

[174] The Austrian Emperor wrote to his mother that 'we shall force back Russia's might and influence', Curtiss (1979), *op. cit*., p. 345

[175] Taylor (1956), *op. cit*., pp. 68–69

[176] Zayonchkovskiy, Pril , II, *op. cit*., pp. 365–367

[177] Convention between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, June 14, 1854, enclosure in No. 4, p. 3-6, Part XII, EP

b. Stages of the Crimean War and the Diplomatic Initiatives

Developments in the Danube turned the Crimean Peninsula, home to the largest Russian naval base in the Black Sea, into the centre of the war efforts. If the allies were to ensure the third condition, which was to curb and reduce the strength of Russia's power in the Near East for the general interests of the balance of power of the 1815 European States System, Sebastopol on the Crimean Peninsula was deemed the most suitable war objective.[178]

The allies landed a military power of 50,000 soldiers on the Crimean Peninsula in the middle of September 1854. The first attempt by the Russian army to expel the allied army was successfully thwarted by the allied forces on 20 September at the battle of Alma; after which two successive attempts at Balaklava and Ackermann, respectively on 25 October and 5 November, 1854, also failed. Following those battles, the Russian army withdrew to Sebastopol and remained on the defensive. The allied siege laid on Sebastopol at the end of 1854 and it lasted almost a full year, and; both sides suffered great losses without either achieving any decisive result.[179]

While the war was going on in the field, the diplomatic efforts did not stop, with initiatives by both sides, as expected, focusing on Austria since her position would be decisive in ending the deadlock in the field for both sides. Russia wanted to secure her benevolent neutrality so that she would be able to shift her troops in the west to the Crimean front; while the allies, if Austria was not going to enter the war, wanted just the opposite. Austria no longer felt the need of the allies, as the likelihood of an attack by Russia on the Habsburg domain was very unlikely while dealing with the invaders in Crimea. Therefore, instead of taking a definite position with either side, she preferred to use her weight to induce the

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[178] Karal (1987), *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238

[179] *Ibid*, pp. 238-250

sides into a compromise to stop the war, which would be the best outcome for Austria's interests. Furthermore, her alliance of 20 April with Prussia was also binding her not to engage on either side of the belligerents too; however Austria was not as resistant as Prussia owing to her vulnerability in Italy against France, particularly as France was in an alliance with Britain.[180] Thus, it did not take long for Austria to tilt again in favour of the allies.

The first concrete result of the diplomatic initiatives and the pressure of the allies on Austria was a treaty among Austria, Britain and France, signed on 2 December, 1854.[181] According to that Treaty, the signatories pledged not to negotiate with Russia apart from on 'the four points'. If peace was not assured, the three allies would deliberate over the best means, which actually meant war, of securing the object of their alliance.[182] To this end, if Russia attacked Austria, then Britain and France would help Austria militarily. Even though Prussia declined to join the latest treaty, Austria's action effectively brought an end to the Holy Alliance.[183] Seeing that Austria was shifting its allegiance to the allies, Russia accepted the four points on 29 November, but according to its own interpretations, which were not shared by Britain or France. However this was enough to dissuade Austria from ratifying the military alliance part of the treaty, except the four points, and so no conclusive military shift could come out of the Treaty between the block of Britain, France and Austria.

The most remarkable result of the 2 December Treaty was a guarantee for Austria that France would preserve the status quo in Italy, backed by an agreement between the two powers on 22 December. This facilitated the tilt of Austria toward the Anglo-French bloc, and more

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[180] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.*, p. 69

[181] Turkgeldi (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 42

[182] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.*, p. 70

[183] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 247

importantly, allowed the active participation of Piedmont in the war in Crimea with 15,000 troops.[184]

The third concrete step of the diplomatic initiative during the war campaign was the Conferences held in Vienna among the five powers on the basis of the four points between 15 March and 4 June, 1855. These Conferences enabled the warring powers to clarify their positions in regard to what they could concede and what they could not from among the previously agreed four points.[185] Put differently, the warring sides revealed their understandings of the four points, making the war objectives much clearer.

The first point, which was to place the Principalities under a guarantee from the five-powers, in other words under the Concert of Europe, was readily accepted by Russia. In this way, the exclusive rights of Russia over the administration of the Principalities, gained by Russia over the past 75 years as a result of the four wars and several treaties, would end.[186]

The second point was about the free navigation of the Danube. Russia had gained islets at the mouth of Danube in the Black Sea with the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, effectively giving her full power to regulate navigation. The Danube River was the only exit for Austria to the Black Sea, Istanbul and the Levant region, and as such she was much in favour of its collective management. The acceptance of Austria's demand in this regard was not difficult in the Conference, as the Principalities at

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[184] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72

[185] Memorandum communicated by Austria, France and Great Britain, December 28, 1854, No 1, p.3, Part XIII, EP

[186] Schroeder (1972), *op. cit.*, pp. 262–263; Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna between 15 and 19 March, p. 4-11, Part XIII, EP.

the mouth of the Danube were already under the temporary control of Austria.[187]

Once the agreements were finalised regarding the first and second points, the Conference turned to the most significant and controversial item at the end of March, being the third point. This was about the establishment of the balance of power in the Near East by curbing the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea through the revision of the 1842 Straits Convention[188].

The third point, as Curtiss pointed out, was the part of the allied plan aiming at bringing the Ottoman Empire into the guarantee of the public law of Europe, thereby protecting it and saving Europe from new troubles;[189] and the material base of this arrangement was a reduction of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea.

However, Russia questioned the rationality of such a measure on the grounds that the existence of the Russian naval power balanced the other naval threats from the Mediterranean, meaning the British and French navies.[190] The British and French delegates agreed to a joint policy on the third point, with the neutralisation of Russian power in the Black Sea as the first proposal. If Russia rejected it, then they would suggest a strict limitation on her naval forces, which was to be presented as an Austrian ultimatum. If the second proposal was also turned down, then they would break up the Conference and concentrate on winning the war.[191]

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[187] Schroeder (1972), *op. cit.*, p.263; Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna between 21 and 26 March, p. 12-21

[188] Protocols of the Conferences held at Vienna between 29 March and 26 April, pp. 22-43, Part XIII, EP

[189] Curtiss (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 388

[190] Gorchakov to Nesselrode, 27 March, 1855

[191] G. B. Henderson (ed) (1947) *Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays* (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Company), p. 48–50 and Schroeder (1972), *op. cit.*, p. 266

The parties were unable to reach any compromise on the third point, and consequently the conference did not move on to negotiating the fourth point.[192] The discussions collapsed on 4 June, and settlement of the issue was thus left to the military.

The failure of the Conference in the end did not lead to the entry of Austria into the war, and the Austrian army demobilised on 10 June,[193] but the timing of Austria's departure was of great benefit to the allies, as it deprived Russia of the ability to transfer its troops from the western front to Crimea. This was to be the only concrete contribution of Austria to the allied efforts in Crimea.

c. *Austrian Ultimatum and the End of the Crimean War*

Since the diplomatic efforts at the Conference of Vienna had failed to convince Russia to accept the neutralisation of its power in the Black Sea, the Allies intensified their siege of Sebastopol from June onwards. The city fell on 8 September, however Russia was unyielding and established a new defensive line immediately after Sebastopol, and started consolidating her power there. The fall of Sebastopol had not had the desired result; and so the allies started considering a second battle front in the Baltics for which Britain entered into negotiations with Sweden.[194] France was also disposed to give serious consideration to a Baltic front, as Napoleon had once thought that a war in the Baltics could bring about the liberation of Poland.[195]

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[192] Protocol no 14 of the Conference held at Vienna, June 4, 1855, Part XIV, EP

[193] Schroeder (1972), *op. cit*., p. 302

[194] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit*., p. 249;

[195] Ibid.

On the other hand, there were some objections on the side of France that she was being dragged along by British interests in continuing the war, and Napoleon III also began considering the necessity of ending the war. In the end, he had achieved what he had always wanted: to terminate the Holy Alliance by bringing Austria over to his side; to restore the military glory of France in Europe; and most importantly, to ally with Britain against Russia, which is something his uncle had been unable to achieve. If France was to bring an end to the war, there were two paths open to her.[196] The first one had been already tried over Austria and Austria did not enter the war. The other was to establish direct contacts with Russia to discuss a settlement. Napoleon III opted to open behind-door discussions with the Russians.

This caused great alarm in Austria, where it was seen as 'A Franco-Russian deal over Austria's head'.[197] The likelihood of that deal forced Austria hastily to act. Austria decided to issue an ultimatum to Russia in agreement, after agreeing the conditions with Britain. The ultimatum was delivered on 16 December, the conditions of which can be summarised as follows:[198]

> – The Principalities should be put under the collective supervision of the great powers, and the Ottoman Empire is not to deploy troops without their prior endorsement.
>
> – The free navigation of the Danube is to be secured.
>
> – The Black Sea is to be demilitarised.
>
> – The rights of the Christian subjects are to be guaranteed without infringement of the sovereignty or independence of the Ottoman Empire.
>
> – The states may present some other specific conditions in accordance with the interests of Europe.

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[196] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.*, p. 58

[197] Taylor (1956), *op. cit.*, p.79

[198] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 250

If the conditions were not accepted within a month, Austria vowed to enter the war on the side of the Allies against Russia, which would result in Prussia also being dragged into the war together with Austria. Accordingly, Russia accepted the conditions as the framework of a settlement on 16 January, 1855. The seriousness of Austria and Prussia played a significant role in convincing Russia to accept the ultimatum, and an armistice was concluded, with the new political and military arrangements planned to be mapped out at a subsequent congress in Paris.

4. Congress of Paris

The warring sides, being the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, France and Piedmont, together with non-warring states of Austria and Prussia, convened in Paris and concluded the peace treaty on 30 March, 1856. Prussia was allowed to participate only during the deliberations about the status of the Straits, given its status as one of the signatories of the 1841 Straits Convention.

The Crimean War was, in fact, a European war under the guise of the protection of the sovereignty (Russia's claims over the Orthodox communities) and the territorial integrity (the evacuation by Russia of the Principalities) of the Ottoman Empire. Three of the five great powers were involved directly, while one of the remaining two, Austria, was also actively engaged in all the stages of the war, and played a determining role in the course of war through its actions, even though she never took part in the actual fighting. The only power that had remained strictly neutral was Prussia. Naturally, the post-war settlement had to satisfy the main goals of the victors. The overall goal of the Anglo-French bloc, together with the non-belligerent Austria, had been to stop Russia from becoming a hegemonic power by destroying the Ottoman Empire. During the pre-war era, Russia had an imbalanced political weight in the Principalities, the Black Sea and the Caucasian region under the advantages of the treaties

of Adrianople (1829), *Hunkar Iskelesi* (1833) and the Convention of *Munchengratz* (1835).[199]

The main peace treaty contained 34 articles.[200] Since the basic premises had been agreed earlier, deliberations did not take long; and beside the main treaty some other auxiliary agreements were also signed.

a. Territorial Readjustment

During the Congress, four significant territorial readjustments were made aimed at reducing the offensive capacity of Russia and increasing the defensive capacity of the Ottoman Empire. The most striking arrangement in that respect concerned the Black Sea. The strategic importance of the Black Sea for the security of Istanbul has been examined in the second and third chapters in detail, and so will not be repeated here, but suffice to say the vulnerability of Istanbul had increased tremendously after Russia had consolidated her power base in the north of the Black Sea and on the Crimean peninsula. Due to Istanbul's proximity to the naval bases of Russia, the Western naval powers of Britain and France were compelled to keep their naval fleets anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean, and their eventual attack on Sebastopol was aimed at destroying the naval capacity of Russia in the Black Sea. Therefore, the resolution of the allies for the demilitarisation of the Black Sea was not surprising. The agreement was that neither the Ottoman Empire nor Russia would keep naval or military establishments in or around the Black Sea, and any existing bases were to be decommissioned; however both states would be allowed to maintain a small and equal number of light vessels for coast guard services (Art: 10-14). Such a restriction on the Ottoman Empire can be considered as little

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[199] V. J. Puryear, '*International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East, A study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1833–1853*, (USA: Archon Books, 1969,)*, p.11

[200] For the text of the Treaty see, E. Hertslett, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, (London: Butterwoths and Harrison, 1875), vol. II, pp. 1250-1265

more than symbolic, since it could still keep its navy in the Straits and in the Marmara Sea.

The second arrangement in the territorial re-adjustments was an agreement regarding the free navigation of the Danube River, for which the principles of the Congress of Vienna were to be applied, and for which a special expert international commission would be set up to deal with the problems of navigation (Art: 2-4). These arrangements were directly concerning Austria, as the Danube River was her only outlet to the Black Sea and to the Levant through the Straits, other than via its Adriatic coast. Russia had taken over the small islands at the mouth of Danube in the Black Sea with the Edirne Treaty in 1829, giving Russia a key role in controlling the navigation of the Danube, but under the new arrangements those islands were to be demilitarised and returned to the Principalities.

Thirdly, in connection with the Danube river arrangement, a part of Bessarabia was rejoined in Walachia, one of the Principalities that had been annexed by Russia in 1829. Through the final territorial arrangements, Austria would succeed in removing Russia from around the Danube River.

The last arrangement was related to the places captured on the Crimean Peninsula by the Allies, and some territories taken by Russia in the east, all of which were to be returned to their former owners (Art: 2-4). In this regard, Sebastopol and the other places occupied by the allies would be returned to Russia, while Kars and some other occupied territories in the east would be restored to the Ottoman Empire by Russia. This last point was important for Britain, as it meant that Russia had been prevented from advancing in the east, which would have given her a military advantage in the event of future conflicts over the Basra Gulf and Persia.

b. *Transfer of Rights and Obligations*

As related in the second and third chapters, Russia obtained some rights over the Ottoman Empire through the Treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774), Yassy (1792), Bucharest (1812), *Ackerman* (1827) and Adrianople (1829), including the administration of the Principalities and Serbia, and most controversially, the protection of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. The acceptance of the Ottoman Empire as a non-European state in terms of public law facilitated Russian claims as the protector of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

The Congress of Paris tried to resolve this problem by formally admitting the Ottoman Empire into the domain of European public law (Art: 7). In this way, it aimed to eliminate the Russian claim that it needed to protect the non-Muslims subjects of the Ottoman Empire; but at the same it obligated the Ottoman Empire to provide sufficient security for her non-Muslim subjects. It was agreed that Russia would have no claim whatsoever regarding the non-Muslim communities (Orthodox) of the Ottoman Empire, and thus Russia could not use the pretext of the protection of Orthodox subjects to intervene in the Ottoman Empire, as she had done since 1774.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire issued an imperial decree ('Reformation Edict', in Turkish '*Islahat Fermani*')[201] about the rights and obligations of her non-Muslim subjects, and the Treaty of Paris referred to the Edict by underlining that the principles in the Edict were emanating from the free will of the Sultan. As a cautionary measure, so as to avoid Russia's subjective interpretation in the future, they added that that confirmation was not empowering or giving any right to any individual or group of states to intervene in the internal affairs of the Sultan between him and his subjects (Art: 9)[202]

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[201] For the English text of the Reformation Edict, see E. Hertslett (1875), *op. cit.,* p. 1243 and for the preparation of the edict see Karal (2007), *op. cit.* p. 245

[202] Armaoglu (2007), *op. cit.* p. 251

The signatory states also agreed on how disputes between the Ottoman Empire and the other European states would be settled, by which the disputing party would seek the mediation of the other signatory states before resorting to the use of force (Art: 8). In this way, the intention was to stop Russian's unilateral recourse to action in relation to the Ottoman Empire. In other words, every issue concerning the Ottoman Empire, according to that article, should be internationalised. [203]

As for the other two issues, the administration of the Principalities and Serbia, over which Russia had some treaty rights, the Congress of Paris followed the same approach defined for the non-Muslims issue. The Congress re-confirmed the autonomous status of the Principalities and Serbia under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire; however those entities now fell under the collective supervision of the signatory states instead of under the treaty rights of Russia that had existed for the last 75 years (Art: 22-27). Both entities were to have their own Parliaments, and none of the signatory states would have the right to intervene in their internal affairs. The rights of their Suzerain, the Ottoman Empire, were also to be limited. For example, apart from some designated locations in Serbia, the Ottoman Empire could not send any extra troops into Serbia without the consent of the signatory states (Art: 29)

c. *Auxiliary Agreements*

In addition to the main treaty, multilateral auxiliary agreements were also signed at the Congress of Paris, two of which were very important for Ottoman-Russian relations.

The first one was signed by Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire on 15 April, 1856, in which Britain and France guaranteed the

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[203] Ibid.

independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with any violation of that guarantee by a third party being a cause for war.

The other agreement was about the status of the Straits, and was known as the Straits Convention of Paris. This convention did not bring any substantial changes to the existing 1841 Straits Convention, but reconfirmed the principle of closure, obliging the Ottoman Empire to adhere to her customary practice of keeping the Straits closed to the naval vessels of all states.

Conclusion

Russia's gains from the Treaty of Adrianople following the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War brought about a deterioration of the political equilibrium that the 1815 Settlements had brought. Although Russia had to step back from the advantages of the 1833 Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*, she was still a dominant power in the Near East due to the treaty rights she had obtained in 1774 through the Treaties of *Kucuk Kaynarca* (1774), Yassy (1792) and Bucharest (1812). However, Russia acted in concert with the majority of the great powers in the Greek and Egypt issues and remained moderate in those issues in line with the foundation principles of the 1815 European States System. For this reason her behaviour did not result in hostilities with the coalition of the great powers.

The Ottoman Empire became part of the 1815 Settlements with the multilateral Straits Convention, which replaced the bilateral Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* of 1833 and was signed by all the great powers in 1841. This convention regulated the use of the Straits during times of both peace and war; but more importantly, brought relative stability to the Near East, although Russia maintained a position of dominance. During this era, the Ottoman Empire became much more economically integrated with the European economy as result of the Trade Agreement with Britain in 1838, and then even more so after the inclusion of other states.

This relative stability in the Near East lasted until a dispute between Orthodox and Catholic priests over the use of sites of religious importance in Jerusalem turned into a Franco-Russian rivalry in the Near East.

The Ottoman government tried to settle the dispute without damaging her relations with France or Russia, while attempting to meet the demands of both sects. Unfortunately her central ground solution to the dispute did not satisfy either the Orthodox or Catholic Churches. From that point onward, France would take a much more moderate path than Russia. Russia's claims and demands surpassed the rights of religious character to be the formal recognition of her protector position over the Orthodox Church and subjects of the Ottoman Empire, while France's demands were limited to the assurance of the ecclesiastical rights of the Catholic Church in Jerusalem, and did not involve France in the assurance of the rights and situations of the Catholic subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

The grounds for the Russian argument were the 7th and 17th Articles of the 1774 Treaty of *Kucuk Kaynarca* which, Russia claimed, gave her the right of protection of the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which was often referred to during the Greek Rebellion in 1821–1829. This claim was never accepted by the Ottoman Empire or the other great powers, as it would mean the transfer of the Ottoman Empire's sovereign rights over 65 percent of her subjects in the Balkans to Russia. This would amount to the removal of the intermediary function of the Ottoman Empire for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System, which obviously was not acceptable to the Ottoman Empire. This would also be incompatible with the political equilibrium of the 1815 European States System, since it would substantially disrupt the balance of power to the detriment of the other great powers. Put differently, it meant that Russia was not moderate in the Near East, which was one of the principal requirements of the foundation of the 1815 European States System.

The Ottoman Empire refused to yield to the political and military pressure imposed by Russia during the *Menshikov* mission to Istanbul in 1853. Britain had taken a negative view of the Tsar's approach in 1853 to reach an agreement over a course of action if/when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The insistence of Russia that she be allowed to protect the Ottoman Orthodox subjects through her occupation of the Principalities in 1854 led to balance of power politics in the 1815 European States System against Russia, going against the functions of the Concert of Europe.

The Concert of Europe was established around the Anglo-French accord, and led to the Anglo-Russian agreements of 1826 and 1839. The objective was not hegemony, but rather a re-establishment of the political equilibrium in the European States System. In precise terms, it was to compel Russia to act with moderation in the Near East, and as a result, both of the functions of the Concert of Europe, being peacekeeping and peacemaking, were in effect during the crisis. It was peacekeeping, because it did not pursue hegemony or the punishment of Russia; and peacemaking due to the coercive measures that were put into operation against Russia, whose policies and objectives in the Near East threatened the balance of power in the European States System.

Therefore, the Crimean War, which seemed to have started over a dispute over the rights of two Christian sects, was in fact a European war over the Ottoman Empire. The war was in fact between Russia, which wanted to turn her into a vassal state, and an Anglo-French bloc, which wanted to preserve the status quo in the Near East. The Anglo-French bloc was supported by the armed neutrality of Austria and her temporary occupation of the Principalities. The Austrian position meant that Russia had to keep a huge army in her west, and prevented her from launching an overland operation over the Balkans to the Ottoman Capital, as she had done in the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War. As to Prussia, her strict neutrality and her decision to act with Austria released France to

concentrate on the war in the Crimean. In addition, the trends in the capability structure of the 1815 European States System also prevented the Russian bid for hegemony in the Near East.

The Crimean War was the first among the great powers since 1815, and would be followed by the French-Austrian (1859), Austrian-Prussian (1864) and French-Prussian (1870) wars. The Crimean War changed the special requirements for the multi-polar structure of the 1815 European States System, meaning a whole new phase in its history. With the Treaty of Paris, the isolation and restriction of France was lifted, while Russia became isolated and restricted, meaning that her supporting role in the order of Central Europe also came to an end.

The institution of the Concert of Europe continued carrying out the two functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking after the Crimean War, but not as effectively as in the 1815–1854 period. Nevertheless, all of the great power wars from 1856 until 1914 were limited both in terms of scope and aim, with none of the warring sides ever seeking hegemony. In other words, the essence of the Concert of Europe for political and territorial equilibrium was still effective.

On the other hand, the significance of the Concert of Europe increased for the Ottoman Empire, since it took on the responsibility to observe the implementation of some of the arrangements of the Treaty of Paris. These arrangements involved the rights of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the relations between the Ottoman Empire and her autonomous vassals, being the Principalities and Serbia. In different terms, the Concert of Europe somewhat took over the role of Russia in applying the former treaty rights over the Ottoman Empire. In this way, the peacekeeping function of the Concert of Europe in the Near East increased.

Ottoman-Russian relations became normalised as a result of the Congress of Paris. The clauses regarding the demilitarisation of the Black Sea removed the constant seaborne threat to her capital city; while the removal of the treaty rights of Russia over the Principalities and Serbia eliminated pressure on the Ottoman Empire. In this way, Russia's relations with the Ottoman Empire can be said to have returned to their pre-1774 and pre-1829 levels in terms of her political and military capacities.

Overall Conclusion

It was argued at the beginning of this thesis that Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period should be analysed on the basis of the new structural conditions that prevailed in the international system after the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815). This argument was based on the assumption that the European States System entered a new phase after the Napoleonic bid for hegemony in Europe had been thwarted by the coalition of Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia. The foundation period of the new phase in the System culminated in the 1815 Settlements, which comprised several multi-lateral treaties and the conventions signed during the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Under these new conditions, Ottoman-Russian relations were bound to take a different form; and it was the nature of these relations as a result of this new structure that was the central question raised by the thesis. To answer this question, first, the new structure needed to be analysed in order to understand its characteristics and how it worked. Then, as a second step, the Ottoman-Russian relations that developed around three specific events in the 1815–1856 period needed to be examined to find out how that new international structure worked and what affect it had on those relations.

For clarity, the detailed analysis of the structure of the new international states system has been split into two analytical but interrelated parts: Relationship Structures, and Capability Structures, with the relationship structure being a function of the capability structure.

It can be observed that the new international system founded by the 1815 Settlements retained some of the characteristics of the System that had prevailed before the Napoleonic wars, particularly multi-polarity and the sovereignty of the unit states. Put differently, the new system was operating on the principles of Westphalia, while being perceived as anarchical in its

general conditions. It is also apparent that there was a new institution that was hierarchical in character in the ordering principle of the structure of this international states system, accompanied by a quasi-hierarchical relation between two groups of states. The first group of states, referred to here as the great powers, assumed a governing role in international relations, and operating in consensus, imposed some decisions on the other states of the second and third tiers. Secondly, there emerged some structural differentiations among the unit states of the second and third tiers in this new international states system as a result of the introduction of the new hierarchical form. Moreover, the special imperatives or requirements for the balance of power, and subsequently for multi-polarity, were considerably different from those of the pre-Napoleonic Wars era.

In order to emphasise the distinctiveness of the new patterns of international relations that the 1815 European States System brought, they are referred to herein as 'the 1815 European States System'. This name denotes that the new international states system maintained some of the essential characteristics of the System that had existed since the 15th century, while introducing a number of new elements.

The '1815 European States System' can be perceived as 'a managed multi-polar international system based on the balance of power', in which the 'managing' feature was new, being built upon the newly introduced hierarchical institution in the ordering principle of its structure, as underlined in the last two paragraphs, and was known as the 'Concert of Europe'.

The Concert of Europe was the most salient invention of the 1815 European States System, being a regime for collective security and concerted action. Its overall objective was to help maintain the 1815 Settlements and to

ensure the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. Rather than replacing the balance of power politics, the two existed in harmony.

The Concert of Europe had two roles and operated in two different capacities, relying on certain principles and norms.

Firstly, it was an intervening variable and functioned to alleviate the competition for security among the great powers. In this way, it paved the way for cooperation in security so that the great powers could easily achieve the same ends as those sought through balance of power politics. Secondly, as an independent variable, it facilitated the collective use of hegemony over the lower tier powers for the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements.

The Concert of Europe acted as a structural modifier in the operation of the 1815 European States System in both of its functions, in that it both constrained and shaped the foreign policies and objectives of the unit states, including those of all of the great powers.

The analysis indicated that the capability structure of the 1815 European States System changed very little throughout the 1815–1856 period, although there was a shift in the balance of power from Russia and Austria to Britain, France and Prussia. For this reason, attention has been paid to the changes in the elements of the relationship structure so as to understand and explain the structural impacts of the 1815 States System on Ottoman-Russian relations in that period. The elements that combined within the relationship structure were the Concert of Europe, functional differences, modal tendencies, divergences of the great powers and finally the types of changes.

These changes can be categorised according to whether they were related to the founding principles or to the relationship structure. If related

to the maintenance of multi-polarity, that is, the restriction of France and moderation of Russia, they can be considered as structural changes with transformational implications; while those related to the elements of the relationship structure, such as modal tendencies, diverging issues and the decision making procedures of the Concert of Europe can be considered as significant structural changes without transformational change.

While focusing on the changes in the relationship structure, it became clear that the processes and interactions between the five great powers were a determining factor in the emergence of the structural forces affecting Ottoman-Russian relations, and as a consequence, the structural characteristics and modal tendencies of the five great powers became the focal point of the analysis. The five great powers were divided into two different blocks in accordance with their modal tendencies relating to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements and their attitudes and policies related to the constitutionalist/liberal and revolutionary movements.

The first block divides the great powers on the basis of whether they were seeking to maintain the status quo, or were revisionist in their attitudes. France, and to a certain extent Russia, may be considered as revisionist powers; while Britain, Austria and Prussia had an interest in maintaining the status quo. Russia in particular diverged from Britain over her policies related to the Ottoman Empire, and with Austria in her policies regarding the Slavic and/Orthodox nations in the Balkans.

The second division was related to the stances and attitudes of the powers towards the constitutionalist/liberal and revolutionary movements. This time, France and Britain constituted one block, in that they did not regard every revolutionary movement against the dynastic regimes as a systemic threat to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. Britain, under governments relatively responsible and vulnerable to public support, were

reluctant to become associated with the absolute monarchies of Russia and Austria, which were brutalising the Poles and Hungarians under their rule, and in this respect was on the same path as France. On the other hand, Russia, Austria and Prussia considered such movements as having a destabilising impact on the dynastic regimes, and consequently, on the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. For this reason, they took a rigid stance of intervention in the name of the Holy Alliance, which had been founded among the three eastern monarchies, whenever and wherever the uprisings took place. The reaction of Britain to this policy was to boycott the conferences and congresses of the Concert of Europe after 1820.

The revisionist policies and objectives of Russia and France, although different in scope and nature, constituted the biggest challenge to the maintenance of the 1815 Settlements. In France, despite being admitted to the Directory of the Concert of Europe in 1818, the priority of successive governments was to rid the nation of the restrictions imposed by the 1815 Settlements. On the other hand, Russia's prime objective was to promote and support the Orthodox and non-Muslim Slavic subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. To this end, Russia proclaimed herself as the legal protector of the Orthodox subjects of Ottoman Empire, and thus maintained a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. France was looking for any opportunity to divide the Quadruple Alliance so as to lift her imposed isolation and containment.

The prevention of the revisionist aspirations of both states was a requirement of the foundation of the 1815 European States System. Russia had to act with moderation and France had to remain within the confines imposed by the 1815 Settlements, since any quest for gain would mean a revival of her bid for hegemony. Of these, it was the complex Russian

revisionist policies that had more serious implications, since Russia was a member of the Quadruple Alliance, and thus was party to the mission to keep France under control after 1815.

It can be understood from the analysis that both balance of power politics and the Concert of Europe worked in tandem to constrain the revisionist powers of Russia and France, and thus maintain the 1815 Settlements. To this end, the powers seeking to maintain the status quo exercised various strategies under the Concert of Europe to moderate Russia and to restrict France.

The restriction of France was carried out through the concerted efforts of the Quadruple Alliance; but in the case of Russia, the strategy was either to compel her to show self-restraint through group norms, or to establish a bloc with the participation of France to force Russia into a position of restraint. With the emergence of the Concert of Europe in the 1815 European States System, the five great powers engaged in different behaviour patterns, depending on the issue at hand. While some of the great powers cooperated in 'active and affirmative' action, others rather remained 'passive and negative'. By being 'passive and negative', the great powers were exercising self-restraint, with the intention being to forego any concrete advantages or gains in the interest of long-term goals. Such behaviours could at first sight be seen as a burden for the state(s) involved; however they were necessary for the continued cooperation of the great powers in maintaining the 1815 Settlements, in which all of the great powers had a stake.

Because of the diverse structural characteristics and modal tendencies of the great powers, the success of the Concert of Europe in achieving all of its goals was not absolute, as issues would be only sometimes be settled, and to varying degrees, up until its demise in 1914, although its rate of success drastically diminished after the Crimean War. It can be said that the most

remarkable achievement of the Concert of Europe was its success in preventing a general war among the great powers between 1815 and 1914.

The second stage of the research was devoted to understanding the shape of Ottoman-Russian relations under that structural environment in the 1815–1856 period, beginning with an analysis of available evidence.

Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 cannot be described as balanced. The Ottoman Empire belonged to the second tier of states, and as such was subject to the tutelage of the Concert of the great powers within the 1815 European States System. Moreover, she had an 'intermediary' and 'buffer' role to play between the great powers as a result of her very strategic territories. In this way she contributed the territorial and political balance of the 1815 European States, but had been under pressure from Russia since 1774 and was very much preoccupied with internal reforms. For this reason, she relied on the support of the other great powers to withstand the Russian threat.

Russia, in contrast, while at the zenith of her power, was going through a dilemma in her foreign policy in that period. She had to reconcile her revisionist goals in the Near East with those of defending the status quo in Central Europe. Put differently, she wanted to achieve her objectives concerning the Ottoman Empire while not allowing France to free herself of her restricted status and form an Anglo-French alliance with the possible participation of Austria.

Russia's revisionist goals arose out of her strategic considerations after she became a littoral state of the Black Sea. From the defensive perspective, Russia was concerned about sea-borne threats, as her southern and Caucasian territories would become vulnerable to the naval forces of the great maritime powers via the Black Sea if the Straits were opened to them.

The Straits also became a lifeline for the Russian economy, being the shortest route to the trade centres in the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean and the main European ports.

On the other hand, from the offensive perspective, Russia wanted to become a maritime power with naval offensive capabilities, which could only be possible if she could secure an outlet to the Mediterranean over the Ottoman territories, as both the Baltic region and Central Europe did not afford such a possibility.

All of these security and economic considerations compelled Russia to focus on the Ottoman Empire, more so than any other great power in the 1815 European States System. She had already secured unique rights prior to 1815 through bilateral treaties related to the administration of the Principalities (present-day Romania) and Serbia, and had some debatable rights regarding the Empire's Orthodox subjects. Therefore, Russia was against the Ottoman Empire becoming a part of the 1815 Settlements, as this would have resulted in collective intervention of all the signatory great powers in the case of a dispute between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. In other words, Russia wanted to keep her relations with the Ottoman Empire on a bilateral basis.

Ottoman-Russian relations after 1815 developed around three remarkable events: the Greek Revolt (1821–1830), the rebellions of the Viceroy of Egypt (1833 and 1839) and the Holy Places Issue and subsequent Crimean War (1852–1856). As initially hypothesised, the Ottoman Empire had to remain independent and free of any influence or association with any of the great powers for the smooth operation of the 1815 European States System. For this reason, the key state in the course and direction of Ottoman-Russian relations was France within the structure of the 1815 European States System, being that Austria and Prussia were structurally

dependent on Russia. Therefore, the only effective way to keep Russia in the parameters of the 1815 European States System was the British-French alliance in Near East. Britain, without an effective land army, could not be enough to keep the status-quo in Near East.

The Greek Revolt was the first test of the great power diplomacy after 1815. Italy and Spain had previously experienced uprisings that were repressed without resulting in any systemic problems; but the Greek uprising had some unprecedented implications, being the first uprising in the Near East after 1815 and the first by Orthodox subjects. Also, the leaders of the rebellion had close associations with Russia, with the organisers of the revolt based there.

The workings of the Concert of Europe in regard to Ottoman-Russian relations after the Greek revolt in 1821 took two distinct forms. The first of these emerged during the initial phase of the Greek Revolt in 1820–1825, when the Concert of Europe operated with the agreement of the five great powers, although the policy lines were drawn by Britain and Austria. In this period, Russia cooperated as part of the Concert of Europe and resisted from making any unilateral interventions.

In contrast, in the second phase, 1825–1830, the Concert of Europe was centred on an accord between Britain and Russia with the participation of France, while Austria and Prussia remained neutral. However, an unexpected event, the annihilation of the Ottoman navy in 1827 in Navarino, resulted in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1828–1829, which the Concert of Europe was unable to prevent. Britain, without the effective cooperation of France, could not prevent Russia from going to war with the Ottoman Empire, although she was able to stop Greece falling under Russian influence, and thus moderated Russia in her war objectives.

With the concluding Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Greek Issue was settled. The new independent Greek state was put under the tutelage of the Concert of Europe, and Russia returned all of the territories occupied during the war, aside from some locations in the east of the Black Sea and at the mouth of the Danube, to the Ottoman Empire. This had the effect of preserving to a great extent the territorial equilibrium of the 1815 Settlements; however the political equilibrium in the Near East was drastically altered in favour of Russia as her influence over the Ottoman Empire was substantially increased. This was to be a structural change with transformational implications for the 1815 European States System in the long term. Russia consolidated her status as the protector of the Orthodox world, demonstrating clearly that she was prepared to go to war for the cause. This had a tremendous impact on the Ottoman Empire, as sixty five percent of her subjects in the Balkans were Orthodox. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire realised that she could not rely on the absolute support of the great powers in her struggle against Russia. In short, the 1821–1830 period witnessed an ascendancy of Russian power in the Near East, the result of which was that the maintenance of the 1815 Settlement became questionable in the long term for the 1815 European States System. Being aware of that fact, Russia re-approached Austria and Prussia and revived the Holy Alliance by pledging that she would act together with them in Near East. The outcome was the *Munchengratz* Agreement in 1834. The response was the *'Entente Cordiale'* between Britain and France. In a way, the structure of the 1815 European States System took the same pattern of relations as had been in 1815-1826.

The rebellions of the Viceroy of Egypt in 1833 and 1839 constituted the second significant event in Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1833–1841 period. The first rebellion brought no concerted European action, and so Russia was able to act unilaterally when the Ottoman Sultan asked for Russian military assistance to defend Istanbul against the army of the

Viceroy of Egypt. A small Russian fleet was anchored in the Bosporus, while a limited number of Russian troops were deployed to the Asian side of the city in 1833. When a temporary settlement was achieved between the Sultan and *Mehmed Ali*, the Viceroy of Egypt, the Tsar pulled its troops and navy out of Istanbul, but not before a defence treaty, the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi*, was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

Upon signing the Treaty, Russia gained the right to intervene in Ottoman affairs when the latter was in need; and in return, the Ottoman Empire would close the Straits to states with which Russia was at war. With the signing of the bilateral defence treaty, Russia reached the peak of her influence over the Ottoman Empire, which rose to the level of dominance. The already-disrupted political equilibrium of the 1815 Settlements was further deteriorated, and so the reaction of the other great powers was swift. Both Britain and France declared that they did not recognise the treaty, and Russia tried to alleviate at the concerns of her former allies of the Holy Alliance by initiating the *Munchengratz* Agreement among Russia, Austria and Prussia, in which Russia committed to acting together with Austria and Prussia in the Near East in a revival of the Holy Alliance. In response, Britain and France forged closer ties and established the *Cordiale Entente* after 1833.

The second rebellion of *Mehmed Ali* in 1839, in contrast, resulted in concerted European action. The Concert of Europe was again centred on the Anglo-Russian accord, but this time with the participation by Austria and Prussia On this occasion, France chose to remain outside the Concert and voiced her opposition, however her restricted status meant that her objections were mostly ignored. After the settlement of the Egyptian issue, the Concert also replaced the *Hunkar Iskelesi* bilateral defence treaty with the Multilateral Convention of the Straits in 1841. In this way, Russian influence was reduced to its pre-1833 level, although she still retained great

influence over the Ottoman Empire. The price of Russian moderation for giving up the gains she had made with the Treaty of *Hunkar Iskelesi* was the end of the *Cordiale Entente* between Britain and France.

The disputes centred on the Hungarian and Polish refugee issue in 1849 and the Holy Places in Jerusalem between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in 1852–1854 were milestone events that led to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The Holy Places Dispute had started as a civil matter; however with the involvement of Russia and France on behalf of respectively, the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, the issue became international. Russia regarded the initiatives of France in the guise of defending the rights of the Catholic Church as a challenge to her place and influence in the Near East. When the Ottoman government decided partly in favour of the Catholic Church, Russia considered the decision as a setback to her influence and a boost to the influence of France, which had been a traditional ally of the Ottoman Empire up until the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt in 1803. To this end, she insisted that the Ottoman Empire formally accept Russia as protector of the Empire's Orthodox subjects. The categorical refusal of the Ottoman Empire resulted in Russian military occupation of the autonomous Danube Principalities in 1854 as a precursor to the start of the Crimean War.

The Crimean war was the first among the great powers since 1815, being fought between the Ottoman-Anglo-French block and Russia. Austria adopted a position of armed neutrality by temporarily occupying the Principalities, thus blocking any overland operation by the Russian army, and diverting a significant proportion of the Russian army to the Balkans, away from the Crimean front.

The operation of the 1815 European States System took on a whole new form during the Crimean War, significantly different to that seen during the Greek and Egyptian events. Russia had not challenged the structural

imperatives of the System during the Greek and Egyptian events, choosing to remain within the limits of the Structure. In other words, she took a moderate stance, although she had some advantages. In the lead up to the Crimean War, Russia tried to change the intermediary position of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the launch of balance-of-power politics against her by the other great powers; and it was this existing capability structure that hindered Russia's bid to achieve her goal of predominance in the 1815 European States system.

As for the Concert of Europe, its intervening function to alleviate the security concerns of the great powers was not effective enough to prevent the war; however it did limit the war objectives of the Ottoman-Anglo-French bloc.

With the conclusion of the war at the Congress of Paris, Russia was drastically restrained against the Ottoman Empire, being deprived of all her bilateral treaty rights over the administration of the Principalities and Serbia. More significantly, the Black Sea was de-militarised, meaning an end to the constant pressure from Russia on Istanbul and its naval aspirations in the Mediterranean. Finally, the Ottoman Empire was formally included into the public law of the European States System. From an 1815 Settlement perspective, Russia was pushed back to her pre-1774 levels in her relations with Ottoman Empire, effectively bringing an end to the era of her willing moderation under the Concert of Europe. She would take France's position as a restricted state from 1856 onwards, which can be considered to be the end of the 1815 European States System phase in the course of European States System.

The objective of this research has been to understand and explain how Ottoman-Russian relations developed after 1815 at the time the post-Napoleonic system was being formulated. It is evident that the path of

Ottoman-Russian relations was significantly different to that followed prior to the Napoleonic Wars era under the influence of the 1815 European States System. In this regard, all of the hypotheses regarding the workings and effects of the Structure on Ottoman-Russian relations in the 1815–1856 period can be confirmed, although to varying degrees.

The structural imperatives required the Ottoman Empire to remain in an intermediary position, free from influence or association by any great power. The rise of influence of Russia in 1829 and 1833 was incompatible with the structural imperatives of the 1815 European States System, meaning that she came into confrontation with the other great powers. Firstly, she was forced to take a step back, and then in 1856 she was pushed even further back in a bid to secure the intermediary status of the Ottoman Empire among the great powers.

As for the effects of the Concert of Europe, it served in the first two cases for the self-restraint of Russia. To this end, it functioned as a peace making body for the Ottoman Empire, despite not being counted among the great powers (Figure 3). However, when Russia refused to act in moderation, as was the case on the eve of the Crimean War, the workings of the Concert of Europe were replaced by balance-of-power politics. (Figure 2) It can be said that the Concert of Europe served to limit the war objectives of the allies, which is in agreement with the second hypothesis.

As long as France remained within the confines of the 1815 Settlements, concerted European action around an Anglo-French accord was the most likely form of the Concert of Europe in Ottoman-Russian relations. The clash of interests between Austria and Russia in the Balkans prevented the Holy Alliance from standing as a block against the Anglo-French accord in Ottoman-Russian relations, as was the case in the Crimean War. This hypothesis is confirmed by the second rebellion of the Viceroy of Egypt (1839)

and the events in the lead-up the Crimean War in 1854, but to a lesser extent in the second phase of the Greek revolt (1825–1829). This is partly because the Concert of Europe, rather than centring on an Anglo-French accord, was rather steered by an Anglo-Russian accord, with the lesser participation of France. An Anglo-French accord for the Concert of Europe with the participation of Austria would be much more compatible with the Ottoman interests, since the restraint of Russia would be greater than that of the Concert of Europe formed around an Anglo-Russian accord.

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MAPS

Map 1:

Source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/congress_vienna_1815.htm

Map 2: Greece in the 19th century

Source: From the book "History of the Greek Revolution" Volume 1, by George Finlay, 1861.

Map 3: Russia in Europe in the 19th Century

Source: From the Cambridge Modern History Atlas, 1912

Map 3: Russia in Europe in the 19th Century

Source: From the Cambridge Modern History Atlas, 1912

Map 4: Ottoman Empire

Source: http://gibaulthistory.wordpress.com/chapter-26/

Map 5: Egypt

Map 6: Crimea

Source: http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/crimean_war_1853.htm